Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 14)

Ending the Vietnam War Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, usin...

Author: Ang Cheng Guan

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Ending the Vietnam War

Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book includes Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, and tells the story of the war from the Tet offensive in 1968 up to the reunification of Vietnam in April 1975. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the predominantly US-centric narratives of the war by placing the Vietnamese communists centre-stage in the story. It is a sequel to the author’s RoutledgeCurzon book The Vietnam War From the Other Side, which covers the period 1962–1968. Ang Cheng Guan is Associate Professor at the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include the international history of the Vietnam War and postWorld War II Southeast Asia, particularly mainland Southeast Asia.

RoutledgeCurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia

1 The Police in Occupation Japan Control, corruption and resistance to reform Christopher Aldous 2 Chinese Workers A new history Jackie Sheehan 3 The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya 4 The Australia–Japan Political Alignment 1952 to the present Alan Rix 5 Japan and Singapore in the World Economy Japan’s economic advance into Singapore, 1870–1965 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi 6 The Triads as Business Yiu Kong Chu 7 Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism A-chin Hsiau 8 Religion and Nationalism in India The case of the Punjab Harnik Deol 9 Japanese Industrialisation Historical and cultural perspectives Ian Inkster 10 War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945 Hans J. van de Ven 11 Hong Kong in Transition One country, two systems Edited by Robert Ash, Peter Ferdinand, Brian Hook and Robin Porter 12 Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1948–1962 Noriko Yokoi 13 Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975 Beatrice Trefalt 14 Ending the Vietnam War The Vietnamese communists’ perspective Ang Cheng Guan

Ending the Vietnam War The Vietnamese communists’ perspective

Ang Cheng Guan

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group # 2004 Ang Cheng Guan All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-98733-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–32609–5 (Print Edition)

Contents

Acknowledgements Map Introduction

ix x 1

Overview of the book 5 1

The start of negotiations Decision to negotiate 9 The Tet Offensive – Phase II 10 The start of the talks in Paris 11 The Tet Offensive – Phase III 12 Le Duc Tho–Harriman private meetings: the first five sessions 13 Hiccups and resumption of talks 14 The military situation in 1968 reviewed 16 The Four-Party Conference 17 The military situation in early 1969 18 Policy differences within the Hanoi leadership 20 The NLF’s ten-point plan and Nixon’s eight-point plan 22 Establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRGSVN) 24 Stalemate in Paris 25 Hanoi and Sino-Soviet relations, 1969 26 Ho Chi Minh’s death and its aftermath 28 Military developments in the South, 1969 32 Military developments in Laos 34 The negotiations in 1969 reviewed 35

9

vi

Contents

2

The widening war

37

The 18th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party 37 Reorganising the VPA 38 Le Duc Tho–Kissinger first secret meeting (21 February 1970) 42 Le Duc Tho–Kissinger second secret meeting (16 March 1970) 43 Communist activities in Cambodia 43 The deposition of Sihanouk and its aftermath 45 Le Duc Tho–Kissinger third secret meeting (4 April 1970) 48 Indochinese Summit Conference (24–25 April 1970) 49 Tensions between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists 49 Military developments in Cambodia 50 Le Duan – ‘first among equals’ 53 Xuan Thuy–Kissinger secret meeting (7 September 1970) 54 Communist military preparations 56 Xuna Thuy–Kissinger secret meeting (27 September 1970) 58 3

Fighting and negotiating Kissinger’s approach rebuffed 60 The 19th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party 60 COSVN Directive No. 01/CT71 61 Communist spring–summer 1971 counter-offensives: Route 9–southern Laos and Cambodia 62 Sino-Vietnamese communists’ relations 67 Communist counter-offensive: Tay Nguyen 70 Vietnamese-Cambodian communists’ relations 71 Xuan Thuy–Kissinger meeting (31 May 1971) 71 Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meeting (26 June 1971) 73 Hanoi’s analysis of the situation in mid-1971 74 Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing 75 Vietnamese communists’ relations with Beijing and Moscow, 1971 77 Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meeting (12 July 1971) 79 Kissinger’s new eight-point plan 80 Vietnamese communists’ relations with Moscow, 1971 81 Kissinger’s second visit to Beijing 82 Kissinger’s new offer 83 Hanoi’s analysis of the situation at the end of 1971 85

60

Contents 4

Negotiations at a standstill

vii 87

Secret meetings made public 87 Nixon’s visit to China 87 Communist military preparations 89 The 20th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party 91 The 1972 Easter Offensive 92 US bombing campaign 95 Vietnam–Soviet relations, 1972 97 Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meeting (2 May 1972) 98 The US-Soviet Summit meeting 99 A change of strategy 100 5

The peace agreement

103

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger fourteenth meeting (19 July 1972) 103 Hanoi’s new negotiation strategy 104 Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meetings (1 and 14 August 1972) 105 Vietnamese communists’ relations with Beijing and Moscow 107 Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meeting (15 September 1972) 108 The 26–27 September 1972 intensive negotiations 109 The communist plan for a ‘general uprising’ (4 October 1972) 111 The 8–12 October 1972 negotiations 111 Xuan Thuy–Kissinger meeting (17 October 1972) 113 The peace agreement aborted 115 Another cycle of negotiations 115 Linebacker II and counter-offensives 117 Another attempt at negotiation 120 The final agreement 122 Laying the groundwork for the agreement 123 6

An incomplete victory Communist strategy for the South 127 COSVN meeting (16–17 March 1973) 128 COSVN Directive 3/CT/73 129 The journey to Hanoi 131 Meeting with Le Duan 132 Discussions with the Central Military Committee 134 Developments in South Vietnam reviewed 134

127

viii

Contents The Politburo meeting (May–June 1973) 136 Developments in North Vietnam 139 Developments in Laos 140 Developments in Cambodia 141 Vietnamese communists’ relations with China and the USSR, 1973 142 Hanoi, Beijing and the on-going conflict in Cambodia 143 COSVN Conference (September 1973) 145 Military preparations 146 Resolution 21 (15 October 1973) and COSVN Resolution 12 147 Developments in the US 148

7

Ending the war

150

The situation in the South 150 Military preparations 151 Meeting with Le Duan at Do Son 154 COSVN conference (July 1974) 156 Politburo meeting (September–October 1974) 156 Politburo meeting (December 1974–January 1975) 158 The fighting in the South 159 The 1974–1975 dry season offensive 161 Vietnamese communists’ relations with Beijing and Moscow 164 The Ho Chi Minh campaign 165 Notes Select bibliography Index

166 185 196

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude to Judy Stowe, Evelyn Goh, Dang Cam Tu, Vo Le Thai Hoang, Lynda Olive and Chong Yee Ming who have assisted in this project either directly or obliquely. I wish also to thank Peter Sowden who is my commissioning editor and Susan Dunsmore for copy editing the text. Any mistakes and shortcomings in this book are my own. This book is dedicated to the memory of Ralph Smith.

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Introduction

Although the literature of the Vietnam War in the English language is massive, in most of the accounts of the war, the substantial part of the story ends soon after either the Tet Offensive in 1968, or when the Paris Peace Agreement was finally signed in January 1973. The accounts of the seven-year period following the Tet 1968, or the two years after January 1973 are usually skimpy. One scholar noted that out of the 760 pages in the best-selling Vietnam: A History by Stanley Karnow, the period after March 1968 was told in just 180 pages. This is just one notable example. The tendency to begin the story of the Vietnam War from 1965 and to end it in 1968 or 1973 reflects a very US-centric understanding of the war. In the past few years, a handful of accounts spanning the years 1968 to 1973 have been published and they are based mainly on newly available US sources of the Nixon administration as well as on some Vietnamese communist sources. Most notable of these include Jeffrey Kimball’s Nixon’s Vietnam War (1998); Lewis Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (1999); Larry Berman’s No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (2001); and most recently, Pierre Asselin’s A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (2002). These scholarly and pioneering accounts have undoubtedly contributed to redressing an imbalance in the narratives of the war. However, their focus is primarily on American decision-making, even on the occasions when the spotlight was trained on the Vietnamese communists as evident in the accounts of Sorley and Asselin. But even in their accounts, the period after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement to the end of April 1975 (that is, the period after the US troops had left Vietnam) received scant treatment. Looking ahead, as researchers continue to tap the more readily available non-communist sources, we can expect to see more publications and analyses of the Vietnam War from the non-communist perspective and especially on the decision-making processes during the Nixon administration.

2

Introduction

This book is the conclusion of a two-volume history of the Vietnam War, based principally but not solely on Vietnamese communist sources. The aim of the study is to redress the predominantly US-centric narratives of the war by giving the Vietnamese communists centre-stage in the story. This study is concerned with describing step by step how decisions were made and carried out on the communist side from March 1968 to April 1975. It deliberately steers clear of the debates over who was right or wrong in the Vietnam War, whether the peace settlement could have been reached in 1969 instead of 1973 and whether the US could have won the war because, in the view of this author, dealing with these questions before first having an overall picture of the war would be putting the cart before the horse. The first instalment, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (published in 2002) attempts to reconstruct the evolution of decision-making on the communist side from 1954 to 1969. This present volume begins the account from 1968 when the Hanoi leadership embarked on its first tentative steps on the negotiation path, and brings the story to its conclusion on 30 April 1975 with the reunification of North and South Vietnam by the communist North. This is possibly the first book-length account of the last seven years of the Vietnam War against the Americans, a war, which for the Vietnamese communists, began way back in 1954. As mentioned in the first volume, everyone writing on the Vietnamese communist side of the Vietnam War is indebted to William J. Duiker whose The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, first published in 1981, is a ‘must’ read. Duiker was motivated to publish a second edition of his pioneering work in 1996 because within the span of fifteen years, ‘a considerable amount of new information has been available that provides new insights into the factors that led to the stunning victory of the Communist Party in the long conflict in Vietnam’.1 Duiker’s account covers the period from 1900 to 1975. In the past six years since 1996, we have garnered more information from the communist side, which were unavailable to Duiker then when he revised his book. Many of these will be recognised from the footnotes and bibliography in this book. My study therefore builds and expands on Duiker’s two chapters covering 1968–1973 and 1973–1975, which remains the most concise and succinct accounts of the last seven years of war from the communist perspective. In describing the Vietnam War from the communist perspective and in order to gain a complete and true picture of the war, one must not focus only on the role of the North Vietnamese, but also consider other players and events in the arena, namely, the roles of the South Vietnamese

Introduction

3

communists, the developments in Cambodia and Laos, as well the decisions and influences of the two principal communist patrons – Beijing and Moscow – with regards to the war. In this respect, it will be remiss not to acknowledge the contribution of the late Ralph Smith, whose pathbreaking An International History of the Vietnam War2 reminds us of the need to look at communist decision-making beyond Hanoi. Smith only managed to complete Volume III (which brought his account of the war up to 1966) of his projected five-volume international history of the Vietnam War before his untimely demise. This study in bringing the communist story right up to the end of the war is a small effort to continue Ralph Smith’s scholarship. I am reminded of his comparison of the history of the Vietnam War to the history of a game of chess: in his view, just as the history of a game of chess cannot be fully documented by only recording the moves of one of the players, similarly, any study of the Vietnamese communists’ struggle would not be complete without examining the moves of all the players in the field. In this respect and as in my earlier study, I have continued to benefit from the scholarly writings of particularly Chen Jian, Qiang Zhai (both on Sino-Vietnamese relations), Ilya Gaiduk3 (whose book remains the main source of information on Soviet Union–Vietnam relations), Robert K. Brigham (on the South Vietnamese communists) and the researchers and translators of the bulletins and working papers disseminated under the auspices of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP).4 As for the North Vietnamese communist sources consulted for the period of the study, I have continued to rely on those communist officials accounts, memoirs and captured documents that had been available for quite some time but which, in my view, have not been fully utilised by researchers.5 There are also a number of newer communist sources that have become available in the last few years. The most heavily ‘mined’ military account remains the Lich Su Quan Do Nhan Dan Viet Nam (The Official History of the Vietnamese People’s Army), hereafter quoted as LSQDNDVN. The account of the writing and publication of this official military history has been described previously and need not be repeated. It is, however, worth noting that it was only in 1994 that Hanoi issued a revised version of Volume 2 of the LSQDNDVN, first published in 1988. The 1988 edition covered the years 1954–1968. The 1994 revised version for the first time included an additional three chapters, thus bringing the communist military account of the war up to 1975. For non-Vietnamese language readers, there is now an English language version of the LSQDNDVN (1994) translated by Merle L. Pribbenow.6 Another communist source consulted is The 30-Year War 1954–1975, Volume II (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2001).

4

Introduction

On the diplomatic aspect of the war, I have relied heavily on Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris (Hanoi: The Gioi Press, 1996) by Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu. This is a very detailed account of the secret negotiations in Paris from 1968 to 1972 from the communist perspective and is comparable to that written by Henry Kissinger.7 Another is Luu Van Loi’s 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1945–1995 (Hanoi: The Gioi Press, 2000). Luu Van Loi had been an assistant to North Vietnam’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (1970–1978) and was a member of the North Vietnamese delegation at the Paris Peace Talks (1972–1973). Besides revisiting the better-known memoirs of the war years such as those by Van Tien Dung,8 Tran Van Tra,9 Truong Nhu Tang,10 Hoang Van Hoan11 and Bui Tin (who had in 2002 published another account of the war),12 I have also perused the following: the memoir by Hoang Van Thai13 (which is an example of one of those communist sources not fully tapped by researchers), a recent reminiscence by Vo Nguyen Giap of what took place at the military general headquarters in the years leading up to the Great Spring Victory of April 197514 and, last but not least, the recollections of the some of the members of the National Liberation Front (NLF) delegation including Nguyen Thi Binh at the Paris Peace negotiations.15 Finally, one significant non-communist archival source, which throws some light on what was happening in the communist camp with regards to the Vietnam War particularly in the early 1970s, is the recently declassified transcripts of conversations between Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai and between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong in Beijing.16 Vietnamese communist sources, especially official histories as well as those accounts that had the approval of the authorities for publication, have to be read and used with considerable care. They have a tendency to highlight and exaggerate the communists’ strengths and successes and downplay (if not completely ignore) their differences, setbacks and failures. Patricia M. Pelley, in her insightful study of Vietnamese historiography, highlighted the characteristic of didacticism in Vietnamese historical writing. Pelley noted that ‘when official historians spoke of the “tradition of unity against foreign aggression,” they did so prescriptively.’ Vietnamese official historians are also ‘obliged (by party and government decrees) to produce a Marxist history of Vietnam’.17 We also learn from Bui Tin’s disclosure that Truong Chinh had commented that Le Duan’s Letters to the South (Thu Vao Nam) contained ‘fabrications and embroidery’, that Van Tien Dung claimed too much personal credit for the 1975 victory in his account, Our Great Spring Victory, and that Vo Nguyen Giap’s Tong Hanh Dinh Trong Mua Xuan Toan Thang was published in response to earlier accounts which had discredited him and

Introduction

5

to re-establish his role in the war. Even those publications, which are condemned and banned by the authorities such as the memoirs of Hoang Van Hoan and Tran Van Tra are not without blemish. For example, Tra’s account of the war, understated the role of the North. Like all the others, Bui Tin’s recollections18 also should be read with a certain degree of circumspection. But this does not mean that all the Vietnamese communist sources are therefore unreliable and of little use for historians. One should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Every kind of source has its strengths and limitations and a judicious reading of as wide a range of sources as possible, both communists and non-communists, should enable one to produce a reasonably accurate and composite reconstruction of the history of the war from the communist perspective.

Overview of the book This study begins with Hanoi’s decision between late March and early April 1968 to accept President Johnson’s proposal to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War. This is a watershed event in the war. As described in Chapter 1 (March 1968–end 1969), the communist decision to negotiate was not unanimous. But having agreed to negotiations, the Vietnamese communists had to quickly achieve some tangible military victory to bolster its negotiating position. The first round of the Tet Offensive (or General Offensive General Uprising) had failed militarily although it led to President Johnson’s decision not to run for the forthcoming US presidential election. This accounts for the controversial decisions to launch a second and then a third round of military offensives that lasted till the end of September 1968, all of which failed to achieve the illusive victory that the communists so badly needed. Not surprisingly, the Vietnamese communists dragged their feet over the pre-conditions and modalities for the peace talks. The Vietnamese communist leadership had evidently not thought through the whole issue of negotiations and this explained their capriciousness in forwarding instructions to the negotiating team in Paris. After almost eight months of wrangling, the Four-Party talks finally convened in Paris in January 1969 but they were mainly for the public eye, the real negotiations took place in private between Le Duc Tho and Averell Harriman (who after 20 January 1969 was succeeded by Cabot Lodge). Meanwhile, the quest for the much-needed military victory continued without any tangible results. On 2 September 1969, Ho Chi Minh passed away a disappointed man. The reunification of the country was nowhere in sight, and the relationship of Hanoi’s two patrons – China and the Soviet Union – was at a nadir. Significantly, Ho’s untimely death did not

6

Introduction

lead to a power struggle in North Vietnam. Nor did it break the resolve of the Vietnamese communists. In the immediate months after Ho’s passing, there was also a noticeable improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations initiated by the Chinese side. Sino-Vietnamese relations had deteriorated because of Beijing’s disapproval of the strategy adopted in the Tet Offensive and also because of its unhappiness over Hanoi’s reluctance to take the Chinese side in the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute. Nixon’s ploys – his threat to unleash a massive mining and bombing operation on North Vietnam (Operation Duck Hook) as well as his activation of a secret nuclear alert to threaten the Soviet Union in October 1969 into pressuring the Vietnamese communists to negotiate – failed to unnerve the communists.19 Chapter 2 (January–December 1970) shows that despite the ongoing talks in Paris, the Hanoi leadership at the 18th Party Central Committee meeting calculated that the military struggle was becoming an increasingly critical factor in bringing the Vietnam War to a conclusion. The communist leaders anticipated correctly that the fighting in Laos would soon spill over into Cambodia. On 18 March 1970, Sihanouk was ousted in a coup, which might not have been directly instigated by the US, but, as George Kahin recalled, it was perceived that Lon Nol and Sri Matak could not have made a number of moves without ‘backup assurances from the United States’.20 Declassified transcripts of the 1970–71 conversations between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger showed that the Zhou believed that the CIA had a role in the deposition of Sihanouk. The coup essentially derailed the Paris talks, further expanded the war and brought about an uneasy coalition of the communist parties of the three Indochinese countries. The relations between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists were particularly troublesome and unstable. The attention of the Vietnamese communists in those months was not focused on the Paris talks but on how to exploit the 1970–71 dry season to achieve a military advantage. After the 27 September 1970 private meeting between Xuan Thuy and Henry Kissinger, despite the many requests from the US side for another meeting, both parties did not meet again till 31 May 1971. Chapter 3 (January–December 1971) describes what took place during the eight-month hiatus and explains what led the Vietnamese communists to resume the private talks at the end of May 1971. Their 1970–71 dry season military campaigns were reasonably successful although not resounding enough to serve as leverage at the negotiations. Vietnamese communists’ relations with Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge continued to deteriorate. There were tell-tales signs that Sino-US relations were thawing. All these could possibly explain Hanoi’s decision to resume the

Introduction

7

secret talks even though they did not expect any immediate breakthrough. On 9 July 1971, Henry Kissinger made his secret visit to Beijing. He left Beijing on 11 July and met Le Duc Tho the next day. The day after, on 13 July, Kissinger’s recent visit to Beijing was officially broadcasted worldwide. Believing that Beijing and Washington were in collusion to pressure Hanoi to concede in Paris, the knee-jerk reaction of the Vietnamese communists was to appear even more intransigent. Another natural response of the Hanoi leadership was to turn to the Soviet Union to counter-balance China but only to learn that Nixon would soon be visiting Moscow. This was clearly a very difficult period for the Vietnamese communists and there was a lot of soul searching on what should be their new game plan in the light of all the developments. A decision was only reached between the end of June and early July 1972. Meanwhile, Nixon’s landmark visit to China in February 1972 marked the high point of Sino-US rapprochement. The Vietnamese communists continued to search for the ‘decisive victory’ and began military planning for the 1972 military offensive (Easter Offensive), all of which are described in Chapter 4 (January–July 1972). At the end of June 1972, four years after the Hanoi leadership agreed to negotiations in April 1968, they finally decided to shift ‘from a strategy of war to a strategy of peace’. This is a significant turning point. Chapter 5 (July 1972–January 1973) recounts this new phase of the secret negotiations between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger. Hanoi wanted to obtain a peace agreement before November 1972. They almost managed to achieve that goal. Indeed, when Le Duc Tho and Kissinger met in early October 1972, they both agreed on a timetable leading to the signing of the peace agreement on either 30 or 31 October 1972. But at the last moment, Nixon decided to launch the controversial Linebacker II (Christmas bombings). This led to a two-month delay and the Paris Peace Agreement was eventually signed on 27 January 1973. Throughout the duration of the negotiations, the Hanoi leadership was determined that there would not be a repeat of Geneva 1954.21 Henry Kissinger in his account of the peace negotiations recollected that both Nixon and he ‘had no illusions that Hanoi’s fanatical leaders had abandoned their lifetime struggle’ and that he had warned Nixon in late 1972 that ‘Hanoi would press against the edges of any agreement and that the peace could only be preserved by constant vigilance’.22 But nobody, not even the Vietnamese communists themselves expected that they would be able to reunify the country so soon after the Paris Peace Agreement. In his recently published memoir,23 Robert Hopkins Miller recalled his visit to South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in October 1974

8

Introduction

in his capacity as the officer in charge of those three countries in the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He left with the impression that the situation in Cambodia was fast deteriorating, ‘on the ragged edge’ and that ‘if friendly forces were deprived of ammunition, they could not survive for long’. In contrast, he found that Laos ‘resembled nothing so much as a peaceful, mythical kingdom of the mysterious East’. The Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) and the Royal Laotain Government had signed the Vientiane Agreement on Restoring Peace and Achieving National Concord on 21 February 1973, about a month after the Paris Peace Agreement was signed. As for the situation in South Vietnam, Miller reported that it ‘appeared to be salvageable’ and ‘tenable even though some territory was likely to be lost to Hanoi’s forces in the anticipated spring offensive of 1975’. Indeed, the Hanoi leadership had initially projected that the struggle would continue till 1976/1977 and no specific date was set for reunification. It was only round about July 1974 that a decision was taken to aim for a victory in 1975/1976. Even at this stage, there were some who were more optimistic of an earlier victory than others. The last two chapters detail the communist decision-making, the problems between the Northern and Southern communists, Hanoi– Beijing–Moscow relations, the military preparations and the fighting from February 1973 to the end of April 1975, when Saigon finally fell to the communists.

1

The start of negotiations

Decision to negotiate In the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive, President Johnson announced in a televised address to the nation on 31 March 1968 that (a) he was restricting air strikes of North Vietnam to the area below the 20th degree parallel (b) he had instructed Averell Harriman to begin negotiations as soon as the Vietnamese communists were ready; and (c) he would not be running for the forthcoming US presidential election. In his speech, President Johnson, however, did not say whether he would resume the bombing or raise the level of American forces in Vietnam should the talks fail to materialise. According to Bui Tin, Johnson’s announcement, coupled with the earlier resignation of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as well as the recommendation of the ‘Wise Old Men’ that the US should end the war, convinced the Hanoi leadership that the US were preparing to back out of Vietnam. Bui Tin recalled that [they] discussed these developments among ourselves and concluded that the US must be in great difficulty. Who could be greater than Johnson as President of the United States? Who could yield as much power as McNamara while he was secretary of defense? Who would have his name linked to the Vietnam conflict as closely as Westmoreland? It was clear that the United States had reached a dead end in Vietnam.1 Three days later, on 3 April 1968, Hanoi issued a statement making the point that, even though the US government had not fully met the communists’ demands, they were willing to meet the Americans for preliminary discussions. According to Hoang Van Hoan, the decision to talk with the Americans was not unanimous. Le Duan decided on it and

10


Ho Chi Minh was not consulted. The latter was then recuperating in Beijing on 3 April 1969 when he heard the news that Hanoi had agreed to Johnson’s call for talks.2 Luu Van Loi explained that Johnson’s announcement was especially significant as ‘it marked a great change in the US strategy, from intensification of the war to de-escalation, from refusal of negotiations to acceptance of probing negotiation’. The public (including the international community) would not have supported Hanoi’s outright rejection of Johnson’s offer. But it was also premature to begin negotiations at that time. The Politburo identified the establishment of preliminary contacts and the insistence on complete cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam as the top priority. Meanwhile, secretprobing discussions could be held but there would be no negotiations on substantive matters until the bombing had stopped.3 The Nhan Dan and Quan Doi Nhan Dan editorials of 4 April expressed support for the decision. The editorials noted that the decision to meet the Americans ‘conformed to the aspirations of the world people, who cherished independence, peace and justice, and would surely receive widespread approval and support in the world’. The editorials also underscored the fact that the Vietnamese communists were determined to fight till total victory was theirs.4 Pham Van Dong told the Japanese writer Seicho Matsumoto in an interview on 6 April that Hanoi had already appointed its representative to meet the Americans.5 Hanoi attempted to exploit the split within the US in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive to advance its cause. On 8 April, during a CBS interview, Nguyen Duy Trinh appealed to the American people for support.6 Pham Van Dong also sent a message to the American public through CBS in which he called upon the American people to join the Vietnamese in the common objective of bringing the war to an end by demanding that the US withdraw its troops from Vietnam.7

The Tet Offensive – Phase II The opening round of the Tet Offensive (which began on 31 January 1968) had not only been a failure but had also resulted in heavy losses on the communist side. Recognising their disadvantage at the negotiation table without first scoring a battlefield victory, Hanoi was desperate for an unqualified military success to help them negotiate from a position of strength. To this end, on 24 April, the Politburo decided to conduct another military offensive. Bui Tin revealed that this decision to launch the second phase of the Tet Offensive was not unanimous. Vo Nguyen Giap was among those who did not agree with the idea but did not express his opposition outright at


11

the time ‘because he was in the minority and the others would not have listened to him’.8 Phase II of the Tet Offensive took place between 4 May 1968 and 17 August 1968. The communists attacked thirty-one cities, fifty-eight districts, thirty airfields and twenty operation staging bases mainly in Saigon and Gia Dinh, suffering high casualties in the process. On 12 June, they withdrew from Saigon.9

The start of the talks in Paris On 7 May 1968, en route to Paris, Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam’s representative at the talks, made a stopover at Beijing. The stopover provided Xuan Thuy with an opportunity to gauge Beijing’s feelings towards the decision to negotiate. Apparently, Mao Zedong refused to meet him. Xuan Thuy had a brief meeting with Zhou Enlai, who was reported to have told him that Hanoi’s decision to negotiate with the US was a major tactical and diplomatic mistake and that Hanoi had fallen into an American trap.10 In the midst of Phase II of the Tet Offensive and despite the disapproval of the Chinese, the first session of the peace talks was convened at the International Conference Centre on Avenue Kle´ber in Paris on 13 May 1968. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Xuan Thuy (with Ha Van Lau as his deputy). The US side was led by Averell Harriman (with Cyrus Vance as his deputy). In the words of Luu Van Loi, ‘a new war officially began between Vietnam and the US: a war around a green carpet as bombs were still exploding on the battlefield’.11 Hanoi had four objectives at the preliminary talks: (1) to win international sympathy and support; (2) to divide and isolate the US and its allies; (3) to gain an insight into the US game plan; and, most significantly, (4) to get the US to stop bombing the North unconditionally. The North Vietnamese negotiating team refused to proceed with any substantive discussion until the US ceased all bombing. After almost a month of posturing at Avenue Kle´ber, on 3 June 1968, North Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh directed the Vietnamese negotiators to ‘continue the fruitful public struggle while preparing for starting, at a propitious moment, behind-the-scenes talks concurrently with the public talks’. ‘Behind-the-scenes talks’, Trinh explained, ‘are different from the US secret talks. However, we should prevent the US from using behind-the-scenes talks to deceive public opinion and to create illusion among people.’12 About a fortnight later on 15 June, Hanoi further clarified that the objective of the private contacts was for ‘probing purposes’ and ‘not yet for bargaining’.13 Soon after, on the evening of 26 June, the deputy leaders of

12


both sides, Ha Van Lau and Cyrus Vance, met at the residence of the Vietnamese delegation in Vitry-sur-Seine. Both sides met again in midJuly. At this meeting, Vance reiterated US willingness to cease the bombing. But he insisted that there must be an agreement of what both sides would do after the bombing had stopped. Vance then proposed a ‘two-phase plan’. In Phase I, the US would stop the bombing as well as all military actions in North Vietnam. However, before that could happen, both sides would first need to discuss the measures to adopt after the bombing had halted. In Phase II, the two sides would agree to (1) reestablish the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements; (2) refrain from increasing their military forces beyond the pre-bombing halt level; and (3) begin substantial discussion on all matters for a peaceful solution to the conflict. The US would accept the National Liberation Front (NLF) as a participant in the substantial talks but Hanoi would have to accept the participation of the Saigon government. The two deputies met again on 4th and 19th August to clarify and discuss the two-phase plan but the main crux of the issue was the question of whether the cessation of bombing which the US had agreed to was a conditional one. But as Harriman took pains to explain to the North Vietnamese, the US was prepared to stop the bombing unconditionally but there should be ‘circumstances’ which would enable the US to do do.14

The Tet Offensive – Phase III Meanwhile, the second phase of the Tet Offensive had also failed to provide the clear victory which the Vietamese desired. In August 1968, the Politburo met again. This time the Politburo forewarned of the need to be ‘prepared to defeat the US should they prolong or expand the war’. This contrasted sharply with the view held in December 1967. The assessment then was that it was unlikely that the US would increase its forces and expand the war. Although the leadership was becoming increasingly less optimistic of a military success than they were in December 1967 and in April 1968, they decided to extend the military offensive ‘to win a decisive victory’. Phase III of the Tet Offensive began on 17 August and continued until 30 September 1968. In this third phase, the communists attacked 27 cities and towns, 100 districts and military posts and 47 airfields. The longest military operation in this phase was the Tay Ninh-Binh Long campaign which involved the 5th, 7th and 9th infantry divisions. It began on 17 August and ended on 28 September.


13

Le Duc Tho–Harriman private meetings: the first five sessions The inability of the communist forces to score a convincing military victory in Phase II and the severe losses incurred further compelled the Hanoi leadership in early August 1968 to decide that should the US agree to stop the bombing on terms which the North Vietnamese could minimally accept, they should not ‘miss the opportunity’.15 Le Duc Tho was then recalled from South Vietnam at the end of the second phase of the Tet Offensive to assume a new appointment as adviser to Xuan Thuy. According to Loi, Tho’s appointment and presence in Paris were an indication that Hanoi wanted to push forward the negotiations.16 At the eighteenth round of the Avenue Kle´ber meeting on 21 August 1968, Averell Harriman suggested a private meeting with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy. The first private meeting between Averell Harriman and Le Duc Tho took place on 8 September 1968 at Vitry-sur-Seine. This was followed by the second on 12 September, the third on 15 September and the fourth on 20 September. The series of private meetings took place in the midst of the Tay-Ninh-Binh Long military campaign. During these meetings, the US tried to coax the North Vietnamese to agree to the participation of the Saigon government in the substantive talks. Harriman was keen on an early fifth meeting but Le Duc Tho was unable to commit a date, pending further guidance from Hanoi (which Tho finally received on 3 October 1968). Meanwhile, the twenty-third Avenue Kle´ber meeting took place on 25 September. At the twenty-fourth Avenue Kle´ber meeting on 2 October 1968, Harriman again broached the possibility of a fifth private meeting. The Vietnamese position remained unchanged. They refused to discuss any other issue until the bombing had ceased. In the meanwhile, the third phase of the Tet Offensive had also failed to achieve the desired results. Instead, their losses escalated.17 In the analysis of the Politburo, the initial success of the Tet Offensive/‘General Offensive General Uprising’ had undergone ‘complicated changes’.18 By September 1968, it was obvious that the Vietnamese communists had to live with the second of the three possible scenarios that they had sketched out in December 1967. The decisive victory they had hoped for did not materialise. Although the Americans did not expand the war during this period, it did not augur well for the Vietnamese communists because the entire Tet Offensive, which lasted for the better part of 1968 and which had exhausted their human and material resources, served only to bring about another stalemate in the military struggle. Under these circumstances and mindful of the domestic politics in the US, on 3 October, Nguyen Duy Trinh directed the North Vietnamese

14


negotiators to take advantage of the period leading up to the US presidential election (scheduled on 5 November 1968) to press the US to de-escalate the war. For once, the Vietnamese negotiators in Paris were given the green light ‘to act according to the situation’ but adhering to the following positions: (1) the US must stop the bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam unconditionally; (2) North Vietnam would stop shelling the DMZ and respect the DMZ; (3) North Vietnam would agree to a Four-Party Conference on the condition that Saigon recognised the NLF and be willing to work towards the setting up of a coalition government; and (4) North Vietnam was prepared to discuss all issues with the US. The Vietnamese negotiators, however, were given the discretion to decide which issues were best left to discuss in greater depth in the second phase of the talks. Soon after receiving Hanoi’s instructions, on 11 October 1968, the fifth private meeting was held at the residence of the US delegation in Touraine Street, Sceaux. It turned out to be a successful meeting and the only outstanding issues were the timing of the cessation of bombing and the date and procedure of the talks. Harriman even offered caviar at the end of it. Loi recalled that the Vietnamese delegation had never felt more at ease.

Hiccups and resumption of talks Just as everyone thought that they had resolved the initial obstacles, two days after, on 13 October, Le Duc Tho unexpectedly received a directive from Hanoi which stated that, besides the cessation of the bombing and fighting, the US must agree to talk directly with the NLF and obtain the Front’s concurrence for the four-party conference. Furthermore, the Saigon government must change its negative policy towards the NLF. Tho was told not to discuss with the Americans the date of the conference. This new directive from Hanoi threw a spanner in the works because, as Loi put it, ‘to demand that the US talk with the NLF and that the Saigon administration change its policies before the start of the Four-Party Conference was an excessive and impractical demand’ and was certain to break up the negotiations.19 This new position indicated that back in Hanoi between 3–13 October 1968, there must have been an extensive debate among the Vietnamese communist leadership over the appropriate policy to adopt. Unfortunately, we do not have any information which could throw some light on what had transpired. Perplexed by the instruction, Le Duc Tho rushed back to Hanoi on the morning of 14 October to seek clarification. Meanwhile, Xuan Thuy was left with the responsibility of stalling the anxious Americans till Tho returned.


15

Le Duc Tho arrived in Hanoi on 16 October and spent the next three days debriefing the leadership. After much discussion and debate, on 20 October, a new set of instructions was sent to Paris which softened the earlier 13 October rigid position. The two requirements – that the US talk with the NLF and that the Saigon government change its policies – were no longer sine qua non conditions to any agreement and they could be taken up at a later stage. The Vietnamese negotiators were also told that that they could propose a Four-Party Preparatory Conference to begin a week or ten days after the cessation of bombing. They were further advised not to give the impression to the US that they were anxious for an agreement. ‘We should,’ the instructions read, ‘go step by step, lest the US think that we accept too easily. Perhaps, at the beginning, we’ll vaguely propose “as early as possible”, then 15 days later agree to the aforesaid timing.’20 Both the US and North Vietnam were now in broad agreement on the holding of the talks except that the US saw it (and called it) a ‘two-side conference’ with the US delegation and the Saigon government delegation, on one side, and the North Vietnamese delegation with representatives of the NLF on the other. Hanoi, on the other hand, insisted that it be described as a ‘Four-Party Conference’. At the private meeting on 21 October 1968, both sides agreed to describe the conference in whichever terms they like. A proce`s-verbal (which would not be published) was agreed upon on 24 October. At midnight on 30 October, the Vietnamese negotiators were informed of President Johnson’s decision to announce a halt to the bombing the next morning at either 7 or 8 p.m. Washington time. On the evening of 31 October at 8 p.m., Johnson unilaterally halted all bombing of North Vietnam, which also marked the end of the preliminary phase of the negotiations between the US and North Vietnam. A week later, on 6 November 1968, Richard Nixon was named the new President of the United States. Nixon promised to end the war and achieve peace with honour. The US negotiators proposed a meeting on 6 November 1968 to discuss the arrangements for the forthcoming peace talks. The Vietnamese communists pointed out that they had yet to settle the format of the talks. The NLF was to be represented by Nguyen Thi Binh. The US side, however, was still unable to persuade Thieu to name a representative from the Saigon government. It was then agreed that the talks would proceed regardless of the presence of a South Vietnamese representative. Should one be apponted later, he could join in the talks then. We should recall that both the US and North Vietnam had agreed to describe the talks in whatever way they wanted. There was another related problem to resolve – the sitting arrangement. The communists wanted a

16


square table with each of the four parties seating at one side of the square, or a lozenge-shaped table reflecting the equality and independence of all four parties. The US side wanted a sitting plan that reflected their idea of being ‘two party-talks’. Both sides debated the seating plan for two months until 15 January 1969 when they finally accepted the Soviet suggestion of a round flat table and two rectangular tables on opposite ends about 0.45 metres away from the round table for the secretaries and that there would not be any flags or name plates on the tables. At this juncture, a review of the military situation is in order.

The military situation in 1968 reviewed Tran Van Tra’s Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Volume 5: Concluding the 30 Years War, which the Vietnamese banned soon after its publication in 1982, was perhaps the first to admit publicly that the Tet Offensive was less than the unmitigated success it was made out to be by the Vietnamese. American intelligence in 1968 calculated that the communists lost 85,000 out of about 195,000 troops in the Tet Offensive.21 Although the exact figures are not known, the more recent Vietnamese accounts acknowledged that they suffered heavy losses. By the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969, the communists had lost both territory and support. Many of their grassroots organisations were smashed and their activities in the liberated areas curtailed. The enemy had ‘pacified’ 9,200 hamlets of about 16 million people, out of a total of 12,395 hamlets with a population of 17,500 million. Although the communist main forces remained numerically strong, they did not have the capability to mount moderate and large offensives until 1970.22 Tran Do recalled that the Vietnamese communists had deployed all their available forces in the Tet Offensive and, although they scored a large political and psychological victory, they also suffered severe losses. Consequently, when the US counter-attacked, the communists did not have sufficient forces to put up a stiff resistance. Thus, 1969 to 1971 were especially difficult years for them.23 According to Bui Tin, in retrospect, it was a mistake to launch the second and third phases of the offensive. He placed the blame squarely on Le Duan whom he described as ‘intoxicated with the apparent victory of the first wave’ and ‘kept pressuring COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam) to go for broke’.24 The communist forces in the South were almost wiped out by the fighting in 1968 and it was not until 1971 that the communists were able to recover their strength.25 However, one should also not over-exaggerate the communist losses, serious as they were. Although it was true that the communists were


17

severely mauled by the military campaigns in 1968, they were not completely destroyed. Ngo Vinh Long in his case study of the strategic province of Long An showed that the NLF was able to rise like a phoenix out of the ashes in the post-Tet period as a result of popular grassroots support.26 An important point to note is that the American withdrawal in 1969 inadvertently provided the Vietnamese communists with the much needed respite to recuperate from the defeats. A case can, however, be made for the decision to launch the second and third phases of the Tet Offensive. Tran Van Tra opined that, while in hindsight the second and third phases should not have been carried out because of the damage they inflicted on the southern revolutionaries in 1969 and 1970, the second phase of the offensive forced Washington and Saigon to join the peace talks, and it was during the third phase that Johnson finally ordered the unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and announced that a four-party conference which included both the NLF and Saigon would be convened.27

The Four-Party Conference The first meeting of the four delegations was finally convened on 25 January 1969 in the International Conference Centre, Avenue Kle´ber. The North Vietnamese and NLF representatives in Paris had been informed of the communist position and strategy to adopt for the FourParty talks in Paris on 1 January 1969 by Nguyen Duy Trinh. Hanoi’s reading of the US was that the Nixon administration was determined to withdraw American forces from South Vietnam with honour and without abandoning the South Vietnamese forces. Washington would want to be able to negotiate from a position of strength. Thus Washington could adopt one of two strategies: (1) it could, because of the heavy losses incurred and political difficulties at home, end the war with an acceptable political solution, or (2) it could seek a temporary respite and then continue to fight a protracted war. As such, the communists should therefore conduct the ‘diplomatic struggle’ with ‘patience’ and focus on four key areas: (1) compel the US to de-escalate the war and unilaterally withdraw part of the US forces from South Vietnam; (2) exploit the differences between Washington and Saigon, as well as between the US and South Vietnam; (3) Enhance the international reputation of the NLF; and (4) ensure the continued material and political support of the fraternal communist countries as well as the international community to pressure the US to ‘rapidly, completely and unconditionally’ withdraw its forces from South Vietnam.28

18


The memorandum of a conversation between Xuan Thuy (Head of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris) and Tran Buu Kiem (Head of the NLF delegation in Paris) with the Soviet Ambassador to France, V. Zorin, on 21 February 1969, sheds some light on the Vietnamese communist reading of the situation in early 1969. The Vietnamese communists believed that Nixon was trying to strengthen the Saigon regime and improve its military position in South Vietnam before proceeding to serious negotiations in Paris. They were of the view that the Americans did not yet have a concrete plan on how to settle the Vietnam problem. The demands put forth at the Paris meetings thus far – simultaneous withdrawal of troops and exchange of prisoners of war – were tactics of procrastination. In their words, ‘the Americans understand that if the questions which they have put forward are not resolved, they will have a chance to strengthen the Saigon regime”. In sum, both Xuan Thuy and Kiem felt that the ‘proper time’ to discuss substantial issues with the Americans had not yet arrived.29 Much was therefore still contingent on their relative strengths on the battleground. Cabot Lodge30 (who replaced Averell Harriman as head of the US delegation in Paris on 20 January 1969) met privately with Xuan Thuy on 8, 22 March and 7 May 1969 but failed to achieve any result. The Vietnamese communist negotiators stuck rigidly to the four points put forward by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in April 1965. Here, it will be appropriate to turn our attention once again to the situation in the battlefield.

The military situation in early 1969 In 1969, the communists carried out two rounds of military offensives. The first was in spring from 22 February 1969 to 30 March 1969 in the Dong Du (Cu Chi)-Thu Dau Mot region which began on the eve of President Nixon’s vist to Paris, his first major trip overseas as President. On 22 February, NLF forces shelled the US military base in Tan Son Nhut. Nixon contemplated retaliating with a bombing attack on the Vietnamese communist bases in Cambodia. Nixon gave the order to launch the bombing campaign in Cambodia on 18 March 1969 after a mid-March rocket attack on Saigon. The air campaign over Cambodia continued till May 1970. In April 1969, the Politburo met and passed the resolution to mobilise both the power of the military and the people in both North and South Vietnam to develop an offensive strategy in order to defeat the ‘Vietnamisation’ policy in the South. The goal was to force the Americans to retreat, to achieve a decisive victory and end the war.


19

The leadership admitted that the failure of the Tet Offensive could be attributed as much to the opponent’s strength as to the many shortcomings and errors committed by the leadership during that period. The Vietnamese communists were not sufficiently responsive to the changing circumstances, they did not have a good understanding of strategy, there was weakness in the Party leadership, and there were also organisational weaknesses. The Politburo noted that the transfer of a large proportion of their forces from the countryside to the town and cities had inadvertently aided the success of the opponent’s pacification programme. They were also slow to recognise and react to the opponent’s Pacification strategy and thus had failed to concentrate their strength to destroy the pacification programme. As for the ‘Vietnamisation’ policy introduced by Nixon, they thought that it was a crafty policy replete with contradictions and could not succeed. According to the Politburo, ‘Vietnamisation’ was a policy of the defeated and showed that the US was in retreat.31 Following the April 1969 resolution, the Central Military Committee ordered all forces to quickly put their organisations on alert so as to enable them to effectively carry out the goals spelt out by the leadership. Top priority was given to air defence and efforts were made to expand and protect the transportation lines between the North and the South. More cadres were posted to all the units in the southern Military Region IV and along the routes that Group 559 operated. The General Staff transferred two regiments, twelve battalions and six companies of combat engineers from the southern part of Military Region IV to assist Group 559 build the ‘20 July route’ from the Thach Ban crossroads to join Route 9. Group 500 and components of the Rear Services Directorate of southern Military Region IV were placed under the control of Group 559. The 367th airdefence division was moved from Ha Tinh to the western Quang BinhVinh Linh area. The number of soldiers in the training establishments and institutes was reduced in order to increase the number in the war zones. Thirteen thousand, two hundred cadres and fighters were sent to replenish the battlefields. Units with sufficient troops and equipment were sent to the strategic eastern Nam Bo region. These included a number of main infantry units from Tay Nguyen and Military Region V – 1st infantry division, comprising three regiments (the 95th C, the 101st C and the 209th) as well as the 33rd, the 174th, the 10th and the 20th regiments. From the North, ten battalions and 100 companies and regiments were sent to the South to reinforce troops lost in 1968. Slowly and gradually, the Nam Bo command rebuilt the strength of the Special Forces and other services in the South.32 The Vietnamese assessment of the situation at this time can be culled from a closed-door speech given by Ho Chi Minh on 11 May 1969. In his

20


address to a big and important high-level military conference on the subject of the change in the nature of the struggle and the use of the military in the newly developed situation, Ho argued that the war against the Americans had entered a new phase since the Tet Offensive. The Americans had clearly lost out in the struggle but they were not yet defeated. The communist troops must not fear making sacrifices and facing difficulties head-on as the people could not expect to experience peace and real freedom until after the Americans had been completely defeated and South Vietnam completely liberated. In order to realise the dream of the joyous day when North and South Vietnam would be united as one, everyone must put their best foot forward, correct their shortcomings and complete the responsibility entrusted by the Party. He cited the Vietnamese hero Tran Hung Dao to illustrate his point that what the military needed was not numerical might but intelligence.33 On 10 May 1969, just one day before his speech reported above, Ho Chi Minh completed the revision of his will. From Ho’s will, it can be conjectured that, in May 1969, the war was not going too well for the Vietnamese communists and Ho did not expect the war to end in the near future. It can also be inferred from his will that there were differences within the Party, and he was particularly concerned about that.34

Policy differences within the Hanoi leadership Within the Vietnamese communist leadership, there had long been prolonged tension between those who supported and those who were against the escalation of the armed struggle in the South, described as the ‘North-first’ or the ‘South-first’ camps. There were also different opinions on how to respond to the enemy. Many southerners, rightly or wrongly, believed that Hanoi, especially members of the National Assembly, placed the long-term interest of the North before the liberation of the South.35 After the Tet Offensive debacle, a variation of the dichotomy developed. The policy debate during this period is still unclear. Apparently, there was one group (represented by Le Duan and his followers) who supported the ‘fight-and-negotiate’ strategy. They believed that in order for the ‘fight-andnegotiate’ strategy to succeed, the fighting must be sustained and intensified to make an impact on the negotiation. Against this group were others like Truong Chinh and Hoang Van Hoan, who held the view that, given the heavy losses already incurred, a ‘protracted war’ strategy was the more appropriate choice. We should recall that Vo Nguyen Giap was also not in favour of Phases 2 and 3 of the Tet Offensive. However, it would appear from the events in 1968 and 1969 that Le Duan and those who shared his view had the upper hand in determining


21

policies.36 A July 1969 communist document, which summarised the ninth COSVN Conference (1969), labelled those who ‘held the retreating back to a “protracted war” view as “skeptical”, “lacking resolution and absolute determination” when confronted with difficulties’. They were said to have an erroneous conception of the transitional nature of the General Offensive and Uprising, now thinking it is a one-blow affair and consequently lacking vigilance against the enemy plots, now thinking it is a period of protracted struggle and consequently lacking boldness and a sense of urgency; worse still, they become right-leaning and shrink from action.37 According to the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam (LSQDNDVN),38 in 1969, the enemy was able to score a number of successes because the communist reaction was not timely enough. Both the main and guerrilla forces did not take any initiative to respond effectively to the enemy’s strategy of ‘pacification’. The challenge for the communist forces was to retain the offensive in the battlefield. The enemy’s strategy, on the other hand, was to disperse and scatter, push the communists back to the border, and if possible, to annihilate them. The question of concentration or dispersal of main troops was particularly controversial. There were those who were of the view that, given the difficulties of having to both protect the rear areas and to fight the enemy, the best approach was to disperse the main forces so as to be able to counter the strategy of ‘pacification’. On the other hand, the Central Military Committee, Southern Regional command and the Regional commands were for concentrating all the cadres in one position to help the main force deal a decisive blow to the enemy. For instance, in Military Region IX (western Nam Bo), Le Duc Anh and Vo Van Kiet criticised the inclination to disperse the main force. But then, again, for the ‘concentration of force’ strategy to be effective, the communists first needed to organise, train, and raise the military force which had been considerably depleted, as well as increase production and tap the resources in the home front, that is the North. The transportation system would also have to be expanded and protected. The ‘education’ of the fighters was considered of great importance. It was felt that the fighters had to be imbibed with the revolutionary tradition of soldiers – indomitable fighting spirit, the capacity to bear and overcome difficulties and the willingness to make sacrifices. ‘Pacification’ had brought about many difficulties for the regiments. For example, the 16th, the 238th and Quet Thang regiments had to live for long periods underground in Cu Chi. The troops also suffered many casualties

22


especially when they encountered enemy sentries while crossing Route 4 (which the soldiers had to traverse twice) to help in the re-organisation of the regiments in the base areas and then proceeded without a break on to support the fighting in Long An. A large number of cadres and fighters in all the regiments and armed detachments operating in the delta region came down from the North.39 A letter of 6 July 1969 from Le Duan to the Party Committee and Military Commission of Tri-Thien conveyed several instructions. According to Le Duan, the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee had recently met to appraise the general situation and had conveyed to the Southern Military Command that they should ‘keep a firm grasp of the direction, correctly select the target and deal a heavy blow to upset the strategic disposition of the enemy, thus bringing about a major change in the trend of the war’. The Tri-Thien region was of particular strategic importance because it was a bridgehead linking the South to the North. Although the enemy were gradually withdrawing, they continued to prevent the communist main force from moving from the North to the South. Unfortunately, the communists had not been able to force the enemy into a passive defence position. Instead, despite the paucity of the enemy force, they were able to obstruct any major communist advance into the South. The Tri-Thien Front therefore had to overcome whatever difficulties it encountered and to develop their attacks on Da Nang and threaten the enemy there. The objective was to achieve control of the whole region covering western Tri-Thien, western Quang Nam-Da Nang, the northern part of Tay Nguyen and the liberated areas of Southern Laos where they could ‘build and perfect a strategic communication system of great efficiency for our national defence and our economy at present for the future’.40 COSVN Resolution Number 9 (dated July 1969),41 referred to above, directed the communist forces to be relentless in developing their strategic offensive. But it also required them to consolidate their strength in anticipation of a prolonged war. Large units were to be broken down into smaller ones, while provincial local force units were to split into smaller cells. The aims were twofold: (1) to hit US troops and installations in order to pressurise US troops to withdraw; (2) to disrupt ‘pacification’ and destroy Saigon’s control of the population. It was a difficult period as the re-organisation had to be carried out while the war was continuing.

