Examining the Possible Corrosive Impact of Negative Advertising on Citizens’ Attitudes toward Politics

Political Research Quarterly OnlineFirst, published on April 19, 2008 as doi:10.1177/1065912908317031

Examining the Possible Corrosive Impact of Negative Advertising on Citizens’ Attitudes toward Politics

Political Research Quarterly Volume X Number X Month XXXX xx-xx © 2008 University of Utah 10.1177/1065912908317031 http://prq.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

Robert A. Jackson Florida State University, Tallahassee

Jeffery J. Mondak University of Illinois, Urbana

Robert Huckfeldt University of California, Davis Negative campaign advertisements have been depicted by many observers as a scourge on American politics. One facet of the case against negative ads—that such commercials discourage voter turnout—has been studied extensively in the past decade. In contrast, a second criticism—that negative advertisements produce corrosive effects on mass attitudes—has received less attention. This is unfortunate as it would be highly consequential for American political behavior if exposure to negative campaign ads breeds widespread cynicism and antipathy toward politics, disapproval of political institutions and elected officials, and a decline in political efficacy. We examine these charges in the context of the 2002 U.S. midterm elections. Merging data on political ads from the 2002 rendition of the Wisconsin Advertising (WiscAds) Project with individual-level data collected via the 2002 Exercising Citizenship in American Democracy Survey, we devise a thorough and multifaceted test of the case against negative advertising. Our analyses do not provide empirical support for the charges levied against negative campaign ads. Keywords: campaign advertising; political attitudes; midterm elections; Congress

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nation’s citizens must walk a fine line when assessing elected officials and political institutions. On one hand, a degree of skepticism seems prudent. Were citizens to view the political arena with

Authors’ Note: We thank anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and the following individuals for research assistance on this project: Andy Bloeser, Karen Halperin, Matt Hayes, Matt Hibbing, Rod Lewis, Dona-Gene Mitchell, Laurie Pantages, Cindy Rugeley, and Joel Turner. Some of our data were obtained from a project of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, under Professor Kenneth Goldstein and Joel Rivlin of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and include media tracking data from the Campaign Media Analysis Group in Washington, D.C. The Wisconsin Advertising Project was sponsored by a grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts. The opinions expressed in this article are ours and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, Professor Goldstein, Joel Rivlin, or the Pew Charitable Trusts. Other data were obtained from the American National Election Study (ANES), 2000: Pre- and Post-election Survey Study, 2nd ICPSR version. The original collector of these ANES data, ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no responsibility for uses of this collection or for interpretations or inferences based on such uses. We are responsible for all errors.

something approaching blind faith, the risk of elite malfeasance would be considerable. Although skepticism may be advisable, mass cynicism can be debilitating. If citizens conclude that government is damaged beyond repair, then little or no incentive exists for individuals to invest time and effort in weighing the pros and cons of new policy proposals or in selecting between competing candidates. During the past four decades, Americans as a whole most often have leaned much closer to cynicism in their political assessments than to blind faith. Indeed, brief periods of high trust in government, such as in the months following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, are notable precisely because they are at odds with the familiar pattern. Numerous factors plausibly contribute to Americans’ characteristically dark views of government. Event-driven explanations ring true when we recall that the period in question encompasses an impressive array of political scandals and failed policies. Likewise, media-driven explanations also enjoy intuitive merit given that signs of mass cynicism emerged soon after the rise of television news, and further waves of 1

Copyright 2008 by University of Utah.

