Equality

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EQUALITY Edited

by

JANE FRANKLIN

Contents

Preface About the contributors Introduction

Jane Franklin

1

Socialists and Equality

11

Back to Socialist Basics

29

Forward to Basics

49

What do Egalitarians Want?

59

What Kind of Equality S hould the Left Pursue?

83

Caroline Daniel

G A Cohen

Bernard Williams

Stuart White

David Miller

What h a s Socialism to do with Sexual Eq uality?

101

Equality i n a Multicultural Society

123

The Attractions of Basic Income

157

Anne Phillips

Bhikhu Parekh

Brian Barry

Preface

Equal ity is a value or aspirati on that continues to divide Left from

Right in politics . Indeed , to the extent that those terms retain

meaning they do so because of different attitudes to equality . Yet

the d i fferences are easier to sense than to make explicit . Everyone believes in the moral equality of human beings in some sense,

though the sense is so vague as to have no practical implications

whatever for many on the Right . Similarly, "equality before the

law", is universally accepted , though nothing like it exists in the UK . This violation of a generally endorsed axiom arouses little indignati on and few proposals for reform. Evidently society's

revealed preference is for equality before the law - unless it is very expensive.

Beyond the more or less hollow support for those two principles

of equality, the R ight wants no further truck with the notion . It is

the Left wh ich wants to go further and therefore has to grapple

with the idea and , in each generation, establish what equality

means and what its current i mplications are. This book is an IPPR

contribution to that exercise .

Its origin l i es in a seminar and discussion group which has met

irregularly at IPPR for a number of years . The group rejoiced in

the sobriquet of the

Back to Basics

group until that title was

adopted elsewhere for a less respectable initiative . The group was

convened by James Cornford, the then-director of IPPR and Bhikhu Parekh, Professo r of Political Theory at the University of Hull and

an IPPR Trustee. It was concerned not so much to debate the philosophical foundations of socialism as to "occupy the elusive

intermediate realm between philosophy and practice that can give

us a critical pu rchase on contemporary reality without losing i ntimate touch with it" . In other words, it sought to examine and

clarify practical p o l i cy issues at their roots in values and ethical

precepts. A latecomer to the group, I always found its deliberations

unusually interesting and pertinent in cutting to the heart of many

of the current ethical and p o litical d i lemmas facing the United

Kingdo m and modern societies in general.

This volume springs from papers written for the group on the theme of equality, one of the larger themes it has considered during its existence. In important respects it establishes reasonable and plausible objectives for the contemporary Left. I should like to thank James Cornford and Bhikhu Parekh for their seminal role i n the group along with other regular participants: Brian Barry, G.A. Cohen, Caroline Daniel , John Dunn, Paul Hirst, David Miller, Onora O ' Neill, Anne Phillips, Stuart White and B ernard W illiams. Many of them have written chapters of the present volume but all are, to a greater or lesser extent, contributors. Finally , I must thank Jane Franklin of the I PPR, who participated, acted as organiser for the group and who has ably edited this book. The views and proposals published in this document are those of the authors. They are not necessarily endorsed by the IPPR, its staff or trustees. Gerald Holtham

About the Contributors

Brian Barry is a Fellow of the British Academy and Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics. He is currently engaged on a multi-volume Treatise on Social Justice of which the first two have been published: Theories of Social Justice

(1 989) and Justice as Impartiality (1975). G A Cohen was educated at McGil l and Oxford universities where he obtained, respectively, the degrees of BA in Philosophy and Pol itics and B Phil in Philos ophy in 1 9 63. For twenty-two years he was a Lecturer and then a Reader in Philosophy at University College, London. In 1 9 85 he became Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory and a Fellow of All Souls, Oxford . Professor Cohen is the author of Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence

(1978), History, [,abour and Freedom (1988), and Self-Ownership,

Freedom and Equality (1995) . Caroline Daniel is a journalist at The New Statesman. Previously, she has been a journalist at The Economist and a researcher for Gordon B rown MP and was research editor for Values, Visions and

Voices (1 995) , edited by Gordon Brown MP and Tony Wright MP. She read history at St John's College, Cambridge . Jane Franklin is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Public Policy Research. Her mai n research interest is in the relationship between social and political theory, politics and po licy making. She is currently editing Politics of Risk Society, Polity Press (1997) forthcoming, and an IPPR/Polity Social Policy Reader, also forth coming. David Miller is Official Fellow in Social Political Theory at Nuffield College, Oxford . His research interests include concepts of social justice, the ethics of markets and the ideas of nationality and citizenshi p . Among his books are Market, State and Community (Oxfo rd , Claren d o n Press , 1 9 8 9 ) , On Nationality (Oxfo rd ,

Clarendon Press, 1 995), and with Michael Walzer, Pluralism,

Justice and Equality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1 995). Professor Bhikhu Parekh is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Hull. He has been a Visiting Professor at many North American universities i ncluding Harvard where he was a Visiting Professor from January to June 199 6. He has written extensively in the field of political philosophy and written and broadcast o n race relations i n Britain. H i s Rethinking Multiculturalism w i l l b e published this year by Macmillan. Anne Phillips is Professor of Politics at Lon d o n Guildhall University. Most of her writing deals with the relationship between socialism and feminism, but she currently works on issues of democracy and representation. Recent books include Engendering

Democracy (Polity, 1991) and The Politics of Presense (OUP, 1995). Dr Stuart White is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department, Massachusetts I nstitute of Technology. He was previously a Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. His research interests concern the nature of egalitarian justice and the application of egalitarian ideals within the framework of advanced market economies. He is currently at work on a book-length manuscript, provisionally entitled, The Civic Minimum: An Essay in the Political Theory of Social Citizenship. Bernard Williams was a member of the Commission on Social Justice. He has recently retired from the White's Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. He has also held chairs at London, Cambridge and Berkeley, and has been Provost of King's College, Cambridge. He was Chairman of the Home Office Committee o n Obscenity and Film Censorship which reported i n 1979.

Introduction

Jane Franklin

The idea of equality has become blurred and has lost its political appeal . Once the anchor of the politics of the Left, it seems to have slipped its traditional mo oring and waits to be reconnected to the system of political ideals that guide po liticians and policy makers. Often avoided as an uncomfortable idea which contains within it negative conn otations of "levelling down" or "uniformity", its presence still haunts us as we witness the growing gap between rich and poor and the atrophy of the welfare state. Tony Blair has written that "liberty, equality and fraternity exist in creative tension. The fact the latter two have been ignored for too long means that the first is b eing increasingly denied. We need to redress the balance."1 It is time to take a fresh look at equality. Equality is a traditio nal idea. Tied to the two great ideologies of liberalism and socialism, its role as one of the guiding principles behind political, economic and so cial reform in this country has been firmly established over the course of the last two centuries. Like these systems of theory and practice, however, it is now open to questio n . There are two ways to respond to this. We can either argue that we have reached the "end of equality"2 and that it no longer has a place in the language of politics, or we can say that we are at the beginning of a new way of seeing equality, and of building a new political language to take us into the future. Any shift in the way we think about traditional ideas evokes a nostalgia for past asso ciations as well as an excitement about future possibilities. But between these two responses, is a transitional phase of i ntense theoretical activity where we must take care to move with sensitivity and understanding, not to debunk traditional thinking but to engage with the transformation of ideas . While some on the Left despair at the abandonment of socialist tradition and others breathe a s igh of relief at the thought of jettisoning a principle which has become problematic, the ideas in this book will , I hope, generate a discussion of how the idea of equality in its many

2

Equality

forms might infiltrate the political mind and influence the politics of the next century. In our engagement with the idea of equality in these pages, you will find no single definition, no central theory of appl ication, but a multiplicity of approaches, which bring the idea alive and shape its potential . Our authors inquire into the nature of equality: whether or not it is a timeless idea w hich exists ind ependently of political intervention and how far it can bend to politi cal expediency. They describe the fluidity of the idea as it shifts from the economic, to the political, to the social sphere and how it relates to the idea of community. They assess the strength of the idea, whether or not strict or diluted equality is appropriate to any given situation. They ask how we occupy that elusive space between ideas and politics and which takes priority over the other. They o ffer an evaluation and critique of the phi losophical foundations of the Commission o n Social Justice, an independent inquiry i nto social and economic reform in the UK, set up at the instigation of the late Rt Hon John Smith QC MP, in 1 9 9 2 . The Commission sets out the philosophical framework for its inquiry in The Justice Gap (1993) , taking social justice as its defining principle and recognising that social justice has "something to do with equality". The question then arises, "equality of what?":l The Commission answers this question as it sets out its four principles· of social justice: •

•

•

•

The foun dation of a free society is the equal worth of all its citizens Everyone is entitled , as a right of citizenship , to be able to mee t their basi c need s T e right to self-respect and personal autonom y demand s the Widest possi ble sprea d of oppo rtuni ties Not all inequa lities are unjust, but unjust inequa ities should l be reduced and whe re poss ible elim inate d. 4

�

The key to und erstand·mg h · ow th e Idea of equality operates within . f . thIs ram ework an d m dee d th roughout this book , is to link it with the co ncepts that bring it mto. focus. In 1he Justice Gap, it is initially . . r tnked wah . . . status, making the active, Iegltlmi smg force for equality •

•

f I

.