The NLF’s ten-point plan and Nixon’s eight-point plan On 30 April 1969, Pham Van Dong received by way of the Soviet ambassador in Hanoi, Serbakov, a secret message from the White House; it


23

had been conveyed via the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin. In the message, Nixon and Kissinger wanted the Hanoi leadership to know that they were determined to find an acceptable and honourable solution and would reject anything that amounted to a surrender. They hoped to reach an agreement before August 1969 based on three points: (1) simultaneous troop withdrawal and cessation of hostilities; and in return, (2) the US would not hinder the political activities of the NLF in South Vietnam; (3) South Vietnam would be left independent for a period which could be negotiated (five years was the proposed time frame), after which the US would not oppose the unification of the two parts. Kissinger had requested Moscow to keep this confidential otherwise Washington would have to deny the content of the message. We do not know whether it was in any way a consequence of either the on-going bombing campaign of Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia or that of the 30 April 1969 message, but on 8 May 1969, Tran Buu Kiem put forward a ten-point peace plan during the sixteenth session of Paris Peace Talks at Avenue Kle´ber. This was followed soon after by a second round of communist offensive which started on 11 May and lasted till 23 June 1969 (Kontum and Long Khanh campaigns). According to Van Tien Dung, although the communist forces killed many enemies, they were unable to bring about any significant change in the balance of strength. The near depletion of their resources in the various military campaigns in 1968 made it difficult to carry out the new missions satisfactorily.42 Luu Van Loi recalled that after the 1968 Tet Offensive, the communists were slow in changing their strategy. Consequently, their control of the rural areas was considerably weakened which created conditions for the enemy to carry out pacification campaigns and to recapture all the rural areas the communists had controlled, causing them difficulties and great losses.43 In response to the NLF’s ten-point plan, Nixon countered with an eight-point peace plan that he announced on television on 14 May.44 There were several critical differences between the two peace plans. The US position called for: (1) The simultaneous withdrawal of all US, Allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces over a twelve-month period, and at that deadline, all non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations; and (2) An international body to be put in place to verify the troop withdrawals and to supervise the general election. The Vietnamese communists, however, insisted that: (1) the issue of the Vietnamese communist forces in South Vietnam should be resolved by the Vietnamese themselves; and (2) during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general election, a coalition

24


Government of South Vietnam would be installed, reflecting national concord and the broad union of all social strata. The reunification of the country was a matter between the North and the South, and would be achieved gradually without foreign interference. On 23 May 1969, Ho Chi Minh received a group of high-ranking cadres of the army and this was reported at length by the Chinese media.45 At that meeting, Ho exhorted the army to continue the struggle against the Americans. He spoke of the need to ‘economise on human and material resources’ even while continuing the struggle and the consolidation and strengthening of the North. On 31 May 1969 at the private meeting between Lodge and Le Duc Tho, Tho observed that the negotiations could not proceed because the US refused to talk to the NLF and the NLF refused to communicate with the Saigon administration. He went on to say that the discussions between the US and North Vietnam should not only be confined to the problems between them but should also be based on the ten-point plan presented by the NLF. Tho’s remarks were taken to mean that Hanoi was now prepared to speak on behalf of the NLF.

Establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRGSVN) On 6 June 1969, as part of the communist game plan, a gathering of communists and non-communists who were opposed to the Saigon administration took place in South Vietnam at Tan Lap village, Chau Thanh District in Tay Ninh province; the meeting continued for three days. It is worth noting that on 20 December 1960, the NLF was established at the same location. Truong Nhu Tang recalled that at the occasion, the communists’ 9th Division set up a tight cordon around the venue. The gathering endorsed the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRGSVN). The strategy was to create a broad-based provisional administration that would have the legitimacy and international recognition to negotiate with the Saigon government and which the Vietnamese communists could make use of. The timing of the meeting was deliberately chosen to coincide with the Nixon–Thieu meeting at Midway Island on 8 June 1969 where the new US policy of ‘Vietnamisation’ would be officially introduced.46 It is no surprise that Hanoi was the first to recognise the PRGSVN as the legal government and true representative of South Vietnam. One of the last publicly reported activities of Ho Chi Minh before his demise in 2 September 1969 was his meeting with the visiting PRGSVN


25

delegation led by Nguyen Van Tien on 13 June 1969, an indication that the formation of the PRGSVN had his support.47 All the communist countries also accorded the PRGSVN diplomatic recognition.48

Stalemate in Paris The peace talks in Paris were not making any headway. In a 12 July 1969 conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, Kissinger expressed his disappointment that Moscow was not doing enough to pressure its client state, and that Hanoi and the NLF were just reiterating their ultimatums in Paris and were not serious about negotiating. Kissinger said that the US was prepared to discuss compromises secretly but it could not simply drop Nguyen Van Thieu because that would represent ‘a political capitulation’. He further added that Washington would have to think of ‘other alternatives in order to convince Hanoi’ that it could not endlessly obstruct the negotiations.49 COSVN Resolution Number 9 (dated July 1969 referred to earlier) also provided an insight into communist thinking of how the war could develop. In its analysis, the communists calculated that there were two possible developments: (1) the brighter scenario was that the Americans might be forced to seek an early end to the war through a political solution. Even then, there would be an extremely complex time-lapse between the signing of the peace agreement and the final withdrawal of American troops which the communists needed to be especially alert to; or (2) if the communist military offensives were not able to dislodge the enemy and the Americans were able to recover from their transient difficulties, the war could be prolonged and they would also be able to negotiate from a stronger position. In both scenarios, but especially so in the second, the assessment was that the Americans were likely to exert pressure on the communists by broadening the war through the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam and/or the expansion of the war into Laos and Cambodia. The Resolution concluded that whether the war would develop according to the first or second scenario would depend principally on the strength of our attacks in the military, political and diplomatic fields, especially our military and political attacks, and on the extent of military, political, economic and financial difficulties which the war causes to the Americans in Vietnam, in the USA, and over the world. One communist veteran fighter recalled that from the second half of August 1968 to the second half of August 1969, they had to constantly

26


avoid the enemy, build new installations, and search for food. As a result, their health and fighting ability deteriorated. Indeed, many Vietnamese communists remembered 1969 to be a particularly difficult year. The hardship was to an extent alleviated by the ‘true heroism of the peasants’, many of whom risked their lives to provide food for the guerillas and soldiers.50 Another factor which saved the situation was the fact that the US was withdrawing its troops in 1969 which convinced the communists that the Americans could not last and would eventually withdraw altogether. Nixon had on 8 June at Midway announced that the US would withdraw 25,000 troops by August 1969. Further withdrawals, according to Nixon, would be dependent on the progress of the Vietnamisation process, the negotiations in Paris and the continued low level of enemy military activity in South Vietnam. In the words of one communist veteran, ‘We knew that even though we faced tremendous difficulties, so did they. They had terrible problems, especially at home. We don’t think their government could stand it in the long run. That gave me heart.’51 On 16 July, Nixon met with Jean Sainteny and requested him to convey a personal letter to Ho Chi Minh. Nixon’s letter urged both sides to settle the war at the conference table. Sainteny passed the letter to Xuan Thuy on 19 July. The Hanoi leadership apparently gave the goahead for a secret meeting between Xuan Thuy and Henry Kissinger, which took place on 4 August 1969.52 At that meeting, Kissinger was told that Nixon’s letter to Ho Chi Minh had been forwarded to Hanoi. Kissinger told Thuy that if there was still no progress in the negotiations by 1 November 1969, Washington would be obliged to take more effective measures. It was not a fruitful first meeting and the two of them agreed to meet again. The secret dialogue was eventually to become more significant than the formal talks at Avenue Kle´ber. Nixon only received Ho’s uncompromising reply dated 25 August on 30 August 1969. Ho neither read Nixon’s letter nor did he pen the reply. According to Ho’s secretary Tu Ky, by late August Ho could no longer work.53 He did not meet the delegation from the Vietnam Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces when they visited North Vietnam from 16–20 August. Chinese sources further revealed that in August, Ho’s illness had worsened, and in late August he fell into a coma.54 On the morning of 2 September 1969, Ho passed away.

Hanoi and Sino-Soviet relations, 1969 We learnt from Ho Chi Minh’s will (which he completed on 10 May 1969) that he was considerably troubled by the divisions in the international communist movement. His fears were not groundless.


27

The year 1969 was particularly stressful in the communist camp. On 2 March 1969, armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese frontier guards took place along the River Ussuri on a small uninhabited island, known to the Chinese as Zhenbao Island and to the Russians as Damansky Island. This incident could possibly explain the Chinese recall of its anti-aircraft artillery units from North Vietnam in March. More significantly, the incident marked the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations and the beginning of Beijing’s rapprochement with the US, and was to have serious consequences for the Vietnamese communists and its relations with China. The differences within the Vietnamese communist leadership on the appropriate strategy to adopt also mirrored the differences in views held by Beijing and Moscow, and had implications for North Vietnam’s relations with China and the Soviet Union. Moscow had from the very beginning advocated negotiation and a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Beijing, on the other hand, was for ‘protracted war’ and, as we recall, opposed the negotiations.55 It was with great reluctance that the Chinese supported the escalation of the armed struggle in 1959 and the 1968 Tet Offensive and they continually reminded the Vietnamese that ‘perseverance means victory’ and that the final victory could only be achieved through protracted struggle. In 1979 the Vietnamese disclosed that Beijing had on 9 October 1968 continued to pressure them to break off their negotiations with the US, and to sever relations with the Soviet Union as well. It seemed that on 17 October 1968 the Chinese went so far as to threaten to sever ties with the Lao Dong Party if the Vietnamese refused to accede to the Chinese demands. If these claims were true, the Chinese, however, did not carry out their threat. On 19 October 1968, the Chinese for the first time took official notice of the Paris meetings. In its report on the Paris talks, the NCNA quoted a number of positive western news reports on the ongoing talks.56 In a conversation with Pham Van Dong in Beijing on 17 November 1968, Mao told the North Vietnamese delegation that the Chinese now agree with the strategy of fighting while negotiating. ‘Some comrades worry that the US will deceive you. But I tell them not to worry’.57 However, Beijing began to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in November 1968 although at the 17 November 1968 meeting, Mao had assured them that the Chinese would return should the Vietnamese communists need their assistance in the future. By March 1969, it had withdrawn all its anti-aircraft artillery units and by July 1970, all its support troops had returned to China.58 Zhou Enlai was one of those who remained unconvinced that negotiating with the Americans was the right approach. He told the visiting COSVN delegation in April 1969:

28

The start of negotiations Of course, any party and country has the right to make decisions with regard to its own fate. . . . But as brothers we have to talk with each other in an open manner, so I say that it is impossible to think that you can deceive the US and the revisionist Soviets with your tactics. We are somewhat concerned that you will be deceived by them instead. . . . I still maintain what I told comrades Pham Van Dong and Muoi Cuc earlier on, that you should spend less foreign currency, time and officials on the negotiations in Paris.59

The North Vietnamese economic delegation headed by Le Thanh Nghi was in China from 17 August 1969 to discuss China’s economic and military aid for North Vietnam for 1970. On 22 August he met Zhou Enlai. But other than a reaffirmation by Zhou of China’s determination to give the Vietnamese firm support and assistance, nothing tangible was agreed upon or signed.60 According to the Vietnamese, the Chinese were then hedging about their aid commitment. Apparently the Chinese were only prepared to give them further aid on the firm assurance that they would continue the war to the very end and not settle for a negotiated settlement.61 The Vietnamese claim was credible in the light of the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet border talks (which had been going on since 12 May 1969) and the renewed clashes on the Xinjiang border on 13 August 1969, which would have rekindled Chinese fears of a US-Soviet Union collusion to encircle China. Also, the Chinese were aware of Ho’s critical condition.62 Considering the circumstances, it was understandable that the Chinese would want an assurance before committing further aid to the Vietnamese communists.

Ho Chi Minh’s death and its aftermath On the morning of 2 September 1969, Ho Chi Minh passed away. On receiving the news of Ho’s death, a delegation from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Zhou Enlai immediately flew to Hanoi on the morning of 4 September. Among the members of the Chinese delegation were two significant personalities. One was Ye Jianying, a member of the Political Bureau and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP. Ye had a good relationship with Ho and he was also the Beijing representative who worked with the NLF leaders in formulating its tactics, strategy and training. The second member was Wei Quoqing, a member of the Central Committee of the CCP, and Chairman of Guangxi Autonomous Regional Revolutionary Committee. Wei was a very close friend of Ho and was one of Hanoi’s military advisers in the 1950s and had played a significant role


29

in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.63 The Chinese message of condolence stated that Ho’s death had unfortunately come at a crucial moment in the Vietnamese struggle, and exhorted the Vietnamese to turn their grief into strength so as to carry the war through to the end.64 During their very brief stay in Hanoi, the Chinese delegation had talks with the Vietnamese leaders led by Le Duan.65 On the evening of the same day, the Chinese delegation returned to Beijing. A new and separate delegation, led by Vice-Premier Li Xiannian arrived on 8 September for the funeral. There had been much speculation as to the reason(s) for the very quick arrival and departure of the first Chinese delegation.66 We still do not have any information on this.67 But had the Chinese hoped that the Vietnamese communists could be persuaded or pressured to align themselves with China against the Soviet Union, or at least to distance themselves from the Soviet Union, they were disappointed. A joint Nhan Dan-Hoc Tap editorial of 6 September stated that Ho had left behind a ‘collective leadership body . . . of his closest comrades-in-arms and most outstanding disciples, around whom the Vietnamese promised to close their ranks’.68 If this was the case, then Le Duan seemed to be the ‘first among equals’ in that collective leadership. The appointment of Le Duan, by both the party and government to head the official committee in charge of Ho’s funeral arrangements would appear to indicate that he had, for the moment, prevailed over Truong Chinh. Bui Tin recalled that many outside North Vietnam expected a power struggle after Ho’s death but ‘insiders’ knew that Le Duan ‘had already long asserted his dominance over the Politburo’. Also, unity had to be preserved in order to fight the war against the Americans, which was now being conducted on both the battlefield and the negotiating table.69 In the months following Ho’s death, there was thus, on the surface, a concerted effort on the part of the Vietnamese communists to present a collective leadership and to carry out the wishes of Ho. The Vietnamese media prominently reported all the public statements of Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap. And what they said all closely echoed Ho’s last testament.70 Le Duan read Ho’s final testament on 9 September. In his will, Ho said that the war might last a long time, but exhorted the Vietnamese to fight to the very end. He drew attention to the importance of inculcating into the people the ideals of socialism. According to Ho, the people must be both ‘Red and expert’. He called for the unity of both the Party and the international communist movement. He expressed his deep sadness at the dissension in the international communist movement, and called upon the Vietnamese communists to do everything within their ability to restore the unity of the movement.71

30


Ho’s funeral presented the Vietnamese with one small opportunity to carry out Ho’s last wish. While in Hanoi for the funeral on 6 September, a member of the Soviet Party and government delegation, led by Premier Kosygin, asked the Vietnamese to inform Li Xiannian that on his way back to Moscow, Kosygin was ready to stop over in Beijing to meet the Chinese leaders. The Chinese reply was also conveyed through the Vietnamese. Kosygin eventually met Zhou Enlai in Beijing airport on 11 September.72 Readers should recall that the North Vietnamese economic delegation led by Le Thanh Nghi had been in China since 17 August 1969 for talks on China’s economic and military assistance to North Vietnam. On 26 September, the long-delayed agreement on Chinese non-refundable economic and military assistance to North Vietnam for 1970 was finally signed in Beijing between Li Xiannian and Le Thanh Nghi. The North Vietnamese economic delegation was reportedly surprised by the generosity of the assistance package. Evidently pleased with the agreement, the Nhan Dan editorial of 26 September 1969 recounted China’s assistance since the war of resistance against the French, and hailed the recently signed agreement as ‘a new, brilliant expression of the increasing consolidated and developed friendship and militant solidarity between the fraternal Vietnamese and Chinese peoples’.73 We can only deduce from the above that the Vietnamese must have given some form of assurance that satisfied the Chinese in exchange for the aid. The next day, Pham Van Dong arrived in Beijing to attend the twentieth anniversary celebration of the CCP where he had talks with Zhou Enlai on 28 September. He then flew to East Germany to attend its National Day and also visited the Soviet Union before returning to Beijing for further talks with Zhou. In the communique´ issued during the visit, the Chinese reaffirmed their support of the four-point principle of the DRV and reiterated their support that ‘the 700 million Chinese people provided a powerful backing for the Vietnamese people; the vast expanse of China’s territory was their reliable rear area’.74 The Chinese conspicuously made no criticism of the Soviet Union on this occasion. Pham Van Dong made clear Hanoi’s position in the Sino-Soviet dispute when he said, As is known to all of us and the people of the world, talks are now taking place in Beijing between two delegations from the biggest socialist countries. Our Party and government delegation expresses its deep hope and wishes that these talks of important significance will achieve good results.75


31

The Nhan Dan editorial of 26 October 1969 gave an historical overview of the development of the friendship between the two countries under the headline ‘Vietnam-China Friendship Ever Steadier’. It expressed the gratitude of the Vietnamese communists for Chinese support in the Vietnamese struggle. According to the editorial, ‘the higher the aggressors scaled up the war, the bigger the support and assistance the Party, government and people of China gave the Vietnamese people’. Mao Zedong was described as ‘an esteemed friend of the Vietnamese people (who has always shown concern for the strengthening of the militant solidarity between the two peoples’.76 A North Vietnamese economic delegation made another visit to Beijing on 22 November. On 23 November, a mutual trade and payment agreement was signed between Li Jiang and Ly Ban. Signficantly, Hoang Van Hoan was still in China at this time. Hoang had come to Beijing with Pham Van Dong, and apparently remained in China when Dong returned to Hanoi on 26 October. The continued presence of Hoang Van Hoan in China was significant. This was because, apart from the late Ho Chi Minh, Hoan (who was the first ambassador to China and representative of the Vietnamese Party Central Committee to the CCP for eight years), had the closest ties with the Chinese leadership.77 He was definitely the most appropriate person to assist in any effort to improve VietnameseChinese relations in the uncertain period following Ho’s death. He finally returned to Hanoi on 24 November, which would appear to indicate that he was satisfied with the course along which the relationship between the two countries was developing. Indeed, on 18 January 1970, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by China, the Nhan Dan editorial once again recounted the development of what it described as the very close relationship between the Vietnamese communists and China. It once again expressed gratitude for Chinese assistance and support in Vietnam’s national struggle, and repeated the slogan of ‘the powerful backing’ and ‘the reliable rear area’ of China. The editorial concluded by stating that ‘true to the behest of esteemed President Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people unceasingly consolidate and strengthen the friendship and militant solidarity between Vietnam and China in the interests of the two countries and of the world revolution’.78 Apparently, there was a marked improvement in the relations between Hanoi and Beijing during the immediate months after Ho’s death. The Vietnamese communists had never been so profuse in their tributes to the Chinese in the past two years. But this did not mean that Hanoi had become pro-China. Beneath the surface, there were signs of anti-Chinese

32


feelings and pro-Soviet sentiment was strong.79 This improvement in the relationship needs to be viewed from the correct perspective. Vietnamese communists’ relations with China had been proper, but certainly far from friendly since the spring of 1966. Chinese aid to Vietnam dropped by 20 per cent in 1969 and by 50 per cent in 1970 as compared to that of 1968.80 Hanoi had leaned towards Moscow in the last two years or more and the Soviet Union had become the principal supplier of economic and military aid to Hanoi by 1969. According to a Soviet Embassy report, the North Vietnamese armed forces, one of the most powerful in the region, had been rearmed and equipped mostly by the Soviet Union. But as Ilya Gaiduk noted in his study of the Vietnam War from the Russian perspective, Soviet assistance was, however, not converted into proportional political influence.81 Thus, this apparent improvement of ties with China in the latter part of 1969 meant that Hanoi had decided to shift back to a more balanced relationship with both the Soviet Union and China. This was, as noted in the Nhan Dan editorial of 18 January 1970, in accordance with the wishes of Ho Chi Minh and in the interests of Hanoi, Beijing and the international communist movement.

Military developments in the South, 1969 General Van Tien Dung recalled that from the summer of 1969 to the end of that year, communist military activities were generally weak and consisted mainly of shelling enemy bases. Many of the communistliberated areas had shrunk and almost all the liberated areas in the delta region in Military Region V had been encroached upon by the enemy.82 In September 1969, a conference was held in Military Region V to clarify what the central task of the communist military forces at that time was. The conference decided that the dual tasks of the communist forces were to destroy the enemy and, at the same time, to win the hearts and minds of the people. The immediate focus of the main force units should therefore gear up to fight large and strategic battles that could have an impact on the changing situation. But in order to preserve and develop the strength of the armed forces in the region, there was the need to strengthen guerrilla warfare and to create base areas for the main forces. To do this, the various regional military commands in South Vietnam began to deploy selected regiments into areas/locations that were considered to be strategic. For example, the 20th regiment and 1st regiment were sent to An Giang; the 4th, the 16th, the 33rd, the 88th, the Quyet Thang and the Dong Nai regiments, which came under the


33

Southern Command and Military Region VII, were deployed to the north, west and northeast of Saigon. The 1st and the 2nd regiments of Military Region IX were moved into Tien Giang and Hau Giang; the Dong Thap regiment of Military Region VIII waas assigned to My Tho and the 36th, the 31st and the 12th regiments of Military Region V to Quang Da and Binh Dinh. A number of military regions also allocated a portion of their main troops to area defence. Military Region V had to disband 22nd regiment (of the 3rd Division) in order to reinforce troops in the provinces of Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. The target was to provide every province with at least a battalion of troops. The Tri-Thien military region transferred 1,500 of its cadres and fighters to other areas to help organise district troops and village guerrillas. Military Regions VIII and IX provided many armed labour detachments to all villages in the deep regions to establish bases.83 The military situation clearly had worsened since the Southern communist leaders met in July 1969 and there must have been further debate on the effectiveness of the ‘concentration of force’ strategy. This was despite Nixon’s announcement on 16 September 1969 that the US was withdrawing another 35,000 combat troops from South Vietnam. COSVN Resolution Number 14 of October 1969 noted that because the communists had placed too much reliance on the main forces, they had failed to remember the utility of guerrilla warfare. Without jettisoning the ‘concentration’ strategy and in an effort to redress the imbalance, Resolution Number 14 directed that: military operations should rely upon the development of guerrilla warfare so as to be able to protect and consolidate our rear areas to create confusion in the enemy rear area and disintegrate his units therein . . . to liberate the rear areas and to basically defeat the enemy’s pacification programme and attempt to win a strong position.84 One military victory highlighted in the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam (LSQDNDVN) was the encounter with a large enemy force, which included the 4th Brigade (US Marines) and components of the 9th and 21st Division, in the U Minh base area at the end of 1969. From 26 September to 9 December 1969, Le Duc Anh, Commander of Military Region IX and Vo Van Kiet (political commissar) concentrated the 1st and the 2nd regiments, self-defence force and guerrilla forces from eighteen villages in U Minh base area.85 From 20 October to 1 December 1969, at Tay Nguyen (B3), two infantry regiments (the 66th

34


and the 88th A), the 40th artillery regiment, three battalions (the 20th, the 37th and the 401st) and one company of engineers launched an offensive along the defence line from Bu Prang to Duc Lap (Dac Lac and Quang Duc) that killed and injured 4,300 enemy soldiers, destroyed 112 planes, 87 military vehicles, 29 cannons and captured 248 weapons of all types.86 The post-Tet 1968 debate over military strategy appeared to have been reconciled by early 1970. In a February 1970 analysis of the revolutionary strategy by Le Duan, he noted that: the armed forces and people of the South have devised many appropriate fighting methods, highly original, varied, flexible, and effective . . . to combine guerrilla operations by regional troops, people’s militia, and self-defence corps with concentrated attack by main-force units.87

Military developments in Laos Over in Laos, as the communist leadership had anticipated, in August 1969, the US and its Thai and Laotian allies launched Operation ‘Cu Kiet’ to occupy the Canh Dong Chum (Plaine de Jarres)–Xieng Khoang region and to use it as a staging area to threaten the communistcontrolled province of Sam Neua and the north-western part of North Vietnam.88 The Vietnamese communists recognised that the objective of this military campaign was to intimidate North Vietnam and to compel Hanoi to divert part of the communist main force to Laos in order to reduce its military activities in South Vietnam. Indeed, many resources had to be expended to disrupt the American plan. The 174th regiment (dispatched from Tay Nguyen) supported the Pathet Lao units in this campaign. At the end of August, the regiment had to throw in a battalion, a company and some units into the heart of the fighting. On 13 September 1969, Vo Nguyen Giap directed all the military units in Tay Nguyen to assist the Pathet Lao in the campaign dubbed ‘Battle 139’ (after that day and month). Taking the best advantage of the rainy season, the enemy forces in October 1969 occupied Xieng Khoang which placed them in a favourable position to advance to Ban Bau and Nong Het, the gateways into North Vietnam and from there into the western Nghe An province. The 174th regiment combined with the Pathet Lao did, however, manage to kill over a thousand enemy soldiers and also took control of several strategic ‘springboards’, such as Ta Lin Noi, Ban Son, Lat Buoc, Hill 952, which could be used for a future counter-offensive.


35

The negotiations in 1969 reviewed We recall from previous accounts that Hanoi had rejected the US-proposed August and November 1969 deadlines to reach a negotiated settlement. In his 3 November 1969 Address to the Nation on the Vietnam War, Nixon revealed that his administration had been holding secret talks with Hanoi and castigated Hanoi for its intransigence. In Nixon’s words The effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations, which have been undertaken since the bombing halt half a year ago, and since this administration came into office on 20 January 1969, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made, except on the shape of the bargaining table. Well now, who’s at fault? . . . The obstacle is in the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants. In the same ‘Silent Majority’ speech, Nixon made it clear that the US would only withdraw all its troops from South Vietnam from a position of strength and not from weakness. The pace of withdrawal, he emphasised, would depend not only on how fast the South Vietnamese forces could replace them but also on the progress of the Paris talks and the level of communist activity. He emphasised that if the increased enemy action jeopardised the remaining US forces in Vietnam, he would not hesitate ‘to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation’.89 Hanoi was apparently agitated by Nixon’s revelation of the secret talks and of Ho Chi Minh’s rejection of his peace overtures.90 On 20 November 1969, Cabot Lodge submitted his resignation as the US chief negotiator at the Paris talks. His resignation was made official on 8 December 1969. Washington chose not to appoint a replacement for Lodge until Hanoi gave in to US demands. The position remained vacant for the next eight months, which confirmed, in the words of Kent Sieg, ‘the downgrading of the formal talks though not of Kissinger’s secret contacts’.91 On 10 December, Hanoi instructed its negotiating team in Paris to ‘show a tough position, a riposte, and will to oppose their pressure’.92 Meanwhile, Kissinger had requested a meeting with Xuan Thuy on 13 or 14 December 1969. On 12 December, Hanoi replied that a meeting would be futile unless the US had something new to offer.93 Luu Van Loi, in his 1996 account of the talks, explained that at that time despite the troops’ withdrawal, the US military strength was still

36


stronger vis-a`-vis the Vietnamese communists in the South and naturally Nixon wanted to settle the Vietnam problem quickly. The communist side, on the other hand, needed ‘time to restore the revolutionary situation and the people’s war’ in the South and to await ‘a more propitious opportunity’ before they were prepared to enter into serious negotiations.94

2

The widening war

The 18th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party The 18th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party convened on 1 January 1970 to appraise the political and military situation since the Tet Offensive of 1968 and to discuss the way forward.1 In their assessment, Nixon was calculating both the timing and the number of troops he could withdraw without compromising the military strength of the Saigon administration. In the view of the Hanoi leadership, the decisive period would be around the end of 1970 and 1971 before the next presidential election in 1972. The meeting thus called for the tighter integration and the intensification of the military, political and foreign policy offensives to defeat the ‘Vietnamisation’ strategy. At the same time, the leadership could foresee that the military struggle would become increasingly important and as such, it was important to focus on improving the effectiveness of the communist main fighting force. The leadership noted that they had adopted an offensive strategy while the enemy still had large forces on the ground, and they anticipated that the next phase of the war would be long, fierce and complicated. Turning to Laos where the Plaine of Jarres–Xieng Khoang military campaign has been going on since August 1969, the leadership directed that special and urgent attention must be given to coordinating the fighting with the Pathet Lao. On 11 February 1970, the combined Pathet Lao-Vietnamese communist troops under the command of Vu Lap and Huynh Dac Huong (as the political commissar) counter-attacked. Participating in the counter-offensive were the 316th and the 312th infantry divisions and the 866th infantry regiment (comprising two battalions), the 16th artillery regiment, an armoured company, six battalions of special forces and engineers, one battalion of regional troops from Nghe An and ten battalions from Pathet Lao. They recovered Canh

38

The widening war

Dong Chum on 20 February 1970, which enabled them to reinforce and expand the ‘liberated’ areas in Laos and further integrate the war in Laos and the war in South Vietnam. At one point during the fighting, they even managed to threaten Vang Pao’s base at Long Cheng. The Hanoi leadership also foresaw that the enemy would soon target Cambodia to cut off the supply routes to Nam Bo and parts of Tay Nguyen. It therefore called for the urgent expansion of the alternative river and land routes. In his account of the events during this period, Luu Van Loi admitted that there were indeed a sizeable number of communist forces in the Mo Viet (Parrot Peak) and Moc Cau (Fishing Hook) region in Cambodia. The US was correct in its assessment that the Cambodian government was allowing the communist forces to shuttle across the border and to encamp on Cambodian territory, specifically in the region of Base 353 where COSVN was located.2

Reorganising the VPA Soon after the 18th Plenary Session, the Central Military Committee organised a conference in Hanoi in February 1970. The conference discussed the problems of how to strengthen the determination of those involved in the military struggle; and how to support the main force fighting force in the battlefield, both the needs of the regular and the mass armies. The conference agreed that the most immediate task was to form as many units and groups as possible to fight in the Indochina battlefield. There was an urgent need to build up the main force in South Vietnam and also raise the level of military preparedness of those in the North. To this end, the General Staff, the Politburo and the Home Front Bureau got together to raise fighting capability and mobility of four infantry divisions – the 308th, the 304th, the 312th, and the 320th. The roles of two divisions, the 325th and the 320thB, were changed from that of training draftees to mobile divisions directly under the General Staff. The 316th division was sent to Laos as reinforcement.3 The artillery service established a number of rickshaw units to raise the mobility and power of its artillery by ensuring that the weapons could get within effective firing range. Up to five new regiments were formed – the 38th, the 45th, the 675th, the 204th and the 16th equipped with different types of artillery of different ranges, including the 130mm, 122mm and 85 mm, BM14 rockets and 160mm mortar. Seven regiments of artillery launchers – the 164th, the 166th, the 154th, the 178th, the 368th, the 572nd and the 42nd – were distributed to all the military regions and fronts. Two additional regiments under the 308th and 304th divisions increased the artillery servicemen at the infantry divisional level.4

The widening war

39

Two additional regiments also beefed up the armour service, namely, the 201st (comprising T34s and T54s) and the 202nd tank regiment, both of which were deployed to reinforce the two battalions in the upper and lower Laos battlefronts. The Special Forces also established a number of mobile battalions to further bolster their numbers in the military. These battalions were fitted into the military regions and infantry divisions. Much importance was attached to training those in the Special Forces to be proficient in independent operations behind enemy line, in ambush, and also in assisting the infantry in the battlefield. The Communications service was also expanded by three battalions and thirty-two companies in order to support the communications network from the Supreme Command to all areas in the battle zones. Last but not least, the number of combat engineers was also raised and by 1971, there were 41,000 combat engineers organised into fifteen regiments, forty-eight battalions and seventeen companies. In March 1970, the Central Military Committee organised a work seminar to discuss how to produce enough science and engineering cadres (who would also be given a well-rounded education) for the fast expanding military services. Subsequently, the Military Medical University was placed under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Defence and two subsidiaries/branches of the Polytechnic University were carved off to form the University of Military Science and Engineering.5 Many of those who were technically trained were sent to the South to help ameliorate the military situation there. In keeping with the decision of the Central Military Committee and the proposals put forward by representatives at the conference organised by the Ministry of Defence in April 1970 to discuss how to raise the effectiveness of the military, the General Staff Department delegated the responsibility of training to the various military regions to organise training units for the infantry at both the regiment and division levels. The training of the reinforcements of the different services would be undertaken by the individual service commands. In June 1970, the Central Military Committee noted that various measures had to be urgently undertaken to support the logistic and transportation network, to rationalise the different supply lines (road, river and pipeline) and to integrate them into the VPA’s manoeuvre warfare.6 To this end, Group 559 incorporated the 968th Front and the 565th military technical specialist group in lower Laos to form a unit equivalent to a military region under the direct control of the Central Military Committee and the VPA High Command. Dong Si Nguyen was appointed Commander and Dang Tinh was the Political Commissar.

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The widening war

Subsumed under Group 559 were five regional commands – the 470th, the 471st, the 472nd, the 473rd and the 571st. Each of the five regional commands was equivalent to a division. Besides the forty regiments, mechanised transport battalions, pipelines, artillery, and combat engineers, there was also a large inventory of weapons and vehicles at the disposal of Group 559. In order that the transportation group could achieve its mission, despite being under constant enemy attacks and with the vulnerability of the 6,000 kilometres of transportation lines in wide open space (stretching from south of the Gianh river, through Quang Binh to Eastern Nam Bo, and cutting across eastern Cambodia and lower Laos), all units under Group 559 were organised either for mobile or fixed position defence. The mobile units comprised four mechanised transport regiments, two regiments to secure the oil pipelines, three anti-aircraft regiments, eight combat engineer regiments and the 968th infantry division. The fixed position units were organised into battalions and companies to protect the twenty-seven stations, which were under the supervision of five commands. The mechanised transport regiments had to cover the very long and sprawling network of routes whereas the fixed defence units operated much nearer to the battlefields.7 Under the stewardship of the Central Military Committee, all the military zones, provinces and cities rationalised their military tasks of destroying the enemy in their locale. They also applied their experiences gained in developing their armed forces and in the construction of the provinces and cities to form many strategic and effective units within the framework of the people’s war.8 In June 1970, the Politburo decided to spearhead a ‘support movement’ under the chairmanship of Do Muoi, alternate-member of the Politburo and Deputy Prime Minister. The aim of this movement was to mobilise more support from the military and the people of North Vietnam, and to display the power and strength of the home front in assisting the war effort. From mid-1970, all the detachments in provinces, hamlets and villages were re-organised and transformed into departments and military commands to lead and direct the armed forces in both fighting and construction in the various regions. The ranks of the local fighters swelled by over ten companies and were equipped with a number of weapons and ammunitions.9 On 24 August 1970, the Central Military Committee and the Ministry of Defence organised a training class on military matters pertaining to the whole army. Vo Nguyen Giap personally conducted the session, which was attended by more than 300 cadres comprising half of the high-level cadres of all the military regions as well as representatives of units, organizations and schools. The session covered topics such as the military

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line of the Party, the new military strategies and tactics, the political tasks of the general staff and the Party, the military task of the home front, among others. Useful experiences and effective fighting methods that could be applied to defeating the enemy were also disseminated at the training session. After a month of such classes, the cadres who attended the sessions became more aware of the many new issues pertaining to theory and practice, thus raising the quality of both command and strategy. The participants also went away with a renewed confidence in the effectiveness of large-scale combined arms operations against the enemy. When they returned to their units, the commanders of the military regions, services and divisions disseminated what they had imbibed by either organising very condensed versions of the training classes that they had undergone or by way of distributing a compilation of the lessons to the unit commanders and heads of organisations. At the end of 1970, the General Staff chose a number of experienced cadres from the Southern Command who had fought in the battle zones, and the military regions to teach all the other units and troops about the needs, expectations and demands of fighting in the new phase of the war.10 Also, to carry out the decisions of the Politburo and the decisions made by the Lao Dong Party Central Committee in March 1970 on holding more ‘Ho Chi Minh classes’ for Party members in order to raise the quality of Party members, the Central Office of the Politiburo produced reading materials for dissemination to the various units. Some 23,000 outstanding cadres and fighters were admitted into the Ho Chi Minh classes for Party members. In November 1970, the Central Military Committee organised a conference to study the work of establishing party cells in the military and to distil the lessons from the years of construction and war. The most important principle was the need to have strong new Party cells at the unit level, which formed the basis for the establishment of strong Party committees, regiments and divisions. It was also necessary to augment the number of Party members in the military. In 1971, over 90 per cent of the Party cells had cell committees. In all the infantry companies, the number of party members increased from 25 to 35 per cent. In the service companies, Party members made up about 40 per cent of all the servicemen. The LSQDNDVN noted that 1970 was a period of complete and comprehensive construction of the VPA in all areas – organisation, equipment, strategy, expanding the technology and material base and intensive training of troops especially in response to the needs of the battlefield. At the end of the entire exercise, the VPA was stronger and the soldiers were better able to protect themselves on the battlefield.

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In particular, the mobile main force gradually became more effective in concentration warfare and in combined operations with the other services.11

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger first secret meeting (21 February 1970) While the military preparations and ideological indoctrination were being implemented, in Paris, on 14 January 1970, Kissinger once again proposed a private meeting with Xuan Thuy. This time Hanoi responded positively and Kissinger was duly informed on 16 February. Kissinger took the opportunity to raise the possibility of meeting Le Duc Tho as well. The first of many more meetings between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho took place on 21 February 1970. A number of points that both of them made at this meeting are worth highlighting: Kissinger noted that because of the deep distrust between the two sides, the negotiations were not unexpectedly difficult. But difficult as it might be, they had to overcome this distrust because it could worsen if peace was not restored in Vietnam. He tried to convince Tho that the US was serious about wanting to end the war and leave South Vietnam. Kissinger drew attention to the relative strengths of the combatants in South Vietnam and stressed that neither side could be expected to surrender at the negotiating table what it had not given up in the battlefield. Kissinger hit the nail on the head when he said that the problem was that Hanoi wanted as a condition for negotiations the guaranteed predominance of the communists in South Vietnam and for the US to ‘rely on your good faith and self-restraint for the future’. He proposed that both sides either discuss the ten-point plan of the NLF and the eight-point plan proposed by Nixon or they could set aside both plans and negotiate a set of general principles that could then guide the discussions at Avenue Kle´ber. Kissinger wondered aloud whether Hanoi was really interested in a peace settlement as, in his words, ‘It is difficult for men who have shown your heroism and your dedication to envision an end to the war which does not guarantee you all your initial objectives.’ Le Duc Tho reiterated American wrongdoings in Vietnam since the 1954 Geneva Conference and was adamant that the ten points must be considered. He disagreed that the US and the Saigon administration had the stronger hand in the war. He was critical of the US using the policy of ‘Vietnamisation’ to exert pressure on the negotiating table. Tho was of the view that the US would keep enough support forces in South Vietnam to prolong the war. Tho was agreeable to both public and private discussions but was doubtful of US sincerity to negotiate. He wanted to know whether Kissinger was tasked by Nixon to settle the problem or merely to

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come periodically to Paris to take a sounding. The North Vietnamese side also pointed out that the US had not yet named the replacement for Cabot Lodge. The first meeting ended with an agreement to meet again on 16 March.12

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger second secret meeting (16 March 1970) The 16 March meeting focused on the subject of troops withdrawal and the time frame for that process. Kissinger stated that the US was willing to consider a two-track withdrawal programme. He added that the communist forces in the ‘so-called “sanctuaries” in countries related to Vietnam’ should be dismantled as well. Le Duc Tho accused the US of exerting military pressure on North Vietnam through Cambodia and Laos and warned that the Americans would fail. As it transpired, in Cambodia, Lon Nol had on 12 March 1970 unilaterally cancelled the trade agreement signed between North Vietnam and Cambodia that gave North Vietnam access to the port of Sihanoukville. On 13 March, he ordered all Vietnamese to leave Cambodia within 48 hours and on 15 March, he requested Saigon to shell areas purportedly occupied by communist forces. Kissinger emphasised that the US would not force Phnom Penh to abandon its policy of neutrality and that it had no plans to recapture Pathet Lao-controlled territories in Laos. Both parties agreed to meet again either on 4 or 5 April 1970 to further discuss the concrete issues.13

Communist activities in Cambodia At this juncture, we shall turn our attention to reviewing the communist activities in Cambodia since 1968. From the report of Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Pham Hung on 29 June 1968, we learn that Beijing was concerned about the problems between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists, and had advised the Vietnamese to improve their relationship with the Cambodian communists. Zhou said that Beijing did not want the Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh, where the staff comprised low-ranking cadres, to have any relations with the Khmer Communist Party because ‘the problem will be too complicated’. Zhou suggested that Hanoi should try to help the Cambodian communists ‘understand the overall context and be aware of the greater task of defeating the US. . . . In short, make them understand the international approach and understand that one cannot fight many enemies at the same time.’ Zhou had more than once noted that the problem was complicated. He explained to the Vietnamese delegation,

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‘the Cambodian comrades wish to develop armed struggle. Sihanouk will oppress them, and you can no longer go through Cambodia. And if Sihanouk oppresses the Cambodian communists, China can no longer provide Cambodia with weapons.’14 Later in November 1968, during a meeting between Mao Zedong and the North Vietnamese delegation led by Pham Van Dong in Beijing, the conversation drifted to the subject of Sihanouk. The Vietnamese noted that, in assisting the Vietnamese communists, Sihanouk had gained both ‘good reputation and benefits’. These included more than $20 million worth of rice and road fees (taxes) from the Chinese, Chinese sympathy, as well as North Vietnamese help to defend Cambodia’s eastern border with South Vietnam. Mao replied that Sihanouk’s politics continued from time to time to surprise the Chinese. Mao observed that while Sihanouk declared that the US should withdraw its troops from the region, he would be worried if the Americans actually withdrew. On the other hand, he often talked ‘in an anti-communist tone’.15 In an April 1969 conversation with the Vietnamese communists, Zhou Enlai noted that while Sihanouk conducted a policy of ‘double-dealing’, he was leaning towards the right.16 According to the Black Paper,17 in 1969, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cambodia anticipated that Lon Nol, with the support of the US, would at some point oust Sihanouk from power. In their view, the coup, when it occurred, could only benefit the Cambodian communists, as it would drive ‘new forces to the revolution’s side’. They therefore devised a plan to deliberately attack US and related interests in Cambodia calculated to provoke the US and Lon Nol into carrying out a coup against Sihanouk. Towards the end of 1969, a delegation from the Communist Party of Cambodia travelled to Hanoi where they met Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap and Nguyen Duy Trinh to discuss the new strategy. The meeting apparently took place in a very tense atmosphere because, despite the US bombing of eastern Cambodia (with Sihanouk’s acquiescence) since March 1969 and the restoration of US–Cambodia diplomatic relations on 11 June 1969, the Vietnamese communists continued to oppose an armed struggle in Cambodia. Sihanouk shrewdly balanced his reconciliation with the US by also announcing his recognition of the PRGSVN. The Hanoi leadership maintained that Sihanouk was a valuable pawn against the US and rejected the idea of overthrowing him.18 To the Khmer communists, Hanoi was afraid that if they were to wage an armed struggle in Cambodia at this stage, it would seriously jeopardise the war in Vietnam.19 Relations between the two fraternal communist parties, which had not been smooth under Pol Pot’s tenure, worsened drastically in 1969 and relations remained tense till 18 March

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1970. As the Black Paper put it, ‘Friendship’ and ‘Solidarity’ were only empty words.20 After the unsuccessful meeting in Hanoi, the Cambodian Communist Party delegation proceeded to Beijing.

The deposition of Sihanouk and its aftermath Two days after the Kissinger–Le Duc Tho meeting, on 18 March 1970, while Prince Norodom Sihanouk was on his way from Moscow to Beijing, he was ousted as chief-of-state in a bloodless coup led by his Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Lon Nol, and the First Deputy Prime Minister, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak.21 The Cambodian communist delegation was still in China when the 18 March 1970 coup took place. John Byron and Robert Pack in their study of Kang Sheng,22 who was responsible for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relations with the international communist fraternity, noted that the officials in the Chinese Foreign Ministry (under Zhou Enlai) were a pragmatic lot and had long been cultivating Sihanouk. In the late 1960s, Kang adopted Pol Pot as a prote´ge´ and promoted him as the ‘true voice of the Cambodian revolution. His actions implicitly challenged the Foreign Ministry’s backing of a reactionary prince. We still do not have enough information regarding Kang’s meddling into what was considered the Foreign Ministry’s turf except that Deng Yingchao reportedly told a visiting Thai delegation in the early 1980s that it was Kang Sheng who was responsible for Beijing’s support of Pol Pot. In contrast, the Communist Party of Cambodia did not have any ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In late 1969, Le Duan, on behalf of the Soviet Ambassador to Hanoi, tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Cambodian communists to establish relations with the CPSU. Sihanouk arrived in Beijing on 19 March 1970. On that same day, the US stated that it would recognise the Lon Nol government. But in Beijing, Sihanouk was still accorded the treatment of head of state. Neither the Chinese nor Vietnamese mass media reported the coup until 21 March 1970. An NCNA report of 21 March simply quoted Sihanouk as saying that his deposition was absolutely illegal.23 The VNA, on the other hand, strongly condemned the coup as being the work of proAmericans in Cambodia.24 On 22 March, an article in Nhan Dan, which was also carried by the Chinese news agency, accused the Americans of staging the coup so that they could use the Cambodians to fight the Vietnamese.25 There was a distinct difference in the way Hanoi and Beijing reported the coup. While the Vietnamese communists’ interpretation of the coup was very clear from 21 March, the Chinese communists adopted a

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noncommittal position. Until 23 March 1970, the NCNA only cited foreign news agencies alleging that the CIA engineered the coup. Its own view was that the situation in Cambodia was still developing, and that everyone was following the developments closely.26 According to the account related in the Black Paper, Pham Van Dong arrived in Beijing shortly after the coup and met with Zhou Enlai. The transcript of a conversation between Zhou and Dong that took place at 4.20 p.m. in Beijing on 21 March 1970 shed some light on their thoughts on the coup and how they planned to respond to the new situation in Cambodia.27 Zhou was of the opinion that Lon Nol’s coup had the support of both France and the US. He felt that Beijing and Hanoi should support Sihanouk ‘for the time being and see how he will act’. As Sihanouk had not yet decided on his next course of action, Zhou felt that they should first ascertain whether Sihanouk wanted to establish a united front before giving him their fullest support; and that they should try to persuade him to move in that direction. In Zhou’s words, ‘The more we can win his sympathy the better.’ Zhou had also not foreclosed the possibility of recognising the Lon Nol government if it adopted a policy of neutrality. Pham Van Dong, on the other hand, appeared quite firm about securing an alliance with Sihanouk. Hanoi’s support was primarily motivated by their concern for their national struggle. The ousting of Sihanouk by the pro-American and anti-Vietnamese Lon Nol had adversely affected the ability of the Vietnamese communists to conduct the war.28 According to the Black Paper, Dong said that the Americans had already created enough serious problems for the Vietnamese communists in South Vietnam, resulting in the loss of base areas as well as human and material losses. The coup against Sihanouk was thus like sticking ‘a dagger in the back of the Vietnamese’. Dong argued that the Vietnamese communists needed the assistance of their Cambodian counterparts and the use of Cambodian territory for refuge. In reply to Zhou’s query as to what Hanoi would do if Lon Nol and Sri Matak proposed negotiations with North and South Vietnam, Dong said that the Hanoi leadership had considered that possibility but concluded that negotiations would not bring about any lasting results and that eventually they would still fight against the communists. According to a CIA report, COSVN was in fact in discussion with the Lon Nol government at that time. If the negotiations failed, the Vietnamese communists would support the Cambodian communists to launch a guerrilla war similar to the one in Laos.29 In the immediate days after the coup, Sihanouk vacillated between resigning and challenging his opponents. According to the Black Paper, it was Zhou Enlai who encouraged Sihanouk to adopt an offensive position.

