Electoral Rules and the Transformation of Bolivian Politics: The Rise of Evo Morales

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ELECTORAL RULES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOLIVIAN POLITICS

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ELECTORAL RULES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOLIVIAN POLITICS THE RISE OF EVO MORALES Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian

ELECTORAL RULES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOLIVIAN POLITICS

Copyright © Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008. All rights reserved. First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the US—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–60819–1 ISBN-10: 0–230–60819–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Muñoz-Pogossian, Betilde. Electoral rules and the transformation of Bolivian politics : the rise of Evo Morales / Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–60819–1 1. Bolivia—Politics and government—1982– 2. Morales Ayma, Evo, 1959– 3. Movimiento al Socialismo (Bolivia) 4. Bolivia—Politics and government—21st century. I. Title. JL2231.M86 2008 324.6⬘30984—dc22

2008012344

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: October 2008 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

This is dedicated to my family—thanks for your support, love and the joy you bring to my life.


CONTENTS

List of Tables

ix

List of Figures

xi

List of Acronyms 1 2 3 4 5

xiii

The Rise of Evo Morales through an Electoral Lens: An Introduction

1

Bolivia’s Founding Pacts: The Pact for Democracy and the Patriotic Accord through an Electoral Lens

31

Paving the Way for the Transformation of Bolivian Politics: Electoral Reforms and Coalition Building

81

Crumbling Coalitions? Assessing the Transformation of Bolivian Politics

143

Explaining Evo Morales’s Rise to Power: The Unintended [or Intended?] Political Consequences of Electoral Laws

187

Notes

209

Bibliography

223

Index

237


LIST OF TABLES

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.1

The Pact for Democracy: Incentives for Coalition Building Legislative Leadership, 1985–1989 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinet 1 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinet 2 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinet 3 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinets 4 and 5 Composition of the Political Council of the Patriotic Accord or COPAP Paz Zamora Administration: Cabinet 1 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinet 1 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinet 2 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinets 3 and 4 Uninominal and Plurinominal Deputies in the 1997–2002 Chamber of Deputies Uninominal and Plurinominal Deputies in the Chamber of Deputies, 2002–2005 Sanchez de Lozada: Cabinet 2 Sanchez de Lozada: Cabinet 3 Mesa Administration: Cabinet 1 Mesa Administration: Cabinet 2 Mesa Administration: Cabinet 3 Electoral Reforms in Bolivia, 1986–2004

39 49 51 52 53 54 68 73 103 104 106 115 152 161 163 169 171 175 195


LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8

Results of the 1985 Elections Composition of the 1985–1989 Chamber of Deputies Results of the 1993 Elections Composition of the 1993–1997 Chamber of Deputies Results of the 2002 Elections Composition of the 2002–2005 Chamber of Deputies Composition of the 2002–2005 Senate Party Representation in Paz Estenssoro’s Cabinet, 1985–1989 Party Representation in Paz Zamora’s Cabinet, 1989–1993 Party Representation in Sanchez de Lozada’s Cabinet, 1993–1997 Party Representation in Banzer’s Cabinet, 1997–2001 Party Representation in Quiroga’s Cabinet, 2001–2002 Party Representation in Sanchez de Lozada’s Cabinet, 2002–2005 Party Representation in Mesa’s Cabinet, 2003–2005 Party Representation in Evo Morales’s Cabinet, 2005–Present

35 37 82 87 150 153 154 199 199 200 200 201 201 202 202


LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADN AP ASP CEPB CIPC CNE COB COMIBOL CONDEPA CONEPLAN CSUTCB CPE ENDE ENFE FEJUVE FRI FSB FTAA IU LAB LPP MAS MBL MIP MIR MNR MNR-I MRTKL NFR

Acción Democrática Nacionalista Acuerdo Patriótico Asamblea Soberana del Pueblo Confederación de Empresarios de Bolivia Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado Corte Nacional Electoral Central Obrera Boliviana Corporación de Mineros de Bolivia Conciencia de Patria Consejo Nacional de Economía y Planificación Conderación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia Constitución Politica du Estado Empresa Nacional de Electricidad Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles Federación de Juntas Vecinales Frente Revolucionario de Izquierda Falange Socialista Boliviana Free Trade Agreement of the America Izquierda Unida Lloyd Aérea Boliviana Ley de Participación Popular Movimiento al Socialismo Movimiento Bolivia Libre Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario de Izquierda Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari L Nueva Fuerza Republicana

xiv

NPE OTBs PCB PDC POR PS SMD UCS UDP UMSA VC YPFB

L I S T O F AC RO N Y M S

Nueva Política Económica Organizaciones Territoriales de Base Partido Comunista Boliviano Partido Demócrata Cristiano Partido Obrero Revolucionario Partido Socialista Single Member District Unión Cívica Solidaridad Unión Democrática Popular Universidad Mayor de San Andrés Vigilance Committees Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos

CHAPTER 1

THE RISE OF EVO MORALES THROUGH AN ELECTORAL LENS: AN INTRODUCTION

I

n recent times, no other region in Latin America has received so much attention as the Andean region. A brief look at the region reveals that the weaknesses of these burgeoning democratic systems have had a tangible impact upon their political stability. In the last decade, there have been at least six political crises that have each resulted in a presidential change.1 Along with Ecuador, Bolivia has been the most unstable country in the region. In 2003, after what became known as Black October, the president resigned and went into exile in the United States. The succeeding president, Carlos Mesa, resigned 20 months later and, in the midst of political uncertainty, the president of the Supreme Court assumed power. After three presidents in as many years, a highly contested political campaign in 2005 ended with the election of Evo Morales, the Aymara union and political leader, as the nation’s new president. Bolivia continues to hold the eye of the international community. The growing interest springs from the fact that, domestically, it is embarking on a process of major national reforms. Not only do those behind the process promise to revamp the nation’s social contract, but also the movement is being led by one of the indigenous leaders whom sectors of the political class have historically despised. Moreover, the international community sees Bolivia as a political laboratory where, although new and interesting projects may emerge, things can go wrong very easily. Regionally, with the 2005 election of Evo Morales, and his manifested sympathy toward left-leaning Latin American leaders, Bolivia joined what some analysts are now calling “the Latin American new left.”

2

E L E C T O R A L RU L E S A N D B O L I V I A N P O L I T IC S

International donors, journalists, analysts, political scientists, and the general public alike are watching this national exercise closely. In the case of Bolivia, the choice of political institutions—electoral systems, specifically—has mattered greatly. Indeed, electoral reforms have been a key part of Bolivia’s institutional development. Between 1958 and 2007, the country had about thirteen electoral reforms—an average of a new electoral law every 3.4 years. Although the process of reforms was not always informed by political engineering, it has facilitated the emergence of more than 400 parties in 20 years and of more than 500 indigenous movements and civic associations as political vehicles to contest power. At the same time, however, the reforms have also produced a complex and politically volatile environment. In the past, political leaders managed to maintain stability, in spite of system fragmentation, through coalition building, as promoted by the electoral system, constitutional design, and, ultimately, Bolivia’s political culture. Yet recently, a disconnect between the political class and the demands of the population has created a breeding ground for turbulent politics. This has been complicated by the emergence of new opportunities within the political sphere for groups that had been relegated before. This book examines the variations of electoral arrangements across time in Bolivia, highlighting the two most recent electoral reforms that introduced the election of half of the members of the Chamber of Deputies using the Single Member District (SMD) system (in 1997) and allowed for indigenous movements and civic groups (in 2004) to contest elections along with political parties. The book contends that the political outcomes of recent times in Bolivia—such as the events of October 2003 and the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada, the political instability of 2004 and 2005, with the election of President Morales in December 2005, and the emergence of the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo-MAS) as the new hegemonic party in the country—are all consequences of the electoral system. In light of the various electoral reforms, the book analyzes the impact of the electoral rules on the configuration of Congress, executive-legislative relations, and effective coalition building and traces the impact of the reforms on the formation and strengthening of the MAS as a new hegemonic political force. In doing this, the book offers a key contribution to the study of the Bolivian electoral system and recent political events in the country. Why use an electoral lens? Because electoral systems have political consequences. Indeed, electoral design generally affects the behaviors and attitudes of voters, with regards to the formation of party systems (Duverger 1954; Rae 1967) as well as to loyalty and cohesiveness.

T H E R I S E O F E VO M O R A L E S

3

Similarly, electoral rules affect attitudes and behavior, as well as citizen participation in elections (Powell 2000). There are also further incentives for conducting a study on electoral systems. First, research on electoral systems represents an important wealth of literature in the field of comparative politics and has immense heuristic value in assessing the nature and qualities of democratic regimes, institutions, and procedures. Second, electoral systems are worth evaluating because in recent years they have become “politically interesting” (Farrell 1997: 2). Both political scientists and practitioners are rediscovering a theoretical and practical interest in examining the crucial part that electoral systems play in strengthening or debilitating democracy. Third, a study of electoral systems is significant because a comparative analysis on electoral systems can shed light on how political systems function in relation to their institutions. Finally, this study is methodologically significant not only because it expands on existing theoretical knowledge about electoral systems (Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), but also because it aims to contribute to the literature by attempting to uncover new variables that may help explain variations in already accepted hypotheses. Beyond the current interest in Bolivia, it is also pertinent to study this country for theoretical reasons. First, a broad overview of Latin American politics suggests that, relative to other countries in the hemisphere, Bolivia has performed comparatively better in terms of forming electoral and governing coalitions. The Bolivian case suggests an important message to scientists and practitioners in the comparative politics field— that the existence of electoral mechanisms giving incentives for interparty coalitions can generate effective policymaking in difficult environments (Shugart and Carey 1992: 85). However, it also shows that interparty coalitions are not enough to guarantee political stability. This essential point requires further analysis. Second, the capacity of the Bolivian political class to enter into longterm pacts shows an important degree of political maturity (Gamarra 1997a: 134). This, in turn, afforded the Bolivian political system an important attribute, that of a relatively stable democratic regime—especially during the first 20 years following the democratic transition. The present study finds these institutionalized mechanisms for coalition building theoretically and empirically interesting. Finally, since Bolivia’s constitutional structure exhibits features of both presidentialism and parliamentarism, the nation’s political system can be considered a variation within a recurrent constitutional structure in Latin America. It is compelling for comparativists to assess its seemingly apparent uniqueness.

4


Electoral Dynamics: A Review of the Literature The systematic analysis of Latin American electoral systems and their impact on executive-legislative interaction remains an unexplored aspect in the field of comparative politics. While U.S. executive-legislative relations have been much studied (Thurber 1991; Mayhew 1991; Davidson 1991; Peterson and Greene 1994), little research has been done on the severe difficulties faced by divided governments of Latin American countries (Hughes and Mijeski 1973; Suarez 1982). Other comparativists focused, albeit subtly, on electoral systems and divided government in the context of three major scholarly discussions: (i) the debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism, (ii) the debate on the effect of electoral laws on the party system and ultimately on democratic stability; and (iii) the discussion about political institutions and democratic stability in the context of country-specific analyses. Herein lies the literature on Bolivian politics, which places great emphasis on political institutions and structures as the major determinants of interinstitutional dynamics at the national level.

