Modern European Philosophy
.Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity Frederick Neu houser
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Modern
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Modern European Philosophy
.Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity Frederick Neu houser
III
, r:
Modern
European Philosophy
I
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JOHANN GOTTL1EB FICHTE J
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This is the first book in English to elucidate the central issues in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a figure crucial to the movement of philosophy from Kant to German idealism. The book explains Fichte's notion of subjectivity and how his particular view developed out of Kant's accounts of theoretical and practical reason. Fichte argues that the subject has a self-positing structure that distinguishes it from a thing or an object. Thus, the subject must be understood as an activity rather than a thing and is self-constituting in a way that an object is not. In the final chapter, Professor Neuhauser considers how this doctrine of the self-positing subject enables us to understand the possibility of the self's autonomy, or self-determination. "[A] very substantial piece of scholarship which analyzes a number of important historical and systematic issues with great clarity and perception. The presentation and treatment of the,basic historical and philosophical issues is magisterial." Professor Raymond Geuss, . Department of PhI losophy, Columbia University
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MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY Executive editor RAYMOND GRUSS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Editorial hoard HIDE ISHIGURO, BARNARD COLLEGE ALAN MONTEFIORE) BALLIO'L COLLEGE, OXFORD MARY TILES, ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
R. M. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value Raymond Geuss, The Idea ofa Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School Karel Lambert, Meinong and the Principle ofIndependence Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society Mary Tiles, Bachelard: Science and Objectivity Robert S. Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematic Peter Winch, Simone Weil: TheJust Balance Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology ofScientific Reason
FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY FREDERICK NEUHOUSER Harvard Universiry
Tile riaMof the UII/vasily of Cambridge to prfllt and sell (/1/ 111(11111(" of hooks
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since 1584.
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE NEW YORK
PORT CHESTER
MELBOURNE
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Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 I RP 40 West eoth Street, New York, NY 1001 I, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1990
First, published 1990 Printed in the United States of America
Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Neuhouser, Frederick. Fichte's theory of subjectivity l Frederick Neuhouser. p. em. - (Modern European philosophy) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-521-37433-2. - ISBN 0-521-39938-6 (pbk.) Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 1762-1814.- Contributions in concept of subjectivity. 2. Subjectivity. 1. Title. II. Series. B2849·S92N48 1990 126 dC20 89-4973 1 CIP
1.
British Lihrary Cataloguing in Publication Data Neuhouser, Frederick Fichte's theory of subjectivity. (Modern European philosophy) . I. German philosphy. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb I. Title II. Series 193 ISBN 0-521-37433-2 hardback ISBN 0-521-39938-6 paperback
FOR UDAY
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments Abbreviations
page ix x
Introduction I Origins of Fichte's theory: the notion of the unity of reason ~ The development of Fichte's project from 1793 to 1799 3 The self-positing subject and theoretical self-consciousness 4- The self-positing subject and practical self-determination Conclusion
Bibliography Index
vii
II
66
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people have been of help to me in a variety of ways during my work on this project. Above all, I am indebted to Charles Larmore, whose detailed and thoughtful comments on several drafts have made this a significantly better book than it otherwise would have been. I have also benefited greatly from conversations and correspondence with Daniel Breazeale, Maudemarie Clark, Stephen Engstrom, Raymond Geuss, Michael Hardimon, Pierre Keller, Charles Parsons, Thomas Pogge, and David Weberman. I would like to express my gratitude as well to Robert Pippin, who made his work on Fichte available to me long before it appeared in print, and to Daniel Parish, who prepared the index and spent many hours checking the accuracy of my translations. In addi- . tion, I have received generous financial assistance from the Edwin and Louise Bechtel Fund of the Harvard Philosophy Department, as well as a year-long fellowship in 1987-8 from the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation, during which time I was able to complete a first draft of the entire manuscript. Special thanks are due to Elisabeth Gladir and Deutsches Haus, Columbia University, who generously allowed me the use of the office space in which most of these pages were written. Finally, I would like to thank Uday Dhar for the encouragement he provided throughout the entire project, without which it surely would not have been completed. ix