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But according to the North Vietnamese account, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had in fact advised the Vietnamese Ambassador to Beijing to support Lon Nol because Sihanouk was powerless. It was Pham Van Dong who persuaded the Chinese to encourage Sihanouk to fight.30 On 23 March 1970, Sihanouk finally made up his mind. He called upon the Cambodian people to join up with the Kampuchean communists to form the National United Front of Kampuchea, to fight US imperialism and to challenge his deposition.31 Zhou Enlai privately told Sihanouk that his speech to the Cambodian people had ‘great appealing power’ and China was determined to support him as long as he was determined to fight to the end and until he returned to his own country victorious.32 In his message to Sihanouk on 26 March, Pham Van Dong publicly affirmed Vietnamese support for Sihanouk’s ‘wise policy’. On 27 March, the Lao Dong Party Central Committee directed COSVN and the Military Command of Military Region V to coordinate with the Cambodian communists to strengthen the offensive against Lon Nol and to extend the liberated areas at the border. The next day, the embassies of the DRV and PRGSVN were withdrawn from Cambodia. On 4 April, the Politburo directed the Southern Command to prepare to assist the Cambodians to reclaim ten Cambodian provinces bordering Vietnam.33 On 28 March 1970, Nay Valentin, the Cambodian Ambassador to China was reported to have said that China was ‘embarrassed’ by the presence of Sihanouk in China. But when questioned by Xinhua reporters on 30 March, he denied having made that remark.34 Although the Chinese had provided Sihanouk with all the hospitality which befitted a head of state since his arrival in Beijing on 19 March and Zhou had been very supportive in his private conversations with Sihanouk, the very first public affirmation of Chinese support was only declared on 5 April 1970 at a state banquet given by Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, when Zhou Enlai stated for the first time that the Chinese government firmly supported the just stand taken by Sihanouk.35 Sihanouk only heard about Zhou’s Pyongyang speech on 6 April 1970. On the same day, he sent Zhou a message of thanks saying that he had just learnt of ‘the noble content of the important official speech you made in Pyongyang’.36 The complicated decision-making process regarding Chinese support for Sihanouk is still unclear. Sihanouk recalled that when he met Mao Zedong on 1 May 1970 (his first meeting with Mao since he arrived in Beijing after the coup), Mao asked many questions about Cambodia, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak and that he only understood the reason for Mao’s protracted questioning much later.37 Four days after that meeting, on 5 May 1970, the Chinese Foreign Ministry finally notified the Cambodian Ambassador in Beijing that China had decided to break off diplomatic relations with

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Cambodia.38 Lon Nol, in an address to the nation on 11 May 1970, however, claimed that Beijing only broke off diplomatic relations with Cambodia when he refused to allow the Chinese to continue the transit of arms and medical supplies from China to the Vietnamese communists.39 In 1979, the Vietnamese accused the Chinese of having attempted to strike a deal with the Lon Nol regime during those weeks.40 A number of statements that Mao made to Le Duan at their 11 May 1970 meeting are worth mentioning: He remarked that Sihanouk was not an easy person to deal with because ‘When you offend him, he will come out to scold you.’ Mao volunteered to send some Zhuang people from Guangxi and Dai people from Yunnan to help in the fighting in Laos when it ‘entered a decisive stage’. He reiterated to the the North Vietnamese delegation that though he did not object to negotiations, ‘your main energy should be on fighting’. Both sides shared the view that the Vietnamese communists had been pushed into a war that started from the Tonkin Gulf incident of 1964. And as Mao put it, ‘since the war had already begun, there was no other choice but to fight it’.41 It is perhaps worth highlighting that the Chinese then were much more concerned about the Soviet threat than about the US role in the ousting of Sihanouk. Beijing was still prepared to go ahead with the 137th session of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks scheduled for 20 May 1970. But it had to be postponed when, at the end of April 1970, American and South Vietnamese forces invaded the communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.42 As late as September 1970, the Chinese were still unsure whether Hanoi would recognise Lon Nol’s government if Lon Nol continued to negotiate with North and South Vietnam. Zhou was anxious to know whether Hanoi would support Sihanouk or Lon Nol if war broke out in Cambodia, and about Hanoi’s thinking should Beijing support Sihanouk. Pham Van Dong’s response was that Hanoi could not recognise Lon Nol and both Hanoi and Beijing should support Sihanouk. It was also the right time, Dong added, to persuade the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and others to also support Sihanouk.43

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger third secret meeting (4 April 1970) In the midst of the diplomatic manoeuvrings, on 1 April 1970, the Vietnamese communists launched a series of military attacks in South Vietnam. According to Michael Clodfelter, the death toll of the Saigon forces between 29 March and 4 April 1970 was the highest since May 1968 and the largest for any single week in the war thus far. The losses on the US side in the period between 4 April and 11 April were the largest in a week since August 1969.44

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It was under the above circumstances that the third meeting between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger convened on 4 April 1970. Tho rejected the proposal of simultaneous troops withdrawal within sixteen months, demanding that US forces be completely withdrawn in six months, that is, before the end of 1970. He again highlighted US failure to appoint a new head of delegation to replace Lodge. Despite Kissinger’s denial that Washington had a role in the ouster of Sihanouk, Tho insisted that the US was exerting both military and political pressure on Hanoi in Cambodia and also in Laos to accept US conditions. Whereas Kissinger was anxious to reach an agreement on the military issues, the North Vietnamese side made it clear that they were unwilling to discuss that until the political issues were resolved. These included (1) Hanoi’s demand for the replacement of the current Saigon administration under Thieu-Ky-Khiem by a provisional government that included the PRGSVN, a condition that the US side was unable to accept; and (2) the US idea of a joint electoral commission to oversee the future election, which Le Duc Tho opposed. Finally, Kissinger proposed another meeting to resolve their differences but Le Duc Tho was not forthcoming. Luu Van Loi recalled that, ‘The first round of negotiations between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger ended with the 4 April 1970 meeting at which both parties did approach substantial issues but still maintained their own standpoints.’45

Indochinese Summit Conference (24–25 April 1970) Having convinced Sihanouk to join hands with the communist side, Beijing sponsored a high-level summit conference of the Indochinese peoples of the three countries of Indochina at the Conghua hot spring resort near Guangzhou on 24–25 April. Sihanouk, Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Huu Tho and Souphanouvong of Laos attended the conference. Zhou made a special trip from Beijing to Guangzhou and according to Chinese sources, he played a significant role in helping to reconcile the differences between Pham Van Dong and Sihanouk and to produce the joint declaration at the end of the conference.46 The North Vietnamese 1980 account of the conference claimed that the Chinese had initially wanted a conference of five countries and six sides to oppose Japan. But failing to garner support for that, they tried to direct the war in Indochina according to its own interest.47

Tensions between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists Sihanouk was very concerned about letting the Vietnamese communists operate in Cambodia and had to be assured that Hanoi would respect the

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territorial integrity of his country. According to Sihanouk, he had requested Vo Nguyen Giap to send military instructors to train the Cambodian cadres but long before the end of 1971, there was no longer any need for North Vietnamese instructors. It was only in the frontiers areas that combined operations were sometimes conducted in accordance with ‘the letter and spirit of the April 1970 Summit Conference of the Peoples of Indochina . . . which provided for the participants helping each other “when requested’”. Sihanouk also revealed that there was a small and virtually uninhabited area along the frontier that was under the direct control of the North Vietnamese to protect their communication with the South.48 The Cambodian communists were equally wary of their Vietnamese counterparts.49 The LSQDNDVN noted that during this period, because the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique was reliant on the Vietnamese communists, they did not openly oppose the Vietnamese. But differences and problems were already obvious. For instance, Pol Pot restricted the level of support and contact between the Cambodian communists and their Vietnamese counterparts, disbanded a number of armed units that the Vietnamese communists had established, instructed a number of regions not to sell grain to the Vietnamese and refused to billet Vietnamese troops in Cambodian territory. As their differences became more serious, the Cambodian communists confiscated Vietnamese ammunition, and kidnapped and killed Vietnamese cadres.50 The Black Paper also revealed that the two sides were locked in an uneasy alliance, that Pol Pot was uncomfortable with the large influx into Cambodia of Vietnamese troops as well as Cambodians who had been living in northern Vietnam since the 1950s. The Black Paper also recounted how the Vietnamese communists continuously exerted pressure on them to accept the idea of mixed commands, of Vietnamese cadres operating in Cambodian villages, communes and districts. Pol Pot objected to the Joint Resistance Command Headquarters proposed by the Vietnamese and in a November 1970 meeting with the Vietnamese, the latter attempted to assassinate him and his associates who opposed the idea. The relationship between the sides further deteriorated in 1971.51

Military developments in Cambodia On 29–30 April 1970, South Vietnamese forces with US troops and air support launched separate offensives to destroy the communist sanctuaries in the Parrot’s Beak and Fish Hook areas in Cambodia. We recall that in January 1970 the Hanoi leadership had predicted that such an attack was imminent. COSVN had already moved out of the targeted areas into

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Kratie on 19 March 1970, so when the South Vietnamese and US launched their attacks, the communists were no longer around.52 On 30 April 1970, Hanoi informed COSVN that ‘Indochina has become a single battlefield.’ They were ordered to ‘deal death blows to the Saigon troops in Cambodia and, at the same time, foil the pacification plan of the enemy on the South Vietnam battlefield’.53 The message also stated: We must prepare forces and plans to broaden the liberation areas in the seven border provinces, from the Vietnamese border to the banks of the Mekong River. At the same time, we are to help our friends set up guerrilla areas in the southwest, north and northeast. The main forces in border areas are duty-bound to carry on the fight against the US-puppets not only on our land, but also to launch resolute attacks in coordination with our friends to broaden the liberated areas on Cambodian soil and to foil the US schemes.54 According to Pol Pot, at the time of the coup against Sihanouk, the Cambodian communists had 4,000 regular fighters and 50,000 guerrilla fighters. In comparison to southwestern and eastern Cambodia, the northeastern part had only a very small regular force, about seventy men divided into seven groups. Each ten-men group had only three handguns, one or two grenades, some muzzle-loading guns and poisoned arrows. They were organised as a company at the beginning of 1969 and with the addition of three more groups later in the year, it became a platoon in late 1969. The fighters were, however, always only 30–40 per cent equipped and constantly under heavy enemy attack.55 But after the coup, these forces were augmented to form regional forces, regular forces, regiments and battalions. These forces were not recruited from among the ordinary village people but from guerrillas who were veterans with two or three years of combat experience. Following the April 1970 summit, the Vietnamese communists were instructed to work with their Cambodian counterparts to strengthen seven provinces in east and northeast Cambodia and another three provinces in south-western Cambodia. The LSQDNDVN declared that in just two months (June and July 1970), Cambodian forces had expanded into nine battalions, eighty companies with a total strength of 20,000 and hundreds of platoons and squads of guerrillas in all the villages.56 Soon after receiving Hanoi’s directive, the Vietnamese communist forces in coordination with their Cambodian counterparts launched a number of counter-offensives. Hoang Van Thai (Commander of the Southern Command) and Pham Hung (political commissar as well as Secretary General of COSVN) led the 1st, the 5th, the 7th and the 9th

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Divisions in the southeast attack; Hoang Minh Thao and Tran The Mon (political commissar of the Tay Nguyen Front) led the 24th and the 95th regiments and a number of floating battalions in the attack in the northeast from Tay Nguyen to Lower Laos. Readers should recall that the combined Vietnamese communistsPathet Lao forces had recaptured the Plaine of Jarres–Xieng Khoang area in February 1970. On 1 May, they captured Attopeu and on 9 June, Saravane. By June 1970, the combined Vietnamese and Cambodian communists forces had also captured five provinces in northeast Cambodia – Kratie, Stung Streng, Ratanakiri, Mondukiri and Kampong Cham. The military success was of great strategic significance for Hanoi because it created a vast integrated strategic area that connected North Vietnam with northern, central and southern Laos, west Tri-Thien, Tay Nguyen, Nam Bo and northeastern Cambodia. Cambodia was now the rear area for B2 and the whole region offered a stable and solid springboard for future communist offensives. The LSQDNDVN recorded that although they had managed to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, because of the new conditions and lack of preparation time, they were unable to destroy as many large American units as they had hoped. But between April to July 1970, the communists were able to put out of action some 40,000 enemy soldiers, several thousands of which were Americans, had destroyed 3,000 military vehicles, 113 transport vehicles, 400 types of cannons, had captured 5,000 guns of different types, 400 tons of bullets, 1,570 tons of rice, 100 tons of medicine and many other kinds of military equipment, thus sapping the vigour, vitality and supplies of the enemy.57 Luu Van Loi recalled that by mid-1970, the ‘revolution was no longer as difficult as in 1969’. Bui Tin also noted that by mid-1970, the communists had regained their strength in the South.58 After the fighting in Cambodia in the summer of 1970, the communist main forces in the South were reinforced to protect the liberated areas. In June 1970, COSVN and the Southern Command established the Binh Long Front to lead the units operating in two directions – northwest and southwest – and also to prepare for the offensive in the west with the Cambodian communists to liberate the region and protect the rear-area. The strength of the Binh Long Front consisted of the 1st regiment (of the 1st Division), four Special Force battalions, infantry and groups from the rear-area. Some months before the end of 1970, the communist forces went into the west, killed and destroyed forty enemy battalions under Lon Nol, and widened the liberated areas. By the end of 1970, the communists controlled fourteen of the eighteen provinces in Cambodia, sixty districts out of 102 with 4.5 million people

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out of a total of 7 million. In September 1970, more than 600 villages were already organised into army sections/squads and guerrilla regiments. The regional troops in the provinces and districts were organised into platoons and companies. A number of districts had two to three companies. The Cambodian communists’ main force had five battalions, 127 platoons and thirty-six companies with a total strength of 9,400 people.59

Le Duan – ‘first among equals’ While the developments in Cambodia were in the spotlight during the months of March, April and May 1970, Le Duan was also becoming increasingly prominent. On 18 April 1970, Le Duan left for Moscow to attend the Lenin centenary celebrations and was received by Brezhnev on 8 May. He arrived in Beijing on 10 May. On 11 May he had talks with Zhou Enlai and was received by Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, apparently the first time Mao had received a North Vietnamese leader for several years60 (part of Mao’s conversation with Le Duan was reported above). On his return to Hanoi, Le Duan was received at the airport by both the Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors.61 On 11 May, the VNA (Vietnam News Agency), to mark the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Ho Chi Minh, republished the first part of a 50,000-word article by Le Duan entitled ‘Under the Glorious Banner of the Party, for Independence, Freedom and Socialism: March Forward for New Victories’. The lengthy article was actually a speech he had made at the fortieth anniversary of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party on 2 February 1970. It was published in full by Nhan Dan and Quan Doi Nhan Dan on 14 February,62 and was then subsequently broadcast in six instalments. The last occasion a speech was given so much prominence was Truong Chinh’s speech on the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx’s birth in 1968.63 On 12 May 1970, Nhan Dan and Quan Doi Nhan Dan also published the full text of Le Duan’s article that he had contributed to the magazine Kommunist, the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the occasion of Lenin’s centenary.64 Indeed, from around February 1970, it was clear that Le Duan was being given more attention than the rest of the Vietnamese communist leaders in the mass media, although it was supposedly still a collective leadership. By spring 1970, Le Duan had established himself as the ‘first among equals’ in the Vietnamese communist leadership hierarchy. On reading Le Duan’s 50,000-word article, which the Nhan Dan editorial described as a ‘very important document and a very basic document of our Party illuminating every effort of our entire Party and entire people to bring our

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revolutionary cause to new victories’,65 one can find numerous references to the Soviet Union in comparison to China, which perhaps betrayed his personal preference. But his wide-ranging essay also asserted that while Hanoi acknowledged its great debt to both the Soviet Union and China, the Vietnamese communists had a mind of their own and would not simply follow the directions of either of these two great powers. Khrushchev in his memoir said that he read the ‘famous’ speech by Le Duan twice in an effort to foretell the future course of Vietnamese-Soviet relations. This would suggest that in the spring of 1970 the Soviet Union was also uncertain of the durability of its relationship with the Vietnamese. It was only later that Khrushchev felt more certain.66

Xuan Thuy–Kissinger secret meeting (7 September 1970) May 1970 was a particularly difficult month for Nixon who had to withstand intense domestic pressure to withdraw from both Cambodia and South Vietnam. On 3 June, Nixon reaffirmed that he would recall all US troops from Cambodia by the end of the month and that he would also withdraw 50,000 of the previously announced 150,000 troops from South Vietnam by 15 October 1970. On 24 June, the Senate repealed the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. A week later, the Senate passed the Cooper-Church Amendment. This move effectively barred Nixon from sending US ground troops into Cambodia and Laos. Meanwhile, Kissinger was trying hard to fix another meeting after 16 May 1970 with Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho but Hanoi was not forthcoming. After Nixon finally appointed K.E. Bruce as head of the US delegation in Paris, Kissinger made another attempt to arrange a meeting with the Vietnamese communists after 25 July 1970. Hanoi finally agreed to a meeting on 29 August 1970 but it was eventually postponed to 7 September at the request of the US. Le Duc Tho was not present at the 7 September 1970 meeting. Kissinger reiterated that the US could not accede to Hanoi’s demands that the US unilaterally withdraw its forces completely, and that the Thieu government be replaced. Apart from that, everything else was open for negotiation. Kissinger also offered a twelve-month schedule for troop withdrawal with the proviso that other outstanding issues were settled. In Kissinger’s view, if both sides could agree on a ‘really free election’, then Hanoi’s demand for a change of the Saigon government would become a non-issue. Xuan Thuy did not present any new formula. The position of the Vietnamese communists remained unchanged. Xuan Thuy accepted Kissinger’s proposal of three working forums: (1) the meeting with

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Kissinger; (2) the private meetings of the heads of the two delegations; and (3) the Avenue Kle´ber conference. Both sides agreed at the end of the meeting that they would study each other’s proposals. One small positive outcome was that the Vietnamese side agreed to another meeting on 27 September 1970. According to Hanoi’s analysis of this meeting, the US had made some concessions and showed some flexibility, particularly in stating a clear schedule for its troop withdrawal without directly demanding for North Vietnam’s reciprocity. To the Vietnamese, this was clearly an indication that the US was facing difficulties back home though its forces in South Vietnam were still very strong compared to the communists. The communist situation on the battlefield was advantageous for the US to want to reach an agreement now. The Vietnamese also surmised that the US had shifted its focus to political issues because the balance of forces would still favour the US after its withdrawal. Also, the success of recent US military operations in Cambodia would have played a part in the US calculations. The US scheme was to trade the issue of North Vietnamese troop withdrawal for concessions in political issues and, in so doing, would secure a predominant position in both the military and political arena. Finally, an early settlement would also give the Republicans an advantage in the coming congressional election in the US. The Hanoi leadership also suspected that the US would want to convene an international conference to guarantee the security of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam.67 Pham Van Dong’s 17 September 1970 analysis of the situation offered additional insight into the thinking of the Hanoi leadership during that time. According to Dong, the Hanoi leadership believed that the objective of Nixon’s ‘Vietnamisation’ policy was still to achieve a military victory in South Vietnam. The peace talks/diplomatic struggle were useful but of secondary importance. Hanoi would continue to squeeze as much out of the diplomatic struggle, for example, winning the sympathy of the people of South Vietnam, particularly the urban population to influence the anti-war public opinion in the US as well as in the world. The NLF had been assigned to work on the diplomatic offensives. But at the end of it all, in Dong’s words, ‘For us and for Nixon, diplomacy is a play of words. Neither side has any illusion about diplomacy.’ Hanoi had two objectives: (1) the unconditional withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam. Hanoi wanted the US to provide a timetable for the withdrawal; and (2) the removal of the Thieu administration. Of the two, according to Dong, the latter was the more important. Dong said these were not new demands but Hanoi had kept focusing on them in order to force Nixon’s hand by influencing public opinion in the US and in the rest of the world, as well as lending support the military and

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political struggles in South Vietnam. However, Dong confessed, the North Vietnamese leadership did not have any illusion that they would bring about any results. From Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Pham Van Dong68 at their 17 September 1970 meeting, we learn that the Chinese were then focusing a lot of attention on the situation in Indochina. In Zhou word’s: At present, China is encircled. Yet, the fighting has begun only in Indochina. We cannot understand our enemies. There is no fighting in Korea. The border with the Soviet Union is sealed off. So we have to look to the front in Vietnam. Mao believed that the reason why the Americans had not yet attacked China was because the Vietnamese communists were doing a successful job of pinning them down.69 Hanoi had kept both the Soviet70 and Chinese leaderships updated on the secret discussions in Paris. Zhou described the last reply of Xuan Thuy to Kissinger at the 7 September 1970 private meeting as ‘very good and humorous’.71 Mao said that he had read the report of the meeting and found the last part of it very funny. Mao added, ‘Kissinger is a University Professor who does not know anything about diplomacy. I think he is not someone who can compete with Xuan Thuy, even though I have not met Xuan Thuy.’ By this time, the Chinese appeared to have become more assured of Hanoi’s ability to manage the diplomatic struggle. Zhou, who was among the most concerned, commented that he had observed that the Vietnamese communists had gained experience from the diplomatic struggle. Mao noted that the Vietnamese communists had shown that they could conduct the diplomatic struggle well in the last two years. ‘At first we were a little worried that you were trapped. We are no longer worried,’ he said. The Chinese leadership had directed the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guangzhou to assist the communist struggle in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia. Mao wanted the cadres from the four provinces to visit Vietnam to make preparations for an American attack on China. In closing his meeting with Dong, Mao reiterated, ‘In short, what I want to say is: You are fighting very well on the battlefield. Your policy for the diplomatic struggle is correct. We must give you what you want. I have no further comments.’72

Communist military preparations The Politburo had anticipated that the enemy (South Vietnamese forces with American support) would take advantage of the dry season of

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1970–1971 to carry out a number of offensives in central and lower Laos and in northeast Cambodia in order to destroy the transportation/logistic lines of the communists. In the summer of 1970, the General Staff began work on a military strategy in preparation for the battles on Route 9-southern Laos. The 2nd Division, the main force of Military Region V consisting of the 1st and 141st regiments and the heavily equipped units, moved secretly from Que Son (Quang Nam) to the vicinity of Route 9. Once there, the division was fully reinforced with soldiers and equipment to its established strength. Also in the Route 9 region, the troops from the B5 Front, the Tri-Thien Military Region (B4) and Group 559 urgently mobilised themselves to operate in combination with the mobile main force. The Home Front command formed a forward headquarters together with units under Group 559 to establish the demarcation line of the enemy home front south of the River Gianh. The combat engineers and many youth volunteers constructed new roads as well as safeguarding the motorised units that were transporting supplies and equipment to the soldiers at the assembly points. By January 1971, the total supplies of all the relay stations of Group 559 was over 6,000 tons, and together with the existing stock was sufficient to support 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers for four to five months. As well, on the supply chain of Group 559 were another 30,000 tons. Should the need arise, the supplies could be delivered to the war zone within two to three nights. There was also a base hospital and dispensaries with a team of doctors to service the needs of the B4 and B5 fronts. In Nam Bo and the extreme south of Trung Bo, in September 1970, the Central Military Committee and the Southern Command convened a conference to discuss the counter-offensive by the main force in Cambodia. One of the main topics discussed was how they should fight the large conventional battle and systematically destroy the enemy. The conference also discussed offensive and counter-offensive strategies, the concern over high casualties, standards of leadership and organization at all levels, and other training matters. In October 1970, the Central Military Committee and the Central Command decided to establish the 70th Army Corps comprising three infantry regiments – the 304th, the 308th and the 320th, including all the service regiments and battalions. Colonel Cao Van Khanh was appointed the Corps commander and Colonel Hoang Phuong, the political commissar. The mission of the 70th Army Corps was to utilise the combined strength of the active units at any one point to destroy the enemy in the large battles. The LSQDNDVN noted that the formation of the 70th Army Corps not only met the demands of the new military strategy in the new phase of the war but it also served as the model for all

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the subsequent main force army corp.73 To prevent the enemy from expanding the war in the direction of Military Region IV, the General Staff instructed the 70th Army Corps to work with the armed forces of Military Region IV to repel the enemy. At the same time, it deployed ten anti-aircraft artillery battalions to reinforce the defence of Military Region IV and to protect its supply lines, as well as bolstering the ten companies of local infantry which were defending the strategic areas along the coast from Thanh Hoa to Nam Ha against enemy ambush from the sea.74 On 21 November 1970, the US carried out the heaviest and most sustained bombing of North Vietnam since 1 November 1968. The bombing campaign targeted areas in Military Region IV. However, the campaign failed to achieve its objective to free US prisoners of war in Son Tay. Finally, by the end of 1970, the Chief-of-General Staff of the VPA had also completed the reorganisation of the air force and equipped it with rockets and radar capability; it had also added another four divisions of air-defence, 10 new battalions of air-artillery to protect all the strategic areas, and ten companies of engineers and Special Forces (reconnoitre). The 367th Division (air defence) was assigned to protect Routes 12, 18 and 20 and assist the people’s army in the destruction of the enemy. Parts of the navy were placed under the command of the Northeast Military Region headed by Colonel Nguyen Ba Phat and Col Hong Tra as the political commissar. Its mission was to protect the coast of North Vietnam, to participate in the economic construction of the North and provide logistical support to the battle zones in the South. Naval bases on the Rivers Ma and Gianh and at Cua Hoi were restored. The strength of each of these naval bases was equivalent to a regiment. Detachments of armed fishing vessels and coastal patrol vessels were also formed. The 126th Special Force regiment constantly attacked the enemy’s rear-base and ships at the port of Cua Viet (in Quang Tri).75

Xuan Thuy–Kissinger secret meeting (27 September 1970) Meanwhile, at the 84th session of the Avenue Kle´ber meeting on 17 September 1970, Nguyen Thi Binh, head of the PRGSVN delegation, put forward a new eight-point political solution. Binh recalled that the main thrust of the eight-point proposal was to get the American troops out of Vietnam by 30 June 1971 and to get rid of the Thieu administration in order to establish an interim coalition government.76 When Xuan Thuy met Kissinger on 27 September 1970, he stuck rigidly to the terms spelt out by Nguyen Thi Binh’s eight-point plan. Kissinger was of the view that the differences with regards to the military issues were small enough for

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them to reach an agreement. But he reiterated US would not be able to ‘dump’ the Thieu administration as demanded by the communists. This point was also emphasised by Nixon in his 7 October 1970 televised address when he presented a five-point peace plan. The 27 September 1970 meeting was the last between Xuan Thuy and Henry Kissinger until eight months later on 31 May 1971. On 12 October 1970, Nixon announced another withdrawal of 40,000 troops from South Vietnam before Christmas. Hanoi’s position, however, remained unchanged: the time was not ripe for a settlement because the balance of forces in South Vietnam was still not favourable for the revolution. Any ceasefire at this point would only benefit the US and Saigon forces. But Hanoi was aware that Nixon’s proposal would help win over public opinion in the US and the international community and that they could not continue to appear inflexible for too long. On 12 December 1970, Nguyen Thi Binh proposed three conditions as the basis for a ceasefire agreement: (1) ceasefire with the US followed by the withdrawal of US forces by 30 June 1971; (2) ceasefire with the South Vietnamese forces after reaching an agreement to form an interim government without Nguyen Van Thieu and his clique; and (3) discussion on the implementation of the ceasefire.

3

Fighting and negotiating

Kissinger’s approach rebuffed Henry Kissinger was anxious to resume his negotiations with Xuan Thuy after their last meeting on 27 September 1970. Towards the end of January 1971, he conveyed his intentions to the North Vietnamese via the usual procedure – first through the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, who in turn passed on the verbal message to the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi, Serbakov, who in turn relayed it to Pham Van Dong. In his verbal message, Kissinger undertook to withdraw all US forces from South Vietnam within a specified time limit without demanding a reciprocal withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam. However, he insisted that Hanoi must observe a ceasefire during and for a limited period after the US withdrawal. Kissinger gave the assurance that the US would not interfere with whatever took place in Vietnam after that agreed period. Pham Van Dong’s response, which was conveyed through Ambassador Serbakov on 3 February 1971, reached Kissinger on 23 February 1971. In his reply, Dong said that Kissinger’s proposal contained nothing that was new. However, he neither rejected Kissinger’s suggestion for another private meeting with either Xuan Thuy or Le Duc Tho nor suggested any date for the meeting. Dong’s non-committal response must be seen in the context of three developments that occurred round about the time Kissinger made his overture.

The 19th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party In late January 1971, the Lao Dong Party Central Committee held its 19th Plenary Session. This Plenary Session is regarded as one of the landmark events of the Vietnamese Communist Party but to date little information of what transpired at the session is available. According to


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the communique´ issued on 1 February 1971, the Plenary Session discussed two matters, namely, the on-going war and the economic development of North Vietnam (‘economic activities and the strengthening of socialism in the North’). With regards to the economy of North Vietnam, the aim was to ‘ensure victory for socialism, the struggle to overcome and eliminate the causes of spontaneous development of capitalism and eradicate all the vestiges of the old regime of exploitation.’ The leadership believed that to achieve this, priority must be given to the development of heavy industry in a rational way but still anchored on the development of agriculture and light industry, and ‘build the economy at the central level along with developing the regional economy’. But for the immediate future, they must also factor in the demands and requirements of the ‘resistance war and the ‘obligation of great rear towards the great front’. It was finally agreed that the current war ‘was the foremost task of the entire Party and the entire people’ and the economic policies would have to meet the requirements of ‘the patriotic resistance against US aggression’. But at the same time, they should not lose sight of the larger and longer-term goal, that is, the Party’s ‘line, policies and organization with regard to leading the progress of the economy in the North toward large-scale socialist production’.1 While it was not reflected in the 1 February 1971 communique´, the leadership apparently also discussed various scenarios related to possible shifts in US–China and/or US–Soviet Union relations and their implications for the Vietnamese communist struggle, (although it was unlikely that at that session, the Hanoi leadership had any prior knowledge of what was to come). According to an official account of the 19th Plenary Session, the leadership was aware of the perfidious policies of the Nixon Doctrine, which was to seek an opportunity to achieve an arrangement among the big powers and to compel smaller countries to comply with the arrangements of the major powers.2 Hanoi, unlike Washington, also might not have missed the significance of Edgar Snow and his wife at the National Day parade at Tiananmen on 1 October 1970 and the picture of Mao Zedong and Snow on the front pages of the major Chinese newspapers.3

COSVN Directive No. 01/CT71 It was also in January 1971 in South Vietnam, at a conference held in early January that COSVN passed Resolution 10 and appointed Vo Van Kiet as secretary of the western Nam Bo region. The contents of the document afford us a glimpse of the Vietnamese communists’ assessment of the situation at that point of time. Cambodia was considered to be ‘the

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most vulnerable point’, Laos was a ‘significant area of operations’ and South Vietnam remained ‘the main theatre of war with a decisive bearing on the common victory’. It was hoped that a combination of the anti-war movement in the US and the anti-US forces operating in Laos and Cambodia would bolster the communists’ struggle. The communist forces therefore needed to destroy as many US and allied troops as possible. This would further flame the anti-war movement, which would in turn pressurise the US to repatriate earlier from Indochina. There was also the need to destroy the South Vietnamese forces because they were ‘the backbone and the last hope of the US in implementing the Nixon strategy’ in the region. The meeting noted that despite the success of the US ‘pacification programme’, there were weaknesses and contradictions that could be exploited in order to ‘reduce or neutralise the effectiveness of the new enemy defensive and oppressive control system, and eventually partially or completely frustrate the “Vietnamisation” plan’. Finally, the communists expected the struggle to continue for some time, particularly in the urban areas.4

Communist spring–summer 1971 counter-offensives: Route 9–southern Laos and Cambodia On 30 January 1971, which was three days before Pham Van Dong replied to Henry Kissinger through Ambassador Serbakov, American forces launched Operation Dewey Canyon II as a precursor to Operation Lam Son 719, which began a week later on 8 February 1971. The communists noted that the direction of the assault from Dong Hen to Muong Pha Lan in the direction west of Route 9 was aimed to sever completely their transportation/logistic line to the battlefield. If successful, it would validate the success of the Vietnamisation policy and compel Hanoi to concede at the Paris negotiations. The area of battle was the mountainous, forested and sparsely populated region in the two provinces of Quang Tri (in North Vietnam) and Savannakhet (in Laos). Route 9 which ran from the town of Dong Ha to Savannakhet village was a strategic road linking both countries. Along the route from the North Vietnam–Lao border to the sea, there were many solid enemy defences. Located on the western side was the transportation/logistic network that was the lifeline of the home front strategy of Group 559. The North Vietnamese Nguyen Khac Vien described the liberated zone in southern and central Laos as ‘a sort of umbilical cord’.5 Thus, on 31 January 1971, the Lao Dong Party Central Committee exhorted all the cadres and soldiers of the Route 9–southern Laos Front to


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give their utmost in this ‘significant’ and ‘decisive’ battle to protect their transportation line, defeat ‘Vietnamisation’, liberate South Vietnam, protect the North, as well as fulfil their international responsibility and the purpose of their military training.6 The Politburo and Central Military Committee immediately launched a counter-offensive in the region of Route 9–southern Laos front. General Van Tien Dung, Politburo member, Deputy-Secretary of Central Military Commission and also Chief-of-General-Staff of the VPA, was appointed to represent the Central Military Committee and the VPA High Command at the Front, an indication of how seriously the communist leadership viewed this military assault. The Party committee and military command of the Route 9 Front (which was code-named the 702 Front) was established with Major-General Le Trong Tan (Deputy Chief of Staff of the VPA) as commander and Major-General Le Quang Dao (deputy Chairman of the General Political Directorate) as the political commissar and secretary of the Party committee. Cadres who were in charge of the various head offices and from the different services within the military were marshalled to beef up the Front organizations. This was to ensure that the Front was able to coordinate the fighting in the battlefield involving Military Region IV, B4, B5, Group 559 Commands as well as the Pathet Lao forces in southern Laos. According to the Vietnamese communist account, when the enemy launched their military operation on 30 January 1971, the communist forces scrambled to occupy the battlefield. The infantry, Special Forces, air defence, combat engineers of Group 559 and from the B4 and B5 Fronts, as well as the 24th regiment (of the 304th division) faced the enemy in the east and west of Route 9. The 324th division was quickly despatched from B4 (Tri-Thien) to the south of Route 9. The 2nd division blocked the enemy at western Ban Dong. The 308th division (mechanised) of the 70th Army Corps, with 1,500 military vehicles, travelled 500 kilometres from west of Nghe An to the north of Route 9. At the beginning of February 1971, the combined strength of all the communist forces on the Route 9–southern Laos Front exceeded 60,000 comprising the 308th, the 304th, the 320th, the 324th and the 2nd Divisions; two infantry regiments (the 27th and the 278th); eight artillery regiments; three regiments of combat engineers; three armoured battalions; six regiments of defence artillery; eight Special Force battalions and a number of home front and transport units.7 This, according to the LSQDNDVN, was the high point of their military campaign of concentration and combined operations. The manoeuvring of troops in the actual theatre of combat finally took shape. The spirit and morale of all who participated in the battle were also very high.

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On 8 February 1971, with the help of the US military, seven infantry regiments of infantry, paratroopers and tanks of the South Vietnamese forces crossed the Vietnam–Lao border in three formations, with the main formation heading towards Route 9 through Lao Bao. On 10 February, it reached Ban Dong. The other two formations were dropped from the air on to a number of strategic high points along the north and south of Route 9 to protect the flanks of the advancing main formation. With the support of American aircraft, artillery and modernised motorised vehicles, the South Vietnamese offensive was indeed very powerful, but according to the LSQDNDVN, the South Vietnamese troops were also somewhat over-confident and presumptuous. The Party Committee of the High Command of the Route 9–southern Laos Front quickly deployed troops to stop the advance of the enemy vanguard formation. The 24th regiment supplemented by artillery and combat engineers were positioned on Hill 351 and the Ka Ki Bridge on Route 9 to stall all enemy incursions. The air defence unit of Group 559, which had more than 300 machine guns and anti-aircraft guns, was positioned like a net of fire and on 8 and 9 February, shot down fifty enemy helicopters. Meanwhile the armed forces of B5 Front continuously launched guerrilla attacks on American bases, ambushed communication lines and killed hundreds of personnel and sank nine transport boats on the Cua Viet River. Within a week, the communist forces had succeeded in disrupting the enemy’s supply line. They were able to foil the enemy advance, create the conditions for their own troops to manoeuvre, and open up the battle formation in preparation for the many concentration battles ahead. In the very important direction towards the northern part of Route 9, from 12 February to the beginning of March 1971, there were many fiercely fought battles which involved the units of the 70th Army Corps, including a paratroops brigade and the troops of the 1st Joint Special mobile unit. The 64th infantry regiment (of the 320th D Division) and the 88th infantry regiment (of the 308th Division) ambushed the enemy at Hills 655 and 456 and destroyed two enemy battalions. The 102nd infantry regiment (of the 308th Division) supplemented by one additional infantry battalion and six artillery companies encircled Hill 500, an important position for covering a section of the enemy forces moving towards north of Route 9, and destroyed one Special Force mobile battalion. In Tay Nguyen on 17 February 1971, the enemy’s 42nd infantry regiment with the 2nd Special Force (mobile) launched the ‘Quang Trung 4’ campaign, in the border region in western Kontum. The aims were to destroy both the communist base area located there and the transportation line, and to link up with the on-going Lam Son 719 military


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campaign. The communist forces, which had prepared themselves in anticipation for a new round of fighting in spring–summer 1971, quickly launched a counter-offensive. From 27 February to 4 March 1971, the 66th, the 28th and the 31st infantry regiments destroyed three enemy battalions at Ngoc To Ba to stop the enemy’s advance, after which they launched an attack on the enemy’s line of defence in the northwest of Kontum. Meanwhile, from 20 to 25 February 1971, the 64th infantry regiment and a number of armour, artillery, air defence and combat engineer units combined to surround Hill 543 where they destroyed three battalions of paratroopers and captured both Colonel Nguyen Van Thao, the enemy commander as well as the brigade general staff. In that battle, the 9th tank company (and combat engineers) were able to open a road and also hit deep at the enemy command centre, thus enabling the communist infantry forces to advance. The enemy diverted its 17th armour group and the 8th paratrooper battalion from Ban Dong to re-take Hill 543 but were confronted by the combined communist force comprising the 36th infantry battalion (of the 308th Division), part of the 64th infantry battalion with two companies of tanks and the fire support of the Front’s artillery troops. In six continuous days of fighting, the communists foiled the enemy’s counter-attack to protect the northern flank, thus putting the enemy main force in Ban Dong under serious threat. In the region south of Route 9, on 27–28 February 1971, the 324th infantry destroyed a battalion and seriously incapacitated another belonging to the enemy’s 3rd regiment. In the west, the 141st infantry battalion (of the 2nd Division), the 48th infantry battalion (of the 320th Division) in combination with the Pathet Lao destroyed three enemy battalions – Laos, Pha Do Tuya and Muong Pha Lan. The remnants of the defeated enemy escaped back to Saravane and Dong Hen. Surprised by the appearance of the communist main force, the enemy was soundly trounced and were forced to beat a hasty retreat. For example, on 28 February, enemy forces launched two operations with two paratrooper brigades, the 4th and the 7th armour regiments and the 147th and the 258th marine brigades. The target was Se Pon. They were, however, stopped by the communist forces and consequently the 1st infantry division failed to reach Se Pon and had to turn back to Hill 723 while the 147th marine brigade retreated to Hills 550 and 532. Seizing the opportunity of turning the counter-offensive into an offensive, the High Command of the Route 9–southern Laos Front decided to concentrate its forces to destroy the retreating 1st infantry division along Route 9, strengthen Se Pon and Na Po and protect the communists’ transportation network. Thus, on 8 March, the Party

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Committee of the Front urged all its cadres and fighters to aim for a complete victory in the military campaign.8 Along Route 9 from Lao Bao to Ban Dong, communist forces comprising the 2nd, the 24th and the 102nd infantry regiments moved in to surround, divide and destroy the enemy troops, tanks and armoured vehicles. The units of B5 Front ambushed enemy bases at Sa Muu, Ai Tu, and Ta Con, destroyed forty helicopters and ammunitions, set fire to 1,000 litres of petrol, and killed over a hundred personnel, which included brigands as well as technical specialists. South of Route 9, the 2nd Division (less one battalion) surrounded Hill 723 and eliminated the enemy’s 1st regiment (of 1st Division). The 64th, the 36th and the 66th infantry regiments with tanks, ground and air artillery surrounded Ban Dong where the enemy’s 1st and 2nd paratrooper brigades and two armoured regiments were ensconced. On 18 March, after intense fighting, the enemy withdrew from Ban Dong. During the retreat, the communist forces killed 1,726 men, captured 100, destroyed 113 tanks and armoured vehicles, 24 artillery pieces and shot down 52 planes. On 20 March, Ban Dong fell into communists’ control. On the same day, the 2nd infantry division destroyed a portion of the enemy’s 2nd regiment (of 1st Division) at Hill 660. Two days later on 22 March 1971, the 324th infantry division with one company of tanks destroyed the 147th marine brigade at Hill 550. The enemy beat a messy and confused withdrawal. Indeed, by March 1971, it was obvious that the South Vietnamese thrust into Laos had failed.9 On 23 March 1971, the Route 9–southern Lao counter-offensive campaign ended with a communist victory. On 31 March, the Party Central Committee sent a letter of commendation to the cadres and fighters of the Front for a well-fought and victorious campaign. The LSQDNDVN noted that it was this campaign which had given the Vietnamese communist army their first large-scale victory since the beginning of the war against the US. The determination of both the leadership and the fighters in eliminating the enemy had finally borne fruit. The Route 9–southern Lao military campaign marked the maturity of the communist army. It proved that the communist forces were able to defeat the ‘Vietnamisation’ policy of the US.10 In the midst of the Lam Son 719 campaign on Route 9–southern Lao, on 4 February 1971, the enemy’s 3rd Corps with US air support launched Operation ‘Toan-Thang 1–71’ in northeast Cambodia. The objective was to destroy the communist rear area and the transportation network at Kompong Cham and Kratie. The Military Committee and Southern Command saw an opportunity to destroy the enemy and hence they quickly mobilised the communist forces to counter-attack as well as to seize the initiative whenever possible to launch offensives.


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On 6–7 February 1971, the 2nd and the 3rd infantry regiment (of 9th Division) on two occasions ambushed Chup airbase and seriously damaged the 31st, the 38th and the 52nd mobile battalions and intercepted a group of tanks. In the various regions, the communists fought large and small battles, conducted guerrilla warfare, shelled enemy mobile forces, struck at vehicles, artillery and ambushed the communication lines. A number of battles were particularly effective such as the ambush of a tank group at Wat Thmei, the sinking of boats and the shooting of seven transport vessels on the Mekong River (Kompong Cham), and the ambush of an enemy battalion in a rubber plantation at Snun. The Military Committee and Southern Command decided to concentrate the 7th and the 9th Divisions in the strategic region of Dam Be-Wat Thmei. As there was no unified command, the cooperation between the two divisions was not as effective as it could have been. As such, the Southern military leadership established a vanguard command, 301st Corps in eastern Nam Bo incorporating the three infantry divisions (the 5th, the 7th, the 9th), 28th artillery regiment and the 12th antiaircraft battalion.11 On 15 March 1971, the 301st Corps deployed the 7th and the 9th Divisions to the Mong-reu region (Kompong Cham) in readiness to attack the enemy along Route 22 as they reached Mong-reu. From 25–31 May 1971, the 5th and the 7th Divisions fought a decisive battle in the Snun region. In the view of the communists, ‘Toan-Thang 1–71’ was a major enemy military campaign in Cambodia which failed to achieve its mission. Besides the destruction of a large quantity of military equipment, over 20,000 enemies were killed in the campaign and 700 were captured. With this defeat and that of Route 9–southern Laos and Tay Nguyen, the enemy had lost three major military campaigns in Spring–Summer 1971. The LSQDNDVN noted that the communist forces in the South had shown that they had progressed to the level where they could fight at the divisional level.12

Sino-Vietnamese communists’ relations It was in the midst of both the Lam Son 719 and Toan-Thang 1–71 military campaigns when Zhou Enlai and a large Chinese delegation visited Hanoi from 5 to 8 March 1971.13 Besides officials from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and International Liaison Department, it is worth noting that the delegation also included Ye Jianying (member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee), Qiu Huizhuo (member

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of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee and Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA) and Yuan Huaping (Director, Armament Department of the General Logistics Department, PLA). Prior to this visit, the Chinese had given what the Vietnamese communists themselves had then acknowledged as a very generous package of supplementary economic and military aid to Hanoi when the North Vietnamese economic delegation led by Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi visited Beijing in February 1971. Nghi had then described the aid as timely ‘under the present tense situation’ and ‘of very important significance’ and as ‘a heavy blow to US imperialism’s war scheme and war escalation’.14 Eight years later in 1979, the Vietnamese communists claimed that the Chinese generosity and support in 1971 (and 1972) were to ‘mask their collusion with the US’.15 We still do not know precisely what motivated Zhou’s visit at that particular time. Ostensibly it was reported as a friendship visit at the invitation of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee but it was clearly more than that. It is worth noting that the war had since spread to the whole of Indochina and Beijing was particularly concerned about the current military campaign in Laos. According to a 12 February 1971 Chinese government statement, ‘Laos is a close neighbour of China. US imperialism’s aggression against Laos is also a grave menace to China. The Chinese people absolutely will not remain indifferent to it.’16 Wilfred Burchett, who had close links with the Vietnamese communists, in a television interview, said that since the overthrow of Sihanouk, the Chinese had become very much more interested in the Indochina War, and this interest grew soon after the invasion of Laos. Chinese military and diplomatic support for the Vietnamese communists increased as a consequence.17 The Chinese were also concerned that Nixon might resort to the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina.18 According to Zhou Enlai, during the visit, both sides held ‘serious discussions on the present situation in Indochina and on questions as to how to deal with the military adventures by the US aggressors, and completely identical views were reached’.19 Pham Van Dong described the visit as a ‘complete success’ and the communique´ as a ‘vivid embodiment of the unbreakable, fraternal friendship and militant solidarity between the peoples of our two countries – who always unite, fight and win victories together’.20 The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) has made available a partial transcript of a much longer conversation between Zhou Enlai, Le Duan and Pham Van Dong on 7 March 1971 that sheds some light on the discussions.21 Zhou praised the Vietnamese communists for their ability to fight and negotiate, and was of the view that the negotiations in Paris were progressing well. The Chinese were committed


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to supporting the Vietnamese communists all the way. In Zhou’s words, ‘we are prepared to render our sacrifices in case the enemy expands the war’. However, the Chinese were lukewarm to the idea of a ‘world-wide People’s Front’ against the US and other imperialists that Hanoi appeared to be pushing hard for because Beijing apparently did not want to lose its flexibility of action. Beijing also did not want Moscow in the proposed Front because ‘they [the Soviets] will control this front’. Indeed, from the brief extract of the conversation, Zhou appeared to be more wary of the Soviet Union than the US. In his attempt to persuade Zhou to lead the Front and to host ‘the conference of the world peoples’ in China just as he had hosted the Indochinese Summit, Le Duan raised the spectre of the US–Japan alliance and the ‘Japan threat’, but Zhou was unmoved. We also learn from the conversation that China had a road that ran to the Sino-Lao border and weapons for the Thai Communist Party came via Vietnam and Laos. According to Zhou, ‘we hold that support for people’s revolutionary struggles cannot be sacrificed for the sake of relations between governments. Only traitors do that.’ Despite the failure to get the Chinese support for the idea of a People’s Front, the Vietnamese nevertheless did get Beijing’s assurance, both privately and publicly, of their commitment to the Vietnamese struggle at the time of fierce fighting throughout Indochina. According to the Nhan Dan editorial of 9 March 1971, the Chinese visit was of ‘a very great political significance’ and was proof that ‘the 700,000,000 Chinese people are providing a powerful backing to the Vietnamese people’.22 Zhou Enlai might have had a hidden agenda for his visit to Hanoi, which was to prepare the ground for the forthcoming developments in China–US relations by first reassuring Hanoi and also reiterating to the international community of Beijing’s strong support for the Vietnamese communists’ struggle. Indeed, after the visit, the Chinese published a collection of the documents – the editorials in both the Chinese and North Vietnamese media, speeches and joint communique´ – under the title ‘Long Live the Great Friendship and Militant Unity between the peoples of China and Vietnam’. The collection was sold in Beijing and other parts of the country from 22 March 1971.23 There had been a gradual relaxation in US–China relations under the Nixon administration. About a month after the Chinese visit to Hanoi, on 6 April, at the end of the World Table Tennis Championship at Nagoya, the Chinese, to the surprise of everyone, invited the US table tennis team to China. The US team visited China from 10–17 April 1971 marking what had been described as the ‘ping pong diplomacy’.24 On 21 April 1971, Zhou sent a message to President Nixon through President Yahya Khan of Pakistan stating that the Chinese government was ready to

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publicly receive a special envoy of the US President, the US secretary of State or even the President himself in Beijing for discussions.25

Communist counter-offensive: Tay Nguyen Meanwhile in South Vietnam, on 1 April 1971, the communist 7th infantry battalion (of the 66th regiment) and a Special Force company eliminated an enemy battalion at Hill Ngoc Rinh Rua. From Ngoc Rinh Rua, they utilised the captured enemy artillery to bombard the Dac ToTan Canh base. The enemy’s 2nd Corps then launched the ‘Quang Trung 6’ campaign, with two regiments which was subsequently increased to six regiments. The communist side at Tay Nguyen had only three infantry regiments and did not possess any tanks and heavy artillery. Nevertheless, using their mobility to surround the enemy and launching relentless attacks, they managed to destroy three battalions and seriously crippled nine others. This military success earned the Tay Nguyen troops a commendation letter from the Central Military Committee. The commendation letter stated that it was an intelligently fought battle, an outstanding accomplishment and also noted that the troops had indeed matured very quickly.26 In the same period, in southern Tay Nguyen, in a bid to forestall the build-up of enemy ground forces in northern Kontum, the 95th infantry regiment with the armed forces in Dac Lac province defeated the enemy at Phu Nhon and Phu Thien prefectures/districts and helped the people rise up against the oppression of the authorities. In the delta of Region V, the regional armed forces attacked the enemy and helped organise the people to oppose the ‘strategic hamlet’ policy. The 2nd and the 12th infantry regiments in unison with the armed forces of Binh Dinh province launched two continuous assaults on the enemy and liberated many areas in the delta region that had been ‘pacified’ by the enemy in 1969–1970.27 Reflecting on the war in 1970 and 1971, the LSQDNDVN stated that the fighting and the alliance with the communists in Laos and Cambodia had enhanced the authority and power of the communist vis-a`-vis the enemy. The fighting capability of the communist forces, particularly in the areas of concentration warfare and joint operations amongst the services, had clearly improved as was evident in the Route 9–southern Lao and the military campaigns in Cambodia. The Vietnamese communists were not intoxicated by their recent military successes. The LSQDNDVN noted that even though the communist forces had grown and matured, they were still unable to pose a credible threat to the enemy in the delta region and cities in South Vietnam. Their ability to organise combined operations in the critical


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areas and to attack enemy defences in the large key positions was still very limited. While the military victories during the spring and summer of 1971 had clearly transformed the situation in Laos and Cambodia in favour of the Pathet Lao and the Cambodian communists respectively, that was not the case in South Vietnam.28

Vietnamese-Cambodian communists’ relations Behind the façade of the grand celebratory banquet held in Beijing in late March 1971 and attended by Le Duan, Kaysone Phomvihan, Nguyen Van Hieu, Sihanouk and Zhou Enlai and all the declarations of the ‘brilliant victories won by the people of the three Indochinese countries’,29 the situation within the communist camp in Cambodia was becoming increasingly troubling and complicated for the Vietnamese communists. The CIA report of 3 June 1971 noted that from as early as October 1970, the peasants in the northeastern provinces of Cambodia were not supporting the Khmer communists and the VPA had to rely on the support and assistance of the Laotians and other tribesmen in the region. In the southeast, the situation was even more complicated because the communists there were divided between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Khmer communists – those who were working towards a revolutionary overhaul of the society and those who wanted to restore Sihanouk to power. In recent months, there had also been a noticeable assertiveness among the Khmer communists towards their Vietnamese ally.30 Indeed, at a July 1971 meeting, the Khmer communist leadership decided to break with the Vietnamese communists and even went so far as to declare the Vietnamese communists were the principal enemy of the Cambodian Revolution. A purge of Cambodians seen or believed to be friendly to Hanoi was carried out and such purges intensified in 1972. According to Tran Van Tra, because the top priority at this time was the war in Vietnam, the Hanoi leadership tried to play down their problems with the Khmer communists.31

Xuan Thuy–Kissinger meeting (31 May 1971) On 24 April 1971, Kissinger again proposed a meeting with Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho and suggested 16 May 1971. After refusing to meet for the last eight months, on 14 May, Thuy finally agreed to a meeting on 30 May instead. Kissinger and Xuan Thuy eventually met on 31 May. At that meeting, Kissinger said that Nixon had sent him to make a last effort to break the deadlock and offered what he described as our ‘last proposal’ comprising the following seven points: (1) the US would set a time limit

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to withdraw all US forces from South Vietnam; (2) the Vietnamese and other Indochinese people would discuss among themselves the withdrawal of other forces (read: North Vietnamese troops) from the Indochinese countries; (3) there should be a ceasefire in place in Indochina when US withdrawal begins; (4) There should not be any further infiltration of outside forces into the countries of Indochina; (5) international supervision of the ceasefire; (6) all parties should respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements; and (7) prisoners of war held by both sides would be simultaneously released.32 Xuan Thuy wanted the US to withdraw all its own and related forces by 30 June 1971. Alternatively, Kissinger could state a specific withdrawal time frame for discussion. Thuy emphasised that this was the most pressing point. With an eye on the coming election in South Vietnam, Thuy also insisted that Thieu, Ky and Khiem must be excluded from the next Saigon government. Both sides agreed to study each other’s demands and to meet again on 26 June 1971. Hanoi was unhappy with Kissinger’s apparent unwillingness to discuss the military and political issues as one package but instead focused on resolving the military issues. However, the communist side also recognised that Kissinger’s offer was a significant one as this was the first time the US had expressed a willingness to fix a date for troop withdrawal without demanding that North Vietnam withdraw theirs. Hanoi was of the view that the US was under time pressure to get an agreement to prevent new communist military actions which could affect the next round of troops withdrawal and which could also destabilise the Saigon regime before the South Vietnam election in October.33 In Hanoi’s analysis, if the Vietnamese communists responded positively to the seven-point plan put forward by Kissinger on 31 May, a negotiated settlement could be reached by the end of 1972; otherwise, the US would continue the ‘Vietnamisation’ policy and the war could drag on beyond 1972. They were therefore at an important point in the negotiations. Thus, shortly before the scheduled 26 June 1971 meeting, Hanoi announced that Le Duc Tho would return to Paris after nearly fourteen months absence. Tho’s return was significant. Paris Radio recalled that when Le Duc Tho left Paris fourteen months ago, he had said that he would return only when the development of the situation demanded.34 Kissinger’s negotiating position was almost undermined by the Senate vote on 22 June which required the Nixon administration to withdraw all US forces from South Vietnam within nine months, that is by April 1972, should Hanoi agree to release all American prisoners-of-war. The White House quickly emphasised that the amendment was not binding and warned the communists not to assume that that was the US policy.