Discussions of Executive-Legislative Relations in the Context of the Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism Debate In the last 20 years, comparativists delved into the study of the features of presidential and parliamentary systems (Lijphart 1984 and 1994; Valenzuela 1990 and 1993; Shugart and Carey 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1997). As a result, a major debate on the advantages and disadvantages of these two ideal types took prominence in the field of comparative politics. This debate includes those scholars who criticize presidentialism and support parliamentarism as the ideal form of government, especially for deeply divided societies (Lijphart 1984 and 1994; Valenzuela 1990 and 1993; Linz and Valenzuela 1994), and those who favor presidentialism and highlight the potential advantages of these systems, especially for Latin American countries (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1997; Mustapic 2002). The major critiques to presidentialism (Lijphart 1984 and 1994; Valenzuela 1990 and 1993; Linz and Valenzuela 1994) relate to its temporal rigidity, its tendency toward majoritarianism, and the existence of dual democratic legitimacy. A substantial aspect of these criticisms deals with examining the sources and consequences of the gridlock caused by divided government in presidential democracies. Lijphart (1984 and 1994),


5

Valenzuela (1990 and 1993), and Linz and Valenzuela (1994) identified this gridlock as one of the primary reasons why presidentialism should not be the preferred form of government for deeply divided democracies, such as those in Latin America. In their analysis, executive-legislative gridlock results from the lack of presidential support in the legislature, imminently induced by the inability of presidential regimes to function effectively with multipartism. In his 1982 study of the power of the executive in Latin American presidential regimes, Suarez identified not only the tendency of presidential governments in Latin America to experience gridlock but also the inability of minority governments to govern effectively. A commonality found in the assertions offered by critics and advocates of presidentialism is their standpoint on the role of executive-legislative confrontation on presidential systems. Scholars who emphasize the potential benefits of the presidential form of government (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1997; Mustapic 2002) also acknowledge the negative consequences of the lack of presidential support in the legislature. Shugart and Carey (1992: 42) examined the performance of democratic systems from various points of view and in turn refuted Linz and other scholars’ claim that, as opposed to parliamentarism, presidentialism is by nature more prone to crises that lead to democratic breakdown. Their study suggested that this negative relationship cited by critics of presidentialism needed to be studied more systematically. Mainwaring also favors presidentialism, but he recognizes the potential negative consequences of the combination of presidentialism and multipartism to democratic stability. He states that “the combination of presidentialism and a fractionalized multiparty system seems especially inimical to stable democracy” (Mainwaring 1990: 168). According to the author, these two elements produce “a difficult combination,” especially when the president lacks congressional support. Like Shugart and Carey (1992), Mainwaring (1993: 215) asserts that legislative support of the president is indispensable for enacting laws and for democratic governance. He also argues that this negative relationship may be not only due to the number of parties in a system, but also due to the interaction between the level of multipartism in a system and the form of constitutional government employed.2 The notions about presidentialism and parliamentarism proposed by these scholars are different. However, both sides of the debate agree that the difficulty of building and sustaining support for the president’s legislative agenda poses a serious problem for effective government; and they

6


both agree that multipartism is inimical to democratic stability. This study throws a challenge to these claims as it attempts to show that presidentialism and multipartism can work and that they have, in fact, worked in the Bolivian case. This study is able to prove this by taking the electoral system for the election of the president and legislature into consideration. Particularly, the project proposes that presidentialism and multipartism can work if the electoral system for executive and legislative elections is designed to engender conditions for effective coalition building. Discussions of Executive-Legislative Relations Utilizing Electoral Rules as one of the Independent Variables Using different comparative approaches, scholars such as Suarez (1982), Mainwaring (1990), Shugart and Carey (1992), Linz and Valenzuela (1994), and Jones (1995) suggest that the degree of executive-legislative confrontation in Latin American presidential systems is a by-product of the electoral rules employed by these nations. These authors focused on two main negative consequences of divided government for Latin American democracies. On one hand, they emphasized the impact of electoral rules on the performance of presidential systems, that is, their capacity to foster ineffective governments and democratic instability. On the other hand, these authors pointed to the risk of democratic breakdown produced by executive-legislative confrontation. Shugart and Carey (1992) focus on constitutional design and electoral rules and cycles as having an effect on the interaction between presidents and assemblies. They assert that the processes of election of the president and legislature have profound effects on the functioning of democracy, especially in light of the separate origins and survivals of these two branches of government. Similarly, Jones (1995: 158) also considers electoral arrangements as one of the main sources of divided government in Latin American presidential systems. In his view, it is not the legislative formula, but the executive electoral formula that has the most inf luence on executivelegislative relations. He agrees with scholars who argue that multipartism and presidential governments are incompatible in most cases ( Jones 1995: 160). But instead of offering parliamentarism as the preferred alternative for these regimes, he proposes the adoption of electoral systems designed to ameliorate multipartism. Although his analysis recognizes that electoral laws alone do not make or break a democratic system, it does posit that they have a significant impact on its effective functioning ( Jones 1995: 3–5). He finds this is specially the case when a president is deprived


7

of a legislative majority (or near majority) forcing her/him to utilize extraconstitutional methods to implement government policies. While acknowledging Jones’s claims that electoral systems can be designed to reduce or produce multipartism, this study further proposes that presidentialism can work with an electoral system that produces incentives for coalition formation. It also proposes that the legislative formula for the translations of votes into seats has as much inf luence as the executive formula, if not more. Similarly, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) examine the impact of electoral laws, party systems, and the internal organization of legislatures in facilitating or hindering the capacity of presidents to obtain legislative approval for their bills. Confirming the already established premise that electoral arrangements matter, their study suggests that executive-legislative relations in presidential systems can be improved by redesigning electoral laws to reduce party fragmentation. In analyzing the legislative powers of the president, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), like many other comparativists, suggest that keeping the legislative powers of presidents restricted, especially if their partisan powers are weak, can enhance democratic stability. In an attempt to provide a theoretical and empirical balance in the study of democratic institutions, and with the goal of overcoming the stereotype imposed on legislatures3 by Latin Americanists, Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) also consider electoral arrangements as one of the variables having an impact on legislative politics, legislative behavior, and the actual role legislatures have in the policy process. Yet electoral rules are not the focus of the study since they believe that although electoral rules may have an independent impact, the party and constitutional systems mediate their impact. In sum, these comparativists conclude that electoral rules and electoral systems matter. Moreover, they assert that democratic stability is inf luenced by the degree of confrontation between the executive and the legislature and that unless the president has a majority or near majority in the legislature, s/he is likely to experience serious confrontation—thus making governance ineffective. However, they fail to propose alternatives in designing electoral systems that can facilitate coalition building. Country-Specific Analysis of Political Institutions and Democratic Stability: The Case of Bolivia A group of comparativists examined the interaction between the executive and legislative branches of governments in their country-oriented

8


analyses (Hughes and Mijeski 1973; Lehoucq 1992; D’Agostino 1992; Gonzales and Gillespie 1994; Deheza 1997 and 1998). However, a small number of scholars consider the case of Bolivia as part of a larger comparative project (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1995; Von Mettenheim 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Grindle 2000 and 2002; Deheza 1997 and 1998), and very few scholars systematically examined the Bolivian political and institutional context as their major case (Whitehead 1986; Gamarra 1987, 1997a and 1997b; Mayorga 1999; Deheza 2000; Whitehead and Crabtree 2001). Within the first group of scholars who considered the Bolivian case as part of a larger comparative project (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1995; Von Mettenheim 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Grindle 2000 and 2002; Deheza 1997 and 1998), some noted the uniqueness of the Bolivian system in terms of the coalition-inducing effect of its method of presidential election. These scholars, besides acknowledging other politicohistorical factors that also inf luence the behavior of political actors, propose that the election of the president via the legislature engenders an interdependent and cooperative presidential-legislative relationship. According to Jones (1995: 48), this in turn allowed Bolivia to avoid much of the interinstitutional confrontation that is associated with other multiparty presidential systems. Jones (1995) provides a compelling analysis of the impact of Bolivia’s electoral arrangements on the relationship between the executive and the legislature. The findings of his analysis support the claim that the unique attributes of the Bolivian system reduced executive-legislative confrontation. His study neither provides an analysis of why executive-legislative confrontation is well managed in Bolivia nor does it consider the particular attributes of the Bolivian electoral system that produce conditions for coalition building. The purpose of this book is to uncover those particular features of the Bolivian political system that reduced executive-legislative confrontation during the 1980s and 1990s until today. A potential answer may be found in what Valenzuela (1993) and Gamarra (1997a and 1997b) suggested, namely, its method of presidential election, recent electoral reforms, and the impact they have on coalition building. Nonetheless, this book recognizes potential changes in this trend as the events of February and October 2003 suggest. These political developments in the country seem to have foreshadowed a reordering of the Bolivian political system. This study also aims to address the factors that may contribute to this trend. Other authors such as Chasquetti (2001) highlight Bolivia’s ability to ameliorate “the difficult combination” of presidentialism with multiparty


9

systems. He evaluates the difficult combination proposed by Mainwaring and attempts to demonstrate that multiparty presidential systems with majority coalitions are effective politicoinstitutional formats able to guarantee democratic stability. Analogously, the author asserts that multiparty presidential systems without government coalitions are, without a doubt, problematic (Chasquetti 2001: 321). Chasquetti (2001: 342) attributes the tendency of the Bolivian political class to form coalitions to the congressional election of the president when no candidate achieves an absolute majority as the key to coalition building in the country. Along with Chasquetti’s arguments, the present study attempts to prove that since 1985 this institutional provision stimulated party coalitions with the purpose of supporting governments. Besides the institutional arrangements that promote coalition building, minority presidents also have a political motivation to negotiate coalitions vis-à-vis their need to approve legislation in the legislature. Deheza (1997 and 1998: 151–169) also focuses on coalition building and democracy in South American nations, including Bolivia. Her quantitative study investigates the existence of coalitions in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela since 1958 until 1994. The author puts forward the notion that coalition governments occur more frequently in South American presidential democracies than do one-party governments (Deheza 1998: 136). Within the debates of this second group of authors who dealt with the case of Bolivia directly, one of the most salient issues in the various analyses is the debate regarding Bolivia’s constitutional structure. No real consensus exists as to how the attributes of the Bolivian system work to the benefit or detriment of its democratic stability, and much less as to what label to give it.4 Mayorga (1999: 36) asserts that “parliamentarized presidencialism” (presidencialismo parlamentarizado) relies on interparty coalitions. Moreover, he asserts that it has generated a different “parliamentary logic” and has established a necessary and essential nexus between presidents and legislatures through the forging of congressional majorities/near-majorities. Mayorga is more optimistic than other comparativists working on Bolivia since he argues that Bolivia experienced a process that resulted in an effective moderate multiparty system in which no party exercises a hegemonic role—a system qualitatively opposed to the highly fragmented and polarized multiparty system in existence during the Bolivian transition to democracy (Mayorga 1999: 24). This study contends with this premise and attempts to show that the electoral system not only helped generate