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pessimism have coincided with the growth of talk radio and twenty-four-hour cable news outlets. Our objective is not to revisit the many forces potentially operating to induce citizens’ highly critical political appraisals, but rather to examine one particular force in depth. The central question we pursue is whether exposure to negative campaign advertisements sours citizens’ broader political perceptions. This focus on campaign ads ties in well with both event- and media-based models in that political campaigns are important recurring events and candidates’ ads are noteworthy components of political television. But our interest in the possible effects of campaign ads stems from more than the opportunity to improve our understanding of why so many citizens view politics and government with displeasure. An additional concern centers on the nature and significance of negative campaign ads themselves. Attention to negative ads has proceeded at a frenzied pace since the publication of groundbreaking research by Ansolabehere and Iyengar (Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). Most of the subsequent studies have focused on the charge that negative ads suppress voter turnout. The scholarly community has devoted less attention to the parallel grievance that these ads fuel public cynicism and political alienation writ large. We view this second case against negative ads as provocative and disturbing, but also as incomplete in that Ansolabehere and Iyengar’s empirical work on this matter speaks to only one aspect of mass opinion and does so using only one methodological approach. We offer a wide-reaching examination of the possible effects of campaign advertisements on citizens’ views of politics and government. First, we assess the case against negative ads, evaluating both the rationale for why negative ads may produce deleterious effects on mass attitudes and past evidence regarding such effects. Second, we outline our own research strategy. Our focus is on ads run in conjunction with the 2002 gubernatorial, U.S. House, and U.S. Senate elections. Advertising data are drawn from the 2002 rendition of the WiscAds Project (Goldstein and Rivlin 2005), with data on citizens’ perceptions drawn from the 2002 Exercising Citizenship in American Democracy Survey, a national survey we fielded during the 2002 election season. Last, we present a series of empirical tests designed to shed new light on the question of whether exposure to political advertisements influences citizens’ perceptions of politics and government.

The Case against Political Advertisements Critiques of political opponents occur in numerous forms, but the negative advertisement has been the means of choice for many candidates in the television era. Ads labeled as negative range from innocuous efforts to contrast the attributes and beliefs of competing candidates to vituperative, inflammatory assaults. At their worst, negative ads hold the potential to denigrate the political process, and to do so while infiltrating the living rooms of television viewers across the nation. Given the distasteful character of the most notorious of negative advertisements, it is reasonable to surmise that exposure to such ads will lead citizens to think less not only of the candidates in a given election, but also of politics and government more broadly. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) argue this point forcefully: In recent years, the political pulsetakers have registered record lows in political participation, record highs in public cynicism and alienation, and record rates of disapproval of the House of Representatives, the institution designed to represent the public will. The single biggest cause of the new, ugly regime is the proliferation of negative political advertising on tv. (p. 2) Later, Ansolabehere and Iyengar explain the mechanism that leads from exposure to negative ads to cynicism and disapproval (1995, 111): “people infer from negative advertisements that the entire process, not just the targeted candidate, is deeply flawed.” Ansolabehere and Iyengar are not alone in arguing that negative ads damage mass attitudes. For example, two reports published a few years prior to the Ansolabehere and Iyengar studies alleged that negative ads generate such effects (Buchanan 1991; Dionne 1991). Buchanan suggested that attack ads may lead to citizen (1991, 134) “disenchantment with the larger political process” and that the attack campaign (1991, 164) “breeds public cynicism.” West (2005) and Diamond and Bates (1992), although themselves skeptical regarding some of the claimed harmful effects of negative ads, noted that the belief that such effects do occur is widely held. West wrote, for example, that (2005, 65) “attack ads are viewed by many people as the electronic equivalent of the plague.” The charge leveled against negative ads seems plausible. Although numerous scholars have suggested that negative ads may mobilize, rather than demobilize, the