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Congress subsequently rejected the deadline. According to Luu Van Loi, if the amendment had been accepted, Hanoi would know exactly the constraints placed on Nixon and Hanoi would then find it unnecessary to negotiate a ceasefire or fix a deadline for the cessation of infiltration into South Vietnam.35

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meeting (26 June 1971) When both sides met again on 26 June 1971, Le Duc Tho drew attention to the pattern of US military pressure after each of their secret meetings beginning with their first meeting back in August 1969, which according to Tho, accounted for the lack of progress in their negotiations thus far: He pointed out that the US launched an offensive in the Plain of Jars after the August 1969 meeting; had supported the coup in Cambodia after the February 1970 meeting; had carried out a bomb attack on North Vietnam after the September 1970 meeting and, most recently, after sending a proposal through the Soviet ambassador, had launched the military offensive on Route 9–southern Laos. ‘Each time we met to solve the problem you always resorted afterward to military offensives and force to put pressure on us in negotiations,’ Tho said. ‘We wonder what you are going to do after this meeting,’ he added. Kissinger, at one point in the meeting, acknowledged that both sides had tried to put pressure on the other through military strength. Le Duc Tho emphasised that Kissinger’s attempt to separate the political and military questions was ‘unrealistic’ because ‘there is no war without political aims. Military force is only a means or the instrument to reach political aims. If military questions are separated from the political questions, the problem cannot be solved.’ Tho was adamant that if the Vietnamese communists did not achieve its political goal of unifying and liberating the country, the fighting would not end. Finally, Xuan Thuy put forward a nine-point proposal: (1) the US would withdraw all its troops in 1971; (2) the release of prisoners of war would be carried out at the same time as the troop withdrawal; (3) the US must stop its support of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime; (4) the US should pay damages for the losses in Vietnam as a result of the war; (5) the US should respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements pertaining to Cambodia and Laos; (6) the Indochinese countries would be left to settle their own problems; (7) all sides would observe a ceasefire after the signing of the Paris agreements; (8) an international supervisory team would be established to ensure that the agreements are respected; and (9) the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese countries would be internationally guaranteed.36

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Kissinger was apparently satisfied with the outcome of this meeting. Both sides agreed to meet again on 12 July 1971, which would be the day after Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing, which had already been scheduled for 9–11 July.

Hanoi’s analysis of the situation in mid-1971 In Hanoi, the Politburo met to evaluate the situation in May–June 1971. The Hanoi leadership decided that they should take advantage of their recent military successes to try to achieve a decisive victory in 1971 and force the US to negotiate from a position of defeat. But they also noted that the enemy, despite their recent military failures and the gradual withdrawal of US troops, were still unwilling to concede. As such, the communists had to be prepared for the eventuality that the war could be prolonged. In June, the Politburo met with the Central Military Committee to draw up plans for the strategic general offensive of 1972.37 On 29 June 1971, Le Duan sent a letter to Pham Hung and COSVN. The letter provides us with a glimpse of Hanoi’s analysis of the situation and its strategy that must have been discussed in the May-June Politburo meeting described above. From the letter, it is clear that the Vietnamese communists intended to pursue the military path towards achieving victory and plans were afoot for a number of large offensives in the winter of 1971 and through 1972 throughout Indochina, but the main thrust of the military offensives would be focused on South Vietnam. The objectives were to destroy the ‘pacification’ programme and to win back the crucial support of the people in the countryside; to step up the political struggle in all the cities; to redress the balance of forces and to regain the initiative in the South, thereby changing the situation in the Indochinese countries and in South Vietnam. The military offensives would complement and support the foreign policy offensive. According to Le Duan, a large portion of the main communist force in the South should begin operations (using the local militia) inside South Vietnam to take control of the initiative before Tet 1972 and be in a position to surround and threaten Saigon. At the same time, they should combine with the communist troops in the zones, provinces, districts and guerrilla forces to threaten and destroy the defence lines of the enemy in the eastern part of South Vietnam, around Saigon and the Cuu Long delta region. Similarly in Cambodia, the Vietnamese communist main force must coordinate with their Cambodian counterparts and always be in control of the battlefield. Le Duan indicated in his letter that concrete military plans were already in place.


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Referring to the recent military success on the Route 9–southern Laos Front, Le Duan wrote that the more one recognised the pivotal role of the military struggle in the same way as one viewed the political struggle, then one would appreciate the vital importance of the need to seize the opportunity. The coincidence of the spring victory, the further withdrawal of more US troops at the end of 1971, and the US Presidential election in 1972, Le Duan explained, were opportunities that should be exploited. Finally, Le Duan noted that the situation was changing very quickly and the most urgent task was therefore to make preparations on every front as well as on the battlefield, to support and develop political strength and enhance the quality of leadership at every level. But above all, there must be unity of purpose and full understanding of the responsibilities that lay ahead.38

Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing On 9 July 1971, Henry Kissinger made his secret visit to Beijing. In the White Book published during the Vietnam–China conflict in1979, Hanoi accused the Chinese of betrayal, ‘of taking advantage of the Vietnam problem to solve the Taiwan issue first’. According to the Vietnamese communists, to mask their collusion with the US, the Chinese had been especially generous with their aid in 1971 and 1972. But at the same time, Beijing was exerting pressure on Hanoi to come to an agreement with the US.39 In the words of Luu Van Loi, ‘the US was offered a new lever to put pressure on Vietnam’.40 According to Qiang Zhai, at the 26 May 1971 Politburo meeting, the Chinese leadership had already anticipated that Hanoi would not be pleased when they learnt of the Sino-US negotiations. However, they concluded that in the longer term the Indochinese struggle would benefit from any improvement in Sino-US relations. To allay the concerns of the Vietnamese communists and to show that Beijing was not about to abandon the Vietnamese for the Americans, in 1971, the Chinese leadership substantially increased their supply of weaponry to Hanoi (this had declined in 1969 and 1970), with supplies reaching a record high in 1972–1973.41 The recent release of the transcripts of the conversations between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 2002 offers an opportunity to assess Hanoi’s claims. When Kissinger met Zhou Enlai on 9 July 1971, he briefed Zhou on his most recent meeting with Le Duc Tho on 31 May 1971. Zhou apparently had not been kept updated of the 31 May meeting and was particularly interested to find out more about Kissinger’s complete troops withdrawal offer. Kissinger told Zhou that Hanoi’s deadline of

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31 December 1971 for a complete withdrawal was too soon but some time in 1972 was more plausible. Kissinger added that it was difficult to reach an agreement when the North Vietnamese were unwilling to make a distinction between the military and the political issues. He informed Zhou that he would be meeting Le Duc Tho again on 12 July and would be apprising him of his conversation with Zhou. Kissinger tried to assure Zhou that Washington did not seek any military allies or bases in Indochina and would not pursue any policy that could cause concern to China. According to Kissinger, after the end of the war, the US would withdraw within a specified time all the troops deployed in Taiwan for the Vietnam conflict. Zhou Enlai did not fall for Kissinger’s ‘Taiwan bait’, or at least he did not give the impression that he would fall for it. Describing the Vietnamese as a ‘great, and heroic and admirable people’ who had once defeated the Chinese, Zhou explained that the Vietnamese communists had a ‘Geneva complex’, which was why they were holding out so tenaciously. They felt very deeply that they had been deceived during the First Geneva Conference and therefore wanted to be absolutely sure that they would not be taken in again. (Zhou spoke of the ‘Geneva complex’ again when he met Kissinger in October 1971. Responding to Kissinger’s complaint of Hanoi’s continued intransigence at the Paris negotiations, Zhou explained that there was a historical reason for the Vietnamese attitude, and that is because ‘they were taken in in 1954 during the Geneva Agreements’.42 Later on in the same conversation, Zhou wanted Kissinger to understand the mental state of the North Vietnamese. ‘They are in a state of war, of being subject to aggression,’ Zhou said.) Kissinger explained that he was different from John Foster Dulles. Zhou said he believed that. According to Zhou, the Chinese considered the Geneva Agreements a thing of the past. From the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident, the Geneva Agreements had been ‘completely violated’. The Chinese view was that all US and foreign troops should be withdrawn from Indochina and the peoples of Indochina should be left alone to decide their own respective fates. Zhou, however, agreed that the US should be allowed a ‘honourable retreat’. Kissinger insisted that the US could not participate in the overthrow of its allies, whatever the origin of the alliance. Zhou reasoned that by leaving the ‘tail’ (referring to Thieu) behind, the civil war would only expand and it would also fuel the suspicion that the US had something up its sleeve. Kissinger’s report to Nixon about Chinese attitude on Vietnam is worth summarising here: He found Zhou Enlai ‘forthcoming as we could have hoped’. There was no threat or bluster but there was a certain ambivalence in their attitude. While, on the one hand, the Chinese


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had the obligation to support Hanoi, on the other, they did not wish to jeopardise chances of improving Sino-US relations. While criticising US aggression, Zhou also understood the US need for a ‘honourable exit’. The Chinese were extremely concerned about the possibility of escalation. Kissinger was particularly struck by Zhou’s remarks on the morning of his departure. Zhou wished Kissinger success and expressed the hope that the negotiations in Paris would be fruitful. Zhou further added that he thought that Kissinger would find Hanoi more generous than expected. Hearing this comment, Kissinger was hopeful that Zhou would nudge the North Vietnamese to reach a quick settlement.

Vietnamese communists’ relations with Beijing and Moscow, 1971 On 13 July 1971, two days before the world was informed of Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing and Nixon’s impending visit to China (to be scheduled before May 1972) at the invitation of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai travelled to Hanoi to inform the North Vietnamese leadership about the content of his discussion with Kissinger. According to the Vietnamese account of the 13 July meeting, they were told that Indochina was the most important topic discussed with Kissinger. Kissinger linked the settlement of the Taiwan issue with that of Vietnam, and said that US troops would be pulled out of Taiwan only after the settlement of the Vietnam problem. But to China, the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam was more important than the issue of China’s admission to the United Nations. In the collection of documents disseminated by the Cold War International History Project, there is one brief and incomplete document on the 13 July meeting in which Le Duan said, In the war of aggression against Vietnam, the US goes from one surprise to another. Until the withdrawal of troops is completed, Nixon will be unable to expect what surprise is next. So the visit of Kissinger is designed to forestall these surprises.43 According to Luu Van Loi’s account of the meeting, Zhou said that the US withdrawal from Vietnam was ‘problem Number 1’ and the recognition of China was ‘problem Number 2’. The Paris negotiations were of key importance and the critical period was between then and May 1972. Luu noted that from Zhou’s statements, the North Vietnamese leadership realised that their respective interests had driven Beijing and Washington to improve their relations. However, at that time Hanoi did not yet grasp the full content and significance of the Sino-US talks.44

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After briefing Le Duan, Zhou returned to Beijing where he met the visiting Australian Labour Party leader Gough Whitlam on 14 July and informed him that China was supportive of a new international conference on Indochina, along the lines of the 1954 Geneva Conference. According to the White Book, after the Zhou–Kissinger meeting in July, the Chinese leaders began to badger Hanoi to be more receptive toward the US solution. There was apparently a shift in the Chinese attitude. At a meeting between Le Duan and Zhou Enlai in Beijing on either 10 or 11 May 1971, both sides held the same views. According to Zhou at that meeting, the Chinese agreed with the view of the Hanoi leadership that there were two possibilities regarding the Vietnam situation. One possibility was that the US would withdraw its troops from Vietnam to ensure Nixon’s re-election. The second possibility was that Nixon would deceive everyone to get re-elected, after which he would expand the war. The Vietnamese communists should therefore demand a total withdrawal and, if the US refused, they would fight hard. Zhou also agreed with the Vietnamese demands that the US should finalise and announce a schedule for the withdrawal of their troops and the replacement of Thieu, Ky and Khiem.45 However, on 18 July 1971, the Chinese commended the US four-point plan to the Vietnamese communists, namely: (1) withdrawal of US troops and release US prisoners of war within twelve months from 1 August 1971; (2) implementing a ceasefire throughout Indochina and arriving at a solution similar to the 1954 Geneva Agreements; (3) the intention of the US, for reasons of honour, to keep some technical advisers in South Vietnam; and (4) the US could also not abandon Nguyen Van Thieu and Sri Matak. On 25 July, the Chinese Ambassador to France, Huang Zhen, also spoke to Le Duc Tho about the recent Zhou–Kissinger talks and highlighted the two main obstacles to settling the war: Hanoi’s insistence on deposing the Thieu regime and its refusal to observe a ceasefire while the US troops were being withdrawn. By the middle of 1971, the Soviet Embassy noted a significant shift in Hanoi’s foreign policy in favour of Moscow. According to their analysis, the Hanoi leadership was worried about Chinese pressure following China’s rapprochement with the US. The Vietnamese tactical response was to try to compromise with the Chinese on minor matters of difference while avoiding compromise on the most important matters, especially on the issue of how to reach a settlement of the conflict. The Vietnamese communists also did not really trust Moscow despite the substantial Soviet military aid in re-equipping and providing training.46 In addition to the major annual aid agreement, two Soviet-North Vietnamese


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supplementary aid agreements were signed in 1971. Moscow also tried to dissuade the North Vietnamese communists from carrying out the 1972 offensive because it was too risky but Hanoi would not heed the advice.47 At a meeting on 7 September 1971, Le Duc Tho told Ieng Sary that the Vietnamese communists would always remember the experience in 1954 and of how Zhou Enlai and, more recently, Mao (two or three years ago) admitted the mistakes they had made at the Geneva Conference of 1954. Tho recalled that the outcome in 1954 was the result of pressure exerted by both Moscow and Beijing. ‘Better to have one’s own mind and not get caught up in big-power politics,’ he advised.48

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meeting (12 July 1971) After departing from Beijing on 11 July 1971, Kissinger met with Le Duc Tho in Paris on 12 July 1971 as had been agreed. The main issue discussed was the replacement of Nguyen Van Thieu. In Le Duc Tho’s words, Thieu was the ‘greatest obstacle’. The North Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry was of the view that the US wanted an early solution and had appeared to be flexible on most points. The Vietnamese delegation in Paris suggested that Hanoi announce a new proposal to oblige the US to both replace Thieu and to fix a deadline for the troop withdrawal.49 It was while the leadership was mulling over their options that they were informed of Kissinger’s meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing. On 17 July 1971, Nguyen Duy Trinh informed Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy that the present time was not the opportune time for a peace settlement. The leadership was of the view that the balance of forces was still not in favour of the communists and therefore they should not make any concessions but stick to the nine points and focus on the withdrawal of US troops and the replacement of Thieu. The message also added that ‘new complexities’ had emerged after the Kissinger–Zhou meeting.50 Given Trinh’s instructions, it was not surprising that when Le Duc Tho next met with Henry Kissinger on 26 July 1971, it was almost a replay of what had been discussed at their last meeting on 12 July. The Vietnamese side remained focused on the deadline for US withdrawal of troops and the replacement of the Thieu regime, the latter being described as ‘the spinal column of the framework’. Hanoi’s insistence on the replacement of Thieu was a reflection of its concern with the policy of Vietnamisation. As Le Duc Tho told Kissinger: You imagine withdrawing in two ways: negotiation and Vietnamisation. You think that these two ways will complement each other. Vietnamisation will help maintain in South Vietnam a strong

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Fighting and negotiating administration and a strong army as instruments for the implementation of your neo-colonialist schemes. If negotiation is unsuccessful, active Vietnamisation will facilitate the achievement of your intention of turning South Vietnam into a new-type colony.51

The Vietnamese account recalled that Kissinger complimented Tho’s analysis ‘as correct and intelligent’ and then countered with his analysis of the Vietnamese communist strategy. Kissinger told Tho: Your strategy is aimed at securing two results: that our forces be withdrawn as soon as possible and after the completion of withdrawal, you will overthrow the existing political structure in South Vietnam. Your demand is not a concession but a requirement that we offer to Hanoi the opportunity to reach your objectives. If you can secure them by yourselves, we shall respect the results, but probably you will not succeed in obtaining them at these negotiations. Of course, neither of us will sign an agreement to offer to the other side all the objectives it has set.52 Le Duc Tho did not respond to Kissinger’s analysis but instead made allusions to Kissinger’s approaches to both Beijing and Moscow to help settle the conflict, Tho said, Over the past few years, you have gone here and there to seek a way out. I wonder whether you have drawn from your experience. In fact, your efforts are futile and they make things more complicated. . . . In a chess match, the winner and the loser must be the players themselves; there is no other way. We are independent in solving our problem.53

Kissinger’s new eight-point plan After the 26 July meeting, en route to Hanoi, Le Duc Tho met with Zhou Enlai in Beijing. Although there is no available record of his meeting with Zhou, it was likely that Tho would have updated Zhou on his negotiations with Kissinger. Le Duc Tho was not present at the 16 August meeting when Kissinger presented a new eight-point proposal which integrated the US seven-point and Hanoi’s eight-point plans. The most significant elements of the new eight-point plan were: (1) the US would withdraw all troops by 1 August 1972, provided the final agreement was signed by 1 November 1971; and (2) the US would remain completely neutral in the forthcoming South Vietnamese elections (which were scheduled for October 1971); (3) one month after the agreement, Nixon would ask


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Congress to support a five-year aid programme to the Indochinese countries amounting to approximately US$ 7.5 billion, of which no less than US$ 2 billion would be allocated to North Vietnam. Here, it would be useful to quote in full what Kissinger told Xuan Thuy on presenting him with the eight-point plan. Kissinger said: Mr Minister, I know you have received instructions not to let me persuade you, and you are going to reply that it is all our fault. It’s a pity. The tragedy is that the war continues, in a year we shall be almost at the same point, and a day will come when the conditions we shall agree upon are more or less the same as those we are discussing at this moment. . . . We will not thwart your plan if you win the political battle. Anyway, this will come sooner or later. It’s your task, but it is obvious that you are not ready to take it up.54 Xuan Thuy acknowledged that the US had now offered a date for complete withdrawal but expressed dissatisfaction that it was not within 1971. He also reiterated ‘with more emphasis’ the demand for the replacement of Nguyen Van Thieu. The next meeting on 13 September 1971 lasted for only two hours and was the shortest since the secret negotiations began. Both sides also did not set a date for the next meeting. By this time, it was clear that Nguyen Van Thieu was the sole candidate in the forthcoming October election in South Vietnam. On 30 September 1971, the US Senate passed the resolution that required Nixon to pull out all troops within six months if the prisoners of war could be brought home. In the process of reaching a decision as to whether it should continue to stall at the negotiations or to adopt a more compromising attitude with the US, the Hanoi leadership had to assess the military situation as well as consider a number of external developments that were taking place in the last quarter of 1971.

Vietnamese communists’ relations with Moscow, 1971 In early October, a Soviet delegation led by Nikolai Podgorny, Politburo member of the CPSU and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet led a friendship visit to Vietnam.55 The visit brings to mind that made by the Chinese leader Zhou Enlai earlier in March 1971. In speeches after speeches and rallies after rallies, the Russians expressed their support for the Vietnamese communist struggle. According to Podgorny, Soviet support had always been based on their ‘principled attitude’, ‘This was our attitude in the past and it is still so at the present time’, he proclaimed. Podgorny also said that the Soviet Union

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Fighting and negotiating had always placed in the first rank the question of strengthening the unity and solidarity of the countries in the socialist community and the alliance of the international socialist system with the national liberation forces in the fierce and active struggle against the imperialist aggressors for the peace and security of all nations.

The North Vietnamese briefed their Russian friends on the negotiations and Podgorny informed the Vietnamese of the forthcoming visit of Nixon to Moscow. (Two months earlier, in August 1971, Moscow had sent an invitation to Nixon to visit the Soviet Union in May or June 1972.) This was perhaps the most important task of Nikolai Podgorny’s visit – to inform Hanoi of the forthcoming visit before the public announcement was made. On receiving the news, the Hanoi leadership did not immediately show its displeasure but later had a change of heart as the date of the visit drew closer. 56 The Russians also tried to convince the Vietnamese communists that it was necessary to reach a settlement with the US and that the military offensive planned for 1972 was not a prudent move, but the Vietnamese leadership would not heed their advice.57 The joint statement issued on 7 October at the end of the visit, however, noted that both sides were ‘highly satisfied with the talks, meetings and conversations which had been held’.58 On 12 October, Nixon announced his visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972. Although the Russians were keen to see a quick resolution of the Vietnam problem, they continued to supply the Vietnamese communists militarily. In October and November 1971, US Air Force reconnaissance captured photographs of new Soviet 130mm artillery pieces near Hanoi or Haiphong, which, according to Roger Warner, had not been seen before in the region. In December 1971, the 130mm artillery was employed to fire at Thai hilltop bases from Laos. Apparently from Long Tieng, Vang Pao sent out his T–28s in an attempt to destroy the guns but two of his T–28s got shot down instead.59

Kissinger’s second visit to Beijing On 20 October, Kissinger’s second visit to Beijing was announced. Kissinger’s discussion with Zhou Enlai on the subject of Indochina did not differ substantially from that of July 1971. The transcripts of the conversations between Zhou Enlai and Kissinger in October 1971 made available in 2002, revealed the following: (1) the Chinese believed that the Indochina problem was the ‘most urgent issue in order to relax regional tensions’; (2) Beijing hoped that there could be an early negotiated settlement, and had told the North Vietnamese so. Beijing also


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hoped that a negotiated settlement could be achieved before Nixon’s visit to China and were prepared to play its part to help bring that about. However, Zhou repeatedly told Kissinger that Beijing could not impose its will on others; and (3) Ye Jianying told Kissinger that the Vietnamese communists were ‘too proud’ and that having defeated the world’s largest military power, Hanoi was very reluctant to take any advice. Ye claimed that Hanoi was goaded on by Moscow. Though Beijing truly wanted peace, it did not want to make it any easier for Moscow to pursue its policy of encircling China by creating a pro-Moscow bloc in Indochina;60 (4) Zhou believed that the US was sincere in wanting to reach a peaceful settlement of the Indochina problem; and (5) Hanoi had not kept Beijing fully apprised of the secret negotiations in Paris. In fact, Kissinger had to disabuse Zhou of some of the latter’s patchy understanding of what had transpired in the secret negotiations at Paris. This is an interesting revelation because Zhou last met Le Duc Tho in August and Nguyen Thi Binh in Beijing in September 1971. The transcripts of two meetings between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in Beijing on 21 and 24 October 197161 offer some tell-tale signs of differences between the NLF and Hanoi. It could also be a case of the right hand not fully aware of the left hand was doing. Unfortunately, we do not have more information. Whatever the situation may be, it reveals the difficulty of negotiating with the Vietnamese. Kissinger related to Zhou how Le Duc Tho in their secret 26 June 1971 had handed him a nine-point peace proposal and on 1 July 1972, Nguyen Thi Binh at the Avenue Kle´ber meeting had produced a seven-point peace proposal. When asked, Le Duc Tho told him that the nine points were ‘the more significant points, and that these were the ones we should negotiate’. A frustrated Kissinger said that the US side could not then respond to the 7-point proposal (which was in the public domain) and had already responded to the secret nine-point proposal twice. He asked how Beijing could continue to ask the United States to support the seven-point programme when Hanoi had said it would only discuss the secret ninepoint programme.

Kissinger’s new offer Before Kissinger left for Beijing, on 11 October 1971, he had tried to fix a meeting with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy on 1 November 1971. He made a new offer (what he described as his last effort to negotiate a solution before the end of 1971), namely, that all US and related forces would be pulled out of South Vietnam by 1 July 1972 if the agreement was signed on 1 December 1971.

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On 25 October while in Beijing, Kissinger was informed that Hanoi had agreed to a meeting on 20 November 1971. When he met Zhou Enlai on 26 October 1971, he told Zhou of the impending meeting with Le Duc Tho and both were hopeful that a compromise could be reached.62 But on 11 November 1971, the Vietnamese communist leadership apparently had a change of mind. Hanoi explained to Xuan Thuy that when the leadership decided that Le Duc Tho would present a counter-proposal to Kissinger’s eight-point plan at the 20 November 1971 meeting, they did not know ‘precisely Nixon’s statement on the Vietnam problem and the date of the new troop withdrawal’. The leadership was worried that if Nixon made his statement after Le Duc Tho had delivered his counterproposal, Nixon would know their intentions and could exploit it to mislead public opinion and undermine the communist plan. The Politburo, having had a re-think, now felt that it would not be in their interest to offer the counter-proposal. As such, Le Duc Tho’s presence in Paris was no longer necessary. But Xuan Thuy could still meet with Kissinger, if the latter was agreeable, ‘just to keep the bridge standing’. On 12 November 1971, Nixon announced another round of withdrawal of 45,000 more troops by 1 February 1971, bringing down the troop level in South Vietnam down to 139,000. On 17 November, the Vietnamese negotiators in Paris were informed that there would definitely not be a counter-proposal for two reasons: (1) through his 12 November statement, Nixon appeared very stubborn. The gradual troop withdrawal is aimed at implementing Vietnamisation, while at the same time maintaining indefinitely a certain military force as a bargaining chip with us; and (2) ‘the orientation for the diplomatic struggle in 1972 is being considered to see whether the problem should be settled before the Spring–Summer period of 1972, if the other party accepts a solution meeting our demands, or only after we have achieved our strategic objectives on the battlefield. The decision of the Hanoi leadership was that they should continue to show ‘a tough attitude’ and, as to the timing of making the counterproposal, it should depend on ‘our strategic scheme’. Three days before the scheduled 20 November meeting, the US side was informed that Le Duc Tho had taken ill and only Xuan Thuy would be meeting Kissinger on the scheduled date. The US side therefore decided to postpone the meeting till Le Duc Tho or another representative of equivalent status could be available. We now know that Le Duc Tho had not really fallen ill and that it was ‘a political


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illness’.63 Both Kissinger and Le Duc Tho did not manage to meet again till 1972.

Hanoi’s analysis of the situation at the end of 1971 In deliberating their next step, the Hanoi leadership had to weigh three sets of factors. The first was the status of the negotiations. On military issues, though both sides had narrowed their difference considerably, the US was sticking rigidly to its position on the political issues. The second factor concerned the unclear developments in US–China and US–Soviet Union relations and their ramifications for the Vietnamese communists: Kissinger had commented to President Pompidou that though the Chinese would like to see the Vietnam problem settled, they did not know how to go about it without moving Hanoi closer to Moscow and in the process unwittingly contributed to their feeling of being cornered.64 While in China from 20–27 November 1971, Pham Van Dong was advised by the Chinese to focus on solving the POW issue and getting the US troops out of Vietnam. The replacement of the Thieu regime would require time and could be resolved at a later stage.65 Mao also turned down Dong’s request that Beijing cancel the Nixon visit.66 On 29 November, Nixon’s visit to China from 21 February 1972 was announced. The third and perhaps the most important factor was the balance of forces in South Vietnam, which, in their view, was still not advantageous to the communists. The Vietnamese communists were then preparing for the spring–summer offensives in the hope of scoring a strategic victory. There were still many weaknesses that needed to be rectified. Both the Politburo and the Central Military Committee had already written in detail about them to Tran Van Tra. Le Duan’s letter of 29 November 1971 to Pham Hung and COSVN, as well as the Saigon-Ba Dinh Regional Committee further highlighted some of the more glaring weaknesses. In his letter, Le Duan was very critical of the Saigon-Ba Dinh regional Committee for not doing enough to galvanise the masses – workers, labourers, students, teachers, women and intellectuals – to deal a fatal blow to the enemy. He was displeased that the strikes carried out on the eve of the October 1971 elections in the South had been ineffective because there was not a critical mass of workers participating. In Le Duan’s view, the communists in the Saigon-Ba Dinh area were not exploiting the enemy’s problems and disunity. For example, they should step up their military proselytising activities and target those wavering rank and file in the enemy camp, especially those that have only been recently weaned over to the enemy side through the ‘Vietnamisation’

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policy. According to Le Duan, it was important to see the political struggle was just as important as the military struggle. He urged the Saigon-Ba Dinh Regional Committee to do more to unite and organise the masses and their activities to bring down the Thieu regime and bring together all political factions that opposed the Thieu administration. Finally, according to Le Duan, 1972 offered a golden opportunity to achieve a turning point in the revolution in the South. The Saigon-Ba Dinh Regional Committee should help the cities build up their armed forces, reinforce the base areas to be used as a springboard for the military offensives, ensure that the leadership at all levels understood thoroughly the tasks ahead and was able to respond efficiently and effectively.67 Having considered the above factors, the leadership concluded that the situation on all fronts were still in a state of flux and as such it was still not yet the right time to reach an agreement. It was therefore ‘necessary not to appear impatient’ and wait.

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Secret meetings made public On 13 January 1972, Nixon announced the withdrawal of another 70,000 troops from South Vietnam by 1 July 1972, thereby bringing down the number of US troops based there to 69,000. On 25 January, he revealed to the public the secret meetings between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho since 1969, the US seven-point proposal of 31 May 1971 and the most recent offer made on 11 October 1971 to pull out all troops from South Vietnam by 1 July 1972 if a peace agreement could be concluded by 1 December 1971. The aim of his revelation was to show the international community that Hanoi’s intransigence was holding up the peace settlement. The day after Nixon’s disclosure, US negotiators in Paris called for the resumption of secret negotiations between the two sides. The Vietnamese communists were in no mood for negotiations at that point. Instead, on 31 January 1972, Hanoi countered by making public its nine-point solution that had been given to Kissinger on 26 June 1971 as well as the exchanges between the two sides on the aborted 20 November 1971 meeting. On 2 February 1972, the PRGSVN reiterated the communists’ demands: (1) the US should set a definite date for the complete withdrawal of US and related troops from South Vietnam. The release of POWs would take place simultaneously; and (2) Nguyen Van Thieu must resign and all policies of repression, terror and pacification should be abandoned. (It is worth noting that the PRG had only demanded the resignation of Thieu and not the entire ruling group.)

Nixon’s visit to China While both sides traded revelations to win the support and sympathy of the international community, Nixon made his landmark visit to China where he spent a week from 21 to 28 February 1972. According to

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Sihanouk, ‘neither our Chinese friends, nor my Vietnamese and Laotian friends, nor myself had any illusions but that one of Nixon’s aims was to try to drive a wedge between the Chinese and our national liberation movements’.1 The Chinese were evidently anxious for a quick settlement of the Indochina War. Prior to Nixon’s visit, Beijing had sought Hanoi’s agreement to discuss the Indochina problem with Nixon on its behalf, but was rebuffed by the North Vietnamese who insisted that Vietnam was an independent country and the Chinese had ‘no right to discuss with the United States the question of Vietnam’. The Chinese were reminded not to repeat the mistake of 1954. In early February 1972, Soviet sources reported that Le Duc Tho was preparing to travel to Beijing to meet with Kissinger.2 Eventually, it did not materialise, much to the relief of Moscow. Nonetheless, Vietnam was a major discussion topic between the two sides during the US President’s visit. In the discussions, the Chinese continued to voice support for the Vietnamese communists and criticised Washington’s policies in Indochina. However, there was a tacit understanding on both sides that the Indochina War would no longer be a hindrance in US–China relations. Mao told Nixon that: At the present time, the question of aggression from the United States or aggression from China is relatively small, that is, it could be said that this is not a major issue, because the present situation is one which a state of war does not exist between our two countries. You want to withdraw some of your troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad.3 What Mao said, according to Luu Van Loi, ‘eradicated the nightmare of the US government’s fearing that China would interfere militarily in Indochina’.4 Both sides were also in agreement that a negotiated solution should be reached sooner than later. During one of the meetings with Zhou Enlai, Nixon said, ‘I am glad that the Prime Minister’s government will not try to discourage the North Vietnamese from negotiating. That is the best way to solve it rather than by solving it militarily.’ Five days after Nixon’s visit, on 4 March 1972, Zhou Enlai flew to Hanoi to brief the North Vietnamese leadership about Nixon’s visit and to reassure them that in Beijing’s eyes the Vietnam problem had higher priority than the Taiwan issue. The Hanoi leadership, however, could not easily be convinced and continued to uphold the belief that the Chinese were making use of the Vietnam question to settle the Taiwan issue first.5 Hanoi believed that Sino-US rapprochement emboldened Nixon to declare on 23 March 1972 that he was suspending sine die the public


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meetings of the Paris Conference until the communists stopped ‘using the conference as a pulpit for propaganda’.

Communist military preparations While the world’s attention was focused on Sino-US rapprochement, the Vietnamese communists had been preparing for their new round of military offensives. In Hanoi’s assessment, the communist liberated zones had been extensively strengthened and consolidated from U Minh, Dong Thap, the forested and mountainous regions of eastern Nam Bo to the Mekong River Delta through Tay Nguyen to Tri-Thien province, making it possible to connect the liberated zones of southern Laos with those in the northeastern part of Cambodia. By the end of 1971, they had successfully reestablished their presence in the battlefronts in South Vietnam, and had consolidated their positions in the western parts of Central Vietnam, Tay Nguyen, eastern Nam Bo and parts of the Mekong Delta. But despite the incremental withdrawal of US troops, in early 1972, the enemy still managed to field a sizeable force and controlled 70 per cent of the total number of villages and 80 per cent of the population in the most densely populated and prosperous regions in the South. At the beginning of 1972, the main forces in Tri-Thien, Military Region V, Tay Nguyen and Eastern Nam Bo were reinforced. The Southern Command established the 75th Artillery Division (consisting of the 96th and the 208th ground artillery regiments, the 56th anti-aircraft gun battalion, and the 26th armour regiment) in Eastern Nam Bo. In Military Region V, the 3rd Infantry Division was given more troops and equipment. It also formed the 711th Infantry Division (comprising the 31st, the 38th and the 57th regiments and a number of companies of the various services) under the Military Region V Command.6 The 2nd Infantry Division (which had been involved in the Route 9–southern Laos campaign in 1971) was also sent in to support Military Region V.7 On the eve of Nixon’s trip to China, Sihanouk was in Hanoi to discuss the overall strategy for the forthcoming military offensive. Sihanouk noted that at the meeting, the North Vietnamese, the NLF and the Pathet Lao ‘were in total agreement that we were not going to be cheated of victory by some new variant of a Geneva Conference’. All felt that they ‘had been tricked too often by the West and that this time it was necessary to smash the US puppet regimes’.8 Vo Nguyen Giap was convinced that the enemy forces would be unable to replicate the March 1971 military operations in southern Laos and Cambodia or the August–December 1971 Chenla 2 operation. Giap calculated that while the US could step up their

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air operations, it would not be able to stop the communist offensive without physically occupying the ground. Without US troops, he believed that the combat capacity of the South Vietnamese troops would quickly decline.9 At the end of February 1972 (while Nixon was still in China), the Central Military Committee issued a resolution on the military tasks for 1972. On the basis of the Politburo’s May 1971 resolution to aim for a decisive victory in 1972, the Committee directed that the military forces should exploit the current weakness of the South Vietnamese military forces and also take advantage of the fact that 1972 was a Presidential election year in the US to strike three strategic blows against the enemy: (1) to attack in the areas/battlefields where the communist forces were stronger; (2) to step up the attacks in the lowland, rural areas, combining military and political offensives with military proselytising; and (3) to promote guerrilla warfare and mass uprisings particularly in the cities. All three ‘strategic blows’, according to the Central Military Committee, must be closely coordinated. The Committee also instructed that there should be closer coordination with their compatriots in Laos and Cambodia. ‘Attention had to be paid to providing supplies and transporting them to our friends.’ On 11 March 1972, it was decided that Tri-Thien would be the principal theatre of operation because of its strategic location and also because of other favourable factors such as competent leadership, good facilities and a logistic network which could support an expanded military campaign. The Tri-Thien Front was thus directed ‘to contribute to changing the balance of forces between the communists and the enemy, and advancing the resistance by annihilating as many of the enemy troops as possible’. The Tri-Thien campaign, according to the March directive, was expected to be ‘a large-scale campaign’ fought out in ‘a very important strategic area’, ‘a combined arms campaign’ as well as ‘a combined military-political campaign’. The campaign had five objectives, of which the most important was to ‘annihilate many of the enemy’s military forces, much of their manpower, and many of their war facilities especially their regular troops, smash the enemy’s defence line, and victoriously develop the offensive’. The other objectives were to coordinate with the mass movement in the lowlands and cities, to liberate all areas that were ‘ripe’, and to draw and tie down an important part of the enemy’s forces. The Central Military Committee established a Party Committee Command to oversee the Tri-Thien campaign and appointed Major-General Le Trong Tan (Deputy Chief of Staff) as commander and Major-General Le Quang Dao (Deputy Chief of the General Political Department) as the political commissar as well as secretary of the Tri-Thien Committee. General Van


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Tien Dung (Politburo member and Chief of General Staff), representing the Central Military Committee, was assigned to oversee this important theatre. Besides Tri-Thien, the military forces in the Tay Nguyen, Military Region V and Nam Bo battlefields were also ordered to conduct medium to large-scale military campaigns and carry out a coordinated strategic offensive all over the South. Eastern Nam Bo and Tay Nguyen were further instructed to be ready to supply up to a division to move into the delta region when the opportunity presented itself.10 By the second week of March, all the participating units in the Tri-Thien, Tay Nguyen and eastern Nam Bo offensives had assembled. At Tri-Thien, there were three infantry divisions and two infantry regiments, two air-defence divisions (the 367th and the 377th) comprising eight regiments of anti-aircraft guns, two rocket regiments, nine ground artillery regiments, two armoured/tank regiments, two regiments of combat engineers, sixteen battalions of Special Forces, signallers and transport. In Tay Nguyen, there were two Infantry Divisions and four infantry regiments, five regiments of artillery, combat engineers and Special Forces, six anti-aircraft battalions and one tank battalion. In eastern Nam Bo, there were three infantry divisions and four infantry regiments, four regiments and six battalions comprising the various services, including two ground artillery regiments and one tank battalion. (In April, the B2 battleground was further reinforced by one tank battalion and two shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and 37mm antiaircraft guns.) In sum, for the forthcoming offensive, the communists had organised a total of three campaign-sized military groups with combined or joint operations capability which were poised to strike in three directions simultaneously.

The 20th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party While the military forces were getting ready, in mid-March 1972, the Lao Dong Party convened its 20th Plenary Session to discuss ‘the mission of resisting the US for national salvation and the mission of economic construction in the socialist North in 1972’. The Politburo affirmed the decision made in mid-1971 and concurred that they should meet ‘as promptly and as fully as possible the requirements for manpower and material to supply to the front’. However, the leadership had reservations whether the communists were able to carry off such an offensive given that the capability of their armed forces to conduct combined/joint operations on a large scale was still limited. According to the

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LSQDNDVN, although the communist armed forces had created a corpssized army group (B70) during the Route 9–southern Laos campaign and Group 301 during the northeast Cambodia campaign in the spring and summer of 1971, they had, up to this time, been slow to establish any regular army corps.11 The Politburo also noted the slow development of the logistic/supply lines in some areas of operations. There were also some doubts about whether they had sufficient good quality local forces to carry out the missions competently. These were issues that the Central Military Committee would have to address.

The 1972 Easter Offensive Even before the Politburo could make the final decision, the Cambodian communist forces launched their attacks in the vicinity of Phnom Penh. On 16 March 1972, they blew up a large ammunition depot at Pochentong airport. On 20 March, they destroyed an ammunition depot belonging to the South Vietnamese forces 25 miles southeast of Phnom Penh. The next day, there were attacks on the airport’s military installations and Phnom Penh’s main radio station. On 24 March, the communists attacked the central section of Chruoy Changwar Bridge on the Tonle Sap. The purpose of these seemingly sporadic attacks (which was part of the overall strategy discussed with Sihanouk in February 1972) was to disperse and to draw the Lon Nol forces away from other parts of Cambodia to defend Phnom Penh before the launch of the spring offensive.12 It would appear that the concerns of the Politburo were assuaged because when it met the Central Military Committee either on 23 or 28 March 1972 (the exact date is not too clear) to be briefed on the military plan, they endorsed the plan wholeheartedly. At 11 a.m. on 30 March, the 1972 military offensive (or what is popularly known in the West as the Easter Offensive) was launched. On 31 March 1972, the Party Central Committee officially announced the start of the ‘historic 1972 Campaign’ exhorting all to give their utmost in this decisive struggle. According to the military plan ratified by the Politburo, the main thrust of the strategic offensive would be in the direction of Quang Tri-TriThien. They managed to keep their opening gambit under wraps. The Saigon administration was under the impression that the communists would launch a potentially serious but not extensive attack in Tay Nguyen. In December 1971, the Saigon forces deployed the 47th infantry regiment and the 2nd brigade to reinforce the defence of northern Tay Nguyen and to stop the anticipated communist advance from that direction. South Vietnamese intelligence also reported of the movement of the communist 304th Division towards Tay Nguyen.


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Though it was aware that the communists were making urgent military preparations, the Saigon administration did not believe that they could muster sufficient strength to mount large-scale offensives on multiple fronts. This misperception persisted when Tet 1972 came and went without any incident. Then on 30 March 1972, the Tri-Thien Campaign began. This was the biggest of four overlapping (in terms of timing) military offensives. Major-General Le Trong Tan commanded the TriThien campaign. Major-General Le Quang Dao was the political commissar. The 304th, the 308th and the 324th Divisions and two independent regiments, the 367th and the 377th air defence Divisions comprising eight regiments of anti-aircraft guns, two rocket regiments, nine regiments of ground artillery, two regiments of tanks/armour, two regiments of combat engineers and sixteen battalions of Special Forces, signallers and logistics, took part in this campaign. From 30 March to 5 April 1972, the communist forces smashed the outer defence line/border outposts and liberated the districts of Gio Linh and Cam Lo, which then forced the enemy to retreat down Route 9. This success provided the communist forces with a staging area in north and west Quang Tri to directly threaten the Dong Ha-Ai Tu-Quang Tri-La Vang area as well as exert pressure on the west of Hue. From 10 April to 2 May 1972, the communists drove deep into enemy territory, divided and systematically killed the South Vietnamese forces and defended Dong Ha, Ai Tu, La Vang, leading to the liberation of Quang Tri province on 2 May 1972. Then from 3 May to 27 June 1972, all the units quickly regrouped to confront the enemy counter-offensive. The Tri-Thien campaign ended on 27 June 1972. The LSQDNDVN recalled that in late June, the fighting became very complicated and serious. The anticipated northern Tay Nguyen campaign, under the command of Major-General Hoang Minh Thao with Truong Chi Cuong (alternatemember of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee) as the political commissar,13 also began on the night of 30 March 1972. Involved in this campaign were the 320th A and 2nd Divisions, four infantry regiments (the 24th, the 28th, the 95th and the 66th), two artillery regiments (the 40th and the 675th), the 234th anti-aircraft gun regiment, two battalions of tanks and a number of other units from the services. From 30 March 1972 to 24 April 1972, they attacked the enemy west of the Po Co River, northern Vo Dinh, Hills 1015 and 1049, smashed the enemy outposts, launched a number of offensives at base areas 42, Dak To and liberated the small town of Tan Canh, the administrative/district seat of Dak To. The first time the communist soldiers destroyed a division (though not at full strength) in a strong defence position was in northern Tay Nguyen battlefield. The campaign lasted from 25 April till 5 June

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1972 and by then they had liberated northern Kontum and were in a position to threaten Kontum City. The communist forces concentrated to attack Kontum and cut off Route 4 in order to check the enemy’s counteroffensive. The arrival of the rainy season, however, disrupted their supply lines and resulted in their failure to capture Kontum. The third military operation launched almost concurrently with the two described above was the Nguyen Hue Campaign in eastern Nam Bo from 31 March 1972 to 28 January 1973. The campaign stretched on for almost ten months. Commanded by Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra with Major General Tran Do as the political commissar, this campaigned involved the 5th, 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions, three independent infantry regiments, one regiment and two battalions of Special Forces, one anti-aircraft gun regiment, three artillery regiments (of the 75th southern main force detachment), one armour/tanks regiment and provincial troops. On 1 April, they destroyed the enemy defence line on Route 13, attacked the key positions of Xa Mat and Bau Dung on Route 22 and liberated Tan Bien district. On 5 April 1972, the 5th Division and the 3rd regiment (of the 9th Division) with the support of two companies of tanks and artillery seized the military district of Loc Ninh, a strongly fortified position, a hundred miles north of Saigon, on Route 13 and 20 kilometres from the Vietnam–Cambodia border which was under the enemy’s 9th battle group (5th Division). This was seen a major victory as it was considered quite an achievement to be able to defeat the enemy in such a strongly fortified military area. The battle also raised the standard of combined warfare involving the different services and the main fighting force in the South. The seizure of Loc Ninh, Du Dop and Thien Ngo gave the communists a staging area at the border of eastern Nam Bo from which to threaten the city of An Loc. On 6, 13 and 15 April 1972, the 9th Division with the support of one tank company attacked Binh Long and had to put up with a fierce enemy counter-attack. In the series of battles from 16 May 1972 to 30 September 1972 and from 1 October 1972 to 28 January 1973, the communist forces continuously surrounded Binh Long, controlled Route 13, neutralised enemy counter-offensives and helped the armed forces destroy the enemy’s ‘pacification’ efforts. After almost ten months of fighting, the communists had destroyed five enemy detachments, seven regiments, sixteen infantry battalions, three armour battalions, thirteen artillery companies, had killed approximately 7,985 soldiers; and had shot and destroyed 897 planes, twenty ships, 1,881 military vehicles, and had captured 282 vehicles (of which twelve were tanks), 6,637 guns of all assortments and other military equipment.


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During this period, they extended the liberated areas in eastern Nam Bo linking them with the communist-controlled areas in northern Cambodia, Tay Nguyen and North Vietnam, thereby creating a substantial stable area for the communist forces to operate in the years ahead. Besides Tri-Thien, Tay Nguyen and eastern Nam Bo, from 9 April to 2 June 1972, the communists launched a fourth offensive, this time in northern Binh Dinh, led by Major General Chu Huy Man with Vo Chi Cong as the political commissar. Troops participating in the offensive included the 3rd Infantry Division, two battalions of Special Forces and regional troops well as the masses. After the opening battle at the strategic position of Go Loi, on 18 April 1972, the 2nd and the 21st B regiment surrounded and attacked the enemy’s 42nd regiment and liberated Hoai An. From 24 April to 1 May 1972, the 3rd Division surrounded and destroyed the base areas of Binh Duong (in Phu My district) and De Duc (in Hoai Nhon district). In conjunction with the military operations, communist supporters in the hamlets also carried out guerrilla activities destroying over 100 enemy sentry posts. After nearly two months of fighting, they had killed and incapacitated 13,000 enemy soldiers, had captured 4,000 and liberated the Hoai An and Hoai Nhon districts as well as part of Phu My district. The Central Military Committee was evidently pleased with the outcome and sent congratulatory notes to the 3rd Division and the armed forces of Binh Dinh. Other areas where the communists scored military successes included their triumph at Quang Nam; the liberation of Hiep Duc by the 38th and the 31st regiments of the 711th Division; and the destruction of three enemy battalions on Route 105 (Que Son district), and also the victories scored in Quang Da. From 21 May to 15 November 1972, the Vietnamese communists and Pathet Lao troops jointly defended Canh Dong Chum-Xieng Khoang. Senior Colonel Vu Lap with Senior Colonel Le Linh as the political commissar led the troops. Under them were troops from 316th Infantry Division, the 866th, the 335th and the 88th infantry regiments (belonging to the 308th B Division) and nine battalions of armour, artillery, anti-aircraft, Special Forces and combat engineers. After 179 days of fighting, they managed to defeat the combined Laos and Thai offensives and held on to the strategic area of Canh Dong Chum.

US bombing campaign Meanwhile, the US had been pushing for a resumption of the private talks. Hanoi insisted that the US first resume the 146th public talks at Avenue Kle´ber (which Nixon had suspended since 23 March 1971) before

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it would agree to another private meeting on 15 March 1972. The US agreed but suggested that the private talks take place on 20 March instead. The US, however, subsequently delayed the lifting of the suspension of the Avenue Kle´ber talks and on 6 April, Nixon ordered the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam, including Hanoi and Haiphong. From 6 April to 8 May 1972, the US targeted communication centres, storage depots, and air defence positions. On 10 April, the B-52s struck the Ben Thuy-Vinh area. This was followed by a series of bombardments in Tho Xuan, Thanh Hoa, Haiphong. Notable hits included four Soviet cargo ships in the harbour and the Duc Giang gasoline depot in Hanoi. Consequently, both the public and private talks were postponed. Since the spring offensive began, the US had increased the supply of weapons and other military materials to its South Vietnamese ally. But it was US air support that played the decisive part in denting the communist offensives. According to the analysis of the US Department of Defense, ‘in MR I, as in other parts of South Vietnam, air power and a revitalised SVN ground defence proved to be the decisive factors in repelling the 1972 NVA offensive’. In his judgement, General Weyand asserted that the South Vietnamese forces could not have stopped the communist invasion if not for the ‘tremendous effectiveness of airpower’ and he could not see ‘how anybody in any service could question the decisive role played by the fixed-wing gunships, TACAIR, and the B–52s.’14 Bui Tin, who travelled to Quang Tri to report the spring offensive, recalled vividly the bombings. During some battles, it is true there were times when I was scared stiff and particularly during our 1972 offensive when the B-52s were carpet-bombing us. The atmosphere was like living through a typhoon with trees crashing down and lightning transforming night into day.15 The LSQDNDVN acknowledged that during this period, because of the bombing, it was very difficult to transport equipment by land, sea or rail; and the communists only managed to convey about a few thousand tons of equipment on the River Gianh each month.16 The Hanoi Politburo viewed the resumption of the US bombing as a ‘very serious step of escalation’ that was aimed at preventing the collapse of the South Vietnamese government and at exerting pressure on Hanoi. The leadership anticipated that the heavier the losses in South Vietnam, the more ferocious the attacks on the North would become. They, however, decided to continue their military offensives as planned and at


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the same time take all possible measures to cope with the air and naval war against the North.17 Much energy and resources were therefore expended to counter US airpower. In May 1972, the Military Central Committee and the High Command of the Vietnamese People’s Army increased the strength of the armed forces in North Vietnam. The 325th and the 320th mobile Divisions (under the High Command) and six regiments of mobile main force of Military Region IV, Viet Bac, Ta Ngan, Huu Ngan Military Regions were reinforced with both more troops and weapons. The cadets in all the military schools were organised into one division-strong reserve (designated the 312th B Division) under the General Staff, ready to be mobilised to protect the northern part of Military Region IV. The High Command added one division, three regiments and 20 obattalions equipped with anti-aircraft guns, rockets, radar and other new equipments in order to strengthen air defence. Dozens of new regiments and battalions of artillery, tanks, Special Forces and combat engineers were created. In the middle of 1972, the strength of the PAVN in North Vietnam grew to 530,000 troops, and the number of main forces belonging to all military regions nearly doubled. In Military Region IV, the number increased by almost five-fold. The self-defence forces were equipped with better armaments to combat US planes and naval vessels. In mid-1972, the North had dozens of companies equipped with anti-aircraft artillery, 170 companies and platoons equipped with anti-aircraft machine guns, twenty platoons equipped with 85mm (barrel) cannon/artillery that were used against the US warships along the coast. Hanoi’s attitude towards the Paris peace talks can be gleaned from a 17 April 1972 message from Nguyen Duy Trinh to Xuan Thuy. According to Trinh, although the US had stepped up its military offensive against the North, it was not in the interests of the Vietnamese communists to forgo the peace talks. To do so would only give the US an excuse to convene an international conference. In Trinh’s words, ‘In the conditions of de´tente between China, the Soviet Union and the US, an international conference aimed at settling the problem is not to our advantage.’ The Paris conference should therefore be maintained ‘as a propaganda forum for our benefit and for direct settlement with the US later’.18 The 146th session of the Paris peace talks eventually took place on 27 April 1972 and the thirteenth private meeting was held on 2 May.

