European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, 1959-77

St Antony’s Series General Editor: Richard Clogg (1999– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include:...

Author: Pilar Ortuno Anaya

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St Antony’s Series General Editor: Richard Clogg (1999– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Pilar Ortuño Anaya EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS AND SPAIN The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77 Renato Baumann (editor) BRAZIL IN THE 1990s An Economy in Transition Israel Getzler NIKOLAI SUKHANOV Chronicler of the Russian Revolution Arturo J. Cruz, Jr NICARAGUA’S CONSERVATIVE REPUBLIC, 1858–93 Pamela Lubell THE COMMUNIST PARTY DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION The Case of the Sixty-One Renegades Klaus Gallo GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA From Invasion to Recognition, 1806–26 Peter Mangold SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY Evaluating the Record, 1900–2000 Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi REFASHIONING IRAN Orientalism, Occidentalism and Nationalist Historiography Louise Haagh CITIZENSHIP, LABOUR MARKETS AND DEMOCRATIZATION Chile and the Modern Sequence Renato Colistete LABOUR RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN BRAZIL Greater São Paulo, 1945–60 Peter Lienhardt (edited by Ahmed Al-Shahi) SHAIKHDOMS OF EASTERN ARABIA John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (editors) TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC VIABILITY The Bolivian Experience Steve Tsang (editor) JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG

Karen Jochelson THE COLOUR OF DISEASE Syphilis and Racism in South Africa, 1880–1950 Julio Crespo MacLennan SPAIN AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1957–85 Enrique Cárdenas, José Antonio Ocampo and Rosemary Thorp (editors) AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA Volume 1: The Export Age Volume 2: Latin America in the 1930s Volume 3: Industrialization and the State in Latin America Jennifer G. Mathers THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SHIELD FROM STALIN TO YELTSIN Marta Dyczok THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND UKRAINIAN REFUGEES Mark Brzezinski THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND Suke Wolton LORD HAILEY, THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND EMPIRE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR The Loss of White Prestige Junko Tomaru THE POSTWAR RAPPROCHEMENT OF MALAYA AND JAPAN, 1945–61 The Roles of Britain and Japan in South-East Asia Eiichi Motono CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SINO-BRITISH BUSINESS, 1860–1911 The Impact of the Pro-British Commercial Network in Shanghai Nikolas K. Gvosdev IMPERIAL POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS GEORGIA, 1760–1819

St Antony’s Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71109–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

European Socialists and Spain The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77 Pilar Ortuño Anaya Research Assistant at the Cañada Blanch Centre London School of Economics

© Pilar Ortuño Anaya 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0–333–94927–7 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ortuño Anaya, Pilar, 1968– European socialists and Spain : the transition to democracy, 1959–77/Pilar Ortuño Anaya. p. cm.–– (St. Antony’s series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–94927–7 1. Socialism––Europe. 2. Labor movement––Europe. 3. Democratization––Spain. 4. Spain––Politics and government––1939–1975. 5. Spain––Politics and government––1975– I. Title. II. St. Antony’s series (Palgrave (Firm)) HX238.5 .O77 2001 320.946'09'045––dc21 2001048207 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

Contents

Foreword Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

vii ix xi

1

Introduction

2

The Socialist International 1960–77 1946–72 SI Commissions for Spanish affairs 1972–74 Going separate ways: the emergence of two distinct PSOEs 1974–77 Spain Committee: the guardian of Spanish Socialism Conclusions

18 19 19 24 24 33 33 43

3

The ICFTU 1960–77 1960–64 Defending the Spanish workers: the Joint ICFTU/IFCTU Committee 1960–62 The three action plans of the ICFTU 1962 1964–69 The ICFTU tarnishing Franco’s image 1964–65 In pursuit of unifying trade organisations 1966–69 ILO study group to Spain 1969 1970–77 A failed attempt to undermine Franco at the ILO 1970 Conclusions

45 48

The British Labour Movement 1959–77 1959–68 The establishment of the Spanish Democrats’ Defence Fund Committee (SDDC) Opposing the Spanish admission to NATO Approaching the Spanish opposition

71 71

4

1

48 51 54 54 55 59 63 63 69

73 78 81

vi

European Socialists and Spain

The SDDC initiatives: challenges and opportunities for the Labour Party Labour Party in power 1964: ‘wait and see’ policy 1969–77 Gathering information on Spain Anti-Franco Commission and protests in 1973 Supporting the process of democratisation Conclusions

85 89 96 97 102 107 116

5

The French Socialists 1959–77 1959–77 The French case: three characteristics The French connection: lobbying and financing 1959–68 France and Spain: love–hate relationship 1969–77 Conclusions

119 120 120 121 129 136

6

The German Socialists 1960–77 1960–68 Organisation of the Spanish workers in Germany by the DGB–UGT The SPD’s encounter with the Spanish reality The DGB solidarity with the UGT: the Bad Nauheim Conference The IG Metall endorsing ASO’s strategy The cancellation of Willy Brandt’s visit to Madrid 1969–77 German Socialists in favour of Spanish democratisation: solidarity with the Spanish Socialists The Spanish government giving in to German pressure: the Pardo affair Willy Brandt opposed the Spanish entry into the EEC The Friedrich Ebert Foundation: the German engine of Spanish democratisation Willy Brandt and Felipe González Conclusions

138 139

Conclusions

185

7

Notes Bibliography Index

139 145 150 152 157 157 158 166 170 171 174 182

189 225 239

Foreword

The transition in Spain from Franco’s dictatorship to a modern democracy was swift and dramatic. Within three years of Franco’s death in November 1975, political parties – including the Communist Party – were legalised, free general elections were held for a new parliament, and a thoroughly democratic, secular, devolutionary Constitution was adopted. Civil and political liberties swept through the ruins of what had recently seemed a strong, authoritarian regime. There was no civil war, no military coup, and no bloodshed. At the time, this rapid, peaceful transformation amazed both Spaniards and external observers, and in retrospect it seems almost more remarkable, because we now know that the political transition also stimulated the growth of a dynamic economy, opened the way to Spanish membership of the European Community and NATO, and triggered a stunning cultural renaissance. It is hardly surprising therefore, that the Spanish transition from dictatorship to democracy has attracted a large number of scholars eager to analyse its sources and stages. In the burgeoning field of transition studies, the Spanish case seems peculiarly successful. The economic and social changes of the 1960s and early 1970s which made the transition possible, and the political leaders and institutions that shaped it, have been thoroughly researched. So far, the main emphasis in this research has been, understandably, on circumstances and actions within Spain itself. But no transition of this magnitude happens in complete isolation from ideas and events elsewhere. It has long been acknowledged that the very existence of the European Economic Community, which Spain first applied to join in 1962, exerted complex pressures on Spain’s developing economy, while also inspiring hopes of a future within Europe instead of on its margins, among both opposition sectors and some of those who supported the dictatorship. Pilar Ortuño Anaya’s important research breaks new ground in the study of the international dimensions of the Spanish transition. She argues persuasively that not just the international political context, but quite specific individuals and organisations, made a significant contribution to the internal transition process. Dr Ortuño Anaya establishes for the first time the role played by European Socialist and trade union organisations, some of them international in scope, others embedded in particular countries, especially the German Social Democratic Party and vii

viii


its affiliated unions, and the Labour movement in the United Kingdom. They kept public attention focused on the Franco regime’s dismal record on human rights, when the internal opposition lacked the freedom or the resources to do so. They also supported and influenced the underground parties and unions of the left in Spain by practical help with funds, training, and external networks. It would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of this international solidarity, for a struggling and fragmented opposition within a dictatorship determined to keep Spain isolated from wider European political and ideological currents. Pilar Ortuño Anaya’s illuminating analysis is based on careful archival research in five countries, and enriched at crucial junctures by her correspondence and discussions with a number of the leading figures involved. Her work enables us to see that although the transition was made in Spain, it was aided and encouraged from outside. Frances Lannon Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford

Acknowledgements

This book evolved from my D.Phil. thesis submitted to the Modern History Faculty, Oxford University. I am extremely grateful to Dr Frances Lannon, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University, for her constant encouragement and stimulating guidance. I would like to thank Dr Tom Buchanan at the Department of Continuing Education, Oxford University, who examined the thesis and highlighted deficiencies. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Cañada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies at the London School of Economics and its director, Prof. Paul Preston for the financial support I have received to complete this book. Prof. Preston read the manuscript over carefully and made numerous constructive suggestions. While I was at St Antony’s College, I received invaluable support and inspiration from Lord Ralf Dahrendorf, Mrs J. Flitter, Dr Anne Deighton, Dr Anne C. Grocock, Mr Anthony Nicholls, Dr Charles Powell and Dr Steve Tsang. Their Antonian spirit gave the strength to face the challenge of undertaking and finishing this project. I am immensely thankful to Prof. Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua. I am also indebted to Mr Hans Matthöfer, Mr Laurence Whitehead, Dr Robert Boyce, Prof. Michael Pinto-Duschisky, Prof. Gilliam Peele and Prof. Richard Gillespie for generously reading and offering comments on key chapters of this manuscript. I must express my gratitude to those who hospitably shared their time and knowledge with me over the course of interviews, especially Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Mr Dieter Koniecki, the late Miss Jenny Little, Mr Jack Jones, Mr Carlos Pardo, Mr Pablo Castellano, Mr Antonio García Duarte and Mr Luis Ayala. A debt of gratitude also goes to Dr James Thompson, Dr Helen Graham and Dr Angel Smith and their students who taught me that teaching is the best way of learning. I would like to thank the staff of the Pablo Iglesias and Largo Caballero Foundations in Madrid, particularly, Ms Ester Ramos Ruiz and Mr Jesús Rodríguez Salvanes; Ms Mieke IJzermans at the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam; Dr Sebastian Balfour and Ms Marisa Maldonado at the Cañada Blanch Centre; Mr Joji Kijima, Mr Diego Muro Ruiz, Mr Christoph Raatz, and Mr Julius Walker and Mr Simon Usherwood at the LSE for their unfailing support. Nonetheless, this book’s errors remain my own. ix

x


Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to my parents Alfonso Ortuño Caballero and Pilar Anaya Peña, my brothers Alfonso and Angel and my sister Victoria in token of affection and gratitude. Pilar Ortuño Anaya London December 2000

List of Abbreviations

Spanish Organisations AECE AS ASO ASU CC.OO CNS CNT COS ETA FLP FRAP FST FUDE FUGTA IBRD MSC NED OEEC PCE PSI PSOE

Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea (Spanish Association for European Co-operation) Alianza Sindical (Trade Union Alliance), created in 1961 by the UGT, the STV and the CNT Alianza Sindical Obrera (Workers’ Trade Union Alliance) Agrupación Socialista Universitaria (University Socialist Organisation) Comisiones Obreras (Workers’ Commissions) Confederación Nacional Sindicalista (National Confederation of Syndicates) Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Labour Confederation) Coordinadora de Organizaciones Sindicales (Co-ordinator of Trade Union Organisations) Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty) Frente de Liberación Popular (Popular Liberation Front) Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico (Revolutionary Anti-fascist and Patriotic Front) Federación Sindical de Trabajadores (Workers’ Trade Union Federation) Federación Universitaria Democrática Española (Spanish Democratic University Federation) Federación de la UGT en Alemania (UGT Federation in Germany) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Moviment Socialista de Catalunya (Socialist Movement of Catalonia) National Endowment for Democracy Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Partido Comunista Español (Spanish Communist Party) Partido Socialista del Interior (Socialist Party of the Interior) Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) xi

xii


PSOE(h) PSOE(r) SOCC SODC STV UFD UGT USO

Partido Socialista Obrero Español histórico (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, historic sector) Partido Socialista Obrero Español renovado (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, renovated sector) Solidaritat d’Obrers Catalans Cristians (Catalan Christian Workers’ Solidarity) Secretariado de Ordenación Democrática de Cataluña (Secretariat for the Democratic Organisations of Catalonia) Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (Basque Workers’ Solidarity) Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas (Union of Democratic Forces) Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers’ Union) Unión Sindical Obrera (Workers’ Trade Union)

Non-Spanish Organisations AFL-CIO

American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CDU-CSU Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Party, Federal Republic of Germany) CERES Centre d’Études de Recherches et d’Éducation (France) CFDT Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Confederation of Labour) CGT-FO Confédération Générale du Travail-Force Ouvrière (General Confederation of Labour-Workers’ Force, France) CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA) DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union Federation, Federal Republic of Germany) EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Area ETUC European Trade Union Congress FDP Freie Demokratische Partie (Free Democratic Party, Federal Republic of Germany) GdED Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner Deutschlands (Railway Workers’ Union of Germany) ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions IFCTU International Federation of Christian Trade Unions IG Metall Industrie Gewerkschaft Metall (West German Metalworkers’ Union) ILO International Labour Office of the United Nations IMF International Monetary Fund

List of Abbreviations

ITS MFA MRG NATO NEC NUM OECD OEEC PCF PS PSU SDDC SFIO SI SPD TGWU TUC UN WCL WFTU

xiii

International Trade Secretariat of the ICFTU Movimiento da Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement, Portugal) Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (Left Radicals, France) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Executive Committee of the Labour Party (United Kingdom) National Union of Mineworkers (United Kingdom) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation for European Economic Co-operation Parti Communiste Français (French Communist Party) Parti Socialiste (French Socialist Party) Parti Socialiste Unifié (Unified Socialist Party, France) Spanish Democrats’ Defence Committee of the Labour Party (United Kingdom) Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (French Socialist Party, later the PS) Socialist International Sozialdemokratische Partie Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany, Federal Republic of Germany) Transport and General Workers’ Union (United Kingdom) Trades Union Congress (United Kingdom) United Nations World Confederation of Labour World Federation of Trade Unions

1 Introduction

One of the most unknown characteristics of the Spanish transition to democracy has been the international dimension of the process and the impact and significance that external factors and actors have had on the process, particularly the role they played in promoting democratisation in Spain. This book examines one particular external actor that supported the Spanish democratisation, the left-wing forces in the main Western European democracies. Therefore, this book is a study of the interactions between external non-state actors and domestic opposition forces during the Franco regime. In recent years there has been a substantial amount of interest in the study of global trends in democratisation. Scholars have been particularly attracted to democratisation in the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa.1 This book is a contribution to the further understanding of one particular process, that which took place in Spain. Democracy is most simply defined by Robert A. Dahl as ‘polyarchy’, ‘a political order distinguished by the presence of seven institutions all of which must exist for a government to be classified as polyarchy: elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive suffrage; right to run for office; freedom of expression; alternative information; associational autonomy’.2 Therefore, the process of democratisation is the mechanism of transition from an authoritarian regime to such a political order. The next question that arises is when the process starts and when it ends. Geoffrey Pridham sees the beginning of the transitional process as the point when the authoritarian system begins to be dismantled, and the end where democracy starts to operate.3 The beginning can be marked by visible events such as the death of a dictator. For democracy to operate, there must be political parties and, therefore, a pre-transitional period often serves as a preparation time for the organisation of those political 1

2


parties. During authoritarian regimes, the formation of political parties was necessarily carried out by underground and/or exiled movements. This pre-transitional period was very important in the case of Spain. As Edward Malefakis says: In Spain, however, events after 20 November 1975 would be completely incomprehensible if one did not understand what had transpired during the previous two decades ... Democracy in Spain was made possible only because it was preceded by a long period of what might loosely be called protodemocratisation.4 Thus, the whole process of democratisation in Spain can be divided as follows. Firstly, there was a ‘protodemocratisation’ period from 1959 to 1975, during which political opposition to Franco’s regime was being shaped. Secondly, there was the period of transition to democracy per se which was initiated on 20 November 1975, the date of the death of Francisco Franco, who had ruled Spain for 36 years in an authoritarian regime. There are some differences of opinion over when the Spanish transition ended: the political scientist, Juan J. Linz argues that the Spanish democratic process ended with the Constitution of 1978,5 whereas the historian Paul Preston considered that with the Socialist victory in the election of 28 October 1982, the transition was over and ‘real change could now begin’.6 However, although both of these events were important for democracy in Spain, it had already cut free from its past with the free general elections on 15 June 1977, in which all the political parties took part, and which produced a new government by universal suffrage. Normal democracy had, therefore, began to operate. Accordingly, this study will conclude in 1977. Both in the protodemocratisation and the transitional period, internal forces have usually played the central role in the establishment of democracy. As Laurence Whitehead states: In all the peacetime cases considered here internal forces were of primary importance in determining the course and outcome of the transition attempt, and international factors played only a secondary role. But this generalization only holds for a particular geographical area and in a specific historical period.7 This statement acknowledges the fact that international dimensions affecting the course and outcome of the transition to democracy may,

Introduction

3

in certain historical circumstances, play an important role. Whitehead argues that ‘where from an internal viewpoint prospects for democracy seemed finely balanced quite a modest impetus from outside might tip the outcome one way or another’8 and cites two examples, Portugal in 1975 and the Dominican Republic in 1978. The significance of international aspects of democratisation has been only recently investigated. There is no consensus amongst scholars as to the relative importance of these factors. Opinion is divided between those who claim that international dimensions of democratisation lacked real significance, and those who argue that external influences played a substantial role. Laurence Whitehead belongs in the first group. However, in 1996 he reevaluated the significance of the international aspect of democratisation and arrived at a more positive conclusion about the international context. He grouped the international aspects of democratisation into three categories: contagion, an unintentional and indirect form of spreading democracy from one country to another, that is, a ‘snowballing effect’; control, the promotion of democracy through intervention of one country in another, as in cases of democratisation through decolonisation or US government initiatives; and consent which involves ‘a complex set of interactions between international processes and democratic groups that generates new democratic norms and expectations from below’. Although he concludes by saying that ‘whether the appropriate perspective for studying a given issue is contagion, control or consent it may be artificial to dichotomize the analysis into domestic and international elements’, Whitehead recognises that ‘two thirds of the democracies existing in 1990 owed their origins at least in part to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention from without’.9 A more specific assessment of the international dimension of democratisation is made in a particular study called Democratization in the South. The Jagged Wave. In this case, Whitehead argues that the impact of international support for democratisation in the South had been rather limited.10 Philippe C. Schmitter also reconsidered the role played by external factors and global context. Schmitter added a fourth category to the previous categories proposed by Whitehead, the so-called ‘conditionality’ related to international policies and initiatives of multilateral character, involving international consultation and negotiations.11 Previously, Schmitter has also claimed that ‘external actors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role with the obvious exception of those instances in which a foreign occupying power was present’.12 On the other hand, Samuel P. Huntington has pointed out that external actors significantly helped what he termed the third wave of democratisation, which

4


transformed about 30 countries, mainly in Southern Europe and Latin America, between 1974 and 1990. For Huntington, especially by the late 1980s, the Vatican, the European Community, the United States and the Soviet Union had in one way or another actively stimulated liberalisation and democratisation.13 From the literature, it appears that the terminology of the international aspects (factors and actors) needs defining in order to assess each contribution. The international dimensions that can influence the democratisation process within a country are twofold: firstly, the occurrence of international factors, such as changes in international economic circumstances affecting, favourably or not, the internal political situation. As Alfred Tovias concludes referring to Southern Europe: The international economic context has certainly not facilitated democratic consolidation in Greece, Spain and Portugal, although it may be said to have contributed to the acceleration of the transition from dictatorship to democracy (in particular in Spain).14 Philippe Schmitter also recognises that sometimes changes at the international level could affect a democratic transition. These changes might include war, terrorism, trade depressions, and shifts in international allegiances.15 Therefore, the international factors are those political and economic circumstances and exceptional events occurring outside the countries that may affect the process of democratisation. Pridham similarly points out that several types of international factors, including the international political environment, international events, and socioeconomic pressures for modernisation, can affect the democratic transition.16 Paul W. Drake identifies four international factors that have an impact on the process of democratisation or that facilitate the transition to democracy: economic impacts such as prior economic growth, international depression and debt crisis, globalisation, neoliberalism and new technologies; the imperial past, such as the impact of the United States and Western Europe and changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; ideological impacts like liberalism, human rights and religious changes; and the domino impact. Drake also notes that ‘near the end of the twentieth century, international factors had an extraordinary impact, partly because of globalisation of capitalism and communication, eroding national barriers to penetration’.17 Moreover, the recent book edited by Jean Grugel, Democracy without Borders. Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies also

Introduction

5

recognises and demonstrates the impact of transnational factors and non-state actors on democratisation processes. Indeed, Grugel argues: Many democratizations in Latin America, sub-Sahara Africa and Central and Eastern Europe were initiated as a result of international pressures or the activities of actors from outside the states concerned. Democratization emerged as a global trend in large part due to international pressures from a range of global actors: the US, the European Union, the World Bank, and internationally significant aid agencies and non-governmental organizations. International factors are also shaping the outcomes and the political struggles which are taking place as democracy is – or fails to be – consolidated.18 The main conclusion of this study is that ‘democratization is the result of the interaction between domestic groups, actors external to the state in transition and the global environment’. Besides, the book entitled Democracy Assistance. International Cooperation for Democratization provides an account of the recent developments regarding donors of democracy assistance, which include the United Nations, the European Union, Germany’s Stiftungen; the contribution of multilateral development banks and agencies in the United States. It also analyses democratic support in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Russia.19 Burnell makes a distinction between democracy promotion and democracy assistance. According to the author, democracy promotion ‘can include all manner of development assistance designed to advance the social, economic and other conditions that experts believe would be beneficial to democracy’ and ‘designed to bring about a democratic “opening” or breakthrough, as well as lend support to democratic transitions that are already in train and democratic consolidation’. Democracy assistance are those ‘efforts that are focused directly on democracy’s political variables, to the exclusion of democracy’s supporting conditions’ and ‘can be applied only to a process of democratization that has already begun’. The second dimension is the role played by international actors. These can be international organisations and institutions such as the EEC, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the ILO, foreign governments, political movements, trade unions, pressure groups, and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International. Recently, Larry Diamond has acknowleged the importance of national and multinational actors in promoting democracy. Promoters of democracy include governments such as the United States; state agencies; NGOs like the German foundations or Stiftunge or the National

6


Endowment for Democracy (NED) and regional and international organisations like the United Nations or the European Community/ European Union and the Organisation of American States. He examines the main mechanism used by those international actors to support democracy. This may be political assistance such as help with elections or political institution building, or economic assistance and diplomatic pressure such as sanctions and aid conditionality. Looking at the significance of international actors in providing assistance to countries in the process of democratisation, he argues that ‘in many newly democratic and transitional countries, international actors would appear to have real scope to influence the course of political development’.20 Diamond confirms this argument when he recognises that ‘one of the distinctive feature of the third wave is the considerable contribution that external actors have made to democratic development by enhancing the resources, skills, techniques, ideas, linkages and the legitimacy of civil society organisations, civic educations efforts, the mass media, legislatures, local governments, judicial systems, political parties and election commissions in the developing and postcommunist worlds’.21 More particular regional studies analyse the influence of the international factors and actors on the process of democratisation in regions such as Eastern Europe, Russia or Latin America. Concerning the international dimension of post-communist transition in Russia and the new states in Eurasia, Karen Dawisha and Michael Turner conclude that ‘external actors do play a significant role in supporting and furthering reform, and that role proceeds not only by setting conditions, but also by engaging in dialogue, gaining voluntary consent to change and by acting as a model’.22 In the case of Latin America, the role of external actors and actions played in promoting democracy have been widely acknowledged. Particular attention has been paid to external actors such as the US government which has facilitated democratic transitions, together with the transnational network of NGOs such as National Endowment for Democracy and the European Party Foundations and international human rights organisations, which have also been significant in assisting democratic transitions.23 Regarding Eastern Europe, Geoffrey Pridham claims that the international dimension has been a major determinant of the democratisation process of those countries. The EC’s influence together with the role played by international organisations like the CSCE and the Council of Europe, gave a great impulse to the promotion of democracy and democratic reforms in Eastern Europe, providing economic and political support for the new democracies. Tomas Niklasson takes into account the correlation between the changes

Introduction

7

in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and the development in Eastern and Central Europe during 1988 and 1989. In his view the most important external influence was the ‘soviet connection’.24 In many cases, international factors and actors have clearly exercised a strong influence on processes of democratisation. In the case of Spain, attention has been focused on the study of the internal process of democratic transition and consolidation. In particular, historians have focused on the role played by political actors such as King Juan Carlos, the main political parties, and interest groups such as trade unions and the Church. There has also been an emphasis on the longerterm changes in the Spanish economy and society that pre-dated the death of Franco – for instance, the liberalisation of the economy, changes in the class structure, and the declining political influence of Catholicism.25 However, very little attention has been paid by historians and political scientists to international factors and actors in the Spanish process of democratic transition. These include international organisations such as the EEC, the Council of Europe and NATO; the bilateral links between Spain and Western Europe and the USA; foreign political parties and trade unions and transnational political organisations such as the Socialist International. In the case of Southern Europe, the impact of European integration influenced the transitional period in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Juan Linz claims that the international influence was not critical for the Spanish transition and consolidation but that it was certainly systematically supportive.26 Similarly, Pridham argues that the way in which the Spanish transition took place by elite negotiations left little room for foreign intervention. 27 A more positive approach to the international influence on the Spanish process is given by the historian Charles T. Powell. Several articles by Powell throw some light on the subject. He analyses the international context of the Spanish transition, international factors, and also the role played by international actors. These included the USA and the USSR, European governments, the EEC and the European Parliament, the non-governmental transnational organisations such as the Socialist International and the World Christian Democratic Union, and the political foundations. He concludes that the international dimension, particularly West European actors – national governments, multinational institutions, transnational party organisations and political foundations – of the Spanish process played an outstanding role, such that ‘external support helped to protect and strengthen the democratic opposition during the last years of the Franco regime and the decisive phase of transition’.28

8


This book supports that positive evaluation. In particular it will demonstrate that, over a longer period, Socialist and trade union organisations outside Spain, and also outside the Spanish émigré community, played an active and influential role in the consolidation of Socialist and trade union organisation inside Spain. These external actors were more involved, and for longer, than those belonging to other political traditions. The eventual political triumph of the Socialist Party in the general elections of October 1982 was won inside Spain. But, as its leaders had long recognised, the preparation of a democratic political culture in Spain and, within that, the strengthening of the PSOE and the Socialist unions, had been helped by external interest and contacts. More research needs to be done to understand the contribution of external actors on the Spanish transitional period. Several European political organisations were interested in Spain, but the international Socialist family was the group that took the most intransigent stand against the non-democratic nature of the Franco regime, compared to the position held by European Christian Democrats and Conservatives. Spain had been the great unresolved cause of the European left ever since the 1930s. The Socialist group in the European Parliament could always be relied on to protest actively against the negotiations between Spain and the EEC. From the first Spanish application in 1962, the Socialist group kept the non-democratic nature of the Franco regime to the foreground in all discussions about Spain’s desire for closer association. Moreover and more importantly, constant criticism of the Franco regime, and constant repetition of the Birkelbach criteria,29 which virtually established the political conditions for a country to be associated with the EEC – namely parliamentary democracy – made it extremely difficult for negotiations between the Franco regime and the EEC ever to go as far or fast as Spain and some European Conservatives wanted. In principle, the Socialist group was in favour of Spain, and therefore of the Spanish people, joining the European Community, since Spain was historically, culturally and geographically part of Europe. A Spain with Franco in power, however, was utterly unacceptable because of the authoritarian nature of the regime. Their opposition was to Franco and not to Spain. The Socialist group of the European Parliament can be viewed as representative of the entire European Socialist family. Although the European Parliament did not have the power to decide on enlargement of the EEC, the Socialist members in particular used it as a forum to criticise the Franco regime’s lack of democratic and civil rights credentials for membership. Throughout these years, the Socialists contributed to the twin processes of denying

Introduction

9

external legitimacy to the Franco regime and succouring its internal opponents, both of which were essential for eventual democratisation. It has also been widely recognised by, among others, analysts Beate Kohler and Richard Gunther, that other European Socialists and trade unionists gave recognition and substantial moral and financial support to their Spanish counterparts, the PSOE and the UGT.30 The PSOE benefited from formal recognition and financial support from the Socialist International, and, in particular, the West German Social Democratic party (SPD). (Gunther) The PSOE has been given effective long term support both by the Socialist International and by the Confederation of European Socialists and Social Democrats. The multilateral and bilateral support of individual sister organizations was particularly important during the transition. (Kohler) The most important of these organisations to take an interest in Spain were: the Socialist International (SI), a worldwide organisation of Socialist, social democratic and labour parties; the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which embraces the most important European and extra-European free trade unions; the British Labour movement, comprising the Labour Party and the TUC (Trades Union Congress); the French Socialist Party, SFIO, later PS and the CGT-FO (French Socialist Union); and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the German Trade Union Federation (DGB). The book will examine the activities of all of these, and assess their contribution to the construction of a democratic political Socialist opposition, able to oppose Francoism and eventually displace it. The SI’s involvement in support of the PSOE stemmed from the historical links between the two: the PSOE had been one of the founder members of the SI in 1951. One explicit aim of the SI was ‘to assist morally and materially democratic Socialist forces fighting underground or from exile against dictatorial regimes in their own countries’.31 Similarly, the UGT had close links with the ICFTU. The UGT attended the Congress in London in December 1949 that drew up the constitution of the ICFTU, and Pascual Tomás, General Secretary of the UGT, was appointed a member of the Executive Board of the ICFTU.32 As in the case of the SI, the ICFTU gave priority to the fight against dictatorship and the support for democratic opposition in the struggle for trade union rights.33 Numerous figures 34 in the British Labour movement had been involved in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) as members of the International

10


Brigades, and the subsequent senior position of some of them within the Labour Party and trade unions was a decisive factor shaping concern about the Spanish situation. For many in the British Labour movement, involvement in support of Spanish Socialists and trade unionists was a moral obligation. Franco was still the enemy, as he had been in the 1930s, and ending his dictatorship remained an important aim. In the case of France, the shared history and destiny between French and Spanish Socialists, which had solidified over the course of the French permission of Spanish refugees during the Spanish Civil War and the Spanish participation in the Resitance against Hitler, was revived after the Second World War. This time it was the cause of Spanish Socialists refugees’ struggle against Franco. The location of the PSOE in exile, in Toulouse, was a further factor that made the French–Spanish cooperation inevitable. For the German Socialists, the influx of Spanish workers into Germany in the 1960s and the consequent involvement of the UGT created a particular awareness of the political situation in Spain. Francisco Román Díaz suggests another possible reason for the German Social Democrats’ concern about Spanish affairs. He correlates the Social Democrats’ intervention in favour of the Spanish Socialists with a supposed ‘guilt complex’ for their alleged role in the success of the Nazis and the latter’s contribution to Franco’s victory during the Civil War.35 Whatever the truth of that might be, the German Socialist movement was anxious that Franco’s dictatorship should not be replaced by a Communist one. Even more strongly than in the case of the British Labour movement, the Germans were determined to try and ensure that a strong Spanish Socialism and a unified union organisation would keep out any Communist alternative. Both the British and the German Labour movements were also among the biggest and most important organisations within the SI and the ICFTU. The purpose of this book is to investigate how the activities of European Socialists helped the organisation of a meaningful and structured Socialist opposition, especially the PSOE and the UGT, in the period between 1959 and the general elections of 1977. In particular, the book will examine the role of the Socialist International, the Labour Party, the French Socialist Party and the SPD, and the ICFTU, TUC, CGT-FO and DGB amongst the labour organisations. All of these helped to consolidate the PSOE and the UGT through a plethora of contacts, and by contributing financial, practical and moral support. These Socialist external actors also put pressure both on Franco’s governments and on their own respective governments, in a series of attempts to modify the regime and its actions. Consequently, this research seeks to argue that European Socialist and

Introduction

11

trade union organisations were prominent among the external actors at a time when crucial external factors, especially the continuance of the Cold War and the economic expansion of the European Economic Community, gave external actors both scope and motivation. The book covers the period from 1959 to 1977. After the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), the Franco regime had adopted an economic policy of autarky.36 The autarkic economy, highly controlled by the government, led by the late 1950s to a deficit in the balance of payments which provoked a serious economic crisis. After 20 years of autarky, the new government appointed in February 1957 planned to replace it with a market economy. Its members were popularly known as ‘the technocrats’ (tecnócratas), among them members of the religious order Opus Dei such as Laureano López Rodó, General Technical Secretary for the Undersecretary of the Presidency, Alberto Ullastres, Minister of Commerce, and Mariano Navarro Rubio, Minister of Finance.37 To incorporate Spain into the international economy, which would allow Spain to establish a stable rate of exchange and to widen foreign trade, Spain needed to be part of international organisations. In 1958, Spain joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/World Bank), and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). With the financial and advisory assistance of the IMF and the OEEC,38 the technocratic administration adopted a new stabilisation plan to liberalise and modernise the economy. The programme had five key components: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)

the reduction of inflation, curbing the rise in prices and adjusting the balance of payments; the liberalisation of exchange rates to promote the international integration of the Spanish economy; the removal of the interventionist policy in order to let private enterprises innovate in the productive process; the search for external markets to widen internal demand; and the promotion of foreign investment and international support.39

After a period of stabilisation from 1959 to 1961, this liberalisation initiated ‘the greatest cycle of industrialization and prosperity that Spain had ever known’.40 Three factors: – foreign investment and revenues from tourism and from emigration – played a key role in Spanish economic growth throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 41 Spain’s application for association with the EEC in 1962 was an important and, from the point

12


of view of the regime, a logical and necessary part of this process of economic re-orientation. Before the economic take-off, however, Spain experienced a sharp recession which inevitably adversely affected Spanish workers.42 The workers who were part of the official syndicates, however, had a new instrument of protest against low wages and bad working conditions and ‘a legal arena for direct confrontation with the ruling class’43 through the 1958 Law on Collective Bargaining (Ley de Convenios Colectivos) which had been introduced within the Spanish Syndical Organisation. The new law made wages and systems of remuneration subject to the negotiations between workers and employers themselves: either directly through the Jurado de Empresa [shop-floor representation] or more indirectly through their representatives in the syndical organisation.44 The economic changes, which produced great dissatisfaction among workers, and the extension of collective bargaining, contributed to the emergence of the working-class movement and the increase of workingclass activity.45 This social unrest culminated in the 1962 wave of strikes which affected Asturias, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Andalucia and Madrid – and led to the declaration of a state of emergency for three months in two of the four Basque provinces and throughout Asturias. The strikes had an economic connotation rather than a political one.46 Indeed, it was a paradox that while Spain tried to integrate in Europe, its own economic modernisation brought social tensions that made blatantly apparent the authoritarian nature of the Franco regime. During the 1960s an underground opposition began to emerge. On the left, the Communist Party emerged as the most important opposition force in the interior.47 The PSOE, with its leadership in exile, began to develop an organisation inside Spain which would later prompt a split within the party and would end up with the SI intervening in the conflict in 1972. Other opposition groups that emerged included the Christian Democrats around Gil Robles, Jiménez Fernández and Joaquín Ruiz Jiménez, Liberal Monarchists around Joaquín Satrústegui and Social Democrats around Dionisio Ridruejo. The first joint action of the democratic opposition took place in 1962, four months after the Spanish application to join the EEC, when the fourth Congress of the European Movement gathered in Munich. Present were 80 opposition members based in Spain and 38 exiles, mainly Christian Democrats, Monarchists and Socialists (although excluding the Communists). The democratic opposition was aware that integration into Europe could strengthen Franco’s regime by granting it

Introduction

13

international legitimacy, and therefore opposed the admission of Spain until a democratic government was restored. During the 1960s, government rhetoric was to insist that Spain was a true democracy though it used the word in a very different way from the one used by the opposition. No real democratic changes were introduced. In 1967, the Organic Law of the State, approved on 14 December 1966 in a referendum, maintained the six Fundamental Laws: the Fuero (Charter) of Work (March 1938); the Law constituting the Cortes (July 1942); the Fuero of the Spaniards (July 1945); the Law of the Referendum (October 1945); the Law of Succession (July 1947) and the Law of the Principles of the National Movement (May 1958).48 Therefore, the structures on which the regime had rested since the end of the Civil War survived intact. The question of a successor to Franco was solved in 1969. On 22 July 1969, Juan Carlos was proclaimed the successor and swore loyalty to Franco, to the Principles of the Movement and the Fundamental Laws.49 From 1969 until Franco’s death aperturistas (those who believed that the regime must be ‘opened’) like Manuel Fraga or José Solís, tried, without success, to liberalise the regime, for example with the law of political association of 1969. They always met the opposition of the continuistas (who resisted any change), such as the new Prime Minister Admiral Carrero Blanco, appointed in October 1969, and the technocrats of the Opus Dei.50 The new Carrero administration hardened its oppressive measures against growing working-class and student unrest, as in the case of the wave of strikes throughout Spain in September/October 1971. Another component that contributed to the radicalisation of the regime was the emergence of ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askasasuna) in the Basque country by the end of the 1960s as a fierce enemy of the regime. In 1970, the trial of ETA militants in Burgos provoked international criticism and a worldwide campaign against the death sentences. Once again the regime found itself disqualified for EEC membership on the grounds of its lack of civil and democratic credentials. After Carrero’s assassination by ETA on 20 December 1973, Carlos Arias Navarro was appointed Prime Minister. He proposed a new political programme – the so called Spirit of 12 February – which contemplated a democratic opening-up of the regime and a project for political associations. The continuistas criticised the programme in the press and the disputes between the two sectors of the regime, continuistas and inmobilistas, became very bitter.51 No real democratic measures were implemented and two serious crises followed, with first the execution of the Catalan anarchist Salvador Puig Antich on 2 March 1974, and then

14


in February 1974 the threat of expulsion of Monsignor Añoveros Antunes, Bishop of Bilbao, because of a homily which defended the customs and political rights of ethnic minorities. 52 These two events provoked numerous international protests against the regime, and, in the case of the EEC, led to a stiffening of attitude in the European Parliament, particularly in the Socialist group. In the meantime, part of the democratic opposition joined in a common front. The PCE and some politicians linked to Don Juan de Borbón (Calvo Serer and Trevijano) established the Democratic Junta in Paris in July 1974. Later they were joined by the Socialists of Tierno Galván, the Carlists of Carlos Hugo, the Workers’ Commissions, the Marxist Party of Labour and other groups. The Junta demanded a ‘democratic break’ (ruptura democrática) with the regime, the formation of a provisional government, an amnesty, legalisation of all political parties, the restoration of all democratic freedoms, autonomy of the regions and a referendum to decide upon the form of state. Other opposition groups decided not to join the Junta, mainly because of the predominant role played by the Communists. The PSOE, the Social Democratic Party of Ridruejo (USDE), the Democratic Left of Ruiz Jimenez (ID), the Catalan and Basque parties, two parties of the radical left as well as those Carlists who had left the Democratic Junta, decided to create the Platform of Convergence in July 1975. In March 1976, the Democratic Junta and the Platform of Convergence united in an opposition front called the Democratic Coordination, which also sought a ‘democratic break’. During 1975, labour and social unrest increased, with large numbers of strikes and a rise in ETA terrorist activities. In September 1975, the execution of five terrorists from ETA and FRAP again provoked a wave of international criticism and led to the EEC Council of Ministers freezing relations with Spain. On 20 November 1975 Franco died and King Juan Carlos, the new Head of State, was the best guarantee for the continuity of the institutions and spirit of Francoism. Juan Carlos confirmed Arias Navarro as President of the government. The new Cabinet included prominent Francoists but also reformists like Manuel Fraga Iribarne and José Maria de Areilza. Arias Navarro proposed disappointing reforms on 28 January which contemplated the legalisation of political parties with the exception of the Communists and separatists, the creation of a two-Chamber Parliament, and the regulation of the rights of assembly. But neither a new electoral law nor the possibility of elections was mentioned. In March 1976, the opposition united in the Democratic Coordination demanded a ‘democratic break’. Across the country, as a consequence of the distressing economic situation and also the demand for regional

Introduction

15

autonomy in Catalonia and the Basque country, there were waves of demonstrations, strikes, terrorist activities and police violence.53 On 28 April 1976 Arias Navarro presented to the Cortes a programme of political reforms, ignoring the question of amnesty, rejecting the possibility of opening a constituent period, and limiting his reforms to a bicameral system with a corporative Senate and Congress. In July 1976 Arias Navarro was dismissed by the King after failing to gain acceptance of his proposals for limited democracy. Adolfo Suárez was appointed as the new President of the government. Suárez carried out a strategy of reform that used the legal institutions of Francoism to bring about democracy ( a ‘democratisation from above’).54 The Law for Political Reform, which was passed by the Francoist Cortes on the initiative of Suárez, dissolved the Assembly and opened the way for general elections. Most of the opposition campaigned for mass abstention in the Referendum to ratify the Law for Political Reform, but nevertheless the electorate backed the Law on 15 December 1976. Between February and April 1977 most political parties, including the Communists, were legalised and the staterun unions were dissolved. On 22 June 1977 the first democratic elections produced a democratic Parliament, consisting of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. Accordingly, Spain at last became acceptable to the EEC on political and civil rights grounds. Democratisation had been achieved. Internal agents had included, to the surprise of many, not just the opposition but also, crucially, the King, and Francoist institutions. But external actors too, in these years of pre-transition and transition, played a substantial role. This book analyses the role of Socialist and trade union organisations outside Spain in criticising the Franco regime and helping the Socialist opposition in Spain, throughout the long process of protodemocratisation and democratisation. This work relies primarily on sources from political parties and trade unions. The major primary sources are materials such as reports, correspondence, minutes, circulars, statements and press releases. The dispersion of the primary sources in four European countries – Britain, Germany, Holland and Spain – made the gathering of the material a more difficult task but, at the same time, more challenging. In all the chapters, material has been used from both sides of the story. In the case of the German chapter, very little relevant material was found in the German archives. This gap has been covered using correspondence from German leaders, and German reports of activities sent to their Spanish colleagues which are to be found in the Spanish archives. Detailed discussions of this chapter with Hans Matthöfer, a pivotal member of the SPD and the IG Metall during the period on which this research is focused, and Carlos

16


Pardo, an ASO and UGT member working in Germany, have helped guard against any possible misinterpretation of the facts. Their information and guidance are invaluable. Newspapers like Servicio de Prensa, El Socialista, El País and The Times, have been very useful too. Oral sources have also been part of this research. Oral interviews and written comments from some PSOE members and several European parties and trade union leaders have been particularly useful for an accurate assessment of the historical circumstances. Also relevant for this research was attendance at two summer courses organised by the Universidad Complutense in El Escorial (Madrid). The first one took place on 10 August 1994 and examined the last Congress of the PSOE in exile organised in Suresnes (Paris) from 11 to 13 October 1974, where Felipe González was elected General Secretary of the PSOE. The second one from 10 to 14 July 1995 entitled ‘La transición política española’ explored the transition from several angles: politics, the Church, the economy, the press, the army and the exiles. Politicians involved in the process including Rodolfo Martín Villa, Pedro Pérez Llorca, Gabriel Cisneros, Jordi Solé Turá, Santiago Carrillo, Elias Llanes and Marcelino Camacho, gave a full account of their views and experiences. In December 1995, the Conference organised by the Contemporary History Department of the UNED (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia) entitled Historia de la transición y consolidación democrática en España 1976–198655 examined the Spanish transition from several viewpoints: the international perspective, Spanish foreign policy, the political transition and political parties, the economy and the European Community, social changes, trade unions, and regionalism. The author presented a paper at this conference, ‘El movimiento británico y España (1974–1977)’.56 It was also worthwhile to attend the International Conference on ‘Political Foundations: National and International Experience’ organised by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn) from 20 to 22 May 1996 in Bad Munstereifel, Germany. The national and international aims of the Socialist political foundations and the relations between them and the political parties and governmental bodies were discussed. It was extremely useful to attend the lecture about the involvement of the Ebert Foundation in Spain given by its director Dieter Koniecki. He confirmed that the role of the Ebert Foundation was to help the PSOE and the UGT, especially because the Communist Party was perceived as a powerful and dangerous threat. He described the settingup of the Ebert Foundation in Madrid in 1975 and the assistance given from December 1977 to set up the Fundación Pablo Iglesias and the Fundación Largo Caballero.

Introduction

17

All the sources helped to form and test the main hypothesis of the book, namely that international actors played a part in the Spanish transition, and that particularly the international Socialist family contributed positively to the complex process of delegitimising the Franco regime and consolidating the Socialist opposition. Evidence from Socialist and trade union archives, and from interviews with major participants indicates strongly that, in order to be complete, any study of the transition to democracy in Spain should include an analysis of the important international component. The book will be structured as follows. Chapter 2 deals with the involvement of the Socialist International (SI) in Spanish affairs from 1960 to 1977, particularly focusing on the role played by the SI in the recognition of the PSOE(r) in 1974. Chapter 3 analyses the actions taken by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) during the period 1960–77 against the Franco government and in aid of Spanish trade unions. Its aims were to encourage concerted action against the regime, to encourage unity amongst trade union organisations working in Spain, and to support workers financially during the numerous strikes that took place during the period. In Chapter 4, the emphasis will be on the involvement of the British Labour movement in Spanish political affairs from the creation of the Spanish Democrats’ Defence Committee (SDDC) in 1959 up to 1977 and the key role played by the Labour Party in the recognition of the PSOE renovado by the SI. Chapter 5 analyses the French Socialists from 1969 to 1977, and how they kept the PSOE/UGT alive at a crucial moment, when the French government was in favour of establishing links with Franco’s Spain. Chapter 6 looks at the German Labour movement, from 1960 to 1977, particularly the ‘ASO (Alianza Sindical Obrera) affair’, and analyses how and why the IG Metall took an independent policy from the DGB in supporting this group instead of the UGT. It also assesses the importance of the role played by Hans Matthöfer, and the relationship established between Willy Brandt and Felipe González. The book seeks to show that European Socialists and trade unionists played a more relevant and crucial role as external actors in the complex process of democratisation in Spain than has usually been acknowledged.

2 The Socialist International 1960–77

The Socialist International was founded in its modern form in 1951, and was strongly committed to solidarity with people living under dictatorships. It therefore took a lively interest in underground Socialist movements in Franco’s Spain. It is the prime example of an international Socialist organisation consciously acting as an external actor in the struggle between Spanish democrats, and especially Socialists, and the dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s. It is paradoxical that its particular interest in Spain was invited by the PSOE leadership in exile, yet it resulted in the international backing of the rival leadership of the underground inside Spain. The Socialist International (SI) is a worldwide organisation of Socialist, Social Democratic and Labour parties. The Socialist International organisation began in 1864 when the First International was founded in London under the inspiration of Karl Marx, collapsing by 1876. Later, in 1889, the Second International was established at the Paris Congress lasting until the outbreak of the First World War. In 1923, the Second International formally reconstituted itself as the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) at Hamburg. Its activities came to an end in the first months of the Second World War. After the war, the Committee of the International Socialist Conference (COMISCO), 1947–51, was transformed into the Socialist International in 1951 in Frankfurt. The purpose of the new organisation was to strengthen relations between the affiliated parties and to co-ordinate their political attitudes by consent. 1 The supreme decision-making body was the Congress which up to 1969 was held every one or two years, and from then on every three years. The Bureau was the permanent executive. Several study groups, councils and committees established by the SI on particular subjects or regions such 18

The Socialist International

19

as Africa, the Asian Pacific, and the Middle East submitted their conclusions and resolutions to the Bureau.2 In the declaration of principles adopted at its first Congress held in Frankfurt, the SI expressed ‘solidarity with all peoples suffering under dictatorship, whether Fascist or Communist, in their efforts to win freedom’, and declared that every dictatorship, wherever it may be is a danger to the freedom of all nations and thereby to the peace of the world. Wherever there is unrestrained exploitation of forced labour, whether under private profit or under political dictatorship, there is a danger to the living and moral standards of all the peoples.3 The SI was, therefore, as fearful of Communism as it was opposed to Fascism, and both these aspects were important in the Spanish case. In relation to dictatorial regimes, the role of the SI has been ‘to assist morally and materially democratic Socialist forces fighting underground or from exile against dictatorial regimes in their own countries’.4 During the 1960s and 1970s the SI concentrated its efforts on helping the Socialist forces in the Iberian Peninsula. For instance, help was given to the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP), which was founded in Germany in 1973.5 In the case of Spain, the SI focused its help on the PSOE which had been one of the founder members of the Socialist International in 1951. The first part of the chapter will explore the importance of the several commissions on Spain created by the SI from 1946 to 1972 in response to the situation that was developing there. It will also focus on the split of the PSOE in 1972 into two different sectors, the PSOE histórico and the PSOE renovado, the intervention of the SI, and the reasons behind the recognition of the PSOE renovado in 1974. This turned out to be the most important intervention of the SI in the political process leading to a multiparty and parliamentary democracy in Spain. The third part (1974–77) will look at the creation of a Spain Committee within the SI, analyse the Committee’s actions, and assess whether its objectives were achieved. It will evaluate the sharing of contacts, solidarity and political culture with the PSOE.

1946–72 SI Commissions for Spanish affairs Attempts at dealing with Spanish affairs by the SI had been made in 1946, 1953 and 1960 with the creation of special commissions on Spain. In May

20


1946, the French delegation to the SI’s predecessor proposed the settingup of a Socialist Conference in Paris to discuss the situation in Spain. This Conference took place in Paris, between 27–28 August 1946. In it, Louis De Brouckére, a Belgian Socialist, proposed the creation of the first Commission composed of Harold Laski (Britain), Paul Rivet (France), Lelio Basso (Italy), Humbert Droz (Switzerland), Van der Goes Van Natters (Holland) and De Brouckére himself, who was the chairman. The Commission was aimed at obtaining funds for the Spanish Socialists. According to Rodolfo Llopis, the Commission worked very seriously and collected a substantial amount of money but as time went by its activities decreased and subsequently it stopped altogether.6 Although an attempt to form a second Commission was made at the meeting of the General Council of the SI in Puteaux in April 1953,7 it was not until December 1960 that a new Commission was set up. Spain took part in the third Commission together with Germany, Belgium, France and Italy. Since at least the early 1950s, the anti-Communist character of the Spanish regime had been beneficial to Franco. The Cold War led the international community to recognise the Franco regime. Earlier, in 1949, the United States provided the regime with economic aid, for instance, in the form of loans.8 During the early 1950s, Franco was allowed to take part in international forums such as UNESCO (1952) and the UN (1955). Moreover, in 1953, Franco signed the Concordat with the Holy See and the bilateral pacts with the United States. The PSOE was very distressed about the entry of Spain into several international organisations, including the OEEC and the IMF in 1958 and 1959, and the Spanish question was raised during the meeting of the Bureau of the SI in London on 2–4 December 1960. Rodolfo Llopis reported on the Spanish situation, affirming that the longevity of the Franco regime was due to international support, and the support of the Army, the Church and the main economic groups. Therefore, Llopis called upon the Socialist parties to put pressure on their governments to stop supporting Franco. He mentioned the critical financial situation of the PSOE and the difficulties that the PSOE had encountered in counteracting not just Francoist but also Communist propaganda. Finally, Llopis emphasised the importance of the help given by the SI to the PSOE and stressed the correlation that existed between having a democracy in Spain and helping the PSOE: If you are interested in Spain becoming a democracy tomorrow, you have to help us, since our Party will be the pivot of democracy in Spain. If you did not help us we would carry on with our work but we would


21

be less effective. The Communists more than the Francoists will be the beneficiaries.9 The outcome of the meeting was to reach a consensus about the actions to be taken by the SI in relation to the situation in Spain in general, and, in particular, on how to assist the PSOE. In Llopis’ words, ‘It’s the first time that we have decided on concrete choices.’10 As a result, the Bureau decided to create the third Spain Commission.11 The first meeting of the Commission, chaired by Franz Tielemans, was held in Brussels on 28 January 1961. The Commission adopted the recommendations put forward by Rodolfo Llopis on international actions. It is worth pointing out a few of these decisions because they were at the heart of the SI philosophy of intervention in favour of the PSOE. It was agreed that the SI should pressure democratic governments to stop assisting Franco, particularly the American government which was giving help to Franco, economically, politically and militarily as part of its international antiCommunist strategy. The SI also agreed to oppose Spanish admission into NATO, the Council of Europe and the EEC. Bearing in mind the ‘ideological vacuum’ created by the regime, the SI should help to reduce this vacuum by helping the PSOE financially. The SI should also help to create in Spain through information and broadcasting an adequate democratic environment for a transitional period.12 In 1964, identical requests were made by the PSOE. The Spanish application for association with the EEC worried the PSOE and the UGT. On 28 August 1964, a joint meeting in Brussels between Rodolfo Llopis, General Secretary of the PSOE, Pascual Tomás, General Secretary of the UGT, Albert Carthy, General Secretary of the SI, Omer Becú, General Secretary of the ICFTU and Luyten, General Secretary of the Belgian Socialist Party and President of the Spanish Commission, examined the Spanish situation, the Spanish application and future actions at national and international level. The Spanish Socialists’ aim was to accelerate the decomposition of the regime, and they asked both Socialist and trade union leaders to activate the Spanish question within the SI and the ICFTU, to act once more upon the governments that were helping Franco, to inform the world about the true nature of the Spanish regime, and finally, to help them improve the political formation of youth and to prepare the political ranks within the party.13 These reiterated requests are a clear indication of what the PSOE hoped to gain from the SI’s involvement, and of the significance it attached to this external influence on Spain. During the late 1960s, therefore, the SI issued frequent statements and resolutions denouncing the violations of human rights

22


and liberties in Spain. For instance, in May 1966 the Congress of the SI denounced the regimes in Spain and Portugal. Also the Bureau of the SI adopted a resolution on 17 December 1966 which condemned the referendum on the Organic Law (Ley Orgánica del Estado) held on 14 December 1966 which reaffirmed full power to Franco and guaranteed the loyalty of the state institutions to the regime. The resolution denounced the plebiscite as a farce: Democratic opinion will not permit itself to be deceived by this mockery, by which the Franco regime tries to put on, for the outside world, the semblance of reposing on the will of the people, when this will has no means whatever of making itself known.14 The SI also protested strongly against the arrests and prosecutions of members of the Socialist opposition. On 25 June 1968 the Chairman of the SI, Bruno Pitterman, sent a telegram to Franco protesting against the sentences passed on Spanish trade unionists by the Madrid Court of Public Order. In 1969, when a state of emergency was declared from 24 January to 25 March, Bruno Pitterman and Albert Carthy sent a telegram to Franco protesting against the arrest of Socialists in many cities. The Bureau of the SI also protested and appealed for the release of the imprisoned Socialists. It protested on 16 February against the arrests of Socialists in Barcelona, Alcoy, Madrid, San Sebastian, Asturias, Valencia and Bilbao and against the limitations imposed by the state of emergency.15 With these statements and resolutions, the SI fulfilled one of the requests made by the PSOE in 1960, to bring the Spanish question to international attention. In April 1970, the SI intervened again in Spanish political affairs. Thirteen Socialists were accused of illicit propaganda and were brought to trial before the Madrid Tribunal of Public Order on 16 April. Bruno Pitterman and Hans Janitschek, General Secretary, sent a telegram to Franco: ‘Deeply concerned fate 13 leading patriots facing trial Madrid April 16 stop 75 million democratic Socialists are on their side.’16 The trial17 was attended by observers on behalf of the SI member parties: Hilde Pee, a lawyer, representing the Belgian Socialist Party; René Benoît, also a lawyer, representing the Socialist Party of France; Vittorio Martuscelli, Regional Appeal Court Magistrate, Chairman of the National Disciplinary Committee of the Italian Socialist Party; Hans Matthöfer, Member of the Bundestag, representing the SPD; and Rodney Balcomb, Assistant Secretary of the SI representing the SDDC (Spanish Democrats’ Defence Committee) of the British Labour Party. Several other foreign observers from Norway,


23

France, Italy and Germany also attended the trial. The prosecution claimed that all the defendants were members of the PSOE and the UGT, and that the defendants were guilty of producing and distributing Socialist literature. Despite the presence of international observers the sentences passed on the defendants were those requested by the prosecution, ranging from four and a half years to three months. After the trial on 20 April the observers issued a joint statement which regarded the sentences passed as of the greatest severity and a violation of the basic human rights of freedom of expression and association.18 Hence, the SI used the trial to publicise the repressive nature of the Franco regime, a method that the British Labour movement had been successfully employing since the creation of the SDDC in 1959. The visit to Spain had another consequence. Soon after the trial, on 4 May 1970, the Bureau of the SI decided during its meeting in London to create the fourth Commission for Spanish affairs. This time the initiative came from the Italian Socialist Party. Before the discussion of the new Commission took place between the SI and the PSOE, Victoria Mezza, International Secretary of the Unitary Italian Socialist Party (PSUI), suggested that a representative of the Partido Socialista del Interior (PSI), a Socialist Party created in 1968 by Enrique Tierno Galván, should take part in the Commission. Mezza also proposed that the Commission should promote closer relations and closer cooperation between the interior and the exterior, should help Spanish Socialists of all tendencies to set up a common programme for actions with well-defined strategies and tactics, and should help every democratic movement to establish every possible contact with Western politicians, including Ministers and Prime Ministers on the occasion of their official visits to Spain.19 Rodolfo Llopis felt very threatened by what Mezza had proposed, and the obvious implication that the Partido Socialista del Interior was considered by the Italians as important in its own right. Llopis sent a lengthy letter to Hans Janitschek insisting that there was no division as mentioned in Mezza’s letter, and that no importance should be attributed to Tierno Galván’s party, because he had been expelled from the PSOE and was too close to the regime.20 For the first time the fragmentation of the Socialists into three groups (the PSOE in exile, the PSOE inside Spain and Galvan’s PSI) had been raised as an issue within the SI. As we will see below, the SI would eventually intervene on behalf of the PSOE renovado and thus facilitate the consolidation of the Socialist movement in Spain. On 26 October 1970, the SI Bureau met in Paris with the PSOE to discuss the new Commission. The PSOE pointed out that, while they agreed with the constitution of the new Commission, nevertheless, they opposed the

24


admission of any member that was not part of the SI. The discussion was suspended without arriving at any conclusion and it was agreed to deal with it at the next meeting of the Bureau.21 The Conference of the SI (Helsinki 25–27 May 1971) adopted a resolution on Fascism in Europe, expressing its concern at the continued existence of dictatorship in Greece, Portugal and Spain and calling for the implementation of human rights and the holding of free democratic elections. It also stated that Socialists must oppose all attempts to associate or integrate these countries more closely with organisations such as NATO, the EEC and the EFTA.22 So far four attempts at creating Commissions for Spanish affairs had failed. Meanwhile, the SI’s actions had been mainly concentrated on responding to Spanish affairs and denouncing the lack of human rights and freedom in Spain. From 1972 to 1974, the SI’s role became more active. The SI played a crucial role in the development of the PSOE when it intervened in the split within the PSOE.

1972–74 Going separate ways: the emergence of two distint PSOEs Before discussing the SI involvement in the PSOE’s conflict, an explanation of the events that led to the split is required. In the 1960s, PSOE members within Spain observed that the leadership of the PSOE in exile, under Rodolfo Llopis, was increasingly out of touch with developments in the country. Socialists were in a strong position in northern Spain along the coast (the Basque country and Asturias), where the most important part of the traditional heavy industries were located. In Madrid and southern Spain, however, the activity of the PSOE was rather meagre, the Communists being stronger there.23 In 1962, a new group from Seville emerged around the figure of Alfonso Fernández Torres, the Socialist responsible for the organisation of the PSOE in Andalucia. Alfonso Guerra and Alfonso Fernández Malo, son of Fernández Torres, began to organise a Young Socialist group. People such as Manuel Chaves, Manuel del Valle, Guillermo Galeote, Luis Yañez and Felipe González, most of them young students, joined the new group. According to Alfonso Guerra, three characteristics defined this Sevillian group: good personal relationships, a leading role in the student movement, and the will to act against the dictatorship.24 Its actions were mainly concentrated on establishing contacts with other regions of Spain, especially Madrid, Asturias and the Basque country, and promoting the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT).25 In 1968, personal animosity between Fernández Torres and Llopis brought


25

about the expulsion of the Andalusian Federation from the structure of the PSOE. The Andalusian Federation was reincorporated into the PSOE in July 1969, at the meeting of the National Standing Committee in Bayonne, when Felipe González in his first public appearance took part as its representative. After this meeting, closer links were established between Andalucia, the Basque Country (Enrique Múgica and Nicolás Redondo) and Asturias (Agustín González), shaping the base of the PSOE inside Spain. The ‘Sevillian group’ was also aware of the importance of establishing contacts with members of the PSOE working outside Spain. Towards the middle of the 1960s Alfonso Guerra had been in contact with Francisco López Real who worked for the ICFTU and had some links with members of this organisation.26 In August 1970 there was a confrontation between the factions of the PSOE during the XI Congress of the PSOE, held in Toulouse. Since 1958, the Executive Committee of the PSOE had given an equal number of seats to representatives of the Party inside Spain and in exile. Felipe González defended the autonomy of the Party inside Spain, which was supported by most of the Socialist groups inside Spain. It was agreed that a majority of seats on the Executive of the PSOE should be allocated to representatives of the party members living in Spain and that the Executive Committee should consist of 16 members, 9 living inside Spain and the remaining 7 living outside Spain. With this Congress was established the so-called dirección compartida, Llopis again being re-elected.27 In the case of the UGT, the control taken by members inside Spain went even further. At the XI Congress of the UGT held in August 1971, the UGT federations inside Spain claimed to have a large number of members, larger than the numbers of members in the federations located in exile. Since the numbers of votes cast by each federation in UGT congresses was directly related to the number of members adhering to each federation, this put the federations inside Spain in control of the Congress. There was no way of verifying the accuracy of the number of members claimed by federations from the interior because they were clandestine, and some delegations from the exterior expressed disbelief at the number of members that they claimed. It was proposed to change the organisation radically, to abolish the role of the General Secretary, and to constitute an Executive Committee consisting of nine members inside Spain and five members in exile. The UGT leaders inside Spain changed the UGT statute to enable the federations inside Spain to vote on all questions and to gain control of the UGT.28 Since all members of the UGT were members of the PSOE, this change inevitably increased the tension between members of the PSOE Executive Committee inside Spain and members in exile.

26


At this stage, the Executive Committee of the PSOE was divided into two groups, on the one hand, eight members inside plus two members in exile, and on the other, the remaining five members outside Spain, plus General Secretary Llopis. Differences within the Executive Committee were evident. According to Llopis one factor in the split was differences of opinion over relations with the Communists. Although Llopis and his group were willing to cooperate with other democratic forces to establish democracy in Spain, they refused to extend this cooperation to include the Communists. Socialists recalled the murderous behaviour of Spanish Communists towards Spanish Socialists during the Civil War, and were not convinced that the Spanish Communist Party had changed its character and methods and was prepared for a peaceful and democratic change. For their part, the Executive Committee members of the interior stated that it was not intended that there should be talks or relations with the Communists. However, they did adopt a resolution at the 11th Congress of the UGT which appealed to all anti-Franco parties and organisations, without excluding the Communists. According to the report issued by the SI about the situation in the Spanish Socialist movement, Llopis and his colleagues had exaggerated and distorted the conciliatory attitude of members from the interior towards the Communists.29 In order to find a solution to this situation, a special Congress of the PSOE was called by the Executive Committee for February 1972. However, the Comité Director, the body which acted as a guardian over Congress decisions and the work of the Executive Committee, decided not to hold an extraordinary Congress in February 1972, but instead to hold the XII Party Congress in April the same year. Nevertheless, five members of the Executive, led by Llopis, then decided to cancel the XII Party Congress. However, the full Executive Committee, including the members from the interior and the exterior, voted unanimously in May 1972 to hold the 12th Congress in August 1972. Instead of following the instruction of the Executive Committee, Llopis sought to have the Congress postponed until later in the year. Despite the opposition of five Executive Committee members from the exterior, a Congress organised by the interior, which received the full support of the UGT and of the Young Socialists (JSE), was held in August 1972 in Toulouse. The Congress was attended by 49 sections from the exterior, which had a total of 1,187 members, and by 11 sections from the interior, with a total of 2,216 members. The Congress abolished the post of General Secretary and established a ‘collegiate leadership’. It was also decided that the Executive Committee of the renovated party PSOE(r) should consist of 14 members, 9 from the interior30 and 5 from the exterior.31 The head office of the party would


27

be moved from Toulouse to Paris. The Congress was attended by observers from member parties of the Socialist International32 and the PSOE(r) believed that this implied a full recognition by the SI. Because the split was due to internal problems within the party, however, the Socialist parties abroad were not involved in the PSOE’s split. At this stage their role was simply to be observers. Undeterred by these events, the five members of the Executive Committee from the exterior,33 who remained loyal to Llopis and who opposed the August Congress, held their own Party Congress in December 1972. In effect, this marked the emergence of two distinct parties: the PSOE(r) renovado comprised those who held the Congress in August 1972 and the PSOE(h) histórico consisted of those who held the Congress in December 1972. The PSOE(r) tried to prevent European Socialist parties from attending Llopis’ Congress. Since the August Congress, the PSOE(r) had been in touch with the Secretariat of the International through López Real, who worked at the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels. López Real sent a letter to the Secretariat of the International dated 15 November 1972 and addressed to all member parties requesting them not to give encouragement to this split and not to send representatives to Llopis’ Congress, even as observers.34 Despite this request, Robert Pontillon, International Secretary of the French Socialist Party, considered that his party should send an observer to the December Congress. The Executive Committee of the PSOE(r) expressed its dissatisfaction with this decision, because in its view it could reinforce Llopis’ group and weaken the group inside Spain.35 Iglesias and Jimeno met in Paris with members of the French Socialist Party such as Bernard Montainer and George Sarre in order to reaffirm their position, and were able to persuade the French Socialists not to send an observer to the Congress. According to Miguel Peydró, however, the SI did send Veronica Isenberg, a member of the SPD, as an observer. To find a solution to the split in the PSOE, the Socialist International intervened in the conflict. The question to be answered is why the Socialist International recognised the PSOE(r) and not the PSOE(h). Richard Gillespie has argued that above all the Socialist International opted for the sector that it thought had more presence in Spain.36 Similarly, Abdón Mateos has pointed out that the French and British decision to support the PSOE(r) was due to the dynamism and presence of the PSOE(r) in Spain and that the sending of missions to Spain had been favourable to the PSOE(r).37 This chapter tries to go further in this analysis of the SI’s decision, and to show in greater detail how the decision came to be made.