AB·BREVIATIONS
GA
GMS KPV KRV KU SW WL 1794
J. G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, edt R. Lauth, H. Jacobs, and H. Gliwitsky Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals) Kant, Kritik derpraktischen Vernunfl (Critique ofPractical Reason) Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunfl (Critique ofPure Reason) Kant, Kritik der Urteilskrafl (Critique ofJudgment) Johann Gottlieb Fichtes siimmtliche Werke, edt I. H. Fichte Fichte, Die Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschoftslehre (1794) (The Science ofKnowledge, trans. P. Heath and ]. Lachs)
x
INTRODUCTION
In 1795, in the first published version of his major philosophical work, Fichte declares that one of the fundamental goals of his thought is to bring "uniry and coherence into the entire human being." In describing his system in these terms, Fichte gives expression to the basic aim that motivates the specific project with which this book is concerned. That project can be characterized as an attempt to construct a "theory of subjectivity," a theory that, to use the term Fichte himself preferred, provides an explanation of what it is to be an "I." Since it is not immediately clear what such a project will involve, or why it is worthy of being undertaken, it will be necessary to say something about the general nature of Fichte's task before we attempt to understand it in full detail. In the first place, we shall need to know what exactly a theory of subjectivity is a theory of. Moreover, what are the philosophical problems that give rise to the need for such a theory? Finally, what role can a theory of subjectivity play in establishing the "unity and coherence" of the human being? Let us begin with the most basic question of all: What is a theory of subjectivity? Or, more precisely, what is it that Fichte's I.
"Es kommt durch dieses System Einheit und Zusammenhang in den ganzen Menschen," SW, I, p. 295.
2
FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY
theory of the subject aims to accomplish? As Fichte conceives of it, the basic goal of his theory is to develop an account of the essential nature of subjecthood, or to provide an explanation of what it is that makes a subject a subject. Part of this undertaking will consist in articulating the important ways in which subjects are distinct from nonsubjects or, in other words, in giving an answer to the question "How is a subject different from a thing?" Central to this task will be the search for a principle that defines what it is to be a subject in a way similar to that in which the notions of 'substance' and 'causal determination' define the constitutive features of objects. But grasping the essential nature of subjectivity will involve more than comprehending the differences between an I and a not-I; it should, on Fichte's view, also enable us to understand how the various capacities we ascribe to subjects can be viewed as grounded in, or made possible by, the unique set of properties that are said to constitute the subject's essential nature. In other words, Fichte will strive to achieve a unified account of subjectivity, one attempting to explain the apparently diverse activities of the subject in terms of a single structure that underlies and informs them all. lM9SmLim,11Qrt~11J,.J.P q§,,,h~1:~,~wjJl.bJ~_Ei~hi~~S atteJ11p.t.1QJJDjfx-tb~""-tlle5~U:~li~~l~,~I!f;lJ!ri!J~~.ti£..'11~§Jlv_c;,!§~f.,~4l>j5t.~9Jiv
i t¥_b_)!.."shQwing~.tb.a,tJhe_kap-~(;itie,s-fQJ: ..k.Jl!ttw:l~dg~auJiJr~~~,£g~n cy both.depend.npan.. QJle_ili~lius;tiY..e~m~~,SJJ1>j,e,c .iliLe~fe.a!JJr~x . ~aLthe.~l,.~ When formulated in this way, it becomes clear that Fichte's theory can be understood as a contribution to the classical philosophical debate concerning the relation between theory and practice; Of, to express it in Kantian terms, Fichte attempts to comprehend the relation between theoretical and practical reason. The search to find a single structure of subjectivity, then, will be intimately related to the question as to whether reason itself is of a unitary nature and, if so, how that nature is to be conceived. A significant portion of this study will be devoted to filling in . the details of the general project just outlined. In doing so, we shall attempt to understand how Fichte arrived at this particular conception of what a theory of subj ectivity should be, as well as why he came to regard such a theory as the primary concern of philosophy. It is only after retracing this rather complex set of developments that we shall be in a position to comprehend the factors that led Fichte to construct his theory of subjectivity as he did. Yet even before we have examined this history in detail, it is possible to get a rough idea of the problem that his theory, at its most fundamental level, is intended to address. As we shall see in