Vietnam–Soviet relations, 1972 On at least three separate occasions in April 1972, Moscow through its ambassador to Hanoi tried to persuade Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy

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Trinh and Le Duan to reach an agreement with Kissinger during their secret talks. The Russians (like the Chinese earlier on) also offered to facilitate a meeting between the North Vietnamese and Kissinger when the latter travelled to Moscow on 21–23 April 1972 to make preparations for Nixon’s forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union; but the Vietnamese declined. When Kissinger was in Moscow, Brezhnev told him that Moscow was not behind North Vietnam’s spring offensive. According to the Soviet Embassy, when the Vietnamese requested new arms from P.F. Batitski, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Defence Forces during his visit to North Vietnam in March 1972, they did not inform him of the impending spring offensive which was launched soon after his departure.19 The Russians were were bent on convening the Soviet–US summit as scheduled despite the recent resumption of US bombing of North Vietnam. After Kissinger’s departure, on 25 April 1972, C. Katuchev (Head, Foreign Relations Commission of the CPSU Central Committee) travelled to Hanoi to meet the North Vietnamese leadership. Katuchev explained to them the US peace proposal and also informed the North Vietnamese that the US would not tolerate an extended negotiation process in a presidential election year and that if Hanoi were unwilling to reach a settlement, the US would expand the war. The blockade of Haiphong port was also mentioned as a real possibility.

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meeting (2 May 1972) According to a Vietnamese account, the atmosphere during the 2 May 1972 meeting between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger was ‘heavy and tense owing to [the] fierce fighting on the South Vietnam battlefields’. The meeting also coincided with the communist military success in Quang Tri province. Not surprisingly, nothing substantial was resolved except that both sides agreed that the private meetings would be kept confidential and both the public and private meetings would be held in tandem. From the meeting, it was evident that Le Duc Tho had been apprised of the domestic debate in the US on the Vietnam issue. He clearly discomfited Kissinger when he made references to Senator William Fulbright and the Pentagon Papers to support the North Vietnamese position. Tho again reminded Kissinger that he should talk directly to Hanoi and that the Vietnamese would not ‘speak through a third person’, referring to Kissinger’s attempts to use the Russians as intermediary. Hanoi was monitoring very carefully and with great concern the interactions between the US and China, and between the US and the Soviet Union. The Hanoi leadership had decided that they would not agree to another private


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meeting until after Nixon’s week-long visit to the Soviet Union from 20 May.20 According to Soviet sources, the Vietnamese communists became increasingly upset as the date of Nixon’s visit drew nearer. We recall that Nikolai Podgorny had informed them of the visit when he was in Hanoi in October 1971 and there was no reaction from the Vietnamese then.

The US–Soviet Summit meeting A week after Kissinger and Tho met, on 8 May 1972, Nixon raised the ante by ordering the mining of all the major North Vietnamese ports to prevent the flow of supplies and materials to the communists. Nixon’s action could have torpedoed the US–Soviet summit. The Soviet Politburo debated over the appropriate response. Moscow eventually made the perfunctory protests but did not allow US actions to derail the planned summit meeting with Nixon. The Russian leadership were unhappy with Hanoi’s attitude. As Anatoly Dobrynin put it, ‘We learned much more from the Americans about their negotiations with Hanoi than we did from the Vietnamese.’ To call off the summit would amount to handing Hanoi ‘a veto’ on Soviet–US relations.21 But at the same time, the Soviets also did not want to lose their influence over North Vietnam to the Chinese and therefore reluctantly agreed to Hanoi’s request to raise the issue of the peace settlement with Nixon during the summit. This they did ‘for the record, and when they said enough to have the transcript to send to Hanoi, they would stop’. It was clear to all present that the Russians were not too interested in the Vietnam problem.22 During his talks with Gromyko on 27–28 May 1972, Kissinger raised the idea of an electoral commission for South Vietnam comprising Vietnamese communist representatives, neutrals and representatives of the Saigon administration to oversee the general election, which could also, if need be, serve as a sort of transitional coalition government. Not long after Nixon’s visit to Moscow, on 11 June, the US requested another private meeting with Le Duc Tho on 28 June. Soon after, Podgorny travelled to Hanoi (14–17 June 1972) to brief the North Vietnamese leadership of Nixon’s visit, and also, at the behest of Nixon, to convey the US position on the peace settlement and to persuade Hanoi to reach an agreement with the Americans. The Vietnamese communists refused to be persuaded by Podgorny. Hanoi was quick to detect the ‘Washington–Moscow connection’ and instructed Xuan Thuy not to respond to the US request until after Podgorny’s visit. Both Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho, who was then in Sofia for the Bulgarian Communist Party Congress, were recalled to Hanoi. Dobrynin remembered that Soviet attempt to act as a go-between had little effect.

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Soon after Podgorny’s visit, Brezhnev wrote to Nixon informing him that Hanoi insisted on dealing directly with the US and that Le Duc Tho would soon return to Paris.23 On 20 June, both Hanoi and the US agreed to hold the private meeting on 19 July 1972.

A change of strategy Despite their strong showing in the various battlefields, the communists still were unable able to achieve total victory. Reviewing the progress of the war on 30 May 1972, the Central Military Committee observed that in the three months since the start of the 1972 military offensives, while their main force had become more experienced in concentrating their firepower and focusing their attacks, and had mastered the techniques of using their weapons and fully utilising combined arms operations in order to successfully demolish the enemy’s strong defences, they were unable to carry their offensives to their fullest or to take full advantage of the enemy’s retreat and confusion. This was due to their limitations in organisation, command and control, and insufficient preparation in the battlefield as well as on the home front. According to the LSQDNDVN,24 the communist forces could have exploited the disintegration of the South Vietnamese forces in Thua Thien after the loss of Quang Tri on 2 May 1972. The opportunity was lost because the communists did not possess a reserve force and adequate supplies. The US bombing of the supply lines compounded their problem. In the case of the Tay Nguyen campaign, inadequate supply/logistics lines once again prevented the communist troops from advancing to Pleiku. In the eastern Nam Bo campaign, the communists wasted their initial advantage when they expended too much time in preparation for the subsequent attacks, thereby giving the enemy the opportunity to bring in reinforcements to defend Binh Long. Interrogation of prisoners captured during the Binh Long battle revealed that about 3,000 North Vietnamese tank crewmen involved in the battles had graduated from the Russian armoured school at Odessa only four to five months before the military campaign and few had any battle experience before leaving North Vietnam for their training in the Soviet Union.25 The communists were also unable to mount a sustainable offensive in the Mekong Delta region. In June 1972, Robert Shaplen reported that the communists were privately acknowledging that the spring offensive had failed to achieve its objectives. About a third of the communist forces had been either killed or wounded.26 The military campaign to defend Quang Tri took up the rest of 1972 from 28 June 1972 till 31 January 1973. Major General Tran Quy Hai


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(with Lieutenant General Song Hao as political commissar) led the campaign which involved five Infantry Divisions (the 304th, the 305th, the 320th, the 325th and the 312th); the 27th regiment and the 6th (independent) regiment; three artillery regiments (the 164th, the 45th and the 84th); four air-aircraft regiments (the 241st, the 243rd, the 250th and the 280th); the 236th rocket regiment; the 203rd armour/tank regiment; two regiments of combat engineers (the 229th and the 249th); five Special Force battalions and regional troops. From 28 June to 30 August 1972, the fighting was for control of the Citadel, a large walled fortress in the centre of Quang Tri city, which the South Vietnamese forces recaptured on 15 September. From 1 September 1972 to 31 January 1973, the communists fought to defend the liberated parts of Quang Tri. Both sides suffered heavy losses in the almost seven-month-long campaign. Besides the military aspect of the war, the Vietnamese communists also understood that the international situation that they had leveraged on to win the war on its terms was changing. After the Sino-US rapprochement in February 1972, Hanoi realised that it was impossible for the Soviet Union not to continue its de´tente with the US. It realised that to the Soviet Union, the Vietnam problem was ‘the problem of a remote region’ and ‘Vietnam had become a bargaining card for the balance of forces between the great powers in Southeast Asia’.27 The Politburo at the June 1972 meeting noted that one of the reasons why the US could escalate the war was because ‘the international situation was undergoing new, complicated changes’.28 Given the already waning Chinese and Soviet diplomatic support, how much longer could the Vietnamese communists count on the continued Chinese and Soviet material support? Many years later, Le Duc Tho recalled: To put pressure on us, in 1972, the US met China and the Soviet Union in order to ask these countries to reduce aid to the minimum to Vietnam and to prevent us from stepping up attacks in SVN. This was the US strategic scheme. Nixon had visited China; the Soviet Union could not fail to invite him to prevent him from going too far with China in opposing the Soviet Union. The card played by the US was to limit the socialist countries’ assistance to Vietnam and to limit the victory. That was the crux of the problem.29 From the end of June to the beginning of July 1972, the Politburo held many meetings to discuss the overall situation. First, on the military balance, the leadership concluded that while the communists had yet to achieve a clear victory, the fact was that US forces were pulling out.

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Dealing with the South Vietnamese forces (without the Americans), which were increasingly demoralised by the US withdrawal, would be much easier. As such, the assessment was that in the longer term, the communists had the military advantage. Secondly, in the negotiations, the US had made concessions by not demanding North Vietnam withdraw their troops from the South and acquiescing that Nguyen Van Thieu would resign before the elections. The leadership calculated that given that the enemy still controlled all the cities and two-thirds of the population in the South, and were not yet defeated in the battlefield, it would be difficult to persist in demanding for Thieu’s immediate resignation. Third, internationally, both Beijing and Moscow wanted to settle the Vietnam problem, particularly the military aspect. And last but not least, the months between July and November 1972 were the critical months of the US presidential election year and offered the best opportunity for reaching an agreement. As Kissinger told Anatoly Dobrynin in June 1972, until November 1972, Nixon would be focusing on his re-election campaign and Vietnam was expected to be at the centre of the election debate.30 Taking all the above into consideration, the North Vietnamese leadership decided to switch ‘from a strategy of war to a strategy of peace’. This, according to an official account, was ‘a turning point in leading the revolution in South Vietnam’.31

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Le Duc Tho–Kissinger fourteenth meeting (19 July 1972) On 7 July 1972, when Xuan Thuy met Zhou Enlai to update him of the Paris negotiations, he told the latter that Hanoi was prepared to continue to fight the Americans but would not forgo any opportunity to find a solution on the basis of ‘reasonable negotiations’. In Zhou’s view, whether the war continued or whether it could be settled peacefully would be determined in ‘the four crucial months from July to October [1972].’1 When Le Duc Tho met Zhou on 12 July, Tho came across to be very much more a hard-liner than Xuan Thuy. According to Le Duc Tho, ‘we still think of a government without Thieu’ and ‘We are asking Thieu to resign. If he does not, we will not talk with the Saigon government.’ Zhou tried to persuade Le Duc Tho that it was necessary to talk to Nguyen Thieu and he gave some examples to illustrate why. Zhou reasoned that nothing would have been achieved had the Chinese communists refused to talk to Jiang Jieshi during the Chinese Civil War. In North Korea, Kim Il Sung was also trying to communicate directly with Park Chung Hee. Replacing Thieu would only mean still having ‘Thieu’s policy without him’. As for Le Duc Tho’s idea of a tripartite government possibly under Duong Van Minh, Zhou’s view was that a coalition government could be established, but the fighting would still have to resume later. The crux is ‘to play for time’ to allow the North to recover its strength and get stronger while the enemy become weaker.2 Having decided on a new strategy in early July 1972, Le Duc Tho met Kissinger on 19 July 1972 for their fourteenth private meeting. This was the first time that their meeting was made public. Tho and his colleagues attended this meeting with a more positive attitude. For a start, they wanted to get a sounding of US intentions since their last meeting on 2 May 1972. They also wanted to let Kissinger know their ‘determination and good will’. At the meeting, Kissinger offered a five-point proposal.3

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Tho rejected the proposal, as it was not sufficiently concrete. Once again, he raised the issues of Thieu’s resignation, the timing of the election in South Vietnam and the deadline for the complete withdrawal of US forces. Although nothing was resolved (nobody had expected any breakthrough at this meeting), it was definitely much more pleasant and positive compared to the previous one. Both sides ended by agreeing to meet again soon after, either on 31 July or 1 August 1972.

Hanoi’s new negotiation strategy We can get an inkling of Hanoi’s game plan with regards to the handling of the negotiations, from a 22 July 1972 message to Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy. The Hanoi leadership believed that, on the whole, the balance of forces in the battlefield, which they considered to be ‘the principal factor’, was moving in the communists’ favour. They should now attempt to take advantage of the ‘acute contradictions’ in the US election, which was another ‘very important’ factor. In this respect, the first deadline to bear in mind was the Republican Party Convention on 24 August 1972. Next would be the ‘critical months’ of September and October when the US electoral campaign was expected to heat up. The communist negotiating team was told that they should grasp well the ‘the great principles of the Vietnamese high-level plan and the middle-level plan.’4 The forthcoming talks would call for the best of their negotiation skills. If they were too inflexible and demanding, they might lose the opportunity. However, if they appear to be weak, they would be unable to exploit the electoral pressure to its maximum advantage. Tho and Xuan Thuy were told to make use of the stance of Senator McGovern ‘to expose and to pressure Nixon’. The message added, ‘Our position in this connection could be no weaker than that of McGovern.’5 The plan was therefore to squeeze the maximum possible concessions out of Kissinger before 24 August 1972. Hanoi was prepared to reach a settlement if Nixon was willing to do so by that date, otherwise, the next possible period for a settlement was projected to be around October 1972. Le Duc Tho was instructed to let Kissinger know Hanoi wanted to reach a settlement with Nixon but was prepared to carry on the war if the US remained intransigent and that they would not allow Nixon to make use of the negotiations to advance his own interest. Kissinger must not be led to think that Hanoi was afraid of postponing the negotiations till after the US presidential election. A letter from Le Duan to COSVN, Military Region V and the TriThien Party Committees6 in August provides a further glimpse of Hanoi’s thinking at that time. Le Duan made four key points in his letter: (1) he

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believed that the recent recognition of the PRG and the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union as full members of the non-aligned movement was a good sign and a diplomatic victory for the communists; (2) while he affirmed that the military and political struggle in the battlefields remained decisive, he drew attention to the need to ‘seize opportunities to be flexible in the use of diplomatic weapons to help fight and defeat the enemy in the best possible way’; (3) in anticipation of a political settlement ‘in the near future’, he exhorted his colleagues to introduce ‘correct’ political slogans. He proposed ‘Peace, independence and democracy’, which would be associated with the call for ‘national concord’. The objective was to unite all national, democratic and peace forces into a broader national front in order to defeat the US-inspired ‘Vietnamisation’ policy. With regards to this, he advised that for those who were prepared to join the national front, the communists should overlook their connection with the enemy and that they should be prepared also to grant amnesty to those who were once associated with the enemy’s political and military organizations; (4) he instructed everyone to monitor the developments of the peace negotiations closely. As soon as a political settlement was reached, they should ‘without delay’ be able to mobilise the ‘third force’ to struggle against both US and the Thieu regime, which Le Duan predicted would in the post-political settlement period, ‘feverishly intensify repression in the areas under their control . . . threatening the life of all in the South’.

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meetings (1 and 14 August 1972) Le Duc Tho and Kissinger met again on 1 August 1972. Not wanting to let Nixon use the occasion to benefit his election campaign, the communist side refused Kissinger’s request for a public announcement of the 1 August and all subsequent private meetings. At the meeting, Tho insisted that US forces must withdraw completely within a month whereas Kissinger’s preferred time frame was four months or by the end of 1972. The meeting also explored the elimination of the two existing administrations and in its place, the setting up of a three-component national reconciliation government with complete jurisdiction over internal and external affairs. In an apparent show of flexibility, the communist side dropped the demand for Thieu’s immediate resignation as a prerequisite for the peace agreement but expected Thieu to resign after the peace agreement had been signed. Tho demanded war reparation of US$8 billion, of which US$4.5 billion would go to the North and US$3.5 billion to the South. Kissinger was adamant that the US would never accept a demand for war reparations. Kissinger was, however, willing to

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give a verbal agreement that the US would contribute a sum of money (which could only be determined by the US Congress) to the reconstruction programme in Indochina. The next meeting was scheduled for 14 August 1972 and the understanding was that any meeting after that could only be held in September because Kissinger would be preoccupied with the Republican Party Convention. At the 14 August meeting, Le Duc Tho stood firm and reiterated the same demands and issues raised at the previous meeting such as the deadline for US withdrawal and the three-component government of national reconciliation. According to the communist side, although both parties had showed a desire to negotiate during the three private meetings – 19 July, 1 August and 14 August 1972 – ‘no basic results nor significant progress had been achieved’. Most importantly, both sides still had significant differences regarding the political issues, which to the communists were the key concerns. At the 14 August meeting, Kissinger informed Le Duc Tho that he could only discuss the political demands after his consultations with Saigon in the first half of September. Both sides adjourned to meet again on 15 September 1972. Kissinger, on the other hand, felt that the communists were being disingenuous because at the public meetings at Avenue Kle´ber, Hanoi gave the impression to the international community that there was a complete deadlock when in reality the US side had made substantial concessions at the private meetings and there had been considerable progress. By the time the sixteenth private meeting was convened on 14 August, Hanoi had concluded that a settlement would not be reached before 24 August. The communist leadership now hoped that Nixon would be prepared to reach a settlement after the Republican Party Convention. In planning their own moves, they tried to figure out Nixon’s strategy. The question that perplexed them was whether Nixon was really serious in wanting to resolve the Vietnam issue or was he merely using the negotiations to help him win the presidential election? Both Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy who had spent the most time interacting with Kissinger would know best. They calculated that Nixon wanted to settle the Vietnam issue preferably on his own terms and that Nixon was also working towards winning a second term in office without or before resolving the Vietnam problem.7 Under the circumstances, there were two options open to the Vietnamese communists: (1) they could be pro-active by being compromising and obliging the US to agree on a settlement before the election. Opting for this would mean accepting a ‘dirty settlement’ and the communists would have to prepare for an unstable peace and political struggle in the South and eventually the renewal of conflict; (2) the

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communists would just have to wait until after the election, particularly if Nixon was unwilling to settle before November. Choosing this path might gain them more favourable conditions for a settlement should Senator McGovern win the election (though the Hanoi leadership considered this highly unlikely). If Nixon won, they envisaged a difficult time ahead. The communist leadership decided that it was best to get an agreement before November. Between late August and early September 1972 or thereabouts, Hanoi drew up a flexible negotiating position for the 15 September meeting. They, however, reasoned that as long as Nixon believed that he could win the presidential election without solving the Vietnam problem, the possibility of a peace agreement before the election would be negligible. They also noted that in July and August 1972, the election campaign was mainly confined to the political parties culminating in the Party Conventions, and Nixon did not feel sufficiently compelled to strike a deal with the communists. Therefore, the most important thing to do now was to step up the pressure on Nixon in the international, diplomatic and military arenas, especially in September and October when the electoral campaign was ‘most energetic’, by concentrating all efforts ‘to increase Nixon’s difficulties, even to make him lose the election’.8 Nixon was confirmed as Republican candidate for the presidential election. On 29 August 1972, Nixon announced the withdrawal of another 12,000 troops (from 39,000) from South Vietnam by 1 December 1972. This meant that by the end of 1972, there would only be 27,000 US troops remaining in the South.

Vietnamese communists’ relations with Beijing and Moscow We would recall that Sino-US rapprochement and Soviet-US de´tente were major considerations in Hanoi’s July 1972 decision to adopt a more constructive attitude towards the negotiations. But beyond that, Kissinger’s efforts to elicit the help of Beijing and Moscow to press the Vietnamese communists towards an agreement had met with limited success. According to Anatoly Dobrynin: Our attempt to act as a go-between had little effect . . . Kissinger fared no better in Beijing. . . . The Americans had to resume their direct negotiations with North Vietnam without having any clear idea of their prospects as the November presidential elections were nearing. Dobrynin further recalled that both the Vietnamese communists and the Americans did not give the Russians important details of their discussions

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but ‘the Americans informed us far more fully and confidentially, which allowed us to talk more candidly with the Vietnamese about concrete questions and advise them to reach a settlement without undue delay’. This, however, did not please the Vietnamese communists who in turn kept urging Moscow to put pressure on the Americans.9 Hanoi’s unhappiness with both Beijing and Moscow for pursuing de´tente with Washington to the detriment of the Vietnamese communist struggle can be gleaned from a 17 August 1972 Nhan Dan editorial that was reproduced in the September 1972 issue of the Vietnam Courier. The editorial was critical of the pursuit of de´tente by both the ‘imperialist’ countries (specifically the US) as well as the ‘socialist’ countries. No socialist country was directly mentioned but it was obvious the reference was to the Soviet Union and China. The editorial noted: With regards to the socialist countries, the defence of peace and peaceful co-existence cannot be dissociated from the movement for independence, democracy and socialism in the world. For a country to care for its immediate and narrow interests while shirking its lofty internationalist duties not only is detrimental to the revolutionary movement in the world but will also bring unfathomable harm to itself in the end. The vitality of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism manifests itself in revolutionary deeds, not in empty words.10

Le Duc Tho–Kissinger meeting (15 September 1972) The wrangling over the details continued at the 15 September 1972 meeting but it was clear that the Vietnamese communist side came to this meeting with the intention of getting the US side to accept an inprinciple agreement and to put aside the technicalities for later. Tho accused Kissinger of being unwilling to reach an early settlement and claimed that Kissinger wanted to extend the negotiations until after the presidential election, which Kissinger insisted was untrue. Kissinger then proposed that an in-principle agreement and a working time frame could be agreed upon, a settlement could be reached by 15 October or, at the latest, by the end of November 1972. Tho and Xuan Thuy immediately seized on the 15 October date. Luu Van Loi recalled that Tho and Xuan Thuy ‘were glad that they had cleverly pushed the other side to say what they themselves wished to hear’. Having agreed on the official date for the settlement, both sides decided on a two-day meeting on 25–26 September 1972 to iron out the in-principle agreement and related issues.

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Even at this stage, the Vietnamese communist side still could not be sure whether Nixon was serious about a settlement but did not want to come across as too anxious, or whether he was just making use of the settlement to secure his election victory without any intention of observing it. But they probably felt that there was little time left to ascertain Nixon’s real intentions and it was decided to give the US side the benefit of the doubt. On 21 September 1972, Hanoi instructed the Vietnamese communist negotiators in Paris to make an all-out effort to reach a settlement before the US election. Le Duc Tho’s brief was sufficiently clear. It would be best if Le Duc Tho and Kissinger could conclude a settlement on 15 October as agreed to when they last met.11 However, there were military and political items that were non-negotiable. On the military side, the US must completely withdraw all its forces and not return to Vietnam. The US must also stop providing military aid to the Saigon administration although the communist fraternity could continue to provide aid to North Vietnam. Hanoi would also not pull out its military forces from the South. On the political side, the US would recognise that there were two administrations, two armies and three political groups in the South and accept a supra-administration or a ‘national reconciliation body’. The ‘negotiable items’ areas where the communist side were willing to be flexible included the deadlines/timing for US troop withdrawal, stoppage of military aid to the Saigon administration, the existence of the two administrations, Nguyen Van Thieu’s resignation and the general election. If need be, Hanoi was further prepared to reduce the number of its forces in the South as well as adopt more neutral appellations, for example, changing ‘Saigon administration’ to ‘Republic of Vietnam’; or using terms like ‘Saigon authorities’ for the PRG and ‘Hanoi authorities’ for the NLF.

The 26–27 September 1972 intensive negotiations Armed with the above guidelines, the Vietnamese communist negotiating team launched into the two-day meeting on 26 and 27 September. To ensure maximum secrecy, the meeting was convened at Number 108, General Leclerc Street, Gif-sur-Yvette, instead of Number 11, Darthe Street, Choisy-le-Roy which had been the venue of the last seventeen private meetings. Reading the Vietnamese communist official account of the meeting, one gets the impression that Le Duc Tho was rather anxious to get a commitment from Kissinger to sign a peace agreement by 15 October. Kissinger, on the other hand, appeared to be in less of a hurry, suggesting 1 November as perhaps a more realistic and comfortable

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deadline. Kissinger was, however, keen on visiting Hanoi at the earliest possible date. This, the Vietnamese side, thought was aimed at ‘serving the election in the US and also at enhancing Kissinger’s own prestige and role in settling the Vietnam problem’. At the end of the two-day meeting, the gap between the two sides on the military and political issues had narrowed somewhat but a lot of other questions pertaining to the deadline for the withdrawal of US troops, technical and non-military personnel, military aid to the Saigon administration, the composition of the national reconciliation body, the general election and the military situation in Laos and Cambodia remained unresolved. Kissinger also tried to include the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South as part of the deal. The Vietnamese communist side felt that ‘at each meeting the US made tiny concessions and at the same time raised new questions.’12 On 30 September, when the Hanoi leadership met to review what had transpired at the two-day meeting, they concluded that Kissinger did not intend to sign an agreement before the presidential election. Nixon was only using the negotiation to win the election and would continue to prop up the Saigon administration even after the US troops were withdrawn. The leadership debated two alternative courses of action: (1) to sign an inprinciple agreement before the election, which would be followed by a comprehensive agreement after the election; and (2) to call off the negotiations for the time being. After several days of brainstorming which included reviewing the military situation and the international environment, it was decided that the July 1972 decision was still the most appropriate. Hanoi believed that it would be difficult to get concessions from the US side after the election; moreover, there was also a high chance that Nixon might renege on whatever that had been agreed before. Thus it was still best to first lock the US side to an agreement before the election. Also, Kissinger would only be allowed to visit Hanoi on the condition that the US ceased the bombing and mining of North Vietnam ports and waterways.13 Le Duc Tho was instructed to reach an agreement on four items: (1) complete US withdrawal from South Vietnam; (2) a ceasefire; (3) an election in the South; and (4) war damages. The other issues, which were considered ‘complicated’, could be settled at a later date. The target was to sign an agreement either on 15 October 1972 or on 20 October 1972 at the latest. ‘Otherwise, Nixon would win the election and we would have no time left for changing the orientation of the struggle.’14 Hanoi had come to accept the fact that it was very unlikely that they could get the US to agree to the communists’ demands even if they were to continue negotiating till after the election, unless there was ‘a change in the balance of forces in

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South Vietnam’ in favour of the communists. And this too was unlikely to happen in the near future because of the arrival of the rainy season that constrained the amount of military activities that could be carried out. As such, the most important step was first to get the US military out of South Vietnam and then later deal with the Saigon administration.

The communist plan for a ‘general uprising’ (4 October 1972) Meanwhile on 4 October 1972, Hanoi instructed the communist cadres in the South to proceed immediately to bring as much of the countryside in South Vietnam under PRG control. They were told [to] increase attacks and uprisings to liberate the rural areas, to speed up the revolutionary movement in the cities, to win people’s hearts in the enemy-controlled areas, to resist resolutely the counter-attacks of the enemy and to protect and build up the liberated areas in all fields. The period between the signing of the peace agreement and the time when it took effect, described as the ‘twilight period’ was the decisive phase and the high point of the uprising. The aim was to take control of the bulk of the countryside. After the peace agreement became effective, they were to use political struggle to consolidate all the areas under the PRG and to work towards weakening the Thieu administration. The directive provided specific instructions of what the cadres should do at each stage. The communist leadership also anticipated that the enemy would also conduct military operations to control more land. The directive stressed that the task of winning and keeping the people, seizing and holding land, disputing and occupying the important territories is a strategic matter, a pressing requirement for the present time and for the long future, and also a matter of survival for the revolution containing a historical meaning of utmost importance.15

The 8–12 October 1972 negotiations Back in Paris, with the draft agreement (comprising a foreword, ten chapters and twenty-three articles)16 drawn up by the study group under Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Duc Tho attended the 8–10 October meeting with Kissinger, which eventually stretched for another two days till 12 October 1972. This was the nineteenth private meeting

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between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. The session from 11 October to 12 October that lasted sixteen hours was the longest in the series of private meetings.17 Luu Van Loi recalled that Kissinger was taken by surprise by Tho’s announcement at the start of the negotiations that the communist side would first settle the military questions – US troop withdrawal, release of prisoners of war, the ceasefire, and just agree on the main principles of the military and political issues of South Vietnam. Luu noted that Kissinger ‘had not expected that what he had proposed over the last three years would today be accepted by Le Duc Tho’.18 Despite their unhappiness with Moscow and Beijing, while the meeting was going on in Paris, Hanoi dispatched Nguyen Duy Trinh to Moscow (where he met Brezhnev) and Le Thanh Nghi to Beijing (where he met Zhou Enlai) to inform them of the draft agreement and also to solicit their support to persuade the US to reach an agreement at the Paris meeting. According to the Vietnamese account, Trinh met Brezhnev and Nghi met Zhou Enlai and both expressed support for the Vietnamese communists.19 The Soviet and Chinese accounts of these meetings are still unavailable to date. The 8–12 October 1972 negotiations is perhaps an appropriate point to re-visit Hanoi’s relations with Laos and Cambodia, as one of the issues Kissinger wanted resolved at the negotiation was the presence of Vietnamese communist forces in Laos and Cambodia. Le Duc Tho’s response threw some light on the status of North Vietnam–Pathet Lao and the North Vietnam–Khmer Rouge relationship during that period. Tho was confident that the Laotian problem would be settled before the Cambodian one. He expected that within a month after the ceasefire in Vietnam, the fighting in Laos would stop and no new troops and military materials would be sent to Laos. While this would not be written into the agreement, Le Duc Tho was prepared to give Kissinger a separate written understanding on this matter. From this, we can gauge the degree of control and leverage Hanoi held over the Pathet Lao. Indeed, only a fortnight earlier on 22 September 22, the Pathet Lao had out of the blue offered to enter into unconditional full-scale talks with the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) immediately. This move took Souvanna Phouma, the Laotian Prime Minister, and the RLG by surprise because the Pathet Lao forces were at this point of time militarily much stronger than they ever had been before. The talks started soon after on 17 October 1972.20 Tho was, however, less forthcoming with regards to Cambodia. Kissinger wanted an assurance that Vietnamese communist forces in Cambodia would not launch military offensives there after the agreement had been signed. He insisted that the situation in Cambodia was complex

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and it could not be solved in the same way as Laos. In his words, ‘As for the Cambodian problem, we should accept the facts and understand that the problem is too complicated.’21 We should recall that Hanoi’s relations with the Cambodian communists had been deteriorating since 1971. According to Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E. Goscha, joint military operations between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists ended some time in mid-1972, which was around the time when Hanoi seriously tried to reach a settlement with the US.22 According to Tran Van Tra (whom Thomas Engelbert interviewed in 1989), when the Vietnamese communists withdrew from Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge took the opportunity to attack the Vietnamese. On 17 October 1972, the Central Committee of the NLF moved their headquarters out of Kratie.23 The attacks intensified as more Vietnamese communist forces were withdrawn. This occurred all over Cambodia except the strategic northeastern part (which Tra had described as ‘the strategic lifeblood of the southern resistance’), where the Vietnamese communists continued to control.24 The Khmer Rouge under Saloth Sar refused to have anything to do with the North Vietnam–US negotiations and the Hanoi leadership were unable to persuade Saloth Sar and his colleagues to cooperate.25 Both sides concurred that there would not be any changes to what had been agreed upon at the nineteenth private meeting. They agreed to settle the two remaining issues on the replacement of weapons and the status of civilian prisoners when they next met on 17 October. The meeting ended with the following timetable of action. Kissinger would return to the US on 13 October to report to and consult with Nixon, after which he would return to Paris on 17 October to resolve any outstanding issues. On 18 October, he would travel to Saigon to brief Thieu. Kissinger would then travel to Hanoi on 21 October to endorse the agreement on 24 October at the latest. Following that, he would return to the US on 24 October. The agreement would be made public on either 26 or 27 October and the official signing of the agreement would be on either 30 or 31 October 1972.

Xuan Thuy–Kissinger meeting (17 October 1972) Kissinger met with Xuan Thuy on 17 October to resolve the two issues of weapons replacement and civilian prisoners. On the first issue, the American side wanted both parties to be able to replace war materials and related items on a piece for piece basis, whereas the Vietnamese communist side, concerned that the US would transfer a larger amount of weapons to the Saigon administration than the PRG could replace, wanted the arrangement to be based on the ‘principle of equality’.

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Kissinger, however, insisted that Xuan Thuy should accept the USproposed arrangement since North Vietnamese forces were not required to leave the South. On the second issue, the American side was constrained by the refusal of Thieu to release 30,000 communist civilian prisoners (whom he believed would immediately turn against the Saigon government once they were set free); hence they could only offer a promise to do their best to resolve the issue in three months after the peace agreement had been signed. The deadlock was only broken after Kissinger threatened that the timetable would have to be delayed by as long as eight days as he would need time to consult with and persuade the Saigon administration, if the Vietnamese communist side insisted on having it their way. On 18 October, the Vietnamese communist side gave in to Kissinger. In Saigon, Kissinger encountered strong opposition to the agreement that he and Le Duc Tho had negotiated. Thieu was particularly unhappy with an agreement that allowed the North Vietnamese communist forces to remain in the South. This has been well treated in the literature on the Vietnam War, especially the non-communist side of the war, and need not delay us here. Suffice to say that it was obvious that the US would not be able to abide by the timetable unless Nixon chose to ignore Thieu’s concern or abandon him altogether, a step he was not yet prepared to take at that stage. Meanwhile, the Politburo informed the Southern Military Command of the latest developments in the negotiations in Paris and directed the Command to make the necessary preparations to implement the peace agreement to be signed at the end of October 1972. The communists based in B2 were instructed on how to organise the quadripartite and bilateral joint military commissions.26 What is perhaps not as widely known is that Hanoi too had to consider and accommodate the views and expectations of the NLF. According to Robert Brigham, the NLF had not been informed by Hanoi that Le Duc Tho would be dropping the demands for Thieu’s departure and also that of the immediate coalition government. In Paris, Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy had to clarify the matter with Nguyen Thi Binh (Head of the NLF delegation at the Paris Talks) and gave the assurance that Thieu would only remain temporarily. In Hanoi, North Vietnamese officials also spent a substantial amount of time trying to assure the Secretary-General of the NLF, Huynh Tan Phat, and other NLF officials on this. The NLF was also acutely concerned about the unresolved issue of the civilian prisoners held by the Saigon administration, especially the lack of concrete assurance that all of them would be released. That the NLF had doubts that the North Vietnamese would necessarily take care of their interest

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was evident in the fact that they approached Moscow to intercede with Hanoi on their behalf. Many in the NLF, both communists and noncommunists, did not understand why Hanoi was so anxious to reach an agreement with the US and were worried that Hanoi would reach a deal with the US at their expense.27

The peace agreement aborted On 21 October 1972, the US side raised the issues of prisoners in Laos and Cambodia, and the termination of military activities in the two countries. Also, the issue of post-war assistance to Vietnam (or what the communists saw as ‘war reparations’) would only be discussed when Kissinger was in Hanoi. The Vietnamese communists had hoped for the peace agreement to be signed on 30 October but to their disappointment, the US side now proposed a 24-hour delay till 31 October in order to sort out those issues. Two days later, on 23 October, Nixon wrote to inform Pham Van Dong that the date for concluding the peace agreement would be postponed indefinitely. According to Nixon, Hanoi had tried to negotiate at too fast a pace and as such there were many ‘technical problems’ and also the question of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam that had to be reconsidered. Then, there was the interview that Pham Van Dong had given to the Newsweek Senior Editor Arnaud de Borchgrave28 that, in Nixon’s view, amounted to a premature announcement of the peace agreement, which had in turn complicated Kissinger’s consultations in Saigon. The US side now wanted another private meeting in Paris and the postponement of Kissinger’s trip to Hanoi. Having come this far and with less than a week to the 31 October deadline, Hanoi really had only one more card left to play. In response, on 25 October, the Politburo made the decision to unilaterally publish the text of the peace agreement along with an account of the negotiations of the past four years up to 22 October 1972. The aim was to refute the US accusation that Hanoi was the cause of the delay. It was also an attempt to make use of international pressure to force the US to stick to the 31 October deadline. Hanoi’s course of action was supported by both Beijing and Moscow.

Another cycle of negotiations On 27 October, the US side again proposed another round of private meetings starting on 1 November and assured the Vietnamese communists that the US would not henceforth make any more changes should a final agreement be reached at this new round of negotiations. Though Hanoi

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agreed to the proposal, it deliberately withheld its reply till 4 November in order not to give the impression that it was anxious for an agreement. The first meeting eventually took place on 20 November 1972. Although the Vietnamese communists failed to get the US to sign an agreement on 31 October, the irony was that they went into the new round of negotiations on a stronger footing for two reasons. Hanoi’s revelation of the agreement and related information on 26 October won much sympathy from the international community. Also, with the reelection of Nixon as President for a second term on 7 November 1972, it meant that Hanoi was longer constrained by a deadline to conclude the peace agreement, which it had earlier imposed on itself. The US side, on the other hand, was boxed into a defensive position after it refused to sign the agreement and Nixon continued to be under pressure from Congress to reach a settlement quickly. At the 20 November meeting, Le Duc Tho told Kissinger that the Vietnamese had been deceived by the French, the Japanese and the Americans, but ‘the deception has never been so flagrant as now’.29 Kissinger now wanted a number of changes to the October 1972 text that amounted to a substantial change to what had been agreed upon and this could only mean another cycle of negotiations.30 Among the modifications that the US side wanted were: (a) refusal to recognise the existence of the PRG; (b) communist forces to withdraw from the South; (c) refusal to recognise that there were two different areas in South Vietnam; in other words, the armed forces of the Indochinese countries must remain within their respective borders; (d) a simultaneous ceasefire in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; and (e) dropping the Committee for National Reconciliation and Concord. Kissinger was also silent about the civilian (PRG) prisoners in the South and the issue of American post-settlement aid. He proposed 15 December 1972 as the new official date for the signing of the revised final agreement. At the end of the meeting, Le Duc Tho said that if those were his ‘last, unchangeable proposals, settlement was impossible’. Hanoi’s assessment was that even if the US dropped its demands, it would still require some additional rounds of negotiations before an agreement could be signed, possibly before 20 January 1973. However, if the US refused to budge from its position, then the communists should brace themselves for a protracted war. In a 8 November 1972 telegram to the Southern Military Command, Vo Nguyen Giap told the southern communists that the Politburo anticipated two possibilities – either the war would continue for a few more years or it would be ended within a short time and that they had to prepare for both eventualities. It was, however, obvious to the communists in the South that whatever the circumstances, they had to intensify their military activities to support the

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Paris talks as well as create a favourable position for themselves when the agreement was eventually signed.31 The meetings from 20 to 25 November failed to reach a consensus. During the meeting on 23 November, Kissinger conveyed Nixon’s threat that he would order the resumption of military activities if Hanoi refused to ‘negotiate honourably’. Le Duc Tho would not be coerced but the Vietnamese communist side agreed to meet again on 4 December after a one-week hiatus, as requested by the US side. Reporting back to Hanoi regarding the November negotiations, Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy wrote that ‘the US had changed the content of the agreement and reversed all the important issues. It can be said that everything is to be renegotiated.’32 The 4 December meeting ended with both sides accusing each other of destroying the substance of the agreement. Both Kissinger and Le Duc Tho left the meeting with the sense that they were at the cusp of a breakdown of the negotiations, although neither side wanted to be the first to decide on ending the talks. At the meetings from 6–9 December and 11–13 December, although both sides proposed ways to close the gap on a number of issues, nothing was firmly settled and both Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had to return home for consultations with their respective governments. On 15 December, Le Duc Tho left Paris for Hanoi and was not expected to return to Paris until a fortnight later. On 18 December, the US informed the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, Vo Van Sung that the US side would be ready to continue the negotiations any time after 26 December 1972. According to Ilya Gaiduk who had seen the Russian version of the transcript of the Kissinger–Tho meeting of 13 December 1972, Le Duc Tho had suggested that both sides keep in touch during the period while they were back in Washington and Hanoi, and that the Vietnamese communists were willing to fix a date for the next meeting. ‘We should act in such a manner so as not to allow the temperature to increase above the limits of the glass’s capacity to resist,’ Tho said.33

Linebacker II and counter-offensives Linebacker II (also known as the 1972 Christmas bombings) that was launched on 18 December 1972 must therefore be seen in the context of the above developments (or lack of development). The air campaign that was launched in three waves – from 18–20 December 1972, followed by 21–23 December 1972 and finally 26–29 December 1972 – was aimed at inflicting the maximum destruction on selected military targets, particularly in the Hanoi–Haiphong area. For Nixon, the objectives of the air attack were to coerce Hanoi to accept US terms at the bargaining

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table, to debilitate Hanoi’s capacity to threaten the South after the peace settlement was signed, and at the same time to reassure Nguyen Van Thieu of US support. With the likelihood of the signing of a peace treaty fading with each October day, the Politburo had anticipated that when the US presidential election was over, Nixon would be under less political constraint to coerce the Vietnamese communists. The Politburo warned the people to be vigilant and be prepared for any increase of enemy military activities. The communist armed forces were told to prepare for a continuation of their strategic offensive. On 25 November 1972, the Central Military Committee ordered the forces to be on the alert for the enemy’s ‘new acts of adventurism’, particularly bombings by the B-52s. The military leadership anticipated the resumption and intensification of the bombing of the north of the 20th parallel as well as Hanoi, Haiphong and other strategic targets by the B-52s.34 This was also conveyed to the Southern Military Command on 27 November. A week later, the Politburo instructed the communists in the South ‘to make every necessary preparation to cope with eventuality of a resumption of bombing over the whole of North Vietnam and suspension of the Paris peace talks’. Hoang Van Thai recalled that the communists in the South received news of Le Duc Tho’s return to Hanoi almost at the same time as the report of the B-52 attacks on the North. Thai revealed that they were not sure how their Northern comrades would react to the air offensive. The education and training department was thus assigned to monitor Voice of Vietnam for news of how the air force and anti-aircraft units in the North were coping against the US bombers.35According to Tran Duy Hung, who was then the mayor of Hanoi, the authorities started evacuating the children from Hanoi on 4 December 1972. They later also issued a general evacuation order but many were reluctant to leave their homes.36 According to the LSQDNDVN, at the beginning of September 1972, the General Staff and the Air Defence Command completed the study on the air defence strategy against attacks by the B-52s on Hanoi and Haiphong. The defence plan called for the concentration of forces and missiles in and around Hanoi to eliminate the enemy’s element of surprise, to shoot down any incoming B-52s and also to protect civilians. As soon as the plan was passed, the General Staff urgently organised the strength of the air defence in the following manner: the 361st air defence Division, comprising two missile/rocket regiments (the 261st and 257th) and five anti-aircraft artillery regiments, with the 274th regiment as reserve force, to protect Hanoi; the 363rd air defence Division, comprising the 238th and 285th missile regiments and two anti-aircraft artillery regiments to protect Haiphong; the 375th air defence regiment,

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comprising the 268th missile regiment and five anti-aircraft artillery regiments, to protect Route 1 from Hanoi to Lang Son; and the 365th air defence Division, comprising the 267th and 275th missile regiments and five anti-aircraft regiments, to protect the supply lines in Thanh Hoa, Nghe Tin and Ha Tinh. The Air Defence-Air Force Party Committee had issued a resolution to strengthen the political education and consciousness of the cadres and soldiers to deepen their understanding of the obstacles and challenges ahead and to fire up their fighting spirit to shoot down enemy aircrafts including the B-52s. At the end of October and in November 1972, many training conferences were organised for radar operators and others to learn about the characteristics of the B-52s and different methods of shooting them down with missiles. But given the urgency and shortage of time, every division only had two to three experienced aircraft spotters or radar operators. The situation was even more serious from the battalion level downwards. Most of them were newly enlisted/trained and highly inexperienced. On 24 November, Senior Colonel Le Van Tri (Commander of the Air Defence-Air Force) and Senior Colonel Hoang Phuong (the political commissar) gave a final briefing to Senior General Van Tien Dung (Politburo member and Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese People’s Army) on the strategy and deployment against the US air campaign. Dung approved the plan and instructed that all preparations be completed by 3 December 1972.37 On 13 December, the LSQDNDVN noted, the Paris talks reached an impasse and the situation had become very critical. On 16 December, US reconnaissance flights over Hanoi, Haiphong and other airfields in the North were detected and the High Command responded by ordering the Air Defence-Air Force units on the highest alert. Linebacker II, we recall, began on 18 December.38 The air defence preparation in the last few months certainly helped the Vietnamese communists confront the most massive bombing attack on North Vietnam to date as well as enabling them to shoot down a number of planes that included B-52s and F–111s by the end of the air campaign. But it was also very much a situation of learning through experience and improvising. When the B-52s arrived, they had to improvise by firing their (not unlimited supply of) SA–2 missiles like machine guns. Wilfred Burchett reported that the North Vietnamese technicians ‘made the accuracy of the missiles independent of ground radio control by firing them in salvos in the path of oncoming aircraft, with proximity fuses which exploded the warheads when they were in effective range’.39 On 25 December, the Air Defence-Air Force Command convened a meeting of all commanders and cadres to review and draw lessons from the air war up

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to that point of time. Particular attention was centred on studying the B-52 flight patterns to find ways to detect and destroy them. Additional forces had to be deployed to Hanoi, Haiphong and other regions to beef up their defence. The civilian population suffered. According to a study by the Office of History – Project Checo (HQ PACAF), while Hanoi did expect an escalation of US bombing, the Vietnamese communists were taken aback by the intensity of the air strikes. There were reports of psychological dislocation and massive evacuation of Hanoi and Haiphong.40 Hanoi mayor, Tran Duy Hung, told Wilfred Burchett that the evacuation of Hanoi residents starting with the children began on 4 December 1972 after Kissinger had threatened to bomb the capital if the negotiations were stalled. But large-scale evacuation only occurred after 16 December. About half the population of Hanoi was supposedly evacuated.41 The LSQDNDVN recalled that President Ton Duc Thang visited the Kham Tien area to encourage and exhort both the civilian population and the armed forces to turn their pain and suffering into strength to defeat the enemy.42 There is little documentation on the effects of the air war on the balance of forces and on the military situation in the South. The LSQDNDVN recalled that the fighting in the South had been going on for more than nine months and they were facing difficulties maintaining troop strength and supplies despite assistance from the North. The air war in North Vietnam must also have made it difficult for the North to divert more troops and supplies to the South. The average strength of each of the main force battalions fell to around 200 men. The communist forces were barely able to control their liberated areas and to repel the enemy forces. The official account did not continue to say how much longer the communists could have sustained the fighting under such conditions but it was obvious that had both the air war in the North and the ground war in the South continued, the communists would have faced severe losses.

Another attempt at negotiation In the midst of the second wave of bombing, on 22 December 1972, the US proposed that the negotiations resume on 3 January 1973 and that if Hanoi agreed, the bombing would stop on 30 December. Hanoi replied on 26 December, at the start of the third wave of bombing, that, if and when the bombing and the hostilities stopped, both Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy would be prepared to meet the US side on 8 January 1973. At the same time, Hanoi also asked Moscow to help urge Washington to acquiesce.43 According to Anatoly Dobrynin, who was then the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, he raised the subject with Kissinger. He

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also recalled that Kissinger informed him on 28 December that the US would stop the bombing and resume talks and the decision was officially announced the next day. The US side agreed to the meeting on 8 January 1973 but proposed that the experts/drafting teams of both sides resume work on the October 1972 text and the agreements reached in November and December 1972 on 2 January 1973. Both Moscow and Beijing publicly condemned the Linebacker II attacks and reaffirmed their support for Hanoi. In private, the Russians persuaded the Vietnamese communist leadership to continue to negotiate and to seek workable compromises.44 The Chinese, whom the North Vietnamese leadership consulted, were also of the view that the prospect for an agreement was reasonably good and that Hanoi should go ahead to reach a settlement. On 31 December, Zhou Enlai told Truong Chinh, who had travelled to Beijing to find out about the Chinese position, that Nixon was really planning to leave Vietnam and Hanoi should negotiate with them seriously. Zhou also warned that in the process they might encounter some difficulties before a final agreement could be reached.45 On 3 January, on his way back to Paris, Le Duc Tho met Zhou in Beijing. Zhou observed that the US bombing to exert pressure on the Vietnamese communists had failed. Nixon wanted to get out of Vietnam and Indochina because there were many other international and domestic issues which demanded his attention. Zhou advised Tho ‘to persist in principles while demonstrating flexibility during the negotiations. The most important thing is to let the Americans leave. The situation will change in six months or one year.’46 It was under such circumstances that Le Duc Tho returned to Paris on 6 January 1973. A few days earlier, on 2 January, the US Congress had passed a resolution to cut off all expenditure for the war in the Vietnam, except for the purposes of troop withdrawal and repatriation of POWs. On 4 January, the Senate’s Democratic caucus passed a similar resolution. As such, both the Hanoi leadership and Nixon/Kissinger, for their own reasons, were eager to reach a final settlement as soon as possible. However, before Tho and Kissinger could resume their discussions, both sides first had to concur on the set of agreements that would form the basis for their negotiations. The Vietnamese communist side wanted to take up the discussions from where they had already been agreed upon on 13 December 1972 when the last round of negotiations broke off. The US side, on the other hand, wanted to go back to the set of agreements reached on 23 November 1972. After much heated debate, they agreed to begin by zeroing in on the outstanding issues of which there were two left, before moving on to the understandings and principles of the protocols. The disagreements still outstanding from 13 December 1972 were

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eventually ironed out during the new round of negotiations from 8–11 and finally on 13 January 1973 when the negotiations were finally wound up.

