Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage: A Methodological Analysis of Theory and Research

Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research (CELCR) Over the pas...

Author: Gerard J. Steen

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Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research (CELCR) Over the past decades, linguists have taken a broader view of language and are borrowing methods and findings from other disciplines such as cognition and computer sciences, neurology, biology, sociology, psychology, and anthropology. This development has enriched our knowledge of language and communication, but at the same time it has made it difficult for researchers in a particular field of language studies to be aware of how their findings might relate to those in other (sub-)disciplines. CELCR seeks to address this problem by taking a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of language and communication. The books in the series focus on a specific linguistic topic and offer studies pertaining to this topic from different disciplinary angles, thus taking converging evidence in language and communication research as its basic methodology.

Editor Marjolijn H. Verspoor University of Groningen

Wilbert Spooren

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Advisory Board Walter Daelemans

Leo Noordman

Cliff Goddard

Martin Pütz

University of Antwerp University of New England

Tilburg University University of Koblenz-Landau

Roeland van Hout

Radboud University Nijmegen

Volume 10 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage: A methodological analysis of theory and research by Gerard J. Steen

Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage A methodological analysis of theory and research

Gerard J. Steen Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia

8

TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Finding metaphor in grammar and usage : a methodological analysis of theory and research / Gerard J. Steen p. cm. (Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research, issn 1566-7774 ; v. 10) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Metaphor--Psychological aspects. 2. Cognitive grammar. 3. Concepts. 4. Throught and thinking. P301.5.M48 S69

2007

415--dc22

2007037108

isbn 978 90 272 3897 9 (Hb; alk. paper)

© 2007 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

To Charlie, Jet, and Annemieke

Table of contents Preface Acknowledgements

xiii xv

part 1. Foundations 1 chapter 1 Mapping the field 1.1 Grammar versus usage 5 1.2 Language versus thought 8 1.3 Symbols versus behavior 10 1.4 Eight areas of research 13 1.5 Relations between areas of research 17 1.6 Converging evidence and the role of methods: Main claims of this book 19 1.7 Outlook 23 chapter 2 The deductive approach 2.1 Deductive reasoning 28 2.1.1 From conceptual structure to cognitive process and product 28 2.1.2 From conceptual structure to linguistic form 31 2.2 Deductive and inductive approaches 34 2.3 The deductive approach and scientific progress 37 2.3.1 From conceptual metaphor to embodied, cultural experience 37 2.3.2 Primary metaphors 40 2.4 Alternative deductive approaches 42 2.5 The diachronic dimension 44 2.6 Conclusion 45

3

27

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

chapter 3 Conceptualization: Theoretical definitions 3.1 Four models of metaphor 48 3.1.1 The two-domain approach 49 3.1.2 The many-space approach 51 3.1.3 The class-inclusion approach 52 3.1.4 The career of metaphor approach 53 3.1.5 Parameters of metaphor models 54 3.2 Metaphor and metonymy 57 3.3 Metaphor and similarity 61 3.4 Metaphor and comparison 64 3.5 Metaphor and literal meaning 66 3.6 Conclusion 70 chapter 4 Operationalization: Operational definitions 4.1 Criteria for metaphor identification 74 4.1.1 Criteria for metaphor in usage 75 4.1.2 Criteria for metaphor in grammar 80 4.2 Units of analysis 82 4.2.1 Grammatical metaphor 85 4.3 Moments of decision 88 4.3.1 Decisions and measurement scales 91 4.4 Metaphorical for who? The role of variation and change 94 4.5 From moments of decision to tools 97 4.6 Conclusion 101 chapter 5 Application: Data collection and analysis 5.1 Data: Verbal, nonverbal, and meta 104 5.2 Data collection: Introspection, observation, manipulation 107 5.2.1 Thought data: The conceptual structures of metaphor 109 5.2.2 Language data: The linguistic forms of metaphor 111 5.3 Data analysis: Quantitative and qualitative 116 5.4 Analyst performance: Reliability and error 120 5.4.1 Interanalyst agreement and individual bias 121 5.4.2 Interanalyst agreement and chance 124 5.4.3 Doing methodological research 125 5.5 Conclusion 127

47

73

103

Table of contents

part 2. Finding metaphor in grammar 131 chapter 6 Linguistic forms in grammar 6.1 Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach 134 6.1.1 The synchronic dimension 134 6.1.2 The diachronic dimension 136 6.2 Conceptualization 138 6.2.1 Conventionalized versus ad-hoc polysemy 139 6.2.2 Polysemy, homonymy, and monosemy 141 6.2.3 Nonliteral similarity 142 6.3 Operationalization 144 6.3.1 One form 144 6.3.2 Two senses 146 6.3.3 Sense relations by nonliteral similarity 147 6.4 Introspection 149 6.4.1 Finding polysemy 149 6.4.2 Metaphoric or metonymic polysemy? 154 6.4.3 Finding metaphorical polysemy: Conceptual metaphor as a search mechanism 156 6.5 Observation 159 6.6 Manipulation 163 6.7 Conclusion 167 chapter 7 Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 7.1 Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach 172 7.1.1 The synchronic dimension 172 7.1.2 The diachronic dimension 175 7.2 Conceptualization 177 7.2.1 Domains and other conceptual systems 177 7.2.2 Defining conceptual domains 179 7.2.3 Domains and metaphorically motivated polysemy 181 7.2.4 Conclusion 183 7.3 Operationalization 184 7.4 Introspection 188 7.5 Observation 191 7.6 Manipulation 196 7.7 Conclusion 198

133

171






chapter 8 Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 8.1 Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach 202 8.1.1 The synchronic dimension 202 8.1.2 The diachronic dimension 205 8.2 Conceptualization 208 8.2.1 Defining cross-domain mappings 208 8.2.2 Configurations of domains and mappings: Metaphor and/or metonymy 210 8.3 Operationalization 213 8.4 Introspection 217 8.5 Observation 220 8.6 Manipulation 224 8.7 Conclusion 227 chapter 9 Cognitive processes and products in grammar 9.1 Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach 230 9.2 Conceptualization 234 9.2.1 Language acquisition 234 9.2.2 Knowledge of language 237 9.3 Operationalization 242 9.3.1 Linguistic forms 242 9.3.2 Conceptual structures 243 9.4 Introspection 244 9.5 Observation 248 9.5.1 Acquisition 248 9.5.2 Knowledge of language 251 9.6 Manipulation 253 9.6.1 Acquisition 253 9.6.2 Knowledge of language 257 9.7 Conclusion 260

201

229

part 3. Finding metaphor in usage 265 chapter 10 Linguistic forms and conceptual structures in usage (1): Metaphorical language use 10.1 Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach 268 10.1.1 Two-domain approaches 269 10.1.2 Many-space approaches 273

267

Table of contents

10.2 Conceptualization 274 10.2.1 From grammar to usage 274 10.2.2 Defining metaphorical linguistic forms in usage: Indirectness and incongruity 276 10.2.3 Defining cross-domain mappings in usage: Two domains or many spaces? 281 10.3 Operationalization 283 10.3.1 Linguistic forms: The Pragglejaz method 283 10.3.2 Conceptual structures: Barcelona’s method 287 10.4 Introspection 289 10.4.1 Linguistic forms 289 10.4.2 Conceptual structures 292 10.5 Observation 293 10.5.1 Linguistic forms 293 10.5.2 Conceptual structures 295 10.6 Manipulation 301 10.7 Conclusion 306 chapter 11 Linguistic forms and conceptual structures in usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 11.1 Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach 311 11.1.1 Two-domain approaches 311 11.1.2 Many-space approaches 316 11.2 Conceptualization 317 11.2.1 Signaling 317 11.2.2 Four dimensions of metaphor in usage 319 11.2.3 Indirectness revisited 323 11.3 Operationalization 324 11.4 Introspection 327 11.5 Observation 329 11.6 Manipulation 339 11.7 Conclusion 342 chapter 12 Cognitive processes and products in usage 12.1 Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach 345 12.2 Conceptualization 349 12.3 Operationalization 354 12.4 Introspection 358 12.5 Observation 362

309

345






12.6 Manipulation 368 12.6.1 Experimental materials 368 12.6.2 Data collection and analysis 370 12.7 Conclusion 377 Conclusion 379 chapter 13 Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 13.1 The production of evidence: The empirical cycle 382 13.1.1 Conceptualization 383 13.1.2 Operationalization 384 13.1.3 Data collection 386 13.1.4 Data analysis 387 13.1.5 Interpretation 389 13.2 The interpretation of evidence: The field of research 390 13.2.1 Symbol analysis 391 13.2.2 Behavior analysis 395 13.3 The utilization of evidence: Variations on convergence 399 13.4 Concluding comments 402

381

References

405

Index

427

Preface

This book presents one side of a dialogue with Ray Gibbs that we kept going for more than five years. We had been invited by Bertie Kaal and Günter Radden to write a joint book on finding metaphor in language and thought for the John Benjamins textbook series Cognitive Linguistics in Practice, and I received a one year grant from the Netherlands Organization of Research, NWO, to finish a first draft between 2002 and 2003. But as I kept working on the manuscript, the text was becoming mine more than ours, gradually shifting positions on a scale from textbook to monograph. By mid 2006, we agreed in excellent friendship to split our ways. I removed Ray’s contributions and, being a linguist, decided to adjust my perspective to finding metaphor in grammar and usage, the contrast between language and thought getting demoted to secondary importance. I completed my personal conceptualization of the book and produced new sections and chapters on metaphor in thought that were restricted to language research. I hope that my reduction of our dialogue to this one-sided monologue does sufficient justice to my intellectual and personal debts to Ray. The book has also benefited a lot from other people’s comments and queries. Responses to a previous, then still jointly written version were offered by Antonio Barcelona, Ewa Biernacka, Alan Cienki, Lettie Dorst, Anna Kaal, Irene LópezRodríguez, Maria del Carmen Molina Cano, Pilar Mompeán Guillamón, Tryntje Pasma, and Francisco Ruíz de Mendoza Ibañez. Parts of the present manuscript were read in final draft by Alan Cienki, Dedre Gentner, Zoltán Kövecses, Tina Krennmayr, and Cornelia Müller, while Joost Schilperoord provided excellent feedback on the manuscript as a whole. I am grateful to the staff of John Benjamins, who made sure that the production of the book was a simple pleasure. And I am grateful beyond expression to my family, for making this book possible. Gerard Steen, Amsterdam, July 2007.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, NWO, for research grant 365-70-010, which funded a sabbatical year for writing a first draft; and for research grant 277-30-001, during which project the present version was completed.

 

Foundations

chapter 

Mapping the field

George W. Bush is so famous for his malapropisms and incorrect syntax that the internet features a number of sites displaying his ‘Bushisms’. One quotation reveals that he has difficulties using the word commensurate, inadvertently pronouncing it as commiserate. Another quotation involving the same word shows how he is monitoring and correcting himself, producing the following utterance: See, without the tax relief package, there would have been a deficit, but there wouldn’t have been the commiserate – not ’commiserate’ – the kick to our economy that occurred as a result of the tax relief. (http://www.slate.com/id/76886/, 21 September, 2006)

In order to avoid the four-syllable Latinate commensurate, Bush makes use of the onesyllable Anglo-Saxon kick. As he does this, he also changes from complex noun phrase to simple noun phrase, dropping the hindersome adjective and moving into metaphorical language use. The question is, does he also have a mental picture of physical engagement with the economy? Or does he simply replace one construction by another while continuing to think as before about the effects of the tax relief package on the economy? And would kick even count as metaphorical to all analysts of language? In this book I offer an analysis of the most important methodological issues involved in finding metaphor in language in order to construct a methodological guide of this process for researchers of language. I address questions about the various areas of research that may be distinguished for the study of metaphor, with special attention to the difference between grammar and usage. The Bush example is an individual usage event that can be described in some detail regarding its unique properties, but how, precisely, can it be related to more general considerations of the position of metaphor in grammar? I also look at the theoretical and operational definitions of metaphor, and at the methods and techniques by which manifestations of metaphor in language can be collected and analyzed. Thus, when Bush says that the tax relief program gives a kick to the economy, is this metaphorical because there is some similarity, or comparison, or analogy between the tax relief program and somebody kicking? Or is it because he is recategorizing the economy as something that can be kicked? And, can researchers rely on their own intuitions when they analyze such data, or should they look for some sort of confirmation outside themselves? These are some of the questions that play a crucial role in any research that attempts to find metaphor in language. My main aim in reviewing these questions is to bring some order to this discussion from a number of interrelated perspectives. My concern with present-day metaphor




research is that different schools and researchers conflate these perspectives in diverging ways, confounding or concealing issues which need to be kept distinct. I hope that disentangling the dimensions and approaches involved will offer a clearer view of the nature of metaphor identification in various areas of research. There is more common ground than is acknowledged by some, but there are more distinct difficulties for different areas than is acknowledged by others. As a result, this methodological analysis of theory and research can be seen as a rough guide to the land of metaphor research. If my analysis can offer a more integrated but differentiated perspective on metaphor identification in language which can help researchers in orienting themselves towards methods and techniques for doing better research, this book will have served its purpose. The starting point of my analysis lies in cognitive linguistics since this is the school which has recently had most impact on the field. This viewpoint will be used to consider a wide range of methodological issues in cognitive linguistics. I will also make forays into other schools and traditions of linguistics, however, as well as into other disciplines concerned with the study of language. My sympathy for the cognitivelinguistic undertaking does not mean that I am blind to its problems. My main audience is therefore the community of linguists at large, including other students of language who are interested in the identification and study of metaphor in grammar and usage, with special interest into its cognitive nature, function, and effects. In this first chapter I will put my methodological cards on the table so that my game will be clear from the start. Methodologists make a basic distinction between three stages of research: data collection, data analysis, and interpretation of the findings. Their handbooks and courses usually focus on the first two stages, which can be formally instructed in rather general terms, interpretation being left to the experts in the particular fields in which the methods and techniques can be applied. Yet interpretation is essential for any appreciation of the methodological efforts made by researchers when they investigate metaphor in grammar and usage in various ways: some methods and techniques and their data are much more closely associated with some areas of metaphor research than others, and this fundamentally affects the interpretation of findings across the entire field. That is why I will begin this book with a discussion of the various dimensions of metaphor in language that determine the interpretation of any evidence. This will provide a map of the field of metaphor identification within which data collection and analysis can be systematically discussed in relation to the particular area in which they are employed. The map presented in this first chapter will be based on a distinction between three commonly used contrasts in research on language: – – –

grammar versus usage; language versus thought; symbol versus behavior.

Combining these contrasts leads to a 2*2*2 configuration, producing eight distinct areas for locating different types of language research. After a brief characterization of

Chaper 1. Mapping the field

the nature of metaphor identification in each of these areas I will proceed to discuss some of the associations between them. This leads to the question how different types of evidence for metaphor can be connected with which area of research, with some attention to what counts as converging evidence for a particular phenomenon. The chapter will then end with an outlook on the rest of the book.

. Grammar versus usage Cognitive-linguistic research on language makes an important distinction between usage and grammar. In cognitive linguistics, and elsewhere, grammar, including the lexicon, is derived from usage, by children, language learners, language users, and by linguists (e.g. Langacker 1987, 1988, 2000; cf. Barlow & Kemmer 2000; Butler 2003; Bybee & Hopper 2001; Tomasello 2003). In fact, grammar, meaning lexico-grammar, is the socio-culturally conventionalized and cognitively entrenched part of the many concrete events of usage that occur in reality. Grammar is the area of research that contains form-meaning pairings that are relatively fixed as opposed to ad-hoc or novel or in change. One manifestation of this degree of conventionalization is that descriptions of these relatively fixed form-meaning pairings may be found in culturally sanctioned repositories, such as dictionaries and grammars, or public institutions, such as language schools. They are also presumably stored in some form in the individual mind of each language user. The special status of grammar as opposed to usage is quite secure, even though its boundaries may be hard to fix in the same way for all research purposes. Grammar displays a good deal of metaphor, which by definition is conventional. This may be found at all levels of linguistic organization: morphology (brain-drain, frogman), vocabulary (defend, attack, support), phraseology (treading the water, holding your breath), and more schematic constructions (such as the conventionalized metaphorical use of ditransitives, as in He gave me a headache). All of these examples are socially conventional to the extent that they can be looked up in dictionaries, for instance, or can be found in foreign language course books (e.g. Deignan 1995; Holme 2004). They are also offered as publicly available symbols to children during language acquisition (Tomasello 1999, 2003). And they are cognitively entrenched to the extent that they cannot be bypassed when language users have to interpret expressions that are ambiguous between a metaphorical and a non-metaphorical meaning (e.g. Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin 1982). It is one of the great contributions of cognitive linguistics that figuration is now seen as part and parcel of lexico-grammar and its semantics. Meaning in usage is relatively more situated and specific than in grammar, both conventional meaning as well as novel or obsolete meaning. This is due to the individual, unique nature of any usage event, which involves particular language users with their own topics, goals, means and contexts of communication. The general and schematic meanings in grammar are the result of the grammarian’s goal to describe






conventions of language use across language users and usage events. This is a matter of abstraction and generalization that is inherent in any attempt at identifying conventions. The study of grammar cannot escape this level of generalization if it wants to reconstruct conventions. By contrast, every study of usage has to begin with making a decision about the level of uniqueness or generality selected for describing a specific (set of) usage event(s). Paul Chilton’s (1996) study of security metaphors, for instance, moves back and forth between the discussion of highly individual usage events as idiosyncratic manifestations of metaphor, on the one hand, and more general patterns of metaphor in usage, on the other. Part of the difficulty with the contrast between grammar and usage is that grammar is derived from usage. Conventionalized metaphorical meanings of grammar are consequently also found in usage. They have to be, since that is the only place where they can be observed in their natural habitats in the first place. This is potentially confusing for the distinction between grammar and usage for the cognitive-linguistic study of metaphor, which has not sufficiently thematized or exploited the distinction. However, it is still possible and useful to keep the study of conventional metaphor in grammar and usage apart as two distinct if related areas of cognitive-linguistic research, in order to map the field of metaphor studies (e.g., Cameron & Low 1999). As Newmeyer (2003) has oracled, “Grammar is grammar and usage is usage”. Usage does not only exhibit conventionalized lexico-grammatical manifestations of metaphor. It also contains novel expressions of conventional metaphor. Thus, a conventional metaphorical expression for a great quantity in English is floods, but when the terrible tsunami had hit a great part of Asia in 2004, it did not take long for floods to be replaced by tsunami as a more vivid expression in many instances of language use, revitalizing the conventional metaphorical idea that may have motivated it. A Dutch newspaper report on a film festival, for instance, signaled “a tsunami of documentaries” within two weeks of the disaster itself. The term has now become conventional enough for a Dutch right-wing politician to use the term in 2006, during election time, to refer to the growing number of Muslim people in the Netherlands, causing a scandal in the political debate. But before such novel coinages as figurative tsunami cross the threshold of sufficient conventionalization for them to be considered as part of the grammar of a language, they constitute one class of phenomena which differentiates the task of finding and analyzing manifestations of metaphor in usage from metaphor in grammar. Completely novel metaphors that do not have any basis in available patterns of metaphorical thought may be somewhat harder to find. But the opposite phenomenon, of metaphors that are on their way out of the grammar, is more familiar. Thus, words like fervent and ardent were fully metaphorical in British English in 1974, if the Concise Oxford Dictionary (McIntosh 1974) is a good source to go by. In that dictionary, these words had both a temperature sense and an emotion sense, exemplifying the underlying metaphorical idea that emotion is temperature. But this has changed in the description of these words by present-day user dictionaries that are based on corpora, such as the Collins Cobuild (Sinclair 1987) or the Macmillan English


Dictionary for Advanced Learners (Rundell 2002.) In these dictionaries, fervent and ardent only designate emotional attributes, the contrast with the domain of temperature having fallen out of use. From a grammatical point of view, these words have only one sense, pertaining to emotions, which does not allow for a metaphorical relation with another, more basic sense relating to temperature (Steen 2005a; cf. Deignan 2005a: 34– 35). An individual speaker, however, may still have retained the contrast between the two senses, so that a grammatical description of current conventionalized use might have to differ from the description of these words in a unique usage event, as happens with the analysis of Bushisms. A further difference between metaphor in grammar versus usage is the possibility of expressing metaphor by simile and other rhetorical means. In grammar, there is just a handful of hackneyed metaphorical comparisons, which for instance have to do with comparisons between people and animals, as in stubborn as a mule. In usage, metaphorical ideas may be expressed as many forms of nonliteral comparison, giving rise to analogy, extended simile and metaphor, and other rhetorical forms (cf. Goatly 1997; Steen & Gibbs 2004). These are manifestations of metaphor which are simply not part of the data for grammarians, who aim to describe the conventionalized part of the language system. They do come up frequently, however, in such studies as Chilton (1996) on the usage of security metaphors in western politics. Even conventionalized metaphorical meanings can be attributed quite specific interpretations in the study of usage, more specific than is customary or even desirable in grammar. This is particularly clear from hermeneutic approaches to literary texts, which aim to understand every detail of a text as a contribution to the communication between author and reader (e.g. Freeman 2000, 2002). But it is also evident from other historical and cultural approaches to unique usage events: after all, there is only one Bible and one Koran (Charteris-Black 2004; Feyaerts 2003), one Carnot and one Boyle (Gentner & Jeziorski 1993), and one Kennedy and one Chroetsjev (Chilton 1996). For less well-known language users, the same attention to unique and specific meaning occurs in conversation analysis, for instance between doctors and patients, or teachers and pupils, where all language use is analyzed as a sign of the interactive goals of the interlocutors (e.g., Cameron 1999b, 2003; Gwyn 1999; Semino, Heywood, & Short 2004). These are the reasons why I advocate making a distinction between finding metaphor in grammar and metaphor in usage. They are distinct areas that are researched with different theoretical aims and assumptions about meaning, and they cover at least partly different phenomena when it comes to metaphor. When they do cover the same phenomena, these may receive different treatment. Researchers may have to adjust their methodology to these different situations, so that it becomes interesting to see how the results for metaphor identification between these two areas of investigation may be related and compared.

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. Language versus thought Much more loudly advertised by the cognitive-linguistic approach is the fact that usage as well as grammar can be analyzed as either language or thought, but, more typically, thought through language. This is particularly clear when it comes to the study of metaphor. The widespread use of metaphorical language in our everyday lives revealed by cognitive linguists since George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published their Metaphors we live by (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) has given rise to the idea that we do not only talk metaphorically much of the time, but that we may also think metaphorically much of the time. The foundation of this theory of metaphor has been a range of conventionalized metaphorical ideas, called conceptual metaphors. More recently Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) have shown how such conceptual metaphors are basic to our language and thinking about time, causality, the mind, the self, and morality. Thus, time is conventionally conceived of in terms of space in many languages and cultures, so that we can look ahead to the future, look back on events in the past, and so on. This even allows for jokes in film titles such as Back to the future. The mind, to give another example, can be seen as a machine, which can run fast or slow. The mind may be compared more specifically to a steam engine or a computer, depending on the technological environment of the language users. As a result, we can be a little rusty or store our ideas. Since the publication of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), hundreds of examples of such systematic metaphorical language have been collected and analyzed in terms of metaphorical thought, or conceptual metaphors, in cognitive linguistics (see Kövecses 2002, for an introduction). All of these linguistic metaphors are seen as so many distinct and particular formal realizations or expressions of conceptual metaphors. The two levels of analysis are indicated by a different conventional representation. Linguistic metaphor is presented as any other language data, while conceptual metaphor, or the conceptual structure of any linguistic metaphor, is shown in small capitals, as in the mind is a machine. Cross-linguistic research is one of the areas which has demonstrated the use of the distinction between language and thought for metaphor, whether the metaphors in two languages are studied as part of conventionalized lexico-grammar or as part of specific situations of usage that display the whole range of varying degrees of conventionalized form-meaning pairings. Kövecses (2003, 2004a) has examined how linguistic and conceptual metaphors are related between English and Hungarian. He offers an Table 1.1 Love is a journey in English and Hungarian: The relation between language and thought

Most frequent case Less frequent case Least frequent case

Word form

Literal meaning

Figurative meaning

Conceptual metaphor

different different different

same different different

same same same

same same different


analysis for love is a journey (table 1.1), concluding: “. . ., two languages or varieties may have the same conceptual metaphor but the linguistic expression of the conceptual metaphor may be influenced or shaped by differences in cultural-ideological traits and assumptions characterizing different cultures” (2003: 319). Deignan, Gabrys and Solska (1997) have proposed the following possible configurations between any two languages: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Same conceptual metaphor and equivalent linguistic expression Same conceptual metaphor but different linguistic expression Different conceptual metaphors used Words and expressions with similar literal meanings but different metaphorical meanings

For their comparison between English and Polish, they offer a number of illustrations. For relation 1, they point to the fact that relationships are buildings works for both languages for a verb such as cement / cementowa´c, as in cement a personal / business relationship. For relation 2, they point to the fact that the same conceptual metaphor ideas are food can be observed in both languages, but that a linguistic difference emerges when we look at the conventionalized linguistic forms of the conceptual metaphor. Thus, Polish niedojrzałe, meaning ‘unripe’, can be used metaphorically, but English would prefer half-baked, not unripe ideas. We do not have to pursue this exercise through points three and four to draw the conclusion that, when metaphor in language is studied, it needs to be clear which of these areas is in focus, the linguistic form of the metaphor, its conceptual structure, or both. The distinction between grammar and usage can be immediately brought into play here. The fact that unripe ideas is not a conventionally possible collocation in English means that the lexico-grammar of either of the two words cannot ‘permit’ its collocation with the other. This can be shown by, for instance, a quick search of the free BNC online service, which performs an exploration of the British National Corpus, a 100 million word data bank of contemporary British English. No attested use of this collocation or its variants (unripe idea, unripe thought, unripe thoughts) are found. This might be taken as one operational definition of the notion of sufficient conventionalization for inclusion in the grammar of English. However, it should also be clear that any singular use of the collocation would probably be intelligible, for instance in a joky or a playful context in advertising or in conversation or in poetry. The expression might hence in principle be possible in usage and might in fact have already been used in some situations. It might even turn into a grammatically conventionalized expression if it were used sufficiently frequently, for whatever reason. It would then acquire a rather different status as a language phenomenon, though, for it would then illustrate relation 1, not 2, of the list of possibilities advanced by Deignan and her colleagues. This would present a different factual description of the relation between the two languages regarding metaphor, which is one of the reasons for exploiting the contrast between grammar and usage and crossing it with the contrast between language and thought.






In all, there is sufficient reason for keeping the linguistic and conceptual aspects of metaphor apart, both in grammar and in usage. Research on the linguistic aspect of metaphor in grammar and usage should focus on the linguistic forms of metaphor. Research on the conceptual aspect of metaphor in grammar and usage should focus on the conceptual structures. Researchers aiming to look at metaphor in both language and thought at the same time need to pay attention to linguistic forms and conceptual structures. This is what is typically meant when cognitive linguists speak of metaphor in language and thought, but the problem is that cognitive-linguistic studies go back and forth between language and thought so often that it is sometimes unclear whether they intend to make claims about language or thought. In the interest of at least crosslinguistic descriptive adequacy, I suggest that the distinction between language and thought in this sense should be methodologically guaranteed and reflected.

. Symbols versus behavior In studying the linguistic forms or conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar or usage, a further distinction can be made which is needed to order the field. Grammar and usage, language and thought, as well as their combinations into more specific areas of research, can be approached in two ways: as symbolic structures and systems, or as cognitive processes and their mental representation in behavior. The former approach involves the use of semiotics, which includes many sub disciplines in linguistics like grammar and stylistics, while the latter is based on the cognitive and social sciences. The relation between the semiotic analysis and behavioral analysis of language has given rise to sometimes heated debates about what linguists can say about the mind and its workings during language processing (e.g. Croft 1998; Sandra 1998; Tuggy 1999; cf. Gibbs 2006a, b). Cognitive linguistics is clearly based in a semiotic approach to the study of language. Langacker’s (1987) approach to linguistic units as more or less conventionalized form-meaning pairings is founded on the symbolicity principle in language, which goes back to C.S. Peirce. Textbooks typically contain discussions of grammar as a sign system that has distinct lexical and grammatical categories (cf. Croft & Cruse 2004; Dirven & Verspoor 1998; Evans & Green 2006; Taylor 2002). Constructions have since taken over as the all-encompassing category for the lexico-grammatical sign that needs to be described by cognitive-linguistic grammarians regarding their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties (e.g. Langacker 2005). These semiotic properties of cognitive linguistics locate it firmly within mainstream linguistics as the study of language as a symbolic system. What is special about cognitive linguistics, however, is the often made assumption that the grammatical descriptions of language are not just claims about the symbolic structure of language as a sign system, but that they also have psychological validity. Most cognitive linguists have adopted the position that the structure of grammar as described by cognitive linguistics is mentally represented as such in the minds of indi-


vidual language users. Speculations are also forwarded about the cognitive processes of language that have led to such cognitive representations in the mind. In other words, one important claim of cognitive linguistics is that it also provides descriptions of the cognitive products of language processing in the form of stable mental representations of lexico-grammatical constructions and their application in usage. This is a bold claim. Although I suspect that some or even much of this may be true, I do not share this assumption as an a priori tenet. Instead, I regard it as an empirical issue. In my opinion, symbolic structure does not necessarily equal psychological process and its product, cognitive representation. In particular, the question arises how much of the relation between the structure of signs on the one hand and cognitive processes and products relating to grammar on the other is in fact one-to-one, and in which areas. A more detailed treatment of this question for Blending Theory has been offered by Gibbs (2000), but it applies to all cognitive linguistics (cf. Gibbs 1996a, 2006a, b). The main reason for advocating this position is the following. All individuals in any given language community vary in many cognitive, social and cultural respects. It would be truly surprising if they were absolutely identical in their acquisition, knowledge, and maintenance of grammar. The cognitive variability of grammar is an issue of individual cognitive psychology. Indeed, individual and social variation should be the logical outcome of the usage-based approach to language acquisition and maintenance advertised in cognitive linguistics. The cognitive processes and products of grammar as verbal behavior (as opposed to abstract symbolic structure) need to be examined with the proper methodological tools. These tools pertain to finding metaphor in the stable, long-term cognitive representations of grammar and belong to the behavioral sciences. They engage with different phenomena (mental capacities of individuals and their use in cognitive performance) than the tools of semiotics or more specifically linguistics, which deal with signs. As a result, grammar may either be described as symbolic structure capturing the conventionalized part of language as a sign system; or it may be studied as the mental representation and processing which captures the entrenched part of language as a cognitive capacity of individual people. Each of these conceptualizations represent distinct areas of research that need to be investigated by their own methodologies, albeit in close relation, as is also advocated in various contributions in Barlow and Kemmer (2000) such as Biber (2000), Dickinson and Givón (2000), and Lamb (2000). This twofold distinction between sign and behavior does not only apply to the investigation of the linguistic forms of grammar; it also applies to the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar. Conceptual structures in grammar, too, can either be approached as symbolic structures and systems, or as cognitive processes and products. When conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar are part of a conventionalized symbolic system, they are approached as semiotic phenomena, as was proposed in the seventies, for instance, by Umberto Eco (1976; cf. 1984), who was inspired by Peirce as well. Such semiotic systems of thought are based on conceptual categories with labels and content, instead of the lexico-grammatical categories of grammar. When this

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semiotic perspective is adopted on thought, it simply means that no claims are made about the cognitive validity of the conceptual systems for each individual in a particular culture. The closest equivalent of this view in contemporary research may perhaps be found in the notions of a semantic network and an ontology in computer science and information science (e.g. Fellbaum 1998a, b). By contrast, when conceptual systems related to grammar are approached as the products of cognitive behavior, we are looking at the mental capacities for cognition that have to do with infant learning and psychological development, memory and storage, the role of individual learning and socio-cultural variation, and so on. Indeed, Tomasello (1999) has opened the final chapter of his book on the cultural origins of human cognition with quotations from Wittgenstein, Peirce, Mead, and Vygotsky to suggest that his psychological work stands in a venerable philosophical tradition which takes thought as a form of symbol manipulation. Whether (conceptual) metaphors are part of these permanent knowledge structures is an issue which has received various answers from different psychologists (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner 2005; Gentner & Bowdle 2001; Gibbs 1992; Glucksberg & Keysar 1990; Murphy 1996, 1997). The same story applies to usage. Even though many cognitive linguists have analyzed usage on the assumption that such descriptions also capture psychological representations and related processes (e.g., Barlow 2000; Kemmer & Barlow 2000; Langacker 1987, 1988, 2000), I would like to insist, again, that these are empirical issues. They need to be addressed by looking at the role of both linguistic forms and conceptual structures in actual cognitive processing and its products, as has been repeatedly emphasized by Gibbs (e.g. 1993, 1994, 1999a), Tomasello (1999, 2003), and others (e.g. Hutchins 1995, 2005; Palmer 1996; Shore 1996). To reiterate, it would be quite surprising if all language users displayed exactly the same cognitive processes and representations of linguistic forms and their related conceptual structures in usage whereas it goes without saying that they display individual differences in many other psychological respects. I therefore propose that metaphor in usage is also investigated in these two distinct ways. First, we may describe the linguistic forms and conceptual structures in usage as symbolic structures with particular forms and meanings. But metaphorical language and thought in usage may also be investigated as the cognitive products of mental processes in individual minds. The ambitions of pursuing one or the other type of approach are radically different, and it would be helpful if researchers were maximally clear about their position in this regard. One example of such an explicit standpoint is provided by Jonathan Charteris-Black (2004), who goes on record to deny that his conceptual analysis of metaphor has any psychological pretensions. The distinction between the study of language and metaphor as either symbol or behavior is the third dimension which should be respected in the methodology of empirical research. We have seen that it can be applied to the study of language as grammar or usage, and to the study of the linguistic forms as well as conceptual structures that may be singled out for special attention. I believe that the implications of the distinction are not always sufficiently respected by all linguists. My recommendation,


which I hope to justify in the rest of this book, is that better attention should be paid in future to the difference between studying metaphor as symbol versus behavior.

. Eight areas of research When cognitive-linguistically inspired researchers of language investigate metaphor, they typically do so by looking at language as either grammar or usage. Moreover, they have to make a choice in focusing on metaphor in grammar or usage as either language, analyzing linguistic forms, or thought, examining conceptual structures, or both. And finally, they have a further choice in adopting either a sign-oriented, symbolic perspective on metaphor, or a behavior-oriented, social-scientific perspective on the processes and products of metaphor in cognition. When these choices are combined, we end up with a field of research that consists of eight distinct research areas displaying their own object and approach (see Fig. 1.1). I have characterized each of the research areas by means of a question about metaphor identification. As can be seen, the questions differ substantially between the distinct approaches. For research on the linguistic aspect of metaphor approached as symbolic structure, there is a difference between research on grammar and usage which may be captured by the contrast between the following two questions (top row): Q1: When does a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q2: When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing in text and talk count as metaphorical? The former type of research requires evidence about sufficient degrees of conventionalization of metaphor whereas the latter type of research does not. It should be noted that this does not mean that all metaphor in usage is novel: metaphor in usage is novel, conventional, or obsolete. The difference between the study of conventional metaphor in grammar versus usage will be returned to at various points in the book. The distinction between conventionalized metaphorical forms versus all metaphorical language forms, whether they are conventionalized or not, applies to all of the following sets of questions about metaphor in grammar versus usage. Natural tools in research about conventionalized meanings in grammar are reference works, such as dictionaries and grammars, and corpora. In usage, we are typically dealing with the analysis of text and talk as verbal documents or transcripts. Metaphors in such usage data, whether conventional or not, may be further determined by their discourse characteristics that have to do with their domain (religion, literature and the arts, science and education, law, government and politics, mass media, business, and so on), their function (information, persuasion, instruction, and so on), their type (narrative, argumentative, expository, descriptive), etcetera (Steen 1999a, 2003; Steen & Gibbs 2004).

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Figure 1.1 Areas of research for cognitive-linguistic approaches to metaphor in language

Approached as symbolic structure

Approached as behavior, whether process or product

Metaphor in grammar Q1 When does a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical?

Metaphor in usage Q2 When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing in text and talk count as metaphorical?

Approached as thought

Q3 When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical?

Q4 When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form in text and talk count as metaphorical?

Approached as language

Q5 When does the storing, acquisition or even loss of a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical?

Q6 When does the production or reception in text or talk of any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical?


Q7 When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical?

Q8 When does the production or reception in text or talk of a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical?


When attention is shifted from the linguistic aspect to the conceptual aspect of metaphor, questions 3 and 4 capture the distinction between grammar and usage for the semiotic approach to the field (second row): Q3: When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? Q4: When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form in text and talk count as metaphorical? This type of research analyzes the conceptual complexities of cross-domain mappings. It takes its cue for such an analysis from language data that express such a metaphorical mapping. The methodological problem here is that more metaphorical mappings in conceptual structure may explain the same language data. This is a problem which may be more difficult to solve in the study of usage than in the study of grammar because of


the potentially idiosyncratic nature of any single usage event (think of the mind set of individual poets, politicians, and patients). In this connection it is of methodological importance that researchers decide either that the analysis fixes the language data and then explores which conceptual structures may be related to it (the ‘semasiological’ route), or that it fixes the conceptual metaphors and then looks for potential linguistic expressions (the ‘onomasiological’ route). The first two rows deal with semiotic approaches to metaphor in grammar and usage, divided by language and thought. The difference between these two areas of research, on the one hand, and research on metaphor in grammar and usage as behavior, on the other, may now be explained as follows, first of all with reference to its linguistic aspects (third row): Q5: When does the storing, acquisition or even loss of a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q6: When does the production or reception in text or talk of any linguistic formmeaning pairing count as metaphorical? Question 5 addresses the cognitive psychological aspect of metaphor in grammar by focusing on the long-term processes of language storing, acquisition, and attrition, in order to be able to tap the cognitive processes and products of sufficiently conventionalized language in individual language users. Question 6 tackles the psychological aspect of metaphor in usage by focusing on the short-term processes of language production and understanding (e.g. lexical access) in order to tap the cognitive experience of individual language users of specific usage events. In both areas of research, attention may be devoted to the behavioral processes themselves or to their products, that is, long-term, conventionalized, or short-term, specific mental representations. The condensed forms of expression of these questions intentionally focus on the metaphorical nature of storing, acquiring, losing, producing, and receiving a metaphorical expression: in cognitive-linguistic terms, these cognitive processes can only be said to be metaphorical if they display the activation of two conceptual domains or spaces, one of which is mapped onto the other. The data of this type of research are speech and listening behavior, or reading and writing behavior, which, for grammar, ideally should stretch out over longer periods of time (longitudinal studies), while for usage, again, they may be highly specific in relation to the genre of discourse that they occur in. Stretches of discourse divorced from their users do not count as such, for they may be compatible with a range of processes, including those that involve the activation of only one cognitive domain because the relevant conceptual mapping has taken place in the history of the language instead of being reproduced by the individual on every occasion of use (see Section 1.5). This is clearly one area where cognitive linguists have to look at work in psycholinguistics and interactional sociolinguistics to find the relevant data and evidence for their theses. The areas of research in Q5 and Q6 are characterized by their focus on metaphor approached as language, not thought. That is, both grammar and usage are defined by their attention to the cognitive processing of linguistic forms without many as-

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sumptions about the cognitive identity and content of related conceptual structures. Questions 7 and 8, by contrast, do precisely that: Q7: When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? Q8: When does the production or reception in text or talk of a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical? Researchers working in these two areas investigate the cognitive processing of either conventionalized or all mappings between conceptual domains as part of grammar or usage. This may again happen with special attention to the processes themselves, or to their products. The crucial characteristic of this type of research is the concern with people and their behavior, not signs. This, too, is an area which is less typical of cognitive linguistics than of psycholinguistics and interactional sociolinguistics. The questions in the lower half of Fig. 1.1 all pertain to metaphor in behavior. They are concerned with cognitive processes and products, which are not necessarily identical with the symbolic structures and their uses that are addressed in the upper half of Fig. 1.1. This is one fundamental divide between areas of research on metaphor in grammar and usage. This is compounded by the fact that, within each of these more encompassing fields, there are distinct areas of research to be discerned for metaphor in grammar versus usage, further divided by investigations of linguistic form versus conceptual structure. To illustrate these distinctions by means of one example, reconsider the opening quotation from George Bush: See, without the tax relief package, there would have been a deficit, but there wouldn’t have been the commiserate – not ’commiserate’ – the kick to our economy that occurred as a result of the tax relief. (http://www.slate.com/id/76886/, 21 September, 2006)

Since this is one specific usage event, let us first examine questions 2, 4, 6, and 8. I am only going to point out a number of obviously different phenomena that are typically picked out for research in each of the four areas. For metaphor in usage, question 2 asks when any linguistic form-meaning pairing, including our noun kick, counts as metaphorical. In this book I will suggest that this is typically the case when it displays an indirect contextual meaning which may be contrasted and understood by comparison with some direct, more basic meaning. In this case, the more basic meaning would be a concrete movement by the foot against another concrete object, whereas the contextual meaning is probably something like an abstract stimulus (in this case a tax relief package) that affects another abstract entity (in this case our economy). Question 4 can then be read as asking what the conceptual structure related to this linguistic form could be and whether it is metaphorical, too. It might be claimed that there is a force-dynamic mapping between the conceptual domains of physical movement and abstract financial processes which includes all sorts of elements in those two domains and projects specific relations between some


of these elements from one domain to another. Question 6 highlights the psycholinguistic process that went on in Bush’s head as he was producing the linguistic forms in the utterance. It would ideally hope to examine the way in which the lexical unit kick was accessed, retrieved, inserted into the formulation to be constructed, and finally articulated, in order to, for instance, test whether two senses were activated during production, one pertaining to physical movement and another pertaining to financial effect. Question 8 also highlights the psycholinguistic production processes, but with special attention to the two knowledge domains involved; it broadens into more general cognitive psychological processes of human performance, and could include the issue of whether Bush has a mental image of the economy indeed getting kicked – whatever such an image may look like. As for metaphor in grammar, questions 1, 3, 5, and 7 could take the Bush example as one usage case out of many, which might or might not add up to a sufficiently conventionalized grammatical phenomenon. For question 1, the question would not only be whether there is a metaphorical meaning in this use of kick, but it would also ask whether such a use can be found in a sufficient number of different cases, which could suggest that the use is conventional and therefore grammatical. For question 3, the same question about conventionality would be asked for the conceptual structures that also play a role in question 4; attention might be paid here to related linguistic manifestations of the postulated conceptual structures in other linguistic forms that can be associated with kick, including its use as a verb, and contextually near-synonyms such as hit or jolt. Question 5 would have to look at the knowledge that the individual speaker Bush has of the English language, in order to ascertain whether the metaphorical use established for kick is a sense that is part of his mental dictionary, so that it is an established metaphorical lexical unit in his personal mental grammar. And question 7 should turn to the related knowledge structures in Bush’s mental encyclopedia, to test whether he has an entrenched conceptual mapping available from the source domain to the target domain. Again, these are just tentative and partial suggestions, meant to illustrate some of the fundamental differences between the eight areas. They are not complete. And they are partly programmatic. The differences between the eight areas of investigation will be further detailed in the rest of this book. But the point is that each of the eight areas displays a distinct set of phenomena that can be researched in various ways. It is therefore important to achieve some sort of understanding of the relations between these diverging types of research.

. Relations between areas of research Methodologically, symbolic approaches predominate over behavioral ones in cognitive linguistics and in most other schools of mainstream linguistics. This is reflected in Gibbs’s (1994, 1999b) concern with a number of possible alternative interpretations of the cognitive-linguistic view of a role for conceptual metaphor in language. I will now

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argue that all of his alternative hypotheses concern the relation between metaphor in language and thought as symbolic structures, on the one hand, and metaphor in language and thought as verbal behavior, on the other. This is of course precisely what might be expected from a contribution by a psycholinguist to the cognitive-linguistic endeavor. If this analysis is accepted, it shows the virtues of adopting an encompassing and systematic approach to the various dimensions of metaphor research since it can explain Gibbs’s alternative hypotheses as relating to various perspectives on metaphor in language and thought. Gibbs’s first hypothesis runs as follows: (1) Metaphoric thought might function automatically and interactively in people’s on-line use and understanding of linguistic meaning. (Gibbs 1999b: 43) This is a hypothesis which narrows the cognitive-linguistic claim about metaphoric thought in language down to the research area designated by question 8. It assumes the potential validity of the symbolic analyses of metaphor in language and thought, and projects them onto issues of verbal behavior. The relation of this claim to other behavioral aspects of metaphor in language, addressed by questions 7, 6, and 5, remains implicit. Gibbs’s second alternative reads as follows: (2) Metaphoric thought might motivate individual speakers’ use and understanding of why various words and expressions mean what they do, but does not play any role in people’s ordinary on-line production or comprehension of everyday language. (Gibbs 1999b: 43) This hypothesis pertains to people’s off-line, long-term understanding of grammar, not to its short-term usage. This suggests that this hypothesis makes a positive claim about the research area characterized by question 7, and by implication a negative one about research area 8. Again, the hypothesis does this by assuming that the symbolic analyses of linguistic and conceptual metaphor as signs have some validity. Hypothesis 3 cuts the connection with behavior, and looks at conceptual metaphor in language as a sign system: (3) Metaphoric thought might motivate the linguistic meanings that have currency within linguistic communities, or may have some role in an idealised speaker/hearer’s understanding of language. But metaphoric thought does not play any part in individual speaker’s ability to make sense of, or process, language. (Gibbs 1999b: 42) I understand this hypothesis as making a positive claim about the research areas designated by questions 1 through 4, and a negative claim about all research areas addressing behavior. The same probably holds for its historical variant, hypothesis 4:


(4) Metaphoric thought might play some role in changing the meanings of words and expressions over time, but does not motivate contemporary speakers’ use and understanding of language. (Gibbs 1999b: 42) It turns out, then, that the interaction between the dimensions of the field which I have distinguished creates a grid which offers a natural home to the alternative interpretations of the cognitive-linguistic position on conceptual metaphor distinguished by Gibbs (1999b). They all pertain to the role of conceptual metaphor in grammar and usage, and make a distinction between grammar and usage as behavior (hypotheses 1 and 2) or as a sign system (hypotheses 3 and 4). Each alternative hypothesis highlights a different area of research, which stands for a different aspect of metaphor in grammar and usage. In order to argue for the validity of one or another of each of these alternative hypotheses, evidence would have to be collected within the boundaries of the relevant field of research, with the appropriate methods, in order to be able to make a connection between that area and the cognitive-linguistic research on metaphor in thought (conceptual metaphor). This assumes that researchers respect the various distinctions between the areas of research, since they involve different phenomena. This is not only advocated by Gibbs but also by other psycholinguists who have taken the proposals of cognitive linguistics seriously (Glucksberg & McGlone 1999; Bowdle & Gentner 2005). And this position has also been adopted in the more general discussion about the relation between linguistic and psychological analysis of language in cognitive linguistics (Croft 1998; Sandra 1998; Tuggy 1999). A map such as the one provided by Fig. 1.1 may be helpful in defining the conceptual framework within which such distinctions can be defined and evaluated. This may also throw light on the increasing interest in cognitive linguistics and, elsewhere, in the role of converging evidence, as we shall now see. In the next section I will also present my main methodological claims for this book.

. Converging evidence and the role of methods: Main claims of this book Converging evidence is particularly important for the debate over conceptual metaphor. This is especially relevant for the question whether evidence about one particular phenomenon in one area of research, metaphor in language, allows researchers to draw conclusions about other phenomena in other areas of research, metaphor in thought. That is, if cognitive linguists have found metaphor in language in various ways, can they then also claim that they have found metaphor in thought? And can they then continue by utilizing these conceptual metaphors in deductive fashion to go back to language and find other linguistic manifestations of the same conceptual metaphors without becoming vulnerable to the accusation of circularity? Here is the objection as phrased by Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg, and Horton (2000: 577):

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How do we know that people think of happy and sad in terms of up and down? Because people talk about happy and sad using words such as up and down. Why do people use expressions such as his spirits rose? Because people think of happy in terms of UP.

But cognitive linguists claim that there is a lot of converging evidence for the existence of a conventional conceptual basis for metaphor which can get expressed in language and in other codes, such as visuals, gesture, and signing. Cognitive linguists also hold that this provides an independent basis for subsequent searches for metaphor in language. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999a) argue that the ubiquitous and systematic patterns of metaphor in language can be seen as various types of evidence for the fact that there is an underlying pattern of conceptual structure which is metaphorical itself. They claim that there is converging evidence for conceptual metaphors in many areas of language, in the form of for instance polysemy generalizations, novel case generalizations, and inference generalizations. They have gone so far as to suggest that these conceptual metaphors are not cultural patterns of thought, as has been weighed as an option by for instance Gibbs (1999c) and Tomasello (1999). Instead, Lakoff and Johnson hold that conceptual metaphors are cognitively real in individual people’s minds (1980, 1999a); what is more, they even claim that they are neurally encoded in every individual’s brain (1999a). Such conceptual metaphors are held to explain the various types of data outside thought, including language. However, the existence of conceptual metaphors as part of the individual mind (let alone the individual brain) has been challenged by a number of researchers outside the cognitive-linguistic school (e.g., Glucksberg 2001; Goddard 2002; Jackendoff 2002; Murphy 1996; Vervaeke & Kennedy 1996, 2004). Even though they highly appreciate the cognitive-linguistic proposals, they contend that the various types of linguistic evidence for conceptual metaphor marshaled by Lakoff and Johnson and other cognitive linguists can be explained alternatively. Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996: 283), for instance, issue the following warning: . . ., the idea that metaphors govern thought needs to be firmly restricted. Rather, a metaphor is often chosen from a set of alternative metaphors with widely differing implications to express an idea that is literal.

These critics even sometimes suggest that the evidence itself, whether linguistic or non-linguistic, is not reliable. Thus Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996) emphasize that the conceptual metaphors proposed by Lakoff and Johnson and their followers are quite dependent on the linguistic examples selected for their support: if the examples are changed, the conceptual groupings are modified, also allowing for lower or higher levels of generality at which a conceptual metaphor may be postulated. This raises questions about both the testability as well as the validity of the theory. These are the most urgent reasons why a methodological assessment is in order of the ways in which metaphor can be found in language and, for that matter, in thought.


The debate over converging evidence for conceptual metaphor presupposes that the methodological picture about each of the separate types of evidence for metaphor in language and thought is clear. This, however, is a presupposition which is simply not endorsed by all linguists outside the cognitive-linguistic fold. It also presupposes that the connections are clear between the various areas that the converging evidence is derived from. This is a presupposition which is not generally supported either. My concern in this book will therefore be with the relations between evidence for all metaphor within and between these areas of research. My general thesis will be twofold. First of all, I will argue that caution needs to be observed when evidence from different domains of investigation is crossed. It is problematic to go from conceptual metaphor to linguistic metaphor within symbolic analysis, or to go from either of these phenomena to its correlate in behavior. It is not impossible, but this type of research needs to be aware of a number of issues. I will spell some out in Chapter 2, where I will look at the way in which cognitive linguists and others have employed deductive argumentation to go from conceptual metaphor to other areas of research. For now, I should like to formulate the following general assumption: Phenomenological pluralism is exciting but problematic “Converging evidence” presented about distinct phenomena, such as metaphor in grammar versus usage, or metaphor in language versus thought, or metaphor in symbols versus behavior, or their more specific configurations, is exciting but problematic, unless clear models of the relation between the distinct phenomena can show how the evidence for one type of phenomenon can be said to point to the same conclusion as the evidence for another type of phenomenon.

The second part of my thesis will be more positive. I will argue that obtaining converging evidence in the field of metaphor research can best be promoted by applying a form of methodological pluralism within each of the various areas of research. Thus, for the identification of metaphor as linguistic form in grammar, different methods and techniques may serve to produce various kinds of evidence that may, or may not, converge to the same conclusion. But the phenomenological condition for this type of success is that it has to be clear from the outset which area of research is being addressed, which is a condition that is not often met. Another condition is methodological, and imposes the same norms of data collection and analysis on the two types of evidence that are said to converge; this condition is not often met either. Methodological pluralism is exciting and attractive “Converging evidence” presented about the same phenomenon, whether metaphor in grammar versus usage, metaphor in language versus thought, metaphor in symbols versus behavior, or their more specific configurations, is exciting and attractive, provided the same norms of data collection and analysis are adhered to in evaluating the evidence obtained with one type of method as with the other type of method.

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The reason why these two methodological claims can be made about converging evidence may now be clear, too. In the first case, we are dealing with evidence about different phenomena, deriving from distinct areas of research, such as cognitive processes and symbolic structures, or grammar and usage. The relations between such distinct phenomena constitute different and more complex objects of research. They require separate evidence about each of the two phenomena that are hypothesized to be connected with each other. In the second case, by contrast, we are dealing with comparable or identical phenomena, located within one area of research, such as metaphor in one specific area of grammar or usage. Converging evidence here has a bearing on one sphere of reality, and distinct studies with different methods and techniques can be compared against the same framework of assumptions. This is the reason why a map of the field may be helpful in ordering the issues of methodology that have been placed on the agenda over the past decade. What is more, the map also helps to understand that converging evidence within each of these areas, or methodological pluralism, is an extremely worthy goal to pursue. The areas characterized by a semiotic approach to language and thought are typically researched by means of introspection and observation, with experimental manipulation trailing far behind. There is moreover a good deal of intuition and qualitative analysis which decides what counts as metaphorical in these areas. This is objected to by researchers who work in the areas characterized by a behavioral approach, who place a lot of emphasis on experimental manipulation and quantitative analysis. Such methods and techniques can also be applied in research on the symbolic structures of metaphor, but not many linguists have adopted them yet. Furthermore, if linguists aspire to be students of cognition, they also need to address cognition by analyzing behavioral data in ways which can be taken seriously by cognitive and social scientists. Then they need to collect the appropriate behavioral data with adequate methods and techniques, and do the required qualitative and quantitative analyses. Moreover, they have a critical and constructive role to play in this area, as some linguists have objected to the lack of representativeness of some of the experimental materials utilized by psycholinguists doing behavioral work on metaphor processing. This might be improved when the role of observational approaches regarding usage is upgraded in such behavioral research. Experimental effects are rewarding, but their validity across all language materials, language users, and situations of language use may not always be quite clear. There are hence plenty of opportunities for researchers in each of these areas to benefit from the methodological expertise of researchers in other areas when they wish to increase the quality of their knowledge in any of these areas. Manipulation does not always require sophisticated laboratory techniques, so that it is more open to linguists than they may think. And observation does not necessarily require advanced corpus-linguistic techniques to enable closer inspection of language data. Once this type of methodological imbalance between the two encompassing research areas of semiotic versus behavioral analysis has been redressed by a healthier methodological pluralism, it is possible to forge better and more comparable connections between the


more distinct areas included by them so that phenomenological pluralism becomes less problematic.

. Outlook The differentiation and integration of the three perspectives on metaphor in language have led to a new map of the field for metaphor identification. It provides the overall structure to the methodological analysis of metaphor identification in parts two and three. Part two will address metaphor identification in the four areas focusing on grammar, and part three will tackle metaphor identification in the four areas targeting usage. In each of these areas, I will examine how various methods may be utilized to collect converging evidence within that particular area of research. In that way, I hope to show that methodological pluralism as defined above is possible and exciting. Finding metaphor in grammar, part two, will first be approached from a semiotic perspective (Chapters 6 through 8), to be followed by one chapter on the behavioral perspective (Chapter 9). Chapters 6 through 8 will make a distinction between identifying linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar (Chapter 6) and identifying conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar (Chapters 7 and 8). Identifying metaphor in grammar as cognitive process and product will be addressed in Chapter 9, which will treat the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor in one go. Finding metaphor in usage will be discussed in part three, in the same order. Chapters 10 and 11 will deal with the semiotic approach to metaphor in usage, approaching metaphor and usage as symbolic structure. Chapter 12 will then continue with a discussion of behavioral approaches to metaphor in usage, dealing with metaphor in usage as cognitive process and product. In these three chapters, linguistic and conceptual aspects of metaphor in usage will be addressed at the same time, albeit in consecutive stages. An overview is provided by Fig. 1.2. Parts two and three will be preceded by a more general part one, which provides an overall impression of the various methodological issues that have to be tackled. Chapter 2 begins by highlighting what is in my opinion the most important difference between cognitive-linguistic approaches and other approaches, the role of conceptual metaphor. Researchers may be looking in deductive fashion across research areas, for instance for linguistic evidence supporting (or falsifying) the presence of a particular conceptual metaphor, such as time is space or the mind is a computer. This would be the prime example of phenomenological pluralism. But researchers may also follow other strategies, in which the identification of a conceptual metaphor may be an accidental by-product of the results. This global difference in research strategies can affect the comparability of the results of cognitive-linguistic and other approaches. With a clear view of this essential characteristic of the cognitive-linguistic approach, we can turn to the three fundamental stages in the methodology of any research project: conceptualization, operationalization, and application. Chapter 3 will deal with the conceptualization of metaphor in language from the general cognitive

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Figure 1.2 Areas of research for cognitive-linguistic approaches to metaphor in language

Approached as symbolic structure



Approached as Approached as language behavior, whether process or product


Metaphor in grammar When does a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Chapter 6

Metaphor in usage When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing in text and talk count as metaphorical? Chapter 10 and 11

When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? Chapter 7 and 8

When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form in text and talk count as metaphorical? Chapter 10 and 11 When does the production or reception in text or talk of any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical?

When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Chapter 9

Chapter 12

When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? Chapter 9

When does the production or reception in text or talk of a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical? Chapter 12

perspective which has held reign over metaphor studies for the past 25 years, and discuss a number of competing theoretical definitions and models for metaphor as well as a number of fundamental issues that they raise. Chapter 4 will then address the question of how such models can be operationalized for doing empirical research on metaphor in the eight research areas distinguished above; I will look at, for instance, the derivation and ordering of criteria for metaphor that may be inferred from such models. Chapter 5 will finally look at the application of these operational definitions


in data collection and analysis, and develop the distinction between introspection, observation and manipulation as well as between qualitative and quantitative analysis. These chapters lay the foundations for the methodological analysis of metaphor in the various areas of grammar versus usage in parts two and three. Each of the separate chapters in parts two and three will follow the same order as the global discussion in part one: they will begin with deductive approaches setting out from conceptual metaphor, then turn to the most important issues of conceptualization and operationalization, and then to their application in introspection, observation, and manipulation. The concluding chapter will take a step back and look at the map of metaphor in grammar and usage for the future.

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chapter 

The deductive approach

In the famous British movie Mary Poppins, Mary and the two children in her care are going on a visit to Bert and his Uncle Albert, who is having a vehement attack of mirth. He is hovering through the air high in the room, and every time he has a laughing fit he goes up a little higher. When the others cannot avoid laughing themselves, they start rising, too. They consequently decide to have tea “on the ceiling” and are having a happy time together. When the children wonder how to get down, Uncle Albert tells them that they have to think of something sad. He starts telling them a miserable story, and the children all disappear from the viewer’s sight, sinking towards the floor. But when the story turns out to be a joke, the punch line lifts them back into view again, happy with loud laughter. The scene ends because Mary Poppins reminds the children that they have to go home, which makes them really dejected and brings them back to the ground. No cognitive linguist can view this scene without being reminded of the conceptual metaphor happy is up. All of the visual images in the scene are instantiations of parts of this conceptual metaphor, and it is hard to avoid watching the scene without bringing this knowledge to bear. It is not impossible, though, for when young children watch the scene, they do not always catch the jokes. Perhaps the use of two verbal puns might cue English-speaking children to the scene’s underlying conceptual structure: at the beginning of the episode, Bert tells Mary that Uncle Albert has a dangerous affliction, for “last time it took us three days to get him down”; and in the middle of the scene, Uncle Albert tells Bert, who has just joined him in the air, to “pull up a chair” so that they can take a seat. The effect of the two puns involves the addition of linguistic material to the visual information, the language alerting the viewer to the multiple meanings of up and down, which may then facilitate the metaphorical interpretation of the visual images. What this example suggests is that cognitive linguists often work with a deductive approach to finding metaphor in language. A number of metaphors has been postulated as permanent conceptual or even cognitive structures and their identity guides the search for metaphor in the linguistic forms of in grammar and usage. For many cognitive linguists, it has become second nature to see concrete manifestations of conceptual metaphors everywhere. In the case of Mary Poppins it seems as if we have every right to be certain about such observations. But in other cases, it may be less obvious how a particular conceptual metaphor can lead the analyst to the reliable description of linguistic or cognitive metaphors in grammar and usage.

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In this chapter I will take a close look at this conspicuous cognitive-linguistic approach toward investigating conceptual metaphor, the deductive approach, in which specific conceptual metaphors are assumed, and predicted presuppositions or entailments of those assumptions for metaphor in other areas of research, in particular linguistic forms and cognitive processes and products, are empirically tested. My main claim will be that these theoretical claims in the form of deductive cross-overs between areas of research are what makes the cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor in language so exciting, but that their research and interpretation are not without problems. This will be the reason for sounding a note of caution about this phenomenological pluralism, urging researchers not to jump to conclusions when they have obtained findings that are compatible with the original claims: compatible evidence is not converging evidence. Not all cognitive-linguistic research is deductive, it should be noted, and most conceptual metaphors have been developed by means of a combination of induction and deduction, as is common in all theory formation. But the deductive approach is the one which has been most noticeable and has been subjected to most criticism. That is why this chapter will discuss the nature of deductive reasoning, the difference from inductive reasoning, and the various ways in which causal relations between conceptual metaphor and other aspects of metaphor (linguistic form, cognitive process and representation) can be researched in deductive fashion.

. Deductive reasoning .. From conceptual structure to cognitive process and product The deductive approach is eminently suited for testing. Deduction in general is a mode of reasoning which is preferably used in cognitive science when a theory has to be subjected to empirical research, for reasons which will be clarified now. It is to be contrasted with induction, which will be considered in the next section. Deduction works in three steps. First, a causal relation has to be postulated or assumed between two phenomena: a hypothesis has to be formulated that one phenomenon causes or more generally influences another. Here is an example from a psycholinguistic test of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, by Lera Boroditsky (2000). It examines whether particular cognitive structures pertaining to space are used in processing language about time. This study hence involves an investigation of the relation between conceptual metaphor, in usage but perhaps even in grammar (question 3 and 4), on the one hand, and metaphor understanding in usage (question 8) and what may be inferred from that about the cognitive representation of grammar (question 7). The postulation of metaphor in conceptual structure leads to a prediction about its equivalent in cognitive processing, which in term may yield evidence for its presence in long-term memory.

Chapter 2. The deductive approach

The study is carried out by activating the spatial concepts in two different ways, by means of a technique called priming. The two different primes correspond to different uses of space in two distinct spatial models for time described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), called the ego-moving model (e.g., We passed the deadline two days ago) and the time-moving model (e.g., The deadline passed two days ago). In the ego-moving metaphor, the ego or observer’s movement progresses along the time-line toward the future (e.g., We’re coming up on Christmas). In the time-moving metaphor, a person is standing and the time-line is conceived as a river or a conveyer-belt in which events are moving from the future to the past (e.g., Christmas is coming up). The causal relation that lies at the basis of the deductive argument and its envisaged experimental test is then formulated as follows: So, can people use spatial schemas to think about time? If they can, then it should be possible to differentially prime particular spatial schemas to affect how people think about time. The following experiment examines whether making people think about spatial relations in a particular way might affect how they then think about time. First, participants answered several priming questions about spatial relations of objects in pictures. These pictures used either the ego-moving or the object-moving spatial schemas. Then, participants interpreted an ambiguous temporal statement such as ‘Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days’. If the above statement is interpreted using the ego-moving schema, then forward is in the direction of motion of the observer, and the meeting should now fall on a Friday. In the time-moving interpretation, however, forward is in the direction of motion of time, and the meeting should now be on a Monday. If space and time do share some relational structure, then participants primed in the ego-moving spatial perspective should be able to reuse this perspective for time, and should thus think that the meeting will be on Friday. Participants primed in the object-moving perspective should prefer the time-moving interpretation and think that the meeting will be on Monday. However, if the domains of space and time do not share any relational structure, then spatial primes should have no effect on the way participants think about time. (Boroditsky 2000: 8; my emphases, GS)

The causal relation that lies at the basis of a deductive approach is typically couched in a conditional framework between two propositions, with an if . . . then formula. It is called the major premise. The deductive process secondly involves the need to observe the state of affairs expressed by the first proposition, the antecedent. The related proposition in the deductive argument is referred to as the minor premise. In experimental research, this is typically the situation which is under control of the researcher who sets up the experiment. In our example, the investigator has created a priming condition in which it may indeed be accepted that two distinct conceptual models of space are activated and could prime subsequent processing. The third step then involves the decision whether the state of affairs depicted by the second proposition in the major premise in fact holds. The depicted state of affairs

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is called the consequence, while the proposition in the deductive argument is called the conclusion. It is typically the predicted effect which is presumably caused by the situation under control of the researcher. In our example, this concerns the question whether the data bear out that people in fact do understand ambiguous expressions about time in different ways if they have been primed by different conceptual models for space. The findings were as follows. In a control group, there was an almost fifty-fifty split between participants who thought the meeting was on Friday versus on Monday. However, in the condition priming the ego-moving frame of reference, more than 70 percent of the participants believed that the meeting was on Friday, and in the condition priming the time-moving frame of reference, this proportion was reversed. These findings were taken as an indication that the conclusion as formulated in the deductive argument above did obtain: people did use the spatial domain in diverging ways to understand the target conventional expressions. As a result, the data could be interpreted as evidence in support of the general claim that was the starting point of the research. This analysis of the deductive approach may be formally reconstructed as follows: Major premise, representing a causal relation . . ., if diverging spatial models are activated, then different understandings of expressions about time can be observed Minor premise, representing the antecedent diverging spatial models are primed for the comprehension of expressions about time THEREFORE Conclusion, representing the logically inevitable consequence different understandings of expressions about time are observed Since the conclusion has been verified by the data, the researchers draw the inference that the argument has been supported by the evidence. As a result, the argument may be maintained and further developed and investigated. This reconstruction points to the individual assumptions that play a crucial role in such research: –

– –

you have to (at least provisionally) accept the validity of the causal relationship expressed by the major premise (typically by formulating an explicit and testable hypothesis) you have to be able to observe the antecedent designated by the minor premise (typically by experimental manipulation), you have to be able to observe the consequence designated by the conclusion (typically by collecting pertinent data and comparing them to the prediction).

The great advantage of the deductive approach is that it guarantees the logical validity of the conclusion once the major and the minor premise have been accepted. It is therefore an extremely useful way of formulating and testing predictions in the form


of cause and effect relationships which may be observed in reality. The prediction that a consequence will follow upon an antecedent is a maximally vulnerable procedure for doing research, increasing the degree of testability of the theory from which the major premise is derived. It has therefore been widely used for experimental research on metaphor in psycholinguistics. This type of research may be specifically aimed at testing the validity of part of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. In Boroditsky’s case, a causal relation was postulated between the assumed conceptual structure of metaphor and its predicted effect on the cognitive representation produced during metaphor comprehension. If the data turn out to be positive for the prediction, such a study in fact yields evidence for one aspect of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, evidence which may converge in various ways with other types of evidence in two ways. First, other methods may obtain the same findings about cognitive processing (methodological pluralism), but second, other evidence is also still required for supporting the assumptions about the metaphorical conceptual structures, too (phenomenological pluralism). Of course, if the data do not agree with the prediction, then new attempts have to be made to support the prediction with other evidence, until it is clear that the prediction is mistaken; finding metaphor in cognitive behavior and its products often depends on repeated deductive tests of Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

.. From conceptual structure to linguistic form The deductive method has also been widely applied within cognitive-linguistic research on language, yielding many discoveries about the nature of metaphor in language and its use. In that type of research, causal relations are formulated between the conceptual structure of metaphor in usage and grammar (questions 3 and 4) on the one hand and the linguistic expression of metaphor on the other (questions 1 and 2). This relation is a reflection of the fundamental cognitive-linguistic idea that metaphor in language is derived from metaphor in thought. To illustrate how this works, let us return to argument is war. Here is what Lakoff and Johnson write at the beginning of their classic treatise Metaphors we live by (1980: 4): It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument – attack, defense, counterattack, etc. – reflects this.

The logic behind this analysis may be reconstructed in the form of a series of deductive arguments, as follows:

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(1) If argument is war, then successful argumentation is victory / arguments can be won Argument is war THEREFORE Successful argumentation is victory /arguments can be won (2) If argument is war, then unsuccessful argumentation is defeat / arguments can be lost Argument is war THEREFORE Unsuccessful argumentation is defeat /arguments can be lost And so on. In line with the above discussion of deductive approaches to research, we can now see that each of these reconstructions in fact presents a distinct prediction about the metaphorical nature of argument and its expression in language, which can be tested against reality. These predictions are related to the more encompassing and complex conceptual model indicated by the mnemonic argument is war. These predictions are moreover held to be mutually consistent with that complex conceptual model on the basis of the latter’s organization as a unified gestalt (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 77–83). Predictions like these are not vacuous statements: their support by empirical evidence is no foregone conclusion. This is mainly because different languages and cultures have different realizations of what may essentially be the same underlying conceptual model (Kövecses 2003, 2004b, 2005). For instance, the Dutch translator of the examples provided by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999b) was unable to use a literal equivalent of the verbs shoot and shoot down in the following examples (Lakoff & Johnson 1999b: 12): (3) You disagree? Okay, shoot! Dat bestrijd ik. ‘I combat that’ (4) He shot down all of my arguments. Die opmerking sloeg in als een bom. ‘That remark impacted like a bomb’ As a result, we might wish to conclude that, in contrast to English, it is impossible in Dutch to verify the following prediction: (5) If argument is war, then disagreeing is shooting Argument is war THEREFORE Disagreeing is shooting Different languages have different realizations of the same conceptual metaphor, as was noted in chapter one. Within one language, not all derivations from the conceptual metaphor that are in principle possible can be substantiated (e.g., Barcelona & Soriano


2004; Boers, Demecheleer, & Eykmans 2004; Deignan 2003; Deignan & Potter 2004; ˝ Kövecses 2003, 2004b; Ozçali¸ skan 2003, 2004; Yu 1998). It is an important empirical finding that metaphorical mappings in conceptual structure only go as far as they happen to go in specific languages. The causal connection between conceptual structure and linguistic expression may turn out to be relatively systematic but is never complete. This is why conceptual metaphor is not claimed to completely predict (or explain) the presence and nature of linguistic metaphor; instead, it is said to motivate it. This accords with the more generally prevailing view of functionalism in cognitive linguistics (cf. Croft 1995): . . ., a language does have a conventionally determined structure that children have to learn specifically and linguists have to describe explicitly. However great its functional motivation, the structure of a language cannot be predicted in full and precise detail on the basis of the motivating factors. Moreover, it has some kind of cognitive representation: major aspects of linguistic structure reside in individual minds. (Langacker 1999: 19)

Postulating conceptual metaphors provides a theoretical model which can guide research, but proposals for particular models need not be immediately rejected when expectations are not fulfilled in distinct languages. Having said that, it is of course also incumbent upon cognitive linguists to state more precisely when lack of converging evidence from distinct languages becomes a genuine problem for maintaining their hypothesis about the existence of a particular conceptual metaphor. As we have seen, conceptual metaphor theory does not generate isolated predictions but entire sets, which are coherent on the basis of some underlying gestalt informing the postulated mapping. The rejection of one prediction in one language does not invalidate the entire mapping, certainly not if it can be supported with evidence from other languages, for instance. However, when an increasing number of predictions is falsified by this type of methodological pluralism, then the relation between the linguistic data and the conceptual structures backfires and the mapping itself may get in danger. Phenomenological pluralism then in fact helps narrow down our views of one area (conceptual structure) from the perspective of another area (linguistic form). It should be evident that the deductive approach can help the linguist search for expressions which may capture successful argumentation as victory, unsuccessful argumentation as defeat, and disagreeing as shooting. The deductive approach facilitates setting up a framework for the systematic examination of synonyms and antonyms, hyponyms and hyperonyms of source concepts and source terms (e.g. Deignan 1999a, b, c; Kövecses 1986). In that way, each item may be empirically tested for its potential use in talking about a particular target domain. This is how the deductive method has been used most productively in cognitive linguistics; and it has led to finding many related metaphorical expressions capturing diverging entailments of a metaphorical mapping in conceptual structure.

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We have seen two important variants of the deductive approach in cognitive linguistics. The first is based on causal relations between conceptual structure as symbolic structure to conceptual structure in psychological processing. It examines how the postulation of conceptual metaphors may lead to evidence in psychological processing that is compatible with the theory. The second is based on causal relations between conceptual structure and linguistic form within the areas of symbolic structure. It examines how the postulation of conceptual metaphors may lead to evidence in language structures that is compatible with the theory. Deductively collected evidence in language or in psychological processing may be compatible when it comes to supporting the conceptual claims of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Phenomenological pluralism is not impossible, and can be extremely exciting. But the note of caution that is developed in this chapter has to do with the precise value of this claim. For compatibility with a theory is not necessarily the same as saying that the evidence actually supports Conceptual Metaphor Theory. That would require independent evidence for what has been provisionally left aside in the deductive approach, the actual validity of the conceptual metaphors themselves. Only when independent evidence about the relevant conceptual structures has been obtained, can the psychological or linguistic evidence be said to converge with such conceptual evidence. As long as that evidence remains extant, the conclusion can only be the more modest one of compatibility between evidence from diverse research areas. This is the potentially misleading quality of the deductive approach. It requires the temporary assumption that, for instance, argument is war. However, when this deductive approach yields interesting linguistic data which appear to be intelligible in this way, then the premise itself does not automatically turn true. Alternative antecedents may also lead to acceptable insights about the same linguistic data. Compatibility with one theory does not mean that another theory has automatically been rejected. In conceptual metaphor research, alternative accounts have been presented both within (e.g., Clausner & Croft,1999; Grady 1997a) and outside cognitive linguistics (e.g. Jackendoff & Aaron 1991; Jackendoff 2002). The potentially misleading quality of the deductive approach is an important problem in cognitive-linguistic research on metaphor, as is the lack of attention to alternative explanations.

. Deductive and inductive approaches The main contrast between deductive and inductive methods of finding metaphor in language and thought is the fact that inductive methods do not assume the validity or effect of conceptual metaphors. Instead, the inductive approach proceeds on a case by case basis, or even in terms of groups of cases, and decides for each case or group what can be inferred about their conceptual structure. If patterns are observed across cases, then tentative generalizations may be postulated, but as a rule these do not go as far as including entire systems of conceptual mappings between source domains and target domains or their conceptual variants in other models of metaphor. As soon as that


happens, as may be argued for semantic field theory (e.g. Kittay & Lehrer 1981; Kittay 1987; Lehrer 1990; Lehrer & Kittay 1992), the generalizations become causal relations of the kind which may be used in a deductive approach to testing. The value of an inductive approach has been defended for lexical analysis by for instance Cliff Goddard (2002: 148–149): The usual strategy adopted in cognitive linguistics, which begins by categorizing metaphors in terms of the broad generalizations about ‘source domains’, is not likely to be particularly productive. Source domains such as person, language, force, and place do not bear any consistent relationship with components of literal meaning. Within each domain there are a multiplicity of different subtypes, each of which calls for individual attention. The more productive strategy is to begin with individual examples in context, attempting on the one hand to articulate the figurative schemas involved and on the other to correlate the overall effects with components of the literal meaning of the thing being described.

Goddard’s basic argument is that, even though conceptual metaphors may exist, they do not have a great effect on the analysis of individual lexical items and their patterns of use (cf. Wierzbicka 1986). This is a view that is not necessarily inherent to all lexical analysis. For instance, lexicographer and corpus linguist Alice Deignan (1995, 1999a, b, c, 2005a, b) has used Conceptual Metaphor Theory in deductive fashion for bringing out the specific relations of individual lexical items in a number of domains. She regards the fact that some items behave according to the predictions while others do not as informative. It is therefore also a matter of the goals of the lexical analyst whether a deductive or inductive approach is to be preferred: if you wish to start out from the rich and specific nature of the data, as Goddard does, then a deductive approach may be too selective and too coarse for your purpose; but if you wish to examine whether a particular theory can shed some light on a number of domains of linguistic reality, as Deignan does, then a deductive approach may be a productive (albeit partial) way to proceed. The inductive approach to metaphor analysis used to be the preferred approach to metaphor in language and discourse before the advent of cognitive linguistics. It may be seen as the most important methodological consequence of the traditional assumption of the deviant and abnormal status of metaphor. When the assumption is made that there is no conceptual system behind metaphorical meanings in language or discourse, then this naturally leads to case-by-case solutions of the interpretation of metaphor in language. This is an inductive approach which leads to the identification of locally valid mappings or projections between domains, spaces, or categories, on the basis of what is traditionally called topic and vehicle analysis – e.g. Black (1962, 1979/1993), Cohen (1979/1993), Glicksohn (1994), Glicksohn and Goodblatt (1993), Grice (1975), Leech (1969), Levin (1977, 1979, 1993), Miller (1979/1993), Reinhart (1976), Richards (1936), Searle (1979/1993), Tsur (1987). When cognitive linguists postulated a whole range of conceptual metaphors with systematic connections between numerous concepts in various domains, the adoption

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of a deductive approach to finding metaphor in language and discourse was greatly encouraged. This is because of the causal relationships we have looked at above: the conceptual structures motivate and constrain the various options for metaphorical language usage, and these motivations and constraints can be tested in a deductive fashion. We have seen in the previous section with reference to argument is war that some of these predictions are borne out by the data in one language (if argument is war, then disagreeing is shooting, which works for American English), but that this does not mean that they also have to be manifested by another language (such as Dutch). It is hard to overestimate the significance of this development for research on metaphor in language and thought, for it has offered a novel starting point in knowledge and thought for the focused and systematic analysis of metaphorical aspects of language and its use. In particular, if metaphor is not deviant or abnormal but part of generally shared conceptual structures, then it is possible to search for possible metaphorical meanings in language and discourse by putting a searchlight on the relevant areas of language and discourse. This is precisely what has happened. Since the cognitive-linguistic theory of metaphor has emerged, many linguists as well as discourse analysts have adopted a deductive approach. There are many classic and well-known examples that deal with language approached as lexico-grammar, such as Deignan (1995), Kövecses (1986, 1988, 2000), Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999a), Reddy (1979/1993), Sweetser (1990), Traugott (1985), and Yu (1998). And there is a rising number of illustrations from language approached as usage, including Charteris-Black (2004), Chilton (1996), Eubanks (2000), Don Freeman (1993, 1995, 1999), Margaret Freeman (1995, 2000, 2002), Gwyn (1999), Hamilton (2002), Koller (2004), Low (1999a, b), Musolff (2004), Ponterotto (2000), Popova (2002, 2003), Semino (2002), Semino and Swindlehurst (1996), Shen and Balaban (1999), Ungerer (2000), and Werth (1994). The deductive approach has produced many confirmations as well as refinements of the cognitive-linguistic theoretical proposals. With the increased application of the deductive approach, new questions have arisen. It was pointed out in chapter one that the fact that we have discovered many general patterns in grammar and usage does not mean that every individual who displays some form of usage of these patterns has gone through the same mapping operations in processing. The conceptual structure of conventional metaphorical expressions, as psychologically experienced by the individual language user during discourse activities, may be divorced from the overall patterns of meaning postulated for systematic conceptual metaphor (e.g. Gentner & Bowdle 2001; Giora 2003; Keysar et al. 2000). This distinction goes back to the difference between metaphor as symbolic structure versus cognitive processes and their products discussed in chapter one. A related question has been posed by Ritchie (2003), who takes up the general matter of connecting linguistic materials to conceptual structures: “Most of the metaphorical expressions Lakoff and Johnson (1980) cited as evidence for an underlying metaphor, argument is war, are also consistent with argument is chess or argument is boxing” (2003: 132). Linguistic materials can often be connected to


more than one underlying conceptual domain (cf. Semino et al. 2004). Moreover, it is not always clear how one domain can be seen as experientially more basic than another (cf. Vervaeke & Kennedy 1996, 2004). This distinction goes back to the difference between metaphor in linguistic form and metaphor in conceptual structure discussed in chapter one. The question of the relation between conceptual metaphor and linguistic expression becomes even more urgent if we have to decide about the specific meanings of specific expressions by specific individuals in specific contexts, as in the analysis of usage instead of in grammar (cf. Eubanks 1999, 2000). How do we decide in concrete cases whether the meanings of words like strategy and position, in the context of a discourse about argumentation, are to be captured with reference to war or to chess (cf. Ritchie 2003: 135)? Is it a matter of the researcher deciding unilaterally, or can the researcher ask the speakers what the speakers meant (Low 1999a)? And as a related matter, how do we know that a word like prolific in such experimental materials as She is a prolific researcher is indeed a reflection of ideas are people and not of ideas are animals or ideas are fish? These aspects go back to the distinction between finding metaphor in grammar versus usage discussed in chapter one. All of these are exciting questions, which go the heart of cognitive-linguistic research of metaphor. The distinction between the various dimensions of research and distinct areas that are demarcated by them may help address the problems that some researchers within and outside cognitive linguistics have with the validity of the research that has been generated by these questions. Before we continue with that analysis, however, I should like to offer one more example of the benefit of applying the deductive approach between conceptual structures and linguistic forms. This example illustrates how previously held cognitive-linguistic positions about this relation were shown to be inadequate, and how the new viewpoint in principle still raises the same methodological issues as the ones discussed just now.

. The deductive approach and scientific progress .. From conceptual metaphor to embodied, cultural experience The consistent application of the deductive approach in cognitive linguistics has been the cause of at least one major theoretical and empirical upheaval during the last decade. When Joe Grady studied a number of conceptual metaphors postulated by Lakoff and Johnson, he observed a number of difficulties (Grady 1997a, b, 1998; Grady & Johnson 2002; Grady, Taub, & Morgan 1996; cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1999a). Consider (6): (6) a. You have failed to buttress your arguments with sufficient facts. b. Recent discoveries have shaken the theory to its foundations. c. Their theory collapsed/caved in under the weight of scrutiny.

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d. ?This theory has no windows. e. ?The tenants of her theory are behind in their rent. The first three examples of the conceptual metaphor theories are buildings are readily interpretable and in fact quite conventional linguistic expressions of the underlying mapping. However, the last two examples are different. They illustrate the possibility that not all possible entailments of a mapping can be that easily used in practice. In other words, they show that it is difficult to find empirical support for the following deductive analysis of two possible entailments of the conceptual metaphor theories are buildings: (7) If theories are buildings, then theories have windows Theories are buildings THEREFORE Theories have windows (8) If theories are buildings, then theories can have tenants who pay rent Theories are buildings THEREFORE Theories can have tenants who pay rent Grady concludes that some of the salient elements in the experiential domain of buildings cannot have a corresponding role in the domain of theories, a fact which had also been observed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 52) themselves. Conceptual metaphors, Grady suggests, are characterized by poor mappings. Kövecses (2002: 81) has discussed this feature of metaphor as a case of metaphorical utilization, and connects it with the well-known property of metaphor that it highlights particular aspects of both domains at the expense of others (e.g. Black 1962, 1979/1993; Reddy 1979/1993). Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996) have discussed this phenomenon as a serious threat to many of the conceptual metaphors proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Metaphor is based on cross-domain mapping, but it is selective mapping. Apart from the poverty of mappings between domains, the examples also point to another problem with Conceptual Metaphor Theory in its classic form. It is hard to define what the experiential basis of these expressions might be, whereas it is a fundamental tenet of Conceptual Metaphor Theory that most conceptual metaphors are motivated by and grounded in experience. This is yet another variant of applying the deductive method in cognitive linguistics. It postulates the following bold causal connection: if a particular mapping is so systematic and conventional that it may be seen as a conceptual metaphor, it should also have a basis in experience. Since this causal connection was held to apply to theories are buildings, support had to be found for an experiential basis. Lack of such evidence then led to a re-consideration of the prediction about the metaphor itself and the theoretical framework from which it had been derived.


A third problem was formed by the fact that the terms which reflect one mapping may also be used in roughly the same way in other metaphors. Grady’s (1997b: 42) examples are the following: (9) a. b. c. d.

the architect of Nazi Germany Trust is the foundation of marriage. The federal Reserve is the cornerstone of the nation’s banking system. Recent land development has caused the near collapse of the Bay’s ecosystem.

All of the metaphorically used terms work in a similar way to their use in theories are buildings, but outside the domain of theories. This suggests that an important generalization can be made across these distinct concrete mappings, in the form of one or more general causal relations between domains, which has been missed by the original formulation of the theory. Grady’s alternative treatment of these problems started out from exactly that, new generalizations across the linguistic and conceptual materials. He suggested that theories are buildings is a complex conceptual metaphor which consists of the combination of two primary conceptual metaphors: logical structure is physical structure, and persisting is remaining erect. Alternative formulations of the two primary metaphors are organization is physical structure and viability is erectness. Each of these primary metaphors have new possible entailments that can be tested in deductively formulated research. For instance, “the notions of erectness, strength, and collapse are derivable from viable organization is erect physical structure” (1997b: 51). Grady then shows that these are two independent mappings, which can occur on their own. When they are combined, they produce theories are buildings. The experiential account of primary metaphors embodies the third way in which the deductive method may be applied. We have seen that it can be based on a postulated causal relation between conceptual structure and psychological process, and between conceptual structure and linguistic form. Now the deductive method may also be discerned to move from conceptual structures to lived, cultural experience. Causal relations are postulated between such experiences and primary metaphors in that the latter are argued to arise as a result from “recurring experiential scenarios, or ‘primary scenes”’ (Grady & Johnson 2002: 536). These experiential scenarios have a conceptual reflection in people’s individual knowledge repertoires, but they are also cultural entities with a particular temporal locality and causal simplicity (2002: 544–545). They require their own theoretical framework and methodology, as is also pointed out by Grady and Johnson (2002: 547–548). The deductive approach may therefore also be found to work between conceptual structure and cultural experience (cf. Tomasello 1999).

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.. Primary metaphors Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) and many others have since accepted Grady’s analysis as an improvement of the original theory. In order to see the range of the proposal, Table 2.1 presents Lakoff and Johnson’s list of illustrations of primary metaphor (1999a: 50–54). Some of these metaphors are well-known from the classic publications, while others are novel constructions from the re-analysis of conceptual metaphors. The theory of primary metaphors explains that different conceptual metaphors such as theories are buildings and organizations are buildings can have partly the same underlying conceptual structure: many conceptual metaphors are complex metaphors, consisting of combinations of different primary metaphors. Moreover, the theory of primary metaphors also accounts for the experiential basis of conceptual metaphor: all primary metaphors involve correlations between sensorimotor experience on the one hand and subjective judgment on the other. Thus, in organization is physical structure, the sensorimotor domain is characterized as “experience of physical objects” while the subjective judgment is described as “abstract unifying relationships” (Lakoff & Johnson 1999a: 51). All primary metaphors listed by Lakoff and Johnson are amenable to such a dual analysis that relates metaphorical conceptualization to lived, cultural experience. Finally, the theory of primary metaphor also accounts for the fact that some entailments of conceptual metaphors are unwarranted: they are the entailments that cannot be related to the underlying primary metaphors. Thus, the invocation of tenants and rent cannot be supported by a relation with either organization is physical structure or viability is erectness so that it becomes understandable why (11e) is so hard to interpret. The postulation of primary metaphor as the fundamental form of conceptual metaphor has important implications for metaphor identification. For instance, how can a distinction be made between finding a primary metaphor and finding a complex metaphor? Primary metaphors have been characterized by their extreme degree of partial mapping and the existence of gaps, but these criteria also apply, albeit to a lesser degree, to complex metaphors. It is one of the characteristics of metaphor that the underlying mapping will always break down at one particular point or other. This means that existence of gaps and partial mappings does not by itself provide enough evidence that one particular expression is a reflection of a primary metaphor or not. This question is just one of the issues which will have to be addressed more fully in future research. For now, however, we can conclude on a more positive note. The deductive method has clearly paid off in that it has eventually corrected a bold theoretical position which claimed that metaphor in conceptual structure was a matter of complex conceptual metaphor. Classic Conceptual Metaphor Theory was developed with great success for some fifteen years. Then Grady (1997a, b) criticized some of its assumptions and consequences and formulated an alternative account of the same data. As a result, Lakoff and Johnson now prefer to speak of “the integrated theory of primary metaphor” (1999a: 46), and this is the outcome of just one research strategy, the con-


Table 2.1 Linguistic expressions and primary conceptual metaphors 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

They greeted me warmly Affection is warmth Tomorrow is a big day Important is big I’m feeling up today Happy is up We’ve been close for years, but we’re beginning to drift apart Intimacy is closeness This movie stinks Bad is stinky She’s weighed down by responsibilities Difficulties are burdens Prices are high More is up Are tomatoes in the fruit or vegetable category? Categories are containers These colors aren’t quite the same, but they’re close Similarity is closeness John’s intelligence goes way beyond Bill’s Linear scales are paths How do the pieces of this theory fit together? Organization is physical structure Support your local charities Help is suport Time flies Time is motion I’m close to being in a depression . . . States are locations My car has gone from bad to worse lately Change is motion I’m moving right along on the project Actions are self-propelled motions He’ll ultimately be successful, but he isn’t there yet Purposes are destinations I saw an opportunity for success and I grabbed it Purposes are desired objects They pushed the bill through Congress Causes are physical forces We’ve been in a close relationship for years, but its beginning to seem confining Relationships are enclosures Don’t worry! I’m on top of the situation Control is up I see what you mean Knowing is seeing I’ve never been able to grasp transfinite numbers Understanding is grasping She picked my face out of the crowd Seeing is touching

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sistent and radical application of the deductive approach to metaphor in cognitive linguistics. This success should also signal that all views on the role of metaphor in grammar and usage should be seen as proposals which need to be tested in various ways, both within and between the various areas of research that I have distinguished.

. Alternative deductive approaches The application of the deductive approach in Conceptual Metaphor Theory has met with fundamental criticism from various quarters. One problem with the deductive approach is that it, at least provisionally, has to assume the validity of conceptual metaphors in order to be able to find instantiations in language and its use. As I have suggested, this is an assumption that has been questioned, and we need to examine how serious this criticism in fact is. As a case in point, consider the parallel patterns between spatial and non-spatial semantic fields as one type of evidence for the existence of an underlying conceptual metaphorical system that maps other domains in terms of space (from Jackendoff 2002: 356–357): (10) Spatial location and motion: a. The messenger is in Istanbul b. The messenger went from Paris to Istanbul c. The gang kept the messenger in Istanbul (11) Possession: d. The money is Fred’s e. The inheritance finally went to Fred f. Fred kept the money (12) Ascription of properties g. The light is red h. The light went/changed from green to red i. The cop kept the light red

[Location] [Change of location] [Caused stasis] [Possession] [Change of possession] [Caused stasis] [Simple property] [Change of property] [Caused stasis]

(13) Scheduling activities j. The meeting is on Monday [Simple schedule] k. The meeting was changed from Tuesday to Monday [Change of schedule] l. The chairman kept the meeting on Monday [Caused stasis] The verbs be, go, and keep, as well as the prepositions in and to display similar semantic relationships, whether they are applied to spatial location and motion, possession, ascription of properties, or scheduling activities. In particular, they represent consistently distinct options from the same verbal and prepositional paradigms. A cognitive-linguistic explanation of these patterns could be to postulate such under-


lying conceptual metaphors as possession is location, and to take the structure of the domain of location as a source for understanding the domain of possession. Jackendoff uses these examples, however, to argue that this analysis does not necessarily hold and presents a possible alternative. He observes the same patterns in language as many cognitive linguists but offers a different explanation in terms of the possible conceptual system that could motivate them. In the words of Jackendoff (1996: 116): “. . . cognitive linguistics tends to view cross-field parallelisms as derivational, while I view them as parallel instantiations of a more abstract schema . . .” Jackendoff does not accept the initial assumptions about conceptual metaphor (cf. 1996: 97), but he does offer his own deductive approach, which starts out from superordinate conceptual abstractions. As a result, the assumption that conceptual metaphors are a valid starting point for a deductive approach to finding metaphors in language and thought becomes a genuine empirical issue. To address this matter, cognitive linguists resort to the strategy described in chapter one: they present converging evidence for the existence of conceptual metaphor. One argument against Jackendoff ’s abstract conceptual structures which govern all concrete manifestations as equal derivations would be to say that this goes against the experiential basis of language, which seems to privilege concrete, embodied experience as a starting point for the grounding of signs and symbols. This would be compatible with a view from cultural anthropology, cultural linguistics, and rhetoric (e.g., Eubanks 2000; Palmer 1996; Shore 1996). It also points to the issue that spatial terms seem to occur much more frequently in other domains than vice versa, which goes against the equal weight of domains as parallel realizations of one abstract structure (e.g. Stern 2000). But this cognitive-linguistic type of defense has been seen as a form of reductionism by Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996, 2004; cf. Vervaeke & Green 1997), who favor abstract conceptualism in much the same way as Jackendoff (2002). Another argument might be based on language acquisition and point to the order in which concepts and terms are acquired. This is how Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) utilize the conflation theory proposed by Chris Johnson (1999), who studied the language acquisition process of a child called Shem: Johnson discovered that, prior to using metaphor, Shem went through a stage in which the knowing and seeing domains were conflated. Since we normally get most of our knowledge from seeing, a conflation of these domains would have been expected. In such conflation, the domains of knowing and seeing are coactive and the grammar of know is used with the verb see in a context in which seeing and knowing occur together – for instance, “Let’s see what’s in the box.” Here, seeing what’s in the box correlates with knowing what’s in the box. Metaphorical cases such as “I see what you mean,” which do not involve literal seeing, are absent at this stage. Such metaphorical cases develop later according to Johnson’s hypothesis. The conflations provide the basis for the learning of primary conceptual metaphors. Subsequent to the conflation experience, the child is able to differentiate the two conceptual domains. Only then does conceptual metaphor emerge. (Lakoff & Johnson 1999a: 48)

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This argument would then have to be evaluated in its own terms before it can be accepted as support for the view that these specific conceptual metaphors motivate this particular part of the lexicon. A critic who favors Jackendoff ’s abstract conceptual structure explanation might argue, for instance, that the conflation stage can also be interpreted as exhibiting a conflation between two patterns of use whose subsequent differentiation may just as well be guided by the abstraction of a superordinate, abstract category governing both domains. Subsequent analysis and theoretical argumentation as well as empirical research will have to decide which of the two positions is more tenable (cf. Taylor 2002). Whatever the empirical outcome of such debates, what should be beyond doubt is the theoretical interest of any postulated system of conceptual metaphors. Such conceptual metaphors can motivate or explain or predict part of the semantic mappings found in many language data (cf. Charteris-Black 2004: 244). It is therefore not their theoretical productivity that may be in question, but their empirical validity. And this leads on to the question of how these assumptions about conceptual metaphors and the predictions that may be derived for language can be corroborated or falsified, or, more generally, how they can be tested. This is the methodological issue which again lies at heart of this book.

. The diachronic dimension The deductive approach to finding lexical polysemy in contemporary grammar is intimately related to its application in language as a diachronic system, or language change. The connection between these two types of research was made explicit by for instance Sweetser (1990), who begins with the following general assumption about conceptual structure and its effect on linguistic forms, and in particular polysemy: In general (see Traugott 1982) it seems clear that more abstract domains of meaning tend to derive their vocabulary from more concrete domains (rather than vice versa) and, furthermore, that in some cases there is a deep cognitive predisposition to draw from certain particular concrete domains in deriving vocabulary for a given abstract domain. (1990: 17)

Metaphor is postulated as a central mechanism for explaining connections between semantic fields which are involved in polysemy patterns as well as in semantic change (cf. Geeraerts 1997; Heine, Claudi, & Hünnemeyer 1991; Hopper & Traugott 1993; Lehrer 1990; Traugott & Dasher 2002; Traugott & Heine 1991). There is nothing new in this position, as may be illustrated by the following quotation from Leech (1969): In the dictum ‘Language is fossil poetry’, Emerson draws our attention to the fact that the expressive power of everyday language largely resides in countless ‘dead’ metaphors, which have become institutionalized in the multiple meanings of the dictionary. (Leech 1969: 147)


However, it has been the merit of the cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor to stimulate systematic and large-scale investigation of this connection, which, moreover builds connections with general cognitive-scientific principles of explanation. The possibility of applying a deductive approach to language as a diachronic system is made clear in the next quotation from Sweetser: Using the idea of systematic metaphorical structuring of one domain (e.g. the epistemic domain) in terms of another (e.g. the sociophysical domain), cognitive semantics may well be equipped to make headway in the murky area of meaningchange, as well as in the area of synchronic semantic structure. (Sweetser 1990: 21)

There have been many studies in this area which have followed Sweetser’s lead since, ˇ such as Geeraerts (1997), Goossens (1999, 2000), Haser (2000), Ibarretxe-Antunano (1999), and Pelyvás (2000). Moreover, these studies have also shown that it is not just metaphorical mappings which explain language change and polysemy, but that metonymy and synecdoche (the latter inducing semantic specialization and generalization) are just as important (e.g. Geeraerts 1997; Panther & Radden 1999). That is why I will also pay limited attention to the ways in which the deductive approach has led to diachronic research on metaphor and language change.

. Conclusion The deductive method has led to some promising results in cognitive linguistics which are also appreciated elsewhere. It has been applied to investigate causal relations between conceptual structure and linguistic form in the area of symbolic systems and structures, as in much of the mainstream cognitive-linguistic work on patterns of metaphor in grammar and usage (e.g. Kövecses 1986, 1988, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Sweetser 1990). Some of this work has focused on specific situations of usage, including, in particular, literature (e.g. Don Freeman 1993, 1995, 1999; Margaret Freeman 1995, 2000, 2002; cf. Steen & Gibbs 2004). And some of this work has been guilty of conflating symbolic analyses of conceptual structures with behavioral analyses of cognitive processes and products. The deductive approach has also been applied in psycholinguistic work which does explicitly distinguish between conceptual structures in the area of symbolic structures, on the one hand, and their cognitive representations in the individual mind, on the other, in order to test whether the predictions of the symbolic analysis are borne out by patterns of manipulated behavior (e.g. Gibbs 1994). On the whole, the application of the deductive method in testing the cognitivelinguistic predictions has led to a considerable increase of data about metaphor in grammar and usage approached in various ways. The distinction between grammar and usage itself has not been thematized much in these discussions, but its relevance will appear in the rest of this book. Progress is even more conspicuous when we consider the major revision which has resulted from the deductive approach. We have seen that Grady’s (1997a, b) theory of

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primary metaphor is a direct consequence of the deductive development and formulation of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This led to the discovery of gaps in predicted metaphorical mappings and a more general revaluation of the fundamental role of the partial nature of metaphorical mappings. The outcome of this process was the postulation of primary metaphors as the true conceptual basis for metaphor in language and thought (Grady & Johnson 2002). It also led to a refined view of the causal relation between conceptual structure and cultural experience, the new theoretical notion of ‘primary scenes’ being added to the stock of cognitive-linguistic concepts for further investigation. One problematic side of the deductive approach is that it may be misleading. It depends on the assumption of both a major premise as well as a minor premise in order to set up an argument which provides an interpretation of the data emerging in the conclusion. However, if such data are observed and can therefore be interpreted in that way, this does not mean that the two preceding assumptions are correct by themselves. These are always provisional and tentative assumptions which may only be accepted as more or less solid against the background of the entire theoretical framework of research. Alternative explanations and therefore interpretations of the data remain possible, as has been demonstrated by the discovery of primary metaphor. This means that alternative minor premises, expressing different antecedents, may always be entertained and checked. It is therefore important that researchers do not fall into the trap of concluding the assumptions from the findings which they produce. As a result, what is sometimes presented as converging evidence may simply be evidence in one area of research, such as linguistic form or psychological process, which is compatible with the classic view about conceptual metaphor, but cannot said to be converging evidence until there is independent evidence pertaining to the area of conceptual metaphor as such. This is the basic problem with the phenomenological pluralism that attaches to the deductive approach. The strong side of the deductive approach is that it highlights at which moments researchers evaluate the data in different ways. The question arises, for instance, whether Grady’s theory of primary metaphor would be accepted by Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996) as an improvement. The theory of primary metaphor is researched by the same deductive approaches as its predecessor, but does not appear to have resolved more principled methodological questions, which are also raised by Kennedy and Vervaeke (2004), about the decision procedures for assigning specific linguistic expressions to specific conceptual metaphors (cf. Ritchie 2003). In a related way, the rejection of the theory of conceptual metaphor by scholars like Glucksberg (2001), Jackendoff (2002), and Murphy (1996, 1997) can be supported by the proposal of an alternative theoretical account of metaphorical polysemy. This alternative position may be researched with the same methodological apparatus of deductive analysis as its cognitive-linguistic competitor, which enhances the comparability of the two types of evidence and their role in their theoretical arguments.

chapter 

Conceptualization Theoretical definitions

In the summer of 2006, the International Astronomical Union had their annual meeting in Prague, and discussed a proposal by a special committee to settle the scientific definition of the notion of planet. One result of the heated debates was the demotion of Pluto from the rank of planets, officially transforming it into a dwarf planet. “Pluto has been voted off the island”, wrote National Geographic News on August 24. The former planet did not qualify on the various counts decided by the committee and the union. For many people, reality was changed by scientists, an event which is reflected in the consequent need to rewrite textbooks and encyclopedias at all levels of instruction and information. Alternative definitions had also been considered, but these would have led to even worse consequences. For instance, one other possible definition might have saved Pluto but would have brought in almost 50 additional celestial bodies under the influence of the sun, exponentially increasing the number of planets by a magnitude of about five. This would presumably have been even more upsetting to the general public. Scientific definitions turn out to be a compromise between needs for the adequate categorization of reality, practicality, language, emotions, and beauty. It may be reassuring for linguists who work with fuzzy categories in language that this is a general problem for every branch of science. One fundamental condition for comparing evidence from different areas and methods of research on metaphor is the requirement that the phenomenon to which the evidence pertains is the same slice from reality. Researchers may endorse comparable hypotheses about the relation between metaphor, thought, and language, but this does not entail that they are examining the same phenomena. It is therefore important to pay attention to the ways in which metaphor may be demarcated from other phenomena as well as theoretically defined. As long as linguists, cognitive scientists and others have not yet held a similar international meeting over the definition of metaphor, this is an ineluctable task for any metaphor researcher. Given the diversity of perspectives distinguished in chapter one for the study of metaphor, the urgency of this task becomes all the more pressing. There are many definitions and models of metaphor. Philosophers and logicians have focused on its lack of truth (e.g. Davidson 1978). Philosophers and grammarians have highlighted its degree of incongruence (Halliday 1985/1994; Kittay 1987) or deviance (Levin 1977, 1979). Philosophers and psychologists have foregrounded its ca-

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pacity for conceptual modeling and representation (Black 1962, 1979/1993; Honeck & Hoffman 1980; Ortony 1979/1993). And philosophers and literary critics or poeticians have concentrated on its degree of fictionality or counterfactuality, and its potential for the imagination (Richards 1936; Ricoeur 1978). These are just some of the most prominent approaches to defining metaphor, and their wide range raises the question whether their evidence may be compared as pertaining to the same phenomenon. In this chapter I will adopt the following strategy. We will first look at the cognitive-linguistic definition of metaphor as a form of cross-domain mapping, which has been the starting point of the theoretical and empirical innovation that we have seen over the past decades. In doing so, we will move from the Lakoff and Johnson model through three alternative models which have arisen in response to it; indeed, one of these models has in fact abandoned the notion of metaphor as a cross-domain mapping. In spite of this divergence, however, it will appear to be possible to delineate a shared common ground which may serve as a platform to discuss a number of related fundamental details. One of these is the contrast between the cognitive-linguistic model of metaphor and the cognitive-linguistic model of what is often seen as its main competitor, metonymy. Then we will move on to two basic issues in this discussion, the role of similarity and of comparison in defining metaphor. And finally detailed consideration will be presented of the theoretical definition of metaphorical language that may be derived from this cognitive-linguistic starting point. This will provide a suitable transition point to operational definitions in Chapter 4.

. Four models of metaphor Analysis ideally takes place by means of operational definitions, which are derived from theoretical definitions. A theoretical definition offers some conception of metaphor that is part of an overall theoretical framework, and it may often be expressed as a model for metaphor. There are several candidates for such a model, as may also be seen from Giora (2001). In my view, four of these are of special importance, because of their shared focus on the relation between metaphor in language and thought, and their resonance in current theoretical and empirical research: 1. the two-domain approach (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999a; cf. Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987, 1993) 2. the many-space approach (Fauconnier & Turner 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier 1995, 1999, 2000; cf. Fauconnier 1997) 3. the class-inclusion approach (Glucksberg 1991, 2001; Glucksberg, Brown, & McGlone 1993; Glucksberg & Keysar 1990, 1993; Glucksberg & McGlone 1999; Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi 1997; Keysar & Glucksberg 1992; Keysar et al. 2000)

Chapter 3. Conceptualization

4. the career of metaphor approach (Bowdle & Gentner 2005; Gentner & Bowdle 2001; Gentner, Bowdle, et al. 2001; Gentner & Rattermann 1991; Gentner & Wolff 1997; Wolff & Gentner 2000). These models all define metaphor as essentially a conceptual phenomenon, following the modern development of taking metaphor as a figure of thought. The linguistic expression of metaphor as a conceptual phenomenon is taken as derivative. And the models have many predictions for the role of both conceptual structures and linguistic forms in psychological processing and its products, cognitive representations. Their major structure is hence related to the deductive relations between the various areas of research discussed in Chapter 2, and to the division of the field presented in Chapter 1: (a) the conceptual starting point of metaphor as based in some relation between two concepts or sets of concepts; this is the second row of Fig. 1.1. (b) the linguistic reflection of metaphor in some form of metaphorical language; this is the first row of Fig. 1.1. (c) the cognitive processes and products of metaphor production and understanding, both for the linguistic forms as well as the conceptual structures; these are the third and fourth rows of Fig. 1.1. They are hence all characterized by the possibility that, in principle, converging evidence for their theses may be obtained by phenomenological pluralism. The four models differ on a number of major counts, which will be grouped into the same three areas. In all of these areas, the distinction between grammar and usage will be left aside for full treatment in parts two and three. This is because none of the above models is overly concerned with the distinction between grammar and usage as such, conflating the two areas into one which they tend to refer to as ‘language’. This may be due to the fact that these are all models which have psychological aspirations, which introduces the complication that matters of competence (or grammar) are typically approached through the study of performance (or usage). Whether that performance is imagined in introspection, observed in natural settings, or manipulated in experimental environments is irrelevant to this general point. Detailed issues that can be related to the distinction between grammar and usage and that are important to linguists, however, are consequently often glossed over in this way – as we shall see in parts two and three.