Jackson et al. / Impact of Negative Advertising 3

electorate (e.g., Bartels 1996; Finkel and Geer 1998; Freedman and Goldstein 1999; Kahn and Kenney 1999; Lau et al. 1999; Wattenberg and Brians 1999; Lau and Pomper 2001; Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Wattenberg 2002, esp. chap. 7; Brooks 2006; Brooks and Geer 2007; Jackson and Carsey 2007), it is far more difficult to envision that such ads would instill the public with optimism and political confidence. Negative ads may be informative, they may point out legitimate concerns about opposing candidates, and they may signal the importance of a particular election, yet none of these leads in any obvious manner to a citizenry with a collectively rosier outlook on politics. Although scenarios can be devised whereby negative ads have either negative, null, or positive effects on voter turnout, only effects of the first two forms seem likely when the question under consideration is whether negative ads influence citizens’ broader political perceptions. The analytical case developed by Ansolabehere and Iyengar is, in our judgment, persuasive, but the empirical case is incomplete. Ansolabehere and Iyengar offer provocative evidence consistent with the claimed effects of negative ads on mass attitudes, but the evidence is, for several reasons, less than definitive. Three specific matters warrant discussion. First, although Ansolabehere and Iyengar issue a sweeping indictment of negative ads, their analyses center on only two variables: internal and external political efficacy. External efficacy encompasses several important considerations regarding the quality and responsiveness of elected officials, and thus it is a reasonable dependent variable for the task at hand. The relevance of internal efficacy is less certain in that the rationale for why negative ads should lead citizens to doubt their own levels of political aptitude is questionable. Ultimately, though, what concerns us is that there were not additional measures that tapped other aspects of public opinion. Ansolabehere and Iyengar find that exposure to negative ads decreases internal and external efficacy, but it is possible that such ads exert stronger or weaker effects on other important dimensions of mass opinion. Second, the authors derive their results using a single methodological approach: the laboratory experiment. We agree with Ansolabehere and Iyengar on the virtues of experiments for causal analysis, but external corroboration of laboratory findings is desirable. This is especially important in the present case because Ansolabehere and Iyengar offer conclusions regarding the corrosive effects of negative ads on U.S. national opinion, even though they present no evidence from outside the laboratory. In contemplating research that does speak to national opinion, it is

uncertain how the results will stack up relative to those from the laboratory. The laboratory is much less noisy than the real world, and thus it is possible that an examination of survey data would mute the finding of an advertisement-efficacy link. Sigelman and Kugler (2003) note, for instance, that citizens in the same states differed dramatically from one another in how negative they perceived a statewide campaign to be. If voters in actual elections do not recognize negative campaigns (or perceive negativity when it is absent), then the realworld link between ad tone and mass attitudes may be tenuous. On the other hand, even elaborate experiments cannot capture the tremendous variance in campaign behavior found across the hundreds of electoral contests in a year such as 2002. If ad tone matters for citizens’ attitudes, then perhaps the strongest evidence will be found in research that differentiates voters who were bombarded with hundreds, and even thousands, of negative ads from voters who viewed only positive ads, and from voters who were exposed to no campaign ads at all. Third, although Ansolabehere and Iyengar find that exposure to negative ads influences internal and external efficacy, the effects appear moderate in both substantive importance and statistical significance. In their model of external efficacy, a model with 2,216 observations, the ad tone variable produces only a modestly significant effect (t = 2.33), and gender, race, and partisanship all generate substantive effects of more than twice the magnitude of the effect for ad tone. Ad tone brings a larger substantive effect on internal efficacy, but this effect is dwarfed by that of political interest. Also, in a model with 790 observations, the coefficient for ad tone only narrowly achieves statistical significance (t = 2.00) as a predictor of internal efficacy. Hence the empirical results do not support the charge that negative ads are the “single biggest cause” of damage to mass attitudes. Many researchers have explored the systemic effects of negative advertisements since the publication of Ansolabehere and Iyengar’s studies, but the vast majority of this research has reconsidered the relationship between ad tone and turnout. In contrast, reassessment of the impact of negative ads on mass attitudes has been rarer.1 We suspect that the reason for this is that most analysts have found Ansolabehere and Iyengar’s thesis to be persuasive—perhaps to the point that follow-up research has seemed unnecessary. There appears to be some agreement that exposure to negative ads will darken citizens’ views of politics, and perhaps that it will serve as a demobilizing force; however, many scholars also believe that other effects of negative ads on turnout are positive, offsetting any demobilization brought by