The final agreement One of the outstanding issues concerned movement within the provisional military demarcation zones; both sides differed on the use of the terms ‘movement of the people’ and ‘civilian movement’ in the final text. The US side wanted ‘civilian movement’ in order to preclude the movement of communist military personnel in the provisional military demarcation zones. The Vietnamese communist side, not surprisingly, did not want to be circumscribed by such a term. In the end, both sides agreed to the following wording: ‘among the questions to be negotiated there is the question of the modalities for civilian movement across the provisional military demarcation line’. There were some other minor issues related to the terminologies and phrasings of particular sentences in the text that were ironed out by morning of 11 January 1973. The other outstanding issue concerned the timetable-cum-procedures for the signing of the peace agreement. With regards to the way the peace agreement would be signed, again there was much debate but both sides eventually agreed that there would be a Two-Party signing and a FourParty signing of the same agreement, with a slightly different preamble for each. The signatures would be on two pages, one for North Vietnam and the PRG, the other for the US and the South Vietnamese government. There would be two official signing ceremonies on the same day on 27 January 1973 and at the same venue, which was the International Conference Centre at Avenue Kle´ber; the four parties would sign in the morning and the two parties (US and North Vietnam) in the afternoon. The Vietnamese communists essentially managed to get what they wanted in the final peace agreement. What they conceded were fairly minor points. Some of the key issues that the US had objected to in October, which resulted in the failure to reach a settlement on 31 October 1972, were once again included in the final agreement. These included the term ‘PRG’, the recognition that there were two different administrations in the South, the formation of the National Council for Reconciliation and Concord and the implicit acceptance that North Vietnamese forces could remain in the South. The difference between the October 1972 and the January 1973 agreements was that in the case of the former, both parties, in order to meet the US presidential election deadline of 7 November 1972, had essentially rushed through the process to produce a single document that was to be signed only by the US and the North Vietnam. It was a peace

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agreement that no doubt pleased the communists but it was at the expense of the Saigon administration. The additional months gave the US side the opportunity to negotiate a series of protocols and to reach a number of understandings with the Vietnamese communist side that were principally meant to redress the imbalance of the October 1972 agreement and reassure the Thieu administration that the US had not simply abandoned the South Vietnamese to their own fate. In his analysis of the two peace agreements many years after the final agreement had been signed, Luu Van Loi wrote, ‘objectively speaking, without the concrete provisions of the protocols, no doubt, the implementation of the 20 October 1973 bilateral agreement would meet with many difficulties that would necessitate further discussions to settle’.47

Laying the groundwork for the agreement Hoang Van Thai,48 who had been posted to the South since October 1967, remembered that in the final months of 1972 and in early 1973 just before the signing of the Paris Agreement on 27 January 1973, the communist leadership in the South had to urgently lay the groundwork for the post-Paris Agreement period. He recalled that a group comprising Nguyen Huu Tho, Huynh Tan Phat, Tran Buu Kiem and himself began preparation for the setting up of the National Council for Reconciliation and Concord during the last months of 1972. The group identified personalities from among the neutrals whom they thought could work with the PRG to form the tripartite administration. The group also did a strategic review of their existing administrative structure with an eye to ‘preserving and developing the strength of the revolution in the future administration and in the mass organizations’. It also drew up a plan on how to continue building up their armed forces and how to win over ‘the middle strata and progressives’ in order to gain the upper hand in the coalition administration. With regards to the National Council for Reconciliation and Concord, ‘there was the making of a fundamental split in the revolution’, as revealed by Truong Nhu Tang. The nationalists/ neutrals soon learnt that reconciliation had its limits. The Northern communists were not prepared to accept those in the South whom they believed had collaborated with or who had benefited from the Thieu administration. It was only resolved (but only temporarily on hindsight) in mid-August 1973 when Le Duan issued a directive that clarified that the policy of national concord and reconciliation without reprisal was the long-term strategy, and that it was the political line and the political behaviour of the Party as well as the position of the working class that counted.49 Recalling this years later, Truong Nhu Tang lamented that

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But that must remain the subject of another story. Meanwhile, COSVN also deliberated on the setting up of the joint military commissions and their views were conveyed to the Politburo. On 9 January 1973, Nguyen Duy Trinh, anticipating the ‘difficult and complex struggle’ that was to come, told COSVN to appoint Major General Tran Van Tra, Deputy Commander of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces, to represent the PRG in the quadripartite joint military commission and in the subsequent bilateral joint military commission. Tra who was also commander of B2 (east, central and south-western Vietnam, which was essentially the whole of the southern war zone) had been fighting in the South since 1945. Bui Tin remembered Tra as an active and intelligent man who was principled and who knew when to be flexible.51 Tran Van Tra arrived in Saigon to head the PRG delegation on 28 January 1973. On the military side, the balance of forces in the South on the eve of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement was as follows. The enemy controlled the towns and strategic routes. Most significantly they continued to enjoy US material support. The communists controlled the mountainous regions and many key other areas in the countryside. But although they had quite a broad political base and had strong armed forces scattered in various areas, the reality was that the population in those areas under communist control were small and the armed forces were not evenly developed. Vinh revealed that ‘many of the armed units which had gone through an interrupted period of war in 1972 had not been revitalised in terms of manpower and equipment nor had they been strengthened organisationally’. Thus, at this point of time, it was not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the communists would be able to realise their goal of reuniting North and South Vietnam. COSVN concurred with Le Duc Tho’s view, which he conveyed in his message of 17 January, that despite the peace agreement, there remained the possibility of a resumption/an escalation of the war. What was therefore needed was a period of time for the communist side to further develop and strengthen their forces in the South in readiness for that eventuality. Tran Van Tra similarly felt that the southern communist forces were exhausted from their years of struggle and were suffering from a shortage of personnel and weapons. Van Tien Dung, who visited the South in early 1973, also

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came to the same conclusion that the southern forces were not ready to launch another military offensive for another three to five years.52 A week before the formal signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, on 19 January 1973, COSVN issued a significant directive (02/73) entitled ‘On Policies Related to the Political Settlement and Ceasefire’. According to Hoang Van Thai, ‘this directive served as the basis for the localities to decide on tactics in the struggle in this new environment’.53 The directive outlined what needed to be done in the period immediately after the peace agreement had been signed. After a long opening preamble on what the communist side gained from the Paris agreement, it went on to predict that the enemy would attempt to sabotage the implementation of the peace agreement and even provoke armed conflict. The communist side therefore had to forestall that from happening and to ensure that the peace agreement was implemented. There were a number of ways to do this: (1) they must be united to carry out their political mission at all costs; (2) they must concentrate efforts to turn the political struggle in a revolutionary movement based on the slogans ‘peace, independence, democracy, rice and clothing for the people, national concord’. Here, the cadres were told that they must ‘fully grasp the objective of the national democratic revolution and closely combine the national mission with the democratic mission in the new situation’; (3) they must try to bring about the collapse of the enemy’s armed forces and government; (4) they must consolidate, preserve and build up their own armed forces as well as their grassroots organizations. In this respect, the cadres were told that they must ‘fully grasp the offensive strategy of pushing back the enemy step by step and winning victory bit by bit before achieving complete victory, and (5) they must strengthen their base areas and bring the enemy-controlled areas under their control. In sum, in the new post-Paris Peace Agreement phase, the strategy was for ‘political struggle’ to be closely combined with ‘armed struggle’ and ‘legalistic struggle’. ‘Political struggle’ would be the principal mode of struggle. ‘Armed struggle’ would play a supporting role while the legal aspects of the Paris peace agreement must be constantly evoked and emphasised.54 This approach suited the needs of the North. Many in the North felt that the war, particularly since 1965, had derailed/stunted the economic/ socialist development of North Vietnam. One official account noted that a thorough analysis by the top leadership carried out in 1973 regarding the serious effects of the war with the US concluded that the war ‘was the main cause of the low level of production, the slow development of the economy and the difficulties in our people’s livelihood’.55 Referring to the peace agreement in his report to the fourth National Assembly on

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The peace agreement

20 February 1973, Pham Van Dong said that it created ‘more favourable conditions for socialist building in the North, for the building of the socialist economy . . . thereby intensifying still further the influence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’. According to Dong, ‘an immediate requirement was to quickly stabilise the economic situation and the life of the people’s, restore and develop the economy while striving to consolidate national defence’. The target was not only to surpass the pre-war production level (within the next few years) but also to enter directly into the building of a new economic structure, in order to lay the groundwork for further development on a large scale and at a quick tempo in the following years.56 The goal of ‘building the socialist North on a large scale and at a high speed’ was a recurrent theme of many of the speeches and reports throughout 1973 and 1974.

6

An incomplete victory

Communist strategy for the South As Tran Van Tra said, ‘we had won a victory, but not yet a complete victory’.1 The ultimate goal of the communists was still to bring about the reunification of North and South Vietnam, and by military means if it was necessary. Meanwhile, the short-term plan was to abide by the terms of the Paris Agreement, with the hope that there might be a chance to obtain reunification through political means. Truong Nhu Tang recalled that at that point in time, it was the political front, not the military that engaged their attention. In his memoir, Tang noted that the Paris Agreement created vast opportunities to bring the Thieu government to an end through political means’ as the accords provided them with ‘a legal political avenue to power’.2 Luu Van Loi noted that the rationale for adopting this approach was to prevent ‘the possible re-intervention of the US’ and more importantly, it was also targeted at ‘winning the sympathy and support of the Soviet Union, China and other brother countries as well as of the world people, including the US’.3 In his excellent study of the NLF, Robert Brigham, who had interviewed many southerners who were actively involved during this period, wrote that Hanoi’s ‘defensive’ approach as spelt in COSVN Directive 02/73, ‘angered many southerners, who remembered too well Diem’s anticommunist sweeps from 1954 to 1959’ and who were of the view that, based on past experiences, ‘the key to lasting peace in the South rested with a battlefield victory over the RVN’.4 Tran Van Tra recalled hearing cadres from the different battle zones asking questions such as ‘Why haven’t the puppet army and the puppet administration collapsed?’ or ‘why the puppet administration has not only continued to exist but has become stronger politically, militarily and economically’. There was also a certain degree of confusion among the communist cadres in the middle and lower levels. Some were hesitant or

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were afraid to retaliate against the enemy for fear of violating the Paris Agreement.5 In Military Region VIII, for example, according to Hoang Van Vinh, between January and March 1973, the enemy recaptured most of the areas lost before the Paris Agreements. The situation was only reversed from April 1973 after COSVN issued a new set of instructions. Similarly, the Party Committee of Military Region IX, in a meeting on 3 February 1973, managed to nip early ‘the same belief in the possibility of peace and relaxation of vigilance’ and pre-empt a recurrence of what had happened in Military Zone VIII. The meeting concluded that they should ‘hit the enemy hard’ ‘in order to safeguard the achievements of the revolution’ but ‘without, however, affecting our [the communist] position on the diplomatic front’.6 About a month after the Paris Agreement was signed, on 25 February, COSVN disseminated Message 775/TV to spell out the instructions in the earlier (pre-Paris Agreement) directive. The thrust of this message was that the post-Paris Agreement situation remained unstable and complex. While the US had been obliged to withdraw its troops and stop its military campaign, the Americans were still shoring up and protecting the Saigon administration by other means. But the Paris Agreement would have to be honoured and it was just a matter of time before the Americans felt obliged to observe their side of the bargain. Message 775/TV was followed soon after by a more substantial COSVN Directive 03/CT 73 in March 1973. Meanwhile, according to Hoang Van Thai, on 27 February 1973, COSVN had completed an overview of the situation and communicated this to the Politburo and the Central Military Committee. He then presented his report, which was based on Directive 02/03 referred to earlier, at a military conference held on 2 March 1973 at Bu Dop and which was attended by the military commanders of every province and district in the region. The most hotly debated issue at the conference, Thai recalled, was ‘how to use the armed forces most effectively and at the right level, given our determination to preserve and consolidate peace while the enemy were overtly sabotaging the Paris Agreement’. In short, how they could synthesise in practical ways the political, armed and legal struggle as spelt out in Directive 02/03. The conference found difficulty in reconciling what they saw as ‘two contrasting tendencies: either to carry on the fight as if no agreement had been reached, or to make themselves hostage to the Agreement by refusing to fight back even if attacked’.7

COSVN meeting (16–17 March 1973) Soon after Thai returned from the Bu Dop conference, he was summoned to Hanoi for a meeting. He remembered that he was greatly pleased to be


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able to return to Hanoi after an absence of four years. But more importantly, he ‘had so many things to discuss with others on the CPV Central Committee after more than a month of implementing the Paris Agreement – so many new problems posed by the enemy’s increasingly blatant sabotage of the Agreement’. Before he and his colleagues left for Hanoi, COSVN convened a meeting on 16–17 March 1973 to review the military situation during 1972, draw up a forward plan of action and draft a report that Thai could present to the Politburo in Hanoi. A number of difficult issues were discussed at the conference: these pertained to the balance of forces in the battlefield, the direction for the development of the revolution in South Vietnam and the question of whether or not the enemy would accept the formation of a tripartite coalition. The conference also noted the emergence of ‘two tendencies’ over the last few months – one was ‘an overconfidence in the workability of the [Paris] Agreement, which led to a relaxation of vigilance and loss of territory’; the other was ‘a failure to understand the full significance of the Agreement and thus failure to rely on its contents in adopting forms and tactics for the struggle appropriate to each locality and for each point in time’. The conference concluded that the ‘two tendencies’ had to be quickly overcome and more had to be done to help the regions ‘make a correct assessment of the general situation and the specific situation in each locality’ in order that they could apply the ‘appropriate forms of struggle’.8 There was a premonition that the war would escalate and that ‘a decisive life-and-death struggle between revolution and counter-revolution was inevitable’. This would be the message that Hoang Van Thai and his colleagues would carry back to Hanoi. Truong Nhu Tang also made reference to this meeting in his memoir. He recalled that their military attitude at the time was ‘primarily defensive’ and the focus was on the political settlement. They had hoped that Thieu’s aggressive approach in contrast with their more pliant attitude would garner more support for the anti-Thieu factions. But what did happen was that the Saigon forces took advantage of their passivity in order to grab more territory. Caught momentarily off balance, COSVN and PRG met in March 1973 to establish a more balanced strategy against the Saigon administration from which emerged Directive 3/CT/73.9

COSVN Directive 3/CT/73 According to Directive 3/CT/73,10 the communists, ‘were determined to foil enemy oppression and aggression by mobilising the masses to engage

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in political, armed and military proselytising struggle in coordination with legality to defend the lives and property of the people, to defend the liberated areas, to defeat the enemy’s plots of obstruction and destruction, and to force the enemy to implement the agreement’. COSVN was of the view that both US and Thieu could be forced to comply with the terms of the Paris Agreement despite the latter’s hostility towards the two-party Joint Military Commission and the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, which the communists believed were important organs in their revolutionary strategy. It admitted that the communists had allowed the Saigon forces to inflict a number of losses on the communist side because ‘the change in principles and methods were not effected in time so that at first there was confusion, and the guidance and organization of their implementation was not taken to the village level and did not reach the masses’. There was also, according to the directive, ‘thoughts of peace, of society, of rest, of drinking, and there were a loss of vigilance and a reduction in the will to struggle sharply and in timely fashion with the enemy’. Although they had begun to correct the shortcomings mentioned, the COSVN leadership felt that there was still lacking a sense of urgency and confusion still persisted. According to the directive, there were two possibilities for the future course of the Vietnamese revolution. The first, the preferred route, was to achieve victory through primarily political struggle. The advantages of this path were that it would provide the communists with a legitimate voice in South Vietnam, help protect the communist-controlled areas and relieve the Party leadership of having to prepare for a return to full-scale war or the introduction of US forces. The second was to achieve victory through a resumption of the fighting/war. While the communist leadership would prefer not to resort to this path and did not see the military option as an immediate possibility, they realised that the possibility of a renewal of the armed struggle could not be ignored and therefore they must make careful preparations and ‘be ready to fight, and, if necessary, move quickly to destroy the enemy’. The directive thus called for an increase in the revolutionary armed forces ‘without which there could be no possibility of change to the status quo’. The military option was apparently vigorously debated and discussed at various levels. For example, there were intelligence reports of a meeting of provincial cadres in May 1973, which concluded that victory could only be achieved through an offensive a` la 1968. There were also intelligence reports that the communists had decided on the necessity for a lightning offensive, and that the political commissars shared the same view. There were reports of a proposed plan for a ‘strategic raid’ on Hue and Danang.11


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The journey to Hanoi Soon after the COSVN 16–17 March meeting, a delegation comprising ‘all the key representatives from South Vietnam’ – Hoang Van Thai, Nguyen Van Linh (Deputy Secretary of COSVN in charge of the SaigonGia Dinh area), Vo Van Kiet (Secretary of the Party Committee of Military Region IX), Tran Nam Trung (who was in charge of eastern Nam Bo) and Nguyen Minh Duong (Party Secretary of Military Region VIII) travelled to Hanoi for the meeting with the Politburo. The route that the group took to reach North Vietnam is worth recounting. They had to travel via northeast Cambodia. The group left on the evening of 18 March 1973 and reached Kratie, the last rendezvous point of the 470th Division of the Truong Son army, the next day. Another day’s journey took them to military post 53 in southern Stung Treng where they were then safely escorted to the North. This was necessary because the US were still bombing the communist supply route from Kratie to the Lao border. The group learnt that the air raids had not significantly affected the supply lines. The group was also informed that Hanoi would be dispatching several thousand troops to reinforce the B2 battlefront. The bombing campaign was still going on along the Mekong River and Highway 13, particularly at the junction of the Sekhong and Serepok rivers near Stung Treng, which resulted in the group having to wait for two days before they were able to cross the river on 22 March. They reached Ta Ngau, the headquarters of the 470th Division (under Colonel Nguyen Lang), near the Lao–Cambodian border on the night of 23 March. The mission of the 470th Division was to protect the supply line from southern Saravane to Phi Ha where it then branched out southwest to B2 and east towards B3 (Tay Nguyen) via Ta Xeng, which was the meeting point of the borders of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Apparently, after the Paris Agreement, the enemy attacks on the road from Laos to the north had lessened considerably, making it possible for the troops there to grow food. Thai remembered that the soldiers he met looked ‘healthy and well fed’.12 The group reached Phi Ha on 24 March where they then followed a new road crossing the Sekhong River and then headed north towards Saravane. On the night of 25 March, they reached the Senoi supply station, (which also doubled up as the base camp of a road construction unit of the VPA), at the northern foot of the Bolovens Plateau in Laos where they rested for a day. Sihanouk had also rested at this place when he travelled to the liberated zones in Cambodia the previous month. Resuming their journey on 27 March, the group proceeded to the southern part of Muong Noong district, which was the headquarters of the 471st Division. On the afternoon of

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28 March, they arrived at K94, (a military post of the 471st Division), where Sihanouk had also made a stop in February 1973 on his way to Cambodia. On 29 March, they continued to Ban Dong, Lao Bao, Huong Hoa (where they took the opportunity to tour the old Khe Sanh battlefield), and north of Highway 9. The next morning, they hit Highway 1, the main North–South highway. On the afternoon of 1 April, they proceeded to Dong Hoi Airport where an IL–14 was waiting to fly them to Hanoi. The journey to Hanoi took almost two weeks. But not that many years ago, it would have taken very much longer. During this trip, Thai was greatly impressed by how the whole environment had been transformed since he last travelled through those parts in 1966 on his way to Military Region V. One episode that occurred during this two-week long journey is worth highlighting. The communist side was apparently privy to the strategy of the Saigon administration with regards to the Mekong River delta region. Vo Van Kiet and Nguyen Minh Duong revealed this on the morning of 26 March. According to Kiet, in early March, they had already been informed of Saigon’s pacification plans for the Mekong Delta region in 1973. The plan was to be implemented over one year and was scheduled to be completed by February 1974. The plan was to be carried out in three stages. The first, from March to May 1973, would be focused on pacification and land-grabbing in Chuong Thien province, which would serve as the springboard for the subsequent operations; the second operation, from June to September 1973, would be conducted in the U Minh area; and the third operation, from October to February 1974 would target the Ca Mau peninsula. COSVN had directed the communist forces in Military Region IX to foil the enemy’s plan.

Meeting with Le Duan The COSVN delegation met Le Duan on the morning of 3 April 1973. According to Le Duan, the Politburo wanted to read and hear their reports and assessments prior to the Politburo meeting in May and the 21st Plenary Session of the Loa Dong Party in June 1973 as there were many major issues that had to be thoroughly considered before the leadership could issue a resolution. The Politburo felt that they could not convene in April until they have the answers to a number of questions such as the intentions of the US and Nguyen Van Thieu, their strengths and weaknesses, whether the revolution in the South had moved to a new phase and if it had, what was the situation and what should be the direction and form of struggle, and what were the most urgent political as well as military tasks that needed to be carried out.


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The presence and input of the COSVN group would certainly give the ‘man-on-the-spot’ perspective to many of the questions posed by Le Duan. One example was the issue of the appropriateness of the policy of having clearly defined enemy and friendly areas so that the communists could then concentrate on consolidating and strengthening their own areas of control, which was cited by Tran Van Tra in his memoir. According to Tra, Hanoi had sent Tran Huu Duc, a member of the Politburo, to carry out a fact-finding mission in Tri Thien and in his report, he had expressed satisfaction that the situation there had stabilised with the enemy and the communist areas of control clearly established. The COSVN group completely disagreed with this conclusion. They argued that the stability was only apparent and that in fact the situation was dangerous as the contested area changed continually, like a strip of sand buffeted by winds from two directions. If the wind blew more strongly from one direction the sand would pile up on the other side and spill over on that side, and vice versa.13 Following that initial meeting, there were a number of exchanges of views and information between the COSVN group and the various departments in the North, as well as communication between the COSVN group and Pham Hung and others in the South to get the latest update of the situation in South Vietnam. From 12 April onwards, the COSVN group met with Le Duan and the Politburo to make their reports and answer their queries. After much deliberation on 19 April, they arrived at ‘almost complete consensus’ of views. They agreed that: (1) the likelihood of US intervention had diminished but had not been completely removed, and the implications of that for the Saigon administration were still not clear; (2) in the transitional period, winning over the population in both the towns and countryside (‘a very bitter contest which was going on’) was most critical and creative ways had to be found to achieve this; (c) the ideal solution was to win without further bloodshed but the question remained as to whether it was necessary to get rid of Thieu to achieve a tripartite coalition government. A related question was whether the communist side was ready for a tripartite coalition government; and (d) it was imperative to build up the military, especially the local armies, as quickly as possible because ‘only with a powerful punch by the main force could we launch a general counter-offensive when the occasion presented itself’. Le Duan underscored the importance of mass mobilisation and the need to win over three groups of people in the rural, urban and mountainous areas , namely, those in enemy-controlled areas, the ‘Third Force’ (the

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petite bourgeoisie and those who supported peace and neutrality) and those living in the newly liberated areas.

Discussions with the Central Military Committee Tran Van Tra arrived in Hanoi in the last week of April 197314 and in early May held a series of discussions with the Central Military Committee, which included Vo Nguyen Giap, Van Tien Dung, Song Hao, Le Trong Tan, Tran Qui Mai and Le Quang Dao. With regards to the military situation, they calculated that while the situation was different for each battle zone, in general the enemy was stronger than the communist side in terms of both military strength (in the ratio of 1:2.5) and equipment, particularly the air force, mechanised units and command and communications. They were especially short of ammunition for their artillery. One important issue that emerged from the military discussions was the problem of recruitment. The war against the Americans had exceeded that of the war against the French in terms of scale and numbers. Since 1965, more than 500,000 young men from the North had been mobilised and many sent to the South. This represented 1.6 per cent of the population of North Vietnam and most of those drafted (7.5 per cent) came from the river delta region. For example, Thai Binh province, in the delta, had contributed more than 8 per cent of its population by 1972. The crux of the problem was how to maintain troop strength at the desired level without depleting the labour force needed to develop the Northern economy, which was not only important for North Vietnam but also for the communist struggle in the South which depended on the North for sustenance. In early 1973, 11 per cent of the armed forces of the North had already been deployed to the South. But it was estimated that they needed another 12,000 to 15,000 more troops in 1973. The solution was to reduce the number of units, maintaining the strength of the regiments at 1,500 men and the battalions at 300–350 men, raising the fighting capability of the soldiers through better training, and expanding the local armies and militia as quickly as possible. The conclusion reached was that unless the above equipment and manpower problems were solved, they would not be able to launch a credible military attack.

Developments in South Vietnam reviewed At this juncture, it is appropriate to review the developments in South Vietnam since the signing of the Paris Agreement on 27 January 1973 up till the May Politburo meeting. Perhaps the most important event, from


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the perspective of the Vietnamese communists, must be the withdrawal of the last American soldier from South Vietnam (and the dissolution of MACV) on 29 March 1973, which the Nhan Dan described as ‘an historic landmark’.15 In a review of the post-Paris Agreement period, the Nhan Dan editorial of 29 March 1973 listed the following ‘achievements’: (1) the US had ended its military operations in both North and South Vietnam; (2) the US had begun to remove the mines from North Vietnamese coastal waters; (3) the Four-Party Joint-Military Commission (JMC) and the fourcountry International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) had been established and had completed a number of tasks; (4) the International Conference on Vietnam, (which convened in Paris from 27 February to 2 March 1973 and was attended by the Vietnamese parties, the five major powers, the members of the ICCS and supervised by the UN Secretary-General), had signed the Act affirming and guaranteeing the Paris Agreement; (5) the two-party Consultative Conference (involving the PRG and the Thieu administration) had begun in La Celle Saint Cloud; and last but not least (6) the North Vietnam–US Joint Economic Committee had also begun their discussions. The same editorial also noted the following ‘violations’ of the peace agreements: (1) the ceasefire had not been effective and ‘the fighting had continued, albeit less violently than previously’; (2) the Americans continued their support of the Thieu administration by turning over all the military bases to the South Vietnamese army and continuing to supply them with weapons and other military materials; (3) under the Operations Enhance and Enhance Plus, the US continued to fly reconnaissance planes over North Vietnamese territory; (4) the Saigon administration did nothing to ensure democratic freedom in the South and they had also not released all military and political prisoners. Not surprisingly, the editorial pinned the blame fully on the ‘US and its lackeys’. The editorial ended with the call for vigilance, noting ‘the overall situation was favourable for the struggle to firmly maintain peace and achieve independence and democracy in the Southern part of the country’.16 In his 5 May 1973 report to President Nixon,17 Ellsworth Bunker, the US Ambassador to South Vietnam, noted that both sides had violated the agreement in the three months since January. The fighting had not stopped and no political settlement was in sight. In his words, there was a ‘resigned acceptance of a situation which is neither war nor peace’. The communists were still active in Cambodia, Laos and the Demilitarised Zone; they had also infiltrated more personnel, weapons and equipment into the South (to counter the US Enhance and Enhance Plus

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programmes) and even harassed members of the ICCS, which made it difficult for the Commission to work effectively. The Joint Military Committee had not made much progress. Tran Van Tra’s absence from Saigon since 30 March 1973 had essentially brought all negotiations to a standstill. (We now know that Tra had returned to Hanoi for consultations.) The two-party (Saigon administration and the PRG) consultative conference/political talks at La Celle Saint Cloud that began on 19 March 1973 were also at a stalemate. The Saigon administration insisted that elections would only be considered after the North Vietnamese armed forces had withdrawn from South Vietnam whereas the PRG demanded the release of all civilian prisoners and the establishment of democratic freedom in the South. Bunker’s assessment was that both sides were slowly working out a balance of forces, which, if successful, could bring about some stability. Notably, the communists at this point of time did not have sufficient troops in the South to support a major military offensive.

The Politburo meeting (May-June 1973) Back in Hanoi, the small group meetings and discussions culminated in the Politburo’s expanded meeting on 24 May 1973 to evaluate the development of the situation since the Paris Agreement and the communists’ strengths and weaknesses vis-a`-vis the enemy. The objective was to map out the communist strategy for the months and years ahead. The COSVN group was present at the expanded meeting to give their views. From the various accounts of Le Duan’s summation of the Politburo meeting on 1 June 1973, we know that there was much ‘heated debate’.18 Tran Van Tra recalled that the discussions were very animated and at times very tense. ‘There was a clashing of many different opinions and interpretations regarding the developments on the battlefields,’ Tra wrote.19 But at the end of the week-long meeting, the Politburo was able to cobble together a consensus: (1) despite its withdrawal from Vietnam, the main enemy of the communist struggle in South Vietnam was still the US and its puppets; (2) the Saigon administration was still strong militarily owing to continued US military and economic support but its political strength was weak due to the growing ranks of the discontented; (3) however, the communist side remained unable to effectively challenge the enemy militarily or fully exploit the enemy’s political weakness. The communist armed force still had to work on its all-round development as its local armies, militia and guerrilla forces continued to be weak in many regions. Its political forces had also not strengthened quickly enough or expanded sufficiently, especially in the urban areas.


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The meeting envisaged two possibilities – either the communist side, working on all fronts (political, military, diplomatic and legal) could incrementally pressurise the enemy to adhere to the Paris Agreement or, failing that, a continuation of the armed struggle until such time when the enemy was defeated and victory was completely achieved. The first possibility was preferable but the meeting agreed that while they would work towards that end, at the same time, they should be prepared for the second possibility. But at this point in June 1973, the view was that ‘both possibilities existed and were evolving’ and the communist side should be ‘flexible but firm’.20 This was interpreted as, in either case, the revolution in South Vietnam could be won only through revolutionary violence and whatever the circumstances, we had to seize the opportunity while keeping firmly to an offensive strategy and adopt a flexible direction in order to take the revolution forward. The question of winning the population over from the enemy, seizing control of more territory and developing the forces of the revolution was both an urgent and fundamental requirement of the South Vietnam revolution at this moment in time.21 Finally, the meeting spelt out the immediate tasks that had to be carried out which included developing the armed forces, winning over the hearts and minds of the population in all regions (including those within the enemy ranks), strengthening and expanding the liberated areas, boosting communist revolutionary activities in the urban areas, and pushing ahead with the diplomatic struggle, not least, the united front activities. The conclusions reached at the enlarged Politburo meeting which ended on 1 June 1973 became the draft report for the 21st Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party later that month and it was subsequently issued as a Party resolution (more commonly known as Resolution 21) in October that year. The 21st Plenary Session ranks as one of the landmark events in the history of the Vietnamese Communist Party.22 It should be mentioned that the decisions reached at the Politburo meeting in June did not amount to an agreement to resume the armed struggle in the South. Soon after the enlarged Politburo meeting, the Hanoi leadership met with Zhou Enlai in Beijing on 5 June 1973. On that occasion, Le Duan told Zhou: the situation will be clear in three or four years’ time. At any rate, the government there eventually must be a democratic and nationalist one. The government can exist for ten or fifteen years. And then the

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An incomplete victory name can be changed. So we are not in a hurry to turn South Vietnam into a socialist entity.

To this, Pham Van Dong added, ‘we are not in a hurry with the goal of national unification’.23 On the instruction of Vo Nguyen Giap, the visiting COSVN officials and military officials of the VPA held a working meeting on 11 June to follow up on the specific military matters pertaining to the South that had been raised at the Politburo meeting. It was agreed that the most important task of COSVN and B2 was to defeat ‘at all costs’ Thieu’s landgrabbing operations, and defend, preserve and expand the liberated areas particularly south and north of Highway 4, Ben Tre province and areas in the vicinity of Saigon and Cho Lon. In the forthcoming dry season, the communist forces would aim for ‘rapid, clear-cut and major successes in annihilation battles’. Besides defeating the enemy’s land-grabbing operations in the east, the communists aimed to destroy the enemy’s military bases at Bu Dang and Bu Na in the southeast. There was much detailed discussion on how to redress the imbalance of forces mentioned at the Politburo meeting. It was decided that they should focus on some key provinces, especially those located in the Mekong River delta. North Vietnam would deploy 17,000 troops to reinforce the B2 battle zone and the first 10,000 would be sent at the start of the dry season. One of the most important items discussed was strengthening the defence of the logistic/supply route from O Rang to Bu Gia Map, Bu Dop and Loc Ninh (through the northern part of Tay Ninh) and also the construction of a new route from Bu Gia Map to Ta Lai Resistance Zone D. It was envisaged that this network of all-weather main and side roads that could be used by mechanised vehicles would be completed within two to three years. To ensure that their colleagues in the South were aware of the plans, immediately after the meeting, Le Trong Tan relayed the content of the working meeting to Tran Do. Meanwhile, Nguyen Van Linh (on the instruction of the Politburo) left Hanoi immediately after the meeting for the South to arrange a COSVN conference scheduled for September 1973. Tran Van Tra also returned separately to the South. The rest of the COSVN group stayed on to attend the 21st Plenary Session and all of them, except Hoang Van Thai, returned to the South after that. One of the items that was raised at the Politburo meeting was the contribution of the North towards the struggle in the South, and the need to increase the solidarity with Cambodia and Laos as well the communist fraternity (read: China and the Soviet), and it is to this subject that we now turn.


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Developments in North Vietnam With regards to North Vietnam, we recall that some quarters within the Hanoi leadership looked forward to the post-Paris Agreement period to re-focus their energy, resources and attention to the socialist and economic development of the North. Indeed, some among the Northern Vietnamese communist leadership were rather attracted by the possibility of a US economic assistance package for the North in the post-Paris Agreement, which was being looked into by the Joint Economic Commission. In his February 1973 meeting with Pham Van Dong, Kissinger noted that Dong was visibly impressed by the fact that the US aid programme, if it materialised, would not be heavy-handed like that of the Russians. Kissinger reported that in his February 1973 meeting in Hanoi, he detected ‘a strong note of ambivalence’ in the North Vietnamese attitude whether to ‘use the Vietnam Agreement as an offensive weapon’ (which would mean giving up US economic assistance) or ‘to honour the Agreement and seek their objectives through gradual evolution’. Hanoi, according to Kissinger, ‘would welcome a more constructive relationship with us [the US], seek our economic assistance and concentrate on reconstruction and building socialism in the north’ but at the same time they were ‘paranoiac, isolated and obsessed . . . morbidly suspicious, their approach conspiratorial.’24 It was not going to be an easy decision to make. There was apparently prolonged and intense debate over this issue, the details of which are still unclear. What we can deduce is that the Party was unable to reach a consensus at its 21st Plenary Session in June–July 1973. The June–July Plenary Session was, according to Hoang Van Thai, only the ‘first round’. All accounts reported that the Plenary Session resumed in October. Indeed, many of the official accounts of the 21st Plenary Session (including Luu Van Loi’s account) placed it in October (without any mention of the earlier session). This would partially explain why Resolution 21 was only publicised in October 1973.25 That ‘the economic rehabilitation and development’ of the North remained a top-priority issue can be seen from the fact that not long after the October session, the Party convened its 22nd Plenary Session in December 1973 to principally discuss economic matters pertaining to the North.26 The tension between the competing needs of the South and that of the North is evident in the following reflection of the Plenary Session: The rehabilitation and development of our socialist economy were being carried out while a very fierce national and class struggle was proceeding in the South. The impact of this bitter struggle on the

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An incomplete victory North was continually felt in many aspects. Therefore in the spirit of the resolution of the plenum, the whole Party and the entire people had to constantly heighten their revolutionary vigilance and stand ready to cope with any eventuality. However, construction could not be neglected. On the contrary, the people of the North had to avail themselves of peace to engage vigorously in economic rehabilitation, heal the wounds of war, develop the economy and culture, build the material and technical basis of socialism, coordinate economic activity with national defence, strengthen the economic and military potentials of our country, stabilise the people’s livelihood, give adequate support to the revolution in the South, while fulfilling their internationalist duty toward the revolution in Laos and Kampuchea.’27

The need to juggle these different demands would continue to occupy the minds of the North till the country was reunified. This was clearly reflected in a December 1974 article by General Van Tien Dung where he wrote: There are times when we have to concentrate our capabilities to build and develop the economy, while at the same time we must still strengthen national defence. At other times, because of the urgency of the situation, we must concentrate our maximum efforts to fulfil every requirement of national defence, but still have to strive to build and develop the economy.28

Developments in Laos As for Laos (which Pham Hung had once described as bound together with Vietnam by fate29), the talks between the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) and the Royal Laotian Government which began on 17 October 1972 concluded with the signing of the Vientiane Agreement on Restoring Peace and Achieving National Concord on 21 February 1973, about a month after the Paris Peace Agreement was signed. The new Vientiane Agreement and the ceasefire that came into effect on 22 February paved the way for the disengagement of US military activities in Laos30 and for the formation of the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU). The new challenge confronting both the communists and non-communists in Laos, not unlike the situation in South Vietnam, was the implementation of the new Vientiane Agreement. An implementing protocol was subsequently signed on 14 September 1973.31 The PGNU was finally established on 5 April 1974 and following that, the last of the Thai Special Guerrilla Units and non-accredited US military personnel


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were withdrawn. Pathet Lao troops moved into Vientiane and Luang Prabang to join with the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) forces to establish a composite police force but RLG troops were not permitted into Pathet Lao-controlled territories.32 North Vietnamese troops also remained in Laos. There was no agreed timetable for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the country. On 12 February 1973, Pham Van Dong told Kissinger in Hanoi that North Vietnamese troops would be withdrawn when a political settlement in Laos had been reached (and not when the ceasefire came into effect, which Kissinger had hoped).33 Like the communists in South Vietnam, the Pathet Lao’s ultimate goal was to achieve full political control over Laos. Pham Hung’s revelation in 1961 that Hanoi viewed the developments in Laos within the context of the situation in South Vietnam and that Indochina formed a unified strategic arena34 remained true in 1973. As Arthur Dommen observed, both sides needed each other to realise their own revolutionary goals.35

Developments in Cambodia The situation in Cambodia was, however, more complicated.36 On 26 January 1973, at a meeting in Hanoi, Le Duan, while informing Ieng Sary of Hanoi’s decision to sign the Paris Agreement, also told him that the Cambodian Communist Party should coordinate its strategy with that of Vietnam. The Khmer Rouge under Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) rejected the idea outright and persisted on a policy of ‘no negotiations’ and continued fighting. The Khmer Rouge wanted to forestall the fearful possibility of the US and Sihanouk cutting a deal behind their backs. In a written interview in March 1980, Le Duc Tho explained: In their [Khmer Rouge leadership] mind, a ceasefire at that time was not to their advantage. With the Paris Agreement signed, they knew that the US defeat was obvious. The Agreement paved the way and created favourable conditions, both military and political, for the victory of the Kampuchean revolution. Therefore they wanted to fight to the end in order to seize total power in Kampuchea, rather than to have a ceasefire and then to negotiate a political settlement.37 Hanoi tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Khmer Rouge leadership to reconsider its policy. On his return to Beijing after a visit to the communist-controlled areas in Cambodia between late March to early April 1973 (which was meticulously arranged by the North Vietnamese against the wishes of the Khmer Rouge), Sihanouk told the French Ambassador to China, Manac’h, that anti-Vietnamese feelings within the

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Cambodian Communist Party were growing at a very rapid pace. Relations between the Vietnamese communists and the Khmer Rouge quickly deteriorated soon after Sihanouk’s visit, with sporadic fighting between the two sides. But the relationship, though increasingly strained, was maintained because as long as the revolution had not been won, both sides needed each other. Hanoi continued to supply arms to the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge continued the sale of foodstuff to the Vietnamese soldiers based in Cambodian territory. It is worth noting that all the above developments took place against the backdrop of the US secret bombing of Cambodia from January till August 1973.

Vietnamese communists’ relations with China and the USSR, 1973 We recall that Vietnamese communists’ relations with China had already been strained to an extent by the Sino-US rapprochement, which took place when the Vietnamese were at war with the Americans. As Le Duc Tho recalled, ‘the 1972 Agreement between the United States and China marked the beginning of the open and comprehensive collusion between imperialism and the Peking rulers’. The feeling was that the Vietnamese communist struggle would have been better served had the Chinese pursued a ‘correct revolutionary line’.38 From Kissinger’s report of his February 1973 visit to Beijing,39 which took place not long after the Paris Agreement, we learn that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were ‘obsessed by Moscow’s intentions’. During the private meetings, the Chinese expressed concern about Hanoi dominating the region ‘as an agent of the Soviet Union’. Kissinger observed that the US was ‘now in the extraordinary situation that, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the PRC might well be closest to us in its global perceptions’. As for US–China relations, the Chinese reception of the US delegation, in Kissinger’s words, ‘was the warmest and easiest ever’ and that the warmth was ‘not kept within a Great Wall of privacy but was made conspicuously public’. It was obvious that the Chinese leadership wanted not only Kissinger but also everyone else to know that they were ‘very favourably disposed toward the US’ following the Paris Peace Agreement and ‘that a new stage had been reached in US–PRC relations’.40 Ilya Gaiduk’s study of North Vietnam–USSR relations during the Vietnam War41 showed that although Chinese influence remained strong during the duration of the war, by 1973, it had diminished considerably, a consequence of Sino-US rapprochement. Moscow was the beneficiary of this development. This was confirmed by Stephen J. Morris’s account.


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According to the 1973 Political Report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi (cited by Morris), the Vietnamese communists had for some time been inching closer towards the Soviet Union and away from China, somewhere between 1968 and 1970 (although there were some hiccups in the following year or two) while at the same time projecting an evenhanded friendly public stance towards both countries. With hindsight, the report said that the Embassy should have detected the subtle shifts. This oversight, according to the report, was because officials were blinded by the ‘Kremlin’s desire for the unconditional loyalty of other communist countries’. But the signs became clear in 1973. North Vietnamese officials had expressed their preference for Soviet views and guidance on important domestic and foreign policy issues in the post-Paris Agreement period.42 Sino-US rapprochement aside, it was, according to Gaiduk, the Soviet leadership’s patient conduct of a two-prong policy towards Hanoi that made it possible for Moscow to win over the North Vietnamese: While, on the one hand, they continued to supply the necessary arms for the Vietnamese to prosecute the war, on the other, they quietly persuaded Hanoi of the benefits of a negotiated settlement.43 One should, however, not overplay the tensions in Sino-Vietnamese relations during this period as they were of the same mind on many issues. For instance, the Chinese were quite willing to ‘back whatever the DRV wanted, and were clearly reluctant to get out in front’, as Kissinger noted in his report of his February 1973 trip to Beijing.44 Both Hanoi and Beijing shared the view that the three Indochinese states should take advantage of the period after the signing of the Paris Agreement to build up and strengthen their forces. As we have noted above, Le Duan and Pham Van Dong shared Zhou’s view that the Indochinese communists should ‘play for time and prepare for a protracted struggle’.45

Hanoi, Beijing and the on-going conflict in Cambodia Both Hanoi and Beijing were also concerned about the ongoing conflict in Cambodia and would have liked the fighting to stop and some semblance of stability restored there. US Ambassador to China, David Bruce recorded in his diary after his 18 May 1973 meeting with Zhou Enlai that Zhou felt ‘particular urgency over achieving a solution in Cambodia’.46 The National Security Council (NSC) noted that the ongoing conflict in Cambodia made it ‘more difficult for Peking to acquiesce in the public manifestation of the rapprochement with Washington, it delays US military disengagement from Indochina, and it most certainly complicated relations with China’s Indochinese allies’.47 Readers should recall the tensions between the Khmer Rouge and the

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Vietnamese communists described earlier. Beijing had only limited influence over the Khmer Rouge and as one NSC paper put it, ‘most of their Cambodian eggs remain in the Sihanouk basket’. But the Chinese ability to control or influence Sihanouk, who had been described as ‘mercurial’, ‘irrepressible’, ‘intemperate’, among other adjectives, was fairly limited. Kissinger had observed that in his conversation with Zhou on Cambodia, the latter at times betrayed a degree of exasperation with Sihanouk. The differences between Beijing and Hanoi with regards to Cambodia outweighed their shared concerns. Beijing’s preference was for the Cambodians to resolve their own differences without outside interference, whether it was the US or North Vietnam.48 They were acutely concerned that the unsettled Cambodian problem offered Moscow an opportunity for ‘anti-Chinese machinations’.49 The Chinese also thought that the strengthening of the Khmer Rouge would be to the advantage of Hanoi rather than Beijing. Sihanouk had apparently told Jerrod Schecter and Stanley Karnow that the Chinese had assured him that Hanoi would not be allowed to ‘satellitise’ Cambodia.50 But the Vietnamese communists were too deeply involved in Cambodia and were either unable or unwilling to withdraw. Zhou pointedly told Pham Van Dong that the Vietnamese communists had military and medical bases in Cambodia that the Chinese were not informed about (although Lon Nol knew about them).51 In a nutshell, the resolution of the Cambodian problem that Hanoi would like to see was the victory of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK) formed by Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge in 1970 over the US-backed Lon Nol, with the caveat that the Khmer Rouge (like the Pathet Lao) would be a junior partner of the Vietnamese communists and that the Khmer Rouge would have control over Sihanouk. The Chinese, on the other hand, wanted Sihanouk, whom they had cultivated over the last few years, to lead and not just act as a figurehead in a post-war Cambodia.52 But there was the question of Sihanouk’s ability to influence or control the Khmer Rouge. In many press interviews, the Prince had told journalists that the Khmer Rouge were exploiting him for their own ends and that his role after a settlement had been reached would resemble that of Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. To Beijing, the ideal resolution would be one where the Russians would not have a role, Hanoi’s influence would be curtailed53 and Chinese interests could be maximised as much as possible. Indeed, Beijing wanted the US to continue to have a diplomatic role in Cambodia because they were fearful that a complete US withdrawal from Cambodia would lead to a vacuum that would be filled by the Russians; hence they were evidently


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vexed by America’s increasing lack of focus in the Cambodian problem. For the same reason, Beijing was not keen on a takeover of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge, preferring a coalition government.54 Although Le Duc Tho might claim with hindsight that the US bombing of Cambodia in the first eight months of 1973 ‘was not much heavier than before’ and that, by comparison, ‘the amount of US bombs dropped in Laos and North Vietnam was much more than that dropped in Kampuchea’,55 there was no possibility then of the communist side agreeing to talks while the US continued to bomb Cambodia.56 Kissinger, however, did not share this view. He was adamant that the bombing halt had in fact deprived the Chinese and Sihanouk of the necessary leverage to push the Khmer Rouge into negotiations.57 The bombing did eventually stop in mid-August 1973 but the talks never materialised. One major theme that Priscilla Roberts distilled from the diaries of then US Ambassador to China David Bruce was that in 1973–1974, the Chinese perception of US inability to move its client Lon Nol to reach a settlement with Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge was ‘a perpetual irritant in Sino-American relations’.58 Neither the Chinese nor the Vietnamese communists were able to deliver a settlement. In an October 1973 conversation with Le Thanh Nghi, Zhou Enlai said that negotiations in Cambodia were not possible at the time because Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge wanted ‘to prolong the fighting for some more time’. Zhou suggested to Nghi that if Hanoi saw any possibility for talks, it should ‘find a suitable moment to tell them’. The Chinese, Zhou explained, were ‘not in a position to do so because we have talked with them a lot about fighting and encouraged them to fight’.59

COSVN Conference (September 1973) We recall that both Nguyen Van Linh and Tran Van Tra left Hanoi for the South before the 21st Plenary Session to prepare for a COSVN conference that was eventually held in September 1973. The aims of the conference were to disseminate Resolution 21 and to discuss how best to implement the resolution. From this conference emerged COSVN Resolution 12. Participating in the conference were a large number of cadres from the provinces, military regions, mass organizations and military units. Most if not all the participants came with local knowledge of the reality on the ground, with an appreciation of their strengths and deficiencies vis-a`-vis the enemy, and were therefore able to relate practice to ‘theory and to the resolution’. Tran Van Tra recalled that the discussions, which revolved over issues such as the balance of forces and the appropriate strategy

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(whether there should be clearly demarcated areas of control, whether the communist forces should consolidate or withdraw from certain areas, how to respond to the enemy’s aggression), were ‘seething and enthusiastic’.60 The dilemma faced by the Southern communists was that while, on the one hand, they truly wanted peace and a respite from the fighting that they had been involved in for decades, on the other, they were fearful of a recurrence of, in the words of Tra, the ‘grievous naivete´ of the 1954–1959 period’. ‘In my heart,’ Tra penned, ‘I still mourn the many comrades who fell in battle – with weapons in hand but not daring to fire – during that period, and mourned the many local movements that were drowned in blood.’61 Reading Tran Van Tra’s account, one will recognise him as one of those who had strong reservations about the ‘political struggle-cummilitary proselytising’ strategy. He felt that those who supported that strategy ‘did not take into account the actual plots and acts of the enemy, and would cause the lower echelons to have pacifist, rightist thoughts and cease to fight’. To Tra, ‘reality is extremely valuable, whether it is the reality of something mistaken or something correct; it is the basis of theory and of policies and lines. Any theory, policy or line not based on reality is mistaken.’62 And here, the reality was that although Saigon had signed the Paris Agreement, Thieu had publicly declared that the war against the communists would continue and that his government had no intention of abiding by the Paris Agreement.

Military preparations After the conference, a military operational plan for B2 in the 1973–1974 dry season (beginning October 1973) was drawn up on the basis of COSVN Resolution and in consultation with the military cadres. This was the first dry season since the signing of the peace agreement and it was expected that the communists and non-communists alike would compete to control both the land and the people. The September 1973 military plan reaffirmed that the communist side would abide by the Paris Agreement and would also ensure that the other party did not violate the agreement, which meant that they could take action against or ‘punish’ those who violated the agreement. To the Saigon administration, this was just a communist ploy that justified their carrying out ‘local attacks while publicly contending that they respected the Paris Agreement’.63 Indeed, at that time, the Saigon side perceived the communist attack on a Saigon Ranger base at Le Minh in the Central Highlands (Tay Nguyen) on 22 September 1973 as the point when the communists resumed their armed struggle. The Southern communist leadership were quite aware that they would first need to strengthen themselves politically, legally and militarily


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throughout the South before they could effectively carry out this plan.64 The September 1973 military operation plan for B2 identified the Mekong delta (particularly Military Regions VIII and IX) as the main battlefield for the 1973–1974 dry season. The mission of Military Region VIII was to attack the enemy who had encroached onto the communist base area of Dong Thap Muoi and to reoccupy Cai Be and Cai Lay (My Tho province), which were located astride Route 4, the backbone of the Mekong delta as well as the areas in Ben Tre province bordering Vinh Long and Tra Vinh. Military Region IX was tasked to attack the enemy who had encroached onto the U Minh base area and to retake Go Quao and Giong Rieng in Rach Gia, in Vinh Long and Tra Vinh. The control of rice was one of the principal objectives.65 Communist forces spent much of 1973 improving and expanding their logistical infrastructure, particularly the construction of a North–South supply line along the Laos–Cambodia border from North Vietnam, to Military Regions I, II and III to Tay Ninh province. They also tried to seize control of ports in Quang Ngai province facing the South China Sea and on the Mekong River in Kontum province.66 Additional manpower and weapons were sent to bolster the communist forces in the Mekong delta. Although there were sufficient military supplies for 1973, Tran Van Tra was concerned that Hanoi had still not yet finalised the supplies for 1974 because the delay would have an impact on the military plan.

Resolution 21 (15 October 1973) and COSVN Resolution 12 Meanwhile, in Hanoi on 13 October 1973, the Politburo met again to round up the deliberations of the 21st Plenary Session that began in June– July 1973. According to Le Duc Tho in 1988, the Politburo had been pressured to convene by the decisions and actions of the communists in the South.67 Despite continued reservations by some sections in the Hanoi leadership who were concerned that an expansion of the fighting might overturn the Paris Agreement and lead to the return of the Americans to South Vietnam (and the implications of a war with the US on the economic development of the North),68 the Politburo was able to issue Resolution 21 which tried to take into consideration the demands of all sides.69 With the issue of the Politburo Resolution 21, on 15 October 1973, COSVN Resolution 12, which called on all to ‘resolutely strike back as the acts of war of the Saigon administration, everywhere in appropriate forms with appropriate strength’70 (emphasis added) was also made public. The main thrust of Resolution 21, in the words of Le Duan, was that:

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An incomplete victory the revolution in the South can only win victory by means of continuous revolution and by violence, by relying on the political and military strength of the people and by making full use of the new factors and advantages that will be brought about by the Paris Agreement.71

Truong Nhu Tang remembered that while the resolution did not yet envision a large-scale offensive, it also did not excessively restrain the forces in the South.72 In his meeting with Kissinger on 19 November 1973, Zhou told him that the North Vietnamese leaders had assured Beijing that they were not planning on launching a major offensive any time soon.73 Indeed, the Vietnamese communist military plan was to make use of 1974 to build up supplies to carry out medium-sized battles in 1975 and larger ones in 1976. One of the questions Vo Nguyen Giap and his military colleagues were pondering over in 1974 was ‘how to establish a new position and new strength on the battlefront as a basis for drawing up the strategic plan for the next few years’.74 It is appropriate at this juncture to turn our attention to the US whose developments the Vietnamese communists (as well as the Thieu administration) were monitoring very closely as they were aware that events in the US would have a direct impact on the war in South Vietnam.

Developments in the US In October 1973, as a consequence of Nixon’s dismissal of the Special Prosecutor investigating the Watergate scandal, the House of Representatives started impeachment proceedings against the President. One of the many implications of this was that Nixon’s authority in making foreign policy began to lessen. In early November 1973, Congress approved the War Powers Resolution, which Nixon had earlier vetoed in October. The War Powers Bill essentially constrained the US president’s authority to engage the US in war. The President, according to the Bill, was now obliged to inform Congress before sending US forces to war, and if that could not be done in a timely manner, he had to do so within sixty days. The above developments, coupled with Nixon’s energy and attention being redirected to fighting his impeachment, which stretched till August 1974, and compounded by the war in the Middle East (which started on 6 October 1973) meant that Washington had little time for Vietnam. Indeed, the US Ambassador to South Vietnam, Graham Martin, was worried that Kissinger’s preoccupation with the Middle East would cause him to neglect Indochina.