Introduction

3

a just soci ety; secondly it is l inked with citizenship and a political d efinition of basic needs; th irdly with freedom and opportunity; and fourthly w ith justice, which renders certain inequalities just. The choice as to which con cepts frame defi nitions of equality, is in turn linked to political , ideological and religious values. Caroline Daniel looks at the fate of equality over the past century to see how its d imensions have altered and adapted to changing circumstances. At the beginning of the century, we can observe how it is attached to the socialist critique of poverty and becomes a force for the redistributio n of material resources. By the 1950s, as Britain beco mes a more affluent society, it shifts to the social sphere, supported by the idea of social justice and promoted as "equality of opportunity". By the 1970s, this optimism for a socially just meritocracy was undermined by the growing economic crisis. The idea th en moves away from its attachment to class, status and wealth, towards the relationship between particular groups and individuals in society, as in the campaigns for racial and sexual equality, and takes on the mantle of liberation. Then the relationship of equality to freedom changes. I n the 1980s, the very concept of society is challenged and the idea of equality is lost to the idea of freed om. Those on the Left who still believed that equality is an essential concept of socialist politics, endeavoured to accommodate the i dea of indivi dual liberty with the idea of equality. So much so, some have argued , that it has lost its radical edge. G A Cohen argues that this accommodation of values, as

articulated in the philoso phical framework of the Commission on Social Justice, undermines the firm foundation of values that the Labour party needs if it is to have any moral force or political character. Contrary to the views of the Commission, he argues , the values of community and equality are not cond itional on changing circumstance and do not need to be adapted to take account of social, economic or political reality. For Cohen, these values are always there, to give social movem ents and political actors a goal and a focus fo r change. They represent a vision which need not correspond with reality, but motivates change toward that vision. Cohen defi nes the p rinciple of equality in material term s : "the measure of amenity and burden in one perso n's life should be roughly comparable to that in any other's". He argues that the

4

Equality

Commission abandons equality as a principle in these terms when it asserts that "inequalities are not necessarily unjust but unjustified inequalities should be reduced and w here possible eliminated" and that "redistribution of income is a means to social justice and not an end in itself ' . The ideal of community represents a particular mode of human relationships says Cohen , and comp lete rejection of the logic of the market. In fact, community is anti-market because the market inspires production, not on the basis of commitment to one's fellow human beings and a d esire to serve them while being served by them, but on the basis of impersonal cash reward . The socialist aspiration is therefore to extend community to the whole of our economic life. The Commission does not, Cohen argues, invoke community as a core value in these terms. Without a firm, moral foundation, Labour has to construct a new identity and in doing so becomes indistinguishable from the Liberal Democrats. Cohen argues that "no Liberal or Tory could object" to the Commission ' s four principles of social justice and that "to modify principles for the sake of electoral gain can be electorally counter-productive". I n undermining the principles which people have always associated with the Labour party , the Commission runs the risk of contributing to electoral failure. B ernard Williams, a member of the Commissi on on Soci al Justice, addresses the complex relationship between princi ple an d electoral success. He agrees with Cohen that principles prov ide a firm foundatio n for the Left, but argues that we canno t take traditional principles for granted : they are not immutable, and to understand them we n eed to inquire as to the circumstances which generated their appeal and understand the particular histo rical condition s in which they were deployed . Unless we trace this relati � nship between tradition and the changin g world we l ive i n , w e Will lose touch with both. The Comm ission acknowled ges that, at the time of the Beveri dge Repor t in 1945, there was perhaps a . . . special feeli ng of clas s so t1· d amy · an d a sense of natio nal com mumty . W Ich grew out of the exper ience of the Secon d Worl d War. But this has changed and many peop 1 e now have a more individual ised tdenttty, and can not accept . . pnnctpl es wht. ch are out of step with the way they live th eu · rIves. F or the Left to generate political suppon, .It .IS nec essary to ques . . . t10n tradIttona l princi ples and move

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.

.

•

Introduction

5

beyond a nostalgic attachment to beliefs that no lo nger resonate with the electorate. This does not mean that we have to reject them out of hand , but that we should engage with them to explore their relevance fo r present circumstances. In this context, Williams disputes the charge that the Commission disparages equality, rather, he suggests, it raises questi ons about what equality is and what it should be equality of. All ideas and theoretical assumptions should be open to interpretation and their traditional status does not exempt them from scrutiny. In fact, the radicalism of the principles of social justice and equality does not arise from principles themselves but in their potential effect. As a political idea, equality must be open to interpretation , which l egitimately takes place in the context of other competing political values. The nature of this i nterpretation will affect the outcome. Stuart White places the values of equality and social justice sid e by side and i nquires into what those who believe in equality want and whether the strategy of the Commission on Social Justice can provide the i nstitutional means to deliver it. White suggests that egalitarians should want a society which satisfies the principles of an "egalitarian perspective on social justice". These i nclude the brute luck principle (which requires that we correct for or prevent d isadvantage attributable to differential "brute luck") ; the fair exchange principle (whi ch requires that we protect ind ividuals from excessive vulnerability in the market-place, and its potentially explo itative effects); and the reciprocity principle (which requires that we prevent economic free-riding) . In The Justice Gap, the Commission explicitly rejects the brute luck principle, at least in its simplest and strongest fo rm . Nevertheless, White argues that the

Commission's

strategy

of "endowment

egal itarianism"

underpinned by an active welfare state, is an ethically attractive one from the stand point of the remaining principles of egalitarian justice, though his support is subject to qualification. White contends that

in setting out its strategy, the Commiss i o n

exaggerates t h e interdependency between justice and efficiency, and understates the extent to which a strategy for achieving social justice must inevitably rely upon conventional income redistribution. In addition, whilst the Commission tacitly endorses the reciprocity principle, it fails rigorously to pursue some of the "tougher"

6

Equality

and the implica tions of this princip le in the areas of welfare policy that ers tax treatme nt of inherit ance. In conclu sion, White consid in the there is much that the egalita rian can and should welcom e the of nt e Commi ssion's report, but calls for further d evelopm l ophica Comm ission' s reform strateg y, a n d of its p hi l os foundations.

Left David Miller turns our attentio n to the kind of equality the y should pursue. He suggests that much of the d ebate about equalit for has been skewed towards material equality and argum ents have equality of outcome or equality of opportun ity - whether all to an equal share of resources or all have an equal opportunity ive s persua strive for unequal resources. M iller puts forward a argument for a third alternative and a way forward for the L eft

-

social equality or equality of status: "when each member of a soci ety regards herself as fundamentally the equal of all the others and is regarded by the others as fundamentally their equal. " In such a society, there would be no hierarchical barriers to friend ship and solidarity. It would, i n effect, be a classless society in which social

equality stands alongside equality of opportunity to "correct its elitist tendencies". This option , he argues, will appeal to many who wish to open up relationships between individuals so that they can relate to each directly without the inhibition of status d ifference. Miller disagrees with Cohen i n that he beli eves that it is not equality per se that distinguishes socialists from other political viewpoints, but the emphasis and significance given to equal ity by those on the Left. It is not, he argues, that socialists believ e in equality while the others do not, but "that they give equ ality a igher priority , or have a better grasp of what it actu ally takes to Implement a principle like equality of opportuni ty". Miller argues that �ea material equality is beyond the grasp of market econo mies and ts, m many cases unjust. If those on the Left could accept th i s, . th ey could move forwar d an d work towards a form of equality that . . . . Is distmcttve and ach . . . tevabl e. I t .IS an attractive propos itiOn that would appeal to many who wish to overcom e the d ivisions of a class-based soc·tet Y an d one that attaches itself to the more . " . . md IVIduahsed identiti es of

�

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the 1990s. Anne Ph i llips takes us funher mto . the intricacies of the meaning . 0 f equahty, con trasting the argument s for equality between men

Introduction

7

and women in both the liberal and socialist traditions. Socialists have argued that women have been constrained by their domestic role in the family, while liberals ten d to defend the private family from public i ntervention and are much less likely to regard th e household as a place of confinement. Phillips explains how "difference between the two traditions has sometimes been theorised as a difference between pursuing equality of opportunities and achieving equality of outco mes: liberalism typically focusing on

rem o ving

opp ortun ities ;

the legal constraints to free up equality o f so cialism

typical ly add ress ing t h e structural

conditions that are necessary to substantial equality". She traces the evolution of the debate between the two theoretical traditions through to the 1990s, where, she argues, feminists still fo cus on the double burden of women who have to juggle home and work responsibilities. This persistent association between women and care work und erlies all sexual inequalities in the labour market and Phillips sees no way out of this short of equalising care work between women and men. Such an outcome requires strict equality between the sexes. Can so cialism help to bring this about? There has been a distin ctive feminisation of Left politics during the 1990s, not least in the recruitment of women as political representatives, with increasing attention being paid to the double burden of women. Yet, this may owe more, Phillips contends, to the recent convergence between l iberal and socialist values than to anything specific to the socialist tradition. Socialist ideas can , however, offer a scale of val ues radically different from that which shores up an unregulated m arket economy. So cialist values can provide the impetus for a social demo cratic regulation of the market, so that "productio n is tailored to social need and caring for people takes equal priority alongside producing marketable goods and services". This im pl ies that un less we separate out the inequalities and differences which are attached to the accident of being born male or female from individual differences we might otherwise accept, we shall never achieve equality between m en and women. In arguing this, socialism may take its cue from liberalism, but it may have a stronger political will to make it happen.

I n Equality in a Multicultural So ci ety Bhikhu Parekh consid ers ,

how we might construct a culturally sensitive theory of equality.

B

Equality

He examines the real dilem mas that different cultures and societies have faced and the ways in w hich they have endeavoured to resolve them, drawing out some of the general theoretical imp lications. Parekh shows us how the discussion of equality in Western political thought has largely ignored the importance of culture, taking an homogeneous society for granted. This lack of cultural sensitivity has meant, that although political thinkers have d iscussed legal, civil, political and other rights of citizens, they have rarely touched on the question of cultural rights, either as the individual's right to culture or as the rights of cultures or cultural communities. They have asked whether, why and within what limits all human beings or citizens s hould be treated equally, but have not raised these questions in relation to cultures. If we i nterpret human beings and their actions, choices, preferences in terms o f the systems of meaning characteristic of their cultures we have greater opportunity to do them justice. As Parekh has argued elsewhere, 5 almost every moder n stat e is characterised by cultural diversity, but is faced with the question s

of how to accommodate differences without losing social co hesion , how to reconcile the apparently conflicting demands of equality of treatment and recognition of cultural differences, and how to create a spirit of co mmon citizenship among its culturall y diverse members . If we are to ensure fairness and equality in culturally diverse societies, we need to do two things . First, we must appreciate that equal treatment might have to be differe nt and not identical in its content. Second , we need to d evelo p app ropriate concep tual and institutional tools to ensure that different treatm ent does not lead to unfair discrim ination or privilege . . Gtven the diversity o f opinion, even among those w h o a i m to embody broadly egalitarian ideals i n practical politics , can policy makers on the Left make any "practical choic es that ' real-world decr ease inequal"1 t "6 B nan · B arry Y· sets out to l eap over w hat he sees as the sh ort term e1 ectoral consensus of policy makers an d . . . pohttctans, to p ropose ch anges . m the nature of eco nomic and soctal . . relatto ns which w1·ll have a real Impact in creating a more equal . soctety . He presents the case for a single measure which woul d , wh en fully .Imp lem . . ented m ake a stgmfican t difference to the quali ty of people s 1.tves. Thi s measure IS baste Incom e . His plea for a .

'

,

·

·

.