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The first step taken by the SI was to gain information about the situation within the PSOE. In December 1972, during the Bureau meeting of the SI, Rodney Balcomb, Assistant Secretary of the SI, submitted an extensive report about the situation in the Spanish Socialist movement. The document, which had been prepared by the Secretariat of the International, was based on written reports and correspondence received from the leadership of the two PSOE groups, on reports written by representatives of the fraternal parties attending the August 1972 Congress, on newspaper articles, and on conversations with a number of informed Spanish left-wingers including PSOE members.38 The report explained the factors that led to the split within the PSOE and the reasons behind it. It also dealt with the existence of a third Socialist group, the Partido Socialista del Interior (PSI), which had applied at the beginning of 1972 for observer membership of the SI, only to encounter the opposition of the PSOE. The SI report stated that: it would be wrong to regard this split as being basically an ideological split, or a split between generations, or even a split between those members living in exile and those members living in Spain.39 It reported that both groups had stated that personal differences and antagonisms within the PSOE were a contributory factor in the split. In the opinion of the Secretariat, before the Bureau took any decision regarding the Spanish affiliation, further study should be made of the situation. Discussions should be held with leading members of the two rival factions, and the results of the Congress to be held on 8–10 December should be considered. At the Bureau meeting, Rodney Balcomb, who had written an earlier report on the political situation in Spain after his visit in April 1970, suggested that the Bureau should seek further information, but more importantly, that it should examine the possibility of promoting reconciliation and cooperation between the different groups.40 Clearly, the Socialist International initially sought the reunification of the PSOE rather than the recognition of one of the two factions. At the same meeting, Bruno Pitterman, Chairman of the International, proposed the creation of a special Committee consisting of representatives of the Italian Socialist Party, the Italian Social Democratic Party, the Chilean Radical Party, the French Socialist Party, the British Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democratic Party, together with a member of the secretariat staff, Rodney Balcomb. The aims of the Committee were to establish the reasons for the split and to examine the possibility of reconciliation among the Spanish Socialists.41 According to Abdón Mateos, the reactions


29

of the two factions to the creation of this special Committee were quite different. While the PSOE(h) received the Bureau’s decision favourably, the PSOE(r) refused to accept that the SI should attempt to reunify the party when, in its view, a minor group had simply split away from the main party. The creation of a special Committee would merely consolidate the division of the party.42 Representatives of both factions were invited to participate in the first meeting of the special SI Committee. Francisco López Real, International Secretary of the PSOE renovado, explained to Rodney Balcomb that the Executive Committee of the PSOE renovado had condemned the SI’s approach to the Spanish Socialist split at its meeting in Bayonne on 6 January 1973. López Real made clear that the presence of the PSOE(r) in Paris did not imply an approval of the method followed by the International, and he emphasised that the special Committee should visit Spain and make contact with the militants to see how they were organised.43 At the first meeting of the special Committee, which took place in January 1973 in Paris, the PSOE(r) presented a document which explained the reasons for the split. It argued that what was an issue was not the existence of two separate parties, but rather that a minority group of dissidents living in exile was not willing to accept the democratic decisions taken by the party because its only wish was to perpetuate its control over the PSOE.44 The PSOE(r) told Rodney Balcomb on 11 January, a day before the meeting, that the SI’s initiative ‘had confirmed the division, making our task of unifying all Socialists in one party very difficult’. On 12 January the Committee met members of the two factions independently.45 During the meeting with the PSOE(r), Pitterman explained the reasons behind the creation of this special committee, saying that it intended to listen to the two factions involved in the conflict. He also asserted that the SI had a great interest in Spain and particularly in the existence of a strong Socialist Party. The PSOE(r) accused the SI of following an improper procedure in not consulting with it beforehand. It felt that the SI’s initiative had become an obstacle to the reunification of the PSOE. During the meeting, Balcomb proposed the reunification of the Socialists without Llopis. The PSOE(r) replied that it did not seek to impose conditions, but simply wanted to ensure that all members supported democratic decisions.46 The strength of the PSOE(r)’s opinion on the SI’s initiative was again made clear by Francisco López Real in an interview with Rodney Balcomb in Brussels soon after the meeting in Paris. The SI’s strategy of having separate meetings and not a joint meeting with

30


the PSOE(h) and the PSOE(r) did not, in his view, favour the reunification of the PSOE. To counter Llopis’ influence on the International, the PSOE(r) decided that the Executive Committee should provide information regularly to other Socialist parties. In February 1973, the PSOE(r) judged that the Party’s organisation was not up to standard, in this respect, and especially that the Executive Committee of the party lacked co-ordination. The links between the Organisation Secretary, Juan Iglesias, and the International Secretary, Francisco López Real, were practically non-existent. According to Juan Iglesias this lack of co-ordination had various consequences. Firstly, the Organisation Secretary was ignorant of the development of relations in the International and the European Socialist parties. Secondly, there was an absence of information inside Spain about what was happening outside Spain. Finally, it was almost impossible to satisfy the constant demand for information that the members inside Spain required.47 As a solution to these problems, the Executive Committee proposed that there should be systematic contacts with López Real, and Iglesias proposed that the International and other European Socialist parties should be informed about the PSOE’s activities on a regular basis. Even though the PSOE(r) was aware of the limitations of its influence on the European Socialist parties, it assumed in March 1973 that it had excellent relations with all the Socialist parties on the continent as well as with the British Labour Party.48 The second meeting of the special Committee of the Socialist International with members of both groups was held in London on 13 March. On 16 March 1973, the Committee decided to make several recommendations to the Bureau which were approved by the SI. First of all, the possibility of reconciliation and cooperation between the two groups, originally proposed by the International, was to be abandoned. Although the Bureau was not, at that moment, in a position to recognise one group or another, it was clear that a choice must be made. Secondly, it was agreed that if a mission was sent to Spain it would have to be done openly as had been the case in Portugal in 1969, something which was not possible in the existing circumstances. However, it was agreed that it might be useful for parties of the SI, especially those represented on the special Committee, to send missions to Spain, to establish contacts with Spanish Socialists which would help the Bureau in taking a final decision on the PSOE.49 The special Committee decided to present this proposal to the Bureau of the SI which would take a decision in November.50 At this stage, therefore, the SI abandoned reconciliation and chose the solution of recognising one of the two groups.


31

Following the recommendation made by the SI, representatives of the Italian Socialist Party and the British Labour Party visited Spain. A delegation from the Labour Party composed of Michael Foot, MP, Jenny Little, joint Secretary of the SDDC, and Will Paynter, ex-General Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, visited Spain. Despite the Labour attempt to see both groups, the delegation met only the PSOE(r). Its report argued that there was little chance of reunification and that the PSOE(r) was more dynamic, commanding the support of both the Young Socialists and the UGT. For them, the latter was particularly important because through the UGT came the support, financial as well as moral, of the European trade union movement. Even though the Labour Party had not taken a position in favour of one of the two groups, it seemed more favourable to the PSOE(r). The report of the mission was sent to the International. This was the only report ‘in situ’ that the SI had as a basis for reaching a judgement on the Spanish situation. At this stage, there were two distinct attitudes to the conflict within the SI. According to Juan Iglesias, France, Italy and Sweden tended to support strongly the exclusive presence of the PSOE(r) in the SI. On the other hand, Bruno Pitterman, together with the German and Austrian parties, favoured the suspension of the PSOE’s affiliation in the International until the problem was solved by the Spanish themselves. As Carmen García Bloise said: The German and Austrian positions were very close, and they even thought of our expulsion from the SI until we reunified.51 This division of opinion took the PSOE(r) by surprise, particularly the attitude of the SPD. Although until that moment the PSOE(r) had followed a plan designed to convince the International about the authenticity of the Party, that is, to make contacts with the different European Socialist parties, the members of the Executive Committee living outside Spain now decided to concentrate their efforts on the most influential parties within the International, namely, the Labour Party and the SPD. The PSOE believed that if they succeeded in convincing these two parties, the resolution of the SI would be in their favour.52 Although the British Labour Party had not declared its position, it was clearly in favour of the PSOE(r). According to Jenny Little and Pablo Castellano, the Labour Party played a very active role in trying to convince other Socialist parties within the International, mainly the SPD, that the PSOE(r) should be recognised as the true Socialist Party.53 This action definitively influenced the final decision of the SI.

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In April 1973 Juan Iglesias and Tomás Hernández attended the IX Congress of the Socialist Parties of the EEC in Bonn. There they met Hans Dingels and Willy Brandt, who told the Spanish delegation that they could trust them. A meeting was also arranged with the SPD in Toulouse in August 1973.54 López Real regarded the meeting in Bonn as an important step towards recognition by the SI: I believe without being too optimistic that our presence in this Congress of the EEC Socialist parties will have a strong influence on the SI decision.55 Moreover, Juan Iglesias told Carlos Pardo about the importance of the PSOE(r)’s presence at the Bonn Congress and how this had changed the attitude of Bruno Pitterman towards them. 56 The Socialists rather overestimated the impact of their presence at that Congress, but it certainly helped. The PSOE(r) made a considerable effort to take part in international congresses and meetings. From August 1972 to June 1973, the PSOE(r) attended the following events: a meeting organised by the friends of Leon Blum in the Sorbonne (Paris); the Congress of the Swiss Socialist Party in Geneva; the Congress of the Italian Socialist Party in Genoa; the Conference on Czechoslovakia organised by the French Socialist Party in Paris; the Congress of the European Left in Paris; the Conference of the EEC Socialist parties in Bonn; and the Conference of the European Movement in London.57 Without doubt, this policy of making its presence felt helped to give the PSOE(r) an advantage over the PSOE(h). In the meantime, the PSOE(h), in order to strengthen its own position, sought association with the Partido Socialista del Interior (PSI), the party founded in 1968 by Professor Enrique Tierno Galván and formed by a group of Socialists who had resigned or had been expelled from the PSOE because of personal differences with Llopis, as well as disagreements over policy matters. On 19 May 1973, both parties signed a protocol of unification, the SI being informed about their decision on 29 June.58 However, this manoeuvre proved to be ineffective as it did not influence the final decision of the SI. On 30 June 1973 the Bureau decided that it would seek to come to a final decision at its forthcoming meeting on 29 August. In preparation, the special Committee on Spain would hold a further meeting during the second half of August.59 The third meeting of the special Committee was held in London on 28 August, in the presence of the two groups. The Committee reached the conclusion that the twelfth Congress of the


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PSOE held in Toulouse in August 1972 was a proper, legitimate and legal Congress and that the Executive Committee elected by that Congress was therefore the legitimate representative of the Socialist International’s Spanish member party.60 Although the special Committee had reached this conclusion, the Bureau decided to postpone its final decision until its meeting on 2 November 1973. In the meantime, it decided that the two PSOE groups should not be told of the conclusions of the special Committee, and the Bureau invited their representatives to explain their positions to the Bureau.61 At its meeting on 6 January 1974, the Bureau of the International finally announced its option in favour of the PSOE(r), endorsing the view of the special Committee: the Twelfth Congress of the PSOE held in Toulouse in August 1972 was a proper, legitimate and legal Congress, and the Executive Committee elected by the Congress is therefore the legitimate representative of the Socialist International’s Spanish member party.62 Several factors influenced the final decision of the SI. One factor was the PSOE(r)’s tactic of monopolising international attention, leaving little room for the PSOE histórico. For example, the mission to Spain carried out by the British Labour Party met exclusively with representatives of the PSOE(r). This was important because it influenced the British representatives’ view and as a result of that they campaigned within the SI in favour of the PSOE(r). The Labour Party, together with the French Socialist Party, managed to persuade the Germans to change their view about recognition.63 Another factor that tipped the balance in favour of the PSOE(r) was the support given by the UGT, that was itself receiving support from the ICFTU, an organisation composed of trade unions which had links with affiliated members of the SI.

1974–77 Spain Committee: the guardian of Spanish Socialism After the recognition of the PSOE(r) by the Socialist International in January 1974, the SI showed great interest in the party and in the process of democratisation in Spain. During the Bureau meeting of 6 January 1974, the creation of a special Spain Committee was proposed. Before setting up the Committee, the Secretary consulted the Spanish Socialist Party about what should be, in its opinion, the composition and the aims of the Committee. The PSOE proposed that the new Committee should be composed of the members of the special Committee established by the

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Bureau in December 1972,64 plus representatives of the Belgian Socialist Party, the SPD, and the PSOE. With respect to the aims, the PSOE suggested that the Committee should study the situation in Spain and make recommendations to the Bureau on the actions that the International and its member parties should take in order to promote democracy in Spain, and to aid the PSOE in particular. The Spanish Committee of the International was set up by the Bureau at its meeting on 31 March 1974 with the composition and the aims on the lines proposed by the PSOE.65 Meanwhile the PSOE was very much concerned to increase the strength of its organisation and to work for greater unity among Spanish Socialists. The Iberian Socialist Conference organised by the SPD with the backing of the SI was held in Paris on 28–30 June 1974, and was attended by representatives from a number of Socialist organisations and groups from different parts of Spain. A second session took place in Bonn in September 1974 under the auspices of the SPD.66 The financial position of the PSOE was not sound enough, however, to cope with the reorganisation of the party and the PSOE appealed for funds to the SI. By the end of July 1974, the Secretariat of the International had received a request for financial assistance which the PSOE was making to member parties of the International. The PSOE’s view was that four factors were contributing to the disintegration of the regime in Spain, ‘the restoration of democracy in Portugal, the failing health of Franco, serious economic problems and a gradual weakening of the apparatus of repression’. In such circumstances, the PSOE believed that it had a good chance of becoming the major left-wing political party.67 The PSOE was planning to establish a permanent office inside Spain and to employ fulltime senior officials whose function would be to supervise the running of the permanent office, to strengthen the party organisation inside Spain, and to strengthen links between the PSOE and its fraternal parties within the International. It was also planning to increase the financial aid given from central party funds to the 20 federations of the party throughout Spain.68 Rodney Balcomb, acting in the absence abroad of the General Secretary, sent out an appeal to all member parties concerning the total amount of aid required and its uses: (a) Salaries for four permanent senior officials: 30,000 pesetas per month for each official, total amount for four officials of 1,440,000 pesetas yearly; (b) Travel expenses for four permanent senior officials inside Spain and abroad: total of 160,000 pesetas per month for the four officials, total amount for the four officials of 1,920,000 pesetas yearly;


35

(c) Cost of running permanent party office in Spain (rent, equipment, salaries of employees, etc): total of 50,000 pesetas per month, total cost of 600,000 pesetas yearly; (d) increased aid to the 20 party federations for equipment organisational work, travel, etc: 12,000 pesetas per month per federation, total for all federations of 2,880,000 pesetas yearly. The total amount of aid requested by the PSOE was therefore 6,840,000 pesetas yearly.69 It was requested that financial aid to the PSOE should be sent to the International Secretary of the PSOE, Francisco López Real, who was also working for the ICFTU. In fact by the time of the meeting of the Spain Committee of the SI in London on 12 January 1975, Rodney Balcomb was able to report that several member parties had stated that they had given help to the PSOE, or were planning to do so.70 Thus, the SI was clearly seeking to co-ordinate the activities of its affiliates. Meanwhile, on 13 September 1974, the first meeting of the new Spain Committee71 was held in London. Rodney Balcomb reported the request by the PSOE for aid. The first and major point on the agenda was the question of material assistance. The PSOE was certain that the political situation in Spain must change in the near future and they wanted to be wellprepared.72 Pablo Castellano, Secretary for International Relations of the PSOE, said at the meeting that in such a crucial situation, the PSOE had important decisions to take and was doing everything possible to increase the strength of its organisation. However it lacked funds. He also pointed out that many Spaniards lacked any real knowledge of free political and trade union activity and of democratic Socialism. Member parties of the International in countries where there was a considerable number of Spanish immigrant workers should assist the work of the PSOE groups locally and should take steps to help these Spanish workers with democratic political and trade union activity.73 The Spain Committee decided that the appeal for financial assistance should be drawn to the attention of the Bureau of the International at its meeting on 14–15 September 1974, with the recommendation that the Bureau should request member parties to contribute financial aid to the PSOE. Additionally, the Committee recommended to the Bureau that it should make certain requests to member parties in countries where there was a considerable number of Spanish immigrant workers: 74 (1) Member parties in these countries should give assistance to the work of the PSOE, and to the PSOE groups in these countries (this could

36


be, for example, by providing office accommodation or equipment for use by the Spanish Party, by making premises available where the Spanish Party could organise meetings and talks for the Spanish immigrants workers and by including an official of the PSOE on their payrolls); (2) Member parties and trade unions in these countries should help to educate and train Spanish workers in democratic political activity and democratic trade unionism (this could be for example, by holding seminars, giving scholarships, attaching Spanish workers to their staff, etc.). The Spain Committee also discussed the visit that the General Secretary of the International, Hans Janitschek, had made to Spain several weeks earlier. Apparently, while in Barcelona Janitschek met a member of the Partido Socialista del Interior, Raul Morodo, to discuss the question of the unification of Spanish Socialism.75 Jenny Little expressed great concern at the fact that neither before nor during his visit had Janitschek entered into contact with the PSOE. The PSOE addressed an official complaint to Bruno Pittermann, Chairman of the SI saying that: not only did he not consult with the PSOE ... but what is more, in the course of this visit maintained contacts with forces and persons who made use of this fact to attribute to themselves the recognition of the SI, when this recognition had been expressly refused in a previous decision’ and that ‘the official press of the Franco regime echoed this visit, presenting it as the recognition by the International of the Spanish regime.76 According to Jenny Little, Janitschek’s attitude made more difficult the PSOE’s efforts to unify the Spanish Socialists which had started in the spring of 1974, because his visit caused confusion and strengthened groups which were against the PSOE.77 Janitschek apologised at the Bureau meeting on 14–15 September 1974 to a representative of the PSOE. Certainly, the Socialist International was aware that the PSOE needed its support at that crucial moment and that the solidarity of the Socialist International should focus on the PSOE.78 This attitude was demonstrated by the presence of European Socialist parties at the last Congress of the PSOE held in exile, at Suresnes (Paris) on 11–13 October 1974. The central significance of this Congress lies in two other aspects. First of all, Felipe González was elected General Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Party, and second, the party proposed a ‘democratic rupture’ as


37

the only way out of the crisis in Spain, that is, a rapid and total liquidation of Francoist institutions which would bring about freedom and democracy. The PSOE, aware of the importance that the international situation could have in the breakdown of the Franco regime, called upon both European Socialist parties and Socialist governments to take action against Franco’s regime and urged the European democracies to reject the acceptance of the Spanish dictatorship into the EC because such integration would strengthen the regime.79 The PSOE’s policy was to oppose Spanish membership as long as the dictatorship continued because experience had shown that membership of international organisations such as the OEEC had not brought democratisation to Spain. Soon after Suresnes, on 26 October 1974, the Bureau protested when the trial was announced of five Spanish Socialists. Enrique Múgica Herzog, Felipe González, Nicolás Redondo, Ambrosio Gutiérrez and Cristóbal Cáliz who had been arrested and released back in 1971, were accused of ‘illicit association’, ‘illegal propaganda’ and of being leaders of the PSOE. Alongside this protest, the Bureau expressed ‘its complete support for its Spanish member party, the PSOE, to bring a democratic and Socialist society in Spain’. International solidarity was again evident when a large number of representatives80 from Socialist International member parties and from trade union organisations travelled to Madrid to attend the trial. In fact, the trial, that was supposed to take place on Monday 28 October, was postponed by the Spanish authorities. The excuse given was that it was necessary to make further investigations with regard to Felipe González, due to the publication in the Spanish newspaper El Correo de Andalucia of an article containing an interview with the recently elected General Secretary.81 The trial was clearly attracting much international attention which implied bad publicity for the Franco regime. The second meeting of the Spain Committee was held in London on 12 January 1975 and was attended by Jenny Little for the Labour Party, Veronika Isenberg (SPD), Gianpiero Rolandi (PSDI), Felipe González and Francisco López Real (PSOE), Bernt Carlsson (Sweden), Rodney Balcomb (SI) and, as a guest, Yoram Peri of the Israeli Socialist Party. Felipe González reported to the Committee on the Suresnes Congress and on the postponed trial of the five Socialists, including himself. González foresaw three possible outcomes of the situation in Spain: 1. an ultra-right-wing takeover; 2. a gradual evolution of the present regime’s institutions and guided liberalisation under Juan Carlos; and

38


3. complete institutional break with the present Fascist system, resulting in the setting-up of a provisional government, the restoration of human rights and the establishment of democracy. González described the steps which the PSOE was taking in order to prepare itself, in terms of both organisation and programme.82 Rodney Balcomb reported that the Chairman and the General Secretary of the SI had on 9 December 1974 issued a statement protesting against the imprisonment and torture of the playwright Alfonso Satre, his wife Genoveva Forest and a number of other Spaniards. All had been arrested following a bomb explosion in a Madrid cafeteria on 13 September 1974 which killed 11 people. The Committee recommended that the Bureau should reiterate to all parties the need for financial aid for the PSOE. For the first time after the recognition of the PSOE, it was suggested that a mission of member parties accompanied by a member of the Secretariat should be sent to Spain. Such a mission would attempt to assess the strength of the Socialists in the regions and also to contact and assess other groupings claiming to be Socialists. The Committee was in principle in favour of such a mission, but recommended that the Bureau should ask the parties to examine and report back on the feasibility of their participation and whether they thought that the mission could achieve what was intended. In relation to the Spanish government, the member parties should be asked to consider what action could be taken over the trial of Alfonso Sastre, Genoveva Forest and the others. In particular, they should decide whether to send observers or to make protests, either directly to the Spanish government or through their embassies. The Committee suggested to the Bureau that no contact should be made with Manuel Fraga, the Spanish Ambassador to Britain, who had suggested a meeting with Hans Janitschek.83 On 10 July 1975, the Spain Committee of the Socialist International held its third meeting in Dun Laoghaire, Ireland.84 It was suggested that the Finnish and Israeli parties should be members of the Spain Committee and again the meeting discussed ways in which member parties could support the PSOE by providing financial and material support. The Committee recommended that a mission of the Socialist International should visit Spain in November or December 1975, and should travel to different regions of Spain with the aim of meeting members not only of the PSOE but also of regional Socialist parties and groupings. The mission should consist of representatives of the Belgian, British, Finnish, German, Israeli, Portuguese and Swedish parties, and the French and Italian parties would be asked to participate. The duration would be seven to ten days


39

and it would be accompanied by a member of the staff of the secretariat of the International.85 The Committee made two important recommendations to the Bureau members that affected, on the one hand, the relationship between the PSOE and the European Socialist parties, and, on the other, the relationship between Spain and the EEC and NATO. The Committee suggested that: European member parties should invite a small delegation of the PSOE, headed by the first Secretary of the PSOE, to visit their country as their guests, in order to meet leading party members, and also government Ministers where appropriate, and to give press conferences, etc.; it was hoped that a number of such visits could be coordinated so that the PSOE delegation could make a tour of a number of countries during October 1975, the principal aim being to make the First Secretary of the PSOE better known, especially in Northern Europe. The Bureau should reiterate its view that, as long as there was not a democratic Government in Spain, Spain should not be associated with NATO or with the European Community, and the Bureau should urge parties to maintain a firm stand in order to ensure the present status of Spain vis-à-vis NATO and the EEC was not modified.86 This stance was the same as that adopted by the Socialist group in the European Parliament. In September 1975, the Spanish Government passed several death sentences which were later carried out. The Socialist group had presented a motion which invited the Commission and the Council to freeze existing relations until freedom and democracy were established in Spain.87 This was exactly the kind of action that the SI wanted to see taken by Socialist organisations everywhere. Another example of the continuous Socialist pressure on the Spanish government occurred on 13–14 September 1975 when the Bureau of the Socialist International, at its meeting in London, expressed its condemnation of the death sentences pronounced on 28 August against the activists José Garmendia Artola and Angel Otaegui Echevarria. It also protested against the death sentences passed on 11 and 12 September at the court martial in Madrid against members of ETA and FRAP: Manuel Blanco Chivite, Vladimiro Fernández Tovar and José Baena Alonso.88 In October 1975, the Bureau approved the Italian Socialist Party’s proposal that the International should stage a massive action against the Spanish regime and confirmed its decision to send a delegation to Spain in November or December 1975.89 The Bureau decided to establish a Socialist International Spanish Solidarity Fund to which member parties could

40


contribute. The Bureau resolved that £4,000 should be taken from the Reserve Fund of the Socialist International, of which £2,000 should be given direct to the PSOE and £2,000 should be placed in an account to start a new Spanish solidarity fund.90 The Bureau elected Jenny Little and Bernt Carlsson as Trustees of the fund, and Harry Van Den Bergh was elected as substitute. In Amsterdam, on 16 November 1975, the Spain Committee held its fourth meeting. After analysing not only the political and economic situation in Spain, and future prospects after the death of Franco and the crowning of Juan Carlos, but also the different forms of cooperation and solidarity with the PSOE,91 the Spain Committee made more specific recommendations to the Bureau of the Socialist International than those already advanced in July 1975. First, regarding the PSOE: (1) All member parties should repeat publicly their solidarity with the PSOE. (2) All member parties should make contributions to the Spanish solidarity fund of the SI, in order to strengthen the organisational structure of the PSOE. (3) All member parties should support and initiate information campaigns to widen and deepen public knowledge of the policies and positions adopted by the PSOE. (4) All member parties should strengthen their relations with Spanish workers in their respective countries and should, if possible, involve them in campaigns in favour of the PSOE.92 Secondly, in connection with the actions that governments should carry out, bearing in mind that social democratic parties were in power in many states of Western Europe: (1) Governments should repeat their full solidarity with objectives such as: freedom of speech and association, freedom for all political parties, freedom for the trade-unions and universal suffrage. (2) Governments should not accept a situation of ‘false democracy’. (3) Governments should maintain the political isolation of Spain as long as there is no real democracy in Spain. For example: (a) there should be no new bilateral agreements with Spain; (b) the European Community should maintain the suspension of the trade negotiations with Spain; (c) relations should not be established between Spain and NATO unless the Spanish people are able freely to decide in favour of this; (d) Governments should put pressure upon the United States


41

and France not to establish any new military or political relations with the new regime and to avoid giving Juan Carlos new prestige; (e) pressure must be put on Juan Carlos to establish a full democracy in Spain and to end the structure and institutions of the Franco regime.93 The British and German governments carried out some of these actions. Two important conclusions were adopted at that meeting: first, the PSOE would reject any attempts to perpetuate the Franco regime beyond the General’s death; and second, the European Socialist parties would support the PSOE in its struggle against the current government to restore democracy and freedoms in Spain.94 The SI was aware that the political situation in Spain was about to be transformed due to the imminence of Franco’s death and with these statements tried to lobby European governments on the actions that they could carry out in relation to Spain. Accordingly, the SI should be considered as one of the many voices seeking to promote a truly democratic regime in Spain. After Franco’s death on 20 November 1975, King Juan Carlos became the new head of state and confirmed Arias Navarro as Prime Minister. Two alternative ways were now opened to achieve democracy. First, the new Arias government proposed an evolutionary process of ‘reform’, using the Francoist institutions to reform Francoism, and second, the opposition asked for what it termed a ‘democratic rupture’. In Brussels on 30 November 1975 the Bureau adopted a statement which deplored the fact that countries with Socialists in government were represented at the funeral of Franco and the crowning of Juan Carlos. Although this part of the statement was adopted by the Socialist International, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands opposed its approval. The Bureau called on all governments to put pressure on the Spanish regime to restore full democratic rights to the people of Spain, and also called on the Spanish regime to free immediately all political prisoners, grant freedom of speech and association and freedom for all political parties and trade unions. Until a genuinely democratic government was established, the political isolation of Spain should be maintained.95 Finally, the Bureau decided to send the mission that had been recommended by the Spain Committee. Even though the Bureau had hoped that either Willy Brandt or François Mitterand would lead the mission, it was Hans Janitschek, General Secretary of the Socialist International, who headed it. The mission took place from 14–17 January 1976 and visited Madrid, Barcelona and Seville. It was intended to give the PSOE moral and political support, as well as to talk to members of the National Executive of the PSOE and to discuss the situation in Spain

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with leading members.96 In the statement issued by the delegation at the first legal press conference organised by the PSOE inside Spain since Franco’s death, it reaffirmed the support of the Socialist International for the PSOE and, through it, for the efforts made for the restoration of democracy in Spain. Additionally, it agreed with the PSOE that ‘opening up’ and ‘liberalisation’ must progress from mere declarations to the level of deeds and institutions. Finally, the delegation was aware that the real problem at that moment was the lack of basic liberties such as freedom of speech, of action for all political parties without exception, and trade union freedom.97 The delegation was sceptical about the prospects for a genuine movement towards democracy. Jenny Little spoke about the changes as ‘superficial, mere cosmetic reforms’. The delegation concluded that all the parties of the Socialist International should continue to press for freedom of speech and association, for the legalisation of all political parties, for free trade unions and for universal suffrage, and should ensure ‘the emergence of a genuine and not a sham democracy within Spain’.98 With this mission the SI drew the international community’s attention to the lack of real democracy in Spain and gave further public backing to the PSOE. On 28 January 1976, Arias announced his programme of very limited reforms. In a statement issued on the following day, Janitschek, for the SI, branded the proposals as insufficient and unacceptable and called on all governments to put pressure on the Spanish regime to restore full democratic rights. He also called on the Spanish regime to immediately free all political prisoners, grant freedom of speech and association, and freedom for all political parties and trade unions.99 Arias remained intransigent, and was replaced as prime minister by Adolfo Suarez in early July 1976. In November 1976 the Francoist Cortes approved a law of political reform which established a bicameral system based on universal suffrage, achieving overwhelming support in a national referendum in December 1976. The same month, after almost 40 years in exile, the PSOE held its 27th Congress in Spain. The presence of leading European Socialist leaders such as Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, Pietro Nenni, Olaf Palme and Michael Foot demonstrated definitive international backing for the PSOE after its recognition by the Socialist International in January 1974. Moreover, the PSOE had become for these international participants the sole interpreter of Spanish political reality. Michael Foot declared that he considered the PSOE as the judge of the authenticity of Spanish democracy.100 This attitude was latter reaffirmed by Bernt Carlsson, General Secretary of the Socialist International when he stated in March 1977:


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That answer, as to whether Spain is democratic or not, must, from the point of view of the SI, be given by its Spanish member party, the PSOE. When Felipe González tells us that Spain is a fully democratic state, we will accept that this is so. We do not make any judgement of the situation in Spain without having the opinion of the PSOE.101 Thus, by 1977, the PSOE had become the Spanish counterpart of the European Socialist parties. In February 1977 the new law of political associations legalised political parties and the Communist Party was finally recognised in April. The first democratic elections took place in June 1977.

Conclusions During the 1960s and 1970s, the SI concentrated its efforts on helping the PSOE in Spain. That was part of the SI’s agenda to oppose Fascism, to undermine Communism, and to assist morally and materially democratic Socialist forces fighting underground or from exile against dictatorial regimes. The actions of the SI during these years included the creation of several Spain Committees. The SI brought the Spanish question to international attention, expressed its concern about the arrest and prosecution of members of the Socialist opposition and kept the PSOE alive before the beginning of the process of democratic transition. From the point of view of the impact that these actions had on the PSOE, the role the SI played in the recognition of the PSOE(r) was essential for the establishment of a strong Socialist opposition inside Spain. The SI identified the PSOE(r) as the organisation inside Spain which was the party on which European Socialist parties should focus their moral and financial help. After according recognition, the European Socialist parties concentrated their attention on helping the PSOE of Felipe González, even though opinions had previously been divided. After the recognition of the PSOE(r) in 1974, the Spain Committee was the main activity of the SI. The Committee played a significant role in helping to keep European Socialist parties aware of the PSOE’s need in terms of funds and public support. The SI’s role, therefore, was to give policy directives to co-ordinate collective actions of all the affiliated members in favour of the PSOE. Even though the political and financial help that the PSOE received from its European counterparts was given from party to party, the SI constantly reminded the European Socialist parties that they should support and strengthen the PSOE and not other possible Socialist options like the Partido Socialista del Interior. Spanish

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democracy needed a strong party of the left, and European Socialist opinion, co-ordinated by the Socialist International, was determined that this should not be the Spanish Communist party. The SI played a solid, if supporting, role in the emergence of a strong, internationally recognised, Spanish Socialist party.

3

The ICFTU 1960–77

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the involvement of the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) in the process of establishing free trade unions in Spain during the period 1960–77, including the actions taken by the ICFTU against Franco’s governments. The importance of the ICFTU for the overall argument of this book is twofold. First, evidence gathered through interviews and personal communications with leading figures of the PSOE, UGT and the TUC, and from other primary sources, suggest that the relations between UGT and the ICFTU, and between the ICFTU and its member organisations especially the British TUC and the German DGB, were important for the consolidation of the UGT in Spain. Secondly, like the Socialist International, which is an umbrella organisation for political parties, the ICFTU embraces the most important European and non-European free trade unions. It is therefore important to understand the way in which the ICFTU worked and how affiliated organisations worked within international scenarios such as that in Spain between 1960 and 1977. The ICFTU was founded in 1949 by the Western European trade unions which left the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) (founded in 1945 and mainly Soviet-orientated). The founding Congress declared its loyalty to truly democratic forms of government and formulated its opposition to all forms of dictatorship or authoritarian rule of a Communist, Fascist or military nature.1 The ICFTU is composed mainly of national trade union centres which are the representatives of their country within the confederation, and, in certain cases, of individual unions, like the UGT. The American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO), the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) and the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) were the biggest organisations within the ICFTU.2 The ICFTU Congress, held every two 45

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years, is the highest authority of the ICFTU and defines the activities and policies of the Confederation. The Executive Board, elected by the Congress, meets twice a year to direct the activities of the Confederation between Congresses. Another important body is the International Solidarity Fund Committee which raises funds for the purpose of being able to carry out relief and organising work immediately after a dictatorship regime had crumbled and also in order to buttress the trade union movement in countries where it was weak, with the effect of strengthening democracy and therefore preventing dictatorships from ever arising in those countries. Another section of the ICFTU is the International Trade Secretariats (ITS), which gather unions of the same trade or industry in different countries, such as the International Metal Workers’ Federation and the International Transport Workers’ Federation. The secretariats are autonomous, acting independently but following the general policy of the ICFTU.3 The ICFTU gave priority to the fight against dictatorship and the support for democratic opposition in the struggle for trade union rights.4 Regarding the Communist regimes, the ICFTU took action in favour of free trade unions, condemning oppressive regimes and supporting trade unions with financial assistance. For instance, the ICFTU gave assistance to the workers during the uprising in East Berlin and other East German towns in 1953, the Polish uprising in June 1956, the democratic Hungarian revolution of October 1956 and during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.5 The ICFTU also fought against the dictatorships in Spain and Portugal. Until Franco’s death, the ICFTU undertook three different kinds of activity: 1. Assistance to Spanish trade unions to set up unity of action against the regime, to encourage unity amongst trade union organisations working in Spain, and to support workers financially during the numerous strikes that took place during the period. 2. Indirect actions against the Spanish government through the ILO (International Labour Organisation). When the ICFTU wanted to complain to the Spanish government it usually submitted the complaint to the ILO. This was because Franco’s government had observers at the headquarters of the ILO, and ILO member states could exercise pressure on the Spanish government directly. There were, however, instances when the resolution was not passed because

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of member-state abstention and therefore the effectiveness of the ICFTU complaint depended on the approval of member states. 3. Direct representations to the Franco government, about trade union rights and freedom of association. The ICFTU also responded to any outside government that showed public support, for instance by a declaration in support of Franco, or by any other policy favouring the regime. In the period before 1960, the ICFTU took several actions against the Franco regime through the UN in general and through the ILO in particular, without significant result. The first ICFTU complaint against the violation of freedom of association in Spain was submitted to the United Nations Economic and Social Council in June 1953. As a result, the Council adopted a resolution which invited the Spanish government to change its trade union policy and to cooperate with the United Nations to safeguard trade union rights.6 There is no evidence, however, that the resolution influenced Spanish government policy on trade unions. In 1956, the ICFTU issued a statement which denounced the violation of trade union rights in the government’s repression of strikes in Northern Spain. The ICFTU submitted the statement to the UN Secretary General and the ILO. In 1957 the ILO called on the Spanish government to amend its legislation, which was in contradiction with the principles enunciated by ILO.7 Similarly, in 1958 the Asturias strike and the subsequent governmental repression led to the ICFTU sending a complaint to the ILO. In the period before 1960, therefore, actions taken by the ICFTU did not achieve any tangible result. From 1957, however, following the visit of Hermes Horne, a member of the ICFTU, to Spain to find out more about the organisation of the UGT, a new tactic had gradually appeared. With a programme of organisational activities inside Spain being undertaken with the aid of the International Solidarity Fund, the ICFTU aimed at helping to expand the activities of the UGT inside Spain. This new tactic by the ICFTU may have been the result of the realisation that the underground PSOE and UGT had begun a period of recovery.8 By the end of the 1950s, a leading activist of the PSOE in Spain, Antonio Amat Maíz, who acted as ‘liaison officer’, taking into Spain propaganda, correspondence and money for the groups of Socialists, pursued policies independent of the Toulouse Executive Committee to organise and coordinate Socialist activities in Spain. In October 1957 Amat established a Socialist Central Committee composed of a Basque (Antonio Amat), an Andalusian (Francisco Román) and members from Catalonia, Madrid and the Agrupación Socialista Universitaria (ASU).9 Relations between the

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interior and the exterior factions worsened when Francisco Román presented to Hermes Horne in Madrid a document entitled ‘The Socialist Position in Spain’, which requested from the PSOE the abandonment of its postura estática (static position)and the adoption of a more dynamic attitude.10 This action, however, was countered by the Toulouse Socialists’ approach to the ICFTU. After the VII Congress of the PSOE in exile in August 1958, the activity of the Socialists inside Spain increased. Nevertheless, this impulse did not last long as, in November 1958, leading Socialists were arrested, among them Antonio Amat.11

1960–64 Defending the Spanish workers: the Joint ICFTU/IFCTU Committee 1960–62 Working-class unrest increased, however, as a consequence of economic changes and the extension of collective bargaining in 1958. At the end of 1960, as a result of Franco’s repression, concrete steps were taken by the ICFTU and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) to unite their efforts to carry out actions in defence of Spanish workers and their political rights. This joint effort was provoked by a variety of developments: the promulgation of the decree of 21 September 1960 which classified strikes as military rebellion and therefore serious crimes; the aggravation of the economic situation of workers due to the introduction of the new stabilisation plan in 1959; the anti-trade union persecution; and the contempt with which the Franco regime treated the fundamental rights of the individual.12 On 23 December 1960, the ICFTU and IFCTU published a joint declaration on Spain. The declaration denounced to the world the totalitarian and police regime of Franco which openly violated the fundamental freedoms laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, it recorded the circumstances of the establishment of the Franco regime, mentioning the repressive measures taken by the regime and the increasing misery of the working class. It also denounced the official trade union movement, as an instrument used by the single party to control the workers, and the support given to the Franco regime by several Western democratic governments. These governments had allowed Spain to enter various international institutions and had granted financial assistance. The declaration affirmed that neither of the two international organisations would ever accept a compromise with Franco or recognise the official trade union organisation and its representatives.

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The ICFTU and the IFCTU committed themselves to redouble their efforts before the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation with a view to bringing closer the moment when Spanish workers would be able freely to express their will and elect their legitimate representatives. The declaration requested all affiliated organisations to take similar action with their respective governments and to promote a movement of solidarity and assistance in favour of the Spanish people. The final paragraph contained the promise of the ICFTU and the IFCTU to pursue their action of solidarity for the re-establishment in Spain of fundamental liberties and especially of trade union freedom.13 This declaration was issued during a sensitive period not just for the regime but for Franco himself, when Franco’s mortality had become an issue.14 1961 and 1962 were important years for the clandestine trade union organisations within Spain and the role of the ICFTU/IFCTU was crucial.15 In 1961, the ICFTU recognised the Alianza Sindical (AS), created in 1961 by the UGT, the Basque STV and the CNT, as the trade union organisation that could be the base of the future trade union structure in a democratic regime. Accordingly, on 4–5 March 1961 the ICFTU/IFCTU set up a Joint Committee in Paris.16 The Joint Committee sought the unity of action and the formation of Joint Committees of trade union alliance of all the free and democratic trade union forces working clandestinely in Spain. The Joint Committee was composed of representatives of the two International Confederations, Omer Becú (ICFTU) and Vautherin, (IFCTU), and the following Spanish organisations: the UGT and the CNT had two representatives, and there was one representative each for the Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (STV), Solidaritat d’Obrers Catalans Cristians (SOCC) and the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores (FST).17 In May of the same year, the ICFTU became concerned about public endorsements of the current regimes by British and German Ministers during their visits to Spain and Portugal. In the view of Omer Becú (General Secretary of the ICFTU), these visits may have created ‘the dangerous impression that the free world is supporting totalitarian regimes’. In a press release Omer Becú alluded to the visits of the German Vice-Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to Spain and Portugal and his declaration describing both as ‘trustworthy countries’. Further examples included the visit of R.A. Butler, British Home Secretary, who said in Madrid that Spain and Portugal were important for the future greatness of Europe and that Spain should be fully incorporated into the Western world.18 Criticism was also expressed about the forthcoming visit of Lord Home, British Foreign Secretary, and of Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State. Rusk’s visit in December 1961, mainly motivated by military issues, was considered

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by the ICFTU a very serious matter, especially because the US administration had been fully informed about the violation of human rights by the Franco regime, only seven months earlier, by a joint ICFTU/IFCTU delegation.19 A concrete action: visit to the US in 1961 This delegation, from 16 to 28 May 1961, was the first concrete manifestation outside Europe of the programme for Spain undertaken by the two international organisations. It consisted of Pascual Tomás of the UGT, representing the ICFTU, and Ramón Agesta, representing the IFCTU. The purpose of the visit was to inform the AFL-CIO, the American administration, the Catholic community and the United Nations, of the conditions existing in Spain and of the actions undertaken by the democratic trade union forces to bring about the establishment, by peaceful means, of a democratic regime in the country.20 The first contact was with leading figures in the AFL-CIO, including its President, George Meany. On 23 May 1961, Meany in a press statement requested that the US government should obtain assurances that any bilateral assistance programmes with Spain should be used to relieve the economic plight of the Spanish people, and pledge efforts to assist in the restoration of their liberties.21 The delegates also met with members of the administration and several US Senators in order to present their views on the impact of American policy on the Spanish people.22 The two main figures were Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and Arthur Schlesinger, adviser to President Kennedy. They also met with leading personalities in the Catholic Church in the United States. Pascual Tomás, reporting on his visit, concluded that the Spanish problem was secondary to European and American governments which adopted ‘the political line they estimated more convenient to their national interests of each moment’. He recommended that the ICFTU/IFCTU should put pressure on democratic governments, trade unions and political parties for a change in their policy towards the Franco regime and send two missions to major European countries to inform them in the same way that they had done in the United States. Pascual Tomás concluded by saying: The contacts we had in America and in other international circles made us understand that, without underestimating the influence of international factors in the solution to the Spanish problem, it is necessary to convince the Spanish and the foreigners that there is a democratic alternative of substitution to the Franco regime – neither

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Communist nor Francoist – an alternative that already exists politically and syndically, and that the Spanish have to demonstrate to the world a continuous passive resistance, the need of putting an end to the dictatorship, with the aim of showing to public opinion the tragedy of the Spanish people and its will to get rid of it.23 The conclusion arrived at by the mission was, nevertheless, a relatively positive one: that the Kennedy administration would be less committed to Franco than the previous administration.24 Nevertheless, despite this seemingly positive conclusion, this delegation did not influence Dean Rusk’s decision to visit Franco, seven months later. This casts doubts on the effectiveness of the actions of the ICFTU in general and of the delegation in particular. Although the Joint Committee put considerable effort into trying to isolate the Franco regime from major democratic countries in the Western world, its success was extremely limited. The ICFTU/IFCTU and Western governments appeared to have very different agendas for Spain, dictated by different considerations and ideals. To keep Spain on the international agenda, the Conference on Spain held in Brussels by the ICFTU/IFCTU Committee on 29 October 1961 declared its opposition to all economic assistance to Spain from international and regional institutions, as well as from democratic governments, until a democratic regime was re-established in that country. The statement also expressed solidarity and support for Spanish trade unionists and democrats of all tendencies and appealed to the international trade union movement, and to democratic political parties and governments, to use all means to obtain the unconditional release of all political and trade union prisoners in Spain.25 The three action plans of the ICFTU 1962 In 1962, the waves of strikes in Spain led the ICFTU to implement its main action plans: financial assistance to workers during strikes, submitting a complaint to the ILO, and protesting directly to the Spanish government. The ICFTU was not alone in condemning the state of emergency following the strikes, since affiliated trade unions such as the American AFL-CIO, the DGB and the TUC also expressed their solidarity and concerns. The wave of strikes had its origin in the reaction of Spanish workers to the so-called collective agreements, negotiated by the state-sanctioned trade union organisation, which would freeze wages and prevent improvements in living standards. The strike movement which had been initiated in the Asturias mines in April 1962 spread to the Basque provinces of Guipuzcua and Vizcaya. At the beginning of May 1962 there were strikes

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in the mining, metal and chemical industries of other regions, particularly Leon, Andalucia and the Levant. As a result, the Franco government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months. The ICFTU issued an appeal on behalf of the Spanish workers. It called upon all affiliated organisations and the International Trade Secretariats to demonstrate their solidarity by organising meetings, publishing statements, sending protests to the Spanish Ambassador in their country, or by a combination of such actions.26 The ICFTU also called on its affiliated organisations for financial assistance.27 Contributions would reach the Spanish strikers through joint committees (which also included representatives of the Basque organisation in exile) and also would be sent to the UGT in exile in Toulouse.28 According to the ICFTU Conference on Spain, held in Brussels in May 1967, some of the affiliated organisations sent contributions to the ICFTU amounting to approximately US$48,000, while others made their contributions directly to the UGT. Over US$170,000 were collected29 in what appears to have been a successful appeal for funds. The ICFTU/IFCTU also submitted a complaint to the ILO against the Spanish government and asked the organisation to send a mission to Spain.30 Omer Becú sent a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Brussels to protest against the proclamation by the Spanish government of a state of emergency in three Spanish provinces: Asturias, Vizcaya and Guipuzcua. This meant that the government could reduce the right of movement, ban meetings, open mail, send army units to intervene and take over factories paralysed by a strike. Meanwhile, the ICFTU/IFCTU’s appeal to affiliated unions to join in the protest against the Spanish government was fruitful. George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, wrote to the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and asked the United States government to express its concern to the Spanish government. Similarly, the DGB addressed a letter to the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn protesting against the repression of the rights of Spanish workers and calling on the Spanish government to give workers trade union rights.31 The TUC expressed its solidarity with the Spanish workers in a letter of complaint to the Spanish Embassy and deplored the fact that freedom of association was denied to the workers.32 The actions taken by the ICFTU in 1962 in support of the workers’ strike proved successful, therefore, in two main ways: the ICFTU gave some financial assistance to Socialist workers and their families, and it was able to mobilise European trade unions to

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complain to the Spanish authorities. Although it is actually not clear how much money reached Spanish workers, because of the complexity of the network distribution within Spain, an important consequence of this mobilisation of the ICFTU around the strikes was to show the UGT to what extent the ICFTU, providing moral and material support, could be important for its future development as a strong trade union organisation in Spain. Another trade union that competed for international solidarity was the Alianza Sindical Obrera (ASO). In October 1962 a small group of UGT dissidents, a large faction of the CNT, and the SOCC created the ASO, which was in favour of infiltrating the official trade union and of establishing a unified free trade union movement. Soon after its creation in November 1962, one of the ASO’s first actions was to seek international solidarity directly from the ICFTU. Because the ICFTU/IFCTU had already recognised the Alianza Sindical and because the committee decided to recognise only organisations connected with the ICFTU/IFCTU, the ASO was not recognised and remained unauthorised.33 Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, the ASO would have the strong support of the German Metalworkers’ Union (IG Metall). During the 1962 strikes, workers’ commitees appeared throughout Spain constituting the embryo of what was to become the most important labour organisation of the 1960s and 1970s, the CC.OO or Workers’ Commissions, which were dominated by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). The introduction of the 1958 Collective Bargaining legislation had created the opportunity for representation on the Jurados de Empresas (works committees).34 With the 1962 strikes, there was an increase of shop-floor workers’ representation through the Jurado de Empresa which was used by underground groups as a legal platform for working-class mobilisation. The UGT and the USO both took part in the movement and supported the factory committees against the official trade unions.35 The Workers’ Commissions also took part in the shop-floor committees elected by workers. However, in 1964, the Workers’ Commissions were transformed into a separate organisation with the formation in 1964 of the Workers’ Commission of the Metal Industry of Madrid. After that, it developed a network of Workers’ Commissions in different branches of industry and all over the country, co-ordinated by provincial inter-branch commissions and by a national executive. As a result, the UGT abandoned any participation in the shopfloor committees. The main difference between the Workers’ Commissions and the UGT was that the former followed a strategy of infiltration and occupation of the Jurados de Empresas and the UGT defended the strategy of boycott.36 Another trade union organisation that defended the

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infiltration of the official trade union was the USO. The USO was a new trade union that was created in 1960 and was composed of militants of the UGT and left-wing Catholic workers. The USO was independent from any political party and supported the creation of a gran central sindical (big Trade Union Congress). In 1962, the USO collaborated with the ASO, leaving this organisation in 1965. Like the CC.OO and the ASO, the USO was in favour of infiltrating the official syndicates and in 1966 took part in the syndical elections.37 The UGT’s decision not to work within the official syndicates had very significant consequences. It boosted the CC.OO and harmed recruitment to the UGT. A weakened UGT was left dependent on support from the European labour movements when it sought to expand, after the death of Franco, in 1976–77.

1964–69 The ICFTU tarnishing Franco’s image 1964–65 The ICFTU protested vigorously against the violations of human rights in Spain. In February 1964, the ICFTU condemned the court verdict on 33 Spanish trade unionists and Socialists accused of illegal propaganda. Of these 20 were found innocent but 13 were condemned to prison sentences of one to five years and to fines ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 pesetas. Roger Lallemand, a Belgian lawyer who acted as observer on behalf of the ICFTU, reported that for the first time the defence lawyers were permitted to speak in court about democracy and Socialism. After the verdict had been announced Omer Becú stated that: ‘until freedom and democracy have been completely restored, Spain cannot expect to join the community of the free world’.38 The same year, on 13 August, the ICFTU/IFCTU protested against the heavy prison sentences imposed on three trade unionists from Barcelona and called on the Spanish Minister of Justice to release them.39 On 30 October 1964 the ICFTU/IFCTU denounced the violation of trade union rights following the trials held in Madrid on 16 and 17 October 1964 of Basque trade unionists. They also sent a complaint to the ILO.40 It is hard to ascertain any direct effect of these efforts, but it seems that the Franco regime took notice of the negative publicity that they generated, and sought to curtail it. Five years after the protest made by the ICFTU before the ILO about the decree that classified strikes as military rebellion, on 21 December 1965, the Cortes adopted an amendment to Article 222 of the Penal Code which condemned all strikes without distinction as acts of sedition. In an apparently liberalising initiative, the new version

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of the code condemned only those strikes which ‘endanger the safety of the state, undermine its authority, disturb the normal functioning of daily life and gravely harm national production’.41 The ICFTU/IFCTU however thought that the new amendment did not go very far, and did not introduce any real change in Spanish legislation on strikes. The government could still consider a strike as an offence. The ICFTU also considered this action ‘as a manoeuvre by which the Spanish regime tries to deceive world public opinion and the international free trade union movement’.42 Indeed, the ICFTU/IFCTU submitted a complaint to the ILO on 30 December 1965 against the Spanish government accusing it of violation of trade union rights. The complaint also urged the Governing Body of the ILO to put pressure on the Spanish government to modify the legislation.43 The action of the Cortes was, nonetheless, a sign that the Spanish government felt the need to seem to offer some response to international criticism. In pursuit of unifying trade organisations 1966–69 The Spanish opposition, however, also created problems for the ICFTU, which continued to seek unity between the AS and the ASO.44 The ICFTU was anxious to reconcile the differences between the ASO and the AS, as was repeatedly emphasised in talks between Adolphe Graedel (General Secretary of the International Metal Workers’ Federation) and Pascual Tomás (UGT). The Joint ICFTU/IFCTU Committee on Spain at their meeting in June 1965 discussed the situation. The Committee pointed out that cooperation should be achieved both between the Spanish trade union organisations, and between them and the international free trade union movement.45 On 13 March 1966 there was a meeting in Paris between the UGT, the ASO, the International Metal Workers’ Federation and the ICFTU represented by Braunthal and Aguiriano. The purpose of the meeting was to co-ordinate the actions between the democratic free trade unions, to bring together the ASO and the UGT to see if common ground existed, and to diminish differences. According to Adolphe Graedel, co-ordinating actions between democratic free trade unions was vital because that could prevent the Communists from taking control of the workers’ trade unions,46 something that ICFTU always feared and sought to prevent. The major differences between the groups were as follows. The ASO was in favour of infiltrating the official trade union and in favour of gradually establishing a unified free trade union movement, which could operate immediately after Franco disappeared. The UGT, on the contrary, believed in trade union plurality, although it was willing to head any united trade union movement that might emerge in post-

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Franco Spain. The UGT was also opposed to taking part in official trade union elections. At the Paris Conference, Pascual Tomás (UGT) appeared to be open to dialogue with delegates from the ASO. However, the Toulouse leaders wanted to marginalise the ASO. They feared being by-passed by Graedel, who wanted aid to go directly to active trade union organisations in Spain and did not want to maintain a bureaucracy in exile.47 At the meeting Tomás agreed to report to the UGT and the AS about possible future contacts. In fact, the UGT rejected any cooperation with the ASO because, according to a TUC report,48 the UGT believed – apparently wrongly – that the ASO had connections with the Communists. UGT leaders therefore resisted unification. They seemed more concerned with maintaining their control than with rebuilding the trade union movement and seeking trade union unity. Despite the appeal made by the ASO for financial assistance, the ICFTU ignored its request because it considered that the ASO was losing ground among Spanish workers.49 A further reason for not granting financial assistance was to avoid further complications between the ASO and the ICFTU affiliates.50 Further attempts were made to reconcile the ASO and the UGT, as in June 1966 when a meeting was held with delegates from the ICFTU and the International Metal Workers’ Federation, but no positive results were achieved. By October 1966, there had been no improvement in the relationship between the ASO and the UGT. In June a meeting was held between the ASO, the UGT, Graedel, Braunthal and Aguiriano regarding cooperation between the UGT and the ASO. The UGT delegates explained that they rejected any cooperation with the ASO for two main reasons: some ASO people had been expelled from the UGT because of their contacts with Communists and the official syndicates; and the ASO had criticised the UGT in exile for being out of touch with events in Spain and for operating from outside.51 Once again, the UGT rejected unification. In September 1966, official trade union elections took place. For the first time, the CC.OO, controlled by the Communist Party, the ASO and the USO were allowed to participate in the elections, in which – to the annoyance of the government – the CC.OO enjoyed a great success, although the ASO did poorly. Notwithstanding the CC.OO’s success, or more likely because of the excellent results and their capability to call for massive demonstrations on 27 January and 27 October 1967,52 they were declared illegal in November 1967. Soon after the elections, and no doubt alarmed by what they had revealed, the regime tightened its repression against workers. The repression was intensified from 1967, leading to the declaration of states of emergencies in 1968 in the Basque

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country and in 1969 and 1970 in the country as a whole.53 On 28 February 1967, the ICFTU sent a message to the Spanish Minister of Labour protesting against the arrests and repression of Spanish workers. ICFTU affiliates also sent a telegram protesting against the arrests and maltreatment to the leader of the Spanish mission to the EEC. They called for the immediate release of the imprisoned and recalled that ‘only a Spain which respects basic democratic rights can form part of the European Community’.54 This argument was emphasised by the ICFTU to put pressure on the Spanish government for democratic reforms. On 5 May 1967, the ICFTU55 protested to the ILO against the arrest of its representative, Maître De Kock. He had arrived in Bilbao on 29 April 1967 to obtain information about the situation of the workers, and was taken to the Spanish/French frontier by the Spanish police on 4 May without explanation. The ICFTU complained that the Spanish government had violated the rights of the Spanish workers to maintain contacts with international trade union organisations.56 Setting up a Co-ordinating Committee 1967 The ICFTU’s efforts to achieve the unity and co-ordination of the Spanish trade union organisations had so far not been successful. The great number of existing Spanish non-official trade union organisations, their different tactics and method of work, and the growing attempts by the Communists to dominate the Spanish labour scene, made the ICFTU decide to intensify its actions on Spain. In March 1967, the 42nd ICFTU Executive Board meeting decided to hold a Conference on Spain.57 The Conference which took place in Brussels on 17 May 1967 discussed a programme of activities to help bring about the unity of action of all the democratic trade union organisations in Spain and to establish a coordinated policy of the international trade union movement. It was attended by the AFL-CIO, DGB, CISL and UIL (Italy), the CGT-FO (France), the FGTB (Belgium), the UGT, and the International Metal Workers’ Federation.58 The ICFTU was represented by Braunthal and Morris Paladino, Assistant General Secretaries.59 The Conference decided to set up a Co-ordinating Committee which met in Geneva on 3 June 1967. The tasks of the Committee were: (i) to act as liaison body between the ICFTU, its affiliates, the International Trade Secretariats, and Spanish democratic trade union organisations; (ii) to collect data and information for action within intergovernmental organisations; (iii) to supervise activities inside and outside Spain and their financing and (iv) to report to the ICFTU Executive Board.60 The Co-ordinating Committee also set up an Advisory Group composed of permanent delegates of the CGTFO,

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AFL-CIO, DGB, UGT, the International Metal Workers’ Federation and the ICFTU secretariat.61 The Committee approved a programme for ICFTU action which included policy guidelines for the free trade union movement, emphasising the need for intensified and direct action and assistance to all democratic trade union organisations with the ultimate goal of establishing a unified democratic trade union movement. The programme aimed to help achieve unity of action at industrial, provincial and national levels on trade union matters; to assist in carrying out joint programmes at all levels which would strengthen the democratic unions; to make available the services of legal advisers, labour experts and economists from within Spain to the free trade union organisations; to secure legal aid for arrested trade unionists and assistance to their families; and to supply the free trade union organisations with suitable means of publicity and propaganda. The budget for the first year of operations was the substantial sum of US$100,000.62 Because of the lack of funds, an appeal for contributions towards that total amount was issued to all affiliated organisations and ITS on 13 June 1967.63 However, the response to the ICFTU appeal appeared to be poor. The 43rd Executive Board meeting (Brussels, October 1967) approved the activities of the Coordinating Committee and its programme of action on Spain, and instructed the ICFTU secretariat to continue its efforts to collect the necessary funds.64 The 27th International Solidarity Fund Committee meeting agreed to allocate US$60,000 for the programme of action of the Co-ordinating Committee on Spain.65 The remaining money was also raised, with US$10,200 from affiliated organisations, US$3,860 representing the unspent balance of the 1962 appeal, and the sum of US$32,100 from the ICFTU which had already been requested for UGT work in Spain.66 The setting-up of the Co-ordinating Committee on Spain is clear evidence of the ICFTU’s continuing determination to encourage unity among trade union organisations working in Spain. The ICFTU, hitherto, had been supporting specific Spanish trade union groups – mainly the UGT – and groups associated with them in the AS. After 1967, however, the ICFTU moved towards a wider concept: while continuing to recognise the UGT as the main pivot of operations inside Spain, it extended its efforts at co-ordinating and assisting all democratic trade union organisations in the country. At the beginning of 1967 an ICFTU representative who visited Spain had recognised that at least in some regions the Workers’ Commissions attracted workers because they concentrated on trade union problems rather than political ones. The representative recommended that all

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trade union organisations interested in the Spanish problem, including the UGT, should adopt a more flexible attitude towards the Workers’ Commissions, as the strategy most likely to avoid the extension of Communist influence. This recommendation was timely because, until recently, the UGT did not have a clear policy on dealing with the Workers’ Commissions, although from recent reports it would appear that there already existed a substantial degree of cooperation between the Workers’ Commissions and the UGT.67 Certainly, at the local level, the factory committee, for instance at la Naval de Sestao in the Basque country, there was cooperation between the Workers’ Commissions and the UGT. This particular initiative failed after two years mainly due to the repression and the excessive control of the Communists over the committee.68 On 27 June 1968, one of the actions taken by the advisory group of the Co-ordinating Committee, which met in Brussels, was to agree to organise a series of meetings with all the democratic trade union organisations in Spain. Taking into account the different attitudes taken by the Spanish trade union organisations in the various regions of Spain, it was decided to give priority to selected areas. The aim was to promote unity of action in these areas and to help in working out joint organising, educational and propaganda activities.69 Following this, a meeting took place in July in southern France with trade union representatives from selected areas in Spain, from the UGT and the USO. A full discussion took place on the possibilities of strengthening and expanding the contacts already existing between the Spanish democratic trade union organisations in the various regions. It was agreed that contacts should be established in as many regions as possible with a view to discussing and working out joint programmes.70 In 1969 the Co-ordinating Committee did not achieve its target, but it continued its efforts to promote cooperation. ILO study group to Spain 1969 In 1969 a state of emergency was declared for three months by the Spanish government from 24 January to 25 March. Articles 12, 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the Fuero de los Españoles, guaranteeing a range of individual freedoms, were suspended. At the same time censorship was extended under article 29 of the Law of Public Order.71 This led the ICFTU and the ILO to condemn the Spanish government and to call upon their affiliated organisations to express their support for workers and democrats in Spain and to let the governments of their respective countries, and the Spanish authorities, know of their unanimous condemnation of Franco’s repressive regime. Indeed, the ICFTU argued that the earlier policy of apparent liberalisation had only ever been a ploy by Franco’s government to

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promote its efforts to become part of the European Community and other international bodies.72 The regime was now displaying its true character. A year before the state of emergency, in May 1968, the Spanish government, which was revising its trade union legislation, had decided to invite an ILO study group to Spain to examine the labour and trade union situation.73 Although the ICFTU had doubts about the effectiveness of the study group, it agreed with its establishment as ‘a further means to exert world-wide pressure on the Spanish regime to grant trade union freedom’.74 On 12 February 1969 an ICFTU delegation, composed of Harm G. Buiter, the new General Secretary of the ICFTU, Manuel Muiño, the UGT General Secretary, a delegate from inside Spain and a delegate from the STV, met the ILO study group.75 The delegation submitted a statement which emphasised that, after the proclamation of the state of emergency, it was up to the study group to decide whether a visit to Spain was still appropriate for the elaboration of their report. The statement also recommended that the study group should visit the prisons and places to which trade union leaders had been deported since 24 January 1969, in order to be able to examine all aspects of the labour and trade union situation.76 The study group visited Spain from 7 to 30 March 1969. The group appointed by the governing body of the ILO was impressive, composed as it was of Paul Ruegger (the Swiss Chairman), a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Institute of International Law, and of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO; J.A. Barboza-Carneiro of Brazil, former Chairman of the Governing Body of the ILO; and P.P. Spinelli of Italy, former Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva. The group as a whole spent ten days in Madrid, three days in Barcelona, two days in Bilbao, and two days in Oviedo (Asturias). In Asturias individual members also visited Gijón, Avilés and Sama de Langreo. Individual members of the group visited Toledo, Valencia, Seville, Badajoz, Zaragoza, La Coruña, Burgos and Valladolid. The study group met with ministers and senior officials, with the highest judicial authorities, with the National Council of Employers and Workers and with the Provincial Councils of Employers and Workers, or their permanent committees, in ten provinces. They also visited industrial and agricultural enterprises and social services. The group had discussions with management and with elected members of works’ committees. It also held private visits and interviews with over a hundred other people ranging from Church authorities and professors specialising in labour law and relations to public figures politically opposed to the government. The group asked to see 12 persons detained in jail, chosen by the group from names given to them by international

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trade union organisations.77 This wide range of interviews gave the group the chance to get a better knowledge of the real situation inside Spain. The study group considered that the reasons for proclaiming the state of exception were not related to the labour and trade union situation, but to the current conflicts in the universities. It gave evidence in its report that trade union rights were not respected by the Spanish authorities and that persons arrested were ill-treated in Spanish prisons, and in some cases tortured, and that the Spanish authorities violated basic human rights.78 The study group told the government that an amnesty or pardon for all persons imprisoned for normal trade union activities would be a major contribution to the future development of the trade union situation in Spain. As though all of this were not bad enough from the Spanish government’s point of view, the study group put a great deal of emphasis on the reform of trade union law. The original initiative for this matter had been taken at the official trade union Congress of Tarragona on 19–21 May 1968, which, after consulting the Employers’ and Workers’ Council, in 1967 adopted a proposal for the revision of the law.79 This proposal was still waiting to be submitted to the Cortes. The ILO report, however, confirmed that Spanish trade union legislation openly contradicted ILO principles. It stated that trade union law should fulfil five conditions: (i) all posts of authority should be filled by election; (ii) there should be complete autonomy of the trade unions; (iii) authority of elected trade union officers over appointed officials and over financial and administrative affairs; (iv) the trade union movement should not be subject to direction or control by any political movement; (v) the law should guarantee freedom of expression and assembly for all schools of trade union opinion.80 Despite the attempts made by the ICFTU and ILO to persuade the Spanish government to change the Spanish Law, on 2 October 1969 the Spanish government submitted a draft Bill on trade unions to the Spanish Cortes which ignored the ILO resolution and the recommendations made by the study group.81 An incomplete and censored version of the interim report was released in Spain. The ICFTU General Secretary, Harm G. Buiter, denounced the distorted utilisation of the report to David Morse, ILO Director General. Buiter recalled that one of the conditions laid down by the ILO Workers’ Group and by the ICFTU for the ILO study group to visit Spain was the

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publication and distribution in Spain of the full text of the report.82 The ICFTU gave wide publicity to the ILO study in Spain and copies of the report were distributed in Spain by the UGT and the STV.83 One of the reactions in Spain to the ILO’s report was the growth of workers’ protest against the official trade unions.84 Clearly, the visit and the report issued by the ILO study group influenced the Spanish opposition groups and gave them encouragement in their fight for trade union rights. At the same time, the government’s invitation to the ILO, followed by a further invitation for another visit in 1970, demonstrated just how sensitive the Spanish government was to opinion abroad. Following the study group’s visit, the 53rd ILO Conference discussed the interim report. Workers’ delegates from ICFTU affiliates in the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Norway and Denmark, endorsed a resolution concerning the labour and trade union situation in Spain. The delegates pointed out that, although the report had called on the Spanish government to grant an amnesty for prisoners, many persons were still in prison and many trade union leaders continued to be sentenced. For the first time, a resolution on Spain had been adopted by an ILO Conference.85 The preamble of the resolution reaffirmed the main principles of the ILO: freedom of association, free and democratic trade unionism and full respect for civil liberties, and the resolution noted that the interim report had been communicated to the Conference. One of the issues that arose during the visit of the study group to Spain in March 1969 was the allegations of ill-treatment of imprisoned trade unionists which were discussed between the group and the Spanish authorities. The Minister of Justice, Antonio María Oriol de Urquijo, made it clear that any ill-treatment of arrested persons was subject to severe penalties under the Penal Code. The Fiscal of the Supreme Court informed the Chairman of the study group that he would prosecute vigorously any case in which specific evidence of alleged ill-treatment was brought to his attention, including any case with specific evidence submitted by any international trade union body, and that he would keep the ILO informed of the result.86 On 20 September 1969, Harm G. Buiter sent a letter of complaint to the Spanish Minister of Justice, Antonio María Oriol de Urquijo and to the Fiscal of the Supreme Court denouncing the torture suffered by workers and students at the prison of Basauri (Vizcaya).87 According to a press release issued several weeks later by the ICFTU, the Spanish government had not informed either the ICFTU or the ILO of any change in its policy towards prisoners.88 Once again, the Spanish government had completely disregarded the ICFTU and ILO representa-

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tions. It wanted the appearance, but not the reality, of cooperation with international labour and union organisations.

