Europe Confronts Terrorism

Europe Confronts Terrorism Also by Karin von Hippel DEMOCRACY BY FORCE (2000) Europe Confronts Terrorism Edited by ...

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Europe Confronts Terrorism

Also by Karin von Hippel DEMOCRACY BY FORCE (2000)

Europe Confronts Terrorism Edited by

Karin von Hippel Senior Research Fellow, International Policy Institute, King’s College London

Editorial matter and selection, Introduction and Conclusion © Karin von Hippel 2005; individual chapters (in order) © Kevin A. O’Brien, Tessa Szyszkowitz, Thanos Dokos, Domitilla Sagramoso and Andrea Nativi, Sara Myrdal, Ana Ramos, Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh, Paul Cornish, Tessa Szyszkowitz, Vinca LaFleur, Jonathan Stevenson, Timothy Garden, Chiara Giorgetti 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–9080–8 ISBN-10: 1–4039–9080–8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Europe confronts terrorism / edited by Karin Von Hippel. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–9080–8 1. Terrorism—Europe. 2. Terrorism—Prevention—Europe. I. Von Hippel, Karin. HV6433.E85E85 2005 363.32′094—dc22 2005042831 10 14

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents

Notes on the Contributors

vii

Acknowledgements

xii

List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

xiii

Introduction: Europe Confronts Terrorism Karin von Hippel

Part I

1

Country Case Studies

1 France Kevin A. O’Brien

19

2 Germany Tessa Szyszkowitz

43

3 Greece Thanos Dokos

59

4 Italy Domitilla Sagramoso and Andrea Nativi

80

5 Nordic Responses Sara Myrdal

95

6 Spain: Part I: Counter-terrorism in Spain – An Overview Ana Ramos Part II: Islamic Extremism Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh 7 The United Kingdom Paul Cornish

123 132 146

Part II Europe and America: Transatlantic Tension and Convergence 8 The European Union Tessa Szyszkowitz

171

9 A View from America: Tactical Unity, Strategic Divide Vinca LaFleur

191

v

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Contents

10 Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation after 11 September 2001 Jonathan Stevenson 11 Military Reforms: Closing the Capability Gap Timothy Garden

208 232

12 Balancing Security and Human Rights: Post 9/11 Reactions in the United States and Europe Chiara Giorgetti

244

Conclusion: A Three-Year Progress Report and Tackling Root Causes Karin von Hippel

263

Index

280

Notes on the Contributors Dr Paul Cornish holds the Peter Carrington Chair in International Security and is Head of the New Security Issues Programme at Chatham House, London. He has been a British Army Regular Commission (Royal Tank Regiment), an arms control and disarmament analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He has also lectured at Cambridge University and King’s College London (Joint Services Command and Staff College). His publications include Partnership in Crisis: the US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO (1997), Controlling the Arms Trade: the West versus the Rest (1996), British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany, 1945–50 (1996), and The Arms Trade and Europe (1995). Dr Thanos Dokos is Director of Studies, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy in Athens (ELIAMEP). He has also held research posts at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung in Frankfurt, and the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University. He served as the Director for Research, Strategic Studies Division, Hellenic Ministry of National Defence and as an adviser on NATO issues to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was also a NATO research fellow. His publications include Negotiations for a CTBT: 1958–1994 (1995), ‘NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Prospects and Policy Recommendations’, ELIAMEP Policy papers, no. 3, June 2003; The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean: NATO and the EU’s Options (forthcoming), as well as a number of contributions in collective volumes on non-proliferation, Mediterranean security, and Greek–Turkish relations. Lord Timothy Garden is a Visiting Professor at the International Policy Institute, King’s College London. He was the RAF Director of Defence Studies from 1982 to 1985 and became Assistant Chief of the Air Staff in 1991. He was subsequently responsible for forward planning for all three Services as Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Programmes) in the Ministry of Defence. His final military post was as the Air Marshal Commandant of the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS). He retired from the UK Air Force in 1996 as a 3-star officer, and went on to be Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House. Chiara Giorgetti is admitted to the New York Bar and she is currently practising with Lalive & Partners in Geneva, where she specialises in international public law and states’ disputes. She served as a Counsel for the vii

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Government of Eritrea for two international boundary disputes and she is currently a member of a team defending the government of Iraq before the UN Compensation Commission on claims for environmental damage. Ms Giorgetti was a Visiting Scholar at NYU Law School in 1997, was responsible for the implementation of governance projects at UNDP Somalia in 1998–2000 and clerked at the International Court of Justice in 2002. She served as a consultant to several UN agencies, including the Office for Legal Affairs and the Political Office for Somalia, as well as several NGOs on international criminal law, international jurisdiction and international litigation. Ms Giorgetti is a graduate of the Faculty of Law at Bologna University and holds a MSc in Development Studies from the London School of Economics, as well as an LLM from Yale Law School, where she is also pursuing a JSD on the enforcement of international obligations of failed states. She has published on international law and international governance. Dr Karin von Hippel is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Policy Institute, King’s College London. In 2002 she directed a project on European counter-terrorist reforms, funded by the MacArthur Foundation, which led to this book. She also advised the OECD on what development cooperation can do to get at the root causes of terrorism. She has participated in numerous conferences and working groups on terrorism in Africa, Europe and North America, and was a member of Project Unicorn, a counter-terrorism police advisory panel in London. Her publications include, ‘Back-Pedalling in Iraq: Lessons Unlearned’, Conflict, Security & Development, 4:1, April 2004; ‘Terrorism as a Problem of International Cooperation’, in Thomas Weiss and Jane Boulden (eds), Terrorism and the UN: Before and After 11 September (2004); ‘The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths’, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Superterrorism: Policy Responses (2002); and Democracy by Force (2000), which was short-listed for the Westminster Medal in Military History. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union for over three years in Somalia and Kosovo. Nicola Horsburgh is a Research Fellow at the International Policy Institute, King’s College London, where she works on nuclear proliferation. She has studied International Relations at the London School of Economics (MSc) and International Politics and Strategic Studies (BScEcon Hons) at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Her publications include (with Javier Jordán) ‘Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (28(5), Sept.–Oct. 2005); and (with Javier Jordán and Manuel Torres) ‘The Struggle Against Al-Qaida Propaganda: the Role of the Intelligence Services’ in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18(1), Jan.–March 2005. Dr Javier Jordán is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Granada (Spain). He was a Research Fellow at the Training and


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Doctrine Command of the Spanish Army and a NATO Research Fellow. He is part of several research projects sponsored by the Spanish Army, the Institute ‘General Gutiérrez Mellado’ and the French Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure. His publications include Profetas del Miedo. Aproximación al terrorismo islamista (2004); editor of Los orígenes del terror. Sobre las causas del terrorismo (2004); co-editor of Introducción a los estudios de seguridad y defensa (2001); and Respuestas a nuevos desafíos de seguridad (2003). Vinca LaFleur is a Visiting Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is also president of Vinca LaFleur Communications, which provides professional writing services to leaders in government, business and the non-profit world. From 1995 to 1998 she served as a member of the US National Security Council staff as director for speechwriting and special assistant to President Clinton. In that capacity, she authored more than 100 speeches and statements on foreign policy, defence, terrorism, trade and other national security issues for the president and his national security advisers. Prior to joining the White House staff, Ms LaFleur served as a speechwriter for the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. She also spent four years as a political and human rights analyst at the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Ms LaFleur worked with former national security adviser Anthony Lake on his book Six Nightmares (2000) and with CSIS authors Kurt Campbell and Michèle Flournoy on To Prevail: an American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism (2001). Her articles have appeared in the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and the New York Observer. Sara Myrdal is a strategic analyst at the Department for Information Assurance and Analysis at the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA). At the time of writing she was Research Associate with the Nordic Security Policy Research Programme. She also worked at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), heading a research project on crisis management in the European Union. Her publications include, ‘The EU as a Civilian Crisis Manager’ (EU som Civil Krishanterare) (Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 2002). Andrea Nativi is an expert on military affairs. He has been editor-in-chief of the monthly publication Rivista Italiana di Difesa since January 2000. He also writes extensively on military and security issues for the Italian daily newspaper Il Giornale, and for the American weekly publication Aviation Week and Space Technology. He has conducted several research projects for the Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies on a wide range of issues – European military cooperation, missile defence, the evolution of air power. His latest edited book Nel Cuore dei Balcani was published in 2003.

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Dr Kevin A. O’Brien is a Senior Policy Analyst with RAND Europe, based in Cambridge, UK. Previously he served as the Deputy Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis, and was a Visiting Fellow – teaching and researching in intelligence studies – in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He has published widely on intelligence and security issues, with a particular focus on France and the United Kingdom, as well as on the continuing transformation of national security structures and operations in the post-Soviet era, especially with regard to information operations and asymmetric warfare strategies – including terrorism. His publications include, Quick Scan of Post 9/11 National Counter-Terrorism Policymaking and Implementation in Selected European Countries-MR-1590 2002 (with Erik van de Linde, Gustav Lindstrom, Stephan de Spiegeleire, Mikko Vayrynen and Han de Vries), RAND, 2002; ‘Information Age, Terrorism and Warfare’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 14:1 (Summer 2003); ‘Networks, Net-war and Information Age Terrorism’, Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds), The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-strategies (2002). Dr Ana Ramos is a correspondent at EFE in Spain, and has covered science, technology and defence, including the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. She also worked for three years at the Ministry of Defence as an adviser to the minister on foreign affairs. She received her PhD from the University of Vienna in Journalism, Politics and Slav Philology. Dr Domitilla Sagramoso is a Research Fellow at the Caucasian Policy Institute, King’s College London. Her areas of expertise include military and foreign policy developments in Russia and the former Soviet states, Russia’s relations with the European Union and NATO, European security developments, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the former Soviet space. Her publications include ‘Avenues of Positive Military Engagement with non-NATO European States and NATO non-EU States’, in The Military and Political Implications of Progress Towards the Helsinki Headline Goals to Further the ESDP (2002); ‘The Russian Peacekeeping Doctrine’, in Regional Peacekeepers: the Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping, John Mackinlay and Peter Cross (eds) (2002); The Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons in and around the European Union: Instability, Organised Crime and Terrorist Groups (2001). Jonathan Stevenson is Senior Fellow for counter-terrorism and editor of Strategic Survey at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. His areas of expertise include terrorism, US policy, conflict prevention, and sub-Saharan Africa. He practised law in New York City for six years and subsequently turned to journalism, which took him to East Africa and Northern Ireland. He was an IISS research associate and became deputy editor of Strategic Survey and research fellow in October 2000. His publications include ‘We


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Wrecked the Place’: Contemplating an End to the Northern Irish Troubles (1996); and Preventing Conflict: the Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions, Adelphi Paper 336 (2000). He has contributed to numerous publications including Foreign Policy, Survival and World Policy Journal. Tessa Szyszkowitz is an historian and correspondent for the Austrian newsmagazine Profil. She was based in Jerusalem from 1994 to 1998, in Brussels from 1998 to 2002, and now works in Moscow. She is also a PhD candidate at the University of Vienna. The title of her dissertation is ‘History and Memory: the Influence of the Deportation of the Chechens in 1944 and the Expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948 on Current National Movements’.

Acknowledgements Europe Confronts Terrorism marks the culmination of a one-year grant to King’s College London by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, managed by the editor, with the contributors forming part of the project team. During the writing and rewriting of drafts, a number of political events occurred, requiring updates: the war in Iraq, the attacks in Madrid, and the expansion of the European Union by ten members. The original chapters were written prior to these events, although all have since been updated. Most assuredly, further critical events will occur following publication – this is always the hazard of writing about modern political events. I would therefore first and foremost like to thank the contributors for not only redrafting their chapters several times, but also for keeping their sense of humour throughout. A special thanks (and congratulations) goes to two of the authors who gave birth during this process. The editor would also like to thank her colleagues at the International Policy Institute at King’s College London, and Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman. Additional thanks go to the reviewers, whose positive and negative critiques have greatly enhanced the quality of this collection. Finally, many thanks to Alison Howson and Guy Edwards at Palgrave Macmillan, and to Christine Ranft for her editing expertise. The editor and the International Policy Institute at King’s College London are grateful for the support received by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. All authors take full responsibility for the views expressed in their chapters.

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Abbreviations/Acronyms

APEC ATCSA AWACS BKA BND CBRN CCC CCS CENTCOM CFSP CIA CILAT CNI COBR COGIC COIA CTC CTR DCPAF DEFRA DEMA DFT DGPN DGSE DHS DIA DLPAJ ECAC ECAP ECHR EMP EMU ESDP ETA EU EUROPOL FATF

Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act Airborne Warning and Control Systems Bundeskriminalamt Bundesnachrichtendienst Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Civil Contingencies Committee (UK) Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat (UK) US Central Command Common Foreign and Security Policy Central Intelligence Agency Comité Interministériel de Lutte Anti-Terroriste Spain’s National Intelligence Centre (replacement for the Defence Information Centre (CESID)) Cabinet Office Briefing Room Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises Centre Opérationnel Interarmées UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Cooperative Threat Reduction Direction Centrale de la Police aux Frontières Department for Energy, Food and Rural Affairs (UK) Danish Emergency Management Agency Department for Transport (UK) Directorate-General of the National Police (France) Direction Generale de la Securité Exterieure Department of Homeland Security (US) Anti-Mafia Directorate Direction des Libertés Publiques et des Affaires Juridiques European Civil Aviation Conference European Capability Action Plan European Convention on Human Rights Euro-Mediterranean Partnership European Monetary Union European Security and Defence Policy Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) European Union European Police Office Financial Action Task Force xiii

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FEERI FLNC GIA GIGN GSCP GSPC HAF IAEA ICAO ICCPR IMF IMO INS INTERPOL ISAF JIC LESLP MEADS NATO NRF OAG PCOTF PIRA PLO POTA PP PSOE RAF RAID SIS SISDE SISMI TRACFIN TREVI UCI UCIDE UCLAT UN UNSC US

Spanish Federation of Religious Islamic Entities/Federación Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas National Liberation Front of Corsica Algerian Armed Islamic Group Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale General Secretariat for Civil Protection (Greece) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat Hellenic Air Force International Atomic Energy Agency International Civil Aviation Organisation International Convention on Civil and Political Rights International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organisation Immigration and Naturalisation Services (US) International Criminal Police Organisation International Security Assistance Force Joint Inquiry Corps between France and Spain (JIC) London Emergency Services Liaison Panel Medium Extended Air Defence System North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO Reaction Force Olympic Advisory Group EU Police Chiefs Operational Task Force Provisional Irish Republican Army Palestine Liberation Organisation Prevention of Terrorism Acts (UK) Partido Popular Social Democratic Party Rote Armee Fraktion Recherche, Assistance, Intervention et Dissuasion Schengen Information System Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica Servizi di Informazione e Sicurezza della Repubblica Italiana Treatment of Information and Action against Clandestine Financial Circuits French acronym for ‘Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence’ Ufficio Italiano Cambi Union of Spanish Islamic Communities/Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España Unité de Co-ordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste United Nations United Nations Security Council United States of America


UK VRP WCO WEU WMD

United Kingdom Vigipirate Renforcé Plan World Customs Organisation Western European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Introduction: Europe Confronts Terrorism Karin von Hippel

In the three-plus years since 11 September 2001, international support for the US campaign against terror could, on the surface, appear schizophrenic. Le Monde’s famous headline from 12 September 2001, ‘We are all Americans now’, can be sharply contrasted with the French attitude in early March 2003, when President Jacques Chirac said he would veto any UN Security Council resolution that threatened war against Iraq. Just after 11 September, 800 million people in 43 European countries observed several minutes of silence. Even Mu’ammar Gaddafi and Fidel Castro expressed their outrage and offered limited assistance. Just before the war in Iraq, millions of people marched for peace and against US intentions in over 60 countries around the globe. For its part, the UN Security Council played a critical role in assisting the counter-terrorist1 coalition when it passed resolution 1373 just after the attacks, which mandated all member states to initiate a specified number of counterterrorist measures and submit progress reports concerning these changes to its newly established Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). By the first deadline of 27 December 2001, most member states had submitted their first-round reports.2 Never before had so many members responded in such a rapid fashion to a request by the Security Council. Contrast this again with the inability of the US government to secure enough votes in the Security Council to support a war resolution in Iraq, as well as the fragile state of affairs in the Security Council post-war – a situation considered so dire that the Secretary-General established a High Level Panel to propose substantive reforms at the UN. Finally, consider the original military coalition built after 11 September that overthrew the Taliban in Afghanistan: NATO invoked the famous Article V, and most European countries, including France and Germany, clamoured to lend a hand. The Pentagon accepted help from only a handful of states during the fighting phase, and in a selective fashion. Compare this with the ‘coalition’ that defeated Saddam’s Iraq – a coalition that was essentially comprised of the United States and Great Britain, with help from several 1

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other states; a coalition that, according to Senator John Kerry, if it included Missouri as a separate country, would rank that state as the third largest member.3 In Iraq, unlike in Afghanistan, the Pentagon was desperate to expand the coalition, especially in the post-combat phase. The obvious explanation for the wide discrepancies in support for the US government – between those ‘with us’ and those ‘against us’ – was the lack of credibility attributed to the US administration’s claims of Iraq’s WMD programmes and its links with al-Qa’ida, both of which were officially refuted by several studies, including the Iraq Survey Group’s final report in early October 2004. Concerning the alleged link with al-Qa’ida, many anti-war European countries argued that an attack on Iraq, followed by an American occupation, would only establish a connection that had not existed in the past: it would in fact augment the ranks of al-Qa’ida, because it would be another war against a Muslim-populated country which would potentially humiliate even moderate Muslims. Moreover, it was common knowledge prior to the war that US Vice-President Dick Cheney, US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been promoting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein since the late 1990s, long before assuming office, when al-Qa’ida was not considered a major security threat.4 Thus even if the US administration had argued that the war on Iraq was part of the war on terror, many others were not so convinced. As it turned out, their scepticism was justified. These countries also argued from the beginning that a counter-terrorist campaign must include an attack on root causes as a core component – something they did not believe the US government ascribed to. For example, on 6 February 2002, then French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine remarked, We are today threatened by a new simplism [sic] which consists in reducing all the world’s problems to the battle against terrorism. That’s not a responsible approach . . . We must tackle the situations of poverty, injustice, humiliation, etc. Today there is clearly a radical difference between our approach and that of the US administration.5 Despite the transatlantic rift, which came to a head because of Iraq, it is also far from certain that the counter-terrorist coalition, particularly at the levels where the real work is done, has been reduced to an exclusive club of a handful of states. In fact, if one considered continued cooperation in the original coalition (excluding Iraq), the figures are more revealing. According to US Central Command, as of September 2004, 70 countries were supporting the ‘global war on terrorism’, and 21 countries had deployed 16,000 troops to the CENTCOM region (although this also includes Afghanistan and Iraq).6 The US State Department noted that three years on, more than 3,400 suspected terrorists had been seized in more than 80 countries.7 Additionally, according to the White House, ‘208 countries and jurisdictions’ have ‘expressed

Karin von Hippel

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their support for the financial war on terror’, while 167 countries ‘have issued orders freezing terrorist assets’.8 Over 90 countries have been cooperating in law enforcement and intelligence sharing, and internal reforms have been initiated in most states to ‘root out terror’. Nor is it clear that NATO, the United Nations and the European Union are truly threatened with extinction as many pundits had been predicting. Indeed, it could be argued that the original counter-terrorist coalition still exists, albeit with fundamental disagreements over tactics and strategy, and that members will use their own discretion as to which parts of the campaign they will join. Europe Confronts Terrorism explores these nuances through an examination of the overall counter-terrorist campaign in the three years since the attacks in America, in all its guises, and from the European perspective. It focuses on Europe’s contribution to the campaign, as well as the unique challenges Europe faces. The book’s focus on Europe is based on three assumptions. The first is that many European countries have significant experience and notable successes fighting terrorism – both old and new varieties – and have already contributed invaluable expertise and assistance to the campaign. For the purpose of this collection, the term ‘New Terrorism’ signifies a brand of international terrorism, which differs from the ‘old’ or domestic variant. New terrorists aspire to cause massive devastation, large-scale destruction, and many casualties. They exploit religious fervour through the use of suicide bombing, even though suicide is condemned by Islam. To the extent that they have a political agenda, it has been transformed into absolute religious imperatives and thereby rendered, in practical terms, non-negotiable, although as will be discussed in this book, there are times when this point has seemed less resolute. They aim to acquire and use high-tech weapons of mass destruction, but also creatively adapt low-tech objects into weapons (for example, an aeroplane or box cutters). They shrewdly manipulate and harness the benefits of globalisation through the Internet, and the use of fluid, transnational networks with cells that can be activated immediately or remain dormant for extended periods. Finally, their spectaculars are often executed simultaneously, in a well-rehearsed and choreographed manner (for example, Kenya and Tanzania, New York and Washington). While there are grey areas between ‘old’ and ‘new’, and increasing overlap as many ‘old’ groups have become hijacked, assisted or more often inspired by the al-Qa’ida network, these distinctions inform the arguments presented in this volume.9 The second assumption is based on the transnational nature of the al-Qa’ida terrorist threat, one that can only be defeated through an equally robust, long-term transnational response. By definition, this will require close cooperation between Europe and the United States due to their common cultures, capabilities and ability to influence less developed states. As articulated by David Veness, the UK’s Assistant Police Commissioner, the challenge before the coalition is to ‘out-globalise al-Qa’ida’.10

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And challenge it will be. Indeed, the modus operandi of al-Qa’ida – a fanatical, fluid, secretive, ever-evolving, unpredictable, multi-pronged ‘organisation, movement and network’11 – can be sharply contrasted with the heavily bureaucratic, open and lumbering procedures of most multilateral efforts and organisations, not to mention similar systems at the national level. If the US government experienced enormous internal problems harnessing intelligence information prior to 11 September, as described in one of the reports of the US Senate hearings: ‘a range of political, cultural, jurisdictional, legal and bureaucratic issues are ever present hurdles to information sharing’,12 so too are these problems intrinsic to international endeavours. Indeed, achieving effective integration of activities and analysis at the international level may only be possible in certain spheres in the near term, such as in blocking terrorist financing or in civil emergency response and planning, while for others, particularly intelligence sharing, a longer time frame may be necessary. Finally, the third assumption of this book, tragically realised on 11 March 2004 in Madrid, is that Europe is also vulnerable, and a target. This chapter therefore introduces Europe Confronts Terrorism by analysing the effectiveness of and challenges for European counter-terrorist coordination and action – both of which will be explored in greater detail throughout this collection. It does so by considering two interlocking themes. The first concerns the complicated transatlantic relationship and the problems that need to be resolved between the major players for the campaign to succeed. The second emerges from the first, and concerns the lack of a common analytical framework.

I: The United States and Europe: transatlantic tension and cooperation Strong relations and coordination at the inner core, that is, between the United States and European states, are crucial components for a successful counter-terrorist campaign. The United States and European countries have the best chance of harmonising their work, having as mentioned similar cultures, overall long-standing good relations, as well as the relevant resources and expertise. If European states and the United States could adhere to a tight and comprehensive counter-terrorist agenda, it would allow energies to be fully dedicated to the more difficult countries and intractable problems, and to maintaining the broader coalition. Reforms within the United States have been well-documented, but what has been happening in Europe? More specifically, how has cooperation been enhanced Europe-wide, and what can be done to resolve the transatlantic dispute that has been in evidence since the end of the cold war, reinvigorated after President George W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech in January 2002, and which potentially reached a climax just prior to the war in Iraq that began on 20 March 2003?

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The European Union Throughout this volume, ‘Europe’ primarily signifies the 15 European states that comprised the European Union until May 2004, when ten new members joined, because the book was largely written prior to this period, and because all new members will in any event be bound by the agreements already made. While the 15 EU member states initially reorganised their counter-terrorist infrastructures at the national level in the aftermath of 11 September, and then again attempted to consolidate these reforms after the attacks in Madrid, significant efforts have also been made Europe-wide in order to develop a larger and more comprehensive counter-terrorist framework, which, if successful, would streamline cooperation between Europe as a block and the United States. Immediately after 11 September, the European Union divided its programme into five thematic divisions: 1) Police and Judicial Cooperation, 2) Bilateral relations with third countries and regions (the Middle East, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Reconstruction of Afghanistan, Humanitarian Aid), 3) Air Transport Security, 4) Economic and Financial Measures, and 5) Emergency Preparedness. Of the five themes, only the third was a direct response to 11 September – the rest were already in the pipeline due to the work underway to improve coordination in counter-terrorism. The response is thus not a novel programme of action to counter the ‘new terror’, but rather, an enhancement of the old. The European Union also developed a 69-point ‘road map’ – a Plan of Action – compiled by the Council, which is to be considered a ‘living’ document and embodies the changes underway. Europeans had begun to coordinate counter-terrorism policies and practices as long ago as 1976, with the establishment of the Trevi group,13 within what was then the European Community, to promote regular sharing of information on security and terrorism issues between some ministers of justice and the interior, and the police. Trevi evolved into the inter-governmental third pillar of the European Union, dealing with justice and home affairs, and led to the establishment of Europol. Europol’s budget has doubled since 11 September, although its mandate currently only allows the agency to provide intelligence support to law enforcement agencies and not to engage in more robust enforcement activity. Europol has also established a task force on terrorism to facilitate exchange of terrorism-related information with the United States. In Chapter 10, Jonathan Stevenson examines the police, customs and intelligence reforms in Europe in greater detail. Within the larger counter-terrorism framework, regular meetings have been taking place to assess and manage progress – from the ministerial level down to bureaucrats from different ministries of the member states. For example, European health ministers meet regularly to share information about improving capability to respond to biological weapons attacks, including the stockpiling of vaccines. This same format is replicated for the G8 + meetings to ensure that these concerns are internationalised. At home, health ministers

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are now finding space in counter-terrorist working groups, along with ministers in charge of defence, home affairs, intelligence and judicial affairs. Interestingly, their inclusion is not always popular with the traditional security types. Not surprisingly, EU coordination is at its best in the non-political arena of health and worst in the most sensitive, that is, intelligence sharing. Beyond the five themes noted above, additional work is underway in the European Council and the European Commission. Javier Solana, the Council’s High Representative for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has been trying to develop a specific European analytical capability to combat terrorism Europe-wide, combining civilian crisis management, police, military and intelligence capabilities in one unit, the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN). This has been an important development in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which currently does not include terrorism in its core tasks; the so-called ‘Petersburg tasks’ cover humanitarian assistance, crisis management, and peacekeeping. Finally, the appropriateness of embedding counter-terrorism within the European Union’s new constitution (the European Convention) had been considered in the Convention’s working group on defence. Counter-terrorism was subsequently included in the constitution in the solidarity clause and with respect to the armaments agency. The appointment of Mr Gijs de Vries as Counter-terrorism Coordinator of the EU, in the aftermath of the Madrid attacks, should also improve overall EU efforts, although his power is limited. In Chapter 8, Tessa Szyszkowitz highlights the unique challenges faced by the European Union and its constituent parts, and the difficulties that de Vries and others at the EU level have in ensuring implementation of agreements that are contingent on action by member states. Bilateral is best? Despite the importance of these reforms Europe-wide, the counter-terrorist successes thus far have been achieved primarily through bilateral initiatives, or between a small number of states, for example, between the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, France and the United States, especially concerning intelligence and police work. Governor Tom Ridge, Director of the US Office of Homeland Security recently remarked, ‘one of the most productive relationships we have is with the law enforcement agencies in the UK’.14 One senior German intelligence official noted that he did not anticipate this practice changing at least for a decade.15 Some even argue that it does not make sense to try to internationalise intelligence sharing at all, as Daniel Benjamin explained, ‘This oft-cited goal is best handled through bilateral intelligence channels. National leaders who seek to force intelligence agencies to open up their files more than the services wish to typically fail.’16 Security and intelligence chiefs in some European member states and in the United States worry about the variability inherent in multinational fora and the absence of cohesion on crucial issues, and argue that at this stage, bilateral cooperation and endeavours

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deliver more than multilateral ones. Chapters 1 through 7 focus on individual country counter-terrorism efforts, and how they both impede and support European and transatlantic reforms. Moreover, some of the Europe-wide reforms are not popular with all member states, which worry about transferring sovereignty to the centre on issues related to crime and terrorism. For example, the common European arrest warrant, which became operational at the end of 2003, initially made most European states nervous that this new legislation would make it easier for the United States to obtain extradition of a suspect, and potentially use the death penalty against him, which all European states oppose. Negotiations with the United States have, however, been underway since early 2002 to manage this. Another thorny issue relates to data protection. Germans – perhaps the most protective European country of the right to privacy – are fearful that harmonisation within Europe would facilitate US interference in national matters.17 In Chapter 2, Tessa Szyszkowitz discusses Germany’s critical counter-terrorist concerns. It is not simply concern over the use of the death penalty or data protection – rather more fundamental differences have been impeding relations between the United States and most European states since the end of the cold war. Thus while the focus of this book is on Europe, Europe cannot be discussed in isolation given that America is driving the counter-terrorist campaign, and US policy and activity abroad have a dramatic effect on both Europe as a whole and European states individually. Transatlantic tension Although Henry Kissinger wryly noted that ‘one country’s perception of unilateralism is another’s perception of leadership’, in times of war, anti-Americanism and accusations of unilateralism inevitably surface in Europe.18 Obvious examples include World War II and more recently, the 1999 Kosovo war. Similar tension arises concerning terrorism, as Bruce Hoffman noted in 1999: ‘Terrorism has long been a source of friction between the United States and Europe.’19 European governments have historically adopted a more tolerant approach to dealing with terrorist-sponsoring states than the US government for three reasons. First, in general, Europeans considered it better to maintain a dialogue than not. Second, certain European countries have wanted to protect foreign investment opportunities, in particular in the oil and gas industries. Third, and relevant to Islamic extremist terrorism, many of these same European countries are home to large Muslim populations – approximately 20 million people in the EU refer to themselves as Muslims – and therefore have been fearful of a domestic backlash if harsh action were taken.20 Thus recent transatlantic tension,21 well-documented by a number of scholars and policy-makers22 (and articulated from the US perspective for this book in Chapter 9 by Vinca LaFleur), is consistent with past experience, though

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this time the combination of the war in Afghanistan, the larger war in Iraq, different approaches to the Middle East conflict, Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech and terrorism have deepened the rift. Major European states assisting in the campaign are also annoyed because they do not feel that they are part of the decision-making process. The oft-heard French complaint that the ‘Americans want to do the cooking and have us do the dishes’ reflects this tension. The capability gap European insecurity over the widening gap in military capabilities also underlines this tension. Since the end of the cold war, European states have greatly reduced defence spending and shifted funds to social infrastructure. The 2001 US defence budget, on the other hand, was more than double that of all EU countries together ($310 billion vs. $144 billion). The 2004 US defence budget represented the biggest increase in 20 years in defence spending, and 2005 showed no sign of changing direction, with Bush requesting a record $401 billion. The gap can only widen further. Reductions in European defence spending have taken place under the protective umbrella of long-standing US defence agreements with European states. US officials have expressed their anxiety over this gulf, and are disinclined to take European criticism of the US campaign against terror seriously until they see a bigger commitment to defence. They have also been applying significant pressure on European counterparts to increase defence spending, which is unlikely to happen in the near future to the degree desired. One Spanish diplomat remarked, ‘our budget process does not allow for the type of deficit spending so common in the United States’.23 Europeans do not necessarily need to spend significantly more at the national level, but rather, an efficient pooling of resources and manpower Europe-wide could drastically alter the gap, as argued by Timothy Garden in Chapter 11. 24 Working in tandem Beyond undertaking necessary military reforms, if counter-terrorism can be institutionalised in ESDP, Europe would become more than an economic power-block. The hope of many European political leaders is that the added political weight of Europe could help to counter any unilateralist tendencies by the United States – recent US action in Iraq has only driven home that message. These changes would also facilitate a more robust transnational response to the transnational threat; and would assist in overall crime reduction because terrorism spills over into other areas. For its part, the US government also needs to exploit European experience with terrorism in a more substantive fashion. Many European states have developed considerable counter-terrorist infrastructures from coping with terrorism for over 30 years, even if the threat has been largely – but not entirely – of a different character from that represented by al-Qa’ida. Beyond the more familiar left-wing or ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, such as

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Italy’s ‘Brigate Rosse’ (Red Brigades) or the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), European states have also borne the brunt of attacks by some form of Islamic extremism on their airports, airlines and embassies since the late 1960s, even if mostly directed at Israeli targets.25 Chapters 1 through 7 (though not Chapter 5) examine counter-terrorism activity in those European countries with the most experience in terrorism, that is, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy and Spain. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, European states – notably France, but also Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom – are home to large Muslim populations, where terrorist cells have been able to blend in with less fear of being detected, or to infiltrate and use local Mosques, community centres and madrasas as bases for recruitment, or even to operate with the tacit knowledge of the government. The Madrid attacks demonstrate how lethal these extremists can be, while it appears that planning for the attacks took place not only in Spain, but also in France, Morocco, the Netherlands, and Norway.26 The attitude of the UK security services prior to 11 September, for example, was that the presence of a fairly sizeable number of known hard-line radical Islamic extremists, such as Abu Hamza al-Masri, the London-based radical imam, was not harmful to the United Kingdom per se. The government was aware that they were living in UK cities, potentially even planning operations, using their adopted cities for logistics and financing for attacks. The misconception was that they would only be attacking targets back home, and not those in the United Kingdom.27 Yet even so, during this period, the UK government still monitored their activities with intelligence and police assets, and were reluctant to extradite them because of concerns that they would be tortured or be subject to the death penalty. Paul Cornish analyses UK reforms in greater detail in Chapter 7. The French, on the other hand, who often referred to London as Londonistan for this very reason, have a deeper understanding of the extremist Islamic terrorist threat owing to their longstanding experience with North African terrorism and insurgency movements. Kevin O’Brien describes the French experience in Chapter 1. Finally, certain European states have better political and economic relationships with a number of developing states than the United States, which can help to ensure the maintenance of such a large coalition. For example, Spain, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have better economic ties with Iran, Libya, and Syria. If the United States can thus partner its considerable resolve and resources with the experience, intelligence and expertise of these European states, the campaign has a far greater likelihood of achieving success.

II: A common analytical framework As noted, the counter-terrorism campaign has been negatively affected at the inner core, that is, between US and European states, due to European

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annoyance at being excluded from decision-making, differences over foreign policy – especially the war in Iraq, and the spillover from the military capability gap. Equally significant, Europeans and Americans appear to be talking past each other because all states have been responding in a more reactive manner, focusing on crisis management, rather than on prevention. A second related obstacle impeding an enhanced coordinated response, therefore, is the lack of a common analytical framework among the major actors, and a corresponding agreed-upon methodology to challenge the threat. There are three reasons for this. First, and as will be discussed in greater detail in the Conclusion, a fundamental area of disagreement between the two power blocks has been over root causes.28 The disagreement centres on how to reduce the appeal and influence of bin Laden and al-Qa’ida through the introduction of a number of political and socio-economic reforms, and which reforms would indeed be the most appropriate. Iraq proved to be critical to this debate, with the US positing that a democratic Iraq would pave the way for more democracy in the Middle East, and thereby undermine terrorism, while some European states argued that war in Iraq would in fact do more to enhance the appeal and swell the ranks of al-Qa’ida, as mentioned earlier. Beyond Iraq, Europe had been pushing since 11 September for a dedicated campaign to address root causes, while the US government only officially joined this effort in February 2003 with the publication of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.29 Since then, as will be discussed in the Conclusion, there has been little evidence that the rhetoric has been matched by substantial reforms. Second, since the majority of the aforementioned EU reforms were underway before 11 September, they were designed primarily to counter old terrorism. Though the dividing line between international and some national terrorist groups is beginning to blur, there are distinctions between old and new. Despite European expertise and experience, which has inherent value and can contribute to the design of a new approach, a successful counter-terrorism campaign that can undermine ‘New Terrorism’ will require a more holistic response, and not just a tweaking of existing counter-terrorist infrastructure. Some states have already shown that they can adapt old terrorist tools to confront the new terrorist threat. For example, in Spain, all provinces have a counter-terrorist infrastructure in place, which varies depending on the region: in Basque country, for obvious reasons, the focus is on the ‘Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’ (Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or ETA), while in Almeria, it is more geared to confront Islamic threats. Even so, this was not enough to prevent the attack on 11 March 2004. In Chapter 6, Spain’s response, including the ramifications from the March attacks in Madrid, is explored in greater detail in two parts, focusing on both ETA and Islamic extremism. The third conceptual difference occurs within Europe. Europeans are divided as to whether they consider their own cities, civilians and assets targets for future attacks, or whether they assume that only America and American

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assets abroad are primary targets. After the Madrid attacks, more European countries may have considered themselves potential targets, yet even so there remains the perception that Spain became a target only due to its involvement in Iraq. The election to power of the anti-war Socialist party in Madrid, led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, just days after the attacks in March 2004, only appeared to confirm this theory. Others argue that all western countries are targets. Indeed, bin Laden has included Spain – referred to as Al Andalus – in his lists of targets for several years because the Spanish ejected the Moors from the peninsula in 1492 after a near-800 year occupation. After the Madrid attacks, a tape was played on 15 April on Al Arabiya, allegedly with bin Laden’s voice, explaining that the real target was America and offering a truce to European countries, ‘our neighbours north of the Mediterranean’. He proposed the establishment of a ‘European committee to study “the justice” of the Islamic causes, especially Palestine’. He said, ‘The door of reconciliation is open for three months from the date of announcing this statement . . . For those who want reconciliation, we have given them a chance. Stop shedding our blood so as to preserve your blood.’30 European leaders obviously rejected this call, but it did indicate a willingness to negotiate, something previously not witnessed in his campaign against the West. If these countries assume they are not targets, and additionally have not been involved in Iraq or even Afghanistan, they will also not respond in a comprehensive manner until they are themselves victims of an attack. But even for those who believe they are targets, if they already have a significant counter-terrorist infrastructure in place, while at the same time have been tightening their internal security in line with aforementioned reforms, it is not entirely obvious what additional measures they could take on their own. One senior Spanish official remarked well before the March attacks, ‘I don’t know what else we can do in Spain that we are not already doing to protect ourselves.’31 Indeed, Spain can be placed on one end of the continuum, as a country that has viewed terrorism as a major threat even before it contributed troops to the reconstruction of Iraq. Prime Minister Aznar repeatedly declared that his first priority was the fight against terrorism, which although focused mostly on ETA also included al-Qa’ida. France too has recognised the seriousness of this threat and given it due priority in government because of the numerous successful and foiled attacks by groups related to or inspired by al-Qa’ida over the last decade. In December 1994, for example, the Algerian terrorist group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), planned to crash an Air France jet into the Eiffel Tower that same month, an early and overlooked indication that fully fuelled airplanes would be used as weapons. Situated at the other end of the spectrum are countries such as Finland, which regard the terrorist threat as important but not a top priority. In Chapter 5, Sara Myrdal’s discussion of Scandinavian countries reveals how

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some of these countries have adapted their generally open societies, as well as the challenges still to overcome. Even the more complacent are now aware that most European countries served as financial and logistical bases to al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in the 1990s. The Netherlands, for example, had been a preferred site for banking and a base used to launch attacks on France.32 This prioritisation within government affects the energy and resources dedicated to working with international partners to counter the threat. If a new and more comprehensive response is based on the assumption that all western states, civilians and assets at home and abroad are potential targets, if it is developed in conjunction with Europeans and North Americans, and can incorporate a robust effort to counter root causes and facilitators, then a more effective counter-terrorist programme could be implemented. As noted in one of the reports from the US Senate hearings on the failures of intelligence prior to 11 September, ‘As terrorist groups increasingly associate with and support each other, information sharing and overarching strategic analysis is critical to success in counterterrorist efforts.’33 Only when the US and European governments together agree on an over-riding strategy would there be less acrimonious debate over responses and next steps. The alliance could then be concerned with other serious challenges, beyond militarily defeating al-Qa’ida: such as how to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq, and how to undermine support for al-Qa’ida in many parts of the world. A strong transatlantic alliance is also instrumental to preserving the broader coalition.

Methodology Europe Confronts Terrorism addresses the core issues mentioned in this introduction in two sections – the first examines reforms in individual countries and the second concentrates on transatlantic themes, given that all countries are influenced by US policy and action in this area. Chapters 1 through 7 (though not Chapter 5) concentrate on the reforms undertaken since 11 September by the six European countries with decades-long experience fighting terrorism, albeit primarily of a domestic variety: France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy and Spain. They consider how well the already existing counter-terrorist infrastructure has been adapted to face the challenges posed by the more lethal transnational terrorist threat, how costs are being met, and coordination issues at the national, Europe-wide and international levels. Chapter 5 discusses reforms in Nordic countries to provide an example of a part of Europe that has little to no experience with terrorism, and hence greater vulnerabilities, in order to ascertain how these countries approach the subject. The four Nordic countries also offer an interesting example of how extremely open and largely pacifist societies have undertaken reforms. In only one of the four has this occurred to the detriment of existing traditions and respect for civil liberties and human rights. In all the country cases, the

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authors judge whether government reforms made thus far have succeeded, or have merely been manipulated by government agencies with vested interests in expanding their capacities. In the transatlantic section, Chapter 8 first provides an overview of EU reforms as well as challenges for the institution as it consolidates. Chapter 9 offers a view of Europe and the transatlantic dispute from the US perspective, while Chapter 10 provides a more focused look at non-military security reforms, including police, customs, and intelligence reforms, as well as another point of view on the transatlantic partnership. Chapter 11 analyses the issues surrounding the enormous military capability gap between the United States and Europe, and makes recommendations for improving efficiency in European defence and its military counter-terrorism capacity, without launching an arms spending race. Chapter 12 highlights the legal dilemma, and how concerns over infringements of civil liberties and human rights have not been fully addressed in individual European countries nor in the European Union. Finally, in the Conclusion, the editor examines the lack of significant progress made in tackling root causes in the three years since the Twin Towers fell. Root causes are considered of utmost importance to European countries, since military, police and legal activity have their limits.

Concluding remarks Democratic societies are by definition vulnerable to terrorist attacks from external and internal factors. Borders are porous, the Internet is truly transnational, while all European societies have been dealing with the positive and negative aspects arising from their increased diversity. It is therefore essential that the United States and European countries resolve their differences and work closely together to develop a common analytical framework that can successfully undermine al-Qa’ida. Unless this happens, the threat itself cannot be defeated, nor can the responsibilities assigned to the UN Security Council in this campaign be realised, as tension among some of the permanent five (P5) members spills over into the work of the organisation and damages its credibility and effectiveness. Beyond the P5, the counterterrorist campaign would gain greater legitimacy from the majority of member states if enshrined in international law, and not perceived as operating at the whim of the sole remaining superpower. Terrorist cells with plans to target US and other ‘infidel’ assets have been found in most European countries as well as in many developing states. Recent attacks have taken place in the United States, as well as in Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tunisia and Yemen. It follows that the US-led coalition could not eradicate al-Qa’ida and its affiliates without assistance from developing as well as industrialised states. The former will need considerable assistance to build up counter-terrorist capacity and a concomitant campaign to address root

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causes, in order to begin to close the perceptual gap that now divides North from South, where all too many people still believe that the CIA or the FBI carried out the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York. Concerning the US relationship with other industrialised states, and particularly with those in Europe, a serious effort needs to be made to mend fences so that al-Qa’ida does not score yet another victory in its propaganda campaign. There is no doubt that this struggle is guaranteed to be a lengthy one. Al-Qa’ida’s spectacular attacks have been planned years in advance and meticulously designed, thereby attesting to the organisation’s incredible patience and capabilities. Members also truly believe that they can and will defeat the United States. The organisation has demonstrated an astonishing capacity for entrepreneurship in financing its activities, in choosing targets and in executing plans. Indeed, al-Qa’ida always appears to be a step ahead, with western governments scurrying to keep up. While it is extremely unlikely that al-Qa’ida will defeat the United States, or indeed establish an Islamic caliphate over the Muslim world, it is very probable that the organisation and movement will continue to cause immense damage and undue suffering until they are decisively defeated. To achieve this, the coalition will not only need to become a true coalition once again, but it will also have to demonstrate a similar degree of flexibility, fluidity and adaptability, particularly in terms of improved coordination at many levels.

Notes and references 1. This book utilises the definitions of counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism provided by Kevin O’Brien in Chapter 1. ‘Counter-terrorism’ activities are the policies and procedures that underpin a strategy to defeat terrorism, whereas ‘anti-terrorism’ is the direct action taken against terrorist organisations. 2. An additional four reports from non-member states and observers were also submitted. By mid-2004, 159 states had sent in second reports, 109 had sent third reports, and 49 had submitted fourth-round reports. 3. From Kerry’s remarks during the US Presidential Debate held in St Louis, Missouri, 8 October 2004. 4. For more information, see the report by Thomas Donnelly, principal author, ‘Rebuilding America’s defenses: strategy, forces and resources for a new century’, (Washington, DC: the Project for the New American Century [PNAC], September 2000). PNAC was formed in 1997. 5. US/France interview given by M. Hubert Vedrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs to France-Inter’s ‘Question Directe’ programme (excerpts), Paris, 6 February 2002. 6. See http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/joint.htm 7. ‘Ghost prisoners haunt terrorism hunt’, The Times, 11 September 2004, p. 19. 8. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/financialresponse.html 9. For more information, see Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); or Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering The New Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999) Project Air Force.

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10. Remark made by David Veness, in charge of Specialist Operations including counter-terrorism, at a roundtable discussion on 15 November, New Scotland Yard, London. 11. As defined by Dr Magnus Ranstorp, the University of St Andrews. 12. ‘Counterterrorism information sharing with other federal agencies and with state and local governments and the private sector’, Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, 1 October 2002, p. 4. 13. The French acronym for ‘Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence’. 14. In a speech given at King’s College London, 7 November 2002. 15. Interview with the author, the Chancellery, Berlin, 18 February 2002. 16. See Daniel Benjamin’s submission to the UN Reform Panel, commissioned by the UN Foundation, at http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/globalchallenges21c/ papers_cat/terrorism_non_state_actors.htm 17. An additional major challenge for the EU is how to help accession countries develop similar counter-terrorism infrastructures. 18. ‘Answering the “Axis” critics’, Washington Post, 5 March 2002. 19. Bruce Hoffman, ‘Is Europe soft on terrorism?’, Foreign Policy, 115 (Summer 1999), 64. 20. See Hoffman, ibid, for more information. 21. For example, in 1998 former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine proclaimed that American power represented a problem for the world, and labelled US foreign policy as heavy-handed. Since the ‘axis’ speech, these differences have only become more pronounced. Chris Patten, Commissioner of the EU in charge of external relations, not only accused the United States of imperialism, but criticised America’s ‘dangerous instincts’. German editorials have also decried American isolationism and hegemonism. ‘Europeans ease criticism of Washington’, International Herald Tribune, 5 March 2002. 22. See, for example, Joseph Nye, ‘The new Rome meets the new barbarians’, The Economist, 23 March 2002, 23–5; ‘Answering the “Axis” critics’, the Washington Post, 5 March 2002; Robert Kagan, ‘Power and weakness’, Policy Review, 113 (June/ July 2002); or Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, ‘The new Transatlantic security network’, Policy Papers 20, a publication of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, 2002. 23. Interview with the author, Madrid, 7 May 2002. 24. See Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden, ‘Counting the cost of Europe’s security needs: the arithmetic of defence policy’, International Affairs, 77:3 (July 2001), 509–29. 25. See Juan Aviles, ‘Es Al-Qaida una amenaza para Europa?’, Real Instituto Elcano, Documentos de trabajo/Working papers, 20 December 2002, www. realinstituoelcano.org/documentos/7.asp 26. See, for example, ‘Spain calls foreign experts to help sift evidence’, Leslie Crawford and Joshua Levitt in Madrid, and Mark Huband in London, The Financial Times, 16 March 2004. 27. As explained by David Veness, see n. 10. 28. For a more in-depth discussion of the debate surrounding root causes, see Karin von Hippel ‘Définir les origines du terrorisme : un débat transatlantique?’ La revue internationale et stratégique, no. 51 (autumn 2003); and Karin von Hippel, ‘The roots of terrorism: probing the myths’, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Superterrorism: Policy Responses, special issue of Political Quarterly (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, September 2002), 25–39. 29. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf

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30. As cited in Lawrence Wright, ‘The terror web: were the Madrid bombings part of a new, far-reaching jihad being plotted on the Internet?’ The New Yorker, 2 August 2004, accessed on the web, August 2004. 31. Interview with the author, Madrid, 7 May 2002. 32. See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qa’ida: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst & Co., 2002), p. 126. On pages 114–31, he documents the role Europe played in supporting – unwittingly and often even with the knowledge of the government – al-Qa’ida. 33. ‘The FBI’s handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui prior to 11 September 2001’, Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, 24 September 2002, p. 3.

Part I Country Case Studies


1 France Kevin A. O’Brien

General overview In his opening speech to the UN Security Council on 12 September 2001, France’s UN Ambassador Jean-David Levitte stated, ‘in deciding upon any appropriate action to combat those who resort to terrorism, those who aid them and those who protect them . . . [a] global strategy is needed’.1 In subsequent discussions in the Security Council, French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine remarked, ‘combating international terrorism means acting simultaneously on many fronts. The mobilisation must be universal.’2 On these two principles, the French have determined a great deal of both their international and domestic policies to combat the ‘new’ terrorism. While outlining such strong support to the United States in this ‘War on Terrorism’, France also made it clear that it was not offering the United States a ‘blank cheque’: in his 24 September 2001 address to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin stressed that while France would not ‘shirk its responsibilities’, this would not prevent it from ‘making a free judgment about French participation in a military engagement’.3 President Chirac presented the same message one week before, at his 18 September meeting with US President Bush in the White House, in which he made military cooperation conditional upon France being ‘consulted in advance about the objectives and modalities of an action, whose goal must be the elimination of terrorism’.4 Nevertheless, France has been strongly behind the ‘War on Terrorism’.5 Unfortunately, where some of this came undone – at least, on the surface – occurred during the 2002–2003 wrangling over the (coming, then real) war in Iraq. While it is no secret that France and the United States clashed head-to-head over the legitimacy of the 2003 Iraq War (once again, before, during and since), what is less clear but generally understood6 is that the levels of international cooperation on counter-terrorism that occurred, at the agency-to-agency level, between France and western allies – the United States and United Kingdom more directly, alongside Spain, Italy and Germany 19

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closer to home within Continental Europe – over the course of 2002–2004 increased, if anything. One need only look to reports in the press to note that France’s record of cooperation, first, with these countries and others in continuing to counter al-Qa’ida directly, and second, with Spain on ETA, and Italy on the ‘new’ Red Brigades, all point to a serious conviction to confront and deter terrorism wherever it occurs. Therefore, while the politico-diplomatic rhetoric surrounding the Iraq War may not have enhanced friendships on the international political stage, this has not – by all appearances and accounts – done anything to diminish France’s strong commitment to the ‘War on Terrorism’.

Background Historically, and similar to several other European countries, France has been a victim of international terrorism on its homeland territory and abroad for many years. At the end of 2001, France noted this in its report to the UN Security Council7 and that, for many years, the country has shown its determination to combat terrorism in all its forms regardless of the identity of the terrorists. In France, this is perceived to have run in ‘trois cercles de terrorisme’: first, ethno-nationalist separatist terrorism within France – such as from the Corsican separatist FLNC, the left-wing ‘Action Directe’, and other groups across the country (such as those in Bretagne or the French Basque region); second, anti-colonial violence related to France’s colonial legacy – such as from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), both of Algeria;8 and third, transnational terrorism which now ‘dovetails with the US-led war against al-Qa’ida’.9 France also experienced a large amount of Palestinian nationalist and general European left-wing militancy and terrorist activities over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, but this must be treated separately from the central problem that France continues to face: terrorism and militancy generated by its historical and ongoing relationships with North Africa.10 During the 1980s, in response to these threats, after many years of evolving mechanisms and legislation to support French anti- and counter-terrorist efforts, France established a coordinated system of legislation and operational mechanisms, and sought to enhance international cooperation. It was said that this determination was reaffirmed following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Preventive measures within France and international cooperation were subsequently strengthened pursuant to the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001. Terrorist activities and arrests in France since 9/11 In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, French police arrested seven people suspected of planning attacks against American targets in France. The militants

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were believed to belong to a series of Islamic terrorist groups. In December 2002, four people – said to be from Algeria and Morocco – were arrested on suspicion of planning a chemical terrorist attack; two of the individuals claimed to have been trained by Chechen leaders in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, an area well known for the training of Islamic militants. One of the men detained was Mirouane Ben Ahmed, who had been wanted since December 2000 for attempting to blow up the Christmas market in Strasbourg. While the French police were convinced that their country narrowly missed a chemical or biological attack by an Islamist cell linked to al-Qa’ida, one such cell centred on the Benchellali family was arrested in January 2004 while trying to manufacture chemical and biological weapons for attacks around Europe.11 Finally, French authorities also arrested Christian Ganczarski, a German national, said to be not only a top recruiter for al-Qa’ida, but also linked to the April 2002 synagogue suicide-bombing on Tunisia’s tourist island of Djerba, which killed 21 people, including 14 German tourists. Given its long-standing experience with terrorism, France has equipped itself with an important anti-terrorist arsenal based on two main pillars: first, that of operational prevention, overseen by the central, all-powerful Inter-ministerial Liaison Committee Against Terrorism (Comité Interministériel de Lutte Anti-Terroriste or CILAT) and its Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (Unité de Co-ordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste or UCLAT), housed within the Ministry of the Interior since 1984, and repression (based on the Vigipirate plan). Second, that of legislation and juridical measures, based on the ‘Act of September 9th of 1986’. Activities before and after September 2001 build on these two main pillars. As such, France’s policy-making and implementation post-9/11 has primarily involved the activation of preconceived contingency plans to bolster security while providing those agencies with anti-terrorist roles more freedom of action to prevent attacks. Terrorism in France – and legislation against it – has, therefore, historically been defined under the law by a series of independent offences. Both countermeasures and prosecutions are predicated by combining the existence of an offence under ordinary criminal law, which appears on a restrictive list, with ‘an individual or collective undertaking, the aim of which is to cause a serious disturbance to public order by means of intimidation or terror’. Certain offences, however, such as acts of environmental terrorism, membership of terrorist groups and the financing of terrorism now have autonomous legal definitions. Terrorist offences come under a special form of legal proceedings characterised by the centralised nature of investigation, prosecution and trial under a sole jurisdiction made up of specialised judges whose competence extends to the entire country. The French government has also stated that it is opposed to simplistic assimilations of terrorism to organised crime, although it recognises that there are increasingly strong links between the two phenomena, especially financial links. In addition, French legislation contains provisions which allow for compensation for victims of terrorist acts. In

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November 2001, new provisions were enacted to facilitate the fight against terrorism.12 Even so, taking this history into account, there was a divided reaction to the prospect of military action to combat terrorism at the start of the ‘War on Terrorism’ in late 2001. To the extent that French leaders accepted that a military response was necessary, they believed it should be limited as much as possible to precise terrorist targets, rather than countries or regimes more broadly. To this end, Jospin emphasised that military strikes must be ‘proportional, strategically and militarily justified, and politically coherent’.13 French public opinion supported this view, with 84 per cent of those surveyed (compared with 56 per cent of Americans) saying that any military strike should involve only military, as opposed to civilian, targets.14 This was essentially due to the four-million-plus Muslims resident in France, and France’s own painful experiences with extremist terrorism. The French are particularly concerned about what Védrine called ‘falling into the diabolical trap that the terrorists wanted to set, that of a “clash of civilizations” ’.15 Overall, these measures constitute the reference framework for the political impetus that France gives to the fight against terrorism. This chapter will examine the juridico-legislative basis for France’s counter-terrorist measures, followed by the preventative (including financial) and protective measures undertaken by France either before or as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 2001; finally, it will conclude by considering the success of France’s counter/anti-terrorist efforts16 in light of the evolving global war on terrorism.

The juridical and legislative pillar against terrorism France’s strong domestic plans makes it one of only six EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) that have specific anti-terrorist legislation. In France, alongside the Vigipirate plan is the ‘Act of September 9th of 1986’ which forms the cornerstone of French anti-terrorist legislation, providing for the prosecution of all terrorist acts. Under this Act, terrorism is defined as an infraction committed by an individual, or a group of individuals, aimed at seriously disrupting public order through intimidation or terror. Terrorist crimes are subject to a special and harsher legal procedure, and also carry some of the longest penalties in the French legal system (up to 30 years imprisonment).17 Defining terrorist activity France has adopted specific and comprehensive anti-terrorist legislation, whose cornerstone is the Act of 9 September 1986, and which has evolved in order to deal with the threat of terrorism on an ongoing basis. The French Penal Code (arts. 421–1 et seq.) defines acts of terrorism as independent offences, that is, a separate category of offences subject to more severe penalties than violations of ordinary criminal law. This legislation defines terrorism as

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an individual or collective undertaking, the aim of which is to cause serious damage to public order by means of intimidation or terror. Terrorist activity is defined in criminal law, however, by combining two criteria. First, the existence of an offence or serious crime under ordinary criminal law, as defined in the Penal Code. This concerns only certain offences and serious crimes included in a list established under the Penal Code. Second, the connection between these offences or serious crimes and an individual or collective undertaking whose aim is to cause a serious disturbance to public order by means of intimidation or terror – whether in support of environmental, criminal or terrorist issues. On the legi-juridical front, France legislates terrorism as an offence, both in terms of attacks and in terms of offences committed ‘in relation to an individual or collective undertaking that has the aim of seriously disrupting public order through intimidation or terror’ (article 421-1 of the Penal Code), meaning that individuals are subject to prosecution through a specific procedure against all illicit acts committed in preparation for the attack. In addition, recruitment of members of terrorist groups is covered by French law under the offence of criminal conspiracy of a terrorist nature, which consists of participation in a group formed or an arrangement set up for the purpose of preparation involving one or more material elements of acts of terrorism. French law also prohibits these offences under 1936 legislation outlawing combat groups and disbanded movements. Since 1996, such offences are subject to more severe penalties if they are related to a terrorist undertaking. This consistently developed penal policy makes it easier to detect, at the earliest possible moment, conspiratorial activities that are likely to constitute a serious threat to public order and are carried out by individuals who would be harder to question at a later stage because they belong to international organisations with support networks based abroad. Finally, the vintage Act of 29 July 1881, which prohibits incitement to racial hatred, discrimination, and violence and advocacy of terrorism, also lays the groundwork for punishing not only the dissemination of propaganda for the purpose of recruitment, but also any natural or legal persons who seek to convert others to terrorism. Deterring terrorist activity French law carries severe penalties for offences against the regulations on the sale and circulation of weapons – of obvious relation to terrorist activities – as well as on sensitive exports, such as war matériel. This brings French law into line with the international guidelines set by the United Nations and the European Union, which aim to cut off terrorist organisations’ sources of supply, and prevent shipments of arms to governments that violate human rights or to regions that are unstable or in conflict. In the case of dual-use items, and communication systems in particular, France implements the European legislation (Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000), which subjects certain goods to export controls. In addition, France has a national ‘monitoring’

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system for exports of goods containing encryption technology, making it easier to trace such goods. France is also party to the Wassenaar Arrangement, a forum made up of 33 countries that manufacture and export weapons and dual-use goods. France takes specific measures to prevent the use of its territory as a ‘home base’ by terrorist movements, and has recently strengthened these measures. Within French legislation already in force, Act 96-647 of 22 July 1996 introduced an additional anti-terrorist measure by creating a new offence: Article 421-2 of the Penal Code was modified to state, ‘The following shall also constitute a terrorist act: participation in a group or an understanding established for the purpose of preparing, by means of one or more material actions, one of the aforementioned terrorist acts.’ This provision is vital in order to prevent the use of French territory to commit acts against third states or their nationals. The offence of criminal conspiracy for the purpose of planning terrorist acts is applicable to persons not only within French territory but also outside the country. Similarly, this offence is also applicable when the terrorist organisation is targeting the territory of a foreign state, not only French territory (article 706-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). A new law called the ‘Loi sur la Sécurité Quotidienne’ (Law on Everyday Security) was adopted by the French Parliament on 15 November 2001, calling for more proactive measures to curb potential terrorist activities. It contains new provisions for the purpose of both combating more effectively those offences which may be connected with terrorist activities, and intensifying the fight against terrorism in general terms, including more intrusive data-access rules.18 The network of liaison officers set up by France and several other countries, especially in Europe, facilitates exchanges among departments. A number of specialised police units have also been created, for example, one was recently established in Bayonne, near the frontier with Spain. Similarly, the provisions of the Act of 1 July 1901 on freedom of association enable the French authorities to deal with the illicit activities of organisations which break the law or disturb public order, and whose purpose is to support terrorist organisations, sometimes in the guise of cultural, religious, charitable or humanitarian activities. This Act enables the authorities to shut down organisations based on illicit causes or objectives contrary to the law or accepted standards of behaviour, and does not require that illegal acts must actually have been committed. As well, the Act of 10 January 1936 provides for the abolition, by a Council of Ministers decree, of combat groups and private militias established as associations, whether declared or not, which call for armed demonstrations in the streets or advocate discrimination or racial hatred or violence. In 1996, this provision was extended to groups which, within or from French territory, conspire to bring about acts of terrorism in France or abroad. Finally, France has set up a system to prevent the use for terrorist purposes of telecommunications and information networks. Under the Act of 10 July

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1991, on the confidentiality of correspondence transmitted via telecommunications technology, interceptions by the security forces are authorised for the purpose of preventing terrorism. Such interceptions are carried out under the supervision of the National Commission for the Monitoring of Security Interceptions. In addition, an automated system to monitor technological development has been set up at a national centre against high-technology crime. Following 11 September 2001, other departments, such as the customs or gendarmerie, have been focusing the activities of their technological monitoring units on terrorism. In the legal field, jurisprudence and legislation consider that the law applicable in the area of press freedom (Act of 29 July 1881) is also applicable to the use of new information technologies. This makes it possible to penalise offences such as discrimination, xenophobia, incitement to racial hatred or advocacy of terrorism when messages are transmitted using these technologies. All such acts can be prosecuted in the same way regardless of whether the terrorist activity is meant to be carried out on French territory or abroad. Similar provisions have been agreed in the context of the European Union. The Council Framework Decision of 6 December 2001 on combating terrorism makes participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way a punishable offence and seeks to harmonise the penalties for it (at eight years imprisonment).

Prevention against terrorism The Vigipirate Renforcé plan: mobilising to deter and prevent terrorism after 9/11 The Vigipirate plan was conceived in 1978 during the first wave of terrorist attacks in Europe – particularly by the ‘Rote Armee Fraktion’ (Red Army Faction) in Germany and the ‘Brigate Rosse’ (Red Brigades) in Italy – as the French government’s main plan for preventing or deterring threats, as well as reacting against terrorist actions. The document outlining the plan itself is classified, but its goal is believed to support the mobilisation of all the police and military to strengthen security. It authorises deployment of personnel from branches of the French Armed Forces (soldiers, gendarmes and paratroopers) to assist specially assigned local law enforcement personnel from national and municipal police forces. They patrol and check critical and sensitive areas – most notably those frequented by the public in Paris and elsewhere in France (airports, train stations, public transportation and other public areas). In the plan, there are two stages: Vigipirate Simple and Vigipirate Renforcé, in which the armed forces participate. Vigipirate Simple was activated for the first time in 1991 during the Gulf War, including the Renforcé stage for four months, and never deactivated since – it was only stepped down to Simple

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and then stepped up again in 1995 and 1996 during/following the large terrorist attacks which occurred in those years, again during the 1998 World Cup to counter threats from Algerian extremists, one year later during the Kosovo crisis, and in November 2000 in Corsica.19 In addition to Vigipirate, France also has a number of emergency plans in case of a chemical (Piratox) or nuclear (Piratome) accident or attack, and for both airplane (Piratair) and ship (Pirate-mer) hijackings.20 Immediately after 11 September 2001, France adopted several plans and measures that aimed principally at strengthening homeland defence and increasing vigilance across the country. To combat terrorism, the lead is taken by the Ministries of the Interior and Defence, as well as the central government. While the Ministry of Defence mobilises civilian and military counter-terrorism resources, the central government machinery is coordinated by the all-powerful Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee Against Terrorism (Comité Interministériel de Lutte Anti-Terroriste or CILAT), which sits ‘at the apex of this apparatus’.21 Within the Ministry of the Interior since 1984, the goal of the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (Unité de Co-ordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste or UCLAT) has been to coordinate the activities of all the agencies involved in the war on terrorism. Former Prime Minister Jospin activated the Vigipirate Renforcé Plan (VRP) on 12 September 2001 as a response to the terrorist attacks in the United States. Its overall aims are to promote enhanced awareness among all public services and private partners; enhance security along highways, train stations, ports and airports; and secure sensitive points and networks throughout the country. On 13 September, Interior Minister Daniel Vaillant assembled the CILAT and unveiled the main elements of Vigipirate which, by 7 October, had been reinforced.22 Under Phase I, the Minister of Interior instructed the prefects to strengthen surveillance and controls around American and Israeli diplomatic premises, and in airports, stations, public transport and public buildings that could be potential targets.23 Defence Minister Alain Richard then instituted a reinforced air defence plan consisting of four patrols of fighter jets on ready alert to intercept intrusions of French air space. The Defence Ministry also boosted security at sensitive locations such as nuclear plants, large dams and major industrial installations. The Prefect of Paris Police, Jean-Paul Prost, announced increased security measures around diplomatic postings, with emphasis on the US and Israeli embassies.24 French prefectures received the order to implement Phase II (highest alert) of the plan within 48 hours. Phase II of Vigipirate called for enhanced awareness among all public services and private partners to increase security along French highways, train stations, metro, ports, airports, schools and shopping centres. Other secured areas include tourist sites, museums, theatres and places of worship. The measures under Vigipirate Renforcé were initially rolled out for two years (through 31 December 2003).

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Finally, Phase III saw some 5,400 additional police, gendarmes or other military personnel being assigned to anti-terrorist patrols and domestic security throughout France. In addition to the police (police and gendarmerie) and customs services, the armed forces contributed more than 1,400 men to this plan. In Paris, about 600 soldiers, 850 paratroopers and 1,300 gendarmes have reinforced the plan, thus bringing the total to some 7,000 mobilised military and security forces. Overall, the implementation of Vigipirate in response to 9/11 appears to have worked smoothly and with completeness. In March 2003, the government revamped the entire Vigipirate system to include a new phased-level of alertness (jaune, orange, rouge, écarlate) corresponding to operational readiness. The system allows for more flexibility in alertness and readiness stages across different sectors (i.e. the railways, the nuclear-fuel industry, airports, etc.). Since that time, with the exception of raising the level to rouge at the time of the Madrid train-bombings in March 2004, and raising the general state level to rouge temporarily at the time of the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day celebrations in June 2004, Vigipirate has remained at a norm of orange.25

National coordination issues The Council for Interior Security (Conseil de Sécurité Intérieur), created in 1997, is chaired by the Prime Minister, and is composed of the Ministers of the Interior, Justice, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finances. It evaluates threats that could touch the national territory, and adapts the anti-terrorist instruments. The political coordination of anti-terrorist policy rests with the aforementioned CILAT, a high-level committee that meets on average twice a year and coordinates the activities of all relevant ministries involved in the combat against terrorism. It includes the Prime Minister and Ministers of Interior, Defence, Justice, and Foreign Affairs. CILAT is in turn responsible for UCLAT, a working level coordination group that includes agencies from the Ministries of Interior and Defence that coordinate operations and which resides organisationally within the Ministry of Interior.26 UCLAT’s three main missions – ‘le renseignement’ (intelligence), ‘la prevention’ (prevention), and ‘la repression’ (repression) – rely on the security forces and intelligence services for implementation. In times of crisis, the Ministry of Defence’s Joint Operational Centre (Centre Opérationnel Interarmées – COIA), in connection with the Ministry of the Interior’s Operational Centre For Inter-Ministerial Crisis Management (Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises – COGIC), evaluate the situation and define the response. The national institutional framework for combating terrorism Unlike a number of other European countries, France does not have a government department with the sole responsibility of combating terrorism. Such

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coordination resides within the two committees CILAT and UCLAT. To support these, counter- and anti-terrorist efforts – including against its financing – involve the mobilisation of all relevant departments available to contribute to its prevention and suppression. An examination of these different departments’ roles and missions, as follows, will provide a clear idea of the French institutional framework for combating terrorism. The Ministry of the Interior is the lead department for combating terrorism in France, responsible for the maintenance and cohesion of the country’s institutions. The Ministry oversees areas such as law and order, public safety, public freedoms, elections and local authorities. Within the Ministry, six key bodies implement the counter-terrorist strategy: the Directorate-General of the National Police (DGPN); the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT); the Office of International Technical Police Cooperation (SCTIP); the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (DCPJ); the Directorate of Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs; and the Central Directorate of the Border Police. As shown in Figure 1.1,27 a host of organisations comprise the National Police. The most relevant to combating terrorism are: (1) The Director General of the National Police (DGPN) deals with various aspects of counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorist activities as a whole are coordinated by the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT), over which the DGPN has authority. In addition, the Office of International Police Technical Cooperation assists with the execution of all forms of cooperative action to combat all forms of international crime, including terrorism, through its 62 delegations at French embassies around the world. The action in question, which may be in the form of internships, visits or missions, is carried out in all counter-terrorism fields. (2) The Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT) is responsible for coordinating and leading the counter-terrorist effort by providing a link between the various actors involved, including ensuring cross-cutting exchange of information and analysis, in recognition of the inter-ministerial dimension of the endeavour. Reporting to the Minister of the Interior, the Director General also Commands the National Police. The Coordination Unit sets up links between the intelligence services, the Central Directorate of the Border Police, the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police, and the Special Action and Support Unit RAID. (3) The Central Directorate of the Border Police (Direction Centrale de la Police aux Frontières or DCPAF) is the service responsible for preventive measures at France’s borders. (4) The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (Direction Centrale de Police Judiciare or DCPJ) is the service responsible for criminal policing, handling economic, financial, criminal, technical and scientific crime. The 6th Division of the DCPJ has as its mission to detect and prevent subversive and terrorist activities. The DCPJ’s director is the nation’s chief detective and the

Prime Minister’s Office Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee Against Terrorism (CILAT)

Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT)

Operational Centre for Inter-Ministerial Crisis Management (COGIC)

Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry

Ministry of Defence

Ministry of the Interior

Joint Operational Centre (COIA)

Director-General of National Police

National Police

Territorial Surveillance Directorate (DST)

National Defence General Secretariat (SGDN)

Treasury Department

Directorate General for External Security (DGSE)

Financial Intelligence Unit (TRACFIN)

Director General of Gendarmerie

Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect Taxes

Gendarmerie National

Central Directorate of General Information (DCRG) Departmental Gendarmerie Central Directorate of the Judicial Police Other Gendarmerie Units Special Action & Support Unit (RAID)

Units Most Directly Inolved in Anti-Terrorist Activities

Mobile Gendarmerie

Central Directorate of the Border Police (DCPAF) Special Ops & Anti-Terror Unit (GIGN) International Police Cooperation Service (SCTIP) Diplomatic & VIP Protection (GSPR) Close Protection Unit (SPHP) Air Frontier Police Urban Police Central Service of Republican Security Companies

Organigram of relevant French agencies concerned with counter-terrorism

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Figure 1.1

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head of the French section of Interpol. The financial aspects of counterterrorism are dealt with at the Subdirectorate for Economic and Financial Affairs of the DCPJ by the Central Office for the Suppression of Major Financial Crime (OCRGDF) and the National Division of Financial Investigations. (5) France also has two operational units designed to deal with serious threats to public safety: the ‘Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale’ (GIGN – also known as the Special Operations and Anti-Terror Unit) and ‘Recherche, Assistance, Intervention et Dissuasion’ (RAID – also known as the Special Action and Support Unit). The GIGN falls under the ‘Mobile Gendarmerie’ under the Ministry of Defence, while RAID, a specialist intervention unit of the National Police, falls under the DCPJ. RAID operates primarily in urban areas with over 100,000 inhabitants. Both GIGN and RAID were fully mobilised post-9/11 under the Vigipirate Renforcé Plan. (6) The intelligence services: • Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (Directorate of Territorial Security): with about 1,500 personnel, DST is responsible for counter-terrorist activities throughout France. Previously focusing primarily on counter-intelligence, the group now tracks foreign criminals and terrorists operating in France. As such, there is growing cooperation between the DST and DGSE (Direction Generale de la Securité Exterieure or General Directorate for External Security), responsible for collecting and sorting raw electronic and military intelligence, as well as counter-espionage outside France. • The Central General Intelligence Directorate or Renseignements Generaux (DCRG or RG): this political intelligence unit collects information on groups considered to be threats to national security. About 4,000 individuals work for the DCRG, 700 of whom are assigned to the Prefecture of the Paris Police. (7) Finally, the Directorate of Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs (Direction des Libertés Publiques et des Affaires Juridiques or DLPAJ, which resides under the Central Border Police Directorate) is responsible for drafting documents and legal norms on transborder traffic and temporary and permanent residence. Within the Ministry of Defence resides not only the armed forces but also the ‘Gendarmerie National’ (DGGN) and the DGSE. The DGGN enforces the law and guarantees public security. It polices some 95 per cent of France, including all towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants. It includes three major components: the ‘Mobile Gendarmerie’ (riot police who can be deployed anywhere in the country), the ‘Gendarmerie Departmental’ (who operate from fixed points), and other Gendarmerie units (for example ‘Gendarmerie de l’Air’, ‘Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité’, ‘Gendarmerie Maritime’, ‘Gendarmerie de l’Armament’). The National Gendarmerie deals with intervention and protection techniques, with its activities covering the entire range of police missions in the area of counter-terrorism, from intelligence gathering to active involvement of units such as GIGN, which resides under the Mobile

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Gendarmerie and is designed to handle high-risk security threats. Significant also to the fight against terrorism within the Ministry of Defence is the General Armed Forces Inspectorate, responsible for controlling arms traffic, including the trade in and possession of arms and matériel, the monitoring of actors, and a registration system and criminal penalties regime for violations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs houses a number of units involved in combating terrorism. These include the Directorate of Strategic and Disarmament Affairs/Sub-directorate of Security, which serves as the principle contact point for the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee. The Ministry of Justice operates its Office of European and International Affairs, which assists in the development of European and international law through both liaison with national and international bodies, and the transposition into and implementation of international instruments under domestic law. The Ministry also includes the Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons, which is involved in the preparation of relevant draft legislation and decrees submitted by the Minister of Justice; drafting and evaluation of general instructions on penal policy for procurators-general; and the monitoring of public action. Finally, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry is central to the fight against terrorism in its every financial guise. The Treasury Department covers all aspects of the financing of terrorism. Through its partnership with regulatory authorities (such as the Banking Commission, Insurance Control Commission, and Stock-Exchange Operations Commission), banks and other financial institutions, it combats the financing of terrorism through injunctions concerning the freezing of assets, structural and legal questions relating to banking and financial operations, while overseeing international cooperation – including with the Group of Seven/Eight, Group of Twenty, International Monetary and Financial Committee (International Monetary Fund), and the Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering (FATF). Its French Financial Intelligence Unit (TRACFIN or Treatment of Information and Action Against Clandestine Financial Circuits), a financial information service, gathers and processes information from a variety of sources, including statements by financial organisations voicing their suspicions and requests made by their foreign counterparts – giving them key involvement in gathering information on the alleged financing of terrorist networks. Once a sufficient volume of information has been collected, the relevant files may be transmitted to the judicial authorities. Finally, the Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect Taxes’ counter-terrorist action is focused on monitoring the effectiveness of measures to freeze assets and prosecution for non-compliance with such measures, efforts to prevent laundering of money from illicit trafficking in drugs, monitoring of products and strategic technologies, monitoring of arms and matériel, prevention of terrorist acts by means of security controls at airports (hold baggage and freight) and the Transmanche fixed link (English Channel link), and participation in immigration controls in cooperation with the Border Police.

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On 20 September 2001, the Ministry established an ad hoc coordinating group (FINTER) to strengthen harmonisation between French economic and financial agencies with competencies in the area of monetary surveillance. Under UNSCR-1373, one of the principal objectives of FINTER is to uncover and freeze terrorists’ assets.28 As of December 2001, France had frozen about €4.42 million worth of funds traced to Taliban and al-Qa’ida members. France has also proposed – under the auspices of FATF – the establishment of a forum on the financing of terrorism, with a broader membership than that of the FATF, which ‘could, inter alia, be an efficient relay point for requirements formulated by the United Nations’.29 This would, it is hoped, ensure consistency between the initiatives of these various bodies and what is being done in the United Nations. France has additionally improved its external cooperation against the financing of terrorism through placing the techniques and other offerings of TRACFIN at the service of efforts to stop the financing of terrorism, with regard to the links between the financial bases of organised transnational crime and those of international terrorist networks. As of the end of 2004, TRACFIN has now signed 28 administrative agreements on bilateral cooperation with various foreign partners to formalise their reciprocal commitment to the fullest possible cooperation.30 External coordination issues Outside of the activities delineated in ‘Domestic/Internal Coordination Issues’ where these relate to external issues also (that is, through CILAT), France has undertaken numerous externally-oriented coordination activities since 9/11 to combat terrorism. One initiative sees France helping to build, at the European level, a network of contact points designed to improve the ability to track firearms used in connection with offences and ensuring greater efficiency in the exchange of information between the police forces of EU memberstates. These activities are bolstered by its significant presence in the Former Yugoslavia, both to the forces under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and to United Nations peacekeeping missions, where it is able to gather and use information on drug rings and criminal groups, as well as on the protection of arms depots. Indeed, while traditionally reluctant to see NATO’s role enhanced or the scope of its missions expanded, France did not hesitate to support the invocation of NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence guarantee, with President Jacques Chirac and other leaders making clear France’s readiness to take part alongside the United States in a possible military retaliation, a stance supported by no less than 73 per cent of the French.31 It has also undertaken significant steps (see ‘Combating WMD Terrorism’ below) to enhance exchanges of information under the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, especially on the latter fulfilling its reporting obligations. France has also introduced extensive new cooperative measures with some non-traditional allies in the fight against terrorism. These include

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Tajikistan – where French–Tajik relations have warmed since the war on terrorism began (see ‘International Military Operations’ below)32 – and India – where France recently communicated to the Indian authorities its agreement to the formation of a proposed joint working-group on terrorism. The Indian initiative could be quite extensive and, in examining all possibilities for cooperation between the two sides in fighting international terrorism, could include everything from greater interaction and cooperation between the various agencies charged with fighting terrorism in the two countries (including training and exchange of manpower) to French Interior Ministry forces, who are experts in counter-terrorism operations, training Indian antiterrorism units. India is also reportedly keen on acquiring some advanced anti-terrorism equipment to arm its own agents, and France is an acknowledged leader in the field of high-tech gadgetry for countering terrorist activities.33 Policing cooperation France has concluded intergovernmental agreements on police cooperation with certain countries. Article 2 of the text provides that ‘In their efforts to combat terrorism, the parties shall: • exchange information on terrorist acts which have been planned or committed, on persons participating in such acts and on the modus operandi and technical methods used to perpetrate such acts; • exchange information on terrorist groups and on members of such groups that may operate, are operating or have operated in the territory of one of the parties against the interests of the other party. France is currently supporting the introduction of early-warning mechanisms enhanced by information-exchanges with partner states, including, inter alia, the exchange of information on terrorist acts planned or committed in France or abroad; on the individuals involved in such acts; on their methods of operation and technical resources used for perpetrating attacks and on terrorist groups; on their strategies and goals; and on their recruitment, organisation and support networks (equipment, weapons, financing, training) and their membership. Bilaterally, the various French counter-terrorist agencies continuously exchange confidential bilateral information with many countries. Intergovernmental agreements on police cooperation have been signed with 42 countries: these all provide for the exchange of intelligence on terrorism.34 France has a network of attachés in the area of domestic security posted to its embassies abroad who are responsible for traditional aspects of police cooperation. In Europe, bilateral operational cooperation is facilitated through the assignment of liaison officers who are experts in counter-terrorism to counterpart agencies. France has assigned such officers to Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, which have also assigned counterparts

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to France. As the Directorate of Territorial Security plays the lead role in combating terrorism directed against France, its specialist investigators exchange intelligence with their foreign counterparts, while the Central Intelligence Directorate deals with domestic terrorism. Likewise, the French customs service has established contacts and agreements to start customs cooperation networks at the European and global levels to facilitate and increase information exchanges and operational contacts. These arrangements are based on a network of 15 customs attachés within France’s embassies abroad and on the existence of various multilateral or bilateral legal instruments on mutual administrative assistance. France not only is a party to the conventions adopted by the European Union and the World Customs Organisation (WCO), but also has concluded at least 33 bilateral conventions on administrative assistance for the prevention, detection and punishment of customs fraud, and is still conducting negotiations with a number of states. France has begun such exchanges in a multilateral (international or European) or bilateral framework. Internationally, France hosts the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and liaises with it heavily. France is also a member of the 1971 Bern Club, a multilateral forum for cooperation between the heads of security and intelligence services in a number of European countries. France participates in several multilateral forums such as the G8, the Mediterranean Forum, the Conference of Ministers of the Interior of the Western Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean Process, which facilitate the exchange of information among police services. There is also the Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference, which consists of the four main countries concerned with cross-Channel activities – Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands – in which the Chiefs of Police of these countries meet annually to discuss the security problems relating to the Channel. Within the European Union, the EU Task Force of Chiefs of Police, on which France is represented by the Directors-General of the Gendarmerie and the National Police, is responsible for enhancing the exchange of operational information. The European Police Organisation (Europol) has been expanded to include terrorism, and a task force has been set up to support EU memberstates in their efforts to prevent and combat terrorism by providing assistance to police and intelligence services. The task force focuses on cooperation between police and intelligence services, improving the exchange of information and cooperation with the United States. France actively participates in the Working Group on Terrorism, which aims to initiate and develop cooperation, and prepares a biannual report assessing threats of terrorism and identifying terrorist groups that pose a threat within Europe. France is also a member of the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), an informal working group where the heads of police counter-terrorist departments meet to discuss current cases under investigation in order to review concrete steps designed to enhance technical and operational cooperation

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with respect to the war on terrorism in Europe. The PWGT has its own coded communications network, and France participates in the work of the liaison office, a communication network which provides confidential or operational information on individual states.