Introduction

9

radical , practical approach to thinking about equality is an example of a far reaching i dea for which a political consensus would have to be built. Barry is critical of the "narrow conception of the constraints of political feasibility" in the report of the Commission on Social Justice and asserts "that those who drafted the report were reduced to cobbling together proposals originating from the various pressure groups associated with d i fferent members of the Commission". While it is crucial to think radically, to drive the political will forward, the Commission was concerned to balance rad i cal id eas with politically viable ones. They considered the idea of basic income and set out their proposals for "participation income", which, they suggested , would operate as a way of modernising the social insurance system by placing a higher value on some types of unpaid work, thereby leaving the door open fo r basic, or citizen ' s i ncome. 7 Barry is criti cal of this gradual approach and of the negative responses with which the idea of basic income is often met. He asks why such an essentially simple idea has failed to make the breakthrough into mainstream political d iscourse. There has, he contend s , been a great tendency in the literature to down play the rad i cal potential o f basic i ncome. It offers a genuinely new d eal a d i fferent way of relating ind ividual and society. Compatible with the i d eas o f such socialist thinkers as William Morris and R H Tawney, it not only limits disparities in income but also gives each person the d ignity that comes from independence and is a practical way of achieving some of their central aims. I ndeed , Barry argues that if we can manage to strip away the appalling legacy of "actually existing soci alism" and go back to Marx 's original utopian vision, it is not absurd to suggest that a subsisten ce-level basic income is a far more plausible institutional embod iment of it than anything Marx himself ever came up with. This is an idea waiting in the wings, and is worth taking seriously, Barry argues, as a way forward fo r the Left. As Cohen tells us, the relationship between theory and practice is complex. I d eas provide the backdrop to political activity, a reference po i nt, a rallying cry. There is a passion in the idea of equality that will not go away. Nelson Mandela came to B ritain in the Summer of 1996 and had an extraordinary effect on the people

10

Equality

who saw and heard him. He inspired the fee ling among ordinary people and politicians alike, that we are all equal , all the same, that before we are men and women, black and white, catholic and protestant, we are human beings and we can change the world we live in. As we enter the twenty-first century, and globalisation and technological change transform all our lives, we are at risk of marginalising a substantial number of people who are unable to participate in this transformatio n . The practice of "actually existing socialism" as B arry has pointe d out, has been d iscredited. But there is still a hunger for a more equal and just society which drives us to search for new political fo rms to ach ieve that end . The language of this new pol itics may at first be unfamiliar. It may be structured more by time, space and access to information rather than by status, wealth or opportunity. Who knows'? I n this book, we have taken one step towards the revitalising an idea that may inspire a new generation. Endnotes

1.

T B lair "Ideological Blurring",

2.

M Kaus (1992) The End of };qualify, New York, B asic B o oks.

3.

The Justice Gap IPP R (1993) p7 . The Justice Gap , IPPR (1993).

4. 5. 6.

7.

Prospect, June 1996.

B Parekh (1994) "Equality , Fairness and Limits of Cu ltural . Diversity" in Inn ova tion , Vo l 7 , No 3. He nry Milner quoted in Brian Barry "The Attract ions of Ba sic Inc om e", p1 57 .

See Social Just"tee.. strateg . tes for National Renewal The Rep ort o f the Com m·ISSio . · n on Soc ial Just ice pp 261-26 '

5.

11

SOCIALISTS AND EQUALITY

Caroline Daniel

Egalitarianism has been a key theme of British socialism for much of this century. George Bernard Shaw opened with his idealistic advocacy of equality of i ncome. R H Tawney followed on with a vision of a society brought together in fellowship by greater equality. Then came Anthony Crosland ' s hope of social equality and Hugh Gaitskell's admission, in 1955, that "the central socialist i d eal is equality" . 1 In the 1 960s, the focus of debate shifted towards the more d istinct areas of racial and sexual inequality, but by the 1980s, there had been a further change. Margaret Drabble, writing in 1 9 8 8 , o bserved that "twenty years ago, a profess ion of faith i n egal itarianism was n o t considered improper or eccentric. It i s now. By some shift o f usage, by some change in the climate of thought, egalitarianism has become a dirty word , a devalued word" . 2 Politicians on the left today are certainly squeamish about the little word "equality". In this paper I shall trace the d evelopment of the concept of equality over the last hundred years , how it evolves and adapts to political necessity and how it is d ebated as an idea and as a political tool. The problem is that although most people want equality of something, there is no consensus about what should be equalised. As Crosland put it in Socialism Now, "what are the main causes of inequality - inherited wealth, inherited IQ, home circumstances, hard work or luck? What are the most i mportant inequalities? Are they of i ncome, capital, education, housing or industrial power? Or are they between the sexes or between races? Or are they perhaps of privacy, sunlight and access to unpolluted beaches?":l Different interpretations of equality can conflict. Equality of opportunity may conflict with equality of outcome; equality of income with equality of respect. As David Miller has argued, "The conflict is not about the value of equality as such, but about competing specifications of that value, about different versions of what it means to treat people as equals". 4 Tawney ' s egalitarianism, for example, arises from his

12

Equality

Christian belief that we are all equal before God; Bentham assumed the existence of equal passions ; and J S Mill equal rationality. Robert Burns expressed many a socialist's view that "A man's a man for a'

that" and G D H Cole echoed that "socialism is an imaginative belief that all men, however unequal we may be in powers of mind and body, or in capacity for service, are in a really significant sense equal, not merely before the law but one with another". Raymond Williams in Culture and Society (1958) thought that "the only inequality that is evil is inequality that denies the essential equality of being". And Douglas Jay asked in Socialism and the New Society (1962): why should I have more right to happiness than you'? . . . if we believe that all human beings have an equal right to happiness and a civilised life, then it is for this reason that we should seek to establish a s ociety in which these rights are embodied. The ultimate ground for condemning inequality is that it is unjust, not that it causes resentment or envy. y This belief is still evocative today. "The foundation of a free societ is the equal worth of its citizens", 5 was the first of the fou r core principles of the Commission on S ocial Justice. But how far does equal worth take us in practi ce'? The Fabians and meeting basic needs

The early Fabians, who were united by their criti cism of po verty, argued for a national minimum standard of living, a nd sta te . . regulation of the econ omy an d state provisi O n of free serv ices to . provide the back groun d con d'Itwns for equal access to the ma rk et. · Amy Gutmann ·m L'b 1 eral Equality , noted that "the idea of equa lity serv ed a critical purpose for most early Fabians - as a criti qu e of . . a so ciety that d enied . th e effective opportunity for all citizens to hve decent1 y .6 Th e com . pass ionate desire to ensure that every o ne has . their b asic . needs met is ref1 ecte d m the second core princip le of . the Comm .iSSio n on Social Jus t'Ice, ..everyo ne is entitle d , as a right of citizenship , to be able to meet their basic needs" 7 . The Fab'Ians develo ped th e concep t of economic surplus to jus tify their attack on so 1 . cia Privileg e As Geo ffrey Foote explains, "they .

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Socialists and Equality

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believed that the wages o f the workers were determined by the d emand for their different skills. Any wages above a subsistence level were seen as a form of rent of ability . . . however, in capitalist society a large proportio n of the workers ' rent was directed into the pockets of the private owners and preserved for the children of the capitalists". B The Fabians wanted to see this surplus used for the benefit of all. They argued that the marginal utility of income and wealth progressively diminishes, so that the satisfaction of the basic needs of the poor should have priority over the d esires of the rich. George Bernard Shaw and equality of income

George Bernard Shaw took a more radical position and called for equality of income, "unless we can see the exped iency of this, we are not socialists: we are o nly pitiers of the poor and rebels against unpleasantness". 9 Shaw argued that capitalism was both unjust and inefficient since it involved a misdirection of production, producing "frippery and luxury whilst the nation is rotting for want of good food" . 10 He assessed seven different metho ds of distributing money to see if any of them could provide an alternative to the present system: "to each what she produces", to "each what she d eserves", "to each w hat she can grab", "to the common people enough to keep them alive whi lst they work all day, and the rest to the gentry", "distribution by class", "let us go on as we are", and "socialism: an equal share to everybody". 1 1 The only solution, Shaw concluded was to give everyo ne the same. He imagined a system in which material i ncentives would be replaced by a sense of public duty, although he accepted that coercion might be needed to get people to work. He hoped that equality of income would promote a true meritocracy, for between "persons of equal income there is no social distinction except the distinction of merit. Money is nothing: characte r, conduct and capacity are everything" . 1 2 Equality and poverty

For the early Fabians, the alleviation of poverty was the prime motivation for the redistribution of wealth. As Anthony Crosland put it, "at any time up to 1 939, the case for greater equality, at least of

14

Equality

rich the poor incom es, seeme d self-evident. By makin g the rich less the rich and could be made less poor . . . to take some caviar from " 13 imperative . distribu te it in bread to the poor, was a clear moral ty are not But can this be taken to mean that argum ents for equali everyo ne really about any desire for equality , but just for levelli ng up to a basic minimum? Joseph Raz has argued that:

what makes us care about various inequalities is not the inequality, but the concern identified with the underlying principle. It is the hunger of the hungry , the need of the needy . . . the fact that they are worse o ff in the relevant respect than their neighbour is relevant. But it is relevant not as an independent evil of inequality. Its relevance is in showing that their hunger is greater, their need more pressing, their suffering more hurtful and therefore it is our concern for the hungry, the needy, th e suffering and not ou r concern for equality that makes us give them prior ity. 14 This perspective can be used to criticise some of the early Fabian arguments for redistribution. However both Richard Tawney and Anthony Crosland show that there are reasons for equality that go beyond just the satisfaction of basic needs.

Tawney and Community In Equality (1931) Tawney worked out a comprehens ive theory of equality. He appealed to the Christian ideal that we are all equ al before God and en d orsed th e pab1 · · asserted t h e wh1ch · an pos1t10n need to guarantee each citizen a decent life, but went further. H is real concern was to build a common and a sense of �ommu �ity. Equality was a means to culture secure fello wship . The 1 nequah�y he deplored was not "inequality of personal gifts , but of the soc1al and eco nomic envuonment . . . not with a biological phenomenon, but . with the spmtu al relation and conduct based on it" 15 The solu tion for Tawney 1ay m . the realm of ideas and . princi ples He reJe cted the Webb 's tocus on changing institu tiona 1 . arrangements. H'ts p . . ollttcs was one charactensed by moral vexatio n . not economic . arne1.1oratton To change, soc1ety needed to "destro y .