INTRODUCTION
3
much greater detail later, Fichte's ing!ili:.y}nto the nature of t.ile is motivated p-rimarily'. bX cOnce!'.!lJLr~lati.ugJ.Q..!~.1!J§.{i§al as,12ect.Qf ~.bj~!iYit)!,J!P~ecli!!JY..,!Q.!d~~ti~~g,j;he in1cl1ig!bilU:>;:,.Q(hullllW fr~edo.mbor 'seJBj~,~1Uiilll'. In order to understand the nature of these concerns, as well as the significance of Fichte's response to them, it will be necessary to recall briefly the historical context within which they arose. The feature of the contemporary philosophical landscape that is of greatest importance for our purposes is directly connected to the rise of a form of Spinozism in Germany during the latter half of the eighteenth century. The particular version ofSpinozism that is relevant here was articulated most compellingly by F. H. Jacobi in his popular book Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza, which was first published in 1785.2 Tlt-Lmost i.illP~!lLas~_Qf su.bj~ct
Jac6JJrsjn.teI:pre1a.ti.uaQt:Spin~§...hia.f,9.r.m.yJ.ati~se
litpe.s.leim that the beliefin human freedom is incomp.!itU:>le wiJh
the vi!f,.):LQLr~~_t~son see"m~~yi!:~_,~.~pt. Jacobi's claim is not merely that the belief in our own freedom cannot be rationallyjustified; he holds that any thoroughly consistent, rational understanding of the world will be committed to ruling out this very possibility. We are forced, then, on Jacobi's view, to choose between an irrational faith in the possibility of freedom and a rational but completely deterministic view of the world in which there is no room for self-determined agency. One consequence of}acobi's claim that will playa significant role in our discussion ofFichte's early development concerns the implications of such a claim for the possibility of morality. If reason cannot be reconciled with the belief in our own freedom, then it is just as incompatible with the idea that human beings are bound by moral duties. Since attributing moral obligation to an agent seems to require that the agent be free to do her duty or not, a world without freedom would also be one in which there could be no moral "ought." A commitment to reason, it would seem, implies that we must also regard commonsense beliefs in both freedom and morality as mere illusions. It is important to note that ~ ) L . Q f . J ~ ..4~1l~!l9_suJ,l.Q!1A.P!Y.~Q!l~p-tionof th~ure Qfratignalitya conception that finds its classical formulation in the principle of ~.
A more detailed account of the controversy surrounding Spinoza and the effect it had on subsequent German philosophy is given by Beiser (1987). See especially Chap. 2, pp. 44-91,
4
i I j
Ii
,I
I
FICHT'E'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY
sufficient reason. According to this principle (or at least the version of it that is relevant here), every existing state of affairs Y is grounded in some other set of conditions X such that the presence of X is sufficient to necessitate the existence of r: The troubling impl,ication of this view is easily seen: Ij52w i~,}t p~ibL~1! cei~.-Qf_th~_hllrp~}J: . . !?~i~g __~~~.~,~.p.~.Ql~~ Q[f!~~~.~ti9r1, ..jf h,~~&l~~re all~£~.§§. ~!)~,,£9n~~.,g u_~"P~~P...r19X ....'l":t·:"nt-rrt: !'\:··i."'r~t:¥f~.vIn:'f1'~)"I~",¥J;;;"~:;iI"Li'.~1I.£"t P~~.£.~i~~t,~!,~~.~.!?~~,J~,~_~~.~, ..~~~.P-~Y ,~~~~,~~9~")' Kant formulates the problem in terms of a potential conflict between the "legislations" (Gesetzgehungen) of the understanding, the source of natural concepts, and reason, the giver of the moral law. First, Kant recalls that each legislation is completely independent of the other in terms of its content. That is, the moral law does not need to seek advice from the understanding in order to tell us what we ought to do, and, conversely, the understanding provides the gene-tal laws of natur.e without the aid of practical reason. Second, it is clear from the results of the first Critique that the two faculties cannot contradict each other in what they might tell us about supersensi-: ble reality, since the understanding can make no legitimate claims to provide knowledge of things in themselves. A potential conflict does arise, however, when one considers the effects of these two legislations within the world of appearances. The principle of .........,..:.\IIl..:.ll.,/
16
FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY
of attaining to knowledge of it, ... nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought in accord with the principles of one to the mode of thought in accord with the principles of the other."