Protecting French society The next wave of policies focused on internal physical security. This was achieved by increasing protection in public or other potential target areas (Vigipirate Renforcé Plan) and bolstering the authority of agencies fighting terrorism (Loi sur la Sécurité Quotidienne – Law on Everyday Security). These include air safety and border control measures, measures against the threat of chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear terrorism, and other internal security measures. The objective of these policies is to improve situational awareness to prevent and pre-empt future terrorist attacks. Besides Vigipirate, France’s emergency plans included for a biological (Biotox), chemical (Piratox) or nuclear (Piratome) accident or attack, and for both airplane (Piratair) and ship (Pirate-mer) hijackings. Air safety, mass transit and border control measures One of the first measures implemented post-9/11 – besides securing certain critical infrastructures and other significant structures – concerned air travel. Consistent with policy implementations in other countries, to ensure air safety in the face of the terrorist threat, a variety of security measures were modified and reviewed post-9/11 to ensure that a similar terrorist attack using aircraft as a weapon would not be replicated in France. The new procedures place more emphasis on careful screening of passengers and their luggage, especially hand luggage. There is greater control of personnel access at the hubs of major airports, enhanced aircraft access control, and improved methods for the inspection of freight and catering supplies.35 France is also involved in the work of international organisations dealing with air safety, having strengthened air transport safety measures substantially after 11 September 2001, through organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Assembly and its Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and more widely via the Ministers of Transport of the European Union, which strengthened counter-terrorism measures generally after both 9/11 and the Madrid attacks. In the area of border controls, France has taken action primarily within a European framework, notably with the Schengen Agreements. Policies were modified to secure vulnerable entry points. The French agencies responsible for controlling the movement of foreigners in and out of France (border police, DCPAF), gendarmerie (DGGN, and customs) ensure that persons crossing the border meet common standards for admission into the territory. These agencies

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also participate, under cross-border cooperation agreements with neighbouring member-states, in the gradual introduction of Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (CCPD), whose purpose is to strengthen bilateral operational cooperation with regard to security and combating illegal immigration and trafficking. These centres also help implement the rights of cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit established by the Schengen Agreements. Checks are also carried out during customs clearance of goods and control of passengers, carriers and merchandise by the Customs Administration, through inspection at points of entry and mobile controls throughout the territory, including the buffer zones. These controls enable the authorities to conduct targeted searches of sensitive materials and transport vehicles that may be used to organise trafficking and smuggling of persons or products. For example, the French customs service now conducts special security inspections of all passenger, tourist vehicle, trucking and railway freight traffic going through the Channel Tunnel to the UK. While these inspections were already in place through an inter-ministerial security committee and endorsed by a bi-national Franco-British committee, the number of inspections has grown considerably since September 2001. Combating WMD terrorism France has instituted numerous measures to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists. Many of these are multilateral – while the two instruments in force, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, do not expressly refer to terrorism, they nonetheless provide the legal basis for action to help combat terrorism. Their aim, which is to prevent the diversion and illegal use of such weapons, encompasses the prevention of terrorist acts. These measures are instituted via three plans: (1) The Biotox Plan Addressing Biological Threats: under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, the Biotox Plan on biological risk – which stems from an inter-ministerial effort commenced in 1999 and adopted in October 2001 – complements the VRP through specific measures in the areas of prevention, surveillance, early warning and emergency action.36 The Biotox Plan calls for closer cooperation between civilian and military agencies concerned with biological threats. Its budget is approximately €60 million. New arrangements were incorporated on 22 September 2001, to increase security at facilities for the production, storage and transport of hazardous biological materials.37 Post-9/11, an epidemiological warning was issued requiring the mandatory notification and reporting of unusual phenomena such as anthrax (Plan Biotox). As part of the programme, two military laboratories and a hospital were made available around the clock to facilitate microbiological diagnosis. Nine hospitals are currently assigned decontamination roles. In addition, an

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evaluation was carried out to ascertain the availability of necessary medicines and vaccinations around hospitals and pharmaceutical laboratories. A specific inventory level is required and is currently being verified by authorities. To be on the safe side, the French government placed an order worth €150 million to ensure the availability of critical antibiotics.38 A policy decision was also taken to increase vaccination stocks by three million to have a total of eight million doses. Finally, the government took measures to facilitate the provision of iodine tablets among the population. (2) The Piratox Plan Addressing Chemical Threats: France meets its reporting obligations under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention: state-parties to the Convention are required to declare their entire stock of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities in operation and past activities in that area, as well as all industrial sites that produce, in quantities exceeding the limits set by the Convention, substances which could be used for the production of chemical weapons. France has submitted initial declarations in this regard, which are updated regularly. (3) Nuclear Protection: Historically, French nuclear plants have had limited protection against aircraft impacts. For example, safety rules providing guidance on the sizing of nuclear installations vis-à-vis the risk of aircraft impacts are over ten years old.39 These rules stipulate that sizing decisions need to consider the potential impact of two types of aircraft: the Cessna 210 and the Learjet 23. Post-9/11, additional measures were implemented under Plan Piratome to ensure the physical safety of vulnerable nuclear installations. On October 2001, the French Defence Ministry announced that radar systems capable of detecting low-flying planes and air defence missiles had been deployed at La Hague and Il Longue.40 Additional security measures introduced at nuclear facilities include further restriction of access to such facilities, improved surveillance, and control of staff access to highly-sensitive areas. Finally, within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), France actively engages in measures taken for the physical protection of nuclear material, including through assistance to countries – such as in the former Soviet Union – where concerns over the vast quantities of fissile materials resulting from disarmament treaties between the United States and the Russian Federation remain.

Conclusions Overall, France has been remarkably successful in its anti-terrorist efforts since the 1980s. Such success has been enhanced by France’s growing cooperation with outside agencies, through both the Third Pillar of the European Union and its wider cooperation with the United States and other members of the international community over the ‘war on terrorism’ and the war in Afghanistan. This has led to numerous successful disruptions of suspected Jihadist cells not only in France but also, with French assistance, across Europe.

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France’s position with ‘La Francophonie’, including most of its former colonies, and its intelligence successes in many of these former colonies (especially in North Africa and the Horn of Africa) has made it a desirable partner for the United States, the United Kingdom and other allies in the war on terrorism. The measures taken by France post-9/11 represent a strong commitment to prevent and limit future terrorist attacks. The implementation of pre-existing anti-terrorist contingency plans (for example, Vigipirate) to their highest level of alert has enhanced internal surveillance while giving law enforcement greater ‘elbow room’ to prevent future attacks. The French Federal Police (Gendarmerie) operates at all levels and has therefore the position to provide oversight that is needed in times of crisis. Indeed, the Gendarmerie – with its key place and role in the Ministry of Defence’s efforts against terrorism, in the key UCLAT Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit, and in the overall domestic efforts (in liaison with the security services) – occupies a very strong, perhaps even commanding, institutional position within the overall French effort. The creation of new committees (such as FINTER) has complemented the process by boosting coordination and information-sharing among the large number of additional agencies involved in the fight against terrorism. At the international level, France has renewed its commitment to greater information-sharing. After the September 2001 attacks, French Minister of European Affairs Pierre Moscovici called for European nations to accelerate their judicial procedures and expand police cooperation in fighting terrorism. The French vision is eventually to have a European justice system, a European police force, and a European prosecutor’s office to combat terrorism more efficiently. But, like most countries, France has not been 100 per cent successful. While continued concerns were expressed about France’s apparently lax attitude towards Basque separatists in south-western France even before the attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, it must also be remembered that Richard Reid – the ‘shoe-bomber’ – managed to get onboard an American Airlines flight at Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport in December 2001, despite the interests of French security and immigration. Only the vigilance and quick reaction of passengers and crew onboard the flight kept Reid from successfully detonating the explosives contained in his shoes. French intelligence services were also not able to prevent the May 2002 bombing of the Sheraton and Pearl hotels in Karachi (Pakistan) aimed at – and successfully killing eleven of – French naval contractors from Cherbourg. Concerns also remain about how French security services and judiciaries have dealt with known Islamic terrorists on French soil believed to be travelling to other countries – this concern, to be sure, will likely be confronted most strongly in the wake of the Madrid attacks. Overall, it is more than likely – with its significant Muslim émigré population, its central position on the international stage, its interventionist attitude within its perceived sphere in the developing world, and its presence in

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Afghanistan – that France will continue to be a central player in the ‘war on terrorism’, whether it wants to or not. France is historically viewed, by many of the groups both active today and aligned with al-Qa’ida, as an impediment to the accomplishment of these groups’ goals within their national struggles – be they in Arabia, the Maghreb or Asia. For this reason, France and its institutions will continue to be targets for terrorist acts, as well as – unfortunately – ripe grounds for recruiting and support-raising. It seems, however, that France has in place significant tools within its counterterrorist arsenal for combating these groups – a series of counter-terrorist pillars that many western countries could learn from which attempt to balance the rights of the individual within France’s cosmopolitan polity with the need for stronger security, both domestically and internationally, than ever before. What remains unclear, however, is whether France will further change the national security system under Vigipirate, especially in light of the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, France increased Vigipirate to rouge, introducing immediate new security measures – such as a higher military profile in protecting society and a greater policing/ gendarmerie presence in public, especially across the national railway network. These measures are aimed at both reassuring the public and decreasing the likelihood of attacks; however, in decreasing the alert level again to orange shortly afterwards, it would appear that France is intent on maintaining a relative level of alertness and readiness across society, while attempting to ensure normalcy in that society.

Notes and references 1. United Nations Security Council (UNSC): 56th year, 4370th meeting, New York, 12 September 2001 – S/PV.4370: www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/pv4370e.pdf 2. UNSC, 56th year, 4413th meeting, New York, 12 November 2001 – S/PV.4413: www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/pv4413e.pdf 3. Daniel Vernet, ‘Matignon est plus prudent que l’Elysée sur un éventuel engagement militaire’, Le Monde, 26 September 2001. 4. Patrick Jarreau and Raphaëlle Bacqué, ‘Jacques Chirac réaffirme à Washington l’offre de coopération de la France’, Le Monde, 19 September 2001. 5. For an outline of US–French relations in the ‘war on terrorism’, see Philip H. Gordon and Benedicte Suzan, ‘France, the United States and the ‘war on terrorism’ in U.S.–France Analysis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1 January 2002): www.brook. edu/fp/cusf/analysis/terrorism.htm 6. From author interviews with US, UK and French security officials during 2002–2004. 7. UNSC, ‘Report submitted by France to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001’ (UN Doc S/2001/1274 – 27 December 2001): www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/ 1373/1274e.pdf

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8. Significant attacks in 1995 by the GIA against an open-air market in Paris and a Jewish school in Lyons, coupled with the well-known train and underground bombings in 1996 – allegedly perpetrated by the Islamic Salvation Front and the GIA respectively – in which 119 people were injured and four killed, are all prime indicators of the kind of terrorist threat that France has long faced against its population, as well as its institutions and officials. Data gathered from RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Databases: http://db.mipt.org/index.cfm 9. Shaun Gregory, ‘France and the war on terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence 15:1 (Spring 2003), 124. 10. The exception to this ‘internationalist’ rule has been the activities of the Basque separatist group ETA and the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC). The FNLC carried out more than 110 attacks during 27 years (1977–2004) resulting in no fatalities and only 34 injuries, but extensive property and infrastructure damage. ETA has operated occasionally in southern France along the Pyrenees border with Spain – prompting the French security forces to assist the Spanish on numerous occasions in countering ETA and rounding-up suspected supporters in France. 11. The central figure, Menad Benchellali, was a chemicals expert who had been trained in poison-making in al-Qa’ida camps in Afghanistan and was actively trying to produce a botulism toxin and ricin. He had been arrested in December 2002 during investigations into French Islamists’ efforts to send young Muslim volunteers to Chechnya. Those arrested included Benchellali’s father, Chellali – a well-known and controversial radical imam – his mother, his brother Hafed, and his sister Anissa. Another of his brothers, Mourad, is among six French nationals suspected of having ties to al-Qa’ida and is being held by the US authorities at Guantánamo Bay. An Interior Ministry official said evidence from Islamist militants arrested in the Lyon area the previous week made it ‘very plain’ that an attack with deadly botulism or ricin toxins was being prepared. The French government had previously believed they were only dealing with a routing-network to send young French Muslims to Chechnya for training and combat. The arrests alerted them to a much bigger immediate threat to France and Europe: Jon Henley, ‘Al-Qaida terror plot foiled, say French police’, Guardian, 12 January 2004, www.guardian.co.uk/ alqaida/story/0,12469,1120823,00.html 12. Unless noted otherwise, the information relating to France’s institutional and policy-led approach to countering terrorism after September 2001 is derived from France’s submission to the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee in pursuit of UNSCR-1373. See UNSC ‘Report submitted by France’, n. 7. 13. Daniel Vernet, ‘Matignon est plus prudent que l’Elysée sur un eventuel engagement militaire; Solidarité totale, mais pas de cheque en blanc, tell est la position prise par les deux têtes de l’executif’, Le Monde, 26 September 2001. 14. See ‘L’opinion publique internationale et la riposte américaine aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001’, poll taken on 14–15 September 2001, see: www.sofres.com 15. ‘Le monde entier reconnaîtra que les Etats-Unis sont en situation de légitime défense’, Le Monde, 18 September 2001. 16. ‘Counter-terrorism’ is considered to be the series of policies and procedures which underpin a strategy to defeat terrorism, where ‘anti-terrorism’ is the direct action taken against terrorist organisations, of any kind. 17. In particular: the centralisation of instruction and sentencing in a special centralised court in Paris, the extension to four days of the maximum duration of police custody, the possibility of carrying out searches at night, postponement of the intervention

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18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25.

26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36.

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of a lawyer until after 72 hours of police custody, trial of terrorist crimes by a special court made up of professional magistrates, and finally of a device in favour of ‘repentants’ (special sentence reductions for repentant terrorists that allow for the prevention of terrorist acts, leading to the avoidance of loss of human life). UNSC ‘Report submitted by France’, p. 6, see n. 7. For more information on Vigipirate, see: www.servicepublic.fr/accueil/ vigipirate_ definition.html, and www.defence.gouv.fr/actualites/publications/ defactu/n74/dossier.html www.consulfrance-quebec.org/Presse/Dossiers/wtc/france.htm Gregory, ‘France and the War on Terrorism’, p. 134. For an overview of these additional measures, see the website of the French Prime Minister: www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/fr/p.cfm?ref=28340&txt=1 ‘Intervention de Monsieur le Ministre de l’Intérieur devant la commission de la défense nationale et de la commission des affaires étrangères’ (Assemblée Nationale), 14 Septembre 2001: www.assemblee-nat.fr/dossiers/attentats/attentats-2.asp I am grateful to RAND visiting fellow Bénédicte Suzan for information on the measures implemented by Defence Minister Richard and Mr Jean-Paul Prost. The section on the Biotox Plan was informed by, ‘French perspectives on counter-terrorism and the international coalition’, prepared for RAND in April 2002. See also Intervention de Monsieur Bernard Kouchner Ministre délégué à la Santé, ‘Lors de la Presentation a la Presse du Plan Biotox’: www.sante.gouv.fr/htm/actu/33_011005bk.htm ‘Plan Vigipirate’, Wikipédia: L’encyclopédie Libre (23 February 2005): http:// fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Vigipirate; ‘Le plan Vigipirate ramené au niveay orange’, Communiqués du Premier ministre (7 June 2004): http://www.archives. premier-ministre.gouv.fr/raffarin_version1/fr/txt/contenu/44264.htm Jean-Luc Marret, ‘L’organisation de la lutte antiterroriste en France’, Commentaires et forum, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 17 September 2001, www.frstrategie. org/version_fr/bandeau_FRS/archives/commentaires_forum/commentaires_forum71. asp?langue=fr Sources used include the Federation of American Scientists, the French Interior Ministry, and Jane’s Information Group. The Ministries involved include Treasury, Customs, Taxes, Fiscal, External Economic Relations and Judicial Affairs. UNSC, 56th year, 4413th meeting. Groupe d’Etats contre la corruption/DG-I Legal Affairs, Department of Crime Problems, Council of Europe, ‘GRECO Eval II Rep (2004) 5E: Second Evaluation Round’ (2 December 2004): http://www.greco.coe.int/evaluations/cycle2/ GrecoEval2Rep(2004)5E-France.pdf See ‘L’opinion publique’, n. 14. Antoine Blua, ‘Tajikistan: president expands bilateral relations with France’, RFE/RL, Prague, 6 December 2002, www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/12/06122002192626.asp Krzytof de Breza, ‘France okays joint working group on terrorism’, rediff.com, 17 August 2000, www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/17paris.htm Negotiations on 13 others were under way at the time of writing. Air France was the first carrier to install an ‘air marshal’ plan post-9/11, with a security agent on board its first flight to the United States on 14 September 2001 (Paris–Atlanta): www.francetourism.com/update_Vigipirate.asp Biotox forms part of the larger Piratox Plan under Vigipirate. Piratox was established in the early 1990s: www.sante.gouv.fr/htm/dossiers/biotox/

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37. UNSC, ‘Report submitted by France’, p. 15, see n. 7. 38. Such as BAL, Carbomix, Contrathion, Cyanokit and Kelocyanor. 39. Règles fondamentales de sûreté (RFS) No.I.2a (August 1980) and No.I.1.a (September 1992). Source: World Information Service on Energy. 40. La Hague is Europe’s largest nuclear waste reprocessing plant. Il Longue is a military base for nuclear submarines off the Brittany coast in northwest France. Source: The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

2 Germany Tessa Szyszkowitz

This chapter examines the changes in Germany’s counter-terrorist architecture since 2001 in four parts: the first analyses how Germany’s approach to terrorism has evolved from a focus on the domestic terrorist group, the Baader–Meinhof Gang, to international terrorism; the second outlines the legal and institutional reforms since 11 September 2001; the third describes the domestic political response to these changes, and finally, the fourth concludes with a discussion of implications for the future for German counter-terrorism.

From ‘German autumn’ to 11 September The RAF For many years terrorism in Germany has meant the threat from the homegrown terrorist group ‘Rote Armee Fraktion’ (RAF) or, as the group was originally known, the Baader–Meinhof Gang. Founders Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader started their political life during the student revolts of 1968, and soon turned to militant action. Early on in the campaign, the original leadership was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment under severe conditions. In order to free these RAF leaders, the second generation escalated the conflict with state authorities. In October 1977, the RAF kidnapped the Lufthansa plane Landshut. The plane was stormed in Mogadishu and the hostages freed on 13 October. Parallel to this operation, Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the influential president of the employer’s union (Arbeitgeberverband) was kidnapped and eventually killed. The attempt to free the leaders of the RAF was thus unsuccessful: Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and others were found dead in their cells just before the Landshut plane was stormed. This period was later called ‘Deutscher Herbst’ (German autumn). The RAF terrorists continued their struggle, with violent action, until 1998, when the members finally laid down their weapons. 43

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Some analysts have tried to compare the similarities between the German RAF and the Islamist al-Qa’ida network since 11 September, but the differences between the two militant groups seem to be more striking than the similarities. Yet even so, the rhetoric used by both was remarkably similar. In 1985 for example, the RAF wrote, ‘The “war against international terrorism” aims to create a political consensus between the imperialist states for military operations against liberation movements all over the world, and should function as propaganda of the psychological war to be denounced and destroyed.’1 If one adds the word ‘Islamic’ to ‘liberation movement’ the statement could come from al-Qa’ida. One binding element between the German terrorists of the 1970s and those inspired by Osama bin Laden is the Palestinian national movement. The hijacking of the Landshut was coorganised by the RAF and Palestinian terrorists. Three of the latter were killed when Special Forces of ‘Grenzschutzzgruppe 9’ (GSG 9) stormed the plane. The GSG 9, a German border protection unit, was founded after Palestinian Al Fattah militants had attacked and killed Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich 1972. The RAF welcomed the bloodbath in a leaflet, ‘There is nothing to be misunderstood concerning the action of Black September in Munich: They took hostages from a people that want to extinguish their people.’2 But the two movements seem to have – to a certain degree – different reasons for their pro-Palestinian and anti-American resentment, as RAF expert Oliver Tolmein explained. He found that in the case of the RAF a, ‘simplified analysis of National Socialism led to an anti-imperialistic perspective’, while the antiAmerican resentment of Osama bin Laden can more easily be set in the framework of globalisation.3 The long experience with home-grown terrorism was of great help in the fight against Islamist terrorism, argued Manfred Klink, who headed the post9/11 commission ‘Besondere Aufbauorganisation USA’ (special construction organisation USA) in the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA, Federal Criminal Agency). Klink had been dealing with RAF and Islamist terrorism for three decades. He explained, ‘We reactivated the Rasterfahndung, which has been in our drawers for some time now.’4 This means that people with similar backgrounds are being checked on suspicion of being connected to terrorist activity. The second tool used against RAF terrorists is ‘Personenabklärung’, as BKA officials called the observation of people who are suspects, but not under arrest. There are, however, profound differences between the RAF and al-Qa’ida terrorism, explained Klink. The RAF terrorists had one goal: a revolution. As absurd as this goal was for the majority of the population, the RAF still tried to explain their ideas. The victims of their terror attacks needed to fit into a certain enemy picture, because the RAF wanted to gain sympathy among parts of the population. ‘Capitalists’ like Alfred Herrhausen or US generals were such obvious victims. Al-Qa’ida related terrorism seems to be vaguer: ‘An attack on a tourist discotheque in Bali or a synagogue in Tunisia filled

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with German tourists would never have been a useful target for RAF,’ said Klink. The RAF terrorists always sent long and detailed letters (Bekennerschreiben), in which they took responsibility for their action. These documents gave clues and made it easier to guess who the next victim would be, and even who seemed to have been found in an issue of ‘Who-is-who-in-Germany’. Al-Qa’ida’s potential victims and goals are much less defined and therefore, said Manfred Klink, ‘we look less at potential victims then at culprit groups’. Although the country prevailed over this home-grown terrorist threat, the past still haunts Germany. It might only be an isolated case, but there has even been a connection between a former RAF activist turned right-wing extremist with an Islamist group in Germany. Horst Mahler was a member of the RAF in the 1970s, with explicit sympathies for Palestinian terrorists. He turned to the ultra-right later and became the lawyer of the right extremist party NPD. On 27 October 2002 Horst Mahler chaired a meeting in Berlin organised by the publication Explizit, a magazine that security sources consider to be the mouthpiece of the Islamist organisation ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’ (‘Islamic Liberation Party’). Security service sources describe the group as ‘a dangerous, secretively working and highly capable organisation’. When agents searched 27 apartments of members of ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’ on 12 November 2002 for evidence, they found propaganda material, money and chemicals. At the Berlin meeting with Explizit fans and NDP followers in a university cafeteria, common ground between the Muslim fanatics and the ultra-right Germans was found in their anti-Americanism. Commenting on the possible war against Iraq, Mahler’s companion Udo Voigt, the leader of the NPD, said to the crowd: ‘When the big confrontation starts, the national German right will not be standing on the side of America.’5 Such a pairing appears on the surface highly unlikely and indeed ironical because the racist views of the NDP should prevent them from supporting a non-white, non-European organisation. ‘Sleepers’ A year after 11 September Interior Minister Manfred Schily called Germany part of the Gefahrenraum (danger zone). The former lawyer for the RAF remarked, ‘Abstractly speaking, some institutions are always in danger.’6 Less abstractly speaking, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s deputy, gave an interview to the TV station al Jazeera, on 8 October 2002, in which he said, ‘The Mujahadeen youth sent a message to Germany and one to France. Should the doses not have been strong enough, we will – with the help of Allah – send a stronger one.’7 The Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the federal bureau of criminal investigation, sent alarm messages to all police stations. This was Germany’s first direct threat from al-Qa’ida. This threat came as a surprise, as it was generally assumed that Germany was not in acute danger as a site for terrorist attacks. Islamist groups preferred

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to use Germany as a ‘preparation zone’8 for its sleepers. ‘One reason why Germans do not have foreign terrorism in their cities is that the terrorists passing through on their student visas and business visas have not been willing to risk that protection by blowing up something here,’ wrote Jane Kramer. 9 In fact, Islamist violence in Germany was directed mostly against other Islamist groups or members of the opposition of Middle East dictatorships. ‘There were attacks within the Turkish scene in Germany or the Iranian regime killing members of the Iranian opposition’, explained Ernst Uhrlau, head of the counter-terrorism task force in the prime minister’s office in Berlin, ‘in that sense it is true: the attacks have not been directed against Germans as such’.10 Even recent attacks planned – but until now never carried out – inside Germany were directed against Israeli or US institutions. Uhrlau added: ‘The fact that we did not have civilian victims since 11 September in Germany does not mean there weren’t any plans for such attacks.’

The three pillars of Islamist terrorism At the start of 2004, 182 judicial inquiries against Islamist suspects were under way. Of these, 70 were conducted under the jurisdiction of the BKA, which, since 11 September, had been following 25,600 leads. German security services speak of ‘three pillars of terrorist groups’, as Manfred Klink, counter-terrorism expert of BKA, explained.11 The first pillar The first pillar includes the al-Qa’ida cells whose members are recruited and trained for Osama bin Laden’s plans. Directly after 11 September the cell around the World Trade Centre pilot Mohammed Atta in Hamburg – or what was left of it – was taken out. Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Said Bahaji and Ziad Jarrah had lived in a flat in Marienstraße 54 in Hamburg. In the first verdict of an 11 September conspirator, the Moroccan citizen Mounir al Motassadeq was sentenced in February 2003 to 15 years for conspiring to terrorist action. The verdict was revised and Motassadeq was set free in April 2004. This happened after another terrorist suspect, Abdelghani Mzoudi, had been acquitted due to lack of evidence and was released on 4 February 2004, because the United States did not allow the German court to use information obtained during the interrogation of key witnesses. Motassadeq’s trial was reopened in August 2004 in Hamburg. It is still unclear if the US authorities will allow the use of their evidence, though it appears more likely that they will. Ramzi Binalshibh, another central figure of Atta’s group, was arrested in Pakistan by the Pakistani security service ISI, the CIA and the FBI in September 2002, after he had boasted in an interview with the independent Arab TV station al Jazeera to be responsible for the 11 September attacks. Binalshibh’s arrest and al Motassadeq’s release has added to the tension in German–US relations as will be discussed later in this chapter.

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Mohammed Haydar Zammar, another suspect of Atta’s group, was kidnapped by Syrian agents in Morocco in 2001 and transferred to Damascus. Zammar told his Syrian interrogators that he and his Islamist conspirators had planned an attack on the US general consulate in Hamburg, but dropped the plan after they realised it would be too much of a security risk for the attackers. According to one of the security officials, Zammar’s kidnapping is the reason why some of the Islamist suspects in Germany remain in the country, albeit under surveillance. A trip to Morocco or elsewhere might inadvertently put them in the hands of a hostile regime that may want to show compliance with the United States in the war against terrorism by arresting, torturing or kidnapping suspects. A network of Mujahadeen was also discovered during a raid in April 2002. Eleven members of Palestinian and Jordanian origin apparently formed the German cell of the Islamist group Al Taweed. Federal advocate general Kay Nehm remarked in an interview, ‘The group had serious plans for an operation in Germany.’12 A trial against a member, Shadi Abdallah, was opened in June 2003 in Düsseldorf. The second pillar According to BKA sources, the second pillar of terrorist structure consists of ‘non-aligned Mujahadeen’ groups such as the ‘Meliani Group’, which was the only cell caught before 11 September. Four of its members were sentenced to prison terms of up to 12 years in March 2003. Although trained in Afghanistan, these Mujahadeen are rather independent. At the end of 2000 a terrorist cell was discovered in Frankfurt, whose members are of Algerian origin. They had planned an attack on the Christmas market in Strasbourg. Although members of the group claimed later in their trial that they did not want to harm people, but attempted only to desecrate a synagogue, a counterterrorism official in Berlin said sarcastically: ‘You don’t need nails for that purpose, do you?’ The third pillar The third pillar of terrorist groups is generally classified as ‘jihad groups with the goal to overthrow the government of a certain country and to replace it with an Islamist state’, for example, the GIA in Algeria or jihad Islami in Egypt. The BKA tracks groups that have been operating to achieve a regime change in their home countries, such as the followers of the ‘Caliph of Cologne’, Metin Kaplan. The ‘caliphate’ in Cologne was founded by Metin’s father, Cemettin. In November 2001 a German court sentenced Kaplan to four years in prison for incitement. Metin Kaplan had called for the murder of his rival, the ‘Caliph of Berlin’, Halil Ibrahim Sofu, in 1996. Unknown assailants shot Sofu dead in May 1997. Kaplan was released in Spring 2003 and has since then been trying to avoid being extradited to Turkey. On 12 October 2004, he

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was extradited to Turkey after a long legal battle. Minister Schily took the opportunity of the EU Commission decision to recommend accession negotiations with Turkey in order to allow Kaplan to be extradited, because if Turkey became a member, Kaplan would not be facing torture when he returned. As the ‘Caliph of Cologne’ was busy building up an Islamic state within the secular republic of Germany and at the same time trying to achieve an Islamic change of regime in Turkey, Kaplan’s group would have been best described as being part of the third pillar of terrorist structure. Most of the violent action was directed against the state of Turkey. A spectacular plan failed in 1998: during the celebrations of the 75th commemoration of the foundation of modern Turkey the attackers wanted to fly a sport plane into Attatürk’s Mausoleum. Recently, however, the categorisation of being ‘a jihad group with a national attitude’, without a connection to al-Qa’ida, may no longer be viable. On 2 October 2002, a spokeswoman at the federal attorney’s office in Karlsruhe claimed that Kaplan’s organisation had been engaged in negotiations in 1996 and 1997 about closer cooperation with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Although German security services were watching the development of groups such as Kaplan’s ‘caliphate’ closely, they did not take comprehensive measures to stop their activities. Germany’s hands were bound by an almost ironic fact: Germany refused to extradite Kaplan to Turkey, because the Turkish authorities could not guarantee that Kaplan would not be sentenced to death. Germany therefore granted Kaplan asylum in 1992 because he would otherwise have faced the death penalty at home. In order to fulfil the European Union’s human rights criteria, Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002.

Legal and institutional reforms The embarrassment of the German government and security services, when it found out only hours after the attacks in New York and Washington, that Germany had housed four of the terrorists for years without sensing the danger, forced the government into swift action. Germany had already signed the relevant UN conventions on counter-terrorism prior to 11 September. The Convention for the Suppression of Financing for Terrorism was signed on 7 July 2000. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was signed by the government on 28 January 1998, but only voted for in the Upper House of the Parliament on 12 July 2002. The mirroring of UN standards for the fight against terrorism had not been a high priority for the government in Berlin, because most of the content of the conventions had already been laid down in German law during the fight against RAF terrorism.

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To demonstrate to the German public and international partners after 11 September that the government in Berlin meant serious business, Interior Minister Otto Schily introduced two ‘security packages’, the so-called ‘Otto Catalogues’. The amendments to already existing laws were hotly disputed in parliament and on the streets. One of the proposed measures is biometric identification through fingerprints in German passports. Foreigners already have their fingerprints taken and included in visa forms and on identity cards. As the United States will not allow EU citizens to enter America without biometric identification after October 2005, EU ministers agreed in June 2004 to include biometric identification in passports, although fingerprints are still an optional measure. Schily managed to complete the first part of the ‘Otto Catalogue’ as early as 30 November 2001, when the parliament agreed to it. It included the strengthening of the laws of societies and groups, and security measures. The second ‘security package’ was completed by December 2002. The amended counter-terrorism paragraph 129a was originally enacted in 1976 and directed against German leftist terrorist groups. The new Paragraph 129b allows the authorities to prosecute foreign organisations as well as sympathisers and members of foreign terror organisations in Germany. Since January 2002, 17 laws concerning the strengthened competence of the BKA have been introduced and the laws for (or against) foreigners toughened. Several existing laws have also been amended. For example, the Act on the Protection of the Constitution now permits the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, ‘Verfassungsschutz’, to collect information on suspected persons through bank accounts, postal services, air traffic organisations and telecommunications. The Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz) was changed. It is now easier to deny visas for those suspected of endangering the democratic basis of Germany. The Organisation Law (Vereinsgesetz) lost its ‘religion privilege’, which removed legal loopholes for some extremist groups. Anti-money laundering legislation was a high priority as well. Two years after the introduction of these measures and amendments, some of them have not proven to be successful – freezing of financial assets, for example, had a very limited effect everywhere in Europe. The German Economic Ministry understandably does not like to talk about the amount of frozen money collected thus far, reputed to be a mere €4,935.75.13 Other measures have been viewed by human rights groups as endangering the democratic and transparent basis of Germany. ‘Domestic and foreign security activity have been brought together with the consequence that police and military measures for the fight against an enemy have become more and more intertwined. The change from a “state of laws” to a “state of measures” became, after 11 September, more and more apparent,’ criticised Oliver Tolmein, an expert on German terrorism.14 Perhaps the biggest flop of Schily’s package has been the ‘Rasterfahndung’, a special screening search for suspects. In one of the federal states,

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Nordrhein-Westphalen, five million people were screened, mainly students and asylum-seekers from Arab or African states. Of the millions checked throughout Germany, the BKA considered 95,271 as suspects, of which 30,960 were living in Nordrhein-Westphalen alone. After re-checking all the suspects, the officials came up with a clear figure: There were no al-Qa’ida activists to be found at all. ‘A huge effort for nothing,’15 said Erhard Denninger, an expert in constitutional law. Another amendment could prove very useful, security sources say. On the basis of the new paragraph 129b of Germany’s criminal law, radicals who support international organisations such as al-Qa’ida can be sentenced to long prison terms. If they are sentenced to at least three years, they can be deported. Federal General Advocator Karl Nehm has already opened 20 investigations based on this paragraph. Prior to 11 September he had twice turned down the request to investigate al-Qa’ida in Germany, namely the Hamburg cell of Mohammed Atta. Nehm had to refuse, because the legal framework did not allow it.

Institutional reforms: security services Financial aspects The counter-terrorism packages had financial implications for the security services. The agencies dealing with counter-terrorism had their budget increased by €350 million in 2002, which meant 2,320 additional positions for the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BKA), the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), the Federal Border Guard and the Federal Bureau for Information Security. The BKA created an additional 244 posts for security of persons, investigation/ analysis/evaluation, the technical-scientific area and Europol. Criminal Techniques, communication and logistics will be strengthened in addition to a Central Bureau for Money Laundering. The office for Verfassungsschutz received €10 million for strengthening its observation of terrorist activities in the areas of alien extremism, Federal terrorism and proliferation. For the implementation of the ‘Otto Catalogues’, an additional budget of €274.5 million was earmarked for 2003. De-centralised security services What makes Germany’s counter-terrorism situation even more complicated is a legacy from World War II, and from the post-war period. In order to crush the central power of Berlin, the Allied forces decided to split up the security agencies not only into different organisations, but also in different cities. To organise a meeting between the heads of these agencies, they must travel across Germany. The delivery of classified information that cannot be sent by e-mail is delayed due to long distances. The federal criminal agency,

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the BKA (the police component of what in the United States would be the FBI), is situated today in three locations: in Wiesbaden, in Meckenheim near Bonn, and in Berlin. The Verfassungsschutz, the intelligence component of the same organisation, is located in Cologne. The German version of the CIA, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), is based in Munich. The General Federal Attorney’s office is in Karlsruhe, while other offices, such as the border police (Bundesgrenzschutz) or military intelligence (Militärischer Abschirmdienst) are again found in altogether different locations. In addition to the natural constraints of the highly decentralised security and intelligence services, there is a further difficulty in that these organisations have different command structures at the provincial level (there are 16 provinces) and at the federal government level in Berlin. German officials seem not to mind this rather complicated structure. It gives each bureau a certain level of autonomy: ‘It was the purpose of the Allies after the war to decentralise the services,’ said Manfred Klink, head of the counter-terrorism department in BKA in Meckenheim. This small town lies outside Bonn, where the Federal government and the parliament were situated until 1999. Ministers and deputies are long gone. Yet the agents, who were supposed to protect them, have stayed behind. Klink added, ‘I don’t think this should be changed. But the close cooperation between the Services is now more necessary then ever.’16 In February 2004 the head of the BKA, Ulrich Kersten, had to resign due to the ongoing fight about his institution moving to Berlin or staying in Meckenheim. For the time being BKA will stay in nowhere-land near the former government city of Bonn. The establishment of a ‘Ministry for Security’ is still not popular in any of the parliamentary parties, as the conservative politician Eckhart Werthebach assessed in a paper he wrote for the Bertelsmann Foundation. The former interior minister of the city of Berlin himself put forward a proposal to establish a security adviser for the federal government: ‘He would be coordinator of the security services . . . and he would establish a data bank on Islamist terrorism.’17 The coordinator of the secret services in the German Chancellery is Ernst Uhrlau. Even the simple exchange of information between the different services in Germany is difficult to organise because of the complicated structure. The various agencies display behaviour typical to large bureaucracies, such as protecting turf, especially when it comes to sharing secret information. Uhrlau remarked that the situation was facilitated because ‘Information boards’ were established prior to 9/11 after the capture of the ‘Meliani group’.18 Questions concerning data protection – an issue dear to the Germans – were answered to the satisfaction of the cautious internal services. For example, the interior security service BND queried how sources could be protected if names were given to the BKA, which has to prosecute in case of evidence of crime. These problems were solved internally, said Manfred Klink of BKA, ‘Information provided by the BND can only be put into BKA files if they agree.’19

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Institutional reforms: the army Financial aspects The Federal Army ‘Bundeswehr’ got a financial boost of €1.5 billion from the first anti-terror package. The army was supposed to be transformed to react more flexibly to new conflict scenarios. Federal soldiers were supposed to guard sensitive spots like nuclear facilities. The funds also were earmarked for special international missions. Although Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the Green’s pragmatic front man, had lobbied hard for German participation in international peace-enforcement missions under UN resolutions, some of his party members from Germany’s old pacifistic left followed his call only reluctantly. The parliament voted on 16 November 2001 to allow up to 3,900 soldiers to take part in ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. Based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, Article 5 of the NATO Charter and UN resolutions 1368 and 1373, troops were also stationed in Kuwait (NBC defence forces), Djibouti (naval forces) and Kenya (naval reconnaissance). These deployments cost €500 million in 2002. Germany also provided extra funds for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Reform of the Bundeswehr The German armed forces are one of the most old-fashioned armies in Europe. Germany still has a draft system with an alternative civilian service. This huge standing army is a legacy from the cold war, when the main threat was perceived to come from the Soviet Union and the response was likely to be a land war fought man-to-man. The modernisation of the army has been a clear aim of the leftist government in Berlin for years in order to respond better to new strategic threats, such as international terrorism, to engage in NATO or EU-led peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and – not the last priority for the green–red coalition in Berlin – to streamline and reduce the costs of the Bundeswehr. Berlin even had difficulties sending its troops to Afghanistan in winter 2001/2002, because it did not have the right transport planes on hand. Defence Minister Peter Struck presented his reform plans on 13 January 2004 in Berlin. He predicted that the army in the future would deploy armed missions for conflict prevention, crisis management – including the fight against terrorism – as well as in support of alliance partners and for homeland security. In order to achieve this, a post-reform structure of 35,000 soldiers for NATO missions and EU operations would be established. A stabilisation force of 70,000 soldiers for peacekeeping missions was also foreseen. An additional 137,500 soldiers were planned for a general support force to ensure basic training needs. Struck hoped to be able to close 100 army bases and to cut costs in terms of arms procurement. This, he said, would not apply to a transatlantic

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cooperation project called Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS). Similarly, the German order of 180 Eurofighters would not be reduced. The draft system would be retained with a service of nine months. The training of the drafted military personnel would be adapted to the changed nature of tasks. In November 2004, the parliament approved an additional €114 million for future counter-terrorist operations for the army.

The political response Assimilation versus integration The shock of 11 September had a profound affect in Germany. Four of the eleven terrorists had worked or studied for years in Germany. Germans today consider themselves tolerant, more tolerant perhaps than most other Europeans, and this is due to a simple fact: almost sixty years after World War II, the past still haunts Germany. Germans do not want to be judged as racist again. The ideological foundation of post-war Germany has therefore been an over-riding commitment to respecting others. Until only recently, asylum seekers have had a better chance of getting asylum status granted in Germany than anywhere else in the European Union. Many of the Turkish minority,20 who were invited to Germany in the 1970s as cheap labourers and decided to stay, have been treated with relative generosity. Only after the reunification of Germany and the somewhat dramatic blending of two separate German cultures did racist incidents take place on a larger scale. At the beginning of the 1990s (mostly) East German skinheads burned down asylum seekers’ homes, finding scapegoats for their own misery in immigrants who were living in even more miserable conditions. Earlier, in the 1980s, Germans had instigated an emotional debate about how to treat the Turkish minority. The conservative, Christian democratic part of society wanted the Muslim Turks to assimilate. The left of the political spectrum argued against assimilation and for integration. This multicultural approach created a problem. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the most outspoken members of the leftist scene in Frankfurt mused after 11 September, ‘We were hiding behind our shield of tolerance and forgot to discuss what influence radical preaching in the Mosques in Germany could have on the understanding of human rights – women’s rights or “non-believers” rights alike.’21 A senior European official in Brussels also thinks Germans should have asked some questions earlier, remarking, ‘The Germans always called the cheap workers from Turkey Gastarbeiter. By now there are already millions of secondgeneration “guest workers”. It is a little late to start the debate about being an immigrant country now, when already seven million Turks live in Germany.’ Spies – no thank you Another reason why counter-terrorism in Germany had not been viewed as a high priority before 11 September was the German dislike for security

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services. After the experience of the Gestapo during World War II and the East German communist security service Stasi in the decades following the war, Germans preferred to live in a ‘spy-free’ environment. Although Bundesnachrichtendienst – that is, the German version of the CIA – and Verfassungsschutz – that is, comparable in some respects to the FBI – had a rough idea of the radical Islamist sermons in some Mosques in German cities, they were not too alarmed about the consequences of these prayers and of gatherings of extremist groups. Even if they had been, they would not have been able to get strong support for preventative counter-terrorist action. Even after 11 September resistance against tougher laws on immigration and enlarged competence for security services in public and parliament remained high.

International political response: ‘the German way’ The case of the suspected terrorist Ramzi Binalshibh is a good example of the latest tension between EU states and the United States. Binalshibh, believed to be one of the central figures in Mohammed Atta’s terrorist group, was caught in September 2002. As mentioned, he had boasted in an interview with al Jazeera that he was responsible for the 11 September attacks. Germany was the first to issue an international arrest warrant for Binalshibh, who lived in Germany until just a few days before 11 September. Normally he would have been extradited from Pakistan to Germany after his arrest. But German Interior Minister Otto Schily said immediately after the arrest, ‘Germany will stand back in this case. After all it was America that was attacked.’22 There was a reason for the unusually humble behaviour of Mr Schily: Germany was happy not to welcome the suspected terrorist on German soil. If Binalshibh had been sent to Germany first, the authorities could not have handed the suspected terrorist over to American judges at a later stage. German Basic Law forbids the extradition of a suspect who faces capital punishment in the country of penalty. After World War II capital punishment became unpopular in most parts of Europe. Germany is torn between the legacy of the racist Nazi past and the requirements of the fight against terrorism in the world of modern Islamists. Not having to receive Binalshibh personally in Germany was therefore a relief for the authorities. The Yemeni citizen was thus brought to the United States for interrogation, straight from Pakistan. The secret protocols of Binalshibh’s interrogation are the subject of a legal battle in another trial in Germany. The defence lawyer of Mounir al Motassadeq wanted to use these protocols in order to prove the innocence of his client. But the US authorities refused to hand over the protocols to the court. Motassadeq was still sentenced to 15 years in prison in February 2003. In the second court case against a suspect of the Hamburg cell, Abdelghani Mzoudi, the judges came to a different conclusion on 4 February 2004. As they could not use the withheld protocols of Binalshibh’s interrogation they found they did not have enough to prove his involvement in the 11 September

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conspiracy. Mzoudi was set free, and subsequently, so was Motassadeq, who was then retried in Hamburg in August 2004. At the time of writing, his case was still pending. ‘I find this conduct of the United States incomprehensible,’ Kay Nehm, the German chief federal prosecutor was reported to have said after Mzoudi’s acquittal.23 Germany also had to solve constitutional problems concerning the 11 September suspects. The United States wanted to enrich the trial against Binalshibh with original documents from Germany. If Berlin provided the required documents and Binalshibh was sentenced to death, Germans feared the same constitutional problem as if the German state had sent Binalshibh personally to an American death chamber. There was a similar debate about evidence against Zachariah Moussaoui, the alleged 20th hijacker. He twice received money from Hamburg and was arrested before he could board a plane either on 11 September or in a planned second stage of attacks. The receipts, signed by Ramzi Binalshibh, were in Germany. The US justice ministry asked for the evidence. If this trial ended with the death penalty for Moussaoui, Germany would again run into conflict with its constitution. But as a senior adviser of Gerhard Schröder ironically explained in autumn 2002, ‘Legally we will find a way to bypass moral problems.’24 And sure enough, the Germans complied with the American request. The former German Justice Minister, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, asked in September 2002 for a guarantee that the material would not be used as the basis for the death penalty. In November this guarantee was given with a declaration by the US government, and considered sufficient by Gmelin’s successor Brigitte Zypries. Some legal experts claimed the guarantee was not even necessary, as for years German courts have only been strict with extradition of people, not of evidence that could lead to a death penalty. In 1985 the courts in Cologne and Stuttgart ruled that such evidence can be transmitted, but people cannot. The court in Karlsruhe followed this ruling in 1990. It was not because of these legal debates that US–German relations deteriorated during late summer 2002. It was the German refusal to go to war against Saddam Hussein that annoyed the Bush administration. The Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder was campaigning for the re-election of his coalition government with the pacifist Green Party of Joschka Fischer. Capitalising on the anti-war mood in the country he emphatically promised that Germany would under no circumstances take part in a military campaign against Iraq. Washington was not amused by the news from Berlin. Things only deteriorated when the then Minister of Justice Herta Däubler-Gmelin compared Bush’s strategy of diverting attention from internal problems to external matters to Hitler’s military campaign tactics. Prime Minister Gerhard Schröder sacked Gmelin for her historically incorrect remarks after his narrow victory in the elections on 22 September. Schröder also apologised to Bush in a personal letter (‘Dear George’).

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But the damage to US–German relations was already done. The ‘German way’ – the flat refusal to discuss military engagement against Iraq – also irritated several European capitals, especially London. Some European Union politicians also thought it unwise: ‘If we do not try to find a compromise with the American administration on how to deal with Saddam Hussein, we cannot complain later about Washington going at it alone,’ criticised Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for Foreign Relations.25 But the leftist German government stuck to its position even after the election was won. This came as an even bigger surprise to the American administration as the initial ‘traitorous’ behaviour could only have been explained by election campaigning. ‘We do have a threat after 11 September and the Germans not only do not give us moral support, they will maybe even hinder our military plans: that is shocking,’26 said Jeffrey Gedmin, head of the Aspen Institute in Berlin.

Conclusions Germany has had experience in counter-terrorism for decades due to the home-grown leftist extremist group Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), whose terrorist attacks kept Germany’s security forces busy from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s. After 11 September the counter-terrorism experts from the Federal Criminal Agency (BKA) resumed work from where they had stopped after the RAF had laid down its arms in 1998. That in itself was an embarrassment to security services and the federal government, because Germany had in the meantime developed into a haven for Islamist activists-in-waiting, so called ‘sleepers’. It was not just that the security services did not watch the development of the Islamic radical scene in Germany, but also that the imminent danger was not recognised by the political establishment and by German society itself. There were several reasons for this. Germany’s post-World War II credo has been tolerance towards others. Germany took in more asylum seekers and immigrant workers than many other European countries over the decades. Cultural differences were not overlooked, but tolerated more or less. To look too deeply into the affairs of minorities and their religious preaching was considered obstructive and unnecessary. Another legacy of Germany’s history, the experience with overactive secret services, namely the Gestapo during the Third Reich and the Stasi in East Germany, led to a profound mistrust by the population towards secret services, their agents and the results of their work. To get public support for stricter laws on visas, immigration or surveillance policies was difficult prior to 11 September. The Allied forces also inadvertently interfered with the work of the security agencies back in 1945 by ensuring that power remained very decentralised

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in Germany. The central power of Berlin was broken, the government was moved to Bonn, and the security services and other law institutions were deployed all over the country. Accordingly, communication between the different agencies has remained problematic. To show its unconditional support after 11 September the German government poured special funds into its security services. Otto Schily, the Minister of the Interior, was delighted to introduce two packages with law amendments to strengthen the security services and to toughen immigration laws. Some of these laws, such as the freezing of assets or German specialties like ‘Rasterfahndung’ (computerised data screening of special suspect groups), have not been proven to be successful. Others, such as the amendment of the counter-terrorism paragraph 129a, have been helpful in the fight against terrorism. Supporters of foreign terrorist organisations can now be brought to trial in Germany. Since 1945 Germany was in many respects a buffer zone between the cold war champions, the United States and the former Soviet Union. This era was brought to an end on 11 September. The enemy of the twenty-first century is not a state; the enemy is a super-empowered individual – Osama bin Laden – with no kingdom, and his team of transnational terrorists. For German society this meant accepting responsibility as Europe’s biggest nation and returning as a key player to the world stage, even including military engagements to keep or enforce peace abroad. The debate about ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan was a continuation of the Kosovo campaign debate in 1999. For the German army this discussion finally led to the modernisation of its strategy, troops and equipment in 2004. This reform has been long overdue, since Germany maintained a large army directed primarily towards a land war to the East. German federal troops will engage in EU missions, with specialised troops on limited EU missions, and therefore it needs to be flexible. Finally, relations between Germany and the United States were rocky due to the refusal of Berlin to follow Washington’s lead on Iraq. Relations were somewhat mended after a rough spring and summer in 2003, when interEuropean squabbling about Saddam Hussein’s fate further strained transatlantic and EU relations. The Iraq campaign at least demonstrated one important point: most German Social Democrats and Greens have – like many other Europeans of the post-war generation – a different attitude towards counter-terrorism than the United States. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer did not believe a war against Iraq had much to do with the fight against terrorism. On the contrary, he stated, ‘We have to strengthen those forces in the Islamic-Arab world, which seek a connection of Islam and modernity. That is one of the main reasons, why we opposed the war in Iraq.’ And he added: ‘I never felt so sorry about having been right with a warning.’27

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Notes and references 1. RAF folder after the attack on the Rhine-Main-Air-Base, 8 August 1985, quoted in Oliver Tolmein, Vom Deutschen Herbst zum 11. September (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 2002), p. 175. 2. Tolmein, p. 36. 3. Tolmein, p. 15. 4. Author interview with Manfred Klink, Meckenheim, 4 November 2002. 5. Cited in Der Spiegel, Nr. 47/2002, accessed on the web. 6. Otto Schily press conference, 4 September 2002. 7. Interview with Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Jazeera, 19 August 2002. 8. ‘Vorbereitungsraum’, as a member of BKA puts it. 9. Jane Kramer, ‘Private lives’, The New Yorker, 11 February 2002, accessed on the web. 10. Author interview with Ernst Uhrlau, 18 October 2002, Berlin. 11. Author interview with Manfred Klink, Meckenheim, 4 November 2002. 12. ARD German television, 23 April 2002. 13. ‘Mit der Schrotflinte’, Der Spiegel, 26 May 2003, 22/2003, accessed on the web. 14. Tolmein, p. 105, see n. 1. 15. ‘Mit der Schrotflinte’, Der Spiegel, as n. 13. 16. Author interview with Klink. 17. ‘Werthebach, Eckhart, Gutachten, Idealtypische Organisation innerer und äußerer Sicherheit’, Bertelsmann-Stiftung, June 2002, Berlin. 18. Author interview with Uhrlau. 19. Author interview with Klink. 20. Approximately seven million Turks live in Germany, of a total population of 88 million people. 21. Author interview with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Brussels, 16 September 2001. 22. Otto Schily, interview on TV station ZDF, 15 September 2002. 23. Cited in International Herald Tribune, 7 February 2004. 24. Author interview, 18 October 2002, Berlin. 25. Author interview with Christopher Patten, Brussels, 9 November 2002. 26. Jeffrey Gedmin, ‘Angst vor einer Eiszeit’, interview in Der Spiegel, Nr. 40, 30 September 2002. 27. Joschka Fischer, interview in Bild newspaper, 12 September 2004.

3 Greece Thanos Dokos

Since 11 September 2001, the US-led war against international terrorism has become a central element of global politics. On the basis of capabilities, Greece may not be considered a major player in the counter-terrorist effort. Yet for four significant reasons, Greece has assumed greater importance in this campaign: 1) Greece is situated in the EU’s southern ‘soft underbelly’, and is therefore geographically exposed to illegal immigration, mostly from the Balkans, but also from the South and the Muslim world, and to transnational organised crime; 2) Greece enjoys excellent relations with the Arab world, but is also rapidly improving its relations with Israel; 3) in August 2004, it successfully hosted the Olympic Games without incident, despite the worries of a number of security analysts; and 4) Greece had a rather sloppy anti-terrorist record for several decades, but in the past few years it has made significant improvements. Like all countries in the world today, Greece still needs to improve its domestic response, particularly in terms of training, equipment, and information-sharing on issues such as money-laundering, cyber-terrorism and cyber-crime, and prevention and consequence management of NBC terrorist attacks. This chapter discusses the changes that have taken place in Greece in the three years since 11 September 2001 in three parts: it first outlines the recent history of terrorism in Greece, then provides an audit of capabilities of military and security assets, including special forces, police, and other trained counterterrorist forces, and concludes with recommendations for further enhancing Greece’s counter-terrorism capabilities. After 9/11, Greece was shocked and deeply saddened by the terrorist attack against the United States and the extremely high number of casualties, which included a number of American citizens of Greek origin. The predominant view in Greece was that this was not a clash of civilizations, of the West against Islam, but rather a war of the civilised world, which included many Muslim countries and the great majority of Muslim people, against the fanatics and the zealots who follow Osama bin-Laden and al-Qa’ida. Since then, Greek officials have been re-assessing their security priorities. While relations with Turkey remain the 59

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highest priority for Greek security planners, followed by concerns about fluidity and instability in the Balkans, a number of so-called ‘new asymmetric threats’ of a transnational nature have been added to the list of actual or potential threats, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, theatre and ‘national’ missile defence, terrorism (both conventional and new forms: NBC and cyber-terrorism),1 transnational organised crime, with special emphasis on drug and human trafficking, religious extremism and illegal migration.2 More specifically on the issue of international terrorism, Greece, along with a number of European countries, has demonstrated a certain sensitivity regarding the definition of terrorism. This is due to a considerable extent to its sympathy towards the PKK,3 which it considered to be a guerrilla movement and not a terrorist organisation, although Greece recognised that the PKK frequently used ‘terrorist methods’ to achieve its goals. In addition, Greece’s Arab ties and pro-Arab stance on the Palestinian conflict, especially in the 1980s, made it reluctant to agree to a definition of terrorism that would classify the PLO as a terrorist group. Since the end of the twentieth century, as Greece has moved considerably closer to the core of European integration, both politically and economically, its views and positions on a number of foreign policy and security issues have converged considerably with those of its EU partners. During this period Greece also normalised relations with Israel and considerably improved its relations with Turkey. Terrorism was a main issue where Greek, NATO and EU positions converged. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks had a rather dramatic impact on Greek foreign policy and on the security elites, although not for the average Greek citizen, where the feelings of sadness over the loss of innocent lives was much stronger than any concern about terrorist attacks against Greece. Recognising that Greece could be a potential target either because of its membership in NATO and the EU, or during the Athens 2004 Olympic Games (the highest publicity event at a global level), or even be used as a transit point for other European targets, Greek officials joined forces with western counterparts in an effort to respond to the emerging terrorist threat. As will be explained below, Greece’s contribution had political, military, intelligence, police and judicial dimensions.

Structure, role and capabilities of Greek security services Police Greece suffered the catastrophic political, economic and social impact of a civil war between 1946 and 1949. As a result, the police was, for over three decades, more of a tool for the close surveillance and occasional oppression of rival political ideologies rather than an institution for maintaining public order.

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An extensive reform programme was necessary after the restoration of democratic rule in 1974. As a result of its past record, the police’s image in the eyes of Greek public opinion has only recently begun to be restored and its popularity has been slowly increasing. The 42,000-strong Hellenic Police has primary responsibility for counterterrorist activities. The police has a counter-terrorist branch with approximately 280 officers, which had been plagued by problems for several years, but only recently its efficiency and level of professionalism have considerably improved – an assessment shared by American and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Although its focus had been on domestic terrorism, after the breakup of ‘November 17’ and the Athens 2004 Olympic Games, its focus shifted to international terrorism. The police also has a 250-strong ‘special operations’ unit, which has had a limited specialised counter-terrorist role, but went through intensive retraining in preparation for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. They work with a new 2,500-strong Special Guards force, who guard public buildings and historic sites, and a Border Guards force of 4,500, with five new helicopters. More than 10 million euros have been spent in the last three years in modernising laboratories and other equipment. Greece is placing considerable emphasis on international police cooperation. The Directorate for International Police Cooperation, with a staff of 273, is linked to the European Information System. There is a National Bureau for the Exchange of Information, which covers Interpol, Europol and Schengen. Since Europol’s establishment in 1994 Greece has been an active member and participant in the agency’s joint task forces. There are also four liaison officers in Europol’s headquarters in The Hague and four Greek officers among the 400-strong permanent personnel. There are also two liaison officers at Interpol’s headquarters. Finally, Greece is participating in the ‘Bureau Liaison pour Terrorisme’ (the successor of the ‘Trevi’ Group), which is functioning in the context of the EU. It should also be noted that there is bilateral cooperation with neighbouring countries, with a total of 34 liaison officers in Tirana, Sofia, Bucharest and Nicosia, and new liaison offices planned for Moscow, Kiev and Beirut (with another eight officers serving in these new posts). National Intelligence Agency Greece’s intelligence agency played a similar role to the police as a result of both the civil war and subsequently the military dictatorship, spending far more resources on domestic activities rather than the protection of Greece’s national security from threats originating abroad. The same process of reform for democratic control, transparency and accountability, described in previous paragraphs for the police and subsequently for the armed forces, has also been necessary. In the 1980s and 1990s, the National Intelligence Agency was an inwardlooking, rather inefficient bureaucracy, exposed to partisan interference. It was

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fairly capable in the collection and assessment of military information, but weak in the ‘civilian’ intelligence sector, for example, concerning terrorism or organised crime. After the Ocalan ‘fiasco’ in March 1999, when the Agency was unable to prevent – despite specific orders from the Prime Minister’s Office – Ocalan’s illegal entry into Greece, the Greek government finally realised that reform was urgently needed in the intelligence sector. An (active) Ambassador was appointed as the new Director, breaking a tradition of appointing only retired military officers. The Agency’s range of responsibilities has recently been expanded to include financial crime, terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration. There will be less emphasis on military information. New Directorates for International Terrorism and Organised Crime and for International Cooperation have also been established. There is increased emphasis on training and an ongoing effort to upgrade existing equipment, although there are serious budgetary constraints: the annual budget is approximately 35 million euros, 90 per cent of which go to personnel expenses. The Agency is reducing the number of military personnel and increasing the number of civilian employees, including the recruitment of highly qualified personnel in various fields, with special emphasis on knowledge of foreign languages. Currently the Agency’s personnel includes 1,200 civilians, 300–350 police officers and 40–50 military officers. An Analyses Centre and Scientific Council are also about to be created. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ‘new spirit’ at the top of the agency will manage to overcome the considerable bureaucratic inertia and transform this agency into a much more efficient mechanism to address the security challenges of the twenty-first century. As for the National Intelligence Agency’s counter-terrorist role, there is a ‘counter-terrorism directorate’ whose activities include intelligence collection, analysis and cooperation with western counterparts. According to Agency sources, no Islamic terrorist cell has been detected so far, but it cannot be completely ruled out that such active or ‘sleeper’ cells operate in Greece. Here, the major problem is that the approximately one million immigrants already residing in the country have not yet been fully registered. The authorities have been focusing on Pakistani, Iraqi and Arab immigrants in general. Immigrants in Greece are first generation, trying to find jobs and become integrated. As a result, the vast majority of them have very limited desire and opportunities to organise or become involved in terrorist networks. At the same time, first-generation immigrants may be more open, or vulnerable, to Islamic fundamentalist teachings and ideologies than established and reasonably integrated second- or third-generation immigrants. Although, of course, young, unemployed, non-integrated people of the latter category are also good candidates for the recruiting officers of Islamic terrorist groups, hence the effort of Greek authorities to monitor activities in (unofficial) mosques to prevent their transformation into recruitment places for extremist groups.

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In terms of potential Islamic terrorist cells in the Balkans, the Agency’s assessment is that there were active groups in the 1990s, especially in BosniaHerzegovina, and strong suspicions about Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYROM, Kosovo, and perhaps Bulgaria. As a result of strong US pressure after 9/11, however, most of these groups are no longer active. Furthermore, it is believed that Albanian nationalism in Kosovo and FYROM is not linked to Islamic extremism, but is funded mainly by the Albanian Diaspora, which has an irredentist ideology and objectives, but does not promote a religious dimension. There has also been improved cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, including the CIA, Israel’s Mossad, and with those in several Arab countries – in the latter case this has been more ‘difficult’ to achieve in the context of the Mediterranean Forum, which is, overall, a rather ‘low speed’ exercise.4 There is also closer cooperation with European organisations in the context of the ‘Club of Bern’, which concentrates on internal security, and the ‘Forum of Madrid’, which focuses on external security. Fire Department The Fire Department will be involved in the case of an NBC terrorist incident. Its role will be mainly in consequence management. The Fire Department is generally considered well organised and trained, efficient, and with considerable experience in fire-fighting, and rescue missions in natural disasters. It has less experience in major industrial accidents, including chemical accidents (see section on NBC protection). Coast Guard The Coast Guard has an elite anti-terrorist platoon of approximately 50 men. In peacetime, the Coast Guard is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Order, although during crises and war, it falls under the operational command/ control of the Ministry of Defence. The Coast Guard has considerable experience in maritime surveillance and also has some experience with terrorist incidents. Other involved agencies General Secretariat for Civil Protection The General Secretariat for Civil Protection (GSCP) is the main coordinating agency for a large number of agencies involved in most types of emergencies, whether they be natural disasters, industrial and technological accidents, largescale road accidents, air or maritime accidents, as well as terrorist incidents. It is also the lead coordinating agency in NBC incidents – whether a result of an accident or terrorist act. Coordination of rescue or consequence management activities is the mission of a Special Task Force, manning a Command Centre, that operates on a 24-hour basis.

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The National Emergency Response Plan (Xenocratis Plan) is being updated and linked with similar EU mechanisms (at a cost of 50 million euros). The GSCP, functioning since 1999, is faced with several problems: lack of personnel (with a current force of 35 out of 100 needed) and of specialised equipment (notably in the field of communications), problems in cooperating with other involved agencies, and internal organisational weaknesses. Although participation in EU disaster-consequence exercises has been considered satisfactory, there has been no involvement in related NATO activities. Athens Olympic Games organising committee’s security plans As mentioned above, there was serious concern about security for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games because such a high-publicity event might have attracted the attention of terrorist groups. Following 11 September 2001, the budget for the Games’ security more than quadrupled in comparison to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The total cost for security exceeded 1.3 billion euros, and the main contract for security software and hardware was awarded to an international consortium of companies led by SAIC International. Because several agencies were involved in security for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games, coordination was critical. The Olympic Games Security Directorate in the police had primary responsibility, committing 30,000 men and women, from a total of 42,000, to this task, whereas the total number of security personnel from all services was more than 90,000 men and women. For the police, 2003 and early 2004 were the years of Olympic Games training. All personnel went through multiple stages of general and specialised training seminars and exercises, depending on their level of involvement in security for the Games. There were over 70 detailed plans for all kinds of emergency scenarios, including the shooting-down of passenger planes (Plan ‘Renegade’) to prevent a repetition of the 11 September attacks. The security ‘project’ included 67 systems: command centres,5 a secure digital trunk radio network, physical security systems such as closed-circuit monitors (CCTV) and access control, automatic vehicle location, geographic information system (GIS), decision support applications and Standard Olympic Security Data Network (OSDN) connecting security agencies and locations, plus other sensitive capabilities. Those systems provided information and capabilities to enhance the ability of security commanders to observe security operations, have immediate access to developments and the ability to make timely and effective decisions for multiple incidents at the same time, while communicating those decisions to subordinate commands, personnel and agencies.6 Among other security preparations and improvements, there was an upgrading of the computer network of the Ministry of Public Order, extra security measures in airports and ports, and upgrading of the Operational Headquarters of the Fire Department and the Coast Guard. Also, a very detailed digital map of Athens allowed security officials to simulate any emergency and respond almost immediately.

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There was increased emphasis on international cooperation. Greece cooperated with the Olympic Advisory Group (OAG), along with seven countries with considerable experience in security matters: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, France, Spain and Israel, and from February 2004, the unofficial participation of Russia and China. There was also special cooperation with the British Home Office. In 2002, 2003 and 2004 there were large exercises based on a multi-dimensional terrorist threat, with the participation of personnel from all involved agencies, as well as security personnel from the United States and other countries. NATO’s involvement included AWACS planes and its NBC battalion, while warships from the 6th Fleet and NATO’s STANAFORMED were patrolling the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite its high-level involvement, however, NATO’s role was largely symbolic. As for the Hellenic Armed Forces, they did not have an autonomous role, but rather a supporting role to the police. Their preparations proceeded according to three plans: Strategic, Master (operational level) and Tactical. Tasks for the military included border surveillance (land, maritime, air), defusing of explosives, training of civilian security personnel for the Games, controlling access to and patrolling Olympic installations, checking vehicles, protecting the Olympic family and VIPs in their places of stay and during transportation, and a supplementary role for guarding vital installations.7 Army Special Forces were deployed to back up the police if necessary. The ‘Olympic Division’ included 13,000 military personnel, although all units of the Greek Armed Forces went into a higher state of alert for the duration of the Games, from early July through early October 2004, for both the Olympic and Paralympic Games. A Deputy Defence Minister in charge of Olympic Games was appointed in 2001, and in mid-2003, the first largescale field exercise was conducted in order to test existing plans. To resolve some initial problems in cooperation with the police, two liaison officers were appointed, one for Operational Planning and one for Logistics. A Joint Security Force was activated in June 2004, together with an Olympic Games Medical Unit, with military personnel participation and support. Finally, the National Intelligence Agency was heavily involved in Olympic security. The 2004 Olympic Games were extremely important for the following reasons: These were the first Summer Games since 11 September 2001. According to Ambassador Alex Rondos, a senior Greek official involved in the organisation of the Games, ‘In a sense this has become the big global test. Given what we have learned since 9/11 about the nature of international terrorism, can we – internationally – handle such an event with a sense of assurance about the security, with full respect, at the same time, for civil liberties?’8 In addition, these were the first Olympic Games, or international event of a similar scale, that took place in a borderless Europe, and in the Schengen zone, which was not suspended (unlike during Prince Felipe of Spain’s wedding). Finally, the Games’ ‘security legacy’ has facilitated Greece’s modernisation

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of its security architecture, and therefore its ability to cope with the new security environment of asymmetric threats. Regarding the Greek authorities’ threat assessment, because of Greece’s traditionally good relations with the Arab world, many officials did not believe that Greece would be high on the list of targets. Other officials and analysts pointed out that (a) terrorists could strike against an American or other ‘high-priority’ targets on Greek soil; (b) the Olympic Games would be an excellent opportunity for high publicity; (c) Greece is near the Middle East and logistics may be easier for the terrorists, although al-Qa’ida appears to have a global network, including local ‘partners’, and the post-war Middle East is ‘rich’ in US targets; and (d) friendly ties between countries or societies may have little meaning or value for such terrorist groups. The smooth execution of the Games, without a single security incident, was a great relief and a reward for the efforts of the Greek authorities.9 Ministry of Justice The Ministry of Justice has focused on two significant issues: 1) The preparation of the Anti-Terrorist legislation, which was approved by the Greek Parliament in 2000 and, 2) the efforts to establish a European Justice Area (Euro-Just). The first step in this direction is agreement on a common European Arrest Warrant. In 2001, Greece passed new legislation on terrorism, which provides for the following: • incentives, such as reduced sentences and new identities, for terrorists who cooperate and provide information to the authorities; • substantial rewards for citizens who provide information to the authorities; • witness protection measures (anonymous testimonies, new identity, and so on); • electronic eavesdropping of suspects, with judicial authorisation; • use of DNA test as evidence in court; • prosecution of all accomplices to terrorist acts – even those not directly implicated in assassinations or bombing attacks; • juries composed of judges only, not citizens; • corporate responsibility in cases of organised crime (heavy fines and even closure). A special group has been established at the Ministry of Justice for the full harmonisation of Greek legislation with EU and international legislation on issues related to terrorism. Finally, an interagency committee was established at the end of 2001 to deal with issues of money-laundering in relation to international terrorist groups. There is also a new law, approved by Parliament in late 2000, on organised crime. Some of its provisions could be used in relation to activities of international terrorist groups in cases when there is an ‘organised crime’ dimension. Greece has signed all the relevant treaties

Thanos Dokos

Ministry of Interior

General Secretariat for Civil Protection

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Public Order

Ministry of Defence

National Police Intelligence Agency, HNDGS

Special Forces, HNDGS

National Intelligence Agency

Ministry of Finance

Task Force on Money Laundering

Coast Guard

Special Forces

Figure 3.1

Ministry of Justice

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Anti-Terrorist Branch Special Forces

Greek anti-terrorist mechanism

and agreements regarding all forms of terrorist actions, plus a number of bilateral agreements. It is also a full member of the Schengen Convention and supported the EU’s decision on terrorism (of 13 June 2002).

The role of the Greek military in counter-terrorism The Hellenic Army has a division-size unit of Special Forces consisting of a regiment each of Green Berets, Paratroopers and Marines. The Hellenic Navy has a battalion of Special Forces and the Air Force has a recently established Special Operations Squadron (which specialises in Search and Rescue operations), equipped with four Super-Puma all-weather helicopters. Greece’s contribution in the war against international terrorism currently consists of two frigates (one in the Persian Gulf in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom and one in the Mediterranean for STANAVFORMED), one submarine, one fast missile craft, one general replenishment ship and one Orion P-3 aircraft for Operation Active Endeavour (to inspect and intercept if necessary various ‘suspect’ ships, in the context of the war against international terrorism),10 and one minesweeper for MCMFORSOUTH. The Greek military has not, so far, been training for counter-terrorism. Although Greek Special Forces are highly regarded by their NATO colleagues, they have neither the experience nor the training for counter-terrorist operations (although this may change in the future). As has already been explained, security planning for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games included a role for those units (mainly guarding installations). They went through a series of crash courses on counter-terrorism, but they are not intended for counter-terrorism in a domestic emergency. They may have a role in NATO or other multinational military operations, as was the case in the Gulf War with ship inspections, or

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in Operation Alba in Albania, in 1997 to secure the evacuation of civilians.11 The Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of Defence also has an active interest in international terrorism, with a geographical focus on the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. Its counter-terrorist role, however, is clearly secondary.

Peacekeeping, ‘defence diplomacy’, and military and civil assistance programmes Greece’s approach (shared by most European countries) on regional and global security threats in general and international terrorism in particular is that a grand strategy, based on a more comprehensive approach with emphasis on prevention, is a sine qua non. In this context, defence diplomacy can be a valuable tool.12 In recent years, Greece has evolved from a firm, but rather inactive supporter into an active participant of United Nations and other peacekeeping efforts and operations. The MoD has in the past five years concluded several agreements for military cooperation with countries in Greece’s wider neighbourhood (Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa), including Egypt, Israel, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Bulgaria, FYROM and Albania. In some cases, cooperation has been rather symbolic and of limited practical value. In other cases, such as Albania, FYROM, Armenia, Egypt, Israel and Georgia, cooperation included the exchange of students for military academies, joint exercises, military assistance and other activities. Military (non-lethal) assistance has been extended to Albania, FYROM, Georgia and Armenia.13 It should be mentioned that no equipment is being exported to states of concern.

NBC defence capabilities As noted earlier, involved agencies include the General Secretariat for Civil Protection, in a coordinating role, the police, the fire department, the Greek Atomic Energy Agency, the health services and the armed forces. The NBC defence ability of the Hellenic Armed Forces has been steadily improving, notably after 9/11, which acted as a booster. A new bureau responsible for NBC defence has been established under Operations Branch (A-Branch of the National Defence General Staff/HNDGS) to coordinate the efforts of the various directorates and departments of the three services. There are three institutions which provide NBC training: the School of Applied Special Weapons, under the auspices of the HNDGS, the School of NBC Defence under the auspices of the Hellenic Air Force’s (HAF) Medical Directorate, and the NBC Basic Training School of the Olympic Games Health Support Unit. The latter is a special (tri-service) joint unit that was expanded to a full Health Service Support Regiment during the Athens Olympic Games of 2004,

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acting as the main NBC–Medical defence agency in case of such an incident. The Hellenic Army had organised two NBC Defence Platoons to operate – if necessary – in the northern and southern parts of Greece. The HAF had an NBC Response Team ready to operate in all its units in case of a NBC incident.14 There are also efforts to procure modern NBC-defence equipment. Because the Fire Service plans for biological and chemical incidents, they have been training for NBC at the Army’s School of Applied Special Weapons. There are 11 teams for biological incidents (mainly anthrax). In the context of the 2004 Olympic Games, seven teams of ten men each were created in case of chemical incidents. Three were deployed in the greater Athens area and the rest in other major cities.15 Airport security Another important issue in counter-terrorism is airport security. Greek airports, including the now abandoned Ellinikon Airport in Athens, have had a reputation for lax security. After 9/11 security improved in other international airports in Greece, although to a slightly lesser extent than Athens Airport. In ‘Eleftherios Venizelos’, the new Athens airport, there has been a visible improvement in airport security: more stringent controls, and five levels of security checks, including a sophisticated X-ray machine for luggage. Responsibility lies with both police and a private security firm. As any passenger travelling via Greece and other European capitals in the past 1–2 years would testify, the new Athens Airport compares favourably with major European airports and has stricter security procedures than many others. Greece’s national airline, Olympic Airlines, has been cooperating with US authorities on the provision of passenger data, in the context of an agreement between the EU and the United States.

Domestic terrorism The main domestic terrorism problem for Greece was linked to the terrorist group ‘November 17’. The Greek authorities’ failure to arrest even a single member of this group, which had been active since 1975, drew considerable criticism from Greece’s partners and allies, especially the United States. Taking advantage of the new anti-terrorist legislation and with the cooperation of the British police, the Greek authorities made significant progress during 2001 and early 2002 in their investigation regarding November 17. The initial time-schedule of the Greek police was for arrests to be made in Autumn 2002. As a result of a failed November 17 bombing attack, however, an injured member of the terrorist group was arrested. He cooperated with the authorities, and based on his confession and the information the police already had, several members of the group have been arrested, including its alleged leader. Only a handful of the November 17 members fully confessed, hoping to benefit from a provision of the new anti-terrorist law for reduced

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sentences for members of terrorist organisations who have cooperated with the police. The police identified three ‘generations’ of November 17 members and a total of 19 arrests were made. It is believed that those arrested include all the active members of the group. There may still be a number of supporters (‘sleepers’) and sympathisers at large. Nevertheless, there is widespread optimism that this is the end of November 17. This significant achievement will boost the morale and the confidence of the Greek police. Together with the acquired expertise from cooperating with the British and the Americans, this will be extremely valuable in view of the international terrorist threat. One should ask why it took so long – 27 years – for the Greek authorities to break up November 17 and what made this possible in 2002? The answers to both questions combine the following factors: 1) the expertise and experience of the British police, partly gained from their struggle against the IRA, along with their cooperative attitude and unprejudiced approach;16 2) the serious effort of the Greek police under its Chief at that time, who had devoted more than 20 years of his career to counter-terrorist efforts, and the Minister of Public Order, who considered the breakup of November 17 a personal ‘crusade’; 3) the new counter-terrorism law, which provides both the necessary ‘tools’ for the police and judicial authorities and the incentives for members of terrorist groups to cooperate with the authorities; 4) the considerable change of mood among the Greek public – for years November 17 was ‘tolerated’ or ignored by a large segment of Greek society. In recent years, especially after the killing of Brigadier-General Saunders and the very dignified behaviour of his widow, indifference changed to dislike and open hostility; 5) pressure from the United States and concern about the 2004 Athens Olympic Games; 6) frequent change of the political leadership of the Ministry of Public Order and the top levels of the Greek Police; 7) the lack of professionalism (despite some remarkable exceptions) in the police force;17 and 8) luck, that is, the bomb that exploded in the hands of a terrorist. According to police sources, the police was in any event ready to move and thus the latter point only accelerated developments. It should also be noted that some of the factors mentioned above, such as the changed mood of the Greek public, new laws, increased international cooperation, and more professional and experienced security services, may contribute significantly in efforts to deal with the challenges posed by al-Qa’ida and similar terrorist organisations. It should be mentioned, however, that Greece has limited experience fighting against new varieties of terrorism (and precious little time to learn). The trial of November 17, which began on 3 March 2003 and ended in November 2003, was expected to close a very unpleasant chapter in modern Greece’s political history. As for other – rather minor – terrorist groups, and more specifically the Revolutionary Popular Struggle/ELA, several arrests of allegedly leading members were made in February 2003. Some were acquitted

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because of insufficient evidence, but four of them were sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. Illegal migration, political asylum, human trafficking A quick glance at the map would demonstrate the difficulty of controlling Greece’s land and, critically, maritime borders. The latter is the responsibility of the Coast Guard, with assistance from the Navy, especially with rescue missions. The aforementioned newly-created body of Border Guards, 2,500 strong, with assistance from the police and the army, are responsible for Greece’s land borders. According to various studies and opinion polls, the flow of illegal migrants is a high priority issue for Greek society. It is perceived as a burden, not so much for the Greek national economy, but rather on the social welfare and education systems, as well as for public order. More than one million economic immigrants from south-eastern and eastern Europe, and countries such as Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan are in Greece, although more than half originate in Albania.18 This number comprises approximately 10 per cent of Greece’s total population of 11 million. Experts agree that the problem is manageable, but it should be addressed as soon as possible. There is consensus that the migrants contribute to the Greek national economy, estimated between 5 and 12 per cent. Measures to control migration flows involve increased patrolling of Greece’s maritime and land borders by the Coast Guard and the Border Guards, a bilateral agreement with Turkey for the return of immigrants, and economic assistance to Albania to improve the economic situation and create local employment opportunities. Finally, together with an effort to control illegal entry into Greece, the Greek government has been implementing a system of giving green cards and work permits to large number of illegal immigrants who have been living and working in the country for a number of years. Most of these measures are taken on a purely national basis, although in the past few months Greece, along with other affected EU countries, are putting pressure on the EU to agree on and begin the implementation of a more coordinated collective policy and system of control of immigrants. This was a priority issue during Greece’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2003.19 There is also a wider debate regarding the protection of EU external borders. Because of the relatively large number of requests for political asylum, this is a sensitive issue for Greece. Most of the asylum-seekers are characterised as economic immigrants and their request is rejected. The figures of asylum applications range from 6,000 to 8,000 annually, and the applications are approved on average at a rate of 4 to 6 per cent of the total in the late 1990s, which rose to 11 per cent for 2001 and dropped to 0.4 per cent for 2002. This is only a small fraction of the total number of illegal immigrants that enter Greece every year, because most of them do not have any identification documents and also because of the weaknesses of the responsible state agency.

