Embodying Technesis: Technology beyond Writing (Studies in Literature and Science)

Embodying Technesis

Embodying Technesis



Embodying

Technesis

Technology Beyond Writing

Mark Hansen

Ann Arbor

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

Embodying Technesis Technology Beyond Writing

Mark Hansen

Ann Arbor

TIm liNIvERsrrr OF MIcmGAN PREss

Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2000

All rights reserved

Published in the United States of America by

The University of Michigan Press

Manufactured in the United States of America

O Printed on acid-free paper

2003 2002 2001 2000

4 3 2 1

No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form

or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise,

without the written permission of the publisher.

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hansen, Mark, 1956-

Embodying technesis : technology beyond writing / Mark Hansen.

p. cm. - (Studies in literature and science)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-472-09662-1 (alk. paper) - ISBN 0-472-06662-5 (pbk. :alk.

paper)

1. Technology-Philosophy. 2. Technology-Social aspects.

I. Title. II. Series.

Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2000 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America @ Printed on acid-free paper

T14 .H287 2000

601-dc21

99-050879

2003

2002

2001

2000

4

3

2

1

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. A elP

catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hansen, Mark, 1 9 5 6Embodying technesis : technology beyond writing / Mark Hansen. p. cm. - ( Studies in literature and science) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-4 72-09662-1 ( alk. paper) - ISBN 0-472-06662-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Technology-Philosophy. 2. Technology-Social aspects. I. Title. II. Series. T14 .H2 8 7 2000 99-050 8 79 601-dc2 1

Foreword: Clearing the Ground

N. Katherine Hayles

A decade ago, when Michael Benedikt, Sandy Stone, and others decided to

organize a series of cyberspace conferences, the idea seemed promising.

Bring together a gaggle of software engineers and a pride of critical theo-

rists, throw them together for three or four days, and see what happens. Sev-

eral months later shock waves were still reverberating through the listservs,

with the engineers complaining that the critical jargon was obscure non-

Foreword: Clearing the Ground

sense that had nothing to contribute to their real-life technologies, and the

critical theorists grumpily responding that the software engineers were

incredibly naive about language and representation. The stand-off, which

N.

Katherine Hayles

has achieved the status of legend in cyberspace circles, is symptomatic of a

larger rift between the lowland fields of the history of technology on the one

hand, and the high plains of critical theory on the other. From the point of

view of the technologist, the critical theorist knows nothing about the work-

ings of technology and demonstrates it by talking in terms so abstract that

material objects are vaporized into mere words; from the point of view of

the theorist, the technologist is so stuck on nuts and bolts that he remains

oblivious of the fact that these objects are never simply present in them-

selves, being always already enframed by cultural assumptions and medi-

ated by discursive practices.

Since then, a number of important initiatives have aimed at integrating

the technoscapes that surround us with the intimate bodily terrains through

which we understand language and culture. In Reading Minds Mark Turner

suggests that the field of literary studies should reformulate itself through

understandings based on the cognitive sciences; George Lakoff and Mark

Johnson have sought to show how language emanates from bodily experi-

ence and remains marked by it. Andy Clark has articulated an "extended

mind" model that enrolls technical objects into the human cognitive system;

Edwin Hutchins argues that change propagates across extended cognitive

systems through self-organizing swirls of activity which include human and

A decade ago, when Michael Benedikt, Sandy Stone, and others decided to organize a series of cyberspace conferences, the idea seemed promising. Bring together a gaggle of software engineers and a pride of critical theo­ rists, throw them together for three or four days, and see what happens. Sev­ eral months later shock waves were still reverberating through the listservs, with the engineers complaining that the critical j argon was obscure non­ sense that had nothing to contribute to their real-life technologies, and the critical theorists grumpily responding that the software engineers were incredibly naive about language and representation. The stand-off, which has achieved the status of legend in cyberspace circles, is symptomatic of a larger rift between the lowland fields of the history of technology on the one hand, and the high plains of critical theory on the other. From the point of view of the technologist, the critical theorist knows nothing about the work­ ings of technology and demonstrates it by talking in terms so abstract that material obj ects are vaporized into mere words; from the point of view of the theorist, the technologist is so stuck on nuts and bolts that he remains oblivious of the fact that these obj ects are never simply present in them­ selves, being always already enframed by cultural assumptions and medi­ ated by discursive practices. Since then, a number of important initiatives have aimed at integrating the technoscapes that surround us with the intimate bodily terrains through which we understand language and culture. In Reading Minds Mark Turner suggests that the field of literary studies should reformulate itself through understandings based on the cognitive sciences; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have sought to show how language emanates from bodily experi­ ence and remains marked by it. Andy Clark has articulated an " extended mind" model that enrolls technical obj ects into the human cognitive system; Edwin Hutchins argues that change propagates across extended cognitive systems through self-organizing swirls of activity which include human and

vi

vi * Foreword

nonhuman actors.1 Diverse as these programs are, they share a conviction

that human cognition does not stand apart from the world of technical

objects but remains deeply immersed within it.

Cognition, in this view, does not issue from the mind alone but extends

beyond the neocortex into the lower brain, the limbic system, the central

nervous system, and the peripheral nervous system. Cognition also reaches

out into the techno-environment, dissolving the boundary between inside

and outside into fluid assemblages that incorporate technical artifacts into

the human cognitive system, not just as metaphors but as working parts of

everyday thoughts and actions. For these researchers, understanding lan-

guage and culture means first of all grasping how cognition emerges from

bodily and physical realities. Yet the very everyday-ness of these models iso-

lates them from the complex linguistic performances that are the subject and

vehicle for critical arguments espousing the self-enclosing nature of lan-

guage. Moreover, although the models assume the physically real nature of

technology, they tend to emphasize the interfaces connecting technology

and human cognition rather than technology as a thing in itself.

We are long overdue, then, for the rigorous, thorough, and far-reaching

analysis that Mark Hansen mounts in Embodying Technesis: Technology

Beyond Writing. Hansen argues that technology is much more important

for everyday life than scientific theories are, reminding us of Isaac Asimov's

comment that it would make far more difference in our lives if the automo-

bile had not been invented than if Einstein had failed to formulate the the-

ory of relativity. For Hansen, technology is the primary determinant of the

human lifeworld and has been so for thousands of years. He finds it partic-

ularly ironic, then, that contemporary critical theory has consistently

treated technology as a trope or representation rather than a physical real-

ity in the world, a move he calls technesis, or "the putting-into-discourse of

technology" (4).

Ranging widely across influential theorists of the twentieth century,

including Freud, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault, Hansen exhibits

the crucial moves that reduce technology from material reality to discourse.

Paying meticulous attention to each theorist's overall project as well as to

the details of the arguments, Hansen displays an awe-inspiring erudition

and a remarkable ability to analyze complex arguments. This book is

polemical in the best sense, for Hansen's project does not pretend to be a

neutral examination of the question of technology. Rather, this is a book

with a mission and a quest. The mission is to show how pervasively techne-

sis has infected contemporary theory, and the quest is to find theoretical

•

Foreword

nonhuman actors. 1 Diverse as these programs are, they share a conviction that human cognition does not stand apart from the world of technical obj ects but remains deeply immersed within it. Cognition, in this view, does not issue from the mind alone but extends beyond the neocortex into the lower brain, the limbic system, the central nervous system, and the peripheral nervous system. Cognition also reaches out into the techno-environment, dissolving the boundary between inside and outside into fluid assemblages that incorporate technical artifacts into the human cognitive system, not j ust as metaphors but as working parts of everyday thoughts and actions. For these researchers, understanding lan­ guage and culture means first of all grasping how cognition emerges from bodily and physical realities. Yet the very everyday-ness of these models iso­ lates them from the complex linguistic performances that are the subj ect and vehicle for critical arguments espousing the self-enclosing nature of lan­ guage. Moreover, although the models assume the physically real nature of technology, they tend to emphasize the interfaces connecting technology and human cognition rather than technology as a thing in itself. We are long overdue, then, for the rigorous, thorough, and far-reaching analysis that Mark Hansen mounts in Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing. Hansen argues that technology is much more important for everyday life than scientific theories are, reminding us of Isaac Asimov's comment that it would make far more difference in our lives if the automo­ bile had not been invented than if Einstein had failed to formulate the the­ ory of relativity. For Hansen, technology is the primary determinant of the human lifeworld and has been so for thousands of years. He finds it partic­ ularly ironic, then, that contemporary critical theory has consistently treated technology as a trope or representation rather than a physical real­ ity in the world, a move he calls technesis, or " the putting-into-discourse of technology " ( 4 ) . Ranging widely across influential theorists o f the twentieth century, including Freud, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault, Hansen exhibits the crucial moves that reduce technology from material reality to discourse. Paying meticulous attention to each theorist's overall proj ect as well as to the details of the arguments, Hansen displays an awe-inspiring erudition and a remarkable ability to analyze complex arguments. This book is polemical in the best sense, for Hansen's proj ect does not pretend to be a neutral examination of the question of technology. Rather, this is a book with a mission and a quest. The mission is to show how pervasively techne­ sis has infected contemporary theory, and the quest is to find theoretical

Foreword

Foreword * vii

tools he can adapt to give a robust account of technology in its irreducible

materiality that exists beyond discourse and representation.

For him the most promising avenue lies in Walter Benjamin's essays about

Baudelaire's poetics, in which Benjamin develops the idea of material inter-

ventions that deliver a "shock" to the human nervous system by operating

below the level of the neocortex. Hansen follows Benjamin in picking up on

Freud's speculation about a "dead cortical layer" that insulates the neocor-

tex from precognitive perceptions. Although Freud's neurophysiological

speculations have been discredited, there is ample contemporary evidence

from such researchers as Antonio Damasio that cognition extends through-

out the body and includes emotions, kinesthesia, proprioception, and other

sensations located in the lower brain, limbic system, and central nervous sys-

tem.2 Although such sensations can be given verbal expression, they origi-

nate as nonverbal perceptions and need not be brought into language at all.

The important point here for Hansen, as for Damasio, is that a highly sensi-

tive and interactive realm of experience exists that precedes linguistic expres-

sion and legitimately counts as cognition. Hansen argues that such experi-

ences function as nonverbal avenues through which humans experience

technology in its robust materiality. By attending to these "shocks," we can

understand technology as an important experience in our lives beyond how

it is represented in language. What Hansen is after is "a process of embodied

reception-of reception as embodiment-that culminates in a nonrepresen-

tational experience of embodied physiological sensation" (261).

This quest engenders a paradox that is not likely to escape the notice of

technologically oriented readers. We can uncover the paradox by compar-

ing the route through which Hansen comes to his quest to the path taken by

Damasio. Damasio's conclusions are based on three decades of work with

neurologically damaged patients at the University of Iowa Hospital, which

serves as the tertiary care facility for patients throughout the central Mid-

western area. When Damasio writes about emotions as the body murmur-

ing to the mind, underlying his poetic language are his experiences with

hundreds of PET scans, X-rays, CAT scans, and other diagnostic proce-

dures, as well as his examinations of literally thousands of patients.

Hansen's body of evidence, by contrast, consists not of intimate physical

knowledge of medical imaging technologies and damaged human neural

systems but rather the very theoretical writings he wishes to go beyond in

order to grasp technology as a thing in itself. His analysis is remarkable for

the absence of particular technologies used either as examples or as occa-

sions for analytical exploration. Skeptics might wonder if Hansen suffers

•

vii

tools he can adapt to give a robust account of technology in its irreducible materiality that exists beyond discourse and representation. For him the most promising avenue lies in Walter Benj amin's essays about Baudelaire's poetics, in which Benjamin develops the idea of material inter­ ventions that deliver a " shock" to the human nervous system by operating below the level of the neocortex. Hansen follows Benj amin in picking up on Freud's speculation about a " dead cortical layer" that insulates the neocor­ tex from precognitive perceptions. Although Freud's neurophysiological speculations have been discredited, there is ample contemporary evidence from such researchers as Antonio Damasio that cognition extends through­ out the body and includes emotions, kinesthesia, proprioception, and other sensations located in the lower brain, limbic system, and central nervous sys­ tem.2 Although such sensations can be given verbal expression, they origi­ nate as nonverbal perceptions and need not be brought into language at all. The important point here for Hansen, as for Damasio, is that a highly sensi­ tive and interactive realm of experience exists that precedes linguistic expres­ sion and legitimately counts as cognition. Hansen argues that such experi­ ences function as nonverbal avenues through which humans experience technology in its robust materiality. By attending to these " shocks, " we can understand technology as an important experience in our lives beyond how it is represented in language. What Hansen is after is " a process of embodied reception-of reception as embodiment-that culminates in a nonrepresen­ tational experience of embodied physiological sensation" (26 1 ) . This quest engenders a paradox that i s not likely to escape the notice of technologically oriented readers. We can uncover the paradox by compar­ ing the route through which Hansen comes to his quest to the path taken by D amasio. Damasio's conclusions are based on three decades of work with neurologically damaged patients at the University of Iowa Hospital, which serves as the tertiary care facility for patients throughout the central Mid­ western area. When Damasio writes about emotions as the body murmur­ ing to the mind, underlying his poetic language are his experiences with hundreds of PET scans, X-rays, CAT scans, and other diagnostic proce­ dures, as well as his examinations of literally thousands of patients . Hansen's body of evidence, by contrast, consists not of intimate physical knowledge of medical imaging technologies and damaged human neural systems but rather the very theoretical writings he wishes to go beyond in order to grasp technology as a thing in itself. His analysis is remarkable for the absence of particular technologies used either as examples or as occa­ sions for analytical exploration. Skeptics might wonder if Hansen suffers

viii

viii * Foreword

himself from the disease that he so brilliantly diagnoses, for he seems to shy

away from actual technologies and our experiences with them in favor of

verbal articulations, which according to his own argument are always in

danger of stripping technology of its physical reality.

I am willing to grant the paradox but not the judgment, for I think that

Hansen's project fulfills an important role that could not be accomplished in

any other way. As the schism between the software engineers and cyber-

space theorists demonstrated, no amount of talking about technology as a

thing in itself will convince the theorists that technology as such plays an

important role in human culture, for they can always revert to cultural and

linguistic interpretations that embed technology in discursive productions.

Arguing that it is these productions which give technology meaning and

significance, they will continue to pooh-pooh any thought of technology as

a thing in itself. Only a systematic analysis such as Embodying Technesis

can prevail, for it takes the argument onto the high ground of theory and

uncovers the moves by which technology is not just embedded in language

but erased by language. Through such analysis, Embodying Technesis aims

to clear the ground so that space can be opened to ask what technology

might be outside of its embeddedness in discursivity.

Having cleared the ground, Hansen then seeks to establish a physiologi-

cal basis for human interaction with technology that is not based primarily

on language. As more theorists become interested in this question of tech-

nology (which is virtually the opposite of the question of technology as Hei-

degger framed it), it may be that the answers Hansen suggests will not long

endure, for this question is now the focus of wide-ranging inquiries emerg-

ing from an interdisciplinary convergence of cognitive science, anthropol-

ogy, literary studies, computer science, and media theory. What will come

out of this convergence remains to be seen, but enough research has already

been done to make clear that much more can be said about the question

than Embodying Technesis articulates. The fact that Hansen's speculations

may soon become outdated is proof of the success of his larger argument,

however, for the resources to answer what technology is in itself can be fully

mobilized only after the question is recognized as legitimate and important.

In my view, the enduring contribution of Embodying Technesis is likely to

be its tenacious insistence that it makes sense to ask this question and its rig-

orous analysis of the theoretical moves that have kept us from asking it in

full force until now. If Embodying Technesis does nothing else (and it does

much more), the ground that it clears will establish it as one of the impor-

tant books concerning the question of technology, for it frees us to ask and

answer that question in new and embodied ways.

•

Forewo rd

himself from the disease that he so brilliantly diagnoses, for he seems to shy away from actual technologies and our experiences with them in favor of verbal articulations, which according to his own argument are always in danger of stripping technology of its physical reality. I am willing to grant the paradox but not the judgment, for I think that Hansen's proj ect fulfills an important role that could not be accomplished in any other way. As the schism between the software engineers and cyber­ space theorists demonstrated, no amount of talking about technology as a thing in itself will convince the theorists that technology as such plays an important role in human culture, for they can always revert to cultural and linguistic interpretations that embed technology in discursive productions . Arguing that it is these productions which give technology meaning and significance, they will continue to pooh-pooh any thought of technology as a thing in itself. Only a systematic analysis such as Embodying Technesis can prevail, for it takes the argument onto the high ground of theory and uncovers the moves by which technology is not just embedded in language but erased by language. Through such analysis, Embodying Technesis aims to clear the ground so that space can be opened to ask what technology might be outside of its embeddedness in discursivity. Having cleared the ground, Hansen then seeks to establish a physiologi­ cal basis for human interaction with technology that is not based primarily on language. As more theorists become interested in this question of tech­ nology (which is virtually the opposite of the question of technology as Hei­ degger framed it) , it may be that the answers Hansen suggests will not long endure, for this question is now the focus of wide-ranging inquiries emerg­ ing from an interdisciplinary convergence of cognitive science, anthropol­ ogy, literary studies, computer science, and media theory. What will come out of this convergence remains to be seen, but enough research has already been done to make clear that much more can be said about the question than Embodying Technesis articulates. The fact that Hansen's speculations may soon become outdated is proof of the success of his larger argument, however, for the resources to answer what technology is in itself can be fully mobilized only after the question is recognized as legitimate and important. In my view, the enduring contribution of Embodying Technesis is likely to be its tenacious insistence that it makes sense to ask this question and its rig­ orous analysis of the theoretical moves that have kept us from asking it in full force until now. If Embodying Technesis does nothing else ( and it does much more ) , the ground that it clears will establish it as one of the impor­ tant books concerning the question of technology, for it frees us to ask and answer that question in new and embodied ways.

Foreword

•

ix

Notes Foreword * ix

Notes

1. Mark Turner, Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive

Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); George Lakoff and Mark

Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and the Challenge to West-

ern Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Andy Clark, Being There: Putting

Brain, Body, and World Together Again (New York: Bradford Books, 1998); Edwin

Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).

2. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes's Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human

Brain (New York: Avon Books, 1995); The Feeling of What Happens: Body and

Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999).

1 . Mark Turner, Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 94 ) ; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and the Challenge to West­ ern Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1 9 9 9 ) ; Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (New York: Bradford Books, 1 9 9 8 ) ; Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild ( Cambridge: MIT Press, 1 9 94). 2. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes's Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon Books, 1 9 9 5 ) ; The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1 9 9 9 ) .



Acknowledgments

This book began as a dissertation in comparative literature at the University

of California, Irvine, and would never have come into being without the

generous support of many teachers, mentors, and friends. The project

evolved under the direct guidance of two fantastic teachers whose examples

have continued to motivate me to this day and whom I would like especially

to thank. Juliet Flower MacCannell has provided me with perhaps the most

important gift a teacher can give-the trust and open-mindedness that nour-

Acknowledgments

ishes and sustains confidence. For this, I am deeply grateful. J. Hillis Miller

has furnished an example of what a scholar should be-someone who con-

tinues to grow in new and exciting ways, who is not afraid to challenge his

own most deep-seated critical assumptions. I only hope that I can emulate

their fine examples in my own future growth as a scholar and teacher.

I would also like to thank three other teachers who have challenged and

supported me in the long period of revision during which this work acquired

its cross-disciplinary form. I am grateful to Richard Shusterman for his

sober-minded, pragmatic outlook on popular culture; his insights have been

instrumental for my effort to bridge the gap from theoretical speculation to

concrete analysis. I thank Thomas Pavel, from whom I have learned the

importance of maintaining a critical vigilance in the face of intellectual

seduction; his example helped me find the confidence necessary to assert the

value of bodily experience against the discursivist tide of contemporary lit-

erary studies. Finally, Kate Hayles has literally opened a new scholarly

world for me; her generous support for my project and her own example as

a sophisticated cultural critic of science and technology have reaffirmed for

me the urgency of rethinking our received linguistic and literary paradigms

in our ongoing efforts to grapple with the fundamental shifts currently

underway in our culture.

I wish to thank other teachers who have provided support and inspira-

tion at various stages along the way: Julia Lupton, Wolfgang Iser, Barbara

Spackman, Martin Schwab, Alexander Gelley, Joseph Margolis, J. N.

This book began as a dissertation in comparative literature at the University of California, Irvine, and would never have come into being without the generous support of many teachers, mentors, and friends. The proj ect evolved under the direct guidance of two fantastic teachers whose examples have continued to motivate me to this day and whom I would like especially to thank. Juliet Flower MacCannell has provided me with perhaps the most important gift a teacher can give-the trust and open-mindedness that nour­ ishes and sustains confidence. For this, I am deeply grateful. J. Hillis Miller has furnished an example of what a scholar should be-someone who con­ tinues to grow in new and exciting ways, who is not afraid to challenge his own most deep-seated critical assumptions. I only hope that I can emulate their fine examples in my own future growth as a scholar and teacher. I would also like to thank three other teachers who have challenged and supported me in the long period of revision during which this work acquired its cross-disciplinary form. I am grateful to Richard Shusterman for his sober-minded, pragmatic outlook on popular culture; his insights have been instrumental for my effort to bridge the gap from theoretical speculation to concrete analysis. I thank Thomas Pavel, from whom I have learned the importance of maintaining a critical vigilance in the face of intellectual seduction; his example helped me find the confidence necessary to assert the value of bodily experience against the discursivist tide of contemporary lit­ erary studies. Finally, Kate Hayles has literally opened a new scholarly world for me; her generous support for my proj ect and her own example as a sophisticated cultural critic of science and technology have reaffirmed for me the urgency of rethinking our received linguistic and literary paradigms in our ongoing efforts to grapple with the fundamental shifts currently underway in our culture. I wish to thank other teachers who have provided support and inspira­ tion at various stages along the way: Julia Lupton, Wolfgang Iser, Barbara Spackman, Martin Schwab , Alexander Gelley, Joseph Margolis, J. N.

xii

xii Acknowledgments

Mohanty, John Carvahlo, and Andrzej Warminski. I am deeply indebted to

friends and colleagues from Irvine, Austin, Princeton, and Santa Cruz-

especially Jacques Duvoisin, Jeffrey Belnap, Susan Morrison, Jim Kilfoyle,

Rebecca Bell-Metereau, Stephen Schwartz, Ziad Elmarsafy, Michael Ran-

dall, and Taylor Carmen. I also thank my students at Southwest Texas State

University and at Princeton University; their enthusiasm and eagerness to

learn convinced me of the value of sustained critical reflection on contem-

porary culture, at moments when I most needed convincing. Somewhere out

there are two excellent anonymous readers whose generous constructive

criticism helped me reconceive my sense of purpose and fathom the

demands of my intended interdisciplinary audience.

I am grateful to the following institutions for financial support that, in

both direct and indirect ways, helped me bring this project to fruition: the

University of California, Irvine; Temple University; the Fulbright Scholar-

ship Program; Southwest Texas State University; DAAD (Deutscher

Akademischer Austauschdienst); and the National Endowment for the

Humanities.

I want to thank Laurie Clark Klavins, Shelly Emmett, and the rest of

Team X at the University of Michigan Press for guiding the manuscript to

print, and I especially thank my editor, LeAnn Fields, for her belief in the

project and for her generosity in understanding my repeated requests for "a

little more time."

I also thank my parents, Howard and Yvonne Hansen, and my sister,

Natalie Hansen, for their direct and indirect support over the years. In ways

I am still coming to understand, their influence stands behind my persistent

engagement with subjectivity in the technological age.

Finally, I thank Mimi Lukens for her friendship and support from the

project's inception and for helping me to appreciate the value of saying what

you mean and meaning what you say.

•

Ack nowledgments

Mohanty, John Carvahlo, and Andrzej Warminski. I am deeply indebted to friends and colleagues from Irvine, Austin, Princeton, and Santa Cruz­ especially Jacques Duvoisin, Jeffrey Belnap, Susan Morrison, Jim Kilfoyle, Rebecca Bell-Metereau, Stephen Schwartz, Ziad Elmarsafy, Michael Ran­ dall, and Taylor Carmen. I also thank my students at Southwest Texas State University and at Princeton University; their enthusiasm and eagerness to learn convinced me of the value of sustained critical reflection on contem­ porary culture, at moments when I most needed convincing. Somewhere out there are two excellent anonymous readers whose generous constructive criticism helped me reconceive my sense of purpose and fathom the demands of my intended interdisciplinary audience. I am grateful to the following institutions for financial support that, in both direct and indirect ways, helped me bring this proj ect to fruition: the University of California, Irvine; Temple University; the Fulbright Scholar­ ship Program; Southwest Texas State University; DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) ; and the National Endowment for the Humanities. I want to thank Laurie Clark Klavins, Shelly Emmett, and the rest of Team X at the University of Michigan Press for guiding the manuscript to print, and I especially thank my editor, LeAnn Fields, for her belief in the proj ect and for her generosity in understanding my repeated requests for " a little more time . " I also thank my parents, Howard and Yvonne Hansen, and m y sister, Natalie Hansen, for their direct and indirect support over the years. In ways I am still coming to understand, their influence stands behind my persistent engagement with subj ectivity in the technological age. Finally, I thank Mimi Lukens for her friendship and support from the proj ect's inception and for helping me to appreciate the value of saying what you mean and meaning what you say.

Contents

Introduction: The Resistance to Technology

1

PART 1. Technology, Embodiment and Cultural Critique

Chapter 1. Technoculture and Embodiment

25

Chapter 2. Locating the Technological Real

53

PART 2. The Machine Reduction of Technology

Chapter 3. From Metaphor to Embodiment: Resisting Technesis 77

Chapter 4. Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne:

Heidegger on Technology

Contents

102

Chapter 5. The Mechanics of Deconstruction:

Derrida on de Man, or Poststructuralism in

an Age of Cultural Studies

122

INTERLUDE 1. Psyche and Metaphor:

Derrida's Freud

141

Introduction: The Resistance to Technology

PART 3. Tracking the Technological Real

1

Chapter 6. Technology and External Experience:

Reconsidering Freud's Project for a

Scientific Psychology

151

Chapter 7. Technology beyond Thought, or

How Real Is the Lacanian Real?

PART

1.

Technology, Embodiment and Cultural Critique

170

Chapter 1.

Technoculture and Embodiment

25

Chapter 2.

Locating the Technological Real

53

PART

2.

The Machine Reduction of Technology

Chapter 3.

From Metaphor to Embodiment: Resisting

Chapter 4.

Questioning the Machine Basis of

77

Techne:

Heidegger on Technology Chapter 5 .

Technesis

102

The Mechanics o f Deconstruction: Derrida on de Man, or Poststructuralism in an Age of Cultural Studies INTERLUDE 1.

Psyche and Metaphor: Derrida's Freud

PART

3.

Chapter 6.

141

Tracking the Technological Real Technology and External Experience: Reconsidering Freud's

Project for a

Scientific Psychology Chapter 7 .

122

15 1

Technology beyond Thought, or How Real

Is the Lacanian Real?

17 0

xiv

•

C o n tents

Chapter 8.

Ontological Revolution at What Cost? Ambivalence in Deleuze and Guattari's

xiv * Contents

Capitalism and Schizophrenia

Chapter 8. Ontological Revolution at What Cost?

Ambivalence in Deleuze and Guattari's

Capitalism and Schizophrenia

186

186

INTERLUDE 2. Breaking with the System:

Technology beyond Semiotics

INTERLUDE 2.

212

Breaking with the System: Technology beyond Semiotics

PART 4. Corporeal Mimesis

212

Chapter 9. On Some Motifs in Benjamin:

(Re)Embodying Technology as Erlebnis,

or the Postlinguistic Afterlife of Mimesis

231

Notes

265

Bibliography

307

PART

4.

Corporeal Mimesis

Index

323

Chapter 9.

On Some Motifs in Benjamin: (Re)Embodying Technology as

Erlebnis,

or the Postlinguistic Afterlife of Mimesis

231

Notes

265

Bibliography

307

Index

323

Introduction: The Resistance to Technology

Isaac Asimov once suggested that the lived experience of modern man has

been shaped far more by practical inventions than by arguably more conse-

quential paradigm shifts in scientific knowledge. Life as we know it, Asimov

implies, would be more drastically altered by the absence of the automobile

than, say, had Einstein never discovered the theory of relativity. This alto-

gether banal observation perfectly captures the ethos shared by many recent

critics in the various fields comprising contemporary science and technology

Introduction: T he Resistance to Technology

studies. Despite an almost bewildering diversity of interest, these critics

stand united against traditional philosophy of science and the sanitizing

privilege it grants the theoretical. Not only do they self-confidently assert

the primacy of the practical, but they do so to probe the messy extraphilo-

sophical "logic" of scientific and technological change-its constitutive

embeddedness within a thick cultural context. Their work collectively oper-

ates what amounts to a paradigm shift in the analysis of science and tech-

nology: for the traditional top-down "diffusion" model, they substitute a

model far more attentive to the wealth of interactions and linkages com-

prising technoscience in action, what sociologist Bruno Latour dubs the

model of "translation" (Latour 1987, 132ff.).

From a broad, anthropological perspective, what is most significant

about this paradigm shift is the central role it accords experience; regardless

of the specific disciplinary or interdisciplinary approach taken, the human

impact of scientific and technological change must be assessed according to

its concrete experiential effects, not its abstract theoretical significance.

While such an imperative introduces an empowering flexibility into the cul-

tural study of technology, it simultaneously calls on us to undertake a major

methodological revisioning: eschewing our ingrained proclivities, we must

learn to embrace language not as the ontological ground of cultural analy-

sis but rather as an admittedly central tool for such analysis. Put another

way, the displacement of language as universal medium and the correlated

recourse to experience confronts the contemporary poststructurally smart

cultural critic with what amounts to a significant theoretical quandary: for

Isaac Asimov once suggested that the lived experience of modern man has been shaped far more by practical inventions than by arguably more conse­ quential paradigm shifts in scientific knowledge. Life as we know it, Asimov implies, would be more drastically altered by the absence of the automobile than, say, had Einstein never discovered the theory of relativity. This alto­ gether banal observation perfectly captures the ethos shared by many recent critics in the various fields comprising contemporary science and technology studies. Despite an almost bewildering diversity of interest, these critics stand united against traditional philosophy of science and the sanitizing privilege it grants the theoretical. Not only do they self-confidently assert the primacy of the practical, but they do so to probe the messy extraphilo­ sophical " logic" of scientific and technological change-its constitutive embeddedness within a thick cultural context. Their work collectively oper­ ates what amounts to a paradigm shift in the analysis of science and tech­ nology: for the traditional top-down " diffusion " model, they substitute a model far more attentive to the wealth of interactions and linkages com­ prising techno science in action, what sociologist Bruno Latour dubs the model of " translation" ( Latour 1 9 8 7, 1 32ff. ) . From a broad, anthropological perspective, what is most significant about this paradigm shift is the central role it accords experience; regardless of the specific disciplinary or interdisciplinary approach taken, the human impact of scientific and technological change must be assessed according to its concrete experiential effects, not its abstract theoretical significance. While such an imperative introduces an empowering flexibility into the cul­ tural study of technology, it simultaneously calls on us to undertake a maj or methodological revisioning: eschewing our ingrained proclivities, we must learn to embrace language not as the ontological ground of cultural analy­ sis but rather as an admittedly central tool for such analysis. Put another way, the displacement of language as universal medium and the correlated recourse to experience confronts the contemporary poststructurally smart cultural critic with what amounts to a significant theoretical quandary: for

2

2 * Embodying Technesis

all our readiness to confirm Asimov's altogether commonsensical observa-

tion, the long-standing logocentrism of our (often inimical) methodologies

renders us hard-pressed to discover concrete instances through which we

can reflexively grasp technology's practical impact on our experience. While

we can confidently assert that the lifeworld would be markedly different

without modern technologies like the automobile or the computer, we are

not so readily able to specify in exactly what ways it would be so.

This theoretical quandary is, I suggest, connected to the constitutive

embeddedness of human practice within concrete and local contexts-what

Ludwig Wittgenstein so aptly termed "forms of life." According to (the

later) Wittgenstein, every human agent necessarily exists within a given

form of life (or "habitus," to use Pierre Bourdieu's more recent idiom) that

performs the central function of orienting (giving meaning to) shared lin-

guistic and, by extension, cultural practices. Any effort to clarify such forms

of life philosophically is bound to fail, since it would require what for the

later Wittgenstein is an impossibility: a descriptive language not similarly

rooted in a particular form of life. As the precursor to the so-called linguis-

tic turn in philosophy, Wittgenstein's account of language forcefully asserts

the immanence of human experience within language-more precisely,

within specific language games that comprise everyday life in a given cul-

tural context.

For Wittgenstein and the philosophical tradition beholden to his later

work, this necessity serves the philosophically significant function of pro-

hibiting the advancement of absolute, fully clarified knowledge claims. It

furnishes the theoretical basis for philosophy's recent turn away from foun-

dationalism and for its contemporary "conversational" style.1 Applied to

technology, however, this same necessity helps to explain why the rich expe-

riential impact of technology, despite its obvious practical impact, nonethe-

less remains so abstract and difficult to grasp. Like language games, tech-

nologies play a constitutive role in structuring the worlds within which they

exist. To the extent that we humans necessarily act within such prestruc-

tured worlds-worlds we in fact share with our technologies2-our prac-

tices presuppose technology in ways that foreclose all possibility for analytic

isolation and cognitive recuperation. Despite its irreducible concreteness,

technology's experiential impact must accordingly be considered to be first

and foremost indirect and holist. More fundamental than all the intentional,

explicit-dare I say cultural?-uses we make of our technologies are the

largely unmarked alterations they operate on our basic perceptual and sub-

perceptual experiential faculties. As philosophers of technology have

recently contended, technologies underlie and inform our basic "ways of

•

E m bodyi n g

Technesis

all our readiness to confirm Asimov's altogether commonsensical observa­ tion, the long-standing logocentrism of our (often inimical ) methodologies renders us hard-pressed to discover concrete instances through which we can reflexively grasp technology's practical impact on our experience. While we can confidently assert that the lifeworld would be markedly different without modern technologies like the automobile or the computer, we are not so readily able to specify in exactly what ways it would be so. This theoretical quandary is, I suggest, connected to the constitutive embeddedness of human practice within concrete and local contexts-what Ludwig Wittgenstein so aptly termed " forms of life. " According to (the later) Wittgenstein, every human agent necessarily exists within a given form of life (or "habitus, " to use Pierre Bourdieu's more recent idiom ) that performs the central function of orienting (giving meaning to ) shared lin­ guistic and, by extension, cultural practices. Any effort to clarify such forms of life philosophically is bound to fail, since it would require what for the later Wittgenstein is an impossibility: a descriptive language not similarly rooted in a particular form of life. As the precursor to the so-called linguis­ tic turn in philosophy, Wittgenstein's account of language forcefully asserts the immanence of human experience within language-more precisely, within specific language games that comprise everyday life in a given cul­ tural context. For Wittgenstein and the philosophical tradition beholden to his later work, this necessity serves the philosophically significant function of pro­ hibiting the advancement of absolute, fully clarified knowledge claims. It furnishes the theoretical basis for philosophy's recent turn away from foun­ dationalism and for its contemporary "conversational " style. 1 Applied to technology, however, this same necessity helps to explain why the rich expe­ riential impact of technology, despite its obvious practical impact, nonethe­ less remains so abstract and difficult to grasp. Like language games, tech­ nologies play a constitutive role in structuring the worlds within which they exist. To the extent that we humans necessarily act within such prestruc­ tured worlds-worlds we in fact share with our technologies2-our prac­ tices presuppose technology in ways that foreclose all possibility for analytic isolation and cognitive recuperation. Despite its irreducible concreteness, technology's experiential impact must accordingly be considered to be first and foremost indirect and holist. More fundamental than all the intentional, explicit-dare I say cultural ?-uses we make of our technologies are the largely unmarked alterations they operate on our basic perceptual and sub­ perceptual experiential faculties. As philosophers of technology have recently contended, technologies underlie and inform our basic "ways of

I ntro d u ction

Introduction * 3

seeing" the world and thus cannot be thematized as "objects" that are con-

stituted by such paradigmatic holist perspectives (Ihde 1991).

In this book, I shall expand the holist approach to technology in order to

counter the recent culturalist assimilation of technology. Without repudiat-

ing the culturalist position as such, I shall reject one of its central underlying

implications: that the cultural construction of technologies somehow

exhausts the extent of their impact on our experience. Although technocul-

tural critics are undoubtedly right to suggest, for example, that "save sheer

accident, technology has no force outside of a system of social practices"

(Stone 1996, 170), much hangs on how such claims are understood. In my

opinion, critics all too often assume that technologies must be "one hundred

percent" social, as it were-that they must be entirely a product of cultural

construction simply because they cannot exist outside social networks.

Countering such a misconception requires a more subtle understanding of

technology's social basis, one that can distinguish the concrete effects of

particular technologies from the general conditions of their efficacy. If it is

true that technologies cannot exist outside social systems, that in no way

precludes them from having effects that cannot be captured by the interpre-

tative tools germane to such systems.

To explore just one example of this enabling confusion, technocultural

critic Sandy Stone, in speaking of social context as the irreducible back-

ground for understanding technologies, collapses their significance into the

impact they have on ideology: ". . . technologies are visible and frequently

material evidence of struggles over meaning. They don't exist outside of

complex belief systems in whose social and political frames they are embed-

ded. Their apparent obduracy is an artifact, a technology of its own" (1996,

176). Technologies may in fact form important sites for carrying out such

struggles, but-as material elements that structure our experiential world(s)

holistically and beyond thematization-they are also much more than that.

Their impact on experience is at once so primitive and so pervasive that any

effort to fathom it through cultural critique will have already presupposed

what it sets out to isolate and clarify. In seeking to localize the extracultural,

extrasocial dimension of technological change, I thus mean to suggest that

technologies function much like language games on Wittgenstein's model.

Within the contemporary postmodern lifeworld, they are simply more basic

than other social phenomena: not unlike language for Wittgenstein, tech-

nologies play an essential role as part of what allows for the very existence

of the social as such.

Given the extensive role that technology's indirect and amorphous

impact has on our basic modes of perception and experience, we can easily

•

3

seeing" the world and thus cannot be thematized as " obj ects " that are con­ stituted by such paradigmatic holist perspectives ( Ihde 1 99 1 ) . In this book, I shall expand the holist approach to technology in order to counter the recent culturalist assimilation of technology. Without repudiat­ ing the culturalist position as such, I shall rej ect one of its central underlying implications: that the cultural construction of technologies somehow exhausts the extent of their impact on our experience. Although technocul­ tural critics are undoubtedly right to suggest, for example, that " save sheer accident, technology has no force outside of a system of social practices " ( Stone 1 996, 1 70 ) , much hangs o n how such claims are understood. I n my opinion, critics all too often assume that technologies must be " one hundred percent" social, as it were-that they must be entirely a product of cultural construction simply because they cannot exist outside social networks. Countering such a misconception requires a more subtle understanding of technology's social basis, one that can distinguish the concrete effects of particular technologies from the general conditions of their efficacy. If it is true that technologies cannot exist outside social systems, that in no way precludes them from having effects that cannot be captured by the interpre­ tative tools germane to such systems. To explore just one example of this enabling confusion, techno cultural critic Sandy Stone, in speaking of social context as the irreducible back­ ground for understanding technologies, collapses their significance into the impact they have on ideology: " . . . technologies are visible and frequently material evidence of struggles over meaning. They don't exist outside of complex belief systems in whose social and political frames they are embed­ ded. Their apparent obduracy is an artifact, a technology of its own " ( 1 996, 1 76 ) . Technologies may in fact form important sites for carrying out such struggles, but-as material elements that structure our experiential world(s) holistically and beyond thematization-they are also much more than that. Their impact on experience is at once so primitive and so pervasive that any effort to fathom it through cultural critique will have already presupposed what it sets out to isolate and clarify. In seeking to localize the extracultural, extrasocial dimension of technological change, I thus mean to suggest that technologies function much like language games on Wittgenstein's model . Within the contemporary postmodern lifeworld, they are simply more basic than other social phenomena: not unlike language for Wittgenstein, tech­ nologies play an essential role as part of what allows for the very existence of the social as such. Given the extensive role that technology's indirect and amorphous impact has on our basic modes of perception and experience, we can easily

4

4 Embodying Technesis

make sense of the common imperative guiding recent cultural investigations

of technology-the imperative to secure technology's impact within some

delimited, theorizable "space." For all of the diversity of approaches

employed by contemporary cultural critics, this imperative seems time and

again to result in an analysis of technology insofar, and only insofar, as it

impacts representation. By focusing on representation-and specifically by

substituting an analysis of technology's impact on representational thinking

for an analysis of technology itself-modern and contemporary critics aim

to overcome the difficulties involved in delimiting technology's ubiquitous

and subthematic impact. Yet if, as I shall argue, technology affects our expe-

rience first and foremost through its infrastructural role, its impact occurs

prior to and independently of our production of representations: effectively,

technologies structure our lifeworlds and influence our embodied lives at a

level, as it were, below the "threshold" of representation itself.3 As long as

cultural analysis restricts its focus to the technical modification of represen-

tation, it cannot but compromise the richness and multidimensionality of

technology's impact on our experience-what, in the following, I shall

repeatedly refer to as the robust materiality of technology.4 What is lost in

the representationalist reduction is not simply some abstract alterity of tech-

nology but the host of concrete materializations through which technologies

impact our practices (and not just our communicational practices) accord-

ing to "logics" that are strongly posthermeneutical.5

The Argument

By critically evaluating the role technology plays in twentieth-century theo-

retical discourse, I seek to prepare the ground for an expanded analysis of

technological materiality, one capable of exploring specifically those mate-

rializations through which technologies mediate the material rhythms of

embodied life. Through what amounts to a critical genealogy of contempo-

rary cultural studies of technology, I trace the latter's extensive, though

largely unrecognized, allegiance to poststructuralism and in particular to the

(philosophical and rhetorical) strategy of what I call technesis, or the

putting-into-discourse of technology. For many of the so-called master-

•

E m bodyi n g

Technesis

make sense of the common imperative guiding recent cultural investigations of technology-the imperative to secure technology's impact within some delimited, theorizable " space. " For all of the diversity of approaches employed by contemporary cultural critics, this imperative seems time and again to result in an analysis of technology insofar, and only insofar, as it impacts representation. By focusing on representation-and specifically by substituting an analysis of technology's impact on representational thinking for an analysis of technology itself-modern and contemporary critics aim to overcome the difficulties involved in delimiting technology's ubiquitous and subthematic impact. Yet if, as I shall argue, technology affects our expe­ rience first and foremost through its infrastructural role, its impact occurs prior to and independently of our production of representations: effectively, technologies structure our lifeworlds and influence our embodied lives at a level, as it were, below the " threshold " of representation itself.3 As long as cultural analysis restricts its focus to the technical modification of represen­ tation, it cannot but compromise the richness and multidimensionality of technology's impact on our experience-what, in the following, I shall repeatedly refer to as the robust materiality of technology.4 What is lost in the representationalist reduction is not simply some abstract alterity of tech­ nology but the host of concrete materializations through which technologies impact our practices ( and not just our communicational practices ) accord­ ing to " logics " that are strongly posthermeneuticaI.5

thinkers of (technological) modernity-in particular, for Freud, Heidegger,

Derrida, Lacan, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari-technesis forms a

common, though variously implemented, reductive strategy that allows for

a progressive assimilation of technology to thought. Technesis allows these

critics to open their respective systems to a form of material exteriority

The Argument

By critically evaluating the role technology plays in twentieth-century theo­ retical discourse, I seek to prepare the ground for an expanded analysis of technological materiality, one capable of exploring specifically those mate­ rializations through which technologies mediate the material rhythms of embodied life. Through what amounts to a critical genealogy of contempo­ rary cultural studies of technology, I trace the latter's extensive, though largely unrecognized, allegiance to poststructuralism and in particular to the (philosophical and rhetorical) strategy of what I call technesis, or the putting-into-discourse of technology. For many of the so-called master­ thinkers of ( technological ) modernity-in particular, for Freud, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari-technesis forms a common, though variously implemented, reductive strategy that allows for a progressive assimilation of technology to thought. Technesis allows these critics to open their respective systems to a form of material exteriority

I ntro d u ction

Introduction * 5

(technology) without imperiling or abandoning the priority accorded to

thinking by our philosophical modernity. To the extent that contemporary

technocriticism absorbs this same strategy in the process of adapting post-

structuralism for its own ends, my critique of modernist technesis will oper-

ate simultaneously as a critique of technocultural criticism in the postmod-

ern age.

In recounting the story of the twentieth century's halted efforts to

embrace technology, my primary aim will be to disabuse cultural critics of

technology (myself included) of our lingering allegiances to vestiges of the

hermeneutic mode. From the groundbreaking explorations of Heidegger

and Freud to the more localized interventions of Stephen Greenblatt and

Donna Haraway, technology has been repeatedly invoked as a means of his-

toricizing theoretical claims, of stamping them with the indelible mark of

the empirical. In the phenomenological and psychoanalytic paradigms

whose trajectories I track, the appeal to technology comprises an ever

increasing ontic turn-a localization of thought and memory, if not always

directly in the concrete, technically mediated lifeworld, then at least against

the more general background of technological modernization. So, for

example, Heidegger's conjunction of modern technology and Being in his

Nietzsche functions to delimit a specifically modern epoch; and Freud's

hydraulic model of the psyche, as Lacan has shown, situates the birth of psy-

choanalysis and the discovery of the unconscious at an irreducibly concrete

moment within the history of technology.

Yet even as this ontic turn has been amplified in the work of the post-

structuralists (Derrida, the later Lacan, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari)

and again with the advent of cultural studies and of specific cultural

approaches to science and technology, there is much reason to question its

adequacy as a means of capturing technology's robust materiality. Post-

structuralists and contemporary cultural critics alike tend to invoke tech-

nology not for its own sake but as an enabling means and a material support

for a more pressing account of subject constitution, whether on ontogenetic

or strictly empirical grounds. In case after case, technology is invoked as a

concrete placeholder for the alterity that has become, at least in the post-

modern academic scene, a compulsory component of any respectable

account of subjectivity. In this role, technology lends a spatiotemporal

specificity to diverse forms of alterity dear to our philosophical modernity,

including Heideggerian Being, the Freudian unconscious, Derridian dif-

ferance, and the Lacanian objet petit a. In each of these cases, the invocation

of technology remains subordinate to a more central overriding theoretical

purpose.

•

5

(technology) without imperiling or abandoning the priority accorded to thinking by our philosophical modernity. To the extent that contemporary technocriticism absorbs this same strategy in the process of adapting post­ structuralism for its own ends, my critique of modernist technesis will oper­ ate simultaneously as a critique of technocultural criticism in the postmod­ ern age . In recounting the story of the twentieth century's halted efforts to embrace technology, my primary aim will be to disabuse cultural critics of technology (myself included) of our lingering allegiances to vestiges of the hermeneutic mode. From the groundbreaking explorations of Heidegger and Freud to the more localized interventions of Stephen Greenblatt and D onna Haraway, technology has been repeatedly invoked as a means of his­ toricizing theoretical claims, of stamping them with the indelible mark of the empirical. In the phenomenological and psychoanalytic paradigms whose traj ectories I track, the appeal to technology comprises an ever increasing ontic turn-a localization of thought and memory, if not always directly in the concrete, technically mediated lifeworld, then at least against the more general background of technological modernization. So, for example, Heidegger's conj unction of modern technology and Being in his Nietzsche functions to delimit a specifically modern epoch; and Freud's hydraulic model of the psyche, as Lacan has shown, situates the birth of psy­ choanalysis and the discovery of the unconscious at an irreducibly concrete moment within the history of technology. Yet even as this ontic turn has been amplified in the work of the post­ structuralists (Derrida, the later Lacan, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari ) and again with the advent of cultural studies and of specific cultural approaches to science and technology, there is much reason to question its adequacy as a means of capturing technology's robust materiality. Post­ structuralists and contemporary cultural critics alike tend to invoke tech­ nology not for its own sake but as an enabling means and a material support for a more pressing account of subj ect constitution, whether on ontogenetic or strictly empirical grounds. In case after case, technology is invoked as a concrete placeholder for the alterity that has become, at least in the post­ modern academic scene, a compulsory component of any respectable account of subj ectivity. In this role, technology lends a spatiotemporal specificity to diverse forms of alterity dear to our philosophical modernity, including Heideggerian Being, the Freudian unconscious, Derridian di{­ {hance, and the Lacanian o bjet petit a. In each of these cases, the invocation of technology remains subordinate to a more central overriding theoretical purpose.

6

6 Embodying Technesis

More recently, technology has been variously invoked by cultural critics

as one of the many material factors that structure the world of social prac-

tice. For those cultural critics who focus specifically on contemporary

technoscience or technoculture, technologies most often play the role of

material condition for new forms of subjectivity-for a subjectivity either

wholly liberated from former (logocentric) limitations or one constrained in

new and ambivalent, though always somehow enabling, ways. Viewed in

this manner, technologies generate new types of human (or posthuman)

embodiment that should lead us to question the privilege we grant thought

in determining what constitutes identity or agency. While such questioning

has been taken up by a minority of today's cultural critics (Kittler, Hayles)

and has been a central focus in such emerging fields as cognitive neuropsy-

chology and linguistics (Varela, Mark Johnson), the majority of cultural

critics remain incapable, often despite their own intentions, of overcoming

their dependence on a representationalist conception of subjectivity. As long

as it is held to be the privileged vehicle by which materiality acquires cul-

tural value, technology will remain pigeonholed into the reductive role of

mere material support for the all important-and all engulfing-process of

subject constitution.

We can observe this subjectivist assimilation of technology in at least

four important and influential recent variants of technocultural criticism.6

First, the mode of criticism found in "science studies" or "technoculture"

views scientific discourses and technologies as cultural phenomena like any

others. While it is attentive to the constraint imposed by capitalist institu-

tions, such as the military and the global economy, this approach finds

solace in the fact that scientific discourses and technologies are constructed

entities. Not only are they potentially open to alternate, noncoercive theo-

retical constructions, but they are in fact always simultaneously constructed

according to alternative popular desires.7 Indeed, scientific discourses and

technologies appear on this account not primarily as constraints (except

when they are employed by powerful elites) but as the enabling tools for

oppositional practices of identity constitution and community formation.8

Second, the mode of criticism found in "social studies of science" views

scientific facts and technological machines as processes rather than prod-

ucts. In this view, facts and machines come to exist and to have an impact

as a result of struggle within robust social networks involving various levels

of extrascientific practice from the most immediately relevant (relation to

previous research and experimentation) to the most distant (general goals of

society).9 From the perspective of a cultural analysis of technology, the most

interesting aspect of this approach is its call for a new constitution or con-

•

E m bodyi n g

Technesis

More recently, technology has been variously invoked by cultural critics as one of the many material factors that structure the world of social prac­ tice. For those cultural critics who focus specifically on contemporary techno science or techno culture, technologies most often play the role of material condition for new forms of subj ectivity-for a subj ectivity either wholly liberated from former (logocentric) limitations or one constrained in new and ambivalent, though always somehow enabling, ways. Viewed in this manner, technologies generate new types of human (or posthuman) embodiment that should lead us to question the privilege we grant thought in determining what constitutes identity or agency. While such questioning has been taken up by a minority of today's cultural critics ( Kittler, Hayles) and has been a central focus in such emerging fields as cognitive neuropsy­ chology and linguistics (Varela, Mark Johnson ) , the majority of cultural critics remain incapable, often despite their own intentions, of overcoming their dependence on a representationalist conception of subj ectivity. As long as it is held to be the privileged vehicle by which materiality acquires cul­ tural value, technology will remain pigeonholed into the reductive role of mere material support for the all important-and all engulfing-process of subj ect constitution. We can observe this subj ectivist assimilation of technology in at least four important and influential recent variants of technocultural criticism.6 First, the mode of criticism found in " science studies " or " technoculture " views scientific discourses and technologies as cultural phenomena like any others. While it is attentive to the constraint imposed by capitalist institu­ tions, such as the military and the global economy, this approach finds solace in the fact that scientific discourses and technologies are constructed entities. Not only are they potentially open to alternate, noncoercive theo­ retical constructions, but they are in fact always simultaneously constructed according to alternative p opular desires.7 Indeed, scientific discourses and technologies appear on this account not primarily as constraints ( except when they are employed by powerful elites) but as the enabling tools for oppositional practices of identity constitution and community formation. s Second, the mode o f criticism found i n " social studies of science " views scientific facts and technological machines as processes rather than prod­ ucts. In this view, facts and machines come to exist and to have an impact as a result of struggle within robust social networks involving various levels of extrascientific practice from the most immediately relevant (relation to previous research and experimentation) to the most distant (general goals of society ) . 9 From the perspective of a cultural analysis of technology, the most interesting aspect of this approach is its call for a new constitution or con-

I ntro d u ction

Introduction * 7

tract between the human and the nonhuman-a fresh conception of knowl-

edge that refuses the modern division between knowledge of people (power)

and knowledge of things (science). By denying mastery to either things or

people, this new constitution would follow the delegation of power to both

humans and nonhumans along the trajectory of networks that produce both

as material effects of a shared world (Latour 1993b).

Third, what I shall call the "virtual-reality-is-an-illusion" school counters

the exuberant claims of "visionary proponents" of cyberspace by insisting

on the "indebtedness" of virtual-reality technologies to their "logocentric

past."10 By remaining cognizant of the inherent and unbreachable limita-

tions of metaphysical discourse, the critics of this school are able to interpret

the derealizing "consensual hallucination" of cyberspace as a collective fan-

tasy "that the more technologically sophisticated our society becomes the

less it has to worry about the distribution of wealth and resources"

(Markley 1996, 4). Specifically, they insist on distinguishing the virtual tech-

nologies that materialize our consensual hallucination from the content of

that hallucination-the abstraction "cyberspace." While the latter promises

a fantasy resolution founded on denial, attention to the former suggests that

virtual reality "can never separate itself from the politics of representation

precisely because it is a projection of the conflicts of class, gender, and race

that technology both encodes and seeks to erase" (ibid.).

Fourth, a diffuse research program grouped under the rubric of the

"materialities of communication" expands the function of exteriority as it is

developed in Derrida's early work.11 Employed as a general term for the

"physical side" of language, exteriority plays an important antihermeneutic

role within what nonetheless remain so many forms of human self-refer-

ence. Exteriority, that is to say, furnishes a significant resistance to the reign

of interpretation and calls for a new model-that of "meaning constitu-

tion"-which brings into view "situations where couplings between human

bodies, psychic systems, and new communications technologies ... produce

specific subject-effects" (Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer 1994, 400).

No matter how forcefully these approaches claim to engage technology

in a robust, postrepresentational, post-theoretical fashion, all of them work

with an impoverished concept of technological materiality that, I suggest,

effectively undermines their intentions. In one way or another, all of them

equate the materiality of technology with cultural materiality-with the

material markings that technology (like all cultural productions) acquires

on entering the cultural domain. Though its advent as a means of conceptu-

alizing technology can be traced back to Aristotle (as I shall argue in chap-

ter 3), this impoverished concept of materiality owes its contemporary

•

7

tract between the human and the nonhuman-a fresh conception of knowl­ edge that refuses the modern division between knowledge of people (power) and knowledge of things ( science ) . By denying mastery to either things or people, this new constitution would follow the delegation of power to both humans and nonhumans along the traj ectory of networks that produce both as material effects of a shared world (Latour 1 99 3 b ) . Third, what I shall call the " virtual-reality-is-an-illusion " school counters the exuberant claims of "visionary proponents" of cyberspace by insisting on the " indebtedness" of virtual-reality technologies to their " logocentric past. "10 By remaining cognizant of the inherent and unbreachable limita­ tions of metaphysical discourse, the critics of this school are able to interpret the derealizing " consensual hallucination" of cyberspace as a collective fan­ tasy " that the more technologically sophisticated our society becomes the less it has to worry about the distribution of wealth and resources " (Markley 1 9 96, 4 ) . Specifically, they insist o n distinguishing the virtual tech­ nologies that materialize our consensual hallucination from the content of that hallucination-the abstraction " cyberspace. " While the latter promises a fantasy resolution founded on denial, attention to the former suggests that virtual reality "can never separate itself from the politics of representation precisely because it is a proj ection of the conflicts of class, gender, and race that technology both encodes and seeks to erase " (ibid. ) . Fourth, a diffuse research program grouped under the rubric o f the " materialities of communication" expands the function of exteriority as it is developed in Derrida's early work . l l Employed as a general term for the " physical side " of language, exteriority plays an important antihermeneutic role within what nonetheless remain so many forms of human self-refer­ ence. Exteriority, that is to say, furnishes a significant resistance to the reign of interpretation and calls for a new model-that of " meaning constitu­ tion "-which brings into view " situations where couplings between human bodies, psychic systems, and new communications technologies . . . produce specific subj ect-effects " ( Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer 1 994, 400 ) . No matter how forcefully these approaches claim to engage technology in a robust, postrepresentational, post-theoretical fashion, all of them work with an impoverished concept of technological materiality that, I suggest, effectively undermines their intentions. In one way or another, all of them equate the materiality of technology with cultural materiality-with the material markings that technology ( like all cultural productions ) acquires on entering the cultural domain. Though its advent as a means of conceptu­ alizing technology can be traced back to Aristotle (as I shall argue in chap­ ter 3 ) , this impoverished concept of materiality owes its contemporary

8

8 Embodying Technesis

currency to French poststructuralism. The various materialities invoked by

the aforementioned cultural critics-materialities encountered in cultural

and social life, in virtual hardware/software, and in the nonsignifying ele-

ments of language-all comprise examples of the quasi materiality (or rela-

tive exteriority) that Derrida's critique of logocentrism unleashes within the

domain of thought. As mere supplements or material supports for the pro-

duction of knowledge/thought/desire, none can furnish the site for a resis-

tance against the imperialism of theoretical (or linguistic) idealism.

By subjecting this impoverished concept of materiality to criticism, I shall

demonstrate that the extensive invocation of technology by twentieth-cen-

tury philosophers and theorists from Freud and Heidegger to contemporary

cultural critics remains faithful to the logocentric foundation of philosophi-

cal humanism-the privilege of thought and/or the thinking agent. Viewed

under the genealogical gaze, the phenomenological and psychoanalytic tra-

ditions on which I focus are marked by the repetition of a shared reductive

pattern. An initial move to embrace technology is in each case compromised

by a defensive gesture: at some point or other, the radical alterity of tech-

nology is sacrificed to preserve thought as the ultimate tribunal of experi-

ence. Analysis of this sacrifice in the theorists already mentioned reveals a

rigorous and inflexible logic behind the various twentieth-century invoca-

tions of technology. Though introduced as a concrete instance of alterity,

technology has in all cases already undergone a fundamental reduction: a

dogmatic stripping away of its robust materiality that I shall refer to under

the rubric of the machine reduction of technology. Rather than embracing

technologies as materially robust entities, the aforementioned critical dis-

courses constrain technology to the figure of the machine-a static and

mechanical figure that is by nature secondary and posterior to the primary

and constitutive movement of thought and to whose sway, consequently, it

can pose no threat.

Though our recent intellectual history displays an undeniable and pro-

gressively evolving interest in embracing technology, the machine reduction

appears only to have been rendered more forceful with the passage of time.

If Derrida's exemplary poststructuralist declaration concerning the "closure

of representation" served to efface traces of the enabling prior reduction of

technology, the empirical approach favored by contemporary cultural crit-

ics compounds the reduction and effectively renders representationalism

hegemonic. By assimilating the poststructuralist representationalist ontol-

ogy without subjecting it to critique (and without preserving its negative or

antihermeneutic moment), cultural studies adds a further layer of distance

between its positivist methodology and the enabling reduction that lies

•

E m bodyi n g

Technesis

currency to French poststructuralism. The various materialities invoked by the aforementioned cultural critics-materialities encountered in cultural and social life, in virtual hardware/software, and in the nonsignifying ele­ ments of language-all comprise examples of the quasi materiality (or rela­ tive exteriority) that Derrida's critique of logocentrism unleashes within the domain of thought. As mere supplements or material supports for the pro­ duction of knowledge/thought/desire, none can furnish the site for a resis­ tance against the imperialism of theoretical ( or linguistic ) idealism. By subj ecting this impoverished concept of materiality to criticism, I shall demonstrate that the extensive invocation of technology by twentieth-cen­ tury philosophers and theorists from Freud and Heidegger to contemporary cultural critics remains faithful to the logocentric foundation of philosophi­ cal humanism-the privilege of thought and/or the thinking agent. Viewed under the genealogical gaze, the phenomenological and psychoanalytic tra­ ditions on which I focus are marked by the repetition of a shared reductive pattern. An initial move to embrace technology is in each case compromised by a defensive gesture: at some point or other, the radical alterity of tech­ nology is sacrificed to preserve thought as the ultimate tribunal of experi­ ence. Analysis of this sacrifice in the theorists already mentioned reveals a rigorous and inflexible logic behind the various twentieth-century invoca­ tions of technology. Though introduced as a concrete instance of alterity, technology has in all cases already undergone a fundamental reduction: a dogmatic stripping away of its robust materiality that I shall refer to under the rubric of the machine reduction of technology. Rather than embracing technologies as materially robust entities, the aforementioned critical dis­ courses constrain technology to the figure of the machine-a static and mechanical figure that is by nature secondary and posterior to the primary and constitutive movement of thought and to whose sway, consequently, it can pose no threat. Though our recent intellectual history displays an undeniable and pro­ gressively evolving interest in embracing technology, the machine reduction appears only to have been rendered more forceful with the passage of time. If Derrida's exemplary po ststructuralist declaration concerning the "closure of representation " served to efface traces of the enabling prior reduction of technology, the empirical approach favored by contemporary cultural crit­ ics compounds the reduction and effectively renders representationalism hegemonic. By assimilating the poststructuralist representationalist ontol­ ogy without subj ecting it to critique ( and without preserving its negative or antihermeneutic moment) , cultural studies adds a further layer of distance between its positivist methodology and the enabling reduction that lies

I ntro d u ction

Introduction * 9

behind it. Far from lending theory a concrete historicity, the culmination of

the ontic turn in contemporary cultural studies thus threatens to efface

wholesale the entire history of technology's reduction-to wipe out those

traces of technology's radical exteriority that remain discernable in the

fissures that cleave the poststructuralist machine reduction of technology.

Accordingly, while the ontic turn toward technology can be cited as one, if

not the most important, factor motivating the contemporary shift from

hermeneutics and textual analysis to a more inclusive and less monological

approach to culture,12 the field of contemporary cultural studies insures in

the most effective form yet imaginable the subordination of the technical to

the social and the reduction of technology to a "relative exteriority."13 By

treating technology exclusively as the material support for ideology critique

and/or identity performance, cultural criticism simply amplifies those ten-

dencies of poststructuralist thought most inimical to a robust account of

technology. In the process, it further obscures any possibility for an engage-

ment with technology's essentially material historicity-an engagement that

would situate technology beyond the grasp of representational thought and

the forms of practice arising from it. By tracing contemporary cultural crit-

icism's extensive reduction of technological materiality to its uncritical

assimilation of poststructuralism, I intend to work through these deep, the-

oretical limitations, with the constructive aim of exploring alternative

avenues toward a cultural criticism more appropriate to our ever increas-

ingly technological, and perhaps (as some recent commentators propose)

properly posthuman, world.14

Poststructuralism in the Age of Cultural Studies

Contemporary cultural criticism of technology, I have suggested, gains

much of its critical force from an extension of certain claims advanced by

French poststructuralism. Unifying the various approaches to cultural prac-

tices and representations that comprise contemporary cultural studies is a

shared embrace of Derrida's sweeping claim (which, for the moment at

least, can stand in for poststructuralism as a whole) that we live in an era

marked by the "closure of representation." In assimilating French post-

structuralism, however, cultural criticism has largely failed to appreciate the

philosophical context and the profound (anti)hermeneutic and (anti)prag-

matic consequences of the various poststructuralist deconstructions of the

•

9

behind it. Far from lending theory a concrete historicity, the culmination of the ontic turn in contemporary cultural studies thus threatens to efface wholesale the entire history of technology's reduction-to wipe out those traces of technology's radical exteriority that remain discernable in the fissures that cleave the poststructuralist machine reduction of technology. Accordingly, while the ontic turn toward technology can be cited as one, if not the most important, factor motivating the contemporary shift from hermeneutics and textual analysis to a more inclusive and less mono logical approach to culture,12 the field of contemporary cultural studies insures in the most effective form yet imaginable the subordination of the technical to the social and the reduction of technology to a " relative exteriority. " 1 3 By treating technology exclusively as the material support for ideology critique and/or identity performance, cultural criticism simply amplifies those ten­ dencies of poststructuralist thought most inimical to a robust account of technology. In the process, it further obscures any possibility for an engage­ ment with technology's essentially material historicity-an engagement that would situate technology beyond the grasp of representational thought and the forms of practice arising from it. By tracing contemporary cultural crit­ icism's extensive reduction of technological materiality to its uncritical assimilation of poststructuralism, I intend to work through these deep, the­ oretical limitations, with the constructive aim of exploring alternative avenues toward a cultural criticism more appropriate to our ever increas­ ingly technological, and perhaps (as some recent commentators propose) properly posthuman, world.14

subject.

To lend substance to my call for a recontextualization of poststructural-

Poststruduralism in the Age of Cultural Studies

Contemporary cultural criticism of technology, I have suggested, gams much of its critical force from an extension of certain claims advanced by French poststructuralism. Unifying the various approaches to cultural prac­ tices and representations that comprise contemporary cultural studies is a shared embrace of Derrida's sweeping claim (which, for the moment at least, can stand in for poststructuralism as a whole) that we live in an era marked by the " closure of representation. " In assimilating French post­ structuralism, however, cultural criticism has largely failed to appreciate the philosophical context and the profound (anti )hermeneutic and ( anti )prag­ matic consequences of the various poststructuralist deconstructions of the subj ect. To lend substance to my call for a recontextualization of poststructural-

10

10 * Embodying Technesis

ism within the new cultural horizon, let me briefly evaluate the contribu-

tions of several cultural critics who have made an explicit effort to apply the

insights of deconstructive criticism transformationally. The work of these

critics-Terry Eagleton, Stephen Greenblatt, and Donna Haraway-exem-

plifies the most fruitful assimilation of poststructuralism in three significant

fields within cultural criticism broadly considered: British materialism, the

new historicism, and (cyborg) feminism. Consideration of their respective

merits and limitations will thus go far toward establishing both the heuris-

tic importance and the methodological limitations of contemporary cultural

studies for the development of a robust, holist account of contemporary

technology's experiential impact. While all three critics deserve praise for

their efforts to suture deconstructive analysis with material reality, they

must all be criticized for their refusal to think rigorously about the disjunc-

tion of the linguistic and the phenomenal. Though the task these critics set

for themselves is admirable and urgent, they articulate concrete suggestions

that too hastily invoke or reinvoke various aspects of the traditionally priv-

ileged cognitive subject.1s

The work of Eagleton, Greenblatt, and Haraway should be situated in

the passage from poststructuralism to postmodernism as the dominant par-

adigm of academic criticism. With the advent of the so-called postmodern

condition, the various core distinctions underwriting the poststructuralist

ethos became largely untenable. In particular, postmodernism witnessed the

collapse of the great divide between literature and popular culture-the very

divide that informed and reinvigorated the modernist assumptions from

which poststructuralism drew its strength (Huyssen 1986). Compelled by

this collapse to confront the ideological assumptions underlying poststruc-

turalism, critics who matured during this transitional period have tended to

direct their attention beyond the formal gymnastics of ecriture to the social,

economic, and technological background of cultural production. Thus, ever

expanding groups of critics representing positions as diverse as neo-Marx-

ism, new historicism, media theory, postcolonialism, queer theory, femi-

nism, and now science and technology studies have stormed the poststruc-

turalist arsenal, claiming its major theorems as tools for developing (often

overtly political) critical agendas far removed from the pristine neutrality

and high-art aura indissociably bound up with poststructuralism's textual-

ist focus. To a certain extent, this deflection of critical sensibility can be

ascribed to a phenomenon known as the Americanization of deconstruc-

tion: the "translation" of theory from a monological society into a pro-

foundly and provocatively dialogical one. Even more fundamentally, this

critical shift would appear simply to reflect the new urgency with which

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

ism within the new cultural horizon, let me briefly evaluate the contribu­ tions of several cultural critics who have made an explicit effort to apply the insights of deconstructive criticism transformationally. The work of these critics-Terry Eagleton, Stephen Greenblatt, and Donna Haraway-exem­ plifies the most fruitful assimilation of poststructuralism in three significant fields within cultural criticism broadly considered: British materialism, the new historicism, and (cyborg) feminism. Consideration of their respective merits and limitations will thus go far toward establishing both the heuris­ tic importance and the methodological limitations of contemporary cultural studies for the development of a robust, holist account of contemporary technology's experiential impact. While all three critics deserve praise for their efforts to suture deconstructive analysis with material reality, they must all be criticized for their refusal to think rigorously about the disj unc­ tion of the linguistic and the phenomenal . Though the task these critics set for themselves is admirable and urgent, they articulate concrete suggestions that too hastily invoke or reinvoke various aspects of the traditionally priv­ ileged cognitive subject. IS The work of Eagleton, Greenblatt, and Haraway should be situated in the passage from poststructuralism to postmodernism as the dominant par­ adigm of academic criticism. With the advent of the so-called postmodern condition, the various core distinctions underwriting the poststructuralist ethos became largely untenable. In particular, postmodernism witnessed the collapse of the great divide between literature and popular culture-the very divide that informed and reinvigorated the modernist assumptions from which poststructuralism drew its strength (Huyssen 1 9 8 6 ) . Compelled by this collapse to confront the ideological assumptions underlying poststruc­ turalism, critics who matured during this transitional period have tended to direct their attention beyond the formal gymnastics of ecriture to the social, economic, and technological background of cultural production. Thus, ever expanding groups of critics representing positions as diverse as neo-Marx­ ism, new historicism, media theory, postcolonialism, queer theory, femi­ nism, and now science and technology studies have stormed the poststruc­ turalist arsenal, claiming its major theorems as tools for developing (often overtly political) critical agendas far removed from the pristine neutrality and high-art aura indissociably bound up with poststructuralism's textual­ ist focus. To a certain extent, this deflection of critical sensibility can be ascribed to a phenomenon known as the Americanization of deconstruc­ tion: the " translation" of theory from a monological society into a pro­ foundly and provocatively dialogical one. Even more fundamentally, this critical shift would appear simply to reflect the new urgency with which

I n trod u cti on

Introduction * 11

agents living in the ever more confusing and paradoxically ever more inter-

connected postmodern environment seek to discover reference points for

their activity in the social and economic context of their lived experience. As

the impetus for the cultural, social, and political contextualization of post-

structuralist tenets, this urgency has introduced a healthy concern for the

relevance or pragmatic function of criticism; wrested from its abstract and

neutral analytic framework, the deconstructive account of subjectivity can

be viewed more productively as a concrete consequence of late capitalism's

impact on traditional modes of experience. Yet for all the freedom such a

shift introduces, to avoid succumbing to the thrill of such a consumerist

utopia-to avoid commodifying theory as our personal means of appropri-

ating the world-we must refrain from abandoning our critical duty to post-

structuralism. Such a duty enjoins us never to forget that the critical possi-

bilities opened by this newfound perspective can fruitfully redeploy

poststructuralist arguments only if they respect-and to some extent only if

they embrace-the poststructuralists' critical rigor.

With this proviso in mind, let us examine the three critics just mentioned

as they engineer critical negotiations with poststructuralism. Terry Eagle-

ton's evaluation of deconstruction in "Capitalism, Modernism, and Post-

modernism" furnishes a splendid example of the contextualization of

deconstruction in the material domain. For Eagleton, hardly a card-carrying

postmodernist, the deconstruction of the traditional "unified subject"

obtains its force not so much from a theoretical necessity (the literariness of

language) as from a material one: "late capitalism," he states with typical

aplomb, "has deconstructed [the unified subject] much more efficiently than

meditations on ecriture" (Eagleton 1988, 396). A similar valorization of

context underwrites Stephen Greenblatt's endorsement in "Towards a Poet-

ics of Culture" of the fluid circulation between the no longer distinct realms

of fiction and reality. Though couched as a remedy to the complementary

insufficiencies of Jameson's and Lyotard's versions of postmodernism,

Greenblatt's argument can more interestingly be viewed as a postmodern

retooling of the deconstructive motif of the "invagination" of fictive and ref-

erential discourse.16 Where deconstruction ascribes the motive force for

such invagination to a theoretical insight concerning language, Greenblatt

situates it squarely within the postmodern mutation of capitalism. Nothing

but the "power of capital" itself can explain the oscillation "between the

establishment of distinct discursive domains and the collapse of those

domains into one another" (Greenblatt 1989, 8). Donna Haraway's practi-

cal deployment of the deconstruction of binary oppositions in "A Cyborg

Manifesto" furnishes yet another example. For Haraway, "high-tech

•

11

agents living i n the ever more confusing and paradoxically ever more inter­ connected postmodern environment seek to discover reference points for their activity in the social and economic context of their lived experience. As the impetus for the cultural, social, and political contextualization of post­ structuralist tenets, this urgency has introduced a healthy concern for the relevance or pragmatic function of criticism; wrested from its abstract and neutral analytic framework, the deconstructive account of subj ectivity can be viewed more productively as a concrete consequence of late capitalism's impact on traditional modes of experience. Yet for all the freedom such a shift introduces, to avoid succumbing to the thrill of such a consumerist utopia-to avoid commodifying theory as our personal means of appropri­ ating the world-we must refrain from abandoning our critical duty to post­ structuralism. Such a duty enjoins us never to forget that the critical possi­ bilities opened by this newfound perspective can fruitfully redeploy poststructuralist arguments only if they respect-and to some extent only if they embrace-the poststructuralists' critical rigor. With this proviso in mind, let us examine the three critics just mentioned as they engineer critical negotiations with poststructuralism. Terry Eagle­ ton's evaluation of deconstruction in " Capitalism, Modernism, and Post­ modernism " furnishes a splendid example of the contextualization of deconstruction in the material domain. For Eagleton, hardly a card-carrying postmodernist, the deconstruction of the traditional " unified subj ect" obtains its force not so much from a theoretical necessity (the literariness of language ) as from a material one: " late capitalism, " he states with typical aplomb, " has deconstructed [the unified subj ect] much more efficiently than meditations on ecriture" ( Eagleton 1 9 8 8 , 3 9 6 ) . A similar valorization of context underwrites Stephen Greenblatt's endorsement in "Towards a Poet­ ics of Culture " of the fluid circulation between the no longer distinct realms of fiction and reality. Though couched as a remedy to the complementary insufficiencies of Jameson's and Lyotard's versions of postmodernism, Greenblatt's argument can more interestingly be viewed as a postmodern retooling of the deconstructive motif of the " invagination" of fictive and ref­ erential discourse. 1 6 Where deconstruction ascribes the motive force for such invagination to a theoretical insight concerning language, Greenblatt situates it squarely within the postmodern mutation of capitalism. Nothing but the "power of capital" itself can explain the oscillation " between the establishment of distinct discursive domains and the collapse of those domains into one another " ( Greenblatt 1 9 8 9, 8 ) . Donna Haraway's practi­ cal deployment of the deconstruction of binary oppositions in "A Cyborg Manifesto " furnishes yet another example. For Haraway, "high-tech

12

12 * Embodying Technesis

culture" itself conditions the deconstruction of persistent dualisms that have

"been systemic to the logics and practices of domination . . . of all consti-

tuted as others" (Haraway 1991a, 177). By undermining the distinction

between human and machine, the electronics revolution and the advent of

what Haraway calls the "integrated circuit" facilitate a practice of "liminal

transformation" that, by submitting hitherto unassailable binary opposi-

tions to radical destabilization, affords new possibilities for overcoming

oppressive constraints.

Poststructuralist arguments are central in all three of these examples; in

varying ways, deconstruction-of the subject, of the fiction-reality divide, or

of dualism itself-furnishes a theoretical principle that simultaneously

demands and facilitates a sociopolitical project. For Eagleton, late capital-

ism's deconstruction of the subject indicates the need to preserve those

aspects of modernism that might mitigate its effect. For Greenblatt, capital-

ism's dissolution of the fiction-reality divide calls for a theoretical model

capable of accounting for "the unsettling circulation of materials and dis-

courses" characteristic of aesthetic practice in its contemporary, thoroughly

worldly form (1989, 13). For Haraway, capitalism's electronic revolution

activates the feminist deconstruction of dualism in a manner far more

urgent, far more productive, and finally far more actual than that developed

by the French feminists of the 1970s.

By applying poststructuralist techniques within a larger social, economic,

and technological context, these critical projects perfectly illustrate how

contemporary cultural criticism seeks a new relevance for the claims of the-

ory. Yet they also exemplify the decidedly ambivalent attitude cultural crit-

icism takes toward poststructuralism. While they all deploy the critical

power of deconstruction (linked directly to late-capitalist material reality) as

the motive force of their respective critical programs, they simultaneously

play down or simply jettison the crucial philosophical rationale behind post-

structuralism: its fundamental critique of logocentrism. By neglecting the

profound antihermeneutic consequences ensuing from the incompatibility

of the linguistic and the phenomenal, such transformational critical projects

fail to grapple with the most unsettling, but also most provocative, conse-

quences of the worldly localization of deconstruction: the eclipse of lan-

guage as a medium capable of brokering our contemporary experience.

Since it reproaches deconstruction with anachronism, Eagleton's analysis

furnishes an apt illustration of the consequences of such an ambivalent

appropriation. To the extent that late capitalism has produced a new kind

of agent, "a dispersed, decentred network of libidinal attachments" lacking

any common ground with the unified subject of the modernist age, post-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

culture " itself conditions the deconstruction of persistent dualisms that have " been systemic to the logics and practices of domination . . . of all consti­ tuted as others " (Haraway 1 9 9 1 a, 1 77 ) . By undermining the distinction between human and machine, the electronics revolution and the advent of what Haraway calls the " integrated circuit " facilitate a practice of " liminal transformation " that, by submitting hitherto unassailable binary opposi­ tions to radical destabilization, affords new possibilities for overcoming oppressive constraints . Poststructuralist arguments are central in all three of these examples; in varying ways, deconstruction-of the subj ect, of the fiction-reality divide, or of dualism itself-furnishes a theoretical principle that simultaneously demands and facilitates a sociopolitical proj ect. For Eagleton, late capital­ ism's deconstruction of the subj ect indicates the need to preserve those aspects of modernism that might mitigate its effect. For Greenblatt, capital­ ism's dissolution of the fiction-reality divide calls for a theoretical model capable of accounting for " the unsettling circulation of materials and dis­ courses" characteristic of aesthetic practice in its contemporary, thoroughly worldly form ( 1 9 8 9, 1 3 ) . For Haraway, capitalism's electronic revolution activates the feminist deconstruction of dualism in a manner far more urgent, far more productive, and finally far more actual than that developed by the French feminists of the 1 9 70s. By applying poststructuralist techniques within a larger social, economic, and technological context, these critical proj ects perfectly illustrate how contemporary cultural criticism seeks a new relevance for the claims of the­ ory. Yet they also exemplify the decidedly ambivalent attitude cultural crit­ icism takes toward poststructuralism. While they all deploy the critical power of deconstruction (linked directly to late-capitalist material reality) as the motive force of their respective critical programs, they simultaneously play down or simply jettison the crucial philosophical rationale behind post­ structuralism: its fundamental critique of logocentrism. By neglecting the profound antihermeneutic consequences ensuing from the incompatibility of the linguistic and the phenomenal, such transformational critical proj ects fail to grapple with the most unsettling, but also most provocative, conse­ quences of the worldly localization of deconstruction: the eclipse of lan­ guage as a medium capable of brokering our contemporary experience. Since it reproaches deconstruction with anachronism, Eagleton's analysis furnishes an apt illustration of the consequences of such an ambivalent appropriation. To the extent that late capitalism has produced a new kind of agent, "a dispersed, decentred network of libidinal attachments " lacking any common ground with the unified subj ect of the modernist age, post-

I n trod u cti on

Introduction * 13

structuralism is disingenuous, suggests Eagleton, in directing its critique

against the traditional humanist subject. In the context of postmodern cul-

ture, he argues, "the 'unified subject' looms up . . . as more and more of a

shibboleth or straw target, a hangover from an older liberal epoch of capi-

talism, before technology and consumerism scattered our bodies to the

wind" (1988, 396). Rarely equaled for its ferocity and bluntness, Eagleton's

judgment nonetheless expresses the rather reactionary sentiment shared by

most practitioners of what we might call "post-poststructuralist" cultural

criticism: an impatience and skepticism concerning the complicated trajec-

tories of deconstructive logic. In the very act of situating the cause inform-

ing the deconstruction of the unified subject within the postmodern mater-

ial domain, Eagleton's analysis fails to account for (if not simply to

recognize) the basic philosophical thesis underlying the textual practice of

poststructuralism: the homology it posits between textual structures and

thought.17 Insofar as they presuppose that thinking itself functions like a

text, textualist analyses posit a coequality between the structure of thought

and the structure of textuality, which they then deploy to distance thought

from the hermeneutic and/or phenomenal models that have traditionally

served to account for it.18 Transformative analyses like Eagleton's ulti-

mately fail to appreciate the irreducibility of this disjunction. Whether it is

caused by the "literariness" of language or by the material realities of the

late-capitalist lifeworld ("technology and consumerism"), the deconstruc-

tion of the subject has lasting consequences: once thought is divorced from

phenomenality, it simply loses its jurisdiction over the experiential domain.

Correlatively, language loses its force as the faculty governing our lived

experience. Despite a constructive effort to (re)ascribe the cause of the sub-

ject's deconstruction directly to the domain of social and material reality,

contemporary cultural critics ultimately undermine their transformative

programs by retaining an analytical methodology (focus on language)

and critical commitments (to traditionally humanist political agendas,

hermeneutical goals, etc.) that are themselves deconstructed in the same

process.

Insofar as they reproduce Eagleton's oversight, today's cultural critics

commit themselves to a reductive strategy. Far from extending the disjunc-

tion of thought and phenomenality into the wider arena of culture, they seek

to historicize the cause of deconstruction in order to render it a "positivity,"

a concrete and local, tangible and fully transparent-and thus temporary

and reversible-impingement on cognition and identity formation as they

have been traditionally conceived. By thus positivizing a theoretical disjunc-

tion that questions the very viability of positivized modes of experience,

•

13

structuralism is disingenuous, suggests Eagleton, in directing its critique against the traditional humanist subj ect. In the context of postmodern cul­ ture, he argues, "the 'unified subj ect' looms up . . . as more and more of a shibboleth or straw target, a hangover from an older liberal epoch of capi­ talism, before technology and consumerism scattered our bodies to the wind " ( 1 9 8 8 , 3 9 6 ) . Rarely equaled for its ferocity and bluntness, Eagleton's j udgment nonetheless expresses the rather reactionary sentiment shared by most practitioners of what we might call "post-poststructuralist " cultural criticism: an impatience and skepticism concerning the complicated traj ec­ tories of deconstructive logic. In the very act of situating the cause inform­ ing the deconstruction of the unified subj ect within the postmodern mater­ ial domain, Eagleton's analysis fails to account for (if not simply to recognize) the basic philosophical thesis underlying the textual practice of poststructuralism: the homology it posits between textual structures and thought . I 7 Insofar as they presuppose that thinking itself functions like a text, textualist analyses posit a coequality between the structure of thought and the structure of textuality, which they then deploy to distance thought from the hermeneutic and/or phenomenal models that have traditionally served to account for it. I 8 Transformative analyses like Eagleton's ulti­ mately fail to appreciate the irreducibility of this disj unction. Whether it is caused by the "literariness " of language or by the material realities of the late-capitalist lifeworld ( " technology and consumerism " ) , the deconstruc­ tion of the subj ect has lasting consequences : once thought is divorced from phenomenality, it simply loses its jurisdiction over the experiential domain. Correlatively, language loses its force as the faculty governing our lived experience . Despite a constructive effort to (re)ascribe the cause of the sub­ j ect's deconstruction directly to the domain of social and material reality, contemporary cultural critics ultimately undermine their transformative programs by retaining an analytical methodology ( focus on language ) and critical commitments (to traditionally humanist political agendas, hermeneutical goals, etc . ) that are themselves deconstructed in the same process. Insofar as they reproduce Eagleton's oversight, today's cultural critics commit themselves to a reductive strategy. Far from extending the disj unc­ tion of thought and phenomenality into the wider arena of culture, they seek to historicize the cause of deconstruction in order to render it a "positivity, " a concrete and local, tangible and fully transparent-and thus temporary and reversible-impingement on cognition and identity formation as they have been traditionally conceived. By thus positivizing a theoretical disj unc­ tion that questions the very viability of positivized modes of experience,

14

14 * Embodying Technesis

cultural critics are able to script the triumph of the cognitive subject over the

deconstructing forces immanent to the late-capitalist lifeworld. Among the

critics I have been discussing, such a triumph takes form along two lines:

through an allegedly more "sophisticated" form of criticism that can

embrace the aporia it introduces (Eagleton, Greenblatt) or through the cog-

nitive adaptation of our experiential faculties to a point where the new

social "logic" can be understood, strategically and locally deployed, or

"cognitively mapped" (Haraway, Jameson).

Rethinking Poststructuralism in the

Technological Age

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

cultural critics are able to script the triumph of the cognitive subj ect over the deconstructing forces immanent to the late-capitalist lifeworld. Among the critics I have been discussing, such a triumph takes form along two lines: through an allegedly more " sophisticated " form of criticism that can embrace the aporia it introduces (Eagleton, Greenblatt) or through the cog­ nitive adaptation of our experiential faculties to a point where the new social " logic " can be understood, strategically and locally deployed, or "cognitively mapped" (Haraway, Jameson) .

Against this common historicizing strategy, we can develop a more empow-

ering refunctionalization of deconstruction if (and only if) we focus on the

ways in which its cultural-and specifically, its technological-localization

radicalizes the disjunction of language and expression beyond the narrow

textualist frame. With the advent of postmodernism, the divide between

thought and materiality takes on new proportions, since the increasing

Rethinking Poststructuralism in the Technological Age

complexification of the material world makes materiality ever more alien

and elusive to thought. One striking example of such material complexifi-

cation-the ever increasing convergence of linguistic materiality with

machine code-has led recent critics to abandon the models of signification

developed in the print era in favor of models derived from information the-

ory (Serres 1982a; Kittler 1987; Porush 1985; Hayles 1990, 1993). Such

developments stress the critical necessity of grappling with the worldly

anchoring of theory: once it is localized in the postmodern real, the disjunc-

tion of thought and materiality can no longer be conceived as an abstract

formalist divide between thought and language. Language simply can no

longer assert its claim to be the exclusive or privileged faculty of experience

(Godzich 1994). In the information age, the disjunction between thought

and linguistic materiality becomes one local and particularly marginal case

of the broader and more forceful disjunction of thought (together with its

material support) from materiality considered robustly. No mere assimila-

tion of deconstruction to the cultural domain will suffice to address the

experiential consequences of this shift: to succeed in this latter task-and

thus to accomplish what I take to be the central task of contemporary criti-

cal theory-we will have to acknowledge the diminution of thought as the

privileged faculty of experience. Only by radicalizing deconstruction's dis-

junction of thought from experience will we be able to emancipate experi-

Against this common historicizing strategy, we can develop a more empow­ ering refunctionalization of deconstruction if ( and only if) we focus on the ways in which its cultural-and specifically, its technological-localization radicalizes the disj unction of language and expression beyond the narrow textualist frame. With the advent of postmodernism, the divide between thought and materiality takes on new proportions, since the increasing complexification of the material world makes materiality ever more alien and elusive to thought. One striking example of such material complexifi­ cation-the ever increasing convergence of linguistic materiality with machine code-has led recent critics to abandon the models of signification developed in the print era in favor of models derived from information the­ ory ( Serres 1 9 82a; Kittler 1 9 8 7; Porush 1 9 8 5 ; Hayles 1 990, 1 993 ) . Such developments stress the critical necessity of grappling with the worldly anchoring of theory: once it is localized in the postmodern real, the disj unc­ tion of thought and materiality can no longer be conceived as an abstract formalist divide between thought and language. Language simply can no longer assert its claim to be the exclusive or privileged faculty of experience ( Godzich 1 994 ) . In the information age, the disj unction between thought and linguistic materiality becomes one local and particularly marginal case of the broader and more forceful disj unction of thought (together with its material support) from materiality considered robustly. No mere assimila­ tion of deconstruction to the cultural domain will suffice to address the experiential consequences of this shift: to succeed in this latter task-and thus to accomplish what I take to be the central task of contemporary criti­ cal theory-we will have to acknowledge the diminution of thought as the privileged faculty of experience. Only by radicalizing deconstruction's dis­ junction of thought from experience will we be able to emancipate experi-

I n trod u cti on

Introduction * 15

ence from the supposedly unbreachable-though in truth thoroughly reduc-

tive-closure of representation; our very ability to rearticulate the "mean-

ing" of experience, once it is divorced from language, requires nothing less

than a thorough working-through of the philosophical consequences of

poststructuralism in the context of postmodern culture.

Precisely the waning of language as the privileged medium of experience

motivates much of the research of contemporary cultural critics of science

and technology. The wide-ranging interest in the technological mediation of

language and the technological embodiment of subjectivity should be under-

stood as a response to this very shift in the media that broker our experi-

ence.19 Yet even among broad-minded, fundamentally technophilic critics,

there persists a strong resistance to technology-a resistance that prevents

them from addressing this fundamental experiential shift. Following in the

footsteps of Haraway and Jameson (and, more distantly, Eagleton and

Greenblatt), recent cultural critics of science and technology have variously

and persuasively deconstructed the dualisms central to traditional techno-

scientific critique (e.g., instrumental vs. substantive theory [Feenberg

1991]), only to compromise their deconstruction because of a recalcitrant,

if not always explicit or intended, commitment to representationalism.

To illustrate this resistance to technology, let me briefly discuss an exam-

ple of the strategy previously outlined-the "positivizing" of an irreducible

theoretical disjunction-which occurs in the work of a recent cultural critic

whose position explicitly refuses to "exclude technological processes and

artifacts as ontologically antecedent to the human" (Kendrick 1996, 144).

In her insightful article, "Cyberspace and the Technological Real," cultural

critic Michelle Kendrick attempts to develop an approach to technology

that would avoid reduction on two fronts: on the one hand, within tradi-

tional dualist schemes where technology is assimilated to the inessential

body; on the other hand, in a more contemporary form of this dualism in

which (virtual-reality) technology facilitates a similar rejection, or more pre-

cisely a transcendence, of the body. According to Kendrick, what both

reductive approaches overlook is the "technological real," a "symbiotic and

contentious-hence dialogic-relationship between the human and the

machine." Attention to the technological real-to the concrete ways in

which technology intervenes in our "selves"-requires a recognition "that

subjectivity is always in the process of being reconstructed by the technolo-

gies-material and semiotic which it purports merely to manipulate"

(ibid.).