10


working coalitions but eventually also engendered a hegemonic role for the MAS party. Furthermore, Mayorga also points to a significant political transformation in Bolivia’s political class that originated not only from what he identifies as a gradual disappearance of corrupt politicians but also from the progressive development of a logic of pacts and agreements that, in his view, has eradicated the traditional logic of “war” between political adversaries (Mayorga 1999: 25). Although he does not directly deal with the electoral arrangements in Bolivia, Mayorga contends that the decisive factor for this increasing democratization of the Bolivian regime lies in its institutions, namely, the interaction between this different government logic and the nation’s constitutional design, which has opened an optimal scenario for government coalitions and for the congressional support of presidents. Conversely, Gamarra (1997a and 1997b) asserts that Bolivia’s hybrid presidential system is inherently incongruous with presidentialism. In his view, under the constitutional provision granting authority to the legislature to elect the president, Bolivian politics has functioned many times as a parliamentary system. He asserts then that to maintain democratic governance, parties have had to build pacts and create multiparty governments just as parliamentary systems do. However, although Congress elects the president, the executive branch is not dependent on parliamentary confidence and s/he remains in office for a fixed term. Thus, Bolivia’s system is a hybrid that combines features of both presidentialism and parliamentarism (Gamarra 1997a and 1997b). Moreover, Gamarra (1997a: 109–135) argues that separate executive and legislative powers permitted Bolivian presidents to build their popularity and form new party coalitions throughout the nation’s democratization process but that external constraints and domestic austerity programs consistently hampered democratic politics during the 1980s. In his view, the Bolivian executive electoral formula forced presidential candidates to balance the “plesbicitarian appeals needed to get votes in the first round with subsequent realities,” namely, the need to forge interparty coalitions in the legislature to get elected and to also renegotiate these coalitions to be able to govern. Building on the work of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and also focusing on the case of Bolivia, a later work by Deheza (2000) studies the effects of electoral laws on the stability and/or instability of the Bolivian political party system and its characteristic multipartism. The author provides a statistical analysis to examine the volatility of political parties in Bolivia. In her study, she argues that although volatility exists in terms of


11

the parties elected to Congress, relative stability is also present due to the permanence across time of the three major political parties in Bolivia, namely, the National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario-MNR), the National Democratic Action party (Acción Democrática Nacional-ADN), and the Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR). Deheza (2000) also asserts that electoral laws in Bolivia have the tendency to promote the proliferation of minor parties and produce system fragmentation. The author argues that the Bolivian political system is highly volatile, mainly due to the electoral reforms that modified the translation of votes into seats. Whitehead et al (2001) also offer an analysis of a wide range of themes to assess Bolivia’s achievements in constructing democracy that, in their view, are considerable. They examine Bolivia’s major political changes to determine how they contributed to resolving the country’s longstanding problems. Their work stresses the need to consider historical conditions to understand “democratic viability” in Bolivia. They refer to various issues that must be taken into consideration to explain democratic viability in Bolivia, namely, the ability of the state to maintain effective control and jurisdiction over the territory, regime legitimacy, and democratic institutionalism, a strong and effective link between state and civil society, effective citizenship, and economic performance, among other factors. Taking into account the hypothesis proposed by these groups of scholars, especially those by Jones (1995), Deheza (1998), and Chasquetti (2001), this study proposes that the Bolivian democratic system has generally produced the necessary mechanisms to resolve the “difficult combination” of presidentialism, multiparty systems, and proportional representation systems that are generally a source of permanent political confrontation and government instability in many other presidential systems. However, the study also recognizes the political challenges present in the country since 2000, and more clearly in 2003, including the increasing weakening of the state and the social mobilization going untangled, besides the economic crisis and international pressures that may challenge these assumptions considerably. Consensus in the Literature The preceding review of the literature on divided government and the impact of electoral arrangements on executive-legislative dynamics

12


suggests that albeit their differences, these authors agree on the following: a. Presidentialism—or hybrid presidentialism—and multipartism are “a difficult combination.” Scholars overwhelmingly assert that when the president’s party lacks a majority or near majority of the seats in the legislature, the system is more prone to democratic instability. b. These authors conclusively posit that presidential systems and hybrid presidential systems, as in the case of Bolivia, that consistently fail to provide the president with adequate legislative support are inherently unstable and ineffective. But some also suggested that some electoral systems can ameliorate multipartism and induce coalition building. c. The electoral arrangements tend to be one of the principal causes of divided government in Latin America, as well as of presidential systems in other regions of the world. Some also suggested that constitutional structures as well as legislators’s goals and strategies, among others, also have a role. d. Most scholars in the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate argue that the stronger the executive and the weaker the legislature, the more unstable the democratic system will be. Other analyses suggest that it might be more beneficial to center decision making in the executive. This study considers electoral arrangements as a basic factor facilitating or undermining divided government. It considers both the legislative and executive electoral formulas as crucial determinants of executivelegislative relations and further proposes, contrary to the above-mentioned propositions, that multipartism and presidential governments can be compatible. The key to enabling presidentialism to work with multipartism lies in an electoral system’s ability to produce incentives for coalition formation. Resolving the Electoral Dilemma Over the past two decades, scholars—including many of those just reviewed—extensively addressed the dilemma that electoral engineers face between the degree of correspondence between the choices of voters and who gets elected (representativeness), on the one hand, and government efficiency (governance), on the other, when designing


13

electoral systems. In their 1992 seminal study, Shugart and Carey (1992: 8) asserted that a tradeoff always occurs between “representativeness” and “efficiency” when designing electoral systems. In their line of analysis, whereas a representative system is one in which elections allow for the articulation and provision of a space and voice for diverse interests in the assembly, an efficient system is one in which elections turn less on the provision of particularistic services and more on constituents focusing on policymaking. Moreover, electoral systems that are proportional tend to facilitate the representation of minority interests, but they also hinder the ability of political leaders to govern, especially because they facilitate the proliferation of numerous minor parties and promote the fragmentation of the political system. Based on this, when there is a high level of representativeness, there should be a low level of government efficiency. These are situations in which government coalitions are difficult to achieve and sustain, causing governments to be unstable and to sometimes collapse. On the contrary, according to the authors, an electoral system that is nonproportional avoids the unmitigated explosion of minor parties, thereby increasing the cohesiveness of the political system. Majoritarian systems have the ability of guaranteeing the possibility that the executive can articulate national policy goals, transcending parochial partisan interests. Consequently, although they undermine the representation of particular and regional interests, they facilitate policymaking and promote government efficiency. This produces a government that is much more stable. Coalitions can be understood as any group of political parties that agree to (a) follow common programmatic goals, (b) mobilize resources to attain those goals, and (c) distribute the benefits of achieving those goals. To secure them, governments can recur to different kinds of payoffs, namely, particularistic payoffs (pork and patronage), positional payoffs (ministerial portfolios), policy concessions, and agenda setting (Cox and Morgenstern 2002: 453–454), among other bargaining strategies. While recognizing the existence of empirical evidence suggesting that electoral systems that favor two-party systems are more capable of avoiding immobilism and intense legislative-executive confrontation because they facilitate the formation of coalition governments (Mainwaring 1990 and 1993: 207; Shugart and Carey 1992), this analysis of the Bolivian case may prove a different reality. The book attempts to show whether electoral systems that favor multipartism can moderate the likelihood of confrontation amongst political actors by producing the necessary conditions for coalition

14


building in the legislature and guaranteeing inclusiveness in the political realm. In the particular case of Bolivia, the book confirms that because the electoral system determines the allocation of power, especially in terms of governmental policymaking, the relations among political actors and the political outcomes themselves are profoundly inf luenced by it. At the same time, the book shows that the Bolivian electoral system had important political consequences for the emergence of new actors, and these factors can explain the rise of a new dominant political force in the country. It is an electoral system that allowed a high level of representation of minority interests. Indeed, the relationship between representation and efficiency remained in tension, but representation of minority interests was guaranteed. In attempting to trace the emergence of Evo Morales as a prominent political leader, and the MAS as the new hegemony, the book evaluates seven key moments in Bolivian political history from 1985 to the present. These key moments are also linked to important legal instruments in Bolivia that dealt with major reforms to the political and/or economic systems, and citizen participation in the political process. Thus, the analysis is done in the context of seven legal instruments: ●

●

●

Supreme Decree 21060 or New Economic Policy (NEP). Enacted by President Paz Estenssoro in 1985, this is one of the most important presidential decrees in Bolivian history because it introduced an economic package aimed at implementing economic stabilization and structural adjustment programs. Indeed, a 1999 survey of 17 of the most important Bolivian politicians, researchers, and journalists on the most relevant laws in the country since the transition to democracy reveals that Decree 21060 is the most cited one, the one cited by all surveyed people, and the one always cited first (Romero Ballivián 1999: 73–86). Law 1330 or Privatization Law. This law was sent to the legislature by President Paz Zamora and approved by Congress with the support of the ADN-MIR alliance. It followed Supreme Decree 22836, also a policy on privatization, enacted by Paz Zamora before the law was designed. The “privatization law” enabled legislation for the privat ization of state-owned enterprises. This law complemented the neoliberal measures that were started with the NPE. Law 1544 or Capitalization Law. Approved by Congress during the Sánchez de Lozada administration, it is one of the most controversial laws in Bolivia. The Capitalization Law covered various


●

●

●

●

15

aspects of the privatization initiative started in the previous administration, and it structured the implementation of a program of partial privatization of state enterprises with the investment of private capital. It also included a program to capitalize a pension plan. Law 1551 or Popular Participation Law. This law was also groundbreaking because it restructured local politics in Bolivia. The law established new municipalities throughout the country as the basic level of public authority. It also implemented the direct election of municipal councils and mayors as well as the assignment of 20 percent of government revenues to the new municipalities. Law 2029 or Law for Drinking Water and Sanitary Sewer Systems. This law was passed during the Banzer-Quiroga administration (1997– 2002) in its second governing year (1999) to privatize the distribution of water in Cochabamba. It was so controversial that it resulted in the so-called Water War (Guerra del Agua) in 2000. Dignity Plan (Plan Dignidad). This was one of the results of the National Dialogue process also started during the Banzer-Quiroga administration. This presidential plan committed the government to eliminating all illicit coca production in Bolivia within five years through coca eradication, alternative development, controlling chemical precursors, and interdiction. Law 3058 or the Hydrocarbons Law. In 2003, as the world closely watched the Iraq invasion, the existing Law of Hydrocarbons was being adamantly rejected by most popular sectors in Bolivia on the grounds that it meant the exploitation of a very important natural resource in the country by the multinationals, with very small revenues accruing from it for the country. Moreover, the situation was complicated by the proposal by Sánchez de Lozada to export gas through Chile. The Law of Hydrocarbons provoked the Gas War, the resignation of the president in 2003, and the tense relationship of the succeeding president with Congress in 2004 and 2005. It served as the legal instrument for President Morales to nationalize gas resources in May 2006.

The book traces the process behind the establishment of these legal instruments, the discussions leading to them, and the consequences of their enactment in the context of the impact of the electoral system on the configuration of Congress. The process of building coalitions is also traced, and emphasis is placed on how these events provided the space for the MAS to emerge as a new and leading political force.