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Thus few are returned to their country of origin; the vast majority remain in Greece or move illegally to other European countries. There is also an official agreement with Turkey for the return of illegal immigrants from Turkey. Although in the beginning the Turkish authorities refused to accept the immigrants – there were even suspicions that Turkish authorities turned a ‘blind eye’ to large groups of illegal immigrants – things improved by early 2004, and cooperation was smoother. The Greek government considers drug smuggling and the associated phenomena of international crime and money-laundering as major problems in the Balkan and Mediterranean regions, a serious threat to regional stability and also to Greek national security, and linked to terrorism. Although Greek public opinion is aware that significant quantities of narcotics are produced in the south of the Mediterranean or are transported through this region, the major concern is about drug smuggling and transnational organised crime originating in the Balkans. As already mentioned, it is felt that such soft threats can only be dealt with through a combination of police (in the context of multilateral cooperation), and preventative measures. The only initiatives that can be effective in this direction are the Barcelona Process (for the Mediterranean) and the Stability Pact (for the Balkans). In both cases, and despite the progress achieved, neither initiative can be considered as highly successful. People smuggling and trafficking – especially women from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, but also illegal migrants from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan among other places – is a recent phenomenon, and a very profitable activity. It is a major problem for the Greek government, not only for the police and judiciary authorities, but also for Greek society. In early 2004 there was a significant effort made by Greek NGOs and government agencies to increase the awareness of Greek society about this social problem. The success of this campaign will have to be assessed after its completion. It should also be noted that there is new legislation, providing for tougher sentences for traffickers (Law no. 3064, 15 October 2002). Special orders have been given to the Coast Guard and the Border Police to spare no efforts in trying to arrest and bring to justice all traffickers.20 Islam in Greece The official religion in Greece is Christian Orthodox, which is adhered to by almost 98 per cent of the indigenous population. Muslims – mainly people of Turkish, Pomak and Roma origin residing primarily in Greek Thrace – comprise 1 per cent and the remaining 1 per cent of the total population belong to other branches of Christianity or religions, such as Catholicism or Judaism. There is a significant number of Muslims and Hindus, however, among the large immigrant community in Greece. According to the Greek Constitution, every person is free to practise the religion of his choice. Generally, and despite the undisputedly dominant

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and privileged position of the Orthodox Church, there are no serious problems or restrictions on other religions, except for activities related to faith conversion and to the activities of certain ‘apocalyptic’ cults. The issue of Islam in Greece deserves some additional comments. The absence of a colonial past is one of the factors that facilitated relations between Greece and the Arab world in recent decades. Muslims – both immigrants and natives – are now part of modern Greece. They have strong links with the outside world, through family and business connections, and even attendance at the Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Their growing presence and activities pose a new challenge for Greece. This challenge involves not only the understanding that Islam has become a European religion and plays an important part in Europe’s social and political landscape, but must also involve the embracing of a European multicultural society. There are no official statistics regarding the Muslim immigrants living in Greece, since most do not complete tax return forms and are not insured by the Greek welfare system. If one also takes into account the fact that many immigrants try to hide their religion and nationality in hope of better employment opportunities, it becomes apparent that it is difficult to find hard data about immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants in particular. It should also be noted that: (a) The Greek society, similar to other western societies, is not void of prejudices against Islam, which have intensified after 11 September, but not considerably so. One of the more common mistakes among decisionmakers and citizens alike is to interpret Islam as a monolithic religion, rather than a complex and diverse one. (b) There has been very limited assimilation of Muslims in Greek society. (c) There is no information about foreign country funding of (immigrant) Islamic associations, with the exception of copies of the Qur’an distributed by Saudi Arabia. (d) So far, Greece has been spared the worst aspects of racism and xenophobia, such as political parties on a one-dimensional, racist/xenophobic platform, or frequent incidents of racist violence. But one can identify signs of underlying xenophobia, mainly because of concerns about increased criminality. (e) The Greek government has taken a number of initiatives for an inter-faith dialogue, especially between the major monotheistic religions. The main challenge for Greece is to promote ethnic and cultural diversity and lay the foundations for a multicultural society. In the twenty-first century the Greek authorities have been investing – although not yet sufficiently – in multicultural education, notably in primary schools, which should go some way to meeting this challenge.21

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Conclusions and recommendations The short- and long-term ramifications of the terrorist attacks against the United States on relations between the EU (and the western world in general) and the Arab/Islamic world, as well as on perceptions between the two sides are expected to be far reaching. Because of the many uncertainties at this stage of transition, an accurate and sober assessment of consequences would be extremely difficult and probably premature. What can be said at this point, is that the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the US-led ‘war against international terrorism’ have led to a considerable increase in suspicion and tension internationally, and are seriously complicating relations between Islamic and western societies. Furthermore, in conjunction with the deteriorating situation in Palestine and the American occupation of Iraq, this campaign could further destabilise the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and complicate efforts for both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and other initiatives. The possible deterioration of relations between the Islamic world and the West and the resulting increased probability of terrorist actions against western targets, such as occurred in Madrid in March 2004,22 will make counter-terrorism an even higher priority for Europe and the United States.23 There is some concern, however, that transatlantic friction as a result of disagreement about the handling of the Iraqi crisis, as well as a range of other issues such as arms control, the environment, and the role of the UN, might inhibit increased cooperation. Greece also aims to strengthen the esprit de corps of the security services, a process that has been under way for the past two to three years with British and American assistance. Positive developments regarding the terrorist organisation November 17 demonstrate that there has been considerable progress to this end. Areas of necessary coordination in counter-terrorism include the following: (a) In view of the difficulties of coordination between ministries and agencies, the lack of a coordinating mechanism on national security issues, especially if a wider definition of the term ‘national security’ is adopted – as suggested below, becomes even more pronounced. The creation of a National Security Council would be strongly recommended; (b) As already mentioned, the primary anti-terrorist forces are those of the police and secondarily of the Coast Guard. Both have participated in operations in the past, with a mixed record. Their competence has improved in the past two to three years, and so has their confidence after the recent success against November 17 and of course, the Olympic Games. Additional training and the acquisition (and familiarisation) with specialised equipment is envisaged and required. More training opportunities for Greek security sector personnel at every level should be offered by its EU and NATO partners,

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and even the United States, despite Greek uneasiness over its unilateralist policies. The considerable resources – trained personnel, organisation, equipment, planning and experience – that were used for the security of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games should be fully exploited now that the Games are over. Indeed, the systems developed for the Games will constitute an important post-Olympic legacy, leaving Greece with a high quality infrastructure in terms of equipment and trained personnel, one that will be, in many respects, more sophisticated than in many western European and American metropolitan areas.24 The Greek security sector will be faced with a number of important challenges: developing and maintaining a ‘critical mass’ of highly trained and motivated officers; increasing professionalism throughout its ranks; resolving problems of inter-agency cooperation and the slow pace of security sector reform, due to the rather low level of awareness about the new security threats25 among the general public, and the traditional weaknesses of the Greek public administration system;26 and, last but not least, developing a security culture. The latter should be achieved by increasing the number of civilian experts, as suggested below, but also through improving the professional education system and, importantly, making the mental leap in order to adapt to a new security environment where Greece is a full member of the developed and ‘privileged’ West and, therefore, a possible target of non-state actors. At the European/transatlantic level, the following remarks should be made: (a) Security sector reform should be a top priority for western governments. For most European countries, security today is primarily measured in nonmilitary terms. These threats include – incompetent government, corruption, organised crime, insecure borders, smuggling, illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources (for example, water) and; of course, terrorism.27 (b) As security is no longer limited to the military dimension, it is no longer just the preserve of MODs and MFAs which have to date been the main ministries involved in security cooperation. It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between external security and internal security.28 Security henceforth requires the coordination of the ‘external’ ministries, such as MODs and MFAs, with their constituent agencies – the armed forces and intelligence services – and with those of the ‘interior’ ministries: internal affairs, education, finance, overseas development, transport, environment, and health, and their agencies – police forces, security services, disaster relief agencies. Security today takes in social development and it should involve all elements of society in a way that differs from the cold war period. Meeting these new security requirements demands fundamental reform of national structures, patterns of investment and systems of government.29 It also demands the evolution of international institutions on a truly radical scale.30

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But to implement such changes in a civil–military partnership requires a civilian body of experts knowledgeable enough to address defence and security issues with credibility and confidence. Without such civilian expertise, decision-makers cannot take hard decisions that are opposed by the entrenched and conservative military staff. Building such an expert civilian security community is the sine qua non of defence and security sector reform. Europol is now fully operational, but its capabilities should benefit from additional political and material support from member states. The office of the European Coordinator for Terrorism should also be significantly strengthened. The answer to immigration from the south of the Mediterranean is not the creation of a ‘fortress Europe’. In addition, increasing problems of terrorism and organised crime, which figure prominently in Javier Solana’s European Security Strategy, adopted at the December 2003 European Council, require an appropriate response. As Europe’s long borders make patrolling and protection by national means all but impossible, the establishment of a European Border Protection Agency has become a high priority. Indeed, there has been progress in the improved protection of maritime borders, with the establishment of two coordination centres in Greece (Piraeus) and Spain (Madrid) and the operation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (from 2005), as well as plans to create a European Coast Guard.31 Improved intelligence cooperation is vital. Indeed, the West’s best chance to prevent NBC terrorism is to work closely with the states in the region, and also in the field of intelligence. In the era of the ‘suicide bomber’, only preventive methods can be effective. In addition to intelligence, police, financial (for the interdiction of terrorist funds), judicial and military cooperation, counterterrorist efforts would be of limited efficiency if the West failed to address the underlying reasons of this anger against the West, including regional conflicts such as the Israeli–Palestinian problem and the widening gap between North and South. In the context of the latter objective, the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), if adequately funded and supported by European governments, can be a valuable tool. Finally, to be successful, counter-terrorist efforts should be Europe-wide. For the long-term fight against the al-Qa’ida network and international terrorism in general, a grand strategy, based on a more comprehensive approach, is necessary. Although Greece should not be expected to be at the forefront of international counter-terrorist efforts, it can apply aggressive methods and undertake any major initiatives because of geographic and political factors, considerations and sensitivities, and can significantly improve its ability to secure its borders and contribute to international counter-terrorist efforts. To this end, the Athens Olympic Games served as a catalyst for the transformation process.

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Notes and references 1. The term netwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organisation and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. See John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt (eds), Networks and Netwars. The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), p. 6. Cyberwar – a concept that refers to information-oriented military warfare – is becoming an important entry at the military end of the spectrum, where the language has normally been about high-intensity conflicts. Netwar figures at the societal end of the spectrum, about low-intensity conflict, operations other than war, and non-military modes of conflict and crime. Whereas Cyberwar usually pits formal military forces against each other, Netwar is more likely to involve nonstate, paramilitary, and irregular forces – as in the case of terrorism. See Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999), p. 47. 2. See, for instance, references to instability in the Mediterranean and asymmetric threats in the 1999, 2001 and 2004 White Papers of the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence, without reference, however, to specific countries. There are similar references to the ‘Strategic Review’, a confidential study which provided the basis for the recent extensive restructuring of the Hellenic Armed Forces (the restructuring process is expected to last at least 4–5 years). 3. This sympathy could be attributed in part to a sincere concern about the plight of the Kurdish people, as well as to the zero-sum game mentality that dominated Greek–Turkish relations for many years, according to which the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’. 4. For more information on the Mediterranean Forum, see: http://www.medea.be/? page=2&lang=en&doc=273 5. The Command Centre System centralised the information-gathering and decisionmaking process from multiple ministries and agencies. It created, for the first time, a unified, integrated command, which supported crisis management for large-scale, complex, multiple incidents. The C4I system received information from satellites, AWACS and an airship/blimp flying overhead, 1,300 closed circuit television cameras and underwater sensing devices at harbours. 6. The C4I system was not fully operational during the Games because of a dispute between the Greek government and SAIC. 7. Key installations (such as water, electricity and communications) had to provide for their own security. Although the military would have been involved only in emergencies, there were military units guarding selected high-level installations. 8. Thomas Fuller, ‘An Olympic hurdle for Greece’, International Herald Tribune, 20 February 2004. 9. There was considerable bitterness among Greeks about the negative publicity and low expectations by other government agencies and the media (especially in the United States) regarding security preparations for the Athens Olympic Games, which increased the cost of the Games and scared many visitors away. Subsequent enthusiastic comments from governments and apologies from foreign media did alleviate, to a considerable extent, those bitter feelings. 10. In early 2002, there was a disagreement with the United States over inspection of ships in Greek territorial waters by US warships. The Greek position was that this

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11. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

Europe Confronts Terrorism would constitute a violation of the Greek Constitution. There have been some discussions about joint multinational naval forces (probably including British warships), but no decision has been reached so far. It should also be noted that despite the high level of defence spending, Greece, similar to the rest of Europe, has limited power projection capabilities. For the concepts of defence diplomacy and strategic engagement, see Andrew Cottey & Anthony Forster, ‘Reshaping defence diplomacy: new roles for military cooperation and assistance’, Adelphi Paper No. 365 (London: IISS, Oxford University Press, 2004), and ‘Challenges to defence diplomacy’, Strategic Survey 1999/2000 (Oxford: IISS, Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 39–53. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently concluded agreements with Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and, soon, with FYROM, for the provision of development aid (approximately $580 million for the next 3–4 years). Hellenic Air Force School of NBC Defence. The Fire Service also possesses three specialised vehicles for CBW emergencies and five more will be acquired. Assistance had been provided by the UK Metropolitan Police Service’s Specialist Operations Department after the assassination by November 17 of Brigadier-General Stephen Saunders, the British defence attaché in Greece. British officers offered assistance with the latest investigative and forensic techniques and brought their own best practice to support the investigation conducted by the Hellenic Police. (Constantine Buhayer, ‘The UK’s role in boosting Greek counter-terrorism capabilities’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2002, p. 13). It has been argued that although Greece was a low-crime zone, the police lacked respect and its morale was low. Its sense of mission was unclear with no overall strategy. The United States had trained talented Greek personnel but, back in Greece, they were assigned to irrelevant posts. The Greek Ministry of Public Order was a rather minor posting. Its rapid turnover of ministers and personnel repeatedly terminated any anti-terrorist initiative (Buhayer, p. 12, see n. 16). According to unofficial estimates, more than 50 per cent come from Albania. There are also sizeable communities of Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs, Russians, Turkish and Kurdish Iraqis, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis, Indians and Nigerians. There seems to be no objection in principle for a Charter of Migrants Rights in Europe. However, there may be some negative reaction on the specific provisions of such a Charter if they are perceived as overburdening the national economy. In any case, Greece would not be a major stumbling block in such an effort. Also, according to the new law, clients of women held and taken advantage of against their will would be prosecuted. Finally, there is provision for providing protection and assistance (material and psychological) to victims of trafficking (with special emphasis on juveniles). Such assistance and support has in the past been offered mainly by private citizens, NGOs and the church, but now the state is expected to become a more active partner. Thanos Dokos and Dimitris Antoniou, ‘Islam in Greece’ in Shireen Hunter (ed.), Islam, Europe’s Second Religion, Center for Strategic & International Studies (Westport: Praeger, 2002), pp. 175–90. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘The 11 September and the March 2004 Madrid attacks gave new weight to long-established European concerns about spillovers of extremism, political violence and terrorism from the South. Extremist groups from the Maghreb (especially Algeria, but also Morocco)

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24. 25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

30.

31.

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have been using Europe as a rear area for recruitment, fundraising, planning and arms purchases . . . The European experience with North African networks also encourages a view of Islamic terrorism that departs significantly from prevailing images in the US, where al-Qaeda is often portrayed as a coherent, even hierarchical group. European analysts, and an increasing number of American observers, tend to see Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian networks as harbingers of a much looser, ad hoc constellation of extremists, with a variety of motives and modes of action, in which the al-Qaeda link may or may not be significant.’ Strategic Survey 2003/4. An Evaluation and Forecast of World Affairs (Oxford: IISS, Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 151–2. It has been argued that one important consequence of the Madrid bombings has been a marked acceleration of EU efforts at intelligence sharing, police cooperation and coordination of counter-terrorism policy. The EU decision to appoint a European counter-terrorism coordinator opens the possibility of a more substantive Washington–Brussels line of communication on terrorism risks and responses. Strategic Survey 2003/4, pp. 151–2. Emergency preparedness is another area where Greece must improve its capabilities. As senior Greek government officials acknowledge, there is considerable concern about the nexus between transnational organised crime in the Balkans, the Middle East and adjacent regions – especially trafficking of narcotics and women – and international terrorism. Because of its geographic location, Greece is a transit point for these activities. Indeed, the wheels of the Greek bureaucracy has been turning rather slowly and this may be a serious disadvantage compared to the flexible organisation and operation of the al-Qa’ida network and of transnational crime syndicates. The spectrum of potential threats includes familiar adversaries who are modifying their structures and strategies to take advantage of networked designs, such as transnational terrorist groups, black-market proliferators of WMD, transnational crime syndicates, fundamentalist and ethno-nationalist movements, intellectual property and high-sea pirates, and smugglers of black-market goods or migrants. See Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, p. 48. In the case of Greece, however, the Greek military would be extremely reluctant to become involved in ‘domestic’ situations because of its past disastrous record. Of course, protection of civil liberties is a major concern among European publics. The protection of personal data will thus be an increasingly controversial issue. Greece has established an Independent Authority to ensure that privacy will be respected in all but highly exceptional cases. This concept draws heavily on the presentation delivered by a senior NATO official, Chris Donnelly, in a conference organised by the Western Policy Centre and the Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Ankara, 26–8 October 2002. See also, Thanos Dokos (ed.), Security Sector Reform in Southeastern Europe, Kluwer Academic Publishers (forthcoming). Again, according to the IISS, ‘The sheer scale of tanker shipping in the Mediterranean, including that of highly explosive liquid natural gas, highlights the potential risks to population centres, the environment and economies posed by maritime terrorism in the region,’ Strategic Survey 2003/4, p. 154. It is interesting that in the context of NATO’s internal adaptation process, the creation of a NATO–Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Sudha Bay, on the island of Crete has also been agreed.

4 Italy Domitilla Sagramoso and Andrea Nativi

Soon after 11 September 2001, the Italian government moved quickly to address the new terrorist threat, both by modifying its national legislation in order to enforce decisions adopted at international levels, and by introducing new measures at the operational level aimed at better protecting Italian territory from a possible terrorist attack. The Italian government acted on two fronts. On the one hand, it enhanced efforts to disrupt and destroy militant Islamic cells based in Italy, and supported international efforts against al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. On the other, the government undertook a series of active measures to protect the civilian population and specific strategic targets from potential terrorist attacks. Although most of these efforts have proven quite successful, achievements have been hampered by the lack of proper funding for certain projects, and by the growing marginalisation of the Muslim community in Italy, some of whose members fall prey to the terrorist option. The Italian government so far has failed to develop an effective policy to integrate the various Muslim immigrants into Italian society and its economy, and as a result, the potential number of recruits among Muslims is growing. During the 1970s and 1980s, Italy faced a significant threat from both left- and right-wing terrorist organisations, and therefore developed effective capabilities to handle terrorist threats. Important shortcomings remained, however, especially after the threat from domestic terrorism declined during the 1990s. For example, although the presence of al-Qa’ida-related groups had been identified on Italian territory before 11 September, their members could not be arrested unless proven to be involved in attacks on Italian territory. In addition, because of its geographical position and its relatively good relations with Arab and Middle-Eastern countries, Italy developed a tradition of tolerance towards the presence of Middle-Eastern and North African militant groups on its territory, as long as its members did not get involved in attacks on its soil. In 2000–2001, however, al-Qa’ida-related groups started planning attacks on Italian soil, forcing Italian law-enforcement authorities to conduct several arrests and become less lenient towards their presence in Italy. Moreover, as the presence of Italian troops in Iraq increased the threat of an attack on 80

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Italian soil, along the lines of the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, more stringent efforts have been undertaken.

Disrupting al-Qa’ida During the mid to late 1990s, Italy became an important logistics base for North African Islamic terrorist groups linked to al-Qa’ida, such as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, the Tunisian Combatant Group, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, which was suspected of being responsible for the Madrid bombings.1 Terrorists belonging to these militant Islamic organisations set up bases in various Italian cities – Milan, Naples, Padua, Rome, Venice and Verona – from where they provided valuable logistical support to members of their group in the form of false documents, housing, money, means of transport, and safe passage to areas of interest such as the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.2 These centres also became the basis for the planning of attacks on Italian territory and for the recruitment of Islamic militants living in Italy. For example, the Milan cell, headed by the Tunisian-born Essid Sami Ben Khemais, and closely linked to the Milan mosque and the Islamic Cultural Institute, became a major recruiting centre for al-Qa’ida followers among Muslim immigrants based in Italy during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The cell provided a European ‘station house’ for Muslims wishing to receive military training in Afghanistan.3 Over the past decade, Italy became home to a large number of disaffected Muslim youth, who although not linked to a specific terrorist group, received military training in al-Qa’ida camps in Afghanistan, and seemed ready to conduct combat operations in Muslim regions throughout the world – Afghanistan, Kashmir and Iraq. According to Muslim religious leaders in Italy, the number of these so-called ‘freedom fighters’ reached about 2,000 men in 2002, and seems to have increased since the US-led war in Iraq.4 Islamic cells based in Italy are allegedly actively recruiting and facilitating the transfer of Islamic volunteers to fight in Iraq and Chechnya.5 Italy began making arrests of al-Qa’ida-related terrorists just before 11 September, because of their potential involvement in attacks on Italian soil. In early April 2001, members of a cell linked to al-Qa’ida were arrested in Milan as they prepared for an attack on the American Embassy in Rome.6 Also in April 2001, the leader of the Milan cell, Essid Sami Ben Khemais, was arrested.7 He was convicted in March 2002 for his criminal activities and his intent to obtain arms and explosives. The terrorist attacks on 11 September clearly revealed the risks faced not only by the United States, but also by European allies of an al-Qa’ida-related terrorist attack. To tackle the threat, the Italian government introduced a series of legal and financial measures to assist law enforcement organs in dismantling the al-Qa’ida network.

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On 18 October 2001, the Italian government adopted decree no. 374/2001, enacted into law no. 438/2001 on 15 December 2001, which incorporated a new crime into the Italian criminal code – the crime of international terrorism. This crime became applicable to those individuals and organisations that promote or conduct terrorist acts abroad while based on Italian soil. The aim of the legislation was to fight against those organisations, which, while based on Italian territory, planned and conducted acts of terrorism against other countries. The new law specifically punished those who were found promoting, belonging to, organising, directing or financing organisations aimed at conducting acts of terrorism and disruption of the democratic order, be it against a foreign state or an international organisation. These types of criminals were subsequently liable to imprisonment for seven to 15 years.8 In order to allow police and magistrates to fight terrorism more effectively, law 438/2001 extended the application of the provisions of the 1965 AntiMafia Act, law 575/1965, to international terrorism. As a result, magistrates and police were able to introduce restrictions on the personal freedom of terrorists suspected of belonging to al-Qa’ida and of planning terrorists attacks by limiting their movements and putting them under surveillance. Magistrates were also allowed to investigate their financial and economic assets, and those of their family members, and to impound and confiscate their goods.9 Law 438/2001 placed emphasis on disrupting and preventing acts of international terrorism by focusing on the preparatory phase of international terrorist activities. In this respect, the law has given police and intelligence officials expanded powers when conducting operational activities in order to avert potential terrorist attacks. The law allows Italian police officers to tap telephone conversations or Internet communications of suspected terrorists, even those who have not yet committed or supported an attack. In terms of avoiding excesses by the authorities and to protect civil liberties, the explicit authorisation of the judge is required. Law enforcement officers are also allowed to conduct ‘covert operations’, involving the execution of minor offences in order to avoid suspicion. Finally, law enforcement agents are allowed to extend the searches of premises by anti-terrorism agents to entire blocks, if considered necessary. 10 Under Law no. 34, adopted on 14 February 2003, Italy ratified and implemented the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in 1997, and aimed at criminalising terrorist acts. The obligations imposed by the Convention, however, were already largely covered by existing Italian legislation.11 Italy also expanded its cooperation in the intelligence field with its European and American allies. Since 11 September, and especially after the Madrid bombings, intelligence sharing on the nature of terrorist networks, their means of communication, their tools, and their methods of operation has increased significantly among members of the anti-terrorist coalition. In addition, information sharing regarding particular individuals and suspects


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has allowed the Italian law enforcement agencies to avert several planned attacks. Granted with expanded powers and resources, and with additional valuable information, the Italian police and Italian magistrates have been able over the past two years to dismantle various al-Qa’ida-related cells, including the Milan cell, and to arrest over 71 suspected terrorists, believed to be providing either logistical support or directly participating in planned terrorist attacks with al-Qa’ida-linked organisations.12 In June 2004 in Milan, the Italian police arrested one of the suspected organisers of the Madrid bombings, Hamed Sayed Osman Rabeim, known as ‘Mohammed the Egyptian’, as part of an international operation that also involved the arrest of 15 al-Qa’ida suspects in Belgium.13 The battle, however, is far from over. Many cells remain active and operational, and many of the disrupted cells keep renewing themselves through incorporating new recruits. Moreover, it has been estimated that cells are becoming increasingly involved in operational activities rather than remaining limited to providing logistical support.14 Part of the problem lies in the absence of properly trained intelligence officers with long experience in the field, the cumbersome procedures of the Italian judiciary – due to lack of funding and need to work within the strict parameters of the law – as well as the inability to put behind bars tried and condemned suspects if a judicial appeal procedure is still under way.

Curbing terrorist financing To curb the financing of international terrorist groups, provisions have been introduced to freeze the Italian financial assets of individuals and organisations involved in international terrorism, and with special links to Osama bin Laden, al-Qa’ida and the Taliban. More specifically, on 24 September 2001, the Bank of Italy instructed financial institutions to inform the Italian Foreign Exchange Office, or Ufficio Italiano Cambi (UIC), of any transactions suspected to be linked to persons, entities and organisations potentially involved in the 11 September attacks, or involved in international terrorism, in accordance with EU Regulations 467 and 1354 of 2001 and the list provided by the Basle Committee on Banking supervision.15 To fulfil these obligations and facilitate the work of financial institutions, the UIC publishes a list of entities and individuals to be monitored by financial organisations on its website.16 Banks and financial intermediaries are being asked to notify the UIC of any measures adopted aimed at freezing funds, to report operations that are traceable to individuals or entities named in the lists published by the UIC, and to notify the UIC immediately of any operation connected to the financing of terrorism, in order to be able to suspend those activities if considered necessary.17 The list of organisations and individuals to be tracked is based on information provided by the various branches of the Italian government, as well as other

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EU partners and the United States, and on various lists of terrorist organisations whose financial assets should be curbed. In addition, to improve the monitoring of terrorist financial flows, on 12 October 2001, the Italian government created a ‘Financial Security Committee’ chaired by the Director General of the Treasury, and made up of representatives of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence Ministries, as well as the Bank of Italy, the Stock Exchange Commission (CONSOB), the UIC, the Customs and Excise Police, or Guardia di Finanza, the Anti-Mafia Directorate (DIA), and the military police or Carabinieri.18 This new committee has been made responsible for coordinating activities and flows of information received from the various branches of government for overseeing financial transactions and determining whether groups or individuals profit financially from terrorist attacks. It is also in charge of creating the list of accounts and individuals whose assets must be frozen.19 The Committee has been vested with special powers to acquire intelligence and information in possession of the government departments and the civil service, even if it involves waiving the Official Secrecy Act. When necessary, it can request further investigations from the UIC, the CONSOB and the Guardia di Finanza. On the basis of these new measures and with the support of better coordination, Italy managed by September 2002 to freeze over 70 accounts, totalling €483,000.20 In August 2002, Italy joined the United States in submitting to the UN the names of 25 individuals and companies linked to al-Qa’ida, so that their assets would be frozen worldwide.21 On 14 January 2003, Italy ratified and brought into effect the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and introduced a number of provisions to adjust Italian domestic legislation accordingly. The ratification law placed emphasis on the liability of entities and companies involved in financing terrorism and the need to protect the victims of terrorism. All these new measures have helped to address issues of terrorist financing in Italy. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how effective the system actually is. Although major structural changes are no longer required, there is little doubt that the various monitoring and tracking systems introduced still need to be perfected, and that suspicious transactions both in the area of money-laundering and terrorist financing need to be more properly scrutinised.

Protecting Italian territory from a terrorist attack In view of the specific threats against Italy emanating from al-Qa’ida leaders and from related organisations operating in Iraq, the government adopted a series of very specific preventive measures. Just after 11 September, a total of 1,500 police forces were deployed in over 150 key strategic locations, such as airports, power stations, water supply systems, foreign embassies, NATO and American bases, the Vatican, as well as around renowned artistic monuments in Rome, Venice and Florence. Police forces received the support


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of over 4,600 servicemen belonging to the Army, in what was called ‘Operation Domino’. The display of forces decreased progressively, however, as the risks subsided, though the operation remained active and the level of alert relatively high during 2002 and 2003. In the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, and in view of the growing threat resulting from the presence of Italian troops in Iraq, the Minister of the Interior agreed to increase the number of police forces and Carabinieri to patrol sensitive areas. In August 2004 the total number of potential targets under protection grew to 13,241, protected by over 23,400 military and police officers. Efforts were also conducted to address the growing concern among government officials that Islamic terrorists and weaponry might penetrate Italian territory undetected, linked to the flow of North African and Balkan illegal immigrants who regularly reach the Italian coasts. To address this concern, the Italian government improved the implementation of bilateral agreements reached with various neighbouring countries across the Mediterranean aimed at curbing the flow of immigrants. For example, Italy re-invigorated an agreement reached with Albania in the late 1990s, which allowed Italian ships, personnel and sensors to patrol the Albanian coasts, in order to prevent illegal Albanian immigrants from reaching Italy. A similar bilateral agreement was also reached with Libya in August 2004 after relations between Libya and western countries improved. The agreement included information exchanges regarding illegal immigrant flows between the two countries, the patrolling of Libyan coasts by joint Italian–Libyan naval, aerial and land patrolling units, and Italian training support for the Libyan police.22 These agreements and a higher level of alert along the Italian coasts have significantly reduced the number of illegal immigrants reaching the Italian coast. Between July 2003 and June 2004 the number of illegal immigrants totalled 9,985, almost half the amount of the previous year, when the number of illegal immigrants totalled 19,294. Further, between July 2003 and June 2004, the number of illegal immigrants stopped at the frontiers and not allowed into the country was 25,748, down from 31,838 in 2002–2003.23 Regarding the consequences of a nuclear, biological or chemical attack, the existing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) unit of the Armed Forces, whose initial purpose was to protect Italian or other NATO forces abroad from WMD attacks, was revamped after 11 September. It was made responsible for uncovering and neutralising a potential attack involving nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons on Italian territory. Because of the absence of an effective civilian structure to address the consequences of a WMD attack, the CBRN regiment was made responsible for training the personnel of the civilian organs involved in civil defence and for assisting them in the protection of the civilian population in case of attack. Efforts were also made to develop more effective civilian structures

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to respond to an NBC attack. In addition, the Ministry of Health sent a plan to regional governments, local health authorities, hospitals and doctors containing instructions regarding the need to enhance the surveillance of infectious diseases considered to be a risk for Italian citizens. The material sent consisted of information files on biological and chemical agents that could present a risk to public health if used by terrorists in an attack. Five million smallpox vaccines were placed at the disposal of hospitals, while other relevant vaccines were produced in greater quantities.24 The 11 September attacks clearly indicated the need to enhance the protection of Italian skies, and as a result, additional financial resources were devoted to improve the country’s air surveillance and boost Italy’s air defences. Security was enhanced at international and national airports, and civilian planes were subjected to more rigorous controls. Improvement of the country’s air defence system also became a top priority of the Italian government in general and the Italian Air Force more specifically.25 The Air Force increased the number of fighter planes on quick reaction alert, and reduced their time of take off and response. In addition, the Air Force enhanced Italy’s overall defensive network, which is directly linked to NATO. More specifically, the Air Force developed the capability to provide a full-protective aerial shield over sensitive areas and key strategic locations, although limited in time-span and geographic extension. The shield is achieved through constant air patrolling over the protected areas, with the support of the Army and the Navy radar anti-aircraft missile systems. These enhanced measures have also been put in place over specific locations during special occasions when there was a fear of a terrorist attack, such as the NATO–Russia summit held in Pratica di Mare on 28 May 2002. To boost the country’s air defences, the Italian Ministry of Defence acquired two SPS-117 mobile radars from Lockheed Martin and examined the possibility of acquiring airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). In addition, in July 2002, Defence Minister Antonio Martino expressed Italy’s commitment to acquire 121 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, designed specifically for air defence purposes.26 The definite number of Eurofighter planes to be acquired remains under discussion, although a first batch of four aircraft has already arrived in Italy. The Italian government also leased 34 F-16 ADF fighters from the United States. The first batch arrived in Italy in 2003 and has since been involved in quick-response operations.27 Italy also examined the possibility of developing theatre missile defence capabilities, on the basis of the MEADS programme.28 Italy’s participation in the development of the programme was approved by the Italian Parliament in the summer of 2004, but the project might not go ahead because of lack of funding. Most of these acquisitions and programmes had been planned and partially implemented before the 11 September terrorist attacks, whereas others started receiving additional support and funding from the government since the attacks, given their relevance and priority. The enormous budget deficit in


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Italy – 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2003 – has interfered with government attempts to find and allocate the necessary resources. In fact, a turf battle has ensued between the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defence over resources. Both departments are trying to avoid the implementation of the budgetary cuts demanded by the Treasury. The Defence Ministry seems to be at the losing end. During the summer of 2004, it was forced to reduce its budget by €907 million, out of a total budget of roughly €20 billion. These cuts, to be applied in the second half of the year, are already having a negative impact on training, maintenance and programmes, even though the €1.2 billion earmarked to cover the costs of military operations abroad, which are not part of the Ministry of Defence Budget, has not been cut. The defence budget is expected to remain unchanged at the very best during 2005. Therefore the implementation of the programmes already approved is far from certain. Homeland security instead is receiving additional funding, even though the budgetary increases are occurring slowly and in the absence of a fund specifically earmarked for combating terrorism. Funding to cover the vast array of services involved in the protection of the Italian mainland from a terrorist attack – police, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, coast guards, forest guards, intelligence services, civil protection services – totalled €13.8 billion in 2001, €15 billion in 2002, €15.87 billion in 2003, and €16.88 billion in 2004. Although these increases are quite significant they are still mostly intended to cover personnel costs and not intended for the acquisition of new technology.29 Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu is suggesting that the expenses incurred in the fight against terrorism be excluded from the calculations of the national budget deficit allowed under the current Maastricht rules. Although there is growing consensus among EU counterparts for such a move, it might take time before it is actually approved. On the other hand, the EU is planning to assist EU member states in their fight against terrorism through the European Security Research Programme. The programme, to be by operational by 2007 with a budget of €1 billion, is aimed at developing new technologies that might enhance EU security, such as protection of networks, interoperability of control and communications systems, and situation awareness.30 To react better to a terrorist attack, the counter-terrorist units of the Carabinieri – the Gruppo Intervento Speciale or GIS – and of the civilian police – the Divisione Operazioni Speciali/Nucleo Operativo Centrale Sicurezza, or DOS/NOCS – are currently being revamped, and are receiving additional training and funding, also in view of the threat posed by indigenous terrorist groups, such as the new Red Brigades and various anarchic groups. These forces have been trained specifically to conduct counter-terrorist operations in Italy and abroad, and have been involved in the release of hostages, the freeing of hijacked airplanes and buses, and the capture of war criminals. Both

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these units cooperate closely with other foreign counter-terrorist units, such as the British SAS, the Spanish UEI and GEO, the French GIGN, the German GSG-9 and SEK, the American HRT and the Israeli YAMAN units. Police cooperation at EU and international levels existed before 11 September, and has been much enhanced since.31 Internal coordination and cooperation between the Carabinieri, the civilian police and the Guardia di Finanza remains rather limited, and forces somewhat antagonistic. Much still needs to be done in order to coordinate better planning and operations. Similarly, there remains a gap in terms of countering the effects of a potentially devastating attack. The response to a potential attack against a target on Italian territory is to be handled at the operational level by the Department of Civil Protection, which is part of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet and is supposed to coordinate the activities of firemen, forest guards, the Red Cross and the health emergency services after an attack occurs. The level of preparedness of this unit after 11 September was rather low, given the lack of effective training, funding, adequate equipment and technology, and ineffective command and control structures. Over the past year, however, the various emergency services have been receiving additional resources, better training and new equipment. In the spring of 2004, for the first time, major training exercises simulating terrorist attacks involving CBRN weapons against major cities were conducted in the cities of Rome and Genoa. In addition, the safety and security of Italian nuclear sites has been greatly increased, and SOGIN or Societa’ Gestione Impianti Nucleari, the Italian company responsible for Italy’s civilian nuclear industry, is strongly advocating the disposal of all the remains of the country’s former civilian nuclear programme in a single, safe and secure, underground site. Improvements are in evidence in terms of countering the proliferation and transit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material through Italian territory. The Italian government has also worked quite effectively, and in close cooperation with the United States, in order to counter the potential smuggling of WMD material transiting through Italian territory. Primary responsibility for such activities lies in the hands of the intelligence unit of the Defence Ministry, the Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare, or SISMI, which provides the necessary information for police and customs to act effectively at operational levels. According to experts, Italy has become an important transit stage for the smuggling of WMD material and related equipment to Middle Eastern countries. In October 2003, Italian officials seized a load of centrifuges capable of producing enriched uranium from a ship destined for Libya, which was stopped at the southern Italian port of Taranto.32 Although the operation was conducted by Italian officials, it was the result of joint intelligence cooperation with the United States. In fact, information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Italy and the United States has improved significantly since 11 September. Cooperation has also improved with Italy’s European allies, although this is also


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based on a longer tradition of joint operations, through the Bern Group, which brings together the intelligence services of European countries, to share and exchange information. The Italian government is also currently discussing a wide-ranging reform of the country’s intelligence services. The draft project, the so-called ‘Frattini Reform’, has unfortunately become hostage to existing disagreements between the Interior and the Defence Ministries. Whereas Interior Minister Pisanu favours the establishment of a single intelligence service, in order to enhance efficiency, Defence Minister Martino opposes the merging of the existing civilian and military intelligence services, the SISDE (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica) and SISMI (Servizi di Informazione e Sicurezza della Repubblica Italiana) respectively, because the MoD would lose direct control over SISMI, and because the new structure would fall directly under the control of the government, or Presidenza del Consiglio. The intelligence services are also suffering from a lack of proper funding – a mere €500 million were allocated to the services in 2004 – and this is having a negative impact on the performance and capabilities of the two agencies.

Italy’s participation in counter-terrorist operations Italy has been involved in counter-terrorist operations against al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, in support of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. In November 2001, the government dispatched the first Italian Naval Group, composed of the aircraft carrier Garibaldi, as well as various frigates and patrolling vessels, to the area of operations in the Indian Ocean. The naval group was involved in ‘sea control’ and ‘maritime interdiction and interception’ operations as well as ‘close air support’ and ‘air interdiction’ operations on Afghan territory. Due to strong domestic opposition to Italy’s participation in combat operations, Navy pilots were forbidden from dropping ammunition on enemy targets and were restricted in their activities to the designation of targets and the provision of cover to American aircraft. In February 2002, the second Italian Naval Group was sent to the Arabian Sea, again to conduct ‘sea control’ and ‘maritime interdiction and interception’ operations. The entire group returned to Italy in early 2003. Since February 2003, Italy’s participation in ‘Enduring Freedom’ has been conducted within the context of EUROMARFOR, the joint Italian–Spanish– French–Portuguese naval unit. EUROMARFOR has become involved in identification, reconnaissance and surveillance operations, maritime interdiction operations, and leadership interdiction operations, as well as monitoring potential illegal trafficking operations. Italy has also been participating since its inception in October 2001 in NATO’s operation ‘Active Endeavour’, which is tasked to intercept suspicious vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.

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In addition, in 2001 Italy dispatched two C-130 J transport aircraft to the Kyrgyz airport of Manas, where they have been involved since the beginning of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in tactical transport operations. In February 2003, Italy also sent 1,000 Alpine troops to fight against al-Qa’ida remnants based along the border with Pakistan. The Alpine contingent was replaced by a regiment-size Parachute Brigade task force in June 2003, which had been trained in mountain warfare, and which had the support of the Italian special forces. The Parachute Brigade stayed in Afghanistan until September 2003, and returned thereafter. Italy remains committed to ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. Potential future operations are currently under assessment by the Italian government in concert with its allies. Italy is also participating in the NATO-led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) peace support operation currently deployed in Afghanistan. Although not directly responsible for fighting against Taliban and al-Qa’ida forces in Afghanistan, ISAF is, nonetheless, contributing to efforts to stabilise the country and create the conditions for holding democratic elections. Since December 2001, Italy has contributed a 500-man strong task force, which in September 2004 was doubled. Italy has also been one of the major contributors to the US-led military operation in Iraq, and since mid-2003 deployed a joint task force of 3,000 men, supported by a helicopter squadron, in the southern area of Nasiriya. Although the Italian participation is being described by the government as a peace support operation, counter-terrorist measures are increasingly being utilised by the Italian contingent to respond to the growing number of terrorist attacks. In November 2003, the Italian contingent deployed in Nasiriya suffered a bloody car-bomb attack, in which 19 Carabinieri were killed and another 20 Carabinieri, soldiers and civilians were injured. Ever since, the Italian contingent has faced stronger opposition from the Iraqi resistance, and has been forced to engage in direct fights and pitched battles. Italy has also had to face the anguish of a series of kidnappings, more recently of two NGO workers, some of which ended in tragedy (a private security contractor and a journalist were killed in April and September 2004 respectively), and which have significantly shocked Italian public opinion. Although the current government does not plan to withdraw the Italian contingent in full from Iraq, a change of government and increased public anger at the number of casualties could eventually result in a change of position. With respect to participating in similar or other counter-terrorism operations in the near future, Italy is trying to sharpen its expeditionary capabilities, within NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment, in order to establish the NATO Reaction Force (NRF). At the NATO Prague Summit, the Italian government committed itself to acquire 22 C-130J (which it did), 12 C-27J air transport planes (which should be ready by 2007), as well as four Boeing 767 air-to-air refuelling (expected to be available between 2006 and 2009).33 Italy expressed its willingness to develop airborne electronic


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countermeasures systems, and to improve the capabilities of its fighterbomber force. Italy also promised to provide the NRF with a well-trained and wellequipped professional Division composed of three Brigades. In addition, Italy is contributing to the NATO airborne ground surveillance system, which is entering full development phase. It is committed to improving NATO’s NBC protection capacity, and to developing Precision Guided Munitions capabilities.34 After the NATO Prague Summit, there were high expectations that most of these programmes would receive the necessary funding. In December 2002, Defence Minister Martino stated that Italy would spend around €250 million per year, starting in 2004 and over a period of five years, reaching a total of €1.250 million.35 Most of these promised funds were never made available, however, and instead the Italian Ministry of Defence has had to use part of its ordinary funding to acquire some of the new capabilities. Italy is also participating in EU efforts aimed at establishing a 60,000 strong rapid deployment force, by committing itself to deploy a maximum of 20,000 personnel for short-term operations, or 13,000 for longer-term deployments. Italy is also participating in the launch of the force, called the EU Battle-group, comprised of 1,500 soldiers and expected to be fully operational by the end of 2007. In its efforts to develop an effective expeditionary force, Italy is also developing its helicopter fleet. It has acquired a series of A-129 combat helicopters, and is in the process of obtaining 60 NH90-TTH helicopters for tactical transport of troops, and 54 NH90-NFH helicopters, primarily conceived for autonomous Anti-Submarine Warfare and Anti-Surface Unit Warfare missions, but also capable of troop transport, and naval search and rescue/CSAR operations. Italy is also acquiring EH101 helicopters for medium-range transport and combat support, and planning to acquire ten new frigates, which should be involved both in air defence and land attack operations using a combination of missiles, guns and helicopters. These elements, if properly developed, could provide support and combat capabilities in expeditionary operations involving counter-terrorist options. To conduct covert counter-terrorist operations, Italy is enhancing the capabilities of its military special forces, by providing them with additional funding and training. Most importantly, the Italian Armed Forces are establishing a Joint Special Forces Command, under the direct responsibility of the Joint Chief of Staff, which will combine special forces from all three services. The new Command will also enable Special Forces to be used more strategically and effectively during combined operations. The Special Forces of the Italian Army and the Italian Navy – the Army’s 9th regiment airborne assault troops Col Moschin, and the Navy’s Gruppo Operativo Incursori of the Commando Subacqueo Incursori – are responsible for counter-terrorist operations against terrorist or guerrilla forces and enemy forces abroad and

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at home. Their tasks involve operations such as actions of sabotage, destruction of key enemy infrastructure, intelligence-gathering, and freeing of hostages. The Italian Air Force has also recently established its own Special Forces, which are expected to grow gradually in terms of numbers and expand in terms of capabilities. Moreover, the Army is currently setting up a robust ‘ranger-type’ force, made up of specially trained light infantry units – the Monte Cervino Alpine parachutist regiment and the Lagunari amphibious regiment – able to carry out a variety of missions, from certain types of special forces operations to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency activities. Finally, the Army has established a special battalion – the 185th Folgore battalion – dedicated to infiltrate enemy lines, to carry out surveillance, as well as target acquisition and target designation activities. This special battalion has been operating quite successfully in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

Outstanding shortcomings and concerns The Italian government reacted rapidly to address the various needs to counter a terrorist threat. Nevertheless, much work still needs to be done. A proper assessment of Italian anti-terrorism capabilities would actually require them being tested in real life, in which a terrorist attack did occur or was about to occur. So far, this has not happened, and Italy has been able to avert any significant attacks, and disrupt various al-Qa’ida cells based in the country. Moreover, Italy has proved it can participate, albeit in a limited fashion, with the United States in a counter-terrorist operation, such as ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan and ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in Iraq. Italy still remains in a position of weakness because of its geographic location near the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East, the large number of illegal immigrants of Muslim origin, and the relative lack of preparedness to counter a terrorist attack. Although important efforts are currently being made, be it in curbing al-Qa’ida cells, freezing its assets, increasing air defences, and enhancing counter-terrorist capabilities, Italy remains a relatively soft target. The absence of an effective and clearly targeted government policy to integrate the various immigrants of Muslim origin into Italian society has resulted in the growing marginalisation of the Muslim community. As a result, many of its members fall prey to the terrorist option. Moreover, Italy’s close involvement with the United States in several crucial international issues affecting the Muslim world in the Middle East, such as the war against Iraq, has made Italy a more attractive target for future terrorist attacks. While maintaining good relations with Muslim states, Italy has changed its previous attitude towards Israel. Under the government of Silvio Berlusconi, Italy has become increasingly supportive and understanding of the Israeli position, which some believe place Italy higher on the al-Qa’ida target list.


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Notes and references 1. From discussions with Andrea Margelletti in February and March 2003. See also report produced by the ROS (Ragruppamento Operativo Speciale), the investigative branch of the Military Police or Carabinieri, and quoted by Claudia Fusani, ‘In Italia sono pronte decine di kamikaze’, La Repubblica, 17 March 2004, p. 1. 2. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qa’ida: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst & Co., 2002), p. 128. See also ‘Italia tra gli obiettivi di al-Qa’ida: La Relazione dei servizi segreti consegnata al Parlamento’, Corriere della Sera, 6 August 2002. 3. Seven al-Qa’ida prisoners kept in the American base at Guantánamo have apparently been recruited by this cell in Milan. See Luigi Ferrarella and Giuseppe Guastella, ‘Milano, fuga di interpreti dal processo al-Qa’ida’, Correire della Sera, 27 November 2002. 4. Magdi Allam, Bin Laden in Italia: Viaggio nel Islam Radicale (Milan: Mondadori, 2002), p. 17. 5. Stefano Dambruso, ‘Milano-Tbilisi (via Baku): La rotta della paura’, Panorama, 10 September 2004. 6. ‘Smantellata cellulla del terrorismo islamico’, La Repubblica, 5 April 2001, available at: http://www.repubblica.it/online/cronaca/ambasciata/ambasciata/ambasciata.html 7. ‘Sventato attacco al cianuro contro la sede USA a Roma’, La Repubblica, 14 October 2001, http://www.repubblica.it/online/cronaca/ambasciata/times/times.html Ben Khemais and three other Tunisians were condemned to 4–5 years in prison in February 2002. 8. Testo del decreto-legge 18 ottobre 2001, no. 374, coordinato con la legge di conversione 15 dicembre 2001, no. 438, recante: ‘Disposizioni urgenti per constrastare il terrorismo internazionale’, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, serie generale, no. 293, 18 dicembre 2001, p. 62. 9. Ibid, p. 66. See also ‘National report of the Republic of Italy pursuant to paragraph 6 of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)’, UNSC, S/2002/ 8, 2 January 2002, p. 4. 10. Testo del decreto-legge 18 ottobre 2001, pp. 64–6; and Corriere della Sera, 19 October 2001. 11. ‘Supplementary report by Italy to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)’, S/2003/724, 18 July 2003, p. 10. 12. Ministero dell’Interno, ‘I dati sugli arresti di terroristi in Italia’, Communicazione, 4 December 2004, available at: http://www.interno.it/news/pages/2003/200312/ news_000019050.htm Testimony of the Italian Interior Ministry, Mr Pisanu, to the Lower House of the Italian Parliament, on domestic and international terrorism, on 27 January 2003. See: http://www.interno.it/news/pages/2003/200301/ news_000017985.htm 13. ‘Stragi di Madrid, arresti a Milan’, La Repubblica, 8 June 2004. 14. Author discussions with Italian security officials, March 2003. 15. ‘National report of the Republic of Italy’, p. 4. 16. See: www.uic.it/liste/terrorismo.htm 17. Ufficio Italiano Cambi, Provvedimento 9 novembre 2001, ‘Istruzioni in materia di contrasto finanziario al terrorismo,’ Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 15 November 2001, p. 27; National report of the Republic of Italy, pp. 5–6. 18. Testo del decreto-legge 12 ottobre 2001, no. 369, coordinato con la legge di conversione 14 dicembre 2001, no. 431, recante ‘Misure urgenti per reprimere

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19. 20. 21.

22. 23.

24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35.

Europe Confronts Terrorism e contrastare il finanziamento del terrorismo internazionanale’, Gazzeta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 14 December 2001, p. 38. ‘Lotta al terrorismo finanziario: ‘Congelati’ 20 conti sospetti’, Il Sole 24 Ore, 10 November 2001, p. 4. ‘Supplementary report presented by Italy to the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee’, UNSC, S/2002/1390, 20 December 2002, p. 4. Alan P. Larson, Undersecretary of Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, ‘The international dimension of combating the financing of terrorism’, testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC, 19 September 2002, p. 2, available at: http://www.state.gov/e/rls.rm/2002/13598pf.htm ‘Immigrati, accordo con la Libia: pattuglie miste alle fronteire, La Repubblica, 12 August 2004, p. 1. Data provided by Giuseppe Pisanu, Minister of the Interior, at a Press Conference on 17 September 2004, available at: http://www.mininterno.it/news/pages/2004/ 200409/news_000019970.htm ‘Piano di emergenza contro il bioterrorismo’, Corriere della Sera, 11 October 2001, p. 1. Intervento del Ministro della Difesa, Onorevole Antonio Martino all Commissione Difesa Camera, Rome, 9 July 2002, available at: http:www.difesa.it/ministro/ audizioni/2002/Luglio2002/audizione_9_Luglio_2002.htm Ibid. La Difesa, Libro Bianco, 2002, Parte IX: I Materiali, Programmi di ammodernamento nel settore dei materiali aeronautici, available at: http://www.difesa.it/librobianco/ 2002/parte9.htm Intervento del Ministro della Difesa, Onorevole Antonio Martino alla Commissione Difesa Camera, Rome, 9 July 2002. Il Sole 24 Ore, 12 September 2004. ‘EU blueprint for Security Research Programme,’ Brussels, 9 September 2004, http://europa.eu.int/cgi-bin/etal.pl Discussions between the authors and Italian security officials and analysts, February/ March 2003. Gary Younge, ‘Uranium kit seizure pushed Libya to come clean’, Guardian, 2 January 2004, p. 5. Intervento del Ministro della Difesa, Onorevole Antonio Martino, alle Commissioni Difesa del Senato e della Camera, Rome, 17 December 2002, p. 8, available at: http://www.difesa.it/ministro/audizioni/2002/Dicembre2002/audizione_17_Dicembre_ 2002.htm Ibid. Ibid.

5 Nordic Responses Sara Myrdal

When the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was assassinated outside a cinema in central Stockholm in 1986, it was one the few times in modern history that the inhabitants of a Nordic country had been confronted with deadly violence directed against a political leader. The murder of Olof Palme shocked the nation, but it was not until the same tragic scenario repeated itself in September 2003 – with the killing of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh – that the Swedish people started questioning some of the freedoms of open democracy that the country has cherished for the past hundred years. The relative lack of direct experience with different types of politically or religiously motivated violence and terror, which characterises all the Nordic countries, is fairly unique in a European perspective. The number of major terror-related incidents that have occurred in the Nordic region during recent decades is in fact so low that they may be summarised in a short paragraph.1 The previous inexperience in countering terrorism, in combination with a traditionally strong popular support for respecting human rights and civil liberties, are only two of the qualities that make the Nordics interesting to include in a study of European counter-terrorist responses. This chapter will analyse how the Nordic governments have handled the challenges posed by the attacks on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent course of events. ‘Responses’ has been interpreted broadly to cover both reactions (publicly expressed perceptions and attitudes) and actions (such as specific measures and reforms). The chapter will examine not only domestic responses, but also those that impact on international events. Questions that will be dealt with are: How did the Nordic governments respond to the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq? In what ways did Nordic actions on the international arena affect national perceptions of security and vulnerability? What types of domestic reforms have the terror attacks instigated? What are the main consequences thus far for Nordic governments in terms of national security and integration? 95

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Common values, regional cooperation and diversity in northern Europe In order to provide a better understanding of the Nordic counter-terrorist responses, this section briefly describes the countries in the region followed by a review of current Nordic cooperative frameworks. To treat the Nordic states as an homogenous group constitutes a crude simplification of reality. The perception of ‘Norden’ as a region of very similar states is, for natural reasons, more commonly embraced by non-Nordic people.2 Even the Nordics themselves, however, generally admit that there is sufficient similarity between the countries in the region to allow the use of expressions such as the ‘Nordic model’ when referring to the existence of certain norms and values that seem to pervade Nordic societies.3 Nordic populations, for example, all have a fairly similar conceptualisation of what constitutes the ‘good state’, meaning the existence of a comparatively strong public sector, welfare systems based on the principle of universality, a significant emphasis on local government, the free and equal exercise of civil rights, including freedom of speech and transparency in policy-making (the principle of public access to public records).4 This vision of the ‘good’, liberal, welfare state, embraced by the Nordics, has also served as a catalyst for the establishment of foreign aid policies. As domestic institutions have been required to take responsibility for the weak and impoverished, the logical extension of this commitment has been a global one.5 In international comparisons of foreign aid contributions, Nordic states have thus consistently been among the leading donor countries of the world in percentage terms. The Nordic countries have also frequently been considered to act as international ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in the field of conflict prevention.6 The norms and values put forth by the Nordic countries in the areas of global welfare (including respect for human rights and civil liberties) and conflict prevention could well be argued to comprise part of the national identities of the Nordic states and contributes as well to the definition of their interests and policies. Norway, Sweden and Finland all have common borders. Being a kingdom of islands (and one peninsula), Denmark has no territorial borders with the other Nordics but for the past few years has been linked to Sweden through the bridge over Öresund and shares its southern border with Germany. Even if Iceland remains geographically aloof and thus comparatively isolated, the populations of the other Nordic ‘mainland countries’, including Denmark, have always displayed a significant intra-regional mobility. A facilitating circumstance has been the Nordic Passport Union, which was established after World War II, granting all Nordic citizens the right to travel freely and take up residence throughout the region.7 The open borders in the Nordic region have also given rise to extensive cooperation between the police and customs services on matters related to

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trans-border crime. There are additional agreements establishing the principles for information-sharing and joint investigations as well as common rules for extraditing criminals between Nordic states. Another area where the Nordics have engaged in cooperation is in civil protection.8 Although these sub-regional arrangements have been integrated into the larger cooperative frameworks of the EU (the Schengen agreement, Europol and the community mechanism in the area of civil protection) and NATO/ EAPC, they have not lost their importance and are still maintained as complementary structures. The agreement regulating the Nordic police and customs cooperation was updated in 2003, and the collaboration in the area of civil protection has also been boosted significantly following the events of 11 September. Despite cooperative endeavours and common characteristics uniting the Nordics, there are also dividing lines within the region. 9 The geopolitical realities of the cold war led to diverging security policy orientations. The west-Nordic countries’ decision to join NATO after World War II, and the Finnish and Swedish decisions to opt for other security arrangements, limits Nordic cooperation in the transatlantic context. Even given the official policy of non-alignment, maintaining the ‘transatlantic link’ has historically been as important for Sweden as for the NATO-allies Norway and Denmark, whereas Finland, due to its geographical position, has placed less emphasis on nurturing the transatlantic relationship. Also in the EU-context, the Nordics enjoy different, country-specific solutions, with Norway and Iceland belonging to the category of non-members (but nevertheless having access to the internal market), Denmark distinguishing itself by its various opt-outs (notably in the area of ESDP and the EMU) and Sweden remaining outside the Euro-zone. All of the factors mentioned above – the common norms and values as well as the specific characteristics of the countries in the region – have contributed to shape the Nordic reactions and responses to the events of 11 September, creating important similarities, but also differences in perceptions and in the implementation of policies.

Responses in the international arena The Nordic states also expressed their solidarity with the United States, similar to the rest of the international community, after the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. All the Nordic countries declared themselves willing to take part in the international ‘war’ against terrorism led by President Bush. The responses of the Nordics after the initial declarations of support and solidarity have, however, revealed diverging views concerning how far they have been willing to go to show their solidarity with the United States and the methods and resources they have been willing to use. One of the dividing lines among the Nordic countries concerning these issues has been the different

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membership arrangements with NATO and the EU, but a number of other factors have also played a role in determining the responses – factors related to national perceptions of identity and the domestic political situation in each country. Reactions to the military campaign in Afghanistan The military actions against the Taliban regime and the al-Qa’ida network in Afghanistan, launched in October 2001, were part of the first phase in the international US-led ‘war’ against terrorism. The initial reactions of the Nordic political leaders towards the campaign in Afghanistan were thus in many ways a first test of their willingness to stand behind the United States in the fight against terrorism. The responses of the Nordic countries also revealed different attitudes towards the role of the UN and the choices between military and civilian/humanitarian methods. NATO-members Norway and Denmark did not hesitate in their decisions to meet the US bid for military support. Following the announcement on 12 September that the NATO defence ministers were considering the activation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Norway’s Defence Minister Bjørn Tore Godal immediately confirmed Norway’s position: ‘The United States is Norway’s most important ally. Norway is already providing intelligence assistance to the United States. If we receive a request for further support, including military support, we will of course respond positively and in accordance with the obligations of Article 5 of the NATO-treaty. Norwegian authorities are taking these obligations of solidarity very seriously.’10 Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen was equally straightforward when he expressed Denmark’s stance: ‘I am ready. My country Denmark is ready and the signal to the US is clear: Tell us what you need!’11 These expressions of solidarity from the Danish and Norwegian governments were reflected in domestic opinion polls in the two countries. According to an international opinion poll (that included all NATO and EU members), which was conducted during the weeks following the 11 September attacks, Denmark was the West European country where the people were most willing to provide military support to the United States – as many as 80 per cent of the Danish population were at this early stage supportive of participation in US-led military actions. In Norway, similarly, support was comparatively high.12 In the non-aligned countries Sweden and Finland, public reactions were different. The attitudes amongst the population on the issue of participation in the military campaign against Afghanistan were overwhelmingly negative. In Finland the level of resistance was the highest of all the EU-countries, with 84 per cent against Finnish involvement in the military campaign.13 This was reflected in the stance adopted by the Finnish government.14 The Finnish political leaders did not hesitate to demonstrate their lack of support for a unilateral military attack. When asked about the Finnish position towards participation in the Afghanistan campaign, President Tarja Halonen declared

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that Finland would not be involved, ‘in any way in any military response’, and that, ‘Finland’s contribution in the fight against terrorism is in protecting democracy and the rule of law’.15 This attitude was emphasised in comments made by Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomija: ‘We must act according to our values of democracy and humanity. Warlike talk and the incitement of a mentality of revenge are not among these.’16 The perceived lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Finnish government for participation in the ‘war’ against terrorism was criticised by certain analysts, who argued that this attitude would eventually marginalise Finland and reduce its influence in the international arena. One critical voice arguing along these lines was the former Finnish Ambassador to the UN, Max Jakobson, who claimed that Finland’s reluctance to be more actively involved in the campaign against terror was a threat to Finnish security: ‘Finland is no longer a country that is hidden away and forgotten. . . . The security of our country cannot be protected under present circumstances by pulling off to the side.’17 In Sweden, opinion polls from November 2001 revealed a population largely against participation in military action in Afghanistan.18 Although no commitments of military support were made by Sweden, the Swedish government was generally more positive towards US policies than its eastern neighbour. The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson was in fact rather keen to ally himself with the US cause and had chosen to address the nation on the day after the attacks with the words: ‘Today we are all Americans’ – a statement which caused one of Sweden’s leading newspapers to editorialise: ‘For the first time in years a Swedish politician was able to talk about a spirit of community with the United States as a natural thing.’19 This relatively strong backing of the Swedish Prime Minister for the US Afghanistan campaign also prompted criticism from the left-wing party and from influential members within his own governing party. One of the contentious issues concerned the question of whether US military actions could be regarded as a legitimate act of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 in the UN-charter. The Swedish government had traditionally defended the need for a restrictive interpretation of Article 51 but was now abandoning this position. This was made very clear during a much publicised visit by Prime Minister Göran Persson to Ground Zero in New York, several months after the attacks: ‘The tragic events that happened here could have happened anywhere in the world. The United States has a right of self-defence. If we would deny the United States this legitimate right that would also have serious consequences for the credibility of the United Nations.’20 Those critical of the government’s position vis-à-vis the military campaign saw this as one of many examples of how Sweden was becoming ‘a vehicle of American interests’. Instead of pleasing the US leadership, they argued, Sweden ought to ‘raise its voice’ and support other methods of combating terror that were more in line with Sweden’s traditional values and foreign policy strategies.21

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‘Enemy combatants’ at Guantánamo base Differences in position among the Nordic countries towards the US campaign in Afghanistan were also illustrated by the cases of the Swede and the Dane at the Guantánamo military base in Cuba. After several months of bombing and land operations in Afghanistan, US forces began transferring captured Taliban soldiers to the American naval base in Guantánamo. Among the first prisoners to be sent to the military base was a 24-year old Swede who had been arrested in Pakistan (close to the border with Afghanistan) in late January. Denmark as well had one of its citizens transferred to the American base. The approach of the two governments in dealing with the issue of their imprisoned nationals differed considerably. In sharp deviance from its previous US-friendly stance, the Swedish government adopted a very tough attitude towards the issue of the detained Swede, which also marked the beginning of a new, relatively strained period in US–Swedish relations.22 The story of the Swede – held in a cage and classified as ‘enemy combatant’ – had not been accorded much attention in the media at first, but gradually found its way onto the front pages of both Swedish and international newspapers. These reports triggered a public outcry against the ‘inhuman’ treatment of the Swedish national. In response to domestic pressure, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly approached the American government with written and verbal declarations, criticising the American decision to deny the Swedish prisoner his status and rights as a ‘prisoner of war’ (his right of legal proceedings) and arguing that the US government should either present valid evidence or release him.23 The Swedish position was supported by Finnish Foreign Minister Tuomioja, who denounced the US treatment of the prisoners in Cuba as completely unacceptable: ‘The United States cannot unilaterally decide on the status of the prisoners. International treaties require that in disputed cases a court should be the one to decide.’24 The Danish government’s reaction to the US treatment of the Guantánamo prisoner differed from that of Sweden and Finland. While the Swedish government asked for regular updates of the legal situation of the Swedish prisoner, the Danish Foreign Minister expressed understanding of US actions and attempted to justify the treatment of the incarcerated Dane. The Danish government’s attitude was criticised by human rights organisations. In a strongly worded article, published in one of Denmark’s leading newspapers, the Secretary General of Amnesty International in Denmark accused the Danish government of ‘complicity with the US’.25 The Danish Foreign Ministry replied to the criticism in a press release issued by Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller, who described the Danish government’s position as follows: The fight against terrorism has provided new challenges and problems for international society and we cannot always find the answer to those

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problems in international law. In order to build an effective defence against terror, Denmark together with all the other democratic states, has to find new strategies. This applies also to the case of the prisoners at Guantánamo. Building a defence against terror implies finding those people who may be actively supporting terror, and those people may not be released as long as their case is being investigated.26 The military campaign against Iraq Many of the issues that divided the Nordics during the first phase of the international US-led ‘war’ against terrorism – the criticism against US unilateralism, the choices between military and civilian/humanitarian methods and the role of the UN – became even more profound following the US decision to start a military campaign against Iraq. The unity of views within the Nordic group proved to be considerably stronger in the case of Iraq than in the run-up to the military actions in Afghanistan. The deep divisions within Europe about the looming war, and the growing transatlantic tensions created a situation where the positions of Norway, Sweden and Finland were brought more closely together, while Denmark’s already strong backing of US policies became even more apparent. This was clearly illustrated when the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as the only Nordic Prime Minister, signed the European pro-war statement circulated by the United Kingdom in the beginning of February 2003. With this public declaration of support, Denmark placed itself within the US-friendly camp of eight European states referred to as the ‘new Europe’ by US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld in January 2003. Despite strong domestic criticism (79 per cent of the population opposed an attack without a UN-mandate), the Danish Prime Minister stated that Denmark would support a US attack even without a new Security Council Resolution on Iraq. Denmark was also one of the first countries to announce a contribution of military resources. Among the Danish opposition parties, these pro-American expressions of solidarity caused severe consternation and the government received sharp criticism for not securing stronger support from Parliament before acting. The argument presented by the opposition and in the media was that Denmark, with its decision to stand behind the United States, had placed itself on a sidetrack in Europe and in the EU.27 In response to the criticism, Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen published an explanatory article in one of the leading Danish newspapers. The article, which appeared in Berlingske Tidende on 26 March, contained a forceful justification for the path chosen: ‘The decision was based on a sober-minded analysis of Denmark’s long-term security interests. Who can, after all, guarantee Denmark’s security? Germany? France? No, on the present stage of the development of the European cooperation, we Europeans cannot ensure our

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own security . . . Denmark can no longer just sail under a flag of convenience and let others fight for freedom and peace. There has in fact been too much of that kind in the past.’28 In Stockholm, Foreign Minister Lindh expressed her unhappiness with the Danish adherence to the ‘gang of eight’, arguing that such unilateral initiatives were ‘not good for the common European policy’.29 Prime Minister Persson used even stronger words, arguing that signing the letter was ‘very unfortunate’ since it revealed the disunity among European leaders and thus ‘played directly into the hands of Saddam Hussein’.30 The Swedish government also distinguished itself as the most vocal opponent amongst the Nordics of a military attack without an explicit UN-mandate. In contrast to the position adopted in relation to the US attack against Afghanistan (which had been argued to be in full conformity with international law), the Iraq campaign was simply dismissed as ‘illegal’. The government’s position was well in tune with public opinion, as expressed in opinion polls, showing that as many as 90 per cent of Swedes were against unilateral, US-led military actions in Iraq. 31 In Finland, public opposition to a military attack in Iraq was as strong as in Sweden. The Finnish government also vocalised its discontent with US unilateralism. Helsinki’s line of support for the attempts of the UN to disarm Iraq of WMD, and the desire for UN-backing in case of an attack, resembled the Swedish position. The official declarations of the Finnish political leaders were, however, generally much more cautious than those expressed by the Swedish government. The Finnish government did not, for example, make a public declaration against the letter signed by the ‘gang of eight’.32 It was also less explicit than its Swedish counterpart in declaring the ‘illegality’ of an attack without a second Security Council Resolution. According to the Finnish Foreign Minister Tuomioja, the need for a new Resolution to legitimise an attack was not easy to assess and could be described as a ‘legal-theological splitting of hair’. Although the Finnish government’s official policy line on Iraq was more cautious than the Swedish, it was clearly not supportive of US actions. The Finnish government position on the Iraq war did, however, become an issue in domestic politics. The reason for this was that the Iraq issue was introduced as part of the campaign leading up to the Parliamentary elections in March 2003. It was the then-opposition leader for the Centre party, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, who decided to ‘play the Iraq card’ and accused the sitting Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen of misleading the public and secretly siding with the United States. She built her case on a number of documents, the sources of which she at first refused to reveal. Her accusations were looked upon as serious by the large majority of Finnish people opposing US policies on Iraq. Anneli Jäätteenmäki won the elections but was later forced to resign when it was revealed that she had lied about how she had obtained the secret documents.33

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For the Norwegian government, with its traditionally strong transatlantic orientation, the war against Iraq entailed a number of difficult choices. Norway had been a loyal ally to the United States during the campaign against Afghanistan and was still participating actively in military actions in Afghanistan when the US decision was made to attack Iraq.34 However, despite its previously active support for the ‘war’ against terrorism, Norway did not join Denmark in signing the European pro-war statement. In fact the Norwegian government was deeply divided on the Iraq issue and domestic opposition against war was also strong in Norway (89 per cent were against a military attack against Iraq without explicit UN approval). In a statement to Parliament made two days after the start of the war, Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik spelled out the Norwegian position: ‘Norway’s position is clear. We cannot lend our support to this war. Norway has consistently maintained that any military action must have a firm basis in international law in the form of a new decision by the UN Security Council. No such decision has been adopted.’35

Humanitarian aid and reconstruction: the Nordic way of tackling terrorism? Even if Sweden, Finland and Norway did not support the military attack against Iraq, they all declared a willingness at an early stage to contribute to the humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In April 2003, total Nordic funding for humanitarian aid and reconstruction already amounted to €100 million – a sum that may be compared to the common EU support for Iraq, which at the time was about €200 million for the period 2004–2006.36 The desire, expressed by all the Nordic governments in early 2003, to support the post-conflict efforts and the humanitarian work in Iraq was very much in keeping with the traditional Nordic approach to international politics and conflict management.37 When asked about the Swedish view on assisting in the reconstruction of Iraq, the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson noted: ‘Sweden has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq for many years. Now, when the needs are greater than ever, it is important for us to show solidarity with the people of Iraq. For Sweden the best way of getting to the roots of terrorism and avoiding future conflict is to promote democracy, institution-building and the rule of law and to get the economic processes going.’38 To use the tools of humanitarian aid and institution building as a means of tackling the threat from terrorism has, according to opinion polls, strong support amongst Nordic populations. This is notably evident in Sweden where studies have indicated that Sweden is the European country with the largest majority of people in favour of using humanitarian aid and democracy-building measures as a way of responding to the events of 11 September.39

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Responses in the domestic arena The terror attacks on 11 September and the subsequent course of events have in many ways challenged the widely embraced perception of the Nordic region as a comparatively safe place – geographically removed from the evils and dangers threatening the European continent and the wider international world. This has above all been apparent for the two NATO allies, Denmark and Norway, and especially for Denmark, which has consistently maintained its high level of support for US policies. The perceptions of threat conveyed by the Danish and Norwegian governments after the start of the military campaign in October 2001 have thus been much more pronounced than those expressed by the Swedish or Finnish governments. The fear of terrorism may be seen as one explanation for the comparatively forceful anti-terror legislation that was put forth by the Danish and Norwegian governments soon after the terror attacks against the United States. As will be shown below there have also been other factors that have played a significant role in determining the level of ambition and the focus of the legislative and institutional anti-terror reforms in the different Nordic countries. Examples of such factors are the growth of xenophobic, anti-immigration political currents and the impact of domestic reform processes initiated already before ‘9–11’. Perceptions of threat and vulnerability The only governments that have expressed fears of terror against their national territory after 11 September are the two NATO-allies, Denmark and Norway. Already on the day after the first military actions in Afghanistan, the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg issued a word of warning to the public: ‘Norway must expect the risk of terrorist attacks to increase following yesterday’s strikes against Afghanistan.’40 The domestic discussion of the threat from terrorism in Norway also gained in intensity as a result of a report in early February 2003, declaring that a Norwegian F16 fighter had dropped the first two Norwegian bombs since World War II, killing a number of Afghan rebels.41 In Denmark the focus on threats and vulnerability linked to international terrorism has been even greater. The need to boost the country’s internal security to meet the threat from terrorism was given top priority in Denmark after 11 September, and was even used as the chief argument for the Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen when, one month after the attacks against the United States, he called general elections several months in advance: ‘The world is not the same. In these times of uncertainty, security has to be ensured . . . after September 11 and with major decisions to be made on security, four months of election campaigning would not be good for Denmark.’42 The idea that Denmark is exposed to a ‘real threat’ from terrorism and must increase its preparedness to meet this challenge was also stated clearly in

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the work carried out by the Danish government’s Commission on Vulnerability which published its results in January 2004.43 The Commission pointed to active Danish support for the ‘war’ against terrorism as the chief explanation for the increased threat against the Danish ‘homeland’. In Finland and Sweden the attitude towards the threat from terrorism has been more cautious. Both governments have declared that the risk of attacks against their countries has increased, but that the likelihood of such attacks nevertheless must be regarded as very small. The concern for future attacks has been particularly low in Finland. This was illustrated by the domestic reactions after a spectacular bombing incident in a large shopping mall outside Helsinki in October 2002, killing seven people. Despite initial uncertainty concerning the nature and the purpose of the bomb tragedy, there was very little public discussion or speculation on possible terrorist motives or connections.44 In Sweden the domestic debate on the threat from terrorism was fuelled by an incident in September 2002, when a man was caught trying to carry a loaded pistol inside his hand luggage aboard a flight heading for London. The man was charged with planning to hijack the aircraft and was arrested pending a court appearance but was later declared innocent and released. The story got massive attention in the international media, where Sweden was described as a ‘safe harbour’ for terrorists. The reaction of the Swedish government to these accusations was relatively calm but did nevertheless reveal an increased threat-awareness. When confronted with the issue in a televised interview the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson replied: ‘Also for Sweden the events of September 11 have meant an increasing vulnerability. This has been shown by the recent incident and may well be shown again.’45 Even if Nordic governments have grown more concerned about the threat from terrorism, Nordic inhabitants seem to have remained relatively indifferent to the international terror alarms. European opinion polls have shown that the Nordic inhabitants belong to the category of EU-citizens who are the least worried about terror in their own countries. In a Eurobarometer survey published in November 2001, only about 3 per cent of Finns, 6 per cent of Danes and 7 per cent of Swedes feared a terror attack in their own country.46 A European ‘end of year poll’ from January 2003 also showed comparatively low figures with 7 per cent of Finns, 12 per cent of Danes, 15 per cent of Swedes and 16 per cent of Norwegians considering that the threat of terrorist attacks in their country was ‘high’.47 Counter-terrorism legislation and xenophobia The fight against terrorism and the risk of future attacks has given rise to intensive activity all over Europe to develop and sharpen existing legislative, regulatory and policing instruments. Much of the legislation post-‘9–11’ has been enacted with reference to Security Council Resolution 1373 from 28 September 2001 and the EU Framework Decision on terrorism that was

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agreed by the Ministers of Justice on 6–7 December 2001. Although both Res. 1373 and the EU Framework Decision point to a number of different measures that the member states are required to undertake, they do not indicate by which means these measures are to be carried out. The measures are also in several instances broadly defined, thus allowing considerable scope for interpretation. The Nordic country that has been prepared to go furthest in launching counter-terrorist legislation is Denmark. On 13 December 2001, the Minister for Immigration and Integration, Bertel Haarder, and the Minister of Justice, Lene Espersen, presented two government bills containing reforms of the immigration laws, the penal code, the weapons laws and the laws on extradition.48 The Danish bills were put forth in a domestic context increasingly dominated by anti-immigrant political currents. Although the growing popularity of far-right parties with xenophobic agendas is not a new feature of the European political landscape, the events in the United States seem to have contributed to reinforcing these tendencies. Denmark is one of the countries where the post-‘9–11’ anti-immigration, anti-Muslim sentiment has found its fullest expression. This was apparent already in the elections in November 2001, which resulted in strong support for the openly racist Danish Peoples Party (Dansk Folkeparti) led by Pia Kjaersgaard. The November elections also meant the return of the right in the form of a liberal-conservative minority government under Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The domestic counter-terrorist measures implemented shortly after 11 September by the Rasmussen government (‘Terrorpakken’), were far-reaching, with significant anti-immigration overtones. One of the measures included in the bill presented by the Ministry of Justice on 13 December was the possibility of extraditing nationals charged with terrorist acts committed abroad. The proposal also contained a reference to the degree of attachment of the prosecuted, meaning that a Danish citizen with a ‘weaker attachment’ (that is, individuals who are not nationals by birth but have acquired their nationality subsequently) would be more liable to extradition.49 The new rules further established close working relationships between the immigration authorities, the police and the security services. All aliens that were deemed to constitute a ‘danger to the society or the security or health of the population’ would be expelled.50 An additional amendment to the previous practice was that the police would be allowed to search the register of all asylum seekers without having to convince a judge that there was a real suspicion that the asylum seeker had committed an offence. According to the bill of 13 December, the police were also to be granted extended powers of investigation against terrorist suspects, including the right to conduct secret searches in cases when there had been indications of planned terror attacks. The government’s anti-terrorist legislation provided new legitimacy to the racist discourse of the far-right parties. In a speech in Parliament (Folketinget),

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in October 2001, Pia Kjærsgaard, the leader of the Danish People’s Party went beyond the infamous statement by the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (‘Western civilization is superior to Islam’) and declared: ‘It’s been said that 9/11 was the start of the clash of civilizations. I disagree since a clash would indicate that there are two civilizations, but that’s not true. There’s only one civilization and that’s ours.’51 Such drastic formulations were also part of the rhetoric at a party congress of the small Progress Party led by Mogens Glistrup, in November 2001. Glistrup then referred to his party’s fight for a ‘Muslimfree-country’ and several of the speakers argued for the need to find a solution to ‘the Muslim problem’.52 Even if the reforms of government met with strong resistance amongst Danish organisations acting in defence of human rights and civil liberties, there were no major popular rumblings regarding the new anti-terrorist legislation. According to a report produced by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, the number of threats, attacks and intimidation of ethnic minorities associated with Islam was higher in Denmark for the period 11 September–31 December 2001 than it had been for the whole of 2000.53 In Norway as well, the legislative counter-terrorist reforms after ‘9–11’ were carried out against a background of rising anti-immigrant sentiment. The elections on 10 September 2001 marked a historic collapse of the Labour party, paving the way for a right-wing coalition government led by former Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik. Although not formally part of the government coalition, the Norwegian far-right Progress Party, led by Carl I. Hagen, declared its support for the new government. The anti-terrorist draft bill, presented by Norwegian Minister of Justice Odd Einar Dørum on 20 December 2001, had many similarities with the Danish ‘terrorpakken’. Like the ‘terrorpakken’ the Norwegian bill stressed the need for tougher measures against asylum-seekers and foreign nationals and contained proposals to extend the investigative powers of the police. Despite Norway’s status as non-member of the EU, the bill complied with the EU’s Framework Decision on terrorism. The resistance to the anti-terror legislation was stronger in Norway, however, forcing the Minister of Justice to withdraw a number of measures included in the original draft bill. Among other things, the proposals to allow the police to use unconventional methods of investigation were moderated, and the general prohibition against planning or preparing for terrorism was also modified as a result of the criticism. There was less opposition against the amendments of the Immigration Act and those measures were retained in the final version of the bill.54 The ‘Somali-Swedes’ Compared to the Danish ‘terrorpakken’ and certain aspects of the Norwegian anti-terrorist bill, the legislative counter-terrorist reforms of the Swedish and Finnish governments have been more moderate. The Swedish government