To develop the significance of the technological real, Kendrick focuses on

two concrete examples that are marshaled to illustrate the intervention of

•

15

ence from the supposedly unbreachable-though i n truth thoroughly reduc­ tive-closure of representation; our very ability to rearticulate the " mean­ ing " of experience, once it is divorced from language, requires nothing less than a thorough working-through of the philosophical consequences of poststructuralism in the context of postmodern culture. Precisely the waning of language as the privileged medium of experience motivates much of the research of contemporary cultural critics of science and technology. The wide-ranging interest in the technological mediation of language and the technological embodiment of subj ectivity should be under­ stood as a response to this very shift in the media that broker our experi­ ence . 1 9 Yet even among broad-minded, fundamentally technophilic critics, there persists a strong resistance to technology-a resistance that prevents them from addressing this fundamental experiential shift. Following in the footsteps of Haraway and Jameson ( and, more distantly, Eagleton and Greenblatt) , recent cultural critics of science and technology have variously and persuasively deconstructed the dualisms central to traditional techno­ scientific critique (e.g., instrumental vs. substantive theory [Feenberg 1 9 9 1 ] ) , only to compromise their deconstruction because of a recalcitrant, if not always explicit or intended, commitment to representationalism. To illustrate this resistance to technology, let me briefly discuss an exam­ ple of the strategy previously outlined-the " positivizing " of an irreducible theoretical disj unction-which occurs in the work of a recent cultural critic whose position explicitly refuses to " exclude technological processes and artifacts as onto logically antecedent to the human " (Kendrick 1 996, 1 44 ) . I n her insightful article, " Cyberspace and the Technological Real," cultural critic Michelle Kendrick attempts to develop an approach to technology that would avoid reduction on two fronts: on the one hand, within tradi­ tional dualist schemes where technology is assimilated to the inessential body; on the other hand, in a more contemporary form of this dualism in which ( virtual-reality) technology facilitates a similar rej ection, or more pre­ cisely a transcendence, of the body. According to Kendrick, what both reductive approaches overlook is the " technological real," a " symbiotic and contentious-hence dialogic-relationship between the human and the machine. " Attention to the technological real-to the concrete ways in which technology intervenes in our " selves"-requires a recognition " that subj ectivity is always in the process of being reconstructed by the technolo­ gies-material and semiotic-which it purports merely to manipulate " ( ibid . ) . To develop the significance o f the technological real, Kendrick focuses on two concrete examples that are marshaled to illustrate the intervention of

16

16 * Embodying Technesis

technology in our minds and bodies "in the localized and multivalent ways

in which real life assaults us" and not merely in "a vaguely holistic fashion"

(146). Both examples concern the relationship between cyber-personas and

actual persons, and both are marshaled to undermine the contention that

cyberspace represents some sort of utopian escape into an alternate reality.

The first example, borrowed from technocultural critic Sandy Stone (and

ultimately from Ms. journalist Leslie Van Gelder), involves a cyber-persona,

"Julie," an older disabled woman who developed intimate electronic rela-

tionships with a group of cyber-companions. When it was revealed that

"Julie" was actually a middle-aged, able-bodied male psychiatrist, the

women "she" had helped reacted with outrage, employed the rhetoric of

rape to describe their sense of violation, and in some cases even "went so far

as to repudiate the genuine gains they had made in their personal and emo-

tional lives" (Stone 1991, 83). The second example, borrowed from Village

Voice journalist Julian Dibbell, recounts a so-called rape within a computer

database named "LambdaMOO," a shared, textually described computer

space that allows interaction among multiple users. By juxtaposing two ver-

sions of the rape-a virtual-reality and a real-life version-Dibbell is able to

complicate the notion of alternate realities. On his account, the response of

the community-and in particular the virulent and vengeful outrage of the

actual user behind the cyber-victim-demonstrates that "MUDs [multiuser

domains] are not places of alternate subjectivities, of a transcending of one's

social and biological identity, but of simultaneous subjectivities" (Kendrick

1996, 158). Together, these examples aptly illustrate Kendrick's sweeping

claim that "the construction of subjectivity is a process of intervening social

and technological forces, in many ways beyond the control or agency of the

user" (159).

One might, however, read these examples along somewhat different

lines. Far from serving to establish the "instability of simultaneous subject

positions" (Kendrick 1996, 159), they could both be interpreted as attesting

to the practical priority of actual persons over cyber-personas. In both cases,

the defensive reactions on the part of the actual users demonstrate the super-

venience of feelings of violation that stem from embeddedness within the

actual world and in an actual body. By showing (contra Kendrick) the per-

durance, in practice, of an actual agent who preexists and supports the con-

stitution of any virtual identity in cyberspace, these examples attest to the

irreducibility of the "embodied mind" (to appropriate Francisco Varela's

felicitous term) as the processing center for all experience, actual and virtual

alike. At the same time as it would support and even expand Kendrick's cri-

tique of dualism, such a reading would highlight the intrinsic limitations of

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

technology in our minds and bodies " in the localized and multivalent ways in which real life assaults us " and not merely in "a vaguely holistic fashion " ( 1 4 6 ) . Both examples concern the relationship between cyber-personas and actual persons, and both are marshaled to undermine the contention that cyberspace represents some sort of utopian escape into an alternate reality. The first example, borrowed from technocultural critic Sandy Stone ( and ultimately from Ms. journalist Leslie Van Gelder) , involves a cyber-persona, "Julie, " an older disabled woman who developed intimate electronic rela­ tionships with a group of cyber-companions . When it was revealed that "Julie" was actually a middle-aged, able-bodied male psychiatrist, the women " she " had helped reacted with outrage, employed the rhetoric of rape to describe their sense of violation, and in some cases even "went so far as to repudiate the genuine gains they had made in their personal and emo­ tional lives" ( Stone 1 9 9 1 , 8 3 ) . The second example, borrowed from Village Voice j ournalist Julian Dibbell, recounts a so-called rape within a computer database named " LambdaMOO," a shared, textually described computer space that allows interaction among multiple users. By juxtaposing two ver­ sions of the rape-a virtual-reality and a real-life version-Dibbell is able to complicate the notion of alternate realities. On his account, the response of the community-and in particular the virulent and vengeful outrage of the actual user behind the cyber-victim-demonstrates that " MUD s [multiuser domains] are not places of alternate subj ectivities, of a transcending of one's social and biological identity, but of simultaneous subj ectivities " (Kendrick 1 9 96, 1 5 8 ) . Together, these examples aptly illustrate Kendrick's sweeping claim that "the construction of subj ectivity is a process of intervening social and technological forces, in many ways beyond the control or agency of the user " ( 1 59 ) . One might, however, read these examples along somewhat different lines. Far from serving to establish the " instability of simultaneous subj ect positions" (Kendrick 1 996, 1 5 9 ) , they could both be interpreted as attesting to the practical priority of actual persons over cyber-personas. In both cases, the defensive reactions on the part of the actual users demonstrate the super­ venience of feelings of violation that stem from embeddedness within the actual world and in an actual body. By showing (contra Kendrick) the per­ durance, in practice, of an actual agent who preexists and supports the con­ stitution of any virtual identity in cyberspace, these examples attest to the irreducibility of the " embodied mind" (to appropriate Francisco Varela's felicitous term ) as the processing center for all experience, actual and virtual alike. At the same time as it would support and even expand Kendrick's cri­ tique of dualism, such a reading would highlight the intrinsic limitations of

I n trod u cti on

Introduction * 17

her approach-the constraints imposed by her commitment to representa-

tionalism. By defining cyberspace as "a discursive site of ideological strug-

gles" (160) and by restricting materiality as such to the (relative) "material-

ity of subjectivity" (150), Kendrick effectively pigeonholes her own

approach to technology in a manner only marginally less reductive finally

than what she opposes. Although she posits the inextricability of embodied

identity and technology, her penchant to explore it exclusively "in the con-

struction of working fictions of subjectivity" (145) evacuates embodiment

of any content and insures the restriction of technology's impact to its effect

on representation-in this case, on the subject's capacity to represent itself

as a self. Within such a scheme, there is no room for the molecular and sub-

representational material impact of technology "outside" or "beneath" the

frame of fantasy or the closure of representation. In the end, by preventing

us from attending to the impact technology has on our bodies prior to and

independently of our discursive constitution as subjects, Kendrick's exclu-

sive attention to identity formation compromises whatever promise her

antidualist view might have for reorienting our approach to technology.

Kendrick's analysis furnishes an exemplary contemporary target for the

criticism of cultural studies I developed earlier in this introduction: it opens

a promising cultural approach to technology that falters because of a too

facile appropriation of poststructuralism, one that fails to respect its pro-

found antihermeneutic consequences. While Kendrick's postulation of the

technological real takes an important first step beyond dualism, it too read-

ily positivizes the real as a "dialogic relationship" between humans and

their technology. Through her reliance on (Bakhtinian) dialogism, Kendrick

suggests that technology's impact can be captured as a social or cultural

materiality inscribed within the "life" of signs. Indeed, by restricting tech-

nology's impact to the destabilization of narratives (or "working fictions")

of subjectivity, she renders it essentially linguistic. Nothing, I suggest, could

be more antithetical to Lacan's understanding of the real or, for that matter,

Althusser's materialist appropriation of it (to mention just two of the

inevitable sources for Kendrick's term). Viewed through a Lacanian or

Althusserian lens, the technological real would raise a different and far more

destabilizing problem than Kendrick's appropriation admits: it would force

us to ask how we could grasp technology's impact on our experience if it

intervenes, outside of the phenomenal field of subjectivity, as the material

support for the "object cause of desire" or as an impossible object of expe-

rience. Within a Lacanian or Althusserian frame of reference, in short, tech-

nology belongs to the real precisely because of its role in the constitution of

the split subject or the subject of ideology, a role that is predicated on its

•

17

her approach-the constraints imposed by her commitment to representa­ tionalism. By defining cyberspace as "a discursive site of ideological strug­ gles" ( 1 60 ) and by restricting materiality as such to the (relative ) " material­ ity of subj ectivity " ( 1 50 ) , Kendrick effectively pigeonholes her own approach to technology in a manner only marginally less reductive finally than what she opposes. Although she posits the inextricability of embodied identity and technology, her penchant to explore it exclusively " in the con­ struction of working fictions of subj ectivity " ( 1 4 5 ) evacuates embodiment of any content and insures the restriction of technology's impact to its effect on representation-in this case, on the subj ect' s capacity to represent itself as a self. Within such a scheme, there is no room for the molecular and sub­ representational material impact of technology " outside" or " beneath " the frame of fantasy or the closure of representation. In the end, by preventing us from attending to the impact technology has on our bodies prior to and independently of our discursive constitution as subjects, Kendrick's exclu­ sive attention to identity formation compromises whatever promise her antidualist view might have for reorienting our approach to technology. Kendrick's analysis furnishes an exemplary contemporary target for the criticism of cultural studies I developed earlier in this introduction: it opens a promising cultural approach to technology that falters because of a too facile appropriation of poststructuralism, one that fails to respect its pro­ found antihermeneutic consequences. While Kendrick's postulation of the technological real takes an important first step beyond dualism, it too read­ ily positivizes the real as a " dialogic relationship" between humans and their technology. Through her reliance on ( Bakhtinian ) dialogism, Kendrick suggests that technology's impact can be captured as a social or cultural materiality inscribed within the " life " of signs. Indeed, by restricting tech­ nology's impact to the destabilization of narratives (or " working fictions " ) of subj ectivity, she renders it essentially linguistic. Nothing, I suggest, could be more antithetical to Lacan's understanding of the real or, for that matter, Althusser's materialist appropriation of it (to mention just two of the inevitable sources for Kendrick's term ) . Viewed through a Lacanian or Althusserian lens, the technological real would raise a different and far more destabilizing problem than Kendrick's appropriation admits: it would force us to ask how we could grasp technology's impact on our experience if it intervenes, outside of the phenomenal field of subj ectivity, as the material support for the " obj ect cause of desire " or as an impossible obj ect of expe­ rience. Within a Lacanian or Althusserian frame of reference, in short, tech­ nology belongs to the real precisely because of its role in the constitution of the split subj ect or the subj ect of ideology, a role that is predicated on its

18

18 * Embodying Technesis

absolute resistance to representational capture. By positivizing this role,

Kendrick simply conjures away the robust materiality she claims to address,

substituting in its place a relative materiality that resists (without invalidat-

ing) the narrative construction of subjectivity.

The internal contradictions that plague even such a technophilic and

antidualist analysis as Kendrick's are important less as criticisms of

Kendrick than as testimony to the difficulties involved when cultural critics

attempt to analyze in a nonholist manner technology's pervasive structuring

impact on our experience. In the end, Kendrick's example makes a funda-

mental contribution precisely because it foregrounds the urgency for a fun-

damental reorientation on our part: we must reject the privilege accorded

the discursive construction of subjectivity in our efforts to describe technol-

ogy's presubjective impact on our bodily experience. Only then will we be

able to realize the implicit desideratum motivating contemporary techno-

criticism: the foregrounding of the body as the site for technology's molecu-

lar material impact.

Technocultural Studies beyond Technesis

Having now established the need for a fundamental reassessment of the

legacy of poststructuralism in contemporary technocultural criticism, let me

briefly sketch the critical genealogy I propose to develop in this study. By

reconstructing the turn toward technology in twentieth-century thought

along Heideggerian and Freudian trajectories, I shall track, on the one hand,

the progressive infiltration of technology into theoretical discourses of dif-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

absolute resistance to representational capture. By pOSltlVlzmg this role, Kendrick simply conj ures away the robust materiality she claims to address, substituting in its place a relative materiality that resists (without invalidat­ ing) the narrative construction of subj ectivity. The internal contradictions that plague even such a technophilic and antidualist analysis as Kendrick's are important less as criticisms of Kendrick than as testimony to the difficulties involved when cultural critics attempt to analyze in a nonholist manner technology's pervasive structuring impact on our experience. In the end, Kendrick's example makes a funda­ mental contribution precisely because it foregrounds the urgency for a fun­ damental reorientation on our part: we must reject the privilege accorded the discursive construction of subj ectivity in our efforts to describe technol­ ogy's presubj ective impact on our bodily experience. Only then will we be able to realize the implicit desideratum motivating contemporary techno­ criticism: the foregrounding of the body as the site for technology's molecu­ lar material impact.

fering sorts and, on the other, the compensating defensive reduction of tech-

nology imposed ever more forcefully to preserve the integrity of theory in

the face of this infiltration. In my reconstruction, twentieth-century theoret-

ical discourses seek to answer the call of two incompatible demands. They

Technocultural Studies beyond

Technesis

pursue what I previously called the "ontic turn" toward the actual, a turn

that requires, among other things, an embrace of the technological media-

tion of the lifeworld; at the same time, however, they develop within the

horizon of a theoretical model inherited from the Greeks (more specifically,

from Aristotle) that appears to presuppose (but actually imposes) the sub-

ordination of materiality to thought. Considered against the background of

the "complexification" of the material domain, a process primarily cat-

alyzed in the modern period by technological development, these two con-

tradictory demands impose on theory a fatal double bind that spells the end

of its traditional jurisdiction over the real (Lyotard 1991). Technology, on

Having now established the need for a fundamental reassessment of the legacy of poststructuralism in contemporary technocultural criticism, let me briefly sketch the critical genealogy I propose to develop in this study. By reconstructing the turn toward technology in twentieth-century thought along Heideggerian and Freudian traj ectories, I shall track, on the one hand, the progressive infiltration of technology into theoretical discourses of dif­ fering sorts and, on the other, the compensating defensive reduction of tech­ nology imposed ever more forcefully to preserve the integrity of theory in the face of this infiltration. In my reconstruction, twentieth-century theoret­ ical discourses seek to answer the call of two incompatible demands. They pursue what I previously called the " ontic turn" toward the actual, a turn that requires, among other things, an embrace of the technological media­ tion of the lifeworld; at the same time, however, they develop within the horizon of a theoretical model inherited from the Greeks (more specifically, from Aristotle) that appears to presuppose ( but actually imposes) the sub­ ordination of materiality to thought. Considered against the background of the "complexification " of the material domain, a process primarily cat­ alyzed in the modern period by technological development, these two con­ tradictory demands impose on theory a fatal double bind that spells the end of its traditional jurisdiction over the real (Lyotard 1 9 9 1 ) . Technology, on

I n trod u cti on

Introduction * 19

this account, comprises a privileged "index" of the material stratum

(Deleuze and Guattari), the real (Lacan), or the unmediated flux (Hayles).

As actual forces immanent to the real, technologies furnish an immediate

material source of movement (active force) that does not rely on the activity

of thinking for its ontogenesis. Yet because technologies so drastically and

fundamentally impact the process of thinking, they seem to afford an ideal

site for analyzing the encounter between thought and the all-too-amorphous

real.

While this peculiar ontological duplicity of technology does much to

explain its allure as a privileged topic for twentieth-century critics, it cannot

justify an all-too-common feature of recent efforts to analyze technology as

the site for thought's encounter with the real: the wholesale assimilation of

technology's materiality into the domain of thought. Technology must not

be construed as a mere figure or metaphor; its role within thought must not

be reductively equated with its far more robust ontological status as "agent"

of material complexification. For this reason, my account of technology

draws more from a functionalist model like Deleuze and Guattari's (despite

my local criticism of it in chap. 8) than from a far more influential contem-

porary representationalist approach like Jameson's. In suggesting that tech-

nology is the "representational shorthand for something else"-for the vast

and altogether unfathomable global, multinational network that comprises

the world of late capitalism, Jameson perfectly illustrates the predicament

theory encounters when it seeks to confront technology's increasing media-

tion of the lifeworld (Jameson 1991). Like the theorists I discuss at length in

this study, Jameson attempts to open theory to materiality through the priv-

ileged index of technology; yet to preserve the priority of thought-or more

precisely because he cannot conceive of our relation to the real as anything

other than a cognitive relation (a relationship culminating in a successful

"cognitive mapping")-Jameson is compelled to construe technology not as

a direct force in the real but as a metaphor for the real itself. Like its coun-

terpart in the Romantic sublime, the ensuing moment of crisis in this process

(what Jameson calls "the technological sublime") remains graspable only

negatively, through the imagination's failure to give it form.20 Moreover,

the negative presentation of technology, like the negative presentation of the

absolutely great or small, remains a merely temporary setback, a provisional

phase on the way toward a successful cognitive adaptation. In Jameson's

allegedly materialist "cultural logic," "technology" is simply the (provi-

sional) "stand-in" for our representational incapacity.

Like Jameson, the critics on whom my critique focuses-Heidegger,

Freud, Derrida, Lacan, and Deleuze and Guattari-all turn to technology as

•

19

this account, comprises a privileged " index" of the material stratum (Deleuze and Guattari ) , the real (Lacan ) , or the unmediated flux (Hayles ) . A s actual forces immanent t o the real, technologies furnish a n immediate material source of movement ( active force ) that does not rely on the activity of thinking for its ontogenesis. Yet because technologies so drastically and fundamentally impact the process of thinking, they seem to afford an ideal site for analyzing the encounter between thought and the all-too-amorphous real. While this peculiar ontological duplicity of technology does much to explain its allure as a privileged topic for twentieth-century critics, it cannot j ustify an all-too-common feature of recent efforts to analyze technology as the site for thought's encounter with the real: the wholesale assimilation of technology's materiality into the domain of thought. Technology must not be construed as a mere figure or metaphor; its role within thought must not be reductively equated with its far more robust ontological status as " agent" of material complexification. For this reason, my account of technology draws more from a functionalist model like Deleuze and Guattari's ( despite my local criticism of it in chap. 8 ) than from a far more influential contem­ porary representationalist approach like Jameson's. In suggesting that tech­ nology is the " representational shorthand for something else "-for the vast and altogether unfathomable global, multinational network that comprises the world of late capitalism, Jameson perfectly illustrates the predicament theory encounters when it seeks to confront technology's increasing media­ tion of the lifeworld (Jameson 1 9 9 1 ) . Like the theorists I discuss at length in this study, Jameson attempts to open theory to materiality through the priv­ ileged index of technology; yet to preserve the priority of thought-or more precisely because he cannot conceive of our relation to the real as anything other than a cognitive relation (a relationship culminating in a successful " cognitive mapping " )-Jameson is compelled to construe technology not as a direct force in the real but as a metaphor for the real itself. Like its coun­ terpart in the Romantic sublime, the ensuing moment of crisis in this process (what Jameson calls " the technological sublime " ) remains graspable only negatively, through the imagination's failure to give it form.20 Moreover, the negative presentation of technology, like the negative presentation of the absolutely great or small, remains a merely temporary setback, a provisional phase on the way toward a successful cognitive adaptation. In Jameson's allegedly materialist "cultural logic, " " technology " is simply the (provi­ sional ) " stand-in " for our representational incapacity. Like Jameson, the critics on whom my critique focuses-Heidegger, Freud, Derrida, Lacan, and Deleuze and Guattari-all turn to technology as

20

20 * Embodying Technesis

a privileged site where the human encounters the material. Yet in all of these

cases, a promising start again ultimately comes to naught, since the explo-

ration of technological materiality is quickly and surreptitiously translated

into an exploration of technology's effects on thought-of the way in which

thought, in coming to rely on technological means of support or embodi-

ment, undergoes a relative exteriorization. In this process, technology is

stripped of its robust materiality in order to serve as a figure for the impact

of materiality on thinking. By variously imposing this same reduction on

technology, the master-thinkers of technological modernity demonstrate

their common allegiance to the strategy that I shall call technesis, or the

putting-into-discourse of technology. An updated form of the Husserlian

phenomenological epoche, this reduction constrains worldliness within the

form of what we might call a technema, the correlate of an act of techno-

thinking (technesis). This correlation is far more inclusive than that imposed

by the phenomenological epoche, since technesis explodes the purity of

Husserl's reduction by encompassing language, the unconscious, and other

sources of materiality that complicate the suspension of the natural stand-

point. But it nonetheless retains the noiesis-noema correlation as its basic

principle. Thus, like the classical phenomenological reduction it updates,

this reduction continues to privilege the ontogenetic role of thinking: like

noiesis, technesis reductively determines the field of exteriority as the tech-

nema that forms its correlate.

Ultimately, this general allegiance to the basic form of phenomenological

reduction is the reason that various twentieth-century theoretical discourses

explored in this study have failed to give a robust account of technological

materiality. While each master-thinker makes some important contribution

toward the assessment of technology's impact on experience, each is ulti-

mately compelled to sacrifice technological materiality in order to maintain

the integrity of thought. Each is compelled, that is, to repress technology at

the point where it threatens to exceed the particular technematic field con-

ditioning whatever serves as the motive principle of analysis in the respec-

tive critics at issue (e.g., Heidegger's horizon of thought, Derrida's closure

of representation, Freud's psychic space, Lacan's objet a, and Deleuze and

Guattari's social assemblage). In each case, the result of this residual phe-

nomenological commitment is the wholesale repression of what I shall call,

adapting Levinas's term, the "radical exteriority" of technology. Like Lev-

inas's primordial "Other" with whom we are in relation prior to all phe-

nomenality, technology possesses a fundamental alterity with respect to

thought. It simply cannot be reduced, without essential violence, to the form

of a technema.21

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

a privileged site where the human encounters the material. Yet in all of these cases, a promising start again ultimately comes to naught, since the explo­ ration of technological materiality is quickly and surreptitiously translated into an exploration of technology's effects on thought-of the way in which thought, in coming to rely on technological means of support or embodi­ ment, undergoes a relative exteriorization. In this process, technology is stripped of its robust materiality in order to serve as a figure for the impact of materiality on thinking. By variously imposing this same reduction on technology, the master-thinkers of technological modernity demonstrate their common allegiance to the strategy that I shall call technesis, or the putting-into-discourse of technology. An updated form of the Husserlian phenomenological epoche, this reduction constrains worldliness within the form of what we might call a technema, the correlate of an act of techno­ thinking (technesis ) . This correlation is far more inclusive than that imposed by the phenomenological epoche, since technesis explodes the purity of Husserl's reduction by encompassing language, the unconscious, and other sources of materiality that complicate the suspension of the natural stand­ point. But it nonetheless retains the noiesis-noema correlation as its basic principle. Thus, like the classical phenomenological reduction it updates, this reduction continues to privilege the ontogenetic role of thinking: like noiesis, technesis reductively determines the field of exteriority as the tech­ nema that forms its correlate. Ultimately, this general allegiance to the basic form of phenomenological reduction is the reason that various twentieth-century theoretical discourses explored in this study have failed to give a robust account of technological materiality. While each master-thinker makes some important contribution toward the assessment of technology's impact on experience, each is ulti­ mately compelled to sacrifice technological materiality in order to maintain the integrity of thought. Each is compelled, that is, to repress technology at the point where it threatens to exceed the particular technematic field con­ ditioning whatever serves as the motive principle of analysis in the respec­ tive critics at issue (e.g., Heidegger's horizon of thought, Derrida's closure of representation, Freud' s psychic space, Lacan's objet a, and Deleuze and Guattari's social assemblage ) . In each case, the result of this residual phe­ nomenological commitment is the wholesale repression of what I shall call, adapting Levinas's term, the " radical exteriority " of technology. Like Lev­ inas 's primordial " Other " with whom we are in relation prior to all phe­ nomenality, technology possesses a fundamental alterity with respect to thought. It simply cannot be reduced, without essential violence, to the form of a technema. 2 1

I n trod u cti on

Introduction * 21

In their quest to open theory to its constitutive material outside without

jettisoning the basic enabling principle of theoretical phenomenology, the

neo-Husserlian master-thinkers of modernity must forge a difficult compro-

mise: they must find a way of acknowledging, pace Husserl, technology's

undeniable material exteriority without abandoning the governing privilege

of thought. Faced with this dilemma, these master-thinkers adopt a defen-

sive strategy: they reduce technology to an ontological status compatible

with nouocentrism and pass this status off as natural. Bound by the privilege

they lend thought, the master-thinkers can only account for technology by

thematizing it. They must, in short, treat technology descriptively, through

the category or figure of the machine. In this study's exploration of this

descriptive thematization, I will uncover the pervasive operation of a

machine reduction of technology whose effect is to naturalize technology's

status as the relative exteriority of thought. By reducing the broad experien-

tial impact of technology to its restricted impact on thought, twentieth-cen-

tury theoretical discourses effectively function to "enframe" technology

within a linguistically or semiotically constituted field. In any such frame of

reference, technology can only attain a positive ontological status in the

form of the machine metaphor, a figure for some (mechanical) operation of

thought.

In its late twentieth-century embodiment, this machine reduction of tech-

nology takes the form of textualism-the reigning ideology of literary stud-

ies from formalism on. In this form, technesis functions covertly and, as I

shall argue, according to the operation of figural compression or reversal

governed by the rhetorical figure of metalepsis. Since the reduction is

imposed in the very same instant that technology is thematized in terms of

textuality, the resulting technema appears to be foundational. In this way, a

reductive account of technology is passed off as a robust one: the funda-

mental alterity of technology is simply effaced in a sweeping move that

asserts the primacy of its derivative, reductive form. Yet while the operation

of metalepsis makes detection of the machine reduction more difficult, by

submitting it to deconstruction in the texts of each of the critics discussed in

this study, I will uncover the presence of a prior, extensive, and dogmatic

reduction of technology to the textual figure of the machine. By liberating

technological materiality from its illegitimate, rhetorically imposed reduc-

tion, I will reposition it as the motive mechanism of an antiformalist, exter-

nally oriented neodeconstructive critical practice responsive to the

"demands" of embodied reality. As an index of the technological real itself,

the deconstruction facilitated by such a practice will testify not to the auton-

omy of language but to the profound resistance that contemporary

•

21

I n their quest t o open theory t o its constitutive material outside without j ettisoning the basic enabling principle of theoretical phenomenology, the neo-Husserlian master-thinkers of modernity must forge a difficult compro­ mise: they must find a way of acknowledging, pace Husserl, technology's undeniable material exteriority without abandoning the governing privilege of thought. Faced with this dilemma, these master-thinkers adopt a defen­ sive strategy: they reduce technology to an ontological status compatible with nouocentrism and pass this status off as natural. Bound by the privilege they lend thought, the master-thinkers can only account for technology by thematizing it. They must, in short, treat technology descriptively, through the category or figure of the machine. In this study's exploration of this descriptive thematization, I will uncover the pervasive operation of a machine reduction of technology whose effect is to naturalize technology's status as the relative exteriority of thought. By reducing the broad experien­ tial impact of technology to its restricted impact on thought, twentieth-cen­ tury theoretical discourses effectively function to " enframe " technology within a linguistically or semiotically constituted field. In any such frame of reference, technology can only attain a positive ontological status in the form of the machine metaphor, a figure for some (mechanical ) operation of thought. In its late twentieth-century embodiment, this machine reduction of tech­ nology takes the form of textualism-the reigning ideology of literary stud­ ies from formalism on. In this form, technesis functions covertly and, as I shall argue, according to the operation of figural compression or reversal governed by the rhetorical figure of metalepsis. Since the reduction is imposed in the very same instant that technology is thematized in terms of textuality, the resulting technema appears to be foundational. In this way, a reductive account of technology is passed off as a robust one: the funda­ mental alterity of technology is simply effaced in a sweeping move that asserts the primacy of its derivative, reductive form. Yet while the operation of metalepsis makes detection of the machine reduction more difficult, by submitting it to deconstruction in the texts of each of the critics discussed in this study, I will uncover the presence of a prior, extensive, and dogmatic reduction of technology to the textual figure of the machine. By liberating technological materiality from its illegitimate, rhetorically imposed reduc­ tion, I will reposition it as the motive mechanism of an antiformalist, exter­ nally oriented neodeconstructive critical practice responsive to the " demands " of embodied reality. As an index of the technological real itself, the deconstruction facilitated by such a practice will testify not to the auton­ omy of language but to the profound resistance that contemporary

22

22 * Embodying Technesis

technology mounts to the psycho-phenomenological modes of criticism that

have long functioned to contain it. By critically reconstructing the machine

reduction of technology in twentieth-century theoretical discourse, I intend

to trace this resistance to the point at which theory's defenses against tech-

nology break down-to the point, that is, where we can begin to see beyond

our ingrained (and to some extent self-inflicted) theoretical proclivities. In

the end, I suggest, it is only by grappling with this collapse that we can even

begin to address the robust impact contemporary technologies have on our

embodied lives.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

technology mounts to the psycho-phenomenological modes of criticism that have long functioned to contain it. By critically reconstructing the machine reduction of technology in twentieth-century theoretical discourse, I intend to trace this resistance to the point at which theory's defenses against tech­ nology break down-to the point, that is, where we can begin to see beyond our ingrained ( and to some extent self-inflicted) theoretical proclivities. In the end, I suggest, it is only by grappling with this collapse that we can even begin to address the robust impact contemporary technologies have on our embodied lives.

Part 1

Technology, Embodiment,

and Cultural Critique

Part 1 Tech n o l ogy, E m bod i m ent, and Cu l tu ral Criti q u e



Chapter 1

Technoculture and Embodiment

In the famous "Book of Machines" from his 1872 utopian satire, Erewhon,

Samuel Butler conceives the man-machine relationship in a hitherto

Chapter 1

unprecedented manner. Cutting through the impasse of the well-worn vital-

ism-mechanism opposition, Butler foregrounds the more important issue of

machinery's experiential impact. His is a vision of the machined man, one

that crystallizes the profound complicity of machines in the ontology of the

Technoculture and Embodiment

human: "Man's very soul is due to the machines; it is a machine-made thing:

he thinks as he thinks, and feels as he feels, through the work that machines

have wrought upon him, and their existence is quite as much a sine qua non

for his, as his for theirs" (Butler 1968, 269). Butler goes on to compare

machines with breathing: both, he suggests, literally condition our existence

at the deepest level, thus impacting us in ways that cannot be captured in

purely cognitive, representationalist terms. His vision of the quasi-evolu-

tionary symbiosis of man and machine imposes an enabling holist frame-

work on analysis, one that forbids the analytical isolation of technology so

common in more recent theorization. Thus, even though he ends by pro-

hibiting machines from Erewhon, Butler readily entertains a thinking of the

impact of technology that does not restrict itself to its impact on thinking.

In sharply distinguishing the rich and varied experiential domain from

the narrow realm of cognition, Butler's analysis succinctly expresses the

deep divide separating the diffuse practical impact of technologies from

their narrow function as handmaidens of science. Indeed, by engaging tech-

nologies as material forces in and of themselves, Butler's analysis makes

common cause with much recent work in the anthropological, historical,

and social studies of science (science studies for short), one central aim of

which has been to demonstrate, in a concrete and local frame, how tech-

nologies both furnish the material background for scientific experimenta-

tion and, in the process, generate unintended effects that diverge from and

(potentially) compromise anticipated or desired scientific results. Because it

engages technology beyond the confines of science itself, Butler's analysis

helps us retool the methodology of this recent work to combat the narrowly

In the famous " Book of Machines " from his 1 8 72 utopian satire, Erewhon, Samuel Butler conceives the man-machine relationship in a hitherto unprecedented manner. Cutting through the impasse of the well-worn vital­ ism-mechanism opposition, Butler foregrounds the more important issue of machinery's experiential impact. His is a vision of the machined man, one that crystallizes the profound complicity of machines in the ontology of the human: " Man's very soul is due to the machines; it is a machine-made thing: he thinks as he thinks, and feels as he feels, through the work that machines have wrought upon him, and their existence is quite as much a sine qua non for his, as his for theirs " ( Butler 1 9 6 8 , 269 ) . Butler goes on to compare machines with breathing: both, he suggests, literally condition our existence at the deepest level, thus impacting us in ways that cannot be captured in purely cognitive, representationalist terms. His vision of the quasi-evolu­ tionary symbiosis of man and machine imposes an enabling holist frame­ work on analysis, one that forbids the analytical isolation of technology so common in more recent theorization. Thus, even though he ends by pro­ hibiting machines from Erewhon, Butler readily entertains a thinking of the impact of technology that does not restrict itself to its impact on thinking. In sharply distinguishing the rich and varied experiential domain from the narrow realm of cognition, Butler's analysis succinctly expresses the deep divide separating the diffuse practical impact of technologies from their narrow function as handmaidens of science . Indeed, by engaging tech­ nologies as material forces in and of themselves, Butler's analysis makes common cause with much recent work in the anthropological, historical, and social studies of science (science studies for short) , one central aim of which has been to demonstrate, in a concrete and local frame, how tech­ nologies both furnish the material background for scientific experimenta­ tion and, in the process, generate unintended effects that diverge from and ( potentially) compromise anticipated or desired scientific results. Because it engages technology beyond the confines of science itself, Butler's analysis helps us retool the methodology of this recent work to combat the narrowly

26

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

scientistic view of technology that is (as I shall demonstrate in this study) all 26 * Embodying Technesis

scientistic view of technology that is (as I shall demonstrate in this study) all

too common in the discourses of "high" theory. With its understanding of

scientific practice as an ongoing and imperfect negotiation with an unpre-

dictable, "noncompliant" material domain, the field of science studies opens

an avenue to engage technology nonreductively, in the rich context of

embodied reality. By expanding such engagement outside the narrow

domain of scientific practice, we can situate technology beyond writing and

thus begin the crucially important task of embodying technesis.

Insofar as it operates such an expansion, Butler's analysis establishes the

pattern for a responsible cultural studies of technology. To encompass the

unthematizable contingency of technology's diffuse material impact on cul-

ture, we must follow Butler in stressing its practical dimension not simply as

it effects scientific procedure but, more broadly, as it permeates the very

core of our embodied practical lives. Accordingly, we need to introduce a

subtle yet fundamental shift in the tenor of cultural studies of technology-

an exteriorization and generalization of its operative deconstruction of the

science-technology correlation. While science and technology have certainly

become (and perhaps have always been) so deeply coimplicated that no sim-

ple hierarchy can tenably divide them,1 efforts to eschew the reduction of

technology to applied science must be thought of not simply as the end point

of particular critical acts but-in the larger cultural frame-as a first step

toward a more global reconfiguration of technology studies. By insistently

foregrounding the broader, extrascientific context in which technologies dif-

fusely impact our embodied lives, such a reconfiguration institutes a

methodological double vision as its operative principle. Thereafter, we will

find it necessary to account for technologies in a double register-to view

them, at once, as concrete embodiments that both condition and are condi-

tioned by the specific scientific principles they translate and also, in a far

broader context, as material forces that expand the role of embodiment and,

in the process, alter what I shall, adapting Walter Benjamin's analysis, call

the "economy" of experience.

Bringing such a double vision to bear on the analysis of technology's

experiential impact comprises one of my major aims in this study, and it

obliges me to draw and maintain a distinction between two divergent con-

cepts of embodiment that are too often either conflated during analysis or

simply collapsed from the beginning. In its predominant definition-a

definition that is, curiously enough, shared by cultural critics of science and

technology and by the practitioners of high theory on whom my critique

focuses-embodiment demarcates the materialization in artifactual form of

some given process of inscription. Whether this process of inscription is

too common in the discourses of " high" theory. With its understanding of scientific practice as an ongoing and imperfect negotiation with an unpre­ dictable, " noncompliant " material domain, the field of science studies opens an avenue to engage technology nonreductively, in the rich context of embodied reality. By expanding such engagement outside the narrow domain of scientific practice, we can situate technology beyond writing and thus begin the crucially important task of embodying technesis. Insofar as it operates such an expansion, Butler's analysis establishes the pattern for a responsible cultural studies of technology. To encompass the unthematizable contingency of technology's diffuse material impact on cul­ ture, we must follow Butler in stressing its practical dimension not simply as it effects scientific procedure but, more broadly, as it permeates the very core of our embodied practical lives. Accordingly, we need to introduce a subtle yet fundamental shift in the tenor of cultural studies of technology­ an exteriorization and generalization of its operative deconstruction of the science-technology correlation. While science and technology have certainly become ( and perhaps have always been ) so deeply coimplicated that no sim­ ple hierarchy can tenably divide them,l efforts to eschew the reduction of technology to applied science must be thought of not simply as the end point of particular critical acts but-in the larger cultural frame-as a first step toward a more global reconfiguration of technology studies. By insistently foregrounding the broader, extrascientific context in which technologies dif­ fusely impact our embodied lives, such a reconfiguration institutes a methodological double vision as its operative principle. Thereafter, we will find it necessary to account for technologies in a double register-to view them, at once, as concrete embodiments that both condition and are condi­ tioned by the specific scientific principles they translate and also, in a far broader context, as material forces that expand the role of embodiment and, in the process, alter what I shall, adapting Walter Benj amin's analysis, call the " economy " of experience. Bringing such a double vision to bear on the analysis of technology's experiential impact comprises one of my maj or aims in this study, and it obliges me to draw and maintain a distinction between two divergent con­ cepts of embodiment that are too often either conflated during analysis or simply collapsed from the beginning. In its predominant definition-a definition that is, curiously enough, shared by cultural critics of science and technology and by the practitioners of high theory on whom my critique focuses-embodiment demarcates the materialization in artifactual form of some given process of inscription. Whether this process of inscription is

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 27

understood as an autonomous act of language (e.g., Derridian differance) or

a pragmatic intervention (e.g., Latour's notion of translation), such embod-

iment in a technical artifact (and even, at the limit, in a body) serves to sta-

bilize and exteriorize something that is by nature amorphous and highly ten-

uous-for example, meaning (for Derrida) or intention (for Latour). Since

this definition focuses on the constitutive role of embodiment for the analy-

sis of socially constructed institutions of knowledge, I shall call it epistemo-

logical (or artifactual) embodiment.

A second (and, within the theoretical field I explore, certainly secondary)

concept links embodiment directly to the (human) process of living through

the body. Not surprisingly, this concept emerges from critical traditions

phenomenology of the body, Deweyian pragmatism, Bergsonian meta-

physics-that have been marginalized with the advent of both high theory

and cultural constructivist criticism (not to mention Anglo-American phi-

losophy following the so-called linguistic turn). By making bodily experi-

ence primary, this concept reverses the direction of analysis imposed by the

epistemological projects previously mentioned: rather than moving from

inscription to (technical or artifactual) embodiment, it stresses the funda-

mental role of (corporeal) embodiment as the necessary background out of

which all acts of inscription emerge and take on meaning. Moreover, far

from imposing an enabling and allegedly nonreductive, if instrumental, fit

between inscription and embodiment, the corporeal concept of embodiment

insists on the irreducible excess of embodied life; it asserts the impossibility

of ever completely clarifying-bringing to discursive articulation-the

embodied background underlying human practice. Philosopher Mark John-

son concisely explains this concept: ". . . because of the limitations of our

propositional modes of representation, we have a hard time trying to

express the full meaning of our experiences . . . [W]hile we must use propo-

sitional language to describe these dimensions of our experience and under-

standing, we must not mistake our mode of description for the things

described" (Johnson 1989, 4). Clearly, for Johnson, as for certain other

recent critics (e.g., Bourdieu, Shusterman, Dreyfus, Varela, to name those

most immediately relevant to my study), the lived body is the site of this

experiential excess. Accordingly, I shall refer to it under the rubric of phe-

nomenological (or corporeal) embodiment.

Drawing this crucial distinction allows me to correlate the general criti-

cal program I develop in this study-the critique of technesis or the putting-

into-discourse of technology-with the specific priorities and the larger con-

text(s) motivating recent science studies. In essence, my program explores

the limitations of a purely epistemological (or in the case of high theory,

•

27

understood as an autonomous act of language (e.g., Derridian differance) or a pragmatic intervention (e.g., Latour's notion of translation) , such embod­ iment in a technical artifact ( and even, at the limit, in a body) serves to sta­ bilize and exteriorize something that is by nature amorphous and highly ten­ uous-for example, meaning (for Derrida) or intention ( for Latour ) . Since this definition focuses on the constitutive role of embodiment for the analy­ sis of socially constructed institutions of knowledge, I shall call it epistemo­ logical ( or artifactual) embodiment. A second ( and, within the theoretical field I explore, certainly secondary) concept links embodiment directly to the (human) process of living through the body. Not surprisingly, this concept emerges from critical traditions­ phenomenology of the body, Deweyian pragmatism, Bergsonian meta­ physics-that have been marginalized with the advent of both high theory and cultural constructivist criticism (not to mention Anglo-American phi­ losophy following the so-called linguistic turn) . By making bodily experi­ ence primary, this concept reverses the direction of analysis imposed by the epistemological proj ects previously mentioned: rather than moving from inscription to (technical or artifactual) embodiment, it stresses the funda­ mental role of (corporeal) embodiment as the necessary background out of which all acts of inscription emerge and take on meaning. Moreover, far from imposing an enabling and allegedly nonreductive, if instrumental, {it between inscription and embodiment, the corporeal concept of embodiment insists on the irreducible excess of embodied life; it asserts the impossibility of ever completely clarifying-bringing to discursive articulation-the embodied background underlying human practice. Philosopher Mark John­ son concisely explains this concept: " . . . because of the limitations of our propositional modes of representation, we have a hard time trying to express the full meaning of our experiences . . . . [W] hile we must use propo­ sitional language to describe these dimensions of our experience and under­ standing, we must not mistake our mode of description for the things described" (Johnson 1 9 8 9 , 4 ) . Clearly, for Johnson, as for certain other recent critics (e.g., Bourdieu, Shusterman, Dreyfus, Varela, to name those most immediately relevant to my study ) , the lived body is the site of this experiential excess. Accordingly, I shall refer to it under the rubric of phe­ nomenological ( or corporeal) embodiment. Drawing this crucial distinction allows me to correlate the general criti­ cal program I develop in this study-the critique of technesis or the putting­ into-discourse of technology-with the specific priorities and the larger con­ text ( s ) motivating recent science studies. In essence, my program explores the limitations of a purely epistemological (or in the case of high theory,

28

28 * Embodying Technesis

onto-epistemological) engagement with technology, in order, ultimately, to

expand our understanding of the rich and varied role(s) technologies play in

our embodied lives. Without denying the importance of concrete study of

the complex coimplication of science and technology, my critique exposes

the necessary partiality of all such study and calls on critics to expand their

perspective by approaching the extra-scientific, practical impact of contem-

porary technologies through the frame of phenomenological embodiment.

The affirmative component of my program should thus be seen not as an

alternative but as a necessary complement to contemporary science stud-

ies-an effort to fill out the extra-scientific and practical register of the dou-

ble methodological vision proposed earlier.

Accordingly, my project bears a markedly different relation to science

studies than to high theory, despite the root privileging of inscription com-

mon to both. Whereas high theory imposes on technology a purely abstract

discursive (or technetic) ontological frame that effectively forecloses all lim-

its to its theoretical dominion, science studies champions a cautious empiri-

cism specifically designed to obstruct the institution of such dominion. If sci-

ence studies (not to mention actual science) cannot always avoid reducing

embodied reality to fit the inscriptional models it introduces, this particular

necessity stems less from an unassailable theoretical framework-from

some metaphysical need-than from the very nature of scientific practice.

To the extent that scientific activity involves the development of models

expressly designed to simplify reality, scientists, it would seem, could hardly

refrain from acknowledging (if only implicitly) that the "nature" they

experimentally produce is not, and can never be, fully commensurate with

embodied complexity. Given this key difference, my critique of the abstract,

metaphysical model of technesis need not entail a blanket rejection of the

inscriptional model(s) introduced by science studies, and it in fact points the

way to a robust understanding of technology that would combine the con-

tribution of science studies with a broader opening to the phenomenological

dimension of technology's experiential impact. Even as it urges a flat rejec-

tion of technesis as a model for thinking about this impact, my critique thus

facilitates a broader engagement with technological materiality that would

function to supplement, not displace, the account of technology generated

by the empirical, scientific paradigm. Where science enacts a process of sim-

plification by moving from embodied complexity to inscription, the corpo-

real phenomenology I propose moves in the other direction-from whatever

narrow slice of embodied complexity is at issue in a particular scientific

operation to the robust materiality that forms the rich background for our

practical, embodied experience of reality as such. By restoring the uncon-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

onto-epistemological) engagement with technology, in order, ultimately, to expand our understanding of the rich and varied role( s ) technologies play in our embodied lives. Without denying the importance of concrete study of the complex coimplication of science and technology, my critique exposes the necessary partiality of all such study and calls on critics to expand their perspective by approaching the extra-scientific, practical impact of contem­ porary technologies through the frame of phenomenological embodiment. The affirmative component of my program should thus be seen not as an alternative but as a necessary complement to contemporary science stud­ ies-an effort to fill out the extra-scientific and practical register of the dou­ ble methodological vision proposed earlier. Accordingly, my project bears a markedly different relation to science studies than to high theory, despite the root privileging of inscription com­ mon to both. Whereas high theory imposes on technology a purely abstract discursive (or technetic) ontological frame that effectively forecloses all lim­ its to its theoretical dominion, science studies champions a cautious empiri­ cism specifically designed to obstruct the institution of such dominion. If sci­ ence studies (not to mention actual science) cannot always avoid reducing embodied reality to fit the inscriptional models it introduces, this particular necessity stems less from an unassailable theoretical framework-from some metaphysical need-than from the very nature of scientific practice. To the extent that scientific activity involves the development of models expressly designed to simplify reality, scientists, it would seem, could hardly refrain from acknowledging (if only implicitly) that the "nature" they experimentally produce is not, and can never be, fully commensurate with embodied complexity. Given this key difference, my critique of the abstract, metaphysical model of technesis need not entail a blanket rej ection of the inscriptional model ( s ) introduced by science studies, and it in fact points the way to a robust understanding of technology that would combine the con­ tribution of science studies with a broader opening to the phenomenological dimension of technology's experiential impact. Even as it urges a flat rejec­ tion of technesis as a model for thinking about this impact, my critique thus facilitates a broader engagement with technological materiality that would function to supplement, not displace, the account of technology generated by the empirical, scientific paradigm. Where science enacts a process of sim­ plification by moving from embodied complexity to inscription, the corpo­ real phenomenology I propose moves in the other direction-from whatever narrow slice of embodied complexity is at issue in a particular scientific operation to the robust materiality that forms the rich background for our practical, embodied experience of reality as such. By restoring the un con-

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

•

29

strained domain of embodied complexity as the locus where technologies Technoculture and Embodiment * 29

strained domain of embodied complexity as the locus where technologies

impact us immediately and practically, I seek, in sum, to counterbalance the

blindness imposed through the narrow epistemological perspective animat-

ing contemporary science studies.

Still, for all of the constructive promise of the phenomenological frame I

introduce, this study will focus fairly insistently-for some, perhaps too

insistently-on exposing and criticizing the role technesis plays in various

twentieth-century discourses of high theory. In what might be thought of as

a propadeutic to a future technocriticism, my principle aim here is to con-

front a particularly strong philosophical tradition of inscription with the

embodied reality it would subsume in language and to do so from the inside,

so to speak, of that very tradition. Accordingly, the argument I develop

undertakes an immanent "deconstruction" of the philosophical reduction of

technology, rather than an extrinsic appeal to other, related traditions that,

like the various fields comprising science studies, certainly do have more

direct ties to embodied reality and technological materiality. This said, my

study is nonetheless intended to comprise more than simply one stage

among others on the way toward a robust model of technology's experien-

tial impact, and it will, I hope, stand as adequate testimony to the important

contribution high theory can still make to such a model, even in the age of

its obsolescence. If, as I ultimately suggest, the rich corporeal dimension of

technology's impact on embodied experience can only be opened by a fun-

damental exhaustion of the epistemological perspective and not solely by

the kinds of local (and still epistemologically focused) interventions pursued

by science studies, the perspectival shift I urge-to a phenomenological con-

cept of embodiment-can in turn only emerge out of a definitive destruction

of inscription's claim to encompass embodied reality, a thorough critique of

technesis that would uncover anew what it sublated in the first place: the

preinscriptive or prediscursive processes comprising corporeal embodiment.

Carrying out such an immanent destruction requires us to address tech-

nesis not simply in the abstract, as the general principle of a philosophical

reduction of technology, but concretely too, via the particular configura-

tions it assumes in contemporary technoculture. Accordingly, we will have

to criticize at least two, relatively independent "models" of technesis: one

rooted securely in French poststructuralism, which we might, with some

significant irony, call "traditional," and one derived from more recent per-

mutations given to it by researchers interested in the cognitive properties of

advanced systems. In the end, our task of overcoming the onto-epistemol-

ogy of inscription will thus call on us to eschew not just the narrow repre-

sentationalist framework of analyses that view technology as a metaphor or

impact us immediately and practically, I seek, in sum, to counterbalance the blindness imposed through the narrow epistemological perspective animat­ ing contemporary science studies. Still, for all of the constructive promise of the phenomenological frame I introduce, this study will focus fairly insistently-for some, perhaps too insistently-on exposing and criticizing the role technesis plays in various twentieth-century discourses of high theory. In what might be thought of as a propadeutic to a future technocriticism, my principle aim here is to con­ front a particularly strong philosophical tradition of inscription with the embodied reality it would subsume in language and to do so from the inside, so to speak, of that very tradition. Accordingly, the argument I develop undertakes an immanent " deconstruction" of the philosophical reduction of technology, rather than an extrinsic appeal to other, related traditions that, like the various fields comprising science studies, certainly do have more direct ties to embodied reality and technological materiality. This said, my study is nonetheless intended to comprise more than simply one stage among others on the way toward a robust model of technology's experien­ tial impact, and it will, I hope, stand as adequate testimony to the important contribution high theory can still make to such a model, even in the age of its obsolescence. If, as I ultimately suggest, the rich corporeal dimension of technology's impact on embodied experience can only be opened by a fun­ damental exhaustion of the epistemological perspective and not solely by the kinds of local ( and still epistemologically focused) interventions pursued by science studies, the perspectival shift I urge-to a phenomenological con­ cept of embodiment-can in turn only emerge out of a definitive destruction of inscription's claim to encompass embodied reality, a thorough critique of technesis that would uncover anew what it sublated in the first place: the preinscriptive or prediscursive processes comprising corporeal embodiment. Carrying out such an immanent destruction requires us to address tech­ nesis not simply in the abstract, as the general principle of a philosophical reduction of technology, but concretely too, via the particular configura­ tions it assumes in contemporary technoculture. Accordingly, we will have to criticize at least two, relatively independent "models" of technesis: one rooted securely in French poststructuralism, which we might, with some significant irony, call " traditional, " and one derived from more recent per­ mutations given to it by researchers interested in the cognitive properties of advanced systems. In the end, our task of overcoming the onto-epistemol­ ogy of inscription will thus call on us to eschew not j ust the narrow repre­ sentationalist framework of analyses that view technology as a metaphor or

30

30 * Embodying Technesis

embodiment of thought but also the broader framework of postrepresenta-

tionalist, posthumanist analyses that model technology systemically. While

the former analyses impose a traditional nouocentric standpoint as the tri-

bunal for evaluating our experience of technology, the latter divorce tech-

nology (which they restrict to the quasi-epistemological function of mater-

ial support for an abstract cognitive system) from the practical domain

altogether. The result is the same in both cases: technology's impact on

embodied life is all too readily reduced to its impact on thought, with the

only meaningful difference being whether techno-thinking (technesis)

remains rooted in the human or whether, through the process of systemati-

zation, it becomes irrevocably inhuman.

The structure of my argument in this book mirrors this division in the

contemporary configuration of technesis. Following a brief sketch of the

growing disjunction between epistemological and phenomenological modes

of experiencing technology in the modern period (chaps. 1 and 2), I recon-

struct two overlapping twentieth-century genealogies of technesis-the

onto-phenomenological and the psychoanalytic-through their respective

representationalist and systemic phases (chaps. 3-8). Since both genealogies

rely on a common, deeply problematic reduction of technology, my critique

will serve as a call for a more fundamental break with representationalism

than is offered by the various contemporary forms of technocriticism,

including those that draw on informational and systems theory. From my

perspective, these latter forms can be viewed simply as the apex of the legacy

of technesis-its mature, state-of-the-art form. In their place, what I urge is

a total break with this heritage; if we are to rethink technology's experien-

tial impact from the ground up, we must reconceptualize the role of human

embodiment and lend a renewed attention to the fundamental role that

noncognitive and nondiscursive affective bodily life plays in contemporary

technoculture.

The Return of Realism

The constructive payoff of my sustained critique of technesis-the call it

advances for a new realism in the cultural study of technology-can most

effectively be contextualized against the backdrop of sociologist of science

Bruno Latour's recent critique of modernity. In a certain sense, my project

could be characterized as an effort to round out the new constitution Latour

develops by dismantling the great divide separating nature from society, the

universe of things from the human world: while Latour attends to the epis-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

embodiment of thought but also the broader framework of postrepresenta­ tionalist, posthumanist analyses that model technology systemically. While the former analyses impose a traditional nouocentric standpoint as the tri­ bunal for evaluating our experience of technology, the latter divorce tech­ nology (which they restrict to the quasi-epistemological function of mater­ ial support for an abstract cognitive system ) from the practical domain altogether. The result is the same in both cases: technology's impact on embodied life is all too readily reduced to its impact on thought, with the only meaningful difference being whether techno-thinking (technesis) remains rooted in the human or whether, through the process of systemati­ zation, it becomes irrevocably inhuman. The structure of my argument in this book mirrors this division in the contemporary configuration of technesis. Following a brief sketch of the growing disj unction between epistemological and phenomenological modes of experiencing technology in the modern period (chaps. 1 and 2 ) , I recon­ struct two overlapping twentieth-century genealogies of technesis-the onto-phenomenological and the psychoanalytic-through their respective representationalist and systemic phases (chaps. 3-8 ) . Since both genealogies rely on a common, deeply problematic reduction of technology, my critique will serve as a call for a more fundamental break with representationalism than is offered by the various contemporary forms of technocriticism, including those that draw on informational and systems theory. From my perspective, these latter forms can be viewed simply as the apex of the legacy of technesis-its mature, state-of-the-art form. In their place, what I urge is a total break with this heritage; if we are to rethink technology's experien­ tial impact from the ground up, we must reconceptualize the role of human embodiment and lend a renewed attention to the fundamental role that noncognitive and nondiscursive affective bodily life plays in contemporary technoculture.

The Return of Realism

The constructive payoff of my sustained critique of technesis-the call it advances for a new realism in the cultural study of technology-can most effectively be contextualized against the backdrop of sociologist of science Bruno Latour's recent critique of modernity. In a certain sense, my proj ect could be characterized as an effort to round out the new constitution Latour develops by dismantling the great divide separating nature from society, the universe of things from the human world: while Latour attends to the epis-

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 31

temological dimension of this dismantling, I seek to engage the broader

experiential consequences that ensue from the (re)distribution of agency

across what Latour calls "the parliament of things" (Latour 1993b).

Following Shapin and Schaffer in Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Latour

overcomes the dual impasse of the "modern constitution" by locating a

"new position" between Nature and Culture. On this view, modernity

arises in the wake of the Boyle-Hobbes debate, when the knowledge of

things was split from power and human politics. For Latour, this polariza-

tion installs an impoverished epistemology, for it alleges that natural objects

and social subjects are either real, social, or discursive, rather than a mix of

all three at once. While, in actual fact, there are always hybrids circulating

within networks of mediation/translation, the moderns do everything possi-

ble to situate them securely as either subject or object, social agent or nat-

ural thing. Against this tendency of modernity, Latour's project urges a

more robust epistemology: instead of ossifying into mutually incompatible

and strictly demarcated domains (Nature vs. Culture), knowledge should be

constructed by pursuing both human and nonhuman agents through the

hybrid networks they trace together. Following Latour's rejection of denun-

ciation, this imperative should not be understood as critique; instead, it

results directly from a certain paradox of modernity: the fact that the more

clandestine the hybrids are, the more they are able to proliferate. Latour

does not so much reject modernity tout court, then, as champion an amal-

gam of elements from both the modern and the premodern worldviews, one

that adopts premodern categories to conceptualize the hybrids, while retain-

ing the moderns' work of purification for the purpose of conceptualizing an

external Nature distinct from subjects (Latour 1993b, 134). In this way,

Latour is able to claim the advantages of both worldviews for his new con-

stitution: following the premoderns, he can recognize hybrids as the basic

ontological units of nature-cultures; following the moderns, he can preserve

the capacity to differentiate a transcendent nature from an immanent soci-

ety, though no longer as distinct, pregiven ontological domains but as sepa-

rate objects generated through the construction of concrete networks.

With his contention that "the very notion of culture is an artifact created

by bracketing Nature off" (104), Latour can persuasively establish the irre-

ducible codependence of Nature and Culture. Regardless of whether he is

right to do so, however, his exclusive focus on epistemology compels him

to overprivilege representation and inscription as the correlated operative

principles of the inclusive democracy of humans and things he proposes.

To grant representational status to the hybrid "quasi-objects" constitutive

of the nature-culture(s) in which we live, Latour has to impose an inscrip-

•

31

temological dimension o f this dismantling, I seek t o engage the broader experiential consequences that ensue from the (re) distribution of agency across what Latour calls " the parliament of things " ( Latour 1 99 3 b ) . Following Shapin and Schaffer i n Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Latour overcomes the dual impasse of the "modern constitution" by locating a " new position " between Nature and Culture. On this view, modernity arises in the wake of the Boyle-Hobbes debate, when the knowledge of things was split from power and human politics. For Latour, this polariza­ tion installs an impoverished epistemology, for it alleges that natural obj ects and social subj ects are either real, social, or discursive, rather than a mix of all three at once. While, in actual fact, there are always hybrids circulating within networks of mediationltranslation, the moderns do everything possi­ ble to situate them securely as either subj ect or obj ect, social agent or nat­ ural thing. Against this tendency of modernity, Latour's proj ect urges a more robust epistemology: instead of ossifying into mutually incompatible and strictly demarcated domains (Nature vs. Culture) , knowledge should be constructed by pursuing both human and nonhuman agents through the hybrid networks they trace together. Following Latour's rej ection of denun­ ciation, this imperative should not be understood as critique; instead, it results directly from a certain paradox of modernity: the fact that the more clandestine the hybrids are, the more they are able to proliferate. Latour does not so much rej ect modernity tout court, then, as champion an amal­ gam of elements from both the modern and the premodern worldviews, one that adopts premodern categories to conceptualize the hybrids, while retain­ ing the moderns' work of purification for the purpose of conceptualizing an external Nature distinct from subj ects (Latour 1 9 93b, 1 3 4 ) . In this way, Latour is able to claim the advantages of both worldviews for his new con­ stitution: following the premoderns, he can recognize hybrids as the basic ontological units of nature-cultures; following the moderns, he can preserve the capacity to differentiate a transcendent nature from an immanent soci­ ety, though no longer as distinct, pregiven ontological domains but as sepa­ rate obj ects generated through the construction of concrete networks. With his contention that " the very notion of culture is an artifact created by bracketing Nature off" ( 1 04 ) , Latour can persuasively establish the irre­ ducible codependence of Nature and Culture. Regardless of whether he is right to do so, however, his exclusive focus on epistemology compels him to overprivilege representation and inscription as the correlated operative principles of the inclusive democracy of humans and things he proposes. To grant representational status to the hybrid " quasi-objects" constitutive of the nature-culture ( s ) in which we live, Latour has to impose an inscrip-

32

32 * Embodying Technesis

tional ontology as a governing framework for analysis. The convincing

account he offers both of the construction of nature in the laboratory and

of the production of technical artifacts thus comes at a significant cost, for

it requires him simply to leave out all mention of the extrascientific context

in which technologies impact our everyday, embodied experience. By

focusing on this "surplus" impact of technology that escapes any delimited

form of inscription and by situating it within the domain of corporeal

embodiment, my project aims to supplement Latour's epistemological pro-

gram precisely on this point, to furnish a practical account of the profound

transformation(s) modern and contemporary technologies have wrought

on embodied reality.

Even given its narrow epistemological focus, however, Latour's project

takes an important step beyond the discursivist position central to the high

theory I critique in this study. Like Shapin and Schaffer's study of the early

modern air pump, Latour's intervention does manage to recognize the real-

ist basis of science, at least in principle, even if it neglects it in practice and,

more importantly, refuses to extend it to technologies. Such recognition is

crucial to the status Latour (following philosopher Michel Serres) claims for

so-called quasi-objects that occupy the new, middle position between

Nature and Culture. Unlike prior determinations that alternatively view

objects as "shapeless receptacles of social categories" or "hard facts,"

Latour's quasi-objects are aggressively hybrid, simultaneously "real, collec-

tive, and discursive." Latour insists:

Quasi-objects are in between and below the two poles, at the very place

around which dualism and dialectics had turned endlessly without being able

to come to terms with them. Quasi-objects are much more social, much more

fabricated, much more collective than the "hard" parts of nature, but they

are in no way the arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society. On the other

hand they are much more real, nonhuman and objective than those shapeless

screens on which society-for unknown reasons-needed to be "projected."

(55)

At the same time as it deconstructs the polarization of Nature and Culture,

Latour's mobilization of the quasi-object anchors the constructions of sci-

ence squarely in the extralinguistic domain of the real. More precisely, the

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

tional ontology as a governing framework for analysis. The convincing account he offers both of the construction of nature in the laboratory and of the production of technical artifacts thus comes at a significant cost, for it requires him simply to leave out all mention of the extra scientific context in which technologies impact our everyday, embodied experience. By focusing on this " surplus " impact of technology that escapes any delimited form of inscription and by situating it within the domain of corporeal embodiment, my proj ect aims to supplement Latour's epistemological pro­ gram precisely on this point, to furnish a practical account of the profound transformation ( s ) modern and contemporary technologies have wrought on embodied reality. Even given its narrow epistemological focus, however, Latour's proj ect takes an important step beyond the discursivist position central to the high theory I critique in this study. Like Shapin and Schaffer's study of the early modern air pump, Latour's intervention does manage to recognize the real­ ist basis of science, at least in principle, even if it neglects it in practice and, more importantly, refuses to extend it to technologies. Such recognition is crucial to the status Latour ( following philosopher Michel Serres) claims for so-called quasi-obj ects that occupy the new, middle position between Nature and Culture. Unlike prior determinations that alternatively view obj ects as " shapeless receptacles of social categories" or " hard facts, " Latour's quasi-obj ects are aggressively hybrid, simultaneously " real, collec­ tive, and discursive . " Latour insists:

focal shift to the quasi-object brings the real into the sphere of the experien-

tial, making it relative not simply to the human but to the larger "parlia-

ment of things" that (for Latour) constitutes lived reality. By repudiating the

false opposition between constitution and discovery, in other words, Latour

is able to overcome the "ghettoizing" of the object performed through phi-

losophy's Copernican revolution, the relegation of the object to a transcen-

Quasi-obj ects are in between and below the two poles, at the very place around which dualism and dialectics had turned endlessly without being able to come to terms with them. Quasi-obj ects are much more social, much more fabricated, much more collective than the "hard " parts of nature, but they are in no way the arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society. On the other hand they are much more real, nonhuman and obj ective than those shapeless screens on which society-for unknown reasons-needed to be " proj ected. " (55)

At the same time a s i t deconstructs the polarization o f Nature and Culture, Latour's mobilization of the quasi-obj ect anchors the constructions of sci­ ence squarely in the extralinguistic domain of the real. More precisely, the focal shift to the quasi-obj ect brings the real into the sphere of the experien­ tial, making it relative not simply to the human but to the larger "parlia­ ment of things" that ( for Latour) constitutes lived reality. By repudiating the false opposition between constitution and discovery, in other words, Latour is able to overcome the " ghettoizing" of the obj ect performed through phi­ losophy's Copernican revolution, the relegation of the obj ect to a transcen-

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 33

dental status-noumenon, or thing-in-itself-that places it forever outside

the domain of experience. If Latour thereby sacrifices the radical alterity of

the material domain, he gains something significant in return: a distance on

the three strategies for "absorb[ing] . . . the Middle Kingdom" (55). Substi-

tuting a nature "extracted from the scientific laboratory and . . . trans-

formed into external reality" for "transcendent/immanent Nature" (77),

Latour secures the right, on the one hand, to invoke the "new position"

between subjects and things against the Kantian divide and, on the other, to

resist efforts by discursive and onto-hermeneutic monists simply to collapse

the divide altogether. Ultimately, his position-and the privilege he accords

science studies-stands or falls with the broad reciprocity he claims to dis-

cover between construction and discovery: according to Latour, when we

construct nature in the lab, we do not just bring the real into the sphere of

experience; we also submit our experience to its constraints. Contrasted

with critical and monist strategies, then, the great advantage of science stud-

ies stems from a willingness to embrace the enabling paradox of the quasi-

object: the fact that, in experiencing nature through experimental construc-

tion, we cannot help but open our experience to something outside the

domain of construction.

On this general point, Latour's valorization of the quasi-object makes

common cause with my critique of technesis. His move to cast science as a

sort of reality check on the power of discourse anticipates and, to a certain

extent, parallels my own effort to embed the deconstruction of the subject

in the material infrastructure of the real. Scientific discourse introduces a

pragmatic perspective that, Latour contends, hampers all attempts to privi-

lege discursive autonomy at the expense of reference.

When [science studies] applied semiotics to scientific discourse, and not only

to literatures of fiction, the autonomization of discourse appeared as an

artifice.... [R]hetoric... changed its meaning entirely when it had truth and

proof to absorb instead of conviction and seduction. When we are dealing

with science and technology it is hard to imagine for long that we are a text

that is writing itself, a discourse that is speaking all by itself, a play of

signifiers without signifieds. It is hard to reduce the entire cosmos to a grand

narrative, the physics of subatomic particles to a text, subway systems to

rhetorical devices, all social structures to discourse. (64)

With this eloge to science studies, Latour introduces a crucial methodologi-

cal principle that will increasingly come to govern not just explicit accounts

of science and technology but all forms of cultural analysis that engage the

rapidly proliferating domain of quasi-objects:2 grappling with the complex,

hybrid ontology of the "Middle Kingdom" requires, Latour suggests, a

•

33

dental status-noumenon, or thing-in-itself-that places it forever outside the domain of experience. If Latour thereby sacrifices the radical alterity of the material domain, he gains something significant in return: a distance on the three strategies for " absorb [ing] . . . the Middle Kingdom " (55 ) . Substi­ tuting a nature " extracted from the scientific laboratory and . . . trans­ formed into external reality" for " transcendentlimmanent Nature " (77), Latour secures the right, on the one hand, to invoke the " new position" between subj ects and things against the Kantian divide and, on the other, to resist efforts by discursive and onto-hermeneutic monists simply to collapse the divide altogether. Ultimately, his position-and the privilege he accords science studies-stands or falls with the broad reciprocity he claims to dis­ cover between construction and discovery: according to Latour, when we construct nature in the lab, we do not just bring the real into the sphere of experience; we also submit our experience to its constraints. Contrasted with critical and monist strategies, then, the great advantage of science stud­ ies stems from a willingness to embrace the enabling paradox of the quasi­ obj ect: the fact that, in experiencing nature through experimental construc­ tion, we cannot help but open our experience to something outside the domain of construction. On this general point, Latour's valorization of the quasi-obj ect makes common cause with my critique of technesis. His move to cast science as a sort of reality check on the power of discourse anticipates and, to a certain extent, parallels my own effort to embed the deconstruction of the subj ect in the material infrastructure of the real. Scientific discourse introduces a pragmatic perspective that, Latour contends, hampers all attempts to privi­ lege discursive autonomy at the expense of reference. When [science studies] applied semiotics to scientific discourse, and not only to literatures of fiction, the autonomization of discourse appeared as an artifice . . . . [R] hetoric . . . changed its meaning entirely when it had truth and proof to absorb instead of conviction and seduction. When we are dealing with science and technology it is hard to imagine for long that we are a text that is writing itself, a discourse that is speaking all by itself, a play of signifiers without signifieds. It is hard to reduce the entire cosmos to a grand narrative, the physics of subatomic particles to a text, subway systems to rhetorical devices, all social structures to discourse. ( 6 4 )

With this e/oge t o science studies, Latour introduces a crucial methodologi­ cal principle that will increasingly come to govern not just explicit accounts of science and technology but all forms of cultural analysis that engage the rapidly proliferating domain of quasi-obj ects :2 grappling with the complex, hybrid ontology of the " Middle Kingdom" requires, Latour suggests, a

34

34 * Embodying Technesis

double analytic framework that focuses simultaneously on the active contri-

bution of the social and discursive and on the constraints imposed by the real.

At a general level, then, the ontology Latour erects around the quasi-

object can help inform an account of technology that would embrace both

its social and discursive constitution and its anchoring in the real. Latour

helps us see that, as ontic or mundane entities, technologies (like scientific

facts experimentally produced in the laboratory) only emerge from and exist

in the divide between Nature and Culture, the domain of nature-culture,

and are consequently (like all quasi-objects) "simultaneously real, discur-

sive, and social." Yet in seamlessly assimilating technologies into his model

of inscription-as constructions essentially similar to the production of facts

in the laboratory-Latour not only runs roughshod over some crucial onto-

logical differences between scientific facts and technologies; he also imposes

an overly narrow epistemological frame-of-reference on technology. As a

consequence, technology is largely stripped of its anchoring in the real, of

the very dimension that Latour's model promised to preserve against both

Kantian and poststructuralist reduction.

To grasp the rationale for this reduction and to expose its complicity

with Latour's governing epistemological orientation, we need to go back to

the model of inscription he develops initially, with Steve Woolgar, in Labo-

ratory Life. There, Latour readily acknowledges the inevitable reduction

involved in inscription: since science functions by translating embodied

complexity into manageable formulations, it simply cannot avoid some sim-

plification or abstraction of the real (Nature) and of the embodied processes

of laboratory practice. On this early model of science as "translation,"

inscriptions explicitly draw their force as direct mediators of the real only

on the condition that the material processes giving rise to them are brack-

eted off. Latour argues:

"[I]nscription devices" transform pieces of matter into written documents.

More exactly, an inscription device is any item of apparatus or particular

configuration of such items which can transform a material substance into a

figure or diagram.... An important consequence of this notion of inscription

device is that inscriptions are regarded as having a direct relationship to "the

original substance." The final diagram or curve thus provides the focus of

discussion about properties of the substance. The intervening material activ-

ity and all aspects of what is often a prolonged and costly process are brack-

eted off in discussions about what the figure means. (Latour and Woolgar

1986, 51; emphasis added)

To attain their role as stand-ins for embodied material processes, inscrip-

tions, in short, require the actual effacement of the very embodied context

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

double analytic framework that focuses simultaneously on the active contri­ bution of the social and discursive and on the constraints imposed by the real. At a general level, then, the ontology Latour erects around the quasi­ obj ect can help inform an account of technology that would embrace both its social and discursive constitution and its anchoring in the real. Latour helps us see that, as ontic or mundane entities, technologies (like scientific facts experimentally produced in the laboratory) only emerge from and exist in the divide between Nature and Culture, the domain of nature-culture, and are consequently (like all quasi-objects) " simultaneously real, discur­ sive, and social. " Yet in seamlessly assimilating technologies into his model of inscription-as constructions essentially similar to the production of facts in the laboratory-Latour not only runs roughshod over some crucial onto­ logical differences between scientific facts and technologies; he also imposes an overly narrow epistemological frame-of-reference on technology. As a consequence, technology is largely stripped of its anchoring in the real, of the very dimension that Latour's model promised to preserve against both Kantian and poststructuralist reduction. To grasp the rationale for this reduction and to expose its complicity with Latour's governing epistemological orientation, we need to go back to the model of inscription he develops initially, with Steve Woolgar, in Labo­ ratory Life . There, Latour readily acknowledges the inevitable reduction involved in inscription: since science functions by translating embodied complexity into manageable formulations, it simply cannot avoid some sim­ plification or abstraction of the real (Nature ) and of the embodied processes of laboratory practice. On this early model of science as "translation, " inscriptions explicitly draw their force as direct mediators of the real only on the condition that the material processes giving rise to them are brack­ eted off. Latour argues: " [I]nscription devices " transform pieces of matter into written documents . More exactly, an inscription device is any item of apparatus or particular configuration of such items which can transform a material substance into a figure or diagram . . . . An important consequence of this notion of inscription device is that inscriptions are regarded as having a direct relationship to " the original substance . " The final diagram or curve thus provides the focus of discussion about properties of the substance. The intervening material activ­

ity and all aspects of what is often a prolonged and costly process are brack­ eted off in discussions about what the figure means. ( Latour and Woolgar 1 9 8 6 , 5 1 ; emphasis added)

To attain their role as stand-ins for embodied material processes, inscrip­ tions, in short, require the actual effacement of the very embodied context

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 35

that makes them possible: "Without the material environment.., none of

the objects could be said to exist," and yet this environment "is required to

be easily forgotten" (ibid., 69).

Insofar as it is both recognized and tolerated by working scientists, this

inevitable reduction comprises a part of the normal activity of science, an

occupational hazard as it were, that only becomes an issue if and when the

nature produced by scientific inscription is taken as fully commensurate

with embodied complexity. Indeed, the scientist's activity is actually

directed not toward the material real but rather toward statements or

inscriptions that have been produced in the laboratory and that have taken

the place of nature: "reality is the consequence rather than the cause of

[the] construction [of facts through operations designed to effect the drop-

ping of modalities which qualify a given statement]" (ibid., 237). Yet in We

Have Never Been Modern, Latour expands this constructionist ontology to

the point of claiming that inscription need involve no meaningful loss of

embodiment at all. In this text, not only is the nature extracted from the

laboratory every bit as real as the "transcendent/immanent Nature" it

replaces (1993b, 77), but the very production of nature as quasi-object has

been accorded the all-important duty of opening nature to our knowl-

edge-of giving us "access to things themselves, not only to their phenom-

ena" (90).

While perhaps tolerable as an inevitable occupational hazard-and cor-

responding limitation-of scientific activity, such a position cannot be car-

ried over to the analysis of technology without significantly reducing the lat-

ter's practical impact. Routed through Latour's inscriptional model,

technologies can only attain significance by contributing to scientific episte-

mology; as forms of capture of the real, they constitute embodied inscrip-

tions (or embodiments of inscription) that function, like scientific facts, to

reduce the real to manageable proportions. In essence then, as we will later

see in detail, Latour's constructivist model reduces technology to the status

of supplement or materialization of inscription. Despite (re)introducing

some form of embodied reality, the "shifting-out" involved in the produc-

tion of technology-shifting out from inscription to materiality-serves

exclusively as a means of expanding the epistemologist's control; rather

than foregrounding technology's robust anchoring in the real, it functions to

solidify the power of inscription to harness the real and render it accessible

to cognition. Regardless of whether shifting-out succeeds in this task, tech-

nology is effectively stripped of its immanence within the embodied real. In

assimilating technology to science, Latour thus brackets out more than just

the material processes of translation that occur within the narrow techno-

•

35

that makes them possible: "Without the material environment . . . none of the obj ects could be said to exist, " and yet this environment " is required to be easily forgotten " (ibid., 6 9 ) . Insofar a s i t i s both recognized and tolerated b y working scientists, this inevitable reduction comprises a part of the normal activity of science, an occupational hazard as it were, that only becomes an issue if and when the nature produced by scientific inscription is taken as fully commensurate with embodied complexity. Indeed, the scientist's activity is actually directed not toward the material real but rather toward statements or inscriptions that have been produced in the laboratory and that have taken the place of nature: " reality is the consequence rather than the cause of [the] construction [of facts through operations designed to effect the drop­ ping of modalities which qualify a given statement] " ( ibid., 2 3 7 ) . Yet in We Have Never Been Modern, Latour expands this constructionist ontology to the point of claiming that inscription need involve no meaningful loss of embodiment at all. In this text, not only is the nature extracted from the laboratory every bit as real as the " transcendentlimmanent Nature " it replaces ( 1 99 3 b, 77) , but the very production of nature as quasi-obj ect has been accorded the all-important duty of opening nature to our knowl­ edge-of giving us " access to things themselves, not only to their phenom­ ena " ( 90 ) . While perhaps tolerable a s an inevitable occupational hazard-and cor­ responding limitation-of scientific activity, such a position cannot be car­ ried over to the analysis of technology without significantly reducing the lat­ ter's practical impact. Routed through Latour's inscriptional model, technologies can only attain significance by contributing to scientific episte­ mology; as forms of capture of the real, they constitute embodied inscrip­ tions (or embodiments of inscription ) that function, like scientific facts, to reduce the real to manageable proportions . In essence then, as we will later see in detail, Latour's constructivist model reduces technology to the status of supplement or materialization of inscription. Despite (re) introducing some form of embodied reality, the " shifting-out " involved in the produc­ tion of technology-shifting out from inscription to materiality-serves exclusively as a means of expanding the epistemologist's control; rather than foregrounding technology's robust anchoring in the real, it functions to solidify the power of inscription to harness the real and render it accessible to cognition. Regardless of whether shifting-out succeeds in this task, tech­ nology is effectively stripped of its immanence within the embodied real. In assimilating technology to science, Latour thus brackets out more than just the material processes of translation that occur within the narrow techno-

36

36 * Embodying Technesis

scientific context: he quite simply eschews the entire extra-scientific dimen-

sion of technology's material impact on practical life.

Accordingly, to restore technology's anchoring in the real, we need to

reintroduce the ontological differences between technology and science that

Latour finds himself compelled to efface. Following both media theorists

and engineers, we must recognize, first, that technologies exist and perform

within a far larger and more heterogeneous social field than do scientific

programs. Situated within the real world (embodied reality), technologies

are never simple materializations of thought (or scientific protocol) but are

composite and complex results of often multiple, concrete and practical

efforts to solve local problems. Moreover, insofar as they form an important

part of the material infrastructure of the lifeworld, technologies generate

unintended and emergent practical consequences that not only have a broad

social impact well beyond the domain of science but can actually alter the

very material conditions for perceptual and cognitive social life. Grasping

this excessive "share" of technology's impact will require us to study it at

once as a social construction and a material "component" of Nature, to

impose a methodological double vision that can supplement the act of con-

structing technologies as quasi-objects with some recognition of the irre-

ducible, though hardly monolithic, autonomy peculiar to technology.3

Accordingly, I urge a stronger differentiation of technology from science

than the functionalist one that the contemporary field of science studies con-

structs entirely within its inscriptionally generated frame of reference.4 By

tempering the constructivist program with a recognition of the hard materi-

ality of technology, such a differentiation can combine the undeniable social

and cultural context underlying the production of technologies with an

account of their equally irreducible status as material components of the

"unmediated flux" (Hayles 1991b). To grasp this peculiar autonomy of

technology and to understand better how it complements the culturalist

account, I suggest that we adopt what the late Jean-Francois Lyotard called

a "cosmological" perspective-a perspective that treats technology as the

privileged vehicle in the autonomous material "complexification" of the

cosmos. Such a perspective would require us to situate technology simulta-

neously within the "Middle Kingdom" where the real, the discursive, and

the social converge in the construction of quasi-objects (the domain of

nature-culture) and within the unmediated material flux (the domain of

Nature).5 Precisely this irreducible, though not incompatible, duality of

technology necessitates the methodological double vision I am calling for:

insofar as they enter into practical networks where the nonhuman interfaces

with the human, technologies are open to the culturalist analysis that has

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

scientific context: he quite simply eschews the entire extra-scientific dimen­ sion of technology's material impact on practical life. Accordingly, to restore technology's anchoring in the real, we need to reintroduce the ontological differences between technology and science that Latour finds himself compelled to efface. Following both media theorists and engineers, we must recognize, first, that technologies exist and perform within a far larger and more heterogeneous social field than do scientific programs. Situated within the real world (embodied reality) , technologies are never simple materializations of thought ( or scientific protocol) but are composite and complex results of often multiple, concrete and practical efforts to solve local problems. Moreover, insofar as they form an important part of the material infrastructure of the lifeworld, technologies generate unintended and emergent practical consequences that not only have a broad social impact well beyond the domain of science but can actually alter the very material conditions for perceptual and cognitive social life. Grasping this excessive " share " of technology's impact will require us to study it at once as a social construction and a material "component " of Nature, to impose a methodological double vision that can supplement the act of con­ structing technologies as quasi-obj ects with some recognition of the irre­ ducible, though hardly monolithic, autonomy peculiar to technology.3 Accordingly, I urge a stronger differentiation of technology from science than the functionalist one that the contemporary field of science studies con­ structs entirely within its inscriptionally generated frame of reference.4 By tempering the constructivist program with a recognition of the hard materi­ ality of technology, such a differentiation can combine the undeniable social and cultural context underlying the production of technologies with an account of their equally irreducible status as material components of the " unmediated flux" (Hayles 1 9 9 1 b ) . To grasp this peculiar autonomy of technology and to understand better how it complements the culturalist account, I suggest that we adopt what the late Jean-Francois Lyotard called a " cosmological " perspective-a perspective that treats technology as the privileged vehicle in the autonomous material "complexification " of the cosmos. Such a perspective would require us to situate technology simulta­ neously within the "Middle Kingdom " where the real, the discursive, and the social converge in the construction of quasi-obj ects (the domain of nature-culture) and within the unmediated material flux (the domain of Nature) . 5 Precisely this irreducible, though not incompatible, duality of technology necessitates the methodological double vision I am calling for: insofar as they enter into practical networks where the nonhuman interfaces with the human, technologies are open to the culturalist analysis that has

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 37

recently been offered for scientific (and other like) practices of inscription

that seek to bridge the gap between the natural and the social; yet to the

extent that they contribute directly though not without human mediation to

the autonomous process by which matter "self-complexifies," technologies

always exceed the grasp of culturalist analysis and inscriptional models.

What I call technesis names the reduction that ensues when we forget this

duality, when we assimilate the material dimension of technology's impact

into its social contextualization.

Lest my position here appear retrograde (since it self-consciously returns

us to the Kantian terrain diagnosed by Bruno Latour as the root evil of

modernity), let me clarify my invocation of realism (Latour 1993b). My

qualified endorsement of Kantian empirical realism aims to counter

Latour's blanket dismissal of the Copernican revolution. In sum, I think that

a heuristic commitment to Kantian realism provides a timely recipe, as it

were, for restoring the realist vector bracketed out in Latour's presentation

of the quasi-object. In my opinion, Latour's dismissal of Kant rests on an

overly narrow construal of Kant's complex conception of nature, one that

privileges the figure of nature underlying Kant's epistemology at the expense

of the radically divergent nature conditioning his aesthetics and moral phi-

losophy. Only by ignoring Kant's explorations of the noumenal in the

notions of freedom (second Critique) and teleology (third Critique) can

Latour effectively hypostatize the topic of knowledge; to make knowledge

the sole mediator of our relation with nature, Latour must simply conflate

the two vastly different domains of nature in Kant.

Given this hypostatization, it is not surprising to discover a distinct cog-

nitive bias behind Latour's characterization of Kantianism as the final

ratification of the modern constitution. If the Boyle-Hobbes debate can be

credited with introducing the basic modern divide between society and

nature, knowledge and things, Kant (so Latour contends) is responsible for

turning this divide into a metaphysical principle, for codifying it as the divi-

sion between radically separate ontological domains.

It is with Kantianism that our Constitution receives its truly canonical for-

mulation. What was a mere distinction is sharpened into a total separation,

a Copernican Revolution. Things-in-themselves become inaccessible while,

symmetrically, the transcendental subject becomes infinitely remote from the

world. The two guarantees remain clearly symmetrical, however, since

knowledge is possible only at the median point, that of phenomena, through

an application of the two pure forms, the thing-in-itself and the subject.

Hybrids are indeed accepted, but solely as mixtures of pure forms in equal

proportion. (Latour 1993b, 56)

•

37

recently been offered for scientific ( and other like) practices of inscription that seek to bridge the gap between the natural and the social; yet to the extent that they contribute directly though not without human mediation to the autonomous process by which matter " self-complexifies, " technologies always exceed the grasp of culturalist analysis and inscriptional models. What I call technesis names the reduction that ensues when we forget this duality, when we assimilate the material dimension of technology's impact into its social contextualization. Lest my position here appear retrograde ( since it self-consciously returns us to the Kantian terrain diagnosed by Bruno Latour as the root evil of modernity), let me clarify my invocation of realism (Latour 1 99 3 b ) . My qualified endorsement of Kantian empirical realism aims to counter Latour's blanket dismissal of the Copernican revolution. In sum, I think that a heuristic commitment to Kantian realism provides a timely recipe, as it were, for restoring the realist vector bracketed out in Latour's presentation of the quasi-object. In my opinion, Latour's dismissal of Kant rests on an overly narrow construal of Kant's complex conception of nature, one that privileges the figure of nature underlying Kant's epistemology at the expense of the radically divergent nature conditioning his aesthetics and moral phi­ losophy. Only by ignoring Kant's explorations of the noumenal in the notions of freedom (second Critique) and teleology (third Critique) can Latour effectively hypostatize the topic of knowledge; to make knowledge the sole mediator of our relation with nature, Latour must simply conflate the two vastly different domains of nature in Kant. Given this hypostatization, it is not surprising to discover a distinct cog­ nitive bias behind Latour's characterization of Kantianism as the final ratification of the modern constitution. If the Boyle-Hobbes debate can be credited with introducing the basic modern divide between society and nature, knowledge and things, Kant (so Latour contends) is responsible for turning this divide into a metaphysical principle, for codifying it as the divi­ sion between radically separate ontological domains. It is with Kantianism that our Constitution receives its truly canonical for­ mulation. What was a mere distinction is sharpened into a total separation, a Copernican Revolution. Things-in-themselves become inaccessible while, symmetrically, the transcendental subj ect becomes infinitely remote from the world. The two guarantees remain clearly symmetrical, however, since knowledge is possible only at the median point, that of phenomena, through an application of the two pure forms, the thing-in-itself and the subj ect. Hybrids are indeed accepted, but solely as mixtures of pure forms in equal proportion. (Latour 1 993b, 5 6 )

38

38 * Embodying Technesis

As long as our access to the real remains mediated through epistemology,

Latour's argument is irrefutable: Kant's Copernican revolution institutes an

epoche of the thing-in-itself as the condition of possibility for the produc-

tion of cognitive representations (Vorstellungen). In this sense, Latour's cri-

tique facilitates an important minirevolution of its own: it brings the world

of things back into the epistemological fold.

Matters are quite otherwise, however, once we move out of the narrow

field of knowledge production to consider our relation with Nature in the

broader terms developed by Kant in the second and third Critiques.

Whereas Kant's concern with Nature in the first Critique centers on its role

as (one essential part of) the transcendental cause of phenomenal represen-

tations of the external world and is thus limited to its contribution to the

task of constituting the objects of experience, in the Critique of Practical

Reason and especially in the Critique of Judgement, Nature cannot be

assimilated into the form of an object, since it corresponds, as supersensible

nature, to freedom and, as teleological nature, to the final unity of things.6

In a recent article, philosopher Kate Soper usefully glosses nature in just this

sense: she speaks of "the nature whose structures and processes are inde-

pendent of human activity (in the sense that they are not a humanly created

product) and whose forces and causal powers are the condition of and con-

straint upon any human practice" (Soper 1996, 31). Understood in this

way, Kantian empirical realism requires us to distinguish two natures-the

"nature" that results from a process of construction (nature as quasi-object

produced in the laboratory) and nature (or Nature) as the material stratum

underlying and conditioning all human activity (including the very con-

struction of nature as quasi-object).

Constrained Constructivism: The Return of

Kantian Dualism

Employed as a heuristic means for conceptualizing that dimension of our

relationship with the real that remains ungraspable through cognition and

representation, a qualified return to Kantian empirical realism will help us

to recognize and respect the particular autonomy of technology I have

attempted to expose. For this purpose, accordingly, a contemporary model

designed to foreground the radical exteriority of nature-a model like

N. Katherine Hayles's "constrained constructivism"-will have certain dis-

tinct advantages over Latour's inscriptional model.7

What differentiates Hayles's constrained constructivism from Latour's

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

As long as our access to the real remains mediated through epistemology, Latour's argument is irrefutable: Kant's Copernican revolution institutes an epoche of the thing-in-itself as the condition of possibility for the produc­ tion of cognitive representations ( Vorstellungen ) . In this sense, Latour's cri­ tique facilitates an important minirevolution of its own: it brings the world of things back into the epistemological fold. Matters are quite otherwise, however, once we move out of the narrow field of knowledge production to consider our relation with Nature in the broader terms developed by Kant in the second and third Critiques. Whereas Kant's concern with Nature in the first Critique centers on its role as ( one essential part of) the transcendental cause of phenomenal represen­ tations of the external world and is thus limited to its contribution to the task of constituting the objects of experience, in the Critique of Practical Reason and especially in the Critique of Iudgement, Nature cannot be assimilated into the form of an obj ect, since it corresponds, as supersensible nature, to freedom and, as teleological nature, to the final unity of things.6 In a recent article, philosopher Kate Soper usefully glosses nature in just this sense: she speaks of " the nature whose structures and processes are inde­ pendent of human activity (in the sense that they are not a humanly created product) and whose forces and causal powers are the condition of and con­ straint upon any human practice " ( Soper 1 996, 3 1 ) . Understood in this way, Kantian empirical realism requires us to distinguish two natures-the " nature" that results from a process of construction (nature as quasi-obj ect produced in the laboratory) and nature (or Nature) as the material stratum underlying and conditioning all human activity (including the very con­ struction of nature as quasi-object ) .

Constrained Constructivism: The Return of Kantian Dualism

Employed as a heuristic means for conceptualizing that dimension of our relationship with the real that remains ungraspable through cognition and representation, a qualified return to Kantian empirical realism will help us to recognize and respect the particular autonomy of technology I have attempted to expose. For this purpose, accordingly, a contemporary model designed to foreground the radical exteriority of nature-a model like N. Katherine Hayles's " constrained constructivism"-will have certain dis­ tinct advantages over Latour's inscriptional model ? What differentiates Hayles's constrained constructivism from Latour's

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 39

inscriptional paradigm is less a deep philosophical divide than a variant

emphasis: whereas Latour is most interested in explaining the complex

process of social translation that underlies all technoscientific production,

Hayles focuses on the limitations of epistemology, on the "cusp" separating

representation from the real. Latour's inscriptional model is predicated on a

denial of the external referent, such that reality becomes the creation of a

constructed system of internal reference (e.g., the adequation and superim-

posibility of reports). Hayles's constrained constructivism, by contrast, fol-

lows the relationship between representation and "unmediated flux" to the

point at which it breaks down. Beginning from the (constructivist) position

that "everything we perceive, think, or do is always already a representa-

tion, not reality as such," Hayles pressures the role of constraint and its rela-

tionship to representation. Specifically, she argues that constraints act as

limits on social constructivism and representationalism; by ruling out cer-

tain possibilities, they "enable scientific inquiry to tell us something about

reality and not only about ourselves" (Hayles 1991b, 79).8 In short, con-

straints introduce negation into representation and thus permit some mini-

mal form of escape from the confines of language.