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dwindling public confidence in the political process. Finkel and Geer (1998) delineate this position clearly: The notion that exposure to attack advertising may influence the electorate’s sense of external efficacy or feelings of governmental responsiveness is certainly reasonable. Moreover, we agree with Ansolabehere et al. and Ansolabehere and Iyengar that this process could explain why some individuals abstain from voting in a given campaign. However, there are equally compelling reasons why attack advertising may stimulate voter participation. (pp. 576-77) Thorson et al. (2000) find that exposure to negative campaign ads lowers efficacy and raises political cynicism. Unfortunately, Thorson et al.’s methodological approach raises serious questions regarding their ability to infer that exposure to negative ads causes these effects. Their data are taken from a survey fielded in a single metropolitan area, and they operationalize exposure to negative ads via an item that asked respondents to gauge how many negative ads they had seen in a recent campaign. Measures of ad exposure based on individual recall are problematic both because viewers’ recollections of what they have seen tend to be sketchy and because of the threat of endogeneity (see Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon 1999; Goldstein and Ridout 2004). On the latter point, it is possible that the correspondence between self-reported exposure to negative ads and levels of political cynicism merely signifies that political cynicism led some respondents to perceive campaigns as negative, effectively reversing the causal arrow. Exposure to negative ads varies across individuals by three factors: (1) when exposure was measured (e.g., in U.S. elections, the likelihood of exposure to negative ads is greater for a respondent interviewed in late October than for one interviewed in early September); (2) where the respondent lives (because some campaigns have more negative ads than others); and (3) what/how many television programs individuals watch. The first and second of these factors are constant in the Thorson et al. (2000) study because they administered their survey in a single community in a five-day period following the 1994 U.S. elections. As to the third factor, nearly half of ads in subnational elections are aired on local news broadcasts, but Thorson et al. control for local news viewing in their models. Hence there is virtually no

opportunity for variance in actual exposure to negative ads to drive variance in self-reported exposure to negative ads. Lau and Pomper (2004) merge data on newspaper coverage of Senate races with data from the National Election Studies (NES) and explore whether campaign tone matters for external efficacy and trust in government. Their full sample models yield no sign that campaign tone produces the hypothesized effects; however, when estimating separate models for partisans and independents, they find a slight relationship for efficacy: “negative campaigning has the hypothesized negative effect on efficacy for respondents who pay a lot of attention to the campaign and live in states where campaign intensity is high” (Lau and Pomper 2004, 87). The authors express doubt as to the importance of this finding because the relationship was found only among a subset of the electorate, the effect was substantively modest (a swing in efficacy of 0.17 points on a variable with a range of 0–4), and the coefficient reached only a marginal level of statistical significance (p < .10). But Lau and Pomper note that the cumulative effect of negative campaigning on efficacy might be greater. We would add to this that the study’s measure of campaign tone is not specific to negative advertising, and thus that somewhat stronger (or weaker) effects may emerge in analyses focused solely on the possible effects of campaign ads. Brader (2006, 104-6) tackles many of the dependent variables of interest to us in experimental research on citizen response to ad tone. Specifically, Brader examines feelings of internal and external efficacy, cynicism, social trust, trust in government, trust in elected officials, and trust in the media. Ads with enthusiasm cues produced only a smattering of significant effects, and in no instance did fear cues adversely affect citizens’ attitudes, leading Brader to conclude that (2004, 106) “evidence on the potential side effects of emotional appeals is weak and decidedly mixed.” Brader’s results speak to the possible effects of emotional cues, not to whether the full content of an ad is positive or negative.2 Still, Brader’s null results, particularly when coupled with Lau and Pomper’s (2004) findings, suggest that any adverse impact of negative ads on citizens’ attitudes may be less than sweeping in scope.3 Brooks and Geer (2007) address the possible broader effects of exposure to negative political ads. They designed a Knowledge Networks experiment and found no evidence that negative, uncivil, or trait-based messages within ads attenuate respondents’ levels of political interest, political trust, external efficacy, or political

Jackson et al. / Impact of Negative Advertising 5

learning. Geer (2006, see esp. chap. 7) also considers the possible effects of negative ads on citizens’ attitudes. The analyses reveal no adverse impact of negative ads on either faith in elections or trust in government. Taking account of the research by Ansolabehere and Iyengar and the subsequent studies reviewed here, we see as inconclusive the empirical case regarding the potential impact of negative advertising on citizens’ attitudes. On the positive side, Ansolabehere and Iyengar’s thesis enjoys considerable logical appeal, and multiple studies report evidence consistent with their thesis, particularly with respect to efficacy. On the negative side, the range of attitudes examined in early work was narrow, and subsequent research has failed to generate strong support for the case against negative ads.4 The indictment of negative advertising is alarming. Negative ads possibly contribute to citizen apathy, and even antipathy, regarding politics. Given the importance of this claim, we seek to subject it to comprehensive empirical scrutiny. First, we assess multiple aspects of citizens’ views of politics. Second, we focus specifically on the effects of campaign advertisements, rather than overall campaign tone. Third, we examine the advertisements emanating from U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and gubernatorial campaigns, drawing data on citizens’ attitudes from a national survey with respondents in each of the one hundred largest media markets. Fourth, in addition to examining the possible general effects of negative campaign ads, we explore whether partisan status and political sophistication condition any such effects.