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has also been one of the harshest critics of the Danish anti-immigrant, counter-terrorist reforms. The differences in approach on the implementation of new legislation may be illustrated by a case that received enormous public attention in Sweden – the case of the ‘Somali-Swedes’. The ‘Somali-Swedes’ had been placed on a ‘black list’ drawn up by the US government, after ‘9–11’, with names of individuals and entities suspected of supporting al-Qa’ida. The Swedes of Somali descent had been running a branch of al Barakaat Financial Co. – a Somali remittance bank that transferred money around the world for a modest commission of 1 per cent on the transferred capital. According to the US Treasury, al Barakaat was giving part of the profit to al-Qa’ida, and the members of the Somali company were thus to be regarded as supporters of terrorist activity.55 The list had been sent to the UN Security Council and the Sanctions Committee in the beginning of November. Shortly after the approval in the Security Council, the political leaders in the EU adopted a joint resolution that made the US-list part of the EU-legislation. For the Somali-born Swedes this meant an instant freezing of all assets – bank savings were blocked and welfare cheques stopped. The situation immediately gave rise to strong criticism from Swedish legal experts who described the measures as a threat against the basic principles of the rule of law.56 Highly critical voices were also raised by members of the left-wing party, who reported the case of the Somali-Swedes to the Standing Committee on the Constitution: ‘These men and even the partner of one of them have been left without any economic assets. It means they are without a salary or benefits. All this has been done without any legal evidence or preliminary investigation . . . It is clearly a threat against Sweden as a society based on the rule of law.’57 The reaction of the Swedish government was cautious at first but did gradually become more assertive as the case of the three blacklisted men got increasing attention in the Swedish press. Articles were published in the leading newspapers condemning the ‘American fatwa’ that had been pronounced against the three citizens.58 In the Finnish press the case also received attention and Finnish Foreign Minister Tuomioja saw this as yet another example of how the fight against terrorism was threatening the delicate balance between upholding the basic rights and freedoms of individuals and increasing security and protection.59 In response to the hardening opinion, the Swedish government decided to look more closely into the case and requested detailed information from the US Treasury Department. When the information arrived it was analysed by the Swedish Security Police who officially declared that there was no substance in the material sent over. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expressed the government’s discontent with the information from the US Treasury: ‘We discovered the Sanctions Committee didn’t have any information whatsoever when they took their action, just a list of names.’60

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As a result, an official request was presented to the Sanctions Committee to have the three Swedes removed from the list and also to have permission to provide the men with certain financial means. The request was disregarded. In order to press the case further, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh visited the US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill on 26 April. Their meeting resulted in a decision to reconsider the case of the Somali-Swedes. In a joint statement following the meeting, Lindh and O’Neill declared that, ‘the tools to advance the fight on terrorism should be reviewed and improved to sharpen our effectiveness and protect the legal rights of individuals’.61 Three months later two of the Somali-Swedes had been removed from the list. The case of the third man was presented to the Court of Justice of the European Communities in February 2004 and is still under investigation. Emergency preparedness and institutional reform Even if the terror attacks against the United States on 11 September gave rise to what one may refer to as a state of enhanced vigilance in Nordic countries, there was no massive increase in security and preparedness. Many of the measures taken in the immediate aftermath of the attacks were relaxed after a few weeks. The surveillance of potential targets such as religious sites, certain embassies and nuclear power plants was reduced, the administrative preparedness was also lowered and the responsibility for coordination was generally transferred from ministerial level to smaller groups consisting of administrative officials. The growing focus on the threat from terrorism and the intense, worldwide media coverage of international terror incidents, such as the lethal anthrax attacks against US citizens one month after ‘9–11’, and the subsequent terror attacks in Bali, Morocco, Iraq and Madrid, have nevertheless kept Nordic governments on guard. The idea, expressed during the first few days after ‘9–11’, that the new terrorism above all involved the United States and certain countries in the Arab world, and was no direct concern for Europe and its northern region soon had to be abandoned. Since 11 September, Nordic governments have had to face the fact that not only countries like Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, but also to some extent their own countries, have been used as a base for international terrorism. Furthermore, during this period, a number of plans for attacks against targets in Europe were discovered involving the use of biological or chemical substances.62 The final proof that large-scale terrorism could strike at the heart of Europe materialised, tragically, on 11 March 2004, when a branch of al-Qa’ida planted a series of bombs in four commuter trains in Madrid, killing 191 and injuring more than 1,600. As a result of this steady flow of terror alarms and attacks, there has been growing pressure in all Nordic countries for institutional reforms and an increase of resources in the areas of emergency preparedness and internal

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security. Among the issues that have been addressed with intensity since 11 September are issues of high-level coordination in complex emergencies, NRBC-protection (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical) and reforms related to civil–military cooperation. High-level coordination in complex emergencies Many of the worst-case terror scenarios that were envisaged in the aftermath of ‘9–11’ were those that could easily turn into complex emergencies affecting a large portion of the population as well as several critical functions in society. For a country faced with a rapid spread of smallpox, perhaps, combined with strategic attacks against the electrical grid, a capacity for cross-sectoral coordination within and between government offices and agencies would be an important component. In the aftermath of 11 September, these issues were discussed in Norway and Sweden as part of the efforts to adapt the national systems for crisis management to the threats of the post-cold war world. More than a year before the events in the United States, the Norwegian and the Swedish governments had both initiated specific commissions of inquiry (composed of representatives from government and parliament as well as independent experts), which had examined the vulnerability of critical functions of society and reviewed the overall preparedness to manage severe peacetime emergencies. Norway had been leading the way, and the Norwegian Vulnerability Commission, appointed in the beginning of 1999, presented its results in a report in July 2000.63 One of the main conclusions of the report was that Norway was in need of a more efficient and integrated coordination structure to plan for and manage peacetime emergencies. The Norwegian Commission suggested the creation of a new ‘super-ministry’, gathering most of the relevant bodies and agencies in the area of preparedness and security, including a crisis management function with operative responsibilities in complex emergencies. Despite the conclusions reached by the Commission, very little happened in terms of immediate reforms. It was only after the terror attacks against the United States that pressure mounted to implement reforms. In July 2002, the newly elected government under Prime Minister Bondevik presented a White Paper (Stortingsmelding) on Security and Emergency Preparedness. The White Paper was to a great extent based on the results of the Vulnerability Commission, but the Commission’s main proposal, to create a new ‘superministry’, was not part of the reform plans. The new Bondevik government opted for a more modest reform path and suggested the establishment of a new ‘planning directorate for security and emergency preparedness’ within the Ministry of Justice.64 Inspired by Norway, Sweden also appointed a Commission on Vulnerability and Security in March 2000, and the conclusions were presented in May 2001.65 The Swedish Commission reached essentially similar conclusions as its Norwegian counterpart. Among the suggested reforms were the

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creation of a new governmental planning agency, tasked to coordinate cross-sectoral planning in the area of civil emergency preparedness, as well as the establishment of a crisis management body within government offices that would have an operational responsibility in situations of crisis. In the government bill presented in March 2002, the idea of a new planning agency (SEMA – as of July 2002)66 received governmental support, whereas the more politically sensitive proposal of creating a new crisis management body within the government offices was disregarded. Although both the Swedish and the Norwegian governments have argued that existing arrangements with the principle of ‘lead ministries’ and ad hoc crisis coordination arrangements are sufficient, the events of 11 September have given added momentum to proponents for further reform in this area. In Sweden, this has led to the establishment of a small secretariat within government offices with responsibility for arranging crisis coordination exercises. In Norway, the government presented a new bill in the area of emergency preparedness in May 2004, containing proposals aimed at facilitating high-level coordination and making more efficient use of existing resources. In Denmark there was no large review of vulnerability and security prior to 11 September. Compared to Sweden and Norway, the Danish emergency management structures remained more focused on traditional military security threats than on the management of complex peacetime emergencies. The terror attacks against the United States did, however, prompt the Danish government to follow the example of Norway and Sweden. In March 2003 the government appointed its own Commission on Vulnerability, which was tasked to look into the need for reforms, including aspects related to national coordination. The results were originally intended to be made public in April 2004, but due to the work with the upcoming 2004 White Paper on Defence, the Commission was only given eight months to work and presented its report to Government in October 2003. Many of the proposals put forth in the Danish Commission’s report are inspired by the Swedish and Norwegian experiences. One of the central conclusions of the Danish report is the need to put in place new institutional structures and resources to increase central coordination in peacetime emergencies.67 The White Paper on Defence from 2004 draws considerably on the Commission’s proposals for reform and also provided a basis for a new National Emergency Management Plan, outlining the coordination structures before, during and after a national emergency situation. In Finland, so far, there have been no major institutional reforms aimed at increasing central coordination and emergency preparedness. In June 2002, the Finnish Minister of the Interior, Ville Itälä, suggested a reorganisation of the Ministry of the Interior into a ‘Security Ministry’ with extended powers in the area of counter-terrorism and a broader responsibility for coordination and emergency preparedness.68 The idea met political resistance and thus far

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there has been a discernible lack of progress in this regard. In September 2004, the Finnish government did, however, present a White Paper on Defence containing proposals aimed at strengthening the preparedness of Finnish society, including improvements in the capacity for high-level coordination.69 NRBC-protection Only a few days after the first anthrax attacks in the United States, phoney anthrax letters (containing white powder) started appearing in Nordic countries. In Sweden the first ‘powder-letters’ were found on 15 October 2001. Similar letters were later discovered in both Denmark and Norway. Many of the early reforms in the area of domestic preparedness in the Nordic countries were thus focused on enhancing the protection against NRBC-related threats, and the threats from bio-terrorism. These threats had been addressed, to varying degrees, by all Nordic countries already before ‘9–11’, but the type of well-organised and highly committed ‘super-terrorism’ demonstrated by al-Qa’ida added a new dimension to previous risk assessments. The potentially serious transnational consequences of scenarios involving BC-terror further meant that attacks against countries in nearby regions also had to be considered as serious threats against Nordic national security. The White Paper on Security and Emergency Preparedness, presented by the Norwegian government in July 2002, placed a strong emphasis on measures related to NRBC-protection and suggested the establishment of a NRBCcoordinating function within the new directorate (described above) comprised of representatives from different ministries and agencies, including the Security Police.70 The White Paper further pointed to the need for inventories of vaccines, serums and specific equipment for detection and protection. These measures were also part of the process within the EU in the area of civil protection and health preparedness. Despite its status as a non-member of the EU, Norway was participating directly in this work through a national expert stationed in the European Commission. Norway also contributed in the development of the common European arrangements for NRBC-protection. Sweden had been comparatively well equipped to handle the ‘powderletters’. In 1998, the Swedish government appointed a special investigator to review the capacity for NRBC-protection. At the time of the terror attacks, the Board for Public Health and Welfare was thus in the process of establishing field epidemiological groups and regional NRBC-centres. The Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control was also constructing a new bio-safety laboratory (BSL4) with a capacity for analysing dangerous diseases. Thanks to a government decision in 2000, the military had also begun preparations for a NRBC-rapid reaction force that could be used in case of attacks against Sweden or in international missions.71 Denmark’s capacity to handle the fake anthrax letters was not very well developed. When a suspect letter arrived at the US Embassy in Copenhagen on 11 September 2002, the letter was sent by military helicopter to the

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Swedish Defence Research Agency and the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control for analysis. In order to examine the need for reforms in this area, the Danish government appointed an inter-ministerial group composed of representatives from the Ministry of the Interior and Health, the Ministry of Finance and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). The results were presented in May 2002.72 The conclusions pointed to an urgent need for competence development and the establishment of cross-sector information and coordination structures. One of the measures taken in response to this was the creation a National Centre for Biological Defence, established in May 2002. Finland has been the slowest of the Nordics in initiating reforms in the area of NRBC-protection. Inventories of vaccines and of certain types of equipment were undertaken during the months following the terror attacks, but there has been no overarching review, focusing on different aspects of capacity development and coordination.73 Nordic cooperative frameworks for civil protection and health preparedness were enhanced by the experience of 11 September. As a result, a Nordic ‘Public Health Preparedness Treaty’ was concluded in June 2002, which contained articles enjoining the Nordic countries to inform and support each other in NRBC-related emergencies and also to eliminate any legal obstacles for the provision of assistance across borders.74 Military support in peacetime emergencies Another issue that received increasing attention among the Nordic countries after 11 September was whether the military should be given greater possibilities of supporting the police in managing different types of peacetime crises and emergencies, including terror attacks. The issue of military support to civil authorities has traditionally been sensitive in most Nordic countries – notably in Sweden, but to some extent also in Norway and Denmark, whereas Finland has had a less restrictive approach.75 The general difference in attitude between the Nordics and countries like France, Italy and Spain has been significant in this area. In Sweden, military support to the police is regulated by the constitution, which only allows the military to get involved in matters entailing the possible use of violence against civilians when the country is exposed to an armed attack by another state. At present there are no specific legal exceptions to this general rule. After ‘9–11’, the Swedish Ministry of Justice tasked a special investigator to examine the legal rules and practices in this area and suggest possible reforms.76 The results, which were published in early 2003, contained a number of proposals to modify the existing legal framework and increase the possibilities for the police to draw on military personnel and resources to manage peacetime crisis situations. 77 One of the more controversial ideas put forth in the report was to give the military the possibility to intervene, without first consulting the Parliament,

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in situations of extreme peacetime emergencies requiring immediate action and the use of military resources. The reactions to the report were mixed. The strongest proponents for reform were found within the military. The Ministry of Defence also expressed a willingness to review the existing framework. When interviewed regarding the issue, the Minister for Defence, Leni Björklund, argued: ‘We have a strong tradition in Sweden of keeping the military away from society but it is possible that people now are ready for a change. Many other countries in Europe are launching new legislation in this area.’78 Despite the cautiously positive reactions from the military and the Ministry of Defence, none of the suggested reforms have so far been enacted. The Ministry of Justice is currently reviewing the possible consequences of the proposals contained in the report. The Norwegian constitution also prohibits the use of military force against civilians, but in Norway there are exceptions to this constitutional regulation. According to a Royal Decree from 1998, the Norwegian military may assist the police in managing large riots that are clearly ‘offensive’ in nature. The decree further provides a possibility for the police to receive military support – with the permission of the Ministry of Justice or the MoD – in situations where there is ‘an immediate threat of large-scale emergencies with potentially very serious consequences for the security of society as a whole’.79 A scenario that has received a lot of attention in Norway is that of terror attacks or sabotage against the infrastructure of the petroleum industry (oil platforms, vessels, pipelines). Although there are legal possibilities for the military to be used in such extraordinary peacetime emergencies, the events in the United States have contributed to a revival of the debate, supported by the Norwegian Vulnerability Commission, that the formal process for obtaining military support is too cumbersome to be effective in crisis situations.80 The same argument has been made in Denmark. In Denmark the government decided in February 2004 to transfer responsibility for emergency preparedness from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defence. The official motivation was to achieve better civil– military coordination and facilitate the use of military resources in peacetime emergencies. In Finland the issue of military support to the police has traditionally been less controversial than in the other Nordic countries. According to legal regulations, the military has a duty to assist the police in situations that require the use of specific military equipment and personnel, including tasks aimed at maintaining or restoring law and order. 81 After 11 September the Finnish government amended the Act on the Provision of Assistance by the Defence Forces to the Police, so that the police now has an explicit authorisation to accept military support in situations involving terrorism.82

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Conclusions The attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, and the subsequent course of events, including the terrorist deeds in the Spanish capital on 11 March 2004, have had a number of consequences for the Nordic governments, affecting national perceptions and policies regarding how to promote national security in the face of the new threat from terrorism. One consequence of the tense and uncertain security environment that emerged after ‘9–11’ is that it has become more difficult for Nordic political leaders to rule out the possibility of terrorism at home. As demonstrated by the motives of the Islamist group claiming responsibility for the terror attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, siding unreservedly with the United States in the war against terror may carry serious consequences. After the Madrid attacks the domestic debate has been harsh in many of the European countries that joined Spain in supporting the war against Iraq. A case in point is Denmark where a large majority of the population were against military participation in the Iraq war. As a result of the bombings in the Spanish capital the Danish government has found its previously active support for US policies to have become increasingly questioned. In Norway, the issue of the costs of US support was part of the domestic discussion already during the campaign against Afghanistan. It is probable that this argument played a role in the Norwegian decision not to stand behind the military actions in Iraq, and it could well affect the future policyline of the Norwegian government. The governments in the non-allied countries of Sweden and Finland, which have so far not made any military contributions to the US-led war against terror (but where the populations have become increasingly opposed to US policies), may be exposed to even more intense domestic pressure in the future against supporting unilateral US initiatives. Both internationally and in the domestic context, the ‘war’ on terror has drawn the Nordics into situations that have compromised difficult trade-offs in areas dear to Nordic inhabitants. One example is the trade-off between maintaining the ‘transatlantic link’ and upholding the supreme role of the UN in international politics. The marginalised role of the UN in the military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq, and the US preference for using military means with a pre-emptive purpose, have caused problems for all the Nordic governments, traditionally strong supporters of multilateral solutions and conflict prevention with civilian and humanitarian methods. This was apparent during the Iraq war when all the Nordic governments, except the Danish, decided to oppose the US-led military actions for lack of an explicit UN mandate. Another difficult trade-off for the Nordics in the fight against terrorism – apparent both in the international and in the domestic arena – has been the choice between upholding the principles of rule of law and promoting

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increased security and protection. The examples in this chapter have shown that this trade-off has been handled differently by each country in the Northern region. In many cases it has been possible to see a correspondence between the positions and attitudes of the Nordics in the international arena and their approach towards counter-terrorist reform in the domestic context. The forceful anti-terror, anti-immigrant legislation introduced in Denmark may thus be seen as a natural prolongation of the Danish policy on Afghanistan and Iraq and the open attitude towards the necessity of sidestepping international legal principles as part of the fight against terror. The lack of major domestic reforms in Finland may in the same way be argued to correspond fairly well with the restrained approach of the Finnish government towards the perceived overtones of the American ‘crusade’ against terrorism. In the case of Sweden, one may also see clear parallels between the government’s domestic response to the US-led ‘finance warfare’ (the treatment of ‘the SomaliSwedes’) and the attitude to the US imprisonment of the Swede at the Guantánamo base. The new security situation with a wider scenario of antagonistic threats has forced the Nordic countries to address problems related to their domestic vulnerability in a more consistent way – new agencies have been created and the preparedness to handle NRBC-related threats has been boosted throughout the region. Current trends in Sweden, Norway and Denmark – but less in Finland – are clearly indicating the beginning of a shift of emphasis from territorial defence and traditional military priorities to a situation where the military is gradually acquiring more of a supportive role in the management of different types of peacetime emergencies. These trends have already started to give rise to budgetary reallocations and a significant reorientation of the role of the defence forces in the Nordic region. The protection of critical functions in society, such as transportation, telecommunications, electricity supply and financial systems will continue to gain in importance. Complex threat scenarios will also make coordination of agencies and bodies (civilian and military), at all levels of society and across a wide range of sectors, an increasingly crucial national security concern. The ‘war’ against terrorism has had ramifications on the Nordic countries’ perspectives on international integration. Many of the legislative and securityenhancing measures undertaken in the domestic context have been a result of regional and international processes of cooperation and harmonisation. In the case of Norway, the events of 11 September have clearly demonstrated the difficulties of its semi-integrated status in the EU. This may well have contributed to the recently growing Norwegian interest in acquiring full membership in the Union after years of voluntary exclusion. For Denmark the choices of the government in the fight against terrorism seem to have reinforced the focus on the ‘transatlantic link’ at the expense

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of a closer integration in the EU context. There is, however, an ongoing discussion on the need to rid Denmark of its ‘opt-out’ in the area of ESDP. For Finland the recent shift of government in combination with the infected domestic debate on the war in Iraq seem to have diminished the country’s short-term prospect of joining the Alliance – something which may also have consequences for future Swedish decisions regarding NATO membership. The Finnish reluctance to join NATO has, however, been compensated with a strengthened enthusiasm for the European efforts to develop a joint crisis management capacity and a more robust cooperation in the area of internal security.83 Despite its traditionally strong support for non-alignment the Finnish government has also taken a fairly pragmatic approach to the current discussion on establishing ‘automatic security guarantees’ within the EU.84 Many of the actions and measures of the ‘war’ against terrorism have met with high levels of popular resistance in the Nordic countries. The case of the ‘Somali-Swedes’ is one example of how Nordic inhabitants have demonstrated their discontent with what they perceived as unjust consequences of the fight against terror. In all the Nordic countries one may also see a gap between the comparatively relaxed attitudes of the population towards the threat from terrorism and the international/domestic responses of their governments. In certain respects one may argue that the events of 11 September have pushed the Nordic governments towards greater ‘normality’, although the level of ambition and the focus have been slightly different. The Nordic governments have all implemented legislative and institutional reforms, which have brought them closer to the positions of other European governments. But even if ‘9–11’ opened new perspectives for the Nordic governments on the means and methods needed to meet the challenges from terrorism, the examples in this chapter have also clearly shown that there is still strong support among the political leaders within the region for traditional Nordic values and principles favouring multilateral solutions, the respect for international legal principles and human rights. This profound community of interests and values among the Nordic countries is likely to persist and play an important role in the future efforts to counter terror.

Notes and references 1. Sweden had some direct experience with international terrorism during the 1970s, for example, when a Swedish SAS plane was hijacked in 1972 by Croatian nationalists, or with the hostage crisis at the West German embassy in Stockholm in 1975 staged by members from the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion). The most spectacular terrorist deed to affect Denmark occurred in 1985 when a number of Palestinians, linked to Islamic jihad, exploded a bomb in the office of the American airline North-West Orient that was located at Vesterbro in Copenhagen. This attack was then

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2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

Europe Confronts Terrorism followed by another attack against a Jewish synagogue in the centre of Copenhagen. Norway’s experience with international terrorism is scant and limited to the murder of the innocent waiter Ahmed Bouchikhi in Lillehammer in 1973, who was thought to have masterminded the assassination of a number of Israeli athletes during the Olympic games in Munich the previous year. In Finland there have been no known terror incidents. The Nordic region is generally seen to include Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland as well as the autonomous territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Svalbard and the Åland Islands. This chapter will, however, limit itself to the first four countries. Iceland is touched upon very briefly in this background description but is not included in the subsequent analysis due to difficulties in finding English information on the country’s response to the events of 11 September 2001. See Olof Petersson, Nordisk Politik (2000), pp. 22–36. The strong emphasis on the respect for freedom of speech and information is apparent in the Nordic countries’ policies regarding neo-Nazi groupings. Provided that these do not engage in direct anti-Semitic propaganda, they are permitted to distribute neo-Nazi reviews and even to operate their own radio stations. Christine Ingebritsen, ‘Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s role in world politics’, Cooperation and Conflict, 37:1 (March 2002), 12–23. One may, for example, point to the frequent use of prominent Nordic politicians as mediators in international conflicts. Among those who have played an important role during the past decade are the former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and the former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, who both acted as negotiators in the Balkan conflicts, as well as the Norwegian Middle East peace-broker Thorvald Stoltenberg (former Foreign Minister). The creation of the Nordic Council in 1952 has played an important role in initiating cooperation in the region. For an overview of the Council’s present activities see: www.norden.org See: www.nordred.org For an exposé on Nordic characteristics see Alyson J. K. Bailes ‘New challenges to human security: how relevant is the “Nordic model”?’ which may be accessed at the Nordic Security Policy Research Programme, www.nnss.org Press release, No. 045/2001, from 14 September 2001, at: www.odin.dep.no ‘Denmark supports war on terror’, 15 September 2001, at: www.cnn.com In Norway 58 per cent of the population supported military involvement. See Gallup International poll on terrorism at: www.gallup-international.com/terrorismpoll2001.htm Ibid. The reluctance among the Finnish population for the US military campaign was also reflected in another opinion poll by the EU Commission during the same period in which Finland distinguishes itself as the country with the most negative attitude of all EU members towards the possibility of putting the country’s military bases at the disposal of the counter-terrorist coalition (83 per cent against) and also on the issue of intelligence-sharing with the United States (54 per cent against). See Flash Eurobarometer 114, ‘International crisis’, at: www.europa.eu.int/ comm/_publicopinion Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Nordic countries have no immediate plans to send force to Afghanistan’, 16 November 2001. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘President Halonen in radio interview’, 29 September 2001. See also Helsingin Sanomat, ‘After the counterattack: angst in a small country’, Kari Huhta, 9 October 2001. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Toumija continues criticism of US policy’, 12 February 2002.

Sara Myrdal 119 17. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Max Jakobson criticises Finnish leaders for soft stances on major events’, 7 February 2002; Helsingin Sanomat, ‘After the counterattack’. 18. In Sweden 74 per cent of the population were against Swedish involvement in US-led military action. See Flash Eurobarometer 114, ‘International crisis’, at: www.europa. eu.int/comm/publicopinion 19. Dagens Nyheter (editorial), 12 September 2001. 20. (The author’s translation) See ‘Persson på katastrofplatsen i New York’, 4 December 2001, www.svt.se 21. See for example Dagens Nyheter, ‘USA styr men med maktens arrogans’, Carl Tham and Ingvar Carlsson, 22 September 2001; Dagens Nyheter, ‘Regeringen är otydlig’, Sverker Åström, 28 September 2001; Dagens Nyheter, ‘Sluta vara USA:s transportkompani’, Sverker Åström, 2 December 2002. 22. The Swedish government’s position on the issue of the Guantánamo prisoner had also been preceded by a highly critical declaration by the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh regarding the US missile attack in Yemen on 5 November. About the attack, which had caused the death of six civilians suspected of cooperation with al-Qa’ida, she said, during a visit to Mexico, ‘If the USA is behind this with Yemen’s consent, it is nevertheless a summary execution that violates human rights . . . Even terrorists must be treated according to international law. Otherwise any country can start executing those whom they consider terrorists.’ Washington Post, ‘Missile strike carried out with Yemeni cooperation’, Walter Pincus, 6 November 2002. 23. ‘Sweden demands US release evidence against Cuba detainee’, 1 November 2002, www.abc.net.au 24. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Toumija crticises treatment of al-Qa’ida prisoners held at US base in Cuba’, 21 January 2002; Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Toumija continues criticism of US policy’, 12 February 2002. 25. Politiken, ‘Fanger bør ikke være prøveklude’, Lars Normann Jørgensen, 23 January 2003. 26. (The author’s translation) the press release is quoted in Politiken, ‘Skulder ved Skulder’, Claus Blok Thomsen, Torben Benner and Matias Seidelin, 1 September 2002. 27. Dagens Nyheter, ‘Danskt storgräl om regeringens USA-stöd’, Ewa Svensson, 31.01.2003; Dagens Nyheter, ‘Krigets motståndare’, 9 February 2003. 28. An unofficial translation (courtesy of the American Embassy in Copenhagen) of the Op-ed by Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen, printed in Berlingske Tidende, March 26 2003, may be found at: www.denmarkemb.org/oped_fogh.html 29. Svenska Dagbladet, ‘Upprop för USA splittrar EU’, 31 January 2003. 30. Ibid. 31. Svenska Dagbladet, ‘Majoritet av svenskar emot Irakattack’, 2 February 2003. 32. See a paper by Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués and Rina Weltner-Puig, ‘The Nordic quartet: straddling the European divide’, published by the Obs insitute (Observatori de Politica Exterior Europea). 33. The fact that a divisive foreign policy issue such as the war against Iraq was allowed to play such a large role in a domestic election campaign is rather sensational in a country which for the past century has been very keen to strive for crossparty consensus in the foreign policy arena. In response to the Jäätteenmäki affair, President Tarja Halonen later made an official statement warning that foreign policy should be used with caution in future election campaigns, ‘When expressing one’s opinions [on foreign policy issues], the current and future position of the country must be protected’. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘President Halonen: foreign policy must be used with caution in election campaigns’, 16 June 2003.

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34. Dagens Nyheter, ‘Norskt plan bombade afghanska rebeller’, Kalle Holmberg, 4 February 2003. 35. The document, ‘Statement to the Storting on the situation in Iraq’ from 21 March 2003, may be found at: www.reliefweb.int 36. See Norden this week, 7 April 2003, www.norden.org 37. According to the most recent United Nations comparison of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 2002, Denmark is the leading donor country in the world (ODA/GNI 0.96%) followed by Norway (0.89%) and Sweden (0.83%). See: www.oecd.org 38. (The author’s translation). The quote comes from a radio interview (on channel one), 22 October 2003. 39. See Flash Eurobarometer 114, ‘International crisis’, www.europa.eu.int/comm/ publicopinion 40. See Norway Daily no. 192/01, ‘Increased threat of terrorism in Norway’, 8 October 2001, www.odin.dep.no 41. Aftenposten, ‘Norwegian F16s in a new bombing raid’, 28 January 2003; Dagens Nyheter, ‘Norskt plan bombade afghanska rebeller’, Kalle Holmberg, 4 February 2003. 42. ‘Danish PM calls snap election’, 31 October 2001, www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/ europe/10/31/denmark.poll/ 43. The report by the National Sårbarhedsudredning (Commission on Vulnerability) may be found at: www.im.dk 44. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Bomb confirmed as cause for shopping mall blast’, 11 October 2002; Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Shopping mall bomber described as a loner’, 14 October 2002; Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Police detain youth in connection with shopping mall bombing – flags fly at half staff all over Finland’, 15 October 2002; ‘Helsinki bomb tragedy points to social tensions in Finland’, Steve James, 23 October 2002, www.wsws.org 45. (The author’s translation.) The interview was broadcast on Swedish television 1 September 2002. 46. See Flash Eurobarometer 114, ‘International crisis’, November 2001, at: www.europa. eu.int/comm/publicopinion 47. These figures may be compared with 83% (UK), 59% (France) and 49% (Germany). See Gallup Europe: www.eosgallupeurope.com/international_crisis/tables.htm 48. Both Bills (no. L32 and L35) were passed on 6 June 2002, after minor modifications (Lov nr. 362 af 06/06/2002, Lov nr. 378 af 06/06/2002) and may be accessed at the homepage of the Danish legislative assembly (Folketinget), www.ft.dk 49. For a discussion on some aspects of L32 and L35 see ‘Den danske anti-terrorpakke – bemærkninger fra det Danske Center for Menniskeretigheder’, in Mennesker & Rettigheter, Nordic Journal for Human Rights, 2 (2002), 67–78. See also ‘Antiterrorpakken – den strafferetlig del’, Lov & Ret, 1/2002, Jørn Vestergaard. 50. See Denmark’s report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, S/2001/1303, 08.01.2002, p. 9. 51. See Martin Burcharth, ‘The rise of the Right in Denmark’, Correspondence: an International Review of Culture and Society, 9 (Spring 2002). 52. See ‘Danish elections overshadowed by the fight against terrorism’, Helmut Arens, 17 November 2001, www.wswss.org/articles/2001/nov2001/den-n17.shtml 53. See: www.eumc.eu.int/publications/terror-report/collection/denmark.pdf 54. Norway Daily No. 43/02, ‘Public prosecutor speaks out against counter-terrorism’, 1 March 2002 and Norway Daily No. 69/02, ‘Counter-terrorism bill with fewer teeth’, 12 April 2002, www.odin.dep.no

Sara Myrdal 121 55. ‘Svensk organisation på terrorlista’, 8 November 2001, www.svt.se 56. Ibid. 57. ‘USA puts three Swedish citizens on UN terrorist list’, www.statewatch.org. See also the reply of the Swedish government to the Standing Committee on the Constitution, ‘Svar till konstitutionsutskottet i granskningsärende 2001/02:25’, www.ud.se 58. Svenska Dagbladet, ‘Vem värnar rättsstaten?’, Martin Lindblom, 11 April 2002; See also Svenska Dagbladet, ‘Bekämpa USA:s rättsröta’, Christian Åhnlund’, 16 May 2002; Aftonbladet, ‘När ska rättsövergreppet stoppas?’, (editorial), 18 April 2002; Aftonbladet, ‘EU manipulerar lagen’, Thomas Olsson and Leif Silbersky, 10 April 2002. 59. Helsingin sanomat, ‘Strong criticism against Swedes on terror list’, 11 April 2002. 60. Svenska Dagbladet, ‘Vem värnar rättsstaten?’, Martin Lindblom, 11 April 2002; the Wall Street Journal, ‘UN Sanctions ensnare individuals, not just countries’, Christopher Cooper, 6 May 2002. 61. See the statement at: usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02042610.htm 62. One example of an averted terrorist attack in Europe was the planned attempt by four Moroccans to poison the water of the US embassy in Rome with cyanide. The plans were revealed when the future perpetrators were arrested on 19 February 2002 in an apartment in Rome. The police seized four kilograms of cyanide and a map of the city’s water network with the US embassy highlighted. See ‘Terror tunnels found in Rome’, 24 February 2002, www.news.bbc.co.uk 63. See Government Official Report, NOU 2000:24. 64. The Norwegian name is ‘Direktoratet for Beredskap og Samfunnssikkerhet’. The new directorate, which has been operational since July 2003, consists of the former Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning (DCDEP) and a large part of the directorate in charge of the fire services (Direktoratet for Brann- og Elsikkerhet). The tasks include coordination of emergency planning at a national level, in combination with more operative responsibilities in relation to the fire and rescue services. See St. melding no. 17, (2001/2002), section 8.2.2.3. 65. See the Government Official Report, SOU 2001:41. 66. SEMA, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, was established in July 2002. The agency, which is organised under the MoD, coordinates the preparedness planning of more than 30 different agencies in the field (including the rescue services) but has no operational responsibility in emergency situations. SEMA also has overarching responsibility for information assurance and functions as the national secretariat for coordination in the area of NRBC-protection. See: www.krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se 67. The report by the National Sårbarhedsudredning (Commission on Vulnerability) may be found at: www.im.dk 68. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Interior Minister Itälä wants to establish ministry to deal with national security’, 27 June 2002. 69. See, for example, a speech by the Finnish Defence Minister in Helsinki on 14 October 2002, www.defmin.fi 70. See St.melding no. 17, (2001/2002), section 6.14.2.4. 71. The force is planned to be operational in 2004. A temporary NRBC standby force, consisting of both military and civilian personnel has, however, been operational since 1 July 2002. It is based at the military headquarters’ ‘Centre for Protection’ (SkyddsC) in the north of Sweden. 72. ‘Analyse af redningsberedskapet’ at: www.im.dk 73. For a description of the measures carried out in this area see the contribution by Mikko Väyrynen from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) on

122

74.

75.

76. 77. 78.

79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

84.

Europe Confronts Terrorism Finland’s response to 11 September, the Nordic Security Policy Research Programme, www.nnss.org. See also the report ‘International terrorism and Finland’ by Toby Archer (ed.), www.upi-fiia.fi Among other things, the treaty calls for the Nordic Health Ministers to meet regularly to discuss matters related to preparedness in the health area. The country’s Health Minister currently presides over the Nordic Council of Ministers, and is responsible for ensuring that meetings take place. The treaty also establishes a Nordic network of clinicians specialised in treating radiation injuries as well as a joint surveillance system for bio-terrorism. The treaty gives all the Nordic countries the possibility to sign an agreement with the Swedish bio-safety laboratory (BSL4), including joint financing for standby preparedness. As part of the Nordic efforts, requirements for joint developments of vaccines, anti-toxins, and others are also being studied. See the report on Nordic Public Health Preparedness from 23 June 2003, www.sos.se In Sweden, the strong resistance against involving the military in situations of peacetime emergencies has often been traced back to an unfortunate episode in 1931, in Ådalen, when the military was used to quench a riot, and five people were killed. The different views between Sweden on the one side, and Finland (Norway and Denmark) on the other side, concerning the military’s role may also be traced to the experiences from World War II. Whereas Finland, Denmark, and Norway were drawn into the war, Sweden managed to avoid it. Particularly in Finland, the exploits of the military during the ‘Winter War’ in 1939, and the military’s assistance to the Finnish people during this period, have become an important part of Finnish folklore. Even today one may find updated lists of the dead war heroes at the homepage of the Finnish Defence Forces. See the Government Bill 2001/02:158, chap.14.4.2. See the Government report ‘Vår beredskap efter den 11 September’, 2003:32, at: www.justitie.regeringen.se (Author translation) Dagens Nyheter, ‘Svensk militär i terrorbekämpning’, Mats Carlbom, 12 February 2003. See also Göteborgs-Posten, ‘Sätt in militär vid terrorattack’, Jan Höglund, 14 November 2002; Norrländska Socialdemokraten, ÖB utesluter inte militär insats vid terrorattack, Leif Hammarström, 26 November 2002; Sydsvenskan, ‘Militär ska få stoppa terrordåd’, Olle Lönnaues, 18 November 2002. (Author translation) the decree from 1998 is entitled ‘Instruks for forsvarets bistand till politiet i fredstid’. A summary of the content may be read in Pressbriefing nr. 003/98, at: www.odin.dep.no See the report from the Defence Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee on St.melding 17, Innst.S.nr.9 (2002–2003), at: www.stortinget.no (The author’s translation.) See ‘Lag om försvarsmaktens handräckning till polisen’, 1980/781 and ‘Lag om försvarsmakten, 1974/402. See the report by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Terrorism and Finland’ at: www.formin.finland.fi As a result of this, the Finnish Defence Minister, Seppo Kääriäinen, has called for an amendment to Finland’s law on international peacekeeping to allow Finnish participation in more robust crisis management missions with a EU mandate. Current legislation only allows military peacekeeping abroad if the operation has a mandate from the UN or the OSCE. See Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Proposal to change peacekeeping law annoys Left alliance’, 16 September 2003. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘PM Vanhanen: Finland willing to help other EU countries if they are attacked’, 3 December 2003.

6 Spain

Editor’s note: this chapter has been divided into two parts, both of which deal with terrorism in Spain. The first provides an overview of Spanish counterterrorism activities, while the second concentrates more specifically on the Islamic threat in Spain. Given that Spain has been the first European country to become victim of Islamic extremist terrorism, I decided to enlist more than one analyst to provide several perspectives on counter-terrorism in Spain.

Part I: Counter-terrorism in Spain – An Overview Ana Ramos On 11 March 2004, nearly 911 days after 9–11, ten bombs on four packed commuter trains exploded at the height of the morning rush hour, killing 191 people and injuring more than 1,600. The victims of Spain’s worst carnage since the end of the 1936 Spanish Civil War included 15 nationalities, both immigrants and commuters, the majority working class and students, who were trapped in the steel and rubble of burst subway trains and buildings. The noise from the ambulance and police car sirens was practically the only noise heard on Madrid’s streets that day. Even the telephone network collapsed. In the immediate aftermath, the Spanish Government was quick to blame ‘Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’ (Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or ETA), even though the attacks were far more typical to those inspired by al-Qa’ida, and atypical to ETA. Arnaldo Otegi, the leader of Batasuna, ETA’s outlawed political front, denied that the group was responsible and pointed an accusing finger at ‘Arab resistance’. Prime Minister Aznar’s strong support for US President George Bush’s ‘war on terror’, coupled with Spain’s contribution of troops to Iraq against the wishes of the majority of the Spanish population, were seen by all too many Spaniards to have caused the attacks. Soon enough, the government’s conviction that ETA was to blame was thrown into doubt: a stolen van was found containing detonators and a tape of verses from the 123

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Koran. In addition, several Islamic groups claimed responsibility. A number of Moroccans and Indians were arrested, and the government finally admitted that the attacks had been carried out by Islamic extremists. International support for Spain resembled that witnessed after 11 September 2001. Within Spain, also reminiscent of 11 September, there were more volunteers than the emergency services could accommodate. In a dignified display of solidarity, eleven million Spaniards took to the dark, rainy streets throughout the country and marched in silent protest. Two days later, on 14 March, those same millions voted the government out of office in one of the largest electoral turnouts in recent history. The Spanish public thought their government acted too opportunistically by fingering ETA, even after it was becoming more than apparent that it was an Islamic extremist group. They believed that the government was attempting to divert attention away from the unpopular Spanish deployment in Iraq. The conservative ‘Partido Popular’ (PP) was ousted from office, a party that had enjoyed an absolute majority since 1996. Aznar’s government could also lay claim to eight years of good economic results, a tough stance against ETA, including a number of high-profile arrests and the banning of its political wing, as well as a close relationship with the United States. The winning Social Democratic Party (PSOE), led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, then promised to pull out the 1,300 Spanish troops from Iraq. While in reality a symbolic move, given that Spanish troops represented approximately 1 per cent of US-led coalition forces, it sent a strong message to other world leaders about the dangers of ignoring public opinion. More ominously, it may have also sent a message to other terrorist plotters, who might wish to influence not only troop deployment in Iraq, but also elections in other parts of the world. Indeed, just after the Madrid attacks, the Polish Prime Minister Alexander Kwasniewski publicly announced that Poland had been duped into believing the WMD claim, and that the 2,200 troops in Iraq would fulfil current commitments, but not stay an extra day. Towards the end of 2004 a number of other members either withdrew entirely from the coalition, or publicly indicated that they would soon withdraw, including Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Thailand, Norway, New Zealand and the Philippines. The change of government in Spain also shifted the power balance in Europe, with a greater weight for the left-wing and pro-Europe governments, seen as significant given Aznar’s obstruction of the European Constitution earlier in 2004, and his opposition to the German–French coalition within Europe. Zapatero has already moved towards the French and the Germans, and away from the United States. Both 11 September and 11 March confirmed the development of multidirectional risks, as considered in NATO’s Strategic Concept at the 1991 Rome Summit. Today’s two main international security threats are international

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terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In Spain, 11 March in particular has had a profound effect on domestic policy, speeding up the implementation of the counter-terrorist strategy, which incorporates the activities of the national police, the regional security forces and the armed forces. Long before 11 September, and certainly 11 March, Spain has had to contend with both domestic and international terrorism.1 Responsibility for confronting the domestic terrorist group ETA, which has been a threat for over 30 years, falls under the jurisdiction of the national security forces, the Guardia Civil and the Policia Nacional, and the Courts of Justice, as outlined in the Constitution. This arrangement did not change after 11 September. The prevention of and response to both international and domestic terrorism in Spain, including collective violence and terrorist attacks directed from abroad, are incumbent upon the security forces, but also depend on international cooperation.

The role of domestic security forces and intelligence in the fight against terrorism Today, Spain’s domestic security, as in other EU states, is designed to confront three important risks or threats: terrorism, increased migration into Europe, and urban insecurity. Because of its domestic terrorist problem, Spain has been making enormous efforts in prevention, law enforcement and international cooperation. In compliance with EU regulations, Spain, like other states has been attempting to apply legislative measures, which allows it to ban organisations that sustain terrorist groups, and interrupt and block their financing. International cooperation between police forces and intelligence services has also improved, while military capabilities to protect citizens from weapons of mass destruction have advanced to a degree. Military power in Spain has, however, been impeded by reductions in defence spending and capabilities over the past decade, as has occurred in most other European countries. The challenge posed by ETA ETA’s criminal activity began in 1968. By 2004, the organisation had killed nearly 900 people. Its main objective is political: the independence of the Basque territory located on the Spanish-French border. The historic relationship of the Basque region with Spain, and the peaceful democratic transition in Spain after Franco’s death have, however, undermined ETA’s campaign. ETA utilises three types of tactics. The first is what is called ‘Fight X’, which includes violent demonstrations, coercion and acts of intimidation against those who oppose their cause. The second, ‘Fight Y’, consists of acts of sabotage and organised street violence, which could be considered low-intensity urban terrorism. Finally, the third, ‘Fight Z’, signifies more serious terrorist acts, such as premeditated murder and the planting of explosive devices.

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In recent years ETA has lost much of its strength, not only operationally, but also from a political and social perspective. Accordingly, its terrorist activity has significantly decreased. In the years leading to 1979, ETA committed approximately 85 murders per year, which increased to 100 in 1980, then dropped to a yearly average of 30 murders in the first part of the 1990s, to an annual average of 25 between 1988 and 1992, and finally ten per year between 1993 and 2001. In 2003 ETA terrorism resulted in only three deaths, while the number of detentions of ETA members and supporters grew. See Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below for details on detentions. The operational, political and social weakness of ETA terrorism can be attributed to two factors: a new and more comprehensive approach by the government, and increased international cooperation. The former focuses not only on ETA’s cells, but also on its larger network, which includes its political parties, social organisations, business enterprises and propaganda ability. The entire network is controlled and directed by ETA, which provides political support, welfare services, logistical and economic assistance in the region. The Spanish government has, therefore, waged war against the network so as to hinder its regeneration capacity and the impunity ETA has enjoyed through manipulating the democratic process. The Guardia Civil, which includes 73,000 officers deployed in 2,000 stations throughout the country, is Spain’s main instrument in the fight against ETA. This force was established in 1844 as a military security force to Table 6.1

Spain

Table 6.2

ETA members or supporters arrested in Spain2 2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

Total

125

123

135

75

19

82

35

39

634

ETA members or supporters arrested abroad3

France Netherlands United Kingdom Canada Uruguay Switzerland Venezuela Argentina Germany Mexico Chile Total

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

Total

46 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 11 1 61

63 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 69

29 0 1 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 36

24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 25

31 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 34

23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24

50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 56

65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 66

331 4 1 2 5 1 4 1 3 18 1 371

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face the serious security situation in Spain at the time, especially in rural areas. From the start, it was a professional and highly disciplined force, deployed throughout the whole territory, and highly centralised. Working closely with the Policia Nacional, the two deal with organised crime, illicit immigration and terrorism. Concerning the latter, in 2001 and 2002, they disrupted 14 and 15 ETA-commands respectively, and detained 258 persons. In 2003, two further ETA commands were disrupted, four civilian structures and five contact networks were dismantled, and a total of 125 ETA members or supporters arrested. The two forces also achieved some successes in operations against Islamic terrorist cells – in September 2001, for example, six Algerians belonging to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), linked to al-Qa’ida, were detained. Two months later, in November 2001, Imad Edin Barakat, alias Abu Dahdah, was arrested, along with another ten members of the al-Qa’ida organisation. Following 11 September and 11 March, and also due to growing urban security and immigration problems, both police corps increased their personnel by 20,000 over the following three years, with their budgets expanded by more than 10 per cent to improve their specialisation. An additional field of activity in domestic security is information. Nine months after 11 September, the new National Intelligence Centre (CNI) was established, responsible for domestic and international intelligence, as a substitute for the former Defence Information Centre (CESID). The new organisation has been complemented by very powerful information services, such as those that belong to the Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil, and works closely with international intelligence agencies. The same law that created the CNI also established a coordination commission, presided over by one of the government’s vice-presidents. This commission includes the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior and Economy, with the purpose of coordinating all information and intelligence organisations in Spain. International cooperation in counter-terrorism Spain has been active in promoting international counter-terrorist cooperation, as demonstrated in the first half of 2002 when it held the EU Presidency. At that time, the EU passed one of the most substantive legislative changes in its history when it adopted the European arrest warrant and defined terrorism as a felony (discussed in more detail in Chapter 8). In June 2003, the 15 EU member states and the ten that joined in 2004 included the ETA-linked coalition Batasuna in the region’s list of terrorist organisations, which would prevent past or present Batasuna members from carrying out activities and proselytising within the European Union. The party’s delegations in Bayonne, France and Brussels, Belgium subsequently were no longer allowed to take part in any public acts under the Batasuna banner. When this change occurred, Spanish Interior Minister Angel Acebes remarked, ‘Today, the EU as a whole understand, as Spain has long defended, the fight against ETA and its entire network.’4

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During this period, anti-terror cooperation with France had produced a series of arrests on both sides of the Pyrenees. The two Interior Ministers, Angel Acebes and Nicolas Sarkozy inaugurated a successful experiment in November 2002: a Spanish–French police station a few metres beyond the Spanish border in Le Perthus, where 40 Spanish and 40 French police officers have been working together on a daily basis since the launch. One of the last official acts by Prime Minister José María Aznar, before quitting office in March 2004, was to bestow the Grand Cross of the Order of Carlos III on Nicolas Sarkozy for ‘cooperating in the war against terrorism and fostering European integration’. Sarkozy remarked at the time, ‘No one can doubt that France wants to finish off ETA.’5 Cooperation is not always publicised, rather it is normally undertaken with little to no media coverage. On Christmas Eve 2003, two bombs planted by ETA, weighing 25 kilograms each, were intercepted in suitcases on a train en route to Madrid. One of them had a timing device set to detonate a few minutes before 4 p.m., just after its scheduled arrival in Madrid. It might have caused a massacre. The train, however, was halted in the city of Burgos in central Spain by security forces. The compartments were searched and the bombs found. The police claimed ETA’s plans were uncovered following the arrest in France of the organisation’s reputed military chief on 9 December. Two months later, the police were less fortunate, even though two weeks prior to the March attacks, the police had again seized a huge load of explosives destined for Madrid. Beyond France, Spain has signed bilateral extradition treaties with the United States, Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay, and all have proven to be key allies in helping to eradicate potential sanctuaries for ETA. In June 2000 FBI director Louis Freeh offered US cooperation in the fight against ETA terrorism in an effort to strengthen cooperation and intelligence sharing. At that time as well, the French Interior Minister and Spanish Interior Minister Jaime Mayor Oreja were cooperating to fight ETA and Islamic terrorism. By November 2001, 14 suspected al-Qa’ida members had been arrested in Spain and that same month, during his visit to Washington, Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar gave Bush his full support in the ‘war against terrorism’. Aznar recalled that in June, just prior to 11 September when Bush visited Spain, even then, Bush had vowed to fight ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with Madrid against the Basque terror organisation. In February 2002 the State Department included 21 ETA members on its international terror-list, so as to be able to block bank accounts, freeze assets and hinder all financial transactions. In taking this step, the United States incorporated the names of all the ETA terrorists, who had formerly only been included in the EU terror-list, to its own blacklist. ETA was officially upgraded on a par with al-Qa’ida. Currently, ETA is on the US State Department’s list of terrorist organisations. Washington and Madrid have

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signed cooperation agreements against terrorism, but ever since the Azores meeting between Bush, Blair and Aznar, the United States has repeatedly and more explicitly vowed to help Spain in its fight against the Basque radical group and thanked it for its participation in the international coalition against terrorism. However, Spain has not always responded in the affirmative to requests by the US government, particularly concerning extraditions of suspects. Like other European countries, Spain opposes the death penalty and its domestic legislation does not permit extradition of individuals who could face military trials or the death penalty in the country requesting extradition. President Bush had issued an executive order to allow the use of military tribunals to try foreign nationals accused of terrorism. This has caused some tensions between the two governments since 11 September. Nevertheless, the efforts of the domestic security forces in the struggle against ETA, along with improved international cooperation, have achieved significant results in the fight against ETA: since 2001 detention numbers of ETA terrorists both in Spain and abroad have doubled (see Figure 6.1). Cooperation with the United States and within Europe are keys to this success and should be further enshrined in EU–US and bilateral treaties. Domestic security efforts along with international cooperation in the fight against Islamic extremists has also been important, and has resulted in the dismantling of some of the cells present in Spain, which will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this chapter.

192

200

186

171

175 150

135 123

125

106

105 91

100

125

100

82

75

75 53 50

39

35 19

25 0

1996

1997

1998

1999

Spain Figure 6.1

2000 TOTAL

ETA members or supporters arrested6

2001

2002

2003

130


The role of the military in the fight against terrorism Strategic defence review in Spain The fight against terrorism and Spain’s commitments to international efforts to achieve peace and security in line with the UN, NATO, the EU and with the United States in ad hoc arrangements have informed Spain’s Strategic Defence Review, launched in February 2001. The Review had several key objectives: to optimise the organisation of defence by making its structures meet today’s conflict criteria and the concepts of shared security and collective defence; to determine the military capabilities needed by the armed forces; to attain greater efficiency in the operative use of force; and to strive towards maximum efficiency in management so as to optimise human and economic resources.7 Spain’s international commitments require it to ensure that its decisions on defence policy are integrated into the frameworks of its alliances, especially the EU and NATO, which means its armament procurement planning must be aligned with the EU’s ‘Headline Goals’ and NATO’s Response Force. Cooperation between armed forces and state security forces The participation of the armed forces in domestic security tasks must fulfil two criteria: to be exceptional (the importance of events may require specialisation and air-space control), and to be accomplished in cooperation with security forces. The aim, therefore, is to cooperate under command of the civilian authority responsible for security in extraordinary situations, both in preventing a terrorist attack and in protection measures after an attack has taken place. An example would be the contribution of the armed forces to the security measures of both EU Summits, in Barcelona and Seville, under the Spanish Presidency of the EU. The cooperation of military intelligence centres, through CNI, in preventing terrorist attacks and protecting citizens against possible attacks with WMD, complete the picture of where the armed forces work closely with other security forces. This is an area that still requires improvement, depending on how the international terrorist scenario evolves. Spain’s contribution to a defence capability for Europe Spain champions an EU defence capability and demonstrated its support during its recent EU Presidency, encouraging the ESDP to give the Union its own military capability, starting from the political and military structures established during the EU Council in Nice. Spain’s commitment to the Rapid Reaction Force8 covers 10 per cent of the Headline Goals in quantitative and qualitative terms.9 The international campaign against terrorism also requires improvements in intelligence capabilities and protection systems against the threat of weapons of mass destruction, both by member states and forces deployed in peacekeeping missions. To this end, in February 2002, the Spanish EU Presidency set up the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), whose

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aim was to resolve the detected shortfalls under the supervision of the EU’s Military Committee. Spain’s contribution to NATO A modernised NATO emerged from the November 2002 Prague Summit. The Summit concluded with three new initiatives: the NATO Response Force,10 a streamlined Command Structure, and the Prague Capability Commitment,11 through which member states commit themselves to ensuring the necessary military capabilities needed to confront new threats to security. Spain has supported the creation of the Response Force from the start because it enhances NATO’s credibility and power of deterrence – two of the organisation’s main assets – and allows an immediate military response to any crisis situation that affects the Allies’ security interests.12 Spain is also committed to the Prague Capability Commitment.13 Spain is also advancing three important armament programmes, initiated under the previous administration (1996), which requires a major improvement in the capabilities of the armed forces. The new armament programmes will contribute to cover the shortfalls identified by NATO and EU in both the Prague Capacities Commitment and the ECA. In order to implement these reforms, Spain will need to increase defence spending, and here, similar to the rest of Europe, Spain faces two obstacles. The first is the tough conditionality imposed by the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, which forces governments to limit public spending to reduce deficits, a policy that has shown positive results in sustained economic growth and job generation. The second is public opinion, which in the main, is very supportive of deploying troops for international humanitarian peace missions, but less than 20 per cent of the population agree with the idea of spending more money on arms programmes. The defence budget for 2003 came to €6.5 billion, an increase of 2.5 per cent from 2002, and representing 1 per cent of GDP.14 The budget for 2003 was considered restrictive, especially when taking into account that such programmes will limit Spain’s financial capabilities for the coming years. The government has therefore been attempting to find a formula that allows it to complete the programmes underway as well as begin those that the Strategic Review has identified as necessary for the armed forces.

Conclusions: Part I The first overall priority of the Spanish government in recent years has been to defeat ETA, including its political, social and economic arms, and its operative commandos, infrastructure, and logistic networks. This would by necessity include the prosecution of those arrested in a court of justice. As noted earlier, 20,000 extra personnel have been added to the state security forces, with a special reinforcement of the anti-terror and anti-organised crime

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warfare units, along with the purchase of new equipment and specialised training. On the legal side, the government has been more robust in prosecuting not only terrorists, but also those who support them. Finally, international cooperation, especially in intelligence sharing, has improved significantly. These efforts have shown remarkable results. ETA still boasts a capacity to commit terror crimes, but due to the government’s firmer policies, it is now much weaker than it was four years ago. In terms of confronting Islamic terrorism – which has been a threat in Spain for over a decade and incorporated in government counter-terrorist policy, even if the bulk of energy went to fight ETA – the next section examines government successes and challenges still to overcome, particularly after 11 March 2004.

Part II: Islamic Extremism Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh As noted, Islamic networks operated in Spain prior to the Madrid attacks, and security services had been monitoring and applying pressure on these networks. Spain’s lengthy experience fighting ETA had provided the government with a strong counter-terrorist infrastructure, one that could be adapted to challenge the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and related groups in a more substantial manner. Thus the attacks on Madrid have not necessitated dramatic internal reforms. In fact, as this chapter demonstrates, the security services have already been able to dismantle some of the jihadist networks in Spain (The term ‘jihad’ in this chapter, and indeed throughout this collection, refers to the ‘outer’ interpretation, that is, a holy war waged by Muslims against infidels, rather than the ‘inner’ interpretation, meaning the struggle for moral or spiritual self-improvement.)

Principle characteristics of Islamic terrorism in Spain During the 1980s, Spain experienced several isolated terrorist acts that were probably carried out by radical Islamic groups. One such attack included the bombing of a restaurant near the military base of Torrejón in Madrid, which killed 18 people. A more permanent presence of these networks in Spain began to emerge in the early 1990s, the most prominent of which are included below. Algerian networks These include both the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Spanish police have arrested over 60 members of these networks, though many have subsequently been released

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due to insufficient evidence. The network probably continues to be active in eastern parts of Spain, where a large Algerian community is based. The Syrian origin network Also known as the ‘Abu Dahdah Network’, the alias of its coordinator, this emerged in 1994. Initially it was formed by Syrians belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood who were fleeing persecution during the 1980s. Moroccans and others (Indonesians, Tunisians, Spaniards) subsequently joined this network. According to police sources, the network had important links to central levels of al-Qa’ida. In 1995, its principal leader, the Palestinian Chej Salah, left Spain and settled in Pakistan, establishing a gateway for volunteers to enter jihad training camps in Afghanistan. It is also suspected that this network had contact with the cell that carried out the 11 September 2001 attacks. Between November 2001 and September 2003, Spanish police detained over 20 members of this network. The suspected leaders are in prison awaiting trial. Currently, this network can be considered mostly dismantled. Madrid attacks network At the time of writing (September 2004), investigations confirmed that the planning and execution of the attacks were attributed to an ad hoc group established in Spain, with support from networks mostly comprised of Moroccans based in Europe. Its origins could potentially be attributed to a few promoters: the Algerian, Allekema Lamari; Serhane ben Abdelmajid ‘the Tunisian’; Rabei Osman El Sayed Ahmed, alias ‘Mohamed the ‘Egyptian’; and the Moroccan, Amer Azizi. These individuals recruited trustworthy members linked to a Moroccan jihadist network in Spain and those who were left from the Syria network.15 The explosives used in the Madrid attacks were acquired through Spanish brokers and criminals, who obtained them from a mine in Asturias.16 Most of the members have been arrested, while seven key members committed collective suicide when hunted down in Leganes by the Spanish police three weeks after the attacks. Other networks with a small presence in Spain For example, terrorist groups such as Hamas, Ansar Al Islam and Hizbollah have sympathisers who live in Spain as students, or as regular immigrants, often with normal jobs. They maintain ideological and emotional links with their respective groups but little operational relations, although some could be ‘sleepers’ with a deeper commitment. In May 2004, Spanish police arrested four individuals belonging to Ansar Al Islam who were running an illegal financial and fake documentation enterprise. This jihadist network has also been recruiting young Muslims in Europe to fight in Iraq.17 Despite arrests before and after the Madrid attacks, the networks have yet to be completely dismantled in Spain. Police information has revealed that there are still approximately 300 radicals, representing 20 nationalities, in the country.18

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The attacks in Madrid broke with the tradition of these networks, which until that point had not attacked inside Spain. Prior to this, network activity consisted of propaganda to increase recruits, sympathisers and resources; fund-raising through petty crime; recruitment of volunteers into the network to train or fight in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Indonesia; linking with other jihadist networks abroad, exchanging propaganda and intelligence, coordinating activities and providing funds; provision of sanctuary for foreign jihadists; and falsification of documents and purchase of dual use equipment for use in war zones (Chechnya, Algeria and Afghanistan). The profile of the members also varies. Many find temporary employment, and dedicate most of their time to serving the jihad. If their salaries do not cover their subsistence, they often receive money from the network. Of the Syrian group, only the leader Abu Dahdah fits this profile. In contrast, Algerian members have dedicated more time to fund-raising. Many are under-employed or work in manual labour. Others have attended university in Spain (or are recent graduates). A very small number fulfil relevant roles within the network. Many who do not have permanent employment rely on petty crime to survive. Generally, members lead normal lives. Some are married with children, and their commitment to the jihad can be called ‘limited’. They share radical ideas, participate in meetings, watch videos of the jihad and might undertake sporadic tasks.19 The variation in commitment complicates the anti-terror struggle because these members do not live on the margins of society, as is the case with ETA. In most cases, the only crime that can be attached to them is that of having ‘dangerous friendships’. It is therefore difficult to ascertain when these networks are in the midst of planning a substantial attack.

The Spanish struggle against Islamic extremism Terrorism inspired by global jihad is a complex threat. As Gunaratna states, al-Qa’ida began as an organisation, but with time was transformed into an ideological movement that inspires the decentralised activity of thousands around the world.20 As a consequence, the counter-terrorist struggle should not limit itself to weakening groups or support networks, but must also fight against the spread of the ideology that feeds into the jihad cause. In the domestic arena, legal and police measures can be combined with others of a social and cultural character. In the foreign arena, the international prosecution of terrorists must be accompanied by diplomatic measures and global cooperation against the factors that favour recruitment. Here, Spain has made some significant efforts. Counter-terrorist police activity pre- and post-Madrid As noted in the first part of this chapter, there are three principal security agencies committed to fighting terrorism in Spain: the Cuerpo Nacional


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de Policía or the Policia Nacional (National Police), the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) and the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, CNI (Centre for National Intelligence).21 Following a 30-year struggle against ETA, these agencies have developed considerable efficiency in counter-terrorism.22 Until the Madrid attacks, their principal priority was the fight against ETA, with Islamic terrorism a secondary concern. This is not to imply that they were complacent in the face of the latter threat, particularly after 11 September when Islamic terrorism became a global concern. After 11 September, these agencies were reformed, and they concentrated more fully on elaborating the growing threat from Islamic networks in Spain. Their budgets and personnel also increased. Between 9/11 and the Madrid attacks, over 70 suspects were arrested in Spain (as depicted in Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 below). These numbers increased as awareness of the danger grew, and also because Spain was committed to the US-led coalition in the ‘war on terror’. Most of the arrests, even after the Madrid attacks, were made by the Policia Nacional (around 95 per cent), with the Guardia Civil arresting the remainder. Between 2002 and 2003 several of these arrests were of individuals who were suspected of preparing attacks in Spain and France.23 95 85 75 65 55 45 35 25 15 5 –5

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Figure 6.2

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Number of arrests for links to jihadist networks in Spain 1995–200424

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Figure 6.3

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Algerian networks

Arrests in Spain according to networks 1995–2004

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Countries of origin of those arrested in Spain for belonging to jihadist

Notes on the tables: In the elaboration of these tables, non-jihadist common delinquents, accused of collaborating with the networks, have not been included. In some instances, the arrest of an individual has been accounted for more than once when that person has later reintegrated into the network. For this reason, the table on nationalities (numbers of total detainees) offers a smaller number than the sum of detentions. Both tables account for those that committed collective suicide in Leganés (5 Moroccans, 1 Tunisian and 1 Algerian). Source: Office of Information and Social Relations, Spanish Home Office; and press summaries facilitated by the Police Studies Institute in Spain.

Pre-11 Madrid 2004 Neither the Policia Nacional nor the Guardia Civil had enough or appropriate information to prevent the explosion of ten bombs on commuter trains in Madrid on 11 March, which killed 191 and injured over 1,600 civilians. Prior to the attacks, the police had been monitoring calls made by Jamal Zougam and had been watching Serhane ‘the Tunisian’, but even so, the information received was not sufficient. These individuals had been under investigation because of their links with the Syrian network, but were not imprisoned because of insufficient evidence. One of the collaborators in the attack was even an occasional source for the Guardia Civil on narcotics-related issues. Yet he managed to hide relevant information about the attacks from his handling agent. Of the three agencies, the National Intelligence Centre had probably obtained the most relevant information about the attacks. In November 2003, the CNI was alerted to the possibility that Allekema Lamari (the suspected leader of the operation and the seventh suicide in Leganes) intended to carry out an attack in Spain.25 The order for his arrest was never made. According to the Parliamentary Commission established to investigate the Madrid attacks, no foreign intelligence agency provided Spain with concrete details on the attacks.26 There were generic warnings, but nothing more than the analysis that the Spanish services already had. The response post-Madrid, however, has demonstrated increased levels of efficiency.


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After Madrid Two days after the attacks, the police made their first arrests. The details of the explosives were soon discovered as was the information that the terrorists had purchased a large arsenal of dynamite. A video in support of the attacks also emerged in the days following the attacks. After examining the video, the CNI determined that for the terrorists, this attack represented only the beginning of a concerted campaign.27 A further video was found in Leganes following the collective suicide. The core nucleus remained operational and three weeks later placed a bomb on the rail lines between Madrid and Seville. Fortunately, that bomb was discovered and deactivated.28 The following day, the police located the group in an apartment in Leganes, a small town near Madrid. After a shootout and siege, the terrorists committed collective suicide, killing a special operations police agent in the process.29 More explosives and details of planned attacks against a shopping centre and a Jewish establishment in Madrid were found.30 All plans were aborted. Soon after, a safe house for the group was located in Granada, indicating that the campaign extended to Andalusia. Three weeks later, the terrorist network was mostly dismantled, though given the fluid nature of these networks, and their ability to regenerate, this by no means indicates that the threat to Spain by this particular group has been eradicated. Structure of the agencies and reforms Given the insidious nature of terrorism, the efficiency of police measures depends in great part on available intelligence. Policia Nacional intelligence efforts fall into the Central Unit of Interior Information (focused on ETA) and the Central Unit of Exterior Information (dedicated to Arab/Islamic terrorism since the 1950s).31 The latter has three services: 1) Arab and Islamic affairs, divided into three sections, focusing on Middle East, Palestinian and African organisations (both the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa); 2) technology; and 3) exterior coordination.32 For the Guardia Civil, the information centre is called the Superior Head of Information and Investigation, and is dependant on the General Sub-Direction of Operations under official mandate of a military official with the rank of General. This service is divided into four special central units (UCE). One of the groups of the second unit (UCE-2) is tasked to collect and analyse information relating to Islamic terrorism.33 The CNI is dependent on the Ministry of Defence, although it directly informs the prime minister. As noted, until 2002 it was known as the Superior Centre of Defence Information (CESID). Its members, however, are not agents with any authority or power and therefore cannot carry out arrests. The role of the CNI is to provide the government with analysis, which is derived from integrated information obtained by police agencies. The focus has

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traditionally been on national terrorism, and its capacity in this area is significant. The CNI dedicates a complete area of the General Direction of Intelligence to the terrorist phenomenon in its interior and exterior dimensions, the latter focused primarily on Islamic terrorism.34 In spite of the professionalism developed by each of the three bodies, the structure favours neither the interchange of information nor the cooperation between the information units of the three agencies. Prior to the Madrid attacks, coordination was realised across weekly meetings held by those responsible for information within each agency and the Secretary of State for Security. Another method of coordination was informal, based on personal contacts and consultations between agents of the different agencies who worked on similar topics.35 Following the attacks, the National Centre for Anti-terrorist Coordination was created to improve the exchange of information and support investigations underway in the other three agencies. Its tasks include: • Obtaining information and creating a database. The information will emanate from pre-existing material already accumulated by the Policia Nacional, the Guardia Civil and the CNI. It will also incorporate information via access to the databases of the Group of Police Cooperation on Terrorism, of Interpol, the Bureau des Liaisons of the European Union (in the third pillar), and any other relevant databases. • Analysing and evaluating information, and producing periodic reports on the terrorist threat. • Coordinating counter-terrorism measures to increase efficiency and to prevent duplication of efforts. Every agency will maintain operative autonomy and will execute assigned missions. The centre, as such, will not carry out anti-terrorist operations.36 The role of Centre Director is to be occupied, on a rotating basis for two years, by a member of the Policia Nacional or the Guardia Civil.37 The Centre presently has 18 agents from the Policia Nacional, 18 from the Guardia Civil and five from the CNI, and its headquarters are temporarily located in a Policia Nacional barracks in Canillas in Madrid, where the Central Unit of Information is located. A new headquarters is planned for the future. Other measures against Islamic extremism pre- and post-Madrid Prior to Madrid, as noted, most anti-terrorist intelligence – both human and material – was devoted to the struggle against ETA. As a consequence, there was an uneven balance of resources between the Interior–Exterior divisions of both the Policia Nacional and the Guardia Civil. Due to the highly sensitive nature of its work, the composition, members and resources of these departments are obviously confidential. Nevertheless, the Parliamentary Commission investigating the attacks has publicised some information


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relating to the exterior information units of the Policia Nacional and the Guardia Civil. Although it is not possible to establish a comparison of the means dedicated to the struggle against ETA and Islamic terrorism, it is clear that prior to Madrid, the latter was considered a lower priority. The Policia Nacional had approximately fifty agents assigned to the Central Unit of Exterior Information in Madrid. These counted on the support of other units of the Policia Nacional, such as vigilance provided by the General Police Information or the analysts of the Central Unit of Intelligence of the police. After 11 September, support increased by about 25 per cent. Following the Casablanca attacks in May 2003,38 a further increase of 20 per cent was made in human resources: the Maghreb section was almost doubled in strength from 19 members to 35.39 A classified number of agents from the provincial brigades of information were Islamic specialists (especially in the provinces of Valencia, Alicante and Tarragona, where the Algerian network is concentrated), but a much larger proportion were devoted to anti-ETA and general matters such as organised crime and common crimes. Importantly, fluid coordination exists among specialists in Islamic terrorism belonging to the Central Unit of Madrid and the provincial units, because in addition to their daily work, which demands frequent contact, they are professionals who have known each other for years.40 In terms of translators, the police had a total of 40 Arabic translators, of which seven were employed in Madrid. According to the person in charge of the Central Unit of Exterior Information, this was still not enough. The Guardia Civil also had a limited number of specialists in Islamic terrorism prior to the Madrid attacks. In 2001, a group of the UCE-2 dedicated to this type of terrorism was comprised of 44 individuals. After 11 September, this increased to 62 members. Added to this should be a number of non-public general practitioners of the police information services. The total numbers are approximately 2,100, but as noted, most of them are devoted to countering ETA or organised crime. On the other hand, when the Madrid attacks occurred, the unit had only two contracted Arabic translators, and the Policia Nacional seven. In 2004, the CNI budget experienced a growth of 17.4 per cent, responding to a need at all levels. In the budget for 2005, a further 17 per cent increase has been approved. In agreement with Article 7 of the Law of the Centre for National Intelligence, the details on the structure and the members of the Centre are secret. Therefore, it is not possible to asses the means that the Spanish intelligence service dedicates to obtaining information and the analysis of Islamic terrorism. In general, the Madrid attacks provoked substantial improvements in material resources and will triple the number of agents dedicated to Islamic terrorism within the Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil by December 2005. The deadline of a year and a half since the plan became public in May 2004 was necessary to train civil servants. Precisely for this reason, a special professional

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status has been created, in order to stimulate long-term commitment. Such posts will acquire prestigious status, akin to special operatives or bomb disposal teams. This is relevant since a recurring problem has been the frequent rotation of personnel in intelligence police units in Spain. Human and material resources of the units in key zones of Spain where Arabic immigrant communities thrive will also be strengthened: Madrid, Catalonia, Murcia, Navarre, La Rioja and Andalusia.41 The concept of mixed units (Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil) in small localities and rural areas has also been proposed. The Spanish experience has demonstrated that in some cases, the jihadists were living in small municipalities. These units could examine the relation between the immigrant community and the terrorist networks in terms of funding, recruitment and the pockets of radicalism that benefit the networks (preachers and prayer rooms for the jihad). An increase in Maghrebi auxiliary personnel, for translation or as confidants, is also expected. Lastly, existing efforts to target the funding of terrorism and cyber terrorism will be augmented. Improving international cooperation Jihadism has no frontiers. For this reason, international cooperation is essential for successful prevention. Spanish security agencies have different arrangements with other agencies and with countries in the Maghreb. For example, since 1996 Spain has deployed police agents to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.42 Morocco is in fact key for counter-terrorism cooperation. Most of the immigrants in Spain come from Morocco (over half a million) and these numbers are likely to increase, possibly to two or three million by 2015.43 Extreme jihadists recruit Muslims in Europe, since they have experience in moving around the continent, and some even have European passports, thus providing great operational advantages.44 Cooperation between Spain and Morocco has acquired importance following the 2003 Casablanca and the 2004 Madrid attacks, where the terrorist groups had links to both countries. Diplomatic relations between Madrid and Rabat have in general been strained since 2001, although they have improved in the last year.45 This distrust has not interfered with counter-terrorist cooperation, but it has not improved it either. Following the Casablanca attacks in 2003, Spain sent agents specialised in Islamic terrorism to Morocco to assist with the investigations. This cooperation led to the arrest of Abdelaziz Benyaich by the Policia Nacional and that of Hicham Tensamani by the Guardia Civil in June 2003.46 Both were wanted in Morocco.47 After Madrid, in which Moroccans immigrants were also killed, Morocco sent agents to Spain to aid in the investigations. Nevertheless, cooperation could still improve. For example, on 26 April 2004, Spanish authorities released a warrant for the capture and arrest of Hicham Ahmidan for his implications in the Madrid attacks. Ahmidan was the brother of one of the suicides in Leganes. Several days after the warrant was made public, it emerged that Ahmidan had been in prison in Morocco since March. The Moroccan


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government has also been protective of the findings of its investigations into the Casablanca attacks.48 In early May 2004, the Home Offices of Spain and Morocco agreed to launch new measures to intensify operational and police cooperation. Cooperation between the European agencies is better and has led to crucial arrests. One example was the creation of Joint Inquiry Corps between France and Spain (JIC). The JIC are special units of magistrates and agents with the same power as judicial police; allowing them to search, interrogate and tap phones in both countries. Such cooperation guarantees direct access to the investigations. The JIC was created in June 2001 at the Tampere summit. In 2003, then Spanish Prime Minister Aznar and French President Chirac agreed in Carcassone to accelerate cooperation. The project finally emerged in September 2004. The Spanish side of the JIC will be led by a district attorney from the Spanish Courts and the French side by a similar authority from the Paris Courts. The Spanish side will include ten police agents, with the freedom to work without restrictions in France on anti-terrorist matters and vice versa.49 Legal measures to prevent and fight against Islamic terrorism Beyond police measures, the following legal measures to prevent and fight Islamic terrorism have been adopted:50 (a) The creation of a specialised judicial organ, as a first layer of coordination, prevention and investigation. In Spain, terrorism cases are brought to a special tribunal, known as the Audiencia Nacional. The ETA experience demonstrates the advantages of having such a specialised tribunal, with experts on terrorism and with a higher priority for security and protection from extortion. Thus far, eight cases for Islamic terrorism have been held in this tribunal. A group of four district attorneys specialised in Islamic terrorism has also been formed for use in Spanish cases and to lend support abroad. (b) Increased access to public and private data, such as company data and information related to transport, rental of vehicles, registration plates, addresses and telecommunications. Attempts will also be made to obtain information on pre-paid credit from mobile phone companies (such phones are widely used by terrorists). (c) The control of funds and electronic transfers from non-profit organisations used as pipelines to finance terrorism. (d) The control of radical activity connected to terrorism, especially associations or individuals under the cover of religious or cultural activities. (e) Expand the power to deport, outlined in the Immigration Law, those that pose a risk to national security. This was used in May 2004 against two radical Islamists indirectly related to the Madrid attacks.51

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Generic measures to facilitate integration of Muslim immigrants Some 700,000 Muslims reside Spain. The number of converts probably does not exceed 3,000. Marginalisation and pockets of radicalism have been exploited by Islamists in Spain as well as in other European states. The Muslim population in Spain is relatively new; most arrived in the last decade. Between 1997 and 1999, the number of immigrants increased by 173 per cent. In order to prevent the extremists from manipulating these communities, it is crucial to accommodate and integrate Muslims in Spanish society. The measures being adopted to achieve this goal include: (a) Generic measures to integrate all Muslims and non-Muslims in the workforce and increase social support. A significant concern is that the growing number of immigrants is larger than the number of available jobs in Spain. (b) A mapping exercise to improve the understanding of where Muslim immigrants live in Spain and avoid the consolidation of radical pockets. In this regard, an obligatory register has been developed by the Ministry of Justice. This will apply for mosques and prayer rooms, for all religions. Until now, the register was voluntary.52 A programme of economic assistance will also be put in place for Islamic associations which undertake programmes favouring integration. These measures will probably not be able to integrate those already radicalised, since they also receive significant support from abroad. It will, however, enable the organisations that do exist to become more transparent to the Spanish administration. To pinpoint radical groups, the work of the information services of the three security agencies will be critical. Equally as important will be the collaboration of the Islamic community in locating these groups. (c) Normalisation of relations between the Islamic communities and the Spanish authorities. There is an agreement that regulates Islamic religious classes in schools, religious festivities, spiritual attention in hospitals, prisons and cells. Most of the agreement has not been put into practice, however, primarily because of a lack of consensus between the communities that comprise the Spanish Islamic Commission, the only body with a voice recognised by the Spanish authorities.53 Two main federations monopolise the Islamic Commission and are not representative of an important number of mosques and centres in Spain. They are the Spanish Federation of Religious Islamic Entities/Federación Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas (FEERI) and the Union of Spanish Islamic Communities/Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España (UCIDE).

Conclusions: Part II It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures adopted since the Madrid attacks. After decades of struggle against ETA, the Spanish security


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services have developed a sophisticated counter-terrorist capacity. The change in focus towards Islamic terrorism and the substantial increase in resources will probably lead to improvements in police efficiency in the prevention and prosecution of Islamic extremist terrorism. The political will for these increases should facilitate the work of the counter-terrorist agencies. It remains to be seen how successful Spain will be in its attempts to integrate further its Maghrebi immigrants. Continued marginalisation or radicalisation could facilitate the extension of jihadist networks in Spain. In the short and medium term, it is difficult to avoid this since radicals still remain in the country. Thus the efforts made by Islamic communities in Spain in rejecting those that pervert their religion will also be important.

Notes and references 1. For more information on terrorism in Spain prior to the Madrid attacks, see Paddy Woodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the Gal and Spanish Democracy, 2nd edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Ludger Mees, Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: the Basque Clash of Identities (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Robert P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975–1988 (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1990); John L. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism (London & New York: Routledge, 1988); José M. Garmendia et al. Historia de E.T.A. (San Sebastián: Haranburu Editor, [Colección ‘Euskal Historia’; 9–10] 1979–1980) 2 vols.; Pedro Ibarra Güell, La evolución estratégica de ETA: de la ‘guerra revolucionaria’ (1963) a la negociación (Donostia: Kriselu, 1987); Fernando Reinares et al. Violencia y política en Euskadi (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 1984); Fernando Reinares, Patriotas de la muerte: quiénes han militado en ETA y por qué (Madrid: Taurus, 2001). 2. Minister of Interior Memo, 2003. 3. Minister of Interior Memo, 2003. 4. Remarks made in Luxembourg, 5 June 2003, EFE News Agency. 5. Aznar bestowed the award in Madrid, 21 January 2004, EFE News Agency. 6. Ministry of Interior documents, 2003. 7. Ministry of Defence documents, February–March 2001. 8. The Helsinki Headline Goals committed the EU, by the end of 2003, to be able to deploy a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men in less than two months, sustainable abroad for at least a year and supplied with all the elements of logistical, naval, air and land support necessary to carry out conflict prevention and crisis management operations. 9. The Spanish contribution includes a balanced distribution of land, naval, air and strategic resources and comprises a wide spectrum of units including: one Division HQ and two Brigade HQs, battalions of differing specialisations, helicopters, logistic units, an aircraft carrier, frigates, submarines, LPD’s, and fighter, reconnaissance and transport aircraft. Spain also contributes with military observers and specialised personnel for international HQs. 10. The NRF is to be comprised of 20,000 soldiers and should be ready by October 2004, deployable to any part of the world in less than one week and sustainable in a distant operational theatre for at least a year.