To explain how this happens, Hayles maps the relationship between rep-

resentation and constraint onto a modified Greimasian semiotic square as

shown in figure 1.9 Such a mapping helps to reveal the fundamental inca-

pacity of our representations to coincide with reality and, in so doing, to

open a different, nonrepresentationalist or antirepresentationalist form of

contact with the real (what Hayles calls "elusive negativity").

exclusion

(inconsistent) False

(unknown)

Not-True

_

exclusion

True

overlap

Not-False (consistent)

(unoccupied)

By contrasting the positions of true and false, Hayles is able to establish

that language's capacity to touch on the world must stem from the function

of negation: while the position of the true cannot be occupied since we can-

not step outside representation to verify the congruence between it and the

unmediated flux it represents, the false is occupied in cases where a given

representation is inconsistent with specific aspects of the reality under inter-

rogation. With the shift to the more complex relation between the not-false

(consistent with the flux as it is interactively experienced) and the not-true

•

39

inscriptional paradigm is less a deep philosophical divide than a variant emphasis: whereas Latour is most interested in explaining the complex process of social translation that underlies all techno scientific production, Hayles focuses on the limitations of epistemology, on the "cusp " separating representation from the real . Latour's inscriptional model is predicated on a denial of the external referent, such that reality becomes the creation of a constructed system of internal reference (e.g., the adequation and superim­ posibility of reports ) . Hayles's constrained constructivism, by contrast, fol­ lows the relationship between representation and " unmediated flux " to the point at which it breaks down. Beginning from the (constructivist) position that " everything we perceive, think, or do is always already a representa­ tion, not reality as such, " Hayles pressures the role of constraint and its rela­ tionship to representation. Specifically, she argues that constraints act as limits on social constructivism and representationalism; by ruling out cer­ tain possibilities, they " enable scientific inquiry to tell us something about reality and not only about ourselves" (Hayles 1 9 9 1 b, 79 ) . 8 In short, con­ straints introduce negation into representation and thus permit some mini­ mal form of escape from the confines of language. To explain how this happens, Hayles maps the relationship between rep­ resentation and constraint onto a modified Greimasian semiotic square as shown in figure 1 . 9 Such a mapping helps to reveal the fundamental inca­ pacity of our representations to coincide with reality and, in so doing, to open a different, nonrepresentationalist or antirepresentationalist form of contact with the real (what Hayles calls " elusive negativity " ) .

(unknown because untested in relation to the flux), Hayles expands the

asymmetry in a way that reinforces the crucial role played by negation:

"Between the negated categories of not-false and not-true, two kinds of

(i nconsistent)

False

..

( u n k n own)

Not-True

...

excl usion overlap

True

(unoccu pied)

Not- False

(co nsistent)

By contrasting the positions of true and false, Hayles is able to establish that language's capacity to touch on the world must stem from the function of negation: while the position of the true cannot be occupied since we can­ not step outside representation to verify the congruence between it and the unmediated flux it represents, the false is occupied in cases where a given representation is inconsistent with specific aspects of the reality under inter­ rogation. With the shift to the more complex relation between the not-false ( consistent with the flux as it is interactively experienced ) and the not-true ( unknown because untested in relation to the flux) , Hayles expands the asymmetry in a way that reinforces the crucial role played by negation: " Between the negated categories of not-false and not-true, two kinds of

40

40 * Embodying Technesis

oppositions are in play. One is a polarity between negation and affimation

(false/true), the other between indefinite and definite (unknown/consistent).

This ambiguity folds together the ability to negate with the ability to spec-

ify. In doing so, it opens an escape hatch from the prison house of language"

(81; emphasis added). In expanding this argument, Hayles stresses the

excess negativity of the not-true; as the "negative of a negative," the not-

true yields a double-marking that renders its status indeterminate and inar-

ticulable. Ultimately, Hayles argues, this ambiguous double negativity of the

not-true permits the reintroduction of external reference in a highly con-

torted, doubly inverted form.

The relation of constraints to representation can now be articulated more

precisely . . . At the cusp [of the theater of representation], the interactions

expressed by these representations [of constraints] have no positive content.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

oppositions are in play. One is a polarity between negation and affimation ( false/true) , the other between indefinite and definite (unknownlconsistent) .

This ambiguity folds together the ability to negate with the ability to spec­ ify. In doing so, it opens an escape hatch from the prison house of language " ( 8 1 ; emphasis added ) . In expanding this argument, Hayles stresses the excess negativity of the not-true; as the " negative of a negative, " the not­ true yields a double-marking that renders its status indeterminate and inar­ ticulable. Ultimately, Hayles argues, this ambiguous double negativity of the not-true permits the reintroduction of external reference in a highly con­ torted, doubly inverted form.

The inability of language to specify these interactions as such is itself

expressed by the elusive negativity that exists within the not-true position.

... At the positive ("true") end of the diagonal [connecting the true and the

not-true], the limits imply that we cannot speak the truth. At the negative

("not-true") end, they paradoxically perform the positive function of gestur-

ing toward that which cannot be spoken. Elusive negativity, precisely

because of its doubly negative position, opens onto the flux that cannot be

represented in itself. (83)

Unlike Latour's internalist semiotic, Hayles's model seeks to address pre-

cisely that dimension of the material flux that lies beyond the grasp of rep-

resentation and the inscriptional model Latour shares with most proponents

of science studies. Through its extrinsic resistance to the textualist ideology,

constrained constructivism thus preserves the dualism that Latour rejects.

Where Latour takes pains to deny the cogency of an external Nature that

would preexist, rather than be derived from, the process of construction,

Hayles strives to preserve the autonomy of the material flux (Nature), while

The relation of constraints to representation can now be articulated more precisely . . . . At the cusp [of the theater of representation] , the interactions expressed by these representations [of constraints] have no positive content. The inability of language to specify these interactions as such is itself expressed by the elusive negativity that exists within the not-true position . . . . At the positive ( " true " ) end of the diagonal [connecting the true and the not-true] , the limits imply that we cannot speak the truth. At the negative ( "not-true " ) end, they paradoxically perform the positive function of gestur­ ing toward that which cannot be spoken. Elusive negativity, precisely because of its doubly negative position, opens onto the flux that cannot be represented in itself. ( 8 3 )

nonetheless developing a means of accessing it through language.

Elusive negativity reveals a synergy between physical and semiotic con-

straints that brings language in touch with the world. Physical constraints, by

their consistency, allude to a reality beyond themselves that they cannot

speak; semiotic constraints, by generating excess negativity, encode this allu-

sion into language . . . Our interactions with the flux are always richer and

more ambiguous than language can represent. Elusive negativity, acknowl-

edging this gap, gestures toward this richness and so provides a place within

semiotic systems to signify the unspeakable . . . (83)

Precisely such acknowledgment of the excess of the material flux forms the

prerequisite for a nonreductive engagement with technology beyond the

narrow frame of epistemology and language.10

Unlike Latour's internalist semiotic, Hayles's model seeks t o address pre­ cisely that dimension of the material flux that lies beyond the grasp of rep­ resentation and the inscriptional model Latour shares with most proponents of science studies. Through its extrinsic resistance to the textualist ideology, constrained constructivism thus preserves the dualism that Latour rej ects. Where Latour takes pains to deny the cogency of an external Nature that would preexist, rather than be derived from, the process of construction, Hayles strives to preserve the autonomy of the material flux (Nature) , while nonetheless developing a means of accessing it through language. Elusive negativity reveals a synergy between physical and semiotic con­ straints that brings language in touch with the world. Physical constraints, by their consistency, allude to a reality beyond themselves that they cannot speak; semiotic constraints, by generating excess negativity, encode this allu­ sion into language . . . . Our interactions with the flux are always richer and more ambiguous than language can represent. Elusive negativity, acknowl­ edging this gap, gestures toward this richness and so provides a place within semiotic systems to signify the unspeakable . . . . ( 8 3 )

Precisely such acknowledgment o f the excess o f the material flux forms the prerequisite for a nonreductive engagement with technology beyond the narrow frame of epistemology and language. 10

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment . 4 1

Technoculture and Embodiment * 41

Because her aim is to locate the unspeakable excess of the real within the

space of language, however, Hayles does not actually consider what I would

see as the broadest implications of her argument: how we actually do expe-

rience the richness and ambiguity of our nonlinguistic interactions with the

flux. Still, simply by indicating the incapacity of representation to account

adequately for our interactions with the flux, she indicates the direction for

such an analysis. Indeed, her effort furnishes a strong testament to the need

for a postrepresentationalist, postconstructivist account of our practical,

embodied existence.

It is therefore not surprising to find Hayles, in another of her recent arti-

cles, engaged in an attempt to bridge the divide between a semiotic and a

phenomenological account of technology. In "The Materiality of Informat-

ics" (1992), she turns her attention explicitly to the relation between tech-

nological change and embodied experience, in what I cannot help but see as

an inchoate gesture toward a postepistemological engagement with the real.

By stressing the irreducibility of embodiment in our experience of techno-

logical change, Hayles is able to counter the persistent identification of tech-

nology with dematerialization and decorporealization that has become a

staple of postmodern cultural criticism. For Hayles and the theorists on

whom she draws (Paul Connerton, Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu, Varela, Mark

Johnson, etc.), cognitive and representationalist constructions are them-

selves rooted in precognitive, prerepresentational embodied experience.

Accordingly, if we expand the field of her argument beyond the "theater of

representation," we can see that embodiment in fact forms a kind of practi-

cal analogue to the negatively inscribed material flux central to the con-

strained constructivism model; as a prerepresentationalist locus for experi-

ence prior to its mediation through representation, the body negotiates

between the flux (identified with the technological infrastructure of the

world) and our discursive knowledge systems. Embodiment, in short, con-

stitutes our practical means of interaction with the material flux and with

the material reality of technology beyond the theater of representation.

Latour and the Socialization of Technology

Perhaps the advantages of Hayles's approach can most easily be grasped by

way of contrast with Latour. Where Latour thematizes technology exclu-

sively as the materialization of (scientific or extrascientific) human, social

intentions, Hayles accords it a far more complex role as mediator (via its

impact on

embodiment) between

autonomous material flux itself.

the discursive domain and the

Because her aim is to locate the unspeakable excess of the real within the space of language, however, Hayles does not actually consider what I would see as the broadest implications of her argument: how we actually do expe­ rience the richness and ambiguity of our non linguistic interactions with the flux. Still, simply by indicating the incapacity of representation to account adequately for our interactions with the flux, she indicates the direction for such an analysis. Indeed, her effort furnishes a strong testament to the need for a postrepresentationalist, postconstructivist account of our practical, embodied existence. It is therefore not surprising to find Hayles, in another of her recent arti­ cles, engaged in an attempt to bridge the divide between a semiotic and a phenomenological account of technology. In "The Materiality of Informat­ ics " ( 1 992 ) , she turns her attention explicitly to the relation between tech­ nological change and embodied experience, in what I cannot help but see as an inchoate gesture toward a postepistemological engagement with the real. By stressing the irreducibility of embodiment in our experience of techno­ logical change, Hayles is able to counter the persistent identification of tech­ nology with dematerialization and decorporealization that has become a staple of postmodern cultural criticism. For Hayles and the theorists on whom she draws (Paul Connerton, Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu, Varela, Mark Johnson, etc . ) , cognitive and representationalist constructions are them­ selves rooted in precognitive, prerepresentational embodied experience. Accordingly, if we expand the field of her argument beyond the "theater of representation, " we can see that embodiment in fact forms a kind of practi­ cal analogue to the negatively inscribed material flux central to the con­ strained constructivism model; as a prerepresentationalist locus for experi­ ence prior to its mediation through representation, the body negotiates between the flux (identified with the technological infrastructure of the world) and our discursive knowledge systems. Embodiment, in short, con­ stitutes our practical means of interaction with the material flux and with the material reality of technology beyond the theater of representation.

Latour and the Socialization of Technology

Perhaps the advantages of Hayles's approach can most easily be grasped by way of contrast with Latour. Where Latour thematizes technology exclu­ sively as the materialization of (scientific or extra scientific ) human, social intentions, Hayles accords it a far more complex role as mediator ( via its impact on embodiment) between the discursive domain and the autonomous material flux itself.

42

42 * Embodying Technesis

In We Have Never Been Modern, in Aramis, or the Love of Technology,

and in several recent essays, Latour explicitly extends the social ontology of

the quasi-object to embrace technology (Latour 1993b, 1996, 1992). As I

have already suggested, the operative principle behind this extension is an

alleged homology between science and technology: just as the successful

production of scientific facts hinges on processes of inscription and transla-

tion that accord them importance and solidity, the development of tech-

nologies centers on the materialization of textual-or as Latour puts it in

Aramis, purely fictional-technological projects. In a sense then, technolo-

gies can be understood as extensions of the translation networks underlying

science as such. Since they culminate, if successful, in the production of

material (and not simply textual) artifacts, they add one last step to the

process of translation: they "transform into an object" what otherwise

would remain "a project in the file drawers" (Latour 1996, 24).

The processes of translation that produce technological artifacts do,

however, differ in one important respect from those underlying the produc-

tion of scientific facts. Latour argues that since a technological project "does

not exist . . . at the outset" and cannot exist as long as it is in the project

phase, the analysis of technologies has a certain measure of freedom to

evade the burden of realism that weighs on science. He maintains that sci-

entific analysis must grapple with the heritage of realist epistemology, with

the constitutive notion that the sciences "seem to have discovered a world

that came into being without men and without sciences." By contrast, tech-

nologies emerge from a protected, fictional space and come into contact

with embodied reality only in their final stages. As Latour puts it, "[n]o one

is a Platonist where technology is concerned," since it would be absurd to

assert that a technology "was always already there, even before it was dis-

covered" (23). On his reckoning, this measure of freedom enjoins the tech-

nological analyst to deconstruct the divide separating signs and things, to

understand it as a nondiscrete and progressive functional differentiation.

The observer of technologies has to be very careful not to differentiate too

hastily between signs and things, between projects and objects, between

fiction and reality, between a novel about feelings and what is inscribed in the

nature of things. In fact, the engineers the observer is studying pass progres-

sively from one of these sets to another. The R-312 [a bus project in Paris]

was a text; now it's a thing. Once a carcass, it will eventually revert to the

carcass state. Aramis was a text; it came close to becoming, it nearly became,

it might have become, an object, an institution, a means of transportation in

Paris. In the archives, it turns back into a text, a technological fiction. The

capacity of a text to weigh itself down with reality, or, on the contrary, to

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

In We Have Never Been Modern, in Aramis, or the Love of Technology, and in several recent essays, Latour explicitly extends the social ontology of the quasi-obj ect to embrace technology ( Latour 1 99 3 b, 1 9 96, 1 992 ) . As I have already suggested, the operative principle behind this extension is an alleged homology between science and technology: just as the successful production of scientific facts hinges on processes of inscription and transla­ tion that accord them importance and solidity, the development of tech­ nologies centers on the materialization of textual-or as Latour puts it in Aramis, purely fictional-technological proj ects. In a sense then, technolo­ gies can be understood as extensions of the translation networks underlying science as such. Since they culminate, if successful, in the production of material ( and not simply textual ) artifacts, they add one last step to the process of translation : they "transform into an obj ect " what otherwise would remain "a proj ect in the file drawers " (Latour 1 9 96, 24 ) . The processes o f translation that produce technological artifacts do, however, differ in one important respect from those underlying the produc­ tion of scientific facts. Latour argues that since a technological proj ect " does not exist . . . at the outset " and cannot exist as long as it is in the proj ect phase, the analysis of technologies has a certain measure of freedom to evade the burden of realism that weighs on science. He maintains that sci­ entific analysis must grapple with the heritage of realist epistemology, with the constitutive notion that the sciences " seem to have discovered a world that came into being without men and without sciences . " By contrast, tech­ nologies emerge from a protected, fictional space and come into contact with embodied reality only in their final stages. As Latour puts it, " [n] o one is a Platonist where technology is concerned," since it would be absurd to assert that a technology " was always already there, even before it was dis­ covered " (23 ) . On his reckoning, this measure of freedom enjoins the tech­ nological analyst to deconstruct the divide separating signs and things, to understand it as a nondiscrete and progressive functional differentiation. The observer of technologies has to be very careful not to differentiate too hastily between signs and things, between proj ects and obj ects, between fiction and reality, between a novel about feelings and what is inscribed in the nature of things. In fact, the engineers the observer is studying pass progres­ sively from one of these sets to another. The R-3 1 2 [a bus project in Paris] was a text; now it's a thing. Once a carcass, it will eventually revert to the carcass state. Aramis was a text; it came close to becoming, it nearly became, it might have become, an obj ect, an institution, a means of transportation in Paris. In the archives, it turns back into a text, a technological fiction. The capacity of a text to weigh itself down with reality, or, on the contrary, to

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 43

lighten its load of reality, is what endows fictional technologies with a beauty

that the novel we've inherited from the nineteenth century has difficulty man-

ifesting nowadays. Only a fiction that gains or loses reality can do justice to

the engineers. . . A fiction with a "variable geometry": this is what needs to

be invented, if we are to track the variations of a technological project that

has the potential to become an object. (24-25)

•

43

lighten its load of reality, is what endows fictional technologies with a beauty that the novel we've inherited from the nineteenth century has difficulty man­ ifesting nowadays. Only a fiction that gains or loses reality can do j ustice to the engineers . . . A fiction with a "variable geometry " : this is what needs to be invented, if we are to track the variations of a technological proj ect that has the potential to become an obj ect. (24-2 5 )

By isolating technology in this way, however, Latour decisively narrows the

scope of his account. Bluntly put, he privileges the genesis of technology at

the expense of what I would call its "perverse performativity." His exclusive

focus on the trajectory leading from textual project to technological materi-

alization simply leaves out an entire dimension of technological materiality:

the unintended, "after-the-fact" effects technologies have once they enter

into existence. Not only does Latour thus trivialize the functional autonomy

that technologies do enjoy after they "gain reality," but he also imposes a

reductive frame on embodiment as such. While technologies would appear

to invert the path of science and to involve a recovery (not a forgetting) of

the material processes underlying them, their contact with embodied reality,

though not always predictable and expected, remains limited in scope. Inso-

far as it constitutes a challenge to be conquered, embodied reality is

restricted to material factors that bear directly on the social and scientific

intention that a particular technology would materialize. All other material

effects that a technology does or could produce-and indeed, the entire

dimension of technology's extrascientific practical impact-simply gets

bracketed out.

To observe this reduction in action, let us focus on a concrete example of

Latour's technological analysis-his account of an automated door-closer.

In exposing the impoverished "ontology" underlying his procedure, my

intention is not to harp on the limitations of Latour's model but to broaden

his focalization of embodiment in order to address the realist dimension of

technology-the potential of any technology, once instituted, to generate

effects outside the "fictional" space governing its genesis. As we will see,

Latour's exclusive concern with challenging the asymmetry structuring the

human-nonhuman relation orients his thematization of technology too nar-

rowly around functional issues directly embedded in the particular con-

structed situation (or quasi-object) at issue.

In "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane

Artifacts," Latour offers a concrete analysis of a particular technological

lineage to illustrate a general methodological claim: that any technology,

insofar as it instantiates a program of action, involves a complex network

composed of both human

and nonhuman

elements. "Students of

B y isolating technology i n this way, however, Latour decisively narrows the scope of his account. Bluntly put, he privileges the genesis of technology at the expense of what I would call its "perverse performativity. " His exclusive focus on the traj ectory leading from textual proj ect to technological materi­ alization simply leaves out an entire dimension of technological materiality: the unintended, " after-the-fact" effects technologies have once they enter into existence. Not only does Latour thus trivialize the functional autonomy that technologies do enjoy after they " gain reality, " but he also imposes a reductive frame on embodiment as such. While technologies would appear to invert the path of science and to involve a recovery (not a forgetting ) of the material processes underlying them, their contact with embodied reality, though not always predictable and expected, remains limited in scope. Inso­ far as it constitutes a challenge to be conquered, embodied reality is restricted to material factors that bear directly on the social and scientific intention that a particular technology would materialize. All other material effects that a technology does or could produce-and indeed, the entire dimension of technology's extra scientific practical impact-simply gets bracketed out. To observe this reduction in action, let us focus on a concrete example of Latour's technological analysis-his account of an automated door-closer. In exposing the impoverished " ontology" underlying his procedure, my intention is not to harp on the limitations of Latour's model but to broaden his focalization of embodiment in order to address the realist dimension of technology-the potential of any technology, once instituted, to generate effects outside the " fictional " space governing its genesis. As we will see, Latour's exclusive concern with challenging the asymmetry structuring the human-nonhuman relation orients his thematization of technology too nar­ rowly around functional issues directly embedded in the particular con­ structed situation ( or quasi-object) at issue. In "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts, " Latour offers a concrete analysis of a particular technological lineage to illustrate a general methodological claim: that any technology, insofar as it instantiates a program of action, involves a complex network composed of both human and nonhuman elements. " Students of

44

44 * Embodying Technesis

technology," proclaims Latour, "are never faced with people on the one

hand and things on the other, they are faced with programs of action, sec-

tions of which are endowed to parts of humans, while other sections are

entrusted to parts of nonhumans" (Latour 1992, 254). To illustrate the

force of his claim, Latour presents an example involving a particular door

on which is posted a notice reading (in French): "The Groom Is On Strike,

For God's Sake, Keep The Door Closed." ("Groom," Latour reminds us, is

"Frenglish" for an automated door-closer or butler [227].) Since the notice

could apply equally to a doorperson and an automated door-closer, it inter-

ests Latour as an expression of the reciprocal symmetry structuring relations

between the human and the nonhuman: it captures the crossover from the

nonhuman to the human sphere that is involved in attributing an intentional

action (going on strike) to an inanimate mechanism (an automated door-

closer). And it does so, importantly, without relying on the asymmetrical

figure of anthropomorphism, a figure that would privilege the human (and

"rhetoric") as a "general equivalent," a "literal" term onto which every-

thing else would be mapped. By guarding the nonhuman from such reduc-

tion, the network constituted by this notice-a complex fusion of "labor

relations, religion, advertisement, and technique"-opens up what Latour

calls "the missing masses of our society" (227).

To trace the network underlying the posting of this statement, Latour

begins by considering the role of the door. Doors allow us to pass through

walls without having first to break holes through them. By measuring the

work a door spares us from, we can isolate the role of "displacement or

translation or delegation or shifting"-the core notion of Latour's model of

technology. As Latour explains, we thereby acquire a basic counterfactual

method, a sort of practical calculus, for assessing the function of technolo-

gies: "As a more general descriptive rule, every time you want to know what

a nonhuman does, simply imagine what other humans or other nonhumans

would have to do were this character not present" (229). In accordance with

this rule, technologies are thematized as functional equivalents of specific

tasks that would otherwise have to be delegated either to human or other

nonhuman actants.

Far from standing alone, as some kind of abstract governing principle,

this descriptive rule immediately returns us to the practical; specifically, it

inaugurates an analytic path that traces the dialectical series of translations

involved in solving the particular practical issue of how to insure that a door

closes properly at all times. On the analysis Latour offers, this series begins

with one specific problem with doors: their tendency to remain open if peo-

ple passing through them do not remember to close them. This problem can

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

technology, " proclaims Latour, " are never faced with people on the one hand and things on the other, they are faced with programs of action, sec­ tions of which are endowed to parts of humans, while other sections are entrusted to parts of nonhumans" (Latour 1 992, 254 ) . To illustrate the force of his claim, Latour presents an example involving a particular door on which is posted a notice reading (in French ) : " The Groom Is On Strike, For God's Sake, Keep The Door Closed. " ( " Groom, " Latour reminds us, is " Frenglish" for an automated door-closer or butler [227] . ) Since the notice could apply equally to a doorperson and an automated door-closer, it inter­ ests Latour as an expression of the reciprocal symmetry structuring relations between the human and the nonhuman: it captures the crossover from the nonhuman to the human sphere that is involved in attributing an intentional action (going on strike ) to an inanimate mechanism ( an automated door­ closer ) . And it does so, importantly, without relying on the asymmetrical figure of anthropomorphism, a figure that would privilege the human ( and " rhetoric " ) as a " general equivalent, " a " literal" term onto which every­ thing else would be mapped. By guarding the nonhuman from such reduc­ tion, the network constituted by this notice-a complex fusion of " labor relations, religion, advertisement, and technique "-opens up what Latour calls " the missing masses of our society" (227) . To trace the network underlying the posting of this statement, Latour begins by considering the role of the door. Doors allow us to pass through walls without having first to break holes through them. By measuring the work a door spares us from, we can isolate the role of " displacement or translation or delegation or shifting "-the core notion of Latour's model of technology. As Latour explains, we thereby acquire a basic counterfactual method, a sort of practical calculus, for assessing the function of technolo­ gies: " As a more general descriptive rule, every time you want to know what a nonhuman does, simply imagine what other humans or other nonhumans would have to do were this character not present" (229 ) . In accordance with this rule, technologies are thematized as functional equivalents of specific tasks that would otherwise have to be delegated either to human or other nonhuman actants. Far from standing alone, as some kind of abstract governing principle, this descriptive rule immediately returns us to the practical; specifically, it inaugurates an analytic path that traces the dialectical series of translations involved in solving the particular practical issue of how to insure that a door closes properly at all times. On the analysis Latour offers, this series begins with one specific problem with doors: their tendency to remain open if peo­ ple passing through them do not remember to close them. This problem can

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 45

be solved in (at least) two ways-either by disciplining all the people who

use a given door or by hiring a doorman (also a "groom" in French). While

promising for its sheer simplicity, even this latter expedient cannot guaran-

tee a solution, since the doorman may be unreliable or occupied with other

tasks. Of course, the groom may be disciplined, but only at a cost far out of

proportion with the minimal effect it would bring about. At this point,

Latour suggests, one can take recourse to the nonhuman, substituting for

the unreliable human a "delegated nonhuman character" devoted solely to

opening and closing the door. Yet even this move cannot entirely resolve the

matter, since it introduces other difficulties, such as the door's slamming too

violently (231). If this and all subsequent problems may be solved through

further intermediate steps, all such local solutions will potentially introduce

new difficulties of their own, following an apparently never-ending dialecti-

cal pattern.

While it might appear to engage embodied reality in a robust manner, the

attention Latour lends the small "realities" of context remains purely instru-

mental: far from actually foregrounding the recalcitrance of material con-

text, he invokes local factors as provisional obstacles that are important

only insofar as they stimulate further translations and thus extend particu-

lar networks or quasi-objects under construction in particular instances.

Even if he remains enough of a realist to acknowledge the impossibility of

any "perfect" technological solution, Latour finds himself compelled to

abjure the qualified autonomy he would accord embodied reality, in order

to champion a monist ontology of social actants. To deconstruct the cate-

gorical divide between the human and the nonhuman, that is, he must focus

narrowly on the paths traced by actors, both human and nonhuman, skilled

and unskilled, as they exchange properties according to the logic of transla-

tion. Such a restricted focus, Latour would seem to suggest, is required if we

are to understand the implications of the notice posted on the door; only by

bracketing embodied reality as such will we be able to articulate the hybrid

ontology that would allow us, coherently, to attribute the property of being

"on strike" to an inanimate technical object. On such a view, claiming that

the groom is "on strike" does not so much anthropomorphize an automated

door-closer as expose the process of delegation that underlies its function;

since the groom performs the very same program of action that might alter-

natively be performed by a human actor, the practical effect of its no longer

functioning is equivalent to the effect of the human actor leaving his or her

post. In either case, to say that the groom (nonhuman or human) is "on

strike" is simply to say that this program of action, of which the groom is

an essential part, is not being performed.

•

45

be solved in ( at least) two ways-either by disciplining all the people who use a given door or by hiring a doorman (also a "groom" in French ) . While promising for its sheer simplicity, even this latter expedient cannot guaran­ tee a solution, since the doorman may be unreliable or occupied with other tasks . Of course, the groom may be disciplined, but only at a cost far out of proportion with the minimal effect it would bring about. At this point, Latour suggests, one can take recourse to the nonhuman, substituting for the unreliable human a " delegated nonhuman character " devoted solely to opening and closing the door. Yet even this move cannot entirely resolve the matter, since it introduces other difficulties, such as the door's slamming too violently (23 1 ) . If this and all subsequent problems may be solved through further intermediate steps, all such local solutions will potentially introduce new difficulties of their own, following an apparently never-ending dialecti­ cal pattern. While it might appear to engage embodied reality in a robust manner, the attention Latour lends the small "realities" of context remains purely instru­ mental: far from actually foregrounding the recalcitrance of material con­ text, he invokes local factors as provisional obstacles that are important only insofar as they stimulate further translations and thus extend particu­ lar networks or quasi-obj ects under construction in particular instances. Even if he remains enough of a realist to acknowledge the impossibility of any " perfect" technological solution, Latour finds himself compelled to abj ure the qualified autonomy he would accord embodied reality, in order to champion a monist ontology of social actants. To deconstruct the cate­ gorical divide between the human and the nonhuman, that is, he must focus narrowly on the paths traced by actors, both human and nonhuman, skilled and unskilled, as they exchange properties according to the logic of transla­ tion. Such a restricted focus, Latour would seem to suggest, is required if we are to understand the implications of the notice posted on the door; only by bracketing embodied reality as such will we be able to articulate the hybrid ontology that would allow us, coherently, to attribute the property of being " on strike " to an inanimate technical obj ect. On such a view, claiming that the groom is " on strike " does not so much anthropomorphize an automated door-closer as expose the process of delegation that underlies its function; since the groom performs the very same program of action that might alter­ natively be performed by a human actor, the practical effect of its no longer functioning is equivalent to the effect of the human actor leaving his or her post. In either case, to say that the groom (nonhuman or human ) is " on strike " is simply to say that this program of action, of which the groom is an essential part, is not being performed.

46

46 * Embodying Technesis

Under the guise of advancing a radical symmetry between human and

nonhuman actants, however, Latour seems quite content to perpetuate the

long-standing subordination of technology to human and social intentional-

ity. For Latour, and for science studies more generally, it remains the case

that humans alone make machines and hence that the origin of every

machine can be traced back to some originary human function that it either

extends or replaces. Because of his exclusive focus on the genesis of tech-

nology, Latour's effort to treat technologies as quasi-objects effectively

insures a privileging of the intention of the human actor and perhaps even

of the technological analyst himself. Not only does he make no effort to hide

his belief that technologies cannot have purposes on their own, but-as the

following example will demonstrate-he seems to think that technologies

are fully accounted for when we understand how they embody or material-

ize what is ultimately a concrete human purpose, intention, or desire.

After fruitlessly imploring his young son Robinson not to sit in the mid-

dle of the rear car seat, Latour describes how he purchased and installed a

device that connects the headrests of the two front seats of his car. This

process allows Latour to materialize his intention in an artifactual form: "I

have," he concludes, "delegated the continuous injunction of my voice and

extension of my right arm . . . to a reinforced, padded, steel bar" (249).

Drawing on the analogy between technological shifting-out and similar lit-

erary procedures, Latour roots his analytic method in a literary process-

translation-that moves outward from a privileged source text.11 By appro-

priating the method of linguists with certain modifications, Latour

maintains, students of technology can combine syntagmatic and paradig-

matic dimensions to describe the "dynamic of an artifact"-how an artifact

translates what was originally a human intention or desire: "The syntag-

matic dimension becomes the AND dimension (how many elements are tied

together), and the paradigmatic dimension becomes the OR dimension

(how many translations are necessary in order to move through the AND

dimension). I could not tie Robinson to the order ["Don't sit in the middle

of the rear seat!"], but through a detour and a translation I now hold

together my will and my son" (251).

In focusing narrowly on the genesis of a given technological solution, this

account (and even this choice of example) neglects the other side of tech-

nology-what I have called its "perverse performativity." By subordinating

technology to human intentionality and by thematizing it narrowly as the

materialization of an articulated human or social program, Latour conflates

embodiment and discourse in a way that simply brackets out the far vaster

domain of embodied experience where human beings actually live through

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

Under the guise of advancing a radical symmetry between human and nonhuman actants, however, Latour seems quite content to perpetuate the long-standing subordination of technology to human and social intentional­ ity. For Latour, and for science studies more generally, it remains the case that humans alone make machines and hence that the origin of every machine can be traced back to some originary human function that it either extends or replaces. Because of his exclusive focus on the genesis of tech­ nology, Latour's effort to treat technologies as quasi-obj ects effectively insures a privileging of the intention of the human actor and perhaps even of the technological analyst himself. Not only does he make no effort to hide his belief that technologies cannot have purposes on their own, but-as the following example will demonstrate-he seems to think that technologies are fully accounted for when we understand how they embody or material­ ize what is ultimately a concrete human purpose, intention, or desire. After fruitlessly imploring his young son Robinson not to sit in the mid­ dle of the rear car seat, Latour describes how he purchased and installed a device that connects the headrests of the two front seats of his car. This process allows Latour to materialize his intention in an artifactual form: " I have," h e concludes, " delegated the continuous inj unction o f m y voice and extension of my right arm . . . to a reinforced, padded, steel bar " (249 ) . Drawing o n the analogy between technological shifting-out and similar lit­ erary procedures, Latour roots his analytic method in a literary process­ translation-that moves outward from a privileged source text . l 1 By appro­ priating the method of linguists with certain modifications, Latour maintains, students of technology can combine syntagmatic and paradig­ matic dimensions to describe the " dynamic of an artifact "-how an artifact translates what was originally a human intention or desire: " The syntag­ matic dimension becomes the AND dimension (how many elements are tied together) , and the paradigmatic dimension becomes the OR dimension (how many translations are necessary in order to move through the AND dimension) . I could not tie Robinson to the order [ " Don't sit in the middle of the rear seat! " ] , but through a detour and a translation I now hold together my will and my son " (25 1 ) . In focusing narrowly on the genesis of a given technological solution, this account (and even this choice of example) neglects the other side of tech­ nology-what I have called its "perverse performativity. " By subordinating technology to human intentionality and by thematizing it narrowly as the materialization of an articulated human or social program, Latour conflates embodiment and discourse in a way that simply brackets out the far vaster domain of embodied experience where human beings actually live through

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 47

the diffuse and unrepresentable impact technologies have as material forces

of the real. As Latour readily admits, all attempts to embody disciplinary

processes in concrete technologies involve the delegation of "the selective

attitudes" of engineers to nonhuman actants (233). By thus restricting tech-

nologies, Latour simply turns his back on their broader, arguably more

significant experiential impact-on the way, for example, that they funda-

mentally alter our experience of space and time or of our own bodies,

beyond the scope of all inscriptional or representational processes.12

Embodiment beyond Cultural Ritual

Hayles's account rescues embodied experience from the neglect it suffers in

•

47

the diffuse and unrepresentable impact technologies have as material forces of the real. As Latour readily admits, all attempts to embody disciplinary processes in concrete technologies involve the delegation of " the selective attitudes" of engineers to nonhuman actants (23 3 ) . By thus restricting tech­ nologies, Latour simply turns his back on their broader, arguably more significant experiential impact-on the way, for example, that they funda­ mentally alter our experience of space and time or of our own bodies, beyond the scope of all inscriptional or representational processes ,12

Latour's analysis. Because she readily acknowledges the inevitable reduction

involved when we move from the domain of embodied practice to the dis-

cursive constructions that bubble up from it, Hayles retains the separation

between discourse and embodiment that the concept of the quasi-object

tends to collapse. In so doing, she is able to introduce a crucial distinction

E mbodiment beyond Cultural Ritual

between two forms of embodiment: the bodily dimension proper to human

experience and the materialization of information in a physical medium.

Not only does she focus her analysis of technology on the former, properly

human form of embodiment, but she differentiates it from the normative

abstraction of the body in a way that exceeds the grasp of inscription. Inso-

far as it is "contextual" and "enwebbed within the specifics of place, time,

physiology and culture," embodiment defines the excess characteristic of

robust experience against the abstraction inevitably involved in construc-

tions of the body (Hayles 1992, 154-55). While embodiment, during any

given period, is in "continual interaction" with contemporaneous construc-

tions of the body, it also possesses a materiality and concreteness that dis-

tance it from those constructions and undermine their descriptive sway.

Hayles gives the example of vaginal orgasm during the early twentieth cen-

tury, noting that women's experiences interacted with the normative con-

cept in a variety of ways, only one of which was correspondence. By stress-

ing how embodied experience is always "imbricated" within culture,

Hayles's example urges a deeper understanding of the experience of culture;

specifically, it suggests that embodied culture is more basic, as a means of

experiencing material reality, than the cultural constructs that spring up

from it: ". . . because embodiment is individually articulated, there is also at

least an incipient tension between it and hegemonic cultural constructs.

Embodiment is thus inherently destabilizing with respect to the body"

Hayles's account rescues embodied experience from the neglect it suffers in Latour's analysis. Because she readily acknowledges the inevitable reduction involved when we move from the domain of embodied practice to the dis­ cursive constructions that bubble up from it, Hayles retains the separation between discourse and embodiment that the concept of the quasi-obj ect tends to collapse. In so doing, she is able to introduce a crucial distinction between two forms of embodiment: the bodily dimension proper to human experience and the materialization of information in a physical medium. Not only does she focus her analysis of technology on the former, properly human form of embodiment, but she differentiates it from the normative abstraction of the body in a way that exceeds the grasp of inscription. Inso­ far as it is " contextual " and " enwebbed within the specifics of place, time, physiology and culture, " embodiment defines the excess characteristic of robust experience against the abstraction inevitably involved in construc­ tions of the body (Hayles 1 992, 1 54-5 5 ) . While embodiment, during any given period, is in " continual interaction " with contemporaneous construc­ tions of the body, it also possesses a materiality and concreteness that dis­ tance it from those constructions and undermine their descriptive sway. Hayles gives the example of vaginal orgasm during the early twentieth cen­ tury, noting that women's experiences interacted with the normative con­ cept in a variety of ways, only one of which was correspondence. By stress­ ing how embodied experience is always " imbricated " within culture, Hayles's example urges a deeper understanding of the experience of culture; specifically, it suggests that embodied culture is more basic, as a means of experiencing material reality, than the cultural constructs that spring up from it: " . . . because embodiment is individually articulated, there is also at least an incipient tension between it and hegemonic cultural constructs. Embodiment is thus inherently destabilizing with respect to the body"

48

48 * Embodying Technesis

(155). Following the lead of Elaine Scarry, Hayles's analysis of embodied

experience thus demonstrates that "bodily practices have a physical reality

which can never be fully assimilated into discourse" (153); they generate an

excess that becomes all the more significant, I suggest, given contemporary

technology's role in the material complexification of the cosmos.

Despite her effort to foreground the individuality and physicality of

human bodily experience, however, Hayles's decision to explicate it through

(what anthropologist Paul Connerton calls) "incorporating practices" effec-

tively reimposes the subordination of embodiment to the articulated logic of

culture. Even if it involves a more subtle, prediscursive form of articulation,

the very appearance of such a subordination in the work of a theorist

devoted to resisting the reduction of embodiment testifies both to our deeply

ingrained bias toward discursivity and to the extreme poverty of the con-

ceptual vocabulary available to us in our effort to rethink technology's

experiential impact. In the final instance, the lasting consequence of

Hayles's move is thus to lend a distinct, if covert, privilege to discursivity. As

the privileged category for describing the domain of embodiment, incorpo-

rating practices assimilate our embodied experience of technological change

into the space of structured cultural ritual and, in so doing, form a kind of

relay station on the path toward inscription. By predigesting the nondiscur-

sive, as it were, they make it ready for conversion into language. Hayles

explains:

First, incorporated knowledge retains improvisational elements that make it

contextual rather than abstract, tied to the circumstances of its instantiation.

Second, it is deeply sedimented into the body and highly resistant to change.

Third, it is partly screened from conscious view because it is habitual. Fourth,

because it is contextual, resistant to change, and obscure to the cogitating

mind, it has the power to define the boundaries within which conscious

thought takes place. To these four [characteristics] I want to add a fifth.

When changes in incorporating practices take place, they are often linked

with new technologies that affect how people use their bodies and experience

space and time. Formed by technology at the same time that it creates tech-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

( 1 55 ) . Following the lead of Elaine Scarry, Hayles's analysis of embodied experience thus demonstrates that " bodily practices have a physical reality which can never be fully assimilated into discourse " ( 1 53 ) ; they generate an excess that becomes all the more significant, I suggest, given contemporary technology's role in the material complexification of the cosmos. Despite her effort to foreground the individuality and physicality of human bodily experience, however, Hayles's decision to explicate it through (what anthropologist Paul Connerton calls) " incorporating practices " effec­ tively reimposes the subordination of embodiment to the articulated logic of culture. Even if it involves a more subtle, pre discursive form of articulation, the very appearance of such a subordination in the work of a theorist devoted to resisting the reduction of embodiment testifies both to our deeply ingrained bias toward discursivity and to the extreme poverty of the con­ ceptual vocabulary available to us in our effort to rethink technology's experiential impact. In the final instance, the lasting consequence of Hayles's move is thus to lend a distinct, if covert, privilege to discursivity. As the privileged category for describing the domain of embodiment, incorpo­ rating practices assimilate our embodied experience of technological change into the space of structured cultural ritual and, in so doing, form a kind of relay station on the path toward inscription. By predigesting the nondiscur­ sive, as it were, they make it ready for conversion into language. Hayles explains:

nology, embodiment mediates between technology and discourse by creating

new experiential frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation

of corresponding discursive systems. In the feedback loop between techno-

logical innovations and discursive practices, incorporation is a crucial link.

(162-63; emphasis added)

Notwithstanding her insightful positioning of embodiment as both the

ground for the experiential processing of technological change and the

background for the production of discursive systems, Hayles's effort to link

these two functions in a causal relationship ultimately strips embodiment

First, incorporated knowledge retains improvisational elements that make it contextual rather than abstract, tied to the circumstances of its instantiation. Second, it is deeply sedimented into the body and highly resistant to change. Third, it is partly screened from conscious view because it is habitual . Fourth, because it is contextual, resistant to change, and obscure to the cogitating mind, it has the power to define the boundaries within which conscious thought takes place. To these four [characteristics] I want to add a fifth. When changes in incorporating practices take place, they are often linked with new technologies that affect how people use their bodies and experience space and time. Formed by technology at the same time that it creates tech­ nology, embodiment mediates between technology and discourse by creating new experiential frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation of corresponding discursive systems . In the feedback loop between techno­ logical innovations and discursive practices, incorporation is a crucial link. ( 1 62-63 ; emphasis added)

Notwithstanding her insightful positioning of embodiment as both the ground for the experiential processing of technological change and the background for the production of discursive systems, Hayles's effort to link these two functions in a causal relationship ultimately strips embodiment

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 49

of its constitutive excess over discourse.13 In the role of mediator between

technological change and discourse, embodiment does not emerge as an

autonomous experiential mode in its own right but instead retains its sub-

ordinate function as a means toward the production of discursive sys-

tems.14 In Hayles's own wording, embodiment creates "new experiential

frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation of corre-

sponding discursive systems." Though she does not say so explicitly, these

discursive systems remain the privileged focus of the critic, since they ulti-

mately furnish our sole means of cognitive access to our own robust

embodied response to technological change. What connects technology to

discourse is therefore not so much a bidirectional "feedback loop" as a lin-

ear process of emergence: via practices of incorporation, robust embodi-

ment is distilled into discourse. Consequently, though she opens the robust

domain of embodiment well beyond the normative boundaries of Fou-

cault's "body," as long as she assimilates embodiment to incorporating

practices, Hayles cannot entirely evade the critique she launches against

Foucault: she, too, tends to subordinate embodiment, if not to a normative

construct of the body, then at least to the discursive systems that make it

available to knowledge.15s

To avoid the philosophically overdetermined slide (back) into our default

mode of the theoretical,16 we must accordingly resist Hayles's identification

of embodiment with incorporating practices. Insofar as it narrows the dis-

tance between bodily and discursive action, such an identification risks col-

lapsing the autonomy so central to the promise of embodiment. By follow-

ing Connerton, Hayles in effect betrays her stated commitment to

embodiment: more precisely, she validates a reductive culturalist account of

embodiment as incorporating practice, as "an action that is encoded into

bodily memory by repeated performances until it becomes habitual" (157).

On this account, incorporating and inscribing practices are largely continu-

ous with one another and share the aim of "creat[ing] cultural constructs."

Hayles explains:

Posture and the extension of limbs in the space around the body, for exam-

ple, convey to children the gendered ways in which men and women occupy

space. These nonverbal lessons are frequently reinforced verbally: "boys

don't walk like that," or "girls don't sit with their legs open." It is significant

that verbal injunctions often take a negative form.., for the positive content

is much more effectively conveyed through incorporating rather than inscrib-

ing practices. It is easy to show someone how to stand but difficult to

describe all the nuances of the desired posture in words. Incorporating prac-

tices perform the bodily content; inscribing practices correct and modulate

the performance. (157)

•

49

of its constitutive excess over discourse . 1 3 In the role of mediator between technological change and discourse, embodiment does not emerge as an autonomous experiential mode in its own right but instead retains its sub­ ordinate function as a means toward the production of discursive sys­ tems . 14 In Hayles's own wording, embodiment creates " new experiential frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation of corre­ sponding discursive systems. " Though she does not say so explicitly, these discursive systems remain the privileged focus of the critic, since they ulti­ mately furnish our sole means of cognitive access to our own robust embodied response to technological change. What connects technology to discourse is therefore not so much a bidirectional " feedback loop " as a lin­ ear process of emergence: via practices of incorporation, robust embodi­ ment is distilled into discourse. Consequently, though she opens the robust domain of embodiment well beyond the normative boundaries of Fou­ cault's " body, " as long as she assimilates embodiment to incorporating practices, Hayles cannot entirely evade the critique she launches against Foucault: she, too, tends to subordinate embodiment, if not to a normative construct of the body, then at least to the discursive systems that make it a vailable to knowledge . 1 s T o avoid the philosophically overdetermined slide ( back) into our default mode of the theoretical,16 we must accordingly resist Hayles's identification of embodiment with incorporating practices. Insofar as it narrows the dis­ tance between bodily and discursive action, such an identification risks col­ lapsing the autonomy so central to the promise of embodiment. By follow­ ing Connerton, Hayles in effect betrays her stated commitment to embodiment: more precisely, she validates a reductive culturalist account of embodiment as incorporating practice, as " an action that is encoded into bodily memory by repeated performances until it becomes habitual " ( 1 5 7 ) . O n this account, incorporating and inscribing practices are largely continu­ ous with one another and share the aim of "creat [ing] cultural constructs . " Hayles explains: Posture and the extension of limbs in the space around the body, for exam­ ple, convey to children the gendered ways in which men and women occupy space. These nonverbal lessons are frequently reinforced verbally: " boys don't walk like that, " or " girls don't sit with their legs open. " It is significant that verbal inj unctions often take a negative form . . . for the positive content is much more effectively conveyed through incorporating rather than inscrib­ ing practices . It is easy to show someone how to stand but difficult to describe all the nuances of the desired posture in words . Incorporating prac­ tices perform the bodily content; inscribing practices correct and modulate the performance. ( 1 5 7)

50

50 * Embodying Technesis

Applied to such cultural practices as the performance of gendered behavior

or any of the examples Connerton develops (rituals, commemorative cere-

monies, etc.), this account of the continuity of incorporating and inscribing

practices remains perfectly coherent. When, however, we extrapolate it to

explain the role of embodiment in situations involving fundamental techno-

logical change, things appear altogether different. In such cases, embodi-

ment is not the product of logically ordered nonverbal sequences of actions

and movements designed to achieve specific, if not always acknowledged,

cultural goals; rather, embodiment here involves a far more passive, undi-

rected, and indeed emergent adaptation to new, largely unanticipated, and

certainly unthematized alterations in the material flux underlying and con-

ditioning the cultural horizon of experience. As the privileged vehicle for

our experience of material technological change, embodiment functions

beyond the scope of the kind of explicit, preconstructed, cultural hermeneu-

tic that ritual furnishes; accordingly, it must not be restricted to the cultur-

ally coded content of incorporating practices.

This conclusion echoes Pierre Bourdieu's defense of embodied experience

against the unnoticed but fundamental alterations that occur when it is

translated into theoretical representation. Contending that we simply can-

not account for the "pernicious alteration" that is "constitutive of the oper-

ation of knowing," Bourdieu argues for a discrete divide between the theo-

retical and practical attitudes (Bourdieu 1990, 27). More specifically, he

insists on the autonomy of what he calls the "practical sense," its status as

a bodily hermeneutic that is not only independent from cognitive-linguistic

understanding but situated below the level of conscious awareness. By artic-

ulating this practical sense with his concept of "habitus," Bourdieu suggests

its close ties to cultural ritual and other incorporating practices; yet his insis-

tence on the absolute divide between habit and intellection makes it clear

that practical sense cannot be clarified through ritual decoding, as it can in

Connerton's (and Hayles's) account of incorporating practices. In a key pas-

sage also cited by Hayles, Bourdieu insists on the ossification and imperme-

ability of values once they are "given body."

... principles em-bodied in this way [through habit] are placed beyond the

grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliber-

ate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more inef-

fable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious,

than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by

the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy. . . . (1977, 94; emphasis

added)17

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

Applied to such cultural practices as the performance of gendered behavior or any of the examples Connerton develops (rituals, commemorative cere­ monies, etc . ) , this account of the continuity of incorporating and inscribing practices remains perfectly coherent. When, however, we extrapolate it to explain the role of embodiment in situations involving fundamental techno­ logical change, things appear altogether different. In such cases, embodi­ ment is not the product of logically ordered nonverbal sequences of actions and movements designed to achieve specific, if not always acknowledged, cultural goals; rather, embodiment here involves a far more passive, undi­ rected, and indeed emergent adaptation to new, largely unanticipated, and certainly unthematized alterations in the material flux underlying and con­ ditioning the cultural horizon of experience. As the privileged vehicle for our experience of material technological change, embodiment functions beyond the scope of the kind of explicit, preconstructed, cultural hermeneu­ tic that ritual furnishes; accordingly, it must not be restricted to the cultur­ ally coded content of incorporating practices. This conclusion echoes Pierre Bourdieu's defense of embodied experience against the unnoticed but fundamental alterations that occur when it is translated into theoretical representation. Contending that we simply can­ not account for the "pernicious alteration" that is " constitutive of the oper­ ation of knowing, " Bourdieu argues for a discrete divide between the theo­ retical and practical attitudes ( Bourdieu 1 990, 2 7 ) . More specifically, he insists on the autonomy of what he calls the " practical sense," its status as a bodily hermeneutic that is not only independent from cognitive-linguistic understanding but situated below the level of conscious awareness. By artic­ ulating this practical sense with his concept of " habitus, " Bourdieu suggests its close ties to cultural ritual and other incorporating practices; yet his insis­ tence on the absolute divide between habit and intellection makes it clear that practical sense cannot be clarified through ritual decoding, as it can in Connerton's (and Hayles' s ) account of incorporating practices. In a key pas­ sage also cited by Hayles, Bourdieu insists on the ossification and imperme­ ability of values once they are " given body. " . . . principles em-bodied in this way [through habit] are placed beyond the

grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliber­ ate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more inef­ fable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy . . . . ( 1 9 77, 94; emphasis added)17

Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment

Technoculture and Embodiment * 51

What distinguishes Bourdieu's account of embodied experience is the irre-

ducible autonomy he grants it; for him, bodily practice-the embodiment of

nonverbal (i.e., felt or sensed) stimuli-constitutes a form of experience dis-

tinctly separate from and inaccessible to conscious intellection. Though he

stops short of affirming categorically that embodied knowledge can never be

altered,18 Bourdieu forcefully suggests that any such alteration can only

result from a far more holist, indirect, and indeed embodied process than

that of analytic penetration into and discursive clarification of its specific

logic.

While Hayles dismisses the autonomy Bourdieu accords practical sense as

an instance of the type of exaggeration not uncommon in recent French the-

ory, I propose, on the contrary, that we take it as the methodological crux of

a nonreductive account of embodied experience. Far from seeking to narrow

Bourdieu's account of practical sense to address specific cultural tasks, we

need to generalize it into a robust experiential mode capable of accounting

for the de jure primacy of embodiment over cultural construction. Put

another way, Bourdieu's example of bodily pedagogy needs to be circum-

scribed as one specific instance of the far more encompassing process of what

he calls "practical mimesis." Defined as a process of acquisition rooted in

direct and immediate bodily adaptation to sensory conditions, practical

mimesis (or mimeticism) "implies an overall relation of identification and has

nothing in common with an imitation that would presuppose a conscious

effort to reproduce a gesture, an utterance or an object explicitly constituted

as a model" (Bourdieu 1990, 73). Not only must practical mimesis not be

confused with identification (which is based in representation), but it must

also be situated below the threshold and beyond the grasp of conscious cog-

nition. Bourdieu notes that it takes place "below the level of consciousness,

expression and the reflexive distance which [memory and knowledge] pre-

suppose." He continues: "The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it

mimes grief. It does not represent what it performs . . . What is 'learned by

body' is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished,

but something that one is" (73; emphasis added ). What is embodied through

mimeticism can only be experienced through mimetic reproduction, never

through translation into language; this necessity, Bourdieu suggests, "is par-

ticularly clear in non-literate societies, where inherited knowledge can only

survive in the incorporated state." There, he continues, "[i]t is never

detached from the body that bears it and can be reconstituted only by means

of a kind of gymnastics designed to evoke it, a mimesis which, as Plato

observed, implies total investment and deep emotional identification" (73;

•

51

What distinguishes Bourdieu's account of embodied experience i s the irre­ ducible autonomy he grants it; for him, bodily practice-the embodiment of nonverbal (i.e., felt or sensed ) stimuli-constitutes a form of experience dis­ tinctly separate from and inaccessible to conscious intellection. Though he stops short of affirming categorically that embodied knowledge can never be altered, 1 8 Bourdieu forcefully suggests that any such alteration can only result from a far more holist, indirect, and indeed embodied process than that of analytic penetration into and discursive clarification of its specific logic. While Hayles dismisses the autonomy Bourdieu accords practical sense as an instance of the type of exaggeration not uncommon in recent French the­ ory, I propose, on the contrary, that we take it as the methodological crux of a nonreductive account of embodied experience . Far from seeking to narrow Bourdieu's account of practical sense to address specific cultural tasks, we need to generalize it into a robust experiential mode capable of accounting for the de jure primacy of embodiment over cultural construction. Put another way, Bourdieu's example of bodily pedagogy needs to be circum­ scribed as one specific instance of the far more encompassing process of what he calls "practical mimesis. " Defined as a process of acquisition rooted in direct and immediate bodily adaptation to sensory conditions, practical mimesis (or mimeticism) "implies an overall relation of identification and has nothing in common with an imitation that would presuppose a conscious effort to reproduce a gesture, an utterance or an obj ect explicitly constituted as a model " (Bourdieu 1 990, 73 ) . Not only must practical mimesis not be confused with identification (which is based in representation) , but it must also be situated below the threshold and beyond the grasp of conscious cog­ nition. Bourdieu notes that it takes place " below the level of consciousness, expression and the reflexive distance which [memory and knowledge] pre­ suppose. " He continues: "The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes grief. It does not represent what it performs . . . . What is 'learned by body' is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is" ( 73 ; emphasis added ) . What is embodied through mimeticism can only be experienced through mimetic reproduction, never through translation into language; this necessity, Bourdieu suggests, "is par­ ticularly clear in non-literate societies, where inherited knowledge can only survive in the incorporated state . " There, he continues, " [i]t is never detached from the body that bears it and can be reconstituted only by means of a kind of gymnastics designed to evoke it, a mimesis which, as Plato observed, implies total investment and deep emotional identification" (73;

52

52 * Embodying Technesis

emphasis added). In short, access to embodiment (to the extent that we have

it) simply does not (and cannot) involve translation or delegation into lan-

guage. Accordingly, any bodily hermeneutic capable of accounting for it will

require us to learn how to use our mimetic bodily "sense" as the primary

medium for living through technology's experiential impact.

Such mimetic skill will become ever more important as contemporary

technologies continue to expand our sensory contact with the material

world. Whether we are able to capitalize on this expansion by adapting our

sensory and experiential capacities to the new media ecology will hinge, I

think, on our ability to experience our own embodiment without a pro-

foundly restrictive dependence on cognition and representation. Thus, even

before we can begin to refine our "mimetic faculty,"19 we must disabuse

ourselves of the culturally ingrained logocentrism that compels us, often

despite our own critical intentions, to translate technological materiality

into discourse.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

emphasis added) . In short, access to embodiment (to the extent that we have it) simply does not (and cannot) involve translation or delegation into lan­ guage. Accordingly, any bodily hermeneutic capable of accounting for it will require us to learn how to use our mimetic bodily " sense" as the primary medium for living through technology's experiential impact. Such mimetic skill will become ever more important as contemporary technologies continue to expand our sensory contact with the material world. Whether we are able to capitalize on this expansion by adapting our sensory and experiential capacities to the new media ecology will hinge, I think, on our ability to experience our own embodiment without a pro­ foundly restrictive dependence on cognition and representation. Thus, even before we can begin to refine our " mimetic faculty, " 1 9 we must disabuse ourselves of the culturally ingrained logocentrism that compels us, often despite our own critical intentions, to translate technological materiality into discourse.

Chapter 2

Locating the Technological Real

In the introduction to the recent volume Virtual Realities and Their Discon-

tents, cultural critic Robert Markley outlines a program of research

Chapter 2

designed to counter the dematerialization so often championed by commen-

tators-both popular and academic on virtual reality. For Markley, argu-

ments that cyberspace entails the "death of print culture" (logocentrism)

are, in addition to being greatly exaggerated, flatly contradicted by their

Locating the Technological Real

own dissemination through print. As an antidote to the inflated claims of

contemporary cyber-prophets, Markley stresses the necessity of drawing a

distinction between the actual technologies facilitating virtual experience

and the abstraction "cyberspace." Such a distinction would allow us to

account for the inscription of cultural forces within the domain of the vir-

tual and would thus situate cyberspace in relation to the (logocentric) meta-

physical tradition from which it stems and that it, in many ways, simply

prolongs.

. . it is [the] awareness of the historical and cultural implication of virtual

technologies in the dreamscape of Western thought that sets [the contribu-

tors to this volume] apart from those writers who characterize cyberspace as

a new, if not always brave, world . . . [We] remain sceptical of a cyberspa-

tial metaphysics that assumes, rather than questions, the revolutionary

nature of virtual worlds and electronically mediated experience. In this

respect, [our] analyses emphasize . . . that the division between cyberspace

and virtual technologies reflects and reinscribes the oppositions of

mind/body, spirit/matter, form/substance, and male/female that have struc-

tured Western metaphysics since Plato. (Markley 1996, 2)

Following this concrete culturalist program, Markley and his colleagues

are able to separate the material technological infrastructure of virtual

reality from the fantasy of a dematerialized cyberspatial existence that it

facilitates. Such a separation allows us to interrogate claims made on

behalf of the fantasy abstraction "cyberspace" and specifically to question

its content-the false promise that, as Markley puts it, "the more techno-

logically sophisticated our society becomes the less it has to worry about

In the introduction to the recent volume Virtual Realities and Their Discon­ tents, cultural critic Robert Markley outlines a program of research designed to counter the dematerialization so often championed by commen­ tators-both popular and academic-on virtual reality. For Markley, argu­ ments that cyberspace entails the " death of print culture " ( logocentrism) are, in addition to being greatly exaggerated, flatly contradicted by their own dissemination through print. As an antidote to the inflated claims of contemporary cyber-prophets, Markley stresses the necessity of drawing a distinction between the actual technologies facilitating virtual experience and the abstraction " cyberspace. " Such a distinction would allow us to account for the inscription of cultural forces within the domain of the vir­ tual and would thus situate cyberspace in relation to the (logocentric) meta­ physical tradition from which it stems and that it, in many ways, simply prolongs . . . . it is [the] awareness of the historical and cultural implication of virtual technologies in the dreamscape of Western thought that sets [the contribu­ tors to this volume] apart from those writers who characterize cyberspace as a new, if not always brave, world . . . . [We] remain sceptical of a cyberspa­ tial metaphysics that assumes, rather than questions, the revolutionary nature of virtual worlds and electronically mediated experience. In this respect, [our] analyses emphasize . . . that the division between cyberspace and virtual technologies reflects and reinscribes the oppositions of mind/body, spirit/matter, form/substance, and malelfemale that have struc­ tured Western metaphysics since Plato. (Markley 1 9 9 6 , 2 )

Following this concrete culturalist program, Markley and his colleagues are able to separate the material technological infrastructure of virtual reality from the fantasy of a dematerialized cyberspatial existence that it facilitates . Such a separation allows us to interrogate claims made on behalf of the fantasy abstraction " cyberspace " and specifically to question its content-the false promise that, as Markley puts it, " the more techno­ logically sophisticated our society becomes the less it has to worry about

54

54 * Embodying Technesis

the distribution of wealth and resources" (4). By reading this content in

terms of the social, economic, psychological, and political realities

attached to the technological infrastructure-what Markley simply chris-

tens as the "material" realities-we can begin to take stock of the concrete

costs and exclusions inseparable from the allegedly revolutionary new

metaphysics. What we thereby discover is the similarity of the virtual rev-

olution to every other so-called revolution; far from comprising a veritable

break with the past and, specifically, with the Western metaphysical tradi-

tion, the cyber-revolution begins to look much more like a new and

improved phase of that tradition, a phase more thoroughly adept than any

previous one at hiding its constitutive biases and exclusions.

For all its urgency, however, Markley's measured call for sobriety in the

face of runaway techno-utopianism runs a certain risk of reduction: by

focusing exclusively on cultural materiality as the site of technology's

effects, Markley's program limits the analysis of virtual reality technologies

to their specific materializations within concrete cultural contexts. Effec-

tively, Markley's enabling alignment of technology with cultural materiality

restricts technology's impact to the effects it has as an assimilated element of

culture.1 Since it cannot address the potential impact of technological mate-

riality beyond the functions technologies acquire through their inscription

within given cultural contexts, Markley's cultural constructivist program

has the (perhaps unintended) effect of stripping technology of its robust

materiality. Despite its success in exposing significant concrete political and

social inequalities that underlie the development and dissemination of vir-

tual technologies,2 the culturalist approach thus attains its force from a

reduction that involves substituting the quasi materiality introduced

through the cultural contextualization of technology for the materiality

belonging to it by dint of its role as an "agent," so to speak, in the com-

plexification of the cosmos.3 To be assimilated into the cultural construc-

tivist paradigm, technologies must accordingly be defined exclusively

through the cultural markings that are affixed to them; whatever material-

ity they possess is derived exclusively from the cultural forces mobilized in

their development and social application. For this reason, the culturalist

approach can do no more than lay bare and contest the ideological content

of technology's culturally acquired materiality;4 it remains narrowly cir-

cumscribed by the very representationalism that is responsible, according to

my thesis, for our compromised engagement with technology. Markley's

decision to bracket the anthropological consequences of technological

change and to focus exclusively on the ideologically loaded cultural strug-

gles ensuing from it reflects precisely such a limitation.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

the distribution of wealth and resources" ( 4 ) . By reading this content in terms of the social, economic, psychological, and political realities attached to the technological infrastructure-what Markley simply chris­ tens as the " material " realities-we can begin to take stock of the concrete costs and exclusions inseparable from the allegedly revolutionary new metaphysics . What we thereby discover is the similarity of the virtual rev­ olution to every other so-called revolution; far from comprising a veritable break with the past and, specifically, with the Western metaphysical tradi­ tion, the cyber-revolution begins to look much more like a new and improved phase of that tradition, a phase more thoroughly adept than any previous one at hiding its constitutive biases and exclusions. For all its urgency, however, Markley's measured call for sobriety in the face of runaway techno-utopianism runs a certain risk of reduction: by focusing exclusively on cultural materiality as the site of technology's effects, Markley's program limits the analysis of virtual reality technologies to their specific materializations within concrete cultural contexts. Effec­ tively, Markley's enabling alignment of technology with cultural materiality restricts technology's impact to the effects it has as an assimilated element of culture. 1 Since it cannot address the potential impact of technological mate­ riality beyond the functions technologies acquire through their inscription within given cultural contexts, Markley's cultural constructivist program has the (perhaps unintended) effect of stripping technology of its robust materiality. Despite its success in exposing significant concrete political and social inequalities that underlie the development and dissemination of vir­ tual technologies,2 the culturalist approach thus attains its force from a reduction that involves substituting the quasi materiality introduced through the cultural contextualization of technology for the materiality belonging to it by dint of its role as an " agent, " so to speak, in the com­ plexification of the cosmos.3 To be assimilated into the cultural construc­ tivist paradigm, technologies must accordingly be defined exclusively through the cultural markings that are affixed to them; whatever material­ ity they possess is derived exclusively from the cultural forces mobilized in their development and social application. For this reason, the culturalist approach can do no more than lay bare and contest the ideological content of technology's culturally acquired materiality;4 it remains narrowly cir­ cumscribed by the very representationalism that is responsible, according to my thesis, for our compromised engagement with technology. Markley's decision to bracket the anthropological consequences of technological change and to focus exclusively on the ideologically loaded cultural strug­ gles ensuing from it reflects precisely such a limitation.

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 55

... even if we see cyberspace as a form of complex mediation within the tra-

ditions of Western science, metaphysics, and economics, it does not tran-

scend the problems of materiality, embodiment, or capital. In this regard, to

offer a critique of cyberspace is to engage in a multivalent exploration of the

values and assumptions of a dualism which are presented as "natural" con-

ditions of human existence, of an ideology of a revolutionary change in con-

sciousness brought about by new forms of technological intervention, and of

the political problems posed by limited access to new and expensive tech-

nologies. (8-9)

As long as we follow Markley by restricting our analysis of technology to

•

55

. . . even if we see cyberspace as a form of complex mediation within the tra­ ditions of Western science, metaphysics, and economics, it does not tran­ scend the problems of materiality, embodiment, or capital . In this regard, to offer a critique of cyberspace is to engage in a multivalent exploration of the values and assumptions of a dualism which are presented as "natural" con­ ditions of human existence, of an ideology of a revolutionary change in con­ sciousness brought about by new forms of technological intervention, and of the political problems posed by limited access to new and expensive tech­ nologies. ( 8-9 )

the influence it brings to bear on our "values and assumptions," we con-

strain our investigation to the macroscopic social phenomena and remain

unable even to broach the topic of technology's microphysical impact-the

ways in which it impacts our embodied experience below the threshold of

representation.

Without denying the importance of a healthy skepticism regarding the

"intrinsic" revolutionary status of virtual reality, we need to grapple with

the claims of a different group of critics (including Michael Heim, Michael

Benedikt, and Marcos Novak) whose work situates virtual reality in the

domain of the anthropological. While Markley and the cultural critics for

whom he speaks furnish a much needed thick description of the cultural

context underlying cyberspace, these more speculative theorists help us

explore its less tangible, holist dimensions. Specifically, they raise the impor-

tant issue of how our increasing reliance on virtual technology has changed

and will continue to change the very sensory modes by which we perceive

and experience the world, independently of and prior to its ideological

impact (see Benedikt 1991). Instead of pitting these two approaches against

one another, it seems to me that we might best realize their (respective) con-

tributions by attempting to forge a synthesis between their emphases, which

are differently inflected but ultimately, I think, not incompatible.

In our effort to contextualize the broad anthropological changes brought

about by technology without reductively identifying them as effects of what

Markley calls cultural materiality, we must impose on ourselves a method-

ological double-distancing from (though not a dismissal of) cultural con-

structionism as it is now practiced. Insofar as technologically generated

experiential changes tend to throw our received, culturally coded modes of

experience into (at least temporary) disarray-as, for example, Frederic

Jameson has shown in his widely influential account of postmodern hyper-

space-we must be able to reach beyond the culturally coded experiential

possibilities available to us at any given time in order to circumscribe the

As long as we follow Markley by restricting our analysis of technology to the influence it brings to bear on our " values and assumptions, " we con­ strain our investigation to the macroscopic social phenomena and remain unable even to broach the topic of technology's microphysical impact-the ways in which it impacts our embodied experience below the threshold of representation. Without denying the importance of a healthy skepticism regarding the " intrinsic " revolutionary status of virtual reality, we need to grapple with the claims of a different group of critics (including Michael Heim, Michael Benedikt, and Marcos Novak ) whose work situates virtual reality in the domain of the anthropological . While Markley and the cultural critics for whom he speaks furnish a much needed thick description of the cultural context underlying cyberspace, these more speculative theorists help us explore its less tangible, holist dimensions . Specifically, they raise the impor­ tant issue of how our increasing reliance on virtual technology has changed and will continue to change the very sensory modes by which we perceive and experience the world, independently of and prior to its ideological impact ( see Benedikt 1 9 9 1 ) . Instead of pitting these two approaches against one another, it seems to me that we might best realize their (respective ) con­ tributions by attempting to forge a synthesis between their emphases, which are differently inflected but ultimately, I think, not incompatible. In our effort to contextualize the broad anthropological changes brought about by technology without reductively identifying them as effects of what Markley calls cultural materiality, we must impose on ourselves a method­ ological double-distancing from (though not a dismissal of) cultural con­ structionism as it is now practiced. Insofar as technologically generated experiential changes tend to throw our received, culturally coded modes of experience into ( at least temporary) disarray-as, for example, Frederic Jameson has shown in his widely influential account of postmodern hyper­ space-we must be able to reach beyond the culturally coded experiential possibilities available to us at any given time in order to circumscribe the

56

56 * Embodying Technesis

changes in question. Adaptation, in such cases, requires more than a simple

appeal to the cultural field underlying our lived experience; it requires, in

effect, an expansion of that field, one that exceeds the explanatory resources

of a static cultural criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that technological

shifts take place at the microphysical level, as changes in the conditions for

embodied experience, we cannot adapt to them through representation-by

thematizing them in the explicitly formulated cultural codes underlying our

collective social experience. Since they enter our experience through embod-

iment, such changes simply cannot be adequately reconstructed through a

symptomatology of our irreducible cultural marking.5

With this conclusion, we again encounter the crucial feature of techno-

logical change that I introduced in chapter 1: its qualified autonomy from

cultural practice. To the preceding account, I can now add the following

further qualification: unlike modifications of scientific theories, technnolo-

gies impact us, in some degree, by directly altering our lifeworld without

any active contribution from us and without the direct mediation of any

preexisting cultural constructions. In attempting to demarcate technological

from scientific change, my aim is precisely to preserve from reduction that

dimension of technology's impact that resists explicit cultural thematiza-

tion. Accordingly, we must accept, as an enabling element of my analysis,

what appears to be a bewildering paradox: that technology both is and is

not cultural in the restricted sense. Whereas it is always implicated within

discursive and cultural networks that have an irreducible formative impact

on it, technology also functions as a key agent in the macroevolution, or

complexification, of the material world. Whereas technologies are always

results of culturally determined processes, they are also privileged vehicles

of the natural process of material complexification.

To respect this duality, we will need to sketch a history of technology

that serves to distinguish it from, rather than assimilate it to, the history of

science. Insofar as they function as agents of material evolution, technolo-

gies impact us as material forces without being mediated through preconsti-

tuted cultural codes. Accordingly, the history of technology foregrounds the

practical impact of matter's complexification in a manner that is, admit-

tedly, culturally relative but that does not view this impact exclusively as the

creation of culture; the history of science, by contrast, focuses on the partic-

ular modes of cultural understanding developed to explain-or more

exactly, to produce-the theoretical significance of matter's complexifi-

cation. Whereas the history of science is thoroughly cultural in the sense

that it is always a construction of a spatiotemporally distinct culture, the

history of technology, likewise a specific cultural construction in this same

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

changes in question. Adaptation, in such cases, requires more than a simple appeal to the cultural field underlying our lived experience; it requires, in effect, an expansion of that field, one that exceeds the explanatory resources of a static cultural criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that technological shifts take place at the microphysical level, as changes in the conditions for embodied experience, we cannot adapt to them through representation-by thematizing them in the explicitly formulated cultural codes underlying our collective social experience. Since they enter our experience through embod­ iment, such changes simply cannot be adequately reconstructed through a symptomatology of our irreducible cultural marking.5 With this conclusion, we again encounter the crucial feature of techno­ logical change that I introduced in chapter 1 : its qualified autonomy from cultural practice. To the preceding account, I can now add the following further qualification: unlike modifications of scientific theories, technnolo­ gies impact us, in some degree, by directly altering our lifeworld without any active contribution from us and without the direct mediation of any preexisting cultural constructions. In attempting to demarcate technological from scientific change, my aim is precisely to preserve from reduction that dimension of technology's impact that resists explicit cultural thematiza­ tion. Accordingly, we must accept, as an enabling element of my analysis, what appears to be a bewildering paradox: that technology both is and is not cultural in the restricted sense. Whereas it is always implicated within discursive and cultural networks that have an irreducible formative impact on it, technology also functions as a key agent in the macroevolution, or complexification, of the material world. Whereas technologies are always results of culturally determined processes, they are also privileged vehicles of the natural process of material complexification . To respect this duality, we will need to sketch a history of technology that serves to distinguish it from, rather than assimilate it to, the history of science. Insofar as they function as agents of material evolution, technolo­ gies impact us as material forces without being mediated through preconsti­ tuted cultural codes. Accordingly, the history of technology foregrounds the practical impact of matter's complexification in a manner that is, admit­ tedly, culturally relative but that does not view this impact exclusively as the creation of culture; the history of science, by contrast, focuses on the partic­ ular modes of cultural understanding developed to explain-or more exactly, to produce-the theoretical significance of matter's complexifi­ cation. Whereas the history of science is thoroughly cultural in the sense that it is always a construction of a spatiotemporally distinct culture, the history of technology, likewise a specific cultural construction in this same

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 57

•

57

sense, also involves a supplemental " exocultural" dimension: our embodied interaction with the " evolution" of matter itself.

sense, also involves a supplemental "exocultural" dimension: our embodied

interaction with the "evolution" of matter itself.

From the Cultural History of Science to

Embodied Technoculture

Two recent and important cultural histories of modern physics both single

out the passage from mechanics to thermodynamics as a particularly

significant moment. For N. Katherine Hayles, whose Chaos Bound articu-

From the Cultural H istory of Science to E mbodied Technoculture

lates science and literature together on the basis of a common cultural back-

ground, and for Phillip Mirowski, whose More Heat than Light traces mod-

ern economics to certain culturally resonant misreadings of energy

conservation, this passage marks a basic shift in the ontology of energy-

from a static, substance model to one that is stochastic and statistically based.

In Mirowski's meticulous and sober recapitulation of nineteenth-century

physics, the primary significance of this passage is its release of immanent

contradictions within the energy concept. By introducing irreversibility into

the process of heat conversion, the second law of thermodynamics threw

into turmoil the then current definition of heat as motion at the molecular

level.

It has not been fully realized that the proliferation of probabilistic concepts

in physics is the first of many manifestations of the self-contradiction of the

global energy concept . . . The energy concept was intended to embody the

rational, lawlike, determinate behavior of nature, in that it was the reification

of the independence of natural law from all temporal or spatial accident, as

well as from the accident of human observation. As the energy concept was

thrust upon a world that appeared to abound in such accidents, and as

"external" cultural considerations sometimes encouraged scientists to elevate

the accidental in nature, ideas of probability and randomness were absorbed

into physics. First the accidents were attributed to the frailty of the human

observer, but later it was allowed that accident might be intrinsic to nature

itself. (Mirowski 1992, 64)

On Mirowski's account, the paradigm shift from classical mechanics to

Two recent and important cultural histories of modern physics both single out the passage from mechanics to thermodynamics as a particularly significant moment. For N. Katherine Hayles, whose Chaos Bound articu­ lates science and literature together on the basis of a common cultural back­ ground, and for Phillip Mirowski, whose More Heat than Light traces mod­ ern economics to certain culturally resonant misreadings of energy conservation, this passage marks a basic shift in the ontology of energy­ from a static, substance model to one that is stochastic and statistically based. In Mirowski's meticulous and sober recapitulation of nineteenth-century physics, the primary significance of this passage is its release of immanent contradictions within the energy concept. By introducing irreversibility into the process of heat conversion, the second law of thermodynamics threw into turmoil the then current definition of heat as motion at the molecular level.

thermodynamics reverses the original definition of energy, thus yielding a

liberation of energy from any physical embodiment in matter: "Once the

mathematics of the field freed energy from matter, it also implied a reversal

within the original definition. Instead of a physical field being necessarily

a spatial distribution of energy that varied in time, physicists found they

could also read the mathematics in such a way that any well-behaved scalar

It has not been fully realized that the proliferation of probabilistic concepts in physics is the first of many manifestations of the self-contradiction of the global energy concept . . . . The energy concept was intended to embody the rational, lawlike, determinate behavior of nature, in that it was the reification of the independence of natural law from all temporal or spatial accident, as well as from the accident of human observation. As the energy concept was thrust upon a world that appeared to abound in such accidents, and as " external " cultural considerations sometimes encouraged scientists to elevate the accidental in nature, ideas of probability and randomness were absorbed into physics . First the accidents were attributed to the frailty of the human observer, but later it was allowed that accident might be intrinsic to nature itself. (Mirowski 1 992, 64)

On Mirowski's account, the paradigm shift from classical mechanics to thermodynamics reverses the original definition of energy, thus yielding a liberation of energy from any physical embodiment in matter: " Once the mathematics of the field freed energy from matter, it also implied a reversal within the original definition. Instead of a physical field being necessarily a spatial distribution of energy that varied in time, physicists found they could also read the mathematics in such a way that any well-behaved scalar

58

58 * Embodying Technesis

function with a vanishing time derivative could be identified with energy"

(68). In other words, the thermodynamic revolution, processed through the

history of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century science,

yielded a divorce between physical or embodied description and mathemat-

ical modeling.

The story Hayles tells complements Mirowski's account but stresses cul-

ture in a far more general sense as the key to understanding the reception of

the thermodynamic revolution. More than its narrowly scientific conse-

quences, what needs to be explained, in Hayles's view, is the popular basis

for the scientific paradigm shift.

The popularization of thermodynamics during the 1860s and 1870s rein-

forced the antagonistic connection between order and chaos through predic-

tions of a cosmic dissipation that would end with all heat sources everywhere

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

function with a vanishing time derivative could be identified with energy " ( 6 8 ) . In other words, the thermodynamic revolution, processed through the history of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century science, yielded a divorce between physical or embodied description and mathemat­ ical modeling. The story Hayles tells complements Mirowski's account but stresses cul­ ture in a far more general sense as the key to understanding the reception of the thermodynamic revolution. More than its narrowly scientific conse­ quences, what needs to be explained, in Hayles's view, is the popular basis for the scientific paradigm shift.

being exhausted, resulting in the so-called "heat death" of the universe.

Countering this pessimistic scenario was the awareness that in the short run

(that is, in the eons while life still continued on earth), the release of thermal

energy could run trains, fuel steamships, generate electricity. The power of

heat engines was of a different kind as well as a different order from the

mechanical advantage bestowed by pulleys, levers, and winches. Whereas

mechanical energy was orderly, conveyed along visible lines of force, thermal

energy was chaotic, driven by the fiery turbulence of the furnace and deriving

its power from the random motions of molecules whizzing by at unbelievable

speeds. (Hayles 1990, 21-22; emphasis added)6

For Hayles, the meaning of the thermodynamic revolution lies less in its

direct impact on scientific theorization than in its correlation with the

broader cultural context that it both supports and modifies. While eschew-

ing any direct, linear relation of influence from science to cultural produc-

tion, Hayles's account suggests that the cultural significance of thermody-

namics is to be found primarily in the various ways in which it modifies and

is modified by our representational practices. In the preceding passage, for

example, we are presented with the tension between two cultural represen-

tations that ensues following the dissolution of the mechanical worldview:

the horrific fantasy of the heat death of the universe is counterbalanced by

The popularization of thermodynamics during the 1 8 6 0s and 1 8 70s rein­ forced the antagonistic connection between order and chaos through predic­ tions of a cosmic dissipation that would end with all heat sources everywhere being exhausted, resulting in the so-called "heat death " of the universe. Countering this pessimistic scenario was the awareness that in the short run (that is, in the eons while life still continued on earth ), the release of thermal energy could run trains, fuel steamships, generate electricity. The power of heat engines was of a different kind as well as a different order from the mechanical advantage bestowed by pulleys, levers, and winches . Whereas mechanical energy was orderly, conveyed along visible lines of force, thermal energy was chaotic, driven by the fiery turbulence of the furnace and deriving its power from the random motions of molecules whizzing by at unbelievable speeds . (Hayles 1 9 9 0 , 2 1-22; emphasis added)6

the redemptive myth of progress channeled through the new technologies of

the industrial age.

Together, these two interpretations serve to isolate the particular divorce

of theory from (embodied) experience that, in my opinion, comprises the

most significant legacy of thermodynamics for the cultural theorist. From

Mirowski, we learn that science shifts from a realist or physically instanti-

ated form of description to a highly abstract, stochastic, and statistical form

For Hayles, the meaning of the thermodynamic revolution lies less in its direct impact on scientific theorization than in its correlation with the broader cultural context that it both supports and modifies. While eschew­ ing any direct, linear relation of influence from science to cultural produc­ tion, Hayles's account suggests that the cultural significance of thermody­ namics is to be found primarily in the various ways in which it modifies and is modified by our representational practices. In the preceding passage, for example, we are presented with the tension between two cultural represen­ tations that ensues following the dissolution of the mechanical worldview: the horrific fantasy of the heat death of the universe is counterbalanced by the redemptive myth of progress channeled through the new technologies of the industrial age. Together, these two interpretations serve to isolate the particular divorce of theory from ( embodied) experience that, in my opinion, comprises the most significant legacy of thermodynamics for the cultural theorist. From Mirowski, we learn that science shifts from a realist or physically instanti­ ated form of description to a highly abstract, stochastic, and statistical form

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 59

of modeling, while Hayles informs us about the more widespread, popular

cultural and ideological significance of this shift. In both cases, we are con-

fronted with the dissolution of the harmony or continuity between our rep-

resentational capabilities and the material structure of the world. Following

its redescription in terms of thermodynamics, energy begins to exceed the

grasp of representationalist description as what Lyotard felicitously calls a

humanist "transformer," a means of cognizing materiality in accord with

human capacities that condition practical experience. If the mathematics

developed to model energy, like the conspiracy and salvation narratives that

stand in for its description, furnish "representations" of energy, these are

distinctly inhuman representations which measure energy as the function of

a mathematical abstraction. By rendering energy abstract and divorcing it

from the phenomenal domain, such representations no longer afford us a

means of experiencing energy in a way directly tied to our embodiment. The

thermodynamic revolution thus marks the eclipse of representational

thought as the privileged faculty for mapping our relation to the material

world; in its wake, theory loses the capacity to represent energy and the

physical world of forces in their immediate relevance to our lived experi-

ence.

Technological Materiality

In broad, schematic terms, the history of modern technology largely paral-

lels that of modern science, with the industrial revolution playing a role

roughly equivalent to the thermodynamic paradigm shift. Once again, the

significance of the moment of rupture (in this case, the industrial revolution

itself) centers on the resulting dissolution of our capacity to grasp the

change at issue through representationally mediated forms of experience. In

the case of technology, however, the situation is more complex, since the

•

59

of modeling, while Hayles informs us about the more widespread, popular cultural and ideological significance of this shift. In both cases, we are con­ fronted with the dissolution of the harmony or continuity between our rep­ resentational capabilities and the material structure of the world. Following its redescription in terms of thermodynamics, energy begins to exceed the grasp of representationalist description as what Lyotard felicitously calls a humanist " transformer, " a means of cognizing materiality in accord with human capacities that condition practical experience. If the mathematics developed to model energy, like the conspiracy and salvation narratives that stand in for its description, furnish " representations " of energy, these are distinctly inhuman representations which measure energy as the function of a mathematical abstraction. By rendering energy abstract and divorcing it from the phenomenal domain, such representations no longer afford us a means of experiencing energy in a way directly tied to our embodiment. The thermodynamic revolution thus marks the eclipse of representational thought as the privileged faculty for mapping our relation to the material world; in its wake, theory loses the capacity to represent energy and the physical world of forces in their immediate relevance to our lived experi­ ence.

ever accelerating technological changes begun during the industrial revolu-

tion impact us at the level of our prerepresentational embodiment and not

solely in ways that are narrowly theoretical and/or explicitly mediated by

cultural codes. Consequently, the eclipse of representation produced by

technology differs markedly from the similar eclipse generated by science.

Technological M ateriality

Not only is technology's experiential impact socially ubiquitous and thus

oddly invisible (since it modifies the infrastructures underlying everyday

practice), but the modifications technologies do bring about occur with

some degree of autonomy-that is, without the mediation of either scientific

theory or popular cultural fantasy. By impacting our embodied lives in ways

In broad, schematic terms, the history of modern technology largely paral­ lels that of modern science, with the industrial revolution playing a role roughly equivalent to the thermodynamic paradigm shift. Once again, the significance of the moment of rupture (in this case, the industrial revolution itself) centers on the resulting dissolution of our capacity to grasp the change at issue through representation ally mediated forms of experience. In the case of technology, however, the situation is more complex, since the ever accelerating technological changes begun during the industrial revolu­ tion impact us at the level of our prerepresentational embodiment and not solely in ways that are narrowly theoretical and/or explicitly mediated by cultural codes. Consequently, the eclipse of representation produced by technology differs markedly from the similar eclipse generated by science. Not only is technology's experiential impact socially ubiquitous and thus oddly invisible ( since it modifies the infrastructures underlying everyday practice ) , but the modifications technologies do bring about occur with some degree of autonomy-that is, without the mediation of either scientific theory or popular cultural fantasy. By impacting our embodied lives in ways

60

60 * Embodying Technesis

that remain invisible at the level of our culturally inscribed expectations,

technologies effectively force us to experience changes in our material envi-

ronment that are no longer thematizable in representationalist terms, that

can only be lived through at the level of our embodiment.

Technology thus provides a bridge between the material, physical world

described by science and the domain of lived experience. Through their

immediate practical effects, technologies broker forms of noncognitive

experiential contact with the material domain that precede and precondi-

tion representational constructions, including those based in the mathema-

tization of the real made possible by these very technologies. What this

means, in short, is that our interaction with technology opens an experien-

tial domain where what we lose in terms of representational power can, in

a certain sense, be redeemed: by forcing us to live through the unrepre-

sentable experiential impact of materiality, our interactions with technolo-

gies operate a shift in the "economy" of experience, a shift from representa-

tion to embodiment (or in Walter Benjamin's terms, from Erfahrung to

Erlebnis) as the privileged site for exploring our worldliness.

Brought to bear on the historical perspective previously sketched, this

shift in the economy of our experience calls on us to find new ways of regis-

tering the practical dimension of technology's impact. Our interactions with

technologies call for a robust experiential model capable both of deformal-

izing our understanding of technology and of (re)situating it at the level of

concrete, lived experience. We simply cannot continue to model our under-

standing of technology's modern evolution on the history of science but

must insist on the autonomy of technology in two senses. First, we must

view technology as the product of a never entirely theorizable feedback loop

involving such forces as the logic of global capital and the cosmological

imperative of material complexification-forces that are, in some sense,

extracultural, extrascientific, and extrahuman. And second, we must refrain

from reducing technology to the product of a cumulative historical process

akin to science, one that assimilates contingent developments into a neces-

sarily culturally relative narrative of our ever increasing capacity to model

the real.

Given its ties to material complexification, it is hardly coincidental that

the specific autonomy I am claiming for technology has emerged during the

industrial revolution-following the widespread distribution to automated

machines of tasks formally performed by humans. By shifting the source of

energy from humans and nature to the machine itself, industrial technology

has rendered obsolete both the traditional understanding of technology as

applied science and its correlative division into the mechanical and the

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

that remain invisible at the level of our culturally inscribed expectations, technologies effectively force us to experience changes in our material envi­ ronment that are no longer thematizable in representationalist terms, that can only be lived through at the level of our embodiment. Technology thus provides a bridge between the material, physical world described by science and the domain of lived experience . Through their immediate practical effects, technologies broker forms of noncognitive experiential contact with the material domain that precede and precondi­ tion representational constructions, including those based in the mathema­ tization of the real made possible by these very technologies. What this means, in short, is that our interaction with technology opens an experien­ tial domain where what we lose in terms of representational power can, in a certain sense, be redeemed: by forcing us to live through the unrepre­ sentable experiential impact of materiality, our interactions with technolo­ gies operate a shift in the " economy" of experience, a shift from representa­ tion to embodiment (or in Walter Benj amin's terms, from Erfahrung to Erlebnis) as the privileged site for exploring our worldliness. Brought to bear on the historical perspective previously sketched, this shift in the economy of our experience calls on us to find new ways of regis­ tering the practical dimension of technology's impact. Our interactions with technologies call for a robust experiential model capable both of deformal­ izing our understanding of technology and of (re) situating it at the level of concrete, lived experience. We simply cannot continue to model our under­ standing of technology's modern evolution on the history of science but must insist on the autonomy of technology in two senses. First, we must view technology as the product of a never entirely theorizable feedback loop involving such forces as the logic of global capital and the cosmological imperative of material complexification-forces that are, in some sense, extracultural, extrascientific, and extrahuman. And second, we must refrain from reducing technology to the product of a cumulative historical process akin to science, one that assimilates contingent developments into a neces­ sarily culturally relative narrative of our ever increasing capacity to model the real. Given its ties to material complexification, it is hardly coincidental that the specific autonomy I am claiming for technology has emerged during the industrial revolution-following the widespread distribution to automated machines of tasks formally performed by humans. By shifting the source of energy from humans and nature to the machine itself, industrial technology has rendered obsolete both the traditional understanding of technology as applied science and its correlative division into the mechanical and the

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 61

dynamical. The industrial revolution has enacted a practical destabilization

of the human measure that prevailed in classical mechanics. In the sugges-

tive terminology recently employed by Lyotard, we could say that the indus-

trial revolution has instituted a "transformer"-an energy convertor-that

is no longer analogical to human experience.

Karl Marx and Michel Serres unfold the two principle elements of this

autonomization of technology. Marx's analysis of machinery establishes the

emancipation of technology from its earlier dependance on human activity.

And Serres's account, by artfully depicting the passage from the old work

model to a new model of spontaneous energy creation, illustrates how the

industrial revolution frees technology from its narrow role of mediating a

preconstituted and static nature and renders it a forceful material agent of

the real. These two contributions develop a notion of technological auton-

omy rooted in the material conditions of energy production and yet focused

on the experiential consequences of technology's eclipse of the human mea-

sure. Together, they stress the practical dimension of technology's impact,

the fact that technology forces society at large to grapple with a new mate-

rial domain. The respective contributions of Marx and Serres help qualify

the particular claim I advance for technological autonomy. Without existing

outside concrete social networks that exert constraints on its development,

technology nonetheless resists cultural and scientific contextualization to

the extent that it "obeys" a (natural or cosmological) imperative that, as

Lyotard puts it, is simply higher than the human. Technology may never be

noncultural in any meaningful sense (what, indeed, could that ever mean?!);

yet, to the extent that its impact is holist, it evades the resources of any "pos-

itive" cultural criticism.