Of course, Kant must do more than merely assert the conceiv.. ' ability of this unity; he must convince us that there is in fact no contradiction in the view that a world governed by universal causal determination might also be one that can accommodate the effects of a completely independent set of laws, namely, those of freedom. Kant argues for the conceivability of the two kinds of legislation within one and the same world by referring to the role played by a particular kind of teleology within natural science. In the third Critique Kant recognizes that the legislation of the categories of the understanding, even as universally applicable in the realm of experience, is not itself sufficient to guarantee the possibility of systematic knowledge of nature according to empir.. ical laws. The world of experience might indeed be structured according to the categories of the understanding and still be too complex - infused with too great a diversity - to be captured in terms of simple empirical laws that could then be combined into a system of natural science. ~_ cond!j:ions fa!: th~~~pil!lY~L e~gl~!~~P:-
locate the tenets of practical reason within such a system might also enable Fichte to prove their validity. As we shall see in greater detail in the following chapter, Fichte's first attempt (in the Gebhard review) to find a common principle for all of reason reveals very dearly how, at least for the young Fichte,' the task of defending Kant's view of morality converges with that of deriving all of
24
FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY
philosophy from one principle. For now our task is to understand the sense in which Fichte believed Kant's practical philosophy to be in need of a more stable foundation. Fichte's criticism of the foundations of Kant's moral theory is articulated for the first time in the Gebhard review of 1793. 15 In this piece Fichte turns his attention to what he believes to be a crucial problem of Kant's philosophy, one that calls into question "nothinf less than the general validity of the Kantian moral prin. ciple." I The unresolved difficulty to which Fichte refers is the absence within Kant's moral philosophy of a positive proof of the practical nature of pure reason. At the end of the Gebhard review Fichte explicitly formulates what for him is the central task yet to be accomplished by Critical Philosophy: "It must be proved that reason is practical.' 17 This assertion raises two questions in need of closer attention: First, what must be shown about pure reason in order to prove that it is practical? And second, why are Kant's own arguments for this claim insufficient? The first question can be made more precise if reformulated as follows: Is the human agent capable of being motivated to act by some incentive other than those that are merely sensuous and hence supplied to her from an external source (nature) in accord with natural causal laws? That is, can certain human actions be determined by a purely rational incentive derived from the awareness of a law of pure reason that the human agent, as a rational being, legislates for herself? It is clear that both Kant and Fichte want to answer these questions in the affirmative, for they agree that a positive answer to each is necessary in order to sustain two closely related beliefs, namely, that human beings have moral obligations and that they are capable of genuine autonomy. Before considering these connections in closer detail, let us turn to the second issue raised earlier concerning the inadequacy of Kant's own arguments in support of his claim that pure reason has a practical capacity. 15. GA, 1.2) pp. 21-9; SW, VIII) pp.418-26. This work is a review of F. H, Gebhard's book Ueber die sittliche Gilte aus uninteressiertem Wahlwollen (1792). 16. SW, VIII) p. 418. 17. SW, VIII, p. 425. Fichte consistently uses the term 'practical reason' to refer to what Kant called 'pure practical reason' and contrasted to 'empirical practical reason'. I shall follow Fichte's usage here, so that 'practical reason' should be taken to signify practical reason in its pure (i.e., empirically unconditioned) form.
ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY
Fichte's main o~ction to Kant's position is that the mere
25 ~
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es~lLl!Lpun; r~a:mn i~~l.
In other words, Fichte's
.t
30
FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY
within theoretical reason itself, there is no obvious reason why the same idea might not also be applicable to the relationship between theoretical and practical reason. In fact, in at least one place in his published writings Kant explicitly endorses the thesis of the unity of reason in precisely the sense we are currently examining: · .. a critique of pure practical reason, if it is to be complete, requires, on my view, that we should be able at the same time to show the unity of practical and theoretical reason in a common principle, since in the end there can only be one and the same reason, which is to be differentiated solely in its application."