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11. The Prague Capability Commitment aims to improve NATO’s military assets in four areas: protection against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; superiority in command, control and intelligence; interoperability and efficiency in combat actions; and the capability of readiness, rapid deployment and sustainability of the force in distant theatres of operation. The main difference with the earlier Defence Capability Initiative is that every state has committed itself individually to solve all highlighted shortfalls and to provide all the capabilities necessary to achieve this goal by a fixed date. 12. Long before the Prague Summit, Spain began to outline its contribution to the new Force and Command Structure, which consists of two new High Readiness HQ’s, one a terrestrial HQ in Betera (Valencia) and the other a naval HQ on board the Amphibious Assault Ship Castilla. 13. It has signed specific national commitments in the four above-mentioned capability areas. It leads the air-to-air refuelling working group and participates in the rest of the working groups. The projected gaps are almost identical with the PCC and the Headline Goals. 14. On the other hand, the supplementary credits necessary to pay for the deployment of the armed forces in international missions as in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq are listed in the Ministry of Treasury budget and not in the Defence Budget. Adding these supplementary resources as investments in armaments and material to the cost of the Guardia Civil, which in Spain is listed under the Interior Ministry budget (in other countries it is listed under the Defence Ministry), the total Defence Budget for 2003 would reach 1.65 per cent of GDP. 15. Office of Information and Social Relations, Home Office, 13 March–20 August 2004. 16. El Mundo, 14 July 2004. 17. Office of Information and Social Relations, Home Office, 13 May 2004. 18. El País, 17 May 2004. 19. A detailed description on the lifestyle of the Syrian network can be found in the ‘Indictment of Al-Qaida Cells in Spain, Summary 35/01, Central Court of Instruction, Number Five, National Audience’, Madrid, 2003. 20. Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda’, The Washington Quarterly 27:3 (summer 2004), 91–100. 21. In addition to the two agencies, the Ertzaintza and the Mossos d’Escuadra, autonomous community police of the Basque country and Catalonia also fight terrorism. 22. Oscar Jaime Jiménez, Política, terrorismo y cambio político en España, 1976–1996, (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2002). See also Home Office statistics in the struggle against ETA: http://www.mir.es/oris/ 23. Appearance of the Chief of the Central Unit for Exterior Information of the National Police, Mariano Rayón, in the Parliamentary Commission investigating 11 March (11-M), 7 July 2004. 24. All three figures have been compiled from data from the Office for Information and Social Relations, Home Office, and news clippings facilitated by the Institute for Police Studies. 25. El País, 19 September 2004. 26. The Parliamentary Commission investigating the Madrid attacks was created in June 2004, and is ongoing. 27. Appearance of Mr Jorge Dezcallar, former Director of the Centre National for Intelligence in the Parliamentary Commission investigating the Madrid attacks, 19 July 2004.

Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

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El País, 3 April 2004. Office of Information and Social Relations, Home Office, 3 April 2004. El Mundo, 13 April 2004. Interview by one of the authors with members of the Central Unit of Exterior Information of the National Police, Madrid, January 2004. Appearance of the Head of the Central Information Unit of the National Police, Mr Mariano Rayón, in the Parliamentary Commission investigating 11-M, 7 July 2004. Available at: http://www.congreso.es/ Ibid. Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, ‘Servicios de Inteligencia y lucha contra el terrorismo’, Carlos de Cueto and Javier Jordán (ed.) Respuestas a nuevos desafíos de seguridad, (Granada: Comares, 2003), pp. 25–36. Appearance of the Chief of the Central Special Unit of the Police, Mr Faustino Álvarez, 7 July 2004. Intervention of the Home Office Minister, Mr Jose Antonio Alonso, in the Parliamentary Commission of Interior, 24 May 2004, http://www.congreso.es Agreement at the Ministers Council, 28 May 2004, in which a national Centre for Anti-Terrorist Coordination was created, http://www.la-moncloa.es/ Spanish cultural symbols were a target in the 2003 Casablanca attacks, where 45 were killed, including four Spaniards. Appearance of the Ex-commissioner General of Information of the National Police, Mr Jesús de la Morena, in the Parliamentary Commission investigating 11-M, 7 July, 2004. Appearance of the Head of the Central Information Unit of the National Police, Mr Mariano Rayón, 7 July 2004. Intervention of the Home Office Minister, Mr José Antonio Alonso, in the Interior Commission of the Parliament, 24 May 2004, see: http://www.congreso.es Appearance of the former General commissioner for Information of the National Police, Mr Jesús de la Morena, 7 July 2004. World Bank, World Development Indicators for 2004, http://www.worldbank.org/ data/wdi2004/ Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda’, p. 95. Its most delicate moment came when the island of Perejil was occupied by Moroccan forces, before being removed by Spanish forces in July 2002. Office for Information and Social Relations, Home Office, 13 June 2003. Ibid, 19 June 2003. Appearance of the Chief of the Special Central Unit of the Guardia Civil, Mr Faustino Álvarez, 7 July 2004. El País, 17 September 2004. Intervention of the Home Office Minister, Mr José Antonio Alonso, in the Interior Commission of the Parliament, 24 May 2004, see: http://www.congreso.es El País, 31 May 2004. Information on the register is available at: http://dgraj.mju.es/EntidadesReligiosas/ Joaquín Mantecon. ‘El islam en España’, Conciencia y libertad, 13 (2001), 57–89.

7 The United Kingdom Paul Cornish

Introduction: the end of the ‘post-cold war world’ Since 9/11, governments around the world have been struggling to describe and respond to a radically changing international security landscape, and to extrapolate lessons for domestic security and defence policy. This has not been a calm and detached intellectual exercise, but has been accompanied and influenced by a series of diplomatic shifts and other, often much noisier events: military operations in Afghanistan; improved relations between the United States and Russia; the enlargement of NATO; the opening up of the Central Asian republics, diplomatically and militarily; the non-compliance of North Korea with nuclear non-proliferation norms and practices; and Libya’s decision to declare and renounce its development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. At the time of writing (September 2004), disagreement over the US-led military action against Iraq in 2003 and its aftermath continued to divide the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and to undermine the United Nations Security Council. Governments have also renewed their interest in the old, cold-war problem of ‘civil defence’: how to prepare for a major attack on cities and facilities, and how to manage the consequences of such an attack for domestic society and government. Some governments have had more reason than others to dust off the old civil defence systems and procedures. Having chosen a prominent position as the leading ally of the United States in the so-called ‘war on terror’, the UK government’s response to 9/11 and its preparation for future, similar events has come under close scrutiny. Inevitably, given the closeness of the US–UK alliance against terrorism and in Iraq, comparisons have been drawn between the scope and scale of the Bush administration’s preparations for homeland security after 9/11, and the commitment and performance of the Blair government. Responding to its critics, the British government has periodically argued not only that much is being done, but also that large-scale reorganisation of government on the US model would be neither appropriate 146

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nor necessary. Informing this argument has been the claim that much of this is all-too familiar territory for the UK and its government. Where the domestic management of terrorist attacks is concerned, the UK government has over three decades of experience of Northern Ireland-related terrorism, experience that confers important advantages in reacting to the ‘new terrorism’ revealed on 9/11. Conversely, critics of the UK’s response to 9/11 and all that is implied by those events, argue that what might appear to be admirable self-confidence, is no more than blinkered complacence. For these critics, the British government’s response demonstrates classic bureaucratic and organisational inertia, where policy is not determined by the nature of the challenge, but by the nature of the policy tools available, which have to be shown to be relevant and effective. The product of this approach, critics argue, has been a wilful failure to understand the real meaning of 9/11, and a consequent unwillingness to devise new policy tools or – at least – to reconfigure existing procedures and mechanisms. This chapter examines the United Kingdom’s response to 9/11, accounting for the general contours of the debate in the UK as well as the more detailed substance of policy. The chapter asks how far the British government has relied on long-established policies, and whether these procedures are sufficiently elastic in the face of the threat of new terrorism? Where (and why) have new procedures been introduced, and what are the main lines of criticism of UK policy? The assessment begins with a summary of the new terrorist challenges to the security of the United Kingdom.

‘New terrorist’ challenges to the security of the United Kingdom The anatomy of ‘new terrorism’ As in other western democracies, the first task of the British government after 9/11 was to anatomise the terrorism that had been revealed in New York and Washington. The source, scale and novelty of the attacks suggested a variety of labels, such as ‘catastrophic terrorism’, ‘megaterrorism’, ‘religious terrorism’, ‘super-terrorism’ and the ‘new terrorism’, which will be used throughout this chapter.1 Whatever the label, it was the simple means with which the attacks were carried out that dominated discussion for many months afterwards. The use of unremarkable utility knives as murder and hijack weapons, and the use of equally unremarkable, laden passenger jets as guided missiles established the possibility that a major attack or even ‘act of war’ could, in fact, be a relatively straightforward matter, and could be carried out by amateurs rather than military professionals. The apparent ease with which such ‘low-tech/high-yield’ attacks could now be made, brought into public discussion the esoteric theory of ‘asymmetric warfare’; the war of the weak but clever and dedicated, against the strong but exposed and complacent.

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The prospect of a civil aircraft being flown into a nuclear power station, allegations of Moroccan dinghy suicide bombers in the straits of Gibraltar, the overpowering and arrest of the airborne ‘shoe bomber’, and rumours of explosive-packed cargo ships in the English Channel all captured the imagination for a time. Many, though, were more concerned with possible effects, rather than merely the style of attack, if more sophisticated technology and even chemical, biological and radiological devices might be involved. As a result, western publics, news media and governments became preoccupied with what might be termed ‘catastrophic asymmetric warfare scenarios’: the systematic release of anthrax or smallpox over a wide area; the deliberate pollution of water supplies by toxic agents; the prospect of a radiological ‘dirty bomb’ being released in Manhattan and other inner city areas, and so on. While understandable given the shock of 9/11, there are penalties in focusing policy too narrowly on possible means and potential effects. Incessant publicity about this or that catastrophic possibility can deepen public insecurity, in the process doing a good deal of the terrorists’ job for them; an issue to which the British government has been especially sensitive. Concentration on apocalyptic scenarios also risks turning policy-making into a series of disjointed reactions either to real events or imagined disasters. Active and anticipatory counter-terrorism requires the fullest possible understanding of the nature of the new terrorist threat. Means and likely effects do, of course, matter. But a comprehensive anatomy of new terrorism requires an understanding of the motives and the distinctive features of al-Qa’ida-type groups, of the structural vulnerability of western societies to such attack, and of the role of the electronic and print media. Implacable, absolute and suicidal Even before 9/11, there had been scores of attempts to produce a durable definition of terrorism.2 If it were possible to synthesise all those definitions, the result might read something like this: ‘negotiation by means of the threat and the use of violent force against civil society, deliberately and indiscriminately, to achieve political ends’. In other words, terrorism has traditionally been understood to be a political exchange, or bargaining process. Bargaining can be possible – and arguably becomes critically important – even at times of deep and ostensibly irreconcilable enmity. But if politics is about bargaining, then it cannot be a zero-sum game; there must be some possibility of compromise and trade-off. Here an early difficulty arises in dealing with groups such as al-Qa’ida, in that their goals can appear non-negotiable and exclusive: the destruction of Israel; the removal of all traces of western influence from Muslim lands; the establishment of an Islamic international order. The possibility of reaching a political settlement with terrorists becomes still more difficult when non-negotiable goals are pursued by absolute means. Terrorists have always sought to kill and injure innocent people, and to destroy and damage property, but usually as a means to convey a message

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and to establish a bargaining position. Many terrorists, of course, have simply been psychopaths.3 Yet with new, al-Qa’ida-style terrorism, there seems to be a strong possibility that the means have become the message, that to kill (and to be killed) have become the sufficient expression of the movement’s goals, and that there is little if any requirement to establish bargaining positions since no bargain can possibly be struck. The willingness to commit suicide during an attack is certainly the most distinctive feature of new terrorism, and the clearest departure from twentiethcentury patterns of terrorist activity.4 When terrorists are willing to kill themselves in order to achieve their unwavering goal, or when the goal is suicide, it is difficult to detect a dialogue waiting to be held, a bargain waiting to be struck, and tempting to suppose that the process and substance of a negotiated settlement are not their first priority. In short, in the al-Qa’ida movement and related organisations, the West is now confronted by an adversary with which dialogue and compromise are simply not possible. Virtual networks Another unfamiliar feature of new terrorism is its organisation. Most modern terrorist groups employ some form of network structure.5 What is distinctive about the organisation of al-Qa’ida and similar groups is not only that they appear to be more tightly organised and highly disciplined than many other terrorist groups, but also that the al-Qa’ida-style network is in some respects virtual. In January 2003 it was reported that ‘at least 40 al-Qa’ida-linked Islamist extremists’ were based in Britain,6 and by midMarch 2003 that estimate had risen to several hundred.7 If these ‘sleeper’ terrorists can be said to be organised in a network, then it is unusually a network that requires minimal formal organisation, few meetings, and little if any further training. But this virtual and latent network could prove to be no less effective; it is widely assumed that if or when these terrorists do emerge to execute their mission, they will prove to be highly professional not only in the specialist skills of explosives and weapons technologies, but also in their ability to exploit ‘neutral’ technology generally available in Britain’s communications, transport and banking infrastructures, for example. The geopolitical scale of the new terrorism challenge is another unfamiliar area. Many western governments have experience of domestic terrorism. But there is little if any experience at the national level (or anywhere else, for that matter) of terrorist movements which, more than even transnational, purport to be global in design and practice. And with a mission articulated in terms of generations rather than months or years, the timescale of new terrorism is another challenge to the West. The vulnerable society Any competent threat or risk assessment must examine not only the capabilities and intentions of any adversary, but also the level of exposure and

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vulnerability to attack, and at this point the difficulties for policy-makers are compounded. The list of possible targets for terrorist attack reads like nothing less than a summary account of life in contemporary Britain. Possible targets fall into several groups: • strategic targets – for example, nuclear power stations, pharmaceutical factories, Houses of Parliament, government and military key points;8 • transport infrastructure targets – road tunnels, airports, docks and railway networks; • ‘economic lifeline’ targets – banking and financial institutions and areas;9 • communications infrastructure targets – media and broadcast organisations; • computer network targets – computing systems vulnerable to software attack;10 • soft targets – for example, hotels, apartment blocks, shopping malls and sports stadiums; • ‘postcard targets’ – for example, the Tower of London, the Millennium Wheel, Stonehenge. While measures can be taken to protect certain of these sites from attack – particularly economic, energy, infrastructure and political key points – in many cases protection could only be achieved by closing the facility or by distorting normal routines, thus spreading the terrorists’ message for them. The implication is that like every other open society in the West, the UK is, and will remain, inherently vulnerable. An essentially vulnerable society is an ideal medium for new terrorist operations. A vast range of target-types is presented – a ‘target-rich environment’ – such that if any single, high-value, strategic target is found to be too difficult to attack, there would be more than enough substitutes available. For the terrorist preparing a plan of attack, any perceived difficulty in attacking a strategic target, such as a power station, could be offset by the ease of attacking a soft target, such as a crowded football stadium. Across the spectrum of possibilities, the results of an attack would differ, but in any case could be devastating. Because society’s vulnerability is so complete, and because this vulnerability is so highly prized by terrorist adversaries, the challenge to policy-makers is to manage vulnerability, since it cannot be excluded, and to reassure public opinion that enough can be done without severely disrupting society. Society can also be psychologically vulnerable. Whatever its nature, armed conflict is essentially a relational activity; it is not just the act of violence that is significant, but also the context in which it takes place and the manner in which it is perceived. This observation applies particularly well to modern terrorism, where the act of violence can often be relatively minor, but organised in such a way that its effect is magnified either by a disproportionate and illiberal government response involving censorship and the extension of

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police powers, or by an excessive public response bordering on panic. It follows that a society which is psychologically and culturally not well prepared to cope with and recover from the shock of an attack, could appear high on a terrorist’s list of valuable targets. The media Electronic and print media are central to any discussion of modern terrorism, and government responses to it. From the terrorist’s perspective, extensive reporting of attacks has always been considered an essential force and message multiplier. Media coverage not only publicises the terrorist movement it also, more importantly, paints an image of a government out of control. The media constitute an open and easily exploitable route by which to reveal society’s vulnerability to attack, and to demonstrate the impotence of government. For liberal polities, this situation exposes a deep dilemma. In an open democracy that values free expression, the media cannot be closed down by government fiat in order to deny publicity to the terrorist, not least because governments themselves need to use the same media in order to convey their assessments of risks and threats, and policy objectives, and generally to inform and reassure an uncertain and often anxious public. All these observations apply equally as well to new terrorism, as to its more traditional antecedents. But in recent years the media have evolved somewhat, both technologically and in terms of their place in civil society, such that the combination of new terrorism with ‘new media’ increases the difficulty for western governments. In the West, new terrorism has elements of the exotic and unfamiliar about it, and its causes are little understood; all of which has made for good news material. The breadth of the new terrorist threat also captures the public imagination; all functions of society appear to be vulnerable, apparently for no other reason than they represent the way of life in the West. Western media are, of course, a central feature of western society, and one that is highly valued by the West’s terrorist adversaries. And if the adversary is implacably committed to his cause, even to the extent of committing suicide, then the conclusion might be that in the struggle between society and terrorism, the media are the only useful interlocutor, with the world of formal politics having little if anything to contribute. For their part, print and electronic media can offer almost instant coverage of major events anywhere in the world, in a non-stop, 24-hour news cycle. This aura of omniscience confers a certain political authority, filling the vacuum left by the decline of trust and interest in representative politics. Taken together, new terrorism and new media represent a serious challenge to government. The reporting of events, and the consequent perceptions and judgements of the general public, at best, occur at a pace well within any government’s decision-making cycle, and at worst, occupy some new space in society where traditional, formal politics are simply not welcome.

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The UK response The British government’s management of the threat from new terrorism falls into five main areas of activity (or, as some critics would suggest, inactivity): organisation; legislation; prevention; consequence management and communication. Organisation At the heart of central government policy in the UK is the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC), chaired by the Home Secretary. A Cabinet-level committee, the task of the CCC is to make the UK ‘more effective in planning for, dealing with, and learning lessons from emergencies and disasters, including those caused by terrorists’. The CCC has three subcommittees: • CCC (CBRN) – sub-committee on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear consequence management, with the task of reviewing ‘contingency and other arrangements to protect the UK against the effects of a terrorist attack using CBRN means, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks of 11 September’;11 • CCC (LR) – sub-committee on London resilience, charged with reviewing contingency arrangements for London;12 • CCC (UKR) – sub-committee on UK resilience, responsible for reviewing ‘contingency arrangements for key suppliers, services and other systems which support the life of the community’.13 The CCC is supported by the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), a small organisation of about 100 officials established in summer 2001. The task of the CCS is to bring together ‘a range of responsibilities which had previously been dispersed across a number of different Departments’.14 As well as providing the secretariat to the CCC, the CCS provides risk assessments, coordinates the various areas and levels of government, and provides a public information service.15 From the outset, the CCS was conceived as a device for facilitation and coordination, rather than policy and decision-making, and was definitely not established as a ‘disaster management agency’, or with ‘large scale terrorist action or asymmetric attacks in mind’.16 The need to improve coordination also led to the appointment, in June 2002, of a senior government official to a new joint post of Security and Intelligence Coordinator, and Second Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office charged with enhancing ‘the capacity at the centre of government to coordinate security, intelligence and consequence management matters and to deal with risks and major emergencies should they arise’.17 The final feature of the UK government’s response to a terrorist or other major crisis is the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), which would serve as an emergency command and control centre.

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The appointment of a Security and Intelligence Coordinator is in keeping with the UK government’s general approach to 9/11 and its consequences, where the emphasis has been placed on coordination and decentralisation, rather than central executive initiative.18 The operating premise is that the responsibility for managing an emergency or crisis should lie with the agency and/or level of government most appropriate to deal with the incident: There is no single agency within the United Kingdom which has all the skills and resources which may be needed. . . . disaster response would not be helped by the creation of anything in the nature of a national disaster squad: prime responsibility for handling disasters should remain at the local level where the resources and expertise are found.19 Where central government does become involved – perhaps with a major infrastructure disaster or a terrorist attack – then, rather than manage the crisis through a central emergency operations centre, a ‘lead government department’ system would be used. A terrorist incident would, initially at least, be handled by the Home Office Terrorism Prevention Unit. In other cases, the immediate lead would be taken by the CCS, which would identify and then hand over control to the most appropriate, pre-nominated government department.20 Thus, in England the consequences of a terrorist incident using a CBRN weapon would be managed by the Department for Energy, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA); an offshore pollution crisis would be dealt with by the Department for Transport’s (DFT) Maritime and Coastguard Agency; a crisis involving the release of nuclear material in transit would be handled by either the Ministry of Defence (military material), or the DFT (civil material); a major flood would be the responsibility of DEFRA; and a disaster in a sports ground would be managed by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.21 Below central government, the devolved or ‘territorial’ authorities (in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland [suspended]), regional and local authorities, and the emergency services (police, fire and ambulance) are all expected to have developed emergency response plans and procedures, and to be prepared to liaise with public utilities and government departments such as the Department of Health and the Ministry of Defence. Across the United Kingdom, and in keeping with the principle that the first response to a crisis should be local, each local government authority organises a civil protection or emergency planning organisation, driven by a nominated Emergency Planning Officer.22 London, for example, is served by the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP), bringing together the Metropolitan Police, the City of London Police, the British Transport Police, the London Fire Brigade, the London Ambulance Service and local authorities. LESLP meets once every three months, under the chair of the Metropolitan Police, with the goal of ensuring ‘a partnership approach between all the relevant agencies in the planning for, and the response to, a major incident of whatever

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kind. This could be anything from a terrorist attack to a natural disaster such as a severe flood, which may occur within the Greater London area.’23 Legislation There are two main bodies of UK legislation to consider, both of which have been the subject of considerable debate since 9/11: emergency counterterrorism legislation, and civil defence or protection legislation. The legislative basis for the counter-terrorism policies of the UK government was already well developed before 9/11, in the form of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts of 1996 and 1998, and the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (POTA) of 1989, 1996 and 2000, with the latter addressing aspects of international terrorism such as financial and telecommunications infrastructures. POTA 2000 was extended and strengthened by the UK’s post-9/11 emergency legislation, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) which came into law on 14 December 2001. ATCSA addresses a broad range of issues, including: • freezing terrorist property and funding; • the management within government of information required for counterterrorism; • the UK’s immigration and asylum procedures, and their possible exploitation by terrorists; • the security of the nuclear and aviation industries; • the security of ‘dangerous substances’ (such as pathogens and toxins) that might be attacked or used by terrorists; • UK legislation concerning chemical, nuclear and biological weapons; • the scope of police powers in the UK; • investigatory powers and the retention of communications data; • the UK’s external obligations in police and judicial cooperation and anticorruption initiatives.24 Part 4 of ATCSA, which seeks to prevent the exploitation by terrorists of the UK’s immigration and asylum procedures, aroused controversy. The provisions of ATCSA enable the UK Home Secretary to derogate from obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights on grounds of national security, to order the detention without trial of individuals suspected of planning or intending terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom and internationally, and other police and judicial measures. These provisions led to the UK government being accused of holding individuals unlawfully, merely on the grounds of their nationality.25 After some public discussion, Part 4 of ATCSA was debated in Parliament in early March 2003 and was renewed. The exercise of powers under the ATCSA has, however, remained controversial. The detention of 13 alleged international terrorists under ATCSA led to a protracted legal argument between

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the Home Office and senior judges.26 And in February 2004 Prime Minister Tony Blair and Home Secretary David Blunkett ignited an argument with the judiciary, with civil liberties campaigners and with British Muslims when they proposed ‘pre-emptive’ trials of suspected terrorists; lowering the burden of proof required for a criminal conviction in order to apprehend suicide bombers before they could make an attack.27 In the face of fierce opposition, the proposal to alter judicial procedures was abandoned,28 and a six-month consultation period was announced. Enhanced measures to combat terrorism will be discussed, with a view to having new legislation in place by 2006 when the post-9/11 temporary powers provided by ATCSA will lapse.29 A reassessment of civil defence and protection legislation was already in progress before 9/11. In August 2001 the British government conducted a review of emergency planning procedures in England and Wales, concluding that ‘the Civil Defence Act 1948 no longer provides an adequate framework for the delivery of emergency planning in England and Wales.’ In July 2002, the government announced its intention ‘to create a modern framework for contingency planning and response’. The shock of 9/11 was still being felt, but even without 9/11 the fuel crisis in 2000 and the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 2001 had indicated the need for a reform of emergency planning. The decision was thus taken to review the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 and introduce new civil protection legislation – a Civil Contingencies Bill – to replace the Civil Defence Act 1948 and the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act 1986, both of which were regarded as being too closely geared to the cold war.30 The CCS duly began a ‘root and branch examination of all the existing legislation affecting public safety’. Various proposals were considered: an initiative to organise local bodies into either ‘leadership, planning and response roles’, or a ‘cooperating category’; the categorisation of emergencies into four types – public welfare, environmental, public order, and defence; and the creation of a new Regional Resilience Forum alongside the UK Resilience and London Resilience bodies.31 After concerns in the House of Commons Defence Committee and elsewhere over the delay in producing the longpromised new legislation,32 following several months of public consultation, the Civil Contingencies Bill was finally presented to Parliament on 7 January 2004.33 The Civil Contingencies Bill allows for a state of emergency to be declared in response to a terrorist attack or some other civil crisis.34 Thereafter, central government and other public authorities would be given extensive emergency powers, including the following: • to requisition, confiscate or destroy property and animal and plant life with or without compensation; • to prohibit movement into key areas and sensitive sites or, conversely, to coerce people to move to certain areas; • to prohibit public gatherings at certain times;

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• to prohibit travel; • to prohibit ‘other specified activities’; • to deploy the armed forces.35 The first draft of the Civil Contingencies Bill would have allowed the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take complete control of financial markets after a terrorist attack, and would have enabled him to suspend trading if markets were perceived to have over-reacted to the crisis. This proposal was abandoned in the face of opposition from the Bank of England and the City of London financial sector, although the government would still be left with a significant degree of control over the activities of the financial markets during an emergency.36 For some critics, the draft Bill also allowed for the exclusion of European Convention and other human rights legislation during an emergency. As a result, the final version was amended to ensure that any extraordinary regulations would lapse after a maximum 30 days and would, in any case, require the approval of both Houses of Parliament within seven days.37 Prevention Efforts to prevent a terrorist attack in or against the United Kingdom cover a broad spectrum of activities. At one end of the spectrum lie various relatively straightforward protection or denial measures, such as the deployment of ‘sky marshals’ on passenger aircraft and the decision to fit all UK-based passenger aircraft with intrusion-resistant cockpit doors. Other, more elaborate measures are necessary to improve the physical security of key sites and materials (including CBRN materials), and to deny them to terrorist groups.38 The protection of nuclear installations is a major concern, prompting the expansion of the United Kingdom’s dedicated nuclear installations police force; the UK Atomic Energy Agency Constabulary.39 A quick reaction alert system to provide a protective air force interception screen has also been developed. And there have been extensive efforts in the United Kingdom to identify and disrupt terrorists’ financial networks. Another category of preventive measures are those that seek to address the causes of terrorism, either in terms of restoring stability to fragile states and regions through peace support operations, such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan,40 or in terms of addressing the putative economic and developmental causes of terrorism and anti-western sentiment. The developmental approach to terrorism is based upon the argument that 9/11 and similar events are at some level driven by global economic distortions, by the exploitative practices of the West, and by the West’s failure to address poverty. It has, nevertheless, so far proved difficult within the British government and elsewhere, to establish an unequivocal, causal relationship between under-development, poverty and terrorism.41 The militant end of the prevention spectrum involves the use of armed force to disrupt or interdict terrorist groups in their base areas. Since the

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operating assumption is that the terrorist group in question is or could be in a position to launch an attack against the United Kingdom and its interests, and has the intention to do so, then UK policy in this regard should be described as pre-emption rather than prevention. The UK approach is expressed in the words of the Secretary of State for Defence: ‘It is much better to engage our enemies in their backyard than in ours, at a time and place of our choosing and not theirs.’42 The UK Ministry of Defence has developed an elaborate intellectual structure to support this pre-emptive position. The goal of the MoD’s ‘conceptual framework for the military contribution to the campaign against international terrorism abroad’ is to show that ‘military action could contribute to the overall cross-Government and international campaign to eliminate terrorism as a force for change in international affairs’. The framework begins with the requirement for ‘knowledge superiority’ and then moves through several levels of activity: prevention (including military diplomacy, conflict prevention and stabilisation activities); deterrence (to convince potential terrorists both of the difficulty of attack and the certainty of a UK military response); coercion (threatening or using military force in order to stop terrorist groups acting against the UK); disruption (surveillance and interdiction operations designed to incapacitate terrorist groups); and destruction (military action to seek to destroy terrorist cells, entire terrorist networks and, if necessary, state sponsored facilities and infrastructure supporting terrorism).43 The long-term structural and operational implications for Britain’s armed forces of a strategy to pre-empt terrorist attacks are beginning to be appreciated, in a debate that has been enlivened by the military campaign in Iraq from March–April 2003, and by the sense of a widening gulf between British and American military capability.44 Consequence management In the event of a major terrorist attack in or against the United Kingdom, the central concern will be the capacity of government departments and emergency agencies to cope effectively with the consequences of that attack. In the United Kingdom, arrangements for consequence management are as much part of the defence against terrorism as other, more directly protective and preventive measures. Concern with, and preparation for consequence management can send a message of reassurance to an anxious public, as well as a message of deterrence to a potential terrorist attacker, in that a society known to have made detailed preparations for the aftermath of an attack might appear to be a less attractive target than another, less prepared and more brittle society. In the United Kingdom, the ability to withstand and cope with the shock of a terrorist attack has come to be known as ‘resilience’, a term which has practical, cultural and psychological dimensions. Practical dimensions of consequence management and resilience are focused on the management of a major, mass casualty terrorist attack involving

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a CBRN weapon. According to analysis based on a report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, ‘the technological obstacles to [a CBRN] attack are by no means insuperable. It appears to be a case not of if, but rather of when, the next such event will occur.’45 This assessment seems to be one with which the UK government would concur. That said, the time and place of such an attack will always be difficult, if not impossible to establish. And given the complexities of weaponisation in all categories of CBRN, and the sensitivity of chemical and biological weapons to adverse environmental conditions, it is even more difficult to gauge likely casualty figures for a CBRN attack. Nevertheless, a mass casualty CBRN attack in the United Kingdom has become the hypothetical standard against which preparations for consequence management are made. The first stage of effective consequence management must be early warning that an attack has taken place. In this vein, the British government is reported to be contemplating a network of mobile chemical and biological air monitoring units, in addition to those already in place in the London Underground.46 Efforts are also being made to improve the ability of medical teams and hospitals to operate in a contaminated environment or with contaminated casualties, and better to equip the emergency services to decontaminate sites, vehicles and people.47 By March 2003, a CBRN Police Training Centre had been established, and some 2,350 police had been trained and equipped in CBRN response.48 In September 2003 an exercise took place in London with a simulated chemical attack on an underground train, designed to test new equipment and procedures.49 In order to augment police and emergency services in the event of a CBRN attack, Britain’s reserve armed forces are being reorganised to provide 14 civil contingencies reaction units of about 500 troops each, available to regional military commanders and civil authorities. Medically, 12 Regional Smallpox Response Groups have been established around the United Kingdom, stockpiles of vaccine and antidote have been prepared, and a network of infectious and/or contagious disease diagnosis laboratories, national secure care centres and high-security treatment units organised (at Muswell Hill in London, and in Newcastle). The cultural aspects of consequence management concern the level of interest in the United Kingdom in such ideas as ‘national resilience’ and ‘critical national infrastructure’, the interpretation and understanding of those key terms, and the levels of sacrifice which government is willing to require, and the public is willing to accept, in the name of effective consequence management.50 These all continue to be open questions in the United Kingdom, with the result that formal government policy statements and public planning all have an uncertain, if not unreal (and therefore unbelievable) quality to them. Does the language of threat and vulnerability which has been so prominent since 9/11, speak of genuinely held fears coupled with a genuine intent to keep such threats at bay? Or has it all been just so much posturing? Has the

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UK’s recent interest in homeland security been little more than a cynical displacement activity by all concerned (government, media and public)? Most analysts would accept that genuine protection and preparation for effective consequence management will require sacrifices to be made. But what is it that is to be protected, preserved or reinstated? Is the main purpose of the UK’s homeland security and consequence management effort to ensure national survival, or merely the survival of the government? And in either case (or some combination of the two), how much demand should be made on the cultural and civil rights fabric of society in order to achieve the desired levels of preparation and security? The identification and preservation of a critical national infrastructure in the United Kingdom should, in the view of one regional emergency planning specialist, be the preliminary stage in an exercise designed to ensure that preferred lifestyles and societal mores are not critically dependant on any key buildings, resources, communications systems, and so forth.51 This form of resilience can be achieved partly by introducing levels of redundancy, but mainly by changing lifestyles. In the United Kingdom, as in any other liberal democracy, calls to modify lifestyle preferences and forego certain personal and societal goods for security reasons are culturally and therefore politically contentious, and can succeed only to the extent that the language of threat and vulnerability is fundamentally believable, and that the measures and changes being proposed will make a meaningful contribution to improved protection and better consequence management. And so the consequence management debate in the United Kingdom turns ultimately to questions of personal and social psychology in the face of risk. As with any other society and its government, policy and planning for consequence management in the United Kingdom are hostage to the quality of public understanding and tolerance of risk. A comprehensive risk assessment should amalgamate at least four different analyses. For example, the British government’s calculation of the risk of a terrorist attack occurring on or in the United Kingdom would involve an assessment of the intention of a given terrorist group to launch such an attack for some reason; the capability of that group to launch the attack effectively; the vulnerability of the United Kingdom to the type of attack being hypothesised; and the capacity of the United Kingdom to do something about such an attack and its consequences (that is, to absorb, deter or pre-empt it). The last is important, since too often – particularly where the threat of a terrorist attack is concerned – an incomplete understanding of risk assessment leads to a misplaced and paralysing sense of inevitability in the public mind. The assessment of risk according to these four dynamics should be the first step in a rational process of risk management. But if risk assessment is allowed to reduce merely to perceptions of threat and vulnerability, then analysis of the risk of a terrorist attack can mistakenly develop into a dire prediction of the inevitability of such an attack, in the face of which society is assumed to

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be powerless. The result is that risk assessment actually becomes self-defeating; it encourages (rather than neutralises) ‘social amplification of risk’,52 and in the public mind becomes the first step towards a preferred goal of risk elimination rather than risk management. One of two outcomes then follows: society either develops excessive expectations of government as providers of security and eliminators of risk; or society becomes so pessimistic about the likelihood and scale of a terrorist attack that it decides either to ignore the risk, or becomes overwhelmed, torpid and fatalistic in the face of that risk. From the perspective of government, neither outcome is satisfactory, and a path must be steered between them. To do too little would be to rebuff the expectations of those who look to government for leadership and action, and might push them towards a more pessimistic position. But to do too much and too busily could give the impression of ‘a society that has lost control’,53 and could reinforce the already bleak, and socially and politically enervating views of the pessimists. Communication Common to all areas of policy for the analysis, prevention and management of new terrorist threats to the UK is the need for effective communications: within government; between government and terrorist groups; between government and the private sector; and especially between government and the British public. The first of these is one of the main objectives of efforts to improve organisation and coordination within central government, between central and local government, and between the various emergency services and other agencies. Communication with terrorist groups is an implied feature of the various initiatives at protection and consequence management. Occasionally, more explicit messages are sent, such as the British Defence Secretary’s promise of pre-emptive military action. Given the physical vulnerability of high-profile commercial and financial organisations to a terrorist attack on their largely unprotected buildings, and the vulnerability of such organisations to a ‘cyber’ attack on electronic systems, good communications between government and the private sector is vital if the bases of an advanced, complex national economy are to be made more resilient.54 As far as government communications with the British public are concerned, the problem here – in the words of former UK Home Secretary David Blunkett – is one of ‘trying to strike a balance between alerting people and alarming them’.55 At times there appears to be an unspoken goal within government to invent its own versions of the banalities of cold-war civil defence, with the rumour that in the event of a major terrorist attack the government’s advice to the public would be to ‘go in, stay in, tune in’ (to a radio), and expect direction from civil defence wardens to be known as ‘gatekeepers’.56 But the British government has consistently acknowledged the importance of effective public information, and to that end has organised both a ‘resilience’57 and a ‘terrorism’58 website. The difficulty for government is that too little public information

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could make the public less alert and informed than it should be about the terrorist threat and the government’s risk management strategy. Conversely, while accepting the public have ‘a right to know what risks they face’,59 too much information could induce the pessimism and social paralysis mentioned earlier, could provide key information to terrorists, and could tempt the public to use emergency response measures – such as evacuation procedures – before it is appropriate and/or necessary to do so.

Critiques The security of the United Kingdom in the face of threats from new terrorism has been the focus of an extraordinary level of official, media and public interest since 9/11, with much heightened interest in these matters following the attacks in Madrid in March 2004. In one way or another, every aspect of homeland security policy and practice has been addressed, resulting in a spate of declarations, initiatives and legislation, all accompanied by vigorous public debate and criticism. The level of achievement is still an open question, especially with regard to the UK’s capacity to organise itself to endure a terrorist attack involving CBRN weapons. The government’s allocation of public resources to counter-terrorism and civil protection has also been scrutinised closely, as has the quality of the government’s public information and crisis communication systems. The July 2002 House of Commons Defence Committee report ‘Defence and Security in the UK’ offered a trenchant critique of the government’s performance after 9/11, arguing that ‘the Government has confused activity with achievement’. The Defence Committee’s principal overall conclusion was that ‘there has been inadequate central control and direction’, and that a ‘strong central authority is needed to lay down clear criteria for the work of individual government departments and to coordinate the efforts of other agencies.’60 Some critics, such as the opposition Conservative Party’s then Shadow Home Secretary, argued that a new Minister for Homeland Security should be appointed to coordinate efforts.61 Building on this theme, others have noted the contrast with the United States where a ‘revolution has taken place in the organisation of the defence of the homeland’ and have called for the CCS to be transformed into a Cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security, with a Minister, a Permanent Secretary and a secretariat, and with considerable executive initiative and authority.62 The issue at the heart of the debate in the United Kingdom is whether the Blair government’s preference for inter-departmental and inter-agency coordination is really the best way to manage and respond to the threat of new terrorism. Certainly, close analysis of the government’s approach reveals important inconsistencies which could prove to be major flaws in the event of an attack. In the first place, there is wide variation in standards of civil contingencies planning and preparation. There are no national performance

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targets for local authorities and emergency agencies, and differences in the quality of preparation among central government departments, with the National Health Service the focus of particular criticism and concern.63 Unless corrected, these inconsistencies can only result in government’s preferred coordination effort being hostage to the least prepared authority, agency or department. The system of nominating a lead government department is another source of concern, in that as well as being organisationally complex,64 the publicly available plan seems to invite a wide-spectrum terrorist attack across several departmental jurisdictions, with all the confusion that would result. The government is also criticised for failing to ensure that the commercial and financial sectors have been properly involved in the coordination effort, although an advisory publication has been distributed to businesses.65 The allocation of resources to UK homeland security is another area of dispute. Several spending decisions have been announced since 9/11, including: • £53 million for purchase of protective equipment for firemen;66 • £56 million for a ‘national mass decontamination capability’;67 • £19 million central government grant to local authorities for civil protection work for 2002–2003;68 • £96 million spending by the Department of Health in 2002–2003 on CBRN medical countermeasures, including vaccines and antibiotics, and a further £5 million for 360 mobile decontamination units and 7,250 Personal Protection Equipment suits for Ambulance Service and hospital accident and emergency departments;69 • £49 million to London’s Metropolitan Police for counter-terrorism in 2002–2003;70 • £132 million for urban search and rescue capabilities.71 With some reason, critics have argued variously that funding decisions since 9/11 have been disjointed, ad hoc, opaque, politically motivated or simply insufficient, especially when set against the scale of US spending on homeland security. The US homeland security budget for 2000 – that is, before 9/11 – was over $12 billion, and the cost of the new Department of Homeland Security is reported to be in the region of $37.5 billion. 72 Finally, the UK government’s communications and public information strategies have attracted criticism, ranging from the technical to the political. Technically, the durability of the government’s emergency communications network has aroused concern,73 while the Home Office’s decision to use the terms ‘tactical’, ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ in a different way than the military is also curious. Politically, the government appears to have difficulty in deciding how and when to communicate an assessment of risk (general or specific) without causing overwhelming public uncertainty. A string of confused messages and mishandled alerts have been heavily censured in the media: Blair’s

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warning in September 2002 that Britain would be a likely target for attack with weapons of mass destruction originating in Iraq; the November 2002 warning by former Home Secretary Blunkett (subsequently withdrawn) that al-Qa’ida could be planning to attack British cities with chemical weapons or a ‘dirty bomb’; the January 2003 discovery of a ricin ‘factory’ in North London; and the February 2003 deployment of armed police and troops to Heathrow airport. Incidents such as these expose the government to the claim that it is indulging in irresponsible alarmism by being unclear as to the quality and purpose of this or that alert, unclear as to the counter-measures it is undertaking, and unclear as to what action is expected of the public, and why. The key issue here, is how much information about terrorist threats should be released to the general public and to specific sectors such as financial and commercial organisations. Some critics take the view that if the British public were more informed and engaged, then the government’s attempts at ‘threat inoculation’ (preparing the public for danger and bad news) would be more mature, respected and therefore effective.74 Rather than secrecy, if openness and transparency could be the government’s starting presumption, modified as necessary on grounds of security, then public understanding of the government’s risk management efforts could be much improved.75 All that said, any tendency to withhold information about terrorist threats from the public is to some extent to be expected and welcomed, given the nature of the information and its sources, and given that the release of such information into the public domain will improve a terrorist’s assessment of the range of preventive, protective and consequence management measures available in Britain.

Conclusion There is a widespread feeling of exposure in the United Kingdom to the threat of a ‘new terrorist’ attack in the near future. After the Madrid incident, that feeling is perhaps more keenly felt than in any other western society apart from the United States. As this chapter has shown, UK preparations to meet that threat have drawn in several areas of public policy, on various levels. Whatever the criticisms of UK performance, there seems to be no shortage of understanding among government departments, agencies and emergency services that effective coordination will be essential, that any response must be scaleable to match the style and effects of any attack, and that any response system must have inbuilt redundancy. The British government believes the desired levels of preparation and coordination can be achieved without extensive reorganisation of central government, and without the creation of a new central government department. The value of this judgement remains, of course, an open question. The larger problem for those responsible for counter-terrorism and homeland security in the United Kingdom is that there is much more to the new terrorist threat that is simply beyond the scope of control and management

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of any government. For the terrorist, the United Kingdom offers many structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities that could be exploited with relative ease. Since no government could be expected to eliminate all vulnerability to terrorist attack, the British government might with reason argue that it should not be held entirely responsible whenever an attack occurs. Yet this position is untenable politically; public opinion in Britain will expect government to be fully in charge, and will hold it fully responsible. The British government therefore finds itself in the unenviable position of being politically obliged to accept responsibility for outcomes which it does not, and cannot fully control. What is also largely beyond the control of the government – but still a central feature of the overall response to new terrorism – is the state of mind of the British public. During the cold war, the main concern of civil defence and protection was to survive a strategic-level military attack. The cold war public were expected to react corporately and in certain disciplined ways, and educated that to do otherwise would provoke social chaos and diminish the chance of society’s survival. The deterrence and then management of a major attack, however, would have been largely a matter for government, with the public playing an essentially passive role. What defines UK homeland security since 9/11, is that the public have become more active partners in the enterprise, expected not only to know what to do in a crisis, but also to take a central role as individuals in protection and prevention measures, and in consequence management and recovery. Public resilience to terrorist attack is an integral component of the overall response to terrorism. The UK government’s management of the threat of new terrorism is therefore determined not only by the flexibility of government systems, by the quality of the intelligence effort, and by timely protection, prevention and pre-emption, but also by the public’s management of the terrorist risk. In the United Kingdom, a framework for managing the consequences of a strategic attack (civil defence) has been fused with the principal method for managing the vulnerability to, and consequences of a terrorist attack (public resilience). It remains to be seen whether these two approaches can effectively be synthesised, not least because cold war-style civil defence tended to marginalise individual judgement, whereas public resilience to new terrorism depends on it.

Notes and references 1. On ‘catastrophic terrorism’ (deaths of 40,000 or more per event) see A. Carter, J. Deutch & P. Zelikow, ‘Catastrophic terrorism: tackling the new danger’, Foreign Affairs (November/December 1998). On ‘megaterrorism’ (deaths of 100,000 or more per event) see R. L. Garwin, ‘Are we safe yet?’ [Interview], IEEE Spectrum Online, January 2003, www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/jan03/elude.html On ‘religious terrorism’ see M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: the Global

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3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

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Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). On ‘new’ terrorism, see W. Laqueur, ‘Postmodern terrorism: new rules for an old game’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 1996), and The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford University Press, 1999). See W. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (London: Little, Brown & Co., 1987); W. Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Gollancz, 1999); W. Laqueur, A History of Terrorism (2001); D. J. Whitaker, The Terrorism Reader (London: Routledge, 2001); and D. C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organisations (London: Frank Cass, 2002). See Reich, The Origins of Terrorism. See G. Whitty, ‘Engaging the public in mitigating the impact of terrorism’, Security Monitor (1/5, December 2002/January 2003), 15–16. See M. Zanini and S. J. A. Edwards, ‘The networking of terror in the information age’, in J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds), Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp. 29–60. ‘Terrorist “sleepers” slip intelligence net’, The Independent on Sunday, 19 January 2003. ‘Panorama’, BBC 1, 16 March 2003. See House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC), Defence and Security in the UK: Volume I (London: The Stationery Office, 24 July 2002), para. 60. For an analysis of the threat to economic targets, see D. Claridge, ‘The vanguard of the new counter-terrorism’, Security Monitor (1/4, November 2002), 13–15. See ‘UK at risk of cyber terror’, Guardian, 12 August 2002, and L. M. Cohen, ‘New priorities take hold in the UK’, Security Management (July 2002), 55. A Minister for CBRN Coordination was appointed in late 2001. London also enjoys a Minister for London Resilience, a London Resilience Forum with various sub-committees (Blue Lights [that is, emergency services], Utilities, Business, Health, Transport, Communications, and Local Authorities), a permanent London Resilience Team, a ‘strategic emergency planning regime’, and a dedicated website – www.londonprepared.gov.uk. See former Home Secretary (Mr David Blunkett), Written Ministerial Statement, 3 March 2003, www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm03030. . ./30303m01.ht For a succinct description of London’s resilience organisations, see ‘Defending the capital – who does what’, Resilience (Issue 1, Spring 2004), 30. HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, para. 132. Ibid., para. 140. Ibid., para. 145. Ibid., paras 142, 146. Ibid., para. 183. ‘Blair’s “homeland security chief” to counter terrorists’, The Times, 21 June 2002. UK Home Office, Dealing with Disaster (UK Resilience website, third edition, www.ukresilience.info/contingencies/dwd/introduction.htm downloaded 7 April 2003), chapter 1. See also HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, paras 160–2. HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, paras 165–76. ‘Handling a crisis: lead government departments’, UK Resilience website: www. ukresilience.info/handling.htm downloaded 7 April 2003. Home Office, Dealing with Disaster, chapters 1–2. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (PAC), Facing the Challenge: NHS Emergency Planning in England (London: House of Commons, HC 545, 16 April 2003), Minutes of Evidence, Appendix 1, Question 126 (i), Ev 17.

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24. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Explanatory Notes (London: HMSO, 2001), chapter 24. See: www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en/2001en24.htm downloaded 26 April 2003. 25. ‘Anti-terror law vital, court told’, Guardian, 8 October 2002. 26. ‘Judges accuse Blunkett over terror suspect’, Guardian, 9 March 2004; ‘Terror suspects to challenge internment’, The Times, 18 March 2004; ‘Terror laws in disarray as Woolf frees Libyan’, The Times, 19 March 2004. 27. ‘Blunkett proposes tougher laws on terrorism’, Financial Times, 2 February 2004; ‘Terrorism trials plan “an affront to rule of law” ’, The Times, 3 February 2004, ‘Blair faces battle over terror laws’, Financial Times, 12 February 2004. 28. ‘Blunkett drops plan for secret terror trials’, The Times, 26 February 2004; ‘Blunkett in reverse on anti-terror expansion’, Financial Times, 26 February 2004. 29. ‘Blunkett to spell out anti-terrorism plans’, The Times, 23 February 2004. 30. See K. Jeffery and P. Hennessy, States of Emergency: British Governments and Strikebreaking Since 1919 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983). 31. ‘Civil Contingencies Bill – update February 2003’, www.ukresilience.info/legislation/ civilbill.htm downloaded 26 April 2003. 32. ‘MPs attack delay over civil defence emergency planning laws’, www.telegraph.co.uk 19 February 2003. 33. Civil Contingencies Bill, House of Commons, Bill 14, 7 January 2004. 34. See Civil Contingencies Bill, Part 1, para. 1. 35. ‘Civil Contingencies Bill’, Resilience (Issue 1, Spring 2004), 5. 36. ‘Brown drops proposals to take control of financial markets’, Financial Times, 3 December 2003. 37. Civil Contingencies Bill, Part 2, paras 25–6. See also ‘Terror law shake-up heralds increase in draconian powers’, Financial Times, 8 January 2004. 38. See HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, para. 60. 39. See B. George and J. Gearson, ‘The protection and security of nuclear installations and materials in the UK’, unpublished paper, Conference on International Approaches to Nuclear and Radiological Security, London, 29 September 2002. 40. HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, para. 23. 41. See my ‘Terrorism, insecurity and underdevelopment’, Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, 1:3 (2001). 42. ‘Introduction’, The Strategic Defence Review: a New Chapter (London: Ministry of Defence, July 2002). 43. ‘The strategic defence review: a new chapter. Supporting information and analysis’ (London: Ministry of Defence, Cm 5566 Vol. II, July 2002), section 6. 44. ‘Armed forces to be slashed for hi-tech war’, The Sunday Times, 20 April 2003. 45. ‘CBRN terrorism: how real is the threat?’, Military Technology (August 2002), 12. 46. ‘Terror gas detector vans to guard Britain’, The Sunday Times, 9 February 2002. 47. ‘Britain “not prepared” for chemical attack’, Daily Telegraph, 9 September 2002; ‘London gets decontamination units to deal with terror strike’, The Times, 29 May 2003. 48. [Former] Home Secretary (Mr David Blunkett), to House of Commons, 20 March 2003: www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansr.. ./30320m02.ht 49. ‘Ministers to study lessons from anti-terror exercise’, Financial Times, 8 September 2003. 50. See T. Vary, ‘Critical national infrastructure and the resilient community’, Security Monitor (1/2, September 2002), and A. Fox, ‘A framework to improve resilience planning for urban communities’, Security Monitor (1/5, December 2002/January 2003).

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51. Vary, ‘Critical national infrastructure’, p. 4. 52. See A. Dwyer, ‘“Prudent pessimism”: the management of terrorist threats against the railways in England, Scotland and Wales’, Security Monitor (1/4, November 2002), 3. 53. B. Durodié, ‘Perception and threat: why vulnerability-led responses will fail’, Security Monitor (1/4, November 2002), 17. 54. See R. Connaughton, ‘Home defence: to think the unthinkable’, The Officer (14/13, October/November 2002), 26; and Cohen, ‘New priorities take hold in the U.K.’ 55. Quoted in ‘Patience will be a vital weapon in the long battle against terrorism’, Independent [Leader], 14 February 2003. 56. See ‘All homes to get terror survival plan’, Sunday Times, 8 December 2002; ‘Civil defence laws to be updated in face of new nuclear, chemical and biological threats’, Independent, 9 December 2002. 57. The home page of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, see: www.ukresilience.info See also HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, para. 287. 58. A Home Office administered website – www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism – which went live on 18 March 2003. 59. HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, para. 293. 60. Ibid, p. 7. 61. ‘Travellers cancel flights as Blunkett calls for calm’, Independent, 14 February 2003. 62. M. Prisk, Eternal Vigilance: the Defence of a Free Society (London: First Defence, January 2003). 63. HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, para. 175. On the condition of the National Health Service, see PAC, Facing the Challenge. 64. See HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, paras 165–76. 65. ‘Employers “ignoring guidelines to counter-terrorism”’, Financial Times, 31 March 2003. 66. ‘Britain “not prepared” for chemical attack’, Daily Telegraph, 9 September 2002. 67. [Former] Home Secretary (Mr David Blunkett), Written Ministerial Statement, 3 March 2003, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm03030.../ 30303m01.ht See also N. Raynsford, ‘Eternal vigilance’, Resilience (Issue 1, Spring 2004), 24. 68. Blunkett, Written Statement, 3 March 2003. 69. Blunkett to Commons, 20 March 2003. 70. Blunkett, Written Statement, 3 March 2003. 71. Raynsford, ‘Eternal vigilance’, p. 24. 72. See Prisk, Eternal Vigilance, pp. 10–11, and Connaughton, ‘Home defence’, p. 24. 73. HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, paras 196–8. 74. Whitty, ‘Engaging the public’. 75. See HCDC, Defence and Security in the UK, para. 293.


Part II Europe and America: Transatlantic Tension and Convergence


8 The European Union Tessa Szyszkowitz

For decades, a number of European states have learned to live with ever-present bomb threats from separatist or radical political groups, and accordingly, have developed sophisticated counter-terrorism infrastructures. ‘There was hardly a day in my political life in Spain without me visiting a funeral of a victim of terror,’ remarked EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana about his time as minister in his home country Spain.1 EU institutions reacted to these national threats, too: in 1995 the European Council in Madrid named terrorism as ‘a threat to democracy’; the Treaty of Amsterdam called for a ‘fight against terrorism’; the Vienna Action Plan in 1998 referred to it, as also did the European Council in Tampere in 1999. The real turning-point in the history of counter-terrorism in the European Union came after the attacks on 11 September 2001, and was re-enforced after the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004. After 11 September, EU commissioner Antonio Vitorino remarked, ‘We had national terrorism, that is true, but up to 11 September we never had suicide attacks!’2 Europe has mostly seen nationalist terrorism as perpetrated by the Basque separatists ETA in Spain. Some groups were fighting for a change of the political system, such as the ‘Baader–Meinhof gang’ (RAF) in Germany, or the ‘Brigate Rosse’ in Italy. The IRA fought against Great Britain; the Algerian terrorists of FIS against France. All these groups have or had a limited agenda compared to Osama bin Laden’s followers, as Manfred Klink of the German ‘Bundeskriminalanstalt’ (BKA)3 explained, ‘The search for al-Qa’ida terrorists, and anticipating their next move, are both extremely difficult jobs because al-Qa’ida terrorism is much more vague in its aims. An attack on a tourist discotheque in Bali or a synagogue in Tunisia filled with German tourists would have never been a useful target for the RAF.’4 Counter-terrorism in Europe thus had to be adapted after 11 September. This chapter analyses changes in the European Union since 11 September in three parts. The first discusses the EU plan of action to combat terrorism; the second focuses on counter-terrorism and its impact on the Common Foreign and Security 171

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Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the costs involved; while the third concludes by considering implications for Europe’s future.

EU plan of action to combat terrorism In one sense, the 11 September attacks have had a positive effect on European integration. In the aftermath of the attacks, European Union member states quickly agreed on counter-terrorism measures that the Commission had proposed long before. Prior to the attacks on America, member states could not be convinced by the European Commission to establish common procedures due to national sensitivities. A report of the European Parliament on combating terrorism from July 2001, for instance, had already listed the establishment of the European arrest warrant as its main recommendation. Immediately after 11 September European governments as well as European Union institutions in Brussels issued strong statements of support in the fight against terrorism. In their conclusions of the Special Summit on 21 September, the 15 member states spoke of ‘unconditional solidarity’ with the United States and declared the war against terrorism an ‘unprecedented challenge for the world and for Europe’.5 The European Union had, however, one condition for its promised support to the United States. Although Resolution 1368 of the UN Security Council6 was accepted and granted America’s right to react to the terrorist attacks, the neutral member states insisted on one specific point: Europe wanted the international war against terrorism to be fought under the sovereignty of the UN. International law should prevail even in extreme circumstances. The EU heads of state did not define the role of the UN clearly, but they certainly hoped the multilateral forum would be able to influence ‘decision making’ in Washington and keep the Bush administration from ‘overreacting’, as one European official remarked.7 The Belgian government was in the position of the EU Presidency at the time of the attacks, and soon found itself overwhelmed by the task of coordinating EU member state responses and directing, as a Presidency should do, EU policy in the war against terror and towards the United States. Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt and his Foreign Minister Louis Michel, two liberal politicians, tried hard to live up to expectations. But their Presidency reflected a serious problem of EU politics. Small countries generally have a big interest in EU institutional work as a counter-balance to the real power of big member states. They therefore tend to run active presidencies. Larger member states, on the contrary, are too accustomed to their powerful national politics; they often cannot work neutrally in the interest of the European Union. In the case of the Belgian Presidency, however, it quickly became clear that a small country in the role of the Presidency runs into trouble, when dramatic policy changes happen on the world stage.

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On 21 September the heads of government met in Brussels for a Special European Summit, where they not only declared their ‘unconditional solidarity’8 with the United States, but also agreed on the EU’s extensive action plan to combat terrorism. After his September meeting with Colin Powell in Washington, the Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel thought briefly that he was standing eye-to-eye with his American counterpart: ‘Powell knows that the United States will need Europe to share the risks.’9 Javier Solana hoped during this trip that the shock of events would bring the United States to a more multilateral approach, ‘If the United States includes Europe and the other centres of power in the war against terrorism, the September 11 attacks would at least have some good consequences for world politics.’10 But after the first shock wave was over and the organisation of immediate response measures was completed, it became clear to European policy-makers that the US administration was not too interested in multilateral proceedings. More so, Belgium as EU Presidency was too small a country to be of special interest to the administration in Washington. The offer of the Belgian Government to contribute military equipment and soldiers to the war in Afghanistan was turned down. Belgian government officials were even dependent on colleagues in bigger member state capitals to get second-hand information about what was happening in Washington or Florida, as a Belgian government official admitted, because Powell preferred to talk directly to the major European players, as well as to Javier Solana, and thereby side-stepped the Presidency. Fellow colleagues in the diplomatic services were not short with criticism concerning the Belgian Presidency: ‘Drafts of declarations in response to September 11 or concerning Afghanistan were hopelessly naïve and diplomatically catastrophic’, says a diplomat of one of the big member states. ‘We had to work on the Belgians to give us the drafts well in advance in order to completely rewrite them before they were even presented to the Council.’11 Not only were diplomatic consultations behind the scenes difficult, but diplomatic coordination onstage also produced an image of chaotic European politics. The Belgian government was snubbed at their Presidency mid-term summit on 24 October in Ghent, when Jacques Chirac pressed Gerhard Schröder to meet him, before the EU summit started. Since the foundation of the European Community, it has been customary for Germany and France to have bilateral meetings to coordinate their politics. But usually they do not conduct these meetings directly at the summit. Things got worse still. On 4 November, British Prime Minister Tony Blair asked his fellow ‘big EU brothers’ to a pre-war meeting at 10 Downing Street. Initially only Chirac and Schröder were invited. The Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his Spanish counterpart José Maria Aznar then forced themselves into the meeting too. In the end the Dutch Premier Wim Kok

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also had to ask to be invited in order to represent the ‘not so big countries’. After this meeting, which was seen in the sensitive ‘smaller’ member states as an affront, the Belgian Presidency – itself one of the concerned smaller states – had Blair and the others promise not to organise meetings in this format again. These diplomatic flaws aside, sources in Brussels agree, the Belgian Presidency achieved ‘a strong boost to Justice and Home Affairs measures in the combat against terrorism’.12 Counter-terrorism measures At the special EU Summit on 21 September 2001, a list – called the ‘roadmap of measures and initiatives in the fight against terrorism’ – was adopted. It was to be implemented in the framework of the EU Action Plan, also decided at the summit. The ‘roadmap’ has since evolved. Most measures were politically decided by the end of the Belgian Presidency in December 2001. After the Madrid bombings, the original ‘roadmap’ was revised at the European Council in June 2004. New measures were added, but most of the emphasis was on deadlines for implementation of measures agreed long ago. The EU states adopted four framework decisions13 on ‘money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime’, on ‘joint investigation teams’, on the ‘European arrest warrant’ and on ‘combating terrorism’. The common definition of terrorism is in fact a definition of terrorist offences. Under Article 1 the framework decision reads: ‘1) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death; 2) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; 3) kidnapping or hostage taking; 4) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; 5) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; 6) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons; 7) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; 8) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; 9) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in 1) to 8).’14 The political agreement on this framework decision was reached on 7 December 2001. Reservations of Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were resolved on 13 June and the definition has since been put into effect. Only six countries had specific terrorist laws prior to 11 September. Henceforth, terrorist acts within the European Union

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would not be treated as criminal acts alone. Today a European judge can base his verdict on common EU standards. The second important improvement made by EU states is the European arrest warrant. The framework decision says: ‘A European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing member states by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made for sentences of at least 4 months.’15 The EU warrant replaces all texts about extradition including the European extradition agreement of 1957 and the two agreements about extradition dating 1995 and 1996. The initial reservations by the parliaments of Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were resolved by June 2002. The arrest warrant was put into effect in 2004, but six member states had started using it before: Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany. The only state that had blocked the agreement for several weeks was Italy. It did so on behalf of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who was said to be afraid of a court case against him in Spain concerning his alleged illegal involvement in Spanish private television. By March 2005 the Commission proudly announced that all member states had finally implemented the European arrest warrant – except Italy, which was still struggling to get legislation through. The EU arrest warrant is supposed to facilitate the work of police departments and judges in EU member states. But it can turn out to be problematic in certain aspects. In July 2004 a French court ruled that Cesare Battisti had to be extradited to Italy. The former member of a militant group called ‘Armed Proletarians of Communism’ killed three men in the 1970s. He came to France on François Mitterrand’s offer of sanctuary in exchange for renouncing his militant past. Battisti has since turned into a successful crime writer. If Italy had already ratified the European arrest warrant, the former terrorist would have been extradited to face a life sentence in his home country. Left-wing circles in France have argued that it does not make sense to put Battisti in prison for life in Italy, because he does not pose a threat anymore. The framework decision on joint investigation teams, which was also decided on 13 June 2002, should be implemented by mid-2005 by several member states such as Greece, Italy and the Czech Republic. Some joint investigation teams were set up to carry out criminal investigations. German and Dutch police for example joined forces in an anti-drug trafficking operation. Another step taken by the European Union has been the freezing of assets of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist activity. It adopted UN resolution 1373, which deals with the fight against all forms of financing terrorist activity. Based on this resolution, the EU agreed on a list of persons, groups and entities with links to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban in December

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2001. It was amended on 17 June 2002. Whenever the UN sanctions committee wants to amend this list, the EU mirrors the changes. This list is open to the public.16 It includes groups such as the Kurdish PKK, the Palestinian Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade and the Israeli Kahane Hai. A second list adopted by EU member states is not based on the UN sanctions committee. It specifies groups such as the Irish IRA, the Basque ETA or various Palestinian groups. Since it was established on 27 September 2001 the list has been amended several times. After a long debate the member states finally agreed in September 2003 to include not only the militant wing of the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas in the list, but also its political wing. On 22 December 2003 the Turkish group IBDA-C was added, which claimed responsibility for the Istanbul attacks in November 2003. In Spring 2004 the Italian anarchist group, which sent 12 letter bombs to EU officials and EU institutions in December 2003, was also included. There is also a third, secret list of terrorist suspects. It is an operational list, which helps cooperation between the various security services in the member states. As a coordination tool it is kept out of the public eye. The common procedure on freezing assets of ‘terrorist funds’ has had limited effects: ‘Nobody writes checks in the name of Hamas’, said a Council diplomat, ‘but the decision to put the militant as well as the political wing of Hamas on the list of terrorist organisations certainly has political value.’17 Europol and Eurojust On the operational side, the European Union decided to strengthen the rather weak EU intelligence bureau, Europol, in The Hague. Europol established a special task force called ‘counter-terrorism’, which was agreed on 20 September 2001 by Interior Ministers, approved by Prime Ministers on 21 September 2001 and put into effect in November 2001. The new office was staffed with 42 Europol officials and 23 special agents from the member states. A senior member of the new unit complained, ‘Thirty-four security and intelligence services of the 15 EU member states work together and try to find common ground. But this is difficult, because each member state has a different way of organising its own security apparatus. In Spain, for example there is a national police, the civil guard and the security service. In Scandinavia they normally have only one service for all of those tasks.’18 Other shortcomings have also become apparent. Europol can request information, but the member state can refuse the request if it would endanger state security or an internal investigation. This has occurred with greater frequency than would be desired. A security official of a larger member state does not hide his surprise when asked about cooperation with Europol, ‘We have very good bilateral relations with several security services in the European Union and with the United States’, he said, after a polite pause.19 Security services of smaller member states seem to be keener on information

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exchange within Europol, due to their limited resources and contacts on the bilateral level. An additional concern is that Europol cannot start investigations by itself. EU Interior Ministers, however, decided on 25 April 2002 in Luxembourg to strengthen the mandate of Europol. The European police can now take part in mixed European investigation teams and request other member states to initiate investigations. ‘Europol is not the European FBI, we do not conduct operational investigations,’ noted Peter Gridling, head of ‘SC-5’, the counterterrorism department at Europol. ‘We analyse information given to us by the member states and offer the results back to the member states.’20 In the aftermath of the Madrid bombings the European Chief’s of Police Task Force met in Dublin on 22–3 March and urged member states to forward appropriate and relevant intelligence data to Europol, as well as invited member states to ‘ensure that appropriate and high quality information is made available to Europol’.21 The problems with Europol were also reflected in the ‘Declaration on combating terrorism’, which was adopted by the European Summit in March 2004 in Brussels. The Council called for ‘reinforcing Europol’s counter-terrorism capacities and reactivation of the counter-terrorist task force’. At least the financial situation has improved somewhat, according to sources at Europol. ‘We don’t have new tasks, but at least we have new means.’22 On 5 December 2002 the European Parliament voted to give an additional €3.8 million to help combat terrorism by setting up an operational control centre for Europol, and assistance in establishing Eurojust, an office intended to enhance cooperation and coordination between member states’ prosecution authorities. Eurojust was established by Council decision of 28 February 2002 and was set up in The Hague. According to the new Constitution the office has the right to ‘initiate criminal investigations as well as proposing the initiation of prosecutions’.23

Immigration policy measures The revised Plan of Action of June 2004 lists under 4.1.2 (ii) a programme for biometric identification, which the EU interior ministers agreed on in June 2004 in Luxembourg and which was proposed by the Commission in 2003. The ‘flasher image’, a digitally readable photograph, will be obligatory in EU citizens’ passports. Fingerprints for biometric identification are for the time being still optional, but will be mandatory by 2007, as was approved in December 2004. Additional measures important for the fight against terrorism include those seen to contribute to the fight against organised crime and illegal immigration. Originally member states thought of establishing a European Border Police Force to guard EU borders after enlargement. But the plan was put on ice under the Italian Presidency in 2003. Member states did not feel

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adequately prepared. Test operations, as in November 2002 by British, Greek, Spanish and German border police guarding the German–Polish border along the river Oder, showed that the results of common border guards were too limited for the costs and complexity of the operations. The idea had initially been fuelled by the German fear that Polish border police would not be able to control the border to the Ukraine properly. There is also a certain amount of mistrust in the German Ministry of the Interior in Berlin even towards the Italian police. A high official of the European Commission in Brussels reflected these fears, ‘As we do not have internal borders anymore, it is more difficult to fight terrorism within the European Union, if there are holes in the outside border.’24 Instead of a common border police force, member states settled for an ‘European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders’, which is based on a Commission proposal and combines already existing agencies for land, air and sea control. National border guards will be subject to common standards and training procedures established by the Council. The control of maritime borders, which involves mainly Italy, Greece and Spain will be strengthened with port-to-port-controls, more shared information and analysis. Stronger bilateral cooperation on internal borders, for instance between Slovakia and Austria, are also planned. In order to counterbalance the image of ‘Fortress Europe’ shutting down its borders to the outside world, Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agreed in November 2003 to send ‘Immigration Liaison Officers’ (ILO) to third countries. Police officers of member states, posted to their respective embassies in countries such as the Ukraine or Morocco, establish contacts with the local authorities in order to combat illegal immigration. Another measure that might help combat terrorism is the establishment of an information exchange network concerning visas. The ‘Visa Information System’ (VIS), based on the already existing SIS (Schengen Information System), will only be extended to the new member states from 2007. The attempt by the Spanish Presidency to punish third countries that do not cooperate in the fight against illegal immigration by temporarily stopping EU development aid was blocked by French President Jacques Chirac and others. The conclusions of the European Summit of Seville in June 2002 noted under paragraph 36 that after full use has been made of existing Community mechanisms without success, the Council may unanimously find that a third country has shown an unjustified lack of cooperation in joint management of migration flows. In that event the Council may, in accordance with the rules laid down in the treaties, adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other European Union policies, while honouring the Unions contractual commitments and not jeopardising development cooperation objectives.25

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Counter-terrorism measures and human rights concerns The liberal Belgian government tried to inject human rights and multilateral concerns into the debate about counter-terrorism. In the first half of 2002 the Spanish Presidency focused more on completing the 63 ‘roadmap’ requirements without much debate. This was also facilitated, because the Spanish public viewed terrorism as its main domestic concern, and thus supported Prime Minister José-Maria Aznar. The political proximity of Aznar to US President George W. Bush somewhat helped to bridge the gap between the EU and Washington over multilateral and unilateral methods. Aznar’s support of Bush’s war in Iraq in spring 2003, however, cost the Prime Minister the support of his population and subsequently led to his downfall at the elections in Spring 2004, which were held directly after the Madrid train bombings on 11 March. Although human rights concerns were not the priority of the Spanish EU presidency, the European Commission reacted to NGO concerns that the protection of human rights may be eroded by tough security measures. It injected a paragraph referring to freedom of speech into the first framework decision on the common definition of terrorism. ‘Although we did not think that abuse was possible with the original wording, it now reads: “Nothing can be interpreted as being a limitation to the freedom of speech”’, said Elsa Garcia-Maltras from the European Commission.26 That did not solve the problem, said Susanne Alegre from ‘Justice’, a British NGO, ‘The implementation of the framework decisions and other decided measures unfortunately lies with the member states.’27 The common definition of terrorism, therefore, can be overruled by the national definition of terrorism. In some member states the definition is much broader than that of the EU. ‘If the UK government decides wearing a hat of the PKK is terrorism, then the other member states or Brussels cannot interfere,’ explained Alegre. At the European Council in Seville the contribution of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – including European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – to the fight against terrorism was discussed. The foreign ministers adopted conclusions on ‘External action of the European Union against terrorism’ at their meeting of 22 July 2002. In order to make the fight against terrorism an integral part of the EU’s relations with third countries, the ‘Joint Situation Centre’ in Javier Solana’s Policy Unit in the Council Secretariat is working on a number of threat analyses. Regional analyses – such as on the Middle East or the Balkans – and country analyses have been conducted. These provide a basis for the operational measures of the European Union, for counterterrorism elements in contractual relations with third countries, and for technical assistance projects to third countries in the field of counterterrorism, as a report of the Danish Presidency explained in December 2002.

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It made far-reaching recommendations for acquiring ‘the military capabilities that may be required to protect forces deployed in EU-led crisis management operations against terrorist attacks (force protection) and the military and/or civilian capabilities that may be required for the protection of civilian populations against the effects of terrorist attacks (consequence management).’28 Although counter-terrorism did not play a major role during the six months of the Danish Presidency29 and Copenhagen was more interested in completing the accession negotiations with ten candidate countries by December 2002, which it did – Denmark did recommend continued analyses: ‘Special attention should be given to . . . further development and regular updating of the analyses of the terrorist threat and the policies of the local government in specific countries and regions by the competent working bodies of the Council with involvement of the Council Secretariat.’30 After hearing the Danish Presidency report on progress in combating terrorism at their meeting on 9 December 2002, the EU Foreign Ministers decided to expand the policy on combating terrorism by enhancing civil protection, fighting the financing of terrorist activity and strengthening external action. As Monica den Boer and Jörg Monar argued, these actions were not sufficient: ‘From an historical perspective, it may be considered a regression if gradual achievements in the field of good governance (transparency, accountability, social legitimacy) and data protection are brought into competition with the need for urgent action and global solidarity.’31 The measures taken were also not effective enough to prevent a large-scale terrorist attack like the one in Madrid on 11 March 2004. At that time Javier Solana had already prepared a ‘Report on the implementation of the action plan’, in which he complained about the slow implementation process of measures that had been mutually agreed on in the member states. In the immediate aftermath of the train bombings the governments in the capitals seemed more open to live up to promised action, such as ratifying the European arrest warrant. The European Union leaders also created a new post in order to show political action. At the European Council Summit on Terrorism on 25–6 March in Brussels Gijs de Vries, former deputy defence minister of the Netherlands, was appointed the EU’s new Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. He is working under Javier Solana, the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. De Vries himself sees his role in ‘assisting member states in dealing with the cross-frontier dimension of the threat’.32 Bigger initiatives after Madrid failed to get the support of the important ‘big powers’. The idea of effective counter-terror coordination and intelligence sharing, in the form of a European Intelligence Agency without police powers, was proposed by Austria at the meeting of EU Interior Ministers on 19 March 2004. Some smaller countries backed the initiative, but Britain,

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Germany, France, Italy and Spain rejected it. Britain argued it would be better to work on already agreed measures. Germany feared the new agency could clash with Europol. All these statements were excuses for the national concerns of the Interior ministers of these big EU states. Their secret services are simply not interested in sharing information openly with up to 30 other European countries. If Germany was overly concerned about Europol, the poorly funded and poorly mandated agency could have been strengthened and turned into an independent European intelligence agency. Instead, the heads of states agreed on De Vries’ appointment and his position under Javier Solana in the Council, which guarantees direct influence of national governments on the work of the counter-terrorist coordinator. Even after Javier Solana will move to the Commission by 2006 as new EU foreign minister and vice president of the Commission, as it is foreseen in the new constitution, De Vries will stay in the Council. At the end of the Irish presidency the European Council in June gave De Vries the mandate to work on new counter-terrorism measures: how the financing of terrorist activity can be prevented, how external relations can play a role in counter-terrorism, how civil protection can be strengthened and basic infrastructure better protected. The new measures were presented in December 2004. EU–US cooperation on counter-terrorism The first period of ‘unconditional support’ offered by the European Union to the United States directly after 11 September helped streamline US access to EU Justice and Home Affairs cooperation. US representatives were allowed into the meetings of the heads of EU counter-terrorism units under the framework of the EU Police Chiefs Operational Task Force (PCOTF). ‘On the US side, this was received with considerable satisfaction as earlier attempts by the Americans to gain greater access to EU Justice and Home Affairs cooperation had not been very successful,’ wrote Monica den Boer and Jörg Monar.33 At the end of 2001 the European Union and United States managed to sign an agreement on the exchange of both strategic and technical information.34 To show its significance, US Secretary of State Colin Powell was present at the signing. The important agreement on mutual legal assistance, however, took longer to finalise. Only in June 2003, after long debates among member states and between EU officials and the United States, was an ‘EU–US mandate for mutual legal assistance’ agreed under the Greek presidency. The agreement is not yet ratified, because member states have partly to amend their bilateral agreements about legal assistance with the United States. The United States has not yet ratified the agreement either. Sources in Brussels expect ratification by mid-2005.

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The matter took so long to decide because some parties were not really interested in agreeing on an EU–US mandate. As a report to the US Congress explained, ‘US officials are proceeding cautiously in pursuing more robust cooperation with the EU in order to avoid actions that could damage currently good bilateral relations or impede ongoing criminal investigations.’35 Some European member states saw matters in a similar fashion. Additionally, capital punishment is prohibited in the European Union. Therefore, European states do not want to assist with legal information in a case that could lead to the death penalty. The cases of Ramzi Binalshibh and Zachariah Moussaoui illustrate this conflict. The US courts asked Germany for evidence to put the suspected terrorists on trial. If Germany provided the required documents and they were sentenced to death – as was expected – Germany would have the same constitutional problem as if it personally sent Binalshibh and Moussaoui to an American death chamber.36 The matter was finally solved in the typical European Union way: the mutual mandate was watered down. Instead of having a common position for all member states, Article 13 was injected into the mandate, which gives faculty for member states to handle matters – like transmitting information to the United States – on a bilateral level. As the EU–US Mandate is not a substitute bilateral agreement, but rather is complementary, the constitutional problems of various member states should be avoided once the mutual mandate is implemented. The matter of legal assistance is also complicated because of fears about personal data being given to authorities. Citizens in Europe are in general not concerned about being registered at the police, an idea that would be met with hostility in the United States. In general, the exchange of information between countries is a very sensitive issue. A Commission official asserted, ‘Even in member states the secret services do not share information easily.’37

Counter-terrorism and European foreign and defence policy Brief history of CSFP and ESDP The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), including defence policy, was created at the European Council in Amsterdam 1997, and since then has been further developed in every treaty. According to the new European Union constitution the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) includes ‘the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decide.’38 In the meantime, member states can engage in ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue task, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight

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against terrorism.’39 If the words are not clear, the meaning is: the possibilities for a ‘common defence policy’ are still very limited. The member states decide on a military engagement not by qualified majority, but unanimously. The EU has, however, made some progress. In June 1999 at the EU Summit in Cologne, the 15 governments decided to dissolve the Western European Union (WEU)40 and create new military structures within the European institutions. This was seen as historical step as the European Union had remained in a stalemate between ‘Europeanists’ led by France and ‘Atlanticists’ led by Britain until the fall of the Berlin wall. Only after the end of the cold war and after European Union diplomacy clearly failed during the Balkan Wars did EU member states think of establishing their own defence policy. The European Council in Helsinki went one step further in December 1999 and created under the so-called ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’ a ‘rapid reaction force’ of up to 60,000 soldiers to be operational at the beginning of 2003. Following the Cologne Summit the Political and Security Committee (PSC), consisting of representatives with political and military expertise, was established in Brussels along with an EU Military Committee, consisting of Military Representatives who make recommendations to the PSC, and an EU Military Staff, including a Situation Centre. In Paris an ‘Institute for Security Studies’ was established. Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and soon-to-be Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the EU priorities after the Seville Summit in June 2002 as follows: ‘1) concentration on political dialogue with third countries concerning the fight against terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons, 2) support for countries to strengthen their capacities to react to terrorism, 3) creation of special clauses for the fight against terrorism in agreement with these countries.’41 He added, ‘The EU needs efficient means for crisis management, because the United States will more and more step back from classic peacekeeping operations.’ The European Council of Laeken in December 2002 reported, ‘The further development of CFSP will make more and more complex operations possible.’42 First EU-led military and police operations On paper the EU can already show some success with its new crisis management capabilities. On 1 January 2003 the EU took over the police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina for three years (UEPM). It also assumed responsibility from NATO for the ‘Amber Fox’ operation in Macedonia on 31 March 2003, which was terminated on 15 December 2003. At that time, the EU assumed leadership of the police operation in Macedonia (PROXIMA), with a limited mandate of one year. The EU also sent its rapid reaction force into Congo from June to September 2003. Its biggest operation so far was the EU’s takeover of SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of 2004 with up to 7,000 troops.