.. The two-domain approach The two-domain approach of Conceptual Metaphor Theory launched by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) models metaphor as a mapping from a conceptual source domain to a conceptual target domain. When we speak of defending a position in an argument, Conceptual Metaphor Theory says, we conceptualize argument as war, with war functioning as a conceptual source domain which informs and structures our view of the conceptual target domain of argumentation. It predicts that our conceptual struc-

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ture of arguments has attacks and defenses, positions and maneuverings, and victories and defeats. The two-domain approach typically deals with conventionalized and systematic conceptual mappings between rather broad and general domains of experience, as may be illustrated by such well-known examples as theories are buildings, ideas are commodities, love is war, seeing is touching, life is a gambling game, and so on. The systematic mappings between these broad domains are called conceptual metaphors, and they consist of conceptual correspondences between elements, relations, and attributes in one domain and their projected counterparts in another domain. Thus, verbal attacks correspond to physical attacks, verbal attackers correspond to physical attackers, and verbal targets correspond to physical targets. Conceptual metaphors are typically manifested by dozens of linguistic expressions. These are not necessarily words or lexical items, but can range from morphemes through vocabulary and phrases to grammatical constructions. For the conceptual metaphor ideas are commodities, Lakoff and Johnson list the following linguistic manifestations as examples: It’s important how you package your ideas. He won’t buy that. That idea just won’t sell. There’s always a market for good ideas. That’s a worthless idea. He’s been a source of valuable ideas. I wouldn’t give a plugged nickel for that idea. Your ideas don’t have a chance in the intellectual marketplace. (1980: 47–48)

Most of these data seem to be a mix of data collection by introspection, observation, and manipulation. Linguistic expressions of a conceptual metaphor can be highly conventional or novel linguistic exploitations of the underlying conceptual metaphorical system. Less systematic metaphors are also included in the two-domain approach, and their conceptual and linguistic manifestations are labeled as ‘one-shot’ metaphors. Distinctions between various forms of metaphor in language, such as metaphor versus simile, have not played a prominent role in the two-domain approach. When it comes to finding metaphor in language, the two-domain approach has typically focused on conventionalized expressions in language approached as (lexico-)grammar and its potential use. It has also looked at the novel metaphorical uses of (mainly lexical) expressions which may be related to a particular conceptual metaphor, but this does not mean that Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been overly concerned with finding all variegating forms of metaphor in usage (but cf. Lakoff & Turner 1989, for one well-known attempt). For all of these metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson hold that the mapping between the two domains in conceptual structure can be related to a mapping process between two cognitive domains in individual processing. In other words, they believe that there is a direct relation between the conceptual structure of ideas and idea systems as revealed by cognitive-linguistic analysis on the one hand, and cognitive processes and their products, cognitive representations, as revealed by behavioral research on the psychology of language on the other. They refer to psycholinguistic evidence on cognitive processing, including gesture studies, as broadly supporting their position (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson 1999a: 83–85).


.. The many-space approach The two-domain model has received competition within cognitive linguistics from the many-space approach of Conceptual Integration Theory, or Blending Theory, advocated by Fauconnier and Turner. Blending Theory replaces the two conceptual domains with at least four conceptual spaces. Two of the four spaces correspond to the source and target domains in the classic model, and two other spaces capture the common ground between the two spaces (the generic space) as well as the emergent structure deriving from the mapping in context (the blended space). Thus, in This surgeon is a butcher . . ., the metaphor may seem to be explainable in terms of direct projection from the source domain of butchery to the target domain of surgery, guided by a series of fixed counterpart mappings: “butcher” onto “surgeon”; “animal” (cow) maps onto “human being”; “commodity” onto “patient”; “cleaver” onto “scalpel”; and so forth. This analysis of the cross-domain relationships, however, cannot by itself explain a crucial element of the statement’s meaning: the surgeon is incompetent. A butcher, though less prestigious than a surgeon, is typically competent at what he does and may be highly respected. The notion of incompetence is not being projected from source to target. (Grady et al. 1999: 103)

The many-space approach consequently deals with the emergence of meaning in the blended space. It would be fair to say, however, that the many-space approach still starts out from a cross-space mapping between the source and the target space. All four spaces are conceived of as temporary and partial conceptual structures containing rather specific and situated conceptualizations of experience. Relatively conventional, permanent conceptual metaphors of the type discussed by Lakoff and Johnson may serve as part of the conceptual materials affecting the mapping between the spaces constructed in Blending Theory (Turner & Fauconnier 2000: 135; Grady 2005). The conceptual structure resulting from the analysis is a complex set of mappings between source and target space as well as between the both of them and the added generic space as well as the blended space. The linguistic materials analyzed by this approach are often novel and unique, ranging from novel morphological compounds such as land-yaught through such utterances as This surgeon is a butcher to such mini-arguments as If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink. This complicates the comparison with the two-domain model, but the underlying structures that are required for conceptual analysis can still be aligned and compared. Most of these data are imagined, but Fauconnier and Turner’s examples also include observed data from published texts to illustrate conventional but specific and situated meanings in a natural co-text and context. Although this also means that Blending Theory covers a relatively wide array of linguistic forms, it has not paid much attention to the variety of functions of the diverging linguistic forms in discourse. Given these considerations, it is probably fair to say that Fauconnier and Turner are more concerned with finding metaphor in language as usage than in language as grammar (cf. Grady et al. 1999).

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This is also because Fauconnier and Turner aim to model the cognitive processing of metaphor in specific instances of discourse. They, too, hold that the mapping between the four spaces in conceptual structure is related to a mapping process between four cognitive spaces in individual processing. In other words, Fauconnier and Turner also believe that there is a direct relation between conceptual structure as revealed by symbolic analysis on the one hand, and the cognitive representations created in individual on-line processing on the other. A beginning has been made with collecting psycholinguistic evidence for that position by Coulson and Matlock (2001) and Coulson and van Petten (2002).

.. The class-inclusion approach The main competitor of the classic two-domain approach outside cognitive linguistics is Glucksberg’s class-inclusion model of metaphor. At the level of conceptual structures, it is based on the interplay between three conceptual categories. In the expression My job is a jail, the class-inclusion approach holds that there is a conceptual target category for the topic term job, a conceptual source category for the vehicle term jail, and a conceptual superordinate category ‘of things or situations that the metaphor vehicle exemplifies (e.g., situations that are confining, oppressive, etc.)’ (Glucksberg & McGlone 1999: 1542). The source category is a relatively typical exemplar of the superordinate category, in the form of actual jails. The nature of the conceptual structures involved in the metaphorical idea is indicated by the term ‘categories’, in contradistinction to the more general ‘domains’ used by Lakoff and Johnson and the more specific ‘spaces’ used by Fauconnier and Turner (cf. Shen 1999). Categories are conceptual structures that may be more or less general and permanent as well as specific and ad hoc. The relation between the categories involved in a metaphor, moreover, is not one of cross-category mapping by means of correspondences or comparison. Instead, it is argued that properties are attributed from the source to the target category by means of class inclusion: the category indicated by the target term (such as job or surgeon) is characterized by the typical exemplar of a superordinate category which does not have a name of its own but which is indicated at one remove by an exemplar (such as jail or butcher). Features of the encompassing or superordinate category, which are suggested by the properties of the source, are then also attributed to the target. When such double uses of source or vehicle terms such as jail become conventional, they cease to be metaphorical because they do not require the adhoc use of knowledge to resolve the interpretation process for the novel and ad-hoc superordinate category. Lexical disambiguation between the superordinate and the more specific use of the source term is then held to be able to resolve the interpretation process of literal and metaphorical uses. As a result, Glucksberg and his associates do not start out from the notion that people have conceptual metaphors in their minds. Instead, when considering the area of linguistic forms, class-inclusion theorists have concentrated on novel metaphor and its difference from conventionally metaphorical expressions, as it is only novel con-


structions which require the use of knowledge to interpret the relation between the topic and the vehicle (e.g. Keysar et al. 2000). They typically utilize nominative constructions specifically designed by the analysts for this purpose. In examining such novel nominal metaphors, they have also included the rhetorical aspect of their form, arguing that similes are interpreted along the same lines as classic metaphors. This has to be contrasted with the opposite view, that metaphor is to be seen as an implicit form of comparison, or simile (cf. Croft & Cruse 2004). In looking at these issues, Glucksberg and his associates focus on finding metaphor in language as usage: they use conventional and novel, mainly lexical and phrasal, metaphors in constructed discourse contexts to examine their processing; but they do not attempt to find all varied forms of metaphor in either grammar or usage. For cognitive processing and its products, Glucksberg hence predicts that metaphors are not understood by a process of mapping between conceptual structures. Instead, he posits that they are understood by a process of ad-hoc categorization (cf. Barsalou 1983; Shen 1992). As a result, the linguistic forms of conventional metaphors are not processed metaphorically in the sense of related to a cross-domain conceptual mapping, but the linguistic forms of novel metaphor are processed metaphorically: the distinction between linguistic form and conceptual structure in cognition is fundamental to the class-inclusion approach. Glucksberg and his followers even claim that this approach holds for those novel metaphors which are expressed as similes. They have presented a wealth of psycholinguistic evidence to support their overall position (cf. Glucksberg 2001, for an overview).

.. The career of metaphor approach Dedre Gentner and her colleagues have advanced a fourth model for metaphor, labeled the career of metaphor theory. At the conceptual level of analysis, this model includes many aspects of the classic two-domain approach as well as of the mentalspace views proposed by Fauconnier (1997), but it also takes seriously the insights produced by Glucksberg’s class-inclusion approach. The career of metaphor theory does allow for the possibility that conceptual metaphors are a valid entity. It also allows for having varying numbers of conceptual structures that are involved in different classes of metaphorical expressions: for novel metaphor, only two conceptual structures are required, corresponding to source (or ‘base’) and target in the two-domain approach; but for conventional metaphor, three concepts are required, corresponding to the topic concept and the subordinate and superordinate vehicle concepts in classinclusion theory. The relations between these conceptual structures vary accordingly: there is cross-domain mapping for novel metaphor but property attribution by classinclusion for conventional metaphor. Gentner and Bowdle’s model hence accounts for novel as well as conventional metaphor, and even adds ‘dead’ metaphor as a third group, an issue which will be left aside here. Variation in linguistic form, pertaining to for instance the difference between nominal and verbal metaphor, is not accorded much attention. However, variation

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by means of rhetorical figure is included: Gentner and Bowdle (2001), for instance, deliberately focus on the expression of metaphor by simile versus simple metaphor. Metaphor has also been compared with analogy (Gentner 1982, 1983; Gentner & Jeziorski 1993). Gentner and Bowdle’s work is comparable to Glucksberg’s in that their linguistic materials are typically constructed for experimental purposes, and that they have a prime interest in finding metaphor in language as usage. As a result of the interaction between all of these conceptual and linguistic issues, the career of metaphor model claims that metaphors may be cognitively represented by processes of comparison or categorization. This is held to depend on the nature of the linguistic and conceptual materials that are being processed: metaphor is processed as a comparison when it is novel, but as a class-inclusion statement when it is conventional. Moreover, simile is always processed by comparison, whether it is novel or conventional. This entails that there is no overall isomorphism between the symbolic analysis of the conceptual structures and linguistic forms of metaphors, on the one hand, and the behavioral analysis of the related processes and products, on the other. In particular, not every metaphorical structure involving three concepts is automatically processed by means of a categorization process, which goes against Glucksberg; nor are all metaphorical structures in general automatically processed by a comparison process (Gentner’s psychological equivalent of mapping), which goes against the two-domain theory.

.. Parameters of metaphor models These are the four most important cognitive-scientific models for metaphor in language and thought. An overview is offered in Table 3.1. The models exhibit only partial overlap and are therefore not in genuine competition with each other. In fact, they are in fairly complementary distribution, capturing different aspects of metaphor in language and thought; this is particularly conspicuous for the row that deals with the linguistic forms of metaphor. This also means that different metaphors in language and thought may be found by these various models. Or, perhaps more accurately, these models often serve their own purposes in different research projects on metaphor in language and thought. All of these models have different consequences for what it means to find metaphor in grammar or usage as either thought or language. As for the conceptual basis of metaphor, classic two-domain theory only has to be able to find two conceptual domains and a mapping, whereas Blending Theory needs to be able to identify at least four mental spaces and their relations. The career of metaphor model first needs to determine the degree of conventionality of a metaphor before it is possible to postulate the existence of two or three concepts which then need to be identified. These are important consequences about the presumed conceptual structure of metaphor in language and thought of adhering to one or another of these models. I will return to a more precise consideration of the criteria for metaphor identification that may be related to these models in the next chapter.


Table 3.1 Four models of metaphor Table 3.1a Conceptual structures Two-domain approach

Many-space approach

Class-inclusion approach

Career of metaphor approach

Number of conceptual structures Nature of conceptual structures Relation betw. conceptual structures

2

4

3

variable

Domains

Spaces

Categories

Concepts and domains

Mapping

Mapping plus space building

Property attribution by class inclusion

Mapping or property attribution

Range of conventionality

Mostly conventional

Mostly novel

Conventional vs novel

Conventional vs novel

Organization of metaphor in mind

Conceptual Conceptual metaphor (and metaphor and adhoc metaphor) adhoc metaphor

No conceptual metaphor

At least some conceptual metaphor

Table 3.1b Linguistic forms Two-domain approach

Many-space approach



Range of linguistic forms

Vocabulary and grammar

Utterances in discourse

Mostly nominal constructions

Mostly nominal constructions

Range of rhetorical forms

Mostly metaphor All rhetorical forms

Metaphor vs simile

Metaphor vs simile, analogy

Language as grammar or usage

Both

Usage

Usage

Many-space approach



Predictions about Cross-domain processing mapping

Conceptual integration

Categorization

Categorization or comparison

Empirical evidence for processing

To be collected

Available

Available

Mostly usage

Table 3.1c Cognitive processes and products Two-domain approach

Available

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At the same time, though, it may also be noted that all models display important similarities. For one thing, they all start out from some sort of juxtaposition of at least two conceptual structures. All models assume a source and target, which may be variously conceptualized as domains (Lakoff and Johnson), spaces (Fauconnier and Turner), categories (Glucksberg and Keysar), or concepts (Gentner and Bowdle). The identification of metaphor in language and thought consequently requires the identification of at least two conceptual structures or systems, whatever they are called. This is the first general requirement for finding metaphor in grammar or usage. All models also require a functional differentiation and connection between the two conceptual structures as a source and a target. In order to identify metaphor in language and thought, the relation between source and target has to be established either directly (Lakoff and Johnson, and Gentner and Bowdle), or via one or more other conceptual structures (Fauconnier and Turner, Glucksberg and Keysar, and Gentner and Bowdle). The conceptual structures are therefore supposed to be distinct enough to facilitate some such operation, but they should also be sufficiently ‘close’ for them to be able to be related to each other. This is the second requirement for finding metaphor in language and thought. For finding metaphor in thought related to grammar and usage, both domain identification and domain mapping are part of the conceptual analysis of metaphor. This conceptual analysis has to be linked to an analysis of the language expressing the metaphor identified in conceptual structure. The linguistic analysis of metaphor is also approached in comparable ways by the various models: they all entail that metaphor involves some form of non-literal or indirect meaning, in which one expression (the vehicle term) is used in a way which deviates from its basic meaning. Where the approaches differ is in their assessment of what it is for a linguistic expression to be used indirectly, that is, when metaphorical relations between indirect use and direct or literal or basic use can still be observed. These variations on the themes of the conceptual structures and linguistic forms of metaphor form the background against which cognitive psychologists look at the verbal behavior that is related to metaphor. In such behavioral research, the central question is whether two domains are activated during processing, or not: the linguistic evidence that suggests that there are many metaphorical mappings in grammar and/or usage is not taken as necessarily converging with the psycholinguistic evidence that still needs to be obtained for many types of cases. Psycholinguists are wary about claiming that there is converging evidence for such phenomenological pluralism. When two domains are activated, a process of cross-domain comparison is assumed to take place; when one domain is activated, a process of categorization. In the first case, metaphorical meaning is constructed; in the second case, meaning that has previously arisen because of a metaphorical mapping but does not have to be represented as a live mapping necessarily anymore, is retrieved from memory. Both the conventional nature as well as the rhetorical form of the metaphor is investigated for its influence on the triggering and nature of these processes. This is done by a range


of methods; when their findings converge, they do so on the basis of methodological pluralism. In sum, the identification of metaphor in language and thought as related to grammar and usage may be conceptualized with reference to a number of distinct models of metaphor in cognitive science. Metaphor in language processing behavior, as well as metaphor in language as symbolic structure, requires conceptual analysis, producing at least two conceptual structures and some relation between them. These conceptual analyses need to be complemented by a linguistic analysis of the nature of the language as displaying some form of metaphorical meaning. These aspects may be processed in various ways in cognition. This view will be the basis of my discussion in parts two and three of the methods that may be employed to address each of these aspects of finding metaphor in grammar and usage, a distinction which has not been thematized sufficiently systematically in these models.

. Metaphor and metonymy The four dominant models define metaphor as a relation between two conceptual structures, whether they are called domains, spaces, categories, or concepts. However, not all relations between two distinct conceptual structures are automatically metaphorical. Most importantly for our purposes, some of them may also be motivated by metonymy. Recent cognitive-linguistic theory and research has shown that the widely-used definition of metaphor by means of a relation between two conceptual structures is too encompassing. An additional criterion needs to be added in order to demarcate metaphor from metonymy. In this section I will argue that this is the criterion of similarity, in contrast with the criterion of contiguity, which characterizes metonymy (e.g. Barcelona 2000b, c; Dirven 1993; Dirven & Pörings 2002; Kövecses & Radden 1998). Since similarity is a controversial notion, as is the related term comparison, I will put my views into a broader context in Sections 3 and 4, after I have sketched the basic picture. Consider the mapping between closeness and intimacy. These are two domains which are sufficiently distinct to warrant the possibility of a mapping between them: not all closeness involves intimacy, and not all intimacy involves physical proximity. Moreover, closeness is physical, whereas intimacy is emotional. But when we think about intimacy, it does correlate with closeness: intimacy often involves a desire for closeness, or an actual situation of physical closeness, or an experience of imaginary closeness. For children, intimacy exhibits almost perfect correlation with physical closeness between child and parent. That is how closeness may come to mean intimacy, so that words like distant and remote may have a physical but also an emotional meaning. This semantic connection may be described as a mapping between two domains, and if the one domain is used to understand the other domain, we have indirect meaning (Gibbs 1993, 1994; Lakoff 1986, 1993). (The related term aloof used to have these

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two senses, too, but has now only retained its emotional sense, turning monosemous instead of ambiguous between physical and emotional meaning.) It is important to note, however, that the notion of mapping itself does not apply to metaphor only, but can also include metonymy (e.g. Coulson 2001; Fauconnier 1997; Kövecses & Radden 1998; Warren 2002). It is the particular nature of the mapping which discriminates between metaphor and metonymy. We consequently have to decide whether the mapping between closeness and proximity produces metaphor or metonymy and therefore the question arises how closeness in actual fact evokes intimacy. Do we see intimacy as closeness (metaphor) or do we see intimacy via closeness (metonymy)? Seeing intimacy via closeness would be a case of a reference-point construction (Langacker 1987, 1993; cf. Croft 1993; Lakoff 1987). This is a general phenomenon in conceptual structure, one concept providing access to another concept which is more relevant. Metonymy has been seen as one such construction. For instance, producer can provide access to product: (1) Plato is on the top shelf. Or place can provide access to an institution: (2) Washington has banned all gay marriages. and so on (cf. Kövecses & Radden 1998; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Norrick 1981). Reference-point constructions are based on these and other contiguous relations between the concept that is explicit (the metonymic term) and the concept that remains implicit, the target (Radden & Kövecses 1999). Closeness can conventionally function as such a reference point for accessing intimacy, and this may be one way in which words like close, distant, and remote (but not aloof anymore) are regularly used by language users. The fact that the association between the two domains is caused by some correlation in reality, however, does not exhaust the analysis. It is true that when you feel ‘close’ to someone, you may describe that feeling by referring to the situation in which you are physically close to a person, providing referential access to the presumably correlated domain of feeling. But use of the word close may also describe the emotion as conceptually or experientially similar to the concrete quality of closeness, in that physical closeness involves concrete forms of nearness, attachment, and relationship. This is a mapping which works by domain juxtaposition (concrete versus abstract) and a mapping between the two that is based on some form of structural similarity despite the external dissimilarity of the domains (metaphor). Closeness can conventionally function as a conventional and nonliteral source domain for talking or reasoning about intimacy, and this may be another way in which words like close, distant, and remote are regularly used by language users. A classic cognitive-linguistic example of a mapping between two domains that is based in correlation but which also allows for conceptual similarity in the form of analogy is Sweetser’s (1990) discussion of sense perception verbs (cf. Feyaerts 1999, 2000;


Radden 2000). In her analysis, Sweetser posits a correlation between various activities of sense perception on the one hand and understanding on the other, but also discusses this situation in terms of similarity. Two quotations from her work may suffice: Visual monitoring ⇔ control. The basis for this metaphor is probably the fact that guarding or keeping control often involves visual monitoring of the controlled entity; and the limited domain of physical vision is further analogous to the domain of personal influence of control. . . . (1990: 32–33; my emphases) Physical vision ⇔ mental “vision.” This metaphor is probably based on the strong connection between sight and knowledge, and also on the shared structural properties of the visual and intellectual domains – our ability to focus our mental and visual attentions, to monitor stimuli mentally and visually. (1990: 33; my emphases)

As has also been noted by Riemer (2001, 2002), the same situation, conceptualization, and linguistic expression may be seen as involving correlation and contiguity (“involves” and “connection”) as well as cross-domain mapping and similarity (“analogous” and “shared structural properties”). Any set of two conceptual structures can be simultaneously judged as more or less contiguous as well as more or less similar. Finding metonymy therefore does not mean that the search for metaphor can be abandoned. It follows that all models which place metaphor and metonymy on one scale as two extremes are too simple (e.g., Deignan 2005b; Dirven 1993; Radden 2000; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibañez 2000). Similarity and contiguity are in fact two independent scales. Any two concepts which are contiguous in a frame or scenario are also more or less similar. The same holds for any two concepts which are not involved in the same frame or scenario. It is true that similarity judgments may be affected by contiguity and other effects of categorization (e.g. Bassok & Medin 1997; cf. Glucksberg & Keysar 1990). But that only goes to show that the factors of similarity and contiguity are not orthogonal in processing. As an analyst of metaphor in grammar and usage, however, an honest attempt should be made to keep this association under control; independent data should be collected on the similarity and contiguity relations between conceptual structures. In some cases, the degree of contiguity between the domains is more prominent and relevant than the degree of similarity; these are clear cases of metonymy (e.g. Feyaerts 2000). In other cases, the reverse situation obtains, similarity between the two domains or spaces or categories or concepts being more salient than degree of contiguity (e.g. Warren 2002). There are also cases where the values of the two parameters are approximately equal, so that it is possible to see a conceptual or semantic relation as either or both metaphoric and metonymic. To illustrate these possibilities, consider the following imagined situation where two colleagues are pouring over the same text submitted for inclusion in an edited book, discussing the difficulties they experience with the text. One colleague points out some of the details, and the other colleague responds by uttering:

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(3) I see what you mean. Since literal seeing is involved and since it provides access to a broader act of understanding, this utterance might be experienced, as well as analyzed, as a case of metonymy, where seeing stands for understanding. It may be a clear example of a referencepoint construction. Now contrast this scenario to the situation when the same colleagues are discussing another submission, which they have both read at home but did not bring back to their office. Then (3) may work in a different manner. Since no literal seeing is involved, this time the non-literal use of see cannot be analyzed as a referencepoint construction and does not involve contiguity. It works by way of the general cross-domain mapping between seeing and understanding, exploiting the structural similarities between the two domains. That this is not just an academic exercise is demonstrated by the work on usage done by Cameron (2003: 69), who discusses the role of metaphor and metonymy in the analysis of the following expressions used in class-room interaction: I want all your eyes looking at me; I see what you mean; see if any bells ring; see what you can do; I’ve been able to see what their problem is; and I don’t want to see any lines drawn. This view is related to the non-contradictory position that many (linguistic) metaphors may be based in (conceptual) metonymy (e.g. Barcelona 2000c; Radden 2000). Thus, understanding is seeing has been analyzed as metaphorical by Sweetser (1990), with such linguistic manifestations as (4): (4) That theory provides a whole new perspective. However, it is equally possible to consider the option that seeing stands for understanding, in that seeing is often or typically a precondition for understanding. Indeed, in language acquisition, this is precisely one part of the process of acquiring the meaning of this lexical field (Johnson 1999). As a result, what looks like metaphor in language may also be based in metonymy in thought. Warren (2002) has suggested that one way out of this situation is to assume that metaphor has a hypothetical nature, whereas metonymy does not. Feyaerts (2000) has a comparable but opposite strategy, proposing that metonymy is contiguity without the presence of similarity. However, as we shall see in Parts 2 and 3, the situation can become rather complicated, leading to distinct combinations of metaphor and metonymy which demand their own attention (e.g. Goossens 1990). I shall therefore not enter into the theoretical debate about the implications of this analysis. Instead, I will keep an eye on the various factors that are involved in metaphor identification: the presence or absence of some form of similarity, the presence or absence of some form of contiguity, and the application of these criteria at the two distinct levels of linguistic form and conceptual structure. Finding metaphor may hence partly be a matter of adopting a particular perspective, one where similarity is more relevant than contiguity (Bartsch 2002). The need for adopting a perspective acknowledges that most ideas and observations are con-


structs, arising out of our experience (even if it is as specific as scientific experience) with our environment. Agreeing that the demarcation of and subsequent projection between domains requires adopting a perspective for metaphor only means that researchers have to be explicit about their methods of data collection, which is what this book is all about. Finding metaphor in language and thought will therefore be clearly demarcated from finding metonymy. In sum, metaphor and metonymy are both relations between conceptual or semantic structures (‘mappings’ in a general sense), but the nature of the correspondences and the relation between the structures is fundamentally different (Feyaerts 2000; Warren 2002). For metaphor, we have to do with a mapping across two distinct conceptual structures (be they domains, spaces, categories, or concepts), but for metonymy we have to do with the highlighting of one conceptual structure against the background of another within an encompassing conceptual frame (Croft 1993). For metaphor, the conceptual structures and their relations are said to reside in some form of similarity between the two domains or spaces, whereas for metonymy, the conceptual structures and their relations are held to lie in the contiguity or co-occurrence between them. The identification of metaphor involves a different conceptual use of the conceptual and semantic structures and their relation than the identification of metonymy. Both perspectives may be applied to the same data, to the effect that metaphor and metonymy are not mutually exclusive ends of one continuum: they need to be identified by independent research procedures.

. Metaphor and similarity The opposition between similarity and contiguity as criteria for finding metaphor and metonymy should be understood in a precise way. Lakoff and Johnson (1999a: 126) have listed four arguments against the position that metaphor defined as a crossdomain mapping is based in similarity, and we need to clarify how these arguments relate to the position of other cognitive linguists, that metaphor should be contrasted to metonymy by means of similarity. What do Lakoff and Johnson mean when they attack the notion of metaphor as involving similarity, even though correspondences in mappings are clearly based on some form of similarity? In order to answer this question, let me review their formulation of the position which they attack: Tenet 5: Metaphors express similarities. That is, there are pre-existing similarities between what words normally designate and what they designate when they are used metaphorically. (1999: 126)

The first argument against the position that metaphors express similarities focuses on the idea that similarities are necessarily pre-existing. Lakoff and Johnson correctly point out that this is a mistake, for similarities may also be created by a metaphorical mapping. Even though this argument is correct in itself, it does not follow that metaphors cannot be defined by means of similarity; it only suggests that metaphors

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cannot be defined with reference to pre-existing similarities. It also leaves open the possibility that some metaphors may indeed be expressive of pre-existing similarities (e.g. Fauconnier 1997: 19–20 cf. Murphy 1996, 1997). If similarity is not narrowed down to pre-existing similarity, it survives Lakoff and Johnson’s first objection against the similarity position. The second argument against the similarity criterion for metaphor focuses on the idea that similarities are necessarily literal. With reference to the knowing is seeing metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson write: “Since one cannot literally see what someone else means, there can be no literal similarity between knowing what someone else means and seeing what someone else means.” This is true, but again, it does not follow that metaphors cannot be defined with reference to similarity: as has been pointed out by many theorists of analogy, relational or proportional similarity between two domains often simply ignores the lack of literal similarity (e.g., Coulson & Matlock 2001; Fauconnier 1997; Gentner 1983, 1989; Gentner & Clement 1988; Shen 1992). However, analogy itself is a clear case of similarity in the less restricted sense than literal similarity (Gentner & Markman 1993, 1997; Markman & Gentner 1993a, b; Medin et al. 1993). This is also shown by for instance Sweetser’s (1990) numerous uses of the term analogous and some of its cognates. Consider, for instance, Sweetser (1990: 17), who writes: “The kinds of ‘likeness’ (e.g. cultural categorization of women, fire, and dangerous things into a class – see G. Lakoff 1987) and metaphors inherent in language do not seem to fall out neatly from the sort of (supposedly objective) features proposed by formal-lexical analysts.” And here is Fauconnier (1997: 20), about the rise of a conceptual system where computer malfunctions are talked about in terms of viruses: “As students of analogy often point out, the similarity between the domains that gets exploited here is one of structure, not of substance.” If similarity is not narrowed down to literal similarity, it also survives Lakoff and Johnson’s second objection against the similarity position. The third argument imports an additional assumption, that similarity is symmetric: Lakoff and Johnson suggest that when two things are similar, A is similar to B in the same way as B is similar to A. However, it is well known that metaphors cannot be reversed without a change of meaning: (5a) has a radically different meaning than (5b): (5) a. This surgeon is a butcher. b. This butcher is a surgeon. Therefore, Lakoff and Johnson conclude that metaphors cannot be defined by means of similarity. However, the additional assumption that similarity is symmetric and that it does not apply to metaphor is not warranted. Shen (1989) has shown that similarity can be symmetric and asymmetric, and that this applies to both literal and metaphorical comparisons (cf. Gleitman, Gleitman et al. 1996). Asymmetric comparisons are therefore, again, just one class of all metaphors, and their specific property of irreversibility should not be taken as a reason for rejecting the criterion of similarity as a basis for defining metaphor. If similarity is not narrowed down to asymmetric similar-


ity and opposed to symmetric literal similarity, it survives Lakoff and Johnson’s third objection against the similarity position. The fourth objection returns to the role of pre-existing similarity. It observes that there are mutually contradictory metaphorical mappings, such as marriage as a business partnership versus a parent-child relationship, in which the relationship between the marriage partners is portrayed as either equal or unequal. Since similarity is supposed to be pre-existing, Lakoff and Johnson argue that the similarity position for metaphor leads to the contradictory conclusion that relationships are both equal and unequal, as is reflected in the metaphors. They conclude that the similarity hypothesis is false. However, if similarity is not narrowed down to pre-existing similarity, but may also include created similarity, there is nothing wrong with the existence of contradictory metaphorical mappings, and the fourth objection collapses, too. For all these reasons, the anti-similarity hypothesis is false. Similarity can encompass pre-existing as well as created similarity; and it can include literal or external similarity (or resemblance) as well as relational or proportional similarity (or analogy). This is a liberal and versatile position which has been supported by general work on the nature of similarity in conceptual structure as carried out by, especially, Dedre Gentner and Arthur Markman (1993, 1997; Markman & Gentner 1993a, b; Medin et al. 1993). These views have also influenced Fauconnier (1997) and have fed into Blending Theory, even though Coulson and Matlock (2001) claim that metaphor is based on mapping by analogy, not similarity or identity. However, similarity in the more restricted sense of literal or external similarity does play a role in image metaphor. The more encompassing position on conceptual similarity adopted by Gentner and her colleagues offers the best opportunities for accounting for these differences between metaphors (cf. Gentner 1983, 1989). Let me offer one illustration of the practical use of this position. Dutch radio commentator Theo Koomen once announced the escape from the pack of a famous Dutch cyclist, Hennie Kuiper, in one of the most difficult mountain legs of the Tour de France by proclaiming: (6) “Dear Mrs Kuiper, dear Mrs Kuiper, wait for this, Hennie has escaped, and he’s winging up high, like an eagle.” Analogical similarity is important here in mapping the flight of the eagle on to the escape of the cyclist, one relevant similarity being the majestic manner in which both take place. According to most metaphor theorists, it should be the proportional similarity which forms the basis of this mapping, with literal similarities being backgrounded or discarded. Kuiper does not have feathers or a bill, and eagles do not ride bikes or any other vehicles when they take flight. However, when you know that Hennie Kuiper is a very slim, small and fragile man, the contrast with the more intimidating aspect of the eagle becomes pronounced and adds to the effect of the metaphor. This is enhanced when you know that the sports commentator had a penchant for overstatement that bordered on the ridiculous, which became part of his reputation and may have been deliberately exploited by him on many occasions. As a result, apart

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from expressing excitement and enthusiasm, the metaphor turns humorous, by the unexpected and slightly perverse exploitation of the role of literal or external resemblance. In this way, such similarity may also play a subservient role in many structural metaphors that are meant to be funny, surprising, creative, and so on. Only a broad approach to the role of similarity can account for these usage effects. In his recent practical introduction to metaphor in cognitive linguistics, Kövecses (2002: 67–77) has also adopted this broad notion of similarity as the conceptual basis of metaphor. His discussion is a reflection of a more general trend in cognitive linguistics. Goossens et al. (1995), Panther and Radden (1999), Barcelona (2000a), Dirven and Pörings (2002), and Panther and Thornburg (2003) all take metaphor as a matter of similarity, as opposed to metonymy which is based in contiguity. This is the way in which I wish to use the notion of similarity as a conceptual basis for demarcating metaphorical mappings from metonymic mappings (whether they are seen as Lakoff and Johnson’s mappings, Fauconnier and Turner’s blends, or Glucksberg’s categorizations). And this is the notion which will play a decisive role in finding metaphor, as opposed to metonymy, in language and thought.

. Metaphor and comparison Where the definition of metaphor is concerned, I see no essential difference between similarity and comparison. In my opinion, comparison is the construction of similarity, and if we define similarity in the ways discussed above, there is no real issue between these two terms. Therefore we can approach the attack on metaphor as comparison by Glucksberg and his associates (e.g. Glucksberg & Keysar 1990, 1993; Glucksberg et al. 1997) in the same way. Glucksberg argues that metaphors like (7), (7) a. My job is a jail. b. My grandfather is a baby. c. Sermons are sleeping pills. should not be taken as comparison statements but as class-inclusion statements, such as (8), (8) A lime is a citrus fruit. They provide a number of reasons as well as empirical evidence why metaphors of this type are not understood by first setting up an implicit comparison and then determining the shared properties (or similarities) that are relevant. Instead, Glucksberg and his co-workers argue, “metaphors are understood as they are stated: class-inclusion assertions in which the concept X is assigned to a category denoted Y” (Glucksberg et al. 1997: 51). If metaphor is defined as some form of similarity, it also has to be clarified what this view entails for Glucksberg’s rejection of metaphor as comparison. My position


is simple: we have to make a distinction between metaphor in conceptual structure, metaphor in linguistic form, and metaphor in psychological processing and representation. Defining metaphor in conceptual structure by similarity does not necessarily mean that every metaphor in language is also psychologically processed as a comparison. Some of these metaphorical relations between categories may be processed in the same way as class-inclusion statements, as Glucksberg has suggested; but others may be processed as comparisons, as has been shown by Gentner and Bowdle (2001). In particular, there appears to be an effect of both rhetorical form as well as metaphor conventionality on comprehension times and metaphoricity ratings which suggests that it is only conventional metaphors in classic metaphorical form that are processed by means of categorization. By contrast, conventional similes, as well as novel metaphors and similes, are processed by comparison (Gentner & Bowdle 2001). The picture of this situation is still developing (cf. Bowdle & Gentner 2005). It should be noted that approaching metaphor as a form of categorization instead of comparison still involves similarity. Most importantly, the two subordinate concepts themselves, such as ‘job’ and ‘jail’ or ‘grandfather’ and ‘baby’, also display some form of similarity. That these similarities are only available after comprehension is important for a psychological view of metaphor comprehension. Yet this observation simultaneously allows for the possibility that similarities are relevant for metaphor assessment or verification, as is explicitly acknowledged by Glucksberg and Keysar (1990: 7). In addition, each of the subordinate concepts displays similarity with the ad-hoc superordinate concept. It follows that the theoretical competition between processing models such as categorization versus comparison does not invalidate the general starting point that metaphorical expressions or utterances may be analyzed as based in the juxtaposition of two categories or concepts on the basis of similarity (cf. Chiappe & Kennedy 2001; Ritchie 2003). It is true, of course, that the possible lack of a role of comparison during processing may complicate the decision of finding metaphor in thought, but that is another matter. Whatever the outcome of these investigations, it is possible to draw an important conclusion about the definition of metaphor. Metaphor may be defined as a mapping between two conceptual structures that is based in similarity, but this does not commit the researcher to the view that it is necessarily understood by means of comparison. Comparison is a psychological process which may or may not be related to metaphor comprehension, but that is an empirical matter which is dependent on a number of discourse factors. After all, defining metaphor on the basis of conceptual similarity does not necessarily entail that all metaphors are expressed as similarity expressions in language either. Indeed, it is precisely their capacity for expression as identity expressions instead of similarity expressions which has led Glucksberg to develop his ground-breaking views. It is therefore crucial to be precise about the meaning of phrases like ‘metaphor as comparison’: when they are meant as a description of a psychological process, they have a different scope than when they are meant as conceptual or linguistic definitions of metaphor. The different research areas distinguished in previous chapters make it possible to say that comparison can be viewed

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as a psychological process, and that metaphor can be defined independently by means of conceptual similarity, or cross-domain mapping. The relation between these definitions and phenomena is precisely what metaphor researchers need to describe and explain in sufficient detail for all of the areas involved.

. Metaphor and literal meaning We have seen that metaphor may be defined as the juxtaposition of two conceptual structures which are related to each other by means of some form of similarity. This is often referred to as cross-domain mapping. We have also seen that the linguistic manifestation of this conceptual situation may involve a special kind of meaning. But when precisely does an expression or an utterance have such a metaphorical meaning? In order to answer this question, the present section will present a global discussion of defining metaphor as non-literal meaning. It is well known that ‘literal meaning’ is not a unitary notion. The following five definitions have been distinguished in cognitive science (Gibbs 1993; 1994; Lakoff 1986; Récanati 1993, 1995): 1. Conventional literality, in which literal usage is contrasted with poetic usage, exaggeration, embellishment, indirectness, and so on. 2. Subject matter literality, in which certain expressions are the usual ones used to talk about a particular topic. 3. Nonmetaphorical literality, or directly meaningful language, in which one word (concept) is never understood in terms of a second word (or concept). 4. Truth conditional literality, or language that is capable of “fitting the world” (i.e., of referring to objectively existing objects or of being objectively true or false). 5. Context-free literality, in which the literal meaning of an expression is its meaning apart from any communicative situation or its meaning in a null context. It will be clear that a definition of metaphor in language which exploits a contrast with literal meaning can only be successful if it engages with the third definition of literality. This, in turn, suggests that we need to have a theoretical definition of what it means for language or understanding to be ‘direct’, as opposed to ‘indirect’. Cognitive linguists have defined ‘direct’ meanings as those meanings which are not understood in terms of another meaning. Thus, many abstract meanings derive their conceptual structure from more concrete meanings, as when the relatively abstract emotion of desire is structured via hunger or fire. Similarly, many aspects of time are structured in terms of space, as when we say that we have put a bad experience behind us, or that we are looking forward to meeting somebody. By contrast, hunger and fire themselves are presumably understood directly, without the help of another meaning. Similarly, aspects of space are usually also understood directly. This theoretical approach can be applied equally felicitously to words and to concepts, or to language and to thought. The distinction between direct and indirect understanding,


in both language and thought, is the cornerstone of the cognitive-linguistic definition of metaphor. One potentially disturbing problem needs to be cleared away here. When one starts out from the target concept that is metaphorically conceptualized, it is hard to see that there is anything like indirect meaning at play. Thus, when we talk or think about argumentation, it does not feel as if we are using indirect language when we say that we attack or defend positions. This is because it is hard to talk in another way about argumentation than with this vocabulary. That is why some psychologists have difficulty accepting that metaphor involves indirectness. However, this should change when we shift the perspective to the source domain. The words and concepts of attacking, defending, and positions have a primary or basic meaning which is not to do with argumentation, but with fighting or war. This is the foundation of the indirectness thesis. The assumption is that metaphorically used words or concepts are applied to another domain or space or category or concept than the one that they are ‘basically’ or ‘directly’ applied to. To determine the nature of this basic or direct application is the real task for researchers of metaphor. When words or concepts are not understood directly, they may be metaphorical. When desire is understood as hunger, then our knowledge of hunger can help us understand desire along the same lines. For instance, it suggests that when we do not have access to what we desire, our frustration will mount. And it entails that when we do have access to what we desire, our frustration will decrease or disappear. In that case, love may be the banquet on which we feed, a line by Bruce Springsteen. Preservation of these types of inference structures between source and target domains is the typical characteristic of metaphor as a cross-domain mapping in thought, and it is this preservation which can be exploited in language and its use. Another important comment has to be made here, which has to do with the precise meaning of the term ‘understanding’, and it lies at the heart of my concerns in this book. For even though it may be possible to describe the conceptual structure of some words or concepts (such as for instance desire) in terms of other words or concepts (such as for instance hunger), this does not necessarily mean that every time we activate concepts of desire during actual cognition, we also activate or construe the cross-domain mapping from hunger to desire. It is true that this is the strong position defended by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a: 66), as we have seen above when we signaled that the two-domain approach assumes a direct relation between conceptual and psychological analysis. However, it is also possible that the observable conceptual mapping may have done its job in the psychology of individuals a long time ago. It may even have done its cognitive job outside the contemporary individual, in the history of the language as whole. Individuals simply learn a lot of vocabulary and other grammatical structures wholesale when they acquire language, and they do not have to always do that by means of a complete rerun of the course of language history (Tomasello 1999, 2003). The situation is probably even different for different words and concepts across different individuals (cf. Blasko 1999).

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As a result, desire may now have its own conceptual structure and function without any further empirical connections to hunger in the cognitive structures of every individual’s mind. In other words, even though desire may be analyzed as pertaining to two conceptual domains, it may still be directly understood by an individual who uses the concept or word on a particular occasion (cf. Gentner & Bowdle 2001; Giora 2003; Glucksberg 2001). This goes back to the various theoretical positions distinguished by Gibbs (1999b) when, in Chapter 1, we discussed the question of the goal of collecting converging evidence. Similar considerations pertaining to distinct conceptualizations of all meaning in linguistics have been put forward by Ariel (2002). Assuming that metaphor depends upon understanding one thing in terms of another in some way, its observation in language and thought involves the presence and distinction of at least two domains that are present at the same time. This is true for all models discussed above, since the two domains may either be needed to trigger a cross-domain mapping or a categorization process. However, it is possible that in conventional metaphorical polysemy only one domain is activated in the individual mind; in that case, a person cannot be said to actually understand one thing in terms of another in terms of on-line processing. It may therefore be concluded that the theoretical question of the general definition of metaphorical versus non-metaphorical meaning appears to be resolvable by utilizing the distinction between direct and indirect meaning. Indirect meaning arises when two domains are involved in understanding the meaning of a word or concept. Opinions differ as to when a meaning is related in metaphorical fashion to another, more basic meaning. Thus, both Glucksberg and McGlone (1999) and Jackendoff (e.g. 2002) are doubtful about the need for a metaphorical explanation of such expressions as (9): (9) a. I have gotten through graduate training. b. We have made it to our goal of finishing this paper. (Glucksberg & McGlone 1999: 1554) They argue for a minimalist assumption about the need for metaphorical meanings, suggesting that distinct senses may be directly retrieved from the lexicon, without interference of some indirect understanding by means of a more basic sense. Lakoff and Johnson and their followers, on the other hand, abide by the live and active nature of the metaphorical relations between basic and extended senses, since these are held to play a role in the production and understanding of novel exploitations of the same linguistic and conceptual patterns. It will therefore be an important issue in this book to examine which methods and techniques there are for discovering and validating indirect meaning as the first step to finding metaphor in language and thought. It is generally acknowledged that the subsequent precise identification of the two distinct domains is a formidable methodological problem (e.g. Dirven 1993; Feyaerts 1999, 2000; Riemer 2001, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibañez & Díez 2002; Warren 2002). These difficulties also apply to the other models of metaphor: for the many-space approach, they are compounded because spaces are specific and ad-hoc, while for the


class-inclusion approach, the superordinate category that is indicated by the vehicle category is also ad-hoc. The career of metaphor model works with all of these phenomena, and is therefore in no better position. Part of our systematic attention will therefore also be devoted to the methodological means for demarcating domains, spaces, categories, and concepts from each other. Another difficulty pertains to finding indirectness in discourse which is not expressed by metaphorical language. Consider the following example from Croft and Cruse (2004): (10) a. Talley made love as if he were starving b. Bray’s tone had the effect of a metal box slamming shut. Even though we have two distinct conceptual domains or spaces which are related to each other by some form of similarity here, the question arises whether any of the words used in the utterances are used indirectly. The language may be classified as all literal, in the cognitive-linguistic sense defined above, even though the conceptual structure which it sets up may be analyzed as a cross-domain mapping. A slightly more complex picture holds for other examples from Croft and Cruse (2004): (11) a. b. c. d.

Bizarre, angry thoughts flew through my mind like a thousand starlings. She was standing there, her eyes fastened to me like steel rivets. Grief tumbled out of her like a waterfall. This is really twisting my brain like a dishrag.

The verbs flew, fastened, tumbled, and twisting are all metaphorical, in that they are concrete, indirect expressions of mental activities. However, the explication of the manner in which the activities are performed involves a direct evocation of a concept for comparison: flying is done by starlings, and so on. These concepts are themselves involved in the mapping which is set up by the utterance as a whole, and they are directly and literally designated by the words in the utterance. The only non-literal, metaphorically used language in these examples is the verbs. Finding metaphor in language is an intricate matter. When it is seen as finding the linguistic reflection of metaphor in conceptual structure, it can include expressions which are not metaphorical, or non-literal, in the traditional sense. An interesting borderline case, in this respect, is formed by simile, which is both a figure of speech as well as an expression of metaphor, but not regarded as non-literal by every scholar of metaphor. However, when metaphor in language refers to indirectly used expressions which have to be interpreted by some mapping from a source to a target, other problems arise. One of these problems has to do with the precise demarcation of source and target domains from each other. Another has to do with the acceptance of metaphorical relations between source and target domains for those metaphorical expressions which are highly conventionalized. And a third problem has to do with the basis for establishing that relation: can it lie in patterns of usage, or does it have to occur in the simultaneous activation of two domains or spaces in the minds of individual language

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users? These are some of the fundamental questions that follow from a precise conceptualization of the field in distinct areas of research with their own questions about what counts as a metaphor.

. Conclusion We have seen that metaphor is defined as a relation between two, three, or four conceptual structures, and that both the relation and the structures have been described in various ways. The relation is seen as either a mapping between two (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999a) or four structures (Fauconnier & Turner 1996, 2002), or as a matter of categorization between two structures with reference to a third, superordinate one (Glucksberg 2001). The structures themselves are seen as domains (Lakoff and Johnson), spaces (Fauconnier and Turner), or categories (Glucksberg). A fourth theory, proposed by Gentner and Bowdle, has attempted to account for the possibility that the number of structures may vary between different classes of metaphor, as well as for the possibility that the relations may vary between different classes of metaphor; the nature of the conceptual structures is kept constant in this theory, and defined as simply involving concepts (Bowdle & Gentner 2005; Gentner & Bowdle 2001). We have also seen that the relations between the conceptual structures have come to be regarded, in most cognitive-linguistic studies at least, as based in some form of nonliteral similarity. Similarity does not necessarily mean either pre-existing or literal similarity, as is supposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) in their argument against the similarity position; nor does it necessarily lead to a view of metaphor as a comparison, as might be concluded by some of the followers of Glucksberg’s categorization approach. What similarity does bring out as an additional criterion for metaphor identification, though, is metaphor’s distinct nature from metonymy, which is held to be based in contiguity (Goossens et al. 1995; Panther & Radden 1999; Barcelona 2000a; Dirven & Pörings 2002; Panther & Thornburg 2003). The distinction between the two figures, I have argued, is based on two independent factors: both metaphor and metonymy have to be opposed to non-metaphor and non-metonymy, and the two figures can co-occur and interact. These interactions have been recognized in most cognitive-linguistic publications, but they have often led to the position that metaphor and metonymy are two endpoints on one scale. I have argued that this is a simplification, and that the same expression may be analyzed from the viewpoint of a scale of metaphor versus nonmetaphor as well as from the angle of metonymy versus nonmetonymy. This is also why the metaphorical cannot be opposed to the literal: when an expression is not metaphorical, it is not necessarily literal, but could also be metonymic, synecdochic, and so on. These conceptual aspects of metaphor identification have to be related to the linguistic analysis of the expression of metaphor in language. Different approaches have concentrated on different linguistic expressions of metaphor, ranging from conventional to novel, and from metaphor through simile to analogy. In addition, these


conceptual aspects also have to be related to the psychological analysis of the processing of metaphor in thought. Some of these approaches assume that there is a tight relation between the conceptual structure of metaphor as a mapping (or not), on the one hand, and the cognitive processes by which it is produced or understood as either some form of comparison or some form of categorization, on the other. The career of metaphor approach, however, has questioned this assumption and presented evidence that metaphor form and conventionality determine how the potential conceptual cross-domain mapping in conceptual structure is handled in cognition. There are hence clear distinctions between the conceptual, linguistic, and psychological analysis of metaphor, which are dramatized by different positions within each of these areas of analysis by the four dominant models in the field. Metaphor can involve the systematic and extensive mapping between two conceptual domains, such as happiness and up. These conceptual domains may be expressed by various means, including language, but also visuals. And these linguistic expressions and underlying conceptual structures may then be seen as the product of, and stimulus for, psychological processing by individual language users who have to build cognitive representations of them. All of these phenomena may be less systematic, and they can even be entirely new and ad hoc. In the latter case, they are necessarily part of the study of usage; all of the other phenomena can be studied as part of grammar or usage. How this can be done by means of concrete operational definitions of these aspects of metaphor will be explored in the next chapter.

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chapter 

Operationalization Operational definitions

Bruce Springsteen’s love song ‘Fire’ has a bridge which goes like this: You had a hold on me right from the start A grip so tight I couldn’t tear it apart My nerves all jumping acting like a fool Well your kisses they burn but your heart stays cool Springsteen’s conceptualization and expression of love clearly exploits a number of conventional metaphorical themes which may be described as cross-domain mappings. The first two lines depict love as seizure, the second line developing the conventional image in the first line into something slightly more specific than usual, perhaps. The third line portrays emotional stress in terms of physical jumping. And the fourth line turns to emotion as temperature, adding a secondary image of fire to the hot end of the scale. These are all clear candidates for analysis as metaphor in terms of a cross-domain mapping. However, detailed inspection raises interesting questions. For instance, what to do with the expression have a hold, a form of grammatical metaphor which is in principle independent of the notion of seizure (we can also ‘have a shower’ or ‘have lunch’). Can that type of construction also be called a cross-domain mapping? By what criteria, applied to which aspects of the expression? Similarly, why would “my nerves all jumping” count as a cross-domain mapping that is metaphorical, and not, for instance, metonymic, the physical behavior standing for the emotional experience that triggers it? These questions show that we need operational or practical criteria to decide what counts as a cross-domain mapping, and how. One aim of the previous chapters was to develop our view of metaphor as linguistic form, conceptual structure, and their behavioral manifestation as psychological process and product. All metaphor models that we have looked at acknowledge these distinctions. They also explore their interrelations, often in deductive ways from the starting point of conceptual metaphor. But linguistic form, conceptual structure, and their related psychological processes and products are also at times confounded or conflated in some of the more rhetorical or didactic publications: analyses of linguistic form and conceptual structure are too often couched in the language of cognitive psychology without adequate behavioral support. I suggest that these problems can be

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circumvented when more attention is paid to their theoretical conceptualization. If the conceptualizations of metaphor as linguistic form, conceptual structure, and psychological process and product are to play a guiding role in finding metaphor in grammar and usage, they also need to be operationalized in more concrete terms for empirical research. I concur with Lynne Cameron (1999a: 7), who writes: “Operationalizing metaphor for a research study requires the researcher to establish appropriate theoretical frameworks that define and categorize the phenomena of concern, and that, having constrained what is counted as evidence, further constrain how that data can be analyzed.” Having developed a framework for such theoretical definitions and categorizations of metaphor in the various areas of research, it is the task of this chapter to go into the most important aspects of this process of operationalization. The plan for this chapter is as follows. In the next section, we will return to the eight areas of research distinguished in Chapter 1 and ask, for each area, which operational criteria for metaphor identification are needed by the various schools of metaphor research discussed in Chapter 3. Section 2 then points out that these criteria can be applied to various units of analysis in grammar and usage and that it is essential to be explicit as well as systematic about the level of organization of language (as either grammar or usage) at which metaphor is looked for. The third section continues with a discussion of the possibility that metaphor identification may be broken up into a series of distinct, smaller decisions that need to be taken in a row. And the fourth section refines this perspective by drawing attention to the fact that what counts as metaphor needs to be based in a particular population of language users as a point of reference for making that series of decisions: what is metaphorical to the general language user does not have to be metaphorical to the specialist language user in a particular area, and so on. The last section of the chapter then offers an initial discussion of some of the tools that may be used in making the decisions involved.

. Criteria for metaphor identification Theoretical definitions have to be turned into practical criteria which may be applied in research. To say that metaphor in language is based in some conceptual cross-domain mapping, for instance, is not very helpful until it becomes clear how cross-domain mappings can be observed. Since cross-domain mappings are conceptual phenomena, their relation with linguistic forms as well as with behavioral processes and products in cognition needs to be explained. These linguistic and behavioral manifestations of metaphor, in turn, have to be defined in such a way that they can be identified in either the symbolic structures or the cognitive patterns of grammar and usage in unambiguous fashion. When a theoretical definition is turned into an operational one, there is also the issue of its areas of application. We have seen in Chapter 1 that there are a number of distinct research areas which all display their own phenomena. But not all theorists in the four schools of metaphor research have thematized the distinctions between the

Chapter 4. Operationalization

eight areas of research, nor all of their underlying dimensions and interactions. This makes it a somewhat risky endeavor to give answers to the questions posed at the end of Chapter 1, when a particular phenomenon in each of these areas counts as metaphorical in which theoretical framework. I will attempt to do so in the spirit of the theories as I understand them. However, it should be clear that my overall approach may also raise new questions for some of these areas for some of these schools of thought.

.. Criteria for metaphor in usage For reasons of exposition, it is easier to begin with the four research areas distinguished for the right-hand column in the original figure, the column of usage (see Fig. 4.1). Another convenience which I have permitted myself is to leave many-space theory, or Conceptual Integration Theory, out of consideration. The main reason for this decision is the fact that both Glucksberg and his associates as well as Gentner and her co-workers have been in serious discussion with the model proposed by Lakoff and Johnson for some time, so that the correspondences and differences have become fairly explicit for these three schools. Since these discussions have typically concentrated on metaphor comprehension, we will start out from that part of the field. There is a clear difference between the three schools when it comes to the criterion for metaphor identification in reception processes and their products. Presumably these criteria are also reflected in the processes and products of metaphor production. As far as the conceptual structures of metaphor are concerned, Conceptual Metaphor Theory sticks to its original and bold claim that comprehending and understanding metaphor in discourse involves the on-line construction or retrieval of a cross-domain mapping. For Conceptual Metaphor Theory finding metaphor in cognitive processing would therefore require the identification of two activated conceptual domains in the behavioral data which are connected by a cross-domain mapping. Class-inclusion theory, by contrast, makes a distinction between the comprehension and understanding processes and products of conventional versus novel metaphors. For novel metaphors, it is claimed that the vehicle term simultaneously refers to and activates two categories, one base category relating to the regular content of the metaphorically used concept while the other pertains to the new content of an adhoc concept which is constructed on the spot. In addition, the adhoc concept is superordinate to both the metaphorically used base concept as well as the target concept to which the base concept is applied. The regular example is My job is a jail. For conventional metaphors, however, it is claimed that only one category is referred to and activated by the vehicle term, the superordinate concept capturing the metaphorical content which has become conventionalized as a distinct and regular category. It can be retrieved from memory and is not constructed on an adhoc basis from the original source concept anymore. Finding metaphor in cognitive processing and its products therefore involves two different scenarios with two different criteria for class-inclusion theory: for novel metaphor, an activated source category and an activated adhoc superordinate category are required, in addition to some activated target

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Figure 4.1 Criteria for finding metaphor in usage

Research area

Conceptual metaphor theory If it expresses a mapping between two domains.

Class-inclusion theory Symbolic variant of processing

Career of metaphor theory Symbolic variant of processing

When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form in text and talk count as metaphorical?

If there is a mapping between two domains.

Symbolic variant of processing (‘hypothetical’)

Symbolic variant of processing (‘empirical’)

When does the production or reception in text or talk of any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical?

If it involves the expression of a mapping between two domains.

If it involves one sense and dual reference to one category and an ad-hoc superordinate category (novel met); if it involves one sense and single reference to a superordinate category (conv met).

If it involves one sense and dual reference to two concepts that are compared (novel met); if it involves one sense and single reference to a superordinate concept, (conv met).

When does the production or reception in text or talk of a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical?

If it involves a mapping between two domains.

If it involves one category and an ad-hoc superordinate category (novel met); if it involves a particular type of superordinate category (conv met).

If it involves two concepts that are compared (novel met); if it involves a particular type of superordinate concept (conv met).

When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing in text and talk count as metaphorical?


category; but for conventional metaphor, an activated superordinate category is all that is needed (in the context of some activated target category). The career of metaphor theory agrees with the need for two different scenarios for conventional versus novel metaphor. This is partly because Gentner and her coworkers take seriously the evidence in for instance Keysar et al. (2000), which calls into question the central claim proposed by Conceptual Metaphor Theory that conventionally metaphorical expressions always activate conceptual mappings. For conventional metaphor, the career of metaphor theory agrees with class-inclusion theory and also expects a class-inclusion or categorization process, which works by activating a conventionalized superordinate category. For novel metaphors, however, the career of metaphor theory does not agree with class-inclusion theory that these are understood by the construction of an adhoc superordinate category and a concomitant process of categorization. Instead, the career of metaphor theory holds that novel metaphor is processed by means of the construction of a cross-domain mapping and a concomitant process of comparison involving alignment and similarity. For the career of metaphor theory, finding metaphor in cognitive processing and its products therefore involves two different scenarios with two different criteria: for novel metaphor, you require an activated source concept and an activated target concept that are connected by a cross-domain mapping, but for conventional metaphor, you only need an activated superordinate category and a process of categorization that applies to the activated target category. There is another reason why the career of metaphor theory prefers its own criteria for metaphor as opposed to the ones required by Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This has to do with the experimental evidence about linguistic processing as opposed to conceptual processing, presented by for instance Giora (2003). During lexical access, conventionally metaphorical words give rise to the activation of multiple senses, after which the metaphorical sense is rapidly filtered out as the relevant sense. This could suggest that, for understanding conventional metaphors, conceptual cross-domain mappings do not have to be constructed or even retrieved, since the comprehension process does not get to a stage of activating the relevant conceptual source domain in the first place. It may stop once disambiguation has taken place. Finding metaphor in the comprehension process of conventional metaphorical linguistic expressions, therefore, may require the detection of two activated senses at a particular moment in the time course of processing. For novel metaphorical expressions, this does not apply, since there is no conventionally metaphorical sense which may be activated in the mental dictionary. In that case, only the basic source domain sense can be activated and it feeds into the construction of a conceptual representation of the utterance which will then require a resolution of the incongruity caused by the metaphorically used word and concept in the context of the utterance. This, says the career of metaphor theory, typically happens by the construction of a cross-domain mapping at a conceptual level. Finding metaphor at the level of individual language processing, therefore, involves the observation of two activated, metaphorically related, senses for conventional metaphor, but

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only one activated, base sense for novel metaphor. The latter is then joined at a later stage by a novel sense which is constructed on the spot by means of alignment and mapping processes involving conceptual structures. Although Bowdle and Gentner (2005: 211) have later evaluated even this view as a possible oversimplification, since it leaves aside the role of the rhetorical form in which a metaphor is expressed, it will serve at this moment to capture the major correspondences and differences between the three models. It looks as if a comparable view of metaphor processing at the level of lexical access is adhered to by Glucksberg and his colleagues (Keysar et al. 2000): they also make a distinction between the conceptual and the linguistic assumptions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory as opposed to class-inclusion theory. As Glucksberg and McGlone write: “To understand such conventionalized expressions, knowledge of the lexicon would suffice” (1999: 1543). In their view, conventional metaphor in the individual lexicon also involves polysemy, but, in contrast to Conceptual Metaphor Theorists, they hold that polysemy does not require a metaphorical connection between the senses anymore (Keysar et al. 2000: 592). This would appear to mean that, for class-inclusion theory, finding metaphor in individuals processing linguistic forms always involves the detection of only one relevant sense, either the conventionally metaphorical one (for conventional metaphor) or the original base sense that is needed to set up the base category for subsequent conceptual processing by means of the construction of an adhoc superordinate category (for novel metaphor). The above analysis largely rests on the distinction between conventional and novel metaphor. Conventional metaphor gives rise to polysemous lexical items (and other linguistic forms, which we are leaving aside here for the sake of simplicity). Polysemy, the argument goes in both the career of metaphor theory as well as in class-inclusion theory, has a profound effect on the way language is processed, since it increases the direct availability and accessibility of the metaphorical meanings of words. Although this sounds much like Conceptual Metaphor Theory, it is in fact the opposite of what is held there: Lakoff and Johnson and their followers hold that polysemy facilitates the access language users have to the related underlying cross-domain mappings in conceptual structure. For Conceptual Metaphor Theory, therefore, finding metaphor in people’s cognitive processing of linguistic forms requires the observation of polysemy or two related senses for conventional metaphor, and of the original source domain meaning or one sense for novel metaphor, both of which should be expressive of an activated underlying cross-domain conceptual mapping. When we move our focus from behavior to symbolic structure, we can see that the behavioral views of the three schools are directly reflected in their approach to symbolic structure. For one thing, since Gentner and Glucksberg aim to test their behavioral theories by experimental psycholinguistic research, they need to construct experimental materials in the forms of texts which contain conceptual structures and linguistic forms that are appropriate as stimuli for the various processes that are predicted to take place. That is why Bowdle and Gentner (2005) make a distinction between novel and conventional metaphors in their materials as stimuli for trigger-


ing comparison and/or categorization processes, and why Keysar et al. (2000) make a distinction between stock phrases and nonconventional expressions of underlying conceptual mappings. Separate tests for genuine polysemy for the group of conventional metaphors I have not seen, but many of the linguistic test items are taken from the standard cognitive-linguistic literature, where polysemy is an almost standard ingredient of conventional metaphor. When a conceptual mapping in some utterance is analyzed from a symbolic perspective, it is presented as a “hypothetical mapping” by Glucksberg and McGlone (1999: 1545). This emphasizes the instrumental role of the analysis of the symbolic structure of language and text for behavioral research in the case of class-inclusion theory: a mapping is hypothetical as long as it has not appeared in behavioral data of processing and its products. By contrast, Gentner’s symbolic analyses of the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor and analogy in scientific and educational texts are presented as having an empirical status of their own (e.g. Gentner & Gentner 1983; Gentner & Jeziorski 1993). Textual data about the symbolic structure of metaphor and analogy are regarded as providing insight into “the kinds of similarities that were felt to warrant inferences about the world” (Gentner & Jeziorski 1993: 447–448). At the end of the day, however, the criteria for finding metaphor in the symbolic structure of text and talk are aligned with the criteria for metaphor identification in cognitive processes and their products: for conventional metaphor, both theories require the identification of one source category/concept and its related, conventionalized metaphorical sense for the superordinate domain, and another category/concept and its sense for the target domain. For novel metaphor, the two theories are different, in the same way as for processing. In particular, class-inclusion theory holds that a symbolic analysis of novel metaphor requires one sense for the source domain category, and dual reference to the source domain category itself and the novel superordinate category, in addition to one sense plus regular reference for the target domain category. By contrast, career of metaphor theory suggests that the symbolic analysis of novel metaphor needs one sense for the source domain concept as well as alignment and mapping onto another target domain concept and its regular sense. The behavioral predictions made by Conceptual Metaphor Theory are also reflected in its symbolic analysis of the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor in text and talk. These analyses are not presented as auxiliary to behavioral research, though, but are presented as empirical analyses in their own right, of the symbolic structure of usage in its linguistic and conceptual respects. Polysemy does play an important role in the identification of conventional metaphor, so that, by implication, a lack of polysemy may suggest metaphorical novelty. And the idea is that there always are two conceptual domains, which are related by a cross-domain mapping. This concludes my analysis of criteria for metaphor identification in usage with respect to the three schools of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, class-inclusion theory, and the career of metaphor theory. We shall now move on to a similar discussion of

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the four areas of metaphor research that have to do with grammar. The overview in Fig. 4.2 may provide initial orientation.

.. Criteria for metaphor in grammar The transition from metaphor identification in the areas of usage to the areas of metaphor in grammar can be usefully thrown into relief by looking at a number of comments made by Glucksberg and McGlone (1999: 1557). They explicitly present their own theory as a discourse processing theory. They make a point of contrasting such a theory with a theory of thought, “which we take Lakoff ’s ‘conceptual metaphor’ theory to be”. By such a theory of thought, Glucksberg and McGlone seem to include my areas of the symbolic (‘hypothetical’) structure of conceptual metaphor in grammar (row 2 in Fig. 4.2 below) as well as the cognitive representation of such metaphorical conceptual structures in people’s memory (row 4 in Fig. 4.2). What is most important to Glucksberg and McGlone is the following: We do not deny that the domains of discourse and conceptualization must interact in some systematic, yet-to-be-understood fashion. However, the domains are distinct and will require independent theoretical elaboration and development. (1999: 1557)

This is another reason why it is useful to distinguish between grammar and usage and their more specific sub domains of research. As a result, Glucksberg and McGlone prefer to remain “agnostic” (p. 1554, 1555) about the presence of conventionalized conceptual mappings in people’s conceptual systems, on the basis of too much evidence which they interpret as undermining the basic proposal advanced by Conceptual Metaphor Theory (row 4). They even find the theory “incoherent”, for reasons which will not detain us here (cf. Glucksberg 2001: 107). Their views of symbolic as opposed to behavioral analyses of conceptual metaphor will therefore probably lead to the same conclusion (row 2), that classinclusion theorists do not see sufficient reason to assume the existence of conceptual metaphor. At the end of the day, class-inclusion theorists are not really focused on finding metaphor in these areas of research. Glucksberg and McGlone also deny that such presumed conceptual mappings could keep informing the meaning of linguistic forms (e.g. 1999: 1543): “Eventually, originally metaphoric meanings are listed as conventional word senses in dictionaries.” To class-inclusion theory this seems to suggest that, both at a cognitive as well as a symbolic level, much conventionalized metaphor in lexico-grammar ceases to be metaphorical. Using The road goes from London to Canterbury as an example, Keysar et al. (2000: 592) argue that the verb go is simply polysemous, which to them implies that it does not require any conceptual mappings for its comprehension. This leads to their denial that these expressions are metaphorical (cf. Glucksberg 2001). My tentative conclusion is that, from the perspective of class-inclusion theory, much metaphorical linguistic form that has got conventionalized in grammar is not


Figure 4.2 Criteria for metaphor in grammar in three schools of metaphor research

Conceptual metaphor theory If it expresses a mapping between two domains.

Class inclusion theory Deny that most conventional metaphor is still metaphorical.

Career of metaphor theory Expression of superordinate re-categorization by polysemous item which results from nonliteral comparison in a previous stage.

When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical?

If there is a mapping between two domains.

Reject CMT as incoherent; agnostic.

Superordinate re-categorization which results from comparison in previous stage.

When does the storing, acquisition or even loss of a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical?

If it involves the expression of a mapping between two domains.

Agnostic (for much language gets learned directly).

Possible, and met if it involves the expression of a mapping between two domains.

When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical?

If it involves a mapping between two domains.

Reject CMT as incoherent; agnostic.

Controversial, but met if it involves a mapping between two domains.

When does a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical?

metaphorical anymore, neither in the area of symbolic analysis (row 1) nor in the area of cognitive analysis (row 3). Which other expressions that are regarded as conventionally metaphorical in cognitive linguistics can still count as metaphorical in class-inclusion theory is not completely clear. This does not seem to become problematic to class-inclusion theorists, though, because as a rule they are less concerned with

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


finding metaphor in these areas of research; they simply use proposals by cognitive linguists for experimental testing in behavior instead of symbolic structure. The career of metaphor theory has a rather different angle. Bowdle and Gentner (2005) take the existence of conventionalized cross-domain mappings in individual memory (row 4) as a controversial question which they do not say much about, whereas the existence of conventionally metaphorical expressions in the lexicon (row 1) is plain to see. That such linguistic forms can be seen as the expression of related systems of extended metaphorical mappings is also accepted (row 2). Whether such linguistic forms are also stored in the individual memory as metaphorical items is another matter, but “conventional base terms like crossroads retain a degree of polysemy, referring to both a literal concept and to an associated metaphoric category” (p. 213). To career of metaphor theorists, this suggest that individual processing may still be based on entrenched cross-domain comparisons in the individual mind, in particular under specific circumstances (row 3). As a result, the career of metaphor theory allows for metaphor in lexico-grammar along the same lines of identification as in usage. The position of Lakoff and Johnson should be sufficiently clear by now. We have therefore completed our tour of criteria for operationalizing the identification of metaphor in usage and grammar. It turns out that different models have different criteria for different areas of research. As long as this situation continues, metaphor research will be hindered by a Babylonian confusion where terms and results have to be interpreted with caution.

. Units of analysis Once the appropriate operational criteria for a particular area of research have been circumscribed, the operational definition needs to be applied consistently to one particular unit of analysis. Language and its cognitive processing and products display metaphorical meaning at many levels of organization, in both grammar and usage. For instance, linguistic forms which may express a cross-domain mapping may be pitched at the level of morphemes, lexical items, phrases, clauses, or sentences, all of which have been studied as forms with functions in their own right by various schools of grammar. In spoken usage, these grammatical units may be taken as one point of departure, but there are also such units of analysis as tone units, utterances, and turns (e.g. Foster, Tonkyn, & Wigglesworth 2000), each of which may also be considered for displaying metaphorical meaning. In comprehension, metaphorical meaning may be relevant to lexical accessing, but also to phrasal and clausal processing and their integration into discourse (e.g., Janus & Bever 1985). An empirical investigation wishing to find metaphor in one of the particular research areas demarcated above will still have to specify which phenomenon within that area is being selected for analysis. I will use Croft and Cruse’s (2004) examples of simile-within-metaphor to illustrate how such differences can play out in concrete analysis:


(1) a. b. c. d.


From a linguistic point of view, each of these four sentences displays the same pattern: their main verb is used indirectly (metaphorically) to convey some sort of action or process between two entities, and the adverbial adjuncts of comparison are used directly (nonmetaphorically) to specify the manner of that indirectly expressed action or process. Specification of manner takes place by comparing it with the way in which another entity than the one that is the topic of the local discourse would typically perform the action or process that is indirectly expressed. A linguistic analysis would show that there are these two parts of the cross-domain mapping: the first part is always a metaphorically used verb, while the second part does not display metaphorically used language but directly expresses a cross-domain mapping. The conceptual analysis could integrate both of these linguistic parts within one conceptual mapping, with one source domain containing both the verbal and the adverbial elements, which would have to be mapped onto the target domain. There might hence be at least three ways of identifying the metaphors in these data: – –

–

only the verbs (metaphor as indirect language use) both the verbs and the adverbial adjuncts, but as a combination of two distinct linguistic categories (metaphor as indirect as well as direct linguistic expressions of conceptual cross-domain mappings; Croft and Cruse’s category of simile-withinmetaphor) the concepts relating to both the verbs and the adjuncts as belonging to one conceptual structure (metaphor as cross-domain mapping)

Analysts of metaphor in usage will have to explain which of these three options they employ for identifying metaphors in their data. Now consider the following variants of these sentences: (2) a. b. c. d.

Bizarre, angry thoughts flew through my mind, like a thousand starlings. She was standing there, her eyes fastened to me, like steel rivets. Grief tumbled out of her, like a waterfall. This is really twisting my brain, like a dishrag.

The addition of the comma breaks the sentences up into separate discourse units, the adjuncts of comparison being added as afterthoughts which have a relatively independent status and function in the discourse (e.g. Hannay & Kroon 2005; Langacker 2001; Steen 2005b). The linguistic analysis would now have to make an additional decision, whether to ignore this linguistic segmentation of the discourse and uphold the previous account and identify the metaphors accordingly, or whether to consider an alternative analysis, which would take each sentence as consisting of two independent parts. The first part of each sentence then contains one metaphorically used word only,

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which indirectly conveys some sort of process or action. The second part of each sentence then further specifies, in a separate stage, the identity of the process or action in question by adding more precise details about the concrete nature of the domain from which the process or action is derived. In the latter analysis, each sentence would have two separate linguistic expressions of either one or two underlying metaphors, depending on your view of the unit of the conceptual mapping. There would be one distinct expression of the underlying metaphor(s) in each autonomous part of the sentence. Every second expression of the underlying metaphor(s) would have the form of a simile. The simile narrows down the interpretation of the metaphor in the first discourse unit by means of a separate and specific, consecutive operation upon the mapping set up in the first clause. In the conceptual structure of this stretch of discourse, there would be two consecutive mappings. The first mapping would only be based on the indirect use of the verb and display a relatively local but general mapping. The second mapping, however, would be incrementally based on the combined use of the verb, which is presupposed by the addition, and the novel adverbial adjunct, which adds the concrete entity related to verb. It would hence be richer and more specific than the first mapping, which is only based on the verb. An overview of the various outcomes of finding metaphor in (2a), Bizarre, angry thoughts flew through my mind, like a thousand starlings, can be found in Table 4.1. Since units of metaphor interact in important ways with the detailed structure of language use, this interaction has far-reaching effects on the identification of the precise nature of the metaphor in the distinct areas of linguistic and conceptual analysis. It may be easily imagined that this issue becomes exponentially more complex when metaphor extension takes place across longer stretches of discourse. For such cases of metaphor, assumptions will have to be made about the unit of analysis within which metaphor may be found if a study wishes to be explicit about where it has found Table 4.1 Metaphor identification and units of analysis Unit of analysis

Findings

Only metaphorically used words

1. Flew 2. through

All linguistic forms expressing the source domain of an underlying mapping All linguistic forms expressing the source domain of an underlying mapping per utterance The source domain of the cross-domain mapping

Flew through, A thousand starlings

The source domain of the cross-domain mapping per utterance

1. Something flew through something 2. a thousand starlings flew through something

1. Flew through 2. A thousand starlings a thousand starlings flew through something


metaphor in language as usage: in the separate words, the utterances, the sentences, paragraphs, or the message as a whole (cf. Crisp et al. 2002). Moreover, decisions also have to be made about the conceptual units and their incremental relationships (cf. Langacker 2001; Steen 2005b): do the two linguistic expressions as well as conceptual mappings in our example sentences count as two distinct and therefore two different metaphorical units, or as one? These are fundamental operational issues in finding metaphor in language which have not been accorded much attention yet. That they can have profound implications on units of analysis in behavioral research is self-evident (cf. Janus & Bever 1985).

.. Grammatical metaphor The fundamental role played by units of analysis can also throw light on the interesting phenomenon called grammatical metaphor (Halliday 1985/1994; Halliday & Matthiessen 1999; Simon-Vandenbergen, Taverniers, & Ravelli 2003). Grammatical metaphor, according to Halliday (1985/1994), involves the ‘incongruent’ expression of what could be expressed less metaphorically and more directly by more ‘congruent’ grammatical means. Consider (3) and (4): (3) a. Mary saw something wonderful b. Mary came upon a wonderful sight c. A wonderful sight met Mary (4) a. It is probably going to rain b. I think it’s going to rain Halliday claims that (3a) and (4a) are the most straightforward, or ‘congruent’, codings of the meanings selected, whereas (3b and 3c) and (4b) are not. They involve grammatical metaphor, with a mental process (3a) being expressed as a material process (3b, 3c), and a material process (4a) being expressed as a mental one (4b). The alternative forms of expression (or ‘agnates’) do not just involve a different choice of vocabulary but also the use of different grammatical constructions; the latter are called grammatical metaphors. The problem for our present concerns is the precise location and hence identification of grammatical metaphor in some unit of the linguistic structure. The typical case of grammatical metaphor involves nominalization: (5) a. On Macquarie’s arrival in England he was already a thing of the past. b. When Macquarie arrived in England . . . (from Derewianka 2003: 196) The nominalization in (5a) is supposed to have two meanings, one of process and one of thing: the ‘thing’ aspect is expressed by the syntax of the noun phrase while the ‘process’ meaning has to be recovered from its semantics (Derewianka 2003: 185). There are many other authors in Systemic Functional Grammar who claim that the meaning of a nominal construction with another referent than a thing is grammatically metaphorical (Heyvaert 2003: 65; Lassen 2003: 281; Painter 2003: 151; Ravelli

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2003: 42; Simon-Vandenbergen 2003: 224ff.). Since this relation is systematic and involves a wide range of phenomena, it has boosted a deductive approach to finding grammatical metaphor in Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) that is just as popular as the deductive approach in cognitive linguistics. However, a number of difficulties have been noted with the exact definition and identification of grammatical metaphor by several authors in the SFG school (e.g. Holme 2003; Ravelli 2003; Simon-Vandenbergen 2003; Taverniers 2003). The question for the present section is whether grammatical metaphor can be related to a recognizable grammatical unit. In particular, do we have to do with one linguistic form that has a direct as well as an indirect sense which can be said to be related by a cross-domain mapping? One aspect of the analysis of grammatical metaphors pertains to the syntactic status of the expression which is said to be grammatically metaphorical. Nominal groups ‘mean’ things, verbal groups ‘mean’ processes, and so on (an assumption which connects SFG with the cognitive-linguistic approach to grammar of Langacker 1987, 1991). Yet it is not the case that the nominal form arrival in (5b) has to be syntactically disambiguated between either a ‘thing’ meaning or a ‘process’ meaning, since it only has a ‘thing’ meaning. As a syntactic entity, being a nominal group, arrival is not necessarily metaphorical. What is happening instead is something else. The ‘thing’ meaning of this expression derives from one dimension of the lexico-grammatical form, the fact that arrival is a nominal group, but the ‘process’ meaning derives from another aspect, the semantic fact that arrival does not designate an entity but a process. Grammatical metaphor exhibits a metaphorical mapping between two meanings which derive from what Systemic Functional grammarians call two different strata of the language system, its lexico-grammar and its semantics (compare Holme 2003; Ravelli 2003; Simon-Vandenbergen 2003; Taverniers 2003). Some further examples are listed in Table 4.2, taken from Derewianka (2003: 197). These expressions may all be analyzed as involving two conceptual domains indeed. Processes and circumstances, for instance, are not things. But the important point about grammatical metaphor is that the two conceptual domains always reside in two different strata of language, lexico-grammatical form and semantic structure. This reveals the conspicuous and fundamental difference between grammatical metaphor, such as nominalization, and lexical metaphor, such as the metaphorically motivated polysemy of a word like attack. The cross between the two conceptual domains does not arise in the same dimension of the linguistic sign, as it does in the two senses that can be connected to the word form attack. To find grammatical metaphor, we need to consider two different dimensions of signs at the same time, their lexico-grammar in contrast with their semantics, as with the ‘thingy’ meaning of the syntax of arrival in contrast with the ‘process’ meaning of its semantics. Finding grammatical metaphor involves a two-dimensional approach to the symbolic data, whether these signs are pitched as lexical units, phrasal units, or what have you.


Table 4.2 Major groupings of experiential grammatical metaphor Shift to ‘thing’ #

semantic shift

class shift

example

1a 1b

quality > quality: thing process > process : thing (i) ‘doing’ process > ‘doing’ process : thing (ii) ‘sensing’ process > ‘sensing’ process: thing (iii) ‘saying’ process > ‘saying’ process : thing (iv) ‘relating’ process > ‘relating process’ : thing phase of process > phase of process: thing conation > conation: thing modality of process > modality of process: thing

adjective > noun verb > noun verb > noun verb > noun verb > noun verb > noun tense > noun phase > noun modal > noun

unstable > instability

circumstance > circumstance: thing Minor process > minor process: thing relator > relator: thing

adv. Group/prep. phrase > noun preposition > noun conjunction > noun

1c 1d 1e

1f 1g 1h

transform > transformation imagine > imagining declare > declaration has > ownership going to > prospect try to > attempt can > possibility; may/must > permission/necessity ‘how quickly?’ > rate [of growth] with > accompaniment so > cause, proof

Demarcating the unit of analysis is hence not limited to making decisions about a behavioral unit versus a symbolic unit, as when you want to find metaphor in utterances or turns on the one hand versus clauses or sentences on the other, nor about the extent of that unit across larger or smaller parts of grammar or usage. Units of analysis are also determined by their definition as solely semantic units, as in the polysemy of words like defend and attack, or multidimensional units with both a grammatical dimension as well as a semantic dimension, as in the potentially metaphorical nature of nominalizations like arrival. Again, pitching your definition of units of analysis at one or the other level of abstraction has far-reaching consequences for the number and kinds of phenomena that need to be taken into account. Whether all linguists explicate and apply such definitions in consistent fashion across the board of their data is a theme which is not often discussed in the research reports published in journals and books. It would be one step forward if that methodological decision were to be reported in more detail in the future. This is not just a matter of good practice: to call grammatical metaphor ‘metaphor’ is to place it on one line with lexical metaphor, which has implications for its function in processing. In itself, there is nothing against such an alignment, since both can in principle be seen as

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grammatical constructions. However, there also is a conspicuous difference between the two. Lexical metaphor simply has to be disambiguated between its nonmetaphorical and metaphorical meaning, in order to understand what is meant by utterances like Michael Jackson was attacked by his sister. I suspect that this will not be the case for the understanding of our example sentence (5b) above, where people can stick to lexical processing without worrying about the syntactic status of arrival as a ‘thingy’ entity. A theoretical explication of the choice of a particular unit of analysis is of the essence for achieving an adequate understanding of metaphor in the various areas of research.

. Moments of decision When criteria and units of analysis have been determined, it is also important to see that the general goal of identifying a particular phenomenon can be transformed into a series of separate moments of decision. I will use the Pragglejaz procedure for finding metaphorically used words in natural discourse to illustrate what this means (Pragglejaz Group 2007). This is a procedure which might be applied by linguists in the analysis of the linguistic forms or conceptual structures of metaphor in usage for the description of conventionalized metaphor in grammar, or for the description of all lexical metaphor in usage. It might also be applied by behavioral researchers who need to study metaphor in the verbal usage of their experimental participants or of interlocutors in natural conversations, where metaphor in usage is part of cognitive processes pertaining to either production and comprehension or even storage. The procedure might also be applied by experimental researchers who need to validate their experimental materials. A procedure like this has the advantage that each of the moments of decision can be defined precisely, can be seen to play a clear role of their own in the encompassing set of instructions, and can be singled out as a locus of interest when researchers display disagreement about their data analysis. The Pragglejaz procedure focuses on the symbolic analysis of metaphorically used words, or lexical units, in discourse (the last cell in row 1 in Fig. 1.1 in Chapter 1) and looks like this: 1. Read the entire text/discourse to establish a general understanding of the meaning. 2. Determine the lexical units in the text/discourse 3a. For each lexical unit in the text, establish its meaning in context, i.e. how it applies to an entity, relation or attribute in the situation evoked by the text (contextual meaning). Take into account what comes before and after the lexical unit. 3b. For each lexical unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the one in the given context. For our purposes, basic meanings tend to be: – more concrete; what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, smell, and taste – related to bodily action


– more precise (as opposed to vague) – historically older. Basic meanings are not necessarily the most frequent meanings of the lexical unit. 3c. If the lexical unit has a more basic current/contemporary meaning in other contexts than the given context, decide whether the contextual meaning contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison with it. 4. If yes, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical. This set of instructions was developed and tested over a number of years, and now produces fairly reliable results between individual analysts who display fairly high levels of agreement between their independent analyses of texts (Pragglejaz Group 2007). Some of its strengths and weakness have been discussed in Steen (2001, 2002a, 2005a), while a concrete application is reported by Steen, Biernacka, et al. (in press). Two examples from the latter publication may help to illustrate the workings of the procedure in concrete detail. Consider the following excerpt, from fiction text AC2 from the British National Corpus: (6) You’re sixty-one and have been looking forward to retirement. I’m fifty and have a long way to go. –

–

–

–

Step 3a Contextual meaning In this context, the meaning of the noun way is ‘a period of time’. It is preceded by the adjective long, which adds the length quality to the abstract route or the time of life ahead and it is followed by the verb to go, which indicates abstract advancing on this abstract journey. Step 3b Basic meaning The basic meaning of way in Macmillan is ‘the particular road, path, or track that you use to go from one place to another’. We take this meaning to be basic because it is the more concrete sense. Step 3c Contextual meaning vs. basic meaning The first part of this step raises the question whether the contextual and the basic sense are distinct and can be contrasted. The answer to this question is affirmative: the contextual sense of way is abstract and contrasts with the basic meaning which is concrete and physical. This is reflected by the Macmillan dictionary, which makes a distinction between the main sense of road, path or track and the subsense of time as two separate descriptions. The second part of this step raises the question whether the two senses can be seen as related by comparison. The answer to this question is also affirmative: an abstract road along which you proceed in life can be compared to a physical road along which you go (cf. LIFE IS A JOURNEY). Step 4 Metaphorically used or not? Yes, the contextual sense of way is distinct from the basic sense of way but it can be understood by comparison to the basic sense. Way is a metaphorically used word in this sentence. Now consider the following excerpt, from BNC file KB7 (a conversation):

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(7) I bet you feel like a [?] now, give them in when they can’t truss them dunno. – –

–

–

Step 3a Contextual meaning The verb to bet in this sentence means that the speaker is sure about something he or she is saying. Step 3b Basic meaning In its basic sense, the verb to bet is used with reference to money; to bet money means to risk money by trying to predict the result of a race, game, competition. This sense is basic because it is a concrete sense which involves, for instance, the transfer of money. Step 3c Contextual meaning vs. basic meaning The two senses are distinct and can be contrasted: in the given context, the verb to bet has nothing to do with money, so it is distinct from the basic sense. The Macmillan dictionary lists the contextual use as a fixed phrase which is described as distinct from the basic sense. The two senses can be related by comparison: making a statement about something you believe can be compared to betting money on a horse you believe to win in a race (cf. LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME). Step 4 Metaphorically used or not? Yes, we can understand the meaning of the contextual bet by comparing it to the basic sense of the verb, even though the two senses are distinct.

The Pragglejaz method aims at finding metaphorically used words (linguistic forms) in usage, which may raise a question about its relation to metaphor in thought (conceptual structure). It has explicitly advertised that it has an indirect relation to finding metaphor in thought. The precise nature of any of the underlying mappings that may be reconstructed for the words identified by the method is a separate affair (cf. Crisp 2002). This has to be catered for by another method, such as Antonio Barcelona’s (2002), which will be discussed in Chapter 10. The Pragglejaz method aims to find the linguistic forms of metaphor in usage in such a way as to be maximally compatible with research into thought operationalized as conceptual structure, but it deliberately does not cross the line into that area of research. On a related note, the Pragglejaz Group also aim their findings to be maximally compatible with, but emphatically distinct from, research into metaphor as part of psychological processes and their products of verbal behavior. There is no claim that any of the metaphorically used words identified by the procedure are also actively realized as metaphorical mappings in the individual mind. The idea is to find expressions in language that are potentially metaphorical in such a way that they may be connected to research on psychological processes and their products. Whether metaphor in language, as identified by the Pragglejaz method, is in fact cognitively real in the thought of every language user is seen as an empirical issue. The operationalization of finding metaphor in usage by the Pragglejaz Group, then, involves a number of distinct aspects that are related to respecting the distinctions between the diverse areas of research. There is the differentiation between the linguistic and conceptual analysis of metaphor in usage. The linguistic analysis would have to show that metaphorical meaning is indirect meaning which is potentially mo-


tivated by similarity or cross-domain mapping; this involves looking at some contrast between contextual meanings and basic meanings. A subsequent and independent conceptual analysis would then have to show that there are two distinct but comparable domains which may be linked by a cross-domain mapping. And yet another stage of analysis would involve the realization of these semiotic aspects of the linguistic form and conceptual structure of metaphor in usage behavior. All of these illustrate operational aspects of metaphor identification which have to be taken into account if metaphor in language is to be found in methodologically responsible ways. One interesting consequence of this analysis of the status of the Pragglejaz procedure is the possibility that class-inclusion theorists and other non-believers in Conceptual Metaphor Theory might still wish to employ it for finding metaphor in text and talk for subsequent experimental purposes. At first sight, this looks distinctly odd, because the procedure makes use of the term comparison as part of one of its decisions, and this is a notion which class-inclusion theorists reject for fundamental reasons. However, we have also seen that it is unclear which conventional expressions are regarded as still metaphorical by class-inclusion theory, and that class-inclusion theorists need experimental materials with expressions that are regarded as conventionally metaphorical by Conceptual Metaphor Theorists. It is therefore quite possible for class inclusion theorists to identify or validate metaphors in their materials on the basis of a comparison based procedure in order to do behavioral research on the processing of such materials, which would be aimed to show that such expressions are in fact not processed by comparison but by a process of categorization.

.. Decisions and measurement scales Finding indirect meaning in usage which is potentially metaphorical has been operationalized in the Pragglejaz procedure by the need for the analyst to make five distinct decisions: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

what counts as a stable unit of analysis? what is an adequate description of contextual (situation specific) meaning? what is a generally motivated description of basic meaning? what is the degree of distinctness between the two meanings? what is the degree of similarity between the two meanings?

I suggest that any operational procedure for finding metaphor in language will have to address these questions in one way or another, and that the Pragglejaz method may provide one methodological example for going about this process. Since it is possible to decompose the overall process of metaphor identification into these distinct decisions, the control of the analyst over the overall process is increased. It will be clearer exactly when borderline cases become problematic in the overall decision process. In the case of the Pragglejaz procedure, the various stages focus on the precise role of a potentially metaphorical word as a lexical unit, its contextual meaning, its basic meaning, and the contrast and comparison between them.

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The greater degree of command over the various aspects of the analytical process, in turn, yields an increase in the reliability of the product of the identification method. When analysts disagree about any of these issues, in general or in particular cases, they will differ in deciding what counts as a metaphorically used word (or other linguistic form) in usage. This will send them back to their analysis and force them to explain how they apply each of the criteria in the procedure, which in turn may lead to more uniform understanding and application of the tool. Each of these decisions pertain to data that can be described or measured in various ways, which complicates decision making. This versatility of the data has mostly to do with the fact that many language phenomena exhibit categorization effects that inevitably make them better or worse examples of their category. This means that they can, for instance, be seen as either inside or outside that category, or closer to the centre of that category or not, or on the borderline between one category and another. All of these aspects are part of language research, as has been part and parcel of the cognitive-linguistic view of linguistics (e.g. Croft and Cruse 2004; Taylor 2002), and they have to be accommodated when decisions have to be made about metaphor in grammar and usage. This is not just the case for metaphor as such, as if this were one monolithic whole. It also holds for the five criteria distinguished by the Pragglejaz Group as constitutive of metaphorically used words in natural discourse. This is particularly clear for the last two criteria, of course, where similarity and distinctness are evidently matters of degree and typically dependent upon one’s perspective. However, the fact that reality comes in shades does not prevent the researcher from imposing a more or less fine-grained perspective upon reality. Similarity, for instance, can be measured on various types of scales, traditionally divided into ratio scales, interval scales, rank scales, or nominal scales (for a practical introduction, see e.g. Scholfield 1995). Each of these scales forces another decision upon the researcher when they want to discover the presence of metaphorical similarity in usage. The Pragglejaz Group have used a nominal scale. This means that the decision boils down, in this case, to a binary distinction between the metaphorical and the non-metaphorical. A linguistic form is hence judged to be either in or outside the category of metaphorical expressions. This is a reflection of one, rather gross, angle on metaphorical meaning as opposed to nonmetaphorical meaning, which, however, has served its purpose in cognitive-linguistic research for the past 25 years. Operationalization hence involves the decision on the part of the researcher to adopt a measuring instrument with just two nominal categories (metaphorical versus nonmetaphorical) or not. One reason why a nominal scale may still be preferable despite its coarseness is precisely the fact that the other scales make the assumption that measurement can be carried out in more precise ways. Thus, a rank scale claims that observation is refined enough to order each linguistic expression as more or less metaphorical than another, while also allowing for ties. An interval scale would make the same claim, but add the requirement that the distance between the ranks would always be equal for all of the


various groups of ranked phenomena. And a ratio scale would claim the same as the interval scale, but add the further claim that the absolute value of each of the intervals would also be known to the researcher and kept under constant control during measurement. Each of these types of measurement is in fact more difficult to make when it comes to the accuracy with which every single case can be assigned to a particular rank or position on a scale. This does not seem to be a realistic demand for the area of metaphor analysis. It follows that researchers usually have to make decisions of the nominal type, ‘yes/no/ don’t know’. For the Pragglejaz procedure, for instance, each word has to be judged as being a lexical unit, or not. Questionable cases can be handled as distinct phenomena, with general guidelines for such things as polywords like of course, so that there are very few remaining cases of doubt. The decision whether a contrast and comparison can be set up between the contextual and basic meanings of a lexical unit also involves a series of binary ‘yes/no’ decisions. When the answer to the last question in the series is affirmative, then another yes/no decision falls out, and the lexical unit is automatically classified as metaphorical as opposed to non-metaphorical. Some analysts have difficulties with accepting this type of approach. They feel that yes/no decisions about metaphor are inappropriate, because metaphor is a graded phenomenon. However, the fact that reality is graded does not mean that it is not useful to make gross orderings of reality into contrasting categories, particularly not when, on average, those categories are functional for all sorts of cognitive and linguistic processes and their products. The objections of such linguists may be countered by pointing out two observations: on the one hand, the measurement of reality by binary nominal scales is not the same as its reification into static categories of all or nothing; and on the other hand, if more fine-grained scales of measurement are preferred, they have to be applicable across the board with a demonstrably identical degree of precision and reliability, which is a claim that cannot realistically be defended given the complexity of the data and the fuzziness of most theories. One alternative which seems to offer itself here is the use of groups of informants who can be asked to underline metaphorical expressions in usage. When such data are pooled, some expressions will have been identified much more frequently than others, which may be taken as an index of their gradable metaphorical nature. The problem with such a method, however, is that the informants really need to know what they are doing in order for the data to be valuable to the analyst. Training such a large group of informants to such a degree that this level is achieved requires almost just as much work as training a small group of analysts with professional expertise. The question is whether this would be worth the trouble, but it is certainly worth trying and investigating. In sum, when identification criteria are derived from a particular school of thought, and when a unit of analysis has been selected from the many levels of linguistic organization in symbolic structure or behavior, another task has to be faced by the analyst. This task is the challenge to examine whether it is possible to break up the superficially monolithic decision of classifying a particular case as metaphorical






or nonmetaphorical. Various aspects of the criteria of identification can be selected and ordered in such a way that analysts can use them for streamlining their decision process. The discussion of the Pragglejaz method has suggested that this increases the control of the analyst over the various aspects of deciding what counts as a metaphorical expression in usage. Such decisions are furthermore influenced by the format into which they are forced by the adoption of one type of measuring scale as opposed to another. The Pragglejaz proposal may hence serve as a concrete target for other researchers to clarify their own decision procedures, in order to facilitate methodological comparison and evaluation in the future.

. Metaphorical for who? The role of variation and change One complicating factor in determining what counts as a metaphorical language form, or its attending conceptual structure, is the fact that meaning is always relative to a group of language users. What is metaphorical to one group of language users does not have to be so for another. If the contrast and comparison between a contextual metaphorical meaning and a nonmetaphorical basic meaning of a particular word, or more generally linguistic form, cannot be made because the basic meaning is not available to a particular group of language users, the contextual metaphorical meaning cannot be placed in a cross-domain mapping. Then it ceases to be indirect and hence metaphorical. This type of situation occurs when either social or historical variation between groups leads to different sets of meanings that are or are not available for contrast and comparison. An example is presented by Charteris-Black and Ennis (2001), who argue that the use of English fall or Spanish caida in financial reporting is not metaphorical: . . . were both originally classified as metaphors based on the physical domain of falling through the air. However, it was decided that given their widespread use in the financial press of both languages it was not clear that their primary meaning was physical as opposed to abstract and so they were no longer included as metaphors. (2001: 254)

In studies of social variation the analyst has to make a decision about the basis of comparison between metaphorical and nonmetaphorical uses. Technical or register specific terms with a metaphorical origin may be seen as direct terms within the context of their technical uses because their basic meanings are never used anymore, or at least not within that register. Alternatively, they may be seen as a specific class of metaphorical terms, in contrast with a basic sense that is available from a less specialized language variety that is still current. The former solution may reflect the experience of the specialists in a particular register, who in their day-to-day practice may fail to recognize that their technical terms have a metaphorical basis. But the objection may be raised that even these specialists may, at least in principle, need to have recourse to the general basic senses of both fall and caida in their


professional environments, too. For instance, if a stock broker trips and falls, her colleagues may wish to comment on her mishap by exploiting the connection between the nonmetaphorical and the metaphorical senses of the term. There will have to be good reasons, therefore, to restrict the range of comparison that is used for finding a contrast between a contextual and a basic meaning. These have to do with aim and object of research for which the operational definition is needed. A comparable case is discussed by Cameron (2003: 66–67), who more generally argues that technical language might be metaphorical from an outside perspective, but may not be metaphorical from the perspective of a particular discourse community. For instance, when people say, in maths classes, that 2 and 3 make 5, the use of make might be considered to be metaphorical from a general usage perspective. However, within the discourse community of teaching maths, this use might be considered as basic, since there would be no contrast with a more direct meaning. This might lead to the decision that technical make is not metaphorical. This was in fact argued by Cameron (1999b), and constitutes another example of the kind of decision taken by Charteris-Black and Ennis (2001). To turn to the role of historical variation, consider the meanings of fervent and ardent. The question is whether they are metaphorical in contemporary English lexicogrammar. According to the Macmillan dictionary, the meaning of fervent and ardent, as well as their nominal cognates ardor and fervor, is restricted to the domain of emotions. No temperature senses are mentioned. This also holds for the Collins Cobuild dictionary. The words are monosemous and not metaphorical. According to the historical Concise Oxford Dictionary from 1974, however, these words were then polysemous (McIntosh 1974). Their original meaning relating to temperature was then still present in British English. In thirty years, fervent and ardent have changed from polysemous words, which may be reflections of an underlying conceptual metaphor, emotion is temperature/heat (cf. Kövecses 2000), to monosemous words, which only have one conventionalized meaning belonging to the domain of emotions. What do these two types of data suggest for finding metaphor in grammar? Imagine a set of language users or analysts who have known English for a long time. They may still have a polysemous representation of the two words: the words would actually have two types of meaning for them. They may consequently be inclined to see the basic meaning of fervent and ardent as related to temperature. They may even understand the emotion senses of these words in terms of the more basic sense. This would also hold for those analysts who have access to the Romance origins of these words, for instance by formal training at school in French or Latin. Every time fervent or ardent would be used in an emotion sense, these speakers and analysts would experience the word as metaphorically used. Contrast this with a set of younger language users or analysts of English. Since the temperature meanings have become or are becoming obsolete to them, their views of these words would tend to be monosemous: the words would have only one meaning each, relating to emotions. It would be difficult to see how they could be able to

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identify the originally temperature-related meanings of these words without additional help. The current language is losing or has lost the contrast between the emotion sense and the original and more basic temperature sense. In addition, there is no way in which the word forms are transparent enough for ordinary users of English to retrieve or recognize any roots having to do with temperature. Unless such speakers have accidentally acquired the expert linguistic knowledge of their etymology, or have access to a Romance language where the words may still have their original temperature sense, or check their intuitions against such dictionaries as the COD, they will not be able, as analysts, to postulate another sense for these words than the emotion sense. It follows that the words fervent and ardent will be polysemous with a conventional metaphorical sense to some language users and analysts, but monosemous without a metaphorical sense, to others. This is a direct consequence of the availability or lack of availability of an entrenched basic sense that contrasts with a metaphorical derivation and causes polysemy. The example illustrates a fundamental linguistic point, that there is an issue of the historical variability of meaning and that it needs to be addressed in research on metaphor identification. The question arises: what counts as a conventional and available basic sense in grammar or usage for which group of language users (and analysts)? This is a fundamental question about the validity of metaphor identification and it raises the additional question whether the areas of research distinguished in Chapter 1 are homogenous or require further differentiation with a synchronic versus diachronic factor. The question about the availability of a specific conventionalized sense does not have to receive a single answer. Fervent and ardent are words which may be classified as polysemous when the English language is studied as a historically developing system. This is because in that diachronic system, it is possible to discern a basic temperature sense as well as an indirect emotion sense which may be related to each other, albeit over time. The indirect emotion sense was apparently derived from the direct temperature sense in a systematic fashion, much in the way sketched by Sweetser (1990) for sense-perception verbs and their extension into the domain of understanding. This analysis involves historical polysemy that is motivated by metaphor, with a basic or direct sense and an indirect sense both being available in the language as a historically evolving grammatical system. This is how the historical linguist would like to be able to study language change, by connecting indirect senses to basic senses across time. When we turn to English as a contemporary system of meaning, however, the basic (temperature) sense appears to have got lost to many speakers. From the contemporary perspective, it will be hard to claim that the emotion senses of these words ‘are understood in terms of ’ the temperature senses. This is because there is no contemporary polysemy (as opposed to historical polysemy). If speakers do not have access to the historical polysemy, there is no basic ground in the contemporary language system to understand fervent and ardent in terms of something else. Even though it is true that their temperature senses have arisen through historical polysemy that is motivated by metaphor, fervent and ardent do not necessarily count as metaphorically motivated polysemous words in the contemporary language. That decision depends


on the availability for a specific group of language users of a more basic meaning in terms of temperature than the more regular emotion sense which these words have now acquired. What counts as a metaphorical word, then, is also partly dependent on the community of language users that is seen as the frame of reference for the notion of language which is being studied. Words may be polysemous and potentially metaphorical for a historical study but not polysemous and potentially metaphorical for a contemporary study. And they may be metaphorical for some contemporary studies, in which older and younger generations of language users are compared, but not for others, which may take a more radical position about the current state of the language: if it does not display the relevant contrast between the two uses, but only one use, then there is only one sense, which is therefore not indirect nor metaphorical. Metaphor researchers need to be clear about the area as well as the intended population of their research when they apply their operational definition in order to decide what counts as a metaphorically used word for which group of language users in which context (cf. Croft 1998). All of this goes without saying when we turn to language acquisition (in Chapter 9), where we will look at the question what counts as a metaphor, and what kind of metaphor, to a child in which stage of development, but that is just a prominent and specific case of a general principle.

. From moments of decision to tools A final aspect of operationalizing a theoretical definition for practical purposes follows on from the series of decisions that have to be made when deciding that a particular phenomenon counts as metaphorical. This aspect has to do with the aids that analysts can invoke when making their various decisions. To give one obvious example, deciding whether a particular metaphorical meaning is conventionalized can be done by consulting your intuitions, but it is also possible to have a look at the available dictionaries. Given the various backgrounds of different analysts with regard to the present state of a particular language, it may be useful to fix what counts as conventionalized and available word meanings by a publicly available, up-to-date and independently produced record. It may therefore be convenient to adopt a dictionary as a concrete norm of reference, so that you have an independent reflection of what counts as the meanings of words for a particular group of users of English. Dictionaries have been used as a convenient starting point to circumvent the problem of intuitions about distinct but conventionalized meanings in a number of studies of metaphor. One recent example is Haser (2000), who used ordinary and etymological dictionaries alike in order to examine the polysemy of perception verbs, obedience and knowledge words, linguistic items concerning ‘counting’ and ‘calculating’, and so on, across a wide range of languages, such as Sumerian, Finnish, Estonian, Lappic, Cheremis, North Caucasian, Hungarian, Motu, Kiribati, Yoruba, Maya, and Navajo. Her inventory presents a diverse list of data across many cases and languages which

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displays a number of discernible patterns of meaning relations, along the lines of Sweetser (1990). It has been pointed out, however, that dictionaries have a problematic status in functioning as arbiters between one or two meanings. First of all, dictionaries may lag behind the developments of contemporary language use (Fauconnier 1997) or have too little space to reflect all of its nuances accurately. For reasons of limited space for a particular lexical item, senses are sometimes simply collapsed which, in other circumstances, might be presented as separate uses. Secondly, Tuggy (1993: 277–278) draws our attention to the different purposes that individual dictionaries and their producers may have. Historical dictionaries serve different purposes than contemporary user dictionaries, and this has an effect on the way they present their descriptions of the language. Deignan (2005b) has made the related observation that most dictionaries aim to explain the meanings of words to their users, which is not always compatible with producing refined descriptions of all of their usage. Thirdly, Goddard (2002) has criticized the practice of dictionary writers as failing to comply with “sound principles of lexical definition – in particular, we have to avoid obscure and circular definitions, and we have to aim for maximal explicitness” (p. 139). He continues to claim that “conventional dictionaries postulate a great deal of false and unnecessary polysemy.” Dictionaries may therefore be one useful source of information, but they should also be treated with care and precision. The advantage of using a dictionary is obvious, though: decisions about conventionalized meanings have been reached across the complete language, with reference to many patterns of usage, and independently of any particular concerns with decisions about metaphor from a cognitive-linguistic perspective. This norm of reference is preferable to the more variable and ad-hoc collection of information that an analyst or even a group of analysts can bring to bear for each and every different case. Dictionaries also afford an opportunity for checking and replication of decisions. These are non-trivial benefits. Another option would be to examine the large databases of usage called corpora. This type of research caters for aspects which are not covered by dictionaries, such as specific morphological or syntactic patterns that may be interesting for metaphor research. But corpus linguistic analysis presents its own problems. For instance, for lexical analysis, how many uses do you have to find in a corpus before you accept a use as a conventionalized meaning, or a sense? Deignan writes: . . ., in the analysis of concordance citations, the difficulty of deciding on cases of innovative metaphor arises only rarely, because innovative metaphors are infrequent. Corpus frequencies can be used as a rough guide: any sense of a word that is found less than once in every thousand citations of the word can be considered either innovative or rare, and therefore, for the purpose of describing typical language use, unimportant. (Deignan 2005a: 40)


Such boundaries need to be fixed, explicated, and compared across studies in order to clarify when the labels of ‘conventional’ and ‘novel’ are used in the same way or not. This discussion also takes us into a range of general difficulties of sampling and statistics. Deignan (2005b) uses “200 and 500 citations of each inflection of each word, depending on how frequent the word form was as a whole in the corpus. For highly polysemous words, a sample of 1000 citations is advisable.” However, if visual inspection shows that a word exhibits only four or five main senses, then a smaller sample is regarded as adequate. Other important factors in determining the appropriate number of citations have to do with the diversity of topics related to metaphorical usage and the lengths of the samples in the corpus. Contemporary corpora can also be used to determine whether a metaphorical sense of a term is historical or not. For if the corpus does not show a contrast between a metaphorical sense and a corresponding nonmetaphorical sense, then the metaphorical sense has become the only sense for a term that is still used in contemporary lexico-grammar. This might be the case with fervent and ardent discussed above. Such metaphorical senses may be labeled historical (with Deignan 2005a: 40). To show how dictionaries and patterns of usage in corpora may be compared regarding their treatment of conventionalized senses, Fillmore and Atkins (2002) performed a case study of the verb to crawl. They first of all compared its description in four major British learners’ dictionaries: the Cambridge International Dictionary of English, the Collins-Cobuild Dictionary of English, the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, and the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. Their comparison shows that there are substantial differences between the treatments of nine senses of the verb crawl in the four dictionaries (see Table 4.3), even though the dictionaries are from the same period, use corpora for their database, and target the same audience. Next Fillmore and Atkins examined the relation between the listed senses on the one hand and a modest sample of 52 sentences from the British National Corpus (BNC) to test whether the dictionary definitions in fact cover the sense distinctions found in attested language use. They arrived at the conclusion that “the number of sense distinctions that show up in the corpus far exceeds the number of distinctions that are provided for us in the definitions we have seen” (2002: 95). For instance, senses Table 4.3 Dictionary senses of the verb crawl, with corpus examples Definitions

Corpus examples

1 of person: dragging body 2 of person: on hands and knees 3 of baby: manner of motion 4 of traffic: move slowly 5 of insects, crabs etc. 6 of snakes, worms etc. 7 of person: grovel, fawn 8 of place: be swarming with 9 of skin etc.: creeping sensation

with a last effort he crawled up the path I crawled smartly after him the moment I child can crawl, everything ... cars crawl along at fifteen miles per hour a beetle began to crawl up his legs larvae of worms crawl up the blades of grass the way you crawl to them makes ma sick the area was crawling with caterpillars his skin crawled and his hair prickled on his neck

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 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

5 and 6 listed in Table 4.3 do not allow for other animals, such as cats and hedgehogs, to be the subject of crawl, too. More important for our purposes, varied metaphorical uses, “where inter alia hands, clouds, fog, steam and even darkness are said to be crawling” (p. 95), are excluded from the dictionary too: (8) a. b. c. d. e.