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We recall that the Chinese too were rather unhappy with the US for not focusing enough on the Cambodian problem. But these were early days yet in late 1973, and the Vietnamese communists could not take it for granted that the Americans would not return to Vietnam. Truong Nhu Tang recalled that the PRG at that time also was concerned that the Americans might once again deploy their airpower and urged the military to be cautious in carrying out Resolution 21 and COSVN Resolution 12.75 There was the persistent worry that the US would re-enter the war if the South Vietnamese military were in danger of collapse. This issue was often discussed (although by July–August 1974, the consensus was that the return of US troops was slim) but, as time went by, the possibility of a resumption of the bombing could not be so easily dismissed.76

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The situation in the South Le Duan’s letter of 16 November 1973 to COSVN, Military Region V and the Central Party Committees of Tri-Thien and Tay Nguyen clearly described the overall situation at the end of 1973 and the strengths and weaknesses of the communists. According to Le Duan, the communists had in the early months after the signing of the Paris Agreement made a mistake by allowing the enemy to occupy parts of the old as well as newly liberated areas due to their inaction. The communist side also had not made maximum use of guerrilla warfare, and in his words, ‘at the moment, guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines is weak’. Le Duan acknowledged that the war in the South ‘was beset with difficulties and hardships’ and that the enemy remained strong because of their considerable military assets, control over the populated areas and continued American support. The communist forces in the South, on the other hand, did not have enough training and were also short of military supplies, especially artillery shells.1 Nevertheless, Le Duan was confident that the communist side, having struggled for the past twenty years, would eventually achieve victory if they were able to overcome their weaknesses.2 The shortage of artillery shells was particularly serious and the problem was raised again during a discussion with Le Duan in July 1974. In the South, the NLF forces were quietly building up the supply lines and putting the foundation in place for the eventual major assault. Truong Nhu Tang recalled that by the start of the 1973–1974 dry season they had completed their deployment around the Saigon and the delta areas, particularly at Loc Ninh. They were also busy expanding the roads to accommodate the anticipated supplies and mechanised forces from the North. An oil pipeline starting from the Truong Son range was also being constructed. On 2 December 1973, a dozen men from the 12th Vietcong Sapper regiment successfully blew up Shell’s Nha Be oil installation, the

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largest oil storage facility in the South. These sappers had infiltrated into the Rung Sat area opposite the Nha Be facility some time after the 1968 Tet Offensive but it had not been easy to operate in the mangrove marshland. At the end of 1970, US intelligence noted that scale models of the Shell installations were being transported to Tran Van Tra’s headquarters and that an attack on either the tankers and/or the installation was imminent. The absence of US helicopters gunship protection of the tankers after the Paris Agreement made it easy for the sappers to accomplish their mission.3

Military preparations Le Duan in his 16 November 1973 letter had identified six ‘immediate basic tasks’ for 1974: (1) foiling the enemy’s ‘pacification’ strategy and land-grabbing operations, which was the ‘the number-one central task’; (2) protecting and preserving the liberated areas and bases in the South which were under communist control; (3) sharpening the fighting capability of the regular troops especially the multi-regiment army groups for the eventual all-out offensive; (4) foiling the enemy’s ‘economic encirclement’ strategy and preventing them from disrupting the supply lines leading from the North to the South; (5) assisting and working with their Cambodian counterparts, particularly in the event of Thai troops entering into Cambodia; and (6) helping the Pathet Lao to protect their liberated areas and to defend the strategic corridor that connected the three Indochinese countries. Readers should recall that Hoang Van Thai did not return to South Vietnam with his Southern colleagues after the 21st Plenary Session. Thai was sent to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for medical treatment after having being diagnosed with kidney stones during a medical check-up just before his impending departure to the South. This took him away from ‘the action’ in Vietnam until his return to Hanoi in late November 1973. Thai had planned to return to the South before Tet 1974 but because he had still not completely recovered by the end of January 1974, he was told to remain in Hanoi to assist the Central Military Committee and General Staff, which were then facing a shortage of qualified personnel to help the Politburo and the Central Committee. Thai was appointed First Deputy of the General Staff to oversee all operational matters related to as well as to be in charge of the supplies to the B2 Front while Tran Van Tra was promoted to command the B2 Front. Hoang Van Thai’s memoir from late 1973 thus provided a glimpse of how the situation in the South was viewed in Hanoi. In mid-December 1973, Hoang Van Thai informed Tran Van Tra and Tran Do of Hanoi’s

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reinforcement plan for the South in 1974. The supplies would be sent as fast as possible by mechanised transport and the delivery was expected to be completed by March 1974 at the latest. Hanoi would also be sending 26,000 troops to the B2 Front.4 According to Hoang Van Thai, the General Staff of the VPA followed the military developments in the South very closely and representatives from the South frequently travelled to Hanoi to present reports of the changing situation in the Southern battlefields. There were also numerous brainstorming sessions in the course of 1974 to distil the lessons from the fighting in 1971 and 1972 and on the most appropriate strategy to adopt for the 1974–1975 dry season. One of the most significant among these meetings was held in March 1974 when the Central Military Committee convened a conference to review the military situation and to draw up a blueprint for future military action. The conference agreed on a broad strategic policy for the next few years, of which the most salient points included the following: (1) the top priority was to destroy the enemy’s ‘pacification’ and land-grabbing operations; (2) they should gradually raise the level of political struggle in the towns; (3) the main force should engage in battles with discrimination and at the same time consolidate its strength for the anticipated ‘annihilation battles’; and (4) they should simultaneously work at restoring and developing the economy of the North while consolidating and extending the areas in the South under communist control. The Central Military Committee also discussed how the above strategy should be implemented over the next few years. The important point to note from all the discussions was that though the topic was hotly debated, no one expected the reunification of the North and South to take place in the immediate future. Some felt that the major offensive should be launched in 1976 to coincide with the next US presidential election but the downside was that the enemy would have anticipated this possibility. Others thought that the offensive should be launched as early as 1975 though they were uncertain about being ready politically and militarily by then. There were those who proposed a later launching date, in 1977, but, then again, it might be too late. There was therefore no target date set. As Hoang Van Thai, who was one of those responsible for explaining and clarifying the March 1974 resolution of the Central Military Committee to the lower levels, put it When the strategic opportunity offers, when the balance of forces has changed essentially in our favour, when the United States faces serious difficulties both domestically and internationally and we have

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made the necessary preparations, we should decide how to act in the light of practical conditions in order to win important victories.5 Thai spent much of April and May 1974 visiting army units to disseminate the March military decisions. With regards to preparation, there was indeed much that needed to be done. These included recruitment, training for large-scale battles and expanding the supply lines. Thai recalled that, while he was enthusiastic because the conference was unanimous on the resolution, at the same time, he was anxious because too much remained to be done and time was running out. In May 1974, delegates from different battle zones in the South gathered in the North to share and review their experiences in countering the ‘pacification’ campaign. The findings and conclusions of this gathering and other conferences served as inputs for a draft ‘Comprehensive Plan for winning victory in the South’ produced by the Organising Group and Combat Operations Department and which was submitted to the Central Military Committee. During this period, Van Tien Dung was apparently away overseas convalescing from an illness. In his assessment of the draft, Vo Nguyen Giap (who was both the Minister of Defence as well as Commander-in-Chief of the VPA), made a number of points. In his view, there ought to be a two-stage strategy, of which the first stage should be to alter the balance of forces in the military arena in favour of the communist side. At the same time, they should also aim to be stronger than the Saigon administration in the political arena. When the first stage had been achieved, they could then move on to the second stage, which was to launch a general offensive/insurrection with the objective of achieving total victory. Giap felt that the strategic battle could either be launched from Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands) or eastern Nam Bo (the main theatre), but they would have to seize and hold on to the initiative by catching the enemy off-guard through diversionary tactics. Giap cautioned against a premature attack stressing that they should do so only ‘when the conditions were right’. In the foreseeable future, the main forces should keep their military operations at ‘a moderate level’ and not reveal their strength too soon. Meanwhile, the plans for the North and the South should be coordinated. In this respect, Giap was thinking of the role of the North in the provisioning of both manpower and material reinforcements to the South and also the need to prepare for a possible resumption of the air war and/or enemy landing along the coast of Military Region IV (Quang Binh and Quang Tri areas).6 On 18 July 1974, Vo Nguyen Giap assigned Hoang Van Thai and the Combat Operations Department to polish up the draft in time for the Politburo meeting in September 1974.

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Meeting with Le Duan at Do Son Two days later on 20 July, Le Duan (who was then vacationing at Do Son beach) called for a meeting with Thai and the members of the Combat Operations Department to discuss the strategic and military plans. They were told to bring with them all the maps for the discussion. Hoang Van Thai, Le Trong Tan (Deputy Chief of the General Staff) and Vo Quang Ho (who was the Deputy Chief of the Operations department and who also served as the minutes secretary of the Politburo and the Central Military Committee) met Giap for his input before departing for the Do Son beach meeting on 21 July. Le Duan was particularly interested in three issues: the balance of forces in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; the strategic plan for 1975 and beyond, which he expounded in some detail; and the defence of the North. On the balance of forces, Thai and his colleagues informed Le Duan that the Thieu government had not been successful in extending their control in the areas around Saigon and in the Mekong River delta. The communists, on the other hand, had been able to regain control of territories that were lost during the period after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement and were firmly in control of their bases in eastern Nam Bo and around the Saigon. The communists had since expanded their liberated zones in Go Cong, Cho Gao, My Tho, Bac Lieu and Soc Trang and had linked the Plain of Reeds with the communist-controlled areas north and south of Highway 4, U Minh, Nam Can, and the provinces of Can Tho, Rach Gia, Soc Trang and Ca Mau. They were upbeat in their assessment and were hopeful that they could overcome the difficulties of the wet season to further strengthen their gains in preparation for the 1974–1975 dry season. One of the urgent issues that Thai raised with Le Duan during this meeting was the shortage of artillery shells. They had only 100,000 pieces in stock and had to resort to recycling the shell casings. Without sufficient ammunition shells, they would not be able to launch any substantial attacks in the South. Thai suggested that the Hanoi leadership enlist the help of the socialist countries. Le Duan agreed that they should ask for aid from the socialist fraternity including China, even though Beijing had lately been putting pressure on the Vietnamese communists to stop their military struggle. The problem of the shortage of artillery shells remained ‘the greatest concern’ up to the end of 1974 and there were many urgent appeals from the southern war military zones for replenishment.7 One point that Le Duan raised is especially worthy of attention. He placed the Vietnam War in the context of the world situation and specifically that of Southeast Asia post-US withdrawal from Vietnam (and

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the region). According to Le Duan, there were ‘other countries which are trying to gain influence in this area’ but ‘[they] did not possess the necessary strength, nor were they prepared to act’ and that ‘even though they did not openly speak about their strategy, all had secret strategies regarding the Southeast Asian region’. Le Duan concluded that it was critical for the North to achieve a reunification before the situation could be reversed. A unified Vietnam with a population of 50 million would not be an easy target for any prospective invader or interventionist. . . . We had to win and win comprehensively before the Saigon administration could react and reorganise and before any other country could intervene. Hoang Van Thai’s account of Le Duan’s analysis did not identify the ‘countries’ but with the departure of the US, the most likely contenders were China and the Soviet Union. Le Duan expected that the communists should be able to respond as swiftly as possible when required. In his estimate, they should be ready for the ‘general counter-offensive and general insurrection within one or two months’ when the ‘strategic opportunity’ presented itself. They would need ‘whole army corps’ to destroy the enemy divisions and they also had to be highly mobile. He was of the view that many foreign strategists did not believe that the Vietnamese communists could engage in such largescale battles, which was precisely why they had to pursue this strategy ‘in order to take by surprise not only the Saigon administration and the United States but also the other countries which were scheming against Indochina and the whole of Southeast Asia’. Le Duan anticipated that if the communist side grew stronger in 1975, the US would have to replace Nguyen Van Thieu. Hence he advised Hoang Van Thai and his colleagues to seriously consider this scenario and be prepared to take advantage of that prospect to alter the balance of forces in the South.8 Thai and his colleagues had plotted a timeline culminating in a decisive blow in 1976 (just before the US presidential election) or thereabouts, which would open the way for a tripartite government and thus pave the way for the final reunification in another two to three years. But after the meeting with Le Duan they were convinced that they could not afford to wait till 1976 or 1977 to launch a major attack. They would have to bring forward their plans. As Le Duan said, ‘It should be earlier, the sooner the better because the longer it was delayed the more complicated the situation would become.’9

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COSVN conference (July 1974) Meanwhile, in the South, the July 1974 COSVN conference agreed to aim for a decisive victory in 1975–1976. Tran Van Tra recalled that it was not easy to reach that unanimous decision and that there were long debates over the communists’ strengths and weaknesses. But once the decision was made, in August and September 1974, an operational plan for the 1974–1975 dry season was drawn up. Thus, 1975 was to be the pivotal year and both parts of Vietnam would be reunified in 1976. One of the most important and immediate tasks during the current rainy season was to prepare the ground for the coming 1975 dry season. The COSVN meeting also discussed what they would do in the event that the Saigon administration collapsed sooner than expected. It was decided that B2 would launch the final attack on the enemy’s headquarters in Saigon. They therefore needed to expedite the development of the local armed forces, guerrillas and the revolutionary masses. However, the B2 main forces were still small in number and unprepared. Tran Van Tra therefore requested the Central Military Committee to send four divisions to B2. To ensure that the divisions would be able to reach B2 on time, Tra suggested a system whereby instead of the North dispatching the four divisions to B2, the divisions based in Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands) would be sent to B2 and the divisions in Tri Thien be sent to Tay Nguyen and so on, until there were sufficient troops in the B2 theatre. COSVN also proposed that the Politburo convene a meeting of representatives from all the military regions to discuss a unified plan for the final stage of the war.10

Politburo meeting (September–October 1974) Back in Hanoi, having taken into account Le Duan’s analysis, by 26 August 1974, Thai and his colleagues had drawn up the draft strategic plan for both 1975 and 1976 – the seventh draft since they were assigned the task in March 1974. The draft was then circulated to both the Politburo and the Central Military Committee. By August, Van Tien Dung had also returned to Hanoi from his convalescence abroad. His input, along with others, was incorporated into the final draft, which was tabled at the Politburo meeting from 30 September to 8 October 1974. The September–October Politburo meeting was the first of two meetings. On the agenda were two items: (1) a review of the military operations from January to September 1974; and (2) a discussion on the draft strategic plan for 1975–1976 and the operational plan for 1975. The communist side was fairly upbeat in their assessment and there was general agreement that the balances of forces had never been so favourable to

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them. In the assessment of the General Staff, the strength of the enemy was not as formidable as it used to be although it was still significant. The air force and artillery remained powerful while the army still held tight control over the population. But the enemy was finding it increasingly difficult to withstand the communists’ offensives. The economic difficulty of the Saigon administration was one main reason. Morale of the troops was low and the Thieu administration, which was completely dependent on US support, was politically isolated in South Vietnam. In their judgement, the likelihood of the reintervention of the US with ground troops was remote although an intervention using the air force and navy to save the Thieu administration could not yet be discounted. At the same time, the network of roads that the communists had been assiduously constructing was now deep into enemy-controlled territories. Anticipating the days ahead, the meeting considered two possibilities – one was the overthrow of Nguyen Van Thieu and the formation of a coalition government as a first step towards total victory; the other was a military victory within the shortest time possible and with minimal resources and lost of lives. The target year for the liberation of South Vietnam was 1976 or at the latest, early 1977. It would be carried out in two stages. The first stage would be the launching of a series of military offensives in various parts of the South starting from December 1974 to February 1975 with medium-scale military operations in the Mekong River delta and eastern Nam Bo. This would be followed by large-scale military offensives from March to June 1975 in southern Tay Nguyen, north of Military Region V and Tri-Thien. Besides destroying as many as possible of the enemy forces, assets and bases, the military operations would also aim to open up a strategic corridor from southern Tay Nguyen to eastern Nam Bo and Military Region V (Tay Ninh, Kien Phuong, Kien Tuong and My Tho). Finally, from August to October 1975, the military campaigns would be intensified in Tri-Thien and Military Region V with the aim of consolidating what they had gained in the last eight months of fighting and also positioning themselves for the final offensive. The second (and final) stage would see the launch of a general offensive and insurrection in 1976 with the aim of completely liberating South Vietnam. The Politburo endorsed the above strategy and also approved the recruitment of another 150,000 youths into the military by the end of 1974 and another 60,000 by early 1975. It was decided that the meeting (which would be expanded to include the field commanders from the South) would reconvene in December 1974. In the meantime, a summary report of the decisions of the recently concluded meeting would be sent via radio to various field commanders in South Vietnam to give them a

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sense of the direction and as a guide for their planning.11 There was quite a lot of excitement and Hoang Van Thai recalled that ‘an atmosphere of urgency prevailed in all the offices of the General Staff from October onwards after the first meeting of the Politburo’.12 The Politburo meeting ended on 8 October 1974. On the same day, Nguyen Thi Binh announced that the NLF would no longer negotiate with the Saigon administration unless Nguyen Van Thieu stepped down or was replaced.

Politburo meeting (December 1974–January 1975) At the end of October 1974, Pham Hung and Tran Van Tra travelled to Hanoi for the December 1974 expanded Politburo meeting to discuss the finer points and details of the strategic plan for the next two years. The others who also went to Hanoi for the meeting included Phan Van Dang (Nam Bo), Vo Chi Cong and Chu Huy Manh (from Military Region V). In South Vietnam, COSVN too had been discussing what they should do and had drawn up a draft 1974–1975 dry season plan for the B2 theatre, which was divided into two phases, the first from the beginning of December 1974 till the beginning of February 1975, and the second from beginning of March to the end of May 1975. Much attention was concentrated on military operations in Highway 14 to Dong Xoai. The aim was to expand and consolidate their bases areas and to lay the foundation to surround and isolate Saigon.13 Tran Van Tra recalled how they again travelled to the North along the Truong Son range, on Route 559 – the famous ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’, which by this time was a misnomer as it was no longer a trail but a system of motor roads with many north–south and east–west branches which were supplemented by the Mekong River, the Sekong River etc., and had been further embellished by communications lines stretched taut by the wind and POL pipelines that crossed streams and climbed mountains. Tra recalled that on this occasion, they were able to travel ‘much faster and with much less hardship’ than in the past and that they made the entire journey from Loc Ninh to Hanoi by motorboat and automobile.14 Indeed, Major General Charles J. Timmes (US Army, retired) who was then based in Saigon as the US liaison officer with the South Vietnamese military and political leaders, recalled that by end 1974, the communist forces had built up a strong logistic base and road network that improved mobility by leaps and bounds, and although the balance of forces and firepower still favoured the South Vietnamese forces, the gap was closing very fast.15

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The expanded Politburo meeting of the Party Central Committee, which took place from 18 December 1974 to 8 January 1975, is considered to be one of the ‘historic landmarks’ of the Lao Dong Party for it unanimously agreed to maximum mobilisation of effort on the part of the entire Party, army and people in the two zones . . . create favourable conditions to mount general offensives and uprisings to wipe out the puppet army, overthrow the puppet administration from the central to grassroots level, win power and completely liberate the South.16 But that did not mean that the communists had thrown caution to the wind or that they had an unrealistic sense of for their own abilities. During the meeting, Le Duan presented a list of their ‘handicaps’: the regular forces were still not of a high enough quality, their numbers were still small and they were inadequately equipped; they were still not thoroughly adept in combined-service warfare especially over an extended period; in many places, the local armies, militias and guerrillas were still weak and lacking in coordination and there was uncertainty as to whether they could serve as the foundation for the mass movement; and the political struggle in the towns was also weak and not pervasive enough. In contrast, although the enemy situation and morale appeared to be deteriorating, they were still well equipped and well funded. By this time, the general sense was that the US would most unlikely to re-intervene in the Vietnam War. Nixon had resigned four months ago on 9 August 1974 and the US House of Representatives had also in that month slashed US military aid for South Vietnam to US$700 million for the 1975 fiscal (which began on 1 July 1974) from the US$1 billion requested. Pham Van Dong at the Politburo meeting confidently assessed that ‘even if we offered the Americans a bribe to intervene again, they would not accept it’.17 Nevetheless, the cautious Le Duan emphasised the need for a contingency plan in case the US resumed their air and naval attacks. He conceded that though this was unlikely, however, ‘even though there was a 5 per cent probability of this, we had to take every precaution because the US had not yet abandoned its colonialist aims against Vietnam’.18

The fighting in the South While the Politburo meeting was in session, the communist forces were engaged in the Highway 14–Phuoc Long campaign (14 December 1974–6 January 1975). Components of the 4th Army Corps attacked and took

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control of the military districts of Bu Dang, Bu Na and Dong Xoai and liberated Highway 14 and Phouc Long. Highway 14 cut through Phouc Long, which was situated in eastern Nam Bo. This area was the enemy’s northeastern defence line of Saigon and was defended only by three Regional Force battalions and one Ranger battalion. The main roads leading to Phuoc Long province had been completely controlled by the communist forces for more than a year and military supplies could only be delivered by air. According to Major General (retired) Charles Timmes, the communists could have taken the province any time they chose.19 Tran Van Tra’s account of this campaign revealed how initially the decision-makers in the North were hesitant about a full-blown attack on Dong Xoai–Phuoc Long because they wanted to conserve their strength and ammunition (of which they were short supply) for the Tay Nguyen campaign, and to fight the war incrementally. As described above, they did not plan for a large-scale military campaign in 1975. Because the COSVN leadership were directly operating in the theatre of war, they were more attuned to the developments on the ground and were quick to see an opportunity when it presented itself. When in Hanoi, Tran Van Tra and Pham Hung were able to assure Le Duan that the proposal of B2 to attack Dong Xoai would not consume too many resources. This episode also illustrated the occasional friction between Hanoi and COSVN. With the success of the Highway 14–Phuoc Long campaign, for the first time since the Vietnam War started, the communists had complete control of a province near Saigon. The US did not come to the assistance of the Saigon forces despite President Gerald Ford’s assurance on taking office to continue US support of the Thieu administration. Van Tien Dung recalled that it ‘gave a clearer indication of United States’ designs and their ability to intervene in South Vietnam’. In his resignation address later in April 1975, Nguyen Van Thieu referred to the US failure to react when Phuoc Long fell and illustrated how US military aid to South Vietnam had decreased since 1973 which led to the failure to implement both the ‘Vietnamisation’ and the modernisation of the South Vietnamese armed forces programmes.20 The news of the Highway 14–Phouc-Long victory reached the Politburo on 6 January 1975, strengthening their resolve and confidence in their strategic plan.21 We recall the concern and anxiety over the shortage of artillery shells, described above. One principal result of the Highway 14–Phouc Long victory was the capture of an ammunition depot with more than 10,000 shells. With this additional supply, the next target of the ammunitionstarved communist forces would logically be the ammunition stock at Mai Hac De in Buon Ma Thout (located in Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands)) and the military depots at Danang and Long Binh. This approach to

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replenish their ammunition supply was called ‘feeding war on war and fighting while equipping ourselves’.22

The 1974–1975 dry season offensive Besides the very significant prize of ammunition supplies, the bigger objective of launching the military offensive in Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands), which Hoang Van Thai called the ‘curtain-raiser’ of the 1974–1975 dry season offensive, was to open a passageway linking Tay Nguyen with eastern Nam Bo, to facilitate the unimpeded movement of troops into eastern Nam Bo who could then join up with the Southern communist forces to attack Saigon. That would form one direction of attack. From Buon Ma Thuot, the communists planned to create another thrust into Saigon from the South by moving some components of their forces in the direction of Tuy Hoa and Phu Yen. This manoeuvre would allow them to effectively encircle Saigon and also force the enemy based in Military Region V to divide its strength. On 5 February 1975, Van Tien Dung, Dinh Duc Thien (Head, Logistics Department), Le Ngoc Hien (Deputy General Chief of Staff) and a few other members of the General Staff set out for Tay Nguyen where they set up a Command Centre, codenamed Group A75, to oversee the 1974–1975 dry season offensive. The commander of the Tay Nguyen Campaign was Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao and the political commissar was Senior Colonel Dang Vu Hiep. The Tay Nguyen campaign took place from 4–24 March 1975 and involved the 10th, the 320th A, the 316th and the 968th Infantry Divisions, the 3rd Infantry Division (from Military Region V) which joined the campaign on Highway 19, four regiments (the 95th A and B, the 25th and the 271st), two artillery regiments (the 40th and the 675th), three anti-aircraft regiments (the 232nd, the 234th and the 593rd), the 273rd tank regiment, the 198th Special Force regiment, the 14th and the 27th Special Force battalions, two regiments of combat engineers (the 7th and the 575th), the 29th Signal regiment and a number of home front as well as transport units.23 Although among the leadership, there were some (such as Pham Van Dong) who were more optimistic that the Saigon administration would collapse before 1976, most were guarded. As Vo Nguyen Giap put it, ‘The decision to complete the national democratic revolution in the 1975–1976 two-year period is correct. But our planning must provide for the contingency that it could end in 1975, or perhaps not until 1977.’24 When the 1974–1975 dry season offensive began with the Tay Nguyen campaign in March, no one, not even the most optimistic, would

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really have expected the enemy to capitulate so easily within two months and the war would be brought to an end so soon on 30 April 1975. The day-to-day details of the fighting need not delay us here. The Politburo and the Central Military Committee followed the military developments assiduously, met regularly from 11 March 1975, and sent out guidance and instructions. At the 18 March 1975 Politburo meeting, Le Duan exclaimed that the military situation was developing at a rate none of them had anticipated. The Hanoi leadership were also surprised by the US inability to back up the Saigon administration. They calculated that the US was unlikely to intervene. The situation was sufficiently positive for Vo Nguyen Giap to propose that the Politburo gave orders to liberate the South in 1975. Between 17 and 24 March, the communist forces liberated Kontum, Gia Lai and the whole of Tay Nguyen. Meanwhile, on 21 March, the Hue-Danang campaign began. On 25 March 1975, in the wake of the military success in Buon Ma Thuot and Tay Nguyen, the Politburo decided to set up the Danang Front under the command of Lieutenant General Le Trong Tan and political commissar Colonel General Chu Huy Man, and approved the liberation of Danang. The plan was to deploy the communist forces in Thua Thien-Hue in the South and Quang NamQuang Ngai in the north to destroy the enemy forces in Danang and prevent them from retreating to the perimeter of Saigon. The message stressed that ‘at this moment, time is strength, we should act with great boldness and make surprise attacks as to catch the enemy unawares’.25 The Politburo also decided to establish a Council for the Support of South Vietnam chaired by Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi as deputy chairman. Part of the 1st Army Corps was sent to the Saigon area leaving the 308th Division to defend the North. The Hue-Danang campaign culminated with the communists’ takeover of Danang on 29 March. In its message of 29 March, the Politburo concurred with Pham Hung that they should ‘seize every opportunity and act with determination and boldness’ and indicated that the communist side could consider the campaign for the liberation of Saigon to have begun.26 Events in the Southern battleground were indeed developing extremely swiftly. In their evaluation of the military developments of the previous three weeks during the 31 March Politburo meeting (which Hoang Van Thai described as an ‘historic’ meeting),27 the Politburo concluded that strategically, militarily and politically, the communists were holding the upper hand and the possibility of the enemy collapsing was high. The US also did not appear to be making any serious attempt to save the Saigon government. As such, conditions were ripe for a military assault on Saigon–Gia Dinh. The Politburo noted the ‘swift turn of events’ and the

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need to ‘race against time and act with great urgency’. To this end, the 3rd Army Corps was to be redeployed from the Tay Nguyen to the vicinity of Saigon and the reserve Army Corps would also be activated. In a flash telegram of 31 March, Pham Hung and Tran Van Tra were told not to leave for Tay Nguyen but to tarry at the COSVN headquarters to await the arrival of Le Duc Tho (who was on his way to South Vietnam) and Van Tien Dung who had been instructed to travel at once from the Tay Nguyen to COSVN to meet Pham Hung to discuss the plan for attacking Saigon. The Hanoi leadership had decided to establish the Command and Party Committee of the Saigon Front (a unified command comprising northern and southern communist leaders) to lead the battle for Saigon.28 Van Tien Dung’ account of the last stage of the Vietnam War mentioned that Le Duc Tho made this announcement on 8 April 1975 in a full meeting of COSVN. Dung was to be the commander with Tran Van Tra, Le Duc Anh and Dinh Duc Thien as deputy commanders and Pham Hung, the political commissar.29 (After the liberation of Saigon on 30 April, Saigon-Gia Dinh was put under the authority of a Military Management Committee chaired by Tran Van Tra.)30 The Hanoi leadership remained cautious amidst the urgency. One of the reasons was that the problem of the shortage of ammunition had still not been fully resolved. The first boxes of artillery shells had only been delivered to the South in late March but shortage of tank shells remained critical. In its message of 9 April, Le Duan said that after discussions with Vo Nguyen Giap and the General Staff, he advised Van Tien Dung, Le Duc Tho, Pham Hung and Tran Van Tra that they should launch the attack on Saigon only after the bulk of the 3rd and the 1st Army Corpss as well as ammunitions were in place.31 On 14 April, the Politburo approved the military plan for the attack on Saigon and agreed that it would be called the ‘Ho Chi Minh’ campaign.32 On 17 April, 240 vehicles carrying 13,000 mm calibre artillery shells and 440 vehicles carrying spare parts for the tanks and 150 vehicles carrying other ammunition and equipment left for the South.33 In the midst of the fighting in South Vietnam, Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge. Readers should recall the anti-Vietnamese feelings of the Cambodian communists, particularly Pol Pot and his colleagues. According to David Chandler, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese communist troops from Cambodia at the end of 1972 and early 1973 appeared to have made it easier for the Khmer Rouge to attack and even execute the pro-Vietnam Cambodians remaining in the country. Pol Pot deliberately adopted policies (for example, collectivisation) that would show up ‘the purity of Cambodian communism and to contrast between the storming attacks of the Chinese and the more cautious policies of the

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Vietnamese’. A revised history of the Cambodian Communist Party published in 1974 hardly mentioned Vietnam.34 The Khmer Rouge who had always wanted to get out of the Vietnamese shadow were able to liberate the country ahead of the Vietnamese. We still do not know what the Hanoi leadership thought of the fall of Phnom Penh but on 17 April 1975 they were probably too engrossed in their own war in the South to think about the long-term implications of the liberation of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge for Vietnam–Cambodia relations. The Politburo finally gave the green light on 22 April 1975 to launch the attack on Saigon. Beefing up the Saigon–Gia Dinh Command were Le Trong Tan (Deputy Commander) and Le Quang Hoa (deputy political commissar). According to Le Duan, ‘we must race against time, make use of every day, to launch the offensive in good time. Taking action at this moment is the surest guarantee for our total victory. Any delay would be detrimental to us, militarily and politically.’35

Vietnamese communists’ relations with Beijing and Moscow If the Vietnamese communists themselves were taken by surprise by the pace of the military developments in the South since March 1975, Beijing and Moscow, who were neither always very well informed of the situation in Vietnam nor had very much control of developments there, were just as astounded. Unfortunately, hardly any information about the thinking in both capitals is available. However, we do know, as described earlier, that Sino-Vietnam relations had been rocky since 1972. There had been some border skirmishes between both countries in 1973, and in January 1974 the Chinese occupied the Paracel Islands. However, at this point of time, a distracted Hanoi could only raise a lame protest in private. In March 1974, Hanoi closed down the only Chinese language newspaper and the activities of the Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association were also suspended. The high profile given to Khieu Samphan’s visit to Beijing in April 1974 where he met Mao Zedong in contrast to the low key publicity of Pham Van Dong’s visit in the same month added fuel to the already strained Sino-Vietnamese relations. By August 1974, because of health reasons, Zhou Enlai was no longer able to watch over Sino-Vietnamese relations.36 Le Thanh Nghi’s two visits to Beijing – in August and again in October 1974 – showed that it was difficult for Hanoi to extract substantial economic and military assistance from the Chinese. Truong Nhu Tang recalled that at a dinner organised in honour of the PRG delegation hosted by Li Xiannian (who had assumed the duties of Zhou Enlai) in Beijing in late April 1975, the Chinese went out of their

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way to signal to the PRG delegates (as well as the North Vietnamese representatives) present that Beijing was ready to have independent contacts with the PRG, bypassing Hanoi.37 Indeed, the week before the fall of Saigon, General Duong Van Minh (who was installed as the new President of South Vietnam on 27 April 1975), believed that Hanoi would be compelled to negotiate with him. Among his reasons was that the PRG did not wish to be dominated by Hanoi and that Beijing favoured two separate Vietnams, as a united Vietnam would pose a threat to China’s southwestern border.38 On hindsight, during 1974–1975, as Tai Sung Ann correctly noted, Beijing surmised albeit incorrectly that the stalemate in South Vietnam would continue for some time. While the Vietnamese communists had differences with the Russians (they continued to refrain from taking sides in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute and they also procrastinated over joining the Russian-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)), the annual report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi on the relationship between the two countries was on the whole positive.39 While we do not have the figures, we do know that the Russians, compared to the Chinese, were more responsive to the Vietnamese request for economic and military assistance. Moscow still remained an important channel for communication between Washington (which was also shocked by the developments in March– April 1975) and Moscow as illustrated by Anatoly Dobrynin’s recollection of 19 April 1975 when Kissinger requested Moscow to intercede with Hanoi to allow for the evacuation of Americans and pro-American South Vietnamese from Saigon. On 24 April, Hanoi replied through Brezhnev that the Vietnamese communists would not impede the evacuation and had no intention of damaging American prestige.40

The Ho Chi Minh campaign The final offensive (the ‘Ho Chi Minh’ campaign) was launched on 26 April. It was the largest military campaign in the twenty years’ resistance against the United States.41 Duong Van Minh was wrong because Hanoi, sensing victory in sight, was in no mood for negotiations. The Politburo and the Central Military Committee ordered the communist forces to ‘continue to attack Saigon according to plans to advance in the highest mettle to liberate and occupy the whole city, disarm the enemy, disband the enemy administration at all levels, and crush all their resistance’.42 With the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975, the Vietnamese communists finally brought the Vietnam War to an end.

Notes

Introduction 1 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. xi. 2 Ralph Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume 1: Revolution versus Containment, 1955–61 (London: Macmillan Press, 1983); Volume II: The Struggle for Southeast Asia, 1961–1965 (London: Macmillan Press, 1985); Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965–66 (London: Macmillan Press, 1991). 3 Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 1996). The memoir of Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, contains useful and untapped information. See Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995). 4 The following were particularly useful: Ord Arne Westad, et al. (eds), 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in IndoChina, 1964–1977, CWIHP, Working Paper Number 22, May 1998 Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (although the documents pertaining to the period after 1970 are rather few); The Cold War in Asia, CWIHP Bulletin Issues 6–7, Winter 1995/1996; Stephen J. Morris, The SovietChinese – Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970’s: The View from Moscow, CWIHP, Working Paper Number 25, April 1999. 5 See bibliography. 6 Merle L. Pribbennow (transl.), Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002). 7 Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 8 Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977). 9 Tran Van Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Volume 5: Concluding the 30-Years War (JPRS 82783, 2 February 1983). 10 Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong (London: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1986). 11 Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988). 12 Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Hurst & Company, 1995) and From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002).

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13 Hoang Van Thai, How South Vietnam was Liberated (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1992). 14 Vo Nguyen Giap, Tong Hanh Dinh trong Mua Xuan Toan Thang (Hoi uc) (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2000). 15 Nguyen Thi Binh va Tap the tac gia, Mat tran Dan toc Giai phong Chinh phu Cach mang lam thoi tai Hoi nghi Paris ve Viet Nam (Hoi uc) (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2001). 16 See National Security Archive website. Also, see William Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1998). 17 Patricia M. Pelley, Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of the National Past (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 1–15. 18 Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh and From Enemy to Friend. 19 William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball, ‘Nixon’s nuclear ploy’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 59, Number 1, January/February 2003, pp. 28–37, 72–73. 20 George McT. Kahin, Southeast Asia: A Testament (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 294. 21 See Hoang Nguyen, ‘The Paris Agreement on Vietnam – Its Political and Juridical Implications’, Vietnamese Studies, Volume 39, 1974, pp. 23–60. 22 Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 456. 23 Robert Hopkins Miller, Vietnam and Beyond: A Diplomat’s Cold War Education (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2002), pp. 143–144, 148–149. 1 The start of negotiations 1 Bui Tin, From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002), pp. 65–66. 2 Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988), pp. 332–334. 3 Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy 1945–1995, Volume 1: 1945–1975 (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000), pp. 185–188. 4 Vietnamese News Agency, 4 April 1968, SWB/FE/2739/A3/2–4. 5 Tokyo Television Service, 6 April 1968, SWB/FE/2741/A3/6. 6 VNA, 8 April 1968, SWB/FE/2743/A3/2. 7 VNA, 8 April 1968, SWB/FE/1743/A3/3. 8 Bui Tin, op. cit, p. 69. 9 Luu Van Loi, op. cit., p. 190. 10 New Delhi, 12 May 1968, SWB/FE/2769/A3/9. 11 Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1996), p. 16. 12 Ibid., p. 19. 13 Ibid., p. 19. 14 Ibid., p. 32. 15 Ibid., p. 27. 16 Ibid., p. 20. 17 Ibid., p. 190. 18 Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation, 1954–197: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), p. 110. 19 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. pp. 44–48. 20 Ibid., p. 52.

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21 Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1999), pp. 94, 97. 22 Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Hurst and Company, 1995), p. 62. Also, see Luu and Nguyen op. cit., pp. 65–67. 23 Tran Do recalling Tet Mau Than in Military History Review (Ministry of Defence, February 1988) cited in Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. p. 66, ftn. 4, p. 457. 24 Bui Tin, From Enemy to Friend, p. 69. 25 Interview with Bui Tin in Stephen Young, ‘How North Vietnam Won the War in Wall Street Journal, 3 August 1995, cited in Sorley op. cit., p. 94. 26 Ngo Vinh Long; The Tet Offensive and Its Aftermath’, in J. Werner and D. Hunt (eds), The American War in Vietnam (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program) pp. 23–45. 27 Tran Van Tra, cited in Ngo Vinh Long, ibid., p. 26. 28 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. pp. 75–76. 29 Memorandum of Conversation with the head of the DRV delegation Comrade Xuan Thuy and the head of the NLFSV delegation Comrade Tran Buu Kiem at the Paris negotiations, 21 February 1969 (Secret, Copy # 2), CWIHP. 30 According to Kent G. Sieg, the appointment of Lodge indicated that ‘the Nixon administration had adopted a hardline approach to the negotiations’. See Kent G. Sieg, ‘The Lodge Peace Mission of 1969 and Nixon’s Vietnam Policy’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, volume 7, number 1, March 1996, pp. 175–196. 31 Pham Hong Son, Nghe Thuat Danh Giac Giu Nuoc Cua Dan Toc Viet Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1997), pp. 299–301; Bo Quoc Phong Vien Lich Su Quan Su Viet Nam, Hau Phuong Chien Tranh Nhan Dan Viet Nam (1945–1975) (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1997), pp. 256–257; Van Tien Dung, Ve Cuoc Khiang Chien Ching My Cuu Nuoc (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1996), pp. 275–278. 32 LSQDNDVN, pp. 329–338. 33 Bo Quoc Phong Vien Lich Su Quan Su Viet Nam, 50 Nam Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1995), pp. 255–256. 34 For the text of Ho’s will as read by Le Duan on 9 September 1969, see SWB/ FE/3173/C/12–13. 35 See Robert K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 41. 36 See Le Duan’s 6 July 1969 missive to the Party Committee and Military Commission of Tri-Thien in Le Duan, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), pp. 101–115. 37 COSVN Resolution No. 9, July 1969 (Extract) in Gareth Porter (ed.), Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, Volume 2, (Stanfordville: Earl M. Coleman, 1979), pp. 532–536. Also see, Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, The General Offensive of 1968–69 cited in Sorley, op. cit., pp. 155–157 and 427, ftn. 2. 38 LSQDNDVN, pp. 342–348. 39 LSQDNDVN, pp. 344–345. 40 Le Duan, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), pp. 101–115.

Notes

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41 COSVN Resolution No.9, July 1969 (Extract) in Gareth Porter (ed.), Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, Volume 2, (Stanfordville: Earl M. Coleman, 1979), pp. 532–536. 42 Van Tien Dung, Ve Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1996), pp. 278–279. 43 Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy 1945–1995, Volume I: 1945–1975 (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000), p. 199. 44 Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The US, Vietnam and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 84; Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 101; Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1996), pp. 84–85. 45 Beijing Home Service and NCNA, 29 May 1969, SWB/FE/3087/A3/1. 46 For a first-person account, see Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a Vietcong (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), Chapter 13. Tang was appointed Minister of Justice at this meeting. 47 VNA, 13 June 1969, SWB/FE/3100/i. 48 Robert K. Brigham, op. cit., pp. 85–87. 49 Memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR to the USA A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger, Aides to President Nixon, 12 July 1969 (Secret), CWIHP; For more of Washington exerting pressure on Hanoi through Moscow, see Kent G. Sieg, pp. 175–196. 50 David Chanoff and Toan Van Tai, Portrait of the Enemy, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987), pp. 109, 171. 51 Ibid., p. 109. 52 Tran Van Don, Our Endless War: Inside South Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1978), pp. 193–196; Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), pp. 277–282. 53 Ibid., p. 597. 54 Xinhua News Agency, 2 September 1969. 55 See Odd Arne Westad et al. (eds)., 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in IndoChina, 1964–1977, Working Paper Number 22, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, May 1998. 56 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China, Hanoi Home Service, 4–6 October 1979, SWB/FE/6242/A3/1; NCNA, 19 October 1968, SWB/FE/2905/A3/1–2. 57 Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 17 November 1968 in Westad, op. cit., pp. 140–155. 58 See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 169–175, 179. 59 Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Thai, Pham Hung, and Others in the COSVN delegation, Beijing, 20 and 21 April 1969, in Westad et al., op. cit., pp. 158–160. 60 NCNA, 17 August 1969, SWB/FE/3155/A3/1; NCNA, 18 August 1969, SWB/ FE/3156/A3/1; NCNA, 21 August 1969; SWB/FE/3159/A3/1; VNA, 23 August 1969, SWB/FE/3161/A3/1. 61 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China, Hanoi Home Service, 4–6 October 1979, SWB/FE/6242/A3/1. 62 Xinhua News Agency, 2 September 1969.

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63 NCNA, 4 September 1969, SWB/FE/3169/C/1–7. 64 Ibid. The Vietnamese media reported the Chinese message of condolence almost verbatim, but conspicuously omitted the word ‘unfortunately’. It could be that the Chinese were implying that Ho’s death came at an inopportune time when Vietnamese relations with China were facing some difficulties. Whoever was in charge of the Vietnamese media could have wanted to avoid that connotation. As Qiang Zhai put it, the death of Ho ‘removed a figure from the VWP politburo who might have kept the DRV in a more evenhanded neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute’. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 174. 65 NCNA, 4 September 1969, and VNA, 4 September 1969, SWB/FE/3170/C/ 10–11. 66 See Yearbook of International Communist Affairs 1970 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1970, p. 705. 67 Qiang Zhai’s study (cited above) covered the episode of Ho’s death in one paragraph. 68 VNA, 6 September 1969, SWB/FE/3173/C/1–9. 69 Bui Tin, Following the Ho Chi Minh Trail, p. 69. 70 See (a) Truong Chinh’s speech to mark the fifteenth anniversary of Bao Anh Vietnam (Vietnam Illustrated magazine), Hanoi Home Service, 19 October 1969, SWB/FE/3210/B/2; (b) Le Duan’s talk at a conference of cadres at An Thuy District, Hanoi Home Service, 31 October 1969, SWB/FE/3221/B/2; (c) Vo Nguyen Giap in an interview with Ferec Hegedue, Director-General of Nephasereg, organ of the Hungarian People’s Army, VNA, 9 December 1969, SWB/FE/3253/A3/1–3; (d) Pham Van Dong’s address to the Fourth Delegate Congress of the Vietnamese University Students’ Union, SWB/FE/3276/B2–3; (e) on the occasion of Lenin’s centenary, previous speeches/articles of Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Le Duan were produced: (i) an excerpt from Truong Chinh’s 150th anniversary speech on the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx’s birth, VNA, 30 March 1970, SWB/FE/3341/A2/4; (ii) Truong Chinh’s 1954 speech on Leninism and the Vietnamese Revolution, Nhan Dan, 30 March 1970, SWB/FE/3341/A2/4; (iii) Pham Van Dong’s 1960 article on Lenin and the Vietnamese Revolution, Nhan Dan, 3 April 1970, SWB/FE/ 3345/A2/1; (iv) Le Duan’s 1960 speech on Lenin, Nhan Dan, 4 April 1970, SWB/FE/3348/A2/1. 71 VNA, 9 September 1969, SWB/FE/3173/C/12–13. For the controversy surrounding Ho’s will, see Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh, pp. 67–68. 72 For details, see Yang Kuisong, ‘The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapproachment’, Cold War History, Volume 1, Number 1 (August 2000), pp. 21–52. 73 VNA, 28 September 1969, SWB/FE/3190/A3/1–2. 74 For full text of the full communique´, see NCNA, 25 October 1969, SWB/FE/ 3213/A3/1. 75 Radio Peace and Progress, 25 October 1969, SWB/FE/3212/A3/1–3. 76 VNA, 26 October 1969, SWB/FE/3214/A3/1. 77 In 1969, Hoang Van Hoan was a member of the Political Bureau as well as Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. For details of Hoan’s ties with China, see Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 379–386. 78 VNA, 18 January 1970, SWB/FE/3288/A3/1.

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79 See David Chanoff and Doan Van Tai, Portrait of the Enemy (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), p. 121; Truong Nhu Tang, A VietCong Memoir (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), p. 248. 80 Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam: A Long History (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1993), p. 324; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 179–180. 81 Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), p. 215. 82 Van Tien Dung, Toan Thang (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 1991), pp. 46–47. 83 LSQDNDVN, p. 343. 84 COSVN Resolution, Number 14, 30 October 1969 in Gareth Porter (ed.), Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, Volume 2 (Stanfordville: Earl M. Coleman, 1979), pp. 547–550. 85 LSQDNDVN, p. 347; 50 Nam QDNDVN, p. 260. 86 50 Nam QDNDVN, p. 260. 87 Le Duan, ‘Analysis of Revolutionary Strategy’, February 1970 (extract) in Porter (ed.), op. cit., Volume 2, pp. 537–539; Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), pp. 125–126. 88 LSQDNDVN, p. 350–351; 50 Nam QDNDVN, p. 260; Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), p. 132; Timothy Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 105–106. 89 Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, 3 November 1969. 90 Lodge to Kissinger, 11 November 1969, (Henry Cabot Lodge II Papers) cited in Kent G. Sieg, op. cit., pp. 175–196. 91 Ibid., pp. 175–196. 92 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. p. 109. 93 Ibid., pp. 108–109. 94 Ibid., p. 85. 2 The widening war 1 Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris (Hanoi: The Gloi Publishers, 1996), p. 111; LSQDNDVN, p. 350; The 30-Year War 1945–1975 (Volume II: 1954–1975) (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2001), p. 197; Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), pp. 123–124. 2 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 110. 3 LSQDNDVN, pp. 365–366. 4 Ibid., p. 366. 5 Ibid., pp. 366–367. 6 Ibid., p. 360. 7 Ibid., p. 361. 8 Ibid., pp. 358–359. 9 Ibid., pp. 358–359. 10 Ibid., pp. 370–371. 11 Ibid., p. 373. 12 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 113–123. 13 Ibid., pp. 123–128.

172

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14 Zhou Enlai and Pham Hung, Beijing, 19 June 1968, in Odd Arne Westad et al. (eds), 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders of the Wars in IndoChina, 1964–1977, Working Paper Number 22, Cold War International History Project, May 1998, Washington, DC. 15 Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 17 November 1968, in ibid. 16 Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Thai, Pham Hung and Others in the COSVN Delegation, Beijing 20 and 21 April 1969 in ibid. 17 Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea (Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Democratic Kampuchea, September 1978) (hereafter, Black Paper). 18 Gareth Porter, ‘Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea, 1930–1970’, in David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds), Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 57–98. 19 Black Paper, pp. 31–33. 20 Ibid., pp. 27, 34. 21 Phnom Penh Home Service, 18 March 1970, SWB/FE/3333/A3/7. 22 John Byron and Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 356–357. 23 NCNA, 21 March 1970, SWB/FE/3336/i. 24 VNA, 21 March 1970, SWB/FE/3336/i. 25 Hanoi Home Service, 22 March 1970, SWB/FE/3337/i. 26 NCNA, 23 March 1970, SWB/FE/3338/A3/13–16. 27 Zhou Enlai and Pham Vam Dong, Beijing, 21 March 1970, in Westad et al., op. cit., pp. 160–162. 28 Black Paper, op. cit., pp. 35–50. 29 Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E. Goscha, Falling out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930–1975 (Victoria: Amazon Press, 1995), pp. 89–91, ftn. 136 and 138. 30 Black Paper op. cit., pp. 35–36. Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China, Hanoi Home Service, 4–6 October 1979, SWB/FE/6242/A3/4. 31 See Sihanouk’s statements in NCNA, 21 March 1970, SWB/FE/3336/A3/2; NCNA, 21–22 March 1970, SWB/FE/3337/A3/1–6; Beijing (in Cambodian), 23 March 1970, SWB/FE/3338/A3/11. 32 Zhou Enlai and Prince Sihanouk, Beijing, 22 March 1970, in Westad op. cit., et al., p. 162. 33 LSQDNDVN, p. 353. 34 Beijing Review, Number 14, 3 April 1970, p. 28. 35 NCNA, 6 April 1970, SWB/FE/3346/A3/16–18. 36 NCNA, 9 April 1970, SWB/FE/3350/A3/1. 37 Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, My War with the CIA: Cambodia’s Fight for Survival (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 207–210. 38 Phnom Penh Home Service, 7 May 1970, SWB/FE/3374/i. 39 Phnom Penh Home Service, 11 May 1970, SWB/FE/3377/A3/11. 40 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China, Hanoi Home Service, 4–6 October, SWB/FE/6242/A3/5. 41 Mao Zedong and Le Duan, Beijing, 11 May 1970, in Westad et al., op. cit., pp. 163–169. 42 NCNA, 18 May 1970, SWB/FE/3383/A1/1.