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On the ground, however, the EU crisis management capabilities are still severely limited. Although the EU is by now in position to deploy some troops, it cannot do so in many places at the same time due to a lack of equipment, command, control and soldiers. This has more to do with oldfashioned army structures in EU member states and the lack of initiative to pool resources. Second, the EU is often dogged by diplomatic and bureaucratic infighting. In order to take over the ‘Amber Fox’ operation from NATO in Macedonia, Brussels needed to get an agreement between NATO-member Turkey and EU-member Greece about the use of NATO equipment for EU operations. As those two states clash over the future of Cyprus and their respective influence in the region, it took many months and serious pressure from the big European capitals to secure the ‘Berlin-plus’ Accord at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. Rather than conducting complex operations in crisis management, the EU is often entangled in solving diplomatic problems between itself and US allies, such as Turkey. Even more difficult to resolve than external problems are internal conflicts about the direction of future EU Foreign and Defence Policy. As was dramatically shown in the case of the US-led campaign to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in spring 2003, the European Union is far from having a harmonised foreign policy. Germany and France were against the war, but Britain backed the US campaign, supported by Spain, Italy and soon-to-bemembers Poland and other former communist eastern European states. So dramatic was the split that the EU Summit in March 2003 almost became a funeral for CFSP, or rather, the dream of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. According to David Allen and Michael Smith, ‘2002 in retrospect represented a long period of waiting between the events of 11 September 2001 and the outbreak of the conflict in Iraq in March 2003’. They added, ‘During this period, the EU became increasingly divided over Iraq and over its relationship with the United States. As the global situation worsened it became clear that the focus of decision-making on a number of external issues was shifting from Brussels back to the capitals of the larger member states.’43 To heal the wounds, Javier Solana presented the ‘European Security Strategy’ in December 2003, which was intended to kick-start a collective exercise in brainstorming on EU security issues. But this will not fundamentally change the situation of the CFSP, which is such a sensitive issue for all governments that no member state will want to cede sovereignty in this area. To the outside world the EU will not be seen as a global player in international politics if it does not at least combine the force of all 25 member states in one voice. ‘As long as member states are not prepared to discuss how the EU should act44 in the UN Security Council, the “C” in CFSP will not mean “common”, but “convenient”,’ EU Commissioner for Development, Poul Nielson, remarked.45

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CFSP and ESDP in the new Constitution The new Constitution of the European Union – which was agreed on 18 June 2004 under the Irish Presidency, was signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome and should then get ratified by the 25 member states by 2006 – includes two instruments that are relevant for counter-terrorism. One is the establishment of a ‘European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency’: ‘The Agency shall be established to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying, and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector . . .’46 This wordy phrase is the leftover of a French–German initiative to get member states to spend more on their common defence. Germany and France requested a stronger defence commitment for the European Union, and specifically a European armaments agency, in a common declaration on 21 November 2002: ‘Germany and France suggest to include in the treaty a protocol in which the states who wish to do so obligate themselves to strengthen their military capabilities and develop new forms of cooperation like harmonising military formation, pooling capabilities and resources.’47 A working group of the convention, dealing with future defence policies under the leadership of then EU Commissioner for Reform, Michel Barnier, issued several recommendations in its final report on 16 December 2002. It noted the major shortfalls of the armies of European Union member states: command, control and communication; strategic intelligence and the surveillance and protection of troops in the field; strategic transport by air and sea; and effective engagement capacity. One area where member states are especially weak is military research, as depicted by the comparison between the 2002 US budget for defence research (€53 billion) and the combined budgets of EU member states (€10 billion). In general, only five member states have defence budgets that exceed 2 per cent of their GDP and only two countries (France and the United Kingdom) have recently undertaken sizeable increases in their defence budgets, while overall there has been a decrease in military spending in member states. Even before the new constitution was agreed upon, the Council decided in November 2003 to set up the Armaments Agency. In July 2004 Javier Solana was declared head of the Agency, the steering board being the 25 defence ministers. Another novelty for ESDP regarding counter-terrorism in the constitution is the introduction of a ‘Solidarity clause’ in Article I-43. Based on Article 5 of NATO’s Charter it specifies that an attack on a member state will be regarded as an attack on the entire EU. The constitution reads: ‘The Union and its member states shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity, if a member state is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The

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Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the member states to prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the member states; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a member state in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack or a disaster.’48 During the debate on the convention and the intergovernmental conference the other member states did not object to the solidarity clause for three reasons. First, the clause referred only to ‘internal solidarity’ in the case of an attack on one member states and the subsequent cooperation of all for one. Second, the clause does not include an external military commitment à la Afghanistan. And third, EU solidarity does not override the responsibilities of NATO members and the constitutional provisions of neutral member states. Also indirectly linked to counter-terrorism is the new function of a ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’. He will have a ‘double-hatted’ function, combining the EU Commissioner for Foreign Relations and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Javier Solana was already chosen to be the first EU Foreign Minister, and will take his place when the Constitution is ratified by member states at the end of 2006. He will act under the authority of the Council of Ministers, but will sit in the Commission offices, if only to access the budget of the EU Commissioner for Foreign Relations, which amounted in 2002 to €3.2 billion as opposed to only €35 million for CFSP. Costs of counter-terrorism Within the European Union institutions, the fight against terrorism has not changed much in financial terms. ‘Most measures of the roadmap have no budgeting implications’, said a council official in Brussels. ‘The EU institutions developed legislative measures. The implementation lies with the member states.’49 And so do the financial obligations. Only a few new positions were created in Brussels, most importantly the EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator, Gijs de Vries. But his office is very small and he mostly relies on existing EU bureaucracy. The offices dealing with Justice and Home Affairs in the Council and the Commission were also reinforced. The ‘Joint situation centre’ in Javier Solana’s bureau has been enhanced in order to cope with the increased need for analysis and preventive crisis management. Although dozens of country analyses have been conducted, there are many tasks still to complete, as Laure Frier from the Council explained, ‘The situation centre is short on resources.’50 Indeed, the financial situation for Solana’s team is bleak in general. The European Union did not give its institutions a strong mandate concerning CFSP, let alone ESDP. It is therefore no surprise that financing is also inadequate. The CFSP budget line for 2002 as noted, was only €35 million.

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During his hearing in the working group called ‘External Action’, Pierre de Boissieu, Deputy Secretary General of the Council, asked for a ‘dramatic increase of the budget for CFSP’. 51 He considered the 2002 budget too limited, when compared to €6 billion for the EU’s budget for foreign relations in general, and the €70 billion that member states spend on foreign politics. As mentioned, Europol is the only place where the budget was increased due to new counter-terrorism responsibilities. In future, European officials hope to have a budget increase for CFSP as the European Union is supposed to organise peacekeeping operations by itself. These might include counter-terrorism-related operations. Although the EU will still rely heavily on NATO for logistics and equipment, and the decision to conduct a military operation as part of the Petersberg tasks will remain with the member states, Solana’s office will in any event need additional funding. The financing of military operations needs clear and sustainable mechanisms and a legal basis. The current imprecise treaty provisions will not be sufficient. Sources say the EU cannot begin preparations for military operations with a big internal row over financing. Once again the problem lies with the member states. Javier Solana remarked in a meeting of working group VII ‘External Action’ of the Convention, ‘What is worrisome is the level of defence spending at the national level.’52 In general, the European Union member states added new responsibilities to the institutions in Brussels after 11 September. For example, the number of EU Special Representatives for missions in crisis regions was increased in 2002. But the budgetary situation does not reflect these changes. In fact, the budget for these representatives has been decreased by up to 37 per cent.

Conclusions The shock of 11 September resulted in streamlining of bureaucratic procedures by EU member states and the harmoniation of some justice and home affairs matters. The EU agreed on the European arrest warrant, the common definition of terrorism and the common list of terrorist groups and individuals, the freezing of assets of people and organisations involved in terrorist activity, the upgrading of Europol and the establishment of Eurojust. Port and border controls have been strengthened by more bilateral cooperation, and Immigration Liaison Officers have been sent to third countries. A Visa Information System has been put in place to simplify and better control immigration into EU states. These achievements, however, look better on paper than in reality. Some of the measures, although agreed at EU level, have still not been implemented in some of the member states. It is the main task of the EU’s new coordinator for counter-terrorism to urge national governments to implement these measures.

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Further, human rights groups fear these measures might undermine fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech or the transparency of judicial and legislative procedures. To counter-balance the image of ‘Fortress Europe’ shutting its borders and turning the EU into a police state entity, some EU institution heads, such as the Council’s Javier Solana, and some EU commissioners, have tried to intensify development policy and cooperation with third states. Emphasis has been put on analysis of root causes of terrorism rather than on regime removals. This European ‘soft approach’ to counter-terrorism has led to conflicts with the United States. In the initial period of ‘unconditional solidarity’ Europe and the United States enjoyed improved access to each other’s security information. Even the long awaited ‘Mutual agreement on legal assistance’ could be signed in June 2003. But on the political stage Europe and America fell out over the EU’s hope for a multinational approach to crisis management and the US priority for a unilateral take on regime change. The harmonisation of internal EU politics, at least as far as EU institutions and the Common Foreign and Security Policy are concerned, has also been a disappointment. After a remarkable buildup of CFSP between 1999 and 2002 and a more courageous approach of European nations towards a strengthened European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), reflected in the debates of the Convention for the Future of Europe in the Winter of 2002/2003, the events of Spring 2003 seemed to have crippled the hopes for a more meaningful Common Foreign and Defence Policy for the European Union. The deep rift between the British, Spanish, Italian and Polish pro-war camp and the more cautious French–German axis were superficially overcome in winter 2003/2004. Since 11 September, however, the capitals of the big European powers seem more interested in bilateral action than common EU positions. Only after intense pressure was the new constitution agreed on in June 2004. The constitution recognises the fight against terrorism in its solidarity clause and the establishment of an armament agency. Overall the European Union institutions demonstrated in the way they combat terrorism how the EU works in all aspects: bureaucratic measures can be agreed upon, when there is political will in the capitals, as was the case after 11 September or 11 March in Madrid. But the big political decisions on Foreign and Defence Policy will be taken in the capitals. Most member states are reluctant to finance high-flying dreams of more European integration – be it defence or anything else. There is also an ongoing debate regarding how important CSFP and ESDP are for counter-terrorism. Burkhard Schmitt of the Security Institute in Paris (ISS) said: ‘I don’t see a big role for European Security and Defence Policy in counter-terrorism. It is most of the time not a military task.’53 Commissioner Antonio Vitorino advocates the opposite: ‘We can’t fight terrorism internally. Terrorism is a trans-national problem. We need to involve not only the security services, but also the police and the armies.’54

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Notes and references 1. Author interview with Javier Solana, 27 September 2001, Riyadh. 2. Author interview with Antonio Vitorino, 16 October 2002, Brussels. 3. The BKA is the federal criminal police, comparable to the American FBI (minus security service). 4. Author interview with Manfred Klink, Meckenheim, 4 November 2002. 5. Conclusions of Special European Council, 21 September 2001, Brussels. 6. Resolution 1368, adopted at 4370th meeting of the Security Council, 12 September 2001, New York. 7. Author interview, Brussels. 8. Conclusions of Special European Council, 21 September 2001, Brussels. 9. Conversation with Louis Michel on 24 September 2001, EU Troika trip to Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. 10. Author interview with Javier Solana, 27 September 2001, Riyadh. 11. Author interview, Brussels. 12. Author interview, Brussels. 13. Since the treaty of Amsterdam Art 34 of the EU treaty mentions a new instrument to harmonise judicial and administrative rules: a framework decision. The goal is binding for all, but form and means are a matter of national choice. 14. Council framework decision 20002/JHA of combating terrorism, Art. 1, p.5. 15. Council framework decision of 13/06/02 on European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between member states, published in Official Journals of the European Communities, 18 July 2002, L 190/1, Art 2, §1. 16. Council decision of 17 June 2002, implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2002/ 334/EC. 17. Author interview, Brussels. 18. Author interview, The Hague. 19. Author interview. 20. Interview with Austrian daily Der Standard, 20/01/2004. 21. 7779/04, ENFOPOL 30. 22. Author interview, The Hague. 23. Constitution, Article III-174(2). 24. Author interview, Brussels. 25. Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, 22 June 2002, p. 11. 26. Garcia-Maltras, intervention at ‘How much security can a democracy take?’, conference organised by Heinrich Böll foundation, Brussels, 9 December 2002. 27. Susanne Alegre intervention at same conference. 28. Report to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on the status of the European Union’s activities in the fight against terrorism, presented at the Foreign Minister’s Council 9 December 2002, Brussels. 29. Denmark is strongly positioned against too much integration, whether it be in harmonising Justice and Home Affairs or developing a ‘Defence Union’. Copenhagen even got an opt-out clause from the developing defence policies of the European Union in the Amsterdam Treaty. Counter-terrorism efforts of the Union were therefore not the Danish Presidency priority, particularly when it meant a strengthening of common foreign policy or concerned military issues. 30. Report to the General Affairs and External Relations Council.

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31. Monica den Boer and Jörg Monar, Keynote Article: ‘11 September and the challenge of global terrorism’, JCMS, The European Union, Annual Review 2001/2002, p. 19. 32. Interview with Gijs de Vries, Enlargement Europe. 33. Den Boer and Monar, p. 14. 34. Council document 14586/01. 35. Report for Congress, Europe and Counter-terrorism: Strengthening Police and Judicial Cooperation, 23 July 2002. 36. For more information, see Chapter 2. 37. Author interview, Brussels. 38. Constitution, Article I-41 (2). 39. Constitution, Article III-309. 40. The WEU was established in 1954, after the planned ‘European Defence Community’ (EDC) was rejected by the French National Assembly. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden invented – it is said in his bath – the WEU within NATO in order to solve the transatlantic and western European crisis. ‘This clever solution facilitated a rearmed West Germany (thus meeting American demands), provided a credible, institutionalised constraint on German military power (thereby alleviating French concerns), secured West German sovereignty (Chancellor Adenauer’s preoccupation) and strengthened the intergovernmental Transatlantic alliance structure (the clear British preference).’ Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy (Palgrave – now Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 145. 41. Speech, annual meeting of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, Paris, 1 July 2002. 42. Conclusions of European Council in Laeken, 15 December 2002, p. 2. 43. David Allen and Michael Smith, ‘External policy developments’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review (2002/2003) 97. 44. Nielson referred to the debate whether the EU-15 should speak in the UN Security Council with one voice. 45. Poul Nielson, speech, convention working group VII ‘external relations’, 21 October 2002, Brussels. 46. Constitution, Article I-41(3) under Title V: The Union’s External action. 47. Common declaration of Germany and France for the European Convention concerning ESVP, 21 November 2002, Schwerin. 48. Constitution, Article I-43. 49. Author interview, Brussels. 50. Laure Frier intervention at CDS meeting of counter-terrorism experts, European Parliament, 11 December 2002, Brussels. 51. Pierre de Boissieu, hearing, working group VII, 15 October 2002, Brussels. 52. Javier Solana, speech, working group VII ‘external relations’, 21 October 2002, Brussels. 53. Hearing on counter-terrorism, European parliament, 9 October 2002, Brussels. 54. Author interview with Antonio Vitorino, 16 October 2002, Brussels.

9 A View from America: Tactical Unity, Strategic Divide Vinca LaFleur1

Introduction Le Monde’s declaration ‘We are all Americans now’ remains one of the most iconic expressions of transatlantic unity in the wake of 11 September 2001. Yet, that spirit of fraternité soon gave way to feelings of mutual frustration; it wasn’t long before articles in US journals began appearing with titles like ‘The case against Europe’, ‘Estranged partners’ and ‘Anti-Europeanism in America’, while European papers asked ‘Has the US lost its way? Does everybody hate America?’ Only two years after the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a Eurobarometer poll indicated that 53 per cent of EU residents thought the United States itself was a ‘threat’ to world peace – indeed, as menacing as Iran and North Korea. By March 2004, favourable opinions of the United States had dropped to 58 per cent in Britain, 38 per cent in Germany, and 37 per cent in France, while positive American views of these European allies had declined as well – especially toward Germany and France.2 To be sure, transatlantic tensions are nothing new. As Ambassador Richard Haass, then director of policy planning at the US Department of State, pointed out in June 2002 in remarks to the Centre for European Reform, the alliance in recent memory has ‘had to endure the Suez crisis, de Gaulle’s pullout from NATO’s unified military command, Vietnam, Ostpolitik, the Soviet pipeline deal, the nuclear freeze movement, and the euromissile deployments.’3 But the very title of Haass’ speech – ‘Charting a New Course in the Transatlantic Relationship’ – suggested that he too believes the current situation cries out for change. What explains the transatlantic gap we see today? Is it driven by post11 September policy differences, or by deep and diverging values – in other words, does it reflect doubts about what America/Europe does, or what America/Europe stands for? And what does it mean, now or for the future, in terms of US–European counter-terror cooperation? 191

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From solidarity to sniping In the dark days that followed the devastating attacks of 11 September, Americans took genuine comfort and strength from the European response. The spontaneous vigils, the seas of flowers, and the gestures of solidarity from Bucharest to Brussels were a welcome salve to an overwhelmed and grieving US public. When National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice returned home the night of 13 September for the first time since the attacks, she flipped on her TV to see the Buckingham Palace guards playing the ‘Star Spangled Banner’ – and she wept.4 A battered and broken-hearted America heard its friends in Europe say, ‘We stand with you.’ Europe’s support was not simply symbolic. British Prime Minister Tony Blair sped across the Atlantic and attended President Bush’s 20 September speech before the US Congress, supplanting Mexican President Vicente Fox as ‘amigo-in-chief’. The European Council proclaimed its total solidarity with America. NATO invoked its collective defence clause for the first time in the history of the alliance. And European partners were quick to back the United States in its military assault against al-Qa’ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan; indeed, they wanted to send more troops than Washington was willing to use. As Antony Blinken and Simon Serfaty put it, ‘Whatever Transatlantic tensions there may have been during the previous nine months, the horrific events of September 11 are a reminder that in moments of crisis, the United States and Europe still look to each other before they look to anyone else.’5 Yet, transatlantic tensions, if temporarily suppressed, did not disappear with the Twin Towers. Well before 9/11 – even before George W. Bush took office – the United States and Europe had found themselves at odds; after all, it was during the tenure of honorary European President Bill Clinton that French foreign minister Hugo Védrine had labelled America an overbearing ‘hyperpuissance’, and the United States had expressed impatience with Europe over challenges from Baghdad to Bosnia. Within a few months of 11 September, the deteriorating situation in the Middle East and strong differences about how to deal with it, combined with President Bush’s belligerent talk of an ‘axis of evil’ and pre-emptive doctrine, caused simmering frustrations to boil over. To simplify the criticism: From Europe’s perspective, the United States was behaving like an arrogant, overmuscled, unilateralist brute. On the one hand, Washington was warning the world ‘You’re with us or you’re against us.’ On the other, it was heedlessly walking away from one international endeavour after another – the Kyoto accord on climate change, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, efforts to put teeth in the Biological Weapons Convention or to establish an International Criminal Court – and making clear that preserving US prerogative was more important than anything else. Worse yet, the country was led by a lame-brained, born again, triggerhappy rube whose administration, the press suggested, might have missed

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key warnings about the terrorist plot. As one British journalist scornfully lamented, ‘it is from this man that we are now all expected to take a dressing down about moral fibre, cohesion and foresight.’6 In addition, many Europeans believed at some level that America had it coming. As Italian playwright Dario Fo wrote, ‘The great speculators wallow in an economy that every year kills tens of millions of people with poverty, so what is 20,000 dead in New York? Regardless of who carried out the massacre, this violence is the legitimate daughter of the culture of violence, hunger and inhumane exploitation.’7 A December 2002 poll found that 55 per cent of Europeans believed that US policies contributed to the terrorist attacks.8 The Bush Administration’s aggressive posture toward Saddam Hussein was viewed as further evidence of US short-sightedness and swagger. Even British poet laureate Andrew Motion joined the fray, putting in verse his condemnation of US policy toward Iraq.9 Indeed, in some left-wing arenas, antiAmericanism was a badge of merit. Danish journalist Martin Burcharth described the censorious editorial atmosphere at his publication post-11 September: ‘You’re generally scorned, perhaps even excommunicated, if you dare to write something balanced and – God forbid – anything positive about US foreign policy.’10 But even in mainstream, diplomatic circles, distrust of US motives, dismay with US methods and discomfort with US power were apparent. As an envoy to one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council confessed during deliberations over how to disarm Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction, the debate was really about two issues: ‘One is Iraq. The other is US power in the world. The second issue is the bigger part of the debate.’11 On the other side of the Atlantic, US popular opinion towards Europe was far less heated. Generally speaking, in the year after 11 September, Americans were more preoccupied with homeland security than with international affairs. And while skirmishes over Iraq policy took their toll on US public opinions of France and Germany in 2002–2003, expressions of popular disregard were by and large restricted to late night comedy and symbolic gestures – such as renaming French Fries ‘Freedom Fries’ on the menu of the US Congressional cafeteria. Timothy Garton Ash, researching American attitudes toward Europe in late 2002, concluded that the predominant attitude of the US public toward Europe was ‘mildly benign indifference, mixed with impressive ignorance’.12 But if the average American was neither stewing about Europe’s role in the world nor focused on European criticism, most were appalled by accusations that the United States itself was to blame for 11 September; no matter the failings of US policy, nothing could justify or excuse al-Qa’ida’s murderous attacks. And even for a culture as open to conspiracy theories as the United States, the wildfire success of Thierry Meyssan’s ‘L’Effroyable Imposture’

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(The Frightening Fraud), which claimed that the plane that hit the Pentagon on 11 September did not exist, struck Americans as shameful and grotesque. Meanwhile, in certain corners of the US foreign policy establishment, the poison pens were dripping. Walter Russell Mead launched a fiery attack in the Atlantic Monthly (April 2002), suggesting Europe played the ‘scrawny, neurotic deputy’ Barney Fife to America’s solid, sensible Sheriff Andy Griffith. Specifically, Mead claimed, ‘Americans just don’t trust Europe’s political judgment. Appeasement is its second nature. Europeans have never met a ruler – Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Qaddafi, Khomeini, Saddam Hussein – they didn’t think could be softened up by concessions.’ Meanwhile, Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Max Boot – reflecting a strain of thought within the Administration – grumbled, ‘On issue after issue, the pattern is clear: America acts, Europe acts up. What does America get out of this? The satisfaction of extending peace and freedom in an important region – but scant thanks from the Europeans, who have adopted the attitude of a petulant 16-year-old toward his parents.’13 And Garton Ash observed during his journeys in America that many of the transatlantic stereotypes hit below the belt: ‘The American is a virile, heterosexual male; the European is female, impotent, or castrated. Militarily, Europeans can’t get it up.’14 The defence gap between the United States and Europe has been a source of friction for some time, but what particularly irritated US policy-makers post-11 September was that some allies – especially France and Germany – seemed more concerned about restraining American power than about toppling terrorists and tyrants. Gerhard Schröder’s exploitation of anti-American sentiment in his reelection campaign, and his pointed criticism of President Bush, was interpreted as a total betrayal by a president who keenly values personal ties, prompting some US diplomats to conclude, ‘The relationship is permanently frayed, and that cannot change.’15 By early 2003, with debates raging over how and when to force Iraq to disarm, relations between Washington and Paris and Berlin had sunk to their post-cold war low, with leaders in the two European countries having ‘failed the Bush loyalty test’ according to a senior Administration official.16 Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld breezily dismissed France and Germany as ‘old Europe,’ and even congenial Secretary of State Colin Powell felt inspired to declaim, ‘multilateralism cannot become an excuse for inaction’.17 Indeed, whatever antagonism existed between Rumsfeld and Powell, there was not much daylight between their views on US action; the difference was in their style. As Robert Kagan rather gleefully warned, ‘If you’re the kind of person who worries about American unilateralism, here’s what should really keep you up at night: Even most American multilateralists are unilateralists at the core.’18 At the end of the day, prevailing in the campaign on terrorism was more important than anything else – and whether Washington asked for support but made clear it was willing to act

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alone (the Powell approach), or tried to spur others to join it by threatening to act alone (the Rumsfeld approach), the United States would do what it had to do. This commitment to US prerogative came with absolute conviction from the top. As Bob Woodward recounts, at a Camp David meeting 15 September, ‘The president said he didn’t want other countries dictating terms or conditions for the war on terrorism. “At some point,” he [Bush] said, “we may be the only ones left. That’s okay with me. We are America”.’19

Are Americans from Mars and Europeans from Venus? As quickly as the transatlantic chasm opened, analysts dived in with explanations. David Gompert of RAND Europe asserted, ‘It reflects the cumulative effect of post-cold war divergence in strategic outlooks, disparity in global responsibilities, and differences in socioeconomic priorities.’20 Scholar Daniel Nelson argued that transatlantic divergence was driven by differing views of who the primary international actors are, how they act and why.21 Daniel Hamilton, director of the Centre for Transatlantic Relations, theorised that Europe was viewing the global stage through the lens of 9 November 1989 – a lens that suggests the world ‘is one of promise and possibilities’ and that ‘the worst is over’; meanwhile, the United States was looking through the darker lens of 11 September 2001 – which suggests the world ‘is one of tragedy, of new dangers’ and ‘the worst is yet to come’.22 In Francis Fukuyama’s view, ‘The disagreement is not over the principles of liberal democracy, which both sides share, but over where the ultimate source of liberal democratic legitimacy lies’; the United States sees legitimacy stemming from the nation-state, while Europe believes it flows from the will of the international community. Moreover, Fukuyama rather cheekily observed, Europeans are driven by the experience of integration and giving up national sovereignty, and, ‘Having lived through this masochistic experience repeatedly, one imagines that they are like former smokers who want to put everyone else through the same withdrawal pains they have endured.’23 But no analysis made more waves across the Atlantic than Robert Kagan’s insightful essay, ‘Power and Weakness’.24 Kagan was emphatic: ‘It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.’ In his view, Europe was entering a Kantian ‘post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity’, and thus believed the world could be governed by laws, norms and treaties, while the United States continued to see the world as a more brutal, Hobbesian place where ‘true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might’. Underlying these clashing worldviews was an enormous power gap. Europeans prefer a world governed by laws because they are weak; the United States would rather rely on muscle, because it can. And, Kagan argued, the very reason

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Europe’s Kantian experiment has been able to succeed is that the United States has shouldered the burden of securing peace in the Hobbesian jungle. Kagan held out little hope for improvement in transatlantic relations; as he wrote, ‘Europeans have complained about President Bush’s “unilateralism,” but they are coming to the deeper realisation that the problem is not Bush or any American president. It is systemic. And it is incurable.’ Opinion research, however, suggests that most Europeans, for now at least, feel differently. A major survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in June 2003 found that nearly three-quarters of the many French and Germans who have unfavourable views of the United States say their negative opinions are directed at President Bush and not at the country writ large; 67 per cent of Italians and 59 per cent of British with unfavourable views of America say the same.25 Another Pew poll, released in March 2004, confirmed that public opinion of ‘Americans’ (as opposed to ‘America’) remained high in Great Britain and Germany, though only at 53 per cent in France.26 Meanwhile, oftentimes, Americans and Europeans share closer perspectives on policy options than the headlines might suggest. Even as tensions over Iraq were heating up, a poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund and released in September 2002 found that nearly four in five Americans want Europeans to exert strong leadership in the world; and 70 per cent believe the United States should share more decision-making with Europe, even if it sometimes means compromise. This poll, as well as a survey of international attitudes released by the Pew Research Centre in December 2002, also found that US and European public views converged in important areas, from strong support for the United Nations, to endorsement of a UN-approved and allysupported invasion of Iraq, to vigorous consensus that military force should be used to uphold international law. In addition, Europeans and Americans ranked serious threats in more or less the same order, with ‘international terrorism’ and ‘Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction’ topping the nightmarish list. At the same time, these and subsequent polls reveal significant and enduring differences which, according to the authors of the CCFR/GMF survey, have ‘the potential to make the trans-Atlantic alliance much weaker and less effective’.27 First, threat perception: In part because of the scars 11 September left on the national psyche, Americans find the world a much more threatening place than do most Europeans, and, consequently, believe immediate action is necessary to make it safer. That sense of urgency helps drive US willingness to go it alone; as President Bush said to raucous cheers in his 2004 State of the Union address, ‘America will never ask a permission slip to defend the security of our country.’ Europeans not only feel less vulnerable, and thus have less of a sense of exigency, but also believe – as mentioned earlier – that the United States

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bears some responsibility for its troubles. The Spanish public’s reaction to the March 2004 train bombing in Madrid was telling: Rather than intensifying their support for the US-led war on terror, they chose to distance their country from US policy as quickly as possible. The government of President José María Aznar, which had been closely associated with US efforts in Iraq and elsewhere, was yet another casualty of the attacks. Robert Kagan, writing in the Washington Post, called the Spanish election of 2004 ‘al Qaeda’s most significant geopolitical success since Sept. 11, 2001’, and warned that, ‘If other European publics decide that the Spaniards are right, and conclude that the safer course in world affairs is to dissociate themselves from the United States, then the transatlantic partnership is no more.’28 Second, leadership: Europeans resent what they perceive as a subordinate role, in which Washington calls all the shots and then expects them to fall into line. Americans are willing to cooperate more on decision-making, but are less enthused about the EU becoming a military and economic superpower; a reality codified in President Bush’s National Security Strategy, which explicitly states that America will not allow anyone to challenge its military superiority. The March 2004 Pew poll found that majorities in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Spain and Italy all supported a more independent relationship from the United States on security affairs – support that has risen steadily since 2001. Yet Europe’s superpower ambitions are not matched by its willingness to spend. Since 11 September, only the UK and France have increased their defence expenditures to a significant degree, while the United States has bolstered its own by $40-plus billion – more than the entire British defence budget – and is anticipating a more than half-trillion dollar defence budget by the end of the decade. Third, the polls indicate that European disenchantment with the United States is more than a matter of disagreement with US policy. The 2002 Pew study found that majorities in every European country save Britain said the spread of US ideas and customs is a bad thing – and even in Britain, fully half of respondents shared that damning view. At first, this might seem strange, given not only Europeans’ consumption of US culture, but also the liberal values we share – such as democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the rule of law, as the leaders of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Denmark, the Czech Republic and Slovakia underscored in a joint statement published on both sides of the Atlantic on 30 January 2003. Indeed, the Pew results reveal a certain inconsistency, as the same West European publics who dislike the invasion of American ideas confess their enthusiasm for US music, movies, television and technology. The driver behind this disconnect may be a matter of style – in particular, the increasing degree to which US policy is cast in religious or moral terms. Former Bush Administration speechwriter David Frum has described how the first words he heard upon entering the Bush White House were ‘Missed

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you at Bible study’; and indeed, the president’s emphasis on good and evil, his understanding of the world and his sense of his role are all driven, in part, by his conviction that the future is ‘held in stronger hands than his own’.29 Thus, as The Economist put it, ‘although Europeans agree with his [President Bush’s] ends, many feel uncomfortable with the fervour and moral idealism that – they fear – determine the means.’30

So what? But what, if any, tangible effect has the widening of the transatlantic divide since 11 September had on counter-terror cooperation so far? That may be the 64 million euro question for those – on either side of the Atlantic – who lament heightened US unilateralism. After all, if Europe’s support in the fight against terrorism can simply be taken for granted, then the expedient course for the United States is a self-serving, ‘me first’ approach. Right? Well, at best, half right. Bob Woodward reports that in October 2001, President Bush told his National Security Council, ‘my belief is the best way that we hold this coalition together is to be clear on our objectives and to be clear that we are determined to achieve them. You hold a coalition together by strong leadership and that’s what we intend to provide.’31 And indeed, on a tactical level – intelligence, financial and law enforcement cooperation – this approach appears to be working. As other chapters in this volume describe in detail, European countries and the EU have worked closely with the United States on improving counterterror capabilities. A number of countries cracked down hard on terrorists whose names appeared on US watchlists; within little over a year after 11 September, more than 200 people had been arrested in western Europe – primarily in Spain, Britain, Italy and France.32 All made unprecedented efforts to freeze the assets of suspected terrorist organisations; and while some have been more successful than others, by the end of 2002, roughly €1 million had been blocked (though a major study on terrorist financing concludes that this probably overstates the amount taken from al-Qa’ida and its supporters).33 The United States and the EU also have jointly added several Europe-based individuals and organisations to the terrorist roll. American law enforcement officials have worked together with European counterparts in a variety of cases, including the capture of two Yemeni terror suspects in Frankfurt in January 2003. In addition, the United States and EU have enhanced cooperation between American law enforcement and Europol and Eurojust; European liaison officers arrived in Washington in September 2002, and US prosecutors have been assigned to liaise with Eurojust. Important agreements have been reached allowing Europol to share data with American law enforcement. To be sure, there have been stumbling blocks. For example, once US Attorney General John Ashcroft decided to seek the death penalty for

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Zacarias Moussaoui, France and Germany declared they would no longer share intelligence for the case. All sides, however, sought a workable compromise, and, in November 2002, a deal was struck by which German and French information would not be used in the sentencing part of Moussaoui’s trial. Similarly, in early 2004, some European governments and air carriers expressed concerns about the US requirement that armed marshals be placed on foreign planes if intelligence indicated a specific terrorist threat, but all parties did their part to find a mutually acceptable arrangement. A US Homeland Security Department spokesman was quoted in the Washington Post as saying the United States was unlikely to ever have to revoke landing rights for foreign aircraft, ‘considering the tremendous cooperation we have seen from our international partners’.34 European officials also have occasionally complained that judicial cooperation is a one-way street, with the United States privileging its own prosecution and not sharing information with others. The United States has refused to allow certain suspects held in US custody to testify in the German trial of a Moroccan man believed to have been involved in the 11 September attacks; German authorities complain that it took the US Department of Justice seven months to provide information relevant to the case, and even then, key details were missing.35 And American officials have been frustrated at times by Europeans’ refusal to block bank accounts of individuals or organisations on US lists; European authorities counter that American authorities refuse to share necessary intelligence confirming terrorist ties. All that said, counter-terrorism officials on both sides of the Atlantic are quick to praise tactical cooperation; even German Interior Minister Otto Schily has emphasised that differences ‘among friends’ on Iraq will not harm bilateral efforts to combat terror.36

Strategic divergence The problem is that the fight against terror cannot be won on the tactical level. And at the strategic level, US and European perspectives dramatically diverge. First is the question of what actually constitutes global terrorism – in other words, who are we fighting? The Bush Administration’s tendency to lump Palestinian terrorism in the same rhetorical potage as Islamic jihadism has alienated European allies, who view the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in a very different light. Tensions also were obviously exacerbated by the Bush Administration’s attempts to shoehorn Iraq into the war on terror; the failure, at least as of mid-2004, to uncover weapons of mass destruction or prove real links between Saddam and al-Qa’ida, has only confirmed critics’ concerns about the excesses of a one-track US mind.

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But if the Bush Administration has gone too far in equating Palestinian violence or Saddam Hussein with al-Qa’ida-style terrorism, the EU has not gone far enough in cracking down on Hamas or Hizbollah, both of which are still permitted to fundraise on European soil. This lack of agreement on definitions and parameters has several repercussions. As a practical matter, it can result in loopholes in efforts to inhibit terrorists’ capabilities – as in the case of Hamas and Hizbollah. And, politically, it can jeopardise the coalition, for as former US National Security Adviser Samuel Berger put it: ‘All terrorism is evil – but not all evil is terrorism. Defeating the violent jihadists who want to spill American blood is, by itself, a daunting challenge. If we [the United States] paint with too broad a brush, if we define the war on terror to embrace an axis of evil, we can lose our focus and credibility – on both fronts.’37 The second area of divergence concerns assessing the nature and severity of the threat. Americans understood from the moment the second plane hit the World Trade Center that the country – and, in some respects, western civilisation – was at war with a new and malevolent enemy. Europeans have been slower, and sometimes reluctant, to take that view. Daniel Benjamin, co-author of The Age of Sacred Terror and former director for counter-terrorism at the National Security Council, recalls attending a diplomatic forum in Washington shortly after 11 September: All the ambassadors expressed great sympathy for the United States. Many also stressed, however, that the US had very little experience with terrorism – especially on its own soil – and all of their countries, especially the European ones, had long-term experience from which America could learn. There was talk of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (or ‘Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’, ETA), the Italian Red Brigades, the German Baader– Meinhof/RAF, the IRA and a sprinkling of others. I was struck by the notion that experience with groups like, say, the ETA, which specialise in occasional assassinations, was in some way comparable to experience with the most spectacular act of catastrophic terror ever committed. I told the assembled that the outpouring of sympathy around the world, the invocation of NATO’s Article V and the like had made a powerful impression on Americans. But if they thought that the type of terrorism that had just been displayed in lower Manhattan and northern Virginia had anything in common with the indigenous terror they were speaking of, then they really didn’t get it. This was a phenomenon so radically different that it almost stretched the word terrorism beyond recognition. I also suggested – to some astonishment – that extraordinary as the sympathy was, governments needed to convince their people that this was not just an American problem but that all status quo powers, and especially those that were part of the Western Alliance, would be targets. The looks I got in response ranged from incomprehending to annoyed.38

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At the time of the 2002 CCFR/GMF poll, Americans and Europeans both ranked international terrorism number one among possible threats to vital interests – but 91 per cent of Americans categorised the threat as extremely important, compared to only 65 per cent of Europeans. Two years later, a whopping 88 per cent of Americans still believed ‘taking measures to protect the US from terrorist attacks’ must be a top foreign policy priority,39 even as one in three Britons, nearly one in two Germans, and 57 per cent of the French said America was overreacting to the terrorist threat. 40 This means that, while the United States is busily reorganising the federal government and stepping up spending to counter the threat, Europeans may be doing less to ensure capabilities match vulnerabilities – and in a global age, one country’s oversight can undermine another’s security efforts. One example is airport security; attempted shoe-bomber Richard Reid (a literal and figurative ‘foot soldier’ for al-Qa’ida) boarded his Miamibound plane in Paris. Another is putting the squeeze on terrorist pocketbooks. Brown University’s Watson Institute, which has conducted a major research project in recent years on targeted financial sanctions, found that even as the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls had more than 100 staff working full-time on sanctions implementation, the Bank of England had seven, the French Ministry of Finance had two part-timers, the German Bundesbank had one, and the European Commission had one and a parttime assistant41 – casting doubts on coalition partners’ ability to ‘follow the money’. The third strategic divergence is on the question of what gives rise to terror in the first place – how to fight not just terrorists, but terrorism. The Bush Administration, informed by the President’s deeply held religious faith, sees the struggle in terms of right versus wrong, good versus evil. In his worldview, evil can’t be reformed, it can only be destroyed – but once we’ve eradicated evil, whether the Taliban, terrorists or Saddam Hussein, we’ve wiped out the worst of the problem. Needless to say, the United States is always squarely on the ‘good’ side of this formulation – but President Bush never fails to emphasise that the values his country promotes are universal: ‘Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world; it is God’s gift to humanity.’42 In other words, as journalist Michael Hirsh observed, ‘America’s going to rescue the world, sometimes with guns blazing, but only so the world will have the freedom to do as it pleases.’43 Europeans, uncomfortable with this public evangelising, ask instead where evil comes from, and emphasise alleviating the violence, poverty, disease, oppression and alienation that create a fertile environment in which extremism can take root. Even Prime Minister Blair, President Bush’s closest lieutenant from the start, underscored two goals in his first

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major address post-11 September; not just destruction of ‘the machinery of terrorism’, but also: Hope amongst all nations of a new beginning, where we seek to resolve differences in a calm and ordered way, greater understanding between nations and between faiths and, above all, justice and prosperity for the poor and dispossessed, so that people everywhere can see the chance of a better future through the hard work and creative power of the free citizen, not the violence and savagery of the fanatic.44 [emphasis mine] Here too, divergence poses risks for both sides. If Europeans are not prepared to concede that there are evildoers in the world with whom, as Prime Minister Blair put it, ‘there is no compromise possible’, then they will be marginalised in US policy decisions – and legitimate concerns, such as the treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo, will be viewed as evidence of skewed priorities and dubious loyalties. But if Americans fail to grasp the importance of the ‘softer’ issues Europeans emphasise, and fail to sustain the positive relationships that will encourage transatlantic burden-sharing on matters such as peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance, then the future may hold success in battles with ‘Most Wanted Terrorists’ – but never in the wider war. The Pentagon’s announcement in December 2003 that countries which had not participated in the Iraq war would be excluded from bidding on reconstruction contracts – in other words, from helping secure the peace – was a good, if disheartening, example of the Bush Administration’s short-sighted approach.

Prognosis and priorities It would be wrong to present these strategic divergences as absolute. For example, there are Europeans who firmly believed Saddam Hussein must disarm or face the consequences – including, critically, the leaders of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, Denmark, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, who declared in a joint statement: ‘The trans-Atlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime’s persistent attempts to threaten world security.’45 And US policy-makers also value development assistance and other forms of ‘soft’ power, as evidenced by President Bush’s pledge at Monterrey, Mexico, to increase US foreign aid by 50 per cent by 2006, and his $15 billion initiative to combat HIV/AIDS in Africa. But the differences are real. And, cumulatively, they create friction that hampers dynamic partnership; the kind of ‘robust political cooperation’ that, as Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon write: can produce vital large-scale initiatives: a common diplomatic approach toward problem states; a sustainable programme of economic development

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for the Middle East; changes in domestic policies that lessen the appeal of jihadism to Muslim diaspora communities; improvement of border controls; tightened bonds among justice ministries, law-enforcement, customs and intelligence agencies, as well as special operations forces on the front lines.46 In other words, the kind of cooperation that can hasten success in the fight against terror. Over the longer term, then, while nuts-and-bolts cooperation at the tactical level will continue, the lack of strategic unity will make broader progress more cumbersome to achieve. Already, we are seeing wear and tear on counterterror comity: Between 2002 and 2004, allied support for the US-led fight against terror – while still strong – had dropped from 70 per cent to 55 per cent in Germany and from 75 per cent to 50 per cent in France.47 And even when America and Europe end up agreeing on strategic matters, ‘getting to yes’ will be a harder and rougher journey than is desirable. Transatlantic energies are better off spent wrestling with common challenges than with each other. Worse yet, the more times the two sides disagree, the more likely it is that each will be seen as confirming the other’s fears. If Europe’s chief goal and role is to put a brake on US efforts, it will convince Americans that cooperation is pointless and they are better off going it alone. If the United States persists in going it alone, it will reinforce European views that America is reckless and in need of restraint. The price of perceived US unilateralism may be more Germanys and Spains (or South Koreas), where politicians either draw on, provoke or benefit from anti-American sentiment to win office. The price of more Germanys and Spains will be more roadblocks in the path of US policy. And the price of such roadblocks will be fewer positive results, and greater ill will on all sides. Such a scenario could hardly be appealing to any US administration. An America that kills off its enemies but fails to keep its friends will never be secure in the world, no matter its military might. But is the future of transatlantic sailing destined to be so choppy? Not necessarily. First, Europeans should recognise the tremendous debates under way within America itself. Much of the harshest criticism of the Bush Administration – on issues from unilateralism to Iraq to the role of international institutions – has come from fellow citizens. Indeed, one of the first and most trenchant voices arguing against confrontation in Iraq was General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to President Bush’s father and a trusted Bush family friend. At the time of this writing, the US is locked in a heated and polarised presidential campaign, in which voters consider foreign policy and national security issues their number one concern for the first time since the Vietnam era. This is not to suggest America’s willingness to use force to fight radical fundamentalism will prove to be a one-term aberration. In a post-11 September

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world, the US public overwhelmingly ranks counter-terrorism action a top policy priority, and even after Iraq’s disappointments, six in ten Americans still believe pre-emption can be justified. Yet, by a margin of 49 to 37 per cent, Americans in 2004 believe that US foreign policy should strongly take allies’ interests into account, rather than be based mostly on US interests alone. According to Pew, ‘A majority of Americans, and nearly half of Republicans, rate improving relations with US allies as a top foreign policy priority.’48 Similarly, the Bush Administration’s behaviour should not be seen as a mirror of US public will. Indeed, on many occasions since 11 September 2001, the White House has been out of step with the electorate. A New York Times/CBS News poll conducted days before the President’s 2003 State of the Union address found that 52 per cent of Americans said the president does not share their priorities for the country. Forty-one per cent disapproved of the way he is handling foreign policy. More than half believed that America is less respected in the world today than two years ago, and also said the Bush Administration has been too quick to get military forces involved in foreign countries and Iraq, rather than pursuing diplomatic solutions – opinions that have been amplified in subsequent polls through the time of this writing in 2004. Going forward, the challenge for Americans is two-pronged. On the one hand, they must commit the energy, time, resources and will to pursue a longterm, multi-faceted struggle against al-Qa’ida and radical jihadists – not just on the battlefield but in the streets and camps and slums where anger, frustration and hopelessness create an enabling environment for extremists. On the other, they must accept that even when America is capable of acting alone, there is still something valuable to be gained by consulting and collaborating with allies. In part, it is the legitimacy of having US efforts endorsed by broader international will – and the practical corollaries of that support, whether troops on the ground or financial burden-sharing, so the United States does not have to take all the risks or foot all the bills. In part, it is the moral authority that comes from being sensitive to other’s cares and concerns. And, finally, in an era when hatred of America in some quarters is more potent and lethal than ever, such cooperation creates a reserve of goodwill from which America can draw strength. At the same time, Europeans must come to terms with the enormity of the dangers at hand – or, to borrow the words of American pop-psychologist, Dr Phil McGraw, ‘Get real!’ Al-Qa’ida and their ilk are ruthless, relentless, and undeterrable – as bloody scenes in Bali, Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Casablanca, Istanbul and Madrid, and thwarted terrorist plots across the European continent make clear. If they succeed in obtaining weapons of mass destruction, they will use them. American power is not the ‘threat’ that should preoccupy Europe right now. If Europe truly wants to stem US ‘unilateralism’, it should choose the path of action, not obstruction. That means making UN resolutions mean something,

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as the European leaders who signed the ‘United We Stand’ joint statement urge. It means closing – or at least, narrowing – the military capability gap, so that US force no longer has to be the default option. It means shouldering more of the burden for securing and eliminating the Soviet WMD legacy in Russia – an effort on which the United States has spent more than ten times as much as Europe over the past ten years. It means strengthening ties to Islamic countries that can serve as models of modernity – for example, by moving forward on Turkey’s accession to the EU. And, crucially, it means working energetically to prevent the radicalisation of Europe’s Muslim communities – not by banning schoolgirls’ headscarves, but by strengthening anti-discrimination policies, supporting moderate Muslim schools, and working to give European Muslims a greater voice in political and economic affairs.49

Conclusion Ambassador Richard Haass, in the speech referred to at the outset of this essay, referred to Giuseppe de Lampedusa’s classic line: ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.’ Today, that is the challenge for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic: To preserve the vitality and purpose of transatlantic ties in a new and dangerous threat environment and in the face of new and different challenges. It won’t be easy, but students of Atlantic affairs should see the cup as half full, not half empty. Americans and Europeans do occupy the same world; indeed, despite the sea that divides them, their values are rooted in common ground. The task now, as David Gompert has written, is for ‘the United States to find the humility, and Europe to summon the nerve, to become genuine partners’.50

Notes and references 1. The author thanks Daniel Benjamin, Ivo Daalder, Heather Hurlburt and William Wechsler for sharing their insights and experience. 2. ‘A year after Iraq War,’ The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, Survey Report released 16 March 2004. 3. US Ambassador Richard N. Haass, ‘Charting a new course in the transatlantic relationship’, Remarks to the Centre for European Reform, London, 10 June 2002. 4. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 63–4. 5. Kurt M. Campbell and Michèle A. Flournoy, principal authors, To Prevail: an American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism (Washington: CSIS Press, 2001), p. 212. 6. Henry Porter, ‘Don’t wag your finger at us, Mr Bush’, Observer, 26 May 2002. 7. Steven Erlanger, ‘In Europe, some say the attacks stemmed from American failings’, New York Times, 22 September 2001.

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8. Craig Kennedy and Marshall M. Bouton, ‘The real trans-Atlantic gap’, Foreign Policy, November/December 2002, 70. 9. US poets were equally vociferous; a White House poetry symposium planned for February 2003 was postponed when the First Lady’s office learned that one of the guests, Sam Hamill, was planning to use the event to present Mrs Bush with an anti-war anthology. The First Lady’s press secretary explained that, while Mrs Bush believed in free speech, she had opinions too and her opinion was that it was inappropriate to turn a literary event into a political forum. By the end of January, Mr Hamill had apparently received as many as 2,000 submissions. 10. Martin Burcharth, ‘Between hammer and anvil’, Correspondence (published by the Council on Foreign Relations), Issue 10 (Winter 2002/03), 16. 11. Quoted in Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, ‘Fear of US power shapes Iraq debate’, Washington Post, 30 October 2002. 12. Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Anti-Europeanism in America’, New York Review of Books, 13 February 2003, accessed on the web. 13. Max Boot, ‘America acts the grown up, Europe needs guidance’, International Herald Tribune, 26 November 2002. 14. Garton Ash, ‘Anti-Europeanism in America’. 15. Quoted in Kevin Livingston, ‘Bush, Schröder rift left unresolved’, Prague Post, 27 November 2002. 16. Quoted in Steven Erlanger, ‘To some in Europe, the major problem is Bush the cowboy’, New York Times, 24 January 2003. 17. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 26 January 2003. 18. Robert Kagan, ‘Multilateralism, American style,’ Washington Post, 13 September 2002. 19. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 81. 20. David C. Gompert, ‘Treat Europe as a full partner, and it will be’, RAND Review, August 2002. 21. Daniel N. Nelson, ‘Transatlantic transmutations’, Washington Quarterly, 25:4 (Autumn 2002). 22. Daniel Hamilton, ‘Transatlantic tensions’, SAISPHERE, 2003, 30. 23. Francis Fukuyama, ‘Has history restarted since September 11?’, John Bonython Lecture, Melbourne, Australia, 8 August 2002. 24. Robert Kagan, ‘Power and weakness’, Policy Review, 116, June–July 2002. 25. ‘Views of a changing world 2003’, The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, released 3 June 2003. 26. ‘A year after Iraq war’, The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, Survey Report released 16 March 2004. 27. Craig Kennedy and Marshall M. Bouton, ‘The real trans-Atlantic gap’, Foreign Policy, November–December 2002, 73. 28. ‘Time to save an alliance’, Robert Kagan, The Washington Post, 16 March 2004. 29. David Frum, The Right Man (Random House, 2003), pp. 3 and 30. 30. ‘On the rise’, The Economist, 4 January 2003, p. 10. 31. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 281. 32. ‘Tackling a hydra’, The Economist, 1 February 2002, p. 44. 33. ‘Terrorist financing’, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair, William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Co-Directors, p. 15. 34. Quoted in ‘Nations balk at sky marshals’, Sara Kehaulani Goo, Washington Post, 7 January 2004.

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35. Desmond Butler, ‘In 9/11 case, Germans note lack of help from allies’, New York Times, 8 December 2002. 36. Eric Lichtblau, ‘German Minister says al-Qa’ida threat is as strong now as before Sept. 11’, New York Times, 25 January 2003. 37. Samuel R. Berger, ‘One year later: America’s agenda’, Remarks to the US Institute of Peace, 5 September 2002. 38. Interview with author, 11 February 2003. 39. ‘Eroding respect for America seen as major problem’, The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, released August 2004. 40. ‘A year after the Iraq war,’ The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, released 16 March 2004. 41. ‘Terrorist financing,’ see n. 33, p. 17, and: www.watsoninstitute.org/TFS 42. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Washington DC, 28 January 2003. 43. Michael Hirsh, ‘America’s mission’, Newsweek Special Issue, December 2002, p. 10. 44. Prime Minister Tony Blair, address at Labour Party conference in Brighton, 2 October 2002. 45. ‘United we stand’, Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2003. 46. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), p. 413. 47. ‘Views of a changing world 2003’, The Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, released 3 June 2003; ‘A year after the Iraq war’, The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, released 16 March 2004. 48. ‘Eroding respect for America seen as major problem’, The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, released August 2004. 49. See Jonathan Stevenson, ‘The Qaeda vipers in Europe’s bosom’, New York Times, 1 February 2003. 50. David C. Gompert, ‘Treat Europe as a full partner’.

10 Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation after 11 September 2001 Jonathan Stevenson

When the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were attacked on 11 September 2001, the experience of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom with serious terrorist threats over the past 30 years ensured European empathy with the United States’ relatively fresh terrorist problem. A high level of both intra-European and transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation immediately followed the attacks. Robust cooperation within Europe in pursuing and arresting terrorists has continued. But there has been notably less intensive cooperation among European national authorities in tightening immigration policies and border security, so as to deny terrorists access to territory, as opposed to apprehending them once they are inside it. The Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 – ten bombs placed on commuter railway cars synchronised to detonate without warning during morning rush hour, killing 191 people – may lead to more robust European border and immigration policies. On the transatlantic front, after an initial period of apparently seamless solidarity, Europeans have taken issue with the United States over particular strategic matters, such as conflict resolution between the Israelis and the Palestinians, regime-change in Iraq, perceived American unilateralism and incompatible social policies. These factors may have fuelled occasional flareups between Washington and national authorities in Europe relating to counter-terrorism cooperation. In March 2002, for instance, the French government threatened to withhold judicial cooperation with the United States after the United States announced that it would seek the death penalty against suspected ‘20th hijacker’ Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national. The following August, Germany issued a similar warning. Washington, for its part, has complained about excessive circumspection on the part of the German government in making arrests and the Belgians’ reluctance to share intelligence, while Berlin and Brussels have rejoined that Washington has not sufficiently reciprocated. Broader bilateral non-military counter-terrorism cooperation between the Washington and European capitals does not appear to have appreciably diminished in proactively pursuing and apprehending terrorists who threaten 208

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the United States. On the European side, the institutional capacity for transatlantic coordination was enhanced with the advent, in March 2000, of the EU Council of Ministers’ Political and Security Committee. Some functional problems – such as contrasting views on the death penalty, which complicate Europe-to-US extradition, and differing data-protection standards – are ongoing but manageable, if not ideally, on a case-by-case basis.1 Certainly such cooperation has become more important since the US-led military action in Afghanistan denied al-Qa’ida its physical base. Al-Qa’ida was forced to spread out, becoming even more decentralised, minimising the exposure of any ‘bricks-and-mortar’ infrastructure and decreasing the availability of large point-targets. Traditional military means therefore became less applicable to the terrorist threat.2 Operationally, al-Qa’ida may be better off without Afghanistan. Homeland security, law-enforcement, intelligence and intergovernmental cooperation in each of these spheres became paramount in generating a horizontal security network that matches up well with al-Qa’ida’s dispersed and ‘virtual’ capability.

Cooperation within Europe Notably heavy radical Islamic activity in support of terrorism was uncovered in Germany, the United Kingdom and France, all of which have large Muslim populations.3 Overall, Muslims constitute a far higher proportion of Europe’s population than that of the United States, and without question the participation of European capitals and the EU in the US-led global counter-terrorism campaign has been generally enthusiastic and vigorous. Over 500 arrests have been made in European jurisdictions, often with the intelligence or operational assistance of a second country, and a couple dozen of those arrested have been convicted of terrorist offences.4 After 11 September the EU also established the EU Counter-terrorism Task Force, consisting of one police and one intelligence official from each EU country, to liase with US authorities, collect and analyse information and intelligence about the 11 September attacks, and compose a joint terrorist threat assessment. Police in each EU member state have the right of hot pursuit into other EU countries, and in May 2002, France and Germany agreed in principle that each country’s lawenforcement authorities could make arrests on the other’s soil. France reached a similar arrangement with Belgium. Cooperation on proactive counter-terrorism enforcement has been impressive. In early 2003, for instance, police in France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom arrested over 50 North African terrorist suspects in a series of coordinated raids, disrupting an al-Qa’ida-linked network apparently poised to strike as war in Iraq loomed. In January 2003, Italian counterterrorism authorities arrested 28 Pakistanis in possession of explosives, detonators, forged documents, and maps identifying US assets in and around Naples.

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The changes prompted by the 11 September attacks in terms of securing European territory against terrorist infiltration, on the other hand, have occurred essentially at the margins. Of the seven different areas included in the EU counter-terrorism programme established shortly after 11 September, only air transport security – an area in which Europe was already superior to the United States – was a direct response to the attacks in New York and Washington.5 ‘Homeland’ or ‘territorial’ security is not among the seven areas.6 In a June 2002 EU report on its response to 11 September, territorial security was broached only in the context of emergency preparedness for terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially those involving biological weapons.7 Even in that area, while European health ministers now meet regularly to discuss improving Europe’s response capability, most European countries are not stockpiling vaccines as intensively as the United States. The discrepancy between the pursuit of terrorists, on the one hand, and denying them access, on the other, is explained by a combination of operational custom, political incapacity and political priority.

Operational custom The EU has an inherited tradition of coordinated counter-terrorist efforts that began in 1976 with the TREVI (the French acronym for ‘Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence’) arrangement among European Community governments, whereby they regularly discussed security problems at ministerial level. This multinational collaboration produced some highly effective joint operations against international terrorist groups, including the dismantling of the Lebanese group Hizbullah’s western European network in 1987. Maastricht’s third pillar – involving immigration and asylum, policing, customs and legal cooperation – superseded TREVI. Among other things, it mandated the creation of the multinational European Police Office (Europol), which became operational in late 1998. Europol has seen its budget double since 11 September to €51.66 million, and its 242-strong staff was set to increase to 350 in 2003. On the other hand, Europol’s staff will remain small; its counter-terrorism unit is to expand to a mere 20 over five years, and its remit is limited to providing analytic and coordinative support for national law-enforcement agencies and does not encompass relationships among intelligence agencies. Europol also does not have enforcement powers. The most it can do is ask national governments to initiate joint investigations of endemic large-scale criminal problems. While general threat assessments are circulated through Europol, it is not a vehicle for sharing specific current intelligence, which is still done mainly on a bilateral basis. ‘Eurojust,’ also based in The Hague, draws together legal personnel from EU member states. It is empowered only to recommend that national authorities

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initiate a specific cross-border criminal investigation, and may coordinate the investigation and prosecution of specific serious cross-border crimes. Thus, Europol and Eurojust too are constrained by the competing interests of Brussels and national governments.8 Europol is seeking to consolidate through its offices a fluent, multinational network of law-enforcement professionals, and now includes in its headquarters in The Hague liaison officers from each EU country (as well as the United States, Iceland, Norway, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Estonia) who facilitate interaction between Europol and 34 law-enforcement agencies. In December 2001, Europol also established a formal liaison arrangement with US lawenforcement agencies and opened a liaison office in Washington the following August. It is unlikely ever to be a European FBI.9 But Europol does have at least limited potential to harmonise the national policies of EU member states on matters such as territorial security – a pursuit that is championed, in particular, by France.

Political incapacity and priority The awareness among national European authorities that Europe was infiltrated by al-Qa’ida and the advent of Europol energised Europe-wide law-enforcement efforts.10 Further, in November 2002, those authorities departed from their relatively circumspect, low-key approach to terrorism alerts in issuing stark and dire warnings about planned al-Qa’ida attacks in Europe. This amounted to an acknowledgement – prompted by al-Qa’idalinked terrorist attacks in Bali and Kenya in October and November 2002, respectively, and taped threats apparently from Osama bin Laden himself that surfaced in November 2002 – that al-Qa’ida had reconstituted since the Afghanistan campaign and was expanding its target set. 11 Nevertheless, what incentives there are for improving territorial security against terrorists in Europe tended to be diluted by countervailing political forces. The EU is not a United States of Europe, and simply lacks the supranational power to effect and harmonise simultaneous changes in the policies of its constituent national governments. This incapacity has a greater impact on territorial security than law enforcement narrowly construed. For example, it would be politically difficult for the EU to enact comprehensive regulations on port security, terrorism insurance or firstresponse capacities, as the United States is doing, and European governments could not be expected to swiftly harmonise multiple laws in these areas. Border security is another problematic area. The Schengen arrangements mandate strict border controls between new EU member states and nonmember states. At the same time, open borders within an expanding union are integral to the EU’s post-modern economic and political experiment.12 The EU was planning to institute an EU-wide arrest warrant as of 1 January

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2004. In theory, the weakening of national borders should ease the application of such warrants to an expanded roster of terrorist organisations. But against that ideal, there is potential for significant member-state backlash. As the EU moves with trepidation towards enhancing its political power, European governments are becoming more worried about haemorrhaging national authority. Furthermore, for purposes of applying the arrest warrant, the EU has proposed an extremely broad definition of terrorism under which all ‘intentional acts . . . seriously intimidating a population or . . . destabilising or destroying . . . fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures’ constitute terrorism. The warrant would also cover common crimes as well as racism and xenophobia. Thus, the arrest warrant, though proposed on the pretext of counter-terrorism, appears to be part of a larger integrative agenda of criminalising racial or religious hatred per se and expanding the EU’s supranational legal jurisdiction generally. These are ambitious and controversial goals far less susceptible to consensus than simply cracking down on terrorism. As a result of these factors, the target date for the EU arrest warrant to become operational has been steadily pushed back. Italy resisted adopting the warrant before relenting as the result of a partial opt-out. Differing law-enforcement philosophies may cause other countries to drag their feet on executing warrants, even though legal grounds may be lacking. For example, France leans towards direct suppression of radical Islamic sentiment, while Britain often prefers to let militants gather and talk freely and gain intelligence from surveillance.13 In May 2002, the European Commission announced the possibility of a multinational EU border patrol that would work with Europol. A promising 15-day trial had been in held in which guards from EU member states patrolled the borders of France, Italy and Spain, stopping 4,500 illegal immigrants and arresting 34 alleged drug traffickers. Despite this success, the EU interior ministers’ meeting in Luxembourg in the subsequent month resulted in near-paralysis on border security and immigration issues. Germany has held up a burden-sharing agreement on asylum-seekers because it wants other EU nations to absorb more of its immigrants but does not want to pay them for it. Greece, Italy and Spain want financial assistance for external border patrols and guarantees that they will not be saddled with refugees seeking asylum in northern Europe. Tony Blair’s call to condition aid to non-EU countries on their cracking down on illegal immigration at its sources was rejected.14 The counter-terrorism potential of those immigration-control devices that have been implemented has been diluted by civil liberties concerns. On 14 January 2003, the European Automated Fingerprints Identification System – known as ‘Eurodac’ – was launched in 14 EU member states plus Norway and Iceland. Designed to monitor and curtail ‘asylum shopping’, the system registers in a central and commonly accessible database in Brussels

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the fingerprints of asylum applicants over age 14 and certain other illegal immigrants. The system, based on American technology, has impressive technical capabilities: it can run up to 500,000 fingerprint comparisons per second, with better than 99.9 per cent precision.15 But the European Commission required that no information acquired or developed by Eurodac be provided to police, intelligence or other security services.16 The Schengen Information System (SIS) – in which 13 EU members plus Norway and Iceland participate – is potentially a useful tool. Each participant is required to issue alerts on illegal aliens from outside the EU seeking visas, including authorised documentary, photographic and biometric means of identification. Eurodac is an element of the system. While the EU has allocated funding for extending the SIS to new members, who are required to apply the system, the existing restrictions on access to Eurodac and a general reluctance to impose additional biometric requirements circumscribes the security utility of the SIS. In fact, visa overstays remain a serious EU problem. In countries that are traditionally liberal with respect to immigration, tighter asylum laws have met with considerable public and indeed official outcry. In the UK, for example, proposed legislation curtailing asylum-seekers’ right of appeal, cutting legal aid, withdrawing state economic support from rejected families that refuse to leave the country, stiffer penalties for destroying travel documents, and cracking down on unscrupulous or unqualified immigration advisers are facing parliamentary resistance. NATO structures could be useful in coordinating national counter-terrorism efforts in general and homeland security in particular. As of June 2002, the alliance had undertaken five concrete counter-terrorism initiatives: a deployable nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) analytical laboratory; a prototype NBC event response team; a Virtual Centre of Excellence for NBC Weapons Defence; a biological and chemical defence stockpile; and a disease surveillance system. But despite pressure from Washington as well as NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, the alliance settled on a meagre 4 per cent increase in NATO’s $147 million civilian budget at the December 2001 NATO summit. Between its impending enlargement and the need to reconsider its mission, NATO perhaps cannot be expected to apply itself swiftly and diligently to counter-terrorism problems. Conversely, the increased saliency of those problems seems to have slowed movement towards the deepening of supranational power in Europe. On balance, then, 11 September has probably strengthened the nation-state in Europe as well as other places. If that reinforcement has been manifested in more unilateralist impulses on the United States’ part, in Europe it means a more cautious attitude toward ceding national power to supranational authorities. Europe-wide, the kind of counter-terrorism mobilisation that TREVI was able to muster, for instance, against Hizbullah in the late 1980s, appears to have materialised with respect to ferreting out terrorists and breaking up cells. It has also been very effective in the financial arena – as of

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June 2002, out of a global total of approximately $125 million of suspected al-Qa’ida assets frozen since 11 September, European countries had frozen about $35 million versus about $34 million in the United States – in part because that is the area in which European supranational power is the farthest advanced.17 Broadly speaking, counter-terrorism in Europe in the near-term will probably redound mainly to national governments that have customarily handled terrorist threats rather than the EU or NATO. That said, the Madrid bombing on 11 March 2004 – which killed 191 and was perpetrated by North African Islamists affiliated with al-Qa’ida – is likely to lead to more energetic transnational counter-terrorism efforts within Europe. Before Madrid, it appeared that the US and European counter-terrorism measures had been able to deter al-Qa’ida and its affiliates – at least to the extent of denying them access and opportunity. The Afghanistan intervention hobbled al-Qa’ida offensively and forced it to seek soft targets elsewhere. Now it seems that al-Qa’ida, having regrouped and been antagonised by US-led intervention in Iraq, is back on the offensive and zoning in on western targets. Escalating up the chain of American allies from tentative to strong – Saudi Arabia, Turkey and now Spain – al-Qa’ida would logically next hit the United Kingdom. A major US operation must also be assumed to be on the cards. Until that is feasible, however, Europe will probably remain the most prominent target in al-Qa’ida’s calculations in light of its historical, political and cultural alignment with the United States. European security organisations – which are generally geared to act on emergent threats on the basis of current intelligence – may now have to move closer to the US vulnerability-based conception of homeland security, under which law-enforcement and intelligence agencies seek through preventive measures to minimise unspecified threats by denying terrorists access to territory and opportunities to act. Success in this enterprise is difficult to achieve under any circumstances, and has become more elusive as al-Qa’ida has come to recruit from and operationally rely on local talent. In Europe, the pool appears to be getting richer. European Muslims are increasingly susceptible to radicalisation on the basis of social and political marginalisation in their host countries.18 Conservative Muslims’ outcry over France’s ban on Muslim headscarves in schools as anti-Islamic – as well as al-Qa’ida second-incommand Ayman al-Zawahiri’s claim that it reflected ‘Crusader envy’ – is only the most conspicuous example of this ‘universalisation’ of grievances. Yet the fact that most of the chief suspects in the Madrid operation were Moroccans – many of whom are hostile to Spain over its colonial predation in Morocco – suggests that terrorists also continue to be inspired by traditional ‘diaspora’ concerns relating to their homelands. With potentially two sources of aggrievement, European Muslims appear especially susceptible to Osama bin Laden’s pan-Islamic agenda. These circumstances paint a daunting picture of terrorist cells already in place. But the fact that Europe is now a target for Islamist terrorist attacks

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should not obscure its ongoing usefulness as a platform for attacks against the United States, and certainly will not blind Washington to this reality. Although transatlantic law-enforcement and intelligence cooperation has become durably more robust since 11 September, European governments should expect more pressure from the United States with respect to the pursuit and apprehension of suspected terrorists within Europe. Europe’s proactive national law-enforcement and intelligence efforts as well as homeland-security measures are likely to become more vigorous and risk-averse. This could mean, for example, broader, possibly EU-wide, implementation of security standards akin to those reflected in the USA PATRIOT Act, according police greater detention powers and intelligence agencies access to pooled immigration data, and better coordination of border security. Only two or three national European governments, most prominently Britain, have enacted laws comparable to the USA PATRIOT Act. But they are constrained in applying them – for instance, by detaining large numbers of terrorist suspects – by legitimate legal and political considerations that are more salient in Europe than the United States. Despite the domestic civil-libertarian condemnation of the British government’s power to detain foreign terrorist suspects indefinitely, it has been applied to fewer than 20 people. Madrid did prompt calls from most European governments for a more robust EU approach to counter-terrorism. The European Council Summit held on 25–6 March 2004 focused considerable attention on developing an adequate security response. In a declaration on terrorism announced on 25 March, the heads of government agreed to redouble efforts to share information both bilaterally and through Europol, to tighten border controls, and to strengthen cooperation with third countries. Most importantly, the European Council supported the appointment of a European counter-terrorism coordinator (former Dutch minister and Liberal Euro-parliamentarian Gijs de Vries) to bring greater coherence to policies adopted with the CFSP. Yet developments such as a December 2003 data-provision accord with the United States indicate that Brussels was focusing greater attention on terrorist threats even before Madrid. The European Council recognised that the key area in which there is need for material progress is border security. But the concurrent expansion of the EU and diminution of its supranational power by virtue of the failure to arrive at a European constitution in 2003 suggest that, even with the impetus of the tragedy in Madrid, advances will be difficult to forge for institutional reasons. It will remain difficult for national authorities to keep real-time tabs on the influx and outflow of foreigners, and Europe will probably remain vulnerable to terrorist infiltration.

Transatlantic cooperation Although transatlantic differences in threat perceptions, counter-terrorism experience, and political and social preferences have and could still inhibit

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transatlantic cooperation, in the wake of the Madrid attack Europeans and Americans are more liable to apprehend the same world of terrorist threats. Threat perceptions The United States has never before faced a sustained terrorist threat of any kind – new or old, transnational or domestic. Thus, the 11 September attacks prompted a drastic shift in the United States’ conception of national security. In addition to maintaining the capacity to respond to identifiable threats, preferably before they were carried out, the US government decided that it now had to minimise vulnerabilities to ill-defined threats. Further, it is mainly the United States that has a revisionist policy in the Middle East/Gulf region whereby US power and influence there would increase. The United States has also militarily intervened in and occupied two Muslim countries, broadly supports Israel, and is the chief source and propagator of a culture that bin Laden and his followers consider inimical to Islam. So the United States remains al-Qa’ida’s bête noire – its ‘far enemy’ – and consequently its preferred target. Europe, as noted, was by contrast the key recruitment, planning and logistics base for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon rather than a direct target. But, although the strategic positions of the United States and Europe have not changed and are not likely to change soon, and Europe remains only al-Qa’ida’s second choice of targets, the Madrid attack signified a shift in al-Qa’ida’s targeting strategy. Accordingly, while transatlantic threat perceptions justifiably differed, as of early 2004 they were converging.19 European authorities, owing to their experience with ‘old’ terrorist threats, would still be more prone to expect traditional terrorist methodologies (car bombs, strafings, and the like) to be used.20 Indeed, the Madrid bombings – which involved explosives placed in backpacks – crossed no operational thresholds and to an extent justifies a European focus on ‘conventional’ means. The fact that al-Qa’ida apparently has not chosen to use such means on American territory – for reasons that remain opaque, but probably are related to some inclination to reserve the United States for its most apocalyptic and spectacular designs – reinforces the United States’ concentration on unconventional terrorist methods. At the same time, the synchronised nature of the bombings and the absence of a warning reflects mass-casualty intent, which does constitute a departure from terrorist business-as-usual in Europe. Accordingly, there are strong reasons for Europe to fear as well the kinds of apocalyptic attacks – including those involving WMD – that especially concern Americans. National Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17) establishes three pillars for US policy for countering WMD threats: counter-proliferation, strengthened non-proliferation, and consequence management.21 Major US non-proliferation initiatives were of course in place well before 9/11. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme for securing and disposing of fissile material and WMD in Russia

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and former Soviet territories and finding alternative employment for weapons scientists, which began in the early 1990s, is well suited to preventing WMD from falling into the hands of non-state actors. Federal support for CTR increased after 9/11, and the model may be extended to India and Pakistan. The recognised gap between al-Qa’ida’s intentions and capabilities has prompted additional forward US measures. Under the Container Security Initiative, US customs officials are permitted to check container cargo in foreign ports; under the Proliferation Security Initiative, some 16 countries cooperate in the air, ground and maritime interdiction of vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD or related materials. On the one hand, the fact that Washington took the lead on both programmes suggests that it perceives a more serious WMD terrorist threat than European capitals. On the other hand, as both initiatives enjoy wide European participation, transatlantic threat perceptions appear to be converging.22 The EU has also increased its financial commitment to the CTR. As it has become clearer that al-Qa’ida and Baghdad had no planning-level connections, and Iraq probably had no ready WMD, the Bush administration has adopted a more decidedly diplomatic and less dire approach to counterproliferation with respect to North Korea and Iran. On this political level as well, American and European approaches to WMD problems have become more compatible.23 On balance, Libya’s recent renunciation of WMD should reinforce rather than hinder this convergence. Some in the Pentagon may be inclined to view the tacit threat of coercive regime-change rendered credible by Iraq as a key determinant of Libya’s decision. But pre-emption against North Korea would be prohibitively risky from a strictly military point of view given its artillery threat to Seoul, its regional ballistic missile threat and its probable nuclear capability. Pre-emption against Iran is politically unattractive because, despite disingenuous justifications and outright duplicity, its enrichment programme is street-legal and subject to IAEA inspection, and poses no imminent threat. And of course, US military overstretch is a factor. Furthermore, former US officials have persuasively argued that in fact a subtle blend of carrots and sticks modified Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi’s behaviour, and suggested that Libya probably would have abandoned its WMD programmes even in the absence of the Iraq intervention. Libya’s transformation began with the second Clinton administration’s measured law-and-order approach to Libya’s involvement in the Pan Am 103 bombing, and was nurtured by carrots dangled by the Bush administration before intervention in Iraq. These included quiet US and UK pledges to end UN sanctions if Tripoli changed its tune on Pan Am 103, and American indications that US sanctions could be dropped if Libya forswore support for terrorism and WMD programmes.24 DCI George Tenet’s recent unclassified Worldwide Threat Briefing supports this assessment.25 So despite the Bush administration’s instinctive preference for sticks over carrots, and its likely diplomatic role as ‘bad cop’ to Europe’s

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‘good cop’, it seems probable that Washington will opt for controlling North Korea and Iran’s nuclear ambitions through some combination of qualified military threats, inspection arrangements, economic incentives and security guarantees. Such an approach would broadly square with the ‘Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMD’ adopted in June 2003, emphasising the complementarity between diplomacy and the use of force as well as multilateral and bilateral coordination – especially with the United States. With respect to Syria, which has indicated that it will not give up its WMD programmes until Israel does, the United States will probably be less inclined to coordinate with Europe, but still likely to opt for diplomacy, albeit of the coercive variety. The most profound transatlantic theoretical differences with respect to counter-terrorism probably remain over homeland security, but the United States and Europe are closer in practice. In essence if not in name, Europe continues to approach terrorism as a risk-management problem to be handled with a threat-based security system, whereby specific emergent risks are assessed and minimised. That activity will, of course, always be important. But because intelligence warning is inherently ambiguous, the American plan, as noted, is to move away from a traditionally heavy reliance on threat assessment towards a system under which a replete range of capabilities are developed to plug as many conceivable vulnerabilities as possible.26 European governments, while they certainly accept the distinction between new and old terrorism, are still more inclined than Washington to view transnational Islamic terrorism as a continuation – if an extreme one – of the ideological and ethno-nationalist terrorist movements with which many European states have extensive experience. That experience also tilts them towards the view that even the most tenacious counter-terrorism authorities cannot always stop a determined terrorist.27 Both aspects of the European approach to counter-terrorism – which can be broadly described as threat-based and intelligence-driven – are somewhat at odds with the American vulnerability-based approach. At the same time, the security policies that the European philosophy has dictated – an intensified focus on civil defence, first-response and national resiliency, particularly in the United Kingdom – are quite consistent with American policies. Why? Because American invulnerability remains only an aspiration. Although the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was conceived as a mechanism for networking disparate security functions to minimise windows of vulnerability in the US homeland-security system, implementation has been fraught. In fact, so far the DHS appears to be largely a first-response agency, with very little independent preventive capacity. The desired synergies have not yet materialised. Thus, as of autumn 2004, the transatlantic difference in counter-terrorism philosophies had not had as large an impact as might be expected. Cooperation in uncovering and neutralising terrorists from Italy, France, Spain and the United Kingdom has been extremely energetic.28 The US

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government has also received help from European allies in implementing ‘forward’ measures such as point-of-origin cargo inspection, electronic truck and container tagging, automatic ship identification systems and strengthened port security. As of November 2002, under its Container Security Initiative the United States had secured permission from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to deploy specially trained US Customs Service officials at the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, Le Havre, Hamburg, Bremerhaven, Genoa and La Spezia to monitor shipping manifests and inspect cargo bound for the United States.29 Discussions were also underway between the United States and British authorities on similar arrangements. At a February 2002 meeting of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in London, the IMO and most of its 161 member states backed US proposals for automatic ship identification systems; security plans for ships; vulnerability assessments; and improving security checks on containers. But they would not support American plans for background checks and biometric devices for seafarers, and resisted a US initiative on internationally sharing information on the ultimate ownership of vessels. Counter-terrorism experience The ‘new terrorist’ threat now facing the United States and the ‘old terrorist’ threats that generally afflicted Europe constitute only a limited source of unity since the means of redressing them differ. While ‘international’ terrorist groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese group Hizbullah operated widely in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, their European activities were undertaken mainly to serve local objectives, did not seek to debilitate European governments, and did not globally disperse anywhere near the number of operatives that al-Qa’ida has done. Moreover, those groups, like the ethno-nationalist groups that have tended to plague Europe most, used violence with restraint to preserve a place at the negotiating table, or at least to constrain adversaries’ direct provocations, and to an extent could be politically tamed. By contrast, al-Qa’ida has no interest in bargaining and seeks to cripple the United States by inflicting mass casualties – potentially with WMD.30 European officials are, of course, aware of this distinction, and understand that al-Qa’ida’s ‘transnational’ threat is different in kind from that posed by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) as well as the PLO and Hizbullah.31 At the same time, European capitals’ approach to counter-terrorism in general is inevitably informed by their respective experiences with essentially old terrorist threats as opposed to new transnational ones.32 European governments and the EU remain somewhat more inclined than the United States to distinguish the political wings of terrorist organisations from their military elements; for instance, European countries froze the assets of Hamas’s political wing only in September 2003 – after years of pressure from the United States. Although the EU has expanded its

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official list of proscribed terrorist organisations to bring it more in line with the US State Department’s list, there remain conspicuous omissions.33 Generally, governments have not mobilised to the degree that the United States has done. As a result, while European governments are likely to remain responsive to American requests for assistance, the majority may not have the same level of counter-terrorist police power as US authorities. Before 11 September most European countries did not have counter-terrorism laws distinct from ordinary criminal codes. Some, such as the Netherlands, responded with specific plans of action or legislative reforms. Others, like Belgium, did not do so. In six European countries, statutory counter-terrorism regimes already in place to combat old terrorist threats arguably provided them with a structural headstart in countering transnational terrorism, and several have been strengthened by new anti-terrorist legislation or increased enforcement efforts.34 Spanish magistrates, seasoned by the longstanding Basque terrorism problem and equipped with tough counter-terrorism laws, have been among the most dogged pursuers of al-Qa’ida suspects. Germany has substantially increased funding for the federal border guard, the federal prosecutor’s office, and the intelligence agencies, and increased law-enforcement access to personal financial data. It has also authorised the prosecution of foreigners associated with foreign terrorist organisations based outside Germany and the deportation of those perpetrating political violence or otherwise threatening Germany’s ‘basic order of democratic freedom’. Italy has similarly broadened statutory authority for apprehending terrorists. These measures, however, could be viewed as largely remedial. Both Germany and Italy were plagued by bureaucratic inefficiencies and significant statutory gaps in their law-enforcement regimes. Prior to 11 September for instance, Germany had no provision outlawing foreign-based terrorist organisations and Italy did not authorise surveillance of those suspected of membership in such organisations. Perhaps due to concerns that its ‘special relationship’ with the United States would make it a more meaningful target to al-Qa’ida than other European countries, and the high degree of insularity and radicalisation in its Muslim populations, the United Kingdom has been exceptionally urgent in responding to 11 September. (So, to a lesser extent, has France, which has had extensive experience with Arab nationalist terrorism.) In December 2001, the UK parliament passed laws comparable in effect to the USA PATRIOT Act, including requirements that communications companies retain accessible records of calls made and e-mails sent (though not their contents), more rigorous recordkeeping requirements for transport companies, enhanced financial surveillance and restriction authorisation, provisions for greater inter-agency exchange of intelligence, and a controversial power of indefinite detention applicable to suspected international terrorists. In June 2002, a security and intelligence coordinator at permanent-secretary rank was appointed. Also in June, the government announced plans to form a 6,000-strong reaction force (to be

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drawn from the Territorial Army, a reserve body) to assist police and civil authorities in the event of a mass-casualty attack in Britain. (France’s Directorate of Territorial Security has about 1,500 employees.) In November 2002, Parliament passed legislation barring asylum-seekers from working and requiring them to be housed in isolated reception camps. Former UK Home Secretary David Blunkett has tightened asylum criteria and vested immigration officials with the authority to reject automatically asylum claims of those from countries determined to be safe. Finally, the Metropolitan Police Service, in cooperation with the FBI, has moved aggressively against UK residents suspected of helping al-Qa’ida prepare or recruit for terrorist operations.35 Political and social divergences Transatlantic philosophical and political divergences could, but need not, affect counter-terrorism cooperation. European philosophical biases in favour of social democracy and against the use of force are admittedly at odds with the United States’ faith in the social equitableness of free markets and its greater preference for military solutions to strategic problems. European governments are unlikely to make large strides in closing the gap between US and European military capabilities and, to an extent, will continue to ‘free ride’ on US military power. There remain some transatlantic disagreements over what indirect political efforts would work best to outflank al-Qa’ida and thwart ‘rogue states’. The Bush administration regarded forcible regime-change in Iraq as a catalyst for a major realignment in the Gulf that would enable the United States to withdraw its military presence from Saudi Arabia and thus remove one of bin Laden’s grievances. Most European powers considered such a move risky, and leaned towards containment of Saddam Hussein with arms inspections. Both sides agree that reducing the level of Israeli– Palestinian violence would eliminate a source of anti-American inspiration to young Muslims, but European capitals hold that the United States should exert more pressure than it has on Israel to participate in dialogue with the Palestinians. On the other hand, President Bush appeared to allay European fears prompted by the ‘axis of evil’ line of his 29 January State of the Union message that he contemplated pre-emptive military action against Iran and North Korea. At this stage, there also seems to be little daylight between European and American views on foreign assistance, as both countenance stepping up foreign aid to Muslim states with an eye towards encouraging democratisation and economic liberalisation, both of which could diminish the discontentment among general populations that fuels radicalism.36 In sum, transatlantic social and political differences are proving manageable if persistent. Consequently, they are not likely to affect non-military counter-terrorism cooperation adversely.37 It is possible, in fact, that European leaders could view lawenforcement and intelligence cooperation and firming up territorial defences as political means of diminishing American pressures on them in some areas, such

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as military spending, and of increasing their power of persuasion in others, such as Iraq and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Transatlantic convergence? What appears at times to be the disinclination of European governments to confront matters such as immigration, border security and mass-casualty attacks full-bloodedly is cause for legitimate concern, and if unremedied could impair the transatlantic relationship. But since 11 September, despite being unable quickly to realise aspirations of wholesale invulnerability, US government efforts have made the American homeland less vulnerable to terrorist attack. Thus, terrorists have made Europeans – the United States’ cultural cousins and political allies – prime targets of opportunity. The Madrid bombing is only the most vivid example. The massive terrorist bombing in Bali in October 2002 killed over 180 mainly western, Christian tourists, and 11 of the 14 killed in the suicide car-bomb attack in Karachi in May 2002 were French submarine engineers. They suggested that terrorists were cherry-picking soft European targets. Bin Laden’s taped warning of November 2002 – which specifically named France, Germany, Italy and the UK as well as Canada and Australia as potential secondary targets – added weight to this inference. In March 2004, capitalising on a threat to Europe rendered all the more credible by Madrid, bin Laden offered European nations a ‘truce’ in exchange for their withdrawing support for US military initiatives in Muslim countries. Not even the most capitulatory European government was likely to accept, so the threat remained salient. But bin Laden probably intended primarily to increase psychological pressure on European governments not to align themselves too closely with US strategic objectives. The danger was that any such policy tilt could ripen into a kind of ‘sanctuary doctrine’, whereby a European government would implicitly forego robust counter-terrorism enforcement in exchange for the terrorists’ exclusion of the country from its target list. This possibility only raised the premium for effective hard counter-terrorism, which would insulate European governments against al-Qa’ida’s attempts at blackmail. In this light, transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation not only will continue to be indispensable, but is, for Europeans, now more acutely a matter of self-protection and foreign-policy independence. To more concretely advance transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation, European governments and the United States might initiate a pilot programme whereby a secure computer network for exchanging unclassified intelligence analyses (as opposed to classified raw data) among national agencies was established and information shared on a trial basis. If the exchange appeared to enhance the intelligence and law-enforcement capabilities of each of the agencies involved, the facility could be institutionalised.38

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One way in which European governments and institutions could make significant improvements in territorial security while maintaining the flow of commerce would be to increase public–private cooperation to levels comparable to those now being approached in the United States.39 In April 2002, for example, seven large companies – Ford Motor Co., General Motors Co., Daimler Chrysler AG, BP America, Motorola Inc., Sara Lee Corp. and Target Corp. – initiated a charter risk-management programme, the Customs–Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), whereby company shipments over the US–Canadian border are voluntarily subject to government-approved security procedures and supply data is provided in advance to the US Customs Service by computer in exchange for expedited ‘fast track’ treatment, aided by electronic transponders, for company trucks at the border.40 But this regime also requires that company truck drivers submit to government security background checks. Some European businesses have resisted government intrusions on the privacy of their employees, even when they are premised on counter-terrorism.41 More broadly, the EU, with the support of many European telecommunications companies, resisted an American request to increase the period under the EU Directive on Data Protection for Digital Communications during which companies must retain data to permit law-enforcement agencies to comb log files in counter-terrorism investigations, accepting retention for only a ‘limited period’.42 The United States generally regarded Europe’s data-protection standards as a serious limitation on counter-terrorism cooperation that needs to be specifically addressed.43 In December 2003, however, after protracted disagreement about how much personal data on passengers EU jurisdictions should permit airlines to furnish to American agencies, the European commission agreed to authorise US access to 34 categories of information, while the United States agreed to shorten the required duration of data storage from 50 to three-and-a-half years, to an annual joint review of the data-sharing arrangement, and to EU authorities’ right to lodge complaints on behalf of EU citizens. Washington still prefers a broader definition than Brussels of ‘serious crime’ for which data can be used by law enforcement, and wants to use information in 60 categories instead of just 34. The EU is also resisting US pressure to mandate armed sky marshals on flights originating from Europe. But the data-protection agreement did reflect a spirit of cooperation and compromise. While 11 September did not immediately weaken the ‘political correctness’ barriers to the political mainstreams confronting the need for tighter immigration laws as it did in the United States, the recent political tilt by European voters towards the far right may eventually dislodge those barriers and open space for more rigorous territorial security on both the national and regional level.44 The EU summit in Seville that followed the Luxembourg conference in June yielded little substantive progress on the headline issue of immigration, and, while approving an EU-wide border patrol, contemplated

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that it would not be operational until 2007. But EU leaders did agree in principle to convene regular meetings of national police chiefs on immigration, to undertake joint border enforcement operations, and to harmonise asylum requirements to discourage refugees from ‘shopping around’ for maximum benefits.45 Robust measures in these areas would improve European governments’ collective capacity to monitor migration and keep tabs on terrorists. French and German authorities’ agreement in November 2002 to provide the United States with the requested information on Moussaoui on condition that it not be used as evidence in support of a death sentence also demonstrated a conciliatory European disposition on values-gap issues – at least as they relate to counter-terrorism. More broadly, the flatness, pragmatism and transnational ubiquity of the al-Qa’ida network means that the operational distinction between international and domestic terrorism is fast becoming more obscure. Evidence has emerged that al-Qa’ida has tried to join forces with more traditional terrorist organisations such as Hamas and Hizbullah, whose modus operandi more closely resembles that of European terrorist groups.46 Consequently, the United States may have a few things to learn from European governments with more experience in fighting local terrorist groups, just as those governments have something to learn from the United States about the exigent nature of transnational threats.47

The bigger picture The increased saliency of terrorism in South East Asia signalled by the Bali bombing, which appears to have been planned in Thailand, and the attacks in Kenya, refocused broader international efforts to combat terrorism. The Bali bomb targeted western, Christian tourists without regard to specific nationality. The victims included predominantly Australians, but also Europeans from several countries and Americans. Thus, the operation drove home the point that comprehensive counter-terrorism requires of Europe as well as the United States a ‘forward’ intelligence and law-enforcement presence. The Kenya operation targeted Israelis. At the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum summit held in Mexico shortly after the Bali attack, APEC leaders noted progress in tightening controls on terrorist financing, increasing sub-regional and regional intelligence sharing and law-enforcement cooperation, stepping up anti-piracy efforts, and improving port, airport and aviation security, and vowed to do substantially more on each front as well as on cyber-security. They also set the goal of building and funding institutional counter-terrorism capacity, which is especially deficient in places like Indonesia and the Philippines, whose geographical characteristics pose territorial security challenges that compound the problem of inadequate computer and surveillance equipment.