To grasp the significance of this unprecedented autonomy, we need only

assess the theoretical limitations of a cultural historical approach to tech-

nology that fails to appreciate the central role of the industrial revolution in

the dissolution of the human as measure. In an interpretation of the steam

engine as a fruitful fusion of mechanical technology ("the artificial control

of technical processes") and dynamical technology ("the harnassing of inan-

imate sources of power to drive new mechanisms"), cultural critic J. David

Bolter relies on an outmoded, preindustrial division that simply cannot

grasp the specificity of machine technology (Bolter 1984, 29). Bolter seizes

on the traditional dual model of technology because it underwrites the cen-

tral narrative of his study-an account of the progressive development of

technology as an expression of human ingenuity. To accomplish his goal of

showing that industrial technology actualizes the modern cultural fantasy of

autonomous technology, Bolter has absolutely no reason to break with the

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61

dynamical. The industrial revolution has enacted a practical destabilization of the human measure that prevailed in classical mechanics. In the sugges­ tive terminology recently employed by Lyotard, we could say that the indus­ trial revolution has instituted a " transformer "-an energy convertor-that is no longer analogical to human experience. Karl Marx and Michel Serres unfold the two principle elements of this autonomization of technology. Marx's analysis of machinery establishes the emancipation of technology from its earlier dependance on human activity. And Serres's account, by artfully depicting the passage from the old work model to a new model of spontaneous energy creation, illustrates how the industrial revolution frees technology from its narrow role of mediating a preconstituted and static nature and renders it a forceful material agent of the real. These two contributions develop a notion of technological auton­ omy rooted in the material conditions of energy production and yet focused on the experiential consequences of technology's eclipse of the human mea­ sure. Together, they stress the practical dimension of technology's impact, the fact that technology forces society at large to grapple with a new mate­ rial domain. The respective contributions of Marx and Serres help qualify the particular claim I advance for technological autonomy. Without existing outside concrete social networks that exert constraints on its development, technology nonetheless resists cultural and scientific contextualization to the extent that it " obeys " a (natural or cosmological) imperative that, as Lyotard puts it, is simply higher than the human. Technology may never be noncultural in any meaningful sense (what, indeed, could that ever mean ? ! ) ; yet, to the extent that its impact is holist, it evades the resources of any " pos­ itive " cultural criticism. To grasp the significance of this unprecedented autonomy, we need only assess the theoretical limitations of a cultural historical approach to tech­ nology that fails to appreciate the central role of the industrial revolution in the dissolution of the human as measure. In an interpretation of the steam engine as a fruitful fusion of mechanical technology ( " the artificial control of technical processes " ) and dynamical technology ( "the harnassing of inan­ imate sources of power to drive new mechanisms " ) , cultural critic ]. David Bolter relies on an outmoded, preindustrial division that simply cannot grasp the specificity of machine technology ( Bolter 1 9 84, 2 9 ) . Bolter seizes on the traditional dual model of technology because it underwrites the cen­ tral narrative of his study-an account of the progressive development of technology as an expression of human ingenuity. To accomplish his goal of showing that industrial technology actualizes the modern cultural fantasy of autonomous technology, Bolter has absolutely no reason to break with the

62

62 * Embodying Technesis

explanatory models of the past; quite to the contrary, he is able to view the

steam engine as a new and improved metaphor for the persistent telos of the

Western technological imagination precisely by demonstrating how it fuses

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

explanatory models of the past; quite to the contrary, he is able to view the steam engine as a new and improved metaphor for the persistent telos of the Western technological imagination precisely by demonstrating how it fuses the dynamical and mechanical models.

the dynamical and mechanical models.

Dynamic technology, then, was as old as or older than mechanical technol-

ogy, but it needed much longer to mature. Although accurate pendulum

clocks were being built in the seventeenth century, it was not until the end of

the eighteenth that the inanimate prime mover found its place as a defining

technology. The triumph of this technology was the steam engine. As a clock-

work mechanism capable of producing power, it combined two qualities that

had long before been expressed separately in the clock and the waterwheel.

Although heat produced by coal was as much a natural resource as the flow

of water in a river or the wind across the plains, the steam engine seemed by

its very intricacy more artificial than the windmill or waterwheel, an expres-

sion of man's ingenuity and not a mere harnessing of nature. (30; emphasis

added)

By adopting a narrowly culturalist, representationalist perspective, Bolter

misses the crucial shift in the economy of the human and the nonhuman

that, as I have suggested, comprises the central legacy of the industrial rev-

olution for the cultural critic. While the steam engine certainly is, in a myr-

iad of senses, an altogether magnificent figure for human reason-a key

Dynamic technology, then, was as old as or older than mechanical technol­ ogy, but it needed much longer to mature. Although accurate pendulum clocks were being built in the seventeenth century, it was not until the end of the eighteenth that the inanimate prime mover found its place as a defining technology. The triumph of this technology was the steam engine. As a clock­ work mechanism capable of producing power, it combined two qualities that had long before been expressed separately in the clock and the waterwheel. Although heat produced by coal was as much a natural resource as the flow of water in a river or the wind across the plains, the steam engine seemed by its very intricacy more artificial than the windmill or waterwheel, an expres­ sion of man's ingenuity and not a mere harnessing of nature. ( 3 0 ; emphasis added)

"expression of man's ingenuity," as Bolter puts it-it also furnishes the

basis for a new lived understanding of the energetics of the material domain

and consequently for a whole new experiential world.

Fathoming this world, Michel Serres suggests, requires a radical break

with the representationalist mechanical models of the past. Describing an

advertising sign made by George Garrard in 1784, Serres furnishes an

account of the industrial revolution directly at odds with the picture painted

by Bolter: "For the study of mechanics, work is a force in motion. What are

the origins, the sources of this force? There are four of them and only four:

horses... ; men... ; wind... ; [and] [w]ater.... [Like Garrard's tableau,

Lagrange's book] recapitulates, by its story and in its system, a perfect

world that will soon disappear, totally overthrown when fire and its power

supplant wind and water, horses and men, as source and origin of force"

(Serres 1982b, 54-55; emphasis added). While Bolter views the industrial

revolution as the culminating cultural synthesis of the two traditional cate-

gories of technology, Serres sees it as the origin point of an entirely new

form of energy and a corresponding experiential world. For Bolter, the

steam engine is perhaps the ultimate metaphor for human reason; for Serres,

by contrast, it is the catalyst for a radically new type of expression that rec-

By adopting a narrowly culturalist, representationalist perspective, Bolter misses the crucial shift in the economy of the human and the nonhuman that, as I have suggested, comprises the central legacy of the industrial rev­ olution for the cultural critic. While the steam engine certainly is, in a myr­ iad of senses, an altogether magnificent figure for human reason-a key " expression of man's ingenuity, " as Bolter puts it-it also furnishes the basis for a new lived understanding of the energetics of the material domain and consequently for a whole new experiential world. Fathoming this world, Michel Serres suggests, requires a radical break with the representationalist mechanical models of the past. Describing an advertising sign made by George Garrard in 1 784, Serres furnishes an account of the industrial revolution directly at odds with the picture painted by Bolter: " For the study of mechanics, work is a force in motion. What are the origins, the sources of this force ? There are four of them and only four: horses . . . ; men . . . ; wind . . . ; [and] [w] ater. . . . [Like Garrard's tableau, Lagrange's book] recapitulates, by its story and in its system, a perfect world that will soon disappear, totally overthrown when fire and its power supplant wind and water, horses and men, as source and origin of force" ( Serres 1 9 82b, 54-55; emphasis added ) . While Bolter views the industrial revolution as the culminating cultural synthesis of the two traditional cate­ gories of technology, Serres sees it as the origin point of an entirely new form of energy and a corresponding experiential world. For Bolter, the steam engine is perhaps the ultimate metaphor for human reason; for Serres, by contrast, it is the catalyst for a radically new type of expression that rec-

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 63

ognizes, and indeed takes it orientation from, the alienation of human cog-

nition ensuing in the wake of the industrial revolution.

The principle behind this alienation is, of course, the shift of operational

control from human to machine that forms the basis for the capitalist mode

of production. With the development of what Marx calls the "motor mech-

anism," technology emancipates itself from the essential dependence on

human activity that characterized it from antiquity through the age of clas-

sical mechanics. In this sense, Marx's account inaugurates a specifically

modern definition of "machine"-a definition that (as I shall argue at length

in chap. 3) breaks with its long-standing rhetorical meaning and, even more

importantly, with the correlated Greek notion of techne as an art supple-

menting nature.

All fully developed machinery consists of three essentially different parts, the

motor mechanism, the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or work-

ing machine . . . The tool or working machine is that part of the machinery

with which the industrial revolution of the 18th century started . . . The

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63

ognizes, and indeed takes it orientation from, the alienation of human cog­ nition ensuing in the wake of the industrial revolution. The principle behind this alienation is, of course, the shift of operational control from human to machine that forms the basis for the capitalist mode of production. With the development of what Marx calls the " motor mech­ anism, " technology emancipates itself from the essential dependence on human activity that characterized it from antiquity through the age of clas­ sical mechanics. In this sense, Marx's account inaugurates a specifically modern definition of " machine "-a definition that (as I shall argue at length in chap. 3 ) breaks with its long-standing rhetorical meaning and, even more importantly, with the correlated Greek notion of techne as an art supple­ menting nature.

machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being set in motion, per-

forms with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the

workman with similar tools. From the moment that the tool proper is taken

from man, and fitted into a mechanism, a machine takes the place of a mere

implement. (Marx 1906, 407-8)

With the insertion of the tool into the machine complex, human mediation

falls out of the equation. While tools are moved by human power, machines

are moved directly by natural force. "As soon as tools had been converted

from being manual implements of man into implements of a mechanical

apparatus," Marx argues, "the motive mechanism also acquired an inde-

pendent form, entirely emancipated from the restraints of human strength"

(412). Consequently, with the development of the machine mode of pro-

duction, technology takes on the modern role I have been ascribing to it: it

becomes the agent of material complexification. Bypassing the mediation

All fully developed machinery consists of three essentially different parts, the motor mechanism, the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or work­ ing machine . . . . The tool or working machine is that part of the machinery with which the industrial revolution of the 1 8th century started . . . . The machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being set in motion, per­ forms with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the workman with similar tools . From the moment that the tool proper is taken from man, and fitted into a mechanism, a machine takes the place of a mere implement. (Marx 1 9 06, 407-8 )

formerly furnished by the human, machines tap directly into natural force

and operate, in effect, as autonomous producers of energy. In the process,

machines introduce a fundamental shift in the very conception of energy:

rather than something to be extracted from nature, stockpiled, or held in

reserve, energy becomes something that is spontaneously or automatically

created.

While Marx articulates the new ontology of the machine age, it falls to

Serres to unpack its concrete experiential consequences. In "Turner Trans-

lates Carnot," Serres employs the self-reflexively metaphoric mode typical

of his thinking to assess the fundamental disenfranchisement of the human

With the insertion of the tool into the machine complex, human mediation falls out of the equation. While tools are moved by human power, machines are moved directly by natural force. "As soon as tools had been converted from being manual implements of man into implements of a mechanical apparatus, " Marx argues, " the motive mechanism also acquired an inde­ pendent form, entirely emancipated from the restraints of human strength " ( 4 1 2 ) . Consequently, with the development of the machine mode of pro­ duction, technology takes on the modern role I have been ascribing to it: it becomes the agent of material complexification. Bypassing the mediation formerly furnished by the human, machines tap directly into natural force and operate, in effect, as autonomous producers of energy. In the process, machines introduce a fundamental shift in the very conception of energy: rather than something to be extracted from nature, stockpiled, or held in reserve, energy becomes something that is spontaneously or automatically

created. While Marx articulates the new ontology of the machine age, it falls to Serres to unpack its concrete experiential consequences. In " Turner Trans­ lates Carnot, " Serres employs the self-reflexively metaphoric mode typical of his thinking to assess the fundamental disenfranchisement of the human

64

64 * Embodying Technesis

in the face of a newly empowered nature. Rooted in the "stochastic meta-

morphosis by fire," the industrial revolution operates what Serres charac-

terizes as a material revolution-a transformation that alters force at its

very origin and generates what is, from the experiential perspective, a new

form of energy.

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Em bod y i n g

Technesis

in the face of a newly empowered nature. Rooted in the " stochastic meta­ morphosis by fire," the industrial revolution operates what Serres charac­ terizes as a material revolution-a transformation that alters force at its very origin and generates what is, from the experiential perspective, a new form of energy.

What is the Industrial Revolution? A revolution operating on matter. It takes

place at the very source of dynamics, at the origins of force. One takes force

as it is or one produces it. Descartes and Newton, crowned by Lagrange,

chose the first alternative: force is there, given by the biotope, the wind, the

sea, and gravity.... With it one produces motion, work, by using tools....

The mediating function of the tools is inscribed in their form, their lines, their

geometry.... Then a sudden change is imposed on the raw elements: fire

replaces air and water in order to transform the earth. Fire will consume

[Lagrange's] Analytical Mechanics and burn down Samuel Whitbread's

warehouse. It will destroy the wooden shed, the wooden ships. Fire finishes

off the horses, strikes them down. The source, the origin, of force is in this

flash of lightning, this ignition. Its energy exceeds form; it transforms. (Serres

1982b, 56)

For Serres, in short, what distinguishes the steam engine from all previous

technologies is not so much its energy principle in itself but rather its con-

crete effects on human experience of the material world: the steam engine

transforms a natural material, coal, into a source of energy unrelated, by

any mechanical calculus, to its natural or static force. By unpacking the

figurative resonances of the industrial revolution, Serres is able to correlate

the ontological material changes analyzed by Marx with experiential

What is the Industrial Revolution ? A revolution operating on matter. It takes place at the very source of dynamics, at the origins of force. One takes force as it is or one produces it. Descartes and Newton, crowned by Lagrange, chose the first alternative: force is there, given by the biotope, the wind, the sea, and gravity . . . . With it one produces motion, work, by using tools . . . . The mediating function of the tools is inscribed in their form, their lines, their geometry . . . . Then a sudden change is imposed on the raw elements: fire replaces air and water in order to transform the earth. Fire will consume [Lagrange's] Analytical Mechanics and burn down Samuel Whitbread's warehouse. It will destroy the wooden shed, the wooden ships. Fire finishes off the horses, strikes them down. The source, the origin, of force is in this flash of lightning, this ignition. Its energy exceeds form; it transforms. (Serres 1 9 82b, 5 6 )

changes at the level of actual practice. He thereby generalizes Marx's con-

cept of alienation into a counterphenomenology of modern experience.

Focusing on the introduction of a new energy principle unbounded by the

form accorded it by nature and by the laws of mechanics that traditionally

were held to describe it, Serres shows how we lose the capacity to experience

the world in the manner privileged by modernity-via the mediation of rep-

resentation. Whereas the energy transmitted by the waterwheel or deployed

in a clockwork mechanism could be represented through the laws of

mechanics, the energy produced by the steam engine is incalculable in tradi-

tional representationalist terms. Rather than fitting into a pregiven form, it

"transforms."

Serres develops the experiential consequences of the ontological revolu-

tion carried out by modern technology precisely by exploding the represen-

tationalist frame of reference. Once we take the creation of force as the

essential characteristic of machine technology, we no longer can oppose the

For Serres, i n short, what distinguishes the steam engine from all previous technologies is not so much its energy principle in itself but rather its con­ crete effects on human experience of the material world: the steam engine transforms a natural material, coal, into a source of energy unrelated, by any mechanical calculus, to its natural or static force . By unpacking the figurative resonances of the industrial revolution, Serres is able to correlate the ontological material changes analyzed by Marx with experiential changes at the level of actual practice. He thereby generalizes Marx's con­ cept of alienation into a counterphenomenology of modern experience. Focusing on the introduction of a new energy principle unbounded by the form accorded it by nature and by the laws of mechanics that traditionally were held to describe it, Serres shows how we lose the capacity to experience the world in the manner privileged by modernity-via the mediation of rep­ resentation. Whereas the energy transmitted by the waterwheel or deployed in a clockwork mechanism could be represented through the laws of mechanics, the energy produced by the steam engine is incalculable in tradi­ tional representationalist terms. Rather than fitting into a pregiven form, it "transforms. " Serres develops the experiential consequences of the ontological revolu­ tion carried out by modern technology precisely by exploding the represen­ tationalist frame of reference. Once we take the creation of force as the essential characteristic of machine technology, we no longer can oppose the

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 65

machine to an independent reality but must situate it as a process within the

real. As a result, the very ontological division underlying the machine's

value as metaphor collapses. Following the industrial revolution, the

machine cannot be employed to represent other processes to which it is

functionally similar (e.g., the body, human life, or textuality, to name only

those most central to modernity) without undergoing a radical reduction of

its robust materiality. Through the new form it acquires in the industrial

revolution, the machine is transformed from a figure produced by thought

(e.g., a concept of functional organization) into an autonomous agent of the

material complexification of the universe.

This ontological revolution calls on us to develop a postrepresentational-

ist reformulation of the question concerning technology. We must learn to

treat technical machines in the way that Deleuze and Guattari treat desiring-

machines-as machines "in more than a metaphorical sense." They suggest:

"Every machine . . . is related to a continual material flow (hyle) that it cuts

into.... [E]very machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the

machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself,

or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it"

(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 36). With the postrepresentationalist emanci-

pation of technology from its reductive metaphoric function, the machine

sheds its restricted status as an organization of force opposed to the organic

and attains its properly modern role as the privileged agent of material

change. In this role, the machine is inseparable from the "real" that it pro-

duces.

Technology and the "History" of Matter

To model this emancipation of energy, we must trace the "inhuman" his-

tory of matter as it "evolves" in excess of our capacity to give it representa-

tional form. Such a task requires us to rethink the function of technology,

since the modern machine foregrounds the primal formlessness of matter.

Serres concludes: ". . . beneath the forms of matter, stochastic disorder

reigns supreme. To smelt is to rediscover chance as fundamental. The fur-

nace is the engine for going back toward chaos. The foundry is where cre-

ation starts over at zero. History is recast beginning with primitive matter"

(1982b, 61). In the industrial boiler room, something happens that alters

our lived relationship with matter: for the first time, we encounter the tech-

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65

machine to an independent reality but must situate it as a process within the real. As a result, the very ontological division underlying the machine's value as metaphor collapses. Following the industrial revolution, the machine cannot be employed to represent other processes to which it is functionally similar (e.g., the body, human life, or textuality, to name only those most central to modernity) without undergoing a radical reduction of its robust materiality. Through the new form it acquires in the industrial revolution, the machine is transformed from a figure produced by thought (e.g., a concept of functional organization ) into an autonomous agent of the material complexification of the universe. This ontological revolution calls on us to develop a postrepresentational­ ist reformulation of the question concerning technology. We must learn to treat technical machines in the way that Deleuze and Guattari treat desiring­ machines-as machines " in more than a metaphorical sense. " They suggest: " Every machine . . . is related to a continual material flow (hyle) that it cuts into . . . . [E] very machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it" (Deleuze and Guattari 1 9 8 3 , 3 6 ) . With the postrepresentationalist emanci­ pation of technology from its reductive metaphoric function, the machine sheds its restricted status as an organization of force opposed to the organic and attains its properly modern role as the privileged agent of material change. In this role, the machine is inseparable from the " real " that it pro­ duces.

nologically embodied, autonomous evolution of matter as something radi-

cally alien to our "natural" human rhythm(s).

Technology and the " H istory " of M atter

To model this emancipation of energy, we must trace the " inhuman " his­ tory of matter as it " evolves" in excess of our capacity to give it representa­ tional form. Such a task requires us to rethink the function of technology, since the modern machine foregrounds the primal formlessness of matter. Serres concludes: " . . . beneath the forms of matter, stochastic disorder reigns supreme. To smelt is to rediscover chance as fundamental. The fur­ nace is the engine for going back toward chaos. The foundry is where cre­ ation starts over at zero. History is recast beginning with primitive matter " ( 1 9 8 2b, 6 1 ) . In the industrial boiler room, something happens that alters our lived relationship with matter: for the first time, we encounter the tech­ nologically embodied, autonomous evolution of matter as something radi­ cally alien to our "natural " human rhythm ( s ) .

66

66 * Embodying Technesis

While Serres's singular fusion of science and poetry forcefully expresses

the urgency for a new evaluation of modern technology, Lyotard's recent

work most decisively sketches the inhuman history of matter correlative

with it. In a series of recent essays focusing on the contemporary material-

ization of mind and apparently addressed to the cosmos itself, Lyotard pre-

sents a conception of matter from a cosmological perspective. According to

Lyotard, the evolution of matter results from a process of "cosmological

chance"-physics' analogue to the chance variation that biologists (and

increasingly researchers in the social and cognitive sciences) identify as the

motor of natural selection. To stress its complicity with the new technolo-

gies of the information age and its autonomy with respect to the human,

Lyotard dubs this cosmological perspective the "metaphysics of develop-

ment."

[The metaphysics of development] results from a process of development,

where it is not mankind which is the issue, but differentiation . . . The strik-

ing thing about this metaphysics of development is that it needs no finality.

Development is not attached to an Idea, like that of the emancipation of rea-

son and of human freedoms. It is reproduced by accelerating and extending

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Em bod y i n g

Technesis

While Serres's singular fusion of science and poetry forcefully expresses the urgency for a new evaluation of modern technology, Lyotard's recent work most decisively sketches the inhuman history of matter correlative with it. In a series of recent essays focusing on the contemporary material­ ization of mind and apparently addressed to the cosmos itself, Lyotard pre­ sents a conception of matter from a cosmological perspective. According to Lyotard, the evolution of matter results from a process of " cosmological chance "-physics' analogue to the chance variation that biologists ( and increasingly researchers in the social and cognitive sciences) identify as the motor of natural selection. To stress its complicity with the new technolo­ gies of the information age and its autonomy with respect to the human, Lyotard dubs this cosmological perspective the " metaphysics of develop­ ment. "

itself according to its internal dynamic alone. It assimilates risks, memorizes

their informational value and uses this as a new mediation necessary to its

functioning. It has no necessity itself other than a cosmological chance.

(Lyotard 1991, 6-7)

Radicalizing Herbert Marcuse's critique of technology, Lyotard effectively

inverts the humanist perspective central to its emancipatory program:

because technology is now in the service of cosmological complexification,

or negative entropy-rather than the human domination of other human

beings (and subsequently of nature)-we must fundamentally alter our

political aims with respect to it.7 Rather than doggedly persisting in our

efforts to triumph over the metaphysics of domination, we must struggle to

adapt our experiential capabilities in an effort to keep up with the techno-

logical "expressions" of cosmological chance.

[The metaphysics of development] results from a process of development, where it is not mankind which is the issue, but differentiation . . . . The strik­ ing thing about this metaphysics of development is that it needs no finality. Development is not attached to an Idea, like that of the emancipation of rea­ son and of human freedoms. It is reproduced by accelerating and extending itself according to its internal dynamic alone. It assimilates risks, memorizes their informational value and uses this as a new mediation necessary to its functioning. It has no necessity itself other than a cosmological chance. (Lyotard 1 9 9 1 , 6-7)

With this thesis, Lyotard begins to articulate a postrepresentationalist,

"exocultural" model of technological evolution. Eschewing traditional

strategies that reductively trace technology to factors internal to human cul-

ture and society, he argues that technologies, while continuing to develop in

response to specific human needs and within specific cultural contexts, both

express and contribute to a process of material complexification unrelated

in any essential way to human cultural pursuit: ". .. what is called research

and development in contemporary society and the results of which con-

stantly disturb our environment are much more the result of... a process of

Radicalizing Herbert Marcuse's critique of technology, Lyotard effectively inverts the humanist perspective central to its emancipatory program: because technology is now in the service of cosmological complexification, or negative entropy-rather than the human domination of other human beings ( and subsequently of nature)-we must fundamentally alter our political aims with respect to it? Rather than doggedly persisting in our efforts to triumph over the metaphysics of domination, we must struggle to adapt our experiential capabilities in an effort to keep up with the techno­ logical " expressions " of cosmological chance. With this thesis, Lyotard begins to articulate a postrepresentationalist, " exocultural" model of technological evolution. Eschewing traditional strategies that reductively trace technology to factors internal to human cul­ ture and society, he argues that technologies, while continuing to develop in response to specific human needs and within specific cultural contexts, both express and contribute to a process of material complexification unrelated in any essential way to human cultural pursuit: " . . . what is called research and development in contemporary society and the results of which con­ stantly disturb our environment are much more the result of . . . a process of

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 67

'cosmolocal' complexification than the work of human genius attached to

the discovery of truth and the realization of good" (61). From Lyotard's

perspective, then, our contemporary imperative to develop technology is not

fundamentally different from the necessity we fall under as natural creatures

subject to evolutionary chance.

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67

'cosmolocal' complexification than the work of human genius attached to the discovery of truth and the realization of good" ( 6 1 ) . From Lyotard's perspective, then, our contemporary imperative to develop technology is not fundamentally different from the necessity we fall under as natural creatures subj ect to evolutionary chance.

As is clearly shown by the development of the techno-scientific system, tech-

nology and the culture associated with it are under a necessity to pursue their

rise, and this necessity must be referred to the process of complexification (or

neg-entropy) which takes place in the area of the cosmos inhabited by

humanity. The human race is, so to speak, "pulled forward" by this process

without possessing the slightest capacity for mastering it. It has to adapt to

the new conditions. (64)

With this pronouncement, we reach the far side of the famous Heideggerian

maxim that will furnish my point of orientation in part 2 of this study. By

aligning technological development with material complexification, Lyotard

effectively expunges any possibility that technology could somehow be pure

of essence. In its contemporary role as the privileged vehicle for cosmic com-

plexification, technology does not constitute a depraved epochal ontology

that functions to conceal Being. Instead, it has become internal to Being

itself.

Correlatively with this displacement, human beings lose whatever active

role remains for them on the Heideggerian view-both as an efficient cause

of the modern epochal stamping of Being and as the passive "shepherds" of

whatever new showing of Being the future will bring. For Lyotard, human

beings have become mere pawns in a vast techno-evolutionary scheme:

"... technological-scientific development is, on the surface of the earth, the

present-day form of a process of negentropy or complexification that has

been underway since the earth began its existence. I'm granting that human

beings aren't and never have been the motor of the complexification, but an

effect and carrier of this negentropy, its continuer . . . I concede that it isn't

any human desire to know or transform reality that propels this techno-sci-

ence, but a cosmic circumstance" (22). Accordingly, for all of its importance

as a contribution to the post-Heideggerian rethinking of technology,

Lyotard's program is compromised by his unmitigated enthusiasm in

embracing techno-complexification. The unwavering privilege he grants the

cosmic point of view is fundamentally disempowering, if not downright

repugnant, given the urgency of our responsibility, as contemporary cultural

critics and as world citizens, to explore the anthropology of the technologi-

cal age.8 In my opinion, moreover, Lyotard's striking nihilism is less the

reflection of any actual or possible experiential reality than a result of his

As is clearly shown by the development of the techno-scientific system, tech­ nology and the culture associated with it are under a necessity to pursue their rise, and this necessity must be referred to the process of complexification ( or neg-entropy) which takes place in the area of the cosmos inhabited by humanity. The human race is, so to speak, "pulled forward " by this process without possessing the slightest capacity for mastering it. It has to adapt to the new conditions . ( 6 4 )

With this pronouncement, w e reach the far side o f the famous Heideggerian maxim that will furnish my point of orientation in part 2 of this study. By aligning technological development with material complexification, Lyotard effectively expunges any possibility that technology could somehow be pure of essence . In its contemporary role as the privileged vehicle for cosmic com­ plexification, technology does not constitute a depraved epochal ontology that functions to conceal Being. Instead, it has become internal to Being itself. Correlatively with this displacement, human beings lose whatever active role remains for them on the Heideggerian view-both as an efficient cause of the modern epochal stamping of Being and as the passive " shepherds " of whatever new showing of Being the future will bring. For Lyotard, human beings have become mere pawns in a vast techno-evolutionary scheme : " . . . technological-scientific development is, on the surface of the earth, the present-day form of a process of negentropy or complexification that has been underway since the earth began its existence . I'm granting that human beings aren't and never have been the motor of the complexification, but an effect and carrier of this negentropy, its continuer. . . . I concede that it isn't any human desire to know or transform reality that propels this techno-sci­ ence, but a cosmic circumstance " ( 22 ) . Accordingly, for all of its importance as a contribution to the post-Heideggerian rethinking of technology, Lyotard's program is compromised by his unmitigated enthusiasm in embracing techno-complexification. The unwavering privilege he grants the cosmic point of view is fundamentally dis empowering, if not downright repugnant, given the urgency of our responsibility, as contemporary cultural critics and as world citizens, to explore the anthropology of the technologi­ cal age . 8 In my opinion, moreover, Lyotard's striking nihilism is less the reflection of any actual or possible experiential reality than a result of his

68

68 * Embodying Technesis

effort to ally his thinking rhetorically with the cosmological perspective he

claims to be explicating. (Consider, for example, the way he introduces his

conclusions, his manner of addressing-or perhaps even of speaking for-

the cosmos itself: "I'm granting that..."; "I concede that..."; etc.) By priv-

ileging the long-term, cosmological evolutionary perspective in this rhetori-

cally insistent way, Lyotard tries his best to coax us into aligning our

perspective with it.

If we hope to meet the challenges of the emerging posthuman age with-

out simply abandoning the human, however, we must struggle most zeal-

ously against just such a cosmological alliance. Only by preserving the value

of our short-term human perspective will we retain the ability to invest our

lives with significance-to intervene (to whatever extent possible) in strug-

gles over the future of technology and to engage ourselves in the affirmative

task of exploring new technologically mediated, posthuman forms of

human agency.9 However irrelevant they may be from the perspective of the

cosmos, such struggles and engagements are absolutely central to our con-

temporary cultural moment: it would hardly be an exaggeration to claim

that their outcome will dictate the terms of whatever contract we will be

able to broker with technology. Only our active intervention, as critics like

Hayles have recently argued, will allow us to fashion a future in which the

human can find ways of grappling with the displacement it undergoes in the

face of technology's inhuman evolution.

Given such an imperative, we must accord Lyotard's cosmological per-

spective a heuristic, rather than a prescriptive, role. Insofar as it forms a

strong reminder of modern technology's fundamental autonomy from the

human measure, Lyotard's perspective provides the critical leverage neces-

sary to loosen the stranglehold maintained by the constructivist idiom. Once

we begin to view his grand narrative as something like a cosmological fairy

tale-one not entirely dissimilar from Haraway's more famous and deeply

resonant cyborg myth-we will be able to enlist his support in the project of

articulating an anthropology for the contemporary technological age.

In effect, Lyotard's effort to correlate the alienation generated by con-

temporary technology with the liberation of energy from mechanical and

dynamical constructions of matter helps to make tangible the shift explored

in the cultural histories of science and technology discussed earlier. With his

crucial notion of the transformer, Lyotard successfully foregrounds the

increasing divide separating the physics of matter-energy from the human

dimension. Lyotard's transformer operates a transformation of a "material

point"; it is a way of modeling and converting energy that can either clarify

matter for us or demarcate its radical incongruity with our human percep-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

effort to ally his thinking rhetorically with the cosmological perspective he claims to be explicating. ( Consider, for example, the way he introduces his conclusions, his manner of addressing-or perhaps even of speaking for­ the cosmos itself: "I'm granting that . . . " ; " I concede that . . . " ; etc . ) By priv­ ileging the long-term, cosmological evolutionary perspective in this rhetori­ cally insistent way, Lyotard tries his best to coax us into aligning our perspective with it. If we hope to meet the challenges of the emerging posthuman age with­ out simply abandoning the human, however, we must struggle most zeal­ ously against j ust such a cosmological alliance. Only by preserving the value of our short-term human perspective will we retain the ability to invest our lives with significance-to intervene (to whatever extent possible) in strug­ gles over the future of technology and to engage ourselves in the affirmative task of exploring new technologically mediated, posthuman forms of human agency.9 However irrelevant they may be from the perspective of the cosmos, such struggles and engagements are absolutely central to our con­ temporary cultural moment: it would hardly be an exaggeration to claim that their outcome will dictate the terms of whatever contract we will be able to broker with technology. Only our active intervention, as critics like Hayles have recently argued, will allow us to fashion a future in which the human can find ways of grappling with the displacement it undergoes in the face of technology's inhuman evolution. Given such an imperative, we must accord Lyotard's cosmological per­ spective a heuristic, rather than a prescriptive, role. Insofar as it forms a strong reminder of modern technology's fundamental autonomy from the human measure, Lyotard's perspective provides the critical leverage neces­ sary to loosen the stranglehold maintained by the constructivist idiom. Once we begin to view his grand narrative as something like a cosmological fairy tale-one not entirely dissimilar from Haraway's more famous and deeply resonant cyborg myth-we will be able to enlist his support in the proj ect of articulating an anthropology for the contemporary technological age. In effect, Lyotard's effort to correlate the alienation generated by con­ temporary technology with the liberation of energy from mechanical and dynamical constructions of matter helps to make tangible the shift explored in the cultural histories of science and technology discussed earlier. With his crucial notion of the transformer, Lyotard successfully foregrounds the increasing divide separating the physics of matter-energy from the human dimension. Lyotard's transformer operates a transformation of a "material point " ; it is a way of modeling and converting energy that can either clarify matter for us or demarcate its radical incongruity with our human percep-

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 69

tual, experiential, and cognitive rhythms. Lyotard notes that for classical

mechanics, which models matter on the substance model, "the only relevant

transformers are the axioms of classic geometry." He notes further that by

thinking of matter through the concept of extension, Descartes submits it to

a transformation that is "analogical to human experience." He argues that

in the case of contemporary technoscience, by contrast, transformations are,

to a large extent, inhuman: "The transformation of elements, such as the

transformation of uranium 238 into neptunium,.., are not only not on our

scale, but require an idea of matter" no longer modeled on substance (37).

In our contemporary world, he continues, "matter is energy," and com-

plexification occurs through the increasingly dematerialized transforma-

tions of energy. As transformations become more diverse and more inhu-

man, explains Lyotard, the capacities of the properly human transformer,

the nervous system, become increasingly marginalized; as a consequence,

energy (matter) increasingly escapes our ken.

Contemporary science. . . shows us that energy, in all its forms, is distributed

in waves, and that, to quote Jean Perrin, "all matter is in the end a particular

and very condensed form of energy." The reality to be accorded such-and-

such a form of energy, and therefore of matter, clearly depends on the trans-

formers we have at our disposal. Even the transformer that our central ner-

vous system is, highly sophisticated in the order of living creatures, can only

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69

tual, experiential, and cognitive rhythms. Lyotard notes that for classical mechanics, which models matter on the substance model, " the only relevant transformers are the axioms of classic geometry. " He notes further that by thinking of matter through the concept of extension, Descartes submits it to a transformation that is " analogical to human experience. " He argues that in the case of contemporary techno science, by contrast, transformations are, to a large extent, inhuman: "The transformation of elements, such as the transformation of uranium 23 8 into neptunium, . . . are not only not on our scale, but require an idea of matter " no longer modeled on substance ( 3 7 ) . I n our contemporary world, h e continues, " matter i s energy, " and com­ plexification occurs through the increasingly dematerialized transforma­ tions of energy. As transformations become more diverse and more inhu­ man, explains Lyotard, the capacities of the properly human transformer, the nervous system, become increasingly marginalized; as a consequence, energy (matter ) increasingly escapes our ken.

transcribe and inscribe according to its own rhythm the excitations which

come to it from the milieu in which it lives. (43; emphasis added)

In foregrounding the incompatibility between nervous systems (explicitly

modeled as inscriptional agents) and the modern complexification of the

material domain, Lyotard describes the very divorce of theoretical knowl-

edge from experience that I have attributed to the industrial and thermody-

namic revolutions. In the process, he adds an important element to the pic-

ture previously sketched-a concrete understanding of how the human use

of technology (e.g., to model mathematically those material processes that

are cognitively unmappable by the human brain) fits within a cosmological

dialectic and indeed how it forms a double-edged sword, simultaneously

aiding us in adjusting to the inhuman material evolution and spurring fur-

Contemporary science . . . shows us that energy, in all its forms, is distributed in waves, and that, to quote Jean Perrin, " all matter is in the end a particular and very condensed form of energy. " The reality to be accorded such-and­ such a form of energy, and therefore of matter, clearly depends on the trans­ formers we have at our disposal. Even the transformer that our central ner­ vous system is, highly sophisticated in the order of living creatures, can only transcribe and inscribe according to its own rhythm the excitations which come to it from the milieu in which it lives. (43; emphasis added)

ther material complexification. Lyotard acknowledges that while the devel-

opment of technoscience allows us to "increase our material liberty" by

memorizing "in a fashion accessible to us, vibrations naturally beyond our

ken," it also further differentiates or complexifies matter-energy itself, leav-

ing us more marginalized than ever. Accordingly, he admits, despite local

and temporary gains, technoscience's ever expanding contribution to

"negentropy" cannot but increase our alienation: "The complexification of

In foregrounding the incompatibility between nervous systems ( explicitly modeled as inscriptional agents) and the modern complexification of the material domain, Lyotard describes the very divorce of theoretical knowl­ edge from experience that I have attributed to the industrial and thermody­ namic revolutions. In the process, he adds an important element to the pic­ ture previously sketched-a concrete understanding of how the human use of technology (e.g., to model mathematically those material processes that are cognitively unmappable by the human brain) fits within a cosmological dialectic and indeed how it forms a double-edged sword, simultaneously aiding us in adjusting to the inhuman material evolution and spurring fur­ ther material complexification. Lyotard acknowledges that while the devel­ opment of technoscience allows us to " increase our material liberty " by memorizing " in a fashion accessible to us, vibrations naturally beyond our ken," it also further differentiates or complexifies matter-energy itself, leav­ ing us more marginalized than ever. Accordingly, he admits, despite local and temporary gains, technoscience's ever expanding contribution to " negentropy " cannot but increase our alienation: "The complexification of

70

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

the transformers, theoretical and practical, has always had as its effect the 70 * Embodying Technesis

the transformers, theoretical and practical, has always had as its effect the

destabilization of the fit between the human subject and its environment"

(44; emphasis added).

Ultimately, the cosmological endgame between the human and the tech-

nological compels Lyotard to situate our current moment in the lineage of

earlier destabilizations of the humanist perspective, as a culminating strike

against the privilege of (human) reason itself.

... this current of thinking... deal[s] a blow to what I shall call human nar-

destabilization of the fit between the human subject and its environment" (44; emphasis added ) . Ultimately, the cosmological endgame between the human and the tech­ nological compels Lyotard to situate our current moment in the lineage of earlier destabilizations of the humanist perspective, as a culminating strike against the privilege of (human ) reason itself.

cissism. Freud already listed three famous ones: man is not the center of the

cosmos (Copernicus), is not the first living creature (Darwin), is not the mas-

ter of meaning (Freud himself). Through contemporary techno-science, he

learns that he does not have the monopoly of mind, that is, of

complexification, but that complexification is not inscribed as a destiny in

matter but as possible, and that it takes place, at random, but intelligibly,

well before himself. He learns in particular that his own science is in its turn

a complexification of matter, in which, so to speak, energy itself comes to be

reflected, without humans necessarily getting any benefit from this. And that

thus he must not consider himself as an origin or as a result but as a trans-

former ensuring, through techno-science, arts, economic development, cul-

tures and the new memorization they involve, a supplement of complexity in

the universe. (45; translation modified, emphasis added)

Paradoxically, to grasp the heuristic value of Lyotard's perspective, we need

to understand this passage not as a hyperbolic obituary of the human but as

a fundamentally ambivalent affirmation of its resilience. The human,

Lyotard's genealogy seems to imply, perseveres through its destabilizations.

Thus, if we can only find a way of resisting his overenthusiastic call for a

direct communion with the cosmos, we can selectively draw on his analysis

to situate technology in a more encompassing and properly posthuman con-

text without at the same time being compelled to affirm its radical inhu-

. . . this current of thinking . . . deal [ s] a blow to what I shall call human nar­ cissism. Freud already listed three famous ones: man is not the center of the cosmos ( Copernicus ), is not the first living creature (Darwin ), is not the mas­ ter of meaning (Freud himself) . Through contemporary techno-science, he learns that he does not have the monopoly of mind, that is, of complexification, but that complexification is not inscribed as a destiny in matter but as possible, and that it takes place, at random, but intelligibly, well before himself. He learns in particular that his own science is in its turn a complexification of matter, in which, so to speak, energy itself comes to be reflected, without humans necessarily getting any benefit from this. And that

thus he must not consider himself as an origin or as a result but as a trans­ former ensuring, through techno-science, arts, economic development, cul­ tures and the new memorization they involve, a supplement of complexity in the universe. (45; translation modified, emphasis added)

manity.

The Practical Dimension of Technology and

Embodied Experience

Once we take up a pragmatic perspective on Lyotard's admittedly eccentric

views, we can fully appreciate his emphasis on the practical dimension of

contemporary technoscience. By demonstrating how technoscientific devel-

opments impact us extrascientifically, independently of their institutionally

mediated scientific significance, Lyotard lends strong support to the auton-

Paradoxically, to grasp the heuristic value of Lyotard's perspective, we need to understand this passage not as a hyperbolic obituary of the human but as a fundamentally ambivalent affirmation of its resilience. The human, Lyotard's genealogy seems to imply, perseveres through its destabilizations. Thus, if we can only find a way of resisting his overenthusiastic call for a direct communion with the cosmos, we can selectively draw on his analysis to situate technology in a more encompassing and properly posthuman con­ text without at the same time being compelled to affirm its radical inhu­ manity.

The Practical Dimension of Technology and Embodied Exp erience

Once we take up a pragmatic perspective on Lyotard's admittedly eccentric views, we can fully appreciate his emphasis on the practical dimension of contemporary techno science. By demonstrating how techno scientific devel­ opments impact us extrascientifically, independently of their institutionally mediated scientific significance, Lyotard lends strong support to the auton-

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 71

omy I have been claiming for technology. On the one hand, he furnishes a

coherent account of technology's particular autonomy from the cultural.

Though always developed within cultural contexts that have a determining

influence on their form, technologies are simultaneously exocultural: they

are crucial vehicles of a nonteleological, natural or cosmological evolution-

ary process that is only secondarily or tangentially (though certainly not

inconsequentially) subject to the more local demands of our cultural

moment. On the other hand, by stressing the key role played by transform-

ers, Lyotard furnishes a concrete account of the constitutive split that

informs human existence following the industrial revolution: with our ever

increasing reliance on inhuman transformers, our very capacity to acquire a

representationally mediated understanding of material complexification

diminishes. Insofar as it depends on abstract mathematics and computer

programs far beyond the grasp of our synthetic, phenomenal cognition, our

contemporary formalized means of representing materiality could not be

further distanced from our phenomenal experience of it.

Far from living out the global embrace gleefully envisioned by Marshall

McLuhan, then, we face a situation in which the prostheses we adopt to

cognize and intervene in the technologically driven material complexifi-

cation of the universe only seem to expand our experiential alienation. Since

they deterritorialize our cognitive mapping of the real into the dematerial-

ized, disembodied domain of mathematical formalization, the prosthetic

transformers on which we increasingly rely reinforce the fundamental inca-

pacity of those transformers proper to us-the embodied mind and the ner-

vous system-to translate technologically generated alterations of the life-

world into forms that fit the human measure.

Because contemporary technology largely exceeds the grasp of our built-

in, or natural, experiential capacities, the very hope of preserving the value

of the human perspective in the face of rapid technological change hinges on

our willingness to accept and adapt ourselves to the shift it produces in the

economy of experience. Thus, far from sharing cultural studies' commit-

ment to contextualization and its reassuring conviction that, as Markley

puts it, we still live in the humanist, logocentric era, we must take on the

more fundamental task of rethinking the very notion of culture in light of

the profound shift in the locus of experience brought about by technology.

Although a full account of this shift must await my discussion of Walter

Benjamin's trenchant distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung (chap. 9),

a brief consideration of Lyotard's debt to Henri Bergson-and specifically

to Bergson's ontological monism-will serve to make clear the extent of our

task. By furnishing the conceptual terminology to describe the progressive

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71

omy I have been claiming for technology. On the one hand, he furnishes a coherent account of technology's particular autonomy from the cultural. Though always developed within cultural contexts that have a determining influence on their form, technologies are simultaneously exocultural : they are crucial vehicles of a nonteleological, natural or cosmological evolution­ ary process that is only secondarily or tangentially ( though certainly not inconsequentially) subj ect to the more local demands of our cultural moment. On the other hand, by stressing the key role played by transform­ ers, Lyotard furnishes a concrete account of the constitutive split that informs human existence following the industrial revolution : with our ever increasing reliance on inhuman transformers, our very capacity to acquire a representationally mediated understanding of material complexification diminishes. Insofar as it depends on abstract mathematics and computer programs far beyond the grasp of our synthetic, phenomenal cognition, our contemporary formalized means of representing materiality could not be further distanced from our phenomenal experience of it. Far from living out the global embrace gleefully envisioned by Marshall McLuhan, then, we face a situation in which the prostheses we adopt to cognize and intervene in the technologically driven material complexifi­ cation of the universe only seem to expand our experiential alienation. Since they deterritorialize our cognitive mapping of the real into the dematerial­ ized, disembodied domain of mathematical formalization, the prosthetic transformers on which we increasingly rely reinforce the fundamental inca­ pacity of those transformers proper to us-the embodied mind and the ner­ vous system-to translate technologically generated alterations of the life­ world into forms that fit the human measure. Because contemporary technology largely exceeds the grasp of our built­ in, or natural, experiential capacities, the very hope of preserving the value of the human perspective in the face of rapid technological change hinges on our willingness to accept and adapt ourselves to the shift it produces in the economy of experience. Thus, far from sharing cultural studies' commit­ ment to contextualization and its reassuring conviction that, as Markley puts it, we still live in the humanist, logocentric era, we must take on the more fundamental task of rethinking the very notion of culture in light of the profound shift in the locus of experience brought about by technology. Although a full account of this shift must await my discussion of Walter Benj amin's trenchant distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung (chap . 9 ) , a brief consideration o f Lyotard's debt t o Henri Bergson-and specifically to Bergson's ontological monism-will serve to make clear the extent of our task. By furnishing the conceptual terminology to describe the progressive

72

72 * Embodying Technesis

shift in the mind-matter economy that has been the legacy of technological

change since the industrial revolution, Bergson helps us grapple with the

imperative we now face: his dissolution of the mind-matter distinction

serves as the strongest possible reminder that we urgently need to find ways

of expanding our access to the ever more prominent embodied dimension of

our lived experience.

Eschewing traditional dualism, Bergson situates matter and mind as the

two poles of a single continuum; mind, he claims, is distinguished from mat-

ter only by "differences of degree, which depends on the capacity to gather

and conserve." He further claims that "[m]ind is matter which remembers

its interactions, its immanence" (Lyotard 1991, 40). Mind, in other words,

is the product of an organism's (or a system's) ability to delay its reaction to

a material point (a stimulus from the material world); such delay gives it the

capacity to assemble what are in effect successive stimuli or material shocks

into a simultaneous unity of duration that yields a "conscious perception"

or "representation" (40). In the case of human perception, the difference

between matter and mind is one of rhythm. The process we follow in delay-

ing our reaction in this way comprises a kind of interface through which we

translate the preperceptual rhythm of material stimuli into units that obey

the rhythms proper to our representational consciousness. If successful, this

translation process yields an increase in our "material liberty," for by delay-

ing our instantaneous reaction to material stimuli, we are able to resist

falling under the determinism that matter would otherwise impose on us.

On Lyotard's account, this translational capacity meets its limit in the

postmodern world. With the material changes imposed by contemporary

technologies, we increasingly find ourselves unable to bridge the gap

between the rhythms of material stimuli and our proper human rhythms.

Consequently, we find ourselves faced with an ever increasing loss of mate-

rial liberty, a loss that can be temporarily forestalled only by our use of

prosthetic forms of mind, even if these forms will progressively alienate us

from our bodies until the moment when they simply replace us. What makes

this tragic story of humanity's demise seem inevitable is not some cosmo-

logical necessity, as Lyotard claims, but simply the poverty of Bergson's

recipe for material liberty. So long as we follow Bergson in predicating the

power to delay on the production of a representation, Lyotard's extreme

antihumanist picture of the future appears all but inevitable. If our power is

reductively bound to our representationalist faculties, not only will our cur-

rent form of existence as embodied creatures become ever increasingly out

of sync with material change, but our fate will indeed come to hinge, as

Lyotard rather gothically suggests it does, on developing prosthetic bodies

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

shift in the mind-matter economy that has been the legacy of technological change since the industrial revolution, Bergson helps us grapple with the imperative we now face: his dissolution of the mind-matter distinction serves as the strongest possible reminder that we urgently need to find ways of expanding our access to the ever more prominent embodied dimension of our lived experience. Eschewing traditional dualism, Bergson situates matter and mind as the two poles of a single continuum; mind, he claims, is distinguished from mat­ ter only by " differences of degree, which depends on the capacity to gather and conserve. " He further claims that " [ m l ind is matter which remembers its interactions, its immanence " (Lyotard 1 9 9 1 , 4 0 ) . Mind, in other words, is the product of an organism's (or a system's) ability to delay its reaction to a material point (a stimulus from the material world); such delay gives it the capacity to assemble what are in effect successive stimuli or material shocks into a simultaneous unity of duration that yields a " conscious perception" or " representation" (40 ) . In the case of human perception, the difference between matter and mind is one of rhythm. The process we follow in delay­ ing our reaction in this way comprises a kind of interface through which we translate the preperceptual rhythm of material stimuli into units that obey the rhythms proper to our representational consciousness. If successful, this translation process yields an increase in our " material liberty, " for by delay­ ing our instantaneous reaction to material stimuli, we are able to resist falling under the determinism that matter would otherwise impose on us. On Lyotard's account, this translational capacity meets its limit in the postmodern world. With the material changes imposed by contemporary technologies, we increasingly find ourselves unable to bridge the gap between the rhythms of material stimuli and our proper human rhythms. Consequently, we find ourselves faced with an ever increasing loss of mate­ rial liberty, a loss that can be temporarily forestalled only by our use of prosthetic forms of mind, even if these forms will progressively alienate us from our bodies until the moment when they simply replace us. What makes this tragic story of humanity's demise seem inevitable is not some cosmo­ logical necessity, as Lyotard claims, but simply the poverty of Bergson's recipe for material liberty. So long as we follow Bergson in predicating the power to delay on the production of a representation, Lyotard's extreme antihumanist picture of the future appears all but inevitable. If our power is reductively bound to our representationalist faculties, not only will our cur­ rent form of existence as embodied creatures become ever increasingly out of sync with material change, but our fate will indeed come to hinge, as Lyotard rather gothically suggests it does, on developing prosthetic bodies

Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real

Locating the Technological Real * 73

capable of housing mind and guaranteeing its survival following the heat

death of the sun.10

Fortunately, to resist such a pessimistic and fantastically hyperbolic con-

clusion, we need only eschew the deep theoretical bias that lies at the heart

of Bergson's (and Lyotard's) ontology. By decoupling human freedom from

the capacity to translate material stimuli into mental representations, we

open entirely new possibilities. Specifically, we avoid reducing the nervous

system to a static entity by granting it capabilities of adaptation that are not

narrowly cognitive. Ultimately, this will allow us to resituate our adaptation

to technological change within the broad perspective of the evolutionary

history and flexibility of the embodied human being. Consequently, we will

be able to acquire the means of explaining how we can modify ourselves to

process preperceptual material stimuli and, correlatively, how we can expe-

rience technologically generated material complexification without the

mediation of representation.11

Faced with the task of developing what amounts to a logic of embodiment,

the contemporary cultural critic occupies a position largely analogous to

that of artificial life (AL) researchers who, departing markedly from the

artificial intelligence (AI) tradition, seek to develop cognitive agents capable

of performing simple everyday practical tasks, such as walking and avoiding

stationary objects. We too must develop a bottom-up model of cognition,

•

73

capable of housing mind and guaranteeing its survival following the heat death of the sun.1 0 Fortunately, to resist such a pessimistic and fantastically hyperbolic con­ clusion, we need only eschew the deep theoretical bias that lies at the heart of Bergson's ( and Lyotard' s ) ontology. By decoupling human freedom from the capacity to translate material stimuli into mental representations, we open entirely new possibilities. Specifically, we avoid reducing the nervous system to a static entity by granting it capabilities of adaptation that are not narrowly cognitive. Ultimately, this will allow us to resituate our adaptation to technological change within the broad perspective of the evolutionary history and flexibility of the embodied human being. Consequently, we will be able to acquire the means of explaining how we can modify ourselves to process preperceptual material stimuli and, correlatively, how we can expe­ rience technologically generated material complexification without the mediation of representation. 1 1

one that does not begin by presupposing (human) consciousness as its goal

but fundamentally reconceives cognition as the operation not of disembod-

ied logical operations but of massively distributed nervous systems. On such

a model, cognitive responses to material stimuli need not take the form of

representations but can be thought of as computational adjustments occur-

ring in the peripheral nervous system. As a model for such a bottom-up,

postrepresentationalist notion of agency, AL research affords us an alterna-

tive to the radically posthuman robotics paradigm

enthusiastically

embraced by Lyotard. If we can learn from AL research efforts to evolve

"intelligence within the machine through pathways found by the 'creatures'

themselves" (Hayles 1996b, 161; emphasis added), we may come to under-

stand how our nervous systems can adapt to material changes that exceed

their inscriptional capacities and how we can stimulate our nervous systems

to "learn" in an emergent and completely practical way-one that would

forever lack a representational correlate.12 As I shall argue in chapter 9,

Walter Benjamin's notion of sensory retraining through submission to the

shock experience of the cinema engages these possibilities in extremely fruit-

ful ways. Where Lyotard's interest in technological prostheses remains

Faced with the task o f developing what amounts to a logic o f embodiment, the contemporary cultural critic occupies a position largely analogous to that of artificial life (AL) researchers who, departing markedly from the artificial intelligence (AI) tradition, seek to develop cognitive agents capable of performing simple everyday practical tasks, such as walking and avoiding stationary obj ects. We too must develop a bottom-up model of cognition, one that does not begin by presupposing (human) consciousness as its goal but fundamentally reconceives cognition as the operation not of disembod­ ied logical operations but of massively distributed nervous systems. On such a model, cognitive responses to material stimuli need not take the form of representations but can be thought of as computational adj ustments occur­ ring in the peripheral nervous system. As a model for such a bottom-up, postrepresentationalist notion of agency, AL research affords us an alterna­ tive to the radically posthuman robotics paradigm enthusiastically embraced by Lyotard. If we can learn from AL research efforts to evolve " intelligence within the machine through pathways found by the "creatures' themselves " (Hayles 1 996b, 1 6 1 ; emphasis added) , we may come to under­ stand how our nervous systems can adapt to material changes that exceed their inscriptional capacities and how we can stimulate our nervous systems to " learn " in an emergent and completely practical way-one that would forever lack a representational correlate.12 As I shall argue in chapter 9, Walter Benj amin's notion of sensory retraining through submission to the shock experience of the cinema engages these possibilities in extremely fruit­ ful ways. Where Lyotard' s interest in technological prostheses remains

74

74 " Embodying Technesis

purely cognitive, Benjamin gives us a recipe for how to use them mimeti-

cally, a recipe for training our senses in a manner that, following Bourdieu's

proscription, has no direct representational or theoretical payoff. In the

space of this difference, I suggest, we encounter the core challenge of the

technological posthuman: if we are to negotiate technologically mediated

material complexification without either falling back into a retrograde and

defensive humanism or taking an all-too-precipitous leap into the inhuman,

we simply cannot put off the opportunity of exploring such unorthodox

possibilities.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

purely cognitive, Benj amin gives us a recipe for how to use them mimeti­ cally, a recipe for training our senses in a manner that, following Bourdieu's proscription, has no direct representational or theoretical payoff. In the space of this difference, I suggest, we encounter the core challenge of the technological posthuman: if we are to negotiate technologically mediated material complexification without either falling back into a retrograde and defensive humanism or taking an all-too-precipitous leap into the inhuman, we simply cannot put off the opportunity of exploring such unorthodox possibilities.

Part 2

The Machine Reduction of Technology

Part 2 T h e Mach i n e Red u cti o n of Tech n o l ogy



Chapter 3

From Metaphor to Embodiment:

Resisting Technesis

Having now exposed the microphysical dimension of technology's impact

Chapter 3

on embodied experience, I can turn to the main topic of my study: the cri-

tique of twentieth-century critical discourses for their reduction of technol-

ogy. In this chapter, I reconstruct the genealogy of this theoretical reduction

by tracing its two major twentieth-century trajectories back to their com-

mon source in Greek ontology; in chapters 4-8, I track the legacy of this

reduction through critical readings of a core set of central twentieth-century

From Metaphor to Embodiment: Resisting Technesis

critical discourses.

Read as a contribution to contemporary criticism, my genealogical

reconstruction serves to expose the extensive and often unacknowledged

reliance of cultural studies on poststructuralist theory. By itself hardly a

grounds for complaint, this reliance becomes an issue, as I suggested in my

introduction, when contemporary critical discourses positivize their theo-

retical sources, making the deconstructive moment a transitory phase in a

larger narrative or historicization of the cognitive subject's triumph over

any and all material obstacles. In the two forms it takes in contemporary

criticism (what I differentiated in chap. 1 as representationalist and systemic

analyses, respectively), this positivization engages technology as an instance

of a broader notion

of exteriority borrowed, essentially without

modification, from poststructuralism. Since this notion of exteriority-what

Derrida christens relative exteriority-is itself profoundly reductive, my cri-

tique is intended to apply with equal force to poststructuralism and to its

contemporary legatees.

In its first, more prevalent form, the positivization of the deconstructive

moment results from the simple incapacity on the part of contemporary crit-

ics to give up their deeply entrenched commitment to representationalism.

The example of cultural critic Michelle Kendrick discussed in my introduc-

tion forms a case in point. While Kendrick announces an urgency to treat

technology as somehow "beyond the control or agency of the user"

(Kendrick 1996), her assessment of its impact is restrictively filtered through

Having now exposed the microphysical dimension of technology's impact on embodied experience, I can turn to the main topic of my study: the cri­ tique of twentieth-century critical discourses for their reduction of technol­ ogy. In this chapter, I reconstruct the genealogy of this theoretical reduction by tracing its two maj or twentieth-century traj ectories back to their com­ mon source in Greek ontology; in chapters 4-8 , I track the legacy of this reduction through critical readings of a core set of central twentieth-century critical discourses. Read as a contribution to contemporary criticism, my genealogical reconstruction serves to expose the extensive and often unacknowledged reliance of cultural studies on poststructuralist theory. By itself hardly a grounds for complaint, this reliance becomes an issue, as I suggested in my introduction, when contemporary critical discourses positivize their theo­ retical sources, making the deconstructive moment a transitory phase in a larger narrative or historicization of the cognitive subject's triumph over any and all material obstacles. In the two forms it takes in contemporary criticism (what I differentiated in chap . 1 as representationalist and systemic analyses, respectively) , this positivization engages technology as an instance of a broader notion of exteriority borrowed, essentially without modification, from poststructuralism. Since this notion of exteriority-what D errida christens relative exteriority-is itself profoundly reductive, my cri­ tique is intended to apply with equal force to poststructuralism and to its contemporary legatees. In its first, more prevalent form, the positivization of the deconstructive moment results from the simple incapacity on the part of contemporary crit­ ics to give up their deeply entrenched commitment to representationalism. The example of cultural critic Michelle Kendrick discussed in my introduc­ tion forms a case in point. While Kendrick announces an urgency to treat technology as somehow " beyond the control or agency of the user" (Kendrick 1 99 6 ) , her assessment of its impact is restrictively filtered through

78

78 * Embodying Technesis

the effects it has on our capacity to constitute ourselves as subjects, to rep-

resent ourselves to ourselves.1 No matter how aware we might be of the

constitutive fictionality of the self, no matter how rigorously we might fol-

low Hume in privileging habit over representation, we remain dependent on

representational constructions of the self to capture the significance of our

habits and, consequently, to mediate the "technological real" for us. What-

ever exteriority is thereby broached is-and can only be-a relative exteri-

ority, a point of resistance internal to the representational space of thought.

In its second form, the positivizing of the deconstructive moment results

from a decision to privilege formal analogies between literary and techno-

scientific systems. In reading literary texts as emergent phenomena in the

sense developed by cybernetics or, alternately, as structures sharing a com-

mon organizational logic with chaos theory, critics deploy the systems per-

spective in a largely uncritical manner: they simply presuppose an underly-

ing structural homology between literary and technoscientific branches of

knowledge.2 Not only does such a position perpetuate the hypostatization

of thought that, as we have seen, hinders the investigation of technology's

robust experiential impact, but it does so by jettisoning the very dimension

of poststructuralist theory most fundamental to its cultural application-the

disjunction between interiorizing thought and its technological embodi-

ment.3

In a recent discussion of literature and complexity that can stand as an

exemplar for the systems approach, William Paulson contextualizes decon-

struction within the cybernetic theory of communication as self-organiza-

tion from noise. By adopting an information-theoretical perspective, Paul-

son is able to reinterpret rhetorical indeterminacy as the constitutive

condition of the literary itself: "The process of self-organization from noise

provides a suggestive model for the understanding of literary signification, a

model that accounts for meaning by accepting, rather than resisting, the

rhetorical dimension of language" (Paulson 1991, 41). Within such a per-

spective, one need not fear the specter of radical undecidability and the con-

stitutive instability of language, since indeterminacy itself-as noise-repre-

sents the condition of possibility for literary meaning to arise.4 In short, the

information-systems perspective reverses the trajectory of deconstruction:

rather than moving outward, as de Manian deconstruction does, from

grammar to rhetoric, deconstruction within an information-theoretical

frame moves inward, as it were, from rhetoric (noise) to grammar (infor-

mation). By furnishing the background for the "play of the signifier," more-

over, information-theory fundamentally alters the focus of rhetorical analy-

sis: instead of culminating in a purely formal incompatibility of grammar

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

the effects it has on our capacity to constitute ourselves as subj ects, to rep­ resent ourselves to ourselves.1 No matter how aware we might be of the constitutive fictionality of the self, no matter how rigorously we might fol­ low Hume in privileging habit over representation, we remain dependent on representational constructions of the self to capture the significance of our habits and, consequently, to mediate the " technological real " for us. What­ ever exteriority is thereby broached is-and can only be-a relative exteri­ ority, a point of resistance internal to the representational space of thought. In its second form, the positivizing of the deconstructive moment results from a decision to privilege formal analogies between literary and techno­ scientific systems. In reading literary texts as emergent phenomena in the sense developed by cybernetics or, alternately, as structures sharing a com­ mon organizational logic with chaos theory, critics deploy the systems per­ spective in a largely uncritical manner: they simply presuppose an underly­ ing structural homology between literary and techno scientific branches of knowledge.2 Not only does such a position perpetuate the hypostatization of thought that, as we have seen, hinders the investigation of technology's robust experiential impact, but it does so by jettisoning the very dimension of poststructuralist theory most fundamental to its cultural application-the disj unction between interiorizing thought and its technological embodi­ ment.3 In a recent discussion of literature and complexity that can stand as an exemplar for the systems approach, William Paulson contextualizes decon­ struction within the cybernetic theory of communication as self-organiza­ tion from noise. By adopting an information-theoretical perspective, Paul­ son is able to reinterpret rhetorical indeterminacy as the constitutive condition of the literary itself: " The process of self-organization from noise provides a suggestive model for the understanding of literary signification, a model that accounts for meaning by accepting, rather than resisting, the rhetorical dimension of language " (Paulson 1 9 9 1 , 4 1 ) . Within such a per­ spective, one need not fear the specter of radical undecidability and the con­ stitutive instability of language, since indeterminacy itself-as noise-repre­ sents the condition of possibility for literary meaning to arise.4 In short, the information-systems perspective reverses the traj ectory of deconstruction: rather than moving outward, as de Manian deconstruction does, from grammar to rhetoric, deconstruction within an information-theoretical frame moves inward, as it were, from rhetoric (noise) to grammar (infor­ mation) . By furnishing the background for the "play of the signifier, " more­ over, information-theory fundamentally alters the focus of rhetorical analy­ sis: instead of culminating in a purely formal incompatibility of grammar

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 79

and rhetoric, it opens language to the outside. Ultimately, then, the cyber-

netic contextualization of the grammar-rhetoric disjunction displaces de

Man's textualist nihilism entirely; far from leading to a prison house of for-

mal self-referentiality, the cybernetic interpretation is marshaled to support

a dialectical reader-response program, based on the notion of literary com-

petence, in which indeterminacy has the function of stimulating the acquisi-

tion of new interpretative codes (see ibid., 48).

Whether the invocation of a systems perspective leads to a fortification of

properly human processes of cognition or, by contrast, to the kind of radi-

cal break with the human perspective introduced through the comparison of

literature with chaos, the attempt to situate the deconstructive disjunction

within a more embracing context can succeed only by converting it into a

functional differentiation within an inclusive context-a provisional cut

between system and environment. To assert a formal homology (and not

simply a common cultural background) between literary texts and scientific

systems, contemporary cybernetic and chaos-theoretical models have to rely

on a systems-theoretical notion of observation that severely compromises

the status of materiality. By restricting materiality to a role within a given

environment, the enabling act of observation that initially differentiates sys-

tem from environment also functions to bracket out materiality in the

broader sense. Instead of being invoked as the rich and unpredictable back-

ground for all practice, including the production of observational acts them-

selves, materiality is situated outside the circuit that connects system and

environment. As a result, it receives a purely abstract determination as that

which resists translation per se.

Paulson, for example, claims that we can infer the "ultimate underlying

unity" of literature and science ("systems that only disciplinary descriptions

have cut into separate hierarchical levels") by developing "local, emergent

and risk-taking . . . process[es] of transcoding" between cultural text (liter-

ature) and sociohistorical context (science) (50).5 Since it directs (and

thereby restricts) critical attention to a model of society (and, by extension,

of reality) that is constructed around specific processes of transcoding, such

a systems-theoretical perspective brackets out the larger domain of materi-

ality. Far from helping us clarify our embodied connection with the world,

systems theory actually seeks to revolutionize the task of theoretical descrip-

tion, to reconceptualize it as a self-contained reproduction of the real: by

introducing the notion of second-order cybernetics (according to which an

observation that introduces a distinction is itself "unable to observe the dis-

tinction on which it bases its own observation" [Schwanitz 1995, 156]), sys-

tems theory shifts the focus of analysis from a first-order process of observ-

•

79

and rhetoric, it opens language to the outside. Ultimately, then, the cyber­ netic contextualization of the grammar-rhetoric disj unction displaces de Man's textualist nihilism entirely; far from leading to a prison house of for­ mal self-referentiality, the cybernetic interpretation is marshaled to support a dialectical reader-response program, based on the notion of literary com­ petence, in which indeterminacy has the function of stimulating the acquisi­ tion of new interpretative codes ( see ibid., 4 8 ) . Whether the invocation o f a systems perspective leads to a fortification of properly human processes of cognition or, by contrast, to the kind of radi­ cal break with the human perspective introduced through the comparison of literature with chaos, the attempt to situate the deconstructive disj unction within a more embracing context can succeed only by converting it into a functional differentiation within an inclusive context-a provisional cut between system and environment. To assert a formal homology (and not simply a common cultural background) between literary texts and scientific systems, contemporary cybernetic and chaos-theoretical models have to rely on a systems-theoretical notion of observation that severely compromises the status of materiality. By restricting materiality to a role within a given environment, the enabling act of observation that initially differentiates sys­ tem from environment also functions to bracket out materiality in the broader sense. Instead of being invoked as the rich and unpredictable back­ ground for all practice, including the production of observational acts them­ selves, materiality is situated outside the circuit that connects system and environment. As a result, it receives a purely abstract determination as that which resists translation per se. Paulson, for example, claims that we can infer the " ultimate underlying unity" of literature and science ( " systems that only disciplinary descriptions have cut into separate hierarchical levels " ) by developing " local, emergent and risk-taking . . . process [es] of transcoding" between cultural text (liter­ ature ) and sociohistorical context ( science ) ( 5 0 ) . 5 Since it directs ( and thereby restricts) critical attention to a model of society (and, by extension, of reality) that is constructed around specific processes of transcoding, such a systems-theoretical perspective brackets out the larger domain of materi­ ality. Far from helping us clarify our embodied connection with the world, systems theory actually seeks to revolutionize the task of theoretical descrip­ tion, to reconceptualize it as a self-contained reproduction of the real: by introducing the notion of second-order cybernetics ( according to which an observation that introduces a distinction is itself " unable to observe the dis­ tinction on which it bases its own observation " [Schwanitz 1 995, 1 5 6] ) , sys­ tems theory shifts the focus of analysis from a first-order process of observ-

80

80 * Embodying Technesis

ing objects to a second-order observation of observations. Rather than a

concrete engagement with technology's impact on our embodied experi-

ence, systems-theoretical models leave us with a description of the func-

tional specification of technological society (or whatever plays the role of

most inclusive context) as a progressive proliferation of second-order obser-

vations.6 While systems theory may indeed function to overcome particular

deconstructive aporia, as its proponents claim, it does so only at the cost of

radically isolating system from environment. Consequently, whatever epis-

temological force it can claim is acquired only by cutting description off

from embodied reality-by bracketing out all constraint the real might

impose on it.7

In effect, then, systems analyses of science and technology form exem-

plary instances of the positivizing of poststructuralist theory that I have

attributed to contemporary cultural studies: by thematizing exteriority

exclusively as a temporary blind spot constitutive of a particular system that

cannot be seen from the vantage point of the observation responsible for its

construction, such analyses domesticate exteriority into a mere by-product

of an evolving description of the relation of system and environment. Not

only is exteriority thus defined, in principle, as purely relative-a con-

structed point of resistance within the space of descriptive thought-but it is

also effectively neutralized, since it can in principle always be recuperated at

a higher level of complexity, as the new state of a system following a further

act of observation. Thus, to the extent that it attributes the disjunction

between interiorizing thought and its technological embodiment to an

observer rather than to the world itself, systems analysis misses the chance

to capitalize on what, in my opinion, is truly novel and affirmative about

our otherwise all-too-banal "postmodern condition"-the way technologies

have incorporated the cause of deconstruction directly into the material

infrastructure of the lifeworld itself.8

As long as technology is modeled on the category of relative exteriority,

its material autonomy remains subordinate to its function within the

domain of discursive thought; far from functioning as an agent of material

complexification, technology is deployed as a purely abstract marker of an

alterity that is constitutive of thought. The most significant consequence of

this reduction is the collapse of technology into metaphor. For the twenti-

eth-century critics on whom I focus-those most responsible for technol-

ogy's assimilation into the category of relative exteriority-this collapse of

technology into metaphor takes the form of what I have already identified

in my introduction as the machine reduction of technology. By identifying

technology with the figure of the machine, twentieth-century critical dis-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

ing obj ects to a second-order observation of observations. Rather than a concrete engagement with technology's impact on our embodied experi­ ence, systems-theoretical models leave us with a description of the func­ tional specification of technological society (or whatever plays the role of most inclusive context) as a progressive proliferation of second-order obser­ vations. 6 While systems theory may indeed function to overcome particular deconstructive aporia, as its proponents claim, it does so only at the cost of radically isolating system from environment. Consequently, whatever epis­ temological force it can claim is acquired only by cutting description off from embodied reality-by bracketing out all constraint the real might impose on it'? In effect, then, systems analyses of science and technology form exem­ plary instances of the positivizing of poststructuralist theory that I have attributed to contemporary cultural studies: by thematizing exteriority exclusively as a temporary blind spot constitutive of a particular system that cannot be seen from the vantage point of the observation responsible for its construction, such analyses domesticate exteriority into a mere by-product of an evolving description of the relation of system and environment. Not only is exteriority thus defined, in principle, as purely relative-a con­ structed point of resistance within the space of descriptive thought-but it is also effectively neutralized, since it can in principle always be recuperated at a higher level of complexity, as the new state of a system following a further act of observation. Thus, to the extent that it attributes the disj unction between interiorizing thought and its technological embodiment to an observer rather than to the world itself, systems analysis misses the chance to capitalize on what, in my opinion, is truly novel and affirmative about our otherwise all-too-banal " postmodern condition "-the way technologies have incorporated the cause of deconstruction directly into the material infrastructure of the lifeworld itself. 8 As long as technology is modeled on the category of relative exteriority, its material autonomy remains subordinate to its function within the domain of discursive thought; far from functioning as an agent of material complexification, technology is deployed as a purely abstract marker of an alterity that is constitutive of thought. The most significant consequence of this reduction is the collapse of technology into metaphor. For the twenti­ eth-century critics on whom I focus-those most responsible for technol­ ogy's assimilation into the category of relative exteriority-this collapse of technology into metaphor takes the form of what I have already identified in my introduction as the machine reduction of technology. By identifying technology with the figure of the machine, twentieth-century critical dis-

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 81

courses effectively preserve the priority of thought over technology and, in

the process, more deeply entrench the instrumental enframing of technology

so central to our modernity.9

Due largely to the legacy of poststructuralism, our current efforts to

rethink the contemporary role of technology are overdetermined and, I sug-

gest, undermined by the prevalence of one particular form of this machine

reduction: the reduction of technology to that particular machine known as

the text. To overcome the machine reduction of technology in its current tex-

tualist form, we will thus have to return to the source of the metaphysical

assumptions underlying current conceptualizations of technology-Aristo-

tle's "decision" to subordinate the "automatic" (to automaton) to a category

of chance modeled on human intentionality and natural teleology (tuche). To

get there, however, we must first sketch the modern trajectory that links tech-

nesis to Aristotle's inaugural machine reduction of technology.

The Machine Reduction of Technology and the

Modern Trajectory of the Machine Metaphor

Understanding the machine reduction of technology in its contemporary

form requires us to reconstruct the gradual historical process through which

it acquired its textualist basis. As literary critic Wylie Sypher suggests, this

•

81

courses effectively preserve the priority of thought over technology and, in the process, more deeply entrench the instrumental enframing of technology so central to our modernity.9 Due largely to the legacy of poststructuralism, our current efforts to rethink the contemporary role of technology are overdetermined and, I sug­ gest, undermined by the prevalence of one particular form of this machine reduction: the reduction of technology to that particular machine known as the text. To overcome the machine reduction of technology in its current tex­ tualist form, we will thus have to return to the source of the metaphysical assumptions underlying current conceptualizations of technology-Aristo­ tle's " decision " to subordinate the " automatic" (to automaton) to a category of chance modeled on human intentionality and natural teleology (tuche) . To get there, however, we must first sketch the modern traj ectory that links tech­ nesis to Aristotle's inaugural machine reduction of technology.

process can be traced back to the nineteenth century, to the moment when

literature rediscovered its pre-Romantic roots and became once again an

explicitly technical enterprise focused on method rather than expression.

For Sypher, this return to method is inseparable from the development of

technology and expresses the desire on the part of literary authors to reap

the benefits of the technicist attitude; centered on the neutralization of

chance and accident, this new attitude finds its literary apogee in Stephan

The M achine Reduction of Technology and the Modern Traj ectory of the M achine Metaphor

Mallarme's effort to automatize the process of writing poetry. Un Coup de

Des, writes Sypher, is "a desperate venture in writing a pure poem by cal-

culating everything, by ruling out the surprises of Chance-the throw of the

dice, which is the aesthetic threat." He continues:

... the Poem (the Book) should be so duly controlled that the casual, the con-

tingent, the irrelevant should be eliminated. The symbolist poem was devoted

to a conquest by method, a program of artistic discipline that banished the

accidental as utterly as a laboratory experiment... The poem, manifesting its

pure Beauty, would appear in all its clarity as the supreme artifact unconta-

minated by the hazard of photography or prose, the disorder of life, the acci-

dents in actuality. (Sypher 1968, 25-26)

Understanding the machine reduction of technology in its contemporary form requires us to reconstruct the gradual historical process through which it acquired its textualist basis. As literary critic Wylie Sypher suggests, this process can be traced back to the nineteenth century, to the moment when literature rediscovered its pre-Romantic roots and became once again an explicitly technical enterprise focused on method rather than expression. For Sypher, this return to method is inseparable from the development of technology and expresses the desire on the part of literary authors to reap the benefits of the technicist attitude; centered on the neutralization of chance and accident, this new attitude finds its literary apogee in Stephan Mallarme's effort to automatize the process of writing poetry. Un Coup de Des, writes Sypher, is " a desperate venture in writing a pure poem by cal­ culating everything, by ruling out the surprises of Chance-the throw of the dice, which is the aesthetic threat. " He continues: . . . the Poem (the Book) should be so duly controlled that the casual, the con­ tingent, the irrelevant should be eliminated. The symbolist poem was devoted to a conquest by method, a program of artistic discipline that banished the accidental as utterly as a laboratory experiment . . . The poem, manifesting its pure Beauty, would appear in all its clarity as the supreme artifact unconta­ minated by the hazard of photography or prose, the disorder of life, the acci­ dents in actuality. ( Sypher 1 9 6 8 , 25-2 6 )

82

82 * Embodying Technesis

Mallarme's ideal remained the goal for later symbolist and modernist critics

and writers, who faced the undeniable failure of his project (Sypher refers to

the "inaccessibility" of his pure Poem) by shifting the emphasis of their tech-

nicism from the work to its reception, from the metaphysics of textuality to

the pragmatics of avant-garde shock tactics. The explicit identification of

text with machine emerges from this shift: Paul Valery, for example,

qualifies the poem as "a kind of machine for producing the poetic state of

mind by means of words" (cited in ibid., 27); and William Carlos Williams

is even more concise, boldly contending that "the poem" simply "is a

machine" (cited in Porush 1985, 11).

Poststructuralist theory further reinforces these same values of the text-

machine-formalism and systematicity against the messiness and open-

ness of life processes. Armed with the methodology of structural linguistics,

poststructuralists make good on Mallarme's impossible program: by divorc-

ing Language (langue) from pragmatics (parole) and concentrating solely on

deconstructing its systematic operation, poststructuralist critics produce the

separation of pure poetry from phenomenal life.10 In this way, they develop

what amounts to a restricted machinic ontology of textuality; for them, lan-

guage assumes the role of a machine that runs independently of the phe-

nomenal and rhetorical categories governing lived experience.

Paul de

Man furnishes the prototype of the poststructuralist

identification of text and machine with his claim that the "machine is like

the grammar of the text when it is isolated from its rhetoric, the merely for-

mal element without which no text can be generated" (de Man 1979, 294).

The poststructuralist text-machine, in turn, finds its philosophical exponent

in the early Derrida, who explicitly describes grammatology as a liberation

of the machine in language: "The originary and pre- or meta-phonetic writ-

ing that I am attempting to conceive here leads to nothing less than an 'over-

taking' of speech by the machine" (Derrida 1974, 79). With their general-

ized identification of text and machine, the poststructuralists realize

Mallarme's goal in the very process of bringing to a close the progressive

project-so central to twentieth-century philosophy and cultural criticism

of introducing technology into the heart of thought. By radicalizing Heideg-

ger's and Freud's invocations of technology, Derrida, de Man, and Lacan

celebrate the text, the letter, and the signifier, respectively, as the site of tech-

nology's penetration into thought. In so doing, they open an entirely new

phase not simply in the technicist history of modern literature but in the

modern cultural history of the machine metaphor itself. With their

identification of text and machine, the poststructuralists bring about a

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

Mallarme's ideal remained the goal for later symbolist and modernist critics and writers, who faced the undeniable failure of his proj ect ( Sypher refers to the " inaccessibility " of his pure Poem) by shifting the emphasis of their tech­ nicism from the work to its reception, from the metaphysics of textuality to the pragmatics of avant-garde shock tactics. The explicit identification of text with machine emerges from this shift: Paul Valery, for example, qualifies the poem as "a kind of machine for producing the poetic state of mind by means of words " (cited in ibid. , 27); and William Carlos Williams is even more concise, boldly contending that " the poem " simply "is a machine" (cited in Porush 1 9 8 5 , 1 1 ) . Poststructuralist theory further reinforces these same values of the text­ machine-formalism and systematicity-against the messiness and open­ ness of life processes. Armed with the methodology of structural linguistics, poststructuralists make good on Mallarme's impossible program : by divorc­ ing Language (langue) from pragmatics (parole) and concentrating solely on deconstructing its systematic operation, poststructuralist critics produce the separation of pure poetry from phenomenal life . 1 o In this way, they develop what amounts to a restricted machinic ontology of textuality; for them, lan­ guage assumes the role of a machine that runs independently of the phe­ nomenal and rhetorical categories governing lived experience. Paul de Man furnishes the prototype of the poststructuralist identification of text and machine with his claim that the " machine is like the grammar of the text when it is isolated from its rhetoric, the merely for­ mal element without which no text can be generated " ( de Man 1 979, 294 ) . The poststructuralist text-machine, i n turn, finds its philosophical exponent in the early Derrida, who explicitly describes grammatology as a liberation of the machine in language : "The originary and pre- or meta-phonetic writ­ ing that I am attempting to conceive here leads to nothing less than an 'over­ taking' of speech by the machine" (Derrida 1 974, 79) . With their general­ ized identification of text and machine, the poststructuralists realize Mallarme's goal in the very process of bringing to a close the progressive proj ect-so central to twentieth-century philosophy and cultural criticism­ of introducing technology into the heart of thought. By radicalizing Heideg­ ger's and Freud's invocations of technology, Derrida, de Man, and Lacan celebrate the text, the letter, and the signifier, respectively, as the site of tech­ nology's penetration into thought. In so doing, they open an entirely new phase not simply in the technicist history of modern literature but in the modern cultural history of the machine metaphor itself. With their identification of text and machine, the poststructuralists bring about a

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 83

significant inversion in the tenor of the machine metaphor: for the first time,

the machine is actually deployed as a metaphor for technology itself.

Prior to this inversion, the machine-despite a diverse set of concrete

deployments-clearly served the single overarching purpose of establishing

the nature of the human. Either by furnishing analogies for its mechanisms

(body and later mind) or by representing what is other than the human (the

universe or God's creation, figured as a clockwork or a feedback mecha-

nism), the machine facilitated consideration of such key philosophical top-

ics as whether human beings have free will and what distinguishes them

from animals.11 One machine in particular provided modern Continental

philosophers with a useful metaphor for conceptualizing or repudiating

what they thought was singular and irreducible about the human-what, in

different accounts, is variously termed soul, mind, free will, spirit, and so

forth. In a justly famous passage from the sixth Meditation, Descartes inau-

gurates the reign of this metaphor by comparing the body to the workings

of a clock.

... a clock constructed with wheels and weights observes all the laws of its

nature just as closely when it is badly made . . . as when it completely fulfils

the wishes of the clockmaker. In the same way, I might consider the body of

a man as a kind of machine equipped with and made up of bones, nerves,

muscles, veins, blood and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind

in it, it would still perform all the same movements as it now does in those

cases where movement is not under the control of the will or, consequently,

of the mind [but occurs merely as a result of the disposition of the organs].

(Descartes 1988, 58)

Across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the clock metaphor gradu-

ally evolved into the radical affirmation of a total equivalence of the human

with the machine. It reached its culmination when the eighteenth-century

French materialist Julien de la Mettrie simply extended Descartes's analogy

to include the mind itself: ". . . since all the faculties of the soul depend to

such a degree on the proper organization of the brain and the whole body,

that apparently they are but this organization itself, the soul is clearly an

enlightened machine" (La Mettrie 1912, 128). With this extension, the rad-

ical potential of the classical machine metaphor is achieved: mechanism and

organism form a single continuum; the human being simply is a kind of

machine.

•

83

significant inversion in the tenor of the machine metaphor: for the first time, the machine is actually deployed as a metaphor for technology itself. Prior to this inversion, the machine-despite a diverse set of concrete deployments-clearly served the single overarching purpose of establishing the nature of the human. Either by furnishing analogies for its mechanisms ( body and later mind) or by representing what is other than the human (the universe or God's creation, figured as a clockwork or a feedback mecha­ nism ) , the machine facilitated consideration of such key philosophical top­ ics as whether human beings have free will and what distinguishes them from animals. l 1 One machine in particular provided modern Continental philosophers with a useful metaphor for conceptualizing or repudiating what they thought was singular and irreducible about the human-what, in different accounts, is variously termed soul, mind, free will, spirit, and so forth. In a j ustly famous passage from the sixth Meditation, Descartes inau­ gurates the reign of this metaphor by comparing the body to the workings of a clock . . . . a clock constructed with wheels and weights observes all the laws of its nature j ust as closely when it is badly made . . . as when it completely fulfils the wishes of the clockmaker. In the same way, I might consider the body of a man as a kind of machine equipped with and made up of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still perform all the same movements as it now does in those cases where movement is not under the control of the will or, consequently, of the mind [but occurs merely as a result of the disposition of the organs] . (Descartes 1 9 8 8 , 5 8 )

Whether we explain the motive behind this trajectory in cultural-materi-

alist terms, as historian Otto Mayr does in his thick description of the

clock's role in early modern Europe, or in theoretical terms, as French

Across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the clock metaphor gradu­ ally evolved into the radical affirmation of a total equivalence of the human with the machine. It reached its culmination when the eighteenth-century French materialist Julien de la Mettrie simply extended Descartes's analogy to include the mind itself: " . . . since all the faculties of the soul depend to such a degree on the proper organization of the brain and the whole body, that apparently they are but this organization itself, the soul is clearly an enlightened machine" (La Mettrie 1 9 1 2, 1 2 8 ) . With this extension, the rad­ ical potential of the classical machine metaphor is achieved: mechanism and organism form a single continuum; the human being simply is a kind of machine. Whether we explain the motive behind this traj ectory in cultural-materi­ alist terms, as historian Otto Mayr does in his thick description of the clock's role in early modern Europe, or in theoretical terms, as French

84

84 * Embodying Technesis

philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem does in his genealogy of the

machine metaphor,12 what is important is the distinct tenor that is common

to the metaphor: in its various guises, the machine is consistently employed

as a heuristic for conceptualizing what is proper to the human.13

Precisely this basic coding is inverted in the twentieth-century evolution

of the metaphor: by the time it acquires its poststructuralist form, the

machine has begun to furnish a metaphor not for the human but for tech-

nology itself. In carrying out Mallarme's program, the poststructuralists

give a radically new spin to the text-machine equation. In their hands, this

equation does not simply comprise a means for understanding and autono-

mizing Language as system (i.e., langue); it simultaneously affords a means

for fundamentally rethinking technology itself. By consummating the shift

in the tenor of the machine metaphor that has been underway since the nine-

teenth century, the poststructuralist equation of text and machine thus fun-

damentally shifts the target of its reduction: in its new textualist form, the

machine functions as a metaphor for technology, and technology's domesti-

cation within the textually generated space of relative exteriority is effec-

tively insured.

Precisely such a reduction occurs in Derrida's assimilation of cybernetics

to grammatology. On Derrida's account, technology is functionally subor-

dinated to the movement of differance, to which it owes its existence.

... [the notion of program] ... must of course be understood in the cyber-

netic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible only in terms of a history of the

possibilities of the trace as the unity of a double movement of protention and

retention.... It is an emergence that makes the gramme appear as such (that

is to say according to the new structure of nonpresence) and undoubtedly

makes possible the emergence of the systems of writing in the narrow sense.

.. [O]ne could speak of a "liberation of memory," of an exteriorization

always already begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning from

the elementary programs of so-called "instinctive" behavior up to the consti-

tution of electronic card-indexes and reading machines, enlarges differance

and the possibility of putting in reserve. (1974, 84)

For Derrida, technology is thus derivative in two senses. Functionally, tech-

nology is limited to the role of material support for the "possibilities of the

trace"; like writing in the restricted sense, it is merely the means by which

differance exteriorizes or expresses itself. And ontologically, technology

remains radically dependent on the quasi-vitalist movement of differance;

again like writing in the restricted sense, it is the product of the primordial

"arche-writing" that conditions its very emergence.

By rethinking the notion of the cybernetic program in terms of his textual

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem does in his genealogy of the machine metaphor,12 what is important is the distinct tenor that is common to the metaphor: in its various guises, the machine is consistently employed as a heuristic for conceptualizing what is proper to the human.13 Precisely this basic coding is inverted in the twentieth-century evolution of the metaphor: by the time it acquires its poststructuralist form, the machine has begun to furnish a metaphor not for the human but for tech­ nology itself. In carrying out Mallarme's program, the poststructuralists give a radically new spin to the text-machine equation. In their hands, this equation does not simply comprise a means for understanding and autono­ mizing Language as system ( i . e . , langue); it simultaneously affords a means for fundamentally rethinking technology itself. By consummating the shift in the tenor of the machine metaphor that has been underway since the nine­ teenth century, the poststructuralist equation of text and machine thus fun­ damentally shifts the target of its reduction: in its new textualist form, the machine functions as a metaphor for technology, and technology's domesti­ cation within the textually generated space of relative exteriority is effec­ tively insured. Precisely such a reduction occurs in Derrida's assimilation of cybernetics to grammatology. On Derrida's account, technology is functionally subor­ dinated to the movement of dif{erance, to which it owes its existence . . . . [the notion of program] . . . must of course be understood in the cyber­ netic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible only in terms of a history of the possibilities of the trace as the unity of a double movement of protention and retention . . . . It is an emergence that makes the gramme appear as such (that is to say according to the new structure of nonpresence) and undoubtedly makes possible the emergence of the systems of writing in the narrow sense . . . . [O]ne could speak of a " liberation of memory, " of an exteriorization always already begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning from the elementary programs of so-called " instinctive " behavior up to the consti­ tution of electronic card-indexes and reading machines, enlarges differance and the possibility of putting in reserve. ( 1 9 74, 8 4 )

For Derrida, technology is thus derivative in two senses. Functionally, tech­ nology is limited to the role of material support for the " possibilities of the trace " ; like writing in the restricted sense, it is merely the means by which differance exteriorizes or expresses itself. And ontologically, technology remains radically dependent on the quasi-vitalist movement of differance; again like writing in the restricted sense, it is the product of the primordial " arche-writing " that conditions its very emergence. By rethinking the notion of the cybernetic program in terms of his textual

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 85

metaphysics, Derrida performs what amounts to a hostile takeover. Unlike

those critics (e.g., Paulson or Michel Serres) who seek to employ the cyber-

netic theory of communication as a model for thinking about the interrela-

tionship of various autonomous spheres, Derrida seizes on the notion of the

cybernetic program precisely because it allows him to restrict technology to

this doubly derivative status and consequently to support the totalizing

grasp of his ontology of differance. For Derrida, in the context of the history

of the trace, technology functions as a mere machine-"a technics in the ser-

vice of language"-while differance is the genetic or quasi-vitalist principle

that animates the technical machine: ". . . a certain sort of question about

the meaning and origin of writing precedes, or at least merges with, a cer-

tain type of question about the meaning and origin of technics. That is why

the notion of technique can never simply clarify the notion of writing" (8).