1970–77 A failed attempt to undermine Franco at the ILO 1970 The ICFTU issued another resolution in April 1970, which pointed out that all the recommendations it had made to the Spanish government since 1957 to change legislation, in conformity with ILO principles and standards, had had no effect whatsoever. The resolution called upon the Spanish government to restore free and democratic trade unionism and full respect for civil liberties in Spain and urged it to accept the study group’s appeal for a generous amnesty or pardon for persons in prison. It also asked the Spanish government to accept the study group’s suggestions for reform of the criminal law and to abolish the public order tribunal. The resolution finally invited the ILO Governing Body to keep the labour and trade union situation in Spain under constant review and to report regularly to the International Labour Conference on developments relating to trade union rights and freedom in Spain.89 The resolution was submitted to the 54th session of the International Labour Conference in Geneva on 3 June 1970 by the workers’ delegates Anton Benya (Austria), Gerd Muhr (Germany), Cyril Plant (Great Britain) and Thorbjörn Carlson (Sweden).90 The resolution was rejected with 9,754 votes in favour, 10,486 votes against and 1,870 abstentions. According to the ICFTU Executive Board Report, a determining factor in the result of the vote was the abstention of various democratic countries, particularly from Western Europe. At the plenary session, ICFTU affiliated members from France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany expressed disappointment at the result, blaming the abstention of some democratic countries and condemning the negative attitude of the Employers’ Group. The UGT also condemned the abstention of governments in Western Europe, particularly where social democratic parties were represented.91 The ICFTU resolution’s rejection by the ILO was surely a triumph for the Franco regime. It is a paradox that the effectiveness of the ICFTU recommendations was frustrated by the unwillingness of some democratic governments to criticise the Franco regime. The Co-ordinating Committee continued its efforts to promote cooperation and unity of action among Spanish democratic trade union organisations, and specifically between the UGT and the USO in three selected areas. By the end of 1969, the report on activities stated that

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insufficient efforts had been made by both the UGT and the USO to cooperate effectively with each other.92 It was reported by the Advisory group at its meeting held in Brussels on 10 March 1970 that the ICFTU had organised joint meetings of the UGT and the USO, and that both organisations had made specific commitments to start working together in the metal and railway sectors. The ICFTU correspondent checked on the progress made and reported that efforts made by the ICFTU to harmonise activities of these two organisations have not yet produced conclusive results. While the UGT has shown its best will in every instance to reach some form of agreement for unity of action, its efforts have not met equal response from the USO. After that, the ICFTU considered the need to encourage joint UGT/USO courses or UGT courses with other democratic trade union organisations. The Advisory Committee unanimously endorsed these recommendations.93 In terms of finance, in November 1969, the International Solidarity Fund had allocated the sum of US$25,000 for the Co-ordinating Committee’s programme in Spain for 1970.94 1970 was the year in which ICFTU began to follow events particularly closely in Spain. On 16 April 1970 the trial of 14 members of the UGT95 was held in Madrid, accused of illegal association and illegal propaganda. Of those nine were sentenced to prison for periods ranging from three months to four years and fines of 10,000 pesetas. Roger Louet attended the trial on behalf of the ICFTU as observer. In a press statement, the ICFTU denounced these sentences as another flagrant repression of human and trade union rights.96 In July 1970, the ICFTU condemned the shooting by the police of three workers, who were protesting against the delay in concluding a new collective agreement in Granada.97 A large number of ICFTU affiliates and the International Trade Union Secretariat expressed their concern over the incident and called on the Spanish government to abolish the obstacles to free trade union rights. As a gesture of solidarity, the ICFTU also sent through the UGT 30,000 pesetas to the families of the victims. On 16 October Harm Buiter, General Secretary of the ICFTU, condemned the revised trade union Bill submitted to the Spanish Cortes on 13 October 1970 as ‘nothing but a continuation of the present repressive system’. Once again, the Spanish government ignored the appeals and recommendations of the ILO on trade union rights.98 The ICFTU requested from the UGT a public manifestation of discontent against the new syndical law:

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We really hope that reactions inside Spain will take place similar to the previous discontent of democratic trade unions at the moment of the publication of the draft Bill of the new Syndical Law.99 On 5 November 1970, the ICFTU protested against the Burgos court martial of 16 persons from the Basque country sentenced to death for alleged terrorist activities.100 Harm Buiter sent a cable to the Spanish Attorney General, Herrero Tejedor, denouncing the torture of imprisoned persons in the Basque provinces and the methods utilised to obtained confessions. This, as well as the practice of holding a court martial in camera, was seen as a procedure which failed to respect the rights of defence and universal standards of justice and equity.101 Buiter called upon ICFTU affiliates to put pressure on their respective governments to save lives.102 European trade unions organised numerous protest actions such as solidarity strikes, boycotts of Spanish ships, demonstrations, cables to the Spanish authorities, and representations to their respective governments.103 The TUC sent a telegram of protest to the Spanish Ambassador in London. The DGB also protested with extensive demonstrations, as did the Italian, Belgian and French federations, the Luxembourg CGT, the Austrian ÖGB, the Swedish trade union LO, the Norwegian LO and the Danish LO.104 The worldwide campaign against the death sentences, to which trade unions had made such an energetic contribution, was effective. Franco decided to commute the death sentences. These ICFTU interventions in 1970 showed its concern about the UGT, and, as on previous occasions, the ICFTU exerted international pressure on the Spanish government to grant trade union rights. The process that started on 10 January 1967 with the modification of the Labour Chapter by the State Organic Law culminated on 17 February 1971 when the Spanish Parliament approved a new trade union law. This approval represented the rejection by the Spanish government of the recommendations suggested by the ICFTU and ILO throughout this period, particularly the five conditions proposed by the ILO study group in its report. Therefore, all the efforts made by the ILO to establish trade union rights had had no effect whatsoever. A minister appointed by Franco would continue to head the official trade union organisation, membership of which was compulsory. The new law did not recognise free trade unions, which were considered illegal and therefore prosecuted. All trade unions activities were still penalised and strikes and propaganda were considered illegal.105 On 18 March, the ICFTU together with the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) expressed its profound disagreement with the Spanish government in a joint statement. In their view,

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the new trade union law modifies only the terminology of the preceding legislation and maintains completely the totalitarian spirit.106 What could not be measured, however, was the effect of ICFTU and ILO denunciations in helping to undermine the legitimacy of the Franco regime, both in Spain and abroad. After the approval of the new law, a delegation of the ICFTU, led by Henri Maier, Head of the Economic, Social and Political Department, with Otto Kersten, head of the International Department of the DGB, attended the Executive Meeting of the UGT to examine the political and trade union situation in Spain. Several issues were discussed such as the new trade union law and the impending trade union elections which were to be held in May 1971. The UGT announced its total repudiation of these elections, and decided to boycott them. The UGT appealed to the ICFTU to continue giving its solidarity and assistance to the cause of the rights of workers and to keep that cause visible before international public opinion.107 Clearly, the UGT still considered ICFTU activities as beneficial. A new wave of strikes had spread throughout Spain by September/ October 1971. The ICFTU, together with the International Metal Workers’ Federation and the International Federation of Building and Woodworkers, submitted a complaint to the ILO against the Spanish government. Three examples were cited to demonstrate that the government was still exercising repressive measures against workers’ action: (i) by the end of October, thousands of workers in Barcelona were on strike following the incidents between the police and workers at the SEAT automobile plant, in which workers had been crushed while they were on a sit-in strike to obtain the reinstatement of 20 dismissed workers; (ii) in Asturias 15,000 miners were on strike in support of higher salaries, and free and democratic unions; (iii) the assassination of Pedro Patiño by the police in Madrid while distributing leaflets among other constructions workers on strike.108 The Executive Board of the ICFTU passed a resolution on Spain on 22 October 1971. The resolution fully supported the previous complaints submitted by the ICFTU to the ILO against the Spanish government, demanded the immediate release of arrested workers and assured full solidarity and support, both material and moral, in their struggle for the re-establishment of trade union rights. A further occasion to express solidarity with the Spanish workers was the X World Congress of the ICFTU held in London on 10–14 July 1972. The Congress denounced the Franco regime and asked all affiliated members to express their support and assistance to the Spanish democratic syndical forces fighting for freedom and democracy in Spain. It also supported vigorously the position

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adopted by the EEC in opposing the entry or close association of Spain until democracy was restored.109 In 1974, the case of Salvador Puig Antich, the Catalan anarchist accused of killing a policeman, who was sentenced to death by a military court, attracted the attention of the ICFTU. A telegram was sent by the ICFTU, on 10 January 1974, to the Spanish Minister of Justice, asking him to absolve Puig Antich. The ICFTU also sent a telegram to the Spanish Head of State, some hours earlier, in a last-minute attempt to save Puig Antich’s life. This time, Franco did not respond to the international community’s request, and Puig Antich was executed on 2 March 1974.110 The same year a joint complaint was submitted to the Director General of the ILO on 12 February 1974, against the verdict of the military court in Barcelona, which had sentenced a worker named Manuel Pérez Esquerra to four years’ imprisonment and three other workers to one year each on charges of having organised demonstrations.111 Another action that can be considered as direct support for the UGT was the very public platform that the ICFTU provided to the UGT’s political initiative in September 1974. On 12 September, a delegation of the UGT presented at the headquarters of the ICFTU the text of a declaration to the working class, which called for a policy of the unity of the working class and issued terms for the liquidation of the dictatorship and for the establishment of a democratic system. The UGT declaration was presented together with a political declaration by the PSOE. Similarly, press conferences were being organised in the main capitals of Europe by UGT delegations. In Brussels, Otto Kersten, General Secretary of the ICFTU, and George Debunne, of the FGTB, presented to the press Antonio García Duarte, UGT Organisation Secretary, and Nicolas Redondo, UGT Political Secretary. The ICFTU guaranteed the representatives of the UGT its unconditional support for the restoration of a democratic regime in Spain.112 In 1975, the year of Franco’s death, the death sentences imposed on 11 terrorists from ETA and FRAP impelled the ICFTU to send a warning to the Spanish Prime Minister Arias Navarro. A telegram sent to him on 24 September 1975 by Otto Kersten said that the execution of these terrorists would lead the ICFTU to use its influence in all democratic countries to bring about the total isolation of Spain.113 Despite the warnings of the ICFTU and the pressure exercised by the international community, including the European Parliament, to commute the death sentences, on 1 October 5 of the 11 sentences were carried out. As a result, the XI World ICFTU Congress held in Mexico on 17–25 October passed a resolution on Spain. The resolution solicited from affiliated organisations that, according to the conditions in each country, they should effect a

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general tourist boycott of Spain, common actions to boycott the transport of tourists, goods and equipment, and also a boycott of mail, telegraph and telephone services to Spain. In addition, the resolution called upon the citizens of all countries not to visit Spain as tourists.114 The resolution was much too ambitious, but served as a useful index of how completely the regime had lost the battle for international public opinion. After Franco’s death the ICFTU became increasingly aware of the importance of the role that the UGT could play, from then on, in the process of democratisation in Spain. In March 1976, the ICFTU decided to appeal to ICFTU member organisations and to ITS to provide the UGT and the STV with the means for carrying out their struggle to assure democracy. The amount granted by the ICFTU represented 10 per cent of the sum which the UGT considered indispensable for their 1976 activities.115 Apart from financial assistance, the UGT requested the presence of all European National Trade Union Centres which were members of the ICFTU at the 13th Congress of the UGT, the first Congress in Spain since the Civil War. Even though the UGT was still illegal, the Congress was authorised by the government and was held in Madrid on 15–17 April 1976. The Congress was attended by Otto Kersten, General Secretary of the ICFTU; Otto Vetter, President of the DGB, Omer Becú, former General Secretary of the ICFTU, and Victor Feather, General Secretary of the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC).116 Many other prominent trade union leaders were also present. The presence of the main ICFTU and ETUC representatives was useful for two main reasons: it publicly backed the UGT in Spain, and it contributed to international pressure on the Spanish government, which was seeking acceptance by Western democracies.117 After the Congress, the UGT began to grow beyond its financial and logistic means. By then, the UGT covered 95 per cent of the whole Spanish territory with only some rural areas still to cover. To strengthen and expand the structure of the UGT, and to provide each area with a minimum of means (premises, full-time officers, training seminars), Nicolás Redondo, General Secretary of the UGT, called for an accelerated fund-raising campaign on behalf of the UGT. The funds would allow the UGT to compete against the Communist dominated Workers’ Commissions.118 It was claimed that, in November 1976, thanks to the aid given by Eastern Bloc countries, the CC.OO employed a minimum of 600 full trade union officers compared to the 20 employed by the UGT, and was able to cover the whole of Spain.119 According to the Assistant General Secretary of the ICFTU, J. Vanderveken, in a letter to all members of the Finance Committee of the ICFTU, the budget of the ISF for UGT

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and STV assistance for 1978 needed to be increased and part of it had to be disbursed as soon as was practical because the need of the UGT is urgent and enormous. All over Spain it has to be active to build its organisation as well as perform the normal trade union tasks. This must be done by people and through efficient working methods at the local and central level. The cost of building and maintaining such a structure is beyond the present means of the UGT. Income from membership is rising and hopefully will be in accordance with its size towards the end of next year.120 Until at least the late 1970s, no trade union movement emerging from the years of dictatorship was able to be financially self-sufficient, and both UGT and CC.OO needed substantial external help. Conclusions The ICFTU, either singly or jointly with the IFCTU, during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s developed policies of intervention in support of Spanish workers. Although the ICFTU took some actions during the 1950s, involvement escalated during the following two decades. The ICFTU intervened on three main fronts: firstly, it offered direct support to workers, for instance with financial and legal assistance during strikes; secondly, it challenged the Franco regime through the ILO; and thirdly, it put pressure on the Spanish government either by direct protests to the regime or by campaigns in ICFTU-affiliated member states for them to take action. The ICFTU was faced with a division in the democratic trade unions in Spain which greatly complicated its task. On the one hand, the Alianza Sindical consisted of the UGT, the CNT and the STV, and on the other a newly created alliance, the ASO, was composed of UGT dissidents, and a large faction of the CNT and SOCC. This division could have been a danger for the establishment of a coherent workers movement once democracy was achieved. Another dimension to be added was the CC.OO’s ascendancy during this period. Clearly, the ICFTU tried to promote the unity of the Socialist trade unions in Spain to counterbalance the Communist predominance. The 1962 Conference in Paris was an example of the several attempts made by ICFTU to reconcile these two trade union forces. However, the ASO and the AS never managed to forget their differences and work together. A decisive factor that led to the end of the ASO in 1968 was the lack of support received from the ICFTU and other affiliates. This is crucial evidence of the importance of international

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factors in pre-democratic processes in Spain. Once the importance of the AS had been established amongst the international trade unions, support started to flow in its direction. For this purpose, in 1967, the ICFTU set up the Co-ordinating Committee. Its main objective was to strengthen unity of action, and assist with financial and legal help the newly internationally recognised democratic free trade union (AS), of which the UGT was the leader. In terms of the action taken by ICFTU and ILO directed at the Spanish government, although protests and representations were numerous, they had not by 1971 had the desired effect on the legalisation of free trade unions and their activities, strikes and propaganda. However, despite the apparent lack of results, these actions gave negative publicity in a very sensitive period for the regime when international opinion really mattered to the Franco government, focusing world attention on the character of the Spanish authoritarian regime. In conclusion, it can be said that the ICFTU’s most effective action was the financial and moral support given to the UGT. This helped to consolidate the UGT, and also promoted the emergence of a free trade union movement under UGT leadership. The turning point was marked by the ICFTU’s presentation of the UGT in Brussels in 1974. A point worth mentioning is that the same year the Socialist International formally recognised the PSOE renovado as the true Socialist party. The PSOE also benefited from aid to the UGT since the PSOE and the UGT were so closely linked. After Franco’s death, the UGT’s need for support increased. At least until the end of 1977 the UGT was very much dependent on external help, above all that of the ICFTU. The underlying worry was the emergence of a powerful Communist trade union movement based in the Workers’ Commissions. During this concluding period, the ICFTU and the affiliated members needed to keep up with the Eastern Bloc countries which were giving help to the Communists.

4

The British Labour Movement 1959–77

In 1959 after 20 years of autarky the Spanish government launched a new stabilisation plan to liberalise and modernise the economy. In 1958 and 1959, Spain become part of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/World Bank) and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This openingup of the regime coincided with waves of arrests of Spanish Socialists and trade unionists in 1958. The conflictive situation inside Spain and international appeals by the PSOE and the UGT triggered, in 1959, the creation by the British Labour movement of a special Committee, the Spanish Democrats’ Defence Fund Committee (SDDC). The new Committee was created by the Labour Party and financially supported by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and its affiliates. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact that the activities carried out not only by the SDDC but also by the Labour Party and the TUC had on the PSOE/UGT, and to assess what they achieved during this period. The first part of this chapter will cover the period from 1959, the year of the creation of the special committee, to the beginning of 1969, when a state of emergency was declared in Spain. The Labour government of Harold Wilson (1964–70) was in power in the UK for much of the period.

1959–68 The involvement of the British Labour movement in Spanish affairs had its roots in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). Even though the British Labour movement had failed to force the British government to change 71

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its policy of non-intervention in the conflict, the help given to the Republican cause by Labour members through Spanish Medical Aid, the International Brigades’ Dependants and Wounded Aid Committee and Voluntary Aid for Spain was very significant.1 After the Second World War, when Clement Attlee’s Labour government took office (1945–50), the Labour Party and the trade unions put pressure on it to change British policy towards Spain and boycott the Spanish government with a rupture of diplomatic relations and an economic blockade. The government rejected this policy and any direct intervention arguing that the breakdown of the Franco regime would only be favourable for the revolutionary left and the Soviet Union.2 During the 1950s, with the Labour Party in opposition, the British Labour movement seemed to have lost interest in Spain.3 By the end of the decade, however, the Labour Party and trade unions’ concern for Spain was revived. In November 1958 the PSOE in exile took a decisive initiative when it sent an urgent appeal, made by Rodolfo Llopis, to the Labour Party asking for moral and material support for 50 Socialists, including leading figures, who had been arrested. This appeal marked the beginning of what was to prove a sustained involvement in Spanish affairs up to and beyond the end of the Franco regime by the British Labour movement. The wave of arrests of Spanish Socialists and trade unionists took place all over Spain: in Madrid, San Sebastian, Barcelona, Vitoria, Zaragoza, Granada and Bilbao.4 Besides Llopis’ appeal, Labour received several reports concerning these arrests, such as an official letter from the Socialist movement of Catalonia.5 According to another source, a statement sent to the Labour Party by Miguel Sánchez Mazas, a member of the Spanish Socialist university group, the motive that led the Spanish authorities to prosecute the Spanish Socialists was ‘the increasing anxiety felt by the regime following recent developments in Spain’. He said that the regime was particularly alarmed about the growing awareness in professional and university circles of the inadequacy of Franco’s system, and explained how such groups could be a real threat to the regime due to their ability to give shape to the social unrest and initiate a mass movement.6 Obviously, repressive actions to control the increasing social unrest did not do the regime any good in the eyes of the international community, especially at a moment when Franco needed to improve his international image. Following these appeals, several actions were taken by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party. The NEC passed a resolution on 26 November 1958 which protested against the arrests and called on the authorities to release those that they had imprisoned.7 A formal protest was sent to the Spanish Ambassador, and Morgan Phillips, General

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Secretary of the Labour Party, sent a circular to all constituency parties suggesting that those wishing to protest against ‘a complete violation of democratic principles’, should write to the Minister of Justice. Those protesting against the continued detention of some of the Socialists should write to the Judge of the 13th Civil Division, Palace of Justice, Madrid.8 The NEC also decided to finance the visit of an observer to the trials. The establishment of the Spanish Democrats’ Defence Fund Committee (SDDC) The most significant initiative carried out by the Labour Party in response to the PSOE appeal and to the situation inside Spain was the establishment of the Spanish Democrats’ Defence Fund Committee (SDDC).9 The new Committee was sponsored by the British Labour movement, and would be concerned with ‘the defence of Socialists, trade unionists and such other victims of political oppression in Spain as the Committee might decide’.10 Therefore, this committee was open to support any organisation inside Spain opposed to the Franco regime.11 The purpose was to help not only the PSOE but also other opposition groups fighting against dictatorship in Spain, among them the Agrupación Socialista Universitaria (ASU), the Basque Socialist movement, the Moviment Socialista de Catalunya (MSC) and even the monarchist Unión Española. The press release issued by the Labour Party listed the aims of the Committee as the following: to gain the maximum publicity for the situation in Spain, to stimulate protest from organisations and individuals in Britain, and to raise funds to assist Socialists and trade unionists and other victims of political oppression. The funds would be used towards the costs of legal defence and to assist the families of the defendants.12 For the work of the SDDC, the Labour Party received generous contributions from the TUC. The Committee was genuinely an undertaking of the whole Labour movement, involving both the Labour Party and the trade unions, as its membership and its funding demonstrated. The PSOE’s reaction to the creation of this new committee was not very enthusiastic. Indeed, on 22 January 1959 Rodolfo Llopis, General Secretary of the party in exile, complained to Albert Carthy, General Secretary of the Socialist International, about the creation of the Committee because, in his view, the problem of political prisoners was not the Labour Party’s responsibility but the PSOE’s and the UGT’s.13 Llopis manifested his dissatisfaction to Carthy because the Labour Party was pursuing a different method for helping the Spanish Socialists from that followed by other member parties of the SI,14 who backed up Llopis rather than acting independently. Llopis was clearly nervous of losing control.

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One of the first actions of the SDDC was to protest directly to the Franco regime about the imprisonment of Antonio Amat and other Socialist prisoners: Francisco Román Díaz, Luis Martín Santos and Santiago Antón. Accordingly, the SDDC sent Peter Benenson, a member of the Society of Labour Lawyers and the Union of Democratic Control, to Madrid in June 1959. The imprisoned Socialists had been pursuing a new and distinctive policy in clandestinity within Spain. The Socialists inside Spain had been working for an internal united front, including the Catalans and the Basques. During the VII Congress of the PSOE in exile, in June 1958, members from the interior had asked for a major participation in the decision-making process because, in their view, the political action against Franco should be located inside Spain. On 11 and 12 August 1958 Francisco Román, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Interior, had proposed to the PSOE’s Standing Committee (Comité Director) the following: (i) collaboration in action with the Communists, (ii) autonomy for the interior, and (iii) a pact with other opposition groups and the organisation of peaceful protests. The Executive Committee in exile had rejected these proposals, arguing that for security reasons the direction and co-ordination of the opposition should be managed from exile.15 Nonetheless, PSOE members within Spain continued to develop links with other groups. The leaders of this operation were Antonio Amat, jailed in 1958, and Josefina Arrillaga, a lawyer in charge of co-ordinating the contacts with other opposition groups such as the ASU and the MSC. The main aim of Benenson’s visit was to secure the release of these Socialist prisoners. Benenson interviewed the lawyers of the imprisoned Socialists José García Mesa and Fernando Montes, and met Oreja Elósegui, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice. He pointed out that the attitude of the Labour Party, and other democrats in the West, was to support an application for the release, on bail, of Amat and other Socialists.16 After the visit, on the recommendation of the SDDC, the NEC of the Labour Party issued a statement in July 1959 calling for Amat’s release.17 In 1961, after three years in prison, Amat was released and held instead under house arrest. When in Madrid, Peter Benenson also learned of the arrest of a number of young members of the ASU and discussed with their lawyers the steps that should be taken to secure their release. The second purpose of the visit was ‘to impress upon the opposition that the Labour Party had not modified its attitude to the Franco regime’.18 In April 1959, the visit to Spain of two Labour MPs, Edward Mallalieu and John Hynd, had created a negative impression upon Socialists in Spain because the official Spanish press had taken full advantage of it.19 As we


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will see later, the Labour Party was very concerned about such visits and the use that the Franco regime could make of them. Benenson also wanted to discover the extent and plans of the opposition in Spain. He made contacts not only with Socialist party members but also with the various Spanish opposition groups from the Monarchists on the right to the leftwing Christian Democrats. Benenson laid stress on the fact that the most vigorous opposition was found among the new intelligentsia of young people who were willing to seek guidance from the Labour Party.20 It was during the course of this visit that the Labour Party discovered the depth of the disagreements existing within the PSOE. In his report, Benenson stressed that one of the problems in Spain was the abyss between the Socialists in Spain and those in exile. He said: The Socialists inside Spain are a new generation with new ideas. Many of them are devout Catholics with little sympathy for the anticlerical bias of the old Socialists.21 He also pointed out how some Socialists were willing to cooperate with the Monarchists who advocated the restoration of a constitutional monarchy, especially in Castille. He mentioned the rise of the left-wing Christian Democrats, who were particularly strong in Catalonia where they had the clandestine adherence of a number of priests. He expressed his surprise that these groups did not cooperate more closely with the Socialist parties and thought that the old anticlericalism of the Socialist Party was partly to blame. He hoped that, ‘If the bogey of anticlericalism could once be laid there is every hope of welding together a strong, progressive Socialist movement.’ 22 Benenson’s meetings with nonSocialists were instructive, but the most important result of the visit was probably the understanding he gained of the conflict between the two parts of the PSOE which would reach its zenith in 1972. This visit helped to clarify why the PSOE in exile was opposed to the foundation of the SDDC. The obvious concern of the Committee for the PSOE of the interior and other opposition parties was not appreciated by the PSOE in exile. During his visit, Benenson concluded that there was a Socialist Party in Spain which had very different ideals from the PSOE in exile. This conviction was to shape the Labour movement’s perceptions of affairs in Spain consistently from then on. The SDDC duly considered Benenson’s report on his visit to Spain. The Committee decided to arrange for a member of the Society of Labour Lawyers to go to Spain as an observer at the trial before a military court of ten students. The chairman Walter Padley made it clear that it was not the responsibility

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of the Committee to become involved in any way in the differences that might exist among the Spaniards who were associated with the Committee.23 Over the following years, the SDDC repeated this statement over and over again. Initially, the main activity of the SDDC was to send observers to attend trials. Ernest Davies, Labour MP for Enfield East and formerly Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, visited Spain on 3 August 1959 to attend the trial of nine young Socialist members24 of the ASU and one Communist, Emilio Hurtado, from Madrid, Valencia and Salamanca universities, under detention since 17 May.25 (They were accused of illegal propaganda in connection with the abortive 24-hour strike called for 18 June 1959.) The trial provided the SDDC with the opportunity to impress upon the Military Court the extent of outside interest and indignation at the trial, to raise the morale of the accused, to exploit the presence of the British and foreign press, to stress the indignation felt at the continuance of political persecution in Spain, and, most importantly, to make contact with opposition groups and to discuss the Committee’s activities.26 Davies criticised the Spanish government on the grounds that the defendants were denied their own legal aid and that rules of evidence were laid aside.27 He also confirmed the abyss which separated the Socialists in Spain from those in exile mentioned in Peter Benenson’s report. In Ernest Davies’ view, the opposition faced two great challenges: first, to create more active Socialist support among the workers, which, he believed, would be extremely difficult, and second, the establishment of a united democratic front. Davies was not only concerned about the Socialists but also about the question of the unity of the whole opposition. A further proof of this interest was another visit by Davies in November 1959, when he met many members of the Spanish opposition. On 2–4 November 1959, Davies visited Madrid to attend the trial of Julio Cerón, who had represented Spain at the ILO, and 16 members of the Frente de Liberación Popular. They had been arrested on charges of association with the organisation of the planned protest strike of 18 June, of association with Communists, and of organising illegal opposition groups. The prisoners were charged with Military Rebellion under the Military Code (2 March 1943). The trial was postponed at the last minute, most probably because of the presence of a foreign observer.28 Davies contacted a wide range of opposition elements: Carlos Zayas, a member of the ASU, Joaquín Satrústegui and Juan Antonio de Zulueta, members of the Unión Española, Josefina Arrillaga of the PSOE and Fernando Álvarez de Miranda of the Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea (AECE). Davies wrote in his report to the SDDC that they all strove to impress upon him that


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opposition to the regime must be inspired from within, stressing the inevitable ineffectiveness of those in exile who, in their view, were unaware of the true feelings of Spaniards. The importance of all these contacts lies in the fact that from this early stage the Labour movement was persuaded that the opposition to the regime must come from inside Spain, and therefore support should be given to the underground movement inside Spain. The postponed trial of Julio Cerón and 16 other defendants took place on 23 December 1959. Bob Edwards, MP for Bilston, Staffordshire, was sent by the SDDC as an observer. Edwards presented to the Ministry of Justice copies of an amnesty petition for the release of all political prisoners. The appeal was signed by 107 leading British personalities including Bertrand Russell, Lord Boothby, Lord Beveridge, Benjamin Britten, Kenneth Robinson MP, Chris Chataway MP, Tom Driberg MP and Jeremy Thorpe MP. In addition, he delivered to the American Embassy a statement addressed to President Eisenhower signed by leading Spaniards expressing concern that Eisenhower’s recent visit to Spain may be interpreted as a further proof that America is supporting a regime that has brutally suppressed in Spain all the freedoms that you yourself so well represent.29 On the day of the trial, Edwards was taken to the headquarters of the secret police in Madrid and was not allowed to attend the trial. He thought that the reason was twofold: the secret police considered that he was interfering in the highest judiciary in Spain, and the police feared a conspiracy to use Edwards’ entrance into the Court as a signal for a demonstration against Franco.30 The Spanish Foreign Office issued a statement31 which accused Edwards of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain, and therefore he was required to leave Spanish territory immediately. That evening, Edwards was released by the secret police. The SDDC protested at Edwards’ detention, and condemned the decision of the court to increase Julio Ceron’s sentence from three to eight years and also to increase the sentences of the other 16 prisoners.32 The visit of Edwards, which had been announced in advance by the Labour Party press, was effective in focusing world attention on the trial, to the extent that the Spanish secret police appeared to be outraged, during Edwards’ questioning, by the world press mentioning his visit. They believed that the News Chronicle and a Paris newspaper33 were organs of the Communist Party. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella, said in a statement that the Spanish people would accept neither interference in

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their internal affairs nor outside pressure.34 Evidently, the regime was extremely sensitive to any negative publicity at the international level. This sensitivity was increased by its eagerness to join international organisations including NATO. The SDDC concluded that Franco was more susceptible than usual to opinion abroad. Opposing the Spanish admission to NATO For the British Labour movement, the prospect of Franco’s Spain being admitted to NATO was intolerable, and there were rumours in 1959 that the Eisenhower administration was in favour of Spanish membership. In July 1959, a letter sent to the British Foreign Secretary reminded him that the British Labour movement, and others affiliated to the ICFTU, had been consistently opposed to the admission of Franco Spain to international agencies of the free world, particularly NATO, and strongly urged that the government should not accept Spain into NATO. On 14 August 1959, the reply of John Profumo, Minister for War, stated that admission to NATO was a matter for the NATO Council to decide and that the government in deciding its attitude would, among other considerations, have to pay very careful attention to the views of other member countries.35 This was the position of Britain in public. Privately, however, the Spanish government had been told that Britain was not opposed to Spanish membership of NATO per se, but that because of the strong opposition of other states like Norway and Denmark, they did not feel that it would be in the interest of NATO or the West as a whole for Spain’s candidature to be pressed at that stage.36 At the end of August 1959, the occasion of a private visit to London of the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella, was used to discuss all aspects of Anglo-Spanish relations with his British counterpart, Selwyn Lloyd37 and to deliver an invitation to President Eisenhower to visit Spain.38 Attempts were made to arrange for a deputation to call on Christian Herter, the American Secretary of State, to speak against the admission of Spain to NATO. Although he was not able to receive a deputation, a Labour Party memorandum was submitted and statements were published.39 According to the historian Antonio Marquina, Herter said to Castiella in London that Spain would become part of NATO.40 Further actions taken by the SDDC included a press statement in November 1959 pointing out that to admit Spain into NATO would be ‘to debase the cause of Western Democracy’.41 The Committee agreed at its meeting the same month that a plea for the release of political prisoners in Spain should be included in a general statement to be issued at the time of the NATO Council meeting in December 1959.


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The TUC was similarly hostile to Franco’s Spain joining NATO. On 25 October 1960, the TUC General Council adopted a resolution in which it opposed the maintenance and establishment of military bases and other military facilities (British, American or German) in Spain and the efforts being made to bring Spain into NATO.42 Spanish entry was discussed at the TUC Congress. Bob Edwards reported that Herter had said that it was the intention of the American government to bring the Spanish government into NATO with full powers. Edwards stated that, ‘If Franco is allowed a triumphant entry into NATO, let me tell you that the fight for human freedom in Spain has been lost in advance.’43 The resolutions and actions taken by the SDDC and the TUC clearly showed the determination of the British Labour movement to prevent Spanish entry into NATO. This was another way of fighting against the Franco regime, at a time when Franco was trying to be accepted increasingly as a member of the main international organisations. The determined British opposition to Spain’s NATO membership was shared by all Socialists throughout Europe. Strong evidence of this was the opinion of Paul Henry Spaak, NATO General Secretary, as reported by the United Kingdom delegation to NATO: When my American colleague had sounded him out some two months ago about bringing Spain into NATO, he had made his own personal opposition very clear, and had gone on to tell Mr Burgess that what was at stake here was the continued support of NATO by all Socialists and moderate Left Wing opinion throughout Europe. Even if governments raised no objections to the entry of Spain into NATO, the Left throughout Europe would be hostile and their present loyalty to NATO would be shaken.44 In April 1961, the SDDC considered the forthcoming visit of Lord Home, Foreign Secretary, to Spain and Portugal on 25–31 May and the rumour that he might discuss with the Spanish government the possibility of Spain’s joining NATO. The SDDC suggested that the Labour Party and the TUC General Council should issue statements prior to the visit, reaffirming their opposition to the admission of Spain into NATO.45 The opposition raised the question of Lord Home’s visit in the House of Commons. During the debate, the answers given by the Lord Privy Seal were rather evasive: first, that the visit to Spain would give an opportunity for a general exchange of views on international questions and for talks on matters of mutual interest; and second, that membership of NATO was entirely a matter for all the member countries of NATO.46

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The International Committee of the TUC was informed that the opposition had been unable to obtain definite assurances that the Foreign Secretary would not discuss the admission of Spain to NATO during his visit, or that the government would not support a proposal for the admission of Spain to NATO.47 George Woodcock, General Secretary of the TUC, informed Lord Home that the General Council was aware of his forthcoming visit and that the attitude of the TUC towards the regime in Spain remained unchanged, being opposed to any proposal that might be made for the admission of Franco Spain to NATO. Woodcock argued that NATO had been established for the defence of free countries whose people enjoy democratic rights and freedoms, and in the case of the Franco regime these rights were denied to the Spanish people. He also asked whether the government’s attitude towards Spain would remain unchanged, and if they were opposed to any suggestion that might be made for the admission of Franco Spain to NATO.48 Later on, the Foreign Office informed George Woodcock that the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Spain had no connection with the question of the possible admission of Spain to NATO and that it was in return for the official visit to Britain made by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella, in July 1960.49 The Foreign Office had invited the Spanish Foreign Minister to visit Great Britain from 11 to 13 July, the first official invitation to any representative of the Franco regime. The SDDC had deplored this invitation, arguing that Castiella had been awarded the Iron Cross by Hitler for his assistance to the Spanish volunteers fighting against the Russians during the Second World War and had written a book during the war criticising Great Britain.50 The Labour movement’s concerns over the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Spain were, to a degree, substantiated by comments made by the Home Secretary R.A. Butler who visited Spain in a private capacity in May 1961. During his stay, Butler said that the object of his visit was to promote and strengthen relations between Britain and Spain and stated that it was ‘shameful’ that Spain had been kept out of international life for so many years when she had always represented and continued to represent, an essential factor against the Communist danger especially today.51 Labour feared that his visit could be the first step of a movement to secure the admission of Spain into NATO. The NEC of the Labour Party issued a statement, emphasising that the nature and policies of the Franco regime were incompatible with the spirit of the NATO Treaty and


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reaffirming its opposition to any attempt to bring Spain under Franco into the Alliance.52 Labour leaders were genuinely alarmed at the apparent thawing of international hostility to Franco. They also used the question of Spanish admission into NATO to strengthen public awareness of the dictatorial nature of the regime. Approaching the Spanish opposition Like the SDDC, the TUC kept in touch with members of Spanish trade union organisations. On 26 July 1961 the visit to Britain by Pascual Tomás, General Secretary of the UGT in exile, and Ignacio Isausti of the Basque trade union organisation, was to inform the TUC and the public of the situation in Spain and the actions of democratic forces. The delegation pointed out that there had been a serious deterioration in the economic conditions of Spanish workers and that oppression had increased. They therefore suggested that a change in the policies of democratic governments towards Franco Spain was urgently required. The change should involve the withdrawal of economic, moral and military support. The General Council of the TUC considered that any effective action would have to involve raising concrete issues with the British government, or interesting the BBC in broadcasting in favour of democracy in Spain. However, in their view, it would be useless to ask the British government to take drastic actions. Indeed, although the General Council had protested against any suggestion of Spanish membership of NATO and against the admission of Franco Spain to the other institutions of the free world, they could nevertheless not be expected to propose the expulsion of Spain from the United Nations.53 The TUC had many other sources of information about internal affairs in Spain. Spanish trade unionists presented to the TUC the agreement signed by the Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas (UFD),54 a broad coalition of opposition groups on 24 June 1961. The agreement stated that the aim of the movement was to establish a democracy in Spain. Following the fall of the Franco regime, the UFD would favour a provisional government without any definitive institutional form, that would grant amnesty and call for general elections. They also rejected any coalition with totalitarian forces such as Communists or Fascists. The parties and organisations collaborating would maintain their respective programmes and exercise their political activity independently of each other.55 Another underground organisation, the Alianza Sindical (AS), composed of the UGT, moderate anarcho-sindicalist elements of the CNT and the STV, also contacted the TUC. Members of the UGT-CNT Co-ordinating Committee held an interview with TUC representatives on 9 November

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1961. The delegation made two somewhat impractical suggestions to the TUC: (i) since tourism was important to the Spanish economy and therefore for the survival of the regime, British people should be asked to discontinue journeys to Spain, and (ii) there should be an industrial boycott of the regime. In reply to these suggestions, Allan Hargreaves, Secretary of the TUC International Department, stated that to be effective a boycott must be worldwide and that it was really a matter for governments to exercise influence on Franco. As regards holidays, he expressed the view that it was important for people to go and see for themselves what was happening in Spain. He pointed out that the British movement could not commit itself to anything which would lead to violent results but was prepared to do all it could to support the Spanish workers, particularly through giving publicity to the situation in Spain and putting pressure on the Spanish government. To achieve this, some contact with the Spanish workers must exist and there was not much point in complete isolation.56 Evidently, the two suggestions made by the Spanish representatives were considered rather inappropriate for the influence the TUC could have on its own government. Since not all the contacts that the SDDC maintained with the Spanish opposition passed through the PSOE in exile, Llopis complained in 1961 that members of the Committee (such as Bob Edwards and Ernest Davies) had been in touch with Spaniards inside Spain who according to him were not always ‘reliable’.57 In his view, Josefina Arrillaga was the wrong contact. She had been dismissed on 12 April 1960 as the internal link by the leadership in exile, but she continued to act as the link between the Committee and certain prisoners in Spain and had selected two Spaniards to attend the Labour Party summer course.58 The Committee took into account Llopis’ opinion, considering that they ‘should be guided by the views of the official Spanish Party’, but they continued to keep in touch with as many leaders of the opposition groups as possible. Evidence of this was the visit made by Ernest Davies on 27–29 November 1961 to attend the trial of seven Basque Nationalists. On that occasion, Davies met the young Socialists, the secretary of the Christian Democrat Left, and José María Gil Robles, leader of the Christian Democrat Right.59 Similarly, on 21 May 1962, the SDDC was informed by León Ramos, the representative of the PSOE, that Antonio Amat had been plotting against the true PSOE and that others working with Amat, including Josefina Arillaga and Vicente Girbau, were working ‘to destroy the PSOE and were working in close co-operation with the Communists’.60 Despite such accusations, the Labour Party maintained its contacts with the whole range of the Spanish opposition, in line with the chairman of the


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Committee’s ruling in 1959 that it was not the responsibility of the Committee to become involved in the differences that might exist among the Spaniards who were associated with the Committee. In April 1962, a strike initiated in the Asturias mines, which was followed by others elsewhere, including in the Basque and the Barcelona provinces, was supported by demonstrations of students.61 The cause of the strike was discontent over the employers’ prolonged negotiations over new contracts for higher wages and improved labour conditions similar to those which had been agreed in other industries.62 The government proclaimed a state of emergency which drastically limited civil liberties, including a ban on freedom of movement and association.63 The British Labour movement, like other organisations worldwide, took action in support of the workers. The UGT asked the SDDC to do everything possible to show solidarity with the strikes, and with those who had been arrested. The SDDC agreed to send a letter of protest about the arrests to the Spanish Ambassador, ‘to ask the TUC to use its good offices in the defence of the imprisoned workers via ICFTU and ILO’, and to send an observer to the trial of the prisoners.64 On May 15, the TUC protested to the Spanish Ambassador in London against the denial of the right of workers to form and join free trade unions and against the arrests which followed these strikes. In his letter, the General Secretary of the TUC, George Woodcock, expressed the hope that a satisfactory settlement of the workers’ demands would be reached without delay and that the Spanish government would make it possible for the workers to pursue legitimate trade union activities without fear of repression and victimisation.65 Soon afterwards, on 28 May, a meeting took place between the Spanish Ambassador and Woodcock. The latter enquired whether assistance to relieve distress might be sent without hindrance to the Spanish strikers and their families by the British trade union movement. On 5 June, the Spanish Ambassador stated that the Spanish government welcomed the possibility of the TUC sending funds66 for the families of striking workers and suggested a number of channels through which the money might be distributed.67 The International Committee of the TUC decided that the use of any of the channels suggested by the Ambassador would be regarded as endorsement of the Spanish government. The alternatives were either to use the contacts made by the National Union of Mineworkers, which had sent two representatives to Spain to investigate the situation amongst miners and to establish contacts, or to send donations to the UGT either directly or through the ICFTU. Another possibility was to send a General Council representative to Spain to investigate the situation and to find

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channels for distribution.68 Finally, the General Council decided to send a donation of £1,000 to the UGT through the ICFTU. The ICFTU transferred the money to the UGT which had independent channels for passing the money into Spain. The money was distributed through joint committees established between the UGT and other organisations.69 The Daily Express of 12 February 1963 suggested that contributions from the TUC had gone to the official Spanish trade unions, which was denied by the General Secretary of the TUC. This contribution made by the TUC did not represent the full contribution of the British trade union movement, since a number of British unions had independently contributed sums for the same purpose. The Labour Party also expressed its solidarity with the Spanish workers. Len Williams, General Secretary of the Labour Party, issued a statement on 10 May 1962 in which he protested against the repressive measures and called for the immediate release of the prisoners.70 The Labour Party decided to make an appeal through the SDDC to raise funds, and to send observers to the trials in Madrid and Barcelona of those involved in recent strikes and demonstrations. By July 1962, £2,500 had been raised by trade unions and constituency parties to back the strikes and the students.71 Additionally, on 5 July a deputation from the NEC of the Labour Party consisting of Hugh Gaitskell MP, Peggy Herberson MP, Tom Driberg MP and David Ennals, International Secretary of the Labour Party, met the Spanish Ambassador to express the party’s concern at the arrests following the strikes.72 It was agreed by the SDDC that Ernest Davies should attend two trials of Spanish students in Madrid from 28 May to 1 June 1962, and in Barcelona from 14 to 16 June 1962. After his first visit to Spain, Davies proposed that the Labour Party should help the Spanish Socialists inside and outside Spain to resolve their differences. After interviews with several opposition groups, Davies arrived at the conclusion that as long as the Socialists were divided, unity of the opposition forces was difficult. To unify the opposition forces the first requisite was that the Socialists inside and outside Spain should resolve their differences especially with regard to how to proceed within Spain.73 Visits of Labour MPs to Spain in 1962 Official representatives of the SDDC or the TUC were not the only members of the British Labour movement to visit Spain in these years. The visit of Labour MPs and trade unionists invited to Spain during the Franco period by the government and by the state trade unions created a great controversy both within the British Labour movement and inside


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Spain. In 1962, the CNS, the Spanish government-backed syndicates, had launched a propaganda campaign designed to project a favourable image of the regime to foreigners. One strategy adopted by the CNS was to invite several Labour MPs and British trade unionists to visit Spain. Protests were made by the PSOE, the UGT and the Basque trade union in exile concerning these visits. Rodolfo Llopis complained to the Labour Party about the damaging effect of the visits of Labour MPs.74 They were aware that Franco used these visits as propaganda against the democratic forces in Spain, pointing out that the visits are used by Franco not only to whitewash his regime abroad, but more particularly to discourage clandestine Spanish democrats and democratic trade unionists at home by vaunting his success in hoodwinking their friends abroad.75 The Labour Party expressed its concern about the visits not only because they discouraged the opposition, but also because they gave the impression that the British trade unions and the Labour Party seemed to be behind the regime.76 In 1962, the British and the Spanish press reported, following the visit of several British MPs invited by the CNS to its II National Congress, how impressed the visitors were by the conditions at work and by the efficiency of the social services. Among other newspapers, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail, The Times and La Vanguardia reported these visits. In the following years, the visits of Labour MPs to Spain remained a controversial issue within the British Labour movement. The SDDC initiatives: challenges and opportunities for the Labour Party In October 1963, the Labour Party considered that a real change from the policy of the Conservative government towards Spain was necessary in the run-up to the forthcoming general elections. The SDDC examined what attitude a future Labour government should adopt towards Spain. In its view, a Labour government would have the following options: (i) a policy of open hostility which included a boycott on Spanish goods (voluntary or controlled), active discouragement of British tourists from visiting Spain, and of British firms from investing in Spain, use of Gibraltar as a centre of opposition activities, opposition to further association of Spain with the West (perhaps including a move to exclude Spain from OECD), a general policy aimed at securing that other governments follow the same line, condemnation at the UN of the Spanish government’s suppression of Basque and Catalan liberties, and other activities which

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would probably result in a breach of diplomatic relations; (ii) continuance of the Conservative government’s benevolence to the regime; and (iii) a policy half way between these two, ‘being essentially the crystallisation (from a position of power) of attitudes developed by the Labour movement when in opposition’.77 The third alternative would essentially continue what they had been doing since 1959. The SDDC pointed out that the first option proposed was the most attractive to many people, but it would be difficult to achieve without co-ordination with other Western powers such as the USA and Gaullist France. It therefore recommended the last one, which was considered the most difficult to articulate in action. The Committee suggested 13 possible measures which might be applied and which would maintain Labour’s standing with the opposition groups. Among other proposals, the Committee suggested: constant representations to the Spanish government; continued and increased financial support of strikers by the Labour movement and the trade unions rather than by the Labour government; all possible help and encouragement to the Spanish Socialist Party, including help in organisation; the opening of the British Embassy in Madrid to give asylum to political refugees; and sustained advocacy of the Spanish opposition cause with other Western governments, particularly the US and French administrators.78 The policy proposed by the SDDC for a possible Labour government was the one that would clearly be a continuation of the policy carried out by the British Labour movement so far. The SDDC would rather that a Labour government should give support to the Spanish opposition by the above-mentioned actions than damage British interests in their fight against the Franco regime by adopting a pointless policy of confrontation and isolation. In addition, the visit of Ernest Davies and John Lyttle to Madrid on 8–11 December 1963 throws some light on what the Spanish opposition required from a future Labour government in relation to Spain. The Spanish opposition proposed a change in the British government’s attitude towards the Franco regime and the opposition: for instance, open acceptance and encouragement of the opposition, representations to the regime against political persecution, attendance at trials, appointment of a sympathetic ambassador, resistance to the admission of Spain to any international organisations particularly NATO, and improved BBC broadcasts of news of opposition activities.79 Thus, the opposition did not expect or want an economic boycott, and they showed agreement with the policy put forward by the SDDC. It will be shown later in the chapter that the British Labour government was not always favourable to these initiatives.


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The issue of the disunity of the PSOE attracted the attention of the SDDC again in December 1963, when Ernest Davies and John Lyttle visited Madrid to attend the trial of several Socialists, including Antonio Amat, charged with reorganising the PSOE in Spain and disseminating propaganda against the regime. The trial was suspended for a combination of reasons ranging from the visit of Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information, to England and the ensuing demonstration of opinion there, to the presence of foreign observers at the trial.80 The report on the visit to Madrid put special emphasis on the lack of unity in the PSOE. This shows itself in three ways: first, differences between the Socialists inside Spain and the officers and executive in Toulouse; second, between the two factions in Spain, for and against Toulouse; and, third between the Catalan Socialist Movement and the rest of the Party. They reported the position held by the three Socialist groups. First, the Catalans were opposed to the PSOE policy of centralisation, favouring some form of federal affiliation. Second, Antonio Amat, Antonio Villar, Jiménez Navarro, Urbano Orad de la Torre, Antonio García Robles and several others, insisted that Toulouse was remote from what was happening in Spain and that they wanted a far more active policy. Third, the Toulouse delegation concentrated their efforts on attacking their rivals inside Spain. The report considered that the grievances of Antonio Amat and his group seemed to be more legitimate than the personal attacks of the Toulouse group. The PSOE inside Spain would like the Labour Party to reconcile the PSOE in Toulouse to giving them more power. Little by little, the SDDC was being drawn into the internal disputes of the PSOE. The Labour Party, both in opposition and later in power, had the Spanish government as well as the divisions within the PSOE to worry about. One issue that emerged in a particularly powerful way was the sale of arms. The Labour Party in opposition had protested against arms sales by the Conservative government to the Franco regime. From 1961 the Spanish government had a special interest in modernising its navy. Informal talks and discussions were held with Britain over ship designs, weapons and equipment. By 1963 it seemed that the Spanish government wanted to sign a contract to build Leander class frigates of British design in Spain. The Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, estimated that the agreement was worth some £11 million to the British economy: £2–3 million for design fees and similar payments, and £8–9 million for equipment manufactured in Britain.81 By 1964, no firm decision to build ships of British design had been taken. The British government, however,

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clearly considered a deal with the Spanish government a very good opportunity to attract money and jobs. The point for the Labour Party was that the British government seemed to have no objection whatever to selling arms to a Fascist country such as Spain. On 17 June 1964, during the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons, Harold Wilson, leader of the Labour Party, stated that Spain was a Fascist country, and that therefore the government’s policy towards Spain should be the same as it was towards dictatorships in Eastern Europe and Cuba: ‘Trade yes. We do not use trade boycotts to underline dislikes or differences. But arms, no.’82 The reply of the British government was that, in the case of Spain, they were not following the same rule as for countries in Eastern Europe and that this was the right policy to adopt because these arms were not likely or intended to be used against other countries or for aggression.83 The intervention of Wilson nonetheless had the desired result of frustrating the negotiations with Spain. On 29 June the Spanish government announced that the negotiations were suspended and that was confirmed by the Spanish Minister of Marine in the following statement: I am not prepared to accept the interference of the honourable Mr Wilson, Leader of the Labour opposition, in the internal affairs of a country such as Spain which maintains the most friendly and normal relations with Great Britain. I hope to be able to continue to maintain our cordial collaboration with the British Admiralty but political prudence makes it advisable for us to break off a transaction which has been the subject, on the part of the honourable Mr Wilson, of a misplaced and unjustified intervention.84 Wilson’s intervention represented a successful action for the Labour Party against the Franco regime because it both damaged the regime and also heightened awareness of the nature of the regime. His intervention also contributed to a worsening of Anglo-Spanish relations. In the same year, the TUC was also sensitive to the potential importance of external influences on events in Spain. At the TUC’s Annual Conference held in September, speakers stressed the fact that the Spanish people would only overthrow Fascism with the help of external supporters, and insisted that the TUC should prevent any arms deals between Great Britain and Spain as long as Franco was in power. The TUC deplored the decision of the Conservative government to negotiate arms contracts with Spain and supported the Parliamentary Labour Party in its opposition to the supply of arms to Spain and believed that the British government policy was designed to strengthen the Franco regime.85


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Labour Party in power 1964: ‘wait and see’ policy In October 1964, the Labour Party won the general election and stayed in power until 1970. By the end of the year, according to George Labouchère, British Ambassador to Spain, there had been a serious deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations. Spain seemed to be irritated with the frigates affair, and the Spanish irritation was aggravated by the unwillingness of the new British government, because of the lack of time for consideration, to permit the annual joint Anglo-Spanish naval exercise. Despite several explanations to Castiella, the Spanish government showed its resentment in November by imposing severe restrictions on persons wishing to leave or enter Gibraltar, and by launching a virulent press campaign against the British presence on the Rock.86 With regard to the supply of military equipment to Spain, the policy of the new Labour government was a continuation of the Labour Party policy in opposition. Harold Wilson, the new Prime Minister, stated on 15 February 1965 that the general policy should be to approve applications for the export of aircraft or aero-engines and items of sophisticated military equipment, but that any applications for the export of weapons such as small arms which could be used against civilians in an internal security role should be considered separately on their merits.87 In February 1965, the irritating question of the visits made to Spain by Labour MPs was considered by the NEC of the Labour Party. The NEC recommended that the Chief Whip should remind MPs that they should consult the overseas department before accepting invitations to visit Spain as guests of the state trade union.88 The same year a holiday visit by some Labour MPs was the subject of an article in the newspaper ABC of 22 August.89 The PSOE in exile raised the matter with the Labour Party. In his reply, Gwyn Morgan, Overseas Secretary of the Labour Party, reminded the PSOE that the policy of the Labour Party was to discourage any actions by MPs or members of the Labour Party which could be used as propaganda by the Franco regime.90 In 1966 the NEC adopted a resolution which had been submitted by the Labour Party to the Annual Conference. This resolution deplored the visits to Spain by various Labour MPs as guests of the Spanish government, used in the Spanish press and radio as propaganda against the democratic forces inside Spain, and called upon the NEC to discourage these trips. The resolution was circulated to all Labour MPs by the Chief Whip.91 The unity of the Spanish Socialists remained an important issue during the visits of members of the SDDC to Spain during the 1960s. This was the case during the visit of George Jeger, Tom Connelly and John Lyttle

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to Spain in the summer of 1965. The delegation visited Barcelona, Madrid and Bilbao and met a wide range of groups, excluding Communists, the extreme right and supporters of the regime. The most important groups they contacted were the PSOE inside Spain and the PSOE in exile, Christian Democrats, Catalan and Basque nationalists, and the ASO. Several groups of the opposition inside Spain, aware of the need to obtain maximum unity among the democratic forces to be ready for any political situation that might follow the death or incapacity of Franco, asked the British Labour movement to work for the unity of the Socialists. A Christian Democratic leader suggested that the Christian Democrats desperately needed a strong democratic Socialist movement as an ally, and that divisions among the Socialists were a major problem. It was not only a question of preventing a continuance of right-wing authoritarian rule, but also warding off any threat from the Communist left.92 The delegation claimed that the sectional character of the UGT no longer conformed to the requirements of the Spanish political situation with its need for maximum unity. Furthermore, the opinion expressed by some of the opposition was that the UGT was no longer representative of the position and attitude of Spanish workers.93 Instead, the delegation formed a very positive opinion of the ASO. The major strength of the ASO, according to the delegation, was based on the following: the ASO claimed to be non-political in the party sense and declared its primary objective to be the development of free trade unionism which would be undivided by political considerations and form the basis of a united free trade union movement. The ASO’s strategy was to infiltrate the official sindicatos94 by getting its members elected as delegates of the sindicatos. The latter would provide a trade union structure should a democratic regime materialise. The ASO’s policy appeared to conform to the general strategy of other democratic groups: maximum preparation and unity for democracy. The delegation was impressed by what it saw as the ‘realism and shrewdness’ of the ASO leaders. The ASO’s idea of a nonpolitical and unitary trade union appealed to both the British and, as we will see later, German trade union leaders.95 Their support could not, however, assure the success of the ASO’s policy. Indeed, it would disappear in 1968, because of its failure to attract substantial membership among Spanish workers. The same year Enrique Tierno Galván contacted the Labour Party, suggesting that closer ties should be established between Spanish and British Socialists. Following the visit of the SDDC delegation to Spain that year, Ramón Ridruejo was sent to London by Tierno Galván to obtain information and political advice about new organisational techniques necessary to ‘put the Spanish Socialist Party on its feet’ after


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so many years living underground.96 Additionally, the SDDC suggested that Ramón Ridruejo should combine his visit with a period at a Labour Party Summer School.97 On 25 April 1966, the Guardian published an article entitled: ‘Labour talks with Spanish underground’ by Bernard Ingham. In his article Ingham pointed out firstly that official contact had been established between the Labour Party and the underground movement in Catalonia, ranging from Socialists to Christian Democrats and including left-wing Nationalists and Liberals. Secondly, he claimed that Gwyn Morgan, International Secretary of the Party, had attended the meeting not only as secretary of the SDDC but also with the approval of the British Labour government. Thirdly, Socialist parties in Western Europe would help ‘active elements inside Spain who are campaigning for the restoration of democracy at the expense of the Spanish Socialist party, which operates in exile from Toulouse’. Finally, Ingham stated that conversations had taken place between the Labour Party, the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties and the German Socialists and that they agreed on the need ‘to switch the emphasis away from assistance for the PSOE which, although a member of the Socialist International, is widely felt to be out of touch after nearly three decades in exile’.98 After the publication of this article, the Foreign Office denied any knowledge of the activities of Morgan in Barcelona while Len Williams, secretary of the Labour Party, denied that Morgan had visited Spain on behalf of the Labour Party and the SDDC, claiming that his visit to Barcelona had a private and personal character.99 The SPD denied the substance of Bernard Ingham’s article. A telegram was sent to the PSOE in exile by the SPD stating that it had never discussed with Scandinavian or British parties the assistance to be given to those groups mentioned by the article. On 5 May, Gwyn Morgan explained what had happened in a letter to Rodolfo Llopis. He argued that the article was false because the Labour Party and the SDDC had not changed their attitude towards the PSOE. However, even though the Labour Party gave its support to the PSOE, the party would not exclude encouragement and specific assistance for other democratic Socialists including parties and trade unions, who were in opposition to the Franco regime. The SDDC also agreed that Robert Swann, a member of the Committee would speak to ASO representatives about how the Committee might best give assistance to the ASO.100 According to Len Williams: Developments in the trade union field are rather obscure, but it would seem that as well as the Unión General de Trabajadores, there now exists

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an organisation in Spain, the Alianza Sindicalista Obrera, which is making rapid progress, especially in Catalonia.101 This new trade union movement would become a competitor for international support. Other evidence of the support given to the Socialist groups was the proposal put forward by the SDDC at the Labour Party Conference held in Brighton on 3–6 October 1966. The Committee reaffirmed its full support for the PSOE, but at the same time it was willing to consider requests for aid made by other Spanish Socialist groups and persons living in Spain.102 Since the establishment of the Committee, financial support had always been given to the PSOE and the UGT, and some modest financial help to other groups. Clearly, the policy of the British Labour movement was a ‘wait and see’ policy, which involved keeping the options of other democratic opposition groups open and in the meantime supporting the opposition groups linked with the SI and the ICFTU, namely the PSOE and the UGT in exile. Controversial visits by members of the British Labour movement in 1968 In the meantime, British trade unionists were well informed about the trade union situation in Spain and how the trade union movement was divided into various groups, predominantly the AS and the ASO. The TUC advised British trade unions to avoid supporting initiatives that might add confusion and complexity to the Spanish trade union scene.103 The TUC considered that they should not be involved in the matter independently of the ICFTU104 and that they should press the ICFTU to consider the question of unity between the AS and the ASO as a matter of urgency. In their view, the ICFTU should do more than it had been doing to bring about the abandonment of rigid positions and attitudes by the UGT and the STV.105 Therefore, the TUC seemed unwilling to enter into debate about unitary trade unions with groups not affiliated to the ICFTU, and preferred to leave the latter to negotiate in this respect. On 20 February 1968, the SDDC considered a verbal report from the secretary about recent events in Spain. In particular, the Committee noted the increased persecution of trade unionists and student leaders. The Committee requested information from the UGT, the Catalan Socialist Movement, the TUC, the ICFTU and Amnesty International with two main purposes: to obtain information about the situation in Spain, and to make public the plight of Spanish trade unionists, particularly among British trade unionists. After this information had been received, in July 1968 the SDDC instructed the secretary to arrange a meeting between George


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Jeger, Jack Jones and Victor Feather, to discuss circulation of information about Spanish trade unionists and the launching of an appeal for funds.106 The same SDDC meeting reported that a grant had been given towards the printing and distribution costs of PSOE propaganda in Spain, and a gift of £1,000 to the Moviment Socialista de Catalunya for printing equipment. It also decided to send Tierno Galván a grant of £300 for a proposed study course for workers and students.107 The Committee also considered requests made by Raul Morodo, a member of the PSI, who had visited the Labour Party’s Overseas Department, that the Committee should give financial help to a number of Spanish workers who had been sacked for going on strike, that help should be given in finding grants for a number of Spanish Socialist students so that they could study in England, and that a representative of the SDDC should visit Spain. The Committee decided that the request for help for Spanish strikers should be noted and tabled pending the proposed discussions between Jeger, Jones and Feather; and that it was not the function of the SDDC to provide grants for long periods of study, but that the SDDC would pay the travel, board and tuition fees of two Spanish students so that they could attend one week of the Labour Party’s Summer Schools. After the meeting between the three members of the Labour movement on the proposed appeal for funds, Victor Feather said that the TUC itself was not in a position to make a donation because part of the payment made by the TUC to the ICFTU was already being used to assist the Spanish trade unionists.108 As in 1962, an issue that created some misunderstanding among the Spanish Socialists in 1968 was the visit of British trade unionists to Spain. These visits caused confusion and discouragement among Spanish Socialists because the British were seemingly acting in a helpful way to the Franco regime. Franco skilfully used these visits to suggest an international recognition of the regime. The first visit from 11 to 16 March 1968 was made by Albert Roberts MP, together with a delegation of trade unionists representing the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) of Great Britain, accompanied by the Labour Attaché from Franco’s Embassy in London, Mario Jiménez de la Espada.109 The delegation included Albert Roberts MP, J.T. Leigh, Vice-President of the Yorkshire Area of the NUM, A.D. Collins, Permanent Representative for the Yorkshire Area of the NUM, and D. Fellowes, Assistant Administrative Officer of the Yorkshire Area of the NUM. The visit was made on an invitation from José Solís Ruiz, President of the National Confederation of Spanish Trade Unions, and the delegation held talks with the General Secretary of the sindicatos and leading members of the official Fuel Industry Union. The International Federation of Mineworkers stated that no delegation from the Union of

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Mineworkers had recently visited Spain and that any person claiming to be the spokesman or delegate of this union had done so without the consent and the knowledge of the union. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the damage had been done. Another visit by British trade unionists took place from 19 to 22 May 1968 to attend the IV Spanish Trade Union Congress in Tarragona. The congress was attended by hundreds of foreign trade union representatives from all over the world. The British delegation was composed of Albert Roberts MP, Richard Buchanan MP, Michael MacGuire MP; Jack Smart and Gilbert Fellowes from the NUM; Leonard Hagestadt, Labour Attaché at the British embassies in Paris and Madrid, and A.L. Coltman from the British Embassy in Madrid. A commentary appeared in the Madrid newspaper Arriba which reported that Albert Roberts had declared that he had found evidence of freedom of expression. On his arrival in London he said: ‘We’ve returned from Tarragona deeply impressed by the sincerity, the bravery, and the freedom of expression shown during the Trade Union Congress.’110 The Spanish government used the visit to give the impression that the regime enjoyed the recognition of democrats abroad. This visit and its use by the Franco government created great discomfort among Spanish Socialists. For instance, on 25 May the Agrupación Socialista Madrileña, the Madrid branch of the PSOE, complained to Albert Roberts about his visit: Your presence at this ‘congress’ could only be justified if, after learning of this state of affairs, you had denounced it publicly. Then you would have rendered a great service to the Spanish workers. In not acting thus you have only damaged the position of Spanish Socialists and UGT members who are being mocked by others in opposition to the regime and its so-called trade unions.111 Similar complaints were expressed by the Spanish Socialists to Derek Page MP, who attended the trial of Spanish trade unionists in Madrid in June 1968. They expressed their concerns about the television interview given by the British trade unionists and the impression given that these visitors were official representatives of the British Labour movement.112 The Labour Party stated that it had not been represented at the Congress and that Albert Roberts was in no way authorised to represent the Labour Party.113 In October 1968, a group of mine workers led by Lawrence Wormald, who had been invited by the Spanish trade union, met José Solis Ruíz. The Spanish Information Bulletin said that the aim of the visit was to


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gain direct, first-hand experience of the structure and operation of the Spanish trade union movement, and the achievement of the Spanish trade unions in social questions. It also said that Lawrence Wormald had told Solís that the members of the delegation intended to inform people in Britain of the favourable impression made on them through their visits and the conversations they had with Spanish trade union leaders.114 The delegation seemed to be naïve in the way it handled the situation, knowing that the Spanish trade unions were controlled by the Franco regime and that its presence would upset the opposition. The SDDC expressed its concern to the TUC’s International Committee about the visits by trade unionists as guests of Spanish official organisations.115 Clearly, the TUC could not control its members. But the whole affair revealed that the Spanish government was worried about international opinion, and anxious to counteract negative publicity by foreign trade union sources. The appointment of a Labour Attaché at the Madrid Embassy The same year, encouraged by having a Labour government in office, the SDDC asked the government whether it would be possible for British Embassy staff to attend political trials in Spain as observers, and suggested also that the presence of a permanent Labour Attaché at the Madrid Embassy would be of great value. The first issue had been previously discussed with the government, and two letters had been sent, dated 15 December 1966 and 28 November 1967, to George Brown, the Foreign Secretary. In his reply, George Brown admitted that it might have proved beneficial to send observers to political trials, but he also suggested that in many cases it was not useful and could even be counter-productive. The letter sent by Gwyn Morgan, Joint Secretary of the SDDC, to the British government, argued that the Committee felt that if observers from the British diplomatic service were able to attend Spanish political trials more frequently, this would often result in reduced sentences. Furthermore, Morgan claimed that since Spain was anxious to become a member of the ‘Western Community’, Spain’s cause would not be advanced if savage sentences were pronounced on democrats in the presence of diplomatic representatives from Great Britain.116 The question of the appointment of a Labour Attaché at the Madrid Embassy had also been raised in Parliament in 1968 by George Jeger, Chairman of the SDDC, without success.117 Even though the Labour Attaché from Paris visited Spain from time to time, the Committee felt that the presence of a permanent Labour Attaché at the Madrid Embassy was desirable because of the significance of the continuing industrial

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unrest. The government’s reply was sent by William Whitlock, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, in a letter to Gwyn Morgan. He expressed doubts as to whether the presence of representatives of foreign embassies in Madrid would have any significant effect. In his view, the Spanish authorities would probably consider the presence of a member of the British Embassy at political trials as another calculated and public gesture of British hostility to the Franco regime that could be exploited by the Spanish government as meddling in Spain’s internal affairs. Nevertheless, an Embassy official would be put on standby to act as observer in a trial when necessary. As regards the appointment of a Labour Attaché, he recognised the importance of covering labour affairs in Spain, but said that due to present financial circumstances they could not establish the post.118 The SDDC learned to its cost that having a Labour government did not necessarily make its efforts to put pressure on government any more effective. On the other hand, it had identified trials of workers, and the denial of civil rights to them, as an area in which the Franco regime was vulnerable to international exposure. This was soon to become particularly evident, with the declaration of a state of emergency and its intensified repression in 1969.