She felt his hands crawling up her thigh. Dark heavy clouds were crawling across the sky . . . He watched the approaching fog crawling forward . . . A cloud of steam crawled slowly upwards from the chimney . . . Darkness crawled through the suburbs like a flood of black ink

All of these uses are integrated by the authors into a semantic network for crawl. They focus on one aspect of its overall meaning, the fact that crawling leads to slow motion, which may then be used as its most salient feature when the verb is applied to “vehicles and traffic, to the motion of clouds, fog and water, and then metaphorically to the speed of any kind of activity (she crawled down the list of names checking each one carefully) and in fact to experiences of the passing of time (the days were crawling past)” (2002: 102). Their analysis hence shows that you have one linguistic form with several distinct meanings that can be related to each other, most of which by means of similarity. These observations relativize the value of dictionaries with regard to their ability to capture all contemporary usage. However, they also raise questions about the comparability of dictionary and corpus methods for the aim of finding (metaphorically motivated) polysemy in grammar. Some of these metaphorical applications in the corpus citations are much less conventionalized than others. For instance, the penultimate example from the previous paragraph (she crawled down the list of names checking each one carefully) seems much more ad hoc, even though its general purport is perfectly intelligible. Finding meaning distinctions in corpora is not the same as finding conventionalized sense distinctions in grammar: that requires a frequency threshold to be passed by a particular attested meaning in order for it to be taken as sufficiently conventionalized. Fixing such thresholds is a hazardous affair and may vary from one research aim to another. By way of aside, the fact that a particular use is present in a corpus but not in a dictionary does not necessarily mean that the dictionary has missed out on capturing a particular conventionalized sense, for whatever reason. Dictionaries use certain cut-off points for including specific patterns of usage as conventionalized enough, and this is precisely their value as an independent source of information about polysemy for the metaphor scholar, even if not all decisions about individual lexical items are equally correct or reliable as such. Less conventionalized usage by definition falls outside the scope of dictionaries. These are just two of the obvious tools and some of the ways in which they can be used by analysts of metaphor. We shall spend more time on these issues in parts two and three. For now it is most important to realize that setting up an operational definition of metaphor does not just involve the selection of concrete criteria, units

Chapter 4. Operationalization 

of analysis, and the breakdown of one decision into an ordered series of partial decisions, which also have to be related to a particular population of language users. It also involves the appropriate selection and attunement of tools to the making of those decisions, so that they become maximally explicit and replicable. Dictionaries and corpora are obvious helps in this area, but even these tools require further attention when it comes to their optimal employment in practice.

. Conclusion In considering the operationalization of metaphor, it should be kept in mind that there is not just one specific way of operationalizing metaphor. The operational definition of metaphor depends on the research area in which metaphor is investigated. Metaphor as linguistic form and as conceptual structure in both grammar and usage are the two manifestations of metaphor that lie at the heart of the concerns of the linguist who is interested in form-meaning pairings and who does not also have a psycholinguistic or sociolinguistic methodological repertoire at their disposal. However, the role of metaphor in behavior is too important for the cognitive-linguistic undertaking to be left aside without further ado. Metaphor as psychological and social process and product of verbal behavior can therefore not be ignored. When researchers wish to find metaphor in grammar and usage, they can aim at finding any of these manifestations. Thus, metaphor as psychological process and product can be found by those researchers who focus on metaphor in grammar or usage as individual verbal behavior; but they then still need to decide whether they concentrate on the cognitive representation of the linguistic form of metaphor (for instance, by looking at lexical access and activation) or of its conceptual structure (for instance, by examining particular processes of inference), or both. Metaphor can also be found as conceptual structure in sign systems and their use, without paying empirical attention to actual cognitive processes and their products in genuinely observed or manipulated behavior. This happens when researchers investigate grammar and usage with special attention to the role of concepts as the symbolic building blocks of thought, as happens in many cognitive-linguistic analyses of metaphor in thought. Similarly, metaphor can also be found as linguistic form in grammar and usage by homing in on linguistic form-meaning pairings as the building blocks of linguistic structure, as also happens in much cognitive-linguistic and other linguistic research on metaphor. In each of these cases, metaphor is conceptualized and identified in a different way even though all of these conceptualizations may go back to one identical definition of metaphor, for instance as a cross-domain mapping. In this chapter we have seen that these distinct conceptualizations lead to different operationalizations which moreover interact with the three most influential schools of thought on metaphor in cognition: Conceptual Metaphor Theory, class-inclusion theory, and the career of metaphor theory. Different criteria for metaphor identification can be distinguished for many of these research areas as they are approached by the

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

three schools. This divergence between operationalizations is one of the main causes of the persisting lack of agreement between researchers on what counts as a metaphor in which situations. But this divergence has arisen because of the critique by some of these schools on particular predictions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which has boldly attempted to promote one single definition for metaphor in all of these areas of research. The idea that metaphor is a cross-domain mapping for all of its manifestations in all of these areas, in particular, has come in for careful scrutiny by some of the behavioral approaches to metaphor, which in turn has promoted the defense of alternative views. Apart from the various criteria for metaphor identification, we have also looked at the fact that these can be applied to different units of analysis, and that this can lead to different ways of presenting the outcome of the research. If such criteria are subjected to further analysis, they can moreover be broken up into a series of more detailed decisions which together lead to the overall conclusion that a particular stretch of language or its use is metaphorical or not. When analysts do not make use of this possibility, it is less clear where their operationalization does and does not agree with the approach of other researchers. A third point in evaluating operational definitions of metaphor has to do with their relation to a well-defined target population of language users whose language is being described. Metaphorical meaning is always relative to nonmetaphorical meaning, and there is variation along historical as well as social lines regarding the availability of such nonmetaphorical meaning which is not always sufficiently taken into account. Finally, there are various tools which facilitate the decisions that have to be made in deciding whether the criteria do or do not apply. These tools should be attuned to the aim of the research: a historical dictionary generally has more limited value for the analysis of word meanings in a contemporary study than a users’ dictionary.

chapter 

Application Data collection and analysis

In his novel Thinks . . ., David Lodge portrays a famous cognitive scientist called Ralph Messenger who is intrigued by the workings of human consciousness. The novel begins with the following text: One, two, three, testing, testing . . . recorder working OK . . . Olympus Pearlcorder, bought it at Heathrow in the duty-free on my way to . . . where? Can’t remember, doesn’t matter . . . The object of the exercise being to record as accurately as possible the thoughts that are passing through my head at this moment in time, which is, let’s see . . . 10.13 a.m. on Sunday the 23rd of Febru – San Diego! I bought it on may way to that conference in . . . Isabel Hotchkiss. Of course, San Diego, ‘Vision and the Brain’. Late eighties. Isabell Hotchkiss. I tested the range of the condenser mike . . . yes . . . Where was I? But that’s the point, I’m not anywhere, I haven’t made a decision to think about anything specific, the object of the exercise being simply to record the random thoughts, if anything can be random, the random thoughts passing through a man’s head, all right my head, at a randomly chosen time and place . . . well not truly random, I came in here this morning on purpose knowing it would be deserted on a Sunday, I wouldn’t be interrupted distracted overheard, nobody else around, the telephones and fax machines silent, the computers and printers in the offices and workrooms in sleep mode.

This goes on for over eight pages. As a comic writer, Lodge has found an excellent target in the attempts of cognitive scientists to gain access to the human mind and consciousness by techniques which look clumsy when they are portrayed in this way. This may perhaps serve as a useful reminder how hard it is to do good research on metaphor in actually ambient thought. It may also serve as a reminder of the public responsibility that academics have towards society in that they have to be able to justify the spending of large amounts of money on their favorite toys and topics. If academics cannot offer such justification, they will end up as comic characters in novels and movies that will ridicule the ways of the world. Operational definitions and procedures for analysis can only become fruitful when they are applied to phenomena in reality that can be turned into data. As Lodge shows, data need to be collected, which may happen by several methods. Moreover, data are not necessarily verbal data, as we shall see. These may be the typical data in the cognitive-linguistic or corpus-linguistic study of metaphor, but they clearly are not

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

when it comes to the behavioral study of metaphor. This is again one dimension on which there are fundamental differences between different approaches to metaphor. After data have been collected, their analysis can also diverge in essential ways. The opposition between qualitative and quantitative research becomes important here. What is more, there are distinct manners in which the performance of the analyst can be evaluated. These are the main topics of this chapter. It forms the last chapter of part one, and completes the methodological foundations for the discussion of metaphor identification in grammar and usage in parts two and three.

. Data: Verbal, nonverbal, and meta Identifying metaphor in grammar and usage depends on the collection and analysis of data which may exhibit diverging manifestations of metaphor and its use. Such data come in three fundamentally different kinds: verbal data, nonverbal data, and meta data. I will use this threefold division in order to discuss their collection and analysis in the next sections. Verbal data are those data which are in the code of language, and which are analyzed for their containment of expressions of metaphorical mappings. The numerous lists of expressions containing metaphorically used language forms in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) may serve as a paradigmatic example. Here is one excerpt from George Lakoff ’s Conceptual Metaphor Home Page: Affection is warmth, dislike is cold She’s a warm person. They gave me a warm welcome. He took a while to warm up to me. My love for her still smolders (she’s an old flame). She was decidedly cool. He gave me the cold shoulder. He’s a real cold fish. Verbal data can either be regarded as symbolic structures, as happens in many linguistic approaches, or as cognitive processes and their products, as happens in psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics. They contain conventional or less conventional metaphor and can hence be used for the study of metaphor in grammar or usage. They can also be analyzed for their linguistic forms or their conceptual structures, revealing aspects of metaphor ‘in language’ or ‘in thought’. Despite their differences, verbal data have one thing in common: they are concrete manifestations of language and its use and they can be used for research on all areas of metaphor identification distinguished in the previous chapters. Verbal data should be contrasted with nonverbal data. Nonverbal data are other types of data than linguistic expressions that still reflect aspects of metaphor in grammar and usage. Examples are data collected from individual language behavior including pausing, gesture, reading times, eye movements, or even brain activities. They are typically presented in tables or figures reporting their means for specific groups of participants in different experimental conditions. Such quantitative nonverbal data are meaningless until they are connected to more encompassing research settings, in

Chapter 5. Application 

contrast with the more suggestive verbal data above which immediately evoke all sorts of ideas about the ways they can be used. Nonverbal, behavioral data can in principle be collected to do research on metaphor in grammar as well as usage, metaphor in linguistic form as well as conceptual structure, and metaphor as symbolic structure as well as cognitive process and product. Despite their differences, nonverbal data also have one thing in common: they are typically behavioral data from language users in action. Performance by language users is what generates both nonverbal data as well as verbal data. This is what distinguishes both of these types of data from the third group, which I will call meta data. I will use this term to allude to the fact that linguists are accustomed to the notion of metalinguistic data, but that cognitive scientists do not seem to have had an equivalent interest in employing a comparable notion of meta conceptual data, at least not for the study of metaphor. Cognitive scientists do collect intuitions and judgments about linguistic and conceptual aspects of metaphor from informants, but simply refer to them as ratings. Since in theory it may be interesting for the study of metaphor to consider these data from a unified methodological perspective, I will keep meta data as a candidate for terminological innovation on the table. In order to keep the discussion suitably general, I will therefore refer to the third group of data as meta data. Meta data are characterized by their lack of display of actual conceptual and linguistic performance by language users. Instead, when people produce meta data they reflect upon such performance, its means, and its cognitive processes and products. Meta data provide intuitions of language users about such aspects as the wellformedness, grammaticality, conventionality, and acceptability of linguistic expressions. In the study of metaphor, such intuitions have for example been used by linguists to discover polysemy, which in turn may then be examined for metaphorical motivation. Such meta data are hence intimately connected with the application of linguistic tests, such as tests for ambiguity to detect homonymy and polysemy. They are therefore also typically generated by linguists or other language experts. Other aspects of metaphor have also been investigated by collecting such meta data, including conceptual ones, from informants instead of researchers themselves. This may take place in, for instance, norming studies describing a whole range of linguistic and conceptual aspects of metaphors in order to obtain a better and independent view of their symbolic properties which may also be relevant for their cognitive processing (e.g. Katz, Paivio, Marschark, & Clark 1988). Meta data come in the form of classifications of linguistic or conceptual stimulus materials on nominal or interval scales, and are reported in the same quantitative tables or figures as nonverbal data. These data are usually collected from participants in psychology experiments, more often than not American undergraduate students of psychology. Of course, meta data can also be perceived as involving some kind of cognitive performance by language users (cf. Scholfield 1995; Schütze 1996). But there is a crucial distinction between the generation of meta data on the one hand and the production of verbal or nonverbal data on the other: the latter two types of data always show what

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

the language user does in action, whereas the former do not necessarily do so. They can be used in essentially two different ways: either to show what the language user thinks about aspects of language use by other language users, or to show what the language user thinks about an aspect of language use as a product of their own recent processing. This is one reason why care has to be taken in interpreting what such data can say about the various areas of research distinguished in the previous chapters (cf. Gibbs & Matlock 1999, 2001; Sandra & Rice 1995). Intuitions and opinions about linguistic and conceptual aspects of the symbolic structure of metaphor in grammar and usage can be quite valid data about how people experience such symbolic manifestations of metaphor when they think about them. And this is how they are typically used in informant research in the symbolic areas of analysis. When we turn to the relation between such opinions and actual metaphorical behavior, however, there is no guarantee that people have adequate insight into their own behavior (production, comprehension, acquisition, storing). Intuitions may tap folklore rather than genuine knowledge when they deal with behavior rather than symbolic structures. When meta data are collected from participants in symbolic research, the participants are utilized as a measuring instrument in the form of a jury to produce information about the true object of study, signs and symbols in grammar and usage. This is a functional relation which determines the methodological role of the participants and the verbal materials for achieving a particular objective: the description of linguistic forms and conceptual structures. Meta data in symbolic research may be based on the performance of participants, but meta data are not about processing. They may even be used as a preparatory stage in processing research, to calibrate the experimental materials as representing groups of metaphors with particular properties, after which the experimental materials can then be used in research on metaphor processing and its products. For instance, Brisard et al. (2001) collected similarity judgments on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 to 6 about degree of similarity between different senses of adjectives, including metaphorical ones, as in hoge functie (‘high function’) versus hoge boom (‘high tree’). When the two senses received an extremely low score (less than 1), the linguistic item was considered to be homonymous: the two senses were insufficiently related for classification as polysemous or monosemous. When the two senses received a mid-range score, between 2 and 4, the linguistic item was considered to be polysemous, on the grounds that there was a clear meaning relation between the two senses. When the two senses received a score exceeding 5, the items were regarded as monosemous (or vague), because the relationship between the two senses was very strong. This is one way in which the distinction between homonymy, polysemy, and monosemy can be operationalized by a relatively easy-to-apply experimental method. The methodological point for the linguist is that this is a somewhat shallow, functional method of measurement. It does not make any claims about the broader grammatical validity of the findings – it is just a method for dividing experimental materials into three distinct categories which need to be formed independently from the researcher’s individual intuitions. The function of this test is auxiliary to the more im-

Chapter 5. Application 

portant aims of the researchers concerning the investigation of the cognitive processing of polysemous adjectives. Meta data hence display an indirect relation with the immediate process of comprehension. Nonverbal data do not seem to be in a better position, but for a different reason. Truly behavioral, online measures, such as reaction times or eye movements, only form the tip of the iceberg of the underlying psychological processes that are being studied. Specific findings may often be related in more than one way to postulated cognitive processes and conceptual structures. Nonverbal data also offer indirect access to the cognitive processes as well as conceptual structures to which they are related (cf. Hoffman & Kemper 1987). Verbal data occupy yet another position. They mimic or perhaps better dramatize the object of study. However, this does not make it easier to find metaphor in grammar and usage. Verbal data still need to be thoroughly analyzed and divided between the metaphorical and the nonmetaphorical before they yield their goods. They do not provide direct and unproblematic access to metaphor in grammar and usage either. Where nonverbal as well as meta data do seem to offer an advantage over verbal data is in the stage of data analysis. Ratings by informants or behavioral measures like reading times come as a series of figures which do not present great difficulties for the analyst who needs to prepare them for statistical analysis. This type of quantitative analysis is profoundly different from having to deal with written or spoken discourse, which require extensive linguistic and discursive analysis of a qualitative nature before they yield their cases of metaphor in an unequivocal way. This does entail that some of the analyses with nonverbal data may be more reliable than the analyses of verbal data, as analyses, that is. But this is of course not the same as saying that their interpretation and validity are also superior: that depends on other aspects of the design of a particular study. Metalinguistic judgments are an interesting category in this respect. They usually come in the form of binary judgments, ‘yes/no grammatical’, ‘yes/no ambiguous’, and so on, which means that they could be seen as a case of filling out a binary nominal scale. However, this is seldom reported for large samples of cases nor for large groups of linguists who perform the same classification task, so that their methodological status becomes more complicated. We shall have a further look at all of these types of data, therefore, from the perspective of data collection methods in the next section.

. Data collection: Introspection, observation, manipulation There are three long-standing methods of data collection by which the three classes of verbal, nonverbal and meta data can in principle be collected: introspection, observation, and manipulation. Their distinction involves the difference between collecting data in three different ways:

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

1. by observing the behavior of oneself (introspection) 2. by observing the behavior of other people in natural situations (observation) 3. or by observing other people who are instructed to produce a particular language or thought behavior (manipulation). There is a fourth method of data collection, simulation, which ought to be mentioned here: in AI, processes of language use are simulated to produce data that can then be collected and analyzed to test the underlying model of data production. But this method has had such marginal effect on metaphor research that I will leave it aside for this occasion. For verbal data, all three methods have been abundantly used in the study of metaphor: they can be collected by introspection, observation, and manipulation. For nonverbal data, there has been an emphasis on their collection by means of manipulation, this being the typical province of psycholinguistic research on metaphor; but nonverbal data like gesture or gaze can also be collected by observation in for instance conversation analysis. For meta data, both introspection and manipulation have been used to collect intuitions and judgments about the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor, with observation not playing a substantial role. Collecting meta data about language by introspection is one typical method in linguistics, which is mostly applied by single linguists themselves. Collecting meta data by manipulation is more often applied in psycholinguistics, where groups of participants are asked to carry out ratings of stimuli. An overview of these relations between kinds of data and methods of data collection for metaphor is offered in Fig. 5.1. Data collection about the thought aspects of metaphor is rather different than data collection about the language aspects of metaphor, as is also signaled by the rather deep disciplinary divide between psychology and linguistics. Even though cognitive linguists have attempted to bridge this gap, it will still be useful to employ my division of the field in previous chapters to divide the discussion of the three data collection methods of introspection, observation, and manipulation between the two big areas

Figure 5.1 Relations between types of data and methods of data collection

Verbal data Introspection Yes, about language and thought

Nonverbal data

Observation

Possible, about language and thought

Yes, about language and thought

Manipulation Yes, about language and thought

Yes, about language and thought

Meta data Yes, by single linguists, about language and thought

Yes, by groups of participants, about language and thought

Chapter 5. Application 

of metaphor in language and thought. I will first look at the collection of data pertaining to ‘thought’, with special attention to the conceptual structures and processes of metaphor, and then I will look at the collection of data pertaining to ‘language’, with special attention to the linguistic forms of metaphor. It should be recalled that both ‘language’ and ‘thought’ can be approached as either symbolic structure and system, or as cognitive process and product.

.. Thought data: The conceptual structures of metaphor Since introspection has been extensively discussed as a method of data collection in psychology, this is the viewpoint from which I will order the materials. Shanon (1984: 167) discusses introspection as a psychological method for the collection of data about thought: Introspection has a notorious history. No other method of psychological research has been the target of such criticism, both extensive and harsh. Boring (1953), the famous historian of the field, might have been extreme when saying that “Introspection that does not lie does not exist,” but certainly his appraisal was not unrepresentative. Indeed, throughout the history of its existence, psychology viewed freeing itself from introspection as one of the foremost steps towards becoming a full-fledged scientific discipline.

Shanon presents a careful discussion and norms for the way in which introspection may be used for collecting data about the thoughts of the researcher. Such data represent what is accessed and accessible by one individual mind. This takes place in a process of data collection that is typically verbal, by writing or by recording one’s own thoughts spoken out loud – as has been nicely dramatized by Lodge. It is one possibility for verbal data collection which has not been explored to its full potential by any metaphor researcher, as far as I know. Perhaps this is because of its inevitable limitation to studies with just one case: the introspecting researcher. What has, by contrast, been used as a method of verbal data collection about thought is the request for other people than the researcher to observe their own thoughts and report them out loud. But this should be seen as data collection by manipulation rather than introspection. Verbal data about thought processes experienced by other people than the analyst can be collected by requesting them to think out loud in different conditions or about covertly manipulated linguistic materials. This has become an accepted method in psychology for the study of various aspects of thought, including the processing of text (e.g. Ericsson 1988; Ericsson & Oliver 1988; Ericsson & Simon 1984). It has also been used in the study of metaphor processing (e.g., Cameron 2003; Goodblatt & Glicksohn 2002; Gregory 1993; Steen 1994). Thinking out loud is just one example of a range of manipulative methods for collecting verbal data about thought. Other techniques include various tasks requiring people to speak or write while they interpret discourse, answer questions, solve a problem, and so on. These techniques have been applied in various studies for the pur-

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pose of investigating the conceptual structure of metaphor, for instance by Glucksberg and McGlone (1999) who asked their participants to produce verbal interpretations of metaphors like Our love is a bumpy rollercoaster ride. Verbal data collection on metaphor in thought by means of observation (instead of introspection or manipulation) takes place in natural settings, where people produce natural thought data in the form of speech or writing. Psychotherapy or counselling sessions have been one source of data collected by observation for the study of metaphor in thought, for instance for people’s conceptualizations of marriage (Quinn 1991). Apart from the usual problem of lack of control, there is another problem with these data that has been pointed out by applied linguists and discourse analysts. They are hesitant about using such observational data for the analysis of metaphor in thought because they feel it is unclear whether a verbal transcript in fact reflects the particular thoughts of the individual speaker or rather of the linguistic or cultural model embodied by the code and the message (e.g., Cameron & Low 1999; CharterisBlack 2004). An alternative interpretation of such verbal data in natural discourse is that they either reflect the symbolic structure of grammar and usage, which may be interpreted as revealing something about the ‘thoughts’ of groups of people in a speech community as reflected by their language use, but not necessarily of individuals. This alternative conceptualization of metaphor as thought deals with the thought of a cultural community or idealized speaker-hearer instead of individuals engaged in natural interaction (cf. Gibbs 1999c; Palmer 1996; Shore 1996; Tomasello 1999). Introspection, observation, and manipulation can hence all serve to collect verbal data for the study of metaphor in thought. They can be applied in the study of conventionalized thought related to grammar, and hence to conceptual metaphor, or in the study of all thought related to specific instances of usage, and hence to any specific conceptualization of a metaphoric mapping. They also seem appropriate for data collection about thought approached as either symbolic conceptual structure or as cognitive process and product. The use of introspection as a controlled method of verbal data collection, in all of these areas, does not seem to have been attempted. Turning to the collection of nonverbal data about metaphor in thought, these are typically collected by means of manipulation in experiments. Reaction times in lexical decision tasks or sentence comprehension tasks, eye-movement recordings, or even brain scans are all examples of nonverbal data that express degrees or quantities of a particular behavioral but nonverbal magnitude. For instance, reading times were collected in the 1980s to test the model that predicted more processing effort and therefore longer reading times for metaphorical interpretations of sentences than for literal ones (cf. Gibbs 1994). Measurements were taken of reading times per sentence or phrase and these were compared across conditions to derive conclusions about their related cognitive processes pertaining to metaphorical versus nonmetaphorical sentence understanding. These data led to the conclusion that, given enough context, sentences did not require more processing time when offered as metaphorical than when offered as literal.

Chapter 5. Application

Metaconceptual data about metaphor in thought are also typically collected by manipulation. Judgments are asked from informants about the nature and function of some of the conceptual structures of metaphor. This happens in a structured way by presenting carefully prepared stimulus materials and appropriate rating scales, where people have to fill out, for instance, whether a metaphor is highly metaphorical or familiar or imageable or not. Such data produce average figures per metaphor for whole sets of participants which can then be compared across groups of cases. Because of the highly structured way of data collection, the analysis of such data is as straightforward as any group of quantitative data. In principle nonverbal and meta data could also be collected by means of observation and introspection. For instance, opinions about the conceptual structures of metaphors may occasionally be found in natural conversations. However, this type of phenomenon does not occur frequently or systematically enough to enable controlled data collection in a way that is superior to the method of manipulation, which is why this venue is not often used, except in ways that conflate data collection and data analysis, as we shall see below.

.. Language data: The linguistic forms of metaphor It is time to turn from data collection about the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar and usage to data collection about the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar and usage. I will begin with the collection of verbal data again. This time I will do so because verbal data constitute the bulk of all studies on metaphor in linguistics (as contrasted with psycholinguistics). The difference between collecting verbal data by manipulation and observation has been used by Cameron and Low (1999) to separate two types of studies of metaphor in applied linguistics. Observed verbal data are natural data: they are those linguistic forms which are generated by people other than the researcher in a natural context of verbal behavior. Conversations or written texts are typical examples of natural language data that can be collected by observation. Their linguistic forms and the presence of metaphor may be studied for their symbolic structures or their associated cognitive processes and/or products. Observation is big in linguistic field work, as in anthropological or cultural linguistics (e.g. Palmer 1996). It is typically used for the purpose of describing nonwestern languages. In this classic form, it has been used for the study of metaphor by e.g. Casad (1977, 1988, 1993, 1996, 2001), Claudi and Heine (1986), and Emanatian (1995, 1999). More recently observation has received an impetus from the development of applied linguistics, corpus linguistics, and discourse analysis. The availability of large corpora of English, in particular, is beginning to have an effect on our view of how data for metaphor in language can be collected by various observational techniques. Examples in the area of metaphor studies include Caballero Rodríguez (2006), Cameron (2003), Charteris-Black (2004), Deignan (2005a), Goatly (1997), and Koller (2004).

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Verbal data collected by manipulation are also obtained from other people than the researcher. They are produced at the special request of the researcher and in some sort of research environment which is more or less artificial. Psychological research labs form the acme of such artificial surroundings. This is where people may produce new verbal data, or they may respond to verbal materials by means of language. Manipulation can take place via the language materials or in the division of participants in groups across experimental conditions. Flor and Hadar (2005), for instance, presented participants with sets of one target concept and one additional concept, which was intended to be open to literal, metaphorical, or otherwise figurative interpretation. Examples are ‘money’ – ‘price’, or ‘truth’ – ‘butterfly’. The researchers then requested participants to explain the relation between the two concepts. These verbal data were then analyzed for their type of interpretation, as well as rated by independent judges for their degree of metaphoricity and familiarity. There is a third group of verbal data that are neither elicited or observed, but imagined. These might be related to introspection, but in a relatively weak sense of the term. Imagined verbal data are those data which are generated by researchers themselves. Sentences like Sally is a block of ice or Sam is a pig are well-known examples of such imagined verbal data. They exhibit linguistic forms and conceptual structures which may be studied from a symbolic or a behavioral perspective. The values of these three kinds of data and their roughly corresponding methods of collection by introspection, observation, and manipulation should be understood from a historical perspective. The study of metaphor in grammar and usage has long been influenced by the heydays, in linguistics, of imagined verbal data, which were characteristic of much philosophical and grammatical research. Since the avowed aim of most grammatical analysis is to describe the underlying system of language competence, data imagined by the analyst were seen as just as useful as other types of data. Indeed, many grammarians regarded observed and elicited data as exemplifying performance, not competence. Such data were seen as potential sources of error and noise and therefore less interesting for the description of the underlying language system. One advantage to grammarians of exploiting imagined verbal data is that less frequent language phenomena can be studied without difficulty. Indeed, imagined language data can even realize expressions that, according to a particular grammatical model, should not be part of language in the first place (cf. Schütze 1996: 2). An example of the use of this type of data was given in Chapter 2, where Grady’s discovery of primary metaphors was triggered by the identification of a number of seemingly unacceptable or impossible extensions of the theories are buildings metaphor. Good illustrations of philosophical and grammatical approaches to metaphor based on imagined data can be found in Ortony (1979/1993). Imagined verbal data may have a special position in the study of metaphor in grammar. Recently, however, collecting natural and elicited verbal data has experienced a considerable status rise in the study of metaphor. There has been a general increase of interest in the properties of language use in discourse, which has begun to complement the grammatical study of language as a conventionalized semiotic or cognitive system.


This has now led to new grammars which are usage-based, even though not all linguists are happy with this development (e.g. Newmeyer 2003). As a result, metaphor scholars pay more attention to natural and elicited data, which are seen as not just reflecting error and noise, but preferred patterns of language use emerging from the innumerable logical possibilities afforded by the language system. Cameron and Low’s (1999) focus on this usage aspect of metaphor research is not only typical of applied linguistics but can be found across the board in various linguistic approaches to metaphor, including cognitive linguistics, functional linguistics and discourse analysis. One argument in favor of collecting observed data is that they do not present the problem that imagined data have with representativeness: From the earliest days of corpus linguistics, it has been shown that one’s intuitions about language can be unreliable as a predictor of natural language use (Sinclair 1991). One of the assumptions underlying this book is that naturally-occurring language data is vastly preferable to elicited or invented language. (Deignan 2005a: 27)

Deignan (2005a: 85ff.) also draws attention to the limitations of human knowledge, attention and memory as the cause of such biased views of the structure of language as reflected in imagined data. A related corpus-linguistic formulation of the problem is provided by Charteris-Black (2004): One of the theoretical principles of corpus linguistics is that theoretical claims should be based on proven instances of language use. It is not that corpus linguists do not rely on their intuitions as much as in traditional approaches, but that their intuitions are measured against attested linguistic evidence. There is therefore a separation between data and intuition, and intuitions may be modified according to the extent to which the linguistic features identified recur in the corpus. (2004: 31–32)

These arguments present the reverse side of the coin of the argument for imagined data, which, as we saw just now, precisely highlights the fact that imagined data can facilitate the study of less frequent or even allegedly impossible expressions, which undeniably may be useful for particular theoretical purposes in grammar. It may therefore be concluded that observed data may likewise have a special position in the study of metaphor in usage. In grammatical research, there has recently been a general movement towards collecting contrasting or converging evidence (e.g. Gonzalez-Marquez et al. 2006; Kepser & Reis 2005). The limitations of imagined data or introspective data have been recognized and additional evidence is sought from observational or manipulative studies in order to see if more solid cases for particular theses can be presented. In corpus linguistics, by contrast, there seems to be less interest in imagined and elicited data. Deignan (2005a) criticizes the over reliance on elicited data in cognitive linguistics. She believes that they are “likely to produce innovative rather than conventional metaphors” and that their linguistic forms might be too restricted to be representative of the full

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gamut of possibilities (p. 110). Psycholinguists have defended the use of elicited data, however, on the grounds that they serve a special purpose in behavioral research: they demonstrate what is naturally accessed and what is therefore naturally accessible to a particular population of language users. These data might therefore be a specific kind of reflection of what knowledge language users have of metaphor in language and thought, providing a particular form of access to the behavioral side of finding metaphor in grammar rather than usage. We now have to turn briefly to the study of the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar and usage on the basis of other data. Meta data are exemplified by grammaticality judgments and so on which are typically collected by introspection by experts. They can also be obtained by manipulation, however, from language users who have to provide ratings of such properties as familiarity or acceptability. The former data usually come as yes/no judgments by single linguists over limited numbers of cases, whereas the latter usually consist of classifications by many participants of many linguistic items on or 5- or 7- or even 9-point scales, which scores can then be converted into figures for quantitative analysis. Both types of data collection are relatively frequent and representative of different traditions of doing research on the linguistic forms of metaphor, especially in the symbolic structure of grammar or usage. The collection of nonverbal data such as reading times and lexical decision tasks for the study of linguistic forms of metaphor has especially occurred in the area of cognitive research on lexical access for metaphorically used terms. Giora (2003) reports several experiments collecting response times to lexical probes that should or should not be activated by a particular metaphorical stimulus at particular moments of the time course of their processing. These data provide nonverbal behavioral support for the view that salient meanings of words, whether nonmetaphorical or metaphorical, are always accessed fast and first. Less salient meanings, for instance in the case of unfamiliar metaphors, are constructed later, after literal meanings have been accessed first. This is one typical example of the use of nonverbal data for the study of the linguistic forms of metaphors, via their behavior in lexical access. Against this historical background, it is also useful to point out one particular problem with the method of introspection. When discussing introspection as a method for data collection about the linguistic nature of metaphor, it is essential to discriminate between two types of interpretation of the term. On the one hand, there are those linguistic investigations that are called introspective because they are based on imagined verbal data, as applies to many traditional publications on metaphor in the areas of for instance grammar and pragmatics. On the other hand, there are those studies which are called introspective because they are based on the collection of metalinguistic data, where linguists self-observe their own intuitions about language. Part of the confusion about what counts as introspection may be caused by the fact that many metalinguistic intuitions are often collected in order to study verbal expressions which have been derived from the imagination of the researcher. On the face of it, such studies could be taken to be introspective on two counts, regarding their verbal data which are imagined as well as their metalinguistic data which are intuited.


In my opinion, this interpretation would be incorrect. The imagined language ‘data’ in the studies aimed at collecting metalinguistic judgments to me are not really data. Methodologically, they function as research materials which are used to elicit the metalinguistic judgments from the analysts. It is the judgments which should be seen as the real data in that respect, being evoked by the linguistic materials as intuitions from the native speaker of a language which say something about the language. It is these native speaker intuitions which would require further description and explanation, although this does not seem to happen much. The verbal materials imagined by the linguist, by contrast, are comparable to the experimental materials constructed by psycholinguists for their metalinguistic data collection from informants other than linguists by manipulation. I propose that the notion of introspection in linguistics requires the following methodological distinction: 1. Either introspection is a method of data collection which involves the prior construction of verbal materials in linguistic tests for the subsequent introspective collection of metalinguistic data from linguists. 2. Or introspection is a method of introspective verbal data collection for subsequent analysis regarding their properties of grammatical acceptability, conventionality, and so on. Both scenarios are possible, but they deliver different data for analysis. Taking a step back from the issues with introspection, we can now summarize the situation with data collection. Verbal, nonverbal and meta data for analysis can be collected via three routes: introspection, observation, or manipulation. I have discussed these routes for metaphor identification in thought, or metaphor’s conceptual structures, and metaphor identification in language, or metaphor’s linguistic forms. I did so because data collection about thought is often seen as the special province of psychologists, so that linguists need to be aware of the various attitudes toward the three methods as well as their combination with the three types of data. This is especially important for the position of introspection, which is fairly marginal as a method of data collection in psychology, in spite of the efforts of scholars like Shanon. By contrast, in linguistics, introspection has played a central role in collecting data about the linguistic forms of metaphor, in two fundamentally different formats. This is one count on which linguists and psychologists may find it hard to share evidence about metaphor in language and thought. The use of manipulation, by contrast, is the preferred method of data collection in psychology whereas it has not been applied on a wide scale in linguistics. Observation occupies an interesting intermediate position. It is used by both disciplines, but applied linguists are hesitant to draw conclusions about metaphor in thought on the basis of observed verbal data, as in recordings of therapeutic sessions, while psychologists have not paid much attention to the linguistic forms of metaphor in such naturally occurring verbal data, although there are exceptions (e.g. Gentner & Jeziorski 1993). There hence seem to be many complementary traditions with their own methodologi-

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cal configurations in which researchers employ different methods for the collection of different data in order to investigate different areas of research. Which of these types of evidence can be usefully compared to see if they converge towards the same conclusion therefore remains a moot point.

. Data analysis: Quantitative and qualitative When verbal, nonverbal and meta data have been collected, either by introspection, observation, or manipulation, they require analysis in order to reveal their manifestations of metaphor. Verbal data typically require some form of qualitative analysis in order to decide which expressions or processes and their products can count as metaphorical. Any conversation or thinking out loud protocol, for instance, does not have all of its metaphors flagged for their special status. On the contrary, it is precisely one of the merits of cognitive linguistics to have drawn attention to the omnipresence of metaphor in grammar and usage after it had remained hidden from linguistic research for so long. As a result, it is up to the analyst to determine which parts of the data count as metaphorical as opposed to non-metaphorical. That this is a non-trivial task may be appreciated from a brief look at the following excerpt from a conversation (Steen 2005a): A: What sort of things did you get up to down in this park and? Did you have dens and. . . tree houses? B: Well, well, yes, d’you, and I, I tell again. You’ll, you’ll be horrified now, and I, and I look at that. . . what there was then, and still is now I think. . . There’s like an old drainage, a drainage pipe goes across the Foss which is concreted in, and it has a barrier going round in like a fan shape, hopefully to stop kids walking across it, you see Metaphor may clearly be involved in the drainage pipe which “goes across”, and in the barrier “going round like a fan shape”, although even in this area opinions may differ (e.g. Jackendoff & Aaron 1991). But let us consider a number of other issues: – –

–

Should things in the first turn be considered as a candidate for metaphorical usage because it does not refer to a concrete thing? Should the words get and up and to be considered as metaphorical because they have more basic meanings when taken in isolation, or should they be regarded as comparable to the morphemes of a single word, get up to, which, as a whole, does not have a more basic meaning than the one in which it is used here? How can we decide about the nonmetaphorical or metaphorical status of the next word, down in “down in the park”, if we cannot check whether the park is actually lower than the situational norm of reference?


–

–

In the same phrase, does the preposition in require marking for metaphorical usage because a park is not literally a container, even though it is concrete and not abstract? And does the word have in the second question of the first turn qualify as metaphorical because there is a weak sense of possession involved?

Nonverbal data in a different code, like gesture and visuals, are in no different position. Other types of nonverbal data, however, come in quantities, often because they are collected by forms of manipulation that have been carefully targeted and structured beforehand. Reading time measures or lexical decision measures are typical examples. These types of data do not require qualitative analysis but quantitative analysis, and they can be transformed into figures without difficulty. Such figures are then as a rule subjected to descriptive and inferential statistical analysis: descriptive statistics produce some sort of general tendency that can be seen in the data, such as a means, whereas inferential statistics compare the data against well-known distributions of figures to find out whether the data reveal relations between variables or not. I do not have space in this book to go into this area any further – there are plenty of good introductions for language researchers. The relation of quantified nonverbal data to finding metaphorical versus nonmetaphorical phenomena is usually hidden in the experimental conditions between groups of participants, or the experimental manipulations of the materials. For instance, Keysar et al. (2000) used a careful mix of four types of experimental materials in order to test the comprehension of conventional versus novel metaphor in one group of participants. In the analysis of the data, the reading times for each of the four groups of materials are then grouped and averaged across items and participants. This yields four different mean reading times which can be compared in order to draw conclusions about people’s processing of nonmetaphorical, conventionally metaphorical and novel metaphorical expressions. Meta data can be analyzed quantitatively, when they have been collected by means of rating scales, or qualitatively, when they are part of the typically linguistic analysis of verbal data by means of linguistic tests. Since the former do not present any special problems for analysis, we can restrict our attention to the latter. I have pointed out above that it is not always clear whether linguists use linguistic tests to collect meta data by introspection in the form of their own intuitions which require subsequent analysis, on the one hand, or whether they use linguistic tests to probe their intuitions which are then upgraded from intuition to analytical judgment. In the former case, analysis of the intuitions is supposed to follow and be reported, which in my experience does not always happen. In the latter case, introspection and intuition are equated with analysis, which is questionable. The argument is presumably that expert knowledge is tapped in this way, but experts may either be too subjective or wrong, so that the quality of the analysis needs further examination and support (cf. Schütze 1996). The difference between quantitative and qualitative research has received a lot of attention in the social sciences (e.g. Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2005; Silverman 1993, 2005).

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It has not played a major role in the evaluation of cognitive-linguistic research or in general research on metaphor (but cf. Geeraerts 1997). However, when some of the debates in metaphor research are approached from this perspective, interesting aspects are thrown into relief. I will therefore briefly comment on some aspects of data analysis from the viewpoint of this contrast. Hard core qualitative data analysis is characterized by a number of features, such as its exploratory as opposed to testing function, its aim of understanding rather than description and explanation, its view of the researcher as related to the object of research instead of being independent and distanced from it, its reliance on the intuitions and expertise of the researcher during the analysis instead of the utilization of standardized methods and techniques, and its interest in the thick, specific, and multilevel analysis of single phenomena as opposed to their selective, generalized, quantified and one-dimensional nature and function. Assuming that such a typical form of qualitative analysis exists, it may be concluded that this is not very frequent in research on metaphor, although it may be encountered in some conversation-analytical or more generally spoken interaction work (cf. Cameron & Low 1999; Cameron 2003) as well as literary-critical text interpretation (e.g. Don Freeman 1993, 1995, 1999; Margaret Freeman 1995, 2000, 2002; Hamilton 2001, 2002; Popova 2002, 2003). Blending Theory, too, may be seen as a rather qualitative approach to metaphor, which mainly aims at the exploration of single cases of verbal data at many levels of analysis in order to formulate theoretical statements for further development of the model (e.g. Coulson 2001). Methodological questions about the intersubjective validation of qualitative analyses of verbal data have been raised by for instance Low (1999a). However, less hard core qualitative analysis exists in various forms in a lot of mainstream (cognitive) linguistics. Cognitive linguistics typically relies on the analysis of verbal data by means of introspection, intuitions, expertise, and personal judgment. This is quite normal in historical work on language change where verbal data are collected by observation from old documents, whether these have been made available through diachronic corpora or not (e.g. Goossens 1999, 2000). But it is also characteristic of the way the cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor started, with the analysis of elicited language data from American speakers by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). A mild form of qualitative data analysis was and still is used for the study of metaphor in both grammar and usage, and language and thought, as may be demonstrated by for instance one look at the theoretical transition between the days of complex metaphor analysis to primary metaphor analysis (e.g. Grady 1997, 2005). Of course, these traditions are not completely qualitative, since they do aim at description and explanation, and their findings do lead to testable hypotheses about general tendencies which have to be subjected to further empirical research, even by means of deductive as opposed to inductive argumentation. However, the dependence on the personal analytical performance by the researcher, the lack of standardized and explicit methods and techniques, and the absence of reliability measures and quantification do place this type of data analysis closer to the qualitative side than the quantitative side of the methodological scale.


Quantitative analysis may be seen as characterized by the opposite of all of these features. Its function emphatically includes testing; its aim is more to describe and explain than to understand in the qualitative sense; its view of the researcher is one of distance and lack of involvement with the object of research; analysis is made as independent of the intuitions and expertise of the researcher as is possible, by the rigorously regimented utilization of standardized methods and techniques; and its interest in the phenomena is not the thick, specific, and multilevel analysis of unique phenomena, but the selective, generalized, quantified and one-dimensional analysis of their nature and function. The researcher is of course part of the scientific enterprise, but much more prominently during the relatively structured stage of data collection, which typically takes place by manipulation. Validation of the research is achieved by critical inspection of the experimental samples of participants, and the nature and functions of the various experimental conditions, instructions and research materials. This type of quantitative data analysis is of course highly characteristic of psycholinguistic enquiries into the cognitive processes and products of metaphor in cognition, whether in usage or in grammar. Such research represents the highest degree of control over the phenomena under investigation, which affords the supreme test of a particular theory and its predictions. But quantitative analysis is not just limited to nonverbal data in psycholinguistic research on metaphor. Psycholinguists and others also collect and analyze verbal data in quantitative manners, as when participants are asked to provide interpretations of such expressions like Our love is a bumpy rollercoaster ride; Our love is a voyage to the bottom of the sea; Our love is a filing cabinet (Glucksberg & McGlone 1999). These verbal data are then classified as exemplifying underlying conceptual structures of various kinds. Ideally, independent judges should perform the classification of the data and measures of agreement should be reported, but this does not always happen. Once the data have been classified, statistical analyses can be performed over their frequencies and distributions, or averages and differences between them. This type of quantitative approach is also getting increasingly applied to verbal data collected by observation, in corpus linguistics, either for linguistic (e.g. Deignan 2005a) or conceptual analysis (e.g. Charteris-Black 2004; Koller 2004). My evocation of the differences between quantitative and qualitative analysis is meant to bring out some of the problems occurring in data analysis which have not received much attention in metaphor research before. The nature of the evidence that is available for the various areas of metaphor research is rather divergent. For much of the symbolically oriented analyses, the evidence comes from qualitative research. For much of the behaviorally oriented analyses, however, the evidence comes from both qualitative and quantitative research, the latter seemingly occupying a superior position when it comes to empirical status. More specific situations may perhaps be delineated for smaller areas of research, with reference to, for instance, the increase in quantitative research on the symbolic structures of usage by means of corpus linguistic studies. For the specific areas of research distinguished in the previous chapters, the convergence between various types of evidence indeed simply has to be compared regarding the conclusions they support. In general, however, the differences between

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 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

the spread of the two types of traditions of data analysis across larger areas of research, such as all of symbolic structure versus behavior, raise a fundamental question about the overall possibilities for comparing various types of evidence and their potential convergence to the same conclusions about metaphor in grammar and usage, as we also saw in Chapter 1.

. Analyst performance: Reliability and error An important aspect about data analysis is the role of subjectivity. But in considering subjectivity, we have to look at the overall purposes of data collection and analysis. Research can be aimed at theory formation, exploration, or testing, and each of these goals offers different constraints on the processes of data collection and analysis and the role played by intuitions. Thus, in testing, data collection and analysis is highly focused on a particular aspect of metaphor in language and thought, to the extent that analysts sometimes appear to see what they aim to find. However, it is then good methodological practice to take a step back and consider alternative explanations of these data in order to check whether the interpretations have not been too much biased by the overall purpose and method. Exploration, by contrast, purports to do the opposite, and is as open as possible about the various ways in which the data may be analyzed. There is a much greater role for intuitions here than in testing. This can only be remedied by turning exploratory research into more advanced research aimed at testing at subsequent stages of investigation. In theory formation, finally, intuitions seem to be essential, both for data collection and for data analysis. It is therefore of crucial importance that researchers are aware of the purpose of their investigation, so that they may monitor the interaction between intuitions, data collection, and data analysis. Another aspect is the relation between subjectivity and analysis. Even though all raw verbal materials have to be interpreted to yield the data for analysis, that additional process can be made less dependent on the private intuitions of the analyst by various methodological means. For instance, metaphor identification in verbal protocols can make use of the independent description of verbal patterns in dictionaries and grammars, in order to test whether particular metaphorical uses of words have already been identified by dictionary writers. Another option is to compare the verbal materials under investigation with independent sources of information about patterns of language use such as corpora, providing a frame of reference which makes the decisions of the analyst less dependent on the unique data as well as the experience and memory of the researcher. And a final possibility is to compare analyses of the same data performed by independent analysts, in order to assess their degree of agreement and highlight possible sources of confusion and error. These are widely used techniques which will be discussed in the next chapters. Having said that, it should also be acknowledged that there is always the possibility of error. Good research should report estimates of margins of error which give the


reader a chance to evaluate the quality of the measurements. Virtually all studies that are based on verbal data analysis that I know of do not report any reliability measures and thereby remain firmly qualitative. This is one of the sharpest contrasts with quantitative data analyses in behavioral studies, where data usually consist of figures so that their classification into categories always is reliable from that perspective. In order to show that this type of attitude can also be developed for studies that are traditionally more qualitative in their orientation, we will now have a look at the way in which the Pragglejaz Group have addressed this problem.

.. Interanalyst agreement and individual bias The central question is of course how big the differences between individual researchers interested in finding metaphor in language actually are. A good indication of the magnitude of this problem may be given by a statistical test of the reliability of the Pragglejaz approach to metaphor identification. At their first meeting in 2000, the Pragglejaz Group discussed a number of papers in press sketching a relatively coherent view of metaphor identification but not offering an explicitly formulated procedure (Steen 2002b). Four months later, four analysts independently analyzed five nineteenth-century poems that had been briefly discussed at the meeting itself. A statistical measure indicating whether the four analysts produced a significantly different number of scores for metaphorically used words in the poems, Cochran’s Q (Dunn 1989), was calculated for these data. The result of the test showed that there was a statistically significant difference between the four analysts. Three days of preparatory theoretical discussion and an initial superficial discussion of the language materials did not lead to statistically reliable agreement between four metaphor experts in their coding of 410 words for metaphorical and non-metaphorical use. The judges had even been asked to concentrate on the four main lexical classes of nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs only, to be able to focus on relatively clear cases from the beginning. Since statistical testing of reliability is a good measure of the quality of metaphor research, this is a telling result. It makes one fear for worse when it is extrapolated to the agreement between other research reports at conferences or in journals. The Pragglejaz Group has made use of statistical testing to monitor its own progress. When the first findings by the four independent analysts had been collected, the poems and the scores for metaphorical usage for each word were posted on a website, and the four analysts involved examined which cases had received either 1 or 3 out of 4 marks. By inserting comments between the lines of the poems, the analysts discussed whether those cases were possible errors (the 1s) or oversights (the 3s) by individual judges. Some of the independently entered marks were changed by individual analysts because of this discussion. After this round of discussion, a new reliability coefficient was computed, for the identification of metaphorically used words after discussion. This time there were no significant differences between the four analysts: the scores after discussion displayed sufficient reliability in the form of interanalyst agreement when measured according to this test (Steen 2001).

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 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

To illustrate what could be at stake, one of the issues that caused disagreement was simile. Consider the following opening lines from William Wordsworth’s famous poem about daffodils: I wandered lonely as a cloud That floats on high o’er vales and hills When doing their independent analysis, one of the four analysts did not mark ‘cloud’ as metaphorically used, because he did not include simile under his understanding of the definition of metaphor. However, it was then argued during discussion that all words that might give rise to the construction of a metaphorical mapping in the mind of a reader ought to be included, which meant that simile should be included as well. The analyst who at first had withheld his mark was then persuaded and added his mark to the data. (It should be noted that the Pragglejaz view of simile has since changed; Pragglejaz Group 2007.) This was one of the changes which eventually led to the satisfactory reliability co-efficient after discussion as measured by Cochran’s Q. As will be appreciated, this particular example illustrates not an error or an oversight. Instead, it indicates a lack of clarity in the approach as it had been informally followed at that moment. Cases like these have led to a further explication of the criteria for metaphor identification. This is precisely why this type of methodological study is desirable. When we return to the simile example for further illustration, another feature can also be pointed out, that not all scores for metaphorically used words are independent from each other. Thus, if you decide that ‘cloud’ has to be included as metaphorically used, this has a consequence for the analysis of the next line as well. In particular, we are not just dealing with ‘clouds’ that are potentially metaphorical because of their use in a simile, but we are dealing with ‘clouds / that float on high o’er vales and hills.’ As a result, the scores for float, high, vales, hills also had to be changed. This means that one clarification of the procedure could lead to small groups of words turning from nonmetaphorical to metaphorical and vice versa, although the latter change did not occur very frequently. (It should be noted that lack of independence of scores is a statistical problem for some statistical tests, but it is a reality which cannot be easily avoided in discourse analysis.) The difference between the unsatisfactory result before discussion and the satisfactory result after discussion in the first reliability test of the Pragglejaz project was due to a total of 62 changed scores. When we divide this by four analysts, each analyst changed on average 15.5 scores, which amounts to an average of 4% of their total number of decisions. However, when we express this as a percentage of only the average number of words scored as metaphorically used (150 out of 410), then the percentage of changes rises to 10.3 (15.5 out of 150). It turns out, then, that there was a decisive 10% margin of error between reliable and unreliable metaphor identification as measured by this particular statistical test. In addition, the difference between the two results is not just one of percentages, but also of the shift from independent analysis before discussion to mutually influ-

Chapter 5. Application 

enced analysis after discussion, where analysts deliberately aim to reduce individual biases. This situation even obtains for this relatively optimal situation, where a number of metaphor experts have had intensive prior consultation about their goals and theoretical assumptions before doing their independent analyses, and where the analysis concentrates on major word classes only. Since this is not representative of most interactions between metaphor researchers at conferences or in the printed media, it may be expected that interanalyst agreement will be lower in those more typical situations. The Pragglejaz Group held about half a dozen reliability tests and all of them exhibited this pattern to a greater or lesser extent. Independent scores of up to eight analysts never achieved satisfactory reliability before discussion. Some analysts consistently marked many more words as metaphorically used than others, the difference sometimes rising to about twice as many cases. However, many of the issues were also able to be resolved by discussion. In practice this means that the low-scoring analysts can be persuaded overall to add more metaphorical cases to their scores, while the high-scoring analysts are persuaded overall to delete more metaphorical cases from their scores. These findings also turn out to vary somewhat between discourse genres and word classes. Nouns have invariably been easiest to score, for instance, while newspaper language has proved to be quite difficult in comparison with, for example, conversation. There has also been a consistent pattern regarding the percentages of words that have been unanimously identified as not metaphorically used: apart from the poetry mentioned above, an average of over 75 per cent of the words in most texts that have been looked at were never marked as metaphorically used by any of the judges involved in the various rounds of reliability testing. This, too, is a rather striking and solid result, pertaining to substantial agreement about non-metaphorical meaning, which itself turns out to be quite ubiquitous. So far, therefore, the independent scoring of metaphorical word usage (‘before discussion’) has not been reliable. However, it also turns out that it can be remedied by discussion and resolution between independent analysts of a modest number of difficult cases. All of this has to be seen in the context of the project as a continuous learning experience, in which personal biases and sometimes even obstinacies played a decisive role. Moreover, during the individual analyses of the materials, performance has also been crucial in inadvertently keeping reliability at a relatively low level, most of the analysts making mistakes which they were readily willing to correct when these were pointed out to them during discussion. Performance and practice, then, are essential factors in determining what comes out of these analyses as metaphorically used words, and the final result varies between the independent analyses themselves as well as between their average result and the group analysis after discussion. What is special about the Pragglejaz project is not this finding per se. It is the fact that individual researchers are prepared to have their practice and performance subjected to detailed critical discussion by their peers as well to statistical testing by means of generally accepted techniques of doing science. It is almost a foregone conclusion that what counts as a metaphorically used word is dependent on the methodological

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

approach of the research and the researcher. What is more interesting is that some of these findings, even though they may be more hard won than others, are also more reliable than others.

.. Interanalyst agreement and chance Cochran’s Q is a measure which compares the total positive and negative scores of each of the analysts and tests whether, given this distribution of scores, the analysts may be seen as roughly behaving in the same way. In technical parlance, the issue is whether they can be seen as a homogenous set of judges. In other words, the test simply examines whether a group of judges produce about the same numbers of zeros and ones for the total number of words in the sample. It is one means to examine the role of measurer bias in reliability. This is one, rather gross, way of examining the reliability of results. On the one hand, it has served its purpose as a first indication of inter-analyst agreement at the beginning of the project, since it is able to record the initial distance between the starting points of individual researchers. It has been especially helpful in indicating which analysts had a consistent tendency to mark significantly fewer or more words as metaphorically used than most of the others. This has been taken as a reflection of rather personal styles in metaphor identification, which could then be subjected to further analysis and discussion. On the other hand, the use of Cochran’s Q also has its limitations. For even if it may be true that four or more judges administer the same number of positive and negative scores to a sample of words in a number of texts, this does not mean that all or most of the judges administer the same values to the same cases. In practice, this is of course inevitably the case to some degree, but it is precisely the magnitude of this degree which is not examined by Cochran’s Q. Consider the case of one reliability test, where seven judges score between 150 and 300 words out of 3000 as metaphorical. Cochran’s Q does not examine whether the 150 cases of the first judge are all included in the next judges’ scores or not. These considerations may produce radically different pictures of interanalyst agreement. A more appropriate measure for this purpose is Cohen’s kappa (Dunn 1989). This is a test which does look at the agreement between judges on a case-by-case basis: it checks inter-analyst agreement for each individual case of the total number of items in a sample. It is specifically concerned with the relation between the agreement that might be expected on the basis of mere chance on the one hand and observed agreement on the other. There are several interpretations of the test, as may be gleaned from for instance Krippendorf (2004a, b). The most critical and conservative interpretation is that kappa only tells you whether agreement between analysts is above chance. The most optimistic interpretation holds that kappa also gives you a measure of the magnitude of between-analyst agreement corrected for chance agreement. Interpretations of the values of kappa vary too, some researchers saying that a value of 0.6 to 0.8 indi-

Chapter 5. Application 

cates substantial agreement, while others say that a kappa from 0.7 is satisfactory, two positions which are in fact not completely incompatible. Three applications by the Pragglejaz Group yielded kappas between 0.6 and 0.8 before discussion. This is not perfect but it is not disappointing either. However, since there is no tradition in linguistics to report this statistic, it is hard to assign any precise interpretation to this finding. The only exception that I know of is Markert and Nissim (2003), who have reported Cohen’s kappa for a restricted area of metonymy identification in a corpus. In metaphor research, reports of reliability results can only become meaningful when they can be compared against kappas produced by other researchers. The value of these findings should also be seen in the light of their possible application. If metaphor identification is needed to analyze large chunks of discourse in a corpus in order to compare the properties and behavior of groups of metaphorically used words across genres or speakers or situations of usage, then overall reliability need not be as high as when the aim of the research is to be certain about each and every individual case of metaphorical usage, say for the interpretation of a particular text (Scholfield 1995). When large groups of cases are compared, differences between groups of metaphorically used words merely have to be somewhat bigger in order to come out as statistically significant. Lower reliability means more error in the measurement of the genuinely metaphorical cases. As a result, there will be more noise in two groups of metaphorical data that are to be compared for their distribution. It follows that there will only be a problem for this kind of work if the finding suggests that there is no difference between the groups of metaphors: then the researcher does not know whether this lack of difference is due to a true lack of difference between the groups or to the relatively high level of noise in the data because of the low reliability of the analysis. High reliability about the value of individual cases may be important for single text analysis, for instance in literary discourse analysis. However, it may also be relevant for the development of experimental materials on the basis of authentic discourse, as may happen for research on metaphor recognition (Steen 2004). If you wish to examine how metaphor recognition in natural discourse by informants is affected by discourse properties of metaphor, it is essential to have a representative sample of all true cases of metaphor in the study, and then unreliable metaphor identification may skew the experimental materials in subtle ways. It has been one of the ambitions of the Pragglejaz procedure to be good enough for application in this type of experimental behavioral setting.

.. Doing methodological research What is probably most special about the Pragglejaz project is that it shows how the reliability of an identification instrument can be tested and improved. For instance, the project has begun by using clear cases as a point of departure. At the beginning of the research, the method only addressed the question whether all content words in a text or spoken interaction were used metaphorically or not; that is, it focused on nouns,

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. The reason for this strategy was the idea that difficult cases can be too frustrating at the beginning of a project which aims at explicating the commonly shared assumptions that play a role in metaphor identification. If you focus on differences of opinion too soon, these may begin to form a hindrance to achieving agreement about the less problematic issues. The worst case scenario of such a hardline strategy would be for analysts to abandon a project before they have properly started it. Another helpful strategy was the adoption of the policy called ‘when in doubt, leave it in’. This is exactly opposite to the more regular policy of ‘when in doubt, leave it out’, which may be helpful for achieving other goals, such as producing a relatively clean data set that everybody can agree is metaphorical (e.g. Scholfield 1995). However, if the goal of the project is to develop an instrument that does not only produce clean data that have high reliability but also the right set of data that have high validity, then ‘when in doubt, leave it in’ provides the better option. It allows analysts to reconsider cases as potentially metaphorical, which is impossible if unclear cases are discarded too soon. As a result, the final set of metaphorically used words identified by the Pragglejaz procedure includes a higher number of less typical metaphorical expressions, but this is precisely intended to increase the validity of these metaphors as a representative sample of metaphor in authentic language use. In the methodological research of the group, analysts reconsider cases by means of targeted discussion. In many cases in the social sciences, when phenomena have to be assigned to classes, or technically speaking, to categories of a variable, analysts work in two stages: first they go through the data individually and divide all data between the categories that they are supposed to use, and then they meet and discuss those cases where they have different results. Agreement between analysts is often reported in the form of ‘before discussion’ versus ‘after discussion.’ Of course, in regular empirical research the gap between the results of the two stages cannot be so great as to completely invalidate the first stage of individual analysis. In methodological research, however, discussion may be used for slightly different purposes. In the case of the development of the Pragglejaz method, for instance, discussion was also used to actually change and improve the instructions for analysis. This is not permitted in regular empirical research, where discussion can only function as a check on whether the instructions for analysis have been applied correctly and consistently by the individual analysts. In addition, in the methodological research of the Pragglejaz group, discussions were also used to further explicate the assumptions underlying the instructions. Instructions themselves were not always changed by the discussions, but ideas informing the interpretation of the instructions might still prove to be in need of clarification and spelling out at various stages of the research. This took place during discussions on a special website as well as at special research meetings. Such discussions quite frequently functioned as reminders to Pragglejaz analysts of what had been agreed before, in order to induce a practice effect in all analysts participating in the project. It should be noted that this is radically different from what happens during discussions among analysts in regular empirical research.

Chapter 5. Application 

Methodological research, therefore, is aimed at building up a store of group experiences in a number of different rounds of analysis in order to come to terms with many difficult issues of metaphor identification. One issue which has not been mentioned is the one of measurer bias. Group work can provide insight into the natural tendencies of some analysts to mark many words as metaphorical, whereas other analysts do the opposite. Such insights can be used by individual analysts to reconsider their own performance and relate it to the theoretical and operational definitions that they are operating with. Another issue is measurer performance. As has been pointed out by Goddard (2002), work on natural semantics can be extremely hard, and sometimes methods have not been pursued to the very end because of lack of stamina. For instance, one of the recent additions to the Pragglejaz procedure has been the obligation for each analyst to go through the data twice with a decent time interval in between, and to submit both sets of findings for statistical analysis. It may be expected that greater reliability can be achieved if coders independently go over the same data repeatedly and at different times in order to optimize their personal performance and to be critical about their personal bias of marking relatively few or many items as metaphorically used. Moreover, analysts may apply additional checks by searching the text for notoriously difficult cases, such as delexicalized verbs (make, get, and so on) or prepositions in order to reduce their number of potential mistakes. Methodological research is possible if researchers are convinced of its function. Acknowledging that researchers make errors is the beginning of acquiring such an attitude. Agreeing that such errors can be due to various aspects of doing research opens up the way for addressing a number of these aspects in a concerted effort. Taking methods and techniques of analysis out of our heads and making them explicit for other researchers is a major task for all researchers of metaphor who do not deal in collecting and analyzing nonverbal data by means of manipulation. Reporting both procedures for analysis as well as some kind of index of agreement and reliability should become standard practice in publications at conferences, journals, and books. Only then will it become possible for various types of evidence to be genuinely compared. And only then will it be possible to transfer such methods from one researcher to another, and to include them in training and even teaching programs at advanced levels.

. Conclusion The theoretical and operational definitions discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 come into their own during data collection and analysis. A distinction can be made between verbal and nonverbal data, which are both reflections of language behavior and which can be analyzed either as such behavior and its products, or as more abstract symbolic structures. They are to be distinguished from meta data which cannot be said to be reflections of language and its manifestation in behavior, but instead are reflections on it. When such data are metalinguistic data, they can be collected by introspection on

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

the part of the linguist, which used to be the dominant mode in the linguistic investigation of grammar, or by the manipulation of informants, which is an emerging form of investigation intended to remedy some of the shortcomings of the introspective verbal data. When they are metaconceptual, they are usually collected by manipulation, requesting informants to fill out scales for various types of conceptual materials. Introspection, observation and manipulation are the three main methods of data collection, and they have different standings and traditions in linguistics and psychology. This has affected their application in the search for metaphor as conceptual structure (‘metaphor in thought’) and linguistic form (‘metaphor in language’). In particular, manipulation is most important in all psychological – that is, typically behavioral – investigation of metaphor, whether this pertains to the collection of verbal, nonverbal, or meta data, and whether these data are meant to say something about the conceptual structure or linguistic form of metaphor in cognition. Observation and introspection are used considerably less often. By contrast, in linguistic research, which is typically symbolic, introspection used to be the dominant mode of data collection. This preference has recently been redressed by the rise of elicited data in cognitive linguistics and observed data in corpus linguistics. Different linguists have different attitudes towards the values of these classes of data. Furthermore, in linguistics these three methods of data collection primarily focus on verbal data collection, for both the study of metaphor in linguistic form as well as the study of metaphor in conceptual structure. Nonverbal and meta data are much less frequent in linguistics than in psychology. The analysis of all of these data collected by these different means typically proceeds by one of two courses: quantitative or qualitative analysis. Psychologists again seem to prefer one of these types, quantitative analysis, and this can be applied to verbal, nonverbal, and meta data. Since most of these are collected by manipulation instead of observation or introspection, a good deal of prior structuring of these data takes place before the stage of analysis, so that analyses themselves are less problematic and, as analyses, contain fewer errors. This should be opposed to the dominant mode of qualitative analysis in linguistics, which applies to all verbal data, whether collected by introspection, observation or manipulation. Even in corpus linguistics, which collects verbal data by observation to perform quantitative comparisons between speakers, registers, genres, and so on, identification of metaphorical linguistic forms or conceptual structures is typically qualitative, with no reports of reliability between analysts and so on being made available. That such quantitative norms can be adopted for qualitative research on metaphor in language has been shown by the Pragglejaz Group. Taking operational definitions apart into ordered sets of instructions and then monitoring their application in actual research is a prerequisite for achieving progress. Utilizing statistical measures of reliability and enforcing optimal performance by independent analysts is another. Methodological research is time consuming and laborious work, but it is inevitable if the disadvantages of qualitative research are going to be overcome.

Chapter 5. Application 

This chapter on application concludes the series of three which took us from theoretical definitions through operational definitions to actual practice. In part one as a whole, we have looked at the theoretical models and goals of four prominent schools of cognitive metaphor research. Each of these schools has employed the fruits of the deductive approach, and some of them have attempted to collect converging evidence for supporting and elaborating the theory of conceptual metaphor. They have done so with the help of the various methods for the study of metaphor in grammar and usage, approached as both language and thought and as symbolic structure and behavior. In some cases, evidence has been compared within one area of research, whereas in other cases, evidence has been compared between different areas of research. The former type of comparison seems to lead to more solid conclusions about the convergence of evidence for a particular phenomenon than the latter. All of these methods will now receive more attention in the next parts of this book, where I will discuss in some detail how they can help in finding metaphor in grammar and usage in various ways.

 

Finding metaphor in grammar

chapter 

Linguistic forms in grammar

The map of the field for metaphor identification proposed in Part 1 may now serve to offer guidance to the methodological analysis of a wide range of studies of metaphor in grammar and usage. The present chapter is the first of a series of four on the question of finding metaphor in grammar. It concentrates on the ways in which linguists attempt to provide an answer to Question 1: Q1: When does a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? In cognitive linguistics, this question is often approached via another question, the third question in our map of the field: Q3: When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? But we have seen in Chapter 2 that this is the result of adopting a deductive approach which may lead to findings that may also be alternatively explained. Therefore I will look at question 3 in Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 9 will then adopt a behavioral perspective on these issues and look at metaphor identification in the cognitive processes and products relating to grammar (questions 5 and 7 in Fig. 1.2 in Chapter 1). The present chapter addresses the question how to find potentially metaphorical linguistic forms in grammar approached as a symbolic system; it also pays brief attention to their diachronic cousin, semantic change. We will concentrate on metaphorically motivated polysemy, which is by far the largest category of linguistic forms in grammar that has been studied for metaphorical meaning in cognitive linguistics. Polysemy is the conventionalized pairing of one form with more than one meaning which are related to each other, and metaphor is one popular candidate for motivating the relation between the senses. It is the function of the next two chapters to raise the question how the presumably metaphorical sense relation can be analyzed as involving two conceptual domains (Chapter 7) that are in turn related by a cross-domain mapping (Chapter 8). But if polysemy and semantic change in grammar may be motivated by metaphor, we first need to come to terms with the nature and identification of potentially metaphorical linguistic forms in lexico-grammar itself. For each of these chapters, I will follow a strategy that mirrors the order of Chapters 2 through 5 in Part 1. Each chapter begins with an illustration of the deductive treatment of the phenomena in cognitive linguistics by means of the exploitation of the

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

notion of conceptual metaphor. Then each phenomenon needs a theoretical conceptualization and a practical operationalization. The remaining sections of each chapter will then treat the role of introspection, observation, and manipulation as three fundamentally distinct approaches to data collection in the grammatical study of metaphor, with additional attention to their quantitative or qualitative analysis. These studies may hence be seen as dramatizing the methodological pluralism that can lead to converging evidence within the distinct areas of research.

. Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach .. The synchronic dimension Chapter 2 showed how conceptual metaphor can be applied to identify a range of potentially metaphorical linguistic forms in lexico-grammar. This approach involves a cross-over from postulating metaphor in conceptual structure to observing metaphor in linguistic form. A variation on this theme would be to use the same postulated conceptual structures for finding metaphor in visual form or bodily gesture. Language, gesture, and visuals are distinct semiotic codes which may all be taken to express the same underlying conceptual structures. This is one reason why we need to pay separate attention to metaphor identification in the separate codes as such. For various reasons, the most convenient illustration of the deductive study of metaphor in lexico-grammar is polysemous vocabulary. Let us take time is money as an example and quote a brief passage from Lakoff and Johnson (1999a: 163–164): the time is money metaphor Money → Time The User Of The Money → The User Of Time (The Agent) The Purpose That Requires The Money → The Purpose That Requires Time The Value Of The Money → The Value Of The Time The Value Of The Money → The Value Of The Purpose This mapping provides time-domain senses for money words like budget, spend, invest, profit, and loss, and hence allows us to comprehend sentences like the following: I have to budget my time. I spent too much time on that. I’ve invested a lot of time on this project. You don’t use your time profitably. That mistake resulted in a considerable loss of time.

This excerpt posits a causal connection between conceptual structure and linguistic form: conceptual structure explains or motivates linguistic polysemy, succinctly expressed by Lakoff and Johnson as “This mapping provides time-domain senses for money words”. The formula introduced in Chapter 2 for deductive reasoning can be used to represent this causal relation:

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar

(1) If we conceptualize time as money, then money words have time-domain senses We conceptualize time as money THEREFORE Money words have time-domain senses This is a typical example of the way in which cognitive linguists apply a deductive approach setting out from conceptual structure when attempting to find potentially metaphorical polysemous lexical items. The positive side of such a deductive approach is the self-evident nature of the emerging patterns. The deductive approach facilitates a clear procedure for testing the grammatical validity and reach of specific conceptual metaphors. This has been done for English as well as for other languages. For instance, Sören Sjöström has examined how the conceptual metaphor postulated by Sweetser (1990) for English, cognition is vision, is also reflected in the vocabulary for cognition in Swedish (Sjöström 1998). He looked at a number of predetermined lexical items and their descriptions in the dictionary, and found massive parallels between the two languages. A more problematic aspect of the deductive approach involves the perennial possibility of finding alternative conceptual explanations of the same linguistic data. Lakoff and Johnson’s example about time as money may serve as a case in point. Analyzing its structure with the help of the formula presented above shows that the argument works by assuming that time is conceptualized as money. Only then does it follow that there may be a causal relation between conceptualizing time as money on the one hand and providing time senses for money words on the other. However, we have seen in Chapter 2 that the fact that we find language data which can be interpreted as consistent with such a prediction does not mean that this is the end of the story. There is at least one other conceptual metaphor which would explain the same linguistic data, an alternative which is in fact also discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a). This is the metaphor that we conceptualize time as a valuable resource, instead of the more specific category of money. This metaphor may provide a better account for at least one of the terms used as an example by Lakoff and Johnson, the noun loss in the last example from the quotation. Here is the description of loss in the Macmillan dictionary, with the ‘money’ sense in third place 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

no longer having sth having less than before money lost death of sb sadness from death/loss disadvantage from loss failure to win race etc + phrases



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

The Cobuild dictionary, which is also based on corpus research, has a similar list, but puts the money sense in sixth place. Independent descriptions of lexical senses in dictionaries alert the analyst to the question how we can decide that a word ‘is’ a money word. Why is loss not a more general word, which has to do with the possession of valuable resources (sense 1 in Macmillan)? Vice versa, if loss can also be considered as a ‘money’ word on the basis of its frequent use in sense 3, it should also be considered as a ‘death’ word on the basis of the popularity of sense 4, and as a ‘race’ word because of sense 7. This would allow for the position that loss is a ‘money’ word, indeed, but it has the disadvantage that it becomes unclear which sense from this list is the basic sense. It raises the question how words can be tied to any one conceptual domain as a basic domain in the first place (cf. Vervaeke & Kennedy 1996, 2004; Ritchie 2003, 2004; Semino et al. 2004). The connection between conceptual metaphors and linguistic forms is somewhat tenuous. Even though patterns of metaphorical polysemy may be discovered in grammar by the postulation of conceptual metaphors, their underlying conceptual structure does not necessarily have to be identical with those very conceptual metaphors: they may be explained alternatively and sometimes better by other complex metaphors, or by combinations of primary metaphors. An even more radical alternative is the possibility that particular linguistic structures may also be explained by other conceptual structures than cross-domain mappings, which work via abstraction, as has been argued by Jackendoff (2002). And a final caveat pertains to the reverse connection between the area of linguistic forms and conceptual structures: particular patterns of polysemy cannot be taken as compelling evidence for the validity of the presumably related conceptual metaphors if those conceptual metaphors are simultaneously used to collect and explain the linguistic data (Keysar et al. 2000: 577). Conceptual metaphor does not provide an unproblematic gateway to linguistic metaphor. It is important to remain aware of these alternative points of view about the deductive approach to linguistic metaphor identification in grammar. As long as the issues have not been further clarified, it seems wise to adopt a position where conceptual metaphors can serve as a search mechanism for potentially metaphorical polysemy in grammar, without making concomitant assumptions about their related conceptual structures. As long as we keep in mind that in the area of metaphor as linguistic form we only need to give an answer to the question what counts as a conventional metaphorical form-meaning pairing, we are focusing on the appropriate target. This is also how we can collect high-quality linguistic data to pursue the distinct search for conceptual metaphors in conceptual structure, which is one way of respecting the distinctions between the various areas of research to the full.

.. The diachronic dimension The deductive approach to metaphor in diachronic cognitive linguistics is closely associated with the name of Eve Sweetser. Her study of the metaphorically motivated polysemy of sense-perception verbs and modals (Sweetser 1990) has served as an ex-

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

ample for other studies of language change and diachronic explanations of synchronic polysemy. To focus on the first case, Sweetser postulates a “Mind-as-Body Metaphor” (p. 28) and uses that to explain the metaphorical mental senses of originally physical words like look down on, look up to, look forward to, look back on, overlook, look after (p. 33). These are all related by a more specific conceptual metaphor to the effect that physical vision is mental “vision”. Another specific conceptual metaphor is physical sight is knowledge, intellection, which is a mapping that may explain the provenance of English idea (and its cognates in German, Dutch, French, Spanish, and Italian, to give just a brief list): it is derived from Greek eidon, which means ‘to see’. Other senses examined by Sweetser beside vision are hearing, smell, taste, and feel, which display comparable patterns of mappings from the body to the mind. These patterns are not just visible in English but in a whole range of languages, including Welsh, Celtic, German, French, Italian, and Spanish. Sweetser’s approach to finding metaphorically motivated polysemy is firmly deductive, as may be illustrated by the following quotation: Studies of systematic metaphorical connections between domains are thus needed, in addition to local studies of relevant semantic contrasts, to help us understand what is a likely relationship between two senses. (1990: 19)

In her conclusion to the chapter on sense perception verbs, she points out the predictive power of adopting such an approach: “For the domain of perception verbs, now that we have examined the system, we have some idea what semantic changes would be ‘regular’ or ‘normal,’ and what changes would be abnormal” (1990: 47). The nature of the conceptual domains and the direction of the mapping across them is assumed to typically involve the concrete versus the abstract: In general (see Traugott 1982) it seems clear that more abstract domains of meaning tend to derive their vocabulary from more concrete domains (rather than vice versa) and, furthermore, that in some cases there is a deep cognitive disposition to draw from certain particular concrete domains in deriving vocabulary for a given abstract domain. (1990: 18)

And the submappings discovered by the close analysis of the various groups of perception verbs permit the formulation of more specific hypotheses. Sweetser’s interpretation of such metaphorical mappings between domains and their effects on semantic structure is also clearly based in similarity: “There are major similarities in our general linguistic treatments of vision and intellection” (1990: 37). She then presents an analysis of the underlying conceptual structure of the mapping between the two domains. This is used to explain correspondences and contrasts between the exploitation of the various senses as source domains for target vocabulary about different aspects of the mind. This model of diachronic study has inspired many follow-up investigations, as I have noted in Chapter 2. What is important for now is the connection between language change and diachronically motivated metaphorical polysemy, on the one hand,

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

and the deductive approach which sets out from assumed conceptual metaphors like the mind is the body or understanding is seeing on the other. Recent work on metaphor and metonymy has shown that some of the connections between these senses and domains may also be explained by metonymy: seeing may be analyzed as a condition for understanding, and hearing may similarly be a condition for understanding (e.g. Barcelona 2000b; cf. Johnson 1999). It is therefore no foregone conclusion that the cross-domain mappings presented by Sweetser are the sole or even the best explanation of the observed patterns of polysemy. As with synchronic metaphor studies, it may be wise to see the deductive approach via conceptual metaphor as offering a search mechanism for potentially metaphorically motivated polysemy. Even though Sweetser presents a persuasive argument that there is a cross-domain mapping between the body and the mind, separate research on the validity of the conceptual mapping of the mind is the body is needed first. This will also have to consider the way it may be compared to any metonymic competitors. Then additional research on the presumed relation between the cross-domain mapping on the one hand and the changes in vocabulary on the other will have to be added. Only then can Sweetser’s thesis about the relation between the conceptual structures and the linguistic forms count as more than a thesis. An illustration of this critical position is Goossens (1999, 2000), who has looked in closer detail at the area of modal auxiliaries in English, as we shall see in Chapter 8. It should be added that this analysis is not meant to depreciate the work of Sweetser, which has clearly served an extremely useful function. Part of that function may even have been to enable the formulation of alternative views which have since been developed and which raise questions about aspects of previous work. This does not detract from the merit of our predecessors. My comments at the end of the previous subsection on the status of conceptual metaphor research in synchronic linguistic research should be read in the same light.

. Conceptualization In Chapter 3 we looked at various aspects of conceptualizing metaphor in language. Metaphorical linguistic forms in grammar are conceptualized by Conceptual Metaphor Theory as conventionalized linguistic expressions of conceptual crossdomain mappings. Their linguistic nature is furthermore specified as one of indirect meaning, where a more basic meaning is available for the same linguistic form. Thus, one sense of the word attack is said to be metaphorical because it expresses the underlying mapping between argument and war. The metaphorical meaning is indirect in that it can be contrasted with the more direct meaning of attack which designates physical engagement. The relation between the metaphorical and nonmetaphorical sense is, moreover, one of nonliteral similarity: the two kinds of attack are similar, but since the metaphorical one is mental whereas the nonmetaphorical one is physical, the similarity is not literal.

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

.. Conventionalized versus ad-hoc polysemy Polysemy is generally defined as the phenomenon where one language form has two distinct but related conventionalized meanings (e.g. Cuyckens & Zawada 2001a; Kilgariff & Palmer 2000; Ravin & Leacock 2002). To spell out the obvious, polysemy is relevant for finding metaphor in grammar because two senses of one linguistic form that is polysemous exhibit a relation which may be based in a metaphorical mapping between their related conceptual structures. In the area of linguistic forms considered separately from conceptual structures, this means that the two senses need to be related by some form of nonliteral similarity rather than by either literal similarity or contiguity, as we have seen in Chapter 3. Consider the following well-known list of examples, which includes many polysemous lexical items: argument is war Your claims are indefensible. He attacked every weak point in my argument. His criticisms were right on target. I demolished his argument. I’ve never won an argument with him. You disagree? Okay, shoot! If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out. He shot down all of my arguments. All of the italicized language forms exhibit two distinct but related meanings: the indirect, contextual meaning has to do with argumentation, but a more basic, direct meaning has to do with fighting or war. The sense relation resides in some form of nonliteral similarity. For metaphor in lexico-grammar, the two related meanings exhibited by polysemy have to be grammaticalized, conventionalized, or ‘entrenched’ meanings (e.g. Lehrer 1990; cf. Taylor 2002). This is true for a word like indefensible, which has two explanations in Macmillan: 1. impossible to defend from criticism: a morally indefensible statement [. . .] 2. impossible to protect against military attack [. . .] A twofold dictionary explication of one word is a good indication that the word has two conventionalized senses. The two sense descriptions in the dictionary also seem to be reflections, indeed, of the two domains identified by the label for the conceptual metaphor, argument is war, but this is an issue for the following chapter. For now, nonliteral similarity between two separate or distinct or contrasted senses is enough. It is unclear, however, whether the same conclusions can be drawn for all of the words in the list of examples. Consider the expression wipe out in the last but one example, “If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.” The Macmillan dictionary contains five senses for wipe out, but none of them is remotely related to argumentation:

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

wipe out phrasal vb 1 [T] to destroy or get rid of something completely: We want to wipe out world hunger by the year 2010. 2 [T] very informal to kill someone 3 [T] to clean the inside of something with a cloth: Just wipe out the fridge with a damp cloth. 4 [T] informal to make someone extremely tired: The early-morning meetings really wipe me out. 5 [I] informal to fall and have a big crash when you are riding something such as a snowboard surfboard

The indirect, contextual meaning of the phrasal verb wipe out in Lakoff and Johnson’s example may indeed be related to argumentation, but it does not seem to be an established, conventionalized sense in the dictionary. Cross-checking this explication against another corpus-based dictionary, the Collins Cobuild dictionary, confirms this impression. Instead of having a conventionalized argumentation sense, the argumentation meaning of wipe out seems to arise as a product of the context in which the verb is presented: it is an example in a series of expressions having to do with argumentation. The most likely conventionalized meaning or sense of wipe out that is at play here is the second explanation in the Macmillan dictionary, ‘to kill someone’. In Lakoff and Johnson’s example, this sense is in turn applied in an ad hoc fashion to a context of argumentation. Of course, both wipe out and kill can be used perfectly intelligibly in usage situations about argumentation, as is evidenced by the present example. They are presumably produced and understood in easy fashion because of their possible connection with the underlying conceptual metaphor, argument is war. But this would take us into two other areas of research, linguistic forms in usage and linguistic forms in cognitive processing. These distinctions show how such intended indirect meanings are ad hoc, not grammatically conventional. As a result, If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out turns on no fewer than three meanings for wipe out: 1. the conventionalized direct sense of ‘cleaning’; 2. the conventionalized indirect sense of ‘killing’; 3. the unconventionalized, ad hoc meaning of ‘winning in argumentation’. In all of the other examples, only two meanings are at play, which are both conventionalized senses. The implication of this analysis for the conceptual structure of wipe out in the present example is that there may also be three conceptual domains at play. In particular, it is presumably not just the case that argument is war for this particular example, but argument is war is cleaning. Polysemy in grammar should consequently be distinguished from the more general notion of indirect meaning in usage, for the latter includes the relatively ad-hoc application of a word to some referent (cf. Sandra & Rice 1995; Tyler & Evans 2001, 2003). Since the technical morpheme ‘semy’ in the term polysemy refers to stable, conventional meanings, it is preferable to restrict the term polysemy to grammar. We can see that wipe out in Lakoff and Johnson’s example is a potentially metaphorical linguistic form, indeed, but that it is not part of grammar as the conventionalized repository of form-meaning pairings in language, but of imagined or elicited usage.


.. Polysemy, homonymy, and monosemy When we limit our attention to the study of meaning within grammar, polysemy has to be contrasted with homonymy and monosemy. Homonymy concerns those language forms which exhibit one form and two distinct senses that cannot be related to each other. The stock example of homonymy is bank, which can either mean ‘financial institution’ or ‘land at river edge’, but these two senses cannot be related to each other. The latter is the important point for analysts of metaphor: in the case of homonymy, it is impossible to perceive a relation of nonliteral similarity between the two senses, or construct a metaphorical mapping between the two concepts, but in the case of polysemy, this should be possible. Polysemy also has to be contrasted with monosemy, where one language form exhibits one meaning. Some monosemous lexical items have a vague meaning which automatically becomes more specific when it gets applied in use. For instance, a word like aunt is a monosemous item, even though it may be applied to two distinct referents: ‘father’s sister’ versus ‘mother’s sister’. Technically, we are dealing with one lexeme and one sense here, even though the one sense may be applied to two distinct extensions. Other languages, such as Turkish and Chinese, appear to have codified this difference between extensions by reserving two different word forms for the meanings of ‘father’s sister’ versus ‘mother’s sister’. In English and Dutch, however, the two potential extensions have not given rise to two distinct senses in the language. As a result, monosemy is not related to metaphor, since it does not involve two clearly distinguishable senses which may be explained by means of nonliteral similarity or conceptual cross-domain mappings, as is the case with polysemy. We hence need three distinctions if we wish to use polysemy as a gateway to finding metaphor in grammar: 1. between conventionalized indirect use, or polysemy (one form, two related senses), and ad hoc indirect meaning in usage (one form – whether homonymous, polysemous, or monosemous–and two meanings). 2. between polysemy (one form, two related senses) and monosemy (one form, one sense) 3. between polysemy (one form, two related senses) and homonymy (two forms, two unrelated senses) Let me now make some final comments about the conceptualization of these distinctions. A fundamental conceptual point about homonymy, polysemy, and monosemy, which has important methodological implications, is that they are not discrete categories. David Tuggy (1993) has argued that they may be placed on a continuum (cf. Deane 1988), and that there are groups of more or less clear instantiations of each category. In particular, all three phenomena can be described as a relation between two subcases of meaning (the senses) and a subsuming schema of linguistic form (the morpheme, lexeme, phrase, or construction): for homonymy, the two subcases (‘bank1’



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

and ‘bank2’) are more salient than the subsuming schema of the word form (bank); for monosemy, the subsuming word form (aunt) is more important than the two applications (‘father’s sister’ versus ‘mother’s sister’); and in the middle case of polysemy, there seems to be a balance between the salience of the two distinct senses (‘indefensible’ for war and for argumentation) and the single encompassing word form (indefensible). Taylor (2002) has since adopted this view in his textbook on cognitive grammar. It stands to reason that the salience of either the subsuming schema or the subsumed categories is a matter of degree, which varies between the whole range of homonymous, polysemous, and monosemous forms in a language. Similarly, the idea that two senses may or may not have a relation is also a gradual phenomenon. This means that the categories of homonymy, polysemy, and monosemy are formed as prototypical categories: items inside these categories display gradations of membership with the three categories, and there may be overlap between the categories. And what is important from a methodological point of view, as Tuggy (1993) has pointed out, the same items may consequently be assigned to more than one category: words may be seen as homonymous and/or polysemous, or polysemous and/or monosemous. This is one potential source of disagreement between analysts when they are trying to find metaphor in grammar. If it is not clear what counts as polysemy, it is unclear what the range of polysemous data is that can be explained by metaphor. Some researchers have suggested that the goal of the research, and the corresponding method of analysis, can affect the classification of the data as illustrating one or another phenomenon, be it monosemy, polysemy, or homonymy. For instance, Sandra (1998: 369) claims that “One can find relations where distinctness seems the only option and differences where identity seems the only possibility” (cf. Geeraerts 1993; Tuggy 1993: 278). In other words, theoretical goals and points of view can either increase or decrease the degree of salience of subcases with respect to their subsuming schema for many items, and this will affect whether they end up as cases of homonymy or polysemy. Sandra (1998) has even related this problem to the basic outlook in cognitive linguistics, which aims to find relations between language forms on the basis of a whole set of assumptions about cognition, embodiment, and experience. He has condemned this tendency as leading to the polysemy fallacy, where items are related to each other which should be treated with more care. It is for this very reason that this part of the book sets out with a precise methodological treatment of polysemy, so that it is clear which phenomena require which methods of analysis and allow for which conclusions.

.. Nonliteral similarity When polysemous items have been identified – whether as morphemes, lexical units, phrases, or constructions – they need to be analyzed to test whether their meaning relation can be seen as a matter of nonliteral similarity. Since we have looked at similarity at some length in Chapter 3, I will only reformulate the most important points for the present context. The overall idea is that metaphor analysis in this area moves away

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

from metaphor as involving a cross-domain mapping, to focus on metaphor as involving one indirect conventionalized meaning which has to be associated with another, more basic conventionalized meaning by means of nonliteral similarity. This typically happens between abstract and concrete senses, nonhuman and human senses, and so on. For instance, when we looked at indefensible above, we saw that it has an abstract sense which has to do with argumentation, and a concrete sense that has to do with fighting and war. It has been argued at length by many that these senses can be classified as similar, with the concrete sense as basic while the abstract sense is derived. It has also been pointed out that this is a nonliteral form of similarity: when something is indefensible in argumentation, we do not talk about fending off physical objects like arrows and cannonballs. Another illustration can be provided by returning to the verb wipe out. It has a conventionally concrete and nonhuman sense that has to do with cleaning with a damp cloth which is basic, but it also has a derived, indirect sense which has to do with killing someone. The latter is similar to the former, in that it resembles something (in this case someone) being completely destroyed by removing. The resemblance is taken to be not literal. I have also pointed out that nonliteral similarity can be judged to be external or not, as when we compare particular land shapes which stretch out into the sea with tongues. Such similarity may also be judged to be pre-existing, but then again other analysts may have a different opinion and call such similarities perceived. Whichever the specific nature of the nonliteral similarity between the two senses, the only important condition for their study as metaphor in grammar is that they should be sufficiently conventionalized. We saw above that the verb wipe out does have a conventionalized metaphorical sense of killing, but that it does not have another, further derived conventionally metaphorical sense that has to do with argumentation (even though it is possible to analyze the relation between the killing and argumentation senses as based in nonliteral similarity, too). Another conceptual issue about nonliteral similarity is its relation to contiguity. Polysemous items with two related senses do not necessarily have to be analyzed as metaphor, for they can also be metonymic, which is based in a contiguity relation between the two senses. Clear examples are locations for people, as in the White House, which has two conventionalized senses in the Macmillan dictionary. However, it is also possible that linguistic forms that have been analyzed as metaphorical by some may be seen as metonymic by others, or even the same analysts. This means that if two senses are first seen as related by metonymy, it should still be checked whether they can also be analyzed as related by metaphor, involving nonliteral similarity instead of or next to contiguity. Some of the sense perception verbs discussed by Sweetser (1990) have been suspected of this ambiguity. Finally, all of these analyses are relatively superficial or skeletal because they only need to capture general patterns of lexico-grammar. Of course, lexical and grammatical analysis is detailed, concrete and specific in that it has to describe how word senses are to be used in particular syntagmatic patterns, in contrast to alternative possibilities. However, such analyses do not as a rule have to show how the underlying concep-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

tual structures across an entire semantic field can motivate or predict or explain the linguistic patterns. The latter type of analysis has to take place in a separate stage of investigation, as we shall see in the next chapters. Linguistic analysis, by contrast, should first of all aim for descriptive adequacy, collecting potentially metaphorical language items that can then be utilized in such subsequent conceptual work, or can be used in their own area for other purposes.

. Operationalization Chapter 4 delineated the foundations of operationalizing the theoretical approaches to metaphor by looking at a number of issues. The operational definition of metaphorical linguistic forms in grammar addresses the way in which cross-domain mappings can be expressed in conventionally polysemous linguistic forms. These forms can be studied at various levels of grammatical analysis, carving up language in such analytical units as morphemes, words, phrases, and more abstract constructions. Their identification as potentially metaphorical can be broken up into a number of steps. In practice, finding metaphorically motivated polysemy requires making three distinct decisions (cf. Croft 1998): 1. Decide what counts as one form 2. Decide whether it has at least two senses 3. Decide whether the two senses are related by some form of nonliteral similarity Each of these decisions involves methodological aspects which have been discussed in the recent literature.

.. One form First of all, there is the question of what counts as one form. Thus, Jackendoff (2002: 340–341) analyzes open in the following three different uses as a standard example of polysemy: (2) a. The door is open1 . b. The door opened2. [≈ the door became open1 ] c. John opened3 the door [≈ John caused the door to open2 ≈ John caused the door to become open1 ] Jackendoff treats open as a polysemous language form because there are clear and regular semantic relations between the three senses of open. However, the question arises whether these examples are acceptable as instantiating one linguistic form. They do relate to the same sound sequence, but their morphology and syntax are different: the first form takes the stages of comparative and superlative comparison; the second form is an intransitive verb and can never

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

taken an object; and the third form is a transitive verb which does take an object and allows for passivization. In general, therefore, when we look at the paradigmatic and syntagmatic behavior of the three forms as lexical items, the three manifestations of open can also be regarded as three different forms. One alternative view of these data is to argue that these three senses of open represent polysemy in a historical way. Since the words are morphological derivations from each other, they may be seen as involving diachronic polysemy, as one form at some time must have preceded the other. In that case, however, they would instantiate diachronic polysemy at the level of morphemes, not lexical items: the morpheme /open/ is the same form with three conventionalized meanings which seem to be derived from each other over time. Cuyckens and Zawada (2001b: xiv) have suggested that the cognitive-linguistic approach to polysemy involves a down-grading of the value of the syntactic category of lexical forms. They argue that the senses of distinct word classes can be seen as belonging to one category. Such a category, however, I note, probably has to be interpreted as a conceptual category, not as a linguistic one, for there are too many morpho-syntactic differences between the three forms to be part of the same generally recognizable category. This means that their particular conceptual notion of one ‘form’ is ultimately based in meaning. To me this defeats the purpose of the entire exercise to find one form that has several distinct meanings. An alternative view, both to cognitive linguistics and to Jackendoff ’s position, holds that the relevant forms for the study of polysemy are defined by syntactic categories, not conceptual ones. This position is defended by for instance Goddard (2002), who asks whether a word like love as used in the following examples has one meaning or not – that is, whether it should be regarded as monosemous or polysemous: (3) What mother doesn’t love her children? He loved her passionately I love you Before giving an answer to that question, however, Goddard first explicitly excludes a number of different syntactic variants of the verb to love, such as She loves music, “which has a non-personal object,” and expressions like in love with, “which has a much narrower range of use than the verb love, and a much more specific meaning” (2002: 135). To Goddard, then, there is no possibility of finding one polysemous word form love which may be equally applied to both people and to non-personal objects such as music, for the reason of its syntagmatic behavior. It would seem to follow that there is probably no possibility either for a metaphorical explanation of any conventionalized relation that is recognized between these two senses, since they do not relate to one form defined as a configuration of paradigmatic and syntagmatic properties. The question is whether Goddard’s view of what counts as one form is not too restricted. Where Jackendoff and cognitive linguists combine adjectives and verbs into one class, Goddard wishes to distinguish between transitive verbs with one type of object (personal) as opposed to another (non-personal). There is a middle position,

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

which defines forms by means of grammatical word class as well, but allows for the same word class to exhibit different details of syntagmatic and paradigmatic behavior as a result of its distinct senses. This would allow analysts to see the transitive verb love as one form, which has two or more distinct but related senses. In finding lexical polysemy, therefore, it is fundamentally important to explicate which unit of analysis is endorsed when it comes to word forms and senses. Some linguists (like Jackendoff and many cognitive linguists) set out from the identity of form, irrespective of its grammatical category and use. Other linguists, like Goddard, take the narrowest definition of form by including linguistic form, grammatical category as well as patterns of use in the form of what used to be called selection restrictions (collocations with typical objects). Finally it is also possible to define form more narrowly as a linguistic form plus its grammatical category in the form of its word class, but to not include its use. Each of these operational definitions of form are in principle valid. They simply represent different levels of grammatical organization. As long as it is clear which unit of analysis is chosen, and for what reason in the context of the research, there should be no problem in comparing or relating these different approaches.

.. Two senses After a decision has been made that two meanings can be related to one form, the next decision is whether the two meanings are contextual specifications of a more general and vague sense, which can be made concrete or extended as the occasion requires. If they are contextual specifications of what is at bottom only one distinct sense, they instantiate monosemy. But two meanings of one form can also be genuinely distinct and represent two separate senses. If they are, the question arises whether the senses are related to each other: if they are related, the language form is polysemous, but if they are not related, the language form is homonymous. Finding evidence for the distinctness of meanings is a crucial step (cf. Croft 1998: 168; Tyler & Evans 2001, 2003). When two senses are distinct, they display a number of properties. For one thing, they cannot be seen as aspects of the same sense. This is the property which Cruse (2002) labels as antagonism. The example sentence She can’t bear children may be quoted as an example. It exhibits two readings which are hard to unify: antagonism is “resistance to unification” (Cruse 2002: 32). The other property displayed by distinct senses is their discreteness. When a linguistic form has two distinct senses, these are discrete to the extent that they manifest different truth conditions and independent lexical relations. For instance, the sentence Mary has a light coat is true in one sense when the coat is not heavy, but false in another sense, for instance when the coat has the color black. These criteria are not fail-proof, however, for Cruse points out that the adjective thin has two antonyms, thick and fat, but these two different oppositions do not seem to point to two senses of thin. Antagonism and discreteness are the two most important properties of two distinct senses for one form. We shall see, in the section on introspection, that a number

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

of linguistic tests have been developed for their discovery. However, these tests are not unproblematic. Other evidence will therefore have to play a role in the decision of monosemy versus homonymy and/or polysemy, too.

.. Sense relations by nonliteral similarity Once it has been established that there is one form with more than one distinct and conventionalized sense, the third critical issue in finding polysemy is to do with the decision that the senses are related (cf. Croft 1998: 169). If the senses are not related, there is no question of polysemy, which means that there is no role for metaphor in explaining the senses either. If the senses are related, we have only established that there is polysemy. Senses can be related in various ways: by metaphor and/or metonymy, but also by synecdoche, which has been discussed in cognitive linguistics as a means to account for generalization and particularization of senses (see Chapter 8). The operational question of finding nonliteral similarity should therefore ideally be tackled by controlling a number of oppositions. There are at least two different aspects that need to be addressed in operationalizing the identification of nonliteral similarity between two related senses. Let us begin with the opposition between the literally similar and the nonliterally similar. Take the word horn: it has one sense which refers to a part of a car, and another sense which refers to the musical instrument; these two senses are literally similar, since they both are variants of a man-made artifact which produces a sound. Opposed to that should be the argumentation and fighting senses of words like attack, indefensible, and so on, where a similarity has to be reconstructed across two fundamentally different domains. The latter type of polysemy is metaphorically motivated, whereas the former is not. The decision about the distinction between such domains is a crucial operational matter. The distinction between literal and nonliteral similarity also has to be decided for external resemblance. Consider a third meaning of horn, which refers to the hard pointed parts on the head of a cow, bull, goat, and so on. Intuitively there is literal external resemblance between these horns and the musical instrument, and perhaps even a historical connection, but this first needs to be checked. Verification in the Oxford English Dictionary shows that this intuition is correct. Literal similarity in the form of external resemblance, then, needs to be contrasted with the nonliteral similarity that is based on external resemblance between people’s tongues and landmasses in the water for tongue, or people’s eyes and needle’s eyes for eye. These, too, exhibit a similarity that has to be reconstructed across two fundamentally different domains, so that their polysemy may be said to be motivated by metaphor. The differentiation between fundamentally different domains remains the decisive issue. Then there is the opposition between the nonliterally similar and what may be termed the literally hierarchical, as follows. Consider the noun appeal as it is explicated by Macmillan:

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

1 2 3

[C] an urgent request for people to give you something you need such as help, money, or information: . . . [U] a quality that something has that makes people like it or want it: . . . [C/U] a formal request for a court of law or similar authority to change its decision: . . .

The crucial question here is whether sense 3 is like sense 1 in such a way that we can construct a mapping between two fundamentally different domains, or whether sense 3 is a specific case of sense 1, so that it can be placed in a hierarchical relation to it, inheriting all sorts of similarities from the general case. It seems to me that the decisive fact here is that sense 1 is not limited to a specific domain that can be contrasted with the specific domain of the law pertaining to sense 3. Sense 3 is a special case of sense 1, or sense 1 is a generalization of sense 3, depending on the history of the word. A mapping across two fundamentally different domains does not seem to be in order, as is the case for the two senses of attack. What is important here is the question of generalization versus specialization: which of the two senses forms the basic sense from which the other sense is derived? If you adopt a historical perspective, it appears that the judicial sense was the original sense of appeal, so that the general sense is the later, derived sense. But this might change if you adopt a human experience perspective limited to the contemporary language user, who presumably has no access to aspects of etymology which cover centuries of language change. Then the general sense might be taken as the more basic sense, so that the judicial sense might be experienced as the derivation. This would also reflect the difference in frequency between the two uses. Such questions become crucial when two senses are not hierarchically related but metaphorically related, as with the senses of the verb fade, which can relate to the domains of flowers, people, and light. Which of these senses would be termed metaphorical, on the basis of what criterion for the basic sense of the word? The historical dictionary shows that the flower sense is the original sense. But a contemporary language user might either give precedence to the sense related to embodied experience or to color, which might lead on to light. Finding nonliteral similarity between two related senses therefore involves operationalizing two decisions: 1. nonliteral similarity should be able to be opposed to both literal similarity and literal hierarchy; each of these oppositions involves the possibility to specify two fundamentally different domains for nonliteral similarity, but not for literal similarity and hierarhy. 2. the direction of the derivation or mapping has to be founded on an explicit and consistently used criterion of basicness, whether that is historical, experiential, acquisitional, and so on. One crucial word in the first decision is ‘possibility’: since we are in the area of linguistic forms, there is a tenuous connection with conceptual domains, and we only

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

need to have an idea that it is possible to relate the two senses to two domains. The (re-)construction of the two domains as domains will be discussed in the next chapter. The linguistic variant of this task, by contrast, is probably the construction of two lexical or more generally semantic fields, in the following way. The grammatical view of determining whether two senses are related, separately from the analysis of the underlying structure of the relation in terms of conceptual domains, has mostly relied on finding other linguistic items that display similar patterns of polysemy. This is a regular strategy that is not just limited to cognitive linguistics (cf. Jackendoff 1996). It is also the reason why Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999a) talk about patterns of polysemy, or polysemy generalizations. Their view of metaphor in grammar does not typically concentrate on single cases but on whole sets of language data, illustrated by samples of regular talk about particular topics, such as time, love, life, and so on. When such samples display patterns of polysemy, with words used to talk about time displaying regular properties suggesting that they in fact are money words, this counts as a good indication that each of these words is polysemous, with a conventionalized relation between the time senses and the money senses. The collection of the relevant data set is hence fundamentally important for the decision that linguistic forms are polysemous. The procedure for such grammatical data collection will hence have to receive some more attention. The procedure for analyzing the underlying conceptual mapping will be returned to in Chapter 7. For now we need to home in on the ways in which the linguistic forms are collected to form presumably homogenous sets of polysemy.