16


Bolivian Political History Revisited: From MNR to MAS Albeit the existence of power-driven leaders, and periods of extreme political instability, which are indubitably two key factors that may undermine institutional development, Bolivian leaders, military and civil alike, have always considered institution building as important and have been able to move forward in this regard. Electoral reforms in Bolivia have generally not been deliberative but responsive to political pressures and events. Also, there has always been a marked trend toward guaranteeing greater political participation and representativeness in the political system. Indeed as Whitehead (2001: 25) asserts, “Successive efforts to widen participation are central to the story of the emergence of democracy in Bolivia,” as well as to later political developments. Politicohistorical events in this country and society’s transformation have generally shaped the building and strengthening of institutions. In this sense, the analysis shows that in the case of Bolivia, electoral systems can inf luence political outcomes but are also inf luenced and shaped by external political factors and decisions made by the political class. Bolivia endured similar patterns of political instability in three basic historical periods, namely, during the independence process, during the 1960s and 1970s with frequent military de facto governments, and during the period following the year 2000. During these periods, however, electoral reforms were advanced and changes were implemented while other kinds of political and societal changes were also taking place. One of the key reforms of the republican years is that enacted on October 14, 1834, which introduced the congressional election of the president among the three most voted candidates in case none of them achieved two-thirds of the popular vote. This electoral stipulation became a permanent feature of the electoral system. The years after two harsh wars, namely, the War of the Pacific against Chile and the Chaco War against Paraguay, were characterized by the formation of one of the main Bolivian political parties. By January 1941, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Hernan Siles Suazo, Walter Guevara Arce, Lidia Gueiler, Juan Lechín, and another group of young intellectuals from the professional middle class established the MNR. The most striking reforms came about in the 1950s when the MNR was able to consolidate an important group of followers who were against existing electoral arrangements, especially those dealing with restrictive citizenship and voting requirements. The party presented itself as a pluralist movement trying to group all social classes. It originally emerged


17

as a force opposing the oligarchic regime that, until then, had dominated all political life. On April 9, 1952, the MNR mobilized the support of tin miners, peasant unionists, and former participants of the Chaco War into what became known as the 1952 Revolution. The reforms previously attempted through a constitutional reform could now be furthered. The 1952 Revolution nationalized tin mines previously controlled by the three tin barons and ended the accumulation of land ownership. The revolution was successful also in shifting government resources into social welfare programs, including the provision of primary education in the rural areas, and, more importantly, in establishing an emerging hegemonic political force in Bolivia—that of the MNR. Indeed, from a politicoelectoral point of view, the revolution transformed the power structure and gave way to the emergence of new actors; it opened the political space with the incorporation of those political actors that, until then, had been excluded or marginalized from the “oligarchic” institutional politics (Garcia Montero 2001: 67; Gamarra and Malloy 1988). The Decree 03128 of July 21, 1952 institutionalized the universal vote. Through this law, all inhabitants of the country—men and women, the indigenous and the mestizos, the literate and the illiterate— had the right to elect their leaders and authorities and to be elected, with only minor requirements—being 21 years of age or older and having Bolivian citizenship. This new disposition was the opposite of what had been utilized in the past, that is, the use of the “qualified vote” through which the vote was reserved only for property-owning men who read and wrote Spanish. As the 1952 electoral decree states, the goal was to impose a democratic regime in which “the people were the source of all power and authority.” With a new electoral law in 1956, the election of the president and vice president was conducted through a system of absolute majority. Another development this law introduced was the possibility for women to assume all popular electoral positions. Senators were elected through a mixed system of majority and deputies through a proportional representation system of double quotient,5 with voting in closed lists6 for both chambers. In other words, senators were elected (two for each department) by a majority system using lists decided by the party chiefs and undisclosed to the voters. However, deputies were elected through proportional representation with a double quotient system according to the system of simple quota and largest remainders.7 Electoral reforms were used by the new dominant political force to also shape political outcomes. This electoral formula (the closed list, and

18


double-quotient system) allowed MNR leaders to choose their most preferred candidates, centralizing the selection process of the members of Congress in La Paz. The complete list, introduced by the MNR, also linked the candidates for deputies and senators to the presidential candidate. In this sense, there was no mechanism for the voter to distinguish between the presidential candidate and those that composed the list for Congress. Also, voters could not split their vote but had to cast a single vote for one party in both presidential and congressional races. In this sense, small parties could not endorse a major party presidential candidate and still keep their own identity in the congressional election. Smaller parties had to run a presidential candidate and assume all costs related to their participation in order to have a chance to reach Congress. Under this system, the MNR candidate as well as the principal leaders of each party named their closest followers for positions within the complete list, so there was no chance for leaders who were not part of the core group of the party to run in an electoral race. Another effect was the dependence of party discipline in the legislature upon patron-client networks. The MNR sustained its hegemonic stance with the assistance of the Bolivian Worker’s Union (Central Obrera Boliviana-COB). These two had dominated Bolivian politics under the figure of a cogovernment, but the MNR sought to institutionalize a hegemonic dominance of the party in the political realm (Gamarra and Malloy 1988: 34). In 1964, as a result of tensions within this alliance between the MNR and the COB, the stability based in this cogovernment was broken, giving way to a crisis in the party and across the country. A period of political instability ensued with the predominance of military regimes. This tension reached its breaking point with the coup d’état by General Hugo Banzer Suarez in 1971. As the military was assuming power, the MNR started losing its hegemonic stance and the Bolivian Revolution was left uncompleted. The principal objectives of the new de facto government were to resolve the democratic governance problems of the previous years and to guarantee the nation’s political stability, considered as an essential condition for economic development. The MNR supported the coup d’état and participated in the Banzer government until 1974 when the military ignored the support of political parties. Its participation consisted of collaborating in the decomposition of its former partner, the union movement. Parallel to the strengthening of this authoritarian regime, the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) was also founded. In 1971,


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Jaime Paz Zamora, Oscar Eid Franco, and Antonio Araníbar Quiroga established the MIR. These militants principally came from the radical currents of Christian and Marxist ideology and were joined by their common opposition to the Banzer regime. Later on, the MIR would come to abandon its initial revolutionary Marxist thesis for more moderate principles. Through various internal reforms, though, the party also became one of the key actors in the politics of pacts characteristic of Bolivian politics. The Banzer regime was very repressive in nature and politically prosecuted many of the members of the MIR. By November 1977, however, after a hunger strike organized by mining women, General Banzer was compelled to suspend prohibitions on political participation and call for general elections. These took place in 1978. The Electoral Law of 1965 was applied to the 1979 elections. Around this time, the political party Nationalist Democratic Action (Acción Democrática Nacionalista-ADN) was also founded. In March 1979, Hugo Banzer Suarez and a group of his followers decided to create this new political party with the purpose of participating in the election taking place that same year. Another purpose of creating the ADN was to create in Congress a support group for the former dictator, who was facing a series of investigations and the possibility of a trial on charges of corruption and human rights violations. The ADN party was formed basically as a conservative party. The “Doctrine and Ideology of ADN” proposed a commitment to a conservative and liberal program in the economic realm. Since its beginning, the ADN represented the interests of the private business sector and the upper middle class. In the social realm, the party promoted the defense of the family as the basis of society and defended the right of the Bolivian people to have access to the sea (Garcia Montero 2001: 42). The ADN ran a campaign for the first time in the 1979 elections. The 1979 electoral process was later annulled by the level of verified fraud. The fraud was generally attributed to errors existing in the electoral registry as well as to “ballot stuffing,” a practice in which political parties made their voters deposit into the ballot boxes more than the one colored ballot allowed per voter. The ambiguity and chaos caused by this fraud paved the way for new de facto military takeovers.8 The existing 1956 Electoral Law was reformed in January 1979, establishing “the representation of majorities and minorities” as one of the principles of suffrage. In terms of the election of political leaders, the electoral arrangements were much more structured. This time, the law stipulated that the president

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and vice president were elected directly by the people with an absolute majority of votes for a four-year mandate.9 For congressional elections, this reform allowed for the nine departments to elect three senators by the system of incomplete lists and absolute majority of votes, that is, “two by majority and one by minority for a six-year mandate,”10 whereas the departments could elect five deputies for every department and one for every 50,000 inhabitants. This 1979 electoral reform was aimed at preventing the proliferation of small parties. Under the terms of these reforms, parties that did not achieve a 50,000-vote minimum were forced to pay their share of printing the ballot. However, to guarantee minority representation, the electoral law allowed alliances and coalitions. In the elections of 1979, Hernan Siles Zuazo won the first majority. Victor Paz Estenssoro was very close behind, obtaining only about 1,500 less votes. As it was stipulated in the Constitution, Congress had the responsibility of determining who would become president. After the 1979 stalemate (empantanamiento), in other words, after various fruitless voting rounds in Congress in which no consensus was achieved, the legislature decided to designate Walter Guevara Arze, the then president of Congress, as interim constitutional president. Various de facto governments ruled the country starting in 1979 until 1982 when the electoral results of the 1979 elections were finally recognized. In 1982, Hernan Siles Zuazo took power as constitutional president of Bolivia, giving way to the Bolivian transition to democracy. However, the early 1980s in Bolivia were characterized by a severe economic crisis that undermined the political stability of the country. Hernan Siles Zuazo voluntarily resigned from the presidency in December 1984 to facilitate the resolution of the country’s economic and political crisis, and new elections were held on July 14, 1985. General Hugo Banzer, who had formed the ADN in 1979, participated in this electoral process—this time with renewed enthusiasm for democracy. He came first in the election. However, because Banzer did not achieve an absolute majority, Congress was left to decide who would become president. Following these arrangements, Victor Paz Estenssoro, second in the popular election, was elected president by Congress and assumed power in August 1985.11 In 1986, a new electoral law was enacted that highlighted the importance of the democratic regime. It stated that the effectiveness of the suffrage was fully guaranteed by law and constituted the basis of the representative, democratic, participatory, and unitary regime. The law also assigned the responsibility of the adequate development and vigilance of


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the electoral process to “the branches of government, to political parties, and citizens in general.” New elections were called at the end of 1988. The 1989 electoral process was paired with other important political and societal developments, including the establishment of new political parties. In 1988, the closing of a very popular radio and TV channel in La Paz caused a great multitude of people to protest in the town squares.12 The protests were followed by the establishment of a nationalist political party—Conscience of the Motherland (Conciencia de Patria-CONDEPA)—by its owner and announcer Carlos Palenque, also known as “El Compadre.” Although small, CONDEPA quickly became an important contender in the nation’s electoral scenario, and for the 1989 elections, Palenque became the candidate with the highest intention of votes in La Paz and El Alto, two important political focal points in Bolivia. If it won at least in these two cities, CONDEPA could clearly become a key partner in a political pact. However, votes were not enough to make CONDEPA the main political force. In the 1989 elections, MNR candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada obtained a relative majority of the votes; General Hugo Banzer with the ADN won the second place, and Jaime Paz Zamora with the MIR achieved the third place. Following the stipulations introduced in 1834 for the congressional election of the president when no candidate achieves a majority, this time Congress elected the third running candidate, Jaime Paz Zamora, as the new president of Bolivia. His victory was due to the support given to him by General Banzer and the ADN party by forming one of the least expected coalitions in Bolivian history. After the 1989 elections, the Solidarity Civic Union (UCS), another political party of a populist nature, was founded on August 15, 1989, after diverging from the National Civic Union party (Unión Cívica NacionalUCN). The UCN later allied with Sánchez de Lozada in exchange for some deputy positions and then disappeared (Garcia Montero 2001: 121). The commercial structure of the brewing company owned by the party leader Max Fernández Rojas was also the party structure. Indeed, there was a strong link between the commercialization and beer distribution functions and the directive positions within the political movement, which was mainly composed of the dissidents of other political parties. Thus, it was difficult to distinguish between the party structure and the management structure of the company (Garcia Montero 2001: 120–121). Following the death of Max Fernández in an accident, the leadership of the company, and of the party, was assumed by his son Johnny Fernández who also ran for elections in 1997 and 2002. Building on his