1969–77 1969 was, as Paul Preston has remarked, ‘a dramatic turning point in the history of the Franco regime’. A combination of events marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the regime: the proclamation of King Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor in July; the intensification of the government’s repression against working-class and student dissent; and the emergence of ETA as one of ‘the most spectacular problems facing the regime’.119 The second part of this chapter will examine the initiatives taken by the Labour Party and the TUC during the crucial years from 1969 until 1977, the year of the first democratic elections in Spain, and assess the impact of those initiatives on the PSOE/UGT and on the Spanish democratic process as a whole. During those years, the British Labour movement continued with its policy of giving support to democratic forces operating in Spain. For a while, the TGWU focused its attention on the Workers’ Commissions (CC.OO), considered by Jack Jones, TGWU General Secretary, to be the most active group working underground in Spain.120 After the recognition of the PSOE renovado by the Socialist International in January 1974, however, it concentrated its assistance on the PSOE and the UGT. The Labour Party and the TUC were also very active in putting pressure on the Labour government (1974–79),


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to try to prevent any dealings with the Spanish government, including the resumption of negotiations between Spain and the EEC in 1976. On 24 January 1969, due to the growing unrest of workers, students and Basque nationalists, Franco declared a state of emergency throughout Spain for three months.121 The PSOE requested the assistance of all the European Socialist parties. Two letters, dated 20 December 1968 and 29 January 1969, were sent by Rodolfo Llopis, General Secretary of the PSOE, to the Labour Party’s Overseas Department requesting assistance and asking the Labour Party to protest energetically against the Franco regime.122 The Labour Party sent a telegram to Franco protesting against the proclamation of the state of emergency and demanding the release of imprisoned Socialists.123 Equally, Victor Feather, General Secretary of the TUC, sent a letter to the Spanish government through the Spanish Ambassador in London, expressing the TUC’s anxiety about the detention of Spanish workers accused of defending trade union rights.124 The SDDC also launched an appeal to trade unions to aid Spanish democrats persecuted by the regime.125 According to the NEC report, the appeal met with an excellent response. Both the Labour Party and the TUC adopted resolutions supporting the struggle of the Spanish people for freedom and democratic rights, calling for an immediate political amnesty and for the release of trade unionists and political prisoners from imprisonment and detention.126 After the state of emergency, the UGT expressed its gratitude to Victor Feather for the TUC’s protest and its solidarity with those facing prosecution. On a more critical note, Manuel Muiño, UGT General Secretary, pointed out that two of the accused, Julián Ariza and Marcelino Camacho, were both members of the CC.OO and had nothing to do with the UGT. The TUC, he claimed, should focus its attention on its comrades in the UGT inside Spain.127 Despite the UGT’s appeal, however, in 1971, Jack Jones, acting through the SDDC, invited a delegation of the Workers’ Commissions to visit Britain.128 Gathering information on Spain The UGT kept in touch with the TUC. In March 1970, a delegation composed of Manuel Muiño and four trade union leaders from various industrial regions of Spain, Asturias, Bilbao and Madrid, together with Morris Paladino, Assistant General Secretary of the ICFTU, visited London. The delegation met Victor Feather, Allan Hargreaves, Head of the International Department, and leaders of the NUM and the TGWU.129 The purpose of the visit was to discuss the trade union situation inside Spain and to inform the British Labour movement about the activities

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of the UGT at industrial, regional and national levels.130 The delegation requested that the Labour Party and the SDDC should help in denouncing Spanish government propaganda which portrayed the PSOE and the UGT as organisations of the past, whose members were all ‘old-timers’. In their view, this was not true because many young people inside Spain were active in their support for the PSOE and the UGT.131 The opinion of the Labour Party on this matter was that it should continue to give its full support to these organisations and their representatives both within Spain and in exile in Toulouse. In the meantime, on 5 March 1970, Albert Roberts MP again visited Spain at the invitation of the official Spanish trade union organisation. Roberts, accompanied by the Labour Attaché in the Spanish Embassy in London, Mario Jiménez de la Espada, was received by the chief of the department of foreign trade union relations, Clemente Cerdá. They met Rodolfo Martín Villa, General Secretary of the trade union organisation, and Enrique García Ramal, the Minister Delegate for trade unions. The involvement of high-ranking members of the government caused indignation among Socialists inside Spain, who complained energetically to Manuel Muiño. Muiño drew the attention of Victor Feather to the visit.132 The SDDC again drew attention to the damage that these visits could do to the cause of democracy. The SDDC followed very closely the fate of Socialists and trade unionists in Spain. A member of the SDDC, Rodney Balcomb, also Assistant Secretary of the Socialist International, visited Spain in April 1970 as a result of the appeal made by the PSOE. He and other members of the Socialist International attended the trial which took place in Madrid on 16 April 1970 of 13 Socialists accused of ‘illicit association’ and ‘illegal propaganda’.133 Balcomb took the opportunity to find out more about political trials and about the political situation in Spain. In his report on the political situation in Spain Balcomb concluded – as earlier observers had done before him – that one of the major negative factors was the disunity which existed amongst the Socialists. According to him, the three main parties were the PSOE, Tierno Galván’s PSI and the MSC. He attributed this disunity to the lack of contact and communication between the groups. In his view, this disunity was tragic, and was further complicated by the disunity of the trade union movement. He felt that democratic Socialism in Spain should present a united front. Balcomb proposed that the Socialist International and its member parties could help the PSOE in two ways. When Socialists were in government they could put diplomatic pressure on the Franco regime. Even when not in government they could always give financial assistance, especially for


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the families of arrested party members.134 The information that the British Labour Party gathered about the situation of the Spanish Socialist movement had an important influence on the decision eventually taken by the SI to recognise the PSOE renovado in the interior as the true Socialist Party. In June 1970, the Conservative government took office and stayed in power until 1974. The actions of the Franco regime and its courts attracted international attention in 1970 and the years that followed. The British Labour movement followed very closely the trial of 16 Basque Nationalists in Burgos in December 1970 before a military court. Of the 16 defendants 6 had been charged with the murder of a police officer and a death sentence could be carried out within 24 hours of pronouncement. The situation was complicated by the kidnapping of the West German consul in San Sebastián, Eugen Beihl, as a hostage by ETA (of which some of the accused had admitted they were members).135 On 14 December 1970, Jack Jones asked that the General Council of the TUC should make representations to the Spanish Embassy urging that no death sentences should be imposed in the trial in Burgos, and if death sentences were imposed then everything should be done to dissuade the Spanish government from carrying them out. He also asked that the Foreign Secretary should be asked to take similar action.136 The General Council of the TUC took the view that they should try to avoid creating the impression that they were supporting the methods used by extremist nationalist elements and that they should draw attention to the interdependence of the trial and the fate of the kidnapped German consul, Eugen Beihl.137 On 15 December a meeting took place between members of the General Council of the TUC and the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs asking the British government to press the Spanish government on this issue. The Minister replied that the trial was conducted under military regulations permitting no appeal. Clearly, the Conservative government was cautious about upsetting the Spanish government. After the meeting a telegram was sent from the TUC on 16 December to the Spanish Ambassador, expressing the TUC’s concern about the Burgos trial, and pointing out that capital sentences and any subsequent executions would produce revulsion in British trade union opinion and a torrent of protest in Europe. The TUC appealed to Franco to exercise clemency if death sentences were pronounced and to consider retrial before a civilian court, and also drew attention to the plight of Eugen Beihl and his family.138 On 16 December the NEC of the Labour Party sent a resolution to the Spanish Ambassador which called upon the Spanish Head of State to exercise clemency in respect of the six Basque

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Nationalists. Furthermore the Labour Party called upon the Spanish government to grant to all Spanish people full political and trade union freedom.139 The TUC issued a resolution which supported the basic rights of workers to seek the re-establishment of free trade unions in Spain, condemned the torture and persecution of workers, students and intellectuals by the regime, and asked that the Spanish authorities release their political prisoners.140 The NEC of the Labour Party agreed with the TUC about the situation in Spain, deploring the continuing lack of democracy and the denial of the basic right to establish free trade unions. The death sentences were pronounced on 28 December 1970. The Labour Party urged Franco to display clemency for those condemned, and reaffirmed its belief that Spain could not have a place among the democracies of Europe until full democratic rights and trade union freedom were granted to the people of Spain. Additionally, on 30 December Harold Wilson, leader of the Labour Party, made a statement asking Franco to commute the sentences. He claimed that if the condemned were executed, the whole of the democratic world would express its horror, and Spain would be taking a terrible step back into the past with consequences that might be incalculable.141 On 31 December Franco announced that the death sentences had been commuted. Worldwide complaint, including the British Labour movement’s protest, proved successful. Once again, the Spanish government showed the importance it attached to opinion abroad. The SDDC continued its policy of maintaining contact with all the democratic forces operating in Spain. On 8 February 1971, on the suggestion of Jack Jones, the SDDC agreed that it should develop contacts with the Workers’ Commissions, which had not previously had any contact with the Committee.142 According to Jack Jones, many British trade unionists had the impression that the Workers’ Commissions were more active than any other Spanish trade union. 143 The Workers’ Commissions came into existence as a movement of industrial workers to set up free and independent trade unions to replace the state-controlled industrial syndicates.144 Their policy was a more successful version of the ASO’s strategy of infiltration of the official syndicates, whereas the UGT line was to reject and boycott the official movement altogether. The SDDC invited a delegation of the Workers’ Commissions to visit Britain from 22 to 27 November 1971 to discuss the situation in Spain. The delegation held discussions with Denis Healey MP, senior Labour Party officials like Sir Harry Nicholas, and regional representatives of the TGWU in Birmingham and Scottish trade unionists in Glasgow.145 The PSOE complained about this visit and the contacts with the Workers’


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Commissions. The complaint was sent to Tom McNally, International Secretary of the Labour Party. He replied that the Committee felt it was necessary to try to make contact with the whole range of opposition groups claiming to be Socialists: the PSOE, the Catalan Socialist Movement and the Partido Socialista del Interior as well as the Workers’ Commissions. McNally argued that to test the strength and the political ideologies of these groups it was necessary to gain first-hand experience of them.146 The British Labour movement clearly did not agree to the PSOE/UGT request of keeping contact only with them. At the same time, PSOE/UGT protests demonstrated the importance they attached to both practical help and recognition by the British Labour movement. Contacts with the Workers’ Commissions 1971–72 On several occasions, British trade unionists expressed their concerns about the fate of members of the Workers’ Commissions. On 23 August 1972, Will Paynter, member of the General Executive Council of the TGWU, made an approach to the Spanish Ambassador urging the release of ten leaders of the Workers’ Commissions – known as the ‘Carabanchel Ten’ – in Spain. Among them was Marcelino Camacho, leader of the CC.OO, who had been imprisoned since 24 June, charged with participating in an illegal meeting. When they were about to be released new charges were made against them for alleged illegal association.147 On 20 November 1972, the TGWU brought the case to the International Committee of the TUC calling for urgent action. It was agreed that an approach should be made on behalf of the General Council to the Spanish Ambassador in London.148 On 13 December 1972, a delegation consisting of Victor Feather, Jack Jones and J.A. Hargreaves, accompanied by the Spanish Labour Attaché, Jiménez de la Espada, met the Spanish Ambassador Jaime de Pinies. The delegation expressed their concern about the imprisoned men and asked for their release.149 In their letter, addressed to the Spanish Ambassador, the TUC stated that Spain, by ignoring demands for the implementation of basic freedoms, could endanger its hopes for a closer relationship with the European Community.150 Other issues relating to the lack of trade union freedom in Spain were also raised. The Spanish representatives claimed that the Spanish trade unions had been transformed under labour legislation into representative workers’ organisations, that the ten accused were Communists, and that they had met to discuss ways of promoting Communism and overthrow the Spanish government.151 The British Labour movement decided to monitor the trial of the Carabanchel Ten, which took place in December 1973.

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Meanwhile, another example of the British interest in the Workers’ Commissions was a meeting on 21 February 1973 between trade unionists and MPs in the House of Commons. A declaration was signed in solidarity with the Carabanchel Ten and all the workers fighting for trade union freedom, stating that the Labour and trade union movement in Britain would oppose any attempt by the Spanish government to become a member of the EEC while Spanish workers were denied basic rights and freedom.152 Anti-Franco Commission and protests in 1973 While the forthcoming trial of the Carabanchel Ten stirred a good deal of interest among trade unionists across Europe, the British Labour movement was also preoccupied by other Spanish problems in 1973 and 1974. The PSOE went through a major transformation brought about by its split and the eventual recognition of the PSOE(r) by the Socialist International, in which the Labour Party played a crucial role. The British Labour movement also decided to create a commission of enquiry into the Franco regime, and it protested against the sale of aircraft to Spain by the British government. In 1973, the SDDC believed that the Conservative government was making efforts to foster contacts with Franco’s Spain. This view was confirmed by two events: first, an invitation had been extended to Prince Juan Carlos to attend the Queen’s 25th wedding anniversary celebrations; second, Princess Anne had visited Madrid in May 1973.153 In March 1973, the SDDC, anxious about the general political situation in Spain and following an SI recommendation, sent a delegation to Madrid led by Michael Foot MP, together with Jenny Little, Joint Secretary of the SDDC and Will Paynter, ex-General Secretary of the NUM. According to Tom McNally, International Secretary of the Labour Party, the delegation was sent to discuss the general political situation with Socialists and trade unionists, but also had a specific brief to investigate the case of the Carabanchel Ten, with the intention of giving publicity to their findings.154 The delegation met one of the lawyers of the imprisoned members of the Workers’ Commissions who encouraged them to give maximum publicity to the case. The delegation discussed with PSOE members the deepening split within the party and the chances of reunification. During the visit, the opposition urged that maximum pressure should be exerted within the member countries of the EEC to keep Spain out until democracy was restored. The report of the delegation concluded by stressing the need for maximum possible publicity for the


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situation in Spain and for protest against the suppression of human rights, and of basic political and trade union freedoms.155 As a result of this visit, on 16 April 1973, Michael Foot proposed at the SDDC the idea of setting up a tribunal to examine the Franco regime and to give publicity to the situation in Spain. The establishment of a tribunal, which was supported by the Spanish underground, seemed opportune at that moment for a number of reasons: (i) A new law had been promulgated restricting wage rises; (ii) January would see the end of the price freeze; (iii) On 12 December various opposition groupings (PSOE, UGT, CC.OO) were going to take part in concerted protest action against the wage freeze and against the case of the Carabanchel Ten; (iv) The position of the Church had changed considerably (for instance, priests in the special prison of Zamora were on hunger strike); (v) There was chaos in the universities. The government had instituted a policy for the universities which had been abruptly brought to an end following a series of strikes.156 During the same SDDC meeting, Will Paynter submitted a paper suggesting that the indictment should name Franco and key leaders of the regime and should list their crimes against the Convention on Human Rights. The indictment should also refer to freedom of association, the right to strike, freedom of speech and of the press, and democratic government. Paynter went on to suggest that there should be five judges chosen if possible from Britain, France or Germany. The jury could be as large as 21–25 members. A panel of lawyers could undertake cross-examination of witnesses. Written evidence would be invited from all opposition organisations inside Spain and from selected external organisations. It was suggested that the proposal for the Tribunal should be initiated by the TUC by inviting the cooperation of all national trade union centres.157 On 21 June 1973, the SDDC approached the TUC to ask for the support of the trade union movement. The TUC welcomed the proposal in principle and called upon all affiliated organisations to contribute to the costs of the enquiry.158 On 8 August 1973, the SDDC meeting agreed that the tribunal should meet in the first half of May 1974 in London. It also agreed to set up a working party to deal with the detailed organisation. The members of this group would be Bob Edwards, Tom McNally, Peter Archer, Will Paynter, Michael Foot and Jenny Little.159 However, with the formation of the new Labour government in February 1974 neither Michael Foot nor Peter Archer had time to continue with their duties.

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Jenny Little suggested at the SDDC meeting of 3 April 1974 that Nigel Rodley, legal adviser to Amnesty International, and Neville Sandelson should take over the legal work of the Commission. The timetable of the Commission was discussed and it was agreed to have meetings both in London and Spain.160 In December 1974, the SDDC discussed whether to go ahead with the Commission. Jack Jones intervened in its favour by saying that the situation in Spain should be brought to the attention of public opinion both in Britain and abroad. It was agreed to go ahead despite some difficulties in organising the gathering of evidence. A mission to Spain was felt to be necessary to assess the situation. The Commission was to be chaired by Horace Maybray, Lord MaybrayKing.161 However, nothing much happened, and on 24 July 1975, the SDDC decided unanimously that, given the circumstances of Franco’s illness, the commission no longer represented the best course of action. Instead, the Committee thought that the Labour Party should concentrate on the now urgent task of helping the PSOE with political and material support. To this end, it invited a delegation to Britain in October and sent out an appeal for funds.162 The Commission of Inquiry failed, according to Jenny Little, due to the lack of funds.163 The project was too ambitious, but the very proposal indicated again the intention to undermine international acceptance of the Franco regime, something that other Labour initiatives did more successfully. As we saw earlier, in 1964 the Labour Party had opposed British assistance in the construction of frigates for Spain. A similar issue arose in 1973. On 17 August 1973, the United States government announced that eight British-made Harrier aircraft, £12 million in value, were to be sold to the Spanish government. They would be made in Britain and delivered to the US Marine Corps before being resold to Spain.164 On 22 August 1973 the General Council of the TUC sent a statement to the British government which condemned the decision to make available the aircraft and urged the government not to proceed further with the sale of military aircraft to Spain. The statement pointed out two main arguments against the sale, namely the repressive nature of the Spanish regime and the difficult relations over the Gibraltar issue.165 Harold Wilson, leader of the opposition, also criticised the sale on the same grounds.166 He added that the sale was an outrage and indicated that a Labour government would have refused to sell arms to Spain.167 The position of the government had been set out by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home, in a statement on 18 August which defended the sale of the aircraft ‘as a sound business transaction’ which would benefit the national economy and workers in the British aircraft industry. The Foreign Secretary


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responded to the comments made by Wilson, arguing that neither the nature of the Spanish regime nor the Gibraltar issue had anything to do with the sale.168 Again in November 1973, the TUC decided to protest about the sale of aircraft to Spain and to ask the British government to cancel its decision in this respect.169 In reply, Sir Alec Douglas Home said that he was sorry that the General Council found the reasons he gave for the government’s decision unconvincing and that he had nothing to add to them except to say that, in the light of recent world developments, the need for Britain to export all she could was greater than ever.170 The Foreign Secretary also issued a statement which defended the sale of aircraft to Spain as a business transaction of benefit to the national economy and to workers in the British aircraft industry, and argued that neither the nature of the Spanish regime nor the Spanish government’s behaviour towards Gibraltar had anything to do with the sale.171 The government was determined that the sale of the aircraft should go ahead. The TUC informed the AFL-CIO about the sale and asked whether it had any comment to make. In its reply, the AFL-CIO stated that it had for many years been opposed to the Franco regime, as it was opposed to all governments that deny to their people fundamental human rights. The AFL-CIO regretted that the TUC appeared to have no more influence on the British government than the AFL-CIO had with the United States government on the question of trading relations with the Franco dictatorship.172 In contrast to 1964, the British Labour movement could not stop the sale of aircraft to Spain. For the Tory government, British national interests were paramount. But the British Labour movement remained committed to the democratisation of Spain, which it continued to try and foster by other means. The trial of the Carabanchel Ten In December 1973, Labour representatives went to Spain to attend the trial of the Carabanchel Ten.173 Ten members of the CC.OO174 had been held in Carabanchel prison since June 1972 accused of ‘illegal association’, the aim of which ‘consists in the violent destruction of the existing structure of the Spanish State’.175 The mission sent by the SDDC was comprised of Peter Archer MP, Chairman of the British section of Amnesty International; Will Paynter MP, ex-General Secretary of the NUM; and Jenny Little, Joint Secretary of the SDDC. The delegation arrived on 20 December 1973, the very day of the assassination of the Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco by the Basque terrorist organisation ETA. The purpose of the mission was twofold: to attend the trial of the

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Carabanchel Ten and to give publicity to the situation in Spain, emphasising the general problems faced by the opposition. The day before the trial, Michael Foot moved an emergency resolution on the trial which was adopted by the NEC of the Labour Party. The resolution expressed the Labour Party’s concern ‘at the persistent and savage suppression of elementary trade union rights in Spain’ and urged that the imprisoned trade unionists should be given the fullest opportunity to defend themselves publicly, with lawyers of their own choice.176 The TUC, which had been in touch with the party about this question,177 also expressed its concern about the trial. The TUC General Council protested to the Spanish government over the treatment of the ten and called on the government to release them.178 Further, a delegation consisting of Len Murray, Jack Jones and Cyril Plant expressed to the Foreign Secretary the concern of the General Council about the trial of the ten men and asked him to assist in ensuring the presence of international observers.179 On the same day that the trial took place, trade unionists and members of Amnesty International presented a letter of protest to the Spanish Ambassador in London, Jaime de Pinies, in which they protested at the heavy prison sentences of up to 20 years being demanded by the prosecution and pointed out that the ten men ‘are all accused of trade union activities which in most countries of Western Europe are considered legal and common place’.180 The trial ended on December 29 with prison sentences ranging from 12 to 20 years imposed on the accused.181 On 31 December, the TUC issued a statement calling for the speedy release of the ten and stating that it was time for Spain and other Fascist states to recognise the rights of working people and to abandon their policies of cruel repression.182 Copies of the statement were sent to the Spanish Ambassador in London, to the Labour Party and to the ICFTU and the ILO. These organisations were asked to make representations to the Spanish government with a view to obtaining an early hearing of an appeal or a fresh trial. However they decided not to make direct representations because such action might jeopardise the appeal.183 In February 1975, the Spanish Supreme Court considered an appeal against the conviction and sentence. The General Council of the TUC decided to make representations again to the judicial authorities and to the Spanish Ambassador in London.184 On 7 February 1975, the TUC sent a letter to the Spanish Prime Minister, Carlos Arias Navarro, urging that the appeal should be sympathetically considered and clemency shown by the Court and by other legal and government authorities.185 Representatives of the General Council at the meeting with the Foreign


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Secretary asked whether the government could urge clemency and whether an observer from the Foreign Office might be present in the appeal. Also, the British Ambassador in Madrid agreed to convey the TUC’s concern to the Spanish government.186 On 16 February the Supreme Court released four of the appellants and reduced the sentences of the others to six years of imprisonment. Without doubt, the pressure put on the Spanish government by the British Labour movement and other international bodies was effective. The reduction of the sentences could, of course, be considered as a manoeuvre by the Spanish government, since it would give the Franco regime a more respectable image in its relationship with the EEC. However, the regime’s need to resort to such a manoeuvre was in itself a victory for external pressure. Supporting the process of democratisation The culmination of all these interventions in Spanish affairs came in 1974, when the Labour Party played a major role in the recognition of the PSOE renovado by the Socialist International. The Labour Party, which had been in contact with the Socialists inside Spain for many years, had known about and lamented the split within the PSOE for a long time. The PSOE was split in two groups, both claiming to be the legitimate PSOE, and each group claimed that the Congress that it had organised in 1972 was the 12th Congress of the PSOE.187 As on other occasions, the Labour Party kept in touch with all the possible options within the Spanish Socialist movement. The NEC decided to send Tom Driberg MP as its representative to the PSOE(r) Congress of August 1972, despite the letter signed by Rodolfo Llopis, General Secretary of the PSOE, which denounced the Congress as invalid and accused the executive members inside Spain of seeking to dominate the party. Driberg reported: The split in the party is a dispute between those in exile (who, whatever their services in the past, seem to those inside Spain to be settling down rather too comfortably in the role of permanent exiles) and those in Spain (who whether or not they want to dominate the party, feel that they are in the front-line of the fight against Franco and should have the major say in determining strategy). To some extent also – there is the familiar conflict between age and youth.188 The conclusions of Driberg’s report were generally accepted by the members of the SDDC at their meeting of 25 October 1972. Nevertheless, some disagreements were expressed about future contacts with the PSOE. Several members suggested that the SDDC should not try to get agreement

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between the different factions of the Spanish Socialist movement. The SDDC reaffirmed that it would continue to keep in contact with both groups. Bob Edwards, as Chairman of the meeting, pointed out that, even though the Committee should not intervene in the internal disputes of the PSOE, it would be quite appropiate for a delegation formed by one member from inside Spain, one from the party in exile and one young Socialist to be invited to London to have discussions with the Committee.189 In March 1973, a delegation from the SDDC visited Spain to find out more about the split inside the PSOE and to assess both the chances for reunification and the strengths of the two factions. In the report drafted by the delegation, it was stated: It seems equally clear that there is little chance of reunification. One is left with the impression that it is the August group which is the more dynamic, commanding the support of both the Young Socialists, obviously important in any future development of the party, and of the UGT, important in that through them comes the support, financial as well as moral, of the European trade union movement.190 The report showed that both the Young Socialists and the UGT supported the PSOE renovado and this was very important for the Labour Party. Even though so far the Labour Party had taken no formal decision on recognition, preferring, like the Socialist International, to wait and see how things developed, the Labour Party appeared to be favourable to the recognition of the PSOE renovado. According to Jenny Little, the first reason why the Labour Party supported the recognition of the PSOE renovado was that it believed that the renovation of the party should come from inside Spain, and would not come from the exiled leaders who were out of touch with the situation in Spain. A second reason was that the generation working inside Spain was younger than the one in exile, and able to command the full support of the UGT and the PSOE Young Socialists.191 Bearing in mind that the Labour Party was one of the most important parties within the Socialist International, its view of the split was highly influential. The Labour Party played an active role in trying to convince other Socialist parties within the SI, notably the SPD, that the PSOE renovado should be recognised as the true Socialist party.192 This assumption has been corroborated by Pablo Castellano, PSOE International Secretary, who has confirmed that: ‘The Labour Party played a decisive role in the recognition of the PSOE renovado.’193 On 6 January 1974, the Bureau of the SI announced the recognition of the PSOE renovado. Clearly, the British Labour movement’s policy of establishing contact with all the


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democratic opposition in Spain gave the Labour Party a wide understanding of the Spanish Socialist groups. Its accurate knowledge of the Spanish situation proved instrumental in helping the SI decide which group to recognise. The recognition of the PSOE renovado by the SI was a turning point in the relationship between the Labour Party and the PSOE. After the recognition the links between both parties were established directly from party to party, and similarly between the TUC and the UGT, from union to union. From then onwards, the SDDC become less important 194 and played a supportive rather than an independent role. Eventually, on 17 June 1976, at the last meeting of the SDDC, representatives of the Labour Party suggested that Spanish affairs should be treated within the NEC’s International Committee and by the trade unions. It was decided that the SDDC should maintain a formal existence, but after June 1976 an active role was no longer its task.195 Another fact that influenced the decision to concentrate support on the PSOE, was the Portuguese revolution. In the Labour Party’s view there was a possibility that after Franco’s death what had happened in Portugal could happen in Spain. In Portugal, the coup d’état of the 25 of April 1974 by a group of young officers called the Movimiento da Forças Armadas (MFA) overthrew the dictatorship established by Oliveira Salazar in 1934. The military junta was clearly Marxist and had a close relationship with the Portuguese Communists.196 Evidence of this fear of a ‘Portuguese scenario’ in Spain was a letter sent by Colin Phipps, MP to Ron Hayward, General Secretary of the Labour Party, on 24 September 1975 after returning from a private visit to Spain. After a conversation with the British Ambassador about the likely situation that would arise when Franco died or was superseded by Juan Carlos, he wrote that There is clearly a possibility of a Portuguese-type situation arising and the Spanish Socialists are probably the key party as far as the erection of democratic institutions in the post-Franco period is concerned. I get the impression from the Ambassador that some of the Spanish Socialists were preparing themselves for a non-democratic approach and I think it is important for the British Labour Party to start giving the Spanish Socialists very considerable and public support.197 The actions of the Labour Party in support of the PSOE from 1974 onwards were directed into two main areas. The first was within the Socialist International, where the Labour Party collaborated in the Spain Committee set up by the SI on 31 March 1974. Jenny Little, International

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Secretary of the Labour Party, was the Chairman. Her participation in the Spain Committee and in the SI mission to Spain in January 1976 will be discussed later. Secondly, the SDDC appealed for funds for the PSOE and started it off with a contribution of £1,000; It also invited a delegation of the PSOE to have talks with leaders of the Labour Party, the government and the unions.198 1975 executions: impact on the British Labour movement Before Franco’s death in November 1975, the execution of five members of FRAP (the Spanish Revolutionary Anti-fascist and Patriotic Front)199 in September 1975 had a great impact on the British Labour movement. At the Annual Conference of the Labour Party in Blackpool the NEC expressed its total condemnation of the death sentences and emphasised that the justified isolation which the Franco regime had brought upon itself must be sustained and intensified, particularly in relation to membership of the European Community and of NATO.200 The government’s attitude was explained by James Callaghan,201 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Speaking on behalf of the NEC Callaghan pledged that the government would oppose closer ties between Spain and the EEC as long as the present Spanish regime was in power: There must be no aid and no comfort given to the existing regime, there must be no prospect as I have made clear, of any closer ties with Europe in any form, there must be no ending of Spain’s self-inflicted isolation brought about not just by the single act of brutality, but by injustices over a generation or more.202 The same argument was advanced by Callaghan in the House of Commons on 29 October 1975, expressing his hope that a situation would be created in which it would one day be possible for Europe and Spain to come closer together.203 The reaction of the leader of the TGWU, Jack Jones, to these death sentences was extreme. During the Labour Party Conference, Jack Jones called for a programme of maximum harassment of the Franco regime, including a refusal to handle Spanish exports. Jones expressed the hope that there would be a spontaneous reaction in Britain against the regime, including the delaying and halting of the loading and unloading of Spanish ships, lorries and aircraft, and a boycott of telecommunications and postal contact with Spain. He also said that a boycott should be developed of Spanish goods and Spanish tourism, although in the press he said that no formal instructions had been given to the TGWU for the


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moment.204 By contrast, the British government showed a rather cautious attitude towards any possible interference in Spanish affairs. The 1975 TUC resolution had called for the support of all those in Spain and Portugal who were fighting for an end to Fascism and militarism and the establishment of democracy, and for the development of a national campaign of solidarity with Spanish workers for free and democratic trade unions.205 In reply to the resolution, James Callaghan said to Len Murray, General Secretary of the TUC, that the government was strongly in favour of the establishment of multi-party democracy and free trade unions in Spain but that: This must be primarily a matter for the Spanish people and we must beware of intervening in the internal affairs or of contributing to a polarisation of Spanish politics with consequent danger of civil war.206 As a result of the death sentences, on 6 October the Council of Ministers of the EEC decided not to continue with the negotiations to revise the Preferential Trade Agreement signed in 1970 between Spain and the EEC, which needed revision to take into account the accession of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark to the EEC in 1973. Because of the large volume of trade between Britain and Spain, it was difficult to adopt the existing agreement between the EEC and Spain, and therefore the EEC decided that a new agreement should be negotiated with Spain under the EEC Global Approach to the Mediterranean.207 Even though the British government agreed on the suspension of negotiations between Britain and Spain, Britain had a strong interest in the resumption of negotiations between the EEC and Spain. In December 1975, James Callaghan explained to Jack Jones the government’s attitude concerning this issue. Because the agreement had not been revised, he stated, legal complications had arisen in relation to tariffs, with the result that while British tariffs had been lowered to the benefit of Spain, there had been no reciprocal action by the Spaniards. According to the Foreign Secretary, the negotiations for the new agreement would be in the interest of Britain and would not carry any implications for a closer relationship between the EEC and Spain.208 The TUC considered that the resumption of negotiations with Spain, or any action seen as a concession, would be misunderstood in Britain and in Spain. The government should maintain the decision not to negotiate and look to negotiate a new agreement only when the situation in Spain was clearer.209 On 16 January 1976, James Callaghan together with Roy Hattersley, Minister of State, and officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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met with members of the International Committee of the TUC210 to discuss the possible resumption of negotiations between the EEC and Spain for a new trade agreement now that Franco was dead. The General Council said that it had not been convinced that conclusion of an agreement would give any substantial advantage to Britain or improve on the compromise arrangement which had applied ever since Britain became a member of the EEC. In their view, a resumption of negotiations with Spain would give the impression to workers in Britain and in Spain that concessions were being made before democratic change had taken place in Spain. In reply Callaghan stated that the negotiations were technical in nature. Their resumption would be of no advantage to Spain, but would lead to reduced import tariffs on Britain’s substantial industrial exports to Spain. He also said that it was not his intention to press for a resumption of negotiations at the meeting of the EEC Council of Foreign Ministers on 20 January 1976. However he declared that it would not be in British interests to delay a new agreement indefinitely. On 20 January, he would refer specifically to the need to seek advances towards trade union freedom in Spain without making it an absolute condition of the resumption of negotiations.211 In other words, progress towards a more democratic system in Spain would not be made an absolute condition for a resumption. Despite this statement, the view of the General Council was that it should nevertheless maintain opposition to the reopening of trade negotiations with Spain.212 However, the political argument for the isolation of Franco’s regime was less persuasive than the case for Britain’s economic interests: in February 1976 the Council of Ministers decided with British support to resume the negotiations. Post-Franco era There was further tension between the Labour government and the Party on the symbolic issue of whether to send representatives to Franco’s funeral. The government decided to send a minister to his funeral. This action was deplored by the Labour Party213 and the General Secretary issued the following statement: The Labour Party will be deeply shocked that our Government is contemplating sending a senior Cabinet Minister to Franco’s funeral. It is an affront to all those fighting for democracy and human rights in Spain. On the proposal of the Foreign Secretary this year the Labour Party went on record at its Annual Conference condemning the policies and actions of Franco’s regime. It would be a cynical repudiation of


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the views of the whole party to send to the dictator’s funeral a senior member of the Cabinet.214 This action was supported by the NEC on 26 November. It deplored the action of the Labour government and called on the government to use its influence on the Spanish regime to ensure the restoration of full democratic rights. Additionally, Chairman Bob Edwards MP, and Treasurer Jack Jones of the SDDC, sent a telegram of protest to the government urging it to reconsider its decision.215 The government ignored these requests and sent Lord Shepherd, the Lord Privy Seal and Labour Party Leader in the House of Lords as its official representative.216 It was ironic that Franco’s death exposed the tensions between the Labour movement in Britain and its own Labour government. Days later, the Duke of Edinburgh attended the coronation of King Juan Carlos. According to Jenny Little, the Labour Party underestimated the figure of the King and the role that Juan Carlos could play in the process of transition because he had been appointed by Franco.217 Equally, the PSOE considered that Juan Carlos was unable to bring about any sort of democracy. In its view: ‘Juan Carlos is a creature of the regime.’218 The Labour Party was also very active within the Socialist International mission sent to Spain on 14–17 January 1976. Jenny Little participated in the mission and wrote an article that criticised the limited reforms put forward by the government of Arias Navarro in January 1976. She concluded: The changes so far have been superficial, mere cosmetic reforms. The same people are in power using the same tactics. Marginal advances have been made though the apparatus of Franco’s state has not been dismantled, one is not seeing real ‘liberalisation’ or ‘democratisation’ and may ask how long it is necessary to wait.219 After the visit, in February 1976, the International Committee of the Labour Party passed a resolution which was later endorsed by the NEC which reaffirmed its support for the PSOE, and said that the Spanish government must progress from the mere declaration of ‘liberalisation’ to the level of deeds. It asked the British government to bring maximum pressure on the Spanish regime to restore full democratic and trade union rights, the holding of free elections in Spain, the establishment of a free trade union movement, and the release of all political prisoners.220 The TUC also put pressure on its own government, following the visit of UGT members to the United Kingdom. The TUC International Committee

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passed a resolution calling on the British government to bring maximum pressure to bear on the Spanish regime to restore full democratic and trade union rights, the holding of free elections, the establishment of a free trade union movement, and the release of all political prisoners.221 The visit of the representatives of the UGT, Nicolás Redondo, First Secretary of the UGT, Pablo Castellano, International Secretary, and Antonio García Duarte, External Organising Secretary, provided information about the situation in Spain and the prospect for the development of a democratic trade union movement. During the meeting the UGT representatives stated that they looked forward to the development of a united trade union movement independent of the state and of political parties, and originating at factory and local levels. In reply the General Council stated that it supported efforts in Spain to regain and to develop trade union unity, particularly at factory level.222 Concerning the possible boycotts of communications and transport with Spain, a UGT representative said that these actions could be of value in some circumstances and could perhaps be considered in the light of future developments in Spain. The UGT representatives also invited the TUC to send a delegation to observe trade union work inside Spain. The delegation visited Spain in November 1976. On 2 March 1976 José María de Areilza, the Spanish Foreign Minister, met James Callaghan to inform the British government of the Spanish government’s intentions with regard to democratic reforms and its wish to seek membership of the EEC. Areilza undertook a complex operation to secure the support of the Western democracies for political reform. During his visit, Areilza told Callaghan about the government’s plans, including the holding in June of a general congress of trade unionists to discuss trade union reform, a referendum in the autumn on legalising political parties and reforming the legislature, and a general election on the basis of universal suffrage early in 1977. He said that most political prisoners in Spain would be released within six months.223 On the same day the General Council of the TUC and the ETUC sent statements relating to the need for democratic reforms before the recognition of the Spanish regime. James Callaghan informed Areilza about these statements, adding that it would be helpful if the Spanish government could ratify ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the right to organise and bargain collectively.224 The TUC reckoned, with some justification, that it could contribute to the establishment of true democracy in Spain by putting pressure on its own Labour government. Even though the Labour Party had manifested its support for the aims presented by the Democratic Co-ordination,225 Felipe González, Leader


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of the Spanish Socialist Party, attending the Conference of the Labour Party in Blackpool in September 1976, asked for Labour’s support for the democratic opposition. During his speech, he talked about the contribution made by the European democracies to the crisis of the first government of the monarchy, which was due to ‘a lack of credibility in all European countries for the policies implemented by the government’. González asked for continuing help in relation to the new government of Adolfo Suárez: This is why, comrades, we need your help, because once again you, like other parties and democratic institutions in Europe, will find yourselves facing an alternative of great significance for our future. Therefore there are two possibilities, either one chooses to support the present government with its political scheme – which in our judgment cannot lead to democracy – or one can continue to support with even greater solidarity the struggle of the democratic opposition for the establishment of a full and total democracy.226 In his interview with James Callaghan, who had recently replaced Wilson as Prime Minister, and Antony Crosland, the Foreign Minister, González spoke of the need to calm down the optimism inspired by Suárez’s reforms, explaining the goals of Democratic Co-ordination as an alternative to the reformist project of the government.227 González was wrong, and the reformist project of the government did indeed bring about democracy. The Law for Political Reform passed by the Cortes in November 1976 formally opened the way for free general elections. The British government, like the European Parliament disagreed with González’s insistence on ‘a democratic rupture’ and instead approved the way that the Spanish government was bringing democracy to Spain.The vexed question of the unity of Spanish trade unionism was raised again during the visit of a TUC delegation to Spain. On 15–18 November 1976, the British trade unionists Joe Gormley, George Smith, Jack Jones and Len Murray, together with J.A. Hargreaves, visited Spain. The delegation had conversations in Bilbao, Barcelona and Madrid with representatives of the UGT and the STV. The delegation also met representatives of the Workers’ Commissions and the USO.228 They recognised that the refusal of the UGT to participate in the official syndicates had turned out to be right, since the UGT was seen as the true alternative to the official machinery. Yet, they still emphasised to the Spanish trade unionists the advantages of developing unity of action at the national and regional level.229 According to Jack Jones, the aim of the TUC during

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these years of transition was to help to build a united trade union movement in Spain: ‘We believed that a united labour movement should work together, like in Britain.’230 However, the single congress proposed by the TUC was never achieved. The UGT did not agree to deal with the Workers’ Commissions to create a general union. The British interpretation of the situation in Spain was proved wrong on the trade union issue, just as it was proved right on the crucial question of the institutional process of democratisation. A particular significance of the relationship between the Labour government and the PSOE nevertheless lies in the fact that the PSOE was considered to be the judge of the actual achievement of Spanish democracy. Michael Foot declared in Blackpool in 1976 that the British government would not support any Spanish official petition for integration into the EEC until the PSOE was satisfied with the democratic conditions created by the Spanish government.231 Later on, during his visit to Spain, Michael Foot considered democracy as a condition for European membership and argued that it was the PSOE which had to judge the democratic conditions of the country.232 It was after the democratic elections in June 1977 that the Labour government finally came to regard Spain as a fully democratic country and ‘would consider with their partners any application she may make for membership of the EEC’.233 By that stage, the PSOE’s advice and British Labour’s conclusions had again converged.

Conclusions The creation of the SDDC implied the sustained involvement of the British Labour movement in Spanish affairs from 1959 to the end of the Franco regime. During the period 1959–68 the SDDC achieved the aims listed in 1959. The Committee was very active in attending trials of opposition members. Its representatives raised the morale of the accused and their presence contributed in several cases to the postponement of the trial. In some cases, their presence was effective in focusing critical world attention on the trial and on the authoritarian nature of the Franco regime. British Socialists and trade unionists also made several exploratory visits to Spain, gaining a better understanding of Spanish realities and of the Spanish opposition, and particularly of the existing divisions between the Socialists. The most important result of these activities was that the Labour Party became aware that the Executive Committee of the PSOE in exile was out of touch with the true situation inside Spain and that the renovation of the PSOE should come from within Spain. As a


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consequence of this awareness, the Labour Party supported the recognition of the PSOE renovado as the Spanish Socialist party within the Socialist International in January 1974. The British Labour movement put pressure on its own government, for instance, in the case of the possible admission of Spain into NATO, and in preventing arms sales to Spain. However, the visit of British MPs and trade unionists, used by Franco as propaganda, caused discouragement and confusion among the Spanish opposition. The Labour movement was unable to stop them, but it increased its efforts to sponsor visits that would have the opposite effect, and would, through detailed criticism of the regime’s repressive policies towards its own citizens, both encourage the opposition and help de-legitimise the regime. In order to assess the British Labour movement’s impact on the formation of an effective Socialist opposition in Spain, the question of why it wanted to get involved in the first place needs to be explained. The feeling of unfinished business from the Spanish Civil War, and the moral obligation felt by senior members of the British Labour movement, among them Jack Jones and Will Paynter, were decisive factors in their desire to establish democracy in Spain. These feelings were translated into plans of action when international circumstances and events within Spain provided the opportunity. The first concrete initiative that framed the British Labour movement’s policies was the creation of the SDDC, formed to organise and co-ordinate actions to assist the Spanish Socialists and other underground democratic forces. These actions consisted of attending trials to give moral support to the accused and to focus world attention on the Franco regime. They achieved those goals by frequent visits to Spain both to attend trials and gather first-hand information on the Spanish situation, and by constant criticism of the nature of the Franco regime. During one of these visits, Bob Edwards, a member of the SDDC, managed to attract the attention of the world press to some of the actions of the Spanish secret police. It is worth pointing out that the regime was extremely sensitive to negative publicity at international level, especially at a time when it wanted to join international organisations. The consequences of these actions were twofold. The British Labour movement was a voice in Europe that spoke up against the nature of the Franco regime and it helped counterbalance any favourable concessions given to the Franco regime by the USA or European countries. The presence of SDDC members throughout these years in Spain had a very positive influence on the Spanish opposition, and especially the Socialist Party, which found itself being backed by an external actor in its fight for democracy. The policy of keeping in touch with several opposition groups during these years could be seen as a policy unfavourable to the PSOE/UGT.

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However, that policy gave the British Labour movement a wide and deep understanding of the problems that the Spanish opposition was facing and, also, of the divisions between the Socialists. This more accurate comprehension of the split within the PSOE had very positive results in the long run. Labour saw that the PSOE working inside Spain was gaining support from the UGT and young Socialists. Some of this popularity was due to the leadership of Felipe González, who also managed to obtain international endorsement from European leaders after SI’s recognition of the PSOE renovado. Labour Party opinion in favour of recognising the PSOE renovado was crucial in deciding how the SI would eventually intervene in the dispute. Evidence gathered in this chapter suggests that the Labour Party and the TUC contributed significantly to the international effort for the organisation of the Socialist opposition, in their support of Socialist trade unions, and last, but not least, in their condemnation of the Franco regime.

5

The French Socialists 1959–77

After the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), the Spanish Socialist Party went into exile in Mexico and France. In France, the presence of a strong émigré community (thousands having fled Spain after 1939) led to the formation of several ‘Socialist groups’. The I Congress of the PSOE in France which took place in Toulouse in 1944 ended a period of tension between several factions within the Spanish Socialist Party: Caballeristas (supporters of Largo Caballero) and Besteiristas (supporters of Julian Besteiros), elected Enrique de Francisco (caballerista) and Trifón Gómez (besteirista) as President and Vice-president and Rodolfo Llopis (caballerista) as General Secretary of the new Executive Committee. Two years later, in May 1946, the II Congress of the PSOE in Toulouse agreed to integrate the Mexican group of Indalecio Prieto and to form the PSOE in exile, which was the official representative of the Socialist Party in Spain1 during the Franco regime. Until the split of the PSOE in 1972 into the PSOE (histórico) of Rodolfo Llopis and the PSOE (renovado) of Felipe González, the PSOE in exile maintained a very close relation with the French Socialists. The leadership used the SFIO’s offices in Toulouse as its headquarters. In addition, the PSOE’s newspaper El Socialista was printed in France with the help of the French Socialists. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the links established between the French Socialists and the Spanish Socialists and to look into the initiative taken by the French Socialists in favour of the democratisation process in Spain. During the period between 1959 and 1977, the French Socialist Party, SFIO (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière), later the PS, Parti Socialiste, unlike the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), remained in opposition. This chapter will cover the Fifth Republic, which was proclaimed in 1959, after being approved overwhelmingly in a referendum in September 1958, with Charles de 119

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Gaulle as its first President (1959–69). After the resignation of de Gaulle in 1969, his successors were President Georges Pompidou (1969–74) and Valery Giscard d’Estaing (1974–81).

1959–77 The French case: three characteristics In order to assess the significance of the French Socialists’ involvement in Spanish politics during the period between 1959 and 1977, it is necessary to bear in mind several factors that make the French case a rather peculiar one, as compared to the labour movements in Britain and Germany. First of all, during the 1960s the SFIO led by Guy Mollet, General Secretary from 1946–69, underwent a process of complete transformation as a party. From 1960 the SFIO divided into several factions. According to Wyme Northcutt, there were two causes of this division: the return of de Gaulle to power supported by SFIO and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. Furthermore, disenchantment with the policies of SFIO known as Mollestisme (Guy Mollet’s strategy based on reform and rather anticommunism) led to the founding of a new Socialist Party. A section of the Party, which included politicians, such as Michel Rocard, founded the Unified Socialist Party or PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié). According to Northcutt, the creation of the PSU ‘foreshadowed the death of SFIO’.2 In the meantime the Socialists’ tactical alliances with the Communists in 1965 and 1967 raised the possibility of defeating the Gaullist majority. In 1969, due to the events of May 1968 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the electoral alliance with the Communists fell apart following the victory of de Gaulle.3 After this electoral defeat, in 1969 Guy Mollet resigned as General Secretary and in July at the Issy-les Moulineaux Congress, the former SFIO was transformed into a new Socialist Party, the Parti Socialiste. Two years later, the Congress of Epinay in June 1971 unified all the French Socialists tendencies. François Mitterrand became First Secretary of the PS ‘by making an alliance with the party right wing (Pierre Mauroy and Gaston Defferre) and the Marxist (CERES) in order to defeat the former Mollist majority’.4 Secondly, the renovation and transformation of the French Socialist Party brought about links with the Communists. Mitterrand rebuilt Socialist strength using a Communist alliance. Evidently Mitterrand expected to become Prime Minister and the Socialists believed this depended on their collaboration with the Communists in the Union of the Left. In June 1972, the creation of the ‘Union de la Gauche’, which

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embraced the PCF (French Communist Party) under George Marchais, the PS and the MRG (Left Radicals), the Socialist Party (PS) saw the signing of a ‘Common Programme’ to bring a united left to power. This electoral alliance did begin to receive significant support from the working classes due to a radicalisation of the PS policies and ideology. Thirdly, in France (and Italy) there were no official links between the unions and the various political parties. In the French case all trade unions without exception affirm their total independence and absolute autonomy towards all political parties. The decentralisation of the French trade union together with the weak links between the PS and its union the CGT-FO (Confédération Générale du Travail-Force Ouvrière) (General Confederation of Labour-Workers’ Force) was conductive to the formation of a strong and united trade union movement, as was the case in Germany and Great Britain. It could be argued that these three factors: (i) the transformation of SFIO into a new Socialist Party; (ii) the electoral alliance between the PS and the French Communist Party in 1972; and (iii) the weak links between the French Socialist Party and its union clearly conditioned the initiatives taken by the French Socialists in favour of their Spanish counterparts during those years. Although the French Socialists provided moral and material assistance to the Spanish Socialists and Trade Unionists and expressed public criticism of the Franco regime on numerous occasions, they were, unlike the British and the Germans, less predisposed to take concrete initiatives in favour of the Spanish Socialists. However, the French had a role to play. By supporting the headquarters of the PSOE /UGT at the SFIO in Toulouse and by helping them with the publication of the newspaper Le Socialiste, they helped the PSOE/UGT to survive as a political organisation in exile, keeping the PSOE/UGT alive during the exile years at a time when the French government was in favour of establishing links with Franco’s Spain. The French connection: lobbying and financing 1959–68 Due to Spain’s strategic and geopolitical importance, France favoured links between Spain and the EEC as early as 1962. During his years as President of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle had a favourable attitude towards Franco’s Spain. For de Gaulle, Spain’s strategic and geopolitical importance could be an asset for his ‘Europe of Nations’. The Fifth Republic collaborated with the Spanish dictatorship. The French government’s disapproval of the Spanish exiles’ activities in France led the French Socialists to struggle against their own government in support of the Spanish opposition.

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July 1959 marked the beginning of a set of actions taken by the French government to ban the activities of the Spanish organisations in exile. A few months earlier, in February 1959, Rodolfo Llopis and Pascual Tomás visited the secretaries of SFIO and Force Ouvrière to remind both organisations that the Spanish government had complained to the French government against the Socialists’ activities in France.5 From 1959 to 1961, the Spanish government put pressure on France to restrict the activities of the Spanish refugees. The first action taken by the French government was to suspend a meeting organised by the CNT on 19 July 1959. Soon after that the French government did not authorise the holding of the VII Congress of the UGT in Toulouse on 13–15 of August 1959. The UGT sent an urgent appeal to the FO and the SFIO asking them to intercede on behalf of the UGT. Due to the composition of the French government, the possibilities of a successful intervention by the FO and the SFIO were rather limited. However, their intervention proved successful. Robert Bothereau, General Secretary of the FO, decided to persude his own government and had interviews with the Chief of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister, Michel Debré. He successfully managed to make the French government change its decision and authorise the holding the UGT Congress in a place outside the South of France. The FO suggested holding the UGT Congress in Limoges, Clemant-Ferrand or Paris. In the meantime, following a meeting of the Executive Committee of the UGT, Pascual Tomás and Rodolfo Llopis went to Paris to meet Bothereau who informed them about the negotiations with the French government. Finally, the government agreed holding the UGT Congress in Paris in the FO´s headquarters. The FO decided to cover the Congress’ expenses in Paris and to send a donation of 450,000 francs to the UGT.6 Like the FO, the SFIO was also sensitive to the importance of the Socialists’ activities in exile. Following the suggestion made by Rodolfo Llopis, Georges Brutelle, Assistant Secretary of the SFIO, explained what had happened personally to Guy Mollet, General Secretary of the SFIO. Mollet intervened in favour of the Spanish Socialists by having a meeting with General Charles de Gaulle, President of the Fifth Republic. During this meeting, Mollet reminded de Gaulle that the Spanish exiles had died for France and the Resistance and that the Franco regime had always been against the Republic and in favour of the Nazis. As far as the Congress was concerned, General de Gaulle stated that the government’s decision was irrevocable. Despite his favourable attitude towards Franco’s Spain, the position taken by de Gaulle with respect to the Spanish exiles and their democratic organisations was surprisingly positive. De Gaulle seemed


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to be willing to respect the Spanish exiles in France when he regarded them as ‘sons of France’. The UGT Congress was held in Paris on 13–16 August 1959.7 Clearly, the intervention of the FO and the SFIO in favour of the Spanish Socialists had a positive result. With this action the French Socialists provided moral and material support to the UGT, which helped to consolidate the PSOE and the UGT. As in 1959, at the beginning of 1960 the French government showed solidarity with the Spanish dictatorship. On that occasion, the anti-Franco propaganda being carried out by the Spanish opposition living in France preoccupied the French government. The French government considered that a negative campaign against Franco from France could affect and somehow deteriorate the good relations established between the two countries. On 21 March 1960, after a conversation with the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, Bothereau informed the UGT that although the Spanish police had complained to their French counterparts about their passive attitude concerning the Spanish propaganda from France towards Spain and the circulation of literature, the French government had never signed any formal agreement with the Spanish government. However, the French authorities agreed with the Franco regime to take actions against the Spanish opposition living in France.8 As a result, the French government, through the prefect of Haute Garonne, adopted a resolution which banned the publication of El Socialista and the Bulletin of the UGT, both of which were sent to Spain. This example demonstrated that the French government was exercising repressive measures against Spanish workers’ action in France. This was another occasion for the French Socialists to express solidarity with the Spanish Socialists. Guy Mollet regarded this action as outrageous and promised to show his concern in his next meeting with General de Gaulle, not only expressing the SFIO’s indignation at this issue but also trying to persuade de Gaulle to lift the ban on the Socialist propaganda. Besides this, Robert Bothereau said that the FO would protest vigorously to the Minister of the Interior against the ban on propaganda activities and would express the FO’s concern about the government’s decision.9 On this occasion the publication of El Socialista was not suspended, but these repressive measures had a negative effect on the activities of the UGT. On 28 March 1960 Pascual Tomás informed Bothereau about the difficult situation the UGT was going through mainly concerning its organisation. He also mentioned how the French press – in particular Paris Presse, Jours de la Semaine and Paris Match – had reproduced the negative campaign carried out by the Spanish government against the Socialist organisations which were seen as ‘a bunch of thieves or murderers’ or

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saw Toulouse as ‘a school of Spanish terrorists’.10 Tomás complained that, on the contrary, the French Press was dedicating articles to Communist elements, which were being portrayed as liberators of Spain. A year later, in January 1961, the Foreign Affairs Ministry had reiterated its instructions to paralyse the UGT campaign of publications against the Franco regime. This negative campaign could deteriorate the diplomatic relations between France and Spain. It was suggested that this time the French government’s repressive measures could go a bit further by taking administrative sanctions against the UGT. The UGT called on the French Socialists for assistance and suggested a public gesture in favour of the UGT. The UGT proposed to the FO the issuing of a joint declaration together with the French Christian Trade Union organisation. Such a declaration could provide moral support, which would have a positive effect among the Spanish exiles. At the same time the action could be a serious warning to the French government.11 On 25 February 1961, the FO expressed its solidarity with the Spanish Socialists in a statement and deplored the fact that France maintained such a good relationship with Spain, where basic rights had been abolished. The FO requested the lifting of all restrictions for the normal work of the UGT in France.12 Clearly, once again the FO paid attention to the UGT request and demonstrated considerable concern for the UGT. Another example of the FO’s solidarity and Bothereau’s interest in Spain was the meeting with the Prime Minister, Michel Debré. Bothereau complained that because of the Spanish lobby, some of the UGT´s members were having difficulties obtaining a Carte de Travail (work permit). With respect to the propaganda activities in France, Debré was rather elusive, arguing that the UGT should carry on with its work.13 Despite the attempts made by the SFIO and the FO to change the French government’s attitude towards Spain and the Spanish opposition living in France, cooperation between de Gaulle and Franco moved a step forward in October 1961 when following Franco’s recommendations, the French government arrested 11 Spanish Republicans in France. The ICFTU immediately contacted members of the French government to protest against these imprisonments. The SFIO’s newspaper Le Populaire defended the Spanish Republicans and attacked Franco and the CGT-FO interceded on behalf of the Spanish Socialists.14 The FO’s intervention was directed towards the French government. Robert Bothereau had a meeting with Michel Debré, who ignored this issue and reminded him what he had earlier promised: to respect the rights of the Spanish Socialists and trade unionists in France. Luckily, Debré intervened in the process and following his intervention 10 people out of the 11 arrested were


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released. Even though Debré promised to the French Unionists that in the future the French government would not take any action against the Spanish Socialists, the reality would turn out to be rather different. In the end, the release of the UGT ´s members proved to be a very successful action of the CGT-FO.15 Despite the promises Debré had made a few days earlier, on 29 October 1961, the French authorities cancelled the meeting called by the AS in collaboration with Force Ouvrière. The FO tried to organise the same meeting, which was also cancelled. Several attempts were made by French Socialists close to the French authorities to reverse the government’s decision, this time without any successful outcome.16 Another action of the French government against the Spanish Socialists and the Spanish exiles in general took place a month later. In November 1961 the French government banned the Spanish exiles from political activities such as the holding of congresses and any propaganda activity such as printing and circulating their newspapers. In particular, on 2 November the French government suspended the publication of El Socialista, newspaper of the PSOE and UGT, as well as the weekly newspapers of the CNT, Solidaridad Obrera in Paris and CNT and España Libre in Toulouse.17 Those measures implemented by the French government had a considerable impact on the clandestine activities of the Spanish Socialists in exile. Once again, the SFIO and the FO protested energetically to their own government against these measures.18 On 9 November 1961, the UGT urged the CGT-FO to find out whether the French government was willing to revoke the ban on publishing and printing since in its opinion the Spanish Communists in collaboration with the French Communists could take advantage and eventually benefit from that situation.19 The same day a letter to Pascual Tomás from Robert Bothereau insisted on two issues: (i) the release of the last arrested Spaniard still in prison and (ii) his meeting with Debré. According to Bothereau, the conclusion of that meeting was that with those actions the French government was clearly making concessions to Franco. Regarding the ban on the Socialist publications, all the pressure exercised by the French Socialists on their own government had a positive result. The government was willing to allow the publication in French of the Spanish newspaper El Socialista, but not in Spanish.20 On this point, the PSOE contacted the SFIO. The SFIO’s view was that it was impossible to go against the government’s decision, and so therefore the French Socialists would assume the responsibility of publishing a newspaper for the Spanish Socialists in French. In other words, the SFIO took over both the publication and diffusion of the new newspaper, called Le Socialiste.21

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On 21 December 1961 the first issue of Le Socialiste attacked the Spanish government and expressed the solidarity of the French democrats with the Spanish democrats in exile and specifically of the SFIO with the PSOE and the UGT. Therefore the SFIO was responsible for the most important propaganda instrument, which was crucial to keep the Socialists informed of the activities of the PSOE and the UGT in exile which denounced and criticised the authoritarian nature of the Franco regime. In the meantime, during the FO Congress of 22–25 November 1961, the FO together with the SFIO expressed their solidarity with the Spanish Socialists and once again expressed strong disapproval about the measures.22 The CGT-FO also helped the UGT with the holding of the VIII Congress on 2–4 August 1962. Pascual Tomás asked the FO to intercede with the French government to obtain authorisation to hold the UGT Congress in Toulouse. On 16 May 1962, Bothereau met the Prime Minister, George Pompidou, and as a result of that, Pompidou authorised the holding of the VIII Congress of the UGT in Paris. As in 1959, to cover the UGT Congress’ expenses, the FO offered money and resources.23 Without doubt, during this difficult period for the Spanish Socialists, the French Socialists put pressure on their own government to modify its actions against the Spanish Socialists and gave financial and moral support to the PSOE and the UGT in exile. Both actions definitely encouraged the Spanish Socialists. The French government’s favourable attitude towards Spain manifested itself in February 1962. Spain made its first approach to the EEC and applied for EEC membership. In June 1970, eight years later, the EEC signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with Spain, something far short of what it had sought. The anti-democratic nature of the Franco regime was the main obstacle in the way of full integration into Europe, which was finally achieved in 1986. The six member countries of the EEC had different attitudes towards the Spanish application; four member states showed resistance to any kind of association with the Franco regime. Italy was reluctant to share its privileged position as a supplier of fruit and vegetables to the Community, and Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were against Spain’s application for political reasons. The Benelux group was opposed to anything that could be interpreted as giving political approval to the Spanish government.24 In contrast, France and Germany had a special interest in Spain and both were in favour of association. In the case of Germany, economic interests in Spain were important along with strategic considerations.25 For France, Spain was very important economically because it had become the third most important trading partner for industrial production, banking insurance


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and armaments. Besides the economic importance of Spain, political and strategic reasons caused Franco’s Spain to be considered by Charles de Gaulle a country that should be grouped together with the six countries of the Common Market in order to form a united ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’. In this respect, he said: I do not forget that Europe extends from Gibraltar to the Urals and, whatever my opinion of certain regimes, I have been in Moscow as well as in London and Brussels, and I have established relations with both Madrid and Ankara. In my opinion, anyone who sincerely wishes it could take part in a united Europe.26 In addition to that, as Richard Vinen has pointed out, a keystone of de Gaulle’s republic was ‘the construction of a new role for France in the international arena ... France was to break away from an American dominated bloc and to show herself capable of guaranteeing her own security.’27 In other words, President de Gaulle favoured Spanish entry to help shape an independent ‘European Europe’ without any subordination to the United States: ‘France needs a stable and prosperous neighbour in the south and Europe a Spain which will give it depth.’28 On the other hand, the French Socialists, like any other European Socialist organisation, opposed any policy which could benefit the Franco regime. Since the Spanish government had made its first approach to the EEC in 1962, the CFT-FO expressed strong opposition to the Franco regime and its integration into Europe. Indeed, the FO tried, without any success, to change its own government’s favourable attitude towards Spanish integration into Europe.29 An example of that opposition took place in 1964, when the French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville visited Madrid on 28–30 May 1964 for talks with the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Maria Castiella and Franco. The aim of the visit was to increase FrancoSpanish political and economic collaboration. Indeed, the French and Spanish governments recognised the importance of collaboration in developing their international relations and ‘in stimulating the economic expansion and reinforcing the security of both countries in their own interests and in those of the free world’. Besides, collaboration between the two countries would be reinforced in economic, social, technical and cultural matters, for instance the spending of the French credit of 750 million francs extended to Spain and the Franco-Spanish cooperation in constructing a space research centre in the Canary islands. Both governments were interested in the extension of economic aid and the strengthening of political and cultural ties with Latin America. Soon

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afterwards and as a result of the close cooperation between France and Spain, on 5 June 1964 the CGT-FO expressed its concern about that cooperation and opposed any form of ‘privileged relations’ between Franco Spain and the Common Market, as long as the Spanish people were deprived of their basic democratic liberties.30 The SFIO also pointed out that the anti-democratic philosophy of the regime was totally opposed to the values of the EEC, stressing the fact that the SFIO was unanimously against the entry of Spain into Europe. This provided further evidence of the strong opposition of the French Socialists to the Franco regime.31 During the 1960s the CFT-FO was also in touch with the ASO (Alianza Sindical Obrera), Workers’ Trade Union Alliance. In 1965, the CFT-FO contacted members of the ASO, which was looking for international recognition. In a letter to the General Secretary of the FO, André Bergeron, Pascual Tomás complained about the publication of an article entitled ‘Contra el sindicalismo amarillo en España’, allegedly sent to the journal of FO by AS.32 Tomás denounced the FO for publishing an article which accused the ASO of being against what the UGT represented. In the UGT’s view, that accusation should never have been published because the ASO was also fighting against the Franco regime and had a substantial number of militants and leaders in prison condemned and awaiting trial. From the mid-1960s, the Socialist CGT-FO and the Catholic-oriented CFDT, Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Confederation of Labour) developed a close working relationship. An example of that cooperation was a mission to Spain organised by the CFDT. From 12 to 21 December 1968, a delegation of the CFDT visited Barcelona, Madrid, Gijón and Bilbao. The aim of this visit was to analyse the social, political and economic situation in Spain in order to propose a plan of action to help the Spanish opposition. The French Trade Unionists established contact with the main trade union movements in Spain. They met with members of the UGT, USO and CC.OO. Of these organisations, USO left an excellent impression to the CFDT members. The CFDT considered the USO to be a dynamic, well-organised and realistic trade union movement. Taking into account the different attitudes of the Spanish trade union organisations and the assistance given directly to those organisations by international organisations such as ICFTU, it was decided (i) to assist the families of the imprisoned Socialists and trade unionists, (ii) to give moral support to the defendants and (iii) to protest against the Franco regime by sending statements to the French press. 33 The British Labour movement had carried such initiatives since the creation of the SDDC in 1959. Like the FO, the CFDT was also concerned about the future of the trade unions in Spain after Franco’s death.