. Introspection .. Finding polysemy How can introspection serve as a good method for data collection regarding metaphor in grammar? How can those data be analyzed in reliable ways? In particular, how can linguists determine that a linguistic form has two conventionalized meanings that are distinct but related to each other by nonliteral similarity? These are the questions for this section. The introspective approach to finding polysemy, including metaphorically motivated polysemy, in grammar has focused on the collection and analysis of verbal data in combination with metalinguistic data. The way these verbal data have been collected is usually left aside and is apparently seen as unproblematic. It is probably the case that such data are not collected in systematic fashion – explicit reports of their collection are not customary. The analysis of these verbal data is usually direct and qualitative, based on the informed intuitions of a single linguist. Reliability checks are not performed, except by means of linguistic tests, which are also based on the intuitions of the analyst.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

The conection of the metalinguistic data has been part of a broader methodological discussion in cognitive linguistics of the introspective approach to polysemy (e.g. Deane 1989, 1996; Geeraerts 1993; Tuggy 1993, 1999). In this discussion, the role of linguistic tests has been perceived as a useful curb on the dangers of introspection as the generally dominant method in grammatical research. The introspective approach to language which makes use of linguistic tests can therefore be characterized as the independent selection of language materials which are then subjected to qualitative analysis on the basis of self-observing the linguist’s intuitions. It is these intuitions which are collected during introspection, and they form the basis of the grammatical analysis. Since linguists, too, recognize that such intuitions may be fallible, they prefer to canalize them by employing some form of standardized ‘testing’, in the form of running linguistic tests. The most important methodological issue regarding linguistic tests for polysemy concerns their exploitation of the semantic effects of homonymy and monosemy, and the question of the intermediate position of polysemy. Homonymy leads to ambiguity, whereas monosemy leads to vagueness, and the two effects can be distinguished by means of various ambiguity tests. It turns out that polysemy can also be diagnosed by such ambiguity tests, but there are several methodological details that need to be addressed. The overarching framework in this discussion is the question raised at the beginning of this chapter: how can we decide that one linguistic form has two distinct but related meanings? That homonymy leads to ambiguity may be seen from a sentence like I went to the bank: it is semantically ambiguous since it is unclear whether the speaker went to the financial institution or to the side of the river. A similar situation holds for a word like seal, which has been exploited as a joke by the Marx Brothers: the brothers are looking for a seal to stamp a letter, and when they are shouting “Where’s the seal? Where’s the seal?”, Groucho opens his coat and releases a live seal who flaps away across the film set. These ambiguities are a reflection of the fact that bank and seal are homonyms. Monosemy, by contrast, leads to vagueness. An utterance like I went to see my aunt yesterday is semantically vague since it is unclear whether the speaker went to the sister of her father or the sister of her mother. A similar situation would hold for a word like neighbor. This vagueness is held to be a reflection of the fact that aunt and neighbor have one meaning which becomes specified according to their context of application. Polysemy does not lead to an effect of its own which may be used as a criterion for its detection. Instead, polysemy may also be detected by ambiguity (cf. Jackendoff 1996). Thus, a sentence like I attacked him is ambiguous between physical and verbal attack, the latter use of attack being metaphorically related to the former. This is why polysemy, including metaphorically motivated polysemy, is subject to the same linguistic tests for ambiguity as homonymy. Polysemy and homonymy yield two distinct senses for the same language form. There are a number of tests for ambiguity, distinguishing monosemy from polysemy and homonymy. The test that is easiest to understand is based on the fact that two senses of the same form can be used at the same time without producing logi-


cal infelicity: since the senses are distinct, the forms can be used in distinct ways in a number of test frames. 1. In conjoined positive and negative assertion, the two senses can be used without producing contradiction: Homonymy example: I went to the bank but I did not go to the bank Polysemy example: I attacked him but I did not attack him Monosemy example: *I saw my aunt but I did not see my aunt 2. In conjoined positive assertions, the two senses can be used without producing redundancy: Homonymy example: I went to the bank and I went to the bank Polysemy example: I attacked him and I attacked him Monosemy example: *I saw my aunt and I saw my aunt 3. In denial, the two senses are not jointly implicated: Homonymy example: If you did not go to the bank, you either did not go to the financial institution or you did not go to the side of the river Polysemy example: If you did not attack him, you either did not present a counterargument or you did not hit him Monosemy example: *If you did not see your aunt, you either did not see your father’s sister or you did not see your mother’s sister In all of these test frames, the homonymy and polysemy examples do not produce any logical infelicity because they are taken as being used in two different meanings. The monosemy example, by contrast, does produce contradiction, redundancy, and a different type of implication, because it is always used in one (vague but encompassing) sense. These observations can presumably be collected by direct introspection on the part of the analyst. A second way to test for ambiguity in order to find polysemy (and rule out monosemy) is not based on logical relations but on grammaticality judgments. There are several test frames, again, and they turn on the exploitation of co-ordination phenomena. 1. If co-ordination is combined with substitution, then the meaning of the utterance presupposes that only one sense (or application) is involved in homonymy and polysemy, but not in monosemy: Homonymy: Ray went to the bank and so did Gerry [either financial institution or river, but no cross] Polysemy: Ray attacked him and so did Gerry [either verbally or physically, but no cross] Monosemy: Ray went to see his aunt and so did Gerry [immaterial which aunt, on father’s side or mother’s side] 2. If co-ordination is combined with substitution and the intention of the speaker involves both senses (or applications), then there arises an effect of zeugma or punning in homonymy and polysemy, but not in monosemy:

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


Homonymy: *Ray went to the bank [financial institution] and so did Gerry [side of the river] Polysemy: *Ray attacked him [verbally] and so did Gerry [physically] Monosemy: Ray went to see his aunt [on his mother’s side] and so did Gerry [on his father’s side] For homonymy and polysemy, the semantic effects of the grammar are a result of the fact that there are two distinct senses, whereas for monosemy, the semantic effect is a consequence of the fact that there is only one sense, whose varied application in practice has not become part of the code. Linguistic tests such as the ambiguity test can technically be interpreted as a means for systematic collection of meta data, concerning analyst intuitions about verbal materials. However, if their use is compared to what happens in experimental research, they display a number of inadequacies. First of all, they typically do not present a whole series of verbal materials that can function as so many judgment trials for the analyst, in order to collect a whole set of intuitions across a range of carefully varied verbal expressions. Indeed, linguistic tests are often applied to single cases. And secondly, they are typically not used in a systematic way to tap the intuitions of a sufficiently large group of linguists, in order to diminish the idiosyncratic effects of the judgments of one or two individuals. Quantitative reliability tests could then be performed on the qualitative data provided by different analysts, increasing the quality of the evidence. Linguistic tests clearly could in principle be used in this way, but this has simply not become customary in mainstream linguistics. It would be one step forward if this practice were adopted in order to increase the quality of grammatical data collection and analysis, even though this clearly would not remedy all problems. This is also because ambiguity tests are problematic (Cruse 1986, 1995, 2002; Deane 1988; Geeraerts 1993). For instance, consider the difference in zeugmatic effect in (4a–b): (4) a. The arm of the ocean resembles that of a giant. b. The giant put his arm into that of the ocean. When two senses are tested for polysemy by means of a zeugma test that uses the notion of comparison, the salience of the zeugmatic effect of oddness dramatically decreases. Therefore, Cruse (2002: 32) concludes that the context of a zeugmatic text should be taken into account when it is used for deciding about polysemy, so that, for instance, the influence of comparison can be neutralized. For example, it might be less than accidental that (4a) involves a case of external resemblance, which might have an effect on the ease with which two fundamentally distinct domains can be reconstructed for the desired zeugma effect to be obtained. This is another recommendation that should be taken into account when linguistic tests are applied to improve the identification of metaphorical polysemy in grammar. Some authors have also pointed out that the inconsistent results of the tests for polysemy may at least in part be due to the nature of meaning itself. Clear-cut distinc-


tions between senses are often hard to find, and they are affected by their contexts of use, as we have seen in (4a). Moreover, as we saw in Section 2, homonymy, polysemy, and monosemy are overlapping areas on one cline, so that individual cases may be seen as representing more than one phenomenon. These borderline cases have been in the focus of the methodological discussions of testing for polysemy, which have typically concentrated on their apparently harmful effects on reliability. The failure of the tests is therefore at least in part a reflection of an inevitable aspect of linguistic reality (cf. Croft & Cruse 2004). It allows for the conclusion that these borderline cases actually do not invalidate the use of the test per se. What they do instead is point to the need for care and precision in their application and interpretation: introspection needs the careful application of control mechanisms such as linguistic tests, but linguistic tests themselves require the same attitude. Sandra (1998) agrees that the unstable or variable nature of meaning may be an important factor in accounting for the failure of linguistic tests for polysemy, but draws an opposite conclusion: If word meaning is not a set of senses, the idea of having decision principles for cutting up the semantic pie is wrong as well. Often, there will be no clear answers to the question whether two usages are distinct or not. Apart from having answers like “they are distinct” and “they are identical”, there will be answers like “they are somewhat similar and somewhat dissimilar” (this is also Tuggy’s 1993 claim). It is quite probable that the majority of answers will be of the latter type. (1998: 371)

To Sandra, this means end of story for the linguistic tests for polysemy. However, two issues are being conflated here. On the one hand, there is the matter of the proportion of unclear cases to clear cases, about which Sandra simply offers his own informed guess that the clear cases are outnumbered by the unclear ones. On the other hand, there is the matter of the inconsistent behavior of the tests for polysemy, which suggests that their results are not one hundred percent reliable. If the informed guess by Sandra is to be replaced by results from research, we may need to allow for some degree of error while improving the care and precision with which the tests are applied and interpreted in order to produce the required evidence. This may seem like an unattractive solution, but it is one which has been used in other sciences which pay attention to the performance of their methods and techniques. The genuine methodological question is how great the degree of error actually is. As is suggested by the Pragglejaz project discussed in Chapter 5, this can be tested in regular quantitative fashion, even across the board of cases distinguished by Sandra. Close analysis of such reliability tests may reveal how much of the unreliability is in fact produced by the nature of the data, or, what is more interesting, a subset of the data. But other sources or error may also be important, including the effect of some let us say less typical applications of the test, such as the ones where comparison plays a role in the test frame. Another response is, of course, that we may collect other types of data which may complement the basically introspective evidence coming out of linguistic tests

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 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

(cf. Sandra 1998: 374). This is the general argument of Tuggy (1999), which has since been taken over by many cognitive linguists (e.g. Cuyckens & Zawada 2001b) and is echoed in other fields (e.g. Schütze 1996). For instance, Geeraerts’ remarks about grammaticality judgments and the impression of oddness (see Tuggy 1993: 276 for similar argumentation) can also be corroborated by collecting metalinguistic data from well-informed informants which can be subjected to quantitative analysis. This alleviates the criticism of those linguists who prefer the use of observational methods, that introspection is a poor guide to the identification of the most frequent senses of a word as well as “the typical meanings and patterns, both grammatical and lexical, in which words appear” (Deignan 2005a: 121). One important part of such data collection, however, should be the determination of a threshold for what counts as sufficiently conventional for it to be regarded as part of the area of grammar. One final comment needs to be added about obtaining a more precise view of the power of linguistic tests for polysemy. For there is also the question how linguistic tests in their classic forms can be applied to other phenomena than lexical polysemy. How can morphemes, phrases, and grammatical constructions be tested for polysemy if they have to be inserted into such test frames as the coordination frame? This is a question which requires more attention.

.. Metaphoric or metonymic polysemy? Not all ambiguity in language signals polysemy: ambiguity may also be a reflection of homonymy. Testing for ambiguity therefore rules out monosemy and can tell you that you have two distinct senses, but in order to find polysemy, a subsequent step has to be taken which decides between polysemy and homonymy. In the examples above, this is shown by the fact that bank and attack behave in the same way. For polysemy this means that you have to find a relation between the two detected senses causing the ambiguity. If that relation is found and can be described as a case of non-literal similarity, you have found polysemy which is explained by metaphor. This is possible for attack, but not for bank. This last step of the analysis, however, has largely remained a matter of intuition in cognitive linguistics. Again, the only way in which this type of analysis is opened up for criticism is by the occasional use of linguistic tests for semantic relatedness by means of similarity. One property of polysemous items is that they could be polysemous across languages. Homonymy is more regularly a quirk of language which does not have to occur in other languages (cf. Morgan 1979/1993). English bank has two unrelated senses, but they do not carry over into Dutch, where the two English senses would be conveyed by the words bank (for the financial institution) and oever (for the side of the river). The Dutch word bank, for that matter, is also homonymous, but between two different senses (‘financial institution’ and ‘couch’). But it is generally known that the problem with the translatability test is that it does not cover all cases of homonymy versus metaphorical polysemy.


There has been some discussion of the ways in which a decision can be made about the identification of either a metaphorical or a metonymic sense relation. Although I believe that the opposition on one scale between metaphor and metonymy is mistaken, for reasons given in Part 1, the contrast may be useful for our present purposes: provided that two senses are conventionalized, if one of the two relations can be found, then, by implication, the homonymy alternative should be rejected. For instance, Gibbs (1990, 1999b) has used the so-called ‘is-like test’ for this purpose (the very name of this test capitalizing on the assumption of metaphor as a figure of similarity). Most polysemy that is motivated by metonymy does not pass the is-like test. Thus, there is a conventional, lexicalized ‘person’ meaning for face, which is based on the metonymy part for whole. It does not make sense to explain this meaning on the basis of the result of the is-like test, *A face is like a person. Instead, it makes more sense to insert it into a metonymic variant of this test, A face can stand for a person. This also applies to such other conventionalized metonymies as money (‘rich person’) and hand (‘help’) (Warren 2002). One problem with the former example, though, is that it is not listed with the metonymic sense by the Cobuild, Longman, or Macmillan dictionaries, so that the metonymic sense may not be sufficiently conventionalized to count as a grammatical sense. Metaphorical polysemy, by contrast, can be inserted into the is-like frame: attacking somebody in a discussion is indeed like attacking somebody in a physical fight. The result of this linguistic test reflects the underlying conceptual structure of the crossdomain mapping. The test seems to work fine when single words can be isolated from their use and combined with their conventionalized figurative senses. Complications arise, however, when a figurative expression is a combination of metaphor and metonymy. Gibbs (1999b: 37) discusses the phrase shoot your mouth off, the conventional meaning of which is “to talk foolishly about something that one does not know much about, or should not talk about”. But the presence of the metonymy mouth, which stands for speech, makes the application of the is-like test more difficult. For shooting your mouth off as a conventionalized, grammatical expression cannot be said to be like something else, such as shooting your gun off. Indeed, such an interpretation would lead to an analysis of mouth as gun, with mouth turning metaphorical (A mouth can be like a gun) instead of metonymic for speech. The test hence leads to counterintuitive results for more complicated cases. Kövecses (2002: 146) presents another case which is difficult to handle by the is-like test. I suggest that the is-like test should perhaps not be seen as a linguistic test. It may be that the test only works for some linguistic expressions, but not for all, because of the complexities of linguistic form, especially in usage as opposed to grammar. What lies behind the test is a concern with the criterion for similarity for metaphor versus contiguity for metonymy (Gibbs 1999b; Kövecses 2002). If this is what the is-like test amounts to, then the failure of its comprehensive applicability as a linguistic formula is less important than the fact that it signals that metaphorical mappings have to be tested for their degree of non-literal similarity. If the is-like test cannot deal with all

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 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

of these linguistic complexities, it may be profitably reconceptualized as an idea which may have its use during conceptual analysis in less linguistically formal ways. Warren (2002: 117–118) also suggests another possible test for the difference between metaphor and metonymy. She proposes that metaphor does not allow zeugma, but that metonymy does. Consider the difference between (5) and (6): (5) Caedmon is a poet and difficult to read (6) The mouse is a favorite food of cats and a cursor controller. Warren claims that (5) exhibits co-ordination of nonmetonymic and metonymic uses while not causing zeugma, but that (6) displays co-ordination of nonmetaphorical and metaphorical uses while also causing zeugma. If this is acceptable, another test for distinguishing between metaphor and metonymy, next to the is-like test, might be available. But without validation of the intuitions behind this test, this remains a proposal that requires further research before it can be seen as a reliable tool. Introspective approaches to the nature of the sense relations in polysemy are often aided by the application of linguistic tests which collect meta data in the same way as discussed in the previous subsection. The is-like test has been used for this purpose in some research, but its comprehensive applicability is questionable. It might be more practical to see the is-like test as a reflection of the theoretical criterion for metaphor of similarity, which probably needs testing in other ways than by means of a formal linguistic test. If we are concerned with systematic polysemy in grammar, such testing for similarity may have to be located in an area outside the analysis of linguistic form, that is to say, in the area of metaphorical conceptual structures which has been opened up by cognitive linguistics. Potentially metaphorical language forms collected and analyzed by the methods and techniques discussed in this chapter may then be used to set up conceptual analyses of potential cross-domain mappings. Discussion of this research area will take place in Chapters 7 and 8.

.. Finding metaphorical polysemy: Conceptual metaphor as a search mechanism One way in which potentially metaphorical language forms may be collected by introspective means has been proposed by Jackendoff and Aaron (1991), ironically enough in order to criticize some of the decisions taken by Lakoff and Turner (1989) in metaphor identification. The test is an interesting diagnostic, certainly when it comes to finding potentially metaphorical polysemy which requires separate and later conceptual analysis. Some of its applications by Jackendoff and Aaron (1991) may now be discussed to call into question their criticisms of the cognitive-linguistic approach. The test is based on two ideas: first, it explicates that there is an incongruous or nonliteral mapping between two conceptual domains, and, second, it tests whether that mapping can be felicitously applied to a particular linguistic expression. Jackendoff and Aaron’s example sentences are:

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

(7) a. Our relationship is at a dead end. b. My computer died on me. Their test invokes the regular cognitive-linguistic explanations of these sentences by means of the conceptual metaphors a relationship is a journey and machines are people. The proposed linguistic test combines the two phenomena as follows: (8) a.

Of course, relationships are not journeys – but if they were, you might say ours is at a dead end. b. Of course, machines are not people – but if they were, you might say my computer died on me.

The first half of the test should present an incongruous, untrue assertion, which expresses the idea of a postulated cross-domain mapping; and the second half of the test should present a relevant continuation of the overall utterance which presents a possible exploitation of the assertion if it were true. Expressions can therefore turn out to be not metaphorical on two grounds: either the proposed cross-domain mapping in the first part is not a genuine cross-domain mapping, or the sentences that are analyzed with the help of the mapping are not genuinely related to it. An example of the first situation is when a proposed metaphorical mapping is taken to be a genuine truth by some language users. Jackendoff and Aaron (1991: 327) provide as an illustration what they report to be an ancient belief in Hebrew culture, that life is a fluid in the body. They hence suggest that the conceptual metaphors proposed by Lakoff and Turner (1989), life is fluid in the body; death is loss of fluid, are not automatically metaphorical conceptual structures. Hebrew speakers would consequently not wish to concur with the first part of the diagnostic: (9) Of course, life isn’t a fluid – but if it were, you might say it is in the blood. The diagnostic therefore helps to determine that this sentence is not metaphorical to some. It shows that not all conceptual mappings proposed by Lakoff and Turner and other cognitive linguists are necessarily metaphorical in all cultures. An example of the second situation involves the acknowledgement of a potential cross-domain mapping in the first part, but the experience of a non-sequitur regarding the allegedly related linguistic expression in the second part. Jackendoff and Aaron imagine a counterintuitive proposal, that the verb to run were to be restricted to humans only, so that its application to dogs might be considered metaphorical on the basis of a mapping that animals are people (a common metaphorical mapping, of course). The linguistic test then shows that this sentence is not metaphorical: (10) !Of course, animals aren’t people – but if they were, you might say my dog ran down the street. There is no feeling of coherence between the two parts of the assertion in (9), say Jackendoff and Aaron, and this is apparently because running is not experienced as part of the people domain as opposed to the animal domain. The test yields a non-

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sequitur in the complete assertion, and leads to the conclusion that the tested sentence (my dog ran down the street) is not metaphorical. The test is interesting because it captures the essence of the cognitive-linguistic proposal for metaphor. It postulates a proposed cross-domain mapping as a conceptual structure of a particular sort which is not direct and literal but metaphorical, and it then establishes a connection with some linguistic expression of that mapping. It can moreover distinguish between metaphorical and nonmetaphorical expressions on two different grounds, those cases where the proposed mapping is not metaphorical (9), versus those cases where the proposed mapping is potentially metaphorical but does not relate to the linguistic forms that are tested (10). It would work for most of the clear cases in cognitive linguistics, and I wonder why it has not been applied more often in the literature. After all, it does seem to provide an explicit introspective means for collecting meta data from linguists about the metaphorical nature of linguistic forms in grammar. What is also interesting is that its critical application by Jackendoff and Aaron is instructive, too, in that it reveals the weaknesses of the test as an introspective tool. For Jackendoff and Aaron (1991: 328–329) claim that the following data are not metaphorical on the basis of the test, but I have my doubts: (11) a.

!Of course, purposes aren’t destinations – but if they were, you might say we haven’t reached our goal of finishing this review article. b. !Of course, states aren’t locations – but if they were, you might say I’ve gotten through my depression. c. !Of course, times aren’t locations – but if they were, you might say we’re getting close to Christmas. d. !Of course, time is not a medium in motion – but if it were, you might say the year passed by quickly. e. !Of course, existence isn’t a place – but if it were, you might say that a new idea has come into existence. f. !Of course, form isn’t motion – but if it were, you might say that the road goes from New York to LA.

For all of these cases, Jackendoff and Aaron state that the test shows that the data are not metaphorical because the second part always is a non sequitur. For none of these cases, however, do they provide reasons or evidence how or why these are non sequiturs. They simply feel that the complete assertions in (11a) through (11f) are not adequately connected. I have no problem at all with any of these assertions. The test to me provides a perfect demonstration of their very metaphoricity. But what are my intuitions worth, especially in contrast with those of Jackendoff? If we do not wish to be dependent on the single pronouncements of great authorities, such differences in intuitions require additional data collection and analysis, along the lines suggested by the proponents of the collection of converging evidence.

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

The adoption of Jackendoff and Aaron’s linguistic test turns the identification of metaphor into a more uniform moment of decision for all polysemous items under consideration, which is a distinct advantage. It even enables making an interesting connection with the conceptual structure of metaphor, through the exploitation of a deductive approach. But the analysis of the elicited meta data remains purely qualitative. This is why we now need to turn to the next method of data collection for the study of polysemy and its potential metaphorical motivation: observation. It may present a complementary approach to the method of introspection, which may eventually yield converging evidence in this area of study, through methodological pluralism.

. Observation Linguists do not always have to imagine or construct their materials in order to put them into linguistic test frames for collecting intuitions about their ambiguity and/or vagueness. They can also look at authentic use. When people make jokes on the basis of zeugma, that is, by linking together two related but distinct senses in one utterance for humorous effect, this is solid evidence that the two senses function as distinct and conventionalized units in grammar. Otherwise there would not be a joke. Thus, when Eminem sings with my windows down and the sound system up, he exploits the polysemy of both down and up between direction or movement or space on the one hand and increased quantity, in this case of sound, on the other. A similar pun can be found in Prince: Girl, I ain’t got no money, but honey I’m rich, on personality. This suggests that the zeugma test does not have to be limited to employing expressions with the same linguistic form used in two different senses, but that semantic relations such as antonymy and coherence relations like contrast can also be exploited. Such natural data are an indication that one set of linguistic forms displays two sets of systematically related meanings which may be seen as similar. The difference between this type of data and the linguistic materials in introspective tests has to do with the nature of data collection in observation, which captures what people really do instead of what they can do or instead of what analysts think they can do. If people play with metaphorical and nonmetaphorical word senses, that is solid proof of their experience of the distinct as well as related nature of the meanings in a language form. However, it should also be admitted that this type of data may be hard to collect if you do not have access to huge data banks that can be searched in sophisticated ways. Moreover, not everything that happens in usage is a reflection of conventionalized grammar. As long as this remains problematic, introspection aided by linguistic tests may be inevitable. The question of the present section returns to the general question posed at the beginning of this chapter: how can linguists collect language data (by means of observation) in order to find metaphor in grammar? How do they analyze such data? And does this provide an answer to the query whether you have one linguistic form

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

with two meanings that are related by similarity? These are the topics for the next paragraphs. It is self-evident that observation is particularly strong, in comparison with introspection, in the area of large-scale and systematic data collection. This is especially true when observation is used for data collection from such resources as corpora or dictionaries and grammars. Observational procedures for data collection reveal aspects of metaphor in grammar which we have not yet addressed. One of them has to do with the issue of conventionalization, which lies at the heart of doing grammar instead of usage analysis. When you have to make a decision about potentially metaphorical polysemy, it is not just a matter of finding two distinct senses. You also have to decide what counts as sufficiently conventionalized meanings to qualify as a sense, in order to stay within the bounds of grammatical as opposed to usage research. Reconsider the example discussed in Section 2 above, If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out. We have seen that this expression is quite intelligible in its context of usage, which is a list of expressions about argumentation. However, an important question for a grammarian or dictionary writer would be whether wipe out should be given a conventionally metaphorical sense pertaining to argumentation, or not. This is not the job of the linguistic tests discussed above, which merely decide between the antagonism and distinctness of two uses. Whether the various uses of a word like wipe out are also sufficiently or equally conventionalized is not really addressed by these techniques. Conventionalization can be established in a number of ways. Analysts can just examine their own intuitions, and decide that, to them, words like wipe out can be used perfectly normally and conventionally in three different senses: cleaning, killing, and arguing. If the user dictionaries consulted are a good source to go by, however, these analysts would be wrong about the last sense, even though ad hoc usage may be perfectly transparent. This is one illustration of the fallibility of introspection. Modern user dictionaries are increasingly based on corpus work, where conventionalization can be measured in terms of frequencies of uses across hundreds of millions of words (Deignan 2005). One result of this type of work is the volume on metaphor in the Collins Cobuild English Guides series (Deignan 1995). This is a study guide and small reference work for learners of English that is related to the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (Sinclair 1987). It presents an analysis of the literal and metaphorical senses of words and idioms in twelve semantic fields: the human body; health and illness; animals; buildings and constructions; machines, vehicles and tools; games and sport; cooking and food; plants; weather; heat, cold, and fire; light, darkness, and color; and direction and movement. It has been inspired by the cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor and looks at the ways in which items from particular lexical fields can be used both literally and metaphorically in order to help language learners in their use of this vocabulary. Since the volume is addressed at a lay audience, it does not use the term ‘metaphorically motivated polysemy’, but this clearly is what the book is describing for contemporary British English.

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

I will first look at the question of conventionalization, which is a prerequisite for calling this a work on the lexico-grammar of English. Of course, the fact that this is a language learners’ aid suggests that it deals with the most conventionalized parts of lexical use. It is based on the most frequent patterns of metaphorical and nonmetaphorical uses of words and phrases in the Bank of English, presented in the introduction as then containing over 200 million words. Relative frequency of metaphorical and nonmetaphorical use is accorded explicit prominence in the explications. For instance, Chapter 2, on health and illness, announces that it will deal with “some of the most common” metaphorical uses of words in this field, and then explicates that these include healthy, unhealthy, cancer, wound, and hurt. The absolute threshold for what counts as sufficiently conventional for inclusion, however, is not made explicit. The next methodological issue has to do with the decision as to what counts as one form which can have a metaphorical as opposed to a nonmetaphorical meaning. The guide mostly uses the term ‘words’, presumably in order to keep the text at a suitable level of accessibility. But the overall organization sets out from a definition of form by means of word classes: metaphorical uses for nouns are compared with nonmetaphorical uses of nouns, metaphorical uses of verbs with nonmetaphorical uses of verbs, and so on. Thus, the first chapter opens with a list of body parts, all presented as nouns (body, eyes, ears, nose, lips, skeleton, spine, backbone, shoulder, hand, blood, guts), followed by two verbs which refer to processes that the body performs (swallow and digest). When other word classes have been derived from these uses, these follow the within-wordclass comparisons. An example is the verbal use of head, which is explained as follows (1995: 2): 1.7 Head is also used as a verb with this meaning. If someone heads a group or organization, they are in charge of it and are responsible for its actions. He will head a provisional government. He heads a group representing the families of the British victims When the noun face is discussed on the same page, the transition from metaphorical nominal to verbal use is not accompanied by such a metanote anymore, but the ordering of the data follows the same within-wordclass between-wordclass sequence. Notes are also provided that distinguish between the frequencies of a particular use as attached to a wordclass. Thus, the description of health ends with the information that “Health is used much less commonly as a metaphor than healthy” (1995: 18). Similarly, the section on infectious ends with the observation that “Other words beginning with infect- such as infected and infection are rarely used metaphorically” (1995: 23). It appears then that the overall form which may display metaphorical or nonmetaphorical meaning is pitched at an encompassing level which simultaneously allows for discrimination between patterns within and between wordclasses. A further comment about the issue of one form can be made when we turn to the question whether these forms always exhibit two distinct meanings. The overall situation is, of course, that the same form (‘word’) has a literal and a metaphorical meaning, for this is the entire purpose of the book. For language learners, however, it apparently

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

does not matter that those two senses can be spread across two different word classes, as in the case of the verbal use of to face: at the level of the verb, this meaning is not metaphorical in the sense that it can be opposed to a literal meaning in which the verb can be used, for there is no such literal or nonmetaphorical use. Some metaphor therefore only arises between word classes, whereas other metaphorical meaning can be explained within word classes. Both types of metaphorical similarity can of course be helpful to the language learner. Grammatically and psycholinguistically speaking, however, these involve rather different phenomena, as is also reflected in the organizational precedence that is given in the Cobuild aid to within-class mappings. A similar complication which is hidden from the language learner has to do with the language community which is implicitly being described. For instance, the literal meaning of ailing is characterized as old-fashioned, which might suggest that young or modern language learners should probably not have many occasions for using this word in this meaning. The metaphorical meaning of ailing, by contrast, is described as most common in journalism. With ailing, we therefore have a metaphorical similarity between an old-fashioned literal sense and a somewhat specialized metaphorical sense. The question arises whether the identification and contrast between these two senses would be generally acceptable for all research purposes. This is not what is claimed by Deignan, of course, but the case serves as an illustration of the decisions that have to be made about the presence of one or two senses for one form. The final issue has to do with establishing a relation of similarity between the two senses. Most of the explications suggest that there is such a similarity. Consider the carefully crafted explication of body on the first page: 1.2 Your body is all your physical parts, including your head, arms, legs, and all your internal organs. This idea of a collection of separate parts working together is used metaphorically to refer to groups or organizations made up of separate parts which work together to perform a particular task. External resemblance is also allowed as a basis for explaining metaphorical meaning, as in the case of eye: 1.21 Eye can also be used to refer to a part of a physical object which looks like an eye. For example, the hole at one end of a needle is referred to as the eye of the needle; dark spots on a potato from which new stems grow are referred to as eyes. This role of external resemblance can also remain implicit in the explication of an item, as with nose: “is also used to refer to the front section of vehicles such as aircraft and cars”. But the entire book is predicated on these two types of resemblance between word meanings or their referents. Corpus-linguistic methods may be employed to see whether many of the predictions of the deductive approach to metaphor in cognitive linguistics can be confirmed. Yet they may also relativize the apparent force of the deductive method by going back to the question of polysemy and checking whether all of the items that ostensibly be-

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

long to the same conceptual metaphor do indeed occur as conventionalized forms of expression of the underlying conceptual possibilities. Deignan’s overall conclusion about this area of research merits quotation: While corpus data are rarely, if ever, inconsistent with Conceptual Metaphor Theory, many of the detailed linguistic features of metaphor described in the previous sections are not easily explained by it. Approaching these data from a linguistic perspective, it seems that a theory of thought is not sufficient to account for what has been observed. (2005a: 223)

This is another reason why the linguistic analysis of metaphor as linguistic form is a distinct area of investigation. Observation appears to be an extremely powerful method of data collection for metaphor in grammar, in particular when it is coupled with the large data bases constituted by present-day corpora and with the sophisticated search tools that have been developed as part of their accompanying software. With these methods and techniques at our disposal, far better studies can be made of the details of metaphor in grammar which are simultaneously directly derived from usage. One big question, of course, pertains to the demarcation of what counts as sufficient conventionalization to count as grammar, but this can be resolved in publications reporting on the statistics of relative frequencies of various constructions. Another big question, which to me seems more important, remains the issue of qualitative data analysis. The decisions that have to be made should not be made by single linguists, but by linguists reporting their methodology, their success in applying it, and their agreement with other linguists who have independently applied the same methodology to samples of their data.

. Manipulation The use of manipulation is an approach which is less familiar to most linguists, who are more focused on introspection, exploiting their own intuitions as meta data in linguistic tests or carrying out qualitative analyses of verbal data from dictionaries and corpora. However, grammatical research with informants does exist. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) seem to have based much of their data collection for Metaphors we live by on the elicitation of metaphorical expressions from informants, even though this was not linked to manipulating any variables of verbal behavior. In addition, these procedures of data collection have not been reported in such a way that their studies become replicable. Their added value in comparison with data imagined by the researcher is consequently diminished. Moreover, the linguistic study of grammar needs access to a wider range of symbolic data than what informants can offer upon elicitation. Informants may miss important aspects of the grammar of a speech community as well as overrepresent other aspects which have not become sufficiently conventionalized for the entire speech community. That is why experimental linguists typically construct their own stimulus materials, with a number of relevant parameters in mind, in order

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

to then request informants to execute one or more experimental tasks. In such studies, either the materials or the experimental conditions typically contain a manipulation which is expected to guide the participants’ behavior into a predicted direction as opposed to other ones. This affords maximum control over the testability of particular claims about the structure of grammar. Informant data for the study of metaphor in grammar as symbolic structure and system may in fact be collected for two purposes. One purpose is to provide additional information to the conclusions that may be derived from the linguistic tests discussed in Section 4. One particularly apt opportunity for combining linguistic tests with informant data involves the sense of oddness, or the effect of zeugma, that is central in the judgments of the grammaticality of some of the test frames. As has been suggested elsewhere as well (Schütze 1996), grammaticality judgments by linguists are meta data that require validation, for instance by collecting the views of general or specifically targeted groups of informants (cf. Low 1999a). A second purpose of collecting informant data is to see them as a direct reflection of informants’ views of sense distinctions, their degree of conventionalization, and the presence or absence of a semantic relation that may be motivated by metaphor. This type of approach is concerned, then, with an independent investigation of language users’ intuitions about polysemy, which is not compared with some analytical measure produced by the analyst. Whether such intuitions should be seen as direct reflections of their long-term representations of lexico-grammar in their individual minds is a moot point. Sandra and Rice (1995) have suggested that there is a fundamental difference between asking people to provide metalinguistic judgments in off-line tasks, on the one hand, and forcing participants to construct mental representations during online tasks in real-time language processing. They hold that the latter technique directly accesses people’s cognitive representations of language, but they point out that it may be unclear whether these cognitive representations provide a window on long-term representations of grammar; alternatively, they may be regarded as short-term meaning constructions that do include the utilization of grammar but are more properly seen as the product of local computation. “The latter type of representations are not stored but generated during on-line language processing on the basis of both stored information and contextual (linguistic and extra-linguistic) information (contextualized meaning)” (1995: 124). Converging methodologies, say Sandra and Rice, are required to decide the issue one way or the other. The long-term and the short-term interpretation of these data have one thing in common: they pertain to the study of language and metaphor as cognitive process and product. The present section and chapter, however, are concerned with the use of manipulation to collect converging evidence for the decision that the symbolic structure of a particular language form can be classified as metaphorical. Such research does not need to make assumptions about the mental representation of that metaphorical linguistic form in either long-term or short-term cognition.

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

It is important to realize that this is fundamentally different from the goal of the study by Sandra and Rice (1995), which is to test whether the symbolic analysis of three prepositions (in, at, and on) in semantic networks (that also include metaphorical connections) has any relation with the mental representation of prepositions in the minds of language users. Sandra and Rice hold that all of their techniques have a bearing on this issue, even the off-line metalinguistic ones. Their distinction between these off-line techniques on the one hand and the on-line processing ones on the other suggests that the off-line metalinguistic techniques provide indirect access to the study of cognition, so that the interpretation of the data and their bearing on the representation of metaphorical senses of prepositions in grammar has to be treated with care (see Chapter 9). For now, however, it is useful to explain that there is another possible exploitation of off-line measures collecting metalinguistic data about metaphorical senses of prepositions. This is to regard such data as reflections pertaining to the structure of publicly available language symbols, irrespective of the long-term and/or short-term cognitive representation of these symbols in the minds of the participants in the experiment. Technically, participants can be asked to function as a jury about the language materials, so that the research focus is on the metaphorical language forms, not on the minds of the jury, who instead are utilized as a human measuring instrument. If the question to be answered in the research involves the metaphorical nature of conventional form-meaning pairings, this use of informants is a most appropriate and suitable technique. This view is connected to an interesting issue about the experimental materials in the Sandra and Rice (1995: 107–108) study, where “for each preposition 20 sentences were randomly selected from a set that was generated by five uninformed graduate students.” The critical question would be whether all of these uses and contexts would be sufficiently conventional to be called grammatical as opposed to more ad-hoc or novel. Intuitive inspection suggests that they are, but they have not been separately checked by the analysts or judged by a separate group of informants. There is also the question whether the spread in these sentences across conventional targets for in is sufficiently representative. To formulate just one idea, the Macmillan dictionary lists 28 different senses, some of which are of course far more frequent than others; the selection of experimental sentences is not related to this type of observational data. And finally, the example sentences do not just contain prepositional uses of in, but also one adverbial one, such as Please come in, and one use where in is part of the fixed phrase in case, which typically functions as a conjunction. The latter issue has to do with the unit of analysis. This type of inclusion might explain one finding for the preposition at: the two test items that received the lowest similarity score in comparison with a canonical spatial target sentence containing at were at any rate and at least. These are two fixed phrases in which at plays a subservient part which, to me, seems incomparable to its role as a preposition in sentences like The baby is at a stage in which he puts everything in his mouth. Even though Sandra and Rice have presented an extremely careful and important study, there are these details which are problematic.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

One practical way in which informant data can be collected regarding sense distinctions is by means of a so-called sorting task. In such a task, participants are requested to group a set of stimuli into either a number of predetermined categories or into as many groupings as they need (free sorting). Sandra and Rice (1995) used a sentence sorting task to examine informants’ sense distinctions for in, at, and on, used in roughly spatial, temporal, and abstract senses. Their aim was to test whether these prepositions could be accounted for by a monosemy view or whether there was evidence for the more plausible polysemy hypothesis. They found that the major division between the groupings is between locative and nonlocative (more metaphorical) senses. They interpreted this result as evidence against a strong monosemy view: the informants treated the three prepositions as polysemous items, according to the traditional analysis of prepositions as involving basic spatial meanings. Collecting informant data, however, does not always yield findings that validate linguists’ theories and predictions. The findings may also go against received views and raise questions about basic assumptions of, in this case, the structure of polysemy. Gibbs, Beitel, Harrington, and Sanders (1994) also used a sentence sorting task, to get a handle on the meaning of the verb stand. Participants were instructed to sort 35 different senses of stand into five groups based on their similarity of meaning. An analysis of participants’ groupings revealed that they did not sort physical senses of stand separately from the non-physical figurative senses. For example, the physical idea of standing in to stand at attention was often grouped with the metaphorical senses of stand in let the issue stand and to stand the test of time. A likely explanation, which was subsequently supported by further evidence, is that different uses of stand are related to one another because they share similar image-schematic information, cutting across the metaphorical non-metaphorical divide. This type of data can throw a different light on the opposition between concrete and abstract senses of a word, which is usually taken as the typical contrast involved in conventionalized metaphorical mappings between senses and their related conceptual domains. For some contexts, the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical appears to become less important than the shared basis of such senses in one image schema as opposed to another. This offers a profound relativization to the stability of even these time-honored examples of polysemy. The phenomenon is not restricted to the single case of stand, for another sorting task applied to 37 test items containing the preposition on yielded a comparable mix of metaphorical and nonmetaphorical items in the resulting groupings (Beitel, Gibbs, & Sanders 2001). But whether these findings are a reflection on grammar or on usage is hard to tell. Sandra and Rice (1995: 107–111) offer a detailed methodological discussion of the rationale of using a sorting task. They also place the evidence coming from such a task into the framework of the collection and interpretation of converging evidence. One of the issues they discuss is the question whether a clean-cut division between spatial and non-spatial senses of prepositions can or even should also be taken as evidence of a lack of relation between the two senses (which would force a decision between polysemy and homonymy). The answer is ‘no’: a clean division only suggests that the

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

two senses are distinct. It has no bearing as such on the question whether the distinct senses are related or not. That has to be investigated in a separate step. A suitable method for collecting informant data about this next issue is to ask participants for sentence similarity judgments – a task which does not just examine polysemy, but also affords a way into the question whether that polysemy may be metaphorically motivated given the distinction between the spatial, temporal, and abstract in the experimental materials. Taking at as an example, Sandra and Rice set up three target sentences exhibiting a canonical spatial, temporal, and abstract sense of the preposition at. Then they asked participants to judge how similar 60 token sentences with at were to one of the targets on a continuous scale with the poles “completely different” and “absolutely identical”. The target sentences were the following: (12) a. I think he’s at the supermarket (spatial) b. He left at midnight (temporal) c. At his request, I didn’t invite his mother (abstract) The rating data showed that, even though many senses were regarded as distinct, they could also be ordered according to a cline of more or less similarity, suggesting that some of these senses are more related to each other than others. Rating scales and sorting cards are just two techniques by means of which data can be collected in manipulation. They have their own dos and donts which can be found in regular textbooks for methods and techniques. We will encounter other such techniques in the next chapters. They yield meta data which are easy to analyze in quantitative terms, provided you have access to the required statistical techniques. The findings produced by such data analysis are hence highly reliable when it comes to the degree of error that may be caused by the analyst. Their collection from a sizable group of language users increases their validity with respect to the population of language users whose grammar is being described, even if symbolically. These are considerable advantages of the method of manipulation. I have concentrated on these two techniques and their use in the encompassing experimental study by Sandra and Rice because their study is exemplary in its methodological explicitness and addresses a central topic in the study of metaphor in grammar, namely polysemy. We have seen that such a study requires careful designing and preparation, which led to various questions about the experimental materials. It will also be appreciated that, once such data have been collected, their analysis is less problematic. Of course the application of statistical analysis posits a high threshold for many linguists, but it is not insuperable when special assistance can be requested from colleagues. All in all then, research by manipulation represents an exciting challenge to linguists who wish to collect converging evidence for their ideas about metaphor in grammar.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

. Conclusion In this chapter I have considered how converging evidence can be collected for answering question Q1, When does a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? We have seen how researchers utilize three main methods for data collection when it comes to finding polysemy in grammar that may be motivated by metaphor: –

–

–

Introspective methods exploit such phenomena as ambiguity and vagueness to test whether a linguistic form is polysemous, and focuses on the collection of metalinguistic data. The analysis remains firmly qualitative. Observational methods collect verbal data and can rely on dictionaries and corpora to check which linguistic items have been analyzed as polysemous by other linguists (dictionaries) or which linguistic items behave in patterned polysemous ways in samples of usage (corpus linguistics). The analysis of the individual cases is typically qualitative but yields quantitative findings in terms of frequencies and distributions. Experimental methods collect nonverbal and meta data from informants about various aspects of polysemy, by means of diverging techniques such as sorting tasks and similarity judgments. They have the advantage of quantitative analysis, which increases the precision and reliability of the findings.

There is thus, in principle, a rich array of data which can be collected about the same grammatical forms to investigate their potentially metaphorically motivated polysemous status. When this type of research is operationalized, a number of questions are addressed: 1. (how) do researchers motivate the linguistic level of one form with two senses that is chosen for examination? 2. (how) do researchers establish the degree of conventionalization of the linguistic constructions representing that form? 3. (how) do researchers establish that the form has at least two distinct senses? 4. (how) do researchers establish that the two senses display a metaphorical relation? In particular: a. how do researchers oppose nonliteral similarity to both literal similarity and literal hierarchy? b. What is the criterion for determining the basic sense (historical, experiential, acquisitional?), so that the direction of the mapping can be consistently determined? These questions can all be answered by using introspection, observation, and manipulation, and it would be interesting to see what converging evidence there is for each of these more detailed issues for a particular manifestation of polysemy. These

Chapter 6. Linguistic forms in grammar 

are not just academic questions, because, for instance, the identification of polysemy is contested for central cognitive-linguistic examples by both Jackendoff and Aaron (1991) and by Glucksberg and McGlone (1999), which has severe effects on the subsequent linguistic (Jackendoff) as well as psycholinguistic (Glucksberg) application of cognitive-linguistic findings. I have also argued that it is commendable to stay within this one area of grammatical research. If ideas or research from other areas are used, these might best be regarded as search mechanisms, as when particular conceptual metaphors guide researchers’ attention to specific linguistic forms and not others. It is better not to conceptualize this type of investigation as part of research into the conceptual structures themselves, unless due care is taken that (a) alternative explanations of the same linguistic data by other conceptual metaphors are ruled out and (b) there is sufficient independent evidence for the validity of the conceptual metaphors themselves to be able to say that the linguistic research adds to the conceptual research and converges with it. Metaphorically motivated polysemy is the typical example of metaphor in grammar in cognitive linguistics. It is often seen as the product of large-scale processes of language change on the basis of systematic metaphorical mappings, which is the diachronic side of finding metaphor in grammar via polysemy. Potentially metaphorical polysemy has therefore provided us with a good way in to finding metaphor in grammar. We now need to address the next area, the discovery of conventionally metaphorical conceptual structures that may be related to these metaphorical linguistic forms in grammar. We will do so in the next two chapters.

chapter 

Conceptual structures in grammar (1) Domains

Finding two senses related by nonliteral similarity is one area in the field of finding metaphor in grammar. Another area is the conceptual one, involving the identification of two conceptual domains which may motivate the two senses of the polysemous language form, as well as the identification of the correspondences between the two domains by means of a cross-domain mapping. That the two areas of linguistic form and conceptual structure have been connected in cognitive-linguistic research does not mean that they cannot be distinguished or temporarily separated for methodological purposes. On the contrary, we have seen in Chapter 2 that the cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor itself capitalizes on this distinction by using the conceptual area to make predictions about the linguistic area, which can then be tested in deductive fashion. We have also seen that languages vary in their conventional linguistic expression of aspects of presumed underlying conceptual metaphors. That is why the identification of metaphor as linguistic form and as conceptual structures can be interpreted as two distinct areas of investigation. When we apply the idea of metaphor as a cross-domain mapping to the analysis of grammar, and in particular to metaphorically motivated polysemy, the aim is to find a cross-domain mapping in conceptual structure that has manifested itself as a conventional, grammaticalized relation between at least two senses of a word, a phrase, a morpheme, or a more abstract construction. This provides an answer to question 3 in Chapter 1: Q3: When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? I will discuss the conceptual area in two stages. This chapter needs to clarify the criteria for establishing the conceptual domains as such. For the study of metaphor in grammar, this should lead to a selection of just those cases of polysemy which display some relation between two domains that have been conceptually distinguished from each other in a methodologically responsible way. Chapter 8 can then proceed to address the second stage of finding conceptual metaphor in grammar, identifying the nature of the relation between the two domains and ascertaining whether it can be seen as a cross-domain mapping. This methodological separation is not always respected in cognitive linguistics or elsewhere. However, it is inevitable if both metaphor and metonymy are conceptual-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

ized as mappings between two domains, as is customary in cognitive linguistics and elsewhere: this suggests that the domains in principle have to be identifiable independently from the determination of their relationship, which may then turn out to be based in either similarity or contiguity, or both. We have seen that this has become an issue for at least some of the previous proposals of metaphor in cognitive linguistics, with interesting discussions about the relation between metaphor and metonymy determining the agenda. This is why the identification of domains and mappings needs to be considered as two distinct stages in the methodology of finding methapor in the conceptual structures related to grammar. How can the relevant conceptual domains be demarcated by the analyst? What sorts of criteria are brought to bear on their identification and analysis? And how can we be sure about the precise nature of a conceptual domain on the basis of its expression by just a number of linguistic items? These are the questions that will be raised in the present chapter.

. Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach .. The synchronic dimension The typical distinction between the two domains involved in metaphorical polysemy is the one between concrete and abstract. This type of mapping is key to the conceptualizing capacity of human beings (Lakoff 1987: 281). Grady (1997a: 288) notes that “In general, the relationship between the conceptualization of abstract concepts and physical concepts seems central to the phenomenon of metaphor” (cf. Sweetser 1990: 18). Same-level mappings also occur, between two concrete domains, or between two abstract domains; and it is even possible to have mappings which have the opposite direction, from an abstract to a concrete domain (e.g. Shen 1995). But the typical mapping is from concrete to abstract. Of course, it is extremely difficult to set up a concrete and an abstract domain as such. Concrete versus abstract had better be seen as one important conceptual dimension along which two related concepts can be ordered and distinguished. The central question of this section, then, is how the adoption of a deductive approach has helped to identify the two domains related to polysemous items that are potentially metaphorical. And this should of course be approached from the perspective of the postulated conceptual metaphors that have given orientation to most cognitive-linguistic research on metaphor, such as love is a journey, theories are building, purposes are destinations, and persisting is remaining erect. The deductive approach has naturally led to the utilization of these concepts as focal points for the identification and reconstruction of distinct conceptual domains which function as source and target structures affording cross-domain mappings. In principle, there are two basic routes which have played a role in the development of the deductive approach:

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

1. from polysemy to domains, as we are following in Chapters 6 through 8; the identification of the two domains becomes important once the polysemy of a linguistic item has been established. 2. from domains to polysemy; the prior selection and demarcation of domains becomes crucial for the subsequent search for polysemy in sets of linguistic items. The first route is called the semasiological route, and goes from linguistic form to conceptual structure; the second route is called the onomasiological route and goes from conceptual structure to linguistic form. I shall make some comments about each of these routes and their relation to the deductive approach. When we start out from conceptual domains, it appears that some domains typically function as source domains, while others typically function as targets. In his practical introduction to metaphor, Kövecses (2002: 16–25) offers the following overview: Common source domains The human body; health and illness; animals; plants; buildings and construction; machines and tools; games and sport; money and economic transactions (business); cooking and food; heat and cold; light and darkness; forces; movement and direction Common target domains Emotion; desire; morality; thought; society/nation; politics; economy; human relationships; communication; time; life and death; religion The cognitive-linguistic explanation of these patterns lies in their relation to the contrast between concrete and abstract: people typically use knowledge about concrete domains to structure aspects of abstract domains. And as we saw for time is money in Chapter 6, the postulation of a conceptual metaphor may then lead on to research on the potential polysemy of ‘money’ words as ‘time’ words. We also saw, in Chapter 2, that not all of the predicted possibilities turn out to be conventionalized options in every language. And Chapters 2 and 6 also pointed out that not all of the polysemous items found in this way are necessarily best explained by the conceptual metaphor that helped discovering them. They may also be described with reference to other conceptual domains and mappings between them. This is where the deductive approach should be approached with some caution. One example is provided by Gibbs, Lima, and Francozo (2004). They first describe the structure and content of the conceptual domain of ‘hunger’ in order to use that description as a searchlight for checking which aspects of this conceptual system have become used in the conventionalized metaphorical expression of desire, including polysemous starve and famish. In such a deductive approach to the domain of hunger, however, it has to be clear what exactly can and cannot be said to be part of each of the conceptual domains as ‘desire’ versus ‘hunger’. For instance, Gibbs et al. (2004) also include crave as an example which may be explained as due to a mapping desire is hunger, but this seems to be an error. The verb crave historically expresses demands and requests. It hence seems to be a direct reflection of desire, not hunger. Its

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

assignment to the conceptual domain of hunger may be due to the fact that is has now primarily become a hunger term to many present-day American speakers of English. This may have suggested that its abstract use for talking about desire has been derived from the more physical, embodied experience of hunger, but this is misleading. Precision about the allocation of concepts to distinct domains, also via the meaning of linguistic forms in relation to their conceptual potential, is what this chapter is about. From a semasiological point of view, linguists have to find a particular metaphorical mapping that may motivate a (set of) polysemous item (s). The question has arisen how the linguist can choose between alternative domains when attempting to do so. The deductive approach to metaphor in cognitive linguistics has of course addressed this question by frequent recourse to the repertoire of conceptual metaphors collected since Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Yet the lists of source and target domains going around in cognitive linguistics are not claimed to be complete and exhaustive, so that it is impossible to use them as finite checklists which can be used for controlled classification purposes. I have also emphasized that the same language data may be compatible with more than one possible mapping between a source and a target domain, where the right level of generality is an important problem (Jackendoff & Aaron 1991; Vervaeke & Kennedy 1996; Ritchie 2003). This discussion is now conducted in cognitive linguistics via the distinction between complex and primary metaphor dealt with in Chapter 2. The search for the right conceptual domains to account for metaphorical polysemy hence appears to be heavily affected by the theoretical framework which guides the deductive approach. If the analyst sets out from some set of compound (or specific) conceptual metaphors, polysemous items appear to be relatable to a mapping between one set of domains; but if the analyst sets out from another set of domains, involved in the primary (or more general) metaphors which may also account for these language data, then the conceptual analysis becomes radically different. At this moment, a preference seems to be developing for the primary metaphor approach on account of the independent basis of the conceptual domains involved in experience (see Grady & Johnson 2000, 2002), but future developments will have to show whether this is the most successful approach. In any case, methodological questions about the precise identification of the domains involved in primary metaphors remain, particularly in connection with the application of a deductive approach. For instance, how are the borders of the domains of primary metaphors involved in compound metaphors demarcated? Grady (1997a: 280) claims that they can be delimited in principled fashion, “by reference to the particular component metaphors which make up the compounds.” He claims that some derivations of theories are buildings that are theoretically possible will never occur in practice because they cannot be supported by either of the two primary metaphors, persisting is remaining erect and structure is physical structure. Grady also emphasizes the possibility of collecting converging evidence about the domains of compound metaphors, in ways that are also discussed here. But Grady (1997a) does not explain how the component or primary metaphors are identified

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains

themselves. He leaves a good part of that type of analysis to the skills of the analyst. This seems to shift the problem of domain identification from the area of compound metaphor analysis to the area of primary metaphor analysis. One way in which the analysis of primary metaphors can be constrained is by connecting them to their experiential basis. Grady and Johnson (2000, 2002) have offered a theoretical sketch of so-called primary scenes and subscenes, basic conceptualizations of experience which lie at the basis of the domains involved in primary metaphors. They emphasize that such scenes are characterized by temporal locality and causal simplicity, and they contrast such scenes with a number of alternative hypothesized units of meaning and experience, including metaphor domains, semantic primitives or atoms, schematic concepts, prototypical events, semantic frames and mental spaces, and image schemas and basic level concepts. However, there is not much methodological help in the way these scenes themselves are defined again, so that operational definitions and methods for finding primary scenes and subscenes still need to be developed. In all then, the general message remains one of caution. The identification of conceptual domains by means of linguistic evidence is tenuous. First of all, linguistic forms do not express everything there is to conceptual structure. And secondly, linguistic forms may be connected to more than one level of generality in conceptual structure. Finally, many of the linguistic forms used for the reconstruction of conceptual domains have themselves been collected by presupposing the conceptual domains in the first place. Without a strict separation of these two stages of research, each following their own rules of validation, as I am advocating in these chapters, the accusation of circularity will persist and diminish the perceived value of the cognitive-linguistic enterprise.

.. The diachronic dimension Over the last two decades, metaphorical mappings between conceptual domains have also been used to account for an increasing number of aspects of language change. This has mostly happened in the framework of grammaticalization theory, which has been greatly inspired by the cognitive-linguistic theory of conceptual metaphor (e.g., Heine, Claudi, & Hünnemeyer 1991; Hopper & Traugott 1993; Lehmann 1985; Sweetser 1990; Traugott & Dasher 2002; Traugott & Heine 1991). It has been used to motivate parts of the processes where “grammatical structure develops out of independent words that first lose semantic content, become function words, and eventually turn into grammatical morphemes” (Claudi & Heine 1986: 298). Tense, aspect, case, and so on are non-physical and conceptually complex notions, and metaphorical mappings from physical and less complex notions can help language users to express them. A general theory of language change is hence emerging that is partly based in the ideas of conceptual metaphor theory. In the conceptual area itself, a distinction is made between a small number of basic conceptual domains, such as person, object, space, and time. These domains are ordered along an implicational scale, to the effect that



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

domains on the left of other domains may function as source domains for the conceptualization and linguistic expression of these domains, which act as targets. The complete scale looks like this: person > object > process > space > time > quality Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer (1991) have suggested that a number of so-called categorial metaphors may be derived from this scale, by simply taking two contiguous terms and placing them in an ‘A IS B’ formula, as in object is person, process is object, time is space, and so on. In each of these cases, a more abstract domain is conceptualized and expressed by means of less abstract domain. A linguistic result of this process is the polysemous nature of the word back for the body part, which in many languages can be indirectly used to express a spatial concept meaning ‘behind’, which in turn may be metaphorically used to express a temporal concept, ‘after’ (cf. Allan 1995). This suggests a potentially powerful conceptual explanation of a lot of conventionally metaphorical structure in lexico-grammar. The selection, construction and ordering of these six domains is expressly based on a conceptual interpretation of the grammatical data that have to be explained. One example of these data is case markings, including agent, benefactive, dative, accusative, locative, and instrument. Heine et al. (1991: 160) suggest that benefactive corresponds with ‘person’, accusative with ‘object’, locative with ‘space’, and instrument and others with ‘quality’. Similarly, Heine et al. (1991) suggest that there are correlations between the list of domains on the one hand and word types and constituent types on the other, as is shown in detail in Table 7.1. These correlations between conceptual structures and grammar have been noted in other approaches, too (e.g. Langacker 1987; cf. Halliday 1985/1994). The general approach to prepositions as involving abstractions from space to time to abstract relations is one interesting case which may be seen as part of this more encompassing picture. The distinctions between these conceptual domains are hence based in identifying the regular conceptual needs of the language user to code particular grammatical distinctions. The domains are then related to the sets of formal features in language systems which have long received particular functional interpretations from grammarians of different persuasions. The direction of postulating the required number of domains and their demarcation hence goes from linguistic forms to conceptual strucTable 7.1 Associations between conceptual domains and grammatical categories Category

Word type

Constituent type

person object process space time quality

human noun non-human noun verb adverb, adposition adverb, adposition adjective, adverb

noun phrase noun phrase verb phrase adverbial phrase adverbial phrase modifier

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

tures, and is dictated by the grammatical distinctions that need to be described and explained. These grammatical distinctions were inductively compared and integrated into the implicational scale presented at the beginning of this section. The scale could then in turn be used deductively to study other phenomena and other languages. This complex story shows that cognitive-linguistic studies of metaphor are not just deductive. It also shows that there is heavy trafficking between the study of linguistic forms and conceptual structures. This is inevitable if cognitive linguistic wants to realize its overall program of relating language to thought (and thought to language). It is perhaps worth repeating here that I find that program exciting, rewarding, and challenging. But this does not mean that the methodology of pursuing these goals cannot be improved. The caveat I should like to issue at this place, therefore, is that the various movements back and forth between the two areas of linguistic form and conceptual structure, as well as their temporarily independent study, requires more attention to the methodological issues raised in as well as outside cognitive linguistics. The deductive approach to the various conceptual domains that need to be distinguished for diverging cross-domain mappings, in particular, needs to be taken as inspiring as long as it is realized that it will not bring universal happiness.

. Conceptualization Chapter 3 showed that there are at least four dominant models of metaphor as conceptual structure. I will now first go into the question of the difference between the two cognitive-linguistic competitors in this area, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Blending Theory. Then we will turn to the question of how domains can be demarcated from each other. And finally the question will be addressed how conceptual domains should be related to their expression by polysemous language forms.

.. Domains and other conceptual systems Source and target concepts in conventional metaphors are located in conceptual domains. The notion of a domain suggests that we are dealing with a more encompassing network or system of concepts. This is the way in which it was introduced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) for their cognitive-linguistic study of metaphor in language and thought (cf. Lakoff 1994). It has clear relations with venerable philosophical positions such as Black (1962, 1979/1993) and others about the role of knowledge systems in metaphor production and understanding. And the idea is steeped in the development of the new views of the organization of knowledge in the human mind in cognitive science which arose in the seventies, as was to become even more evident in Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987), and Lakoff and Johnson (1999a). There are therefore many common assumptions about conceptual domains which affect the way they are conceptualized by scholars of metaphor.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Conceptual domains have not just been discussed in the study of metaphor. Langacker (1987), for example, has used the notion in his cognitive-linguistic studies of a range of grammatical phenomena. Associations with ‘domains’ held by metaphor specialists may consequently be more specific than is warranted. Clausner and Croft (1999) have therefore provided a critical discussion of the various ways in which fundamental conceptual categories have been used in cognitive linguistics by Langacker, Lakoff, Fillmore, and Talmy, even leaving outside consideration the more recent development of Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual integration theory. In their textbooks on cognitive linguistics, Taylor (2002), Croft and Cruse (2004), and Evans and Green (2006) have also drawn attention to some of these issues, discussing the distinction between such knowledge systems as domains, frames, and spaces. Outside cognitive linguistics, a similar variety of views of conceptual systems can be observed (e.g. Barsalou 1992; Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994; Murphy 2002; Wierzbicka 1992). In conceptualizing the notion of a domain for the study of metaphor, it is therefore important to realize that there are various theoretical and empirical issues about conceptual structures and systems. My own view of conceptual systems capitalizes on a number of trends in cognitive linguistics. Dirven (2002: 37), in his overview of cognitive-linguistic theories of metaphor and metonymy, has suggested that, “In spite of early criticism against it, the two-domain theory of metaphor and metonymy now stands firm.” He also acknowledges, however, that there is recent criticism of the two-domain approach, in particular in Fauconnier and Turner’s many-space theory (1996, 1998, 1999, 2002), which is presented as a new breakthrough by Dirven (2002) himself. The main critical point of Blending Theory has been that the understanding of metaphorical expressions in language requires more than two knowledge domains for their analysis, and that these domains, moreover, are more ad-hoc and more specific than the relatively more general and permanent domains advanced by Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This is also why Blending Theory refers to these conceptual structures as mental spaces instead of conceptual domains (cf. Grady, Oakley, & Coulson 1999). I believe that this opposition between the two-domain theory and the many-space theory may be usefully viewed from the distinction between language as grammar versus language as usage. Both Fauconnier and Turner (2000: 135) and Lakoff (1987: 281) have made a distinction between more general knowledge structures, which they often refer to as conceptual domains, and more specific mental spaces, in which these conceptual domains are used for constructing meaning in discourse (cf. Grady 2005). The construction of meaning during events of usage may be novel or conventional, but it is always situated, specific, and unique to the occasion; this situation holds for metaphorical as well as for other types of meaning (cf. Evans and Zinken, in press). My point, with both Fauconnier and Turner (2000) and with Lakoff (1987), is that general and entrenched conceptual structures and systems play a role in the analysis of usage with mental space theory (cf. Grady 2005). The study of metaphorical polysemy, by contrast, as an analysis of relations between grammaticalized meanings abstracted from concrete situations of use and pro-

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

cessing, does not seem to require more than two domains. This holds irrespective of the problems with the proper identification of the nature of the domains at the right level of abstraction, or of the possibility that such domains may serve as discovery procedures but not necessarily as valid explanations. In my view, this difference between the need for specificity in usage analysis versus generalization in grammar is what is reflected by the quotation from Dirven above. The situation with the two-domain theory may consequently turn out to be less clear or secure than Dirven suggests when we turn to metaphor in usage. For that area, a more complex model may be required, at least for some purposes of research. Such a model for metaphor in usage may have to be based on more than two domains or spaces, with various conceptual systems forming part of the potential input, as has also been acknowledged by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a: 47). But it should also be announced here that this is certainly not necessarily so, as I will demonstrate in part three with reference to corpus work on usage in the two-domain tradition by, for instance, Charteris-Black (2004), Chilton (1996), Deignan (2005a), Koller (2004), and ˝ slikan (2003, 2004). Ozça¸ As a result, when discussing the identification and analysis of conceptual structures of metaphorical language in grammar, I will assume that cross-domain mappings involve two domains. When we then turn to metaphor in usage in parts two and three, I will include the possibility that there may be more than two domains or spaces, particularly for the situated and specific meanings of individual words in unique events of usage. More general and permanent conceptual domains may be utilized as one component in that framework. I believe that this is compatible with the theorizing of both Lakoff and Johnson (e.g. 1999a: 47) and with Fauconnier and Turner (e.g. 2000: 135; again, Grady 2005), and that these positions can also be recovered from the textbooks surveying the field.

.. Defining conceptual domains The most widely accepted account of the notion of conceptual domains in the cognitive-linguistic study of metaphor and metonymy has become the view of Croft (1993, 2002), who has recruited the notion of domain proposed by Langacker (1987). Croft has defined a domain as ‘a semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one concept profile (typically, many profiles)’ (2002: 166). For instance, the notion of an ‘arc’ can only be understood relative to the domain of circles, but circles also provide a base for understanding other concepts such as ‘diameter,’ ‘radius,’ ‘chord,’ and so on. Circles consequently constitute one conceptual domain. In more general terms, therefore, domains can be any coherent set of concepts that are related to one concept, but usually many concepts, and that are needed for understanding that (set of) concept(s) (cf. Taylor 2002). This may seem far removed from the global approaches to domains as pertaining to abstract versus concrete concepts, and so on, which has been the traditional view of how domains work. However, such an impression would not be quite correct. For

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

circles and other figures such as squares and triangles cannot be understood without invoking another, more encompassing domain, geometry, and geometry, in turn, cannot be understood without invoking an even more global domain, space. Domains acting as bases for profiled concepts typically do not function on their own, but in domain matrices and domain structures, and some of these domains are the highly general ones mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. This may be theoretically and empirically adequate, but Croft’s definition provides little guidance to the researcher who needs to find and demarcate one conceptual domain from the other, as we would wish to do in order to test whether a cross-domain mapping can be related to the two senses of a polysemous language item which may be motivated by metaphor. Nor do Croft’s additional observations offer much further help, that some domains are basic and that some domains have more than one dimension. These distinctions may all be useful from a theoretical point of view, but the question arises how they can be operationalized in empirical research on finding metaphor in language and thought. The problematic nature of the state of the art and its possibilities for doing empirical research has been readily acknowledged by Croft (1993, 2002) and others. Taylor (2002: 195), for instance, retains the distinction between the more specific notion of a base and the more general notion of a domain, and can only offer examples to elucidate the distinction. He does offer general theoretical criteria (“how intrinsic the broader conceptualization is to the semantic unit, how immediately relevant it is, and to what extent aspects of the broader conceptualization are specifically elaborated”), but operational procedures for making these graded decisions in practice are not available. Similarly, when Croft (2002: 166) offers advice for finding basic domains, he can only alert the analyst to the higher divisions of a good thesaurus. Croft subsequently draws attention to the difficulties arising when researchers have to make practical decisions. The only solution to this problem appears to lie in “a careful working out of the definitions of concepts,” with a reference to the work done by Wierzbicka (1985, 1987, 1988) as a comparable remedy to the same plight (cf. Wierzbicka 1992, 1994). This pessimism concerning the identification of conceptual domains is corroborated by Warren (2002: 126–127): Generally the theory of domains is difficult to apply since domain boundaries are not observable, nor intuitively self-evident and therefore, as pointed out by Dirven (1993), Riemer (2001), Ruiz de Mendóza Ibañez (1997), and Ruiz de Mendóza and Díez (2002), methodically and theoretically problematic.

And Feyaerts (1999, 2000) could have been added to her list. Outside cognitive linguistics, the problem of domain identification has not just been observed by Wierzbicka (1985, 1987, 1988) for the NSM approach to semantics; it has also been experienced in another area that is related to conceptual domains theory, semantic field theory (Kittay 1987; Lehrer & Kittay 1992). Outside linguistics, whether cognitive or otherwise, more generally cognitive-scientific approaches to conceptual domains have also grappled with the issue of domain identification and demarcation (e.g. Hirschfeld & Gelman


1994; Lehrer & Kittay 1992; Murphy 2002; Tomasello 1999). Even though there may be a lot of theorizing and illustration of the nature of domains, the precise and systematic application of these ideas in empirical research has remained problematic.

.. Domains and metaphorically motivated polysemy The third issue in this section on the conceptualization of domains has to do with their relation to their linguistic expression by means of polysemy. For ease of exposition, I set out in the previous chapter from the starting point that most metaphor in grammar involves some form of polysemy. However, even though this may account for the bulk of metaphor in grammar, it should also be acknowledged that not all linguistic expressions of metaphorical mappings in conceptual structure are captured by the notion of polysemy. One different type of linguistic manifestation of metaphor in conceptual structure is for instance grammatical metaphor, which was discussed in Chapter 4. We saw there that grammatical metaphor does not require disambiguation between two conventionalized senses at the same level (or stratum) of the language code, a property which lies at the basis of polysemy; instead, in grammatical metaphor, the cross between two conceptual domains pertains to two different levels of the sign, its lexicogrammatical form and its semantics. Another exception to the common linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor by metaphorically motivated polysemy is formed by those linguistic signs which, in their form, exhibit an explicit indication of two domains. Not all of these linguistic signs are polysemous. Let us examine a number of examples to see how metaphorical mappings may be linguistically expressed in other ways than by polysemy. One category of expressions which formally indicates the juxtaposition of two distinct conceptual domains are metaphorical compounds. These may consist of two morphemes exhibiting a metaphorical relation with each other, as in frogman. One suggestion might be that the domains related to the two morphemes are ‘animals’ and ‘human beings,’ producing a conceptual metaphor man is an animal. The analysis of the relation between the two domains as metaphorical (or not) has to take place in a subsequent step, as we shall do in Chapter 8; the precise identification of the two domains as domains is the main problem for the present chapter. Even though frogman may display metaphor at the level of its morphological structure, it is not polysemous as a lexeme, in the way that words like attack and defend are polysemous: frogman conventionally has only one sense, not two or more. In order to throw this issue into relief, frogman can be contrasted with the way in which a word like toad works. In British English, toad is polysemous and can conventionally designate an animal as well as an unpleasant person (even though the latter sense is becoming oldfashioned). Toad may therefore also be seen as based on a mapping between human beings and animals, but it does not explicitly signal this mapping in its morphological form, as is the case with frogman. Toad is not a compound which exhibits a reflection of two domains but it is an example of the classic illustration of metaphor in grammar by means of polysemy. The possible existence of an underlying mapping for toad is sig-



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

naled by its polysemous semantics, which can only be revealed by inserting the word into alternative linguistic contexts, as we saw in Chapter 6. Also consider the contrast between frogman and frog, used as a term of insult in English for the French. Frog, too, is not a compound but polysemous, like toad. In the case of frog we also have two conceptual domains, animals and humans, which are somehow related, and, just as with toad, we do not have an explicit signal in the form but we need to look at the polysemous lexical semantics. For frog, however, the question arises whether the relation between the two domains is based on metaphor. In that case, the French should somehow resemble frogs. It seems more likely, though, that the expression is based in metonymy, with reference to the French predilection for frogs as food. In general, then, the contrast between frogman, toad, and frog is a useful illustration of the way in which the relation between distinct conceptual domains and their linguistic expression in lexico-grammar can vary. When we turn to the level of conventionalized signs above lexical items, fixed phrases, we see similar variation of expression of underlying conceptual mappings. First of all, there is a phraseological parallel with the morphological case of frogman in that there are plenty of fixed phrasal expressions with two linguistic forms coming from two different domains. Thus, metaphorical comparisons between humans and animals are part and parcel of the fixed phrases of the language system, including blind as a bat, busy as a bee, dead as a dodo, and stubborn as a mule (Moon 1998: 196). These fixed phrases are conventionalized similes. They are another example of conventionalized language items which can display a formally explicit opposition between two distinct conceptual domains which are related by nonliteral similarity. The conventionalized similes do not involve polysemy. They contain expressions belonging to two domains, but the words themselves are used directly. The conceptual comparison that is evoked by the words can trigger a mapping between the two domains of humans and animals; but there is no indirect language use in such similes as such. As far as I can tell, these morphological and phraseological expressions are exceptional cases where the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor is not based on polysemy but on the conventionalized juxtaposition of two domains designated by two directly used linguistic forms. This should be contrasted with another class of conventionalized cross-domain mappings at the level of phrases, which, as phrases, are genuinely polysemous. Moon (1998) found that 5% of her database of 6776 fixed expressions and idioms were polysemous, and one quarter of those 5% was accounted for by metaphor. This is probably much lower than the proportion of metaphorical polysemy in lexical items, but it still is considerable enough for it to merit separate attention. Examples include abandon ship, tread water, clear the air, and break the ice, which as fixed phrases have a direct sense as well as an indirect, metaphorical sense. These expressions are like lexically polysemous items, in that they have to be disambiguated by context regarding their metaphorical or non-metaphorical use. In sum, even though I started out in Chapter 6, for expository purposes, from the assumption that the bulk of metaphor in grammar has to do with synchronic

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

or diachronic polysemy, the relation between metaphor in conceptual structure and grammar is not restricted to polysemy. Apart from grammatical metaphor, which is another phenomenon altogether, there are phrases and compounds which exhibit an explicit clash between two domains, as in blind as a bat and frogman, but which are not necessarily polysemous as phrases or as compounds. This should be contrasted with the way in which words like defend and attack are polysemous as words. These are clear examples of metaphor in grammar where researchers can focus on two domains without having to take into account the role of polysemy. There are other compounds and phrases, however, that can be polysemous between a non-metaphorical and a metaphorical sense. For phrases, we looked at abandon ship, tread water and other examples; for compounds, a word like razor-sharp is polysemous between a literal and a metaphorical interpretation. These phrases and compounds are completely comparable to the bulk of illustrations of two-domain theory, lexical polysemy. They form the typical examples of metaphor in grammar as discussed in cognitive linguistics.

.. Conclusion The conceptualization of the notion of domain is fraught with difficulties. There are different notions of what counts as a conceptual domain, and, within cognitive linguistics, there is competition between at least two important models: the two-domain theory of Lakoff and Johnson and the many-space theory of Fauconnier and Turner. I have suggested that, for the purpose of studying metaphor in grammar, the twodomain approach appears to be most adequate. When Conceptual metaphor Theory is adopted as a starting-point, however, it is still not quite clear how a domain can be conceptualized. Theoretical insights abound, but they have not been elaborated in such a way as to form a coherent and explicit model. Many authors have commented on the problems inherent in determining what counts as a domain outside as well as within cognitive linguistics. Apart from these issues, I have also looked at the relation between conceptual domains on the one hand and their expression in conventionalized metaphorical language on the other. Even though I set out in Chapter 6, for expository purposes, with the idea that conceptual metaphor is typically manifested by metaphorically motivated polysemy, this is not the complete story. We have seen above that conceptual metaphor may also be expressed as conventional simile, metaphorical compounds, and so on, each of which display different relations with the underlying conceptual structures. I will keep concentrating on the case of polysemy in most of this book, but only because this is the typical case.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

. Operationalization In Chapter 4 we saw that the operationalization of metaphor in grammar varies between the three major schools of metaphor that can be distinguished (Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Class-Inclusion Theory, and the Career of metaphor Theory), as well as the four major areas of metaphor research (linguistic form and conceptual structure as either symbolic structure or as cognitive process and product). For identifying the conceptual structure of metaphor in grammar analyzed as a symbolic system, I will focus on the two-domain approach favored by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a), for reasons I have offered above. Thus metaphor in conceptual structure is assumed to involve a mapping between two domains, which provisionally need to be distinguished irrespective of the nature of the mapping – since the mapping may also be based on contiguity, this needs to be resolved after the domains have been circumscribed. We have seen that the identification and demarcation of domains is generally problematic. However, linguists do not have to identify and demarcate domains in a general fashion. They are in the fortunate position that they can focus on domains from a specific point of view which has a particular context, in two distinct ways. For metaphor in grammar, they are mostly looking at domains from two opposed senses for a set of language forms, and those senses have to be related to a number of other aspects of the grammatical system. For metaphor in usage, linguists are looking at conceptual spaces from the perspective of two opposed situational meanings which have to be located in a discourse context. In this section I will try to describe what is involved in the task of finding two conceptual domains for two distinct, potentially metaphorically related senses of sets of linguistic forms. Consider the adjective open, which has a number of concrete as well as abstract senses, as may be illustrated from its description in the Macmillan dictionary. The adoption of this dictionary also suggests that I am looking at the grammar of English from the general contemporary user of British English: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

when public can visit when you can see inside not blocked not covered/enclosed honest anyone can see/join considering suggestions when sth can be done possible + phrases

Let us take the first four senses as variations of a concrete meaning, leaving undecided for now which of the four could be labeled as the basic sense that could act as source domain, if that choice would have to be made in the first place. The fifth sense is an abstract sense, which may be metaphorically related to the first four senses

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

(but this needs to be established independently). How can these concrete and abstract senses of language be related to more encompassing conceptual domains which can be reconstructed by the analyst? Since we are dealing with polysemy at the level of lexical units, we can begin by collecting a number of different types of linguistically important information about the two potential domains. In cognitive processing as well as in technical analysis, the search for connections between any two conceptual domains is guided by relevance, as connections may range from bare, skeletal, and minimal to full, concrete and maximal. A full overview of the various types of linguistic information that may be searched in such a quest for relevance includes three areas: syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic information about the lexical item (or other unit of analysis) in question. The first type of information concerns syntactic information of various kinds: –

–

–

We need to establish that we are dealing with a particular word class, which for open is the one of adjectives, as a result of which the word open may also be found in various degrees of comparison. As an adjective the word also exhibits specific collocation restrictions and collocation patterns, which adds detail to the nature of the two potentially distinct conceptual domains to which it may be related; for instance, Macmillan lists expressions like in open court, an open book, the open road, throw sth open, and welcome/receive sb with open arms, which all indicate specific aspects in grammatically conventionalized ways of the abstract and concrete domains to be reconstructed. Also as an adjective, the word open exhibits specific morphological relations with other words, like the verb to open, as we also saw in the discussion of Jackendoff in Chapter 6. Thus the question arises whether you can open a court just like you can open a book or a road.

The typical syntactic role and the typical syntactic relations between a word and its possible collocates provide essential anchoring points for reconstructing the conventional structure of the underlying conceptual domains involved in the mapping between the metaphorical and nonmetaphorical senses of the polysemous item open. Moving away from syntactic information, the second type of linguistic information that is relevant for the reconstruction of underlying conceptual domains is semantic information of various kinds: –

There are set semantic patterns of synonymy and antonymy; this is one reason why word class plays an important role, for adjectives have to be compared in this connection with adjectives, not verbs. The opposite of open as an adjective in its concrete sense is closed or shut, but shut cannot be metaphorically used of people who are not open. Closed can be used as the opposite of the seventh sense, as when we speak about an open/closed mind/society, and it can also be used of people when they are an open/closed book. However it is not conventional to speak of a closed person in British English. That all of this may be language-specific is illustrated by the fact that the latter possibility has been conventionalized in Dutch.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

–

Similar information has to be collected about patterns of superordinates and hyponyms, and about patterns of gradability. Thus, a door can be ‘wide open’, but whether a person can be ‘wide open’ without crossing the boundaries of grammatical conventionalization is another matter.

Synonymy and antonymy, superordinacy and hyponymy, and gradability are all phenomena which provide detailed information about the conventionalized conceptual structure of the two domains for open which may be involved in a cross-domain mapping between its concrete, spatial sense and its abstract, psychological sense. The third type of linguistic information which can be collected to reconstruct the conceptual domains presumably underlying the metaphorical and nonmetaphorical senses of open has to do with pragmatic information of various kinds, often called inference structures in cognitive linguistics (e.g. Grady & Johnson 2000, 2002). Presupposition and entailment are the most crucial phenomena to be considered here. For instance, open entails that the opposite does not hold, so not closed; note that this is how senses 3 and 4 in the Macmillan dictionary are defined. As a result, when people are open in the metaphorical sense, this entails that they cannot also, as a rule, be secretive or dishonest at the same time, even though that type of people cannot be conventionally described in English as being closed. Another type of pragmatic information that can be derived is the consequence of open – thus, senses 1, 2, 6, and 8 define the sense of open with reference to the entailed consequence. It would thus be odd to find an open shop which cannot be visited by the public (sense 1), or to find an open book or drawer which you cannot see inside (sense 2). Apart from these three types of linguistic information which may be recruited to model the conceptual structure of a domain, there is also encyclopedic information of various kinds. Linguistic information can be integrated into the conceptual structure of various typical scenes or scenarios which may function as encompassing knowledge frames in the tradition of Fillmore (e.g., 1985, 1988; Fillmore & Atkins 1992; Martin 2001). The most helpful tool in this area might be the comparable conceptual system built by George Miller and his associates, called WordNet (Fellbaum 1998a, b). For instance, the first sense of open in Macmillan typically involves buildings of some kind, whereas the second sense does not. The second sense does involve concrete objects, though, which is the most important contrast with the presumably metaphorical sense of ‘honest’, which can only be applied to people. Another important property of frames and other types of conceptual structures is that they contain implicit causal and lateral connections between entities, such that buildings have walls, floors, roofs, rooms, and so on. A question therefore arises how much of this type of knowledge needs to be made explicit in the description of a domain for the purpose of analyzing the relation between two metaphorically related senses of a polysemous language form, and how this process can be constrained. The available relations in WordNet might be one way in which such decisions might be made explicit and systematic. I have distinguished between four types of information which may be collected for reconstructing the underlying conceptual structure of a polysemous, potentially

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

metaphorical language form. Three of these are linguistic (syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic) while the fourth is conceptual (encyclopedic). To form one domain, all of these types of information have to be integrated, usually within the compass of the fourth type of information. This should lead to the postulation of two distinct conceptual domains for the two postulated senses of open. The final stage in the analysis of the conceptual domains for open involves an important shift of perspective, away from the word open. I noted in Chapter 6 that polysemy is commonly established by collecting other linguistic data from the lexicogrammar of a language which seem to display the same related senses. When there are such cases, both the decision about polysemy and the decision about a conventionalized conceptual domain becomes intuitively stronger for that grammar as well as those items. When it comes to fine-tuning the underlying domains for a word like open, therefore, we need to turn to related linguistic items and analyze them in the same way. Since these related words were all considered during the analysis of open itself, they are easily available for running them through the same analysis. Thus, words like closed and shut are prime candidates for checking whether there is a systematic pattern for polysemy in which the presumed metaphorical polysemy of open should be situated. WordNet, again, might be an excellent tool for standardizing this approach across cases. The analysis of open and of closed and shut are methodologically two different stages of analysis. In principle, the conceptual domain for open would have to be established in this manner independently of similar rounds of analysis for other candidates in the same lexical field. Only then would there be truly converging evidence in the form of a reliable polysemy pattern for the same underlying conceptual structure. Given the possibilities for multiple interpretation of language items, and their susceptibility to slightly different meanings when contexts change, this is not a trivial warning. However, independent analyses for separate language items are not really separately reported in cognitive-linguistic analyses of metaphorical polysemy. The linguistic patterns and the underlying conceptual patterns are typically presented as two coherent groups of findings, with no differentiation between the applicability of all of the conceptual patterns to each of the linguistic items. That is possibly why a word like wipe out discussed in Chapter 6 may have got included in a list of words that are all ‘war’ words: it is possible that it has not been separately tested for its appurtenance to the domain of argumentation. Even though not every article or book chapter should present all of these analyses as separate items, it would be preferable if a methodological report of this stage of the research and its findings were to be included in analyses of polysemy patterns and their underlying conceptual domains. One additional operational issue in this connection pertains to the level of abstraction at which these details are integrated. For instance, Kövecses (2000) has shown that the language of emotions is compatible with specific metaphors such as emotion is internal pressure, an opponent, a wild animal, hunger, a physical force, and so on. However, as Kövecses demonstrates, all of these conceptual metaphors for the

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

domain of emotion are also compatible with a generic metaphor emotion is force. As I have indicated before, the nature of the conceptual domains behind the language patterns around the polysemous items can be pitched at these various levels of abstraction. The identification of the elements of these varying conceptual domains would have to be accordingly consistent: finding and labeling the domain of emotion remains constant, but deciding between the postulation of a domain of force as opposed to a domain of internal pressure or physical force is much trickier. Kövecses (2000) has resolved this issue by adopting a deductive approach in which the two domains are used in controlled fashion to examine the language data. The question is how a choice between domains can be constrained in cases when there are no theoretical (deductively derived) expectations guiding researchers in their reconstructions of underlying domains for two senses. In this section, we have gone from linguistic forms through syntactic, semantic and pragmatic structures to conceptual systems. That is, we have used linguistic senses and syntactic, semantic and pragmatic structures as a way of entrance into underlying conceptual systems. As long as it is realized that we have deliberately followed this route, this is not a problem. It certainly should not be so for cognitive linguistics, which adheres to an encyclopedic view of meaning where linguistic senses are embedded in more encompassing conventionalized conceptual structures. This route has also been followed in other traditions, such as semantic field theory, where linguistic senses provide access to systematic semantic structures. The decisions that have to be taken, then, in operationalizing the reconstruction of a conceptual domain have to do with at least three methodological issues: 1. You have to decide what level of abstraction you are going to use for ordering the conceptual materials; 2. You have to decide which set of polysemous words (or more generally linguistic forms) are going to be included in the reconstruction of the underlying conceptual structures; 3. You have to decide about the descriptive framework for analyzing the syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and encyclopedic information that can be collected about each of the polysemous items (or more generally linguistic forms). All of these decisions presuppose that the potentially metaphorical linguistic items have all been identified independently of this stage of research, requiring approaches described in the previous chapter.

. Introspection The question whether two conceptual domains can be distinguished in relation to two independently established senses that are metaphorically related can be answered by introspective, observational, and manipulative methods of data collection. Some

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

researchers are quite outspoken about their preferences. Here is Anna Wierzbicka (1992: 213–214): “Category membership” of words and meanings cannot be established by asking informants simple questions, or giving them simple “sorting” tasks. It can only be established by methodical semantic analysis. In the absence of such an analysis, different schemes of “semantic” and “conceptual” categorization proposed in recent literature, particularly psychological literature, often reflect the pretheoretical ideas of the researchers rather than the results of valid, well-conceived empirical investigations.

I am happy that the quotation leaves open the possibility for useful informant testing in the conceptual area once methodical semantic analysis has produced findings which survive the scrutiny of linguists. Such informant studies may, after all, offer evidence about conceptual structures which may agree with the conclusions about linguistic forms drawn by semanticists – or again, they may not. And if they do not, the question arises what such diverging evidence can tell the linguist about their methodical semantic analysis. This is a genuine question, not a flippant one. It should be pointed out in defence of cognitive linguistics that the “pretheoretical ideas of the researchers” about conceptual structures might in fact be the result of deductive approaches that have their motivation in general cognitive categorization phenomena instead of in lexical semantics. If the latter are well established, they may also act as constraints on the category membership of words and meanings in language. This should form sufficient reason to adopt such a deductive approach for a particular research project. More important for our present purposes is to examine what the methodical semantic analyses performed by introspective techniques may look like in actual practice. Wierzbicka has been quite explicit about her techniques of analysis, offering an explicit methodology for researchers. She sets out from the assumption that linguists have intuitions about which words are related to which other words in a language (1992: 210). These intuitions may be used to construct sets of related words in order to function as comparative materials for establishing the semantic and perhaps conceptual structures of a particular linguistic item. In this way, similarities and differences between the various lexical items in a set can be revealed and finetuned by further analysis. That such a procedure collects verbal data by introspection might be less appealing to, for instance, corpus linguists. The selection of the semantic or conceptual level of abstraction at which a word’s meaning is described is determined inductively. When sets of words have been selected by introspection, groupings of words, patterns within and between those groupings, and idiosyncracies of specific words will naturally emerge. However, this procedure has to be applied with care, precision, and systematically. This leads us on to the empirical basis and method of Wierzbicka’s qualitative analysis, because it is this part of her approach which offers the desired control.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage takes the semantic dimension of lexical items as a starting point. A number of special semantic elements or concepts have been identified which are claimed to function as semantic primitives in the search for meaning patterns. Like image schemas and conceptual metaphors in cognitive linguistics, in NSM semantic primitives act as a set frame of reference for finding the senses of lexical items. Shared semantic primitives between lexical items lead to the postulation of semantic domains, which can form the beginning of the description of their related conceptual domains. To illustrate, in her study of speech act verbs, Wierzbicka has concluded that one of their most important common features is the presence of the two semantic primitives i say, which are followed by a meaning component expressing an attitude. For instance, verbs like ask and order are characterized by the following part of their semantic definition: (1) (I say:) I want you to do it Groupings of such meaning components across classes of verbs reveal semantic fields. These are not necessarily the same as conceptual domains, but they may be exploited to reconstruct or finetune proposals for conceptual domains. When analyzing a set of lexical items, Wierzbicka does not just examine semantic information, by looking at their relation with semantic primitives. She also pays attention to the syntactic patterns displayed by the linguistic items, and furthermore orders the semantic information in more encompassing scripts or frames, which may in turn be linked to more general cultural scripts which have to do with norms of behavior. She therefore offers an explicit and systematic version of the qualitative method of analysis for finding a close equivalent of conceptual domains. This type of analysis may be compared with semantic field analysis by scholars such as Kittay (1987, 1992), who proposes a distinction between lexical fields and content domains. As Kittay writes: “A content domain is identifiable but not exhausted by a lexical field” (1987: 225). In other words, lexical fields can provide an initial point of entry into content domains (or conceptual domains). Yet their analysis does not provide a full view of conceptual domains, and this is not what is claimed by Wierzbicka and her associates either. As is aptly pointed out by Kittay (1992), “A content domain may be identified and not yet articulated [by a lexical field, GS],” which is precisely what may happen by means of novel metaphor (Kittay 1992: 227). Kittay’s analysis of the structure of semantic fields also requires attention to the role of ordered paradigmatic sets like synonymy, partial synonymy, incompatibility, converses, as well as of syntagmatic relations. But semantic fields or domains are not quite the same as conceptual domains, as is hinted by both NSM research and semantic field research itself. However, it still remains true that cognitive linguists have typically approached the identity and structure of conceptual domains through the structure of language. The type of research discussed above is one example of how analysis of part of the conceptual structure of metaphor in grammar may proceed when introspective methods are adopted for the collection of the verbal data that give access to the conceptual


domain in question. The qualitative analysis is highly explicit about the employment of linguistic and encyclopedic information of the lexical items analyzed. The level of generalization at which the semantic and by implication conceptual structures are placed, however, is not thematized and inductively emerges from the data.

. Observation There are other methods for validating proposals that a particular set of language items is related by means of an underlying relation between conceptual domains. As we have noted before, much of the work done by Sweetser (1990) and some of her followers (e.g., Haser 2000) is based on what is available from dictionaries. One notable study in this area is the one by Goossens et al. (1995) on conventionally metaphorical expressions for linguistic action, which is couched in suitably cognitive-linguistic terminology in that all of the underlying meanings are seen as part of conceptual domains (instead of semantic fields, as in the previous section). The first operational question in a linguistic approach to the study of the conceptual domain of linguistic action pertains to the selection of the relevant linguistic data (Vanparys 1995). Goossens and his colleagues collected all of their data from the Longman Dictionary Of Contemporary English, a general usage dictionary based on corpus research. Their method of data collection used a set of defining terms for metalinguistic words such as accuse, beg, and ask. The set of defining terms was constructed on the basis of a pilot study which set out from the NSM definitions of the 240 speechact verbs listed in Wierzbicka (1987), which was applied in an automatic search of the entire dictionary for words defined by them. All expressions defined by one term were then grouped. For instance, the defining term secret brought together a whole set of expressions, including metaphorical ones like leak, leak out, let the cat out of the bag, and so on. This first selection then had to be manually filtered to get rid of items which, for instance, contained example sentences that happened to contain a metalinguistic term but did not have anything to do with the meaning of the headword. The final result was a list of 1916 entries. The reason why this study can be said to be based on observation is that data collection takes place by observing which linguistic items have been analyzed in which ways by other linguists, or have been used in which ways by other language users. This is different than Wierzbicka (1992). The second operational question has to do with the level of generality at which a conceptual domain can be pitched. This question does not appear to have played a role in the research. This is perhaps because this is a publication from 1995, which is when the theme of levels of abstraction was just beginning to emerge in the theoretical debates. Instead, the level of generality was inductively determined, or so it seems, but the semantic nature of the defining terms, as in the NSM approach discussed in the previous section. The third operational question concerns the use of the linguistic and encyclopedic information attaching to the linguistic items for the purpose of reconstructing an



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Table 7.2 Three illustrations of metalinguistic metaphors from Vanparys (1995) Defining term

Dictionary entries defined by defining term

Metalinguistic metaphor

Secret

leak, leak out, let the cat out of the bag, spill, spill the beans chalk out, chart, delineate, depict, illustrate, picture, portray, sketch barge into, break in on, break into, burst in on, butt in, chime in, cut in, get in, horn in, push in, put in

to make known is to make visible to make known is to make visible a conversation is a container

Describe Interrupt

underlying conceptual domain. A systematic survey of the source domains showing up in these 1916 entries led to an inventory of about a dozen major source domains (Vanparys 1995). These clusters of linguistic items being related by one domain were produced by selecting all words that had one or more defining features in common. This is much in the way in which Wierzbicka recommends the analysis of semantic domains, by finding common semantic primitives between lexical items. It is also much in the way that Croft discusses the possibility for any semantic feature acting as a profile as also being able to act as a conceptual domain. Attention was also paid to the syntactic, pragmatic, and encyclopedic dimensions of words. For instance, it was observed that nouns denoting a linguistic expressions often function as objects of make (syntactic information). Or encyclopedic information is invoked when Vanparys explains that “Another way of changing objects is to make them larger or smaller by expanding or compressing, or by adding or removing parts” (1995: 15), which accounts for the possibility that we can amplify ideas or compress reports. The discussion does not make a systematic distinction between the contribution of the various dimensions, however. Zooming in on data analysis as opposed to data collection, Vanparys (1995) provides three examples in which one defining term aggregates a number of lexical entries which then “reveal” an underlying metaphor (see Table 7.2). The methodological question is whether all analysts would arrive at the same identification and labeling of the source and target domains. This might clearly be tested by asking independent analysts to examine samples of the data and then procuring some measure of interanalyst agreement. But this weaker side of the final stage of the data analysis is balanced by the controlled management of the data collection and prior first stages of data analysis. Another example of a cognitive-linguistic analysis that is based on the dictionary which leads on to a discrimination between two conceptual domains is the work by Mary Ellen Ryder (1994). She focused on one section of the morphology of language as a synchronic lexico-grammatical system, analyzing over 1,600 established noun-noun compounds taken from the American Heritage and the American Heritage Word Frequency Book. One result of this research is a series of ‘linguistic templates’ that are modeled as a combination of two conceptual domains receiving a specific interpretation (1994: 97–103):

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

(2) Location Y + X = X located in/at Y Examples: camp stool, altarpiece, countrywoman, seaman, schoolroom, etc. (3) Y + Container X = X that characteristically holds Y Examples: suitcase, teapot, ice bag, saucepan, etc. (4) Domestic Animal + Human = a Human that raises/tends/trains Domestic Animal Examples: horseman, cattleman, poultryman, sheepman, goatboy, etc. (5) Vehicle/Machinery + Human = a Human that operates Vehicle/Machinery Examples: boatman, cabman, trainman, ferryman, busman, etc. (6) Body Part + Clothing/Jewelry = Clothing/Jewelry worn on Body Part Examples: headband, necktie, earmuffs, breastplate, neckerchief, etc. (7) Body Part + Non-Clothing = Non-clothing that is operated by/used on Body Part Examples: foot pedal, foot brake, handcart, hand soap, toothbrush, etc. (8) Animal + Carnivorous Animal = Carnivorous Animal that eats/hunts Animal Examples: bee fly, bee moth, bee louse, bird dog, boarhound, buckhound, foxhound, wolfhound, elkhound, buffalo wolf, fox terrier, buffalo fly, mouse hawk (9) Animal1 + Animal2 = Animal2 resembling Animal1 Examples: tiger shark, kangaroo rat, mule deer, elephant seal, catbird, dogfish, spider monkey, mole rat, spider wasp The selection of the linguistic items going into the data analysis is therefore only constrained by the morpho-syntactic condition that the compound has to be noun-noun. Each of the resulting templates involves a combination of two conceptual domains, some of which are extremely broad and general, such as animal, human, location, while others are extremely specific, such as clothing/jewelry. The question about the level of abstraction at which the two related domains are pitched seems to be dictated by the nature of the data, again, this time as they have been grouped by the intuitions of the analyst. Thus, the actions of ‘operating’ and ‘wearing’ are more specific than the relations of ‘being located at’ or ‘resembling’. And when it comes to the third operational issue, the role of the four information dimensions of the parts of the distinct lexical items, it seems evident that the most important role is assigned to semantic and encyclopaedic information, at the expense of syntactic and pragmatic information (but, of course, syntactic information has been fixed to the nominal compound pattern). This study demonstrates that the combination of two conceptual domains in one language form does not necessarily involve a cross-domain, metaphorical mapping. Most of the connections between the two domains involve a shared relation to an encompassing event schema, which may be seen as a specific class of conceptual frames (Ryder 1994: 140; cf. Mandler 1984). The connection between the concepts from the two domains is mostly explained as a relation: ‘operated by/used on’, ‘worn on’, and so on. This suggests that the interpretation of the relation between the two parts of nom-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

inal compounds is based on contiguity rather than on similarity. It would support the suspicion that much of language use is just as dependent on metonymy as it may be on metaphor. The only conspicuous exception to the tendency for metonymic instead of metaphorical mappings between two domains would be template (9). It offers an interesting case, in that the mapping between two domains of animals can be seen as metaphorical, on the basis of an image mapping. The advantage of the use of a dictionary as a source for data collection by means of observation is self-evident. A wide range of data is included so that proposals for patterns are not too biased to the personal experience and memory of individual linguists who imagine their own examples. The resulting differentiation between various domains may moreover be regarded as the consequence of an optimal sorting of the data according to relevant criteria: some domains appear to be more popular for nounnoun compounding than others, and an encompassing and exhaustive system based on logical possibilities might be less appropriate for capturing the differences between the actual data. This is hence an inductive approach, based on a large sample of data, which leads to a list of domains and their combinations that is rather practical. The degree of specificity of the conceptual domains seems to depend on the degree of specificity of the relation dominating the event schema. However, this approach also leads to such strange conceptual domains as nonclothing in template 7. Of course, the label of this domain is intended to serve a practical function, as a contrast with the label of domain 6, but all the same this is where questions about the nature of the conceptual domains begin to arise. What is more, all of the other domain labels can be seen to exhibit an experiential connection, but this is problematic for the one of non-clothing, whose basis seems to lie in an analytical contrast that is primarily relevant to the researcher. For conceptual domains (as opposed to lexical-semantic ones), practical approaches to the differentiation of domains should at least have a consistent orientation towards the use of domains by language users. We have seen how dictionaries may be an excellent tool for the study of such nounnoun compounds as the ones examined by Ryder, because these are conventionalized lexemes with signals for one or two domains as the case may be. However, words that do not display this type of double morphological structure require different methods of examining whether they can be conventionally linked to two domains. Dictionaries may indeed be a good means to do so, since they may list various senses belonging to distinct domains in the way that Goossens has exploited the equivalent of semantic primitives. However, it is now time to turn to corpus work as another use of observation to identify the conceptual domains related to metaphorical linguistic forms in grammar. Deignan (1999c; cf. 2005a) examines the metaphorical transfer of paradigmatic sense relations (synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy) for a number of words, such as deep, clean, and sweet. To give just one example, the literal antonyms of these words are shallow, dirty, and sour. The question is whether these systematic oppositions in the basic domain of meaning are carried over for all metaphorical uses of these words.

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

Table 7.3 Metaphorical senses of literal antonyms LEXEME

CITATIONS OF ANTONYMOUS METAPHORICAL SENSES

CITATIONS OF NON-ANTONYMOUS METAPHORICAL SENSES

Deep

Sometimes we need to ask deep questions, ones that no one else has dared to voice.

She must also overcome the deep prejudice against women which exists on racing’s workshop floor.

Shallow

. . . her lavish but shallow lifestyle.

Clean

Won’t she become bored with the shallow questions and glib answers. I was glad we were playing clean cricket.

Dirty

Terry is not a dirty player.

‘Second-hand’ is no longer a dirty word.

Sour

. . . our new art teacher, a Mr. Brine, a sour, quiet man who growled at the whole class. Many of these killers are frequently glib and superficially charming, helpful, sweet and kind.

He accused Dr FitzGerald of being sour because he never made it.

Sweet

He left power with a clean conscience.

Perhaps in a couple of years she too would have a sweet little granddaughter like that.

This might be predicted if knowledge about contrastive relations in the source domains of depth, cleanliness, and taste corresponds with knowledge about the contrasts in the target domain, so that we can employ that source domain knowledge to guide our conventionalized ways of speaking about those target domain areas of experience. Deignan’s findings offer mixed support for the systematic influence on the language system by the metaphorical conceptual system. Consider Table 7.3 (from Deignan 1999c: 323). When we look at the first set of items, it is common for people to exploit the opposition between deep and shallow when it comes to questions, but they do not do so when they talk about prejudices, which are only deep, or lifestyles, which are only shallow. The linguistic exploitations of conceptual structures are sometimes systematic, but sometimes partial. This is not just important for the description of the grammar of English in terms of conventionalized senses, or polysemy. It also reveals the precise nature of the conceptual domains of depth, cleanliness, and taste when they are applied in the analysis of these lexical items. Apparently, the relevant aspects of these domains are used in only some circumstances, and not in all which are possible in principle. Corpus work may therefore be a subtle tool for the refinement of cognitive-linguistic descriptions of conceptual domains, and may raise questions about why some of these potential applications remain unused. This example offers a concrete demonstration of the more general view that a conceptual domain is not the same as its reflection in language. The advantage of corpus work over dictionary data is that it takes the linguist away from selected data which have been analyzed from an idealizing, often practical perspective for a specific user audience. Corpus analysts have access to a wider range

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

of usage data which are attested manifestations of grammar. Such a corpus approach can for instance test whether all potentially metaphorical mappings that are predicted by the reconstruction of two domains by the cognitive linguist are indeed realized by language users, and, in particular, which of these display sufficient degrees of frequency to be called grammatically conventional. The advantage of a dictionary, however, is that it provides labels of semantic domains in the form of sense descriptions produced by independent analysts; this also solves, in a practical way, the question of the level of generality at which a domain for a particular set of words needs to be pitched. Analysis hence seems to be less dependent on the individual researcher.

. Manipulation The identification of conceptual domains that are related to metaphor in grammar may also be carried out by eliciting information from informants. The goal of such research would be to provide a description of the conceptual structure of those domains that may be relevant to the analysis of conventionalized language forms in grammar that are motivated by metaphor. The language items need to be collected and analyzed separately from the information about the conceptual domains, as we have seen in the previous chapter. When such an analysis of the linguistic forms of grammar is available, it can guide further research into the conceptual structures that may lie at the basis of the semantic relations between the linguistic forms. An example of such an investigation is Gibbs and Matlock (2001), who examined the conceptual structure of the notion of ‘to make’ in order to throw further light on the polysemous structure of the verb to make. In the first stage of their study, they performed a cognitive-linguistic analysis of frequent uses of the verb in natural discourse, producing a distinction between eight different senses. These were taken as lexico-grammatical forms, comparable with the sort of schematic structures proposed by construction grammarians (Brugman 1988; Fillmore 1988; Goldberg 1995); that is, they are form-meaning units pairing a particular syntagm (in most cases, NP make NP) with a particular constructional meaning. In this sense, our make-constructions reflect various conventionalized uses of make. (Gibbs & Matlock 2001: 226)

This suggests that their cognitive-linguistic analysis is firmly oriented towards the area of the symbolic analysis of the linguistic forms of grammar. Each of the eight senses of make was interpreted as highlighting different conceptual properties of the grammatical constructions in which the verb was used. Thus, most senses led to a construction in which a state change of the patient could be observed, as in (10): (10) John made a mess of the cake

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

However, some senses led to constructions with more specific conceptual properties. For instance, in (11), (11) Fred made a dent in the wall there is a perceivable end result of a particular action or event. When these eight senses were conceptually analyzed in this way, it appeared that a limited set of concepts was able to account for the various make-constructions and their senses. This result of the linguistic analysis formed the input to the second stage of Gibbs and Matlock’s study, the independent conceptual analysis of the concept ‘to make’. The central conceptual properties of ‘make’ following from the cognitive-linguistic study included the following list: intention, human effort, end result of action, language implied, temporary state, inherent property, necessary ingredient, inclusion, and substitution. These concepts were subjected to further conceptual analysis intended to reveal their own properties, by means of informant judgments. For each distinct concept related to ‘make’, a list of test items was constructed with a range of diverging concepts presented as lexical items, and participants had to score these concepts on a 7-point scale for their degree of relatedness to the relevant ‘make’ concept. Thus, for the list examining the conceptual properties of intention, the item thief received an average score of 6.60, indicating that it displayed a close relation with intention. The item bowl, by contrast, received a mean rating of 1.09, indicating that it has a weak relation with intention. This suggests that participants have clear intuitions about which words, concepts, and entities in the world, such as thieves and bowls, display a particular conceptual property, such as intention. To rephrase this in the context of the present chapter, people have clear intuitions about the relation between a concept (thief, bowl) and a particular dimension (intentionality) of a conceptual domain (to make). This knowledge about conceptual structures may be revealed by directly accessing informants’ intuitions, as in the study by Gibbs and Matlock. Such informant research can start out from a model of people’s knowledge which is the result of the cognitive-linguistic analysis of language patterns. But it is important to note, as Gibbs and Matlock explicitly do, that speakers’ conceptual knowledge of the entities functioning as arguments of make was examined independently from their intuitions about the meanings of make. This research strategy is essential, in our view, if psychologists and cognitive linguists are to empirically demonstrate motivated links between conceptual knowledge (and embodied experience) and linguistic structure and behavior. (Gibbs & Matlock 2001: 230)

Provided these conditions are met, the conclusions for a particular conceptual domain may then be exploited in further research examining people’s judgments about the acceptability or conventionality of a range of linguistic expressions of the domain in question, which would lead us back to informant research about metaphor in the linguistic forms of grammar, as discussed at the end of the previous chapter. And this is

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

what Gibbs and Matlock did, too, in the third and last stage of their study. The findings of the second, conceptual stage of their study hence gave them some well-validated experimental materials for research on grammar by manipulation, in which grammatical and ungrammatical expressions with make could be constructed and divided over experimental conditions. Alternatively, of course, results like the ones discussed above may also be treated as findings about conceptual structures in their own right. They would offer complementary, perhaps converging evidence about the content and structure of conceptual domains as proposed by introspective or observational studies. In such a case, however, it would become more important to justify how the various test items related to the nine targeted ‘make’ concepts were selected for rating by informants. Their number, coverage of the domain and others domains, and their representativeness might all require more methodological justification. It is important to point out that this may be less problematic if researchers collect these conceptual data for the subsequent construction of experimental materials that need to drive apart linguistic constructions with varying degrees of acceptability. The Gibbs and Matlock study is another example of a study utilizing rating scales. It should be clear, again, that such scales provide clear quantitative data that can be analyzed without a problem by means of standard statistical techniques. This degree of simplicity in the stage of analysis, however, is only possible if the stage of data collection is well motivated by the experimental design. The focus on the eight ‘make’ concepts and the construction of the testing booklets with the ranges of test items requires a lot of preparation and prior analysis which is less quantitatively based. Collecting informant data about conceptual properties of domains is possible and useful as a means to validate or support conceptual analyses produced by introspection or observation. However, it should also be acknowledged that such experimental methods are time-consuming and require a lot of data for a fairly restricted and specifically targeted set of phenomena. This may partly explain why not many cognitive linguists have collected informant data about every possible mapping which may play a role in the motivation of metaphorical meaning in grammar. The strength of such studies as Gibbs and Matlock (2001; cf. Gibbs, Beitel, Harrington, & Sanders 1994 for another example), therefore, seems to lie above all in their strategic use for theoretical or methodological purposes. They are eminently suitable as case studies with the express idea of testing or validating analyses produced by other methods.

. Conclusion This chapter is concerned with the first stage of providing an answer to question Q3, When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized potentially metaphorical linguistic form count as metaphorical? This first stage addresses the demarcation and description of two underlying conceptual domains which may form the basis for the two metaphorically related senses of the polysemous linguistic form. Such concep-

Chapter 7. Conceptual structures in grammar (1): Domains 

tual domains organize the conceptual information that is needed to set up the complex mapping between the two senses which is usually involved in metaphorical polysemy. The nature of that mapping itself will be discussed in the next chapter. When researchers aim to delimit a conceptual domain for finding metaphor in grammar, they are addressing an issue which is difficult to observe independently. For linguists and other students of language, it hardly makes sense to attempt the demarcation of a conceptual domain without considering its relation to language, and, in the present case, lexico-grammar. They should naturally pay close attention to the linguistic materials which are expressive of such content domains. The difficulty of identifying conceptual domains, therefore, lies in the conceptualization of its relationship with the identification the linguistic forms that are presumed to be manifestations of that domain. Methodological control over handling this relationship involves crossing two areas of research that are in principle independent, and few researchers have explicitly taken this issue into account. We have seen that some studies employing the method of manipulation form an exception to this trend. The collection of meta data from informants, about what is included and what is not in a conceptual domain, presents a radically different alternative to what is usually done in cognitive linguistics and other linguistic approaches. It can help to drive apart what people know about particular conceptual domains on the one hand and what people think are conventional linguistic expressions related to such conceptual domains on the other. These studies collecting meta data by manipulation might act as an inspiration to those researchers who favor the more traditionally popular methods in linguistics, of observation and introspection. Observational and introspective methods typically collect verbal data in order to reconstruct the conceptual structures of domains. These methods may be improved by explicitly focusing on the relevant set of linguistic data, but then these data need to be established independently and by explicit procedures that do not refer to conceptual domains. Less typical observational or introspective methods may collect nonverbal or meta data; they may be improved by explicitly aiming at collecting other manifestations of the relevant conceptual structures than language, as in visuals, behavior, or cultural manifestations of thought. The connection of these data to the relevant domain then requires explicit justification. Whichever strategy is chosen, the autonomy from metaphor in grammar needs to be explained, so that it remains possible to examine the relationship between metaphor in ‘thought’ versus language on the basis of two sets of independently collected data. When the approach via language is chosen, as is customary in cognitive linguistics, much depends on the collection of the grammatical and lexical data that are relevant to the issue in hand. Wierzbicka prefers an approach via introspection whereas corpus linguists would probably opt for an approach via observation. Data elicited from informants would have special relevance in that they reflect the immediate availability or accessibility or salience of a particular set of linguistic items or senses to the language user. It seems to me that each of these sets of data have their own use, with introspective and observational approaches having largely comparable targets. When

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

observational approaches via corpus-linguistic techniques are used to check the validity of some introspective and or manipulative studies of conceptual domains, however, it turns out that not all imagined linguistic manifestations of particular conceptual domains are equally frequent or popular, so that questions may be raised about the inclusion of their conceptual equivalents in reconstructions of the postulated underlying conventionalized cross-domain mappings. Another factor in a linguistic approach to conceptual structure has to do with the analysis of these grammatical and lexical items as indications of underlying conceptual structures in source and target domains. I have shown how various dimensions of analysis need to be taken into account. Most importantly, analyses of conceptual domains crucially depend on the syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and encyclopedic properties of the linguistic items under analysis. The qualitative analysis of these aspects covary with the number of other linguistic items that are being considered, as well as the primary or compound level of abstraction at which they are going to be compared (cf. Vervaeke & Kennedy 1996). This is a complication for the identification of conceptual domains which has not been sufficiently addressed. It would be in the spirit of the cognitive-linguistic enterprise to collect converging evidence from other sources than language for the precise nature and content of the conceptual domains related to the senses of polysemous language forms. This has not happened much yet, but one avenue which might be followed would be to examine the nature of the two distinct conceptual domains involved in a conceptual metaphor in isolation from each other. Independently collected data – from informants, from nonverbal behavior and culture which might reflect such domains, or from independent conceptual analyses such as WordNet – would provide a neutral starting point for the further investigation of a mapping from one of those domains, acting as a source, to the other, acting as a target. This would also make maximal use of the possibilities of the deductive approach which is so characteristic of cognitive linguistics. The conventionalized conceptual systems which have been discussed in this chapter form the bridge between polysemy and metaphor. Polysemy is the synchronic result of diachronic tendencies in grammar which are explained by processes of meaning extension based on metaphor and metonymy, but also of generalization and specialization. In all of these processes, meaning transfer or mapping is held to take place from one content domain or conceptual domain to another. When the mapping is based in some form of nonliteral similarity, the meaning relation is taken to be metaphorical. We will now proceed to the second stage of finding conceptual metaphor in grammar, the nature of the mapping between the domains that were the topic of the present chapter.

chapter 

Conceptual structures in grammar (2) Mappings

The detection of two conceptual domains that are conventionally related by distinct senses in lexico-grammar, such as concrete versus abstract, or human versus animal, does not necessarily mean that the domains are related by a metaphorical mapping. Two related domains can also be found to be associated as cause and effect, or producer and produced, and these connections typically do not produce metaphor but metonymy. That is why the second stage of finding metaphor in the conceptual structures related to grammar pertains to determining the nature of the mapping between the two conceptual domains detected, in order to make a distinction between metaphor, metonymy, and other conceptual relations, which may all motivate the observed and conventional sense relations for the linguistic forms. This second stage completes the process of trying to find an answer to the question formulated in Chapter 1 for area 3: Q3: When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? I have emphasized that metaphor and metonymy are not mutually exclusive. Two distinct domains may be simultaneously seen as exhibiting a relationship of nonliteral similarity as well as a relation of contiguity. Even though two concepts or subdomains may be contiguously related within one encompassing conceptual structure, producing metonymy, they may still also be sufficiently distinct for them to be considered as exhibiting a mapping between two conceptual domains that is based in nonliteral similarity, generating metaphor. This may be particularly relevant for the relation between physical and mental domains in primary metaphors, where mental experiences correlate with sensori-motor experiences so that the sensori-motor experiences may provide a contiguous point of access to the mental ones (metonymy), but where these mental experiences may also be seen as analogous to the physical experiences (metaphor). In order to find metaphor in grammar, the relation between the two conceptual domains has to be tested for nonliteral similarity irrespective of the role of contiguity. We consequently need more criteria than just two domains for finding metaphor in the conceptual structures of grammar. Two domains may be related in more than one way (such as similarity and contiguity); and they may be seen either as part of one encompassing frame or as two contrasted domains. Deciding about the nature of the

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

mapping between the two domains in this way is the second and final step in finding metaphor in the conceptual structures of grammar.

. Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach .. The synchronic dimension A detailed cognitive-linguistic study of cross-domain mappings with attention to the nature of the separate conceptual domains and the precise details of their relation is Kövecses’ (2000) study of emotions (cf. 1986, 1988, 1990). Over two decades, linguistic data were collected to suggest that emotions are conceptualized as internal pressure, an opponent, a wild animal, a social superior, a natural force, a trickster, insanity, fire, hunger, physical agitation, a burden, and physical force (2000: 63). These various conceptualizations of emotions, Kövecses argues, turn out to be specific instantiations of one general conceptual metaphor, emotions are forces. This metaphor has been postulated inductively after considering a wide range of diverging data, mostly linguistic. Once the general conceptual metaphor is formulated, it can function deductively to finetune the more detailed conceptual analyses of the particular instantiations listed above. Each of the specific metaphors has since been shown to exhibit properties that can be related to the conceptual structure of the general mapping. This approach facilitates the necessary selection, ordering, and connecting of the conceptual elements in the two domains of emotion and force, since one unifying model is presupposed. Thus, for each particular metaphor, Kövecses (2000) argues, there is an agonist with a force tendency, there is an antagonist with a force tendency, and there is a resultant action. When this schema is applied to emotion is an opponent and to emotion is a wild animal, the result looks as displayed in Table 8.1 (Kövecses 2000: 69–70). The specific conceptual metaphor emotion is an opponent is held to account for the following conventionalized metaphorical senses of a number of ‘opponent’ words (2000: 69): (1) a. b. c. d.

He was seized by emotion. He was struggling with his emotions. I was gripped by emotion. She was overcome by emotion.

A check in the Macmillan dictionary shows that all four words appear to be polysemous between concrete and abstract senses. In these examples, the nature of the target domain of emotions is activated and controlled by contextualizing the polysemous words in sentences with the word emotion(s). Whether all four concrete senses of the target words can be equally legitimately grouped as ‘opponent’ senses, however, is a moot point. The items struggle and overcome clearly involve opponents when their more basic senses are examined. But the items seize and grip do not necessarily presup-

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

Table 8.1 Two instances of emotions are forces 8.1.a emotion is an opponent Metaphorical Mapping

Agonist’s Force Tendency

Antagonist’s Force Tendency

Resultant Action

Source Opponent in a struggle

Opponent 1 opponent 1’s attempt to resist opponent 2

either opponent 2 wins or opponent 1 wins

Target Emotion

Rational self Self ’s attempt to try to maintain control

Opponent 2 opponent 2’s attempt to cause opponent 1 to give in to his force Emotion the emotion causing the self to lose control

self either loses or maintains control

8.1.b emotion is a wild animal Metaphorical Mapping

Agonist’s Force Tendency

Antagonist’s Force Tendency

Resultant Action

Source Opponent in a struggle [sic] Target Emotion

Master to hold animal back

Animal to get away from master

either animal gets away or master holds it back

Rational self to try to maintain emotional control

Emotion to exert force on self to lose control

self either loses control or maintains it

pose or entail opposition. One may seize or grip objects or people for a whole range of reasons, for instance to steady either oneself or the other person or thing, which goes against the idea of opposition. More central to the idea of seizing or gripping is the idea of control, either of oneself or of the other person or thing. This suggests that the items seize and grip might be better explained by an alternative conceptual metaphor, which highlights the control aspect of emotions as forces. A similar question can be raised about the linguistic items related to the mapping between the domain of emotions and social forces: (2) a. b. c. d.

He is ruled by anger. She is driven by fear. His whole life is governed by passion. Your actions are dictated by emotion.

The polysemous nature of these words can also be verified by a check in the Macmillan dictionary, and here, too, the target domain is controlled by including the relevant emotion words in the example sentences. Yet here, too, there are complications when it comes to identifying the underlying conceptual source domain. The verbs rule and

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

govern clearly have direct senses that have to do with control by a social superior, and their conventionally metaphorical application to the emotions is not in doubt. For drive, however, the question arises whether the postulated mapping holds between an emotion sense and a social superior sense. The Macmillan dictionary, for instance, also lists the following sense, with the addition that the verb often occurs in the passive, as it does here: “to provide the power that makes something move.” This sense is then illustrated by the following example: the pump is driven by an electric motor. How do we know that it is not this particular concrete sense which lies at the basis of the mapping into the domain of the emotions? After all, emotions can also be caused by physical forces, as is discussed at a later stage by Kövecses. This example illustrates the general importance of finding a homogeneous group of related polysemous items if we want to determine the nature of the crossdomain mapping. When linguistic forms are not individually tested regarding their association with both postulated source and target domain, they may be incorrectly included in a particular source domain, which obfuscates the precise identification of the mapping. This is why each and every linguistic form that is held to be potentially metaphorical also ought to be examined for its domains in the semasiological fashion which has been described in the last chapter. What are the consequences for the topic of this chapter, the details of the conceptual mapping explicated in Table 8.1a? Concentrating on the Source row of the table, the aspect of the Antagonist’s Force Tendency seems to be unproblematic: in the case of both seizing and gripping, it may be agreed that the actor fulfilling the role of Antagonist does indeed attempt to cause the Agonist to give in to his force. However, this is only so in a neutral fashion. Moreover, it certainly is not necessarily the case that the Agonist’s Force Tendency may be described as an attempt to resist the Antagonist’s Force Tendency: you may be gripped or seized in order to be staid or in order to act as support. The Resultant Action consequently does not necessarily involve an experience of winning or losing. Although some aspects of the meaning of seize and grip are compatible with the opposition scenario, both verbs are not necessarily opposition verbs. As a result, their metaphorical meaning pertaining to emotion should be analyzed with reference to a different conceptual domain than opposition, which is then mapped onto emotion. ‘Human physical force applied in taking’ might be a more apt description. This narrows the definition of the profile of seize and grip down to more detailed proportions, as would be needed for a precise description of domains along the lines of Croft (1993) and Langacker (1987). When evaluating deductive research on conceptual metaphors, various issues need to be checked. The most important question pertains to the correct classification of specific linguistic forms as expressions of the conceptual metaphor under scrutiny. Linguistic items may be compatible with a particular mapping without actually being a full expression of that mapping. This can be tested by examining each linguistic item in isolation, and by systematically checking whether all of the details of the proposed conceptual mapping indeed do apply to the metaphorical sense of the expression. This

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

can be done at higher or lower levels of abstraction. Such research is improved if more items are looked at according to the same instructions by more analysts who compare their independent findings. As long as this does not happen, deductive approaches setting out from particular conceptual metaphors can lead to incorrect classifications of linguistic forms which in turn are used to support identifications of cross-domain mappings that eventually do not adequately account for them – even if they do look consistent or compatible with part of their semantic nature.

.. The diachronic dimension The application of the cognitive-linguistic approach to the role of metaphorical and metonymic mappings between conceptual domains in the field of language change may be usefully discussed with reference to the system of English modal verbs. Louis Goossens (1999, 2000) has taken up the theme of the historical development of new (epistemic or subjective) senses for modal auxiliaries which have also retained their old (deontic) senses. An example quoted by Goossens (1999: 195) is (3): (3) She must be married When (3) is interpreted as an utterance about a social obligation, then the modal auxiliary displays a deontic sense. But when (3) is used to talk about a private conclusion, then the modal is used in its epistemic or subjective sense. The question about the historical development of epistemic from deontic senses for most modal verbs is whether it can be accounted for by metaphorical motivation. Goossens (1999, 2000) offers a critical analysis of two central theories of this diachronic development. On the one hand, there is Sweetser’s (1990) view that the development is a case of metaphor. On the other hand, there is Hopper and Traugott’s (1993) proposal that it is not due to metaphor but to metonymy. Goossens (1999, 2000) finds fault with both positions and presents an alternative account which does not see a role for metaphor or metonymy altogether. Where previous analysts either found metaphor or metonymy as a motivation for the development of new senses in English grammar, Goossens does not find any cross-domain mapping at all. Instead, he proposes that this development is due to a chain of partial sanctionings (Langacker 1987). Sweetser’s analysis (1990) claims that the patterns of diachronic meaning extension in such verbs as can/could, may/might, and must/must are to be explained by metaphorical mappings. In particular, Sweetser argues that the deontic meaning of modal verbs is a socio-physical concept, having to do with concrete forces and barriers. For instance, in You may/must do it, there is a concrete social situation in which the speaker removes a barrier so that an action becomes possible. Deontic meaning, Sweetser claims, was primary to, and could hence function as a source domain for, the epistemic meaning of modal verbs. In an epistemic use of may, as in He may have seen her, “Speaker opens a possibility in the epistemic domain for it to have been the case that ‘he saw her’ removes a knowledge barrier which could have been involved to claim

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

that he did not see her” (sic, Goossens 2000: 155). The epistemic domain is claimed to display a degree of correspondence with the deontic domain. Hopper and Traugott (1993) question the explanatory role of metaphor in this relation between distinct domains. They argue instead that the deontic is connected with the epistemic and may shade off into it, as when the meaning of willingness of will/shall (deontic sense) forebodes that something will happen in the future (epistemic sense). According to Hopper and Traugott as well as to Goossens, this is a relationship of contiguity more than of similarity. As a result, Hopper and Traugott argue that the relation between the deontic and epistemic senses of modals, and their underlying sociophysical and abstract domains, is based in metonymy, not metaphor. Yet Goossens (1999, 2000) challenges both accounts. He qualifies the two competing analyses as “cognitively acceptable”, but condemns them for failing “to find out what the details of these developments may have been in actual language use” (2000: 157). He has collected data from various stages of Old and Middle English and scrutizined the various meanings of various modal verbs in context. For the verb may and its Old-English predecessor magan, for instance, he finds that there is a gradual range of meanings shifting the locus of potency in the verb from inside the subject to an unidentified agent as well as in the judgment of the speaker. The two extremes of this scale are represented by the following two glosses from Old English: (4) a. He isn’t the lord of the possessions if he can’t distribute them b. Through the east may be signified those that turn to God when they are young: because in the east is the beginning of the day. In (4a), the locus of potency is internal to the agent of the action of distributing; this is the prototypical use. In (4b), the locus of potency is said to lie outside the action of signifying. Goossens’ analysis proposes a more refined picture of the semantic changes in modal verbs, based on a chain of steps of “partial sanctioning” in the sense of Langacker (1987). None of these steps, argues Goossens, involves metonymic or metaphorical mapping. Instead, meanings can also be extended by short-range inferences. If anything, these are more likely based on connections of contiguity than similarity. Goossens hence shows that detailed and extensive corpus research is needed to underpin plausible cognitive-linguistic models of language change. They can reveal intermediary stages of development. He thus sounds a healthy note of criticism regarding the enthusiastic deductive application of metaphor and metonymy as ubiquitous explanatory devices to patterns of polysemy which may also be explained in other ways. Of course, both Sweetser as well as Hopper and Traugott also examined linguistic data in various ways. However, what Goossens’ critique illustrates is the role of adequate data collection. In particular, attention should be paid to the appropriate degree of refinement of the search procedure. The patterns of language use as observed bottom-up in his corpus indicate more complex transitions than the simple and neat top-down accounts in terms of metonymy or metaphor, and this is the great value of doing corpus-linguistic research.

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

Goossens’ diachronic perspective on the polysemy of many English modal verbs has shown that it is possible to defend three different analyses of the same data: – – –

The first analysis says that the development was motivated by metaphor (Sweetser). The second analysis argues that the change was motivated by metonymy (Hopper and Traugott). And the third analysis claims that neither metaphor nor metonymy is involved, but that the semantic developments have to do with an extended chain of partial sanctioning (Goossens).

In all of these cases, there seems to be an interaction between the theoretical perspective of the researcher and the method applied: –

–

–

Sweetser aims to make a case for the possibility that there is a metaphorical motivation to language change. The selection of her cases across languages from a wide range of dictionaries shows that her data are compatible with this standpoint. This may be seen as a deductive approach inspired by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), which has been rewarded with what looks like a provisionally positive answer. What is relevant for grammaticalization research along the lines of Hopper and Traugott is the theoretical emphasis on the metonymic origin of ‘experiential metaphors’ (cf. Heine et al. 1991: 45–78). This is another example of the power of adopting a particular deductive approach, in this case setting out from metonymy though, and of discovering patterns in the data which lead to a positive answer to the research question, again. Goossens, by contrast, has another theoretical axe to grind, and consequently focuses on the need for precision in corpus linguistics when studying usage and patterns of polysemy between periods. He uses this theoretical and methodological approach to criticize the other deductive approaches and aims to demonstrate that these are not fine-grained enough; Goossens’alternative explanations arise inductively from his data.

Not much attention is paid to the method of doing a detailed reconstruction of the conceptual domains, their elements, and the nature of the mappings involved. Thus it is not quite clear on the basis of what criteria the epistemic and the deontic count as two distinct domains or not. Whether all analysts work with precisely the same set of conceptual elements and their domain-internal relationships is another matter which remains implicit. And the reason for selecting particular elements for metaphorical and metonymic mappings is not related to a model for all data either. These are fundamental issues if the quality of deductively-oriented metaphor research is to be guaranteed. But most important, as we have seen, is the appropriate level of detail for the collection of the linguistic data that are supposed to support the historical development of one sense into another sense as a reflection of the existence of the postulated conceptual mapping. If this does not happen, deductive research runs the risk of finding what it wants to find without properly subjecting its predictions to rigorous tests. In

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

that case, theoretical claims about conceptual metaphors may be said to be compatible with particular language data, but they have not been supported very strongly yet by solid evidence and alternative explanations may remain equally attractive.

. Conceptualization .. Defining cross-domain mappings Metaphor as a cross-domain mapping was the starting point of the cognitive-linguistic tradition in metaphor research (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). The definition suggests that, in order to test whether a particular grammaticalized expression may be motivated by metaphor, we need to look at mappings between conceptual domains that were independently identified and demarcated, presumably by the methodological means discussed in the previous chapter. The nature of cross-domain mappings has become clearer over the past decades, when an increasing amount of attention was paid to the contrast with metonymy. Lakoff (1987) defines metaphor as a mapping between two conceptual domains modeled as Idealized Cognitive Models; metonymy, by contrast, is defined as involving a mapping between two subdomains within one Idealized Cognitive Model. This has been the basis for Kövecses and Radden’s encompassing cognitive-linguistic theory of metonymy (1998; cf. Radden & Kövecses 1999). They prefer Lakoff ’s Idealized Cognitive Models approach to the one advanced by Croft (1993), which is based on Langacker’s (1987) notion of a domain matrix. Croft (1993) characterizes the difference between metaphor and metonymy as one of domain-highlighting within one domain-matrix for metonymy versus domain mapping between two domain-matrices for metaphor. His view has since been adopted and developed by other cognitive linguists working on the distinction between metaphor and metonymy (e.g. Barcelona 2000b, c, 2002). Whether the ICM approach or the domain-matrix approach is followed, the crucial distinction between metaphor and metonymy remains the same: – –

For metaphor, two distinct conceptual domains are opposed and linked by a mapping based in correspondences, or nonliteral similarity; for metonymy, two subdomains are linked by a mapping that includes identities, within the context of an encompassing conceptual domain, with one subdomain being highlighted at the expense of another.

The notion of similarity as one criterion for metaphor has been controversial in cognitive linguistics, as has been noted in Chapter 3. However, there has been no such hesitation in cognitive linguistics about metonymy and the criterion for its detection, contiguity (e.g. Radden & Kövecses 1999; Feyaerts 2000). Thus, Koch (1999) shows how contiguity as a criterion for metonymy can be handled in cognitive linguistics by putting it inside frame semantics (cf. Blank 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibañez & Díez

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

Velasco 2002). And many of these theorists have also had no qualms in opposing contiguity as a criterion for metonymy with similarity as a criterion for metaphor. The second criterion for making a distinction between metaphor conceptualized as domain mapping versus metonymy as domain highlighting has to do with the relative salience of the two domains. In metaphor, the two distinct domains are commonly more salient than the general schema that may be said to relate them – this is because they are contrasted and compared at the same time (cf. Dirven & Pörings 2002). In metonymy, it is the general schema that encompasses the two domains which is more salient – this is because the two domains are somehow contiguous or connected. That is precisely the reason why metonymy can be seen as a reference-point construction (cf. Langacker 1987, 1991) or as domain highlighting (Croft 1993, 2002; cf. Pauwels 1999): with the general schema encompassing two conceptual domains, one domain acts as point of entry providing access to another domain and their relationship within the encompassing schema; indeed, quite often the encompassing schema is identical with the target domain. It is the combination of these two criteria, of (a) similarity versus contiguity and (b) the diverging salience of the two domains in connection with an encompassing schema, that distinguishes the mappings involved in metaphor and metonymy: –

–

Metaphor is characterized by the fact that the two domains are more salient than their general schema, plus the fact that there are correspondences between the two domains which are not based in identity relations between elements of the domains, but in projected nonliteral similarities. Metonymy is characterized by the fact that the two domains exhibit a relation of inclusion within one encompassing schema, plus the fact that there is not a relevant set of correspondences defined as similarities between the two subdomains; instead, there is a set of identity relations between elements of the domains.

All of these issues and their interrelations have been thrown into relief by the recent investigation of metonymy in relation to metaphor. A connection can also be made with Warren (2002), who observes that metaphor is hypothetical or a fiction (similarity between domains as if the source domain equals the target domain), while metonymy is not (cf. Steen 1994). Yet both figures are still comparable in that they are forms of indirect meaning which are based on some relation between two conceptual domains. This was the reason why we first had to deal with the identification of the two domains in the previous chapter. We can now continue with a consideration of the differentiation between the types of mappings between the two domains. To do so, we have to examine how the two criteria of similarity and domain salience can be conceptualized and operationalized for doing empirical research on metaphor in grammar. It is useful at this point to clarify the connection with a third figure which is often connected to metaphor and metonymy, synecdoche. For instance, Koch (1999) points out that many discussions of synecdoche conflate two phenomena: on the one hand, there are part-whole figures, such as roof for ‘house’ or America for ‘USA’, which

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

should properly be seen as metonymic according to Koch; and on the other hand there are figures of generalization (e.g. bread for ‘foodstuff ’) and of specialization (e.g. mortal for ‘man’) which appear to be cases of synecdoche (p. 154). Seto (1999) adopts the same position about the distinction between synecdoche and metonymy, and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibañez and Díez Velasco (2002) restrict metonymy, along the same lines, to part-whole figures (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibañez 2000). These analyses are not only important for our view of metonymy, but also for our appreciation of other possible motivations of polysemy by relations between distinct conceptual domains, such as generalization and specialization. These can now be regarded as covered by synecdoche. Like metaphor and metonymy, synecdoche is also characterized by indirect meaning based in the presence of two domains. The two domains are also closely related, as is the case with metonymy. However, the difference between synecdoche and metonymy pertains to the restriction that the domains involved in synecdoche display a relationship of hierarchy or taxonomy (cf. Geeraerts 1997; Gentner 1983, 1989).

.. Configurations of domains and mappings: Metaphor and/or metonymy In analyzing the nature of the relation between two conceptual domains, it is helpful to recall a number of basic configurations between domains distinguished by Pauwels (1999: 259) with reference to Croft (1993) – I am numbering the five categories for ease of reference: (a) Distinct domains and mapping between them (metaphor); (b) distinct domains of which one happens to be in the matrix of the other, and mapping (metaphor); (c) single domain matrix and highlighting of a secondary domain (metonymy); (d) single domain matrix and a difference in domain prominence (metonymy); (e) and single domain matrix and highlighting of a different primary domain (literal lexical ambiguity). Each of these configurations could in principle apply to the two conceptual domains reconstructed in the previous steps of finding metaphor in grammar discussed in Chapter 7. Configuration (e), exhibiting a single domain matrix and the highlighting of a different primary domain, is illustrated by (5): (5) a. This book is heavy (‘weighs a lot’) b. This book is a history of Iraq (6) a. The Times is owned by Rupert Murdoch b. The Times hasn’t arrived yet (meaning its reporter) The examples in (5) involve two distinct domains for book, weight and content. However, since these are primary domains, the highlighting of one domain at the expense of the other presumably does not produce figurative polysemy for the lexical item

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings

book. Identification of configuration (e) between domains depends on what counts as a primary domain (cf. Paradis 2004). By contrast, (6) also involves two distinct domains of the newspaper The Times. Since it is claimed that these domains are not both primary, highlighting of one domain (employees) at the expense of the other (the company) presumably does produce figurative polysemy. Since the two domains in (6) are said to be located in a single domain matrix and since it is a secondary domain that gets highlighted, we have to do with metonymy. This is an illustration of Pauwels’ category (c). Domain highlighting, illustrated by the metonymic analysis of (6b), is the typical configuration between two domains in metonymy. A less typical variant of this situation occurs when two domains within one single domain matrix are related by a different degree of prominence, not selected for highlighting (Pauwel’s class d). The example of this situation discussed by Croft (1993) and Pauwels (1999) is : (7) We need a couple of strong bodies for our team. Since the domain of bodies is subsumed under the domain of human beings, argues Pauwels, there is no domain highlighting (which occurs as a result of novel domain selection); there is just a “subtle shift in domain prominence” (Croft 1993: 350; quoted in Pauwels 1999: 259). Where highlighting stops and prominence begins, however, is a difficult issue if it is unclear where one domain stops and another begins. The difference between the two types of metaphor distinguished at the beginning of Pauwels’ list, (a) distinct domains and mapping between them versus (b) distinct domains of which one happens to be in the matrix of the other and mapping between them, is illustrated with reference to the following example: (8) “Oh dear,” she giggled, “I’d quite forgotten.” One analysis of the verb giggle is to take it as metaphorical; this happens “In situations where the manner of speaking is conceived in terms of giggling, i.e., speaking in a particular way as if it were giggling, though actually no giggling is involved” (Pauwels 1999: 258). There is a mapping between two domains, but the complication (and the impression of metonymy) arises because the target domain (manner of speaking) and the source domain (sound of speaking) are located in the same domain matrix (speaking). This is of course a less typical manifestation of metaphor than those cases where the two conceptual domains are not located in the same domain matrix, Pauwels’ class (a) of mapping between domains – the classic group of metaphors in cognitive linguistics. Since the analysis of (8) assumes a particular configuration of the two conceptual domains within one domain matrix, an alternative analysis of (8), as potentially metonymic, is also possible. When (8) is treated as invoking a single domain matrix with highlighting of a secondary domain, it supports a metonymic analysis, to the effect that sound stands for manner of speaking. In that case, speaking is not conceptualized as if it is giggling, because it in fact is. Warren’s (1999) criterion for metaphor as fiction shows that this view of (8) is not metaphorical but metonymic. Note also



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

that in that case the salience of the encompassing domain matrix is more important than the salience of the two juxtaposed domains of sound and manner. This should be contrasted with the metaphoric interpretation of (8), which is based on a higher degree of salience of the two distinct domains as two distinct domains. One general comment has to be made about all of these examples. The illustration of various configurations between two conceptual domains by means of example sentences introduces a complication in that it gets unclear which of the above senses are conventional senses that are present in lexico-grammar. What is grammatically possible and interpretable does not have to be sufficiently conventional for it to be part of grammar. Pauwels, for instance, notes that the metaphoric and metonymic analyses of giggle above are ad hoc. His reconstruction of the domains involved in the analyses is hence not meant to apply to a conventional linguistic metaphor. The verb giggle is not conventionally three-way polysemous between literal, metonymic, and metaphorical interpretations. The same comment may apply to the example involving The Times. I have used Pauwels’ analysis to make a point about the various possible relations between conceptual domains which may underlie polysemy and related phenomena, not to suggest any further detailed implications about the grammatical status of these examples. The contribution by Pauwels (1999) continues an influential discussion begun by Goossens (1990, 1995), addressing the possibilities for interaction between metaphor and metonymy. I wish to present Goossens’ discussion in the framework of my more general assumption that metaphor and metonymy are not two extreme ends on one scale, but that they involve two separate scales, metaphor versus non-metaphor and metonymy versus non metonymy, which have to be crossed. As a result, there are clear cases of metaphor which are also not metonymic, clear cases of metonymy which are also not metaphoric, and various types of language forms which are open to an analysis as metaphor and metonymy at the same time. Thus, I have already pointed out that understanding may be conceptualized as seeing but also via seeing. Goossens’ (1990, 1995) proposal for identifying various types of interaction between metaphor and metonymy, called metaphtonymy, can be regarded as a variation on this theme. The above discussion of giggle, for instance, suggests that it can be seen from three perspectives: non-figurative (neither metaphoric nor metonymic), metonymic (reference to speech act by means of manner and sound), and metaphoric (reference to manner of speech act without sound, but as if sound). The latter phenomenon is called metaphor-from-metonymy by Goossens. It suggests that there are three conceptual domains involved in the analysis of the metaphorical meaning of giggle, which would be less typical than what happens in most cases of metaphor accounted for by the two-domain approach. Goossens distinguishes metaphor-from-metonymy from metonymy-within-metaphor, which is illustrated by such expressions as bite one’s tongue off. This expression can have a literal and a metaphorical meaning, but in the metaphorical meaning, there is a built-in metonymy, where tongue stands for the speech faculty. In such cases, too, there are three domains involved instead of the more typical case with two, which

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

would considerably complicate the analytical task of finding and testing for metaphor. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibañez and Díez Velasco (2002) have explored how Goossens’ classification of the types of interaction between metaphor and metonymy can be further developed. Barcelona (2000b, c, 2002) and Radden (2000) have offered a further analysis of this area by making a distinction between the conceptual interaction between metaphor and metonymy on the one hand and the textual co-instantiation of metaphor and metonymy on the other. At a textual level, metaphor and metonymy may interact by their sheer co-presence; but our map of the field suggests that this category of interaction between metaphor and metonymy is specific to usage, not grammar. At a conceptual level, metaphor in grammar may indeed be conceptually motivated by metonymy, as happens for most metaphors which are based in correlation in experience. Alternatively, metonymy in grammar may also be conceptually motivated by metaphor, as in most cases of idiom illustrating Goossens’ metonymywithin-metaphor. An encompassing model of the relation between metaphor and metonymy hence requires a factor which deals with two levels of analysis (linguistic and conceptual). The model should also allow for various configurations of metaphor and metonymy in grammar and usage, and this should be possible at both the levels of language and thought. This is where my map of the field may provide some guidance. Relatively autonomous parts of the research should preferably be conducted on their own terms without losing sight of the complete field, as I am suggesting here.

. Operationalization Assuming that two domains have been identified in a separate step as described in the previous chapter, the second step for finding metaphor in the conceptual structures related to grammar involves the identification of the cross-domain mapping. This includes (a) finding relevant elements of the two conceptual domains, (b) their alignment for creating correspondences, and (c) the actual determination of the nature and value of the correspondences (e.g. Veale & O’Donoghue 2000). This process in effect involves testing the possibility of superimposing a pattern of correspondence, analogy or similarity on the two domains. Such patterns may vary regarding their richness, systematicity, and a number of other properties (e.g. Gentner 1983). In cognitive linguistics and elsewhere, this kind of reconstruction or modeling has often been performed in intuitive and argumentative fashion. Computational approaches suggest how this last step of creating a cross-domain mapping for metaphor in grammar can be made more precise and controlled. Veale and O’Donoghue (2000) discuss no fewer than five computational models of metaphor and analogy as cross-domain mappings which have this very purpose: SME, or the Structure-mapping engine (Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner 1989), ACME, or the analogical constraint matching engine (Holyoak & Thagard 1989), LISA (Hummel

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

& Holyoak 1996), Tabletop (Hoffstadter & Mitchell 1988; French 1995), and Sapper (e.g. Veale, O’Donoghue, & Keane 1999). These models emphasize different aspects of building cross-domain mappings, and these may now be used for operationalizing the identification of a mapping across two independently identified domains. The first aspect involves the alignment of the domains for cross-domain mapping. One observation to be made here is that the selection and ordering of the elements in the two domains with a view to their alignment may reveal obvious gaps and redundancies within as well as between the two domains. It has been one important merit of Black’s (1962, 1973/1993) interaction theory to point out that metaphorical projection involves an interaction between source and target domain regarding their very structure for mapping. This means that the domains as identified and demarcated in the previous stage are to be regarded as tentative: they may need to be adjusted for the purpose of alignment and mapping. It would be interesting to see this stage of adjustment reported explicitly in publications to assess the extent of this issue. Finding potential correspondences between the elements of the two aligned domains is inevitably guided by a search for some form of similarity, as I have emphasized in Chapter 3. This assumption is also reflected in the computational models referred to above. One problem is that such similarity may pertain to external resemblance (or attributes) or structural resemblance (or relations) (e.g. Gentner 1982, 1983; Gentner & Clement 1988; Gentner & Toupin 1986). For instance, when clouds are compared to sponges, the mapping may concentrate on what they share in their appearance (they are round and fluffy) or on the functional relations between clouds as well as sponges with other phenomena (they can hold water and release it). Moreover, external resemblance may be found within or across modalities (Winner 1988), and relational similarity may also be found at higher-order levels or lateral levels of connections between elements (e.g. Veale & O’Donoghue 2000). For instance, in her analysis of the Rutherford analogy between the solar system and the hydrogen atom, Gentner points out that there is not just a mapping from the facts (a) that the sun is more massive than a planet and (b) that the planet revolves around the sun onto the corresponding conceptual domain of the hydrogen atom, but that (c) the very causal relation between these two facts is also mapped. The latter is a higher-level correspondence with a powerful role of its own in the (re)construction of cross-domain mappings. Decisions about the role of these various types of correspondences between domains have not been systematically reported so that their value in metaphor identification across the entire range of domains remains unclear. The search for such possible similarities between the two domains is fundamentally a matter of pattern recognition. Gentner and Markman (1993) present a review of psychological research which has demonstrated the following claims: 1. similarity involves structured pattern matching 2. similarity involves structured pattern completion 3. comparing the same item with different things can highlight different aspects of the item

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings

4. even comparisons of a single pair of items may yield multiple interpretations These are findings which pertain to general human performance, which ought to be constrained when researchers perform technical analyses of conceptual structures, if such analyses are to be seen as forms of valid and reliable measurement. Therefore two operational issues for metaphor scholars arise when conceptual elements have been found that are potential candidates for correspondences on the basis of similarity. First, there is the threshold for determining what counts as sufficient similarity. For instance, Gentner and Toupin (1986) report an experimental study of the development of analogy in children which shows that relational mappings are easier to comprehend if there is additional external similarity between the components of the mapping than when there is not. When surface similarities between the components go against the intended relational correspondences, it is even more difficult for children to identify the intended underlying relational mappings. In such cases, the similarities between the relations may not be sufficient for children to identify the correspondences, since they are being distracted by other, deliberately misleading attribute similarities. Even though this example involves a specific class of processing cross-domain mappings, it illustrates the general relevance of ascertaining the level of similarity between the elements participating in a cross-domain mapping. This problem is complicated by the possibility that levels of sufficient similarity may have to be established for different aspects of the components of the mapping, as we have seen here for attributes versus relations. When analysts cannot trust their own intuitions in this respect, other remedies will have to be looked for. Secondly, there is the opposite problem of determining when a correspondence between two domains does not count as similarity anymore but instead constitutes a case of projections between elements with the same identity. In Cameron’s (1999a) terms: how different do two concepts or two domains have to be? To illustrate this issue, consider Grady and Johnson’s (2000, 2002) discussion of the primary metaphor becoming accessible to awareness is emerging from a container. They hold that this mapping is metaphorical, because it “refers to correlations at the level of experience, and to truly metaphoric patterns of conceptualization which arise from these correlations” (2002: 540). This is because Grady and Johnson highlight the fact that there are two domains, a perceptual and a cognitive one, which are clearly not identical. Hence there is cross-domain mapping and metaphor, with nonliteral similarity between some aspects of the two domains. Yet what Grady and Johnson do not discuss is the fact that some of the crucial elements participating in the two domains are identical (an issue which does get raised in Johnson’s paper on the polysemy of see, Johnson 1999). In both the perceptual as well as the cognitive subscene, there is the same entity which does the emerging / becoming accessible to the awareness, there is the same entity which functions as a container, and there is the same entity which does the perceiving / knowing. These identities between elements in the conceptual mapping between the two domains form the very basis of the idea formulated by Grady and Johnson that becoming accessible to awareness is emerging from a container



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

is based in experiential correlation. But this situation also allows for an alternative interpretation, where becoming accessible to awareness is not like emerging from a container, but where emerging from a container stands for becoming accessible to awareness. The potential for analyzing the data as motivated by metonymy instead of metaphor is increased by focusing on the identities of the elements instead of the differences between the two subscenes of perception versus cognition. In order to identify metaphor, it is hence crucial to examine the interplay between similarities and identities of elements in cross-domain mappings. One factor in operationalizing this type of analysis of the possible relation between conceptual domains is the role of the salience of the contrast between the two domains for metaphor, versus the lack of such a contrast between two subdomains in an encompassing schema which is more important for metonymy. Thus, when the above primary metaphor is related to the following two examples, there seems to be more room for a metaphorical interpretation, because of the obvious relevance of a contrast between the concrete and the abstract: (9) a. I didn’t get much out of this article. b. There’s very little content in this paper. However, when it is related to the following example, there may also be a case for metonymic interpretation, depending on the situation in which the sentence is used, as I argued in Chapter 3: (10) Oh, I see what you wanted. For (10), it may be possible that the domains of seeing and understanding can be construed as correlated to each other as two subdomains within one encompassing schema. That relevance is an important factor here suggests, though, that these cases may be more illustrative of usage than of grammar. For grammar, we have to generalize across many of these cases of usage and decide whether both are equally conventional – only then can both analyses be accepted as equally plausible for motivating the relation between the two conceptual domains identified before. These are the most important aspects of reaching an operational definition of metaphor: 1. Decide about the relative salience of the two domains as distinct conceptual systems. Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, typically, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. 2. Decide about the necessary and sufficient degree of similarity required for a mapping, since corresponding elements between two domains may be relatively more or less similar. a. Decide about the role of types of correspondences between domains, such as external similarity versus relations, and relations versus higher-order relations.

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

b. Decide about minimal and maximal number of correspondences required for an analysis to be accepted as complete. The criteria for finding cross-domain mappings are hence the discovery of contrastive domain salience and nonliteral similarity between the elements of the domains. This points to two moments of decision, which might however be hard to keep apart and in order. Methodological research which studies the effect of separating these two moments from each other does not exist. The units of analysis to which these decisions are applied are typically concepts in their conceptual networks, which leads to sets of concepts, and to the correspondences between these concepts across domains. A good tool for studying within-domain conceptual relations might be a dictionary, a thesaurus, and conceptual networks like WordNet. To keep operational control over all of these variables while identifying the conceptual structure of a whole series of conceptual cross-domain mappings underlying conventionalized expressions in grammar seems almost impossible. But it is in fact the challenge taken up the cognitive-linguistic analyst of metaphor. That is why additional remedies, such as independent analysts, separate and repeated rounds of analysis, and exploitation of independently developed publicly accessible tools become important. But such additional measures will only begin to exert an effect if they are also incorporated in the formal research reports of the findings.

. Introspection Just as with the reconstruction of distinct conceptual domains, introspection can also help in finding correspondences between two domains. If introspection is taken as the collection of expert intuitions about the nature of particular theoretical proposals regarding the structure of mappings across two conceptual domains, then this is probably just what many cognitive linguists do. Such intuitions clearly have the status of well-informed opinions about the object of investigation. But it should also be admitted that they are not infallible and require support by other evidence collected by observation and manipulation which pertains to the same area of research. Another methodological comment is that such intuitions are also not just intuitions which are to be taken at face value as intuitions. Instead, they are also ideas which feed into the analysis of the data – the proposed cross-domain mapping. When that happens, intuitions are weighed as aspects of the analytical argument which is proposed about a particular mapping, and not all of them will survive this critical scrutiny, even if they have been collected by introspection and represent expert intuitions. Then the norms of qualitative data analysis take over from the norms of introspective data collection. It is this transition which obfuscates the methodological quality of many cognitive-linguistic publications. Since cross-domain mappings are conceptual structures which are expressed by language, this is usually how the collection of intuitions gets started. In particular, there

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

is typically a set of linguistic forms which has been recognized as potentially expressing one cross-domain mapping, and the cross-domain mapping may then tentatively be labeled as, for instance, thinking is moving or understanding is seeing. We have seen in Section 1 how this is part of the deductive approach in cognitive linguistics, which usually works by then postulating the derived conceptual metaphor in order to subsequently test whether it can explain or motivate a set of linguistic forms. The mapping may then be teased out in specific details with which the individual linguistic forms are compatible; however, not all linguistic forms are necessarily best explained by the mapping. That is why I will leave aside a closer examination of the role of the linguistic forms for the rest of this section, having acknowledged that they may motivate the initial formulation of a particular cross-domain mapping which is further introspected. Introspection can thus lead to the detailed identification of a cross-domain mapping by means of a set of correspondences. Here is an example from Lakoff and Johnson (1999a: 238), pertaining to knowledge is vision: The Mind Is A Body Thinking Is Perceiving Ideas Are Things Perceived Knowing Is Seeing Communicating Is Showing Attempting To Gain Knowledge Is Searching Becoming Aware Is Noticing An Aid To Knowing Is A Light Source Being Able To Know Is Being Able To See Being Ignorant Is Being Unable To See Impediments To Knowledge Are Impediments To Vision Deception Is Purposefully Impeding Vision Knowing From A “Perspective” Is Seeing From A Point Of View Explaining In Detail Is Drawing A Picture Directing Attention Is Pointing Being Receptive Is Hearing Taking Seriously Is Listening Sensing Is Smelling Emotional Reaction Is Feeling Personal Preference Is Taste Such a list of correspondences is typically supported with a large set of observations which have presumably been collected by introspection (memory and imagination, mostly). These anecdotal observations have a bearing on world knowledge, conceptual structure, and linguistic expression. For instance, one aspect of the mapping between thinking and perceiving is explained by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a: 239) in a paragraph dealing with our real-life experience of perspectives, angles, viewpoints, and standpoints. Another aspect is explained by two consecutive stages in the conceptual

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

scenario of looking and searching versus discovering and finding. And most aspects are explained with reference to our common ways of talking about thought and knowledge, which make use of expressions like cover-up or not being able to see the forest for the trees. These observations are fairly anecdotal, as they presumably should be, if introspection is the collection of expert intuitions. A procedure for this type of introspective data collection, however, is never reported. This is not conducive to independent replication by other experts. In research based on data collection by observation and manipulation, this would not be an acceptable way to go about data collection. Introspection is also used in a looser sense, which spills over into data analysis. This is what happens quite a lot in the area with which we are concerned here, the reconstruction of the cross-domain mappings. The expert intuitions reported as introspectively collected evidence in support of a particular mapping then also acquire the weight of arguments for an analysis. In that role, they should be presented as open for discussion on various points. This is what is often lacking. The questions raised in the previous section may provide a guide to our assessment here. One issue concerns the matter of the degree of salience of each of the two domains that are joined by the mapping. How can introspection resolve this matter? Is it possible to introspectively compare degrees of salience of various conceptual domains across the entire range, and then decide that the two domains under investigation are sufficiently salient for them to be metaphorically related? And how should it deal with the possibility of setting up an alternative explanation, for instance one in which perceiving stands for thinking, because it is a precondition for thinking? Lakoff and Johnson (1999a: 238) open their section on this metaphor with the following sentence: “We get most of our knowledge through vision.” Why have they decided that this does not give rise to a metonymic mapping in which the domain of perceiving highlights the domain of thinking with one knowledge acquisition scenario? This consideration of an alternative interpretation is an essential part of the stage of data analysis, but it is not often included in the reports of the research. A similar question may be raised about the correspondences between the elements. How have the elements been identified as part of the two domains (see previous chapter)? Is the list of correspondences and therefore the entire mapping claimed to be exhaustive and complete or can other correspondences still be added? How many of the listed correspondences do not connect similar elements on either side of the equation – as in ideas are things perceived – but identical elements, as in the identical human agents involved in both directing attention as well as pointing. These are analytical questions which should be addressed even or especially in those studies of cross-domain mappings which are based on introspective data collection. They can be tackled by collecting more introspective evidence, but this, too remains fallible as well as indecisive until it has been validated by converging evidence from observational and experimental data. Introspection is the most frequent method of data collection in cognitive linguistics when it comes to identifying the nature of the mappings between two domains.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

There are problems with this method because it spills over into data analysis, so that the collection of meta data and anecdotal observations by memory and imagination gets confused with the qualitative analysis of conceptual structures. These weaknesses may be somewhat remedied if researchers become more deliberate in addressing the nature of their decision procedures about (a) relative domain salience and (b) nonliteral similarity between elements of specific correspondences. But the collection of evidence by observation and manipulation does seem to be an inevitable desideratum.

. Observation The adoption of a corpus-linguistic method for examining the nature of cross-domain mappings in the conceptual structures of grammar inevitably begins with the collection of linguistic data. For instance, Deignan and Potter (2004) aimed to investigate whether English and Italian displayed identical or comparable metaphorical mappings from the body to other domains, including the mind, along the lines of Sweetser (1990). In doing so, they had to start with selecting a number of target words for both languages which demarcated their area of study. They focused on the nonliteral use of nose, mouth, eye and heart, and their Italian equivalents naso, bocca, occhio and cuore. These expressions were searched in one large English language corpus, the Bank of English (329 million words) and two smaller Italian corpora (35 million words). The data were restricted to the main collocates as well literal and nonliteral senses of each word, which were established by frequency as well as cross-checking with dictionaries. Then all nonliteral uses were taken apart and subjected to further study in order to determine their underlying conceptual structure. In other words, the researchers first select a set of words which clearly display a polysemic character and single out the indirect uses for further scrutiny; this reflects the area of metaphor analysis in grammar described in Chapter 6. Only then did they proceed to determine the nature of the mapping between the body-part words on the one hand and the target domains involved on the other: the target domain as well as the mapping required conceptual analysis that was separate from the preceding linguistic analysis. Moreover, the identification of the mapping was divorced from the determination of the domains, with the source domain being fixed in the human body. In analyzing the data, Deignan and Potter first concentrated on finding metaphor. They report that they found few purely metaphorical and clearly systematic mappings, but they do not explain how these decisions were reached. One example of a clear and somewhat systematic mapping, from body language to aircraft or vehicle, is illustrated by the following data: (11) a. The helicopter would land, her nose into the wind. b. The pair had driven nose to tail on the rain-soaked track. c. We’ve replaced some wide-body aircraft with narrow-body aircraft on various routes for more efficiency.

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

The authors suggest that the body parts are not human here but animal, and they take all quotations as relating to the same underlying systematic mapping. The derivation of this mapping, the specification of the source domain to animal bodies, and the relationship of all three expressions to this single mapping are not discussed. When looking for metonymy, not many clear-cut cases were found either. Instead, interactions between metaphor and metonymy seemed to be more frequent for this source domain. A number of expressions are discussed as potential candidates, for instance, essere di bocca buona, which may be literally glossed as “to be of good mouth”. This is an expression which is used to designate somebody who eats well, where mouth functions as a metonymy for eating. However, the phrase is also used more generally for persons who are easily pleased. This is taken to be the result of a metaphorical mapping, but the details of the two domains involved, and the correspondences between them, are left implicit. Other expressions that are discussed in this way are parlare a mezza bocca, follow your nose and its Italian translation equivalent, and to get back on one’s feet. Turning to metaphor from metonymy, it is noted that some fixed phrasal expressions may be three-way polysemous, between a direct meaning, a metonymic meaning, and a metaphoric meaning. Attention is drawn to idiomatic expressions which may be given a literal or two more broadly figurative interpretations, including bite one’s lip, lick one’s lips, turn one’s back, put a brave face, look over one’s shoulder, send/feel a shiver down one’s spine, breathe/give a sigh of relief. Thus, one may literally bite one’s lip only, or one may bite one’s lip and not say anything (metonymy), or one may not say anything without biting one’s lip (metaphor from metonymy). Deignan and Potter argue that the presumed motivation of indirect meaning by bodily experience seems to be borne out by many of these data. They draw attention to understanding is seeing and to the human body representing people’s most immediate concerns, as when you cannot see beyond the end of your nose, which is grammatical in English and Italian (and Dutch, for that matter). In both languages, the eye is connected with attention while the nose is connected with instinct, all of which supports the analysis by Sweetser (1990; cf. Ibarretxe-Antuñano 1999; Lakoff & Johnson 1999a). Subtle differences between the two languages are also observed, such as when English mouth has a more restricted range of application than Italian bocca, which may be applied to a wider range of feelings and behavior than those to do with food and eating. Moreover, differences in possible lexicalizations of the same conceptual metaphor also occur, as when keeping the mouth shut in English is typically expressed by the verb shut, while Italian appears to allow for a wider range of expressions. Adopting a corpus-linguistic approach to the description of cross-domain mappings for the explanation of polysemy in grammar may hence be a productive strategy. It helps in collecting relevant data for the verification of the original proposals. It reveals details of both a conceptual and a linguistic nature which were not known before. And it throws into relief the complexities of the interaction between metaphor and metonymy which turn out to characterize a great deal of actual language use. If the

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

procedures for deciding about metaphorical and metonymic interpretations become more explicit and their application is integrated as a natural part of the research report, this type of research will become even more valuable. It is a small step from Deignan and Potter’s research to the work done by Rosalind Moon (1998) on fixed phrases. She illustrates the category of conventionalized polysemous fixed phrases with examples like abandon ship, tread water, and clear the air. These phrases can each be used, as fixed phrases, in a direct way as well as in an indirect way. These expressions are like polysemous lexical items, in that they have to be disambiguated by context regarding their direct and indirect sense. Moon regards the indirect sense of these phrases as metaphorical. This would mean that we have two domains that are sufficiently distinct to be contrasted and compared, producing some form of similarity between them. However, the question arises whether the two meanings of the expressions are related by similarity (metaphor) or by class-inclusion (synecdoche). The possibility of a metaphorical relation between the two meanings depends on whether the two domains are comparable but different. This is a possibility with at least one of these expressions, abandon ship. The Macmillan dictionary offers the following two sense descriptions: 1. to leave a ship or boat because it is dangerous to stay 2. to leave an organization because you think it will fail There are correspondences between ships or boats on the one hand and organizations on the other, between the negative states of danger versus impending failure that the respective entities are in, between the action of leaving a boat and leaving an organization, and between the causal relations between the negative states of the entities and the actions of leaving. But when we turn to the expression tread water, the situation seems to be different. The Macmillan offers the following two sense descriptions: 1. to not make progress, especially because you have to wait for something else to happen first 2. to stay upright in deep water by moving your legs and arms so that your head stays out of the water Here, it is more difficult to see the relation between the two senses as belonging to two contrasting but comparable domains. Instead, the first sense seems to offer a more general description of a scenario, of which the second sense seems to be a possible instantiation. The indirect meaning (sense 1) seems to have been abstracted from the direct meaning (sense 2) by a process of generalization, not comparison. This conceptual structure is more like synecdoche than metaphor. When the expression tread water is used indirectly in actual discourse, it is of course applied to a concrete situation in which there is a contrast between the original source domain and the topic domain of the discourse, and this may increase the potential for having a metaphorical experience of the mapping. However, in abstracto, as in the dictionary, the indirect meaning

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

seems to be much more general and skeletal than is the case with the indirect meaning of abandon ship. The decision for claiming tread water as metaphorical needs to take these difficulties into account, at least, if the descriptions of the various phrases by the Macmillan dictionary are taken as valid. It is easier to agree about the metaphorical status of fixed comparisons between humans and animals. They are also part and parcel of grammatically conventionalized phrases, including such cases as blind as a bat, busy as a bee, dead as a dodo, and stubborn as a mule (Moon 1998: 196). The question arises at which level of conceptual structure these mappings have to be characterized: people are animals, or people are bats / bees / dodos / mules. As conventionalized similes, they do not only display an explicit opposition between two domains, but they also exhibit a lexical signal for the need to construct a cross-domain mapping that is based on some form of similarity. These cross-domain mappings in grammar are considerably easier to find than many others. A third example of corpus work on conventionalized phrases is Charteris-Black (2001) on the figurative use of blood in English phraseology. He first proposes what he calls three conceptual keys, or conceptual metaphors and metonymies, and then goes on to check their possible realizations in the Bank of English. The keys are blood for ancestry, blood for life, and blood is temperament. They are inspired by cognitive-linguistic work on conceptual metaphors for the emotions, but their exact provenance nor conceptual structure is not explained. Armed with these conceptual keys, Charteris-Black considers expressions like in your blood, blue blood, own flesh and blood, and so on. Focusing on the metaphorical key blood is temperament, Charteris-Black finds the following phrases: bad blood; in cold blood; blood sweat and tears; make your blood boil; sweat blood; blood and thunder; a rush of blood (to the head); make your blood run cold / freeze; taste blood. For each expression, he proposes an interpretation of the relation between the language and the presupposed underlying conceptual mapping. We have seen how observational methods may facilitate the study of metaphorical mappings in conceptual structures related to grammar in various ways. CharterisBlack (2001) sets out with a combination of one target word, blood, with a number of conceptual keys that have been derived from the cognitive-linguistic literature. From that starting point, he collects phrases containing blood from a large corpus and studies their potential motivation by the conceptual keys. Moon (1998) starts out with a collection of frequently recurring phrases which are therefore regarded as fixed and conventionalized. This data set is then analyzed for polysemy and metaphorical motivation, with the help of some cognitive-linguistic findings about conceptual metaphor. Deignan and Potter select a number of words from a specific source domain, the human body, and use them to collect fixed phrases in two languages, English and Italian. These phrases are then analyzed for their metaphorical, metonymic, or combined semantics along the lines of the conceptual structures postulated by cognitive linguistics.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

I have also made some critical comments about these studies. Their reports often lack in details of data analysis. For instance, it is not always clear what the criteria are for deciding that two domains are sufficiently distinct, and their elements sufficiently similar, to be taken as metaphorically related. Nor are procedures reported of how such criteria are applied in practice. As long as this does not improve, the findings of corpus work are based on equally qualitative analysis of the data as the findings of introspective research.

. Manipulation Dictionary and corpus data are typically observational means of research. But data may also be collected by informant manipulation to support the second stage of finding the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar. The goal of such data collection and analysis would be to test whether the domains identified in the previous stage are indeed connected by means of a cross-domain mapping. Alternative explanations of polysemy in grammar might be based in metonymy or synecdoche, which would lead to different relationships between the domains. It is possible to examine such conceptual cross-domain mappings in direct fashion. Gibbs, Lima and Francozo (2004) provide an example of this in their study of American English and Brazilian Portuguese language and thought for desire as hunger. They first asked participants to rate a whole battery of possible symptoms for hunger on a 7-point scale, indicating whether they had experienced the effect mentioned when feeling hungry. The possible symptoms were classified by the researchers, on the basis of their intuitions, into three groups: local symptoms, general symptoms, and behavioral symptoms. Each of these three groups was subdivided into three further classes, of symptoms that were presumably closely related, possibly related, and not related to hunger. A number of examples of the various symptoms are provided in Table 8.2. As a whole, the table provides an analytical view of a large part of the conceptual structure of hunger. The findings of this study produced two groups of phenomena which were strongly and weakly related to the experience of hunger. Many of the items were rated in the same way by the English and the Portuguese speakers. They agreed equally, for instance, about the closely related local symptoms and about the unrelated local symptoms included in the table. Only a few items were treated differently between the two groups of participants, which suggests that the embodied experience of hunger, measured by these items for these participants (university students), is relatively homogeneous for both cultures. In a second study, the two sets of items – weak and strong hunger symptoms – were then used to create new questions about the relation between these symptoms and three types of desire (love, lust, and other). The idea was, of course, to test whether knowledge of symptoms of hunger can be used to predict the conceptual properties of

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

Table 8.2 Illustration of stimulus materials of Gibbs et al. (2004): symptoms of hunger Closely related Local symptoms

Possibly related

One has a stomach ache One becomes temporarily blind One has a headache One is covered by cold sweat General symptoms Become dizzy Become sick Become weak Get a fever Behavioral symptoms The person becomes The person is out of depressed balance The person becomes The person behaves like very anxious an animal chasing its prey

Not related The hands itch The feet hurt Want to run Get annoyed The person behaves normally The person can work well

various forms of desire. The same strategy was therefore followed as in the first study, with, for instance, the following set of questions about love: How do you imagine that somebody who is deeply in love feels? The person becomes dizzy The person becomes weak The person gets annoyed The person becomes talkative These items were constructed on the basis of those symptoms of hunger that in the previous study had been shown to be either closely related or not related at all to the physical experience of hunger. These symptoms were now used to investigate their predicted high or low degree of relevance to desire. This was done by asking participants to provide a rating of the relevance of each of the bodily experiences to the question about love, lust or other desires on a 7-point scale. The strong hunger symptoms turned out to be quite acceptable as experiences for desire, too, whereas the weak hunger symptoms were not. Again, the differences between the two cultures were smaller than the similarities. This shows that the conceptual structure of one domain predicts or constrains people’s metaphorical conceptualization of another experience. The conceptual details of such a mapping can hence be tested in fairly precise fashion from one predicted correspondence to the next. Another experiment in the same study exploited the conceptual findings about hunger to test whether a series of linguistic expressions about the three kinds of desire were acceptable to the American speakers of English and the Brazilian speakers of Portuguese. In that study, strong symptoms of hunger led to linguistic items such as My stomach was aching for you, while weak symptoms of hunger led to such linguistic expressions as My knees swell for information about my ancestry. Participants were asked to provide acceptability ratings for each of these linguistic expressions on a 7point scale again. The findings showed that the use of strong symptoms for hunger led to highly acceptable talk about desire, but the use of weak symptoms for hunger produced highly unacceptable expressions for talk about desire. The two language

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

communities, again, appeared to agree more than disagree about the acceptability of these expressions. The overall method of this study is exemplary, in that it collects independent conceptual evidence about the source domain of hunger before it turns to an examination of the correspondences with the target domain of desire. It is true that the selection and initial view of the source domain of hunger has been inspired by the cognitivelinguistic proposal of a conceptual metaphor desire is hunger and its relation to a whole range of polysemous expressions in the two languages. But the experimental set for the conceptual study of hunger was “randomly determined in that we simply generated embodied experiences and body-parts for the questionnaire without thinking of the desire is hunger metaphor” (Gibbs et al. 2004: 1202). This isolation of the source domain from the target domain, and of the conceptual source domain from its linguistic reflection in conventional expressions, is not typical of cognitive-linguistic methodology and deserves to be emulated more often. One more detailed point about the research, however, is more critical. Cognitivelinguistic studies of the linguistic reflection of conceptual metaphors often set out from the observation that people speak in conventional ways about particular topics. This suggests that such expressions are or could be part of individual speakers’ grammars. This has also been an area of interest for psycholinguistic researchers like Gibbs, as we saw in Chapter 7 in connection with Gibbs and Matlock’s study on make. The problem is that requesting participants to produce acceptability ratings does not target what is part of grammar alone. It also includes what people can make sense of on the spot, in an ad-hoc fashion, which is a reflection of more encompassing patterns of usage. Such shifts from the conventional to the acceptable make it unclear whether studies like Gibbs et al. (2004) can also be used to draw conclusions about the details of metaphorical concepts and expressions of desire in grammar conceptualized as the conventionalized repertory of linguistic constructions. For grammarians, it would be an added advantage if researchers were explicit about this distinction. Informant data about various aspects of cross-domain mappings as cross-domain mappings have not been used a lot in research on metaphor in grammar. I do not know of many studies which ask informants to list or verify attributes, relations, or higher-order relations which get mapped across conceptual domains presumably informing the sense relations of large sets of conventional linguistic forms. What studies there are have been reviewed in Gibbs (1994), but the method does not seem to have attracted a host of researchers. Yet such studies do not requires advanced technological equipment but only smart research designs, well thought-out questionnaires, and pen, paper, and participants. Perhaps in the future more linguists will learn how to apply these techniques to add further detailed evidence to our views of how such conceptual domains work.

Chapter 8. Conceptual structures in grammar (2): Mappings 

. Conclusion The second stage in the identification of metaphor in the conceptual structure of grammar aims to establish that there is some form of similarity between two conceptual domains which are supposed to support two distinct but metaphorically related senses of one conventionalized language form. We are talking about two distinct and independent conceptual domains, so the similarity should be nonliteral. Assuming that both the underlying domains as well as the metaphorical and nonmetaphorical senses have been determined by independent means, which is by no means the case for current practice, the last step may be taken in more than one way. Whichever way is chosen, each of these approaches aims to provide an answer to question 3, when does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? The theoretical conceptualization of metaphor as a form of cross-domain mapping plays a guiding role in this last step. For one thing, some theorists hold that a forced choice has to be made between construing the relation between two domains as either metaphoric or metonymic or some sort of specific interaction between the two. In contrasting metaphor and metonymy as two extremes on one scale, they force the analyst to categorize all phenomena with reference to one factor. When a particular case is analyzed as metonymic, it cannot also be counted as metaphorical. This is the most important consequence of opting for this particular model. An alternative to this position is the one I adhere to. It holds that polysemy and the underlying conceptual domains may always be approached in two distinct and complementary ways: they may be examined with an eye to determining whether they are manifestations of metaphor or not, and, separately from that, whether they are manifestations of metonymy or not. I believe that this approach has several advantages: – –

–

it can cater for all clear cases which are only metaphor and not metonymy, and for all clear cases which are only metonymy and not metaphor; it can also cater for some cases of figuration which may be analyzed and experienced as metaphorical but also as metonymic, depending on the perspective of the analyst and the language user; and it can also cater for some cases of figuration which display specific forms of interaction between metaphor and metonymy, at either the linguistic level, or the conceptual level, or even both.

My two-dimensional model, with a metaphor-nonmetaphor axis and a metonymynonmetonymy axis, can hence account for all of the phenomena handled by the onedimensional model, with a metaphor-metonymy axis; but it can also account for those cases which allow for multiple analysis. The latter phenomena have received an increasing amount of attention over the past years, with questions being raised about the impact of the goal of the research (do you want to find metaphor or metonymy?) on the findings (do you count something as metaphorical or not?).

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Another advantage of the two-dimensional model is this. In the usage of grammar, there is the behavioral possibility that some expressions may be typically conceptualized as either one or the other figure. This would reflect the more natural or at least the more conventionalized form of usage. However, some of these language forms may also still be potentially conceptualized as the other figure. This would reflect the cognitive possibilities for the idiosyncratic exploitation of language which might otherwise have to go unexplained. Research on the typical versus potential processing of metaphor in grammar has not been carried out. It might proceed by collecting data in three different ways again. Introspection may provide analytical intuitions about the presence, nature and degree of similarity between the two domains, and more particularly about the correspondences between the elements and relations in the source and target domains. Observation may exploit the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations between concepts in the source domain to see whether they are carried over in the same way into the target domain. And manipulation can collect data from informants about their views of sameness or comparability of all sorts of aspects of conceptual structure in different domains. I have suggested before that these methods might be employed to collect complementary evidence about the same phenomena. This is particularly relevant for the relatively new area of primary metaphor. Since primary metaphor is typically based in correlation rather than similarity, this may become an interesting testing ground of the difference between metaphor and metonymy at both a conceptual and a linguistic level. There are, moreover, fundamental questions about the origin of these primary metaphors, both in the history of the language as a whole as well as in the cognitive development of each and every language user, as we shall see in the next chapter. It seems to me that this could be a focal point for cognitive metaphor research in the near future.

chapter 

Cognitive processes and products in grammar

In this chapter we will change our perspective from finding metaphor in grammar as symbolic structure and system to metaphor in grammar as cognitive process or product in the behavior of language users. Let me reinstate the questions which are addressed in these areas: Q5: When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q7: When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? These questions suggest that the cognitive processes and products related to grammar are long-term. What is often called knowledge of language is the cognitive product of storing and maintenance processes of grammar, where conventionalized constructions of varying degrees of concreteness are committed to memory and become more or less entrenched as a function of frequency of usage. This long-term process and its products of metaphorical representation are naturally preceded by another long-term process and its many intermediate products, language acquisition. The reverse longterm process, of language loss, or attrition, which can take place in various forms under various conditions, should be mentioned for the sake of completeness, but it has not received attention, as far as I know, in the study of metaphor. All of these cognitive processes and products are to be seen as placed at a more encompassing level than the local processes and their products from which they can be discerned to emerge, which have to do with usage events. In usage, people produce and receive language in concrete, specific and always unique situations of verbal communication. These usage events display their own processes and products, of speaking and listening, and writing and reading. It is obvious that the time-scale and function of these usage processes is fundamentally different than the time-scale and function of the processes of construing and maintaining a grammar. That is why these two types of cognitive processes and their products require separate treatment, usage getting dealt with in Chapter 12. In a usage-based approach to language, grammar is perceived as emerging from usage processes and their products in various ways. This happens in the analysis of grammar and usage as symbolic structures (both linguistic and conceptual), as we have seen in the previous chapters, but it also applies to their psycholinguistic analysis as cognitive processes and products, as I will now develop. The long-term cognitive

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

products resulting from these processes are the various kinds and levels of knowledge of language; they are the behavioral, psychological correlates of the more symbolic approaches to grammar. It is the task of the present chapter to consider metaphor in grammar from this behavioral, in particular psychological angle. In looking at grammar in this way, we need to make a further distinction between the behavioral approach to grammar with an interest in the linguistic forms of metaphor as opposed to their related metaphorical conceptual structures. This distinction goes back to the old debate about the relation between the mental dictionary on the one hand and the mental encyclopedia on the other (e.g. Aitchison 1994). This is something of an issue in cognitive linguistics, since there is assumed to be an intimate connection between words and concepts in most cognitive-linguistic approaches to meaning (e.g. Langacker 1987). It is therefore a major challenge to researchers of metaphor to tease out the distinct contributions and complications caused by the cognitive behavior of linguistic forms as opposed to the conceptual structures that are related (cf. Evans & Zinken, in preparation; Giora 2003: 34–35). To appreciate the fundamental methodological difference between this chapter and the previous ones, I would like to include one last comment. The division, of course, has to do with the nature of the data. Most if not all cognitive-linguistic work on metaphor in grammar can be called cognitive when it comes to its theory and its analysis of language and thought as symbols abstracted from usage events. Yet the data seldom include genuinely observed or elicited behavioral processes and their psychological products; even self-observed verbal or conceptual data are not collected and reported in ways that would be acceptable as a form of introspection to cognitive psychologists. Corpus data do not count as such, unless they involve the audio-visual recordings of the behavioral processes of verbal interaction, which still remains the exception that proves the rule. This absence is indicative of the wide gap between the analysis of people’s actual verbal processes and their mental products in psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and applied linguistics, on the one hand, and the analysis of the symbolic structures abstracted from such processes in most of linguistics on the other. The nature of this difference will become clearer in the next pages. I will follow the usual plan for this chapter. We will begin with a brief evocation of the deductive approach to metaphor in grammar as cognitive process and product. Then we will turn to issues of conceptualization and operationalization. And finally we will take a look at issues of empirical research by means of introspection, observation, and manipulation.

. Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach From the beginning, the cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor has been characterized by bold claims about metaphor in grammar as a cognitive process and product. The conventionalized status of many metaphorical language forms in the symbolic structure of usage is taken to be the result of their entrenched status in people’s indi-

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

vidual mental dictionaries and grammars. Moreover, the systematicity and ubiquity of these metaphorical linguistic forms is explained, as we have seen, by the postulation of another set of conventionalized metaphors in people’s individual minds, conceptual metaphors. Conventionalized conceptual metaphors are taken to be equally entrenched in individual language users’ mental encyclopedias, with links to their mental dictionaries and grammars. The deductive nature of this approach involves the postulation of a causal connection between linguistic forms and conceptual structures as symbolic structures and systems on the one hand, and their representation in people’s individual minds as an entrenched result as well as persistent cause of repeated, conventionalized patterns of usage on the other. Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) have given two specific turns to this general account. First of all, attention has been shifted from conceptual metaphors as compound metaphors to their conceptual components, primary metaphors. And secondly, the cognitive processes and products which account for the acquisition and representation of primary metaphors have been pinpointed to occur at the neural level of cognition. Our enormous metaphoric conceptual system is thus built up by a process of neural selection. Certain neural connections between the activated source- and targetdomain networks are randomly established at first and then have their synaptic weights increased through recurrent firing. The more times those connections are activated, the more the weights are increased, until permanent connections are forged. (Lakoff & Johnson 1999a: 57)

This view is called the integrated theory of primary metaphor, which is supported by computational models of neural processes (e.g., Feldman & Narayanan 2003), observational evidence of language acquisition (Johnson 1999) and introspective evidence of language structures (Grady 1997a, b). The basic cognitive-linguistic claims about a psychological foundation for the symbolic structures observed in grammar and usage remain untouched. To demonstrate how these proposals relate to the central questions of this chapter, I will take a closer look at the work by Chris Johnson (1999). In his case study of the acquisition of the verb to see, he raises the question whether children learn the metaphorical, mental sense of the verb by means of constructing a mapping from the more basic visual sense, in accordance with the postulated conceptual metaphor understanding is seeing. This might be one plausible prediction following from conceptual metaphor theory, even though Johnson notes that such a hypothesis cannot be explicitly attributed to anyone, and that conceptual metaphor theory and research have not focused on acquisition. Johnson’s metaphor acquisition hypothesis is therefore a theoretical extrapolation of the principles of conceptual metaphor theory. It is another exploitation of the deductive approach, along the following lines: if people use conceptual metaphors to extend word senses in metaphorical ways, then children may acquire metaphorical word senses by constructing mappings from concrete to abstract domains. The deductive argument spans the relation between conceptual structure and linguistic form analyzed as symbolic systems, on the one hand, and their behav-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

ioral acquisition in the area of grammar approached as cognitive process and product, on the other. Johnson provides evidence that the hypothetical metaphor acquisition hypothesis does not account for all of the data. Children do not appear to have a clearly demarcated visual sense of the verb to see from which they derive a mental sense by exploiting their knowledge of the visual domain to structure their emerging knowledge of the mental domain of understanding. What happens instead is that children exhibit a use of the verb which displays a combination of visual and mental aspects, as in : (1) a. I have to see who it is b. i-‘m going an(d) see what’s the trouble This is explained by the fact that visual and mental aspects of children’s visual experiences typically correlate, and that adults adapt their use of visual language to help children develop an understanding of this correlation, transcending the clear-cut visual versus mental uses of the term see. As a result, children’s use of see may not be polysemous but monosemous, with more prominent visual and/or mental semantic properties as the case may be. This conflated representation of see lays the foundation for a later differentiation stage which does yield the required distinction, provided that children have more complex conceptual structures available to them which can better separate the visual domain from the mental domain. Johnson points out that this acquisition process does not work via metaphor, but metonymy. Some properties of the understanding is seeing metaphor itself suggest that it may be largely metonymic in nature, i.e. that it may involve correspondences within what may be considered a single domain rather than across distinct domains. In this metaphor, exemplified by expressions like I see what you’re saying, It looks different from my point of view, The discussion was opaque, etc. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), someone who sees corresponds to someone who understands, what they see corresponds to what they understand, and darkness, light, obstacles and other things that affect vision correspond to factors that aid or hinder understanding. The fact that certain corresponding entities in this mapping are not clearly of different types, e.g. an experiencer maps onto an experiencer, raises some questions about whether or not they indeed belong to two different domains. One characteristic of a conceptual domain which is implicit in the idea of the cognitive utility of source domains is the ability to support inferences. Using this as a criterion, the two domains of understanding is seeing should count as a single domain, since there are important inferences that involve both. For example, I can infer from the fact that someone saw me eat plums that someone knows that I ate plums. If a domain is a cluster of related concepts that supports inferences, then there is a single domain that includes both mental experience and visual experience. (1997: 161)

Johnson’s arguments for this evaluation are identical with the criteria that I have used in my discussion in the previous chapter of identifying the nature of mappings be-

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

tween domains. What is more important, application of these criteria to the process of metaphorical language acquisition by children addresses the question of what counts as one domain to children, and how they exploit this knowledge to acquire new – metaphorical or metonymic – senses. They hence address both of the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter. As is noted elsewhere, the child may “learn associations between perception words and the mental domain simply because mental experience is an important part of the situation in which the forms are used by adults” (Johnson 1999: 160). This has powerful implications for the acquisition of metaphor if it is pitched at the level of primary metaphor, which is based on systematic correlations between sensori-motor and other domains. It is also important for “the historical development and maintenance of polysemy” (1999: 167). These implications have, of course, been acknowledged and placed on the agenda by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) in their integrated theory of primary metaphor. Johnson’s study is another rewarding example of the application of the deductive approach. His conflation-differentiation hypothesis about acquisition has undermined the idea that metaphorical mappings in language are the direct product of experiential correlations during childhood that motivate their metaphorical nature. The acquisition process is basically metonymic instead, and the perception and status of conceptual metaphor in adult language related to understanding is seeing may also require further attention. However, this is a complex situation, since other terms related to the conceptual metaphor, such as illuminating, may be acquired in different, truly metaphorical ways, as is also noted by Johnson. Moreover, the adapted uses by adults of the term see to children might also come in for further examination. What is therefore particularly shown by this study is the need to make a systematic methodological distinction between a metaphorical and a metonymic perspective on language data and their behavioral embedding. The deductive approach has yielded another fine result but it is also noteworthy that the symbolic perspective on the relation between conceptual structure and linguistic form may be misleading when it comes to their realization in cognitive processing and representation. Johnson’s hypothesis was indeed based on a simple extrapolation of the principles of conceptual metaphor theory in its description of the symbolic systems of language and thought, but it proved to suggest an incorrect picture of the process of metaphorical language acquisition. This was only revealed by close observation of the behavioral process of adults and children interacting in specific situations with each other. This is why the distinction between behavioral and symbolic studies of metaphor should be treated with care: the symbolic structure of metaphor, whether as linguistic form, conceptual structure, or even their association, does not display a uniformly transparent relationship with the cognitive processes and products of metaphor in language behavior. Since most of cognitive-linguistic research is symbolic, not behavioral, a note of caution should be sounded about too optimistic estimates of its psychological validity (cf. Gibbs 2006a, b). It may be suggestive of what happens in individual cognition, but does not necessarily count as (‘converging’) evidence.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

. Conceptualization Processes take time. The process of grammatical conventionalization itself is a longterm process that is part of the cultural history of a language. At an individual level, language acquisition, maintenance and attrition are processes which take place in large time-frames that span significant portions of individual people’s lifetimes. By contrast, usage events take place as a matter of seconds or minutes, occasionally extending into hours (reading a novel, watching a film, engaging in a conversation, class or meeting). It is this temporal quality of verbal processes which determines the conceptual framework of the behavioral study of metaphor, whether in grammar or in usage. Products are end states of processes. In order to study products of processes, data need to be collected about end states as resulting from the processes that led to them. Thus, products of comprehension processes indeed need to be the end state of an encompassing cognitive process that is also incorporated in the scope of research. For grammar, the cognitive products of acquisition, maintenance, or (in the future?) attrition can be characterized as knowledge of language at various stages of individual people’s lives. These products also require examination as part of their encompassing processes. This is what is typical of the behavioral investigation of metaphor in grammar.

.. Language acquisition In his book on language acquisition as a psychological process and its various products, Michael Tomasello (2003) erects a temporal framework which may be profitably recruited for the study of metaphor in language acquisition (cf. Tomasello 1999). He explicitly locates his views inside the usage-based approach to language, grammar, and their acquisition. In spelling out the details of the temporal framework, he makes a number of comments which are suggestive of the way in which metaphor might be conceptualized in these terms, too. The overall framework of the study of language acquisition has to be formulated in terms of three time scales (Tomasello 2003: 283): – – –

Phylogenetic: the biological adaptations that have enabled members of this individual’s species to communicate with one another linguistically. Historical: the cultural-historical forces that have changed and shaped the particular linguistic conventions of this individual’s speech community. Ontogenetic: the developmental processes by means of which this individual has acquired competence with a language during her life-time.

When I talk about the behavioral take on metaphor in language acquisition, I refer to the third process. The relation with the other two processes has to do with the prior existence of conventionalized metaphorical linguistic forms and conceptual structures that are offered as such by adult language users to the child (effect of historical time on ontogenetic process, Tomasello 1999), and with humans’ possession of general cog-

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

nitive skills and abilities, such as categorization, that are a condition for developing language (effect of phylogenetic time on ontogenetic time, Tomasello 1999). These distinctions are important for assessing the proposal that cultural-historical processes of language are mirrored or reflected or re-enacted in ontogenetic processes, as has sometimes been suggested in cognitive linguistics (cf. the critical discussion in Johnson 1999). Tomasello’s distinction between historical and ontogenetic time, and the related processes, shows that such a proposal may also be seen as another case of bold deductive reasoning on the part of cognitive linguistics. That is, the question arises whether children always go through particular embodied cultural experiences that motivate their acquisition of all conventional metaphors. The alternative hypothesis is that they learn conventional linguistic and conceptual metaphorical structures directly, without realizing any cross-domain mappings before they store them. And the in-between position raises the possibility that both stories may be true, but that it is imperative to collect processing data in order to find out which hypothesis is true for which metaphor or groups of metaphors. Chris Johnson’s study of see has provided an important demonstration of how to carry out such research. Tomasello notes in several places, however, that at present we do not know much about the time course of any of the general processes of language acquisition that he places centrestage (e.g. 2003: 300–301, 302–303, 315ff.). We do know something about some of the mechanisms of metaphor acquisition during childhood, but I will return to these later. The central general processes of language acquisition are the following (Tomasello 2003: 295): – – – –

Intention-reading and cultural learning, which account for how children learn linguistic symbols in the first place; Schematization and analogy, which account for how children create abstract syntactic constructions out of the concrete pieces of language they have heard; Entrenchment and competition, which account for how children constrain their abstractions to those that are conventional in their linguistic community; Functionally based distributional analysis, which accounts for how children form paradigmatic categories of various kinds of linguistic constituents.

Let me briefly comment on each process in order to give more shape to my conceptualization of metaphor in acquisition. A usage-based approach to language is clearly founded on the process of intentionreading, an ability which is not just relevant to the process of language acquisition but which offers a pervasively unifying principle underlying all psychological processes involving grammar and usage (Clark 1996; Gibbs 1999a). When people produce or encounter indirect language, including metaphor, intention-reading may have to play a role in solving the communicative problem that may arise. This is certainly true for less conventional metaphor, and this is precisely one of the problems that children face all the time: to them, a lot of language is unconventional, and it is their job to create a store of conventionalized constructions as fast as they can. This problem is alleviated by the fact that language acquisition is also promoted by cultural learning

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

(the fact that symbols – including the conventionally metaphorical ones in language and thought – are offered to children as already there, meaningful and functional). But cultural learning does not entail that such conventional metaphorical symbols are necessarily processed and stored as metaphorical by children, involving the recreation of genuine crossdomain mappings of some kind. Children may simply guess at the indirect meaning of metaphorical expressions by means of other clues in the context than the grammatical patterns of polysemy – again, the study by Johnson (1999) provides a case in point. All of these factors complicate the decision what counts as a metaphor in language acquisition. Schematization and analogy are presented by Tomasello as essential for the child’s construction of abstract syntactic constructions, but they are just as crucial for the child’s construction of their semantic dimension. Schematization and analogy may hence clearly lead to the cognitive construction of parts of linguistic and conceptual metaphors (cf. Vosniadou 1995; Winner 1995). Tomasello suggests that the general process is based in children’s exploitation of similarity and structure mapping across utterances or parts of utterances, and this may be directly connected to my discussion of the role of similarity in models of metaphor in part one. Such schematization and analogy become possible, explains Tomasello, because children connect the words to the referents in the situation and the intentions of the speaker in order to compare them to their representation of similar configurations in previously experienced utterances. This naturally applies to metaphorically used words, too, as when children overextend words on the basis of similarity between their intended referents (e.g. Winner 1988). This is, again, a pervasive principle informing the function of metaphor in any usage event. Such processes eventually lead to the cognitive products of grammar as a structured inventory of constructions (Langacker 1987), including metaphorical ones. Tomasello also draws attention to the fact that, when children have to make these generalizations across the various language data that are offered to them by adults, their generalizations are constrained by various aspects of the causal structure in analogies discovered by Gentner. This finding has been seminal for Gentner’s discussion of metaphor, both in general (1982, 1983, 1989) as well as with reference to its acquisition by children (Clement & Gentner 1991; Gentner 1988; Gentner & Clement 1988; Gentner & Toupin 1986). But in his review of the relevant literature Tomasello is quite explicit that we do not know much yet about the way how children’s generalizations across language data get entrenched in their individual grammars (p. 301). The process of analysis by which children arrive at specific generalizations and constructions is called ‘functionally based distributional analysis’. It turns on the discovery of the functions of symbols across variegated forms and formal contexts, their presumed communicative intention being the guide to their contextual meaning for the searching child. This, too, is a general process that is part of first-language learning, but it will also aid children in acquiring conventionalized metaphorical senses of linguistic forms, as well as, possibly, conventionalized conceptual structures that may motivate them.

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

Within this general conceptualization of the process of language acquisition in an ontogenetic framework, the question about metaphor identification may be formulated in more specific terms. What counts as a metaphor to the child depends on the state of knowledge of the child about both the linguistic forms and the conceptual structures which have been discussed in symbolic fashion in the previous chapters. Following the division of grammar as a symbolic system into two areas of research, with the second, conceptual area being subdivided into two more detailed questions, we have to do with four main issues that require theoretical conceptualization: 1. corresponding to Chapter 6: what lexico-grammatical abilities do children have at their various stages of development to recognize and use metaphorical language at the appropriate levels (Winner 1988)? 2. corresponding to Chapter 7: what conceptual domains do children have at their disposal at their various stages of development to distinguish and use diverging domains (Keil 1979, 1989)? 3. corresponding to Chapter 8: what types of mapping can children construct at their various stages of development to achieve metaphorical closure across conceptual domains (Gentner 1988; Winner 1988)? 4. following from the combination of these three areas into one more encompassing domain of research here: how are the conceptual structures and mappings related to the linguistic forms in individual children’s minds at their various stages of development (Keil 1979, 1989)? We will return to these questions when looking at the criteria for their observation in the processes and products of the acquisition of linguistic forms as well as conceptual structures in Section 3.

.. Knowledge of language When we turn from the child’s acquisition of lexico-grammar to the adult’s knowledge of lexico-grammar, we can observe a dearth of behavioral studies. Psycholinguistic and psychological work on metaphor is apparently more interested in short-term processes of usage, including most notably the study of metaphor understanding (comprehension, recognition, interpretation, and appreciation). The study of long-term representation and maintenance of metaphor has received less attention, with the exception of the work done by Ray Gibbs (e.g., 1994, 2006a). This may be due to the lack of belief or the agnostic attitude that many psychologists have about the long-term existence of conceptual metaphors in the individual mind, which may have led them to concentrate on the local and short-term processes of understanding linguistic metaphor, to be treated as part of usage in Chapter 12. Whether this is an explanation that has any merit, there is not much psycholinguistic work on metaphor in grammar which looks at the behavioral side of its longterm cognitive representation, either as linguistic form or as conceptual structure. Therefore this section on the conceptualization of metaphor in grammar approached

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

as cognitive process and product will take Gibbs’s work as its point of orientation. He is not only one of the few representatives of this area, but his views are exciting. In particular, he has proposed and partly carried out a research program that is fully cognitive-linguistic in that it takes seriously the link between language and cognition that is central to that school (Gibbs 1994). But what is more, he also regards such a cognitive-linguistic research program as a novel and challenging contribution to a broader discussion of the relation between language and cognition in cognitive science (Gibbs 2006a). The behavioral angle on metaphor in grammar that is proposed by Gibbs evinces the general cognitive-linguistic idea that the analyses of symbolic structure should also strive for cognitive validity. This is what is expressed by the so-called cognitive commitment endorsed by cognitive linguists, first formulated by Lakoff (1990), which is a commitment to make cognitive-linguistic accounts of human language consistent with what is generally known about cognition. As Gibbs (1994: 19) writes: “our easy facility with figurative discourse is suggestive of the poetic mind”. But Gibbs has gone one step further. From the beginning, cognitive linguists have entertained an even stronger hypothesis, suggesting that cognition – including language – is fundamentally based in experience, in particular in relation to the human body (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999a). In line with this view, Gibbs (2006a: 9) has adopted what he calls the ‘embodiment premise’: People’s subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental grounding for language and thought. Cognition is what occurs when the body engages the physical, cultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamical interactions between people and the environment. Human language and thought emerge from recurring patterns of embodied activity that constrain ongoing intelligent behavior. We must not assume cognition to be purely internal, symbolic, computational, and disembodied, but seek out the gross and detailed ways in which language and thought are inextricably shaped by embodied action.

Such a view is not peculiar to cognitive linguistics, as is shown at length in Gibbs’s book on embodiment and cognitive science. What is important about his position is that he promotes cognitive linguistics as an important contribution to the further development of the more general interest in embodied cognition in psychology. From this point of departure, Gibbs (2006a: 159) proceeds to offer “a hierarchy of possibilities about the interaction of embodied experience with different aspects of language use and understanding”, an interaction which is clearly essential for our view of metaphor in grammar researched as a behaviorally entrenched repository for cognition: 1. Embodiment plays a role in the development of and change in the meanings of words and expressions over time, but does not motivate contemporary speakers’ use and understanding of language. 2. Embodiment motivates the linguistic meanings that have currency within linguistic communities, or may have some role in an idealized speaker/hearer’s under-

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

standing of language. But embodied experience does not play any part in speakers’ abilities to make sense of or process language. 3. Embodiment motivates contemporary speakers’ use and understanding of why various words and expressions mean what they do, but does not play any role in people’s ordinary on-line production or comprehension of everyday language. 4. Embodiment functions automatically and interactively in people’s on-line use and understanding of linguistic meaning. These four hypotheses are, of course, variations of the hypotheses interpreting the role of thought in metaphor which were discussed in Chapter 1. In the context of the present chapter, Gibbs connects these four hypotheses to the time course of linguistic communication and makes a distinction between various time frames in which embodiment may be expected to interact with language and thought, including metaphorical language and thought. This creates an encompassing behavioral framework for the study of the metaphorical linguistic forms and conceptual structures of grammar. Gibbs’s concern with distinct time frames for the study of language is reminiscent of Tomasello’s interest in the three distinct time frames accounting for aspects of acquisition. Gibbs’s proposal may be argued to intermesh with Tomasello’s historical time frame (see Gibbs’s hypothesis one) as well as Tomasello’s individual time frame (Gibbs’s hypotheses three and four). For our present topic, the cognitive representation of grammar in adult speakers’ long term memory as an entrenched repository of knowledge and skills, it is the third and fourth hypotheses which are particularly relevant. The third hypothesis posits that there may be a relation between embodiment and language and thought from a grammatical point of view, without having a systematic connection with most events of usage. The fourth hypothesis, by contrast, posits that there may be a relation between embodiment and language and thought as a matter of usage whereas it remains unclear whether this presupposes some basis in previously stored linguistic forms and conceptual structures in individual people’s mental grammars. Gibbs (2006a: 84–85) emphasizes that there is an intimate connection between short-term processes of usage and long-term processes of acquisition and representation. In discussing the flexibility in defining conceptual categories between people and between experiments, he points out that such flexibility and variation do not have to be indicative of differences in long-term knowledge structures. Instead, he argues that they are more likely to be reflections of different types of situated use which people make of their conceptual representations. Such experiments may therefore have to be reinterpreted as experiments pertaining to short-term usage processes instead of accessing long-term knowledge structures. These short-term usage processes are heavily influenced by people’s embodied understanding of objects and events as well as of language. The connection with our present behavioral concerns with grammar may be forged by quoting the following conclusion:

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

These studies on the effect of category use on categorization tasks illustrate how people’s rich interactions with the world shape knowledge acquisition and representation. (2006a: 85)

This is an evaluation of the available research which is not limited to the cognitivelinguistic view of embodied cognition (e.g. Barsalou 1999; Zwaan & Pecher 2005). It raises the question what such research in fact does demonstrate about the structures of long-term linguistic and conceptual knowledge (cf. Glenberg 1997). In cognitive linguistics it has been customary to see image schemas as the pivotal psychological mechanism for these embodied processes of cognition and their long-term products (cf. Johnson 1987). Image schemas are experiential gestalts, skeletal representations of sensori-motor experiences. They are probably limited to a restricted number, including source-path-goal, balance, momentum, resistance, containment, and so on. Image schemas are “emerging patterns of entire systems in action (i.e., interplay of brain, body, and world)” (Gibbs 2006a: 115). This suggests that they should not be seen as permanently encoded conceptual structures in memory or the brain (Gibbs 2006a: 114), which seems to go against the claims put forward by Lakoff and Johnson quoted in Section 1. Again, however, the question remains what is the connection between image schemas and the content of permanent grammar and knowledge structures in individual people’s minds. This is a question which, in my opinion, does not have a clear answer yet. Gibbs (2006a: 121) formulates a suggestion that may be taken as an attempt at addressing this issue. He writes that “. . . conceptual metaphors may not pre-exist in the sense of continually structuring specific conceptual domains. But conceptual metaphors may be used to access different knowledge on occasions as people immediately conceptualize some abstract target domain given a particular task”. But this, too, leaves open the question where these conceptual metaphors come from, and what metaphorical structures remain in permanent knowledge structures. An important conceptual consequence of the focus on image schemas is that it seems to go against the similarity thesis that lies at the basis of many scholars’ definition of metaphor: There is not an objectively similar set of attributes for concepts such as difficulty and physical weight, nor are there similar features that connect “sunny dispositions,” “bright words,” and “radiant smiles.” Conceptual metaphor theory demonstrates, alternatively, that concepts from different domains are related to one another by virtue of how people are physically constituted, their cognitive abilities, and their interactions with the world. (Gibbs 2006a: 96)

This position might be damaging to the overall integrity of the field of research if it were correct, but a number of responses can be made. First of all, the idea of ‘objective similarity’, mentioned in the first part of this quotation, may be a red herring, as I have argued in Chapter 3 with reference to my critique of Lakoff and Johnsons’s anti-similarity position. Secondly, the idea of people’s cognitive abilities and their interaction with the world plays a fundamental role in Chris Johnson’s account of the

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

acquisition of primary metaphor, which, indeed, was not based on similarity and metaphor, but on correlation and metonymy: perhaps some of the previous cognitivelinguistic analyses of these phenomena need to be reconsidered as having to do with metonymy instead of metaphor. Yet, at the same time, this analysis does not seem to preclude the possibility of analyzing complete patterns of linguistic and conceptual metaphor as metaphorical on the basis of some cross-domain mapping where similarity, not identity, of elements of correspondences is pivotal, as we have seen. The idea that metaphorical and metonymic perspectives on the data are not mutually exclusive is therefore another idea proposed here which might be helpful in rescuing the integrity of the field. And thirdly, these reflections may also lead to a situation where linguistic forms may be analyzed as metaphorical on the basis of similarity, whereas underlying conceptual structures are analyzed as metonymic on the basis of correlation and contiguity, as has been proposed as an option by Barcelona (2000c) and Radden (2000). The idea of treating the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor as relatively autonomous areas of research may therefore be another positive contribution resulting from the approach advocated here. I should consequently like to conclude that similarity does not have to be abandoned as the fundamental criterion for metaphor, but that the more controversial findings and phenomena mentioned by Gibbs simply give rise to further empirical questions that need to be addressed by more precise research. Metaphor in grammar hence raises new questions about the processes of acquisition and maintenance or representation, as well as their products. A behavioral perspective has to look at people’s embodied development and interaction with the world, with their cognitive abilities growing, stabilizing, updating and changing throughout their lives. The products of these processes are knowledge of language and the world in various stages of transition and perhaps even permanent flux. Testing this knowledge and researching the processes that produced it require investigations of the cognitive behavior of real people instead of symbolic structures. An important issue in that research pertains to the actual content of people’s linguistic and conceptual knowledge in their long-term memory. Following the model proposed for acquisition, I suggest that our conceptualization of metaphor in grammar as cognitive process and product concerns the following four questions: 1. What conventionalized and entrenched lexico-grammatical abilities do adults have to recognize and use metaphorical language at the appropriate levels? 2. What conventionalized and entrenched conceptual domains do adults have to distinguish and use diverging domains? 3. What types of mapping do adults conventionally construct to achieve metaphorical closure across conceptual domains? 4. How are the conceptual structures and mappings related to the linguistic forms in individual adults’ minds? These are the questions that require operational definitions in the next section.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

. Operationalization Processes require people. The behavioral study of metaphor in grammar looks at what people in fact do when they acquire, store and maintain grammatical structures, either as linguistic forms or as conceptual structures. This means doing fieldwork with tape recorders and video recorders to collect verbal data by observation, or it means getting children and adults into labs to elicit various types of verbal, nonverbal or meta behaviors from them. What as a rule is not sufficient is the analysis of symbolic structures that have been abstracted away from the people going through the on-going processes that have to do with acquiring and maintaining a lexico-grammar.

.. Linguistic forms In Chapter 6 I proposed that the following decisions were involved in operationalizing metaphor identification in the linguistic forms of the symbolic structures of grammar: 1. Decide what counts as one form 2. Decide whether it has at least two senses 3. Decide whether the two senses are related by some form of nonliteral similarity a. nonliteral similarity should be able to be opposed to both literal similarity and literal hierarchy; each of these oppositions involves the possibility for the analyst to specify two fundamentally different semantic or conceptual domains. b. the direction of the derivation or mapping has to be founded on a criterion of basicness, whether that is historical, experiential, acquisitional, and so on. Each of these moments of decision now has to be operationalized for the areas of the cognitive processes and products that people exhibit in acquiring and maintaining their mental grammars. For acquisition, this means that a decision has to be made for particular age groups which linguistic forms have been differentiated by the child into polysemous constructions, and which have not. The units of analysis would therefore typically be vocabulary items and their related and developing constructional properties. It also means that similarity and directionality (point 3) have to be judged relative to the child’s linguistic and world experience. These may be rather different from the assumptions derived from the analysis of general, that is, adult, grammar: tools such as dictionaries and corpora may point the way to interesting areas of research, but they may also be misleading when it comes to describing what goes on in the mind of the child. What counts as metaphorical to who is quite crucial in this respect. The general stages of early language acquisition described by for instance Tomasello (2003) will have to act as a constraining framework here. For knowledge of language, the situation is not essentially different. Units of analysis would remain constructions of various degrees of concreteness, with words forming one category on the scale. Operationalizing similarity and directionality as cognitively

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

represented in the mental grammars of speakers is less problematic than in the case of children, since ideas about mappings by nonliteral similarity have typically been derived from adult language as symbolic structure. Tools may therefore generally be used in the same way as in the area of symbolic research on metaphor in grammar. However, when variation between language users is taken into account, the question of what counts as metaphorical in the mental grammars of which group does become an interesting issue: do stockbrokers have different basic and derived senses for words like rise and fall than other people (e.g. Charteris-Black & Ennis 2001)? Do computer freaks have different cognitive representations of words like mouse and window than other language users (e.g. Giora 2003). These are questions which may suggest subtle complications for deciding what counts as the basic as opposed to metaphorical sense in a person’s lexico-grammar.

.. Conceptual structures When we turn to the identification of metaphor in the conceptual structures of grammar, the following operational decisions can be transferred from the area of symbolic analysis and need to be looked at from the perspective of behavior at analysis:

Demarcating a conceptual domain 1. Decide what level of abstraction you are going to use for ordering the conceptual materials 2. Decide which set of polysemous words (or more generally linguistic forms) are going to be included in the reconstruction of the underlying conceptual structures 3. Decide about the descriptive framework for analyzing the syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and encyclopedic information that can be collected about each of the polysemous items (or more generally linguistic forms).

Identifying a cross-domain mapping 4. Decide about the relative salience of the two domains as distinct conceptual systems Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, typically, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. 5. Decide about the necessary and sufficient degree of similarity required for a mapping, since corresponding elements between two domains may be relatively more or less similar Decide about the role of types of correspondences between domains, such as external similarity versus relations, and relations versus higher-order relations. Decide about the minimal and maximal number of correspondences required for an analysis to be accepted as complete

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

These moments of decision for operationalizing metaphor in the symbolic study of grammar should now be considered from a behavioral angle. For the study of the conceptual structures of metaphor as part of people’s knowledge of language, the question about level of abstraction points to the issue of what it is that gets represented in memory. Researchers have to make a choice between operationalizing image schemas, primary metaphors, or complex conceptual metaphors as units of analysis. There is also the matter of the nature of the cognitive representation: measurement can aim at the observation of permanently stored symbols or of neurologically entrenched motor patterns that are used differently in working memory on each occasion. Another set of questions that has to be addressed concerns the variability between conceptual domains: is it possible to measure all conceptual domains as equally well differentiated and equally permanently stored in people’s minds? Do the answers to this question of measurement apply in the same way for research into the domains involved in image schemas, primary metaphors, and conceptual metaphors? And how does the measurement itself affect the nature of the phenomenon that is measured if people retrieve different aspects of knowledge in different ways from their long-term memory because they are performing in different mind-body-world configurations? Finally, there is the operationalization of the relation between these conceptual structures on the one hand and the mental dictionary or more generally mental grammar as an inventory of linguistic forms on the other: does the research aim at maximizing or minimizing the effect of this relation in measuring the relevant conceptual structures? For acquisition, all of the above questions apply, too. Apart from that, however, there is the complication that children have different experiences and knowledge of the world than adults, and that this changes over time. It will therefore be of paramount importance to target all of the above questions about conceptual structures at the right levels of development, in which some domains have been differentiated or achieved richer degrees of development, but others have not. The interaction with the acquisition of lexico-grammar complicates this picture further, as the linguistic forms themselves cannot be assumed to be fully developed either. The measurement of metaphor in the cognitive development and representation of grammar is hence exceedingly complex.

. Introspection The previous chapters have considered how introspection has served as a method for data collection for the study of the symbolic structures of metaphorical linguistic forms and metaphorical conceptual structures. In that context, introspection does seem to have some validity in bringing out analysts’ intuitions about these symbolic structures. I believe that this felt validity has to do with the fact that introspection in such cases activates expert knowledge about the specialist area of conventionalized signs, expert knowledge that is generally taken as authoritative. Whether these intu-

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

itions are reliable across analysts is another matter (Schütze 1996; Gibbs 2006b). But they are typically divorced from, or at most idealized from, the on-going personal cognitive processes of these analysts. We do not see reports of analysts’ internal processing of any of the linguistic or conceptual structures under scrutiny. The intuitions therefore do not apply to the analyst’s cognitive processes or their products in the sense of individual psychology; they are personal – if well-informed – responses to public signs (instead of private meanings and thoughts) that have been filtered by subsequent analysis and reporting. In the present chapter we are looking at something completely different. The big question for now is whether introspection can serve as an adequate method for data collection in order to answer the questions at the beginning of this chapter. That is, can we use introspection to examine the long-term processes of metaphor acquisition, storage, maintenance and perhaps also loss? To pose the question is to suggest the answer. Of course it is impossible to introspect such long-term processes as storage and maintenance over long periods of time, and to consider the possibility for acquisition and attrition borders on the absurd. A more serious option, though, would be to entertain the possibility that linguists can introspect the products of these processes in their own minds, at least for the products of storage and maintenance. We can therefore narrow the question down to: (how) can we, as analysts, introspect our individual knowledge of metaphorical linguistic forms and metaphorical conceptual structures? Bill Croft (1998) has argued that most of the cognitive-linguistic claims about the mental representation of grammar are based on introspective data. He advances the position that such introspective data can only restrict the range of possible mental representations, but that they cannot be sufficient for deciding which (type of) mental representation is actually valid for a particular linguistic phenomenon. In other words, analyses of introspective data should always leave room for the possibility that alternative explanations can in principle never be excluded, because more than one model may be compatible with the introspective data. Instead, Croft claims, when you wish to choose between a number of possible alternative conceptual models for the same linguistic phenomenon, you have to add data collected by means of the observation or manipulation of language behavior. Dominiek Sandra (1998) has responded to Croft and shifted the issue to the question whether linguists can say anything at all about the nature of cognition. He suggests that linguists, on the basis of linguistic evidence alone, cannot say much about the cognitive processes of language, or about the representational architecture that is required for such processes; the latter is fully co-extensive with my cognitive as opposed to symbolic notion of grammar, both of the linguistic forms of metaphor as well as of its conceptual structures. Sandra agrees with Croft that linguists can on the one hand restrict the range of alternatives when it comes to the contents of particular mental representations but that on the other hand they cannot specifically determine those contents. Sandra concludes that proposals for mental representations of language advanced on the basis of linguistic evidence alone are beliefs, not findings. Another way of looking at this is to say that these proposals have the status of hypotheses which

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

have been derived from a theoretical framework; these hypotheses need to be examined against relevant data to be collected from observing or manipulating cognition, not from introspection. David Tuggy (1999) has in turn replied to both the views of Croft (1998) and of Sandra (1998). Even though he attacks the general spirit of especially Sandra’s contribution to the debate, he in fact agrees with the position that cognitive-linguistic proposals for mental representations are hypotheses. Tuggy defends the role of intuition as a source of evidence, but admits as well that other kinds of evidence are required for achieving greater certainty (1999: 352, 357). He discusses a number of options, such as coincident intuitions, cross-linguistic evidence, and so on (cf. Cuyckens & Zawada 2001b). The need for converging evidence about postulated conceptual structures or even individual mental representations does not seem to be in doubt for Tuggy, who thereby relativizes the value of introspective evidence by itself. In a more recent contribution to this discussion, Ray Gibbs (2006b) has cautioned cognitive linguists in a similar vein, but he goes one step further: “The simple fact is that our ability to introspect about many cognitive and emotional processes is extremely limited” (Gibbs 2006b: 136). With a reference to Myers (2002), Gibbs argues that the problems with introspection and intuitions are manifold, even when they are restricted to the domain of linguistic (as opposed to conceptual) intuitions: “misreading our own minds, hindsight bias, self-serving bias, overconfidence, belief preservation and confirmation bias, framing, and illusory correlation” (p. 141). Gibbs’s critique pertains to a combined view of introspection in both grammar and usage as cognition, but the question now is what is possible for the area of knowledge of language (grammar as cognitive product). Here Gibbs turns to the recent critique of the use of linguistic intuitions in the study of grammar by Schütze (1996) and others and extrapolates that to the study of conceptual systems in cognitive linguistics. His ultimate position is that “cognitive linguists must be careful not to assume cognitivepsychological reality for any of their proposals based on intuitions and introspection alone, . . .” (p. 144). He then proposes a number of improvements for the use of introspection and linguistic intuitions, which have to do with various issues of data collection and analysis in the area of linguistic forms. In my opinion, this advice does not pertain to introspection as a method of data collection about knowledge of language, since it concerns improving the methods of observation and manipulation, as is the case with for instance the use of other informants and corpora. Gibbs’s suggestions also have a bearing on data analysis and interpretation more than on data collection by introspection, as is the case with, for instance, the advice to articulate falsifiable hypotheses as well as the advice to specify alternative hypotheses. If these suggestions are put aside, there is not much left in Gibbs’s contribution which might suggest that introspection could serve to even study knowledge of language as a genuine cognitive product in the individual mind of the researcher. In my opinion, Gibbs’s (2006b) discussion is an example of a tendency to conflate introspection as a method of data collection about cognitive processes or their products by means of self-observation, as described by for instance Shanon (1984),

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

with both introspection as a term for theory and hypothesis formation, as illustrated by Sandra’s (1998) interpretation, as well as a term for private, qualitative analysis by researchers who rely on their intuitions to describe the nature of public instead of introspected data, as may be the interpretation adhered to by Tuggy (1999). I believe that the notion of introspection should remain restricted to the area of data collection, pertaining to collecting data by means of self-observing one’s own behavior. In that way, introspection can be reasonably used in the study of symbolic structures, serving to collect metalinguistic and conceptual intuitions about symbols that are used as publicly or culturally available and meaningful entities, as we have seen in previous chapters. This is also the reason why most cognitive-linguistic work is introspective (Gibbs 2006b). I believe that this rather special use of introspection in the area of symbolic research should be distinguished from introspection as a proper methodological means to access individual analysts’ specific cognitive processes and their products (another form of data collection, in the area of psychology instead of semiotics). It should also be distinguished from the intuitions that are used in the subsequent qualitative analysis of data that are collected from various sources, such as informants, corpora, public resources, and so on. If these methodological distinctions are accepted we are forced to conclude that introspection does not seem to be very helpful in the collection of data about knowledge of language as the product of the long-term processes of storage and maintenance, the area of research that is the concern of the present chapter. Only if expert intuitions are collected in linguistic tests about specific linguistic phenomena acting as quasi-experimental stimuli do we seem to be getting close to introspecting into the cognitive system of an individual researcher’s mind, but such evidence is based on single cases, may be erroneous and biased, and its procedure of operation is typically filtered by subsequent data analysis and publication. The value of such introspective data is rather limited as data (not as ideas for testing that requires new data collection). The validity of introspective evidence is still at stake. With Croft, Sandra, Tuggy, and Gibbs I hold that introspective evidence cannot be accepted as sufficient for deciding between one cognitive, that is, psychological, model for the mental representation of metaphor as opposed to another. And introspection certainly cannot work for collecting data about the processes and products of metaphor acquisition, both its linguistic forms and its conceptual structures. Converging evidence within this area of behavioral research is clearly needed before deductive work across areas can become successful.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

. Observation .. Acquisition Observation is strong in acquisition studies. It is the typical method with which the verbal and cognitive development of children has been examined. There are hours of tape recordings of individual children which have been collected across several years of their life. These studies are hence based on a wealth of verbal data which are usually analyzed in qualitative fashion, both regarding their linguistic forms and their conceptual structures. The most recent book-length review of the state of the art of metaphor studies in acquisition was provided by Ellen Winner (1988). Even though it does not engage with the cognitive-linguistic view of metaphor, it is extremely useful as a methodological guide to the kinds of issues that play a role in this area of research (cf. Winner 1995). To illustrate how this may work, I can look at only one study in some more detail. Winner (1979; cf. 1988) examined the spontaneous speech produced by a child called Adam, from 2.3 to 4.10 years old. To identify metaphorical language use in order to study the development of his metaphorical competence, all words that were used in a manner not consonant with conventional adult usage were collected. Then a distinction was made between three classes of unconventional usage: overextension, anomaly, and metaphor: –

–

–

Anomalies were simply those utterances which could not be interpreted by the analyst. For example, Adam called a briefcase label “spaghetti”, which was deemed an anomaly. Overextensions were those words where a term was used to designate a group of similar referents, while at the same time the child did not have the appropriate word for those referents that fell outside the conventional scope of the overextended word. For example, “worm” was overextended to designate a larger group of stringlike objects, and the child was unable to name the non-worm objects by their own label. Metaphors were cases of re-naming objects, with the appropriate non-metaphorical term appearing in the immediate discourse vicinity of the metaphorically used term; or they were cases of re-naming during symbolic play, crucially involving additional gesture which accompanied the re-naming act. An example provided by Winner is Adam’s use of a horn as an eggbeater, calling it “mixer”.