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father’s success, he had forged a political career at the local level and had also become a key person in the family business. The UCS ideologically supported “work, honesty, and social justice.” It promoted the defense of democracy and respect for the Constitution. The party valued market economy and opposed both interventionism and protectionism in the economy. By 1989, the UCS had become the fifth most important political force in Bolivian politics (Archondo 1999: 22). Advocating for the strengthening of security forces in Bolivia and for decentralization, the core of its appeal to the masses rested on the popularity of its leader, Max Fernández. The results of the 1989 general elections in Bolivia provoked serious controversy for various reasons. On one hand, an electoral coalition was formed with two very unlikely parties bringing into power the third most voted candidate. This later made way for a major electoral modification through which Congress would elect the president only from the top two formulas. On the other hand, the general public and the media questioned the behavior adopted by the departmental electoral courts and the National Electoral Court (CNE).13 There were alleged reports of manipulations of the vote counting procedures, and an alleged bias in the allocation of Senate and deputy seats. These reports created an environment filled with suspicion and led the general population to ask for more credibility and legitimacy in electoral procedures and institutions. In July 1989, the Catholic Church called the leaders of the three most voted parties to meet behind closed doors. After two days, the political parties announced to the public that they had identified a series of “legal deficiencies” that had to be amended in order to strengthen democratic institutionalism in the country. The parties agreed on the need to provide all people in society, especially those in rural sectors, with identification documents. Similarly, the parties agreed on the need to establish one electoral registry, permanent and computerized, as well as to guarantee impartiality and transparency by the Electoral Courts. The representatives at this meeting also agreed on the need to make constitutional reforms in order to improve the existing electoral system. After almost 18 months, the leaders took on the task of taking concrete measures to implement what they had agreed upon. Their work culminated with what was known as the “Agreements of February 5, 1991,” subscribed by the leaders of each of the three most voted parties plus CONDEPA, and the Free Bolivia Movement party (Movimiento Bolivia Libre-MBL) that broke away from the MIR. That same year, an interparty


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commission proposed a project for an electoral law, which was approved by Congress and enacted on July 5, 1991. Although it did not directly deal with the proportional representation system prevalent at the time, nor with other features of the electoral system, the 1991 constitutional reform further institutionalized the CNE. The reform guaranteed the CNE’s autonomy and stated that it would be composed of five members not associated with any political party who would be elected by a two-thirds vote in the National Congress, plus one member appointed by the president. The 1991 reform also proposed the adoption of a validation mechanism for the votes in the ballot boxes based on the “principle of preclusion” (Art. 171), by which election results recorded at the voting table were considered final, stipulating very specific causes for annulment, thereby eliminating existing mechanisms that made possible the manipulation and distortion of the results by the department electoral courts and the CNE.14 For instance, previous electoral arrangements granted the electoral courts the authority to review the voting procedures and results, as well as to annul votes if they thought that electoral laws had been violated in any way, or if political party representatives claimed any wrongdoing. These duties assigned to the electoral courts were always questioned, but they became more controversial after the 1989 elections. Similarly, and with the purpose of guaranteeing minority representation, the procedure to calculate the translation of votes into parliamentary seats was changed substituting the double quotient system, established with the 1956 electoral reform, with the D’Hondt formula using the odd divisors variant.15 Using the 1991 electoral arrangements, general elections were held again in June 1993 through which Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was elected president. Although there was a new electoral reform in 1993 by Jaime Paz Zamora, electoral reforms well into the 1990s did not significantly alter the proportional representation system and the use of closed lists. The electoral reforms focusing on the proportional representation system, for instance, were limited in principle to determining the application of different formulas of proportional representation used in the 1985, 1989, and 1993 elections with the purpose of avoiding the entrance of small parties into Congress. In 1991, however, the intention was to not marginalize smaller political parties. Unlike the double quotient formula, the 1991 electoral reform introduced the Saint-Lägue formula,16 which was used for the 1993 presidential and parliamentary elections with the purpose of stimulating

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the representation of small parties. Under this proportional representation system, small parties could easily access the legislature by winning a seat with only 1 to 1.5 percent of the votes. For the municipal elections of 1995, a new political force of high electoral caliber at the time was born in the department of Cochabamba. The center-right political party New Republican Force (Nueva Fuerza Republicana-NFR) was a faction of the ADN. It was led by the then mayor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa, and coca-leaf peasants from the Chapare, who joined to contain governmental repression of their crop production. The locals formed a political party that was started from their unions, and the NFR started to build a mass support in the late 1990s. In 2002, the NFR became one of the strongest political contenders in the elections and even today enjoys some popular appeal at the local level. Evo Morales’s Emerging Hegemonic Political Force: The 1994 Constitutional Reform During the 1993–1997 presidential period, and as a result of the National Agreement for the Modernization of the State, the Constitution was modified, recognizing, at least in theory, the multiethnic character of Bolivia. The educational reform was developed to promote the intercultural and bilingual character of the country, and the Law of Popular Participation was enacted to strengthen the rural municipalities and to create a space for indigenous people to take part in local government functions. In the early 1990s, one of the sectors that benefited the most from these reforms was a new emerging but critical mass, a party that was initially called the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (Asamblea por la Soberanía del Pueblo-ASP). The ASP and the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People (Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos-IPSP) were established in March 1995, grouping peasant, indigenous, and coca grower organizations to contest political power. This group wanted to run a campaign for the municipal elections held in 1995. Since the ASP-IPSP was unable to secure recognition from the CNE, the group was forced to find a party that would want to sponsor them. Thus, the ASP-IPSP pacted with the United Left party (Izquierda Unida-IU), a coalition of leftist parties led by the Bolivian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Boliviano-PCB). In this first electoral experiment, the group obtained 10 mayor posts and 49 council posts, all in the Department of Cochabamba.17 For the 1999 municipal elections, the cocaleaf (cocalero) leader, Evo Morales, negotiated with the chief of the


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Movement Toward Socialist party (Movimiento al Socialismo-MAS-U), David Añez Pedraza, for the ASP-IPSP to assume the MAS nomenclature. In January 1999, the IPSP-MAS was established with Morales as president. In the 1999 municipal elections, the MAS, under the leadership of Evo Morales, obtained 3.2 percent of the votes amongst the group of 8 parties. However, it was still a small group with only a regional reach limited to Cochabamba and La Paz (especially in the Yungas, largely a coca-leaf-producing region). Motivated by their municipal success, the party also launched its campaign for the 1997 national elections and eventually won six seats in the Chamber of Deputies, including one seat for their leader, Evo Morales. Benefiting from the electoral system features that allowed for greater inclusion of these smaller parties, the MAS and its leader Evo Morales continued building on these little but meaningful steps. In 2002, they became the second largest force in Congress and thus the main opposition party, both in Congress and in the streets. In 2005, the MAS started the process of consolidation as the new hegemonic political force in the country. The 1994 constitutional reform had produced an important change in the electoral system. With minor adjustments, a system similar to the German personalized proportional representation system was adopted for the lower chamber. At the time, there was increasing skepticism regarding the overall political process and the real representativeness of the political parties. This was caused by the predominance of a selected group of people in the closed lists of candidates, generally defined by the party leadership, and was seriously debilitating the nexus between parliamentary representatives and their voters. Bolivians were also disenchanted with political parties for their lack of accountability to the electorate. The reform served to reverse the perceived disconnect between parties and society and attempted to strengthen the connection between representatives and their constituents. Due to the limitations of the 1994 reform, Congress agreed to enact the so-called Law for the Application of Article 60 of the Political Constitution of the State to reduce its defects and contradictions. This law reestablished the D’Hondt formula of proportional representation and introduced, for the first time, an electoral threshold of 3 percent for legislative seats that corresponded to the plurinominal circumscriptions in the Chamber of Deputies. According to the new mixed system implemented in 1997, 68 deputies out of the 130 constitutionally ascribed members would be elected by plurality, or by absolute majority in plurinominal districts, while the remaining 62 would be elected in nine

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departmental uninominal districts on the basis of a complete and closed list according to the D’Hondt proportional representation formula. Uninominal circumscriptions were created taking into consideration various factors, namely, the percentage of population, geographic continuity, and affinity, as well as existing departmental divisions. Plurinominal circumscriptions, on the other hand, were defined according to existing arrangements as per the nine departments in which the country was administratively divided. The increase in population required a redistribution of the seats, but the number of deputies was maintained at 130. La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, however, were assigned more seats.18 Under this mixed system of elections, the seats would be directly assigned to the candidates who won in the uninominal districts even if the candidate’s party won in only one district. Moreover, under this system, voters were allowed the split vote (voto cruzado), that is, one vote for the candidates to the uninominal circumscription and another vote for the candidates to plurinominal deputies by a list that was linked to the presidential and vice presidential candidates as well as to the senators of each party. The split vote allowed voters to vote for candidates of two different parties and allowed smaller parties to run congressional candidates without necessarily running a presidential campaign. The supporters of this reform believed that the mixed system would (a) help create direct linkages between parties, constituencies, and legislators promoting a strong personalization of politics; (b) lead to a stronger geographic representation by creating 68 single-seat districts, thereby supporting the ensuing process of regional decentralization and the development of local governments; and (c) improve the choices of voters in democratic elections by allowing the split vote (Mayorga 2001: 205–208). For the election of senators, however, the electoral system did not endure any modifications with the application of this law. The members of the Senate continued to be elected under a plurality system. Like the plurinominal candidates, candidates to the Senate are part of a complete list attached to the candidates for the presidency and vice presidency. However, two of the senators for each department must correspond to the majority party, and one to the first minority party. Using the March 19, 1997 Electoral Law, elections took place on June 1, 1997. In this process, General Hugo Banzer obtained the first place in the elections and a coalition of parties confirmed his position as president but with a fundamental modification this time: the president, vice president, senators, and deputies, according to the reforms introduced in the Constitution, would function in their positions for five years, instead of four.