Data and Method The two essential forms of indicators required for the planned analyses are measures of individuals’ political attitudes and level of exposure to campaign advertisements. We develop the needed indicators with data drawn from the 2002 WiscAds Project and from the 2002 Exercising Citizenship in American Democracy Survey, a national telephone survey that we fielded in the period from September to November 2002 and that was administered by the Center for Survey Research at Indiana University. The WiscAds Project provides an exhaustive compilation of political advertisements aired in the one hundred largest media markets. We use these data to construct indicators of ad exposure and ad tone.5 All other measures are developed from items on the 2002 survey. This survey includes an initial crosssectional component of 1,485 respondents, with roughly three-fourths of respondents interviewed prior to Election Day. The preelection and postelection instruments were virtually identical, although some questions

on the postelection instrument were changed from future to past tense to account for the occurrence of the election. To permit attention to campaign effects, the survey included an oversample from fifty U.S. House districts with competitive and/or open-seat contests in 2002. In the analyses reported subsequently, data are weighted to represent the actual distribution of electoral competitiveness in the lower forty-eight states. Six dependent variables will be examined. The first two measure attitudes regarding Congress, including congressional approval and an eight-item scale that taps cynicism toward Congress (see Appendix A of the online supplemental materials for question wording). If exposure to negative ads taints people’s views of the political system, then ads run in a midterm year, such as 2002, may be especially consequential for attitudes toward Congress. The third and fourth dependent variables continue our focus on Congress, but add a partisan component by asking how favorably respondents feel toward Democratic and Republican congressional leaders. The last two dependent variables are conventional indicators of internal and external political efficacy. We have noted our view that the logic for why negative ads will erode internal efficacy is questionable,6 but we consider internal efficacy because it was one of the two attitudinal variables examined by Ansolabehere and Iyengar. The rationale regarding the possible harmful effects of negative ads applies well to external efficacy.7 In measuring ad exposure, our objective was to gauge as accurately as possible how many political ads each of the survey respondents was likely to have viewed. What we knew from the WiscAds data included how many advertisements were aired in each of the one hundred largest media markets in the United States, the dates those ads were aired, and on what specific television programs they appeared. What we knew, or could estimate, from the survey is when during the campaign the respondent was interviewed and the frequency with which the respondent viewed different genres of television programs. Collectively, this information enabled the construction of respondentspecific measures of ad exposure. As noted previously, three factors—where individuals live, when they are interviewed, and which and how many television programs they view—contribute to variance in ad exposure. As to geographic variance, an advantage of the 2002 survey relative to some other data sources is that respondents were drawn nationally, rather than from only a select subset of congressional districts, and all one hundred of the largest media markets are represented in our models. In 2002, the number of political ads aired in these

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media markets ranged from 182 to over 35,000. If exposure to advertisements influences political attitudes, then the variance in potential exposure stemming from geography alone positions us well to detect such effects. Second, we take account of when each respondent was interviewed. Only those ads that aired prior to the date of a respondent’s interview hold the potential to influence political views as recorded on our survey. Among our respondents, 23 percent were interviewed in September, 49 percent in October, and 28 percent in November. In the average media market, nearly three-fourths of political ads were run after our first respondents completed the survey in early September, and thus variance in interview date contributes greatly to variance in potential ad exposure. The final source of variance in ad exposure is that respondents differ in their television-viewing habits. An individual who watches television several hours a day will, on average, see more campaign ads than a person who rarely watches television. Likewise, the person who views the sorts of programs on which candidates prefer to advertise—such as the local news and evening game shows—will see more political spots than a viewer who alternates solely between the Sci-Fi Channel and the Golf Channel. Translating this logic into precise measures is, unfortunately, impossible. The WiscAds data permit us to ascertain with great accuracy the programs on which political ads were aired; however, at best, we have only respondents’ recollections as guides when determining the programs they viewed, and we have no means to differentiate those respondents who pay close attention to commercials from those who leave the room or change the channel to avoid seeing televised ads. Like others who have used the WiscAds data (e.g., Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004), what we can do is estimate the maximum number of political ads each respondent was likely to have seen based on our knowledge of what ads were aired and what sorts of programs the respondent claims to have watched. The 2002 survey includes measures of the number of days per week respondents report having watched local and national television news broadcasts, programs on which nearly half of all political ads were aired. The frequency with which respondents view other sorts of programs is not measured directly, but we are able to construct estimates using a two-stage process (see Franklin 1989). For example, for game shows, such as Jeopardy and Wheel of Fortune, we estimated negative binomial count models of how often NES respondents watched these shows and then used the coefficients to calculate projected viewing