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France and Spain: love–hate relationship 1969–77 In France the rule of President de Gaulle came to an abrupt end in 1969. The refusal of the French electorate to approve by plebiscite the creation of new regional bodies and a reduction in the powers of the Senate made de Gaulle resign on 28 April 1969. Georges Pompidou, once Premier under de Gaulle, won the subsequent presidential elections. With respect to Spain, the new government showed strong continuity and little innovation in policy. When Georges Pompidou took office he regarded the role of France ‘as an intermediary for Spain in Europe’.34 Another occasion for the French Socialists to condemn their own government’s attitude and to express public criticism of the Franco regime took place at the end of 1969. Like the Socialist group in the European Parliament, the French Socialists managed to maintain awareness of the authoritarian nature of the Franco regime. This time the occasion was the continuation of negotiations between Spain and the EEC. The Council of the EEC decided at its session on 10–11 July 1967 to open negotiations for a preferential trading agreement with Spain, from 1967, and by April 1968 an initial phase of negotiations was completed. On 15 October 1968, the Council received a report on these negotiations from the Commission. The agreement would consist of two stages. The first would provide for reciprocal trading preferences. The transition to the second stage, which would not be automatic, would be decided jointly by the two parties. At its session of 17 October the Council adopted a second mandate for the continuation of negotiations with Spain.35 The new mandate made no change in the general outline of the earlier one. The negotiations between the Commission delegation and a Spanish delegation continued in October and December 1969, on the basis of this mandate. In a press statement on 14 November 1969 the FO condemned the continuation of negotiations between the EEC and Spain. In their view, it was unacceptable that democratic countries were making concessions to a fascist country like Spain.36 Once again, the FO expressed its hostility to any privileged relation between Spain and France. 1970 marked the beginning of a period of tension between France and Spain. In December 1970, the trial of 16 Basque Nationalists in Burgos and the kidnapping of the West German Consul in San Sebastian by ETA led to a period of some tension between the two countries. The French media’s treatment with anti-Spanish comments in the French press and television caused irritation to the Spanish government. The French government, aware of the importance of the role that Spain could play in Europe, decided to appease the Spanish government. At a press

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conference on 21 January 1971, Pompidou declared that ‘this treatment was sometimes excessive, either through passion or a taste for dramatisation’. As on previous occasions,37 Pompidou expressed French support for Spanish effort to join Europe. Ministerial contacts were resumed on 1 April 1971. In the summer of 1971, the French government took actions against the Spanish activities carried out in France by the Spanish Basque or Communist exiles. Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the PCE (Partido Comunista Español), for instance, was forbidden to visit France. Following the wave of strikes that had spread throughout Spain by September/October 1971, the FO took action in favour of the Spanish workers and expressed solidarity with the Spanish workers at the XI Congress of the FO held in Paris from 16 to 19 November 1971. The resolution on Spain assured full solidarity and both moral and material support to the UGT in its struggle against the Spanish government for the re-establishment of freedom and democracy in Spain. The Congress also asked all affiliated members to boycott the Spanish economy, abstaining from spending their holidays in Spain. The Congress denounced the assistance given to the Spanish government, such as coal from Poland, since it felt that it strengthened the government’s position with respect to the workers in Spain.38 On 24–25 November 1971, the French Foreign Minister Maurice Schuman’s official visit to Spain for talks with the Spanish Foreign Minister Gregorio Lopez Bravo ended the period of tension in the two countries’ diplomatic relations. During his stay he was also received by Franco and met Vice-President of the government Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco. Three main issues were discussed: (i) the question of Spain’s relations with the European Economic Community, (ii) European policy and (iii) the proposed European Security Conference and Mediterranean problems. Regarding the EEC, the Preferential Trade Agreement signed in 1970 between Spain and the EEC would require revision in the light of the expected entry into the EEC of Britain and the other new members. On this respect, France would support Spain’s ‘aspirations’ with regard to the Common Market. Unlike the German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel who held interviews with members of the opposition in April 1970, the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schuman, declined to receive a delegation representing Spanish opposition circles such as Socialists, Social Democrats and Liberal Monarchists.39 Regarding the opposition, the French government avoided upsetting Franco. In reply to this action, on 20 December 1971 official representatives of the UGT from France and Spain and the CGT-FO met in Paris. Both delegations examined the


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situation in Spain and the French Socialists reaffirmed their full support for the Spanish workers.40 Almost a year after Schuman’s visit to Spain, the French government continued its policy of supporting the candidature of Spain under the Franco regime. Georges Pompidou said publicly on 21 September 1972 that he favoured Spanish entry into the Community as soon as possible, though acknowledging both economic and political difficulties. Apparently, Pompidou would welcome support from the Mediterranean countries, especially against Germany. After this declaration, the Socialists once again expressed great concern about any kind of recognition of the Franco regime. Jean Rouzier, Confederal Secretary of the FO, published an article in FO FEBDO No. 1321, reaffirming the FO’s firm position against any attempt of admission of the Franco regime within the Common Market.41 Mitterrand’s convictions and the Spanish Socialists 1972–77 In 1972 François Mitterrand, leader of the Parti Socialiste since the Epinay Congress in 1971, reached a political accord with the Communist Party on 27 June. The two parties agreed that they would govern together. They would nationalise 15 major industries, including the banks, abandon the nuclear force, improve labour conditions and modify relations with the EEC and NATO. Both parties ratified the Common Programme on 9 July. The same year the split of the PSOE into two different factions – the PSOE histórico of Rodolfo Llopis and the PSOE renovado of Felipe González – and the intervention of the SI, resulted in the recognition of the PSOE of Felipe González as the true Spanish Socialist Party in 1974. Since the August 1972 Congress of the PSOE(r), the French Socialist Party had been giving assistance to the PSOE(r). In the report on the UGT Congress, Bernard Montainer, acting as representative of the French Socialist Party and the Socialist International, stated that the PSF’s position was determinant. They would provide all the necessary help to the PSOE(r) including the use of the PS’s installations in Toulouse and in Paris.42 The PSOE(r) tried to prevent European Socialist parties from attending Llopis’ Congress. After the August Congress, the PSOE(r) had been in touch with the Secretariat of the International through Lopez Real, who worked at the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels. Lopez Real sent a letter to the Secretariat of the International dated 15 November 1972 addressing all member parties, asking them not to give encouragement to this split and not to send representatives to Llopis’ Congress, even as observers.43 Despite this request, Robert Pontillon, International Secretary of the French Socialist Party, considered that its party should send an observer to the December Congress. The Executive

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Committee of the PSOE(r) expressed its dissatisfaction with the position of the French Socialist Party, because in its view it could reinforce the Llopis’ group and weaken the group inside Spain.44 Iglesias and Jimeno met in Paris with members of the French Socialist Party such as Bernard Montainer and George Sarre in order to reaffirm that they were against the position of the French Socialist Party. After this meeting the French Socialist Party decided not to send any observer to the Congress. According to Miguel Peydró, the SI sent Veronika Isenberg, member of the SPD, as an observer to the December Congress. Clearly, with this decision, the French Socialist Party took sides from the very beginning and was in favour of the PSOE of Felipe González. Despite the PS’s full support for the PSOE(r), the close friendship between Mitterrand and Enrique Tierno Galván, leader of the PSI, caused discontent within the PSOE. The Spanish Socialists were concerned that the PSI could be accepted as a member of the SI. Bernard Montainer told Carmen Garcia Bloise and Arsenio Jimeno, both members of the Executive Committee of the PSOE(r) in Paris, that the PSF had not promoted the entry of the PSI into the SI and that they didn’t have any right to vote in favour of it.45 Le Socialiste, normally printed on the presses of the Marseilles Socialist newspaper Le Provençal, was suspended in the weeks prior to the August 1972 Congress. In the memorandum sent by Llopis to the Secretariat of the International, he said the following on this issue: These two scissionist leaders (Julio Fernández and Juan Iglesias) had gone to Marseilles, before the Congress and had got Gaston Defferre, President of the company where we have been printing our weekly newspaper since 1948 to agree that publication of it should be suspended until after the Congress, thus depriving us of the only means of communication which we had.46 As a result, Le Socialiste became the publication of the group which organised the August 1972 Congress. In the meantime, Llopis managed to publish another weekly, Le Nouveau Socialiste, generally similar in style, content and format to Le Socialiste, but consisting of only four pages. Ironically, despite the long-term relation between the leaders of Spanish Socialism living in France and the SFIO and the PS, the French Socialists supported the PSOE(r). Although the French Socialist Party fully supported the PSOE of Felipe González, according to Pierre Guidoni, the attitude of the PSF towards the Spanish Socialists was different from the attitude of its Secretary Mitterrand. Since the 1960s, Mitterrand had established close links with Enrique Tierno Galván and Santiago Carrillo, General


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Secretary of the PCE, who belonged to the same generation. Mitterrand somehow believed that Santiago Carrillo and his party represented the most important opposition to Franco.47 It has been argued that one of the reasons why the PS was in favour of Felipe González was because in 1971 the French Socialist Party had also been transformed and renovated under the leadership of François Mitterrand.48 At this stage Mitterrand’s attitude towards Felipe González was not representative of the PS, which was basically the right wing of the French Socialist Party, Pierre Mauroy and Gaston Defferre among others, together with the CERES which believed that the renovation of the PSOE was necessary in order to have a strong Socialist Party which could eventually come to power. After the recognition of the PSOE(r) by the SI as the true representative of Spanish Socialism in January 1974, the French Socialist Party was deeply concerned about the unity of the several Socialist groups around the PSOE.49 Since the French Socialist Party had been going through a similar process of disintegration and renovation in the early 1970s, they knew of the importance of the unification of all the Socialist forces in order to create a strong Socialist Party. The first evidence of that came in June 1974, when the French Socialist Party and the SPD acted together with the Ebert Foundation to sponsor the first session of the Conferencia de Unidad Socialista in Paris. This was attended by the PSOE, the Partido Socialista Gallego, Union Poblo Gallego, MSC, Secretariado de Ordenación Democrática de Catalunya (SODC) and the Partit Socialista del Pais Valenciá.50 Invitations were sent to the French Socialist Party, the SI, the SPD and the Portuguese Socialist Party. The aim of this conference was cooperation among the Socialist organisations; to establish links with other opposition groups and to define a common policy at all levels. The second session in Bonn in September 1974 was attended by the MSC, Partido Socialista Gallego, PSOE, Partit Socialista del Pais Valenciá and USO51 and focused on the question of Socialism and the different factions within Spain. Certainly, the Socialist International was aware that the PSOE needed its support at that crucial moment and that the solidarity of the Socialist International should focus on the PSOE.52 This attitude was demonstrated by the presence of European Socialist parties at the last Congress of the PSOE held in exile, at Suresnes (Paris) on 11–13 October 1974. The French Socialist Party helped with the organisation of the Congress and Robert Pontillon, member of the PS and mayor of Suresnes, was the main organiser of the event. The central significance of this Congress lies in two other aspects. First, Felipe González was elected General Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Party, and second, the party proposed a ‘democratic rupture’ as the only way out of the crisis in Spain, that is, a rapid and

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total liquidation of Francoist institutions which would bring about freedom and democracy. The PSOE, aware of the importance that the international situation could have in the breakdown of the Franco regime, called upon both European Socialist parties and Socialist governments to take action against Franco’s regime and urged the European democracies to reject the acceptance of the Spanish dictatorship into the EC because such integration would strengthen the regime.53 The PSOE’s policy was to oppose Spanish membership as long as the dictatorship continued, since experience had shown that membership of international organisations such as the OEEC had not brought democratisation to Spain. Mitterrand, together with Pierre Guidoni and Robert Pontillon, attended the Congress and were the three representatives of the PSF at Suresnes. On the other hand, Mitterrand gave a very radical speech, which talked of the class struggle as ‘the engine of history’. The aim of that speech was to create an image of radicalisation of the Spanish Socialist, as opposed to the SocialDemocratic, discourse. It could be argued that Mitterrand wished that the Spanish Socialists would enter into a similar cooperation with the Communists, as in the French case. In his view, that unity of the left in Spain would reinforce his position within the SI. Mitterrand’s support for Felipe González was seen again by the end of 1974. On 4 December 1974 a delegation of the PSOE headed by Felipe González visited Paris having been invited by the PSF. On that occasion, both parties decided to intensify their contacts at all levels, particularly in the preparation of militants and exchange of information. François Mitterrand expressed his solidarity with the Spanish Socialists and he recognised the PSOE/UGT as the only representative of Spanish Socialism.54 Having said that, it could be argued that Mitterrand’s friendship with Carrillo was rather opportunistic. Mitterrand’s relationship with the Spanish Socialists was conditioned by the French Socialists’ internal political strategy of alliance with the Communists. From 1974, the PCF attacked its Socialist partner, arguing that the Socialists fundamentally dominated the Union of the Left. The Communists could not accept that the Socialists were allied with centrists in local government and tried to defend the left-wing programme.55 At a time of poor relations with the Communists, Mitterrand showed his friendship with the Spanish Communist leader, Santiago Carrillo, because he had decided to demonstrate the intransigence of George Marchais, Secretary of the Stalinist PCF.56 During the First Portuguese Socialist Party Congress held in Lisbon on 13–15 December 1974, Tierno Galván and Carrillo were presented as leaders of the Spanish opposition. Regarding this issue, Gillespie argues:


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Paradoxically, like Mitterrand, Mario Soares was prepared to flatter the PCE leadership, not just because of the labour influence it enjoyed via the workers’ Commissions, but as a way of highlighting the differences that existed between the Spanish ‘Eurocommunist’ party and the more Stalinist Communist parties of Europe, especially Portugal. In this way the Socialist leaders hoped to embarrass communist leaders like Marchais and Cunhal and to deflect claims that they themselves were anti-communist. Clearly, that French public display in favour of the Spanish Communists created confusion among the Spanish Socialists. At that Congress, Mitterrand supported Carrillo for his party’s own sake and gradually changed his position with respect to the Spanish Socialists. Regarding the PSF’s action within the SI, according to Jacques Huntzinger ‘Mitterrand was anxious to strengthen the weight of the Socialist Party there in order to limit the domination exercised by traditional social democracy.’57 For Tierno Galván, the First Conference of Southern European Socialists constituted a frontal attack against the SI.58 Members of the SI met at the first Conference of Southern European Socialists, which had been suggested in Les Landes in May 1975 and took place in Paris on 24–25 January 1976. The French Socialist Party, the Italian Socialist Party, the PSOE, the Portuguese Socialist Party and the Belgian Socialist Party attended the Conference. The PASOK (the Greek Socialist Party), the SPD, and the Secretary of the SI, Hans Janitscheck, attended as observers.59 Gillespie has pointed out that ‘these displays of “Mediterranean Socialism” must be seen also as a bid by Mitterrand to challenge West German dominance in the International, an attempt that failed chiefly because of successful SPD courtship of the Iberian parties’.60 François Mitterrand in his opening speech pointed out that the Conference should not be seen as evidence of divergence between northern and southern European Socialist parties but as a forum to study problems common to south European Socialist parties. The following four reports were discussed: (i) the place of southern Europe in world policy; (ii) European Socialism and the crisis of capitalism; (iii) the strengthening of democracy in Europe by Socialism; (iv) the co-ordination of actions between left-wing forces in Europe. In his intervention, Felipe González emphasised the significance of the construction of a democratic and Socialist Europe. This could not only act as a guarantee against the division of the world into areas of influence, but could also act as a bridge for communication with all countries, including those in the Third World, which were attempting to construct a Socialist society.61

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He considered it necessary that there should be a compromise between all the political forces, which wished to bring about a democratic rupture, because the left could and should play an important role. The resolution on Spain, adopted by the Conference, considered the PSOE to be the axis of the construction of Socialism in Spain and supported the efforts of the PSOE to unify democratic forces within Spain. At the same time, it emphasised opposition to Spanish entry into the European Community,62 either as a full or as an associate member, as long as there was no genuine democracy in Spain. Additionally, it supported the opposition of the PSOE to the signature of a new agreement between Spain and the United States for the use of military bases. The Conference was an example of public solidarity with the PSOE, in line with the SI’s policy. The Second Conference of Southern European Socialist Parties took place in Madrid in May 1977. This time it was agreed that the cooperation between Southern European Socialist parties was part of the SI’s global policy. In 1974 the PSU (Unified Socialist Party) became part of the PS. The fact that Michel Rocard, leader of the PSU, had established very close links with the CFDT helped the UGT. On 25 February 1975 a delegation of the UGT met in Paris with members of the CFDT. The delegation of the CFDT was composed of Rener Salanne, member of the Executive Committee, Jacques Chereque, General Secretary of the Metal Workers’ Federation, Jean Bourhis, members of the Metal Workers’ Federation and Pierre Evain, member of the International. The aim of the visit was to discuss the political situation in Spain and its possible evolution. Both delegations agreed to keep in contact in the future and to develop further cooperation.63 Another example of that close cooperation between CFDT and the UGT took place at the beginning of 1976. On 27 January–8 February 1976 a delegation of the CFDT visited Spain. The delegation had conversations in Barcelona, Murcia, Sevilla, La Coruña, El Ferrol and Oviedo with representatives of the UGT and the USO. The general impression of the situation in Spain was very positive. Following this visit, the CFDT proposed a new meeting between the CFDT and the UGT.64 Conclusions The French Socialists, like other European Socialist parties and trade unions, followed the two categories of actions: (i) they gave moral and material support to the PSOE/UGT and helped with the propaganda activity of the Spanish Socialists – for instance, they helped with the publication and distribution of the newspaper El Socialista and loaned the use of the SFIO’s offices in Toulouse as headquarters; (ii) like the


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Socialist group in the European Parliament, the FO managed to maintain awareness of the authoritarian nature of the Franco regime. The FO put pressure on its own government to limit the French government’s friendly relations with Franco’s Spain. With these actions the French Socialists contributed to establishing a network between the PSOE/UGT and other European Socialist parties and trade unions which was crucial for the future of Spanish Socialism. The existence of that European network was the base for future political, economic and ideological influence, mainly British and German, on the Spanish Socialist movement. Leaders of the PSF such as Bernard Montainer, Robert Pontillon and Gaston Defferre supported the recognition of the PSOE of Felipe González by the SI in 1974. However, the close relationship between Mitterrand and Carrillo and Tierno Galván created confusion among the Spanish Socialists. It could be argued that the ill-defined position of the French Socialist Party regarding Spanish Socialism reinforced the close cooperation between the Social-Democratic leader Willy Brandt and Felipe González. Felipe González said the following about the French Socialists: The French Socialists had the biggest interest in seeing close co-operation between Socialists and Communists similar to the French one because that would reinforce their position. On the contrary, from the international policy’s viewpoint and the internal policy of Socialism that image turned out to be detrimental to Northern European Socialism.65 The hopes of Mitterrand for the Union of the Left were never realised in Spain. As it has been argued, circumstances made the PSOE closer to their German Social Democratic colleagues than to their French counterparts. It could be argued that the French role was rather reactive and internal but indispensable.

6

The German Socialists 1960–77

During the 1960s, because of the emigration of thousands of Spanish workers to Germany, the PSOE and the UGT established closer links with the Sozialdemokratische Partie Deutschlands (SPD) or Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) or German Trade Union Federation of the Federal Republic of Germany. It should be borne in mind that most German union officials were Social Democrats or sympathised with the party.1 In this chapter we will find prominent members of the SPD who were also working for the trade unions – for instance Hans Matthöfer. Therefore, it is appropriate to study both the SPD and the DGB together. The purpose of the first part of the chapter is to assess the involvement of the German Socialists in Spanish issues from 1960, the year in which the massive emigration of Spanish workers to Germany started, to 1968, the year in which the German unions changed their policy towards the Spanish unions. It will identify the issues which they were particularly concerned about, evaluate the importance of these links, and assess what the Spanish Socialists achieved through them. It will discuss how and why the IG Metall took an independent line from the DGB, supporting the ASO instead of the UGT. Differences of opinion about the right way forward in Spain were resolved in 1968 in favour of the UGT. During this period, the SPD was in opposition until 1966, when it joined a coalition government. Previously, after the 1961 elections, the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU-CSU) had lost its majority, and Konrad Adenauer held power in a coalition government with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). In October 1963, Ludwig Erhard, former Economics Minister, succeeded Adenauer as Chancellor of the Federal Republic. After the 1965 elections, Erhard continued as Chancellor in alliance with the FDP. In 1966, the FDP left the coalition because it opposed tax increases. In 138

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December 1966, the ‘Grand Coalition’ of the CDU-CSU and the SPD was established under Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt.

1960–68 Organisation of the Spanish Workers in Germany by the DGB–UGT In 1949, the DGB was constituted in Munich, gathering together 16 industrial unions. The individual unions are autonomous and independent, that is, they have their own rules, manage their own finances, and formulate their own policy guide lines at their own congresses.2 The biggest national industrial union is the IG Metall or Metalworkers’ Union. Before 1960, on several occasions the DGB had expressed its concern about the progressive normalisation of relations between Franco’s Spain and the democratic world. The DGB always disapproved of the involvement of the German government in diplomatic relations with Spain. For example, in 1955 the DGB had protested against the cultural agreement signed between Spain and Germany on 10 December 1954 which promoted reciprocal cultural collaboration through the circulation of books and journals and the promotion of exhibitions, concerts and radio and TV broadcasts.3 In the 1960s, the DGB had the chance of becoming more closely acquainted with the situation inside Spain. The implementation of the Spanish Stabilisation Plan of 1959, which aimed to liberalise and modernise the economy, forced many Spanish workers out of work. This, together with structural problems in the agricultural sector in Southern Spain and a bad agricultural year in 1959, induced the Spanish government to promote the emigration of workers to Europe.4 Some European countries suffered from a labour shortage as a consequence of an imbalance between economic development and the demographic evolution experienced after the Second World War. Several emigration agreements were signed between Spain and other European countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, Holland and Austria.5 After the agreement signed between the Spanish and German governments on emigration on 29 March 1960, a substantial number of Spanish workers emigrated to Germany, and there were about 100,000 there by the end of 1962. This large number of workers needed to be organised. The UGT took this opportunity to spread Socialist ideas among the emigrant workers and to gain new members. The lack of exiled UGT members in

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Germany, unlike France or Belgium, prompted the UGT to ask the German trade unions to help to create UGT sections in Germany.6 In 1960, the attitude of the DGB to the Spanish workers in Germany was rather passive, showing a lack of interest. The DGB’s position was expressed by Ludwig Rosenberg, President of the DGB, in a letter to the UGT Executive Committee. The DGB did not see any possibility of organising the 6,000 workers scattered all over the country at that time. Instead, the DGB proposed to help the trade unionists belonging to the UGT in prison in Spain and their families through the International Solidarity Fund of the ICFTU.7 The UGT was dissatisfied with this course of action, and it was disappointed at the lack of support from the DGB. It discovered later that the DGB took the view that no action was needed until the number of Spanish workers was considerably greater. The same year, following the agreement between the Spanish and the German governments, the number of workers who intended to work in Germany rose to around 25,000, mainly metalworkers, and in the UGT’s view these workers had to be organised. The UGT’s plan was to create sections of the UGT or, as an alternative, union groups of the UGT within the DGB.8 Even the ICFTU shared the UGT’s view on this question. It thought that this issue should be discussed by the UGT, the ICFTU and the DGB, along with the intervention of the IG Metall.9 In the meantime the UGT waited for the DGB’s reply on how to organise the workers in Germany. In fact, they could have organised only very few by themselves and they expected the unions in the DGB to do it for them.10 The Executive Committee of the UGT considered it necessary to organise the emigrant Spanish workers as soon as possible.11 In addition to the organisation of the Spanish workers in Germany, the UGT was concerned about the favourable attitude of the German government towards Spain. That concern was expressed to the SPD by Pascual Tomás. Tomás, General Secretary of the UGT and representative of the ICFTU, and Jesus Insausti, representative of the IFCTU, had a meeting with representatives of the DGB on 1 August 1961 and with members of the SPD on 2 August 1961 (Erich Ollenhauer, SPD President, Herbert Wehner, Vice-president, Günter Markscheffel, head of the press section and Hans Dingels of the International Department). Tomás asked for a change in Germany’s attitude towards Spain. Ollenhauer explained that this was a difficult matter as none of the European governments which were conservative was against Franco. In his view, it was necessary to convince German public opinion that Franco had fought not just against Communism but also against democracy. The big problem in Germany was that, in the eyes of the public, to be against Franco was to be pro-


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Communist. To this, the Vice-President added that it would be very useful to demonstrate to public opinion that in Spain there was an opposition composed of Socialists, other leftists and also Catholics. He added that among German Socialists there persisted a strong hostility towards Franco, but it was a pity that they lacked information about the current situation in Spain. He was interested to know about the performance of the Communists in Spain. He was willing to declare against the Franco regime publicly, and promised that the SPD was willing to support Spanish democracy.12 In March 1962, the number of Spanish workers registered at the employment office in Germany was 74,431, by mid-1962, it had risen to 87,100, and by the end of 1962, it stood at 94,000.13 The German trade unions, however, still did not have a clear idea of how to organise the Spanish workers. Manuel Muiño, as representative of the Executive Committee of the UGT in exile, visited Frankfurt on 23–25 March 1962. The aim of the visit was twofold: on the one hand, to examine the work that needed to be carried out to achieve the association of Spanish workers with the unions of the DGB, and on the other, to study the methods that could be implemented in Germany to spread information among the workers about the UGT.14 Muiño met a Spanish group affiliated to the German trade unions and to the UGT, 15 together with Max Diamant, representative of the IG Metall. Max Diamant considered that the propaganda among Spanish workers should not be made in the name of the UGT but of the DGB, the IG Metall and other unions within the DGB, to invite them to be part of the DGB unions. Once they had joined, the UGT could then set about organising UGT sections, which could run the activities of the Spanish workers. The IG Metall considered that, mainly for legal reasons, the UGT should keep a low profile in Germany and work as a semi-clandestine organisation, because, if the UGT made public pronouncements, the foreign ministry in Bonn could forbid its work.16 It was agreed that all the Spanish workers should be affiliated to the DGB, to counteract the control exercised by the Spanish government through the embassy, the consulate and the casas de España (cultural centres).17 All the activities of the Spanish workers should be organised by the DGB, and specifically by the local and regional administrations.18 The IG Metall in favour of the ASO Meanwhile, the German Metalworkers’ Union was following an independent policy from the DGB. In Frankfurt, Manuel Fernández Montesinos, a member of the UGT, had very good relations with the IG Metall. The IG Metall was very active and gave outstanding help to this

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section with the publication of the UGT’s El Noticiero and Servicio de Prensa. Even though Montesinos was a member of the UGT, from October 1962 he also belonged to the ASO. The ASO, the organisation created in 1962 that pursued a controversial strategy of working within the structures of the official trade union, was supported by the IG Metall and the International. The strategy of the ASO was considered by important members of the IG Metall such as Hans Matthöfer, also an SPD Bundestag member, and Max Diamant, as the right policy to follow in Spain. They were mainly opposed to the creation of ideologically defined trade unions in Spain because of the danger that some would be Communist. In Matthöfer’s view, experience in Italy and France showed that the division of unions according to political ideology was detrimental to their effectiveness, whereas the German experience with a united and independent trade union movement had been positive.19 Another important member of both the ASO and the IG Metall was Carlos Pardo. Pardo worked for the Krupp company in Essen, where he was a shop steward. In 1965, the IG Metall moved him to Frankfurt to put him in charge of addressing the problems of all Spanish workers in Germany. He was also a member of the SPD. An example of the good relations that existed between Manuel Fernández Montesinos and IG Metall was the visit he paid to its Executive Committee in Frankfurt and to Adolphe Graedel, General Secretary of the International Metal Workers’ Federation in Switzerland. The main reason for these visits was to clarify the UGT’s position in relation to UGT funds allegedly set aside to sponsor the 1962 workers’ strikes in Spain.20 According to a letter sent by Antonio Amat, a member of the UGT living inside Spain, no funds were actually received by the workers. Montesinos believed this to be true for he recognised Amat as the true leader of the UGT and the PSOE inside Spain. It is not clear whether the UGT funds did reach Spanish workers, because the complexity of the network of distribution within Spain, and unsatisfactory accounting for funds, might have obscured their course.21 Be this as it may, Montesinos’ visits were badly received by the UGT which reacted strongly against these allegations, taking disciplinary action against Montesinos. The Executive Committee of the UGT refused to send him as the assistant to the UGT’s delegate to the Congress of the ICFTU, and it also decided to study his behaviour to see what it should do.22 The UGT was put in a difficult position vis-à-vis the IG Metall and the International Metal Workers’ Federation. In January 1963, Montesinos, while visiting Toulouse, accepted responsibility for this problem. He declared that he was in favour of discipline and that he wanted to work


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loyally in support of the UGT.23 Later, however, the UGT, through Manuel Simón, found out that he had split from the UGT and had joined the SPD and was working for the ASO.24 The IG Metall was not satisfied with the activity of the UGT among Spanish workers in Germany, preferring that immigrant workers should join the German unions. Relations between the UGT and the IG Metall were tense. A letter of complaint was sent by Diamant to Adolfo Llopis Brave, a member of the UGT living in Düsseldorf, in August 1962. On the one hand, Max Diamant, who attended the VIII Congress of the UGT in Paris the same month, was surprised at the fact that the trade union action of the 150,000 Spanish workers in Europe went unnoticed at the Congress. On the other, Diamant complained to Adolfo Llopis that members of the Executive Committee of the UGT in Toulouse did not mention a word, either in publications or in the UGT Congress, about the speech of Otto Brenner, General Secretary of the IG Metall, on the Spanish problem and the relations between Spain and the EEC which was delivered at the Congress of the ICFTU in Berlin in July 1962.25 Adolfo Llopis, in a letter to Max Diamant, tried to excuse the passive attitude of the leaders in Toulouse with respect to the activities of Spanish residents in Germany. In Diamant’s view, members of the UGT in exile should pay more attention to the Spanish workers in Germany. As an example of their negligence, he mentioned that the group in Essen sent a letter to the UGT in exile (in Toulouse), but had not received any reply after two months.26 In consequence, in September 1962, the Executive Committee of the UGT decided to reorganise and widen Socialist activities among the Spanish workers in Germany. This plan, in its view, could not be elaborated until it could exchange ideas with the DGB and the IG Metall.27 The opportunity to meet the DGB arose very soon. Following an invitation from the DGB, Pascual Tomás, Miguel Armentia Juvete and Adolfo Llopis Brave attended the Congress of the DGB in Hannover on 21–27 October 1962. The presence of the UGT delegation was not acknowledged at the opening session because the federal government and the DGB agreed to prevent any action that might endanger or stop the flow of Spanish workers to Germany. It was thought that if the UGT’s presence was mentioned the number of workers would not be allowed to keep increasing beyond the current level of something over 100,000. The Congress was an opportunity for the UGT and the DGB to meet and to establish a common plan of action for Spanish workers with a view to increasing their interest in free unionism, both German and Spanish.28 The Congress adopted a resolution on Spain which declared its solidarity with the Spanish workers in their fight for freedom and protested

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energetically against their oppression by the Franco regime. Furthermore, the resolution claimed that economic links between the German government and the Franco regime strengthened Spanish Fascism.29 Members of the UGT in Germany were dissatisfied at the lack of direct contact with the organisation in exile. For instance, members of the UGT in Cologne found out about Pascual Tomás’ visit to Cologne on 27 and 28 October 1962 through Adolfo Llopis and not through an official communication.30 In January 1963, the Cologne section sent a letter to all the sections of the UGT in Germany to set up a meeting to create a federation. Following the advice of the Executive Committee of the UGT in exile, members of the Hanover and Stuttgart sections did not attend. The Federación de la UGT en Alemania (FUGTA) was set up, and Carlos Pardo, from Essen, Castells from Cologne and Manuel Fernández Montesinos from Frankfurt were elected secretaries. The UGT in exile was opposed to the establishment of this organisation, on the grounds that it might diminish its direct control over the position of Spanish workers in Germany. As a result of this disapproval, on 15 March 1965 the FUGTA was dissolved, and the representatives of the UGT sections in Germany created instead the Comité Coordinador (Co-ordinating Committee). During the short political life of the FUGTA there was a clear conflict between the Executive Committee in exile and members of the UGT in Germany who were also members of the ASO. Members of the FUGTA like Carlos Pardo considered that the exiles were out of touch with Spanish reality. This was precisely the view taken by the IG Metall.31 In 1963 the UGT in exile was still waiting for the reply of Rosenberg, the DGB President, as to how to organise the workers in Germany. Pascual Tomás had conversations with members of the DGB. The DGB argued that they were still waiting for 100,000 more Spanish workers to come to Germany, and that they would then work intensively.32 During 1963, the activity of the UGT in Germany was rather subdued33 and there were few sections. The Executive Committee of the UGT decided to intensify its propaganda among the Spanish workers in co-ordination with the Spanish militants in Germany and with the DGB. In the meantime, members of the ASO inside Spain contacted the IG Metall. In April 1964, Spanish members of the ASO who had worked in Germany sent a letter from Spain to Otto Brenner, President of the IG Metall, asking for solidarity with the Spanish workers who were fighting in Spain for their rights. They referred to the confrontations between the police and trade unionists after the Congress of the Spanish official trade unions. The letter emphasised that the basis for a democratic and free trade union existed in Spain and that this was the ASO.34 This information


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appeared in the Servicio de Prensa. In response, the Executive Committee of the UGT insisted to the IG Metall that the ASO was practically nonexistent in Spain and was creating confusion among the Spanish metalworkers, rather than helping to strengthen the fight against the Franco regime.35 The SPD’s encounter with the Spanish reality The PSOE was also in touch during the 1960s with the SPD. It was a Socialist, Willi Birkelbach, who had presented the report to the European Parliament which established democratic government as the criterion for association with the EEC. Birkelbach, and Peter Blachstein, attended the IX Congress of the PSOE in August 1964 in Toulouse. Both were very impressed by the activities of the PSOE, and in their reports to the SPD expressed admiration for what the PSOE was doing both inside and outside Spain.36 Rodolfo Llopis, General Secretary of the PSOE, was grateful to Blachstein for attending the Congress and for informing the SPD about the situation inside Spain. During the Congress the PSOE realised that there were two main necessities: one was to intensify political work amongst younger people and the second was to increase its activities both inside and outside Spain. The PSOE needed some financial help to organise the party and appealed for help to the ICFTU. On 28 August Rodolfo Llopis and Pascual Tomás met Albert Carthy, General Secretary of the Socialist International, and Omar Becú, General Secretary of the ICFTU, in Brussels to discuss the future of the PSOE. However, Carthy could not provide the necessary financial assistance. Later, Hans Dingels, International Secretary of the SPD, invited Llopis to meet some members of the SPD on 5 September, on the occasion of the celebration of the centenary of the Socialist International in Brussels, without mentioning the needs of the Spanish Socialist Party. At the end of September 1964, Llopis contacted Peter Blachstein. In a very extensive letter, he informed him about the financial difficulties that the PSOE was experiencing and how the SFIO (the French Socialist Party) was incapable of providing the necessary help.37 This time the request was successful, and the SPD decided to help the PSOE. As a first step, the PSOE would need an analysis of the current situation in Spain and accordingly Llopis was invited to attend the SPD’s Karlsruhe Congress (22–27 November 1964). In an interview with SPD member, Herbert Wehner, Alfred Nau, the International Secretary of the SPD, Hans Eberhard Dingels and Alexander Kohn-Branbenburg, translator,38 the situation in Spain and the situation of the party were examined, and a plan to assist the PSOE was presented by the PSOE’s

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Executive Committee.39 Llopis argued that this was a very delicate moment as the regime was in a period of transition, although it was difficult to establish where this transition was leading. Therefore, it was necessary to intensify the work inside and outside Spain. Llopis explained that to work inside Spain, the UGT had given the PSOE some financial help but that this was not enough for the education of militants through seminars and propaganda. Some further help was essential.40 Wehner announced that the PSOE would receive immediately DM10,000. Further assistance would be decided at a meeting which would take place in midDecember. Also, the SPD would help to hold seminars for the education of militants and would contribute to the cost of publications.41 During the meeting of 15 December, the SPD’s contribution of DM10,000 was approved, together with other projects such as seminars and publications. Alfred Nau informed Llopis that at the next meeting of the financial commission of the Socialist International, which would take place in February in London, he would propose that the SI or some other European Socialist parties should also send financial assistance to the PSOE. Llopis was very sceptical about this proposition.42 At this time of closer relations between the SPD and the PSOE, the German government was in favour of Spain’s proposed entry into the EEC. As a result, the UGT expressed its grave concern. In January 1965, during a meeting between Pascual Tomás and members of the Executive Committee of the DGB, the General Secretary of the UGT argued that the German government should not give any support to the government of Franco. The DGB replied that it could not change the German government’s foreign policy towards Spain, pointing out that the DGB was not in a position to influence the governing CDU. Rosenberg affirmed that the DGB was totally opposed to Spain’s entry into the EEC, and claimed that the British TUC was less hostile in its attitude. He said that he would try to persuade British trade unionists to adopt the same criteria as the DGB, and the ICFTU. Rosenberg also said that German diplomats considered that the right policy to follow was to establish political links with the Spanish government. As a result, the Spanish government would liberalise the country gradually, and as the Executive Committee minutes stated: ‘to shift from a dictatorship to a completely different situation overnight would provoke a convulsion’.43 The visit of the Vice-President of the SPD to Spain In the meantime in Spain, in February 1965, university students and workers demonstrated openly against Franco. These confrontations created a situation of social tension. For this reason, Fritz Erler, the first


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Vice-President of the SPD, who had been invited to visit Spain by some universities in February, postponed his trip until April. The PSOE reacted strongly against this invitation. At the Karlsruhe Congress in November 1964, Rodolfo Llopis learnt that Erler had been invited by the universities of Madrid and Pamplona to explain the Bad Godesberg programme adopted by the SPD in 1959.44 Llopis warned Erler that his trip to Spain would cause a very bad impression among Spanish democrats and that it was not advisable. Llopis pointed out that Spanish Socialists and democrats could not understand the attitude of Germany towards the Franco regime and how Konrad Adenauer, a Christian Democrat, could have good relations with Franco.45 On 1 April 1965, the announcement of Erler’s visit was made by the Spanish government. In a letter to Erler, Llopis asked him to cancel his trip. In his view, this was the worst moment to go to Spain because Franco would make use of the visit against the opposition, especially after the university demonstrations of February.46 However, the SPD wanted to learn more about the Spanish political situation, and to make contact with the opposition inside Spain. Therefore, Erler ignored the request made by the PSOE. On 5 April, Erler gave a lecture at the Instituto Nacional de Estudios Jurídicos about the history of the SPD, the Godesberg programme, democracy, and the role of the opposition within it. He had interviews with members of the Spanish government including José Solís, Minister of the Syndicates. On the subject of this interview, Erler declared at the airport that he had found basic differences between Spain and Germany where freedom was concerned and criticised Spanish syndical organisation. He argued that the syndicates should be independent from the state and from companies, so that they could defend the rights of the workers as unions did elsewhere in Western Europe.47 Erler also had a meeting with members of the ASO. These members considered that the visit, and the criticisms made against the Spanish syndicates and the political structure, were a brave act of solidarity with Spanish workers. On his return, in a letter to Llopis, Erler tried to justify his visit. He argued that it had not been exploited by the Spanish government, because the German and Spanish press had fully reproduced the democratic and Socialist ideas that he had expounded in Madrid. In addition to that, he made clear that Spain could not become a member of the EEC until it was a true democratic country.48 In support of Erler’s view, Hans Dingels indicated in an article in the Servicio de Prensa that his presence in Spain had contributed to fostering the activities of the democratic forces there.49 Despite the explanation offered by Erler and Dingels, Llopis replied that Erler had gone to Madrid at the invitation of a Fascist government. In

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his view, the Spanish government had exploited his visit because the Spanish press had renewed the campaign against the PSOE to demonstrate that there were two distinct kinds of Socialism and Socialists: a civilised Socialism represented by the Germans and a fanatical one represented by the Spanish.50 Other members of the democratic opposition such as the Socialist Enrique Tierno Galván approved of Erler’s visit. Tierno Galván, in a letter to the SPD, wrote that the visit had been important and profitable for the democratic opposition and expressed his willingness to establish closer links with the SPD.51 Tierno had other reasons to consider the visit a success. Erler had declared that he was deeply impressed by Tierno Galván’s personality and humanity, and praised his courage and intelligence.52 Later, in 1967, Tierno Galván was invited by the SPD to visit Germany. Erler’s visit revealed a division of opinion inside the Spanish opposition. According to the old Socialists in exile like Rodolfo Llopis, it was a betrayal of their fight against Franco. In the opinion of the younger generation, however, the presence of European politicians could help Spanish democrats to achieve more freedom, because, if Erler could talk about the Godesberg programme in Madrid, it would soon be possible for them to speak about the same issues in public. Erler’s visit reinforced the SPD’s awareness that the Spanish political situation was still very far removed from the situation in Western democracies. Spain at the centre of the debate for German Social Democrats In the same year as Erler’s visit, the situation of the Spanish workers in Germany was beginning to be discussed in the German Parliament. Hans Matthöfer asked the German government in Parliament in January 1965 to explain about a Fascist weekly periodical called ‘7 Fechas’. This was published in Cologne in its German edition and was allegedly subsidised with federal money, and criticised the support given to the Spanish workers in Germany by the DGB. The sub-secretary of the Social Minister, Clausen, replied by quoting the Constitutional Law (Article 9, paragraph 3) in which the right of association of workers, both foreigners and German nationals, were guaranteed.53 Following this intervention, the subsidies of the publications were stopped immediately.54 In November 1965, Spain was again at the centre of debate for the German Social Democrats. On 10 November a conversation took place in Düsseldorf among members of the DGB and the SPD about the Spanish problem. The aim of the discussion was to exchange information and opinions to avoid any disparity of actions taken in the international


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organisations relative to the Spanish problem. The SPD’s view was presented by Hans Dingels, who argued that, despite the economic and cultural liberalisation in Spain, the political situation remained the same. He added that the Franco regime was aware that Christian-democratic and Social-democratic ideologies had many followers among the Spanish people. For this reason, the Spanish government was creating groups which expressed these views, but controlled and led by the authorities. Among such groups created by the government he listed: Nueva Economía, the ASO, and the Federación Universitaria Democrática Española (FUDE). Regarding the PSOE and the UGT, Dingels expressed full support for them when he affirmed that they were the only forces which the SPD could seriously consider because these organisations had a clear line and had available a very reliable and efficient cadre of militants.55 Despite the visit made by Erler in April 1965, the SPD clearly seemed to be unfamiliar with the reality of affairs inside Spain. Indeed, the SPD believed that the ASO was an organisation created by the Franco regime. Such an affirmation came as a complete surprise to DGB members, since Max Diamant had always talked favourably about the ASO and had recently informed the DGB about the detention of Manuel Fernández Montesinos and other members of the ASO by the Spanish authorities, accused of having attended the conference of the ICFTU in Amsterdam in the same year. The German Socialists were concerned about the division among the Spanish Socialists and wanted to know the reason for it. Adolfo Llopis Brave, a UGT member, attempted to explain the situation as far as the unions were concerned by putting forward the argument of the ASO which stated that it was a unitary trade union, was more active than other groups and that its real leadership was in Spain. That view, however, was not completely shared by Llopis himself. He explained that the Alianza Sindical (AS), which was comprised of Socialist, anarchist and Basque groups, had been founded before the ASO, that the UGT had held conversations with its members inside Spain to organise a workers’ union, and that the leadership of the UGT had been in Spain previously, although it had been recently dismantled by the police. To this, he added that the ASO was willing to come to an agreement with the regime in exchange for certain freedoms in the labour sphere. For the UGT, this strategy threatened to ruin the future of the Spanish workers’ unions, potentially leaving Communist unions as the only genuine form of trade unionism. The Germans reached the conclusion that for the future of trade unionism in Spain there ought to be a unitary syndicalism. Indeed, in their view, the UGT and the ASO should reach an understanding. Otto Kersten, an

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IG Metall member, was willing to assume the role of mediator between the ASO and the UGT, and suggested a meeting with Pascual Tomás, General Secretary of the UGT, at the next session of the Executive Committee of the ICFTU.56 Following this discussion, the UGT sought to find out more about the support that the ASO was receiving from the IG Metall in order to decide on counter-measures. Accordingly, Miguel Armentia Juvete, following the advice of the Executive Committee of the UGT, went to Germany on 4–9 December 1965 to meet with members of several sections of the UGT. On 4 December Armentia held a meeting with Pablo Schalmey who was a personal friend of Otto Brenner, President of the IG Metall. Schalmey explained that Brenner had doubts concerning the ASO.57 Schalmey had tried to convince him that help should be redirected to the UGT. One of the reasons for Brenner’s confusion about the ASO was that Adolphe Graedel’s work with respect to the ASO was backed by two members of the UGT (Sánchez Mazas and Ossorio) who were working for the International Metal Workers’ Federation. The UGT had not taken any action to expel those members. Following this conversation, the UGT realised that Brenner was a key factor in the process of obtaining support from the IG Metall and that Max Diamant, an IG Metall member who had always been a supporter of the ASO, would follow whatever Brenner might say about Spain.58 Armentia discovered that the ASO was only active in Frankfurt, with a few members, and practically non-existent in other parts of the country. He was convinced that the organisation would disappear as soon as the IG Metall support ceased. The DGB solidarity with the UGT: the Bad Nauheim Conference The UGT’s Co-ordination Committee and the Committee of the UGT in Frankfurt decided to prepare a conference of all the sections in Germany. This was the result of the discussion of Spanish issues that took place between the SPD and the DGB on 10 November 1965. The UGT would exploit the opportunity of the Conference to present information to the DGB about the work of the UGT in Germany. After the Conference, a report would be sent to the DGB about the sections of the UGT in Germany, emphasising that they had a good number of affiliates and that they were very active. Therefore, a representative of the DGB should attend the Conference. For the UGT, this seemed the right moment to terminate the support given to the ASO by the IG Metall, and that could only be achieved when they could convince Otto Brenner. The Conference took place in Bad Nauheim (Hessen) on 26–27 February 1966 and it was attended by the Co-ordination Committee of the sections


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in Germany, representatives of the sections in Ahlen, Bonn, Duisburg, Düsseldorf, Esslingen, Frankfurt, Hildesheim, Kassel, Stuttgart and Weinheim, delegations from Hamburg and Hannover, and representatives of the direct affiliates of Balingen, Bremen, Munchen, Schweinfurt, Heidenheim and Mainstockheim. Miguel Armentia and Mariano Rojo represented the Executive Committee of the UGT, and De Hann represented the DGB along with Kuno Brandel, of the construction union, Lutz Gosepath, of the communications union, Weimer and Lozano, Schalmey, Ocko Forcan and Werner from the regional organisation of Frankfurt. The IG Metall was not present. The Conference was a good moment to present to the representatives of the DGB, and to the German organisation in general, the strength, the extent and the activities of the UGT in Germany. The Conference produced a very good impression among the DGB members.59 De Hann, impressed by the presence of so many UGT delegations in Germany, expressed the solidarity of the DGB with the UGT. Despite the attempts at liberalisation of Franco’s regime, such as the change in strike legislation, the DGB announced that the German trade unions would not recognise Franco’s regime and were against the entry of Spain into the EEC. Armentia opposed the attitude of certain leaders of the IG Metall who were in favour of a ‘ pseudo-syndical’ organisation, the ASO. He also pointed out that the German trade union model was not applicable in the case of Spain. To this, De Hann replied for the DGB that the only organisation that could get his support was the UGT.60 The Conference adopted the following resolution: We remind our German colleagues that the best way of approaching the Spanish worker in Germany is giving support to the Spanish free syndical organisation, the General Workers’ Union. The UGT also complained to the Executive Committee of the DGB that the IG Metall had been giving support and protection to the ASO, in their view a pseudo-organisation which was not at all representative, and that had been to the detriment of the UGT. Accordingly, that attitude should change.61 It was agreed that, after the Conference, the second part of UGT’s strategy would be the visit of the General Secretaries of the UGT and the PSOE to the President of the DGB, Ludwig Rosenberg, the President of the IG Metall, Otto Brenner, and to the leaders of the SPD in Frankfurt. The visit to the SPD was justified for the following reasons: first, because the ASO was trying to change its name to the Agrupación Socialista Española Dentro del SPD (the Spanish Socialist organisation within the SPD) and therefore would create confusion, and second, because a deputy of the

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SPD from Hessen (Frankfurt), Hans Matthöfer, was giving support to the ASO. At the Conference, verbal support had been expressed in favour of the UGT by the majority of the representatives present, among them those of the DGB. However, at the meeting of the DGB Commission on foreign labour aid for development on 20 July 1966, the DGB Chairman Ludwig Rosenberg expressed rather different views. Referring to the session of the Executive Committee of the ICFTU which had taken place on 28–30 June 1966, he said that the UGT in exile was meaningless to the Spanish people and that the opposition forces within Spain took a different shape from the groups in exile. As far as the session of the ICFTU was concerned, it was decided that the ICFTU would carry on with the policy of not giving concessions to the Franco regime. In addition it was decided that an ICFTU delegation should be sent to Spain. Max Diamant, who agreed with the statement made by Rosenberg, made a pronouncement against any collaboration with the UGT.62 In August 1966 the ICFTU appeared to adopt two different positions vis-à-vis the UGT in exile. On the one hand, the apparent official position was expressed by Omar Becú, President of the ICFTU, who stated that the organisations in exile were not valid because they had lost touch with their own country and that it was necessary to look for alternative ways forward.63 On the other hand, a confidential report sent by the ICFTU to the DGB on the syndical situation in Spain did not include any unfavourable remarks about the UGT.64 This shows, yet again, the complexity of the situation, and the confusion of the international and foreign organisations when trying to identify the group most likely to succeed in Spain. The IG Metall endorsing ASO’s strategy The IG Metall’s absence from the February Conference of the UGT seems further evidence of its policy of support for the ASO. The first occasion on which the IG Metall publicly manifested this support was the trial of August 1966 when seven members of the ASO65 were tried by the Tribunal de Orden Público, accused of having attended the VIII Congress of the ICFTU66 in Amsterdam in 1965 and of having tried to organise free trade unions. The trial was condemned by the DGB, the IG Metall and the ICFTU. Several union leaders were refused permission to attend the trial as witnesses, among them Ludwig Rosenberg and the American union official, Victor Reuther. However, the IG Metall sent Hans Matthöfer, Head of the Education Department, to attend the trial. Later, the trial accepted Matthöfer as a witness for the defence.


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The ICFTU showed its interest in the trial by sending Marc de Kock as an observer and the Labour Party sent Francis Noel Baker. During the trial, both the accused and witnesses had the opportunity of attacking legislation which criminalised the organisation of syndicates outside the official movement, and expressing their views accordingly. As a witness, Matthöfer pronounced his conviction that the ASO was not in favour of any abrupt change. On the contrary, it sought a peaceful transformation of the Spanish syndicates into a free union association.67 With this declaration, the IG Metall publicly endorsed the strategy of the ASO. During the trial, the charge was based mainly on illegal propaganda and association. The sentences of the defendants, reduced respectively from 13 and 3 years to 6 and 4 months, were rather indulgent68 and that might well have been in response to the presence of international observers. The Spanish government hoped to create a good impression in Europe, at a time when Spain was trying to be part of the EEC and to establish contact with the ICFTU. After the trial, Matthöfer declared that the official Spanish trade unions could not be recognised by the international trade unions because they had an anti-democratic structure, gathering together workers and employers. Furthermore, the strategy carried out by the ASO was in his view realistic. This strategy consisted of the separation of workers’ and employers’ organisations; democratisation of the current trade unions, that is the election of all the officials from top to bottom; independence of the trade unions from the state, political parties and Church; and the right to strike. The opinion of Matthöfer was that the ASO’s view corresponded to the German idea of a trade union: a strong unitary union like the German or the British case.69 By contrast, Matthöfer opposed the creation of ideological trade unions in Spain. After his return, he stated in Frankfurt that ideological trade unions (Richtungsgewerkschaften) should not exist after the end of the Franco regime because such trade unions could be controlled by the Communists as in the Italian case.70 In order to find out more about the ASO trial, Heinz Richter, a member of the Executive Committee of the DGB, contacted Adolfo Llopis Brave. In Reichter’s view, the leniency of the sentences and the apparent fairness of the trial did not correspond with their understanding of the Franco regime. Moreover, the DGB was interested in clarifying the role played by the ASO in relation to the regime. The explanation given by Llopis stated that the ASO’s strategy was a betrayal because it wanted to reach an agreement with the government to neutralise the syndical question.

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That meant allowing Franco to introduce supposed democratisation in his own manner. The declarations of Matthöfer in favour of the ASO created great discomfort among UGT members. Miguel Armentia, Vice-President of the UGT, sent a letter to Otto Brenner in which the Socialists in exile enquired as to the meaning of the declarations.71 In his reply, Brenner stated that the general opinion of the DGB was that the main strategy to follow, after Franco’s death, was not to take part in the restoration of ideological trade unions but to support a free and unitary trade union.72 Brenner explained that under the current circumstances in Spain, especially the crisis of erosion and weakening of the Franco regime, and the worsening of social differences, the declaration of several syndical groups in favour of free ‘European type’ unitary trade unions could have a great effect on the mobilisation of the Spanish proletariat. Brenner tried to convince Armentia that the UGT could play a leading role in the movement in favour of unitary trade unions in Spain because of the historic importance and glorious name of the UGT and he concluded by saying that: ‘We could never forget that the UGT was and is our intimate friend.’73 In September 1966, Ludwig Rosenberg, the DGB Chairman, sent a memorandum on the syndical situation in Spain to members of the DGB, IG Metall and other trade unions.74 The memorandum was about the Alianza Sindical which included the UGT, the CNT and STV; the ASO, the CC.OO, and the joint Committee of the ICFTU for Spain. Rosenberg proposed a meeting to discuss the Spanish syndical problem and to draft conclusions which would be sent to the Executive Committee of the DGB to be discussed.75 Inspired by Rosenberg, members of the DGB created the Spain Commission which elaborated the conclusions which would be studied by the Executive Committee of the DGB. The first meeting of members76 of the Spain Commission took place on 28 October 1966 in Düsseldorf. After a long discussion on Spain and the Spanish labour movement, the Commission arrived at the conclusion that, considering several aspects of the evolution initiated with the strikes of 1962 and 1963, the German labour movement should back without reserve the consolidation of a democratic, independent and unitary trade union in Spain. The DGB suggested that the UGT, a member of the ICFTU, should head the efforts which would lead to the creation of a unitary trade union.77 In addition to that, the Commission recommended that a delegation from the ICFTU should visit Spain soon and that it should include a representative of the DGB. Although some members of the DGB showed their support for the UGT, the DGB still needed to clarify its understanding of the current position


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of the Spanish trade unions. Max Diamant was asked by the DGB to explain his views on the problem. He expressed his view at the Commission for ‘Foreign Workers’ that met on 27 October 1966.78 He gave a short historical review and said that the Asturian strikes in 1962 had initiated a new phase, involving new means of struggle different from the one followed by the UGT. Indeed, accusations were made against Adolfo Llopis Brave and the UGT. Diamant argued that Llopis was a pluralist syndicalist and, by contrast, the DGB was a ‘unitary trade union’. Moreover, Diamant claimed that, because of Llopis, the Spanish circles in Germany had fallen under Communist control because the division of the Socialists enabled the Communists to make the most of the situation. Llopis, who attended the session, defended himself. Heinz Richter, a member of the DGB, rejected all the accusations made by Diamant and showed his solidarity with the UGT because, for him, it was an organisation with a clear policy. Diamant was told that, instead of attacking the UGT, he should explain his alternative and talk about the ASO and the CC.OO. Nevertheless, he remained silent on these matters and stood by his reproaches against Adolfo Llopis Brave.79 On 31 October 1966, the Servicio de Prensa published a letter written by Hans Matthöfer on the Spanish syndical situation.80 Firstly, Matthöfer distinguished two fundamental positions on the future of the trade unions in Spain, giving an account of the points of view of, on the one hand, the UGT and on the other the CC.OO and the ASO. For Matthöfer, the UGT’s aim was that after Franco’s regime had been overthrown, the official syndical organisation (CNS) should be managed by a committee comprised of representatives of the ideological trade unions, such as the UGT, CNT and STV as well as Communists and Falangists. Afterwards, unity should be established. As far as the CC.OO and the ASO were concerned, all the employees should abandon the official syndicates to set up a real organisation for workers. They contemplated a peaceful transformation of the CNS. The organisation should be independent and have a democratic structure. Matthöfer added that German labour did not want to see a division of the union organisation in Spain, because the Communists would take control in such circumstances, as in the case of France and Italy. Therefore, the UGT should head the movement for syndical unity.81 Matthöfer criticised the UGT because it did not appreciate the desire for unity of the Spanish workers. It was in the process of being reduced to being a spectator for events in Spain, leaving the field open for anti-democratic forces.

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It was evident that fear of Communism was the driving force behind many of the criticisms of the UGT. Meanwhile, circumstances in Spain were far from static. During 1966, the influence and prestige of the ASO, inside and outside Spain, declined. This was due to the repression, the consolidation of the CC.OO, disagreements with other forces that comprised the alliance such as the MSC, and the counter-offensive from the UGT.82 Adolphe Graedel, General Secretary of the International Metal Workers’ Federation, recognised that it had made a mistake in supporting the ASO.83 In an interview with Pablo Schalmey in Geneva on 26 September 1966, Graedel argued that the reason why they had interrupted the support given to the UGT was because, after asking for information from the UGT and not having received it, they came to the conclusion that the UGT was inactive in Spain. Since then its activities within Spain had recovered.84 Schalmey asserted that members of the ASO had wrongly claimed to be members of the UGT and the PSOE, and that they were in very close contact with those organisations so as to receive support and international recognition. In September 1966, for the first time, syndical elections allowed the participation of semi-tolerated organisations such as the CC.OO and the ASO for the election of official trade union representatives. The results were very important. The CC.OO achieved an unexpected degree of success in this election and was then declared illegal in February 1967.85 On the other hand, the ASO achieved little success in the elections, and subsequently disappeared as an organisation in 1968. The ASO’s lack of support in Spain had been clearly revealed. After this, the IG Metall had no choice but to reconsider its policy towards the UGT. It is ironic that the Franco regime’s syndical policy had the effect of exposing the weakness of the ASO in a way that the UGT had so far been unable to do. On the party political front in 1968, after the earlier visit of Erler in 1965, Willy Brandt, Vice-Chancellor, Foreign Minister and President of the SPD, planned a visit to Madrid. The visit was announced by the Spanish press and that gave the PSOE the opportunity to contact the SPD. This was not the only time that Brandt had been invited to Spain. Previously, in 1964, the Spanish press had announced several times that Brandt, at that time Mayor of Berlin and President of the SPD, had been invited to inaugurate the Berlin Square in Madrid. The PSOE wrote to Brandt to say that his trip would be a major political mistake since the Mayor of Madrid, the Conde de Mayalde, had arrested several Socialist Party members like Zugazagoitia, Cruz Salido and Teodomiro Menéndez. That trip was, therefore, cancelled.86


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The cancellation of Willy Brandt’s visit to Madrid After the visit to Bonn made by Fernando María Castiella, the Spanish Foreign Minister, the German Foreign Minister Schröder was invited by his Spanish counterpart to Madrid. When Castiella renewed this invitation, Willy Brandt had became the new Foreign Minister. The German Chancellor, Georg Kurt Kiesinger, was planning to go to Spain and Portugal and wanted Brandt to accompany him. The Spanish press announced that Brandt had accepted the invitation to visit Spain on 23 March 1968. However, the announcement did not mention the existence of a cooperation agreement between Germany and Spain which implied an annual meeting – either in Bonn or in Madrid – to examine the problems between both countries.87 Instead of announcing Brandt’s visit within the framework of the cooperation agreement, the press emphasised that it was the first time that a president of a Socialist party would visit Madrid.88 At the Congress of Nuremberg on 17–21 March 1968, Llopis, who met Brandt and Hans Dingels, expressed the discomfort of the Socialists and their opposition to the visit, and explained how the Spanish press had already exploited it. Llopis pointed out that there were comments in the press which affirmed that the visit was the beginning of a new policy which would lead to the formation of a new Bonn–Paris–Madrid axis.89 After the Congress, Brandt argued that it was his duty to meet his Spanish colleague, and that the Spanish comrade should understand the duties of Socialist ministers when they were part of a coalition government. Llopis, however, insisted on the bad impression that the trip might cause to the opposition. Despite the explanation given by Willy Brandt about his commitment as a member of the government to the visit, he had already decided not to go to Spain, and that was confirmed by Pablo Schalmey who had talked to Dingels about the visit. On 27 March a telegram received at the German embassy in Madrid announced that Brandt’s visit had been postponed sine die. The fact that Brandt did not go showed the international support that the PSOE had for its cause. Later we will see how this support influenced the transition to democracy in the period between 1968 and 1977.

1969–77 After 1968, following the disappearance of the ASO from the scene, the DGB focused its support on the UGT in exile, while the SPD, at party level, continued to liaise with the PSOE and other Spanish Socialists. The

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second part of the chapter will analyse the interactions between them during the period 1969–77. This period saw significant changes both in Spain and Germany. In Spain’s case, there was a toughening of Franco’s regime against the opposition, not least in the state of emergency in 1969; the increasing interest of the Spanish government in becoming a member of the European Community; and ultimately, the most important event of the 1970s, Franco’s death in November 1975. During the same period, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the SPD came to power after the 1969 elections in a coalition government, with Willy Brandt (SPD) as Chancellor and Walter Scheel (FDP) as Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister. In 1972, the coalition government was re-elected for another term in government. In 1974 Brandt resigned as Chancellor, although he remained the SPD’s party Chairman. Helmut Schmidt succeeded Brandt as Chancellor, and was re-elected in 1976. This section will look at the support and help given by the SPD and the DGB to the PSOE and UGT respectively, to form an organised opposition party and free trade union. A key player in these relationships was Hans Matthöfer,90 member of the SPD and the IG Metall. It will emphasise his contribution to the general attitude of the DGB/SPD to Spain during this period. It will also illustrate the pressure exerted on the Spanish government by the SPD and the DGB in favour of the Spanish democrats, and its positive outcome – for instance in the ‘Pardo affair’ and the trip of Felipe González to Germany. Finally, following the international recognition of the PSOE(r) as the true Spanish Socialist Party, the chapter will assess the interest of the German Socialists in the leadership of Felipe González. In particular, attention will be paid to his relationship with Willy Brandt. German Socialists in favour of Spanish democratisation: solidarity with the Spanish Socialists After the ASO had disappeared in 1968, the DGB and the UGT consolidated their contacts by exchanging invitations. In July, Max Diamant was invited to take part in the X Congress of the UGT in exile from 31 July to 4 August in Toulouse. The UGT was invited by the IG Metall to attend its Congress which took place from 2 to 7 September in Munich. The Executive Committee of the UGT decided to send a member working inside Spain together with Adolfo Llopis Brave.91 The attitude of Hans Matthöfer towards the UGT and the ASO had changed. Although he had not forgotten his friends in the ASO, he did not favour them openly. Similarly, he did not criticise the members of the Executive of the UGT in Toulouse.


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In Spain, because of the growing strength of militant workers and Basque nationalists, the government repression was intensified after 1967. A state of emergency was first declared in the Basque country in 1968 and in the country as a whole in 1969 and 1970. As Maravall later pointed out: Repression against secret working-class organizations was intensified on three levels: dismissal from jobs, dismissal from the official posts of shop-floor representation (the jurados de empresa), and direct political sanctions through the Public Order Court.92 Under the state of emergency between 24 January to 25 March 1969, the Spanish Socialists suffered from this intensified repression. The IG Metall was not indifferent to these measures taken by the Spanish government, and the Executive Committee protested energetically. The ICFTU also expressed its concern about the situation of the Spanish opposition. Spanish workers in Germany meanwhile manifested their opposition through demonstrations in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt and Stuttgart. The state of emergency, together with the financial straits into which the party had fallen, forced the PSOE to seek assistance from its European colleagues. Llopis wrote two letters to Dingels asking for help, but no reply was received. Consequently, Llopis contacted Pablo Schalmey asking him to contact Dingels or any other member of the executive of the SPD.93 Pablo Schalmey, an old militant of the PSOE during the time he had spent in Spain as a refugee, then living in Frankfurt, was willing to collaborate with Llopis. The action taken by Schalmey had positive results: through Zschiesche, the official in charge of relations between the SPD and the unions, he managed to reach the SPD leadership and communicate Llopis’ plea.94 SPD funds were then mobilised for Llopis to attend the SPD Congress at Nuremberg, after having been congratulated on his birthday by telegram by the presidium of the SPD,95 Hans Dingels, and the Ebert Foundation. Financial assistance to the PSOE was also being organised to secure bail for Spanish prisoners96 and to help their families in response to Llopis’ further appeal.97 Dingels met Llopis at the SFIO Congress in Paris (marking the end of the old French Socialist Party). He confirmed that the SPD was collecting the money and would soon be able to send it. On 12 February 1969, during the state of emergency, the Spanish Minister of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, was awarded the Grand Cross of Merit (Das große Budesverdieustkreuz) by the German government.98 This gesture provoked the protests of SPD members. Hans Matthöfer asked the federal government in Parliament about the decoration, arguing that for those opposition members persecuted in Spain

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it could be understood as an intervention by the federal government in Spanish internal affairs in favour of the repressive forces. Matthöfer thought that such an award at that particular moment was an offence to the free labour movement. He added that if the position of the government was not to support Franco’s regime, then the government should make clear that it wished a democratisation of Spanish institutions.99 Clearly, the SPD would not tolerate public support for Franco’s regime by the German government. Hans Matthöfer made a reconnaissance trip to Barcelona from 14 to 16 March 1969 to gather information about the situation in Spain during the state of emergency. In Barcelona he held interviews with members of the opposition from different political backgrounds. Following his visit, he gave a press conference on 17 March 1969. He claimed that around 1,500 members of the opposition had been imprisoned in Spain, 200 in Barcelona and 600 in Madrid, under the state of emergency. Matthöfer asked the SPD and the DGB and its unions to help the democratic forces in Spain, arguing that as long as dictatorships remained in Spain, Greece and Portugal, democracy could not be assured for the rest of Europe. In his view, Spain should not be allowed to become a member of the EEC unless it went through a process of democratisation. In the correspondence between Pablo Schalmey and Miguel Armentia reporting Matthöfer’s press conference, there was no indication of the kind of help the DGB and the SPD should provide to the democratic forces in Spain. With respect to the PSOE and the UGT, Matthöfer underlined the efficiency of the work of both organisations, particularly in the North of Spain.100 In July, Matthöfer sent a letter of protest to the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn against the detention of Spanish trade unionists and the systematic persecution of those trying to claim the right to organise free trade unions. Because of these violations of fundamental union rights, he confirmed his opposition to any kind of association between Spain and the EEC.101 On 24 November 1969, Manuel Muiño, General Secretary of the UGT, warned Otto Brenner, President of the IG Metall that Carlos Pardo, a member of the IG Metall who had been working for the UGT after the ASO had disappeared, was interfering with the internal affairs of the UGT. This was not his responsibility and was causing inconvenience and disturbance to the UGT.102 In his letter, Muiño said that Carlos Pardo had been to Spain during the summer interviewing members of the UGT inside Spain, expressing his views about several issues and making offers of solidarity. A previous incident proved that Pardo’s pretension of having a mandate from the Executive Committee of the UGT would cause


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unnecessary confusion among the Socialists in Spain. For instance, in March 1969, Carlos Pardo had offered money to members of the UGT imprisoned in the prison of Basauri (Bilbao) as a consequence of the strikes in Vizcaya. The 41 members of the UGT refused to accept the offering, which seemed to come from the UGT, arguing that the money did not come through the Executive Committee of the UGT. They said that they took that decision to avoid any confusion and because they were loyal to the Executive Committee appointed by them. To find out where the money was coming from, the Executive Committee of the UGT asked Pablo Schalmey, a member of the Executive Committee of the GdED (Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner Deutschlands, or German Railway Unions) to give a letter personally to Otto Brenner and to discuss the issue with him,103 although the discussion never actually took place because of Brenner’s absence. After talking to Carlos Pardo and Adolphe Graedel, Schalmey discovered that the money offered to the UGT members in prison was from neither the IG Metall nor the International Metal Workers’ Federation. In fact, it came from collections among German and Spanish friends who had taken their own initiative.104 The Executive Committee of the UGT did not like these interventions for two main reasons: firstly, there was the delicacy of the relations just established with the IG Metall and the DGB; secondly, there was the leadership crisis within the UGT following the X Congress of the UGT, held in Toulouse in August 1968. Here the internal dissenters (The sector crítico) wished to renovate the leadership and the union policy, proposing a greater representation of the internal federations of the UGT in the Congress and to restore the PSOE and UGT presence in Spain.105 This emphasis on the organisation of Spanish socialism and unionism within Spain was shared by Carlos Pardo, who argued that Socialists in exile did not comprehend that socialism should be organised inside Spain.106 Another issue that the UGT was concerned with in 1969 was the question of the integration of Spain into the Common Market, specifically the commercial trade agreement between the Spanish government and the EEC which was signed in June 1970. On 11 December 1969, a letter was sent by the UGT to Heinz O. Vetter, the new President of the DGB, explaining its opposition to these agreements. The UGT explained that despite the propaganda of the regime inside and outside Spain, trying to present itself as able to liberalise the country socially and politically, repressive measures such as military trials and the Public Order Court were still commonplace in Spain. The UGT provided him with the following example: in October and November 30 members of the UGT

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accused of illicit association had been condemned to sentences of four years and two months.107 At this time, the UGT was equally concerned about the links between the Spanish and the German governments and how they might strengthen the Spanish regime by acting as so-called balones de oxígeno (oxygen balloons), to prolong its existence. The UGT was considerably worried about the visit of Spanish ministers to Germany and their interviews with members of the German government about several issues of great interest to both countries. Obviously, the UGT hoped that the Franco regime would not succeed in its bid to improve its relations with Germany. The UGT’s letter to Vetter was examined at the meeting of the International Committee of the DGB, which expressed its solidarity with the UGT.108 The reply sent to the UGT reiterated that for the DGB the Franco regime was a Fascist regime and was, therefore, automatically excluded from being part of the EEC. The DGB explained that at the Congress held in May 1969 in Munich the German trade unions had opposed any recognition of the official unions of Franco’s regime and the entry into any international organisation. Letters of protest had been sent by the DGB on 21 October and 11 November to the EEC against the conclusion of the trade agreement with Spain. However, the DGB did not appear to have criticised openly the attitude of its own government concerning this issue, which was in favour of the Preferential Trade Agreement with Spain. This was quite uncharacteristic of the DGB for they consistently showed open support for the democratic forces within Spain, which were against Spain’s association with the EEC as long as Franco’s regime was in power. The German government followed very closely the development of events in Spain. The government was aware that the ICFTU had published information about the documents presented to the Spanish Supreme Court on torture carried out by the police against political prisoners. Indeed, in the Federal Parliament on 12 December 1969, Matthöfer alleged that the use of torture was not some localised incident but was a common feature of contemporary Spain.109 In reply, Dr Dahrendorf, Undersecretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that there was no evidence to prove these allegations, let alone other similar incidents within Spain. However, the federal government was relying on the willingness of the Spanish Minister of Justice not only to appear in front of an ILO delegation, but also to allow foreign observers to investigate these incidents. This is evidence of two points: on the one hand, the federal government showed concern and kept in touch with the situation developing in Spain, on the other it had a more cautious approach to Spanish issues than the SPD.