27

Two years later, on June 25, 1999, the Electoral Code was enacted with the purpose of giving more coherence, structure, and clarity to the arrangements relating to the registration of citizens in the electoral registry, the presentation of candidates, the functioning of the electoral tables, the vote-counting procedures, and other aspects of the electoral process.19 More importantly, on June 25, 1999, the first Law of Political Parties was also enacted to regulate the functioning of political parties and to push for greater internal democratization. This Political Parties Law was the first ever in the history of the country. In 2002, new elections took place. Uninominal and plurinominal deputies were elected for a second time under the mixed system of legislative elections. Article 90 of the Constitution still dictated the congressional election of the president and thus the MNR’s Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada came to power once more. After the events of February and October 2003 and his resignation, Vice President Mesa assumed the presidency. In February 2004, Mesa approved a constitutional reform that incorporated changes to the electoral regime, including the possibility of holding referenda and the opening of the electoral scenario to indigenous movements and civic associations to run electoral campaigns. The first attempt at an electoral process with these arrangements was in the 2004 municipal elections, and the arrangements were used for the 2005 general election as well. Two referenda, one on the gas issue (2004) and another on regional autonomies (2006) were also held. After the resignation of President Mesa in June 2005 and in a chaotic scenario in which both the president of the Senate and the president of the Chamber of Deputies—namely, MIR’s Hormando Vaca Diez and MNR’s Mario Cossio—declined their right of succession, the then president of the Supreme Court, Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé, became president. The process of political and social transformations started in 2005 with the election of Evo Morales promised to bring new electoral reforms. Electoral Reforms and the Move toward a New Hegemonic Political Force The preceding review of Bolivian electoral developments suggests that important electoral transformations were generally paired with sociopolitical changes. Although the republican years did not really bring structured electoral arrangements, by the end of the 1830s, the direct election of the president and her/his election among the top three most voted candidates was introduced.

28


The first 20 years of the twentieth century maintained most of the previous electoral arrangements, but more systematic regulations for political parties, for instance, were beginning to be implemented. Key electoral reforms took place as one of the major sociopolitical events in Bolivia was unfolding—the 1952 Revolution. From 1952 to 1956, fundamental electoral developments occurred, including the adoption of the universal vote, and the right of women to elect and be elected. These years also experienced the institutionalization of political parties. They were defined within these electoral reforms as the sole channels of the interrelation between people and the political system. Similarly, more refinements occurred in terms of the electoral registry, the mandate periods, and the institutionalization of the CNE as the only electoral authority in the country. In terms of electoral arrangements for the translation of votes into seats, the president continued to be elected by an absolute majority, but a mixed system of proportional representation and majoritarianism was implemented for legislative elections. The last constitutional reform took place in 1967, in which the current division of powers between the executive and legislature was instituted and the congressional election of the president was institutionalized through Article 90. The 1970s were marked by a period of repressive dictatorships, which gave way to the transition to democracy in the 1980s. The 1990s saw greater democratic stability, as well as important electoral reforms including the latest two in 1997 and 2004. Institution building has been important for both civil and military Bolivian political leaders. The assessment of the various electoral developments documented in this volume suggests that politicohistorical events and society’s transformation have generally inf luenced institution building in Bolivia, as the case of 1952 Revolution and the major reforms of the 1990s reveal. However, the reforms have also inf luenced the political reality of the nation. The cumulative effects of these reforms are analyzed in the following chapters. Indeed, the project seeks to demonstrate that political outcomes in Bolivia are profoundly inf luenced by electoral systems, particularly because these determine the allocation of power. In this manner, the study attempts to reveal how electoral systems inf luence the relationship among political actors, and political outcomes themselves, depending on whether they produce conditions for (a) effective and functioning coalitions and for (b) new political forces to emerge and assert power within the political system.


29

Chapter 2, “Bolivia’s Founding Pacts: The Pact for Democracy and the Patriotic Accord through an Electoral Lens,” focuses on the period covering 1985 to 1993. It presents an analysis of the impact of Article 90 and the mixed system for legislative elections on the two founding pacts of Bolivian democracy—the Pact for Democracy and the Patriotic Accord. The section also studies the impact of the electoral system and coalition building around key economic and privatization legal instruments for this period, including the NPE—an emblematic economic policy that followed the Washington Consensus. This chapter assesses the potential implications of the Bolivian electoral system in terms of Bolivian presidents’ ability to govern and to avoid immobilism, and the conditions for legislators to form coalitions from 1985 through 1993. Chapter 3, “Paving the Way for the Transformation of Bolivian Politics: Electoral Reforms and Coalition Building,” provides an analysis of Sánchez de Lozada’s Pact for Governance and Pact for Change (1993– 1997), and Hugo Banzer and Jorge Quiroga’s Megacoalition (1997–2002). It reviews the electoral reforms that took place in this period and the impact they had on the formation of Evo Morales as a leader, and the MAS as the new hegemonic political party in Bolivia. The chapter traces the formation of the aforementioned political pacts and how the electoral system and the composition of the congress and cabinets inf luenced the relationship between presidents and congresses. Chapter 4, “Crumbling Coalitions? Assessing the Transformation of Bolivian Politics,” provides an analysis of recent events. It analyzes political events in Bolivia and their impact on executive-legislative relations since the June 2002 elections until December 2005 when Evo Morales was elected president. It attempts to explain the impact of the 1997 electoral reform that allowed for the election of uninominal deputies and assesses the 2004 reform as it was first used in the 2004 municipal elections. It also analyzes the July 2 election of members of the Constituent Assembly and the prospects that existed for an environment conducive to a broad-based and consensus-based constituent process. Chapter 5, “Explaining Evo Morales’s Rise to Power: The Unintended (or Intended?) Political Consequences of Electoral Laws,” provides a summation of the most important findings of the project, emphasizing the impact of electoral systems on the interaction amongst political actors in Bolivia. The chapter unveils the lessons learned from the Bolivian experience in a comparative perspective highlighting the implications of the Bolivian process for the region and for the rest of the world. It

30


addresses how the Bolivian case compares to other cases in the hemisphere, especially in the Andean region. Ultimately, the chapter highlights the contributions of the book to the study of electoral systems and political institutions in general and provides this analysis in the context of the political events in the Americas and the rest of the world.

CHAPTER 2

BOLIVIA’S FOUNDING PACTS: THE PACT FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE PATRIOTIC ACCORD THROUGH AN ELECTORAL LENS

I

nstitutional design in Bolivia, mainly through electoral reforms, has had a dramatic impact on the capacity of Bolivian governments to forge and maintain ruling coalitions even since the transition to democracy. To move toward democracy, elections were held in July 1979 with the Popular Democratic Unity’s (UDP) Hernan Siles Zuazo emerging as the most voted candidate with 38.74 percent. MNR’s Paz Estenssoro obtained 20.15 percent of the vote and ADN’s Hugo Banzer came in third with 16.83 percent. The 1979 stalemate ensued when no agreement was reached among parliamentarians as to who should become president. After voting the number of times stipulated in the Constitution, instead of electing a president among the top three electoral formulas, the parliamentarians arbitrarily decided to appoint the president of the Senate, Walter Guevara Arze, as the interim president of the republic—an extraconstitutional resolution to the stalemate. This decision was not widely accepted by the electorate. Indeed, Bedegral (2001) asserts that this was an unconstitutional arrangement.1 Besides popular opposition, opposing candidate Hernan Siles Zuazo and his running mate, Jaime Paz Zamora, went on a hunger strike at the Bolivian Library of Congress to protest the congressional decision that they thought to be unconstitutional (Baptista Gumucio 1996: 320). This stalemate left a considerable mark on the Bolivian political class. As most Bolivian political leaders indicate,2 the

32


fear of another stalemate was one of the crucial determinants for coalitional politics in this country’s democratic history. The new president’s commitment was to call new elections the next year (Mesa Gisbert 2003a: 33). Starting in 1980 through 1982, however, a series of de facto military governments prevented Guevara Arze from governing. The political forces and civil society groups that had started to push for a democratic transition demanded that the 1979 election results be recognized. It was only in 1982 that General Guido Vildoso decided to ask the 1979 Congress-elect to retry electing the new president. The parliamentarians met and a coalition of leftist parties elected Siles Zuazo, the most voted candidate in the 1979 election, as the new president. The Bolivian Communist Party, the MNR-I, the MIR, and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) put together the Popular Democratic Unity (Unidad Democrática Popular-UDP) coalition to support Siles Zuazo in government. Siles Zuazo’s political basis was heterogeneous and conf lictive. The Siles Zuazo administration lacked a congressional majority. Congress became controlled by an opposition alliance between the ADN and the MNR (Gamarra and Malloy 1988: 163). Thus, a chronic situation of executive-legislative confrontation and lack of legitimacy of the executive power emerged (Carvajal Donoso 2000: 65; Rojas-Ortuste 2004). In this situation, Congress emerged as an institution highly independent of the executive but simultaneously caused great political instability. The opposition blocked all governmental initiatives, rejected draft laws, and requested oral reports and the interpellation of ministers (Fernández Saavedra 2004: 58). For example, on April 1983, Deputy Carlos Valverde Barbery requested an interpellation by the lower chamber against the interior ministers and ministers for foreign relations and aeronautics for having sent former Nazi refugee Klaus Altmann-Barbi, accused of having committed war crimes, to be tried in France (Abecia Valdivieso 1999: 346–347). Also, Senators Oscar Zamora and Luis Añez requested, in November 1984, another interpellation to the economic cabinet for the inability of the government to manage the economic crisis. Because of these actions and the weaknesses of the executive, there were frequent ministerial crises,3 contradictory positions, and an impasse in the government administration. The president faced a chaotic situation. He was kidnapped by police forces and a coup d‘etat was attempted with no success. The opposition deputies accused Siles Zuazo of having links to narco-trafficking and threatened him with starting a Malfeasance Trial against him. To defend

B O L I V I A’ S F O U N D I N G PAC T S

33

his and his family’s honor, Siles Zuazo returned $300,000 he received for travel expenses, and other expenses related to his tenure as president, to the treasury and declared a hunger strike (Baptista Gumucio 1996: 343). The collapse was imminent. The economic crisis became the aggravating factor for the institutional crisis of the 1982–1985 period. The Siles Zuazo administration had to resolve critical aspects of an inf lationary and depressive economic period. While Bolivians‘ purchasing power decreased, the government responded with monetary emissions that simultaneously worsened the inf lation (Carvajal Donoso 2000: 65). Two other factors triggered the inf lationary crisis, namely, the need to service the foreign debt and the effect of the drop in the prices of basic raw materials. The president promised to resolve the crisis within 100 days of assuming power by implementing austerity measures. In response, strong antagonism emerged between labor and private sector interests regarding the implementation of the measures. The Bolivian Worker’s Union (COB) pressured the government. The pressure was such that Siles Zuazo even offered a new system of cogovernment to the COB emulating the model of the revolutionary period, but confrontations continued. The Communist Party (PC) had been part of the UDP government but was also part of the COB. Interestingly, the COB pressured the government in parallel spaces: in Congress and in the streets. The April 24, 1983 edition of El Diario, a major Bolivian newspaper, describes the clash between Siles Zuazo and the COB’s Lechín, whom the former called an “an anarchicunionist, ultraleftist, destabilizing factor” who occupied the premises of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia). The crisis between the UDP and the COB suffered a definitive rupture in November 1983. Two hundred and four strikes occurred during the first three months of the Siles Zuazo administration—October–December 1982 (Gamarra and Malloy 1988: 165). By May 1985, 865 strikes were accounted for— strikes that led to the loss of 4,191 man-days in the three-year period.4 By 1984—in the middle of an intransigent deadlock between the opposition forces and Siles Zuazo’s minority in the legislature, with growing rumors of a coup d‘etat and social mobilizations—shortening Siles Zuazo’s mandate emerged as the only viable option to relegitimate the executive mandate. Demands for his resignation emerged from all sectors. The most visible one was by MNR’s Senator Jaime Arellano Castañeda who, in an address to the Senate, indicated that according to the Constitution, the August 1980 Congress had concluded its four-year mandate in August 6, 1984.