This approach reveals a number of decisions that have to be taken by researchers studying the process of metaphorical language acquisition over time. The first step in the data analysis of Winner’s study is of course problematic in the eyes of the cognitive linguist. Not all metaphor can be characterized by means of the criterion of unconventional use, so that the study by Winner (1979) only seems to capture novel and therefore relatively deliberate or at least conscious metaphors. Such metaphors were at the focus of attention in developmental psychology before

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

the advent of cognitive linguistics. They demonstrate the child’s progress in mastering the abilities of creating cross-domain mapping and expressing them in language. Such studies have lost none of their relevance today, in that they sketch the time course of the development of some of the more conscious uses of metaphor by children, which may provide a framework for the empirical study of more encompassing uses of metaphor as part of the child’s acquisition of the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of grammar. Novel and deliberate metaphors still have to be included, of course, in present-day psychological studies of metaphor acquisition that do take the cognitive-linguistic perspective on board, if only to determine how they interact with the acquisition and production of conventional metaphors. But such new studies would be presented with the problem of how to identify all potentially metaphorical expressions in the language of a child if the criterion of unconventional language use cannot be applied. This is where potentially metaphorical polysemy, or, more generally, potentially metaphorical linguistic form, as discussed in Chapter 6, may be helpful. The second issue in Winner’s study concerns the three-way classification of the verbal data between anomalous, overextension, and metaphorical. Let us first agree that anomalies are part and parcel of the analysis of any verbal data that are collected by observation. There will always be verbal data that simply do not make sense to the analyst, as part of some sort of performance error or noise. The occurrence of anomalies in language acquisition is simply another manifestation of this general and inevitable phenomenon, and it has been one cause of a neglect of observational methods in the study of grammar during the sixties and seventies, as I have noted. The distinction between overextension and metaphor is more interesting for our present purposes. To the cognitive linguist and many other researchers, overextension by means of nonliteral similarity would of course be a prime case of metaphor, as long as we are willing to add: metaphor to the child. The question of what counts as metaphorical to who becomes of central importance in this area of study. Moreover, the distinction between linguistic form and conceptual structure also comes into play here. Consider Winner’s following basic assumptions: there is an important difference between the communicative functions of overextensions and metaphors. [. . .], overextensions fill lexical gaps, and once the gap is filled by the appropriate word, the overextension drops out. Metaphoric misuses do not usually fill gaps. Instead, the child typically misnames an object despite the fact that he possesses the appropriate name for it. He does so to point out a resemblance that has struck him as noteworthy. (Winner 1988: 92)

There is hence the interesting scenario that a child does not have the appropriate linguistic form for a particular referent and therefore designates it by overextending another linguistic form on the basis of resemblance. To me, this suggest that the child displays the ability to construe metaphorical conceptual structures. It is true that there is no associated contrast between a metaphorical and a nonmetaphorical use of a linguistic form, but that is irrelevant to the analysis of the grammatical abilities regarding metaphor in conceptual structure.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Another scenario is that the child overextends one word to include a new group of referents by metaphor, for which no other term is available in the language. This would be the group of cases where the overextension fills a lexical gap and stays there, because it in fact is the appropriate word itself. A large group of the overextensions laid aside as not metaphorical by Winner (1979), therefore, may have to be reconsidered as potentially metaphorical at the level of conceptual structure by cognitive linguists. Many of these overextensions, since they fill lexical gaps, will typically be conventionally metaphorical, a point conceded in Winner (1995). Overextensions may therefore turn out to play a central role in the acquisition process of metaphorical linguistic forms in grammar. Winner also mentions a third criterion for metaphorical use, which applies when the other two criteria fail. This is the probability, as estimated by the analyst, that the child in fact knew the conventional term for a particular object when he applied another name in metaphorical fashion. This kind of estimate is trickier and more questionable than the other two types of analysis. However, the fact that these are longitudinal data may provide backup to the assessment of a particular linguistic form as intended as metaphorical, on the grounds of the extensive knowledge of state of the child’s verbal and conceptual development. It would be interesting to learn how large the number of such cases in fact is. My insistence on the relative autonomy of metaphor as linguistic form versus conceptual structure may now serve to alert us to the fact that the aspects of Winner’s study discussed so far are concerned with the study of the cognitive representation of linguistic forms. Metaphorical conceptual structures play a role in another way. Symbolic play metaphors are described by Winner as typically relational metaphors, where one entity is forced into the role of its analogue in the target domain of the symbolic play. They are metaphors based on proportional similarity, even if that is typically created in adhoc fashion by the child (Winner 1988: 95). As such, symbolic play metaphors can be easily contrasted with so-called sensory metaphors, which are based on external resemblance between the things compared. The identification criterion of gesture or transformation turns out to be crucial in marking this distinction between different types of conceptual mappings. This type of data analysis has led to the conclusion that children may produce more proportional metaphors than sensory ones at an early age (of two), which emerges from their general involvement in symbolic play, whereas sensory metaphors are produced more frequently than proportional metaphors at the age of four. Symbolic play metaphors are based in functional similarities that have little to do with the actual resemblances between objects, but metaphor production seems to get attuned to the actual perception of (mostly external) similarities with the development of the child’s cognitive abilities and knowledge. Similar methods have been used to study the development of metaphor in early school years. A decline of spontaneous metaphoric speech has been observed from around the age of six, but this may have to be re-interpreted from our current cognitive-linguistic perspective. Since researchers focused on relatively novel and de-

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

liberate metaphor, it remains an open question how children acquire conventional metaphor during their school years – with all the attending analytical problems of identifying those metaphors in the first place. The ability to produce analogies increases and changes over the years, with a shift taking place in preference for relational as opposed to sensory (or attribute or external resemblance) metaphor (Gentner 1988; Winner 1988). However, many of these findings have been produced by experimental studies, on the grounds that observation allows for only a limited number of conclusions. Psycholinguists have concluded that some hypotheses about language acquisition cannot be addressed by collecting observational evidence, an issue which we will come back to. Observational evidence may be consistent with experimental evidence, but it cannot always be given the same explanatory power. For this moment, it should be noted how the analysis of observationally collected verbal data relies on determining the intention of the child’s language use, in particular when distinctions have to be made between anomaly, overextension, and metaphor. This is clearly another approach than the types of analysis we have seen in previous chapters, where we typically did not have or need genuine speakers displaying intentions to discuss the conventionalized meanings of linguistic forms and conceptual structures. The focus on intentions also acknowledges Tomasello’s insistence that the study of language acquisition is the study of children’s developments in intention reading. It is true that the study of grammar is to do with general and schematic linguistic forms and conceptual structures, but when we study grammar as cognitive behavior, we are talking about observing what happens over the course of time in one person’s individual mind, and this can only be studied by looking at that person’s intentional behavior.

.. Knowledge of language How can we investigate the conventionalized and entrenched knowledge of language of adult individuals by observation? We can observe what people say in particular situations, and more generally how they use language across different occasions of use, but what does that tell us about the state of their personal linguistic and conceptual systems? When children are studied by observation, researchers typically focus on the achievement of particular levels of verbal and conceptual expertise, as we have seen, as well as the order in which these are acquired. It is not easy to formulate the equivalently precise targets of research for adult users of language. Can we say that all observed conventional patterns of language use have to be part of the permanent cognitive representation of grammar of the average language user? This might be relatively acceptable. It would be a conclusion about the cognitive representation in grammar of metaphorical linguistic forms. But can we also say that all of these observed conventional language patterns point to a permanent cognitive representation of the associated conceptual structures in the average language user? This is more questionable. Alice Deignan, for instance, says: “Corpus data cannot give us information about mental representations of meta-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

phors, . . .” (2005a: 222). And Jonathan Charteris-Black (2004) has explicitly presented his conceptual keys or conceptual metaphors as analytical tools, not as descriptions of permanently represented cognitive structures. Corpus linguists seem to shy away from drawing the inference that conventional linguistic patterns are proof of entrenched cognitive representations of the conceptual structures of metaphor in personal grammars. Their interpretation of metaphor as thought is deliberately symbolic, not psychological: language patterns do allow for testable inferences about related conceptual structures as part of symbolic systems, but these do not necessarily exhibit one-toone relations with cognitive processes and their products. Such inferences are at most hypotheses about cognition that would require independent psychological research. Corpus linguists have been joined in this assessment by psychologist Ray Gibbs, who writes: “As is the case with all scientific methods, there are limitations to the strategy of trying to infer something about conceptual structure from a systematic analysis of linguistic structure and behavior” (2006a: 118). One limitation is that too many competing alternative hypotheses of the cognitive representation of the relation between linguistic forms and conceptual structures may be formulated, as we have seen in Chapter 1 (Gibbs 1994, 1999b). When such theories are not contrasted with their competitors, and when they are mainly researched by means of the observation of linguistic structures and behavior, they can be condemned as “overly limited” by psychologists (Glucksberg 2002: 765; quoted by Gibbs 2006a: 119). The claim of such theories to cognitive-psychological validity in the area of long-term representation of grammatical structures is accordingly doubtful (Boroditsky 2000, 2001; Murphy 1996, 1997). Linguistic evidence based on observation for the cognitive validity of the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar is consequently almost as suspect as the introspective evidence discussed by Croft (1998), Sandra (1998), Tuggy (1999), and Gibbs (2006b) – which makes even more sense if we recall that some of the evidence called introspective in that debate may also be seen as observational evidence about language patterns which has been analyzed in qualitative ways that rely a lot on intuitions. Attention should also be drawn to the point that the linguistic forms can indeed be observed, but that conceptual structures cannot, at least not directly. Conceptual structures have been postulated by the symbolic analysis of metaphor in grammar, in the way that we have seen in the previous chapters. When we talk about observation as a means to study the cognitive representation of grammar in individual people’s minds, therefore, we can only observe them via the linguistic forms that are the product of the use of grammar. Even if we suppose that we can give a positive answer to the question whether we can infer from conventional patterns of language use that they are uniformly related to their cognitive representation in people’s personal longterm grammars, which is dubious, then it is still much more controversial to deduce from the observation of these language patterns that their presumed corresponding conceptual structures can also be uniformly related to a cognitive representation in people’s long-term grammars. This is in fact a deductive inference from the presumed cognitive representation of linguistic form to the cognitive representation of associated conceptual structures.

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

The discussion has shifted its footing away from general abilities of the child which have been studied by observation when it comes to language acquisition. Instead, the focus in research on adult knowledge of grammar lies on the content of the conceptual domains which are presumably part of metaphor in grammar, as well as their precise relation to which linguistic forms. The study of these aspects by observation has typically been undertaken by corpus linguists, who look at corpora of language use produced not by one child but across many language users. The potential of this type of research for drawing conclusions about the cognitive representation of metaphor in grammar in the average native speaker has been deemed restricted. It had better be seen as suggestive of specific possibilities that need to be followed up by further research than as conclusive evidence for a particular view of grammar as cognitive process and product.

. Manipulation .. Acquisition There are several points in her survey of metaphor in language acquisition where Winner (1988) draws attention to the limitations of observational evidence. One issue concerns the interpretation of word-extension by children beyond their regular meaning: For instance, even though Adam may have known that a pencil was not really a needle, he may have believed that both pencils and needles belonged to the same category and that thinness and sharpness were properties of equal salience to pencils and needles. Hence, when he calls the pencil a big needle, he may have been naming on the basis of literal rather than metaphoric similarity. To determine whether preschool children discriminate between literal and metaphoric similarity, one needs to intervene experimentally. (1988: 99)

In another passage, Winner (1988: 102) emphasizes that it is “risky” to draw strong conclusions about cognitive representations on the basis of spontaneously created metaphors. Such conclusions are generally taken as suggestive of further research questions which need to be investigated experimentally in order to offer more focus and control than is possible by observation. The conclusions themselves, therefore, cannot be taken as presenting converging evidence, since it is not conclusive, but at most evidence which is consistent or not with a particular interpretation. In line with this methodological relativism, Winner demonstrates how the value of experimental findings themselves is also dependent on the various measures of metaphor that have been used in empirical research. The main theme here is the problem of relying on children’s metalinguistic skills to test their developing linguistic and conceptual abilities of grammar. If children’s metaphorical abilities are tested by an interpretation or paraphrase task, negative findings may be due to the difficulty of the task rather than to their linguistic and cognitive abilities. Multiple-choice tasks do not

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

present a fail-proof alternative, since “they may either underrepresent or overrepresent level of understanding, depending entirely on the type and range of choices provided” (1988: 46). This is why developmental psychologists have exploited a range of other techniques. Production tasks collect verbal data which offer insight into the verbal and conceptual development of the child. Thus Vosniadou and Ortony (1983) asked children of different age groups to complete similarity statements by choosing one word out of two, from three sets of contrasts: metaphorical/literal, literal/anomalous, and metaphorical/anomalous. Because of the careful control over the experimental set-up, such data are easy to analyze in quantitative fashion. Vosniadou and Ortony found different patterns of awareness of the value of the semantic distinctions between the various age-groups, suggesting that even four-year-olds already have rudimentary metaphorical competence. However, three-year-olds seemed to conflate literal and metaphorical similarity, which is a finding that also supports the conflationdifferentiation theory more recently promoted in cognitive linguistics. A more elaborate production task requested children to complete comparisons, beginning with “He looked as gigantic as . . .” or “His voice was as quiet as . . .” (Gardner 1975). The range of children included in the study extended from groups of preschoolers to fourteen-year-olds. Their answers exhibited literal as well as metaphorical comparisons, with metaphorical comparison in turn extending from conventional to novel (if trite) linguistic forms of at heart conventional conceptual metaphors. The analysis of this type of open verbal data is more complicated than in the case of a selection task as used by Vosniadou and Ortony. More original comparisons can only be elicited by using a technique which adds a probe for novel domains (Winner 1988). Comprehension tasks can collect several types of data. One effective technique is to ask children to act out the meaning of metaphorical language, for instance with a set of dolls or puppets. Gentner and Toupin (1986) read stories to children and then asked them to act out the same story gain, but with new characters. When the new characters resembled the original characters (for instance original story with walrus but new story with seal), the children displayed better analogical transfer than when the new characters did not resemble the original characters (for instance original story with lion and new story with seal). Moreover, when the original story displayed stronger causal structure, children performed better. At the age of nine, children demonstrate accurate analogical transfer of the causal relations, irrespective of the role of resemblance between the characters. Another technique is to use visual stimuli. For instance, Gardner (1975) asked children to match terms such as loud to visuals presenting either thin lines (incorrect) or thick lines (correct). When such techniques employ nonverbal stimuli only, they investigate metaphorical ability at the level of conceptual structure with even less interaction with linguistic form. An example is the Metaphoric Triads Task (Kogan, Chadrow, & Harbour 1989). This has sets of three pictures with one pair displaying literal resemblance as opposed to another pair which displays metaphorical resemblance (for instance, between an angry man and a thunderstorm). The Kogan et al. (1989)

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

study used this method to reveal that, as children grow older, they manifest clearer preferences for human beings as targets of metaphorical constructions, and animals, plants, physical objects and events as sources. There are other variations of these techniques, but I have to refer the reader to Winner (1988, 1995) for further details. Her discussion stresses the role of various factors which can affect the validity of the findings so that conclusions have to be drawn with caution. I have mentioned the dependance on metalinguistic skills, which can cause underestimation of children’s metaphorical abilities. Other factors include the complexity of the experimental materials which increases processing load during comprehension, the presence or absence of sufficient context, and the development of sufficient knowledge of the conceptual domains involved in the metaphorical mappings (cf. Vosniadou 1987, 1989). The latter leads on to a number of studies by Frank Keil (e.g., 1979, 1989) which seem to have escaped the attention of Johnson (1999) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999a), for Keil presents a full-blown version of a conflation-differentiation theory of metaphor acquisition that is based on extensive experimental evidence. Keil’s research shows that metaphor acquisition is guided by the developing knowledge that children have of various domains. Keil (1979) presents a description of the order in which children differentiate domains, including for instance animate versus inanimate for preschoolers, and animals versus plants versus inanimate, physical objects versus inanimate nonphysical objects for seven-year olds. One criterion which Keil uses for his research is precisely whether a particular word can be appropriately applied across different categories, as is the idea behind Chris Johnson’s study. Children were presented with experimental sentences which they had to say were acceptable or meaningful to them, or not. When children did not rule out inappropriate uses of terms for a particular domain, such as “The recess is heavy” (versus “The rock is heavy”), Keil concluded that they did not have fully differentiated that domain. What counts as a metaphor in various stages of acquisition is heavily dependent on this course of conceptual development. Schecter and Broughton (1991) explore this question further in a longitudinal study with respect to children’s developing concepts of life, consciousness, and, interestingly, metaphor itself. Their results for metaphor show the following developmental course: Level 1 Level 2

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Level 3

→←

Level 4

→→

A state of undifferentiation in which the terms have only one meaning. The two meanings are seen as two different descriptions – one of people and the other of objects. Literal and nonliteral meanings (physical vs. mental) are contrasted with one another. Literal and symbolic meanings are seen as two versions of a common dimension.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Again, what counts as a metaphorical word or concept to the child is heavily determined by the child’s level of differentiation of the concept of metaphor. This is an approach within which the study by Chris Johnson (1999) and its adoption by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) can be squarely placed and evaluated for future research. One recent metaphor acquisition study within the cognitive-linguistic framework is Seyda ¸ Özçkali¸skan’s (2004) work on how English and Turkish children learn the metaphorical organization of motion verbs for talking about time. She used a wordless picture book containing four pictures for each story, and had the children look at the pictures while listening to an oral account of the story which contained a metaphorical description of the passage of time. One example of the text is the following: This is Sam and this is his grandma. Sam loves his grandma very much, but he does not get to see much of her, because she lives in a different city. This is Sam’s mom. His mother tells him that he might go see grandma when school closes. But time drips by. Days slowly crawl by. Sam can’t even study his lessons and gets bad grades.

Then the experimenter asks two finger puppets why Sam can’t study his lessons and gets bad grades. One finger puppet says “Because Sam is worried that his mom will go without him”, and the other says “Because there is too much time before school closes and Sam gets impatient”. The children are asked to pick out the correct answer and justify their choice, which is taken as one measure of their acquisition of the vocabulary relating to the time is motion metaphor. Another measure is an open-ended interview in which children are asked to describe the motion of flying as represented by a bird in a picture, in order to move on to other entities that can fly, including time, which is then elaborated by looking at a set list of other motion event types (can time fly, run, jump, pass, flow, and so on?). The results show that comprehension increases with age in both English and Turkish, and that English children acquire a wider range of motion verbs that can be conventionally used to talk about time than Turkish children, which is a reflection of a typological difference between the two languages. Some of the above studies may raise a question of interpretation. Are we talking about the cognitive representation of metaphor in usage (in particular, understanding) or of metaphor in grammar (as a slice of the product of the long-term process of acquisition)? Winner writes: “As with all psycholinguistic research, there is no pure measure of competence divorced from performance, and even grammaticality judgments may measure performance rather than competence” (1988: 48). This is of course the typical situation in experimental psychology, where data collection pertaining to long-term cognition requires the manipulation of some form of behavior. But it is generally accepted that experimenters may reasonably use measures of performance to gauge the depths of grammatical conventionalization in cognition, and the developmental stages by which they are achieved. This depends on the objectives of their research and the way they motivate their selection and application of a particular methodological approach.

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

.. Knowledge of language Measurement of competence, or the cognitive representation of grammar, in adults is in no different position. Experimental tests of claims about metaphoric representation require measures of comprehension and so on. In this section I will concentrate on the methodological discussion between Murphy (1996, 1997), Gibbs (1996; cf. 2006a, b), and Boroditsky (2000; cf. 2001; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky 2002) of the psychological validity of conceptual metaphor theory. They all formulate views which may be taken as contributions to explicating how the long-term representation of grammar in the human mind may be researched by manipulating behavior. Murphy (1996) opens the exchange by signaling the need for other evidence than linguistic evidence, that is, evidence of the kind which I have discussed in the previous chapters. This evidence is required in particular for supporting the proposal that conceptual metaphors are not just symbolically convincing but also cognitively real (e.g. 1996: 184). In collecting such evidence, a psychological model of metaphoric representation needs to be derived from the cognitive-linguistic publications, both of process and of representation as two sides of the same coin, because Murphy (1996: 176) finds the available theoretical proposals psychologically too thin. He therefore advances two alternative psychological models of conceptual metaphor theory, and opposes them to one competing alternative. In his discussion of these models, Murphy raises several issues. One of these pertains to the lack of nonlinguistic evidence for conceptual metaphor theory. Another concerns Murphy’s adoption of an alternative interpretation of metaphorically motivated polysemy, which leads to a critique of the validity of part of the linguistic evidence itself. And a third problem has to do with the relation between the cognitive-linguistic evidence and language acquisition, where Murphy raises the (rhetorical) question whether observation and experiment can indeed demonstrate that children need to acquire conceptual metaphors such as argument is war, life is a gambling game, problems are precipitates in a chemical solution; Murphy argues that children do experience argument, life, and problems in direct ways, and that wars, gambling games, and precipitates in chemical solutions are not more meaningful to them. As a result, Murphy (1996: 200) concludes that three remedies are needed for conceptual metaphor theory to make a stronger psychological case: 1. a more precise psychological model of process and representation 2. predictions and evidence of a psychological as opposed to the linguistic kind, pertaining to memory, problem solving, induction, and so on 3. comparisons with specific, reasonable alternative hypotheses These needs have since been acknowledged as reasonable by Gibbs (1996, 2006a) and others. From the present, methodological perspective, they include an emphasis on the autonomy of the area of metaphor in behavior as opposed to symbolic systems (need number 1) as well as an emphasis on the distinction between metaphor in linguistic form as opposed to conceptual structures (needs number 1 and 2). Moreover,

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Murphy’s requirements also point out the limitations of what can be said about psychological process and representation by observation: the wish for predictions and evidence of a psychological kind is a wish for experimental research. One of the researchers who has taken up this gauntlet is Lera Boroditsky (2000). She concurs with Murphy’s critical assessment of the cognitive-linguistic proposal for metaphoric representation and the aim of her paper is precisely to address each of the three requirements posed by Murphy (1996). In a first experiment, Boroditsky aims to show that the linguistic distinction between the two conceptual metaphors for time (ego-moving versus time-moving) is not just language-deep but has psychological consequences. I have discussed this experiment in Chapter 2 as an example of a deductive approach to metaphor, going from conceptual structure to cognitive representation, and this is precisely what the whole discussion between Murphy and other psychologists on the one hand and some cognitive linguists on the other is about. This evidence, however, is not detailed enough to decide between two competing psychological models of metaphorical representation, one proper topic of this chapter (question 7 in Figure 1.1). The first model would take all spatially guided understanding of time to be a result of on-line metaphorical mapping from the conceptual domain of space onto the target domain of time. The second model would take all spatially guided understanding of time to be the product of activating existing structures of the conceptual domain of time which have been influenced by the structure imported from space but which have since got represented independently in the domain of time. The former model suggests that expressions of time need to be understood by fresh actual metaphorical mappings between space and time every time they are encountered in usage, whereas the latter model suggests that on-line usage does not require a metaphorical mapping, and that, indeed, available representations of time from long-term memory do not require metaphorical mapping anymore either. Instead, the relevant structures are already there in the conceptual system of time, and they can be directly accessed and activated in processing. These are two radically different pictures of the representation of metaphorical conceptual structures, both in usage as well as in grammar. ‘Finding metaphor in thought’, as in Boroditsky’s first experiment, does not mean that it is clear where and how, precisely, metaphor resides in thought as individual cognition. A separate experiment collected data intended to discriminate between the two models (Boroditsky 2000). It showed that spatial schemas can be used to think about time, but that they are not a necessary requirement for thinking about time. This led to the conclusion that the on-line mapping model is not supported by the data. Instead the evidence supported the model which has the conceptual domain of time permanently structured in accordance with the structure of the conceptual domain of space. This model does not require renewed activation of a cross-domain mapping when time expressions have to be understood according to one or the other of the two conceptual metaphors for time. When we are talking about the metaphorical representation of time as space in cognition, then, we are talking about long-term conceptual structures in people’s mental grammars that have been influenced by a metaphorical mapping,

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

perhaps in Tomasello’s and Gibbs’s historical time; but these cognitive structures may be directly acquired as part of the grammar during ontogenetic time in early development. The relation between these two conceptual domains is not a permanently live connection in memory. The big question here is whether this specific configuration of conceptual domains in people’s individual minds can actually still be called metaphorical. Another experiment was then conducted to rule out that the alternative model might still be defended, but on the basis of process data. This experiment takes seriously, then, the idea that there may be a difference between examining processing data versus product data. In particular, product data of short-term usage behavior may not exhibit traces anymore of processes that would be relevant as support for the model which says that online metaphorical mappings take place between space and time every time a temporal utterance needs to be interpreted. Not all behavioral data collected from experimental research are equal, nor equally suitable to answer the same question. Another motive for running the new experiment was to address a different and competing explanation of the data, this time by a processing model which rejects metaphoric representation altogether. That model is called the Generic Schema View, and works by placing both the spatial and the temporal conceptual domains underneath a more generic schema which is held to guide their processing. It is not attributed to a particular author by Boroditsky, but it is quite reminiscent of the views advanced by Jackendoff and Aaronoff (1991; cf. Jackendoff 2002) discussed in Chapter 2. The findings of the new experiment appear to rule out both alternative accounts. The Metaphoric Structuring View proposed by Boroditsky (2000) as one psychological model of conceptual metaphor theory can be provisionally maintained. Experimental research is hence intimately tied to theoretical argumentation. It is aimed at comparing alternative models by formulating precise predictions which can be derived from them and can be contrasted. These can then be tested in various ways, for instance by collecting process and product data. Not all of these data have equal weight or consequences for evaluating the differences between the theories. Nor is it the case that performance measures such as a comprehension task are necessarily limited to saying something about performance and not about competence, or, in our case, grammar. Boroditsky’s (2000) study may even be interpreted as setting up a contrast between a usage versus a grammar model of metaphoric representation, which was studied by collecting process and product data by manipulation. Finding metaphor in the processes and products may still lead to conclusions about metaphor in the processes and products of grammar. Another way in which these experiments are tied to theoretical argumentation is by their intentional focus on the conceptual structures of metaphor. They have nothing to say about the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar as cognition. That is an area of research which deals with the ways in which metaphorical meanings of words have been stored in people’s private lexico-grammar, which is relatively independent from the structures of people’s conceptual systems that have to do with time and space.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Mental dictionaries have recently received renewed and exciting attention from Rachel Giora (2003), who has developed a novel perspective on their nature by investigating the Graded Salience Hypothesis about lexical access. The upshot of this work for our present concerns is that the various meanings of words (and probably other lexico-grammatical constructions as well) have varying degrees of cognitive salience in our individual minds. During usage, “more salient meanings – coded meanings foremost on our mind due to conventionality, frequency, familiarity, or prototypicality – are accessed faster than and reach sufficient levels of activation before less salient ones” (Giora 2003: 10). For some words, metaphorical meanings would be more salient than nonmetaphorical ones, whereas for other words, nonmetaphorical meanings would be more salient than metaphorical ones. For computer freaks, the word mouse might hence have a most salient sense that is metaphorical, whereas for petshopkeepers, mouse might have a most salient sense that is not metaphorical. The relation with metaphor identification is clear. Recall our discussion of fervent and ardent and different generations of language users. From a psychological or behavioral perspective on metaphor in lexico-grammar, we can now make a justifiable distinction between two groups of language users. The older group would probably have a polysemous mental representation of fervent and ardent, with the temperature sense still equally salient as the emotion sense. But the younger group would have a highly salient emotion sense for the words, as opposed to a very weak or totally absent temperature sense. For the former group, a metaphorical mapping between the two senses might still be achievable in cognition, but for the latter that would be highly problematic or simply impossible. The experimental methods discussed in this section provide exciting opportunities for further exploring these issues in the coming years.

. Conclusion In this chapter I have considered how converging evidence can be collected for answering two questions: Q5: When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q7: When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? I have divided each question up into two subdomains of research, for acquisition and for knowledge of language. The former emphasizes a dynamic, developmental view of these long-term processes, whereas the latter emphasizes a more static and idealizing view – as is customary in most linguistic approaches to grammar. A truly cognitive approach, however, would have to look at all long-term cognitive representation of grammar as both dynamic and in transience as well as temporarily fixed.

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

In operationalizing these questions, I have suggested, a number of decisions have to be made. For linguistic form, the following issues have been lifted from the area of symbolic research into metaphor in grammar:

Finding a metaphorically motivated linguistic form 1. Decide what counts as one form 2. Decide whether it has at least two senses 3. Decide whether the two senses are related by some form of nonliteral similarity a. nonliteral similarity should be able to be opposed to both literal similarity and literal hierarchy; each of these oppositions involves the possibility for the analyst to specify two fundamentally different semantic or conceptual domains. b. the direction of the derivation or mapping has to be founded on a criterion of basicness, whether that is historical, experiential, acquisitional, and so on. For the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar taken as knowledge of language, the following issues arise:


Identifying a cross-domain mapping 4. Decide about the relative salience of the two domains as distinct conceptual systems Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, typically, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. 5. Decide about the necessary and sufficient degree of similarity required for a mapping, since corresponding elements between two domains may be relatively more or less similar Decide about the role of types of correspondences between domains, such as external similarity versus relations, and relations versus higher-order relations. Decide about minimal and maximal number of correspondences required for an analysis to be accepted as complete.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Each of these issues about operationalizing the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar as cognition have to be decided with respect to their position in acquisition research versus research on knowledge of language. We have seen that there are important differences between the ways in which researchers utilize the three main methods for data collection. –

Introspective methods are problematic. Several distinctions need to be respected in discussing the role of introspective methods, and when this is done, there does not seem to remain a lot of room for using introspection in collecting data for the analysis of metaphor in grammar as cognitive process and product. ◦ The first distinction has to do with grammar as cognitive process and product versus grammar as symbolic system and structure. When introspection is used to study grammar, it mostly applies to the analysis of symbolic system and structure, not to the analysis of the cognitive processes and products of real people acquiring and representing language in real time. ◦ The second distinction has to do with theory formation versus data collection in research. When introspection is used in the behavioral study of grammar, it is typically used to form theories and hypotheses, not to do research by collecting data through self-observing the analyst’s own cognitive processes. And even when the emphasis is on the analyst’s personal knowledge of language (the product of these long-term processes), there is little controlled procedure in introspective data collection which may be replicated in other studies. Instead, there is a typical mixture of theory-formation, data collection, and data analysis which are all reported in argumentative academic prose. ◦ The third distinction concerns data collection by introspection versus qualitative data analysis capitalizing on intuitions. The term introspection is often used to refer to the latter stage of research, with analysts looking at observational instead of introspective data.

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Observational methods collect verbal and nonverbal data from children and from adults. For children, these are typically recordings of natural conversations in context. For adults, they are typically based on corpora which include natural spoken interaction as well as all sorts of mostly public (i.e., published) writing. For children, the analysis of conversations has focused on linguistic forms as well as conceptual structures, which have both been taken as indicative of the cognitive processes and products of metaphor acquisition. Symbolic play is another type of data collected by observation, which is nonverbal. The analysis is typically qualitative but may yield quantitative findings in terms of frequencies and distributions. The inconclusive nature of evidence that is only based on the observation of natural language behavior has been stressed for various research questions about the cognitive processes and products of acquisition. For adults, corpus linguists refrain from drawing hard-and-fast conclusions about the cognitive representation of grammar on the basis of observed language pat-

Chapter 9. Cognitive processes and products in grammar 

–

terns. They are joined in this assessment of the limited possibilities of observed linguistic evidence by psycholinguists. What comes out of this research, then, is either to be seen as pertaining to the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of grammar as symbolic systems, whose cognitive representation needs to be researched separately; or it needs to be seen as data that are the result of cognitive process and products which are in need of further explanation by cognitive modeling. Here, too, then, there is an awareness of the restricted value of language patterns as evidence collected by observation for theories about the cognitive representation of grammar. Experimental methods have been used to collect verbal, nonverbal, and meta data from both children and adults. They have tapped the cognitive processes and products of acquiring and maintaining grammar regarding linguistic forms as well as conceptual structures of metaphor. Their data analysis is typically quantitative, which increases the reliability of the findings. In many cases, the interpretation of these findings is directed by assessing their relation to two or even more alternative hypotheses, which have informed the experimental design. Such experiments are often carried out to address questions which cannot be answered by mere observation. Converging evidence for these questions can hence only exist in the form of different forms of experimental evidence, since these would presumably be the only type of permissible evidence that is relevant to the details of the question under investigation.

The methodological situation in the area of grammar as cognitive process and product is radically different than in the area of grammar as symbolic system and structure. In symbolic research, all three types of data collection play an important role, and can produce evidence that may be compared with each other in order to see whether it converges to the same conclusion. In the area of the behavioral research of grammar, however, there is a clear scale of usefulness: experimental research outranks observational research, while research by means of introspective data collection raises questions about its function in the research, since it usually conflates data collection with theory formation or data analysis. This is one way in which the converging evidence in one area of research – symbolic structure – may have a different nature than the converging evidence in another area of research – cognitive processes and its products. In the encompassing area of metaphor identification in grammar, converging evidence for metaphor is quite variable. The status, use and validity of the three main methods of data collection (introspection, observation, and manipulation) as well the two main methods of data analysis (quantitative and qualitative) varies considerably between the four more specific areas of research. This raises fundamental questions about the possibilities for collecting comparable converging evidence across all areas of research. It points to the need for new research projects that require extra effort but which may be strategically important.

 

Finding metaphor in usage

chapter 

Linguistic forms and conceptual structures in usage (1) Metaphorical language use

In this chapter we make the transition from finding metaphor in grammar to finding metaphor in usage. We are also changing back from metaphor identification in cognitive processing and its products to finding metaphor in language analyzed as symbolic structure. These are two shifts of attention at once. What does not change is the combined attention to the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor in the compass of one chapter. Even though these are two distinct areas of research, we will look at them at the same time for reasons of space. This will lead to intermittent comments about their relation as well as their independence. Looking at usage as symbolic structure as opposed to grammar as symbolic structure involves a shift between two different perspectives on metaphor. The philosopher Josef Stern makes a distinction between linguistic metaphor as type versus token (2000). Conversation analysts, discourse analysts, and applied linguists prefer to talk about situated meanings versus system-based meanings (e.g. Cameron & Low 1999; Musolff 2004). Terms like these are also used by cognitive linguists like Langacker (2000), Turner and Fauconnier (2000), and Kövecses (2002). Whether the contrast is labeled as grammar versus usage, system versus use, or type versus token, it is clear that the identification of metaphor in usage, to many linguists, includes a more specific and situated operation of meaning identification than in grammar. The reason of this difference is easy to see. When linguistic signs are studied as conventionalized lexico-grammatical items, their conventionalized senses are typically compared and analyzed with respect to the senses of other lexico-grammatical items in the overall inventory of constructions. In doing so, abstractions are inevitably made across imagined or real or even elicited situations of usage of particular signs, and attention gets focused on the meaning that is constant across these contexts of use (‘sense’). This holds for both the source domain and the target domain of the metaphorically used expressions that are examined. But when linguistic signs are studied as symbolic units in usage, they are situated in concrete linguistic and situational contexts which highlight more variable features of their presumed function and effect. Relatively schematic lexico-grammatical signs and structures are enriched with additional specific linguistic and situational information which create ‘meaning’. The most conspicuous difference has to do with the

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

specific nature of the target domain of the local stretch of discourse that a particular metaphorically used term is used in. In most messages, we know numerous details about the content of the intended target domain, because they are part of the dominant conceptual frame of the discourse. This gives a fundamentally different feel to the study of language as usage in contrast with the study of language as grammar. It is these specific, situated meanings of metaphors that discourse analysts and other students of language as usage, such as literary critics, theologians, historians, anthropologists, therapists, political scientists, and media analysts typically attempt to identify. The methodological issue which is central to part three concerns the specification of metaphorical meaning in the cotext and context of concrete usage events. The encompassing notion for finding metaphor in usage needs to be broader than just indirectness by polysemy or by conventional simile, phrasal idiom, and sayings or proverbs: in usage we need to consider all indirect meaning that is based in nonliteral similarity, conventionalized, obsolete and novel. It is the task for Chapters 10 and 11 to see how this can be achieved by the various methods that are available for research on symbolic structures. In the present chapter, I will look at the following two questions phrased in Chapter 1: Q2: When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q4: When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical? The relation of these phenomena to the cognitive processes and products of metaphor in usage is deferred until Chapter 12.

. Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach One way in which the deductive approach can be developed in the area of usage is by looking at the ways in which postulated conceptual metaphors can explain or motivate the incidence in usage of conventional linguistic signs, but also of obsolete signs as well as novel signs that have not been grammatically conventionalized as metaphorical yet. This is the typical two-domain perspective pursued by Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Another way in which a deductive approach can be developed, however, is by taking any metaphorical expression in usage as a unique contribution to an utterance or text and then account for part of its local and specific metaphorical meaning by deductively applying the relevant conceptual metaphors that may play a role in its function. This is the typical many-space angle, advocated by Conceptual Integration Theory. Both are valid if radically different manners of exploiting the deductive potential of the cognitive-linguistic approach to finding metaphor in usage, as I will now try to show.

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

.. Two-domain approaches A useful illustration of applying Conceptual Metaphor Theory to finding the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor in the symbolic structures of usage is Chilton (1996). He investigated the way in which the concept of security was shaped by metaphor in a series of public documents in western politics over a period of fifty years. The subtitle of his study is indicative of the angle on the materials: “Cold war discourse from containment to common house”. The method of the study is discourse-analytical, with a number of conventional conceptual metaphors and image schemas steering the research on the speeches and texts. For instance, the notion in American politics of containment, aiming to build up strength against the Russians in order to force them into political agreement, is analyzed with reference to the container schema. This schema suggests that the policy of containment should define an interior, an exterior, and a boundary, and this is how metaphorical concepts can lead to practical policy as well the linguistic forms that express it. What is special about Chilton’s study is the way it traces the historical development of the metaphorical application of the container schema, together with three other fundamental schemas (person, path, and force), over a period of half a century of international politics. Chilton hence moves back and forth between the conceptual structures and the linguistic forms of well-known metaphors of security. An impressive number of speeches, political documents, and media texts is analyzed in what amounts to a partial history of cold war discourse and the role of metaphor in it. The metaphorical image of the iron curtain, for instance, is one of the data that receives a motivated position in the overall story. The texts are analyzed and interpreted off-stage, illustrations demonstrating the kinds of decisions Chilton makes about words belonging to a particular source domain. These analyses are guided by assumptions about conventional conceptual metaphor which are based in the cognitive-linguistic literature. For instance, argument is war is held to motivate the metaphorical application of words like deadly struggle, destruction of rival, destructive, and combat to talk about diplomatic argument (1996: 139). Similarly, use is made of a general and a specific metaphor labeled organizations are oriented up-down structures and organizations are buildings, which are held to account for the metaphorical use of such words as foundations, planes, basic, building up and others to refer to political activities (1996: 142). The collection of these terms, however, and the analysis of their precise relation to the underlying conceptual metaphors, is not reported as a separate stage of the study. Most of the expressions discussed by Chilton are conventionalized linguistic forms. However, novel linguistic metaphors are also encountered. And many of these metaphors ostensibly exhibit a degree of coherence, which ties in with Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999a) ninth type of evidence for conceptual metaphor, discourse coherence. Together then, three of the nine categories of evidence for conceptual metaphor adduced by Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) play a role in Chilton’s study: polysemy, novel metaphor, and discourse coherence.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

One striking example of their combination, also involving container, person and path schemas, is the following quotation from Chilton’s (1996: 195) data: (1) Once a party line has been laid down . . . the whole Soviet government machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy moves along the path, like a toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets some unanswerable force. The individuals who are components of this machine are unamenable to reason which comes to them from outside sources. Some of these words are used indirectly to indicate their referents, such as moves along the path, qualifying as metaphorically motivated polysemy. Other words are used directly to indicate their referents, such as a toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction. The latter words directly designate a new frame of reference which is offered to the addressee for nonliteral comparison with the local topic of the ambient discourse. Metaphor in usage is expressed in nonliteral, indirect language as well as in literal, direct language. It should also be noted how this area of research differs from grammar because of the unique and individuated meaning of any piece of situated discourse. Thus, the fact that we are dealing with the government machine of the Soviet Union adds a dimension of size to the picture of moving along a path which is specific to this occasion. Since the Soviet Union was a massive country, and since it is in this context connected to associations of threat and fear, the use of “moves along a path” acquires a particular image quality which emphasizes the dimension of size beyond its common use in this metaphor. What is also interesting is that this particular quality is then almost undermined by the next image that is used in the text, which continues the theme of movement along a path, but actually downsizes the complete picture to one of children’s toys. This shift of perspective on the size of the metaphorical mapping may account for the sense of oddness which I experience with this text. In comparison with grammar, the identification of the nature of a metaphor in usage, then, is guided in much more concrete detail by the specific information that is naturally available about the target domain, which is typically part of the topic or more generally content of the discourse. A synchronic variant of the deductive approach by means of the two-domain theory is Koller’s (2004) study of business is war in business media discourse. This is a deductive study because it assumes that the conceptual metaphor has been established by previous research and proceeds to investigate how that metaphor is realized in various expressions in a specific genre of writing. The study was carried out in a fundamentally different way than in the case of Chilton, who was interested in the role of metaphor in the constitution of specific political meanings in a series of unique usage events that were all taken as separate cases contributing to the course of international history. Koller is interested in patterns of metaphorical usage across collections of texts. Chilton’s study is idiographic and diachronic, concentrating on a sequence of

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

single cases, whereas Koller’s is nomothetic and synchronic, focusing on patterns in one set of cases. Koller first identifies and delimits three lexical fields as expressions of just as many conceptual source domains for two target domains: war, sports, and games for marketing and sales, and fighting, mating, and feeding for mergers and acquisitions. For each of these six lexical fields, 35 lemmas are selected, including the various grammatical categories of noun, verb, and adjective/adverb for each lemma. For instance, for the lexical field of ‘games’, use is made of words like ace, bet/to bet, and play, player/to play, to outplay, and playful. The occurrence of all of these words and their related conceptual implications in business discourse was then presumed to be metaphorical, on the condition that their basic meaning could indeed be shown to be related to the source domains in question. This condition was needed to be able to claim that their use in the domain of discourse was indeed metaphorical, as is consistent with the general idea that metaphorical meaning has to be indirect and different from some basic meaning. This condition was tested by checking the description of the various lemmas in a number of dictionaries. Not each expression found in the corpus can be taken as an expression of the conceptual metaphors business is war and so on. For instance, embrace is presented as one expression of the domain of ‘mating’, but when it is used in embrace the idea, it does not qualify as an expression of business is war but as an expression of an aspect of the metaphorical conceptualization of the domain of ideas. These irrelevant metaphorical expressions hence had to be removed from the data. All remaining expressions were linguistic metaphors related to the conceptual metaphors constructing business as war, sports, games, fighting, mating, and feeding, yielding a wealth of materials for the linguistic and conceptual analysis of metaphor in usage. These data were then quantitatively analyzed to yield findings about absolute frequencies of metaphoric expressions and metaphor density, with relative frequencies of metaphoric expressions across the three source domains, and across word classes by domains. For business media on marketing, for instance, metaphorical uses of words that have to do with war, sports, games, and romance, occur no fewer than 5.3 times per 1,000 words, with the war field being predominant. Conventional expressions are most frequent, but novel realizations can be found as well, one example being Dell’s efficiency jihad. Breakdown according to word class reveals a preference for nouns, which is interpreted by Koller as stimulating richer reference than verbs or adjectives, which by definition are slightly more abstract. A qualitative analysis of four sample texts is also presented, to throw the quantitative findings into relief and to demonstrate their potential for application in idiographic research. Each of the texts is representative of the general tendency for war metaphors to be most frequent. When looking at the texts as wholes, they also evoke entire metaphoric scenarios, concentrating on aggressive movements by contenders over territory, or movements by runners in a race. These scenarios are realized by metaphoric chains which develop across the length of the articles. Some alternative

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

metaphors in the text are also discussed and serve to relativize the general patterns with respect to specific and unique occasions of discourse. A conceptual model of marketing is derived from the linguistic data, with various conceptual source domains receiving their own position in the encompassing structure. This move crosses the border between linguistic and conceptual metaphor identification. Koller then interprets the linguistic and conceptual data in terms of their expression of capitalist and masculine views of business and does not make a distinction from their corresponding cognitive impact on the readership. My methodological concern here is that texts may be seen as symbolic reflections of the views of their authors and what they want to convey to their readers, but that this does not necessarily equal their individual authors’ actual intentions. Nor can the presumed functions of texts for readers be that easily equated with their actual cognitive effects upon those readers. These contentions would constitute a move from research on metaphor in the symbolic structure of usage to its cognitive processing and representation. As far as I am concerned, therefore, the latter move is speculative and not supported by relevant data. This is a moment where a map of the field raises questions about the validity of conclusions drawn about metaphor in one area (cognition by authors and readers) on the basis of data for metaphor in another area (linguistic forms and conceptual structures in the symbolic domain of documents). There are hence various ways in which metaphor may be found in the symbolic structure of usage within the framework of two-domain theory. It may be found by making assumptions about source domains or about target domains, as in Chilton, or about combinations of them, as in Koller. These approaches may be equally well applied in historical as well as in synchronic research. Chilton’s is a diachronic study which also illustrates how an idiographic interest, concentrating on the details of metaphor usage in unique texts, can be combined with an interest in more encompassing patterns, tracing the development of a number of metaphorical models across a consecutive series of texts over time. Koller’s is a synchronic study which demonstrates the applicability of two-domain theory in deductive fashion to find patterns of linguistic metaphor in usage, which may then serve to act as a background for the interpretation of individual texts. Koller also shows how such deductively collected linguistic data then feed back into the conceptual analysis that formed the starting point, in that new and more detailed conceptual models of business as war may be formulated for further investigation. This part of her analysis is decidedly qualitative, although it is based on a rigorous quantitative study of the linguistic patterns. Her conclusions about the presumed cognitive effects however are less well-founded. By contrast, Chilton’s entire study is qualitative, whether he deals with linguistic forms or conceptual structures. There are hence many methodological details which can be different between two applications of the two-domain theory in a deductive approach to a large set of texts in usage.

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

.. Many-space approaches The relation between many-space theory and the deductive approach is slightly more complex. Some analysts have voiced doubts about the possibility of a deductive approach by means of Blending Theory. For instance, Hamilton (2002: 418) writes: . . . examining blends is always a bottom-up process: one finds an artifact that results from blending (e.g., an analogy) and unpacks the psychological steps that produced the result. Analyzing blends is very rarely a top-down process where one places two random input spaces side by side and then predicts what the resulting blend will be. In other words, blending is a process, not a predictor of results, and its utility arises when items like analogies, counterfactuals, and metaphors are not always describable by the dual-domain model offered by conceptual metaphor theory.

This is a view which is shared among other practitioners of Blending Theory, but I believe that it is misleading. Grady et al. (1999), Turner and Fauconnier (2000), and Grady (2005) have indicated that conventionalized metaphors can function as inputs into the construction of a conceptual integration network which displays the conceptual structure of a metaphor in usage, so that deductive analyses are possible. Moreover, analysts may aim to study this as a psychological process, as is intended by Hamilton, but this is not the only option: metaphor in usage may also be analyzed as symbolic structure, and this may in fact be the more valid interpretation of what goes on in such research, since behavioral data pertaining to ongoing processes of blending are not often used in these examinations. In this section I only talk about the symbolic analysis of the structure of conceptual integration networks, without making any assumptions about cognitive processes or their products. The most important properties of Blending Theory for the purposes of this section may be illustrated with reference to Turner and Fauconnier’s (2000) re-analysis of anger is heat. They summarize the conceptual correspondences between the two domains of heat (or physical events) and anger (or emotions) as described by Kövecses (1986) and Lakoff (1987) and include a third domain of body symptoms (or physiology) as a separate conceptual domain which is metonymically linked to the domain of emotions. The emotion of anger is metonymically linked to the physiological feature of body heat, and the two of them may be metaphorically linked to heat in physical events. Turner and Fauconnier then add a fourth conceptual space, the blended space, which represents combinations of concepts that are impossible in any of the other spaces. This conceptual integration network serves to identify the following sentence as a blend: (2) He was so mad I could see the smoke coming out of his ears The authors contend that (2) is a blend because anger does not lead to smoke in the real world, and that (2) can be understood as a blend because there are these conceptual correspondences between heat, emotion, and physiology which can locate both

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

anger, ears and smoke within their respective conceptual systems. The structural as well as deductive nature of this type of analysis is explicitly highlighted by Turner and Fauconnier (2000: 137): “Of course, the structure of the Blend itself is highly dependent on the conventional metaphorical mapping of heat to anger.” Indeed, Barcelona (2002: 219) wonders whether the blend cannot be entirely explained by the information available from the two-domain analysis. Barcelona comes close to interpreting the blended space as a structural, symbolic representation of working memory, with input from long-term knowledge structures that have been organized by conceptual metaphors. Whether all typical blends are special cases of cross-space mapping or not is a question which has to remain unanswered. That Blending Theory, apart from being applied in inductive fashion, may also be developed and investigated deductively, however, utilizing the available proposals for conceptual metaphor, is not in doubt. The methodology with which this is supposed to take place, however, is less clear. And finally, the relation between an expression like (2) and let us say regular metaphor is another intricate problem. In sum, the deductive approach to metaphor in usage includes a number of variants. First of all, there is the distinction between assuming a two-domain framework or a many-space framework. Secondly, the goal of the research may be more nomothetic or idiographic. There seems to be an association between the many-space approach and idiographic research, but the two-domain approach may be used for both purposes, even though its role in identifying the nature of metaphorical meaning in a specific usage event is necessarily partial. The stage of analysis typically co-varies: idiographic research is typically qualitative whereas nomothetic research can be either qualitative or quantitative. Thirdly, there is the direction of the deductive approach: the typical form, of course, is to go from the conceptual structures to the linguistic forms, but the opposite direction may also be followed, as when Koller uses her linguistic data to derive a new and refined conceptual model for business as war. These combinations of possibilities lead to many variants of the deductive approach in cognitive linguistics to finding metaphor in usage. These variants do not necessarily all support the same types of conclusions for the same areas of research. Whether these are equally valid types of evidence for metaphor in usage that may be usefully said to converge, therefore, is a complicated matter.

. Conceptualization .. From grammar to usage To appreciate the difference between finding metaphor in grammar versus usage, it is important to realize that the analysis of usage does not necessarily stop at the border of what the grammatical meaning of a conventionally metaphorical expression is. Finding metaphor in usage as opposed to grammar is typically a matter of identifying

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

more specific, situated meanings of a linguistic form, because it contributes to and is influenced by the nature of a specific message. In particular, the identity of the target domain is commonly more specifically developed in specific messages than can be predicted by most general conventionalized metaphorical mappings between source and target domains. One issue in the study of metaphor in usage, therefore, is the extent of incorporation of specific details from the target domain in the reconstruction of the overall cross-domain mapping. One interesting illustration of this type of discourse meaning, which is deliberately contrasted with grammatical meaning, can be found in Anita Naciscione’s (2001) study of phraseological units. The opposition between grammar and usage for the study of phrases is captured by Naciscione’s distinction between the base form and its core use on the one hand (part of the grammar, and may occur in usage) and instantial stylistic use on the other (only occurs in usage). Take her case of the conventionalized metaphorical idiom the course of true love never did run smooth, which dates back to Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream, and consider its instantial stylistic use in the following quotation from D.H. Lawrence’s short story “Mr Noon”: (3) The course of true love is said never to run true. But never did the course of any love run so jagged as that of Joanna and Mr. Noon. (Naciscione 2001: 74) The second sentence of this quotation involves the manifestly instantial use, a creative extension of the base form which is quite specific. But the base form itself, too, receives a specific situated meaning in the context of the encompassing discourse: the second sentence retroactively turns the meaning of the phrase “never run true” into something stronger and more specific, to the effect of “run at least somewhat jagged”. The grammatical meaning of the base form is there but it is attuned to the usage event. When finding metaphor in language is not restricted to describing the regular meanings and uses of the conventionalized expressions which are part of grammar but is extended to include all expressions of cross-domain mappings which may be found in usage, the range of metaphor which may be found in language is dramatically increased. Not only do we find obsolete as well as novel situational meanings of conventionally linguistic metaphors, or novel metaphorical expressions of conventional conceptual and linguistic metaphors, but entirely new metaphors are also to be encountered. It has, again, been one of the great contributions of cognitive linguistics to draw attention to the value of these various phenomena. These are usage phenomena which may be called metaphorical language use without causing any confusion or need for clarification. This nomenclature is less natural, however, for another category of metaphor in usage, which has attracted less interest. For there are also implicit forms of metaphor in usage, which cannot be identified with respect to their linguistic form alone, as the previous examples are. An illustration is the following line from Alfred Lord Tennyson (Steen 2002a): (4) Now sleeps the crimson petal, now the white

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

From the perspective of usage, this line contains two comparable metaphors in conceptual structure, but they are expressed by radically different linguistic forms. The first utterance explicitly profiles that the crimson petal performs an action that is metaphorically conceived of as sleeping, and does this by means of the indirect use of the language form sleeping. This is a classic case of metaphorical language use. It should be contrasted with the second utterance, which does the same for a white petal, but in an entirely different linguistic form: it does not exhibit a linguistic manifestation of the metaphorical action of sleeping. It is more problematic to call this phenomenon metaphorical language use because metaphorical language use is typically interpreted as the indirect but explicit use of linguistic signs. Implicit metaphor is a typical usage phenomenon. In that respect it may be compared with Naciscione’s notion of instantial use. Both arise because of the power of the conceptual structures representing connected discourse and situations of usage. Implicit metaphor and other forms of metaphor are moreover not limited to novels and poems, but occur in all types of discourse, as the following example of implicit metaphor from a conversation may illustrate: (5) A: Told him he’s a ignorant pig. I couldn’t help it, I was so angry with him. B: Ooh A: He’s taking the piss out of me pulling a rack through. He wouldn’t get out the bloody way. Laughed his head off and B: He pushed me the other night. I fucking pushed him back. A: I said you’re just you’re just a ignorant pig. Shut your bloody . . . B: But he is. A: . . .mouth or. The last turn by B is an implicit expression of the idea, or conceptual structure, that ‘he is an ignorant pig’. Phenomena like implicit metaphor dramatize the fact that it is the conceptual structure behind the language which contains the metaphorical mapping in usage, as is held by cognitive linguists and discourse analysts alike. Implicit metaphor raises the question what sorts of linguistic methods have to be applied to discover metaphor in discourse if it can be expressed in such varied ways. In particular, if we still assume that metaphor in usage is also a matter of finding indirect meaning which works by nonliteral similarity, as is suggested by our overall definition of metaphor, then the definition of indirect meaning has to be able to cater to all forms of indirect meaning in usage, including both metaphorical language use (conventional, obsolete and novel) as well as implicit metaphor and related phenomena. The task of the next subsection will be to address this issue of definition.

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

.. Defining metaphorical linguistic forms in usage: Indirectness and incongruity Indirectness. Finding the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar is based on the notion of indirect meaning, in accordance with the generally accepted position in cognitive linguistics. After all, the cognitive approach to metaphor involves understanding one thing in terms of another, and this explains the relation between metaphor and indirectness in language: when one understands one thing in terms of another, one typically also speaks about one thing in terms of another, and this causes indirect meaning. If grammar emerges from usage, it is advisable to conceptualize the identification of linguistic forms of metaphor in usage along the same lines. The notion of indirectness in usage also has to be such that it can cater to the following manifestations of metaphor: –

Conventional metaphorical language use in discourse: ◦ The course of true love is said never to run true. But never did the course of any love run so jagged as that of Joanna and Mr. Noon. The wonder is, it ever got there at all.

–

Novel metaphorical language use in discourse: ◦ The course of true love is said never to run true. But never did the course of any love run so jagged as that of Joanna and Mr. Noon. ◦ Now sleeps the crimson petal, now the white

–

Metaphor in meaning and thought expressed by implicit language in discourse (ellipsis and substitution): ◦ Now sleeps the crimson petal, now [sleeps] the white ◦ But he is [an ignorant pig]

–

Metaphor in meaning and thought expressed by language that is not metaphorically used in discourse, as in simile and comparable rhetorical forms (the following examples, from Croft & Cruse [2004], have been discussed in Chapter 3): ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦


All of these examples from usage require different types of formal linguistic analysis, but all examples share an ability to express or trigger cross-domain mappings in the conceptual structures of discourse; they may also all be seen as forms of indirect meaning if that is conceptualized in the following way. Metaphor in usage involves talking or writing about one thing in terms of something else, in order for people to understand one thing in terms of something else. When we concentrate on the symbolic structure of the language of talk and text, we

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

examine the ways in which such talk and text is formally shaped. You may indeed talk about one thing in terms of something else, and hence employ metaphorically used language. Yet it is not inevitable for a speaker or writer to explicitly express either the source or the target concepts that are involved, since it is possible to use ellipsis and substitution; the formal manifestations of these choices do not constitute metaphorically used language in the formal linguistic sense of the term (as in the second part of example [4]), but they do involve metaphor in usage if it is taken as a symbolic reflection of a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual structures of verbal interaction. And it is also possible for a language user to understand one thing in terms of another and present both conceptual domains in directly used language forms, in order for the addressee to process them as two distinct and different conceptual domains or spaces. These then need to be connected by means of a cross-domain mapping that has to be built in conceptual structure on the basis of the linguistic information provided (as in the case of simile, analogy, extended comparison, and so on). In these diverging linguistic forms of metaphor, there are always at least two different conceptual systems (domains or spaces), which function as a source and a target domain. The target domain concepts designate target domain referents which, for a particular stretch of discourse, are part of the current topic. The use of a sourcedomain concept involves an indirect manner of talking about a target domain concept and referent, which are part of the going concerns of the discourse. Thus, in Tennyson, both the explicit as well as the ellipted concepts ‘sleep’ are indirectly related to their presumably intended discourse elements in the conceptual target domains. A potential conceptual candidate in the target domain needs to be inferred from the set of referents that the line is about, and this clearly is some ‘action’ that is performed by the crimson petal. The same holds for the other examples. In (3), course and run may be said to relate indirectly to discourse concepts in the target domain which are part of the local discourse topic of ‘love’. And even a waterfall and a dishrag, in the last two examples for simile from Croft and Cruse, are only indirectly connected to the local topic of their respective sentences, through comparison, even though they are directly expressed themselves. It is only this type of conceptual approach to discourse coherence which is able to capture all of these different linguistic manifestations of metaphor as so many variations of indirectness. A purely formal linguistic approach would not be able to include simile and nonliteral comparison, nor substitution and ellipsis, because they do not exhibit metaphorical language use if that is restricted to indirectly used language forms as such. This is the place where another distinction between finding metaphor in grammar versus metaphor in usage becomes conspicuous. The study of metaphor in grammar necessarily looks at the conventionally metaphorical senses of specific linguistic signs, such as words, or morphemes, or phrases, or more complex constructions. These signs can either have more than one sense, one of which is metaphorical, as in attack, or can consist of two components which contrast two domains, as in frogman or stubborn as a

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

mule. All of these senses are part of a set that pertain to one conventional sign, which, for instance, can be found in a dictionary. In usage however, we are not looking at signs, but at utterances in discourse. These deploy language signs in a range of concrete ways, and it is possible to leave part of the intended meaning implicit. That is why in usage a conceptual approach is more adequate than a grammatical orientation to the use of linguistic signs: a conceptual approach is able to recover the intended but implicit conceptual structures required to maintain the coherence of the utterance and message. Here, too, the difference between concentrating on metaphor as linguistic form versus conceptual structure is an important and helpful factor in clarifying the conceptualization of metaphor. It can explain why some linguistic forms do not exhibit metaphorical language use but still need to be analyzed as expressions of metaphor in usage. This conceptual approach to usage is a crucial element of most if not all discourse analysis in linguistics, psycholinguistics, and sociolinguistics (cf. Hamilton, Schiffrin, & Tannen 2001). It is precisely the reason why many discourse analysts are interested in the conceptual approach to language as grammar and usage advocated by cognitive linguists. One particularly interesting synthetic model of many of the general insights in discourse analysis is Herbert Clark’s (1996) psychological approach to language use as a form of coordinated joint activity between language users who need to align their conceptual structures with each other. The relevance of this viewpoint to the symbolic study of metaphor is attested by for instance the following recent publication in Critical Discourse Analysis, which does not relate to Clark’s discourse psychology but advocates the same ideas: If we can make something congruent (while apparently incongruent) it means that we have engaged in a joint activity of meaning creation that goes against what is normally codified within the semantic system. (Charteris-Black 2004: 12)

Usage as a form of coordinated joint activity between language users provides an attractive general conceptualization for metaphor scholars (cf. Booth 1978), especially when they aim to analyze the linguistic forms of metaphor as expressive of a crossdomain mapping in conceptual structure.

Incongruity. The explicit or implicit co-presence of two conceptual domains in one stretch of discourse – whether that is a phrase, an utterance, a sentence, a paragraph, or even more encompassing stretches of discourse is immaterial – creates some form of tension, incongruity, anomaly, and so on (cf. Cameron 1999a: 20). The evocation of the source domain has even been said “to go against accepted practice” or to constitute a violation of the discourse expectations related to some default frame (Cameron 1999a: 20–21). But this view only works if “accepted practice” and “default frame” are interpreted in a special way, since much conventional metaphor is accepted practice and part of the default frame of expectations regarding a particular topic. In my view, incongruity reflects something fundamental about any metaphor in usage, and that is that it causes a potential problem for coherence (Steen 2002c).

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Within one continuous stretch of discourse, the source domain is a foreign intruder, or it would not be a source domain. It is this apparent lack of coherence that causes the feeling of tension, defeated expectations, anomaly, and so on. Thus, the word sleeps in the Tennyson line above can be said to create a threat to coherence, because the context of usage does not afford a regular or permissible agent to do the sleeping. Language users presumably need to resolve this apparent problem by performing or retrieving a mapping from the concepts belonging to the source domain to the concepts belonging to the target domain. The notion of incongruity goes back to such sources as Kittay (1987). It is a venerable linguistic criterion for finding indirect meaning. But there are two difficulties with incongruity. One is that it is too broad. It does not just signal metaphor. It also signals metonymy, irony, humor and possibly other forms of indirect meaning. Incongruity and its result of conceptual tension may therefore be a necessary condition for finding metaphor in usage, but it is not sufficient. Incongruity always needs to be supplemented as a criterion for metaphor by another feature (just like indirectness always needs to be supplemented by adding the criterion of some form of nonliteral similarity). When incongruity plays its role in irony and humor, this can be resolved by shifting the frame of reference from the original frame to a new, unexpected frame (Attardo 2001; Coulson 2001; Ritchie 2005). Such frame shifting involves the complete abandonment of the original frame in favor of the new frame, which causes an ironic or humorous discrepancy between the two conceptual structures. But when incongruity plays its role in metaphor, the incongruity between the two frames of reference (or conceptual spaces or structures) is to be resolved in another way. There is no question of frame shifting, but of frame projection or mapping. Aspects of the incongruous frame or structure are mapped onto the dominant frame, which stays in focus. This is why Cameron holds that the criterion of incongruity needs to supplemented by the criterion of semantic transfer to be able to find metaphor in discourse. It narrows our objective of finding indirect meaning down to finding potentially metaphorical (or metonymic) indirectness. When the second criterion of semantic transfer (or, conceptually, cross-domain mapping) is added to incongruity as another necessary criterion for finding metaphorically motivated indirectness, however, there still is another problem with the notion of incongruity. For not all metaphorically used language can be called incongruous or anomalous unless these terms themselves are interpreted in the special, technical way which is envisaged in this tradition of research. This is why the Pragglejaz Group (2007) have suggested that an opposition has to be perceptible between the contextual and a more basic sense of metaphorically used language items, in such a way that the two senses are both sufficiently distinct as well as somehow similar. Only then can the basic sense be said to be incongruous with the surrounding contextual senses of other words – acting as an unexpexted focus in the utterance. This approach in effect involves a return to the criterion of indirectness.

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

I will make tacit use of some of the conceptual models from various forms of discourse analysis to locate the conceptual basis of metaphor into an encompassing context of usage. I am doing so for conventional and novel metaphorical language use in this chapter. Since implicit and ‘literal’ metaphor are rather different phenomena which have not received the same kind and amount of attention, their treatment has to wait until Chapter 11. The present chapter therefore focuses on metaphorically used expressions (words, morphemes, phrases, constructions) in discourse, and considers their identification as linguistic forms and conceptual structures. In sum, there is a contrast between the orientation towards linguistic signs in grammar on the one hand, and conceptual structure in usage on the other, which is related to an emphasis on indirectness in grammatical research versus incongruity in usage research. Indirectness is a natural criterion for the study of signs, which can be used directly in their basic, or indirectly in their metaphorical sense. Incongruity, however, is a natural criterion if contrasts between different conceptual frames of reference within one utterance or message are to be identified, and it can work irrespective of the implicit or explicit linguistic expression of such conceptual frames of reference. Both criteria can be aligned and seen as manifestations of indirect meaning, but only if indirect meaning is interpreted in the manner suggested above.

.. Defining cross-domain mappings in usage: Two domains or many spaces? Particularly important for analyzing metaphor in usage as conceptual structure is the idea propagated by blending theorists that it may require the reconstruction of more than just two conceptual systems which need to be related to each other. The question arises how the metaphor analyst has to deal with the choice between analyzing metaphor in usage by means of either two domains or four spaces. One way of interpreting the difference between the two-domain model and the many-space model in the study of metaphor in usage is to see the blended space in the many-space model as the area where the description of the specific, situated meaning of a metaphor is formulated. This approach would be supported by some of the writings of Fauconnier and Turner. Consider their following example: (6) If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink Here is what Turner and Fauconnier (2000: 135) write: The emergence of meaning and inference in blended spaces was overlooked as a theoretical issue in earlier work on basic metaphor, probably because the focus on abstract mappings at the superordinate level obscured some of the principles of on-line construction of meaning in actual specific cases. It is uncontroversial that cases like the Clinton-Titanic example involve the basic metaphor purposeful activity is traveling along a path toward a destination – the traveler projects to the agent, reaching the destination projects to achieving the goal, and so on, as analyzed in Lakoff and Turner (1989, passim); Lakoff (1993, passim), and

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Turner (1996b: 88–90). But that metaphor cannot by itself yield the complex inferences outlined above. It is in the blended space that we construct and run the counterfactual scenario in which the Titanic sinks the iceberg, and it is that scenario which projects to the input of politics and society to provide the appropriate inferences regarding Clinton, Starr, and the effect of the scandal.

In usage events, grammaticalized language forms act as cues in encompassing linguistic and conceptual structures for the development of even richer and encompassing conceptual structures which capture the situated meaning of a discourse. It is these specific, situated meanings of metaphors that are the typical target of identification and analysis in usage. And it is the task of the blended space to capture these specific, situated meanings. In the blended space, various types of information are combined, including grammatical, conceptual, and situational knowledge structures. The blended space is a symbolic representation of information that is deemed to play a role in the working memory of the language user. The blended space may be compared with Langacker’s notion of Current Discourse Space (Langacker 2001) and Brandt’s (2005) semiotic space (cf. Coulson & Oakley 2005). The terminology and precise model is immaterial for our purposes, as long as the space is seen as a description of the structure of the various types of information that are supposed to play a role at any moment in a usage event. Its cognitive validity is a matter for psycholinguistic analysis and validation, as has also been pointed out by Gibbs (2000). For our present purposes, blended spaces may less controversially be regarded as semiotic descriptions of situated specific symbolic structures; these need to be independently tested for their relation to cognitive processing and representation. It should be noted that the model of blending appears to be quite suitable for the pursuit of separate-case approaches to metaphor in usage (idiographic approaches). It should also be pointed out that blending theorists typically focus on this type of analysis of individual utterances in individual texts. In doing so, they cover both conventional and novel metaphor. They even cover nonmetaphorical language use, as in the very example of (6), which does not display indirectly used language forms, but counterfactual language use. There is a fundamental difference between asserting that Clinton is the Titanic, in which case the Titanic would be used indirectly and metaphorically, versus counterfactually supposing that Clinton were the Titanic, in which case the Titanic would be used directly. The two-domain approach, by contrast, may now be understood as particularly suitable for an approach to finding general patterns in usage (a nomothetic approach). When Lakoff and his followers examine authentic usage in texts and talk, they typically employ usage in order to discuss patterns of correspondence between two domains across a wide range of usage instances. Some of that work aims to abstract descriptions of grammar from usage, but there is also a good deal which aims to describe usage as usage, whether the linguistic forms in that usage have become fully grammaticalized and entrenched or not. It is precisely one of the strengths of Conceptual Metaphor

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

Theory that it can address both conventional as well as novel metaphor in usage. There is therefore no reason why Conceptual Metaphor Theory should not be considered as a theory that can find and analyze metaphor in usage. One problem with Conceptual Metaphor Theory in this connection, however, is that it often exemplifies its general findings about patterns in usage by discussing concrete cases as illustrations. At such moments, Conceptual Metaphor Theorists often use a terminology which suggests that their analysis captures all there is to that individual moment of usage. They contend that ‘we’ ‘understand’ life as a journey, or time as space, or emotions as forces, and so on. This may lead to the impression that Conceptual Metaphor Theorists attempt to describe the specifics of individual usage events in comparable fashion to Conceptual Integration Theorists. Yet a careful reading of many of their writings can also reveal that their analysis is often meant as a constraint upon the delimitation of meaning in usage, not as a full idiographic specification of it. In particular, reference is made to conceptual mappings and conventional metaphors in the analysis of usage to point out that these phenomena have an effect on the specific, situated meaning. They do not necessarily have to be exhaustive descriptions of it. In Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) have embraced Blending Theory for at least some purposes of description. Grady et al. (1999) have also argued that Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Integration Theory may be two complementary approaches. In my view, the complementary relationship may best be viewed from the distinction between idiographic versus nomothetic goals of research in usage: CIT seems best suited for capturing more details of the specific situated meanings of individual usage events, whereas CMT seems more apt for revealing patterns of linguistic and conceptual structure across many instances of usage. CMT may hence also be used as offering input into the descriptions of single events of metaphorical usage pursued by CIT, as is also suggested by Turner and Fauconnier (2000) and Grady (2005). It is up to researchers themselves to decide which of these two conceptualizations of metaphor in usage is more apt for their purposes, the two-domain approach or the many-space approach. This decision may be influenced by their idiographic or nomothetic goals of research. Once they have made that decision, though, they still are faced by essentially the same questions for the next stages of research. For they still have to define the nature and extent of the conceptual systems which underlie the indirect meaning in usage that may be metaphorically motivated, whether those conceptual systems involve two conceptual domains or many conceptual spaces. And they also still need to determine the nature and content of the conceptual mappings between those conceptual systems, again, irrespective of whether these are two domains or many spaces. The same principled and methodological issues arise here as were discussed for metaphor in grammar.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

. Operationalization .. Linguistic forms: The Pragglejaz method One fairly well-developed example of how linguistic analysis can be turned into an explicit procedure for finding metaphorical language in usage as symbolic structure is the Pragglejaz method (Pragglejaz Group 2007). I have discussed the procedure in Chapter 4 in order to illustrate one aspect of operationalization, moments of decision; but here it may serve as a more general means of exposition because the Pragglejaz method has systematically and explicitly attempted to turn various issues of conceptualization into matters of operationalization. It covers the identification in usage of indirect lexical meaning that may be motivated by metaphor. The identification of the underlying conceptual domains and the mapping between them is not included and will be addressed in the next subsection. The overall aim of the Pragglejaz procedure is to tackle the question faced by linguists who have to deal with authentic usage: how can indirect meaning that may be motivated by metaphor be observed in usage situated in contexts of discourse? This question about operational criteria has to be answered irrespective of the use of introspective, observational, or manipulative methods for data collection. The answer to the question appears to require a number of decisions, and these decisions have been formulated as a number of stages of analysis. The procedure suggests that the following operational decisions have to be taken (Pragglejaz Group 2007; Steen, Biernacka, et al. in press): 1. 2. 3. 4.

What counts as a word? What counts as the contextual meaning of a word? What counts as the basic meaning of a word? What counts as a sufficient contrast between basic and contextual meanings of words? 5. What counts as sufficient resemblance between basic and contextual meanings of words? These are all independent moments of decision. They may be completely aligned with the moments of decision for operationalizing the identification of the linguistic form of metaphor in grammar, discussed in Chapter 6:

Identifying the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar 1. Decide what counts as one form 2. Decide whether it has at least two senses 3. Decide whether the two senses are related by some form of nonliteral similarity a. nonliteral similarity should be able to be opposed to both literal similarity and literal hierarchy; each of these oppositions involves the possibility for the analyst to specify two fundamentally different semantic or conceptual domains.

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

b. the direction of the derivation or mapping has to be founded on a criterion of basicness, whether that is historical, experiential, acquisitional, and so on. These decisions also have to be taken when metaphor is sought in usage at the level of other units of analysis, including morphemes, phrases, and more abstract constructions. The rationale of the Pragglejaz procedure may now be explained in the context of the present chapter. Indirect meaning in usage arises out of a contrast between the contextual meaning of a linguistic form and its more basic meaning, the latter being absent from the actual context but observable in others. For instance, when a word like attack or defend is used in a context of argumentation, its contextual meaning has to do with verbal exchange. However, this is an indirect meaning, in the sense of Lakoff (1986, 1993) and Gibbs (1993, 1994), because it can be contrasted with the more basic meaning of these words in other contexts, which has to do with physical engagement between people. The fact that the contextual meaning can be contrasted with the basic meaning, and the fact that the basic meaning can afford a mapping between the two meanings on the grounds of some form of nonliteral similarity, is the reason why all uses of defend and attack in contexts of argumentation can be analyzed as metaphorical. This procedure therefore provides an operational way of finding all conventional metaphor in actual usage. Jonathan Charteris-Black (2004: 37) has independently used exactly the same rationale. Alice Deignan (2005a) has added that this type of approach typically leads to the discovery of what she calls active and dead metaphor; novel metaphor is rarely found, and historical metaphor cannot be identified with this procedure. The procedure does accommodate, however, novel metaphorical usage. Thus, when the linguistic form wipe out is used in the context of argumentation, its contextual sense is clear. However, that contextual sense, having to do with argumentation, has not become conventionalized to such an extent that it has ended up in the dictionary, as we have also seen. The Pragglejaz procedure does not have a problem with this: the ad hoc or situation-specific contextual sense may simply be contrasted with and compared to the basic sense of wiping out, which has to do with cleaning. As a result, wipe out in our example also gets identified as metaphorical language use. One of the crucial features of the Pragglejaz approach is that it does not aim to identify the precise nature of the underlying conceptual mappings themselves. It identifies the linguistic forms of metaphor, not its conceptual structures. Even though the Pragglejaz Group accept the general idea that there are underlying mappings for metaphorical expressions in discourse, they have not employed a deductive approach which goes from conceptual metaphor to linguistic metaphor, or the other way around. On the contrary, they have found that it is often unnecessary to specify which crossdomain mapping in particular is involved in a particular instance of metaphorical usage. That is, in order to identify a word or set of words as metaphorically used, it is often sufficient to be able to say that there are two domains and that they may be related by some cross-domain correspondence (e.g., Crisp 2002: 9–10). This is be-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

cause the procedure only needs to find the more basic sense than the metaphorical discourse meaning – to determine which conceptual domains these words belong to is not needed, extremely difficult, and a research question of its own. The Pragglejaz procedure intends to capture metaphorically used words, not the metaphorical concepts or conceptual structures and mappings that underlie them. Incorporating precisely identified metaphorical mappings in conceptual structure within the Pragglejaz procedure may in fact reduce the reliability of the metaphorically identified words, because identifying conceptual metaphors seems to be more open to disagreement between analysts. As an illustration, consider an expression which refers to Gandhi’s political opponents. It may be relatively easy to agree that opponents is metaphorically used, but relatively difficult to agree that politics has to be seen as sports or as war. If the identification of metaphorically used words is made dependent on the identification of underlying conceptual structures, disagreement or lack of agreement about conceptual structures should inevitably lead to disagreement about the identification of metaphorically used words. The advantage of the Pragglejaz procedure in such difficult situations, which are quite common, is that it does not throw out the baby of the identified metaphorically used words with the bathwater of the troublesome conceptual domains and mappings. The same analysts often have less difficulty in agreeing that a word or expression is metaphorical than in establishing the precise nature of the underlying metaphorical concepts and structures. This is probably the reason why Charteris-Black (2004) makes a distinction between metaphor identification, pertaining to identifying potentially metaphorically used words, on the one hand, and metaphor interpretation and explanation on the other, which refers to the assignment of metaphorically used words to conceptual metaphors. Cameron (2003) follows a comparable division of stages between linguistic metaphor identification and conceptual metaphor interpretation. Linguists dealing with metaphor in usage often make a functional separation between identifying the linguistic forms of metaphor and its conceptual structures, honoring the fundamental differences between these areas of research. A happy corollary of this purely linguistic approach to metaphor identification in discourse is that analysts focusing on the linguistic forms of metaphor do not have to choose either between the two models for cross-domain mappings in cognitive linguistics, the two-domain approach or the many-space approach. As we have seen, the two approaches exhibit important differences. If metaphor identification by means of the Pragglejaz procedure were to be founded on the identification of conceptual structures, a choice would have to be made for either of the two models. As a result, the general validity of the method might be called into question by proponents of the other approach. The shallow and restricted approach that has been adopted, however, permits the analyst to remain agnostic about their conceptual structure. It also relieves the analyst from the duty of comparing these two cognitive-linguistic approaches with competing models of underlying cross-domain mappings, such as Gentner’s (1982, 1983, 1989) structure mapping approach.

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

In general, though, the theoretical definition of metaphor endorsed by the Pragglejaz Group is identical with the theoretical definition that I have put at the centre of this book, metaphor as a cross-conceptual mapping, whether these mappings pertain to two domains or to many spaces. The linguistic analysis of finding potentially metaphorically used words (or more generally, expressions) therefore does not bar making connections with the area of conceptual metaphor analysis in usage in either of these two ways. The Pragglejaz method was in fact meant to prepare for examining that connection. And its temporary independence from the area of conceptual analysis was meant to increase its autonomous validity for serving as better input to conceptual analysis.

.. Conceptual structures: Barcelona’s method Finding the conceptual structure of metaphor in usage involves the identification of the underlying domains as well as the mapping between them. This may be operationalized with reference to a two-step procedure discussed by Antonio Barcelona (2002). His procedure is based on the assumption that the linguistic forms of metaphor have already been detected, which is another signal of the relative autonomy of that area of research. This assumption is not made explicit in Barcelona’s discussion of the procedure but the prior identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor does turn out to be a condition. This becomes apparent at a later stage of Barcelona’s discussion when he (2002: 268) identifies which linguistic expressions in the stretch of discourse under examination trigger which metaphoric and metonymic mappings Step 1: Observe which domains are connected by the mapping (metaphor or metonymy) and how they are connected. Step 2: Characterize the mapping in precise terms a. Look for additional conventional linguistic expressions of the metaphor (or metonymy). b. Look for additional semantic/pragmatic evidence. c. Try and recognize the most general metaphor (or metonymy) manifested in the specific mapping under analysis in combination with another metaphor (or metonymy). d. Describe the functioning of the metaphor (or metonymy) in the particular context in which it is used. This entails in turn: 1) observing whether or not some specific submappings of the metaphor are highlighted at the expense of others (or, in metonymies, whether some other subdomains in the common domain have been highlighted), and 2) observing whether or not the linguistic expression of the metaphor (or the metonymy) is itself metaphorico-metonymically complex. (Barcelona 2002: 247)

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Application of the procedure is illustrated by a discussion of one line from Romeo and Juliet (II.iii.61-68), “Young men’s love then lies / Not truly in their hearts, but in their eyes.” The two steps cover the two tasks of identifying the domains and the mapping between them discussed for grammar in Chapters 7 and 8:

Demarcating a conceptual domain 1. Decide what level of abstraction you are going to use for ordering the conceptual materials 2. Decide which set of polysemous words (or more generally linguistic forms) are going to be included in the reconstruction of the underlying conceptual structures 3. Decide about the descriptive framework for analyzing the syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and encyclopedic information that can be collected about each of the polysemous items (or more generally linguistic forms)

Identifying a cross-domain mapping 1. Decide about the relative salience of the two domains as distinct conceptual systems Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, typically, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. 2. Decide about the necessary and sufficient degree of similarity required for a mapping, since corresponding elements between two domains may be relatively more or less similar a. Decide about the role of types of correspondences between domains, such as external similarity versus relations, and relations versus higher-order relations. b. Decide about minimal and maximal number of correspondences required for an analysis to be accepted as complete But the subtask of domain identification is intertwined with the identification of the metaphorical and/or metonymic mappings. What is meant by Barcelona’s phrase “and how they are connected” has to do with the details of the relationship between the two conceptual domains as two independent systems or within one encompassing frame. In effect, the first step of Barcelona’s procedure collapses domain identification and identification of the mapping into one. This is the typical manner of analysis in cognitive linguistics, and I have suggested that its quality may be improved if the two stages are carefully separated and treated as independent moments of decision by following the above, more detailed instructions. Some details of Barcelona’s step 2 correspond with some of the details of identifying domains and mappings in grammar. Thus, the search for other conventional expressions (2a) is equivalent to the search for two semantic fields that can be seen

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

as expressive of two content domains functioning as source and target. And looking for additional semantic and pragmatic information (2b) also plays a role in the reconstruction of conceptual domains in grammar, in particular with the more precise delimitation of the target domain. These aspects match the operations of domain identification in grammar, with the addition that the identification of the target domain is fundamentally easier and more specific because of the surplus of information deriving from the usage event. To alert analysts to this difference, I should like to add the following instruction to (1) in the identification of the cross-domain mapping: 1. Decide about the relative salience of the two domains as distinct conceptual systems Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, typically, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, in this particular context, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. To this end, interpret the target domain as specifically as is possible on the basis of the usage event, and then contrast and compare it with the basic interpretation of the source domain of the metaphorically used expression. As for the mapping itself, some cognitive linguists might also see the third stage of Barcelona’s step two, the identification of the position of the mapping in the general metaphorical hierarchy, as an obligatory stage in metaphor identification in usage. Charteris-Black (2004) has for instance also made use of such hierarchies. And apart from these three relatively general aspects of Barcelona’s step 2, there is also the more specific description of the local meaning of the metaphorical mapping in context. This part of the analysis is of particular importance in identifying the nature of a specific metaphorical conceptual structure in literature and other important texts (religious, scientific, legal, and so on), in political and other speeches, and in more mundane meanings as in court cases, therapy, and so on. The latter is the clearest manifestation of the unique character of describing metaphor in usage. Many of these aspects seem to require qualitative modes of analysis. Their interanalyst reliability may hence be problematic unless additional measures are adopted. This is a problem which looks more serious for the identification of the conceptual structure of metaphor than of the linguistic forms of metaphor in usage. New analytical procedures may have to be developed for these goals, but acknowledging that they are needed is imperative first.

. Introspection .. Linguistic forms The typical introspective study of metaphor in usage as symbolic structure, combining introspective collection of verbal data with qualitative data analysis, is the classic

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

pragmatic or semantic study of the linguistic forms of metaphor as exemplified by for instance Grice (1975) and Searle (1979) for pragmatics and by Davidson (1978) for semantics. More linguistically inspired offshoots of these philosophical approaches are Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance theoretical account of metaphor and Josef Stern’s semantic approach (Stern 2000). Although Stern (2000) also pays attention to attested metaphors (collected by observation), his study is still typical of the introspective approach, which is characterized by lengthy argumentation and explication of assumptions about ways in which metaphors in usage may be profitably analyzed given a whole range of other philosophical and linguistic assumptions about the way in which language works. Important aspects of metaphor in usage have been discovered by introspective studies like these. They pertain to all kinds of issues of definition and theory, both regarding metaphor and what counts as the literal and metaphorical use of signs. Indeed, the purpose of such analysis is often the furthering of theoretical discussion rather than the empirical exploration, description or explanation of language data collected by introspection themselves. This is especially true for the clarification of notions like literal and metaphorical meaning, indirectness, and so on (cf. Récanati 1993, 1995). But many of these traditional findings have since been challenged by the cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor in grammar and in usage (cf. Coulson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2005). This has developed another model of the relation between language and thought and their relation to for instance reality and truth than in classic semantic and pragmatic approaches. Lakoff and Johnson (1999a) have discussed this difference as a difference between first-generation as opposed to second-generation cognitive scientists. Most classic or first-generation proponents of the introspective approach set out from different initial assumptions about the relation between language and thought than is customary in cognitive linguistics. Since the argument in the introspective approach rests on precisely that, introspection, it has to stay within the confines of its own assumptions and cannot easily be called into question by empirical counterevidence arising from cognitive-linguistic research (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1999a). To give one example, Nogales (1999: 230–231) posits that metaphor is necessarily defined by a lack of conventionality: In examining Davidson’s argument against metaphorical meaning based upon dead metaphors, we found that one of the requirements of metaphorical meaning (and content, if you accept this distinction) is that it not be tied to the term by conventional means. In my analysis of metaphor, the lack of conventionality of metaphorical meaning and content stems from the fact that they are based upon a reconceptualization of some or all of the entities referenced in the metaphor. Since this reconceptualization is not determined by linguistic convention but rather affected by cultural stereotypes and contextual information, it is not conventionalized. Nor is the resulting content.

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

When metaphors, after their first novel use, become part of the language, they are dead as metaphors, is Nogales’s argument. They do not require reconceptualization of one entity in terms of something else, because the metaphorically designated entity has now become part of the conventional extension of the originally metaphorically used term. According to Nogales, all of the conventional linguistic metaphors discussed in the previous pages do not count as metaphorical uses, at most as dead metaphors in lexico-grammar. The methodological difficulty of engaging with this sort of philosophical study is that it is often based on a limited set of clear cases, produced by introspection. Thus, Nogales’ only data for her entire book consist of the following twelve utterances: (7) a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.

That [pointing to a sheep dog] is a sheep dog. I think I’ll visit the bank tomorrow. He lives without a doorbell of any windows. Steve is a sheepdog. Margaret Thatcher is a bulldozer. Shirley Temple is a bulldozer. Mom, my sock has a hangnail. I promise to give the butterfly [speaking of one’s daughter] a real talking to. i. The philosopher is the city’s pilot. j. In the days that came after my father’s death, I walked the halls of my memories day and night. k. A semicolon is a period. l. The ham sandwich wants a cup of coffee.

Her analysis is theoretical and meant to clarify the machinery needed to uphold and elaborate a particular theoretical view of metaphor. It is not meant to be applied to further introspective data collection and qualitative analysis of the complexities of natural or elicited usage. Other introspective approaches, such as Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (1986/1995), display the same type of reasoning. Papafragou (1996), Vicente (1996), and Pilkington (2000) predominantly deal with invented sentences in minimal invented contexts to present arguments about details of the theoretical framework. For instance, Pilkington (2000) concurs with Vicente (1996) that the salience of one particular interpretation of a metaphorical utterance as opposed to another one is an effect of the interpretation process, not a precondition. But introspective evidence alone cannot really decide that if it can even be claimed that it has access to aspects of salience. As we have seen, Giora (2003) has shown that salience indeed is a precondition for metaphorical meaning, in that some meanings for words are simply more salient (because they are entrenched) than others. This makes some interpretations of metaphorical utterances more obvious and inevitable than others. This type of experimental evidence and its relation to many other types of experimental evidence make a stronger case

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

than theoretical argument supported by introspective evidence. It also presents a different view of how metaphor identification works or can work than the picture painted by relevance theorists such as Pilkington and Vicente. Introspective evidence for the identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor is the traditional approach to metaphor in usage. It is perhaps telling that this is commonly referred to as ‘use’, to reflect the relation between signs and their imagined use in made-up contexts that are relatively bare in comparison to concrete events of usage. Both novel as well as conventional metaphorical expressions can be imagined in introspection. Their validity as verbal data and their qualitative analysis, however, is typically constrained by the theoretical goals of introspective analysts. Such metaphors and their analysis more often than not serve to illustrate theoretical assumptions.

.. Conceptual structures Introspective studies identifying the conceptual structures of metaphor in usage can serve comparable theoretical ends. Morgan (1979/1993) is a typical example of an introspective approach to the relation between the linguistic forms and the conceptual structures of metaphor which demonstrates its theoretical impetus. Even if the examples are more imaginative and entertaining than the simple A is B formulas found in other introspective discussions, the validity of their analysis remains restricted until converging evidence has been collected by observation or manipulation. Examples include imagined cases of somebody saying “John’s mind is a meadow in winter”. An interesting case is Levin’s (1993) discussion of the way in which metaphorical expressions can give rise to radically different conceptual construals when they are interpreted as literary instead of ordinary metaphors. Imagined expressions like the sky is angry or the wind is hungry or the stars are happy can all be related to two entirely different sets of conceptual structures. In the regular approach, the predicates are to be adjusted to the normal conditions of the world and taken to express a conceptual structure that says something about the elements of nature in a nonliteral, indirect fashion. A mapping has to be construed which projects from angry, hungry, and happy onto some default aspects of the sky, the wind, or the stars such that the expressions make sense. In the literary approach, however, suggests Levin (1993: 121), this identification of conceptual structures is fundamentally changed. The metaphorical linguistic forms are then taken at face value, and their conceptual structures have to be constructed in such a way that they form a state of affairs in a newly imagined conceptual world that allows for such states of affairs as regular parts. In other words, in such an identification of the conceptual structure of a metaphorical expression, we conceive of a text world in which skies are indeed angry, the wind can be hungry, and the stars are happy. “The usual process of construal is simply inverted; instead of constructing an interpretation that consists with conditions in the actual world, we construct one that conforms to the actual language of the utterance” (Levin 1993: 121). The utterance re-

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

mains metaphorical, but its language is taken literally in such cases, and the conceptual structures come out completely different. This is a manner of identifying the conceptual structures of metaphor by introspection which is not just interesting for presenting a proof of existence. Levin shows that it can in fact be straightforwardly applied in observational research on certain texts in poetry, such as work by Emily Dickinson, William Wordsworth, and William Blake. Peter Stockwell (2000) has presented a similar analysis for metaphor in science fiction. It is probably to be found elsewhere too, as in advertisements that turn on language play. Some of the ideas of Blending Theory come quite close to Levin’s (1988, 1993) arguments. What is important about most introspective approaches to both the linguistic forms as well as the conceptual structures of metaphor in usage is that data collection yields clear cases. Problems with nonliteral similarity, the levels and distinctness of the domains, or the details of the set of correspondences hardly ever arise. This is because the invented examples usually serve to make theoretical points that are part of an encompassing framework that is being forwarded. This is not to deny their usefulness, but it does reveal their limited validity and applicability. When such approaches are applied to wide ranges of observed or elicited data, new problems emerge which have to be addressed by the empirical researcher.

. Observation .. Linguistic forms The linguistic identification of metaphor in the symbolic structures of usage aims to find indirect meaning which may be motivated by metaphor. This is operationalized by a search for indirectness according to various criteria. The Pragglejaz procedure looks for indirectness as a contrast between a contextual meaning and a more basic meaning which may be motivated by metaphor, and this is also the approach of for instance Koller (2004: 50). But various other researchers have used the criterion of incongruity to find linguistic forms of metaphor. Cameron (2003: 59–60) uses incongruity (also called anomaly) and semantic transfer as two necessary conditions for finding metaphorically used language. Caballero Rodríguez (2006) speaks of incongruity and narrows it down to referential incongruity. Charteris-Black (2004) also uses incongruity and equates it with semantic tension, appealing to a notion of ‘domain shift’ which is also meant in referential terms (2004: 35–37). He makes a further distinction between linguistic, pragmatic and cognitive incongruity, which may be compared to similar distinctions in Cameron (2003). Charteris-Black (2004) tests the idea that a particular word is used metaphorically in a particular context by comparing it against its nonmetaphorical uses in other contexts, which takes us back to the procedure followed by the Pragglejaz Group. For instance, in deciding that a word like crusade in American politics can be seen as

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

metaphorical, a search was run of its use in a general corpus of English. Since this showed that the word was also still used in its original religious sense, its use in a political context was interpreted as creating a contextual, indirect meaning pertaining to politics which deviated from the basic meaning pertaining to religion. To put this differently, the basic religious meaning of crusade creates a semantic tension with the political context in which it is used in some types of discourse, producing an incongruity between the two frames of reference. This has to be resolved by interpreting the political use of crusade in a metaphorical way, requiring meaning transfer from the religious domain to the political domain. This is an operational approach to incongruity which forces the analyst to specify in concrete terms the nature of the semantic tension between the metaphorically used expression and its discourse environment. Whether the identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor in usage is based on indirectness or on incongruity, it may proceed in two ways: inductively or deductively. Cameron (2003) and Caballero Rodríguez (2006) examined educational discourse and architectural reviews inductively. If they did construct conceptual metaphors in relation to the linguistic forms, they did so retrospectively. Koller (2004) and CharterisBlack (2003), by contrast, found linguistic forms of metaphor in usage by setting out from complete conceptual metaphors or a selected number of source domains. These approaches yield rather different views of the data. Yet even the best analysis cannot depend on just one analyst explaining the criteria and applying them in the best possible way. That is why Cameron (2003) discusses additional measures to strengthen her research. What is most important in this connection is the pursuit of intrarater reliability by running repeated analyses by the same analyst, and interrater reliability by having other analysts do (parts of) the same analysis. These are measures which have to reduce the degree of inevitable error that is caused by poor performance of the analyst as well as by particular biases of the analyst. The same solution has been propagated by the Pragglejaz Group. It is instructive to note, at this point, the dramatic change of scene which is taking place in linguistics broadly conceived. Here is a quotation from psychologists Pollio, Barlow, Fine, and Pollio (1977: 67), who in the early seventies were among the pioneers in cognitive science to write about figurative language in usage for the disciplines of psychology, psychotherapy, and education: In order to own a phenomenon philosophically all we need to do is to think clearly and well; in order to own a phenomenon theoretically, all we need to do is provide a potentially workable model; and in order to own a phenomenon empirically all we need to do is measure it. The usual procedure employed in literary analyses of figurative language (e.g., Brooke-Rose 1958) involves a single scholar working alone over a text, and this seems a perfectly reasonable strategy for an analysis of texts. Fortunately or unfortunately, the niceties of psychological measurement often will not sit still for a single rater – no matter how well trained – and for this reason a different approach is required for psychological and psycholinguistic research. In order to meet, even partially, the reliability requirements usually imposed by psychological measurement, Barlow, Kerlin, and Pollio (1971) devel-

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

oped a training manual designed to teach raters to identify figurative language in contexts ranging from therapy interviews to children’s compositions by way of political speeches.

This quotation may serve to trigger a number of final comments about the identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor in usage. The first comment to make is that, today, at least some analysts of usage in texts (written and spoken) strive for the same degree of reliability in text analysis as many psychologists in cognitive science. The second point, however, is that, indeed, some literary and other traditions of research still display the situation described with reference to Brooke-Rose. Since I believe that this is a situation which may be explained by historical developments and traditions, I also think that it is a situation which is not necessarily inevitable or insuperable. Even literary scholars may aim for more reliable and valid analyses of their data, as is evidenced by recent developments in literary studies (e.g. Schram & Steen 2001). Since many linguists and discourse analysts still behave in this way, I have written the present book in precisely this spirit. Moving on from comments about goals of metaphor research to methods and techniques of metaphor research, my third comment relates to procedures. The solution to the problem of reliability advanced by Pollio and his colleagues involves the development of a training manual and of testing its effect on a number of raters. It is this route which has been followed in the work of the Pragglejaz Group and of Cameron (2003). But a fourth remark then has to note that psychologists often work with highly practical notions of what counts as metaphor, not always incorporating all of the implications of detailed linguistic analyses or models (cf. Colston & Kuiper 2002; Corts & Pollio 1999; Graesser et al. 1989; Kreuz et al. 1996; Pollio et al. 1977). This is why the combination of explicit procedures with theoretically motivated criteria and their combined testing for reliability is essential for achieving the kind of progress that is interesting for both social scientists as well as linguists and discourse analysts.

.. Conceptual structures Conceptual metaphor analysis by means of observational methods may proceed in two ways: deductively and inductively. The deductive method is based in the analyst’s focus on the conceptual structures of either a complete metaphor or a particular source domain, such as motion, as in the studies by Seyda ¸ Özcali¸skan (2003, 2004), and the observational collection of linguistic data which are deemed to express this domain. Finding source domain language may be accomplished almost automatically, as in the cases of Özcali¸skan (2003, 2004) and Koller (2004), and the decision whether the source domain meaning is incongruous with the local topic of the discourse provides a good initial indication of the identity of the target domain and the general nature of the mapping. When this research sets out from a complete conceptual metaphor, as in the case of Koller’s work on business as war, a tentative description of all targets is also naturally assumed.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

However, when the research sets out from a particular target domain, such as security (Chilton 1996), education (Cameron 2003), architecture (Caballero Rodríguez 2006), or speech activity (Semino 2005), the situation becomes slightly different. Then all expressions which do not pertain to the target domain in question are potentially incongruous and indirect. In that case, the analyst is in the same position as those linguists wanting to find metaphor in usage without adopting a deductive approach altogether. For they, too, have to find all potentially metaphorical expressions against the background of an assumed topic of a discourse which then functions as the target domain. How are these conceptual analyses of underlying domains and mappings handled in methodological terms by linguists who work with observational approaches? Semino’s (2005) study examined all metaphorical expressions of speech activity in a quarter million word corpus of contemporary written, narrative English. The corpus had been independently annotated for speech, writing, and thought presentation. The two most important categories for speech presentation were then selected from the corpus and examined for metaphorical usage. About 2,500 plus 1,000 instances of these two categories were then examined for metaphor, yielding 249 and 214 metaphorical cases. The criterion for metaphorical expression was defined as follows: 1. One or more of the lexical items that, in context, refer to speech activity have a more basic current sense that is not to do with verbal communication. 2. The speech activity sense of the relevant expressions can be said to be motivated by the more basic sense via a cross-domain mapping where the target is speech activity and the source is a different domain. (2005: 41) The first criterion may be seen to be compatible with the demands for the identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor discussed above. The second criterion leads on to the conceptual analysis of the linguistic metaphors in terms of domains and mappings, our current concern. The conceptual analysis is guided, in Semino’s case, by two cognitive-linguistic theories of conceptual metaphor (Grady 1997a, 1999; Kövecses 2000, 2002). The clustering of (mostly) verbs into related conceptual domains takes place by their shared content. Thus, join and step in are related to ‘movement toward’, while spread and circulate are related to ‘movement’ without a destination. This is a qualitative analysis which constructs and labels conceptual domains without providing any further reliability checks. A comparable case is formed by Charteris-Black (2004), whose research aligns with many of the findings in cognitive linguistics regarding conceptual metaphor. He studies a number of target domains which are all fairly clearly circumscribed, determined as they are by the registers that he studies: politics (New Labour, the political manifestos of British political parties, and American presidential speeches), the press (sports and financial reporting), and religion (the Bible and the Koran). He also selects clearly incongruent source domains such as building, journey, conflict, weather, and fire in the Old Testament. He interprets their application to the target domain by

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

examining all of the language data for each potential mapping. This leads to the postulation of a number of conceptual metaphors (whose status is presented in terms of symbolic abstractions rather than cognitive realities). The increased strength of the conceptual analysis, then, lies in the availability of a large number of linguistic expressions. Their patterning helps in postulating more details of underlying conceptual structures with greater confidence. But the conceptual analysis itself still remains qualitative and relatively unconstrained in terms of reliability. The above studies of the conceptual structures of metaphor in usage still possess a measure of the deductive approach. They do not wish to ignore the patterns found in cognitive linguistics between the linguistic forms and the conceptual structures of metaphor in usage. These studies should be contrasted with the inductive approach to the conceptual structure of metaphor in discourse that is followed by Cameron (2003). She generally works on a case-by-case basis and examines the specifics of each individual metaphor in context without assuming too much about more general conceptual patterns. When Cameron (2003: 252) discusses the utility of employing a deductive approach, for instance in order to examine the precise meaning and function of a potential conceptual metaphor education is a journey, she raises a number of fundamental issues that have become familiar in our analysis: – –

–

–

How many instances of linguistic metaphor are needed to infer a particular mapping? What do we do with linguistic metaphors that do not fit the conceptual mapping? – some activities seem to be mysteries to be unlocked: the secret to this skipping thing. How far does the analyst’s expectations about the conceptual metaphor shape the interpretations of linguistic metaphor? deserve a medal could also be linked to fighting in a war, competing in an art show, or a dog show How do we decide the level of generality of the conceptual mapping? – is it a journey, a trek or guided tour, or a young people’s adventure holiday?

Some of these questions have been raised before. They have to be addressed by any scholar who tries to find metaphor in usage by means of observational techniques. An attempt to provide a formal answer to the first question, however, is the fivestep method proposed in Steen (1999b; in press a; cf. Semino et al. 2004). According to the five-step procedure, linguists dealing with metaphor in usage always have to give answers to the following questions when they wish to make a connection between the linguistic form of metaphor and its conceptual structure, even if they are one-offs: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

What is the metaphor focus? What is the metaphorical idea, or proposition? What is the metaphorical comparison? What is the metaphorical analogy? What is the metaphorical mapping?

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Each of these questions leads to a fuller representation of the metaphorical conceptual structure underlying the linguistic form. If a linguistic expression requires conceptual mapping to resolve the apparent threat to conceptual coherence, some procedure like this is required for the conceptual analysis of every metaphorical expression in usage. It is, then, in essence, immaterial if the expression is mirrored in countless other expressions or stands by itself as one uniquely metaphorical linguistic form used to project a particular conceptual structure across two domains or spaces. A relatively simple example may be used to illustrate this procedure and point to some of its concealed assumptions: reconsider the first line by Tennyson discussed above: “Now sleeps the crimson petal, now the white” (Steen 2002a). The procedure begins with metaphor focus identification. This label alludes to the terminology introduced by Max Black (1962, 1979/1993), where the metaphorically used word is called the focus, which stands out against the background of a literal frame. To me this is another way of talking about metaphor as incongruity or indirectness. The word sleep in the first unit of the Tennyson line “Now sleeps the crimson petal” is the metaphor focus, and it would be picked out as the metaphorically used word by most analysts: it is indirectly used and incongruous with the environment (that’s why it can be said to be a focus). The seemingly trivial nature of this step is immediately called into question when we consider the second unit of the first line, which does not display a metaphorically used word. An approach that simply works with a formal focus/frame distinction is not sufficient for a rigorous methodology of all metaphor identification. Not all metaphors in discourse display metaphorically used words which act as the linguistic focus of the metaphor. This is a problem for all procedures which rely on the detection of vehicle incongruity by linguistic forms alone. The need for the second step as a separate step, metaphorical idea identification, is illustrated by the same token. Both discourse units of line 1 give rise to a proposition containing a metaphorically used concept, which thereby leads to the identification by the analyst of two metaphorical ideas, that a crimson petal sleeps and a white petal sleeps. Propositions are regarded as one representational form of conceptual structure by many psychologists (Kintsch 1998); as a result, these metaphorical propositions are one representational form of conceptual structure. The recovery of implicit elements is not always as simple as in this case. Such a metaphorical idea or proposition, by its very nature, presents a semantic puzzle. What is at stake when people use linguistic metaphor is the referential coherence of a stretch of discourse (cf. e.g. Perfetti 1999). In particular, a solution has to be found to the presence of the indirect form of reference that is the very nature of a metaphorically used concept, in this case sleep. Transforming the single utterance into a mapping between two conceptual structures is one solution to that problem. It provides a fully-fledged conceptual and referential baseline (the target domain) which is motivated and understood by approaching it from a source domain that closely corresponds with it.

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

Since mappings are sets of connections between two domains, and since metaphorical mappings additionally involve some form of similarity, the first condition for setting up a mapping is to separate out the elements of the two domains in an open comparison. This insight is due to Miller (1979/1993). In our case, the open comparison involves the assumption of a construed similarity between some activity of the petals in the target domain and the sleeping of some entity in the source domain. A formal notation of this comparison, first proposed by Miller, looks like this: (8) (∃F) (∃ y) {SIM[F (petal), sleep (y)]} This formula should read as follows: there is some activity F and some entity y for which it may be asserted that there is a similarity between petals doing F and ys sleeping. As can be seen, an open comparison contains two incomplete propositions that are asserted to exhibit a relation of similarity if their open slots can be filled. The two propositions capture the basic conceptual structure of each of the two conceptual domains or spaces that are involved, with some of the elements having been made concrete while others remain open slots. The elements of the second proposition are underlined to indicate the fact that they pertain to the source domain. The filling of the slots is the task for step 4. By filling the slots, we move away from an open and indeterminate comparison statement to – typically – a completed and determinate non-literal analogy (other types of mappings are possible too but are much less frequent). The analogy consists of two references to two states of affairs by means of two complete propositions, which suggests that their elements fulfil analogous functions in the two similar domains. In our example, the analogy might look like this: (9) {SIM [inactive (petal), sleep (person)]} The nature of the concepts to be inserted into the analogy is problematic. Sleeping may be done by animals apart from people, and the choice for personification is not self-evident. Indeed, the old approach to metaphor by means of selection restrictions might actually have preferred the widest possible scope for the argument coming with the verb sleep, that is, [+animal]. However, we typically think of sleeping as a human activity, and that may be one cognitively motivated reason why the metaphor should be constructed in this way. This part of the analysis is called ‘vehicle interpretation’ by Reinhart (1976; cf. Steen 1994). Its problematic aspects have been discussed at length by Semino, Heywood, and Short (2004), also in connection with the difficulties exhibited by the other side of step 4, ‘tenor interpretation’. Thus, in the present instance, the choice of “inactive” instead of “quiet” or “still” or “hang down” begs just as many questions. However, these caveats are not intended to undermine the potential of the procedure. On the contrary, they would apply to any construction of a cross-domain mapping, whether in Conceptual metaphor Theory, Blending Theory, and so on. What they point out is that the validity of one solution may have to be compared with the validity of another, and that these alternatives have different effects on the further fleshing out of the analogy

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

into a full-blown mapping, which is step 5. The general idea that metaphor in usage requires more local and situated interpretation in terms of the target domain may be of help here, moving metaphor interpretation into the general domain of determining what a particular utterance can be said to mean in a usage event. The fifth step of identifying the metaphorical mapping turns the analogy into a list of correspondences between its elements, and further presuppositions and entailments that can be derived from the analogy. Adopting the format of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), we can come up with a list like the following: Being inactive corresponds to sleep Petals correspond to persons The function of being inactive corresponds to the function of being asleep: resting from tiredness The quality of being inactive corresponds to the quality of being asleep: it is typically deep and long The spatio-temporal location of being inactive corresponds to the location of being asleep: it is typically at night and in a bedroom Each of these entailments and their elaborations might have to be considered as possible components of the complete mapping, some of the entailments having greater plausibility and relevance than others (cf. Pilkington 2000). Figure 10.1 offers a schematic overview of the discussion. The five-step procedure is a logical reconstruction of what has to happen if analysts want to get from linguistic to conceptual metaphors in usage. There are fundamental questions about the proce-

Figure 10.1 Analysis of first half of line 1

Text 1. Identification of metaphor-related words 2. Identification of propositions

3. Identification of open comparison 4. Identification of analogical structure 5. Identification of cross-domain mapping

Now sleeps the crimson petal Sleeps P1 (sleeps petalt ) P2 (mod p1 nowt ) P3 (mod petalt crimsont) sim {EF Ea [F (crimson petal)]t [sleep (a)]s } sim {[be-inactive (crimson petal)]t [sleep (human)]s} sleep > be-inactive human > crimson petal inferences: goal of sleep > goal of be-inactive: rest time of sleep > time of be-inactive: night

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

dure, as has been made clear by Semino et al. (2004), but these are questions that have to do with the nature of metaphor analysis more than with the nature of the procedure itself (cf. Steen, in press a). What the procedure helps to do is increase the awareness of analysts of those moments when they make analytical steps in identifying the conceptual structures of metaphor in usage. It may thus be useful in revealing differences between analysts, which may then be scrutinized for unwarranted or less warranted assumptions, so that disagreement may be decreased. The five-step procedure may offer a form of reconciliation between the deductive and inductive approaches to metaphor as conceptual structure. It may be applied in various ways: analysts can use it on a case-by-case basis without utilizing any of the cognitive-linguistic assumptions in steps 4 and 5; but analysts may also use it to go from case to case while making maximal use of the cognitive-linguistic evidence; and finally, it is also possible to examine groups of cases, from the perspective of assumptions about their source domain, target domain, or cross-domain mapping chartacteristics. The overall advantage of the procedure is that it offers a single formal format for comparing these types of analyses regarding the same aspects.