By using the machine (the cybernetic program) as a metaphor for tech-

nology's role in the differential movement of the trace, Derrida adds a meta-

physical wrinkle to the inversion of the machine metaphor we have been

tracing. According to Derrida, it is only by recognizing its foundation in dif-

ferance that cybernetics can overcome the opposition of man and machine:

"... the entire field covered by the cybernetic program will be the field of

writing. If the theory of cybernetics is by itself to oust all metaphysical con-

cepts-including the concepts of soul, of life, of value, of choice, of mem-

ory-which until recently served to separate the machine from man, it must

conserve the notion of writing, trace, gramme, or grapheme, until its own

historico-metaphysical character is also exposed" (9; emphasis added). For

Derrida, the foundedness of cybernetics in differance leads to the dissolution

of the machine metaphor in its classical form. By tracing the cybernetic pro-

gram back to arche-writing, Derrida shows that it stems from a nonorigi-

•

85

metaphysics, Derrida performs what amounts to a hostile takeover. Unlike those critics (e.g., Paulson or Michel Serres) who seek to employ the cyber­ netic theory of communication as a model for thinking about the interrela­ tionship of various autonomous spheres, Derrida seizes on the notion of the cybernetic program precisely because it allows him to restrict technology to this doubly derivative status and consequently to support the totalizing grasp of his ontology of differance. For Derrida, in the context of the history of the trace, technology functions as a mere machine-" a technics in the ser­ vice of language "-while differance is the genetic or quasi-vitalist principle that animates the technical machine: " . . . a certain sort of question about the meaning and origin of writing precedes, or at least merges with, a cer­ tain type of question about the meaning and origin of technics. That is why the notion of technique can never simply clarify the notion of writing" ( 8 ) . By using the machine (the cybernetic program) as a metaphor for tech­ nology's role in the differential movement of the trace, Derrida adds a meta­ physical wrinkle to the inversion of the machine metaphor we have been tracing. According to Derrida, it is only by recognizing its foundation in dif­

ferance that cybernetics can overcome the opposition of man and machine : " . . . the entire field covered by the cybernetic program will be the field of

nary principle of origination, a principle that precedes all metaphysical

oppositions-most importantly the very opposition underlying the classical

machine metaphor: "Even before being determined as human.., or nonhu-

man, the gramme-or the grapheme-would thus name the element" (loc.

cit.).

What Derrida does not say is that this grammatological dissolution of

metaphysical opposition generates an enabling opposition of its own, since

it owes its possibility to a subordination of technology to the genetic or

quasi-vitalist principle of differance. The grammatological project works to

realize the cybernetic program only if technology is equated with the exteri-

orization of the trace in writing. As a result, the dissolution of the machine

metaphor in its classic form gives way to a new form that perpetuates, at a

different systemic level, the very reductive binary opposition (vitalism vs.

writing. If the theory of cybernetics is by itself to oust all metaphysical con­ cepts-including the concepts of soul, of life, of value, of choice, of mem­ ory-which until recently served to separate the machine from man, it must conserve the notion of writing, trace, gramme, or grapheme, until its own historico-metaphysical character is also exposed " (9; emphasis added ) . For D errida, the foundedness of cybernetics in dif(erance leads to the dissolution of the machine metaphor in its classical form. By tracing the cybernetic pro­ gram back to arche-writing, Derrida shows that it stems from a nonorigi­ nary principle of origination, a principle that precedes all metaphysical oppositions-most importantly the very opposition underlying the classical machine metaphor: " Even before being determined as human . . . or nonhu­ man, the gramme-or the grapheme-would thus name the element " (loc. cit. ) . What Derrida does not say i s that this grammatological dissolution of metaphysical opposition generates an enabling opposition of its own, since it owes its possibility to a subordination of technology to the genetic or quasi-vitalist principle of dif(erance. The grammatological proj ect works to realize the cybernetic program only if technology is equated with the exteri­ orization of the trace in writing. As a result, the dissolution of the machine metaphor in its classic form gives way to a new form that perpetuates, at a different systemic level, the very reductive binary opposition (vitalism vs.

86

86 * Embodying Technesis

mechanism) that it is supposed to have overcome. So long as it functions "in

the service of language," technology remains thoroughly mechanical and

can readily be assimilated to the figure of the machine. In the end, the reduc-

tion Derrida imposes on technology reflects the marked privilege he accords

ontology: more precisely, it stems from his decision to consider technology

exclusively as part of an ontogenetic, language-centered program and to use

the generative text-machine as a model for encompassing technology as

such. To show that this approach succeeds only to the extent that it reduc-

tively predetermines the status of technology, we must thus expose the oper-

ational principles of its functioning.

Technesis

With his ontogenetic circumscription of cybernetic technology, Derrida fur-

nishes the theoretical core of a hugely influential approach to technology. By

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

mechanism ) that it is supposed to have overcome. So long as it functions " in the service of language," technology remains thoroughly mechanical and can readily be assimilated to the figure of the machine. In the end, the reduc­ tion Derrida imposes on technology reflects the marked privilege he accords ontology: more precisely, it stems from his decision to consider technology exclusively as part of an ontogenetic, language-centered program and to use the generative text-machine as a model for encompassing technology as such. To show that this approach succeeds only to the extent that it reduc­ tively predetermines the status of technology, we must thus expose the oper­ ational principles of its functioning.

following Derrida's lead in restricting technology to the model of the text as

machine, latter-day poststructuralist and contemporary cultural critics par-

ticipate in and define the strategy for discursivizing technology that I call

technesis.

Like gynesis, the putting of woman into discourse that Alice Jardine dis-

Technesis

covers at the heart of French feminism and poststructuralism, technesis des-

ignates an equivocal, ambivalent effort on the part of modernity to embrace

otherness. Just as gynesis promotes a reduction of women in the service of

the theoretical deconstruction of the phallologocentric modernist text, tech-

nesis advances a reduction of concrete technologies in the service of a gen-

erative, deconstructive textual model. As Jardine explains, gynesis names

the process by which modernity (in particular, French poststructuralism)

comes to explore the paradoxes and self-contradictions inherent in discur-

sive practice; seeking the "reincorporation and reconceptualization of that

With his ontogenetic circumscription of cybernetic technology, Derrida fur­ nishes the theoretical core of a hugely influential approach to technology. By following Derrida's lead in restricting technology to the model of the text as machine, latter-day poststructuralist and contemporary cultural critics par­ ticipate in and define the strategy for discursivizing technology that I call

which has been the master narratives' own 'nonknowledge,' " French theory

explores a new kind of "space," a space "over which narrative has lost con-

trol." It is not at all surprising that this space has "been coded as feminine,

as woman" (Jardine 1985, 25). Like gynesis, technesis employs an abstrac-

tion-technology-as a cipher for the internal otherness that, following

poststructuralist (and now multiculturalist) orthodoxy, forms an intrinsic,

constitutive element of any text (or identity construction). In a similar way

then, gynesis and technesis both require, as their point of departure and con-

dition of possibility, the preparation of their respective object for its assim-

ilation into the text: the robust exteriority of actual, embodied women and

technesis. Like gynesis, the putting of woman into discourse that Alice Jardine dis­ covers at the heart of French feminism and poststructuralism, technesis des­ ignates an equivocal, ambivalent effort on the part of modernity to embrace otherness. Just as gynesis promotes a reduction of women in the service of the theoretical deconstruction of the phallologocentric modernist text, tech­ nesis advances a reduction of concrete technologies in the service of a gen­ erative, deconstructive textual model. As Jardine explains, gynesis names the process by which modernity (in particular, French poststructuralism) comes to explore the paradoxes and self-contradictions inherent in discur­ sive practice; seeking the " reincorporation and reconceptualization of that which has been the master narratives ' own 'nonknowledge,' " French theory explores a new kind of " space," a space " over which narrative has lost con­ trol . " It is not at all surprising that this space has " been coded as feminine, as woman" (Jardine 1 9 8 5, 25 ) . Like gynesis, technesis employs an abstrac­ tion-technology-as a cipher for the internal otherness that, following poststructuralist (and now multiculturalist) orthodoxy, forms an intrinsic, constitutive element of any text (or identity construction ) . In a similar way then, gynesis and technesis both require, as their point of departure and con­ dition of possibility, the preparation of their respective obj ect for its assim­ ilation into the text: the robust exteriority of actual, embodied women and

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 87

of concrete ontic technologies must undergo reduction so that they can

function as purely abstract placeholders for the otherness internal to lan-

guage.

By exposing the logic of reduction central to French poststructuralism,

Jardine's critique of gynesis is bold and unequivocal. While the putting of

woman into discourse might serve to broaden textuality in a way that

allows male theory to encompass that which appears to defy narrative cap-

ture, it reduces women to the abstraction "woman," before reducing both

to language. Gynesis, Jardine concludes, transforms "woman and the femi-

nine into verbs at the interior of those narratives that are today experienc-

ing a crisis in legitimation" (25). Indeed, as Jardine points out, gynesis can-

not in fact even be said to concern women in any meaningful sense: ". . . in

the writings of those theorists participating in gynesis, woman may become

intrinsic to entire conceptual systems without being 'about' women-much

less 'about' feminism" (61).

A similar point can be made about technesis. Like gynesis, it reduces

materially embodied technologies to the abstraction "technology," before

reducing both to language. There is, however, an important difference

between the two reductive strategies. Gynesis perpetuates a reductive use of

the concept "woman" for the purpose of expanding our understanding of

the nature of textuality; its primary aim is not that of providing a model for

thinking (or rethinking) about women.14 Technesis, by contrast, is

employed by critics in an effort, whether explicit or covert, to valorize the

text as a model for enframing material technology. Unlike gynesis, technesis

has as its primary function the translation of material technology in its con-

crete, worldly embodiment into a textualist analogue, the abstraction cre-

ated when technology is constrained to fit the textual figure of the machine.

This translation betrays a deep-seated resistance to technology whose force

only increases in proportion to the strength with which it is disavowed. By

taking this resistance seriously, we can appreciate the extent to which the

enabling move in the poststructuralist version of the machine metaphor-

the generalization of the text-machine into a model for thinking about tech-

nology as such-is itself motivated by a desire to preserve the integrity of the

textual ontology on which it is based. The machine metaphor of technology

functions as a defense against the threat posed by the radical material alter-

ity of technology: by safely situating technology as the "other" within

thought, as the machinery of language integral to thought's genesis, techne-

sis neutralizes a more formidable "other" that threatens the wholesale dis-

solution of the much-cherished closure of representation.

Rather than adopting Jardine's strategy of preserving what is fruitful in

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87

of concrete ontic technologies must undergo reduction so that they can function as purely abstract placeholders for the otherness internal to lan­ guage. By exposing the logic of reduction central to French poststructuralism, Jardine's critique of gynesis is bold and unequivocal. While the putting of woman into discourse might serve to broaden textuality in a way that allows male theory to encompass that which appears to defy narrative cap­ ture, it reduces women to the abstraction "woman, " before reducing both to language. Gynesis, Jardine concludes, transforms "woman and the femi­ nine into verbs at the interior of those narratives that are today experienc­ ing a crisis in legitimation" (25 ) . Indeed, as Jardine points out, gynesis can­ not in fact even be said to concern women in any meaningful sense: " . . . in the writings of those theorists participating in gynesis, woman may become intrinsic to entire conceptual systems without being 'about' women-much less 'about' feminism " ( 6 1 ) . A similar point can b e made about technesis. Like gynesis, it reduces materially embodied technologies to the abstraction " technology, " before reducing both to language. There is, however, an important difference between the two reductive strategies. Gynesis perpetuates a reductive use of the concept " woman " for the purpose of expanding our understanding of the nature of textuality; its primary aim is not that of providing a model for thinking (or rethinking) about women.14 Technesis, by contrast, is employed by critics in an effort, whether explicit or covert, to valorize the text as a model for enframing material technology. Unlike gynesis, technesis has as its primary function the translation of material technology in its con­ crete, worldly embodiment into a textualist analogue, the abstraction cre­ ated when technology is constrained to fit the textual figure of the machine. This translation betrays a deep-seated resistance to technology whose force only increases in proportion to the strength with which it is disavowed. By taking this resistance seriously, we can appreciate the extent to which the enabling move in the poststructuralist version of the machine metaphor­ the generalization of the text-machine into a model for thinking about tech­ nology as such-is itself motivated by a desire to preserve the integrity of the textual ontology on which it is based. The machine metaphor of technology functions as a defense against the threat posed by the radical material alter­ ity of technology: by safely situating technology as the " other " within thought, as the machinery of language integral to thought's genesis, techne­ sis neutralizes a more formidable " other" that threatens the wholesale dis­ solution of the much-cherished closure of representation. Rather than adopting Jardine's strategy of preserving what is fruitful in

88

88 * Embodying Technesis

the object of her criticism, we must therefore resolutely reject technesis in

favor of the robust embrace of technology I have outlined in the two pre-

ceding chapters. In its hegemonic role as the contemporary form taken by

the machine reduction, technesis purges technology of its materiality in a

way that simply allows for no recuperative reconstruction whatsoever. The

technema resulting from poststructuralist technesis is a woefully rarified

object-for-thought. Stripped of its material basis, it cannot deliver the expe-

rience of otherness it promises, for like the noema containing the other's

consciousness in Husserl's fifth Cartesian Meditation, it turns out to be

nothing other than a projection (no matter how distorted and indetermi-

nate) of its constituting agent, the textualized "ego" (Husserl 1977). To root

out the technetic reduction, we must therefore reject the path of Husserlian

phenomenology-and its enabling commitment to the noiesis-noema corre-

lation-as an adequate mode of describing the real.s5 By reintroducing the

very technological materiality that the phenomenological epoche was

designed to bracket out, we must try, as it were, to force high theory into a

crucial act of self-de(con)struction, one that chips away at the enabling

ontological reduction of technology to text.

To judge by the endurance of technesis following the advent of cultural

studies, the hegemonic sway poststructuralist textualism exercises over

efforts to explore technology has not only persisted into the contemporary

critical epoch but expanded to form a general program for the various sorts

of technocriticism current today. Nowhere is this legacy more significant-

and less acknowledged-than in the emerging field of literature and science.

Without explicitly intending it, contemporary technocultural critics inter-

ested in bridging the divide separating science from the humanities have

embraced technesis as a generalized theoretical interface between literary

texts and technological systems. As long as it serves a purely instrumental

function in an analysis that focuses narrowly on the interpretation of literary

texts, such an embrace remains benign; as soon, however, as it is generalized

into a universal medium capable of establishing ontological isomorphism

between text and technological system, it becomes profoundly reductive.

To illustrate how tenuous the divide actually is between these two possi-

bilities, I shall concentrate for an instant on one particularly well focused

example from the emerging field of literature and science. By exposing the

tendency of such interdisciplinary work-even when it is most limited in

scope-to advance larger claims concerning the ontology of technology, I

shall foreground the unacknowledged, structural legacy linking contempo-

rary technocriticism to technesis.

In his insightful study of "cybernetic fiction," literary critic David Porush

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

the obj ect of her criticism, we must therefore resolutely rej ect technesis in favor of the robust embrace of technology I have outlined in the two pre­ ceding chapters . In its hegemonic role as the contemporary form taken by the machine reduction, technesis purges technology of its materiality in a way that simply allows for no recuperative reconstruction whatsoever. The technema resulting from poststructuralist technesis is a woefully rarified obj ect-for-thought. Stripped of its material basis, it cannot deliver the expe­ rience of otherness it promises, for like the noema containing the other's consciousness in Husserl 's fifth Cartesian Meditation, it turns out to be nothing other than a proj ection (no matter how distorted and indetermi­ nate ) of its constituting agent, the textualized "ego " (Husserl 1 9 77) . To root out the technetic reduction, we must therefore reject the path of Husserlian phenomenology-and its enabling commitment to the noiesis-noema corre­ lation-as an adequate mode of describing the real . 1 5 By reintroducing the very technological materiality that the phenomenological epoche was designed to bracket out, we must try, as it were, to force high theory into a crucial act of self-de(con) struction, one that chips away at the enabling ontological reduction of technology to text. To judge by the endurance of technesis following the advent of cultural studies, the hegemonic sway poststructuralist textual ism exercises over efforts to explore technology has not only persisted into the contemporary critical epoch but expanded to form a general program for the various sorts of technocriticism current today. Nowhere is this legacy more significant­ and less acknowledged-than in the emerging field of literature and science. Without explicitly intending it, contemporary technocultural critics inter­ ested in bridging the divide separating science from the humanities have embraced technesis as a generalized theoretical interface between literary texts and technological systems. As long as it serves a purely instrumental function in an analysis that focuses narrowly on the interpretation of literary texts, such an embrace remains benign; as soon, however, as it is generalized into a universal medium capable of establishing ontological isomorphism between text and technological system, it becomes profoundly reductive. To illustrate how tenuous the divide actually is between these two possi­ bilities, I shall concentrate for an instant on one particularly well focused example from the emerging field of literature and science . By exposing the tendency of such interdisciplinary work-even when it is most limited in scope-to advance larger claims concerning the ontology of technology, I shall foreground the unacknowledged, structural legacy linking contempo­ rary technocriticism to technesis. In his insightful study of " cybernetic fiction, " literary critic David Porush

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 89

unpacks the multivalent function of the machine figure in modern literature

and, in the process (and, I think, without explicitly intending to), institutes

an overly narrow ontological determination of technology as, essentially, a

figure for determinism. Contending that the machine constitutes "some-

thing even more powerful than a metaphor," Porush sketches a model of

machine iconicity that, despite an important and empowering break with

the insular and largely defunct formalist tradition, steadfastly refuses to

abandon the narrowly figurative basis of the machine metaphor. Not only

does the machine consistently recur in literature as an image particularly

expressive of technology's widespread impact on contemporary culture, but

it also plays a more specific structural role in the organization and con-

cretization of postmodern literary texts. Following Eco and Iser, Porush

describes the machine as an "icon," a figure that does not "serve to desig-

nate a signified object but instead designate[s] instructions for [its] produc-

tion" (1985, 15, quoting Iser); he thereby emphasizes that it is "a sort of

machine, in so far as we understand machines as the incarnation or illustra-

tion of a systematic set of rules" (loc. cit.). As a "self-referential icon," notes

Porush, the machine designates instructions for the "production of a com-

plex of ideas about mechanism"-more exactly, "for the various determin-

istic and mechanistic descriptions of experience and the world that our cul-

ture has invented" (16).

Whatever Porush's approach can tell us about technology remains

directly correlated to his elucidation of the machinic icon's role in the con-

stitution of a text-machine. Without in any way directly intending it,

Porush's model thus effectively reduces technology to the status of a deter-

ministic system, one that is-importantly-strictly homologous to the rule-

governed mechanism of a literary text.

... in th[e] case of the machine icon, there is an infinite variety of machines

used figuratively by fiction, but only one thing that they signify: determinism.

Swift's All-Knowlege machine signifies the deterministic reduction of knowl-

edge to an accumulation of random phrases. Dickens' description of Grad-

grind signifies the determinism . . . of his pedagogical method. Butler and

Forster describe society itself as a machine. Henry Adams sees the machine as

a metaphor for history's deterministic process. The structuralists use the

machine as a metaphor for the determinism of language's structures of

signification. The cyberneticists use the machine as a metaphor for the deter-

mination of human communication and mechanisms of the brain, and then

proceed to translate their metaphors into hardware. (16)

If the machine icon is indeed, as Porush insists, "even more powerful than a

metaphor," its proper field of operation still remains the domain of lan-

•

89

unpacks the multivalent function of the machine figure in modern literature and, in the process (and, I think, without explicitly intending to ) , institutes an overly narrow ontological determination of technology as, essentially, a figure for determinism. Contending that the machine constitutes " some­ thing even more powerful than a metaphor, " Porush sketches a model of machine iconicity that, despite an important and empowering break with the insular and largely defunct formalist tradition, steadfastly refuses to abandon the narrowly figurative basis of the machine metaphor. Not only does the machine consistently recur in literature as an image particularly expressive of technology's widespread impact on contemporary culture, but it also plays a more specific structural role in the organization and con­ cretization of postmodern literary texts. Following Eco and Iser, Porush describes the machine as an " icon, " a figure that does not " serve to desig­ nate a signified obj ect but instead designate [ s] instructions for [its] produc­ tion " ( 1 9 8 5 , 1 5 , quoting Iser ) ; he thereby emphasizes that it is " a sort of machine, in so far as we understand machines as the incarnation or illustra­ tion of a systematic set of rules" (loc. cit. ) . As a " self-referential icon," notes Po rush, the machine designates instructions for the " production of a com­ plex of ideas about mechanism "-more exactly, " for the various determin­ istic and mechanistic descriptions of experience and the world that our cul­ ture has invented" ( 1 6 ) . Whatever Porush's approach can tell u s about technology remains directly correlated to his elucidation of the machinic icon's role in the con­ stitution of a text-machine. Without in any way directly intending it, Porush's model thus effectively reduces technology to the status of a deter­ ministic system, one that is-importantly-strictly homologous to the rule­ governed mechanism of a literary text. . . . in th [ e] case of the machine icon, there is an infinite variety of machines used figuratively by fiction, but only one thing that they signify: determinism. Swift's All-Knowlege machine signifies the deterministic reduction of knowl­ edge to an accumulation of random phrases. Dickens' description of Grad­ grind signifies the determinism . . . of his pedagogical method. Butler and Forster describe society itself as a machine. Henry Adams sees the machine as a metaphor for history'S deterministic process. The structuralists use the machine as a metaphor for the determinism of language's structures of signification. The cyberneticists use the machine as a metaphor for the deter­ mination of human communication and mechanisms of the brain, and then proceed to translate their metaphors into hardware. ( 1 6 )

I f the machine icon i s indeed, a s Porush insists, " even more powerful than a metaphor, " its proper field of operation still remains the domain of lan-

90

90 * Embodying Technesis

guage. In contrast to metaphor in its classical determination, the machine

icon does not refer to some extratextual state of affairs; it describes the con-

stitution of the figurative and grammatical mechanism of the very text it

generates. Without explicitly making the equation, such an analysis suggests

a textualized model of technology: like poststructuralist technesis, it privi-

leges the mechanism of the text as a sort of prototype technical system.

Porush, moreover, is hardly alone among contemporary technocultural

critics in skirting the delicate line separating a benign application of the

machinic icon to a literary text from a full-blown ontological reduction of

technology. Indeed, where his model merely implies an impoverished ontol-

ogy of technology as its correlate, other explorations of the convergence of

literature and science more directly engage the machinic icon in ways that,

it seems to me, either simply take for granted the general viability of using

texts to describe technologies or else more actively seek to expand litera-

ture's descriptive function beyond the scope of a particular literary text or

figure. In my opinion, what motivates recent literary critics to appropriate

systemic models from information science and chaos theory is not just a

methodological instrumentalism but a strong quasi-ontological conviction

that literary texts actually share common structural properties with the

physical reality that these technological models were originally developed to

describe.16 Whether they explicitly intend to or not, such systemic analyses

thus invest literary texts with the responsibility of mediating the most fun-

damental material changes technology brings about. Not unlike the cyber-

punk conspiracy narratives that Frederic Jameson reads as the "representa-

tional shorthand" for the unfathomable workings of global capitalism

(Jameson 1991, 38, 321), the postmodern literary texts privileged by these

critics are called on to translate such changes into a form more readily

understandable in human experiential terms than the technical, mathemati-

cal idiom germane to science. No matter how radically contemporary and

worldly they may appear, however, the various literary translations mobi-

lized in these readings rely on and perpetuate the thoroughly reductive

notion that technology can be adequately captured in the text.17

Metalepsis

Having established technesis as the dominant strategy of poststructuralist

and contemporary analyses of technology, we can now focus more

specifically on the form of its textual inscription. Through a rhetorical

analysis of this strategy, I shall attempt to show how the machine reduction

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

guage. In contrast to metaphor in its classical determination, the machine icon does not refer to some extra textual state of affairs; it describes the con­ stitution of the figurative and grammatical mechanism of the very text it generates. Without explicitly making the equation, such an analysis suggests a textualized model of technology: like poststructuralist technesis, it privi­ leges the mechanism of the text as a sort of prototype technical system. Porush, moreover, is hardly alone among contemporary technocultural critics in skirting the delicate line separating a benign application of the machinic icon to a literary text from a full-blown ontological reduction of technology. Indeed, where his model merely implies an impoverished ontol­ ogy of technology as its correlate, other explorations of the convergence of literature and science more directly engage the machinic icon in ways that, it seems to me, either simply take for granted the general viability of using texts to describe technologies or else more actively seek to expand litera­ ture's descriptive function beyond the scope of a particular literary text or figure. In my opinion, what motivates recent literary critics to appropriate systemic models from information science and chaos theory is not j ust a methodological instrumentalism but a strong quasi-ontological conviction that literary texts actually share common structural properties with the physical reality that these technological models were originally developed to describe . I 6 Whether they explicitly intend to or not, such systemic analyses thus invest literary texts with the responsibility of mediating the most fun­ damental material changes technology brings about. Not unlike the cyber­ punk conspiracy narratives that Frederic Jameson reads as the " representa­ tional shorthand" for the unfathomable workings of global capitalism (Jameson 1 9 9 1 , 3 8 , 32 1 ) , the postmodern literary texts privileged by these critics are called on to translate such changes into a form more readily understandable in human experiential terms than the technical, mathemati­ cal idiom germane to science . No matter how radically contemporary and worldly they may appear, however, the various literary translations mobi­ lized in these readings rely on and perpetuate the thoroughly reductive notion that technology can be adequately captured in the text.I7

M etalepsis Having established technesis as the dominant strategy of poststructuralist and contemporary analyses of technology, we can now focus more specifically on the form of its textual inscription. Through a rhetorical analysis of this strategy, I shall attempt to show how the machine reduction

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 91

of technology permeates poststructuralist (and contemporary technocriti-

cal) theoretical texts not so much as the result of a conscious intention but

rather as a necessary axiom of the underlying discursive ideology that the

poststructuralists (and their more recent legatees) inherit from structuralist

linguistics.18 By demonstrating how the machine reduction of technology is

effectively instituted by the "logic" of textuality, I shall prepare the ground

for a markedly different, nontextualist technocriticism.

As an involuntary, structural necessity, technesis constitutes an unrecog-

nized theoretical commitment no less for the poststructuralists than for their

more recent legatees. Not unlike the process of naturalization analyzed by

Barthes (1972) in his study of myth, technesis works by proffering a discur-

sivized model of technology as a ground-zero, default model. It is therefore

a construction, but one that is not so much chosen by the critic as imposed

by the critical method or, more exactly, by the ideology of textualism.

Accordingly, the materiality of technology surfaces in texts in a manner

more symptomatic than thematic: it is textually "inscribed," if inscribed is

the right term, through metalepsis, a rhetorical figure describing the

metonymical substitution of one (figurative) word for another or several

others. Most often involving extreme compression and an ensuing obfusca-

tion of the literal sense of the statement, metalepsis also, in certain cases,

designates an inversion or conflation of cause and effect.19 Consider, for

example, the Oxford English Dictionary's citation (s.v. metalepsis) from

Blair's Rhetoric of 1812: "When the Trope is founded on the relation

between an antecedent and a consequent, or what goes before, and immedi-

ately follows, it is called a Metalepsis." What is at stake, if not just such a

causal inversion, when technology is inscribed as a textual function? As the

rhetorical operation that collapses (linguistic) text and (nonlinguistic) con-

text, metalepsis produces "materiality" within the space of language.

Accordingly, it forms the precondition for the reign of technesis.

In this role, metalepsis functions in a manner formally akin to what

Harold Bloom describes, in his work on the anxiety of influence, as the ratio

of apophrodes, the "Return of the Dead." In this final stage of confronta-

tion with the work of a precursor, the strong poet is able to incorporate the

precursor's vision as if it were his or her own. In The Anxiety of Influence,

Bloom describes apophrades as "the triumph of having so stationed the pre-

cursor, in one's own work, that particular passages in his work seem to be

not presages of one's own advent, but rather to be indebted to one's own

achievement" (Bloom 1973, 141; emphasis added). In his commentary on

Bloom, Louis Renza points out that what apophrades actually describes is

the operation of metalepsis, and he cites Bloom's reference to the Freudian

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91

of technology permeates poststructuralist ( and contemporary technocriti­ cal) theoretical texts not so much as the result of a conscious intention but rather as a necessary axiom of the underlying discursive ideology that the poststructuralists (and their more recent legatees) inherit from structuralist linguistics . 1 s By demonstrating how the machine reduction of technology is effectively instituted by the " logic " of textuality, I shall prepare the ground for a markedly different, nontextualist technocriticism. As an involuntary, structural necessity, technesis constitutes an unrecog­ nized theoretical commitment no less for the poststructuralists than for their more recent legatees. Not unlike the process of naturalization analyzed by Barthes ( 1 972 ) in his study of myth, technesis works by proffering a discur­ sivized model of technology as a ground-zero, default model. It is therefore a construction, but one that is not so much chosen by the critic as imposed by the critical method or, more exactly, by the ideology of textualism. Accordingly, the materiality of technology surfaces in texts in a manner more symptomatic than thematic: it is textually " inscribed, " if inscribed is the right term, through metalepsis, a rhetorical figure describing the metonymical substitution of one (figurative) word for another or several others. Most often involving extreme compression and an ensuing obfusca­ tion of the literal sense of the statement, metalepsis also, in certain cases, designates an inversion or conflation of cause and effect. 1 9 Consider, for example, the Oxford English Dictionary's citation ( s.v. metalepsis) from Blair's Rhetoric of 1 8 1 2 : " When the Trope is founded on the relation between an antecedent and a consequent, or what goes before, and immedi­ ately follows, it is called a Metalepsis . " What is at stake, if not j ust such a causal inversion, when technology is inscribed as a textual function ? As the rhetorical operation that collapses (linguistic) text and (nonlinguistic) con­ text, metalepsis produces "materiality " within the space of language. Accordingly, it forms the precondition for the reign of technesis. In this role, metalepsis functions in a manner formally akin to what Harold Bloom describes, in his work on the anxiety of influence, as the ratio of apophrodes, the " Return of the Dead. " In this final stage of confronta­ tion with the work of a precursor, the strong poet is able to incorporate the precursor's vision as if it were his or her own. In The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom describes apophrades as " the triumph of having so stationed the pre­ cursor, in one's own work, that particular passages in his work seem to be not presages of one's own advent, but rather to be indebted to one's own achievement " (Bloom 1 973 , 1 4 1 ; emphasis added ) . In his commentary on Bloom, Louis Renza points out that what apophrades actually describes is the operation of metalepsis, and he cites Bloom's reference to the Freudian

92

92 * Embodying Technesis

fantasy of the primal scene by way of example; in this instance, Renza notes,

the "trope" of apophrades is able to generate "the illusion of having

fathered one's own fathers," of projecting the vision of the precursor "as if

it has not yet occurred" (Renza 1995, 191, citing Bloom 1975, 20). Accord-

ingly, in Bloom's neo-Freudian account of metalepsis, we witness an impor-

tant modification-a modernization, as it were-of its more general sense of

tropological compression;20 here the compression of time and chronology

(and, one might add, positivist literary history) is so extreme that the com-

monsense distinctions underlying our notions of causality and influence

begin to coalesce, if not to fade away entirely.

By shifting its focus from the text itself to the intertextual agon between

ephebe and precursor, Bloom's modernization of metalepsis adds to the

trope a psychological dimension that is not present in its traditional form.

For all its promise, however, Bloom's intervention does little to supplant

the traditional task of literary interpretation or to question its narrow

focus on "the relationship between two or more texts" (1975, 65). If it

retools metalepsis as a privileged trope with which to describe psychologi-

cally motivated intertextual relationships, Bloom's analysis continues to

bracket the relation of text to context. While such a reduction remains

largely benign in an interpretative model explicitly intended to describe the

logic of textual relations, it becomes significant when metalepsis functions

instead to domesticate what lies beyond the text. Technesis represses not

simply the text of a precursor poet but the extratextual domain of techno-

logical materiality as such.21 Accordingly, what "returns" is not the dead

breaking out of their purely symbolic subservience to the living but tech-

nological materiality emancipated from the tenuous and never wholly

effective rhetorical erasure under which metalepsis places it. In its post-

Bloomian form, metalepsis thus functions to disguise the threat of techno-

logical materiality by domesticating it into something that appears to be

(or-in the past perfect tense appropriate to such a virtual historical oper-

ation-to have been) produced by the text itself. Modifying Bloom's ear-

lier cited description (with italics to mark the substitutions), we might say

that metalepsis designates "the triumph of having so stationed technology,

in one's own work, that particular aspects of technology seem to be not

preconditions of one's description, but rather to be caused by one's own

production."

What is foregrounded by such a hypothetical modification is the radically

different cause motivating the "return" of the repressed in the two cases:

while the dead precursor poet can return only because of guilt and only

through the mediation of the (Bloomian) literary critic adept in discerning

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

fantasy of the primal scene by way of example; in this instance, Renza notes, the " trope" of apophrades is able to generate " the illusion of having fathered one's own fathers, " of proj ecting the vision of the precursor "as if it has not yet occurred" ( Renza 1 995, 1 9 1 , citing Bloom 1 975, 2 0 ) . Accord­ ingly, in Bloom's neo-Freudian account of metalepsis, we witness an impor­ tant modification-a modernization, as it were-of its more general sense of tropological compression;2o here the compression of time and chronology ( and, one might add, positivist literary history) is so extreme that the com­ monsense distinctions underlying our notions of causality and influence begin to coalesce, if not to fade away entirely. By shifting its focus from the text itself to the intertextual agon between ephebe and precursor, Bloom's modernization of metalepsis adds to the trope a psychological dimension that is not present in its traditional form. For all its promise, however, Bloom's intervention does little to supplant the traditional task of literary interpretation or to question its narrow focus on " the relationship between two or more texts" ( 1 975, 6 5 ) . If it retools metalepsis as a privileged trope with which to describe psychologi­ cally motivated intertextual relationships, Bloom ' s analysis continues to bracket the relation of text to context. While such a reduction remains largely benign in an interpretative model explicitly intended to describe the logic of textual relations, it becomes significant when metalepsis functions instead to domesticate what lies beyond the text. Technesis represses not simply the text of a precursor poet but the extratextual domain of techno­ logical materiality as such .21 Accordingly, what " returns" is not the dead breaking out of their purely symbolic subservience to the living but tech­ nological materiality emancipated from the tenuous and never wholly effective rhetorical erasure under which metalepsis places it. In its post­ Bloomian form, metalepsis thus functions to disguise the threat of techno­ logical materiality by domesticating it into something that appears to be ( or-in the past perfect tense appropriate to such a virtual historical oper­ ation-to have been) produced by the text itself. Modifying Bloom's ear­ lier cited description (with italics to mark the substitutions ) , we might say that metalepsis designates " the triumph of having so stationed technology, in one's own work, that particular aspects of technology seem to be not preconditions of one's description, but rather to be caused by one's own

production. " What is foregrounded by such a hypothetical modification is the radically different cause motivating the " return " of the repressed in the two cases: while the dead precursor poet can return only because of guilt and only through the mediation of the ( Bloomian) literary critic adept in discerning

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 93

its traces, technological materiality returns under its "own" volition, as it

were, independently of mediation as such. Unlike the language of a precur-

sor literary text, technology is simply not subject to being changed by revi-

sionary rhetorical misprision, which means, in effect, that the metalepsis

constitutive of technesis cannot maintain itself in the face of the real.

Beneath-or better, outside of-the space of its textualization, technology

remains what it is regardless of the modifications to which it is submitted in

the process of its textualization.22 In sharp contrast to Bloom's ratio of

apophrades, no metalepsis involving technology can ever really be success-

ful, since rhetoric by itself remains powerless to alter the actual materiality

of technology.23

In twentieth-century theoretical texts from Freud and Heidegger to

Lacan, Derrida, and Deleuze and Guattari, metalepsis functions precisely to

produce an obfuscation of this extratextual status of technology, a denial of

the irreducibility of the technological real. As long as technology is made to

derive from language, the poststructuralist and constructivist idioms can

confidently maintain their enabling conflation of technology's robust mate-

riality with the relative materiality that it possesses within the theater of rep-

resentation. Viewed exclusively as the "support" for ecriture, the petit objet

a, the assemblage, and so forth, technology does indeed appear derivative,

the product of a genetic or quasi-vitalist program of differance, subject con-

stitution, or desiring-production.

Far from being a merely recent phenomenon, moreover, as our discussion

thus far might suggest, metalepsis in fact forms nothing less than the basic

principle of the Western philosophical tradition's encounter with the real

from antiquity onward. By subordinating robust materiality to language,

metalepsis performs a foundational role in the inauguration of philosophi-

cal discourse concerning technology: as a metaphor of metaphor, it func-

tions analogously to the figure of catachresis, with the difference being that

it is based not on an inaugural act of (improper) naming but on a derivative

sleight of hand, an illegitimate and violent domestication of materiality into

the striated space of discursive reason.24

To glimpse the rhetorical reduction at stake in technesis, let us focus

briefly on the role metalepsis plays in the paradigm case of technesis in

twentieth-century theoretical discourse. As I shall show in detail in chapter

4, Martin Heidegger's mature meditation on modern technology in "The

Question concerning Technology" owes its force and its cogency to a fun-

damental metaleptic reversal. While Heidegger unequivocally asserts the

ontological secondarity of technology on the basis of the ontological differ-

ence between Being and beings, he cannot acknowledge the precondition of

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93

its traces, technological materiality returns under its " own " volition, as it were, independently of mediation as such. Unlike the language of a precur­ sor literary text, technology is simply not subj ect to being changed by revi­ sionary rhetorical misprision, which means, in effect, that the metalepsis constitutive of technesis cannot maintain itself in the face of the real. Beneath-or better, outside of-the space of its textualization, technology remains what it is regardless of the modifications to which it is submitted in the process of its textualization.22 In sharp contrast to Bloom's ratio of apophrades, no metalepsis involving technology can ever really be success­ ful, since rhetoric by itself remains powerless to alter the actual materiality of technology.23 In twentieth-century theoretical texts from Freud and Heidegger to Lacan, Derrida, and Deleuze and Guattari, metalepsis functions precisely to produce an obfuscation of this extratextual status of technology, a denial of the irreducibility of the technological real. As long as technology is made to derive from language, the poststructuralist and constructivist idioms can confidently maintain their enabling conflation of technology's robust mate­ riality with the relative materiality that it possesses within the theater of rep­ resentation. Viewed exclusively as the " support" for ecriture, the petit objet a, the assemblage, and so forth, technology does indeed appear derivative, the product of a genetic or quasi-vitalist program of differance, subj ect con­ stitution, or desiring-production. Far from being a merely recent phenomenon, moreover, as our discussion thus far might suggest, metalepsis in fact forms nothing less than the basic principle of the Western philosophical tradition's encounter with the real from antiquity onward. By subordinating robust materiality to language, metalepsis performs a foundational role in the inauguration of philosophi­ cal discourse concerning technology: as a metaphor of metaphor, it func­ tions analogously to the figure of catachresis, with the difference being that it is based not on an inaugural act of (improper) naming but on a derivative sleight of hand, an illegitimate and violent domestication of materiality into the striated space of discursive reason.24 To glimpse the rhetorical reduction at stake in technesis, let us focus briefly on the role metalepsis plays in the paradigm case of technesis in twentieth-century theoretical discourse. As I shall show in detail in chapter 4, Martin Heidegger's mature meditation on modern technology in " The Question concerning Technology " owes its force and its cogency to a fun­ damental metaleptic reversal. While Heidegger unequivocally asserts the ontological secondarity of technology on the basis of the ontological differ­ ence between Being and beings, he cannot acknowledge the precondition of

94

94 * Embodying Technesis

such assertion-its dependence, by way of a dogmatic appeal to the onto-

logical priority of language, on an essentially violent reduction of the ontic

impact of technology. Nonetheless, Heidegger can purchase the right to

assert the (ontological) secondarity of (ontic) technology only by first deter-

mining it as something subordinate to language. This effectively means that

the ontological difference is itself constituted as the effect of a prior reduc-

tion designed to domesticate ontic technology into the frame of reference

provided by Heidegger's onto-hermeneutic understanding of Being. Despite

Heidegger's claims for its "originarity," the ontological difference actually

functions to mask a prior metalepsis; its purpose is not to account for tech-

nology's origin but to obfuscate the enabling reduction of technology by

seamlessly assimilating materiality into the onto-hermeneutic horizon of

discourse. By demystifying Heidegger's foundational metalepsis, we can see

that the derivative status he assigns technology is less the result of a rigor-

ous analysis of its actual materiality than the mere by-product of a dogmatic

philosophical commitment.

Insofar as they fetishize this prototype textualization of technology, post-

structuralist theory and much contemporary technocultural criticism,

whether knowingly or unknowingly, follow Heidegger's lead: they too con-

ceal the fact that technology has always already undergone a prior reduction.

Moreover, because the force of the textualist metaphysics depends on a rad-

ical blindness to this reduction, the text cannot furnish the site for an archae-

ology of the technological real. From the textualist standpoint, technology

just is what it appears to be: the material support for the genetic or quasi-

vitalist ontology of textuality. Metalepsis simply effaces all (textual) traces of

anything beyond the theater of representation. Thus, the always already real-

ized reduction constitutive of technesis remains invisible in a model like

Hayles's constrained constructivism, which hypostatizes the semiotic indica-

tion of the material flux within the text; unlike the "elusive negativity" fore-

grounded by Hayles, technesis functions on an all-or-nothing basis: entrance

into a (textualist) system governed by metalepsis can only be purchased at

the cost of a total blindness to its constitutive reduction.

Accordingly, our effort to counter the forceful legacy of technesis will

require us flatly to reject the covert textualism of contemporary technocul-

tural criticism. Because the metaleptically constituted text cannot point us

to its material outside, we will have to restore such an outside beyond the

form imposed by the text, as something that had to be effaced during the

process of textual constitution. Such a task will call on us to rethink the role

of rhetoric in the analysis of contemporary technoculture. Instead of con-

tinuing to employ rhetoric semiotically-to point to the extratextual tech-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

such assertion-its dependence, by way of a dogmatic appeal to the onto­ logical priority of language, on an essentially violent reduction of the ontic impact of technology. Nonetheless, Heidegger can purchase the right to assert the (ontological) secondarity of ( ontic ) technology only by first deter­ mining it as something subordinate to language. This effectively means that the ontological difference is itself constituted as the effect of a prior reduc­ tion designed to domesticate ontic technology into the frame of reference provided by Heidegger's onto-hermeneutic understanding of Being. Despite Heidegger's claims for its " originarity, " the ontological difference actually functions to mask a prior metalepsis; its purpose is not to account for tech­ nology's origin but to obfuscate the enabling reduction of technology by seamlessly assimilating materiality into the onto-hermeneutic horizon of discourse. By demystifying Heidegger's foundational metalepsis, we can see that the derivative status he assigns technology is less the result of a rigor­ ous analysis of its actual materiality than the mere by-product of a dogmatic philosophical commitment. Insofar as they fetishize this prototype textualization of technology, post­ structuralist theory and much contemporary technocultural criticism, whether knowingly or unknowingly, follow Heidegger's lead: they too con­ ceal the fact that technology has always already undergone a prior reduction. Moreover, because the force of the textualist metaphysics depends on a rad­ ical blindness to this reduction, the text cannot furnish the site for an archae­ ology of the technological real. From the textualist standpoint, technology just is what it appears to be: the material support for the genetic or quasi­ vitalist ontology of textuality. Metalepsis simply effaces all (textual) traces of anything beyond the theater of representation. Thus, the always already real­ ized reduction constitutive of technesis remains invisible in a model like Hayles's constrained constructivism, which hypostatizes the semiotic indica­ tion of the material flux within the text; unlike the " elusive negativity" fore­ grounded by Hayles, technesis functions on an all-or-nothing basis: entrance into a (textualist) system governed by metalepsis can only be purchased at the cost of a total blindness to its constitutive reduction. Accordingly, our effort to counter the forceful legacy of technesis will require us flatly to rej ect the covert textualism of contemporary technocul­ tural criticism. Because the metaleptically constituted text cannot point us to its material outside, we will have to restore such an outside beyond the form imposed by the text, as something that had to be effaced during the process of textual constitution. Such a task will call on us to rethink the role of rhetoric in the analysis of contemporary technoculture. Instead of con­ tinuing to employ rhetoric semiotically-to point to the extratextual tech-

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 95

nological outside-we must open the text to a practical deconstruction ema-

nating directly from the technological real; at the same time, we will have to

(re)focus our rhetorical skills on the task of discerning traces of those con-

stitutive metalepses that enable the simulation of textual autonomy in the

face of the technological real. Refigured as an instrumental task within a

posttextualist model of embodied experience, the effort of probing these

rhetorical sites of metaleptic suture will help us reconstruct the robust mate-

riality that was sacrificed, in each specific case, to preserve the theoretical

cogency and explanatory grasp of the hegemonic textualist ontology.

Greek Ontology and the Machine Reduction

Breaking with the metaleptic strategy of contemporary theory involves

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95

no logical outside-we must open the text to a practical deconstruction ema­ nating directly from the technological real; at the same time, we will have to (re)focus our rhetorical skills on the task of discerning traces of those con­ stitutive metalepses that enable the simulation of textual autonomy in the face of the technological real. Refigured as an instrumental task within a posttextualist model of embodied experience, the effort of probing these rhetorical sites of metaleptic suture will help us reconstruct the robust mate­ riality that was sacrificed, in each specific case, to preserve the theoretical cogency and explanatory grasp of the hegemonic textualist ontology.

much more than a reconceptualization of its modern ontology. Though con-

crete industrial and electronic technologies may have been historically nec-

essary to effectuate it, the automatic deconstruction of the machine reduc-

tion explodes a metaphysical determination of technology that has been

handed down to us from the Greeks. To root out this reduction, we will

G reek Ontology and the M achine Reduction

have to revisit and revise the Greek assimilation of technology under the

category of techne.

The exemplary textual site of this assimilation occurs at the point in the

Physics where Aristotle argues that art (techne) imitates nature: "he teckhne

mimeitai ten physin" (194a; Aristotle 1929, 121, 123). As Philippe Lacoue-

Labarthe has pointed out, Aristotle specifies two forms of this mimesis: "On

the one hand," says Aristotle, "techne carries to its end [accomplishes, per-

fects, epitelei] what physis is incapable of effecting [apergasasthai]; on the

other hand, it imitates" (cited in Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 255). While the lat-

ter designates mimesis as it has traditionally been defined, the former coin-

cides with the motif of the supplement central to Derrida's early work; in

effect, the supplement Derrida describes in Of Grammatology could well be

read as a gloss on Aristotle's passage: "The supplement adds itself, it is a

surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of pres-

ence. It cumulates and accumulates presence. It is thus that art, techne,

image, representation, convention, etc. come as supplements to nature and

are rich with this entire cumulating function" (Derrida 1974, 144-45). In

this form, the supplement-no matter how novel an interpretation it is

given-retains a basic fidelity to Aristotelian techne.

By sketching out the ties linking technesis and techne, Lacoue-Labarthe's

interpretation of the Physics clarifies the heritage of contemporary technesis

Breaking with the metaleptic strategy of contemporary theory involves much more than a reconceptualization of its modern ontology. Though con­ crete industrial and electronic technologies may have been historically nec­ essary to effectuate it, the automatic deconstruction of the machine reduc­ tion explodes a metaphysical determination of technology that has been handed down to us from the Greeks. To root out this reduction, we will have to revisit and revise the Greek assimilation of technology under the category of techne. The exemplary textual site of this assimilation occurs at the point in the Physics where Aristotle argues that art (techne) imitates nature: "he teckhne mimeitai ten physin " ( 1 94a; Aristotle 1 929, 1 2 1 , 1 23 ) . As Philippe Lacoue­ Labarthe has pointed out, Aristotle specifies two forms of this mimesis: " On the one hand, " says Aristotle, " techne carries to its end [accomplishes, per­ fects, epitelei] what physis is incapable of effecting [apergasasthai] ; on the other hand, it imitates" (cited in Lacoue-Labarthe 1 9 8 9 , 255 ) . While the lat­ ter designates mimesis as it has traditionally been defined, the former coin­ cides with the motif of the supplement central to Derrida's early work; in effect, the supplement Derrida describes in Of Grammatology could well be read as a gloss on Aristotle's passage: "The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of pres­ ence. It cumulates and accumulates presence. It is thus that art, techne, image, representation, convention, etc. come as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire cumulating function" (Derrida 1 974, 1 44-45 ) . In this form, the supplement-no matter how novel an interpretation it is given-retains a basic fidelity to Aristotelian techne. By sketching out the ties linking technesis and techne, Lacoue-Labarthe's interpretation of the Physics clarifies the heritage of contemporary technesis

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96 * Embodying Technesis

in Aristotle's determination of technology. Accordingly, the crux of Lacoue-

Labarthe's reading concerns his subtle demarcation of two different mimetic

functions that correspond to the two forms of techne introduced by Aristotle.

There are thus two forms of mimesis. First, a restricted form, which is the

reproduction, the copy, the reduplication of what is given (already worked,

effected, presented by nature) . . . Then there is a general mimesis, which

reproduces nothing given (which thus re-produces nothing at all), but which

supplements a certain deficiency in nature, its incapacity to do everything,

organize everything, make everything its work-produce everything. It is a

productive mimesis, that is, an imitation of physis as a productive force, or a

poiesis. It accomplishes, carries out, finishes natural production as such.

(Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 255-56)

Lacoue-Labarthe's distinction suggests that Western philosophy has devel-

oped on the basis of a fundamental (and reductive) allegiance between tech-

nology and art; techne as know-how, no less than techne as art, finds its

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

in Aristotle's determination of technology. Accordingly, the crux of Lacoue­ Labarthe's reading concerns his subtle demarcation of two different mimetic functions that correspond to the two forms of techne introduced by Aristotle. There are thus two forms of mimesis. First, a restricted form, which is the reproduction, the copy, the reduplication of what is given (already worked, effected, presented by nature ) . . . . Then there is a general mimesis, which reproduces nothing given (which thus re-produces nothing at all ) , but which supplements a certain deficiency in nature, its incapacity to do everything, organize everything, make everything its work-produce everything. It is a productive mimesis, that is, an imitation of physis as a productive force, or a poiesis. It accomplishes, carries out, finishes natural production as such. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1 9 8 9 , 255-5 6 )

place securely within the (Greek) category of production-poiesis-defined

in Plato's Symposium as the bringing forth of "what passes over and goes

forward into presencing from that which is not presencing" (205b).25 From

the Greeks to today's technocultural critics, technology thus remains under

the sway of the presentational function of mimesis-what Lacoue-Labarthe

calls "onto-mimetology."

In aligning techne and mimesis in this way, Lacoue-Labarthe in effect

marshals the Derridian motif of the closure of representation to account for

technology's function in the production of truth. Ultimately, onto-mimetol-

ogy ascribes all truth claims (and truth itself in the Greek/Heideggerian

sense of aletheia) to an untheorizable discursive operation that generates the

possibility for representation itself, what Lacoue-Labarthe glosses as the

"production of a theater" (a space of representation) that enables the

(restricted) operation of mimesis.

... because [fundamental mimetology] represents the function (or even the

fact) of supplementation in general-the function, or the fact, of substitu-

tion-it is necessary to think that the theater exemplifies general mimesis.

Theatrical mimesis, in other words, provides the model for general mimesis.

Art, since it substitutes for nature, since it replaces it and carries out the poi-

etic process that constitutes its essence, always produces a theater, a repre-

sentation. That is to say, another presentation-or the presentation of some-

thing other, which was not yet there, given, or present. (Lacoue-Labarthe

1989, 257)

For my purposes, what is important about this intervention is less its pow-

erful critique of presence than its broader fidelity to the onto-theological

Lacoue-Labarthe's distinction suggests that Western philosophy has devel­ oped on the basis of a fundamental ( and reductive) allegiance between tech­ nology and art; techne as know-how, no less than techne as art, finds its place securely within the ( Greek) category of production-poiesis-defined in Plato's Symposium as the bringing forth of " what passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing" (20Sb) .25 From the Greeks to today's technocultural critics, technology thus remains under the sway of the presentational function of mimesis-what Lacoue-Labarthe calls " onto-mimetology. " In aligning techne and mimesis in this way, Lacoue-Labarthe in effect marshals the Derridian motif of the closure of representation to account for technology's function in the production of truth. Ultimately, onto-mimetol­ ogy ascribes all truth claims ( and truth itself in the Greek/Heideggerian sense of aletheia) to an untheorizable discursive operation that generates the possibility for representation itself, what Lacoue-Labarthe glosses as the " production of a theater" (a space of representation) that enables the (restricted) operation of mimesis . . . . because [fundamental mimetology] represents the function (or even the fact) of supplementation in general-the function, or the fact, of substitu­ tion-it is necessary to think that the theater exemplifies general mimesis. Theatrical mimesis, in other words, provides the model for general mimesis . Art, since it substitutes for nature, since it replaces it and carries out the poi­ etic process that constitutes its essence, always produces a theater, a repre­ sentation. That is to say, another presentation-or the presentation of some­ thing other, which was not yet there, given, or present. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1 9 8 9 , 257)

For my purposes, what is important about this intervention is less its pow­ erful critique of presence than its broader fidelity to the onto-theological

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 97

horizon opened by Aristotle. The distinction Lacoue-Labarthe draws

between general and restricted mimesis remains securely within the space

cleared by the metalepsis Aristotle inaugurates with his subordination of

technology to techne. Accordingly, the reversal Lacoue-Labarthe attributes

to the moderns-the privileging of art over nature-only serves further to

efface the dependence of this very mode of thinking about technology on its

prior and enabling reduction. Once it is determined as the supplement of

physis, techne stops being an object of interpretation; investigation turns

away from the question whether techne is an adequate category for thinking

about technology and toward the role art plays in the production of nature.

In effect, then, Lacoue-Labarthe's onto-mimetology, expanding the sway of

the Derridian supplement, generalizes Aristotle's metaleptic reduction of

technology into the constitutive condition of possibility for thought itself.

Aristotle and the Automatic

To undo the assimilation of technology under the Greek category of techne,

we will need to reconstruct Aristotle's notion of the automatic (to automa-

ton). By pressuring the contradiction at the heart of Aristotle's determina-

tion of technology-the contradiction between technology as supplement

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97

horizon opened by Aristotle. The distinction Lacoue-Labarthe draws between general and restricted mimesis remains securely within the space cleared by the metalepsis Aristotle inaugurates with his subordination of technology to techne. Accordingly, the reversal Lacoue-Labarthe attributes to the moderns-the privileging of art over nature-only serves further to efface the dependence of thi s very mode of thinking about technology on its prior and enabling reduction. Once it is determined as the supplement of physis, techne stops being an object of interpretation; investigation turns away from the question whether techne is an adequate category for thinking about technology and toward the role art plays in the production of nature. In effect, then, Lacoue-Labarthe's onto-mimetology, expanding the sway of the Derridian supplement, generalizes Aristotle's metaleptic reduction of technology into the constitutive condition of possibility for thought itself.

(techne) and as the radically nonnatural (para physin)-I shall redeem the

technological real from the forcible abjection it must undergo in order for

Aristotle's causal doctrine to retain its integrity and maximize its explana-

tory grasp. Following my analysis, Aristotle will be unmasked as nothing

less than the progenitor of technesis in Western metaphysics; like Heidegger,

Aristotle and the Automatic

Derrida, and Lacoue-Labarthe after him, Aristotle finds himself compelled,

by the structural logic of his thought, to suppress the radical exteriority of

technology at the moment when it threatens the integrity of his nouocentric

(mind-centered) metaphysics.

In the example on which I shall focus, Physics 2.6, Aristotle distinguishes

two forms of chance in a manner that appears, at least initially, to recognize

the autonomy of the real. While tuche, or "luck," remains relative to human

and/or natural intentionality, to automaton (the automatic) designates a

category of causality that remains irreducible to techne, in its general and

restricted (mimetic) forms. In the final reckoning, however, when Aristotle

seeks to reconcile his investigation of chance with his famous doctrine of

causality, he betrays the initial promise of his introduction of the automatic.

By assimilating the automatic to tuche (chance modeled on human/natural

intentionality), Aristotle inaugurates a philosophical choice that has proven

To undo the assimilation of technology under the Greek category of techne, we will need to reconstruct Aristotle's notion of the automatic (to automa­ ton) . By pressuring the contradiction at the heart of Aristotle's determina­ tion of technology-the contradiction between technology as supplement ( techne) and as the radically nonnatural (para physin )-I shall redeem the technological real from the forcible abj ection it must undergo in order for Aristotle's causal doctrine to retain its integrity and maximize its explana­ tory grasp. Following my analysis, Aristotle will be unmasked as nothing less than the progenitor of technesis in Western metaphysics; like Heidegger, D errida, and Lacoue-Labarthe after him, Aristotle finds himself compelled, by the structural logic of his thought, to suppress the radical exteriority of technology at the moment when it threatens the integrity of his nouocentric ( mind-centered) metaphysics. In the example on which I shall focus, Physics 2.6, Aristotle distinguishes two forms of chance in a manner that appears, at least initially, to recognize the autonomy of the real. While tuche, or " luck, " remains relative to human and/or natural intentionality, to automaton (the automatic ) designates a category of causality that remains irreducible to techne, in its general and restricted (mimetic ) forms. In the final reckoning, however, when Aristotle seeks to reconcile his investigation of chance with his famous doctrine of causality, he betrays the initial promise of his introduction of the automatic. By assimilating the automatic to tuche (chance modeled on human/natural intentionality) , Aristotle inaugurates a philosophical choice that has proven

98

98 * Embodying Technesis

decisive for subsequent efforts to explore technology's experiential impact.

Since it forms nothing less than the prototype for the metaleptic reduction,

this decision will form the initial and ultimate theoretical target, as it were,

of my effort to rethink technology beyond technesis.

Aristotle's analysis of chance (tuche) reaches its crucial moment when he

asks whether luck and the automatic (tuche and automaton) can be

explained on the basis of his famous fourfold doctrine of causality or if

they-in defiance of his nouocentric ontology-require a modification of

that doctrine. Almost as soon as the question is raised, an answer is fur-

nished: "luck and the automatic," Aristotle unequivocally states, "are reck-

oned as causes" (196a, Aristotle 1987, 100) specifically, as efficient causes,

"sources from which . . . change originates" (198a; 105). Whatever chal-

lenge the analysis of chance poses to the fourfold doctrine of causality is one

that can easily be met. As a result, chance is important less as a philosophi-

cally significant object in its own right than as a test of the scope of Aristo-

tle's causal doctrine; it draws its significance from the resistance it offers

causal explanation, since it designates events that fail to fall within the nor-

mal range of causal action, events that fail to demonstrate strict necessity

and/or regularity. Chance occurrences, Aristotle tells us, are those we ordi-

narily ascribe to "luck" (meaning precisely that which lacks necessity and/or

regularity). They can be divided into two categories: those due to "luck" in

a more narrow sense (tuche) and those due to the "automatic" (automaton).

In Aristotle's usage, luck (tuche) applies to a restricted domain of events,

those effected by an agent "capable of choosing." The automatic applies in

far more cases, extending, Aristotle says, "to the animals other than man

and to. . . inanimate objects" (1976; 104).

Aristotle gives two accounts of the difference, both of which help to

reveal what is at stake in this crucial distinction and to prepare for his reduc-

tion of the automatic to luck in the narrow sense. In the first account, Aris-

totle argues that outcomes due to luck and those that are automatic are "for

something" (i.e., have a final cause) in different ways: the former are for

something in a sense that could be determined by their agent (i.e., according

to the category of thought), while the latter are for something in a sense that

cannot be so determined, that remains-in itself-indeterminate. While it

makes sense to speak of luck in respect to a human agent-who can, for

example, go to a business meeting and run into an old friend by chance-it

makes no sense to do so when the agent in question is an inanimate object.

Aristotle concludes that "luck and its outcome belong only to things which

can be lucky and in general engage in rational activity" (197b; 104, empha-

sis added).

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Em bod y i n g

Technesis

decisive for subsequent efforts to explore technology's experiential impact. Since it forms nothing less than the prototype for the metaleptic reduction, this decision will form the initial and ultimate theoretical target, as it were, of my effort to rethink technology beyond technesis. Aristotle's analysis of chance (tuche) reaches its crucial moment when he asks whether luck and the automatic ( tuche and automaton) can be explained on the basis of his famous fourfold doctrine of causality or if they-in defiance of his nouocentric ontology-require a modification of that doctrine. Almost as soon as the question is raised, an answer is fur­ nished: " luck and the automatic, " Aristotle unequivocally states, " are reck­ oned as causes" ( 1 96a, Aristotle 1 9 8 7, 1 0 0 ) specifically, as efficient causes, " sources from which . . . change originates " ( 1 9 8 a; 1 0 5 ) . Whatever chal­ lenge the analysis of chance poses to the fourfold doctrine of causality is one that can easily be met. As a result, chance is important less as a philosophi­ cally significant obj ect in its own right than as a test of the scope of Aristo­ tle's causal doctrine; it draws its significance from the resistance it offers causal explanation, since it designates events that fail to fall within the nor­ mal range of causal action, events that fail to demonstrate strict necessity and/or regularity. Chance occurrences, Aristotle tells us, are those we ordi­ narily ascribe to " luck " (meaning precisely that which lacks necessity and/or regularity ) . They can be divided into two categories: those due to " luck " in a more narrow sense ( tuche) and those due to the " automatic " (automaton) . In Aristotle's usage, luck (tuche) applies to a restricted domain of events, those effected by an agent "capable of choosing. " The automatic applies in far more cases, extending, Aristotle says, "to the animals other than man and to . . . inanimate objects " ( 1 976; 1 04 ) . Aristotle gives two accounts o f the difference, both o f which help to reveal what is at stake in this crucial distinction and to prepare for his reduc­ tion of the automatic to luck in the narrow sense. In the first account, Aris­ totle argues that outcomes due to luck and those that are automatic are " for something " ( i . e . , have a final cause) in different ways : the former are for something in a sense that could be determined by their agent (i.e., according to the category of thought ) , while the latter are for something in a sense that cannot be so determined, that remains-in itself-indeterminate. While it makes sense to speak of luck in respect to a human agent-who can, for example, go to a business meeting and run into an old friend by chance-it makes no sense to do so when the agent in question is an inanimate obj ect. Aristotle concludes that " luck and its outcome belong only to things which can be lucky and in general engage in rational activity" ( 1 97b; 1 04, empha­ sis added ) .

Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 99

Events caused by the automatic are not likewise (i.e., intrinsically) mean-

ingful. They do not pertain directly to the intentional horizon of an agent,

and importantly (although Aristotle does not put it this way), they can only

be rendered meaningful through (metaleptic) translation. To attain mean-

ing, automatic events must be evaluated not in themselves but rather within

a specific subjective horizon belonging to some particular intentional agent.

While luck names a real force that simultaneously plays an explanatory role

within the field of thought of its agent, the automatic is a real force inde-

pendently of its relation to an intentional agent and only becomes a cause in

the proper, explanatory sense by being transposed into a second-order func-

tion of an intentional agent.

Aristotle's second account of the difference between luck and the auto-

matic concerns the relation between efficient and final cause. In cases where

luck is in operation, the final cause is internal to the nature of the object,

stemming unintentionally but nevertheless from the activity of an otherwise

intentional agent. "The source of an automatic outcome," however, "is

external" (197b; 105): it stems from outside the nature of the object pas-

sively undergoing change. The final cause corresponding to this external

efficient cause emerges only through analogy with an intentional agent, as

Aristotle's example of a stone falling illustrates: "A stone falls and hits

someone, but it does not fall for the purpose of hitting him; the fall accord-

ingly was 'in-itself-to-no-purpose'-a chance result [rather, an automatic

result, tou automatou]."26 It is simply outside the nature of the stone to hit

a man "with the purpose of hitting him." In qualifying the final cause of the

automatic as external, Aristotle establishes, among other things, that in

itself (i.e., in its relation with its efficient cause), the automatic is opaque to

thought and can be known only negatively through comparison with the

sense it takes on when it is carried over to an intentional agent. Thus, like

the first difference, this one emphasizes the mediation or translation that the

automatic must undergo to be presented in thought.

On the basis of these two differences, Aristotle stresses the external

provenance of the efficiency that defines the automatic in its proper sense.

Luck (in the narrow sense) rests at the farthest extreme from natural neces-

sity while still remaining natural (i.e., governed by the nature of the agent);

as Aristotle puts it, "[w]e are furthest from an outcome of luck with things

which come to be due to nature" (1976, 105). The efficient cause of a lucky

event, nevertheless, remains internal to the nature of the agent, either

directly or "by concurrence." The automatic, however, comes into play

when things take place "contrary to nature" (para physin).

To illustrate this difference, Aristotle compares two examples. In the case

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99

Events caused by the automatic are not likewise ( i . e . , intrinsically) mean­ ingful. They do not pertain directly to the intentional horizon of an agent, and importantly ( although Aristotle does not put it this way ) , they can only be rendered meaningful through (metaleptic) translation. To attain mean­ ing, automatic events must be evaluated not in themselves but rather within a specific subj ective horizon belonging to some particular intentional agent. While luck names a real force that simultaneously plays an explanatory role within the field of thought of its agent, the automatic is a real force inde­ pendently of its relation to an intentional agent and only becomes a cause in the proper, explanatory sense by being transposed into a second-order func­ tion of an intentional agent. Aristotle's second account of the difference between luck and the auto­ matic concerns the relation between efficient and final cause. In cases where luck is in operation, the final cause is internal to the nature of the obj ect, stemming unintentionally but nevertheless from the activity of an otherwise intentional agent. "The source of an automatic outcome, " however, "is external " ( 1 97b; 1 0 5 ) : it stems from outside the nature of the obj ect pas­ sively undergoing change. The final cause corresponding to this external efficient cause emerges only through analogy with an intentional agent, as Aristotle's example of a stone falling illustrates: "A stone falls and hits someone, but it does not fall for the purpose of hitting him; the fall accord­ ingly was 'in-itself-to-no-purpose'-a chance result [rather, an automatic result, tou automatou] . " 2 6 It is simply outside the nature of the stone to hit a man "with the purpose of hitting him. " In qualifying the final cause of the automatic as external, Aristotle establishes, among other things, that in itself ( i . e . , in its relation with its efficient cause), the automatic is opaque to thought and can be known only negatively through comparison with the sense it takes on when it is carried over to an intentional agent. Thus, like the first difference, this one emphasizes the mediation or translation that the automatic must undergo to be presented in thought. On the basis of these two differences, Aristotle stresses the external provenance of the efficiency that defines the automatic in its proper sense. Luck (in the narrow sense) rests at the farthest extreme from natural neces­ sity while still remaining natural (i.e., governed by the nature of the agent) ; as Aristotle puts it, " [w] e are furthest from a n outcome o f luck with things which come to be due to nature " ( 1 976, 1 0 5 ) . The efficient cause of a lucky event, nevertheless, remains internal to the nature of the agent, either directly or " by concurrence. " The automatic, however, comes into play when things take place "contrary to nature" (para physin ) . To illustrate this difference, Aristotle compares two examples. In the case

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100 * Embodying Technesis

of what we might call freaks of nature, natural monstrosities produced con-

trary to nature's logic, Aristotle contends, we are still dealing with luck,

since the cause of such monstrosities remains internal to nature. Yet because

of the perversity that goes with conceiving such mishaps in intentional

terms, we tend to attribute them to "'accident[s]' [automaton] in Nature."

When it comes to categorical definitions, however, we must avoid drawing

ontological conclusions from what is merely a manner of speaking, and so

we must distinguish from this example of luck an example of the automatic

in its proper sense. The automatic itself, Aristotle argues, is para physin

(contrary to nature) in a radical sense, since it breaks entirely with the model

of natural (or internal) generation. He continues:

Automaton, on the other hand, may be used to describe the behaviour of

brute beasts and even of many inanimate things. For instance, we attribute it

to automaton if a horse escapes a danger by coming accidentally to a place of

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Em bod y i n g

Technesis

of what we might call freaks of nature, natural monstrosities produced con­ trary to nature's logic, Aristotle contends, we are still dealing with luck, since the cause of such monstrosities remains internal to nature. Yet because of the perversity that goes with conceiving such mishaps in intentional terms, we tend to attribute them to " 'accident[ s] ' [automaton] in Nature. " When it comes to categorical definitions, however, we must avoid drawing ontological conclusions from what is merely a manner of speaking, and so we must distinguish from this example of luck an example of the automatic in its proper sense. The automatic itself, Aristotle argues, is para physin (contrary to nature ) in a radical sense, since it breaks entirely with the model of natural (or internal ) generation. He continues:

safety.... But this case [of a natural monstrosity] is different from that of the

horse; for the horse's escape was due to an external cause, but the causes of

Nature's miscarriage are internal to her own processes. (Aristotle 1929, 159,

161; emphasis added)

The automatic is para physin in the sense that it cannot be tied down to a

purpose immediately graspable by and attributable to an agent of thought

or to nature. Its efficiency derives from something purely contingent and

external to the subject it qualifies and thus comprises a sort of lacuna in the

explanatory matrix of Aristotle's causal doctrine.

Given what look like solid grounds for a stable and interesting categori-

cal distinction between luck and the automatic on the basis of their respec-

Automaton, on the other hand, may be used to describe the behaviour of brute beasts and even of many inanimate things . For instance, we attribute it to automaton if a horse escapes a danger by coming accidentally to a place of safety . . . . But this case [of a natural monstrosity] is different from that of the horse; for the horse's escape was due to an external cause, but the causes of Nature's miscarriage are internal to her own processes. (Aristotle 1 929, 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 ; emphasis added)

tive relations to (human) thought, the conclusion Aristotle goes on to draw

cannot but come as a surprise.

... both [the automatic and luck] are sources from which the change origi-

nates; for they are always either things which cause naturally or things which

cause from thought-of which there is an indeterminate multitude. But since

the automatic and luck are causes of things for which mind or nature might

be responsible, when something comes to be responsible for these same

things by virtue of concurrence, and since nothing which is by virtue of con-

currence is prior to that which is by itself, it is clear that no cause by virtue of

concurrence is prior to that which is by itself a cause. Hence the automatic

and luck are posterior to both mind and nature; so however much the auto-

matic may be the cause of the heavens, mind and nature are necessarily prior

The automatic is para physin in the sense that it cannot be tied down to a purpose immediately graspable by and attributable to an agent of thought or to nature. Its efficiency derives from something purely contingent and external to the subj ect it qualifies and thus comprises a sort of lacuna in the explanatory matrix of Aristotle's causal doctrine. Given what look like solid grounds for a stable and interesting categori­ cal distinction between luck and the automatic on the basis of their respec­

causes both of many other things and of this universe [proteron noun . .

physin aitian einai]. (Aristotle 1987, 198a; emphasis added)

tive relations to (human ) thought, the conclusion Aristotle goes on to draw cannot but come as a surprise . . . . both [the automatic and luck] are sources from which the change origi­ nates; for they are always either things which cause naturally or things which cause from thought-of which there is an indeterminate multitude. But since the automatic and luck are causes of things for which mind or nature might be responsible, when something comes to be responsible for these same things by virtue of concurrence, and since nothing which is by virtue of con­ currence is prior to that which is by itself, it is clear that no cause by virtue of concurrence is prior to that which is by itself a cause. Hence the automatic and luck are posterior to both mind and nature; so however much the auto­ matic may be the cause of the heavens, mind and nature are necessarily prior causes both of many other things and of this universe [proteron noun . physin aitian einai] . (Aristotle 1 9 8 7, 1 9 8 a; emphasis added)

From Metap h o r to E m bo d i m e n t

From Metaphor to Embodiment * 101

By restricting efficient causes to two categories-"either things which cause

naturally or things which cause from thought"-Aristotle leaves out the

proper definition of the automatic as what is para physin, unnatural in a

radical sense. He forgets that automatic causes are "causes of things for

which mind or nature might be responsible" only following their translation

into the horizon of an intentional agent, or in other words, only after a

reduction of the radical exteriority of the automatic. Again, the example of

the stone seems to establish this difference: by itself the stone falling is

"without why"; it acquires a determinable final cause only when viewed on

the model of intentional thought, that is, as an event within an individual

mind or within that great mind Aristotle calls "nature."

Not surprisingly, given my claim for Aristotle's privileged status as the

progenitor of technesis, this assimilation of the automatic into the doctrine

of causality takes form as a metalepsis in the text of the Physics. By claim-

ing that the automatic, like luck, is an (efficient) cause by virtue of concur-

rence, Aristotle is merely drawing a conclusion on the basis of what, for

him, is simply a fundamental law of nature-the law stating that "nothing

which is by virtue of concurrence is prior to that which is by itself." In itself

or prior to its reduction, however, the automatic does not lend itself to such

a hierarchizing distinction; since the final cause of the automatic is unknow-

able, unthinkable, and unpresentable, there is no principle in the case of the

automatic on which to separate essential from concurrent. The possibility to

do so comes only following the translation of the automatic into the horizon

of thought, where something can be a cause by concurrence only if it is sub-

ordinated to an intentional agent that is a cause in itself.27 Consequently,

Aristotle's assertion of the priority of "mind and nature" over luck and the

automatic is both circular and metaleptic. His subordination of cause by

concurrence acquires validity only on the basis of a prior commitment to

nouocentrism-a categorical and dogmatic privileging of the mental over

the material. Once it is assimilated into the field of thought, to automaton

loses its radical exteriority: following Aristotle's inaugural metalepsis, the

automatic appears to be the result of a prior cause, rather than a force oper-

ating beyond the scope of thought.

•

10 1

By restricting efficient causes to two categories-" either things which cause naturally or things which cause from thought "-Aristotle leaves out the proper definition of the automatic as what is para physin, unnatural in a radical sense. He forgets that automatic causes are " causes of things for which mind or nature might be responsible " only following their translation into the horizon of an intentional agent, or in other words, only after a reduction of the radical exteriority of the automatic. Again, the example of the stone seems to establish this difference: by itself the stone falling is " without why " ; it acquires a determinable final cause only when viewed on the model of intentional thought, that is, as an event within an individual mind or within that great mind Aristotle calls " nature . " Not surprisingly, given my claim for Aristotle's privileged status as the progenitor of technesis, this assimilation of the automatic into the doctrine of causality takes form as a metalepsis in the text of the Physics. By claim­ ing that the automatic, like luck, is an (efficient) cause by virtue of concur­ rence, Aristotle is merely drawing a conclusion on the basis of what, for him, is simply a fundamental law of nature-the law stating that " nothing which is by virtue of concurrence is prior to that which is by itself. " In itself or prior to its reduction, however, the automatic does not lend itself to such a hierarchizing distinction; since the final cause of the automatic is unknow­ able, unthinkable, and unpresentable, there is no principle in the case of the automatic on which to separate essential from concurrent. The possibility to do so comes only following the translation of the automatic into the horizon of thought, where something can be a cause by concurrence only if it is sub­ ordinated to an intentional agent that is a cause in itself.27 Consequently, Aristotle's assertion of the priority of "mind and nature " over luck and the automatic is both circular and metaleptic. His subordination of cause by concurrence acquires validity only on the basis of a prior commitment to nouocentrism-a categorical and dogmatic privileging of the mental over the material. Once it is assimilated into the field of thought, to automaton loses its radical exteriority: following Aristotle's inaugural metalepsis, the automatic appears to be the result of a prior cause, rather than a force oper­ ating beyond the scope of thought.

Chapter 4

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne:

Heidegger on Technology

In chapter 3, I showed that Aristotle's decision to repress the automatic

Chapter 4

played an operative role in the inauguration of the machine reduction of

technology. To trace the endurance of this reduction in the Western philo-

sophical tradition, I shall now focus on the figure responsible for reinvent-

ing the philosophical machine metaphor in a distinctly twentieth-century

form, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger.

Heidegger's influence on contemporary technocultural theory is, in a

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne: H eidegger on Technology

word, immense. His diagnosis in essays like "The Question Concerning

Technology" and "The Age of the World Picture" has established technol-

ogy as an important object for disciplines as diverse as political science,

media studies, gender studies, and art history, not to mention philosophy

and literary criticism. Certainly, no serious contemporary study of technol-

ogy in practically any discipline would dream of forgoing a sustained

engagement with Heidegger's work, and yet, despite the enormity of this

influence, his model tends less to inspire genuine critical attention than to be

taken as an unquestioned-and unquestionable-starting point for explor-

ing technology.1 Mediated by French poststructuralism, this uncritical

(non)reception of Heidegger is, I think, largely responsible for the reign

technesis enjoys in contemporary technocultural criticism. The failure on

the part of contemporary critics to criticize Heidegger's presuppositions-

especially his ontologizing of technology-not only has had the effect of

rubber-stamping his bleak depiction of an absolute technological command

over reality but has facilitated a wholesale and still more reductive posi-

tivizing of it. Given Heidegger's sustained call for a resistance against tech-

nology, there is certainly a bitter irony to the fact that technology's restric-

tion of the real to what can be "conceived and grasped as a picture"

(Heidegger 1977c) has come to form an unquestioned methodological basis

for much recent work in cultural theory of media and technology; from Bau-

drillard's embrace of the hyperreal to the robust celebration of representa-

In chapter 3 , I showed that Aristotle's decision to repress the automatic played an operative role in the inauguration of the machine reduction of technology. To trace the endurance of this reduction in the Western philo­ sophical tradition, I shall now focus on the figure responsible for reinvent­ ing the philosophical machine metaphor in a distinctly twentieth-century form, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's influence on contemporary technocultural theory is, in a word, immense. His diagnosis in essays like "The Question Concerning Technology" and "The Age of the World Picture" has established technol­ ogy as an important obj ect for disciplines as diverse as political science, media studies, gender studies, and art history, not to mention philosophy and literary criticism. Certainly, no serious contemporary study of technol­ ogy in practically any discipline would dream of forgoing a sustained engagement with Heidegger's work, and yet, despite the enormity of this influence, his model tends less to inspire genuine critical attention than to be taken as an unquestioned-and unquestionable-starting point for explor­ ing technology. 1 Mediated by French poststructuralism, this uncritical (non)reception of Heidegger is, I think, largely responsible for the reign technesis enj oys in contemporary technocultural criticism. The failure on the part of contemporary critics to criticize Heidegger's presuppositions­ especially his ontologizing of technology-not only has had the effect of rubber-stamping his bleak depiction of an absolute technological command over reality but has facilitated a wholesale and still more reductive posi­ tivizing of it. Given Heidegger's sustained call for a resistance against tech­ nology, there is certainly a bitter irony to the fact that technology's restric­ tion of the real to what can be "conceived and grasped as a picture " (Heidegger 1 9 77c) has come to form an unquestioned methodological basis for much recent work in cultural theory of media and technology; from Bau­ drillard's embrace of the hyperreal to the robust celebration of representa-

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 103

tion common to most contemporary forms of cultural studies, Heidegger's

bleakest prospect has been more than fulfilled.

As I suggested in my introduction, this misguided positivizing of Heideg-

ger finds its theoretical basis in the refunctionalization to which French

poststructuralism has submitted his thought. As exemplified in the work of

both Derrida and Lacan, poststructuralism operates an explicit inversion of

Heidegger's position, an inversion that functions to radicalize Heidegger's

view by expanding the command of technology and tightening the strangle-

hold exercised by representational thinking. Where Heidegger maintains

that the essence of technology (techne) is uncontaminated by technology,

both Derrida and Lacan assert a constitutive complicity of logos (and hence

of all determinations of essence) with an irreducible technicity. According to

their otherwise quite divergent analyses, the contemporary reign of repre-

sentational thinking is not simply a historically specific and hence limited

phenomenon but a structural element of thought itself.

In the wake of this poststructuralist decision regarding Heidegger's

famous maxim that the essence of technology is nothing technological, the

historically determinate reduction of technological materiality that we find

in Heidegger is given a vastly stronger legitimation. Thus in Derrida, tech-

nology is equated with writing (and all of its possible externalizations),

while in Lacan, technological artifacts (exemplarily, embodiments of the

gaze and the voice) serve as the locus for the worldly enactment of desire. In

both cases, a restricted account of technology rooted in a radicalized and yet

ultimately faithful version of Heideggerian enframing takes priority over a

robust account of technology's radical material exteriority.

Breaking with French poststructuralism, I shall challenge this radicaliza-

tion of Heidegger's position, together with the positivization it has more

recently yielded, not so much by disputing its cogency as by questioning the

adequacy of its source. In particular, I shall question whether Heidegger's

account of the temptations posed by ontic technologies provides us with a

rich enough basis for grasping technology's robust impact on our experi-

ence. In the story I shall tell, whatever cogency and force Heidegger is able

to acquire for his ontologizing of technology comes from a massive and vio-

lent reduction of ontic technologies. My account will thus expose the prior-

ity of the ontological for what, I suggest, it is: a defense against the ontic

threat of the technological real. By laying bare the occulted priority of the

ontic, I shall thus urge a different path out of Heidegger than the one cho-

sen by poststructuralism, a path that takes seriously the notion of techno-

logical autonomy that he repeatedly found himself compelled to repress and

that simply cannot be grasped through any radicalization of representation,

Techne

•

103

tion common to most contemporary forms of cultural studies, Heidegger's bleakest prospect has been more than fulfilled. As I suggested in my introduction, this misguided positivi zing of Heideg­ ger finds its theoretical basis in the refunctionalization to which French poststructuralism has submitted his thought. As exemplified in the work of both Derrida and Lacan, poststructuralism operates an explicit inversion of Heidegger's position, an inversion that functions to radicalize Heidegger's view by expanding the command of technology and tightening the strangle­ hold exercised by representational thinking. Where Heidegger maintains that the essence of technology (techne) is uncontaminated by technology, both Derrida and Lacan assert a constitutive complicity of logos ( and hence of all determinations of essence ) with an irreducible technicity. According to their otherwise quite divergent analyses, the contemporary reign of repre­ sentational thinking is not simply a historically specific and hence limited phenomenon but a structural element of thought itself. In the wake of this poststructuralist decision regarding Heidegger's famous maxim that the essence of technology is nothing technological, the historically determinate reduction of technological materiality that we find in Heidegger is given a vastly stronger legitimation. Thus in Derrida, tech­ nology is equated with writing ( and all of its possible externalizations ) , while i n Lacan, technological artifacts (exemplarily, embodiments o f the gaze and the voice ) serve as the locus for the worldly enactment of desire. In both cases, a restricted account of technology rooted in a radicalized and yet ultimately faithful version of Heideggerian enframing takes priority over a robust account of technology's radical material exteriority. Breaking with French poststructuralism, I shall challenge this radicaliza­ tion of Heidegger's position, together with the positivization it has more recently yielded, not so much by disputing its cogency as by questioning the adequacy of its source. In particular, I shall question whether Heidegger's account of the temptations posed by ontic technologies provides us with a rich enough basis for grasping technology's robust impact on our experi­ ence. In the story I shall tell, whatever cogency and force Heidegger is able to acquire for his ontologizing of technology comes from a massive and vio­ lent reduction of ontic technologies. My account will thus expose the prior­ ity of the ontological for what, I suggest, it is: a defense against the ontic threat of the technological real. By laying bare the occulted priority of the ontic, I shall thus urge a different path out of Heidegger than the one cho­ sen by poststructuralism, a path that takes seriously the notion of techno­ logical autonomy that he repeatedly found himself compelled to repress and that simply cannot be grasped through any radicalization of representation,

104

104 * Embodying Technesis

no matter how extreme. On this point, my interpretation resonates with

recent interpretations of Heidegger's politics and specifically with the per-

suasive suggestion that an overriding desire to maintain faith in a philo-

sophical salvation blinded him to the everyday, "fallen" menace of technol-

ogy, which he might otherwise have seen quite clearly.2

In this chapter, I shall critically reconstruct Heidegger's account of tech-

nology to contextualize my central claim: that the key distinction Heidegger

develops in "The Question concerning Technology" between a generic and

a specifically modern form of production-between Hervorbringen (literally

"bringing-forth," Heidegger's translation for poiesis) and Herausfordern

(challenging-forth)-presupposes and obtains coherence only on the basis

of a reduction of technology first developed in his early period. Without this

reduction, undertaken most explicitly in Heidegger's account of the

machine as subordinate to the world-disclosing power of Dasein (the mode

of situated being or "being-there" constitutive of human existence) in his

lecture course from 1928, the distinction of Herausfordern from Hervor-

bringen would threaten the primacy of poiesis and, with it, the very priority

of ontology on which his analysis is based. As I see it, Heidegger's reduction

of technology thus functions to insure the domestication of modern tech-

nology within the frame of poiesis. In the process of exploring this reduc-

tion, I shall argue that Heidegger's account of technology is ultimately

determined by the analysis of language he initially develops in Being and

Time and that his reduction forms the paradigm for technesis as the privi-

leged twentieth-century form of the machine reduction of technology.

"Angst" vor der Technik?

In Being and Time, Heidegger addresses technology in two fundamental

ways, both of which serve to establish its secondarity with respect to

Dasein's ontological commitment to its ownmost Being. On the one hand,

Heidegger develops an account of technology as that which is experienced

practically in the mode of Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand); in accord with

his account, ontic technologies are a part of what makes up the world of

Dasein's everyday, practical concern and are experienced as components of

a total activity and not in themselves. They owe their existence to the world-

disclosing force of Dasein. On the other hand, Heidegger addresses technol-

ogy more obliquely through his analysis of Dasein's fallenness. In the host

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

no matter how extreme. On this point, my interpretation resonates with recent interpretations of Heidegger's politics and specifically with the per­ suasive suggestion that an overriding desire to maintain faith in a philo­ sophical salvation blinded him to the everyday, " fallen " menace of technol­ ogy, which he might otherwise have seen quite clearly.2 In this chapter, I shall critically reconstruct Heidegger's account of tech­ nology to contextualize my central claim: that the key distinction Heidegger develops in " The Question concerning Technology " between a generic and a specifically modern form of production-between Hervorbringen (literally " bringing-forth, " Heidegger's translation for poiesis) and Herausfordern (challenging-forth )-presupposes and obtains coherence only on the basis of a reduction of technology first developed in his early period. Without this reduction, undertaken most explicitly in Heidegger's account of the machine as subordinate to the world-disclosing power of Dasein (the mode of situated being or " being-there " constitutive of human existence ) in his lecture course from 1 92 8 , the distinction of Herausfordern from Hervor­ bringen would threaten the primacy of poiesis and, with it, the very priority of ontology on which his analysis is based. As I see it, Heidegger's reduction of technology thus functions to insure the domestication of modern tech­ nology within the frame of poiesis. In the process of exploring this reduc­ tion, I shall argue that Heidegger's account of technology is ultimately determined by the analysis of language he initially develops in Being and Time and that his reduction forms the paradigm for technesis as the privi­ leged twentieth-century form of the machine reduction of technology.

of examples Heidegger marshals to illustrate the three modes of fallenness

(idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity [Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit])-

" Angst" vor der Technik? In Being and Time, Heidegger addresses technology in two fundamental ways, both of which serve to establish its secondarity with respect to Dasein's ontological commitment to its ownmost Being. On the one hand, Heidegger develops an account of technology as that which is experienced practically in the mode of Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand); in accord with his account, ontic technologies are a part of what makes up the world of Dasein's everyday, practical concern and are experienced as components of a total activity and not in themselves. They owe their existence to the world­ disclosing force of Dasein. On the other hand, Heidegger addresses technol­ ogy more obliquely through his analysis of Dasein's fallenness. In the host of examples Heidegger marshals to illustrate the three modes of fallenness ( idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity [Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit] )-

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 105

examples that centrally involve technologized modes of public communica-

tion-technology is prohibited from playing any positive role whatsoever.

Rather than assisting Dasein in its quest to achieve an authentic under-

standing of its source of Being, technology here comprises precisely what

must be overcome on the way toward such an understanding. In Heideg-

ger's account, it would seem, technology can only interfere with the quest

for authenticity in a manner that-like any other breakdown in Dasein's

average everyday, practical activity (Zuhandenheit)-can easily be cor-

rected simply by being thematized.

Heidegger's account does not consider the potential recalcitrance of ontic

technologies-the possibility that they might resist such thematization or

that Dasein might never be in a position to make its dependence on them

explicit. To understand why this possibility poses a threat to Heidegger's

phenomenological program, let us distinguish Being and Time's famous

account of the hammer as the prototype of the tool from those technologies

that Dasein encounters as obstacles on its quest for authenticity. Such a dis-

tinction serves to emphasize the specificity of electronic and media tech-

nologies that, as various postmodern critics have pointed out, differ from

machine and preindustrial technologies insofar as they impact us from

within; because they are implicated in our very Being-in-the-world as a cen-

tral aspect of what enables experience as such, they cannot be thematized in

the same way as earlier technologies, that is, by being made explicit via the

theoretical mode of knowing Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit.3 Accordingly,

such technologies simply cannot be accounted for on the theory of reference

Heidegger develops in Being and Time: unlike the examples of practical

objects he furnishes (e.g., the automobile's turning signal), the vast majority

of postmodern technologies cannot be constituted either as signs or as indi-

cations and thus cannot be given any objectal status by Dasein. Effectively,

this means that postmodern technologies (to the extent that they become an

issue for Dasein) must occupy a position formally analogous to the role of

death in Being and Time: in both cases, Dasein confronts the lack of an

object where an object should be. Within the terms of Heidegger's analysis,

postmodern technologies should provoke Angst, the feeling of ontological

doubt faced in experiences (such as Dasein's confrontation with its own

death) that cannot be correlated with a particular referent and that, conse-

quently, disturb Dasein sufficiently to tear it away from its everyday

involvement with the thing-world and spur it on to attain its authenticity.

It is not surprising that Heidegger furnishes no such account of technol-

ogy in Being and Time. Not only would an account of technology as

"nonobjectal" contradict his instrumental determination of technology as

Techne

•

105

examples that centrally involve technologized modes of public communica­ tion-technology is prohibited from playing any positive role whatsoever. Rather than assisting Dasein in its quest to achieve an authentic under­ standing of its source of Being, technology here comprises precisely what must be overcome on the way toward such an understanding. In Heideg­ ger's account, it would seem, technology can only interfere with the quest for authenticity in a manner that-like any other breakdown in Dasein's average everyday, practical activity (Zuhandenheit)-can easily be cor­ rected simply by being thematized. Heidegger's account does not consider the potential recalcitrance of ontic technologies-the possibility that they might resist such thematization or that Dasein might never be in a position to make its dependence on them explicit. To understand why this possibility poses a threat to Heidegger's phenomenological program, let us distinguish Being and Time's famous account of the hammer as the prototype of the tool from those technologies that Dasein encounters as obstacles on its quest for authenticity. Such a dis­ tinction serves to emphasize the specificity of electronic and media tech­ nologies that, as various postmodern critics have pointed out, differ from machine and preindustrial technologies insofar as they impact us from within; because they are implicated in our very Being-in-the-world as a cen­ tral aspect of what enables experience as such, they cannot be thematized in the same way as earlier technologies, that is, by being made explicit via the theoretical mode of knowing Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit. 3 Accordingly, such technologies simply cannot be accounted for on the theory of reference Heidegger develops in Being and Time: unlike the examples of practical obj ects he furnishes (e.g., the automobile's turning signal ) , the vast majority of postmodern technologies cannot be constituted either as signs or as indi­ cations and thus cannot be given any obj ectal status by Dasein. Effectively, this means that postmodern technologies (to the extent that they become an issue for Dasein) must occupy a position formally analogous to the role of death in Being and Time: in both cases, Dasein confronts the lack of an obj ect where an obj ect should be. Within the terms of Heidegger's analysis, postmodern technologies should provoke Angst, the feeling of ontological doubt faced in experiences (such as Dasein's confrontation with its own death) that cannot be correlated with a particular referent and that, conse­ quently, disturb Dasein sufficiently to tear it away from its everyday involvement with the thing-world and spur it on to attain its authenticity. It is not surprising that Heidegger furnishes no such account of technol­ ogy in Being and Time. Not only would an account of technology as " nonobj ectal" contradict his instrumental determination of technology as

106

106 * Embodying Technesis

ready-to-hand (zuhandene), but more importantly, it would accord a recal-

citrance to technology that Heidegger is hardly prepared to allow. Unlike

Being-toward-death, which provokes Angst from a source internal to

Dasein, nonobjectal technology introduces a source of anxiety that would

be radically external to Dasein's powers-that could, in short, potentially

obstruct Dasein from ever beginning its quest for authenticity. This threat, I

suggest, furnishes the root motivation for Heidegger's reduction of ontic

technology: to purchase coherence for his account of Dasein's conversion,

Heidegger must exclude all possibility of sustained external technical inter-

ference.

