Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century

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FIXING THE SPY MACHINE

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FIXING THE SPY MACHINE Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century

Arthur S. Hulnick Foreword by Richard R. Valcourt

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hulnick, Arthur, 1935Fixing the spy machine : preparing American intelligence for the twenty-first century / Arthur S. Hulnick ; foreword by Richard R. Valcourt p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-96652-6 (alk. paper).—ISBN 0-275-96653^ (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Intelligence service—United States. I. Title. JK468.I6H85 1999 327.1273—dc21 99-37523 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1999 by Arthur S. Hulnick All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 99-37523 ISBN: 0-275-96652-6 0-275-96653-i (pbk.) First published in 1999 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) asked the author to include the following statement in this book: CIA's Publications Review Board has reviewed the manuscript for this book to assist the author in eliminating classified information and poses no security objection to its publication. This review, however, should not be construed as official release of information, confirmation of its accuracy, or an endorsement of the author's views. In fact, the CIA's review was helpful and certainly not onerous. No other intelligence service seems to be as willing as the CIA to permit its former officers to write about intelligence matters.


For Eileen, Sandra and Larisa


Contents Foreword by Richard R. Valcourt Acknowledgments Acronyms

xi xvii xix

1

Is the Spy Machine Broken?

2

Stealing the Secrets

23

3

Puzzles and Mysteries

43

4

Secret Operations

63

5

Catching the Enemy's Spies

87

6

Stopping the Bad Guys

105

7

Managing and Controlling Secret Intelligence

129

8

Spying for Profit

151

9

Secret Intelligence and the Public

173

Fixing the Spy Machine

191

10

1

Bibliography

209

Index

217


Foreword Proposals to reform the U.S. intelligence community are not new. Congress and outside investigators have persistently urged that alterations be made in the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency since its inception in 1947 and to those of its sister agencies in the various years thereafter. Efforts at reform tend to run in cycles, increasing in intensity in the aftermath of the failure of a particularly unpopular covert action, or when an intelligence analysis has proven embarrassingly inaccurate. Internal reform efforts are generally more incremental than the broadscale suggestions offered by external forces. The bureaucracy appreciates its own accomplishments and naturally protects its members, as might be anticipated in any functioning organization, public or private. Even scholars are loathe to have their presumably closely-reasoned, informed assessments challenged. But internal commentary is often more astute than that offered by outsiders. Intimate knowledge of relevant intellectual and organizational processes takes a significant amount of time and effort, and those who have challenged any government agency's performance often soften their criticisms when given access to the decisionmakers and their rationale, or upon personal participation in an agency's ranks. Arthur S. Hulnick, a veteran of more than thirty-five years in the intelligence community, has had the benefit of learning the business from the ground up. Starting with his service in the U.S. Air Force and subsequent recruitment by the CIA, Mr. Hulnick served in both the analytical and clandestine branches of the Agency. Subsequently, he became an editor of the President's Daily Brief and Coordinator of Academic Affairs in the CIA's Office of Public Affairs. He also served as Chairman of the Director of Central Intelligence's Management Advisory Group. As an Agency spokesman, Mr. Hulnick embarked upon an extensive

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Foreword

speaking tour of U.S. colleges and universities, writing and speaking about the CIA and its role in the intelligence community. Explaining the world of intelligence to generally skeptical audiences, he won numerous friends by advocating greater Agency openness and easier access to its noncritical documents, so as to allow a deeper public understanding of the real work of intelligence officers. Yet, to date, the CIA remains substantially unable to adequately explain itself to the public. Late in his Agency career, Mr. Hulnick became a CIA officer-inresidence at Boston University, teaching about the intelligence profession and its role in the policymaking process. Subsequent to his retirement from the Agency, he remained with the university, lecturing in its department of international relations. In conjunction with his teaching, Mr. Hulnick has participated consistently in the activities of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association and has long been a member of the editorial board of the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence. Over more than a dozen years, Mr. Hulnick's articles, reviews, and commentaries in numerous publications have addressed an assortment of vexingly difficult intelligence issues, some of which are revisited in Fixing the Spy Machine. In the pages of the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence and elsewhere, he has written, naturally, about the Agency's often controversial and contentious relationship with academia, indicating that it should be a symbiosis not a psychosis; dealt with the difficulty of obtaining information about intelligence and advocating greater openness to facilitate scholarly research and greater public understanding and appreciation; discussed the "uneasy relationship" between intelligence and private industry; wondered about the effectiveness of contemporary counterlntelligence efforts while examining the cause and effects of the Aldrich Ames case; differentiated between intelligence officers and police officers, indicating that "spies are not cops"; questioned the future of covert action; and examined the possibilities for intelligence cooperation in the post-Cold War era. On the Agency's internal operations, Mr. Hulnick has studied techniques for managing the CIA's analysis process and speculated on methods for determining U.S. intelligence policy. He has reviewed books dealing with the federal government's long-standing reliance, dating to President George Washington's days, on various forms of intelligence, military and political, and on the delicate balance that must be maintained by the American intelligence community in a world essentially hostile to its operations. Fixing the Spy Machine is Mr. Hulnick's first book. Taking his previous writings several steps further, this volume is a scholarly, yet easily understandable treatise on numerous reorganization proposals from legislators and special commissions in the past several years. Rather than dwelling at

Foreword

xiii

length on the intense criticisms of the past quarter century, dating back to the upheavals of the early 1970s when the Seymour Hersh articles in The New York Times and the Select Senate and House Committees conducted hearings that brought the intelligence community to its figurative knees, Mr. Hulnick looks at more recent reorganization efforts and applies them to the contemporary CIA and its sister agencies. For instance, he notes that a major impediment to achieving a more beneficial relationship between intelligence producers and consumers is the decisionmakers' preference for "top secret" information rather than material collected mainly from open sources. He deplores the relative lack of appreciation for the work of intelligence analysts and the frequent downplaying of their contribution to overall policymaking in government. Mr. Hulnick also questions the financial balance of intercept intelligence, noting the difficulty of determining the effectiveness of this very expensive process. Technology can go only so far, or as he puts it, "Spy cameras are not much use without the spy." Much is requested from the intelligence community, but, as Mr. Hulnick points out, intelligence can't predict the future, it can offer only a weighted judgment about the likely course of events. Arthur Hulnick's assessment of the wide discrepancy in power between the titular head of the intelligence community, the director of central intelligence, and its actual head, the secretary of defense, is noteworthy. Most media attention focuses on the DCI because of his statutory position as both coordinator of the overall intelligence apparatus and director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But the DCI controls little more than 10 percent of the intelligence budget; most of the remainder is under the jurisdiction of the defense secretary through his direct line of supervision over the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the new Measurements and Signatures Intelligence Office. Smaller pieces of the intelligence budget are held by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Commerce, the State Department (through its Bureau of Information and Research), and the Treasury Department. This huge budgetary imbalance is the foundation for considerable bureaucratic struggle within the intelligence community and confusion in the outside world among those unfamiliar with the internal financial and organizational struggles. Intelligence is now part of the corporate world. Many nations encourage considerable collaboration between their intelligence apparatuses and the business and corporate sectors. The United States has so far refrained from developing such a symbiosis, believing in the separation of government and the private sector, at least in these matters. Furthermore, most intelligence professionals consider themselves public servants, working on behalf of the general welfare of the nation and not as paid snoops for private

xiv

Foreword

companies. And, as Mr. Hulnick points out, U.S. firms have not been overeager to get help from the CIA. The American economy is relatively free of nationally sponsored corporations, and the intensive competition among companies makes each of them wary of individual assistance from a government unit. A significant number of former intelligence professionals have joined firms specializing in political risk analysis and business intelligence, but practitioners in those firms realize that private espionage is theft, and those caught participating in stealing business secrets often incur a criminal liability. In the espionage business, the "spies" ("agents") are generally foreign nationals working in their home country on behalf of the United States or another intelligence service. The CIA personnel are called "case officers." Their job is to recruit, train, "task," and debrief the agents and send the collected information back to CIA headquarters in Virginia. The case officer's job is difficult, for he/she must carefully evaluate any potential agent lest the United States's presence in a country be jeopardized or compromised. The officer's own life is occasionally at stake, as is that of the prospective recruit. Mr. Hulnick points out that human agents are often more valuable than sophisticated and expensive technological devices because a person can communicate and interpret in ways no machine can. The CIA's Clandestine Service case officers must often do business with "evil people," individuals with whom they would seldom otherwise associate. Such relationships are a negative, yet essential, part of the intelligence/espionage business. The CIA is aware that relationships with "evil people" involve considerable danger, ranging from identity disclosure to torture or even death. The worldwide reputation of the United States is also at stake. In my article "Controlling U.S. Hired Hands" (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 163-178), I pointed out that these undesirable types frequently control the legitimate agencies of government in their homelands and hold their nations' seats in the United Nations while participating extensively in international diplomatic circles. Therefore, both diplomats and intelligence officers are compelled to interact with them. Given generally accepted U.S. political, social, and ethical mores, these relationships must become more discrete over time. The question is often raised as to whether secret ("covert") action is necessary and whether the Clandestine Service should be separated from the CIA and, perhaps, attached to the military. This debate, intermittently waged for over five decades, has been consistently resolved in favor of the Agency's retention of both paramilitary and covert functions. Covert action is not strictly an intelligence matter, according to the author, who suggests that the relationship between the operations directors and the analytical branch be closer, particularly among the top people.

Foreword

xv

Mr. Hulnick also recommends the establishment of a Covert Action Coordination Center and that any operation undertaken have a realistic chance of success and be considered reasonable by the public should it be disclosed prematurely or result in failure. The author suggests an enhanced recruitment effort among the best and brightest college and university graduates as the best method of developing highly qualified and motivated intelligence officers at all levels and in all directorates—from analysts, to case officers, to administrative personnel. He advocates a partial return to the "old school" network, whereby sympathetic college professors encourage their most promising students to consider an intelligence career. Intelligence courses, now being offered at more than one hundred U.S. institutions of higher learning, are routinely over-subscribed. Not everyone taking these classes is a suitable candidate for an intelligence career, but several among them might show enough talent to be considered. The Agency also faces the challenge of developing a better system of training and retaining these new officers after recruitment so that they can function as a permanent cadre of professionals for two or three decades, thereby constituting both experienced staff and institutional memory. The widespread belief that the intelligence community no longer has a primary function a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire is easily dispelled. In July 1999 Russia's then-prime minister, Sergei V. Stepashin, a former director of that country's security apparatus, told reporters at the National Press Club in Washington that "[a]s long as states exist, there will always be special services, intelligence communities." But, according to The New York Times, "he added that such ungentlemanly pursuits should not stand in the way of 'partnerlike' relations between the two countries" (July 28, 1999, p. A8). The continuity of intelligence agencies being virtually guaranteed, Arthur S. Hulnick's Fixing the Spy Machine is not merely a valuable addition to the literature on intelligence. It is a blueprint for improving the intelligence community of the United States, not by dramatically taking it apart and building anew, but by acknowledging its accomplishments over a half-century, incorporating better internal and external communication, balancing investment costs and anticipated results, and finetuning every member agency's components for greater efficiency and accuracy. Given his four decades of experience as a professional intelligence officer and scholar, Mr. Hulnick's instructions, akin to those of a master mechanic or technician, should be followed as directed. Richard R. Valcourt Editor-in-Chief International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence


Acknowledgments As usual in works of this sort, I owe a debt of gratitude to many people who helped me and encouraged me in writing this book. Special thanks go to Deborah and Richard Valcourt of New York City because it was over a lovely dinner at one of Richard's favorite Manhattan restaurants that the two of them first kindled the idea of writing this book, pushed me to come up with a plan for it and even a title. Thanks also to Richard for finding a publisher and preparing the foreword. As managing editor and later editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, Richard has published a number of my articles, thus laying the groundwork for this book. My wife Eileen and my daughter Sandra were helpful in providing patient but consistent support whenever my enthusiasm for the project waned, but it was my younger daughter Larisa who gave me specific help in editing the original manuscript, questioning my occasionally vague writing, and providing useful suggestions over the two years it took to get this book done. My graduate assistant during the last year of the project, Lisa Sasson, helped me track down some of the source materials I needed and helped me put the bibliography together. I was able to obtain other useful data from the electronic notes sent out by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), an organization of which I am an active member. I am grateful to the folks at Greenwood Publishing for deciding to publish the book, especially Dr. Heather Ruland Staines, the history editor, who first took an interest in the manuscript, and the others, some of whom I don't know, who prepared the copy and readied the book for printing, including Nicole Cournoyer and Bridget Austiguy-Preschel. My former colleagues at the Central Intelligence Agency have helped

xviii

Acknowledgments

me over the years in staying current on the world and profession of intelligence. Thanks go to the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which has taken over the job of providing unclassified materials to me and hundreds of other academics who teach or write about intelligence matters, and to the Public Affairs Staff which sends out useful information to those of us who are now or who were CIA Officers-in-Residence on college campuses around the country. I am especially grateful to the Publications Review Board at the CIA for their prompt review of this work and the other articles I have written. They have never been arbitrary or capricious in asking for the very few revisions and deletions they have requested over the years. Finally, I wish to thank my colleagues in the Department of International Relations at Boston University who welcomed me when I first arrived on campus in 1989, defended me against the skeptics who wondered about the propriety of having a CIA "agent" in the classroom, and questioned the validity of intelligence as an academic subject. The popularity of the courses and the spreading interest in studying the arcane world of intelligence seem to have silenced the critics.

Acronyms AFIO

Association of Former Intelligence Officers

ANSIR

FBI security awareness network

ASIS

American Society for Industrial Security

CA

covert action

CFI

Committee on Foreign Intelligence

CI

counterlntelligence; also competitive intelligence

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CMS

Community Management Staff

CNC CNN

Counter Narcotics Center

COMINT

communications intelligence

CTC

Counter Terrorism Center

DCI

director of central intelligence

DDI

deputy director for intelligence

DEA

Drug Enforcement Administration

DGI

Cuban intelligence service

DGSE

French intelligence service

DI

Directorate of Intelligence

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DMI

director of military intelligence

Cable News Network

DNI

director of national intelligence

DO

Directorate of Operations

DOD

Department of Defense

xx

Acronyms

ELINT

electronic intelligence

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBIS

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

GOC

global organized crime

GRU

Soviet-Russian military intelligence service

HPSCI

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

HUMINT

human intelligence

IC

Intelligence Community

IG

inspector general

INR

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State Dept.)

IOB

Intelligence Oversight Board

KGB

Soviet intelligence service

MASINT

measurements and signatures intelligence

MI-5

British internal security service

MI-6

British secret intelligence service

NACIC

National Counterlntelligence Center

NFIB

National Foreign Intelligence Board

NIC

National Intelligence Council

NIE

National Intelligence Estimate

NIMA

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NIO

national intelligence officer

NPIC

National Photographic Intelligence Center

NRO

National Reconnaissance Office

NSA

National Security Agency

NTM

National Technical Means

OSINT

open source intelligence

OSS

Office of Strategic Services

PCI

Italian communist party

PDB

President's Daily Brief

PFIAB

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PHOTINT photographic intelligence R&A

research and analysis

SCIP

Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals

SIGINT

signals intelligence

SIS

Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6)

Acronyms SSCI

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

SVR

Russian intelligence service

UN

United Nations

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

xxi


CHAPTER 1

Is the Spy Machine Broken? America's intelligence system is at a crossroads. As we approach the twenty-first century, many questions are being raised about a system that is now more than fifty years old. The roots of this system lie in the conflagrations of World War II. The system's founding fathers included such luminaries as "Wild Bill" Donovan, the commander of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). American intelligence rang up many victories in World War II. It captured German and Japanese spies, ran agents into occupied Europe and Asia, broke enemy codes, and carried out spectacular feats of aerial reconnaissance. During the Cold War American intelligence repeatedly forecast, with considerable accuracy, the plans and intentions of the Soviet Union and its associated states while repeatedly thwarting the operations of its "main enemy," the Soviet KGB intelligence apparatus. Today America's intelligence system is, by any measure, the largest and most expensive intelligence bureaucracy in the Western world—perhaps the largest anywhere on the planet. But it's in serious trouble. Despite myriad successes over the past half century as America's first line of defense in shooting wars and Cold War confrontations, many observers of American intelligence believe the system is seriously flawed and that America's "Spy Machine" needs a major overhaul. These days people who think at all about American intelligence remember its failures rather than its victories. Starting with Pearl Harbor and the invasion of South Korea by the North, up to modern times and Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait, American intelligence does not seem to do what it was designed for: preventing surprise. Covert action failures also remain in memory, from the failed Bay of Pigs invasion to

2


the attempted overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile. And who could forget the debacle of Aldrich Ames, the Soviet mole inside CIA headquarters? For many years the CIA ran a film for newly hired employees that pointed out that while the CIA's failures often became known, its successes had to remain hidden. At the time this was not a big issue for those of us who toiled inside the CIA because we understood that by hiding our victories, we stood a very good chance of repeating them. If our adversaries knew that our sister agency, the National Security Agency (NSA), was reading their codes, they would change them. If the enemy knew that we had recruited agents inside their walls, they might find them and execute them or turn them against us. If they could tell how good our photo reconnaissance was, they might hide the very weapons or activities we were capable of seeing. We never thought about the drawback of hiding success. Is Failure Inevitable? As American intelligence failures became known, they caused serious problems. Failure is inevitable in intelligence. It is not always possible to forecast the future, or measure a hidden weapons system, or stop a determined terrorist, or find a "mole," an undercover spy inside the intelligence system. Human judgment sometimes results in faulty analysis, poor decisions, or bad policy. In intelligence operations, where an adversary is working in secret to discredit the intelligence system, as happened in the Cold War, the enemy may circulate false stories, or disinformation, to those quite willing to believe that their own intelligence agencies are flawed. The result of all this is that the American people, to the extent that they pay attention to such things, and even those who are close observers of American intelligence, in the media, in academe, and in government, may have a faulty perception of the successes and failures of the intelligence system. This does not mean that the American people are opposed to having good intelligence. All it takes is a bombing in Saudi Arabia or Oklahoma City to provoke an outcry for more intelligence. As General Vernon Walters once said, when the American people feel threatened, they want intelligence to work for them. He added that they soon lose interest when the threat is over.1 Misunderstanding of intelligence is further complicated by the growth of a great body of literature, films, and television over the past fifty years devoted to spy fiction and espionage drama. People think they know about the CIA because they've seen James Bond movies or read Tom Clancy novels. In one absurd incident, students at a prominent eastern


3

college reportedly protested the appearance of a CIA recruiter after they had seen a fictional movie portraying CIA involvement in the assassination of a U.S. president. Examining the System How can we examine a system that is cloaked in secrecy? In fact, it is not so difficult. For the careful observer, America's intelligence system is the most open in the world. This was not always the case. In its early years the system followed the British style and tried to keep everything secret. Malcolm Muggeridge, the British author and wit, who served in British intelligence in World War II, once observed that secrecy in intelligence was akin to vestments in church, creating an aura that is necessary for the process. In America's free society, however, maintaining secrecy was not so easy. After a series of revelations in the press about the evils of American intelligence, a host of "tell all" books by former intelligence officers, and the subsequent development of congressional oversight by legislators who had for years avoided close scrutiny of intelligence, many of the activities of the intelligence system became public. This new openness was reinforced when Admiral Stansfield Turner decided that the American public was paying large sums for the CIA and American intelligence and that they had a right to know more about where their money was going. Despite the objections of some old-timers in the Agency, Turner set up the Public Affairs Office, held press conferences, released previously classified material, and after leaving the CIA wrote his own book about intelligence. 2 His successors have been equally open. Despite having been nurtured in the OSS tradition, the late William Casey became a willing public speaker, and Bob Gates, director of central intelligence (DCI) under President George Bush, himself a former DCI, wrote a book about his experiences as well. 3 Coupled with press stories, growing academic interest in intelligence, and the open literature about it, we now have the opportunity to learn a great deal. In fact, studying American intelligence is a form of intelligence in itself. Just as the clever intelligence analyst pieces together small bits of data from a variety of sources, from agents, from space photos, and from a variety of open sources, so can we examine the Spy Machine. Admittedly, it helps that the author spent thirty-five years inside the system as a military intelligence officer and as a CIA official. As with all intelligence professionals, however, the author is sworn to keep the secrets he learned during his service and is required to submit his manuscripts, including this one, for review by the CIA. That a reader has access to this book at all suggests that the CIA had no objection to its publication, although the Agency may not like what it says. This is yet another rea-

4


son why American intelligence is unique. In some countries, the author might have quietly "disappeared." Reform Studies Perceptions of failure, concerns about cost and needless duplication among the various intelligence agencies, the psychological marker of the dawn of the twenty-first century, the end of the Cold War, the traditional friction between the Congress and the president, inept management, bloated bureaucracy—any of these might have led to an examination of the intelligence system. To have them come together all at once, however, made the examination inevitable. In 1995, at the urging of the Congress and with the agreement of the president, a study commission was established to make a careful review of American intelligence.4 The commission was to be bipartisan, have access to the entire system of intelligence agencies that make up the American Intelligence Community, and take testimony as it wished from practitioners, observers, and opponents of the system. At the same time the House of Representatives, through the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the oversight committee, undertook its own study. 5 It was not alone. The Twentieth Century Fund commissioned a task force on the "Future of U.S. Intelligence" and published the study in Washington, and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, a Georgetown University group, did the same. 6 The results of all these efforts appeared within months of each other in the first half of 1996. Interestingly, many of the same people made inputs, gave testimony, or wrote parts of all four studies. Their conclusions and recommendations, as one might expect, were similar, though with significant differences. Because of the enormous amount of material that went into the four, the studies provide even more information with which to study the Spy Machine. Of course, these studies were written and circulated, for the most part, "inside the Beltway," that is, within the narrow confines of the Washington governmental community that lies inside the ribbon of concrete surrounding our capital city. Whereas it did not take much effort to acquire these studies for someone in the know or for someone with good contacts in Washington, they did not receive much attention in the rest of the country. The really knowledgeable could find the studies on the Internet, but most people have probably never seen them. Nonetheless, for the careful intelligence watcher, the studies are extremely useful.


5

Is It Broken? Now we can begin to analyze the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. Is the Spy Machine broken? As in most exercises of this nature, the answer is a mixed one. In some respects, American intelligence is without peer in the world; in others, it is less successful. It is not nearly as incompetent as some charge, but there are many areas where repair seems appropriate. Although certainly not the evil "secret government" that its detractors fear, it has taken on some operations where it should probably have said an emphatic no. Probably much larger than it needs to be, the Spy Machine is certainly a confusing conglomerate of agencies strung together through weak ties and in some cases weak leadership. It has, over time, been penetrated by the enemy, though not as often as one might expect. Its successes outweigh its failures, but its mistakes have been costly. What is intelligence anyway? We need to define intelligence if we are going to examine it, and we have many definitions from which to choose. Some say that intelligence is information about a nation's adversaries, enemies, or competitors or about threats to national security. Others argue that intelligence is information designed to assist policy officials in formulating strategies or reaching decisions. Both positions are correct. Intelligence is also the business of stopping others from stealing national secrets, plans, or policies; from penetrating the government; and from carrying out terrorism. It can include anti-subversive activity, although the United States has rarely suffered from real internal subversion; or it can be used to combat narcotics flows and organized crime. Finally, intelligence can include secret operations designed to carry out national policy by surreptitious methods, or in modern terms covert action. Intelligence can also be studied in terms of functions. These activities can be divided in a variety of ways. There is strategic intelligence that operates at the national level to support the president and his policymakers, and there is tactical intelligence for military operations. Intelligence includes collection operations for gathering information, research and analysis to make sense out of the gathered data, counterlntelligence to stop others from doing to you what you are doing to them, covert action, and intelligence management and control. All these functions will figure in our examination. The Intelligence Process We begin with the general nature of the intelligence process. In almost all schools that teach about intelligence to practitioners—in the military

6


or the CIA—the concept of the intelligence cycle is widely studied. 7 This cycle begins with requirements from policy officials, which leads in turn to collection, analysis, circulation of reports, and decision making. This is not a particularly accurate or useful explanation of the process generally, but since it is so widely taught, it cannot very well be ignored. The concept nonetheless gives a distorted picture of how intelligence really works. First, policy officials rarely provide intelligence requirements for collection of data. Their questions, to the extent that they ask them at all, are far too general to guide the gathering of information. Usually requirements for collection come from within the system, since intelligence professionals know best what information they are missing. Policy officials might give some sense of priorities, but again, they rarely do so. This forces intelligence collectors to rely on their own reading of what's going on at the top. In the military, this process is a bit more orderly. Military commanders do provide guidance for tactical collectors, espcially at the combat level. Second, collectors cannot always afford to wait for guidance in gathering data. Sometimes they have to anticipate what will be needed and grab information as they can get it. This is especially true in dealing with human sources or in some forms of technical collection. Third, analysts cannot always wait for data to be collected in order to deal with a fast-breaking issue or problem. Usually analysts have built a large database and can deal with most subjects using incremental bits of new data as they get them. The circulation of reports to consumers—decisionmakers, military commanders, policy staffers, or intelligence users—is hardly as automatic as the intelligence cycle depicts. In fact, getting intelligence to those who need it is a major problem for intelligence managers. Ensuring that the right people receive the information they need or should have, in a useful format and on a timely basis, is the "end game" in intelligence, and when it is played poorly, the entire system suffers. History tells us that intelligence failure can often occur at this point in the intelligence process. Last, we know from surveys, interviews, and experience that decisions are rarely made on the basis of intelligence alone. Although intelligence may be a crucial part of policy formulation, or in carrying out policy, it is rarely decisive on its own. Where this has happened, it has usually been in time of war, such as at the Battle of Midway in World War II in the Pacific, when Admiral Chester Nimitz trusted his intelligence analysts, who had broken the Japanese code, to tell him where to fight the Japanese carrier fleet.


7

Understanding the Process We also know from surveys and from listening to intelligence consumers that they do not understand the process or the product very well. After a terrorist bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, Defense Secretary William Perry was heard to remark that he took no action on intelligence reports because they were "inconclusive." 8 What did he expect? Intelligence is almost always less than perfect in that respect; it is not fact or truth but judgments based usually on partial evidence, incomplete data, bits and pieces. Intelligence managers have never been very good at educating consumers about what to expect from intelligence. Unless the consumer has been a part of the system, he or she is likely to know the same halftruths about intelligence as the man in the street. In other words, not much. When he was director of intelligence, former DCI Bob Gates created a handbook for consumers to try to inform them about the system, but because the text was Top Secret and therefore protected by further restrictions, few consumers actually had access to it. Even though the intelligence cycle is a poor depiction of the intelligence process, it gives us a place to start in further defining and describing how intelligence works. We can begin with the collection process, which breaks down into three major categories: open source collection, technical collection, and human source collection, which usually means espionage. Surprisingly, the vast majority of the data collected by intelligence is from open sources. This doesn't sound very exciting, but it has proven to be extremely useful, effective, and relatively cheap. Open sources—press reports, TV and radio broadcasts, governmental reporting, and these days the Internet—can all provide a surprising amount of information at relatively low cost.

O p e n Sources During the Cold War we could learn a great deal about our adversaries, even in countries where our diplomats were carefully restricted in their travels or where there was no U.S. presence at all, from their radio and TV broadcasts or from publications we could obtain. We learned about Soviet military strategy from the writings of their generals, and we could tell what was going on in the Kremlin just from the way the Soviet leaders arranged themselves on the top of Lenin's Tomb for parades. We could interpret Cuban policy by careful "content analysis" of

8


Fidel Castro's endless speeches, and we could interpret China's activities from statements by the New China News Agency. Open source intelligence is hardly the stuff of spy movies. Yet some intelligence veterans in Washington have been pushing the system to place even more reliance on open sources. The Intelligence Community has responded by appointing an open source coordinator; but unfortunately, when budget cuts have had to be made, such open source organizations as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which has been translating and publishing media reports for more than fifty years, take the brunt of the reductions. FBIS is a component of the CIA, and in spite of some antipathy toward the CIA on many college campuses, academics have welcomed their translations and subscribed to FBIS publications for many years. Open sources may make up as much as 80 percent of the database on any given subject or country, though in dealing with a closed society such as in North Korea, it may be much less. One of the problems involved in using open sources is that they are unclassified—not secret— and thus the analysis derived from such sources is not supposed to be secret either. When an analyst combines open source information with secret sources, the resulting analysis may be classified at the level of the most sensitive source. Policy officials are rarely interested in unclassified analysis. They see it as no better than the New York Times. When the analysis has "Secret" or "Top Secret" stamped on it, however, it has a cachet. Only cleared people can have such information, so policy officials are more interested in paying attention to it. Thus, the clever analyst soon learns that if he or she wants the attention of the policy community, it is important to find secret material to use in drawing the analysis, even if the bulk of the information comes from open sources.

Technical Sensors Technical collection, using sophisticated electronic sensors, provides an increasing amount of information in intelligence. Although the techniques date back to before World War I, modern systems have become increasingly sophisticated in design and capability. Breaking of codes and ciphers is an ancient practice; indeed, the first codes may have been used by Alexander the Great. 9 Evidence of code breaking can be found in the American Revolution and in our Civil War, and similar practices were used at the same time in Europe. In World War I the British successfully broke German ciphers, leading to the famous Zimmermann Telegram incident in which a German offer of an alliance with Mexico


9

was intercepted and deciphered by British intelligence, helping in part to push America's entry into the war. 10 In World War II a combined group of British, French, and Polish intelligence officers managed to decipher transmissions from the supposedly unbreakable Enigma system. The Germans never found out that their transmissions were being read by their enemies. At the same time U.S. Navy code-breakers derived ways to read Japanese diplomatic and military communications traffic. To protect these intelligence successes, special handling was required for all those with access to the deciphered material, and special Top Secret "compartments" were created to limit distribution of the reports. This is the system that American intelligence still uses. When NSA, the National Security Agency, was established in the 1950s to centralize communication and signals intelligence taken from intercepted foreign transmissions, it was cloaked in secrecy. Later, insiders claimed that NSA really stood for "No Such Agency" or "Never Say Anything." Even now, when its mission and activities and even the location of its facilities are relatively well known, NSA remains the most secretive of all America's intelligence services. Nonetheless, NSA has established a small museum to herald its exploits and has begun to advertise its location and even to sell souvenirs. Communications intelligence, or COMINT, and its related discipline of electronic intelligence (ELINT) rarely come in for criticism. Yet, Americans were disturbed after the Vietnam War to discover that NSA resources had been used to gather information about American citizens involved in anti-war protests in violation of regulations established to prevent such abuse. Since those revelations there has been no further evidence of misuse of the intercept system, but there are those who still fear the possibility that their civil rights might be violated by such a system. It is difficult to measure the utility of intercept intelligence. In the author's experience intelligence derived from intercepts tends to be fragmentary and of limited use. Nonetheless, others consider such systems to be valuable. Because COMINT and ELINT require satellites for much of the intercept work, the process has turned out to be very expensive. Also, because so much of such intelligence is still considered Top Secret and is tightly compartmented, few outside observers can tell much about its effectiveness. In fact, former CIA director Admiral Turner tried to write about it in his book Secrecy and Democracy, but his unclassified draft was allegedly returned stamped "Top Secret." He protested to no avail.

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Photo Intelligence The same protections were given to American photo reconnaissance in its early post-World War II days. Actually, photo reconnaissance dates back to the American Civil War when intrepid "intelligencers" lugged heavy plate cameras onto hot air balloons to capture photos of the enemy. 11 Both sides used balloons, but not until the invention of the airplane did photo observation really became practical. In World War I, hand-held cameras were soon replaced by photo apparatus specifically designed to be mounted in the flimsy aircraft of those days, and by World War II the business of taking photos from high altitude and interpreting them had become quite advanced. The photos were used for targeting, bomb damage assessment, and other forms of intelligence gathering. Although no one was paying much attention, photos taken over Auschwitz revealed clear evidence of Nazi death camps. 12 When the Cold War began and Soviet-controlled territory became closed to the West, attempts were made to take photos from the periphery of the Iron Curtain using converted bombers. Many planes returned from such missions full of bullet holes, and some did not return at all. In order to learn about Communist military capability, a better system was needed, and so the high-flying U-2 was built, a joint project of the U.S. Air Force, the CIA, and Lockheed. It was enormously successful. Flying at over 70,000 feet, the U-2 was immune at first to Soviet attempts to bring it down. Eventually the Soviets managed to bring down Francis Gary Powers, and the exploits of the U-2 became known. Nevertheless, the U-2 remained a very effective weapon in the American intelligence arsenal, and more than forty years after it first flew, it is still gathering intelligence for America and its allies. The follow-on aircraft, the SR-71, ironically called "Oxcart" when it was first built, was an even more capable airplane. It could fly at Mach 3, three times the speed of sound, fast enough to outrun enemy missiles. It could fly higher than the U-2, though with more limited range. It was too expensive to operate, however, and was eventually taken out of service despite sporadic efforts to keep it flying. When one SR-71 was sent to Dulles Airport from Los Angeles to become part of a planned air museum, it made the trip in sixty-eight minutes. Today photo reconaissance has changed. A great deal of emphasis has shifted from supersonic aircraft to unmanned aircraft, some no larger than model airplanes. They are relatively inexpensive, are expendable, and can stay over targets for more than twenty-four hours in some cases. They are flexible and can be targeted by field commanders rather than by a remote headquarters in Washington. The other great change in overhead photography came with the de-


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velopment of satellites. During the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other nations, developed space systems for photography. At first these systems relied on the return of camera film from space, but the resulting photos were not timely and were sometimes lost in returning from space. Later systems used digital imagery to beam pictures back to Earth in "real time," that is, soon after the image was captured by the space camera. They provided incredible detail from more than 150 miles over Earth. At first the resulting imagery was considered Top Secret and was protected by the same compartmented controls used to protect communications intercepts. Lately the controls have been loosened and the classification lowered. Nonetheless, the ability of the photo systems remains protected. Some observers have written that the cameras can "read license plates from space." Why anyone would want to see such a thing, or how it would be managed, considering that the images are usually taken from directly over the target, is difficult to conceive. No one argues about the value or utility of overhead reconnaissance. Although space-based reconnaissance may not be as useful as photo imagery from aircraft as far as the tactical military commander is concerned, it has many other uses. It can be used to keep an eye on potential adversaries to prevent surprise attack. It can be targeted against potential environmental disasters and against narcotics growers and shippers as well. Space-based reconnaissance is expensive, but modern technology has given the space "platforms" remarkably long life and capability. Few critics suggest that we stop using such techniques, but in any budget discussion, costly space reconnaissance systems are always on the table. Overlooked in all the hype about overhead reconnaissance is the utility and value of ground photography. Throughout the Cold War a regular and systematic effort using surreptitious methods was made to gather photos of intelligence targets. The history of the "spy camera," for example, parallels that of photography itself. As cameras became smaller, they were rouinely hidden in matchboxes, in cigarette cases, and even in buttons. They were used to photograph documents as well as other targets. Some of the spy cameras are still being manufactured today, and though early examples are prized by camera collectors, modern models can still prove useful. The spy camera is not of much use, however, without the spy.

Espionage Espionage is probably the oldest form of intelligence gathering. Biblical stories recount the deeds of spies, and Sun Tzu, writing four centuries before the birth of Christ, noted their value in his treatise on war.

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Recruiting a secret agent to penetrate the enemy's defenses is what many people think about when the term "intelligence" is used, and clearly, espionage has been a significant factor in American history. George Washington ran spy rings against the British, Thomas Jefferson understood the value of spies, James Madison employed them, and James Knox Polk defended against efforts by the Congress to reveal their identities.13 Spies were used by both sides in the American Civil War, and in World War II, espionage activity was incorporated in the OSS. Many of the original members of the CIA, founded in 1947, learned their espionage "tradecraft," as spy techniques are called, in the OSS and returned to the business when the Agency was created. Espionage, sometimes called HUMINT for "human intelligence," is still a controversial subject. Despite its role in the history of the United States, there are those who take the position, much like the British in the nineteenth century, that obtaining intelligence by clandestine methods is abhorrent. Modern critics have argued that espionage is a waste of time. This view was taken by jailed Soviet spy Aldrich Ames to justify his willingness to steal information from the CIA. Former State Department chief of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman has said that he thought foreign service officers were quite capable of collecting the material that the CIA's Clandestine Service normally gathers, and George Kennan, the architect of America's strategy during the Cold War, has said that clandestine intelligence collection is overrated. 14 The Department of Defense (DOD), however, thinks human intelligence is an important part of its data collection system and has established the Defense HUMINT Service to carry out espionage for DOD. Efforts to link the DOD system with the CIA's Directorate of Operations in early 1996 came to nothing, despite the recommendations of the study panels. Actually, the DOD espionage net and the CIA's Clandestine Service are after different targets. Defense is likely to use the system to obtain tactical military information, whereas the CIA will target political and economic data. This issue is worthy of further discussion later in this work. Puzzles and Mysteries Espionage is the stuff of spy novels. Intelligence analysis is something quite different. If you consider that the unknowns in the world are made up of secrets, puzzles, and mysteries, then intelligence ought to have a way to get at them. Intelligence collection operations ought to be able to unearth—or steal—the secrets. Intelligence analysis ought to be able to solve the puzzles and perhaps even divine the mysteries. Intelligence


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analysis is the most fascinating and yet the least understood or recognized part of the intelligence process. Intelligence collection systems produce what might be thought of as "raw" data. The information has not been evaluated or compared to intelligence already on hand. When an analyst evaluates the raw material and synthesizes judgments from it—either to solve the puzzle or to understand the mystery—then we have what some call "finished" intelligence. Others might call the result an intelligence product. We can understand this a bit better by looking at the different types of products intelligence creates. One major role of any intelligence service is to warn policymakers of impending crisis. Warning intelligence should alert decisionmakers early enough so that they can take action to stop or prevent the crisis or at least prepare themselves to react to it. In order to be able to warn of crisis, most intelligence services these days maintain twenty-four-houra-day crisis or operations centers, where all incoming material is reviewed and evaluated to make sure that no activity that might be potentially threatening is missed. The warning analyst is looking for anomalies or deviations from the norm, sometimes using "indicators" such as changes in communications patterns or increases in military movements to tell that something is up. For example, it is quite common to be able to detect a military overthrow of a government when normal commercial or governmental broadcasts switch from their regular programming to the playing of military march music. Today warning intelligence analysis is aided and abetted by the proliferation of all-day news services such as CNN, and most operations centers in the United States probably watch CNN for early warning. Current Intelligence A second product is the daily report, a heritage from military intelligence; for many years military commanders have expected to receive, first thing in the morning, an intelligence briefing to begin their day. President Truman was an early and eager recipient of an intelligence brief designed just for the White House, and the practice of issuing a daily brief has become a staple of CIA intelligence production. The same may be said for the other U.S. intelligence agencies as well, each with its own list of "subscribers." With the growth of secure on-line computer systems, the daily brief has become available electronically day and night and thus can be updated at a moment's notice. This process is usually referred to as current intelligence, and it takes up a good part of the work of intelligence analysts.

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Inevitably, current intelligence products are criticized because they are written by experts for non-experts—senior policy officials who are generalists rather than specialists. Consumers of intelligence who are area or functional specialists usually find daily reports lacking in specificity or detail and complain that the reports do not help them. Generalists, however, find them a good, quick update to supplement what they learn from the media. In fact, because of the efficiency of electronic distribution of raw intelligence reports to policy users, who receive them at about the same time as intelligence analysts, policy specialists find few surprises in the resulting daily intelligence products. The "value added" by intelligence experts in the daily briefs is in the judgments the analysts reach, untainted by policy considerations or political pressure. Intelligence analysts create a database out of raw intelligence by writing studies, memoranda, and other research products. Some of these may be circulated to interested users, others kept on the shelf until a need for them arises. When analysts share their research with other intelligence experts, they not only educate their colleagues but also create networks for sharing knowledge and ideas. Unfortunately, for many years intelligence analysts were pressed to send their research to policy officials, whether it was wanted or not. The resulting glut of rather lengthy intelligence research papers on policy desks led to a cheapening of the product, and much of the material went unread. Former DCI Bob Gates often noted that when he was director of intelligence analysis, his unit turned out more than 5,000 reports and papers a year. He never said who wanted them. We know from interviews, consumer surveys, and informal discussions that policy officials really want intelligence delivered only when they need it, and in a form they can use: a printed or electronic report, a video, or a briefing. Intelligence producers thought that as long as they were putting out an intelligence research paper, they might as well ship it to anyone who might conceivably have use for it. Modern desktop publishing techniques and electronic links make it much easier to deliver just-in-time intelligence only to those who really need it. A final category of product is the most controversial. These are forecasts of the future, usually referred to as intelligence estimates. They became a special category of intelligence analysis in World War II when OSS chief William Donovan created a board of "wise men" to write estimates for strategic planning. He dubbed the board his "College of Cardinals." 15 Later, in the CIA, this became the Board of National Estimates, and under DCI Bill Colby the estimates function was taken up by the newly created National Intelligence Council. The controversy surrounding intelligence estimates involves the fact that intelligence analysts cannot really predict the future. The British, who developed a similar system of estimates, believed that smart people


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given good data could do so. Experience, however, shows that the best that can be expected is to give policymakers insights into the future or weighted judgments about the likely course of events. In other words, intelligence can try to solve the puzzles or unearth the mysteries, but it can make no guarantees. This problem is still not well understood by those who wonder why we spend billions on intelligence if we cannot forecast the future. The entire issue of intelligence analysis was tackled by the various reform studies and is worth considerable discussion. Counterintelligence The business of counterintelligence (CI) is as old as intelligence collection. It makes sense that if one country is spying on another, the target country will want to stop its secrets from being stolen. This process is called counterespionage, one of several categories of activity that might be considered part of counterintelligence. Most countries in the modern era have counterintelligence and security services, and many of them have at least some form of police power. This is the case with America's domestic CI and security service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Of course, the FBI is primarily focused on fighting crime, but countering foreign espionage has always been part of its mandate. The founder of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, tried to keep the FBI in the forefront of American intelligence activity, and he fought long and hard against the growth of the OSS in World War II and the creation of the CIA in the post-war period. Through much of the Cold War, there was relatively little cooperation or even communication between the FBI and the CIA. After Hoover's death, these barriers began to break down. As the emphasis on countering terrorism has grown in the United States, more and more efforts have been made to bring the two agencies into a closer working relationship. In the aftermath of the Aldrich Ames spy case, the alleged failure of the CIA to give information to the FBI moved the Clinton administration to detail FBI agents to the CIA to help direct some CI activity. Foreign Spies Penetration of an intelligence organization by foreign spies is almost inevitable, and it is quite remarkable that American intelligence has so rarely fallen victim to a "mole." Nonetheless, when it has happened, it has caused enormous anguish both inside and outside the agencies concerned. It is easy to forget that foreign intelligence organizations, some friendly, some not so friendly, are working assiduously to get someone

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inside. More often, hostile intelligence services are able to turn an agem into a "double" and feed false information to the service that has been fooled. Today such activity has spread beyond government and has become part of the murky world of business intelligence and industrial espionage. Intelligence services have to work diligently to protect themselves against penetrations, moles, and double agents. In some countries, where respect for human and civil rights is not strong, a variety of tactics—phone taps, surveillance, or strong-armed interrogation—might be used against those suspected of working for the other side. In Western democracies, and especially in the United States, such draconian methods are carefully controlled. Thus, intelligence services in democracies have a double burden: They must protect themselves against hostile intelligence agencies and at the same time respect the rights of their own citizens. The United States has rarely had a serious problem with internal subversion despite the hysteria of the various "Red scares" that occurred after both world wars. In many countries, including America's close neighbor, Canada, internal subversion has been an important target for CI and security services.16 CI techniques have been used to combat the growing threat of terrorism, to work against narcotics flows, and increasingly to deal with global crime. Efforts to strengthen CI resources in the United States, usually in demand after a terrorist incident or a spy case, tend to be offset by fears of abuse. This was illustrated dramatically in the summer of 1996 when the Clinton administration, in the aftermath of the TWA Flight 800 crash, asked Congress for emergency legislation to fight terrorism. Civil libertarians protested plans to broaden FBI phone taps and special interest groups quickly rallied to fight chemical markers in gun powder. Covert Action Secret operations, called "covert action" in the United States and "active measures" in Russia, are not intelligence operations in the strict sense. They are not designed to gather or analyze information. Rather, they are used to carry out the foreign and security policy of the state using clandestine methods. They include various forms of psychological warfare, including deception and disinformation, the use of "agents of influence" for political or economic operations, support for guerrillas or irregular military forces, and in some countries assassination, terrorism, or sabotage. Despite a long history of such covert activity by the United States, the subject is one of continuing controversy. George Washington's use of covert action to combat the British is well documented, and the other Founding Fathers, including Jefferson and


17

Madison, were not opposed to such activity. In fact, running secret operations out of the White House became a tradition in the United States, involving many presidents up through Teddy Roosevelt. The IranContra affair and the involvement of White House officials in both the events and subsequent coverup would not have seemed strange to nineteenth-century presidents. During the Cold War the American CIA and the Soviet KGB both carried out covert action to support their respective governments. The United States said that it was forced to use such dirty tricks because the other side was so good at them. Thus, the CIA gained a reputation as a "secret government," allegedly overthrowing regimes it did not like, assassinating leaders it opposed, and supporting evil forces. The reputation was hardly deserved. When Senator Frank Church claimed that the CIA was a "rogue elephant running amok," his hearings into the subject proved that he was wrong. Nonetheless, the reputation of the CIA in regard to such activity never recovered. There are still those who believe that the CIA is in league with the devil, or at least is doing business with the devil's associates. It is not surprising that questions about covert action were raised in the various studies on American intelligence. Yet, none of them suggested that the United States should give up on covert action as a potential tool against the bad guys. The studies reiterated that covert action may prove useful when military action is too strong and where diplomacy seems ineffective. Covert action is a "third option" for policymakers. 17 Most intelligence watchers agree that covert action needs to be carefully controlled, and so the United States has the most stringent restrictions on covert action of any nation. No president has ever said that he would be opposed to the use of covert action, and all modern presidents have authorized its use at some point in their tenure. Managing Intelligence Controlling and managing intelligence is hardly the subject of spy fiction. Yet, the various studies undertaken during 1995-96 focused a great deal of attention on management and control issues, and this was true as well of the studies of the intelligence system carried out in previous administrations. Whereas management and control issues are of little interest to the general public, they are the very lifeblood of Washington bureaucrats. "Turf issues," as they are called—who controls what functions—are critical in Washington because they mean power, personnel, and resources and thus rank and importance. Budget matters are equally critical to the Beltway insider. Money is power in Washington, and this is true in most areas of government, not

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just in intelligence. But in intelligence, turf and budget issues are more difficult to see because of the secrecy that surrounds so much of the intelligence business. In fact, a great deal of discussion in the recent survey panels was devoted just to the question of whether or not to make public the total amount of money spent on intelligence each year, as if no one in Washington knew what the number was. Thanks to leaks to the press, a common policy tool in Washington, the budgeted amount spent on intelligence has been general knowledge for years. The breakdown of the budget—how much of the pie each agency receives—was also leaked, and so it is relatively easy to calculate the percentage breakdown for future budgets. The Intelligence Community argues, by the way, that the number is still secret because it has never been officially confirmed. Can something be secret if everyone knows it? The problem of secrecy, keeping secrets, and who can determine what should be secret is in itself a subject worth examination. One enterprising reporter tried to find out not long ago the date of America's oldest secret and found one in the Pentagon (called the "Five-sided Puzzle Palace" by some) that dated back to World War I.18 Apparently no one had ever bothered to "declassify" the document, which related to the shipment of American troops to Europe. The DCI A great deal of controversy surrounds the role of the DCI, the director of central intelligence. Although this person is supposed to be the coordinator of all American intelligence activity and the intelligence advisor to the president, the DCI really has control only over the CIA, a significant but small part of the overall intelligence bureaucracy. When the position of DCI was created in 1946, there was no CIA; but when the Agency was established in 1947, the DCI became its leader. Most of America's intelligence resources belong to the Department of Defense, and most of the money spent on intelligence is controlled by the Pentagon. Smaller intelligence units exist in other departments, including the State Department, Treasury, and Energy and Justice, but they are "small potatoes" compared to DOD. The FBI, or at least its intelligence components, are part of the Intelligence Community, the conglomerate intelligence establishment, although J. Edgar Hoover fought to keep the FBI independent of any outside interference. As one might expect in Washington, the role of the DCI, the extent of the DCI's control, the resources, and the budget issues all received serious attention in the various intelligence studies. These issues are worth


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careful study from an outside-the-Beltway perspective. After the official study commission report was published, efforts were made to make changes in the intelligence bureaucracy as the study had recommended, but these initial steps were quickly quashed because of "turf" issues. Control is also a matter of serious concern. Who does control American intelligence? It seems clear that it is not always the DCI. Is it the president? The Founding Fathers were very specific in deciding that intelligence was an executive function and should be controlled by the president. This was argued in the Federalist Papers and in constitutional debate and has been the general practice since 1790. Efforts by Congress to challenge the president's preeminent role in intelligence have been consistently rejected. Yet it remains the subject of discussion. Any student of management who looks carefully at the conglomerate American Intelligence Community would certainly conclude that it ought to be realigned. There are nine major agencies plus a host of minor units, a chief executive with no control over most of these units, and a budget process that can only be called byzantine. Likely, this system could be "right-sized" and duplication cut back. But this is very difficult in Washington, where turf and money are so critical. The problem, then, is not only proposing changes to the Intelligence Community but also figuring how to make the changes actually happen. Management is an internal issue in intelligence, complicated not only by secrecy but also by what is termed "compartmentation," allowing intelligence employees to have access only to those secrets they need to know to do their jobs. In theory, by compartmenting secrets, no single individual can learn enough to give away everything, even if he or she should choose to do so. The result is an intelligence bureaucracy in which many do not know all that they should and are too intimidated to find out. It seems clear that an individual who really does want to get around secrecy and compartmentation, and Soviet spy Aldrich Ames or Israeli agent Jonathan Pollard are good examples, can get whatever he or she wants. Management Issues Intelligence agencies, as large bureaucracies, have the same problems as any large organization. They have to manage their people and resources, communicate with each other, and handle problems of medical care, insurance, and even such mundane things as parking for their employees. All of this becomes more difficult when the employees' identities are hidden to allow them to work in secret. A substantial number of CIA employees are "under cover" to allow them to work abroad with-

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out becoming targets and to protect their contacts and activities. Some maintain this cover even in the United States, and this means that their ties to the CIA have to be protected. Obviously, they cannot have insurance or tax forms or bank accounts that identify them as CIA employees. This forces the creation of yet another layer of bureaucracy. Over the years, as America's intelligence agencies have grown, they have become increasingly bureaucratic. Several of them occupy buildings spread around Washington and its suburbs, and they always seem to outstrip their resources. During the Reagan administration, for example, the CIA was able to double the size of its headquarters, only to find that it could not shoehorn in all its employees when the building was finished. The formerly Top Secret National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) created a real stink when it was revealed that its new headquarters had been built in secret and that it was four times as large as the agency that was to go in it. American intelligence agencies have traditionally hired their new employees by seeking the best and the brightest from the nation's top universities and colleges. They no longer recruit in the traditional sense, however, but merely invite graduates to apply. In the "good old days" spotters on campus were able to seek out good students and convince them to apply. This means that some graduates who might have been effective intelligence officers have never been tapped. Further, the system tends to try to bring new people in at the lowest level and allow them to advance through the ranks. It is far less successful at bringing in people at middle grades, even though they might have acquired skills the system could use. One study took particular aim at the training American intelligence professionals receive in preparation for their work. Each agency tends to run its own training programs, in its own style, emphasizing its own values. The result is an intelligence system in which values and culture differ remarkably. Within disciplines, training varies as well. Thus, CIA officers entering the Clandestine Service, as the Operations Directorate is known, receive much different preparation than those who go into analysis or administration. The result has been the creation of a fraternal atmosphere among those who train together, and this has created problems over the long run, since those who do not belong to the fraternity are rarely allowed access to its activities. Over the last few years it has become quite clear that an arrogance has developed within the Clandestine Service. Activities that should have been reported to managers or policy officials were withheld because they were deemed to have "no need to know." Interestingly, the military takes an entirely different approach to training its intelligence people with what appear to be far better results, but the CIA has steadfastly refused to adopt such techniques.