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Socialists and Equality

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the moral, social, economic and historical credentials of the status quo", and discredit the acquisitive culture. He wanted to replace the

culture of competition with one based on co-operation and fell owshi p , where people saw themselves as equal citizens. A society that valued equality would place more significance on the differences of character and intelligence between individuals , and a low degree of significance on social or economic differences. Tawney condemned the "habit of mind which thinks it, not regrettable, but natural and desirable, that different sections of the community should be distingu ished from one another by sharp differences of economic status, of environment, of education and culture and habit of life". 16 Tawney did not call for exact equality of income, but equality of "environm ent, habits of life, of access to education and the means of civilisati o n , of secu rity and independence, and of the social considerations which equality i n these matters usually carries with it". He accepted that people were unequal in natural endowments , or in the capacity to d evelop them by education. To criticise inequal ity and to desire equality is not, as is someti mes suggested, to cherish the romantic illusion that men are equal in character and intelligence. It is to hold that while natural endowments may differ profoundly, it is the mark of a civilised society to aim at eliminating such i n equalities

as

have

their sou rce ,

not differences, but i n its own organisation. 17

in

ind ividual

Tawney thought that some measure of income inequality was j u sti fiable si nce "i nequality of circumstance is rega rded as reasonable, i n so far as it is the necessary condition of securing the services which the community requires . . . when a reasonable p ro vision has been made for all, exceptional responsibilities should be compensated by exceptional rewards, as a recognition of the

service performed and an inducement to perform i t". 1 B These intuitions were later d eveloped by Anthony Crosland and Jo hn

Rawls. I nequalities could be justified if they were to the benefit of the worst off. Tawney di d not favour an equal opportunity society. He accepted that privileged positions should be won on merit,

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Equality

requi re that men b elievi ng that "indi vidua l happ iness does not only and distinction; shoul d b e free to rise to new posit ions of comf o rt life of dignity it also requir es that they shoul d be able to l ead a 1 ed that there and cultu re, whet her they rise or not". 9 Tawn ey show alleviatio n of were reaso ns for redist ributi o n that went b eyond the limit the absolute poverty, and that th ere were reaso ns to tho se at the advantages of those at the top, as well as provid e for difference, b ottom. Tawn ey recog nised that i n accep ting indivi du al talent. a hierarchy of b i rth could be replaced with a hierarchy of

Anthony Crosland and Social Equality keen Writing in the post austerity years of the 1950s, Croslan d was call to distance himself from the dour values of the Webb' s in their is H for hard work, self-discipline, efficiency, research and abstin ence. is was a liberating, expansive socialism. In The Future of Socialism, h ate priv paean to social equality, he called for "liberty and gaiety in life: the need for a reaction against the Fabian traditi on" . Britain needed not only higher exports and old age p ensions but m ore open air cafes, brighter and "gayer streets at night, later closing h ours for public houses , more local repertory theatres . .. and so on ad infinitum "20• Socialism and affluence could go han d in han d. Crosland emphasis ed social rather than materia l equ ality. H e '

.' beli eved that econ omic · growth, full employment and Impr o vemen ts . 10 the welfare state had reduced the need for further redis tributio n of wealth, while s ocial i n e qualities s t i l l created coll ective resentm ents, evid ent i n strikes and social unrest ' which could . un dermine democracy , soc1a l and indu strial p eace, tolerance an d free dom Second!y, C ros I and argued for greater equality on th e grounds of social . . I t was unjust , h e argued to pay for an JUStice. . edu cattO . . n which wo ld u overwhelming social privilege; It provide . was UnJu st to inherit . . wealth smce lt could b e gained without merit, carried no corresp . ond ing 0bl"tgattOn, and n ot everyone had an equal opportumty to · acqutre It; and rewards from work could be unjust' because t h e . y were sometimes hnked to nepotism, and th e old school ti"e Th. udlyh eberIeved that s ocial inequality was ' wasteful and . ineffitC:l. ent It ' . sto od 10 th e way of social mobility and prevented genui n e equartty of opportunity. A society based on ·

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Socialists and Equality

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equal of opportunity, provided it was genuinely fair, would prevent the top rewards being reserved for a pre-selected few, would encourage mobility and would be effi cient in selecting people on merit for top jobs .

I s equality of opportun ity enough? Although Crosland is frequently seen as the chief proponent of equali ty of opportuni ty, his support was qualifi ed . Many of the reasons behind his doubts find an echo in the views of John Rawls, set out in A Theory of Justice.21 In Socialism Now, Crosland openly li nked his views to those of Rawls, when he claimed that he adopted "the strong d efinition of equality - what Rawls has subsequently called the "democratic" as opposed to the li beral co n ception of equality of opportunity".22 The l iberal conception of equal i ty

of

opportunity

(so metimes

cal l ed

the

minimalist

interpretation) is mainly concerned with the progressive removal of legal impedi ments to recruitment, and giving all children a fair start in schools. It is a procedural notion, concerned with making sure that the race for positions, or unequal outcomes, is a fair one. For Crosland, this did not fulfi l the requirements of social justice. An equal opportunity so ciety is more than a meritocratic society in which the greatest rewards go to those with the most fortunate family backgroun d . Raymond Plant summed up his view: "Crosland had a belief in equality, with inequalities being justifi ed if, and only if, differential rewards work to the benefi t of the community as a whole and we can assume that access to jobs which command differential rewards would be on the basis of genuine equality of opportunity". 2:� This is very close to John Rawls ' principles of justice: "Each person to have the most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible with similar liberties fo r all", and "social and economic inequal ities to be arranged so that they a re (a) to the greatest advantage to the least advantaged consistent with a just savings pri ncipl e, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all u nd er conditions of fair equality of opportunity".24 But there are clear d i fferences between the two approaches. Crosland thought his i nsti n ctive v i ew of social justice "not susceptible to proof or disproof ' . He therefore relied on the "moral

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Equality

. predilections of the reader . . Rawls' theory was needed to "round out Croslan d's i ntellectual position", accord ing to Plant. Rawls wanted to get away from this subjective approach. Keen to link ordi nary moral feel ings to an objective case for equality, Rawls adopted the idea of a social contract in which he imagined individuals living in a state of ignorance of their own talents an d abilities. From behind this veil of ignorance, individuals could make objective choices as to the principl es which s hould govern social life . However, Crosland grappled w ith a feeling that egalitarianism was not a co nsensus value. H o w was it possible to move towards an egal itarian principle of distri bution when people both know their talents, and want to keep the rewards they can earn from them'? After Crosland

win g By the 1970s , Crosland's optimism had fizzled out, as the g ro s. econ omic crisis undermin ed his more compreh ensiv e ambi tion wth Incomes were not naturally growing closer togethe r an d lo w gro r made plans for painless redistribu ti on redundan t. Argum ents fo y· alit social equality gave way to arguments for sexual and raci al equ The call for equal op portuniti es for women, for exam ple, was pushed higher up the political agenda, resulting in the 197 0 Eq ual

Pay Act and th e 197 5 Sex D iscrimin ati on Act. ln terpretatio ns as to the sources of inequality also cha ng ed at . . thts ttme N 'tck B osanque t argued that: ·

. We now see po veny more .m relattve than absolu te te rms , but our view of th e sources of mequahty have also c han ge d . . We have co me to fear th e effects of the tax and social secu nty system on inequarIty we have also become much less . opftm.lsttc about wh e th er th e educational system can ever cont n· bute very much t0 equa I'1ty. The government wa s thu s faced w'th 1 th e challe ng e 0 f Inequal · ity arising from t he old natural sources and also W.ith a greater challenge of fin d i n g a more equI· t a . bl e way of fimancmg public spend ing. The redistributive effects of p bl' u IC spending might well be undermined bY th e . . I ncreasingly regr tt esstve way m wh tch was fina ·

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Socialists and Equality

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The forces that created inequal ities i n the first place, and which perpetuated them, were too strong to be resis ted through indi rect methods. Inequalities had to be tackled at their source, through more equal incomes, attacking the culture of inequality . John Gold thorpe argued that the o nly way to create a more equal society was through collective action by the wo rking classes. Piecemeal measures misjudged the resistance of the class structure to attempts

to change it. 2 6

Equality a nd liberty

But the climate fo r equality was changing, and these views were chall enged by those who sensed that equality now had to come to terms with fr eedo m . For Raymond Plant equal ity was "the distinctive so cialist value", nevertheless his main prio rity was to make equality compatible with liberty. "It is because we value li berty for all, that we are concerned to secure a greater equality in the worth of lib erty" arguing that a fair distribution of the worth of li berty is "going to involve far greater equality of income and wealth as well as the provision of services", because differences of income lead to differences i n the use of other sorts of basic welfare goods. Plant's co nclusion is blu nt. "Except in conditions of high economic growth the greater equality in the worth of li berty cannot be attained without a certain amount of levelling down. We have to be clear about this". 2 7 But the political context did not prove amenable to such thinking. "The current pol itical and intellectual climate is deeply hostile to egalitarian ideas", observed Plant. 2B Doubts about the role of public spending combined with a resurgence in new right thinking summed up by Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption in Equality (1979) when they argue that equality of opportunity "requires that no external barrier shall prevent an individual from exploiting his talents. No laws shall permit some men to do what is forbidden by others". They do not admit that equality of dignity or self-respect has anything to do with equality of wealth. Freedom lay in the absence of coercion, not the absence of cash, or as they famously put it �poverty is not unfreedom". They called Tawney 's hopes of changing man 's competitive instincts "despotic". Inequality was merely "a state of

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Equality

affairs which results when the natural aptitudes of men are allowed to manifest themselves in natural differences". People do not have the same earning power. Income was paid not according to desert, or merit, but according to the value of work to others. They concluded that the best way to help the poor was not through redistribution, but through trickle-down: "you can only make the poor better off by making everyo ne richer, including the rich" . 29 These criticisms hit home and supporters of equality were anxious to show that equality was not incompatible with freedom. In 1986, Neil Kinnock wrote in The Future of Socialism that Labour had allowed itself to assume that liberty was not important, "efficiency, ind ividual liberty, wealth creati on, patriotism; such a vocabulary is thought to be unfamiliar to the Labour movement . . . the objective past, present a n d future of demo cratic socialism is individual free dom. And the means w hich d emocratic so cialism has chosen to protect that freedom are equality and d emocracy". Rather than look to growth as the means to effect red istribution, Kinnock wanted to create a strong body of moral opinion in favour of equality. "Political economy is not ulti mately a questi on of econ omic organis ation or historical i nevi tab i lity, but mor al 'J · ch Oice :lO R oy Hattersley agreed . His book Choose Freedom· 1 was a clear attemp t to paint Labour as the party of free dom, with equa lity p layin g a lead ing role . "