We can see this reduction at work in the analysis of how Dasein moves

from its everyday absorption in idle talk (Gerede) to a position where it is

able to hear itself authentically. Restricted by his inflexible categorical

opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity, Heidegger has no means to

recognize the possibility that Dasein might indeed depend, intrinsically and

insurmountably, on ontic technologies; not insignificantly, it is important to

point out that any such dependence will only have increased with the evolu-

tion and increasing sophistication of consumer society in the twentieth cen-

tury. In paragraph 55 of Being and Time, Heidegger depicts Dasein's strug-

gle for authenticity as an unmediated response to the call of conscience; to

respond properly, Heidegger contends, Dasein must overcome its factical or

phenomenal absorption in the idle talk of the public self (das Man). Yet,

because this absorption is rooted not in the formal structure of Dasein but

in its ontic, fallen desire, Dasein must overcome what is in effect an external

threat-an everyday, habitual (i.e, nonthematized) reliance on mundane

technologies that might in fact be quite difficult or altogether impossible to

give up.4 Before it can even begin its philosophical quest for ontological

authenticity, Dasein must thus surmount a prior ontic commitment-its

absorption in the domain of the technical.

In the face of the external, ontic origin of the threat of the technical, Hei-

degger asserts the categorical priority of the ontological over the ontic. Sim-

ply by presupposing this priority (the very priority that technology puts into

question), Heidegger is able to shift the focus of the existential analytic of

Dasein from the constraints imposed by its external absorption to its

unhampered power for internal modification. "Losing itself in the public-

ness and the idle talk of the 'they,'" Heidegger says, "Dasein fails to hear

[Uberhort] its own Self in listening to the they-self." He continues:

If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear

itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

ready-to-hand (zuhandene), but more importantly, it would accord a recal­ citrance to technology that Heidegger is hardly prepared to allow. Unlike Being-toward-death, which provokes Angst from a source internal to Dasein, nonobj ectal technology introduces a source of anxiety that would be radically external to Dasein's powers-that could, in short, potentially obstruct Dasein from ever beginning its quest for authenticity. This threat, I suggest, furnishes the root motivation for Heidegger's reduction of ontic technology: to purchase coherence for his account of Dasein's conversion, Heidegger must exclude all possibility of sustained external technical inter­ ference. We can see this reduction at work in the analysis of how Dasein moves from its everyday absorption in idle talk ( Gerede) to a position where it is able to hear itself authentically. Restricted by his inflexible categorical opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity, Heidegger has no means to recognize the possibility that Dasein might indeed depend, intrinsically and insurmountably, on ontic technologies; not insignificantly, it is important to point out that any such dependence will only have increased with the evolu­ tion and increasing sophistication of consumer society in the twentieth cen­ tury. In paragraph 55 of Being and Time, Heidegger depicts Dasein's strug­ gle for authenticity as an unmediated response to the call of conscience; to respond properly, Heidegger contends, Dasein must overcome its factical or phenomenal absorption in the idle talk of the public self ( das Man) . Yet, because this absorption is rooted not in the formal structure of Dasein but in its ontic, fallen desire, Dasein must overcome what is in effect an external threat-an everyday, habitual (i.e, nonthematized ) reliance on mundane technologies that might in fact be quite difficult or altogether impossible to give up .4 Before it can even begin its philosophical quest for ontological authenticity, Dasein must thus surmount a prior ontic commitment-its absorption in the domain of the technical. In the face of the external, ontic origin of the threat of the technical, Hei­ degger asserts the categorical priority of the ontological over the ontic. Sim­ ply by presupposing this priority (the very priority that technology puts into question ) , Heidegger is able to shift the focus of the existential analytic of Dasein from the constraints imposed by its external absorption to its unhampered power for internal modification. " Losing itself in the public­ ness and the idle talk of the 'they,' " Heidegger says, "Dasein fails to hear [ Oberhort] its own Self in listening to the they-self. " He continues: If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 107

itself-to find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which

fails to hear in that it listens away to the "they." This listening-away must get

broken off; in other words, the possibility of another kind of hearing which

will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein itself. The possibility of its thus get-

ting broken off lies in its being appealed to without mediation. Dasein fails

to hear itself, and listens away to the "they"; and this listening-away gets

broken by the call if that call, in accordance with its character as such,

arouses another kind of hearing, which, in relationship to the hearing that is

lost, has a character in every way opposite. If in this lost hearing, one has

been fascinated with the "hubbub" [vom Larm] of the manifold ambiguity

[Zweideutigkeit] which idle talk possesses in its everyday "newness" [des

alltaglich "neuen" Geredes], then the call must do its calling without any

hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity. (1962,

315-16/1986, 271; emphasis added)5

Given Heidegger's own catastrophic fall into the ontic-a fall mediated, as

Avital Ronell has shown, by his own fear and repression of the technologi-

cal-there is every reason to question the efficacy of such an exclusively the-

Techne

•

107

itself-to find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which fails to hear in that it listens away to the " they. " This listening-away must get broken off; in other words, the possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein itself The possibility of its thus get­ ting broken off lies in its being appealed to without mediation. Dasein fails to hear itself, and listens away to the " they " ; and this listening-away gets broken by the call if that call, in accordance with its character as such, arouses another kind of hearing, which, in relationship to the hearing that is lost, has a character in every way opposite. If in this lost hearing, one has been fascinated with the " hubbub " [vom Uirm] of the manifold ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] which idle talk possesses in its everyday " newness " [des alltaglich "neuen " Geredes], then the call must do its calling without any hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity. ( 1 962, 3 1 5-1 6/1 9 8 6 , 2 7 1 ; emphasis added)S

oretical solution.6 What we quickly discover in doing so is that Heidegger's

analysis of language (Rede) is absolutely powerless to insure the "breaking-

away" of Dasein from its everyday objects of desire. Though his formal-

ontological genealogy of language establishes the ontological priority of

authentic discourse (Rede) over mere speech (Sprache) and idle talk

(Gerede), ontology can provide no guarantee against the external danger

inherent in the everyday priority of these latter-the danger of a practical,

ontic co-optation of the "call of conscience" by the technological. While

Heidegger's dogmatic assertion of Dasein's power to overcome its fallenness

might effectively repress the priority of the ontic within the domain of his

theory, it can do no such thing at the level of the practical, where, I suggest,

ontic technology returns with a vengeance.

Heidegger's Ambivalence

To grasp the significance of ontic technology's return beyond its much

debated role in Heidegger's own fall into ontic politics, we must turn to the

later Heidegger's far more nuanced account of technology and specifically

to the central claim he makes in "The Question concerning Technology"

that the essence of technology "is in a lofty sense [in einem hohen Sinne]

ambiguous" (1977b, 33). The possibility of reconstructing and developing

the repressed ontic priority of technology hinges on our ability to demystify

Given Heidegger's own catastrophic fall into the ontic-a fall mediated, as Avital Ronell has shown, by his own fear and repression of the technologi­ cal-there is every reason to question the efficacy of such an exclusively the­ oretical solution.6 What we quickly discover in doing so is that Heidegger's analysis of language (Rede) is absolutely powerless to insure the " breaking­ away " of Dasein from its everyday obj ects of desire. Though his formal­ ontological genealogy of language establishes the ontological priority of authentic discourse (Rede) over mere speech (Sprache) and idle talk ( Gerede), ontology can provide no guarantee against the external danger inherent in the everyday priority of these latter-the danger of a practical, ontic co-optation of the " call of conscience " by the technological. While Heidegger's dogmatic assertion of Dasein's power to overcome its fallenness might effectively repress the priority of the ontic within the domain of his theory, it can do no such thing at the level of the practical, where, I suggest, ontic technology returns with a vengeance.

H eidegger' s Ambivalence

To grasp the significance of ontic technology'S return beyond its much debated role in Heidegger's own fall into ontic politics, we must turn to the later Heidegger's far more nuanced account of technology and specifically to the central claim he makes in "The Question concerning Technology" that the essence of technology "is in a lofty sense [in einem hohen Sinne] ambiguous " ( 1 9 77b, 3 3 ) . The possibility of reconstructing and developing the repressed ontic priority of technology hinges on our ability to demystify

108

108 * Embodying Technesis

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

this claim, to recognize the fundamental limitation inherent in the very ter­ minology Heidegger employs to present the two poles of the ambiguity.

this claim, to recognize the fundamental limitation inherent in the very ter-

minology Heidegger employs to present the two poles of the ambiguity.

On the one hand, Enframing [das Gestell] challenges forth into the frenzied-

ness of ordering [das Rasende des Bestellens] that blocks every view into the

coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically [von Grund auf] endangers the

relation to the essence of truth [den Bezug zum Wesen der Wahrheit]. On the

other hand, Enframing comes to pass [ereignet sich] for its part in the grant-

ing that lets man endure.., that he may be the one who is needed and used

for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth [zur Wahrnis des

Wesens der Wahrheit]. (33/37)7

Against Heidegger's inclination to take this description as exhaustive of the

ontology of technology, we must stress its fundamental limitations. Since

On the one hand, Enframing [das Gestell] challenges forth into the frenzied­ ness of ordering [das Rasende des Bestellens] that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically [von Grund aufJ endangers the relation to the essence of truth [den Bezug zum Wesen der Wahrheit] . On the other hand, Enframing comes to pass [ereignet sich] for its part in the grant­ ing that lets man endure . . . that he may be the one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth [zur Wahrnis des

Wesens der Wahrheit] . ( 3 3/3 7)?

both poles remain firmly within the space of an ontological hermeneutics in

which language is the site of truth, Heidegger's "lofty ambiguity," like the

ontological difference itself, presupposes a prior reduction of the ontic

domain, an act of translation in which a merely theoretical incompatibility

between two modes of thematizing technology takes the place of a real

conflict between technological materiality and thought. Since it strips tech-

nology of its exteriority and its material resistance to thought, this transla-

tion installs technesis as the enabling figure of Heidegger's account of tech-

nology.

Not surprisingly, this very same epoche of technological materiality

informs the poststructuralist reception of Heidegger and, through it, con-

temporary cultural studies of technology. By retaining the structure of Hei-

degger's account of technology, contemporary technocultural critics effec-

tively render themselves incapable of eschewing his reduction. Like

Heidegger's poststructuralist heirs, these critics are barred by their own

methodology from redeeming his prescient, if bleak, insight into technol-

ogy's radical and inhuman autonomy-the very insight whose foreclosure

comprises the enabling condition for constituting technology as "in a lofty

sense ambiguous."

Though Heidegger could never quite bring himself to face this prospect

without reduction, there are moments in his later career when he actually

comes close. In his 1966 interview with the German news magazine Der

Spiegel, for example, Heidegger contends that technology impinges directly

on the very possibility of thought itself not from within (as it does in the

figure of the supplement) but from without:8 "The modes of thinking

handed down by the metaphysical tradition, which concludes in the figure

of Nietzsche, no longer offer the possibility of reflectively experiencing

Against Heidegger's inclination to take this description as exhaustive of the ontology of technology, we must stress its fundamental limitations. Since both poles remain firmly within the space of an ontological hermeneutics in which language is the site of truth, Heidegger's " lofty ambiguity, " like the ontological difference itself, presupposes a prior reduction of the ontic domain, an act of translation in which a merely theoretical incompatibility between two modes of thematizing technology takes the place of a real conflict between technological materiality and thought. Since it strips tech­ nology of its exteriority and its material resistance to thought, this transla­ tion installs technesis as the enabling figure of Heidegger's account of tech­ nology. Not surprisingly, this very same epoche of technological materiality informs the post structuralist reception of Heidegger and, through it, con­ temporary cultural studies of technology. By retaining the structure of Hei­ degger's account of technology, contemporary techno cultural critics effec­ tively render themselves incapable of eschewing his reduction. Like Heidegger's poststructuralist heirs, these critics are barred by their own methodology from redeeming his prescient, if bleak, insight into technol­ ogy's radical and inhuman autonomy-the very insight whose foreclosure comprises the enabling condition for constituting technology as " in a lofty sense ambiguous . " Though Heidegger could never quite bring himself to face this prospect without reduction, there are moments in his later career when he actually comes close. In his 1 9 66 interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel, for example, Heidegger contends that technology impinges directly on the very possibility of thought itself not from within (as it does in the figure of the supplement ) but from without: 8 "The modes of thinking handed down by the metaphysical tradition, which concludes in the figure of Nietzsche, no longer offer the possibility of reflectively experiencing

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Techne

•

109

[denkend zu erfahren] the fundamental principle [Grundzug] of the emerg­ Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 109

[denkend zu erfahren] the fundamental principle [Grundzug] of the emerg-

ing technical age."9 Far from merely contaminating thought via its depen-

dance on language, Heidegger here suggests that technology imperils the

descriptive sway of discursive reason by producing a reality that exceeds the

onto-hermeneutical grasp of language. Unlike his poststructuralist disciples,

who fervently embrace the critical constraints imposed by the reign of rep-

resentational thought, Heidegger momentarily envisions (if only to dismiss)

the possibility of a more fundamental shift in the economy of our experi-

ence.

Because of the sustained, enabling privilege he grants language, however,

Heidegger was unable to cash in this insight. Like his disciples, he could not

see in technology anything other than a threat to the purity of language.

"Cybernetics," he contends in another late essay, "reconstructs language so

that it can function as an exchange of news [bildet die Sprache um zu einem

Austausch von Nachrichten]. The arts become stored and storing instru-

ments," (Heidegger 1977a, 376; translation modified). As a consequence,

the possibility of connecting thought with its primordial ground in the

ontology of truth is compromised: "'Theory' ['Theorie'] now means: sup-

position of the categories, which are restricted to a cybernetic function, but

denied any ontological significance [aber jeder ontologische Sinn abge-

sprochen wird]" (377). On such a view, technology's impact, which can

only be negative, stems exclusively from the way it effaces the deep onto-

logical significance of Vorhandenheit, or "presence-at-hand," the ontic cat-

egory Heidegger develops in Being and Time to describe the theoretical

being of a worldly object. What cybernetic technologies do is present the

being of language as mere words cut off from their connection with a

Bedeutungsganzheit, or "context of involvements." In this sense, what Hei-

degger says of the typewriter is all the more true of the computer: it "renders

language operational [die Sprache in Betrieb nimmt] and thus holds mastery

over [meistert] the essence of man" (Heidegger 1957, 28).10

Despite its very different tonality, this restriction of technology's impact

to its effect on language draws on and extends his early formative account

of Dasein's effort to gain knowledge of (or make explicit) its practical

engagement with technology. In Being and Time, Heidegger subordinates

Vorhandenheit to Zuhandenheit, the mode in which Dasein exists in its

average everydayness. One only becomes aware of the existence of a techni-

cal object (e.g., a hammer) when the object fails to function properly (e.g.,

when it is too heavy or breaks down). On Heidegger's account, while the

practical activity characteristic of the mode of Zuhandenheit is prior to and

ing technical age . ,, 9 Far from merely contaminating thought via its depen­ dance on language, Heidegger here suggests that technology imperils the descriptive sway of discursive reason by producing a reality that exceeds the onto-hermeneutical grasp of language. Unlike his post structuralist disciples, who fervently embrace the critical constraints imposed by the reign of rep­ resentational thought, Heidegger momentarily envisions (if only to dismiss) the possibility of a more fundamental shift in the economy of our experi­ ence. Because of the sustained, enabling privilege he grants language, however, Heidegger was unable to cash in this insight. Like his disciples, he could not see in technology anything other than a threat to the purity of language. " Cybernetics, " he contends in another late essay, " reconstructs language so that it can function as an exchange of news [bildet die Sprache um zu einem Austausch von Nachrichten] . The arts become stored and storing instru­ ments," (Heidegger 1 9 77a, 3 76; translation modified) . As a consequence, the possibility of connecting thought with its primordial ground in the ontology of truth is compromised: " 'Theory' ['Theorie'] now means: sup­ position of the categories, which are restricted to a cybernetic function, but denied any ontological significance [aber jeder ontologische Sinn abge­ sprochen wird] " ( 3 77 ) . On such a view, technology's impact, which can only be negative, stems exclusively from the way it effaces the deep onto­ logical significance of Vorhandenheit, or " presence-at-hand, " the ontic cat­ egory Heidegger develops in Being and Time to describe the theoretical being of a worldly obj ect. What cybernetic technologies do is present the being of language as mere words cut off from their connection with a Bedeutungsganzheit, or "context of involvements. " In this sense, what Hei­ degger says of the typewriter is all the more true of the computer: it " renders language operational [die Sprache in Betrieb nimmt] and thus holds mastery over [meistert] the essence of man" (Heidegger 1 957, 2 8 ) . 1 0 Despite its very different tonality, this restriction of technology's impact to its effect on language draws on and extends his early formative account of Dasein's effort to gain knowledge of (or make explicit) its practical engagement with technology. In Being and Time, Heidegger subordinates Vorhandenheit to Zuhandenheit, the mode in which Dasein exists in its average everydayness. One only becomes aware of the existence of a techni­ cal obj ect (e.g., a hammer) when the obj ect fails to function properly (e.g., when it is too heavy or breaks down ) . On Heidegger's account, while the practical activity characteristic of the mode of Zuhandenheit is prior to and

1 10

110 * Embodying Technesis

comprises a necessary background for the mode of theoretical knowing, one

can only encounter one's dependence on ontic technology-and thus only

assess the impact of technology on experience-by thematizing it in the

mode of Vorhandenheit. By instituting such a theoretical necessity, Heideg-

ger imposes a fundamental limitation on what counts as technology: only

those technologies that are or can be thematized in explicit terms can, on his

account, be understood to have a direct impact on our practical lives.

Left out of this scheme are two kinds of technologically mediated practi-

cal experiences that do not achieve the level of explicit thematization: (1)

experiences in which there is no breakdown and hence no motivating reason

to cross from the practical to the theoretical domain and (2) experiences in

which technology's impact (because it is molecular and diffuse) is in princi-

ple not recuperable through thematization. To assess these two kinds of

experiences, we must break with the cognitive focus of Heidegger's analysis

and articulate a bodily hermeneutics-a robust mode of understanding able

to encompass the unthematized, corporeal dimensions of our embodied

lives.11 Without in any way endorsing Heidegger's paranoia about technol-

ogy, we must radicalize his muted concern at the fundamental incapacity of

Western metaphysics to facilitate what Heidegger, in his monumental

Nietszche (1961), calls a "thinking experience" (denkende Erfahrung) of

modern technology. By acknowledging the eclipse of language as the domi-

nant experiential faculty, we can bring the deep ambivalence of Heidegger's

project to the fore and take stock of the cost, as it were, of his stubborn

commitment to the motif of the ontological difference: simply stated, Hei-

degger's logocentrism prevents him from capitalizing on-let alone recog-

nizing the importance of-the fundamental shift in the economy of experi-

ence toward which his late work gestures.

While Heidegger attributed the ontological difference to (his reconstruc-

tion of) pre-Socratic Greek thought, it appears, when seen in historical hind-

sight, to owe much more to an ontic, and thus (in his terms) inauthentic,

fear of technology. Accordingly, Heidegger's explicit characterization of

technology as "in a lofty sense ambiguous" should be viewed as a protective

measure designed to ward off the threat of a more fundamental

modification of our mode of being, one that would destroy the gains of his

life's work. Yet because technology's actual ontic effects are entirely unaf-

fected by the theoretical reduction, the threat of technological autonomy-

precisely the dreaded object of Heidegger's fear-remains very much alive;

in the contemporary world, this threatened autonomy takes the form of an

insistent revenge of the real operated through our profound addiction to

commodified technologies.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

comprises a necessary background for the mode of theoretical knowing, one can only encounter one's dependence on ontic technology-and thus only assess the impact of technology on experience-by thematizing it in the mode of Vorhandenheit. By instituting such a theoretical necessity, Heideg­ ger imposes a fundamental limitation on what counts as technology: only those technologies that are or can be thematized in explicit terms can, on his account, be understood to have a direct impact on our practical lives. Left out of this scheme are two kinds of technologically mediated practi­ cal experiences that do not achieve the level of explicit thematization: ( 1 ) experiences in which there is no breakdown and hence no motivating reason to cross from the practical to the theoretical domain and (2) experiences in which technology's impact (because it is molecular and diffuse) is in princi­ ple not recuperable through thematization. To assess these two kinds of experiences, we must break with the cognitive focus of Heidegger's analysis and articulate a bodily hermeneutics-a robust mode of understanding able to encompass the unthematized, corporeal dimensions of our embodied lives . l l Without in any way endorsing Heidegger's paranoia about technol­ ogy, we must radicalize his muted concern at the fundamental incapacity of Western metaphysics to facilitate what Heidegger, in his monumental Nietszche ( 1 9 6 1 ) , calls a " thinking experience " ( denkende Erfahrung) of modern technology. By acknowledging the eclipse of language as the domi­ nant experiential faculty, we can bring the deep ambivalence of Heidegger's proj ect to the fore and take stock of the cost, as it were, of his stubborn commitment to the motif of the ontological difference: simply stated, Hei­ degger's logocentrism prevents him from capitalizing on-let alone recog­ nizing the importance of-the fundamental shift in the economy of experi­ ence toward which his late work gestures . While Heidegger attributed the ontological difference t o (his reconstruc­ tion of) pre-Socratic Greek thought, it appears, when seen in historical hind­ sight, to owe much more to an ontic, and thus (in his terms) inauthentic, fear of technology. Accordingly, Heidegger's explicit characterization of technology as " in a lofty sense ambiguous " should be viewed as a protective measure designed to ward off the threat of a more fundamental modification of our mode of being, one that would destroy the gains of his life's work. Yet because technology's actual ontic effects are entirely unaf­ fected by the theoretical reduction, the threat of technological autonomy­ precisely the dreaded obj ect of Heidegger's fear-remains very much alive; in the contemporary world, this threatened autonomy takes the form of an insistent revenge of the real operated through our profound addiction to commodified technologies.

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 111

Acknowledging this material revenge allows us to deflate Heidegger's

claim for the archaic priority of ontology. Like Aristotle's reading of the

automatic, such a claim imposes a reduction of technology that both enables

the command of philosophical description over the real yet is thoroughly

reductive-and also thoroughly impotent-in light of the robust materiality

of the technological real. This effectively means, then, that the most famous

motif of Heidegger's thought might turn out to owe more to a strategic deci-

sion than to any philosophical necessity. Just as Aristotle strategically

employs a theoretical hierarchy to domesticate the excess of the automatic,

Heidegger strategically fetishizes language as the locus of Being to bracket

out the ontic priority of technology. Far from the primordial and enabling

motif he claims it to be, the ontological difference is thus itself conditioned

by something "older" than and prior to it: the dogmatic reduction of tech-

nology to the purely instrumental status of the machine.12

The Machine

Heidegger's deeply paradoxical claim concerning the devastation wrought

by technology in the twentieth century follows directly from this reduction

of technology to instrumental status.

[Technology's] threat to man does not come in the first instance from the

Techne

•

111

Acknowledging this material revenge allows u s t o deflate Heidegger's claim for the archaic priority of ontology. Like Aristotle's reading of the automatic, such a claim imposes a reduction of technology that both enables the command of philosophical description over the real yet is thoroughly reductive-and also thoroughly impotent-in light of the robust materiality of the technological real. This effectively means, then, that the most famous motif of Heidegger's thought might turn out to owe more to a strategic deci­ sion than to any philosophical necessity. Just as Aristotle strategically employs a theoretical hierarchy to domesticate the excess of the automatic, Heidegger strategically fetishizes language as the locus of Being to bracket out the ontic priority of technology. Far from the primordial and enabling motif he claims it to be, the ontological difference is thus itself conditioned by something " older " than and prior to it: the dogmatic reduction of tech­ nology to the purely instrumental status of the machine.12

potentially lethal machines and apparatus [todlich wirkenden Maschinen

und Apparaturen] of technology. The actual threat [Die eigentliche Bedro-

hung] has already affected man in his essence. The rule of the Enframing [Die

Herrschaft des Gestells] threatens man with the possibility that it could be

denied to him to enter into a more original revealing [Entbergen] and hence

The M achine

to experience the call [Zuspruch] of a more primal truth. (1977b, 28/1954,

32)

Despite its undeniable perversity, we must acknowledge that this claim

obeys a logic that is absolutely central to the humanist tradition of Western

thought. By celebrating the priority of the human over the technological, of

the essential over the derivative, Heidegger paradoxically reinforces the

Heidegger's deeply paradoxical claim concerning the devastation wrought by technology in the twentieth century follows directly from this reduction of technology to instrumental status.

humanism that he otherwise so insistently rejects: as long as technology is

defined as merely machinic-as wholly dependant on Dasein for its being-

it remains purely instrumental and (always potentially) subject to human

control.

The significance of this paradox cannot be emphasized enough, for it

demonstrates the enduring sway exercised by Heidegger's early reduction of

technology to the figure of the machine. Far from marking a break with fun-

[Technology's] threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus [todlich wirkenden Maschinen und Apparaturen] of technology. The actual threat [Die eigentliche Bedro­ hung] has already affected man in his essence . The rule of the Enframing [Die Herrschaft des Gestells] threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing [Entbergen] and hence to experience the call [Zuspruch] of a more primal truth. ( 1 9 77b, 2 8/1 954, 32)

Despite its undeniable perversity, we must acknowledge that this claim obeys a logic that is absolutely central to the humanist tradition of Western thought. By celebrating the priority of the human over the technological, of the essential over the derivative, Heidegger paradoxically reinforces the humanism that he otherwise so insistently rejects: as long as technology is defined as merely machinic-as wholly dependant on Dasein for its being­ it remains purely instrumental and ( always potentially) subj ect to human control. The significance of this paradox cannot be emphasized enough, for it demonstrates the enduring sway exercised by Heidegger's early reduction of technology to the figure of the machine. Far from marking a break with fun-

112

112 * Embodying Technesis

damental ontology, the later Heidegger's famous division of technology is in

fact thoroughly dependent on his early, seldom discussed instrumental

definition of the machine.13 In a lecture course of 1929-30, The Fundamen-

tal Principles of Phenomenology, Heidegger explicitly likens machine tech-

nologies to tools: "The machine is a tool [Zeug] and as such is 'serviceable

for' [dienlich zu] . . ." (Heidegger 1981, 315). The type of being accorded

machines-Dienlichkeit, or "serviceability"-squares perfectly with the

account of Zuhandenheit from Being and Time; like the hammer, with

which we engage first and for the most part in a practical mode, the machine

is a use object and becomes the explicit theme of theoretical discourse only

when it breaks down. In accord with this homology, we can thus conclude

that Heidegger's early determination of the machine respects the founda-

tional privilege of Dasein; like all tools, the machine requires a "manufac-

turing by men" (Erzeugnis von Menschen) and, more importantly, is depen-

dant for its very existence on the activity of a questioning Being: ". . . the

manufacture of tools," Heidegger says unequivocally, "is only possible on

the basis of what we call Weltbildung" (313).

In assimilating the machine to the tool, Heidegger effectively expands the

sway of the restriction Being and Time placed on our assessment of tech-

nology's impact; like the prototypical tool (the hammer), the machine can

only be made thematically available to us as Vorhandenheit. Through this

assimilation, Heidegger effectively pigeonholes the machine as an instru-

mentalist mode of revealing that owes its existence to the constitutive con-

cern of Dasein or the world-disclosing power of language. Moreover, the

reduction of machine to tool lies behind Heidegger's later splitting of tech-

nology into essential (linguistic) and nonessential (nonlinguistic) dimen-

sions; by generating a category for what he later comes to call the "merely

technical" (das Technische), this assimilation of machine to tool effectively

serves as the foil against which the essential status of technology as techne

can emerge (1977b).

Indeed, this assimilation itself ultimately underwrites the central motif of

Heidegger's questioning after technology: the much debated purity of

techne, the essence of technology. Heidegger models his machine reduction

of technology on the assimilation of machine to tool; like any tool, the

machine is constituted by the passage from Zuhandenheit to Vorhanden-

heit. With this restriction of technology to the figure of the machine, he ties

technology's efficacy to the world-disclosing activity of Dasein or language,

thereby purchasing, as it were, the right to domesticate the radical material

exteriority of technology. The priority Heidegger places on ontology thus

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

damental ontology, the later Heidegger's famous division of technology is in fact thoroughly dependent on his early, seldom discussed instrumental definition of the machine. 1 3 In a lecture course of 1 929-3 0, The Fundamen­ tal Principles of Phenomenology, Heidegger explicitly likens machine tech­ nologies to tools: "The machine is a tool [Zeug] and as such is ' serviceable for' [dienlich zu] . . . " (Heidegger 1 9 8 1 , 3 1 5 ) . The type of being accorded machines-Dienlichkeit, or " serviceability "-squares perfectly with the account of Zuhandenheit from Being and Time; like the hammer, with which we engage first and for the most part in a practical mode, the machine is a use obj ect and becomes the explicit theme of theoretical discourse only when it breaks down. In accord with this homology, we can thus conclude that Heidegger's early determination of the machine respects the founda­ tional privilege of Dasein; like all tools, the machine requires a " manufac­ turing by men " (Erzeugnis von Menschen) and, more importantly, is depen­ dant for its very existence on the activity of a questioning Being: " . . . the manufacture of tools, " Heidegger says unequivocally, "is only possible on the basis of what we call Weltbildung" ( 3 1 3 ) . In assimilating the machine to the tool, Heidegger effectively expands the sway of the restriction Being and Time placed on our assessment of tech­ nology's impact; like the prototypical tool (the hammer) , the machine can only be made thematically available to us as Vorhandenheit. Through this assimilation, Heidegger effectively pigeonholes the machine as an instru­ mentalist mode of revealing that owes its existence to the constitutive con­ cern of Dasein or the world-disclosing power of language. Moreover, the reduction of machine to tool lies behind Heidegger's later splitting of tech­ nology into essential (linguistic ) and nonessential (nonlinguistic) dimen­ sions; by generating a category for what he later comes to call the " merely technical " (das Technische), this assimilation of machine to tool effectively serves as the foil against which the essential status of technology as techne can emerge ( 1 977b ) . Indeed, this assimilation itself ultimately underwrites the central motif of Heidegger's questioning after technology: the much debated purity of techne, the essence of technology. Heidegger models his machine reduction of technology on the assimilation of machine to tool; like any tool, the machine is constituted by the passage from Zuhandenheit to Vorhanden­ heit. With this restriction of technology to the figure of the machine, he ties technology's efficacy to the world-disclosing activity of Dasein or language, thereby purchasing, as it were, the right to domesticate the radical material exteriority of technology. The priority Heidegger places on ontology thus

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 113

allows him to enact a sweeping two-part, theoretical metalepsis: only after

violently reducing the ontic priority of technology is he able to establish that

language furnishes the ground for whatever relationship we have with tech-

nology; yet once he imposes this reduction, ontic technology is accorded a

status only through the thus secured ontological standpoint, effectively

insuring that it can only have the derivative status he grants it. As an instru-

mental machine, technology is made to depend for its very existence on the

"world-forming" (weltbildend) power of an agent of thought (1981). And

since thought hereby attains the status of efficient cause, Heidegger's doubly

reductive move effectively installs representation in the place of production

and description in the place of the real.

Aristotle and to automaton

The very same metaleptic strategy informs Heidegger's rereading of Aristo-

tle's doctrine of causality in "The Question concerning Technology."

Techne

•

113

allows him t o enact a sweeping two-part, theoretical metalepsis: only after violently reducing the ontic priority of technology is he able to establish that language furnishes the ground for whatever relationship we have with tech­ nology; yet once he imposes this reduction, ontic technology is accorded a status only through the thus secured ontological standpoint, effectively insuring that it can only have the derivative status he grants it. As an instru­ mental machine, technology is made to depend for its very existence on the " world-forming " (weltbildend) power of an agent of thought ( 1 9 8 1 ) . And since thought hereby attains the status of efficient cause, Heidegger's doubly reductive move effectively installs representation in the place of production and description in the place of the real.

According to Heidegger, this doctrine has dominated man's thinking about

causality since Aristotle; in its wake, the essential meaning of cause as "that

to which something else is indebted" [das, was ein anderes verschuldet] has

been covered over by a merely instrumental definition (Heidegger 1977b,

7/1954, 12). To correct this instrumentalist reduction, we must ask after the

meaning of the term cause itself, with an eye to discovering what Heidegger

Aristotle and

to automaton

calls the "unifiedly determined" causal character of the four causes, that

which allows them to "belong together" (7/12). Heidegger finds this deeper

meaning in the hermeneutic function he substitutes for Aristotle's efficient

cause.

Finally there is a fourth participant in the responsibility for the finished

sacrificial vessel's lying before us ready for use, i.e., the silversmith-but not

at all because he, in working, brings about the finished sacrificial chalice as if

it were the effect of a making; the silversmith is not a causa efficiens. The

Aristotelian doctrine neither knows the cause that is named by this term nor

uses a Greek word that would correspond to it. The silversmith considers

carefully and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being

responsible and indebted. To consider carefully [iberlegen] is in Greek leg-

ein, logos. Legein is rooted in apophainesthai, to bring forward into appear-

ance. The silversmith is co-responsible as that from whence the sacrificial ves-

sel's bringing forth and resting-in-self take and retain their first departure.

The three previously mentioned ways of being responsible [formal, material,

The very same metaleptic strategy informs Heidegger' s rereading of Aristo­ tle's doctrine of causality in "The Question concerning Technology. " According to Heidegger, this doctrine has dominated man's thinking about causality since Aristotle; in its wake, the essential meaning of cause as " that to which something else is indebted" [das, was ein anderes verschuldet] has been covered over by a merely instrumental definition (Heidegger 1 9 77b, 7/1 954, 1 2 ) . To correct this instrumentalist reduction, we must ask after the meaning of the term cause itself, with an eye to discovering what Heidegger calls the " unifiedly determined " causal character of the four causes, that which allows them to " belong together " ( 7/1 2 ) . Heidegger finds this deeper meaning in the hermeneutic function he substitutes for Aristotle's efficient cause. Finally there is a fourth participant in the responsibility for the finished sacrificial vessel's lying before us ready for use, i . e . , the silversmith-but not at all because he, in working, brings about the finished sacrificial chalice as if it were the effect of a making; the silversmith is not a causa efficiens. The Aristotelian doctrine neither knows the cause that is named by this term nor uses a Greek word that would correspond to it. The silversmith considers carefully and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being responsible and indebted. To consider carefully [iiberlegen] is in Greek leg­ ein, logos. Legein is rooted in apophainesthai, to bring forward into appear­ ance . The silversmith is co-responsible as that from whence the sacrificial ves­ sel's bringing forth and resting-in-self take and retain their first departure. The three previously mentioned ways of being responsible [formal, material,

114

114 * Embodying Technesis

final causes] owe thanks to the pondering of the silversmith for the "that"

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

final causes] owe thanks to the pondering of the silversmith for the " that " and the " how" of this coming into appearance and into play for the produc­ tion of the sacrificial vessel. ( 8/1 3 )

and the "how" of this coming into appearance and into play for the produc-

tion of the sacrificial vessel. (8/13)

In the context of my argument, this allegedly fundamental philosophical

intervention underwrites what is in effect a mere reversal. Because it leaves

intact the broader foundation of Aristotle's doctrine-the purely instrumen-

tal determination of (ontic) technology-Heidegger's ontologizing of

efficient causality does nothing to surmount Aristotle's restricted view of it

as a supplement to physis. In both cases, something that has causal force

outside of any secured hermeneutic space is metaleptically translated into a

mere derivative effect of a constitutive act of thought.

The parallel with Aristotle helps to contextualize what is at stake in Hei-

degger's (failed) effort to capture ontic technology within an onto-

hermeneutic frame of reference. Just as so-called automatic events refuse the

subordination Aristotle submits them to, industrial and electronic technolo-

gies exceed the space of the epoche Heidegger imposes on them. Yet since

the materiality at stake in these latter is active or productive at the level of

the real, they operate a revenge of the real that literally explodes the prior-

ity Heidegger lends ontology. This revenge takes place as a kind of

autonomous deconstruction

that puts into practice something like

Emmanuel Levinas's (still essentially theoretical) critique of fundamental

ontology for "subordinat[ing] the relation with someone who is a being (the

ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of being which, because it is

impersonal, permits the capture, the domination of being (in a theoretical

relation [une relation de savoir])" (Levinas 1971, 36). Effectuated in this

way Levinas's critique calls on us to recognize the practical or ethical imma-

nence of contemporary technology within the real. Indeed, the resulting

revenge of the real operates a mundane equivalent of what arms-race spe-

cialists call "technology creep"-"the uncontrollable surging ahead of

invention [or simply of technical mediation] past all attempts to predict it or

legislate it" (Brand 1987, 19). Such a revenge perfectly instantiates the cat-

egory of "technological drift" that political philosopher Langdon Winner

coins to describe such unintended consequences of technological innova-

tion. More precisely, the revenge of the technological real instantiates Win-

ner's twofold notion of technological drift as a designation for the "preg-

nant possibilities" accompanying new technologies in the early phases of

their dissemination as well as the particular autonomy of technology, the

"life of its own" that any given technology possesses "as it finds its way into

the complex sphere of social practice" (Winner 1977, 92-93).

In the context o f my argument, this allegedly fundamental philosophical intervention underwrites what is in effect a mere reversal. Because it leaves intact the broader foundation of Aristotle's doctrine-the purely instrumen­ tal determination of ( ontic) technology-Heidegger's ontologizing of efficient causality does nothing to surmount Aristotle's restricted view of it as a supplement to physis. In both cases, something that has causal force outside of any secured hermeneutic space is metaleptically translated into a mere derivative effect of a constitutive act of thought. The parallel with Aristotle helps to contextualize what is at stake in Hei­ degger's ( failed) effort to capture ontic technology within an onto­ hermeneutic frame of reference. Just as so-called automatic events refuse the subordination Aristotle submits them to, industrial and electronic technolo­ gies exceed the space of the epoche Heidegger imposes on them. Yet since the materiality at stake in these latter is active or productive at the level of the real, they operate a revenge of the real that literally explodes the prior­ ity Heidegger lends ontology. This revenge takes place as a kind of autonomous deconstruction that puts into practice something like Emmanuel Levinas 's ( still essentially theoretical ) critique of fundamental ontology for " subordinat [ing] the relation with someone who is a being (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of being which, because it is impersonal, permits the capture, the domination of being ( in a theoretical relation [une relation de savoir] ) " (Levinas 1 9 7 1 , 3 6 ) . Effectuated in this way Levinas's critique calls on us to recognize the practical or ethical imma­ nence of contemporary technology within the real. Indeed, the resulting revenge of the real operates a mundane equivalent of what arms-race spe­ cialists call " technology creep "-"the uncontrollable surging ahead of invention [or simply of technical mediation] past all attempts to predict it or legislate it" ( Brand 1 9 8 7, 1 9 ) . Such a revenge perfectly instantiates the cat­ egory of " technological drift " that political philosopher Langdon Winner coins to describe such unintended consequences of technological innova­ tion. More precisely, the revenge of the technological real instantiates Win­ ner's twofold notion of technological drift as a designation for the " preg­ nant possibilities" accompanying new technologies in the early phases of their dissemination as well as the particular autonomy of technology, the " life of its own " that any given technology possesses "as it finds its way into the complex sphere of social practice " (Winner 1 9 77, 92-93 ) .

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Production and

Techne

•

115

Poiesis

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 115

Production and Poiesis

In "The Question concerning Technology," we find another, more sophisti-

cated version of this same metaleptic reduction, one that foregrounds Hei-

degger's paradigmatic identification of technology (techne) with poiesis:

"Technology is a way of revealing.... Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to

poiesis; it is something poietic" (Heidegger 1977b, 13/1954, 16). By explic-

itly identifying production with the Greek notion of poiesis, Heidegger

effectively covers over the reduction of ontic technology that renders plausi-

ble his ontological approach to technology: once installed as the category

for thinking technology, poiesis limits the domain of what counts as tech-

nology to what can be constituted through onto-hermeneutics, whether an

onto-hermeneutics of Dasein (early Heidegger) or of language itself (late

Heidegger). In this sense, the identification of production with poiesis is not

fundamental, as Heidegger claims, but rather, like the more general priority

of ontology, thoroughly dependent on a prior reduction of ontic technology.

The immediate motive for Heidegger's identification of technological

production with poiesis stems, as one recent commentator suggests, from

his understanding of Greek metaphysics: "The Greek founders of meta-

physics defined the being of entities in a proto-technological way. For them,

'to be' meant 'to be produced.' Hence, according to Heidegger, the history

of metaphysics became the history of the unfolding of productionist meta-

physics" (Zimmerman 1990, xv). Insofar as he concurs with Plato in

defining poiesis as the bringing-forth of "what passes over and goes forward

into presencing from that which is not presencing" (Symposium 205b; Hei-

degger's translation [1977b, 10/1954, 13]), Heidegger contributes to the

deep hold that Greek poietic ontology exercises over Western metaphysics.

Indeed, precisely this Heideggerian appropriation of the term productionist

as a translation for poiesis informs the modern repression of productive

materiality: in its wake, production is simply narrowed to fit within the poi-

etic model. Faced with this reduction, we must insist on a fundamental dif-

ference between Greek and modern technology. Whereas poiesis could

coherently be applied to the forms of production known to the Greeks

("handcraft manufacture," "artistic and poetical bringing into appearance

and concrete imagery," and physis [1977b, 10/1954, 13]), it simply cannot

be extended to cover the category of modern production. By claiming that

"[t]he possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing," Heideg-

ger violently restricts the scope of production to a model utterly incapable

of accounting for (a large share of) the impact of modern and postmodern

technology (1977b, 12/1954, 15). Moreover, Heidegger's attempt to suture

In "The Question concerning Technology, " we find another, more sophisti­ cated version of this same metaleptic reduction, one that foregrounds Hei­ degger's paradigmatic identification of technology (techne) with poiesis: " Technology is a way of revealing . . . . Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something poietic" (Heidegger 1 9 77b, 1 3/1 954, 1 6 ) . By explic­ itly identifying production with the Greek notion of poiesis, Heidegger effectively covers over the reduction of ontic technology that renders plausi­ ble his ontological approach to technology: once installed as the category for thinking technology, poiesis limits the domain of what counts as tech­ nology to what can be constituted through onto-hermeneutics, whether an onto-hermeneutics of Dasein (early Heidegger) or of language itself (late Heidegger) . In this sense, the identification of production with poiesis is not fundamental, as Heidegger claims, but rather, like the more general priority of ontology, thoroughly dependent on a prior reduction of ontic technology. The immediate motive for Heidegger's identification of technological production with poiesis stems, as one recent commentator suggests, from his understanding of Greek metaphysics : "The Greek founders of meta­ physics defined the being of entities in a proto-technological way. For them, 'to be' meant 'to be produced . ' Hence, according to Heidegger, the history of metaphysics became the history of the unfolding of productionist meta­ physics" (Zimmerman 1 9 90, xv) . Insofar as he concurs with Plato in defining poiesis as the bringing-forth of "what passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing " (Symposium 205b; Hei­ degger's translation [1 977b, 1 0/1 954, 1 3 ] ) , Heidegger contributes to the deep hold that Greek poietic ontology exercises over Western metaphysics. Indeed, precisely this Heideggerian appropriation of the term productionist as a translation for poiesis informs the modern repression of productive materiality: in its wake, production is simply narrowed to fit within the poi­ etic model. Faced with this reduction, we must insist on a fundamental dif­ ference between Greek and modern technology. Whereas poiesis could coherently be applied to the forms of production known to the Greeks ( " handcraft manufacture, " " artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, " and physis [ 1 977b, 1 0/1 954, 1 3 ] ) , it simply cannot be extended to cover the category of modern production. By claiming that " [t]he possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing, " Heideg­ ger violently restricts the scope of production to a model utterly incapable of accounting for (a large share of) the impact of modern and postmodern technology ( 1 977b, 1 2/1954, 1 5 ) . Moreover, Heidegger's attempt to suture

116

116 * Embodying Technesis

the gap separating ancient and modern ontology by determining production

as poiesis appears to compromise his crucial claim regarding the fundamen-

tal singularity of modern technology.

As is so often the case with Heidegger, this apparent contradiction points

to a deeper unity that invokes the seemingly all-powerful figure of the onto-

logical difference: ancient and modern technologies are ontically distinct

even though they share a common (ontological) essence. Consider, for

example, the important passage where Heidegger connects the enframing

[das Gestell], his term for modern technology's hold on Being, with poiesis.

The word stellen [to set upon] in the name Ge-stell [enframing] not only

means challenging. At the same time it should preserve the suggestion of

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

the gap separating ancient and modern ontology by determining production as poiesis appears to compromise his crucial claim regarding the fundamen­ tal singularity of modern technology. As is so often the case with Heidegger, this apparent contradiction points to a deeper unity that invokes the seemingly all-powerful figure of the onto­ logical difference: ancient and modern technologies are ontically distinct even though they share a common (ontological) essence. Consider, for example, the important passage where Heidegger connects the enframing [das Gestell] , his term for modern technology's hold on Being, with poiesis.

another Stellen from which it stems, namely, that producing and presenting

[Her- und Dar-stellen] which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences

come forth into unconcealment. This producing that brings forth-e.g., the

erecting of a statue in the temple precinct-and the challenging ordering now

under consideration are indeed fundamentally different [grundverschieden],

and yet they remain related in their essence [im Wesen verwandt]. Both are

ways of revealing, of aletheia. (1977b, 21/1954, 24)

Despite an allegedly fundamental difference, challenging-forth and bring-

ing-forth-into-concealment are, Heidegger seems to be saying, at a deeper

(i.e., ontological) level, effectively the same.

What is the sense of this equivocation? How can modern technology be

simultaneously non-poietic and yet ultimately a mode of poiesis? How, fur-

thermore, can we reconcile this claim with Heidegger's earlier articulated

commitment to the view that modern technology "does not unfold into a

The word stellen [to set upon] in the name Ge-stell [enframing] not only means challenging. At the same time it should preserve the suggestion of another Stellen from which it stems, namely, that producing and presenting [Her- und Dar-stellen] which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into unconcealment. This producing that brings forth-e.g., the erecting of a statue in the temple precinct-and the challenging ordering now under consideration are indeed fundamentally different [grundverschieden] , and yet they remain related in their essence [ im Wesen verwandt] . Both are ways of revealing, of aletheia. ( 1 9 77b, 2 1/1954, 24)

bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis" (14/18)? Is this just carelessness on

Heidegger's part, or can we read in it the traces of a deeper, structural

conflict-of a prior commitment to a model of technology wholly incapable

of accounting for the alleged singularity of modern technology?

To address these questions, we must explore the notion of Herausfordern

(challenging-forth) that Heidegger introduces to characterize the mandate

behind modern technology, the "stockpiling" (Lagern) or placing "on call"

(zur Stelle) of energy as the "standing-reserve" (Bestand). Herausfordern

characterizes what I shall call the storage model of technology, a model

whose essential feature is the bending of natural force to unnatural (i.e.,

non-poietic) ends.

The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Heraus-

fordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply

energy that can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true

for the old windmill as well? No. . . . [T]he windmill does not unlock

Despite an allegedly fundamental difference, challenging-forth and bring­ ing-forth-into-concealment are, Heidegger seems to be saying, at a deeper (i.e., ontological ) level, effectively the same. What is the sense of this equivocation ? How can modern technology be simultaneously non-poietic and yet ultimately a mode of poiesis ? How, fur­ thermore, can we reconcile this claim with Heidegger's earlier articulated commitment to the view that modern technology " does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis " ( 1 4/1 8 ) ? Is this just carelessness on Heidegger's part, or can we read in it the traces of a deeper, structural conflict-of a prior commitment to a model of technology wholly incapable of accounting for the alleged singularity of modern technology ? To address these questions, we must explore the notion of Herausfordern (challenging-forth ) that Heidegger introduces to characterize the mandate behind modern technology, the " stockpiling" (Lagern) or placing " on call " (zur Stelle) of energy as the " standing-reserve " (Bestand) . Herausfordern characterizes what I shall call the storage model of technology, a model whose essential feature is the bending of natural force to unnatural (i.e., non-poietic ) ends. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Heraus­ fordern] , which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well ? No . . . . [T]he windmill does not unlock

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 117

[erschliesst] energy from the air currents [Energien der Luftstromung] in

order to store it [umrn sie zu speichern]. In contrast, a tract of land is chal-

lenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a

coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant

formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did

when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of

the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain

it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth [Wachstumkrdiften]

and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field

has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon

[stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now

the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth

to yield ore, ore to yield uranium . . . ; uranium is set upon to yield atomic

energy... (14-15/18-19)

In the very act of instituting a fundamental distinction between the two

technological modes of storage and translation, this passage inscribes an

essential duplicity into the key notion of Heidegger's theory of technology:

Techne

•

117

[erschliesst] energy from the air currents [Energien der Luftstromung] in order to store it [um sie zu speichern] . In contrast, a tract of land is chal­ lenged into the putting out of coal and ore . The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth [ Wachstumkra(ten] and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium . . . ; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy . . . ( 1 4-1 5/1 8-1 9 )

Herausfordern is made to designate both a mode of production unique to

modernity and a mode of revealing like any other. In so doing, Heidegger

perpetuates and in fact greatly expands the sway of his early subordination

of technology (as Zuhandenheit) to the world-disclosing power of Dasein:

he sacrifices his claim regarding the difference of modern technology in

order to champion an allegedly more basic ontological unity of production

as such. With this "choice," Heidegger effectively exposes the instrumental-

ist basis of his interest in technology: for him, technology is nothing more

than a stepping-stone toward a discussion of humanity's peculiar ontologi-

cal predicament in the modern age, a predicament that-Heidegger takes

great pains to stress-is in no way essentially technological.

As we might expect, however, Heidegger is able to downplay the para-

dox that ensues from the duplicity of Herausfordern. By playing his onto-

logical trump card once again, he introduces a covertly operating distinction

between two basic registers of poiesis: (1) poiesis as a description of pro-

duction-the production of presencing-as such and (2) poiesis as a nar-

rower category of production in harmony with the presencing of physis.

This key distinction allows Heidegger to maintain the ontic singularity of

modern technology without abandoning

his primordial ontological

identification of production and poiesis. Viewed against the narrow register

of poiesis, Herausfordern presents a radically new mode of production; cir-

cumscribed by the broader register of poiesis, by contrast, it shows itself to

possess a fundamental kinship with Hervorbringen, since both are, essen-

tially, modes of revealing.

I n the very act o f instituting a fundamental distinction between the two technological modes of storage and translation, this passage inscribes an essential duplicity into the key notion of Heidegger's theory of technology: Herausfordern is made to designate both a mode of production unique to modernity and a mode of revealing like any other. In so doing, Heidegger perpetuates and in fact greatly expands the sway of his early subordination of technology (as Zuhandenheit) to the world-disclosing power of Dasein: he sacrifices his claim regarding the difference of modern technology in order to champion an allegedly more basic ontological unity of production as such. With this "choice," Heidegger effectively exposes the instrumental­ ist basis of his interest in technology: for him, technology is nothing more than a stepping-stone toward a discussion of humanity's peculiar ontologi­ cal predicament in the modern age, a predicament that-Heidegger takes great pains to stress-is in no way essentially technological. As we might expect, however, Heidegger is able to downplay the para­ dox that ensues from the duplicity of Herausfordern. By playing his onto­ logical trump card once again, he introduces a covertly operating distinction between two basic registers of poiesis: ( 1 ) poiesis as a description of pro­ duction-the production of presencing-as such and (2) poiesis as a nar­ rower category of production in harmony with the presencing of physis. This key distinction allows Heidegger to maintain the ontic singularity of modern technology without abandoning his primordial ontological identification of production and poiesis. Viewed against the narrow register of poiesis, Herausfordern presents a radically new mode of production; cir­ cumscribed by the broader register of poiesis, by contrast, it shows itself to possess a fundamental kinship with Hervorbringen, since both are, essen­ tially, modes of revealing.

118

118 * Embodying Technesis

By introducing this distinction, Heidegger effectively embraces technesis

as the enabling strategy for his mature meditation on technology: whether it

accords with physis or not, technology (as an ontological modality of

physis) always essentially involves a production of presencing. Yet far from

solving the paradox underlying "The Question Concerning Technology"-

the paradox of Herausfordern's duplicity-Heidegger's recourse to the priv-

ilege of ontology effectively suspends it. By reinstalling the ontological dif-

ference, Heidegger is able to focalize his account of modern technology

exclusively on its role in the presencing constitutive of truth. From this per-

spective, not surprisingly, technology can only be given a negative determi-

nation, as a degradation of a former, more authentic relationship to Being:

Herausfordern only attains its status as a form of poiesis in the broader

sense (as a mode of revealing) by constituting a degradation of poiesis in the

narrower sense (as a mode of presentation compatible with physis). With

this move, Heidegger subtly shifts his focus: far from exploring the being of

modern technology, he concentrates exclusively on the ways in which it cov-

ers over whatever possibility we might have of developing an authentic rela-

tionship with the essence of technology qua the modern stamping of Being,

or in other words, with truth in its modern showing.14 As long as it com-

prises a mode of poiesis or the revealing of Being, modern technology, in

other words, can be distinguished solely through its negativity-the way it

obscures the meaning of Being.

Technology and Language

Heidegger's effort to enframe modern technology as an obstacle preventing

us from authentically experiencing Being sends him back to the account of

language he originally developed in Being and Time. As a degradation of

poiesis, Herausfordern plays a role formally identical to the one played by

Aussage (assertion), the inauthentic degradation of Auslegung (interpreta-

tion), within his onto-hermeneutic theory of reference. By transforming

Herausfordern into a degraded form of an authentically onto-hermeneutical

relation to Being, Heidegger restricts the scope of its effects to the horizon

of thought in a way that insures the efficacy, in principle, of his poietic

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

By introducing this distinction, Heidegger effectively embraces technesis as the enabling strategy for his mature meditation on technology: whether it accords with physis or not, technology (as an ontological modality of physis) always essentially involves a production of presencing. Yet far from solving the paradox underlying "The Question Concerning Technology"­ the paradox of Herausfordern's duplicity-Heidegger's recourse to the priv­ ilege of ontology effectively suspends it. By reinstalling the ontological dif­ ference, Heidegger is able to focalize his account of modern technology exclusively on its role in the presencing constitutive of truth. From this per­ spective, not surprisingly, technology can only be given a negative determi­ nation, as a degradation of a former, more authentic relationship to Being: Herausfordern only attains its status as a form of poiesis in the broader sense (as a mode of revealing ) by constituting a degradation of poiesis in the narrower sense (as a mode of presentation compatible with physis ) . With this move, Heidegger subtly shifts his focus : far from exploring the being of modern technology, he concentrates exclusively on the ways in which it cov­ ers over whatever possibility we might have of developing an authentic rela­ tionship with the essence of technology qua the modern stamping of Being, or in other words, with truth in its modern showing.14 As long as it com­ prises a mode of poiesis or the revealing of Being, modern technology, in other words, can be distinguished solely through its negativity-the way it obscures the meaning of Being.

strategies (see for example, his discussion of the "saving power" of language

[1977b, 28, 32-35/1954, 31, 35-38]) for overcoming the threat posed by

modern technology. Following this reductive transformation, whatever

strategy we take to grapple with technology involves an essential internal

modification of our (ontological) self-understanding that is unrelated to any

Technology and Language

Heidegger's effort to enframe modern technology as an obstacle preventing us from authentically experiencing Being sends him back to the account of language he originally developed in Being and Time. As a degradation of poiesis, Herausfordern plays a role formally identical to the one played by Aussage (assertion ) , the inauthentic degradation of Auslegung ( interpreta­ tion ) , within his onto-hermeneutic theory of reference. By transforming Herausfordern into a degraded form of an authentically onto-hermeneutical relation to Being, Heidegger restricts the scope of its effects to the horizon of thought in a way that insures the efficacy, in principle, of his poietic strategies ( see for example, his discussion of the " saving power " of language [ 1 977b, 2 8 , 32-3 5/1 954, 3 1 , 3 5-3 8 ] ) for overcoming the threat posed by modern technology. Following this reductive transformation, whatever strategy we take to grapple with technology involves an essential internal modification of our ( ontological) self-understanding that is unrelated to any

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 119

potential change in our mundane, practical comportment toward technol-

ogy. Just as Dasein only reaches a more primordial understanding of its

Being-in-the-world by surmounting its superficial absorption in Aussage, so

too must human beings in the technological epoch see beyond their chal-

lenging-forth of nature (Herausfordern) in order to experience the revealing

of Being. By attesting to the enduring sway of a hermeneutic (or logocentric)

notion of truth, this homology foregrounds the central function that the

(correlative) machine reduction of technology continues to play following

the period of fundamental ontology.

Indeed, this homology allows us to discern the extensive debt Heidegger's

mature reflection on technology owes to fundamental ontology. The rela-

tionship of Auslegung and Aussage furnishes a model of ontological unity

for Heidegger's later assimilation of Herausfordern to Hervorbringen.s5 In

paragraph 34 of Being and Time, Heidegger explains how the two struc-

tures of the understanding are in fact rooted in a single ontological ground,

what he calls Rede (discourse), and how, furthermore, they can be viewed as

two modifications-one authentic, the other inauthentic-of this structure.

As the most fundamental articulation of Dasein's circumspective under-

standing, Rede, Heidegger contends, "underlies [liegt . . . zugrunde] both

interpretation and assertion" (1977b, 204/1954, 161).

By determining Herausfordern as, effectively, a degradation of Hervor-

bringen in the same sense that Aussage is a degradation of Auslegung, Hei-

degger is able to map out the radical difference of modern technology (it is

non-poietic in the restricted sense) without abandoning the privilege of

ontology. While Herausfordern perverts the revealing of nature by stockpil-

ing nature's resources just for the sake of stockpiling, at a deeper level it

continues to serve the poietic function of disclosing the world, if only in a

fallen mode (one that parallels Aussage) in which the truth of Being is cov-

ered over. When Heidegger goes on to distinguish poetic from technological

modes of revealing by applying the test of authenticity, we encounter a par-

ticularly striking example of this debt to fundamental ontology.

The hydroelectric plant. . . sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure,

which then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in

motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which the long-dis-

tance power station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch electric-

ity. In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly dis-

position of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at

our command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as

was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years.

What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, derives from out of

Techne

•

119

potential change i n our mundane, practical comportment toward technol­ ogy. Just as Dasein only reaches a more primordial understanding of its Being-in-the-world by surmounting its superficial absorption in Aussage, so too must human beings in the technological epoch see beyond their chal­ lenging-forth of nature (Herausfordern) in order to experience the revealing of Being. By attesting to the enduring sway of a hermeneutic (or logocentric) notion of truth, this homology foregrounds the central function that the ( correlative ) machine reduction of technology continues to play following the period of fundamental ontology. Indeed, this homology allows us to discern the extensive debt Heidegger's mature reflection on technology owes to fundamental ontology. The rela­ tionship of Auslegung and Aussage furnishes a model of ontological unity for Heidegger's later assimilation of Herausfordern to Hervorbringen. 15 In paragraph 34 of Being and Time, Heidegger explains how the two struc­ tures of the understanding are in fact rooted in a single ontological ground, what he calls Rede ( discourse ) , and how, furthermore, they can be viewed as two modifications-one authentic, the other inauthentic-of this structure. As the most fundamental articulation of Dasein's circumspective under­ standing, Rede, Heidegger contends, " underlies [liegt . . . zugrunde] both interpretation and assertion" ( 1 977b, 20411 954, 1 6 1 ) . By determining Herausfordern as, effectively, a degradation of Hervor­ bringen in the same sense that Aussage is a degradation of Auslegung, Hei­ degger is able to map out the radical difference of modern technology ( it is non-poietic in the restricted sense) without abandoning the privilege of ontology. While Herausfordern perverts the revealing of nature by stockpil­ ing nature's resources just for the sake of stockpiling, at a deeper level it continues to serve the poietic function of disclosing the world, if only in a fallen mode ( one that parallels Aussage) in which the truth of Being is cov­ ered over. When Heidegger goes on to distinguish poetic from technological modes of revealing by applying the test of authenticity, we encounter a par­ ticularly striking example of this debt to fundamental ontology. The hydroelectric plant . . . sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which the long-dis­ tance power station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch electric­ ity. In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly dis­ position of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at our command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years . What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, derives from out of

1 20

120 * Embodying Technesis

the essence of the power station. In order that we may even remotely consider

the monstrousness [das Ungeheuere] that reigns here, let us ponder for a

moment the contrast that speaks out of the two titles, "The Rhine" as

dammed up into the power works [verbaut in das Kraftwerk], and "The

Rhine" as uttered out [gesagt aus] of the art work, in Holderlin's hymn of

that name. (13/16)

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

the essence of the power station. In order that we may even remotely consider the monstrousness [das Ungeheuere] that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast that speaks out of the two titles, "The Rhine " as dammed up into the power works [verbaut in das Kraftwerk], and "The Rhine " as uttered out [gesagt aus] of the art work, in H6lderlin's hymn of that name. ( 1 3/1 6 )

What makes the power station monstrous is not its explicit destruction of

nature but the way it corrupts the mode of revealing characteristic of poetry

(poiesis). In the place of a nature that is discursively disclosed, modern tech-

nology substitutes a purely instrumental model of nature, the significance of

which is found not, oddly enough, in its ontic effects but rather in its

poverty as an ontological mode of revealing Being.

If modern technology is, as Heidegger claims, "something completely dif-

ferent and therefore new," something that orders nature according to an

instrumental, external telos, this difference-and whatever danger of auton-

omy it might pose-is quickly subsumed by its more profound kinship with

Hervorbringen (5/8). As a producer of standing-reserve, ontic technology is

reduced to the status of pure instrumentality; it becomes a type of unau-

tonomous inner-worldly entity that, like any other such entity, discovers its

possibility-and also its limits-thanks entirely to the ontological mode of

revealing Heidegger calls Herausfordern: "Revealed, [the airplane] stands

on the taxi strip only as standing-reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure

the possibility of transportation . . . Seen in terms of the standing-reserve,

the machine is completely unautonomous [schlechthin unselbststaendig],

for it has its standing [ihren Stand] only from the ordering of the orderable"

(17/20-21). In a manner no less reductive than that employed in the 1928

instrumental definition, the machine is here made to depend for its very exis-

tence on the operation of an ontological clearing, what Heidegger calls "the

ordering of the orderable." Restricted in this way, ontic machines are pro-

hibited from having any significant (i.e., ontological) impact whatsoever.

If this restriction allows Heidegger to foreground the ontological

significance of modern technology, it also sets the stage for a redemptive

story that exactly parallels Being and Time's account of Dasein's quest for

authenticity-and that must fail for the same reasons. By modeling his the-

ory of modern technology on his earlier model of language, Heidegger

builds into it the possibility for a return to an authentic relationship with

Being. Just as Dasein had merely to answer the call of conscience, human

beings in the technological epoch, while no longer possessing control over

unconcealment itself, need only listen to the call of the poet, a call that

testifies to the "saving power" within the essence of technology (1977b, 34).

What makes the power station monstrous i s not its explicit destruction of nature but the way it corrupts the mode of revealing characteristic of poetry (paiesis ) . In the place of a nature that is discursively disclosed, modern tech­ nology substitutes a purely instrumental model of nature, the significance of which is found not, oddly enough, in its ontic effects but rather in its poverty as an ontological mode of revealing Being. If modern technology is, as Heidegger claims, " something completely dif­ ferent and therefore new, " something that orders nature according to an instrumental, external telos, this difference-and whatever danger of auton­ omy it might pose-is quickly subsumed by its more profound kinship with Hervarbringen ( 5/8 ) . As a producer of standing-reserve, ontic technology is reduced to the status of pure instrumentality; it becomes a type of unau­ tonomous inner-worldly entity that, like any other such entity, discovers its possibility-and also its limits-thanks entirely to the ontological mode of revealing Heidegger calls Herausfardern: " Revealed, [the airplane] stands on the taxi strip only as standing-reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure the possibility of transportation . . . . Seen in terms of the standing-reserve, the machine is completely unautonomous [schlechthin unselbststaendig] ,

for it has its standing [ihren Stand] only from the ordering of the arderable" ( 1 7/20-2 1 ) . I n a manner n o less reductive than that employed i n the 1 92 8 instrumental definition, the machine i s here made to depend for its very exis­ tence on the operation of an ontological clearing, what Heidegger calls "the ordering of the orderable . " Restricted in this way, ontic machines are pro­ hibited from having any significant (i.e., ontological ) impact whatsoever. If this restriction allows Heidegger to foreground the ontological significance of modern technology, it also sets the stage for a redemptive story that exactly parallels Being and Time's account of Dasein's quest for authenticity-and that must fail for the same reasons. By modeling his the­ ory of modern technology on his earlier model of language, Heidegger builds into it the possibility for a return to an authentic relationship with Being. Just as Dasein had merely to answer the call of conscience, human beings in the technological epoch, while no longer possessing control over unconcealment itself, need only listen to the call of the poet, a call that testifies to the " saving power " within the essence of technology ( 1 977b, 3 4 ) .

Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of

Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 121

Once again, however, what guarantees this possibility is nothing other

than the privilege Heidegger lends ontology, the very issue that technology

puts into question. Like Dasein, "modern man" is a questioning Being and

is thus able to grasp the implicit "as-structure" underlying the technological

revealing of Being.16 Moreover, like Dasein, human beings in the techno-

logical epoch possess a certain autonomy with respect to the fallen mode of

their everyday existence, a particular facility for ontological self-transfor-

mation: ". . . precisely because man is challenged more originally than are

the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he is never trans-

formed into mere standing-reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he

takes part in ordering as a way of revealing" (18/22). For Heidegger, such a

privilege insures nothing less than the categorical triumph of the human

over any merely external interference with the call of Being. By harmonizing

ontic technology with his account of language, Heidegger submits it to the

reduction I call technesis and thereby purchases the right to discount the

very real possibility that ontic technology might interrupt the call of Being

in a far more disruptive and recalcitrant way. No differently than in Being

and Time, Heidegger dogmatically turns a blind eye to the admittedly dis-

turbing possibility that our absorption in technology might simply drown

out or contaminate Being's call in a way that effectively compromises any

hope for (ontological) redemption.

Techne

•

121

Once again, however, what guarantees this possibility i s nothing other than the privilege Heidegger lends ontology, the very issue that technology puts into question. Like Dasein, "modern man " is a questioning Being and is thus able to grasp the implicit " as-structure " underlying the technological revealing of Being . 1 6 Moreover, like Dasein, human beings in the techno­ logical epoch possess a certain autonomy with respect to the fallen mode of their everyday existence, a particular facility for ontological self-transfor­ mation : " . . . precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he is never trans­ formed into mere standing-reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing " ( 1 8/22 ) . For Heidegger, such a privilege insures nothing less than the categorical triumph of the human over any merely external interference with the call of Being. By harmonizing ontic technology with his account of language, Heidegger submits it to the reduction I call technesis and thereby purchases the right to discount the very real possibility that ontic technology might interrupt the call of Being in a far more disruptive and recalcitrant way. No differently than in Being

and Time, Heidegger dogmatically turns a blind eye to the admittedly dis­ turbing possibility that our absorption in technology might simply drown out or contaminate Being's call in a way that effectively compromises any hope for (ontological ) redemption.

Chapter 5

The Mechanics of Deconstruction:

Derrida on de Man, or Poststructuralism

in an Age of Cultural Studies

Chapter 5

Having presented the paradigm case of the twentieth-century machine

reduction of technology, I shall now begin to unpack the philosophical

underpinnings of the contemporary technocultural turn by focusing on one

exemplary appropriation of Heidegger. In "Acts," the third of his Memoires

for Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida proposes a generalization of deconstruc-

tion to bring it into continuity with the technologized lifeworld. By con-

fronting de Man with Heidegger, Derrida emphasizes deconstruction's

"constitutive complicity" with Heidegger's meditation on technology-its

T he Mechanics of Deconstruction: Derrida on de Man, or Poststructuralism in an Age of Cultural Studies

need to "question the dissociation between thought and technology" (Der-

rida 1986, 107). This critical imperative informs Derrida's qualified appro-

priation of de Man's division of memory into two basic forms-what de

Man, following Hegel, calls Erinnerung (remembrance) and Geddichtnis

(the faculty of memory proper). Playing de Man against Heidegger, Derrida

is able to articulate a "disjunctive juncture" that occurs between these two

forms of memory and that, he feels, can underwrite a productive general-

ization of deconstruction-an extension of differance to objects other than

philosophical and literary texts, to what he calls the "totality of our relation

to the world" (Derrida 1990, 107).

More so than any other of his numerous texts, "Acts" spells out the cen-

tral role that Heidegger plays in Derrida's effort to open deconstruction to

technology. By recasting Heidegger's famous dissociation of technology

from techne onto de Man's opposition of Erinnerung and Geddichtnis, Der-

rida would seem to be engaged in an effort to broaden the question of tech-

nology beyond its narrow Heideggerian framework. Yet to the extent that it

simply translates the issue of technology into the (narrower) problematic of

memory, this critical gesture, as we shall see, only furthers the domestica-

tion of technology's material exteriority into the horizon of thought. Far

from breaking with Heidegger's foundationalism, Derrida effectively

Having presented the paradigm case of the twentieth-century machine reduction of technology, I shall now begin to unpack the philosophical underpinnings of the contemporary technocultural turn by focusing on one exemplary appropriation of Heidegger. In "Acts, " the third of his Memoires

for Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida proposes a generalization of deconstruc­ tion to bring it into continuity with the technologized lifeworld. By con­ fronting de Man with Heidegger, Derrida emphasizes deconstruction's "constitutive complicity " with Heidegger's meditation on technology-its need to " question the dissociation between thought and technology " (Der­ rida 1 9 8 6 , 1 0 7 ) . This critical imperative informs Derrida's qualified appro­ priation of de Man's division of memory into two basic forms-what de Man, following Hegel, calls Erinnerung (remembrance ) and Gedachtnis ( the faculty of memory proper ) . Playing de Man against Heidegger, Derrida is able to articulate a " disj unctive j uncture" that occurs between these two forms of memory and that, he feels, can underwrite a productive general­ ization of deconstruction-an extension of dif(erance to obj ects other than philosophical and literary texts, to what he calls the " totality of our relation to the world" (Derrida 1 990, 1 07 ) . More so than any other o f his numerous texts, " Acts " spells out the cen­ tral role that Heidegger plays in Derrida's effort to open deconstruction to technology. By recasting Heidegger's famous dissociation of technology from techne onto de Man's opposition of Erinnerung and Gedachtnis, Der­ rida would seem to be engaged in an effort to broaden the question of tech­ nology beyond its narrow Heideggerian framework. Yet to the extent that it simply translates the issue of technology into the (narrower) problematic of memory, this critical gesture, as we shall see, only furthers the domestica­ tion of technology'S material exteriority into the horizon of thought. Far from breaking with Heidegger's foundationalism, Derrida effectively

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 123

repeats the very same metalepsis that was responsible for generating the

ontological difference; like his mentor, Derrida purchases the right to sub-

ordinate technology to thought through a previously enacted and occulted

reduction of technology's robust materiality: recast as artificial memory, or

Geddichtnis, technology is rendered essentially linguistic and remains

securely rooted in the legacy of Aristotle's techne.

Though it certainly does begin to rethink Heidegger's purity in the light

of our contemporary media age, Derrida's strategy in "Acts" thus fails to

take a sufficient distance from Heidegger's manner of thinking about tech-

nology. As long as Derrida retains the figure of thought (no matter how

transformed by deconstruction) as the tribunal for evaluating technology,

he cannot truly break with the poietic foundation of the Heideggerian pro-

ject. His argument, accordingly, is important for my purposes less for its

own conclusions than for its broader aim of opening deconstruction to cul-

tural critique and for the extensive, if largely unrecognized, influence it has

exercised (and continues to exercise) on contemporary cultural studies of

media and technology. By updating Heidegger's machine reduction, Derrid-

ian technesis furnishes the prototype for the reduction currently enjoying

hegemonic sway within contemporary cultural criticism: the reduction of

technology to representational technology. Whether acknowledged or not,

the Derridean motif of the closure of representation serves as the philo-

sophical basis for current forms of cultural studies that privilege representa-

tion as the raw material for analysis. Since it localizes the experiential

impact of the material domain within the closure of representation, Der-

rida's radicalization of Heidegger furnishes something like a general theo-

retical grounding for the culturalist epoche itself.1

By exposing the dependence of Derrida's representationalist ontology on

the prior reduction of technology, the argument I develop in this chapter

will resituate the motif of incompatibility-which deconstruction predicates

exclusively of a given text-outside the restricted space governed by the clo-

sure of representation. As a figure for the space between representation and

radical materiality, incompatibility will acquire an altogether new function:

rather than circumscribing the "totality of our relation to the world," as

Derrida puts it, incompatibility will point beyond itself, to that which rep-

resentation cannot capture. Accordingly, my critique of Derrida will urge a

basic reorientation of cultural studies, a shift out of the restricted horizon of

representation and into the robust domain of embodiment.

Toward this end, I shall pursue two interrelated critical engagements. On

the one hand, I will call into question the methodological commitment, on

the part of contemporary cultural critics as much as Derrida himself, to the

•

123

repeats the very same metalepsis that was responsible for generating the ontological difference; like his mentor, Derrida purchases the right to sub­ ordinate technology to thought through a previously enacted and occulted reduction of technology's robust materiality: recast as artificial memory, or Gedachtnis, technology is rendered essentially linguistic and remains securely rooted in the legacy of Aristotle's techne. Though it certainly does begin to rethink Heidegger's purity in the light of our contemporary media age, Derrida's strategy in " Acts " thus fails to take a sufficient distance from Heidegger's manner of thinking about tech­ nology. As long as Derrida retains the figure of thought (no matter how transformed by deconstruction) as the tribunal for evaluating technology, he cannot truly break with the poietic foundation of the Heideggerian pro­ j ect. His argument, accordingly, is important for my purposes less for its own conclusions than for its broader aim of opening deconstruction to cul­ tural critique and for the extensive, if largely unrecognized, influence it has exercised (and continues to exercise) on contemporary cultural studies of media and technology. By updating Heidegger's machine reduction, Derrid­ ian technesis furnishes the prototype for the reduction currently enj oying hegemonic sway within contemporary cultural criticism: the reduction of technology to representational technology. Whether acknowledged or not, the Derridean motif of the closure of representation serves as the philo­ sophical basis for current forms of cultural studies that privilege representa­ tion as the raw material for analysis. Since it localizes the experiential impact of the material domain within the closure of representation, Der­ rida's radicalization of Heidegger furnishes something like a general theo­ retical grounding for the culturalist epoche itself. 1 By exposing the dependence of Derrida's representationalist ontology on the prior reduction of technology, the argument I develop in this chapter will resituate the motif of incompatibility-which deconstruction predicates exclusively of a given text-outside the restricted space governed by the clo­ sure of representation. As a figure for the space between representation and radical materiality, incompatibility will acquire an altogether new function: rather than circumscribing the " totality of our relation to the world, " as D errida puts it, incompatibility will point beyond itself, to that which rep­ resentation cannot capture. Accordingly, my critique of Derrida will urge a basic reorientation of cultural studies, a shift out of the restricted horizon of representation and into the robust domain of embodiment. Toward this end, I shall pursue two interrelated critical engagements. On the one hand, I will call into question the methodological commitment, on the part of contemporary cultural critics as much as Derrida himself, to the

124

124 * Embodying Technesis

closure of representation as the exhaustive horizon for assessing the impact

of contemporary technology. On the other hand, I will counter Derrida's

program for the cultural application of deconstruction by submitting his

reading of de Man to criticism. By demonstrating how Derrida's violent

appropriation of de Man's analysis of textual memory (Geddichtnis) installs

an enabling and yet debilitating double bind at the heart of contemporary

postdeconstructive cultural studies, I shall indict the very move that opens

deconstructive analysis to the cultural domain for effacing what is (poten-

tially) its most significant contribution to the cultural study of technology:

its recognition of the radical exteriority of the material real.

The Priority of Poiesis

In his commentaries on Heidegger, from the early essays in Margins to later

work, such as Geschlecht II, Of Spirit, and Given Time, Derrida criticizes

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

closure of representation as the exhaustive horizon for assessing the impact of contemporary technology. On the other hand, I will counter Derrida's program for the cultural application of deconstruction by submitting his reading of de Man to criticism. By demonstrating how Derrida's violent appropriation of de Man's analysis of textual memory ( Gedachtnis) installs an enabling and yet debilitating double bind at the heart of contemporary postdeconstructive cultural studies, I shall indict the very move that opens deconstructive analysis to the cultural domain for effacing what is (poten­ tially) its most significant contribution to the cultural study of technology: its recognition of the radical exteriority of the material real.

the alleged purity of techne without questioning the broader Heideggerian

privilege of a poetic witnessing of the "truth" of Being.2 While Derrida's cri-

tique persuasively establishes that the possibility of thinking the essence of

technology is first and foremost a linguistic possibility (and thus that Hei-

degger's desired purity is an impossibility), he nonetheless retains a deep sol-

The Priority of

Poiesis

idarity with the more general Heideggerian fetishizing of language. For Der-

rida no less than for Heidegger, the "truth" of Being (and, in Derrida's case,

the "truth" that Being is not "one") can only be witnessed in language.

Appreciating this particular solidarity is crucial if we are to grasp Der-

rida's deep fidelity to the Heideggerian project as such. While Derrida con-

vincingly shows that all language bears within itself a constitutive technical

contamination (the possibility of iteration) and that a certain "essential"

nonidentity precedes the determination of essence (and founds language

itself), Derrida cannot do away with the alethic framework of Heideggerian

hermeneutics, its division into manifest and latent domains (predication and

apophansis). As a consequence, I suggest, Derrida simply cannot eschew the

subordination of technology to truth that is, as we discovered, such a promi-

nent feature of Heidegger's thought. By privileging the trace as the with-

drawal of truth, Derrida retains the very same priority of ontology for

which Levinas rebukes Heidegger.3 Despite rejecting Heidegger's insistence

on the singularity of Being, Derrida's understanding of differance as the

nonoriginary foundation of discourse lends it an entirely analogous, onto-

genetic function: like Being, it furnishes a nonphenomenal, poetic site that

forms the condition of possibility for the emergence of thought as such.

In his commentaries on Heidegger, from the early essays in Margins to later work, such as Geschlecht II, Of Spirit, and Given Time, Derrida criticizes the alleged purity of techne without questioning the broader Heideggerian privilege of a poetic witnessing of the "truth " of Being.2 While Derrida's cri­ tique persuasively establishes that the possibility of thinking the essence of technology is first and foremost a linguistic possibility ( and thus that Hei­ degger's desired purity is an impossibility), he nonetheless retains a deep sol­ idarity with the more general Heideggerian fetishizing of language. For Der­ rida no less than for Heidegger, the " truth " of Being ( and, in Derrida's case, the " truth " that Being is not " one " ) can only be witnessed in language. Appreciating this particular solidarity is crucial if we are to grasp Der­ rida's deep fidelity to the Heideggerian proj ect as such. While Derrida con­ vincingly shows that all language bears within itself a constitutive technical contamination (the possibility of iteration) and that a certain " essential" nonidentity precedes the determination of essence ( and founds language itself) , Derrida cannot do away with the alethic framework of Heideggerian hermeneutics, its division into manifest and latent domains (predication and apophansis) . As a consequence, I suggest, Derrida simply cannot eschew the subordination of technology to truth that is, as we discovered, such a promi­ nent feature of Heidegger's thought. By privileging the trace as the with­ drawal of truth, Derrida retains the very same priority of ontology for which Levinas rebukes Heidegger.3 Despite rej ecting Heidegger's insistence on the singularity of Being, Derrida's understanding of differance as the nonoriginary foundation of discourse lends it an entirely analogous, onto­ genetic function: like Being, it furnishes a nonphenomenal, poetic site that forms the condition of possibility for the emergence of thought as such.

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 125

This analogy underwrites a general commitment on the part of Derrida

(and, by implication, those cultural critics who inherit his legacy) to the

basic principle of Heidegger's questioning of technology: the machine

reduction of technology. Since Derrida's conception of the text shares with

Heidegger's privileging of poiesis a common source in Aristotelian ontol-

ogy, the textualism central to poststructuralism and postdeconstructionist

cultural studies can be understood as a variation on Heidegger's (and Aris-

totle's) paradigm reduction of technology. This homology, moreover, holds

up despite the local modifications to which Derrida submits Heidegger's

text. Like other influential French intellectuals from the second half of the

twentieth century, Derrida has made a fundamental contribution toward

rethinking the opposition between nature and culture and has thus compli-

cated the Aristotelian categories in a way unimaginable to Heidegger. Since

nomos (institution, law, culture) becomes thinkable only with the possibil-

ity of writing, Derrida is quite correct to suggest that one cannot speak of

physis as the opposite of culture: "The very idea of institution-hence of the

arbitrariness of the sign-is unthinkable before the possibility of writing

and outside of its horizon. Quite simply, that is, outside of the horizon itself,

outside the world as space of inscription, as the opening to the emission and

to the spatial distribution of signs, to the regulated play of their differences,

even if they are 'phonic"'" (Derrida 1974, 44). Yet while such a move suc-

cessfully reverses Heidegger's (and Aristotle's) hierarchical schema by

demonstrating the dependence of nature on culture, it does not actually

overthrow the nouocentrism of Greek metaphysics. In fact, far from coun-

tering the collapse of exteriority at stake in Aristotle's own assimilation of

techne to physis, Derrida's assimilation of physis to techne effectively raises

it to a new level: by taking the being of what is and making it thoroughly

dependent on the metaphysics of the text (and thus on the operation of

techne), Derrida simply effaces the very category of radical exteriority and,

along with it, all traces of materiality outside the space governed by textu-

ality.

Whereas Derrida's encounter with Heidegger comprises the proximate

source of grammatology, his (earlier) encounter with Husserl represents the

deep source of his unwavering fidelity to Aristotelian ontology. Derrida's

conception of the text and the textualization of the world is ultimately noth-

ing but a grammatological transformation of the Husserlian noema (the

thought content that is inseparable from a noetic act of thinking).4 Schemat-

ically put, Derrida substitutes differance for the transcendental ego; in place

of the noetic-noematic correspondence, he installs the relation between

thought and writing. It is, of course, on the basis of this arche-deconstruc-

•

125

This analogy underwrites a general commitment on the part of Derrida ( and, by implication, those cultural critics who inherit his legacy) to the basic principle of Heidegger's questioning of technology: the machine reduction of technology. Since Derrida's conception of the text shares with Heidegger's privileging of poiesis a common source in Aristotelian ontol­ ogy, the textualism central to poststructuralism and postdeconstructionist cultural studies can be understood as a variation on Heidegger's ( and Aris­ totle's) paradigm reduction of technology. This homology, moreover, holds up despite the local modifications to which Derrida submits Heidegger's text. Like other influential French intellectuals from the second half of the twentieth century, Derrida has made a fundamental contribution toward rethinking the opposition between nature and culture and has thus compli­ cated the Aristotelian categories in a way unimaginable to Heidegger. Since nomos (institution, law, culture) becomes thinkable only with the possibil­ ity of writing, Derrida is quite correct to suggest that one cannot speak of physis as the opposite of culture: "The very idea of institution-hence of the arbitrariness of the sign-i s unthinkable before the possibility of writing and outside of its horizon. Quite simply, that is, outside of the horizon itself, outside the world as space of inscription, as the opening to the emission and to the spatial distribution of signs, to the regulated play of their differences, even if they are 'phonic' " (Derrida 1 974 , 44 ) . Yet while such a move suc­ cessfully reverses Heidegger's (and Aristotle's) hierarchical schema by demonstrating the dependence of nature on culture, it does not actually overthrow the nouocentrism of Greek metaphysics. In fact, far from coun­ tering the collapse of exteriority at stake in Aristotle's own assimilation of techne to physis, Derrida's assimilation of physis to techne effectively raises it to a new level: by taking the being of what is and making it thoroughly dependent on the metaphysics of the text ( and thus on the operation of techne) , Derrida simply effaces the very category of radical exteriority and, along with it, all traces of materiality outside the space governed by textu­ ality. Whereas Derrida's encounter with Heidegger comprises the proximate source of grammatology, his ( earlier) encounter with Husserl represents the deep source of his unwavering fidelity to Aristotelian ontology. Derrida's conception of the text and the textualization of the world is ultimately noth­ ing but a grammatological transformation of the Husserlian noema (the thought content that is inseparable from a noetic act of thinking) .4 Schemat­ ically put, Derrida substitutes differance for the transcendental ego; in place of the noetic-noematic correspondence, he installs the relation between thought and writing. It is, of course, on the basis of this arche-deconstruc-

126

126 * Embodying Technesis

tion that Derrida can think of the world as text and delineate the "death of

the book" in Of Grammatology; on the one hand, it renders obsolete tradi-

tional boundaries separating private thinking from exteriority, and on the

other, it introduces writing as exteriority (and exteriority as writing) into

the most intimate interiority: "The system of writing in general is not exte-

rior to the system of language in general, unless it is granted that the divi-

sion between exterior and interior passes through the interior of the interior

or the exterior of the exterior, to the point where the immanence of lan-

guage is essentially exposed to the intervention of forces that are apparently

alien to its system" (Derrida 1974, 43; emphasis added). If we attend to the

equivocation in the final sentence of this passage, we see that the interven-

tion of "apparently alien" forces into the immanence of language signals not

the intervention of any material outside but only the upsurge of the relative

exteriority of writing within the interiority of language. In no way has the

"system of language in general" been broached.

On this point, Derrida speaks more frankly earlier on in Of Grammatol-

ogy when he defines exteriority as "the exteriority of meaning" (13; empha-

sis added). Here Derrida again marks his debt to Husserl by announcing his

intention to work within the general field of Husserlian phenomenology, a

field constituted through the reduction of experience to the experience of

meaning. More than any other aspect of grammatology, this phenomeno-

logical commitment explains Derrida's restriction of technology to the

domain of memory; only by fetishizing the philosopheme of memory can

Derrida replace the disjunction between interiority and radical material

exteriority with a division between a relative interiority (thought as writing)

and a relative exteriority (the technology of writing).

If the trace, arche-phenomenon of "memory," which must be thought before

the opposition of nature and culture, animality and humanity, etc., belongs

to the very movement of signification, then signification is a priori written,

whether inscribed or not, in one form or another, in a "sensible" and "spa-

tial" element that is called "exterior." Arche-writing, at first the possibility of

the spoken word, then of the "graphie" in the narrow sense, the birthplace of

"usurpation," denounced from Plato to Saussure, this trace is the opening of

the first exteriority in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living to its

other and of an inside to an outside.... (70)

With this allegiance to memory, it would seem that we have come full circle

back to the Heideggerian equation of Being with the meaning of Being and

also, therefore, to the Aristotelian privilege of nature and thought over the

automatic. For, we must ask, does this restriction of exteriority (including

the exteriority of matter itself) not already decide the problem of technology

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

tion that Derrida can think of the world as text and delineate the " death of the book " in Of Grammatology; on the one hand, it renders obsolete tradi­ tional boundaries separating private thinking from exteriority, and on the other, it introduces writing as exteriority ( and exteriority as writing) into the most intimate interiority: " The system of writing in general is not exte­ rior to the system of language in general, unless it is granted that the divi­ sion between exterior and interior passes through the interior of the interior or the exterior of the exterior, to the point where the immanence of lan­ guage is essentially exposed to the intervention of forces that are apparently alien to its system " (Derrida 1 9 74, 43; emphasis added) . If we attend to the equivocation in the final sentence of this passage, we see that the interven­ tion of " apparently alien " forces into the immanence of language signals not the intervention of any material outside but only the upsurge of the relative exteriority of writing within the interiority of language. In no way has the " system of language in general" been broached. On this point, Derrida speaks more frankly earlier on in Of Grammatol­ ogy when he defines exteriority as " the exteriority of meaning" ( 1 3 ; empha­ sis added ) . Here Derrida again marks his debt to Husserl by announcing his intention to work within the general field of Husserlian phenomenology, a field constituted through the reduction of experience to the experience of meaning. More than any other aspect of grammatology, this phenomeno­ logical commitment explains Derrida's restriction of technology to the domain of memory; only by fetishizing the philosopheme of memory can Derrida replace the disj unction between interiority and radical material exteriority with a division between a relative interiority (thought as writing) and a relative exteriority ( the technology of writing) . If the trace, arche-phenomenon o f " memory, " which must b e thought before the opposition of nature and culture, animality and humanity, etc., belongs to the very movement of signification, then signification is a priori written, whether inscribed or not, in one form or another, in a " sensible " and " spa­ tial " element that is called " exterior. " Arche-writing, at first the possibility of the spoken word, then of the "graphie" in the narrow sense, the birthplace of " usurpation, " denounced from Plato to Saussure, this trace is the opening of the first exteriority in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living to its other and of an inside to an outside . . . . (70)

With this allegiance to memory, it would seem that we have come full circle back to the Heideggerian equation of Being with the meaning of Being and also, therefore, to the Aristotelian privilege of nature and thought over the automatic. For, we must ask, does this restriction of exteriority (including the exteriority of matter itself) not already decide the problem of technology

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 127

in advance and according to a dogmatic philosophical program? And if so,

does it not thereby compromise from the start the radicality of Derrida's

grammatological circumscription of cybernetics-both by instituting in gen-

eral a nouocentric origin and by preserving all of those metaphysical con-

cepts (soul, life, value, choice, and especially memory) that, as Derrida puts

it, serve "to separate the machine from man" (9)?

Indeed, only such a prior dogmatic reduction of technology can, I sug-

gest, explain Derrida's practice of identifying text with machine. Within the

pseudo-exteriority opened by the movement of the arche-trace, technology

can be given no other determination than that of text-machine.

Within the closure . . . it is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a

careful and thorough discourse-to mark the conditions, the medium, and

the limits of their effectiveness and to designate rigorously their intimate rela-

•

127

in advance and according to a dogmatic philosophical program ? And if so, does it not thereby compromise from the start the radicality of Derrida's grammatological circumscription of cybernetics-both by instituting in gen­ eral a nouocentric origin and by preserving all of those metaphysical con­ cepts ( soul, life, value, choice, and especially memory) that, as Derrida puts it, serve "to separate the machine from man " ( 9 ) ? Indeed, only such a prior dogmatic reduction of technology can, I sug­ gest, explain Derrida's practice of identifying text with machine. Within the pseudo-exteriority opened by the movement of the arche-trace, technology can be given no other determination than that of text-machine.

tionship to the machine whose deconstruction they permit . . . (14; empha-

sis added)

Within a certain historical epoch, there is a profound unity among infinitist

theology, logocentrism, and a certain technicism. The originary and pre- or

meta-phonetic writing that I am attempting to conceive of here leads to noth-

ing less that an "overtaking" of speech by the machine. (79; emphasis added)

... it is very difficult to avoid the mechanist, technicist, and teleological lan-

guage at the very moment when it is precisely a question of retrieving the ori-

Within the closure . . . it is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a careful and thorough discourse-to mark the conditions, the medium, and the limits of their effectiveness and to designate rigorously their intimate rela­ tionship to the machine whose deconstruction they permit . . . . ( 1 4; empha­ sis added)

gin and the possibility of movement, of the machine, of the techne, of orien-

tation in general. (84-85; emphasis added)

Far from a mere consequence of the nature of technology, this literally ubiq-

uitous identification of text with machine itself constrains technology to fit

it into the horizon of memorial thought. By domesticating technology into a

supplement to thought, Derrida repeats the enabling move of Heidegger's

analysis: the reduction of technology's material effects into a question for a

cognizing human agent, or Dasein.