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Business Intelligence It should also be noted that intelligence is now no longer the purview of the government alone. Traditionally, intelligence organizations around the world, and especially in the United States, have been part of the federal establishment. Now, we have seen intelligence practices spread into the private sector. With the growth of industrial espionage, some of it sponsored by foreign intelligence agencies, American businesses have turned to intelligence techniques to protect themselves. There has been a growth as well in intelligence collection and analysis in the private sector as business firms seek to learn more about areas of the world in which they might do business or to learn about their competitors in the marketplace. Should the U.S. government help American business by using national intelligence resources? The Japanese and the French, not to mention a host of other countries, do use their intelligence agencies to assist the private sector. So far, both policy officials and intelligence managers in the United States have resisted this, and businesses have not been eager to get help. Nonetheless, the issue remains open to debate. Many problems have been created as American intelligence has grown increasingly large, bureaucratic, and inflexible. Can they be fixed? The recent surveys have offered some solutions, but because the commissions took most of their testimony from senior professionals, rather than from workers at all levels of the bureaucracy, they got some rather self-serving information from people who had been successful in the bureaucracy. There are other answers and solutions. Most of the recent works on intelligence begin their discussions from the top down. They focus first on the DCI and on the upper elements of the system. It makes more sense to start at the beginning. We can begin our exploration where the process starts, with the collection of data, and go on from there. Perhaps the Washington way makes sense to the bureaucrats, but to a working intelligence officer, the process starts with collection. So should we.

Notes 1. Vernon Walters, Silent Missions (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 611. 2. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (New Y Houghton Mifflin, 1985). 3. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996 4. Preparing for the 21st Century, Report of the Commission on the Roles an Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1996).

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5. IC 21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Staff Study, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 104th Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996). 6. See In from the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force o Intelligence (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996); Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence (1996); and Gary Schmitt and Abe Shulsky, The Future of U.S. Intelligence: Report Prepared for the Working Group on Intelligence Reform (Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1996. 7. Amos Jordan, William Taylor, and Michael Mazar, American National Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 147. 8. "Perry Underestimated Terrorist Threat in Saudi Arabia/' Star Tribune, 10 July 1996, p. 3A. 9. Jock Haswell, Spies and Spymasters (London: Thames & Hudson, 1977). 10. Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Ballentine Books, 1966). 11. Edwin Fishel, The Secret War for the Union (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). 12. "Photos of Auschwitz Extermination Unit Produced/' New York Times, 24 February 1979; the author had the opportunity to see and hear Mr. Brugioni's presentation on the subject. 13. Stephen F. Knott, Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 14. George F. Kennan, "Spy and Counterspy/' New York Times, 18 May 1997, p. E17. 15. Nathan Miller, Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 279. 16. John Sawatsky, Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security Service (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1980). 17. Theodore Shackley, The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency (Pleasantville, NY: Reader's Digest, 1981). 18. Jonathan Landay, "Prying Open T o p Secret' U.S. Safe," Christian Science Monitor, 27 November 1998, p. 3.

CHAPTER 2

Stealing the Secrets Espionage means the gathering of information through clandestine surveillance or observation, or through the use of spies to steal information. In ancient days clandestine observation meant climbing a hill or a tree to view the enemy without being seen. If one needed to get closer, a spy might be sent under the cover of a disguise or through subterfuge, but this proved to be much more dangerous than surveillance. If the spy were discovered, the enemy might be alerted to take action or hide the very information the spy was sent to obtain. Modern technology has changed the way people spy on each other, but the basic notions remain the same as Sun Tzu described them almost 2,500 years ago. 1 We no longer have to find a mountain for secret reconnaissance; we can use a satellite, or we can fly a long-range unmanned photo aircraft over the targets we seek. We can pick up electronic communications or signals in the same way that each side intercepted the signals of the other during America's Civil War. Of course, in the nineteenth century the signals were made by soldiers using hand-held flags. Today spies might use fiber-optic cables to send their signals, using high-tech encryption devices. Interestingly, as more and more countries develop the ability to intercept signals and communication, they are also developing the ability to protect their transmissions from their adversaries. Intelligence services are continually trying to stay one step ahead. Governments do not usually protest electronic and communications intercepts. Recently the Japanese government did raise the issue when it was alleged that the United States was intercepting Japanese communications to gain an advantage in trade negotiations. As one might expect, the United States denied the charge, even though the U.S. government probably has the capability to do just what the Japanese suggested. Most

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governments seem to understand that if they fail to protect their communications, they may very well be intercepted. They do not protest overhead photography either, although they might try to hide their activities. The Soviets tried, for a while, to hide their latest developments in submarines from U.S. photo satellites but later gave up when they realized that there was no way to take the subs out for sea trials without leaving the covered sheds they had built for the vessels. National Technical Means During the last stages of the Cold War, the use of satellites for photography and electronic intercepts became enshrined in arms control treaties. The satellites were referred to as National Technical Means (NTM), and it seems likely that none of the treaties would have been ratified without an agreement on NTM, since both sides could use the satellites to monitor and verify that the other was following the rules. Thus, the gathering of intelligence by technical sensors has become generally accepted, though it is still considered a form of spying. It is, however, far less intrusive—and far less dangerous—than the use of human agents to gather information. It is tempting to think that technical sensors, whether for imagery or for intercepts, can replace the secret agent. When he was DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner got the notion—probably based in part on advice from people who knew even less about intelligence than the admiral—that technical sensors could do what the spies could do, only better and more safely. The DCI was very much taken with this notion and decided that a combination of sharply focused intelligence requirements and capable satellites would be the wave of the intelligence future. He established a complex, expensive, and rather large bureaucracy to handle the requirements. He put his money in the wrong place. We have spent billions on satellites but we haven't yet spent the necessary funds to deal with the enormous amounts of data the satellites gather. Thus, we can collect far more information than we can process. This became obvious during the Cold War when congressional probers learned that a Soviet brigade had been resident in Cuba for many years and wondered why the Intelligence Community had failed to find it. As it turned out, a search of data that had never been processed revealed that we could have known about the brigade from its earliest assignment to the island, but because policy officials expressed little interest, the imagery was not analyzed and no reports were written. In another example of problems with processing, analysts discovered that they could not review imagery fast enough to retarget the photo satellites from one "pass" over Earth to the next. Typically, it takes about


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ninety minutes for a satellite at the usual altitude to go around the globe, but it takes much longer for the photo analyst to tell what's in the first image. Computer techniques help the photo analyst, but at first no investment was made on the processing side. All the money went into the space vehicles themselves. According to the various intelligence reviews, this problem has yet to be completely fixed. Collecting intelligence with technical sensors is further complicated by the rather large organizations that handle the work. The National Security Agency, located near the Baltimore-Washington Airport, is responsible for communications and electronic intercepts; it is probably the largest organization of its kind in the world. During the author's service in Washington, it was at least twice as big as the CIA and certainly more secretive. To get NSA to respond to informal requirements for information was difficult and formal requests involved lots of paperwork. Just to visit NSA was a tough job. Even with the appropriate clearances and badges, official visitors required an escort, and walking around freely was certainly not allowed. These measures have supposedly been relaxed in recent years, but outsiders are not likely to find out. Judging the Value of Signals Intelligence It is very difficult to judge the value of intercepted communications. In the author's experience, NSA intercepts were occasionally useful but often fragmentary and of little value. Others swore by them and found them to be essential. Much of the value of such signals intelligence (SIGINT) depends on the target. In working against closed societies, such as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, intercepts may be a large part of what we can get. Against terrorists, drug dealers, or organized criminal groups, however, our ability to collect information will depend on the extent to which these groups use communications that can be intercepted. In battlefield situations or against potential military targets, intercepted communications or electronic signals can be extremely valuable. Under the pressure of military operations, an enemy may very well loosen communications security or make mistakes in encrypting data. In World War II, for example, the British capability to intercept German signals was enhanced when the Germans made errors in using their "unbreakable" Enigma encoding machine. Even when the signals cannot be broken, the volume and direction of the communications can often be determined, and much can be learned from what is called "traffic analysis." In the preparations for the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1978, traffic analysis gave useful intelligence on events. It seems clear, then, that maintaining the "Big Ear" to intercept poten-

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tially useful communications and signals is necessary if the United States is to keep its lead in tracking events and activity that might have the potential to affect U.S. national security. Still, the costs are very great, and there is the potential for misuse of this capability. NSA is not supposed to focus on U.S. persons—U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or U.S. corporations—in intercepting communications. Can this be avoided? After all, the system was abused during the Vietnam War, when it was turned against Americans involved in anti-war protests. The government argued then that it was seeking to find out if the Soviets or their allies were somehow involved in the anti-war activity, but we now know that the regulations and laws that protected against such abuse were violated.

Controlling SIGINT Clearly, some method of control has to be maintained to prevent the illegal use of the intercept capability. Pvight now we rely on the internal control mechanisms of NSA, the DCI's overall control of the Intelligence Community, and the monitoring of the congressional oversight committees to make sure that the system is not abused. These controls can be effective in preventing an individual from using the system improperly. An effort to acquire data illegally would quickly become apparent to managers. The controls that are in place today did not exist during the Vietnam War, but because of the top secret nature of SIGINT, some outsiders may continue to worry about potential abuse. The cost issue in SIGINT is a little easier to understand. The satellites that we use for intercepts are terribly expensive, are complicated, and require a rather large infrastructure for construction, launching, and maintenance. Add the costs of personnel and computers, and you have accounted for a major part of the intelligence budget. Can SIGINT costs be reduced? Certainly, but the options may not be too palatable to oldline professionals. Reducing the size and complexity of the satellites is already under consideration. The new "small satellites" would be cheaper and simpler in construction, easier to build and launch. Reducing other costs in SIGINT is tougher. Cutting personnel, or processing capability, might sound good to budget folks, but people and computers are critical. Slowing the rate of construction and satellite launches, building satellites with long space life, and cutting unneeded layers of bureaucracy and management would help. To say much more than that is difficult because the system is so shrouded in secrecy. Is so much secrecy really necessary?


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The N e e d for Secrecy We learned in World War II that rigorous protection of our intercept capability kept the Japanese and the Germans from learning that their "unbreakable" encryption systems had been penetrated. Today careful observers of intelligence understand what NSA does, but secrecy and compartmentation have kept observers from learning how the intercepting is done and how much we have learned. 2 If we relax controls on intercept intelligence and as a result adversaries learn the specifics of NSA's methods, they might change their codes or alter their communications techniques, which might cut us off from critical information just when we need it. So, in this area rigid security controls are one good way to maintain NSA's capability, even if this means that much about the agency will be kept secret from the public or even from other intelligence professionals. We know much more about imagery intelligence and how that part of technical intelligence collection works. At least in photo intelligence, very often what you see is what you get. And sometimes, what you get is more than what you see. The interpretation of photos and images taken from the reaches of space is both an art and a science, and the resulting intelligence has had significant impact ever since someone dragged that first plate camera into a hot air balloon and came back with pictures of the enemy. Imagery Intelligence In World War II we began to perfect aerial reconnaissance techniques and the associated photo analysis methods. The photos were taken from the then-unheard-of altitude of 30,000 feet, and the systems we have today are not much different in concept, although we can obtain images from much higher altitudes. As we developed the ability to fly higher, each successive development remained shrouded in secrecy at first; but over time, to hide what we were doing became increasingly difficult. Thus, the U-2, the glider-like spy plane that penetrated the Soviet Union, was kept so secret that air bases where the plane took off and landed were closed to unauthorized visitors during U-2 operations. 3 When Francis Gary Powers, the CIA U-2 pilot, was shot down by the USSR in 1961 as he flew over Soviet missile bases, secrecy could no longer be maintained, and the U-2 became a well-known part of the American intelligence arsenal. Not long ago a U-2 was displayed in the Smithsonian, a tribute to clever engineering and American intelligence

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know-how, but its wingspan was so huge that only part of the plane could fit inside the museum. Space Reconnaissance Early efforts at space reconnaissance were kept secret as well. In fact, the same system that was used to protect SIGINT was replicated at first to protect space photography. In addition, a "cover story" was created to explain the launches as weather satellites or military testing. 4 Nonetheless, the press were quick to ferret out what was going on, and literature on space imagery made clear that the United States was in the lead in this area of intelligence collection. Although the Soviets were first into space with Sputnik, their breakthrough was soon overtaken by American technical sophistication. Both sides relied, for a while, on satellites that could take pictures in space on film and return the exposed material back to Earth via capsules that separated from the parent vehicle. This provided excellent images, but the pictures were two or three weeks old by the time the film capsules were recovered. In the 1970s the United States developed a "nearreal-time" photo capability from space that used digital imagery to return pictures almost instantly and with remarkable clarity. At first the KH-11, as the near-real-time satellite was called, was protected by strict security controls, but when a low-level CIA officer decided to steal the manual that explained the KH-11's operation and sell it to the Soviets, the strict controls proved worthless. Later, imagery from the satellite was released to the press to support various White House positions, and so the entire imagery methodology has become quite well known. In this case the government recognized that secrecy was no longer necessary. The CIA has publicized its early achievements in space reconnaissance, and literature on space reconnaissance has become readily available. The government refuses only to release the details of the potential "resolution" of the imagery, that is, how small an object can be identified in the picture. Suffice it to say, in the author's experience the resolution can be safely described as unbelieveably good. Benefits and Costs of Imagery Maintaining both the space-based imagery capability and the new techniques in aerial reconnaissance using manned or unmanned aircraft has many potential benefits. In addition to the standard usage in spying on one's enemies or in monitoring treaties, overhead imagery can be


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used to locate narcotics crops, assess natural disasters, and detect pollution. It is, nevertheless, an expensive business. Launching and maintaining the satellites is just one aspect of aerial operations. Sophisticated ground stations are needed to retrieve the imagery, and photo analysts require advanced machinery to analyze the resultant intelligence. Remotely piloted vehicles, in contrast, are less expensive, but they require targeting and guidance, and the analytic cost is much the same as in space imagery. Maintaining this capability reportedly eats up about as much as SIGINT in the intelligence budget, and there is little pressure to reduce this because the benefits are great and the payoff is obvious. The same cannot be said for the bureaucracy that controlled the imagery systems. Unlike NSA, which centralized the control of SIGINT soon after it was established, control of imagery was fragmented and the operations decentralized. Some control were maintained by the DCI, but the Department of Defense owned most of the assets. A super-secret agency, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was created under the Department of Defense to manage the overhead systems, but analysis was handled in a joint CIA-military organization, and requirements were put together in yet another unit. It was quite clear, right from the start, that the different intelligence agencies could not each launch their own imagery satellites and that they would have to share. This forced the Intelligence Community to work more closely together and eventually to establish management systems to regulate the sharing. Much of the management was kept within the National Reconnaissance Office, whose very existence was considered to be secret, although many knew of it. This secrecy broke down, in part, because the press picked up much of the information about the NRO, and it fell apart completely when enterprising sleuths on Capitol Hill discovered that the NRO was building new headquarters out near Dulles Airport in Virginia that exceeded its needs, according to press stories, by some 300 percent. Coupled with reports that the NRO management had violated budget rules by squirreling away extra money from previous allocations, the resulting scandal forced the administration's hand. A N e w Agency The National Reconnaissance Office has not been broken up. Rather, a new overarching imagery operations and management agency has been created to take over much of the work of imagery intelligence. This unit, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), has subsumed the Central Imagery Office that managed requirements, the National Photograpic Intelligence Center (NPIC), the Defense Mapping Agency, and some smaller units related to imagery. The new organization belongs

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to the Department of Defense and, like NPIC, is reportedly staffed by a combination of military officers, DOD civilians, and CIA officers. Of course, this means the creation of yet another support bureacracy, but it shouldn't be too big, since most of the people will belong to their parent organizations and NIMA will not need a large cadre of its own personnel. Another idea for saving money is to privatize the launching of imagery satellites and the collection of images. It is already possible to purchase imagery from French, Russian, and some American satellites, although the resolution of the images is probably too large for intelligence purposes. Such imagery might be useful, however, for analyzing natural disasters, narcotics production, or problems of pollution. The Brown Commission suggested that we try to arrange cooperation with our allies to share the cost burden of building and launching satellites, but there is always a reluctance in intelligence to become too dependent on others, even if they are supposed to be our friends. In any event, the business of imagery, once classified as tightly as intercept intelligence, has become so open that little secrecy is left. Espionage Secrecy, however, remains essential in dealing with secret agents, the traditional form of espionage. Espionage has also become an accepted part of international behavior, even though most countries have strict laws against such activity. If a spy is caught, it usually means death for the spy and disgrace, if not something worse, for the spy's masters. Throughout the Cold War the United States and its allies, and the Soviets and their allies, placed resident diplomats and attaches on each other's territory, understanding that they would be gathering information. Their travel might be restricted or other limitations placed on them, but they were never confined to their embassies. They were supposed to gather information openly and not involve themselves in clandestine intelligence collection. If they were to do so and were caught in the act, they would be declared in violation of their diplomatic privilege and sent home as persona non grata, "PNG-ed." Both sides also sent intelligence officers who were career officers of their respective clandestine services. For the United States, this meant members of the operations directorate of the CIA; for the KGB, officers from the First Chief Directorate. Other countries, East and West, sent similar people, all of whom were supposed to manage the business of clandestine intelligence collection, operating from stations in the host country. Their job was not to spy but, rather, to recruit others to do the spying for them. The spies were the "agents" of the spymasters— "case


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officers" in American terminology. The case officers were to recruit the spies, give them their assignments, teach them how to avoid detection, and translate the information they gathered into usable intelligence reports. The literature on the actual activity of case officers is derived mostly from outside observers. CIA clandestine service careerists have written only rarely for publication, and their counterparts in other services have been equally reluctant to go public, although such works are starting to appear in print. 5 A great deal of material about espionage and tradecraft, the term used to describe spy behavior, emerged from the capture of Aldrich Ames and the subsequent books about his case.6 We can learn about espionage from a careful reading of open literature, and we can even find information in spy fiction, although most of it is far from realistic. Retired officers have from time to time spoken about their experiences at meetings of retired intelligence personnel, and the recent spate of reform literature has added to our knowledge. Managing Espionage Operations In the world of clandestine operations, there is a remarkable similarity in the ways in which such activity is handled, whether we are speaking of the CIA, the old KGB, or the Israeli Mossad. The general nature of espionage is thus well known, although specific cases remain secret. Above all else, intelligence services want to protect the identities of the spies and the spymasters and the targets on which they spy. Spy cases usually come to light only when an agent is caught or there is a leak of information. As in so much of the intelligence business, success is carefully hidden in hopes that it can be repeated. How do intelligence officers recruit and train agents to spy for them? Aind how are the case officers and the agents equipped to carry out such potentially dangerous and sensitive missions? Let's begin with the case officers themselves. In the United States, members of the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO)—sometimes referred to as the Clandestine Service—join the agency after a rigorous hiring process. They are chosen because they have lived and worked abroad, they already speak at least one foreign language fluently and have demonstrated the capacity to learn others, and they display the kind of personality that will enable them to recruit and handle clandestine agents. 7 Psychological testing and tough interviews weed out those who do not have the personality for such unusual work. By the time they reach the end of the selection process, the applicants have passed through a medical test, a polygraph exam, and a thorough background check. Typically the new Clandestine Service officers are between the ages of

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twenty-five and thirty, have a graduate degree, and show some military or business experience; they do not come right out of college or graduate school. In spite of the Agency's continuing effort to attract more minorities and women into the ranks of the Clandestine Service, case officers are still mostly white males. At one time case officer trainees tended to come from eastern college backgrounds, especially from the Ivy League, but that changed some years ago. W o m e n in Clandestine Operations Recently a group of women within the Clandestine Service sued the CIA in a class action claiming that there had been systematic discrimination against females in the Directorate of Operations and that women had neither received the same good assignments nor promotions as their male counterparts. 8 In the end, the agency had to admit that the claims were true and there had indeed been discrimination. Promises were made that such injustices would not continue and that women would receive equal treatment with the men in the Directorate of Operations. This ought to be the case, since there are very few jobs that men can perform that women cannot. There may be some assignments in the Middle East, for example, that would be difficult for women to take on because of the restrictions of Muslim religious laws, but in other areas women might under some circumstances be even more effective than their male counterparts. The Agency contends that the inequalities associated with women in the Directorate of Operations have been corrected, but we may not know for sure until there is another lawsuit. Once admitted to the Agency, the potential case officers undergo at least one year of training, much of it at "the Farm," the CIA's training facility near Williamsburg, Virginia. The site is supposed to be secret, but the location and mission of the place is widely known. The trainees learn the rudiments of intelligence and the specifics of managing clandestine operations abroad. 9 They undergo some physical training as well as weapons handling and other skills training that they may have to teach to future agents. If they are successful and do well in training, the trainees may be assigned to language school or they may be sent abroad to acquire field knowledge while they perfect their language skills. If they remain in the Clandestine Service, where agent recruiting and handling is done, the potential case officers will spend most of their time overseas. In most cases it takes several years of overseas work to become completely proficient as a case officer. An assignment to headquarters is not seen as productive because it involves support for overseas operations, paperwork, and bureaucracy and because promotions are mostly won abroad.


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A n Isolated Career Because of the arcane skills needed to be a case officer and because of the extensive training for the job, Clandestine Service officers tend to stay within the Service throughout most of their careers. They win no points for serving outside the Directorate of Operations in what are called "rotational assignments," although such assignments may be broadening and may give officers exposure to other parts of the Agency. Members of the Clandestine Service worry that their cover may be blown if they work with open employees, thus jeopardizing their effectiveness overseas. They prefer to socialize with others under cover so that they don't have to worry about saying the wrong thing to the wrong person. The result of this has been the growth of a Clandestine Service that is isolated from the rest of the CIA and the Intelligence Community. Recent problems that have surfaced within the Directorate of Operations indicate that its members have been reluctant to report their activities to their ambassadors abroad or to senior Agency managers outside the Directorate of Operations at home. 10 This arrogance has developed because of the isolated nature of the Directorate of Operations, the insularity of its case officers, and the almost fanatic zeal to protect clandestine operations from prying eyes. This attitude has led to errors in judgment on the part of case officers—mistakes the DO senior managers should have prevented. These managers, however, came up through the same system as those they supervise, belong to the fraternity, so to speak, and seem protective of their brothers (and occasionally their sisters). Perhaps some arrogance is justified among those who handle clandestine operations. It takes a special talent and a particular personality to do this work. Not everyone is able to find potential sources of information and convince the sources to become secret agents. This job requires facility in foreign language, the ability to understand personality well enough to detect vulnerabilities and motivation, and the confidence to make the "recruiting pitch." It also means having to deal with people who are sometimes unpleasant, coarse, or venal; who have carried out criminal acts or violated human rights; or who might be terrorists. D e a l i n g w i t h Evil People The American people may be somewhat squeamish about the need to work with evil people, but Clandestine Service officers have to deal with them anyway. This caused something of a fuss when a New Jersey congressman alleged that the CIA had two Guatemalan colonels on the payroll as sources, and that these colonels had been involved in the mur-

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der of two American citizens. The subsequent investigation revealed that Agency managers had failed to inform the ambassador about the sources, and this led to a revision of the rules about whom to recruit as clandestine agents. If we are going to be successful in working against enemies and adversaries, against terrorists and criminals, intelligence officers are going to have to do business with people they don't like and whom they wouldn't invite home to dinner. They need to get at people who have or can obtain the information they want, even if the contacts are unsavory. Intelligence managers should not encourage illegal activity or condone activity they find reprehensible, but if they are going to be successful in gathering intelligence, they'll just have to accept the negative aspects of clandestine operations. Clandestine Service managers will have to balance the demands for information against the dangers of dealing with evil people. Why do people, evil or not, become spies? Sometimes it's for the money, although most agents are not paid princely sums. An agent who receives too much money and spends it on high-priced goods immediately draws attention to himself. This was one of the great mistakes the Soviets made in handling the Ames case: Ames spent too much money on cars and high living, leading to his eventual discovery. Agents may work for ideological reasons against a regime or people they don't like, or they may help establish a government or support a faction they prefer. And sometimes they become agents for the thrill or excitement of the work. In fictional accounts of spying, agents are sometimes coerced or blackmailed into clandestine work after they have been caught in a sex scandal or in black market transactions. This was a technique actually used by the Soviets and their allies. During the Cold War it was not unusual for foreigners in Moscow to be offered an exchange of rubles for dollars at a very attractive rate, only to be ambushed by police or the KGB once the money changed hands. The KGB would then offer to overlook the "crime" if the victim would become a source. Although such blackmail may be an easy way to trap someone into becoming a spy, the information the spy then collects may be suspect. The agent may be generating information just to keep his handler off his back. In some cases the blackmail victims went to the police when they returned from Moscow, reported what had happened, and were then turned against the KGB by the FBI. Controlling Agents Whatever the method, once the agent has been recruited, the case officer has to establish a contract with the agent so that the rules of the


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relationship are clear. The case officer wants to control the agent, set up an agreement on pay, and in other ways ensure that the agent does what the case officer wants. This system ensures that the case officer is in charge. After the agent is under control, the case officer has to provide training and establish rules of tradecraft—the common term for clandestine practices—to mask the relationship between case officer and agent and protect the agent against the possibility of discovery by counterintelligence or security services. The case officer has to give the agent some means of communication, either a radio that cannot be easily intercepted or perhaps the traditional "dead drop," a hiding place where messages can be exchanged. During the Cold War the Soviets were fond of using old soda cans left on the side of the road as places to hide messages, and in one case an American case officer was caught putting a message into a hollow "rock" built for the purpose. After the communications and security systems are in place, the case officer and agent can get down to the actual business of espionage. The case officer might train the agent to use tiny cameras to photograph documents or other targets, provide equipment to hide papers, or give the agent miniature recorders to capture conversations. In many cases the agent is sent to find out particular information and is directed to report back to the case officer at an agreed time. Meetings between case officer and agent usually take place in a "safe house," often an apartment that is known to be secure, where the two can enter and leave without being noticed and where they can speak without fear of being intercepted.

Agent Reporting If the agent is performing properly, he or she obtains the intelligence sought by the case officer and reports back. The case officer then has to turn the conversation or the documents into a useful report. The report has to capture faithfully what the agent has said, not what the case officer wishes he or she had said, but usually a provision is made for the case officer or others to provide comments on the agent report. This report is sent to users to fulfill an established requirement, but this does not quite complete the reporting process. Each agent has to be evaluated over time to see if he or she is actually providing useful and reliable intelligence. In some cases agents turn out to tell more than they know or to become "paper factories," agents who fabricate information. In the worst situation, the case officer may discover that the agent is a "double," someone controlled by a hostile intelligence service and who is actually working for the other side, feeding false information to the case officer. It may be

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necessary to terminate the agent. In spy fiction, this has an ominous ring and means death to the agent. In reality, however, the agent has to be terminated with little fuss, certainly no violence, and in such a way that the agent does not tell all about working for the Americans. This may mean a final payoff of some kind or putting the agent on ice, telling the agent to wait for a signal to resume operations. Of course, the signal may never come. The Value of H U M I N T After the arrest of Aldrich Ames in 1994 and his subsequent public comments that espionage was a waste of time and that Americans weren't very good at it anyway, there was some discussion in the press and on Capitol Hill about the value and utility of HUMINT. How much does human intelligence collection add to our knowledge? Considering the dangers inherent in espionage operations, should we continue to do it? Were Roger Hilsman and George Kennan correct when they claimed that the CIA should get out of the espionage business? Although intelligence derived from clandestine sources may make up only 10 or 20 percent of the inputs to intelligence analysis, agent reports can provide insights that are truly valuable. Traditionally supporters of HUMINT argue that agent reports can help us learn about the attitudes and intentions of our adversaries. Agents can bring us material that cannot be obtained by technical sensors or developed by diplomats. It seems foolish to give up the possibility of learning inside information from a well-placed source. If we agree that we should continue to use clandestine sources as a way of learning about our adversaries, what changes should be made to improve the system? Better Recruiting Methods It seems clear that the traditional method of recruiting Clandestine Service officers by putting ads in newspapers or sending recruiters to college job fairs is not good enough. The Agency rarely hires officers for the Clandestine Service right out of college anyway, and it cannot rely on the possibility that the more seasoned people it really wants will see the newspaper ads. Too many people with the necessary talent may be missed by what is essentially a passive system. We know a great deal about recruiting agents, so why are we reluctant to be a bit more aggressive about finding the kinds of talented people the system needs? In the early days contacts at colleges and universities, some of whom had served in the OSS, were enlisted to find the right candidates for the


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CIA's clandestine work. In fact, that's how the author was first steered in the agency's direction, as were several of his classmates. There are plenty of people on college campuses who would be prepared to help find the best and the brightest if only someone would let them. The CIA ought to be looking in other areas as well. The agency has never been particularly good about recruiting officers or enlisted men and women completing active military service. Perhaps there is some fear of poaching on the armed services. Still, military service is good preparation for intelligence work, and there are probably many service people who would be only too glad to continue to serve the country as CIA staffers. Breaking down the isolation of those who serve in the Clandestine Service is much more difficult than finding recruits. To maintain cover in those parts of the CIA that routinely have contact with other parts of the government is no easy task, and the tendency of those under cover is to shy away from meetings or activities where they might meet too many outsiders. Moving in and out of cover destroys what little credibility most covers provide. Without effective cover, a case officer may be relegated to liaison work abroad and would not be able to recruit and handle difficult targets. Overcoming the Fraternal Mentality Solving this dilemma is not easy. It may well be that the clandestine operators will have to resign themselves to the same fate as hot-shot fighter pilots, who know that they can remain in the cockpit only early in their careers, when their reflexes are still good and their eyesight keen. Eventually, to advance their careers, they have to give up front-line flying, take command positions, and maintain their flying proficiency in less-demanding aircraft. Clandestine Service officers may have to give up agent handling at some point in their careers, take on management jobs in other parts of the intelligence system, and understand that when they go overseas again, their cover will only be sufficient to maintain "deniability." They will be able to handle liaison with other intelligence services and direct operations, but they will no longer be expected to do street work. By making clear that advancement in the ranks requires moving outside the Clandestine Service, the old fraternal mentality can be overcome. In addition, officers at mid-grades from other parts of the agency should be given assignments in the Clandestine Service. Agency managers talked about doing this for years, but not much was accomplished. The operators resented the "outsiders" and refused to accept them completely into their ranks. Experience shows that competent intelligence officers from other disciplines are quite capable of handling work over-

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seas, especially management and liaison functions. To fit into the operations group, the transferees would have to be given additional training, but much of it could be done on the job. Although the CIA has not said much about what it is doing in regard to changes in the Clandestine Service, agency managers have reportedly begun to put analysts together with operations officers, either in centers or in geographically oriented offices. That is, analysts and operations people who work on Latin America, for example, are sitting in the same place in the agency instead of in totally isolated offices. The same is true for analysts and operations people who work on terrorism, counternarcotics, and counterintelligence. This will certainly break down the traditional barriers between analysts and operations officers. Only time will tell if it will break down the fraternal mentality of the operations directorate. Perhaps agency managers will realize that people who sit together and work together may be able to do each other's job. When that happens, the insularity of the clandestine operators is bound to diminish. Some critics of the Agency argue that placing analysts and DO officers together will allow the operators to influence the analysis to support operations. This criticism suggests that DO officers are interested only in the cases they run and not in the information that is collected, and that analysts are weak minded and incapable of detecting attempts to influence them. Neither charge is correct. In the author's experience, both collectors and analysts are after the best information, although they use different methods of getting it. Military H U M I N T What about the problem of military HUMINT? Should military officers be seconded to the CIA to gather information critical to military operations? Or should the Department of Defense run its own clandestine collection operations aimed at the targets it thinks important? The issue remains unresolved, and there are good arguments to be made on both sides. The author once served in a military collection unit in the U.S. Air Force, and the comparison between it and the CIA's operations were striking. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to have the military run its own effort to gather tactical military data from human sources. The CIA's focus is on strategic issues, and it does not collect tactical military information. It is a civilian organization focused on political and economic issues, and its interest in military problems aims at strategic issues of interest to high-level users. It does not have the resources to go after information of interest to the battlefield commander, nor should it. What the CIA can do, and is doing better all the time, is to provide the information it does collect and analyze to military users. But the specific


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and detailed information fighting men and women need should be gathered using military intelligence resources. Some information will be gathered by military attaches. They can recruit and handle agents; but since they are diplomats, they have to be careful about getting caught. Usually, military attaches are expected to coordinate their activities with the CIA chief of station to make sure that there are no conflicts in their respective operations. Another way to handle tactical targets is to assign a military collections officer to the CIA station and allow the officer to operate under station guidance, but against military sources. The military has traditionally operated its own collection units, but their operations are usually fairly visible and their tradecraft has been poor, even with CIA training. In one case of which the author is aware, a military case officer was seen driving an official army car—with army markings on the sides—to an agent meeting, hardly good clandestine practice. Stand-alone units are costly to operate and difficult to hide. Placing a military HUMINT officer under cover inside a CIA station might prove cost-effective but means that the CIA officers have to get over having a non-CIA officer in their midst. An effective station chief, however, should be able to make the arrangement work.

A Separate Agency? One idea that surfaced in the course of the various reform studies on clandestine operations, an idea that was espoused by Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, the respected former DCI and director of NSA, was to establish a Clandestine Service agency, outside the CIA, just for secret operations. 11 This hardly seems feasible. To maintain the cover of the officers in such an agency would be nearly impossible—unless the whole operation was set up as a proprietary, or business, operation, and then the officers would all have to be put under non-official cover. This would mean that their stations abroad would have no access to diplomatic or official circles, and thus protecting the officers abroad would be a nightmare. A stand-alone agency would be cut off from analytic units as well. If anything, there should be a closer working relationship between collectors and analysts, not complete separation. There seems little question that the United States is going to continue to run clandestine operations abroad, and not only for gathering positive foreign intelligence but also against traditional counterintelligence targets and for covert action operations. These problems will be discussed later; for now, suffice it to say that if the United States is going to employ secret agents, then the agent handlers ought to be given the best equipment, the best cover, and the most effective communications systems as

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possible. Also, the American people ought to understand that this can be a nasty business and that those who engage in it will receive little recognition for their work. Clandestine Service officers should not be saddled with guilt for what they do; rather, they should be given support for what can be a dangerous way to serve the country. The Value of O p e n Sources We should not leave the discussion of stealing secrets without some recognition of the importance of open sources. Neither glamorous nor adventurous, open sources are nonetheless the basic building block for secret intelligence. Why, then, is open source collection being cut back when it is a relatively inexpensive part of the budget? A key element in the collection of open sources is the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the unit that translates foreign media. FBIS is one of the oldest components of the intelligence system, dating back to World War II when it was a unit of the State Department. When the CIA was created, FBIS became part of that organization. It maintained stations around the world to pick up radio broadcasts and had a team of local native-speaking translators to provide the linguistics. It produced translations by cable and in printed books; unclassified, the books could be obtained by subscription. FBIS publications were available in many college libraries as an important source of information for those who could not obtain or could not read the foreign media in the original language. Of course, in the modern world of electronics, many foreign newspapers and magazines are available on the Internet; but for those who cannot read the language, they are of little use. Analysts who cannot handle the originals will be dependent on news services to provide the information, but some important details or nuances may be missed. Foreign broadcasts are an equally important source of information, but who can spend hours trying to find the transmissions, record them, and then translate them? Anyone who has listened to one of Fidel Castro's sixhour orations, even with fluent Spanish, understands the problem. In contrast, a translation can easily be skimmed for the key points. At one time FBIS had an analysis unit of its own to carry out a process known as content analysis. This was a way of divining the real meanings in the obtuse pronouncements made by some world leaders, especially those who ruled in the Communist world. With the end of the Cold War that unit was broken up in the mistaken belief that its services were no longer needed. These days when leaders like Saddam Hussein or Fidel Castro speak, analysts in other parts of the Intelligence Community are left to figure out what they really mean.


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Early Warning FBIS performed another valuable service as part of the intelligence community's early warning system. It was the FBIS radio teams that through careful monitoring of foreign broadcasts often picked up the first signs that something was happening. Now the intelligence system has to rely on the Cable News Network (CNN). FBIS was and remains a cost-effective intelligence collector, but it is not likely to remain so if the cuts in personnel and resources continue. During the Cold War it was considered cost-effective for U.S. embassies and missions abroad to gather open source documents, usually newspapers and magazines, and send them back to Washington. When cost was no problem, analysts could order the important news magazines or papers from the country they were following, assuming they were able to read them in the original language. If they could not, FBIS could usually be relied on to provide a translation through its Joint Publications Research Service. Today an enormous number of open source databases are available electronically, and the CIA is proud of programs it has set up to tap these materials. We have no way of measuring the effectiveness of these new inputs in the intelligence world, but if university research is any indicator, then these databases are truly a gold mine of information. These programs to take advantage of open sources indicate that Agency managers realize that if American intelligence is really intent on maintaining our intelligence system as an all-source establishment, then we must not lose the capability to obtain and analyze open sources. These sources make up the great majority of the inputs in many areas, and they do not cost much to gather. In fact, what is really special about our intelligence system is that it does gather all sources for the analysts to study. Although the intelligence collection system gives us the way to steal the secrets, intelligence analysis enables us to understand the puzzles and divine the mysteries. That is the subject to which we now turn.

Notes 1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). 2. The classic work on revealing the inside story on NSA is James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1984); an update appeared in series in "No Such Agency: America's Fortress of Spies," Baltimore Sun, 3-1 December 1995. 3. The CIA has published the official story of the U-2 in Gregory W. Bedlow

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and Donald E. Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1998). 4. Jeffrey Richelson, Keyhole: America's Secret Eyes in Space (New York: Harper & Row, 1990). 5. See, for example Tom Gilligan, CIA Life: 10,000 Days with the Agency (Guilford, CT: Foreign Intelligence Press, 1991); Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons (New York: Scribner, 1997). A work of fiction by a senior DO officer is also useful: Milt Bearden, The Black Tulip (New York: Random House, 1998). 6. The most informative books on the Ames case are David Wise, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); and Pete Earley, Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1997). 7. These characteristics are listed in the CIA's recruiting ads and brochures. 8. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Judge Approves Payment in CIA Sexual Bias Case," Washington Post, 10 June 1995, p. A3. 9. The author completed this training himself during his first year in the CIA. 10. John Walcott, "Mission Impossible? Anthony Lake Takes on a Demoralized, Recalcitrant CIA," Washington Post, 8 December 1996, p. CI; "CIA Should Clean House on Honduras: Agency Disciplines 10 for Shielding Human Rights Abuses," Baltimore Sun, 13 October 1995, p. 22A. 11. Associated Press, "New Spy Agency Proposed," Boston Globe, 20 January 1996.

CHAPTER 3

Puzzles and Mysteries Tom Clancy had the right idea when he made the hero of his technothrillers an analyst. Of course, Clancy's hero, Jack Ryan, gets to do many things besides intelligence analysis. Nonetheless, throughout his novels Clancy emphasizes the importance of the intelligence products and the role they play in bringing intelligence to the top decisionmakers in government and to the working stiffs at lower levels. That's not fiction. Intelligence analysis is the "end game" in intelligence, providing the judgments of the intelligence system to policymakers. 1 Intelligence analysts are the ones who figure out the puzzles and divine the mysteries about threats to national security. Intelligence analysis is also where intelligence failure can often occur. This process deserves careful examination. No country devotes more resources and attention to intelligence research and analysis than does the United States. The roots of this emphasis on the study of raw reports from all sources may lie in the Civil War, according to historian Edwin Fishel. He claims that it was Union general "Fighting Joe" Hooker, one of the series of failed U.S. Army commanders preceding General Ulysses S. Grant, who first came up with the idea of analyzing reports from various intelligence sources by comparing them to each other and to an existing database. 2 When General "Wild Bill" Donovan became President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's chief of intelligence and the commander of the Office of Strategic Services at the beginning of World War II, the general quickly established a unit for research and analysis (R&A) in the new organization. 3 It paralleled the unit set up for secret operations, rather than serving in a subordinate position, and this organizational structure carried over into the CIA. Donovan tasked R&A with producing intelligence

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reports ranging from short-range daily reports to long-term strategic judgments. To be sure that these judgments were carefully considered, Donovan appointed a board of "wise men" to oversee the process, and perhaps because Donovan was a practicing Catholic, he dubbed this group of wise men the "College of Cardinals." This, too, carried over into the CIA, and the wise men became the Board of National Estimates. The Legacy of Pearl Harbor Part of the drive to create an R&A unit stemmed from the World War II experience. The intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor was believed by most observers to have been a failure of intelligence analysis rather than a failure to gather the secrets. The inevitable investigation into the Pearl Harbor disaster revealed that some of the intelligence that might have given clues to the Japanese attack was either not reported to Washington or not shared among the intelligence units of the U.S. Army and Navy. There was a clear need for a central clearing house for intelligence reporting, and so Donovan recommended to President Roosevelt in 1944 that a civilian-run central intelligence organization be created after the war to serve as an all-source repository for intelligence data. 4 Donovan envisioned this new agency as a replica of the OSS, with parallel operations and analysis units. After a false start in 1945 when J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI leaked Donovan's recommendations to the press and stories circulated that FDR was planning a post-war "secret police" organization more like the Nazi Gestapo than an intelligence agency, the CIA was created by President Truman in 1947 much as Donovan had suggested. The new agency had the parallel analysis and operations structure of the OSS, and many old hands from the OSS days flocked back to the new agency to resume careers they believed were more exciting and valuable than either academics or business. President Truman had already come to value the idea of an all-source intelligence agency even before the CIA's creation. In 1946 Truman had seen the need for some kind of intelligence leadership and had tapped Admiral Sidney Souers to serve as his director of central intelligence (DCI). Truman called him his "head snoop," but Souers was apparently not offended.5 Later the post was given to Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg of the U.S. Army Air Corps, who was waiting in the wings for the establishment of the new independent U.S. Air Force, which he was to head. While serving as DCI, Vandenberg decided to begin sending Truman a daily intelligence report, and the president liked it. The practice of sending a special daily intelligence report to the pres-


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ident has continued ever since that first one in 1946. Today the supersensitive report is called the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and it contains information that appears in no other intelligence publication, in addition to the regular run of daily intelligence items. Because of its sensitivity, the PDB is usually carried to the White House by a special briefing officer who may sit with the president while he goes through the report. If the president has questions, the briefing officer can answer them or the answer can be put in the next day's brief. Comments from the president are eagerly sought by the PDB staff to make sure the report is meeting the needs of the White House. Usually the PDB is also carried by hand to the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national security advisor. They are avid readers, if for no other reason than that they want to be sure to know what the president is being told by the CIA. Daily Intelligence Products Other intelligence customers, perhaps as many as several hundred, receive a daily publication from the CIA as well, called for many years the National Intelligence Daily. Although it does not contain the most sensitive items hand-carried to the White House, it is classified Top Secret. This daily publication is supposed to be a joint document that contains not only articles written at the CIA and coordinated with the other key intelligence agencies but also pieces produced by the other agencies themselves. Thus, the publication is national-level intelligence analysis and may include disagreements or dissents about the judgments made by the producing agency. This document has traditionally been printed and distributed as a paper product, but advances in desk-top publishing and electronic delivery mean that most consumers cleared for this product can now receive such material on their secure office computers. The delivery of a daily report about current events is one of the most traditional of intelligence activities and is replicated at many levels from the highest offices of government in Washington down to field units in the various agencies involved in foreign and security affairs. Some cynical intelligence consumers have told evaluators that the daily reports are no better—and sometimes far less—informative than the daily press or TV news, yet persistent questioning often reveals that such readers do actually use current intelligence. The value of current intelligence is demonstrated by the fact that though intelligence managers push analysts to write longer and more complex analyses, it is the shorter and more focused daily intelligence that policymakers actually take the time to read.

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Fixing the Spy Machine The Analytic Challenge

The challenge for the analyst in writing current intelligence is to inform policymakers and other consumers, including intelligence users, not only about what is happening and why but also about what is likely to happen next. This short-term forecast requires a judgment from the analyst and is the great difference between journalism and intelligence. Newswriters do not have to make such judgments, but intelligence analysts have to take the plunge. There is no great trick to making such short-term forecasts. They are usually based on historic trends, patterns of behavior, the context in which the activity takes place, and the actors involved. The analyst must be steeped in the history of the target area and must be immersed in the information flow from it. That's why intelligence analysts are such information junkies; they are always looking for keys and clues in the inputs they receive. Many analysts become nervous when separated from their mailboxes by holidays and weekends, and this explains why many analysts tend to go to their offices to read their incoming traffic even on days off. Analysts are aided in their judgments by discussing trends and forecasts with colleagues. Coordination, as this process is called, helps prevent judgmental error and surface disagreements and differences. Some analysts, though, may become arrogant over time and think that they alone have correctly analyzed events; their attitude can lead to intelligence failure. The judgment about what might happen next is the value intelligence analysts add to the flow of information. After all, many policy people see the same incoming information at about the same time as the analysts. In theory, however, and usually in practice, the intelligence analysts can make judgments without concern for policy considerations and without fear of political pressure. From the perspective of the analyst, current intelligence is the favored method of communicating judgments to decisionmakers. When events abroad are changing rapidly, daily reports mean the analyst can focus on the short-term forecasts, which are usually easier to make and more meaningful to users, than on a longe-range prediction that is of little use to a policymaker coping with a near-term crisis. The daily reports are incremental and enable the analyst to give users intelligence judgments as events unfold. Current intelligence creates a dialogue between intelligence producer and policy consumer, the most effective way of delivering intelligence. It is no surprise, therefore, that current intelligence takes up a great deal of an analyst's time and energy and that daily


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reports are the most useful of intelligence products, according to feedback from users.