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This was frequently a distinction between the SPD and the federal government attitudes towards Spain.110 In February 1970, 196 SPD deputies111 of the Federal Parliament expressed their support for the claims of the Spanish opposition in an open letter addressed to the Spanish Head of State.112 On 24 December 1969, 137 representatives of the whole range of the Spanish opposition, from monarchists like Joaquin Satrústegui to the extreme left represented by Ramon Tamames, had asked for the establishment of democratic rights in Spain: (i) recognition of the right to create a free and independent trade union; (ii) recognition of the right to create free political associations; and (iii) political amnesty for all political prisoners and freedom of speech and information.113 In a press conference in Frankfurt, Matthöfer said that the declaration of the German Social Democrats was a sign of solidarity with the forces working in favour of democratisation inside Spain. He explained that the declaration should not be understood as in favour of any specific group, because Spanish problems should be solved by the Spanish themselves, with the support of European democratic forces. Answering a question on how the SPD regarded the next visit of the Foreign Minister Walter Scheel to Spain, Matthöfer distinguished between government and the SPD as a party. He argued again that the government could have normal relations with other countries and that this would not have any repercussions on the party, which would follow the policy that it considered most equitable.114 On 16 April 1970, the trial of 13 Basque Socialists that took place in Madrid attracted the attention of the European Social Democrats. Hans Matthöfer attended the trial on behalf of the SPD. The Socialists were accused of being members of the PSOE and the UGT, and of disseminating illegal propaganda. They had been arrested in 1969 during the strike in Bilbao during the state of emergency. Matthöfer also held interviews with members of the UGT in Madrid and Vizcaya. After attending the trial, in May, Matthöfer gave a lecture at the Colegio de Abogados in Barcelona. In his speech, he made clear that the entry of Spain into the EEC as a full member would only be possible when the political situation permitted.115 He concluded his speech by saying: I consider myself a friend of Spain and for that reason I would very much hope that when we have to discuss the steps towards the second phase in 1976 [of the trade agreement between Spain and the EEC] all the obstacles that nowadays stop the Spanish entry into the EEC will have been removed.116

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According to Matthöfer, Franco’s regime was the main obstacle to Spain’s membership of the EEC, and this would have to await at the very least a ‘biological solution’: Franco’s death. He also held interviews with members of the MSC, but not with members of the UGT. Members of the UGT in Cataluña protested to the UGT in exile about Matthöfer’s lack of consideration towards them.117 Contacts with such foreign visitors clearly mattered. Several meetings took place between the Foreign Affairs Minister, Walter Scheel, part of the new SPD/FDP coalition government, and his Spanish counterpart, Gregorio López Bravo, to discuss issues that affected the German and Spanish economies. When Walter Scheel, a member of the FDP, made his first visit to Madrid in April 1970, there were two agreements to be signed: (i) an agreement on mutual rights; (ii) on one about scientific cooperation, specifically electronic and nuclear energy. Spain wished to receive a loan of DM200 million to finance the Spanish project of trasvase del Tajo-Segura (diversion of the Rivers Tajo–Segura), of which 40 million would be at a concessional rate of interest and the rest at international interest rates. The Spanish government was trying to obtain the whole amount at a concessional interest rate.118 During Scheel’s visit, the Spanish government, under the pressure of the possible cancellation of his trip, allowed the first meeting between members of the Spanish opposition and a European foreign affairs minister. The Foreign Minister held interviews at the German Embassy with four members of the opposition: Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, the leader of the Christian Democrats, Enrique Tierno Galván, leader of the PSI, José María de Areilza, of the Democratic Monarchists, and Joaquín Satrústegui, of the Monarchists. These were representatives of the official opposition recognised by the government.119 There was no doubt that these opposition members would request of the Minister the fulfilment of the following conditions before Spain’s admission into the EEC: (i) amnesty for all political prisoners; (ii) recognition of political parties and free trade unions; and (iii) free elections.120 The government forbade any press conference after the meeting. The official press Arriba and Pueblo presented the visit as a success for the regime.121 Clearly, with this visit the government was trying to enhance the reputation of the regime abroad at a crucial moment before the signing of the Preferential Trade Agreement with the EEC in June 1970. After the meeting the four members of the opposition sent a memorandum to Scheel which summarised the points of view expressed during the interview:


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(i)

Representative sectors of public opinion were persuaded that the economic development and the political and economic stability of Spain depended, to a great extent, on relations with the European Community. (ii) Political institutions should be based on the following conditions: guarantee of individual and collective rights and amnesty for all political prisoners; free, secret and direct universal suffrage, at municipal, regional and national levels; recognition for all political parties; the existence of a freely elected Parliament and freedom of union association. (iii) Despite the promises of evolution, there had been no progress towards true democracy. (iv) The democratic opposition appreciated what the representatives of the democratic countries were doing for them, i.e. the recognition of the existence in Spain of groups whose ideology corresponded to modern European political thought.122 Before finishing his visit to Spain, Scheel indicated that Spanish integration into the EEC was not possible with the current undemocratic Spanish political structure.123 The Spanish press did not publish this remark. This statement was in contrast to what Ullastres, head of the Spanish delegation to the EEC, had said regarding Spain and the EEC, that the Common Market was indifferent to the political system in Spain. Visits by both the Spanish Foreign Minister and his German counterpart were exchanged throughout the Seventies. In December 1970, Gregorio López Bravo was in Bonn. In October 1971, both Ministers met in Baden-Baden. Walter Scheel visited Madrid again in June 1972, where he met López Bravo, Franco, Prince Juan Carlos and Vice-President Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco. Two issues were discussed during his stay: the desiderata of the Spanish government in relation to the Common Market and European security.124 The Federal Republic rejected for political reasons the integration of Spain into Europe, although Bonn supported Madrid’s aim of improving the conditions of the Preferential Trade Agreement signed between Spain and the EEC in 1970, which involved a preferential tariff regime. In May 1970 the SPD organised its first Congress as the party in government, in Saarbrücken. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation invited Rodolfo Llopis, General Secretary of the PSOE in exile, together with Enrique Múgica Herzog, a member of the Executive Committee inside Spain, to attend the Congress. So far the Ebert Foundation had established links with other Socialists inside Spain such as Enrique Tierno Galván (PSI), and had supported Tierno Galván by giving scholarships to his

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friends.125 Even though the existence of members of the PSOE working in Spain was not unknown to the SPD, for many years Llopis had monopolised international relations, preventing any contact between the European Socialist parties and members of the PSOE inside Spain.126 Following this Congress, the SPD established closer links with the Socialists working within Spain. Above all, on 22 June 1970, the SPD established the German Committee for the Defence and Support of Spanish Democrats which was founded in Frankfurt, following the initiative of a group of Social Democrats and trade unionists, with Hans Matthöfer as its President. The aims of the Committee were: 1. To compile and evaluate information on Spanish democrats who were prosecuted, sentenced or banished for their political and unionist activities. 2. To help the defence of the prosecuted, by financial contributions and by explanations to German and international public opinion before and during the trial. 3. To help their families during preventive imprisonment, and with the deposit of bail. 4. To give economic help with the cost of trials and fines; organisation of legal advice for the prosecuted and their families during the period of the sentences and after being released.127 As an example of the actions carried out by the Committee, Matthöfer requested information from the PSOE on prisoners belonging to the PSOE and the UGT. The first action of the Committee was to send a list of 289 prisoners to Oriol, Minister of Justice, on 1 July 1970. Hans Matthöfer asked the Minister whether the 289 persons were arrested or not, why and to which sentences they had been condemned, in which prisons they were being held, when they would be released and to which political organisation they belonged.128 In February 1971. Hans Matthöfer protested against the arrest of five Socialists, among them Enrique Múgica Herzog, and tried to negotiate their release. In his telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Germany, José de Erice, Matthöfer expressed his concern about the arrest and warned the Ambassador about the consequences of these detentions for the Spanish regime in the long run.129 The Spanish government giving in to German pressure: the Pardo affair At the beginning of 1971, Carlos Pardo travelled to Bayone with 80,000 pesetas for a training course organised by the UGT and 90,000 pesetas


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for another one organised by the MSC. The UGT in exile asked for an explanation about the money because it did not know its origin and refused to accept it.130 Carlos Pardo claimed that he had followed instructions from the Ebert Foundation in Germany.131 Once again, this incident exposed the strained nature of the relationship between the UGT and Pardo. It seems difficult to believe that Pardo’s actions were not part of an IG Metall agenda for Spain which was not explained to the UGT in exile. Carlos Pardo, however, was soon to find himself at the centre of a major incident in which the Spanish state over-reacted, and provoked widespread criticism in Germany, when it attempted to convict him under Spanish law of trade union and propaganda activities in Germany. On 15 May 1971 Pardo was arrested, arriving from Germany, at the Barajas airport (Madrid) by the Spanish authorities on the flimsy pretext that his passport was not in order. Pardo had previously travelled to Spain twice without being stopped, and, according to the Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), the fact that he was not stopped may have been because the regime wanted to monitor Pardo’s contacts in Spain.132 Pardo had been sent to Spain by the IG Metall to accompany the editor of its publication Der Gewerkschafter, to help him as interpreter and to observe the union elections.133 At the moment of his arrest he was accused of his union activities in Germany. During his early questioning, the police were also very concerned about the contacts that Pardo might have maintained in Spain with members of the banned PSOE.134 During a press conference in Frankfurt, Hans Matthöfer energetically condemned the detention of a member of the German trade union movement in relation to union activities on German territory. In his view, the detention of someone who had just taken part in a federal Congress of the DGB as official representative of the foreign workers in the Federal Republic was a provocation and an insult against the German trade unions, and an outrage against the German government. Matthöfer sent telegrams of protest to the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn, on 16 May 1971, and to the Minister of Justice,135 saying that Pardo’s arrest was an interference with freedom of opinion in Germany. The Spanish Ambassador, José Sebastián de Erice, replied that, without knowing exactly why Carlos Pardo was arrested, his detention could be related to his activity as sub-editor of the journal Exprés Español136 of which Hans Matthöfer was the editor. He also rejected Matthöfer’s affirmation that the detention of Pardo was a challenge to the German trade unions and to the German government, underlining that both the Spanish Embassy and the Spanish authorities felt a deep respect for the DGB and the

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SPD.137 On 7 June 1971, Helmut Lenders, an SPD deputy, also sent a letter to the Spanish Ambassador to Germany reiterating the view that Pardo’s detention was a blow against freedom of opinion in Germany, and he requested that his view be conveyed to the Spanish government. He also asked the Ambassador to influence the Spanish authorities to arrange the immediate release of Carlos Pardo.138 The Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Munich and Nurenberg sections of the UGT sent telegrams to Chancellor Willy Brandt, to the President of the DGB, Heinz O. Vetter, and to the President of the IG Metall, Otto Brenner, protesting against the detention of Carlos Pardo and accusing the Spanish government of not respecting the freedom of trade union association and the democratic rights of Spanish workers. Moreover, after declaring that under Franco, the Opus Dei and the Falange there was no freedom in Spain, the UGT expressed its solidarity with the IG Metall in its fight in favour of democratic and union freedom.139 On 21 May 1971 the IG Metall sent telegrams to Chancellor Brandt, to the Foreign Minister, Scheel, to the Interior Minister, Genscher, and to the Labour Minister, Arendt asking them to spare no effort to achieve the immediate release of Carlos Pardo. Moreover, telegrams were sent to the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn, José Sebastián de Erice, to the Spanish Minister of Justice, Oriol and to the Dirección General de Seguridad where Pardo was kept in solitary confinement, demanding that he should be released, otherwise his arrest could have serious consequences for Spanish interests.140 The ICFTU, the International Metalworkers’ Federation, and the DGB and the SPD in Frankfurt also protested to the Spanish government. On 28 May 1971, the Secretary of the International Metalworkers’ Federation, Ivan Noren, accused the Spanish Minister of Justice of being ignorant of European law. He sent a message to the general director of the ILO accusing the Spanish government of violating ILO conventions 87 and 98.141 On 21 May 1971, during the ceremony to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Akademie der Arbeit, a demonstration of 150 people took place in Frankfurt demanding the release of Carlos Pardo. A letter signed by four Social Democrat deputies, Matthöfer, Zander, Sperling and Krockert, was given to the Minister of Labour, Arendt. The letter explained the circumstances of the detention of Carlos Pardo and emphasised that his journey had been prepared with the help of the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, the letter exhorted the German government to include in the new agreement with Spain on the contracting of workers in Germany a clause which guaranteed the fundamental rights granted in the German Constitution to all the workers in Germany.142


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In spite of the German Socialist protest, on 22 May 1971 Carlos Pardo was sent to Carabanchel prison accused of illegal propaganda arising from his activities as editor of several publications in Germany, particularly the Exprés Español. Regarding this accusation, in a letter to his wife, Pardo affirmed that the accusation of being involved in the Exprés Español was only an excuse and that the police were just interested in the activities of the IG Metall among Spanish workers in Germany.143 The main accusation was based on a photo-montage which presented Franco shaking hands with Hitler in the year 1936.144 The examining magistrate argued that Carlos Pardo could be considered guilty of an offence against the ‘security of the Spanish state’. Article 132 of the Penal Code defined this offence.145 To make matters worse, the Spanish authorities intended to prosecute him before the Public Order Court. Pardo’s defending counsel, Pablo Castellano, applied for freedom on bail for his client, which was rejected by the Tribunal. In the meantime, Hans Matthöfer sent a telegram to Willy Brandt in which he requested the intervention of the head of the German government in Pardo’s favour. Also, Matthöfer asked Brandt to confirm that foreign workers should enjoy complete protection of the fundamental rights recognised in the German Constitution.146 The Spanish government had to yield to German pressures. On 18 June 1971, Carlos Pardo was released on bail (50,000 pesetas/DM2,600). After that, Hans Matthöfer and Fritz Schäfer, former Sub-secretary of State, held conversations with the Spanish Minister of Justice, Oriol, and the acting Foreign Minister, Valderrama. The aim of the conversation was to ensure that, as in the previous 11 years, Spanish workers in the Federal Republic would have rights of free association and freedom of opinion, including opinion about the situation in Spain, without anyone having to fear a penal prosecution on their return to Spain.147 The Spanish government promised not to take proceedings against any Spanish worker for trade union activities in the Federal Republic. In other words, as was established in the agreement between Germany and Spain on the contracting of Spanish workers in 1960, Spanish workers would not suffer any damage in Spain for their democratic and syndical activities in the Federal Republic. After negotiations between Hans Matthöfer and Fritz Schäfer and the Spanish government, Carlos Pardo was authorised to leave Spain and came back to Frankfurt. Once again the Spanish government had given in to international pressure. The arrest and detention of Carlos Pardo had sent a shockwave throughout European Socialist groups, particularly the German Socialists and trade unionists, who demanded his release on the basis of democratic

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right and freedom of opinion. The successful outcome was a major achievement not just as far as the release of Carlos Pardo was concerned but also because it was an example of how external forces could influence events in Spain. As Carlos Pardo stated: That made us become aware that the Spanish government was not so strong as it pretended to be. The Spanish government had to give in to the SPD and the German trade union’s requests.148 As Pardo said, the fact that he was a Spanish citizen made his release much more important, and the actions of the SPD and DGB much more relevant for the democratisation process. Willy Brandt opposed the Spanish entry into the EEC While SPD and DGB pressure proved effective in Spain itself, at the same time the SPD in government continued to oppose the entry of Spain into the EEC. Willy Brandt declared in spring 1972 that there was no possibility of Spain entering the EEC. He pointed out obstacles such as the lack of freely elected members of Parliament and the lack of free trade unions.149 During the visit of Walter Scheel to Spain in June 1972, Gregorio López Bravo, the Spanish Foreign Minister, did not mention Brandt’s declaration against the entry of Spain into the EEC. However, he made reference to a speech by Brandt, delivered in Teheran, that stated that foreign policy should not be determined by ideological criteria. He declared that: My country hopes that countries in Europe consider with sympathy and respect – with that perspective free of ideology mentioned by Willy Brandt – the Spanish way of creating modern institutions. Ideological pressure exercised from outside would lead to the opposite results to the one proposed.150 López Bravo was trying to persuade other European countries that the approach to policy towards the Soviet bloc advocated by Willy Brandt, transcending ideological divisions, was also the most appropriate in the Spanish case; and he proposed Spanish admission to the EEC without a change of regime. López Bravo compared the EEC with the United Nations and pointed out that, as the UN was comprised of countries with different political systems, therefore a unified Europe should not be based on a false uniformity. Scheel replied that Europe spoke with one voice, and therefore the political structure of member states must be in harmony. The Spanish Foreign Minister, on this occasion, put forward


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a thin argument to shift the political debate away from the policy that the European democratic forces were following. Spain’s main foreign policy priority remained the establishment of relations with Europe. On another occasion, during the official visit of Prince Juan Carlos and Princess Sofia together with Gregorio López Bravo to Germany in September 1972, Walter Scheel declared that Spain did not meet the democratic criteria for membership of the EEC. In Scheel’s view, the structure of European institutions both in Brussels and in Strasbourg assumed that the members should have democratic Parliaments to choose their representatives in the political organisations of the Community.151 On the occasion of this visit, the DGB expressed its solidarity with the Spanish workers of Citroën Hispania on strike in Vigo and the DGB reaffirmed the resolution made at the last federal Congress, where the admission of Fascist Spain into the EEC was rejected.152 As well as the German government and the DGB, the SPD as a whole opposed Spanish entry into the EEC and actively tried to prevent that from happening. One of these actions was taken in May 1973, when the Congress of the SPD in Hannover condemned the situation in Spain, denouncing the assassination of workers on strike, the persecution of opposition members and the denial of fundamental rights. It also condemned the detention of Spanish Social Democrats such as Nicolás Redondo and José Antonio Zaraibar for their Socialist and union activities, and repressive measures against Spanish Socialists such as the confiscation of the passport of the lawyer Pablo Castellano. The SPD demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners. The Congress organised fundraising, after accepting the motion presented by the Aid Committee for Spanish Refugees. The SPD urged the Socialists in the parliamentary group and in the government to prevent the entry of Greece and Franco’s Spain into the EEC, because only a democratic state could become a member of the European Community.153 According to the SPD, as reported by Irene Rüde (political specialist of the SPD), any approach by the EEC towards Spain, based on the model of the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany,154 would strengthen and stabilise the Spanish economy and hinder democratic change.155 The Friedrich Ebert Foundation: the German engine of Spanish democratisation Alongside these political condemnations of Franco’s regime, a major event that would change the whole opposition spectrum was the recognition of the PSOE renovado, as opposed to the PSOE histórico, by the Socialist International in January 1974. Within the SI, the SPD was

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a determining influence for this recognition.156 The process of recognition of the PSOE(r) started in 1972 and was concluded in 1974. This period saw intense contacts between German Socialists and trade unionists, and their Spanish counterparts. In the case of the German trade unionists, following the invitation made by the DGB, on 30 July 1973 a delegation from the UGT comprised of Enrique Múgica, Pablo Castellano, Jaime San Sebastián, Juan Iglesias and Antonio García Duarte, members of the PSOE(r), visited Germany.157 The delegation was received in Düsseldorf by Dieter Wagner, a member of the international department of the Executive Committee of the DGB and Erick Harndt, the official in charge of the foreign workers in the Federal Republic. The visit and the subsequent discussions had as one of their aims to strengthen the links with the DGB for all the issues concerning both organisations, specifically for matters related to Spanish workers in Germany. The delegation, analysing the situation of the Spanish workers in Germany, particularly focused on the idea of the Spanish unions that they should create sections in countries with Spanish immigrants. Later, Heinz Oskar Vetter, President of the DGB, together with the Executive Committee of the DGB, met the UGT delegates. Vetter enquired about the kind of help that the DGB could provide to the UGT. On the one hand, the UGT suggested that the DGB could sponsor three permanent representatives to work for the UGT for printing and publishing purposes: two inside Spain and one in Toulouse. On the other, the DGB could help the distribution in Germany of the bulletin of the UGT, the Exprés Español, and broadcast news about Spain in Radio Baviera.158 During this meeting, the DGB reaffirmed its opposition to Spanish entry into the EEC because of the lack of democratic freedom and the continuous repression of democrats and unionists in Spain.159 Subsequently, the delegation moved to Bonn to meet the Ministerial Director for Foreign Workers at the Ministry of Employment, Dr Hernst, and members of the SPD: Gerhard Cleipsties, Assistant Director of the International Relations Department, Walter Edenhofer, Director of the Department for Labour Issues, and Hans Matthöfer. The issue discussed with Dr Hernst was the organisation of Spanish workers in Germany by the Spanish official trade unions.160 Hans Matthöfer also had an interview with the Spanish Socialist members. He made reference to the Informe Confidencial161 written by the Confederación Centro del Partido Socialista Obrero Español, which accused Hans Matthöfer and Max Diamant162 of being in touch with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)163 to create in Spain a strong anti-Communist union loyal to the official trade unions. The allegation was based on how


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the ASO had been created with money from the German trade unions and the International Metalworkers’ Federation, and Matthöfer’s involvement in the release of Carlos Pardo. Matthöfer believed that the confidential report had been written by Rodolfo Llopis and Enrique Tierno Galván and stated that he would block any economic assistance given to Tierno Galván by the Ebert Foundation. In Bonn, the UGT delegation also visited the Friedrich Ebert Foundation where they met Elke Ester, a member of the Foundation and the SPD. This meeting was important for clarifying the position of the Ebert Foundation towards the Spanish Socialist groups because in the past the Foundation had supported everything the SPD and DGB did,164 including giving support to Tierno Galván and his group with disastrous results.165 Elke Esters claimed that the Ebert Foundation would resume their help to the Spanish Socialists (the PSOE and UGT), only if the unity of all Socialist forces was achieved. In reply, the UGT reported that this had been proposed at the Congress of the PSOE in 1971. They had held meetings inside Spain with other Socialist tendencies such as the Galician Socialist Party, the Valencian Socialist Party and two groups of the MSC, although Tierno Galván’s PSI had been excluded because it was not considered a Socialist party, and was regarded as trying to destroy the PSOE. Referring to the help that had already been given to the Spanish Socialists by the Foundation, the Spanish Socialists replied that they were not interested in studentships for Spanish students to study in Germany. They had other much more urgent requirements. According to the Spanish report, the visit was a success as far as the UGT was concerned and they were optimistic about their future. Nevertheless, the DGB did not appear to have made a decision on the plan to assist the UGT in Spain agreed during the visit. A report was sent by the UGT to Dieter Wagner, of the International Department of the DGB, to solicit the implementation of the plan to help the UGT agreed during the visit. The report explained the situation of crisis in Spain, above all the assassination of Carrero Blanco by ETA and his replacement by Arias Navarro. The report also stressed the fact that the UGT wanted to become the most important union organisation in the country. The most outstanding competitor was the Communist Party and its union platform the CC.OO, which was going through a crisis and losing prestige and influence but enjoyed enormous financial resources.166 The UGT estimated that, despite the help given by the ICFTU, they needed more resources to continue to maintain their activities. Some of these included strikes in Vizcaya and Guipuzcua, Valladolid, Asturias, Huelva, Sevilla, Madrid and Barcelona. Because these activities were illegal

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and most of the UGT members were fined and some of them taken to court, because of propaganda expenses, and because the UGT was growing throughout the country, greater financial assistance was needed.167 Willy Brandt and Felipe González Until 1972, the PSOE was still united under the leadership of Rodolfo Llopis, and the German Socialist group had dealt with his requests for assistance. In 1970 a confrontation had taken place at the XI Congress of the PSOE between Rodolfo Llopis and the emerging member of the Executive Committee, Felipe González. Members inside Spain argued that a majority of seats in the Executive of the PSOE should be allocated to representatives of the party members living inside Spain. This confrontation would initiate the process of division within the PSOE. In 1973, Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra resigned as members of the Executive Committee of the PSOE. The same year, Nicolás Redondo was elected General Secretary of the UGT. In September 1974, several members of the PSOE: Guillermo Galeote, Nicolás Redondo, Enrique Múgica, Pablo Castellano, Eduardo Gómez Albizu, Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra, elaborated a document known as ‘The September Declaration’. This defined the position of the Party at that crucial moment of Franco’s illness, the apparent openness of the new Arias Navarro government, and the creation of the Democratic Junta by the Communist Party in July 1974. The document argued that the Franco regime was coming to an end due to the economic and political crisis following the death of Carrero Blanco. The PSOE proposed as the only way out of this situation a ‘democratic rupture’.168 In October 1974, the last Congress of the PSOE outside Spain took place in Suresnes (France) from 11 to 13 October. The Congress elected a new Executive Committee after the split with the PSOE(h). Following differences of opinion about the most suitable candidate, Felipe González was elected First Secretary of the PSOE. Pablo Castellano, who had been within the Executive Committee of the PSOE since 1971, was elected International Secretary. After González’ election as General Secretary, two things happened: firstly, there was a polarisation of responsibilities around Felipe González and other members of the Party such as Guillermo Galeote and Luis Yañez. The first victim of this was Pablo Castellano who resigned in March 1975 because, as he later said: ‘Felipe González and Guillermo Galeote took over my International Secretary’s duties.’169 Secondly, German Socialists like Willy Brandt, Hans Matthöfer and Dieter Koniecki displayed an increasing interest in the leadership of Felipe González. Full support from the SPD was finally expressed at the Mannheim Congress in November


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1975. To understand the relationship between Willy Brandt and Felipe González, it is necessary to go through events of that period in detail. However, Brandt’s memoirs reveal the warmth of the relationship between the two Socialist leaders: ‘From the first, I felt a liking for the young lawyer Felipe González, who had taken over the leadership of the PSOE.’170 International contacts with German Socialists were already being pursued by González before his election as General Secretary. The first time that Felipe González and Willy Brandt met was in Bonn in 1971. Carlos Pardo prepared the meeting together with Hans Matthöfer.171 Pardo argued that it was difficult to change Brandt’s attitude towards the Spanish Socialists. Rodolfo Llopis had been a member of the Socialist International for many years, and Brandt agreed with his policy and leadership. However, members of the SPD like Helmut Schmidt and Hans Matthöfer did not fully agree with Llopis’ analysis of the Spanish situation and believed that a different approach should be taken.172 This first contact with Brandt was not as successful as the later ones. At the Suresnes Congress, the PSOE was again seeking international recognition by inviting the most important European leaders to attend. Amongst those who accepted the invitation were Bruno Pittermann, President of the Socialist International, and François Mitterrand, General Secretary of the French Socialist party. Although Willy Brandt, Olaf Palme and Bruno Kreisky did not attend the Congress, in Luis Yañez’ view, the Suresnes Congress was, nonetheless, important for the international recognition of the PSOE: In Spanish public opinion there was a great confusion. To have the recognition of our European counterparts endorsed our position in front of the Spanish people.173 It is peculiar that on the one hand, the PSOE was seeking recognition, and on the other, none of the SPD members, a party so important within the Socialist International, attended the Congress.174 Felipe González met Willy Brandt again in Lisbon in December 1974 at the first Congress of the Portuguese Socialist Party. The significance of this encounter resided in the fact that the two leaders were able to get acquainted with each other. According to Richard Gillespie the meeting in Portugal resulted in an immediate friendship.175 This friendship proved to be very important in April 1975 when Felipe González and representatives of the PSOE went to Germany to seek closer cooperation with the SPD. After a meeting between Brandt and González in Bonn on 18 April 1975, the SPD and the PSOE agreed to this. Willy Brandt affirmed that

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for the SPD the only valid interlocutor was the PSOE renovado. Felipe González warned the German press that the entry of Spain into the European Community would undoubtedly strengthen Franco’s regime.176 His intervention was directed at the federal government. Another dimension should be added to understand the attitude of the German Socialists towards the PSOE: the Portuguese revolution. In Portugal, on 25 April 1974, the Movimiento de Forças Armadas (MFA), the military junta, overthrew the dictatorship established by Oliveira Salazar in 1934. Marcelo Caetano had ruled the country since Salazar’s incapacity and subsequent death. The military junta had the support of the Portuguese Communist Party. Fear of Communism made the SPD send financial assistance to the Portuguese Socialist Party. Previously, the SPD had helped Mario Soares to refound the Portuguese Socialist Party in the spring of 1973 in Münstereifel (Germany). Concerning Portugal, Willy Brandt argued in his memoirs: ‘The situation could pose a threat to the necessary changes in Spain and even cause an international crisis.’177 The Portuguese revolution had a profound influence on the attitude of the SPD towards Spain. Braunthal has pointed out that the SPD concentrated its attention on the PSOE as it did in the case of the Portuguese Socialist Party, ‘to strengthen the parties against the threat of the competing Communist parties’.178 The problem was emphasised by a discussion that took place on 29 May 1975, in Brussels, between Helmut Schmidt, Gerald Ford, President of the United States and Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State. There were differences of opinion as to what attitude to take towards Spain and Portugal. As far as Spain was concerned, the Americans seemed to be concerned about strategic issues and not about the period after Franco’s death. Helmut Schmidt pointed out that, in the interests of Europe, support should be given to the most plausible candidate after Franco’s death. Schmidt said that: To us in Europe the whole Spanish problem looks a little different than it does to the United States, for whom Spain is primarily a strategic factor. The Franco era is obviously coming to an end. It is still not clear who will take the helm. We should be encouraging those we hope will govern after Franco. That means we must deal not only with those who are in power now.179 Therefore, there were conflicting interests between two very important external actors: on the one hand, the United States fearing an uprising of Communism, and on the other, the German government which was just


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as anxious to avoid a Communist victory, but which was advocating a more pragmatic and forward-looking approach to Spain’s political situation. It was after the SPD Congress held at Mannheim from 11 to 15 November 1975, shortly before the general elections in Germany, that González obtained Brandt’s full support.180 The Congress re-elected Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt as President and Vice-President of the SPD respectively. In his speech González stated that the responsibility for a Spanish political transformation lay in the obligation of the European democratic countries to support the democratic project of the Spanish opposition: These circumstances reveal the great European responsibility in the transformation of Spanish politics. All the democratic countries in Europe and in the world have the duty of supporting the democratic project of the Spanish opposition.181 But González’s attendance at the Mannheim Conference was only due to German diplomacy. The German Ambassador in Spain, Georg von Lilienfeld, had taken the necessary steps, following the suggestion of the Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, and Willy Brandt, to secure the return of González’ passport which had been confiscated by the Spanish authorities in July 1975. He talked with the Minister of the Interior and with Prince Juan Carlos, who was being trained for the functions of head of state.182 The motivation of González’ speech was to acknowledge and encourage greater involvement of European democratic forces in the process of the Spanish transition. Indeed, his participation at the Congress was a tribute to the effectiveness of such involvement. We have already seen this kind of intervention in the case of the release of Carlos Pardo.183 Meanwhile, in September 1975, five members of the FRAP (the Revolutionary Anti fascist and Patriotic Front) were executed by the Franco regime. The DGB joined the great wave of international protest against these executions. Heinz Oskar Vetter, President of the DGB and President of the ETUC, suggested that the aim of the European trade unions must be to isolate the Spanish government in every possible way. He said that Spain could be isolated, cutting off all means of transport, radio and telephone networks; the purpose of the trade unions was to punish the Government but not the Spanish people.184 Jack Jones of the TGWU shared the DGB’S desire to harass the Franco regime to the full. But, for tactical reasons, the SPD disagreed with a total rupture with Spain. Bruno Friedrich, foreign policy spokesman for the SPD Parliamentary group, added in Bonn that avoiding a total rupture should not be interpreted as approval of the current Spanish

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government.185 As a result of these executions, in the European Parliament, Ludwig Fellermaier (SPD) on behalf of the Socialist group tabled a motion for a resolution which invited the Commission and the Council to freeze existing relations between Spain and the EEC. The Council of Ministers decided to suspend relations with Spain from October 1975 to January 1976. 1975 was a critical year for Spain, and for its future process of democratisation. Not only was it the year of Franco’s death, but it was also a year, as far as the opposition was concerned, that saw movements to unify the opposition groups within Spain. The unification of the Socialist groups had already started in 1974, and a type of alliance with all the democratic groups was formed in the summer of 1975 with the Platform of Democratic Convergence. The realisation that Franco’s regime could not be overthrown by insurrection played a significant role in the decision to unify the Socialist opposition.186 The German Socialists advocated this political option in agreement with Felipe González.187 The SPD backed the unity of the several Socialist groups around the PSOE.188 Perhaps the first evidence of that came in June 1974, when the SPD acted together with the Ebert Foundation to sponsor the first session of the Conferencia de Unidad Socialista in Paris. This was attended by the PSOE, the Partido Socialista Gallego, Union Poblo Gallego, MSC, Secretariado de Ordenación Democrática de Catalunya (SODC) and the Partit Socialista del Pais Valenciá.189 Invitations were sent to the French Socialist Party, the SI, the SPD and the Portuguese Socialist Party. The second session in Bonn in September 1974 was attended by the MSC, Partido Socialista Gallego, PSOE, Partit Socialista del Pais Valenciá and USO190 and was focused on the question of Socialism and the different factions within Spain. On 20 November 1975 Franco died. All the evidence suggests that both the German Socialists and the PSOE were waiting for what Matthöfer calls the ‘biological solution’191 to the Spanish situation. After Franco’s death, the process of democratisation gradually became a reality. The major obstacle had been the dictator Franco himself. But Franco’s death was clearly not enough. Political alternatives were needed and these were not created overnight. In January 1976, in an interview published by Exprés Español, Felipe González stated once again the importance of external actors192 in the Spanish process of transition: We could say that one of the factors that has allowed the public appearance of the Socialist Party inside Spain, has been the strong


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European support given by European Socialist and Social-Democratic parties to the PSOE.193 This declaration summarises the importance of external support, and in particular of the European Socialist lobby that had not only helped the PSOE within Spain but also helped keep Franco out of Europe. Similarly, in February 1976, Matthöfer gave two reasons why the SPD was supporting the PSOE. Both parties were members of the International, and the SPD believed that the PSOE offered the Spanish people long experience and a well-organised party.194 After Franco’s death, the Ebert Foundation opened a permanent office in Madrid, following the approval of Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of the Interior, at the end of March 1976.195 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky has argued that: The Ebert Foundation, and to a lesser extent the other German Foundations, specialized in training party recruits and in providing advice to party leaders on policy and campaign techniques.196 The Ebert Foundation also helped to create the Spanish Socialist Foundations named after Pablo Iglesias and Largo Caballero, where they helped to finance seminars and training sessions.197 It could be argued that one of the most important factors that contributed to the successful work of the Ebert Foundation was that the political option in favour of the PSOE of Felipe González had been taken before Franco’s death. From 4 to 8 February 1976 a delegation of the IMB-IG Metall headed by Eugen Loderer, President of the IG Metall, visited Madrid and Lisbon, having been invited to Spain by the UGT and USO.198 In Madrid, the delegation199 met Felipe González, Nicolás Redondo and regional representatives of the UGT, and a delegation from the USO. Loderer also talked to José María de Areilza, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating the four conditions that Spain should meet to be part of the Common Market: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

freedom for all political parties; freedom for the trade unions; abolition of special trials; and freedom for all political and union prisoners.200

Regarding trade union unification, Eugen Loderer was in favour of a unitary and strong trade union in Spain:

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my advice to the UGT and USO colleagues was to suggest that they should do everything that was possible to get a unitary syndical organisation, free and independent from any political party.201 But the UGT had a different view, and had refused to take part in the Congreso Sindical Constituyente (Constituent Trade Union Congress) proposed by the CC.OO in January 1976. The resolution of the XXX UGT Congress, held in Madrid on 15–18 April 1976, pointed out that ‘UGT will not take part in any unitary action without free affiliation and syndical action’.202 Even though the UGT was part of the COS (Coordinator of Trade Union Organisations), the organisation created in July 1976 and composed of the UGT, the CC.OO, and the USO, the UGT considered the COS not as ‘the embryo of the future syndical unity’, but as an organisation to promote ‘unity of action’ among the several trade unions.203 The UGT left the COS in March 1977, following the suggestion of the DGB and Otto Kersten, President of the ICFTU, because the CC.OO was thought to be Marxist.204 The DGB and the ICFTU feared that the CC.OO could impose its ideology on the COS. Although they advocated a unitary trade union, it seems that they were not in favour of including the CC.OO. One year after Franco’s death, in October 1976, Erwin Kristoffersen, a member of the DGB, visited Spain. Outlining his impressions, he said that there had been political change but not democracy in Spain. Willy Brandt was very cautious about judging the policy of the Arias Navarro government but he pointed out that Spain could only become a member of the European family when citizens obtained the rights of freedom, political parties and trade unions.205 The Federal Republic was waiting for more concrete proof from the Spanish government of a coherent plan for movement towards democracy because, until that moment, in its view the stage of transition had been characterised by backwards movement, stammers and violence.206 Willy Brandt came to Madrid to attend the XXVII Congress of the still illegal PSOE in December 1976. In February 1977 the PSOE would be legalised. After 40 years in exile, the PSOE held its Congress in Spain. The presence of some of the most important European Socialist leaders such as Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, Pietro Nenni, Olaf Palme and Michael Foot symbolised the definitive international support for the PSOE renovado after its recognition by the Socialist International. Willy Brandt was impressed by the full support given by the PSOE to González at that Congress.207 During his visit Brandt, along with Matthöfer and the German Ambassador Georg von Lilienfeld, met Suárez and King Juan


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Carlos in order to obtain concrete information on the process of democratisation in Spain.208 He made clear in a press conference that his visit obeyed a personal interest rather than representing an intervention by the SPD in Spanish politics. In January 1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited Madrid. Regarding the new Suárez government, he stated that he was following with admiration and satisfaction the political reforms introduced in Spain. Suárez was one of the youngest European heads of government and, in his opinion, one of those whose success had been the greatest.209 The future of the unions in Spain and the process of democratisation were the central issues. The Chancellor also met King Juan Carlos and Felipe González. During his interview with Felipe González in Madrid, Schmidt suggested finding a solution to the Spanish economic crisis by meetings between the government, the trade unions and businessmen. As far as Spanish entry to the EEC was concerned, the German Chancellor expressed himself in favour of speeding up Spain’s entry to the European Community if the democratisation process in Madrid was consolidated and confirmed.210 Many observers thought that the reason why Schmidt gave eulogies to Suárez and to the process of transition was because the Federal Republic was worried about the feedback given by France to Spain regarding Community issues and the advantages that France could obtain. It seemed that Germany wanted to create privileged relations with the Suárez government.211 Hans Matthöfer wrote an article in the official paper of the party, Vorwärts, in which the PSOE was criticised by the SPD and the Spanish government was eulogised. This seemed linked to the official federal government support for the new government in Spain, especially for its entry into the EEC. But it was also the case that German Socialists simply disagreed with González’ negative view of Suárez’ reforms. This disagreement disappeared after the general elections of 1977 had proved that a democratic rupture as González had advocated, and the SPD had feared, was unnecessary. In order to ease the way for Southern European countries wishing to join the EEC, the SPD proposed an EEC ‘Marshall Plan’ for Spain, Greece and Portugal. Since these countries had a lower development index compared with the EEC, the aim was to balance the disequilibrium of these countries, transferring economic resources from the most developed areas to the least developed. Brussels seemed to be in favour of this initiative. Even though the German Social Democrats mainly intended to carry out an operation of massive economic support for Portugal, they included in their strategy all three future members of the Community.212 Willy Brandt hoped that this plan would be directed

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towards the eradication of unemployment. But the significant issue was that the entrance of these countries was inevitable from the political point of view. From the economic point of view, entry and integration would be more difficult.213 It was evident that the process of Spanish democratisation, if not yet fully complete, was well advanced. Spain was ready to take its place in a democratic Europe. By mid-1977, the PSOE had been legalised and the first democratic elections had taken place. From now on, external factors and actors had a different role to play. Conclusions What this chapter set out to do was firstly to assess the relationship between the German Socialists and trade unionists and their Spanish counterparts in the period 1960–77. The DGB, the IG Metall and the SPD each had its own agenda and its own (not always accurate) understanding of events in Spain. As far as the DGB is concerned, although it had manifested its support for the UGT, its attitude was rather ambiguous, influenced by the IG Metall, the leading trade union within the federation. Two members of the IG Metall, Hans Matthöfer and Max Diamant, also members of the SPD, had a decisive influence on the policy of the IG Metall towards the Spanish unions. They supported the ASO because this organisation wished to implement a unitary trade union in Spain as in Germany and Britain and was thought to be more active as an underground workers’ movement in Franco’s Spain than the UGT, and more effective in keeping the Communists out of the unions. In 1968 they were proved wrong by the cessation of the ASO’s activities as a trade union. The IG Metall was unable to change the UGT’s policy on the development of trade unionism, which was against the use of legal means and any infiltration of the official Sindicatos. After the failure of the ASO and the IG Metall’s inability to change the UGT’s policy, the IG Metall had to put aside its strategy of unity and follow the UGT’s policy on trade unionism. An important element that played a major role in promoting awareness of the situation in Spain among the German unions was the influx of Spanish workers into Germany and the consequent involvement of the UGT. At the same time that this was happening, the PSOE was establishing contacts with the SPD. The SPD provided financial help to increase the activities of the PSOE inside Spain. Moreover, the PSOE tried to prevent Franco’s regime receiving recognition by Germany on issues such as economic cooperation between Spain and Germany, or the Spanish entry into the EEC. However, the PSOE’s efforts could not prevent Erler’s visit in 1965 which was thought by the SPD an important step towards bringing democratic ideas to the people in Spain. The PSOE succeeded,


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however, in the more important case of Willy Brandt helping to persuade him not to visit Spain. Throughout these years, it was clear that for many leaders of the SPD and the German unions, fear of Communist predominance among the Spanish workers in Spain was a constant preoccupation. A distinction has to be made between the SPD and the DGB because of their different objectives. As far as the latter is concerned, the DGB, like the ICFTU, was in favour of supporting the UGT. Nevertheless, its most important trade union, the IG Metall, had a strategy to create a strong unitary trade union in Spain. At first, it had attempted to achieve that by supporting the ASO, which was in favour of a unified trade union which could prevent the Communists (CC.OO) from taking control. Once this option failed, following the decline of the ASO, the IG Metall had to support the UGT’s policy on trade unionism. After 1968, the DGB and the UGT consolidated their contacts and DGB assistance henceforth was directed towards the UGT. During this period, the SPD demonstrated a sustained support in Spanish developments. The aim of the SPD, like other European Socialist parties, was to bring about democracy in Spain. Parliamentary democracy needs political parties. Therefore the main objective of the SPD in Spain was to support the most likely political party that could, in the future, oppose the Franco regime. The SPD eventually gave its full support to the PSOE renovado, and this was enhanced by the special relationship that developed between Felipe González and Willy Brandt. Earlier, the SPD exercised its influence with the German government in relation to Spain’s entry into the EEC, and criticised the federal government’s occasionally ambiguous attitude towards the Franco regime (for instance the award made to Manuel Fraga). In the meantime, it was giving support to the PSOE (prisoners and their families) during the states of emergency, it expressed solidarity with the Spanish opposition directly to the head of state, and it also established close links with Spanish workers working in Spain, creating the Spanish Committee for the Defence and Support of Spanish Democrats. Did the SPD and DGB’s support really matter? One way of analysing the impact that their support for the PSOE and UGT had in Spain is by way of looking at the example of the ASO. At the beginning, the DGB, through the IG Metall, was behind the ASO (although the DGB never completely neglected the UGT). The DGB tried to bring the AS, of which the UGT was part, and the ASO together, with little or no effect. When, in 1968, the support from the DGB ceased, to be directed exclusively to the UGT, the ASO could no longer survive. This is useful evidence for

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understanding both the force and the limits of the role played by the DGB in the setting-up of a future trade union movement in Spain. The view of so many German union leaders, that Spain should have one unified trade union movement, was never implemented. The German Socialist movement gave a range of support: financial, logistic and moral. A close working relationship was established between Felipe González and Willy Brandt. Moreover, the presence of Spanish individuals that belonged to both the UGT and IG Metall, like Carlos Pardo, who had very good connections with high-ranking German Socialists such as Hans Matthöfer, laid the foundation for the German Socialist involvement in Spanish politics.

7

Conclusions

1939 was the year that saw the defeat of democratic forces in Spain. During the 36 years of dictatorship after the end of the Civil War, Franco’s Spain remained for European democrats, and especially for Socialists, an unresolved problem, and democratisation remained their aim. The direct involvement of volunteers such as Jack Jones or Bob Edwards during the 1936–39 Civil War, in the fight against the Fascist forces through the International Brigades, gained renewed relevance when they became prominent figures within the British Labour movement. More generally, the question of Spain’s relationship to the EEC from the late 1950s onwards meant that European Socialists had to clarify their position. Because of its geographical, cultural and historical links with Europe, Spain could not be left out of the European Community indefinitely, but nor could it be allowed in under a dictatorial regime. Socalists within the European Parliament reiterated the democratic credentials required for entry, and in this they echoed and reinforced the arguments of the Spanish clandestine opposition. National and international Socialist and trade union organisations in Europe each had their own particular motivation for involvement in Spanish affairs in the period 1959–77. The involvement and assistance given by the SI and the ICFTU, to the PSOE and the UGT, both in exile and in Spain, were motivated by a sense of moral obligation towards their respective affiliated members and by the explicit aims of both organisations, which were ‘to assist morally and materially democratic Socialist forces fighting underground or from exile against dictatorial regimes in their own countries’.1 Within these international organisations the British Labour movement and the German SPD and unions were particularly influential, and both the British and the Germans were 185

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committed to helping Spanish Socialists and trade unionists to regroup and reorganise. The evaluation of the effectiveness of these national and international organisations of the democratic left in the processes of proto-democratisation and democratisation from 1959 to 1977 has to be placed in the context of their goals. They did not contemplate the direct overthrow of the Franco regime, but rather the consistent denial to it of international legitimacy and the supply of moral and material support to its democratic opponents, especially Socialists and trade unionists. Although Franco’s death in November 1975 can be regarded as a ‘biological solution’ to the problem of the dictatorship, true parliamentary democracy could not have emerged without the previous establishment of a strong democratic opposition. This is where international support by external actors could play a crucial role. As Whitehead states: ‘where from an internal viewpoint prospects for democracy seemed finely balanced quite a modest impetus from outside might tip the outcome one way or another’. Obviously, the Spanish transition to democracy was carried out by internal forces but it was not a foregone conclusion. External actors, and not least international and foreign national organisations of the left, had a role to play. From the evidence gathered in the book, it appears that actions of the European Socialists and trade unionists can be grouped into two distinct categories. The first was assistance to the internal democratic opposition. They gave financial support to opposition groups and to individuals imprisoned by the regime. They helped with expertise and resources in organisation and training. Their moral support, although impossible to quantify, was clearly important for clandestine groups struggling in adverse and often isolated conditions inside the dictatorship. The final recognition of the PSOE and the UGT as the Spanish counterparts of long-established European Socialist parties and trade unions was an essential part of the consolidation of the PSOE and the UGT against their Spanish rivals. The second kind of intervention was direct and public criticism of the Franco regime. From the opening-up of the regime in 1959 and its integration in important international organisations such as the IMF and the OEEC, the regime sought prestige and acceptance in Europe and, eventually, integration into the EEC, while denying democratic rights in Spain. The European Socialists and trade unionists publicly protested against the Franco regime, both by making direct representations, and, through the European Parliament or the ILO, giving negative publicity in a very sensitive period when international opinion really mattered to

Conclusions

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the Franco regime. This constant criticism of the authoritarian nature of Franco’s Spain and the repeated demands for democratisation definitely encouraged the Spanish opposition. Each of the international actors presented in the book followed one or both of these categories of actions. The main contribution of the SI was to recognise the PSOE renovado, a step that was essential for the establishment of a strong Socialist opposition within Spain. Its role was to keep Socialists in Europe aware of the PSOE’s needs and to co-ordinate collective actions in favour of the PSOE, such as numerous fund-raising campaigns. Significantly, the SI persuaded its affiliated members to focus their attention on one particular party rather than spread their assistance to other forces. In the 1960s, the Germans had tended to follow their own agenda: the SPD helped Tierno Galván, and the IG Metall within the DGB helped the ASO. Those two strategies pursued by the Germans were not productive and, eventually, their full support was redirected towards the PSOE and the UGT. The ICFTU acted as a financial lifeline for the UGT. The UGT was considered by the ICFTU as a truly democratic trade union as opposed to the emerging Communist trade union, the CC.OO. The ICFTU and its major affiliates such as the DGB, the AFL-CIO and the TUC, always regarded Communism as a major threat. Like the Socialist group, who used the European Parliament to focus world attention on the true character of the Spanish authoritarian regime, the ICFTU used the ILO to protest against the lack of Spanish workers’ rights. The ICFTU also protested directly to the regime, in a way that Spanish workers themselves were unable to do, and kept emphasising that the regime was not, in its political culture and institutions, part of the free international community. The British Labour movement worked within the framework of the SI and the ICFTU, but also took its own initiatives. Its major contribution was to gather information about all the Spanish Socialist forces through numerous visits and contacts with them, and to feed that information back to the SI, interparty contacts and the European Socialist group. This eased the decision to recognise the PSOE as the official Socialist opposition. By these visits and by attending trials in Spain, the British Labour movement gave moral support and encouragement to Spanish Socialists and trade unionists. On several occasions its presence influenced the sentences passed on arrested opposition members. The French Socialists’ moral and material assistance to the Spanish Socialists and trade unionists was reactive and often took the form of internal rhetoric and logistics within the domain of French domestic politics. For instance, they were accustomed to rhetorically attacking the Franco regime, in contrast with the British and the Germans, who actively

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took external initiatives in favour of the Spanish Socialists. The French Socialists made the headquarters of the SFIO available for the PSOE/UGT in Toulouse and assisted in the publication of the newspaper Le Socialiste. Accordingly, the French Socialists kept the PSOE/UGT alive at a critical moment when the French government was in favour of establishing links with Franco’s Spain. The German SPD and DGB can be regarded as amongst the most important organisations within the SI and the ICFTU respectively. Because of the influx of Spanish workers into Germany in the 1960s, the organisation of Spanish workers became a priority for the German trade unions. Among other activities, the DGB through the IG Metall, helped the distribution in Germany of the bulletin of the UGT (Exprés Español), the organisation of seminars and courses for the Spanish workers, the publication of Servicio de Prensa, and the broadcasting of news about Spain on Radio Baviera. Moreover, even though the unitary trade union it wanted could not be achieved, the DGB was important in the eventual consolidation of the UGT in Spain. The SPD gave substantial financial and organisational support to the PSOE of Felipe González, and this was further encouraged by the special relationship between González and Willy Brandt. The setting-up of the Ebert Foundation in Madrid in 1975 and the assistance given to the establisment of the Pablo Iglesias and Largo Caballero Foundations contributed to the organisation of the PSOE renovado and the UGT during the transitional period. Overall the intervention of European Socialists and trade unionists had a favourable impact on the establishment of a meaningful Socialist opposition and on the delegitimising of the Franco regime, both in Spain and abroad. It has long been apparent that international factors, notably the continuing Cold War, the post-war economic boom in Western Europe, and the foundation and development of the EEC, all in various ways created a political and economic context in which the eventual emergence of democracy in Spain became more likely. But in the Spanish process of democratisation specific international actors were also significant. In particular, it has been argued here that European Socialists and trade unionists played a more relevant and crucial role than has usually been acknowledged. As Felipe González himself stated: We could say that one of the factors that has allowed the public appearance of the Socialist Party inside Spain, has been the strong European support given by the European Socialists and the SocialDemocratic parties to the PSOE.2

Notes

1 Introduction 1. See, e.g., Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds) Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Guillermo O’Donell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986; Guillermo O’Donell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986; Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (eds) Democratization in Eastern Europe; Domestic and International Perspectives, Routledge, London, 1994; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991; Yassi Shain and Juan J. Linz, Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995; Dankart A. Rustow, ‘Democracy: A Global Revolution?’, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1990, pp. 75–91; David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh and Paul Lewis (eds) Democratization, Polity Press/Open University, Cambridge, 2000. 2. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1971; Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1989, p. 221. Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1998. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl add two more conditions to the previous seven: ‘Popularity elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials’ and the ‘Polity must be self governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system’ in Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl ‘What Democracy is … and is not’ in Larry Diamond and March Platter (eds) The Gobal Resurgence of Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1993. p. 45. 3. Geoffrey Pridham, ‘International Influences and Democratic Transition’ in Geoffrey Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1991, p. 5. See also, Geoffray Pridham, ‘The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective’ in Gunther Richard, Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos and Puhle, Hans-Jurgen (eds) The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1995. 189

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4. Edward Malefakis, ‘Spain and its Francoist Heritage’ in John Herz, From Dictatorship to Democracy. Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, Greenwood Press, London, 1982, p. 216. 5. Juan José Linz, ‘La transición española en perspectiva comparada’ in Javier Tusell and Alvaro Soto (eds) Historia de la transición 1975–1986, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1996. 6. Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, Methuen, London, 1986, p. 227. 7. Laurence Whitehead, ‘International Aspects of Democratization’, in Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds) Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, p. 4. 8. Ibid. 9. Laurence Whitehead, ‘The International Dimension of Democratization’ in Laurence Whitehead (ed.) The International Dimensions of Democratization. Europe and the Americas, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 3–25. 10. Laurence Whitehead, ‘Concerning International Support for Democracy in the South’ in R. Luckham and G. White (eds) Democratization in the South. The Jagged Wave, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996. 11. Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neodemocracies’ in Laurence Whitehead (ed.) The International Dimensions of Democratization. Europe and the Americas, pp. 26–54. 12. In the introduction to Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, p. 5. 13. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991, p. 85. 14. Alfred Tovias, ‘International Context of Democratic Transition’ in Geoffrey Pridham, The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain Greece and Portugal, Frank Cass, London, 1984, p. 169. 15. Philippe Schmitter, ‘The Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe (and Latin America)’, European University Institute, paper, cited in Geoffrey Pridham, ‘International Influences and Democratic Transition’ in Geoffrey Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe. Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1991, p. 7. 16. Geoffrey Pridham, ‘International Influences and Democratic Transition. Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics’ in Geoffrey Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, p. 29. 17. Paul W. Drake, International Factors in Democratisation, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investiugaciones, Madrid, 1994. Paul W. Drake, ‘The International Causes of Democratisation 1947–1990’ in Paul W. Drake and Mathew D. McCubbins (eds) The Origins of Liberty, Political and Economic Liberalisation in the Modern World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998, p. 71. 18. Jean Grugel, ‘Contextualizing Democratization. The Changing Significance of Transnational Factors and Non-state Actors’ in Jean Grugel (ed.) Democracy without Borders. Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies,

Notes

19.

20.

21. 22.

23.

24.

25.

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Routledge/ECPR, London, 1999, p. 19. See also Jean Grugel ‘Support Democratisation: A European View. European Political Parties and Latin America’, European Review of Latin America and the Caribbean Studies, 60, 1996, pp. 87–104. Peter Burnell (ed.), Democracy Assistance. International Cooperation for Democratization, Frank Cass, London, 2000. On Democracy Assistance, see Michael Cox, John G. Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (eds) American Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies and Impacts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, Carnegie Endowmnet for International Peace, Washington, 1999. Larry Diamond, ‘Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments and Isuues’ in A. Hadenius (ed.) Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 311–70. Larry Diamond, ‘The Globalization of Democracy’ in Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz and Steve R. Dorr (eds) Global Transformation and the Third World, Adamantine Press, London, 1993. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1999, p. 272. Karen Dawisha (ed.) The International Dimension of Postcommunist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Sharpe, New York and London, 1997. See also Sarah E. Mendelson, ‘Democracy Assiatance and Political Transition in Russia. Between Success and Failure’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring 2001, pp. 68–106. Tom Farer (ed.) Beyond Sovereignty. Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996. See also Arturo Valenzuela, ‘External Actors in Latin America’ in James F. Hollifield and Calvin Jillson (eds) Pathways to Democracy. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, Routledge, New York, 1999; Wolf Grabendorff, ‘International Support for Democracy in Contemporary Latin America’, in Laurence Whitehead (ed.) The International Dimensions of Democratization. Europe and the Americas, pp. 201–26. Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price, ‘Democratization in Eastern Europe’ and Thomas Niklasson, ‘The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1988–9. Interactions between Domestic Change and Foreign Policy’ in Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (eds) Democratization in Eastern Europe, Routledge, London, 1994; Jacques Rupnik, ‘Eastern Europe. The International Context’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 2000, pp. 115–29. For a full account of the transition, see Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, Methuen, London, 1986; Victoria Prego, Así se hizo la transición, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1995; José María Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain, Croom Helm, London, 1982; Manuel Redero San Román (ed.) La transición a la democracia en España, Ayer Marcial Pons, 1994; Charles Powell, España en democracia 1975–2000, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés 2001. About Juan Carlos I, King of Spain, see Tom Burns Marañón, Conversaciones sobre el rey, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1995; Charles T. Powell, Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-made Monarch, St Antony’s Macmillan, Oxford, 1996; Joaquín Bardavo, Las claves del rey: el laberinto de la transición, Espasa Calpe, 1995. On political parties and trade unions, see, Richard Gunther (ed.) Spain after Franco: the Making of a Competitive Party System, University of California Press,

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26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31. 32.

European Socialists and Spain 1988; Mario Caciagli, Elecciones y partidos en la transición española, siglo XXI, 1986; Holm Detlev Köhler, El movimiento sindical en España, Fundamentos, Madrid, 1995; Robert Fishman, Working Class Organisation and the Return to Democracy in Spain, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990; Ruth Berins Collier, Paths towards Democracy. The Working Class and the Elites in Western Europe and South America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. On the economy, see José Luis Garcia Delgado (ed.) Economía española de la transición y de la democracia, CIS, Madrid, 1990; Keith Salmon, The Modern Spanish Economy: Transformation and Integration into Europe, Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1995. On the Spanish Church, Audrey Brasslof, Religion and Politics in Spain. The Spanish Church in Transition, 1962–1996, Macmillan, London, 1998. On regionalism, see J.P. Fusi (ed.), España. Autonomías, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1989; Francisco Letamendia Belzunce, Historia del nationalismo vasco y de ETA, 3 vols, R&B Ediciones, San Sebastian, 1994; Albert Balcells, Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996. Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, p. 113. Geoffrey Pridham, ‘The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practise and Inter-regional Comparisons’ in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford (eds) Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe, Leicester University Press, London and Washington, 1997, pp. 7–29. On elite negotiations, see Donald Share, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4, January 1987, pp. 525–48; Richard Gunther, ‘Spain: The Very Model of Modern Elite Settlement’ in John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds) Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Sothern Europe, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 38–80. Charles T. Powell, ‘La dimensión internacional de la transición española’ in Manuel Ferrer (ed.) Franquismo y transición democrática. Lecciones de historia reciente de España, Centro de Estudios de Humanidades, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 1993, pp. 101–43; Charles T. Powell, ‘La dimensión exterior de la transición política española’, Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, no. 18 (May–August 1994), pp. 79–116; Charles Powell, ‘International Aspects of Democratization. The Case of Spain’ in Laurence Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization. Europe and the Americas, pp. 285–314. Willi Birkelbach, ‘Rapport sur les aspects politiques el institutionnels de l’adhésion ou de l’association á la Communauté’, document 122, Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, 15 Janvier 1962. Beate Kohler, Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal, Butterworth, London, 1982, p. 42; Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Gordie Shabad, Spain after Franco. The Making of a Comparative Party System, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1986, p. 75. Hans Janitschek, ‘The State of the International’, Socialist Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 6, November–December 1975, pp. 105–8. ICFTU, The European Trade Union Movement within ICFTU, Know Your Facts, No. 4, Brussels, 1964.

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33. ICFTU, ICFTU, 20 years, 1949–1969, Brussels, 1969, p. 23. 34. Jack Jones and Will Paynter, both leaders of major trade unions, fought in the British Battalion of the International Brigades. Another union leader, Bob Edwards, led the small Independent Labour Party (ILP) contingent. 35. Francisco Román Díaz, Antes y después de Suresnes, Edinford, Málaga, 1992, p. 96. 36. Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, ‘Spain from Corporatism to Corporatism’ in Allan Williams, Southern Europe Transformed. Political and Economic Change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, Harper & Row, London, 1984, p.137. 37. Maria Teresa La Porte, La Política Europea del Régimen de Franco (1957–1962), Pamplona Eunsa, 1992, p. 90. 38. Wolfgang Wipplinger, ‘Spain’s Economic Progress since 1960’ in William Salisbury and James Theberge (eds) Spain in the 1970s. Economics, Social Structure, Foreign Policy, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976, p. 2. 39. La Porte, op. cit., p. 94. 40. Stanley Payne, The Franco Regime 1939–1975, Wisconsin University Press, Wisconsin, 1987, p. 473. 41. Allan Williams, Southern Europe Transformed. Political and Economic Change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, Harper & Row, London, 1984, p. 10. 42. Eduard De Blaye, Franco and the Politics of Spain, Penguin, Middlesex, 1976, p. 206. 43. Sheelagh Ellwood, ‘The Working Class under the Franco Regime’ in Paul Preston (ed.) Spain in Crisis. The Evolution and Decline of the Franco Regime, The Harvester Press, London, 1976, p. 167. 44. J. Amsden, Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict, London School of Economics, London, 1972, p. 130. 45. Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, Allen and Unwin, London, 1979, p. 140; José María Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent, Tavistock Publications, London, 1978, p. 29. 46. Paul Preston, Franco. A Biography, HarperCollins, London, 1993, p. 701. 47. Carr and Fusi, op. cit., p. 163. 48. Ibid., p. 257. 49. Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, Methuen, London, p. 21. 50. Raymond Carr, Modern Spain 1875–1980, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 169. 51. Victoria Prego, Así se hizo la transición, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1995, pp. 87–9. 52. Carr and Fusi, op. cit., pp. 195–206. 53. John Coverdale, The Political Transformation of Spain After Franco, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979, p. 39. 54. José María Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain, Croom Helm, London, 1982, p. 11; Juan Antonio Ortega Díaz Ambrona, ‘Transition to Democracy in Spain’ in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents, Spain: Conditional Democracy, Croom Helm, London, 1984, p. 25. 55. The main presentations to the Congress are in Javier Tusell and Alvaro Soto (eds) Historia de la transición 1975–1986, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1996. 56. Pilar Ortuño Anaya, ‘El Movimiento laborista británico y España (1974–1977)’, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Historia Contemporanea, Madrid, 1996, pp. 279–93.

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2 The Socialist International 1960–77 1. Luis Ayala, ‘40 years since Frankfurt’, Socialist Affairs, Issue 2/1991, pp. 10–13; Hans Janitschek, ‘The State of the International’, Socialist Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 6, November–December 1975, pp. 105–8; Gianni Finocchiaro ‘Socialism in Europe Today’, Socialist Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 3, May–June 1976, pp. 54–9; Stephen Padgett and William Paterson, A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe, Longman, London, 1991, pp. 221–3. 2. Felicity Williams, La Internacional Socialista y América Latina. Una visión crítica, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, Azcapotzalco, 1984, p. 98. 3. Declaration of the Socialist International adopted at its First Congress held in Frankfort-am-Main on 30 June–3 July 1951. 4. Hans Janitschek, ‘The State of the International’, Socialist Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 105–8. 5. Rui Mateus, Contos Proibidos. Memorias de un PS Desconhecido, Publicaçoes dom Quixote, Lisboa, 1996; Mario Soares, Portugal’s Struggle for Liberty, Allen & Unwin, London, 1975. 6. FPI, PSOE, CE, Socialist International(1945–76), Memorandum du PSOE sur la décision du Bureau de l’Internationale Socialiste de réorganiser la Commission pour les affaires concernant l’Espagne, 3 August 1970. 7. Ibid. 8. Paul Preston, Franco. A Biography, HarperCollins, London, 1993, p. 587. 9. FPI, PSOE, CE, Socialist International (1945–76), Meeting of the SI Bureau, 2–4 December 1960. Translation from Llopis’ speech. 10. FPI, PSOE, Socialist International (1945–76), Memorandum du PSOE sur la décision du Bureau de l’Internationale Socialiste de réorganiser la Commission pour les affaires concernant l’Espagne, 3 August 1970. Translation from the French. 11. FPI, PSOE, CE, Socialist International (1945–76), Meeting of the SI Bureau, 2–4 December 1960. 12. FPI, PSOE, Confidential Report sent to the Spain Commission of the SI, January 1961. 13. FPI, PSOE, CE, Circulars (1964–67), Circular No. 4, 27 December 1964. 14. IISH, SI/Spain, selection of statements, cables and resolutions 1966–71. 15. Ibid. 16. IISH, SI/Spain, the International protest against forthcoming trial of Spanish socialists, SI,NS 41/70, 9 April 1970. 17. The only coverage given to the trial appeared on 17 April in the newspaper Nuevo Diario. 18. FPI, PSOE, Socialist International (1945–76), Report on the trial of Spanish Socialists, Circular No. 23/70, 27 April 1970. Hans Matthöfer on his return to Germany made a report on the trial to the Executive Committee of the SPD and issued a statement: ‘If the defendants are sentenced because they have spread Social Democratic ideas, then it is clear that Spain has transgressed the basic principles of human rights.’ 19. IISH, SI/Spain, Restablissement du Comite D’Espagne, Obsevations du PSU (Italie), Circular no. B.21/70 24 July 1970. 20. FPI, PSOE, Socialist International, letter from Rodolfo Llopis to Hans Janitschek, 4 August 1970.

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21. FPI, PSOE, Political documentation PSOE-Comité Director, Information about the activities, 4 August 1970. 22. The Council Conference was attended by five heads of state: Bruno Kreisky (Austria), Willy Brandt (Germany), Golda Meir (Israel), Tryve Bratelli (Norway) and Olaf Palme (Sweden). IISH, SI and Spain, Resolution on Fascism in Europe adopted by Council Conference of SI, Helsinki, 25–27 May 1971. 23. John Ivar Nalsund, ‘Socialists in Spain’, Socialist Affairs, December 1971, pp. 237–8. 24. Alfonso Guerra, Felipe González. De Suresnes a la Moncloa, Novatex, Madrid, 1984, pp. 24–8. 25. Ibid., p. 33. 26. Eduardo Chamorro, Historia del PSOE, Madrid, 1980, p. 76; Interview with Francisco López Real, Madrid, 12 July 1994. 27. Guerra, op. cit, p. 42; FPI, PSOE, Report by Pablo Castellano about the PSOE in exile and the split, 1973. 28. IISH, SI/Spain, Report of the SI on the situation in the Spanish Socialist movement, December 1972. 29. Ibid. 30. The members from the interior were: Nicolás Redondo, Political Secretary, Enrique Múgica, Organisation Secretary, Pablo Castellano, International Secretary, Felipe González, Press and Propaganda, Agustín González, Syndical Secretary, Eduardo López Albizu, Joaquín Jou Fonollá, Marcelo García and Alfonso Guerra, Administration Secretaries. 31. The five Executive members from the exterior were as follows: Juan Iglesias, Organisation Secretary; Fernando Gutierrez, Administrative Secretary; Arsenio Jimeno, Secretary of Press and Propaganda; Francisco López Real, Secretary for International Relations; Carmen García Bloise, Secretary for Political Education. 32. Bernard Montanier, representing the French Socialist Party and acting of behalf of the Socialist International; Tom Driberg, British Labour Party; Claude Dejardins, Belgian Socialist Party; Hans Matthöfer, German Social Democratic Party; Ellisca Alevi, Israel Labour Party; Peter Doyle, British Labour Party Young Socialist; Gilbert Sans, French Young Socialists. 33. José M. Velasco, Ildefonso Torregrosa, Antonio Pallares, Miguel Armentia and Rodolfo Llopis. 34. IISH, SI/Spain, Report of the SI on the situation in the Spanish Socialist movement, December 1972. 35. FPI, PSOE, CE, France (1945–74), letter from Arsenio Jimeno and Carmen García to Robert Pontillon, Paris, 28 November 1972. 36. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party. A History of Factionalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 286. 37. Abdón Mateos, El PSOE contra Franco, Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1993, p. 445. 38. IISH, SI/Spain, The situation of the Spanish Socialist movement, 1 December 1972. 39. Ibid. 40. IISH, SI/Spain, Minutes on Spain from draft Minutes of Bureau Meeting held in London on 9–10 December 1972. 41. Ibid; Manuel Peydró Caro, Las escisiones del PSOE, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1980.

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42. Mateos, op. cit, p. 446. 43. FPI, PSOE, Socialist International, letter from Francisco López Real to Rodney Balcomb, 8 January 1973. The invitation was responded to by the British Labour Party and the Italian PSI. 44. FPI, PSOE, Socialist International, Report presented by the Executive Committee of the PSOE to the Special Commission of the SI, 9 January 1973. 45. The meeting was attended by the President, Bruno Pitterman; the Secretary, Rodney Balcomb; Interpreter: Carlos Parra; Members: Ron Hayward, Secretary of the Labour Party; Tom MacNally, International Secretary of the Labour Party; Victoria Mezza, Italian Socialist Party; Absent: Nenni; Saragat; French Socialist Party and Swedish Socialist Party. The PSOE(r) was represented by Enrique Múgica, Pablo Castellano, Juan Iglesias, Arsenio Jimeno and the PSOE(h) by Rodolfo Llopis, Juan Martínez de Velasco, Luis Morilla and Manuel Turrion. FPI, PSOE, Socialist International, special Commission to explore the reunification of the Spanish Socialists, January 1973. 46. Ibid. 47. FPI, PSOE, correspondence between the Organisation Secretary and the International Relations Secretary, letter from Juan Iglesias to Francisco López Real, 28 February 1973. 48. FPI, PSOE, Circulars (1972–74), Circular No. 11, March 1973. 49. FPI, PSOE, Political Documentation PSOE(h), Minutes of the meeting of the Bureau Committee of the SI, London 17–18 March 1973. 50. FPI, PSOE, Information about the meeting of the Bureau Committee of the SI, London, 16 March 1973. 51. FPI, PSOE, correspondence Organisation Secretary with International Relations Secretary (1972–74), letter from Juan Iglesias to Francisco López Real, 27 March 1973; Action PSF/PSOE, 26 March 1973. 52. FPI, PSOE, correspondence of the PSOE Executive Committe with Carlos Pardo, letter from Juan Iglesias to Carlos Pardo, 9 April 1973. 53. Interview with Jenny Little, London, 12 December 1993; interview with Pablo Castellano, Madrid, 5 July 1994. 54. FPI, PSOE, correspondence of the Organisation Secretary with the International Relations Secretary (1972–74), letter from Juan Iglesias to Francisco López Real, 2 May 1973. Minutes of the Executive Committee meeting, 28 April 1973. 55. FPI, PSOE, correspondence of the Organisation Secretary with the International Relations Secretary (1972–74), letter from Francisco López Real to Juan Iglesias, 2 May 1973. 56. FPI, PSOE, correspondence of the Executive Committee with Carlos Pardo, letter from Juan Iglesias to Carlos Pardo, 22 May 1973. 57. FPI, PSOE, Circulars (1972–74), Paris, June 1973. 58. Mateos, op. cit, pp. 448–50. 59. IISH, SI/Spain, letter of Balcomb to López Real, 27 July 1973. 60. IISH, SI/Spain, Special Committee on Spain, London, 29 August 1973. 61. Ibid. 62. Report of the Bureau on activities of the Socialist International, presented to the XIII Congress, Geneva, 26–28 November 1976 by Hans Janitschek. R. Llopis sent an appeal against the decision to the Council Conference of the International which was rejected by the Bureau.