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Equa lity, just ice a nd effi cien cy . Th e oth er crit'ICis · m t hat had h .it home was that equ ality was. . Inco mpatible Wit · h e ff'ICien · cy. The emphasis by Le Gran d and the oth ers on the n eed for d 'lfect attacks on money inequal ity seem ed . to Interfe re wi th . . the work mgs of the free market, and pai d msuffiICi. ent regard t0 th e fact that some of the i nequ alities the market generated cou ld b e seen as just. Rather than argu e the "moral" case for equa1lty · , more pragmatic thi nkers have tried to move with the sp. . mt of the n eo- l'b . . I era I times, by frammg their case for equ ality I· n th e language o f eco nom ic effic iency. The Justice Ga . . p also tn es to meld equa l'Ity With efficiency. It d oes not accept th at a11 mequah t1 es are UnJ· ust. The paper can be rea d as an attempt to m ov e away fro m RawIsm . n thinking, and liberal ·

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Socialists and Equality

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egalitari anism more general ly, b y i nvoking the concepts of entitlement and desert. It seems fair, for instance, that a medical student should receive a lower income than the fully qualified doctor; or that experience or outstanding talent should be rewarded . . . most people believe that it is fair for people to bequeath their property as they see fit, even though this means that some will inherit more than others . . . parents can, however, pass on intelligence, talent, charm and other qualities, as well as property or titles. Rawls in his theory rests a lot on the fact that a perso n's talents , and his or her capacity to make productive use of those talents, are very much matters of luck and are also, in some part, the product of society . Nobody, he has rightly insisted , deserves his or her natural talents . . . but Rawls's argument applies as much to effo rt a s to raw talent . . . virtually everything about a person that yields a product is itself undeserved . So no rewards, on Rawls's view , are at the most basic level a matter of desert . Few people believe this . . . A s the American philosopher Robert Nozick fo rcefully put it, why does "desert have to go all the way down?: 12 Ronald Dworkin's arguments are relevant to this critique of Rawls. In Dworkin's terms , the goal of equality of income is insufficiently "ambitio n sensitive" as well as insufficiently "'endowment sensitive". Inco me equality does not permit income inequality where this results not from differences in productive capacity over which the individuals have no control, or which are matters of brute luck, but from different choices persons make as how to deploy their productive capacities. But if you or I have the same opportunity to earn a certain amount, but I choose not to make use of the opportunity to earn a certain amount, while you take it, is the ensuing income inequality really unjust? What Th e Justice Gap report attempts to do is restore some role for individual ambition, or effort. It is easy to see that the role of choice does affect the way we view the justice of different distributions. We need info rmation about how the in equalities have come about before we can d ecide if a particular distribution is fair or unfair. So if A earns more

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Equality

A money than B because A works harder, this seems fairer than if is earns more money that B (for the same job) because B for So, r. employe discrimina ted agai nst by a racially prejudiced example, it seems fair that someone who smokes should pay more for their insurance because of the extra risk they kno w they are

taking on by smoking. Yet it may seem unfair that someon e gets turned down for insurance because of factors beyond their control, such as inheriting certain genes. If the outcome is the resul t of individual choice then it seems fair . As Dw orkin says "peop le 's fate should d epend on their ambitions but should not depen d on their

natural and social endowments" . When in equal ities of i nco me are created by choices not circumstances Rawls' differen ce prin ciple would create not remove unfairness . Yet there may be a situation where trying to be distributi on sensitive will conflict with ambition sensitivity. Some peopl e will be unreservedly disadvantaged by circumstances beyond their control, such as being handicapped . However, showing equal concern for advantaged and disadvantaged requires something other than maximal redistribution to the disadvantaged. The disadvantaged can never be fully compensated for their unequal endowm ents as this would involve some kind of slavery of the advan taged.

Betw een equal ity of opportu nity and equality of outcom e Distin ctions between equality of opportunity and equa lity of outco me continue to shape the debate about equality. It helps to look at equality of opportun ity in a li near way. At the begin nin g you have a fair start, and at the end there are winn ers and lo sers . The idea of the fau · start ·Is that there should be no legal barn. ers . p eventmg anyo ne from taking part. So, the fact that a t iny num b er o wo men ' or bla ck peopI e, do not succeed in becomin g doctors , does not mean th at th e race is unfa irly run . As we have alrea . dY seen , sociali sts have typically questiOn ed this Th e ab sen ce of legal b arners IS not enough to ensure that t h e race is a fair one So me may start with an economic hand icap , which preven ts them from rna k' mg the most of opportun ities o n offer . Th e way to address thIS ' Is to ensure that people's min im u m needs are met ' hence the Web b's advo cacy of a natio n al minimu m

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Socialists and Equality

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standard of living , and Tawney's call for a basic level of practical equality. At issue is the question as to how far it is practical to intervene to make the start fair. And , if the start cannot be made fair, how far should the outcomes be interfered with? This can be illustrated by the debate between Roy Hattersley and Gordon B ro wn. Hattersley argues that: I certainly want equali ty of outcome . . . many inequalities are not the result of genetics , even less of fate . They are the product of the way in which soci ety is organised . . . socialists want first to reduce and then eliminate the organisational, institutio nal and social factors which make men and women unnaturally d i fferent. For Hattersley, equal ity of outcome is "the belief that those who fall behind in the race should not be told that they had their chance and failed but sh ould be given a new impetus to run on. :!: l Gordon Brown sees things differently: "the essence of equality is equality of opportunity"_: l- 4 He d evelops a dynamic, progressive model of equal ity of opportunity, where there is not just one race, but several, so if you fall at the first hurd le, this will not auto matically d isadvantage you fo r the rest of the race. He clearly takes Dworkin's view that there are limits to how far it is possible to compensate those who start the race uneq ual ly. And that some inequalities can be justified by a degree of effo rt and desert. He proposes a pol itics of second chances. Like the Commission on Social Justice, he is keen to dispel fears that there is a t rade-off between equal ity and efficiency. Inequality, Brown argues, "affects us all because whether it is in high social security bills and h igh taxes or in the waste of economic potential, every one of us pays a heavy price as a result". Equality of opportunity, he argues secures a more equal so ciety and is also the key to economic prosperity .

Conclusion The current academic and political climate has come a long way from the ambitions of George Bernard Shaw, and even those set out in Labour's 1974 Manifesto which called for "a fundamental

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Equality

favour and irrevers ible s hift in the balance of power and wealth in ic of working people and their fam il ies . . . far greater econom increase equality - in i ncome, wealth and living standar ds . . . and an ful l in social equality by giving far greater importa n ce to emplo yment, housing, education and s o cial benefi ts". It is an illustrati on of how attitudes to equality have changed that n this declaration seems absurdly extreme. Now money redistributio is politically taboo . Argument s about equality have evolved to fit g changed political and economic circumsta nces. Croslan d's thinkin can be understood in terms of his desire to find a way beyo nd nationalisation, and accept a wider role for the market . He was also conscious of the dilemma of how to get people to vote for redistribution, when it was against their fiscal self-interest. His answer lay in growth. But when this failed, egalitarianism fell apart. Simi larly Brown is conscious of the fact that talking of equality of outcome,

as Hattersley does, would be political suicide. Yet the phrase "equality of opportunity" is the rhetorical equivalent of elevator music. Rather bland and meaningless. The language of "fairness" has more salience with today's electorate than "equality", which many still equate with highe r taxat ion. Money redis tribution is becoming less central to aca demi c debate too. Michael Walzer, for example, choos es to stress no t

money equal ity, but complex equality. This recogni ses that there are a number of different dimensions along which indivi duals can be scored , but does not mean that the sco res shou ld be eq uali sed

within one particular dimension. Overall equality can be attain ed by balancing out the inequalities that emerge in different sp h er es , a�d �nsuring that goods are distributed according to app rop riate . cntena So h ealth care s h ould not be distributed solely on the bas1s of cash consid era t'1o ns. p oht1cal . . power should l ik ewis e n ot be . abused to gain a ccess to other types of good. As Walzer puts It, · w m form al ter m s . . c omp 1 ex equal ity means that no citizen ' s stan dm g i n one sp here or w It · h regard to one social good can b e undercut by h'Is standi ng in so m e oth er sphere, with regard to some oth er 35 social goo d" . F rom this perspective, there may be no need to lim it 1. mon ey inequa It y. ·

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Mickey Kaus a gre es In The E 1. nd of Equality,36 he argues for wh at vic l'b t era Ism" as · agamst money l iberalism". The latter

he terms "ci

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Socialists and Equality

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involves reducing income i nequalities , the former a i ms to restrict the spheres of l i fe in which money matters, and seeks to expand the public space in which money d i fferences are ignored . He wants to boost the n o n-economic sphere where money cannot talk, and hold sway. Again, reducing money inequalities is not o n the agenda . I t is clear from the book's preface that the author, a journalist, was respond i ng to a dilemma faced by American l iberals , and i n particular B i l l Clinton. Like Crosland, K aus asks how we can "pursue the traditional li beral goal of social equality at a time when, first, d ifferences i n i ncome and wealth seem to be ineluctably growing, and , second, this money i nequality i ncreasingly originates in differences of skill and talent". The preface concludes with the observation that "Clinton presumably believes, as d o many Democrats, that there is an advantage in combining money and civic liberalism. The claim of The End of Equality, is that this advantage is a chimera - that Clinto n , or his successors, will eventually have to choose". New Labour seems set to choose civic l iberalism over money liberalism. After years of being i n opposition there is not enough pol itical will to see through an aggressive d irect attack on money inequalities , by h igh taxation, or d irect attacks on advantage such as private education. It seems clear that the focus will be on redistributing o pportunities, not i n co m e - an emphasis on preventative m ed icine, through boosting skills, not invasive surgery, through higher taxes. Yet, if we do accept t hat people are capable of, and should b e held responsible for, their cho ices we will have to concede that equal opportuni t ies will result i n unequal outcomes . Not everyone will have the natural talent to succeed , despite their efforts. Soci ety cannot hope to fully compensate those who are disadvantaged by unequal natural abiliti es. But what it can ensure, which is morally most urgent, is a baseline of capability rather than a basel i ne of i ncome. I t matters l ess that pub lic spending may benefit the middle classes, as Le Grand had argued, than the fact that it provid es some m easure of equality of status and some sense of a common culture. Money equality may be d ead, but l ong live equality.

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Equality

En d n otes H Gaitskell (1 9 5 5 ) ··Public Ownership and Equality" i n Soc i al ist

1.

Commentary , June. 2.

Margaret D rabb le ( 1 9 88) "Case fo r E quality", Fa b i a n Society No

527. 3.

C A R C ro sl and (1 974) Socia l ism Now a n d Other Ess ays London: Jo nathan Cape.

4.

D Miller (1989) "Equal ity" i n Ph ilosophy and Politics G M K Hunt.