Kant's insistence that "there can only be one reason, which is ... differentiated solely in its application" can be considered the classical formulation of this third sense of the unity of reason; and, as I shall argue later, it is this provocative but unelaborated idea of Kant's that Fichte attempts to work out. Such a project, then, would take as its most basic question the following: Is it possible to comprehend theoretical and practical reason as two forms of a single faculty of reason? Or, alternatively, does a single structure - a structure of reason in general- underly both the theoretical and practical uses of reason? Of course; it is by no means obvious from this brief characterization what precisely it would mean to attribute to theoretical and practical reason an identical "structure." One way in which a Kantian might attempt to fill in the details of such a claim is by arguing that reason has an identical function in both its theoretical and practical employments, since in both cases it bestows a kind of unity upon some given manifold content - in the first case, a manifold of intuitions, in the second, a manifold of natural desires. Although this is not the particular direction taken by Fichte, it nevertheless qualifies as an example of the unity that can be attributed to reason in the sense under consideration here. In the view that Fichte will ultimately develop, the identical structure of reason will be articulated in his most distinctive philosophical notion, that of the self-positing subject. As we shall see in Chapter 2, Fichte comes to believe that his theory of subjectivity can demonstrate the essential unity of reason by showing that the subject's theoretical and practical faculties are derivative of the same funda-nental activity of the mind, which he calls "self-positing." 26. GMS, p. 391.; English, p. 59.
ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY
3I
This way of unifying theoretical and practical reason can easily be seen as ~ continuation of the philosophical proJ~,cJJunderJaken by::;Leibniz, cQnti!!"!!~d-hy,.J;YQJ!h.Jtni...~llud.!:.d to by_Ka,11.Lin..rhe earlier quote) of ~b.Q.wingJhl:!-.L~ll oQhe...§ubj eds capacities derive fremlL!!!!gkJundam,l;nl~LR9..w~.L(Q.1Y.tY.lkraJt1...Qf.J.b.e~Q..ul. 27 Although Kant in the Critique qf Pure Reason denies that the unity of the subjective capacities can be guaranteed in advance of any actual philosophical inquiry, he does admit the legitimacy of philosophy's endeavor to demonstrate this kind of unity among the various faculties, and this for a reason similar to one mentioned earlier, namely, that the "principle of reason calls upon us to bring about such unity as completely as poseible.t''" Thus, the unity. of r.(~!!:lton in.this third sense i~ taken by Kii:{l.i..t~~P...§.tjtU_tk..GJs:ind.Qf. ~ulat~l that philosophy by its very nature must strive to attain (even though, of course, it may not actually be able to realize it). Viewed in this context, Fichte's attempt to demonstrate the unity ofreason in this deepest sense can be seen not only as a continuation ofa project central to the tradition of modern philosophy, but, at least in its basic intent, as one that is consistent with the spirit of Critical Philosophy as well. The question remains, however, whether this particular version of Fichte's philosophical task also responds in some way to his concerns about philosophy's ability to defend human freedom. We shall return to this question at the end of the following chapter, after we have examined in greater detail how the specific features of his undertaking emerge out of his attempts to find a proof of practical reason and to ground all of philosophy in a single first principle. 27. See Henrich (1955, pp. 28-69). 28. KRV, A649/B677. In the first version of the introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant also characterizes such an attempt as one which "is undertaken in a genuinely philosophical spirit" (p. 206).
2
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~---------~
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT FROM I 793 TO I 799
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development that Fichte's philosophical project undergoes during the period from 1793 to 1799. OUf ultimate goal will be to understand how his conception of that project as a theory of subjectivity emerges out of earlier attempts to uphold the thesis of the unity of theoretical and practical reason. As we shall see, in his early philosophical writings Fichte concentrates primarily on the task of demonstrating the unity of reason in the second of the three senses outlined in Chapter I (where both theoretical and practical reason are to be brought together into one system that proceeds from a single first principle). By 1797, however, Fichte comes to have a different understanding of his enterprise, one that embodies the third sense of the unity of reason, according to which theoretical and practical reason are to be comprehended as a single faculty, each of which exhibits the same "structure" of reason in .general. The story of this transformation is significantly complicated by the fact that fuL,Ficht..e_Jh~.jsAslle_Qf__tht,~lWit~_~Qf ..J:~~on is inextri~ boun