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On the bilateral level, the United States won permission from Malaysia to open a regional counter-terrorism training centre in Kuala Lumpur in 2003. In a similar vein, the EU indicated that a high-level troika (representing the European Commission, the Danish Presidency and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy) would visit Indonesia to build on regular contacts at expert level and to identify projects for improving counter-terrorism and financial-surveillance capacity. The EU also pledged to accelerate aid to Indonesia for border monitoring, and to intensify counterterrorism contacts with Australia, a regional power with close cultural and political ties to Europe and the United States. Australia, in turn, moved quickly to establish a permanent intelligence liaison office in Jakarta and, in a flurry of diplomacy, secured memoranda of agreement from Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines providing for greater Australian involvement in counter-terrorism operations and investigations in those countries. In the aftermath of Bali, the Australian Federal Police worked closely with Indonesian police to identify the terrorists involved and establish evidence that could be used to bring about convictions. In February 2004, Canberra announced the opening of the Indonesia Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (ICLEC), to which Australia pledged A$35 million over five years. Scheduled to begin operations by the end of 2004, the ICLEC is mandated both to provide operational support for counter-terrorist activities and to build regional counter-terrorism capacity through training and professional guidance. The Kenya operation similarly focused American and European attention on enhancing bilateral counter-terrorism links with sub-Saharan African authorities. These are sensible steps that might also inspire additional cooperative measures between Washington and European capitals that could further improve global security. For instance, American, European and Australian intelligence services might leverage the heightened regional capabilities and points of access that Bali has prompted by developing better modes of sharing information. Europol might also establish formal liaisons with South East Asian and Australian law-enforcement agencies, whereby officers are exchanged, as it has with the FBI. Were it to do so, Europol would potentially improve its forward counter-terrorism capability by expanding the geographical range of its assessments and analyses of distant and prospective terrorist threats. Furthermore, Europol’s increasing its liaison relationships could eventually enable it to function as a clearinghouse for European, South East Asian, Australian and American polished intelligence. Yet the reality remains that any measures aimed mainly at advancing counter-terrorist enforcement and prevention capabilities do not address the organic causes of terrorism in the region. Similarly, military cooperation and assistance, such as that provided by the United States to the Philippines, can be effective, but have a limited counter-terrorism trajectory, and if excessive can inspire rather than discourage grassroots anti-western radicalisation.

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Accordingly, the APEC leaders recognised that ‘as we accelerate our progress against terrorism, APEC economies must also move to meet the challenge of encouraging global economic growth and bringing the benefits of global markets to all our peoples’ and ‘grow our economies even as we protect our borders’. The EU, for its part, stressed assistance to Indonesia for strengthening good governance and the rule of law, an agenda that is underwritten by the €216 m in aid announced in June 2002 as part of a five-year cooperation programme. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which have large programmes in Indonesia, said that they would adjust expectations as to its hitting reform targets in light of the economic effects of the Bali bombing. These signals indicate some comprehension of the depth and complexity of the transnational terrorism problem. Although the American inclination to use force and the European preference for diplomacy have produced substantial transatlantic frictions over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Iraq, these biases are based on substantive strengths that could be complementary if appropriately coordinated. Western and regional governments do need to attend urgently to immediate ‘hard’ counter-terrorism concerns such as law-enforcement and intelligence cooperation. Ultimately, to defeat a resilient, religiously-motivated adversary, they must also look beyond them and continue supporting gradual political and economic reform, paying especially close attention to cushioning the impact of protracted deprivation on those ordinary citizens who provide the mass base for Islamic political groups and militias. This is a politically delicate and fraught process. For example, the IMF and the World Bank – among the most important instruments of western economic diplomacy – are resentfully perceived by many nationalists as impinging on Indonesian sovereignty and imposing short-term economic stresses. With the United States, the EU, the Bretton Woods institutions and other bilateral and multilateral donors rhetorically and materially committed to the goal of countering terrorism via economic and political reform, it is not easy to determine, in programmatic terms, what more can be done. One possibility would be to coordinate their economic efforts through a more formalised consultative process, perhaps taking a cue from the multilateral coordinative efforts made in post-conflict situations, to facilitate the efficient allocation of resources and the exchange of ideas about political as well as technical matters. Should the United States’ Greater Middle East Initiative gather steam, and attract European support, there would be scope for this kind of arrangement. Another important dimension of longer-term counterterrorism is greater diplomatic attention to resolving ongoing conflicts which, if left in a political vacuum, would almost inevitably widen al-Qa’ida’s array of potential recruits. These include pre-eminently the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Kashmir problem. Despite some differences in American and European approaches and threat perceptions, mutual recognition of potential transatlantic synergies will

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probably drive both the regular case-by-case exchange of intelligence and coordination of law-enforcement efforts, and, longer-term, the evolution of lasting institutional relationships that help harmonise European and US counter-terrorism policies. Among the politically and practically supportable measures that United States and European governments might undertake jointly or separately in the near term are the following: • harmonising European border-security and visa standards, so that a single data source – perhaps linked to analogous US databases – provides a clearer picture to intelligence and law-enforcement agencies of who is going where. This would require, among other things, permitting law-enforcement and intelligence agencies access to Eurodac data; • deeper public–private partnerships for more effective risk management in European countries; • expedited and universal implementation of the EU-wide arrest warrant; • establishing a pilot programme involving a secure computer network for exchanging unclassified intelligence analyses among American and European national law-enforcement and intelligence agencies; • revisiting with greater resolve the issues of immigration policy, border security within the EU and harmonisation of European asylum requirements in high-level EU forums; • with the impetus of the Madrid bombing, developing better modes of sharing intelligence among European agencies; • better, and perhaps more formally, coordinating American and European economic and diplomatic efforts to indirectly thwart transnational radical Islamic terrorism through economic development and conflict resolution.

Notes and references 1. See generally Paul Geitner, ‘Sept. 11 sways Europe terror stance’, AP Online, 17 August 2002. 2. At least in the US view, of course, there remains a significant role for precise, leadingedge military counter-terrorism applications, such as the CIA-launched missile strike from a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle against six al-Qa’ida operatives in Yemen in November 2002. 3. See, for example, Gordon Corera, ‘How militant Islam found a home in London’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2002, 15–19. 4. Although Muslims in Europe far outnumber those in the United States, six months after the 11 September attacks the number of related arrests made in the United States exceeded arrests in Europe by a factor of roughly five. See Josh Meyer, Eric Lichtblau and Bob Drogin, ‘Gains and gaps in Sept. 11 inquiry’, Los Angeles Times, 10 March 2002, A1. Nevertheless, European authorities appear to have had a greater degree of success in connecting those arrested to al-Qa’ida and convicting them.

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5. The other areas are police and judicial cooperation; emergency preparedness; economic and financial measures; reconstruction of Afghanistan; humanitarian aid; and the diplomatic front. On the relative positions of Europe and the United States on the aviation-security learning curve, see Elizabeth Neuffer and Kevin Cullen, ‘Airport security: learning from Europe’, Boston Globe, 14 October 2001, D1. 6. Most European capitals and certainly the EU seem reluctant to use the term ‘homeland security’ in that it connotes national borders that cut against Europe’s supranational tilt. 7. European Commission News Release: Memo/02/122, 3 June 2002. 8. Observed one journalist: ‘The EU members states say it is not worth sharing information with Europol because it is ineffective; Europol says it is ineffective because it is not given information’, Judy Dempsey, ‘Europol labours to forge bonds among EU’s crimefighters’, Financial Times, 28 February 2002. 9. Axel Krause, ‘Europol: a European FBI?,’ Europe, February 2002, S1. 10. See, for example, Charles M. Sennott, ‘Wide dragnet splinters al-Qa’ida’, Boston Globe, 21 June 2002, A20. 11. See, for example, Peter Finn, ‘Europe warns of attacks’, Washington Post, 15 November 2002, A1. 12. See, for instance, Jim Hoagland, ‘A new disconnect with Europe’, Washington Post, 14 April 2002, B7. 13. See Susan Bell, ‘Britain in row with France as bomb terrorism trial opens’, The Scotsman, 2 October 2002, 13. 14. See Paul Taylor, ‘EU action on migration faces stiff opposition’, Reuters, 13 June 2002. 15. Karl Cushing, ‘Security concerns at immigration database launch’, Computer Weekly, 23 January 2003, 14; Rachel Fielding, ‘System will simplify asylum process’, Computing, 30 January 2003, 20. 16. Some European civil-liberties activists found even this safeguard unsatisfactory. See, for example, ‘Asylum-seekers set to face fingerprint rule across EU’, EIU ViewsWire, 17 January 2003. 17. See generally ‘Transnational control of money-laundering’, Strategic Survey 2001/2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2002), 53–69. 18. See Olivier Roy, ‘EuroIslam: the jihad within?’, The National Interest, 71, (Spring 2003), 63–73. 19. See, for example, IISS, ‘Transatlantic threat perceptions’, Strategic Comments, 8:4 (May 2002). In June, a secret report emerging from a meeting of EU interior ministers in Luxembourg was leaked to the Spanish newspaper El Pais. The report indicated that while the al-Qa’ida threat in Europe was high, it had become less acute due to the heightened counter-terrorism alert after 11 September and in any event imperilled mainly American assets. See ‘Threat of Islamic terrorism high: EU report’, Agence France-Presse, 20 June 2002. As of November 2002, European governments appeared to perceive a broader and more acute al-Qa’ida threat to Europe. 20. See Erik van der Linde, et al., Quick Scan of Post-9/11 National Counter-terrorism Policymaking and Implementation in Selected European Countries, Research Project for the Netherlands Ministry of Justice, RAND Europe, May 2002, pp. 6, 27–9. 21. ‘National strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction’, National Security Presidential Directive 17, 17 September 2002 (unclassified version released December 2002). 22. Some Americans, of course, disagree. For example, Robert Kagan, ‘America’s crisis of legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, 83:2 (March/April 2004), 69. 23. Some prominent European commentators recognised a need for European governments to take the threat more seriously after 9/11. For example, Thérèse Delpech,

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27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

32. 33.

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‘International terrorism and Europe’, Chaillot Paper no. 56, Institute for Security Studies (December 2002), p. 31. See also ‘Non-proliferation in the 21st century: a transatlantic agenda’, Draft General Report, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 22 September 2003. Other European analysts, however, have seemed self-consciously unalarmed. See, for example, Harald Müller, ‘Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat assessment’, Chaillot Paper no. 56, Institute for Security Studies, (March 2003), 70–2. See, for example, Flynt Leverett, ‘Why Libya gave up on the bomb’, New York Times, 23 January 2004. DCI’s Worldwide Threat Briefing, ‘The worldwide threat 2004: challenges in a changing global context’, 24 February 2004, pp. 11–12. For a prime example of the kind of expansive thinking required to determine the range of threats that need to be anticipated, see Dennis M. Gormley, ‘Enriching expectations: September 11’s lessons for missile defence’, Survival, 44:2 (Summer 2002), 19–35. See generally Jonathan Stevenson, ‘How Europe and America defend themselves’, Foreign Affairs, 82:2 (March/April 2003), 75–90. The Greek authorities’ successes in apprehending members of the hitherto elusive ‘17 November’ Organization and seizing its weapons, while not necessarily indicative of Greek effectiveness against transnational threats, were facilitated partly by US and UK pressure and counter-terrorism training and assistance. Eventually US customs officials plan to extend this system to 20 ports worldwide that account for 70 per cent of the 5.7 million containers shipped annually by sea to the United States. In November 2002, like arrangements were in place in Canada (the US’ largest trading partner) at the ports of Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver, and Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore had formally agreed to such arrangements while China had agreed in principle. Immediately after 11 September the US Customs Service was capable of inspecting only 2 per cent of the containers coming into the United States; as of July 2002, the Service was checking at least 15 per cent of the incoming cargo. ‘Customs cargo inspections boosted to 15 per cent’, National Infrastructure Protection Center Daily Report, 3 July 2002. The seminal article on this distinction is Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, ‘America and the new terrorism’, Survival, 42:1 (Spring 2000), 59–75. In 1999, 30.5 per cent of MI5’s £140 million budget was devoted to the Northern Irish terrorist threat, compared to 22.5 per cent to international terrorist threats. British analysts have concluded that the UK’s security services neglected the threat from al-Qa’ida due to their preoccupation with Northern Irish terrorism. For example, Fraser Nelson, ‘MI5 accused of ignoring al-Qa’ida’, The Scotsman, 20 June 2002, 20. Similarly, German counter-terrorism authorities were focused on neo-Nazi, rather than Islamic, threats. Douglas Frantz and Desmond Butler, ‘The 9/11 inquest: did Germans bungle?’, New York Times, 11 July 2002, A1. There remains a significant risk, of course, that ‘old’ terrorist groups, particularly Islamic ones, confronting dim political prospects will find advantages in forging various types of relationships with al-Qa’ida. See, for example, Jonathan Stevenson, ‘Pragmatic counter-terrorism’, Survival, 43:4 (Winter 2001), 37–8. For a pre-11 September view on this difference, see Bruce Hoffman, ‘Is Europe soft on terrorism?’, Foreign Policy, 115 (Summer 1999), 62–76. EU member states remain free to compose their own official lists of prohibited terrorist organizations, and some (for example, the United Kingdom) have lists that are more inclusive than the EU’s.

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34. Erik van der Linde, et al., Quick Scan of Post-9/11. 35. British authorities have charged Yasser al-Siri for conspiracy to murder in connection with the assassination of Northern Alliance leader General Ahmed Shah Massoud in Afghanistan, Sulayman Balal Zainulabidin for providing terrorist training, and Sheik Abdullah el-Faisal with incitement to murder. They have also indefinitely detained Abu Qatada, a cleric and suspected al-Qa’ida financier and operative, but then released Abu Qatada in March 2005, subject to monitoring. 36. Europeans do, however, have anxieties about apparent US plans to bypass states in favour of directly assisting civil-society stakeholders under the ‘Greater Middle East initiative’, but Washington is likely to adjust those plans. See IISS ‘The greater Middle East initiative’, Strategic Comments, 10:2 (March 2004). 37. One of the most acute ‘value gap’ issues is US–European disagreement about the death penalty, and it has some relevance to law-enforcement cooperation, as demonstrated by French and German threats of judicial non-cooperation due to prospective US imposition of the death penalty in the Moussaoui case. But in practical terms, if the United States judges a form of cooperation that a European capital threatens to withhold as overridingly important, it retains the option of waiving the death penalty. Conversely, European authorities can extend substantive cooperation to US authorities (for example, by sharing intelligence or permitting interrogation) without extraditing suspects who might be subject to capital punishment. 38. This idea belongs to Dennis Gormley, an influential American defence and intelligence analyst. See Dennis M. Gormley and Douglas M. Hart, ‘Extending network centric warfare to crisis management and assessment’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 145:2 (April 2000). 39. The tendency in Europe seems to be for private industry to look to government for help in managing the risks of terrorism, rather than vice versa. Commenting on the formation of a new insurer to underwrite terrorism insurance, one European insurance executive said: ‘In this huge new situation, industry cannot cover everything alone. There has to be some government role. The potential losses are incalculable. But this shows that private industry can do something.’ ‘Insurers create European terrorism underwriter’, Best’s Insurance News, 4 April 2002. 40. See, for example, Gary Fields, ‘Customs unveils security moves’, Wall Street Journal, 16 April 2002, A4. By August 2002, nearly 400 US companies had enrolled in CTPAT. ‘Increased container, border security remain tops on customs agenda’, HazMat Transport News, 1 September 2002. 41. In Germany, for example, as of August 2002 only 212 of about 4,000 companies agreed to hand over personnel records that the government sought to check against profiles of the 11 September hijackers. See Ian Johnson and David Crawford, ‘Corporate defiance: Germany’s hunt for terrorists hits unlikely obstacle’, Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2002, A1. 42. Daniel Dombey, ‘EU deal agreed on Internet privacy’, Financial Times, 31 May 2002, 6. 43. See Raf Casert, ‘Ashcroft, EU counterparts seek closer cooperation in battle against terrorism’, Associated Press, 11 September 2002. 44. For an argument that US policy on legal immigration must in fact become broadly rather than selectively tighter to accommodate liberal principles, see Mark Krikorian, ‘Get tight’, National Review, 25 March 2002, 40–1. 45. See, for example, Steven Erlanger, ‘Europeans move cautiously on illegal immigration issue’, New York Times, 23 June 2002, 6.

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46. See Dana Priest and Douglas Farah, ‘Terror alliance has U.S. worried’, Washington Post, 30 June 2002, A1. 47. For instance, the US, which has been burdened by rivalries among security agencies, could glean valuable pointers on inter-agency counter-terrorism coordination from both France and the United Kingdom that could prove useful in bureaucratically configuring the Department of Homeland Security. Marc Champion, ‘On issues of security, U.S. needs lessons’, Wall Street Journal Europe, 12 June 2002, A2. See also Hoffman, ‘Is Europe soft on terrorism?’, 73–5.

11 Military Reforms: Closing the Capability Gap Timothy Garden

European security concerns While EU member states have not suffered a terrorist outrage as large as the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, they are all fully aware that they are also targets. The 191 deaths from Islamic extremist-linked attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 demonstrated that all European states are at risk. The attacks in November 2003 on UK commercial and diplomatic facilities in Turkey reminded Europe that these threats are international in nature. For over 50 years, most western European states have depended on collective security through NATO. Facing a potential armed threat from the Soviet Union, they shared their defence requirements, and drew heavily on US resources. In the new world of international terrorism, NATO is less well-suited to providing defence from the threat. Yet there is a natural desire to try to adapt the Alliance to provide the capabilities to take on the new challenges. At the same time Europe has continued to move towards economic and political integration. The final piece in this move is the vision of a common foreign and security policy for Europe. There is much to be done, but the new terrorist threat, and a divergence from strategic thinking in the United States, may give added impetus to European Defence Policy. The member states agreed1 in 2003 on the nature of the new security challenges. They would need to give priority to addressing the threats from international terrorism, proliferation, failing states and from international crime. This would mean that all the diplomatic, economic and military levers of power would need to be provided. In parallel, the European members of NATO had agreed at Prague in December 2002 that a range of new capabilities, including those of a modern deployable military force, were needed to meet the new threats. It is not yet clear whether the political will exists throughout the EU to fulfil these potentially expensive promises. Much may depend on how the transatlantic relationship develops, and whether NATO can rise to the current difficulties. 232

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The nature of US power US foreign policy is about promoting the interests of the United States; but this is true for most states. Yet those US interests are served by having growing economies in peaceful societies with which to trade. Nevertheless, there is mounting concern that this rich, commercial, high technology, well-armed superpower is minded to take ever less notice of the views of other states or the constraints of the international system. The litany of issues that are dividing Bush’s America from the rest of the world is growing longer. They include tariffs on steel, subsidies to farms, lack of interest in arms control and environmental controls, coupled with antipathy to the International Criminal Court. The lack of objectivity over Israel is another source of concern to Europeans, as is the apparent unwillingness of the Bush Administration to use the international system. US power is based on a number of inter-related elements. The internal factors include the strong economy, a lack of focused internal dissent and perhaps a unique culture of national certainty and pride. The external factors include a long history of lack of threats from near neighbours, the lack of any other global power of equal capability, and a military machine that surpasses all other nations. The scale of defence spending and investment in new military technology is truly astonishing under the circumstances of overwhelming superiority. That is not to say that the US military is exempt from the difficulties of fast rising defence costs that other states suffer from. It has personnel retention, infrastructure and equipment replacement problems, and these can be exacerbated by the focus on high technology future systems at the expense of maintaining current operational capabilities. But that said, for all the inefficiencies of military programmes, the United States stands in a different league of military capability from any other state. The increase in US defence spending 2 over the coming years will drive the military technology development at an even faster pace. The moves towards ‘transformational capabilities’3 will shape US forces in novel ways. Before 11 September 2001, the United States believed that its only large-scale vulnerability on its own territory came from the strategic nuclear capabilities of Russia and China, and potentially in the future from proliferating states of concern. These could be addressed by closer cooperation and arms control in the case of Russia, and by the use of technology to provide defensive systems in the case of the proliferating states and China. Since the end of the cold war, the United States has flexed its military muscle in a number of areas. Over the last decade of the twentieth century, it was able to develop a new perspective on the application of military power: one that was driven by technology. The Gulf War saw the United States in the lead of a large coalition, operating with the full backing of the United Nations, to free Kuwait after invasion by Iraq. The shadows of the Vietnam War were finally laid to rest as the United States demonstrated that its

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investment in aerospace technology could produce a new way of fighting wars. The remorseless prolonged air campaign meant that the ground operation could be completed with virtually no casualties to the Allied forces. The theories of generations of air power enthusiasts seemed at last to have been proved. Yet at the time there was no certainty of such a cost free operation. Subsequent experience in Somalia showed that it was still possible for US military might to be thwarted by an unsophisticated enemy. The casualty-free experience of the Gulf War had set new political standards for the way US military operations were to be conducted in operations that were not about defence of the homeland. Precision air power was seen by some to have been the key enabler for the Dayton agreement in Bosnia. In Kosovo, the doctrine had advanced to a stage where the use of ground force in hostile territory was discounted by President Clinton from the start of operations. Each campaign reinforced the message that air power, space systems and precision attack could allow the United States to intervene, change governments, right wrongs and celebrate the American way without risking GI lives. At the same time this focus on technology has widened the military capability gap between the United States and the rest of the world, which has had a profound effect on the practicality of Alliance operations. The French Air Force found itself isolated in the Gulf War because of it being years away from NATO interoperability standards. A decade later, few Allies were invited to join the offensive operations in the air over Afghanistan, because even the most ardent NATO allies were failing to keep abreast of the technical standards needed to operate with the new US systems. Allies are more about political and overflight or basing support these days than about making a real military contribution to any operation which the United States leads. And if the United States is not in the lead, it loses interest rapidly. While post-conflict operations have been the big activity for European states and others over the last decade, US forces have been reluctant participants, and some would say not too effective either. The nature and tactics of warfare have changed for the United States; but its allies have been slow to accommodate to these changes.

The growth of the EU as a regional power The European Union has also changed in the decade since the end of the cold war. Europe was the region directly affected by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact. It had lived with a very real and urgent threat of the ultimately destructive war being fought across its territory, and that threat disappeared faster than could ever have been imagined. The process of integration continued, especially with the work towards monetary union. The 15 EU states – expanded to 25 in May 2004 – found themselves at peace with each other, growing more prosperous. The

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EU already matches the United States in terms of GDP, and will draw ahead as it enlarges. It is already more populous. EU members have learned a number of lessons during the decade of the 1990s. Europe suddenly felt safer than it had in living memory. Defence budgets fell as the worries of the cold war were forgotten. Most operational combat forces fell by between 30 and 40 per cent. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, took the opportunity to reshape their armed forces towards their interpretation of future needs. Others, like Germany, were slower to restructure. Germany had discovered the time and cost that it took to carry out the reunification process. To an extent it still bears the financial burden of its generous arrangement. This has given it a defence squeeze from two different directions: lack of money and inappropriate military structures. Yet Europe was also discovering that it could operate in some aspects as a regional power. Trade negotiations were much more effective when conducted at the EU level than by individual states. The EU could restrain unfair practices from any part of the world, and most particularly could face down the United States in trade disputes when necessary. But the EU was still missing the essential qualification to be regarded as a serious global power comparable to the United States. Foreign and security policy remained largely national activities, and if Europe was threatened directly, then NATO was still the forum to turn to. Coping with the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia was also not a success story for the EU as a coherent security organisation. Here was a part of Europe that was to cause difficulties for all EU member states as it broke up. Yet the United States was needed to drive through an enforceable settlement in Bosnia. The United States provided the major warfare contribution to NATO’s operation in Kosovo, and NATO remained in the lead, at least initially, as Macedonia subsequently faced instability.

The EU defence capability The European Union found itself with important regional interests in its backyard, but without the diplomatic and military cohesion and strength to solve the thorny problems of the region. A year after the election of a Labour government in the United Kingdom in 1997, important policy developments in Britain were initiated, which were able to advance progress on developing EU diplomatic and military power. Previously, the United Kingdom had been unhelpful to any moves towards greater cooperation on security policy by EU states. It was feared that this would undermine NATO, and perhaps lead to a disengagement by the United States in the longer term. The Anglo-French summit at St Malo in late 1998 changed this obstructive agenda. The process over the following months led to a more enthusiastic and practical approach to European Defence Policy. The EU states agreed at Helsinki to work towards specific goals to bring together military capabilities

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for specific operations, other than the NATO task of territorial defence. These ‘Petersberg Tasks’ might involve humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peace enforcement or conflict prevention. The capability for Europe was sized to be up to 60,000 troops available to be deployed in under two months and sustainable for 12 months, with all the necessary air and sea power support. The work on developing this modest military capability for the European Union is very important. At the 2000 Commitments Conference, EU members indicated what forces they were prepared to make available at the required notice for European Union authorised operations. The absolute numbers offered were impressive – 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships – but the packages were complex. From the United Kingdom, the army would provide either an Armoured or Mechanised brigade, each of which could be sustained for at least a year; or an Air Assault brigade, which could be deployed for up to six months. Combat Support enabling capabilities such as Artillery, and Short Range Air Defence, and Attack Helicopters could be deployed in addition. The Navy has committed an aircraft carrier, two nuclear powered submarines, four destroyers/frigates, support vessels; and an amphibious task group, including one helicopter landing platform and an amphibious brigade. The aircraft carrier, helicopter landing platform and submarines could not necessarily be sustained continuously for a whole year. In the air, the United Kingdom has offered up to 72 combat aircraft (including Sea Harriers, which are now to be phased out under national plans), with associated support aircraft including strategic transport. This number would be available for six months to cover initial theatre entry. For a longer-term commitment the total would reduce. As can be seen, the offer has constraints on time that may not fully meet the Helsinki requirement, and other states will need to be able to fill the gaps. As time passes, some of the promises cannot be fulfilled because of reductions in national force structures. As the work has continued, it has become clear that gaps remain in major enabling capabilities, which had already been identified in NATO work under the Defence Capabilities Initiative.4 The list of these deficiencies is long. They include such elements as the necessary air and sea transport to deploy European forces with their equipment. There is insufficient air-to-air refuelling support for all the military aircraft that might be deployed on operations. While the cold war has left us with many air defence fighters, procured against the threat of Soviet bombers, Europe lacks the precision all-weather offensive capabilities that we have become used to in US operations. Reconnaissance and Intelligence capabilities both at the strategic and the tactical level are fragmented between nations even when they exist. Few Europeans can plug directly into the operational data sources which US forces are beginning to take for granted in any military operation at any level. Deployable command and control capabilities are essential these days, and must be able to link back to the operational headquarters, which may be on

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the other side of the world. If the use of air power is to be the preferred initial phase for any conflict, the ability to suppress enemy air defences is crucial; and is another missing piece in the jigsaw of European capabilities. Even secure interoperable communications are less than universal. At the Prague Summit of November 2002, NATO streamlined the list of 59 weaknesses to a handful, in the hope that members would at least address the most important. A similar exercise in the Helsinki Headline Goals process has tried to put pressure on EU members to fill these gaps. The approaches are still fragmented. The lack of strategic air transport has been turned into a question of European joint procurement rather than one of European joint capability. The funding for the A400M strategic air transport project becomes the test of how strong a state supports European defence. Yet the capability is needed now, not at some indeterminate time in the future. It is a low technology requirement which could be filled by a range of solutions available on the market today. Nevertheless, the question that remained was how appropriate the new NATO transformation was for countering the growing threat from terrorism?

What can Europe do? EU member states have agreed that they want to provide a serious military capability to support their common foreign and security policy. European members of NATO have agreed to address a range of shortcomings which have a 70 per cent overlap5 with EU needs. Europe needs to be able to work with the United States in the security field; and Europe also needs to be able to look after its own interests when they do not align with those of the United States. The institutions are developing within the European Union to manage these aspirations, and the EU Convention made a start to address some of the institutional barriers to a coherent security policy. Unfortunately, the complex politics of the 2003 Intergovernmental Conference meant that no final agreement of a new Constitution for the European Union was agreed. The good work in Justice and Home Affairs that followed 11 September has shown that sovereignty issues can be overcome when there is a pressing need. The question still to be answered is how do we make some move on the capabilities issue? National defence budgets are overstretched everywhere in Europe, and problems have sharpened since 11 September as new urgent priorities for security spending have been added. Even in the United Kingdom, the signs of British military decline continue as capability after capability is phased out early. Despite some respite from cuts in real terms in the defence budget, the New Chapter to the SDR6 is likely to be another excuse for cutting defence capability. The normal cry from the defence specialist is that the Europeans must increase defence spending. It is true that the EU states in total are now spending less half the amount that the United States spends on defence. Yet when they

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were spending 60 per cent of US defence spending, at the time of the Kosovo campaign, they could provide less than 20 per cent of the effort for the air campaign. We get very poor value from European defence spending. Europe has 25 armies, 23 air forces and 20 navies, all with their own command structures, headquarters, logistics organisations, and training infrastructure. Some have similar equipment, others incompatible units. All have been in decline as the effect of fast rising personnel and equipment costs take their toll. Even though the total of EU defence budgets is less than half of that of the United States, EU member states continue to field 1.6 million people in uniform compared with 1.4 million US regular forces. EU states also maintain 2.6 million reservists,7 which is more than twice the number the United States feels that it needs. The European Union has far too many surplus military people, who as a result are even more ill-equipped than necessary. If this was a multinational business, the answer would be self-evident. Streamline the company so that the overheads for small non-viable branches could be covered by common services. Unless the Europeans start rationalising their military capabilities now, they will individually and progressively cease to have any useful global, and eventually even national, role. In Britain, we have become used to the remorseless rationalisation process in defence as our costs rise faster than normal domestic inflation. After the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the United Kingdom may have now approached the limits of rationalisation at the national level. France has recognised this difficulty with a serious increase in defence spending. Germany has more national options, as it still has an internal rationalisation process to go through; but this will be politically very difficult.

The case for European integrated capabilities All proposals for more capable European forces will require serious investment. While European states are to a greater or lesser extent restructuring their forces, there is little sign that new money will be made available for new capabilities. Defence budgets at best are held level in real terms, and this is insufficient to fund either major new capabilities, or to maintain force levels over a period of time. Yet plans for specialist contributions, such as the NATO Response Force8 proposal of 2002, will need early funding if they are to be achieved. In addition, there is a range of modern enabling capabilities that are needed throughout Europe and will remain unaffordable by individual states. These states are all also having to look at the need to provide national defences to counter the effects of possible terror attacks. There are three complementary pressures on European states to start taking forward pooling of some force elements. First, pooling offers the opportunity for lower overhead costs, and the resources released might then be used to fund new enabling capabilities including the proposed strike force. Second, pooling would make the new enabling capabilities more affordable on a

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shared basis. Third, pooled forces would drive moves towards greater interoperability and common doctrine and equipment. If suitable transformational capabilities were operated on a pooled basis, they could act as the motivating drive for states to start transforming their national capabilities in order to exploit the shared enabling capability. There is one other consideration that could increase the attractiveness of pooled capabilities to European governments. The experience of the Afghanistan campaign has increased doubts about the relevance of NATO to future high intensity campaigns. The only NATO contribution was its one joint-owned, joint-operated (pooled) force: AWACs. All other contributions to the US operation in Afghanistan were arranged on a bilateral national basis. If NATO is to be seen as relevant as an organisation for future operations, it would benefit not only from fielding European capabilities that were able to operate alongside US forces, but also by fielding them as NATO or EU jointowned, joint-operated capabilities. This would mean that Europe would be in the loop on any decision to use such force elements. If Europe had a serious military capability available, and had a common policy, it might have found that it would have had a greater say in the handling of the Iraq diplomatic crisis of 2003. The smaller states are moving down the path of integration already as they lose capabilities. The joint naval arrangement between the Dutch and the Belgians is a good illustration of what is possible. Of course shared capabilities are not new. There are many things which we have today that could be pooled. Air transport is a good example, and Germany has set up an organisation that could manage such an arrangement. Again, to produce capability and cost benefits, it needs to be done with what is in place now, not on the back of some uncompetitive, long-term European procurement plan. Much of the equipment that could be pooled is American, because that is where common capabilities exist. Tactical transport using C130s9 exists in 10 EU countries. The F16 in all its guises is found across Europe.10 One of the great missed opportunities, both from the military and commercial aspect, has been the failure of states to pool the Eurofighter force. With a pooled force, the support costs would have been much less, and the aircraft configuration control could be maintained, unlike the Tornado. It would also allow smaller European nations to buy a handful of Eurofighters to add to a much larger force. The cost benefits between such a Eurofighter buy, JSF or upgrades to F16 or F18s might work out very differently then. Failing to pool the Eurofighter means it will cost far more to operate and do far less than it could have done with a little more imagination. It will also sell to fewer European countries. Even if the politics of pooling of major combat capabilities are too difficult, there are opportunities for less contentious sharing of costly capabilities. In particular, contracted out services or Public Private Partnership projects11 could be done on a European-wide basis instead of nationally. Removing

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the EU competition exemption for defence contracts might help this process on its way. In any case, pork barrel politics lead to many of the poor valuefor-money equipment decisions throughout Europe.

EU defence budget These examples suggest some practical areas where the development of European Force Elements and common support and logistic services could provide building blocks for the strengthening of European defence contributions. They would make more effective use of European national defence budgets through the removal of the cost overhang of separate support systems. Valuable as such individual initiatives would be, they would not by themselves represent a coherent new security contribution by Europe. They would, however, illustrate how significant improvements in effectiveness could be achieved through merging national capabilities and sharing common services. For this approach to become coherent, it would be necessary to develop a planning and budgetary system at the European level. Eventually there would be a requirement for a European Defence Budget. If such an accounting system were managed by the European Union, members would provide either defence capability or money as their contribution. This would have a number of beneficial effects: not only would the free ride be stopped, but states would probably prefer to improve their military capabilities rather than contribute money to the employment and industries of other states. Peer pressure, as well as legally binding commitments to a given level of defence expenditure, might come to seem markedly more compelling to the participants than the distinctly low-key incentives that have characterised NATO cooperation. A virtuous circle of improved military capability and effective European defence could be established. There would be many problems in assessing the true worth of each contribution, but the process would also make the planning and audit at the European level more effective.

Security through European defence or NATO? There is a real threat to the territory of each European state from international terrorism. Logic would suggest that NATO would be the organisation of choice for providing collective security against this threat. This certainly appeared to be the thinking of the Greek government when it requested NATO assistance for the 2004 Olympic Games. Terrorists seek easy targets, which will attract wide publicity. They may want to attack the interests of certain countries. For al-Qa’ida and related extremist movements, the Olympics posed a tempting target set: large crowds, overstretched security forces, international media coverage, and people from every state on earth. As a member of NATO, Greece ought to be able to expect to share the problem with allies, and

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produce a collective response. But the help which NATO could provide was very limited. The Greek authorities needed to be very clear in what they expected from a NATO component. It was not sensible to think of NATO going in on the ground and trying to act as a sub-unit of the Greek police force, or even worse, as an independent security force. Proposals for using NATO in the air to monitor air threats with AWACS were more appropriate. Similarly defending the coast from the sea was a capability that NATO could deploy. Following the attacks of 9/11, NATO had set up some capabilities which proved useful. Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was launched on 18 October 2001. It provided maritime surveillance and monitoring in the Mediterranean. More than 41,000 ships have been tracked during the operation. An expansion in OAE was announced in March 2004, and allowed NATO to help protect the Olympics from terrorist attack from the sea. The area in which NATO capabilities could prove most useful is in coping with the aftermath of a terrorist attack. NATO could provide a quick reaction force to deal with the consequences of a major attack. Helicopters, medical troops, decontamination specialists, and engineers may all be needed if things go wrong. Putting together such a capability would be useful for the whole of Europe. The Madrid bombing of March 2004 showed that the attacks may occur anywhere. While national police forces are better placed to be in the lead for prevention, consequence management may need the resources of many countries. NATO could plan and assemble such a capability. As we think of the possible use of chemical, biological or nuclear material in future terror attacks, the military expertise will become more necessary. The muchpublicised NATO Response Force, agreed at the Prague summit in 2002, might be better equipped with paramedics rather than precision weapons. Development of such capabilities are likely to be slowed by continuing transatlantic differences over the best counter-terrorism strategy and the war in Iraq. The military security dimension is important for Europe in its future relations with the United States. To be cast in the role of sweeper-up after America is not an enticing prospect. Without addressing the shortfalls in military capability, EU member states will find themselves less and less able to operate individually, or collectively with the United States to support their common interests. Nor will they have a strong voice in where and how future operations are conducted. Yet Europe will be expected to take on the postconflict tasks as a share of the transatlantic burden. Kosovo was NATO’s first and last war, and future arrangements will be much more about Europeans and Americans operating together or separately. NATO will survive as a place for dialogue, and perhaps as a useful organisation to set common military standards, but even then interoperability will decline if the technology gap becomes too great. The lack of a significant outcome from the NATO Summit in Istanbul in June 2004 gives little reason for optimism.

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The national politics of much greater European defence integration are difficult. But there are opportunities that would produce more capability for lower cost, with no effect on sovereignty. Those benefits must be used to grow the missing European enabling capabilities, and that will need the European Union to control funds. At the same time the European Union needs to address the need for a clear cooperative approach to countering terrorism. Even if Europe were to follow a path towards providing greater effectiveness in its defence spending, it would still need to look at the priorities for tackling the threat from international terrorism and proliferation. While there are times when the use of offensive military force may be appropriate, Iraq in 2003 showed that many EU states are reluctant to use force before the alternatives have been exhausted. The European Union is much better placed than any individual state to use all the possible economic, diplomatic, police, and wider political levers to reduce terrorism in the longer term and defend against it in the shorter term. Military power remains important both for influence and ultimately for use when necessary. In this one area, the European Union is giving poor value for money, and the international systems suffer as a result.

Notes and references 1. ‘A secure Europe in a better world’ was drafted by Javier Solana in June 2003 and after discussion by member states, was taken forward on 13 December 2003 as an agreed text. 2. In 2002, US defence spending was $330 billion, which was nearly 40 per cent of global spending on defence. Military Balance 2003–2004 (London: IISS, 2003). 3. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence explained it to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 9 April 2002 as: ‘The U.S. military is pursuing not a single transformation but a host of transformations, including precision, surveillance, network communications, robotics, and information processing. The six specific transformation goals identified in the QDR are first, to defend the U.S. homeland and other bases of operation and defeat nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. Second, to deny enemy sanctuary, depriving them of the ability to run or hide, any time, any where. Third, to project and sustain forces in distant theaters in the face of access denial threats. Fourth, to conduct effective operations in space. Fifth, to conduct effective information operations. And sixth, to leverage our information technology to give our joint forces a common operational picture.’ 4. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) agreed by NATO members at the Washington summit in April 1999 originally listed 58 (later increased to 59) decision areas for improvement. Little progress has been made subsequently on implementation of necessary capability improvements. 5. Assessment of overlap made in ‘Achieving the Helsinki goals’, a Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, discussion paper dated November 2001 para. 4.3.

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6. Cm 5566 Vol 1 MOD July 2002 ‘The strategic defence review: a new chapter’ discusses the post-11 September changes need to UK defence policy. In a section on network-centric warfare, the authors indicate that numbers of platforms and people will in future be less useful measurements of combat power (para. 41). This approach was confirmed by the UK Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, who announced cuts to all 3 armed service personnel on 14 July 2004. 7. This figure was compiled pre-enlargement. 8. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a US proposal for a European high-readiness force of two brigades which would be fully interoperable with US forces. It would not be due to be fully operational until 2006. 9. Twelve (10 EU) European nations operate 155 C130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft: Belgium has 11, Denmark 3, France 14, Greece 15, Italy 14, Netherlands 2, Norway 6, Portugal 6, Spain 12, Turkey 13, United Kingdom 51, Sweden 8. 10. Belgium (110), Denmark (68), Greece (75), Netherlands (157), Norway (57) and Portugal (20) operate 487 F16s between them. 11. ‘Achieving the Helsinki headline goals’, see n. 5. Annex C lists areas where contractorised support could be done on an EU basis.

12 Balancing Security and Human Rights: Post 9/11 Reactions in the United States and Europe Chiara Giorgetti

The acts of 11 September 2001 demonstrated how vulnerable civilians are, in any part of the world, to terrorist attacks. This awareness led to a determined response by the international community to fight international terrorism in all its forms. As governments and international organisations alike re-evaluated the effectiveness and appropriateness of their counter-terrorist measures, the challenge emerged of conducting the fight against terrorism while respecting human rights and civil liberties. In fact, the wide consensus that actions are necessary to confront terrorism does not undermine the necessity to balance human rights considerations and preserve the democratic process. As portrayed throughout this book, measures to confront terrorism are multifaceted and complex. This chapter examines policies adopted to confront international terrorism, with special attention paid to their implications for human rights and personal freedoms, comparing the United States, the European Union and specific EU member states.

The day that changed the world? Coordinated international legal action to confront terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been on the international agenda for the last 40 years, and the first two international conventions on specific terrorist activities were concluded in the early 1970s.1 In fact, a more comprehensive international legal framework was already being negotiated in the 1990s.2 The enormity of the terrorist attacks on 11 September, however, required a rethink of the entire approach and accelerated the effort of the international community to find better tools to combat international terrorism in an appropriate manner.3 The international community was quick to react to the 11 September events, supporting the United States and urging states to take measures to combat terrorism. At the United Nations, the international community reacted by passing measures directed at stopping the financing of terrorism and encouraging sharing of information, among other actions. On 28 September 2001, the UN Security Council approved the seminal resolution 1373/2001 within 244

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Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That resolution requested member states to ensure their national legislation contained measures to: • prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, including the freezing of accounts and criminalising any direct or indirect fund collections; • take measures to prevent the execution of acts by establishing an earlywarning system of information exchange; • ensure that those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts are brought to justice, and that they are prevented from using their respective territories for those purposes against another state or their citizens; • afford one another assistance in investigations relating to supporting and financing terrorism, including obtaining evidence and increasing collaboration in information exchange; • deny safe haven to those who finance, plan to commit and support terrorist acts, or provide safe havens and enable the prosecution of terrorists and deny them asylum.4 At the same time, a new Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was also created, and members states were to report periodically on their progress in implementing the resolution. Tensions with human rights concerns were immediately apparent in this framework, as no human rights considerations were included in the resolution. Res. 1373/2001 even called for enhanced controls to prevent asylum and refugee status from being abused by possible terrorists. Moreover, there was no official link between counter-terrorism and UN Human Rights bodies, and the CTC refused advice on human rights.5 Human rights activists complained that the Security Council had strongly resisted the inclusion of human rights concerns in the CTC mandate,6 and expressed concern that actions taken by the Security Council would create the impression, which the Security Council seemed unable to prevent, that human rights would take a back seat in the fight against terrorism. Human rights special rapporteurs and independent experts voiced ‘profound concern at the multiplication of policies, legislation and practices increasingly being adopted by many countries to combat international terrorism’, and observed that ‘vulnerable groups are targeted and discriminated against on the basis of origin and socio-economic status, in particular migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers’.7 The main concern was that actions taken to combat terrorism would result in the unnecessary use of state of emergency legislation, which would boost a state’s policing of their citizens and increase discrimination, especially towards Muslim populations. Disproportionate reactions in the United States The vulnerability exposed by the terrorist attacks triggered a series of reactions within the US administration; while at the same time, in the wake of the

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nation’s mourning, the country bound together and fear of popular resentment against young Muslim men of Arab or Asian origin grew. The reactions of the US administration was framed within the discourse of ‘war’, which permeated and directed its policies, so that the attack on the Twin Towers was soon compared to the attack on Pearl Harbor: hitting the US territory unexpectedly and with vicious force. From a legal perspective, reactions to the attacks by the US administration were of three kinds: measures directed at facilitating the collection of evidence, provisions directed at aliens living within the territory of the United States and those directed at people living outside the territory of the United States. Each is described below. Several of these measures have violated fundamental civil liberties and were implemented in such a way as to be discriminatory against a specific group of people. Three days after the attacks, President Bush declared a state of national emergency. The Patriot Act was rushed into Congress and was signed into law by the President on 26 October 2001.8 The Act is complex piece of legislation, which mostly amended existing provisions in several different domains. First, the Act contains several provisions that expanded the power of the government to collect evidence and personal data. It allows for more information sharing, and also permits records to be collected upon FBI certification that they are sought in connection with an international terrorism investigation. Further, the Act expands the Government’s power to conduct criminal searches and wiretaps and it authorises secret searches.9 The most important element of these amendments is that both intelligence and personal records can be collected without showing probable cause that a crime has been committed, because when an investigation is directed at collecting evidence with a significant international anti-terrorism intelligence purpose, this by itself becomes a sufficient cause.10 Traditionally and through the Fourth Amendment, US evidence law has protected individual privacy very cautiously and these amendments may result in a significant intrusion in the private domain.11 Provided that they are not abused and implemented discriminatorily, however, some new form of evidence collection seems a necessary tool to confront the new terrorist phenomenon. Similar reforms have also been envisaged by the European Union and EU member states. It will also be for national courts in their application of the law to ensure a balance between personal freedoms and the need for protection. A second set of measures adopted in the Patriot Act is directed at resident aliens. Provisions in the Act authorise executive indefinite detention of immigrants upon certification by the Attorney General that the person is a ‘suspected terrorist’. Aliens can be detained indefinitely, and they can be held for up to seven days before charges are filed. This part of the legislation has been the most criticised because it is directed only at foreign citizens, and because it violates national and international requirements of due process.

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Interestingly, the Department of Justice concluded in May 2003 that although many aliens detained after 11 September could have been charged in connection with the Patriot Act, this had not been necessary as traditional immigration proceedings proved to be sufficient.12 In fact, in parallel to the Patriot Act, on 17 September 2001, the Immigration and Naturalisation Services (INS) was given powers to extend the time non-nationals could be held in custody without being charged from 24 to 48 hours, except in ‘event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstances’, in which case charging must be made within an additional reasonable period of time, which may be longer than the seven days envisaged in the Patriot Act. Moreover, existing INS regulations and powers of detention were applied more strictly. International law, including the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the United States is a party, provides specifically against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and includes the rights of people under arrest to be notified immediately of the reasons for their detention, and their right to communicate with their lawyer and family, who should also be informed of the location of the detention.13 That notwithstanding, the Justice Department issued new instructions to Immigration Judges on 21 September 2001 to hold closed hearings for ‘special cases’ designated by the Justice Department, and restricted information on the existence of a case and the dates fixed for the proceedings. It is estimated that more than 1,200 migrants were detained, and some were held for months without formal charges.14 Further, numbers of those detained, released or deported were not confirmed. Contrary to normal practice, identities and places of detention were not made public.15 The majority of the detainees were being held for immigration violations, others were charged with criminal offences and a smaller group considered material witnesses.16 The Government generally filed ‘garden-variety immigration charges against them, rather than pursuing criminal prosecution or removal’17 of the suspects and applied existing legislation more harshly. Violations included visa overstays and other minor infractions, which would normally not have resulted in extended detentions. Moreover, most of the people arrested after 11 September were males of Arab or Asian origin, which makes it ‘hard to escape the conclusion that, in some cases, race or origin may have been a prime factor in continued detention’.18 Detainees were at the time held in prison beyond their agreed date of voluntary departures, or deportation after bail was set and ready to be paid if they were considered a security or a flight risk by the INS, or pending clearance from the FBI. Moreover, Amnesty International concluded that it was even possible that some people were detained after they were no longer under investigation for acts connected to 11 September.19 By the end of 2002, most detainees had been either deported or released. The Justice Department reported that of the 765 people detained for immigration violations,

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500 had been deported, 134 were arrested on federal criminal charges and 99 convicted, and only six remained in custody.20 In addition, contrary to international and national standards and INS regulations, detainees were not able to contact their lawyers or their families for extended periods of time, and were not given the opportunity to contact their consulate. Harsh conditions of imprisonment were applied, including prolonged solitary confinement and use of unnecessary restraints. On this topic, Amnesty International concluded that prolonged solitary confinement, especially when it is imposed with other deprivations like restriction of visits and exercise, may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The third set of post-11 September measures related to aliens outside the United States. These were captured in Afghanistan as a result of the American-led military intervention. The intervention was approved by Congress with a resolution containing an ‘Authorisation to Use All Necessary and Appropriate Force’ (AUMF) for use by the President against nations, organisations or persons associated with the terrorist attacks of 11 September. Since January 2002, the United States transferred more than 600 foreign nationals taken prisoner in Afghanistan to a detention centre in Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. Because they were detained in a territory considered to be outside the United States, national courts were deemed not to have jurisdiction over them. Thus, they were detained without charge in harsh conditions, with no access to lawyers or their families.21 Non-US nationals were to be tried by military commissions created by a Presidential Order. Lord Steyn22 effectively summarised the situation stating that the prisoners: have no access to the writ of habeas corpus to determine whether their detention is even arguably justified. The military will act as interrogators, prosecutors, defence counsel, judges, and when death sentences are imposed, as executioners. The trials will be held in secret. None of the basic guarantees for a fair trial need to be observed. The jurisdiction of the United States courts is excluded. The military control everything. It is, however, in all respects subject to decisions of the President as Commanderin-Chief even in respect of guilt and innocence in individual cases as well as appropriate sentences. It is an awesome responsibility. The President has made public in advance his personal view of the prisoners as a group: he has described them all as ‘killers’.’23 This objectionable situation seemed to have improved by mid-2004: several detainees were released to their country of origin (and in the majority of cases charged with no criminal offence), and the US Supreme Court rendered two important decisions. In Rasul et al. v. Bush, the Court held that Federal Courts had jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and

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incarcerated at the Naval Bay of Guatánamo. 24 Similarly, in Hamdi et al. v. Rumsfeld, the Court concluded that the detention of enemy combatants, ‘for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident of war as to be an exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has authorised the President to use’. The Court did hold, however, that ‘a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertion before a neutral decisionmaker.’ The Court also confirmed that he ‘unquestionably has the right to access to counsel’.25 This broad overview illustrates that one of the unwelcome results of the US response has been the restriction of rights and civil liberties of many citizens and the harsher enforcement of existing laws. Several of the measures implemented by the US government in the aftermath of 11 September may violate fundamental human rights as defined by the ICCPR and were applied in a discriminatory way.26 This is both illegal and unnecessary. These violations are contrary to international human rights law, which creates frameworks of action for states to guarantee fundamental individual freedoms while, at the same time, provides states with sufficient mechanisms to confront terrorism effectively. The international and regional frameworks identify minimum enforceable civil, political and economic rights that each state must guarantee to individuals. They also create a coordinated monitoring and reporting system and, in specific situations, afford individuals ways of redress. Moreover, the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) provide that under certain specific conditions that threaten the existence of a nation, a state of emergency may be declared and certain limited rights may be derogated.27 Certainly, some fundamental rights cannot be derogated and a special procedure must be put in place. International human rights law, however, provides a sufficient and comprehensive system to confront emergencies. Non-derogable rights include, as a minimum: the right to life, the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; the principles of nonretroactivity of criminal law and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Under the ICCPR and ACHR regimes, these derogations are possible only for limited periods, they must be strictly required by the situation and reviewed regularly, they must be consistent with other obligations of international law and must not involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. The International Commission of Jurists also includes in the list of non-derogable rights the right to independent and impartial tribunal, presumption of innocence and judicial guarantee, principle of legality with regard to crimes and punishment; right to habeas corpus, and judicial remedy against any human rights violation.28 Measures taken by the US administration violated these principles because of the discriminatory way they have been implemented. Probably, moreover,

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they also constituted cruel and degrading punishment as interpreted by the UN Human Rights Commission. Finally, some detentions both in the United States and in Guantánamo may also amount to arbitrary detention.29 Although the United States did declare a state of emergency, it did not officially derogate to any of the provisions included in international human rights conventions. Indeed, these measures are incompatible with the core civil liberties values traditionally supported by the United States. It is difficult but necessary to try to understand why this happened. A lively debate already existed within and outside the United States among academics and politicians.30 It became more and more shaped along political lines, with the Bush administration supporting certain measures and others condemning them. A possible explanation could be found in the interpretation of the terrorist act as an act of war, which then generated a condition of crisis that fostered an atavistic diffidence against the enemy/foreigner. This resulted in the fear that foreigners may become the enemy’s fifth column. There was also a sense of urgency, anger and frustration, which stirred a strong sense of national pride and unity. The reactions have in fact been fully in line with the policy of isolation and confrontation that has characterised G. W. Bush’s presidency. Three years on, it is difficult to assess whether these measures were useful in terms of evidence collection. Although the US Secretary of Defence stated that important information had been gathered in this way, not enough is known about the results of these actions. Politically, however, these measures were criticised internationally and nationally, and have antagonised Muslim minorities and traditional allies, who were initially very supportive of their transatlantic neighbour.

European restraint? As opposed to the US experience, the reaction of the European Union was mostly directed at strengthening judicial and police collaboration, and implementing restrictions on terrorism financing. Within each national government, however, reactions did vary. While the United Kingdom implemented policies to restrain civil liberties of foreigners, other states took the opportunity of 11 September to implement legislation to address long-standing concerns, including immigration and evidence collection, and to act against asylum-seekers. European coordination to combat international terrorism was already well under way at the time of the events of 11 September. Basic principles had been agreed upon in October 1999. The authority derives from the Treaty of the European Union itself, which established the goal to create an area of Freedom, Security and Justice for all its citizens.31 Most importantly and contrary to the US experience, because of their internal past and present situation, several EU members (France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) already had specific legislation on terrorism where

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terrorist offences were identified as separate crimes based on the motivation of the offender and special procedures available to investigators and prosecutors.32 Nonetheless, reactions by European states to 11 September was strong and the European Union supported its ally with no restraint. 33 The European Union reacted by implementing new laws and strengthening existing ones to give police more powers to investigate and detain suspects for longer periods of time, and the implementation of the 1999 Tampere principles was accelerated.34 Within the European Union, the reaction was immediate. On 13 September the European Commission had already made a proposal to adopt a common definition of terrorism and related penalties and to implement a European arrest warrant to supplant extradition. This had been on the table for a long time, but there was an urgency after 11 September for the Union to be seen as concretely doing something to fight cross-border crime.35 Members therefore dropped long-standing reservations about allowing each other more power to enforce cross-border arrest and extradition.36 The arrest warrant allows the police in any country within the Union to arrest a suspect wanted by one of them for 32 listed crimes punishable with a minimum prison sentence of three years.37 Further, the Brussels European Council on 20 September 200138 identified a series of priority measures to combat terrorism and intensify information exchange between member states, including joint investigation teams of police and magistrates, the creation of a common list of terrorist organisations, improved cooperation and information exchange regarding terrorism between states and Europol, and the creation of a coordination body composed of magistrates, prosecutors and police officers (Eurojust).39 On 10 December 2001, the Council of the European Union agreed on a common position to apply specific measures to combat terrorism, which required states to implement measures to freeze and withhold the availability of funds, other financial assets and economic resources of natural and legal persons listed on a regularly updated annex.40 In the same meeting, the Council also amended directive 91/308/EEC on money-laundering to extend its prohibition to most organised and serious crimes.41 The European Union undertook other actions to restrict financing of terrorist activities and to increase judicial and police cooperation. At the beginning of 2003, 200 Muslim terrorist suspects, mostly from North Africa, had been arrested in Europe: of these, 47 in Spain, 37 in Britain, 33 in Italy, 29 in France.42 In sum, at the Union level, measures targeted financial matters and police and judicial cooperation. This milder approach was also dictated by the limited power of the European Union, which is composed of sovereign states, and may also be attributed to the fact that the threat of a terrorist attack remained remote. A renewed sense of urgency appeared after the explosion in Madrid on 11 March 2004. Immediate reactions, however, were in line with the previous approach. New actions have so far been limited to the creation

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of a EU terrorism coordinator to help common efforts of intelligence sharing and collection, speedier implementation of already agreed counter-terrorism measures, and the retention of communication data for a minimum period of time to enable tracking. These measures are consistent with the role and constraints of the European Union, which are intrinsic to the Union. At the national level, however, states reacted in different ways.

United Kingdom: a rush into (unnecessary) counter-terrorist measures Traditionally the closest ally to the United States, Britain immediately felt threatened and was the only country in Europe to adopt emergency legislation. Because of its extensive domestic experience confronting the IRA, the United Kingdom had already implemented detailed legislation against terrorism.43 Even in 2000, the UK government approved new legislation, the 2000 Terrorist Act, which was already the largest piece of anti-terrorist legislation in the European Union.44 Walker’s Blackstone Guide noted, ‘with the full panoply of the Terrorism Act 2000 in force, including the proscription of al-Qa’ida, extensive measures with terrorism finances and offences about conspiracy and incitement to commit offences abroad, the United Kingdom was the most legally fortified country in Europe’.45 Indeed, the United Kingdom was quick to respond to the threats of 11 September. In October the British Home Office proposed new stringent security measures, which included enhanced police powers.46 On 13 November 2001, the new Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) was published by the British Home Secretary. The reforms included measures to enable telecommunication providers to retain personal data, including emails and mobile-phone logs. The most significant part of ATCSA was Part 4, which allowed the Secretary of State to order indefinite administrative detention, without charge,47 for foreigners who were certified by the Home Secretary as suspected international terrorists or a threat to national security and provided that they could not be removed to another country.48 These measures only applied to foreigners and were therefore not only discriminatory, but also ineffective as evidence exists that British citizens are involved in al-Qa’ida activities.49 Eight foreigners were detained under ATCSA by the end of 2001,50 eleven by the end of 2002,51 and fourteen by February 2004.52 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in fact confirmed in 2002 that the ATCSA exclusive targeting of foreign nationals was discriminatory and disproportionate to the counter-terrorist threat.53 The decision was subsequently reversed on appeal by the Secretary of State to the Court of Appeal, which found that the measures were not discriminatory because aliens who could not be deported had no rights to remain in the United Kingdom. The Court, moreover, concluded that it would be surprising if the European

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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)54 provision not to discriminate prevented the Home Secretary from taking the actions that he deemed appropriate. Pragmatically, the Court concluded that accepting that the measures were discriminatory would have resulted in the application of harsher measures than the Home Secretary had envisaged, which would not foster human rights.55 In a case on detention of a person awaiting deportation, the European Court of Human Rights had stated that ‘everyone who is deprived of his liberties is entitled to a review of the lawfulness of his detention by a court, regardless of the length of confinement. The Convention requirement that an act of deprivation of liberty be amenable to independent judicial scrutiny is of fundamental importance . . . to provide safeguards against arbitrariness. What is at stake is both the protection of the physical liberty of individuals as well as their personal security.’56 Amnesty International also expressed the concern that many of those detained under ATCSA were, ‘held in inhuman or degrading conditions in high security prisons’.57 Detainees had no access to lawyers and reduced access to their family. To implement this legislation and allow indefinite administrative detention, the United Kingdom derogated from Article 9 of the ICCPR and from Article 5(1) of the ECHR.58 Similarly to provisions in ICCPR, under the ECHR regime, derogations can be made only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, while the Council of Europe must be kept informed of all measures taken, and this must be consistent with international law. Non-derogable rights include the right to life, the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; and the principles of non-retroactivity of criminal law. The Home Secretary declared a ‘state of emergency’ on 12 November 2001, but at the same time declared to Parliament that, ‘there is no immediate intelligence pointing to a specific threat to the United Kingdom’.59 These contradictory remarks created mistrust in the decision to opt out from ECHR and was widely criticised as unnecessary.60 An official Review Group stated that detentions had not been used excessively, but should be replaced with measures that do not require Britain to opt out of the ECHR.61 Similarly to the US, recent developments in UK Courts are significantly protective of human rights and liberties. In December 2004, ‘the Law Lords declared that the powers of the Home Secretary to indefinitely detain without charge or trial non-deportable foreign nationals as “suspected international terrorists” and a “national security risk” were discriminatory and disproportionate, and therefore incompatible with human rights law. They also ruled that the UK government must withdraw the derogations from Article 5(1) of the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and from Article 9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which allowed the introduction of Part 4 of ATCSA.’

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As a result, the Home Secretary proposed that the detention of foreign terrorist suspects will be replaced by restrictions on movement and communication, and in some cases amounting to house arrest. Deportation will also be sought by the UK government. The proposed new measures will also apply to UK citizens. However, this proposal disregards the fact that the foreign detainees are still not charged with any crime. As Nicola Duckworth, Head of Europe and Central Asia Programme at Amnesty International said, the proposal of the Home Secretary ‘may alleviate the conditions they are under, but it falls short of doing them justice’.62 Other European states: taking the opportunity to adopt restrictive measures British measures to confront terrorism are the tightest in the European Union. Other member states have also reported stricter measures to the CTC, directed primarily at facilitating evidence and data collection. Some countries utilised this ‘window of opportunity’ to introduce more restrictive measures on loosely related issues, such as immigration and drugs control. For example, several member states adopted policies to regulate immigration controls. It appears that these measures were targeted more at satisfying pre-existing conservative constituencies rather than addressing terrorist threats. In fact, al-Qa’ida operatives often possess the nationalities of many European states, and preventative actions thus, ‘may result in the adoption of unduly harsh and restrictive control measures’.63 The International Federation for Human Rights concluded that ‘anti-terrorist legislation passed in 2001 and 2003, such as those passed in Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy include, inter alia, severe restrictions to freedoms (such as detention for an indefinite period, or refusal to grant the right of asylum and immigration and an increased role for the secret services) on the basis of a mere suspicion of belonging to a terrorist group.’64 France had been active in combating international terrorism in its own territory and abroad for many years, and confronted numerous acts of terrorism in Paris in the mid-1990s. For this, it had implemented a series of measures to combat terrorism, the cornerstone of which was a 1986 Act defining terrorism as an independent offence with severe penalties, which evolved to deal with transformation of terrorism threats. Terrorist offences are prosecuted by specialised national judges. As a consequence of 11 September France activated the ‘Vigipirate renforcé’, a security plan that includes measures to enhance security in all mass transit centres and nuclear facilities. France enacted new legislation in November 2001, which created a special definition for the offence of financing terrorist activities, and other financial measures. 65 The law allowed easier inspection of vehicles and facilitated night searches of unoccupied premises for offences relating to terrorism, trafficking of arms, explosives or drugs. In addition, the use and collection of evidence for trial has been enlarged: video recordings may be used for

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witness confrontations for offences relating to terrorism, trafficking of arms, explosives or drugs. Police personal files may be accessed more easily and Internet connection data and other technical data must be kept for a longer period of time.66 France amended its anti-terror law to allow the police greater freedoms to stop and search cars, ‘intended to catch terrorists, the measure is in fact chiefly used to find drugs’.67 Italy also noted in its reports to the CTC that its experience in combating domestic terrorism enabled it to react quickly to the events of 11 September. Several pieces of legislation and regulation had in fact already been approved in the ‘Anni di Piombo’ emergency, especially for criminal law and evidence. Decree-Law 369/2001 was approved to provide ‘urgent measures to suppress and combat the financing of international terrorism’.68 Another 2001 decree introduced urgent measures to combat international terrorism.69 This decree extended existing measures to combat the Mafia to international terrorism. These included pre-emptive and preventive measures restricting personal freedom, extension of the investigation of economic and financial assets to family members, and the confiscation of illegally acquired assets and goods.70 The new law also expanded the possibility of judicial and preventive wiretapping, communications interception (including electronic) and the search of buildings, facilitated undercover operations and the delay of arrest warrant issuance for cases of international terrorism.71 Italy also adopted a more selective approach to the entry of foreign nationals, approving stringent measures and heightened attention to combat illegal immigration and ‘the role of foreigners in our country’.72 Specifically, measures related to visas, readmission agreements, and asylum policies (allowing temporary detention until a streamlined application is examined for certain individuals considered most at-risk).73 A new Immigration Act was adopted which increased the period of time for preventive detention for the purpose of identification, increased criminal penalties for recidivist immigrants, allowed the taking of fingerprints and photographs of foreign nationals who became residents or renewed their permits, and ensured that deportation acts were carried out.74 Finally, in Germany the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation was given power in 2001 to investigate terrorist activities in Germany of terrorists groups operating abroad, to look into crimes organised over the Internet, while the Office for the Protection of the Constitution was able to examine bank-account details. In March 2004, Spain was the victim of the most severe al-Qa’ida attack in Europe. Spain was already under threat due to national terrorism, and Spanish law in 2001 already contained several criminal provisions against terrorism, while its criminal code included specific terrorist offences.75 A new law had also been approved in July 2001 to restrict access to Spain to those known for having connections with national or international criminal organisations.76 Several pieces of legislation existed to block financial flows or accounts in order

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to prevent the use of such funds for terrorism, as well as prevent and avoid money laundering and other serious forms of crimes related to terrorism.77 After 11 September, Spain intensified controls to prevent procurement of weapons and increased efforts to trace contacts with terrorist groups. Amongst other actions, Spain had also banned ETA’s political arm, Batasuna, an action that ‘would have been impossible before September 11’.78 Several operations against Islamic terrorist groups were conducted, which resulted in the arrest of a number of al-Qa’ida suspects.79 These measures, however, proved insufficient and the future will show whether Spain will adopt measures similar to that of the United States. So far, the response has been measured, and Spanish police at the time of writing were continuing their investigation, with 20 suspects already in prison.

Conclusions In 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan affirmed that ‘[O]ur responses to terrorism, as well as our efforts to thwart it and prevent it, should uphold the human rights that terrorists aim to destroy. Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism – not privileges to be sacrificed at a time of tension.’80 Unfortunately, it seems that many countries have instead tightened legislation in the name of security. Existing laws have been toughened or extended in all too many cases. Governments passed legislation they had in mind for a long time, or too easily restricted liberty.81 This has been more pronounced in the United States, where the attacks took place, but similar constraints have been put into practice in the United Kingdom, and, to a lesser extent, in other European countries. A lengthy debate has ensued from the different reactions to confront terrorism in Europe and the United States. While there has been widespread support for actions to strengthen security, there has also been a consensus that this must be done while respecting personal freedoms and democracy. The debate will continue on how governments should find a balance between different priorities. Aware of the tension, the UN Security Council adopted Res. 1456/2003, which called on states ‘to ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law and should adopt such measures in compliance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law’. Moreover, resolution 58/187 (2003) of the General Assembly called for the Human Rights High Commissioner to examine the question of the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, and to report and make general recommendation to the specific state.82 In the aftermath of the March attacks in Madrid, a Mexican proposal to appoint a UN expert to investigate whether countries violate human rights provisions with their counter-terrorism

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measures divided member states, with the United States opposing the proposal and the European Union split on the issue.83 This chapter has demonstrated that the reactions to 11 September were rather different in the United States and in Europe, with the United States implementing harsher measures. There is no doubt that one of the reasons for such different responses to the terrorist threat was that the attacks took place in the United States. Now that Europe has also been wounded with the attacks in Madrid, new measures may be expected. Thus far, however, reactions have been measured. A further reason for the different reaction is that most of Europe had already been dealing with both national and international terrorism for a number of years, and these states were more ready to react to a terrorist emergency.84 For example, national legislation existed in many European states that already criminalised acts of terrorism, and special provisions existed for evidence collection and the conduct of trials. The American legal system in fact had developed very stringent requirements for evidence collection and search to counter the power of government. The amendment of those through the Patriot Act spurred strong reactions from the liberal elites that would not have occurred in Europe. Indeed, several European countries adopted more stringent legislation on data and evidence collection that were not received as negatively. The different reactions can also be framed in the European tradition of multilateralism, which was renewed after the Madrid bombing, and the isolationist policy of the United States. To conclude, it is instructive to quote Judge Patel in Korematsu v. United States on the legality of detention of people of Japanese descent after Pearl Harbor, ‘in times of distress the shield of military necessity and natural security must not be used to protect governmental institutions from close scrutiny and accountability’.85 International law provides a framework that allows states to confront emergencies effectively while respecting human rights. Neither the United States nor Europe can choose to act outside this framework. Here, it is interesting to note the useful role of the judiciary – in both the US and the UK – as a guarantor for the protection of human rights and civil liberties.

Notes and references 1. The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and the 1971 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Act against the Safety of Civil Aviation. 2. Most recent international conventions include: 1997 UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. For Europe, the most significant effort to combat terrorism generically: 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, for a complete list: International Instruments related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism (New York: UN, 2001). 3. See Peter J. van Krieken (ed.), Terrorism and the International Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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4. As paraphrased in UN Security Council Resolution 1373/2001. 5. See for example, Amnesty International, Report: 2002 In Focus (2003), p. 10, http:// web.amnesty.org/report2003/usa-summary-eng accessed 27 September 2003. 6. Human Rights Watch, ‘UN: counterterrorism body must include rights component’, Press Release, 3 March 2004; http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/03/ global7829.htm, accessed 27 September 2004. 7. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’, Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2004/21 (2004), p. 2. 8. For example, see David Cole and James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security (New York: The New Press, 2002), p. 151; and W. McCormak, ‘Patriot, privacy and politics’, in Houston Lawyer (January/February 2004). 9. Cole and Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution, pp. 147–76. 10. McCormak, ‘Patriot, privacy and politics’. 11. McCormak, ‘Patriot, privacy and politics’, p. 26, see also Cole and Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution, pp. 159–68. 12. McCormak, ‘Patriot, privacy and politics’, p. 27. 13. See also the interpretation of these provisions described in Digest on Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, OHCHR, pp. 18–25; http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/digest.doc accessed on 27 September 2004. 14. Reported by Amnesty International, which also concluded that the longest period of pre-charge detention amounted to 129 days, in Amnesty International, United States of America, Amnesty International’s concerns regarding post 11 September detentions in the USA; http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr510442002 15. Fitzpatrick concludes that the US government counter-terrorism policies since 11 September ‘have been strongly hostile to the involvement of courts and lawyers’, in Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Terrorism and migration’, The American Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism, October 2002, p. 12; http://www.asil. org/taskforce/fitzpatr.pdf 16. Cole and Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution, pp. 172–3. 17. Fitzpatrick, ‘Terrorism and migration’, p. 9. 18. Amnesty International, United States of America, Amnesty International’s concerns regarding post 11 September detentions in the USA. 19. Ibid. 20. Amnesty International Report 2003, United States of America, p. 2; http:// web. amnesty.org/report2003/usa-summary-eng, accessed on 27 September 2004. 21. See also, Michael I. Greenberger, ‘Three strikes and you’re outside the constitution’, Maryland Bar Journal (March/April 2004), 15. 22. Judicial Member of the House of Lords. 23. Lord Steyn, ‘Guantánamo Bay; the legal black hole’, Twenty-Seventh FA Mann Lecture, British Institute of International and Comparative Law and Herbert Smith, Lincoln’s Inn Old Hall, 25 November 2003, p. 15; http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/ nov/guantanamo.pdf 24. Rasul et al. v. Bush, President of the United States, et al., case no. 03–334, argued on 20 April 2004 and decided on 28 June 2004; http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=03-334 Accessed 27 September 2004. 25. Hamdi et al. v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence et al. case no. 03-6696, argued on 28 April 2004, and decided on 28 June 2004. Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated, ‘As critical as the government’s interest may be in detaining

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26.

27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

32. 33.

34.

35. 36. 37.

38.

39.