5.

The Justice Gap, IPPR (1 9 9 3).

,

7.

A G utmann (19 80) L i beral Equality, Camb ridge: CUP.

8.

G Fo ote ( 1 9 86) The J.abour P a r ty s Political Th ough t, Londo n : Croo m Helm .

6.

9.

The Justice Gap, op cit.

'

i b i d.

1 0 . G B Shaw (1 890) "What Socialism Is", Fa bian S oc i e t y N o 1 3 . 1 1 . G B Shaw ( 1 949) Th e In telligent Wom en 's Guide to Social ism, Capital ism , Sovietism and Fascism , Lond o n : Constable. 1 2. ibi d.

1 3. C A R Cro slan d (1 9 5 6) Th e Futu re of Socialism, Lond o n : Jonathan Cap e.

1 4. J Raz (198 6) The Morality of Freedom, Oxfo rd: Cl are ndon Press . 1 5 . R H Tawn ey (1 931) Equality, London: A l l e n & U nwi n. 1 6. ibid. 17. ibid .

1 8 · R H Tawne y ( 1 9 31 ) op cit. 1 9 . i b i d.

20. Crosland C A R (19 ;:> � 6) op crt . . 21 . J Raw ls ( 197 1 ) A •fhe ory of Justice, . Cambridge Mass . : H arva rd U ntv erstt . y P ress . 22. C A R C rosland (1 9 74) S . . m Now and ocwlts O ther Essays, Lo ndo n: J o na t h a n C a p e. 23 . R Plant (1 9 81) . "Democ ra ttc Soci al ism and Equ ality" in Th e Socialist A ge n da : Cro sl and 's I.egacy, edt· leoaard L ted by D Lipsey and D o ndo n: J onat han Cap e . 24 . J R a wls (1 97 1 . ) op cu . ·

•

Socialists and Equality

27

25 . N B os anquet and P Townsend (eds) ( 1 9 80) Labour and Equality:

A Fabian Study of La bour in Power 1 9 74- 1 9 79, Lond o n : Heinemann.

26. J Go!dthorpe ( 1 9 80) Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern

Britain, Oxford: Clarendon Press . 27. R Plant (1 9 84) "Equality , Markets and the State", Fab ian Society N o 494. 28. ibid. 29 . K Joseph and J Sumption (1 979) Equality, Lon d o n . 30. N K i nn ock ( 1 9 8 6) "The Future o f Socialism" Fa b ian Society N o 509. 31. R H atters!ey (1 987) Choose Freedom: Th e Future for Democratic

Socialism, Lo ndon: Michael Joseph.

3 2 . J Rawls (1 9 7 1 ) op rit.

3 3 . R Hattersley ( 1 9 87) op cit. 34 . G Brown (1 996) foh n Sm ith Memorial Lecture: New Labour and

fqu a lity, 1 9 April. 35 . M Walzer (1 9 83) Spheres of Justice, New York: Basic Books. 3 6 . M Kaus (1992) The Fnd of ].;quality, New York: B asic Books.

28

29

Back to Socialist Basics 1

G

A

Cohen

On 24 November 1 993, a meeting of Left intellectuals occurred in Londo n , under the auspi ces of the I nstitute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) , which is a Left-lean ing think tank. A short document was circulated i n advance of the meeting, to clarify i ts purpose. Am o ng other things, the document declared that the task of the I PPR was "to do what the Right did in the seventies , namely to break through the prevailing parameters of d ebate and offer a new perspective on contemporary British politics." The explanatory document also said that "our concern is not to engage in a philos ophical d ebate about foundations of socialism." If this meant that those foundations were not the appropriate thing to talk about, that might have been right: not everything has to be discussed at every meeting. But if what was meant was that discussion of philosophical foundations is not what the Left n o w needs, then I d i sagree, and, if that indeed is what was meant, then

I think i t curious that the breakthrough by the Right should have

been invoked as an achievement for the Left to emulate. For, if there

is a l esson for the Left in the Right's breakthrough , it is that the Left must repossess itself of its traditional foundations, o n pain of co ntinuing along its present politically feeble reactive course. I f the Left turns its back o n its foundations, it will be unable to make statements that are truly its own .

Theory, conviction, practice An essential i ngredient in the Right ' s breakthrough was an inte l l ectual self-confidence that was grounded in fundamental theoretical work by academics such as Milton F riedman, Friedrich Hayek, and Robert Nozick. I n one i nstructive sense, those authors did not propose new ideas. Instead they explo red , d eveloped , and forth rightly reaffirmed the Right ' s trad itional principles. Those principles are not so trad itional to the British political Right as they

30

Equality

theless, in the are to the Ameri can , but they are tradi tiona l never d epth which is impo rtant sense that they posse ss an histo rical which they are assoc iated with the conce ptual and mo ral d epth at locate d .

shoul d do. I t Wha t the Right d i d is not p r o o f of w hat the Left okin g for "a is, nevert heless, extrem ely sugge stive. I t t e l l s agains t l o not land a big new i d ea". That is a futile endea vour, since you do intell ectual new idea as a resul t of angli ng for one i n the wide sea of s to solv e possib ility. New i deas standa rdly come from attemp t new idea proble ms by which o l d ideas are stump ed. S ometim es the because turns out to be big, but looking for a big n ew i d ea , as such, it woul d be impressive to hav e one, is a ridiculou s agen dum. I P PR The character of the Right's success suggest s that if, as the alist document also said, and as I agree, custom ary i n herited soci ut rhetoric now turns people off, then the remedy i s not to cast abo its for a different rhetoric, or buzz-phras e , irrespecti v e of what relationship to traditional principles m ay be, but to resto re our o wn contact with those principles, from w hich exercise a new rhetoric may indeed emerge. The old rhetoric now sounds dated not because everybo dy knows the content behind it but partly b ecaus e its �ontent has been forgotten . The Left w i l l not recou p itself

tdeo logically without addressing that foun dational cont ent. The relatio nship between theory and practice is mor e co m p lex th�n some friend s of the Labour party appear now to sup pose . The pomt of theorY ts not to . e socm · l desi· gn generate a comprehensiv . Whtch the po)ltlct · · an then seeks to implement . Things do not wo rk . that way because tmp . I ementmg a design requires whole cloth , an d ' noth.mg .m co n t emp orary politics is made out of whole cloth . . cs t. s po1 ltt an end! ess struggle, and theory serves as a weap o n in that strugg1 e, b ecau . . . ' . se it p rov'd wn, 1 es a ch aractensatwn of Its d uect and of tt · � co ntr olling purpose. . Con std ered as practtcal propos als, the theori es of Fri edm an , Hayek and N . oztck were crazy; crazy m the strict sense that you would h ave t o be crazy to t . h mk that such proposals (eg abo l itio n of aU regulat ion of p rofes · stona1 standa rds and of safety at work, abolition of stat e tno ney, ab ol1'fton of all w elfare provision) mig ht be .Implement ed in the sh ort med'IUm , or long term.2 The theo ries are rn that � nse trazy pre . Cisely becaus e they are uncom pro misin gly ·

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Back to Socialist Basics

31

fundamental: they were not d ev ised with one eye on electoral possibility. And just for that reason, their serviceability in electoral and other political contest is very great. Politicians a n d a ctiPists

can press n o t-so-crazy rig h t-wing proposals wit/1 con v iction b ecause

t/z ey /z a pe the stre ng t h of con viction that depends upon depth of co1wiction, a n d depth comes fro m theory t/zat is too fun damental to be practicable in a direct sense.

I said that pol iticians make nothing out of whole cloth . All

change i n mo dern c o n d i tions of s o cial d i fferentiat i o n and international integration is perforce incremental, one per cent here, five per cent there, accumulating after, say, fifteen years , into a revolutio n . The large fundamental values help to power (or block) the little changes by nourishing the justificatory rhetoric which is needed to push (or resist) cha nge. Fundam ental social ist values which point to a fo rm of society a hundred miles from the horizon of present possibility are n eeded to d efend every h alf-mile of territory gained and to mount an attempt to regain each bit that has been lost. Consider Gordon B rown's response to Kenneth Clark e's budget

of November 1 9 9 3 . Its central themes were two: the To ries have

broken their promise not to raise taxes, and it is they who are respo nsible for the m ess which obl iged them to break that prom is e .

That co m bined charge, important though it i s , and i mportant as it was to level it, requ ires no socialist valu e, no non-Tory valu e , to back it u p . Co nsider, too, Michael Portill o ' s artful m anoeuvre around Brown's charge. He did not have to face it i n its own terms because he could say with conviction to B rown that Brown

proposed no solution to the £50 billion deficit (to which B ro w n ' s

criticisms of betrayal a n d incompetence a n d B rown ' s policy o f long­ term greater i nvestment indeed represented no solution). Brown centred

his

attack

on

the

m i s d e m e a nours

of

eco n o m i c

mismanagement a n d political promise-breaking, i nstead o f o n the crime o f d epressing the conditions of l ife o f poor people, and on the cri me of not loading more burden o n the better off, includ i ng the not stupendously well off. I do not say that Brown d i d not mention the sheer inegalitarianism of the budget's p rofile. But he did not a n d could not make that point w ith conviction as a central point, because he is imprisoned by the thought about who votes

32

Equality

values. for what and b ecause he has lost touch with founda ti onal because it The B rown respon se was relativ ely i neffec tual partly actual ly presupposed for its effect that peopl e are dumb er than they hough it are. People already knew that the Tories made the mess , t ont was no doubt useful to remind them of it, to keep it at the forefr it think of their co nsciousness. But they are not so d u mb that they Labo ur fol lows from the fact that the Tories made the mess that win will would be b etter at getting the country out of it. Labour its the politics of competence o n ly if people have confid ence in n ow its comp etence. That requires that Labour itself be confi d ent in nt superior compet ence, and that i n turn requires that it be confide i n itself, tout court, which it can only b e if it tran scends its furti ve relatio nship to its traditional values. Electoral success is to a large extent a by-pro duct of commitmen t to someth ing other tha n electo ral succe ss. Success in a particular election can , moreover, be bought at the cost of an ideol ogical backslide which has lasting deleterio us effect. It is one thing to point out that the Tories have fai led by their o wn sta�dards. It is quite another, i n the course of making that goo d pomt, to endorse those standards yourself. Labour is now so beguiled by the praspect of exposing the Tories as tax-raisers that 1t IS begin ning to tre at tax restramt not merely as a Tory goa1 but as an . . . d mtnn s1c des id eratum. Therewith traditional pledges to remforce an extend w elfar e p ·3 rov1s1on are being seriously compromised: ·