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63. Interview with Jenny Little, London 9 December 1993. 64. The Labour Party, the Chilean Radical Party, the French Socialist Party, the Italian Socialist Parties and the Swedish Socialist Party. 65. FPI, PSOE, Circular of the Executive Committee of the PSOE to the Members of the National Committee, no. 29–19, Paris, June 1974. 66. MRC, TUC/Spain, Report on the Conferencia Socialista Ibérica, London July 1975. 67. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, letter from Rodney Balcomb to Jenny Little, 30 July 1974. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. IISH, SI/Spain, Circular No. S5/75, 7 July 1975; Minutes of the second meeting of the Spain Committee of the SI, London, 12 January 1975. 71. The meeting was attended by the following participants: chairman: Jenny Little (Great Britain); Chile: Carlos Parra; Germany: Veronika Isenberg; Italy: Gino Bianco; Spain: Pablo Castellano; Sweden: Bernt Carlsson; Socialist International: Rodney Balcomb. 72. Personal notes of Jenny Little. 73. IISH, SI/Spain, Minutes of the first meeting of the Spain Committee, London 13 September 1974. Circular No. S2/75, 9 January 1975. 74. During the 1960s more than one million Spanish workers emigrated to Europe. At the end of 1973, France had 600,000 Spanish emigrants, Germany had 200,000, followed by Belgium, Great Britain and Holland. 75. Cambio 16, 9 September 1974. 76. IISH, SI/Spain, Minutes of the first meeting of the Spain Committee, London 13 September 1974. Circular No. S2/75, 9 January 1975. 77. Personal notes of Jenny Little. 78. Speech by Pontillon, International Secretary of the French Socialist Party, Suresnes. El Socialista, October 1974, p. 7. 79. FPI, PSOE, International Resolutions. Resolutions of the 13th Congress of the PSOE, Suresnes, October 1974. 80. Otto Kersten, General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; Jenny Little, Acting International Secretary of the British Labour Party and Greville Janner, MP British Labour Party; Colette Anger, French Socialist Party; Gerhard Jahn, Federal German Minister of Justice German Social Democratic Party; Liv Aasen MP, Norwegian Labour Party and Karl Nandrup Dahl Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions and Rodney Balcomb, Assistant General Secretary of the Socialist International. 81. Socialist Affairs, November–December 1974, p. 95; SI, Report of the Bureau on the activities of the Socialist International 1972–76, Statement on Spain, London 26 October 1974. 82. IISH, Circular No. S5/75 7 July 1975, Minutes of the second meeting of the Spain Committee of the SI, London, 12 January 1975. 83. IISH, SI/Spain, Spain Committee. Recommendations to the Bureau meeting, 13 January 1975. 84. The meeting was attended by Oscar Debunne (Belgium); Jenny Little (Britain); Hans-Eberhard Dingels (Germany); Manuel Bonmati and Jose Rivera (Spain); Bernt Carlsson (Sweden); Hans Janitschek and Rodney Balcomb (Socialist International); Guests: Rauno Viemeroe (Finland) and Yoram Peri (Israel).

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85. IISH, SI/Spain, Minutes of the third meeting of the Spain Committee, Ireland 10 July 1975; Circular No. S6/75. 14 November 1975. 86. Ibid. 87. Working documents of the European Parliament, 24 September 1975, document 270/75. 88. IISH, SI/Spain, Report of the Bureau on the activities of the Socialist International, Statement on Spain, London, 14 September 1975. 89. IISH, SI/Spain, Bureau meetings August 73–76 (293). Bureau meeting of October 1975. 90. IISH, SI/Spain, Circular No. M26/75, 10 October 1975. 91. El Socialista, November 1975. 92. IISH, SI/Spain, Meeting of the Spain Committee of the SI, Amsterdam, 16 November 1975. 93. Ibid. 94. El Socialista, November 1975. 95. IISH, SI/Spain, Report of the Bureau on the activities of the Socialist International 1972–76. Statement on Spain. Brussels, 30 November 1975. 96. The mission was represented by Hans Janitschek, General Secretary of the SI, Jenny Little, the Labour Party, Veronica Isemberg, the SPD, Abraham Allon, Israeli Labour Party, Jaime Gama, the Portuguese Socialist Party and Pierre Guidoni, the French Socialist Party. 97. SI. Report of the Bureau on the activities of the Socialist International 1972–76. Statement of the mission to Spain, Madrid, 16 January 1976. 98. Jenny Little, ‘Socialist International Mission to Spain’, in Socialist Affairs, March–April 1976, Vol. 26, No. 2. 99. IISH, SI/Spain, Statement SI, 29 January 1976. 100. El Socialista, 7 December 1976. 101. Speech by Bernt Carlsson, at the I Congress of the Madrid Federation of the PSOE, 6 March 1977.

3 The ICFTU 1960–77 1. ICFTU, ICFTU, 20 Years, 1949–1969, Brussels, 1969, p. 15. 2. By mid-1960, Germany had a total of 6.5 million members affiliated to the ICFTU and Great Britain had 8.2 million members. The European Trade Union Movement within ICFTU, Know your Facts, No. 4, Brussels, 1964, p. 115. 3. ICFTU, ICFTU, the First Ten Years, Brussels, 1959, pp. 13–21. 4. ICFTU, 20 Years, op. cit, p. 23. 5. Ibid., pp. 23–4. 6. ICFTU, The Defense of Trade Union Rights. The ICFTU in Action No. 2, 1965. 7. ICFTU, The First Ten Years, op. cit. 8. Edouard de Blaye, Franco and the Politics of Spain, Penguin, Middlesex, 1976, p. 495. 9. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party. A History of Factionalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 221–30. 10. Francisco Román Díaz, Antes y después de Suresnes, Edinford, Málaga, 1992, p. 70.

Notes

199

11. Sergio Vilar, Historia del Anti-Franquismo, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1984, p. 272. For a full account of the arrested members, see Carlos Martínez Cobo y José Martínez Cobo, La travesía del desierto. Intrahistoria del PSOE, Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1995, pp. 38–9. 12. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU/IFCTU, International Union Conference on Spain, Brussels, 29 October 1961. 13. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU/IFCTU, joint statement on Spain, Brussels, 23 December 1960. 14. See Paul Preston, Franco. A Biography, HarperCollins, London, 1995, p. 685. 15. On trade union matters and labour relations inside Spain in 1961–62, see J. Amsden, Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict, London School of Economics, London, 1972, and José María Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent, Tavistock Publications, London, 1978. 16. FLC, UGT, ACE, 10 March 1961. 17. The latter two organisations were formed under the auspices of the IFCTU. 18. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press statement, PRS/pw- Com.17/61. 19. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, PRS/mfm-Com:51/61, 22 December 1961. 20. FLC, UGT, correspondence of Pascual Tomás with ICFTU/IFCTU and AFLCIO on the trip to USA, 1961, background statement by representatives of the ICFTU and the IFCTU. 21. FLC, UGT, Correspondence of Pascual Tomás with ICFTU/IFCTU and AFLCIO on the trip to USA, 1961. News from the AFL-CIO, 23 May 1961. 22. FLC, UGT, Correspondence of Pascual Tomás with ICFTU/IFCTU and AFLCIO on the trip to USA, 1961. Background statement by representatives of the ICFTU-IFCTU, 23 May 1961. 23. FLC, UGT, Correspondence of Pascual Tomás with ICFTU/IFCTU and AFL/CIO on the trip to USA, 1961. Report of Pascual Tomás about the mission. 24. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Omer Becú to George Woodcock, 21 June 1961. 25. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, International Trade Union Conference on Spain, Brussels, 29 October 1961. 26. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Circular No. 9(1962) to all affiliated organisations and International Trade Secretariats, 8 May 1962. 27. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Circular No. 11 (1962) to all affiliated organisations and ITS, 11 May 1962. 28. MRC, TUC/Spain, Spanish strikes, ICFTU and UGT appeals, AK/JP 18 May 1962. 29. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Conference on Spain, Brussels 17–18 May 1967. According to the TUC contributions included the following: £5,000 from the ICFTU’s International Solidarity Fund; £1,375 from the Swedish LO; £2,500 from the Dutch NVV; £1,250 from the Austrian TUC; £1,250 from the Norwegian LO; about £12,500 from the FGTB (the Cooperative Movement and the Socialist Party of Belgium); about £9,000 from the German Metalworkers’ union; £3,570 from the United Automobile Workers of America; over £1,000 from UGT sections in various countries. British contributions included £250 from the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, £1,000 given by the Scottish miners, and £250 from the Labour

200

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

European Socialists and Spain Party. The TUC donated £2,000 and the Spanish Democrats Defence Fund Committee sent £2,400. MRC, TUC/Spain, Joint ICFTU/IFCTU Committee on Spain, Brussels, 26–27 April 1962. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press and Radio service, 10 May 1962. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from the General Secretary to the Spanish Embassy, London, 15 May 1962. FLC, UGT, CE, correspondence with the ICFTU (1960–62), Circular No. 7(1962) to all affiliated organisations and ITS, 14 November 1962. J. Amsden, Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict, London School of Economics, London, 1972, p. 99 José María Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent, Tavistock Publications, London, 1978, p. 30. Ibid., pp. 31–2. On USO see Fernando Almendros Morcillo (ed.) El sindicalismo de clase en España (1939–1977), Peninsula, Madrid, 1978, pp. 87–119. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release, 20 February 1964. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release, Com.33/64, 13 August 1964. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, PRS/df-37/64, 30 October 1964. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release, 25 November 1965. Ibid. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release, PRS/cgv-com 27/65. Also efforts were made by the joint ICFTU/IFCTU Committee to bring ASO and AS together through the creation inside Spain of a Co-ordinating Committee. The effort failed because of the lack of will of both organisations. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Braunthal to George Woodcock, Brussels 10 June 1965. FLC, UGT, CE, correspondence with ICFTU (1965–67), réunion CISL/FIOM/UGT/ASO, Paris, 13 March 1966. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party. A History of Factionalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 238–9. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, correspondence from Hargreaves to Woodcock, 1 March 1966. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, Spain: ASO and other trade union factions, 7 October 1966. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, AK/SA 21 January 1966. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, Spain: ASO and other trade union factions, AK/DG 7 October 1966. See Fernando Almendros Morcillo, El sindicalismo de clase en España (1939–1977), Peninsula, Madrid, 1978, pp. 46–7. See José María Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent, Tavistock, London, 1978, p. 33. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 42 Executive Board/13, 14–15 March 1967. ICFTU submitted a protested on its own because the Joint Committee had not held any meeting since 1965. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, PRS/sab-com 11(1967), 5 May 1967. MRC,TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Conference on Spain, Brussels 17 and 18 May 1967. OD/mdt-9 May 1967. TUC was not present.

Notes

201

59. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Co-ordinating Committee on Spain, Geneva, 3 June 1967. 60. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Appendix 28 ISFC/70, Spain Co-ordinating Committee – Programme of Action on Spain. 61. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Coordinating Committee on Spain, 3 June 1967. Appendix I. 62. Ibid. 63. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Spain 27 ISFC/81–83. 64. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Appendix 28 ISFC/70 65. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Appendix 28 ISF/70. 66. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 27 ISFC/81–83. 67. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, Spain, AK, 5 November 1967. 68. José Manuel Arija, Nicolás Redondo. Perfil humano y político, Cambio 16, Madrid, 1977, pp. 29–30. 69. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Morris Paladino to all affiliate members, Brussels, 12 July 1968. 70. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 45 Executive Board, Brussels 20–22 November 1968. 71. FLC, UGT, CE, correspondence with ICFTU (1968–68), Information about persecution, arrests, trials of workers (January 1969–February 1969), Brussels, 10 February 1969. 72. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release PRS/COM-ad-1/69, 27 January 1969, letter from Harm G. Buiter to certain affiliated organisations and to all international trade secretariats, Brussels, 28 January 1969. 73. MRC, TUC/Spain, ILO, Press Release, 31 May 1968. 74. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, statement on the Interim Report of the ILO Study Group on Spain, 19 May 1969. 75. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Harm Buiter to certain affiliated organisations and to certain ITS, Brussels, 20 February 1969. 76. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, ICFTU statement submitted to ILO study group on Spain on 12 February 1969. 77. MRC, TUC/Spain, ILO, Interim Report of the ILO Study Group, 23 April 1969. 78. MRC, TUC/Spain, ILO, Third Report of the study group, Geneva, 3 April 1969. 79. Manuel Ludevid, 40 años de sindicato vertical, Laia, Barcelona, 1976, p. 87. 80. MRC, TUC/Spain, ILO Third Report of the study group, 3 April 1969. 81. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 49 Executive Board/9 (D), 26–28 November 1969. 82. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, statement of the Interim Report of the ILO Study Group on Spain, Brussels, 16 May 1969. 83. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Harm Buiter to all affiliate organisations in Europe, International Trade Secretariat, Executive Board members, Brussels, 16 March 1970. 84. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 50 Executive Board 11–12 March 1970. 85. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 49 Executive Board/9 (d) 26–28 November 1969. 86. MRC, TUC/Spain, ILO study group to examine the labour and trade union situation in Spain, Geneva, 3 April 1969. 87. FLC, UGT, CE, correspondence with ICFTU (1969–70), letter from Hans G. Buiter to Antonio María Oriol y Urquijo, Brussels, 20 September 1969. 88. FLC, UGT, CE, correspondence with ICFTU (1969–70), press release, ICFTU, PRS/mlt-com.23 (1969), 20 November 1969.

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89. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Resolution concerning the examination by the ILO of the Labour and trade union situation in Spain, 1 April 1970. 90. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press and Radio Service, 1 June 1970. PRS/mdtcom.14/70. 91. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 51 Executive Board, Brussels, 8–10 December 1970; letter from Omer Becú to Cyril Plant, 29 September 1970. 92. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 49 Executive Board, 26–28 November 1969. 93. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Morris Paladino to member organisations of the Co-ordinating Committee on Spain, Brussels, 2 June 1970. 94. Ibid. 95. The members of the UGT were: Jóse Luis Echave Asensio, Jóse Agustín Serrano Sebastian, Salustiano Solá Albinabarre, Eduardo López Albizu, Pablo Iglesias Freire, Eusebio Virto Dañobeitia, Luis Tallaeche, Enrique Alonso Iglesias, Pablo Chueca, Santiago Martínez Gómez, Amelio Revilla, Agustin Alday, Ramón Rubial y Felipe García Fanjul. 96. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 51 Executive Board, 8–10 December 1970. 97. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, PRS/dm-Com 17 (1970), 22 July 1970. 98. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press release PRS/sma-Com. 24 (1970). 99. FLC, UGT, CE, correspondence with ICFTU (1970), letter from Heribert Maier to Manuel Muiño, Brussels, 26 October 1970. 100. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release PRS/dm-Com.26 (1970), 5 November 1970. 101. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 51 Executive Board 8–10 December 1970. 102. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release PRS/a.v-Com 29 (1970). 103. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Circular No. 67 (1970), 16 December 1970. 104. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release, PRS/av-Com 29 (1970), 16 December 1970. 105. For a comparison between the New Syndical Law and the ILO recommendations, see Manuel Ludevid, 40 años de sindicalismo vertical, Laia, Barcelona, pp. 86–98. 106. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU/WCL joint statement, 18 March 1971. 107. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter to all member organisations of the Coordinating Committee on Spain, 12 March 1971. 108. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Circular no. 53, 26 October 1971. 109. FLC, ICFTU, Documentation X Congress of the ICFTU London, 10–14 July 1972. 110. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 61 Executive Board/21 (d) (ii), 30–31 May 1974. 111. Ibid. 112. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release, Com PRS/dm-35 (1974) 12 September 1974, declaration of the UGT to the working class, September 1974. 113. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, Press Release, Com 31. 24 September 1975. 114. FLC, ICFTU, Resolution XI World Congress of ICFTU, Mexico, 17–25 October 1975. 115. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Otto Kersten to Len Murray, 22 March 1976. 116. Rodolfo Martín Villa, Al servicio del Estado, Planeta, Barcelona, 1985, p. 34. 117. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Otto Kersten to Len Murray, 24 March 1976.

Notes

203

118. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Nicolás Redondo to Otto Kersten, 13 July 1976. 119. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from Otto Kersten to Len Murray, 30 November 1976. 120. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, letter from J. Vanderveken to all members of the finance committee, 13 September 1977.

4 The British Labour Movement 1959–77 1. For an account of this period see Tom Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991; Bill Alexander, No to Franco, The Struggle Never Stopped 1939–1975, Oval Printshop, London, 1992. 2. Florentino Portero, Franco aislado. La cuestión española (1945–50), Aguilar, 1989, pp. 117–200. 3. See Tom Buchanan, ‘British Politics and Franco’s Spain, 1945–60’, unpublished paper presented at the conference Spain in an International Context, 1936–1959, held at the University of the West of England, 18–20 July 1996. 4. The following appeal was made to the Socialist International: ‘There must be protests against the arrests of the Spanish Socialists by means of strongly worded telegrams to Franco and to Francoists Ambassadors, press statements and public demonstrations. Attempts must be made to prevent the prisoners from being tortured. If there are trials they must take place with all the necessary legal guarantees and friendly foreign lawyers should intervene either as defending council or as observers.’ BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1956–59), NEC Minutes, International Department, letter from Rodolfo Llopis to the Labour Party, 22 November 1958, Int/1958–9/10. 5. Ibid. 6. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1956–59), International Department, Arrest of Socialists and Liberals in Spain, Int/1958–9/7, November 1958. See Edouard de Blaye, Franco and the Politics of Spain, Penguin, Middlesex, 1976, pp. 199–207. 7. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1956–59), International Department, Int/1958–9/7. Draft Resolution. 8. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1956–59), Press and Publicity Department PS/99. 9. The Committee included Walter Padley, Chairman, MP, President of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers and member of the National Executive Committee; Sam Watson, Treasurer; David Ennals, Secretary; Earl Attlee and James Griffiths MP, patrons of the Fund; Peter Benenson, Anthony Wedgwood Benn MP; Ernest Davies MP; Geoffrey de Freitas MP; Hugh Delargy MP; Robert Edwards MP; George Jeger MP; Elwyn Jones MP and representatives of Spanish exile organisations in Britain such as PSOE and UGT, the Basque Nationalist Party and the Catalan Socialist Movement. 10. BLPES, Ernest Davies papers, Labour Party, International Department, Spanish Democrats Defence Fund Committee, Minutes Spain 1, 1958–59. 11. Interview with Jack Jones, London, 5 June 1995.

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12. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, issued by the Labour Party press and publicity department. 5 February 1959. Ps/108. 13. FPI, PSOE, ACE, 28 January 1959. 14. FPI, PSOE, ACE, 4 March 1959. 15. Abdón Mateos, El PSOE contra Franco. Continuidad y renovación del socialismo español 1953–1974, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1993, pp. 113–31. 16. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, report to the SDDC Committee by Peter Benenson, visit to Spain, June 1959. 17. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, Minutes Spain 3, 1958–59, 8 July 1959. 18. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, report to the SDDC by Peter Benenson, visit to Spain, June 1959. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, Minutes Spain 3, 1958–59, 8 July 1959. 24. The accused were: Cesar Cimedevilla; Tomás Llorens; Alonso Novo; Emilio Hurtado; Vicente García; Vicente Lluch; Salvador Franco; José Mena; Isabel Muñoz. 25. The Times, 3 August 1959. 26. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, Report to the SDDC Committee by Ernest Davies, MP. Trial before Madrid Military Court of nine members of the ASU, 3 August 1959. 27. The Times, 4 August 1959. 28. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, Report to the SDDC Committee of visit to Madrid on 2–4 November 1959 by Ernest Davies, 9 November 1959. 29. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, Statement issued to Press, 21 December 1959. 30. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, Report to the SDDC of the visit to Madrid on 21–24 December 1959 by Robert Edwards. 31. Concerning the statement of the Foreign Office, in his report Bob Edwards said: ‘The Spanish Foreign Office press release to the American Press was entirely different to the statement to the British and European press. The American press men received, I understand, documents allegedly signed by me with masses of photostat copies of the European Communist press, obviously in an attempt to involve me in an alleged Communist plot to overthrow Franco. On the assumption that where there is a Communist menace, even though in fact it is non-existent, dollar aid will continue to flow.’ 32. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, press release for 31 December 1959. 33. The News Chronicle and a Paris paper reported the visit of Edwards to Spain. 34. The Times, 24 December 1959. 35. MRC, TUC/Spain, History Sheet Spain, 1960. On Spain and NATO, see Angel Viñas, Los pactos secretos de Franco con EE.UU, Grijalbo, Barcelona, 1981, and Antonio Marquina Barrio, España en la política de seguridad occidental 1939–1986, Ediciones del Ejército, Madrid, 1986. 36. PRO, FO 371/153245, 1960, Admission to NATO, Spain and NATO, 9 December 1960.

Notes

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37. The matters discussed were believed to have included Spain’s recent entry into the OEEC as well as questions concerned with daily movement of Spaniards employed in Gibraltar and discrimination against protestants in Spain. The Times, 2 September 1959. 38. Castiella carried a personal letter from Franco to Eisenhower dated 24 August which contained an invitation to visit Spain. It also gave Spanish backing to the American policy towards the USSR, and gave information on Spanish military projects. Luis Suárez Fernández, Franco y su tiempo, volume VI, Madrid, 1984, p. 126. 39. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, Minutes Spain 4, 1958–59, International Department, 11 November 1959. 40. Antonio Marquina Barrio, España en la política de seguridad occidental, 1939–1986, Madrid, 1986, p. 738. 41. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, Statement to Press, 19 Nov. 1959. 42. MRC, TUC/Spain, 1960 Congress Resolutions. Motion 46: Spain. I.C.1/1(1960–61), 25 October 1960. In June 1960 the ICFTU executive board had adopted a resolution on Spain expressing grave concern about assistance given by governments and inter-governmental organisations to the Franco regime, and the admission of Spain to inter-governmental organisations, and urging their governments to change their policies in connection with Spain. 43. TUC, Report on the Congress 1960, pp. 423–4. 44. PRO, FO 371/153245, 1960. Admission to NATO, Extract from United Kingdom delegation to NATO, letter to Sir Anthony Rumbold, 29 January 1960. 45. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from John Clark to J.A. Hargreaves, 10 April 1961. 46. House of Commons Debates, Volume 638, 11 April 1961, pp. 29–31. 47. MRC, TUC/Spain, International Committee 7, Spain and NATO, 25 April 1961. 48. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from George Woodcock to Lord Home, 4 May 1961. 49. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from the Private Secretary of the Foreign Secretary to George Woodcock, 12 May 1961; The Times, 12 July 1960. 50. MRC, TUC/Spain, Labour Party, the visit of the Spanish Foreign Secretary, Int/1959–60/29, June 1960. 51. The Times, 23 May 1961. This declaration was criticised by Omer Becú, see chapter on ICFTU. 52. The Times, 24 May 1961; MRC, TUC/Spain, Labour Party, draft statement on Spain and NATO, International Department, Int/1960–61/29 Rev. 53. MRC, TUC/Spain, meeting between representatives of the Spanish trade unionists in exile and of the General Council held at the Congress House, 26 July 1961. I.C. 1/2, 24 October 1961. 54. The UFD was comprised of the following groups: IDC Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana (Christian Democratic Left), PNV, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party), PSOE, UGT, ARDE, Alianza Republicana Democrática Española (Spanish Democratic Republican Alliance), ANV, Acción Nacionalista Vasca (Basque Nationalist Action), STV, Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (Basque Workers’ Solidarity).

206


55. MRC, TUC/Spain, Union of Democratic Forces, 24 June 1961, CPD/JP, 9 August 1961. 56. MRC, TUC/Spain, interview with Spanish representatives, 9 November 1961. 57. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, letter from John Clark to Sam Watson, 10 October 1961. Again, in 1962 Rodolfo Llopis protested to the SDDC Committee concerning the visit to London of Josefina Arrillaga. 58. On recommendation of the SDDC, the Labour’s National Executive Council had granted two scholarships to young Spaniards. 59. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, report of the trial of seven Basque nationalists, 28 October 1961. 60. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC Minutes, 21 May 1962. 61. For an account of these strikes and demonstrations, see Stanley Payne, The Franco Regime 1936–1975, University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1987, and Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, Allen & Unwin, London, 1979. 62. MRC, TUC/Spain, Inter-departmental Correspondence, G. Woodcock to J.A. Hargreaves, 8 May 1962. 63. Ibid. 64. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, Minutes of meeting of the 2nd May 1962; MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from John Clark to J.A. Hargreaves, 3 May 1962. 65. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from George Woodcock to the Spanish Ambassador, 15 May 1962; Extract from minute IC.7 of International Committee, 22 May 1962. 66. A number of trade union organisations sent assistance. The ICFTU donated £5,000 from the International Solidarity Fund; £1,375 from the Swedish LO; £2,500 from the Dutch NVV; £1,250 from the Austrian TUC; £1,250 from the Norwegian LO; about £12,500 from the FGTB, the Cooperative Movement and the Socialist Party of Belgium; about £9,000 from the German Metalworkers’ union; £3,570 from the United Automobile Workers of America; over £1,000 from UGT sections in various countries. British contributions included £250 from the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, £1,000 given by the Scottish miners, and £250 from the Labour Party. MRC, TUC/Spain, assistance to the Spanish strikes, I.C.8/1, 13 June 1962. 67. Ibid. 68. MRC, TUC/Spain, Minutes of the eighth meeting (1961–62), International Committee, I.C.8, 13 June 1962. 69. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from J.A. Hargreaves to G. Woodcock, 5 June 1962. 70. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, Solidarity with Spanish workers, 10 May 1962. 71. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, letter from the SDDC to all constituency parties, June 1962. 72. Labour Party, National Executive Committee, Report of the Overseas Department: SDDC, 1962. 73. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, visit to Spain 28 May–1 June, report by Ernest Davies, 7 June 1962

Notes

207

74. MRC, TUC/Spain, Minutes no. 6/1961–2, International Department, International Sub-Committee of the NEC, 10 April 1962. The ICFTU also expressed its concerns about such visits. 75. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, Labour visit to Spain, 1962. 76. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, Labour visits to Spain. The European regional organisation of ICFTU strongly protested against such visits and asked what the TUC intended to say to counteract the effect of this visit. 77. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, The Labour government and Spain, October 1963. 78. Ibid. 79. BPLES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, Report on visit to Madrid 8–11 December 1963 by Ernest Davies and John Lyttle. 80. Ibid. 81. House of Commons Debates, Volume 698, 7 July 1964, p. 85. 82. Reported in Foreign Affairs Debate, 17 June 1964 in MRC, TUC/Spain, CPD/JP, 16 July 1964. 83. Ibid. 84. House of Commons Debates, Volume 698, 15 July 1964, p. 1392. 85. MRC, TUC/Spain, Arms contracts and Spain, CPD/JP, 18 September 1964. the AFL-CIO supported the British Labour movement in its opposition to the sale of arms to Spain. 86. PRO, FO 371/180111, Annual review for 1964, George Labouchere, 4 January 1965. 87. PRO, FO 371/180132, UK arms supplies, Military equipment for Spain, Harold Wilson, 15 February 1965. 88. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1965–67), NEC Minutes, International Department, Minutes of the first meeting of the overseas subcommittee, 9 February 1965, ov/1. 89. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from G. Woodcock to A.L. Williams, 27 September 1965. 90. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1965–67), NEC Minutes, International Department, letter from Gwyn Morgan to José Barrerio, 23 September 1965. 91. MRC, TUC/Spain, SDDC, visits to Spain by MPs – Labour Party Actions, 1966. 92. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, report on visit to Spain by George Jeger, MP, Tom Connelly and John Lyttle, summer 1965. 93. MRC, TUC/Spain, the Spanish Worker’s Trade Union Alliance (ASO), Tom Connelly 22 June 1965. 94. Since 1938, all Spanish workers engaged in production had been grouped in one unitary organisation known as the CNS. The umbrella organisation was divided into 28 integral corporations or sindicatos, each bringing together in a single unit all workers and all employers in one particular segment of industry. 95. For a full account on ASO see chapter 6. 96. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1965–67), NEC Minutes, International Department, Minutes of the second meeting of the Overseas Subcommittee, 7 December 1965 ov/2.

208


97. MRC, TUC/Spain, Minutes of the meeting of the SDDC, 17 February 1966. 98. Guardian, 25 April 1966. 99. FPI, PSOE, CE, Nota de las reuniones de la Internacional Socialista para los asuntos de España, Toulouse 21 May 1966. 100. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, Minutes of the SDDC Committee, 25 May 1966. 101. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from Len Williams to George Woodcock, 1 June 1966. 102. FPI, PSOE, circulars (1964–67), Circular No. 10, 5 January 1967. 103. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from J.A. Hargreaves to D.A. Perris, Secretary of the Birmingham Trades Council, 20 October 1966. 104. MRC, TUC/Spain, interdepartmental correspondence from G. Woodcock to J.A. Hargrgeaves, 1 March 1966. 105. MRC, TUC/Spain, JAH, 27 October 1966. 106. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, Minutes of the meeting of the SDDC, 23 July 1968, 20 August 1968. 107. The secretary reported at the same meeting that the Executive Committee had given £400 to assist the work of the Portuguese Socialists. This financial help was given after the request made by the Accao Socialista Portuguesa (ASP), a social democratic organisation opposed to Salazar dictatorship. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1968–73), NEC Minutes, International Department, Portugal: the political situation, ov/1967–68/35, April 1968. 108. IISH, SI/Spain, Meeting of the SDDC, 13 February 1969. 109. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, trial of Spanish trade unionists and related matters, 23 July 1968. 110. Cinco continentes, June/July 1968, p. 52. 111. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, letter from the Agrupación Socialista Madrileña to Albert Roberts 25 May 1968. 112. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, report by Derek Page on the trial of Spanish trade unionists, 4 July 1968. 113. MRC, TUC/Spain, Labour Party, news release, p.s. 148, 6 August 1968. 114. Spanish Information Bulletin, no. 229. 115. MRC, TUC/Spain, interdepartmental correspondence, letter from the SDDC to J.A. Hargreaves, 27 November 1968. 116. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, 13 February 1969, letter from Gwyn Morgan to Michael Stewart. 117. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, Minutes of the SDDC, 23 July 1968. 118. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC 13 February 1969, letter from Gwyn Morgan to William Whitlock. 119. Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, Methuen, London, 1986, pp. 13–24. 120. Interview with Jack Jones, London, 5 June 1995. 121. See, José María Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent, Tavistock, London, 1978. 122. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, Persecution of PSOE and UGT members: request for assistance from PSOE, 13 February 1969. 123. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1968–73), NEC Minutes, International Department, Minutes of the third meeting of the Overseas

Notes

124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135.

136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144.

145. 146. 147. 148.

209

Subcommittee held in February 1969. Overseas Review, Feb/March 1969, 28 March 1969. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from Manuel Muiño to Victor Feather, 12 August 1969. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, letter from the SDDC to general secretaries of affiliated trade unions, 23 January 1969. MRC, TUC/Spain, letter from Harry Nicholas to Victor Feather, 10 December 1970; IC.4/2, 27 January 1970. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from Manuel Muiño to Victor Feather, 12 August 1969. see below. MRC, TUC/Spain, ICFTU, 51 Executive Board/12(e) 8–10 December 1970. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, interdepartmental correspondence, 10 February 1970. IISH, SI/Spain, SDDC, Report of ICFTU/UGT, Delegation to London, 6 March 1970. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from Manuel Muiño to Victor Feather, 20 March 1970; Pueblo, 5 March 1970. FPI, PSOE, CE, report on trial of Spanish Socialists, Circular no. 23/70, 27 April 1970. See chapter 2. IISH, SI/Spain, report by Rodney Balcomb, the political situation in Spain, following his visit on 15–19 April 1970, January 1971. On the Burgos trial see Edouard de Blaye, Franco and the Politics of Spain, pp. 281–323; Francisco Letamendia, Historia del nacionalismo vasco y de ETA, 3 volumes, R&B Ediciones, San Sebastian, 1994. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, International Department, letter from J.A. Hargreaves to Victor Feather, 14 December 1970. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, International Committee Minutes, IC 3, 15 December 1970. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, Minutes of the sixth meeting (1970–71), 16 December 1970. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1968–73), NEC Minutes, International Department: Party action on the Burgos trial, ID/1970–71/29. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, Congress resolution, IC3/3, 15 December 1970. BOD, Archives of the British Labour Party, X. Films (1968–73), NEC Minutes, International Department: Party action on Burgos Trial ID/170–71/29. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, Minutes of the meeting held on 8 February 1971. Interview with Jack Jones, London 5 June 1995. On CC.OO, see Julián Ariza, Comisiones Obreras, Avance, Madrid, 1976; David Ruiz (ed.), Historia de Comisiones Obreras (1958–1988), Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1993. IISH, SI/Spain, SDDC, Minutes of the SDDC, 8 February 1971. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, letter from Rodolfo Llopis to Tom McNally, Toulouse 14 January 1972. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from Jack Jones to Victor Feather, 22 November 1972. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, International Committee Minutes I.C.2, 21 November 1972. Enquiries had been made by the ICFTU.

210


149. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from J.A. Hargreaves to Victor Feather, 19 December 1972. 150. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter to Jaime de Pinies, 11 December 1972. 151. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from Victor Feather to G. Purnell, 8 June 1973. 152. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, Solidarity with the ‘Carabanchel Ten’, Informations Bulletin n.41 (20/3/1973). 153. Labour Party, National Executive Committee, Report 1973. 154. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, letter of Tom McNally, International Secretary to J.R. Searle, 23 July 1973. 155. SDDC, Mission to Spain, March 1973. 156. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, meeting with members of Workers’ Commissions to discuss SDDC Commission of Inquiry. 157. IISH, SI/Spain, SDDC, Minutes of the meeting 16 April 1973. 158. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, extract from International Committee Minutes I.C.9, 26 June 1973; letter from Victor Feather to all General Secretaries of all affiliated organisations, 5 July 1973. 159. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, SDDC, Minutes of the SDDC, 8 August 1973. 160. IISH, SI/Spain, Minutes of the SDDC meeting 3 April 1974. 161. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, Minutes of the meeting 2 December 1974. 162. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, letter from Jenny Little to Jack Jones, 11 August 1975. 163. Interview with Jenny Little, Brighton 14 September 1997. 164. Daily Telegraph, 18 August 1973. 165. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, International Committee Minutes I.C.11, 21 August 1973. 166. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from Sir Alec Douglas Home to Victor Feather, 6 September 1973. 167. Guardian, 20 August 1973; Daily Telegraph, 20 August 1973. 168. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, International Department, from J.A. Hargreaves to Victor Feather, 20 August 1973. 169. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from Victor Feather to Sir Alec Douglas Home, 28 November 1973. 170. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from Sir Alec Douglas Home to Len Murray, 10 December 1973. 171. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, Meeting with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Spain. SWS/SD. 11 July 1974. 172. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from Victor Feather to George Meany, 29 November 1973; letter from George Meany to Len Murray, 11 December 1973. 173. Regarding the trial, Altiero Spinelli, EEC Commissioner, argued that the trial proved once again that Spain could not become a member of the Community under her present regime and that the proceedings revealed the flagrant contradiction between the reality of the country’s internal policy and the impression of opening up towards Europe. Guardian, 21 December 1973. 174. Marcelino Camacho Abad; Nicolas Sartorius Alvarez; Eduardo Saborido Galan; Francisco García Salve; Francisco Acosta Orge; Isidoro Santisteban, Fernando Soto Martin; Juan Marcos Muñiz Zapico; Luis Fernández Costilla and Miguel Angel Zamora Anton.

Notes

211

175. BLPES, Ernest Davies Papers, Labour Party, The trial of Carabanchel Ten. International Department, Labour Party. ID/1973–74/23. 176. Labour Party, Minutes of the NEC, 19 December 1973. 177. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, letter from Jenny Little to G.H. Horton, 15 December 1972. 178. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from J.A. Hargreaves to Lionel Murray, 4 January 1974. 179. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from T. Jenkins to J.A. Hargreaves, 31 December 1973; Report of Annual Trade Union Conference, 1974. 180. Morning Star, 21 December 1973 181. Marcelino Camacho and one of his co-defendants received sentences of 20 years each, two others received 19 years each, one received 18 years, one 17 years and the remaining four 12 years. 182. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, MW/SA, 31 December 1973. 183. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, Extract from International Committee Minutes, I.C.5, 4 February 1974. 184. Ibid., 3 February 1975. 185. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter to Carlos Arias Navarro from General Secretary, 7 February 1975. 186. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from J.A. Hargreaves to Lionel Murray, 10 February 1975. 187. On the PSOE split see Abdón Mateos, El PSOE contra Franco, Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1993, pp. 444–55; Miguel Peydró, Las escisiones del PSOE, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1980. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 277–88; José Martínez Cobo and Carlos Martínez Cobo, La segunda renovación. Intrahistoria del PSOE, volume IV, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1991. 188. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, Report on the XII Congress of the PSOE by Tom Driberg. 189. IISH, SI/Spain, Minutes of the SDDC Meeting, 25 October 1972. 190. SDDC, Mission to Spain, 10 April 1973. 191. Interview with Jenny Little, London, 22 February 1995. 192. Interview with Jenny Little, London, 12 December 1993. According to Jenny Little, the French Socialist Party also supported the PSOE renovado. 193. Interview with Pablo Castellano, Madrid, 5 July 1994. 194. Interview with Jenny Little, Brighton, 14 September 1997. 195. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, Minutes of the meeting on 17 June 1976, International Department, 6 December 1976. 196. Since 1969, close contacts had been established between Mario Soares, leader of the Portuguese Socialist Party and the Labour Party. Mario Soares received substantial support from the Labour Party. According to James Callaghan, the policy of the Labour government was to ensure that all the democratic forces had the same rights without being dominated by the Portuguese Communist Party. James Callaghan, Time and Chance, Collins, London, 1987, p. 360. On the Portuguese Revolution see Douglas Porch, The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution, Hoover Institution Publication, London, 1977; Mario Soares, Portugal’s Struggle for Liberty, Allen & Unwin, 1975; Kenneth Maxwell ‘The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, January 1976, pp. 250–70.

212


197. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, letter from Colin Phipps to Ron Hayward, 24 September 1975. 198. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, letter from Ron Hayward, General Secretary of the Labour Party to Colin Phipps MP, 16 October 1975; letter from Jenny Little to Derek Bourn, 21 October 1975. 199. On September 12 three members of FRAP were sentenced to death and two other FRAP members were sentenced to 25 and 30 years imprisonment respectively after being found guilty by a military tribunal of killing a policeman in Madrid. On 18 September, a further five FRAP members were found guilty by a summary court of killing a Guardia Civil lieutenant and were condemned to death. 200. Labour Party, NEC, Report of the 75th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Blackpool, 1975. 201. Before the executions, Callaghan had a meeting with the Spanish Foreign Minister, José María Areilza in New York. The Prime Minister sent an appeal for mercy to the Spanish Prime Minister. 202. Labour Party, NEC, Report of the 75th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Blackpool, 1975. 203. House of Commons Debates, Volume 868, 29 October 1975, p. 1572. 204. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, International Department, 2 October 1975; Financial Times, 30 September 1975. 205. In the case of Portugal, the TUC considered that the situation was not the same as in Spain because in Portugal there were democratic forces in progress. 206. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from James Callaghan to Len Murray, 14 October 1975. A similar justification was used by Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary from 1945–51 to prevent any intervention on Spanish affairs. Florentino Portero, Franco aislado. La cuestión española (1945–1950), Aguilar, 1989, p.117. 207. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, meeting with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, January 1976. 208. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from James Callaghan to Jack Jones, 23 December 1975. 209. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, meeting with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, January 1976. 210. The representatives were the following: R.N. Bottini, L. Buck, J.L. Jones, T. Parry, J.H. Slater, G.F. Smith, L. Murray, J.A. Hargreaves and S.W. Shaw. 211. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, meeting with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, I.C.5/4, 2 February 1976. 212. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, International Committee Minutes, I.C.5. 2 February 1976. 213. The Bureau of the Socialist International adopted a resolution in Brussels on 30 November 1975 condemning the fact that countries with Socialist governments were represented at the funeral of Franco and the crowning of Juan Carlos. 214. NMLH, Labour Party, International Department, SDDC, letter from Jenny Little, 18 December 1975. 215. Ibid. 216. Bill Alexander, No to Franco. The Struggle Never Stopped, 1939–1975, Oval Printshop, London, 1992, p. 84.

Notes

213

217. Interview with Jenny Little, London, 28 March 1994. 218. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, speech given by a member of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (London Section), on 31 October 1975. 219. On the Arias reforms, see above. Jenny Little, ‘Socialist International. Mission to Spain’, Socialist Affairs, March–April 1976, Vol. 26, No. 2. 220. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from R. Hayward to Lionel Murray, 17 March 1976. 221. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, statement on Spain, February 1976. The ETUC, European Trade Union Confederation, supported by the TUC issued a statement specifying that democratic changes should be introduced in Spain before the Spanish regime could be recognised. 222. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, extract from International Committee Minutes IC.5, 2 February 1976. 223. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, letter from James Callaghan to Lionel Murray, 12 March 1976; see José María de Areilza, Diario de un ministro de la monarquía, Espejo de España, Planeta, 1977. 224. MRC, TUC/Spain, TUC, interdepartmental correspondence from J.A. Hargreaves to L. Murray, 19 March 1976. 225. In March 1976, the entire opposition, the Democratic Junta and the Platform of Convergence joined in the so called Democratic Co-ordination. 226. Labour Party, NEC, Report of the 75th Annual Conference of the Labour Party. Blackpool, 27 September–1 October 1976, p. 240. 227. El Pais, 30 September 1976. 228. Joe Gormley, Jack Jones and George Smith together with J.A. Hargreaves also visited Portugal on 18 and 19 of November, with the assistance of the British Embassy. They met a number of trade unionists and a number of British businessmen in Portugal. 229. Interview with Jack Jones, London, 5 June 1995. 230. Ibid. 231. El Pais, 1 October 1976. 232. El Socialista, 7 December 1976. 233. Labour Party, NEC, Report of the 76th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1977, p. 95.

5 The French Socialists 1959–77 1. Alicia Alted Vigil, ‘Ayuda humanitaria y reorganización institucional en el exilio’ in Josefina Cuesta and Benito Bermejo (eds) Emigración y exilio. Españoles en Francia 1936–1946, Eudema, Madrid, 1996, pp. 202–27, and Santos Juliá, Los socialistas en la politica española, Taurus, Madrid, 1996, p. 299. 2. Wayme Northcutt, The French Socialist and Communist Party under the Fifth Republic 1958–1981. From Opposition to Power, Irvington, New York, 1985, p. 27. 3. William Paterson and Ian Campbell, Social Democracy in Post-War Europe, Macmillan, London, 1974, p. 17. 4. Robert Ladrech and Philippe Marliere, Social Democratic Parties in the European Union, Macmillan, London, 1999, p. 66.

214 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28.

European Socialists and Spain FLC, UGT, ACE, February 1959. FLC, UGT, ACE, August 1959. Ibid. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from Robert Bothereau to Pascual Tomás, 21 March 1960. FLC, UGT, ACE, March 1960. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from Pascual Tomás to Robert Bothereau, 28 March 1960. Ibid., 1 February 1961. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), CGT-FO, 25 February 1961. FLC, UGT, ACE, March 1961. FLC, UGT, ACE, October 1961. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from Robert Botherau to Pascual Tomás, Paris 17 October 1961. FLC, UGT, ACE, November 1961. Informe de Antonio García Duarte-December 1984, Editorial Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, Spain. Interview with Antonio García Duarte, 30 October 2000. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from Pascual Tomás to Robert Bothereau, Toulouse, 9 November 1961. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from Robert Bothereau to Pascual Tomás, Paris, 9 November 1961. FLC, UGT, ACE, December 1961. Georges Brutelle, Assistant Secretary of SFIO was the director of Le Socialiste; Roger Southon, National Secretary of the Youth Socialists as administrator. Among the members of the editorial board were: Jean Paul Boncour, ex-president of the Council of Ministers; Suzanne Lacore, ex-minister; Eugene Montel, Deputy; Georges Guille, senator; Gerard Jaquet, ex-minister and Joseph Begarra, member of SFIO. Le Socialiste, 19 October 1961, 4 January 1962. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from Robert Bothereau to Pascual Tomás, Paris, 21 May 1962. European Community, August–September 1970, p. 10. In the event of attack by the Warsaw Pact, the military plans of NATO considered necessary a withdrawal towards the south of France and from there to initiate the counter-offensive. The German government wanted a rearguard zone in Spain in case of war: a place to store materials, set up hospitals , airports and other facilities. Antonio Marquina Barrio, España en la Política de Seguridad Occidental, Colección Ediciones Ejército, Madrid, 1986, p. 784. Paul Reynaud, The Foreign Policy of Charles de Gaulle, The Odyssey Press, New York, 1964, p. 14. Richard Vinen, France 1934–1970, Macmillan, London,1996, p. 181. European Documentation. A survey, January–March 1969, p. 69.

Notes

215

29. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from André Bergeron to Pascual Tomás, Paris, 16 January 1964. 30. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from André Bergeron to Pascual Tomás, Paris, 4 June 1964. Le Socialiste, 16 June 1964. 31. Le Socialiste, 4 June 1964. 32. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), letter from M. Gazola to André Bergeron, Lorient, 26 November 1965; letter from Pascual Tomás to André Bergeron, Toulouse, 1 December 1965. 33. FLC, UGT, CFDT Mission en Espagne, December 1968. 34. Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou, Cornell University Press, New York, 1974, p. 521. 35. Bulletin of the EEC, No. 12, 1969, p. 71. 36. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the CGT-FO (1948–71), FO s’insurge contre le franquisme, 14 November 1969. 37. On 21 January 1971, Pompidou said ‘I believe that it is in the interest of Spain to be open to Europe and that geography pushes it to do so through France as go-between.’ 38. FLC, UGT, Resolution on Spain, Paris, 19 November 1971. 39. Le Socialiste, 2 December 1971. 40. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the CGT-FO and Antonio García Duarte (1971–76), Contacto Fraterno, Paris, 20 December 1971. 41. FLC, UGT, correspondence between Manuel Simon and the CGT-FO (1972), letter from Manuel Simón, Secretary of Press and Propaganda to Jean Rouzier, Confederal Secretary of FO, Toulouse, 12 October 1972. 42. IISH, SI, Report on the XII Congress 13/14/15 August 1972, Paris, 4 September 1972. 43. IISH, SI/Spain, Report of the SI on the situation in the Spanish Socialist movement, December 1972. 44. FPI, PSOE, CE, France (1945–74), letter from Arsenio Jimeno and Carmen García to Robert Pontillon, Paris, 28 November 1972. 45. FPI, PSOE correspondence between José Barreiro and Arsenio Jimeno (5 January 1971–28 September 1974), interview with the French Socialist Party, 21 June 1972. 46. SI, Report of the SI to the Bureau members: the situation of the Spanish Socialist movement, 4 December 1972. 47. Interview with Pierre Guidoni, El Escorial (Madrid), 10 August 1994; interview with Luis Yañez Barnuevo, Sevilla, 24 August 1994. 48. Carlos Martínez Cobo, Jose Martínez Cobo, La Segunda Renovación. Intrahistoria del PSOE. Volume IV, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 1991, p. 179. Mateos, op. cit, p. 353. 49. Interview with Pierre Guidoni, El Escorial (Madrid) 10 August 1994. 50. FPI, PSOE, correspondence between the Organisation Secretary and the Ebert Foundation, 1974, letter from the General Secretary to all groups attending the Conference, June 1974.

216


51. FPI, PSOE, correspondence between the Organisation Secretary and the Ebert Foundation, 1974, Information note on the second session of the Conference, 1974. 52. Speech by Pontillon, International Secretary of the French Socialist Party, Suresnes. El Socialista, October 1974, p. 7. 53. FPI, PSOE, International Resolutions. Resolutions of the XIII Congress of the PSOE, Suresnes, October 1974. 54. El Socialista, January 1975. 55. D.S. Bell and Byron Criddle, The French Socialist Party. The Emergence of a Party of Governement, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 84–6. 56. Interview with Pierre Guidoni, 10 August 1994, El Escorial (Madrid) Antonio Papell, Conversationes con Luis Yanez, Paza y Janés, Barcelona, p. 95. 57. Jacques Huntzinger ‘The French Socialist Party and Western Relations’ in Werner Feld, The Foreign Policy of West European Socialist Parties, New York, Praeger, 1978. p. 75. 58. Tierno Galván, Cabos Sueltos, p. 559. 59. El Socialista, March 1976. 60. Gillespie, op. cit, p. 318. 61. El Socialista, 10 March 1976. 62. Ibid., 25 February 1976. 63. FLC, UGT, correspondence between Antonio Garcia Duarte and the CFDT (1974–76), Encontre entre la CFDT et la UGT D’ Espagne, Paris, 25 February 1975. 64. FLC,UGT, correspondence between Antonio Garcia Duarte and the CFDT (1974–76), letter from René Salanne, National Secretary of the CFDT to Antonio Garcia Duarte, Paris, 7 January 1976; letter from René Salanne to Antonio Garcia Duarte, Paris, 13 February 1976. 65. Miguel Angel Aguilar, Eduardo Chamorro, Felipe González. Perfil Humano y Político (eds) Cambio 16, Madrid, 1977, p. 12.

6 The German Socialists 1960–77 1. Gerard Braunthal, The German Social Democrats Since 1969, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 155. 2. Michael Schneider, A Brief History of the German Trade Unions, Verlag J. H.W., Dietz Nachf, GmbH, Bonn, 1991, pp. 242–3. 3. FLC, UGT, correspondence with the DGB (1952–60), letter from Walter Freitag to Pascual Tomás, 21 January 1955. 4. Jesús García Fernández, La emigración exterior española, Ariel, Barcelona, 1965, p. 27. 5. According to the statistics published by the journal Collegite, 1964, between 1959 and 1962, 368,204 emigrants went to France, 111,056 to the Federal Republic of Germany, 44,000 to Switzerland, 38,000 to Belgium, 25,000 to Great Britain, 6,000 to Holland and 1,000 to Austria. Jesús García Fernández, La emigración exterior española, Ariel, Barcelona, 1965, p. 30. 6. Interview with Carlos Pardo, Mazagón (Huelva), 22 September 1996. 7. FLC, UGT, ACE, 19 February 1960. 8. Ibid., 9 September 1960.

Notes 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

217

Ibid. Interview with Hans Matthöfer, March 1997. FLC, UGT, ACE, 24 March 1961. FLC, UGT, ACE, report on the visit to London and Germany by a delegation of the ICFTU and IFCTU from 23 July to 6 August 1961. Jesús García Fernández, La emigración exterior de España, Ariel, Barcelona, 1975, p. 284. FLC, UGT, General Secretary, correspondence with Manuel Fernández Montesinos (1962), letter from Pascual Tomás to Manuel Fernández Montesinos, Toulouse, 3 March 1962. Carlos Fernández Puig, Manuel Fernández Montesinos, Arcadio González, Francisco Gordillo, Martin Iñigo, Santiago Lazcano, Adolfo Llopis Brave, Carlos Ossorio and Horacio Zapata. FLC, UGT, ACE, 31 March 1962. Interview with Manuel Simón, Madrid, 12 September 1996. FLC, UGT, General Secretary, correspondence with Manuel Fernández Montesinos (1962), report of the meeting between the IG Metall and the DGB, 25 March 1962. Interview with Hans Matthöfer, March 1997. In 1962, there was a great increase in working-class activity. In the first months of the year a wave of strikes spread in Valencia, Barcelona, Madrid, Cartagena, and the Basque country. In April, May, and June a second wave of strikes involved coal mining in Asturias, metal, chemical, electrical and shipbuilding industries in the Basque country, and metal industries in Barcelona. José Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent. Workers and Students in Franco’s Spain, Tavistock Publications, London, 1978, p. 29. FLC, UGT, ACE, 29 June 1962. Ibid. Ibid., 25 January 1963. Ibid., 27 November 1964. FLC, UGT, correspondence of Adolfo Llopis Brave with the DGB (1961–65), letter from Adolfo Llopis to the UGT in Spain, Düsseldorf, 23 August 1962. Ibid., 3 September 1962. Ibid., letter from Manuel Muiño to Adolfo Llopis Brave, Toulouse, 24 September 1962. FLC, UGT, ACE, 17 November 1962. FLC, UGT, correspondence of Adolfo Llopis Brave with the DGB (1961–65), resolution on Spain adopted by the National Congress of the DGB, Hanover, 28 October 1962. On 9 May 1961 a cooperation agreement had been signed between Spain and the Federal Republic of Germany, which regulated German capital investment in Spanish enterprises. FLC, UGT, correspondence of Adolfo Llopis Brave with the DGB (1961–65), letter from Adolfo Llopis Brave to the UGT in exile, Düsseldorf, 10 October 1962. Interview with Carlos Pardo, Mazagón (Huelva), 22 September 1996. FLC, ACE, UGT, 19 March 1963. FLC, UGT, correspondence of Adolfo Llopis Brave with the DGB (1961–65), letter from Manuel Muiño to Adolfo Llopis Brave, Toulouse, 13 May 1963. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 April 1964.

218


35. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the UGT section of Esslingen (1965–70), letter from the UGT to the IG Metall, Toulouse, 8 May 1964. 36. FPI, PSOE, CE, circulars (1964–67), Circular No. 4, 27 December 1964. 37. FPI, PSOE, CE, correspondence of the PSOE with the Executive Committee of the SPD (1962–72), letter from Rodolfo Llopis to Peter Blachstein, Toulouse, 29 September 1964. 38. Peter Blachstein could not attend the Congress because he was ill. 39. FPI, PSOE, CE, circulars (1964–67), Circular No. 4, 27 December 1964. 40. FPI, PSOE, CE, correspondence of the PSOE with the Executive Committee of the SPD (1962–72), letter from Rodolfo Llopis to Peter Blachstein, Toulouse, 2 December 1964. 41. Ibid. 42. FPI, PSOE, CE, correspondence of the PSOE with the Executive Committee of the SPD (1962–72), letter from Rodolfo Llopis to Peter Blachstein, Toulouse, 31 December 1964. 43. FLC, UGT, ACE, 24 January 1965. 44. At Bad Godesberg, the party had abandoned Marxist determinism and affirmed the religious and philosophical roots of democratic socialism as well as the principles of freedom, justice and solidarity in the parliamentary democratic system. See Gerard Braunthal, The German Social Democrats Since 1969, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, p.10. 45. FPI, PSOE, CE, correspondence of the PSOE with the Executive Committee of the SPD (1962–72), report on the trip of Fritz Erler to Madrid, 1965. 46. Ibid. 47. Servicio de Prensa, Müncher Merkur, 7 April 1965. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. FPI, PSOE, CE, circulars (1964–67), Circular No. 6, 30 September 1965. 51. Ibid. 52. Servicio de Prensa, Le Monde, 8 April 1965. 53. Servicio de Prensa, Metall, 1 June 1965. 54. Interview with Hans Matthöfer, March 1997. 55. FLC, UGT, correspondence of Adolfo Llopis Brave with the DGB (1961–65), letter from Adolfo Llopis Brave to Miguel Armentia Juvete, Düsseldorf, 10 November 1965. 56. Ibid. 57. Otto Brenner suggested that Dambersch, International Metalworkers’ Federation member, should visit Spain to find out about ASO. Dambersch refused on the grounds that he would not visit Spain, as long as Franco was in power. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the UGT section of Frankfurt (1965–69), report of Miguel Armentia’s visit to Germany, Toulouse, 15 December 1965. 58. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the UGT section of Frankfurt (1965–69), report of Miguel Armentia’s visit to Germany, Toulouse, 15 December 1965. 59. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the UGT section of Esslingen (1965–70), report of Miguel Armentia on the Conference of the UGT sections in Germany, Toulouse, 4 March 1966.

Notes

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60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the DGB department of organisation and propaganda (1952–71), session of the Commission of ‘foreign work and aid for development’, Düsseldorf, 21 July 1966. 63. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the DGB Department of Organisation and Propaganda (1952–71), letter from Adolfo Llopis Brave to Miguel Armentia Juvete, Düsseldorf, 9 August 1966. 64. Ibid., 22 September 1966. 65. The members accused were: Fernández Montesinos, Nuero Diaz, Nogués Diez, González Quesada, Buiria, Pallach and Piquer. 66. The head of the syndical organisation and Spanish Minister of Movimiento, José Solís, was not allowed to attend the Congress because the Spanish trade unions were not democratic. 67. El Noticiero, n. 8, 1966. 68. Fernández Montesinos: six months; Nuero Diaz, González Quesada and Nogues Diez: four months; Buiria, Pallach and Puiquer were absolved. 69. FES, DGB/Spanien (1962–67), Hans Matthöfer, Bericht Uber meine Reise nach Madrid vom 2. bis 4. August 1966. 70. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the DGB Department of Organisation and Propaganda (1952–71), letter from Adolfo Llopis Brave to Miguel Armentia Juvete, Düsseldorf, 9 August 1966. 71. FLC, UGT, correspondence with the IG Metall (1966–71), letter from Miguel Armentia to Otto Brenner, Toulouse, 17 August 1966. 72. Ibid., letter from Otto Brenner to Miguel Armentia, Frankfurt, 19 October 1966. 73. Ibid. 74. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the DGB Department of Organisation and Propaganda (1952–71), DGB memorandum on the trade union situation in Spain, September 1966. 75. Ibid., letter from Adolfo Llopis Brave to Miguel Armentia Juvete, Düsseldorf, 8 September 1966. 76. The members attending the meeting were: Max Diamant (IG Metall), Dr Günter Grunwald (Friedrich Ebert Foundation), Dr Bern Heise (DGB, Social Department), Otto Kersten (DGB, Foreign Department), Herbert Koch (Education Trade Union), Hans Matthöfer (IG Metall), Heinz Richter (Organisation Department) and Harald Simon (Foreign Department). 77. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the DGB Department of Organisation and Propaganda (1952–71), report on the conference of the commission España, Düsseldorf, 23 November 1966. 78. In the same session, the trade union situation in Greece, Italy and other issues were discussed. 79. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the DGB Department of Organisation and Propaganda (1952–71), report of the session of the commission Trabajadores Extranjeros, Düsseldorf, 27 October 1966. 80. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 22 October 1966. 81. They wanted to have a strong UGT as the decisive force in ASO. Personal communication with Hans Matthöfer, March 1997.

220


82. Abdon Mateos, El PSOE contra Franco. Continuidad y renovación del socialismo español 1953–1974, Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1993, p. 326. 83. Interview with Manuel Simón, Madrid, 12 September 1996. 84. FLC, UGT, correspondence between Miguel Armentia and Pablo Schalmey (1966–69), report of the interview Graedel-Schalmey, Geneva 26 September 1966. 85. Manuel Ludevid, Cuarenta años de sindicato vertical. Aproximación a la organización sindical española, editorial Laia, Barcelona, 1976, p. 47. 86. FPI, PSOE, CE, circulars (1964–67), Circular No. 6, 30 September 1965. 87. Servicio de Prensa, Le Socialiste, 25 April 1968. 88. Ibid. 89. FPI, PSOE, PSOE-Director Committee, information about the activities presented to the Executive Committee of the Director’s Committee, 31 July 1968. 90. Written interview with Helmut Schmidt, 5 May 1997. 91. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the DGB Department of Organisation and Propaganda (1952–71), letter from Manuel Muiño to Otto Brener, Toulouse, 22 August 1968; letter from Manuel Muiño to Adolfo Llopis Brave, Toulouse, 22 August 1968. 92. José María Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent, Tavistock Publications, London, 1978, p. 33. 93. FPI, PSOE, CE, correspondence of the PSOE with the Executive Committee of the SPD (1962–72), letter from Rodolfo Llopis to Pablo Schalmey, Toulouse, 12 February 1969. 94. Ibid., letter from Pablo Schalmey to Rodolfo Llopis, Frankfurt, 17 February 1969. 95. Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, Alfred Nau and Hans Jürgen Wischnewski. 96. The bails the judge asked were 15,000 pesetas; 10,000 pesetas and 30,000 pesetas. 97. FPI, PSOE, CE, correspondence of the PSOE with the Executive Committee of the SPD (1962–72), letter from Rodolfo Llopis to Hans E. Dingels, Toulouse, 14 March 1969; letter from Rodolfo Llopis to Pablo Schalmey, Toulouse, 17 March 1969. 98. The director of the journal Frankfurter Rundschau as an act of protest returned his cross. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Memoria breve de una vida pública, Planeta, Barcelona, 1980, p. 241. 99. Servicio de Prensa, SPD-Pressedienst Hessen-Sud, 17 February 1969. 100. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Rundschau, 18 March 1969; FLC, UGT, correspondence between Miguel Armentia and Pablo Schalmey (1966–69), letter from Pablo Schalmey to Miguel Armentia, Frankfurt, 19 March 1969. 101. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 11 July 1969. Frankfurt/Main. 102. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the IG Metall (1966–71), letter of Manuel Muiño to Otto Brenner, Toulouse, 24 November 1969. 103. FLC, UGT, correspondence between Miguel Armentia and Pablo Schalmey (1966–69), letter from Miguel Armentia to Pablo Shalmey, Toulouse, 20 March 1969. 104. Ibid., letter from Pablo Schalmey to Miguel Armentia, Frankfurt, 25 March 1969.

Notes

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105. Abdón Mateos, El PSOE contra Franco, Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1993, p. 408. 106. Interview with Carlos Pardo, Mazagón (Huelva) 22 September 1996. 107. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the General Secretary and the DGB Department of Organisation and Propaganda (1952–71), letter from Manuel Muiño to Heinz Vetter, Toulouse, 11 December 1969. 108. Ibid., letter from Otto Kersten to the Executive Committee of the UGT, 16 January 1970. 109. Servicio de Prensa, German Bundestag Bulletin, 12 January 1970. 110. Similar differences occurred between the British Labour Party and the British Labour government. 111. Among them, three ministers: Alex Möller, Minister of Finance; Egon Franke, Minister of all German affairs and Helmut Schmidt, Minister of Defence; the Chairman of the Socialist group in the Parliament, Herbert Wehner and the General Secretary of the SPD, H.J. Wischnewski. 112. IISH, SI/Spain, correspondence 1970, letter from Hans Matthöfer to the director of the newspaper Diario, Bonn, 6 February 1970. 113. Servicio de Prensa, Metall, 17 February 1970. 114. Servicio de Prensa, Bayerischer Rundfunk, 7 February 1970. 115. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 May 1970. 116. La Vanguardia, 23 May 1970. 117. FLC, UGT, ACE, 30 May 1970. 118. Servicio de Prensa, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 23 April 1970. 119. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Rundschau, 24 April 1970. 120. Servicio de Prensa, International Herald Tribune, 24 April 1970. 121. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 April 1970. 122. Servicio de Prensa, Oficina Prensa Euzkadi, 6 May 1970. 123. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 April 1970. 124. Ibid., 14 June 1972. 125. Written interview with Hans Matthöfer, March 1997. 126. Interview with Enrique Múgica Herzog, Madrid, 18 July 1994. 127. FLC, UGT, correspondence of the General Secretary with the Comité Alemán de ayuda a los democratas españoles (1962–71), letter from Hans Matthöfer to the PSOE, Bonn, 26 June 1970. 128. Servicio de Prensa, Pressemitteilung, 1 July 1970. 129. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 February 1971; Solinger Tageblatt, 3 February 1971. 130. FLC, UGT, ACE, 6 February 1971. 131. Ibid., 13 March 1971. 132. Servicio de Prensa, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 May 1971 (Munich). 133. Servicio de Prensa, Metall-Pressedienst, 17 May 1971. 134. See note 39. 135. Servicio de Prensa, Bayerischer Rundfunk-Emision para españoles en la RFA, 16 May 1971. 136. Monthly journal (10,000 numbers) published in Frankfurt since October 1970 and edited by Hans Matthöfer, which opposed the Franco regime. 137. Servicio de Prensa, Bayerischer Rundfunk- Emisión para españoles en la RFA, 17 May 1971.

222


138. FES, DGB/Spanien (1967–73), Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 7 June 1971. 139. Servicio de Prensa, Bayerischer Rundfunk- Emisión para españoles en la RFA, 17 May 1971. 140. Servicio de Prensa, Neue Presse, 21 May 1971; Metall Presse-dienst, 19 May 1971. 141. Servicio de Prensa, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 May 1971. 142. Servicio de Prensa, Bayerischer Rundfunk-Emisión para España en la RFA, 21 May 1971. 143. FES, DGB/Spanien (1967–73), letter from Max Diamant to Otto Kersten, 7 June 1971. 144. ‘Defending it later, my argument was, that it did not show the Spanish head of the state but the insurgent general of 1936.’ Personal communication with Hans Matthöfer, April 1997. 145. Servicio de Prensa, IG Metall, Vol. II, 1971. Le Monde 26 May 1971, Paris. 146. Servicio de Prensa, Bayerischer Rundfunk- Emisión para españoles en la RFA, 22 May 1971. 147. Servicio de Prensa, Hessischer Rundfunk-Zeitfunk, 22 June 1971. 148. Interview with Carlos Pardo, 22 September 1996, Mazagón, (Huelva). 149. Servicio de Prensa, España Libre, March/April 1972. 150. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 June 1972. 151. Servicio de Prensa, Le Monde, 27 September 1972. 152. Servicio de Prensa, DGB-Nachreichten-Dienst, 27 September 1972. 153. Exprés Español, n. 32, May 1973; El Noticiero, May 1973. 154. A policy based on the ‘change by approach’, which refers to the policy applied by Germany to influence the policies and activities of East Germany and Eastern Europe through reconciliation. Klaus Harpprecht, Willy Brandt. Portrait and Self-Portrait, Abelard Schuman, London, 1972. 155. Exprés Español, June 1974, p. 9. 156. See above, Chapter 2. 157. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the Organisation Secretary and the DGB (1971–76), report on the visit to Germany, August 1973. 158. Ibid. 159. Servicio de Prensa, Abendzeitung, 2 August 1973; El Noticiero, August 1973. 160. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the Organisation Secretary and the DGB (1971–76), Report on the visit to Germany, August 1973. 161. FPI, PSOE, CE, confidencial report Sobre los origenes y situación actual del PSOE nacidos del Congreso faccioso de Toulouse: Agosto 1972, Londres, 30 May 1973. 162. After Bonn, the delegation met Max Diamant in Frankfurt, discussing the same issues as they did with Matthöfer. 163. The CIA allegedly feared an increasing importance of Communism in Spain. Therefore, to stop the Communist influence the CIA contacted the DGB for them to support the most anti-Communist union, that is, the ASO. 164. Interview with Hans Matthöfer, 1997. 165. FLC, UGT, correspondence between the Organisation Secretary and the DGB (1971–76), report on the visit to Germany by the UGT delegation, August 1973.