Warning Intelligence Intelligence analysts have the responsibility of warning policymakers about impending crises or events, especially those that may require a response by the United States. Based on the experience of Pearl Harbor and other such surprises, the goal is to provide warning before the event; but clearly surprise cannot be completely avoided. Nonetheless, the analyst benefits from a variety of systems designed to detect changes in world events that may signal the possibility of a potential surprise. Analysts look for indicators that might serve as warning signals. By establishing specific targets that can be monitored frequently and regularly, changes to established patterns of behavior may be observed. For example, movements of military vehicles from regular routine travel, changes in fuel supplies or food shipments, shifts in political rhetoric by key politicians, or even changes in communications patterns may signal that something is happening that deserves extra attention. Analysts throughout the U.S. intelligence system can take advantage of a worldwide communications and warning network that monitors events through military commands and other facilities so that the changes, once observed, can be evaluated. This system operates twentyfour hours a day, seven days a week, and is supplemented, of course, by the twenty-four-hour news services such as CNN. The analyst, however, cannot just push the panic button every time change is observed. Though it is tempting to try to alert policy officials just to be sure there is no surprise, doing so may lead to the "cry wolf" syndrome. That is, after being awakened several times by overeager or nervous intelligence officers, policy officials may become blase; disinterested, or just annoyed. Then they might not respond when there really is a problem. Thus, analysts have to be careful about initiating the alerting process. Once they do initiate the process, analysts have to be able to convince their managers that there really is a problem, and there have been occasions when the analysts had warning of surprise but were unable to alert policymakers because senior intelligence officials were skeptical about the data. The senior officer in charge of warning at the CIA believed strongly that Saddam Hussein was preparing to invade Kuwait in 1990 but could not prove this to his bosses. 6 When he went to policy officials anyway with his information, they rejected it because senior CIA leaders had not approved. In the end, of course, the warning officer was

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correct, but some observers remember only that the CIA gave them little warning of the invasion. Preventing Surprise Although the system may not be able to prevent surprise in every case, the track record of American intelligence in detecting surprise is actually quite good. Unfortunately, there is little way to prove this, since in many cases the warnings issued by intelligence came early enough for policymakers to deal with the problems before they got out of hand. Thus, there were no crises, no publicity, and therefore no public record of success. Even within the intelligence system there was little effort to keep track of successful warning operations. We are left, then, with records only of failure, and these are not likely to be forgotten. Failure to detect changing events may be inevitable in intelligence, as Richard Betts has said, but he also points out that intelligence failure may really be policy failure when decisionmakers fail to pay attention to warnings or fail to take action.7 Intelligence warnings in the Middle East in regard to potential danger to U.S. Marines in Lebanon or soldiers in Saudi Arabia were apparently ignored by operational leaders, who took no action to protect their troops. The results were deadly. Reprisals by Iranians after the United States admitted the ailing Shah in 1978 were expected by intelligence analysts, but the U.S. embassy in Teheran was stormed anyway and hostages taken. 8 To make the warning process work properly, analysts have to provide detailed requirements to collectors so that the indicator targets can be regularly monitored. This suggests that there ought to be a close relationship between analysts and collectors and that efforts to have them work more closely together make sense. Of course, the monitoring of many indicators will be derived from technical collection systems rather than from espionage agents. Thus, analysts, especially those in the CIA or the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have to communicate regularly with the agencies that run the satellite systems. Modern electronic links between the agencies ought to facilitate this, but analysts have to understand the collection discipline of the technical agencies and spend time becoming known to their counterparts at NSA and the new NIMA. Although U.S. intelligence may not be able to avoid surprise completely, it can ameliorate the effects of surprise through rapid alerting of officials to crisis. This is an area in which the intelligence system is usually quite effective. Because all the intelligence agencies operate an alert, watch, or operations center—the terms are more or less synonymous— on a twenty-four-hour, seven-day-a-week basis, incoming intelligence from around the world can be reviewed rapidly, and hints that some-


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thing is happening are difficult to miss. Each watch center can communicate with all the others, so coordination or discussion among watch center analysts can easily be arranged. When it becomes clear that policy officials need to be alerted, communications systems are in place to make such alerting rather automatic. Unfortunately for policy officials, this means that a certain amount of practice must take place to ensure that the communications systems and equipment are working, so practice exercises have to be held periodically. This does not bother military people, but civilians can quickly become annoyed at being awakened just for an exercise. Nonetheless, experience shows that if communications and other electronic systems are not used frequently, they will not work just when they are needed, or watch officers may become rusty on procedures. Once policy officials are alerted to a crisis, intelligence officers must keep them informed about developments. Often an intelligence task force is established for a crisis, and the various watch centers facilitate preparation of situation reports periodically to keep policy and intelligence officials up to date on events as they unfold. Modern electronics have made it possible for intelligence analysts engaged in such task forces to communicate without actually moving to a central location and to coordinate the analytic judgments they put into the situation reports. Consumers usually understand that the intelligence analysis in situation reports is short term and can easily be overtaken by events. In the early days of the CIA, watch center officers could expect a steady flow of senior officers into the center to keep up with events, allowing rather junior analysts to meet and brief top officials. Electronic systems have probably killed the excitement of such meetings. The Importance of Personal Relationships Current and warning intelligence systems work well, even though policy officials sometimes say they could be better, without being specific about what should be included in the analysis. The various reform studies give such systems high marks, asking only that there should be better communication between intelligence and policy bureaucracies to make sure that the right subjects are covered on a timely basis. The Brown Commission thought that this might be facilitated by electronic systems, but the author is convinced that there is no substitute for establishing personal relationships between intelligence producers and policy consumers at all levels. Intelligence officers have to take the initiative to find their consumers, go to see them, establish a working relationship so that each is known to the other, and the intelligence officer has to determine what material would be useful for the consumer, not only meeting what

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the consumer thinks are his or her needs but also providing material that may not necessarily be welcome. Current studies as well as those carried out in prior years all point to the importance of the relationship between intelligence producers and policy consumers. There are many impediments, however, to making this relationship work. The intelligence agencies are, for the most part, physically separated from their consumers. The CIA, the DIA's analytic component, and NSA are all located away from Washington. They are easily connected through secure electronic communications both with each other and with consumers, but the physical separation means that the establishment of personal relationships is made that much more difficult. Analysts, who don't want to leave their desks anyway in case a key message comes in, are faced with heavy traffic, lack of parking, tedious bus systems, and other such problems in going downtown to the National Security Council Staff, to the State Department, or over to the Pentagon, where the consumers are located. Many analysts are introverts who are happy not to have to go out to meet people they do not know. The idea of calling some faceless policy official and arranging a meeting is anathema to an introvert, who would much rather do all the communication through the relative distance of the computer screen. Circuit Riders One solution to this chronic problem is to replicate in some ways the method used to keep the president informed, namely, by sending briefing officers out to the various policy officers on a periodic basis to give an intelligence briefing. This rarely works well because the briefers cannot be experts on everything and will either have to arrange to obtain answers to the questions they cannot handle or, more dangerously, tell more than they know. Such briefers were often referred to as "circuit riders," and they often wore out their welcome when it became clear that they were not the experts the policy officials wanted to see. Intelligence managers sometimes referred to such visits as "parish calls" and were clearly not interested in such visits, arranging them only to satisfy a mandate from the top. One answer to this question of establishing a better working relationship between producers and consumers is to put an analytic office in downtown Washington, where it would be relatively easy to find common ground between policy offices and the analysts. The intelligence system has always avoided this, claiming that political pressure on the analysts would destroy their objectivity. Intelligence managers have argued that analysts would be sucked into policy debates and would be pressured to tailor their analysis to meet policymakers' needs. This is


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not a frivolous argument. Policymakers often admit that what they want from intelligence is information to help them achieve their policy aims. They do not want to be told that the world is different from the way they see it, and they expecially do not want to be told that the policies they are pushing might not work. They see such negative information as obstructive or even as an effort by intelligence analysts to give assistance to their policy adversaries. The National Intelligence Council During his tenure as DCI, Robert Gates set out a series of reform measures, among which was a plan to move the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to a downtown location to facilitate better communication between senior intelligence officials and their consumers. The NIC is made up of twelve to eighteen very senior officials, each of whom has a specific functional or regional specialty. Some of the officials are professional intelligence analysts who have risen through the ranks; others are drawn from the military, from the foreign service, academe, or even from the operational side of intelligence. These officers, called national intelligence officers or NIOs, report directly to the DCI, are responsible for overseeing intelligence production in their specialty, and are in charge of coordinating this production throughout the Intelligence Community. The NIOs are also supposed to serve as a liaison with senior consumers to determine their intelligence needs. The NIOs supervise the production of interagency intelligence studies, including National Intelligence Estimates. The NIC has an interesting history. The system was put together when Bill Colby was DCI as a way to improve and modernize the Board and Office of National Estimates, which dated back to the earliest days of the CIA and which had its roots in the OSS. The board was seen as archaic, and some critics thought it had become merely a place to put senior officials before they retired. It had certainly become a poor imitation of the board of wise men envisioned by William Donovan and later established by DCI "Beetle" Smith. Arguing and defending an estimate in front of the board had become something like defending a Ph.D. thesis, only with professors who knew less about the subject than their students. Perhaps Colby had envisioned a council that would also serve as a substantive board of final review for interagency in-depth analysis, but the NIC never reached that point. Instead, the NIOs each went their own ways in determining what would be produced, and eventually each was given a deputy drawn from the ranks and the power to assign work to other Intelligence Community components as needed. It never became collegial, as the old Board of National Estimates had been, but it did

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create a new level of expertise at the highest levels of the intelligence system. In fact, the final level of review for estimates became the National Foreign Intelligence Board, which was made up of the directors of each of the IC agencies. The first director of the NIC—the chairman of the board, so to speak— was George Carver, a CIA professional who had come through the ranks, and a man who had considerable substantive expertise in a variety of areas and the complete confidence of the DCI. Carver set the tone for the role of the chair of the NIC as a close confidant of the DCI, his substantive spokesperson on intelligence issues and his alter ego in meetings with senior administration officials, members of Congress, or within the Intelligence Community. Subsequent NIC chairs took on the same role, and several of Carver's successors came from prestigious universities with no particular intelligence experience but with the cachet of being wise, well known, and well connected. The Impact of the NIC It is not clear why the plans to move this latest version of the "wise men" downtown never went anywhere. Instead, they remain located at the CIA, although they are technically not a part of the agency itself but, rather, a part of the DCI's community system. Because they are the most senior officials, meeting with their policy counterparts is made easier by their ability to arrange transportation downtown and to return them quickly, except in Washington's notorious rush hour, and they are usually well enough known to be able to get in to see the most senior people much more easily than an analyst in the lower ranks could. As usual in government, the NIO record in regard to improving producer-consumer relations is a mixed bag. Some NIOs have been particularly effective in this role; others have tended to closet themselves at Langley. It still seems to make sense to have the NIOs closer to the people they are supposed to serve. Not all of Washington's business is done in the office. Lunchtime is a critical part of the working day for senior officials at State, Defense, or the White House, and being close enough to take part in this daily ritual is important. In many respects, getting close to policy people is an operational problem for intelligence. Substantive officers, like their operational colleagues, have to establish a relationship through personal contact. This requires personal presence, and better electronics is not going to make the relationships more close. Long-term Analysis Although daily or current intelligence analysis is the product most used by policy consumers, the intelligence system continues to believe


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that its most effective output lies in the area of longer-term analysis. There has been a great deal of debate over the years about which longerterm or in-depth intelligence analyses are the most useful for consumers. In the 1960s, senior officers in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) decided that the daily and weekly analytic publications sent to policymakers were falling short of their needs. Of course, in-depth studies had been done from time to time, especially in the economic and military analytic offices, but the Office of Current Intelligence, where most of the political analysis was performed, had done relatively few of them. Eventually the flow of longer-term studies increased, and as the Directorate of Intelligence reorganized itself in various ways, the pressure to produce more "think-pieces" increased. An effort was made to study not only the substance of the material but the methodology as well. Could the traditional analytic methods be improved by using statistical or other analyses being pioneered in academe? The methodologists discovered that their new techniques were unpopular with analysts because they had no time to absorb these systems in the face of tight deadlines. Finally, in 1981, on becoming the deputy director for intelligence (DDI), Bob Gates decided that the Directorate of Intelligence would produce all the in-depth material he said policymakers were demanding. Every DI analyst was expected to produce at least two papers a year on subjects that would enlighten their consumers and provide the encyclopedic intelligence that decisionmakers needed. The result of this campaign was the production of some 5,000 reports a year, a figure of which Gates was quite proud. Looking back on this period, it now seems clear that this enormous effort achieved far less than Gates had hoped. Many consumers had no idea why they had received the papers they got from the CIA, were not interested in the subject, or had no need for the analysis when it arrived. 9 Typically these research papers went out to several hundred consumers, and informal surveys showed that some addressees had stuck them in a safe unread, passed them to others, or destroyed them without actually reading them. In some cases, the recipients had moved on to other offices or had left the government. In one case, the addressee had been dead for quite some time, but the office had never informed the CIA, which continued to send material. K n o w i n g Consumers Part of the problem, of course, was that some CIA analysts had little idea about their consumers or their needs. The analysts were also trapped by the production planning schedule, which required them to forecast the papers they planned to write. Because the plan called for quarterly submissions—every three months—many papers were pub-

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lished to meet the planning deadline, rather than the timing that would be most beneficial for consumers. Some papers arrived late, some too early, and some never got to the people who needed them. If the papers contained compartmented, Top Secret intelligence, some consumers had to go a special room to read them, could not take them back to their desks, and therefore lost interest in the studies. Managers thought they were doing good work through broad circulation of the intelligence studies, but in reality only a handful of consumers were really interested in any particular publication. This problem has been solved in part by the development of desktop publishing, which enables an analyst to produce a report in a limited number of copies with the same professional appearance as those coming out of the printing press. In fact, even in the Gates era, CIA analysts often wrote what became known as "typescript memos." These were studies that were not published through the regular production system, but which were requested by specific consumers. They lacked the style of the printed reports because they were typed and sent out just like an internal office memo. Analysts did not want to do such informal papers because they got more credit for the published ones. Now longer-term studies can be geared to the needs of individuals, delivered at just the right time, and not only cover the material in the ways most useful to the particular recipients but look professional as well. This issue is less significant in other analytic components—at DIA and State, for example—where analysts are used to the idea of gearing studies to individuals and producing only a handful of copies. At the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), such studies have usually been designed to support policy initiatives and are not written until specifically requested. At Defense, DIA studies are written to supplement war plans or contingency plans. Only the CIA became caught up in the publish-or-perish syndrome. Now the CIA's intelligence production can be set up for just-in-time delivery. 10

The Estimate There is yet one more intelligence product to examine, and that is the most controversial of all, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the forecast of the future, the premier product of intelligence. The theory behind the NIE or any long-range intelligence forecast is simple: Give very smart analysts good information, and they will be able to predict the future. This was the basis for General Donovan's "College of Cardinals" and later the Board of National Estimates. The theory is actually derived from British intelligence, whose leaders believed that analysts should be able to reach a judgment about the future if forced to


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do so. In practice, British analysts were indeed able to reach judgments about the future, but they tended to be rather general because the analysts could agree with each other only at a relatively low level. Over time the Americans modified British practice to look at a variety of possible scenarios for the future instead of seeking some basic thesis on which all could agree. Since the major analytic agencies were represented in drawing up the estimates, each had a voice in the conclusions. If the majority took one position, those who disagreed could "take a footnote." That is, the minority view could be represented as a dissent or disagreement, but only in small type at the bottom of the page. In practice, it was a way for intelligence managers to try to intimidate dissenters by forcing them to make their identities and dissents specific. Alternatively, it gave agencies who disagreed with the majority a chance to cover themselves if the estimate proved to be wrong. In later years, as the Board of Estimates became the National Intelligence Council, the NIEs have tried to present disagreements in the body of the text and argue out varying scenarios, especially when it is difficult to reach an agreed conclusion. The process of creating an estimate is lengthy and complicated, although in crisis situations, special estimates, or SNIEs, as they are called, have been turned out in just a few days. Each participating agency is expected to make inputs to a selected analyst or team that drafts the actual paper. Then, in a series of meetings, agency representatives hash out a final text. Finally, the draft is briefed to the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), made up of the directors of the agencies that constitute the Intelligence Community. If the NIE passes that hurdle, it is signed by the DCI and distributed to consumers. The Premier Product? Intelligence managers believe that the NIE is the premier output of the intelligence process. Although these papers may not necessarily predict the future, they do outline the most likely course of events, some possible scenarios that ought not to be overlooked, and even some unlikely possibilities that should not be ignored. The text is supposed to provide policymakers with a sense of the certainty of the analysts in their judgments. Because consumers may have differing views on what "probably" or "likely" means, analysts have begun to use betting terminology. They might, for example, indicate that they believe a scenario has one chance in five of taking place. Analysts are also supposed to indicate blanks in their knowledge, but this is difficult because any blank implies criticism of the collection system. Nonetheless, where gaps exist is important for readers to know.

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When each NIE is delivered to policy officials is usually a proud moment because these papers represent the best thinking within the intelligence system. Unfortunately, policy consumers have consistently indicated that they do not like them and do not rate them as highly as intelligence managers think. If the estimates reach conclusions with which policymakers agree, they dismiss the NIEs as telling them nothing they do not already know. 11 If the conclusions are at odds with what decisionmakers think, the NIEs may be dismissed as wrong, or even as an effort by intelligence leaders to drive policy. If over time the conclusions prove to be correct, intelligence is rarely given credit; but if the estimate turns out to be incorrect, then intelligence managers are blamed for an intelligence failure, especially if policymakers either fail to take action or move in the wrong direction. Clearly the NIE creates a "no-win" situation for intelligence. Nonetheless, intelligence managers continue to tout the NIE as an important input to policy, perhaps because of the long tradition and history associated with the intelligence estimate. In discussions with policy officials, in surveys of users, and in examining the fate of estimates, it is apparent that both intelligence managers and policy users expect more from this product than it can deliver. For policy consumers, the NIEs are too long, too complicated, and tell them more than they want to know. Many senior officials in policy agencies admit that they never read NIEs, or that if they open them at all, it is only to read the one- or two-page executive summary that gives them the bottom line, the key judgments of the estimate. In many cases these users are already knowledgeable about the subject of the estimate and have drawn their own conclusions based on a variety of sources, including current intelligence that they may have read over time. Lack of a Planning System Estimates are hampered as well by the lack of a long-range planning system in the national security policy apparatus of the U.S. government. Estimates try to look out about six months to a year, but policy planners rarely seem to look that far ahead. They are too busy dealing with current issues and efforts to take a longer-range view and are usually overtaken by whatever crisis is on the front burner in Washington. The Carter administration was one of the few to try to plot out long-range policy initiatives, but by the time the year-long studies were completed, the Carter White House was buried in a series of crises, and action on longrange plans had to be set aside. 12 Intelligence managers have to take some responsibility for the failure of the estimates process to have the impact it warrants. The managers


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have given policymakers the impression that the NIE will indeed be an accurate forecast, even though they should know that too many variables exist in most situations to make such predictions more than educated judgments. In their efforts not to overlook any possibility, the managers have allowed the estimates to become too complicated. They have not sold this product to consumers, and it should not be surprising that NIEs are not meeting consumers' needs. Interestingly, military intelligence estimates have fared better in the world of defense planning and receive higher marks than their civilian counterparts. War plans, contingency plans, and other such policyplanning documents in the Pentagon have always included within them a threat assessment or estimate about a potential enemy. Because these inputs are part of the plans, they are read and absorbed by military and defense leaders as a matter of course. They tend to be shorter than the NIEs and more specific. Written within the Pentagon system, they are usually not coordinated or even discussed with other agencies, although the analysts who write them are aware of what analysts in other agencies think about the issues contained in the threat analysis. The same process takes place at the State Department, where its small intelligence unit, INR, writes analysis keyed to policy initiatives as directed from the various policy offices. Although the forecasting done at Defense and State are well regarded by their respective consumers, this analysis can be criticized as being "politicized" in the sense that it gives decisionmakers information that they want to make and support policy. It is not necessarily policy neutral. In theory the NIEs written under the direction of the National Intelligence Council are independent of pressure from policy officials and free of politicization. They are also irrelevant to the making of national security policy in many cases. Can this situation be fixed? Perhaps it is time for intelligence to admit that analysts cannot predict the future, despite the best inputs, the most competent methodologies and the smartest writers. What they can and should do, however, is to provide policymakers with independent judgments about possible courses of events untainted by political pressure or bias. This is still a tall order and is the reason, more than any other, that estimates ought to be written by groups rather than by individuals. Team writing tends to eliminate bias because each team member will have different views and prejudices. A team is more likely to stand up against political pressure, especially if the members come from different parts of the Intelligence Community. There is no "magic bullet" in trying to forecast the most likely course of future events. Just as in current intelligence, analysts must look forward seeking trends, looking at the historical record, evaluating how individuals behave, and understanding the atmosphere in which events

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might take place. The process requires a thorough understanding of the culture and dynamics of an alien society and its people, and it requires a good deal of risk taking. Nonetheless, experience shows that this process can be taught to analysts whose academic expertise is usually in looking backward, rather than forward. A n Interactive Process It seems clear that the bureaucracy surrounding the estimates needs to simplified and streamlined. Intelligence managers have to realize that policymakers are not waiting around for the NIC to deliver its wise judgments before they take action. This suggests that the estimates team ought to have a way of telling consumers where they are going while they are going there. The estimates ought to be part of an interactive process in which consumers are consulted at each step. Consumers should be consulted as the terms of reference of the estimate—that is, the questions the estimate will seek to answer or the issues it will discuss—are put together, and they ought to be privy to the deliberations as they progress. If this process is carried out properly, the team's basic judgments will be known to decisionmakers well before the final version hits the street. Intelligence deals with uncertainty, and no part of the intelligence process is more uncertain than predicting the future course of events. Yet, if the creation of an estimate can be a dialogue rather than the delivery of a judgment as if from Mount Olympus, end-users will find the process more useful. Further, intelligence managers are going to have to trust the estimates teams they select to carry out the estimates dialogue without the constant supervision that has been so frustrating for analysts. In the early days of the CIA, analysts were hired because they were the best and the brightest and were therefore trusted to provide judgments to their consumers without having to pass their work through several levels of review. Fear of failure, however, has led to a process in which some analysts hardly ever see their analysis appear in print the way they wrote it. Everything written in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence seems to have been written by the same nerd. Managers argue that they have to be sure that what is delivered to consumers represents an agency rather than an individual viewpoint, but if the CIA is really hiring the best and the brightest, agency managers should be more confident about their troops. The Competence of Analysts This raises an issue that appears from time to time about the competence of intelligence analysts. Melvin Goodman, a frequent critic of in-


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telligence analysis and a former senior analyst and intelligence manager himself, has suggested that they are less than the best and often not the brightest. 13 Similar criticisms appeared in the report prepared by retired U.S. Navy admiral David Jeremiah, who was asked to determine why the CIA failed to catch Indian nuclear tests in 1998.14 Other critics, especially in the academic world, have made similar arguments. Is there merit in these criticisms? If so, what can be done about the problem? Analysts are recruited in much the same way as operations officers. Advertisements are aimed at students at the graduate level, and recruiters visit key college campuses to interview potential candidates. Emphasis is placed on language skills and area knowledge, but there has always been a certain bias in hiring in favor of those who might become case officers. Recruits who do not meet the operations officer personality test are relegated to the analytic directorate or to support fields. Just as in its failure to seek well-qualified operations officers, the agency does not really go after graduate students who might fit the analytic bill. Rather, the CIA offers the opportunity to apply and hopes that the right people will read the advertisements. At colleges and universities where intelligence is taught as an academic subject, students have the opportunity to learn more about intelligence. Academics who teach the subject report consistently that interest in intelligence as a career is high, although it is the rare student who is actually accepted into the profession. Unfortunately, intelligence agencies seem unaware of the growth and intensity of intelligence studies and have not taken advantage of this process as a recruiting tool. The CIA and other intelligence agencies continue to be reluctant, as well, to take in qualified analysts at mid-level grades. This might be understandable in intelligence operations, where tradecraft is a skill that is not easily learned in civilian endeavors. A great many people in the private sector have the talent, area knowledge, language ability, and experience to become good analysts. Even if interested in serving in intelligence, however, they could hardly be expected to go back to square one in their lives. They would have to be convinced that they could do some good by switching careers, and they would have to be offered sufficient monetary incentive to come aboard. So far, the CIA has failed to take advantage of the talent that is out there, continuing to run its personnel system just as it did in the Cold War. Analysts have been promised, since the earliest days of the CIA, that they could reach senior grade without having to become managers. This promise has never been fulfilled in any meaningful way. Some analysts have indeed been promoted to the lower senior grades, but the top ranks still go to office directors and division chiefs. It would seem feasible to create a separate career track for non-managers and promote them to the highest pay grades based on their capability and track record, but again, intelligence managers are mired in the old ways of doing things.

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These situations suggest that Mel Goodman is right, that the CIA and the other intelligence agencies are not attracting and retaining the best and the brightest. From an inside perspective, however, the view is somewhat different. The author served as an analyst, as an analytic supervisor, and as a production manager in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. The quality of analytic ability was never in question. The Directorate of Intelligence was filled with brilliant people with fascinating backgrounds, exceptional skills, and superior ability. If a problem existed, it was in the quality of training and preparation given analysts. Most had to learn the business on the job. Analyst Training Intelligence managers have traditionally believed that intelligence operations—managing espionage—can be learned only in an intelligence trade school, that is, at a place like the CIA's training facility in Virginia. Even trainees who have prior experience in military intelligence are told to forget what they had previously learned so that they could absorb the "right way" to do things. But in the world of intelligence analysis, managers have taken an entirely different approach. The CIA, for example, assumes that analysts would have learned about substantive issues in graduate school, and that they need to be trained only about the mechanics of writing intelligence products. The CIA used to invest considerable time and money in preparing operations officers for their work. Several of the author's classmates in operations training spent two years after training in foreign assignments where their only task was to perfect their language skills. The CIA has never given analysts that kind of opportunity. Analysts may indeed serve duty tours abroad, but only after they have become established in the profession. Overseas duty for analysts is considered more of a reward than an opportunity to advance their skills and knowledge, and they are rarely promoted because of their overseas performance. If anything, such so-called "rotational tours" are career-damaging for anyone below the most senior grades. The result of this bias is a situation in which a substantive analyst, who should be an expert in terms of the area he or she covers, may have spent far less time on the ground in the region than the consumers. Is it any wonder, then, that consumers may be skeptical about the analyst's expertise? Intelligence managers must begin investing in their analysts in the same way that they invest in operations officers. This means that analysts have to spend a fair part of their formative years in the area in which they are supposed to be expert. Unfortunately, several obstacles block such a practice.


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First, travel funds are usually in short supply in the analytic directorate. Operations people travel all the time and rarely run into a travel budget crunch, whereas travel for analysts has always been considered something of a luxury. Second, operational stations abroad do not welcome visiting analysts, consider them outsiders, and are reluctant to have to hand-hold them while they are in the area. Operations officers fear that the analysts will do something stupid to jeopardize operations, and, indeed, there have been some horror stories. Finally, analytic supervisors are reluctant to have their junior analysts running around overseas when they should be at their desks reading their mail. All of this must change if analysts are to become well versed in the politics, the culture, and the ambience of their area of expertise.

W o m e n and Minorities Another issue recently raised is criticism of the government's effort to attract more women and minorities into the profession of intelligence to redress the imbalance in the intelligence profession, which is still run mostly by white males. The CIA has tried a variety of schemes to try to recruit more women and minority candidates, but with only limited success. In his book on his experiences in the Clandestine Service, former operations officer Dewey Clarridge complains that the emphasis on female and minority hiring may well produce case officers who cannot be successful in recruiting agents. 15 In the world of analysis, though, sex and race should play no part. There is no position in the Directorate of Intelligence that could not be filled by someone other than a white male. In fact, the CIA's problem is not in hiring women and minorities, but in retaining them and in promoting them to senior positions. Although the CIA has recognized the "glass ceiling" problem facing women, it has promoted or appointed only a few women to senior positions. Minority officers are another story. No black, Latino, or Asian American has ever reached top rank anywhere in the Agency. Until that situation is remedied, the minority retention problem will continue, with little justification for the CIA's failure to deal more forthrightly with the issue. The production of finished intelligence is truly the "end game" of the intelligence business. Unless cogent analysis is provided to decisionmakers, the satellites and spies are not worth the money spent on them. Intelligence managers have to realize that intelligence analysis, while hardly the glamorous or adventurous part of the intelligence process, may be the most meaningful in terms of how the process serves policymaking. Observers of intelligence have been saying these things for years. Now it is time for the intelligence leadership to pay attention.

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Notes 1. The author first proposed this usage in his "Managing Intelligence Analysis: Strategies for Playing the End Game," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence. vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 321-343. 2. Edwin Fishel, The Secret War for the Union (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), pp. 298-299. 3. Barry M. Katz, Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 19421945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 4. George J. A. O'Toole, Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991). 5. Ibid. 6. Michael Wines, "Washington at Work; CIA Sidelines Its Gulf Cassandra," New York Times, 24 January 1991, p. D22. 7. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics, vol. 31, 1978. 8. Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (Harrisonburg, VA: R. Donnelly & Sons, 1986). 9. The author participated in several studies on the value of long-term analysis; all reached more or less the same conclusions. 10. John C. Gannon, "Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence/' address to a conference at Georgetown University, 20 March 1997. 11. Consumer surveys have consistently produced such judgments. 12. The author studied the uses of intelligence in the Carter administration while serving as a DCI Fellow in the Center for the Study of Intelligence. 13. Melvin Goodman, "The Road to Intelligence Reform: Paved with Good Intentions," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 1997. 14. Walter Pincus, "CIA Chief Cited Loss of Agency's Capabilities," Washington Post, 25 May 1998, p. A4. 15. Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons (New York: Scribner, 1997).

CHAPTER 4

Secret Operations When the famous Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu wrote about intelligence in his treatise The Art of War, much of the material actually concerned what we call today "covert action," secret operations designed to carry out security or defense policy rather than collecting and analyzing information. Writers about intelligence and practitioners of the art have used other terms for covert action, including psychological warfare, active measures (Russian terminology), or "dirty tricks" (used mostly by those opposed to covert action). Covert action includes a variety of activities that deserve careful explanation and scrutiny because in democractic societies such activity is quite controversial. Certainly covert action has played an important role in American history, although it is a factor that is often ignored or misunderstood by historians, perhaps because so much of it remains buried in secret archives. Covert action isn't intelligence in the strict sense, yet intelligence services are almost always involved in carrying out such activity largely because they have the resources to do it. They have secret agents, safe houses, spy paraphernalia, and other tradecraft necessary to hide covert action, so that a government undertaking such action can deny the activity if it becomes public. This "deniability" has been especially important in democractic societies when questions are raised about the morality or legality of such operations. Of course, dictators and authoritarian governments do not have to worry about moral or legal issues, although they, too, enjoy the benefits of being able to deny responsibility for secret operations.

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A Third Option What is covert action? Most modern scholars who have written about covert action agree about what it is, although they do not necessarily agree about how different aspects of covert action should be categorized. Some say that covert action is designed to serve as a "third option," lying somewhere between military force on one end of the spectrum and diplomacy on the other. Covert action would be used to accomplish an objective when military force is too strong and where open diplomacy is not strong enough. Others argue that covert action by itself cannot be decisive and should be used only as an adjunct to some larger scheme of policy. Professor Roy Godson, an intelligence scholar at Georgetown University, has pointed out that covert action is not a "magic bullet." 1 A Variety of Activities Covert action encompasses a variety of activities designed to accomplish objectives in such a way that the hand of the action country is not seen, or at least in a way that provides deniability. Covert action may include political operations to aid favored parties or factions in a target country, especially in situations where these groups may be at a serious disadvantage. Thus, the United States aided Solidarity in Poland when it became the victim of a government crackdown in the 1980s, but this had to be done secretly of course, to protect Solidarity members and the reputation of the party. Covert action can mean the use of economic action to disrupt an adversary's financial structure or other parts of its economy. Iran has been accused of secretly forging U.S. banknotes as a way of disrupting the American economy, although most of the counterfeit bills have circulated outside the United States. Former members of the KGB, highly skilled in the techniques of forgery, may be doing the same thing. Covert action encompasses various aspects of psychological warfare, including the use of "black propaganda" that hides the origin of the information; deception, especially in military operations; and disinformation, circulating false information to disrupt or discredit an adversary. During the Cold War the United States sponsored a number of clandestine radio stations whose function was to broadcast news as the United States saw it, but whose sponsorship was hidden; these stations included Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Later, these stations became acknowledged entities of the U.S. government. Deception operations are widely known in U.S. history, from George Washington's use of deception to trick the British and their Hessian allies

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at the Battle of Trenton to General Schwarzkopf's deception to mask his flank attack on Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Deception to trick an enemy is a key factor in Sun Tzu's writings; there is no more graphic example of its use than the Allied creation of a "phony" army in World War II to convince the Nazis that the D-Day invasion was to come at Calais rather than at Normandy. Disinformation was a major part of the KGB's efforts to discredit the United States and the CIA during the Cold War. Some of the charges seem ludicrous, but they were—and still are—widely believed in parts of the Third World. The Russians circulated stories that the CIA had created the AIDS virus as a by-product of its drug experiments and that the United States was behind the assassinations of world leaders from Olaf Palme in Sweden to Indira Gandhi in India, not to mention Martin Luther King and Malcolm X. Although no facts were ever presented to substantiate such charges, they were couched in a such a way as to make them believeable. The Soviets valued disinformation so highly that they co-opted the Czech intelligence service to carry out disinformation operations on behalf of the USSR throughout the Cold War. 2 Support for Paramilitary Forces Finally, covert action includes support for guerrilla, irregular, or paramilitary forces who may fight as surrogates for their secret sponsors. During the American Revolutionary War, the French sent secret aid to the Americans as a way of getting back at the British, and they even enlisted clandestine help from Spain for the enterprise. Later the United States sent secret aid to Panamanian revolutionaries who were trying to throw off Colombian rule. Of course, the U.S. assistance was not altruistic; rather, it was part of an agreement to give rights to the United States to build a canal if the revolutionaries were successful. During the Cold War there were many cases on both sides of aid to paramilitary groups. For example, in Central America, the KGB aided the Farobundo Marti guerrillas in El Salvador, who were fighting a U.S.favored government; while next door in Nicaragua, the U.S.-backed Contras were trying to unseat a Soviet-supported Sandinista regime. Both sets of guerrillas were considered "freedom fighters" by their respective clandestine supporters. The use of terrorist tactics, including assassination, is also part of covert action, but the United States has foresworn such operations ever since they were banned by the first of a series of presidential executive orders in 1976.3 The Soviets were not so fussy and were known to have carried out assassinations—"wet operations" in their terminology— against defectors such as Stefan Bandera and Georgi Markov. Other

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nations, including Syria, Libya, and Iran, are believed to be using their intelligence services to carry out state-sponsored terrorism against targets in the West and in Israel. The Agent of Influence In covert action operations, a key figure is the so-called agent of influence, a secret agent who does not steal information but, rather, manages the covert action. He or she may be recruited and handled by the sponsoring intelligence service in much the same way as a spy who gathers data, but the role of the agent of influence is different. The covert action agent serves as the conduit for passing money, providing arms, or giving other assistance to political parties or military groups. When the operation becomes too large, the sponsoring country may seek broader help from another intelligence service. The CIA reportedly used the Pakistani intelligence service to handle support for the guerrilla fighters trying to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan, for example. 4 The KGB turned to the Cuban intelligence service, the DGI, to assist in defeating antiCommunist guerrillas in Angola and Ethiopia. The Cold War is over, but covert action remains part of the arsenal of the major powers as well as that of many lesser nations. Now observers of intelligence as well as reformers are asking if covert action should be used against the post-Cold War problems such as global organized crime, terrorism, and drug cartels. To answer that question, a more detailed examination of covert action and its history is necessary. Just as in the case of espionage, the roots of covert action lie deep, although the information is fragmentary and anecdotal. Early Uses of Covert Action in the United States Over the past ten years a number of good books on covert action have appeared, mostly focused on covert action by the United States, partly because the history of its use has been hidden and because so much controversy surrounds it.5 We know now that covert action has been a part of American history since the earliest days of revolutionary fervor in the British colonies and that is it not merely a child of the Cold War. Even before the Declaration of Independence, the American colonists had formed secret committees to gather arms and to share information about their British masters. When war broke out, it was clear that George Washington would have to use all possible methods if his rag-tag army of poorly trained colonials was going to defeat what was then part of the best-trained and -equipped army in the world. Washington may

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never have heard of Sun Tzu, but Washington's tactics in winning the war might have come right out of the ancient Chinese philosopher's book. Washington tricked the British generals into believing that his army was much larger than its actual strength by circulating false information to British spies, and Washington's deputies were able to keep the British from attacking by deceptive demonstrations of strength by a handful of troops. Washington understood the value of propaganda and at one point arranged the purchase of a newspaper, the Montreal Gazette, as a way of trying to convince the Canadians to join the revolution. The French engaged in deception as well in supporting the Americans by setting up a phony trading company—what we would call today a "proprietary"—to cover the secret transfer of funds and arms to the United States. After the war, Washington insisted, when he became president, that a secret fund, the Contingent Fund for Foreign Intercourse, be established to give him the ability to carry out secret operations without having to reveal to Congress what he was doing, only that he had spent the money. The first allocation amounted to $40,000, but it soon grew to $1 million, almost 12 percent of the federal budget. It demonstrated that Congress understood that in matters of clandestine operations, the chief executive was to be the controller and ratified the views contained in the Federalist Papers that such operations would be possible only if they were kept hidden. Although there is no evidence that John Adams dabbled in covert action, his successors in the White House were not reluctant to take advantage of secret operations in carrying out foreign policy. Thomas Jefferson became the first president to approve an operation to overthrow a government hostile to the United States, and James Madison used secret agents to try to wrest East and West Florida away from Spanish rule. When Congress sought to find out more about these operations, the White House refused to turn over full information, a tradition that has lasted until the modern era. Dispatching Secret Agents Andrew Jackson, our first "western" president, was not above sending secret agents to bribe foreign officials to bend to American will. John Tyler (who became president in 1841 only because William Henry Harrison contracted pneumonia and died in office after a long-winded inaugural speech in freezing Washington weather) permitted his secretary of state to engage in a highly questionable disinformation campaign in order to convince the people of Maine to sign on to the Webster-

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Ashburton Treaty establishing the northern border with Canada. This effort involved the circulation of doctored maps, the use of foreign funds, and secret deals that bring to mind the later scandals of the Iran-Contra affair. When Congress sought to investigate, Tyler's successor, James Knox Polk, refused to turn over the data, claiming executive privilege. In a statement that rings as true today as it did in 1846, Polk wrote: The experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public safety or the public good to make expenditures, the very object of which would be defeated by publicity. Some governments have very large amounts at their disposal, and have made vastly greater expenditures than the small amounts which have from time to time been accounted for on the president's certificates. In no nation is the application of such sums ever made public. In time of war or impending danger the situation of the country may make it necessary to employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining information or rendering other important services who could never be prevailed upon to act if they entertained the least apprehension that their names or their agency would in any contingency be revealed.6 As they did from time to time in such circumstances, members of Congress raised a fuss but in the end permitted the chief executive to protect the operations and agents just as Polk had demanded. Covert Action and War Polk engaged again in covert action in order to support rebels seeking to overthrow Mexican rule in California and to foment war with Mexico over Texas. According to Professor Stephen Knott, who has documented these operations in detail, Polk's instructions to his agents were vague and occasionally contradictory. Nonetheless, they resulted in a vast expansion of the United States along its present borders. Polk thus deserves credit, not only for his deft handling of American expansionism, but also for his understanding of the utility of covert action as an adjunct to foreign policy. During the Civil War both sides engaged actively in covert actions, from the use of political action to propaganda, disinformation, and sabotage. President Lincoln sent agents to Europe to squelch efforts by the European powers to recognize the Confederacy, and his agents arranged to interfere with ship construction in England, the main source of supplies for the rebels. We don't know quite as much about Confederate operations because many records were destroyed in the sack of Richmond, but rebel agents were known to have given clandestine support to the anti-war Copperheads in the North.

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Toward the end of the nineteeth century, President Benjamin Harrison, taking a page from President Madison's book, used a secret agent to foment rebellion among the American planters who had moved into the Hawaiian Islands, eventually forcing Queen Liliuokalani out of power. Harrison's successor, Grover Cleveland, while expressing regret about the queen's overthrow, refused to undo the action that had resulted in the islands' becoming a territory of the United States.

The United States Acquires an Empire There was probably no more blatant secret operation run out of the White House than the one that created the Republic of Panama and gave the United States the land to build the Panama Canal. President Theodore Roosevelt himself provided the guiding hand behind the operation, taking advantage of a rebel movement in Panama that was seeking to throw off Colombian rule. One of the secret agents in the operation, Manuel Amador, later became Panama's first president—the first but certainly not the last president of Panama to take money from the United States. Roosevelt was quick to claim credit for the adventure when he was criticized by Congress, thereby violating the unwritten rule of deniability. Roosevelt's secretary of war later said that Roosevelt had been accused of seduction but was in fact guilty of rape. 7 The United States had thus acquired an empire partly as a result of its secret operations, aided by the power of the U.S. Navy. The United States then entered a period of isolation, broken only by its reluctant entrance into World War I. Not until Franklin Delano Roosevelt became president did the United States again turn to secret operations, spurred by the specter of war. It was FDR who created America's first organized intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services, under the leadership of General William Donovan, and part of its mandate involved covert action. The creation of the OSS enabled the White House to shift responsibility for secret operations to this new organization, a situation that lasted until 1945. During World War II the OSS and other military intelligence units carried out secret operations against the Nazis and the Japanese at the direction of the White House and U.S. military commanders. Sabotage, psychological warfare, the use of secret agents, even assassination, became the order of the day. The United States aided the Norwegian underground in destroying Nazi nuclear research facilities, the U.S. Army Air Corps targeted Japan's Admiral Yamamoto for assassination, and secret agents in France were enlisted to sabotage roads and bridges in advance of the Allied invasion of the Continent. Such operations, when

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they became known, were applauded as an integral part of the war effort, although they might not have been tolerated in peacetime.

The CIA Takes on Covert Action After World War II the OSS was disbanded and its secret operations handed over to the Pentagon. These operations included efforts, largely unsuccessful, to prevent the Soviets from putting puppet regimes in power in Eastern Europe, but also operations designed to snatch German scientists before they could fall into Soviet hands. After the CIA was created in 1947, most of these secret operations were passed to the new agency despite grumbling from the Pentagon. Some CIA officials questioned whether or not the CIA really had authority to carry out covert action. The law that created the CIA merely said that it should carry out activity related to intelligence as directed by the president or the National Security Council. The first DCI under the new system, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoeter, asked for advice from his legal counsel, who recommended against covert action, but Hillenkoeter decided to go ahead in 1948 with plans to aid the Christian Democratic Party of Italy stave off an election bid by the Communist Party (PCI). The Soviets threw their support to the PCI, but the Americans had much more experience in "buying" elections and in the end, the PCI was defeated. This operation confirmed the role of CIA in covert action. This system for carrying out secret operations at the direction of the White House required that Congress be brought in to provide the funding. The "secret fund" operation used by so many presidents was no longer in effect, since the mandate had gotten so big. Congress wanted to know in general what was going on, although many members thought that they should not be privy to operational details because that would be dangerous. Since there were no intelligence committees in those days, the CIA worked with key members and subcommittees to arrange financing of secret operations. 8 The record of accomplishment is mixed.

Controversial Operations Efforts to overthrow a reformist and freely elected government in Guatemala in 1954 remain controversial even now. At the time the replacement of President Jacobo Arbenz was seen as a victory against the spread of communism in Central America, although Arbenz was hardly a Communist. His reformist ideas included plans to seize the property of the

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United Fruit Company and pay compensation based on the measly sum the company had declared as the value of the property. United Fruit lobbied Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had served United Fruit as its general counsel, and Dulles turned to his brother Allen, the DCI, to help out. The CIA carried out a psychological warfare campaign and was able to force Arbenz to quit. Critics of the policy, even now, note that this may have been the main cause behind Guatemala's subsequent civil war, which raged into the 1990s and reportedly resulted in thousands of deaths. Another "victory" for covert action was the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime in Iran at about the same time as the Guatemala campaign. The young and timid shah had been forced into exile by Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who planned to take over British and American oil assets in Iran. Naturally this made him a Communist in some eyes. The situation was further complicated by the threat that the USSR might somehow move into northern Iran if Mossadegh remained in power. The CIA was again enlisted to save the day. Chief of Station Kermit Roosevelt organized riots and demonstrations against Mossadegh, and the prime minister was forced to resign. The shah returned, thanked Roosevelt for saving his throne, and began a period of rule that ended in his overthrow by the fundamentalist Shiite clergy in 1978. It was another case of shortterm victory becoming a long-term disaster.

A b u s e s of Covert Action Other operations to change governments unacceptable to the United States did not go as well as those in Italy, Guatemala, and Iran. An effort to oust President Sukarno in Indonesia in 1958 failed miserably; the CIA had tried to convince the Eisenhower administration not to try it but was pressed to carry out the operation anyway. Interestingly, the Indonesians themselves eventually ousted Sukarno's government. Although the subsequent regime under President Suharto was only minimally democratic, it was stable and anti-Communist, just what Washington wanted. In this case, short-term failure resulted in a long-term victory in the Cold War. The worst abuse of covert action came in the wake of Fidel Castro's rise to power in Cuba in 1959. When Castro announced that he was really a Marxist-Leninist and threw in his lot with the Soviets, he became anathema to Washington. The attempt to oust him by arranging an invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs was not only a disaster, it turned out that the director of operations at the CIA—then called the deputy director for plans—Richard Bissell had lied to the White House, Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DCI, and his colleagues about the operation. 9 Bissell knew it had little chance of success, but apparently he

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thought that somehow the new president, John F. Kennedy, would bail out the operation with U.S. military troops. The failure to get rid of Castro by military force led to a new operation—spurred, it appears, by the president's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy—to assassinate the Cuban leader. The younger Kennedy may not have said "kill him" in so many words, but CIA leaders determined that a hit was what the White House wanted. Of course, the many rather bizarre attempts to kill Castro failed, and he has outlasted six U.S. presidents at last count. Even now a psychological warfare campaign against Castro seems to be ongoing, although it is no longer clandestine.

The Doolittle Mandate In all these cases, the U.S. was following a policy outlined by General Jimmy Doolittle in 1954. Doolittle had been asked to carry out an examination of U.S. intelligence as part of a larger study on government at the time. In regard to covert action, Doolittle wrote: It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of fair play must he reconsidered. We must. . . learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.10 This policy of seeking to be at least as devious as our adversaries continued for almost twenty years. Orders to carry out covert action came from the White House but were driven at times by the State Department or the president's close advisors. Members of Congress provided the money and did not ask too many questions. The CIA never made final decisions about covert action by itself, although it may from time to time have made suggestions to State officials or the White House staff. Nonetheless, the CIA gained a reputation as a secret government, planning and carrying out covert action without any oversight from anyone, raising money by secret means to fund the operations. In reviewing the covert actions carried out by the CIA during the early Cold War period, CIA historian Michael Warner describes in some detail efforts by the CIA to recruit liberal and even leftist groups to take up the ideological struggle against the Communist enemy. 11 These cooperative groups included labor organizations, student and academic orga-

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nizations, and political groups of various leanings. In some cases key officials in these organizations were aware of the ties to the CIA, but many leaders and the rank-and-file were kept in the dark.

A Mixed Record Looking back, it seems clear that many of these groups would have been unable to combat their Soviet-sponsored counterparts without funding from the U.S. government. Because of the rampant antiCommunist hysteria in the United States at that time, open funding by Congress would have been impossible. Thus, hiding the funds by letting the CIA manage the money gave Congress a way out. We know now that some key members of Congress were quite aware of these secret operations but chose not to seek the details. 12 The other aspects of covert action during the Cold War period have been described and discussed in detail elsewhere in books, journal articles, and the press. Both the Americans and the Soviets used the full panoply of covert action operations against each other with mixed success. We supported practically anyone willing to declare himself antiCommunist, whereas the Soviets were willing to aid those who said they were Marxist-Leninist. The outcomes of these efforts were hardly what each side professed as its goals. We ended up backing a variety of dictators from Somoza in Nicaragua to Mobutu in Zaire, all in the name of democracy, and the Soviets found themselves backing such stalwart "Communists" as Mengistu in Ethiopia and Najibullah in Afghanistan. Ironically, the one real ideologue in the mix, Salvador Allende in Chile, got relatively little support from the USSR. Finally, a series of revelations in the press about covert action operations, triggered in part by the Watergate affair and hints of CIA involvement, as well as by the overthrow of the Allende government, caused the pot to boil over. Senator Frank Church of Idaho led a congressional inquiry in the Senate on the allegations that the CIA was a secret government—a "rogue elephant" in Church's terminology—carrying out the foreign policy of the nation using covert action.13 Church thought that neither the president nor Congress was privy to the CIA's activities. We now know that Church was quite wrong. The investigation and subsequent report have become public and permit an examination of all the alleged abuses in detail. Results of the Church Committee Investigation In fact, the CIA never plotted its operations behind closed doors without direction from the White House, and members of Congress were only

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too willing to provide the money as long as their role could remain secret. If CIA officials were guilty of anything, it was perhaps a bit more enthusiasm for some of the more hair-brained schemes than was warranted. In retrospect, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba seem amateurish. Far worse, the CIA's involvement in drug experimentation, in which mind-altering drugs were administered to unwitting victims, one of whom subsequently committed suicide, might lead today to an indictment for criminal behavior. White House oversight of the operations was loose at best, and Congress preferred not to know. Is it any wonder that there were significant errors in judgment? With the revelations of the Church Committee and those of the press, Congress was forced to come to grips with its failure to exercise adequate oversight of the intelligence process. At the same time the White House recognized that it, too, needed to take a stronger hand in the direction of intelligence operations. The result was the establishment of oversight committees for intelligence in both houses of Congress and the issuance of the first of a series of executive orders by President Gerald Ford regulating intelligence. The executive order banned assassination or any effort to support such practices and forbade drug experimentation as well. The congressional committees soon realized that their role should go well beyond the narrow oversight of covert action. They established, as their mandate, budget review, evaluation of intelligence analysis and management practices, and counterintelligence matters. On the Senate side, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) became the group responsible for determining the suitability of the president's choice for DCI, a role that has become increasingly important and increasingly visible. In fact, the establishment of rigorous congressional oversight of intelligence has changed the balance between the executive and legislative branches in ways that would have astonished the Founding Fathers of the nation, who thought that intelligence operations were an executive function only. Still, the establishment of congressional oversight has provided an unexpected benefit in regard to covert action. To have a covert action, the president must issue a written "finding" that the operation is necessary and has his approval, and then the DCI must advise Congress of the president's intentions through the oversight committees. Although the committees cannot veto the operation, they can seek to have the president withdraw his plans, or they can try to stop funding for the covert action. The committee members are not supposed to reveal the covert action in order to tie the president's hands, but there have been leaks from Capitol Hill from time to time. Nonetheless, having a system that requires the White House to keep Congress in the loop on covert action means that though the public can't know about these actions ahead of

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time, their representatives in Congress are acting on the public's behalf to make sure that covert actions are acceptable.

Controlling Covert Action The oversight system has not eliminated the tension between the executive and legislative branches over the control of intelligence operations. It has, however, made it more visible. Congress has for years sought to force the president to provide information about covert action before the start of operations, but without success. Modern presidents have claimed executive privilege just as early presidents had done. The president is required to provide information only on a timely basis and may even restrict the briefings on covert action to key members of Congress in the interests of national security. In the covert action set up to free hostages taken by militant students in Iran after the fall of the shah, Congress was kept in the dark to prevent leaks that might have scuttled the effort. Even though the main mission failed, some Americans were taken out of Teheran in a secret operation in cooperation with Canada that would have been impossible if even a hint of it had become public. 14 Although Congress was critical of the handling of the hostage rescue operation, it did not complain about the administration's reluctance to advise it about the covert action aspects of the scheme. Perhaps Congress would have taken a different stance had the cooperative effort with Canada gone awry, but success is usually welcomed by congressional overseers. Failure to advise Congress about various aspects of the Reagan administration's support for the Contras in Nicaragua, however, became a key factor in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. It appears that President Reagan was given bad advice about his responsibilities in telling Congress about his secret operations. Some of the president's close advisors thought that the oversight rules allowed them to keep secret operations from the oversight committees if the operation was run directly from the White House rather than through the CIA. A number of rules were violated, causing Congress to try to micro-manage the intelligence process to prevent further abuse. The public was unhappy about the administration's Central American policy anyway and was unenthusiastic about aiding the Contras in trying to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and in giving support to the right-wing regime in neighboring El Salvador. Yet, the public favored covert action to support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, even though there was not much distinction between the Afghan rebels and the Contras.

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Fixing the Spy Machine Rules for Covert Action

This demonstrates several important lessons. Covert action will probably gain public support if the overall policy of which the action is a part is popular, and the public will oppose secret operations in support of a policy it does not like. Second, if the administration chooses to have a covert operation, it should use the system set up to run it, not turn to White House amateurs as stand-in case officers. Finally, trying to make an end run around the rules set up to control covert action only leads to abuse. There are other rules, as well, that will be discussed later. The tension between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government regarding covert action has led to making Congress become increasingly aggressive about its role in determining the scope of U.S. intelligence operations, with the White House trying to fight back by restricting the information it gives Capitol Hill. Thus, CIA officials, required not to lie to Congress, have taken a page from DCI Bill Casey's book, answering only the questions asked in congressional hearings and volunteering nothing. If congressional staffers—some of whom are former intelligence officers themselves—do their homework and ask the right questions, the committees can perform their oversight function. If they do not probe in the right places, the committees are likely to remain in the dark about secret operations. With the end of the Cold War and the defeat of the "implacable enemy," new questions have been raised about covert action. Whether or not covert action was a significant factor in the Cold War is extremely difficult to say, but there is no question that the intelligence officers engaged in the battles thought they were doing the right thing in going head to head with the Communist adversary. Clearly there were successes and failures, but one can only imagine what might have happened had we done nothing. Is Covert Action Still Necessary? Critics of covert action argue that as the world's leading democratic nation, the United States has no business engaging in such practices. Yet, all the investigations of secret intelligence operations—the Church Committee, the Rockefeller Commission, the Joint Investigation of the IranContra Affair—have all concluded that covert action is and ought to remain an important part of the U.S. national security arsenal and that the capability to carry out such operations should be maintained, but carefully controlled. No president in modern times, Democrat or Repub-

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lican, liberal or conservative, has stood for election on a platform that calls for the end of covert action, and no president in modern memory has said that he would not use it. Perhaps covert action made sense during the Cold War when we were facing an adversary who was highly skilled in its use; it seemed then to be good policy to fight fire with fire. But now the problems are different. We are no longer trying to win the hearts and minds of the uncommitted and to roll back Communist ideology. Instead we face what former DCI R. James Woolsey called "poisonous snakes," problems that during the Cold War were minor irritants but now have become potential threats to American security. These include the so-called rogue states, nations that seem to defy the rule of law and international agreements, states including Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Other threats come from terrorists, some of whom are sponsored by the rogue states, from drug dealers, and from foreign organized crime. Is there a role for covert action in combating these threats? Should secret operations continue to be a regular part of U.S. national security policy? So far, the answer seems to be a qualified yes. During the Cold War the CIA was accused of overthrowing governments throughout the world, although in reality it ran relatively few such operations and with only limited success. It seems unlikely that covert operations to depose Saddam Hussein or other dictators we dislike will work unless the people they lead really want to depose them as well. More and more, we are seeing indigenous movements grow in opposition to some of our former Cold War partners, and these movements do not seem to want our help. They understand that they could be tarnished if they were to be perceived as the handmaidens of the United States. This did not keep House Speaker Newt Gingrich from pressing $20 million on the CIA to overthrow the government of Iran, of course, but the glare of publicity surrounding the issue would certainly prevent the CIA from carrying out the operation in secret.15 Dealing with terrorists is another vexing problem for covert action. Terrorist groups are difficult to penetrate because they operate in small cells and their members are prone to violence. Distaste for recruiting such people is growing, and trying to stop or thwart their operations does not seem to be a valid target for most covert operations. The same may be said about operations to stop drug dealers and organized criminal operations. Some conservatives have argued that covert action might be used to disrupt terrorists or criminals, but it seems more likely that a combination of good intelligence and effective police operations will be more successful at thwarting crime. This creates a different set of problems, which will be discussed in a later chapter.