·

·

·

·

·

·

Principle and pol itic s

In its ideol ogi . . call Y se 1£-confi dent phase, when its relatio nshi p to I tS valu es was fo rt hright rath er than furtive, the Labour part y affi rm ed a Prine·1P1e of com mumty an d a princip l e of equality. ("Com mu nity'' and "equalit .. can be defined in t differen t ways, and I shal l say wh at l mean by e m, as names of . · tra d ltwn al mainstream Labour valu es, 11\ the follo w. mg sectio n s ) E ach principle was rega rded as authoritative in . Its own rig ht but aI so as JUStified throu g h ·Its tonn tQion With the ot er h E ach vaI ue supported the oth er, an d eacb ... Itt . �b e fact that it was supporte d by t he th odltt. Aalt tbe.e vel y __. ..,._ uea were not on1 Y cen part y -� t.bou, tno\Jetnent surrountral to the Labour also ding it. They were :_ , ·

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·

·

•

·

·

·

·

·

·

Back to Socialist Basics

33

the val ues t h a t d is t i n gu i s h ed Labour fro m o t h e r p a r t i es a t

Wt•stminster . T h e y were. i n deed. t h e only values w h i ch t il e /,eft affirmed as a m a t t e r of prin ciple a n d wh ich th e Centre a n ti R i g h t n•ject as a m a tt e r of p ri n cip l e . +

The v a lu es of commun i t y a n d equality were articu lated in books and pamphlets . fi u t t hey were a lso carried by, and t h ey ex pressed the sent iments o f, a broad m o vement t h at no l o nger exists and t h a t w i l l newr be

recrea t ed .

I t w i l l n ever b e recreated b ecause

technological chan ge means t hat the class base of t h at movem e n t

is gone . fo ren·r. S o c i a l i s t values have l o s t t heir mooring in capita list

social s t ructure. Partly because o f that, but also part l y beeause o f righ t win g i deo logical successes , com munity a n d e q u a l i t y h a v e lost -

the q u i t e extensive ideologieal hegemony that t h ey o n ce enjo yed . If I had to hazard a causal story, I would say that right-wing values

fi l l ed a space vaca t ed b v left-w i n g values which went on vacation

because t h t·ir class base was eroded. fieeause I t h i n k that i s a l i k el y causal s to r y , I should n o t b e accused o f accusing Labour's l ead ers o f gratuitous betraya l . in t h e i r abandonment of traditi onal values . " B etrayal" is t h e wrong name for abandon ment w h i ch has a hard underlying social cause. B u t the hard ness of the cause d o es not mea n

that

t h ere i s

no

a l te r n a t i v e

but

t o a l l o w w h o l es a l e

aban donment o f values t o b e i t s effect . The struggle for community a n d eq uality i s perforce more difficult when the calculus of class interest reduces the constituency that would gain from t h e m , in an i m mediate sense of "ga in". B u t there remain two reasons for i nsisting o n t heir authority. The fi rs t , which

is decisive on

its o w n . i s a self-standing mora l-cum­

intellectual reason. The second , more co n tingent a n d debatable, i s a reason r e l a t e d to the identity and s u r v i v a l o f t he L a b o u r p a r t y , and i t is cont ingent p a r t l y because it i s not a necessary t r u t h t h at the Labour party s h o u l d continue to exist. The decisive reason for not abandoning com mu n i t y and eq u a l i t y i s t ha t t h e m o r a l fo rce o f t h ose values never depended o n the social for ce supporting them that i s now d isappearing. No one who believed in the values could h ave said that she believed i n t h e m

beca use t h e y

expressed the sentiments of a social movement. Anyo ne who bel ieved i n them b eli eved i n them because sh e t hough t them i n h e re n t l y authoritative, and the withering of the social fo rce

34

Equality

. i nk t hem auth orita tive that back ed them cann ot justi fy ceas i n g to t h once e valu es is that, And t h e seco nd reas on fo r not a b a n d o n i ng t h ed princ iple , as oppo s they are drop ped, then there is no reaso n of . Libe ral Dem o crats to of histo r y , for Labo ur n o t to m erge w i t h t h e a party , b elie ve i n Labo ur cann ot cheri sh i t s i ndep ende nce as a "four princ iples of poli tics of princ ip l e , a n d affir m noth ing but the a l Justice ill a social justic e" affirm ed i n The Ju stice Gap a n d S oci Tory need Changi ng World.s No Liberal D e mocrat or progre s sive reject those principles. 6

to think the A d i fferen t respo nse to the prese nt pred icame nt is to see h o w values afresh in a spirit of loyalty to them a n d i n o r d er t i m e , and o n e can sustain comm itm ent to t h e m i n a n i n hosp i t a b l e hat part ly what n ew m o d es of advoca cy o f them are p o ss i b l e . But t sort t h at practical task requires foundat ional refl ection o f just the the IPPR might have m eant us to eschew .7

belie ve You can ask what our princip les are , what , that i s , we ext with passio n, and you can ask what is the b est way to win the n nd election . But you cannot ask what p r i nci ples w e shou l d have , a e th what we should believe with passion, as a m eans o f win n i ng next election . B For the answer w i l l n o t be principl es you can rea lly believe i n , and you m ight therefore n o t even h elp yo urs elf ele:torally , since electors are not so unperceptive that th e y can be rehed upon not to notice that you are dissemb l ing. The two IPPR documents bow b efore the succes s of pro -ma rke t · · and anti-egalitar 1" an ·' d eo 1 ogy that r s has helped to precipita t e La b ou . . . present ldeolog·lea 1 cns1s. . . Th ere .1 s , as I have said , nothm g m t h en fou r core ideash'.J t h . at any L1beral Democrat or left-wi n g Tory n ee d . reJect. To be su re th e T . ones .m particular do n o t in practi ce resp ect the core .ideas as muc h as a Labour governm e n t might, b u t th at does not .JU Sti. " fy fl oun. s h mg forth pale principles to d efin e t h e ' ·

•

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direct"lon of La bou r's renewal . After each of L abour , s four electoral failures, the Labo ur Righ t . said: we d"d l not wm . becaus e we looked too socialist; a nd t h e Labour Left sa·1 d· we did not w ·m b ecause we did not look socia list enough. I do n ot th'mk enher . . s'd 1 e k nows s to b e •

ttue

·

II ttue' and •

. if o ne std e 18 nght, then I do not know w h i ch Certainly there . tx lStS an aversion to Incr eases in taxati o n , a nd ·-·h altlv.. - ""'"5 that is no dou bt P8rtlY because no truly p r i n c i p led d efen ce

•·1o

·

that what it claim

·

·

·

Back to Socialist Basics

35

of greater redistribution is confidently p rojected , I admit that I do not know how la rge a pa rt of the explanatio n of u n popularity o f greater taxation is associated w i t h fai l u re t o project is justifi cat i o n . I

a m t herefore not contending that a principled d efence o f

community and equality is a sure route t o electo ral success i n 1 9 9 7 . But fai lure to secure acceptance of t h e p ri nciples o f community a n d equality 1 1 is n o t a reason t o mod ify o n e ' s belief i n the principles t h emselves, even if it is indeed a reason, politics being what it is, not to thrust them fo rward publicly i n their unvarnished fo rm Y L To massage one's beliefs fo r the sake of electoral gain can, moreover, be electorally counterpro ductive . I t can be i nexpedient to

abandon prin ciple for expediency, because i t is h ard to h ide the

fact that you are doing s o , and everyone, Neil K innock included, knew that the To ries were right when, to po werfu l electora l effect, t hey accused Kinnock o f that unprinci pl ed abandonment. The Commission on Social Justice should not pretend to run an exercise in the examination of pri nciple whose real focus i s not principle but electoral success, because then i t will certa i n l y betray p r i nci p l e and possibly co ntribute t o electoral failure .

Community versus ma rket I mean here, by "community", the a n t i-market principle acco rding

to

which I serve you not b ecause of what I can get out o f doing so but because you need m y service. 1 :l That is anti-mark et becau s e the market motivates productive contri bution not o n the basis of com mitment to one's fel l o w human beings and a desire to s ervice them while being served by them, but on the basis o f i mp e rsonal cash reward. The i m m ed iate motive to productiv e activity i n a market society is typica l l y 1 4 some m ixture of greed and fear , in p ropo rtions that vary with the details of a p ers o n ' s market position · and persona l characte r I n greed , o th er p eop le are seen as possible . sou rces of enrichm ent, and i n fear they are seen as threats . These are horrib le ways of seeing other people , h o w ever much w e have bee n habitu at ed and inured to them, as a result of centu r i es of ca pitalis t develo pment . 1 5 I said that, i n comm unity motiv ation , I p rodu ce b ecaus e of m y

· com ffiitme nt to my fel l o w huma n beings and w ith a desire to s erve

Equality

36

mot ivati on, there is Y them whi le bein g serv ed by thcm ' In such neve rtheless differs inde ed an expe ctation of reci procati o n , but it is willi ng to serve, critic ally fro m m arke t moti vat i o n . The mark eteer the conj u nctio n but only in orde r to be serv ed . He d o es not d esire serve if doing so (serv e-and-be-served) as such , fo r he woul d not expressed in the were not a mea ns to get servi ce. The diffe renc e is on. Cont rast lack of the fi ne tuni ng that atten ds n o n-ma rket moti vati buys the drinks tak i n g turns i n a loose way with respe ct to who The form er with keeping a record of who has paid what for them . the mark et. procedure is i n line with com munit y, the latter with the thought Now , the histo ry of the twen tieth centu ry encou rages soci ety is that the easiest way to genera te produc tivity in a modern unequal by nourishing the motives of greed and fear, in a hierarch y of wo uld income. That does not make them attract ive motiv es. Who otin g propose running a society o n such motive s, and thereby prom to be the psychology to which they belo ng, if they were not kno wn nly effective, did they not have the instrum ental value whic h is the o ith value that they h ave? In the famous statement in which Adam S m ot ustifi ed m arket relations , he pointed out that we plac e our fai th n 1 � the butch er's generos ity, but o n his self interest, when we rely o n · · · ns ic h 1m to �rov·ision us. Smith thereby propou nded a whol ly extn .J . UstificatiOn of m arket motivation in face of what he ackno w led ged ' · · · h av e to be its un attract 'Ive mtrms1c · ter. Tradit ional so cia 1·1sts charac . . rk et often Ign ore d S mi' th ' s pomt, . m a morali stic conde mna tion of ma . . . motivatiOn am . Cert whi ch fa1 1s to address its extrinsi c justification . . . . contempora ry ov er-ent husmst1c market socialists tend , contra n w1se , to forget that the . . are market IS mtrms ically repugnant, because they . blinded b Y theu . beI ated d lscov ery of the market's extrinsic val ue. T he genius 0 f t he m · shabby motives to des1 rab1e arket IS · that It recruits ends ' and .In a ' balanced VIew, · b oth s ides of that propo sitio n m us t be k ept in focu s.