counts for respondents in the 2002 survey. Several diagnostic tests were conducted to assess the strength of the resulting measures (see Appendix B of the online supplemental materials for details). Summed across all genres, values on television viewing range from less than two (meaning the respondent is estimated to have watched fewer than two of the target television programs per week) to greater than thirtyfive. To summarize, of the three factors that produce variance in ad exposure, we have direct, concrete measures of two (where the respondent lives and when the respondent was interviewed) and half of the third (exposure to television news broadcasts), along with an indirect measure of exposure to other television programming. Construction of our final measures of ad exposure was a laborious process in which respondents and political ads were matched on media market, television program, and date. Because some of the dependent variables concern general political views, while others focus on attitudes toward Congress, we created separate measures of total ad exposure (House, Senate, and gubernatorial) and exposure to congressional ads (House and Senate). We use total ad exposure in the efficacy models, and exposure to ads about the House and Senate elections in models with our four dependent variables concerning attitudes toward Congress and its members. Because the thesis we examine is specific to negative ads, we must distinguish commercials based on their tone. Two approaches are used. In our first set of models, we use a measure of ad tone provided in the WiscAds data set. This coding scheme initially classifies ads as promoting a specific candidate, attacking a candidate, or contrasting the candidates; the latter category is then divided into three subgroups—more promote than attack, about equal promote and attack, and more attack than promote. Drawing on these five categories, our models include not our summary measure of ad exposure, but instead separate counts of ad exposure for each of the five levels of ad tone. A limitation of this initial approach is that it treats all attack ads as equal. If the effects of negative ads differ depending on whether those ads include reasonable critiques or bombastic assaults (e.g., Kahn and Kenney 1999), then we need to differentiate further ad tone.8 The WiscAds data set includes indicators of up to two adjectives used in a given ad to describe opposing candidates. In a second series of models, we capture the possible effects of this linguistic variance. To do so, we had seven coders rate each of the twenty-two words and phrases in the WiscAds data

Jackson et al. / Impact of Negative Advertising 7

set on a 1 (word or phrase is likely part of a legitimate, informative critique) to 10 (word or phrase is likely an example of inflammatory mudslinging) scale. The evaluations were highly correlated (α = 0.89), and average scores ranged widely, from a low of 2.57 for “likes taxes” to 9.14 for “traitor.” Scores from this procedure were calculated for each ad and then matched to the respondent via our ad exposure measure.9 Thus we will be able to determine not only whether exposure to negative ads influences respondents’ perceptions, but also if it matters whether the ads in question are relatively harsh or mild in tone. In addition to our two-part search for possible effects of exposure to negative ads, we estimate a third set of models designed to help determine whether any effects of negative ads differ in magnitude as a function of respondents’ levels of political sophistication and strength of partisan affiliation. All models include a series of control variables that tap demographic characteristics, political identity, and intensity of the campaign environment.