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43 Wang Youping and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 20 September 1970, in Westad et al., op. cit., pp. 176–177. 44 Michael Clodfelter, Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the IndoChina Wars, 1772–1991 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995), p. 175. 45 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. p. 139. 46 See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 190–191; p. 260 ftn 66. 47 Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), p. 127. 48 Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, My War With the CIA: Cambodia’s Fight for Survival (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 172; See Francois Bizot for his first-hand account of his encounter in June 1970 with North Vietnamese soldier in the Angkor area, Francois Bizot, The Gate (London: The Harvill Press, 2003), Ch. 2. 49 See Black Paper op. cit., pp. 58–59. 50 LSQDNDVN, p. 385. 51 Thomas Engelbert and Goscha, op. cit., pp. 54–59. 52 Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), p. 177. 53 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. p. 130. 54 The 30-Year War 1954–1975 (Volume II: 1954–1975) (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2001), p. 200. 55 Speech by Pol Pot in Phnom Penh Home Service, 29 September 1977, SWB/FE/ 5632/C/1–20. 56 LSQDNDVN, p. 354. 57 LSQDNDVN, p. 354; Also see, Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), pp. 132–133. 58 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. p. 141; Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p. 70. 59 LSQDNDVN, pp. 384–385. 60 NCNA, 11 May 1970, SWB/FE/3377/A3/1; Beijing Review, Number 20, 15 May 1970. 61 VNA, 14 May 1970, SWB/FE/3380/A3/12. 62 VNA, 14 February 1970, SWB/FE/3380/A3/12. 63 Hanoi Home Service, 23 August 1968, SWB/FE/2857/B/1–4. The speech was subsequently broadcast in five instalments by Hanoi radio. 64 VNA, 12 May 1970, SWB/FE/3379/A2/1–5. 65 VNA, 15 February 1970, SWB/FE/3307/B/10–11. 66 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: Andre´ Deutsch, 1971), pp. 447–448. 67 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 151–152. 68 Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 17 September 1970, in Westad, et al., op. cit., pp. 174–176. 69 Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 23 September 1970, in Ibid. pp. 177–178. 70 See Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), pp. 221–222. 71 Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 19 September 1970, in Westad et al., op. cit., p. 176.

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72 Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 23 September 1970, in ibid., pp. 177–178; Also see Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 154. 73 LSQDNDVN, pp. 374–375. 74 Ibid., pp. 375–376. 75 Ibid., p. 358. 76 Nguyen Thi Binh va Tap the tac gia, Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai phong Chinh phu Cach mang lam thoi tai Hoi nghi Paris ve Viet Nam (Hoi uc) (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2001), pp. 61–63. 3 Fighting and negotiating 1 Vietnam News Agency, 1 February 1971, SWB/FE/3600/C/1–4. 2 ‘The Communist Party of Vietnam: Historic Landmarks’, in The Vietnam Courier, Number 56, January 1977, p. 16; Fifty Years of Activities of the Communist Party of Vietnam (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1980), pp. 207–208; Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), pp. 133–134; The 30-Year War 1945–1975 (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2001), pp. 210–211. 3 Kissinger said that Washington completely missed the signal. See Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 254–257. 4 COSVN Directive No. 01/CT71, January–February 1971 (Extract) in Gareth Porter (ed.), Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decision, Volume 2 (Stanfordville: Earl M. Coleman, Inc., Publishers, 1979), pp. 550–555. 5 Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam: A Long History (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1993), p. 328. 6 LSQDNDVN, pp. 376–377. 7 LSQDNDVN, p. 378. 8 Ibid., pp. 380–381. 9 Robert P. Miller, ‘The Road to Laos’, Army, Volume 40, Number 1, January 1990, pp. 26–35. 10 Ibid., pp. 382–383. 11 Ibid., pp. 386–387. 12 Ibid., pp. 387–388. 13 For details of the visit, see SWB/FE/3630/A3/1–17; SWB/FE/3631/A3/1–2; SWB/FE/3632/A3/2–5. 14 NCNA, 12 February 1971, SWB/FE/3610/A3/5–6. 15 SRV Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China: Continued, VNA, 4, 5, 6 October 1979, SWB/FE/6242/A3/3–2. 16 NCNA, 12 February 1971, SWB/FE/3610/A3/1. 17 Tokyo Television Service, 15 May 1971, SWB/FE/3686/A3/6–8. 18 See for example, NCNA in Chinese, 7 February 1971, SWB/FE/3605/A3/9; broadcast of editorial of Liberation Army Daily (15 February 1971) in Beijing Home Service, 14 February 1971, SWB/FE/3613/A3/4. 19 Full text of speech by Zhou Enlai in NCNA in English, 16 March 1971, SWB/ FE/3637/A3/5–6. 20 NCNA, 9 March 1971, SWB/FE/3630/A3/13–14. 21 Zhou Enlai with Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, Hanoi, 7 March 1971, in Odd Arne Westad et al. (eds), Washington, DC, 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977, Working Paper

Notes

22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46

175

Number 22, May 1998, pp. 178–180; See also Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam War, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 194–195. VNA, 9 March 1971, SWB/FE/3630/A3/16–17. NCNA, 25 March 1971, SWB/FE/3643/A3/10. Zhou Enlai’s meeting with the visiting US table tennis team, see NCNA, 14 April 1971, SWB/FE/3659/A1/2. Message from Premier Chou En Lai dated April 21, 1971 (Delivered to Mr Kissinger – 6.15 p.m., April 21, 1971) in William Burr (ed.), ‘The BeijingWashington Back Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China (September 1970–July 1971)’, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Number 66, 27 February 2002. LSQDNDVN, p. 383. Ibid., p. 384. Ibid., pp. 388–389. See SW/FE/3646/i and SWB/FE/3646/A2–5. ‘Appraisal of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Reports to Establish Communist Infrastructure in Cambodia’, 3 June 1971, Folder 70, Box 4, Central Intelligence Agency Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E. Goscha, Falling out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930–1975 (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1995), pp. 99–100, ftn. 162–166. Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. pp. 168–169. Ibid., pp. 172–173. SWB/FE/3719/I, 26 June 1971. Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 174. Ibid., pp. 178–180. Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), pp. 138–139. ‘Gui Anh Bay Cuong va Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam’, 29 June 1971, in Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam, (Hanoi; Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 1985), pp. 245–272. It is worth noting that this letter was not reproduced in the English language version, Le Duan, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986). SRV Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China: Continued, VNA 4, 5, 6 October 1979, SWB/FE/6242/A3/3–4 Luu and Nguyen, p. 168. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 195–196. Memorandum of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, Beijing, 21 October 1971, William Burr (ed.), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book Number 70: Negotiating US-Chinese Rapprochement. National Security Archive Website. Zhou Enlai and Le Duan, Hanoi, 13 July 1971, in Westad, et al., op. cit., p. 180. Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 191–193. Zhou Enlai and Le Duan, Beijing 1971 (day and month not provided) in Westad et al., op. cit. Stephen J. Morris, The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970’s: The View from Moscow, CWIHP, Working Paper Number 25, April 1999, pp. 12–14. Morris’s account is based on Soviet sources. See note 11, p. 12.

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47 Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), pp. 231–232. 48 Le Duc Tho and Ieng Sary, 7 September 1971 in Westad, et al., op. cit., CWIHP, Working Paper Number 22, pp. 180–181. 49 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit. p. 191. 50 Ibid., pp. 193–194. 51 Ibid., pp. 194–201. 52 Ibid., p. 197. 53 Ibid., p. 198. 54 Ibid., p. 205. 55 See SWB/FE/3804/A2/6–9; SWB/FE/3805/A2/2–8; SWB/FE/3806/A2/3–7; SWB/FE/3809/A2/2–8. 56 Stephen J. Morris, op. cit., pp. 16–17. 57 Ilya Gaiduk, op. cit., p. 232. 58 Text of joint statement signed in Hanoi on 7 October 1971, see SWB/FE/ 3809/A2–7. 59 Roger Warner, Backfire: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 312–313. 60 Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, The White House, 11 November 1971 (Subject: My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues), in William Burr (ed.), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book Number 70: Negotiating US-Chinese Rapprochement. National Security Archive Website. 61 Memorandum of Conversation between between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, Beijing, 21 and 24 October 1971, in William Burr (ed.), ibid. 62 Memorandum of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, Beijing, 26 October 1971, in William Burr (ed.), ibid. 63 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 211. 64 Memorandum of Conversation (Top Secret), 13 December 1971 in William Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 40–42. 65 SRV Foreign Minsitry White Book on Relations with China: Continued, Hanoi Home Service, 4, 5 and 6 October 1979, SWB/FE/A3/3; Luu and Nguyen, p. 210. 66 See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 198–199. 67 Gui Anh Bay Cuong Va Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam Dong gui Khu Uy Saigon-Gia Dinh, 20 November 1971 in Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 1985), pp. 273–295. This is the second of two letters that was not published in the English edition of this book. 4 Negotiations at a standstill 1 Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, My War with the C.I.A.: Cambodia’s Fight for Survival (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 235. 2 Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), p. 232. 3 Memorandum of Conversation, 21 February 1972, Chairman Mao’s Residence, Beijing reproduced in Jeffrey T. Richelson, China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960–1998, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing, Book Number 18, 24 September 1999. National Security Archive Website.

Notes

177

4 Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Le Duc The–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1996), p. 216. 5 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 202–203; Vietnamese Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China, VNA, 4 October 1979, SWB/FE/ 6238/A3/1–16 SWB/FE/6242/A3/1–21. 6 In May 1972, the 97th Regiment was added to the 711th Division. 7 LSQDNDVN, p. 384. 8 Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, op. cit., p. 233. 9 Ibid., p. 233. 10 Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 1 June 1982), pp. 142–144. 11 LSQDNDVN, p. 398. 12 Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, op. cit., p. 232. 13 Another Vietnamese source gave Colonel Tran The Mon as the political commissar. 14 The 1972 Invasion of Military Region I: Fall of Quang Tri and Defence of Hue (HQ PACAF Directorate of Operations (Project Checo Report, 15 March 1973), p. 71. 15 Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Christopher Hurst, 1995), p. 71. 16 LSQDNDVN, pp. 410–411. 17 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 220. 18 Ibid., p. 220. 19 Stephen J. Morris, The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970s: The View from Moscow, CWIHP, Working Paper Number 25, April 1999, Washington, DC., p. 19. 20 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 226–232. 21 See Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. 248–255. 22 Ilya Gaiduk, op. cit., p. 239. 23 Anatoly Dobrynin, op. cit., p. 262. 24 LSQDNDVN, pp. 339–407. 25 Ian Ward, ‘Why Giap Did It: report from Saigon’, in ‘North Vietnam’s Blitzkrieg – An interim Assessment’, Conflict Studies, Number 27, October 1972, p. 5. 26 Robert Shaplen, ‘Letter from Vietnam’, The New Yorker, 24 June 1972, p. 70. 27 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 236. 28 Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 1 June 1982), p. 149 29 Le Duc Tho’s talk to the Paris Peace Conference officials on 14 November 1988 quoted in Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 241–242. 30 Anatoly Dobrynin, op. cit., p. 262. 31 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 240. 5 The peace agreement 1 Zhou Enlai and Xuan Thuy, Ly Ban, Beijing, 7 July 1972, in Ord Arne Westad et al. (eds), 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in IndoChina, 1964–1977, CWIHP, Working Paper Number 22, May 1998, Washington, DC.

178

Notes

2 Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho, Beijing, 12 July 1972, in ibid. 3 Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1996), p. 249. The five-points are: (a) immediate Indochina-wide ceasefire; (b) withdrawal of US and related forces within four months of internationally supervised ceasefire; (c) release of prisoners of war; (d) international supervision; and (e) general principles to guide the negotiations. 4 Ibid., p. 255. 5 Ibid., p. 258. 6 Le Duan, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), pp. 153–174. 7 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 276–277. 8 Ibid., p. 281. 9 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 262, 267. 10 Cited in Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, Volume 2 (Stanfordville: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, Inc., Publishers, 1979), pp. 569–570. 11 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 290. 12 Ibid., p. 297. 13 Ibid., pp. 300–302. 14 Ibid., p. 305. 15 Communist Plan for ‘General Uprising’, 4 October 1972 (Extract) in Gareth Porter, op. cit., pp. 571–573. 16 See The 30-Year War (Volume II: 1954–1975) (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2001), pp. 248–250. 17 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 327. 18 Ibid., p. 313. 19 Ibid., p. 306. 20 See MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, ‘The Pathet Lao Moves Toward Reconciliation’, Pacific Community, Volume 6, Number 3, April 1975, pp. 421–434. 21 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 330. 22 Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E. Goscha, Falling Out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930–1975 (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1995), p. 101. 23 Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), p. 219. 24 Ibid., p. 101. 25 For details, see Engelbert and Goscha (1995), pp. 102–108. 26 Hoang Van Thai, How South Vietnam was Liberated (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1992), p. 11. 27 Robert K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 104–110; see also, Truong Nhu Tang, op. cit., pp. 215–216. 28 ‘Exclusive from Hanoi’, Newsweek, 30 October 1972, pp. 16–17. 29 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 357. 30 Ibid., p. 359. 31 Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 10. 32 Luu and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 385. 33 Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), p. 243.

Notes

179

34 LSQDNDVN, pp. 424–426. 35 Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 11. 36 Wilfred Burchett, Grasshoppers and Elephants: Why Vietnam Fell (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), pp. 162–194. 37 LSQDNDVN, p. 433. 38 For the Vietnamese communist side of the air campaign, see LSQDNDVN, pp. 436–446. 39 Wilfred Burchett, op. cit., pp. 162–165. 40 Linebacker Operations September-December 1972 (U) (Project Checo, Office of History, HQ PACAF (Prepared by Major Calvin R. Johnson), p. 71. 41 Wilfred Burchett, op. cit., pp. 164–165. 42 LSQDNDVN, p. 446; See also, Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), pp. 653–654. 43 Ilya Gaiduk, op. cit., p. 244; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 268. 44 Ibid., p. 244. 45 Zhou Enlai and Truong Chinh, 31 December 1972 in Ord Arne Westad et al. (ed.), 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977, CWIHP, Working Paper Number 22, May 1998, Washington, DC., p. 185. 46 Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho, Beijing, 3 January 1973 in ibid., pp. 185–186. 47 Luu and Nguyen, p. 447. 48 Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., pp. 13–16. 49 Truong Nhu Tang, op. cit., pp. 225–226. 50 Ibid., p. 225. 51 Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), pp. 74–75. 52 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 330–331. 53 Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 22. 54 COSVN Directive 02/73 ‘On Policies Related to the Political Settlement and Ceasefire’, 19 January 1973 (extract) in Gareth Porter (ed.), op. cit., pp. 594–596. 55 50 Years of Activities of the Communist Party of Vietnam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980), p. 220. 56 Report to the Fourth National Assembly Session, 20 February 1973 in Pham Van Dong: Selected Writings (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), pp. 303–320. 6 An incomplete victory 1 Tran Van Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Volume 5: Concluding the 30-Years War, (JPRS 82783, 2 February 1973), pp. 36–37. 2 Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), pp. 220–221. 3 Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy 1945–1975, Volume I: 1945–1975 (Hanoi: The Gioi Press, 2000), p. 285. 4 Robert K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 116–119. 5 Tran Van Tra, op. cit., pp. 31, 33. 6 Hoang Van Thai, How South Vietnam was Liberated (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1992), pp. 19–20.

180 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28

Notes

Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., pp. 23–24. Truong Nhu Tang, op. cit., p. 228. COSVN Directive 03/CT 73, March 1973 (extracts) in Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, (Stanfordville: Earl M. Gleman Publishers, 1979), pp. 615–620. Also contains summary of the main thrusts of COSVN Directive 02/CT 73 (25 February 1973); Vo Truong Son, ‘Vietnam a year after the Spring/Summer offensive’, Southeast Asian Spectrum, Volume 2, Number 1, October 1973, pp. 25–33. Nguyen Duy Hinh (Major General ARVN), Vietnamisation and the Ceasefire (Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program, Report OAD-CR–156, 30 September 1976), p. 131. Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 27. Tran Van Tra, op. cit., pp. 43–44. Interestingly, the BBC reported that Vo Nguyen Giap had delivered a speech at a grand farewell reception for Tran Van Tra on 20 April 1973 on the conclusion of Tra’s successful visit to North Vietnam. See VNA, 20 April 1973, SWB/FE/4277/A3/5. This is a clever piece of disinformation on the part of Hanoi. We now know that if such a reception did take place, it was more a welcome than a farewell as we now know that Tra had only just arrived in Hanoi and was to spend the following weeks in serious discussions with the Hanoi leadership on the strategy for the South. Hanoi Home Service, 30 March 1973 and VNA, 31 March 1973, SWB/FE/4260/ A3/4–5. Hanoi Home Service, 28 March 1973, SWB/FE/4258/A3/1–3. Douglas Pike (ed.), The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President from Vietnam 1967–1973, Volume 3 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1990), pp. 852–862. Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 68. Tran Van Tra, op. cit., p. 33. Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., pp. 69–71. Ibid., p. 71. ‘The Communist Party of Vietnam: Historic Landmarks’ Vietnam Courier, Number 56, January 1977, pp. 15–16. Zhou Enlai and Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi, Beijing, 5 June 1973 in Odd Arne Westad et al. (eds), 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in IndoChina, 1964–1977, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Working Paper Number 22, May 1998, Washington, DC. Memorandum to the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 27 February 1973 (The White House, Washington). See Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), pp. 159–162. The History of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Volume II (Hanoi: Institute for Marxism, Leninism and the Ideology of Ho Chi Minh), pp. 611 and 621. 50 Years of Activities of the Communist Party of Vietnam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980), pp. 220–222. Van Tien Dung, ‘Some Matters in Combining Economic Development with the Consolidation of National Defence’, Hoc Tap and Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan (December 1974 issues) and Nhan Dan and Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 17 December 1974. See SWB/FE/4790/C1/1–16. See also, David W.P. Elliott,

Notes

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

181

‘North Vietnam Since Ho’, Problems of Communism, July–August 1975, pp. 35–52. See Marek Thee, Notes of a Witness: Laos and the Second IndoChinese War (New York: Random House, 1973), Chapter 9. For details, see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: US Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955–1975 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Arthur J. Dommen, ‘Communist Strategy in Laos’, Problems of Communism, July–August 1975, Volume XXIV, pp. 53–66. Grant Evans, A Short History of Laos: The Land in Between (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2002), p. 170. Arthur J. Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 838. Marek Thee, op. cit., Chapter 9. Arthur Dommen, ‘Communist Strategy in Laos’, Problems of Communism, July–August 1975, Volume XXIV, p. 66. The following is summarised from Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E. Goscha, Falling Our of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930–1975 (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1995), pp. 103–117; Also see, Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea (Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, September 1978), pp. 60–65. Anthony Barnett, ‘Interview with Le Duc Tho’, in Anthony Barnett and John Pilger, Aftermath: The Struggle of Cambodia and Vietnam, NS Report 5, 1982, pp. 54–59. Anthony Barnett, ‘Interview with Le Duc Tho’, in Anthony Barnett and John Pilger, ibid. p. 54–59. Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 27 February 1973 (The White House, Washington). Memorandum, to the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 2 March 1973 (The White House, Washington). Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), pp. 247–248. Stephen J. Morris, The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970’s: The View from Moscow, Working Paper 25, Cold War International History Project, April 1999, pp. 19–21. Ilya Gaiduk, op,cit., pp. 248–249. Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 2 March 1973 (The White House, Washington). Zhou Enlai and Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi, Beijing, 5 June 1973 in Westad et al. (eds), op. cit. Also see, Mao Zedong and Le Duc Tho, Beijing, 2 February 1973, in ibid. Priscilla Roberts (ed.), Window on the Forbidden City: The Beijing Diaries of David Bruce 1973–1974 (University of Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 2001), p. 72. NSC Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger on Peking and the Cambodian Issue (Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem), 26 May 1973. Zhou Enlai and Prince Sihanouk, Beijing, 24 January 1973, in Westad et al. op. cit.

182

Notes

49 National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger on Peking and the Cambodian Issue (Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem), 26 May 1973. 50 Ibid. 51 Zhou Enlai and Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi, Beijing, 5 June 1973 in Westad et al., op. cit. 52 Priscilla Roberts (ed.), op. cit., p. 298. 53 Memorandum of Conversation between Teng Hsiao-ping and Henry A. Kissinger, Beijing, 26 November 1974. 54 NSC Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger on Peking and the Cambodian Issue (Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem), 26 May 1973; Priscilla Roberts (ed.), op. cit., pp. 33–34, 445–446. 55 Anthony Barnett, ‘Interview with Le Duc Tho’ in Anthony Barnett and John Pilger, op. cit., pp. 54–59. 56 Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 16 August 1973 in Westad et al., op. cit. 57 William Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 126–127. 58 Priscilla Roberts (ed.), op. cit., p. 34. 59 Zhou Enlai and Le Thanh Nghi, Beijing, 8–10 October 1973, in Westad et al., op. cit. 60 Tran Van Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Volume 5: Concluding the 30-Year War (JPRS 82783, 2 February 1983), p. 52. 61 Ibid., p. 53. 62 Ibid., p. 57. 63 Nguyen Duy Hinh (Major General, ARVN), Vietnamisation and the Ceasefire (Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program, 30 September 1976), p. 132. 64 Ibid., pp. 53–54. 65 Tran Van Tra, op. cit., pp. 61–62. 66 Major General Charles J. Timmes (United States Army, retired), ‘Military Operations After the Cease-Fire Agreement’, in Military Review, August 1976, pp. 63–75. From 8 July 1967 until 29 April 1975, Major Timmes served as the US Embassy liaison with the South Vietnamese military and political leaders. 67 Cited in Robert K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 120, 182 ftn 49. 68 Ibid., p. 119, 181 ftn. 39 and 40. 69 See Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), pp. 160–162. 70 Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000), p. 284. 71 Le Duan, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), p. 176. 72 Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), pp. 229–230. 73 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger on My Visit to China, 19 November 1973 (The White House, Washington). 74 Hoang Van Thai, How South Vietnam Was Liberated (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1992), pp. 87, 97–98.

Notes

183

75 Truong Nhu Tang, op. cit. p. 230. 76 Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 116. 7 Ending the war 1 Hoang Van Thai, How South Vietnam Was Liberated (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1992), pp. 86–87. 2 Le Duan, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), pp. 175–187; Hoang Van Thai, How the South was Liberated (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1992), pp. 87–88. 3 Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), pp. 231–232; Louis Wesseling, Fuelling the War: Revealing an Oil Company’s Role in Vietnam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 37–39. 4 Hoang Van Thai, How South Vietnam was Liberated, pp. 78–79. 5 Ibid., pp. 83–90. 6 Ibid., pp. 95–97. 7 Ibid., p. 142. 8 Ibid., pp. 109–111. 9 Ibid., p. 117. 10 For details, see Tran Van Tra, Vietnam, History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre (JPRS 82783, 2 February 1983), pp. 82–94. 11 See for example, COSVN Directive 08/74 reproduced in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, Document Number 118, February 1975; Le Duan to Comrade Bay Cuong, 10 October 1974: Conclusion of the First Round of the Politburo meeting, in Le Duan, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), pp. 203–221. 12 Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 137 13 Tran Van Tra, op. cit., pp. 100–102. 14 Ibid., p. 103. 15 Major General Charles J. Timmes, (United States Army, retired), ‘Vietnam: Summary: Military Operations After the Ceasefire Agreement, Part I’, Military Review, August 1976, p. 75. 16 ‘The Communist Party of Vietnam: Historic Landmarks’, Vietnam Courier, Number 56, January 1977, p. 16. See also, Van Tien Dung (translated by John Spragens, Jr.), Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam (New York: Monthly Preview Press, 1977 and republished by Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000), Chapter 2; Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy: 1945–1995 (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000), pp. 284–285. 17 Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p. 79. 18 Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., pp. 145–150; Conclusion of the Second Round of the Politburo meeting on the Situation and Tasks of the Anti-US Resistance for National Salvation, 7 January 1975 in Le Duan, op. cit., pp. 222–235. 19 Major General Charles J. Timmes (United States Army, retired), ‘Vietnam Summary: Military Operations After the Ceasefire Agreement, Part II’, in Military Review, September 1976, p. 21. 20 Saigon Home and Television Services, 21 April 1975, SWB/FE/4885/A3/1–17. 21 Tran Van Tra, op. cit., pp. 122–130; Bo Quoc Phong Vien Lich Su Quan Su Viet Nam, 50 Nam Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban

184

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Notes

Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1995), p. 308; The 30-Year War 1945–1975 (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2001), pp. 267–268; Merle L. Pribbenow (transl.), Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam 1954–1975 (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), pp. 358–359; Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., pp. 142–145; Van Tien Dung, op. cit., p. 22. Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 145. Bo Quoc Phong, Vien Lich Su Quan Su Viet Nam, 50 Nam Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1995), p. 310. Tran Van Tra, op. cit., p. 125. To Comrades Nam Cong and Hai Manh, 6pm, 27 March 1975 in Le Duan, op. cit., pp. 236–237. To Comrade Bay Cuong, 6.30pm, 29 March 1975 in ibid., p. 238. Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., p. 189. To Comrades Bay Cuong, Sau and Tuan, 11am, 31 March 1975, in Le Duan, op. cit., p. 239; To Comrades Bay Cuong, Sau and Tuan, 2pm, 1 April 1975, in ibid., pp. 240–244. Van Tien Dung (translated by John Spragens, Jr.), Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp. 152–153. To Comrades Sau, Bay, Tuan, Tu and Tan, 10 am, 30 April 1975, in Le Duan, op. cit., p. 250. To Comrades Tuan, Sau, Bay Cuong and Tu Nguyen, 11pm, 9 April 1975, in ibid., pp. 245–246. To Comrades Tam Thanh, Bay Cuong and Tuan, 5.50pm, 14 April 1975, in ibid., p. 247. Hoang Van Thai, op. cit., pp. 199–200, 211. David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 104–106; David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 208. To Comrades Tuan, Sau, Bay and Tan, 3.30pm, 22 April 1975, in Le Duan, op. cit., pp. 248–249. Zhou Enlai and Le Thanh Nghi, Beijing, 3 August 1974 in Ord Arne Westad et al., op. cit. Truong Nhu Tang, op. cit., pp. 256–257. Major General Charles J. Timmes (United States Army, retired), ‘Vietnam Summary: Military Operations After the Ceasfire Agreement, Part II’, Military Review, September 1976, pp. 28–29. Stephen J. Morris, The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970’s: The View from Moscow, CWIHP, Working Paper Number 25 (April 1999), pp. 21–22. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 348–349. Bo Quoc Phong Vien Lich Su Quan Su Viet Nam, Lich Su Nghe Thuat Chien Dich Viet Nam 1945–1975 (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1995), p. 518. To Comrades Sau, Bay, Tuan, Tu and Tan, 10 a.m., 30 April 1975 in Le Duan, op. cit., p. 250.

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Ho Khang, Tet Mau Than 1968 Tai Mien Nam Viet Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1998). Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 1985). Le Mau Han, Cac Dai Hoi Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2000). Lich Su Bo Doi Dac Cong, Tap I (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1987). Lich Su Dang Cong San Viet Nam, Tap II, De Cuong Bai Giang (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Dai Hoc Trung Hoc Chuyen Nghiep, 1981). Lich Su Dang Cong San Viet Nam, Tap III, Chuong Trinh Cao Cap (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Sach Gio Khoa Mac-Lenin, 1985). Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, Tap II (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1988 and updated in 1999). Luu Van Loi, Nam Muoi Nam Ngoai Giao Viet Nam 1945–1995 (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Cong An Nhan Dan, 1998). Pham Hong Son, Nghe Thuat Danh Giac Gu Nuoc Cua Dan Toc Viet Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1997). Vo Tran Nha (chu bien), Lich Su Dong Thap Muoi (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh, 1993).

Memoirs/first-person accounts Dang Vu Hiep, Ky Uc Tay Nguyen (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 2000). Duong Ho Chi Minh: Hoi Ky Truong Son (Nha Xuat Ban Tac Pham Moi/Hoi Nha Van Viet Nam, 1982). Luu Van Loi va Nguyen Anh Vu, Cac Cuoc Thoung Luong Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Tai Paris (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Cong An Nhan Dan, 2002). Nguyen Thi Binh va Tap the tac Gia, Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong Chinh Phu Cach Mang Lam Thoi Tai Hoi Nghi Paris Ve Viet Nam (Hoi uc) (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2001). Thanh Tin, Hoa Xuyen Tuyet (Hoi Ky) (California: Saigon Press, 1991). —— Mat That: Hoi Ky Chinh Tri cua Bui Tin (California: Saigon Press, 1993). Van Tien Dung, Ve Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1996). Vo Nguyen Giap, Tong Hanh Dinh Trong Mua Xuan Toan Thang (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2000). Zhongguo Wai Jiao Guan Huiyi Lu: Xin Zhongguo Waijiao Fengyun (3 volumes) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1994).

Memoirs/first-person accounts (in English) Bizot, Francios, The Gate (London: The Harvill Press, 2003). Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Christopher Hurst, 1995). —— From Friend to Enemy: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002).

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187

Chanoff, David and Doan Van Toai, Portrait of the Enemy: The Other Side of the War in Vietnam (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Limited, 1987). Dobrynin, Anatoly, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995). Gromyko, Andrei, Memories (London: Hutchinson Limited, 1989). Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988). Hoang Van Thai, How South Vietnam Was Liberated (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1992). Karnow, Stanley, ‘An Interview with General Giap’, in Walter Capps, (ed.), The Vietnam Reader (London: Routledge, 1991). Kissinger, Henry, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). Lam Quang Thi, The Twenty-Five Year Century: A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2001). Mai V. Elliot (trans.), No Other Road to Take (Khong Con Duong Nao Khac): Memoir of Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Southeast Asia Programme, Data Paper Number 102, June 1976). Maneli, Mieczyslaw, War of the Vanquished,(New York: Harper and Row, 1971). Macmillan, Harold, Riding the Storm, 1956–1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971). —— Pointing the Way, 1959–1961 (London: Macmillan, 1972). Miller, Robert Hopkins, Vietnam and Beyond: A Diplomat’s Cold War Education (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2002). Nguyen Cao Ky, Buddha’s Child: My Fight to Save Vietnam (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2002). Radvanyi, Janos, Delusion and Reality (Indiana: Gateway Limited, 1978). —— ‘Vietnam War Diplomacy: Reflections of a Former Iron Curtain Official’, in Matthews Lloyd and Dale E. Brown (eds), Assessing the Vietnam War: A Collection from the Journal of the US Army War College (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defence Publishers, 1987). Roberts, Priscilla (ed.), Windows on the Forbidden City: The Beijing Diaries of David Bruce 1973–1974 (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 2001). Sihanouk, Norodom and Burchett, Wilfred, My War with the CIA: Cambodia’s Fight for Survival (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1973). Tran Van Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre: Concluding the 30 Years War (Ho Chi Minh City, 1982). Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong (London: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1986). ‘We Lied to You’ (interview with Generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Vo Bam) The Economist, 26 February 1983.

Chinese language sources Dang De Junshi Shilue Zhuanbian Yu Renmin Jundui Jianshe (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 1990).

188

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Guo Ming et al., Xiandai Zhongyue Guanxi Ziliao Xuanbian, Volume I and II (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1986). Guo Ming, Zhongyue Guanxi Yanbian Sishinian (Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1992). Han Suyin, Zhou Enlai Yu Ta De Shiji 1898–1998 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992). ‘Huan Nan Zhi Zhong Jian Zhen Qing: Mao Zedong Yu Ho Zhiming’, Congren Ribao, 28 November 1993. Huang Guoan et al., Zhongyue Guanxi Jian Bian (Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986). Huang Zheng, Ho Zhiming Yu Zhongguo (Beijing: Jiefang Jun Chubanshe, 1987). —— Zhongyue Guanxi Shi Yanjiu Ji Gao (Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1992). Jie (Xie) Lifu, Yuenan Zhanzheng Shilu (2 volumes), (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1993). Li Deng, et al., Jianguo Yilai Junshi Bai Zhuang Da Shi (Beijing: Zhishi Chubanshe, 1992). Wang Qi, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dui Wai Guanxi Gaishu (Shanghai: Waiyu Jiaoyu Chunbanshe, 1989). Wang Xiangen, Yuanyue Kangmei Shilu (Jinan Chubanshe, 1992). Xie Yixian, Zhechong Yi Gongchu – Xin Zhongguo Dui Wai Guanxi Sishinian (Henan Renmin Chubanshe, 1990). Xie Yixian, Zhongguo Waijiao Shi – 1949–1979 (Henan Renmin Chubanshe, 1994). Zhongguo Junshi Guwentuan Yuanyue Kangfa Douzheng Shishi (Beijing: Jiefang Jun Chubanshe, 1990). Zhou Enlai Waijiao Huodong Da Shiji (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1993).

Communist documentation/publications in English An Outline History of the Vietnam Workers’ Party, 1930–1975 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978). Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea (Phnom Penh, September 1978, reprinted in New York). China’s Foreign Relations: A Chronology of Events, 1949–1988 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989). ‘Chinese Government and Hoang Van Hoan’s replies to Vietnam Foreign Ministry White Book’, in Beijing Review, 23 November, 30 November and 7 December 1979; 12 October, 19 October and 2 November 1981. ‘Facts about Sino-Vietnamese Relations’, in China and the World (Beijing Review, Foreign Affairs Series I, 1982). Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, 1920–1969 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977). Hoang Khoi, The Ho Chi Minh Trail (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2001). Le Duan, Selected Writings (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977). Le Duan, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986). Luu Van Loi, Fifty Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy 1945–1995 (Volume I: 1945–1975) (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000).

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189

Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1996). Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam: A Long History (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1993). Pham Van Dong, Selected Writings (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994). Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China (Hanoi Home Service, 4–6 October 1979, SWB/FE/6238 and 6242). The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation, 1954–1975 (translated by FBIS/ US Joint Publications Service, Washington, DC, June 1982). The Chinese Rulers’ Crimes against Kampuchea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of Kampuchea, April 1984). The Ho Chi Minh Trail (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982). Tran Van Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Volume 5: Concluding the 30-Years War (FBIS, JPRS 82783, 1983). Truong Chinh, Selected Writings (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977). Vietnam Documents and Research Notes (Saigon: Joint United States Public Affairs Office). Zhong Huaiwen (compiled), Years of Trial, Turmoil and Triumph:- China from 1949 to 1988 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989).

Non-communist documentation Burr, William (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1998). Documents from the National Archives (College Park, MD) and the National Security Archives (NSA/George Washington University, Washington DC). Herring, George (ed.), The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1983). Nalty, Bernard C., Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh (Office of Air Force History, US fair Force, Washington, DC: 1973). Porter, Gareth (ed.), Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, Volume II, (Stanfordville, Earl M. Coleman Publishers, 1979). The Viet Cong Tet Offensive 1968 (History Section, J5/Joint General Staff, RVN Armed Forces, Saigon, August 1968). United States Marine Corpss, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year 1968 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1997). Who’s Who in North Vietnam (no publisher given but believed to be CIA, November 1972).

Monitored broadcasts/reports Keesing’s Research Report: The Sino-Soviet Dispute (Keesing’s Publications Limited, 1970). Keesing’s Research Report 5: South Vietnam: A Political History, 1954–1970 (New York: Charles Scribner, 1970).

190

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Sagar, D.J., Major Political Events in Indo-China (Oxford: Facts on File, Inc., 1991). Summary of World Broadcasts (Far East Series) (SWB/FE) (Caversham: BBC Monitoring Service). Summers, Harry G., Jr., Vietnam War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1985).

Books and compilations Adams, Nina and McCoy, Alfred W., Laos: War and Revolution (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970). Ang Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002). Asselin, Pierre, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Berman, Larry, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 2001). Brigham, Robert K., Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). Burchett, Wilfred, Grasshoppers and Elephants: Why Vietnam Fell (New York: Urizen Books, 1977). —— The China Cambodian Vietnam Triangle (London: Zed Press, 1981). Cable, James, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). Caldwell, Malcom and Lek Hor Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973). Castle, Timothy Neil, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: US Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955–1975 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Chandler, David P., The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). —— A History of Cambodia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). —— Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). Charlton, Michael and Moncrieff, Anthony, Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam (London: Scolar Press, 1978). Currey, Cecil B., Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Vietnam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap (Washington: Brassey’s Inc., 1997). Davidson, Philip B., Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975, (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1988). Dommen, Arthur J., Laos: Keystone of Indochina (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). —— The Indochinese Experience of the French and Americans: Nationalism and Communism on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001). Dudley, Williams and Bender, David (eds), The Vietnam War: Opposing Viewpoints (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1990).

Select bibliography

191

Duiker, William J., The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981). —— China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, Indochina Research Monograph I, 1986). —— Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995). —— Ho Chi Minh: A Life (New York: Hyperion, 2000). Dyke, Jon M. Van, North Vietnam’s Strategy for Survival (Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books Publishers, 1972). Engelbert Thomas and Goscha, Christopher E., Falling out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930–1975 (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1995). Errington, Elizabeth Jane and McKercher B.J.C., The Vietnam War as History (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990). Fall, Bernard, Vietnam Witness, 1953–66 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966). —— The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967a). —— Last Reflections on a War (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967b). —— Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960–1961 (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1969). Ford, Ronnie, Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise (London: Frank Cass, 1995). Gaiduk, Ilya V., The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 1996). Gardner, Lloyd C. and Gittinger Ted (eds), Vietnam: The Early Decisions (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1997). —— International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station, OH: A&M University Press, 2000) Gettleman, Marvin and Susan, and Kaplan, Lawrence and Carol (eds), Conflict in Indochina: A Reader to the Widening War in Laos and Cambodia (New York: Random House, 1970). Gilbert Marc Jason (eds), Why the North Won the Vietnam War (New York: Palgrave, 2002). Gilbert, Marc Jason and Head, William (eds), The Tet Offensive (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1996). Goodman, Allan E., The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978). Han Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1898–1976 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1994). Hannah, Norman B., The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (London: Madison Books, 1987). Hearden, Patrick J. (ed.), Vietnam: Four American Perspectives (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1990). Honey, P.J., Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973).

192

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Kahin, George McT., Southeast Asia: A Testament (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History (London: Penguin Books, 1988). Kimball, Jeffrey, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998). Kirk, Donald, Wider War: The Struggle for Cambodia, Thailand and Laos (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). Kolko, Gabriel, Vietnam: Anatomy of War, 1940–1975 (London: Unwin Hymman Limited, 1987). Lacoutre, Jean, Ho Chi Minh (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968). Langer, Paul F., The Soviet Union, China and the Pathet Lao: Analysis and Chronology (California: Rand Corpsoration, no date indicated). Langer, Paul F. and Zasloff, J. Joseph, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). Lanning, Michael Lee and Cragg, Dan, Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam’s Armed Forces (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992). Lowe, Peter (ed.), The Vietnam War (London: Macmillan Press, 1998). MacAlister, Brown and Zasloff, Joseph J., Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930–1985 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986). MacDonald, Peter, The Victor in Vietnam: Giap (London: Fourth Estate, 1993). McMahon, Robert J. (ed.) Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990). Moore, John Norton, The Vietnam Debate: A Fresh Look at the Arguments (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990). Morris, Stephen J., Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). O’Ballance, Edgar, The Wars in Vietnam, 1954–1973 (London: Ian Allan Limited, 1975). Osborne, Milton, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994). Papp, Daniel S., Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking and Washington (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 1981). Pelley, Patricia M., Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of the National Past (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). Pike, Douglas, Viet Cong: The Organisation and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968). —— History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925–76 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978). —— PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1986). —— Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). Pike, Douglas (ed.), The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President from Vietnam 1967–1973, Volume 3 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1990). Porter, Gareth, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam and the Paris Agreement (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1975).

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193

Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). Smith, John T., The Linebacker Raids: The Bombing of North Vietnam, 1972 (London: Cassell & Company, 1998). Smith, Ralph B., An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume I: Revolution Versus Containment, 1955–61 (London: Macmillan Press, 1983); Volume II: The Struggle for Southeast Asia, 1961–65 (London: Macmillan Press, 1985); Volume III: The Making of a Limited War 1965–66 (London: Macmillan, 1991). Smyser, W.R., The Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Commmunism Between Russia and China, 1956–1969 (Ohio: Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1980). Sorley, Lewis, A Better War (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1999). Stevens, Richard L., The Trail: A History of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Role of Nature in the War in Vietnam (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993). Tai Sung An, The Vietnam War (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1998). Thai Quang Trung, Collective Leadership and Factionalism: An Essay on Ho Chi Minh’s Legacy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985). Thompson, Wayne, To Hanoi and Back: The US Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000). Toye, Hugh, Laos: Buffer States or Battleground (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). Turley, William S., The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954–1975: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). Werner, Jayne and Hunt, David (eds), The American War in Vietnam (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993). Werner, S. Jayne and Luu Doan Huynh (eds), The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). Wirtz, James, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). Zasloff, Joseph J., The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organisation (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1973). Zasloff, Joseph J. and Goodman, Alan E., Indochina in Conflict: A Political Assessment (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972). Zasloff, Joseph J. and MacAlister, Brown, Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives (London: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975).

Articles Brush, Peter, ‘Reassessing the VC Role after Tet’, Vietnam, February 2002. Burr, William, ‘Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps Towards Rapprochement’, Cold War History, Volume 1, Number 3, April 2001.

194

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Burr, William and Kimball, Jeffrey, ‘Nixon’s Nuclear Ploy’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 59, Number 1, January/February 2003. ‘Nixon’s Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam War Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969’, Cold War History, Volume 3, Number 2, January 2003. Chen Jian, ‘China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–1969’, China Quarterly, Number 142, June 1995. Chen, King C., ‘Hanoi’s Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War’, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 90, Number 2, Summer 1975. Crozier, Brian, ‘’North Vietnam’s Blitzkreig – An Interim Assessment’, Conflict Studies, Number 27, October 1972. Elliot, David W.P., ‘North Vietnam Since Ho’, Problems of Communism, July– August 1975. Garver, John W., ‘The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War’, Parameters, Spring 1992. Heder, Stephen, ‘Kampuchea’s Armed Struggle: The Origins of an Independent Revolution’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Volume 11, Number 1, 1979. Hunt, David, ‘Images of the Viet Cong’, in Robert M. Slabey (ed.), The United States and Vietnam from War to Peace (Jefferson: McFarland, 1996). Parker, Maynard, ‘Vietnam: The War That Won’t End’, in Foreign Affairs, January 1975. Phan Thien Chau, ‘Leadership in the Vietnam Workers Party: The Process of Transition’, Asian Survey, Volume XII, Number 9, September 1972. Pike, Douglas, ‘Origins of Leadership Change in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’, in Taras, Raymond C. (ed.), Leadership Change in the Communist States (London: Unwin Hyman Limited, 1989). Qiang Zhai, ‘China and the Geneva Conference of 1954’, China Quarterly, Number 129, March 1992. —— ‘Opposing Negotiations: China and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965–1968’, Pacific Historical Review, February 1999. Roberts, Priscilla, ‘Sino-American Relations, 1973–1974: The Role of David K.E. Bruce’, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, Volume VI, Number II, Winter 2002. Shaw, Brian, ‘China and North Vietnam: Two Revolutionary Paths, Part I and II’, Current Scene, Volume IX, Number 11 and 12, 1971. Smith, R.B., ‘Cambodia in the Context of Sino-Vietnamese Relations’, in Asian Affairs, Volume XVI, Part III, October 1985. Turley, William, ‘The Vietnamese Army’, in Jonathan R., Adelman, Communist Armies in Politics, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). Vo Truong Son, ‘Vietnam a Year after the Spring/Summer Offensive’, Southeast Asian Spectrum, Volume 2, Number 1, October 1973. Yang Kuisong, ‘The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochment’, Cold War History, Volume 1, Number 1, August 2000. Zhang Xiaoming, ‘China’s Involvement in Laos During the Vietnam War 1963–1975’, The Journal of Military History, Number 66, October 2002.

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195

Journals/periodicals/reports Beijing Review China News Analysis Cold War International History Project Bulletin Contemporrary Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO) Reports of Southeast Asia (1961–1975) Far Eastern Economic Review Indochina Monographs News from Xinhua News Agency Nhan Dan Su Kien Va Nhan Chung Tap Chi Nghien Cuu Lich Su The World Today Vietnam Vietnam Courier Vietnamese Studies

Index

Asselin, Pierre 1 Berman, Larry 1 Borchgrave, Arnaud de, 115 Brigham, Robert K. 3, 114, 127 Bruce, David 143, 145 Bruce, K.E. 54 Bui Tin 4, 5, 9, 10, 16, 29, 52, 124 Bunker, Ellsworth 135–136 Burchett, Wilfred 68, 119, 120 Central Military Committee 19, 21, 22, 38, 39, 40, 41, 85, 90, 92, 95, 97, 100, 118. 134, 152, 162 COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam) 16, 21, 22, 25, 27, 33, 38, 47, 50, 51, 61, 74, 85, 104, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 138, 146, 149, 150, 156, 158, 160,163 Chen Jian 3 Chu Huy Man 95, 158, 162 Cooper-Church Amendment 54 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 165 Do Muoi 40 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 23, 25, 99, 102, 107, 120, 165 Dommen, Arthur, 141 Dong Si Nguyen, 39 Duiker, William, 2 Duong Van Minh, 165 Ford, Gerald 160

Gaiduk, Ilya 3, 117, 142, 143 Geneva-Complex (Geneva Conference 1954) 76, 79 Gulf of Tonkin 54, 76 Ha Van Lau 12 Harriman, Averell 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18 Ho Chi Minh 5, 10, 19, 20, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 41 Hoang Van Hoan 4, 5, 9, 20, 31 Hoang Minh Thao, 93, 161 Hoang Van Thai, 4, 51, 118, 123, 128, 131, 138, 139, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158, 161, 162 Hoang Van Vinh 128 Huang Zhen, 78 Huyhn Tan Phat 114, 123 Ieng Sary 50, 79, 141 International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICSS) 135, 136 Johnson, Lyndon 5, 9, 10, 15 Kang Sheng 45 Karnow, Stanley, 1, 144 Katuchev, C 98 Kaysone Phomvihan 71 Khieu Samphan 164 Khmer Rouge (Khmer/Cambodian communists) 6, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 113, 141, 142, 144, 145, 163, 164 Khrushchev 54 Kimball Jeffrey, 1

Index Kissinger, Henry 4, 6, 7, 25, 26, 35, 42, 43, 49, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 71–73, 75–79, 80–85, 87, 88, 98, 102, 103, 105, 106, 108–121, 139, 142, 148, 165 Kosygin 30 Le Duan 4, 9, 20, 22, 29, 44, 48, 53, 54, 68, 69, 71, 74, 75, 77, 78, 85, 86, 98, 104, 105, 123, 132, 133, 136, 137, 141, 143, 147, 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 159, 164 Le Duc Anh 21, 33, 163 Le Duc Tho 5, 7, 13, 14, 15, 24, 42, 43, 44, 49, 54, 60, 71. 72, 73, 76, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 98, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108–114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 124, 141, 142, 145, 147, 163 Le Quang Dao, 63, 90, 93, 134 Le Thanh Nghi 28, 30, 68, 112, 145, 162, 164 Le Trong Tan 63, 90, 93, 134, 138, 154, 162, 164 Li Xiannian 29, 30, 164 Lodge, Cabot 5, 18, 24, 35 Lon Nol 6, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 144 Luu Van Loi 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 23, 35, 52, 75, 77, 88, 108, 112, 123, 127, 139 Ly Ban 31 Mao Zedong 4, 11, 27, 44, 48, 53, 56, 57, 142, 164 McNamara, Robert S. 9 Miller, Robert Hopkins 7, 8 Morris, Stephen J. 142 National Council for Reconciliation and Accord 122, 123, 130 National Liberation Front (NLF) 14, 15, 17, 22, 23, 42, 55, 89, 113, 114, 115, 150, 158 Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) 8, 140 Ngo Vinh Long 17 Nguyen Duy Trinh 10, 11, 13, 44, 70, 97, 98, 111, 112, 124 Nguyen Huu Tho 40, 123 Nguyen Minh Duong, 131, 132 Nguyen Thi Binh 4, 15, 58, 59, 114, 158

197

Nguyen Van Hieu 71 Nguyen Van Linh 131, 138, 145 Nguyen Van Thieu 24, 25, 72, 73, 76, 78, 79, 81, 86, 87, 102, 103, 105, 109, 111, 114, 127, 130, 132, 133, 135, 146, 155, 157, 158 Nguyen Van Tien 25 Nixon, Richard 4, 7, 15, 18, 23, 24, 26, 35, 37, 54, 69, 71, 82, 87, 88, 89, 95, 99, 100, 102, 104, 106, 107, 109, 115, 116, 117,118, 135, 148, 159 Operation Operation Operation 135 Operation Operation

‘Cu Kiet’ 34 Duck Hook 6 Enhance and Enhance Plus Lam Son 719 62–67 ‘Toan-Thang 1–71’ 66, 67

Paracel Islands 164 Pathet Lao 34, 37, 95, 112, 141 Pelley, Patricia M 4 Pham Hung 43, 51, 74, 85, 133, 140, 141, 158, 160, 162, 163 Pham Van Dong 10, 18, 22, 27, 29, 30, 31, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, 62, 68, 85, 97, 115, 126, 138, 139, 143, 144, 161, 162, 164 Plenary sessions; 18th 37, 38; 19th 60, 61; 20th 91, 92; 21st 132, 137, 138, 139; 22nd 139 Podgorny, Nikolai 81, 82, 99, 100 Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) 6, 44, 45, 50, 51, 113, 141, 163 Pompidou 85 PRGSVN/PRG 24, 44, 58, 87, 105, 111, 113, 116, 122, 124, 129, 135, 149, 164, 165 Pribbenow, Merle L 3 Qiang Zhai 3, 75 Sainteny, Jean 26 Serbakov 22, 60, 62 Sihanouk 6, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 68, 71, 89, 132, 141, 144 Siuphanouvong 49 Smith, Ralph 3 Snow, Edgar 61

198

Index

Sorley, Lewis 1 Souvanna Phouma 112 Sri Matak 6, 45, 46, 78 Tet Offensive (1968) 1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 23, 27 Timmes, Charles 158, 160 Ton Duc Thang 120 Tran Buu Kiem 18, 23, 123 Tran Do 16, 94, 138, 151 Tran Duy Hung 118, 120 Tran Van Tra 4, 5, 16, 17, 71, 85, 94, 113, 124, 127, 133, 134, 136, 138, 145, 146, 147, 151, 156, 158, 160, 163 Truong Chinh 4, 20, 29, 53, 121 Truong Nhu Tang, 4, 24, 123, 127, 129, 148, 149, 164 Tu Ky 26 Van Tien Dung 4, 23, 32, 63, 91, 119, 124, 134, 140, 153, 156, 160, 161, 163

Vance, Cyrus 11, 12 Vang Pao 38, 82 Vo Chi Cong 95, 158 Vo Nguyen Giap 4, 10, 20, 29, 40, 44, 50, 89, 116, 138, 148, 153, 161, 162 Vo Van Kiet 21, 33, 61, 131, 132 Vo Van Sung 117 Xuan Thuy 6, 11, 13, 14, 18, 26, 35, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 71, 72, 73, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 97, 99, 103, 104, 108, 113, 114, 117, 120 Ye Jianying 28, 67, 83 Zhou Enlai 4, 6, 11, 27, 28, 30, 54, 46, 47, 49, 53, 56, 67, 68, 69, 71, 75–79, 81, 82–85, 88, 104, 121, 137, 142, 143, 144, 145, 148, 164 Zorin, V. 18

Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 14)

Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia)

US-China Cold War Collaboration: 1971-1989 (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia)

Women's Suffrage in Asia: Gender, Nationalism and Democracy (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia)

Japanese-German Relations, 1895-1945 War and Diplomacy (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia)

The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 22)

Henry Kissinger: Ending the Vietnam War

Capitalist Restructuring and the Pacific Rim (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 19)

The Columbia History of the Vietnam War

Ghosts of War in Vietnam (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare)

Ghosts of War in Vietnam (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare)

The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War

Weapons of the Vietnam War

The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War: A History in Documents (Pages from History)

Imperial Tombs in Tang China (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Early History of Asia, 1)

The Vietnam War: A Concise International History

The Vietnam War

Capital and Knowledge in Asia: Changing Power Relations (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Growth Economies of Asia)

Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913: An Anthology of Travel Writing (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia)

The Oxford History of Modern War

The Oxford History of Modern War

The Atterbury Plot (Studies in Modern History)

The Oxford History of Modern War

Designing Financial Systems for East Asia and Japan (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Growth Economies of Asia)

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