�

.

.

·

·

Generosity nd . . a self-interest ex1st m everyone. We kno w ho w to . m ake an eco n omi c system wo rk on the basis of self-interest. W e do not know how to m ake it wo rk on the basis of generosi ty . B u t that does no t mea n that we s h ouId forget genero sity: we shou l d sf1 ll confine the sway of . s elf -Inte rest as much as we can . We d o that. for ex ample h we tax , redis resu tribu alis i ng

lts of lllatket• ·

:/�

tively the unequ lVtty . The extent to which we can d o that •

Back to Socialist Basics

37

without defeati ng our aim (of making the badly off better off) varies inversely with the extent to which self-interest has been all owed to triumph in private and public consciousness. 1 7 (To the extent that self-interest has indeed triumphed, heavily progressive taxation drives high earners ab road , or causes them to decide to reduce their labour input, or induces i n them a morose attitu d e which makes their previous input hard or impossible to sustai n . ) The market, any market, contradicts t h e principle which n o t only Marx but his socialist predecessors proclaimed for the good society , the principle embodied in the slogan "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." One might ask what it means for each to give according to his ability, and what it means for each to get according to his needs . But for present purposes, the unambiguous m essage of the slogan is that what you get is not a function of what you give, that contribution and benefit are separate matters . Here the relationship between people is not the instrumental one in which I give because I get, but the wholly non-instrumental

one in which I give because you need . You do not get more b ecause you produce more, and you do not get less because you are not good

at producing. Accordingly, the ideal in the primeval socialist slogan constitutes a complete rejection of the logic of the market. The socialist aspiration was to extend co m munity to the whole of our economic life. W e now know that we do not now know how to do that, and many think that we now know that it is i mpossible to do that. But community conquests in certain domains, such as h ealth care and educatio n , have sustained viab l e fo rms of production and d istribution in th e past, and it is co nsequently a matter for regret that the IPPR documents

do

not invoke

community as a core value, when it is a value that is currently under aggressive threat fro m the market principle, and when then there is even immediate political mileage to be got from reasserting community in the mentioned particular domain s .

Justice a n d equ ality · · I e of equaht The prmc1p · y says that the amoun t o f amenit y and urde n in one person 's life s hould be roughl y compa rabl e to that m any other' s. That princi ple is not mentio ned i n the docu ments ;

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38

Equality

in parod y, in the or, to be m o re precis e , tt ts mentio ned only " 18 arithm etic al equality . statem ent that "few peop le b el i ev e in of of the princ i ple Perh aps no one belie ves in the u n l i m ited sway h equali t y is roug 1 equali ty, as I d efined it above , 9 where , that is, nly other s , certai simil arity of amen ity and burd e n . But I , and many other s , and this b elieve in it as a value to be trade d off again st ments . I nst ead, value is rejected , as such, i n the Comm iss io n ' s docu a ly said to be we have an arresti ngly weak propo sition - strang e l just ice, w hich "radica l " one 2 0 - in the fourth "core id ea" of socia - bu t tho se reads as fol lows : "Inequ alities are not necess arily u njust 1 imi nate d . "2 which are should be reduced and where possib l e e\ ineq uali ties Those who are eager to declare their support for unjus t will oppose the fourth core idea .

Proposition three on social just ice read s , in part, as fo llows: Redistribution of income is a means to social justice and not

an end i n itself; social justice d emands sufficient revenue to meet basic n eeds and extend opportunitie s, but the re are li mits of prin ciple as well as practice to l evels of taxa tio n . 22

:o �ay that (an equalising) redistribution of incom e is not an en d m

Itsel f but o nly a means t o fulfil b a s i c need s and exte nd . · :1 opp ortu mttes, · · · once aga .m , to abandon equality as a pn n c1pl e. 2 Is . · · tice The fourth core I· d ea and the third propositi on on socw l JUS . · rats e two quesfton s: d first, what is the d ifference betwe en a JUSt an 1 .. an un just in equ artty ? A · e p n d , second , what are the "limits of prinC J · , to ta xat.ton be yon d w h' 1ch taxation counts as "punit ive ?"2+ ' . An answer t o the fi . g1ven on page 43 ot I Jz e Jus t1ce Irst questiOn IS Gap . The mequarIt. tes that "are indeed justified"2 5 are, it say s th ere . justified b n ed, Y merit, or reward"26 I find that list curio us a nd I � want to examt n · · e 1t m a little detail . ..1nequalities" jus tifi . ed . m . ter ms of need are not ones that eve n the most radic al egahtanan h . as ever opposed . The Justzce G ap do es not say what eed . n . s tt contempI ates h ere, but there are only t wo kmda that apna... 1 .--. re evant p· t ome lev u s _ ... s peo ple need more reso u rce s to •chleve the e ._ ..e l of ll'b emg as others. But to unequ alis e w e 1t:IOufeel on . that basis fld\Ql kkacl. Seeon-� 18 consiStent with egalitarianism of a mo st .

. . .

.

.

K

·

,

·

.

-. SOibe peopte need ·

,

more means of productio n

Back to Socialist Basics

39

t h a n o t hers do to ca rry out their social fu nction . But producer need is

out of place in a rol l-call of justifi ed inequal ities which i s

i ntended to cha l lenge a n uncompromising egalitarianism. N o

egal itarian thinks t hat brain surgeons s h o u l d be d e n i e d expensive equi pment . The other supposed ways of justifying inequalities are, first, in t erms of merit and . seco nd, in terms of reward . But the phrase . . inequality justified in terms of reward" conveys no clear thought, especiallv when it is, as here, contrasted with "inequal ity justified in

tl·rms of merit." I suppose that the phrase was a piece of innocent

carelessness. yet it is symptomatic of the altogether casual treatment of equality i n these proceedings that such carelessness should have

got by the eyes of what must have been quite a few readers. I presume

we ran take it that what was intended by "inequality justified i n terms

of rl'Ward" is i nequality justified in terms of reward for merit and/or

l'ffort . So let me address merit and effort, as grounds of inequality. If one person produces more than others that is because he is more talented or because he expends more effort or because h e is lucky in his circumstances of productio n , which i s to say that he is

luc-ky with respect to whom and what he produces

with.

The last

n•ason for greater productivity, lucky circumstance is morally (as opposed to economical ly) unintelli g i bl e as a reason for greater reward . And w hereas rewarding prod uctivi ty which is due to greate r inherent talent is indeed morally i ntell igible, from certain ethical standpoints , it is nevertheless a profoundly anti-socialist idea . c-o rrec t l y stigmatised by J S Mill as an instance of "giving to t hose who have" ,27 since greater talent is itself a piece of fo rtune

that c a lls for no furth er rewa rd. Effort might be a different matter . I say that it m ight be d i fferent, becau se it can be co ntended that unusual effort (largely) reflects un usual capacity for effort, which is but a further form of talent and therefo re subject to the same sceptic ism as talent itself i s with respe ct to its relevan ce to reward . But let us allow, agai nst such pticis� , that effort i s i ndeed pertin ently28 subjec t to the w i l l . a t bemg grante d , ask , now, w h y t h e effortful p erson who i s o sed t o be hands omely rewar ded expen ded t h e effo rt s h e d i d . . i she do s o m order t o enrich herse lf'? If s o , t h e n w h y shoul d her speci al effort comm and a high rewa rd '? Or d id s h e work hard

�� ��

40

Equality

in o rder to benefit others? If s o , then it contradicts her own aim

to reward her with extra resources that others would otherwise

have, as opposed to with a salute and a han dshake and a sense of

gratitude. 29 Those remarks are, o f cou rse , only the beginning of a

long argument, but it is i n d icativ e of the utter conventionality of

the d isparagement of equ ality in the IPPR pamphlets that such lO considerations l i e b eyond their ho rizo n . : o n social I turn to the q u estion raised by the third propos ition ". N ow, justice ,:H concerning the "limits o f principle on taxat ion ined in although those "limits of p rinciple" are not d efined or e xpla of the the two published documents, I conjectu re that part:3 2 in the unstated explanatio n o f them is the one that appe ars a ms Willi unpublished paper on "Ideas of Social Justice" that B ernar d be rt prepared for the Com mission . Echoing a chief claim of Ro of Nozick's, Williams said that "sustainin g as equal distri but ion mon ey would involve continuous incursions into lib erty." That summa ry r e m ark o verlooks the conce ptua l tru th tha t to have money is

(p ro tanto) to have l iberty . The r icher you are, the

more courses of actio n are open to you, which is to say that you

are freer than you would be otherwise. Accordingly, whoever

receives money as a result of redistribution thereby enjoys an iberty enhancem ent of her l iberty,33 albeit at the expe nse of the l for �f the p erso n from who m it is taken, but with the net res ult

· · h ere liberty as such entire · 1 y moot. Taxation restric ts not, as It IS . · hts ' misleadi ngly su ng ggeste d , liberty as such ' but privat e prope rty · both in ext erna l her th mgs ' and i n one ' s own labour powe r. Whe t or n ot such ri ghts are d eepl y founded , it is ideol ogi cal hocu s-p ocus . . . to Identify . them With . l iberty as such, and it is entir ely all en t o . tr ad'!tiO na\ s oci a rIst b e, Ief . so to cons true them . . The sto ut op p · ion to equality and redistribu tion as m att ers osit . 1 of p ri nci e . p Is reve aled ·In th'IS reJectio n of Tory dog ma: ·

Contrary to . the wtnc kle-down" theory of the 1980s, mak in g the rich ri ch e r do es n 0 t m ake the poo r richer to o . Inde ed , he Whi t1 es for . ci. p l e , but set support a "comprehensi ve�· versio n of the pnn luck f the b rute a "threshold" version. The threshold vers .wn o n t, t we preve . principle in itsel seems not to demand very roueh : "th a strategiC or correct/compensate for, brute luck disadvantage ·m cencY insofar as this pushes people below cert ai n d e u do o Y m · prosp e t for well-bemg and agency ·" o u ld ga itari a to agree that no-on e sh el merely need to be mo d erat Y connection with egalitarianism, to the extent that there d is m Wh s insistence that the thresh ol is f i ig an issue of principle. The o igin o f the rute luck" principle said we must it .. ...... · · ·-.•· '"'. 11\ean that