The Impact of Ad Exposure on Citizens’ Political Attitudes Initial models draw on the WiscAds Project’s fivecategory classification of ad content.10 All dependent variables are coded such that larger values reflect more positive assessments. If negative ads adversely affect citizens’ political judgments, then signs of this may take several forms. One straightforward expectation is that large and statistically significant negative coefficients will be produced for exposure to pure attack ads; that is, as a survey respondent’s level of exposure to unequivocally attack-oriented ads rises, we should see a decline in evaluations of Congress and in perceptions of political efficacy. Second, similar results should be obtained for those contrast ads that include a preponderance of attack material. Third, because the five categories in the WiscAds ad tone typology are ordered, a consistent pattern of effects should be found across the five indicators, with the highest values emerging for commercials that exclusively promote a candidate, and the lowest values emerging for pure attack ads.11 Results for the initial models are reported in Table 12 1. Control variables in all models include political knowledge, ideology, partisanship, education, sex, age, and two measures of the intensity of the campaign context: a dummy variable for whether the respondent’s U.S. House district had a competitive and/or open-seat

contest in 2002 and a count of the total number of political ads aired in the respondent’s media market.13 The four models concerning judgments about Congress also include a measure of presidential approval and two indicators of the extent to which respondents’ expectations regarding policy matters and representation have been met (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Numerous significant effects emerge for the various control variables. For present purposes, the most noteworthy are the two statistically significant negative coefficients for total ads, used here as a surrogate for campaign intensity (see also Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004). Intense campaigns appear to produce modest disapproval of both Congress as a whole and of Democratic congressional leaders.14 Although not specific to negative ads, these effects are consistent with the thesis that what transpires in campaigns can bring repercussions for how citizens view politics and government. The last five rows of substantive effects, which appear in boldface, report results for the ad tone variables, with ad tone arrayed from most negative to most positive. The results provide no support whatsoever for the thesis that exposure to negative ads breeds critical views of government. First, none of the coefficients for exposure to pure attack ads reaches statistical significance, and only one of the six coefficients produces the expected negative sign. Second, exposure to contrast ads that include primarily attack content also yields no statistically significant effects,15 and only two of the coefficients are negative. Third, in no instance does the expected pattern emerge across the five ad tone variables; that is, it is never the case that values increase from low to high as ad tone grows increasingly positive, and eight of the twelve coefficients for promote ads are negative. Only one of the thirty ad tone coefficients reaches conventional statistical significance; however, this result—a positive effect on external efficacy for exposure to contrast ads that include an equal mix of promote and attack content—provides no meaningful support for the claim that negative ads bring destructive effects on citizens’ political judgments as it does not follow that only neutral ads should yield positive effects or that such a dynamic should operate only on efficacy.16 The null results in Table 1 suggest that being bombarded with negative ads during the course of a campaign does not lead citizens to form more pessimistic appraisals of politics and government; however, these null results do not rule out the possibility of subtler effects. First, although attack ads as categorized by the WiscAds coders are irrelevant for political judgments,

8 0.359 (1.04) –0.794* (–2.46) 1.02** (3.26) 0.222 (0.63) 0.668 (0.84) 1.03 (1.27) 2.07** (2.58) 0.655* (2.43) –0.016 (–1.91) 0.101 (0.40) 0.013 (0.16) 0.109 (0.99) 0.011 (0.12) –0.016 (–0.13) 0.084 (0.83) –0.129 (–1.48) 0.908 (0.79)

–0.117 (–0.64) –0.692** (–3.53) 0.557** (3.30) 0.342 (1.72) 0.384 (0.85) 0.190 (0.40) 0.119 (0.26) 0.254 (1.77) –0.014** (–2.86) –0.139 (–1.05) –0.103* (–2.35) –0.038 (–0.64) 0.0033 (0.07) 0.077 (1.16) 0.0080 (0.14) 0.049 (1.06)

–1.97** (–2.96) 0.209 (0.32) 0.245 (0.38) 3.85** (5.80) 187.3** (20) 1,136 0.24 1,123

0.296** (6.21) 0.167 (1.01) 0.219** (8.25) 1.83** (6.86)

–0.064* (–2.35) 0.340** (4.06) 0.092** (5.90) 0.745** (4.98)

B. Perceptions of Congressional Performance (OLS Regression)

–0.629 (–0.80) 1.20 (1.54) 3.46** (4.40) 5.44** (6.68) 317.8** (20) 1,120

–0.080 (–1.76)

–0.049 (–1.07)

0.105 (1.87)

–0.417* (–2.34) 0.458** (3.06) –0.446** (–2.75) 1.02** (5.98) –0.087 (–0.14) –0.140 (–0.23) –0.375 (–0.61) 0.113 (0.85) –0.0022 (–0.50) 0.031 (0.26) 0.017 (0.36) 0.029 (0.57) 0.018 (0.42)