With his radicalization of phenomenology and the problematic of repre-

sentation, Derrida nonetheless appears to bring metaphysics to a decisive

point of rupture: mandated to eclipse nothing less than the privilege of

thought itself, the cybernetic program puts into question all hitherto

unquestioned (and unquestionable) metaphysical concepts, including the

Within a certain historical epoch, there is a profound unity among infinitist theology, logocentrism, and a certain technicism. The originary and pre- or meta-phonetic writing that I am attempting to conceive of here leads to noth­ ing less that an " overtaking " of speech by the machine. ( 79; emphasis added) . . . it is very difficult to avoid the mechanist, technicist, and teleological lan­ guage at the very moment when it is precisely a question of retrieving the ori­ gin and the possibility of movement, of the machine, of the techne, of orien­ tation in general. ( 84-8 5; emphasis added)

very institution of the trace. Yet as Derrida's own practice shows, this point

of rupture is one that he cannot cross, if only because, for him, thought

remains, and cannot but remain, the (occulted and/or fantasized) origin

the origin of that first exteriority from which substance itself follows, as

both thought and extension.

Far from a mere consequence of the nature of technology, this literally ubiq­ uitous identification of text with machine itself constrains technology to fit it into the horizon of memorial thought. By domesticating technology into a supplement to thought, Derrida repeats the enabling move of Heidegger's analysis: the reduction of technology's material effects into a question for a cognizing human agent, or Dasein. With his radicalization of phenomenology and the problematic of repre­ sentation, Derrida nonetheless appears to bring metaphysics to a decisive point of rupture: mandated to eclipse nothing less than the privilege of thought itself, the cybernetic program puts into question all hitherto unquestioned ( and unquestionable) metaphysical concepts, including the very institution of the trace . Yet as Derrida's own practice shows, this point of rupture is one that he cannot cross, if only because, for him, thought remains, and cannot but remain, the (occulted and/or fantasized) origin­ the origin of that first exteriority from which substance itself follows, as both thought and extension.

128

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

The " Disj unctive J uncture" : G eneralizing de M an 128 * Embodying Technesis

The "Disjunctive Juncture": Generalizing de Man

To demonstrate in concrete terms how the fundamental limitations of Der-

rida's methodology compromise his effort to liberate technology from its

Heideggerian reduction, I shall turn to his reading of de Man. Just as (Der-

ridean) deconstruction can only reveal spaces of relative exteriority within a

parasited text, it can only model technology on a textual function-in other

words, on the text as machine. The functional analogy linking text with

machine begins to function ontologically-and hence reductively-from the

moment when deconstruction generalizes its claims to technology as such,

rather than restricting them to technology in its textual form.

My focus on a particular text (one itself concerned with a particular text)

will allow us to address the ontological violence of deconstruction's

embrace of technology within the confines of its reading practice. By gener-

alizing the de Manian distinction between Erinnerung and Geddichtnis

beyond the scope of Hegel's system, Derrida seeks to broaden the role of the

text-to articulate nothing less than a textual account of the constitution of

the world. On such an account, materiality is rendered essentially textual: it

is incorporated into thought as relative exteriority. Thus, far from truly

opening onto the outside, such an incorporation domesticates worldly exte-

riority into a textualist frame of reference. Moreover, since it is the result of

an important structural commitment of deconstruction, such a domestica-

tion simply cannot be avoided: guided by its need to parasite a prestructured

and structurally unified text, deconstruction can only think what gives itself

as text.

Despite the limitations it highlights, such an evaluation is entirely consis-

tent with the various descriptions Derrida has given of deconstructive read-

ing. In Positions, for example, Derrida cites, as justification for his reticence

to address Marx's thought, deconstruction's need for a "host text."

In what I have begun to propose, I attempt to take into account certain recent

acquisitions or determined incompletions in the order of philosophy, semiol-

ogy, linguistics, psychoanalysis, etc . . . Now, we cannot consider Marx's,

Engels' or Lenin's texts as completely finished elaborations that are simply to

be "applied" to the current situation. In saying this, I am not advocating any-

thing contrary to "Marxism." . . . These texts are not to be read according to

a hermeneutical or exegetical method which would seek out a finished

signified beneath a textual surface. Reading is transformational . . . But this

transformation cannot be executed however one wishes. It requires protocols

of reading. Why not say it bluntly: I have not yet found any that satisfy me.

(Derrida 1981, 63)5

To demonstrate in concrete terms how the fundamental limitations of Der­ rida's methodology compromise his effort to liberate technology from its Heideggerian reduction, I shall turn to his reading of de Man. Just as (Der­ ridean) deconstruction can only reveal spaces of relative exteriority within a parasited text, it can only model technology on a textual function-in other words, on the text as machine. The functional analogy linking text with machine begins to function ontologically-and hence reductively-from the moment when deconstruction generalizes its claims to technology as such, rather than restricting them to technology in its textual form. My focus on a particular text (one itself concerned with a particular text) will allow us to address the ontological violence of deconstruction's embrace of technology within the confines of its reading practice. By gener­ alizing the de Manian distinction between Erinnerung and Gedachtnis beyond the scope of Hegel's system, Derrida seeks to broaden the role of the text-to articulate nothing less than a textual account of the constitution of the world. On such an account, materiality is rendered essentially textual: it is incorporated into thought as relative exteriority. Thus, far from truly opening onto the outside, such an incorporation domesticates worldly exte­ riority into a textualist frame of reference. Moreover, since it is the result of an important structural commitment of deconstruction, such a domestica­ tion simply cannot be avoided: guided by its need to parasite a prestructured and structurally unified text, deconstruction can only think what gives itself as text. Despite the limitations it highlights, such an evaluation is entirely consis­ tent with the various descriptions Derrida has given of deconstructive read­ ing. In Positions, for example, Derrida cites, as justification for his reticence to address Marx's thought, deconstruction's need for a "host text. " In what I have begun to propose, I attempt to take into account certain recent acquisitions or determined incompletions in the order of philosophy, semiol­ ogy, linguistics, psychoanalysis, etc . . . . Now, we cannot consider Marx's, Engels' or Lenin's texts as completely finished elaborations that are simply to be " applied" to the current situation. In saying this, I am not advocating any­ thing contrary to " Marxism . " . . . These texts are not to be read according to a hermeneutical or exegetical method which would seek out a finished signified beneath a textual surface. Reading is transformational. . . . But this transformation cannot be executed however one wishes . It requires protocols of reading. Why not say it bluntly: I have not yet found any that satisfy me. (Derrida 1 9 8 1 , 6 3 ) 5

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 129

In "Acts," this same requirement for reading protocols compels Derrida to

adopt the very machine reduction of technology that I criticized in Heideg-

ger. To provide a field for his critical inversion of Heideggerian purity, Der-

rida must provisionally embrace the structure of Heidegger's text and, with

it, the governing onto-phenomenological reduction explored earlier. Focus-

ing on the basis of this problematic commitment, "Acts," we can question

Derrida's hyperbolic claims concerning the affirmative "re-marking" of the

concept of matter (and, by extension, of techne)-the re-marking that is

supposed to liberate matter from its metaphysical (textual) closure. If the

marking of the concept "in the deconstructing text" does indeed function as

a "positively displacing, transgressive deconstruction"-a second re-mark-

ing "outside the oppositions in which it has been caught"-it can do

absolutely nothing to broach the onto-phenomenological reduction, the

bracketing of the radical exteriority of matter, that gives its possibility in the

first place (Derrida 1981, 65-66).6 Within the deconstructed-deconstructing

space of thought, the concept of matter undergoes a drastic narrowing: it

plays the purely abstract role of that which resists idealization.

While we earlier had occasion to observe Derrida's invocation of the

machine as a way of modeling the structure of the text, here we confront

something far more radical: the wholesale reduction of machine to text. To

contaminate Heidegger's purity, Derrida is compelled to localize the opera-

tion of technology exclusively within the domain of the text. Technology is

thus restricted to the "machinic," the "programmatic," and, ultimately, the

"grammatical" aspect of thinking (the mechanism of language). The result

is a curious inversion of Heidegger's position, one that contaminates the

essence of technology only to compromise further the possibility of main-

taining the radical material exteriority of technology. While Heidegger

reduces technology to the machine to determine it as the nonessential out-

side of thought, Derrida identifies machine and text in a way that obscures

the very possibility of distinguishing between technology and thought. The

contamination of thought by technology simply forecloses all consideration

of technology beyond its impact on thought, outside of the category of the

grammatical. Reduced to a machinic function within the operation of the

deconstructed-deconstructing text, technology is thus effectively dematerial-

ized.

Ultimately, then, what Derrida presents as a radical departure from Hei-

degger turns out to be no more than a local inversion that leaves untouched

the broadly Heideggerian framing of technology. Derrida's generalization of

de Man functions less to break with Heidegger than to harmonize the nar-

rowly literary practice of deconstructive reading with the onto-phenomeno-

•

129

In " Acts," this same requirement for reading protocols compels Derrida to adopt the very machine reduction of technology that I criticized in Heideg­ ger. To provide a field for his critical inversion of Heideggerian purity, Der­ rida must provisionally embrace the structure of Heidegger's text and, with it, the governing onto-phenomenological reduction explored earlier. Focus­ ing on the basis of this problematic commitment, " Acts, " we can question D errida's hyperbolic claims concerning the affirmative " re-marking " of the concept of matter ( and, by extension, of techne)-the re-marking that is supposed to liberate matter from its metaphysical (textual) closure. If the marking of the concept " in the deconstructing text " does indeed function as a "positively displacing, transgressive deconstruction "-a second re-mark­ ing " outside the oppositions in which it has been caught "-it can do absolutely nothing to broach the onto-phenomenological reduction, the bracketing of the radical exteriority of matter, that gives its possibility in the first place (Derrida 1 9 8 1 , 6 5-6 6 ) . 6 Within the deconstructed-deconstructing space of thought, the concept of matter undergoes a drastic narrowing: it plays the purely abstract role of that which resists idealization. While we earlier had occasion to observe Derrida's invocation of the machine as a way of modeling the structure of the text, here we confront something far more radical: the wholesale reduction of machine to text. To contaminate Heidegger's purity, Derrida is compelled to localize the opera­ tion of technology exclusively within the domain of the text. Technology is thus restricted to the " machinic, " the "programmatic, " and, ultimately, the " grammatical " aspect of thinking (the mechanism of language ) . The result is a curious inversion of Heidegger's position, one that contaminates the essence of technology only to compromise further the possibility of main­ taining the radical material exteriority of technology. While Heidegger reduces technology to the machine to determine it as the nonessential out­ side of thought, Derrida identifies machine and text in a way that obscures the very possibility of distinguishing between technology and thought. The contamination of thought by technology simply forecloses all consideration of technology beyond its impact on thought, outside of the category of the grammatical. Reduced to a machinic function within the operation of the deconstructed-deconstructing text, technology is thus effectively dematerial­ ized. Ultimately, then, what Derrida presents as a radical departure from Hei­ degger turns out to be no more than a local inversion that leaves untouched the broadly Heideggerian framing of technology. Derrida's generalization of de Man functions less to break with Heidegger than to harmonize the nar­ rowly literary practice of deconstructive reading with the onto-phenomeno-

1 30

130 * Embodying Technesis

logical approach to worldly materiality. In the end, Derrida's textual reduc-

tion of technology comprises not so much a critique of Heidegger's ontology

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

logical approach to worldly materiality. In the end, Derrida's textual reduc­ tion of technology comprises not so much a critique of Heidegger's ontology as a fine-tuning of the latter's machine reduction.

as a fine-tuning of the latter's machine reduction.

From Hegel to Heidegger

To assess the constraints Derrida's methodology places on his concrete

reading practice and assumptions about culture, let us explore his effort to

pose the question concerning technology through a specific deconstructive

From H egel to H eidegger

reading-de Man's reading of Hegel's account of memory. By grafting de

Man's reading onto Heidegger's questioning of technology, Derrida

launches a bivalent critique directed simultaneously against Heidegger and

against de Man. On the one hand, Derrida uses de Man's account to intro-

duce the complicity between thought and its material support (writing, tech-

nology, techne, etc.) that serves to undermine Heidegger's alleged purity; on

the other hand, he deploys Heidegger's onto-phenomenological framing of

technology-reinterpreted in textualist terms-to suggest the necessity for a

fundamental refunctionalization of de Man's distinction between interior

and artificial memory (Erinnerung and Geddichtnis, respectively). Through

this double critique, the allegedly pure essence of techne is shown to be con-

taminated, since its presentation-in the technically embodied form of

Geddichtnis-is not simply exterior to it. Furthermore, the intrinsic connec-

tion of language with technology is broadened beyond the narrowly textual

sphere and made to assume the ontological function of world constitution.

Derrida's reading thus marks a certain ambivalence regarding deconstruc-

tion's debts-its complex and simultaneous complicity with and break from

both the Heideggerian questioning of technology and de Manian reading

technique.

Paul de Man's text "resembles," says Derrida, "a double decision," a

decision to "rethink" or think beyond (and against) Heidegger what Hei-

degger himself tried to think, namely, "the totality of our relation to the

world." He continues:

... it in principle gives itself the means not to drive out into the exterior and

inferior dark regions of thought, the immense question of artificial memory

and of the modern modalities of archivation which today affects, according

to a rhythm and with dimensions that have no common measure with those

of the past, the totality of our relation to the world (on this side of or beyond

its anthropological determination): habitat, all languages, writing, "culture,"

art (beyond picture galleries, film libraries, video libraries, record libraries),

To assess the constraints Derrida's methodology places on his concrete reading practice and assumptions about culture, let us explore his effort to pose the question concerning technology through a specific deconstructive reading-de Man's reading of Hegel's account of memory. By grafting de Man's reading onto Heidegger's questioning of technology, Derrida launches a bivalent critique directed simultaneously against Heidegger and against de Man. On the one hand, Derrida uses de Man's account to intro­ duce the complicity between thought and its material support (writing, tech­ nology, techne, etc . ) that serves to undermine Heidegger's alleged purity; on the other hand, he deploys Heidegger's onto-phenomenological framing of technology-reinterpreted in textualist terms-to suggest the necessity for a fundamental refunctionalization of de Man's distinction between interior and artificial memory (Erinnerung and Gedachtnis, respectively) . Through this double critique, the allegedly pure essence of techne is shown to be con­ taminated, since its presentation-in the technically embodied form of Gedachtnis-is not simply exterior to it. Furthermore, the intrinsic connec­ tion of language with technology is broadened beyond the narrowly textual sphere and made to assume the ontological function of world constitution. Derrida's reading thus marks a certain ambivalence regarding deconstruc­ tion's debts-its complex and simultaneous complicity with and break from both the Heideggerian questioning of technology and de Manian reading technique. Paul de Man's text " resembles, " says Derrida, "a double decision, " a decision to " rethink " or think beyond ( and against) Heidegger what Hei­ degger himself tried to think, namely, " the totality of our relation to the world. " He continues: . . . it in principle gives itself the means not to drive out into the exterior and inferior dark regions of thought, the immense question of artificial memory and of the modern modalities of archivation which today affects, according to a rhythm and with dimensions that have no common measure with those of the past, the totality of our relation to the world ( on this side of or beyond its anthropological determination) : habitat, all languages, writing, " culture , " art ( beyond picture galleries, film libraries, video libraries, record libraries ),

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction . 1 3 1

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 131

literature (beyond libraries), all information or informatization (beyond

"memory" data banks), techno-sciences, philosophy (beyond university insti-

tutions) and everything within the transformation which affects all relations

to the future. This prodigious mutation not only heightens the stature, the

quantitative economy of so-called artificial memory, but also its qualitative

structure-and in doing so it obliges us to rethink what relates this artificial

memory to man's so-called psychical and interior memory, to truth, to the

simulacrum and simulation of truth, etc. (1986, 107; emphasis added)

literature ( beyond libraries ), all information o r informatization (beyond " memory" data banks ), techno-sciences, philosophy (beyond university insti­ tutions ) and everything within the transformation which affects all relations to the future. This prodigious mutation not only heightens the stature, the quantitative economy of so-called artificial memory, but also its qualitative structure-and in doing so it obliges us to rethink what relates this artificial memory to man's so-called psychical and interior memory, to truth, to the simulacrum and simulation of truth, etc. ( 1 9 8 6 , 1 0 7; emphasis added)

For Derrida, the significance of de Man's reading practice stems from its

method and not from its specific, textually anchored claims: de Man out-

lines a general strategy for thinking about the world as it is given, a strategy

that "in principle" furnishes the possibility of not separating memory as a

faculty of thought from its form in the world, as archivation, writing, tech-

nical mediation. Derrida's generalization thus involves two discrete stages:

(1) a movement outward from the Hegelian text to the text of the world or

textuality as such and (2) a jump from the explicitly textual structures of the

world (e.g., technical archives, etc.) to structures that allegedly break with

the metaphysics of textuality, that "have no common measure with those of

the past."

Despite the appearance it gives of moving beyond the textualist ontology,

however, Derrida's appropriation of de Man retains an extensive commit-

ment to phenomenological reduction. Paradoxical as it sounds, Derrida is

able to develop a coherent account of the passage from the first to the sec-

ond stage only by reimposing the very phenomenological bias de Man

works so hard to undermine: to open itself to world-structures that "have

no common measure with those of the past," deconstruction must rely on

the priority of thinking, precisely that phenomenological commitment most

strenuously under attack in de Manian deconstruction. For Derrida, in

short, only the act of a thinking subject can bridge the gap that distinguishes

contemporary technology from the traditional metaphysical text. His gener-

alization thus functions by substituting an account of the technical

modification of the contemporary text (in its role as surrogate subject) for a

robust analysis of technology itself.7

Viewed in this way, Derrida's attempted generalization of deconstruction

should be understood as imposing a violent reduction on de Man. Rather

than addressing the radical critique of phenomenal thought at work in de

Man's reading of Hegel, Derrida employs de Man's account of memory

solely as a means of revising Heidegger's conception of the purity of techne.

We thus discover a certain phenomenological imperialism underlying Der-

rida's appropriation of de Man. From Derrida's standpoint, even a reading

For Derrida, the significance of de Man's reading practice stems from its method and not from its specific, textually anchored claims: de Man out­ lines a general strategy for thinking about the world as it is given, a strategy that " in principle " furnishes the possibility of not separating memory as a faculty of thought from its form in the world, as archivation, writing, tech­ nical mediation. Derrida's generalization thus involves two discrete stages: ( 1 ) a movement outward from the Hegelian text to the text of the world or textuality as such and ( 2 ) a j ump from the explicitly textual structures of the world (e.g., technical archives, etc . ) to structures that allegedly break with the metaphysics of textuality, that " have no common measure with those of the past. " Despite the appearance it gives of moving beyond the textualist ontology, however, Derrida's appropriation of de Man retains an extensive commit­ ment to phenomenological reduction. Paradoxical as it sounds, Derrida is able to develop a coherent account of the passage from the first to the sec­ ond stage only by reimposing the very phenomenological bias de Man works so hard to undermine: to open itself to world-structures that " have no common measure with those of the past, " deconstruction must rely on the priority of thinking, precisely that phenomenological commitment most strenuously under attack in de Manian deconstruction. For Derrida, in short, only the act of a thinking subj ect can bridge the gap that distinguishes contemporary technology from the traditional metaphysical text. His gener­ alization thus functions by substituting an account of the technical modification of the contemporary text ( in its role as surrogate subj ect) for a robust analysis of technology itself? Viewed in this way, Derrida's attempted generalization of deconstruction should be understood as imposing a violent reduction on de Man. Rather than addressing the radical critique of phenomenal thought at work in de Man's reading of Hegel, Derrida employs de Man's account of memory solely as a means of revising Heidegger's conception of the purity of techne. We thus discover a certain phenomenological imperialism underlying Der­ rida's appropriation of de Man. From Derrida's standpoint, even a reading

132

132 * Embodying Technesis

like de Man's-a reading that thinks through or, more precisely, presents

the impossibility of thinking through the radical disjunction between Erin-

nerung and Geddichtnis-is beholden (to some minimal extent) to the onto-

logical force of thought. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that Derrida

can submit de Man's reading to a protocol that is irreducibly Heideggerian:

"There is no deconstruction which does not begin by tackling this problem-

atic or by preparing itself to tackle this problematic, and which does not

begin by again calling into question the dissociation between thought and

technology, especially when it has a hierarchical vocation, however secret,

subtle, sublime or denied it may be" (107). By instituting such an impera-

tive, Derrida effectively restricts the scope of de Man's argument to the phe-

nomenological frame of his own program for the cultural deployment of

deconstruction: viewed as a (subordinate) part of the neophenomenological

model of the thinking subject, de Man's radical deconstruction of textual

memory can only function as a local critical modification of the Heidegger-

ian approach.

What underwrites this imperializing appropriation is Derrida's "discov-

ery" of a "certain continuity" between the two disjoined forms of memory.

Perhaps we can measure the stakes of de Manian interpretation. It delineates

a gesture quite different from that of Heidegger by recalling that the relation

of Geddchtnis to technique, artifice, writing, the sign, etc., could not be one

of exteriority or heterogeneity. This amounts to saying that the exteriority or

the division, the dis-junction, is the relation, the essential juncture between

thinking memory and the so-called techno-scientific, indeed literary outside.

... I would say that this gesture is quite different from Heidegger's and that

it gives rise to quite different intonations. .. On the side of deconstruction,

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Em bod y i n g

Technesis

like de Man's-a reading that thinks through or, more precisely, presents the impossibility of thinking through the radical disj unction between Erin­ nerung and Gedachtnis-is beholden (to some minimal extent) to the onto­ logical force of thought. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that Derrida can submit de Man's reading to a protocol that is irreducibly Heideggerian: "There is no deconstruction which does not begin by tackling this problem­ atic or by preparing itself to tackle this problematic, and which does not begin by again calling into question the dissociation between thought and technology, especially when it has a hierarchical vocation, however secret, subtle, sublime or denied it may be" ( 1 0 7 ) . By instituting such an impera­ tive, Derrida effectively restricts the scope of de Man's argument to the phe­ nomenological frame of his own program for the cultural deployment of deconstruction: viewed as a ( subordinate ) part of the neophenomenological model of the thinking subj ect, de Man's radical deconstruction of textual memory can only function as a local critical modification of the Heidegger­ ian approach. What underwrites this imperializing appropriation is Derrida's " discov­ ery " of a "certain continuity " between the two disjoined forms of memory.

if this can be said, and in its de Manian form, a certain continuity (within the

disjunctive structure) between thinking memory and techno-scientific mem-

ory does not exclude, but, on the contrary, permits a thinking of the essence

of technology, a thinking which it is not within the logic of deconstruction to

renounce. This is why deconstruction, at the very moment when it puts in

question the hierarchical division between thought and technology, is neither

technicist nor technological. (109-10; final emphasis added)

The continuity Derrida distills from de Man's reading allows him to deter-

mine technology on the model of the supplement. Within the space sutured

by the "essential juncture" of thinking memory and the "techno-

scientific/literary outside," technology simply supplements thought with a

material basis without which it could not function. That is why deconstruc-

tion permits, and indeed requires, a (nontechnicist) "thinking of the essence

of technology." By refunctionalizing the "disjunction" between Geddichtnis

Perhaps we can measure the stakes of de Manian interpretation. It delineates a gesture quite different from that of Heidegger by recalling that the relation of Gedachtnis to technique, artifice, writing, the sign, etc., could not be one of exteriority or heterogeneity. This amounts to saying that the exteriority or the division, the dis-j unction, is the relation, the essential j uncture between thinking memory and the so-called techno-scientific, indeed literary outside . . . . I would say that this gesture is quite different from Heidegger's and that it gives rise to quite different intonations . . . . On the side of deconstruction, if this can be said, and in its de Manian form, a certain continuity (within the disj unctive structure) between thinking memory and techno-scientific mem­ ory does not exclude, but, on the contrary, permits a thinking of the essence of technology, a thinking which it is not within the logic of deconstruction to renounce. This is why deconstruction, at the very moment when it puts in question the hierarchical division between thought and technology, is neither technicist nor technological. ( 1 09-1 0; final emphasis added)

The continuity Derrida distills from de Man's reading allows him to deter­ mine technology on the model of the supplement. Within the space sutured by the "essential juncture " of thinking memory and the " techno­ scientific/literary outside, " technology simply supplements thought with a material basis without which it could not function. That is why deconstruc­ tion permits, and indeed requires, a (nontechnicist) " thinking of the essence of technology. " By refunctionalizing the " disj unction" between Gedachtnis

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 133

and Erinnerung in a way that compromises its radicality, Derrida is able to

read it as a local critique of Heidegger, rather than a radical critique of the

onto-phenomenological subject and of the priority of thinking as such.

In the form Derrida here gives it, deconstruction is therefore placed in the

paradoxical position of being more Heideggerian than Heidegger's own

onto-phenomenology: following the "closure of representation," technol-

ogy is made wholly coequivalent with the supplement and thus loses its truly

radical force as a material obstacle to the onto-phenomenological move-

ment of thought, a threat to thinking itself. In this way, Derrida's general-

ization of deconstruction brings to a culmination the linguistic reduction of

technology (technesis) that remained a source of so much ambivalence for

Heidegger. In the end, Derrida's critique establishes the necessity of invok-

ing deconstruction as a means-indeed the sole means-of accomplishing

Heidegger's goal of thinking the essence of technology. Only deconstruc-

tion, Derrida proclaims, has the power to think technology's (impure)

essence.

Accordingly, the "disjunctive juncture" that Derrida attributes to de

Man comprises the fundamental principle of the generalization of decon-

struction necessary for opening deconstruction to the field of culture. By

evaluating de Man's reading only insofar as it "tackles" or "prepares to

tackle" Heidegger's dissociation, Derrida presents it as an exemplary

instance of the operative role deconstruction plays in opening thought to the

world. On this model of disjunctive juncture, deconstruction acquires its

role in cultural critique from its suturing function: the cultural application

Derrida proposes functions by suturing a concrete deconstructive figure (the

heterogeneity of Erinnerung and Geddichtnis) with a phenomenologically

determined horizon or field of application. By modeling the relationship of

thinking to technology on the disjunctive juncture between thought and its

material support, Derrida effectively naturalizes the subordination of tech-

nology to thought in a way that collapses the two discrete stages in his gen-

eralization of de Man's Hegel reading. The ensuing reduction of technology

becomes the precondition that enables the movement from the first stage

(the expansion of the de Manian disjunction from Hegel's text to textuality

as such) to the second stage (the jump from textual structures to technolo-

gies that "have no common measure" with textualized forms of technolog-

ical archivation). Effectively then, Derrida's account of technology in the

cultural field relies on a metalepsis formally analogous to the one that struc-

tures Heidegger's text: technology undergoes an initial textual reduction

that is subsequently effaced through the imposition of a textualist ontology

of differance. Ultimately at stake in Derrida's advocacy for a "certain

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133

and Erinnerung in a way that compromises its radicality, Derrida is able to read it as a local critique of Heidegger, rather than a radical critique of the onto-phenomenological subj ect and of the priority of thinking as such. In the form Derrida here gives it, deconstruction is therefore placed in the paradoxical position of being more Heideggerian than Heidegger's own onto-phenomenology: following the "closure of representation, " technol­ ogy is made wholly coequivalent with the supplement and thus loses its truly radical force as a material obstacle to the onto-phenomenological move­ ment of thought, a threat to thinking itself. In this way, Derrida's general­ ization of deconstruction brings to a culmination the linguistic reduction of technology (technesis ) that remained a source of so much ambivalence for Heidegger. In the end, Derrida's critique establishes the necessity of invok­ ing deconstruction as a means-indeed the sole means-of accomplishing Heidegger's goal of thinking the essence of technology. Only deconstruc­ tion, Derrida proclaims, has the power to think technology's (impure ) essence. Accordingly, the " disj unctive juncture" that Derrida attributes to de Man comprises the fundamental principle of the generalization of decon­ struction necessary for opening deconstruction to the field of culture. By evaluating de Man's reading only insofar as it " tackles" or "prepares to tackle " Heidegger's dissociation, Derrida presents it as an exemplary instance of the operative role deconstruction plays in opening thought to the world. On this model of disj unctive juncture, deconstruction acquires its role in cultural critique from its suturing function: the cultural application D errida proposes functions by suturing a concrete deconstructive figure (the heterogeneity of Erinnerung and Gedachtnis ) with a phenomenologically determined horizon or field of application. By modeling the relationship of thinking to technology on the disj unctive juncture between thought and its material support, Derrida effectively naturalizes the subordination of tech­ nology to thought in a way that collapses the two discrete stages in his gen­ eralization of de Man's Hegel reading. The ensuing reduction of technology becomes the precondition that enables the movement from the first stage (the expansion of the de Manian disj unction from Hegel's text to textuality as such ) to the second stage (the jump from textual structures to technolo­ gies that " have no common measure " with textualized forms of technolog­ ical archivation ) . Effectively then, Derrida's account of technology in the cultural field relies on a metalepsis formally analogous to the one that struc­ tures Heidegger's text: technology undergoes an initial textual reduction that is subsequently effaced through the imposition of a textualist ontology of dif{erance. Ultimately at stake in Derrida's advocacy for a "certain

134

134 * Embodying Technesis

continuity" between Erinnerung and Gedichtnis is nothing less than the

possibility of constraining technology to the form of textual supplement-

the very locus of deconstruction's resonance among contemporary techno-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

continuity " between Erinnerung and Gedachtnis is nothing less than the possibility of constraining technology to the form of textual supplement­ the very locus of deconstruction's resonance among contemporary techno­ cultural critics.

cultural critics.

Allegory as Radical Disjunction: De Man's Resistance

to Heidegger

In appropriating de Man as the source of the disjunctive juncture of tech-

nology with thought, Derrida assumes the ready assimilation of de Man's

account of Gedichtnis into the phenomenological field. Given de Man's

constant opposition of the linguistic and the phenomenal, however, there is

Allegory as Radical Disj unction: De M an's Resistance to H eidegger

much reason to question such an assumption.8 To do so, let us consider Der-

rida's treatment of de Man-and de Man's reading of Hegel-in more

detail.

In "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics" (1982), de Man ostensibly

seeks to clarify both the determination of beauty as "the sensory appearance

of the idea" and the general symbolic theory of art that it articulates. His

ultimate goal, however, is a critical indictment of all symbolic aesthetics for

failing to recognize the cognitive breakdown implicit in Hegel's theory. Ulti-

mately, this task amounts to demonstrating how the Hegelian system

itself-the dialectical forward progress of thought-requires a material (and

aesthetic) supplement, what de Man (following Hegel) calls "allegory." To

assess the plausibility of Derrida's appropriation, we must then ask whether

his onto-phenomenological account can encompass allegory in the sense de

Man (and Hegel) lend it.

By way of contextualizing this question, let me briefly sketch de Man's

reading of Hegel, beginning with his analysis of the complicity of sign and

subject that Hegel develops in the Encyclopedia. The distinction of sign and

symbol, de Man contends, exactly parallels the distinction between thinking

subject and sensing subject: "Just as the sign refuses to be in the service of

sensory perceptions [as the symbol is] but uses them instead for its own pur-

poses, thought, unlike perception, appropriates the world and literally 'sub-

jects' it to its own powers" (1982, 767). Yet because it derives from the gen-

erality of language, this freedom of the sign and of thought at once threatens

to annihilate the respective moment of origin of both sign and thought. Cit-

ing Hegel's own (in)famous pronouncement that "we cannot say anything

in language that is not general," de Man draws the following conclusion:

"Thus the sign, random and singular at its first position, turns into symbol

In appropriating de Man as the source of the disj unctive juncture of tech­ nology with thought, Derrida assumes the ready assimilation of de Man's account of Gedachtnis into the phenomenological field. Given de Man's constant opposition of the linguistic and the phenomenal, however, there is much reason to question such an assumption. 8 To do so, let us consider Der­ rida's treatment of de Man-and de Man's reading of Hegel-in more detail. In " Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics" ( 1 9 8 2 ) , de Man ostensibly seeks to clarify both the determination of beauty as " the sensory appearance of the idea" and the general symbolic theory of art that it articulates. His ultimate goal, however, is a critical indictment of all symbolic aesthetics for failing to recognize the cognitive breakdown implicit in Hegel's theory. Ulti­ mately, this task amounts to demonstrating how the Hegelian system itself-the dialectical forward progress of thought-requires a material ( and aesthetic ) supplement, what de Man ( following Hegel) calls " allegory. " To assess the plausibility of D errida's appropriation, we must then ask whether his onto-phenomenological account can encompass allegory in the sense de Man ( and Hegel) lend it. By way of contextualizing this question, let me briefly sketch de Man's reading of Hegel, beginning with his analysis of the complicity of sign and subj ect that Hegel develops in the Encyclopedia. The distinction of sign and symbol, de Man contends, exactly parallels the distinction between thinking subj ect and sensing subj ect: "Just as the sign refuses to be in the service of sensory perceptions [as the symbol is] but uses them instead for its own pur­ poses, thought, unlike perception, appropriates the world and literally 'sub­ j ects' it to its own powers " ( 1 9 8 2 , 76 7 ) . Yet because it derives from the gen­ erality of language, this freedom of the sign and of thought at once threatens to annihilate the respective moment of origin of both sign and thought. Cit­ ing Hegel's own (in)famous pronouncement that "we cannot say anything in language that is not general, " de Man draws the following conclusion: "Thus the sign, random and singular at its first position, turns into symbol

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 135

just as the I, so singular in its independence from anything that is not itself,

becomes in the general thought of logic, the most inclusive, plural, general,

and impersonal of subjects" (768).

In a reading that almost exactly reproduces the "sense-certainty" section

of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, de Man goes on to develop the paradox

of the subject-the fact that the "I" is at once what is most particular to

"me" and what is common to all forms of human being. When sense-cer-

tainty, pointing to itself, says "I am this," it cannot say what it wants to say,

since the very act of calling itself "this" requires that it act as a grammatical

"I"-in other words, as the very antithesis of a particular "this." This initial

paradox of the subject, de Man concludes, poses an "inescapable obstacle"

to the Hegelian system.

Thus, at the very onset of the entire system, in the preliminary consideration

of the science of logic, an inescapable obstacle threatens the entire construc-

tion that follows. The philosophical I is . . . self-effacing in the much more

radical sense that the position of the I, which is the condition for thought,

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135

j ust as the I, so singular in its independence from anything that is not itself, becomes in the general thought of logic, the most inclusive, plural, general, and impersonal of subj ects " ( 76 8 ) . In a reading that almost exactly reproduces the " sense-certainty " section of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, de Man goes on to develop the paradox of the subj ect-the fact that the " I " is at once what is most particular to "me" and what is common to all forms of human being. When sense-cer­ tainty, pointing to itself, says "I am this, " it cannot say what it wants to say, since the very act of calling itself "this " requires that it act as a grammatical "I"-in other words, as the very antithesis of a particular " this. " This initial paradox of the subj ect, de Man concludes, poses an " inescapable obstacle" to the Hegelian system.

implies its eradication, not, as in Fichte, as the symmetrical position of its

negation but as the undoing, the erasure of any relationship, logical or oth-

erwise, that could be conceived between what the I is and what it says it is.

The very enterprise of thought seems to be paralyzed from the start. It can

only get under way if the knowledge that renders it impossible, the knowl-

edge that the linguistic position of the I is only possible if the I forgets what

it is (namely, I), if this knowledge is itself forgotten. (769)

As de Man goes on to note, Hegel's own passage constitutes a performative

example of this necessity and in the process points forward to the role of the

aesthetic (and specifically to Hegel's own introduction of allegory): it "for-

gets its own statement . . . by describing the predicament it states, which is

a logical difficulty devoid of any phenomenal.., dimension, as if it were an

event in time, a narrative" (769).

Having outlined the paradox of the subject, de Man introduces the neces-

sity for an aesthetic defense against the self-erasure of thinking in Hegel.

Insofar as it furnishes the illusion of a reconciliation between saying and

meaning, the aesthetic of the symbol covers over the fundamental obstacle

Thus, at the very onset of the entire system, in the preliminary consideration of the science of logic, an inescapable obstacle threatens the entire construc­ tion that follows . The philosophical I is . . . self-effacing in the much more radical sense that the position of the I, which is the condition for thought, implies its eradication, not, as in Fichte, as the symmetrical position of its negation but as the undoing, the erasure of any relationship, logical or oth­ erwise, that could be conceived between what the I is and what it says it is. The very enterprise of thought seems to be paralyzed from the start. It can only get under way if the knowledge that renders it impossible, the knowl­ edge that the linguistic position of the I is only possible if the I forgets what it is (namely, I), if this knowledge is itself forgotten. (769 )

that language poses to Hegel's dialectical system. De Man argues that it is

therefore "an ideological, and not a theoretical construct, a defense against

the logical necessity inherent in a theoretical disclosure" (771). Readers

familiar with the later de Man will recognize in this appeal to ideology the

prelude to an introduction of the "material." Having demonstrated the

impossibility of a dialectics of interiorization (Erinnerung), the "command-

ing metaphor" of Hegel's entire program, de Man asks "whether the

As de Man goes on to note, Hegel's own passage constitutes a performative example of this necessity and in the process points forward to the role of the aesthetic ( and specifically to Hegel's own introduction of allegory ) : it " for­ gets its own statement . . . by describing the predicament it states, which is a logical difficulty devoid of any phenomenal . . . dimension, as if it were an event in time, a narrative " ( 769 ) . Having outlined the paradox o f the subj ect, de Man introduces the neces­ sity for an aesthetic defense against the self-erasure of thinking in Hegel. Insofar as it furnishes the illusion of a reconciliation between saying and meaning, the aesthetic of the symbol covers over the fundamental obstacle that language poses to Hegel's dialectical system. De Man argues that it is therefore " an ideological, and not a theoretical construct, a defense against the logical necessity inherent in a theoretical disclosure " ( 77 1 ) . Readers familiar with the later de Man will recognize in this appeal to ideology the prelude to an introduction of the " material. " Having demonstrated the impossibility of a dialectics of interiorization (Erinnerung), the " command­ ing metaphor " of Hegel's entire program, de Man asks " whether the

136

136 * Embodying Technesis

external manifestation of the idea . . . indeed occurs in the mode of recol-

lection [Erinnerung]," or if-on the contrary-the mind "leaves a material

trace upon the world" in which the sensory manifestation of the idea can

take place (771).

To demonstrate that the latter is the case, and to bind the problematic of

language more closely to that of thought, de Man turns to Hegel's discus-

sion of memory in the Encyclopedia. The function of Hegel's account of

memory almost exactly parallels that of his treatment of the subject. In

order for the mind to advance on its dialectical path, it must forget what it

has earlier interiorized. The progression from perception to thought is itself

operated by a movement from the kind of memory (i.e., recollection, or

Erinnerung) characteristic of phenomenal experience to a kind of memory

(Gedichtnis) that can only be identified with the mechanical order of gram-

mar. Gedichtnis stands opposed to Erinnerung: while the latter operates the

interiorization of meaning, the former, as the faculty of memorization, or

learning by heart, requires, according to de Man, that meaning be forgotten

and words be "read as if they were a mere list of names" (772). In de Man's

view, this incompatibility of Erinnerung and Gedichtnis, like the earlier dis-

cussed incompatibilities of saying and meaning and of sign and symbol,

leads to a cognitive impasse that once again occasions an aesthetic defense:

"Memory [Gedichtnis] effaces remembrance (or recollection) just as the I

effaces itself. The faculty that enables thought to exist also makes its preser-

vation impossible. The art, the techne, of writing which cannot be separated

from thought and from memorization can only be preserved in the figural

mode of the symbol, the very mode it has to do away with if it is to occur at

all" (773).

With this third demonstration of the Hegelian impasse, however, de Man

is able to articulate the negative truth of the aesthetic. "The idea," he con-

cludes, "makes its sensory appearance, in Hegel, as the material inscription

of names" (772). In the process of being committed to writing (i.e., to

Gedichtnis), the idea becomes a thing of the past, something that can never

be recaptured by interiorizing thought, or Erinnerung. The movement from

remembrance to memory, from thought to writing, installs a radical dis-

junction between thought (the phenomenal) and its content (the idea mate-

rially inscribed in words). Gedichtnis, for de Man, remains radically sepa-

rated from thinking; this is why he says that memory (material inscription)

cannot be preserved in thought.

Given such a radical disjunction, the question then surfaces as to how the

impossible progression from perception to thought (impossible, that is,

from the phenomenal standpoint of consciousness) is nevertheless possible.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

external manifestation of the idea . . . indeed occurs in the mode of recol­ lection [Erinnerung] , " or if-on the contrary-the mind " leaves a material trace upon the world" in which the sensory manifestation of the idea can take place ( 77 1 ) . To demonstrate that the latter i s the case, and to bind the problematic of language more closely to that of thought, de Man turns to Hegel's discus­ sion of memory in the Encyclopedia. The function of Hegel's account of memory almost exactly parallels that of his treatment of the subj ect. In order for the mind to advance on its dialectical path, it must forget what it has earlier interiorized. The progression from perception to thought is itself operated by a movement from the kind of memory ( i . e . , recollection, or Erinnerung) characteristic of phenomenal experience to a kind of memory ( Gedachtnis) that can only be identified with the mechanical order of gram­ mar. Gedachtnis stands opposed to Erinnerung: while the latter operates the interiorization of meaning, the former, as the faculty of memorization, or learning by heart, requires, according to de Man, that meaning be forgotten and words be " read as if they were a mere list of names" (772 ) . In de Man's view, this incompatibility of Erinnerung and Gedachtnis, like the earlier dis­ cussed incompatibilities of saying and meaning and of sign and symbol, leads to a cognitive impasse that once again occasions an aesthetic defense: " Memory [Gedachtnis] effaces remembrance ( or recollection) just as the I effaces itself. The faculty that enables thought to exist also makes its preser­ vation impossible. The art, the techne, of writing which cannot be separated from thought and from memorization can only be preserved in the figural mode of the symbol, the very mode it has to do away with if it is to occur at all " ( 773 ) . With this third demonstration of the Hegelian impasse, however, de Man is able to articulate the negative truth of the aesthetic. " The idea, " he con­ cludes, "makes its sensory appearance, in Hegel, as the material inscription of names " ( 772 ) . In the process of being committed to writing (i.e., to Gedachtnis) , the idea becomes a thing of the past, something that can never be recaptured by interiorizing thought, or Erinnerung. The movement from remembrance to memory, from thought to writing, installs a radical dis­ junction between thought (the phenomenal) and its content (the idea mate­ rially inscribed in words ) . Gedachtnis, for de Man, remains radically sepa­ rated from thinking; this is why he says that memory (material inscription) cannot be preserved in thought. Given such a radical disj unction, the question then surfaces as to how the impossible progression from perception to thought (impossible, that is, from the phenomenal standpoint of consciousness) is nevertheless possible.

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 137

The answer de Man gives is, of course, through allegory, that linguistic

function absolutely heterogeneous to phenomenal thinking: ". . . allegory

narrates 'the separation or disarticulation of subject from predicate [die

Trennung von Subjekt und Prdidikat].' For discourse to be meaningful, this

separation has to take place, yet it is incompatible with the necessary gener-

ality of all meaning. Allegory functions, categorically and logically, like the

defective cornerstone of the entire system" (775). The linguistic category of

allegory permits the movement from Erinnerung to Gedichtnis, the mater-

ial inscription of the (thence forgotten) idea. Consequently, allegory permits

the elaboration of the symbolic theory of art.

As I have noted, Derrida's generalization of deconstruction centers on the

status of his "juncturing" of de Man's "disjunction"-in other words, on its

compatibility with "allegory." To play de Man against Heidegger, Derrida

is compelled to bracket Erinnerung and to inscribe its incompatibility with

Gedichtnis within the space of Gedichtnis itself; he argues that de Man's

example serves to establish "that the relation of Gedichtnis to technique,

artifice, writing, the sign, etc., could not be one of pure exteriority or het-

erogeneity" (1986, 109). Despite its superficial resemblance to de Man's

own statement that Gedichtnis "cannot be separated" from writing, Der-

rida's interpretation ignores de Man's introduction of the "material"-a

category that, I suggest, holds the relation of radical exteriority with respect

to phenomenological thought or consciousness (i.e., Erinnerung). When

Derrida junctures the disjunction of thought and technology, he submits this

exteriority to a relativizing reduction by introducing something that is not

present in de Man: the synthesizing thought-act (noetic or technetic act) of

a (textualized) consciousness. Only such a supplemental act can juncture or

suture the exteriority of the "material" and "thinking memory": "the exte-

riority of the division, the dis-junction," claims Derrida, "is the relation, the

essential juncture between thinking memory and the so-called techno-sci-

entific, indeed literary outside" (109; emphasis added). With this supple-

mental technetic act, the disjunction is captured in the form of a technema

(or text), and-as in the Hegelian march of the Spirit-the exteriority of the

material simply loses its exteriority: it is eaten up by textualizing spirit on its

forward march toward the total techno-textualization of the world.

Whereas Derrida pursues a grammato-phenomenological (and ultimately

very Hegelian) dissolution of the obstacles posed by the disjunction between

memory and technology, de Man focuses on the problematic of presenta-

tion-how it is that Hegel's text can say the impossible. Not only does this

difference explain the distinct textual practices of these two "fathers" of

deconstruction, but it points to a fundamental disparity between their

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137

The answer de Man gives is, of course, through allegory, that linguistic function absolutely heterogeneous to phenomenal thinking: " . . . allegory narrates 'the separation or disarticulation of subj ect from predicate [die Trennung von Subjekt und Pradikat] . ' For discourse to be meaningful, this separation has to take place, yet it is incompatible with the necessary gener­ ality of all meaning. Allegory functions, categorically and logically, like the defective cornerstone of the entire system " ( 775 ) . The linguistic category of allegory permits the movement from Erinnerung to Gedachtnis, the mater­ ial inscription of the (thence forgotten) idea. Consequently, allegory permits the elaboration of the symbolic theory of art. As I have noted, Derrida' s generalization of deconstruction centers on the status of his "j uncturing " of de Man's " disj unction"-in other words, on its compatibility with " allegory . " To play de Man against Heidegger, Derrida is compelled to bracket Erinnerung and to inscribe its incompatibility with Gedachtnis within the space of Gedachtnis itself; he argues that de Man's example serves to establish " that the relation of Gedachtnis to technique, artifice, writing, the sign, etc., could not be one of pure exteriority or het­ erogeneity " ( 1 9 8 6, 1 09 ) . Despite its superficial resemblance to de Man's own statement that Gedachtnis "cannot be separated " from writing, Der­ rida's interpretation ignores de Man's introduction of the " material "-a category that, I suggest, holds the relation of radical exteriority with respect to phenomenological thought or consciousness ( i . e . , Erinnerung). When D errida j unctures the disj unction of thought and technology, he submits this exteriority to a relativizing reduction by introducing something that is not present in de Man: the synthesizing thought-act (noetic or technetic act) of a (textualized) consciousness. Only such a supplemental act can j uncture or suture the exteriority of the "material " and " thinking memory " : " the exte­ riority of the division, the dis-j unction, " claims Derrida, " is the relation, the essential juncture between thinking memory and the so-called techno-sci­ entific, indeed literary outside " ( 1 09; emphasis added) . With this supple­ mental technetic act, the disj unction is captured in the form of a technema ( or text), and-as in the Hegelian march of the Spirit-the exteriority of the material simply loses its exteriority: it is eaten up by textualizing spirit on its forward march toward the total techno-textualization of the world. Whereas Derrida pursues a grammato-phenomenological ( and ultimately very Hegelian ) dissolution of the obstacles posed by the disj unction between memory and technology, de Man focuses on the problematic of presenta­ tion-how it is that Hegel' s text can say the impossible. Not only does this difference explain the distinct textual practices of these two " fathers" of deconstruction, but it points to a fundamental disparity between their

138

138 * Embodying Technesis

respective conceptions of thought. For de Man, thought is rigorously asso-

ciated with phenomenal consciousness (Erinnerung), which means that the

allegorical presentation of thought, its "material inscription," must remain

fundamentally heterogeneous and inaccessible to it; deconstruction, more-

over, is just the name for this radical heterogeneity, and the task of the (de

Manian) deconstructive critic is to mark the negative moment in particular

texts where thought and its inscription (or presentation) become disjoined.

For Derrida, by contrast, textual structures characterize not only texts in the

material sense but also consciousness itself; consequently, on his account,

there can be no radical divide between the phenomenal structure of memory

and the material-linguistic structure of the text. The aspect of the de Man-

ian disjunction that is important for Derrida is thus the separation of textual

memory, or Gedichtnis (which, for him, is simply another way of saying

Erinnerung), and its technical "outside." Since neither can be radically exte-

rior to thought, this disjunction is itself a relation of thought and technol-

ogy. The hope of thinking the "totality of our relation to the world" there-

fore remains alive for Derrida, because-despite the lack of "common

measure" with the unfolding of the world in the past-the technologized

structures of memory in the world simply are identical with the structures of

Gedichtnis.

This identity allows us to grasp in the clearest possible manner the reduc-

tive phenomenological background of Derrida's proposed generalization of

deconstruction. In order for us to think of the outside as a supplement, we

must presuppose that the world is as it is accessible for us, that the real is the

representable, that technology can be encompassed by techne. This remains

the case, moreover, despite the complication presented to each of these

claims by the Derridian motif of relative exteriority. One need not deny that

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

respective conceptions of thought. For de Man, thought is rigorously asso­ ciated with phenomenal consciousness (Erinnerung), which means that the allegorical presentation of thought, its " material inscription, " must remain fundamentally heterogeneous and inaccessible to it; deconstruction, more­ over, is just the name for this radical heterogeneity, and the task of the ( de Manian) deconstructive critic is to mark the negative moment in particular texts where thought and its inscription ( or presentation) become disjoined. For Derrida, by contrast, textual structures characterize not only texts in the material sense but also consciousness itself; consequently, on his account, there can be no radical divide between the phenomenal structure of memory and the material-linguistic structure of the text. The aspect of the de Man­ ian disjunction that is important for Derrida is thus the separation of textual memory, or Gedachtnis (which, for him, is simply another way of saying Erinnerung), and its technical " outside. " Since neither can be radically exte­ rior to thought, this disj unction is itself a relation of thought and technol­ ogy. The hope of thinking the "totality of our relation to the world" there­ fore remains alive for Derrida, because-despite the lack of " common measure " with the unfolding of the world in the past-the technologized structures of memory in the world simply are identical with the structures of

technoscientific archivation extends the textualization of the world in order

to resist the stronger conclusion that such a determination encompasses the

totality of the outside of the world. By assuming that it does, Derrida's pro-

ject furnishes an endorsement of Heidegger's machine metaphor that only

serves to strengthen its final determination in the figure of the Gestell: tech-

nology reduced to a (mere) means of storage.

To resist this tacit endorsement and the wholesale reduction that it

fortifies, we must grasp its ultimate consequence: the implicit yet profoundly

reductive idealization of the world that results from Derrida's assimilation

of Heidegger's dissociation of thinking memory and technology into the

figure of the supplement. No matter how fundamentally it purges con-

sciousness of its traditional attributes, Gedichtnis continues to perform the

function of consciousness insofar as it serves to mediate our relation to the

Gedachtnis. This identity allows us to grasp in the clearest possible manner the reduc­ tive phenomenological background of Derrida's proposed generalization of deconstruction. In order for us to think of the outside as a supplement, we must presuppose that the world is as it is accessible for us, that the real is the representable, that technology can be encompassed by techne. This remains the case, moreover, despite the complication presented to each of these claims by the Derridian motif of relative exteriority. One need not deny that techno scientific archivation extends the textualization of the world in order to resist the stronger conclusion that such a determination encompasses the totality of the outside of the world. By assuming that it does, Derrida's pro­ j ect furnishes an endorsement of Heidegger's machine metaphor that only serves to strengthen its final determination in the figure of the Gestell: tech­ nology reduced to a (mere) means of storage . To resist this tacit endorsement and the wholesale reduction that it fortifies, we must grasp its ultimate consequence: the implicit yet profoundly reductive idealization of the world that results from Derrida's assimilation of Heidegger's dissociation of thinking memory and technology into the figure of the supplement. No matter how fundamentally it purges con­ sciousness of its traditional attributes, Gedachtnis continues to perform the function of consciousness insofar as it serves to mediate our relation to the

The Mech a n i cs of Deconstru ction

The Mechanics of Deconstruction * 139

world through thinking. Moreover, despite Derrida's claim that it lacks any

intrinsic "common measure" with the totality of past technological media-

tion of memory, the so-called technoscientific outside can only be accessed

through this neophenomenological faculty of Gedichtnis, whose structure

is derived explicitly from the traditional metaphysical text. To put it in Der-

ridean terms, there can be no deconstructive reading of Heidegger without

the possibility of framing the world as text. Only within such a textual

unity, no matter how heterogeneous its content appears, can the world take

shape as contaminating differance. Accordingly, at those moments when

Derrida contends that the world is differance or, alternatively, that dif-

ferance is in the world, we can be sure that the text-world homology will

have always already been activated. Moreover, if the world is presentable

only as a trace structure, bearing within itself the potential for meaning,

deconstruction does not have it within its logic, as Derrida might say, to

avoid Heidegger's trademark epoche, his reduction of the world to "some-

thing" reconcilable with the phenomenological category of meaning. Like

Heidegger, Derrida must in the end determine the world (narrowly) as

"something" that gives itself to thinking.

Memory and Cultural Studies

My critical account of Derrida's appropriation of de Man has served to

show that his proposed generalization of deconstruction comes only at the

cost of a reductive allegiance to the phenomenological model of thought. To

preserve the possibility of thinking about the technological outside, Derrida

is compelled to model this outside on the textual structures of thought itself

and to impose an act of a textualized consciousness as the constitutive prin-

ciple for the disjunctive juncture constituting the principle of his generaliza-

•

139

world through thinking. Moreover, despite Derrida's claim that it lacks any intrinsic " common measure" with the totality of past technological media­ tion of memory, the so-called technoscientific outside can only be accessed through this neophenomenological faculty of Gedach tnis, whose structure is derived explicitly from the traditional metaphysical text. To put it in Der­ ridean terms, there can be no deconstructive reading of Heidegger without the possibility of framing the world as text. Only within such a textual unity, no matter how heterogeneous its content appears, can the world take shape as contaminating diffirance. Accordingly, at those moments when D errida contends that the world is diffirance or, alternatively, that dif­ firance is in the world, we can be sure that the text-world homology will have always already been activated. Moreover, if the world is presentable only as a trace structure, bearing within itself the potential for meaning, deconstruction does not have it within its logic, as D errida might say, to avoid Heidegger's trademark epoche, his reduction of the world to " some­ thing" reconcilable with the phenomenological category of meaning. Like Heidegger, Derrida must in the end determine the world (narrowly) as " something " that gives itself to thinking.

tion. Given both the homology Derrida asserts between text and world and

the synthetic function he accords textualization, all distinction between

Gedichtnis and Erinnerung disappears, leaving thinking memory with the

quasi-sacred status of postmodern subject-effect.

This sacralization of thinking memory constitutes a metaphysics of the

Memory and Cultural Studies

contemporary age that, as I have repeatedly suggested, underpins contempo-

rary media and cultural studies. In their fetishization of representation, con-

temporary discourses of cultural constructionism betray a deeply rooted,

though perhaps largely unconscious, allegiance to Derrida's generalization of

deconstruction. This allegiance is particularly clear in the case of cultural

studies of technology. Not only does the task of such cultural study remain

My critical account of Derrida's appropriation of de Man has served to show that his proposed generalization of deconstruction comes only at the cost of a reductive allegiance to the phenomenological model of thought. To preserve the possibility of thinking about the technological outside, Derrida is compelled to model this outside on the textual structures of thought itself and to impose an act of a textualized consciousness as the constitutive prin­ ciple for the disj unctive juncture constituting the principle of his generaliza­ tion. Given both the homology Derrida asserts between text and world and the synthetic function he accords textualization, all distinction between Gedachtnis and Erinnerung disappears, leaving thinking memory with the quasi-sacred status of postmodern subj ect-effect. This sacralization of thinking memory constitutes a metaphysics of the contemporary age that, as I have repeatedly suggested, underpins contempo­ rary media and cultural studies. In their fetishization of representation, con­ temporary discourses of cultural constructionism betray a deeply rooted, though perhaps largely unconscious, allegiance to Derrida's generalization of deconstruction. This allegiance is particularly clear in the case of cultural studies of technology. Not only does the task of such cultural study remain

1 40

140 * Embodying Technesis

that of thinking technology, but it also presupposes some form of phenome-

nologizing memory whose function is precisely to open the space in which

technology can be thought. Technocultural critics who follow the represen-

tationalist program cannot avoid sanctioning a version of the same machine

metaphor that is at work in Heidegger (and Aristotle)-the reduction of tech-

nology to a function within thought. This commitment insures that technol-

ogy will have always already been reduced to the form of representation-

text-in which it gives itself to thinking memory.

Derrida's impulse to generalize deconstruction is to be commended, but

since deconstruction's relevance in an age of cultural studies depends on a

movement beyond the restricted literary text and beyond textualism as such,

that impulse must also be checked. To be successful in reconceptualizing the

cultural studies of technology, we must move, with de Man, beyond the

bounds of Derridian grammato-phenomenology. Adapting de Man's indict-

ment of the aesthetic, we might say that Derrida's juncture constitutes a

defense against the radical exteriority or materiality not simply of allegori-

cal memory but of technology or technological worldliness itself. As I shall

argue when I return to it in chapter 9, the radical disjunction de Man posits

between Erinnerung and Geddichtnis allows us to overcome this defensive

reaction formation. In so doing, it comprises a crucial step in the evolution

of a poststructurally smart, nonreductive account of technology's impact on

human experience.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

that of thinking technology, but it also presupposes some form of phenome­ nologizing memory whose function is precisely to open the space in which technology can be thought. Technocultural critics who follow the represen­ tationalist program cannot avoid sanctioning a version of the same machine metaphor that is at work in Heidegger (and Aristotle)-the reduction of tech­ nology to a function within thought. This commitment insures that technol­ ogy will have always already been reduced to the form of representation­ text-in which it gives itself to thinking memory. Derrida's impulse to generalize deconstruction is to be commended, but since deconstruction's relevance in an age of cultural studies depends on a movement beyond the restricted literary text and beyond textualism as such, that impulse must also be checked. To be successful in reconceptualizing the cultural studies of technology, we must move, with de Man, beyond the bounds of Derridian grammato-phenomenology. Adapting de Man's indict­ ment of the aesthetic, we might say that Derrida's juncture constitutes a defense against the radical exteriority or materiality not simply of allegori­ cal memory but of technology or technological worldliness itself. As I shall argue when I return to it in chapter 9, the radical disj unction de Man posits between Erinnerung and Gedachtnis allows us to overcome this defensive reaction formation. In so doing, it comprises a crucial step in the evolution of a poststructurally smart, nonreductive account of technology's impact on human experience .

Interlude 1

Psyche and Metaphor: Derrida's Freud

In chapter 5, I exposed the complicity of Derrida's proposed generalization

of deconstruction with the phenomenological category of memory (or

Interlude 1

memorial thought). On the basis of an appropriative misreading of de Man,

Derrida was able to develop a powerful and influential-though unfortu-

nately also reductive-model for thinking technology. In the form given it

by Derrida, this model serves as the basis for the technetic approach that has

Psyche and Metaphor: Derrida's Freud

retained hegemony following what I would call the "technocultural turn" in

the theory and criticism of media, science, and technology. In particular, it

is Derrida's localization of technology within thought that prepares the

metaphysical ground for the identification of language and technology so

central to contemporary constructivist critical idioms. As long as contem-

porary technocultural criticism retains this reductive genealogy of technol-

ogy, it cannot evade an extensive commitment to the very sacralization of

thinking memory we discovered in Derrida's reading of de Man.

To address further complications introduced by this commitment, we

must now expand our consideration of memory to another disciplinary site

equally central for assessing the genealogy of contemporary cultural criti-

cism. I make no exaggeration in claiming that Freud's rich theoretical work,

and particularly his evolving model of memory, furnishes a touchstone of

sorts for many a current effort to evaluate technology's impact on the sub-

ject. In its various forms, Freud's model of the psyche has been appropriated

by critical practitioners of all sorts, including the film-apparatus theorists of

In chapter 5, I exposed the complicity of Derrida's proposed generalization of deconstruction with the phenomenological category of memory ( or memorial thought ) . On the basis of an appropriative misreading of de Man, D errida was able to develop a powerful and influential-though unfortu­ nately also reductive-model for thinking technology. In the form given it by Derrida, this model serves as the basis for the technetic approach that has retained hegemony following what I would call the " technocultural turn" in the theory and criticism of media, science, and technology. In particular, it

the 1970s, feminist film and cultural critics, post-Lacanian ideology critics,

postcolonial critics, and post-Althusserian Marxists like Jameson. In my

opinion, the appeal of the Freudian psyche as a model for subjective agency

stems from its capacity to unite two central concerns of contemporary crit-

ics: (1) a strong sense of the anthropological basis of the subject and (2) a

sophisticated understanding of the internal divisions inseparable from the

process of subject constitution. Accordingly, Freud's conception allows for

a highly complicated understanding of technology's impact on the psyche,

which nonetheless does not eschew its worldliness. For neo-Freudian critics,

is Derrida's localization of technology within thought that prepares the metaphysical ground for the identification of language and technology so central to contemporary constructivist critical idioms . As long as contem­ porary technocultural criticism retains this reductive genealogy of technol­ ogy, it cannot evade an extensive commitment to the very sacralization of thinking memory we discovered in Derrida's reading of de Man. To address further complications introduced by this commitment, we must now expand our consideration of memory to another disciplinary site equally central for assessing the genealogy of contemporary cultural criti­ cism. I make no exaggeration in claiming that Freud's rich theoretical work, and particularly his evolving model of memory, furnishes a touchstone of sorts for many a current effort to evaluate technology's impact on the sub­ j ect. In its various forms, Freud's model of the psyche has been appropriated by critical practitioners of all sorts, including the film-apparatus theorists of the 1 9 70s, feminist film and cultural critics, post-Lacanian ideology critics, postcolonial critics, and post-Althusserian Marxists like Jameson. In my opinion, the appeal of the Freudian psyche as a model for subj ective agency stems from its capacity to unite two central concerns of contemporary crit­ ics: ( 1 ) a strong sense of the anthropological basis of the subj ect and ( 2 ) a sophisticated understanding of the internal divisions inseparable from the process of subj ect constitution. Accordingly, Freud's conception allows for a highly complicated understanding of technology's impact on the psyche, which nonetheless does not eschew its worldliness. For neo-Freudian critics,

142

142 * Embodying Technesis

the machine merges two crucial functions: it constitutes both a descriptive

model and a materialization of the psyche. As the externalization of psychic

space, the machine plays an integral role in the constitution of the subject,

lending it worldly support for its ontogenetic dialectic.

For all the momentous cultural and theoretical significance of the

unconscious as a radical deterritorialization of cognition, however, con-

temporary theory's allegiance to psychoanalysis largely reproduces those

limitations we discovered in our analysis of its commitment to phenome-

nology: once again, materiality or exteriority is subordinated to the onto-

genetic (or presentational) role of what can still be termed the thinking

subject. Despite this common motif, however, the shift from Heideggerian

to Freudian ground does mark a progressive step within my genealogical

reconstruction of the twentieth-century history of cultural studies of tech-

nology. In Freud (and in neo-Freudian modes of criticism), we encounter

an effort to work through (rather than surmount) the eclipse of the unified

subject of philosophy. Whereas Heidegger can only bemoan thinking

under the grip of technology as inauthentic, and whereas Derrida can only

invert this valuation, Freud seeks to diagnose the modification of the sub-

ject that results from its encounter with technological modernization.

More specifically, Freud considers the impact of the technologized life-

world insofar as it penetrates into, and subsequently exteriorizes, the psy-

che. In this sense Freud furnishes a much needed antidote to the philo-

sophical discourse of modernity: he fruitfully counterbalances the

grandiose and abstract gestures of Heidegger and his followers with a

healthy tinge of concreteness.

The Mind-Machine Analogy

Given Derrida's central role in refunctionalizing deconstruction for cultural

critique, it will come as little surprise to find in him an ad hoc spokesman

for the theoretical appeal that Freud exercises among so many contempo-

rary cultural critics. In his early essay "Freud and the Scene of Writing,"

Derrida traces the evolution of the various Freudian models of the psyche

from the 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology to the "mystic writing

pad" of the 1920s (Derrida 1978, 196-231). Focusing on Freud's recourse

to machinic metaphors for the mind, Derrida argues that the evolution in

the Freudian model witnesses an increasing convergence between the psyche

and its technological analoga. For Freud, this convergence reaches its apex

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

the machine merges two crucial functions: it constitutes both a descriptive model and a materialization of the psyche. As the externalization of psychic space, the machine plays an integral role in the constitution of the subj ect, lending it worldly support for its ontogenetic dialectic. For all the momentous cultural and theoretical significance of the unconscious as a radical deterritorialization of cognition, however, con­ temporary theory's allegiance to psychoanalysis largely reproduces those limitations we discovered in our analysis of its commitment to phenome­ nology: once again, materiality or exteriority is subordinated to the onto­ genetic (or presentational ) role of what can still be termed the thinking subj ect. Despite this common motif, however, the shift from Heideggerian to Freudian ground does mark a progressive step within my genealogical reconstruction of the twentieth-century history of cultural studies of tech­ nology. In Freud ( and in neo-Freudian modes of criticism ) , we encounter an effort to work through ( rather than surmount) the eclipse of the unified subj ect of philosophy. Whereas Heidegger can only bemoan thinking under the grip of technology as inauthentic, and whereas Derrida can only invert this valuation, Freud seeks to diagnose the modification of the sub­ j ect that results from its encounter with technological modernization. More specifically, Freud considers the impact of the technologized life­ world insofar as it penetrates into, and subsequently exteriorizes, the psy­ che . In this sense Freud furnishes a much needed antidote to the philo­ sophical discourse of modernity: he fruitfully counterbalances the grandiose and abstract gestures of Heidegger and his followers with a healthy tinge of concreteness.

The Mind-M achine Analogy

Given Derrida's central role in refunctionalizing deconstruction for cultural critique, it will come as little surprise to find in him an ad hoc spokesman for the theoretical appeal that Freud exercises among so many contempo­ rary cultural critics. In his early essay " Freud and the Scene of Writing, " Derrida traces the evolution of the various Freudian models of the psyche from the 1 8 95 Project for a Scientific Psychology to the "mystic writing pad" of the 1 920s (Derrida 1 9 7 8 , 1 9 6-2 3 1 ) . Focusing on Freud's recourse to machinic metaphors for the mind, Derrida argues that the evolution in the Freudian model witnesses an increasing convergence between the psyche and its technological analoga. For Freud, this convergence reaches its apex

Psyche and Metap hor

Psyche and Metaphor * 143

in the mystic writing pad-"a slab of dark brown resin or wax" over which

"is laid a thin transparent sheet" (Freud 1963, 209). The mystic pad embod-

ies the dual function of memory: like consciousness, the top sheet can be

cleared of its inscriptions, and thus it represents the infinite capacity for per-

ception; like the unconscious, the underlying slab retains traces after they

have been cleared from the top sheet. By combining these functions, the

mystic writing pad furnishes a metaphor for the psyche that finally meets the

dual requirement (of capacity and retention) motivating Freud's theory

from its earliest systematic form.

Still, from Freud's perspective, the mystic writing pad remains a

metaphor, since the convergence it presents-of psyche and machine-must

at some point come to an end. Freud acknowledges that it is limited by an

internal deficiency-namely, the difference separating a dead metaphor

from a living system.

We need not be disturbed by the fact that in the Mystic Pad no use is made

of the permanent traces of the notes that have been received; it is enough that

they are present. There must come a point at which the analogy between an

auxiliary apparatus of this kind and the organ which is its prototype will

cease to apply. It is true, too, that once the writing has been erased, the Mys-

•

143

in the mystic writing pad- " a slab of dark brown resin or wax" over which " is laid a thin transparent sheet " (Freud 1 9 6 3 , 209 ) . The mystic pad embod­ ies the dual function of memory: like consciousness, the top sheet can be cleared of its inscriptions, and thus it represents the infinite capacity for per­ ception; like the unconscious, the underlying slab retains traces after they have been cleared from the top sheet. By combining these functions, the mystic writing pad furnishes a metaphor for the psyche that finally meets the dual requirement (of capacity and retention) motivating Freud's theory from its earliest systematic form. Still, from Freud' s perspective, the mystic writing pad remains a metaphor, since the convergence it presents-of psyche and machine-must at some point come to an end. Freud acknowledges that it is limited by an internal deficiency-namely, the difference separating a dead metaphor from a living system.

tic Pad cannot "reproduce" it from within; it would be a mystic pad indeed

if, like our memory, it could accomplish that. (211; emphasis added)

The originality of Derrida's reading lies precisely in his rejection of this

Freudian restriction. For Derrida, the mind-machine analogy is not simply

one analogy among others but-like the heliotropic metaphor from Der-

rida's "White Mythology"-the analogy that founds the psychic system as

such. Machines like the mystic pad can represent the psyche precisely

because they embody it. Consequently, Derrida alleges, the psyche itself is

nothing but the operation of the machine we call "representation": with its

necessary reliance on the deferral of presence, the psyche instantiates the

very essence of the machine-an essence embodied in the historically con-

We need not be disturbed by the fact that in the Mystic Pad no use is made of the permanent traces of the notes that have been received; it is enough that they are present. There must come a point at which the analogy between an

auxiliary apparatus of this kind and the organ which is its prototype will cease to apply. It is true, too, that once the writing has been erased, the Mys­ tic Pad cannot " reproduce " it from within; it would be a mystic pad indeed if, like our memory, it could accomplish that. ( 2 1 1 ; emphasis added)

crete technology of the mystic writing pad. As Derrida explains, the "two-

handed operation" of the mystic pad (one hand writes on the surface while

another periodically raises the top sheet) is itself, in its essence, the move-

ment that produces psychic life.

Traces thus produce the space of their inscription only by acceding to the

period of their erasure. From the beginning, in the "present" of their first

impression, they are constituted by the double force of repetition and era-

sure, legibility and illegibility. A two-handed machine, a multiplicity of agen-

cies or origins-is this not the original relation to the other and the original

The originality of Derrida' s reading lies precisely in his rej ection of this Freudian restriction. For Derrida, the mind-machine analogy is not simply one analogy among others but-like the heliotropic metaphor from Der­ rida's "White Mythology "-the analogy that founds the psychic system as such. Machines like the mystic pad can represent the psyche precisely because they embody it. Consequently, Derrida alleges, the psyche itself is nothing but the operation of the machine we call " representation " : with its necessary reliance on the deferral of presence, the psyche instantiates the very essence of the machine-an essence embodied in the historically con­ crete technology of the mystic writing pad. As Derrida explains, the " two­ handed operation" of the mystic pad (one hand writes on the surface while another periodically raises the top sheet) is itself, in its essence, the move­ ment that produces psychic life. Traces thus produce the space of their inscription only by acceding to the period of their erasure. From the beginning, in the " present" of their first impression, they are constituted by the double force of repetition and era­ sure, legibility and illegibility. A two-handed machine, a multiplicity of agen­ cies or origins-is this not the original relation to the other and the original

144

144 * Embodying Technesis

temporality of writing, its "primary" complication: an originary spacing,

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

temporality of writing, its " primary " complication: an ongmary spacing, deferring, and erasure of the simple origin, and polemics on the very thresh­ old of what we persist in calling perception ? ( 1 9 78, 226)

deferring, and erasure of the simple origin, and polemics on the very thresh-

old of what we persist in calling perception? (1978, 226)

An actual worldly machine capable of modeling the process of psychic pro-

duction, the writing pad furnishes a metaphor not just for the intrapsychical

functioning of the mind but for the ontogenesis of the psyche itself. It com-

prises nothing less than the ontic embodiment of differance.

The Reduction of Technology

Derrida's liberation of the machine from its Freudian devaluation has far-

An actual worldly machine capable of modeling the process of psychic pro­ duction, the writing pad furnishes a metaphor not just for the intrapsychical functioning of the mind but for the ontogenesis of the psyche itself. It com­ prises nothing less than the ontic embodiment of differance.

reaching consequences for the traditional question concerning technology.

Once it is no longer possible to isolate the machine from thinking memory as

the dead metaphor of a living system, technology cannot simply be opposed

to psyche. Rather, it comes to function as an essential part of the very move-

The Reduction of Technology

ment that generates psychic life. It comes to be introduced, as Derrida puts it,

"within the psyche." This introduction requires two stages. The machine and

representation must first be rendered homologous, and the function of tech-

nology must be made coequivalent with that of psychic representation. Only

then can the machine find a role within the psyche. The hinge articulating the

two is the concept of death. When he argues that both machine and represen-

tation are, from an ontological standpoint, dead, Derrida installs the very

same machine reduction of technology we discovered in our earlier investiga-

tion of Heidegger. In Derrida's argument, however, the essence of technology

is not the poietic showing of Being but representation itself.

That the machine does not run by itself means something else: a mechanism

without its own energy. The machine is dead. It is death. Not because we risk

Derrida's liberation of the machine from its Freudian devaluation has far­ reaching consequences for the traditional question concerning technology. Once it is no longer possible to isolate the machine from thinking memory as the dead metaphor of a living system, technology cannot simply be opposed to psyche. Rather, it comes to function as an essential part of the very move­ ment that generates psychic life. It comes to be introduced, as Derrida puts it,

"within the psyche. " This introduction requires two stages. The machine and

death in playing with machines, but because the origin of machines is the

relation to death.... But what was to run by itself was the psyche and not its

imitation or mechanical representation. For the latter does not live. Repre-

sentation is death. Which may be immediately transformed into the follow-

ing proposition: death is (only) representation. (1978, 227)

As the embodiment or materialization of representation and everything

bound up with it (difference, delay, etc.), the machine functions to interrupt

the pure spontaneity of memory and thus to generate psychic life. Derrida

thus argues that the localization of technology within the psyche is simply the

consequence of Freud's untapped insight into the complicity of life and death.

All that Freud had thought about the unity of life and death, however, should

have led him to ask other questions here .... Freud does not explicitly exam-

representation must first be rendered homologous, and the function of tech­ nology must be made coequivalent with that of psychic representation. Only then can the machine find a role within the psyche. The hinge articulating the two is the concept of death. When he argues that both machine and represen­ tation are, from an ontological standpoint, dead, Derrida installs the very same machine reduction of technology we discovered in our earlier investiga­ tion of Heidegger. In Derrida's argument, however, the essence of technology is not the poietic showing of Being but representation itself. That the machine does not run by itself means something else: a mechanism without its own energy. The machine is dead. It is death. Not because we risk death in playing with machines, but because the origin of machines is the relation to death . . . . But what was to run by itself was the psyche and not its imitation or mechanical representation. For the latter does not live. Repre­ sentation is death. Which may be immediately transformed into the follow­ ing proposition: death is ( only) representation. ( 1 9 78, 227)

As the embodiment or materialization of representation and everything bound up with it (difference, delay, etc . ) , the machine functions to interrupt the pure spontaneity of memory and thus to generate psychic life. Derrida thus argues that the localization of technology within the psyche is simply the consequence of Freud's untapped insight into the complicity of life and death. All that Freud had thought about the unity of life and death, however, should have led him to ask other questions here . . . . Freud does not explicitly exam-

Psyche and Metap hor

Psyche and Metaphor * 145

ine the status of the "materialized" supplement which is necessary to the

alleged spontaneity of memory, even if that spontaneity were differentiated

in itself, thwarted by a censorship or repression which, moreover, could not

act on a perfectly spontaneous memory. Far from the machine being a pure

absence of spontaneity, its resemblance to a psychical apparatus, its existence

and its necessity bear witness to the finitude of the mnemic spontaneity which

is thus supplemented. The machine-and, consequently, representation-is

death and finitude within the psyche. (227-28)

•

145

ine the status of the "materialized " supplement which is necessary to the alleged spontaneity of memory, even if that spontaneity were differentiated in itself, thwarted by a censorship or repression which, moreover, could not act on a perfectly spontaneous memory. Far from the machine being a pure absence of spontaneity, its resemblance to a psychical apparatus, its existence and its necessity bear witness to the finitude of the mnemic spontaneity which is thus supplemented. The machine-and, consequently, representation-is death and finitude within the psyche. (227-2 8 )

From Derrida's perspective, the psyche cannot be fundamental, for it owes

its constitution and operation to death-death as difference, as the technical

supplement that produces the periodicity responsible for opening the space

of the psychic. Since the complication of psyche and machine is more pro-

found than Freud admits, their resemblance cannot be restricted to a merely

external analogy. The machine resembles the psyche not simply from the

outside but in the sense that it is death and finitude within the psyche.

Given Derrida's articulation of machine, representation, and death, we

can now understand why he addresses Freud's contribution to the question

concerning technology solely through the textuality of the psyche. This

focus, as Derrida explicitly claims, reflects the "metaphoric investment" of

Freud's text-Freud's commitment to a double claim that "[p]sychical con-

tent will be represented by a text whose essence is irreducibly graphic" and

that "the structure of the psychical apparatus will be represented by a writ-

ing machine" (199). Nonetheless, if Derrida's deconstruction of this

"metaphoric investment" re-poses the question concerning technology in

fundamentally new terms, it does so only at the cost of a crippling adherence

to the machine reduction. Rather than asking if technology is a kind of text,

Derrida simply assumes that it is, in order to pursue a far more dogmatic

line of interrogation.

We shall not have to ask if a writing apparatus-for example, the one

described in the "Note on the Mystic Writing Pad"-is a good metaphor for

representing the working of the psyche, but rather what apparatus we must

create in order to represent psychical writing; and we shall have to ask what

the imitation, projected and liberated in a machine, of something like psychi-

cal writing might mean. And not if the psyche [and its technical supplement]

is indeed a kind of text, but: what is a text, and what must the psyche be if it

can be represented by a text? (199)

For Derrida, the psyche is a textual effect, not in the trivial sense that it is

only language, but rather because it is founded on writing-on the opera-

tion of differance, the marking of intervals by the "two-handed machine."

For this reason, the machine can function, like the heliotropic metaphor of

From Derrida's perspective, the psyche cannot b e fundamental, for it owes its constitution and operation to death-death as difference, as the technical supplement that produces the periodicity responsible for opening the space of the psychic. Since the complication of psyche and machine is more pro­ found than Freud admits, their resemblance cannot be restricted to a merely external analogy. The machine resembles the psyche not simply from the outside but in the sense that it is death and finitude within the psyche. Given Derrida's articulation of machine, representation, and death, we can now understand why he addresses Freud's contribution to the question concerning technology solely through the textuality of the psyche. This focus, as Derrida explicitly claims, reflects the "metaphoric investment " of Freud's text-Freud's commitment to a double claim that " [p ] sychical con­ tent will be represented by a text whose essence is irreducibly graphic " and that " the structure of the psychical apparatus will be represented by a writ­ ing machine" ( 1 99 ) . Nonetheless, if Derrida's deconstruction of this " metaphoric investment" re-poses the question concerning technology in fundamentally new terms, it does so only at the cost of a crippling adherence to the machine reduction. Rather than asking if technology is a kind of text, D errida simply assumes that it is, in order to pursue a far more dogmatic line of interrogation. We shall not have to ask if a wntmg apparatus-for example, the one described in the "Note on the Mystic Writing Pad "-is a good metaphor for representing the working of the psyche, but rather what apparatus we must create in order to represent psychical writing; and we shall have to ask what the imitation, projected and liberated in a machine, of something like psychi­ cal writing might mean. And not if the psyche [and its technical supplement] is indeed a kind of text, but: what is a text, and what must the psyche be if it

can be represented by a text? ( 1 9 9 ) For Derrida, the psyche i s a textual effect, not i n the trivial sense that i t is only language, but rather because it is founded on writing-on the opera­ tion of dif(erance, the marking of intervals by the " two-handed machine. " For this reason, the machine can function, like the heliotropic metaphor of

146

146 * Embodying Technesis

"White Mythology," as a founding metaphor: it is at once both a represen-

tative of the psyche and the technical supplement that opens its domain.

Thus Derrida concludes, "For if there is neither machine nor text without

psychical origin, there is no domain of the psychic without text" (199). We

might add that there is also no such domain without machine.

With this conclusion, we can begin to fathom the constraint imposed on

contemporary cultural criticism through its extensive allegiance, via Der-

rida, to a radicalized version of Freud's mind-machine analogy. The gener-

alized identification of machine and psychic writing beyond the restricted

domain of analogy effectively compels the reduction of technology to tech-

nical forms of memory. Accordingly, the liberation of the machine devel-

oped by Derrida and perpetuated in contemporary criticism entails an initial

and massive sacrifice of technological materiality that institutes the govern-

ing metalepsis of Derrida's textualization of Freud: by imposing such a

sacrifice, Derrida can subordinate the autonomy and worldliness of techni-

cal machines to their function within psychic life.

Not unlike his reading of de Man, this metalepsis operates a conflation of

representation and the real into two relatively differentiated categories of

thought, two different metaphorical registers that he reductively character-

izes as the "rhetorical" and the "solid" metaphors, respectively. Just as it

did in the appropriation of de Man, Derrida's reduction of the material

exteriority of the real into a rhetorical category is intended to carry out a

generalization of deconstruction beyond the narrow confines of the meta-

physical text. At stake once again is a movement from a narrowly textual

understanding of the machine to a more fundamental (ontogenetic) interac-

tion between thinking and worldly technology. Derrida writes:

Nor does Freud examine the possibility of this machine, which, in the world,

has at least begun to resemble memory, and increasingly resembles it more

closely. Its resemblance to memory is closer than that of the innocent Mystic

Pad: the latter is no doubt infinitely more complex than slate or paper, less

archaic than a palimpsest; but, compared to other machines for storing

archives, it is a child's toy. This resemblance-i.e., necessarily a certain

Being-in-the-world of the psyche-did not happen to memory from without,

any more than death surprises life. It founds memory. (228)

By transposing the mind-machine relation from the restricted rhetorical

domain to the material domain and by replacing the reflective category of

analogy with the productive function of resemblance, Derrida in effect

determines technology as a form of memory, or more exactly, as its enabling

supplement.

Not surprisingly, this transposition serves to conceal the extensive met-

aleptic reduction of the real that lies behind Derrida's effort to generalize

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

"White Mythology, " as a founding metaphor: it is at once both a represen­ tative of the psyche and the technical supplement that opens its domain. Thus Derrida concludes, " For if there is neither machine nor text without psychical origin, there is no domain of the psychic without text " ( 1 99 ) . We might add that there is also no such domain without machine. With this conclusion, we can begin to fathom the constraint imposed on contemporary cultural criticism through its extensive allegiance, via Der­ rida, to a radicalized version of Freud's mind-machine analogy. The gener­ alized identification of machine and psychic writing beyond the restricted domain of analogy effectively compels the reduction of technology to tech­ nical forms of memory. Accordingly, the liberation of the machine devel­ oped by Derrida and perpetuated in contemporary criticism entails an initial and massive sacrifice of technological materiality that institutes the govern­ ing metalepsis of Derrida's textualization of Freud : by imposing such a sacrifice, Derrida can subordinate the autonomy and worldliness of techni­ cal machines to their function within psychic life. Not unlike his reading of de Man, this metalepsis operates a conflation of representation and the real into two relatively differentiated categories of thought, two different metaphorical registers that he reductively character­ izes as the " rhetorical" and the " solid" metaphors, respectively. Just as it did in the appropriation of de Man, Derrida's reduction of the material exteriority of the real into a rhetorical category is intended to carry out a generalization of deconstruction beyond the narrow confines of the meta­ physical text. At stake once again is a movement from a narrowly textual understanding of the machine to a more fundamental ( ontogenetic) interac­ tion between thinking and worldly technology. Derrida writes: Nor does Freud examine the possibility of this machine, which, in the world, has at least begun to resemble memory, and increasingly resembles it more closely. Its resemblance to memory is closer than that of the innocent Mystic Pad: the latter is no doubt infinitely more complex than slate or paper, less archaic than a palimpsest; but, compared to other machines for storing archives, it is a child's toy. This resemblance-i . e . , necessarily a certain Being-in-the-world of the psyche-did not happen to memory from without, any more than death surprises life. It founds memory. (22 8 )

B y transposing the mind-machine relation from the restricted rhetorical domain to the material domain and by replacing the reflective category of analogy with the productive function of resemblance, Derrida in effect determines technology as a form of memory, or more exactly, as its enabling supplement. Not surprisingly, this transposition serves to conceal the extensive met­ aleptic reduction of the real that lies behind Derrida's effort to generalize

Psyche and Metap hor . 147

Psyche and Metaphor * 147

Freud's model for cultural application. By founding the rhetorical metaphor

(and the order of analogy) on the so-called solid metaphor (and the order of

resemblance), Derrida effectively collapses the heterogeneity between the

two categories. In the process, moreover, he obfuscates all traces of the

material exteriority that is a constitutive element of the solid metaphor. Like

Heidegger, he substitutes a distinction relative to the register of representa-

tion for an opposition between radically distinct registers (the representa-

tional and the real). Accordingly, the transposition of one metaphoric regis-

ter into the other, which comprises the operative principle of Derrida's

generalization, requires a prior reduction of the technological real-the ini-

tial act of inscribing it as the solid metaphor. Derrida writes:

Metaphor as a rhetorical or didactic device is possible here only through the

solid metaphor, the "unnatural," historical production of a supplementary

machine, added to the psychical organization in order to supplement its

Freud's model for cultural application. By founding the rhetorical metaphor ( and the order of analogy) on the so-called solid metaphor ( and the order of resemblance ) , Derrida effectively collapses the heterogeneity between the two categories. In the process, moreover, he obfuscates all traces of the material exteriority that is a constitutive element of the solid metaphor. Like Heidegger, he substitutes a distinction relative to the register of representa­ tion for an opposition between radically distinct registers (the representa­ tional and the real ) . Accordingly, the transposition of one metaphoric regis­ ter into the other, which comprises the operative principle of Derrida's generalization, requires a prior reduction of the technological real-the ini­ tial act of inscribing it as the solid metaphor. Derrida writes:

finitude. The very idea of finitude is derived from the movement of this sup-

plementarity. The historico-technical production of this metaphor which sur-

vives individual (that is, generic) psychical organization, is of an entirely dif-

ferent order than the production of an intrapsychical metaphor, assuming

that the latter exists (to speak about it is not enough for that), and whatever

bond the two metaphors may maintain between themselves. (228)

By construing the operation of actual machines exclusively through the

rhetorical category of the solid metaphor, Derrida betrays a deep allegiance

to the machine reduction of technology. As the material supplement to

thought, the concept of technology exemplified by the solid metaphor has

already undergone the metaleptic reversal constitutive of technesis.

Rather than generalizing deconstruction beyond textuality, then, Derrida's

interpretation simply expands the jurisdiction of the textual reduction of tech-

nology. Through his proposed generalization, technology remains, in its

Metaphor as a rhetorical or didactic device is possible here only through the solid metaphor, the " unnatural, " historical production of a supplementary machine, added to the psychical organization in order to supplement its finitude . The very idea of finitude is derived from the movement of this sup­ plementarity. The historico-technical production of this metaphor which sur­ vives individual (that is, generic) psychical organization, is of an entirely dif­ ferent order than the production of an intrapsychical metaphor, assuming that the latter exists ( to speak about it is not enough for that) , and whatever bond the two metaphors may maintain between themselves. (22 8 )

essence, a means of archivation, of information storage; only now, in the post-

Freudian era, it finds itself spread over global dimensions.1 Stripped of all hints

of autonomy, of a proper materiality, technology-as the materialization of

the world's resemblance to memory-is made to fit within a teleological his-

tory of the psyche and its ontogenetic production of thought and memory.

Integrated into the textually given play of the world, technology comprises

nothing more than a support for the Being-in-the-world of the psyche.2

Beyond the Machine Reduction

Despite the reduction it ends up imposing, Derrida's effort to open thought

to the material outside effectively plants the seeds for the undoing of the

B y construing the operation o f actual machines exclusively through the rhetorical category of the solid metaphor, Derrida betrays a deep allegiance to the machine reduction of technology. As the material supplement to thought, the concept of technology exemplified by the solid metaphor has already undergone the metaleptic reversal constitutive of technesis. Rather than generalizing deconstruction beyond textuality, then, Derrida's interpretation simply expands the jurisdiction of the textual reduction of tech­ nology. Through his proposed generalization, technology remains, in its essence, a means of archivation, of information storage; only now, in the post­ Freudian era, it finds itself spread over global dimensions. 1 Stripped of all hints of autonomy, of a proper materiality, technology-as the materialization of the world's resemblance to memory-is made to fit within a teleological his­ tory of the psyche and its ontogenetic production of thought and memory. Integrated into the textually given play of the world, technology comprises nothing more than a support for the Being-in-the-world of the psyche.2

Beyond the M achine Reduction

Despite the reduction it ends up imposing, Derrida's effort to open thought to the material outside effectively plants the seeds for the undoing of the

148

148 * Embodying Technesis

ontogenetic approach. Once broached, technological materiality resists cap-

ture within the field of metaphor, even when the latter is thought through

ontologically, as it is in Derrida's conception of solid metaphor. This fact

highlights the significant difference between Derrida's neo-Freudian concep-

tion of metaphor and the more famous account he furnishes in "White

Mythology"-a difference that is concretely bound up with the advent of

technological modernity. While Derrida derives metaphoric supplementar-

ity from the heliotropic metaphor in "White Mythology," his reading of

Freud seeks to correlate differance with worldliness through machinic

embodiment. As a ground for the nonoriginary origin of metaphor, the

machine possesses a far more concrete and insistent material specificity than

does the sun. While the sun is originally nonnatural by dint of its necessary

discursive mediation, the machine is nonnatural in another, radically differ-

ent sense: it is the result of a mode of production that breaks with the order

of nature, that is, in Aristotle's sense, para physin (see chap. 3). With his

introduction of the machine, Derrida has in effect opened theory to a force

beyond its grasp.

For the generalization Derrida proposes to be successful, therefore, it

must break with textuality in a more radical way than he permits;

specifically, it must eschew the Greek model of techne and the ontological

understanding of metaphor that Derrida derives from it. In this sense,

"Freud and the Scene of Writing" stands at the crossroads of two tendencies

in Derrida's work-his commitment to an ontogenetic account of history

and his increasing awareness of a material dimension of worldliness. Insofar

as it shows these tendencies to be fundamentally incompatible, moreover,

Derrida's reading of Freud marks the immanent movement of deconstruc-

tion toward its own dissolution. In the end, therefore, Derrida finds himself

compelled to do precisely what he criticizes Freud for doing: like Freud, he

must limit the resemblance between mind and machine, though in the oppo-

site direction. Where Freud discounts the machine for its inability to gener-

ate life, Derrida encounters a machine that, so to speak, has too much life.

Accordingly, his restriction of technology to the mere support for the Being-

in-the-world of the psyche should be understood as a defensive gesture

designed to preserve the principle underlying the homology of differance

with the Freudian psyche: the resemblance between mind and machine.

Against such a gesture, we must ask whether post-Heideggerian, post-

Freudian questioning concerning technology must address the real opera-

tion of machines-not their role in the ontogenetic construction of thought.