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Fixing the Spy Machine Managing the N e w Covert Action

Covert action operations—or at least the capability to carry out such activity—has been eroded by the loss of intelligence veterans from the Cold War period. Coupled with low morale at the CIA and increasing public attention, carrying out such clandestine work has become increasingly difficult for the United States. Supporters of the system and reformers alike nonetheless agree that the United States should maintain the capability to carry out covert action. Only those on the fringes—some of them who decry covert action as inappropriate for a free and open society and others who think it gets in the way of other intelligence work—have called for an end to it. Since the political leadership in the United States, Republican and Democrat alike, seems to want to have the capability to use covert techniques, it seems unlikely that covert action will disappear anytime soon. Evaluating the success or failure of a covert action is probably more difficult than judging intelligence collection or analysis. Keeping score in the collection of intelligence comes down to whether or not the collectors were able to obtain the needed information and if their techniques were appropriate. Evaluating analysis is more difficult, but intelligence managers have developed useful systems for making such judgments. Evaluating covert action is not so easy, though. Judging covert action on the basis of the accomplishment of the mission may miss the long-term implications of what has been done. In Guatemala, for example, the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz was seen, in 1954, as a victory against the Communist menace in Central America, and the restoration of the shah in Iran kept a friendly ruler in power. In the long run, however, what happened was hardly of benefit to either the United States or the target countries. Guatemala slipped into a period of prolonged instability and civil war and thousands died. Iran has gone from being a stalwart defender of U.S. interests in the Middle East, albeit under a weak ruler, to an adversarial, theocratic state that wants to spread its fundamentalist philosophy throughout the Muslim world and views the United States as the "Great Satan." Short-term success has led to long-term failure in both cases. Of course, there is another side to the coin. There have been occasions when a covert action has failed, but the long-term outcome sought by the United States was achieved anyway. Failure to overthrow Sukarno in Indonesia in 1958, for example, led to the development of a stable regime, although the United States could hardly claim responsibility for the outcome. Even in Chile there has been a victory, though not without a high price. The overthrow of leftist Salvador Allende, sought so

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strongly by the Nixon administration, came about in spite of efforts by the CIA. It was Allende's own army chief, General Augusto Pinochet, who brought down his president and without U.S. help. This led to almost fifteen years of draconian rule by the Chilean military; but democracy has now been restored in Chile, the outcome sought in vain by Nixon. This was hardly a victory for U.S. covert action, but the end result was what Washington wanted. Only Fidel Castro remains to demonstrate that covert action is not a "magic bullet." Efforts to kill him consistently failed, and operations to destabilize his regime were neutralized by Castro's ruthless security service. Propaganda "radios" have not done the job either. Here is a case where short-term failure has led to a long-term problem. In fact, the revelations about Washington's efforts to bring down the Cuban dictator have only strengthened his hand and his resolve to maintain the last of the Marxist-Leninist dictatorships. Recent Cases Two more recent cases are instructive of how a short-term covert action victory can lead to an unexpected outcome in the long run. U.S. attempts to unseat the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s by backing a rag-tag coalition of rebel groups quickly became widely known. Many in the United States opposed this policy, even though the president called the rebels "the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers." This led to protests, demonstrations, and an outcry in the United States against covert action. Although covert support for the Contras, as the U.S.-backed rebels were known, did not bring down the Sandinistas, the policy certainly weakened the Managua government. Finally, the Sandinista regime decided to hold an open and honest election, perhaps to demonstrate once and for all that it was the legitimate government of Nicaragua. To everyone's surprise, the Sandinistas lost at the polls the power they had won by the bullet. But the Contras did not win either. Instead, a new power center developed that put Nicaragua back on the road to stable democracy. One could argue that this happened despite Washington's best efforts. In Afghanistan, a different situation developed. Again, the covert action campaign became widely known, but in this case the administration's policy—to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, where they had been ever since their invasion of the country in the 1970s—garnered broad support. The rebels in Afghanistan—again, a coalition of disparate groups—became known as the mujahedeen, and the CIA established a

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conduit through Pakistan to provide them with arms, ammunition, and training. Instead of protesting, however, the American people cheered, and there was a sense of victory when the Soviets were forced to withdraw. In this case, the victory was short-lived. The puppet regime the Soviets had installed in Kabul under former security chief Najibullah did not collapse, as the CIA had predicted, when the Soviets pulled out. Instead, the mujahedeen began fighting among themselves over who was to take power, their squabble leading to chaos and civil war. The current rise of the Taliban, a fanatic, fundamentalist Muslim group, has produced a regime that is, if anything, worse than the Soviet-backed Najibullah dictatorship. A short-term victory for the United States and for covert action has become a long-term disaster.

Evaluating Covert Action The preceding examples demonstrate that judging the success or failure of a covert action solely on the accomplishment of the short-term mission may not be particularly sound. In fact, the evaluation of covert action is a subject that has received relatively little attention by intelligence managers. Figuring out whether or not a covert action has been a success is difficult partly because covert action is a policy rather than an intelligence function. From the viewpoint of the policymaker, the judgment about the utility or success of a covert action will be based on the success or failure of the policy governing the action. From the perspective of the intelligence manager, the judgment will probably be narrowly focused. Were the right agents recruited? Was appropriate tradecraft used? Was the Clandestine Service's part of the operation effective? Judging a covert action from the manager's perspective is thus going to deal with operational details rather than overall outcomes. Seeing the issue only from the policymaker's perspective may ignore how the outcome was achieved. In the United States the evaluation of a covert action might well lie with the public, which learns about such actions only from the press. Inevitably, the public will quickly hear about a covert action that fails— such as the flawed effort at the Bay of Pigs or more recently abortive efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein—but will rarely hear about a successful venture. Examples abound of covert actions gone awry, but there is relatively little information about success. This is not surprising, since CIA managers have long believed that the only way to have success is not to talk about it. One senior CIA officer is alleged to have said that

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"the secret of our success is the secret of our success." Readers may have to repeat this a few times to understand it. Explaining Covert Action to the Public It seems surprising that an agency supposedly so adept at carrying America's messages behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War has never been able to explain itself to the American people, especially in regard to so controversial a subject as covert action. The CIA seems unable to gauge public reaction to its operations, does not anticipate when covert actions will be revealed, and usually falls back on the old line that it can "neither confirm nor deny allegations of intelligence activity." The situation is exacerbated by those who intend to do damage to the Agency, including some former officers who circulate credible but false stories about covert action. The public, the press, and even scholars seem to pick up these stories and in repeating them give them a credibility they do not deserve. During the Cold War the Soviet Union and its allies took advantage of this situation by circulating disinformation about CIA operations to make it appear that the CIA was carrying out illegal activity. Thus, the CIA was given the blame for assassinations it did not commit, failed governments it did not overthrow, and bank scandals it did not touch. In spite of voluminous evidence that the CIA had nothing to do with drug dealing in the United States, press stories to the contrary have triggered several congressional investigations, each of which has turned up nothing. Yet, the story does not die. The issue of how a secret intelligence agency should deal with the public in a free and democratic society will be addressed later. The issue here is how the public—and the officials they elect to run the government—can judge the utility, the value, and the success or failure of covert action. There are no quick answers. Most covert actions will eventually become public over time, especially if they involve large numbers of operatives and significant resources as in Nicaragua or Afghanistan. The government, when it chooses to use a covert action, should be prepared to explain what it did and why it did so. Merely responding to negative media coverage is not as effective as preparing for the inevitable revelations. Because covert action will remain a part of the U.S. security arsenal— no mainstream politician has indicated a willingness to give up the option of using covert action—the issues of management and control should be reviewed. The United States has the most carefully constructed and scrutinized system of any major nation in managing covert action. It should preclude abuse. Nonetheless, problems still arise. Why?

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Fixing the Spy Machine Friction b e t w e e n the President and Congress

Part of the problem relates to the inevitable friction between the president and Congress over policy matters. Unlike intelligence collection or analysis, covert action is a policy issue; but unlike other kinds of policy debates, discussion of covert action must take place in secret if the action is to have any chance of success. Thus, the president will be reluctant to tell Congress what action is planned, and the legislators will try to pry the information out of the White House or out of the DCI. If Congress does not like what it hears or what it thinks it knows, it will seek ways to short-circuit the covert action plan. Nothing does this better than publicity. Current legislation requires the DCI to brief the intelligence oversight committees on planned covert action on a timely basis, but presidents find that these rules tend to interfere with their freedom of action. The result is that presidents tend to tell Congress as little as possible, especially when the covert action may become controversial, and legislators tend not to like what they cannot learn about ahead of time. The reporting requirement probably inhibits risk taking in covert action, not always a bad thing. The Council on Foreign Relations, in its study on intelligence reform, suggested that CIA managers should be rewarded for taking risks in secret operations, but recent experience shows that CIA officials can be quite vulnerable when a covert action goes sour.16 The experiences of the Reagan period and efforts to criminalize the actions of senior CIA officials in the Iran-Contra affair have left CIA careerists wondering how much support they can expect if they take risks that lead to failure. It is one thing to be given an internal reprimand for errors in judgment or failures in control. It is quite another to be treated as a criminal, to be hauled into court, and to face the enormous expense as well as the public humiliation of a trial.

Maintaining a Covert Action Infrastructure If future administrations want to maintain the capability to undertake covert actions—and all the signs suggest that they do—then changes must be made both in the planning and in the implementation of covert action management and control. In recent years covert action has been initiated in a variety of ways. State Department officials sometimes seek to use covert action, initiatives for it may come from the National Security Council, or the CIA itself may suggest its use. No matter where the idea comes from, new initiatives for covert action must, first of all, be coordinated at the White House level, usually in a committee set up

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for just that purpose. The members usually include representatives from the policy offices as well as from the CIA's operations directorate. The aim of the committee is to make sure the covert action fits in with other policy plans and that it is politically acceptable to the National Security Council. This committee, however, may not be the best place to make judgments about covert action or analyze its chances for success. That judgment ought to come much earlier in the planning process. The CIA has had considerable success in establishing centers to deal with such issues as counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics. Perhaps a similar center could be established to deal with covert action. The centers are supposed to bring together representatives of the various CIA directorates, as well as representatives from the other intelligence agencies. Although this was not favored at first by those who wanted a strict separation between analysts and operations officers and between intelligence and law enforcement, the centers have actually worked well. Analysts have demonstrated that they can protect sources and methods, operations officers have shown that they will not skew analysis to support operations, and intelligence officers from the CIA have been working well with representatives from the other agencies. At present, as far as we know, there is no covert action center either in being or planned. The CIA does reportedly ask the most senior managers to review covert action initiatives, but this is not the same as submitting such plans to an intensive analysis. The purpose of the intensive review would be to look at several issues that inevitably arise in covert action. Since a covert action cannot, on its own, be successful, reviewers ought to ask whether or not the covert action fits in with some larger scheme of foreign policy. Second, the covert action must have some realistic chance of actually achieving the goal set for it. Throwing large sums of money at a questionable project—as was done at the Bay of Pigs in the 1960s and more recently in vain attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussein—not only is wasteful but also stands a good chance of being counterproductive, squandering precious covert resources and perhaps putting agents in danger. Third, the covert action must be activity that would, if revealed, be seen as sensible by the American public. Without public support a covert action is bound to be pilloried in the press, even though it would have been approved by the White House and by the oversight committees in Congress. The administration ought to be prepared to explain why it chose to undertake the covert action if the matter becomes public, a possibility that seems inevitable in today's media-hungry world. Finally, the covert action ought to have long-term as well as shortterm benefits. Too often administrations have chosen to use covert action for a quick fix in a situation where wiser heads might have chosen a

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different approach. Unless a covert action offers some hope that the longterm outcome will be as beneficial as the short-term results, the covert action may be a poor choice for policymakers. If policy officials had taken the longer view in Cuba or Chile, for example, they might have chosen different policies. A Covert Action Center A covert action center within the intelligence system would be able to weigh the various issues to determine if a planned covert action meets the criteria outlined above. Analysts and operators would be able to discuss the long-term prospects for planned operations and make recommendations to policy officials who would make the final decision on using covert action. If such a system had been in place, policy officials might have understood the folly of the invasion of Cuba because analysts knew there was no groundswell of support for the overthrow of Castro. In the case of Chile, the analysts not only realized that there was no way to prevent the election of Salvador Allende; they saw no evidence that he would refuse to step down when his term was over. In addition to changing the way covert action is reviewed within the intelligence bureaucracy, we also need to overhaul the existing system for oversight. No one is suggesting that the present method of reporting to the oversight committees is a mistake; but in assessing this matter, the Council on Foreign Relations has raised an important issue: Covert action can be killed by leaks, and this seems to be happening with increasing frequency in recent years. The White House sometimes leaks a covert action plan either to gain support for it or to see if there are objections to it. Congress has been known to leak as well, sometimes to undercut support for a covert action or at least to voice its displeasure. Covert action cannot be successful unless secrecy is maintained until the action has taken place. After the action maintaining secrecy may be impossible. Therefore, the White House ought to be prepared to defend the policy choices it made, and the oversight committees have to explain that they reviewed the covert action. During the Cold War both the White House and Congress chose to take the path of deniability, partly because to do so meant that a covert action choice might be repeated without a breach in secrecy. Today, however, covert actions receive so much scrutiny that they ought to be defended after the fact, although the secret resources involved still deserve protection. Further, the CIA ought to be more aggressive about declassifying and releasing information about past covert actions that remain controversial. Agency managers do not seem to realize that the public is willing and able to understand and analyze these cases, often to the benefit of the

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CIA. If anything, the system set up by DCI Casey, in an agreement with Congress early in the Reagan administration, for a systematic review and release of historic intelligence documents has been allowed to falter, especially in regard to controversial issues such as the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala or the Allende episode in Chile. The CIA has pleaded that it lacks the resources to carry out a more extensive review program, but that it has sought more support from Congress is not clear. Covert action is an irresistable tool for American presidents. Since it will be needed in the future, intelligence managers must maintain the infrastructure to plan, review, and carry out such actions. There seems to be no good reason to shift covert action away from the CIA to some other part of the government. The CIA has the experience and the personnel to do this well, but they need the backing of the White House, Congress, and the American public. Failing such support, the CIA will continue to have to face public anger when covert action goes awry and will continue to seem to be a rogue elephant, even though everyone in Washington will know better.

Notes 1. Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995), p. 121. 2. As related by Professor Larry Martin of Boston University, who as Ladislav Bittman managed such operations for the Czech intelligence service. 3. The last such executive order, EO 12333, issued by the Reagan administration in 1981, states, "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." 4. Brian Cloughley, "Pakistan Secret Service Leaves Violent Legacy from Cold War," Washington Times, 11 February 1995, p. A8. 5. Among the best books on the subject are Stephen F. Knott, Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only (New York: HarperCollins, 1995). 6. Edward F. Sayle, "The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence Community," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 1, no. 1, 1986, p. 15. 7. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 27-28. 8. Anne Karalekas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," in William M. Leary (ed.), The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989). 9. Uri Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States (University Park, PA: Perm State Press, 1995). 10. Karalekas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," pp. 64-65. 11. Michael Warner, "Sophisticated Spies: CIA's Links to Liberal Anti-

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Communists, 1949-1967," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 425-433. 12. Karalekas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," p. 66. 13. A good account of how the Church Committee investigation was managed appears in Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988). 14. Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (Harrisonburg, VA: R. Donnelly & Sons, 1986). 15. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Plans to Oust Iran's Leaders Is an Open Secret before It Begins," New York Times, 26 January 1996. 16. Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence, report of an independent task force, Council on Foreign Relations, 1996.

CHAPTER 5

Catching the Enemy's Spies It stands to reason that if the United States is running espionage operations against other countries, those same countries may be spying on the United States. Of course, if the United States is carrying out espionage, it is only because it is necessary for national security, it is accepted as a part of international practice, and there is no alternative for self-defense. If, however, other countries run espionage operations against the United States, they are seen to be evil, they must be violating international law, and they must be stopped. Counterintelligence (CI)—the business of catching enemy spies—has long been a part of the intelligence world and has deep roots in the United States. Today countering espionage is just one part of counterintelligence, which now may include countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or global crimes. We can examine these other threats later, but we should begin by looking at the system designed to stop espionage by other intelligence services. George Washington understood very well the uses of espionage against the British, but the Colonials were chagrined and frustrated to discover that they were ill-prepared to take action against British spies who penetrated their army and their government. One of the first spies the British used against the upstart Americans was Dr. Benjamin Church, the surgeon general of the American Army. 1 It was Church who had leaked information about the weapons held by the colonial militias in Lexington and Concord. It was no wonder that the British seemed to know so much about the plans of the revolutionaries in and around Boston. Church was the "mole." When the good doctor was discovered after his mistress gave an encoded letter from Church to an acquaintance

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in the American Army, the Americans discovered that they had passed no laws against espionage and could do no more than jail Church and repatriate him to England. Subsequent efforts corrected that failure, and soon the Committee on Spies and a law against spying were established. Major John Andre found out the hard way when he was captured after helping Benedict Arnold in the effort to betray West Point and was hanged for his work. If Washington's plans to kidnap Arnold had succeeded, the former American hero might have ended up swinging from a rope as well. Throughout the Revolutionary War, the Americans had to face espionage operations by Tory loyalists and their British masters, but the lesson was well learned. The discussions surrounding the Constitutional Convention after the war—as illustrated in the Federalist Papers—show how concerned John Jay and Alexander Hamilton were about potential foreign efforts to undermine or penetrate the pending new government. 2 Their writings show their determination to give the president the dual role of carrying out foreign operations and protecting the government from foreign operations. During the Civil War Americans showed that although they were eager to have protection from their enemies, they were not willing to sacrifice legal or civil rights. President Abraham Lincoln's unprecedented step of denying suspected Confederate spies the writ of habeus corpus and Lafayette Baker's draconian police methods were rejected by the post-Civil War Congress. Baker had set up what amounted to a secret police in the style of authoritarian regimes, and his minions were known to drag civilians out of their houses in the middle of the night, throw them in jail, and treat them harshly. 3 In spite of his cruel tactics, Baker never picked up the plot to assassinate Lincoln, a major counterintelligence failure. Meanwhile, Alan Pinkerton, a former railroad detective, was able to protect Lincoln using methods that would be familiar today. Pinkerton penetrated groups plotting against the president and, using surveillance, identified the famous Confederate spy Rose Greenhow, although not before she had given away the battle plans for what turned out to be the Union disaster at the First Battle of Bull Run. 4 Pinkerton later became General McClellan's chief of intelligence, consistently overestimating the strength of the Confederate enemy and thus helping McClellan snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in the Penninsula campaign. Perhaps this illustrates the notion that good CI officers do not necessarily make good collectors of intelligence or good analysts.


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Civil and H u m a n Rights Concern for legal, civil, and human rights has often affected the way in which Americans apply CI methods. This issue came up during the hysteria surrounding the Bolshevik Revolution, when U.S. Attorney General Palmer mounted raids against suspected "reds," and it arose again in the McCarthy period after World War II, when the Wisconsin senator sought to oust suspected Communists from the government. As it turned out, Soviet-directed Communists had indeed penetrated the government, but it was J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI, not Joseph McCarthy, who rooted them out, aided by defectors and double agents and by information derived from intercepts of Soviet cables.5 Racism was certainly a factor in counterintelligence in the United States both during and after World War II. There was relatively little clamor, for example, when persons of Japanese descent were rounded up and thrown into what amounted to concentration camps early in World War II; and the death sentences applied against Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the Soviet spies who transmitted information about the atomic bomb to their Soviet handlers at the end of World War II, might have been a bit lighter had they not been both Jewish and Communists. There was a strong outcry when revelations about CIA and FBI activity during the Vietnam War showed that specific rules, designed to prevent abuse in CI cases, were routinely violated by both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, all to find out whether foreign influence was responsible for the anti-war movement in the United States. Of course, if the tactics tended to intimidate the "peace-niks," so much the better, as far as the two administrations were concerned. The reaction to revelations that the rules had been broken was so strong that it not only led to further regulations against abuse but also spurred congressional hearings and eventually a new system of oversight to protect citizens from extra-legal practices. A Plethora of Spy Cases Toward the end of the Cold War, a plethora of espionage cases became known to the public, including the John Walker spy ring, which revealed U.S. Navy code secrets to the Soviets; the Chinese "mole" Larry Wu-tai Chin, who spied for Beijing for decades; and the infamous Aldrich Ames case, in which a number of Soviet agents, spies for the United States, were executed after their identities were blown by Ames, a CIA officer. Perhaps more troubling was the case of Jonathan Pollard, who spied for the Israelis during the 1980s, showing that friends as well as adversaries

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engage in such practices. In all these cases the legal restraints on CI activity were scrupulously followed, perhaps delaying the apprehension of the Americans working for the other side. This stands in marked contrast to the work of the reknowned CI officer in the CIA James J. Angleton, who hounded a number of CIA officials out of the Agency in the 1960s using what would be unacceptable tactics today. 6 We can examine the rules later, but to begin we should start with the fundamentals of counterintelligence. Counterintelligence remains an important part of the American intelligence system, just as it does throughout the rest of the world. Exploring it in some detail has been made easier by publicly available information about spy cases, terrorist activity, crime groups, narcotics dealers, and all kinds of "bad guys" the intelligence system is supposed to counter. We can start by looking at counterespionage, the most basic and fundamental of all CI operations. The traditional wisdom about countering espionage is that a penetration of the adversary's intelligence service is the most effective way to learn about the operations being run against the country. Although this is rarely successful, when it does work, it enables CI and security officers to thwart the adversary's spying operations and perhaps turn them into an advantage. The cases we know about illustrate this quite well. No penetration of an intelligence service is a better illustration of this than the case of Kim Philby. Philby, the Master Spy Kim Philby was a British intelligence officer, a member of MI-6, Britain's foreign intelligence service and a Soviet mole. 7 This is one of the few cases where the agent was recruited to become a member of an intelligence service, and Philby carried out his mission almost to perfection. He had been recruited at Oxford University, in part because of his communist leanings, and began his intelligence career during the Spanish Civil War, ostensibly as a journalist sympathetic to the Spanish Fascist general Francisco Franco, but secretly reporting to the Communists supporting the Loyalists. During World War II Philby worked for MI-6, rising in rank as the war progressed. After the war ended, Philby stayed on at MI-6, eventually becoming a senior counterintelligence officer and liaison to the American CIA, where he worked closely with James J. Angleton, the CIA's top counterspy. Angleton was convinced that there was a mole in the CIA but he apparently never realized that it was Philby, and not a CIA officer, who was the penetration. Philby was thus able to give away to his Soviet masters the CIA's secret operations, including the planned invasion of Albania, and information about CIA's espionage activities against the Soviets.


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Another case involving a mole, recruited to penetrate a hostile intelligence service, was that of Larry Wu-tai Chin, who was sent to infiltrate American intelligence soon after the Communists drove the Nationalists out of mainland China in 1949. Chin became a translator for the Americans on Okinawa and eventually worked his way into the CIA as a translator for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Although Chin did not have access to the most sensitive operations, he was a regular employee of the agency and could meet with CIA officers who might have useful intelligence for his Communist Chinese handlers. We don't know the extent of the damage Chin was able to do because he committed suicide after being arrested by the FBI when a defector gave away his identity. 8 Recruiting a M o l e These two cases aside, recruiting an agent to infiltrate an intelligence service is chancey indeed. Even if a hostile intelligence service were to find someone of the right age and with the right credentials and who was willing to take on the task, just getting this person into the pool of applicants would be no mean feat. Every year thousands of people apply for jobs in American intelligence, and only a relative handful are asked to take the next step, which is to send in a detailed background form. From this handful only a selected few are invited to Washington to interview, and many who reach this stage fail to pass the polygraph test or some other hurdle in the hiring process. The prospective penetration would probably fail to pass the security screening, although there are a few cases where security checks failed. Most of these cases involved employees already on board, rather than new hires. Thus, it seems unlikely that there would be a payoff for an intelligence service trying to penetrate American intelligence by using this strategy. The more probable way to infiltrate an intelligence service is to recruit an agent who is already a member of the target service. Most professional intelligence officers would, however, recognize immediately that they were being targeted and would not fall for the ploy unless their superiors decided to have the intelligence target pretend to go along with the recruitment to see what developed. Although this works in fictional espionage stories, it is unlikely to be productive in reality. Walk-Ins Most efforts to penetrate a hostile intelligence service involve defectors or "walk-ins," intelligence officers who seek to flee their own country or to sell out to the enemy. Most of the cases we know about fit into this

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category. Pyotr Popov and Oleg Penkovsky were famous Soviet "walkins" from the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence service, who provided significant information about their service before they were caught and executed. George Blake was a British MI-6 officer who was turned into a penetration of his service by the Soviets after being interned in North Korea during the Korean War. Blake was key in revealing to the Soviets the existence of the famous Berlin Tunnel, the Allied operation to tunnel under the streets of Berlin to tap Soviet communications cables.9 Some more recent cases of Communist intelligence officer "walk-ins" include Oleg Gordievsky, a KGB officer handled by the British; Dmitri Polyakov, run by the Americans; and Farewell (a code name), a French penetration of the KGB's technical collection unit. A Polish military intelligence officer, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a "walk-in" to the United States, was able to report on plans for the imposition of martial law in the 1980s in Poland, before he was forced to defect outright when he was in danger of being captured. After the Cold War and the return of democracy in Poland, Kuklinski, over some objections, was freed from the death sentence imposed by Poland's former Communist rulers and was able to return to Poland from his new home in the United States.10 The Pollard Case Jonathan Pollard was also a walk-in. 11 Pollard, a civilian employee of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence and a fervent Jewish supporter of Israel, sought out Israeli officials because he believed that the United States was denying the Israelis the intelligence information Israel really needed for its own defense. Pollard pushed himself on the Israeli government, but the Israelis decided to run the case, even though they knew they were taking a chance of offending the United States if Pollard were caught. In the end a combination of Israeli bungling and poor security practices by Pollard, who had no training in clandestine operations, led to his discovery. When Pollard tried to escape the FBI by fleeing to the Israeli embassy in Washington, security guards turned him away. The Israelis had failed to give him an escape plan so that he could get away to Israel. Despite continued Israeli efforts to win Pollard's freedom through diplomatic measures, even going so far as to admit that Pollard had been an Israeli agent, as of 1999 Pollard remained in jail serving a life sentence. When Pollard's case was raised in efforts to secure a peace agreement in the Middle East, U.S. intelligence officials reacted vehemently to the possibility that he might be released. Was this another example of racism? Or was it designed to send a message to America's friends not to engage in espionage against the United States?


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A m e s and N i c h o l s o n Of course, the cases of Aldrich Ames and Harold J. Nicholson, both walk-ins to the Russians from the CIA, are the ones with which we are most familiar because so much was revealed about them. Still, both cases follow the pattern of an intelligence officer who seeks to sell out to the enemy. In the cases of many Communist walk-ins, including those just mentioned, ideology had as much to do with their sell-out as the money involved. In the Ames and Nicholson cases, however, as well as those of other American intelligence officers who sought out the opportunity to spy for the enemy, greed was the motivating force that drove them into the enemy camp. Ames was able to give his Soviet handlers information about American and British penetrations of the KGB, resulting in the deaths of at least ten of them. Nicholson gave away the identities of several classes of new case officer trainees, thus ending their careers in the Clandestine Service before they ever got started. 12 Although greed and ideology seem to be the major factors behind the defection of intelligence officers to their adversaries, anger, frustration, revenge, and perhaps the thrill of such activity cannot be discounted. Unlike fictional spies, who are lured to work for their enemies by sexual encounters or by blackmail, the defector or walk-in cases we know about don't seem to involve such factors. Trying to escape a bad marriage or a deteriorating family situation has been a factor in defections as well as alcoholism or drug use. Presented with a walk-in, intelligence services not only would check to make sure the walk-in is genuine and really has something to offer (by seeking proof of access to secret materials, for example) but also would want to make sure the walk-in is stable enough to continue to operate within his own intelligence service. The walk-in, who might very well want to defect on the spot and not return to his service, might be told that he would have to earn his transfer by spying on his service for some specified period of time. Of course, the walk-in would be given an escape plan in case he had to bail out of his situation. Not providing such a plan was the error the Israelis made in handling the Pollard case.

Double Agents Another traditional method of infiltrating an opposition intelligence service is to turn a penetration into a double agent. In order to save himself from possible prosecution, a mole might be willing to continue to work with the service that controlled him, but he would report to the service in which he was the penetration and perhaps pass false infor-

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mation to his opposition controllers at the direction of the service in which he was the mole. This sounds confusing, and it is no wonder that some writers have referred to this situation as a "wilderness of mirrors." The evidence that such double-agent cases have been successful is limited. In the recent spy cases neither the CIA nor the KGB tried to double the agents they caught spying for the other side. The CIA did not consider doing this in either the Ames or the Nicholson case, nor did the KGB; the Soviets preferred execution, whereas the Americans chose plea bargains. Are such double-agent tactics even possible? According to Fidel Castro, all the agents the CIA recruited in Cuba were allegedly turned and run against the American service, and apparently the same was true for at least some American agents in East Germany before the Berlin Wall fell. We know that in Operation DoubleCross in World War II, British intelligence officers were able to turn the German spies they caught and were able to use them to help support the deception designed to convince Hitler that the Allied invasion at Normandy was just a feint and that the real invasion was to come at the Pas de Calais. It thus seems possible that under the right circumstances, a mole can be turned into a double agent, but we have no details of modern cases to confirm this. There are other ways to learn about a hostile intelligence service besides trying to infiltrate the organization. For one intelligence service to be aware of the identities of at least some of the members of opposition intelligence services is not unusual. Thus, clandestine surveillance of the known intelligence officers may well reveal their contacts or their operational patterns. It may be possible to deduce from this the nature of their targets or their operational interests. The surveillance has to be discreet, however, so as not to alert the opposition that they are being watched. Monitoring of communications may also provide information of interest as long as it can be done without detection. Modern systems of communications surveillance have largely eliminated the need to tap phones or put bugs in walls, but these methods may still prove useful under certain circumstances. According to press reports, a CIA officer was arrested in Vienna in 1997 while trying to bug the office of several North Korean representatives, and Israeli intelligence officers were caught in Switzerland around the same time trying what the professionals call an "audio op." In both cases the local police were alerted by what appears to have been clumsy tradecraft by the intelligence officers installing the taps and bugs. A more sophisticated approach might have been better, but it is possible that intercepts were not picking up the wanted material off-site, thus making the audio op necessary.


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A Bizarre Case In a rather bizarre case in 1998, a CIA officer named Douglas Groat was arrested by the FBI after he attempted to blackmail the CIA by threatening to reveal details of CIA clandestine operations to steal code and other operational materials from foreign intelligence services by breaking into their embassies. The details of the Groat case emerged after Groat and the government reached a plea bargain. Groat had threatened to seek, in discovery, details that the government would have preferred to keep secret. It turned out that Groat was a former police and military officer who had trouble in his previous careers. In some foreign intelligence services, an attempt by a career officer to blackmail his masters might well result in the quiet disappearance of the officer concerned. Penetrations, the use of walk-ins, or surveillance may indeed reveal something about the activities of a hostile intelligence service directed at one's own intelligence system, but these counterintelligence collection operations have to be supported by defensive measures to protect one's own service against the enemy. This process is, at least in the American system, considered more an administrative function than one involving intelligence operations. Perhaps this might help to explain why failures have occurred from time to time.

D e f e n s i v e Measures Typically, defensive measures fall under the category of security; they involve the protection of data and facilities against penetration by an adversary, as well as the careful screening of personnel to ensure their reliability, to monitor their behavior and limit their access to sensitive information. No matter how carefully these processes are handled, history shows that a determined intelligence professional who wants to overcome security hurdles can sometimes do so, as we can see in cases that have come to light in recent years. American intelligence, beginning with the OSS and continuing as more modern intelligence agencies developed, has relied on background investigations based on material supplied by the applicant to determine the reliability and stability of potential new hires. This means that professional investigators have had to interview acquaintances, family, and former employers of each potential intelligence recruit, a painstaking and expensive process, to verify the data submitted. The investigators look for discrepancies in the data supplied by each applicant in voluminous

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forms and for evidence that the applicant may have lied or hidden information about his or her past. During the Cold War applicants who had relatives behind the Iron Curtain were subjected to additional scrutiny, but few were turned away on that basis alone unless their relatives in Communist countries were in a position to put pressure on the applicant after employment. After World War II, during the McCarthy era of anti-Communist hysteria, membership in organizations that were extremist, left or right, inevitably raised questions, but later this issue generally disappeared. Security investigators began to concentrate more on personal behavior than ideological views, especially after the defection to the Soviets of National Security Agency members William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, both of whom turned out to be homosexual.

The Polygraph The investigators are aided by the use of the polygraph, or so-called lie detector, in screening new applicants. The polygraph is supposed to detect lying or hiding of information by measuring respiration, heart rate, blood pressure, and perspiration. Its ability to detect deception is based on the theory that lying or hiding information requires more effort than telling the truth. Unfortunately, the polygraph has proven to be an unreliable tool in some respects, although security investigators swear by its use. To new applicants who have never undergone such a procedure, being put on the "box," as the machine is sometimes called, creates high stress and sometimes hysteria. This inevitably affects the results, and many young people who have been through the process, especially those who were turned away after the examination, have reported that the grilling they had to go through was unbelievably stressful. It seems clear from years of experience that the polygraph does indeed intimidate people into revealing information they would have preferred not to divulge and that these revelations do aid in determining the reliability and stability of the applicant. Yet, it also seems clear that many talented and otherwise qualified people have probably been turned away by this process, and their abilities have been lost. Security officials argue that the polygraph is an extremely useful tool, but like many such machines, it requires a skilled operator and careful management to make sure the process is not only effective but also equitable. Efforts to develop other techniques to detect lying or hiding, such as voice stress analysis, have not yet been perfected, and we see no evidence that security managers are trying to find a better system. Once people are hired, background reinvestigations are used period-


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ically to make sure that the employee has not "gone sour" and become either an agent of a foreign service or engaged in compromising behavior such as drug use or crime. This is not a fool-proof process, although in the negative cases we know about, it was the interpretation of the machine's readouts rather than the machine itself that was at fault. Larry Wu-tai Chin reportedly said that he repeatedly passed the polygraph exam because he was able to lie easily in English, but he might have had difficulty if the exam had been given in his native Chinese dialect. Aldrich Ames was shown to have indicated deception on the polygraph at least twice but in each case was let go by the operator or his supervisor. Cases of success are also well known. Harold J. Nicholson was quickly put under surveillance and eventually arrested after clearly trying to beat the machine in 1995, and Edward Lee Howard, the CIA officer who defected to the Soviets in 1985, was fired after the polygraph led to revelations about his misconduct. 13 Most of us in the CIA believed that the polygraph would catch us if we broke the security rules or engaged in conduct unacceptable to the Agency. The Background Check The background check is not foolproof either, as we have learned from some espionage cases. Investigators in the Ames case never seemed to be aware of his increasing alcoholism or his binge drinking, and a security officer sent to Colombia to verify the source of his new found wealth—Ames claimed it came from his wife's rich Colombian family— failed to detect that Ames was wildly overstating their resources. In the years since the author has left the CIA, security investigators have from time to time checked on students or former colleagues, but they seem to follow a rote script and never probe beyond the formal questions on their interview forms. In fact, the security system depends a great deal on self-revelation. A determined rogue officer may be able to beat the system, at least for a while, by hiding derogatory information and coaching individuals listed as references. Of course, we have to remember that the system is generally successful in weeding out problems, and the cases that we know of represent only a handful of security failures in a system that has over fifty years had relatively few disasters. As usual in intelligence, however, it is the disasters that we remember. Another defensive mechanism traditionally applied in intelligence work is called compartmentation, which means that intelligence workers at all levels have access only to the information they need to know to do their jobs. This need to know principle is supposed to prevent an insider bent on obtaining information for a foreign intelligence service

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from having unlimited access within the system. In several of the wellknown spy cases, security alerts were sounded when the moles began to seek out sensitive information to which they were not supposed to have access. This move was the first clue that Jonathan Pollard was a security risk and one of the steps in building a case against Harold Nicholson. At the CIA and in other American intelligence services, compartmentation is reinforced by security access controls that provide physical barriers to keep unauthorized insiders from areas where they have no business. Thus, even inside the closely guarded CIA headquarters, where employees have Top Secret security clearances, there are vaulted doors with security locks that require employees who do not belong to a particular office to request entry and identify themselves at the door. Of course, this requires that the gate-keepers question even people they know relatively well, which was probably how Aldrich Ames was able to gather materials from offices where he had no business, but where he was well known. D o c u m e n t Controls CIA officers are trained early in maintaining control over documents entrusted to them so that others who have no need to know about the material cannot casually peruse them. Even in vaulted offices, sensitive materials are supposed to be locked away in safes within the vaults for added security, and the vaults are regularly checked to make sure the practice is followed. Perhaps the worst breach of good security practice in this regard was the Kampiles case, in which a junior officer, William Kampiles, fired during his probationary hiring period in the 1970s, took away with him a manual for the then-Top Secret KH-11 photo satellite.14 No one knew the document, despite its Top Secret labels, was missing until Kampiles revealed to a friend that he had sold the manual to the Soviets. Kampiles was arrested by the FBI and ended up serving a lengthy prison sentence. Good security practices can in theory prevent even a clever mole from gaining access to more than just a slice of the intelligence pie, but as we know from the Ames case, even that slice can be devastating. Given the history of intelligence in which moles appear from time to time despite even the most stringent security, intelligence managers have to assume that there is a mole, even if they have no evidence. But there has to be a balance between the extreme paranoia of James Angleton and the lax practices that let Ames run loose for almost nine years. Among intelligence professionals, good security practices have to be learned and enforced, even though this may create an atmosphere that is less warm than many managers may prefer.


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Countering espionage requires not just learning about the operations of hostile intelligence services and good security practices to limit damage; it also requires punishment of spies to deter others from espionage against the United States. Thus, there has to be a combination of intelligence work and law enforcement. In the United States, this has not been so easy to achieve. Part of this difficulty resulted from animosity that was generated by J. Edgar Hoover, the legendary director of the FBI, America's traditional counterintelligence organization. CIA-FBI Friction Hoover was intent on preventing the development of a civilian-based intelligence service, even before World War II. Although he could not stop the creation of the OSS, he was able to keep it out of Latin America, which he considered to be the FBI's turf. His leaking of the plans Bill Donovan had submitted to President Roosevelt in late 1944 about creating a follow-on service to the OSS delayed the creation of the CIA. Hoover's leak and subsequent press stories led the public to believe that Donovan wanted to create a secret police in the image of the hated Gestapo of Nazi Germany. When General Hoyt Vandenberg developed the legislation that eventually led to the creation of the CIA in 1947, the marked-up bill contained specific restrictions that kept the CIA from having police or subpeona power or any role in internal security. 15 The law was interpreted so strictly that for many years the CIA was unable to have its own guard force and had to use security police at the gates and guard posts from the General Services Administration. When Mir Aimal Kansi, the Pakistani terrorist, gunned down several CIA officers on the road leading to the CIA headquarters building in 1994, it was the Fairfax County police who came to the scene. If Kansi had been caught at the time, the CIA guard force would have had no jurisdiction outside CIA property. In its early days, because of Hoover's restrictions, there was almost no contact between the FBI and the CIA. One FBI special agent was appointed as liaison with the CIA, and it was this agent alone whom CIA officers were to contact.16 Occasional FBI reports were sent to analysts at the CIA, but they were of limited utility. An informal agreement was apparently reached between Hoover and James Angleton that the CIA would deal with its own internal security, including the pursuit of suspected moles and penetrations. Because of the legacy of this agreement, the FBI was not called in until late in the Howard case: Ed Howard had been dismissed by the CIA in 1983 when his failed polygraph, and reinvestigation showed possible criminal behavior and drug use, but the FBI was apparently not informed until after Howard left Washington.

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Fixing the Spy Machine Impact of the Howard Case

According to author David Wise, who wrote extensively about the Howard case, senior CIA officers, dismayed that Howard turned out to be a problem while he was being prepared to serve his first operational assignment in Moscow, were either ashamed, embarrassed, or arrogant in failing to inform the FBI that Howard was being fired for cause. In the event, Howard sought out KGB officers in 1984 while in Vienna and later eluded FBI surveillance in order to escape to the USSR. Howard was, as far as we know, the only CIA officer ever actually to defect to the Soviets during the Cold War; but some of the CIA's Soviet agents that Howard allegedly betrayed, we know now, were actually given away by Aldrich Ames. In the aftermath of the Howard case, Congress mandated that cooperation between the FBI and the CIA be increased, and FBI agents were assigned to CIA headquarters. This cooperation was increased even further when DCI William Webster established the Counterintelligence Center at the CIA and FBI agents were assigned to it. The move was spurred by what became known as the Year of the Spy, in 1985, when the John Walker spy ring, the Howard and Pollard cases, and the case of Larry Chin became public. The press made it appear that the U.S. Intelligence Community was riddled with spies and that these cases were only the tip of the iceberg. From the perspective of the counterintelligence and security officers who had broken the cases, however, the arrests of these foreign agents appeared to be a major victory. Cooperation between the FBI and the CIA in countering espionage improved even further in the Ames case, although press reporting at the time and the subsequent flood of books on the case might make it seem otherwise. A careful reading of the case shows how both agencies worked together to stop Ames, although it was too late to prevent the enormous damage he had done to American and British intelligence assets in the former Soviet Union. Dogged efforts by CIA and FBI professionals, working together, eventually broke the Ames case despite sloppy security, failure to follow up on reports from Ames's co-workers that he was a problem, and some clever tradecraft by Ames to elude detection. 17 After Ames was arrested, another senior CIA officer, Harold J. Nicholson, a former station chief, was found to be working for the Russian Intelligence Service (SVR). In the Nicholson case, which surfaced in 1996, FBI and CIA officials worked together as soon as evidence of Nicholson's betrayal surfaced. Nicholson failed a polygraph, and after surveillance was begun, was seen photographing secret documents in his office using a CIA document camera he had obtained from the Office of Technical


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Services. This rather blatant flaunting of proper espionage techniques by a man who was supposed to be an expert led to Nicholson's arrest. Cops versus Spies The fallout from the Ames case led to even further FBI encroachment onto traditional CIA turf. A senior FBI agent was made chief of counterintelligence at the CIA, and the role of FBI agents abroad was expanded. When legislation enabled the FBI to task CIA and other American intelligence units to collect information that might be used in criminal cases, fear grew among some intelligence professionals that the traditional barrier between intelligence and law enforcement was eroding. This has led to what some observers have called the "cops versus spies" problem. 18 Beginning with the founding of the CIA, intelligence officers overseas were supposed to deal with counterintelligence issues abroad, whereas the FBI was the lead agency working against espionage in the United States. If the CIA uncovered information about Americans spying for foreign powers, it was to turn the intelligence over to the FBI for action. The CIA would deal with espionage involving its own employees just as did the military counterintelligence units, such as the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps or the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The recent spy cases, however, show that more cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement is needed. Intelligence officers—"spies"—are not interested in making cases in the same way as are law enforcement officers, the "cops." Intelligence officers want to obtain information by recruiting sources and exploiting them. Law enforcement officials want to arrest law breakers, convict them of crimes, and see that they are punished. These two aims are really incompatible. Intelligence officers are reluctant to see their sources arrested, even if they are criminals, because if the sources are arrested, their ability to provide new information effectively ceases. The cops want evidence that enables them to arrest a perpetrator of a crime, and they want to be able to present that evidence in court to obtain a conviction. Thus, the evidence has to be handled in ways that are consistent with good legal practice. The cops have to be prepared to testify in court about how they obtained the evidence, and they must be prepared to provide information in disclosure to the perpetrator's defense. The spies want nothing to do with such practices. Intelligence officers would be hard-pressed to develop information from sources that might be considered evidence or to handle the information according to legal rules. The spies could hardly be expected to

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appear in court, destroying their cover in the process; nor would they be interested in revealing their sources and methods to a defense attorney. It's easy to see, under such circumstances, why culture and tradition, as well as a marked difference in professional procedure, create the spies versus cops dilemma. Legal rules exacerbate the problem. Counterintelligence to Criminal Investigation In the Ames and Nicholson cases, counterintelligence officers in both the CIA and the FBI were able to obtain warrants to put the suspected spies under surveillance from a little-known secret body, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. This court can authorize wire taps, physical surveillance, mail opening, or other such practices to obtain information to pinpoint an American who might be spying for a foreign power. No such rules are necessary if the suspect is a foreign espionage agent. The aim of the warrants is to identify spies; but to arrest them and obtain evidence of their espionage, a criminal investigation is needed. The spies cannot do this. They must turn the cases over to the cops, who then obtain warrants under the criminal code, gather evidence suitable for trial, and make the arrests. The administrative problem here is to determine when the counterintelligence investigation ends and when the criminal procedure begins. The United States has no fixed rule for this turnover and relies on a series of informal agreements between the intelligence agencies and the Justice Department about the transition from spy business to cop business. Clearly, a firewall is necessary to make sure that intelligence sources and methods are not dragged into a criminal case, or that a court case might be compromised in the interest of protecting secret assets. In several recent espionage cases defense lawyers have threatened to challenge the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but plea bargains have kept these cases from coming to trial. Although it is certainly necessary to stop, arrest, and punish enemy spies, intelligence managers want to be sure that no loose ends are left dangling. They want to be able to determine the extent of the damage done by the spy and ensure that no remaining enemy agents are left in place. In the Ames case there was much discussion about the possibility that Ames had recruited other CIA officers for his Soviet masters and that they had gone undetected. Unless the principal agent—Ames, in this case—willingly gives up his subagents or reveals the extent of his operations, there may be no way to determine with certainty the answers to these riddles. In many espionage cases a plea bargain was one tool used to obtain information for a damage assessment. In the Ames case,


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it seems clear that Ames had kept some of his secrets to himself, perhaps in hopes of one day writing a book about his exploits. The end of the Cold War has not ended spying by America's adversaries or competitors. If anything, the situation is now more complicated because the number of potential enemies, or adversaries, has increased, not diminished. We can see from the Ames and Nicholson cases that the Russian intelligence service has taken up where the KGB left off, and that other countries are willing and eager to try to steal America's secrets. This means that counterintelligence has to remain a potent tool in America's intelligence arsenal. Press reporting suggests that it is a sign of intelligence failure when spies are caught; to the contrary, it is, in fact, a form of victory. The concern should be about how many spies remain at large.

Counterintelligence as a Career To ensure American capability to combat espionage, more emphasis must to be put on training and establishing a cadre of professionals who devote themselves to counterintelligence as a career. Jim Angleton and his associates had become career CI officers in the early days of the CIA, but their system of institutionalized paranoia created serious problems. They suspected as potential moles everyone they did not know and trust personally, and the hostile climate this attitude created was counterproductive and, to some people, dangerous. Is there a way to avoid this dilemma? Paul Redmond and his associates, the CIA officers instrumental in catching Aldrich Ames, were clever, dedicated, but hardly paranoid. Their example shows that with proper training and experience, a CI corps that uses professional techniques to work against enemy espionage can be built. Training has to be coupled with a security atmosphere that makes clear to intelligence employees that they are under scrutiny all the time. This means consistent application of background checks, finding a more reliable mechanism to replace the polygraph, and an indoctrination in security awareness for everyone. Intelligence is a special profession, and those who engage in it must be prepared to sacrifice personal freedoms routinely enjoyed by employees in other work in the interest of preserving the security of intelligence sources and methods. This is a hard sell in the United States, where so much emphasis is placed on the protection of civil and human rights. Still, for those of us who toiled in intelligence during the Cold War, accepting these restrictions seemed a very low price to pay for the excitement of serving the country in this special way.

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Notes 1. Thomas Fleming, Liberty: The American Revolution (New York: Viking Penguin, 1997), p. 147. 2. Stephen F. Knott, Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 42-47. 3. Edwin Fishel, The Secret War for the Union (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), p. 27. 4. Ibid., pp. 58-61. 5. Robert L. Benson and Michael Warner (eds.), VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response (Washington, DC: NSA and CIA, 1996). 6. Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), pp. 60-62. 7. Phillip Knightley, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby (New York: Vintage Books, 1988). 8. Kessler, Inside the CIA, p. 155. 9. David E. Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997). 10. Christine Spolar, "Once Spurned, Polish Spy Returns to Hero's Welcome," Washington Post, 28 April 1998, p. A l l . 11. Wolf Blitzer, Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard (New York: Harper & Row, 1989); Seymour M. Hersh, "The Traitor: The Case against Jonathan Pollard," New Yorker, 18 January 1999, pp. 26-34. 12. Arthur S. Hulnick, "Understanding the Ames Case," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 8 no. 2, pp. 133-154; for details on the Nicholson case, see R. Jeffrey Smith and Robert Suro, "Waiting to Close the Trap on Suspected Spy," Washington Post, 24 January 1996, p. Al. 13. David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away (New York: Random House, 1988). 14. The author was one of Kampiles's supervisors and raised the issue of firing him. The details of what happened subsequently appear in Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 346-347. 15. Arthur Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950 (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), p. 28; see also Michael Turner, "CIA-FBI Non-Cooperation: Cultural Trait or Bureaucratic Inertia?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 8, no. 3, p. 265. 16. Cartha DeLoach, Hoover's FBI (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1995); Ronald Kessler, The FBI (New York: Pocket Books, 1993). 17. Hulnick, "Understanding the Ames Case." 18. Stewart D. Baker, "Should Cops Be Spies?" Foreign Policy no. 97 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 36-52; see also Arthur S. Hulnick, "Intelligence and Law Enforcement: T h e Spies Are Not Cops' Problem,' " International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 269-286.

CHAPTER 6

Stopping the Bad Guys During the Cold War, beginning even before the establishment of the modern U.S. intelligence system just after World War II, the major focus of America's intelligence resources was the Soviet Union, the only nation that had the power to destroy our country. Nevertheless, and from the very beginning, intelligence resources were also spent on other targets. The CIA and the other services could not ignore potential threats or hot spots around the world, given the wide range of American interests abroad and the huge number of Americans who lived, worked, or traveled overseas. Collectors and analysts alike worked on country issues, including politics, economics, and military and social problems as well as such transnational issues such as terrorism, instability, and revolution. The U.S. Intelligence Community had to be able to respond to policymakers' needs, no matter the subject. Since the end of the Cold War, a myth has proliferated that American intelligence failed to watch the the non-Soviet topics and was illprepared to deal with the transnational issues that had became the new national security threats. This was hardly the case. In fact, the intelligence system had been collecting and analyzing information related to these problems for many years. But the intelligence system was in large part merely a passive actor. It was designed to alert policymakers to issues with which they had to deal, but it was not supposed to give recommendations for action. The action was left to the State Department or the military for response. In rare cases, as we have seen, the intelligence system might provide covert action as part of the policy, but that was carried out by a handful of operatives.