. Manipulation Experimental research on the linguistic and conceptual properties of metaphor in usage has also provided information about the questions raised in this chapter. A series of rating studies by Allan Paivio, Albert Katz, Marc Marschark and colleagues revealed a number of dimensions of metaphor which may be discussed from this perspective (Katz, Paivio, & Marschark 1985; Katz, Paivio, Marschark, & Clark 1988; Marschark, Katz, & Paivio 1983; Trick & Katz 1986). These are meta data about metaphor which allow for refined quantitative analysis on a grand scale. Marschark, Katz, and Paivio (1983) were interested in the conceptual properties of metaphorical sentences which were presumed to be important for their interpretability as metaphors. They constructed a pool of 260 metaphorical sentences, mostly novel, of the form “(noun phrase) is/are (noun phrase)”. Each of these sentences was judged on ten different 7-point scales, measuring the following properties, which may all be seen as related to the conceptual structure of the metaphorical sentences: Degree of metaphoricity Metaphor goodness Felt familiarity Number of alternative interpretations Ease of interpretation Comprehensibility Semantic relatedness Subject imagery

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Predicate imagery Overall imagery Scales were divided between ten groups of on average 33 informants (total number is 334) who had to rate all metaphors on their own respective scales. These data were then averaged across participants to yield mean scores per metaphor for each of the ten properties. The aim of the study was to examine which metaphor properties were related to each other in which ways (positively or negatively). I will not review the findings of this particular study for it is part of a series which presents a more encompassing and complex picture. Thus, in the same article, the authors report a second, replication study which was aimed at corroborating the findings from the first study by a different pool of participants who had to rate a subset of 98 metaphors from the original study. In a subsequent study, reported in Katz, Paivio, and Marschark (1985), a new set of metaphors was developed and subjected to the same method of rating by another group of (300) participants. The new set consisted of 204 metaphors drawn from poetry, in order to increase the validity of the findings that might have been compromised by the artificial nature of the metaphors from the 1983 study. In a third publication, the 1983 and 1985 studies are pooled and presented together as providing norm scores for the two sets of literary and nonliterary metaphors (Katz, Paivio, Marschark, & Clark 1988). The studies showed a number of interesting relations between degree of metaphoricity of the sentences – a variable which is of central interest to linguistic metaphor identification – and such other conceptual variables as semantic relatedness and imagery. However, the most important conclusion which the authors draw from their study is the substantial correlation between all of the variables in the study. In their first study the authors end on the following note: While we hesitate to label this “monster” factor (in the sense of Frankenstein’s monster being composed of many different parts but not easily named on the basis of any subset of them), similar results have been obtained by other investigators (e.g., Johnson & Malgady 1979) and appear to be the nature of the beast. Rather than viewing this with alarm, researchers should search for the reasons underlying the commonality and ensure that the stimuli used in future metaphor studies are carefully chosen. (1983: 38)

This methodological conclusion is reiterated in 1988: “These data demonstrate the need for metaphor researchers to consider multiple attributes if they are to achieve less confounded or factorial variation of theoretically motivated variables” (1988: 191). Psychologists regard the range of conceptual properties of metaphorical sentences as an important area of study that needs to be tackled before metaphorical language can be manipulated in order to serve as experimental materials in studies of cognitive processes and their products. They believe that this cannot only be resolved by structural analysis by individual linguists or psychologists. The care that is devoted to the study of the conceptual structure of metaphorical sentences is illustrated by a number of methodological properties of the research. The

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

replication of the first study with a subset of the items was mentioned above. Another example is the move to offer a selection of items twice in the same study, to examine within-rater reliability of scoring. If raters have low agreement between their first and second scores, they may have been too distracted or unmotivated and can be removed from the sample. Furthermore, a statistical test is run of the reliability of the scales that have been administered. If a particular scale has low reliability, it may have been formulated in the wrong way or may have been understood in diverging ways by the various participants. In such a case, the scale may be corrupt and may have to be removed from consideration too. And finally, awareness of the difference between constructed and attested examples is another methodological feature which merits more attention from other researchers interested in identifying the conceptual structures of metaphorical sentences in usage. Another important aspect of these studies is the use of large sets of raters. These function as a jury pronouncing their verdict over a large set of cases. What is more, each jury has to pronounce one verdict only, so that they can concentrate on the job and bring out the best of their expertise without being distracted or confused by other metaphor properties. This strategy guarantees the highest degree of independence of observation for each of the ten metaphor properties in the study. Averaging across thirty raters, moreover, facilitates rank ordering the large sets of metaphors beyond the crude categories between 1 and 7. As a result, fine and relatively stable quantitative assessments of each property are procured for each metaphor in the sample. Every metaphor thus has a norm score for all ten properties, describing its nature in great detail with great reliability in contradistinction from all other metaphors in the sample. No qualitative analysis can produce this sort of identification of conceptual structures with this sort of stability on this scale. Table 10.1 displays some examples of metaphors about popular topics, ordered in pairs. The highest degree of metaphoricity in this small sample is attributed to Man is a box of nerves, Time is a moving escalator, and A body is a prison for the soul. The lowest degree of metaphoricity is accorded to the metaphors having to do with life, thought, and doubt. Even though Life is a year-hedged avenue can be seen as a manifestation of the highly conventional life is a journey, it is not very familiar or comprehensible, and less so than Life is a prolonged and hungry howl. This should be contrasted with the much more familiar Man is a box of nerves, which is highly comprehensible and easy to interpret. It is a manifestation of the conventional container metaphor, as are the two body metaphors in positions 5 and 6. These are fairly comparable in their scores to Man is a box of nerves, but their judged degree of metaphoricity and goodness display considerable variation. I will not pursue this exercise any further but trust that the general point is clear. Crucial issues in metaphor identification like degree of metaphoricity, familiarity, semantic relatedness and so on can be studied in great detail and precision across large samples of data in order to achieve a firmer grasp of their role in what it is for an expression in usage to be metaphorical. Familiar themes in cognitive linguistics such as the domains of journeys, containers, and time can be thrown into fresh light, also in re-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Table 10.1 Some literary metaphors and their properties on ten dimensions CMP

ESI

MET

MGD

IMG

IMS

IMP

155. Life is a year-hedged avenue 3.10 3.50 2.52 2.90 3.07 2.67 2.80 67. Life is a prolonged and hungry howl 4.20 3.57 3.10 3.20 3.13 2.93 3.57 146. Man is a box of nerves 5.43 5.10 4.93 3.00 4.20 3.90 3.73 3. Man is a leaf in the garden’s of God 5.60 5.80 3.57 5.40 4.83 4.27 4.73 195. The body is a fading mansion taken on short lease 5.30 5.20 3.40 4.17 3.90 3.90 3.87 21. A body is a prison for the soul 6.13 6.03 4.03 4.60 3.90 4.17 4.40 69. A smile is a knife 4.17 3.27 2.40 2.30 2.87 3.80 3.57 159. The tongue is a bayonet 5.80 5.43 3.53 5.07 4.73 4.53 5.17 188. Thought is a bird whose wings spread wide to rain and snow 3.73 3.67 2.83 3.50 4.53 3.23 3.77 51. Thought is a snake sliding and coiling on warming stones 3.70 3.67 2.77 4.20 4.37 3.07 4.53 56. Doubt is a net 4.80 4.53 2.67 3.77 4.80 2.90 4.20 71. Doubt is a sword 4.37 4.20 2.90 3.03 3.70 2.43 4.03 193. Age is the embers of a fire built on the ashes of youth 4.57 5.27 3.28 4.63 4.48 3.90 3.57

FAM

SRL

ALT

2.87

3.13

1.43

3.67

2.17

1.73

4.70

3.47

2.03

4.70

3.77

2.07

4.80

3.57

1.70

5.67

4.07

1.80

3.30

1.80

2.37

5.13

3.97

2.47

3.63

2.90

1.83

3.50

2.70

1.67

4.73

3.20

1.70

3.57

2.60

2.17

4.87

3.97

1.62

2.43

1.50

4.07

2.17

3.33

1.53

4.00

2.07

2.30

1.63

149. Infancy is the green apron age 3.53 3.17 3.30 2.93 3.30 3.37 2.47 3.23 54. Time is a moving escalator 5.63 5.83 4.13 4.43 5.87 4.43 5.23 5.10 190. The hastening minutes are waves making for the pebbled shore 4.90 4.83 3.17 4.30 5.10 3.83 4.83 5.00 189. The sun is the eye of heaven 6.10 5.80 3.67 5.50 5.60 4.73 4.37 5.60 172. The sun is a mustard seed 4.77 4.23 2.90 2.57 4.20 3.80 3.63 3.10

CMP = Comprehensibility, ESI = Ease of Interpretation, MET = Degree of Metaphoricity, MGD = Met. Goodness, IMG = Met. Imagery, IMS = Subject Imagery, IMP = Predicate Imagery, FAM = Felt Familiarity, SRL = Semantic Relatedness, ALT = Number of Alternative Interpretations

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

lation to each other, when these techniques are adopted. Surprising comparisons may be drawn. These are costly and time-consuming approaches, but their data provide a rich view of the area of research. The techniques illustrated above are also intimately linked to the aims of research, it should be added. In two studies inspired by the work by Katz, Marschark, Paivio and their colleagues, I introduced a number of adjustments in order to pursue my own goals (Steen 1994). For one thing, I mixed literary and nonliterary metaphors in one set of materials, in order to be able to compare their scores within the same participants. Katz and his colleagues had carried out the literary and nonliterary studies as two separate studies, with different groups of participants for each study. This makes it difficult to interpret any differences in findings between the two studies, for these may be due to the participants just as much as to the items. I also used experimental materials from authentic sources for both groups of metaphors. I randomly took metaphors from novels and newspapers, sampled in a systematically varied way. These metaphors were moreover offered in their original forms in minimal contexts from their sources, in order to increase the role played by linguistic form and usage. This may be seen as a source of error from the side of measuring conceptual structure, but it simultaneously is a source of information about the other properties of metaphors in usage. This adjustment was desirable because my study was aimed at discovering whether there were other dimensions to metaphor than the ten highly correlated ones described by Katz and his colleagues. For that purpose, other measuring scales, designed to tap, for instance, linguistic form and communicative function, were also added to the measuring instrument. My studies were carried out with Dutch and English language materials. Since I did not have the large samples of participants at my disposal, I had to make do with ten and nine professionals in the humanities who were all graduates of a Master’s degree in linguistics or literature. These raters had to rate all items on a large battery of scales, with some restest items and statistical tests of interrater agreement controlling for reliability. The findings of the studies show that the properties of metaphor cannot be restricted to the highly conceptual ones measured by Katz and his colleagues, and that literary and journalistic metaphors display systematic differences that can be understood as functions of their register and genre (Steen 1994). Metaphor identification in usage has to incorporate these differences as part of its expectations about, and interpretation of, the data. Research by manipulation exhibits a range of goals and uses of participants, which has an effect on the techniques that can be applied. When the relation between the nature of metaphor and context is in focus, studies aim to demonstrate a causal effect, or more broadly a relation between the two variables. This does not necessarily require as many participants as a norming study. The latter requires large groups of raters in order to obtain as precise a measurement of the ‘true scores’ of the test items as is practically possible. These are two rather different set-ups. In both cases, the informants act as a jury, or as an even more representative panel. They do not provide meta data about cognition, but about the nature of the symbolic

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

structures of the metaphors under investigation. It is true that such information can be fed into studies of cognition, acting as a discourse factor which may influence the cognitive processes and products of for instance comprehension. But that is another topic, which will be returned to in Chapter 12.

. Conclusion When researchers aim to find metaphor in the symbolic structures of usage, they can address two questions: Q2: When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q4: When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical? Many of the linguistic forms of metaphors in usage are conventionally metaphorical constructions, which we have also looked at in Chapter 6, but some metaphors in usage are either obsolete or novel cases. The conceptual structures related to most of these forms may be compared with the conventional conceptual metaphors discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, but the use of these linguistic forms and conceptual structures in concrete usage events alters the identification of their precise nature and content. One important point that has been emphasized in this respect is the much more detailed nature of many target domains in usage, which are affected by the presence of much more knowledge of cotext and content of use. The study of metaphor in usage has received an exciting stimulus from the advent of corpus linguistics as a means for observing language on an unprecedented scale. Special corpora have been constructed to study metaphor in for instance business, politics, the media, education, fiction, and religion. These corpora vary in size, and their use has also varied considerably. Some have been exploited for deductive purposes, in attempts to find particular source domains or entire conceptual metaphors. Others have been utilized differently, where researchers attempt to find all metaphor that can be observed in a particular sample. The limiting case of the latter approach is, of course, the study of one case, such as a play or a novel, which technically might also be seen as a corpus, even though it is not always treated as such. The advantage of employing an observational method over introspection should be clear. A wider range of metaphor forms and contexts is encountered, and their representativeness as well as other properties (degree of metaphoricity, conventionality, and so on) can be compared. This can be done by means of direct analysis or by means of informant judgments. The latter option has not been used much and offers exciting opportunities for the future. This should give a boost to the validity of metaphor studies in comparison with more traditional approaches in semantics and pragmatics, which are mostly based on imagined data. The purpose of introspective studies typically seems to be the formation and development of theory. Observation and manipulation studies, by contrast, typically aim

Chapter 10. Usage (1): Metaphorical language use 

for description and possibly even explanation of metaphor in usage. The possibility to apply quantitative analysis in these studies enhances their quality. In that respect, most blending theoretical studies of metaphor in discourse also lean more towards the introspective side and the aim of theory development than towards the observational side and the concomitant goal of description. This is in line with their predilection for idiographic research which focuses on single and unique cases. Yet such research can only gain in depth if it can make use of the results of large-scale nomothetic research which is maximally precise and, eventually, quantitative, so that detailed comparisons between unique cases and general patterns are facilitated. Corpora are particularly interesting for the deductive investigation of selected conceptual metaphors that have been postulated in the literature. Some studies have explicitly set out to examine the linguistic realization in usage of one or more conceptual metaphors, such as Koller (2004). Others have made grateful use of those proposals once they had collected their linguistic data from the corpus, such as Ca˝ ballero Rodríguez (2006), Charteris-Black (2004), Chilton (1996), Ozçali¸ skan (2003, 2004), and Semino (2005). But in all of these cases, cognitive-linguistic research on conceptual metaphor has provided a firm drive to the research. This felicitous combination between corpus-linguistic research and the deductive approach is due to their preference for selection and focus. Whether the research fixes the language of the target domain (e.g. security or speech activity), the source domain (e.g. motion), or both (business and war), each of these methods provides a theoretically motivated but selective starting point which may be operationalized in concrete linguistic terms that are open for inspection. The subsequent collection and analysis of the data from the corpus may then be made explicit and is hence open for replication. The preceding motivation of the identity and content of the domains as conceptual structures is usually based in the cognitive-linguistic literature, which may be sufficient for the present state of the art. The combination of these aspects has led to some exciting findings on a broader scale than has hitherto been possible. There is one methodological comment that I wish to make about this development, by way of conclusion to this chapter. It has to do with the reliability of the conceptual and linguistic analyses. Even though validity may have been boosted by the recourse to the cognitive-linguistic literature, the reliability of the analyses may have been jeopardized by the sheer increase in scale regarding the number of data that have to be examined. Again, determining in deductive fashion that only a limited set of lexical items will be analyzed clearly pays off, but even here there is an intimidatingly high number of decisions made in counting a linguistic form as metaphorically used, and, what is more, as expressive of a particular underlying conceptual metaphor. The possibilities for bias and error are simply too great for tolerating. That is why the need for methodological procedures, both within and between independent analysts, needs to receive more attention. The general applicability of the operational issues formulated in Chapters 6 through 8 proved to be just as relevant for the identification of the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor in usage, as they were for the behavioral study of metaphor in grammar in Chapter 9. When the application of

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

these procedures, and the statistical tests of the reliability of their application, are also part of standardized reporting in research publications, the promises of the combined deductive plus observational approach by means of corpus linguistics can be cashed in. This is a methodological demand which becomes even more important for those studies which do not follow a selective, deductive procedure. When the goal of the research is not just to capture those expressions in usage which reflect one or several conceptual metaphors or their source or target domains, but all metaphorical language use, irrespective of its conceptual basis, the observational method by means of a corpus becomes more risky. When large numbers of texts have to be analyzed, the possibility for error increases exponentially. That is why a procedure for metaphor identification in usage is dearly needed. Moreover, the application of such a procedure should not be based on one analyst and its degree of success should be monitored explicitly. One solution to this problem is to run reliability tests of the degree of agreement within and between analysts.

chapter 

Linguistic forms and conceptual structures in usage (2) Other forms of metaphor

In the previous chapter I restricted my attention to one clearly delimited set of phenomena that all linguists have to deal with when they wish to find metaphor in language as usage. Metaphorical language use requires the identification of a particular type of meaning in usage, indirect meaning; this is true irrespective whether it is grammatically conventionalized, obsolete or novel, and whether it occurs as a single instance or in a coherent discourse pattern. The meanings of this class of metaphors in usage are partly based in the conventional, grammaticalized meanings of the linguistic forms used (cf. Langacker’s 1987 notion of partial sanctioning) but they are specified and enriched on the spot. The identification of this class of metaphorical meanings in usage can take place by the various methodological means which were also distinguished for grammar. The process of data collection and analysis was again divided into two distinct areas, pertaining to the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor. The cognitive validity of these symbolic structures as mental representations or of the processes that lead to such products is a separate issue, to be discussed in Chapter 12. Looking at metaphor in usage in this way is a matter of looking at events of discourse, and especially the linguistic and conceptual nature of the symbolic structures of utterances and texts that are central in such usage events. When language usage is examined in this way in order to find metaphor, cognitive linguists tend to focus on one particular range of phenomena, metaphorically used language. They focus on words and other linguistic forms that are used indirectly in conventional, novel or obsolete ways. Yet there are other manifestations in usage events of metaphor defined as a mapping across two conceptual domains, including well-known phenomena like simile, analogy, allegory, and so on. Simile, for example, embodies a distinct linguistic manifestation of a metaphorical mapping in conceptual structure: simile does not involve indirect language use but displays direct or nonmetaphorical indications that a cross-domain mapping is at stake – as has also been emphasized by scholars like Donald Davidson, John Searle, and Sam Glucksberg. It is this type of phenomenon in usage which now requires our attention. If metaphor is defined as a conceptual cross-domain mapping and language usage is approached as grounded events of discourse, then there is still more metaphor to be

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

found than metaphorically used language. Consider the world-famous sonnet XVIII by Shakespeare as a case in point: Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day? Thou art more lovely and more temperate: Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May, And summer’s lease hath all too short a date; Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines, And often is his gold complexion dimmed; And every fair from fair sometime declines, By chance or nature’s changing course untrimmed: But thy eternal summer shall not fade, Nor lose possession of that fair thou ow’st, Nor shall death brag thou wandrest in his shade, When in eternal lines to time thou grow’st. So long as men can breathe or eyes can see, So long lives this, and this gives life to thee. The first line sets up a cross-domain mapping by evoking and contrasting two distinct mental spaces, but does not use metaphorical language to do so. The words activate the concepts of I, thee, compare, and summer’s day, and each of these concepts has a direct role in designating their respective referents in the world of the text. The referents in the rest of the poem belong to two distinct conceptual domains or spaces of discourse. One frame pertains to the addressee of the sonnet, and the other to summer’s days. The point, however, is that both are directly expressed as text topics in their own right. The reader is explicitly invited to set up and compare the elements of the one topic to the elements of the other. This is a cross-domain mapping in usage which does not exhibit indirect meaning as intended by Lakoff (1986, 1993) and Gibbs (1993, 1994): it is not the linguistic forms (or ‘language’) that are being used indirectly, but there is one local topic which is used to talk about another, more encompassing topic. Using one topic to talk about another topic may also be seen as a form of indirect meaning in usage. This discourse perspective explains that lines 2 through 8 use language that, as a rule, may be deemed directly expressive of their subject: line 2 uses words that directly express the personal characteristics of the addressee, whereas lines 3 through 8 directly express the properties of a summer’s day (one or two exceptions apart, see below). The lines do not contain metaphorical language in the sense of being indirectly meaningful. Instead, they work as non-metaphorical expressions. They are direct instructions for setting up conceptual structures in the domain of the beloved and the domain of a summer’s day, respectively, and these conceptual structures require cross-domain mapping by some form of comparative inferencing in order to achieve textual coherence. If the analysts (and the reader) do not carry out these cross-domain mappings, expressions like “more lovely and more temperate” turn incomplete while

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor

“rough winds do shake the darling buds of May” lose their point. It may hence be concluded by the analyst that such mappings are part of the intended conceptual structure of the text. It should be noted, though, that the first seven lines also exhibit expressions that do deviate from the dominant semantic frame, even if that semantic frame may be subservient to yet another semantic frame, the target domain. Consider lease and date in line 4 and eye in line 5: these are indirectly meaningful when it comes to integrating them into the local discourse topic of a summer’s day which is dominant in these lines. To spell this out for eye, the word activates the concept eye which does not designate a referent ‘eye’ in this part of the text world, for that does not deal with eyes but with summer’s days. Instead, eye is indirectly meaningful; its semantic function for the complete text has to be resolved by some form of analogizing in which the sun in the sky is compared to (or, more generally, related by some form of similarity to) the eye in the face of a person. If this does not happen, the part of the text containing eye becomes incoherent. Words like eye and lease and date, therefore, can be considered as local linguistic metaphors in the context of a more encompassing local topic, summer’s day, which in turn functions as the non-metaphorical expression of the source domain that the poem stages for conceptual mapping onto the target domain. The incidence and interaction between these various forms of metaphor in discourse is not restricted to poetry, although the intricacies of Shakespeare’s text may be quite exceptional. Cross-domain mappings by means of non-metaphorical or direct language are typical of other types of discourse as well, such as education and science (e.g. Gentner 1982; Gentner & Jeziorski 1993; Mayer 1993). There are even complete genres which are based on the direct use of language which simultaneously and conventionally evokes a mapping across two conceptual domains: both parable (Turner 1996) and allegory (Crisp 2001, 2005) exhibit this characteristic. It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to examine which other forms of metaphor in usage there are apart from metaphorically used language, and how they can be characterized theoretically and identified empirically. In addressing these issues, I will attempt to give further answers to the questions raised at the beginning of Chapter 10: Q2: When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q4: When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical?

. Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach .. Two-domain approaches Classic conceptual metaphor theory has drawn attention to the various alternative forms of metaphor such as simile, analogy, extended metaphor, and so on. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff and Turner (1989), and Turner (1996) offer sketches of their position in cognitive linguistics, with special attention to their relation with concep-






tual metaphor. Extensive empirical research on their specific position and function in usage is not reported, however. Other cognitive-linguistic approaches provide equally interesting examples of finding other forms of metaphor than indirect language use. Chilton (1996) has some spectacular examples of other forms of metaphor, next to indirect language use. Consider the following excerpt: (1) Molotov, conducting the meeting, sat leaning forward over the table, a Russian cigarette dangling from his mouth, his eyes flashing with satisfaction and confidence as he glanced from one to the other of the foreign ministers, obviously keenly aware of their mutual differences, and their common uncertainty in the face of the keen, ruthless, and incisive Russian diplomacy. He had the look of a passionate poker player who knows that he has a royal flush and is about to call the last of his opponents. (1996: 130) The last sentence is the metaphorical climax of the text, but there is no metaphorical meaning in the language if that is defined as the indirect evocation of referents. Molotov presumably did have the look of a passionate poker player who is about to win. However, it is also clear that that this is Truman’s metaphor for conceptualizing the Soviets. The text is moreover presented in the context of Chilton’s analysis of other expressions of the same underlying idea: (2) I have an ace in the hole and another one showing – so unless he [Stalin] has threes or two pair (and I know he has not) we are sitting all right. (Chilton 1996: 129) If finding metaphor in usage is based on finding a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual structure of the discourse, it does not have to be expressed by indirect language, as is shown by (1). Chilton does not draw attention to this theoretical issue, perhaps because it is less relevant to his empirical concerns. However, he does comment with reference to (1) that “The last sentence quoted above merely makes the source of the details in the preceding sentences explicit” (1996: 130). The point that I wish to emphasize here is that those analysts who do not allow for the effect of conceptual source domains on language in usage, the final sentence of (1) does not have to count as a case of metaphor at all (as it does for Chilton). Somebody can literally have the look of a poker player. Therefore, to analyze that last sentence as an act of metaphorical conceptualization in discourse may be open for discussion to different analysts. And the question whether it counts as a metaphorical language form is probably even more difficult. A similar analysis of the role of a foreign source domain in the context of the target domain of international politics can be presented for the following example. It has been taken from Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’: (3) (conclusion 1) We must study it [the Communist ‘movement’] with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emo-


tionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual. (Chilton 1996: 146; emphasis in original, GS) The expression in bold is adduced by Chilton as an example of the effect of the source domain of illness, which, in other places, gives rise to regular metaphorically used language such as : (4) Much depends on the health and vigor of our own society . . .. In (3), use is made of the source domain of illness to map the doctor-patient relation onto the West-USSR. No comment is made by Chilton, however, that this is a crossdomain comparison that is expressed in direct terms. The comparison is explicitly signaled, by means of same . . . with which, and the two domains are both set up in their own terms in the context of the encompassing discourse, just as, for instance, with Shakespeare’s sonnet. If an analyst does not set out from the assumption that we have a conceptual metaphor at play here, the expression in bold in (3) is probably not identified as a case of metaphor in usage, neither as a linguistic form nor as a conceptual structure. Similes are of course also present in Chilton’s materials. I have quoted the toy automobile in Chapter 10. Here is another example: (5) No time was left for appraisal. In the past eighteen months, I said, Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a rotten barrel infested by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry infection through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, . . . (1996: 178–179; bold emphasis in original, underling mine, GS) Chilton refers to all of these expressions as metaphors, on the basis of the deductive assumption that they are expressions of the same underlying metaphorical conceptualization in the discourse. One of these metaphors, “the disease metaphor”, is expressed in a highly specific image, which is directly instead of indirectly presented, Like apples in a rotten barrel infested by one rotten one. The direct mode of expression is not singled out for comment. However, other analysts might not wish to call this metaphor, but literal comparison between unlike entities. (They might even wish to take infested as literal: it is applied to apples, an appropriate frame of reference for infested.) That this comparison would be across two domains might be seen as a matter of conceptual structure, not linguistic form, by these other analysts. Again, the identification of metaphor as either linguistic form or conceptual structure might yield rather different results. When cross-domain mappings are expressed as comparisons such as the ones we have considered just now, the source domain becomes more prominently available for further development and commenting as a discourse concept and topic in its own



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

right in further utterances or even different usage events. In Chilton’s study, this type of discursive metaphor development is illustrated by for instance the issues surrounding the metaphor of Europe as a common house. Its utilization across people and usage events may give rise to such metaphor extension as the following, by Gorbachev: (6) Whatever aspects we consider of the development of human civilization, the contribution of Europeans is enormous. We live in a single house (dom), although some go into that house from one entrance, others from another entrance. It is necessary to work together and repair the communication in that house. (Chilton 1996: 266) The conceptual extensions in this example are expressed by means of metaphorically used language, in the second half of the quotation. From a linguistic and conceptual perspective, this is fundamentally different from the nonmetaphorical, direct use of language in the following extension of the same conceptual metaphor: (7) The Germans find themselves in the situation of the man beaming with joy because he has finally decided to build his own house [Eigenheim]. Now, however, begins the hard part: securing finance for the project; arranging details of the building plans with the family and the architect; getting the agreement of the neighbors and the approval of the planning authorities. (1996: 315) If analysts do not accept that metaphor may or even has to be a conceptual instead of a linguistic phenomenon, they will be forced to ignore this type of linguistic form as a related case of metaphor in usage. As soon as cross-domain mappings get thematized in these ways, language users also begin to display an explicit awareness that they are actually setting up crossdomain mappings, especially when these threaten to go wrong, as in some of the above cases. At such moments, language users start to insert metaphor flags, as is also noted by Chilton in a side comment on an utterance by Helmut Kohl (Chilton 1996: 359). The point is, however, that these signals may have fundamental effects on the semantic status of the language used. Consider the following quotation from Adam Wildavsky (Chilton 1996: 335): (8) If the danger is there, if the United States cannot accept the results of Soviet pressure and does not do anything to remove it, it must be contained. The physical analogy to this policy is the resistance to outward pressure. America’s choice is to allow expansion, remove the pressure, or contain it by measures that are designed to resist its continuation. The words resistance and pressure are used in two different ways in this quotation. They are used metaphorically, that is, indirectly, in the first and last sentence of this quotation, when they are used to talk about politics. However, they are used nonmetaphorically, that is, directly, in the second sentence of this quotation, when they are used to talk about physics (“The physical analogy to this policy is . . .”). This is because the speaker presents two distinct conceptual domains as two distinct topics for


discourse, which are to be seen as analogically related by the addressee, and explicitly signals this intention as such. From a linguistic point of view, the type of metaphor in usage exhibited by the middle sentence of this quotation is fundamentally different from the type of metaphor in usage in the first and last sentences. Again, some analysts might have their doubts about the metaphorical status of the middle sentence as metaphor in language, even though they might accede that metaphorical conceptualization is there. These decisions depend on the delimitation of the area in which metaphor is looked for, conceptual structure or linguistic form. They also raise interesting empirical questions about the potentially diverging effects of these forms on comprehension, recognition, interpretation, and appreciation. Koller’s (2004) study of business discourse also has a conceptual basis which allows for diverging linguistic forms of metaphor, as is demonstrated by the following examples of other forms of metaphor than indirect language use: (9) Like football and trench warfare, this is a contest of sweat, mud, and inches. (2004: 101, from Fortune, line 13) (10) [Mergers] are, like second marriages, a triumph of hope over experience. (2004: 155, from The Economist, line 4) Both examples involve direct, not indirect presentations of the respective source domains. It should be noted that both of these sentences are then followed by other sentences containing indirect language use, exploiting terms of football, trench war, and marriage to talk about business without any further signaling that the conceptualization is metaphorical. Combinations of simile and metaphor are hence also exploited over longer stretches of discourse than just within the clause or sentence. They may be typically introduced by the simile, which introduces the foreign source domain relatively explicitly for setting up the foundations of the comparison, and then be followed by more integrated uses of the source domain within the dominant target domain in order to background the comparison and exploit it only in playful, stylistic ways – but that is speculation. The question again arises how these expressions should be identified as units of metaphorical meaning, and for which purposes. Are we dealing with a sequence of linguistic realizations of the same metaphorical conceptual structure, or are we dealing with a single but complex linguistic realization of the same metaphor? And would all of these linguistic expressions be seen as metaphorical by all analysts? And how are these symbolic phenomena connected with the processes and products of reading and writing, or listening and speaking? We have seen how the adoption of a conceptual starting point for the study of metaphor in usage leads to a wider scope of metaphor than simply metaphorically used language. The difference is important for a precise linguistic analysis of metaphor in usage, which has implications for studies of cognitive processing. And indeed, studies about the history of science suggest that, for instance, the difference between using metaphor or analogy in scientific discourse is fundamental. For instance, Gentner



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

and Jeziorski (1993) argue that “the ascendancy of analogy over metaphor in scientific reasoning was not always the case” (1993: 453). Blending Theory would probably hold that the two sets of data lead to distinct conceptual structures. It is therefore time to move on and briefly discuss two studies of allegory which have adopted that point of view.

.. Many-space approaches One of the interesting other forms of metaphor which has received much attention in Blending Theory is allegory (Turner 1996; cf. Lakoff & Turner 1989; Sinding 2002). Allegory is often described as extended metaphor, but the description is only acceptable if ‘extended’ refers to the linguistic expression while ‘metaphor’ refers to the conceptual structure. Crisp (2005: 124–125), for instance, claims that “Extended metaphor . . . is different from allegory because it contains language that relates directly to both the source and target.” Allegory, by contrast, typically only has language which evokes what may be seen as the elaborated source domain. One problem with allegories is in fact the difficulty of determining what counts as source and what as target. For instance, Animal Farm is a text about a farm, which may be taken as an explicit model for thinking about a more abstract, implicit target that has to do with totalitarian politics. Or is Animal Farm a text about a farm which, as an explicit target, is structured by our knowledge of a prior cultural text about totalitarian politics which acts as an implicit source? The fact that totalitarian politics is abstract and the farm is concrete favors the first analysis, but the fact that the global topic of the story of the text is the life at this farm favors the latter. It is precisely one of the distinguishing characteristics of allegory that the direction of the relation between the domains may be read in two ways. Blending Theory claims it can accommodate this property by setting up a blended space which has input from both source and target spaces (cf. Sinding 2002). Crisp (2005: 125) offers a Blending Theory account of allegory which assumes that the text functions as the source domain while the implicit target domain of the text functions as its real topic: Extended metaphors elaborate metaphorical blended spaces to an unusual degree. Allegory, however, is a superextended metaphor, one extended to the point where all directly target-related language is eliminated. This means that there is no longer any of that mixing or “blending” of source- and target-related language that is the linguistic basis for conceptual blending. The language of allegory simply refers to and describes the metaphorical source.

However, two sentences later he speaks of the allegorical text as presenting a possible situation that “exists first of all in its own fictional right”; to me, this is the very basis for the possibility of subverting the relationship between source and target as sketched above.

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

Text analyses such as those presented by Crisp (2001, 2005) and Sinding (2002) may act as pointers to themes of future research on metaphor in discourse. They may help to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of many-space models and two-domain models regarding their ability to handle all forms of metaphor from the same set of assumptions and variables. That literary texts may function as an exciting testing ground for the instruments needed to apply these models is self-evident.

. Conceptualization .. Signaling Before we turn to the overall conceptualization of the other forms of metaphor, it is helpful to explain one interesting consequence of approaching metaphor in usage as a problem for coherence and for joint coordination between language users. This is the fact that language users are sometimes aware of the coherence problem that may be caused by the introduction of an ‘alien’ or incongruous source domain in relation to the dominant target domain that belongs to the local topic of a usage event. In the spirit of their cooperative attitude towards language use as joint activity, language users often wish to alleviate such a potential problem for their interlocutors by flagging. In these cases, language users apparently prefer to take the risk of a threat to coherence to finding other means of expression. This suggests that, again in these cases, language users use metaphor relatively deliberately; or they cannot find better alternatives. The most extensive study of metaphor signaling has been presented by Andrew Goatly (1997). A close look at his study shows that the signals discovered so far may be divided by the three main aspects of metaphor identification which I have consistently used in my discussion. Thus, there are signals for indirectness, for different domains, and for mapping by nonliteral similarity. For instance, indirectness may be signaled by such expressions as sort of and kind of, as in : (11) “What’s your game?” “Why, I just thought I’d sort of, kind of, oh, like drift with every passion.” Goatly (1997: 180) The clash between the source domain and the target domain may be alleviated by inserting a signal of the nature of the target domain that needs to be mapped onto from the source domain, as in (11): (12) a. b. c. d.

mental incontinence intellectual stagnation inner speech Ceylon . . . was a tax haven, a sort of oriental Switzerland. Goatly (1997: 171–172)

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

The words mental, intellectual, inner, tax, and oriental all provide indications of the aspect of the target domain which needs to be utilized to connect the alien source domain concept to the rest of the discourse. And finally, the need for a cross-domain mapping on the basis of some form of similarity is often signaled by means of words like as, like, and comparative constructions such as more . . . than or as . . . as (examples have been provided above). The three basic aspects for metaphor identification discussed in Chapter 6 through eight with respect to metaphor in grammar (indirect meaning by nonliteral similarity, two conceptual domains, cross-domain mapping by means of nonliteral similarity) are hence reflected in the use of three different types of signals for metaphor. These flags may suggest varying forms of awareness of language users that they need to alleviate a potential problem of discourse coherence for their addressees. People may merely wish to indicate the fact that they are using language indirectly, but they may also wish to show that there are two domains which need to be connected, or even that such a connection has to be established on the basis of some form of similarity. The symbolic analysis of these signals for metaphor in usage hence clearly has a functional basis, which facilitates making connections with research on the cognitive processing of such metaphors. This analysis is strengthened by the fact that a similar phenomenon occurs at the level of morphological organization. When metaphor is signaled at the level of morphological structure, there is a comparable distinction between signaling indirectness, domains, and similarity as in lexical metaphor. Thus, White (1996) has a lengthy discussion of the use of unbookish in Shakespeare’s Othello (IV, i, 7-11), -ish serving as one explicit marker of the approximate, indirect meaning of the morpheme to which it is affixed. Indications of the two domains that are at play in one morphologically complex structure may be found in compounds, such as frogman. And an illustration of a morphological signal for similarity or comparison is the affix -like, as in Bridget Jones’s Phoenix-like (from the entry for Tuesday 3 January of Bridget Jones’s Diary): (13) Now, though, I feel ashamed and repulsive. I can actually feel the fat splurging out from my body. Never mind. Sometimes you have to sink to a nadir of toxic fat envelopment in order to emerge, phoenix-like, from the chemical wasteland as a purged and beautiful Michelle Pfeiffer figure. Tomorrow new Spartan health and beauty regime will begin. The need to attend to indirectness, different domains, and similarity can also be encoded at the level of morphology. It is self-evident that these signals may be of help in finding metaphor in usage. Cameron and Deignan (2003) have discussed some of the methodological issues in using metaphor signals as a starting point for finding metaphor in usage. But a more general discussion of signals for all types of metaphor will have to take place in a more encompassing framework.

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

.. Four dimensions of metaphor in usage The discussion of other forms of metaphor in usage is less focused in the literature than the discussion of metaphorical language use covered in the last chapter. Scholars in different disciplines have looked at different aspects of the total picture, and this has led to partial treatments of phenomena which demand fuller consideration. In what follows, I will not attempt to present an integral and new model of all forms of metaphor in usage, for that does not lie within the remit of this book. However, what I can do is single out a number of dimensions of metaphor in usage which require consideration in any project that aims at finding other forms of metaphor in usage than metaphorically used language. The first dimension of the linguistic expression of metaphorical mappings in usage is the dimension of language use. The prototypical category of this dimension is indirect language use, as in They tore the theory to shreds, as discussed in the previous chapter. I have also shown, however, that the language of metaphors in usage may be direct, one example being the first line in Shakespeare’s sonnet, “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day”. This line is a direct expression in usage of a cross-domain mapping in conceptual structure. But explicit invitations for metaphorical comparison are not the only type of directly expressed metaphor. Reconsider Fauconnier and Turner’s (2000) example of Clinton and the iceberg: (14) If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink. As noted in Chapter 10, there is a fundamental difference between asserting that Clinton is the iceberg, which would be a classic metaphor, on the one hand, and counterfactually suggesting a condition in which Clinton were the iceberg, on the other. The latter requires a literal, direct interpretation of the language for it to make sense as a counterfactual condition, even though it also demands that a cross-domain mapping between an iceberg and Clinton takes place. There are hence various ways in which language can be used directly to convey a cross-domain mapping in discourse, including invitations for comparison and counterfactual suggestions. As noted, an initial inventory of these alternative forms has been offered by Goatly (1997). To press the point home, whether explicit comparisons, counterfactual suggestions, and related phenomena are accepted as linguistic forms of metaphor or not is entirely dependent on the researcher’s definition of metaphor. If indirect language use forms the basis of that definition, then many other but conceptually related phenomena cannot be regarded as metaphorical, since their language is used directly to indicate the referents involved. However, if the definition of metaphor is not located in language use but in conceptual structure, then each of these phenomena are linguistic forms expressing cross-domain mappings that are based in some form of similarity. As a result, they should all qualify as metaphor in usage. The distinction between the two areas of research of metaphor as linguistic forms versus metaphor as conceptual structure is essential to appreciating this point and to assessing which point of departure in research is taken in a particular study.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

The second dimension which plays an obvious role in discussions of the wider range of metaphor forms in usage is metaphor signaling. This area has naturally received a lot of attention in connection with the contrast between metaphor and simile. The classic category of metaphor is distinct from simile because it is assumed to lack signaling. This has raised the question which of the two figures is more basic, metaphor or simile. Croft and Cruse (2004: 211–215) have briefly discussed the various positions that may be adopted in this connection, with special reference to the class-inclusion theory of Glucksberg (2001): – – –

metaphors are implicit similes similes are implicit metaphors similes and metaphors are distinct

The second option is Glucksberg’s, but Croft and Cruse adopt the third view. One argument for their decision is that similes contain an explicit assertion of resemblance, while metaphors do not. This argument is therefore based on the presence of a signal in simile, as opposed to its absence in a metaphor. Signals constitute one dimension of the expression of cross-domain mappings in the linguistic forms found in usage. The second reason for Croft and Cruse’s decision to treat metaphor and simile as distinct goes back to my first dimension, the role of language use. For Croft and Cruse also argue that metaphors typically present a blend of two domains, whereas similes typically present the two domains as separate. What this suggests is that in metaphors some language is used indirectly, which has to be incorporated into the encompassing language of the target domain that is used directly. In similes, by contrast, no language is used indirectly, but it is the directly expressed conceptual structure of the source domain which has to be integrated within the encompassing conceptual structure of the dominant topic. The distinction between metaphor and simile therefore has to be based on the interaction between the two dimensions: it has to do with signaling as well as with language use. There are other signals for metaphor in usage than the ones marking simile (Goatly 1997). Thus, the comparison and counterfactual metaphors discussed above may be argued to exhibit typical signaling themselves, too. The comparison metaphor is flagged by the verb compare and the counterfactual metaphor by the conjunction if. Even classic metaphor based on indirect language use may be signaled in some way, as we saw for example (12) above. The absence or presence or signaling, and its nature, is of paramount importance in deciding what counts as metaphor or not. The role of signaling is especially important since the addition of a signal may kill the metaphor if the notion of metaphor is restricted to the classic category of metaphorically or indirectly used language (Goatly 1997). Thus, many theorists and researchers do not regard simile as metaphorical, precisely because explicit invitation for comparison can turn the juxtaposition of the two domains into a direct instead of an indirect expression. As has been noted by Davidson (1978), Searle (1979), and others, anything may be (directly) compared with anything. Direct language use in simile is a result of the insertion of like and similar markers, at least as far as the differenti-

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

ation between simile and metaphor is concerned. In other words, signals may change the status of the language used to express a cross-domain mapping from indirect use to direct use, which clearly affects the identification of metaphor depending on whether a conceptual or linguistic approach to the data in usage is followed. The interaction between signal and language use may become quite complicated when, for instance, metaphor and simile are combined (cf. Croft & Cruse 2004: 215– 216). Croft and Cruse distinguish between metaphor-within simile and simile-within metaphor. I have mentioned the former in Chapter 10, and the latter is illustrated by : (15) a. He looked tired, as if life had pushed him too far. b. Bray’s tone had the effect of a metal box slamming shut. In (15a), the words push too far are used indirectly, but this happens within the scope of an utterance which is directly offered for fictive comparison (as if ). In (15b), none of the words is used indirectly, and a comparison is suggested by the use of the words have the effect of. The comparison does indeed involve a cross-domain mapping, but the question arises whether all researchers would classify the expression of this conceptual structure as the rhetorical figure of simile. Clear definitions of metaphor and simile are required to make the identification and classification of these phenomena reliable. Croft and Cruse (2004) stop short of dealing with the third dimension of metaphor in usage, which has to do with the extension of metaphor. I have discussed variations of some of Croft and Cruse’s examples in this light in Chapter 4, in the section on units of metaphor. When two linguistic units of usage are involved, for instance in the form of independent clauses, the linguistic expression of a metaphor may be said to be extended (cf. Crisp, Heywood, & Steen 2002). Classic metaphor is a case of metaphor that is typically restricted to the boundaries of one utterance. That is why there is a terminological opposition between the unmarked notion of metaphor itself and the marked notion of extended metaphor (e.g. Piller 1999; Werth 1994). Extension is moreover not limited to metaphor but also pertains to other figures, as is shown by the study of extended or epic simile by Ziva Ben-Porat (1992). This suggests that the third dimension of metaphor extension has to be crossed with the other two dimensions, of language use and signaling, to produce a three-dimensional space in which various forms of metaphor in usage may be distinguished. Some of these extended manifestations of metaphor may be so far removed from the typical metaphor in its restricted form that it becomes problematic for some analysts to accept them as alternative forms of metaphor. Extended comparison typically has relatively long stretches of direct language use for one domain followed by long stretches of direct language use for another domain. There is a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual structure, but the experience of the language is quite different from the experience of language in classic, restricted metaphor. A conceptual definition of metaphor as a cross-domain mapping provides a coherent framework for treating these various manifestations of metaphor in usage events from one perspective, but it also raises new questions about the nature and function of the differences be-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

tween these various linguistic manifestations. As long as these have not been addressed, difficulties with identifying metaphor in usage remain. The fourth dimension has to do with metaphor explicitness, and pertains to the question whether both source and target domains are explicitly expressed in the discourse or not. Classic metaphor in the linguistic form of A is B metaphors is explicit. However, to pick up on the issues from the previous paragraph, allegory is a form of extended metaphor which is typically implicit: it only displays an extensive stretch of language use from the source domain, and does not have language from the target domain (e.g., Crisp 2005). (Moreover, and because of this, the language expressing the source domain is used directly or non-metaphorically; it is only the conceptual structure of the discourse which accommodates the cross-domain mapping to some target – see, again, Crisp 2005.) Similarly, parable is another linguistic form of extended – but conceptual – metaphor (e.g., Charteris-Black 2004: 191). Parables contain at least one long text section expressing the source domain and may then vary in having either a brief target domain section or not having such a section altogether. The former parables are explicit with a conventionally uneven balance between source and target expression, while the latter are implicit. Restricted forms of metaphor in discourse can also vary regarding explicitness. In Chapter 10 we saw at least two examples of implicit metaphor within the confines of a complete utterance, both of which lacked expression of the source domain: the line from Tennyson manifested linguistic zero realization of the metaphorically used source concept of sleep, and the follow-up in the conversation had linguistic zero realization of the source concept pig. These are just some illustrations of the fact that the dimension of explicitness displays various interactions with the other three dimensions. The presence of a linguistically explicit contrast in usage between the two domains of a metaphor may enhance linguistic and conceptual metaphor identification, while its absence may frustrate it. This may even be taken to the point where the lack of either a source domain or a target domain in the discourse may be sufficient for an analyst to deny the presence of metaphor altogether. Thus, sentences containing source domain language only, such as The rock was brittle with age, have been denied to be metaphorical by some because of the lack of an overt semantic clash between source and target in the language. Metaphor explicitness is hence another important dimension in identifying metaphor in usage. The four dimensions labeled language use, signaling, extension, and explicitness go a long way towards accounting for the various forms of metaphor in usage. One important question which will have to be addressed in that connection is whether these four dimensions suffice to account for all forms of metaphor, or whether the interplay of metaphors in discourse is so complex that further dimensions have to be considered for inclusion. Another question for research will be the effect of these dimensions and their interactions on the theoretical and empirical acceptability of particular form as metaphorical, as I have suggested for the treatment of extended comparisons. And a final, obvious question has to do with the effect of these distinct

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

configurations of metaphor properties on processing and the way they are produced in speaking or writing. Let me spell out one consequence of this analysis for the research discussed in the previous chapter. If metaphor identification in usage is restricted to finding metaphorically used language, then the range of findings is delimited on three counts: clear cases of direct language use involving for instance comparison or counterfactual metaphor may be ignored, metaphor that has been killed because of additional signaling may be left aside, and implicit metaphor may be left aside. Whether this has indeed taken place in the various studies of metaphor in usage is not always fully clear from their reports. What is certainly true is that most models of metaphor have only recently begun to look at some of the other forms of metaphor in more detail, so that the picture is still very incomplete in this area.

.. Indirectness revisited The forms of metaphor in usage are too diverging for the definition of classic metaphor, which is based on the indirect use of concrete signs and constructions. This has been the focus of most cognitive-linguistic research. However, we have seen that there are other forms of linguistic expression of cross-domain mappings. In particular, there are direct as well as implicit expressions of such mappings which also qualify as metaphor in usage. This suggests that we need to go back to the criterion of indirect language use and revise it in such a way that the other forms of metaphor can also be included within its compass. The key to this revision is to shift the notion of indirectness from linguistic signs to conceptual structures. The use of a conceptual domain as a source to understand and talk about another conceptual domain which functions as a target is the true basis for metaphor in the study of usage. It embodies a form of indirectness in conceptualization which exploits the conceptual structure of one domain to conceive of another domain that is the local or global topic of an utterance or message. Indirectness in conceptual structure may be linguistically expressed in various ways. One of these ways is by means of metaphorically used language. This is the classic category of metaphor. And the classic category of metaphor may therefore be defined by means of indirectly used language which conveys the indirect conceptualization of some target domain by means of some source domain. However, indirect conceptualization by means of a cross-domain mapping does not always have to be expressed by indirect language. It may also be expressed directly, and this may happen in various forms. Some of these forms may be explicit invitations for comparison, others may be assertions of resemblance, and still others may be counterfactual presentations of imagined re-categorizations. In all of these cases, and there are more, indirectness in conceptualization can be seen as being expressed by direct language. Most if not all of these classes of metaphor have been studied as metaphor in usage, some of which in cognitive linguistics, most notably in Blending Theory.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

In metaphorically used language as well as in other forms of metaphor, the true cause of some form of referential discontinuity or incongruity is indirectness in conceptualization. The apparent lack of coherence has to be resolved by assuming that a mapping from the foreign source domain to the dominant target domain has to be performed. This mapping may take place because it is triggered by indirect language use or by direct language, as the case may be. It may also be explicitly signaled in some way, or not. It may be restricted to one word within one utterance, or extend across a number of utterances in a row. And it may be explicitly expressed as a contrast between two domains, or remain more implicit. But in all of these cases, the real problem for maintaining coherence lies at the level of conceptual structure, not linguistic form. The point of the present chapter is that this problem of maintaining conceptual coherence may reveal itself in varying degrees of prominence in the linguistic structure.

. Operationalization If the above conceptualization holds water, it should follow that the identification of other forms of metaphor in usage has a different aspect when it comes to finding the relevant linguistic forms. The analysis of the conceptual structures, however, should look the same. Let us reconsider some of the previous examples to see what is happening. We will begin with the analysis of their conceptual structure by means of the questions formulated in previous chapters, to confirm that these are able to handle the data. For finding the conceptual structures of metaphor in usage, the following issues arise:


Identifying a cross-domain mapping 4. Decide about the relative salience of the two domains as distinct conceptual systems a. Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, typically, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame.

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

b. Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, in this particular context, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. To this end, interpret the target domain as specifically as is possible on the basis of the usage event, and then contrast and compare it with the basic interpretation of the source domain of the metaphorically used expression. 5. Decide about the necessary and sufficient degree of similarity required for a mapping, since corresponding elements between two domains may be relatively more or less similar a. Decide about the role of types of correspondences between domains, such as external similarity versus relations, and relations versus higher-order relations. b. Decide about minimal and maximal number of correspondences required for an analysis to be accepted as complete. None of these issues requires a different approach for implicit metaphors than for explicit metaphor, as may be checked with reference to the petals that sleep or the ignorant pig discussed at the beginning of Chapter 10. Similarly, Koller’s examples (9) and (10) in Section 1 above, comparing business to football and trench war, or mergers to second marriages, may also be related to underlying conceptual structures by these same sets of questions; indeed, her own research has in fact dealt with both types of phenomena by one methodological approach. And Fauconnier and Turner’s counterfactual assumption in (14), ‘If Clinton were the Titanic’, is no exception. When we turn to the extended metaphors and other forms discussed by Chilton, we can note that the situation is slightly different. The European house metaphors in (6) and (7), for instance, provide so much additional material in the text that the answers to the first two questions about the demarcation of the domains are strongly constrained and guided. This will also help in providing an answer to question 4b: since the discourse is about politics, not about housing or domestic problems, the two domains can be contrasted and compared. This is precisely one of the important variations in metaphor in usage that are due to the diverging intentions of language users which need to be taken into account. The methodological framework for identifying and describing this variation, however, does not seem to be ill-suited to capture this variation; on the contrary, it brings out the specific nature of this class of metaphor in comparison with the other ones. All in all, the operational framework for identifying the conceptual structure of other forms of metaphor in usage does not have to differ from the one erected for metaphorical language use or for metaphor in grammar. This supports the idea that the approach to metaphor identification propagated in this book is fundamentally unified at a conceptual level, even for less regular cases like implicit metaphor, simile, extended metaphor, and so on. Let us therefore now turn to the set of questions as formulated for identifying the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar and metaphorical language use in usage, and see how they fare with these data.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Identifying a metaphorically motivated linguistic form 1. Decide what counts as one form 2. Decide whether it has at least two senses 3. Decide whether the two senses are related by some form of nonliteral similarity a. nonliteral similarity should be able to be opposed to both literal similarity and literal hierarchy; each of these oppositions involves the possibility for the analyst to specify two fundamentally different semantic or conceptual domains. b. the direction of the derivation or mapping has to be founded on a criterion of basicness, whether that is historical, experiential, acquisitional, and so on. It is immediately clear that these questions cannot be applied to the other forms of metaphor discussed above. Such forms do not work by metaphorically motivated polysemy but in another way. This is an important finding, for it suggests that these cases do not involve metaphorical language use in the traditional definition. This is precisely the reason why they are not identified as metaphorical by some analysts. If they are to be kept on board as linguistic forms of metaphor, their identification has to resort to another but related set of questions. A variant of the Pragglejaz procedure which I have successfully used in unpublished research is the following:

Identifying other forms of metaphorically motivated language 1. Find local referent and topic shifts. Good clues are provided by lexis which is “incongruous” (Cameron, CharterisBlack) with the rest of the text. 2. Test whether the incongruous words are to be integrated within the overall referential and/or topical framework by means of some form of comparison. Good clues are provided by lexis which flags the need for some form of similarity or projection (Goatly). 3. Test whether the comparison is nonliteral or cross-domain. Cameron (2003: 74) suggests that we should include any comparison that is not obviously nonmetaphorical, such as the campsite was like a holiday village. I agree and would translate this into conceptual terms as follows: whenever two concepts are compared and they can be constructed, in context, as somehow belonging to two distinct and contrasted domains, the comparison should be seen as expressing a cross-domain mapping. Cameron refers to these as two incongruous domains. 4. Test whether the comparison can be seen as some form of indirect talk about the local or main referent or topic of the text. (If it is not, we might have to do with a digression.)

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

A provisional sketch of a mapping between the incongruous material functioning as source domain on the one hand and elements from the cotext functioning as target domain on the other should be possible. 5. If the findings to tests 2, 3, and 4 are positive, then a word should be identified as (part of) an expression of another form of metaphor. When this set of instructions is applied to the above examples, they can account for all of the data: football, trench war, second marriages and the Titanic are all cases of local reference shifts that have to be incorporated into the overall referential and topical framework of the text on the basis of the criteria explained in these instructions. The same holds for the extended expressions discussed by Chilton. The instructions can finally be adjusted in such a way that they can also deal with local referent and topic shifts that are not explicit but implicit and recoverable because they are realized by substitution or ellipsis. The linguistic forms of other forms of metaphor can be identified by means of the same type of approach as metaphorically used language. What is urgently needed, however, is an operational definition of the various figures and forms that are involved. Terminology is one factor here, with questions about the demarcation of such forms as extended comparison, simile, and metaphor. But this is just the surface which hides more fundamental problems regarding the scope of the phenomena to be included and accounted for. Moreover, the structural complexity of some cases, including even our counterfactual reasoning example, is greater than what has been commonly shown in most cognitive-linguistic analysis so far (with the exception of Blending Theory). An integrated and detailed theoretical and empirical approach does not seem to be available at this moment.

. Introspection Introspective approaches have long influenced the debate about the relation and difference between metaphor and simile. For instance, both Davidson (1978) and Searle (1979) have pointed out that similes involve comparison statements which can be taken literally, since anything can be compared with anything. Man can be like a pig, Sam can be like a wolf, Juliet can be like the sun, and so on. Whether these comparison statements are useful or felicitous and whether they have clearly identifiable meanings is another matter, but that is beside the point. Classic metaphors, by contrast, have the form of class-inclusion statements. Metaphorical class-inclusion statements are typically false, as in Man is a wolf, Sam is a pig, and Juliet is the sun. That is what distinguishes them from metaphorical comparison statements (Sam is like a pig), which can be true, as well as from nonmetaphorical class-inclusion statements, such as Man is a living being, Sam is a psycholinguist, and Juliet is the main character in a Shakespeare play. As a result, most metaphorical class-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

inclusion statements require a semantic and conceptual solution which is not needed for nonmetaphorical ones, or for comparison statements. If the solution lies in setting up a comparison between the two elements, then metaphor becomes like simile. This has been one longstanding position in rhetoric and it lies at the basis of the cross-domain mapping view. But if the solution lies in taking the linguistic form of the identity statement seriously, then metaphor is just a specific case of class-inclusion statements, and simile may be treated either along the same lines (the position of Glucksberg 2001) or kept apart as a distinct category (the position of Croft & Cruse 2004). In cognitive processing, preference for one of these analyses for particular cases of metaphor versus simile may be related to the degree of conventionality of the mapping, as has been shown in the experimental research by Bowdle and Gentner (2005; Gentner & Bowdle 2001). In the symbolic structures of usage, it is hard to weigh the value of the solutions by introspection alone, since they seem to be dependent on varied contexts of usage which pose different questions to the analyst. Observation seems more appropriate to settle the issue than introspection by itself. Black’s (1979/1993) essay on metaphor has a useful section on metaphor and simile which represents the third position, that the distinct linguistic forms of metaphor and simile should not be reduced to the same underlying conceptual category (cf. Croft & Cruse 2004). Even though they have the same underlying conceptual structure which is based on similarity or analogy (1979/1993: 30), their expression in different linguistic forms has diverging implications, including for their conceptual structure. Black makes this argument on the basis of partially introspective data: But to suppose that the metaphorical statement is an abstract or précis of a literal point-by-point comparison, in which the primary and secondary subjects are juxtaposed for the sake of noting dissimilarities as well as similarities, is to misconstrue the function of a metaphor. In discursively comparing one subject with another, we sacrifice the distinctive power and effectiveness of a good metaphor. The literal comparison lacks the ambience and suggestiveness, and the imposed “view” of the primary subject, upon which a metaphor’s power to illuminate depends. (1979/1993: 30–31)

Black’s introspective account is very much in line with the view of metaphor and simile as distinct expressions of cross-domain mappings in cognitive linguistics (Croft & Cruse 2004). I have tried to formalize at least part of the identification of the conceptual structure of observed metaphor and simile in my five-step method, as discussed in Section 5 of Chapter 10 (see also Section 5 below). Searle (1979/1993) discusses what I have used as the middle steps of the five-step method, the proposal by Miller (1979/1993) to set up an analogical comparison between the literal and figurative parts of a metaphor. He is extremely dismissive of Miller’s argument: “this ‘reconstruction’ is (a) counterintuitive, (b) unmotivated, and (c) assigns an impossible computing task to the speaker and hearer” (p. 100). Searle then simply reiterates his judgment in the form of two rhetor-

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

ical questions, that have to do with the alleged impossibility to identify the nature of the concepts that have to be inferred, as well as the alleged impossibility to identify the nature of the computational process by which this is supposed to happen in individual cognition. Case is closed, to Searle. That empirical research has since come a long way in addressing and tackling these issues, for instance in the computational models referenced in Section 8.3 above, was inconceivable to this introspective philosopher. Without any further evidence from observation or manipulation, introspective researchers are forced to adopt one of the three positions on metaphor and simile distinguished above on the basis of their own intuitions, and develop implications in further qualitative analysis. This may lead to pre-emptive conclusions such as Searle’s. Observation and manipulation have since shown that more can be achieved in research on other linguistic forms of metaphor and their related conceptual structures than could sometimes be imagined. Such research has even led to computational models of analogical metaphor processing which give answers to both of Searle’s above questions.

. Observation When simile and other linguistic forms of metaphor are included in the analysis of metaphor in usage by observation, interesting issues arise about metaphor identifica˝ tion. Consider Ozçali¸ skan’s study of metaphorical uses of motion verbs (2003), and her examples originally numbered [11] and [17]: (16) The knowledge went through Mrs Bolton like a shot. He was Lady Chatterley’s lover. [11] (17) One is ejected into the world like a dirty little mummy; . . . [17] These are two cases which could qualify as Croft and Cruse’s metaphor-within-simile, one part of the underlying metaphor being expressed by direct means, or simile. It should be noted, however, that like a dirty mummy in the second example is not under˝ lined. This suggests that Ozçali¸ skan does not see it as part of an expression of a motion metaphor. This should be contrasted with the inclusion of like a shot in the first example, which therefore presumably would be part of a motion metaphor. In other words, when we draw the implications for the identification of the conceptual structures involved in these utterances, we presumably have to do with one cross-domain mapping in the ‘shot’ metaphor, but with two in the ‘mummy metaphor’, of which the mummy domain itself is not seen as part of the domain of motion. The ‘mummy’ simile is apparently not an obvious specification of life is a journey. Yet the question arises whether the conceptual structure of the simile like a shot is more easily assimilable to the body as a container. Deciding what counts as an expression of which metaphor requires explicit criteria and procedures for analysis, both in the area of linguistic form as well as in the area of conceptual structure.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

The five-step method introduced in the last chapter offers a structured means of identifying more details of the conceptual structure for metaphorically used words. But it can also cater for identifying the conceptual structure of other forms of metaphor. Indeed, my attention to the pervasive role of the dimensions of language use, signaling, extension and explicitness in all forms of metaphor may now throw into relief some of the advantages of the five-step method for identifying at least part of the conceptual structure of all kinds of metaphors in usage. Let us consider some of the issues. One important characteristic of the five-step method is that it is based in a general approach to the relation between linguistic form and conceptual structure. This is the discourse-analytical technique of propositionalization which is widely used, in various forms, in psychology and cognitive science (e.g. Kintsch 1998). The technique offers a procedure for turning linguistic forms into conceptual structures. These conceptual structures are part of an encompassing textbase, which is one conceptual equivalent of the linguistic structure of texts. A textbase consists of a linearly and hierarchically ordered series of propositions, or conceptual predications, which represent the concepts activated by the linguistic forms of a text. Propositions are the structures produced by the second step of the five-step method. Propositions also exhibit conceptual representations for metaphor (cf. Kintsch & Bowles 2002). Given the close relation between the linguistic structure of the text and the conceptual textbase, variation in metaphor form is directly reflected in the textbase. This may be demonstrated with reference to the difference between two sets of examples from the Tennyson poem discussed before (Steen 2002a): Now Sleeps the Crimson Petal 1

Now sleeps the crimson petal, now the white; Nor waves the cypress in the palace walk; Nor winks the gold fin in the porphyry font; The fire-fly wakens: waken thou with me.

5

Now droops the milk white peacock like a ghost, And like a ghost she glimmers on to me. Now lies the Earth all Danaë to the stars, And all thy heart lies open unto me. Now slides the silent meteor on, and leaves

10

A shining furrow, as thy thoughts in me. Now folds the lily all her sweetness up, And slips into the bosom of the lake: So fold thyself, my dearest, thou, and slip Into my bosom and be lost in me.


First consider the analogy presented in lines 7 and 8. If this is analyzed (loosely) according to the propositionalization technique of Bovair and Kieras (1985), we obtain the following result: (18) Now lies the Earth all Danaë to the stars And all thy heart lies open unto me P1 (comparison DU1 DU2) DU1 P1 (lies earths danaes ) P2 (mod p1 nows ) P3 (tosp1 starss) P4 (mod danaes alls ) DU2 P1 (liet heartt opent ) P2 (untotP1 met ) P3 (mod heartt allt ) P4 (possesst thout heartt ) There are two discourse units, DU1 and DU2 (Crisp et al. 2002; Steen 2005), which each represent one domain of the assumed mapping: DU1 expresses a set of elements from the source domain, all marked by the subscript ‘s’, while DU2 does so for the target domain, all marked by ‘t’. The propositional analysis of these two units is preceded by a so-called relational proposition (e.g. Mann & Thompson 1988, 2000), indicating a coherence relation of comparison between the two units. Relational propositions are explications of coherence relations between discourse units. Close inspection of these two propositional structures reveals that the textbase in fact contains a full analogy. There are four correspondences between the elements in the two domains: the Earth corresponds with all thy heart; lies corresponds with lies; all Danaë corresponds with open; and to the stars corresponds with unto me. These correspondences need to be explicated by a separate analytical step, which turns the analogical structures in the text base into a fully explicit cross-domain mapping. This is what the five-step method is designed to do (Steen 1999b, in press). Since the text contains an explicit rendition of the analogy, captured by step 4 in the five-step procedure for other cases, we merely require to apply step 5 to the conceptual structures in the text base (18) in order to reconstruct the underlying mapping (cf. Fig. 11.1). Other forms of metaphor, as opposed to analogies, can contain a smaller selection of concepts from the two domains. They need fuller application of the five-step procedure. Thus, in now sleeps the crimson petal, discussed in Chapter 10, we have the following conceptual structure in the textbase. (The metaphorical use of the word activating the concept is indicated by underlining. It is metaphorical because there is no actual ‘sleeping’ referent in the text world.) (19) Now sleeps the crimson petal P1 ( sleeps petalt ) P2 (mod p1 now) P3 (mod petalt crimsont)



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Figure 11.1 Analysis of lines 9–10

Text 1. Identification of metaphor-related words 2. Identification of propositions

3. Identification of open comparison

4. Identification of analogical structure

5. Identification of cross-domain mapping

Now lies the Earth all Danaë to the stars, And all thy heart lies open unto me. Now lies the Earth all Danaë to the stars, P1 (comparison DU1 DU2) DU1 P1 (lies earths danaës ) P2 (mod p1 nows ) P3 (tosp1 starss) P4 (mod danaës alls ) DU2 P1 (liet heartt opent ) P2 (untotP1 met ) P3 (mod heartt allt ) P4 (possesst thout heartt ) sim { [lie (all thy heart) (open) (unto me)]t [lie (earth) (danaë) (to stars)]s} sim { [lie (all thy heart) (open) (unto me)]t [lie (earth) (danaë) (to stars)s]} lie > lie earth > heart danaë > open stars > me inferences 1 2 3

The output of step 2 is presented in (19), and it shows that we have less conceptual material for the cross-domain mapping in the metaphor in line 1 than in the analogy in lines 7 and 8. When we aim to reveal the cross-domain mapping for the metaphor, we need to turn the proposition into a comparative structure (step 3), explicate the conceptual elements that may play a role in the comparison (step 4), and develop that structure into a list of correspondences (step 5), as discussed in Chapter 10. Propositionalization can also reveal the difference between explicit and implicit metaphor. Here is the propositional analysis (output of step 2) of the second metaphor from line 1:

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

(20) . . ., now the white P1 (sleepi,s petali,t ) P2 (mod p1 nowt ) P3 (mod petali,t whitet ) The implicit status of the source domain concept ‘sleep’ is signaled by the subscript ‘i’. An analysis of the cross-domain mapping would have to transform the propositions into an open analogy (“the white petal performs an action that is like the sleeping of some agent”), fill in the open analogy, and transform that into a series of correspondences. These steps would be identical to the ones for (19). There is no space to go into the five step method any further (cf. Steen, in press a). But it is capable of revealing all relevant aspects of the linguistic forms of metaphor in usage: direct or indirect language use, presence or absence of signalling, restriction or extension across discourse units, and implicitness or explicitness of source and target domain. When other forms of metaphor are examined in this way, the application of the five step method to bring out the underlying conceptual structure seems quite natural. Its identical and consistent application to classic metaphor in the form of metaphorically used language (Chapter 10) may become more acceptable from this perspective. In this way, we have an instrument which can connect the identification of the various linguistic forms of metaphor to the conceptual structures of metaphor from one single formal perspective. It provides a unified account of the various levels of prominence of the conceptual structures of metaphor in the linguistic forms of metaphor in discourse. The detection of other forms of expression of cross-domain mappings than indirect language use may be most dramatically illustrated by turning to those observational studies which focus on extended as opposed to restricted cases of metaphor in usage. Such examples may serve to give a good feel of how indirectness as a criterion for metaphor works when it is not realized by indirect language, but by the indirect use of conceptual structures. In particular, when a cross-domain mapping is expressed by means of direct language but at extended length across a message, one conceptual domain is used as a source domain to throw a new light onto another domain which serves as the local topic of the discourse. The source domain hence constitutes an indirect conceptual approach to the target domain, even though it is presented as a temporary discourse topic in its own right. A good example of an observational study of such direct and extended expression of a source domain is the following example from the Illiad (Ben-Porat 1992): (21) He spoke, and they caught the body from the ground in their arms, lifting him high with a great heave, and the Trojan people behind them shouted aloud as they saw the Achaians lifting the dead man, and made a rush against him like dogs, who sweep in rapidly on a wounded wild boar, ahead of the young men who hunt him, and for the moment race in raging to tear him to pieces until in the confidence of his strength he turns on them at bay,

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

and they give ground and scatter for dear one way and another; so the Trojans until that time kept always in close chase assembled, stabbing at them with swords and leaf-headed spears, but every time the two Aiantes would swing round to face them and stand fast, the color of their skin changed, and no longer could any endure to sweep in further and fight for the body. (Iliad 17.722-734) Ben-Porat discusses this type of metaphor under the label of ‘epic simile’, or ‘extended simile’. This label captures the fact that we are dealing with a simile, because of the use of the signals like and so, which is extended, since it goes beyond the confines of a single utterance (called the ‘nuclear simile’ by Ben-Porat 1992: 739). The label of ‘epic simile’ is a reference to the typical provenance of the figure from epic poetry. The use of extended simile, however, is not confined to the realm of epic poetry, so that the more general and neutral term of ‘extended simile’ is preferable. The specific nature of this case of extended simile may be thrown into relief by comparing it with other types of extended comparison between two conceptual domains. Consider the following example from a text in education (Mayer 1993: 570): (22) The phenomenon of acoustic echoes is familiar; sound waves reflected from a building or a cliff are received back at an observer after a lapse of a short interval. If the initial sound is a short sharp one such as a hand-clap and if the speed at which sound waves travel is known, the interval between the initial clap and its echo is a measure of the distance of the reflecting object or surface. Radar uses exactly the same principle except that waves involved are radio waves, not sound waves. In this extract, the domain of sound waves is used as a source domain to explain something about the domain of radio waves. The source domain is presented as a temporary topic in its own right, just as the hunting dogs were presented as a temporary topic in its own right by Homer. The language use for the source domain of sound waves is also direct, like the language use portraying the dogs in the hunt. The source domain is furthermore presented in extended fashion, covering more than one clause. Moreover, as with the extended simile from Homer, lexical signaling of the need for cross-domain comparison is also present, for the last sentence of this excerpt uses the terms exactly the same, and are versus are not. Even though both expressions of the underlying cross-domain mappings in Homer and in education use direct language in extended fashion with the addition of lexical signals for comparison, the excerpts also exhibit differences. These can affect the ease with which the conceptual identity of the underlying mapping can be established. The Homeric text suggests that there is an ordered sequence of actions in the source domain, signaled by the following expressions: dogs sweep in on boar, dogs ahead of men, dogs race in, boar turns on dogs, dogs give ground and scatter. Then follows a presentation of another ordered series of actions in the target domain, returning

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

Figure 11.2 Discourse structure of Homeric extended simile

Line Signal Target 4 Like 5 6 7 8 9 So Trojans kept in chase assembled 10 Trojans stab at Aiantes 11 Aiantes swing round 12 Trojans changed 13 No longer could any [Trojan] endure

Source Dogs sweep in on boar Dogs race in to tear him to pieces Boar turns on dogs Dogs give ground and scatter

the reader to the original local topic of the text: Trojans kept in close chase assembled, Trojans stabbing at, Aiantes swing round, Trojans changed color, no longer could Trojans endure. The roughly equally long target domain series of actions, its placement in the text, and its introduction by the lexical signal so constitute a strong invitation to the reader to attempt to interpret these target domain actions in close alignment with the preceding source domain series. A schematic view of this structure of the discourse may be helpful (see Fig. 11.2). The task for the metaphor analyst is to decide whether there are indeed close correspondences between the two series of actions, so that the nature of the mapping between the two conceptual domains may be made explicit and precise. There certainly is an overall correspondence between the two scenarios: in both cases, one agent acts as an aggressor to the other agent, then the other agent makes a stand against the aggressor, and then the aggressor gives ground. In both cases, these are three stages that are causally connected in the form of action, reaction, further reaction, yielding an integrated conceptual scenario. The causal conceptual structure of the source domain scenario may be mapped in its entirety onto the overall causal conceptual structure of the target domain scenario. At a global level, the nature of the mapping between the two domains is relatively clear. Whether there are just as many precise correspondences between the conceptual details of the two domains is a trickier question. Does the preparatory move of ‘sweeping in’ correspond with ‘keeping in close chase assembled’? Does ‘racing in to tear him to pieces’ correspond with ‘stabbing at them with swords’? The correspondence between ‘turn on them at bay’ and ‘swing round to face them and stand fast’ seems more striking and secure, perhaps partly because of the lesser degree of precise correspondence in the previous lines. But the giving ground and scattering of the dogs seems slightly different again from the Trojans no longer being able to endure to sweep in further. There seems to be some variation between the precision and appropriateness with which particular source domain actions may be felicitously mapped on to presumably corresponding target domain actions.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Figure 11.3 Discourse structure of educational extended simile

Clause Signal 1:1 1:2 2:1 2:2

Target Target plus source

2:3 3:1 3:2

Exactly same

Source Acoustic echoes Sound waves received back Initial sound is short Speed of sound waves known Interval clap / echo is measure of

Radar uses exactly same principle [as sound waves] Waves are radio, not sound

Let us contrast this example of extended simile with Mayer’s (1993) text and its presentation of radio waves as sound waves. This text has a different structure: it first presents a series of propositions about the source domain of sound waves in two sentences. The first sentence starts after the colon and contains one proposition; the next sentence opens with two co-coordinated conditional propositions and then concludes with a main proposition. There are hence at least four full-fledged information units about the source domain, which is roughly comparable to what happens in the Homeric text. However, the transition to the target domain is effected in a radically different manner. We do not receive an analogous series of statements about the target domain of radio waves, which has to be understood on the model of the sound waves – as was the case with the structure in the Homeric text. Instead, we simply receive the instruction that “Radar uses exactly the same principle”, with the addition that the main protagonist of that same principle is not sound waves but radio waves. In other words, the exact nature of the conceptual structure of the target domain is not expressed in the text. It is left implicit. It is the reader who has to do the setting up of the target domain on the basis of the source domain, without any verbal cues in a separate stretch of text about the target domain. A schematic display of the second text is given in Fig. 11.3. The educational text is a radically different extended realization of an underlying cross-domain mapping than the Homeric simile. This is possible even though, at the surface of the language, the two excerpts are quite comparable, as we have seen. In setting up the underlying conceptual mapping that is suggested by this type of text, it is not just the reader who may have alternative options to consider: analysts may disagree about the details of the cross-domain mapping, too. There is a wide variety of other forms of metaphor in usage, of which we have just seen two examples. To give just one more variant, consider the following scientific text from the early nineteenth century, discussed by Gentner and Jeziorski (1993: 454):

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

(23) 1. According to established principles at the present time, we can compare with sufficient accuracy the motive power of heat to that of a waterfall. Each has a maximum that we cannot exceed, whatever may be, on the one hand, the machine which is acted upon by the water, and whatever, on the other hand, the substance acted upon by the heat. 2. The motive power of a waterfall depends on its height and on the quantity of the liquid; the motive power of heat depends also on the quantity of caloric used, and on what may be termed, on what in fact we will call, the height of its fall, that is to say, the difference of temperature of the bodies between the higher and lower reservoirs. The first section presents the cross-domain mapping by combining the two domains in the various information units; the second section follows the opposite strategy, and discusses each of the domains in its own terms and orders them from source to target. Opposite orders, from target to source, may of course also be found. The effects of all of these factors on metaphor identification by the analyst, let alone metaphor processing by the language user, have not been studied. Some of these forms pose interesting challenges to the analyst of metaphor. Consider the following well-known poem by Ezra Pound: In a Station of the Metro The apparition of these faces in the crowd: Petals on a wet, black bough. There are two conceptual domains here, but they are only implicitly connected via similarity or comparison, by means of the colon. The identification of the implicit coherence relation as one of comparison might be controversial to some analysts. The presupposition that we are dealing with two discourse units which require the postulation of a coherence relation in the first place may be questionable, too: deciding one way or the other affects the analysis of the two lines as participating in an extended metaphor or not. The question whether we are dealing with metaphor, simile, or another rhetorical form is yet another problem. And the direct use of language for both domains, to the more traditionally minded, might be another difficulty in accepting that this is a form of metaphor in usage. The varying forms of metaphor in usage also occur in widely different contexts, which bring along their own conventions for allowing what can go into a conceptual mapping and what cannot. For instance, Ben-Porat (1992: 742) points out that extended mappings in literature highlight the attributes of some of the elements involved in the mapping, increasing the richness of the text (cf. Gentner 1982, 1983; Steen 1994). In scientific and educational texts, by contrast, even though the same structures are present, such attributes of aspects of the source domain are typically ignored, in order to bring out the proportional relations between the two domains to the full. That this convention is not a permanent and universal one has been demonstrated by Gentner and Jeziorski (1993), who have shown that in some areas of early science,

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

matches between attributes across conceptual domains did matter. Generic and historical variation are another complication of the issue of which aspects of source domains may be projected onto target domains by the analyst. In spite of these complications, it appears to be possible to find other forms of metaphor in usage by paying attention to the parameters which have been invoked above. One of these concerns the alternation between indirect and direct language use. The second has to do with heeding the presence or absence of lexical signals. The third dimension looks at how language users exploit or avoid various possibilities for extended expression. And fourthly there is the utilization by language users of various possibilities for leaving several aspects of a cross-domain mapping implicit, or, by contrast, making them explicit by profiling them in the discourse. Let me finally illustrate how this type of research can be done in a more nomothetic and quantitative way by means of a corpus. Shen (1995) collected and analyzed 400 poetic similes in order to identify the nature of their conceptual structure. The focus was on the directionality of their conceptual mapping between concrete and abstract. The distribution of four logically possible structures was examined: from concrete (source) to abstract (target); from concrete to concrete; from abstract to concrete; from abstract to abstract. All similes were so-called closed similes, with source, target, and ground made explicit in the linguistic form. Examples are Emptiness is like a weight, heavy on the heart; the moon there blazes like a kiss of carnage; a flock of birds leaves a trail like a jetplane; the sun blazes like a fire; and the airplanes murmur like blood / in the ears of the sick. These similes were classified regarding their possible conceptual structures by four analysts who had to classify the imagery value of the concepts used in the similes on a four-point scale. Thus, a concept like ‘moon’ presumably has high imagery value, but a concept like ‘emptiness’ does not. These data yield scores for each simile in terms of the concreteness or abstractness of its component terms, so that a classification of the similes into one of the four categories of conceptual structure automatically follows. The way in which the similes were identified and sampled from the works of poetry is not reported. But the method of collecting independent observations from analysts about the data is exemplary. That all analysts worked independently and scored each concept in isolation from the simile is another good point about the method. Moreover, a separate examination of the reliability of the judgments was also undertaken and reported, which further improves the quality of the study. The resulting classification of the similes into the various categories distinguished by the theory is quite solid. Shen (1995) provides an elegant demonstration of how quantitative research into the properties of alternative forms of metaphor in as difficult an area as poetic discourse may be successful when it exploits corpora and careful techniques of analysis.

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

. Manipulation The difference between other forms of metaphor and classic metaphor has also been investigated in experimental research on the difference between metaphor and simile. One popular method has been the utilization of rating scales for the detection of a wide range of differences between cross-domain mappings expressed as metaphor versus simile. Concepts which may be used for a cross-domain mapping are selected, and then they are put into linguistic formulas of the form A is B and A is like B. By asking groups of participants to judge these expressions on five-point, seven-point, ninepoint or even ten-point rating scales for various properties, such as their naturalness, differences between metaphor and simile forms can be revealed. Chiappe, Kennedy, and Smykowski (2003) constructed a range of items like the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Alcohol is (like) a crutch Beauty is (like) a passport Billboards are (like) warts Cigarettes are (like) timebombs Cities are (like) jungles Crime is (like) a disease Deserts are (like) ovens Desks are (like) junkyards Education is (like) a stairway Exams are (like) hurdles

Participants had to rate either the metaphor or the simile form of each item for aptness. They gave a score between 1 (‘not at all apt’) and 10 (‘extremely apt’). The average scores for aptness across the metaphor and simile conditions were then calculated for each item, which produced a mean ranking of all items according to aptness. When these average aptness scores for items were then related to the aptness judgments for the item in the form of either a metaphor or a simile, it turned out that items with a high aptness score had higher aptness ratings when expressed as metaphors than as similes. In other words, preference for expressing a cross-domain mapping as a metaphor as opposed to a simile may have to do with the aptness of the underlying cross-domain mapping. A second measure was taken by asking participants how conventional the use of the vehicle term was for the expression of the intended figurative meaning. The intended figurative meaning was provided to the participants in a paraphrase; for instance, for Billboards are (like) warts, the paraphrase provided was “Something noticeable and unattractive”. These paraphrases had been produced by participants in a previous experiment. In order to indicate degree of conventionality, participants had to fill out a seven-point scale for the degree of conventionality of the paraphrase, from ‘not at all conventional’ to ‘extremely conventional’. Conventionality scores for each item were calculated again by averaging across metaphor and simile form, after which

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

the relation was examined between preference for metaphor form on the one hand and degree of conventionality. It turned out that conventionality did not influence preference for metaphor (or simile). Rating scales have also been applied by Kennedy and his colleagues to study other aspects of the difference between metaphor and simile. Chiappe et al. (2003), for instance, also looked at the reversibility of source and target in metaphor and simile form. And Chiappe and Kennedy (2000) investigated the strength of the attitude of the speaker towards the topic when he utters a metaphor or a simile. Metaphor research on the diverging properties of distinct metaphor forms may exploit the potential of this technique further by examining the difference between metaphor and a wider range of alternative forms, including various combinations of metaphor with simile, analogy, and so on. Another way in which the relation between conceptual metaphor properties and linguistic metaphor form can be examined is by using a binary classification task. Aisenman (1999) used 19 pairs of statements like The sun is an orange and The sun is like an orange. She had her participants decide for each pair which form was the most natural or suitable way of expressing the mapping. This classification was then crossed with the nature of the conceptual mapping, which could be based on crossdomain correspondences between attributes, relations, or both. Thus, for sun and orange, attributive predicates are mapped, such as ‘round’ and ‘orange’. For sea and big aquarium, relational predicates are mapped, i.e. ‘X contains Y’. And for double comparisons, both attributes and relations can be mapped, as for stem and drinking straw. It turned out that mappings on the basis of attributes only were massively preferred as similes. When mappings are based on both attributes and relations, then the preference for simile diminishes, even though it is still preferred for two thirds of the cases. When mappings are based on relations only, the preference for simile drops below fifty percent, metaphorical expressions being preferred in 57% of the cases. A simple chi-square statistic is able to measure whether the distribution of the cases across the three-by-two table is due to chance or to a relation between the two variables of conceptual structure of the cross-domain mapping (attributive, relational, both) and metaphor form (simile or metaphor). An alternative method for obtaining comparable insights into the difference between metaphor and simile is to conduct a sentence completion task. Gibb and Wales (1990) gave their participants a series of open statements like the following: (24) The ocean . . . a lapping giant A lightning flash . . . elusive beauty Patriotism . . . a contagious disease They asked them to complete these open statements by inserting either is or is like. This led to a binary classification of the data recording how many participants preferred the one or the other linguistic form. The form variable was then crossed with another variable classifying the conceptual structure of the cross-domain mapping with reference to concreteness. It had three values: concrete tenor – concrete vehicle; concrete

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

tenor – abstract vehicle; and abstract tenor – concrete vehicle. The relation between the two variables was significant, suggesting that concrete tenors combined with concrete vehicles were preferred as similes; concrete tenors with abstract vehicles were preferred as metaphors; but abstract tenors with concrete vehicles were preferred as similes. This led the authors to draw the provisional conclusion that concrete vehicles trigger a preference for simile, while abstract vehicles trigger a preference for metaphor. This conclusion was relativized by another study reported in the same article which collected further data by the same method. Rating tasks, classification tasks, and sentence completion tasks are three examples of how informant data can be collected – both meta and verbal – to study the difference between metaphor and simile. They have the obvious advantage that they are easy to apply: they do not require sophisticated software or psychological labs. They are also easy to analyze: the participants have a limited range of options in responding to the task, and this means that the analyst has no difficulty in processing the data collected. The number of options provided to a participant may be adjusted to the level of refinement which is deemed desirable for the measure, rating scales varying from anywhere between five to ten categories, for instance. That these data then require statistical analysis and subsequent interpretation is another matter. But the techniques described here are fairly basic and can be easily acquired with some training. Similar tasks may be explored for other contrasts between forms of metaphor, such as metaphor versus analogy. An example from Sternberg and Nigro (1983) may be useful to illustrate the possibilities here. Thus, differences between various metaphor forms were examined for their effect on aptness and comprehensibility by means of 9-point rating scales. The metaphor forms may be illustrated by the following example: (25) a. b. c. d. e.

Bees in a hive are a Roman mob in the Coliseum Bees in a hive are a Roman mob. Bees are a Roman mob in the Coliseum. Bees are a Roman mob. Bees are a Roman mob in a hive.

They may be seen as two different metaphor forms, metaphor and analogy, with more or less information explicitly expressed. The last form, moreover, changes the underlying mapping. The average ratings of aptness and comprehensibility for the five metaphor forms were then compared and aptness showed a reliable difference, but comprehensibility was marginally significant. The response times of the judgments were also measured, and it turned out that there were significant differences for both aptness and comprehensibility. When more information was present (forms a through d), aptness was higher, but response latencies, too: this is a reflection of the time needed to process the explicit information. When more information was present, comprehensibility was also generally higher, with almost the same effect for response latencies. These nonverbal data provide an exciting glimpse into the connections and differences between various

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

metaphor forms in discourse. The Sternberg and Nigro study may offer inspiration to carry out further explorations of these connections in the future.

. Conclusion This chapter has shown that questions 2 and 4 lead to the identification of other forms of metaphor than the group of cases which may be described as metaphorical language use: Q2: When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q4: When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical? Metaphorical language use is characterized by the indirect use of linguistic forms, but metaphor may also be expressed in other ways. Such alternative forms of metaphor in usage are based on direct meaning which present an alien source domain in its own terms within the context of a more encompassing and dominant target domain. This may happen in simile, analogy, extended comparison, allegory, and so on. In each of these cases, a cross-domain mapping is needed to tie the directly expressed source domain to the prevailing concerns of the target domain, typically by means of an explicit comparison that is used for diverging rhetorical purposes, such as illustration, explanation, diversion, and so on. My discussion of other forms of metaphor has revealed that language users are aware of some of these forms more than of others. Some cross-domain mappings are expressed as a text or section of a text with two different parts, one of which is devoted to the source domain and the other to the target domain. In such cases, the mapping between the two domains is a task for the receiver which has to be carried out with sustained attention and energy. This type of metaphor form is not restricted to literature, but is used in many different discourse contexts, including education and science, advertising and propaganda, and so on. More limited forms of such deliberate and relatively conscious metaphor may be found in analogies extending across two utterances, which may also be found in various discourse contexts. Even more restricted would be analogies and similes within one utterance; the difference between them would be that analogies offer more explicit information about the mapping, while similes are marked by explicit signals for comparison. Analogies may of course also have such signals, probably adding further to their felt deliberateness and identifiability. The operational issues that have to be decided for these different forms of metaphor are interesting. It is clear that their linguistic form needs to be handled in a different way than when we talk about metaphorical language use, as in the previous chapter, because it is their linguistic form that is radically different. By contrast, the underlying conceptual structure can be addressed in roughly the same way as with metaphorical language use, so that we do not have to go over those grounds again.

Chapter 11. Usage (2): Other forms of metaphor 

The resulting questions for the identification of the other forms of metaphor, I have suggested, are the following:

Identifying other forms of metaphorically motivated language 1. Find local referent and topic shifts. 2. Test whether the incongruous words are to be integrated within the overall referential and/or topical framework by means of some form of comparison. 3. Test whether the comparison is nonliteral or cross-domain. 4. Test whether the comparison can be seen as some form of indirect talk about the local or main referent or topic of the text. 5. If the findings to tests 2, 3, and 4 are positive, then a word should be identified as (part of) an expression of another form of metaphor. The various ways in which data can be collected and analyzed with respect to the other forms of metaphor may be seen as follows. Introspection is in no different position than for metaphorically used language, but the way in which let us say classic metaphor and other forms of metaphor such as simile are compared and related to each other has been fairly superficial. Claims that are made about functions and effects clearly need to be based on more extensive observational and manipulative research. Research by manipulation is beginning to yield refined quantified data about various properties of large samples of cases which may help to throw new light on the properties of the various forms. Converging evidence for any distinct theoretical position has not yet been produced in great quantities. I have suggested that there are at least four dimensions which may be at play in the variation between forms of metaphor – language use, signaling, extension, and explicitness – and that these dimensions may have various and interacting effects on the identification of metaphor by the discourse analyst. When identifying metaphor, the analyst is engaged in the technical analysis of the linguistic and conceptual structure of metaphor in discourse. Such an analysis may also provide a model for various aspects of metaphor processing by language users, but this requires further research. Some of the parameters involved have recently been shown to affect elicited metaphor recognition in discourse by language users (Steen 2004), but this is only the beginning of a line of research which needs to be developed on a larger scale. This is why my discussion of metaphor in discourse in this chapter and the last is symbolic, not behavioral. It is the task of the next chapter to make the connection between the analysis of symbolic structure and cognitive processes.

chapter 

Cognitive processes and products in usage

Metaphor can also be identified in the cognitive processes and products of usage. These are the processes and products of production and reception, in writing, print, speech, and so on. When metaphor has to be found in usage approached in this way, two questions arise: Q6: When does the production or reception of any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q8: When does the production or reception of a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical? The term reception, in these questions, refers to various types of processes, including comprehension, interpretation, and understanding, which will be discussed in the next pages. The cognitive processes and products of metaphor processing have been at the center of attention in psycholinguistics. They pertain to the brief and fast as well as drawn-out moments of cognition that language users need to deal with metaphor in usage. The usage data in which metaphor will have to be identified, therefore, are behavioral data, that is, samples of online language production and processing, or their products in individual cognition. These are data which are collected in psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics, and much less in cognitive linguistics. The structure of this chapter will follow the regular routine. We will first look at the role of conceptual metaphor in those cognitive-linguistic studies which have made an attempt to engage with actual processes of cognition. Then we will consider the conceptual and operational issues that play a role in framing metaphor identification in the processes and products of usage. And finally we will address the three data collection methods of introspection, observation, and manipulation and the way they lead on to quantitative and qualitative analysis of various types of data.

. Cognitive-linguistic examples of the deductive approach Conceptual Metaphor Theory has formulated a cognitive model of production and reception that runs parallel with its symbolic description of the conceptual structures and linguistic forms of metaphor in usage. It posits that the cross-domain mappings underlying linguistic metaphor are not just a matter of linguistic and conceptual sym-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

bols, but also and primarily a matter of cognitive processes and products. It also suggests that most if not all metaphors in language use require the activation and mapping of two conceptual domains. This is held to explain why so many metaphors have become conventionalized in the grammar of language, both approached as cognitive as well as symbolic structure. Conventional metaphors are hence processed fast and automatically, and novel metaphors can be easily understood when they are new exploitations of familiar conceptual metaphors. However, to most psycholinguists, these are theoretical assumptions, not empirical research, because the bulk of the evidence has remained restricted to patterns of linguistic structure, not behavioral data (e.g. Murphy 1996). Indeed, some psycholinguists have even criticized the plausibility of these assumptions (cf. Murphy 1996, 1997; McGlone 1996). Conceptual Metaphor Theory has also been criticized by psycholinguists for lacking an adequate model of cognitive processing: behavioral aspects have to be derived and posited by psycholinguists themselves (Murphy 1996, 1997; Boroditsky 2000). And some of these critical researchers have set up deductive arguments to show that specific predictions that may be derived from Conceptual Metaphor Theory are in fact mistaken (Keysar et al. 2000). In all, then, psycholinguists have received the behavioral claims of Conceptual Metaphor Theory with some reservation. Of course, positive sounds may also be heard. The work by Boroditsky on time (2000, 2001), discussed in Chapter 2 as an example of the deductive approach to metaphor in cognition as opposed to in symbolic structure, is the latest addition in a row of studies carried out by Dedre Gentner and her colleagues which have taken an open attitude towards the explanatory potential of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Apart from this line of research, there is mostly the work by Gibbs which illustrates how the deductive approach in cognitive linguistics can lead to empirical work on the cognitive processes and products of the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2006a). Since I have already used Boroditsky’s investigation as a positive illustration of the power of the deductive approach in Chapter 2, and amply referred to the work by Gibbs throughout this book, I will now turn to the position of Blending Theory in this area of research. Blending Theory is presented as a theory of online meaning construction (Coulson & Oakley 2000, 2005). Its theoretical terms abound with cognitive operations, such as conceptual integration itself, compression, completion, and so on. However, deductive approaches to metaphor in the ongoing behavior of individual people’s language usage are hard to find. Let me consider a number of aspects of this observation. Coulson and Oakley (2000: 178–179) provide a useful summary of how Blending Theory works, by looking at the following bumper sticker on a college student’s car: (1) My karma ran over my dogma

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

After their illustrative analysis, they comment: . . ., blending analyses typically begin with the introduction of an example hypothesized to involve blending, and proceed with a description of conceptual structure in each of the spaces in the integration network. These descriptions usually begin with the structure in the input and generic spaces, and include a list of the mappings between elements and relations in each of the spaces. For example, in the bumper sticker blend we pointed to the mappings between the car, the karma, and the agonist in the contact over schema, as well as the dog, the dogma, and the weaker agonist in the contact over schema. Next the analyst describes the structure in the blended space, focusing on which aspects of its structure come from each of the inputs. For instance, in the bumper sticker blend, dogma and karma stand in opposition to one another, and karma kills dogma.

This is an excellent description of what typically happens in publications on blending, and it may serve to point out the following issues. First of all, Blending Theory analyzes language and text to formulate hypotheses about the occurrence of blending in cognitive processing as it is imagined for unspecified individuals. This means that it should be taken as a theoretical or speculative approach to metaphor in cognition, which in itself is of course fine. However, this also means that it is not the same as empirical research, which should actually test the incidence of metaphorical mappings or blends by observing on-going cognitive processes or products in specific people. By the same token, nor can such textual analyses count as data turning into evidence for the tenability of conclusions following from empirical research; instead, they should be taken as support for the plausibility of a theory that still needs to be offered for testing. Secondly, when blending theorists produce their analyses, they typically conflate a number of spheres of reality, including, most importantly, the ones of symbolic structure on the one hand and observed cognitive processes and products on the other. Note how the penultimate sentence in the quotation portrays aspects of the blended space as “coming from” each of the inputs, a typical form of parlance in Blending Theory. This choice of verb suggests a degree of autonomy which may be interpreted in various ways. For one thing, it may be seen as describing a form of neurological activation by, for instance, spreading, which is meant as a literal model of neurological processes of metaphor comprehension. But it may also be interpreted as describing higher-level inference processes that are executed under some degree of control by the language user, for instance as a form of problem-solving applied to this intriguing metaphor. These are two competing interpretations of “coming from” when it is taken as a – speculative – reference to cognitive processes and their products as well as what it is that drives them. But these two alternative cognitive interpretations of this type of analysis are not the only readings which are possible. For the phrase might also be read as a loose form of talk about symbolic analyses, in the sense of my previous two chapters, which simply pertains to linguistic forms and conceptual structures as abstract, semiotic entities.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

This interpretation of “coming from” would suggest that the combination of these conceptual structures naturally leads to the conceptual structures in the blended space, as a form of inevitable symbolic logic, comparable perhaps to presupposition and entailment. And finally, the phrase might equally legitimately be seen as a loose form of describing the activities of the analyst, who derives the conceptual structures in the blended space as coming from the relevant elements in the input spaces. That the latter interpretation can also be supported is shown by the next sentence of Coulson and Oakley’s exposition; I am quoting that in full context: In such descriptions, it is important to characterize the differences between the structure evoked in the blended space and each of the inputs. For example, in the realistic car space, the car killing the dog is interpreted as tragic; in the philosophical space, karma supplanting dogma is a desirable outcome; and in the blend, karma running over dogma and killing it is interpreted as a desirable outcome. In this case, then, the blending analysis suggests that the force dynamics of the scenario in which the car runs over the dog can be exploited analogically to frame the relationship between karma and dogma – in spite of the disanalogy between emotional valence of the physical (negative) and philosophical (positive) consequences. The characterization of differences between the structure in the blended space and structure in the input spaces is how the analyst justifies the claim that conceptual blending gives rise to emergent structure that frequently sustains reasoning. (2000: 180; my emphasis, GS)

The final sentence of this quotation, too, offers a rather different picture of the status of any claim following from a blending analysis than the sentence containing the “coming from” phrase. Close analysis of publications in blending suggests that all four interpretations distinguished above can be found across the board within and between many studies. Notice how Coulson and Oakley move away from the meta-perspective emphasized in the previous quotation to an empirical and behavioral perspective on cognitive processing their next paragraph: Completion is pattern completion that occurs when structure in the blend matches information in long-term memory. For instance, because we complete the car accident frame with the inference that the dog dies, the accident in the blended frame is completed with the ‘death’ of dogma. (2000: 180)

The use of long-term memory and of “we complete . . . with the inference that . . .” is meant as a description of behavior, not as a formulation of a structural analysis by a researcher. Gibbs (1999b) has condemned this type of speculative going back and forth between the spheres of text structure, text processing, and text analysis: One reason why it is imperative, in my view, to distinguish between the different possibilities on how metaphoric language and thought interact is because many psychologists, linguists, philosophers and educators play fast and loose between

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

these different possibilities, when they claim that metaphoric cognition either does or does not play a role in language use and understanding. (1999b: 43)

I share this evaluation and it has been my main motive for interpreting Blending Theory research, when it is presented as empirical research of text and discourse, as pertaining to the symbolic analysis of usage, targeting the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor in text, and not as empirical research of cognitive processes and products, despite the ubiquitous use of terms that seem to suggest otherwise. At most, such claims are to be interpreted as speculative and theoretical, although it is not always clear to which level of cognitive processing and representation the various claims are meant to apply (cf. Grady 2000). As a result, there are hardly any examples of deductive blending research of metaphor in cognitive processes and its products (but cf. Coulson & Van Petten 2002, for the exception that confirms the rule). This has or should have substantial consequences for views that Blending Theory provides converging evidence for specific types of claims about metaphor in language and cognition. After all, Mark Turner has gone on record as saying that what he does is “speculative neuroscience”.

. Conceptualization The gap between the symbolic analysis of metaphor in usage on the one hand and its behavioral analysis on the other turns on two factors: time and people. This is a mirror image of the situation in grammatical studies of metaphor discussed in part two. The cognitive processes and products of metaphor in usage involve real-time events that are enacted by unique language users. If researchers do not present data that show or reflect the on-going behavior of individual language users over time, they are probably engaged in symbolic analysis. The difference with the area of grammar is the time-scale that we are considering. In usage, we are talking about concrete events of speaking and writing, or listening and reading, and variants thereof. These are goal-directed actions, and of a relatively bounded nature, to be opposed to language acquisition and maintenance, which are self-regulating processes, of an elongated nature, even though the short-term actions of usage obviously feed into the long-term processes of grammar. The limitations of usage events are best appreciated by bearing in mind the radically different time frames that define them. Psycholinguists have mostly concentrated on studying the processing of metaphor during reading, and, to a lesser extent, listening. This has led to a fourfold distinction by Gibbs (1993, 1994) between various aspects of the time course of metaphor processing in usage: 1. “Comprehension refers to the immediate moment-by-moment process of creating meanings for utterances. These moment-by-moment processes are mostly unconscious and involve the analysis of various linguistic information (e.g., phonol-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

ogy, lexical access, syntax), which, in combination with context and real-world knowledge, allows listeners/readers to figure out what an utterance means or a speaker/author intends.” (1994: 116) 2. “Recognition refers to the conscious identification of the products of comprehension as types. For example, the meaning understood by a reader of a particular utterance may be consciously recognized as metaphorical.” (1994: 116) 3. “Interpretation refers to analysis of the early products of comprehension as tokens. One can consciously create an understanding of a particular type of text or utterance as having a particular content or meaning.” (1994: 117) 4. “Finally, appreciation refers to some aesthetic judgment given to a product as either a type or a token. This, too, is not an obligatory part of understanding linguistic meaning, because listeners/readers can automatically comprehend utterances or texts without automatically making an aesthetic judgment about what has been understood.” (1994: 117) The most important divide is the one between comprehension and the other three processes. The latter are all non-obligatory, optional processes, and they presuppose the essential mental representation of the comprehension process. They are also relatively conscious and reflective. The moment when the product of comprehension arises is symbolized by the “click of comprehension”; it is subject to a total-time constraint for metaphor processing (Gibbs & Gerrig 1989; Gerrig 1989; Gibbs 1990, 1994: 110–115). In order to be able to distinguish between the immediate and mandatory comprehension process on the one hand and all other optional and relatively conscious processes that are based upon its product, including recognition, interpretation, and appreciation, I have suggested that we refer to the latter processes by means of one cover term, metaphor understanding (Steen 1994). Their optional, conscious, and reflective nature also suggests that the post-comprehension processes of understanding might be more oriented towards the overall norms, expectations and goals of the language user concerning the particular usage event they are engaged in, and this may vary with the concerns and expertise of the language user in the particular class of discourse that the metaphors occur in (cf. Perfetti 1999). Empirical evidence for this view was presented in Steen (1994) for the recognition, interpretation, appreciation of metaphor in literary versus journalistic contexts of reading by professional versus nonprofessional readers of literature: expert readers of literature processed literary metaphors by means of postcomprehension operations more often than nonexpert readers of literature, and both groups paid more attention to literary metaphors in literary reading than to journalistic metaphors in journalism in postcomprehension understanding processes. These distinctions and observations agree with more general results from reading research (e.g., Perfetti 1999). All processes of metaphor understanding may be seen as forms of post-comprehensive elaborative inferencing, about which Perfetti (1999: 188– 189) says the following:

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage

. . ., for a whole range of elaborative inferences that a comprehender might be expected to make in establishing a situation model [a distinct type of mental representation that presents an integrated picture of what the text is about, GS], the evidence is less strong. Most evidence does not support the assumption of early ‘on-line’ elaborative inferences (Corbett & Dosher 1978; McKoon & Ratcliff 1986, 1989, 1992; Singer 1979; Singer & Ferreira 1983), while some evidence suggests early inferences under restricted conditions (O’Brien et al. 1988). McKoon and Ratcliff (1989) suggest that inferences are encoded to different degrees of explicitness, with some, for example those that involve prediction of events, encoded only vaguely. Such less encoded inferences are readily made specific when required but are not specifically computed as part of comprehension. A related possibility is that elaborated inferences are not typically made as part of the text representation but can be observed in the situation model when readers are encouraged to attend to meaning (Fincher-Kiefer 1993). It is also possible that inferences required to maintain causal coherence among story elements are more likely to be made than other kinds of elaborative inferences (Trabasso & Suh 1993).

As a result, it becomes an empirical question of some importance whether the complete set of metaphorical entailments that is claimed to be part of a cross-domain mapping is also part of the automatic comprehension process, and therefore always occurs every time a metaphorical expression is encountered. Alternatively, many and sometimes all postulated correspondences might only be represented, and made explicit in behavioral research, in post-comprehension processes that are typically optional to most language users. In natural situations, this might spontaneously occur in specific types of usage involving, for instance, argumentation and imagination. The relevance of this type of research might therefore be especially great for those metaphor studies that are concerned with application in education, text design, and so on. The major implication for our present purposes then becomes: how do we know whether a particular study of metaphor in cognitive behavior identifies metaphorical cognition in comprehension versus in postcomprehension processes and their products? This may be essential for deciding which version of Conceptual Metaphor Theory can be supported by particular evidence. On a related note, the question is whether symbolic analyses of mappings are meant to predict something about comprehension or postcomprehension processes and products – but this is seldom thematized. One area where the relevance of these concerns has been empirically demonstrated for metaphor is the one of lexical access. Perfetti (1999: 182) summarizes general lexical access research by concluding that “the overall pattern of results can be explained by assuming that all meanings are activated, but with the degree of activation sensitive to both the relative frequency of the meanings and the context.” This raises fundamental questions for words that have conventionalized metaphorical and nonmetaphorical senses, such as the following: 1. Does the activation of polysemous words with metaphorical senses, in comprehension contexts requiring the metaphorical sense, always involve the activation



 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

of both the basic nonmetaphorical sense as well as the indirect metaphorical sense (processing of linguistic form)? 2. Does the activation of polysemous words with metaphorical senses, in comprehension contexts requiring the metaphorical sense, always involve such a degree of activation of the basic nonmetaphorical sense that it is sufficiently rich to function as a conceptual source domain for mapping the indirect metaphorical sense (processing of conceptual structure of domains)? 3. Does the activation of polysemous words with metaphorical senses, in comprehension contexts requiring the metaphorical sense, always display some manifestation of an obligatory mapping from the basic nonmetaphorical sense to the indirect metaphorical sense (processing of conceptual structure of mapping)? These questions may be answered by turning to Rachel Giora’s work on the role of salience in the online accessing of word meanings (Giora 2003). Salient word meanings are word meanings that are frequent, familiar, conventional, and prototypical, and it is these senses which are quickest to retrieve. Since metaphorical word senses may also be highly frequent, familiar, conventional, and prototypical, they may also be activated faster than their nonmetaphorical counterparts. It follows that questions 3, 2 and even 1 have to receive negative answers, as may be inferred from Giora’s detailed review of her own and other researchers’ work. This may now be placed in the interpretive framework advanced in this book. The fact that symbolic synchronic or historical analysis may helpfully privilege a particular class of senses as direct or nonmetaphorical does not directly map onto individuals’ cognitive representation of such senses as prior or even necessary in the online comprehension of linguistic forms when these are to be processed in metaphorical ways. And the fact that subsequent reflection upon the cognitive products of such metaphorical comprehension can also make available nonmetaphorical senses to the perceptive language user, which may be seen as perhaps providing a connection via a conceptual source domain for interpreting the metaphorical senses of the same words, again, does not mean that these nonmetaphorical senses also played a role during comprehension. The behavior of both metaphorical and nonmetaphorical senses is a highly variable function of the salience of the senses of the metaphorically used words in the language as a whole, the language of the various groups an individual belongs to, the language as mentally stored in the grammar of an individual’s mind, and the language as appropriate for the various types of occasion of use. And if this systematic variation already occurs in the first seconds of comprehension, the situation in postcomprehension cognition will be even more variable. The question when a metaphor is observed in cognitive processing is of fundamental importance to the finding’s role as evidence for or against a particular theory of metaphor in cognition. The behavioral study of metaphor in usage events can therefore not remain restricted to the sentence processing paradigms that are popular in psycholinguistics. It also requires attending to the definition of the usage event as a purposeful form of verbal action or communication, or discourse, to the participants. People use language

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

on particular occasions in specific roles, for particular goals, about particular topics, in particular settings, and against the background of specific norms and expectations (Steen 1994, 1999a, 2003). They constantly orient themselves towards these aspects when they communicate, and this clearly interacts with the salience of particular word senses for particular language uses on specific occasions (Giora 2003). This higher level of contextualization of metaphor processing has not received much attention in the psycholinguistic canon. Higher-level contextual aspects of language usage have been theorized and modeled in the sociolinguistics of spoken interaction, where for instance Gumperz (1982; cf. 2001) and Hymes (1974) have done important work on the conceptualization of the social and cognitive embedding of language use in multi-dimensional frames of discourse. This work has been absorbed by Herbert Clark (1996) in his model of language use as coordinated joint action, but that model has not incorporated new developments in the field of genre analysis yet. Different genre-analytical approaches to all discourse, spoken as well as written and otherwise, emphasize the fact that all language use is genre-regulated. This has observable effects on the conceptual structures as well as linguistic forms of the written and spoken texts that are the verbal manifestations of individual discourse behavior, as has also been shown (and elaborated in Chapters 10 and 11) for what counts as metaphor in the symbolic analyses of particular discourse genres presented by for instance Caballero Rodríguez (2006), Charteris-Black (2004), and Koller (2004). Behavioral studies of metaphor in such generically defined reading processes are scant, however, and have largely remained limited to literary reception (Glicksohn & Goodblatt 1993; Steen 1994; but cf. Cameron 2003). By contrast, psycholinguists have mostly focused on metaphor comprehension in relatively neutral discourse contexts. I have concentrated on the conceptualization of metaphor in the cognitive processes and products of reading. Much work remains to be done in the areas of metaphor in writing, speaking, and listening. These processes and their products can be studied as fairly general cognitive phenomena, as would befit the style of sentence processing research in psycholinguistics. But they may also be examined as part of more encompassing processes of discourse, in which case the concept of genre becomes important. Some of this work has been carried out in conversation-analytical contexts, as we shall see in Section 5 below. The conceptualization of metaphor in psychological models of speaking and listening (e.g., Clark 1996, 2002; Levelt 1989, 1999), however, is still rather underdeveloped in comparison with metaphor in reading. One final conceptual issue may be mentioned here by way of conclusion. Sentencelevel and discourse-level studies of metaphor in the cognitive processes of usage may be brought together by paying attention to the question of the basic unit of discourse (Steen 2005b). How language users progress from one basic unit of discourse to another is crucial for both levels of analysis, and it varies between speech and writing. Moreover, basic units of discourse also interact with the unit of metaphor, affecting how many metaphors in which forms may be identified in the time course of behavior. This leads us back to the distinction between extended and restricted metaphor

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

discussed in Chapter 11, but it also has connections with metaphor signaling, explicitness, and (in)directness. When these aspects become relevant in the next sections, they will be discussed from a behavioral, not symbolic perspective, with the caveat that all of these ideas are still theoretical and need to be empirically examined in research on processing.