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

ontogenetic approach. Once broached, technological materiality resists cap­ ture within the field of metaphor, even when the latter is thought through onto logically, as it is in Derrida's conception of solid metaphor. This fact highlights the significant difference between Derrida's neo-Freudian concep­ tion of metaphor and the more famous account he furnishes in "White Mythology"-a difference that is concretely bound up with the advent of technological modernity. While Derrida derives metaphoric supplementar­ ity from the heliotropic metaphor in "White Mythology, " his reading of Freud seeks to correlate differance with worldliness through machinic embodiment. As a ground for the nonoriginary origin of metaphor, the machine possesses a far more concrete and insistent material specificity than does the sun. While the sun is originally nonnatural by dint of its necessary discursive mediation, the machine is nonnatural in another, radically differ­ ent sense: it is the result of a mode of production that breaks with the order of nature, that is, in Aristotle's sense, para physin ( see chap. 3 ) . With his introduction of the machine, Derrida has in effect opened theory to a force beyond its grasp. For the generalization Derrida proposes to be successful, therefore, it must break with textuality in a more radical way than he permits; specifically, it must eschew the Greek model of techne and the ontological understanding of metaphor that Derrida derives from it. In this sense, " Freud and the Scene of Writing" stands at the crossroads of two tendencies in Derrida's work-his commitment to an ontogenetic account of history and his increasing awareness of a material dimension of worldliness. Insofar as it shows these tendencies to be fundamentally incompatible, moreover, Derrida's reading of Freud marks the immanent movement of deconstruc­ tion toward its own dissolution. In the end, therefore, Derrida finds himself compelled to do precisely what he criticizes Freud for doing: like Freud, he must limit the resemblance between mind and machine, though in the oppo­ site direction. Where Freud discounts the machine for its inability to gener­ ate life, Derrida encounters a machine that, so to speak, has too much life. Accordingly, his restriction of technology to the mere support for the Being­ in-the-world of the psyche should be understood as a defensive gesture designed to preserve the principle underlying the homology of dif{erance with the Freudian psyche: the resemblance between mind and machine. Against such a gesture, we must ask whether post-Heideggerian, post­ Freudian questioning concerning technology must address the real opera­ tion of machines-not their role in the ontogenetic construction of thought.

Part 3

Tracking the Technological Real

Part 3 Tracki n g the Tech n o l ogi cal Real



Chapter 6

Technology and External Experience:

Reconsidering Freud's Project for a

Scientific Psychology

Chapter 6

By demonstrating the dead end of the ontogenetic textualist approach, my

preceding criticism of Derrida's "Freud and the Scene of Writing" was

designed to indicate the urgency for a radically different reading of Freud,

one that would be capable of overcoming his own narrow focus on the

mind-machine analogy. In this chapter, I shall rehabilitate the role of exter-

nal experience beyond the narrow frame Freud accords it in his theory of the

death drive; in so doing, I shall re-pose the question concerning technology

in a manner that does not subordinate it to the project of representing the

Technology and External E x perience: Reconsidering Freud 's Project for a

Scien tific Psych ology

psyche through an "auxiliary memory aid." Once liberated from its ontoge-

netic subordination, the topic of external experience will furnish the basis

for a critical revision of Freud's understanding of technology-one that

breaks out of the psychic frame of reference in order to embrace the embod-

ied, corporeal dimension of technology's experiential impact.

By exposing the analytical necessity that compelled Freud to introduce

the death drive, I shall critically interrogate the source of the ontogenetic

reduction: the legislative power with which Freud invests theoretical specu-

lation. In concrete terms, I shall question Freud's implicit claim that the

death drive introduces radical exteriority into the psyche, and in the process,

I shall unpack the ontogenetic reduction that, I suggest, Freud imposed on

external experience in order to make room for the death drive.

Within the frame of Freud's evolution, of course, the death drive answers

a certain empirical challenge: it explains the persistent and troubling phe-

nomenon of traumatic repetition. To account for instances of repetition that

lacked any clearly identifiable psychic purpose, Freud found himself com-

pelled to confront the limitations of his hitherto dominant homeostatic view

of the psyche and to articulate the bivalent theory of energetics for which he

has been alternatively celebrated and taken to task.1 Since it counterbal-

ances the forces of life, the death drive serves to undermine the notion that

By demonstrating the dead end of the ontogenetic textualist approach, my preceding criticism of Derrida's " Freud and the Scene of Writing " was designed to indicate the urgency for a radically different reading of Freud, one that would be capable of overcoming his own narrow focus on the mind-machine analogy. In this chapter, I shall rehabilitate the role of exter­ nal experience beyond the narrow frame Freud accords it in his theory of the death drive; in so doing, I shall re-pose the question concerning technology in a manner that does not subordinate it to the project of representing the psyche through an " auxiliary memory aid. " Once liberated from its ontoge­ netic subordination, the topic of external experience will furnish the basis for a critical revision of Freud's understanding of technology-one that breaks out of the psychic frame of reference in order to embrace the embod­ ied, corporeal dimension of technology's experiential impact. By exposing the analytical necessity that compelled Freud to introduce the death drive, I shall critically interrogate the source of the ontogenetic reduction: the legislative power with which Freud invests theoretical specu­ lation. In concrete terms, I shall question Freud's implicit claim that the death drive introduces radical exteriority into the psyche, and in the process, I shall unpack the ontogenetic reduction that, I suggest, Freud imposed on external experience in order to make room for the death drive. Within the frame of Freud's evolution, of course, the death drive answers a certain empirical challenge: it explains the persistent and troubling phe­ nomenon of traumatic repetition. To account for instances of repetition that lacked any clearly identifiable psychic purpose, Freud found himself com­ pelled to confront the limitations of his hitherto dominant homeostatic view of the psyche and to articulate the bivalent theory of energetics for which he has been alternatively celebrated and taken to task. 1 Since it counterbal­ ances the forces of life, the death drive serves to undermine the notion that

152

152 * Embodying Technesis

living organisms are governed exclusively by internal forces tending toward

progressive or qualitative change. The death drive, in short, subjects the

individual organism to a collective, biological force that appears to be

located outside them.

By placing the psyche in close proximity to less complicated organisms,

the death drive would thus appear to undermine the ontogenetic privilege

Freud attributes to the psyche in his early metapsychological papers. Far

from being the result of some primarily internal psychic dialectic, the

"phenomena of organic development must," Freud contends, "be attrib-

uted to external disturbing and diverting influences" (Freud 1961, 32). He

continues:

In the last resort, what has left its mark on the development of organisms

must be the history of the earth we live in and of its relation to the sun. Every

modification which is thus imposed upon the course of the organism's life is

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

living organisms are governed exclusively by internal forces tending toward progressive or qualitative change. The death drive, in short, subj ects the individual organism to a collective, biological force that appears to be located outside them. By placing the psyche in close proximity to less complicated organisms, the death drive would thus appear to undermine the ontogenetic privilege Freud attributes to the psyche in his early meta psychological papers. Far from being the result of some primarily internal psychic dialectic, the " phenomena of organic development must, " Freud contends, " be attrib­ uted to external disturbing and diverting influences " ( Freud 1 9 6 1 , 3 2 ) . He continues:

accepted by the conservative organic instincts and stored up for further rep-

etition. Those instincts are therefore bound to give a deceptive appearance of

being forces tending towards change and progress, whilst in fact they are

merely seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths alike old and new. (32)

In the case of the human organism, such external modification takes place

through the process of repetition. By translating instinctual energy from the

primary process into the secondary process, repetition aims to ward off the

possibility of a traumatic impact of instinctual energy. It thus serves on the

side of life, as it were, since, as Freud argues, it both increases the complex-

ity of the organism and makes it possible for "the dominance of the pleasure

principle . . . to proceed unhindered" (29). Traumatic dreams can accord-

In the last resort, what has left its mark on the development of organisms must be the history of the earth we live in and of its relation to the sun. Every modification which is thus imposed upon the course of the organism's life is accepted by the conservative organic instincts and stored up for further rep­ etition. Those instincts are therefore bound to give a deceptive appearance of being forces tending towards change and progress, whilst in fact they are merely seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths alike old and new. ( 3 2 )

ingly be understood as the attempt by primary processes to bind, via a com-

pulsive repetition, the excess of freely mobile energy responsible for neuro-

sis: ". . . by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the

traumatic neurosis," writes Freud, they endeavor "to master the stimulus

retrospectively" (26).

If it is empirically undeniable that the death drive introduces a certain

dimension of exteriority into Freud's account of the psyche, further consid-

eration reveals a massive subordination of this exteriority to the overarch-

ing project of representing the psyche. When he grants repetition agency

over the organism's allegedly external modification, Freud imposes the

ontogenetic understanding of the psyche as the governing frame of his inter-

pretation in a way that compromises any more robust consideration of

external experience. Specifically, his understanding of the organism's exter-

nal modification through the mechanism of traumatic repetition subordi-

In the case of the human organism, such external modification takes place through the process of repetition. By translating instinctual energy from the primary process into the secondary process, repetition aims to ward off the possibility of a traumatic impact of instinctual energy. It thus serves on the side of life, as it were, since, as Freud argues, it both increases the complex­ ity of the organism and makes it possible for "the dominance of the pleasure principle . . . to proceed unhindered" (29 ) . Traumatic dreams can accord­ ingly be understood as the attempt by primary processes to bind, via a c om ­ pulsive repetition, the excess of freely mobile energy responsible for neuro­ sis: " . . . by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis, " writes Freud, they endeavor " to master the stimulus retrospectively " (26 ) . I f it i s empirically undeniable that the death drive introduces a certain dimension of exteriority into Freud's account of the psyche, further consid­ eration reveals a massive subordination of this exteriority to the overarch­ ing proj ect of representing the psyche. When he grants repetition agency over the organism's allegedly external modification, Freud imposes the ontogenetic understanding of the psyche as the governing frame of his inter­ pretation in a way that compromises any more robust consideration of external experience. Specifically, his understanding of the organism's exter­ nal modification through the mechanism of traumatic repetition subordi-

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience

Technology and External Experience * 153

nates the direct, physical impact of external stimuli to its necessarily subse-

quent impact on the psychic system. Whether caused by mechanical shocks

(the so-called war neuroses) or by lingering traces of infantile and early

childhood experience, trauma, for Freud, remains an unequivocally psychic

phenomenon: the experience of a stimulus that the psychic organism was

not prepared to handle. To the extent that it reflects certain reductive

aspects of Freud's model of the psyche,2 this subordination unequivocally

demonstrates that the origin of traumatic stimuli holds relatively little

importance for Freud, since it is designed solely to support a theory of psy-

chic economy.

Despite its apparent opening to external experience, then, the death drive

cannot underwrite a challenge to the ontogenetic reduction of exteriority

underlying Freud's theory. Consequently, if we are to succeed in rehabilitat-

ing external experience from its Freudian reduction, we must interrogate the

death drive in a context that allows us to circumscribe Freud's ontogenetic

standpoint. Following the lead of communications theorist Anthony

Wilden, we must criticize Freud's homeostatic model for its constitutive nar-

rowness. According to Wilden, what compelled Freud to develop the biva-

lent theory of energetics was nothing other than the poverty of his theoreti-

cal perspective. Lacking a concept of the psychic system's interaction with

its environment, Freud had no other recourse than to postulate a further

internal drive to account for phenomena that explicitly violated the psyche's

economy. Viewed in the light of systems theory, Freud's error stems from

his wholesale assimilation of environment into system, an assimilation that

occurs in two stages. The first involves the actual positing of the death drive

to account for something that stems from the relation of the psychic system

to its environment; the second seeks to account for this act of positing itself.

Since Freud has no concept of environment, this latter account can only

derive from the psychic system itself and thus implicates Freud in a radical

double bind. Wilden writes:

. . the psychoanalytical theory of repetition seems to be no more than the

tautologous product of theory's CONSTITUTIVE lack of context.... Being

innately paradoxical because of the inadequacy of its theoretical structure to

account for the vast field to which it is applied, the theory will do well to

identify all oscillations and repetitions as innate and universal characteristics

of its "object," rather than recognize them as its own products. (Wilden

1980, 134)

Freud's error perfectly exemplifies what Wilden glosses as the "projection of

a model derived from technology. .. into the social dimension" (129)-an

•

153

nates the direct, physical impact of external stimuli to its necessarily subse­ quent impact on the psychic system. Whether caused by mechanical shocks (the so-called war neuroses) or by lingering traces of infantile and early childhood experience, trauma, for Freud, remains an unequivocally psychic phenomenon: the experience of a stimulus that the psychic organism was not prepared to handle. To the extent that it reflects certain reductive aspects of Freud's model of the psyche,2 this subordination unequivocally demonstrates that the origin of traumatic stimuli holds relatively little importance for Freud, since it is designed solely to support a theory of psy­ chic economy. Despite its apparent opening to external experience, then, the death drive cannot underwrite a challenge to the ontogenetic reduction of exteriority underlying Freud's theory. Consequently, if we are to succeed in rehabilitat­ ing external experience from its Freudian reduction, we must interrogate the death drive in a context that allows us to circumscribe Freud's ontogenetic standpoint. Following the lead of communications theorist Anthony Wilden, we must criticize Freud's homeostatic model for its constitutive nar­ rowness. According to Wilden, what compelled Freud to develop the biva­ lent theory of energetics was nothing other than the poverty of his theoreti­ cal perspective. Lacking a concept of the psychic system's interaction with its environment, Freud had no other recourse than to postulate a further internal drive to account for phenomena that explicitly violated the psyche's economy. Viewed in the light of systems theory, Freud's error stems from his wholesale assimilation of environment into system, an assimilation that occurs in two stages. The first involves the actual positing of the death drive to account for something that stems from the relation of the psychic system to its environment; the second seeks to account for this act of positing itself. Since Freud has no concept of environment, this latter account can only derive from the psychic system itself and thus implicates Freud in a radical double bind. Wilden writes: . . . the psychoanalytical theory of repetition seems to be no more than the tautologous product of theory's CONSTITUTIVE lack of context . . . . Being innately paradoxical because of the inadequacy of its theoretical structure to account for the vast field to which it is applied, the theory will do well to identify all oscillations and repetitions as innate and universal characteristics of its " obj ect, " rather than recognize them as its own products . (Wilden 1 9 8 0, 1 3 4 )

Freud's error perfectly exemplifies what Wilden glosses a s the "proj ection of a model derived from technology . . . into the social dimension " ( 1 29 )-an

154

154 * Embodying Technesis

extremely compressed, yet still recognizable, version of what I have been

calling the machine reduction of technology. Indeed Freud seems to impose

what is in effect a double reduction, since, in addition to modeling exterior-

ity on a formal model of the psyche as technological system, he generates

this latter model on the basis of a reduction of technology to the figure of the

machine. By pointing to the fundamental reduction involved here-the

reduction of the social environment to the status of an epiphenomenon of

the (individual) psyche-Wilden's critique lays bare the profoundly reduc-

tive metalepsis at work in Freud's theory. Precisely because Freud lacks a

concept of the environment, his account can only work with exteriority in a

rarefied form-with a form of relative exteriority that is intrinsic to and gen-

erated by the system itself but that is nonetheless posited (and can only be

so posited) as emanating from the (phantom) environment.

To rehabilitate the role of external experience against this powerful

reduction, we must therefore consider Freud's account from an environ-

mental perspective rather than in terms of the individual psyche. By shifting

focus in this way, I shall bring a fresh perspective to a crucial element of

Freud's account of external experience in Beyond the Pleasure Principle-

the so-called dead cortical layer. Viewed as a system function that evolves

through interaction with an increasingly technologized environment, the

dead cortical layer comprises a historically specific form of experiential

agency. In addition to the task Freud assigns it-protecting the psyche by

filtering stimuli-it acquires the function of absorbing external stimuli cor-

poreally. By suspending the psychic neutralization of external stimuli that

Walter Benjamin so insightfully diagnoses as the theoretical principle

informing Freud's model of the organism in Beyond, this view of the dead

cortical layer opens what amounts to a new mode of experiencing the exter-

nal world (Benjamin 1968).

In my effort to contextualize this revisionary reading of the cortical layer

within the Freudian theoretical corpus, I will follow a trajectory that is the

precise inverse of Derrida's. Rather than tracing the evolution of the mind-

machine analogy forward from the hydraulic model of the 1895 Project for

a Scientific Psychology to the mystic writing pad, I will begin with Freud's

fully elaborated trauma model from Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where

the reduction of exteriority is in full force, and move backward to the topo-

logical derivation of external experience developed in the 1895 Project.

Reading retrospectively in this way, I shall isolate an important dimension

of Freud's initial conception of consciousness that has been subsequently

overlooked: the "problem of quality" or the "temporal period" of external

experience (Freud 1954). By aligning this early notion of the period of stim-

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Technesis

extremely compressed, yet still recognizable, version of what I have been calling the machine reduction of technology. Indeed Freud seems to impose what is in effect a double reduction, since, in addition to modeling exterior­ ity on a formal model of the psyche as technological system, he generates this latter model on the basis of a reduction of technology to the figure of the machine. By pointing to the fundamental reduction involved here-the reduction of the social environment to the status of an epiphenomenon of the (individual) psyche-Wilden's critique lays bare the profoundly reduc­ tive metalepsis at work in Freud's theory. Precisely because Freud lacks a concept of the environment, his account can only work with exteriority in a rarefied form-with a form of relative exteriority that is intrinsic to and gen­ erated by the system itself but that is nonetheless posited (and can only be so posited) as emanating from the (phantom ) environment. To rehabilitate the role of external experience against this powerful reduction, we must therefore consider Freud's account from an environ­ mental perspective rather than in terms of the individual psyche. By shifting focus in this way, I shall bring a fresh perspective to a crucial element of Freud's account of external experience in Beyond the Pleasure Principle­ the so-called dead cortical layer. Viewed as a system function that evolves through interaction with an increasingly technologized environment, the dead cortical layer comprises a historically specific form of experiential agency. In addition to the task Freud assigns it-protecting the psyche by filtering stimuli-it acquires the function of absorbing external stimuli cor­ poreally. By suspending the psychic neutralization of external stimuli that Walter Benj amin so insightfully diagnoses as the theoretical principle informing Freud's model of the organism in Beyond, this view of the dead cortical layer opens what amounts to a new mode of experiencing the exter­ nal world (Benj amin 1 9 6 8 ) . In my effort to contextualize this revisionary reading o f the cortical layer within the Freudian theoretical corpus, I will follow a traj ectory that is the precise inverse of Derrida's. Rather than tracing the evolution of the mind­ machine analogy forward from the hydraulic model of the 1 8 95 Project for a Scientific Psychology to the mystic writing pad, I will begin with Freud's fully elaborated trauma model from Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where the reduction of exteriority is in full force, and move backward to the topo­ logical derivation of external experience developed in the 1 8 95 Project. Reading retrospectively in this way, I shall isolate an important dimension of Freud's initial conception of consciousness that has been subsequently overlooked: the " problem of quality " or the " temporal period" of external experience (Freud 1 954 ) . By aligning this early notion of the period of stim-

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience

Technology and External Experience * 155

ulation with Bergson's conception of the duree, I shall pursue the far more

materialist line of thinking concerning consciousness that Freud all but

abandoned in his later metapsychological work. Like the duree, the tempo-

ral period articulates a point of contact between matter (which always pos-

sesses a distinct temporal period) and mind (which translates such a period

into quality) and thus calls for a model of psychic functioning very different

from the (Freudian and Derridian) temporal account of the psyche as writ-

ing machine.3

The Trauma Model: Consciousness, Memory, and

External Experience

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155

ulation with Bergson's conception of the duree, I shall pursue the far more materialist line of thinking concerning consciousness that Freud all but abandoned in his later metapsychological work. Like the duree, the tempo­ ral period articulates a point of contact between matter (which always pos­ sesses a distinct temporal period) and mind (which translates such a period into quality) and thus calls for a model of psychic functioning very different from the (Freudian and Derridian) temporal account of the psyche as writ­ ing machine.3

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud repeatedly attributes the speculative

hypothesis of the death drive to his assessment of certain nineteenth-century

and early twentieth-century advancements in mechanical technology. By

defining traumatic neurosis as "a condition which occurs after severe

mechanical concussions, railway disasters and other accidents involving a

risk to life" (1961, 6), Freud makes clear the complicity of this new psychic

The Trauma Model: Consciousness, Memory , and External E x perience

phenomenon with machines like the locomotive and technologies of mass

destruction.4 While this connection makes a genuine contribution to the

exploration of modern technology's experiential impact and has been inter-

estingly interpreted by some of Freud's more acute commentators (most

notably, Ronell [1989]), it cannot escape Wilden's objection (since it incor-

porates technology as a systemic element) and thus cannot serve as the basis

for a robust account of external experience. In my assessment of Freud's

treatment of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (henceforth Beyond),

I shall seek to demonstrate the limitations that are imposed on external

stimuli by the theoretical demands of Freud's metapsychological model of

the psyche. In particular, I shall demonstrate how the two modes in which

Freud treats external experience-sampling and trauma-acquire their

respective functions only on the basis of a wholesale subordination of sen-

sation to Freud's overriding theoretical interest in preserving the integrity of

the psychic economy. The results of this demonstration will in turn guide

my reconstruction of Freud's theory of periodicity and its role in his earlier

(1895) mechanical model of the mind.

Both sampling and trauma function by imposing a form on stimuli that

are themselves undifferentiated, pure quantity. Though introduced as the

perceptual dimension of Freud's account of external experience, sampling

effectively restricts perception (and its constitutive sensory matter [hyle]) to

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud repeatedly attributes the speculative hypothesis of the death drive to his assessment of certain nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century advancements in mechanical technology. By defining traumatic neurosis as "a condition which occurs after severe mechanical concussions, railway disasters and other accidents involving a risk to life " ( 1 9 6 1 , 6 ) , Freud makes clear the complicity of this new psychic phenomenon with machines like the locomotive and technologies of mass destruction.4 While this connection makes a genuine contribution to the exploration of modern technology's experiential impact and has been inter­ estingly interpreted by some of Freud's more acute commentators (most notably, Ronell [ 1 9 8 9] ), it cannot escape Wilden' s obj ection (since it incor­ porates technology as a systemic element) and thus cannot serve as the basis for a robust account of external experience. In my assessment of Freud's treatment of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (henceforth Beyond) , I shall seek to demonstrate the limitations that are imposed on external stimuli by the theoretical demands of Freud's metapsychological model of the psyche. In particular, I shall demonstrate how the two modes in which Freud treats external experience-sampling and trauma-acquire their respective functions only on the basis of a wholesale subordination of sen­ sation to Freud's overriding theoretical interest in preserving the integrity of the psychic economy. The results of this demonstration will in turn guide my reconstruction of Freud's theory of periodicity and its role in his earlier ( 1 8 9 5 ) mechanical model of the mind. Both sampling and trauma function by imposing a form on stimuli that are themselves undifferentiated, pure quantity. Though introduced as the perceptual dimension of Freud's account of external experience, sampling effectively restricts perception ( and its constitutive sensory matter [hyle] ) to

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156 * Embodying Technesis

the narrow role of testing the real, with the sole purpose of alerting the psy-

che to potentially traumatic stimuli. And trauma, the psychic effect of exter-

nal experience, functions by representing technology's experiential impact

as the feeling accompanying the breakdown of the psychic system, its failure

to master or bind an influx of external stimuli.5 In this sense, sampling and

trauma together institute what we might call, following Deleuze and Guat-

tari, a molar reduction of the imperceptible.6 As the privileged modes for

experiencing technologically generated stimuli, sampling and trauma both

function by installing a system of reference and a threshold of perception

that determine what can count as external experience. On such a model, I

suggest, technology is stripped of its robust materiality and reduced to the

narrow role of supporting or materializing a traumatic cause.

Through sampling, the system of consciousness (system-Cs) is able to

receive and test a small portion of the stimuli constantly bombarding it from

the outside. Samples pass through the system-Cs as "mobile cathectic

energy" (Freud 1961); they overcome no resistances and thus, like all phe-

nomena of consciousness, leave behind no permanent traces, expiring

instead in the very process of becoming conscious. By limiting perception to

what is experienced consciously and by imposing the hylomorphic form of

the sample on the undetermined flux, sampling carries out a reduction of the

molecular, subrepresentational level of experience-what, in the tradition

of Kant and the early Husserl, would be called sensation, or hyle.' In this

respect, sampling imposes the ontogenetic reduction germane to Freud's

metapsychology: rather than opening the psyche to exteriority, the sampling

of external stimuli serves to isolate the psychic system and protect it against

the harsh outside world. "The main purpose of the reception of stimuli,"

says Freud, "is to discover the direction and nature of the external stimuli;

and for that it is enough to take small specimens of the external world, to

sample it in small quantities" (1961, 21). On this model, perception is

reductively determined as a mechanism for psychic defense: the information

it yields helps the psyche determine how great a store of cathected energy it

will need to master incoming stimuli and thus preserve its equilibrium

against the threat of trauma.

In the case of trauma, Freud argues, the psychic reduction of external

experience becomes all the more forceful, since feeling simply replaces direct

contact with exteriority.

We describe as "traumatic" any excitations from outside which are powerful

enough to break through the protective shield. It seems to me that the con-

cept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach in

an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli. Such an event as an external

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Em bod y i n g

Technesis

the narrow role of testing the real, with the sole purpose of alerting the psy­ che to potentially traumatic stimuli. And trauma, the psychic effect of exter­ nal experience, functions by representing technology's experiential impact as the feeling accompanying the breakdown of the psychic system, its failure to master or bind an influx of external stimuli .5 In this sense, sampling and trauma together institute what we might call, following Deleuze and Guat­ tari, a molar reduction of the imperceptible. 6 As the privileged modes for experiencing technologically generated stimuli, sampling and trauma both function by installing a system of reference and a threshold of perception that determine what can count as external experience. On such a model, I suggest, technology is stripped of its robust materiality and reduced to the narrow role of supporting or materializing a traumatic cause. Through sampling, the system of consciousness ( system- Cs) is able to receive and test a small portion of the stimuli constantly bombarding it from the outside. Samples pass through the system-Cs as " mobile cathectic energy " (Freud 1 9 6 1 ) ; they overcome no resistances and thus, like all phe­ nomena of consciousness, leave behind no permanent traces, expiring instead in the very process of becoming conscious. By limiting perception to what is experienced consciously and by imposing the hylomorphic form of the sample on the undetermined flux, sampling carries out a reduction of the molecular, subrepresentational level of experience-what, in the tradition of Kant and the early Husserl, would be called sensation, or hyle. 7 In this respect, sampling imposes the ontogenetic reduction germane to Freud's meta psychology: rather than opening the psyche to exteriority, the sampling of external stimuli serves to isolate the psychic system and protect it against the harsh outside world. "The main purpose of the reception of stimuli, " says Freud, " i s t o discover the direction and nature o f the external stimuli; and for that it is enough to take small specimens of the external world, to sample it in small quantities " ( 1 9 6 1 , 2 1 ) . On this model, perception is reductively determined as a mechanism for psychic defense: the information it yields helps the psyche determine how great a store of cathected energy it will need to master incoming stimuli and thus preserve its equilibrium against the threat of trauma. In the case of trauma, Freud argues, the psychic reduction of external experience becomes all the more forceful, since feeling simply replaces direct contact with exteriority. We describe as " traumatic" any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield. It seems to me that the con­ cept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli. Such an event as an external

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience

Technology and External Experience * 157

trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large scale in the functioning

of the organism's energy and to set in motion every possible defensive mea-

sure. At the same time, the pleasure principle is for the moment put out of

action. There is no longer any possibility of preventing the mental apparatus

from being flooded with large amounts of stimulus, and another problem

arises instead-the problem of mastering the amounts of stimulus which

have broken in and of binding them, in the psychical sense, so that they can

then be disposed of. (23-24)

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157

trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large scale in the functioning of the organism's energy and to set in motion every possible defensive mea­ sure. At the same time, the pleasure principle is for the moment put out of action. There is no longer any possibility of preventing the mental apparatus from being flooded with large amounts of stimulus, and another problem arises instead-the problem of mastering the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of binding them, in the psychical sense, so that they can then be disposed of. (23-24 )

Whether such breaches in the protective shield are neutralized in conscious-

ness or lead to unconscious trauma, their significance extends only to their

impact on the psyche. By assimilating the excessive external excitations into

the form of endogenous disturbances (an assimilation rhetorically marked

by the shift signaled in the phrase "and another problem arises instead

.."), Freud places them under the jurisdiction, as it were, of the death

drive. More precisely, Freud isolates external excitations from their empiri-

cal context and revaluates them in terms of the psychic economy in order,

subsequently, to attribute the disturbances they occasion to a basic psychic

drive.8 As both Wilden and Deleuze and Guattari contend, the causal force

Freud attributes to the death drive permits him to retain his ontogenetic

focus at the moment that context, environment, and exteriority threaten its

collapse.9

Ultimately, then, Freud's institution of the death drive insures the reduc-

tion of technology's experiential impact, which can only begin following a

breach in the protective cortical layer and only on the inside of the psyche.

As a consequence, the trauma model depends on an enabling metaleptic

reversal akin to Derrida's assimilation of psyche to text: rather than asking

how psychic representation results from external experience, Freud gener-

ates the category of exteriority in accord with the requirements of a dog-

matically instituted representational model of the psyche. In this same vein,

we can discern in Freud's updating of the "old, naive theory of shock" a

reduction analogous to the one we have already discovered in Derrida. Just

as Derrida asks what the psyche must be if it is to be determined on the

model of the text, Freud asks what external experience must be if it is to be

determined on the model of the psyche: "The [shock theory] regards the

essence of the shock as being the direct damage to the molecular structure

or even to the histological structure of the elements of the nervous system;

whereas what we seek to understand are the effects produced on the organ

of the mind by the breach in the shield against stimuli and by the problems

that follow in its train" (25; emphasis added). Not only does such a per-

spectival shift discount the direct experiential impact of technology, but it

Whether such breaches in the protective shield are neutralized in conscious­ ness or lead to unconscious trauma, their significance extends only to their impact on the psyche. By assimilating the excessive external excitations into the form of endogenous disturbances (an assimilation rhetorically marked by the shift signaled in the phrase " and another problem arises instead . . . " ) , Freud places them under the jurisdiction, as it were, of the death drive. More precisely, Freud isolates external excitations from their empiri­ cal context and revaluates them in terms of the psychic economy in order, subsequently, to attribute the disturbances they occasion to a basic psychic drive. 8 As both Wilden and Deleuze and Guattari contend, the causal force Freud attributes to the death drive permits him to retain his ontogenetic focus at the moment that context, environment, and exteriority threaten its collapse.9 Ultimately, then, Freud's institution of the death drive insures the reduc­ tion of technology's experiential impact, which can only begin following a breach in the protective cortical layer and only on the inside of the psyche. As a consequence, the trauma model depends on an enabling metaleptic reversal akin to Derrida's assimilation of psyche to text: rather than asking how psychic representation results from external experience, Freud gener­ ates the category of exteriority in accord with the requirements of a dog­ matically instituted representational model of the psyche. In this same vein, we can discern in Freud's updating of the " old, naive theory of shock " a reduction analogous to the one we have already discovered in Derrida. Just as Derrida asks what the psyche must be if it is to be determined on the model of the text, Freud asks what external experience must be if it is to be determined on the model of the psyche: "The [shock theory] regards the essence of the shock as being the direct damage to the molecular structure or even to the histological structure of the elements of the nervous system; whereas what we seek to understand are the effects produced on the organ of the mind by the breach in the shield against stimuli and by the problems that follow in its train " (25; emphasis added) . Not only does such a per­ spectival shift discount the direct experiential impact of technology, but it

158

158 * Embodying Technesis

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Em bod y i n g

Technesis

calls for a fundamental reconstitution of external experience as the "mater­ ial " correlate of the energetic economy of the psyche.

calls for a fundamental reconstitution of external experience as the "mater-

ial" correlate of the energetic economy of the psyche.

Freud's Quality Model: The Emancipation

of Sensation?

Despite the predominance of this reconstitution, Freud's oeuvre does in fact

contain (the rudiments of) an alternative model of external experience that

furnishes a more promising basis for developing a robust account of tech-

Freud ' s Quality Model: The Emancip ation of Sensation?

nology's experiential impact. To reconstruct this model, we must seek to

understand the hydraulic account of the psyche that Freud introduces in his

1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology (hereafter Project) without reading

it retrospectively through the later metapsychological works. In particular,

we must counter the reduction the later Freud and Derrida impose on the

concept of the period of stimuli: its wholesale assimilation to the periodicity

of the psychic system. Toward this end, we must rehabilitate Freud's 1895

account of the autonomous perceptual function of consciousness from the

sweeping reduction it undergoes in Beyond. With his introduction of a third

experiential register, the system o (perception), alongside consciousness (the

system 4) and the unconscious (the system N), Freud strives to determine

perception molecularly, on a level where "use, functioning, production, and

formation are one and the same process" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 181).

By placing the psyche into direct contact with exteriority, w forestalls the

reduction of function to ontology that informs the metalepsis of Beyond.10

Unlike Beyond, then, the 1895 Project is fraught with tension in a par-

ticularly explicit manner. By tracing the development of the hydraulic model

as it is presented in the text, we will be able to reconstruct the deep theoret-

ical contradiction informing Freud's approach prior to the metaleptic reduc-

tion that subordinates exteriority to the demands of the psyche. More

specifically, we will uncover the conflict between Freud's ontogenetic stand-

point and his naturalizing aim of developing a quantitative account of psy-

chical processes that would square psychology with the requirements of nat-

ural science.

Freud begins his sketch with a division between stimuli originating in the

external world and stimuli coming from within. This division leads him to

differentiate between two psychic aims: while the "primary neuronic sys-

tem" strives to discharge whatever energy it takes in from the outside world

following the "principle of inertia," the "secondary function" concerns

itself with stimuli originating "from the somatic element itself" (Freud

Despite the predominance of this reconstitution, Freud's oeuvre does in fact contain (the rudiments of) an alternative model of external experience that furnishes a more promising basis for developing a robust account of tech­ nology's experiential impact. To reconstruct this model, we must seek to understand the hydraulic account of the psyche that Freud introduces in his 1 8 95 Project for a Scientific Psychology (hereafter Project) without reading it retrospectively through the later metapsychological works. In particular, we must counter the reduction the later Freud and Derrida impose on the concept of the period of stimuli: its wholesale assimilation to the periodicity of the psychic system. Toward this end, we must rehabilitate Freud's 1 8 95 account of the autonomous perceptual function of consciousness from the sweeping reduction it undergoes in Beyond. With his introduction of a third experiential register, the system 0) (perception ) , alongside consciousness (the system �) and the unconscious (the system \jI ) , Freud strives to determine perception molecularly, on a level where " use, functioning, production, and formation are one and the same process" (Deleuze and Guattari 1 9 8 3 , 1 8 1 ) . By placing the psyche into direct contact with exteriority, 0) forestalls the reduction of function to ontology that informs the metalepsis of Beyond. 1o Unlike Beyond, then, the 1 8 95 Project i s fraught with tension i n a par­ ticularly explicit manner. By tracing the development of the hydraulic model as it is presented in the text, we will be able to reconstruct the deep theoret­ ical contradiction informing Freud's approach prior to the metaleptic reduc­ tion that subordinates exteriority to the demands of the psyche. More specifically, we will uncover the conflict between Freud's ontogenetic stand­ point and his naturalizing aim of developing a quantitative account of psy­ chical processes that would square psychology with the requirements of nat­ ural science. Freud begins his sketch with a division between stimuli originating in the external world and stimuli coming from within. This division leads him to differentiate between two psychic aims: while the " primary neuronic sys­ tem " strives to discharge whatever energy it takes in from the outside world following the " principle of inertia, " the " secondary function " concerns itself with stimuli originating " from the somatic element itself" (Freud

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience

Technology and External Experience * 159

1954, 357). In the former case, the neuronic system simply employs the

quantity of energy it acquires from outside in order to get rid of it. Things

are not so simple in the latter case, however, for, argues Freud, "the organ-

ism cannot withdraw itself from [endogenous stimuli] as it does from exter-

nal stimuli," since the former "give rise to the major needs" of the body

(357). According to Freud, insofar as these needs call for actions, the neu-

ronic system must "abandon its original trend towards inertia" and "learn

to tolerate a store of quantity (Qn) sufficient to meet the demands for

specific action" (358).

This functional necessity compels Freud to introduce the basic structur-

ing principle of the hydraulic model of the mind-namely, resistance: "The

secondary function, which requires quantity (Qn) to be stored up, is made

possible by supposing that there are resistances which oppose discharge."

Freud initially applies these resistances, or "contact-barriers," to explain the

possibility of representing memory, which he defines as "a susceptibility to

permanent alteration by a single process" (359). By interrupting the free

flow of quantity through "neurones," the contact-barriers leave the latter in

a modified condition following each excitation and thus represent memory.

On this naturalizing account, memory arises to meet the psyche's need for

stored energy sufficient to neutralize the threat of endogenous stimuli.

At this point, Freud encounters the first in a series of "difficulties" that

exert a decisive influence on the trajectory of his analysis. The possibility of

permanent neuronic alteration appears to conflict with the empirical fact

that "in general, fresh excitations meet with the same conditions of recep-

tion as did the earlier ones." To overcome this difficulty, Freud simply dis-

tinguishes two classes of neurones: "permeable neurones (offering no resis-

tance and retaining nothing) which serve the function of perception, and

impermeable neurones (offering resistance and retaining quantity [Qn])

which are the vehicles of memory and presumably of psychical processes in

general." From this distinction in neurone class, Freud draws a significant

systemic distinction: "Henceforth, accordingly, I shall call the former sys-

tem of neurones and the latter N" (360).

Freud goes to some length to emphasize that these two systems are not

distinct in essence but have been prepared by experience for their separate

functions: the two systems "retain their characteristics because the -neu-

rones are connected only with the periphery and the w-neurones only with

the interior of the body. A distinction in their essence is thus replaced by a

distinction in the milieu to which they happen to be located" (365). This

functional distinction informs Freud's resolution of the exclusivity of mem-

ory and consciousness, since consciousness occurs as a limit point of

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159

1 9 54, 3 5 7 ) . In the former case, the neuronic system simply employs the quantity of energy it acquires from outside in order to get rid of it. Things are not so simple in the latter case, however, for, argues Freud, "the organ­ ism cannot withdraw itself from [endogenous stimuli] as it does from exter­ nal stimuli, " since the former " give rise to the maj or needs " of the body ( 3 5 7 ) . According to Freud, insofar as these needs call for actions, the neu­ ronic system must " abandon its original trend towards inertia" and " learn to tolerate a store of quantity ( Qn) sufficient to meet the demands for specific action " ( 3 5 8 ) . This functional necessity compels Freud to introduce the basic structur­ ing principle of the hydraulic model of the mind-namely, resistance: "The secondary function, which requires quantity ( Qn) to be stored up, is made possible by supposing that there are resistances which oppose discharge. " Freud initially applies these resistances, or "contact-barriers, " to explain the possibility of representing memory, which he defines as "a susceptibility to permanent alteration by a single process" ( 3 5 9 ) . By interrupting the free flow of quantity through " neurones," the contact-barriers leave the latter in a modified condition following each excitation and thus represent memory. On this naturalizing account, memory arises to meet the psyche's need for stored energy sufficient to neutralize the threat of endogenous stimuli. At this point, Freud encounters the first in a series of " difficulties" that exert a decisive influence on the traj ectory of his analysis. The possibility of permanent neuronic alteration appears to conflict with the empirical fact that " in general, fresh excitations meet with the same conditions of recep­ tion as did the earlier ones . " To overcome this difficulty, Freud simply dis­ tinguishes two classes of neurones: "permeable neurones (offering no resis­ tance and retaining nothing) which serve the function of perception, and impermeable neurones (offering resistance and retaining quantity [Qn] ) which are the vehicles of memory and presumably of psychical processes in general . " From this distinction in neurone class, Freud draws a significant systemic distinction: "Henceforth, accordingly, I shall call the former sys­ tem of neurones � and the latter \II " ( 3 6 0 ) . Freud goes t o some length to emphasize that these two systems are not distinct in essence but have been prepared by experience for their separate functions: the two systems " retain their characteristics because the �-neu­ rones are connected only with the periphery and the \II-neurones only with the interior of the body. A distinction in their essence is thus replaced by a distinction in the milieu to which they happen to be located " ( 3 6 5 ) . This functional distinction informs Freud's resolution of the exclusivity of mem­ ory and consciousness, since consciousness occurs as a limit point of

1 60

160 * Embodying Technesis

facilitation, when a contact-barrier is so traveled that it loses its resistance

and becomes permeable (i.e., open to the lower quantities that characterize

the -system). By explaining how the psyche can possess both a limitless

receptivity and a retentive capacity, this functional distinction allows Freud

to meet the requirement imposed by his conception of the psyche as writing

machine. Those excitations that meet resistances (in the v-system) will be

retained, while those excitations meeting no resistance (in the -system) will

simply vanish on expiration.

Insofar as he marshals the -w distinction primarily to explain the psy-

che's capacity for both receptivity and retention, Freud appears to institute

an ontogenetic bias formally identical to the one governing Beyond. Despite

their functional independence, -functions remain exclusively in the service

of the v-system: limitless receptivity is required not to facilitate perceptual

experience but rather to insure ever new content for the progressive consti-

tution of the v-system. As in the case of the trauma model, everything here

is in the service of the psychic system proper. Freud explains: ". . . one pecu-

liarity of neuronic systems-their capacity to retain and at the same time to

remain receptive-seems to be explained by the hypothesis of there being

two neuronic systems, and W . .. All psychical acquisition would on this

basis consist in the organization of the v-system through partial and locally

determined suspensions of the resistance in the contact-barriers which dis-

tinguishes w from " (363; emphasis added). The functional separation of #

and w thus masks a fundamental reduction. From the moment that the

v-system is equated with the "psychical processes in general," the -system is

needed only to explain how facilitations are possible-how, that is, quantities

select the particular routes through neurones that will produce memory.

In contrast to Beyond, however, Freud's analysis in the Project does not

conclude with this point but begins (haltingly) to eschew this reduction in

the face of demands made by empirical phenomena (i.e., by the environ-

ment). When he expands the functional distinction of and W to reflect what

he calls the "magnitude of quantity," Freud confronts a certain weakness in

his theory-its inability to account for experiences involving minimal exci-

tation. This weakness stems from two elements of Freud's model: (1) the

genealogy of consciousness from the v-system and (2) the restriction of

-functions to their contribution to the economy of the psyche. By subordi-

nating consciousness to the v-system, Freud imposes a perceptual threshold

whose function is to limit which external stimuli find representation within

the psyche. He explains that whereas permeable -neurones are receptive to

any quantity (no matter how negligible), w-neurones can only be reached by

quantities above a certain threshold (commensurate with the resistance of

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Technesis

facilitation, when a contact-barrier is so traveled that it loses its resistance and becomes permeable ( i . e . , open to the lower quantities that characterize the �-system ) . By explaining how the psyche can possess both a limitless receptivity and a retentive capacity, this functional distinction allows Freud to meet the requirement imposed by his conception of the psyche as writing machine. Those excitations that meet resistances (in the \If-system ) will be retained, while those excitations meeting no resistance (in the �-system ) will simply vanish on expiration. Insofar as he marshals the �-\If distinction primarily to explain the psy­ che's capacity for both receptivity and retention, Freud appears to institute an ontogenetic bias formally identical to the one governing Beyond. Despite their functional independence, �-functions remain exclusively in the service of the \If-system: limitless receptivity is required not to facilitate perceptual experience but rather to insure ever new content for the progressive consti­ tution of the \If-system . As in the case of the trauma model, everything here is in the service of the psychic system proper. Freud explains: " . . . one pecu­ liarity of neuronic systems-their capacity to retain and at the same time to remain receptive-seems to be explained by the hypothesis of there being two neuronic systems, � and \If . . . All psychical acquisition would on this basis consist in the organization of the \If-system through partial and locally determined suspensions of the resistance in the contact-barriers which dis­ tinguishes \If from �" ( 3 6 3 ; emphasis added ) . The functional separation of � and \If thus masks a fundamental reduction. From the moment that the \If-system is equated with the "psychical processes in general, " the �-system is needed only to explain how facilitations are possible-how, that is, quantities select the particular routes through neurones that will produce memory. In contrast to Beyond, however, Freud's analysis in the Project does not conclude with this point but begins (haltingly ) to eschew this reduction in the face of demands made by empirical phenomena (i.e., by the environ­ ment ) . When he expands the functional distinction of � and \If to reflect what he calls the " magnitude of quantity, " Freud confronts a certain weakness in his theory-its inability to account for experiences involving minimal exci­ tation. This weakness stems from two elements of Freud's model: ( 1 ) the genealogy of consciousness from the \If-system and ( 2 ) the restriction of �-functions to their contribution to the economy of the psyche. By subordi­ nating consciousness to the \If-system, Freud imposes a perceptual threshold whose function is to limit which external stimuli find representation within the psyche. He explains that whereas permeable �-neurones are receptive to any quantity (no matter how negligible ) , \If-neurones can only be reached by quantities above a certain threshold (commensurate with the resistance of

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience . 1 6 1

Technology and External Experience * 161

the contact-barrier): ". . . quantities pass through the -neurones against

which the resistance offered by the contact-barriers is negligible, but . . . the

v-neurones are only reached by quantities which are of the same order of

magnitude as that resistance" (365). On this account, only those excitations

whose magnitude of quantity is sufficient to penetrate the contact-barriers

of the v-system will find representation in the psyche. With this restriction,

we once again encounter the reductive trauma model of experience.

Rather than marshaling the threshold notion to bolster his ontogenetic

account of the psyche as he does in Beyond, however, the 1895 Freud finds

it necessary to expand his account of the -system precisely to address this

theoretical weakness. This expansion centers on the opposition of quantity

and quality, an opposition Freud employs to distinguish two functions of

the -system: screening of exogenous quantities and reception through the

sense organs. By underwriting Freud's introduction of a third system of neu-

rones (co), this latter -function will introduce what amounts to a second

form of consciousness.

Screening functions in the Project just as it does in Beyond: it protects the

organism against excessive external stimuli. Exogenous quantities, insofar

as they possess a greater magnitude than endogenous ones, must be trans-

formed before they can be introduced into and ultimately into W. Freud

attributes this transformation to what he calls the "nerve-ending appara-

tus": "... the -neurones do not terminate in an unattached manner at the

periphery, but end in cell-structures; and it is these and not the -neurones

which receive the exogenous stimulus. A 'nerve-ending apparatus' of this

kind.., might well serve the purpose of not allowing exogenous quantities

(Q) to impinge upon in undiminished magnitude but of damping them

down" (367). The nerve-ending apparatus serves the same function as the

protective shield (the dead cortical layer) in Beyond: it allows the -system

to sample stimuli from the external world in quantities that are not harmful

to it. Once again, however, this screening function is immediately evaluated

in terms of how it benefits the v-system: Freud argues that its function is

exclusively to protect against the pain caused by "the irruption of large

quantities (Q) into w" (368).

Only when he seeks to explain the phenomenon of consciousness proper

does Freud actually address the content of external experience. While it

"knows nothing of... quantities and neurones," consciousness, Freud con-

tends, "gives us what we call 'qualities'-sensations which show a great

variety of 'differences' and whose differences depend on relations to the

external world" (369; emphasis added). With this notion of "quality,"

Freud introduces a type of experience capable of registering external stimuli

the contact-barrier) : " . . . quantities pass through the �-neurones against which the resistance offered by the contact-barriers is negligible, but . . . the \If-neurones are only reached by quantities which are of the same order of magnitude as that resistance " ( 3 6 5 ) . On this account, only those excitations whose magnitude of quantity is sufficient to penetrate the contact-barriers of the \If-system will find representation in the psyche. With this restriction, we once again encounter the reductive trauma model of experience. Rather than marshaling the threshold notion to bolster his ontogenetic account of the psyche as he does in Beyond, however, the 1 8 95 Freud finds it necessary to expand his account of the �-system precisely to address this theoretical weakness. This expansion centers on the opposition of quantity and quality, an opposition Freud employs to distinguish two functions of the �-system: screening of exogenous quantities and reception through the sense organs. By underwriting Freud's introduction of a third system of neu­ rones ( m ) , this latter �-function will introduce what amounts to a second form of consciousness. Screening functions in the Project just as it does in Beyond: it protects the organism against excessive external stimuli. Exogenous quantities, insofar as they possess a greater magnitude than endogenous ones, must be trans­ formed before they can be introduced into � and ultimately into \If. Freud attributes this transformation to what he calls the " nerve-ending appara­ tus " : " . . . the �-neurones do not terminate in an unattached manner at the periphery, but end in cell-structures; and it is these and not the �-neurones which receive the exogenous stimulus. A 'nerve-ending apparatus' of this kind . . . might well serve the purpose of not allowing exogenous quantities ( Q ) to impinge upon � in undiminished magnitude but of damping them down " ( 3 6 7 ) . The nerve-ending apparatus serves the same function as the protective shield (the dead cortical layer) in Beyond: it allows the �-system to sample stimuli from the external world in quantities that are not harmful to it. Once again, however, this screening function is immediately evaluated in terms of how it benefits the \If-system: Freud argues that its function is exclusively to protect against the pain caused by "the irruption of large quantities ( Q ) into \If " ( 3 6 8 ) . Only when he seeks to explain the phenomenon o f consciousness proper does Freud actually address the content of external experience. While it " knows nothing of . . . quantities and neurones, " consciousness, Freud con­ tends, " gives us what we call 'qualities'-sensations which show a great variety of 'differences' and whose differences depend on relations to the external world" ( 3 69; emphasis added) . With this notion of " quality, " Freud introduces a type of experience capable of registering external stimuli

1 62

162 * Embodying Technesis

without imposing the psychic reduction characteristic of the v-system. In

fact, Freud here introduces what amounts to a second form of conscious-

ness, something akin to what contemporary neuroscientists call "conscious-

ness in general," which is not derivative from nor subordinate to the W-sys-

tem (Damasio 1995). To prevent misunderstanding of this important point,

we need to distinguish three properly independent modes of experience

which Freud groups under the blanket term consciousness: (1) a representa-

tional mode, or consciousness proper (consciousness as a function of the N-

system); (2) a perceptual mode, or consciousness in general; and (3) a sub-

perceptual mode, or sensation. Only the first corresponds to consciousness

in the sense of mental experience with a representationalist content.11 The

second and third modes involve more robustly embodied levels of experi-

ence that, I suggest, do not necessarily (and in many cases cannot) have

mental representations as correlates and do not involve consciousness at all

in its familiar sense. The experience of qualities constitutes "consciousness"

in the sense of the second and/or third modes; I shall henceforth call it qual-

itative consciousness.

On Freud's account, qualitative consciousness can be distinguished from

representational consciousness primarily through its distinct genealogy.

Qualities are not a function of quantity, or more specifically, of quantity

flowing freely or against resistance in the 4- and v-systems; as Freud

unequivocally puts it, "there is nothing quantitative about them" (369).

Qualitative differences do not depend on differences in quantity (as do the

differences in facilitation that underlie memory and representational con-

sciousness).12 They are, rather, the internal modification of external quan-

tity (and science, according to Freud, teaches that there is nothing but quan-

tity in the external world). Consequently, qualities cannot be accounted for

in terms of the systemic correlation of and W. They stem neither from the

-system (since, on Freud's psychic model, consciousness can only result

from excitations reaching the "higher levels of the neuronic system") nor

from the v-system (since at least one v-function, recollection, is entirely

devoid of quality). To explain the origin of qualities, therefore, Freud "must

summon up enough courage" to introduce a third system of neurones (co, or

Wahrnehmung [perception]). Since, he argues, they are "excited along with

the others during perception but not during reproduction," these "percep-

tual neurones" appear to share the protective function characteristic of the

nerve-ending apparatus, though with one important difference. While the

latter holds off quantity by screening it into manageable quotients, co does

so by transforming it into quality. Indeed, argues Freud, the perceptual sys-

tem primarily "consists in contrivances for changing external quantity into

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Technesis

without imposing the psychic reduction characteristic of the \jf-system. In fact, Freud here introduces what amounts to a second form of conscious­ ness, something akin to what contemporary neuroscientists call "conscious­ ness in general, " which is not derivative from nor subordinate to the \jf-sys­ tern (Damasio 1 99 5 ) . To prevent misunderstanding of this important point, we need to distinguish three properly independent modes of experience which Freud groups under the blanket term consciousness: ( 1 ) a representa­ tional mode, or consciousness proper (consciousness as a function of the \jf­ system ) ; ( 2 ) a perceptual mode, or consciousness in general; and ( 3 ) a sub­ perceptual mode, or sensation. Only the first corresponds to consciousness in the sense of mental experience with a representationalist content . l l The second and third modes involve more robustly embodied levels of experi­ ence that, I suggest, do not necessarily ( and in many cases cannot) have mental representations as correlates and do not involve consciousness at all in its familiar sense. The experience of qualities constitutes "consciousness " in the sense of the second and/or third modes; I shall henceforth call it qual­

itative consciousness. On Freud's account, qualitative consciousness can be distinguished from representational consciousness primarily through its distinct genealogy. Qualities are not a function of quantity, or more specifically, of quantity flowing freely or against resistance in the �- and \jf-systems; as Freud unequivocally puts it, " there is nothing quantitative about them " ( 3 6 9 ) . Qualitative differences d o not depend o n differences i n quantity ( a s d o the differences in facilitation that underlie memory and representational con­ sciousness ) . 12 They are, rather, the internal modification of external quan­ tity ( and science, according to Freud, teaches that there is nothing but quan­ tity in the external world ) . Consequently, qualities cannot be accounted for in terms of the systemic correlation of � and \jf. They stem neither from the �-system ( since, on Freud's psychic model, consciousness can only result from excitations reaching the " higher levels of the neuronic system " ) nor from the \jf-system ( since at least one \jf-function, recollection, is entirely devoid of quality ) . To explain the origin of qualities, therefore, Freud "must summon up enough courage " to introduce a third system of neurones (co, or Wahrnehmung [perception] ) . Since, he argues, they are " excited along with the others during perception but not during reproduction, " these "percep­ tual neurones " appear to share the protective function characteristic of the nerve-ending apparatus, though with one important difference. While the latter holds off quantity by screening it into manageable quotients, co does so by transforming it into quality. Indeed, argues Freud, the perceptual sys­ tem primarily "consists in contrivances for changing external quantity into

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience

Technology and External Experience * 163

quality." (370). Moreover, according to Freud, perception occurs only

when quantity has been assimilated into quality: "It may be that the char-

acteristic of quality (that is, conscious sensation) only appears where quan-

tities have so far as possible been excluded" (371).

Far from solving the problem of external experience, however, the intro-

duction of qualitative consciousness introduces what Freud, in an instance

of his well-known tendency to dramatic hyperbole, calls an "immense

difficulty." To achieve the complete permeability and limitless receptivity

that characterizes them, perceptual neurones (N-neurones) require a magni-

tude of quantity necessary to break down contact-barriers; yet, by

definition, they constitute that class of neurones possessing the least degree

of quantity. The difficulty, in a word, is this: barred from employing his

quantity theory of the genesis of the psyche, Freud has no way of explaining

how external excitations result in the kind of (perceptual) consciousness

that results from the stimulation of perceptual neurones. Freud solves this

difficulty in characteristic fashion-by introducing yet a further speculative

claim.

I can see only one way of escape: to revise our basic hypothesis on the pas-

sage of quantity (Qn). Hitherto I have regarded it only as a transference of

quantity (Qn) from one neurone to another. It must have another attribute,

however-of a temporal character; for the mechanics of the physicists have

assigned this temporal attribute even to the motions of masses in the external

world. I shall describe this attribute briefly as "period." Thus I shall assume

that the resistance of the contact-barriers applies only to the transference of

•

1 63

quality. " ( 3 7 0 ) . Moreover, according to Freud, perception occurs only when quantity has been assimilated into quality: " It may be that the char­ acteristic of quality (that is, conscious sensation ) only appears where quan­ tities have so far as possible been excluded" ( 3 7 1 ) . Far from solving the problem o f external experience, however, the intro­ duction of qualitative consciousness introduces what Freud, in an instance of his well-known tendency to dramatic hyperbole, calls an " immense difficulty. " To achieve the complete permeability and limitless receptivity that characterizes them, perceptual neurones ('V-neurones) require a magni­ tude of quantity necessary to break down contact-barriers; yet, by definition, they constitute that class of neurones possessing the least degree of quantity. The difficulty, in a word, is this: barred from employing his quantity theory of the genesis of the psyche, Freud has no way of explaining how external excitations result in the kind of (perceptual) consciousness that results from the stimulation of perceptual neurones. Freud solves this difficulty in characteristic fashion-by introducing yet a further speculative claim.

quantity (Q), but that the period of neuronic motion is transmitted without

inhibition in every direction, as though it were a process of induction. (371)

With this added attribute, Freud can explain the complete permeability and

limitless receptivity of the perceptual neurones in a way that does not rely

on quantity-in a way, in short, that is independent of the genesis of the

psychic system.

Because it links perceptual consciousness and the external world, this

independence is absolutely crucial for any effort to liberate external experi-

ence from the reduction Freud imposes on it. We can grasp its importance

by clarifying the key differences separating Freud's conception of the

"period" from Derrida's (reductive) construal of it as the "general periodic-

ity" of the psyche. In his effort to synthesize Freud's model of the mind with

Heidegger's analysis of temporality, Derrida contends that the permeability

of the perceptual neurones proceeds "from pure time, from pure temporal-

I can see only one way of escape: to revise our basic hypothesis on the pas­ sage of quantity ( Qn ) . Hitherto I have regarded it only as a transference of quantity ( Qn) from one neurone to another. It must have another attribute, however-of a temporal character; for the mechanics of the physicists have assigned this temporal attribute even to the motions of masses in the external world. I shall describe this attribute briefly as " period . " Thus I shall assume that the resistance of the contact-barriers applies only to the transference of quantity ( Q ) , but that the period of neuronic motion is transmitted without inhibition in every direction, as though it were a process of induction. (371 )

ization in its conjunction with spacing: from periodicity" (Derrida 1978,

205). According to Derrida periodicity introduces "pure difference" as the

With this added attribute, Freud can explain the complete permeability and limitless receptivity of the perceptual neurones in a way that does not rely on quantity-in a way, in short, that is independent of the genesis of the psychic system. Because it links perceptual consciousness and the external world, this independence is absolutely crucial for any effort to liberate external experi­ ence from the reduction Freud imposes on it. We can grasp its importance by clarifying the key differences separating Freud's conception of the " period " from Derrida's (reductive) construal of it as the "general periodic­ ity " of the psyche. In his effort to synthesize Freud's model of the mind with Heidegger's analysis of temporality, Derrida contends that the permeability of the perceptual neurones proceeds " from pure time, from pure temporal­ ization in its conj unction with spacing: from periodicity " (Derrida 1 9 7 8 , 20 5 ) . According t o Derrida periodicity introduces "pure difference " a s the

1 64

164 * Embodying Technesis

condition of possibility for the emergence of the psyche and everything

related to it (perception included): "The concept of a period in general pre-

cedes and conditions the opposition between quantity and quality, and

everything governed by this opposition" (205). By conflating the difference

marked by quality with the differences among quantities that underlie mem-

ory, Derrida blatantly ignores the careful effort Freud takes to avoid align-

ing the period with the quantitative difference generative of memory (i.e.,

with a quantitative difference internal to the psychic system) and thereby to

preserve the independence constitutive of perceptual consciousness.13

In his zeal to ontologize Freud's model of the mind, Derrida thus brack-

ets precisely what is most fruitful in Freud's speculation: the external

anchoring and irreducible locality of the period. According to Freud, there

is no "period in general" but only the period of specific stimuli emanating

from the external world. By ontologizing Freud, Derrida effectively over-

looks the substantial naturalism of the 1895 model and downplays Freud's

strong desire to make his theory consistent with "the general laws of

motion." Insofar as they "assimilate the period of an excitation," argues

Freud, perceptual neurones are a function of such general laws (1954, 371;

emphasis added). By perception, then, Freud means the integration into the

organism of external forces, all of which possess their own characteristic

period (or "qualitative characteristic"). According to Freud, while such inte-

gration involves a certain reduction-of what is continuous in the external

world into a discontinuous segment-and yields what Freud calls an "anal-

ogy," not an absolute coincidence,14 the specific period of the actual exter-

nal stimulus nevertheless retains a constitutive role: "The characteristic of

quality in the stimuli . . . is represented by a particular period of neuronic

motion which is certainly not the same as that of the stimulus but has some

relation to it, determined according to a reduction formula that is unknown

to us" (375).

Duration, the "Quality" Model, and Technology

Freud's conception of the period would therefore seem more akin to

Bergsonian "duration" (duree) than to Heideggerian temporality. Like

duration, the temporal period brokers an encounter of matter and mind that

eschews traditional dualism as well as the radicalized form of subjectivity

stemming from the ecstatic temporalizing of Dasein (and, one could add, of

differance). While a thorough analysis of Bergson's theory of perception is

beyond the scope of my argument here, a brief comparison of Freud and

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Technesis

condition of possibility for the emergence of the psyche and everything related to it (perception included) : "The concept of a period in general pre­ cedes and conditions the opposition between quantity and quality, and everything governed by this opposition" (205 ) . By conflating the difference marked by quality with the differences among quantities that underlie mem­ ory, Derrida blatantly ignores the careful effort Freud takes to avoid align­ ing the period with the quantitative difference generative of memory ( i . e . , with a quantitative difference internal to the psychic system ) and thereby to preserve the independence constitutive of perceptual consciousness . 1 3 I n his zeal t o ontologize Freud's model o f the mind, Derrida thus brack­ ets precisely what is most fruitful in Freud's speculation: the external anchoring and irreducible locality of the period. According to Freud, there is no " period in general" but only the period of specific stimuli emanating from the external world. By ontologizing Freud, Derrida effectively over­ looks the substantial naturalism of the 1 8 95 model and downplays Freud's strong desire to make his theory consistent with " the general laws of motion. " Insofar as they "assimilate the period of an excitation, " argues Freud, perceptual neurones are a function of such general laws ( 1 954, 3 7 1 ; emphasis added) . By perception, then, Freud means the integration into the organism of external forces, all of which possess their own characteristic period (or " qualitative characteristic " ) . According to Freud, while such inte­ gration involves a certain reduction-of what is continuous in the external world into a discontinuous segment-and yields what Freud calls an " anal­ ogy, " not an absolute coincidence,14 the specific period of the actual exter­ nal stimulus nevertheless retains a constitutive role: "The characteristic of quality in the stimuli . . . is represented by a particular period of neuronic motion which is certainly not the same as that of the stimulus but has some relation to it, determined according to a reduction formula that is unknown to us" ( 3 75 ) .

Duration, the " Quality " Model, and Technology

Freud's conception of the period would therefore seem more akin to Bergsonian " duration " (duree) than to Heideggerian temporality. Like duration, the temporal period brokers an encounter of matter and mind that eschews traditional dualism as well as the radicalized form of subj ectivity stemming from the ecstatic temporalizing of Dasein ( and, one could add, of dif{erance ) . While a thorough analysis of Bergson's theory of perception is beyond the scope of my argument here, a brief comparison of Freud and

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience

Technology and External Experience * 165

Bergson will help us expand Freud's narrow and too hastily abandoned

analysis of quality. Modeled on duration, the notion of quality provides the

conceptual basis for an understanding of external experience beyond the

scope of the psychic reduction.

In the larger picture, reading Freud through Bergson will help us to mod-

ify the notion of qualitative experience to reflect the experiential conditions

of our technological age; aligned with Benjamin's category of Erlebnis ("liv-

ing through"), qualitative consciousness specifies the mechanism for our

embodied mode of experiencing the technologized environment of post-

modernity (see chapter 9). By replacing Freud's account of quality as a pro-

tective mechanism with an understanding of it as a robust and richly

embodied mode of apprehending the external world, I shall expand its func-

tion to encompass two types of encounter between organism and world that

have become prevalent in contemporary postmodern technoculture:

encounters involving subperceptual or molecular stimuli that do not register

psychically in any direct way and encounters involving stimuli that are

incompatible with the capacities and rhythms of qualitative consciousness,

that cannot simply be screened out, and that therefore impose violent,

though often unregistered (i.e., nontraumatic) modifications on our nonpsy-

chic qualitative experience.

Working under the assumption that there is a complete continuum

between matter and mind, Bergson defines perception as a fundamentally

pragmatic gesture: the act of aligning the rhythm of internal duration with

the rhythm of the duration belonging to external matter. In this sense, he

argues, perception constitutes a "choice."

Perception, therefore, consists in detaching, from the totality of objects, the

possible action of my body upon them. Perception appears, then, as only a

choice. It creates nothing; its office, on the contrary, is to eliminate from the

totality of images all those on which I can have no hold, and then, from each

of those which I retain, all that does not concern the needs of the image

which I call my body. Such, at least, much simplified, is the way we explain

or describe schematically what we have called pure perception. (Bergson

1991, 229)

As the result of this process of alignment, perception is equated with an

action of the body on the "totality of images." Since perception, for Berg-

son, always involves a mix of mind and matter, the alignment of internal

and external duration can embody any of the possible configurations of

•

165

Bergson will help us expand Freud's narrow and too hastily abandoned analysis of quality. Modeled on duration, the notion of quality provides the conceptual basis for an understanding of external experience beyond the scope of the psychic reduction. In the larger picture, reading Freud through Bergson will help us to mod­ ify the notion of qualitative experience to reflect the experiential conditions of our technological age; aligned with Benj amin's category of ErZebnis ( " liv­ ing through " ) , qualitative consciousness specifies the mechanism for our embodied mode of experiencing the technologized environment of post­ modernity ( see chapter 9 ) . By replacing Freud's account of quality as a pro­ tective mechanism with an understanding of it as a robust and richly embodied mode of apprehending the external world, I shall expand its func­ tion to encompass two types of encounter between organism and world that have become prevalent in contemporary postmodern technoculture : encounters involving subperceptual or molecular stimuli that do not register psychically in any direct way and encounters involving stimuli that are incompatible with the capacities and rhythms of qualitative consciousness, that cannot simply be screened out, and that therefore impose violent, though often unregistered ( i . e . , nontraumatic) modifications on our nonpsy­ chic qualitative experience. Working under the assumption that there is a complete continuum between matter and mind, Bergson defines perception as a fundamentally pragmatic gesture: the act of aligning the rhythm of internal duration with the rhythm of the duration belonging to external matter. In this sense, he argues, perception constitutes a " choice . "

matter and memory on the continuum between pure perception and pure

memory. Depending on which pole is more prominent, perception will

either tend to obey necessity (the law of matter) or to express freedom (the

Perception, therefore, consists i n detaching, from the totality o f obj ects, the possible action of my body upon them. Perception appears, then, as only a choice . It creates nothing; its office, on the contrary, is to eliminate from the totality of images all those on which I can have no hold, and then, from each of those which I retain, all that does not concern the needs of the image which I call my body. Such, at least, much simplified, is the way we explain or describe schematically what we have called pure perception. (Bergson 1 9 9 1 , 229 )

As the result of this process of alignment, perception is equated with an action of the body on the " totality of images . " Since perception, for Berg­ son, always involves a mix of mind and matter, the alignment of internal and external duration can embody any of the possible configurations of matter and memory on the continuum between pure perception and pure memory. Depending on which pole is more prominent, perception will either tend to obey necessity (the law of matter) or to express freedom (the

166

166 * Embodying Technesis

law of spirit). In either case, argues Bergson, the important point is that

"sensible qualities" are not internally or psychically generated representa-

tions but rather the materialization of choices enacted by memory on the

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Technesis

law of spirit) . In either case, argues Bergson, the important point is that " sensible qualities " are not internally or psychically generated representa­ tions but rather the materialization of choices enacted by memory on the real.

real.

Now, at the same time that our actual and so to speak instantaneous percep-

tion effects this division of matter into independent objects, our memory

solidifies into sensible qualities the continuous flow of things.... To reply, to

an action received, by an immediate reaction which adopts the rhythm of the

first and continues it in the same duration, to be in the present and in a pre-

sent which is always beginning again-this is the fundamental law of matter:

herein consists necessity. If there are actions that are really free, or at least

partly indeterminate, they can only belong to beings able to fix, at long inter-

vals, that becoming to which their own becoming clings, able to solidify it

into distinct moments, and so to condense matter.... (210; emphasis added)

Depending on where it lies along the continuum of matter and mind, an act

of perception thus comprises either an adaptation of internal to external

duration or an assimilation of external to internal duration.

Modeled on Bergsonian duration, Freud's conception of quality takes on

Now, at the same time that our actual and so to speak instantaneous percep­ tion effects this division of matter into independent obj ects, our memory solidifies into sensible qualities the continuous flow of things . . . . To reply, to an action received, by an immediate reaction which adopts the rhythm of the first and continues it in the same duration, to be in the present and in a pre­ sent which is always beginning again-this is the fundamental law of matter: herein consists necessity. If there are actions that are really free, or at least partly indeterminate, they can only belong to beings able to fix, at long inter­ vals, that becoming to which their own becoming clings, able to solidify it into distinct moments, and so to condense matter. . . . ( 2 1 0 ; emphasis added)

a far more materialist flavor. As the products of the alignment of internal

and external duration, perceptual qualities attest to the relative command of

the organism over its material world. Like the "sensible qualities" Bergson

speaks of, perceptual qualities comprise an organism's material incorpora-

tion of the external world. Bergson explains: "as they are found in our mem-

ory-shot perception, [sensible qualities] are, in fact, the successive moments

obtained by a solidification of the real" (211). Read in this way, Freud's

qualitative consciousness becomes capable of more than mere protection

and, at the same time, loses its lingering representationalist function. Instead

of comprising a mysterious psychic analogy for external stimuli, perceptual

qualities would be the physiological products of the organism's effort to

solidify or fix that stimuli-in other words, the means by which an organ-

ism robustly experiences the external world.15 Bergson's monism gives us

the conceptual tools necessary to assess the material impact of technological

change according to a simple economic formula that eschews Freud's onto-

genetic reduction: as our material world complexifies, we become less and

less able to solidify the real by fixing the becoming of matter.

Nonetheless, if we are to grasp the continual increase in passivity that is

the correlate of technological change, we must eschew the voluntarist strain

of Bergsonist pragmatism. In particular, we must focus our attention on

those experiences where no solidification of the real is possible, where the

material world simply imposes its rhythms on us. If we cannot delay our

Depending on where it lies along the continuum of matter and mind, an act of perception thus comprises either an adaptation of internal to external duration or an assimilation of external to internal duration. Modeled on Bergsonian duration, Freud's conception of quality takes on a far more materialist flavor. As the products of the alignment of internal and external duration, perceptual qualities attest to the relative command of the organism over its material world. Like the " sensible qualities " Bergson speaks of, perceptual qualities comprise an organism's material incorpora­ tion of the external world. Bergson explains: "as they are found in our mem­ ory-shot perception, [sensible qualities] are, in fact, the successive moments obtained by a solidification of the real " ( 2 1 1 ) . Read in this way, Freud's qualitative consciousness becomes capable of more than mere protection and, at the same time, loses its lingering representationalist function. Instead of comprising a mysterious psychic analogy for external stimuli, perceptual qualities would be the physiological products of the organism's effort to solidify or fix that stimuli-in other words, the means by which an organ­ ism robustly experiences the external world. I S Bergson's monism gives us the conceptual tools necessary to assess the material impact of technological change according to a simple economic formula that eschews Freud's onto­ genetic reduction: as our material world complexifies, we become less and less able to solidify the real by fixing the becoming of matter. Nonetheless, if we are to grasp the continual increase in passivity that is the correlate of technological change, we must eschew the voluntarist strain of Bergsonist pragmatism. In particular, we must focus our attention on those experiences where no solidification of the real is possible, where the material world simply imposes its rhythms on us. If we cannot delay our

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience

Technology and External Experience * 167

response (by generating a representation) in an ever increasing number of

situations, how, we must ask, can we avoid becoming the mere pawns of

technological materiality?

One answer to this question-Lyotard's-involves our use of technology

to expand our material liberty. Lyotard argues that by availing ourselves of

the "complex of transformers" produced by technoscience, we can gain the

means to extend the range of external rhythms that we can solidify or take

in as sensible qualities. New technologies thus comprise what Lyotard calls

a "supplementary cortex." Lyotard explains that as a stand-in for our per-

ceptual faculty, the technological cortex enables an extension of the range of

our collective perception and thus fundamentally alters the nature of expe-

rience: "These [new] technologies show in their own way that there is no

break between matter and mind, at least in its reactive functions, which we

call performance-functions. They have a cortex, or a cortex-element, which

has the property of being collective, precisely because it is physical and not

biological" (Lyotard 1991, 43). By submitting matter to a deindividualized

spirit, the new technologies expand the range of perception. In the process,

however, they also fundamentally alienate the individual organism from its

role as locus of perception, stripping from it the biological privilege it has

always held. Ultimately, then, if the new technologies increase our material

freedom, they do so in ways that lie beyond the bounds of individual, lived

experience.

An example cited by Lyotard-Bergson's example of the technoscientific

grasp of the color red-helps to establish this point. Lyotard argues that if

science increases our command over the sensory experience of redness by

breaking red light down to a "vibration of the electro-magnetic field at a fre-

quency... of 400 trillion vibrations per second," this "liberation" is hardly

one for us as embodied creatures of experience, since the human eye, were

it to synchronize itself to that rhythm (even if such a thing were possible),

would register only "pure shocks" (42). While this example might seem far

removed from the domain of actual experience, the new media and elec-

tronic technologies that structure our experiential domains function in a

formally identical way. By accelerating the rhythm of the lifeworld in ways

that increasingly escape the cognitive and perceptual grasp of the individual

organism, new technologies introduce something radically incommensurate

with our traditional, biologically based experiential faculties. Once again,

however, rather than following Lyotard in abandoning the human, we need

to focus on finding ways of integrating such opaque elements into our indi-

vidual experiential lives, of gaining some modicum of control over them.

In the context of such a quest, the specific advantage of Freud's concep-

•

167

response ( by generating a representation) in an ever increasing number of situations, how, we must ask, can we avoid becoming the mere pawns of technological materiality ? One answer to this question-Lyotard's-involves our use of technology to expand our material liberty. Lyotard argues that by availing ourselves of the "complex of transformers " produced by techno science , we can gain the means to extend the range of external rhythms that we can solidify or take in as sensible qualities. New technologies thus comprise what Lyotard calls a " supplementary cortex. " Lyotard explains that as a stand-in for our per­ ceptual faculty, the technological cortex enables an extension of the range of our collective perception and thus fundamentally alters the nature of expe­ rience: "These [new] technologies show in their own way that there is no break between matter and mind, at least in its reactive functions, which we call performance-functions. They have a cortex, or a cortex-element, which has the property of being collective, precisely because it is physical and not biological" ( Lyotard 1 9 9 1 , 43 ) . By submitting matter to a de individualized spirit, the new technologies expand the range of perception. In the process, however, they also fundamentally alienate the individual organism from its role as locus of perception, stripping from it the biological privilege it has always held. Ultimately, then, if the new technologies increase our material freedom, they do so in ways that lie beyond the bounds of individual, lived expenence . An example cited by Lyotard-Bergson's example of the techno scientific grasp of the color red-helps to establish this point. Lyotard argues that if science increases our command over the sensory experience of redness by breaking red light down to a " vibration of the electro-magnetic field at a fre­ quency . . . of 400 trillion vibrations per second," this " liberation" is hardly one for us as embodied creatures of experience, since the human eye, were it to synchronize itself to that rhythm (even if such a thing were possible ) , would register only "pure shocks" (42 ) . While this example might seem far removed from the domain of actual experience, the new media and elec­ tronic technologies that structure our experiential domains function in a formally identical way. By accelerating the rhythm of the lifeworld in ways that increasingly escape the cognitive and perceptual grasp of the individual organism, new technologies introduce something radically incommensurate with our traditional, biologically based experiential faculties. Once again, however, rather than following Lyotard in abandoning the human, we need to focus on finding ways of integrating such opaque elements into our indi­ vidual experiential lives, of gaining some modicum of control over them. In the context of such a quest, the specific advantage of Freud's concep-

168

168 * Embodying Technesis

tion of quality should immediately become apparent: as the basis for a

model of perceptual "consciousness" (consciousness in general) that is inde-

pendent from psychic (or representational) consciousness, quality brokers a

form of experience that, unlike Bergson's notion of the solidification of the

real, does not depend on the mediation of representation, on a translation of

external experience into an analogous internal form. As the faculty the indi-

vidual organism uses to absorb excessive or alien external rhythms, periods,

or durations, perceptual consciousness thus permits the experience of these

latter independently of the psychic model and (psychic) representation as

such. It forms the basis for a corporeal mode of experience-a mode of

experience founded on the direct interactional contact of the individual

organism with the material world.16 Moreover, precisely because it requires

a distinction among three forms of consciousness, Freud's 1895 model

allows us to avoid concluding, with Bergson and Lyotard, that the deter-

minism of our passive (unmediated) encounters with matter necessarily

entails a decrease in our liberty. Notwithstanding its internal inconsistency,

Freud's complex concept of consciousness has the merit of explaining how

our embodied experience, despite being largely outside of our (direct, con-

scious) control, can nonetheless be an issue for us. By making it an explicit

concern (though not the intentional object) of our representational con-

sciousness, we can take actions that will ultimately, if only indirectly,

improve our bodily lives. We can, for example, retrain our bodies to deal

better with certain types of excessive stimuli or to tolerate repetitive labor;

and we can do so, importantly, without first (or ever) acquiring cognitive

and/or representationalist mastery over these experiences. Expanded in the

ways I suggest, Freud's model thus addresses our insistent current need-a

need directly correlated with technological advancement-to secure a

means of accounting for the unmarked dimension of our experience of tech-

nological materiality in a way that need not end in pessimistic resignation or

nihilistic disenchantment.

To give my suggestion its strongest possible form and to prepare for our

return to Freud in chapter 9, let us briefly reconsider the notion of the dead

cortical layer in the context of my reconstruction of the topic of quality.

Whereas Freud's 1895 notion of qualitative perception remains exclusively

oriented toward the needs of his model of the psyche,17 in Beyond he

emphasizes what he calls the "protective" function of the dead cortical

layer, a function that (he haltingly admits) is "almost more important...

than reception of stimuli."

... we have more to say of the living vesicle with its receptive cortical layer.

This little fragment of living substance is suspended in the middle of an exter-

•

Em bod y i n g

Technesis

tion of quality should immediately become apparent: as the basis for a model of perceptual "consciousness " (consciousness in general) that is inde­ pendent from psychic (or representational ) consciousness, quality brokers a form of experience that, unlike Bergson's notion of the solidification of the real, does not depend on the mediation of representation, on a translation of external experience into an analogous internal form . As the faculty the indi­ vidual organism uses to absorb excessive or alien external rhythms, periods, or durations, perceptual consciousness thus permits the experience of these latter independently of the psychic model and (psychic) representation as such. It forms the basis for a corporeal mode of experience-a mode of experience founded on the direct interactional contact of the individual organism with the material world . 1 6 Moreover, precisely because it requires a distinction among three forms of consciousness, Freud's 1 8 95 model allows us to avoid concluding, with Bergson and Lyotard, that the deter­ minism of our passive ( unmediated) encounters with matter necessarily entails a decrease in our liberty. Notwithstanding its internal inconsistency, Freud's complex concept of consciousness has the merit of explaining how our embodied experience, despite being largely outside of our ( direct, con­ scious ) control, can nonetheless be an issue for us. By making it an explicit concern (though not the intentional object) of our representational con­ sciousness, we can take actions that will ultimately, if only indirectly, improve our bodily lives. We can, for example, retrain our bodies to deal better with certain types of excessive stimuli or to tolerate repetitive labor; and we can do so, importantly, without first ( or ever ) acquiring cognitive and/or representationalist mastery over these experiences. Expanded in the ways I suggest, Freud's model thus addresses our insistent current need-a need directly correlated with technological advancement-to secure a means of accounting for the unmarked dimension of our experience of tech­ nological materiality in a way that need not end in pessimistic resignation or nihilistic disenchantment. To give my suggestion its strongest possible form and to prepare for our return to Freud in chapter 9, let us briefly reconsider the notion of the dead cortical layer in the context of my reconstruction of the topic of quality. Whereas Freud's 1 8 95 notion of qualitative perception remains exclusively oriented toward the needs of his model of the psyche,17 in Beyond he emphasizes what he calls the " protective " function of the dead cortical layer, a function that (he haltingly admits) is " almost more important . . . than reception of stimuli . " . . . we have more to say of the living vesicle with its receptive cortical layer. This little fragment of living substance is suspended in the middle of an exter-

Tech n o l ogy and External Experience

Technology and External Experience * 169

nal world charged with the most powerful energies; and it would be killed by

the stimulation emanating from these if it were not provided with a protec-

tive shield against stimuli. It acquires the shield in this way: its outermost sur-

face ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, becomes to some

degree inorganic and thenceforward functions as a special envelope or mem-

brane resistant to stimuli. In consequence, the energies of the external world

are able to pass into the next underlying layers, which have remained living,

with only a fragment of their original intensity; and these layers can devote

themselves, behind the protective shield, to the reception of the amounts of

stimulus which have been allowed through it. By its death, the outer layer has

saved all the deeper ones from a similar fate . . . (21)

As a protective envelope enclosing the psyche, the dead cortical layer func-

tions by deflecting exogenous stimuli, by refusing them entrance into the

•

1 69

nal world charged with the most powerful energies; and it would be killed by the stimulation emanating from these if it were not provided with a protec­ tive shield against stimuli. It acquires the shield in this way: its outermost sur­ face ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, becomes to some degree inorganic and thenceforward functions as a special envelope or mem­ brane resistant to stimuli. In consequence, the energies of the external world are able to pass into the next underlying layers, which have remained living, with only a fragment of their original intensity; and these layers can devote themselves, behind the protective shield, to the reception of the amounts of stimulus which have been allowed through it. By its death, the outer layer has saved all the deeper ones from a similar fate . . . . (2 1 )

psychic system. Or so it appears from the standpoint of the psyche.

From a nonpsychic standpoint, by contrast, the cortical layer physically

absorbs those exogenous stimuli that would lead to psychic trauma. In this

way, the dead cortical layer functions as an organic and corporeal agency

through which we can experience the technologically induced shift in the

economy of mind and matter. Read through the 1895 model of qualitative

consciousness, the cortical layer carries out a thorough deterritorialization

of Freud's nouocentric stance, one that brings this theoretical model into the

domain of practice. As a material and physical agency, it dissociates experi-

ence from the narrower metapsychological model of the psyche as writing

machine.

By demonstrating the necessity for a corporeal level of experience,

Freud's stress on protection from stimuli would thus seem to make good on

an injunction voiced in 1895 by Joseph Breuer, Freud's early mentor and

collaborator, that the "perceptual apparatus, including the sensory spheres

of the cortex, . . . be [kept] distinct from the organ which stores up and

reproduces sense impressions in the form of memory-images" (Freud 1954,

363n).18 Not only does the protective function require that perception be

detached from consciousness, but it effectively demands that the (hence-

forth) merely local (intrapsychic) divide between consciousness and mem-

ory-trace be replaced with a broader exclusivity-the exclusivity of corpo-

real and psychic experiential modes.

As a protective envelope enclosing the psyche, the dead cortical layer func­ tions by deflecting exogenous stimuli, by refusing them entrance into the psychic system. Or so it appears from the standpoint of the psyche. From a nonpsychic standpoint, by contrast, the cortical layer physically absorbs those exogenous stimuli that would lead to psychic trauma. In this way, the dead cortical layer functions as an organic and corporeal agency through which we can experience the technologically induced shift in the economy of mind and matter. Read through the 1 8 95 model of qualitative consciousness, the cortical layer carries out a thorough deterritorialization of Freud's nouocentric stance, one that brings this theoretical model into the domain of practice. As a material and physical agency, it dissociates experi­ ence from the narrower metapsychological model of the psyche as writing machine. By demonstrating the necessity for a corporeal level of experience, Freud's stress on protection from stimuli would thus seem to make good on an inj unction voiced in 1 8 95 by Joseph Breuer, Freud's early mentor and collaborator, that the " perceptual apparatus, including the sensory spheres of the cortex, . . . be [kept] distinct from the organ which stores up and reproduces sense impressions in the form of memory-images" ( Freud 1 954, 3 63n) . 1 8 Not only does the protective function require that perception be detached from consciousness, but it effectively demands that the (hence­ forth ) merely local (intrapsychic) divide between consciousness and mem­ ory-trace be replaced with a broader exclusivity-the exclusivity of corpo­ real and psychic experiential modes.

Chapter 7

Technology beyond Thought, or How Real Is

the Lacanian Real?

By reconstructing Freud's inchoate notion of perceptual consciousness in

Chapter 7

chapter 6, I have sought to retool the dead cortical layer into a "faculty"

correlated to the experiential impact of modern and contemporary tech-

nologies. As a corporeal agency of experience, the cortical layer would seem

capable of registering technology's molecular impact on our bodies-the

impact it makes without leaving traces. Why, then, do I now delay develop-

ing this function of the cortical layer to focus on Lacan's, and subsequently

Technology beyond T hought, or H ow Real Is the Lacanian Real?

on Deleuze and Guattari's, respective engagements with modern technol-

ogy? What can possibly be gained from an exposition of the arcane "logics"

of the object petit a and of desiring-production?

Put bluntly, Lacan and the team of Deleuze and Guattari are coresponsi-

ble for an "ontological revolution" in contemporary theory that makes pos-

sible a determination of technology as something more than the mere sup-

port for thought. With the Lacanian conception of the real, and even more

so with its critical appropriation by Deleuze and Guattari, something radi-

cally external to the domain of phenomenological thought becomes-for

the first time-irreducible and unbracketable. In short, the variant though

broadly complementary efforts of both Lacan and Deleuze and Guattari to

link technology with the real combine to form a crucial hinge in my effort to

sketch an alternative approach to technology that avoids the machine reduc-

tion. In this chapter, I shall examine the terms of Lacan's break with the

phenomenological tradition, focusing mostly on its limitations, though not

without some recognition of the positive contribution it made historically as

a catalyst for alternate, nonrepresentationalist models of the subject's con-

stitutive relation to the technological real. In the following chapter, I shall

explore Deleuze and Guattari's joint effort in Capitalism and Schizophrenia

to capitalize on the break first broached by Lacan.

The sustained attention Lacan paid to technology throughout his career

plays a crucial enabling role in his important break with phenomenology.

The final fruit of this attention-Lacan's instantiation in Seminar XI of

By reconstructing Freud' s inchoate notion of perceptual consciousness in chapter 6, I have sought to retool the dead cortical layer into a " faculty " correlated to the experiential impact of modern and contemporary tech­ nologies. As a corporeal agency of experience, the cortical layer would seem capable of registering technology's molecular impact on our bodies-the impact it makes without leaving traces. Why, then, do I now delay develop­ ing this function of the cortical layer to focus on Lacan's, and subsequently on Deleuze and Guattari 's, respective engagements with modern technol­ ogy ? What can possibly be gained from an exposition of the arcane " logics" of the object petit a and of desiring-production ? Put bluntly, Lacan and the team of Deleuze and Guattari are coresponsi­ ble for an " ontological revolution " in contemporary theory that makes pos­ sible a determination of technology as something more than the mere sup­ port for thought. With the Lacanian conception of the real, and even more so with its critical appropriation by Deleuze and Guattari, something radi­ cally external to the domain of phenomenological thought becomes-for the first time-irreducible and unbracketable. In short, the variant though broadly complementary efforts of both Lacan and D eleuze and Guattari to link technology with the real combine to form a crucial hinge in my effort to sketch an alternative approach to technology that avoids the machine reduc­ tion. In this chapter, I shall examine the terms of Lacan's break with the phenomenological tradition, focusing mostly on its limitations, though not without some recognition of the positive contribution it made historically as a catalyst for alternate, nonrepresentationalist models of the subject's con­ stitutive relation to the technological real . In the following chapter, I shall explore Deleuze and Guattari's j oint effort in Capitalism and Schizophrenia to capitalize on the break first broached by Lacan . The sustained attention Lacan paid to technology throughout his career plays a crucial enabling role in his important break with phenomenology. The final fruit of this attention-Lacan's instantiation in Seminar XI of

Tech n o logy beyo n d Thought . 1 7 1

Technology beyond Thought * 171

objet a as "gaze" and "voice" in the modern world-articulates a connec-

tion between desire and ontic technology that localizes technology as the

hinge linking the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. Through this instan-

tiation, Lacan grants technology a role both in the imaginary dialectic con-

stitutive of the split subject and in the inaccessible real. By coordinating the

function of the objet a in the imaginary (the suture of fantasy) with its func-

tion in the real (what in relation to the imaginary subject can only be con-

ceived as "pure lack" or "void"), Lacan recognizes what the phenomenolo-

gist could not: that, alongside its role in fantasy or consciousness,

technology-or, more precisely, the technologically embodied objet a-has

a certain autonomy in the real. Notwithstanding the limitations of Lacan's

own treatment of this autonomy, the connection he draws between technol-

ogy and the real constitutes the hinge that will, in the hands of others, begin

the long process of overturning the machine reduction.

In reconstructing the development of Lacan's thought concerning tech-

nology, I shall seek to separate this fruitful connection of technology and the

real from the reduction it undergoes in his theory. What we will find is that

Lacan's notion of the real is itself the problem, insofar as it remains inca-

pable of breaking with the psychocentrism we have discovered in Freud and

Derrida. Because he consistently conceives of the real from the standpoint of

the symbolic, Lacan effectively renders it a psychic construction. As long as

it remains junctured to the symbolic-"defined by the impossibilities

encountered by the symbolic," as Francois Roustang puts it-the real can-

not furnish the material basis for a robust conception of technological

autonomy.1 To think through the autonomy Lacan wants in principle to

grant technology, we shall thus need to revise the very basis of the real,

emancipating it from its symbolic foundation.

We can get a sense for the stakes of Lacan's reduction by focusing on one

of his more central metaphors for the real: his comparison of psychic energy

with the energy stored up by a hydroelectric dam. Insofar as it installs mean-

ing as the ultimate horizon of analysis, this comparison reproduces the

enabling move central to the analyses of Heidegger and Derrida: "To say

that the energy was in some way already there in a virtual state in the cur-

rent of the river is properly speaking to say something that has no meaning,

for the energy begins to be of interest to us in this instance only beginning

with the moment in which it is accumulated, and it is accumulated only

beginning with the moment when machines are put to work in a certain

way."2 Following the terms of this analogy, we can only conclude that the

Lacanian real is, in some sense, constructed: it comes into being (as some-

thing "of interest to us") only with the imposition of structure, just as the

objet a as " gaze " and "voice " in the modern world-articulates a connec­ tion between desire and ontic technology that localizes technology as the hinge linking the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. Through this instan­ tiation, Lacan grants technology a role both in the imaginary dialectic con­ stitutive of the split subj ect and in the inaccessible real. By coordinating the function of the objet a in the imaginary (the suture of fantasy) with its func­ tion in the real (what in relation to the imaginary subj ect can only be con­ ceived as " pure lack " or " void " ) , Lacan recognizes what the phenomenolo­ gist could not: that, alongside its role in fantasy or consciousness, technology-or, more precisely, the technologically embodied objet a-has a certain autonomy in the real. Notwithstanding the limitations of Lacan's own treatment of this autonomy, the connection he draws between technol­ ogy and the real constitutes the hinge that will, in the hands of others, begin the long process of overturning the machine reduction. In reconstructing the development of Lacan's thought concerning tech­ nology, I shall seek to separate this fruitful connection of technology and the real from the reduction it undergoes in his theory. What we will find is that Lacan's notion of the real is itself the problem, insofar as it remains inca­ pable of breaking with the psychocentrism we have discovered in Freud and D errida. Because he consistently conceives of the real from the standpoint of the symbolic, Lacan effectively renders it a psychic construction. As long as it remains junctured to the symbolic-" defined by the impossibilities encountered by the symbolic, " as Fran