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Fixing the Spy Machine The Equation Has Changed

In the post-Cold War era the equation has changed. The intelligence system has already been enlisted to help combat the transnational threats by using a combination of counterintelligence and law enforcement techniques. In some cases covert action might be added to the mix. This means that intelligence assets will no longer be used only as passive observers; they will instead become part of the arsenal of measures used to fight at least some of the problems. The issues are wide-ranging, from the growth in weapons of mass destruction controlled by so-called rogue states to terrorism, global organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and industrial espionage. Can U.S. intelligence, either on its own or working with foreign security services, combat these new threats to national security? Clearly some of the same techniques traditionally used in counterespionage operations might well prove useful. Just as in counterespionage, however, combating the threats will require cooperation among intelligence, law enforcement, and military organizations in ways that none of the participants are used to, or in ways they may very well oppose. Yet, they must be brought together if they are to deal with the new threats and beat them back. Weapons of Mass Destruction Working against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ought to be the easiest target for intelligence because the threat seems more like the Cold War issue than any other. We successfully tracked Soviet weaponry during the Cold War using a combination of photo reconnaissance, SIGINT, and espionage. Now that the Cold War is over, we can look back and see that the U.S. intelligence system's analysis of Soviet military capability was, if anything, overstated, although we had the order of battle correctly analyzed. What we may have missed was poor hardware performance and the inflexibility of the battle tactics. This was illustrated very well in the Gulf War in which the Iraqis, using Soviet equipment and tactics, proved quite vulnerable to Western weaponry and battle techniques. 1 Despite assurances that Russia no longer targets the United States and that the United States is not currently pointing its missiles at Russia, both sides could easily retarget if necessary. Thus, some U.S. intelligence effort must remain focused on Russia, to keep track of not only its strategic weapons but also its ability to maintain security and control over its arsenal. The possibility that a rogue general or criminal group might take


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control of a strategic weapon cannot be ruled out. Since China is potentially an adversary of the United States and has some limited capability to launch strategic missiles at the United States, additional resources have to be directed against the Beijing arsenal as well. Using a mix of collection methods, U.S. intelligence working with sophisticated Western services ought to be able to track weapons of mass destruction in the hands of potential adversary states other than Russia and China, but the targets are elusive. Weapons of mass destruction are comprised of nuclear, chemical, and biological systems. Nuclear weapons are the most frightening, perhaps because many of us, remembering the end of World War II, have seen for ourselves the awesome power and gruesome destruction of an atomic explosion. Although nuclear weapons have not been used in actual combat since World War II, their destructive power, increased many times over, remains a threat. Both the United States and Russia maintain large arsenals of such weapons, along with France, Great Britain, and China, the so-called Nuclear Club. In 1998 India and Pakistan both tested nuclear devices despite worldwide condemnation. Thus, these two powers joined the second tier of nuclear weapons states, a group that includes Israel and probably North Korea. Although there is little fear that India or Pakistan might attack the United States, there is great anxiety over the possibility that the two countries could use nuclear weapons against each other. If the U.S. intelligence system is capable of tracking nuclear capability, why did it fail to pick up the 1998 testing by India until the tests were completed? The study carried out in the wake of this intelligence failure has not yet been made public, but the reasons seem clear enough, just based on press reporting. 2 Clearly, the satellite reconnaissance systems that would have been able to detect preparations for a test were not focused on the testing area targets. This resulted from a combination of factors: India carried out a deception to divert attention to a missile test; analysts who should have recognized the potential for testing based on public statements by the new government in New Delhi and who should have provided requirements to the satellite managers failed to do so; apparently none of the intelligence agencies had developed a capability to collect information from human sources in India; there was a problem with mirror imaging by less-than-expert analysts with little experience who judged India's intentions based on faulty perceptions; and policy officials seemed uninterested in the potential for trouble. The system had no difficulty in detecting the tests carried out by Pakistan, but the damage had been done. Since neither Pakistan nor India can hurt the other with nuclear weapons until each develops a delivery system and the ability to mate the weapon and the delivery vehicle, the intelligence targets now are obvious. It appears that as of 1998, India was perfecting the ability to use

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missiles against both Pakistan and possibly China, whereas the regime in Islamabad might choose an air-launched weapon. Surely U.S. intelligence needs no further guidance to figure out what intelligence data it should be collecting and analyzing in regard to this issue. Weapons and Delivery Systems Equally troubling is the possibility that other nations, some of which seem to be rogue states that do not behave according to the rules established by the United Nations or general international practice, might have nuclear capability. These states include North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. North Korea has hinted that it has set aside its nuclear weapons development program, and Iraq's facilities were badly damaged by Israel in its attack on the Osirak reactor, even before the Gulf War targeted suspected nuclear facilities.3 Nonetheless, both North Korea and Iraq remain suspect as possible or potential nuclear states. Iran, another rogue state, may have nuclear warheads that it obtained from Russia or Khazakhstan, according to some press reports, but it does not yet have the capability to manufacture its own. As we have seen, creating a viable nuclear threat requires both a weapon and a delivery system. The most available delivery system seems to be a missile with a nuclear warhead. The rogue states do not have nor do they seem likely to obtain the kinds of aircraft that might be used for a nuclear bomb. We have seen Iraq's capability to use missiles in the Gulf War when Saddam Hussein's forces fired short-range surface-tosurface Scud missiles at Israel and Allied targets. We know that Iran has tested missiles it has acquired from China and North Korea; and, of course, North Korea itself has tested missiles of short- and mediumrange capability. So far, none of these countries has been able to mate a non-conventional warhead to such a missile, but they might very well have the sophistication to do so. To have a credible threat, however, would require the testing of a missile with a nuclear warhead attached, something none of the rogue states has yet been able to do. Just because these countries have not yet tested a nuclear weapon does not mean that the U.S. Intelligence Community should be complacent about keeping an eye on them. During the Cold War U.S. intelligence tracked nuclear developments in a number of countries from Argentina and Brazil to South Africa. In one case that remains something of a mystery, a U.S. satellite reportedly detected a nuclear air burst off the coast of South Africa, and the supposition at the time was that this could have been a South African nuclear test and that the white-run government had obtained help from Israel for the test.4 Of course, both nations denied the reports.


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Keeping Track of Weapons and Delivery Systems Nonetheless, as evident by its track record in the Cold War, U.S. intelligence is quite capable of keeping track of nuclear weapons and delivery systems when it wants to. A combination of photo reconnaissance, SIGINT, and HUMINT ought to enable us to find out who actually has nuclear weapons and their status. Just as in the Cold War, though, the action that might be taken once the weapons or delivery systems are identified lies outside the purview of intelligence. A diplomatic or military response, and not covert action, is the most likely way for the United States or its allies to respond to a rogue state's nuclear threat. More insidious is the possibility that non-state actors—terrorists or guerrilla bands—or rogue states may develop a portable nuclear device, a suitcase bomb. This would be used as a terror weapon rather than as a combat weapon. In fact, according to press reports, the United States had just such a weapon in its inventory until 1989.5 This device, the "Special Atomic Demolition Munition," weighed about sixty pounds and could be carried in a backpack by a paratrooper. Designed to be used to destroy fixed targets, it would have had the explosive force of one kiloton. It's not clear how the paratrooper placing the device would have escaped injury in the blast, but since the United States does not rely on suicide missions, some protection for the paratrooper was probably envisioned. Russian general Alexander Lebed frightened many in the West in 1997 when he suggested in one of his political speeches that the former Soviet Union had hundreds of such suitcase weapons, many of which were no longer under government control. Further investigation revealed that Lebed was speaking more for political effect than to warn the West. The Russians denied at the time that they had such weapons, but a defector from the Soviet military intelligence service, the GRU, told congressional investigators in 1998 that he had scouted potential sites in the United States for such weapons, which he claimed were the size of a golf bag. 6 The image created by General Lebed was one of terrorists blithely carrying Samsonite-style luggage through airports or cities, dropping them at suitable locations, and watching the mushroom clouds grow. The GRU defector indicated that the weapons were to be detonated by remote control. Terrorists and N u k e s We expect that guerrilla groups or terrorists would not have the sophistication required to create a really small bomb, even though the in-

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formation needed to create such a weapon seems readily available on the Internet. The nuclear material necessary for a bomb is well guarded in both the United States and the former Soviet states. Even though tiny amounts have been discovered in the hands of smugglers, a group would have to obtain several kilos of radioactive, bomb-grade uranium or plutonium and then have the machinery to form the components into a weapon. This sounds good to fiction writers such as Tom Clancy, but the reality is quite different.7 Intelligence resources are well placed to track nuclear materials partly because of the willingness of most nations to cooperate in this endeavor. Sharing of intelligence among security services (the methodology that revealed the small amounts of loose nuclear material and identified the smugglers) coupled with strict controls among the nuclear states is probably a strong deterrent to those who might try to build a suitcase bomb. Besides, rogue states, terrorists, and guerrilla groups have a much easier way to achieve their ends. They can develop cheaper and more easily constructed chemical or biological weapons, the weapon of mass destruction of choice for all of them. Chemical and Biological Weapons Chemical weapons are usually found in the form of poison gas and have been used by combatants ever since World War I. Both sides used various poison gases in that war, and both sides began at the same time to develop protective gear to permit soldiers to fight while gas was being used. The gas mask became standard issue for soldiers in most armies, and the expectation was that chemical weapons would be used in future wars. In fact, the major combatants in World War II had the capability to use poison gas but refrained from doing so. The United States did use napalm and flamethrowers in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. These weapons use a jellied petroleum product but are not considered chemical weapons in quite the same way as poison gas. Modern technology has increased the range of poison and debilitating gases as well as ways to manufacture such products. Whereas the United States has been going through the process of destroying its rather immense stockpiles of chemical weapons, other states seem to be producing new chemical weapons of their own. We know from the experience of the Gulf War that identifying chemical weapons using overhead reconnaissance or battlefield observation is not so easy. In fact, one weapons dump in Iraq was destroyed using conventional methods and apparently resulted in the release of toxic gas that caused lingering illness among American and other U.N. forces. A CIA study published after the event

to explain what happened concluded that the munitions did not have


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the usual chemical weapons markings and there was no other way to tell what they were. 8 That chemical weapons can be disguised to look like conventional munitions compounds the intelligence problem, but much can still be done. Overhead reconnaissance can identify production facilities—they seem to have particular characteristics visible from above—as well as storage depots and handling facilities. Chemical weapons do require various special handling techniques, and these too, may be observable. If time permits, it is conceivable that human sources may be recruited to provide information about a nation's chemical weapons. Although the West did not have all the data it would have liked about Iraq's chemical weapons capability, it did know quite a bit even before the Gulf War started. This intelligence was not satisfactory to battlefield commanders, but it was sufficient to allow for planning and training before the combat phase began, and some targets were identified during the bombing that preceded the land attack. We knew something about how Iraq might employ chemical weapons based on their use in the Iran-Iraq war and on the Iraqi use of poison gas against Kurdish dissidents. This enabled analysts to develop the scenarios needed to predict what Iraq might do. As it turned out, Iraq did not actually use chemical weapons against either the U.N. forces or against Israel. Nonetheless, Israelis went through gas-mask drills and built various shelters to defend against the possibility that they would become victims of SCUD-launched poison gas. Terrorists and Chemical Weapons Intelligence can identify nations that either have or plan to develop a chemical weapons capability. It is much more difficult to pinpoint nonstate actors—that is, guerrilla groups and terrorists—who are seeking to develop and use such weapons. This was brought home clearly when a Japanese cult group called Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, killing and injuring hundreds. 9 Sarin is relatively easy to make in a home lab, is extremely toxic, but can be employed without particularly sophisticated methods. Another toxic gas, ricin, can be made from castor beans. Both ricin and sarin are nerve gases, and a only a tiny amount of either is needed to cause paralysis or death. The U.S. attack on what it claimed was a chemical weapons facility in August 1998 in Sudan demonstrates what can be done when intelligence does identify a target. The U.S. government said that intelligence sources had enabled it to identify a plant in Sudan that was creating a precursor chemical for VX nerve gas.10 Although the Sudanese government quickly

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denied that the plant was doing any more than producing medicine, the evidence must have been compelling to back up Washington's claim. Biological Weapons Attention has also begun to focus on biological weapons as an alternative to chemical compounds. A flurry of press reports was stimulated by revelations that Iraq had been developing a way to use anthrax spores in combat. Further reporting showed that the United States had been testing similar weapons in the past, primarily as a way of developing defensive measures. 11 Included in the tests was a form of encephalitis virus that would disable but not kill an enemy. Whereas most countries have signed a 1972 treaty outlawing the use of biological weapons, the rogue states have either failed to do so or could not be counted on to abide by the treaty in any event. Bio-weapons have become more sophisticated because the viruses or other ingredients can be genetically altered to make them more deadly and harder to combat. Nonetheless, delivering a bio-weapon may not be so easy. A rocketlaunched delivery system with some form of explosive warhead might very well destroy the disease-laden materials when they reach the target, and conditions of wind and other variables have to be just right to release bio-weapons on the battlefield. Identifying the manufacturing plants, the delivery systems, or the nature of the bio-weapons themselves presents much the same challenge for intelligence as in the case of chemical weapons. Reconnaissance, surveillance, and HUMINT are the tools needed; and again, the necessary countermeasures will likely fall in the realm of diplomatic or military action, especially in the case of rogue states. But what would happen if a terrorist group were to gain the capability to produce and deliver a chemical or biological weapon? Given the nature of terrorists and terrorism, identifying groups with chemical or biological weapons capability is a tough task for intelligence. Stopping them is even tougher. The same may be said for terrorism. The Nature of Terrorism What is terrorism? It is the use of violence to create fear and panic, to call attention to a group or its philosophy, to target victims, or to exact revenge against an enemy. It is certainly not a new phenomenon, but it has become more dangerous and threatening in recent years because terrorists have access to such a wide variety of weapons and because terrorist violence is sure to gain broad media attention. Coupled with


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the fact that rogue states have sponsored, trained, encouraged, and protected terrorists, terrorism has become a threat in ways that no one might have imagined just a few years ago. Terrorists usually have a specific agenda. They may commit random violence to call attention to themselves, but more often they have a particular target in mind when they strike. Terrorists may be religious fanatics who seek to destroy those who do not conform to their view of worship or behavior, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, or they may combine religious fanaticism with ethnic vengeance, such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon. They might have a political ideology, such as the "maoist" Sendero Luminoso of Peru, or they could be motivated by monetary gain, such as some of the new "mafia" families in Russia. According to some terrorism experts, the new style of terrorism is based on revenge for perceived abuses or as an outlet for rage. 12 The challenge for intelligence is not only in finding out who the terrorists are but in stopping them before they can kill and destroy. Since terrorists operate in small cells—handfuls of people who know and trust each other, usually because they come from the same ethnic, religious, and social background—and because they are by nature extremely violent, traditional methods of counterespionage are difficult to use against them. Penetrating a terrorist cell by recruiting one of its members is not just extremely difficult and dangerous; it means working with a person who likely is a violent criminal. Establishing a close relationship with such a person puts both the case officer and the terrorist at risk of a quick end if the relationship is discovered. Informants and Surveillance Experience shows that a more likely route to learning about a terrorist cell is through informants and surveillance. We know from past experience that good investigative techniques can identify and locate terrorists. When Brigadier General William Dozier of the U.S. Army was kidnapped by terrorists in Italy in the 1980s, informants in the neighborhood where he was being held recognized that something unusual and suspicious was going on, and eventually the Italian security forces were able to pinpoint his location and free him. 13 Similar methods were used to keep track of hostages being held by the Hezbollah in Lebanon, even though the hostages were moved periodically to thwart countermeasures. Even more painstaking forensic work was involved in tracking down the terrorists who used a bomb hidden in a radio to bring down a Pan Am airliner, Flight 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland. Eventually, careful sifting of shards and pieces produced bits of the bomb, and the nature

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of these fragments enabled investigators to determine that the terrorists must have come from Libya. The Libyan government, however, denied complicity and refused to extradite the individuals, though investigative and intelligence work had actually been able to identify the terrorists. Finally, Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi agreed to permit the two suspects to be tried outside the United States, apparently in a bid to have economic sanctions against Libya lifted. This meant, as well, that he was prepared to write off the two terrorists, who were reportedly members of the Libyan security services.14 Terrorism is crime, and U.S. security and intelligence services have become quite good at identifying terrorists and even at bringing cases to court to convict and punish perpetrators. The foreign terrorists who exploded a bomb in the World Trade Center in New York were quickly identified, their terrorist cell exposed, and the terrorists convicted and jailed. The two men who blew up the Federal Building in Oklahoma City—not foreign terrorists at all but two Americans who sought revenge against the government for its supposed abuses—were also brought to justice in short order. To bolster its ability to go after terrorists who have targeted Americans, the United States has declared that it will use extra-territorial jurisdiction to indict foreign terrorists outside the United States and attempt to bring them to justice in the United States. This is illustrated by the case of Fahwaz Yunis, who was lured into international waters by the CIA, snatched by the FBI, and brought back to the United States for trial.15 Yunis was targeted because he had harmed American citizens, was indicted in a U.S. court, and was vulnerable. Other terrorists who target Americans will certainly have learned a lesson from this case.

Other Aspects of Counterterrorism The intelligence system has assisted in other aspects of counterterrorism in addition to using traditional methods. During the 1980s, when hostage taking by terrorists was a favored ploy, CIA and State Department psychiatrists working together developed negotiating strategies to deal with hostage takers. Meanwhile, the military developed operational teams designed to storm hostage havens, particularly hijacked airliners. In one famous case the CIA chief in Argentina was able to talk a hijacker into surrendering and releasing his hostages. Most operational units, however, were taking a lesson from the famous Israeli operation to free hostages taken to Uganda by terrorists. Israeli commandos stormed the Air France airliner on the ground, killing the terrorists, losing only one hostage and one soldier in the operation. 16 Now airline hijacking has become much reduced through strong se-


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curity measures. As the danger shifted to airline bombing, new developments in security screening have made it increasingly difficult for terrorists to bring explosives into an airliner. What this means is that terrorists will have to develop new methods for violence, and that the intelligence system will have to fight back with new security methods. An area of increasing vulnerability lies in other parts of the U.S. infrastructure. In fact, President Clinton in 1997 issued a directive to increase efforts by intelligence and security forces to protect the U.S. infrastructure, including transportation systems, bridges and highways, and the information network. 17 The U.S. reliance on computers in all aspects of modern life has made the nation vulnerable to what have become known as cyber-terrorists. These new electronic terror gangs have been breaking into computers to disrupt operations of government and private industry, steal funds through unauthorized electronic transfers, and trash electronic databases. As one cyber-expert pointed out, no matter how clever the cyber-terrorists might be, countermeasures are likely to be developed to thwart them. 18 This means that the terrorists will just have to develop new methods of electronic violence in what has become an unending game of cat-and-mouse. The Internet has now become a useful tool for foreign terrorist groups as well as for to those groups based in the United States. According to press reports, a number of foreign terrorist groups have web sites, including the National Liberation Army in Colombia, the Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Zapatista guerrillas in Mexico.19 The Internet provides a means for them to share their views with the public, but it also enables security forces to keep track of them. Despite the horrors of the two major terrorist incidents in the United States in the 1990s—the bombing of the World Trade Towers in New York by foreign terrorists and the destruction of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City by two Americans—the United States has been relatively free of terrorism in recent years. A good deal of this can be laid to the effectiveness of the FBI in identifying and thwarting terrorists before they can do damage. Of course, the FBI has been reluctant to reveal how it has been able to counter terrorists, pointing out that revealing its methods would only aid potential bad guys bent on violence. A good lesson to be learned from the two incidents cited above is that it takes only a handful of people and relatively simple methods to create a good deal of destruction. U.S. Embassies as Targets That terrorism may not require great sophistication was brought home to the American people by the simultaneous truck bombings of U.S. em-

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bassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the summer of 1998. These attacks demonstrated that although we may be relatively safe at home, we are increasingly vulnerable overseas. U.S. embassies, American businesses, and even American tourists provide ready targets for terrorists, and the reasons are simple: American facilities and people abroad are visible, open, and accessible. Attacks on Americans and their embassies and businesses, especially in the Third World, are guaranteed to generate just the kinds of publicity and attention terrorists crave. Though the U.S. press and the government have condemned the apparent mastermind behind the bombings, the reclusive, wealthy Saudi Osama Bin Laden, the unceasing press coverage of the events have undoubtedly made Bin Laden a hero to many. When the United States responded to the embassy attacks by launching cruise missiles at Bin Laden's terrorist headquarters in Afghanistan, many U.S. activists were encouraged, especially those who believe the system ought not to wait for terrorists to commit violence before seeking to bring them to justice, those who believe in pre-emptive action against the terrorists. There are a number of problems with this view. The American system of justice requires that criminals, such as terrorists, have to be arrested in the commission of a crime and stand trial by their peers. Is the American public completely prepared for a vigilante system to strike terrorists, either as acts of revenge, as in the 1998 embassy bombings, or in a pre-emptive strike? Are Americans prepared for what might become an escalating war with terrorists? Although polls showed public support for the attacks against Bin Laden's base and the Sudanese chemical plant, this support may change if terrorists began to increase their operations against Americans. Israel has long favored a policy of striking back against terrorism, but it has not deterred terrorists who are prepared to become martyrs in their battle against the Jewish state. U s i n g Terror against Terrorists? In the wake of the killings of Israeli athletes in Munich in 1979 by Arab terrorists, the Israeli Mossad took on the task of vengeance against the alleged perpetrators. 20 Unfortunately, one of their targets was an innocent civilian working as a waiter in Norway, where he was killed by mistake. The chances of making such mistakes is probably very great, given the elusive nature of the terrorist. This means that democratic societies have to be very careful in using extra-legal methods against terrorism, lest their security organizations become terrorists themselves. The fight against terrorism requires patience and typical intelligence methods: careful recordkeeping to identify known terrorists, the development of sources who might be able to provide information about


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terrorist activity, and coordination with law enforcement and security forces who may be able to stop the terrorists and bring them to justice. Although the United States has made strides in stopping or thwarting some forms of terrorism, it is unlikely that this type of political expression will go away. In fact, we can expect new kinds of terrorism to arise, perhaps using methods we don't yet recognize. Therefore, the intelligence system has to be prepared to identify these threats and assist in developing countermeasures, just as it has done in the past. One effective development in dealing with terrorism has been the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Center within the U.S. Intelligence Community. Resembling the center established to deal with counterintelligence, the unit brings together representatives from around the U.S. Intelligence Community to share information, help develop requirements for collection, and coordinate analysis on terrorism issues. In addition, the Department of State issues an annual publication entitled "Patterns of Global Terrorism," which provides an unclassified compendium of data on terrorism worldwide. 21 The FBI has established a security awareness network (ANSIR) to provide warnings to the private sector about potential security threats, and private businesses can subscribe to consultant services that gather and analyze security threat information. Possible Countermeasures The State Department has put together helpful brochures for Americans who travel or work abroad, although this material tends to be dated by the time it appears. More and more of such information is available on-line, thus speeding up the reporting process. Information valuable to U.S. businesspeople is available from the Commerce Department as well. The aim of all this intelligence data is to enable Americans to be able to make sensible judgments about traveling, working, or investing abroad. It does not take much, however, to replace reason with panic. During the buildup to the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's agents were able to place stories in the press suggesting that Iraq might target airliners carrying Americans as retaliation for strikes on Iraq. Even though nothing actually happened and there was no terrorist attack by Saddam's people, the fear and panic generated by the stories, multiplied by press reporting, led many people to cancel planned travel, thus achieving Saddam's aim of disruption without actually doing anything. Press restraint in cases of terrorism would be welcome, but in a free society such restraint is not likely. Terrorists know this and can be counted on to take full advantage of the press. Some terrorism experts have suggested that U.S. intelligence develop the clandestine capability to undermine terrorists by attacking their sup-

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port networks, identifying their sources of funds and equipment, and cutting them off. This sounds good in theory, but it is likely to be highly labor-intensive and potentially dangerous to those involved. This tactic may work against someone with vast wealth and connections, such as Osama Bin Laden, but it is not likely to work against the small terrorist cell. Attacking a terrorist infrastructure will require focused intelligence collection and analysis to identify and pinpoint the targets before any action can be taken. In that sense, it will require the political will to go after the terrorists as well as good intelligence. Global Organized Crime The latest threat to national security in the United States is one with which U.S. intelligence has had relatively little experience. That is the threat of global organized crime (GOC). Of course, the FBI has long battled the traditional Italian Mafia, the so-called Cosa Nostra, with some success, while the CIA was apparently working with some Mafia dons to assassinate Fidel Castro, but the threat of crime has taken on several new dimensions in recent years. The most familiar problem is that of countering the illegal flow of narcotics into the United States. The more recent issue concerns the growth in the United States of crime "families" from around the globe who are exporting their militant style of crime from a base abroad. What role should U.S. intelligence play in battling crime? The answer is not so clear. When Judge Webster was director of Central Intelligence in the 1980s, probably based on his own experience in law and as director of the FBI, he complained that the so-called war on narcotics was a misnomer. Webster argued that drug dealers were criminals and should be attacked using law enforcement rather than military techniques. The United States has tried a variety of methods to combat illegal shipments of narcotics into the United States, and although there have been some spectacular tactical successes, strategically the problem remains as acute as ever. What should be the role of intelligence in this fight? Over the years the role of intelligence has expanded considerably from a time when it was hardly an issue. From military intelligence service in the Far East, the author can remember discussions at the time about drug lords running opium in Burma and elsewhere in the region. It was rated of little importance because the drugs were not affecting the United States at the time. Later, in Latin America in the 1960s, the drug issue again received a low priority because it was not a direct threat to the United States, even though we knew that some Latin American military officers were running illegal drug-smuggling operations. Once the drugs started to flow to the United States in increasing vol-


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ume, the situation changed. The role of intelligence seemed clear: identify the areas where raw materials were being cultivated; find the processing units that produced the actual narcotics; determine the shipping channels used to bring the drugs into the United States; and coordinate with the FBI and, later when it was established, the Drug Enforcement Administration, so that law enforcement organizations could seize the drugs and arrest the dealers. Some of this work could be done easily with overhead reconnaissance systems, some in liaison with foreign security and intelligence services, and some using traditional sources. Gathering the information was not the problem. Stopping the drugs before they hit the street was much tougher. Countering Narcotics Flows Farmers in Bolivia, for example, were reluctant to give up a steady cash crop in coca leaves, and they certainly objected when the U.S. and Bolivian governments tried to defoliate the coca plantations. Even today growers of coca and poppy plants, the source of opium, are fighting to retain the right to grow their crops. Stopping the processing proved equally difficult, since most narcotics are easily fabricated in crude facilities that can be picked up and moved quite rapidly. Destroying them only delayed but did not stop production. Trying to stop the shippers ran up against the so-called drug cartels, whose wealth and power exceeded that of several foreign governments. The drug lords were able to co-opt local and national law enforcement and, in some cases, practically destroyed the fabric of the justice system by systematically executing those who stood in their way. Emphasis then shifted to stopping the drugs at the border using a combination of surveillance and early warning techniques. Military units, police, and DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), FBI, and intelligence personnel all got into this, with some success. Illegal shipments were detected in the air, at sea, and on the ground, and substantial quantities were intercepted and destroyed. Nonetheless, it seems clear that drug shippers can continue to profit even if a great deal of their illegal narcotics is seized. This led several administrations in Washington to begin to work against drugs on the demand side, beginning with Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" campaign in the 1980s. This has also had only limited success. It seems clear that working against the narcotics trade will continue to be a significant task for U.S. intelligence in the years ahead, but success may well be elusive. If the United States did nothing, the proliferation of drugs on the streets would increase, although the price of drugs might drop. If anti-narcotics work were given a high priority, the number of

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drug shipments destroyed might go up, but drug shipments would not likely be eradicated. The American people would have to accept the fact that increased efforts at drug eradication will be only partially successful—a concept that flies in the face of the American experience that finds success the only acceptable outcome. The CIA and Drug Smuggling American intelligence—especially the CIA—has been victimized by its involvement in the anti-drug campaign. In 1996 an enterprising reporter for a newspaper in San Jose, California, wrote a front-page article in which he claimed that the CIA was responsible for bringing drugs into black and Latino areas of Los Angeles. 22 According to the article, Nicaraguan Contras, some of whom had been supported by the CIA, were the actual drug runners, but the CIA was allegedly aware of the drug deals and complicitous in the shipments. This story created a firestorm in the media, despite denials from Washington. A California congresswoman attacked the CIA, and other politicians were quick to get on the band wagon. The then-DCI, John Deutch, went to Los Angeles to hold a "town meeting" to answer the allegations firsthand, but this achieved little, since his answers to the vigorous protests were not what the crowd wanted to hear. This was just the last in a series of such allegations that had floated around Washington for years. In fact, the CIA and the oversight committees of Congress had investigated each of the allegations, and no credible evidence of CIA drug-running was discovered. When he was DCI, Judge Webster promised that he would assist in the prosecution of any CIA or other intelligence personnel who were involved in drug dealing, but again no evidence surfaced. As usual in such cases, the allegations were front-page news, whereas the results of the investigations hardly made it into print at all. In the San Jose case the reporter was eventually forced to resign and the paper issued an apology for running the story without more careful scrutiny. The story was hard to kill, however, and the reporter has now written a book detailing his charges, although his case remains pretty weak according to reviewers. 23 Finally, the CIA's inspector general issued a report on the subject that showed that intelligence managers did make some mistakes in dealing with the Contras suspected of drug dealing, but that the managers were certainly not supporting drug smuggling. 24 Despite the adverse press the CIA and the other U.S. intelligence agencies continue to work against illegal drugs. The Counter Narcotics Center, like the other centers, remains the focal point for collecting and


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analyzing information and for intelligence sharing with other countries in the anti-narcotics campaign. Intelligence can only do so much in the struggle. Law enforcement and military units are the operational elements that actually seize the drugs and arrest the dealers. In that respect, intelligence in counternarcotics operates much as it does in military operations, supporting but not supplanting action arms.

Other Aspects of Fighting Crime In regard to other aspects of global organized crime, the role of intelligence at the national level remains open to debate. Traditionally, in working against the Italian mafias, the CIA and the other intelligence agencies had no role to play. This was a law enforcement problem handled almost exclusively by the FBI in conjunction with state and local law enforcement officials.25 Many of the crimes for which Mafia figures were indicted had to be prosecuted at the state or local level, and these jurisdictions typically developed their own police intelligence units to combat organized crime. Since many organized crime groups are based off-shore, shouldn't agencies such as the CIA, with assets abroad, be able to help out in attacking organized crime groups? This raises a number of thorny issues for national-level intelligence agencies. Just as in counterintelligence cases, the aims of intelligence and law enforcement are different. The CIA is enjoined by law from engaging in law enforcement activity, and in the end the American system demands that members of organized crime groups be brought to justice on a case-by-case basis. What contribution can intelligence make? Organized crime groups operate very much like armies, and intelligence systems can gather information about them in just the same way they deal with enemy military forces. Since GOC groups have hierarchies, identifiable leadership, headquarters, and troops, intelligence can locate them, identify the leaders, count the troops, and pinpoint their types of crime. Organized crime groups are usually ethnically based, speak an identifiable dialect, and sometimes specialize in particular kinds of crime. Because these groups are more broadly based than terrorist groups, they are more easily penetrated by recruited agents—as the FBI has done successfully with the Mafia—and they are more vulnerable to electronic surveillance. Since the private sector is the target of much criminal activity, this raises some new issues for intelligence, which traditionally provides its support to the government. What is the responsibility of the government in aiding the private sector to combat global organized crime? The United States has actually taken initiatives in this area that deserve at-

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tention. As in the case of terrorism, the Department of State provides warning information to private industry that may face threats from global organized crime when doing business abroad. This is bolstered by the FBI, which sends out warning notices to domestic industrial consumers, just as it warns them about terrorism. Sharing Intelligence on Crime The FBI, to the dismay of traditionalists in the CIA, has expanded its legal attache system abroad, in part to help America's allies in working against organized crime. The United States shares information about global organized crime through Interpol and other centers where intelligence about crime groups can be brought together. Beyond information sharing and cooperation among police forces, are there other steps that might be taken? Some observers have suggested that crime groups might be attacked through publicity or even sabotage. Based on experience with the Italian mafias, this seems unlikely. In their hey-day, Mafia dons seemed to glory in publicity and were not afraid to be identified in public, daring law enforcement to catch them in the act. And sabotage usually involves some criminal act itself—not a tactic welcomed by police. The most likely step for the United States is to develop the kinds of information sharing systems seen elsewhere, such as the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada or the Bundeskriminal Amt in Germany. So far, that task has fallen to the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC); but as global organized crime proliferates in the United States, a more comprehensive system centered around law enforcement at national, state, and local levels, will probably be more effective. In addition, a regularized way to share intelligence information will have to be developed. We know this is possible because a system was set up for just such intelligence sharing to protect the Olympic Games in Los Angeles and Atlanta. It needs only to be institutionalized on a permanent basis. Industrial Espionage Industrial espionage is a problem the United States has fought since the height of the Cold War. We realized fairly early on that the USSR was trying to steal technological secrets from the West, using the resources of the KGB and the GRU. The Soviets even recruited the Polish intelligence service to specialize in industrial espionage. This was brought home in the 1980s when a Polish spy, Marian Zacharski, was arrested by the FBI in California's Silicon Valley after trying to recruit an engineer to steal sensitive industrial secrets.26


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When the United States and its allies developed a system for preventing the export of defense-related technology to the USSR, the Soviet intelligence services became even more heavily involved in stealing both the secrets and the machinery. When he was DCI, Bill Casey used to point out in his public speeches that the Soviets were using Western technology in their missile guidance systems and fighter aircraft avionics, just to name two examples. With some success the FBI took the lead in rooting out attempts at such technology transfer, with the CIA working to develop leads that might help identify potential targets. Since the end of the Cold War, industrial espionage has become even more of a problem because a number of former adversary services along with some friendly ones have gotten into the business. One former head of the French intelligence service, the DGSE, admitted openly that the French were attempting to steal industrial secrets, and the evidence is strong that the Germans and Israelis, as well as the Chinese and Russians, are doing the same thing. 27 This was brought home very clearly in 1999 when Chinese penetration of U.S. nuclear weapons labs became known. After the United States passed the Economic Espionage Act in 1996, industrial espionage became a federal crime, thus enabling the FBI to work against the problem directly, rather than waiting to be called in by state or local officials. The FBI has also been given the authority to be able to task the CIA and other intelligence agencies to collect information to help the Bureau fight this and other crimes. Although this authority has been accepted warily by the intelligence agencies, it should help stop some industrial espionage as well as other kinds of organized crime. The FBI cannot fight this battle alone. The role of the private sector and the growth of non-governmental intelligence and security will be examined in a later chapter. Countering Subversion One problem the United States has not had to deal with very often, but which requires counterintelligence techniques, is that of countersubversion. Indeed, in many countries, countering subversion is one of the main tasks of the intelligence service. This is especially true in authoritarian societies where the ruler may well have come to power by overthrowing a previous government and needs to be sure the same thing does not repeat itself. Even in democratic societies, however, subversion cannot be ruled out, as we have seen in the cases of the Front for the Liberation of Quebec in Canada or in several Latin American countries where guerrilla groups, such as the Sendero Luminoso in Peru seem intent on overthrowing an elected regime.

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The traditional approach to countering subversion is to penetrate the movement with agents, identify leaders and operations, and arrest the leadership before the movement can solidify itself or win converts to its cause. Usually security forces are able to find agents willing to join a subversive movement, and unlike terrorist groups, the subversive groups are usually large, eager for new members, and often careless with security. Once on the inside, the agents can provide intelligence to their handlers, and operations can then be developed to strike back at the dissidents. In Peru this worked very well indeed when Abimael Guzman, the leader and strategic thinker behind Sendero Luminoso, was captured by the government in 1992, thus weakening the movement and depriving it of its brain. 28 Of course, democratic societies have to be careful to distinguish between genuine political organizations and subversives. Clearly, the United States government violated the rules in the 1960s and 1970s by using intelligence resources against the anti-war movement. The CIA and other intelligence agencies opened mail, put people under surveillance, and failed to abide by the internal security restrictions built into the enabling legislation of the 1940s. The anti-war movement was not run from abroad, was not designed to overthrow the government, and had a legitimate political agenda, although there were times when it used tactics that could be called extra-legal if not subversive. In fact, the CIA did study the movement and advised the Johnson and Nixon administrations that it was not foreign dominated, but this was not intelligence that was welcome in the White House. The abuses of the Vietnam War period have not been repeated, and legislation has been created in the wake of congressional and White House investigations in the 1970s to ensure that the government seeks legal sanction before treating a political movement is if it were a subversive entity. Nonetheless, the intelligence and security services must deal with subversion as a threat to national security when the need arises. Problems in Intelligence Sharing The Brown Commission, in 1996, recommended that the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies deal with the transnational issues discussed here, in part, through intelligence sharing with allies and friendly countries. The notion of broad-based sharing of sensitive intelligence creates problems for intelligence agencies because of concerns about protecting sources and methods. Traditionally, intelligence agencies, including those of the United States, share intelligence on a bilateral basis, giving a "partner service," to use the German term, useful information in return


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for similar consideration. The unspoken rule is that no third-party service will be informed about the nature or content of the shared information and that both sides will protect carefully the relationship as well as the shared data. Sharing finished or evaluated intelligence is much easier than sharing operational information, such as agent reports, sensitive intercepts, or some forms of overhead reconnaissance materials. Analytic products have already been written to protect sources and methods, but even though the sensitivity might not be so great, bilateral sharing has been the rule. Clearly, this is material that could be more broadly disseminated, and that seems to be the case now that the Cold War is over. But to combat the transnational issues, sharing of operational data is going to be required. Why are intelligence services so nervous about multiparty intelligence sharing? This is not an irrational fear. On a bilateral basis, intelligence services want to learn about the protective abilities of the partner service and whether or not the partner service can actually protect the materials being shared. As we have already learned, opposition services try to penetrate a target by getting a mole on the inside. It is easy to understand why the United States and Britain, perhaps the two nations that share intelligence more easily with each other than in any other partnership, became concerned about penetration of the partner, first when British intelligence officer Kim Philby gave away to the Soviets secrets he had learned while in liaison with the United States and later when it was learned that the United States had also been a victim of a Soviet mole in the person of Aldrich Ames. Could Ames have learned about British sources inside the Soviet system? Indeed he did, revealing to his Soviet masters that Oleg Gordievsky, a British agent and Soviet rezident in London, was a mole. 29 Fortunately, the British MI-6 was able to rescue Gordievsky, exfiltrating him from the USSR where he was being detained and interrogated by the KGB. We knew, during the Cold War, that the West German services were penetrated by the opposition services in East Germany. Certainly in such a circumstance one would have to assume that information given to our West German allies might very well end up in Potsdam. With that assumption in mind, it would have been possible to tailor the intelligence we gave our German allies so that our German adversaries could not take advantage of obtaining it. Of course, the reality remains shrouded in secrecy. If intelligence services have to be wary about bilateral sharing, multilateral sharing creates even more problems. What if one of the accessing services has been penetrated by organized crime or by one of the rogue states? Once the operational information has been made available, control by the originating service is lost, for all practical purposes. How can

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a service recruit agents or seek informants if there is a possibility that the identity of the source may somehow be revealed? So far, no one has designed a system to deal with this dilemma. All the efforts that we know about to increase intelligence sharing seem to be continuing to take place bilaterally. If the intelligence agencies do develop a method for multilateral sharing, they are not likely to broadcast the nature of the system. Dealing with the transnational issues will continue to be a major task for intelligence services in the years ahead. International cooperation will be required, and that seems to be getting better, but intelligence and security services are going to be reluctant to take the cooperative steps that diplomats, military officials, or police find much easier. At least we know that intelligence services, both at home and abroad, recognize the problems, even though all the solutions are not yet at hand.

Notes 1. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown, 1995); Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr., Into the Storm: A Study in Command (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1997). 2. Walter Pincus, "Spy Agencies Faulted for Missing Indian Tests," Washington Post, 3 June 1998, p. A18. 3. Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 332. 4. Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Services (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p. 3 5. Walter Pincus, "U.S. Developed 60-Pound Nuclear Weapon a Parachutist Could Deploy," Washington Post, 23 December 1997, p. A4. 6. Joseph C. Anselmo, "Defector Details Plans to Plant Nukes in U.S.," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 August 1998, p. 52. 7. Tom Clancy, The Sum of All Fears (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1991). 8. CIA, Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses, 24 August 1996. 9. Jim McGee and Brian Duffy, "Someone to Watch over Us," Washington Post Magazine, 23 August 1996, pp. 9-18. 10. M. J. Zuckerman, "Terrorism War Spurs Silence," USA Today, 23 September 1998, p. Al. 11. John M. Broder, "Plan for Germ Warfare Facility Defended," Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1988, p. 16. 12. Vincent Cannistraro, "A Strike against Terrorism—and Ourselves?" Boston Globe, 23 May 1998, p. El. 13. General Dozier came to the CIA to explain his ordeal and how he was released. 14. Evelyn Leopold, "U.S. and Britain Warn Libya to Hand over TWA Suspects," Boston Globe, 27 February 1999, p. A5.


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15. Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 1997), pp. 349-359. 16. Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, pp. 217-219. 17. Mike Billington, "U.S. to Erect 'Cyber-Wall' around Computer Networks," United Press International, 9 April 1998. 18. George I. Seffers, "NSA Chief ups Info War Ante," Defense News, 29 June 1998, p. 1. 19. Kevin Whitelaw, "Terrorists on the Web: Electronic Safe Haven," U.S. News & World Report, 22 June 1998, p. 46. 20. Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, pp. 184-194. 21. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, April 1998; this seems to be an annual publication. 22. Andrea Orr, "Disgraced Reporter Stands by Stories of CIA Drug Link," Reuters, 10 August 1998. 23. Gary Webb, Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998). 24. Walter Pincus, "CIA Ignored Tips Alleging Contra Drug Links, Report Says," Washington Post, 3 November 1998, p. A4. 25. Cartha DeLoach, Hoover's FBI (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1995), pp. 297-317. 26. Winston Williams, "Spy Case and Tool Industry," New York Times, 4 July 1981, p. B25. 27. John Fialka, War by Other Means: Economic Espionage in America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997). 28. Alonso Cueto, "Celebrations and Reflections after Peru's Capture of the Century," Wall Street Journal, 9 October 1992, p. 15. 29. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), pp. 8-16.


CHAPTER 7

Managing and Controlling Secret Intelligence Managing an intelligence service is no different than running any large bureaucracy, but it is complicated by secrecy, compartmentation, needto-know, and the fact that some of its employees are devious, manipulative, and trained to hide their activities from others. How can intelligence managers and political leaders be sure that their intelligence officers are doing only what they are supposed to, that they are not stealing the secret funds so carefully hidden from public scrutiny, or that they are not plotting some off-the-record operation bypassing the chainof-command and the system designed to monitor their activities? How do intelligence managers handle a system in which a substantial number of employees are under cover, their affiliation with their service carefully hidden, even from other government officials and their own fellow intelligence officers? And how does anyone manage a system in which the director has line authority over only one of several intelligence agencies in a convoluted and complicated system, little budget control, and very little real power? This is a subject that has not received much attention in the media and the standard books on intelligence, although the reform studies in recent years have given the problem considerable focus.1 In fact, unless a crisis erupts about these issues, most people probably never think much about them at all. We can begin by looking at some of the internal management issues that any intelligence service must face, followed by an examination of the overall U.S. system of management and control. Despite numerous shortcomings, the system, like the bee that should not be able to fly but does anyway, functions remarkably well. All intelligence services have to deal with standard administrative issues, but the nature of intelligence operations makes many of these func-

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tions more complicated than in private industry or other parts of the government. These functions include handling human resources, security, training, communications, money management, and logistics. These last three functions are quite sensitive in intelligence for a variety of reasons, and it would not be surprising if an intelligence service objected to much discussion about them. Throughout the Cold War—and even before that—communications activities required considerable protection because a breach of security in this area could lay bare many of an agency's most highly prized operations. The case of Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet code clerk who defected in Ottawa, Canada, soon after the end of World War II highlighted the value of getting at an adversary's communications. 2 Gouzenko knew a great deal about Soviet penetrations of the U.S. Manhattan Project, the atomic bomb research, and how the Soviets had made their way inside. Generally intelligence services restrict access to their internal communications systems to a small group of specially cleared people and no one else is permitted entry. Finance and Logistics Finance and logistics are not quite so sensitive, but consider the problems for an intelligence service operating abroad in which most if not all of its overseas staff are under cover. The service couldn't very well furnish its safe houses with standard issue government desks and chairs that would instantly give away to any visitor the nature of the facility. It might also want to keep secret the contracts it lets for goods and services or when it outsources some of its activities to contractors. It would have to keep secret the funds it used and find a way to hide the paper trail the logistics activities created. Similarly, the intelligence service would want to hide the financial connection between itself and its employees under cover. Thus, an arrangement would be needed to create a system for pay and allowances that would show that the employee under cover was being paid by his cover employer, including tax data, pension plans, insurance, and reimbursements. In dealing with agents overseas (foreign nationals the service's case officers have recruited), a payment system would be needed to hide any connection with the case officer. In other words, the intelligence service would have to "launder" whatever currency was used so that the agent could account for the payments received. This was one of the major mistakes the Soviets made in handling its spy cases in the United States, paying such people as John Walker and Aldrich Ames in U.S. cash currency, which the recipients then deposited in banks, creating a paper trail that was eventually followed by the FBI. Had Soviets used


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foreign currency and the deposits been made abroad, following the money might have been much tougher for the investigators. The other administrative matters are less sensitive, more easily discussed here and are matters that lend themselves to a measure of reform. This is especially true in the handling of human resources, the modern euphemism for what was once called "personnel." America's intelligence services seem to be having serious problems in this regard, although this was not always the case. How does an organization such as the CIA find, recruit, and retain the best and the brightest?

Help Wanted Open any major newspaper and turn to the help wanted section. If a reader hits this on the right day, he or she will see a small, catchy advertisement by the CIA seeking those people who might be qualified to serve abroad in challenging assignments. The ads note that speakers of exotic languages, or those with prior military service, or individuals with experience living or working overseas would be preferred. Similar information now appears on a web site, and both the print ad and the electronic ad advise the prospective employee to write to the agency at a post office box for further consideration. This method of attracting new talent is just the latest effort by the CIA to fill its ranks, but it is hardly recruiting and it probably does not reach all those the agency ought to attract. In its early days the CIA did indeed recruit those with the talents it needed, using a system later condemned as the "old boy" method. 3 Former members of the service or of the OSS, many of them teaching on college campuses, would identify students they thought might be right for the CIA and encourage them to apply. 4 Since many of these "spotters" were working on Ivy League campuses, it was not surprising that a great many CIA recruits emerged from what might be called the Eastern establishment. Later the CIA sought to broaden its employee base by setting up recruiting offices around the country. The recruiters would use a variety of methods to find the right people and encourage them to apply. At first, this resulted in bringing together at the CIA a mix of talented and interesting people with a broad range of skills and experience. As the CIA grew bigger, however, this system began to deteriorate. The search for talent began to be overshadowed by the search for numbers. During the Reagan administration a friendly Congress gave the Intelligence Community funds for new buildings and more people. It was understood by intelligence managers that Congress would look unkindly at them if they failed to fill the slots, so CIA recruiters came

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under pressure to send more and more files to Washington. The recruiters were supposed to "beat the bushes" for new talent. Unfortunately for them, this recruiting push came at a time when protests began to grow against the Reagan administration's policies in Central America. The CIA recruiters became the focus for anti-government protests. The CIA was also criticized for what many thought was discrimination against hiring homosexuals. Although that had certainly been true in the early days, the CIA emphatically denied, during the recruiting push, that any discrimination continued. The Agency's credibility in this regard seemed to be quite low on many campuses. Pressure from Congress Under pressure from Congress and in response to criticism that the CIA was still largely dominated by white, male employees, the CIA began to seek out more women and minorities to fill its ranks. This was certainly the right thing to do, not only because of pressure to open up the agency to women and minorities but also to broaden the base of its employees and take advantage of their skills and talents. Despite its best efforts, however, this campaign was only partly successful. Among some minority groups the CIA had a poor image based on media coverage, disinformation, and apocryphal beliefs.5 Women needed only to look at who was serving in top positions in the CIA; there were few women among them. Thus, attracting members of the non-white, non-male population was a hard sell for the recruiters. Although the CIA has reportedly made gains in hiring more minorities and women, it is not clear that these groups are remaining in the Agency for their careers. A study undertaken some years ago seemed to indicate that minority professionals were leaving the CIA after several years because they found that there were relatively few role models in higher grades, that there was no minority network they could rely on for support, and that senior managers failed to understand differences in their cultural backgrounds. Although the CIA has issued statistics from time to time indicating that the Agency's minority hiring is growing, minority retention might be a more interesting measure of how well the Agency is dealing with this aspect of the human resource problem.