–0.019 (–0.71) 0.815** (8.39) 0.041** (2.87) 0.541** (3.99)

C. Feelings toward Republican Leaders in Congress (Ordered Logit)

–4.17** (–4.60) –2.55** (–2.87) –0.260 (–0.30) 1.58 (1.78) 241.4** (20) 1,120

0.045 (0.99)

–0.054 (–1.02)

–0.032 (–0.54)

0.042 (0.24) –0.940** (–5.40) 1.16** (6.81) –0.549** (–3.12) –0.392 (–0.54) –0.396 (–0.55) –0.415 (–0.58) 0.266* (2.03) –0.0053 (–1.14) 0.154 (1.27) –0.104* (–2.30) 0.072 (1.30) –0.014 (–0.29)

–0.095** (–3.44) –0.256** (–2.90) 0.044** (2.95) 0.423** (2.91)

D. Feelings toward Democratic Leaders in Congress (Ordered Logit)

–0.586 (–0.99) 1.46* (2.43) 1.79** (2.97) 3.13** (5.16) 104.1** (16) 1,219

–0.0089 (–0.10)

–0.011 (–0.27)

–0.047 (–0.99)

0.412** (2.73) 0.294 (1.81) –0.164 (–1.09) –0.090 (–0.54) 0.297 (0.67) 0.867 (1.92) 0.914* (2.02) –0.270* (–2.07) –0.0056 (–1.27) – –0.016 (–0.20) 0.023 (0.46) 0.048 (1.27)

0.135** (5.64) – – –

E. Internal Efficacy (Ordered Logit)

–0.078 (–0.11) 1.59* (2.28) 2.08** (2.99) 3.93** (5.52) 49.5** (16) 1,219

–0.016 (–0.19)

–0.013 (–0.33)

0.146** (3.26)

0.105 (0.66) 0.237 (1.49) 0.219 (1.44) 0.428** (2.69) 0.726 (1.31) 0.800 (1.41) 0.931 (1.66) 0.239 (1.91) –0.0056 (–1.24) – –0.055 (–0.77) 0.0041 (0.08) –0.069 (–1.83)

0.058* (2.49) – – –

F. External Efficacy (Ordered Logit)

Note: Z-values based on robust standard errors. All models incorporate the sample weights. Ad exposure measures based on House and Senate ads in models A, B, C, and D and on House, Senate, and gubernatorial ads in models E and F. *p < .05. **p < .01.

Political knowledge Presidential approval Perceived policy success Congressional representation of respondent’s views Liberal Conservative Democrat Republican High school degree Some college College degree Female Age Competitive House race Total ads Exposure pure attack ads Exposure contrast-more attack ads Exposure contrast-equal attack promote ads Exposure contrast-more promote ads Exposure pure promote ads _cut 1/constant _cut 2 _cut 3 _cut 4 Wald χ2 (df)/R2 Number of cases

Independent Variable

A. Approval of Congress (Ordered Logit)

Coefficient (z-Value)

Table 1 Models of Attitudes toward Congress and Efficacy (Influence of Exposure to Ads by Tone)

Jackson et al. / Impact of Negative Advertising 9

it may be that a narrower swath of ads, those that are the most inflammatory in content, do affect our respondents’ political attitudes. If there is a meaningful difference between critical and mudslinging, then our initial tests would be too coarse to permit definitive judgment of the case against negative ads. Second, it may be that some segments of the electorate are resistant to the more deleterious effects of negative ads, segments such as strong partisans and the politically sophisticated. To differentiate among attack ads, we employ the WiscAds researchers’ coding of adjectives used in ads to criticize opposing candidates. By developing numerical scores for the extent to which these words and phrases represent mudslinging, rather than legitimate criticism, we can determine whether the nastiest of attacks produce harmful effects on political attitudes. The models reported in Table 2 are identical to those in Table 1, but for the addition of our more refined measure of ad tone. Coefficients for the new variable provide no evidence that exposure to campaign mudslinging soured respondents’ views of politics and government. Five of the six coefficients for the new measure are positive, including the only effect (p