34


New elections thus needed to be called for in May 1985, according to Arellano Castañeda (Abecia Valdivieso 1999: 350). In the middle of the economic and institutional crisis, Siles Zuazo accepted to shorten his mandate and, on November 24, 1984, the parliament agreed to call new elections. A majority of the Congress members (from the MNR, MNR-I, ADN, FRI, PCB, PDC, BPO, and BPI) approved the law that set the election date for July 1985.5 Paz Zamora, who was vice president in this period, wanted to run for president in the 1985 elections. By signing a law with no stipulations about the candidacy of former heads of government for the post of president or vice president, Paz Zamora could lose his chance at the candidacy. The MIR refused to approve the law. The elections were called for in July 1985. Through this experience, Bolivians concluded that the key and first condition for governance was securing a parliamentary majority; otherwise, a government would have enormous difficulty governing.6 The Paz Estenssoro Administration: 1985 Elections and the Composition of Congress The sequels of the taxi-partidos still existed in 1985.7 The National Electoral Court (CNE) recognized 18 political parties for the 1985 elections. Paz Estenssoro’s MNR regrouped many of its dissidents, former supporters of military regimes, and even convinced Walter Guevara Arze, who had defected, to go back to the MNR (Abecia Valdivieso 1999: 344). Hugo Banzer emerged as the most challenging contender and made successful efforts at projecting his image of a converted democrat who would privilege the popular vote. Paz Zamora launched his candidacy with the MIR after arranging for a constitutional provision that would allow him to participate in the elections regardless of his tenure as vice president in the previous administration. The MIR used to their advantage the fact that the party abandoned the UDP coalition in 1982, and that Paz Zamora later resigned from the vice presidency. For these elections, the MIR suffered a division. The radical sector of the MIR that still adhered to the Marxist orthodox ideology formed a new party, the Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre-MBL),8 and launched Antonio Araníbar Quiroga and Oscar Salas Moya as presidential and vice presidential candidates respectively. Former UDP partners MNR-I, MNR-V, and PS-1 also launched candidacies led by Roberto Jordán Pacheco, Carlos Serrate Reich, and Ramiro Velasco Romero respectively.

35


The 1985 electoral campaign issues centered around economic matters. Political parties and their teams of technocrats made an effort to propose practical solutions to the economic crisis during the campaign. The MNR as well as the ADN devised similar proposals to stabilize the Bolivian economy, once elected (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 189–193). Elections took place on July 14, 1985. The results showed that, after the experience with the UDP, voters decided to reject the leftist options and to support the moderate right. Banzer and Paz Estenssoro won more than 60 percent of the votes. Banzer obtained the highest plurality of votes with 32.83 percent and Paz Estenssoro followed with 30.36 percent. The UDP parties lost a significant number of votes. Jaime Paz Zamora’s MIR obtained a mere 10.18 percent, 20.18 percentage points less than the second place candidate. The remaining 26.63 percent was divided amongst the other 15 parties; most of them of the radical left. Former UDP parties, PDC, and PS-1 were punished by voters receiving only 1 to 4 percent of the votes, as figure 2.1 shows. In terms of the mechanism for translating popular vote into seats in the lower chamber, the proportional representation (PR) system in Bolivia was relatively similar to the PR systems prevalent in Latin America at the time. In the first democratic elections, in 1979, the method utilized to distribute seats was the Hare quotient method of the highest remainders, one of

2.53%

1.08% 1.33% 1.60%

2.11%

5.12% A.D.N. MNR

2.58%

MIR

4.80% 32.83%

MNR-I MNRV

5.48%

PS-1 10.18%

FPU MRTKL 30.36%

PDC FSB

Figure 2.1 Results of the 1985 Elections (Prepared by the author using National Electoral Court [CNE] data)

36


the most proportional formulas (Deheza 2000: 141). For the 1985 elections, the D’Hondt proportional representation system and the system of closed lists were used. With these arrangements, the 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were divided into nine plurinominal circumscriptions according to the nine departments in which the country was administratively divided. Although there was some controversy in terms of the effects of this law, the D‘Hondt formula allowed the allocation of parliamentary seats to 10 of the 18 parties participating in the election. The MNR and the ADN, the two most voted parties, obtained 43 and 41 deputy seats respectively. The law also contained a provision that permitted parties that failed to meet the participation quota to nonetheless obtain a seat, if their total vote was not less than the lowest remainder that earned a seat in the district. This provision allowed parties with less than 5 percent of the vote to enter Congress. The smaller Tupac Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación-MRTKL), with only 2.11 percent of the popular vote, obtained 2 seats, the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano-PDC), with only 1.60 percent, obtained 3 seats and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana-FSB), with only 1.33 percent of the vote, obtained 3 seats in the lower chamber. Geographically, the MRTKL votes were concentrated in La Paz, thereby limiting its seats to 2; whereas the PDC and the FSB won in more departments allowing them each to obtain one more seat than the MRTKL. The MNR, however, seemed to remain the hegemonic political force in Congress. The party, and its divisions (MNR-I, MRN-V), obtained 58 deputy posts as figure 2.2 illustrates. In terms of the election of senators, Article 162 stated that each of the nine departments could elect three senators by the system of incomplete lists and a simple majority of votes, in other words, “two by majority, and one by minority for a six-year mandate.” In the Senate, composed of 27 members (each department elects 3 senators), seats were distributed using the plurality system and closed lists. According to Article 63 of the Constitution, the party that won the relative (first) majority in a department obtained two senators, and the party that received the second highest number of votes (second majority) obtained the remaining senator. The distribution of Senate seats mirrored the popular vote for the presidential ticket. Only three parties entered the Senate: the MNR, the ADN, and the MIR—the three most voted parties. Because the concentration of parties and the distribution of seats according to votes varied throughout the country, there was a minor (but determinant) difference between the popular vote and the votes

37

B O L I V I A’ S F O U N D I N G PAC T S 43

41

15 8

RT K

L

2

M

C

3

PF

B

3

FS

U

4

FP

-1

5

PS

N RV M

N R I M

IR M

D. N A.

M

N R

6

Figure 2.2 Composition of the 1985–1989 Chamber of Deputies (Prepared by the author using National Electoral Court data)

assigned to parties in Congress. Although the ADN had won the popular vote over the MNR, albeit by a small number (2.47 percent), the MNR obtained two more deputies and six more senators than the ADN. The explanation lied in the geographical nature of the electoral system. The MNR won in more departments than the ADN, whose votes were concentrated in only two departments. Governing Coalition: Pact for Democracy The ADN obtained 41 seats in the lower chamber and 10 Senate posts for a total of 51 parliamentarians. The MNR controlled 43 seats and 16 Senate posts respectively, for a total of 59 parliamentarians. Without a two-thirds representation in parliament, Banzer and Paz Estenssoro, the first and second most voted candidates, needed to forge a winning coalition. The MNR had been one of the opposition parties to the UDP, a coalition in which the MIR had been one of the key partners. However, by 1983, the MIR left the governing coalition and joined the MNR in the opposition group in Congress. The MIR was still on the radical side of the left but was starting to moderate its discourse and move toward the center of the political spectrum. The MIR and the rest of the political forces represented in parliament, except for the ADN, decided to support Paz Estenssoro in his bid for the presidency (Mesa Gisbert 2003a: 170). For the first time in Bolivian history, Congress elected the second most

38


voted candidate with 94 congressional votes for Paz Estenssoro against 51 for Banzer.9 An implicit pact of support was formed between the MNR and the MIR to elect Paz Estenssoro. Under the agreement, the MIR participated marginally in the Paz Estenssoro government. It received some vice ministries, but the majority of the payoffs were given through embassy posts in the foreign service.10 Although the congressional support of the MIR was useful, it was not sufficient to guarantee Paz Estenssoro a majority government. Another alliance was in the horizon. Paz Estenssoro decided to implement a package of structural adjustment reforms called the New Economic Policy (NPE) to control the economic crisis. The MNR-MIR alliance did not have the sufficient vitality to confront what needed to be done. A new and strongly programmatic alliance between the MNR and the ADN was forged within one month after the congressional election. The Pact for Democracy became Paz Estenssoro’s governing coalition. The immediate antecedent of the Pact for Democracy had been the UDP government. The MNR and ADN parties had formed a center-left alliance that was opposed to Siles Zuazo’s political line and his leftist coalition that was more oriented toward the protection of the internal market. To understand this alliance, it is important to take into account the failure of the left (the UDP), which was indeed showing signs of exhaustion from the 1952 state model. With the dramatic decline of the left in Bolivia, the 1985 political scenario was the ideal space for an alliance between the MNR (the rightist wing of the MNR movement) and the ADN. The MNR and Banzer had also been partners in the past. In fact, Banzer had started to govern in 1971 with the support of the MNR. President Paz Estenssoro was facing great street opposition in his efforts to stabilize the Bolivian economy through the NPE decreed on August 29, 1985. In the midst of an inevitable crisis, Paz Estenssoro declared a state of siege under Article 111 of the Constitution. However, the constitutional stipulation also required him to secure congressional approval to continue the stage of siege. Paz Estenssoro entered negotiations with Hugo Banzer for ADN congressional support to ratify the state of siege and, on October 16, 1985, they signed the Pact for Democracy. Initially, the ADN and MNR were joined by the need to maintain the state of siege and control public opposition. Later, however, the pact served to support the implementation of the NPE. The nature of the pact became highly ideological with some elements of pragmatism. In the ideological realm, there was convergence as to the appropriateness of the structural adjustment program encapsulated in the

39


NPE. Both parties were planning to make the NPE their economic policy plan. With the agreement on the need for the NPE, the Paz Estenssoro administration was able to move its monetary stabilization policies forward with the support of the ADN. On the pragmatic side, although there was no real model of cogovernment under this pact, the ADN guaranteed Paz Estenssoro legislative support in exchange for a limited share of state patronage.11 Through this alliance, the MNR controlled all cabinet positions, vice ministries, foreign service appointments, and most prefect’s offices. The ADN acceded to state patronage only through the leadership of a number of state enterprises such as the Railroad National Company (Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles-ENFE), Lloyd Bolivian Airlines (Lloyd Aérea BolivianaLAB), the Customs Autonomous Administration (Administración Autónoma de Almacenes Aduaneros-AADAA), the Airport and Auxiliary Services to Air Travel Administration (Administración de Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares a la Navegación Aérea-AASANA), and some superintendent offices. Congressional leadership positions were also shared but the exchange of positional payoffs was limited. Various strategic reasons for both the MNR and Paz Estenssoro and for the ADN and Banzer served as incentives for the forging of this coalition. Table 2.1 summarizes them. Table 2.1 The Pact for Democracy: Incentives for Coalition Building ADN-Banzer

MNR-Paz Estenssoro

1. Electorally, the system concentrated the number of congressional posts into a few parties. The ADN and the MNR were able to maintain the majority in the legislature and thus advance their programmatic goals. With the alliance, they had the two-thirds congressional majority needed to pass legislation. 2. Banzer confronted an untenable situation. The MNR and ADN economic plans aimed at the same objective and used the same strategies to stabilize the economy. In this scenario, he had two choices: either to oppose the NPE for purely political reasons or to support a program that had also been designed by his own economic team (Gamarra 1997b).