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those who actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat.’http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000& invol=03-6696 accessed 27 September 2004. See Digest on Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, prepared by the OHCHR, pp. 36–38, 44–7. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/digest.doc accessed 27 September 2004. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, together with the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. International Commission of Jurists, Terrorism and Human Rights (Geneva: Abrax, 2002), pp. 248–9. As concluded for the cases of Ayub Ali Khan and Azmath Jaweed by the UN Human Rights Commission, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention, ‘Report of the working group on arbitrary detention’, Chairperson-Rapporteur: Lous Joinet, E/CN/4/2003/8 of 16 December 2002, paras. 61–64; http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2003/documentation/commission/ e-cn4-2003-8.htm accessed 27 September 2004. For example, Cole and Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution, and Lord Steyn, ‘Guantánamo Bay’. See Commission of the European Communities, ‘Proposal for a Council framework decision on combating terrorism, 19 September 2001’, COM(2001) 521 final; http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/com_01_521.pdf accessed 27 September 2004. Ibid., p. 6. The European Council met on 20 September 2001 ‘to take the necessary measures to maintain the highest level of security and any other measure needed to combat terrorism’, see Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs), Brussels, 20 September 2001, SN 3926/6/01 REV 6. In: http://europa.eu.int/comm/ justice_home/news/terrorism/documents/concl_council_20sep_en.pdf accessed 27 September 2004. The European Council held a special meeting on 15 and 16 October 1999 in Tampere on the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union. See: http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm accessed on 27 September 2004. It was part of the actions agreed in Tampere in 1999 to increase judicial cooperation. ‘The EU arrest warrant: curbing crime – and sovereignty’, The Economist, 15 December 2001. For an in-depth analysis of actions taken by the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament, see ‘Chapter 6: Europe’ in Peter J. van Krieken (ed.), Terrorism and the International Legal Order (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002). Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs), Brussels, 20 September 2001, SN 392/6/01 REV 6. See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/ terrorism/documents/concl_council_20sep_en.pdf accessed 27 September 2004. See: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/110901/me02_187.htm accessed 27 September 2004, and ‘11 September attacks: the European Union’s broad response, EU actions: economic and financial measures’;http://www.europa. eu.int/news/110901/justice.htm accessed 27 September 2004.

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40. See Report of the European Union to the Committee Established Under paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) adopted by the Security Council at its 438th meeting on 28 September 2001, S/2001/1297 dated 28 December 2001, p. 4, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/un/docs/eu1373.pdf accessed 24 September 2004. 41. Ibid, p. 5. See also Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, SN 140/1; http://www.europa.eu.int/ comm/external_relations/110901/me02_187.htm accessed 27 September 2004. 42. ‘Islamist terror in Europe: tackling a hydra’, The Economist, 1 February 2003, 31. 43. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: report to the CounterTerrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, S/2001/1232;http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ committees/1373/submitted_reports.html accessed 10 March 2004. 44. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council framework Decision on Combating terrorism, 19 September 2001, COM(2001) 521 final, p.7; http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2002/com2002_0173en01.pdf accessed 27 September 2004. 45. C. Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 10. 46. Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, United Kingdom, p. 367, http:// www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe21.html accessed 27 September 2004. 47. Amnesty International, ‘Rights denied: the UK’s response to 11 September 2001’, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engEUR450162002?OpenDocument& of=COUNTRIES%5CUK accessed on 27 September 2004. 48. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: report to the CounterTerrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, S/2001/1232, p. 9; http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/ 1373/submitted_reports.html accessed 10 March 2004. See also Amnesty International, United Kingdom, ‘Amnesty Internationals Memorandum to the UK Government of Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001’, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engEUR450172002?OpenDocument& of=COUNTRIES%5CUK Accessed 27 September 2004. 49. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: second report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, S/2002/787, p. 6, http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html accessed on 10 March 2004. 50. Amnesty International Report, 2002, p. 255, http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002. nsf/home/home?OpenDocument accessed 10 March 2004. 51. Amnesty International Report, 2003, p. 262, http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/ index-eng accessed 10 March 2004. 52. ‘Blunkett outlines terror options’, BBC News, 25 February 2004. 53. Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Amnesty International’s Memorandum to the UK Government of Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engEUR450172002?OpenDocument&of= COUNTRIES%5CUK accessed 27 September 2004. 54. Signed in 1950 by the members of the Council of Europe. 55. Yonah Alexander and Edgar H. Brenner (eds), The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism (London: Transnational Publishers, 2003), p. ix. 56. Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 20 June 2002, in Fitzpatrick, ‘Terrorism and migration’, p. 12. For an assessment by the ICCPR of administrative detention, see Digest on Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of

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60. 61. 62.

63. 64.

65.

66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75.

76.

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Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, prepared by OHCHR, pp. 39–41; http:// www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/digest.doc accessed on 27 September 2004. Amnesty International Report, 2003, p. 262. Amnesty International Report, 2002, p. 255. As reported by Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, United Kingdom, p. 367, in http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe21.html accessed 27 September 2004. See also Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Rights Denied: the UKs Response to 11 September 2001. In: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engEUR450162002? OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES%5CUK accessed on 27 September 2004. ‘Anti-terrorist measures, and throw away the key’, The Economist, 17 November 2001. ‘Blunkett outlines terror options’, BBC News, 25 February 2004. ‘Home Secretary’s proposal falls short of Law Lords ruling’, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PRESS RELEASE, 26 January 2005, Al Index: EUR 45/002/2005 (Public), in: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR450022005 site visited 18 February 2005. Fitzpatrick, ‘Terrorism and migration’, pp. 3–4. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-up to the World Conference on Human Rights, Written statement submitted by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), a non-governmental organisation in special consultative status, E/CN.4/2003/NGO/247, of 17 March 2003, p. 2, http:// www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.2003.NGO.247.En? Opendocument Accessed 27 September 2004. For a complete description of France’s actions post-11 September see Report Submitted by France to the Counter-terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, S/2001/1274 dated 27 December 2001. See: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html accessed 10 March 2004. Ibid., p. 19. ‘Special report: civil liberties’, The Economist, 31 August 2002, 20. National report of the Republic of Italy pursuant to paragraph of United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), S/2002/8, dated 2 January 2001, see also supplementary report presented by Italy to the United Nations Security Council CounterTerrorism Committee (CTC), S/2002/1390, dated 20 December 2002 and Supplementary report presented by Italy to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), S/2003/724, dated 18 July 2003. See: http:// www. un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html accessed 10 March 2004. Decree Law 374 of 18 October 2001 (enacted as law 438 of 15 December 2001). National report of the Republic of Italy, p. 4. National report of the Republic of Italy, p. 6. See also Supplementary report presented by Italy to the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), S/2002/ 1390, dated 20 December 2002, p. 14. See: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/ 1373/submitted_reports.html accessed 10 March 2004. National report of the Republic of Italy, p. 9. Supplementary report presented by Italy, p. 20. National report of the Republic of Italy, p. 21. See Report submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373(2001), S/2001/ 1246 dated 26 December 2001, p. 3; http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ submitted_reports.html accessed 10 March 2004. Ibid., pp. 11–12.

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77. The existing framework included Act 19/1993 on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Act 40/1979 on Exchange Control, see Reply to the Letter from the Counter-terrorism Committee requesting additional information from Spain pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373(2001), S/2003/628 dated 9 June 2003, pp. 6–7, see: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ submitted_reports.html accessed 10 March 2004. 78. ‘Special report: civil liberties’, The Economist, 31 August 2002, 20. 79. See Report submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373(2001), S/2001/1246 dated 26 December 2001, pp. 6–8. 80. OHCHR, ‘Terrorism and human rights’, p. 1. 81. ‘Special report: civil liberties’, The Economist, 31 August 2002, 20. 82. OHCHR, ‘Terrorism and human rights’, p. 3. 83. Naomi Koppel, Associated Press, 14 March 2004. 84. ‘Anti-terrorism, farewell, Londonistan?’, The Economist, 2 February 2002. 85. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 91984 at 1420, as quoted in Lord Steyn, ‘Guantánamo Bay’, (see n. 23), p. 5, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/ guantanamo.pdf accessed 27 September 2004.

Conclusion: A Three-Year Progress Report and Tackling Root Causes Karin von Hippel

Europe Confronts Terrorism examines the institutional, political, security and other reforms that have taken place in Europe in the three years since the catastrophic terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001. The tragic attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 – to date, the worst terror attack on European soil – demonstrated that Europe was also a target, and emphasised the necessity of decisively defeating the al-Qa’ida organisation, movement and network. The three years covered in this volume have been defined by two US-led wars, increased unilateralism by the United States, heightened transatlantic tension, multilateral expansion and consolidation in Europe as well as deep divisions within Europe. All but the expansion of the European Union have been the result of policies put in place after 11 September. Europe undertook a number of reforms, not only as a response to the terror attacks, US unilateralism and individual country concerns about becoming the next target, but also as part of a process that had been under way since the mid-1970s. September 11 and March 11 accelerated a course of action already underway. The three years since the attacks in America have also witnessed a widening gulf between the public and their leaders in many parts of Europe. Notably in Britain, Italy and Spain, while the three governments supported the US-led war in Iraq, large majorities were adamantly opposed to it and simply did not believe the arguments made by their democratically elected leaders. Several days after the attacks in Madrid, Prime Minister Aznar invited the public to join him on the streets in protest. Eleven million people responded as they marched in dignified silence in the early evening through the rainy streets of Spain. Two days later, they invited a new government to represent them in one of the largest electoral turnouts in years, with 77 per cent of the electorate voting. This so-called ‘people’s revolt’ could herald further changes to come. While it is too early to predict al-Qa’ida’s demise – too many important senior figures remain at large, attacks are being carried out at fairly regular intervals in many parts of the world, recruitment does not appear to have slowed, and the ‘perceptual gulf’ between North and South only seems to be widening – the progress as well as the manner by which the campaign has 263

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been executed thus far can be evaluated. This final chapter does so in two parts: the first considers the reforms that have taken place in Europe and concerning Europe’s relations with America, while the second outlines the more challenging and long-term aspect of the campaign: the attempts to tackle root causes. Success can only be achieved through a combination of military, legal, financial, police, and intelligence reforms with a dedicated effort to combat the ideology and the ‘enabling environment’ in which terrorism takes root.

What reforms have occurred in Europe? As depicted in the chapters in this volume, numerous reforms have been carried out in every European country, from the most vulnerable in terms of assumed high-end targets (the United Kingdom) through to the least likely target (Finland). All countries have established – or bolstered – counter-terrorism, civil defence and protection legislation. All the while, airport procedures and border patrols have been tightened in European states, and police, intelligence, the military and even health care officials placed on a fairly continuous state of alert. European terrorist experts recognise the network of existing national intelligence services as the best guarantee of efficiency for now, though that could be shifted to EU levels in the future. Several European militaries have even received a budgetary boost, reversing a trend that had been in motion since the end of the cold war. In addition, citizens in every part of Europe have become enlisted to report suspicious activity to the police, and to watch for lone bags at airports or in train stations. In general, Europeans have demonstrated a calmer, more collective resolve than Americans due to decades of experience with counter-terrorist measures of some kind. Their governments mirror this by issuing fewer warnings than their counterpart across the Atlantic, where a daily colour-coded threat level can be found on all US government websites, one that vacillates between severe (red) through to low (green), but typically lingers somewhere in the middle at elevated (yellow). It is safe to say that citizens in Europe, as well as in America, are more vigilant today, and perhaps more politically aware, than they were prior to 11 September. That many reforms have been pushed through without strong reactions from the public testifies to the perceived serious nature of this threat, particularly in those European states with a history of mistrust of security authorities. In Greece and Spain, for example, where democracy was only restored in the mid-1970s after years of dictatorship, this evolution has been symbolically significant. Germany can be found at the other end of the spectrum, where power was purposely decentralised by the Allies after World War II, and security and intelligence agencies scattered throughout the 16 provinces. Here, harmonisation in face of this new threat has proved equally challenging not just because of the bureaucratic and geographic

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hurdles. Germans also had to overcome the psychological legacies of the Gestapo and the Stasi when transferring more power to security authorities, especially at the centre. The British have had other reasons for wishing to maintain a decentralised counter-terrorist infrastructure. The operating premise in the United Kingdom has been that the responsibility for managing an emergency should lie with the agency and/or level of government most appropriate to deal with the incident, whether it be health, environment or transport-related. The UK government believes that preparation and coordination can be achieved without the massive reorganisation of central government that has taken place in the United States with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. Whether or not this decision is correct remains to be seen. At the European level, 11 September and 11 March galvanised EU institutions and pushed through numerous reforms that had previously been blocked. Bureaucratic procedures have been streamlined and some justice and home affairs matters harmonised. Europe approved a European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist groups and individuals. European states and institutions have frozen assets of people and organisations involved in terrorist activity, while Europol has been upgraded and Eurojust established. Port and border controls have been strengthened by more bilateral cooperation, Immigration Liaison Officers have been sent to third countries, and a Visa Information System has been put in place to simplify and better control immigration into EU states.

Where are the divisions? At the same time, some governments in Europe have used the excuse of 11 September to tighten legislation in the name of security or pass pet legislation that had been blocked. This has been more pronounced in the United States, but it has also occurred in the United Kingdom, and, to a lesser extent, in other European countries. The Finns, on the other hand, have been the most protective of civil liberties and concerned about maintaining the delicate balance between upholding the basic rights and freedoms of individuals and increasing security. Human rights groups fear that some of the more restrictive measures might undermine fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech or the transparency of judicial and legislative procedures. And they have responded in a vocal manner when their governments have over-played their hand, complaining in numerous fora about the more draconian measures undertaken by their own or by US authorities, especially concerning Guantánamo detainees. In several instances, their campaigns have succeeded in reversing legislation and practice. European countries also differ in terms of treatment of immigrants and integration policies. Germany sits at one end of the spectrum, perhaps more

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politically correct than other countries due to its Nazi past, and Denmark at the other, after November 2001, when Danes elected the openly racist Danish Peoples Party (Dansk Folkeparti) led by Pia Kjaersgaard, which then tried to implement anti-immigrant legislation. Given that Europe is now home to over 20 million Muslims, and that pockets of Muslim immigrants live in fairly isolated areas, often on the margin of society, it is understandable that some of these areas have become ripe grounds for recruiting, fund-raising and providing sanctuary. For example, in Italy, Islamic cells are apparently actively recruiting and facilitating the transfer of Islamic volunteers to fight in Iraq and Chechnya. There are also differences in threat perceptions, with some arguing that support for the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq makes them more likely targets, while others posit that all European societies should consider themselves targets. Bin Laden’s pinpointing of several European countries at different times – both before and after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – provides some evidence that this may be the case. In Spain, for example, many believed that Spanish support in Iraq was responsible for the bombings, even though Spanish security officials had considered Spain a target long before Spanish troops deployed to Iraq. Bin Laden has also referred to the loss of Al Andalus on more than one occasion, also prior to the Iraq war. A number of Danes fear that Danish support for the ‘war against terrorism’ makes Denmark more of a target. The French and British governments, on the other hand, believed themselves to be targets prior to both wars, especially France which suffered attacks by Islamic extremists during the 1990s. While France may have the most developed counter-terrorist infrastructure in Europe, and notable successes in countering extremist elements, developed over a 20-year period, Greece has been catapulted further up the chain, closer to Spain and the United Kingdom, after years of complacency, primarily because of the security demands from hosting the Olympics. Greece also feels itself to be a more likely target given its geography, its relations with Arab and Gulf States as well as improved relations with Israel. There are other historical legacies that need to be fully overcome, as mentioned, such as the mistrust between the French and the British during the 1990s, when Britain harboured known Islamic extremists, and between the French and the Spanish. For the latter, the Spanish long believed that the French provided sanctuary to suspected ETA terrorists. The French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, an expert on Islamic terrorism, noted that his own investigations led to Madrid in June 2001 when he informed the Spanish police that Jamal Zougam, who owned the phone shop that was later to become core to the Madrid attacks, was involved with Islamic extremist groups and recruited in Europe and Morocco. The Spanish police did not arrest him, because of insufficient evidence. The aforementioned tensions may have also played a role.1

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Some European countries are more multilateral than others. For example, the Nordics traditionally value multilateral and pacifist solutions, and greatly respect international legal principles and human rights. While many smaller European states favour a multilateral approach, some of the larger ones, particularly the British, have tended to shy away from further integration. Others argue that the European Union cannot provide a full transnational response until it improves its defence capabilities. Europe-wide, many of the achievements are yet to be realised given that a number of the measures agreed at the EU level still have not been implemented by some of the member states. The EU’s new coordinator for counter-terrorism is responsible for urging national governments to implement these measures, yet he has no mandate to force these changes. At the transatlantic level, thus far Europeans have behaved in a more measured manner than the US government in terms of restricting civil liberties and infringing human rights. The harsh measures applied based on the USA Patriot Act, as well as the blatant disregard for international law in the treatment of detainees in Guantánamo in Cuba, have been criticised by most European leaders, scholars and publics (as well as a number of American counterparts). The lesson may be that many European governments have learned from their own experiences fighting terrorism that such harsh measures do not reduce terrorist attacks, and may be more damaging to the democratic process. The contrast between the Scandinavian approach, where all government records are publicly available, and that of the United States, where the whereabouts of too many terrorist suspects remained unknown even by their families in late 2004, cannot be more stark. The more multilateral European ‘soft approach’ to counter-terrorism has indeed led to conflict with the United States. In the initial period of ‘unconditional solidarity’, Europe and the United States enjoyed improved access to each other’s security information. The war in Iraq reversed that cooperative attitude, and interfered with the consolidation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As the distinctions between international and domestic terrorism increasingly blurs over time, and as evidence emerges that al-Qa’ida has tried to merge with more traditional terrorist organisations, the United States may request more assistance from those European states with significant experience fighting national terrorist groups. There appears to be scope for negotiation with some of the groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida – even bin Laden himself offered to negotiate with European states at one stage, as noted in the Introduction. No matter how ridiculous his offer may have been, it demonstrates that some of the hard and fast lines drawn after 11 September by analysts may no longer be so certain. In addition, not all groups are so radicalised. Some hijack parts of bin Laden’s agenda without fully subscribing to all aspects. Others act more like occasional

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freelancers. Thus the imperative of transnational cooperation in order to confront all variations of these groups. Yet, as noted by several authors in this collection, until Europe and America agree on an overarching strategic framework for countering this new terrorist threat, success will remain illusive. A fundamental component of this framework will be the campaign to deal with the root causes of terrorism, because all these new measures and reforms at national, Europe-wide and even transatlantic levels cannot guarantee that an attack will not take place. All governments have structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities that could be exploited, and no government could be expected to eliminate all vulnerability to terrorist attack. It is simply not possible to prevent attacks in truly globalised, relatively open societies. Thus a complementary campaign that addresses root causes takes on added urgency.

Dealing with the roots of terror: a progress report three years on Al-Qa’ida’s spectacular on 11 September, along with the tragically lethal attacks in places such as Nairobi, Bali and Madrid, attest to its determination, reach and capabilities. The indoctrination strategy is equally long-term; the extremist madrasas epitomise the patient nurturing of potential recruits. Beyond the military, police, legal and financial activities that have been undertaken to confront this threat, as noted, a number of longer-term preventative measures also need to be adopted by governments and international organisations to thwart this movement, network and organisation. At the risk of stating the obvious, the threat posed by transnational terrorism can only be defeated through a coordinated, robust, long-term, transnational response. Publicly, all states and international organisations have been committed to tackling root causes since 11 September, though some were quicker than others in articulating their policies. For example, just after the attacks, the European Union outlined a comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy that also incorporated a major component aimed at root causes, as did the United Nations and the OECD.2 For these organisations, the focus was not on regime change, but rather on a number of socio-economic reforms in developing states. Approximately one and a half years later, and two wars on, the US government formally joined the effort when it published its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,3 though the US administration remained committed to its belief that regime change in Iraq was also a core part of a campaign dedicated to root causes. The US paper asserts: Ongoing US efforts to resolve regional disputes, foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, while not necessarily focused on combating terrorism, contribute to the campaign by addressing underlying conditions that terrorists often seek to manipulate for their own advantage.4

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The strategy paper goes on to describe how the US government cannot do this alone, ‘The United States has neither the resources nor the expertise to be in every place in the world . . . Our friends and allies face many of the same threats. It is essential for America to work with its friends and allies in this campaign.’5 While much of the language in the National Strategy appears bizarrely out of place, and certainly inconsistent with US behaviour since the start of the Bush Administration, at least publicly, the US government formally committed to dealing with root causes. However it transpired that the public strategies of Europe and America converged on the issue of tackling root causes (though not on the regime change component), and however welcome the US approach may be to European policy-makers, the question remains as to how well both power blocks actually understand root causes and what their strategies in fact entail for countering them. Three years on, they have not implemented significant practical measures, in terms of political and socio-economic reforms, which could fundamentally reduce the appeal and influence of bin Laden and al-Qa’ida. Three years on, the progress report is decidedly mediocre. Beyond the more radical elements of the al-Qa’ida platform which are considered non-negotiable, other underlying causes still need to be tackled, while those that are less well understood, or merely assumptions at this stage, need greater clarification. (This chapter takes it as a given that if President Bush would follow through on his promise to push for peace in the Middle East, this would make an enormous contribution to removing a serious obstacle and perceptions of inequity by many Arabs and Muslims.) This part of the concluding chapter, therefore, examines developments in six main areas that have emerged in the public debate as causal and facilitating factors for international terrorism. A closer examination of these factors reveals that while some energy has been dedicated to understand and tackle them in the three years since the attacks in America, the response has not been adequate. The rhetoric – on both sides of the Atlantic – has not yet been satisfactorily matched by realistic and robust reforms. 1. Terrorism and poverty: what are the links? The first area is the complicated link between terrorism and poverty. Since 11 September, a number of world leaders, including President Bush, have made a connection between poverty and terrorism. Although conventional wisdom would argue in favour of establishing a direct correlation, the evidence gathered thus far does not fully support this proposition. Indeed, if poverty really were the root cause of terrorism, terrorists would mostly come from the poorest parts of the world, namely sub-Saharan Africa. Thus far, this is not the case. A Princeton study in 2002 on Israeli and Arab terrorism in the Middle East demonstrated that in this region, terrorists not only enjoyed living standards above the poverty line, but also had obtained at the minimum a secondary

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education.6 Information gathered thus far regarding the background of al-Qa’ida members seems to be consistent with these findings, especially regarding the ability of these terrorists to adapt successfully to foreign environments. In alien cities, members of al-Qa’ida have had no trouble finding employment, renting apartments, attending graduate schools and enrolling in flying lessons, all of which would have been much more difficult had they been uneducated and indigent. Two additional factors, however, complicate the poverty debate: suicide bombers and education. Suicide bombers A more direct link could be established between ‘suicide bombers’ and poverty in some circumstances, given that the families of ‘suicide bombers’ are generously compensated by a number of charitable organisations. It could thus be argued that the financial reward can become an attractive incentive for a poor family. In the case of the Palestinians, the sponsors of ‘suicide bombers’ included, among others, Saddam Hussein. Yet, in her interviews with potential Palestinian suicide bombers, Nasra Hassan found that most came from middleclass and educated families.7 In contrast, Jessica Stern’s research, which focused on the Kashmir dispute, demonstrated that many volunteers did indeed come from poor families, and often because of the financial reward.8 Further research is needed to shed light on how relevant financial considerations are with respect to such volunteers in many parts of the world. Education Education is an additional factor to consider in the poverty debate. In some Islamic countries, such as Somalia or Pakistan, poor parents send their children to madrasas and Qur’anic schools because they are heavily subsidised or free of charge. Children also receive food, clothing and books, at no cost to the family. It has become apparent, however, that children who attend certain radicalised madrasas are taught to despise ‘corrupting western influences’ from an early age, and gain few practical skills to prepare them for working in modern society (for example, some learn no maths nor science whatsoever).9 In the late 1990s, it was estimated that more than 10,000 teachers were instructing three million local students plus an additional 10,000 foreign students in madrasas. Most of these children came from poor families. Combined spending on this type of education was estimated at over $1 billion per year, with three-fourths of the funds coming from abroad, and mostly from Saudi Arabia. While approximately 30 per cent of the Taliban – the hosts for al-Qa’ida – were educated in such madrasas, many of the known al-Qa’ida terrorists themselves, such as those who committed the 11 September attacks, were not. Interestingly, many of the hijackers had advanced scientific and technical degrees, and were educated in Europe and North America. These discrepancies indicate the need to clarify and categorise educational achievement and

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standards for different terrorists in order to develop appropriate interventions for these populations. Support for quality public education could be one way of attacking root causes in some parts of the world. Tentative steps have begun in this direction, for example, the European Union has been exploring innovative approaches to working with the Pakistani madrasa system, in an attempt to engage the ‘huge untapped source of manpower and funding for educational and development work’ in evidence in these communities.10 The US government has also been applying pressure on Pakistan and other countries to reform the madrasas – with minimal success.11 Yet the funds dedicated to educational reform thus far – such as USAID’s commitment in 2002 for $100 million to help reform Pakistan’s education system over a five-year period – pale in comparison to the amounts spent on defence. Rumsfeld’s missile defence system, now being deployed even though evidence does not exist that it actually works, already has cost US taxpayers over $31 billion, and estimates of the total cost are more than $100 billion.12 After the war in Afghanistan, Senator Joe Biden proposed a project to build and supply a thousand schools in Afghanistan in order to counter the influence of the madrasas. The idea was soon killed, and not just by the Republican party, but also by his own Democratic colleagues.13 As George Packer explained, ‘Spending twenty million dollars on schools in Afghanistan is a harder sell than spending four hundred billion on defence; fear is more compelling than foresight.’ According to Biden, ‘This is a place where the President’s bragging to me, “Mr Chairman, I don’t do nuance” – where he has an advantage.’14 It is not only poor children who are being indoctrinated at extremist schools, but also a large number of educational systems in wealthier Middle East countries. In 2002, the Saudis conducted a review of their textbooks and found that 5 per cent of the material was ‘horrible’, 10 per cent ‘questionable’ while 85 per cent called for ‘understanding with other religious faiths’.15 Thus far Qatar is the only country to completely overhaul its education system, and in this case, reform has been attributed to the modernisation package introduced by the ruler, Sheik Hamad Bin Khalifa Thani, rather than as a result of US pressure. Even if the entire system could be overhauled overnight, there are still millions of children who have already gone through this system, one that began to expand significantly from the 1970s in places such as Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, Indonesia, parts of Africa as well as the Middle East and North Africa (although not all schools have an extremist agenda and not all students will become terrorists).16 Policy measures focused on these ‘graduates’ have not even been considered. Even if many terrorists, and their leaders, are neither poor nor uneducated, they tend to use the plight of the poor as one justification for committing violence, and for broadening their appeal. They often claim to speak on

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behalf of the poor, just as other middle-class, well-educated ideologues have done in the past. Therefore, it could well be argued that a serious effort to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals (or making them more realistic and achievable) is essential in order to remove one of the platforms commonly used by terrorists. As Ambassador David Shinn remarked, ‘What is missing is a major, new, long-term program to reduce poverty and social alienation.’17 Instead of concentrating on the individual terrorist, who is likely to be beyond reach, it may be more important to work on what Louise Richardson of Harvard refers to as ‘the enabling environment’ or ‘complicit society’. 2. Collapsed and weak states: breeding grounds or open markets for illegal economic activity? When discussing the environment in which terrorism flourishes, a further theory links ‘failed’ states, such as Somalia, to terrorism.18 The factors that make these places attractive include weak or non-existent government structures, and the inability of the international community to monitor or interfere with trafficking and smuggling pipelines, which are used to move humans, drugs, small arms, natural resources, black money and potentially nuclear materials across porous borders. Terrorists in theory can operate with relative impunity, without fear of a government crackdown on operations, or international intervention. These attractions may be countered by the difficulties facing terrorists when operating in an insecure and foreign environment, where security is itself highly fragmented and infrastructure unreliable. It should be recalled that when taking refuge in Sudan, bin Laden did not settle in the southern parts of the territory that are considered ‘lawless’, albeit Christian and Animist, but rather in the Muslim north, in Khartoum, an area where the government is and was firmly in control. Similarly, when he established his base in Afghanistan in 1996, the country was no longer a collapsed state, but was instead under the control of the Taliban, except for the northern province of Badakhshan. While collapsed states may not be the real breeding grounds for terrorists – and there is little hard evidence to support the allegations, particularly in the case of Somalia19 – they could, in future, become more attractive territories, especially if the international community tightens its grip over terrorist networks in other states. And currently they are at risk for transhipment activity and for providing sanctuary to some terrorists – the recent Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia to the Security Council described how Somalia not only harboured some of the terrorists who carried out the attacks in Mombasa, but also how the territory was used to smuggle weapons into Kenya. These types of interventions can only serve to undermine nascent state authorities and attempts at democratisation. While the al-Qa’ida network has also penetrated western societies, at least in Minneapolis, London, Hamburg or Toronto, they leave behind a paper

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trail, whereas in weak states it is far more difficult to ascertain their movements and activities. All policy papers recognise the need to strengthen governance and security sectors in these places. For example, the US National Strategy likewise declares, ‘we will ensure that efforts designed to identify and diminish conditions contributing to state weakness and failure are a central US foreign policy goal. The principal objective . . . will be the rebuilding of a state that can look after its own people.’20 Yet here too, unfortunately, little has been done in the past three years to rebuild weak and collapsed states around the world. For example, funds committed to Somalia by OECD states are not only insignificant in scale, but the totals are also no larger today than prior to 11 September, and most of it is dedicated to humanitarian efforts, not to nation-building.21 3. Conflicts hijacked by religious extremists Wars perceived as threatening Islam have been exacerbated due to the participation of ‘foreign volunteers’, many of whom have links to al-Qa’ida. This occurs in much the same way that past ideological wars, such as the Spanish Civil War, attracted foreign recruits. Bin Laden and other al-Qa’ida members – the so-called ‘Afghan Arabs’ – fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which is when al-Qa’ida was allegedly founded. While researchers and journalists are now revisiting some of the conflicts penetrated by these ‘Muslim Mercenaries’, not enough is known about their participation in places such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Eritrea, Kashmir, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan and Uzbekistan. Al-Qa’ida involvement can also transform these territories into breeding grounds for terrorists, as occurred in Afghanistan during the late 1990s. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s top lieutenant, wrote that he visited Chechnya with the intention of establishing it as a further training base.22 These conflicts also provide new recruits, and expand the network of affiliates. The presence of these ‘foreign volunteers’ can lead to the improvement of strategies, tactics, quality of equipment, and to the adoption of more violent methods of confrontation, that is, suicide attacks involving massive civilian casualties as opposed to selective attacks against precise military targets. Attempts should be made to resolve these conflicts through shrewd use of diplomatic and development tools, before they are corrupted in this manner. For those conflicts that have already been exacerbated, new tools will have to be utilised, but first, a greater understanding of how these conflicts have been manipulated by the al-Qa’ida movement is necessary. Here again, too little is being done to resolve these conflicts. The 2004 Beslan school massacre, in Russia’s North Caucasus, provides a horrific example of what can happen if these conflicts are left to fester. It only serves Russian Prime Minister Putin’s interests to claim foreign involvement, even though it is still unclear if it was purely a domestic terror attack or if ‘Muslim mercenaries’ played a role.

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4. Fundamentalist charities Financial support that promotes international terrorism comes from a variety of sources, including wealthy individuals, states, diasporas, criminal activities, and charitable organisations. Funding from all sources is dedicated, among other things, to planning and executing attacks, assistance for families of suicide bombers, and long-term indoctrination through extremist madrasas, religious centres, and social support mechanisms. Concerning charitable assistance, a distinction needs to be made between some Islamic charities, such as the Aga Khan Foundation, which provides critical humanitarian and development assistance in neglected rural and urban areas, and others that promote a radical agenda. Significantly, one of the basic tenets of Islam is charity, and charity given in a way that does not humiliate the receiver. This discreet method of delivery, however, complicates matters and makes it difficult to discern how certain Islamic charities, along with several governments, such as Iran, propagate their extremist ideology and anti-western sentiment with their aid in many developing countries. Rohan Gunaratna notes, ‘According to the CIA, one-fifth of all Islamic NGOs worldwide have been unwittingly infiltrated by al-Qa’ida and other terrorist support groups.’23 It is important, therefore, to understand how these funding pipelines operate, as well as the extremist advocacy that is channelled through these networks. Incidentally, western aid agencies may also consider utilising more discreet delivery mechanisms in Islamic countries as an additional means to avoid humiliation. While international efforts have uncovered information about the financial activities of some of the Saudi-funded charities, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is trying to implement a more stringent regime to make all charitable organisations more transparent and accountable, greater efforts need to be made to understand and improve our response to radical religious funding and advocacy efforts in many parts of the world. The US government also needs to consider alternative ways of ‘winning hearts and minds’ through their actions, rather than their current policy of doing the opposite, for example, by shutting down remittance houses, which are in most cases a lifeline for poor countries. At the most basic level, it is often simply the dearth of western international support that makes some developing states vulnerable and susceptible to terrorist ideology. While the religious appeal may not be overwhelming for many families, the lack of alternatives for schooling or health care fuels the growth of the movement. In Somalia, for example, because western international assistance is not significant in scale, the influence of these Islamic movements has increased. A recent ICG report noted that the fundamentalist movements inside Somalia ‘owe their rapid growth since 1990 less to genuine popularity than access to substantial external funding’.24 Islamic charitable assistance is rarely noted in UN appeals for Somalia (indeed this is lacking in

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most UN appeals), and few of the sponsoring states or organisations actively participate in the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, established to serve as the permanent coordination body for donors, UN agencies, NGOs and other international organisations. Every effort should be made to try to include Islamic NGOs in all international coordinating bodies. Currently the work of these NGOs all too often occurs in parallel to those sponsored by OECD states. At the very least, discussion should be promoted and information exchanged with Islamic NGOs in order to prevent overlap and duplication, improve needs assessments, and importantly, enhance the lives of the poor. Moreover, it appears that over the last decade, significant amounts of financing for terrorist activities worldwide has come from Saudi Arabian sources. Saudi money has allegedly funded fundamentalist activity in a wide range of places – from Algeria or Chechnya, in support of insurgent groups, to Europe or Central Asia, where the Saudis have provided the funding for mosques and scholarships for students of Islamic studies. The influence of these charities has increased on the quiet, though recently in the United States, two publications concerning the Saudi connection have received significant attention.25 It must also be pointed out here that it is not just the extreme Islamic groups that utilise this method of influence: Christian fundamentalist organisations in the United States, for example, have been supporting certain sides in conflicts that are perceived as threatening to Christianity, with southern Sudan being the most obvious example. President Bush has been openly supporting the southern Sudanese in this long-standing conflict, primarily due to the influence of the Christian fundamentalist lobby. 5. Transnational mobilisation and recruitment The fifth area concerns a debate as to whether some economic migrants, asylum seekers, and members of certain diaspora communities are joining terrorist groups after having spent time in their host country. Mohammed Atta’s experience in Hamburg, or Sayyid Qutb’s in Colorado, are cited as two examples. It has been suggested that one of the main reasons why immigrants come to support terrorist groups, such as al-Qa’ida, is the alienation and prejudice they often experience in the West. This marginalisation is further reinforced by the fact that many remain outside formal state structures because they are not legal residents. Consequently they seek assistance and support from local mosques and Islamic cultural centres – often the first port of call for new arrivals – where they can obtain fake passports and identity cards. It appears that some of these individuals are vulnerable to the aggressive recruitment campaigns being carried out by extremist groups operating across Europe and the United States. Here too, they often access the extreme Islamist literature that advises them on ways to survive in ‘infidel’ countries. Such publications, along with

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al-Qa’ida manuals, promote and glorify an isolated existence in western countries, turning feelings of alienation into a necessary and noble means of survival. Prior to 11 September, many were encouraged to attend training camps in Afghanistan from these mosques and centres. In addition, today, as in the past, they are also recruited and radicalised in prisons. While this may be happening in some cases, it is also true that many were radicalised at home prior to coming to Europe and North America. It was in fact the liberal laws in Europe that prevented most European countries from returning many wanted radicals to their home countries, for fear they would be tortured or that the government would apply the death penalty. As noted above, the UK security services tolerated their presence, as did the Italians and several other European governments in the 1990s. At this stage, too many assumptions are being made on a too-small sample size.26 At the same time, it is critical that Europe confronts the thorny issue of overhauling its asylum procedures. 6. The governance factor: the democratic deficit Strong, authoritarian states that lack democracy and accountability may be the real breeding grounds for international terrorism. The al-Qa’ida terrorists who participated in the 11 September attacks, and most of the members of affiliated organisations who have been arrested for other acts of terrorism, come from such states. They oppose what they perceive to be authoritarian, secular rule in their own countries, and view their leaders as corrupted by western influences. They believe that only through the establishment of Islamic states can these countries be returned to the right path, and their former glory. In these countries, the snowballing anger on the so-called ‘Arab Street’27 hones in on the United States and some other western countries. Ordinary Saudis or Algerians or Egyptians are resentful of their own governments, but are unable to express that anger in any meaningful way that will bring about change. It is far easier to direct that anger at the United States and other developed states, which anyway are supporting their ‘elitist’ and nonrepresentative leaders. This frustration is so strong in some parts of the world that we often hear two entirely different and competing versions of events. Conspiracy theories abound as to who really committed recent terrorist attacks: accusations that the CIA and the FBI were behind the Bali bombing, or destroyed the Twin Towers, are perpetuated by extremist imams. These beliefs are being fed to populations in certain parts of the world that are already disillusioned and distrustful of the intentions of the ‘West’, or learned to hate the ‘West’ in school. Moreover, they read and hear about generous financial support for the impoverished, but rarely see evidence that the money reaches the poor. This is not necessarily the fault of developed states, which are often forced to work with corrupt governments due to their own conditionality factors

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to ensure accountability, or because they are unable to spend funds that have been committed due to lack of accountable partners on the ground. Nevertheless, the inability of developed states to realise international development goals contributes to this disillusionment and resentment, and allows more and more ordinary citizens to become susceptible to believing these conspiracy theories. This is the ‘complicit society’ referred to above. Thomas Friedman has argued that every attempt should be made to address the anger on the ‘Arab Street’, as once they move into the ‘Arab Basement’, it is too late to use persuasion and other non-violent measures.28 These six areas – poverty, weak and collapsed states, wars hijacked by Islamic extremists, fundamentalist charities, radicalisation in Europe and North America, and the ‘democracy deficit’ – need deeper analysis to understand how they may facilitate terrorist recruitment and support. They also require a response that goes further than that advocated by current policy in both Europe and America: new, more nuanced tools are required. At the very least, both Europe and America should make more of an effort to implement policies committed to since 11 September. As noted earlier, the threat posed by transnational terrorism can only be defeated through a dedicated and coordinated transnational response, one that not only focuses on the symptoms, but also on the causes. The latter should be spearheaded by the United Nations, as the only neutral and morally legitimate world body, which thus far has been hampered in its own counter-terrorism strategy by the transatlantic rift. As former US President Bill Clinton recently remarked, ‘If you come from a wealthy country with open borders, unless you seriously believe you can kill, imprison, or occupy all your enemies, you have to make a world with more friends and fewer enemies.’29

Notes and references 1. Eventually Bruguière interviewed Zougam and Spanish security began monitoring him, but they were still unable to arrest him prior to the attacks. For more details, see Lawrence Wright, ‘The terror web: were the Madrid bombings part of a new, far-reaching jihad being plotted on the Internet?’ The New Yorker, 2 August 2004, accessed on the Internet, August 2004. 2. See www.europa.eu.int for more information. The OECD-DAC Secretariat has also been at the forefront for exploring potential root causes and their implications for development cooperation. See the OECD’s most recent report, ‘A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action’, 11 April 2003, DCD/DAC(2003)11/REV1. See also the UN publication, ‘Annex, Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism’, A/57/273, S/2002/875. 3. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf 4. Ibid., p. 23.

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5. Ibid. 6. ‘Education, poverty, political violence and terrorism: is there a causal connection?’, Alan B. Krueger, Princeton University and NBER and Jitka Maleckova, Charles University, Working Papers, Research Programme in Development Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (May 2002). 7. Nasra Hassan, ‘An arsenal of believers’, The New Yorker (19 November 2001) 36–41. 8. Jessica Stern, ‘Pakistan’s jihad culture’, Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000). 9. See Jessica Stern, ‘Meeting with the Muj’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 57:1 ( January/February 2001) 42–51. 10. As noted in Brigid Smith, ‘Review of primary education in Pakistan during last 10 years, Madrassah schooling: potential for growth’, Consultancy to European Commission: Pakistan, ARCADIS BMB and EUROCONSULT, Pakistan, April 2002, p. 8, para. VI, See also ‘Pakistan: Madrasas, extremism and the military’, ICG Asia Report 36, International Crisis Group, Brussels, 29 July 2002. 11. See Febe Armanios, ‘Islamic religious schools, Madrasas: background’, Report for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, October 2003), p. 6. 12. See Bradley Graham, ‘The Bush record: missile defense interceptor system set, but doubts remain network hasn’t undergone realistic testing’, Washington Post, 29 September 2004, A01. 13. See George Packer, ‘A democratic world’, The New Yorker, 16 & 23 February 2004, 100–08. 14. Ibid., 107–08. 15. Febe Armanios, ‘Islamic religious schools, Madrasas’, p. 4. 16. Febe Armanios and Uzma Anzar, ‘Islamic education: a brief history of Madrassas with comments on curricula and current pedagogical practices’, Washington: World Bank (March 2003). 17. David Shinn, ‘Fighting terrorism in East Africa and the Horn’, Foreign Service Journal (September 2004), p. 42. 18. See, for example, ‘Banks-to-terror conglomerate faces US wrath’, Daily Telegraph, 28 September 2001. This article claimed that ‘between 3,000 and 5,000 members of the al Qa’eda and al-Itihad partnership are operating [in Somalia], with 50,000 to 60,000 supporters and reservists’. 19. For more information, see Ken Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: next up in the war on terrorism?’, CSIS Africa Notes, 6 ( January 2002); Andre le Sage, ‘Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist radicalism in Somalia’, Review of African Political Economy, 27:89 (September 2001); ‘Somalia and the “war” on terrorism’, Strategic Comments, 8:1 ( January 2002); Karin von Hippel, ‘Terrorist space’, World Today (February 2002). 20. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, p. 23. 21. For financial contributions to Somalia, see: www.sacb.info 22. As cited in Lawrence Wright, ‘The man behind bin Laden: how an Egyptian doctor became a master of terror’, The New Yorker, 16 September 2002, 80–1. 23. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qa’ida: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst & Co., 2002), p. 6. 24. ‘Somalia: countering terrorism in a failed state’, ICG Africa Report, 45 (23 May 2002), 13. 25. See, for example, ‘Terrorist financing: report of an independent task force’, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair, William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Co-Directors, 2002.

Karin von Hippel

279

26. Alison Pargeter, a research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, is undertaking a research programme on this topic. 27. Although the term is inappropriate because the anger is also felt by many nonArabs in other parts of the world. 28. Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, 23 October 2002. 29. Yale Alumni Magazine, Jan/Feb 2004, 13.

Index

Abdallah, Shadi, 47 Abu Hamza al-Masri, 9 Acebes, Angel, 127, 128 Active Endeavour, Operation, 67, 89, 241 Afghanistan, 1 Italian involvement, 89–90 Nordic attitudes toward campaign in, 98–9 Aga Khan Foundation, 274 Ahmidan, Hicham, 140 air safety, 201 European Union, 210 France, 35 Greece, 69 Italy, 86 Al Arabiya, 11 al Barakaat Financial Co., 108 Al Fattah, and Munich Olympic Games (1972), 44 al Jazeera, 45, 54 Al Taweed, 47 Alba, Operation, 68 Albania Islamic terrorist groups, 63 Italian cooperation with, 85 Alegre, Susanne, 179 Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 11 France, 20, 40 n8 Italy, 81 Spain, 132–3 Allen, David, 184 al-Qa’ida, 14, 171 Germany, 46–7, 48 as ideological movement, 134 impossibility of dialogue with, 148–9 Italy, 80, 81–3 loss of Afghanistan base, 209, 214 manipulation of conflicts, 273 modus operandi of, 4 network organisation of, 149 sources of recruits, 214 Spain, 127, 128 targets of, 214

transnational nature of threat, 3, 219, 224 United States, 216 al-Shehhi, Marwan, 46 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 45, 214, 273 American Convention on Human Rights, 249 Amnesty International United Kingdom, 253, 254 United States, 247, 248 Amsterdam, Treaty of, 171 Anglo-French summit (St Malo, 1998), 235 Annan, Kofi, 256 Ansar Al Islam, 133 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA, UK 2001), 154–5, 252 anti-terrorism, definition of, 14 n1, 40 n16 Ashcroft, John, 198–9 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 224, 226 asymmetric warfare, and new terrorism, 147 Atta, Mohammed, 46, 50, 54, 275 Australia counter-terrorism, 225 European Union, 225 Azizi, Amer, 133 Aznar, José María, 11, 128, 173, 179, 197, 263 Franco-Spanish cooperation, 141 Baader, Andreas, 43 Baader–Meinhof Gang, see Rote Armee Fraktion Bahaji, Said, 46 Bali bombing (2002), 222, 224, 225 Balkans Islamic terrorist groups, 63 organised crime, 72 Bangladesh, 271 Bank of Italy, 83 Barakat, Imad Edin, 127 280

Index Barcelona Process, 72 Barnier, Michel, 185 Basque Fatherland and Liberty, see Euskadi Ta Askatasuna Batasuna, 256 added to list of terrorist organisations, 127 Madrid bombing (2004), 123 Battisti, Cesare, 175 Belgium Belgian–Dutch naval arrangement, 239 counter-terrorism, 220: Franco-Belgian cooperation, 209 presidency of European Union, 172–4 Benchellali, Anissa, 40 n11 Benchellali, Chellali, 40 n11 Benchellali, Hafed, 40 n11 Benchellali, Menad, 40 n11 Benchellali, Mourad, 40 n11 Benjamin, Daniel, 6, 200, 202–3 Benyaich, Abdelaziz, 140 Berger, Samuel, 200 Berlusconi, Silvio, 92, 107, 173 Common European arrest warrant, 175 Bern Group, 34, 63, 89 Beslan school massacre, 273 Biden, Joe, 271 bin Laden, Osama, 266 anti-Americanism, 44 offers European truce, 222 Spain, 11 Binalshibh, Ramzi, 46, 54–5, 182 biological terrorism, combating France, 36–7 Greece, 68–9 Italy, 85–6 Nordic countries, 112–13 United Kingdom, 158 Biological Weapons Convention, 36 biometric identification, 49, 177 Björklund, Leni, 114 Black September, 44 Blair, Tony, 155, 162–3, 173–4, 192, 201–2, 212 Blinken, Antony, 192 Blunkett, David, 155, 160, 163, 221 Bondevik, Kjell Magne, 103, 107, 110 Boot, Max, 194

281

border controls European Union, 177–8, 223–4 France, 35–6 Greece, 71–2 Italy, 85 Bosnia-Herzegovina European Union mission in, 183 Islamic terrorist groups, 63 Bouchikhi, Ahmed, 117 n1 BP America, 223 Bretton Woods institutions, 226 Bruguière, Jean-Louis, 266 Brussels, Special European Summit at (2001), 172–3 Bulgaria, and Islamic terrorist groups, 63 Bundeskriminalamt (BKA, Germany), 44, 45, 50, 51, 56 Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, Germany), 51, 54 Burcharth, Martin, 193 Bureau Liaison pour Terrorisme, 61 Bush, George W. ‘axil of evil’ speech, 4, 221 domestic criticism of, 203–4 European views of, 192–3, 196, 198 on need for leadership, 198 war on terrorism, 195, 201 Castro, Fidel, 1 Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises (COGIC, France), 27 Centre Opérationnel Interarmées (COIA, France), 27 charities, fundamentalist, and financing of terrorism, 274–5 chemical weapon terrorism, combating France, 37 Greece, 68–9 Italy, 85–6 Nordic countries, 112–13 United Kingdom, 158 Chemical Weapons Convention, 36, 37 Cheney, Dick, 2 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 196 Chirac, Jacques, 1 Franco-Spanish cooperation, 141 meeting with Schröder, 173 NATO, 32 United States, 19

282

Index

Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC, United Kingdom), 152 civil defence, renewed interest in, 146 Clinton, Bill, 192, 234, 277 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel, 53 Cologne, ‘Caliph of’, 47–8 Comité Interministériel de Lutte Anti-Terroriste (CILAT), 21, 26, 27 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, European Union), 6, 179, 182–3, 184, 186–7, 188, 267 communication interceptions France, 24–5 Italy, 82 Spain, 141 United Kingdom, 220 Conference of Ministers of the Interior of the Western Mediterranean, 34 Congo, 183 Container Security Initiative (USA), 217, 219 Cooperative Threat Reduction programme (USA), 216–17 counter-terrorist campaign definition of counter-terrorism, 14 n1, 40 n16 international support for, 2–3 lack of common analytical framework, 9–12 requirements of successful, 13–14 see also entries for individual countries and institutions; terrorism; transatlantic relations Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference, 34 Customs–Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT, USA), 223 cyberwar, 77 n1 Dahdah, Abu, 134 Daimler Chrysler AG, 223 Danish Peoples Party (Dansk Folkeparti), 106, 266 data protection Germany, 7, 51 United States/European Union agreement, 223 Däubler-Gmelin, Herta, 55 Dayton agreement, 234 de Boissieu, Pierre, 187

de Lampedusa, Giuseppe, 205 de Vries, Gijs, 6, 180, 181, 186, 215 Defence Information Centre (CESID, Spain), 127 defence spending European Union, 185, 187, 197, 235, 237–8, 242 France, 238 Germany, 52 Italy, 86–7, 91 Spain, 124, 131 United States, 233, 271 United States–European disparities in, 8, 221 democratic deficit, and root causes of terrorism, 276–7 den Boer, Monica, 180, 181 Denmark Afghanistan campaign, 98 anti-immigrant politics, 106–7, 266 Commission on Vulnerability, 111 counter-terrorism legislation, 106–7 emergency preparedness, 111 Guantánamo detainees, 100–1 international integration, 115–16 Iraq War (2003), 101–2 perception of terrorist threat, 104–5 role of military, 114, 115 support for United States, consequences of, 114 terrorism, domestic experiences of, 117 n1 Weapons of Mass Destruction protection, 112–13 Denninger, Erhard, 50 Direction Centrale de la Police aux Frontières (DCPAF, France), 28 Direction Centrale de Police Judiciare (DCPJ, France), 28–30 Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST, France), 30 Direction des Libertés Publiques et des Affaires Juridiques (DLPAJ, France), 30 Direction Generale de la Securité Exterieure (DGSE, France), 30 Directorate-General of the National Police (DGPN, France), 28 Dominican Republic, 124 Dørum, Odd Einar, 107 Duckworth, Nicola, 254

Index education, and root causes of terrorism, 270–1 Enduring Freedom, Operation, Italian involvement, 89–90 Ennahda, 133 Ensslin, Gudrun, 43 Espersen, Lene, 106 Essid, Sami Ben Khemais, 81 ETA, see Euskadi Ta Askatasuna Eurofighter, 239 Eurojust, see European Justice Area Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 74 Euro-Mediterranean Process, 34 European Automated Fingerprints Identification System, 212–13 European Civil Aviation Conference, 35 European Commission, 6, 172, 179, 213, 251 European Convention, and EU constitution, 237 counter-terrorism, 6, 184–5 solidarity clause, 185–6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 252–3 European Council, 6, 180, 192, 215 European Court of Human Rights, 253 European Information System, 61 European Intelligence Agency, rejection of, 180–1 European Justice Area (Eurojust), 65, 177, 210–11, 251, 265 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 107 European Parliament, 172, 177 European Police Organisation (Europol), 5, 176–7, 181, 210, 211, 265 France, 34–5 Greece, 61 South East Asia/Australia, 225 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 6, 8, 179, 182–3, 188, 232, 267 military capabilities, 180, 235–6: deficiencies in, 236–7; integration of capabilities, 238–40; need for rationalisation, 238 progress towards, 235–6 ‘solidarity clause’ of constitution, 185–6 European Security Research Programme, 87

283

European Union Armaments Agency, 185 Australia, 225 Common European arrest warrant, 7, 66, 127, 175, 211–12, 251, 265 Council of Ministers’ Political and Security Committee, 209 counter-terrorism, 25, 127, 171, 187, 215, 264–5: air safety, 210; bilateral initiatives, 6–7; border controls, 177–8, 211–12, 223–4; Constitution of the European Union, 6, 185–6; coordination of, 5–6; Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 180, 181, 215, 267; data protection, 223; definition of terrorism, 174; developmental policy, 188; disagreement over nature of threat, 10–11; financing of, 186–7; human rights concerns, 179, 188, 212–13, 250–2; immigration policy, 177–8, 212–13, 223–4; operational custom, 210–11; political incapacity, 211–12; rejection of European Intelligence Agency, 180–1; root causes, 268; territorial security, 210, 214, 223; terrorist finances, 175–6, 213–14; threat analysis, 179, 180; threat perceptions, 216–18; threat-based approach, 218; Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism, 218 Counter-terrorism Task Force, 209 defence spending, 185, 187, 197, 235, 237–8, 242; European Defence Budget, 240 European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), 5, 130–1, 174–6 European Security Strategy, 184 foreign aid, 221 Framework Decision on terrorism, 105–6, 174–6 growth as regional power, 234–5 Indonesia, 225, 226 Iraq War (2003), divisions over, 1–2, 10, 184, 188 Joint Investigation Teams, 175 military and police operations of, 183–4: financing of, 187; limitations on, 184; Petersberg Tasks, 236

284

Index

European Union – continued military capabilities, 180, 235–6: Battle-group, 91; deficiencies in, 236–7; European Defence Budget, 240; integration of, 238–40, 242; need for rationalisation, 238; Rapid Reaction Force, 91, 130, 143 n8, 183 Muslim populations within, 7, 9, 209, 214 NATO, 240–1 police force cooperation, 34–5 response to September 11 terrorist attack, 172: diplomatic chaos, 173–4; Special European Summit (Brussels, 2001), 172–3 Schengen Agreements, 35–6, 61, 67, 211 security challenges facing, 232 Stability and Growth Pact, 131 Task Force of Chiefs of Police, 34 terrorism, domestic experiences of, 171, 219–20 terrorist-sponsoring states, 7 United Nations, 172 United States: cooperation with, 181–2; expresses solidarity with, 172, 173; tensions between, 7–9, 10, 184, 188 Vienna Action Plan (1998), 171 Visa Information System, 178, 265 see also Common Foreign and Security Policy; European Security and Defence Policy; transatlantic relations European Union Police Chiefs Operational Task Force, 34, 181 Europol, see European Police Organisation Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), 40 n10, 123, 125–7, 128, 129, 131–2, 171, 219 Explizit, 45 failed states, and root causes of terrorism, 272–3 Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering (FATF), 31, 32, 274

financing of terrorism, combating, 198 European Union, 175–6, 213–14, 251 France, 31–2 fundamentalist charities, 274–5 Germany, 49 Italy, 83–4 Spain, 141 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, 245 variable efforts in, 201 Finland, 11 Afghanistan campaign, 98–9 emergency preparedness, 111–12 Guantánamo detainees, 100 human rights concerns, 265 international integration, 116 Iraq War (2003), 102, 118 n13 perception of terrorist threat, 105 role of military, 114, 115 Weapons of Mass Destruction protection, 113 Fischer, Joschka, 52, 55, 57 Fo, Dario, 193 Ford Motor Co., 223 Fox, Vicente, 192 France Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises, 27 Centre Opérationnel Interarmées, 27 Comité Interministériel de Lutte Anti-Terroriste (CILAT), 21, 26, 27 Council for Interior Security, 27 counter-terrorism, 11, 22, 37–9, 254–5: air safety, 35; arrests made, 20–1; border controls, 35–6; concerns over, 38; defining terrorist activity, 22–3; deterring terrorist activity, 23–5; European coordination, 32; Franco-Belgian cooperation, 209; Franco-German cooperation, 209; Franco-Spanish cooperation, 128, 141; institutional framework for, 27–32; international cooperation, 19–20, 32–3, 128, 209; international police cooperation, 33–5; legislation, 21–2; national coordination issues, 27; principles of, 19; structure of, 21; success in, 37–8; Vigipirate Renforcé plan, 21, 25–7, 39, 254

Index defence spending, 238 intelligence services, 30 Iraq War (2003), 1, 19 Islamic terrorist groups, 21, 38, 209 Ministry of Defence, 26, 30–1 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry, 31–2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 Ministry of Justice, 31 Ministry of the Interior, 26: National Police structure, 28–30 Muslim population of, 9 NATO, 32 terrorism, domestic experiences of, 20, 40 n8 as terrorist target, 39 threat perception, 266 Unité de Co-ordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT), 21, 26, 27, 28, 38 United States, 194, 208 Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism: Biotox Plan on biological risk, 36–7; nuclear protection, 37; Piratox Plan Addressing Chemical Threats, 37 Freeh, Louis, 128 Friedman, Thomas, 277 Frier, Laure, 186 Frum, David, 197–8 Fukuyama, Francis, 195 Gaddafi, Mu’ammar, 1, 217 Ganczarski, Christian, 21 Garcia-Maltras, Elsa, 179 Garton Ash, Timothy, 193, 194 Gedmin, Jeffrey, 56 Gendarmerie National (DGGN, France), 30–1, 38 General Motors Co., 223 General Secretariat for Civil Protection (GSCP, Greece), 63–4 Germany Bundeskriminalamt, 44, 45, 50, 51, 56 Bundesnachrichtendienst, 51, 54 Bundeswehr (Federal Army): increased spending on, 52; reform of, 52–3, 57, 235 counter-terrorism, 255, 264–5: FrancoGerman cooperation, 209;

285

increased spending on, 50; intelligence services, 50–1, 53–4, 56–7; legal reforms, 48–50, 57, 220; Rote Armee Fraktion, 43–5, 56 data protection, 7, 51 Grenzschutzzgruppe 9, 44 immigrants in, 53, 56, 265–6 Islamic terrorist groups, 45–6, 56, 209: al-Qa’ida, 46–7, 48; jihad groups, 47–8; Mujahadeen, 47 United States, 194: Iraq War (2003), 55–6, 57; legal disputes with, 54–5, 208 Glistrup, Mogens, 107 Godal, Bjørn Tore, 98 Gompert, David, 195, 205 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Greater Middle East Initiative (USA), 226 Greece, 59–60 counter-terrorism, 264: air safety, 69; border controls, 71–2; coast guard, 63; defence diplomacy, 68; fire department, 63; General Secretariat for Civil Protection, 63–4; legislation, 65–6; National Emergency Response Plan, 64; National Intelligence Agency, 61–3; police force, 60–1; recommendations for improving, 74–6; Revolutionary Popular Struggle, 70–1; role of military, 67–8; Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism, 68–9 human trafficking, 72 immigrants in, 62: illegal, 71–2 Islamic terrorist groups, 62–3 Muslim population of, 72–3 November 17 group, 69–70 Olympic Games (2004), 60, 61, 64–6, 240–1 organised crime, 72 political asylum seekers, 71 security concerns of, 59–60 threat perception, 266 Grenzschutzzgruppe 9 (GSG 9, Germany), 44 Gridling, Peter, 177 Group of Eight, 31 counter-terrorism, 5

286

Index

Group of Seven, 31 Group of Twenty, 31 Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN, France), 30 Guantánamo naval base, 267 detention of non-resident aliens, 248–9 Nordic attitudes towards detainees at, 100–1 Guardia Civil (Spain), 126–7, 135, 137, 139 Gunaratna, Rohan, 134, 274 Haarder, Bertel, 106 Haas, Richard, 191, 205 Hagen, Carl I, 107 Halonen, Tarja, 98–9 Hamad Bin Khalifa Thani, Sheikh, 271 Hamas, 133, 176, 200, 219, 224 Hamilton, Daniel, 195 Hassan, Nasra, 270 Herrhausen, Alfred, 44 Hirsch, Michael, 201 Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party), 45 Hizbollah, 133, 200, 219, 224 Hoffman, Bruce, 7 Honduras, 124 human rights, and counter-terrorism measures, 244, 256–7, 265 European Union, 250–2: concerns over, 179, 188, 212–13 France, 254–5 Italy, 255 United Kingdom, 251–3: detention without trial, 154–5, 215, 220, 252–3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, 245 United States, 249–50, 267: detention of immigrants, 246–8; detention of non-resident aliens, 248–9; evidence collection, 246 human trafficking, and Greece, 72 immigrants Denmark, 106–7, 266 European Union policy, 177–8, 212–13, 223–4

Germany, 53, 56, 265–6 Greece, 62: illegal, 71–2 Italy, illegal, 85, 255 Muslim populations, 266: European Union, 7, 9, 209, 214; France, 9; Greece, 72–3; Italy, 80, 81, 92; Netherlands, 9; Spain, 9, 140, 142; United Kingdom, 9 Norway, 107 terrorist recruitment, 275–6 United States: detention of immigrants, 246–8; immigration policy, 223 Immigration and Naturalisation Services (INS, USA), 247 India, 271 France, 33 Indonesia, 224, 271 European Union, 225, 226 Indonesia Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (ICLEC), 225 intelligence services bilateral cooperation, 6–7 France, 30 Germany, 50–1, 53–4, 56–7 Greece, 61–3 Italy, 82–3, 88–9 Spain, 127, 135, 136, 137–8, 139 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 37 International Civil Aviation Organisation, 35 International Commission of Jurists, 249 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 247, 249, 253 International Criminal Court, 233 International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), 34, 61 International Federation for Human Rights, 254 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 219 International Monetary Fund, 31, 226 Interpol see International Criminal Police Organisation Iran, 217, 218 Iraq Survey Group, 2

Index Iraq War (2003) European Union divisions, 1–2, 10, 184, 188 France, 1, 19 German–United States relations, 55–6, 57 limited support for, 1–2 Nordic countries, 101–3: post-conflict aid, 103 post-war withdrawals, 124 United Nations Security Council, 1 United States–European relations, 1–2, 10 Islamic Cultural Institute (Italy), 81 Islamic Liberation Party, 45 Islamic terrorist groups Albania, 63 Balkans, 63 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 63 Bulgaria, 63 France, 20, 21, 38, 40 n8, 209 Germany, 45–8, 56, 209 Greece, 62–3 Italy, 81 Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of, 63 Spain, 127, 128, 132–7, 220 United Kingdom, 209 Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 226 difference in transatlantic views on, 199, 221 Itälä, Ville, 111 Italy Afghanistan, 89–90 Common European arrest warrant, 175 counter-terrorism, 80–1, 92, 255: air safety, 86; al-Qa’ida, 80, 81–3; financing of, 86–7; illegal immigration, 85, 255; intelligence services, 82–3, 88–9; international cooperation, 209; Islamic terrorist groups, 81; legislation, 81–2, 220; police forces, 87–8; protection of strategic locations, 84–5; response to potential attacks, 88; smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction material, 88; special forces, 91–2; terrorist finances, 83–4; Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism, 85–6 defence spending, 86–7

287

European Union forces, 91 Iraq War (2003), 80–1, 90 Muslim population of, 80, 81, 92 NATO, 90–1 as terrorist target, 92 Jäätteenmäki, Anneli, 102 Jakobson, Max, 99 Jarrah, Ziad, 46 Joint Inquiry Corps (JIC, Franco-Spanish), 141 Joint Investigation Teams (European Union), 175 Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), 6 Jospin, Lionel, 19 on military action, 22 Vigipirate Renforcé plan, 26 Kagan, Robert, 194, 195–6, 197 Kaplan, Cemettin, 47 Kaplan, Metin, 47–8 Karachi bombing (2002), 222 Kashmir, 226 Kenya, 224, 225 Kerry, John, 2 Kersten, Ulrich, 51 Kissinger, Henry, 7 Kjaersgaard, Pia, 106, 107, 266 Klink, Manfred, 44–5, 46, 51, 171 Kok, Wim, 173 Kosovo, 234, 235, 241 Kramer, Jane, 46 Kwasniewski, Alexander, 124 Lamari, Allekema, 133, 136 Le Monde, 1, 191 Levitte, Jean-David, 19 Libya Italian cooperation with, 85 renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 146, 217 Lindh, Anna, 95, 102, 109, 118 n22 Lipponen, Paavo, 102 London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP), 153–4 Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of, 235 European Union mission in, 183, 184 Islamic terrorist groups, 63

288

Index

madrasas, and root causes of terrorism, 270–1 Madrid bombing (2004), 9, 109, 123–4, 136, 208, 214, 222, 232 dismantling of terrorist network, 137 Islamic terrorist group, 133 nature of attack, 216 political impact of, 124, 197 Mahler, Horst, 45 Malaysia, 225 Marshall Fund, 196 Martino, Antonio, 86, 89, 91 McGraw, Phil, 204 Mead, Walter Russell, 194 media, and new terrorism, 151 Mediterranean Forum France, 34 Greece, 63 Medium Extended Air Defence Systems (MEADS), 53, 86 Meinhof, Ulrike, 43 Meliani Group (Mujahadeen), 47 Metropolitan Police Service (UK), 221 Meyssan, Thierry, 193–4 Michel, Louis, 172, 173 Milan, and al-Qa’ida, 81, 83 military expenditure, see defence spending military power, and United States, 233–4 Millennium Development Goals, 272 Mirouane Ben Ahmed, 21 Mitterand, François, 175 Møller, Per Stig, 100–1 Monar, Jörg, 180, 181 Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, and Italy, 81 Morocco, and cooperation with Spain, 140–1 Motion, Andrew, 193 Motorola Inc, 223 Mottassadeq, Mounir al, 46, 54–5 Moussaoui, Zachariah, 55, 182, 199, 208, 224 Mujahadeen, in Germany, 47 Muslim Brotherhood, 133 Mzoudi, Abdelghani, 46, 54–5

National Centre for Biological Defence (Denmark), 113 National Commission for the Monitoring of Security Interceptions (France), 25 National Intelligence Agency (Greece), 61–3 National Intelligence Centre (CNI, Spain), 127, 135, 136, 137–8, 139 National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC), 20, 40 n10 NATO Afghanistan, 1 Athens Olympics (2004), 65, 240–1 counter-terrorism, 213 European security, 240–1: counterterrorism role, 241 France, 32 International Security Assistance Force, 90 international terrorism, 232 invokes collective defence clause, 192 NATO Reaction Force (NRF), 143 n10, 241: Italy, 90–1; Spain, 131 Prague Capabilities Commitment, 90, 131, 144 n11, 232, 237 Spain, 131 Nehm, Karl, 47, 50, 55 Nelson, Daniel, 195 Netherlands Belgian–Dutch naval arrangement, 239 counter-terrorism, 220 Muslim population of, 9 as terrorist base, 12 netwar, 77 n1 new terrorism apocalyptic scenarios, 148 asymmetric warfare, 147 characteristics of, 3 difference in transatlantic views on, 199–202 the media, 151 nature of, 148–9 network organisation of, 149 vulnerability of attack from, 149–51 see also terrorism New Zealand, 124 Nicaragua, 124 Nielson, Poul, 184

Index Nordic countries, 11–12 cooperation among, 96–7 counter-terrorism legislation, 105–9 difficult trade-offs faced by, 114–15 divisions within, 97 emergency preparedness, 109–12, 115 the European Union, 97 foreign aid policies, 96 Guantánamo detainees, 100–1 inexperience of terrorism, 95 institutional reform, 109 international integration, 115–16 Iraq War (2003), 101–3, 114: post-conflict aid, 103 the Nordic model, 96, 267 perceptions of terrorist threat, 104–5, 114 Public Health Preparedness Treaty (2002), 113, 122 n74 reaction to Afghanistan campaign, 98–9 relaxation of counter-terrorism measures, 109 response to September 11 terrorist attack, 97–8, 117 role of military, 113–14, 115 support for United States, consequences of, 114 terrorism, domestic experiences of, 117 n1 Weapons of Mass Destruction protection, 112–13 Nordic Passport Union, 96 North Korea, 146, 217, 218 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts (1996, 1998), 154 Norway Afghanistan campaign, 98 anti-immigrant politics, 107 counter-terrorism legislation, 107 emergency preparedness, 110, 111 European Union, 115 Iraq War (2003), 103 Norwegian Vulnerability Commission, 110, 114 perception of terrorist threat, 104 role of military, 114, 115 support for United States, consequences of, 114

289

terrorism, domestic experiences of, 117 n1 Weapons of Mass Destruction protection, 112 withdrawal from Iraq, 124 November 17 terrorist group, 69–70 nuclear terrorism, combating France, 37 Greece, 68–9 Italy, 85–6 Nordic countries, 112–13 United Kingdom, 158 Ocalan, 62 Olympic Advisory Group (OAG), and Athens Olympics (2004), 65 Olympic Airlines, 69 Olympic Games Athens (2004), 60, 64–6 Munich (1972), 44 O’Neill, Paul, 109 Oreja, Jaime Mayor, 128 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 268 organised crime Greece, 72 international terrorism, 79 n25 Otegi, Arnaldo, 123 Packer, George, 271 Pakistan, 271 Palestine Liberation Organisation, 219 Greek attitude towards, 60 Palestinian national movement, 44 Palme, Olof, 95 Pan Am 103 bombing, 217 Partido Popular (PP, Spain), 124 Patel, Judge, 257 Patriot Act (USA), 215, 257, 267 human rights concerns, 246–8 Patten, Chris, 55 criticism of United States, 15 n21 Persson, Göran, 99, 102, 103, 105 Pew Research Centre, 196, 197, 204 Philippines, 224, 225 withdrawal from Iraq, 124 Pisanu, Giuseppe, 87, 89 PKK, 60 Poland, 124

290

Index

Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (CCPD), 36 police forces France, 28–30: international cooperation, 33–5 Germany, 44, 45, 50, 51, 56 Greece, 60–1: international cooperation, 61 Italy, 87–8: international cooperation, 88 Spain, 126–7, 135, 137, 139 United Kingdom, 221 Policia Nacional (Spain), 127, 134–5, 137, 139 poverty root causes of terrorism, 269–72 suicide bombers, 270 Powell, Colin, 173, 181, 194 Prevention of Terrorism Acts (POTA, UK 1989, 1996, 2000), 154 Progress Party (Denmark), 107 Progress Party (Norway), 107 Proliferation Security Initiative (USA), 217 Prost, Jean-Paul, 26 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 9, 171, 219 Public Health Preparedness Treaty (Nordic countries, 2002), 113, 122 n74 public–private cooperation, and counterterrorism, 223 Putin, Vladimir, 273 Qatar, 271 Qutb, Sayyid, 275 Rabeim, Hamed Sayed Osman (‘Mohamed the Egyptian’), 83, 133 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 101–2, 106 Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup, 98, 104 Recherce, Assistance, Intervention et Dissuasion (RAID, France), 28, 30 Red Army Faction, see Rote Armee Fraktion Red Brigades, 9, 25, 87, 171 Reid, Richard, 38, 201 Renseignements Generaux (DCRG, France), 30 Revolutionary Popular Struggle (Greece), 70–1

Rice, Condoleezza, 192 Richard, Alain, 26 Richardson, Louise, 272 Ridge, Tom, 6 Robertson, George, 213 Rondos, Alex, 65 Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), 25, 43–5, 56, 171 Rumsfeld, Donald, 101, 271 Iraq War (2003), 2 ‘old Europe’, 194 Russia, and Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, 216–17 SAIC International, 64 St Malo, Anglo-French summit (1998), 235 Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) France, 20 Italy, 81 in Spain, 127, 132–3 Salah, Chej, 133 Sara Lee Corp, 223 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 128 Saudi Arabia, 271, 275 Saunders, Brigadier-General Stephen, 70 Scandinavia, see Nordic countries Schengen Agreements, 211 France, 35–6 Greece, 61, 67 Schengen Information System (SIS), 213 Schily, Otto, 45, 48, 49, 54, 57, 199 Schleyer, Hanns-Martin, 43 Schmitt, Burkhard, 188 Schröder, Gerhard, 55 anti-Americanism, 194 meeting with Chirac, 173 Scowcroft, Brent, 203 Serfaty, Simon, 192 Serhane ben Abdelmajid (‘the Tunisian’), 133, 136 Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militaire (SISMI, Italy), 88–9 Shinn, David, 272 Simon, Steven, 202–3 Smith, Michael, 184 Social Democratic Party (PSOE, Spain), 124

Index Societa’ Gestione Impianti Nucleari (SOGIN, Italy), 88 Sofu, Halil Ibrahim, 47 Solana, Javier, 6, 76, 171, 173, 180, 185, 186 defence spending, 187 European Security Strategy, 184 European Union priorities, 183 Somalia, 234, 272, 273, 274–5 Somalia Aid Coordination Body, 275 ‘Somali-Swedes’, 107–9 Spain counter-terrorism, 10, 124, 142–3, 255–6, 264: cooperation with Morocco, 140–1; Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), 125–7, 128, 129, 131–2; Franco-Spanish cooperation, 128, 141; intelligence gathering, 137–8; international cooperation, 127–9, 140–1, 209; legislation, 141; organisational reform, 138–40 defence spending, 124, 131 Guardia Civil, 126–7, 135, 137, 139 Iraq War (2003), 123: withdrawal from Iraq, 124 Islamic terrorist groups, 127, 128, 132, 133–4, 220: Algerian networks, 132–3; arrests made, 135–6; dismantling of Madrid bombing network, 137; Madrid bombing network, 133; Syrian origin network, 133 Madrid bombing (2004), 9, 109, 123–4, 136: dismantling of terrorist network, 137; political impact of, 124, 197 military forces, 130: domestic security, 130; European Union, 130–1; NATO, 131; Strategic Defence Review (2001), 130 Muslim population of, 9, 140: integration of, 142 National Centre for Anti-Terrorist Coordination, 138 National Intelligence Centre (CNI), 127, 135, 136, 137–8, 139 Policia Nacional, 127, 134–5, 137, 139

291

as terrorist target, 11 United States: cooperation with, 128–9; tensions between, 129 Spanish Federation of Religious Islamic Entities, 142 Spanish Islamic Commission, 142 Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC, UK), 252 Stern, Jessica, 270 Steyn, Lord, 248 Stoltenberg, Jens, 104 Struck, Peter, 52–3 Sudan, 272 suicide bombing, 149 new terrorism, 3 poverty, 270 Sweden Afghanistan campaign, 99 Commission on Vulnerability and Security, 110–11 counter-terrorism legislation, 107–9 emergency preparedness, 110–11 Guantánamo detainees, 100 Iraq War (2003), 102: post-conflict aid, 103 perception of terrorist threat, 105 role of military, 113–14, 115, 122 n75 the ‘Somali-Swedes’, 107–9 terrorism, domestic experiences of, 117 n1 Weapons of Mass Destruction protection, 112 Swedish Defence Research Agency, 113 Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control, 112, 113 Syria, 218 Tajikistan, 33 Taliban, 1 Tampere principles (European Union), 251 Tenet, George, 217 Tensamani, Hicham, 140 terrorism definition of, 148: European Union, 174; France, 22–3 European experience of, 3 old and new, 3

292

Index

terrorism – continued root causes of: al-Qa’ida manipulation of conflicts, 273; collapsed/weak states, 272–3; democratic deficit, 276–7; disagreements over, 10; education, 270–1; fundamentalist charities, 274–5; immigration policy, 275–6; lack of action on, 269; poverty, 269–72; United States, 268–9 see also new terrorism Terrorism Act (2000, UK), 252 Thailand, 124 threat perceptions European Union, 216–18, 266 Nordic countries, 104–5, 114 transatlantic differences, 196–7, 201, 216–18 Tolmein, Oliver, 44, 49 transatlantic relations American criticisms of Europe, 193–4 American unilateralism, 194–5, 203 counter-terrorism cooperation, 4, 218–19: bilateral initiatives, 6–7; intelligence-sharing, 222; obstacles to, 202–3; recommendations for improving, 227; social/political differences, 221–2, 226; strategic divergence, 199–202; tactical success, 198–9 deterioration in, 191, 199: explanations of, 195–8 European criticisms of America, 192–3 improvement of, 205: the challenge for America, 204; the challenge for Europe, 204–5 popular opinion: American, 204; differences in, 196–7; similarities in, 196 post 9/11 solidarity, 192 tensions within, 1–3, 7–9, 74, 192, 208, 267 terrorism: different understandings of, 201–2; disagreements over root causes, 10 threat perception, differences in, 196–7, 201, 216–18 Treatment of Information and Action Against Clandestine Financial Circuits (TRACFIN, France), 31, 32

Trevi group, 5, 210, 213 see also Bureau Liaison pour Terrorisme Tunisian Combat Group, 81 Tuomija, Erkki, 99, 100, 102, 108 Ufficio Italiano Cambi (UIC), 83 Uhrlau, Ernst, 46, 51 Union of Spanish Islamic Communities, 142 Unité de Co-ordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT), 21, 26, 27, 28, 38 United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 154–5, 252 asylum seekers, 213, 221 Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), 152 Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), 152, 155 Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC), 152 counter-terrorism, 146–7, 163–4, 220–1, 264–5: communication, 160–1; consequence management, 157–60; criticisms of government performance, 161–3; international cooperation, 209; legislation, 154–6, 220–1; organisation, 152–4; pre-emption, 157; preventive measures, 156–7; resilience, 155, 157, 160, 164; risk-assessment, 159–60; role of public, 164 emergency management, 152–3, 155–6: Civil Contingencies Bill, 155–6; criticisms of, 161–2; localisation of, 153–4 European security policy, 235 European Union military capability, 236 Home Office Terrorism Prevention Unit, 153 human rights concerns, 251–3: detention without trial, 154–5, 215, 220, 252–3 Iraq War (2003), 1 Islamic terrorist groups, 209 London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP), 153–4 Metropolitan Police Force, 221

Index military reform, 235 Ministry of Defence, 157 Muslim population of, 9 new terrorism, vulnerability to, 149–51, 163–4 Terrorism Act (2000), 252 threat perception, 266 United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency Constabulary, 156 United Nations European Union attitude towards, 172 root causes of terrorism, 268 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), 1, 245 United Nations General Assembly, 256 United Nations Human Rights Commission, 250 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 48, 82 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 48, 84 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Iraq War (2003), 1 Resolution 1368, 172 Resolution 1373, 1, 20, 81–2, 105, 175, 244–5: human rights concerns, 245 Resolution 1456, and human rights concerns, 256 United States Afghanistan, 1 counter-terrorism: Container Security Initiative, 217, 219; Customs–Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), 223; data protection standards, 223; immigration policy, 223; Proliferation Security Initiative, 217; public–private cooperation, 223; root causes, 268–9; threat perceptions, 216–18; vulnerability-based approach, 218; Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism, 216–17 defence spending, 233, 271 Department of Homeland Security, 218 domestic criticism, 203–4

293

European Union: cooperation with, 181–2, 208; tensions between, 7–9, 10, 184, 188 foreign aid, 202, 221, 271 France, 194, 208: Iraq War (2003), 1, 19 Germany, 194: Iraq War (2003), 55–6; legal disputes with, 54–5, 208 Greater Middle East Initiative, 226 human rights concerns, 249–50, 267: detention of immigrants, 246–8; detention of non-resident aliens, 248–9; evidence collection procedures, 246 Iran, 217, 218 Iraq War (2003), limited support for, 1–2 Malaysia, 225 military power, nature of, 233–4 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 10, 268–9, 273 North Korea, 217, 218 Russia, Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, 216–17 Spain: cooperation with, 128–9; tensions between, 129 Syria, 218 see also transatlantic relations United States Central Command (CENTCOM), 2 United States Supreme Court Hamdi et al. v. Rumsfeld, 249 Korematsu v. United States, 257 Rasul et al. v. Bush, 248–9 Vaillant, Daniel, 26 Védrine, Hubert, 2, 192 combating terrorism, 19 criticism of United States, 15 n21 Veness, David, 3 Verhofstadt, Guy, 172 Vienna Action Plan (1998), 171 Vigipirate Renforcé plan, 21, 25–7, 39, 254 Visa Information System (European Union), 178, 265 Vitorino, Antonio, 171, 188 Voigt, Udo, 45

294

Index

Wassenaar Arrangement, 24 Watson Institute, 201 Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism, combating European Union, 218 France, 36–7 Greece, 68–9 Italy, 85–6 United Kingdom, 158 United States, 216–17 Werthebach, Eckhart, 51 Western European Union (WEU), 183

Wolfowitz, Paul, 242 n3 Iraq War (2003), 2 Woodward, Bob, 195, 198 World Bank, 226 World Customs Organisation (WCO), 34 Yugoslavia, 32, 235 Zammar, Mohammed Haydar, 47 Zapatero, José Luis, 11, 124 Zougam, Jamal, 136, 266 Zypries, Brigitte, 55

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