Notes

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166. Ibid., report sent by the UGT to Dieter Wagner, international department of the DGB. 167. Ibid. 168. Alfonso Guerra, Felipe González. De Suresnes a la Moncloa, Novatex, Madrid, 1984. 169. Interview with Pablo Castellano, Madrid, 5 July 1994. 170. Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992. 171. Interview with Carlos Pardo, Mazagón (Huelva), 22 September 1996. 172. Ibid. 173. Interview with Luis Yañez, Seville, August 1994. 174. No reasons have been found for their non-attendance. 175. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989. Brandt admired González’ definite personality and independence; Alfonso Guerra, Felipe González. De Suresnes a la Moncloa, Novatex, Madrid, 1984, p. 144. According to Pilar Cernuda, Brandt used to say that: ‘... what I admired most about González was that he was the only Spanish politician that talked about the future and not about the past’. Pilar Cernuda, El Presidente, Temas de Hoy, Madrid, 1994, p. 237. 176. Exprés Español, May 1975. 177. Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992, p. 316. 178. Gerard Braunthal, The West German Social Democrats 1969–1982. Profile of a Party in Power, Westview Press, Colorado, 1983. 179. Helmut Schmidt, Men and Power. A Political Retrospective, Jonathan Cape, London, 1990, pp. 167–8. 180. Interview with Dieter Koniecki, President of the Ebert Foundation in Spain, Madrid, September 1993. 181. Exprés Español, January 1976. 182. Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics, op. cit, p. 315; Antonio Papell, Conversaciones con Luis Yañez, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1991, p. 104. 183. After the Congress, an interview was arranged between Hans Matthöfer and Felipe González in Lanzarote. They discussed the Spanish economic situation and integration into the Common Market. Informaciones, 30 December 1975. 184. Servicio de Prensa, Die Welt, 8 October 1975. 185. Servicio de Prensa, Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 October 1975. 186. Interview with Hans Matthöfer, March 1997. 187. Felipe González confirmed this to Walter Nocker, member of the German Embassy. FES, DGB/Spanien (1974–76), letter from Walter Nocker to Erwin Christophersen, 30 September 1975. 188. This policy was restated by Hans Matthöfer in February 1976. 189. FPI, PSOE, correspondence between the Organisation Secretary and the Ebert Foundation, 1974, letter from the General Secretary to all groups attending the Conference, June 1974. 190. Ibid., information note on the second session of the Conference, 1974. 191. Interview with Hans Matthöfer, March 1997. 192. González used the actor and factor terminology interchangeably. In this particular case, factors are actors.

224


193. 194. 195. 196.

Exprés Español, January 1976. Ibid., February 1976, p. 35. Speech given by Dieter Koniecky, Bonn, May 1996. Michael Pinto Duschinsky, ‘Foreign Political Aid: the German Political Foundations and their US Counterparts’, International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. I 1991, p. 55. See also Michael Pinto Duchisky, ‘the Rise of “Political Aid”’ in Larry Diamond, Marc. F. Platter, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien (eds), Consolidating the Thrid Wave Democracies. Regional Challenges, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party. A History of Factionalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 375. Of Christian origin, the USO formed part of ASO until 1966. Herman Rebhan; Otmar Günther; Albert Schunk and Carlos Pardo as interpreter, were members of the delegation. FES, DGB/Spanien (1974–76), Bericht, uber die Besuche einer IMB-IG Metall-Delegation unter der Leitung von Eugen Loderer in Madrid und Lissabon vom 4 bis 8 February 1976. Exprés Español, March 1976, p. 24. Cambio 16, 15 February 1976. Rodolfo Martín Villa, Al servicio del Estado, Planeta, Barcelona, 1984, p. 34. F. Almendros Morcillo, El sindicalismo de clase en España (1939–1977), Peninsula, Madrid, 1978, p. 133. Berneker, 1985, p. 442, cited in H.D. Köhler, El movimiento sindical en España, Fundamentos, Madrid, 1995, p. 118. El País, 25 May 1976. Ibid., 9 October 1976. Ibid., 7 December 1976. Ibid. Ibid., 7 January 1977. Agence Europe, 2128, 8 January 1977. El País, 9 January 1977. Ibid., 20 July 1977. Ibid., 11 August 1977.

197. 198. 199.

200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213.

7 Conclusions 1. Hans Janitscheck, ‘The State of the International’, Socialist Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 6, November–December 1975, pp. 105–8. 2. Exprés Español, January 1976.

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Maxwell, Kenneth, ‘The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, January 1976. Medhurst, Kenneth, ‘Spain’s Evolutionary Pathway from Dictatorship to Democracy’, West European Politics 7, 2 April 1984. Mendelson, Sarah E., ‘Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia. Between Success and Failure’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring 2001. Nalsund, John Ivar, ‘Socialists in Spain’, Socialist Affairs, December 1971. Ortuño Anaya, Pilar, ‘El Movimiento laborista británico y España’ (1974–77), Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, t.9, Historia Contemporanea, Madrid, 1996. Ortuño Anaya, Pilar, ‘The Labour Party, the TUC and Spain, 1959–1977’, Labour History Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (1999). Ortuño Anaya, Pilar, ‘The Involvement of the ICFTU in Pre-democratic Spain, 1960–1977’, International Journal of Iberian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1999). Pinto Duschinsky, Michael, ‘Foreign Political Aid: the German Political Foundations and their US Counterparts’, International Affairs, 67, I (1991). Powell, Charles T., ‘La dimensión exterior de la transición política española’, Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, No. 18 (May–August 1994). Pridham, Geoffrey, ‘Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition?’, West European Politics 7, April 1984. Remmer, Karen L., ‘New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization’, Comparative Politics 28, 1, October 1995. Rupnik, Jacques ‘Eastern Europe. The International Context’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 2000. Rustow, Dankart A., ‘Transition to Democray: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1970. Rustow, Dankart A., ‘Democracy: A Global Revolution?’, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1990, pp. 75–91. Share, Donald, ‘Two Transitions: Democratisation and the Evolution of the Spanish Socialist Left’, West European Politics, Vol. 89, No. 1, 1985. Share, Donald, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Transition Through Transaction’, Comparative Political Studies 19, 4, January 1987. Story, Jonathan, ‘Spanish Political Parties: Before and After the Election’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn 1977). Tovias, Alfred, ‘The International Context of Democratic Transition’, West European Politics 7, 2, April 1984. Valenzuela, Samuel, ‘Labour Movement in Transitions to Democracy. A Framework for Analysis’, Comparative Politics 21 (July 1989).

3. Unpublished work Buchanan, Tom, British Trade Union Internationalism and the Spanish Civil War, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1987. Buchanan, Tom, ‘British Politics and Franco’s Spain, 1945–60’, paper presented at the conference Spain in an International Context, 1936–1959, University of the West of England, 18–20 July 1996. Onkenhout, M., Spain and the European Communities, a Question of Politics, 1957–1980, M.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1980. Powell, Charles T., Reform versus ‘Ruptura’ in Spain’s Transition to Democracy, D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1989.

Index Compiled by Auriol Griffith-Jones

Aasen, Liv, Norway 197n Acosta Orge, Francisco, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Adenauer, Konrad, German Chancellor 138, 147 AECE (Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea) 76 AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations) 45, 50, 105, 187; and ICFTU 57, 58 Agesta, Ramón, IFCTU, visit to US 50 Agrupación Socialista Madrileña (PSOE branch) 94 Aguiriano, José Antonio, ICFTU 55, 56 aircraft, sold by Britain 102, 104–5 Alday, Agustín, UGT 202n Alevi, Ellisca, Israel Labour Party 195n Allon, Abraham 198n Alvarez de Miranda, Fernando, AECE 76 Amat Maíz, Antonio, PSOE 47–8, 74, 82, 87, 142 Amnesty International 5, 92, 106 Andalucia province 51 Anger, Colette 197n Anne, HRH Princess 102 anti-clericalism, of Socialists 75 Antón, Santiago, Socialist 74 Antunes, Monsignor Añoveros, Bishop of Bilbao 13 Archer, Peter, MP 103, 105 Areilza, José Maria de 14 Arendt, Walter, German Labour Minister 168 Arias Navarro, Carlos, Prime Minister 13, 173; confirmed by King Juan Carlos 14, 41; dismissed (1976) 15, 42; programme of political liberalisation 14, 41, 42, 113, 174; and sentence on Carabanchel Ten 106–7

Ariza, Julián, CC.OO 97 Armentia Juvete, Miguel, UGT 150, 154, 160, 195n; at DGB Congress (1962) 143; at UGT Bad Nauheim conference (1966) 151 Arriba newspaper 94, 164 Arrillaga, Josefina, PSOE 74, 76, 82 AS (Alianza Sindical) 49, 70, 149, 154; attempts to unite with ASO 55–6, 69, 183, 200n; and TUC 81–2 ASO (Alianza Sindical Obrera) 53, 55, 92, 149, 173; cooperation with UGT rejected 55–6, 150; decline of 156, 157, 183; German perceptions of 149–50, 151–2, 155; IG Metall support for 53, 138, 141–5, 150, 152–4, 182; relations with CGT-FO 128; relations with ICFTU 56, 69; SDDC view of 90, 91–2; strategy 90, 142, 152, 153 Asturias, Socialist support in 24; state of emergency (1962) 52; strikes 47, 66, 173; strikes (1962) 12, 51–2, 83, 217n ASU (Agrupación Socialista Universitaria) 47, 73 Attlee, Clement, Earl, British Prime Minister 72, 203n Austria 31, 41; Spanish emigrants to 139, 217n Austrian ÖGB 65, 200n Baena Alonso, José 39 Balcomb, Rodney, SI 22, 37, 196n, 197n; report on political trials (1970) 98–9; and support for PSOE(r) 28, 29–30, 34–5, 196n Banya, Anton, Austrian delegate to ILO 63 Barboza-Carneiro, J.A., ILO study group (1969) 60

239

240


Basque Country 14, 24, 54; strikes (1962) 12, 51, 217n, see also Basque nationalism; ETA Basque nationalism, and France 129–30; suppression of 82, 85, 159, see also ETA Basso, Lelio, SI 20 BBC, news of Spanish opposition 81, 86 Becú, Omer, ICFTU 21, 49, 68, 145; condemnation of Spain 54; protest about 1962 strikes 52; on UGT in exile 152 Begarra, Joseph, SFIO 214n Beihl, Eugen, kidnapped by ETA 99 Belgium, opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 126; Socialist Party and SI Spain Committee 34; Spanish workers in 197n, 217n, see also FGTB Benenson, Peter, SDDC and Society of Labour Lawyers 74–5, 76, 203n Benn, Anthony Wedgwood, MP, SDDC 203n Benoît, René, French Socialist Party 22 Bergeron, André, FO 128 Berlin, uprising (1953) 46 Besteiros, Julián, leader of PSOE faction 119 Beveridge, Lord, signatory to appeal 77 Bevin, Ernest, MP 212n Bianco, Gino, SI 197n Birkelbach criteria, for association with EEC 8, 145 Birkelbach, Willi 145 Blachstein, Peter, SPD 145 Blanco Chivite, Manuel, ETA 39 Blum, Leon 32 Boncour, Jean Paul, French Council of Ministers 214n Bonmati, Manuel 198n Boothby, Lord, signatory to appeal 77 Borbón, Don Juan de, Democratic Junta 14 Bothereau, Robert, FO 122, 123, 124–5, 126 Bottini, R.N., TUC International Committee 212n

Bourhis, Jean, French Metal Workers’ Federation 136 boycotts, by foreign trade unions 65, 82; Jack Jones’s call for (1975) 110–11; on Spanish goods 85; of tourism 68, 82, 85 Brandel, Kuno, DGB 151 Brandt, Willy, German Chancellor 32, 41, 158, 168, 195n; as Foreign Minister 139; visit to Madrid cancelled 156, 157, 183; opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 170–1; and Pardo affair 168; at PSOE Congress in Spain (1976) 42, 180–1; relations with Rodolfo Llopis 175; relationship with Felipe González 17, 174–6, 177, 183, 223n; as SPD leader 137, 220n Bratelli, Tryve 195n Braunthal, Gerard, International Metal Workers Federation and ICFTU 55, 56, 57, 176 Brenner, Otto, IG Metall 143, 144, 150, 151, 168; and Pardo affairs 160–1, 168; support for unitary trade union in Spain 154 Britten, Benjamin, signatory to appeal 77 Brown, George, British Foreign Secretary 95 Brussels, ICFTU Conference (1967) 57 Brutelle, Georges, SFIO 214n Brutelle, Georges, SFIO 122 Buchanan, Richard, MP 94 Buck, L., TUC International Committee 212n Buiter, Harm G., ICFTU 60, 61, 62, 64, 65 Burgos, ETA court martial (1970) 13, 65, 99, 129 Burnell, P., Democracy Assistance 5 Butler, R.A., British Home Secretary 49, 80 Caballero Foundation 16, 179, 188 Caballero, Largo, leader of PSOE faction 119 Caetano, Marcelo, Portuguese dictator 176

Index Cáliz, Cristobal, trial (1974) 37 Callaghan, James, MP, as British Foreign Secretary 110, 111–12, 114, 212n; as Prime Minister 115 Camacho Abad, Marcelino, CC.OO 16, 97, 101; one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Canary Islands, proposed space centre 127 Carabanchel Ten (CC.OO members), trial of 101–2, 103, 105–7 Carlson, Thorbjörn, Swedish delegate to ILO 63 Carlsson, Bernt, SI 37, 40, 42–3, 197n, 198n Carrero Blanco, Admiral Luis, Prime Minister 13, 130, 165; assassination (1973) 13, 105, 173, 174 Carrillo, Santiago, PCE 16, 130, 134–5; links with Mitterrand 132–3, 134, 137 Carthy, Albert, SI 21, 22, 73, 145 Castellano, Pablo 114, 172, 195n, 196n, 197n; passport confiscated 171; PSOE(r) secretary for international relations 35, 174, 195n, 196n; on role of Labour Party 31, 108 Castells, Herr, UGT in Cologne 144 Castiella, Fernando María, Spanish Foreign Minister 77–8, 80, 89, 127, 157 Catalan Socialist Movement see MSC Catalonia 14, 75, 87; separatist movement 13, 85, 91 Catholic Church 7, 75, 103; in US 50 CC.OO (Workers’ Commissions) 14, 100–1, 173, 187; and 1962 strikes 53; Communist control of (1966) 56, 69, 70, 183; Congreso Sindical Constituyente proposed 180; declared illegal (1967) 56, 156; success in syndical elections (1966) 156; support for 58–9; TGWU support for 96, 97; and trial of Carabanchel Ten 101–2, 105–7; UGT and 68, 69, 155 CDU-CSU (German Christian Democratic Union) 138

241

censorship, extended (1969) 59 Cerdá, Clemente 98 CERES (Centre d’études de recherches et d’éducation) (Marxist) 120, 133 CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail), and PSU 136; support for Spanish trade unionists 128, 136 CGT-FO (French socialist union) 9, 127; and ICFTU 57–8; links with ASO 128; protest against death sentences 65; relations with PS 121; support for Spanish Socialists 124–5; support for UGT 125, 126, see also FO Chataway, Chris, MP 77 Chaves, Manuel, PSOE (Seville) 24 Chereque, Jacques, French Metal Workers’ Federation 136 Chilean Radical Party 197n Christian Democrats 12, 75, 90, 91; European parties 8 Chuecha, Pablo, UGT 202n CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 172–3, 223n Cimedevilla, Cesar, trial (1959) 204n CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindicati Lavoratori), at ICFTU conference (1967) 57 Cisneros, Gabriel 16 Civil War, Spanish (1936–39) 185; British labour movement and 9, 71–2 Clausen, Herr, German Social Minister 148 Cleipsties, Gerhard, SPD 172 CNS (Confederación Nacional Sindicalista) 85, 155, 207–8n CNT, CNT newspaper (Toulouse) 125 CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo), and trade union alliances 49, 53, 81–2 Collective Bargaining, 1958 Law on 12, 53 Collins, A.D., NUM 93 Coltman, A.L., British embassy 94 COMISCO (Committee of the International Socialist Conference) 18

242


Communism, American fear of 21, 172–3, 176–7, 204n; German fear of 10, 155–6, 176, 177, 183; SI policy on 19, 43; as threat 124, 187 Communist party see PCE Communist regimes 6; ICFTU relations with 46 Communists, French see PCF; Portuguese 109, 135, 176 Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 133, 178 Congreso Sindical Constituyente (Constituent Trade Union Congress) (1976) 180 Connelly, Tom, SDDC 89–90 Conservative Party (British), policy towards Spain 85, 86, 102 Correo de Andalucia, El 37 Cortes (parliament), amendment to Penal Code 54; Law constituting (1942) 13; revised trade union law (1970) 64–6 COS (Coordinator of Trade Union Organisations) 180 Council of Europe 6, 7, 21 court cases see courts martial; trials courts martial, Burgos (1970) 13, 65, 99, 129; Madrid (1975) 39, 67, 110 Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister 123, 127 Crosland, Antony, British Foreign Minister 115 Cruz Salido, Sr, Socialist Party 156 CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) 6 Cunhal, Alvaro, Portuguese Communist leader 135 Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion (1968) 46, 120 Dahl, Robert A. 1 Dahrendorf, Dr, German Foreign ministry 162 Daily Express newspaper 84 Daily Mail newspaper 85 Daily Telegraph newspaper 85 Danish Labour Organisation 65

Davies, Ernest, MP 86, 87, 203n; Labour party observer at trials 76–7, 82, 84 Dawisha, Karen 6 de Areilza, José María, Foreign Minister 114, 164, 179 De Brouckère, Louis, SI 20 de Erice, José Sebastián, Spanish ambassador to Germany 166, 167–8 de Francisco, Enrique, PSOE President 119 de Freitas, Geoffrey, MP, SDDC 203n De Hann, Herr, DGB 151 De Kock, Marc, ICFTU/ILO 57, 153 de Pinies, Jaime, Spanish Ambassador to London 101, 106 de Zulueta, Juan Antonio 76 death sentence, campaigns against 13, 65, 99; condemnation of 1975 executions 39, 110, 177–8 Debré, Michel, French Prime Minister 122, 124–5 Debunne, George, FTGB 67 Debunne, Oscar, Belgium 198n Defferre, Gaston, French Socialist 120, 132, 133, 137 Dejardins, Claude, Belgian Socialist Party 195n Delargy, Hugh, MP, SDDC 203n democracy, defined 1, 189n Democratic Co-ordination (1975) 14, 114–15 Democratic Junta (1974) 14, 174 ‘democratic rupture’, demand for 14, 36–7, 41, 115, 133–4, 174 democratisation, international factors in 2–5; role of international actors 5–6; third wave of (Huntingdon’s) 3–4 DGB (German Trade Union Federation) 9, 45, 182; Congress (Hannover 1962) 143; influence in ICFTU 57, 58, 188; links with SPD 138; opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 172; protest against Franco regime 52, 65, 168; relations with IG Metall 161; solidarity with UGT 150–2, 154, 157–8, 172, 183, 188; Spain

Index Commission (1966) 154; and Spanish workers in Germany 139–41, 144, 148–9; support for Spanish opposition 143–4, 160, 162, 183–4; support for unitary trade union in Spain 154–5, 184, 187 Diamant, Max, IG Metall 141, 142, 143, 149, 182, 219n; allegation of links with CIA 172–3; and support for ASO 152, 155, 182; at UGT Congress (1968) 158 Diamond, Larry 5–6 Dingels, Hans, SPD 32, 140, 145, 147, 198n; and German policy on Spain 149, 157; support for Spanish Socialists 159 Dominican Republic 2 Douglas Home, Sir Alec see Home, Earl of Doyle, Peter, British Labour Party 195n Drake, Paul W. 4 Driberg, Tom, MP 77, 84, 107, 195n Droz, Humbert, SI 20 Eastern Europe, post-communist 6 Ebert Foundation see Friedrich Ebert Foundation Echave Asenio, Jóse Luis, UGT 202n economy, Spanish 103; autarky (to 1957) 10–11; liberalisation of 7, 11, 139 Edenhofer, Walter, SPD 172 Edinburgh, Duke of, at coronation of Juan Carlos 113 Edwards, Bob, MP 79, 82, 108, 117, 185, 193n; detention 77; and Franco’s funeral 113; SDDC 103, 203n EEC (European Economic Community) 3, 5, 7, 111; accession of new members (1973) 111; conditions for Spain’s admission 164–5, 179; criteria for association 8, 145, 185; economic expansion of 10, 181–2; French support for Spanish admission 121, 126–7; German support for Spanish

243

admission 181–2; opposition to Spanish admission 12, 37, 60, 67, 102, 136, 163–4, 170–1; Preferential Trade Agreement (1970) 111, 126, 129, 130, 161, 162, 164–5; SI opposition to Spanish admission 21; Spanish application to 8, 11, 21, 129, 161, 185; Spanish mission to 57; trade negotiations with Spain (1975-6) 111–12 Eisenhower, Dwight, US President, visit to Spain 77 elections, (1977) 2, 15, 43; (1982) 2, 8 Elósegui, Oreja, Ministry of Justice 74 emigration, of Spanish workers 11, 139–40, 197n, 217n emigré community, Spanish 7 Ennals, David, MP 84, 203n Erhard, Ludwig, German Chancellor 49, 138 Erler, Fritz, SPD Vice-President 146–8, 182 España Libre, CNT newspaper 125 Ester, Elke, Ebert Foundation 173 ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askasasuna) (Basque separatists) 13, 14, 96; assassination of Carrero Blanco 13, 105; Burgos trials (1970) 13, 65, 99, 129; kidnapping of Eugen Beihl 99, 129; terrorists executed (1975) 14, 39, 67 ETUC (European Trade Union Congress) 68, 177 European Left, Congress of 32 European Movement, 4th Congress (Munich 1962) 12; London conference (1973) 32 European National Trade Union Centres 68 European Parliament 7, 186; protest against Franco regime 13; Socialist group in 39, 129 European Socialists 185–6 European Union 5, 6, 7 Evain, Pierre, SI 136 executions, FRAP members (1975) 110, 177–8; Salvador Puig Antich (1974) 13, 67 Exprés Español 169, 172, 178, 188

244


external actors 185; role of 2–5, 178–9; role in post-communist transitions 6 Falange party 168 FDP (German Free Democratic Party), coalition with SPD 138 Feather, Victor, TUC 68, 93, 97, 98, 101 Fellemaier, Ludwig, SPD 178 Fellowes, D., NUM 93 Fellowes, Gilbert, NUM, delegate at Tarragona congress (1968) 94 Fernández Costilla, Luis, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Fernández, Jiménez, Christian Democrat leader 12 Fernández, Julio, PSOE(r) 132 Fernández Malo, Alfonso, Young Socialist leader 24 Fernández Montesinos, Manuel, UGT and ASO 217n, 219n Fernández Puig, Carlos, UGT 217n Fernández Torres, Alfonso, PSOE in Andalucia 24 Fernández Tovar, Vladimiro 39 FGTB (Belgian trade union federation) 57, 65, 200n Finland, membership of SI Spain Committee 38 First International (1864-76) 18 FO (Force Ouvrière), opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 131; protests against French policy towards Spain 125, 127, 129, 137; support for UGT 122, 126, 130; XI Congress (Paris 1971) 130, see also CGT-FO Foot, Michael, MP 103, 116; Labour Party resolution on Spain (1973) 106; at PSOE Congress in Spain (1976) 42, 180; visit to Spain (1972) 31, 102 Forcan, Ocko 151 Ford, Gerald, US President 176 foreign investment 11 Forest, Geneveva 38

Fraga Iribarne, Manuel 13, 14, 179; ambassador to Britain 38; Minister of Information 87, 159, 183 France, and 54th ILO conference 63; ban on activities of Spanish exiles 122, 124–5; emigration agreement with Spain 139, 197n, 217n; Fifth Republic (from 1959) 119–20; government policy towards Spain 121–8, 130; observers at Madrid trial (1970) 22–3; plebiscite (1969) 129; PSOE in exile in 119; SI membership, and PSOE split 31; Socialist links with Spain 10, 187–8; support for Spain’s membership of EEC 121, 126–7; tension with Spain (from 1970) 129–30, see also CGTFO; PS; SFIO; Toulouse Franco, Francisco, commutation of death sentences (1970) 100; death of 2, 14, 41, 112, 158, 178–9, 186; funeral 112–13; and international forums 20; meeting with Couve de Murville 127; meeting with Scheel 165; succession 13, 109 Franco regime 13, 185; denounced for human rights violations 21–2, 23, 48, 54, 103; ignores ILO report on trade unions (1969) 61; ILO/ICFTU attempts to undermine (1970) 63–6; negative publicity 54–5, 68, 70; repression of dissent (1969) 96–7, 159; repression of workers (1967) 56–7, 159; sensitivity to criticism 55, 62, 70, 78, 100, 117, 186–7; SI pressure for international opposition to 21, 39, 40–1; submission to international pressure 169–70; value of foreign visits to 75, 85, 93–4; weakening of 34, 174, see also Spain; states of emergency; trials Franco, Salvador, trial (1959) 204n Franke, Egon, German minister 221n FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico) 14, 212n; and 1975 Madrid court martial 39, 67, 110, 177

Index French Christian Trade Union organisation 124, see also CGT-FO French Socialist Party see PS; SFIO Frente de Liberación Popular, trial of members (1959) 76 Friedrich, Bruno, SPD 177–8 Friedrich Ebert Foundation 16, 165, 167, 188; and Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 133, 178; office in Madrid 179; support for Spanish Socialists 173 FST (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores) 49 FUDE (Federación Universitaria Democrática Española) 149 Fuero (Charter) of the Spaniards (Fuero de los Españoles) (1945) 13; suspended (1969) 59 Fuero (Charter) of Work (1938) 12–13 Fundación Largo Caballero see Caballero Foundation Fundación Pablo Iglesias see Iglesias Foundation Fundamental Laws of Spanish state 12–13 Gaitskell, Hugh, MP 84 Galeote, Guillermo, PSOE (Seville) 24, 174 Gama, Jaime 198n García, Marcelo, PSOE(r) 195n García, Vicente, trial (1959) 204n García Bloise, Carmen, PSOE(r) 31, 132, 195n García Duarte, Antonio, UGT 67, 114, 172 García Fanjul, Felipe, UGT 202n García Mesa, José, Socialist 74 García Ramal, Enrique, Minister for trade unions 98 García Robles, Antonio, PSOE 87 García Salve, Francisco, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Garmendia Artola, José 39 Gaulle, Charles de, French President 119–20, 129; policy towards Spain 121, 122–3, 127; vision of Europe 127

245

Geneva, ICFTU co-ordinating committee 57 Genscher, Hans Dietrich, German Minister 168, 177 Germany 158, 222n; and 54th ILO conference 63; and death of Franco 41; debate on Spanish workers 148–9, 155; in favour of unitary syndicalism in Spain 149–50, 154–5, 182; ICFTU membership 198n; ministerial visits to Spain 49; observers at Madrid trial (1970) 22–3; perception of Spain 10, 140–1, 181–2; relations with Spain 139, 140–1, 147–8, 159–60, 162–5, 182–3; rights of workers (Constitutional Law) 148, 168; SI membership, and PSOE split 31; Socialist links with Spain 10, 159–60; Spanish workers in 10, 138, 139–41, 143, 159, 182, 217n; support for Spanish admission to EEC 126, 181 Gibraltar 85, 89, 104–5 Gil Robles, José María, Christian Democrat 82 Gillespie, Richard 27, 134–5, 175 Girbau, Vincente 82 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, French President 120 Gómez, Trifón, PSOE Vice President 119 González, Agustin, PSOE 25, 195n González, Arcadio, UGT 217n González, Felipe, PSOE 24, 37, 43, 188; and French links 132, 133–4, 137; General Secretary 16, 25, 36–7, 118, 174; and IG Metall delegation (1976) 179; at Labour Party Conference 114–15; at London meeting of SI Spain Committee 37–8; pessimism about Suárez’ reforms 181; at PSOE Congress in Spain (1976) 180; and PSOE (renovado) 119, 131, 174, 195n; relations with Willy Brandt 17, 137, 158, 174–6, 177, 183; in Seville 24, 37; at Southern European Socialists Conference (1976) 135–6; at SPD

246


Mannheim Congress 177; trial (1974) 37 Gordillo, Francisco, UGT 217n Gormley, Joe, NUM 115, 213n Gosepath, Lutz, DGB 151 Graedel, Adolphe, International Metal Workers Federation 55, 56, 142, 150, 161; and support for ASO 156 Great Britain, and 54th ILO conference 63; appointment of Labour Attaché in Madrid 95–6; ICFTU membership 198n; ministerial visits to Spain 49, 85; and negotiations to build warships 87–8; opposition to Spanish admission to NATO 79; relations with Spain 9, 41, 72, 89; representation at Franco’s funeral 112–13; Royal Family’s contacts with Spain 102; Spanish workers in 197n, 217n; trade with Spain 111–12, see also Labour movement; Labour Party; TUC Greece 4, 24, 181 Greek Socialist Party (PASOK) 135 Griffiths, James, MP, SDDC 203n Grugel, Jean, Democracy without Borders 4–5 Grunwald, Günther, Ebert Foundation 219n Guardian, Ingham article in 91 Guerra, Alfonso, PSOE(r) 24, 25, 174, 195n Guidoni, Pierre 132, 134, 198n Guille, Georges, editorial board of Le Socialiste 214n Guipuzcua province 51, 52, 173 Günther, Otmar, IG Metall 224n Gunther, Richard 8–9 Gutiérrez, Ambrosio, trial (1974) 37 Gutierrez, Fernando 195n Hagestadt, Leonard, Labour attaché, delegate at Tarragona congress (1968) 94 Hargreaves, J.A., TUC 82, 97, 101, 212n, 213n; visit to Spain (1976) 115 Harndt, Erick, German official 172

Hattersley, Roy, MP 111 Hayward, Ron, Labour Party General Secretary 109, 196n Healey, Denis, MP 100 Heise, Dr Bern, DGB 219n Herberson, Peggy, MP 84 Hernández, Tomás 32 Hernst, Dr 172 Herter, Christian, US Secretary of State 78, 79 Home, Earl of, British Foreign Secretary 49, 79–80, 104–5 Horne, Hermes, ICFTU member 47, 48 Hugo, Carlos, Carlist leader 14 human rights organisations 6 human rights violations, ICFTU denunciations 48, 54; SDDC indictment of Franco regime 103; SI denunciations 21–2, 23 Hungary, uprising (1956) 46 Huntington, Samuel P. 3 Huntzinger, Jacques 135 Hurtado, Emilio, Communist 76; trial (1959) 204n Hynd, John, MP 74 Iberian Socialist Conference (1974) 34 ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) 9, 17, 124, 185; and 54th ILO Conference (1970) 63; assistance to Spanish unions 46, 69; attempts to isolate Spain 50–1, 54–5, 162, 205n; attempts to unify Spanish trade unions 55–9, 63, 69; Co-ordinating Committee (from 1967) 57–9, 63–4, 70; complaints via ILO 46–7, 52, 54–5, 66, 69–70; Conference on Spain (1967) 57; Congresses 45–6, 66, 67–8; Executive Board 46; fundraising for strikes 52–3, 199–200n; funds for UGT 68–9, 187; International Solidarity Fund 46, 47, 58, 64, 199n; International Trade Secretariats 46, 68; joint committee with IFCTU (1960-62) 48–51; origins and functions of 45–6; relations with ASO 56; relations with PSOE 47–8; represen-

Index tations to Spanish government 47, 159; support for UGT 45, 53, 66–9, 70, 152; view of CC.OO 180 ideology, effect on democratisation 4; and trade union divisions 142, 153 IFCTU (International Federation of Christian Trade Unions), joint committee with ICFTU 48–51 IG Metall (German metalworkers’ union) 17, 139, 182, 188; Congress (Munich 1968) 158; delegation to Madrid (1976) 179, 224n; funds for strikers 200n; policy towards UGT reconsidered (1967) 156, 183; protest against detention of Pardo 168; relations with DGB 161; relations with UGT 142–3, 149–50, 167; and Spanish workers in Germany 140; support for ASO 53, 138, 141–5, 149–50, 152–4, 183, 187 Iglesias, Enrique Alonso, UGT 202n Iglesias Foundation 16, 179, 188 Iglesias Freire, Pablo, UGT 202n Iglesias, Juan 31, 132, 172, 195n, 196n; and PSOE(r) 27, 30, 32 ILO (International Labour Office) 5, 46–7; complaint to Spain 52; report on 1969 visit 61–2 ILO (International Labour Organisation) 49; 53rd Conference (1969) 62; 54th Conference (1970) 63–6; ICFTU and 186, 187; study group visit to Spain (1969) 59–63 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 5, 186; Spain joins (1959) 11, 20, 71 Ingham, Bernard, journalist 91 Iñigo, Martin, UGT 217n Insausti, Jesus, ICFTU 140 International Brigades, Spanish Civil War 9, 72, 185, 193n International Federation of Building and Woodworkers 66 International Metalworkers’ Federation 46, 66; and ASO 173; and ICFTU 57, 58; and NUM visit (1968) 93–4; and Spanish workers in Germany 142; and UGT–ASO talks 55

247

International Transport Workers’ Federation 46 Isausti, Ignacio, Basque trade unionist 81 Isenberg, Veronika, SPD 27, 37, 132, 198n; and SI 37, 197n Israel, membership of SI Spain Committee 38 Italian Socialist Party 32, 197n; and SI action against Spain 23, 39; at Southern European Socialist Conference (1976) 135; visit to Spain (1972) 31 Italian trade union federation 65 Italy, observers at Madrid trial (1970) 22–3; opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 126; SI membership 31 Jahn, Gerhard, German Minister of Justice 197n Janitschek, Hans, SI 23, 38, 198n; and Madrid trial (1970) 22; SI mission to Spain (1976) 41–2; at Southern European Socialist Conference (1976) 135; visit to Spain (1974) 36 Janner, Greville, MP 197n Jaquet, Gerard, editorial board of Le Socialiste 214n Jeger, George, SDDC 92–3, 95, 203n; visit (1965) 89–90 Jiménez de la Espada, Mario, Labour Attaché in London 93, 98, 101 Jimeno, Arsenio, PSOE(r) 27, 195n, 196n; meeting with French PS 132 Jones, Elwyn, MP, SDDC 203n Jones, Jack, TGWU 93, 96, 103, 117, 185, 193n, 213n; and 1970 Burgos trial 99; and 1975 executions 110–11, 177; delegation to Spanish ambassador 101; and Franco’s funeral 113; links with CC.OO 97, 100; and trial of Carabanchel Ten 106; TUC International Committee 212n; visit to Spain (1976) 115–16 Jou Fonollá, Joaquín, PSOE(r) 195n Jours de la Semaine 123 Juan Carlos, King 7, 113, 180–1; accession 14, 41; coronation 113;

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named as Franco’s successor (1969) 13, 96, 177; as Prince 102, 165, 171 Jurados de Empresas (works committees) 53 Kennedy, John F., US President 51 Kersten, Otto, DGB 66, 149–50, 220n; General Secretary ICFTU 67, 68, 197n Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg, German Chancellor 139, 157 Kissinger, Henry, US Secretary of State 176 Koch, Herbert, Education Trade Union 220n Kohler, Beate 8–9 Kohn-Brandenburg, Alexander 145 Koniecki, Dieter, Ebert Foundation 16, 174 Kreisky, Bruno, Austrian Chancellor 175, 195n Kristoffersen, Erwin, DGB 180 Krockert, Herr, SPD 168 la Naval de Sestao 59 Labouchère, George, British ambassador in Madrid 89 Labour movement (British) 9, 116–18, 185, 187; and Carabanchel trial 101–2, 103, 105–7; perception of PSOE in Spain 75, 91; and Spanish Civil War 9, 71–2, 117; support for strikers 86; and unity of Spanish socialists 90, 91, 101, 108, see also Labour Party (British); SDDC Labour Party (British) 9, 113, 197nn; concern about visits to Spain 74–5, 84–5, 98, 116–17; formation of SDDC (1959) 71, 73–8; and Franco’s funeral 112–13; funds for strikers 200n; in government (1964-70) 88, 89–96; in government (1974-79) 96–7, 103; MPs’ visits to Spain 89, 92–5; National Executive Committee (NEC) resolutions 72–3, 89, 100, 106, 113; opposition to Spanish admission to NATO 80–1, 117; policy towards Spain 85–6, 96–7; protests to Franco regime 84,

99, 110, 203n; recognition of PSOE(r) 33, 91, 107–10, 116, 117, 118; Summer Schools 91, 93; support for Portugal 211–12n; support for Spanish opposition groups 91, 116–18; visit to Spain (1972) 31, 102, see also SDDC Lacore, Suzanne, editorial board of Le Socialiste 214n Lallemand, Roger, Belgian lawyer for ICFTU 54 Laski, Harold, SI 20 Latin America 3, 127 Lazcano, Santiago, UGT 217n Leigh, J.T., NUM 93 Lenders, Helmut, SPD 168 Leon province 51 Levant province 51 Liberal Monarchists, opposition group 12 liberalisation, attempts at 11, 13, 139, see also Arias Navarro Lilienfeld, Georg von, German ambassador in Spain 177, 180 Linz, Juan 2, 7 Little, Jenny, SDDC 36, 40, 197n, 198nn; on Arias Navarro’s reform proposals 42; on Juan Carlos 113; and SDDC tribunal on Spain 103–4; and SI Spain Committee 37, 109–10; and support for PSOE(r) 108; and trial of Carabanchel Ten 105; visit to Spain (1972) 31, 102 Llanes, Elias 16 Llopis Brave, Adolfo, UGT (in Germany) 143, 149, 217n; at IG Metall Congress (1968) 158; view of ASO 153, 155 Llopis, Rodolfo, PSOE General Secretary 119, 195n; and British Labour movement 72, 73, 85, 97; letter to Janitschek 23; meeting with Brandt 157; opposition to Erler’s visit (1965) 147–8; and PSOE (histórico) 119, 131, 196n; PSOE leadership in exile 24–7, 73, 82, 91, 166; and PSOE split 26–7, 30, 32, 107; relations with French Socialists 122; relations with SPD 145–6, 159,

Index 165, 175; and report on Matthöfer 173; on SI Spanish Commission 20–1; on suspension of Le Socialiste 132 Llorens, Tomás, trial (1959) 204n Lloyd, Selwyn, British Foreign Secretary 78 Lluch, Vicente, trial (1959) 204n Loderer, Eugen, IG Metall 179–80 López Albizu, Eduardo, PSOE(r) 174, 195n, 202n López Bravo, Gregorio, Foreign Minister 130, 164, 165, 170–1; visit to Germany (1972) 171 López Real, Francisco, ICFTU 25, 27, 195n; International Secretary of PSOE(r) 27, 29–30, 32, 35, 37 López Rodó, Laureano, General Technical Secretary 11 Louet, Roger, ICFTU observer 64 Lozano, Sr 151 Luxembourg 126 Luxembourg CGT 65 Luyten, Jan, Belgian Socialist Party 21 Lyttle, John, SDDC, visits to Spain 86, 87, 89–90 MacGuire, Michael, MP 94 McNally, Tom, Labour Party 101, 102, 196n; and SDDC tribunal (1973) 103 Maier, Henri, ICFTU 66 Malefakis, Edward 1–2 Mallalieu, Edward, MP 74 Maravall, José María 159 Marchais, Georges, PCF 121, 134, 135 Markscheffel, Günther, SPD 140 Marquina, Antonio 78 Martín Santos, Luis, Socialist 74 Martín Villa, Rodolfo 16, 98 Martínez de Velasco, Juan, PSOE(h) 196n Martínez Gómez, Santiago, UGT 202n Martuscelli, Vittorio, Italian Socialist Party 22 Mateos, Abdón 27, 28–9 Matthöfer, Hans, SPD and IG Metall 15, 17, 138, 142, 158, 182, 195n, 220n; allegation of links with CIA

249

172–3; and criticism of Spanish workers 148; and Madrid trial (1970) 22, 163–4, 194–5n; and Pardo affair 167, 168, 169; and Spanish reforms (1976) 181; support for ASO 152–3, 158, 182; support for PSOE(r) 174, 175, 180; support for Spanish Socialists 159–60, 162, 163–4, 166, 184; on syndicalism in Spain 155 Mauroy, Pierre, French Socialist 120, 133 Mayalde, Conde de, Mayor of Madrid 156 Maybray-King, Horace Maybray, Lord 104 Meany, George, AFL-CIO 50, 52 Meir, Golda 195n Mena, José, trial (1959) 204n Menéndez, Teodomiro, Socialist Party 156 Mexico 67–8, 119 Mezza, Victoria, Unitary Italian Socialist Party 23, 196n MFA (Movimiento da Forças Armadas), Portugal 109, 176 military equipment, aircraft sales to Spain 102, 104–5; Anglo-Spanish trade 87–8, 89 Mitterrand, François, PS 41, 120; alliances with Communists 120–1, 131; friendship with Tierno Galván 132–3, 137; links with Carrillo 132–3, 134, 137; at PSOE Congress in Spain (1976) 42, 180; at PSOE Congress (Suresnes) 175; at Southern European Socialists Conference (1976) 135; support for Felipe González and PSOE 134; and Union de la Gauche 121, 134, 137 Möller, Alex, German Minister of Finance 221n Mollet, Guy, SFIO 120, 122, 123 monarchists 12, 73, 75, 76 monarchy, constitutional 75 Montainer, Bernard, PS 27, 131, 132, 137, 195n Montel, Eugene, editorial board of Le Socialiste 214n

250


Montes, Fernando, Socialist 74 Montesinos, Manuel Fernández, UGT and ASO 141–3, 144, 149 Morgan, Gwyn, Labour Party and SDDC 89, 91, 95–6 Morilla, Luis, PSOE(h) 196n Morodo, Raul, PSI 36, 93 Morse, David, ILO Director General 61 MRG (French Left Radicals) 121 MSC (Moviment Socialista de Cataluña) 14, 73, 92, 98, 101; at Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 133, 178; SDDC grant to 93 Múgica Herzog, Enrique, PSOE 25, 172, 174, 195n, 196n; at SPD Congress (1970) 165; trial (1974) 37 Muhr, Gerd, German delegate to ILO 63 Muiño, Manuel, UGT General Secretary 60, 97, 98, 141, 160–1 Muñiz Zapico, Juan Marcos, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Muñoz, Isabel, trial (1959) 204n Murray, Len, TUC General Secretary 106, 111, 115, 212n Nandrup Dahl, Karl, Norway 197n National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) (UK) 83, 97; visit to Spain (1968) 93–4 NATO, military facilities in Spain 79, 214–15n; opposition to Spanish admission 21, 39, 78–81; role in democratisation 5 Nau, Alfred, SPD 145, 146, 220n Navarro, Jiménez, PSOE 87 Navarro Rubio, Mariano, Finance Minister 11; as Prime Minister 67 NED (National Endowment for Democracy) 5, 6 Nenni, Pietro, at PSOE Congress in Spain (1976) 42, 180 Netherlands 41, 126; Spanish emigrants in 139, 197n, 217n Netherlands NVV, funds for strikers 200n News Chronicle 77

NGOs (non-governmental organisations) 5, 6 Nicholas, Sir Harry, Labour Party 100 Niklasson, Tomas 6 Noel Baker, Francis, observer at ASO trial 153 Noren, Ivan, International Metalworkers’ Federation 168 Northcutt, Wayne 120 Norway, observers at Madrid trial (1970) 22–3 Norwegian Labour Organisation 65, 200n Noticiero, El, UGT newspaper (Germany) 142 Noveau Socialiste, Le 132 Novo, Alonso, trial (1959) 204n Nueva Economía group 149 Nuremburg, Congress (1968) 157, 159 OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation) 11, 186; Spain admitted to (1958) 20, 37, 71 Ollenhauer, Erich, SPD President 140 opposition (within Spain) 12, 14, 130, 141, 186; DGB support for 143–4, 160, 162, 183–4; Labour party support for 91, 116–18; SDDC contacts with 82–3, 89–91, 100–1, 107–8; TUC contacts with 81–2, 83–4, 97, see also Socialists Opus Dei (religious-political order) 11, 13, 168 Orad de la Torre, Urbano, PSOE 87 Organic Law of the State (1967) 12, 22 Organisation of American States 5 Oriol de Urquijo, Antonio María, Minister of Justice 62, 166, 168, 169 Ossorio, Carlos, UGT 150, 217n Otaegui Echevarria, Angel 39 Padley, Walter, SDDC and Society of Labour Lawyers 75–6, 203n Page, Derek, MP 94 Paladino, Morris, ICFTU 57, 97 Pallares, Antonio 195n Palme, Olaf 175, 195n; at PSOE Congress in Spain (1976) 42, 180 Pardo affair 158, 166–70

Index Pardo, Carlos, ASO and IG Metall 142, 175, 184, 224n; arrested in Spain 166–70; Essen secretary of FUGTA 144; and PSOE(r) 32; and UGT 15, 144, 160–1 Paris Match 123 Paris Presse 123 Parra, Carlos, SI, Chile 196n, 197n Parry, T., TUC International Committee 212n Partido Socialista Gallego, at Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 133, 178 Partit Socialista del Pais Valenciá, at Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 133, 178 Patiño, Pablo, assassination of 66 Paynter, Will, MP 101, 117, 193n; and SDDC tribunal (1973) 103; and trial of Carabanchel Ten 105; visit to Spain (1972) 31, 102 PCE (Spanish Communist Party) 12, 26, 141; control of CC.OO 53, 56, 69, 70, 183; and Democratic Junta 13–14, 174; legal recognition of (1977) 43; support for 24, 70, 173; and trade unions 55, 57, 149, see also anti-Communism; Carrillo; CC.OO PCF (French Communist Party) 120–1, 131 Pee, Hilde, Belgian Socialist Party 22 Penal Code, Article 222 amended (1965) 54 Pérez Esquerra, Manuel 67 Pérez Llorca, Pedro 16 Peri, Yoram, Israeli Socialist Party 37 Peydró, Miguel 27, 132 Phillips, Morgan, British Labour Party 72–3 Phipps, Colin, MP 109 Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael 179 Pitterman, Bruno, SI President 22, 36, 196n; at PSOE Congress (Suresnes) 175; and PSOE split 28, 29, 31 Plant, Cyril, British delegate to ILO 63, 106 Platform of Democratic Convergence (1975) 14, 178

251

Poland, uprising (1956) 46 political asylum, at British Embassy in Madrid 86 political parties, legalisation (1976) 15, 43; and transition to democracy 1 political prisoners 22, 114, 160, 162, 166 Political Reform, Law for (1976) 15, 115 Pompidou, Georges, appeasement of Spain (1970) 129–30; as French President 129–30, 131; as French Prime Minister 120, 126 Pontillon, Robert, PS 27, 131, 133, 134, 137 Populaire, Le, SFIO newspaper 124 Portugal 2, 4, 24, 181; revolution (1974) 109, 176 Portuguese Socialist Party, Congress (Lisbon 1974) 134, 175; invited to 1974 Conferencia de Unidad Socialista 133, 178; SDDC support for 208n; SI assistance to 19, 24; at Southern European Socialist Conference (1976) 135 Powell, Charles T. 7 press, French 123–4; reports of Scheel’s visit (1970) 164–5; Spanish 148 Preston, Paul 2 Pridham, Geoffrey 1, 6, 7 Principles of the National Movement, Law of (1958) 13 Profumo, John, British Minister for War 78 propaganda, by CNS 85; French assistance with 136 PS (French partie socialiste) 9, 119, 120, 131, 197n; concern for unity of Spanish Socialists 133; at Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 178; support for PSOE(r) 131–4; under Mitterand 131, 132–3; and Union de la Gauche 121, see also SFIO PSI (Partido Socialista del Interior) 28, 43, 98, 101; membership of SI 23, 132; unification with PSOE(h) 32

252


PSOE Congresses, 11th Toulouse (1970) 25, 174; 12th (1972), disputed 26–7, 32–3, 107, 131; 27th (Spain 1976) 42, 180–1; last in exile (Suresnes 1974) 36–7, 174, 175 PSOE (in exile) 119, 148, 159, 185; appeals to British Labour movement 72, 73, 98, 203n; Besteirista faction 119; Caballerista faction 119; disunity of 26, 75, 82, 86, 98; financial difficulties (1964) 145; and ICFTU support 47; international support for 8–9, 91, 136, 175; leadership in exile 12, 24, 72; and Platform of Democratic Convergence 14, 178; relations with British TUC/Labour Party 89, 100–1, 116; relations with Communists 26; relations with SPD 9, 91, 138, 145–6, 158, 175, 182; Seville group 24–5; and SI 4th Spanish Commission 23–4; SI intervention in 12, 19, 27–33; SI support for 20–1, 98–9; and Socialist Central Committee (1957) 47–8; split (1972) 12, 19, 24–33, 102, 107, 131, 174; support within Spain 25, 47–8, 74, 87, 98, 118, see also PSOE(r) (renovado) PSOE(h) (histórico) 19, 27, 32–3 PSOE(r) (renovado) 186, 187, 188; at 1973 congresses 32; and accession of Juan Carlos 42–3; arbiter on achievement of democracy in Spain 116; case for SI recognition 28–30, 99; at Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 133, 178; established (1972) 26–7, 42–3, 174; legalised (1977) 180; links with SPD 175; opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 134; recognition by British Labour Party 107–10, 116; recognition by SI (1974) 17, 30–3, 96, 131, 133, 171; ‘September Declaration’ (1974) 174; and SI Spain Committee (1974-77) 33–43; view of Juan Carlos 113; visit to DGB in Germany 172

PSU (French Parti Socialiste Unifié) 120, 136 Public Order, Law of 59 Pueblo newspaper 164 Puig Antich, Salvador, Catalan anarchist, execution (1974) 13, 67 Radio Baviera (Germany) 172, 188 Ramos, León, PSOE 82 Rebhan, Herman, IG Metall 224n Redondo, Nicolás, UGT 67, 68, 114, 174; and IG Metall delegation (1976) 179; and PSOE(r) 25, 174, 195n; trial (1974) 37, 171 Referendum, Law of the (1945) 13 Reuther, Victor, US trade unionist 152 Revilla, Amelio, UGT 202n Richter, Heinz, DGB 155, 220n; and ASO trial 153 Ridruejo, Dionisio, Social Democrat leader 12, 14 Ridruejo, Ramón, ASO 90–1 Rivera, José 198n Rivet, Paul, SI 20 Roberts, Albert, MP 93, 94, 98 Robinson, Kenneth, MP 77 Robles, Gil, Christian Democrat leader 12 Rocard, Michel, PSU 120, 136 Rodley, Nigel, Amnesty International 104 Rojo, Mariano, at UGT Bad Nauheim conference (1966) 151 Rolandi, Gianpiero, PDSI 37 Román Diáz, Francisco, PSOE 10, 47–8, 74 Rosenberg, Ludwig, DGB President 140, 144, 146, 151; support for ASO 152; and syndical situation in Spain (1966) 154 Rouzier, Jean, FO 131 Rubial, Ramón, UGT 202n Rüde, Irene, SPD 171 Ruegger, Paul, ILO study group (1969) 60 Ruiz Giménez, Joaquín, Christian Democrat leader 12, 14, 164 Rusk, Dean, US Secretary of State 49–50, 51, 52

Index Russell, Bertrand 77 Russia, post-communist 6 Saborido Galan, Eduardo, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Salanne, Rener, CFDT 136 Salazar, Oliveira, Portuguese dictator 109, 176 San Sebastián, Jaime, PSOE 172 Sánchez Mazas, Miguel, UGT 72, 150 Sandelson, Neville, SDDC 104 Sanisteban, Isidoro, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Sans, Gilbert, French Young Socialists 195n Sarre, George, French Socialist Party 27, 132 Sartorius Alvarez, Nicolas, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Sastre, Alfonso, playwright 38 Satrústegui, Joaquín, Liberal Monarchist leader 12, 76, 163, 164 Scandinavian Social Democratic parties 91 Schäfer, Fritz, German minister 169 Schalmey, Pablo, IG Metall 150, 151, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161; and Pardo affair 161 Scheel, Walter, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister 130, 158, 163, 168; visit to Madrid (1972) 165, 170–1; visit to Spain (1970) 163, 164–5 Schlesinger, Arthur, US presidential advisor 50 Schmidt, Helmut, German Chancellor 158, 175, 176, 177; meeting with González 181; meeting with King Juan Carlos 181; as Minister of Defence 221n Schmitter, Philippe C. 3, 4 Schröder, Gerhard, German Foreign Minister 157 Schuman, Maurice, French Foreign Minister 131; visit to Spain (1971) 130 Schunk, Albert, IG Metall 224n SDDC (Spanish Democrats’ Defence Committee) 17, 71, 73–8, 203–4n; becomes inactive (1976) 109;

253

contacts with Spanish opposition 82–3, 89–91, 100–1, 107–8; funds for PSOE(r) 110; funds for strikers 200n; and Labour Party policy 85–6, 95–6; observers at trials 76–7, 116; opposition to Spanish admission to NATO 78–81; protest about Socialist prisoners (1959) 74; and PSOE disunity 87, 108; report on trade unions in Spain (1968) 92–3; and Spanish trade unions 92–3, 97; student grants 93; tribunal on Spain 103–4, see also Labour Party (British) SEAT automobiles, strike (1971) 66 Second International (1889-1914) 18 Serrano Sebastian, Jóse Agustín, UGT 202n Servicio de Prensa 142, 145, 147, 155, 188 7 Fechas, German Fascist periodical 148 SFIO (French Socialist party) 9, 32, 120, 121, 188; Congress (1969 Paris) 159; opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 128; and PSOE 119, 145; recognition of PSOE(r) 33, 131–2; support for Spanish exiles 125; support for Spanish Socialists 122–3, 130–1, see also PS Shaw, S.W., TUC International Committee 212n Shepherd, Lord, representative at Franco’s funeral 113 SI (Socialist International) 7, 9, 10, 17, 185; anti-Communism of 19, 43; demands international opposition to Franco regime 21, 39, 40–1, 98–9; denunciation of human rights violations 21–2, 23; Dun Laoghaire meeting of Spain Committee (1975) 38–9; financial support for PSOE(r) 34–6; Helsinki conference (1971) 24; influence of SPD in 135, 171–2, 188; intervention in PSOE 12, 19, 27–33, 131; London meeting of Spain Committee (1975) 37–8; mission to Spain (1976) 38–9, 41–2, 113; Mitterrand and 135; origins

254


18–19; reaction to accession of Juan Carlos 41–2; recognition of PSOE(r) 30–3, 40, 43, 70, 99, 108–10, 118, 187; resolution on Fascism (1971) 24, 43; Spain Committee (1974-77) 33–43, 109–10, 197n; Spanish Commissions 19–24; Spanish Solidarity Fund 39–40; support for PSOE 20–1, 43–4, 133, see also Balcomb, Rodney Simon, Harald, DGB 220n Slater, J.H., TUC International Committee 212n Smart, Jack, NUM 94 Smith, G.F., TUC International Committee 115, 212n, 213n Soares, Mario, Portuguese Socialist Party 135, 176, 211–12n SOCC (Solidaritat d’Obrers Catalans Cristians) 49, 53 Social Democratic party, Spanish opposition group 12, 14 Socialist Central Committee (1957) 47–8 Socialist International see SI Socialist Parties of the EEC 91, 129; Congress (Bonn 1973) 32 Socialista, El, PSOE newspaper 119, 136; banned 123, 125 Socialiste, Le, SFIO newspaper 125–6, 132, 188 Socialists 24; arrested in France 124; arrests 22, 72; British support for 86; detained (1973) 171; fragmentation of 23, 98, 148, 173; German Committee of Support for 166; German concern for unity of 173, 183; imprisoned (1959) 74; SDDC concern for unity 86, 90, 108, see also opposition (within Spain) Society of Labour Lawyers 75–6 SODC (Secretariado de Ordenación Democrática de Catalunya) 133, 178 Sofia, Queen, visit to Germany (as Princess) 171 Solá Albinabarre, Salustiano, UGT 202n Solé Turá, Jordi 16

Solidaridad Obrera, CNT newspaper 125 Solís Ruiz, José, Minister of the Syndicates 13, 93, 94–5, 147, 219n Soto Martín, Fernando, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Southern Europe, political transition 3, 7, see also Greece; Portugal; Spain Southern European Socialists, First Conference (1976 Paris) 135; resolution on Spain 136; Second Conference (1977 Madrid) 136 Southon, Robert, French Young Socialists 214n Soviet Union 3, 6, 7 Spaak, Paul Henry, NATO Secretary General 79 Spain, application to join EEC 8, 11, 21, 129, 161; application to join NATO 21, 79; Constitution (1978) 2; democratisation (1976) 15, 180–1; economic liberalisation 7, 11, 139; government-controlled groups 149; internal process of transition 2, 7, 8, 15; opposition forces 12, 130, 186; relations with Britain 9, 41, 72, 87–8, 89; relations with France 121–8, 129–30; relations with Germany 139, 140–1, 147–8, 159–60, 162–5, 182–3; Stabilisation Plan (1959) 139; strikes classed as military rebellion 48; trade negotiations with EEC (19756) 111–12, see also Franco regime; states of emergency Spanish Medical Aid 72 SPD (West German Social Democratic Party) 9, 185, 187; Bad Godesberg programme (1959) 147, 218n; in coalition with CDU-CSU 139; coalition with FDP 138; and Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 133, 178; criticism of German support for Franco 160, 162–3, 183; German Committee for the Defence and support of Spanish Democrats 166; Hannover Congress (1973) 171; Iberian Socialist Conference (1974) 34; influence in

Index SI 135, 171–2, 188; Karlsruhe Congress (1964) 145–6; Mannheim Congress (1975) 174–5, 177; ‘Marshall Plan’ for EEC applicants 181; Nuremburg Congress 157, 159; opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 171, 182; perception of ASO 149; and Portuguese revolution (1974) 176; press conference (Frankfurt) 163; protest against detention of Pardo 168; reaction to 1977 executions 177; recognition of PSOE(r) 31, 33, 174–5, 176, 183; Saarbrucken Congress (1970) 165; and SI Spain Committee 34; at Southern European Socialist Conference (1976) 135; and Spanish workers in Germany 140, 148–9, 182; support for PSOE 9, 91, 138, 145–6, 157–8, 175–6, 182; support for Spanish Socialists 159–60, 163, 166, 171; visit of Erler to Spain 146–8 Sperling, Herr, SPD 168 Spinelli, Altiero, EEC Commissioner 210n Spinelli, P.P., ILO study group (1969) 60 State Organic Law, Labour Chapter modified (1971) 65 states of emergency, (1962) 12, 52; (1968, 1969, 1970) 56–7, 159; (1969) 56–7, 59–60, 97, 158 Stiftungen (Germany) (foundations) 5 strikes, 1962 wave 51–2, 83, 217n; 1971 wave 13, 66; 1973 wave 173–4; as acts of sedition 54–5; Asturias (1958) 47; Asturias (1962) 12, 51–2, 217n; classed as military rebellion 48; ICFTU fund-raising 52–3, 199–200n; solidarity (by foreign trade unions) 65; Vigo (1972) 171 students, British trade union grants for 93 STV (Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos) 49, 68, 92 Suárez, Adolfo, Prime Minister 115, 180; political reforms 15, 42, 181

255

Succession, Law of (1947) 13 Süddeutsche Zeitung 167 Swann, Robert, SDDC 91 Sweden 31, 197n Swedish Labour organisation 65, 199n Swiss Socialist Party 32 Switzerland, emigration agreement with Spain 139, 217n syndicates, official 11; dissolved 15, see also CC.OO Tallaeche, Luis, UGT 202n Tamames, Ramón, extreme left leader 163 Tarragona, official trade union congress (1968) 61, 94 technocrats (Opus Dei) 11, 13 Tejedor, Herrero, Attorney General 65 TGWU (Transport and General Workers’ Union) (UK) 96, 97, 100, 101, see also Jones, Jack Thorneycroft, Peter, Minister of Defence 87 Thorpe, Jeremy, MP 77 Tielemans, Franz, SI 21 Tierno Galván, SPD support for 187 Tierno Galván, Enrique, PSI and ASO 14, 23, 90, 98, 148, 164; Ebert Foundation grants 165–6, 173; friendship with Mitterrand 132–3, 137; at Portuguese Socialist Party Congress (1974) 134–5; and PSOE(h) 32; SDDC grant to 93, 165–6; at SPD Congress (1970) 165 Times, The, newspaper 85 Tomás, Pascual, UGT General Secretary, on future of PSOE 145; on German relations with Spain 140, 146; on ICFTU executive 9; and relations with FO 128; relations with French Socialists 122, 123–4, 126; and SI Spanish Commission 21; and Spanish workers in Germany 143, 144; and talks with ASO 55, 56; visit to Britain 81; visit to Cologne (1962) 144; visit to US 50–1 Torregrosa, Ildefonso 195n

256


torture, ICFTU condemnation of use of 65, 162 Toulouse 188; PSOE 1st Congress (1944) 119; PSOE 11th Congress in 25; PSOE headquarters in 119, 136; and UGT Congress (1959) 122 tourism 11; boycotts called for 68, 82, 85 Tovias, Alfred 4 trade unions 47, 49, 59, 98, 114; after Franco’s death 114, 115–16; attempts to unify (1966-69) 55–9; collective agreements (1962) 51; elections (1971) 66; foreign support for 185; German preference for unitary syndicalism in Spain 149–50, 154, 179–80; ICFTU funds for 58, 68–9; ILO report on (1969) 61–2; official congress (Tarragona 1969) 61, 94; official elections (1966) 56; repression (1958) 47, 72; revision of law on (1971) 65–6; SDDC report on (1968) 92–3; violation of rights of 54, 160, see also AS; ASO; CGT-FO; syndicates, official; TUC; UGT trade unions, foreign, French 121; German 139, 142, 185; influence of 7–8, 185; protest actions 65; visits by British to Spain (1968) 93 trials, Alfonso Sastre 38; ASO members (1966) 152–3, 219n; Balcomb’s report on (1970) 98–9; Basque nationalists (1961) 82; Basque trade unionists (1964) 54; British observers at 76–7, 95, 116, 153; Carabanchel Ten (1972) 101–2, 103, 105–7; of ETA militants (Burgos 1970) 13, 65, 99–100, 129; five Socialists (1974) 37; Julio Cerón (1959) 76–7; nine Socialists (1959) 76; observers 22–3, 64, 187; sixteen members of FLP 76; thirteen Socialists (Madrid 1970) 22–3, 163; trade unionists (1968) 94; trade unionists (1969) 22; trade unionists and socialists (1964) 54; UGT members (1970) 64, see also courts martial

TUC (Trades Union Congress) (British) 9, 45, 187; call for tourist boycott 82; and CC.OO 97; contacts with Spanish opposition 81–2, 83–4, 97; financial support for SDDC 71; hostility to Spanish admission to NATO 79, 80; International Committee 113–14; opposition to arms deals (1964) 88, 104; pressure on Labour government (1974-79) 96–7, 114; protest about 1962 strikes 52, 83–4; protests against death sentences 65, 99; relations with ICFTU 92; resolution on Spain (1975) 111–12; support for strikers 86, 200n; support for united Spanish trade union movement 115–16; and trial of Carabanchel Ten 106–7; visits to Spain (1968) 93–5 Turner, Michael 6 Turrión, Manuel, PSOE(h) 196n UFD (Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas) 81 UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) 8, 24, 55–6, 185; 13th Congress (in Spain 1976) 68; Bad Nauheim conference (1966) 150–2; coordinating committee with CNT 81–2; Congress (1972) 131; declaration to working class (1974) 67; delegation to Germany (1973) 172; and Ebert Foundation 173; and French curbs on activities of exiles 121, 125; FUGTA (Federación de la UGT en Alemania) 144; funds for strikers 200n; German view of strategy 155; hope for unified trade union movement 114, 180; ICFTU support for 66–9, 70, 187; leadership crisis (1968–69) 161; links with ICFTU 9, 45, 47, 49, 57, 58; links with PSOE 25, 121, 146; and Matthöfer’s visit (1970) 164; meeting with CFDT (Paris) 136; need for funding 173–4; opposition to Spanish admission to EEC 161–2; organisation of Spanish workers in

Index Germany (with DGB) 139–41, 143; relations with ASO 55–6, 145, 149–50; relations with CC.OO 53, 180; relations with IG Metall 142–3, 149–50, 156, 167, 183; relations with Pardo 161, 167, 168; relations with TUC 84, 97, 115–16; request for French support 124; role after Franco’s death 68–9, 114, 115, 180; SDDC view of 90, 91; sections in Germany 10, 140, 141, 144, 182; solidarity with DGB 138, 150–2, 158, 172; support for PSOE(r) 26, 31, 33, 108; support within Spain 25, 118; and trade union alliances 49, 53, 63–4; visit to Britain 97–8; X Congress (Toulouse 1968) 158 UIL (Italian), at ICFTU conference (1967) 57 Ullastres, Alberto, Minister of Commerce 11, 165 UNESCO (UN Economic and Social Council) 20, 47 Union de la Gauche (1972) 120–1, 134, 137 Unión Española (monarchist group) 73, 76 Union Poblo Gallego 178 United Automobile Workers of America 200n United Nations 5, 20, 49, 85 United States 3, 6, 7, 205n; economic aid (loans) to Spain 20; fear of communism 21, 172–3, 176–7, 204n; ICFTU/IFCTU visit to (1961) 50–1; and Spanish admission to NATO 78, see also AFL-CIO Universal Declaration of Human Rights 48 universities, Socialist group 72; unrest in 61, 103 USO (Unión Sindical Obrera) 54, 63–4; and CFDT (France) 128; at Conferencia de Unidad Socialista (1974 Paris) 133, 178; and IG Metall delegation (1976) 179 Valderrama, Sr, acting foreign minister 169

257

Valle, Manuel del, PSOE (Seville) 24 Van Den Bergh, Harry 40 Van Natters, Van der Goes 20 Vanderveken, J., ICFTU 68–9 Vanguardia, La, newspaper 85 Vatican 3, 20 Vautherin, M., IFCTU 49 Velasco, José M. 195n Vetter, Heinz O., DGB President 161–2, 168, 172, 177; president of ETUC 177 Vetter, Otto, DGB 68 Villar, Antonio, PSOE 87 Vinen, Richard 127 Virto Dañobeitia, Eusebio, UGT 202n Vizcaya province 51, 52, 161, 173 Voluntary Aid for Spain 72 Wagner, Dieter, DGB 172, 173 warships, Anglo-Spanish negotiations on building 87–8 Watson, Sam, SDDC 203n WCL (World Confederation of Labour) 65–6 Wehner, Herbert, SPD Vice-President 140, 145–6, 220n, 221n Weimer, Herr 151 Werner, W. 151 WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) 45 Whitehead, Laurence 2–3; Democratisation in the South 3 Whitlock, William, British Foreign Office 96 Williams, Len, British Labour Party 91–2 Williams, Len, Labour Party General Secretary 84 Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister (1964-70) 71, 88, 89, 100 Wischnewski, Hans Jürgen, SPD 220n, 221n Woodcock, George, TUC General Secretary 80, 83 Workers’ Commission of the Metal Industry of Madrid (1964) 53 Workers’ Commissions see CC.OO working-class activism 12 works committees 53, 59

258


World Bank (IBRD) 5, 11, 71 World Christian Democratic Union 7 Wormald, Lawrence, NUM 94–5 Yañez, Luis, PSOE(r) 24, 174, 175 Young Socialists, support for PSOE(r) 31, 108 youth, political organisations 21; support for PSOE and UGT 98

Zamora Anton, Miguel Angel, one of Carabanchel Ten 211n Zander, Herr, SPD 168 Zapata, Horacio, UGT 217n Zaraibar, José Antonio, Social Democrat 171 Zayas, Carlos, ASU 76 Zschiesche, Herr 159 Zugazagoitia, Sr, Socialist Party 156

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