The Dreaded Polygraph Initial screening of the thousands of applicants for CIA positions, based on lengthy application forms and personal interviews, usually produces a crop of potential new hires that probably look fine, but all these


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recruits have to pass a security screening that includes a polygraph interview. The polygraph remains a controversial tool for such screening. In theory, by measuring a variety of physical responses, the polygraph is supposed to enable a trained operator to detect prevarication or withholding of information. Even to a person who has regularly been through such interviews, the polygraph interview is highly stressful, and its accuracy remains in serious question. To a potential new hire who has never been through a polygraph interview/the experience can be a disaster. The poor recruit sits facing a blank wall, the machine operating behind him or her, the unseen interviewer asking questions that probe the most personal experiences of the recruit's young life. Some of the questions relate to counterintelligence issues that the recruit most likely finds to be no problem: "Have you given secret information to a foreign power?" for example. More troubling are questions about sex, drugs, and personal behavior. These are questions that the recruit's most intimate friends or family are not likely to ask, and they are being asked by someone the recruit has never seen before and who must seem terribly intimidating. Is it any wonder that many talented young people, especially the more imaginative, never get through this test? 6 Security officials defend the polygraph and the way it is administered as their most reliable tool to root out potential penetrations of the CIA and those whose reliability and stability are open to question. One writer notes that an increasing number of veteran CIA employees were having difficulty with the polygraph, even though they had no real security problems. 7 In contrast, Aldrich Ames twice showed deception on the polygraph, but no action was taken. No intelligence agency can afford to tread lightly in investigating the security and reliability of its potential new hires as well as its veterans; but in the author's view, based on many years of observing the results of its use, the polygraph is costing the CIA dearly in turning away potential talent. Other intelligence agencies in the U.S. system that use the polygraph may be having similar problems, but, of course, the data either to confirm or to deny this are not publicly available. CIA Training Once hired, the new recruit is then turned over to the CIA's training system to learn the ropes. Unfortunately, not everyone gets the same rope. Typically the new recruit begins with what some call "CIA 101," a basic examination of the world of intelligence, including emphasis on laws, regulations, ethics, and morality. Students who have studied strategic intelligence at the university level, based on admittedly anecdotal

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reporting, indicate that the CIA's training is less detailed than what they had already studied. But this is only the beginning. Then the recruit begins to study the material directly related to his or her assignment. Here the CIA and the military services tend to part company. The CIA's training philosophy parallels its philosophy about human resources. According to CIA practice, new people are hired based on specific needs, and the Agency uses a variety of methods to determine the work for which each recruit is best suited. Thus, some new hires become operations officers, some become analysts, some go into scientific work, and others are directed into administrative fields. Generally there is little movement between career fields, so the training is career-specific right from the beginning. In the military a different philosophy applies: Intelligence officers are expected to be able to perform a wide variety of tasks in intelligence, so the training is more broadly based. 8 All new intelligence officers receive the same training, regardless of their future assignment. In the CIA additional training is designed to advance the officer in one specific career field. Thus, CIA's mid-grade officials tend to know a good deal about their own work but relatively little about those in other departments or directorates. Years ago the CIA would bring officials at mid-grade together from the various departments for more advanced and general training, but work pressure, lack of funding, and perhaps security considerations reduced this practice. It used to be repeated for more senior officers headed for top management, but that too was cut. The result is that senior CIA officers have little experience in fields outside their own career and tend not to know their contemporaries outside their own offices. The Military System The military seems to have a much better system. Intelligence officers who train together develop a bond that extends throughout their careers. This is reinforced when they are brought together later for further training. At mid-career and senior levels, intelligence officers have the opportunity to train with officers from other career fields. Military intelligence officers would also have had a variety of assignments as they advanced in rank. The result is that senior intelligence officers in the military are probably better equipped than their CIA counterparts to take on senior management positions and are more flexible in how they can be used. A second major difference between the CIA and the military concerns training for leadership and management. Military officers are trained early on in how to lead, as well as how to manage, based on the as-


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sumption that they will have to do both in the years ahead. The CIA does not train its managers until they actually take on a position that requires management skill, and they do not train people for leadership roles at all. CIA managers tend to advance because they are good analysts or good operations officers, not because they have displayed talent as leaders. One would often hear that someone had been appointed to a senior position at the CIA, but that this person was a terrible manager. Surely this is a system that begs for correction. Language Training and Area K n o w l e d g e In the Cold War era, when the CIA had a substantial number of operations officers abroad, a great deal of emphasis was put on language training and area knowledge. This seems no longer to be the case. Years ago a fledgling case officer might spend one or two years just perfecting language ability in an overseas assignment, or he or she might serve in a support position while absorbing the culture and ambiance in an area where the case officer would later have to recruit agents. Based on the recent examination of the intelligence failure in India in 1998, it appears that the CIA is no longer investing the money it took to give a case officer language and area knowledge; most probably this is so because of budget cuts. Similarly, the CIA used to have analysts take frequent orientation trips to the countries or areas they were covering. That practice began to erode as early as the 1960s, and the situation has gotten worse ever since. The CIA has never invested as much effort in analyst training as in the training of case officers, and now both categories of substantive officers are being short-changed. Admiral Jeremiah's review of the India debacle confirmed that analysts had committed one of the cardinal sins in intelligence analysis, that of mirror-imaging. The analysts had apparently assumed that the Indian leadership would not test nuclear weapons because Western leaders in similar circumstances would not do it. The analysts failed to understand the Indian mindset largely because they had not been exposed to it. Personnel Cuts Human resources in intelligence were dealt a further blow at the end of the Cold War when budget cuts forced severe cutbacks in personnel. This is particularly difficult in intelligence work because a disgruntled employee may take revenge on the intelligence service that fired him or her by seeking to peddle information to a hostile intelligence service. In

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fact, there was just such a case years ago when an angry employee, let go in a round of personnel cutbacks, offered to deliver secret information by throwing a package of classified files over the fence of the Soviet embassy in downtown Washington, with a note explaining that there was more where that came from.9 In the event, the KGB watcher on duty decided that the package might be a bomb and turned it over, unopened, to the Secret Service officer on duty outside the embassy. This led eventually to a sting operation in which the FBI was able to trap the disgruntled CIA officer when he went to pick up what he thought was his payoff from the Soviets. We don't know what happened to the KGB watcher, but we can speculate that he was certainly not rewarded for his caution. As far as we know, the various schemes developed by the government in general, and not just for the intelligence services, have succeeded in thinning the ranks at the CIA and other agencies. These schemes have included buyouts for early retirement and cash payouts for those willing to leave. From all accounts, this has created a serious morale problem, since many employees who used to think of themselves as having tenure in the intelligence profession have now realized that they are as vulnerable to downsizing as any firm in the private sector. This has, according to some reports, caused some intelligence professionals in mid-grades to leave to seek their fortune elsewhere. 10 Who can be totally dedicated to a service that might force an employee out when the employee has served in such unique work? In some cases, the former intelligence officer would be hard pressed to account for years of service under cover. The downsizing has also led to the consolidation of the hiring system. In 1991-92, the CIA began closing its recruiting offices around the country, relying on a centralized system operated out of the Washington area. Now it appears that pressure to rebuild the ranks, especially in terms of case officers, may require rethinking the way the system operates. If college campuses are any indication, students are very interested in intelligence work and often seek advice about how to prepare for a career in the field. Unfortunately, the CIA seems to know little about this and has not taken advantage of the network of professors who teach about intelligence around the country. N o Longer Special A further blow to morale came in 1998 when DCI George Tenet announced that because of budget restrictions, CIA retirees who had previously had their retirements managed by CIA employees would now be turned over to the Office of Personnel Management and would be treated just as any other retired civilian employees of the government. 11


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This sends an ominous message to the intelligence ranks, and not just at the CIA, because intelligence employees are not part of the regular civil service; rather, they serve in a category called the "excepted service." This gives the DCI and other intelligence managers considerable leeway in handling personnel matters, although they have traditionally relied on civil service rules as a matter of uniformity and convenience. Thus intelligence personnel in the civilian ranks, who used to think of themselves as a special breed, now realize they are not much different than the rest of the Washington bureaucracy. In the military, however, things have been a bit different. Intelligence as a career field used to be thought of as only for those who could not make it in the combat arms. In World War I one German general was reported to have left his intelligence officer behind when his troops went into combat because the officer was excess baggage. 12 Over time, however, as intelligence officers have achieved senior ranks and generals' stars, that attitude has changed. Military intelligence is no longer an oxymoron, and intelligence officers are no longer considered second-class citizens when it comes time to choose officers for senior schools and advancement. Like the CIA the military has also suffered budget cuts and has had to force officers into retirement, and intelligence personnel are treated in the same way as their counterparts. One would think that the civilian intelligence services would be eager to recruit veterans of military intelligence, and indeed, the intelligence agencies under the Department of Defense—the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency among them—have done so. The CIA has traditionally hired only those beginning a career, and its record of taking on veterans who would have to be hired at mid- or senior grades is not a good one. In fact, the CIA has even discriminated against its own officers who have served outside the CIA on various assignments, rewarding them by asking them to "prove themselves" upon their return and denying them promotion or reward based on the work they have performed elsewhere. Other Services U.S. intelligence agencies perform other tasks that should be noted because some of them are unique and require resources that support the main tasks of collection, analysis, or other operations. For example, the CIA has to maintain a medical staff to assist employees overseas who are serving in areas where medical care is either inadequate or dangerous compared to that in the United States. This is another of the functions that has to take account of cover and clandestine activity abroad. Some employees need help and counseling for drug- or alcohol-related prob-

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lems, if not for themselves, then for their families, especially in an overseas environment where such problems are endemic. After all, families have to live under cover, too, even when they are not actually CIA employees. In recent years the CIA has had to deal with problems that no one foresaw when the Agency was created. Because of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the CIA and other intelligence agencies have to search secret files and release material when proper application is made. Bill Casey did manage to make a deal with Congress, when he was DCI, to exempt operational files from such searches because that material was almost never released anyway. 13 But this deal created a new problem. Casey agreed that he would begin a systematic effort to review and release old Agency files that might be of historic interest, but this meant that a significant number of resources had to be assembled because no intelligence service can release documents in bulk if there is the slightest danger that sources and methods might be compromised. This is an issue that will be examined later when we look at how intelligence services deal with the public.

The Security Function One critical administrative function, already discussed in part, is that of security. Security, as we have seen, is a key defensive element in counterintelligence, but it is certainly more than that. The security function is wide-ranging and includes protection of physical facilities, of personnel, of operational activities, and protection of data. As in many large organizations, the security function includes protecting the organization from its personnel as well. Thus, the security function is not only an administrative necessity but serves as a control element as well. When Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani citizen, gunned down several CIA officers on the road leading to CIA headquarters in Virginia, it brought home to many the need for protection of CIA people and facilities.14 In this case, the CIA itself could do very little because its jurisdiction, in terms of physical security and police power, covered only CIA buildings and grounds. Outside those areas the CIA must turn to the local police for aid, just as any private citizen would do. In fact, the CIA obtained the right to maintain its own security police only in the 1980s. Before that time the CIA relied on government uniformed security police, the same people who guarded museums and other government facilities— to guard its domestic buildings. This system was used because of the 1947 law preventing the CIA from engaging in law enforcement activities.


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Security Abroad Overseas the CIA is also dependent on others for much of its physical security. The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 revived discussion about the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad, many of which were built to be open and available to the public. CIA officials have undoubtedly not forgotten about that vulnerability. CIA officers were taken in the storming of the U.S. embassy in Teheran in 1979, and several CIA officers were lost in the bombing of the embassy in Beirut in 1983. At the time a committee was set up to review security at embassies abroad, and the CIA concluded that the security provided by the State Department was inadequate. Anyone who has served abroad in a CIA post would certainly be able to confirm that conclusion. Nonetheless, very little was done, except that more training was developed to help officers abroad protect themselves through defensive driving and other such skills. Even though the CIA has to rely on other agencies to protect its facilities at home and abroad, there is still a role for its own security office. A key element in developing protective measures is to determine the nature of the threat. Here, security personnel can work with both analysts and operations officers to develop threat assessments, so at least the CIA can decide where it is most vulnerable. Security can also play a role in protecting personnel by helping to develop defensive training and by providing actual physical protection to key leaders. It always seemed a bit excessive, however, that such protection was provided inside the CIA headquarters, a place we all thought was one of the safest places in the country. When President Reagan visited CIA headquarters in 1985 for the groundbreaking for a new building, the Secret Service brought a bomb-sniffing dog to patrol the Langley campus, an event that led many to wonder just how safe we were. The Kansi shooting, years later, proved that the CIA security officials and the Secret Service were not wasting their time. Control and Protection It is perhaps an unfortunate fact of life that the Office of Security at the CIA has had to become an element of control as well as one of protection. Yet, we know that as in any large bureaucracy, people must believe that wrongdoing will be detected and punished. In the private sector, white-collar crime is endemic and a great deal of money is lost in business because of fraud, embezzlement, extortion, and more recently

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electronic theft. The CIA probably has one of the most carefully controlled, carefully screened, most reliable workforces of any organization in the country, and the other intelligence services seem to be the same. Despite the special nature of its personnel, the CIA has been victimized by inside crime from time to time. One of the more egregious cases was that of Ed Wilson, a contract operations officer who was arrested by the FBI in 1981 after it was learned that he had become a rogue agent, selling illegal arms to East Germany and Libya.15 A second CIA officer was implicated in Wilson's nefarious operations and was also arrested. More recently we learned that Douglas Groat, a former military and police officer, had attempted to extort money from the CIA by threatening to inform target countries about CIA plans to gather information about them. In the summer of 1998, Groat worked out a plea bargain with the government that focused on the extortion rather than the more serious charges of espionage that might have forced the government to reveal sensitive data in court.16 These famous cases are among the few that have reached the public. More low-level crime goes largely unreported. One CIA officer was found to have tried to take advantage of a CIA purchase of automobiles he was administering to get a free car for himself; he was quickly caught and prosecuted. Agency employees always believed that any attempt to do anything illegal would eventually be detected by the polygraph or other security checks. It is not a bad atmosphere to create in an agency where keeping secrets is the norm. The Inspector General Another control element in the CIA is the Office of the Inspector General (IG). In the early days of the CIA, the inspector general was always a senior Agency official with many years of service and his staff was drawn from around the various directorates and components of the organization. 17 This was a so-called rotational tour of duty, and it was expected that the IG staffer would return to his or her component when the tour was over. The IG office was supposed to serve not only as a unit to inspect and evaluate the components of the Agency but also as a grievance office as well. Employees were told that if they could not get a hearing from within their own chain-of-command, they could go to the inspector general with a grievance. This meant, however, reporting to officials who were actually peers and co-workers. Many employees were undoubtedly reluctant to air grievances with people with whom they might later have to work. This system militated against a hard-charging examination of internal components as well. What career officer wanted to attack the managers


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of a unit for poor performance and then find out that these very same managers might later be their supervisors or be in a position to review their promotions? Despite these drawbacks, most employees would probably agree that the Office of Inspector General did perform a useful function, even if its reports were softer than some might have liked. After the Iran-Contra affair, Congress began an attack on the CIA's IG system, demanding that the CIA have an independent inspector general, and not someone drawn from within the ranks. This would put the CIA on equal footing with the rest of government, where inspectors general are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, as are most political appointees. President Bush agreed to this requirement, appointing as his first inspector general Frederick Hitz, a lawyer who had served in the CIA both as a case officer and later in the Office of General Counsel. He was not really an outsider, but he was not then serving within the CIA. He was easily confirmed and his tenure, which stretched on through much of the Clinton administration, has set a tone that bodes well for the system. Hitz led the IG office through examinations of alleged drug running or complicity in such affairs, bank scandals, and the Ames case.18 Some of these examinations that have been released to the public show an IG office that has not been reluctant to draw attention to CIA mistakes in management and substance. After Hitz retired in 1998, his successor, L. Britt Snider, was also confirmed by the Senate.19 Snider, while not truly a CIA insider, had served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, had written about intelligence matters for publication, was well known to many senior CIA officers, and was not a "babe-in-the woods" when it comes to asking the tough questions. Nonetheless, the IG staff is still drawn from Agency ranks and is still subject to returning to the ranks, and this remains a weakness in what has otherwise been a very effective system for control. The Audit Staff One aspect of the Office of the Inspector General that is not well known is the audit staff, whose job is to ensure that CIA officers who spend the Agency's money are not skimming off the top or mishandling funds. This is especially important in a system where a great deal of money is spent in clandestine ways. Nothing strikes more fear in the hearts of officers serving abroad than when the auditors come and each officer has to account for every penny, whether in dollars or rupees or lekas. Controlling the money may well be the key to controlling everything else because no rogue operation is possible without funds. By following the money the perpetrators in the Iran-Contra affair were soon

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tracked, and so the audit function remains one of the key tools management has to be sure that its secret operatives are following the rules. For the most part the president relies on the DCI and other agency leaders to control their agencies, deal with legal and management issues, and make sure that clandestine operatives are doing only what the management has approved and funded. The executive branch has two other tools to use to oversee the intelligence system, but both are relatively weak and have been judged ineffective from time to time. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board When President Eisenhower inherited the intelligence system from President Truman, he established a board of review to access outside advice about the efficiency of the intelligence agencies he commanded. This board became the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), pronounced "PIFF-ee-ab" in the world of Washington acronyms. Then, as now, it was made up of retired senior officials, retired business leaders, and friends of the president. PFIAB members received clearances and were able to investigate allegations of inefficiency or mismanagement as well as subtantive judgments made by the U.S. Intelligence Community, not by just the CIA. Except for expenses, PFIAB members are not paid for their services, but most seem sufficiently wealthy that this is no bar to their public service. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about how well PFIAB members perform their function because their reports are sent only to the White House and are not shared with the working level at the intelligence agencies themselves. The small staff that supports the PFIAB is equally close-mouthed, pointing out that by reporting directly and only to the president, they can be more free about what they say. It may well be that the DCI and other senior leaders in the Intelligence Community are privy to these reports, but no information about this, with rare exceptions, has ever surfaced. The second element of this White House mechanism is the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). This is composed of three members, again appointed by the president to serve without pay, who investigate allegations of malfeasance or illegal behavior. The Intelligence Oversight Board has issued statements from time to time about its work, but its most famous—or infamous—moment came when it was revealed that the lawyer who was serving at the time as legal advisor to the board had given the White House bad advice, saying that members of the White House staff did not have to report to Congress about covert action in the same way as did intelligence officials. This apparently led to Ollie North's


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misadventures in the Iran-Contra affair, for which the IOB lawyer was soundly criticized by congressional investigators. 20 Given that these two boards are made up of part-time political appointees, it is difficult to see how effective they might be in dealing with serious matters requiring in-depth investigation. Their staffs are too small to do much investigating on their own, and so this appears to be a relatively weak control mechanism for any president. Most recent presidents have also had officers drawn from professional intelligence ranks to serve on the White House staff as intelligence advisors or coordinators, but these officials do not form part of a control mechanism. They are there to deal with the development of intelligence policy, including covert action, or to ensure that intelligence judgments are reaching senior officials on the president's staff. Taken as a whole, it seems clear that the president has to rely for the most part on his DCI and the other intelligence agency heads to control the system on behalf of the executive branch. This serves in sharp contrast to many other countries where the chief executive, whether a prime minister or a president, has direct control of the several intelligence services of the nation, each of which reports directly to the top. Of course, in most countries the intelligence services are much smaller and the system much less complicated than the services and system in the United States. Presidential Orders In response to criticism of presidential control of intelligence, in 1976 President Ford issued a presidential executive order detailing who was responsible for what within the U.S. Intelligence Community. 21 The order specifically banned the use of assassination and human experimentation, activities that had come to light in the course of investigations of the Intelligence Community, and that order, somewhat revised, was reissued by President Carter and then by President Reagan.22 Despite the fears of some human rights activists that the Reagan order was "unleashing" the CIA to carry out domestic intelligence operations, the order proved to be sufficiently non-partisan that it was adopted wholesale by both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Future presidents may choose to revise this order again if they see a need to change the priorities and lines of authority it contains. The United States has another control mechanism that is unique, effective, and perhaps only possible in its peculiar political system of checks and balances. Since 1976 the United States has had a congressional committee for intelligence oversight in each house of Congress, a development that would have been seen as unworkable by the Founding Fa-

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thers of the nation, who thought that intelligence matters were the purview of the chief executive alone. In fact, many presidents stonewalled attempts by Congress to investigate secret operations, pointing out the dangers of revealing sources and methods to a large, elected assembly and thus to the public. Chief executives in the United States had to inform Congress that they were making secret expenditures, but they were not required to explain the details. In the aftermath of World War II and the coming of the Cold War, members of Congress were satisfied to have only the sketchiest of information about secret intelligence operations, preferring not to know more. 23 Since there were no committees to oversee the growing U.S. Intelligence Community, members of the U.S. Armed Services Committee were usually the ones to sign off on funds for the CIA or the other services. Military intelligence activities were dealt with more openly as part of the regular military budgets.

Congressional Oversight This all changed in 1974 when Senator Frank Church began his landmark investigation of charges that the CIA was a rogue elphant. Out of the Church and companion Pike Committee in the House of Representatives emerged a demand for more rigorous oversight of intelligence, which led to the establishment of the Senate and House oversight committees. 24 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), each created in 1976, are made up of members of Congress appointed by the congressional leadership—making them select committees—and are granted complete access to intelligence materials through the highest levels. Whereas the members themselves need go through no security or background checks, the staffs of the two committees are cleared in the same way as intelligence professionals. In fact, over time the staffs have usually contained former intelligence professionals who have decided to leave the executive branch. The original drive to create these committees was mostly based on a need to oversee covert action operations, the kinds of activities that Senator Church thought were being run by CIA professionals without even the direction of the White House. The Church Committee and the Pike Committee learned, to their chagrin, that this had not been the case at all; all the covert actions were directed by the White House and were made known to certain key members of Congress, who then arranged the funding. Once the SSCI and HPSCI were in place, a new system for dealing


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with covert action was established in which the DCI was to report to the committees any presidential policies requiring covert operations. The president was to issue a written "finding" attesting to the need for such action, and the DCI was to testify to the details before the committees. Although neither the SSCI nor the HPSCI could veto the president's order, each could withhold funds or express its reservations to the president. The committees were not supposed to torpedo the policies by leaking the details. This system worked reasonably well and should have given critics of intelligence some assurance that while the public was not able to learn in advance about covert action, their representatives on Capitol Hill were carefully reviewing plans for secret activities. This assurance was badly eroded by the Iran-Contra affair. The investigations of the Reagan White House revealed that senior administration officials and the DCI had either misled the committees, lied to them, or withheld information from them about covert action. Of course, this caused congressional leaders to seek even tighter control of intelligence activities, including more careful review of budgets, more wide-ranging evaluation of intelligence analysis, and increasing attempts to micro-manage the intelligence process. A n Effective Control Mechanism? Despite the rancor and friction created by the seemingly constant debate over intelligence activities between the White House and Congress, the U.S. oversight system has proven to be an effective way to control secret organizations, albeit at a high price. It is a remarkable change from the original notion that intelligence activities were supposed to be an executive function alone, immune from congressional prying. Now we have a system in which the representatives of the people, on their behalf, have an obligation on a non-partisan basis to review the workings of the intelligence agencies and in which the executive branch is required to cooperate in this rather intrusive and adversarial process. Some problems are inevitable as Congressmen probe more deeply than is needed and as intelligence officers seek to avoid giving out information that might compromise their operations. With good will on both sides, the system can work. We know from the Iran-Contra affair, however, that it is still possible to subvert this control mechanism for a time, but that in the end, malfeasance, illegal activities, or stupidity are bound to surface. When that happens, further congressional controls and restrictions are inevitable. And if Congress is less than careful about protecting secrets, more information will be withheld for security reasons. Thus, it pays for both sides, executive and legislative, to play by the rules.

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Fixing the Spy Machine The Intelligence Community

Finally, we have the issue of the system itself, the convoluted, complicated, multiheaded U.S. Intelligence Community. When President Truman appointed the first DCI, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, in 1946, he was seeking a way to coordinate the information he was receiving from the FBI and the State, War, and Navy Departments, each of which had intelligence elements. 25 Truman didn't have time to sift through the conflicting reports or assess the information himself. Creating the Central Intelligence Agency was perhaps an inevitable next step, endowing it not only with the ability to sift and evaluate but to collect and operate as well.26 The DCI could then have an agency to support him, and this creation would give him troops to lead, a budget, buildings, turf—all the elements of bureaucratic power in Washington. Technically, the DCI was to serve not only as the head of the CIA but also as the intelligence advisor to the president and coordinator, whatever that meant, of all U.S. intelligence activities. In reality the DCI's power to coordinate was limited to the extent that other agencies were willing to cooperate. J. Edgar Hoover, who fought bitterly against what he saw as attacks on his turf, power, and his beloved FBI, was not about to let himself be overshadowed by this upstart new agency or the DCI. As additional intelligence elements were created with the Department of Defense—the National Security Agency in 1954 and the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1961—the secretaries of defense were also wary of efforts that might compromise their control of DOD intelligence resources. Similarly, the secretary of state wanted to be able to keep the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) out of the clutches of the CIA and the DCI. Turf Issues The result of these turf issues was a system in which the DCI had almost no power over any agency outside the CIA. The only tools he could use were his access to the White House, his legal requirement to protect sources and methods, and his force of personality. When he met periodically with the other agency heads as chair of the National Foreign Intelligence Board to coordinate estimates or review intelligence policy, his ability to get everyone to play from the same sheet of music was more limited than that of the director of the National Symphony. At the working level the various intelligence agencies did deal with each other on substantive issues from time to time. Because the CIA styled some of its publications as "national intelligence," CIA analysts


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were required to coordinate with (that is, seek comments and approval from) State, INR, DIA, and even NSA, when writing for the nationallevel publications. INR, DIA, and NSA were not required to reciprocate. Community analysts did make inputs to National Intelligence Estimates, most of which were drafted at the CIA and then sent out for coordination, but analysts at other agencies wrote their own forecasts for internal use at Defense and State. As for administrative matters, each agency was on its own. Efforts to coordinate security clearances, for example, went nowhere. Each agency wanted to do its own background checks and grant its own clearances. Budgets were submitted by each agency to the Office of Management and Budget and then defended at the congressional level. And access between agencies was restricted so that officials of one agency often had to be escorted when they visited other elements of the Intelligence Community, even though they had the necessary clearances. The CIA even maintained two cafeterias, one for open employees and one for those under cover. Guests were not allowed in the "cover" cafeteria. Change in the 1970s All this began to change in the 1970s, spurred by three major developments. First, the vast expense of intelligence collection satellites required the agencies to share their use. Second, the new intelligence oversight committees of Congress demanded that the DCI submit one consolidated budget that covered all the intelligence agencies at the national level. Third, DCI William Colby had scrapped the system for writing National Intelligence Estimates, eliminating the CIA Office of National Estimates and its staff and creating the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC was to be made up of senior officers drawn from around the Intelligence Community, and they were supposed to be able to tap talent at any agency to draft the new estimates. These changes meant that the Intelligence Community had to cooperate and work together, whether its members wanted to or not. A system was needed to task the collection satellites and to manage the budget. It was assumed that the NIC would deal with substantive issues on its own. Eventually, under DCI Stansfield Turner in 1978, the Intelligence Community Staff was set up, some of whose members were assigned from the IC agencies and some of whom were hired directly, although they were considered CIA employees and made to go through CIA clearance procedures to avoid even more bureaucratic processes. The IC Staff, as it was called, set up committees to deal with requirements and tasking, not just for the satellites but for human collection as well. A budget group was to bring together the budgets developed by

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each agency and establish an overall budget, with funding requests listed by priority. Other staff elements dealt with evaluation and planning. The staff was located in downtown Washington in a building that once housed General Lewis Hershey and the Selective Service Commission. Unfortunately, for officers drawn from the IC agencies, word got around that serving on the staff was tantamount to "career death," so many officers were reluctant to serve on the staff or to stay there very long. The permanent cadre was informed that they had no right to transfer to the other agencies, even to the CIA, unless someone really wanted them. Despite these hassles, the IC Staff did bring the Intelligence Community together on a variety of issues and became an effective clearinghouse for discussing problems of mutual concern. When Bob Gates took over as DCI, the IC Staff was moved to the CIA and restyled the Community Management Staff; also, an attempt was made to bring together the administrative elements of the old IC Staff and the substantive units that made up the NIC. The functions of dealing with requirements and tasking, budgets and planning remained more or less the same. The Role of the DCI Much of the focus of the reform studies carried out in 1996 focused on the role of the DCI and the organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Most critics agreed that the present arrangement was not effective or sensible. The DCI has too little power to really run the community, most of which belongs to the secretary of defense and the Department of Defense. The overall budget is skewed in that way as well, since the CIA reportedly controls only about 10 percent. Nonetheless, efforts by the Congress to give the DCI more power and more control over the budget failed. Giving the DCI more power meant taking power away from the secretary of defense. In the zero sum game of Washington politics, that was not about to happen. This is an issue that deserves more careful scrutiny in a later chapter. Why does the system work if it is so divided and cumbersome? The answer lies in the fact that the people involved want it to work and seek ways either to evade, ignore, or circumvent the bureaucratic rules when these rules get in the way of cooperation. This is true throughout the government, but particularly true in the Intelligence Community, despite turf battles, personality clashes, secrecy, and compartmentation. Several years ago the then-IC Staff carried out a survey that showed that at least seventy-five informal committees and working groups in the IC had been created by their members to solve problems or deal with issues. These groups had not been ordered or legislated, or even budgeted, but be-


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cause there was a need, an informal solution was found. The same may be true today. The DCI makes the system work in much the same way. If the DCI has a personality that creates harmony rather than friction, much can be accomplished. Even when prickly J. Edgar Hoover was running the FBI, DCIs such as Richard Helms learned how to get along with the "old man." In the end, the Agency heads all want to accomplish the same general goals, even if they disagree on the methods. This means that DCIs must reach out to their counterparts in the other agencies and bring them on board. Administration, management, and control are not the stuff of spy novels, but they are critical issues in a system that now costs $27 billion to run and engages thousands of people. It is no wonder that reformers zero in on these issues when it comes seeking fixes. Yet, revising the lines of command—the "plumbing charts" or "wiring diagrams," as Washington insiders call them—may not be the key. The American system is very much dependent on the personalities of the people involved and their willingness to cooperate and work together. Rewiring the bureaucracy may not make that happen and may even stifle the energy that makes the system function.

Notes 1. Books that do discuss management issues include Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Loch K. Johnson, Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); and Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992). 2. John Sawatsky, Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security Service (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1980), pp. 71-91. 3. See Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992). 4. In fact, the author was recruited for the CIA in just such a fashion. 5. When the author was chairman of the DCI Management Advisory Group, he worked closely with a group of minority employees who were trying to study and fix the retention problem. 6. Although their stories are admittedly anecdotal, a number of the author's former students have reported a variety of horror stories about the polygraph. 7. Vernon Loeb, "CIA Still Recuperating from Mole's Aftermath," Washington Post, 22 February 1999, p. A13. 8. The author was trained in both the military system and the CIA system. 9. Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), p. 158. 10. Tim Weiner, "Spies Wanted/7 New York Times Magazine, 24 January 1999, p. 36.

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11. Letter to annuitants from George C. Clark, CIA Human Resource Management Office, May 1998. 12. Jock Haswell, Spies and Spymasters (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), p. 114. 13. Arthur S. Hulnick, "Learning about U.S. Intelligence: Difficult but Not Impossible," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 89-99. 14. Daniel Kleidman and Gregory Vistica, "In Search of a Killer," Newsweek, 11 August 1997, p. 37. 15. Peter Maas, Manhunt (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 278. 16. Walter Pincus and Bill Miller, "Ex-CIA Operative Pleads Guilty to Blackmail Attempt at Langley," Washington Post, 28 July 1998, p. Al. 17. Scott D. Breckinridge, The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). 18. The Inspector General Reports released to the public were available on the CIA website at www.odci.gov. 19. White House press announcement, 5 May 1998 (www.fas.org). 20. Loch K. Johnson, America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 237-238. 21. Executive Order 11905, "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Activities," 19 February 1976. 22. President Carter's order was Executive Order 12036, "U.S. Intelligence Activities," 26 January 1978; President Reagan's was Executive Order 12333, "U.S. Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981. 23. Anne Karalekas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," in William M. Leary (ed.), The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1955), p. 66. 24. Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988). 25. Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 164. 26. Arthur Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950 (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), pp. 171-183.

CHAPTER 8

Spying for Profit When most people think about intelligence, they probably consider it a function of government, and indeed, intelligence activity has largely been run by governments since early history. At first most governments used intelligence to spy out subversion. Thus, we have evidence of "the King's eyes" in a number of civilizations, including early Egypt and the lands conquered by Genghis Khan and the Mongols. Spying to learn about foreign enemies was well described by Sun Tzu in The Art of War and practiced by Hideyoshi in uniting the feudal warlords of Japan under the Tokugawa shoguns. Before the Cold War, intelligence was often thought of as a part of military operations, but with the development of civilian intelligence services in the twentieth century, that concept was broadened. Still, it was the government that ran such secret services whether in democracies or dictatorships. The idea of using intelligence techniques in the private sector is relatively new. Perhaps its earliest manifestations can be found in the first days of the Industrial Revolution, although the evidence is scanty and anecdotal at best. We do know that in 1811, Francis Cabot Lowell, an American, managed to memorize the construction and operation of the British cotton loom despite stringent controls imposed to prevent anyone from stealing the secret of this machine. 1 Lowell was able to reconstruct the machine from memory, thus creating a new industry in the United States. In an even more bizarre incident, a farmer in Maine is alleged to have ordered his daughter to enter a Shaker community in the state so she could steal the formula for condensed milk the Shakers had invented. Even before World War II, American auto manufacturers consistently tried to learn about new developments in style or construction from their competition. Using photo reconnaissance, the intelligence collectors

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would stake out test tracks or roads used to try out the new vehicles. To thwart this, manufacturers would try to disguise their new cars to prevent anyone from seeing what they really looked like. If the marketplace is a battlefield, as some suggest, then trying to outfox one's adveraries and competitors requires a method of knowing one's enemies, just as in political or military affairs. Can the traditional functions of governmental intelligence work in the private sector as well? Comparing the the two sectors shows what works and what doesn't.

Differences in Law A key element that separates the public and private sectors when it comes to intelligence is the law. Espionage is illegal all over the world, yet governments routinely practice if and even admit it if they are caught in an espionage operation. Agent handlers, as long as they have diplomatic immunity, may suffer no more than being declared persona non grata and sent home from a foreign post. The agents they handled, however, may well be severely punished or even executed. Still, it appears that most nations are willing to accept the fact that foreign intelligence officers will be posted in their countries and will conduct espionage. In the private sector the rules are quite different. Private espionage is theft, and those caught in the act are treated as thieves. This has led to two interesting developments. The first is that many governments have begun to use their official intelligence services to engage in industrial espionage, thus giving protection to the agent handlers. 2 They use the information collected to help make their domestic industries more competitive with foreign firms. The second development is that the United States has finally begun to protect itself against industrial espionage by using its intelligence services in a counterintelligence and law enforcement role. In fact, the 1996 Economic Espionage Act signed into law by the Clinton administration has turned industrial espionage into a federal crime, thus permitting the FBI to go after the criminals instead of relying on state and local law enforcement.

Differences in Cost Another factor that separates governmental intelligence and private intelligence is cost. In the government the cost of carrying out intelligence operations is based on an annual budget developed by the Intelligence Community, supported by the president's Office of Management and Budget, and passed by Congress. Whereas intelligence managers

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may concern themselves with keeping their operations within budget guidelines, this is not usually a concern of those actually doing the work. No one worries about the cost of each agent meeting or of a daily intelligence report. In the private sector, in contrast, each intelligence activity has to be measured against cost and the contribution it makes to corporate earnings and profit. It is easy to see, then, that intelligence activity in the private sector faces obstacles that either do not appear in government or are not of major concern. We can examine intelligence in the private sector by comparing the various functions of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action with their governmental equivalents, and we can see how intelligence actually manifests itself in the marketplace. More Narrow Focus Intelligence collectors in the private sector have a more narrow focus than their counterparts in government, and the rules governing their behavior are more strict, at least for the United States. The government has declared several times, through several administrations, that it will not use its intelligence services to spy for American industry, even if other countries do so. Since espionage is illegal when practiced by nongovernmental operatives, this effectively rules out traditional forms of spying as a collection method. The cost of trying to carry out electronic intercepts would be prohibitive for the private sector, even if it were legal, so technical collection has to be limited to the kinds of overhead photography that can be purchased from the growing number of sources that provide such data. The Russians, for example, have said that they will sell satellite photos of particular targets on demand, and the cost seems reasonable for a firm that might be seeking such data. Realistically, then, most private intelligence collection, at least as far as Americans are concerned, is going to be limited to open sources, legally obtained. We already know that a great deal of information is available, either through print or electronic sources, and can be gathered merely for the cost of Internet time or sending someone to the library. Some information is available from the U.S. government and may have been derived from governmental intelligence collection systems, suitably declassified to protect sources and methods. A third category of open information has been dubbed "grey intelligence" by some writers and refers to legally obtainable information not open to the general public but accessible through some form of application process. 3 Many financial and property records can be seen in this way, and some can be obtained from the government through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which also requires an application pro-

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cess plus a small charge for copying any documents that might be released. For example, when a firm purchases a piece of heavy equipment and finances the purchase through a U.S. lending institution, various public records are created, including descriptions of the machinery and the tasks for which it will be used. 4 Similarly, firms that build new plants or renovate older ones usually have to file environmental impact statements that describe the nature of the construction or renovation as well as the purpose of the plant, the expected product and output, the number of workers to be employed, and the nature of the materials that will be needed to manufacture the product. The environmental impact statement is obtainable through legal means, as are the licensing documents or other details of the project. In fact, as one writer on competitive intelligence has noted, almost every transaction in the private sector generates information that can be legally obtained, so intelligence collectors need only follow the money to find out a great deal of data. A Form of H U M I N T Whereas espionage has been ruled out for Americans, there is a form of human intelligence collection, HUMINT, that is quite legal and effective, and it works for the private sector just as it does in government. Elicitation is the art of gathering information from people so that they do not realize they are providing it. It involves careful listening, perhaps a bit of prodding, and a good memory to capture the details. A favorite technique for eliciting information is to attend technical meetings, symposia, conferences, and other open gatherings and hang around the coffee bar, listening carefully for useful conversation and perhaps zeroing in on someone who seems to be both knowledgeable and forthcoming. Such gatherings are also a good source of printed materials and papers. Of course, the intelligence gatherer has to understand the technical language and jargon of the conferees, so a good deal of homework might be required to prepare for eliciting intelligence. The rules that govern private intelligence suggest that the intelligence collector should not lie about his or her reasons for being at the conference or seeking the information, but telling everything is not required either. The collector should have worked out ahead of time just what will be revealed and in what detail. Leonard Fuld, a noted practitioner and writer on private intelligence, says that the collector should do no damage, hurt no one's job, and create no problems in collecting data. 5 These seem to be sound principles for such activity. Others are not quite so pristine in their advice. Some practitioners see no harm in making up cover stories for elicitation, including pretending to be potential custom-

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ers for a product in order to gather pricing data or seeking information from suppliers using false references.6 However it is done, the information gathered from human sources has to be collated, just as in government, to be useful for analysis. Whereas an operative in government might use secret recording devices to make sure no information is lost in speaking with a human source, this is illegal in the private sector unless the source is informed that a recording is to be made. In such cases, elicitation becomes interview—not necessarily a bad thing, but something that has to be done openly. In fact, interviews are good ways to obtain information as long as the interviewer is well prepared, has thought out questions ahead of time, and does not try to hide the real reason for the session. Analysis in the Private Sector In government, as we know, intelligence collection is a rather specific operation, whether from open sources, from human sources, or from technical sensors. Those who collect information then turn their raw data over to analysts, who function quite separately from the collectors. This is done, in part, to avoid bias in analysis and to protect sources and methods. In the private sector, in contrast, because of cost considerations and the small size of the units involved, those who collect are almost always those who analyze the collected data. Since the division between collection and analysis disappears in the private sector, an intelligence worker may be doing both things at the same time. Intelligence analysis in the private sector falls into different categories than in government, although some of the output may appear similar. One kind of analytic product is focused on the feasibility of doing business in the overseas environment and is generally called "political risk analysis" or simply risk analysis. It is aimed at business abroad because the assumption is that there are no secrets to doing business domestically. All the information an investor needs about the United States is readily available, and there are no mysteries about rules and regulations, culture and environment, or security and safety. Overseas, however, these issues may not be so clear.7 In investigating the business climate outside the United States, intelligence collection and analysis is necessary because some information needed for business decisions may be difficult to find, hidden, or falsified. The security climate is of particular interest because of possible corruption or incompetence. No one can do business safely and effectively if the big goons who come to the door demanding payoffs or protection money are the police. The topics that need to be investigated in the foreign environment range from legal restrictions on hiring and

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firing, to the health and welfare of personnel, to restrictions on repatriation of capital and profit. The literature on risk analysis clearly specifies the range of topics to be investigated. Much of the needed data on such topics can be gathered through readily available open sources either through the private sector or from the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce. Getting a good feel for the business climate, the security situation, or the cultural atmosphere probably means an investigative trip to the target country by someone fluent in the local language, familiar with local customs, and capable of seeing beyond the host government's propaganda to find out what may be going on behind the scenes. Businesses that are used to working in the United States may forget that in some countries, political and economic stability are much shakier than they are in the United States. Even though democracy is growing in Third World countries more accustomed to political dictatorships and to economies prone to inflation, the recent experience in Russia ought to be instructive. Under communism, Soviet rulers routinely falsified and hid economic data to make their system appear more effective than it really was. Today, the reliability of economic statistics seems little improved, although the reason may be based on incompetence rather than on dictatorship.

Forecasting in Risk Analysis Risk analysts in the private sector have to be able to forecast the climate for business, the likely outcomes of investment, and potential security issues in much the same way that governmental intelligence analysts write national estimates for security and planning. Both the processes and the methodologies are similar, but there is a major difference between the public and private sectors. In government, analysts avoid at all costs suggesting what action political leaders should take on the basis of their estimates. When asked what should be done, intelligence analysts in government usually reply by saying that such decisions are none of their business. When he was DCI, Judge William Webster went so far as to walk out of cabinet meetings when policy issues were under discussion so as to avoid political taint of intelligence. 8 In the private sector the approach is quite different. Firms that undertake risk analysis want to see clearly the bottom line of any forecast. They want a "go or no-go" recommendation, and they would be impatient indeed if a risk analyst to whom they had paid big money avoided the issue. This means that before reaching the conclusions of the risk analysis, the intelligence analyst must consult with financial and management experts in order to provide both a forecast and

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a recommendation. Thus, risk analysis closely resembles military thinking and planning. As in government, risk analysts in the private sector have to be adept at presenting their conclusions to management. This is made easier by the fact that most firms, at least in the United States, rely on consultants to provide risk analysis rather than having an internal intelligence unit. This is not surprising, given concerns about cost and also about the propriety of having a unit labeled "intelligence," since this smacks of industrial espionage. Risk analysis may be the easiest form of intelligence to outsource anyway, unless the firm is one constantly looking for business opportunities abroad. Hiring a consultant may be cheaper and more effective and eliminates the need to acquire expertise for what may be a one-shot deal. Although the evidence is anecdotal at best, consultants who carry out risk analysis indicate that they have better access to top management than counterparts in internal intelligence units and are more able to give the fruits of their work to those who may actually do something with the information. Doing business abroad may require more than just a one-time risk analysis forecast, however. Once the firm actually starts operating in a foreign country, it may need other kinds of intelligence to protect its operations. The firm needs to pay attention to the political, economic, and security situation in the country where it operates, so in this respect the firm's concerns are similar to those of U.S. officials in that country, and the U.S. embassy there may well be the best source of current intelligence. As well, the firm may wish to subscribe to one of the growing number of security newsletters written for such situations. These newsletters usually contain intelligence analysis similar to the current intelligence analysis written for senior policy officials in Washington, and a subscription is likely to be much cheaper than hiring someone to be an intelligence collector and analyst in the overseas location. Competitive Intelligence A second kind of intelligence product in the private sector is called competitive or competitor intelligence because it concerns adversaries and competitor firms in the marketplace. It is as much tactical as strategic intelligence and seems to be the fastest-growing form of private intelligence today. In many ways it is more like governmental intelligence than risk analysis because it involves gathering and analyzing information that the firm's competitors would really prefer to keep confidential. The practitioners of this form of private intelligence are more like their governmental counterparts than the researchers who carry out risk analysis, and this makes many private practitioners a little nervous. They certainly

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do not want to be seen as spies or to be accused of industrial espionage, and these concerns color the way competitive intelligence, usually called CI by its practitioners (but not to be confused with counterintelligence) is conducted in the United States. In many countries, competitive intelligence is seen as a necessary part of doing business, and CI professionals are incorporated into the firm in both strategic planning and marketing departments. One former CIA official, who left the CIA to become one of the pioneering CI professionals in the United States, believes that almost all firms in Japan have CI departments and many European firms have them as well. 9 Further, in many countries the government's professional intelligence service collects and analyzes CI information and provides it to businesses in the country to make them more competitive abroad. Although some countries deny that they actually do this, the evidence is strong that such activity exists. In fact, the former head of the French intelligence service some years ago not only admitted that his service carried out such practices but also explained in some detail why this was a necessary and right thing to do. 10 In the United States the situation is quite different. The U.S. government is happy to provide assistance to firms willing to invest abroad and makes information available for risk analysts openly through the Departments of State and Commerce. Some of this information is indeed derived from intelligence collected by the U.S. Intelligence Community and declassified to protect sources and methods. But when it comes to competitive intelligence, the U.S. government draws the line. This issue has been debated ever since Admiral Turner was DCI in the Carter administration, and each succeeding administration and DCI has ratified the original decision. The U.S. government will not assist U.S. firms to become more competitive abroad, and the reasons certainly make some sense. There seems to be no reasonable way to provide CI intelligence to private firms even-handedly; that is, there is no way to share equally between large corporations and smaller firms. Second, the nature of corporations in the United States is that ownership is often multinational. How could the government provide intelligence to firms that might be partly owned by foreigners? And why should taxpayers fund such activity when they might derive no benefit from such operations? Funding governmental intelligence to provide for national security gives each citizen a benefit, but funding private intelligence benefits only stockholders. As one CIA operative is alleged to have put it, he was willing to risk his life for his country, but he was not willing to risk it for General Motors. Interestingly, most CI professionals in the United States and the firms that use them are reluctant to seek the government's help anyway. They do not want the government to be involved in their businesses; they do

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not want to have help from governmental intelligence professionals; and they believe, with some justification, that they are capable of finding out what they need to know on their own. Further, some of them distrust former governmental intelligence operatives, perhaps explaining why relatively few former intelligence professionals have found their way into competitive intelligence, although they may be active in other aspects of business intelligence or industrial security. The Business Intelligence Unit The data remain somewhat anecdotal, but it appears that some kinds of firms do see the need for having a competitive intelligence unit integrated into the business, whereas others prefer to outsource this function. Service firms such as banks, insurance companies, and communications firms and the like seem to be attracted to integration, whereas manufacturing and pharmaceuticals like to outsource their CI needs. Overall, the use of a CI consultant firm may make economic and managerial sense in the United States, and the number of such firms seems to be growing. Despite the growing reliance on consultant CI firms, the argument for having a CI unit integrated into the business is a strong one. A permanent unit can stay on top of the competition, continuously monitor the marketplace, and provide what one writer calls "actionable" intelligence, the kind of information that managers can use to steer the firm to beat the competition by developing new products, seeking productive markets, or instituting new services.11 The CI unit can provide management with a regular flow of intelligence, whereas the consultant CI firm can deliver intelligence only to meet specific requirements. However, the nature of modern business management in the United States works against an integrated CI unit. Too many managers seem to focus on quarterly earnings statements and are not able to see how the CI unit contributes to corporate profit, according to CI practitioners. When cuts have to be made, the CI unit may be the first to feel the axe. Some firms may see competitive intelligence as only a marketing tool rather than as a strategic planning mechanism. If the CI unit is relegated to the marketing department, its real value to the firm may be lost. Some of the problems may lie with CI professionals themselves. Few of them admit to having any professional intelligence experience, although the number of former government intelligence veterans in competitive intelligence seems to be growing. Many CI professionals are trained in library science and are very good at pulling information together, but they may not be capable of making the data into the kind of actionable intelligence the firm really needs. Unlike in government, CI

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professionals in the private sector seem to learn mostly on the job. There are very few courses on competitive intelligence in American colleges and universities, and most of the training programs that do exist are one- or two-day seminars put on at rather heavy prices by the CI consultant firms themselves. Although the literature in the field is growing, aided in part by the work of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP), which publishes a professional journal and a magazine, basic texts are few indeed. 12 Further, there is no standard that CI professionals have to meet, and one can become a CI professional without prior experience or training. Given the rather loose nature of competitive intelligence, some business managers may believe they are better served by an experienced CI firm than by creating their own integral unit from scratch with people who may have to learn on the job. Of course, whether the CI professional is working as a consultant or is integrated into the firm, the work remains the same. The task is to find out about competitors, using legal and ethical methods, to improve the tasking firm's position in the marketplace. Collecting Competitive Intelligence Thus, for the CI professional, the requirements may vary from learning about a competitor's pricing strategies to production methods, marketing techniques, or the introduction of a new product. Further, the CI professional must not only collect the data using legal methods but also derive the appropriate analysis and usually make recommendations to the tasking firm about how to counter the operations of the competitor. From the literature on competitive intelligence, it seems clear that the means of doing this work involve lots of clever techniques and fall short of operations that violate either the spirit or the letter of the Economic Espionage Act. A great deal of information can often be collected from the tasking firm's own employees, and much of the rest can be obtained from open sources or gray intelligence, or from using methods already discussed. D e f e n s i v e Measures Just as the government's intelligence services have to protect themselves against espionage, the target private sector firm has to protect itself against competitor intelligence. The defense methods are similar to those used in government, but they involve a quite separate group of professionals, the practitioners of industrial security. Unlike CI profes-

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sionals, the world of industrial security is filled with people who have considerable experience in intelligence, investigative, or police work. The skills learned in government translate easily into the private sector, and those individuals with prior government experience are welcomed and not treated with suspicion as in competitive intelligence. Because many industrial security professionals have extensive experience and training acquired in government, they tend to be better equipped to deal with private security issues. Industrial security professionals who enter the field without government experience will find a broad range of training available to them either through college programs or in courses taught by security professionals. There is even a certification program supported by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS); achieving the Certified Protection Professional certificate is a reliable indicator that the holder has met national standards. Training literature in the security field is much broader than that in business intelligence as well, so the aspiring professional has a good chance of learning the basics just by going to the library. 13 Industrial security can be broken down into a number of fields, each of which has its own problems and characteristics. These fields include protection of plant, facilities, and equipment; personnel security; and operational and data security. Given the similarities to governmental practices as well as the differences in each field, making the comparison with government methods can be instructive. We can begin with protection of plant, facilities, and equipment because private sector security and government security deal with similar issues in that area. Physical Security Both government and the private sector face limited jurisdiction when it comes to physical protection. Privately hired security guards can patrol the perimeter of a facility, but their jurisdiction ends where their property ends. In government, the same rules apply. Local police take over if a crime has been committed or if trespassers have entered the property and then fled. CIA security guards can no more pursue criminals off CIA grounds than can Wackenhut guards patrolling a factory. In fact, summoning the police is one of the key roles security plays in both government and the private sector. Both government and private companies want to create an image of security to deter illegal or unwanted entry. Strong fences topped with barbed or razor wire, good lighting, surveillance cameras, and manned patrols, especially with guard dogs, should certainly intimidate anyone trying to penetrate a government facility, and similar tools are available to private companies. Many companies in the private sector, however,

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want to be open to the public and appear friendly and welcoming rather than intimidating. Who would want to stay in a hotel that appeared to be as well guarded as the CIA, or shop in a department store with guard dogs and patrols nearby? Maintaining security in the private sector often means creating the illusion to the casual observer that there is none while at the same time letting potential troublemakers know that security officials are on the job. There is probably no better example of this than in the many casinos in Las Vegas and other gambling centers, where security is pervasive but very low key. The same is true for sporting events or other large gatherings, where managers want the presence of security to be visible but not intrusive. In retail trade where shoplifting is a problem, managers might want to give security surveillance a high profile to deter theft. Physical security also includes barrier protection to prevent unauthorized entry. In some firms, expecially in manufacturing, unauthorized visitors are a threat to safety and to operational security and can be kept out in much the same way as in government. The use of various forms of entry and exit devices is growing and becoming increasingly sophisticated. Today, instead of having to swipe an encoded badge through a reader to gain entry, employees may use recognition devices that check fingerprints or eyeball patterns. Many businesses have been reluctant to use such expensive and intimidating machinery, though, preferring instead to rely on low-paid receptionists or guards to scan photo IDs. Penetrating businesses that do not use barrier devices is simple for the thief or industrial spy; often entry can be gained merely by looking as if you know where you are going or by melting into a throng. The Security Inventory To assess the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the firm in terms of physical security, the security force should probably undertake a security inventory to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the firm's physical security systems and barrier entry devices. Security professionals may even go so far as to attempt to bypass the firm's security systems in order to find strengths and weaknesses and thus be able to recommend changes where needed. Such attempted forced entry is often carried out in military units. In one such intelligence unit in which the author served, the troops penetrated a high-tech, highly classified collection unit by hiding in the trunk of the commander's official vehicle and were eventually able to place a box labeled "bomb" on the commander's desk without being detected. In that case security was increased in a hurry. Security professionals must deal with the fact that in many parts of

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the country, each employee will drive his or her car to work and expect to find a place to park. Parking security is a continually growing headache in both government and the private sector and has been exacerbated by the threat of terrorist car bombs. In government, parking facilities have been upgraded to ensure entry only by authorized employees. The facilities themselves may have pop-up road barriers or other obstacles to keep bad guys from getting close enough to do damage. In the private sector, however, parking and parking protection create expenses most firms would rather do without. This creates a security vulnerability that may degrade whatever barrier protection the firm has instituted. Turning parking management over to a specialty firm to control both access and safety of the area may prove cost-effective in the long run. Cars are a security headache in other ways, especially in the world of intelligence. Whereas CIA employees may themselves be under cover and have their pay and allowances routed through their cover agencies, their cars are not under cover and become identifiers. During the Cold War, rumor had it that Soviet agents occasionally hid outside entrances to the CIA to photograph license plates as a way of breaking the cover of clandestine service employees. Since the cars could not be going anywhere else, this must have been a useful way for the KGB to find out who we were. This was also a factor in the Mir Aimal Kansi case when that Pakistani terrorist killed and wounded CIA employees by shooting them as they waited in line to make the turn onto the CIA access road. The people waiting at that particular place had to be CIA—the access road goes nowhere else. The CIA is not the only intelligence service whose employees can be given away by their cars. We have recently learned that the former East German intelligence service was able to track virtually all the employees of the West German service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst, through their license plates. And it should come as no surprise that the Soviets and their allies were also vulnerable to identification in this way in Washington or those few restricted areas where they were allowed to travel. Overseas, for the United States, the situation is somewhat better. A story surfaced in 1998 that a CIA officer overseas was able to maintain a socalled clean car, not identified with him at all, and he used this car to rescue one of the agents revealed to the Soviets by Aldrich Ames. 14 Personnel Protection Intelligence services, especially those in the United States, want to protect their personnel from harm both at home and abroad. They also want to protect their agencies from their employees who may "go sour." We have already discussed the steps intelligence agencies take to be sure