. Operationalization At least two issues arise from the conceptualization section which need to be addressed in operationalizing metaphor in the area of cognitive processing and its products. First of all, there is the temporal stage of processing within which metaphor is to be identified. In reading, this would require making an operational distinction between comprehension and understanding. Where does the one stage stop and the other begin? Recognition and appreciation may probably be legitimately confined to the understanding stage, but where to draw the line between comprehension and interpretation is much more difficult to say. This does not mean that the distinction should be abandoned, though, for there is sufficient reason both within and outside metaphor processing theory to maintain it. These questions also have to be addressed for metaphor processing in listening. When we turn to metaphor production in speech and writing, however, new problems arise. Is it possible to make a distinction between short-term processes of metaphor production that are comparable to comprehension, as opposed to relatively more drawn-out and conscious processes of metaphor planning that are comparable to the more elaborate aspects of understanding? Consider how people may sometimes look for apt cross-domain comparisons to explain a particular point or content area in conversations or teaching. In observational studies, long pauses and markers of hesitation might be helpful indicators of such relatively long planning processes, but it need not be clear whether the speaker would be looking for the appropriate crossdomain mapping or for the most felicitous linguistic expression of a mapping they already may somehow have in mind. Or consider how such planning may take more complex and elaborate forms of planning in written composition. Revision of written texts presents an even more complicated situation, where reading and writing interact while leading to altered metaphor production. It is fairly clear that these aspects of production in some way mirror what is going on in reception, but it is also evident that their conceptual and operational definition, let alone their empirical study, requires much more work than can be conveyed here. The second question that needs to be addressed is which unit of measurement is used for examining the presence of metaphor. We have seen how lexical access represents one unit of measurement, reflecting how metaphor may be present in the cognitive processing of individual words. Similarly, sentence processing may be seen as another unit of cognition, which may or may not reflect the presence of metaphor in the processes and products of either sentence production or reception. Paragraph

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

and text (or often textoid) processing represent the highest and most encompassing units of analysis for metaphor in cognition. The presence of metaphor at one level does not necessarily mean that it should also be observable at another level. These different levels of analysis typically also require different techniques for data collection. There may also be an interaction between these levels of analysis on the one hand and the temporal processes of production and reception on the other: higher-level processes and products of verbal behavior typically belong to relatively independent areas of cognition, as has been emphasized by Gibbs since 1993. This also suggests that metaphor identification at one of these levels has a different function for the description of the overall experience of reading than metaphor identification at another level. The lower levels of metaphor in cognition need not even have an effect on, or play a role in, the higher levels of cognition, unless higher levels of cognition reinstate metaphorical versus nonmetaphorical senses as relevant to the drawn-out understanding process of a text. These are operational differentiations which have not been discussed in great depth by blending theorists who find metaphorical mappings in detailed analyses of imagined reading processes for poems and plays or other wellcrafted texts, again suggesting that their work belongs to the symbolic rather than to the behavioral reign of metaphor research. Recent research on lexical access in relation to metaphor has provided one seminal window onto these interrelations and differentiations (Giora 2003). But another spectacular example has been around for some time: Janus and Bever (1985) were critical of the sentence-comprehension paradigm used in earlier studies to test whether the two-stage model of metaphor comprehension caused longer processing times for metaphorical contexts versus nonmetaphorical contexts. Ortony et al. (1978) and Inhoff et al. (1984) had not found longer reading times for sentences comprehended as metaphorical as opposed to literal, as when The fabric had begun to fray had to be processed after (2) or (3): (2) Metaphoric Lucy and Phil needed a marriage counselor. They had once been very happy but after several years of marriage they had become discontented with one another. Little habits which ad at first been endearing were now irritating and caused many senseless and heated arguments. The fabric had begun to fray. (3) Nonmetaphoric The old couch needed re-upholstering. After two generations of wear the edges of the couch were tattered and soiled. Several buttons were missing and the material around the seams was beginning to unravel. The upholstery had become very shabby. The fabric had begun to fray. Janus and Bever (1985) argued that comprehension of the sentence might have been the incorrect cognitive level of analysis, because other processes might have diluted

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

or masked the presence of metaphor in more local processes of metaphor in cognition (cf. Gibbs & Gerrig 1989). When they examined cognition at the level of phrase comprehension, they did find an effect of metaphoric versus nonmetaphoric contexts on processing. Thus, when the phrase “the fabric” was offered as one unit, it did take longer to comprehend in the metaphorical condition than in the nonmetaphorical condition. This is a clear demonstration of the relevance of unit and level of analysis in cognitive processing to the identification of metaphor in cognition. Again, we need to see these comments in the light of their relation to reading research. They can probably be transferred to listening research without great difficulty. But their role in production research becomes more difficult to handle. Operational definitions of word, phrase, sentence, paragraph and text in production are relatively comparable to what happens in reception, but controlling the observation of their processes of production at these different levels of detail will not be easy. And as with the reception side, the relevance of each operationalization to a particular research question about metaphor in cognitive processing is rather variable. Word-level measurements pertain to all types of metaphor processing, from conventional to novel and so on, since all of these metaphors require fast online formulation alike. Sentence or text-level measurements, however, will probably only capture the online production of relatively deliberate, novel, extended, and signaled metaphors in cognition, since these can penetrate the higher-level and conscious processes of planning. Cognitivelinguistic studies that claim to address the behavioral side of metaphor in cognition do not always explicate how they stand on the relevance of these distinctions. A third issue for operationalization concerns the operational questions about the linguistic forms and conceptual structures in language that are presumably produced or received during processing. In general, behavioral researchers like psycholinguists tend to adopt the findings of symbolic analyses. Since we saw in Chapter 11 that it is most useful to start out from the underlying conceptual structures as the unifying element across all forms of metaphor, we will begin with the issues involving the demarcation of the conceptual domains involved in a metaphorical mapping:


Identifying a cross-domain mapping 4. Decide about the relative salience of the two domains as distinct conceptual systems

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, typically, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. Decide about the necessary and sufficient degree of similarity required for a mapping, since corresponding elements between two domains may be relatively more or less similar. 5. Decide about the role of types of correspondences between domains, such as external similarity versus relations, and relations versus higher-order relations. Decide about minimal and maximal number of correspondences required for an analysis to be accepted as complete. These operational issues about the conceptual structures of metaphor do not seem to have received much principled attention either in the behavioral research on metaphor in cognitive processing. How these questions can be adequately addressed in behavioral research, therefore, has to remain somewhat of an undecided matter. When it comes to questions formulated for identifying the linguistic forms of metaphorical language use, it looks as if behavioral researchers have generally followed the same identification procedures for the linguistic materials involved in cognitive processing as linguists:

Identifying a metaphorically motivated linguistic form 1. Decide what counts as one form 2. Decide whether it has at least two senses 3. Decide whether the two senses are related by some form of nonliteral similarity a. nonliteral similarity should be able to be opposed to both literal similarity and literal hierarchy; each of these oppositions involves the possibility for the analyst to specify two fundamentally different semantic or conceptual domains. b. the direction of the derivation or mapping has to be founded on a criterion of basicness, whether that is historical, experiential, acquisitional, and so on. This also holds for the other forms of metaphor discussed in Chapter 11:

Identifying other forms of metaphorically motivated language 1. Find local referent and topic shifts. 2. Test whether the incongruous words are to be integrated within the overall referential and/or topical framework by means of some form of comparison. 3. Test whether the comparison is nonliteral or cross-domain. 4. Test whether the comparison can be seen as some form of indirect talk about the local or main referent or topic of the text. 5. If the findings to tests 2, 3, and 4 are positive, then a word should be identified as (part of) an expression of another form of metaphor.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Here, too, linguistic analysis appears to function as the model approach which provides well-informed input for behavioral research. Finally, there is the related cognitive definition of metaphor in the cognitive representation of these linguistic forms and conceptual structures. Does the cognitive representation of the linguistic form of metaphor always require the activation of two senses, for instance, or is that immaterial to the study of metaphor in cognition? And does the cognitive representation of the conceptual structure of metaphor always require the activation of (a) two conceptual domains, and (b) other conceptual nodes than the target concept itself? Moreover, is the observation of two activated senses for one linguistic form also taken as evidence for the activation of two underlying conceptual structures, or are these levels of analysis separated from each other? These are the cognitive variants of the symbolic analyses of metaphor discussed just now. In sum, operationalizing metaphor for the behavioral study of its processing in usage requires four types of decisions: 1. There is the operational definition of the process within which the cognitive processes and products related to metaphor are to be found. 2. There is the operational definition of the cognitive unit within which the cognitive processes and products related to metaphor are to be found. 3. There is the operational definition of the symbolic structures of metaphor (linguistic forms and conceptual structures) that are part of the language involved in the usage event. 4. There is the operational definition of the cognitive structures of metaphor processing (linguistic forms and conceptual structures) that are involved in the usage event. Let us now examine how some of these issues fare in the three main methods of data collection and their analysis.

. Introspection The question to be addressed in this section is whether and how introspection can serve as a good method for data collection to answer the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter. It looks as if the answer to this question is generally just as negative as it was for the use of introspection in the areas of metaphor in language acquisition and knowledge of language discussed in Chapter 9. It is certainly impossible to self-observe the processes of immediate online production and comprehension, whether in writing or speaking, reading or listening, for these are subliminal, automatic, and superfast. It might be different for the products of comprehension, which might be available for introspection if appropriate procedures of data collection are observed, as in thinking out loud. This is also a method which has been used for the more conscious processes and products of understanding, including recognition, interpretation, and appreciation. But even here, thinking out loud is typically used as a

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

third-person approach (cf. Gibbs 2006b), where other language users than the analyst observe their own post-comprehension processing and deliver the goods, which may then be analyzed at one remove by the researcher. This will be returned to in Section 6, when we will consider manipulation. In general, therefore, not many data have been collected by cognitive scientists employing introspection for the study of the cognitive processes of metaphor production, comprehension and understanding. Introspection into the products of comprehension has taken place a lot in linguistic approaches to metaphor processing, often with the avowed aim to reconstruct the preceding cognitive process – a shift of perspective which has been criticized by Gibbs (1994) and other psycholinguists. The best-known product of such a presumably introspective approach to metaphor processing is probably the standard pragmatic model advanced in the seventies by Grice (1975) and Searle (1979). Psycholinguistic research into the proper comprehension processes, however, has since shown that that model is inadequate. The present methodological perspective may now explain this course of history as due to the weakness of introspection regarding the immediate cognitive processes of production and comprehension. In particular, the standard pragmatic model was constructed on a number of ill-warranted assumptions about the role of literal and metaphorical meanings and how these worked at the various levels of analysis, including lexical access versus sentence comprehension. These assumptions were unable to be corrected by analysts self-observing their own language processing. Instead, they were maintained and led to a two or three-stage model of metaphor processing which became the dominant view of metaphor comprehension for some time. It took experimental testing in order for its shortcomings to be revealed. An overview of the relevant issues and research is available from for instance Gibbs (1994) and Steen (1994). Another originally introspective approach to metaphor processing is Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which posits that all metaphor is understood by constructing a mapping across two domains that are both activated during processing. Introspective evidence marshaled by Lakoff and Johnson and others has to do with the inferences and reasoning patterns that people can self-observe when they understand metaphors. However, it now turns out that this story probably does not hold for all metaphors, but only for novel or deliberate metaphors, which form a small proportion of most metaphor in usage (e.g. Keysar et al. 2000). When other metaphors manifest symptoms of cross-domain mapping during their processing, we are probably not dealing with obligatory processes of comprehension, but optional and subsequent processes of understanding, which selectively and functionally utilize the products of fast comprehension. Introspection has, again, not been able to correct and fine-tune these initial impressions. The original findings produced by introspection may have been no more than well-motivated theoretical assumptions derived from an overall theoretical approach based on patterns in language. Experimental research collecting data from online cognitive processes has been required to test and adjust the original proposals to more adequate models.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

A third introspective approach to metaphor processing is Blending Theory, which is subject to the same critique. Gibbs (2000) has offered a constructive discussion of how Blending Theory can be turned more psychologically valid and acceptable. He does not explicitly label blending research as introspective, but instead calls attention to its posthoc, interpretative nature which is based on theorists’ private intuitions: “Many psychologists complain about cognitive linguistics work that trying to infer aspects of conceptual knowledge from an analysis of systematic patterns of linguistic structure leads to theories that have a post hoc quality” (Gibbs 2000: 349). When he discusses ways in which blending researchers can make their work more acceptable to psychologists, he writes: “Blending scholars do not have to actually conduct empirical research to gain the attention and respect of psychologists” (p. 355). This implies that the introspective work done so far is not counted as empirical research; it is seen as a theoretical framework which has shown its use by many illustrative case studies, but it requires further elaboration in many respects before it can be empirically investigated. This would seem to agree with the assessment by Coulson and Oakley (2000: 192), that “post hoc analyses of texts will necessarily play a basic role in building and refining models of online meaning construction.” This also implies that only then can genuine data pertaining to self-observed, observed or manipulated cognitive processes be collected; so far, such data, whether verbal, nonverbal, or meta, have hardly been presented for the tenability of Blending Theory. One important theoretical clarification that is needed, for instance, is the very status of Blending Theory as a theory of online meaning construction. Gibbs prefers to reconstruct Blending Theory as a model that captures the products of the interpretation process. This should be understood in contrast with a model of the process of interpretation, which in turn should be distinguished from the process and product of the prior stage of comprehension. To illustrate the steps needed to turn introspective Blending Theory into empirical psychological research, here is a list of questions: Do people ordinarily infer the complex meanings presumably associated with the phrase John is digging his own grave, as suggested by Fauconnier and Turner (1998)? Must people actually create complex blended spaces to understand what speakers intend by this expression? Do listeners create new blended spaces each and every time they hear an expression? When do the various mappings occur during meaning construction? How do specific blending operations – such as composition, completion, and elaboration – figure in the on-line creation of different meanings for linguistic expression? (Gibbs 2000: 351–352)

Clearly, all of these questions are essential to the way in which any metaphor can be identified by researchers at which moment in the time course of metaphor processing, pertaining to precisely indicated cognitive processes and products of the linguistic forms and conceptual structures that play a role in the production and understanding of language usage. Indeed, my own position would be to reconstruct Blending Theory as a theory of conceptual usage analysis which is symbolic rather than behavioral, as I have argued above.

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

The admonishment to distinguish processes and products of meaning construction along a time scale that accounts for differences between comprehension and understanding (recognition, interpretation, appreciation) may be situated in a more encompassing theoretical framework that pays attention to other requirements of good psychology. Gibbs (2000: 352–355) offers a brief discussion of seven aspects of cognitive modeling, derived from Markman (1999), which have to be heeded if Blending Theory is to make further empirical progress. Again, many of these aspects are essential to what may be identified in which way as the mental representation of a metaphorical linguistic form or conceptual structure in an ongoing usage event (cf. Grady 2000 for a similar view): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Cognitive models must be based on representations that actually represent. Cognitive models must adopt multiple approaches to representation. Cognitive models must use representations at multiple grain sizes. Cognitive models must be clear about the specification of processes. Cognitive models must attend to the details of processing as well as to its gross form. 6. Cognitive models must attend to social context. 7. Cognitive models must attend to the relationship between the individual and the world. It should be noted that all of these are requirements for theoretical modeling, which is still not yet the same as testing the predictions of that model in empirical research, by means of introspection, observation, or manipulation. More clearly methodological advice is given when Gibbs discusses the importance of falsification and the role of alternative hypotheses. Falsification turns on the possibility to formulate predictions about people’s behavior and to test those predictions in well-designed experimental settings. Alternative hypotheses are crucial because they demonstrate that a researcher pays attention to the fact that the same data may often be explained in more than one way; attending to such alternative explanations and disarming them increases the interest of the proposed explanation. Neither of these strategies has been used very much in blending research when it comes to its introspective study of metaphor processing, except perhaps in the comparison between Blending Theory on the one hand and Conceptual Metaphor Theory on the other. One reason for this state of play may be that Blending Theory is highly idiographic. It has been mining for “golden events”, to quote Coulson and Oakley (2000: 193), and thereby places itself in an “image tradition” rather than a “logic tradition”. That is to say, Blending Theory does not focus on generalizations across wide ranges of cases, but aims to capture the full complexity and variability of unique events of usage. At the end of the day, however, the adequacy of single case interpretations can only be judged against the validity of the general assumptions that are made in order to interpret the single case. Idiographic and nomothetic research will have to make better attempts to converge than we have witnessed so far.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

One example where blending theorists have progressed beyond the emphasis on golden events is Coulson and Oakley’s (2005) discussion of the difference in processing conventional versus novel metaphor. With a reference to the career of metaphor theory, Coulson and Oakley suggest “that the mappings in conventional metaphors are established via an automatic process of retrieval, while mappings in novel metaphors require analogical reasoning processes” (2005: 1524). It follows from this, though, that both conventional and novel metaphors still activate mappings between two domains, which should be observable in online processing – a claim which is not necessarily identical with the career of metaphor theory and its evidence. Textual analysis by means of intuitions is then advanced by Coulson and Oakley to support their argument. Collecting introspective data about the nature and function of texts in cognitive processing, though, cannot settle this issue. Behavioral data collected by manipulation, observation or introspection are instead required, with introspective data assuming an extremely problematic position. The experimental data reported by Wolff and Gentner (2000; cf. Bowdle & Gentner 2005; Gentner & Bowdle 2001) can also be interpreted to suggest that most conventional metaphors are processed directly, with reference to only one domain, as opposed to by means of a mapping between two. If metaphor in the cognitive process of usage is defined by the identification of two activated spaces or concepts, it follows that many of these cases do not qualify as metaphorical cognition. If such cases are analyzed as the cognitive processes related to metaphorical linguistic forms, however, their processes might still be identified as metaphorical, for instance if the accessed words briefly display the activation of two competing, metaphorically related senses (Giora 2003). But it will have become clear that these questions can only be fruitfully assessed if the relevant behavioral data have been collected. This seems impossible without the utilization of sophisticated laboratory techniques. How introspection could serve an empirical function for testing here is a moot point. It may function as support for the plausibility of a theory, not as evidence for the tenability of conclusions from research on behavior.

. Observation The question whether the cognitive processing of the linguistic forms and conceptual structures of metaphor can be observed in natural language behavior is an intriguing one. When it is broken up into various subquestions, it becomes clear how complex the situation is for the study of metaphor in individual cognition. Metaphor in the cognitive process of writing has not been given much if any attention. What such an approach would aim at if it were concerned with the cognitive products of that process is even more fascinating: it would have to be the mental representations of the writer of the metaphors they produced in their text. This is an area which would probably become interesting for text design processes and their men-

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

tal products, as in the written production of textbooks, advertisements, or political speeches, where deliberate metaphor use might be part of the cognitive concerns of the language user. Whether such aspects of cognition are open to natural observation is quite dubious – elicitation techniques including thinking aloud or interviewing would probably have to be utilized to get at these behavioral data. The recent rise of tracking devices in composition processes at the computer, however, may afford an unobtrusive as well as fine-grained and useful means for the observational study of metaphor in writing, including its role in online word choice processes (e.g., SpelmanMiller 2000). It will be exciting to see what such studies can show about the online production of metaphor. The alternative option, reconstructing the writer’s cognitive processes and their products from the language materials they have produced, is quite problematic and at the end of the day too speculative to be taken seriously. It has long been known in literary criticism, for instance, that author’s intentions and general plans for writing cannot be reliably recovered from the text. This is no different in many other arenas of written text production. The cognitive processes and products of reading are in the same position. The study of metaphor in reading has typically been pursued by experimental psychologists who attempt to tap online behavior by means of reading-time measures and other techniques. They may also examine its products in offline questionnaires and so on. But observing a reader reading a text does not yield a lot of useful behavioral data about what goes on in their mind. The processes of spoken language have been studied more extensively with reference to their relation to cognition. Chafe (1994, 2001), for instance, has done extensive work on the relation between speech production and consciousness. And researchers working in Conversation Analysis and Interactional Sociolinguistics have attempted to describe how people treat utterances in verbal interaction by looking at their responses to them. This type of work is not meant as a description of the complete cognitive process of production or reception, if only because not all processes are conscious and because we cannot be certain that speakers lie or play or pretend in other ways. Indeed, Conversation Analysis has resisted taking on board a lot of the cognitive baggage that has been cheerfully included in other functional approaches to language use. But Conversation-Analytical work can at least aim to describe and explain those parts of the process of meaning production and reception that are required for understanding what goes on in public between speakers. This provides a tip-of-the-iceberg perspective into cognition during verbal interaction which can also have a bearing on the identification of the production or reception of the linguistic forms and even conceptual structures of metaphor – as we shall see in a moment. It can also look at the more local processes of word choice and signaling, as I have suggested in Chapters 10 and 11. These hence seem to be interesting options for at least some observational approaches to metaphor in the processes of speaking and listening. While various types of discourse analysts study verbal interaction to obtain a view of the processes of linguistic metaphor production and reception, it is also possible to

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

attempt to look through the use of language, as it were, to capture the processes handling the conceptual structures of metaphor. This has typically happened in studies of psychotherapy or of education, as, for instance, in the pioneering work by Howard Pollio and his colleagues (Pollio, Barlow, Fine, & Pollio 1977). This type of study is concerned with discourse genres that revolve around people presenting their thoughts as carefully worded as possible. Right before the advent of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, for instance, Pollio and his colleagues derived a whole range of what they call metaphor themes from their spoken data, most of which can be directly related to many of the conceptual metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Examples include “Personal self worth or loss thereof ”, “Some feelings are experienced as overpowering”, and “Analogy of physical strength-weakness to character strength-weakness”. For more recent studies about the role of metaphor in the discourse of cancer patients, see Gwyn (1999) and Semino, Heywood, and Short (2004). There are problems, however, with drawing conclusions from the use of particular language structures about that language user’s cognition. As has been emphasized by Cameron and Low (1999; cf. Charteris-Black 2004), it is never completely clear without further ado whether the use of a particular codified metaphorical expression reflects the precise contents of the thought of an individual at a particular time of processing. It may also simply be a matter of unreflective word choice and linguistic construction, which may be a matter of shallow processing (e.g., Sanford 2002). What people say and do is not necessarily the same as what they think – an insight which has informed Conversation Analysis from the start. One comment that may be made in this context, of course, is that much work on psychotherapy and education focuses on relatively novel metaphor. This seems to offer a better window into the mind of the language user in this respect. Novel metaphors are probably more conscious and often deliberate or exploratory metaphors, so that they often do directly reflect at least some aspects of the speaker’s process of conceptualization. But deciding about the circumference of that group of special cases is no easy task, as we have seen throughout part two. One example of a careful observational study of the on-going processes of metaphor production and reception is Cameron’s (2003) work on metaphor in educational discourse. One stage in her research involves the mapping of metaphors in class-room discourse onto teaching action. Regular discourse analytical techniques for the description of teaching actions across discourse events led to the independent identification of a number of processes between teachers and students. These, in turn, provided a framework for the observational study of metaphor as part of these teaching processes. The following observations could be made (2003: 126): –

–

The teaching sequences most likely to involve metaphor were Summarizing, Agenda Management and Evaluative Feedback. More than half of these sequences contained at least one metaphor. Metaphors occurred in about one-third of Control, Strategic Feedback and Explication sequences.

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

–

Very few metaphors were used in Exemplification, Checking, Understanding, Organizing and Information Search sequences.

These relations are then further explored by close analyses of excerpts which show how metaphors can be related to the goals and topics of the interlocutors, or the form and order of their talk. For instance, here is Cameron’s conclusion about the processes involving metaphors in Summarizing: Metaphors were used to summarize content and process, often employing general or abstract lexis. At the end of episodes of teaching action, summaries offer students a final opportunity to consolidate the ideas in the preceding discourse. They also signal an upcoming change of topic in the talking-and-thinking, and so may be important in prompting students to close down the current topic in their minds and to get ready for the next. (2003: 134)

This is a good example how behavioral data can be collected by observation and analyzed in qualitative fashion in order to derive conclusions about metaphor in cognitive processing. What is interesting from a methodological perspective is the way in which the production and reception processes of the linguistic forms of metaphors is linked to the role of metaphor in more general cognitive processes of discourse. The way in which this is discussed by Cameron does not make a distinction between the linguistic forms of metaphors and their conceptual structures: in the above quotation, for instance, she simply refers to ‘metaphors’, which allows for more than one interpretation. From my perspective, I would like to suggest that we are looking at the production and reception process of the linguistic forms of metaphors. We cannot make many assumptions, at least not in most cases, about the relation of linguistic metaphor processing (production and reception) on the one hand and the online production or reception of any related metaphorical conceptual structures on the other. Indeed, with Cameron and Low (1999), I should like to insist that we only know that these linguistic forms fulfill a particular function in the overall discourse processes, one which is regulated by the overall concerns of educational discourse. They do this frequently and successfully, too. In metaphor analysis, however, this would typically have to be an observation about the cognitive process relating to the target domains of the metaphorical forms involved. More detailed assumptions about the activation and role of any of the source domains related to the linguistic forms in the cognitive processes of the interlocutors, by contrast, cannot be made by mere observation, unless we know more about the on-line conceptual processing of each of these individual cases. Identifying the production and reception processes of the linguistic forms of metaphor in usage is not the same as identifying the potentially related processes of the production and reception of metaphorical conceptual structures. An even more ambitious analysis based on observation is Giora’s (2003) study of a conversation between two people in their bedroom. Giora’s interest is in the role of the immediate processing of metaphorically used lexical units, which has to do with

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

the activation of their salient meanings. Her claim is that “a conversational response to the salient, albeit contextually incompatible, literal meaning of both familiar and less familiar metaphors is consistent with the view that salient meanings should not be bypassed” (p. 128). An illustration of this process is found in (4): (4) that marriage became, ... became a way out for me. It was the flip side. .. It’s like sometimes you go through things, ... and you come out the other side of them, You .. come out so much better. Giora’s conclusion from these data is that metaphor is processed both literally and metaphorically and that “their salient meaning is retained and may be resonated with for further processes” (p. 134). From the current methodological perspective, however, a number of issues arise. First of all, Giora’s experimental research on the graded salience hypothesis focuses on the process of immediate lexical access, which forms the basis of comprehension. Whether all of the conversational processes illustrated above can be seen as part of that immediate process of comprehension and production is a moot point: many of them may also work on the products of that comprehension process, with verbal memory facilitating the use of the same verbal forms during understanding irrespective of whether their appropriate or inappropriate senses had been activated in comprehension. Whether such senses can be said to have remained active, or whether they are in fact re-instated or even perceived for the first time on the basis of lexical prompting, is therefore not clear. Secondly, suppose this is a matter of persisting activation of literal senses, then another question arises. For it is also possible that this type of extended production is not (just or mostly) due to the availability of a particular lexical sense, but to a conceptual structure which guides the formulating process (Levelt 1989, 1999). The question is, therefore, whether we are dealing with a set of relatively independent utterances that each produce a new metaphor that is prompted by the presence of a salient sense; or whether we are dealing with a set of utterances that are all connected as a series of attempts to express the same underlying conceptual structure or idea. In that case, the apparently driving force of the salient sense would be epiphenomenal to the more important driving force of the cross-domain mapping that has produced the first metaphor in the first place. This may vary from one case of echoing or resonance to another. It is therefore not quite clear what Giora’s observations have really shown. It is possible that her conclusion is valid, but there are at least two alternative views which affect the purported role of the salient meanings processed in the first metaphorical utterances. Again, finding production processes of the linguistic forms of metaphors, in this case following upon other linguistic metaphor forms that may have triggered them,

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

does not facilitate drawing unequivocal conclusions about the concomitant conceptual processes and their relation to the linguistic processes. One final example needs to be added here to show the importance of the discourse generic perspective on the processes under examination. Giora (2003) also discusses the processes of writing from the perspective of the graded salience hypothesis. She postulates that, during writing, too, the activation of salient but inappropriate word meanings can have an effect on their availability at slightly later stages of composition. Her evidence for this thesis is then taken from Hebrew metaphors used in newspaper articles, where some metaphorically used words are found by themselves whereas other metaphorically used words give rise to the metaphorical use of similar lexis slightly later. Examples are (2003: 135): (5) The strikes in the education system took place when the union was putting up a fight against the government. In this fight, threats, sanctions, and even a general strike were the weapons. (6) In this situation, the Treasury [department] looks like an island of sainty in a sea of unconstrained demands. Giora concludes that the same processes of resonance are at play in writing as in speech. However, what is ignored here is that newspaper articles are highly edited texts: they go through several rounds of revision, where writers can also exploit their comprehension and subsequent recognition of one word as metaphorical in a specific way to replace subsequent words by lexically cohesive terms, for rhetorical effect. The materials utilized for studying the process of writing, therefore, are too far removed from the process of composition itself to allow for any firm conclusions. Again, when observation is used to collect data about metaphor in processing, it seems as if the minimal requirement for the data is that they are behavioral, not symbolic. Observation can be helpful in the study of metaphor in processing, though. When verbal and nonverbal data are collected from conversations, they can afford qualitative and even quantitative insight into aspects of the production and reception of the linguistic forms of metaphor. These cognitive processes and their products may be described with reference to a number of functional features of usage, including the goals of their users, the topics of the discourse, and so on. But care needs to be taken about the specific details that can be examined, for not all aspects of behavior wear their heart on their sleeve. The interpretation of the conceptual side of metaphor production and reception in text and talk, in particular, is quite problematic if that has to be based on observational data only.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

. Manipulation .. Experimental materials Methods and techniques are an important part of doing any kind of experimental psychology, so it is not surprising that the massive rise of figurative language research in the seventies and eighties led to explicit methodological discussion. Richard Honeck published an article in the very first issue of Metaphor and Symbol (then still called Metaphor and Symbolic Activity), focusing on the problems surrounding the use of verbal materials in experimental figurative language research. Honeck (1986) distinguished five issues for attention: 1. the overall complexity of figurative language in itself; 2. the origins or sources of the experimental materials; 3. the role of expert knowledge in the selection and creation of experimental materials; 4. the variable success or failure of experimental materials; 5. the degree of representativeness of experimental materials, and the way in which this factor is to be handled in statistical designs. These issues all have to do with the more restricted problem of finding metaphor in the cognitive processes and products of language usage. The overall complexity of metaphor is at least partly reflected by the multidimensional models of metaphor that were discussed in Chapter 3. What was not discussed there is the attention drawn by Honeck to the fact that metaphors exhibit many more dimensions than the obvious ones like their simple grammatical or rhetorical form. For instance, he refers to the ten variables of metaphor described by Marschark, Katz, and Pavio (1983; cf. Katz et al. 1985, 1988), including comprehensibility, imageability, and so on. Moreover, as Honeck points out, these dimensions also interact with each other, and it is important to acknowledge how this may affect the ease with which metaphors may be identified as such. For instance, a metaphor with high imagery value or a low degree of comprehensibility is not easy to miss when searching for metaphors in authentic discourse, whereas a metaphor with low imagery value and high comprehensibility is much more easily ignored. If a particular study wishes to make use of a representative sample of metaphors instead of a selective set of clear cases of a particular kind, these issues require careful attention. In addition, Honeck’s comments only pertain to the conceptual structures of metaphors, as I have since been able to demonstrate in my work on the role of linguistic form, communicative function, and so on (Steen 1994). That the problem of reliable metaphor identification in authentic discourse is even more complicated than that has been made abundantly clear in the previous two chapters. The provenance of metaphors is another crucial issue. When experimenters construct their own materials, they are dependent on their intuitions, and may be biased in their preferences as well as in the need for clear or appropriate cases. When experi-

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

menters derive their materials from existing corpora, by contrast, they need a reliable search procedure, which has not been readily available. Moreover, the selection of the discourse materials in a corpus from which the metaphorical expressions are to be culled presents another problem, since we do not know which metaphor forms and types are representative of which genres and registers. In all, the problem of constructing metaphors in experimental materials for research on metaphor in processing is not trivial. The experimenter’s expertise is crucial in defining metaphor as well as its selection or construction for experimental work. This is particularly important for the eventually semantic decision whether a particular expression instantiates an underlying conceptual metaphor or not. For instance, suppose a researcher wishes to utilize Emilia’s hit song “I’m a big big girl,” which contains the following lines: You had your arms around me Warm like fire Does the reference to fire simply invoke physical warmth, as is suggested by the words in the simile? Or does it invoke intimacy, which involves closeness and warmth? Or does it relate to love, which is conventionally associated with fire? The identification of the underlying conceptual metaphor is totally dependent on the researcher’s expertise and the way that can be made explicit in preferred procedures for metaphor identification. This should of course be related to the model which is being preferred for a particular study, so that the role of personal expertise gets constrained by a minimal number of more generally accepted assumptions about metaphor. The remaining two issues discussed by Honeck (1986) each implicate the first three. The failure of some materials, compared with the success of other materials, has to be interpreted and solved by experimenters against the background of their expertise, the way they have selected or constructed their materials, and their view of the definition of metaphor. And the assessment of the representativeness of the materials seems to present another aspect of this same configuration of issues. These have become familiar themes by now. Since Honeck (1986) published his discussion, not much attention has been devoted in public to this fundamental part of finding metaphor in thought. It seems as if experimenters are content to live with the problem as best as they can, since it is seen as a fact of laboratory life. One aim of this book is to make explicit many of the assumptions as well as issues that play a role in the evaluation of experimental materials. One special way in which this can now take place is by making use of the findings of metaphor in language that are being produced by discourse analysts, corpus linguists, and cognitive linguists, and assessing their quality against the methodological norms discussed in this book (Deignan 2005a: 114ff.; cf. Bowdle & Gentner 2005).

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

.. Data collection and analysis Verbal data. The experimental collection of verbal data is particularly suitable for the study of metaphor reception processes during reading. People may be asked to think out loud while they are reading in various ways, for instance after every sentence of a text, or after every paragraph. They may also be asked to focus on particular issues at such moments of thinking out loud, but then the procedure turns into an interview and, more importantly, affects the natural reading process (cf. Steen 1994). Cameron (2003) asked school children to think out loud together, about metaphors they found in a school text. As an alternative to talking, people may also be asked to write down their thoughts, but this might only be suitable for very high levels of cognition, where thinking becomes elaborate and goal driven instead of more restricted and associative. Again, such writing tasks may also be focused on particular topics, which would then run the danger of spilling over into the collection of meta data by means of a questionnaire (Glucksberg & McGlone 1999). I have used thinking out loud as one means for getting at the processes of metaphor understanding during reading, in literary and journalistic prose. It provides an excellent means to utilize third-person introspection for collecting data about the higher level processes of metaphor understanding, such as recognition, interpretation, and appreciation. These are presumably based on the products of the prior process of metaphor comprehension, which, I believe, cannot really be researched without using laboratory techniques. The verbal data that are obtained in this way show what people do with metaphors at the level of sentence understanding: some metaphors are only used in their function of saying something about the target domain, but other metaphors are processed during understanding as involving a mapping between source and target, emerging into consciousness as metaphors in varying degrees. When the experimental materials contain a set of metaphors which are responded to in various ways by a group of participants, it is also possible to analyze the verbal protocols in quantitative fashion: groups of metaphors can be examined for exhibiting specific operations of metaphor processing in the verbal data. This approach can yield a lot of information about the presence of metaphor in one part of cognition. Qualitative analysis of these data showed that there were a number of distinctly recognizable processes of understanding metaphor in reading. I discriminated between the following ten operations (1994: 137, with some terminological adjustments): 1. When readers express their difficulty or doubt with processing a metaphorical expression, this is problem recognition. 2. When readers express their metalingual awareness regarding a metaphor as being non-literal, comparative, or an image, this is explicit metaphor recognition. 3. When readers connect the target and source domain of the metaphor with an overt comparative linker such as is or is like, this is labeling. 4. When readers process a metaphor in terms of language belonging exclusively to the target domain, this is focus processing.

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

5. When readers process a metaphor in terms of language belonging exclusively to the source domain, this is vehicle construction. 6. When readers interpret a metaphor in terms of language belonging to both the target and source domain, this is metaphor construction. 7. When readers connect the metaphor to other portions of the text or their interpretations thereof, this is metaphor functionalization. 8. When readers connect the metaphor to the intentions of the author, this is metaphor context construction. 9. When readers return to metaphors interpreted before the current sentence, this is metaphor refunctionalization. 10. When readers express their judgment concerning the class or the quality of the metaphor, then this is metaphor appreciation. These distinct operations can hence provide data about the role of the linguistic forms as well as the conceptual structures of metaphors in identifying the presence of metaphor in cognitive processing. Thus, problem recognition and metaphor recognition are more closely related to the processing of the linguistic forms than the conceptual structures of metaphor, whereas all of the other operations are more intimately linked to the conceptual structures. The big problem about this type of analysis is, of course, the reliability with which these processes can be observed in the verbal data. Protocol analysis is difficult and comparable to any other sort of authentic discourse analysis. However, the focus on a selected set of phenomena in the verbal data as well as a set of explicit instructions may help to alleviate some of the difficulties. When I attempted to train an MA student in finding the above processes, we achieved modest reliability figures, measured by Cohen’s Kappa, for identifying five out of ten processes in the protocols. These five categories were then analyzed to determine the effect of different text types (literary versus journalistic), classes of readers (literary academics versus nonliterary academics), and classes of metaphor (clear versus less clear; positive versus less positive) on their incidence. The data were detailed enough to yield statistically reliable and suggestive evidence about the effect of these factors on the presence of the five cognitive metaphor operations during understanding. One question which may be asked at this point is whether thinking out loud is only applicable in the study of reading. I do not think so. It might be possible to experiment with its use in some situations of listening, for instance when people are watching a film or listening to a radio program. In these cases, the verbalization of thoughts would not disrupt the ongoing oral discourse as it would when other people are present and talking live. Language production has also been studied by means of thinking out loud, for instance in the field of translation, so that further opportunities may also be imagined. Verbal data collected by means of thinking out loud are a good example of how linguists may go beyond introspection and observation when they wish to study the cognitive processes and products of metaphor in usage. Linguists do not necessarily

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

have to measure reaction times or dabble in neuro-imaging to investigate important aspects of metaphor processing. Verbal data are closer to their daily concerns than nonverbal data, and they are easier to collect, with writing offering a possible alternative to talking out loud for some purposes. That these processes are relatively high-level is not necessarily a problem: for many applied projects, these are fundamental. That these verbal data are rather difficult to analyze is true. But they are verbal data, which makes it possible to analyze them in roughly the same way as other verbal data found in usage.

Nonverbal data. The most popular paradigm for collecting nonverbal data in figurative language studies has probably been the Reaction Time paradigm. Hoffman and Kemper (1987) published a critical overview of the appropriateness of RT studies for different research goals in metaphor studies as well as investigations of other types of figurative language. Their survey covered a wide range of techniques, summarized in Table 12.1, which is quoted verbatim from their article (1987: 154–155). Their conclusion emphasizes the high number of variables and values that goes into any experiment on metaphor comprehension: The complexity of the potential processing models, combined with the differences between various types of figurative language, and with differences in participants’ strategies, result in formidable counterbalancing problems in designing RT experiments. Almost by definition, no single experiment can provide data that would be typical of all metaphors, all people, or all comprehension strategies. (1987: 176–177)

And this is just the conclusion of a survey of one experimental paradigm (Reaction Time) applied to one aspect of metaphor in reception (comprehension). Other nonverbal data that have been collected include eye movements and fixations as well as hemispheric activity in the brain (e.g. Giora 2003, 2007). Most ordinary linguists do not have access to laboratory environments that enable the collection of these types of data; indeed, many psycholinguists cannot collect brain activity data either. And even if linguists did have that kind of access, they would lack the training and expertise to optimally utilize these methods and techniques. When it comes to the collection of this type of nonverbal data by manipulation, it looks as if it is inevitable that we need some agreed division of labor between linguists and psycholinguists. This ineluctable division of labor has mostly to do with the material research environment which is simply too radically alien or unfamiliar to most linguists. Only very few exceptions have been able to transgress this border with success. As Gibbs (2006b) has also suggested, linguists do not have to become experimental psychologists to be able to gain access to this type of research. What they should do, if they value this type of approach, is to make their own research maximally comparable to what happens in experimental behavioral research. That is why it is important to distinguish between the various stages of doing empirical research: conceptualization, operationalization, data collection, data analysis, and interpretation. That is why it is also important to carry out empirical research with the same attention to the norms

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

Table 12.1 Types of Reaction Time Tasks Found in Studies of Figurative Language Reading comprehension RT task “Push this button as soon as you have understood each of these sentences.” Paraphrase latency task “For each sentence, generate a paraphrase, using your own words, as quickly as you can.” Lexical anticipation task “Push the button as soon as you can predict or anticipate the next word as you listen to the sentences.” Semantic similarity decision task “Decide as quickly as possible if the first and second sentence in a pair have the same (literal or figurative) meaning.” Sentence-picture verification task “Read each sentence and decide if it matches the accompanying picture.” The sentence would be a nonliteral form such as the indirect request, “Must you open the door?” and the accompanying drawing might be of a room with an open or closed door. Context-sentence verification task “Read each context and final sentence, and decide as quickly as possible if the final sentence fits with the meaning of the context.” The context could be a single sentence or it could be prose, and it could relate to either the literal or figurative meaning of the final “target” sentence, itself either a metaphor or a paraphrase of its literal or figurative meaning. Classification decision task “Read each sentence and decide as quickly as possible whether it is ____ (metaphor or literal, literally true or literally false, anomalous or grammatical, etc).” Rhyme monitoring task “While listening to this sentence, try to detect any words that rhyme with back: When Fred was working at the grain elevator, he wanted to hit the sack as soon as possible.” Cognitive capacity task Task 1: “Listen to the sentence and decide as quickly as possible if the two sentences of a pair have the same (literal or figurative) meaning.” Task 2: “Try to detect any ‘click’ sounds inserted at various points during the taped sequence of sentences.” Lexical decision task a. Word-nonword pairs “After each pair of letter strings, decide if both strings in a pair are words.” Word-nonword: closet-pobeld Unrelated words: tiger-nurse Associatively related words: doctor-nurse Metaphorically related words: jobs-jails b. Sentence-word pairs “After each sentence will be a second stimulus. Try to decide as quickly as possible if the stimulus is a word or a nonword.” The sentence might be metaphorical or literal and the test stimulus might be the metaphor’s topic, vehicle, or ground, as well as a non-word.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Sentence priming decision task Time 1 Context or prime

Time 2 Target sentence

Time 2 Comprehension task

Cold

“His wife was a refrigerator”

Rhyme cue: falls Category cue: Part of a building

“By his fourth day in the hospital he was climbing the walls to go home.”

“Is the target literally acceptable?” (classification decision task) “Read and understand the sentence that follows the word” (comprehension RT task) “Respond once you have detected a word in the target that fits the cue type.” (classification decision task)

and values of having explicit and systematic procedures for data collection and analysis. And that is why the reliability of data analysis is an issue which needs to be addressed more explicitly, both by means of reliability tests as well as by means of reports of estimated margins of error. Only then will the quality of let us say regular linguistic research on metaphor be comparable to the quality of the experimental work on behavior which collects nonverbal data by means of sophisticated laboratory techniques, which is so highly valued in some of the rhetoric of linguistics.

Meta data. The collection of meta data about usage focuses on people’s reflections on aspects of usage. In previous chapters I have discussed rating studies by means of scales of various kinds as the best example of this type of study. The present chapter can now provide a little more content to my analysis of this practice: when meta data are collected to provide information about metaphor processing, they are data which either capture people’s reflections on the products of their comprehension processes, or go a step further and provide people’s classifications, interpretations, or appreciations of metaphor on the basis of these comprehension products. These are data which are ‘meta’ in the sense that they are post comprehension and off line. But they do tap aspects of processing which provide useful information about the cognitive processes and products of metaphor in usage. An example of the empirical success of this type of approach may be offered by the recent debate between the class-inclusion model and the career of metaphor model. Glucksberg, McGlone and Manfredi (1997) used a rating task to collect judgments from participants about the meaningfulness of metaphors and their reversals, the latter in two forms. Thus, my marriage was an icebox was reversed to my icebox was a marriage and an icebox was marriage. These metaphors and their reversals were offered as part of a larger set of materials including simile variants of the metaphors (my marriage was like an icebox, my icebox was like a marriage, an icebox was like marriage), and literal similarity statements (his dog is like a cat, a cat is like his dog, his cat is like a

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

dog). Participants received different sets of materials which always had only one variant of the experimental items. They had to fill out a 7-point rating scale judging the meaningfulness of the expressions, and immediately provide a verbal paraphrase of their interpretations. The predicted difference between their comprehension of the literal similarity statements and their reversals, on the one hand, and the figurative ones and their reversals, on the other, was supported by the rating data: literal comparisons can be sensibly reversed, but figurative ones cannot. A cat is like a dog in more or less the same way as a dog is like a cat, or at least much more so than is the case for marriages and iceboxes. Analysis of the verbal paraphrase data was able to ground the interpretation of these findings in the content of people’s interpretations of the stimuli. A subsequent reading time experiment, collecting nonverbal data, shifted the perspective to online comprehension. Meta data may provide post comprehension information about people’s understanding of metaphors, but this is usually considered as the first step to more detailed studies of the comprehension process itself, which is then typically measured by the collection of nonverbal data that reflect aspects of the course of online processing. In this study, the experimental materials were developed with the help of further rating studies by independent groups of subjects, who were asked to characterize the nature of the metaphorical materials on different rating scales. This is another common feature of such experimental work on metaphor processing. From the present perspective, these are meta data which pertain to the symbolic nature of the metaphors, promoting their effective used in different, independently validated groups to examine the cognitive processing of metaphor in the main reading time experiment. The function of Glucksberg et al.’s (1997) experiments was to provide support for the class-inclusion model. This was achieved in a typical combination of meta, verbal, and nonverbal data, while further meta data were obtained to calibrate the experimental materials and verbal data were obtained to test the quality of the performance of the participants. Such a combined methodological approach may also be observed in the response to this type of research by Gentner and Bowdle (2001) and Bowdle and Gentner (2005). The order of the research is also identical. First meta data are collected about people’s products of comprehension, this time in the form of preference judgments for expressing a particular statement as a comparison statement (with like) or as a categorization statement (without like). When these data show that the predictions are confirmed, it makes sense to continue with collecting new on-line nonverbal data from comprehension behavior. The results of this research could then be interpreted as providing empirical support for the career of metaphor theory. The meta data collected by these studies pertain to people’s judgments of the meaningfulness of metaphor variants and their preference for a particular form, with additional information about other properties of these metaphors, such as their degree of conventionality, being described and controlled as factors in the experiments. Collecting data about these types of metaphor properties and their processing on this scale of magnitude and precision is hard to do without using participants: introspec-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

tive and observational research would clearly be much less suitable for these ends. But this does not mean that this type of research is not without its own problems. For instance, new light has been thrown on this debate by Jones and Estes (2006; cf. 2005), who claim that Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) focus on metaphor conventionality is mistaken. Following the line of enquiry begun by Chiappe and Kennedy (2000, 2001), they have offered an alternative explanation of the debate in terms of aptness, and suggest that aptness can explain the preference of metaphors over similes as well as the speed and ease of comprehension of both expression forms. They claim that the existing research has confounded metaphor aptness with metaphor conventionality, and that their experimental contrast of the two factors shows that it is metaphor aptness and not conventionality which is the operative variable in cognitive processing. Their study again employs a combination of meta data in the form of metaphor ratings with nonverbal data in the form of reading times. Jones and Estes (2006) interpret their findings as support for the class-inclusion model and as lack of support for the career of metaphor model. The debate will continue to engender new research until agreement about the most fundamental differences of opinion has been established. What is important is that it also pushes researchers to produce creative research designs which collect new data of the highest quality in ways which are hard to emulate in introspection and observation. Such research is clearly inspired by proposals about metaphor properties that come from linguistics, but it should also be evident that the ultimate empirical test of such proposals lies in experimental behavioral research. The ways in which psycholinguists have contributed to our understanding of the role of metaphor properties in processing, like aptness, conventionality, salience, and so on, have not been paralleled in linguistics, with, perhaps, the exception of the study of metaphor conventionality in corpus linguistics. Another way in which regular linguistic research can contribute to experimental behavioral research in psycholinguistics has to do with the limited range of linguistic forms and perhaps conceptual structures that is included. The debate between the class-inclusion model and the career of metaphor model focuses on the contrast between metaphor and simile in the classic A is B form, but we have seen that there are many linguistic and rhetorical variations on this theme. Linguists can make a beginning with studying the relation between this variety of forms on the one hand and such issues as aptness, conventionality, salience and also deliberateness on the other. They can speculate about their role in processing and provide empirical evidence by observing patterns of usage which might be compatible with such speculations. If they can tie these patterns and their interpretations in with any of the models that are at the center of the debate in psycholinguistics, they could furnish further food for thought that may affect the design of new experiments on behavior, which might hopefully lead to producing new data about the relation between language and thought in the processes and products of usage.

Chapter 12. Cognitive processes and products in usage 

. Conclusion In finding metaphor in the cognitive processes and products of usage events, researchers can address one of these two questions, or both: Q6: When does the production or reception of any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Q8: When does the production or reception of a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical? The operationalization of the various conceptual issues involved in this type of research requires attention to at least the following four issues: 1. There is the operational definition of the process within which the cognitive processes and products related to metaphor are to be found. 2. There is the operational definition of the cognitive unit within which the cognitive processes and products related to metaphor are to be found. 3. There is the operational definition of the symbolic structures of metaphor (linguistic forms and conceptual structures) that are part of the language involved in the usage event. 4. There is the operational definition of the cognitive structures of metaphor processing (linguistic forms and conceptual structures) that are involved in the usage event. Some of these issues are comparable or identical with questions that have been discussed before, so that I will focus here on what is specific to the area of usage as cognitive process and product. When we consider introspection as a method for data collection, we have to conclude that it has limited powers. Introspection can serve to produce information about the products of our comprehension processes, both regarding our experience of the linguistic forms and the conceptual structures of metaphor, but it does not provide access to those comprehension processes themselves. Indeed, a number of models of processing which were presumably based on introspection have been shown to be mistaken or partly mistaken by manipulative studies of usage, and these models were not previously corrected by introspection. Postcomprehension processes of understanding, such as recognition, interpretation and appreciation, may also be accessed by introspection, but data collection is hard to systematize so that it can be replicated. Data analysis is typically qualitative and dependent on the single case of the analyst self-observing themselves. The collection of processing data pertaining to usage is also typically limited to the reception side of discourse. Observation has been used with some success in the area of verbal interaction, including conversation, therapy and other doctor patient meetings, and education. Both linguistic forms and conceptual structures have been identified in the context of fairly general Conversation-Analytical approaches. The addition is often made that discourse analysts are much more confident about the identification of the linguistic

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

forms than the conceptual structures, since it is often unclear whether language users use conventional forms because they think in a particular way or simply because they, and people, happen to speak in a particular way. The use of observational techniques for the fast processes of lexical access during conversation is a hazardous affair, because it is not always clear whether metaphorical resonance between utterances is a matter of continuing lexical activation or not. By the same token, analyzing published writing is too far removed from the actual process of written composition to be able to draw any firm conclusions about the cognitive processes of lexical access from the finally published text. Studies collecting data by manipulation hold a dominant position in processing research on usage, and they are typically found in the discipline of psycholinguistics. The most popular type of data that is collected here are nonverbal data such as reaction times, eye movements and fixations, and brain activity. These can be obtained in fairly large as well as precise quantities, while experimental manipulations can be used to contrast potentially competing causal factors that drive the usage behavior that is moreover, typically, on-line comprehension. Verbal data, by contrast, are used in studies that explore the products of comprehension and subsequent understanding processes and their products, including recognition, interpretation, and appreciation. When the processes and products of metaphorical cognition have to be found in these data, analytical techniques have to be applied to the protocols that are no different than the observational ones discussed above, which in turn rely on many techniques of symbolic analysis. The reliability of such data analysis therefore remains an issue. Meta data, finally, are often collected in the form of ratings of various properties of metaphors, which can be seen as the immediate product of a preceding comprehension process. Meta data are playing a crucial role in the current debate between various psycholinguistic models of metaphor comprehension, but they are usually presented in combination with subsequent reading time studies which perform online checks of the conclusions drawn from the rating studies. If there is any converging evidence in the area of usage, therefore, it is probably between the latter two types of manipulative studies. In particular, experimental work often begins with collecting informant data that provide a window onto the cognitive products of their metaphor comprehension, which may then be used to confirm predictions about online comprehension that require independent online testing. The latter typically happens by means of reading time experiments. Observational and introspective evidence have little if any role to play in this type of discussion.

Conclusion

chapter 

Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage

My main aim in this book has been to tease apart a number of aspects of metaphor identification in language which are frequently conflated in various ways in contemporary empirical research. I am concerned about this loose academic practice because it prevents obtaining a clear view of the genuine differences between various disciplines and schools of metaphor research. It also prevents achieving a better idea of what agreement and complementariness do exist, obscured as these are by the fact that researchers work in different academic communities that have their own ways of framing metaphor in language research. An explicit and systematically developed framework for discussion may be helpful in reducing these counterproductive tendencies. My proposal in this book has been to develop such a framework by crossing three generally distinguished factors of language research labeled grammar versus usage, language versus thought, and symbol versus behavior. What is more, I believe that a constant methodological perspective on this framework is the most useful, because practical, way of engagement. Such a perspective can be applied by all researchers who are interested in the empirical identification of metaphor in language. By appealing to widely accepted norms of good methodology, which I regard as the foundation of good empirical science, my proposal may be eligible for broad theoretical credence, irrespective of the particular discipline or school of thought a specific metaphor researcher belongs to. After all, methodology forms the practical bridge between theory and research in all approaches to metaphor. An increased awareness of the role of some of its fundamental characteristics may help researchers understand better what other researchers are doing, and how they should optimally relate to those efforts and their outcomes. Methodology has played an underestimated but pivotal role in the broader discussion of the validity of present-day research on metaphor. This assessment fits into a wider picture, which shows an increasing interest in more general methodological issues, testifying to linguists’ aims to redress the balance. Apart from the foundation of the Converging Evidence Series in which the present monograph appears, special issues of scholarly journals in linguistics have appeared on data and evidence, in Lingua (Vol. 115, Number 11, 2005) and Studies in Language (Vol. 28, Number 3, 2004). There are also recent edited books on methods in linguistics, by Kepser and Reis (2005), entitled Linguistic Evidence: Empirical, Theoretical, and Computational Perspectives, and by Gonzalez-Marquez et al. (2007), called Methods in Cognitive Linguistics. This looks

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

like the beginnings of a methodological turn, and provides a more general academic background against which my own undertaking may achieve significance.

. The production of evidence: The empirical cycle One of my main points has been to show that it is possible to formulate general methodological guidelines for doing empirical research on metaphor identification which go beyond most of the guidelines followed until now, at least in a lot of linguistics. Current guidelines have served to make the case for the possibility of metaphor as a conceptual and cognitive phenomenon, but it is essential to progress beyond that stage if research findings are to be taken seriously across the board of cognitive science. This can be achieved by beginning with a vigorous emphasis on the functional distinction between the different stages of research that require independent or ordered methodological treatment. My basic picture of metaphor identification has revolved around the differentiation between five stages of research, which together make up the famous empirical cycle: – – – – –

Conceptualization Operationalization Data collection Data analysis Interpretation

Each of these stages feeds into the next one, but in practice also retrospectively affects the previous one. The methodological function of distinguishing between these stages is that they merit separate attention from researchers when they do empirical research on metaphor in language. When these five stages are regarded as distinct moments of investigation with their own aims and norms, the level of control that researchers have over them is increased. This also enables other researchers to home in on specific problems they may have with the details of one stage without necessarily implicating their assessment of other stages. The five stages should ideally be reported in separate sections in research publications. This is best reflected by the traditional research article in psychology and other social and natural sciences, with their conventional sections of introduction, method, results, and discussion. These sections each have a different function, corresponding to reports of respectively conceptualization (introduction), operationalization and data collection (method), data analysis (results), and interpretation (discussion). In linguistic studies of metaphor, however, this format has not been widely adopted, not even by those studies that are reports of purely empirical research. It would be beneficial for interdisciplinary discussion and exchange as well as for discussions between different schools of thought if these distinct functional stages of research were differentiated more clearly in both the research itself as well as in the subsequent reports.

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

It should immediately be added that some research does not aim at empirical metaphor identification in the first place. Such investigations may have theoretical goals, aiming, for instance, to clarify concepts, or relations between levels of a particular model of metaphor, often by way of illustrative analysis which shows that particular theoretical approaches are possible and plausible. These endeavors require different publication formats, and this should be plain from their statement of purpose. Similarly, other studies do not set out to identify, describe and explain metaphors in grammar and usage, but instead present and use interpretations of metaphors for literary-critical or cultural ends. This type of publication should also be judged by different norms and conventions, since their main intention is not to report empirical work either. Apart from these sorts of exceptions, however, the bulk of linguistic and cognitive research into metaphor in language may be approached from the above methodological model. Its express adoption can maximize comparability between studies even though they come from a wide range of distinct approaches.

.. Conceptualization The stage of conceptualization is where all empirical research begins. It is a theoretical stage that postulates how various phenomena are to be thought of in terms of distinct concepts. The concepts are to be defined by other concepts, and all concepts should be related to each other in a network as well as a model. These aspects of conceptualization take place against more general theoretical and empirical assumptions. Models also vary regarding their degree of precision about which causal relations between which phenomena are entertained. We have seen how various psychologists have criticized cognitive-linguistic models of metaphor in cognition for not being precise enough about the details of processing, and that cognitive linguists will therefore have to up the ante if they wish to be taken seriously in that respect. Even if all parties would agree about these overall properties and aims of conceptualization, it is hence an arena in metaphor identification research where different assessments by the same norms remain possible and fruitful for generating new research. For metaphor I have singled out four models for special attention: – – – –

Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Fauconnier and Turner’s Conceptual Integration Theory or Blending Theory, the Class-Inclusion Theory by Glucksberg and his associates, and Gentner and Bowdle’s Career of Metaphor Theory.

These models turn out to share a number of basic parameters, as may be expected from the fact that they broadly deal with the same phenomenon. The bulk of this book has focused on the two cognitive-linguistic theories by Lakoff and Johnson and by Fauconnier and Turner, because these have had more to say about a wide range of topics in grammar and usage; they have therefore had most academic impact in linguistics. It is also true that these cognitive linguists have expressed greater aspirations regarding the psychological sides of their models than their psychological competitors have done for

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

the linguistic sides of their own models; the cognitive-linguistic models consequently set out to cover more of the entire field. My choice for privileging these models has therefore allowed for a constant starting point for each of the research areas discussed, while the other models could serve as contrapuntal variations. My main conclusion about the stage of conceptualization is that the various models of metaphor are more comparable and broadly compatible than might be realized. I have suggested that all models require at least two distinct conceptual structures which are to be related to the two distinct senses or meanings or even functions of a metaphorical expression in language. Moreover, I have argued that the relation between these two conceptual structures can be modeled by some form of similarity. This is in direct agreement with the two models of Conceptual Integration Theory and the Career of Metaphor Theory, while it has been possible to defuse the counterarguments against similarity and comparison formulated by Lakoff and Johnson as well as by Glucksberg and his associates. Furthermore, the integrated, general model is also able to account for other forms of metaphor than the metaphorically used linguistic forms which have been at the center of attention for over 25 years now, which increases the validity of its foundations beyond the more limited scope of for instance Class-Inclusion Theory. And finally, the model can also be related in sensible ways to issues raised by metonymy, which have been important in cognitive linguistics while they have been largely ignored in cognitive psychology. My main proposal here has been to set up two independent dimensions for metaphor and metonymy which may be crossed, so that any linguistic form or conceptual structure will have to be analyzed for its metaphorical versus nonmetaphorical nature irrespective of its metonymic versus nonmetonymic nature. This model allows for finding cases of clear metaphor, clear metonymy, clear metaphtonymy in various ways, as well as clear ‘literalness’ (neither metaphor nor metonymy), while it can also accommodate more troublesome borderline cases.

.. Operationalization Conceptualization leads to conceptual definitions of metaphor in its various manifestations. Such definitions are theoretical entities, and they need to be translated into operational terms that can be uniformly understood and applied in practice by researchers. Criteria have to be developed for metaphor in diverse, broad areas of research, such as the linguistic forms of metaphor versus its conceptual structure, or metaphor as a linguistic sign versus metaphor as a cognitive process. This becomes more subtle when the areas of research are further narrowed down to, for instance, finding the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar approached as a symbolic system. One problem with a lot of empirical research is that it is not sufficiently explicit about the precise nature of the area that is intended to be covered by the operational definition of metaphor selected – if one is specified. Operational criteria for metaphor identification are not single monolithic entities. They are often partial criteria that have to be applied in a logically ordered series of

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

smaller decisions, such as whether a particular expression in language counts as one form with two meanings, or not. Deconstructing such decision procedures into an ordered series of steps yields great benefits in terms of control and accuracy. These decisions, in turn, can only be made consistently and adequately if an appropriate level of analysis is chosen: a unit of analysis at a well-defined level of symbolic or behavioral organization will have to be selected for a particular goal and then operationally defined. Further complications arise when the operational definition of metaphorical meaning is to be connected to the speech community that it is deemed to be used by – what is metaphorical to one group of speakers does not have to be metaphorical to another, and the sampling of meanings and metaphors has to be adequate for the descriptive purposes at hand. The state of the language of such a speech community is therefore a separate issue of concern, and independent sources of the language norms and expectations of that community, in the form of dictionaries, grammars, or corpora, are of immense value when researchers have to relate potential cases of metaphor to the more general sample of grammar or usage that is being studied. I believe that detailed configurations of most of these operational issues have not been adequately incorporated in many published reports of studies of metaphor, which obviates comparison between them and slows down any possible accumulation of findings. One important problem where the functional differentiation between operationalization and conceptualization pays off is the question of how to handle the gradability of metaphor. Cognitive linguists and cognitive scientists in general have emphasized that categorization in cognition, including in language, is not always a matter of clearly identifiable necessary and sufficient conditions. This may be true at the level of the relevant phenomena and the way we should conceptualize them, but this does not mean that we cannot, for many empirical purposes, operationalize categories as if they are clear-cut affairs of inclusion and exclusion. Metaphor identification provides a good case in point. If we want to compare particular language varieties with each other regarding their degree of metaphorical language use, one way in which this may be measured is to count the number of words that are used metaphorically as opposed to the number of words that are not, and then to compare these ratios across the language varieties in question. This type of measurement means pushing borderline cases into one category or the other, but the validity of this strategy becomes questionable only if there is an extremely large number of borderline cases. The obvious alternative, of scaling expressions on a cline from for instance highly metaphorical to highly nonmetaphorical, only multiplies the number of borders between intermediate categories where decisions have to be made. This means that a higher percentage of cases will in fact be turned into potential borderline cases, so that the chance of error is increased rather than reduced. The same story would hold for identifying conventional versus nonconventional metaphors, or concrete versus abstract metaphors, and so on. By the way, the latter questions can only be answered if the group of metaphors themselves have been completely and reliably separated from the group of nonmetaphorical expressions in the first place.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

In more technical parlance, operationalization involves deciding about the nature of the variable that is going to be measured in order to observe the behavior of a conceptual construct. Such a variable may be designed as a nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio scale. For nominal variables, you have to have a scale with a number of nonoverlapping categories, the minimal number of which is two, such as metaphor versus nonmetaphor, or conventional metaphor versus non-conventional metaphor. Deciding on the nature of the measurement scale and its categories is an essential step in the operationalization of a conceptual model, and it does not have to mirror the ontological assumptions that inform the conceptual model. Linguists cannot aspire to go cognitive-scientific without willing to make dirty hands.

.. Data collection Operational decisions guide the formulation of the identification criteria that are required, which in turn enable making the next step: to turn to reality and observe phenomena in such a way that they can be collected as data. The stage of data collection is concerned with the application of the operational definitions to some set of data. These data require collecting by means of one of three basic methods: introspection, observation, or manipulation. Introspection involves self-observation; observation is based on the observation of other people; and manipulation involves some intervention or instruction on the part of the researcher to manipulate the behavior of the other people that are being observed in order to obtain data that are more suited to the goals of the investigation than natural data collected by observation can afford. There is a fourth method, simulation, where data are collected by simulating the relevant language process computationally, but I have decided to leave that aside because it has not had much impact on the overall discussion yet; future treatments of methodology and metaphor will probably have to reformulate this picture. In promoting this view of methods, I am deliberately advocating a more restricted view of introspection than is often found in linguistics, including cognitive linguistics. My main motive in doing this is to increase the respectability of introspection as a method of data collection: it is a tool which can be used to self-observe certain cognitive processes and products that have to do with usage, or certain aspects of knowledge that have to do with the long-term representation of grammar. But it can only be used as such a tool if it is not confounded with, for instance, the role of intuitions during data analysis, which is a separate stage and should be applied after a delimited set of data has been collected by introspection (or some other method). If data collection by introspection is more strictly regimented by explicit protocols for researchers who rely on self-observation, the data resulting from introspection will be taken more seriously by researchers who favor observation or manipulation. If such a view of introspection as a method for data collection is accepted, it is also a small step to reconsidering its application in the use of linguistic tests by linguists, or its possibilities for transfer to manipulation by having other language users think out loud about appropriate aspects of metaphor; these might be interestingly new alternatives to many linguists who are

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

accustomed to using introspection. But when introspection keeps being used in the fuzzy way that is currently customary, these opportunities will not be realized. Data collection on metaphor identification is also interesting when it comes to deciding which type of data should be collected. Linguists have a natural preference for collecting verbal data, via introspection or observation, and to a lesser extent via manipulation. Verbal data clearly are important for the identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor. But when it comes to identifying the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar and usage, the question arises whether verbal data are the best data to be examined. Nonverbal data, in the form of for instance response times to all sorts of stimuli, might be more appropriate; but these data require careful interpretation when it comes to the specific perspective from which the conceptual structures of metaphor are studied: as symbols or as cognitive processes and products? In grammar or in usage? Meta data, in the form of judgments about conceptual issues, may also be informative; but their status as meta data, being off-line reflections on people’s own knowledge, makes them less useful for some purposes (such as the study of conceptual structures in ongoing comprehension) than for others. The validity of various types of data for various types of interpretations of metaphor (as symbol or behavior, language or thought, grammar or usage) may be an important point for explication in individual research reports. Another methodological issue that should not be neglected here is the difference between verbal materials in experimental settings on the one hand and verbal data collected by introspection, observation and manipulation on the other. When verbal materials are used in for instance reading experiments (manipulation) or linguistic tests (introspection), their constructed nature has to be controlled by the researcher and targeted at eliciting particular data. Such verbal materials are not verbal data themselves, but an instrument to collect for instance nonverbal data such as reading times or meta data such as the linguist’s intuitions. This functional differentiation between the distinct methodological roles of language, as materials versus data, is also frequently ignored in linguistics. Introspective linguists can shift back and forth between treating their own elicited meta data as data and their linguistic test materials as the allegedly real data. The problem with verbal materials in psycholinguistics is often that the expressions used in experiments have a tenuous relation with more general patterns of language use as emerging from corpus research. These issues should be accorded more attention in the design and publication of research.

.. Data analysis The various data collected by the three main methods are analyzed in broadly two ways: qualitatively or quantitatively. There is a clear association between method of data collection and type of data analysis: most data collected by introspection are analyzed qualitatively, and most data collected by manipulation are analyzed quantitatively. The close link between introspection and qualitative analysis has indeed been the cause of the fuzzy view of introspection which I have commented on before. When

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

data are collected by manipulation, on the other hand, this typically happens by means of tasks that pre-order the data into quantifiable categories: reaction times and scores on scales are self-evident examples of such data. Moreover, such data are also usually collected from groups of participants that are manipulated, so that quantification across language users as well as language targets is a natural type of analysis. Data collected by observation occupy an interesting middle position. When such studies home in on the details of individual language users, as in some conversationanalytical approaches, they display all characteristics of qualitative research. But when they cover large sets of texts, as in corpus-linguistic research, they enable quantitative analysis and description. One problem about such studies, however, is the intuitive assignment of numerous cases to distinct categories, which raises questions about the reliability of the figures that are sometimes reported. This has to do with my more general worry about the way in which the quality of data analysis is approached in most empirical studies of metaphor in linguistics. Quantitative data analysis on the basis of scores on scales or reaction times, for instance, cannot make many errors in preparing and grouping the data into categories or onto clines for quantified treatment. But the qualitative analysis of verbal data is of another order. A more critical attitude from linguists is in order towards the way in which the quality of this type of analysis is managed. Apart from more explicit methodological procedures during operationalization, the use of reliability tests is therefore a condition sine qua non, if cognitive scientists are to accept the empirical results of linguistic research on metaphor. Variations on this theme that I have mentioned before are testretest reports within analysts, various tests of agreement between analysts before and after discussion, and tests of the reliability of measuring instruments such as scales across a wide range of cases that they are applied to. A final connection that should be mentioned here has to do with the number of data that have been collected. Some studies are concerned with just one word or construction or text, while others look at literally dozens of thousands of words. This distinction tends to correlate with the idiographic versus nomothetic aims of a study. But even in idiographic studies which look at the use of sometimes even one metaphor in one text, it is still preferable to at least follow a more generally accepted procedure for metaphor identification in order to make the findings of the unique study interpretable against a more general background. If a procedure for metaphor identification in a particular area of research can be employed as an instrument that is independent of the qualitative concerns of the analyst, this will increase the impact of the study on the wider discussion of metaphor in grammar and usage. Comparable questions arise for the analysis of groups of data for nomothetic purposes. For instance, when a particular conceptual metaphor is postulated, the question arises how many linguistic expressions have to be analyzed in order for the overall study to hold water. As has been pointed out before, adding or removing linguistic cases from a set of examples can change the overall picture, and, again, it is up to the researcher to explain what sort of conclusion is supposed to be drawn from the analysis of a particular set of data. The relation between data sampling and the purport of their

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

analysis might become another theme that may help improve the quality of linguistic publications on metaphor.

.. Interpretation Analyzed data do not mean anything by themselves: they have to be related to an interpretative framework which makes them significant. One fundamental issue in metaphor research which I have stressed throughout is that the nature of such an interpretative framework needs to be made explicit and independently motivated. My suggestion has been to do this by employing three broadly distinguished dimensions in all language research: – – –

Grammar versus usage Language versus thought Symbol versus behavior

Moreover, it is not enough for researchers to contrast metaphor in language to metaphor in thought, or to oppose metaphor in symbols with metaphor in behavior. Nor is it sufficient to combine two of the three dimensions, yielding, for instance, metaphor in language and thought crossed with metaphor in grammar and usage. I have demonstrated that in each of these more global approaches, more than one phenomenon is examined at the same time, and this means that care has to be taken in the abstractions and generalizations that are made. The simultaneous interactions between all three dimensions produce highly specific questions for metaphor identification but these tend to be skipped over when researchers simply talk about metaphor in language and thought, for instance. My recommendation is that researchers make explicit, when they talk about metaphor in grammar or usage, which of the various larger or smaller areas of research they are actually including in the scope of their claims. I have emphasized the perspective which sets out from the contrast between grammar and usage, an opposition which has recently enjoyed a good deal of attention in cognitive linguistics and elsewhere. I have done so at the expense of the distinction between language and thought, which I have made subservient to grammar and usage. This dimension is more popular in cognitive linguistics, and certainly in studies of metaphor and metonymy, but when the dimension of language and thought is taken seriously, it also requires paying attention to other conceptual issues of metaphor that are not related to language. For instance, Murphy (1996) has drawn attention to such general issues in the study of thought as memory, problem solving, induction, and so on. As long as that is not done, the advertised attention to metaphor in language and thought is in fact attention to metaphor in thought as related to language; this is best signaled by linguists by means of starting out from the contrast between grammar versus usage. In addition, the bifactorial cross between grammar and usage on the one hand and language and thought on the other cannot account for some of the crucial method-

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

ological issues in the discussion of metaphor identification. That is why I have upgraded the importance of the dimension of symbol versus behavior, the importance of which has of course been generally acknowledged in linguistics. The systematic contrast between the two encompassing areas of metaphor as symbol versus behavior has also revealed a number of important methodological and eventually empirical issues. For instance, cognitive-linguistic aspirations to behavioral adequacy are largely based on symbolic analyses of linguistic forms and conceptual structures, which is a matter of concern and criticism in psycholinguistic circles. These are the main reasons why I have attempted to spell out the implications of simultaneously crossing all three dimensions of grammar versus usage, language versus thought, and symbol versus behavior. The resulting map of the field contains eight distinct areas of metaphor research, and its explanatory potential has been shown with reference to its capacity to accommodate the various alternative hypotheses about metaphor in thought distinguished by Gibbs (1999b). This conclusion can take us into the next round of the empirical cycle, with a new stage of conceptualization, where it is possible to differentiate and formulate distinct conceptual questions about the nature of metaphor in each of the eight areas of research. These can now be related in principled fashion to each other with reference to the underlying three dimensions of research. Some general comments will be made about the state of play in this map of the field in the next section.

. The interpretation of evidence: The field of research Another main point in my argument has been to recognize the need for an encompassing, systematic, consistent and relevant ordering of the field in order to provide orientation to the many questions and issues that have to be addressed in the study of metaphor. The cognitive study of language is in constant transition and change, as may ˇ Cervel’s (2005) edited book, Cognibe seen from Ruiz de Mendoza Ibañez and Pena tive linguistics: Internal dynamics and interdisciplinary interaction as well as from Brdar and Fuchs’s (in prep.) edited collection, Converging and diverging tendencies in cognitive linguistics. The nature of the map of the field of metaphor identification presented here is well-motivated by exploiting a seldom-used combination of three basic oppositions in research on metaphor in language that by themselves are widely used in all language research. The result of this factorial approach is a detailed characterization of the specific properties of each of the eight areas of metaphor research. These areas each impose their own demands on the analyst of metaphor that arise as natural results of the definition of each research area by the configuration of properties connected to the three general dimensions that have been crossed. When this map is adopted, a systematic approach can be followed to the examination of the main methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation across the eight distinct areas. Each area is approached in the same way with the same questions about such issues as conceptualization, operationalization, and data collection by

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

introspection, observation, and manipulation. This approach reveals the correspondences and differences between the eight areas in systematic fashion, fulfilling a need for clarification which has been caused by the current turmoil of disciplines, schools, perspectives, and terminology.

.. Symbol analysis The first area that was distinguished concerns the identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar, approached as a symbolic system. The main question to be answered in this area is: Q1: When does a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? I have discussed this question mostly with reference to lexical items, but my treatment should be understood as applicable to all conventionalized concrete and abstract constructions. The typical data in this area are verbal data that involve linguistic forms exhibiting polysemy which may be motivated by metaphor. In answering Q1, the following operational decisions have to be made: 1. (how) do researchers motivate the linguistic level of one form with two senses that is chosen for examination? 2. (how) do researchers establish the degree of conventionalization of the linguistic constructions representing that form? 3. (how) do researchers establish that the form has at least two distinct senses? 4. (how) do researchers establish that the two senses display a metaphorical relation? In particular: a. how do researchers oppose nonliteral similarity to both literal similarity and literal hierarchy? b. What is the criterion for determining the basic sense (historical, experiential, acquisitional?), so that the direction of the mapping can be consistently determined? We have seen how introspection and linguistic tests have determined the methodological agenda of this area for a long while, but that corpus-linguistic approaches to vast quantities of uses of specific forms are beginning to make their mark. Such corpuslinguistic approaches have access to those various meanings of a form that are in fact conventional enough to appear sufficiently frequently in a large corpus. In addition, they can reveal in which linguistic and situational contexts various metaphorical and nonmetaphorical senses are typically used. It is a fundamental question in this connection to decide when particular uses are sufficiently conventional to be seen as part of the patterns of grammar as opposed to usage; this question, however, also needs to be answered by those linguists who use introspection, or, for that matter, manipulation, to collect their data.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

The second area concerns the identification of all linguistic forms of metaphor in usage, again approached as symbolic structure. The main question in this area of research is the following: Q2: When does any linguistic form-meaning pairing in text and talk count as metaphorical? The big difference with respect to the area of grammar is that meanings in usage tend to be more specific and adhoc. Describing the precise metaphorical meaning of a single and unique form-meaning pairing in usage is more challenging than describing the precise metaphorical meaning of a conventionalized form-meaning pairing in grammar, which is based on more usage events that can be abstracted over. Another difference between grammar and usage involves the presence of many more different linguistic forms of metaphor that may occur as unique forms of expressions of cross-domain mappings in usage, including, paradoxically, implicit ones. Of course, the bulk of metaphor displayed in usage is conventional, and involves conventionally metaphorical language use, as we saw in Chapter 10; but Chapter 11 also showed that simile, analogy, extended comparison, implicit metaphor, and so on are all part of usage, too. This is because usage events are conceptualized as having topics and content, which may display a range of forms of expression: in the symbolic study of usage, researchers do not set out from an interest in describing the signs of the language system (as in the study of grammar), but in the functional relation of linguistic forms to the underlying conceptual structures that can be recovered from the analysis of text and talk. As a result, researchers of metaphor in usage do not only have to address questions about conventional metaphorical language use, which are largely identical to the questions above; they also have to account for the other forms of metaphor that have been recognized in the literature. I have suggested that this may be done by attending to the following set of questions:

Identifying other forms of metaphorically motivated language in usage 1. Find local referent and topic shifts. 2. Test whether the incongruous words are to be integrated within the overall referential and/or topical framework by means of some form of comparison. 3. Test whether the comparison is nonliteral, or cross-domain. 4. Test whether the comparison can be seen as some form of indirect talk about the local or main referent or topic of the text. 5. If the findings to tests 2, 3, and 4 are positive, then a word should be identified as (part of) an expression of another form of metaphor. This set of questions is based on the same conceptual definition of metaphor as a crossdomain mapping as the previous sets of questions, as was explained in Chapter 11. The theoretical unity of the entire field of metaphor identification has in this way been pre-

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

served. The need for further work on distinguishing between the diverging linguistic forms of metaphor was indicated there too, and I proposed that this might be undertaken with reference to at least four dimensions of metaphor in discourse: direct versus indirect language use, presence or absence of metaphor signaling, explicit versus implicit expression of both source and target domains, and extended versus restricted expression. A important methodological issue that was broached in this area is the application of an explicit procedure for the identification of metaphorically used words, the Pragglejaz procedure. There are two crucial aspects. First, the identification of the metaphorically used words takes place irrespective of any conceptual analysis of metaphor. I have pointed out that the latter would only complicate the identification process. And, secondly, it would lower the degree of reliability of applying the procedure. Metaphorically used words can be identified with adequate reliability by independent researchers in such a way that their findings become interesting to the more generally valid norms of doing empirical science. The third area returns to grammar and is concerned with the identification of the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar, still approached as a symbolic system. Such conceptual structures do not exist in vacuo but are linked to the linguistic forms that express them, or we would not be concerned with metaphor in grammar. The big question to be answered in this area, then, is the following: Q3: When does a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? The typical data in this area are the conventional conceptual metaphors that have been at the center of attention in cognitive linguistics. In order to derive them from the data, which are typically verbal again, I have answered Q3 in two steps, in Chapters 7 and 8. The first step involved the independent demarcation of two conceptual domains, or more generally, conceptual structures; and the second step tackled the identification of the exact nature of the mapping between the two domains. The main reason for this procedure is the fact that two related senses found for one form in the grammatical analysis of the linguistic forms of metaphor presumably give analytical access to two related conceptual domains, but that the relation between the two domains does not necessarily have to be one of cross-domain mapping: metonymy and synecdoche may be possible alternative explanations. They need to be tested for their explanatory potential on the basis of the same previous reconstruction of the conceptual domains that they might link. This is why conceptual domains have to be identified and demarcated independently from the mapping which they may afford. There are consequently two sets of questions that have to be answered when researchers attempt to identify the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar as symbolic structure:

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

Identifying the nature of two distinct conceptual domains 1. You have to decide what level of abstraction you are going to use for the ordering of the conceptual materials; 2. You have to decide which set of polysemous words (or more generally linguistic forms) are going to be included in the reconstruction of the underlying conceptual structures; 3. You have to decide about the descriptive framework for analyzing the syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and encyclopedic information that can be collected about each of the polysemous items (or more generally linguistic forms).

Identifying the nature of a mapping between two domains 1. Decide about the relative salience of the two domains as distinct conceptual systems. Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, typically, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. 2. Decide about the necessary and sufficient degree of similarity required for a mapping, since corresponding elements between two domains may be relatively more or less similar. a. Decide about the role of types of correspondences between domains, such as external similarity versus relations, and relations versus higher-order relations. b. Decide about minimal and maximal number of correspondences required for an analysis to be accepted as complete. The big issue in this area is how conceptual structures can be sufficiently independently identified as such when they also have to be relevant to the linguistic forms which they are supposed to explain or support. For the study of the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar, the collection of verbal data from observed language use seems an inevitable starting point; but it probably has to be supplemented by other data, such as verbal, nonverbal, and meta data from informants or even linguists themselves in order to establish a secure enough footing for any proposed conceptual structures of metaphor. The distinction between complex and primary metaphor as two distinct levels of conceptual organization has added a new interest to this area of research. Furthermore, the proposal that distinct domains, in particular in primary metaphor, may also be related via metonymy is yet another complication which makes the conceptual area of metaphor in grammar extremely complicated, if, indeed, equally exciting. And finally, a brief note should be added here that the conceptual perspective on metaphor in grammar makes it easier to see that there are also other forms of metaphor in grammar than metaphorically motivated polysemy: conventional similes, for instance, are not necessarily polysemous between direct and indirect meanings, but do express cross-domain mappings.

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

The fourth area shifts the perspective back from finding the conceptual structures of metaphor in grammar towards usage, again, still approached as symbolic structure. The general question characterizing the research in this area reads as follows: Q4: When does a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form in text and talk count as metaphorical? Apart from the more diverse range of linguistic forms which give access to the two conceptual domains that are linked by metaphor, there is another big difference between grammar and usage which comes out here. This has to do with the more individuated nature of the conceptual target domain, which is both situated and unique because of the particular usage event it is part of. The question arises, therefore, which aspects of the usage event may be used for characterizing the particular nature of the target domain, and how this affects the possibilities for setting up a mapping from the source domain. I have attempted to accommodate this phenomenon by adding a more detailed instruction to section (1) of the identification of the metaphorical mapping as formulated for the area of grammar: Explore whether the two domains are to be seen, in this particular context, as contrasted and compared, or as connected and embedded in a unifying frame. To this end, interpret the target domain as specifically as is possible on the basis of the usage event, and then contrast and compare it with the basic interpretation of the source domain of the metaphorically used expression. Apart from this addition, the operational framework for identifying the conceptual structure of the other forms of metaphor in usage does not have to differ much from the one erected for metaphorical language use or for metaphor in grammar. This supports the idea that the approach to metaphor identification propagated in this book is fundamentally unified at a conceptual level, even for less regular cases like implicit metaphor, simile, extended metaphor, and so on. I have suggested that all of these various forms of metaphor can be handled in one format, while allowing for the singular, individual nature of the mapping in context; one-off metaphors are therefore handled in the same way as any expression of conventional conceptual metaphors.

.. Behavior analysis When we turn to the next area of research, we cross a big divide. All previous areas focused on metaphor in grammar or usage as symbolic structure. All next areas focus on metaphor identification in grammar or usage as behavior. The same detailed operational questions turn out to be useful for the empirical identification of metaphor, but they have to be applied to data that manifest cognitive processes and their products. These are typically collected, we have seen, by the observation and manipulation of language users in action. For grammar, they do not just involve the collection of words

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

and other constructions, or their related conceptual structures, but of their processes of acquisition and maintenance. And for usage, they do not just involve the collection of text and talk, or their related conceptual structures, but the collection of text and talk as instruments in action during ongoing events of production, reception, and interaction. There is an essential difference between analyzing a video or audio recording of a conversation and an imagined dialogue between Peter and Mary, just as there is an essential difference between analyzing a text and the way it might be read in contrast with the reading process of individual readers. This does not mean that these areas cannot be aligned, but they should be connected with an adequate view of their own symbolic versus behavioral properties. This is the warning that should come with the phenomenological pluralism that is inherent in this connection. The fifth area for finding metaphor in grammar and usage focuses on the identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor in grammar studied as behavior. This means that we have to decide what counts as a metaphorical linguistic form in the acquisition and knowledge of language: Q5: When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conventionalized linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? The operationalization of this question can take place by roughly the same means as in symbolic structure, focusing on the same type of verbal phenomena typically related to polysemy, but the question has to be answered by looking at the permanent cognitive representation of the various forms, senses, and their semantic relation in the minds of adult language users. Research will also have to show how these forms, senses and relations got there via the processes and stages of acquisition. We have seen that the recently launched theory of conflation and differentiation in cognitive linguistics can be further developed by looking at earlier work in this area by developmental psychologists such as Keil. And when we look at the representation of metaphorical senses in the linguistic knowledge of language users, exciting new work by Giora and others about lexical access is showing that symbolic analyses of conventional metaphor may provide a good starting point for further behavioral analyses of their cognitive representation, which can then examine their relative salience in comparison with other senses. The influence of language varieties on any socio-cognitive variation in people’s acquisition and knowledge of grammar is one of the themes which may be expected to become more important in this area. The experimental study of metaphor and lexical access is a typical example of a general problem in the study of grammar as behavior. Since we are dealing with long-term processes here, longitudinal or cross-sectional or repeated studies would be required to capture the degree of entrenchment or sedimentation of particular metaphorical forms in people’s individual mental grammars. However, this is not always feasible for practical reasons. It has in fact been noted by for instance Winner that one complication for the behavioral study of grammar is the fact that the method of manipulation typically measures competence via performance, or grammar via usage. The design and discussion of such studies therefore requires careful interpretation.

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

This comment immediately leads on to the sixth area, which has to do with the identification of the linguistic forms of metaphor in usage studied as cognitive processes and products. The behavioral approach that characterizes this area prompts the following question: Q6: When does the production or reception of any linguistic form-meaning pairing count as metaphorical? Answering this question can again be operationalized by roughly the same means as in symbolic research, provided that the focus in usage research is on people in action. The shift from grammar to usage itself has consequences, as we have seen, because of the conspicuous presence of more variegated linguistic forms in the data. In the behavioral analysis of usage, this consequence is to be inspected by looking at their representation in the minds of language users. What is essential about such a behavioral approach is the importance of the time course of processing and its temporary products. Distinctions between processes of comprehension and understanding (recognition, interpretation, and appreciation) play an important role in guiding what may be expected to appear of the linguistic forms of metaphor in cognition. Lexical access is one central theme here, too, which has attracted increasing attention. Less attention has been accorded to people’s cognitive processing of the direct versus indirect linguistic expression of source domains, as well as the related linguistic factors of metaphor signaling, explicitness, and extension. The obvious exception is the difference between metaphor and simile, which has mostly been studied out of context. These factors are also all related to the more or less deliberate use of metaphor, another issue which has not been addressed much in metaphor identification research. Genre-specific tendencies of processing verbal expressions may clearly play an additional role in this linguistic area of analysis. And language production and on-going interpersonal coordination loom large as further themes. The seventh area returns to grammar and focuses on the identification of the conceptual structures related to the metaphorical linguistic forms that have been discovered in people’s minds. The general question in this area is Q7: Q7: When does the storing, acquisition, or even loss of a conceptual structure related to a conventionalized linguistic form count as metaphorical? The big problem in language acquisition research is the way in which domain knowledge develops and affects what can count as a cross-domain mapping. Various stages of knowledge development have been differentiated by Keil and others. Their relation with language acquisition and development and the role of metaphor is complex. Observational and experimental studies are dearly needed to develop the picture. In adults’ knowledge of language, there is the empirical problem of which postulated conceptual mappings may be said to persist as live mappings. Various hypotheses about the role of thought in grammar have been distinguished. Some scholars believe that conceptual mappings become entrenched during language acquisition and persist

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

during adulthood. Other scholars suggest that conceptual mappings may have done their work at one point in individual or even historical language development, leaving a ‘metaphorical’ effect on the structure of particular conceptual domains, but that such mappings are not present as live mappings in people’s mental grammars and encyclopedias anymore. A clear picture about the overall situation, let alone the details regarding many different conceptual domains, is still lacking. The last area in the field of metaphor identification in language pertains to the conceptual structures of metaphor that may be related to the various linguistic forms in usage, again with the restriction that these are to be approached as behavior, not signs. The big question in this area is the following: Q8: When does the production or reception of a conceptual structure related to any linguistic form count as metaphorical? One question which has been raised by psycholinguists is whether the details of the symbolic analysis of the conceptual structures of metaphor in usage can also be found back in the cognitive processes and representations. And this question is not as simple as it seems, because linguistic models have not been sufficiently precise about their processing views. What also needs to be ascertained is when any particular conceptual structures are predicted to emerge. If we concentrate on reception, the question arises whether particular aspects are expected to be observable in the processes of comprehension, the products of comprehension, or during the optional post comprehension processes of understanding and its products. Moreover, the question also arises at which level of cognitive organization particular conceptual structures are expected to emerge: when they are predicted to occur at the deepest levels of cognitive processing, rather different methods and techniques are required for obtaining evidence for such predictions than when they are expected to occur at the relatively high levels of processing. Introspection, for instance, may produce suggestive data about rather high-level processes of metaphor recognition, interpretation and appreciation, but it cannot provide any insight into the process of comprehension and its neuro-cognitive basis. One special issue in usage might also be placed higher on the agenda. We have seen that metaphor in usage is characterized by the higher degree of information that is available about the target domain, because of the situated meaning of any usage event. The question is how the process of more situated meaning construction by people affects the identification of the conceptual structures of metaphor in their comprehension and understanding processes and their products. Related to this are the phenomena of lexical resonance and echoing during production and reception: it will be a challenge for researchers to disentangle the role of linguistic forms and conceptual structures in these processes. These look like exciting points on the research agenda for the near future. This brings to an end our brief tour of the entire field. One important result is the conclusion that it is possible to formulate specific empirical questions for doing research on metaphor identification in each area. These questions highlight the special

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nature of finding metaphor in grammar and usage when this is conceived in more empirical detail, with reference to the role of language versus thought and symbol versus behavior. They also highlight the distinct operational decisions that have to be taken by researchers. Even though all of these questions can be shown to be connected within one overall framework, their distinct nature per area of research can also serve a useful function in coming to terms with what it means to find metaphor in specific area of language research.

. The utilization of evidence: Variations on convergence The third important theme of this book has been to emphasize that the nature of converging evidence can be made more precise and open for critical discussion. Converging evidence is not just all evidence that is compatible with a particular idea of the relation between for instance metaphor in language and thought; converging evidence should be stronger than that and actually aim to demonstrate the same precisely formulated point. Evidence that is consistent with a particular view is weaker than evidence which converges towards the same conclusion. As a result, ‘converging evidence for conceptual metaphor’ may now be seen to involve converging evidence for four different phenomena: conceptual metaphor in either grammar or in usage analyzed as symbolic structure, or conceptual metaphor in either grammar or in usage analyzed as cognitive behavior. Evidence for one of these phenomena, I have emphasized, is not identical with evidence for another of these phenomena. How these types of evidence as well as phenomena are to be related to each other is a complicated issue. One detail of this clarification involves the observation that converging evidence for metaphor is itself not homogeneous. It is more difficult and problematic to obtain converging evidence for a claim about metaphor that bridges two or more of the areas distinguished in the map of the field than to obtain converging evidence within distinct areas by themselves. Converging evidence produced by phenomenological pluralism is exciting, but problematic. For instance, when grammarians aim to show that a particular conceptual metaphor causes or motivates a particular set of linguistic expressions, they bridge two distinct areas of research. They would need to have independent support for the identification of both parts of the equation. Only when that has been achieved, can further types of evidence be collected in order to test whether they converge and demonstrate the same relationship between conceptual metaphor and its linguistic expression. This leads to the conclusion that the distinctions between the various areas should be respected in such a way that the appropriate evidence for the different sides of a relation between two areas can be examined in its own terms. Given the programmatic conjunction between language and thought in cognitive-linguistic research on metaphor, this has not always happened. By contrast, when converging evidence is obtained for either conceptual metaphor in grammar or for its linguistic expression as separate topics of investigation, we are in

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

a different situation. Then different methods and techniques are employed for collecting and analyzing data that are relevant to the same claim about one area of research. Converging evidence produced by methodological pluralism is exciting and attractive. For instance, we have seen how introspective, observational, and manipulative methods of data collection can all be recruited to gather evidence for demonstrating the metaphorically motivated polysemy of linguistic forms in grammar approached as a symbolic system. That knowledge or hypotheses about other areas of metaphor can play a guiding or constraining role in such research is self-evident; but these leading ideas are not themselves the subject of the research if the focus remains on the linguistic forms of metaphor. At present, converging evidence for metaphor within each of the eight areas of research is highly variable. We have seen that the status, use and validity of the three main methods of data collection (introspection, observation, and manipulation) as well the two main methods of data analysis (quantitative and qualitative) varies considerably between the eight areas of research. Obvious contrasts are the traditionally dominant role of introspection in grammar analyzed as a symbolic system, the dominant role of observation in usage analyzed as a symbolic system, the dominant role of observation combined with manipulation in grammar analyzed as behavior, and the dominant role of manipulation in usage analyzed as behavior. Moreover, in each of these cases there are associated differences between the predominance of qualitative versus quantitative data analysis. This variegated practice raises essential questions about the possibilities for collecting comparable converging evidence across all areas of research; it also points to the need for new research projects that require strategic combinations of such diverging methodologies to explore the potential as well as limitations of this type of approach. I have attempted to summarize these issues in the following two claims: Phenomenological pluralism is exciting but problematic “Converging evidence” presented about distinct phenomena, such as metaphor in grammar versus usage, or metaphor in language versus thought, or metaphor in symbols versus behavior, or their more specific configurations, is exciting but problematic, unless clear models of the relation between the distinct phenomena can show how the evidence for one type of phenomenon can be said to point to the same conclusion as the evidence for another type of phenomenon. Methodological pluralism is exciting and attractive “Converging evidence” presented about the same phenomenon, whether metaphor in grammar versus usage, metaphor in language versus thought, metaphor in symbols versus behavior, or their more specific configurations, is exciting and attractive, provided the same norms of data collection and analysis are adhered to in evaluating the evidence obtained with one type of method as with the other type of method.

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I suspect that these claims are not just applicable to the study of metaphor but can be related to most topics in the study of language (cf. Gonzalez-Marquez et al. 2007; Kepser & Reis 2005). One topic which illustrates all of these comments in concrete detail may be mentioned by way of conclusion. The idea that metaphor in language derives from metaphor in thought was a bold and original proposal which, in its unqualified and most audacious form, applies to metaphor in grammar and usage, in symbolic structure as well as in the processes and products of cognition. Even though it is possible for some metaphors in language to be related to metaphor in thought in all of these four areas, the critical question has now become for which metaphors this in fact holds true. We have seen how some cognitive linguists still stick to the most encompassing view, claiming that all or most metaphor in language is related to conceptual metaphor for each of the four areas, even though they need not be sure whether conceptual metaphor should be restricted to primary metaphor or not. However, many behavioral researchers of language have cast doubt on the purported systematic relation between linguistic metaphor and conceptual metaphor, both in the cognitive processes and products of grammar (acquisition and knowledge of language) and of usage (production and reception). They believe that it may only be novel metaphors which manifest a direct relationship with underlying cross-domain mappings, but that most conventional linguistic metaphors may have lost this connection and are processed as any other polysemous linguistic form, with brief spells of sense activations but without the corresponding conceptual mappings between domains. Metaphor salience and aptness have recently been added to this debate as important metaphor properties that may affect the relation between conventional and novel metaphor in the cognitive representation of language and thought. The point is that the evidence for each of these positions is not always comparable. Evidence from language change, for instance, may provide plausible underpinnings for the identification of systematic relations between conceptual domains and semantic fields in grammar, but these are symbolic analyses which look at language as a system for the idealized abstract native speaker. These relations may provide a useful and indeed important cultural norm for foreign language learners, as may be seen from any foreign language course and its textbooks and reference works. But how these systematic linguistic patterns relate to what is happening during language acquisition by children and language maintenance by adult language users is a radically different area of analysis, which at least partly needs to be examined with the aid of different methods. These different methods have suggested that what looked like converging evidence for a unified role of conceptual metaphor across all four areas may in fact have been different types of evidence for different theses of the relation between language and thought, theses which turn out to belong to different areas of research.

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage

. Concluding comments I have presented three main points about the present-day quality of evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage. First of all, there is a lot of evidence for metaphor in cognitive linguistics and elsewhere, but it comes from such different sources, has such diverging status in terms of reliability and validity, and is presented in so many different ways, that this hampers comparison and integration. The production of such evidence can be improved if the general methodological guidelines summarized in Section 1 are more expressly and consistently adhered to. Secondly, the interpretation of evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage has been geared towards making particular points about the relation between metaphor in language and thought that are possible, and exciting, but not inevitable, or even selfevident. The quality of the interpretation and discussion of evidence can be upgraded if researchers pay better attention to the specific concerns of more precisely delimited areas of research. These can be seen to arise from crossing the contrast between grammar and usage with two other contrasts, language versus thought and symbol versus behavior, as summarized in Section 2. And thirdly, evidence for metaphor has been presented as converging in various ways, involving various types of data and methods. Yet all of this converging evidence is rather heterogeneous and highly variable. Our view of its function in scientific argumentation can again be considerably clarified if distinctions are made between converging evidence within distinct areas of research, so that their quality can be fairly compared and assessed. Converging evidence for phenomena which bridge more than one area of research is much more difficult to obtain and evaluate. The main factors at play here have been summarized in Section 3. In developing this argument, I have concentrated on what I believe are the rhetorically important cases in the academic debate which has taken place over the past two decades or so. I have concentrated on fundamental research on metaphor in grammar and usage and have paid hardly any attention to emerging concerns with metaphor in applied linguistics. Examples could be metaphor in (foreign) language teaching, translation, document design, media studies, and communication. Even within the sphere of fundamental work, I have left aside a number of potential themes. Examples here include sign language, gesture, and visuals. Computational work on metaphor in language has also been ignored. This is not because any of these are irrelevant, for the opposite is true. However, I believe that they do not fundamentally affect the argument which I have presented here and which has been based on what I think belongs to the canon of contemporary metaphor analysis in grammar and usage. Metaphor presents a fascinating case study of the way in which human language, cognition and communication are structured and work. I have great admiration for the different ways in which various schools of thought and even disciplines have attempted to reveal these properties of metaphor by means of respectable academic work. But I also believe that scientists are human and fallible. Methodology plays a fundamental role in reducing the role of personal bias and error as well as optimizing the chances

Chapter 13. Evidence for metaphor in grammar and usage 

for reaching reliable and valid agreement. If my analysis can make a contribution to improving these chances in the future, this book will have served its purpose.

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Index

A Abstract , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Abstraction , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Acceptable, -ability , , , , , , , , ,  Access , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , – Acquisition , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Activation, activated , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Ad-hoc , , , , , , , , ,  Agreement , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Alignment –, , ,  Allegory , ,  Analogy , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , ,  Anomaly , , , ,  Antonym, -y  Applied linguistics  Appreciation , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Attribute , , , , , , , ,  Attrition , 

B Basic meaning , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Bias , , , , , , , , , ,  Blend , , , ,  Blending theory , , , , , , , , , , , ,  C Career of metaphor theory , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , ,  Categorization –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Category , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , ,  Chance , , , , ,  Class-inclusion theory , –, –, , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , ,  Cognitive Grammar  Cognitive process , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Cognitive product ,  Coherence , , –, , , , , , ,  Coherence relation ,  Comparison , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Competence , , ,  Complex metaphor  Comprehension , , , , , , , , , , , ,

, , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , ,  Computational , , , , ,  Concept , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Conceptual domain , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Conceptual Integration Theory , ,  Conceptual mapping , , , , , , – passim, , , – Conceptual metaphor –, , , , , , –, , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Conceptual Metaphor Theory , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Conceptual system , , , , , ,  Concrete , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Conflation-differentiation hypothesis ,  Construction , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage , , , , , , , , ,  Content , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Content domain ,  Contextual meaning , , , , , , , ,  Contiguity –, , , , , , ,  Conventional metaphor , , , , , , ,  Conventionalization , , , , , , , , , ,  Convergence, converging , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , – Corpus , –, , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , ,  Counterfactual , , , , ,  Cross-domain mapping , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Current Discourse Space  D Data analysis –, , , , , –, , , , , , , , , ,  Data collection , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Deductive method, deduction , , , –, , , 

Diachronic , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Dictionary , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, ,  Direct meaning , , ,  Directness  Discourse , , –, , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, –, , , , , , –, , , , , , , –, –, , ,  Discourse analysis ,  Dual reference ,  E Elicited data , ,  Embodiment , , , , , , – Empirical cycle  Encyclopedia –, , , , , , , , , ,  Entrenchment , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Error , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Experiment, -al , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , –, –, , , ,  Extended metaphor , ,  Extended simile , – Extension , , , , , , , , ,  F Familiar, -arity , , , , , , , ,  Five-step method , ,  Form-meaning pairing –, , , , , , , ,

, , , , , , ,  Forms of metaphor , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , – G Genre , , , ,  Grammatical metaphor , –,  Grammaticalization ,  Grounding ,  H Homonymy, -y , , , , , –, , ,  Hyponym, -y , ,  Hypothesis , , , , , –, , , , ,  I Image mapping ,  Image schema , , , , ,  Imagination , ,  Imagined data ,  Implicit metaphor , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Incongruity , , –, , , ,  Indirect meaning , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , –, , , ,  Indirectness , , , , , , , , , , ,  Induction, -ive , , , , , , ,  Informant , , , , , , , , , , ,  Informant data , , , , , ,  Interpretation , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Introspection , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 

Index  Intuition , , , ,  K Knowledge of language , , , , , , , , , ,  L Language change , , , , ,  Lexical access , , , , , , , , ,  Lexical field ,  Lexical unit , , ,  Linguistic test , , , ,  Literal meaning , , ,  Loss –, , , , , , ,  M Manipulation , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Many-space approach , ,  Measure, -ment –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Memory , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Mental dictionary ,  Mental encyclopedia  Mental space  Meta data –, , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , ,  Metalinguistic judgment , ,  Metaphor processing , , , , , , , , , , , –, , ,  Metaphor signaling , –, , , , , , ,  Metaphorical language use , , –, , , , , , , 

Metaphtonymy ,  Methodological pluralism , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Metonymy , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , ,  Model , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, –, , , , , , , –, , , , –, , , , ,  Monosemy , , , , , , ,  Morpheme , ,  Morphology, morphological , , , , , , , , , ,  N Natural data ,  Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) , ,  Nonliteral meaning , , ,  Nonverbal data , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, ,  Novel metaphor , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  O Observation , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , –, , , , , –, , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , ,  Off-line , ,  On-line , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Open comparison , 

Operationalization , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –,  P Parable ,  Performance , , , , , , , , , ,  Phenomenological pluralism , , , , , , ,  Philosophy, -ical , , , , , ,  Phrase , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Phraseology, -ical , ,  Polysemy , , , , , , , , , , , , –, –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Pragglejaz Group , , –, , , , ,  Pragglejaz method , , , ,  Pragmatic , , , , , , , ,  Primary metaphor , , , , , , , , ,  Production –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Proposition , , , , ,  Propositional analysis ,  Psycholinguistics , , , , ,  Psychology, psychological –, , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Q Qualitative analysis , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 

 Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage Quantitative analysis , , , , , , –, , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Questionnaire ,  R Reception –, , , , , , , , –, , , , , ,  Recognition , , , ,  Reference , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Reference-point construction ,  Referent , , , , , , , , ,  Register ,  Reliability , , –, , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , ,  Representation , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Restricted metaphor  Rhetorical form , , ,  S Salience , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Scale , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Semantic , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , –, , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , ,  Semantic field , , , ,  Semantic transfer ,  Semiotic –, , , , , , , , , 

Sign , , , , , , ,  Sign system ,  Similarity , , –, , , , , , , , –, , , , , , –, , , , , , –, , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , ,  Simile , –, , , , , , , , , , , , –, –, , ,  Simile-within-metaphor  Simulation ,  Source domain , , , , –, , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Storing –, , , , , , , ,  Structure-mapping  Stylistics  Subordinate ,  Superordinate , , , , , , , –, , ,  Symbol , , , , , , –, ,  Synchronic , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Synecdoche , , , ,  Synonym, -y , , ,  Syntax , , , , , , , , , , ,  Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) ,  T Talk –, , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Target domain , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Tenor , ,  Tenor interpretation  Text , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 

Thinking out loud , , , ,  Thought , , –, , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , ,  Topic , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Two-domain approach –, , , , , , ,  U Understanding , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , ,  Unit of analysis , , , , ,  Unit of discourse ,  Usage event , , , , , ,  Usage-based , , ,  Utterance , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  V Validity , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Variation , , , –, , , , , , , , , ,  Vehicle , , , , , , , ,  Vehicle interpretation  Verbal data , , –, –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , ,  W Word class , , 

In the series Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: 11 Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara (ed.): Asymmetric Events. Expected March 2008 10 Steen, Gerard J.: Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage. A methodological analysis of theory and research. 2007. xv, 430 pp. 9 Lascaratou, Chryssoula: The Language of Pain. Expression or description? 2007. xii, 238 pp. 8 Plümacher, Martina and Peter Holz (eds.): Speaking of Colors and Odors. 2007. vi, 244 pp. 7 Sharifian, Farzad and Gary B. Palmer (eds.): Applied Cultural Linguistics. Implications for second language learning and intercultural communication. 2007. xiv, 170 pp. 6 Deignan, Alice: Metaphor and Corpus Linguistics. 2005. x, 236 pp. 5 Johansson, Sverker: Origins of Language. Constraints on hypotheses. 2005. xii, 346 pp. 4 Kertész, András: Cognitive Semantics and Scientific Knowledge. Case studies in the cognitive science of science. 2004. viii, 261 pp. 3 Louwerse, Max and Willie van Peer (eds.): Thematics. Interdisciplinary Studies. 2002. x, 448 pp. 2 Albertazzi, Liliana (ed.): Meaning and Cognition. A multidisciplinary approach. 2000. vi, 270 pp. 1 Horie, Kaoru (ed.): Complementation. Cognitive and functional perspectives. 2000. vi, 242 pp.

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