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they are hiring the right people. If an employee does not measure up, an extended probationary period of employment enables the CIA or other U.S. services to terminate the employee without too much fuss. Indeed, there have been cases where the fired employee sought revenge, a problem the intelligence services have to keep in mind. In the private sector, the situation is different. Private firms hire and fire people all the time, but the firm's ability to investigate a potential employee is much more restricted than in government. In the private sector, protecting the firm from employees has higher priority than protecting the employees from security hazards. Private firms lose millions of dollars a year through employee crime, a problem the CIA rarely has to face. Overseas, however, the private sector has to devote as much effort to employee protection as do many government agencies. Many of the methods the government can use to clear potential employees, especially in the security sector, are not available to the private firm. The CIA can use the polygraph, extensive background checks, and access to financial and criminal records, all methods forbidden to the private firm for legal reasons. Private companies, unless they are doing business with the security sectors of government, cannot routinely use the polygraph or gain access to private records without cause. Thus, they have to rely on self-reporting by the potential employee and on information from previous employers to determine the reliability and dependability of the new hire. Only in the security sector, where government clearances are required, is the private firm able to carry out an investigation similar to that in government. Drug testing, however, seems to be equally applied in government and the private sector. Other Restrictions The CIA can look at a broad range of issues when it interviews potential new recruits, and it can ask about private activity, including sexual activity, or other personal issues more or less without restriction. In the private sector, questions about sex or personal activity are restricted unless an issue that the potential employee is willing to discuss surfaces. Unless the firm is willing to pay a private investigator to look into a potential employee's past, even a criminal record might easily be covered up. Unable to learn about a person's past in ways the CIA considers routine, the firm is vulnerable to hiring people of questionable reliability. In the CIA, security officers monitor employees more or less without restriction, as we know. When monitoring becomes investigation, however, such as in the Ames or Nicholson cases, then a court order is necessary. In the private sector, employers have to be much more careful about employee monitoring and must warn employees if they are going

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to be watched through surveillance cameras or if their phone conversations will be recorded. In the CIA, security awareness requires that employees alert security officials to suspected improper conduct by their co-workers. This did happen in the Ames case, when several Agency officers reported Ames's questionable behavior, though without much effect. Private sector employees are not likely to report on their office mates without provocation, requiring managers to be vigilant in looking for bad conduct. Theft is always a potential problem in the private sector, especially in businesses that have something to steal. White-collar crime is by far the more difficult problem to deal with, however, because it is less overt than, say, someone who steals products on the sales floor. White-collar crime includes, but is not limited to, extortion, embezzlement, fraud, and increasingly, electronic vandalism. This is an area where the firm's security force may not be effective without outside help. The security force is, after all, not the police. But the security force can be helpful in dealing with white-collar crime. Their first job is to determine that a crime has been committed, something they will probably have to do in conjunction with management. Then they need to identify the possible culprits and make sure that any evidence related to the crime is protected. Beyond that, their task is to summon law enforcement officials, again in conjunction with management, make evidence available, and then provide whatever help investigators need to pursue the criminals. 15 An overzealous security force eager to stop a crime might well taint the evidence or give the criminals enough warning to cause them to flee. Operational Security Industrial security units have a major task in protecting the operations and the proprietary information of the firm. In the face of growing threats from industrial espionage, data protection is becoming an increasingly important part of the industrial security umbrella. Taking a page from the government's security book can be instructive. Throughout the security system of the U.S. government, data protection is a key issue. All information of a sensitive nature is classified according to how much damage would be created by its loss or according to the nature of the sources and the methods by which the information was obtained. Information handling and storage are governed by strict rules about marking the information, recording the passage of the information through the system, and storing it in safe containers. Those of us responsible for information handling at the CIA probably never even considered the cost to the government of the recordkeeping, the cost of the storage containers, or the price of the cover sheets used

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to protect documents. In the private sector, however, these costs cannot be ignored. Yet, it seems clear that many firms that have valuable proprietary data to protect, including such things as the formula for a pharmaceutical drug, a new soft drink, or a software product would help themselves if they copied the procedures used in government. The U.S. government encourages firms that do business abroad to protect their data using readily available encryption technology or even commercially available scrambler phones. Firms that do business at home might consider these economical measures as well. Firms that do business overseas have to face the possibility that they might be targeted by the host country's intelligence or security service either for the purposes of industrial espionage or just to verify that the firm is doing what it said it would when it moved into the country. In the latter case, of course, there is nothing to worry about as long as the firm is indeed living up to whatever commitments it made when it opened for business. In dealing with industrial espionage abroad, the firm will probably need help if it becomes an intelligence target. H e l p from the Government Although the U.S. government has said repeatedly that it will not help firms to be more competitive by carrying out industrial espionage, it has agreed to assist firms that may be the victims of foreign spying at home and overseas. The FBI has been tasked with alerting firms to possible dangers from industrial espionage and is now able to task the collection agencies—the CIA or NSA primarily—to gather information about foreign industrial espionage. 16 The firm has the responsibility of taking measures to protect its proprietary data through proper handling and storage procedures, and it should be using its own security force to take steps to detect possible problems. Employees should be alerted to report any attempts to collect data on the firm, however innocent the approach may seem; barrier devices should be used to detect attempts at unlawful entry; and communications systems should be secured from interception. If a problem is uncovered, the firm's managers ought to be reporting to the U.S. embassy. Industrial espionage that takes place within the United States is definitely the responsibility of the FBI, and firms working in areas that may leave them vulnerable to espionage ought to be on the FBI's alerting network even before they detect a problem. During the Cold War the Soviets or their allies used to cruise areas where high-tech firms were located, looking for opportunities to meet employees who might somehow be seduced into espionage. One approach was to seek publicly available data from the employee; if a relationship developed, then the industrial spies would go after more sensitive materials, pointing out to

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the victims that they had already violated the company's rules and that they might lose their jobs if word got back to their bosses about what they had done. Fortunately, most of these attempts at blackmail pushed the victims to report the incidents and in some cases led to FBI sting operations against the enemy. Security Awareness Security awareness is a key factor in dealing with industrial espionage. Employees who have access to a firm's proprietary data and trade secrets must be trained to recognize signs of potential industrial spying and ought to be encouraged to report anything out of the ordinary. They need to be taught how to protect their information, how to avoid saying too much at meetings and conferences to the wrong people, and how to recognize attempts at elicitation. This is the kind of training routinely given to government employees who handle classified materials, and the private sector could easily follow suit at relatively low cost. To assist the firm in data protection, the security force should carry out both a vulnerability assessment and a threat assessment. Security professionals should be able to advise management not only where the firm might be vulnerable to the loss of data but also who might be the likely culprits if an attempt is made to steal proprietary information or trade secrets. This might enable the firm to strengthen weak points, but also to set up warning devices that might indicate attempts at penetration. In electronic data systems, for example, attempts at penetration ought to be detectable to provide early warning of possible industrial espionage. Then the firm can make a determination about calling for help from law enforcement. The firm needs to weigh potential losses against possible adverse publicity that might arise from acknowledging a possible security weakness. In this area the private sector has an advantage over government. In the private sector a firm can seek to indemnify itself against loss by purchasing insurance. The government, in contrast, is essentially selfinsured and has to seek budgetary relief in case of loss, under the circumstances suffering what could be embarrassing revelations about poor security. Unlike government, a private firm, properly insured, can make choices about how it seeks to cover losses from security penetrations or data theft. A v o i d i n g Turbulence Operational security can be a headache for the private firm, but it is an issue that cannot be ignored. To generalize about operational security

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is difficult because businesses come in so many varieties, but in all cases, firms seek to avoid what some writers describe as "turbulence," anything that might disrupt the smooth operation of the firm. These disruptions may range from natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, to man-made disasters like fires or electrical failures, to crime or just plain stupidity. To protect against turbulence, the security unit should develop a threat analysis to try to outline the most likely problems that might be disruptive in addition to contingency plans to deal with the disruptions. As in other security issues, the firm must choose which actions to take to deal with turbulence and insurance to cover the cost of damage from disruptions. Developing a threat analysis requires the same input and talent that drive the creation of any intelligence product, but in this area security units often fall short. Only in the last few years or so has the security literature begun to discuss the development of intelligence analysis. A serious disconnect seems to exist between the various forms of business intelligence and the security function. Since most U.S. firms do not have internal intelligence units, there is no one to assist the security people in determining possible threats to the firm and in developing the analysis to support contingency planning. This forces the firm to seek outside help when it might be more cost-effective and fit better to have the work done by those employees familiar with the firm's operating characteristics and internal culture. Since there is no way to predict with any certainty what disasters the firm may face, the security office must examine a broad range of problems and develop contingencies for each. This is an issue with which government has had a great deal of experience, so the private sector can learn another lesson in this case. At the Pentagon, for example, contingency plans are written for all kinds of situations, and each plan has, at its core, a threat assessment prepared by intelligence officers. These plans can be adjusted when actually needed. After the Gulf War some writers suggested that the plan used for the defense of Kuwait and the subsequent invasion of Iraq was based on a contingency plan for an invasion of Iran that was never actually used. Preparing for Disaster Unlike the Pentagon the private sector cannot spend time and money drawing up a wide range of contingency plans, and therefore the threat assessment has to focus on the problems most likely to face the firm so that management can decide whether to establish a disaster plan, buy more insurance, or arrange some combination of both. Some disasters certainly require a contingency disaster plan as well as insurance. For

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example, airline companies must plan for crashes, hotels and retail establishments for fire, and manufacturing companies for power failures. The firm should practice the procedures outlined in the plan, but firms are usually reluctant to do this because such practices are disruptive and can create adverse publicity. Governmental experience shows that even the best plans will not always work smoothly even if continual practice is held. Firms can take another leaf from the government's book by using a form of practice that in the Pentagon is called a command post exercise. In such a scenario plans are rehearsed in a very limited way to test communications, leadership roles, or systems needed for operations. In the private sector a limited exercise would test to make sure that alarm systems work, emergency communications systems function, or substitute power systems are ready to go. Mixing Intelligence and Security Planning for disaster or the disruption of operations requires a mix of intelligence and security activities that seem to be absent in most firms, at least according to the literature and to anecdotal material that appears among professionals in both fields in the private sector. The CIA and the FBI seem to be working cooperatively in a way no one could have anticipated years ago. This same cooperation could take place in the private sector if security professionals were more attuned to the intelligence function, or if firms were to establish internal intelligence units along with security offices. Intelligence and security in the private sector can protect firms in much the same way that intelligence and security operations serve to protect national security. The United States has a long way to go in developing such operations in the private sector, but clearly progress is being made. So far the government is playing only a limited role in aiding and protecting the private sector, and private firms do not always take advantage of the services the government has to offer. It seems clear that although the U.S. government is not going to use its intelligence resources to spy on foreign firms the way the French or Russians do, intelligence information is available to the private sector if it wishes to use it. Similarly, the United States is not going to provide security directly for firms to protect them against foreign industrial espionage, but it is going to provide assistance, information, and ultimately the force of law to aid them. Is the government doing enough to help the private sector in the United States? One would have to conclude that potential assistance is available, but that the private sector may not know it. Perhaps the in-

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telligence a n d security agencies in g o v e r n m e n t o u g h t to try h a r d e r to e d u c a t e p r i v a t e firms a b o u t the assistance they are p r e p a r e d to offer; unfortunately, the agencies d o n o t consider this a major mission, so it's n o t surprising that the CIA or the other agencies are reluctant to d o m o r e . O n l y the FBI h a s m a d e a n intensive effort to set u p a w a r n i n g n e t w o r k for the private sector. Until the g o v e r n m e n t decides that m o r e h e l p is n e e d e d , c h a n g e in the situation is n o t likely.

Notes 1. John Fialka, War by Other Means: Economic Espionage in America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. xi-xiv. 2. Ibid.; Peter Schweizer, Friendly Spies: How America's Allies Are Using Economic Espionage to Steal Our Secrets (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993). 3. Jon Sigurdson and Patricia Nelson, "Intelligence Gathering and Japan: The Elusive Role of Grey Intelligence," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 17-34. 4. Leonard M. Fuld, The New Competitive Intelligence (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995). 5. Ibid., p. 33. 6. Alfonso Sapia Bosch and Robert S. Tancer, "Navigating through the Legal/Ethical Gray Zone: What Would You Do?" Competitive Intelligence Magazine, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 22-31. 7. Wen Lee Ting, Multi-national Risk Assessment and Management: Strategies for Investment and Marketing Decisions (New York: Quorum Books, 1988); David M. Raddock (ed.), Assessing Corporate Political Risk: A Guide for International Businessmen (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986); and William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary (eds.), The Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis (E. Syracuse, NY: Political Risk Services, 1994). 8. Mark Perry, Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1992), p. 78. 9. Jan P. Herring, "Senior Management Must Champion Business Intelligence Programs," Journal of Business Strategy, September 1991. 10. "French Spy Admits Economic Espionage," United Press International, 10 January 1996. 11. Jan P. Herring, "The Role of Intelligence in Formulating Strategy," Journal of Business Strategy, September 1992, pp. 54-59. 12. In addition to Competitive Intelligence Magazine cited above and published by the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP), see also Competitive Intelligence Review, published by John Wiley. Both publications are distributed to members of SCIP. 13. Two texts the author has used in class are Robert J. Fischer and Guion Green, Introduction to Security (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998); and Richard S. Post and Arthur S. Kingsbury, Security: An Introduction to the Protective Services (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991).

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14. David Wise, "The Spy Who Wouldn't Die," GQ, July 1998, p. 198. 15. Fischer and Green, Introduction to Security, pp. 447-450. 16. Arthur S. Hulnick, "Intelligence and Law Enforcement," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 269-286.


CHAPTER 9

Secret Intelligence and the Public Secrecy in intelligence is a virtue as well as a necessity. The sources of information and the methods by which the information is gathered must remain unknown to the targets of intelligence. The extent of knowledge about an adversary as well as the operations aimed at him have to be hidden. But in modern democracies intelligence services require public support and need to earn public trust to be completely functional. Without such support and trust the services will not be able to obtain resources or recruit talented people and their judgments will be questioned by those who use the intelligence product. Maintaining secrecy while gaining public support creates a dilemma for intelligence services in democracies in general and in the United States in particular. In 1998, during the U.S. government's efforts to broker a Middle East peace agreement, President Bill Clinton sought to use the CIA as a treaty monitor, a role apparently welcomed by Palestinians and Israelis alike. The plan to use the CIA in this fashion, however, caused something of a stir in the United States despite the fact that the CIA and the other U.S. intelligence services had been engaged in treaty monitoring for many years. This was no secret, but the role of intelligence in this regard was obviously not well known or recognized by the American public. Should U.S. intelligence managers have made more of an effort to publicize their treaty-monitoring work? It may never have occurred to them to do so because secrecy in intelligence is not only a tradition but also a habit. The British, who have served as intelligence role models for their American "cousins" from time to time, have had almost an obsession with secrecy in intelligence. For many years the British refused to acknowledge the existence of their secret services, and their records of the intelligence services remain largely sealed, even now that the Cold War

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is over. Under the Official Secrets Act members of the British services are rarely given permission to speak about their work, journalists can be enjoined by the government from writing about intelligence, and intelligence matters have only lately been debated in Parliament. The British attitude about secrecy is well characterized by British author Malcolm Muggeridge, himself a veteran of British intelligence, who wrote: "Secrecy is as essential to intelligence as vestments and incense to a Mass, or darkness to a spiritualist seance, and must at all costs be maintained, quite irrespective of whether or not it serves any purpose." 1 As often seems to happen in democracies, a series of scandals involving intelligence officers eventually forced public discussion about intelligence matters in Great Britain. When the government tried to suppress the publication of a book about MI-5, the internal security service, the issue engendered further public debate. Peter Wright's book Spycatcher turned out to be an interesting memoir of his experiences in MI-5, but his accusation that Sir Roger Hollis, at one time the head of MI-5, had been a Soviet mole proved to be groundless. 2 Hollis, who had died before the book's publication, was unable to defend himself, but others turned out to be more careful researchers than Wright. This incident and the subsequent public turmoil eventually led to a loosening of British restrictions on intelligence data; finally in 1994, Parliament passed the Intelligence Services Act, which established a statutory basis for the British intelligence organizations. 3 Nonetheless, the British remain more closemouthed about intelligence than are many other Western democracies. The American Experience The American experience is somewhat different despite the influence of British custom and tradition. During the country's beginnings American leaders extolled the virtues of keeping intelligence matters secret. George Washington understood this very well indeed. In 1777 he wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton outlining the need for intelligence support for a planned attack on the British by the American general William Alexander, who referred to himself as Lord Stirling. Washington wrote: The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged—all that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue.4 The Central Intelligence Agency thought so much of this statement that it reproduced the letter in its entirety and hung it on the wall of its headquarters for all employees to see.


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During the discussions leading to the creation of the U.S. Constitution, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton discussed the need for secrecy in intelligence matters, urging that the intelligence function remain the purview of the "chief magistrate," pointing out that it would be difficult to carry out "secret correspondence" if it had to be made known to the select members of the planned upper chamber of the legislature, and it would be impossible if given to a "large popular assembly." Thus, the Founding Fathers accepted the notion that intelligence matters were to be left in the hands of the "chief magistrate." When Washington became president in 1790, he asked for and was granted by Congress a secret fund for foreign operations. Congress stipulated that the president need only submit a voucher certifying that the funds had been spent, but that he need not explain the details of the expenditures. In later years Congress challenged the president from time to time about his expenditures for foreign intelligence. In response to one such challenge, as we have seen, President James Knox Polk in 1846 rejected congressional demands for details of the use of secret funds by his predecessor, John Tyler. As it turned out, Polk was helping to cover up the rather scandalous use of secret funds and British money to convince the citizens of Maine to support the Webster-Ashburton Treaty establishing the northern border with Canada. Today such activity would certainly result in public hearings and intense media scrutiny, but Polk was able to face down Congress in this case. His statement about keeping the secrets is as valid today as it was more than a century ago. During the Civil War Lafayette Baker established what was called the Secret Service, although it was not the forerunner of the modern service we have today. In fact, Baker's service was rather draconian, operating with few constraints under the suspension of some normal judicial procedures, and became a kind of secret police.5 After the war the reaction to Baker's excesses was strong and demonstrated that even in times of crisis most Americans will not support such organizations, although they are prepared to accept the need for secrecy in other parts of government. Thus, when the Office of Strategic Services was created at the beginning of World War II, Americans understood that little could be said about what it did because enemy espionage could surface anywhere. As we now know, it was not the enemy who was carrying out espionage in the United States as much as it was our ally in World War II, the Soviet Union. Secrecy and the CIA When the CIA was created in 1947, the government did not attempt to hide its existence; instead, it kept secret the details about what the

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agency was to do. The law creating the agency is suitably vague, so much so that early leaders of the CIA wondered from time to time about the limits of their charter. When President Truman asked the CIA to help prevent the election of the Communists in Italy in 1948, DCI Roscoe Hillenkoeter sought legal advice to determine if the CIA was actually authorized to carry out Truman's request. Despite some misgivings, the operation went forward, and its success cemented the role of the CIA in covert operations. It was not surprising that the CIA sought to build its headquarters in a wooded parkland setting, making it almost invisible to the casual observer. In a speech in 1959 at the laying of the cornerstone, President Eisenhower said: "By its very nature, the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthiness and selflessness.. .. Success cannot be advertised; failure cannot be explained. In the work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity." 6 For many years this was the norm in American intelligence. The United States did not hide the establishment of the National Security Agency in 1954, but details of its activities were not made public, even after the defection of two of its officers to the USSR. Nonetheless, as in the case of the CIA, information dug up by journalists or leaked by the administration made it possible for persistent researchers to figure out what went on to some degree, even if the government would refuse to confirm the facts. Even the super-secret National Reconnaissance Office, created to manage technical intelligence collection, became known, although its very existence was classified. This led to the rather bizarre concept that information known to the public could still be secret as long as the government did not confirm it. Of course, for adversary intelligence services, this made gathering information about U.S. intelligence activities no more complicated than subscribing to defense-related magazines such as Aviation Week. Secrecy about U.S. intelligence activities suffered a grievous blow after a series of newspaper revelations about alleged CIA excesses. First came stories about the CIA's relationship with the National Student Association, then a full-blown expose by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times. The main thrust of these stories was that the CIA was carrying out covert operations in contravention of U.S. policy and U.S. law; it was alleged to be a government unto itself without benefit of control by either the White House or Congress. Coming as it did in the wake of the Watergate scandal, in which the CIA had only the most peripheral role, these stories led Senator Frank Church to condemn the CIA as a "rogue elephant" and to call for hearings to investigate the allegations raised in the press. The Church Committee investigation became something of a water-


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shed in American intelligence. It not only led to the development of rigorous congressional oversight of intelligence but also opened up American intelligence to a degree the Founding Fathers could not have imagined. To his credit, DCI Bill Colby decided to be open and frank with the Church Committee, revealing information that had, until then, remained hidden. Colby's dramatic testimony probably confirmed to many their worst fears about the CIA. When Colby died of an apparent heart attack while canoeing many years later, conspiracy theorists were quick to claim that his death was a revenge killing by old CIA hands who never forgave Colby for his openness and honesty on the witness stand. O p e n i n g u p Intelligence So the genie was out of the bottle. The Church Committee report actually contradicted the allegations that the CIA was out of control and that it was a secret government. Clearly the CIA had only done what presidents had ordered, and key members of Congress were not only privy to the operations, but had eagerly supported clandestine activities they could not have voted for in open session. The hearings nonetheless exposed the CIA, and there was no turning back. President Gerald Ford's executive order outlining the roles and duties of the intelligence system and banning assassination as well as drug experimentation was issued as a public document. Coupled with congressional demands for complete reporting to the new intelligence oversight committees about planned covert operations, the CIA became the most highly scrutinized and controlled intelligence service anywhere in the free world. President Carter's DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, took openness a step farther at the CIA by creating the Public Affairs Office, saying that the American people were shelling out big bucks for the intelligence system and that they deserved to know what it was doing with their money. It was a bold step that was greeted with uncertainty and anger by some intelligence professionals who thought the admiral, and not the CIA, was out of control. Turner began to hold press conferences at CIA headquarters. He circulated declassified intelligence analysis to the public, and the Public Affairs Office began to answer letters and take phone calls. It was a brand of openness unseen anywhere else in the intelligence world, even in other U.S. intelligence agencies. The results of DCI Turner's openness are difficult to measure. The press was no more inclined than before to write positive articles about the CIA just because the door had occasionally been thrown open to them, nor were critics of CIA analysis less harsh. In fact, some were even more virulent in criticizing the CIA—especially academics—because

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they thought the analysis they were seeing was less profound than their own, not realizing that much of the really sensitive material had been excised. Turner's fling with openness raised the hackles of his successor, William J. Casey, a veteran of the "oh so secret" days of the OSS and no stranger to intelligence. The Casey Era Casey's initial reaction, upon learning that he had a public affairs office, was to shut it down. This didn't last long. The press was accustomed to being able to contact the CIA and complained when they could not. Letter writers wrote their Congressmen when they got no response from the CIA. Casey himself became a public figure because he had been Ronald Reagan's campaign chairperson and thought of himself as a policymaker as well as the DCI. In fact, he was the first DCI to become a member of the president's cabinet, breaking the traditional barrier between intelligence and policy. It did not take long for Casey to realize that he needed a public affairs function, so he restored the office more or less along the lines Turner had established. Casey's choice for its chief, however, raised some issues because he had selected a career operations officer, a person who had been schooled in keeping the secrets, to run the office. This officer, George Lauder, thought his job was damage limitation rather than public enlightenment. This attitude created an adversarial relationship with the press, a serious problem during a period when the CIA was increasingly in the spotlight because of its less-thanclandestine role in supporting the Nicaraguan Contras and the rebels in Afghanistan. 7 Casey himself began to become a frequent spokesperson for the CIA and seemed increasingly to enjoy his public appearances, even though he was hardly a polished speaker, frequently mumbling in his rather heavy New York accent. He had, by luck, chosen as his speech writer a highly competent intelligence analyst who turned out to be so professional in preparing the DCI's speeches that she received lucrative offers from private industry, a choice she refused to make. As the Iran-Contra affair began to surface in the press, DCI Casey became fatally ill and could no longer defend himself. His illness forced him finally to resign just before his death. Some conspiracy theorists seemed to believe that Casey's illness was the work of the CIA, which was trying to silence him, but in fact it was a real tragedy. We will never learn what Casey knew about the various issues raised in the Iran-Contra affair; but for those of us who knew him, he was hardly the evil genius depicted in the press.


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The FBI Influence Casey's successor, Judge William Webster, the former director of the FBI, brought a new approach to public affairs when he asked a skilled FBI career agent to run the Public Affairs Office. Bill Baker, the new public affairs chief, carried with him the open tradition of the FBI. Unlike the CIA, which had always been closed to the public, the FBI opened a part of its headquarters in downtown Washington to tourists, who were able to see displays demonstrating the FBI's victories over criminals and spies, peer into the vaunted crime lab, and watch an agent fire a machine gun. J. Edgar Hoover had established a tradition of openness early in his leadership of the FBI. Hoover supported radio and TV programs that made the FBI look good and had his agents undergo public relations training before they took charge of FBI offices. Baker not only earned a good reputation with the press but also began to move toward improving relations between the FBI and the CIA as well. Coupled with DCI Webster's public appearances in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair, the CIA's image began to recover from the scandal-ridden days of the immediate past. Although Webster had no foreign affairs experience and suffered from the distrust of some careerists in the CIA's Directorate of Operations, he proved to be a quick study and was soon able to handle tough questions from skeptical audiences. He would occasionally preface his responses by saying, "I can't wait to hear my answer to that question." His aides were finally able to convince him to stop saying that his job was so secret that even he did not know what he was doing. Gates Takes Over When Bob Gates became DCI at the end of the Bush administration, he undertook a number of studies on reforming intelligence, among them the question of openness. According to one story that circulated at the time, a reporter allegedly called the CIA to find out who was chairing the study on openness, only to be told that the information was secret. This unfortunate knee-jerk answer says something about the tradition of secrecy at the CIA; the CIA's normal response to questions about operational matters was to say that the Agency could neither confirm nor deny allegations of intelligence activities. Bob Gates's rather short tenure as DCI kept him from completing many of the reforms he had planned. Nonetheless, his successors, R. James Woolsey and John Deutch, continued the pattern of openness.

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Both made public appearances, and both used the public affairs function to try to educate the public about intelligence matters. Unfortunately, dealing with a public that seems prepared to believe the worst about its intelligence services demonstrates the frustration of attempting to be open and honest about intelligence. When the San Jose, California, Mercury News surfaced a story alleging that the CIA had somehow been complicitous in drug dealing in Los Angeles as part of an effort to support the Nicaraguan Contras, even the best efforts by DCI Deutch to turn the story around proved futile. Although the newspaper later repudiated the story, Congress launched yet another investigation on top of several previous ones, and some political activists used the story as an excuse to blast Washington's racist policies. A further investigation by the CIA's inspector general showed that the CIA was probably aware of suspicious activities by Contra functionaries and did try to cut off support to those who might have been involved in drug dealing, but the story of the CIA's complicity in drug dealing remains imbedded in the databases and continues to surface from time to time. 8 The Most O p e n Intelligence System In spite of the frustration of dealing with conspiracy theorists, such as those who believe the CIA is hiding aliens from outer space who landed in Roswell, New Mexico, in 1947, or with political activists who like to use the CIA as a target for government bashing, the American intelligence system has become the most open of any in the industrialized world. The evidence to support this is readily available to the public at large and to those who study intelligence matters at colleges and universities. For more than a decade, beginning in the late 1980s, the CIA published books on intelligence matters that contain formerly secret material reviewed and released with only a few blacked-out words or phrases. These publications, pulled together by the history staff and others in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, covered such diverse subjects as the Cuban missile crisis, the views of President Harry Truman on intelligence, the early attempts to launch photo satellites in the Corona Project, and Soviet spying in the United States as revealed in the Venona files. Each of these publications was preceded by a conference to which outsiders were invited in order to discuss the issues and hear from key intelligence officials. All publications available to the public were listed in a catalog available from the National Technical Information Service and increasingly appeared on the CIA's Internet web site. In addition, Penn State Press, in cooperation with the CIA, published


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the authentic early history of the Agency drawn from the classified work of Arthur Darling, the CIA's first historian, as well as a book on DCI Walter "Beetle" Smith by Ludwell Montague, one of the early members of the CIA's Board of National Estimates. 9 Not to be outdone by the CIA, the National Security Agency (whose initials NSA were thought to mean either "No Such Agency" or "Never Say Anything") joined in the openness business by establishing the National Cryptologic Museum just off the Baltimore-Washington Parkway in Maryland. Visitors were able to see cryptologic gear used to break codes during World War II and other material related to NSA's normally Top Secret work. The CIA had similar displays of spying equipment, but they were inside the headquarters building at Langley and not open to the public. Included in the display were personal items that belonged to Wild Bill Donovan as well as artifacts associated with Moe Berg, the Boston Red Sox catcher who was an operative for the OSS. Even the National Reconnaissance Office, whose very existence was once highly classified, established a public affairs unit. Openness in intelligence reached the academic world as well. More and more former practitioners found positions teaching about intelligence at American colleges and universities, writing learned papers, and publishing articles and books, even though they were, like the author, required to submit their manuscripts for review. The Spreading of O p e n n e s s As the twentieth century drew to a close, openness in intelligence began to spread beyond the United States. In fact, in the dying days of the Soviet Union, even its intelligence service, the KGB, opened a public affairs office and produced films about its activities. Its credibility was called into question, however, when one of the senior KGB officers alleged that he preferred the food in the Lubyanka prison to what he got at home and that's why he spent so much time in the office. The KGB's activities were also highlighted in the wake of the Aldrich Ames spy case when former KGB officers as well as those in the new intelligence service, the SVR, seemed to get official permission to talk with Pete Earley, the enterprising journalist and author, about the mole in the CIA. O p e n n e s s on the Internet Evidence of the new openness began to appear increasingly on the world wide web as the 1990s were ending. Intelligence services with web sites ranged from Argentina and Australia to South Africa and even the

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United Kingdom. Most of the sites provided information about internal security services rather than about foreign intelligence, but with the growing interest in intelligence matters and the breakdown in the British tradition of secrecy, it seemed likely that even the foreign intelligence services would put something up on the web before long. Since the British have served as a role model for many intelligence services, their foray into the public electronic arena may spur others to do the same. So far MI-5, the internal security service, has a web site, but MI-6, the foreign intelligence service, does not. During this period, the CIA seemed to be out in front in regard to the world wide web, maintaining a web site for scholars and potential recruits as well as for children. The appearance of the junior web page drew a great deal of publicity when it first appeared and both the regular and kids-only web sites demonstrated what could be done to educate people about intelligence. The drawback to this effort involves vandalism; in its early days the CIA web page was trashed by hackers. Nonetheless, the ability of an intelligence service to tell its story on the web, release unclassified information, provide access to such useful tools as the Worldwide Fact Book, or provide the text of the DCI's speeches, was a positive step.

Releasing D o c u m e n t s A key issue in regard to openness is the wholesale release to the public of documents that no longer need to be classified. In many industrialized countries a systematic release of documents takes place after twenty or thirty years; these documents are not necessarily reviewed but are released based on the date of their creation. Some scholars in the United States have argued that intelligence documents should be treated like those of the State Department, which regularly releases a compendia of documents on U.S. foreign policy. Wholesale release of intelligence documents, however, creates a number of problems for intelligence services. One of the voices crying out for document release was that of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, a former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senator Moynihan, in his book Secrecy, published in 1998, argued that because secrecy in government created inefficiency and friction, we would be better off without it.10 But Senator Moynihan seemed to confuse secrecy in government policy with secrecy in intelligence. The senator did, from time to time, call for the disestablishment of the CIA, so one must to wonder what he may have learned during his service on the SSCI. Moynihan appeared to twist the facts to fit his arguments—a questionable practice indeed for someone who used


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to be an academician. Moynihan claimed, for example, that President Truman was never told about the Soviet spying in the United States that was revealed by the Venona intercepts. In fact, we don't really know whether Truman was told or not, only that General Omar Bradley told his subordinates that he would take on the responsibility of informing the president—not a bad decision in a case where the White House itself might have been penetrated by Soviet agents. 11 Moynihan repeated what had become something of a mantra among intelligence-bashers in the aftermath of the Cold War: that the CIA failed to predict the fall of the Soviet Union. Moynihan also slammed the CIA for estimating during the Cold War that the economy of East Germany was growing faster than that of its wealthy, highly productive sibling, West Germany. No one who ever saw the plastic-bodied, lawn-mowerengined East German "Trabi" automobile and compared it to a Mercedes or even a Volkswagon Beetle could reach such a conclusion, and so far no evidence to support Senator Moynihan's criticism has surfaced. The alleged failure to predict the fall of the USSR was equally incorrect, yet those criticisms continue to be voiced despite the careful analysis of the facts by CIA officers and their counterparts. 12 Would document release help clear up misunderstandings about CIA successes and failures? Perhaps, but no intelligence service can afford the wholesale release of documents if doing so jeopardizes sources and methods or gives an adversary knowledge about how much we know about him. As part of an effort to win release from the CIA's having to review operational documents under the Freedom of Information Act, DCI Bill Casey agreed that the Agency would begin a systematic and comprehensive historical review of documents and release all that it could. Over time, however, the task proved to be more time-consuming and expensive than anyone expected. The CIA, for the most part, had to rely on annuitants—retired CIA officers—to review and release intelligence materials, but finding people willing to spend thirty hours a week redacting documents and coming up with the money to pay them was a problem. More recently, in explaining why the process was so slow, DCI George Tenet blamed the shortage of resources and defended his reluctance to release documents until he could be sure that U.S. intelligence assets and abilities were protected. Clearly the CIA should have continued to release what it could as quickly as possible, but unless Congress was prepared to provide additional resources, the CIA was likely to create more secrets in a year than it could review and make available to the public. Even more dangerous in considering wholesale document release was the possibility that the identity of a former clandestine service officer or an agent might somehow be compromised. This seems unlikely in releasing analytic products of an earlier era, but who can be sure? When

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the files of the former East German intelligence service were plundered after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the East German regime, several people were revealed to have had ties with East German intelligence, thus ruining their prospects for a political role in the newly combined Germany. Educating the Public An intelligence service has other ways to educate the public about what it does and how it does it. The FBI learned long ago that it paid to cooperate with film and TV or radio producers if the programs were fair in their content, not necessarily puff pieces, but honest attempts to cover aspects of the intelligence or law enforcement process. It appears, however, that fiction is more popular than truth. The CIA received lots of favorable publicity from the Tom Clancy films, even though his characters and events are hardly accurate depictions of the real CIA or military intelligence for that matter. Stories circulated under President Clinton's DCIs that the CIA was cooperating with other producers for future programs, but we have yet to see the results. We know from the public appearances of directors of Central Intelligence from Bill Casey to George Tenet that public speeches about the CIA and American intelligence can give the system credibility. Coming from the Agency executive, explanations about how or why things were done, or why judgments were made, can be helpful in educating the nation about its intelligence agencies. DCI Tenet said at the beginning of his tenure in 1997 that he did not want to be a public figure, but modern DCIs can no longer avoid this role. Having other intelligence officials appear in public, however, proved to be something of a mixed bag. The CIA has tried from time to time to maintain a speakers' bureau to respond to requests for presentations from civic groups, academic associations, or other such gatherings but has had limited success. Although press coverage of these presentations is usually positive, serving officers seem reluctant to become too heavily involved with the public for fear that they will say the wrong thing, inadvertently reveal secret information, or otherwise jeopardize their careers. Especially in periods when the CIA is under fire for one reason or another, appearing in public can be stressful and not always productive. Further, it seems clear from discussions with serving officers that they have little sense of how much the public knows about intelligence and how much they should or can say. Inevitably, in press coverage of such presentations, the speaker is quoted as refusing to answer certain questions because of secrecy constraints. The pressure on former intelligence officers who appear in public is much lower than that experienced by serving officers, and sometimes


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their presentations are more forthcoming than those of their active duty colleagues. The Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), whose membership includes veterans of all the U.S. intelligence services as well as others interested in the business, has made known its willingness to find speakers for public presentations. Although some of their knowledge may be out of date, the members bring with them a great deal of credibility because they have "seen the elephant," as Civil War veterans used to say. Fixing the Image It would be nice to think that the political leaders who oversee and use intelligence would defend it more often, but this rarely happens. Nor can we expect the media to be even-handed in its treatment of intelligence matters. Occasionally reporters do try to find positive things to say about U.S. intelligence and the CIA, but most reporters would probably agree that to get a story above the fold on page one, or as the lead on the nightime TV news, it has to be a "grabber." That usually seems to mean scandal or failure rather than success. Journalists argue that scandal and failure are news, but success is not. The result of this is that the public has developed a skewed view of the intelligence system in general and the CIA in particular. Should American intelligence spend scarce resources to fix its image? This is an issue that has been debated from time to time inside the system. Using governmental resources for the purposes of public relations is difficult to justify and may even be forbidden by governmental regulations. Public education, however, can be justified if it improves the ability of the intelligence services to perform their functions, including as noted earlier, the ability to obtain resources, to recruit employees, or to serve their consumers. This is not much of an issue for the intelligence components of the Department of Defense, which make up most of the American intelligence system, or for the small components of the other civilian departments such as State or Treasury, because their functions are subsumed within the larger activities of their departments. And clearly it is not a problem for the FBI, which has developed polished and effective methods of telling its own story or having others tell it the way the FBI would like. But the CIA has a different image and a different problem.

The Budget Debate One of the issues related to openness that surfaces frequently in the United States is that of the budget for the Intelligence Community. In

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most countries that subject is not only kept secret; it is not even debated in the legislature. In most countries the budget also involves far fewer resources than in the United States. In 1997, after considerable pressure from Congress and from special interest groups, particularly the Federation of American Scientists, the overall budget figure for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 were revealed to the public, although specific information about the allocations for the several agencies was not. The DCI refused to reveal the 1999 figure, however, despite continuing pressure to do so. In fact, interest in learning about the intelligence budget has been high for many years. Those who think it should be revealed claim that constitutional rules require it, forgetting the long-established precedent, dating back to our first president, that such sums would not be made public. In reality the general budget figures, as well as the breakdown of specific allocations, seem to be well known to intelligence watchers in Washington. A story in USA Today published in the early 1990s gave a breakdown of the budget by agency, but the government refused to confirm the figures. Nonetheless, this meant that adversary intelligence services probably knew how much the United States was spending on intelligence, for whatever that is worth. Was this an issue worth the fuss that arose each year as the intelligence budget was prepared?

Worth the Fuss? Ever since the congressional oversight process was established in 1976, the preparation of the intelligence budget has been subject to intense scrutiny, first within the agencies, then by the president's Office of Management and Budget, then by the Oversight Committee of the House of Representatives. Considering the sensitivity of some of the issues contained in these budget submissions, it is no wonder that the entire process is handled under stringent security. This is not a subject for public debate, nor should it be. Keeping the budget secret was the intention of the Founding Fathers, as we know from the documents in the Federalist Papers, and this policy has been ratified from time to time ever since. Maintaining the secrecy of the budget has little to do with protecting operational information. Knowledge of the overall budget figure hardly allows even a careful researcher to learn more than the general allocation funds for each of the U.S. intelligence agencies. Rather, maintaining the secrecy of the budget keeps it from being debated in public and thus politicized. Hiding the budget in the line items of other agencies prevents eager researchers from making the intelligence budget public just to show how clever they are. If Americans want results from the money they spend on intelligence, then they should ensure that their representatives in Washington are asking the tough questions of intelligence managers.


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Releasing Analysis A second push comes from those who believe, including, apparently, Senator Moynihan, that the analysis prepared by intelligence experts in the various agencies should be made available to the public. Such a process would destroy the utility of the analysis itself and would drag the analysis into endless political debate over the issues. The whole point of having an independent central intelligence service was to enable it to make judgments without consideration of Washington's political winds or pressures or the operational interests of the various federal departments. Although the track record is not perfect, experience shows that intelligence analysts at the CIA as well as those in the Defense and State Departments are eager to tell their consumers what they want to know as well as what they ought to know. Public disclosure of current intelligence analysis would inevitably raise political issues. In late 1998 a press story appeared that suggested that Vice President AI Gore had refused to accept CIA analysis concerning the former prime minister of Russia because Gore liked the minister and did not appreciate intelligence that suggested the minister might be having problems. Of course, both the White House and the CIA denied that the intelligence analysis had been rejected, but the story revealed that intelligence officials recognize that their analysis may make political leaders uncomfortable, if not downright angry. This should not stop the analysis from being written or delivered, however. Making any of this material public, though, would enmesh the analysts as well as the recipients in an endless and fruitless debate. Intelligence analysis is prepared to aid decisionmakers in formulating and implementing policy. Degrading that process by making controversial analysis public would be harmful. Releasing intelligence analysis that is twenty or thirty years old, however, should be of historical interest and show the mindset of those who were doing the work. Surely we have learned a great deal from the release of documents related to the Cuban missile crisis, including the fact that both sides were a lot closer to a nuclear confrontation than either believed at the time. As more and more of this intelligence product becomes available, scholars will have plenty to do. As it is, the intelligence system does release a considerable amount of current data and analysis to the public, but the best stuff must remain secret to be useful. Handling O p e n n e s s A careful examination of the issues suggests that the CIA is handling openness about as well as can be expected, given the nature of what it

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does. Yet there are steps that may be taken within the restrictions of protecting sources and methods, as well as budget constraints that may be tried. To begin, CIA managers ought to make an effort to find out what the public really knows, especially outside the Washington Beltway, a roadway that seems to restrict thinking as well as traffic. Asking academics or former professionals who regularly deal with the public on intelligence matters around the country may be a good first step. Although justifying the resources needed to create a museum for the CIA would be difficult, establishing a display at an existing facility, such as the Smithsonian's Museum of American History, may be a relatively inexpensive way to show the public some of the CIA's more interesting artifacts. The CIA does open itself up to visitors on occasion, although the security effort to do this is costly. Allowing selected groups to see part of the facility tends to create a positive image of the CIA, and careful planning can reduce the potential security hazards. Public Appearances Public appearances by CIA officials, from the DCI, to senior managers, to the working troops, almost always draw favorable comment in the local press, even though they might not receive coverage in the Washington Post. The public is usually fascinated to meet CIA officials, but the officials need to be schooled in what to say and how to say it. Experience shows that intelligence professionals in general and CIA employees in particular are not aware of the copious literature on intelligence available to the public. Thus, serious students of intelligence at the university level may be better read about some aspects of intelligence than their professional counterparts. This information is admittedly anecdotal, but the author has been questioned by active service intelligence officers from time to time about what to say in public, indicating their ignorance of the open literature. The CIA occasionally publishes a short bibliography of intelligence literature; it would be interesting to survey CIA employees to see how many of them have actually read the items listed. Planning for Disaster The Agency needs to put more effort into planning for disaster, a formula security officials in the private sector emphasize a great deal. In most cases, revelations about CIA clandestine activity surface only when things go wrong. The CIA's response to such revelations usually begins with denial, then grudging admissions, and the agency's credibility suffers accordingly. In the private sector, managers are urged to plan for


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disaster, including the public response that might be needed. For example, airline officials ought to be prepared for crashes, hotel managers for fires, or manufacturers for natural disasters, and all should practice how they will deal with the public should a disaster happen. But CIA managers seem to ignore the possibility that their secret operations will be revealed until the word gets out. Then, the responses seem ad hoc, without much thought about long-term consequences. This was clearly the case in the Los Angeles drug story. Preparing for public revelations of secret intelligence activity ought to be part of any operational plan. This requires a level of cooperation between clandestine service managers and public affairs personnel that might be uncomfortable for the operations people and compromises good security practices, the need-to-know principle, and compartmentation, but good preparation is necessary to reduce misperceptions, misinterpretations, and outright lies about what happened. After all, CIA professionals in public affairs are just as interested in CIA successes as are the operations people, even though the two functions are quite different. Service in Public Affairs Dealing with the public is as much a function of intelligence these days as the recruiting of agents or the forecasting of future events. Yet the public affairs function is considered by many professionals as a side show to the main event. Service in that part of the profession is not considered first-line work, and for some professionals, taking on the public affairs function probably precludes further employment in anything clandestine. Traditionally intelligence services seek people for the public affairs function from among their own ranks, probably with the idea that since the service has hired the best and the brightest, the intelligence officers hired ought to be just as good at public affairs as they are at secret operations. This may not always be the case. Dealing with the public requires professional training and expertise, but few intelligence professionals are ever given such schooling, even after they are assigned to the job. The FBI has found that the investment in public affairs training pays off for its senior agents; the CIA might give this some consideration. Malcolm Muggeridge was at least partly correct when he suggested that a certain aura and level of mystery is necessary in an agency that carries out espionage and secret operations. Intelligence professionals are indeed different from other government bureaucrats and should not be perceived the same as the typical civil servants who grind away at more mundane duties. During the Middle East peace negotiations, DCI George Tenet wrote that misperceptions about intelligence are the price of doing

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business, b u t such m i s p e r c e p t i o n s m a y b e costly, especially w h e n a n agency n e e d s public s u p p o r t . O p e n n e s s h a s its limits in secret intelligence, b u t intelligence m a n a g e r s o u g h t to p l a n for w h a t those limits s h o u l d be. Being public a b o u t secret intelligence m a y b e just as i m p o r t a n t in a democratic society as b e i n g secret a b o u t it. Intelligence m a n a g e r s h a v e to b e equally concerned a b o u t b o t h issues w h e n they p l a n their operations.

Notes 1. Malcolm Muggeridge, Chronicles of Wasted Time (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), p. 123. 2. Peter Wright, Spycatcher (New York: Viking Books, 1987). 3. Kenneth G. Robertson, "Recent Reform of Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Democratization or Risk Management?" Intelligence and National Security, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 144-158. 4. As quoted in Intelligence and the War of the Revolution (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1976). 5. Edwin Fishel, The Secret War for the Union (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), pp. 27-28. 6. As quoted in Presidential Reflections on Intelligence, Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, at www.odci.gov/csi/monograph/firstin/eisenhower/html. 7. A short history of the Public Affairs Office appears in Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), pp. 213-236. 8. A good summary of the San Jose Mercury News story and its aftermath can be found in Walter Pincus, "CIA Ignored Tips Alleging Contra Drug Links," Washington Post, 3 November 1998, p. A4; Peter Kornbluh, "The Fresh Dope on CIA Drug Link," Baltimore Sun, 30 August 1998, p. CI; and in the CIA's Inspector General's Report. 9. Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 10. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 11. See Robert L. Benson and Michael Warner (eds.), VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response (Washington, DC: NSA and CIA, 1996), p. xxiv. 12. A careful analysis of this controversy appears in Douglas J. MacEachin, "CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record vs. the Charges," Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1996.

CHAPTER 10

Fixing the Spy Machine America's intelligence system is, by any measure, the largest in the free world and certainly the most complicated, bureaucratic, convoluted, and expensive system anywhere. Its failures, as President Eisenhower noted, are often heralded and its successes hidden. With the end of the Cold War, some critics have argued that the system is too big for what it does, and others have suggested that we don't need it at all. Wiser heads, however, generally agree that intelligence is our first line of defense and that it should be strengthened, not made weaker. Is there a way to improve what we have? Despite the relatively enormous cost of American intelligence and its bureaucratic complexity, it does work surprisingly well. Nonetheless, there are several ways in which the system could be made to work better if there was sufficient will among intelligence managers and political leaders. So far efforts at reform have been either too difficult to manage or too politically charged to be acceptable. Further, efforts at reform have almost always been triggered by perceptions of failure or hints of scandal. Typically the response to either scandal or failure has been to look for ways to reorganize the system rather than seek to change the way it works. There are other ways to approach the problem, but first we have to understand the present structure and its operating philosophy. Intelligence Structure In most developed countries and even in some less-developed nations, the intelligence structure is made up of a foreign intelligence service, whose role is to ferret out threats to the country from abroad; an internal

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security service to work against threats at home; a military intelligence service to support the combat arms; a police intelligence service; and in more sophisticated countries, a technical intelligence service for SIGINT, or communications intercepts. The overall chief of the system is usually the prime minister, chief of state, or key minister in the cabinet. Only the United States has a director of central intelligence, a role with real responsibility but little real power. The DCI, as we have seen, is not an officer of first rank compared to cabinet officers, nor does he have control or authority over most of the intelligence system he is supposed to oversee. In fact, the American system is so convoluted that efforts to depict it by using the standard organizational diagrams do not work well. In most of the literature the system is drawn as a circle with all the agencies around the circumference and the DCI in the middle. Since the DCI has no control over any agency but the CIA, no organizational lines of authority are shown. A better way to describe the system would be to outline the intelligence agencies that belong to the various departments at the national level. Thus, most of the system would be shown as subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, and the rest, except for the CIA, to other departments. Only the CIA is truly an independent agency. 1 The U.S. system is further complicated by the fact that its major internal security service, the FBI, combines the functions of internal security, federal police powers, and criminal intelligence, whereas America's technical services such as signals intelligence or imagery intelligence belong to the defense structure. Some of the intelligence units are part of the socalled Intelligence Community and thus fall under the aegis of the DCI; others do not. No one could have invented such a system, but because it grew in bits and pieces, it has become the complicated structure we have today. Most reform efforts since World War II have focused on making the system more efficient, more reliable, and less prone to failure. By and large, efforts at restructuring have not been successful. In recent years reforms of intelligence have received a great deal of attention but not much action. Various reform studies published in 1996-97 all seemed to focus on the role of the DCI. The Brown Commission, for example, the most prestigious of the study groups, suggested that the way to make the system work better was to give more power and authority to the DCI. Unfortunately for the reformers, this meant taking power from the Secretary of Defense, who quickly squelched the effort. Thus, the money and time spent by the commission was largely wasted, although there were some good ideas generated by that study as well as the others.


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Intelligence Policy and Operations Perhaps a better way to look at reform is to divide the issues into questions of intelligence policy and intelligence operations rather than a question of intelligence structure. Since the key actor in all this is the director of central intelligence, perhaps we should start by examining this rather anomalous position. The DCI, a position established by President Harry Truman in 1946, predates the CIA. Some DCIs have been strong and effective; others have been relatively weak. Most have been political or military appointees, and only a few have been career intelligence officers. Some have had ready access and a close relationship with the president they served; others have had to try to reach the president through White House staffers and aides. Some of the appointees, especially those with little intelligence background, seem to have absorbed quite a bit about the world of intelligence; others never seemed to understand exactly how to handle the position. With the creation of the CIA in 1947, the DCI acquired an agency to head. This fleshed out the position so that the DCI was now not only the intelligence adviser to the president and the National Security Council and the coordinator of all U.S. intelligence activities but also the head of an agency. 2 Now the DCI had bureaucratic power, a budget, and troops. Before long the DCI was ensconced in a sprawling new campus hidden in the woods in Langley, Virginia, several miles from the White House and even more distant from the real decisionmakers in government. As the American Intelligence Community continued to grow, the DCI's position became weaker. He was supposed to coordinate intelligence activities, but he had no real authority over any intelligence agencies but his own. As we have seen, this changed with the coming of satellites, coordinated budgets, and pressure for long-range planning. C o m m o n Interests DCIs such as Dick Helms, the consumate professional, or George Bush, the erstwhile politican, dealt with the other agencies through meetings of the agency heads in a forum called the National Foreign Intelligence Board. Where there were common interests, the agency directors usually agreed to work together, but often the demands of the individual agencies took priority, especially in the Defense Department. Until Admiral Turner became DCI, there was no real need for the agencies to work together, except in regard to producing coordinated estimates and other analysis. Overseas the CIA chiefs of station were supposed to coordinate

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the intelligence activities in their various locations, replicating the role of the DCI; but the ultimate disposition was up to the American ambassadors, who spoke for the president. When the sharing of satellite time, the coordinating of budgets, and pressure for long-range planning came together in the 1970s, Admiral Turner was at the helm of the intelligence ship, a role for which he was well qualified even though he had no prior intelligence experience. Under Turner the role of the DCI as coordinator of the Intelligence Community's variegated agencies took on real meaning. Turner also had good access to President Jimmy Carter, his Annapolis classmate. To be sure, being DCI meant more than just running the CIA. Turner established and staffed an office in the Old Executive Office building, next door to the White House, and he created a management staff, the IC staff, and put it in a nearby building downtown. Cabinet Rank The next DCI, William J. Casey, was even more aggressive than Turner in cementing his role as the president's intelligence advisor. Casey insisted on having cabinet rank, which President Reagan, grateful for Casey's key role in getting the former California governor into the White House, was happy to bestow. Casey asked his deputy, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, a widely respected former director of the National Security Agency, to play the key role in overseeing Intelligence Community affairs. In one of his first efforts, Inman led a long-range planning study that drew close cooperation among the various agencies, probably because they knew that this would lead to increased budgets, human resources, and facilities.3 Casey's successor, Judge William Webster, former head of the FBI, sought to distance himself from the White House by insisting that he not be given cabinet rank and by withdrawing from policy planning meetings so as to be seen as politically neutral in policy debates. Interagency cooperation began to fracture a bit, and real differences emerged in the wake of the Gulf War. The military claimed that it was not well served by the CIA during the hostilities, and military intelligence managers began to work out ways to ensure that they could manage without the Agency if they had to. 4 DCI Robert M. Gates, the last professional intelligence officer to serve as DCI, tried to bring the community back together, but moving the IC staff, renamed the Community Management Staff, back to CIA headquarters at Langley only emphasized its CIA dominance. Gates might have been able to make things work had his tenure been extended, but


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his close ties to President Bush proved his undoing. When the president failed to be reelected, Gates knew he had to go. 5 The Clinton Era Under President Clinton, the role of the DCI as community leader and intelligence manager deteriorated even further. Clinton's first DCI, R. James Woolsey, proved unequal to any of the tasks set for him, either as CIA leader or as intelligence community manager; and President Clinton's second DCI, John Deutch, though well meaning and hard-working, was no better. President Clinton's third DCI, George Tenet, turned out to be better than anyone had expected. Tenet was neither a career intelligence officer nor a real political appointee; rather, he was someone who had served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, and later in the Clinton White House as intelligence coordinator. Some observers thought that Tenet had gotten the job because no one else wanted it. Nevertheless, he managed to rebuild morale at the CIA and to resume the interagency cooperation that had been missing. The lesson from all of this is a simple one. The effectiveness of the DCI is dependent not on bureaucratic power or political power but on the power of personality and the DCI's management style. The most effective DCIs have been those who could bring the disparate elements of the community together to cooperate and share tasks. Of course, good access to the president is necessary as well as an understanding of the intelligence process. When the DCI can bring the other leaders into a cooperative circle, all things are possible. If the DCI cannot do this, bureaucratic structure or political power won't help. The DCI has to be a leader as well as a manager. From time to time intelligence observers and critics have suggested that the DCI position should be removed from the CIA and made into a more independent post—a director of national intelligence (DNI) who would oversee the community. A DNI would be part of the National Security Council apparatus and would have a small staff, but no agency to run. Interestingly, a position of this kind is often referred to as an "intelligence tzar." Considering what happened to the real tzars in Russia, it seems a poor term, though perhaps a bit more benign than "emperor." Most insiders believe that creating a DNI is a bad idea. A DCI with no agency behind him would have no power or authority at all, even if he were an effective leader and manager. Under the present system, as director of the CIA the DCI has both a very special intelligence collection capability, the Clandestine Service, and an independent analytic staff, the Directorate of Intelligence. If intelligence creates power,

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then separating the DCI from the CIA would leave the DNI position powerless. It would also create even more bureaucracy, which the system does not need. There is nothing wrong with the present system if the DCI is capable of making it work. Politicizing the DCI One step that should be taken to assist the DCI in his roles as CIA manager and U.S. intelligence coordinator would be to depoliticize the position, that is, to make it politically neutral as it was originally conceived and give it tenure. This was the way President Truman probably envisioned it, but this situation has been seriously eroded over time. 6 Even though the DCI position is one requiring presidential nomination and ratification by the Senate, there is no reason why the DCI should necessarily be a member of the president's political party or even sympathetic to the president's political goals. Intelligence officers are supposed to be politically neutral anyway, and the DCI should be no different in that respect. The first DCIs were military officers, so politics did not figure into their appointments. Allen Dulles was the first DCI to have political connections to the administration since his brother, John Foster Dulles, was secretary of state under Republican president Dwight Eisenhower. Dulles's tenure as DCI extended into the Democratic administration of President John F. Kennedy and might even have lasted longer had it not been for the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Dulles's successor, Republican industrialist John McCone, served both Kennedy and President Lyndon Johnson, but he fell into disfavor as Johnson sought to find someone who would be willing to be more sympathetic to his foreign policies, especially in Vietnam. Johnson's first choice, Admiral "Red" Raborn, proved willing but unable to do the job, and the task fell to Dick Helms, a politically astute career Clandestine Services officer. Helms outlasted Johnson himself, serving well into the Republican Nixon administration, but Helms ran afoul of Nixon's Watergate scandal. When Helms refused to participate in the coverup that eventually led to Nixon's resignation, he was banished to Iran as U.S. ambassador. His successor, Jim Schlesinger, a real politician, soon left the DCI's position for the more prestigious post of secretary of defense. Another Clandestine Services careerist, Bill Colby, tried to put the role of DCI back into neutral, but Colby was swept out in the wake of the Church Committee hearings and the resignation of Nixon. Another politician, George Bush, took over as DCI, but his political ambitions did not stop at Langley either.


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Totally Politicized Finally, the DCI position became totally politicized when President Jimmy Carter, who campaigned in part against the CIA, nominated Theodore Sorensen, an active member of the president's party but without any intelligence experience or leadership history, to the DCI's post. When Sorensen's nomination quickly ran into trouble in the Senate, President Carter turned to his Annapolis classmate Admiral Stansfield Turner to be DCI. Turner was as apolitical as any other four-star officer, at least when he took the position, and although he had no intelligence background, his management skills were legendary. Many of us disagreed with some of Admiral Turner's approaches to management and substance, yet to his credit he did not use his post for political purposes. In fact, some of the reforms in procedures and regulations instituted by Admiral Turner are still being followed. Nonetheless, when President Carter was turned out of office by the voters, Admiral Turner was forced out as well. This was part of the Reagan administration's total housecleaning to make sure that no Democratic appointees were left in political positions. Of course, President Reagan's DCI, William J. Casey, was as much a politician as he was an intelligence veteran, although he wisely rejected efforts by the Reagan transition team to place additional Republican appointees in key intelligence posts. Casey was not bashful about giving President Reagan and his key advisors the benefit of his rather conservative analysis on the issues, although he never actually suppressed the judgments of his more neutral analysts. Nonetheless, we all knew who had the president's ear. After Casey passed away, his successor, Judge William Webster, tried to de-politicize the position of DCI by insisting that he not be made a member of the cabinet and by avoiding political debate where he could. When George Bush became president, he asked Judge Webster to stay on. In fact, there was some discussion at that time about giving the DCI position a ten-year tenure, as had been done when Webster was director of the FBI. After Webster decided to step down, his successor, Bob Gates, an intelligence careerist, was nominated to be DCI. Gates was tainted, however, by his service in the Bush White House and the controversy surrounding his nomination. When Bill Clinton defeated George Bush for the presidency, Gates knew he would not be asked to stay. Clinton's first choice for DCI, R. James Woolsey, seemed non-political, but Woolsey turned out to be a lackluster leader and eventually found a good excuse to resign. Clinton's second choice, clearly a man sympathetic to the president's politics, John Deutch, was no better than Woolsey.

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Finally, toward the middle of his second term, Clinton gave the DCI job to George Tenet, who was neither an intelligence veteran nor a politican. Tenet turned out be both a better intelligence manager and a better analyst than anyone expected. He quickly began to restore morale in the CIA, stem the tide of resignations, and rebuild consensus among the other intelligence agency leaders. It was a remarkable performance, but certainly no guarantee that Tenet would be kept on beyond the end of President Clinton's term of office. This is a situation that begs for fixing. American presidents would be well served by giving the DCI the tenyear tenure that the director of the FBI enjoys. Doing this would depoliticize the position, of course, but it would also give the DCI the chance to make systematic and meaningful reform within the system. It would give employees a sense of stability and take the entire system out of the political arena. It should give the political leadership, regardless of political party, confidence that the intelligence they receive has nothing to do with who they are and everything to do with what they need to know. This is an easy fix that requires only a bit of political will on the part of the president and Congress. Interagency Cooperation Another management fix that would substitute for what we now know is the almost impossible task of restructuring the American intelligence system is to encourage interagency cooperation at all levels. Years ago a study undertaken by community managers revealed that there were dozens of informal interagency cooperative groups at various levels focused on substantive and management issues. These groups were formed mostly because the people involved recognized the need to meet from time to time to discuss problems they faced or to anticipate issues with which they might have to deal. These groups can now communicate with each other more easily via the electronic network, but face-to-face meetings can help create bonding that technology does not achieve as well. The formal interagency groups, such as the Counterintelligence Center and Counterterrorism Center, have proven to be effective in generating interagency cooperation. Intelligence managers ought to encourage the formation of informal interagency committees and groups, but this means that they have to be more tolerant of employees being away from their desks from time to time. The groups themselves ought to let managers know more about what they are doing, as long as the bureaucracy is willing to accept informal reporting rather than something more cumbersome. If there is no practical way to reorganize the American intelligence


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community and only limited ways to give the DCI more clout, what other reforms might be meaningful or useful? This leads us to questions of operations more than of structure. This is the area where real change might take place. To begin, we might consider the idea that intelligence should be divorced from policy. In the American system this is symbolized by the fact that almost the entire intelligence system is out of town: The CIA is in suburban Virginia, most of the DIA is isolated at a defunct airbase south of the Washington proper, the NSA is nearly in Baltimore, and the NRO is out near Dulles Airport. Only the FBI and the small analysis unit in the State Department are anywhere near the center of power. The argument made today in support of this system is that electronic links make location unimportant. But this ignores a crucial factor. American security policy is still made by people, and human relationships are critical in making the system work.

The Intelligence-Policy Link A great deal of policy is created in various committee meetings and gatherings where ideas are tossed around and positions on the issues argued. For intelligence to count, it has to be in the loop. This means that intelligence managers have to make an effort to encourage the inclusion of intelligence officers at the appropriate level in policy discussions; it also means that policy officials have to seek an intelligence input. When the author first joined the CIA, this was more prevalent than it is today. As time went on, intelligence managers became increasingly content with delivering intelligence in print, or more recently electronically, rather than by appearing in person. This was an easy road to take because it meant that the intelligence managers could completely control the content of the intelligence that was delivered. In the give and take of policy discussion, who could tell what an intelligence analyst, especially a relatively junior one, might say. If the CIA and the other substantive agencies are indeed hiring the best and the brightest, then they should be willing to send these individuals out confident that they will faithfully deliver the considered wisdom of the agencies they represent as well as their own views on the issues. Policy officials often want to have both and welcome the input. For the most part, these inputs will involve hot-burner issues, that is, current intelligence. Our policy system is not well equipped to deal with long-range issues, even though the intelligence system spends a fair amount of time in estimating the future. This is a fix that lies outside the realm of intelligence.

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Fixing the Spy Machine N o Long-Range Planning System

The United States has no real long-range national security policy planning mechanism outside the Pentagon. Defense planners have to anticipate requirements, especially in regard to weapons procurement, many years in advance. Therefore, long-range planning is a must, and defense intelligence has had to support this planning requirement with long-term threat analysis. On the civilian side, in contrast, long-range planning often gives way to more immediate concerns. Years ago a long-range policy-planning function did indeed exist within the National Security Council and in the policy planning mechanisms of the State Department. Increasingly over the years, however, this function has become politicized. Instead of having professional, nonpolitical appointees in positions where they could deliberate longe-range American policy, the posts have been filled with people whose qualifications must include loyalty to the president and party in power. The appointees do not seek to build American policy so much as try to satisfy the constituencies the president and their party represent. This subtle difference means that policy planners want intelligence to help them achieve their political goals, and so some of the long-range analysis is either of no use in that regard or is seen as obstructive. Further, the policy planners know that their tenure is linked to that of the president, so their long-range vision ends when his term ends. Fixing this system has nothing to do with intelligence, but if there were a long-range, non-political policy-planning system within the executive branch, then long-range intelligence would be more useful and more welcome. How often have we seen presidents come into office expressing vision statements about their long-term foreign policy or national security goals only to become enmeshed in crisis management? In such circumstances, decisionmakers become firefighters, and they want intelligence to help them put out the fire. They don't have time to think about the long-term consequences of their decisions, so long-term intelligence is of no use to them. Remedying this situation requires the political will of the president and Congress. The National Security Council staff was created to serve this function, coordinating the various policy proposals of the State, Defense, and other departments into some coherent national security strategy. This function could be restored if the NSC staff returned to its roots, with the staff built from a mix of careerists seconded from the departments as well as political appointees. And they should be given tenure to create continuity in long-range planning, without the house-cleaning that seems now to go on whenever the presidency changes hands. If the United States


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had a truly effective long-range policy-planning staff, then long-term intelligence analysis would be able to provide the necessary inputs that now beg for an audience. Micro-Managing Intelligence Another operational issue in fixing intelligence concerns the continuing effort by Congress to try to micro-manage the U.S. intelligence system. The Founding Fathers may not have realized that the system of checks and balances they were creating would result in establishing an adversarial relationship between the president and Congress. The congressional effort to micro-manage government has been with us from the birth of the nation, but only relatively lately has Congress tried to employ intelligence management. Early efforts by Congress to horn in on intelligence matters was rebuffed by early presidents, and in later years members of Congress indicated that they would prefer to leave intelligence matters to the executive branch. The establishment of rigorous congressional oversight of intelligence matters in 1976 changed all that. Suddenly members of both houses had the tools to tinker with intelligence policy and intelligence management. The DCI was required to send them a detailed consolidated budget for all the intelligence agencies, to report to them on planned covert actions, and to provide them with the same intelligence analysis provided executive branch decisionmakers. It did not take long for members of the committees to start to press their own agenda on the DCI and to find fault, sometimes in public, with the way in which the system was run. This politicized micromanagement ought to stop. Congressional oversight is, in general, a good thing for the country as well as for intelligence. It should give the American people confidence that their representatives are, on their behalf, seeking to ensure that a system run largely in secret is not abusing the peoples' trust. But its mandate should end there. There should be no need to tell the DCI, in detail, how to spend the intelligence budget. Insisting on expenditures for covert action in public, most recently in the effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein of Iraq, is certainly counterproductive, though politically satisfying. Congressional efforts to micro-manage intelligence force intelligence managers to be less than candid and forthright in their reporting to the committees in fear that somehow they will say something that the members will use against the DCI, the president, or them. Only Congress can police its own house in this regard; as part of the executive branch, intelligence managers have to protect the system they represent. The 1996 staff study on intelligence reform undertaken by the House

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of Representatives, IC 21: The Intelligence Community in the Twenty-first Century, though well meaning and interesting, demonstrates this kind of micro-managerial effort.7 The study does make one recommendation that deserves action, however, and it is one that would head off the congressional zeal to dabble in intelligence policy. The study recommends the creation of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) within the National Security Council to be made up of a combination of policymakers and intelligence officials. Their job would be to set out the general direction for the use of intelligence resources and establish priorities for intelligence managers. While the DCI may not have much control over the intelligence agencies that belong to the Department of Defense or the other departments, the White House certainly has that power and should use it. Of course, the DCI and the senior intelligence manager from Defense should be part of the CFI, but the ultimate authorities should be the president and the national security advisor. Directing Military Intelligence Both the IC 21 study and the Brown Commission suggested that there should be a director of military intelligence (DMI), presumably a senior general or admiral, to oversee the myriad intelligence components of the military services and the joint intelligence agencies such as the DIA and NSA. In addition, there should be an assistant secretary of defense to assist the secretary of defense in creating defense intelligence policy. These are sensible suggestions for intelligence management, would not require large additional bureaucracies, and would create positions to manage and control the resources devoted to intelligence support for decisionmakers and military commanders. Traditionally the senior military officers who head the DIA and the NSA have not been key figures in intelligence at the national level, although they have played a significant role within the Department of Defense. The two leaders are usually three-star officers with intelligence background and experience, and that has been true since the founding of the NSA in 1954 and the DIA in 1961. The DIA director fills the role of the J-2, the chief intelligence officer of the Joint Staff, and the director of the NSA is responsible for SIGINT and communications security. The DIA is smaller than the CIA, but it does play an important part in providing intelligence support to military operations as well as strategic planning. The NSA is believed to be quite a bit larger than the CIA, but the actual figures remain classified. With the growth of various aspects of military intelligence, it would make sense to have a very senior officer, with four-star rank, to oversee and direct the entire process. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) has become a major player within the military system,


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and most observers believe that measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT), now the purview of the military's Central MASINT Office, is bound to grow. 8 Since most of the national intelligence budget goes to support various components of military intelligence, and since most of the personnel belong to the military system, it makes sense to have a senior officer in charge of this empire. Although Congress has suggested that the appointment of such a senior officer be coordinated with the DCI, the secretary of defense is unlikely to give the DCI a veto over the officer nominated. The advice and consent of the Senate ought to be sufficient, but it would make the entire Intelligence Community work a great deal better if the DCI and the DMI got along well with each other. Personnel Reform Congress could help reform the intelligence system by supporting personnel reform. After the turmoil created by the end of the Cold War, intelligence personnel have found that instability in the system, lack of resources, and perceptions that intelligence services are no longer needed in the post-Cold War era have made a career in intelligence work less and less desirable. A strong economy, good jobs that pay better than government, and perhaps the greater flexibility of work in the private sector may also be factors. Although it is true that the system in general may have been too large, intelligence managers fell under considerable pressure to reduce the intelligence work force rapidly. This led to various schemes to force people out, schemes aimed especially at those in a position to retire after long years of service. Soon it became clear that potential retirees were either not leaving fast enough or were seeking ways to stay on. Intelligence managers tried new schemes, including payoffs for early retirement, or so-called buyouts that provided enough cash so that personnel who did not have enough time in the system to retire might be induced to seek other employment. In many ways these schemes were far more palatable than what was happening in private industry, where layoffs and outright dismissals at all levels had become commonplace. Nonetheless, the early retirements and buyouts sent a poor message to mid-level careerists, who began to leave the system while they still had the chance to find other employment. A Brain Drain In its study the Brown Commission pointed out that personnel costs in intelligence had risen by some 50 percent from 1980 to 1989 and concluded that the work force ought to be reduced. At the same time the

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study acknowledged that people are the Intelligence Community's most vital resource. The commission recommended that more effort be made to weed out poor performers, although there was no evidence in the study to suggest how many such weak performers there were. This may have been another overreaction to the Ames case, in which clearly Ames was himself a weak performer, though clever enough to manage to elude capture for nine years. The result of downsizing has been a brain drain among those careerists who would have comprised the next group of senior managers in the intelligence agencies. Losing a large number of mid-careerists is a blow in any organization, but because of the special nature of intelligence work, it is particularly devastating to lose the people who would be in the best position to nurture new employees in the arcane skills of intelligence work. Coupled with a system that for several years hardly hired any new professionals at all, the U.S. Intelligence Community is suffering from a personnel situation that must be fixed. This is especially true among those who do clandestine work or carry out highly technical intelligence collection operations. It takes years to train a case officer to be able to operate overseas in a hostile environment and to recruit and handle human sources. To the dismay of the CIA, when Harold J. Nicholson gave to the Russians the names of several entire classes of new Clandestine Service recruits in the early 1990s, he wiped out an entire cadre of potentially capable case officers.9 Once the identities of these potential case officers was made known to a hostile intelligence service, they could no longer be sent abroad under cover; thus their careers were ruined before they even started. Coupled with downsizing in the Clandestine Service, the CIA has had to crank up a hard-driving recruitment campaign to seek new talent, but it will be years before potential trainees become proficient in handling espionage operations. A similar situation exists in technical areas such as SIGINT or in imagery intelligence, although no one has betrayed the people who do the work, as far as we know. In most of the technical areas, the intelligence system has had to do its own training, since intercepting communications, deciphering codes, or analyzing satellite imagery is rarely taught elsewhere. Unfortunately for intelligence managers, these technical skills, once acquired, can lead employees to seek lucrative positions in the private sector, and this has caused yet another brain drain within intelligence. Still a Desirable Career Years of downsizing and cutbacks in resources, coupled with the greater benefits offered in private industry, blows to morale from spy


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cases, and attacks on the system by politicians and the press, have hurt careerists in intelligence in many ways. The nature of the intelligence profession is such that their stories are not widely known or frequently told. A rare few have written books or denounced the system in public, but most have just quietly faded away to seek other opportunities. Yet, we know from the responses to recruiting advertising, web site contacts, and reports in the press, that intelligence work remains a desirable career path for many young people. The system has to do more to recruit new people and, more importantly, to retain those it has already brought on board. One way to revise the system would be to scrap the present pay scale, which is tied to the general civil service scale, for something more imaginative. The DCI has the authority to do this for the CIA, as does the secretary of defense for the DOD agencies, but it has always been more convenient and simple just to replicate the civil service system already in place throughout the government. The intelligence managers who adopted the civil service pay scale in the early days of the CIA could then claim that they were just treating their employees the same as everyone else in government. Considering the special nature of the intelligence business, however, means that intelligence personnel are not like everyone else. Intelligence managers ought to investigate ways to modify the system to entice more people to stay, especially in special skills areas, such as the Clandestine Service, or in the technical fields. Attempts were made in the past to organize a new system for pay and allowances, but employees were not enthusiastic about change. Intelligence managers ought to try again, though. The intelligence system must be prepared to compete with private industry in finding, hiring, and retaining the best and the brightest. Most careerists enter the world of intelligence not to get rich but to serve the country in a unique field. Their dedication ought to be rewarded. Congress ought to support pay reform and various incentives to encourage recruiting and retention. Personnel costs in intelligence are not nearly as great as the costs of satellites or other technical hardware. If Congress really believes in the value of intelligence personnel, it ought to be eager to keep them on duty.

Again, the Polygraph Further, intelligence managers must try to find a better clearance mechanism than the polygraph. Not only does it work against new hires, but we now know that long-time employees are running afoul of this insidious device. Employees are reportedly finding that reinvestigations and the accompanying polygraph interview are turning up unresolved issues that are hurting their careers even though they have done nothing

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wrong. This scrutiny is mostly an overreaction to the Ames case. In their zeal to make up for the security errors in checking out Ames, intelligence managers are bending over backward to make sure such a breach of security never happens again. The result is that they are doing as much damage to the system as Ames did, though in a different way. The polygraph has been around in intelligence usage for more than forty years, and there seems to be little effort to find something better. Considering the amount of money spent on sophisticated new technical intelligence techniques to ferret out biological or chemical weapons, narcotics, or electronics, one would think that such sophistication could be extended to a way to detect prevarication or subterfuge. From time to time mention has been made of voice stress analysis as one way to tell if a person is lying or hiding information. The polygraph has been judged to be of questionable reliability in court cases, and since at least one intelligence service we know has been told by its overseers to drop the machine, perhaps it is time for the United States to find an alternative. Size and Duplication One issue raised at the beginning of this work was that of duplication of effort. A second was that of size. Is the U.S. Intelligence Community too big? Is there a great deal of duplication of effort? How could outsiders judge either of these issues? In fact, we know from the reform studies done in recent years that these judgments are difficult to make even for those paid to study the problem with all the necessary data. There are good reasons to have duplication in some areas, especially in both collection and analysis. Collecting data from a variety of sources, even if there is overlap, is just what analysts need to solve the mysteries. From the analyst's perspective, there is never too much raw material. Analysts are comforted when several analytic units go through the data and reach similar conclusions; when they disagree on the interpretation, then there is a good reason to confer and sort things out. Competitive analysis is a good way to avoid intelligence failure. One could conclude from this that redundancy in the substantive areas of intelligence is generally a good thing and should not be cut back. In administrative areas, there may be some hope for reducing duplication. This is especially true in military intelligence, where personnel management, logistics, and support is fungible and where people can be moved in and out of the various parts of the system. Thus, recruiting, clearance procedures, obtaining supplies, communications, and other such support services could be centralized. If there were a director of military intelligence and this officer had control of support services for


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all military intelligence, it seems likely that some savings could be made. But attempts to do the same things for the entire Intelligence Community are not likely to work, and they violate sensible rules about compartmentation. As far as size is concerned, there is no evidence from which to draw a conclusion. Is the system too big? Are there too many people? Does it spend too much money? Perhaps there are managers within the system who might be able to answer such questions, but the answers would certainly not be made public. We do know that the intelligence oversight committees of Congress do ask such questions and probably receive some fairly detailed data in answer. In this case we have to trust that our representives in Congress are satisfied with the information they are getting. From the perspective of an intelligence professional, however, the system does seem to have become incredibly large and cumbersome, bureaucratic, and increasingly inflexible. But that's just one person's view, supported only by personal experiences and perspectives. Perhaps intelligence managers ought to ask their current employees what they think, as long as they are not afraid of the answers they may get.

Risk Averse One writer who knows the world of intelligence wrote in 1999 that U.S. intelligence managers have become increasingly risk averse, fearing the wrath of their political masters if they fail to predict the future accurately, if their agents are caught by the opposition, or if our system is penetrated by a foreign intelligence service.10 Failure is inevitable in intelligence, and a failure to take risks almost guarantees a poor outcome. America cannot have a zero-defect intelligence system. Perhaps we have been fooled by the nearly perfect record of our manned space missions, where zero-defect technology can be achieved. This does not work in intelligence because of the heavy dependence on people to do the work. Human judgment is critical in intelligence, but it will occasionally produce failure. Political leaders should be prepared not only to accept it but to defend the system as well. Is U.S. intelligence in need of a major overhaul, as some critics have suggested? Is the Spy Machine broken? It appears that what is needed is not a major fix but, rather, a good tune-up. Throughout this work numerous small changes and fixes have been suggested. Implementing them will require a coordinated effort by intelligence managers, political decisionmakers and Congress. Even if it does no more than spark discussion about some of the issues, this review will have been worthwhile. America's intelligence system seems to be ready to handle the chal-

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lenges of the n e w p o s t - C o l d W a r era, b u t it still n e e d s h e l p . W e can n o longer d o m o r e w i t h less. Intelligence is, in m a n y w a y s , A m e r i c a ' s first line of defense against the n e w threats of terrorism, global crime, a n d cyber-warfare, as well as the age-old p r o b l e m s g e n e r a t e d b y nationalism, dictatorships, a n d h a t r e d . Wise political leaders s h o u l d a c k n o w l e d g e that i n v e s t m e n t s in intelligence are cheaper a n d h a v e a potentially greater payoff t h a n s p e n d i n g h u g e s u m s o n w e a p o n s systems. The Chinese p h i losopher Sun T z u recognized this almost 2,500 years ago. W e s h o u l d p a y attention to w h a t h e h a s t a u g h t u s .

Notes 1. For detailed descriptions of the various components of the U.S. Intelligence Community and organizational charts of the agencies, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). 2. This early history is well recorded in Arthur Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950 (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990). 3. The author worked on this study during his tour with the IC staff. 4. The chief complainant was General Norman Schwarzkopf, the overall commander of the combined forces. See H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992). 5. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 6. Michael Warner (ed.), CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1994). 7. John Millis, staff chief for the HPSCI, at a presentation in Washington at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in February 1999, argued that Congress had to micro-manage the CIA and the other agencies when it saw evidence of poor management or leadership. Millis was himself a former CIA careerist. 8. MASINT refers to such exotic targets as reflected energy, nuclear emanations, biological weapons, industrial pollution, and nerve gas, to name just a few. 9. David Wise, "The Spy Who Sold the Farm," GQ, March 1998, pp. 294-301. 10. David Ignatius, "Failure: Ticket to Success," Washington Post, 3 March 1999, p. A23.

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Foreign Intelligence Systems Andrew, Christopher. Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community. London: Heinemann, 1985. Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. KGB: The Inside Story. New York: HarperCollins, 1990. Black, Ian, and Benny Morris. Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991. Brook-Shepard, Gordon. The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988. Dziak, John J. Chekisty: A History of the KGB. Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1988.

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Eftimiades, Nicholas. Chinese Intelligence Operations. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Knight, Amy. Spies without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Knightley, Phillip. The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby. New York: Vintage Books, 1988. Porch, Douglas. The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995. Raviv, Dan, and Yossi Melman. Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Services. Boston: Houghton Mifflon, 1990. Richelson, Jeffrey T. Foreign Intelligence Organizations. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988. Sawatsky, John. Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security Service. Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1980. Waller, John H. The Unseen War in Europe—Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War. New York: Random House, 1996. West, Nigel. Games of Intelligence: The Classified Conflict of International Espionage. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989.

Autobiographical Accounts and Personal Viewpoints Adams, Sam. War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir. So. Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1994. Blake, George. No Other Choice. London: Cape, 1990. Casey, William J. The Secret War against Hitler. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988. Clarridge, Duane R. A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA. New York: Scribner, 1997. DeLoach, Cartha. Hoover's FBI. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1995. Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Gilligan, Tom. CIA Life: 10,000 Days with the Agency. Guilford, CT: Foreign Intelligence Press, 1991. Gordievsky, Oleg. Next Stop Execution. London: Macmillan, 1995. McGehee, Ralph. Deadly Deceits: My Twenty-five Years in the CIA. New York: Sheridan Square, 1983. Meyer, Cord. Facing Reality: From World Federation to the CIA. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Philby, Kim. My Secret War. MacGibbon and Kee, 1968; paperback, New York: Ballantine Books, 1983. Philips, David Atlee. The Night Watch: Twenty-five Years of Peculiar Service. New York: Atheneum, 1977. Shevchenko, Arkady N. Breaking with Moscow. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998. Strong, Major-General Sir Kenneth. Intelligence at the Top: the Recollections of an Intelligence Officer. London: Cassell, 1968. Walters, Vernon. Silent Missions. New York: Doubleday, 1978.

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Women in Intelligence Adams-Deschamps, Helene. Spyglass: An Autobiography. New York: Holt, 1995. Bancroft, Mary. Autobiography of a Spy. New York: Morrow, 1983. Lovell, Mary S. Cast No Shadow: The Life of the American Spy Who Changed the Course of World War II. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992. Macdonald, Elizabeth P. Undercover Girl. New York: Macmillan, 1947. Mclntosh, Elizabeth P. Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Rossiter, Margaret. Women in the Resistance. New York: Praeger, 1991.

The Practice of Intelligence Bar-Joseph, Uri. Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States. University Park, PA: Perm State Press, 1995. Berkowitz, Bruce E. and Allan Goodman. Strategic Intelligence for American National Security. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989. Betts, Richard K. Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982. Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1977. Felix, Christopher. A Short Course in the Secret War. New York: Dell, 1963; 1988. Ford, Harold P. Estimative Intelligence. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993. Handel, Michael I. War, Strategy, and Intelligence. London: Cass, 1989. Haswell, Jock. Spies and Spymasters. London: Thames & Hudson, 1977. Herman, Michael. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Johnson, Loch K. Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996. Jordan, Amos, William Taylor, and Michael Mazar. American National Security. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966. Laqueur, Walter. A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence. New York: Basic Books, 1985. Levite, Ariel. Intelligence and Strategic Surprises. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Martin, David C. Wilderness of Mirrors. New York: Bantam Books, 1980. Maurer, Alfred C , Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle (eds.). Intelligence: Policy and Process. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

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Murphy, David E., Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey. Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997. Oseth, John M. Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations: A Study in Definition of the National Interest. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985. Richelson, Jeffrey T. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Shulsky, Abram N. Silent Warfare. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1991.

Espionage and Counterintelligence Allen, Thomas, and Norman Polmar. Merchants of Treason. New York: Delacorte Press, 1988. Barron, John. Breaking the Ring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. Benson, Robert L., and Michael Warner (eds.). VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response. Washington, DC: NSA and CIA, 1996. Blitzer, Wolf. Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard. New York: Harper & Row, 1989. Earley, Pete. Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1997. Hood, William. The Mole. New York: W. W. Norton, 1987. Mangold, Tom. Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy Hunter. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Riebling, Mark. Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and the CIA. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994. Sakharov, Vladimir. High Treason. New York: Ballantine Books, 1981. Wise, David. The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of Edward Lee Howard. New York: Random House, 1988. . Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

Covert Operations Barnett, Frank R., B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Schultz. Special Operations in U.S. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985. Godson, Roy. Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995. Leary, William M. Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984. Prados, John. Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through Iranscam. New York: William Morrow, 1986. Rositzke, Harry A. CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage and Counterespionage and Covert Action. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Shackley, Theodore. The Third Option: An American View of Counter insurgency. Pleasantville, NY: Reader's Digest, 1981.

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Business Intelligence Coplin, William D., and Michael K. O'Leary (eds.). The Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis. E. Syracuse, NY: Political Risk Services, 1994. Fialka, John. War by Other Means: Economic Espionage in America. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997. Fischer, Robert J., and Guion Green. Introduction to Security. Boston: ButterworthHeinemann, 1998. Fuld, Leonard M. The New Competitive Intelligence. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995. Post, Richard S., and Arthur A. Kingsbury. Security: An Introduction to the Protective Services. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991. Raddock, David M. (ed.). Assessing Corporate Political Risk: A Guide for International Businessmen. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986. Schweizer, Peter. Friendly Spies: How America's Allies Are Using Economic Espionage to Steal Our Secrets. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993. Ting, Wen Lee. Multi-national Risk Assessment and Management: Strategies for Investment and Marketing Decisions. New York: Quorum Books, 1988. Winkler, Ira. Corporate Espionage. Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1997.

Analysis Helgerson, John. Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1992. Washington, DC: Center for Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1995. MacEachin, Douglas J. CIA Asessments of the Soviet Union: The Record vs. the Charges. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1996. Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength. New York: Dial Press, 1982. Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran. Harrisonburg, VA: R. Donnelly & Sons, 1986. Steury, Donald (ed.). Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates. Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1994.

Technology Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1984. Bedlow, Gregory W., and Donald E. Welzenbach. The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1998.

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Beschloss, Michael R. Mayday: Eisenhower, Kruschev and the U-2 Affair. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. Brugioni, Dino. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Random House, 1990. Burrows, William. Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security. New York: Random House, 1986. Day, Dwayne, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.). Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998. Kahn, David. The Codebreakers. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Layton, Edwin T., Rear Admiral USN (Ret.). "And I Was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1985. Lewin, Ronald. The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan. London: Penguin, 1983. Peebles, Curtis. The CORONA Project. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Rich, Ben R., and Leo Janos. Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed. New York: Little, Brown, 1994. Richelson, Jeffrey T. Keyhole: America's Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Spy Satellite Program. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. Ruffner, Kevin (ed.). CORONA: America's First Satellite Program. Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1995.

General Interest Bearden, Milt. The Black Tulip. New York: Random House, 1998. Clancy, Tom, and General Fred Franks, Jr. Into the Storm: A Study in Command. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1997. Codevilla, Angelo. Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century. New York: Free Press, 1992. Godson, Roy, Ernest May, and Gary Schmitt (eds.). U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995. Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard Trainor. The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. New York: Little, Brown, 1995. Hilsman, Roger. Strategic Intelligence and National Decision. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956. Muggeridge, Malcolm. Chronicles of Wasted Time. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974. O'Toole, G.J.A. The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence and Espionage. New York: Facts on File, 1988. Schwarzkopf, H. Norman. It Doesn't Take a Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1992. Smith Thompson, Robert. The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Tuchman, Barbara. The Zimmermann Telegram. New York: Ballantine Books, 1966. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Watson, Bruce W. United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia. New York: Garland Publishers, 1990.


Index Afghanistan, 25, 66, 73, 113; U.S. covert action in, 75, 79-81, 116, 178 Allende, Salvador, 2, 73, 78-79, 84 Amador, Manuel, 69 American Revolution, 8; counterintelligence in, 87-88; covert action in, 65-67 American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), 161 Ames, Aldrich, 2, 15, 19, 31, 89, 94, 141, 163-164; betrayal of Gordievsky, 125; case results, 101-103; and Pete Earley, 181; and the Howard case, 100; and the polygraph, 97, 133, 206; Soviet errors in handling, 34, 130; views on espionage, 12, 36; as a "walk-in, " 93 Angleton, James J., 90, 98-99, 103 Angola, 66 Arbenz, Jacobo, 70-71, 78 Argentina, 108, 114 Arnold, Benedict, 88 Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), 185 Aum Shinrikyo, 111 Auschwitz, 10 Baker, Lafayette, 88, 175 Baker, William, 179

Bandera, Stefan, 65 Berg, Moe, 181 Betts, Richard K., 48 Bin Laden, Osama, 116, 118 Bissell, Richard, 71 Blake, George, 92 Bradley, General Omar, 183 Brown Commission. See United States, Intelligence Community, reform studies of Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), 163. See also Germany Bush, George, 3, 141, 193, 195, 197; administration of, 143, 179 Cable News Network (CNN), 13, 41, 47 Canada, 16, 75, 122-123, 130, 175 Carter, Jimmy, 143, 177, 194, 197; administration of, 56, 158 Carver, George, 52 Casey, William J., 3, 76, 85, 123, 138, 178-179, 183, 194, 197 Castro, Fidel, 7-8, 40, 71-72, 74, 84, 94, 118 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2 4, 8, 18, 105, 142, 192, 199; analysis in, 13-14, 43-45, 50-54, 58-61, 110111, 147-148; clandestine service of,

218

Index

12, 20, 30-40, 93, 204; counterintelligence in, 89-91, 94-95; and counterterrorism, 114, 117, 198; and covert action, 17, 65-66, 70-85; and crime, 121; and the FBI, 15, 99-103, 122, 146, 166, 178; and industrial espionage, 123, 158, 170; inspector general of, 120, 140-142, 180; intellignece sharing in, 124-126; management of, 19-20, 137, 193198, 205; and narcotics, 120; open sources in, 41; photo reconnaissance in, 27-28, 30; public affairs in, 176185, 187-190; security in, 98, 138140, 161-164; training in, 133-135; and treaty monitoring, 173; warning in, 47-48. See also Director of central intelligence Chile, 73, 78-79, 84 Chin, Larry Wu-tai, 89, 91, 97, 100 China, 8, 91, 107-108, 123 Church, Benjamin, 87 Church, Frank, 17, 73-74, 144, 176177 Clancy, Tom, 2, 43, 110, 184 Clarridge, Duane R., 61 Cleveland, Grover, 69 Clinton, William J., 115, 173, 184; administration of, 15-16, 141, 195, 197198 Colby, William E., 14, 51, 147, 177, 196 Cold War, 1-2, 4, 10, 130, 151, 173, 191; counterintelligence in, 89-91, 96-97, 100, 105-106, 163; covert action in, 65-66, 76-77, 81; industrial espionage in, 166-167; open sources in, 7-8 Colombia, 65, 69, 97, 115 Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 4 Contras. See Nicaragua Corona, 180 Council on Foreign Relations, 82-84 Cuba, 7, 24, 84, 196; Bay of Pigs landing in, 1, 71, 83; intelligence service

of (DGI), 66; missile crisis in, 180, 187 Czechoslovakia, 25, 65 Darling, Arthur, 181 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 48, 50, 54, 137, 146-147, 202 Deutch, John, 120, 179-180, 195-197 DGI (Cuban intelligence service), 66. See also Cuba DGSE (French intelligence serveice). See France Director of central intelligence (DCI), 3, 18-19, 21, 29, 44, 51-52, 55, 7071, 137, 142-143, 146-149, 156, 183, 186; and Congress, 74, 82, 120, 145, 177, 201-202; and intelligence reform, 192-199, 205; and military intelligence, 203; and the public, 177180, 184, 188 Donovan, William "Wild Bill," 1, 181; and College of Cardinals, 14, 44, 51, 54; and Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 4 3 ^ 4 , 69, 99 Doolittle, General Jimmy, 72 Dozier, General William, 113 Dulles, Allen W., 71, 196 Dulles, John Foster, 71, 196 Earley, Pete, 181 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 142, 176, 191, 196; administration of, 71 El Salvador, 65, 75 Enigma machine, 9, 25 Ethiopia, 66, 73 Farobundo Marti, 65, 75 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 1, 192, 198-199; and CIA, 99-101, 146, 149, 179, 194; and foreign espionage, 15, 34, 89, 91, 98, 130, 136; and global crime, 118-119, 121; and industrial espionage, 123, 152, 166, 170; and intelligence, 18, 44, 122, 140; and private industry, 117, 122; and the public, 184, 189; and terrorism, 16, 114-115 Federation of American Scientists, 186

Index Fishel, Edwin, 43 Ford, Gerald, 74, 143, 177 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 8, 40-41, 91 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 102 France, 21, 30, 65, 67, 69, 92, 107, 123, 158 Fuld, Leonard, 154 Gandhi, Indira, 65 Gates, Robert M. 3, 7, 14, 51, 53-54, 148, 179, 194-195, 197 Germany, 8-9, 25, 70, 94, 99, 122, 125, 137, 140, 163, 183 Global organized crime (GOC), 106, 118-119 Godson, Roy, 64 Goodman, Melvin, 58-60 Gordievsky, Oleg, 92, 125 Gouzenko, Igor, 130 Great Britain, 64, 67-68, 71, 87-88, 107, 182; intelligence services of (MI5, MI-6), 3, 8-9, 54-55, 90, 125, 173174 Greenhow, Rose, 88 Groat, Douglas, 95, 140 GRU (Soviet Union, military intelligence service of), 92, 109, 122 Guatemala, 33-34, 70-71, 78 Gulf War, 65, 106, 111, 117, 194 Guzman, Abimael, 124 Harrison, Benjamin, 69 Helms, Richard, 149, 193, 196 Hersh, Seymour, 176 Hezbollah, 113, 115 Hillenkoeter, Admiral Roscoe, 70, 176 Hilsman, Roger, 12, 36 Hitz, Frederick, 141 Hollis, Sir Roger, 174 Hoover, J. Edgar, 1, 15, 18, 44, 89, 99, 146, 149, 179 Howard, Edward Lee, 97, 99-100 HPSCI (House Permanent Select Committee on Itelligence). See United States, Congress, intelligence oversight committees of

219

HUMINT (human intelligence). See Intelligence, espionage in Hussein, Saddam, 1, 40, 47, 65, 77, 80, 83, 108, 117, 201 Imagery, photo intelligence (PHOTINT), 10-11, 23-24, 27-30, 194 India, 59, 65, 107, 135 Indonesia, 71, 78 Inman, Admiral Bobby Ray, 39, 194 Intelligence: analysis in, 12-15, 21, 4 3 61, 155-157; counterintelligence in, 15-16, 87-103, 106; covert action in, 16-17, 63-85; definitions of, 5-7; espionage in, 11-12, 23, 30-40, 87,152155; management and control in, 1720, 129-149; measurements and signatures (MASINT), 203; photo (PHOTINT), 10-11, 23-24, 27-30, 194; polygraph use in, 31, 96-97, 132-133, 205-206; and private industry, 21, 151-170; recruiting in, 131-132, 136; signals (SIGINT), 8-9, 23-27, 29, 206-107, 192 Iran, 25, 48, 64, 66, 71, 75, 77-78, 108, 139 Iran-Contra Affair, 17, 68, 75-76, 82, 141, 143, 145, 178 Iraq, 25, 77, 106, 108, 111-112, 117 Israel, 66, 89, 92, 94, 107-108, 111, 116, 123, 173 Italy, 70-71, 113, 118, 121 Jackson, Andrew, 67 Japan, 6, 21, 23, 69, 111, 151, 158 Jefferson, Thomas, 12, 16, 67 Jeremiah, Admiral David, 59, 135 Johnson, Lyndon, 196; administration of, 89, 124 Joint Publications Research Service, 41 Kampiles, William, 98 Kansi, Mir Aimal, 99, 138, 163 Kazakhstan, 108 Kennan, George, 12, 36 Kennedy, John F., 72, 196 Kennedy, Robert F., 72 Kenya, 116, 139

220

Index

KGB. See Soviet Union, intelligence service of KH-11, 28, 98 Knott, Stephen, 68 Kuklinski, Colonel Ryszard, 92 Kuwait, 1, 47 Lauder, George, 178 Lebanon, 48, 113, 115, 139 Lebed, General Alexander, 109 Libya, 66, 77, 114, 140 Lincoln, Abraham, 68, 88 Lowell, Francis Cabot, 151 Lumumba, Patrice, 74 McCarthy, Joseph, 89, 96 McCone, John, 196 Madison, James, 12, 17, 67 Markov, Georgi, 65 Martin, William H., 96 Mengistu Haile Mariam, 73 Mexico, 68, 115 MI-5, MI-6. See Great Britain, intelligence services of Mitchell, Bernon F., 96 Mossad, 116. See also Israel Mossadegh, Mohammed, 71 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 182-183, 187 Muggeridge, Malcolm, 3, 174, 189

lic, 181; recruiting in, 137; secrecy in, 27 National Technical Means (NTM), 24 Nicaragua, 65, 73, 75, 81, 120, 180 Nicholson, Harold J., 93, 97, 100-103, 164, 204 Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 6 Nixon, Richard M., 79; administration of, 89, 124, 196 North Korea, 25, 77, 92, 94, 107-108 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1, 3, 12, 36, 4 3 ^ 4 , 51, 69, 95, 99, 131, 175 Pakistan, 66, 80, 107-108 Panama, 65, 69 Pearl Harbor, 1, 44, 47 Penkovsky, Oleg, 92 Perry, William, 7 Peru, 113, 123 Philby, Kim, 90, 125 Pinkerton, Alan, 88 Pinochet, General Augusto, 79 Poland, 64, 92, 122 Polk, James K., 12, 68, 175 Pollard, Jonathan, 19, 89, 92, 98, 100 Polyakov, Dmitri, 92 Popov, Pyotr, 92 Powers, Francis Gary, 10, 27 President's Daily Brief (PDB), 45 Qaddafi, Muammar el-, 114

Najibullah, 73, 80 National Estimates, Board of, 14, 44, 51, 54-55, 147, 181 National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), 52, 55, 146, 193 National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), 29-30, 48, 202 National Intelligence Council (NIC), 14, 51-52, 55, 58, 147-148 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 20, 29, 176, 181, 199 National Security Agency (NSA), 2, 9, 50, 146; and CIA, 25, 48, 147; and controls, 26; costs of, 29; defectors from, 96, 176; and the FBI; and military intelligence, 202; and the pub-

Raborn, Admiral William, 196 Reagan, Nancy, 119 Reagan, Ronald, 75, 139, 143, 178, 194, 197; administration of, 20, 131, 145 Redmond, Paul, 103 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 43-44, 69, 99 Roosevelt, Kermit, 71 Roosevelt, Theodore, 17, 69 Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel, 89 Russia, 106-107, 109, 123, 153, 187, 204; intelligence service of (SVR), 100, 103, 181 Sandinistas. See Nicaragua Saudi Arabia, 2, 7, 48

Index Schlesinger, James, 196 Schwarzkopf, General Norman, 65 Sendero Luminoso, 113, 123 SIGINT (signals intelligence), 8-9, 2 3 27, 29, 106-107, 192 Smith, General Walter Bedell, 51, 181 Snider, L. Britt, 141 Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP), 160 Sorensen, Theodore, 197 Souers, Admiral Sidney, 44, 146 Soviet Union (USSR), 1, 10-11, 70; and the Cold War, 105-106, 130, 166; and Cuba, 71; and economic data, 156, 183; and SIGINT, 24-28; and the Third World, 73, 79-80 Soviet Union, intelligence service of (KGB), 1, 136; and covert action, 17, 64-66; and espionage, 30-31, 34, 8990, 92-94, 100, 103, 125, 163; and industrial espionage, 122; and public affairs, 181 Soviet Union, military intelligence service of (GRU), 92, 109, 122 SR-71, 10 SSCI (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence). See United States, Congress, intelligence oversight committees of Sudan, 111, 116 Sukarno, 71, 78 Sun Tzu, 23, 63, 65, 67, 151, 208 Taliban, 113. See also Afghanistan Tanzania, 116, 139 Tenet, George, 136, 183-184, 189-190, 195, 198 Truman, Harry S., 44, 142, 146, 176, 180, 183, 193, 196 Turner, Admiral Stansfield, 3, 9, 24, 147, 158, 177-178, 193-194, 197 Twentieth Century Fund. See United States, Intelligence Community, reform studies of Tyler, John, 67 U-2, 10, 27 United States: civil war, intelligence

221

in, 8, 10, 12, 23, 43, 68, 88; Congress, 68, 70, 72-76, 82-83, 85, 89, 132, 141, 175, 203; Congress, intelligence oversight committees of, 4, 26, 144-145, 176-177, 186, 195, 201202; defense, secretary of, 45, 148, 192; Department of Defense, 12, 18, 29-30, 146, 185, 193, 200, 202-203; Department of Justice, 18, 102; Department of State, 18, 40, 50, 52, 72, 105, 117, 122, 139, 156, 158, 182, 187, 200; Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research of (INR), 54, 57, 146-147; Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 119; Economic Espionage Act, 152, 160; executive office of (White House), 45, 52, 69, 71-76, 81-83, 124, 142-144, 176, 183, 193-194; executive orders, 65, 74, 143, 177; Founding Fathers, 12, 16, 74, 79, 175, 186, 201; Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 138, 153, 183; Intelligence Community (IC), 18-20, 29, 50, 108, 114-115, 117, 124, 137-138, 143-144, 146-149, 152, 158, 191-196, 198-199; Intelligence Community, reform studies of, 4, 18-21, 30, 4950, 76-82, 191-193, 195, 201-204, 206; Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), 142-143; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), 142 USSR. See Soviet Union Vandenberg, General Hoyt, 44, 99 Venona, 180, 183 Walker Spy Ring, 89, 130 Walters, General Vernon, 2 Warner, Michael, 72 Washington, George, 12, 16, 64, 66-67, 87, 174 Watergate, 73, 176, 196 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 106-112 Webster, William, 100, 118, 120, 156, 179, 194, 197

222

Index

Wilson, Edwin, 140 Woolsey, R. James, 77, 179, 195, 197 World War I, 8, 18, 69, 110 World War II, 9-10, 12, 43, 65, 69 -70, 89, 130, 151, 175, 192

Wright, Peter, 174 Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku, 69 Yunis, Fahwaz, 114 Zacharski, Marian, 122

About the Author ARTHUR S. HULNICK is a thirty-five year veteran in the intelligence profession, including seven years as an Air Force Intelligence Officer and twenty-eight years in various assignments in the Central Intelligence Agency. He has been teaching about intelligence at Boston University since 1989, first as a CIA Officer-in-Residence and, after his retirement from the CIA in 1992, as a regular member of the faculty. He has published numerous articles on intelligence matters and serves on the Editorial Board of International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence. He is an active member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and is a member of the board of its New England chapter.

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