Paz Estenssoro wanted to implement an economic package of reforms similar to the one discussed within the ADN during the electoral campaign.* Newspaper coverage indicates that both candidates and their parties were advised by the same Harvard Economist, Jeffrey Sachs. The ADN would thus be the ideal partner to implement the NPE. Continued

Table 2.1 Continued ADN-Banzer 3. The political class still resisted Hugo Banzer for his military past. Banzer wanted to find a mechanism to make himself legitimate again in the political arena. By facilitating a viable solution to the national economic crisis through the provision of political support to the president, he saw an opportunity to show himself as a committed democrat (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 192; Jaime Aparicio 2004).

MNR-Paz Estenssoro Paz Estenssoro also had important personal reasons to join the Pact: he only had 43 deputies in the lower chamber, and 16 senators in the Senate. Although the most important policy in his administration was passed unilaterally through decree, he needed the coalition to guarantee some degree of legitimacy for the new economic plan. This legitimacy could be guaranteed through the legislative support of the ADN, the most voted party in the election.

4. The period preceding this administration featured intense ideological polarization. An incipient trend became obvious, that is, that of moving political tendencies toward the center of the political spectrum. Moreover, although the experience of the UDP weakened the Bolivian left as the 1985 electoral results showed, both ADN and the MNR realized that whoever implemented the policies would face protests and opposition from the left that remained in Bolivia. A strong center coalition could confront opposition to the measures emanating from these sectors. 5. Banzer was willing to give support in exchange for policy concessions. The ADN saw in the Pact a mechanism to further the structural adjustment policies the party favored. Sharing the success of the policy could serve as beneficial to the following electoral campaign. Indeed, the policy was continued by Banzer in the next administration.

The Pact also allowed Paz Estenssoro to control both congressional houses to pass complementary policies to the NPE. The series of laws passed in relation to the NPE relied on the support of a partner with similar policy orientations. By forging the alliance, he was closer to guaranteeing the continuity of the economic plan.

6. The ADN also saw an opportunity to receive positional concessions. Although not in very politically visible positions, with the pact the ADN received control of some development

Paz Estenssoro’s MNR, a highly institutionalized political party, would receive the majority of the posts within the state apparatus. However, Paz Estenssoro was willing and had the authority to Continued


41

Table 2.1 Continued ADN-Banzer

MNR-Paz Estenssoro

state corporations, superintendence offices, and the leadership of key state enterprises.

grant limited state patronage to the ADN in exchange for legislative support.

7. The Pact for Democracy somehow emulated the Venezuelan Punto Fijo Pact (Pacto de Punto Fijo) and the Colombian National Front (Frente Nacional). Banzer saw this as an opportunity to alternate power with the MNR in future years** (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 192).

By adhering to the Pact, the MNR could share the management of the country with the ADN for the next few decades. Paz Estenssoro saw this as an opportunity to extend the MNR’s political hegemony well beyond his presidency.

*

Paz Ballivián, Ricardo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. The Historical Ratification of the Pact for Democracy would be signed later by Paz Estenssoro and Banzer to facilitate the election of the candidate who obtained the first majority in future elections, and thus alternation of power between the ADN and the MNR.

**

The Pact for Democracy marked the beginning of a structural change in Bolivian politics. It allowed the president to have a majority in Congress, to move his policy proposals forward, and it served as the basis of the model of “pacted democracy” in Bolivia. Two factors made the pact a point of structural transformation in this country’s national politics. First, the pact not only gave political legitimacy to the implementation of executive policies but also marked the beginning of a process of ideological convergence in political and economic policies amongst the majority parties. Second, political parties adopted a new style of political interaction, one based on consensus building and coalition building and on the exchange of payoffs to achieve policy objectives. Supreme Decree 21060: The NPE The serious economic crisis confronted by Siles Zuazo was the result of the extensive and mismanaged state intervention that followed the 1952 revolution, the collapse of the international tin market, the effects of an international recession, and the country’s extensive corruption and political instability that drove away foreign investors (Grindle 2002: 2). The UDP altered its monetary policies but was unable to stop inf lation; discontent emerged from unions, private and urban sectors, and political parties.12

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When Paz Estenssoro assumed power the crisis had worsened. In one of the most memorable speeches by any Bolivian president, President Paz Estenssoro stated that by 1985 Bolivians had two options: to implement a radical economic adjustment plan or to let the country collapse. In his inauguration speech on August 6, 1985, Paz Estenssoro stated that he had a “moral obligation to radically implement, with sacrifices, a new economic policy, or [else] simply and with great pain for all of us, Bolivia will die on us” (Bolivia se nos muere). Inf lation went from 296 percent in 1982 to 8,170.52 percent in 1985 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística-INE). By 1985, the economic crisis led to a fall in the GNP (11.7 percent in 1985) and uncontrolled hyperinf lation. The external debt was almost 5 billion dollars and GNP per capita had declined from $610 to $450 per year (Grindle 2002: 2). To combat this, his package of reforms sought three primary objectives: (a) the liberalization of the economy, (b) the ascendance of the private sector as the central actor in economic development, and (c) the recuperation of state control over key state enterprises (Gamarra 1996: 98). Following the tenets of the Washington Consensus, the Supreme Decree proposed the following mechanisms to achieve these objectives: ● ●

● ● ●

Reduce the fiscal deficit. Establish a fixed exchange rate, as a result of direct f loating and mini-devaluations of the currency. Freeze prices and salaries. Reduce taxes (by 10–20 percent). Restructure/downsize public enterprises.

This formula was also similar to the model used by other Latin American countries. The origin, in the case of Bolivia, was disputed between the ADN and MIR. Interestingly, even the government of Siles Zuazo had similar policy proposals although it was never able to secure enough political support or the congressional majority to implement them. Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard Economist seemingly responsible for advising the design of the NPE, was invited to Bolivia on two occasions. On one occasion, Sachs was invited by David Blanco, an economics professor at the Catholic University in La Paz and later MNR minister of finance, and on another occasion he was invited by Ronald McClean, one of the key economists of the ADN and later part of the Patriotic Accord (Acuerdo Patriótico-AP) cabinet. They both had been Sachs’s students. Later visits by Sachs to Bolivia as well as by ADN militants to Boston, including a seminar on the policy held at


43

Harvard University, allowed the ADN team to formulate their version of the NPE.13 The MNR was not precisely associated with the ideological tendencies related to the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s. In the collective understanding, the MNR was still associated with nationalism, statism, and the 1952 revolution. However, Sachs also advised the MNR on options for stabilizing the economy. In his March 29, 1985 speech at the MNR National Convention,14 Paz Estenssoro already enunciated what would become the main tenets of the New Economic Policy. He identified the need to reduce the fiscal deficit, organize state enterprises, and rationalize private credit. Asserting that negotiating with the international financial agencies “was a taboo that the infantile left had created,” Paz Estenssoro even proposed to renegotiate the foreign debt and establish a dialogue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He reminisced of Lenin and the application of his own version of the New Economic Policy, in which “certain capitalist measures were implemented to confront the economic crisis that the Soviet Union faced following the October Revolution.” On the part of the MNR, the main tenets of the NPE were formulated by Juan Cariaga and Guillermo Bedegral, ministers of finance and planning respectively, while in Congress the political maneuvering was done by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada who had been elected senator from Cochabamba. In a cabinet shift in January 22, 1986, Sánchez de Lozada became minister of planning, and Bedegral moved to the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Sánchez de Lozada led the implementation of the NPE from then on, but the original key designers of the policy were Bedegral and Cariaga.15 An existing characteristic of policymaking in Bolivia became obvious. To design policy on the given areas, Paz Estenssoro put together teams of experts. He appointed small design teams that deliberated and drafted legislation related to the NPE and did so in isolation from public discussion or debate (Grindle 2002: 9; Conaghan and Abhugattas 1990). Controversy emerged as to the origins of the NPE. During the next presidential campaign in 1989, Sánchez de Lozada asserted that ADN had nothing to do with the NPE. He affirmed that Supreme Decree 21060 was “of exclusive responsibility of an MNR cabinet,”16 although later he stated that the MNR did not dispute the paternity of the NPE, he indicated, “we just implemented it because that is what was needed to save the country.”17 Members of the ADN also contended it was formulated by their party. Although the MNR and the ADN disputed the origins of the NPE, they facilitated the implementation of the policy together.

44


Collaboration was such that the ADN and the MNR are still thought to be the authors of deregulation, new economic policies, and the application of the Washington Consensus in Bolivia. The structural adjustment policies controlled hyperinf lation, reducing it from 8,168 percent in 1985 to 16.56 percent by the end of Estenssoro’s administration in 1989, according to the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística-INE). The liberalization of the economy to international goods and capital was also successful. A large amount of aid and some investment came into Bolivia, ameliorating the balance of payment discrepancies. Internationally, Bolivia and its application of the NPE was praised as a success case. Political Actors and Outcomes Assessed: The Paz Estenssoro Administration During his tenure (1982–1985), Siles Zuazo tried to impose policy proposals on the legislature and to unilaterally govern by decree. The legislature, however, was exerting harsh confrontation that provoked the resignation of the president. In his tenure, the legislature functioned as a political obstacle launching assaults on the executive and other political actors.18 The Pact for Democracy provoked a change in the institutional interaction between political actors based on common programmatic goals. The Pact for Democracy resolved the state of confrontation that had characterized executive-legislative relations in the transition period. By forming a legislative majority, the government developed and consistently implemented policies that provided the nation with relative economic stability and effective governance. Along with the presidential power of decree, Bolivian presidents are also permitted to exercise discretionary powers in declaring a state of emergency. The Constitution states in its Article 111 that in times of crisis due to internal commotion or international war, the president, with the support of his Council of Ministers, can declare a state of siege in areas of national territory that s/he may deem necessary. However, the president and legislature have to agree on the maintenance of the state of siege and its duration. The complementary policies associated with the NPE generally enjoyed the support of a majority in Congress, and Paz Estenssoro was able to maintain two states of siege with congressional support—one in September 1985 to control a massive hunger strike declared in protest against Decree 21060, and another in August 1986 to stop the March for Life mobilization by


45

displaced miners.19 Those who protested against the dismissal of more than 20,000 workers from the state mining company, the Bolivian Mining Corporation, were captured under the state of siege and sent to internal exile until they were willing to have a dialogue with the government.20 Paz Estenssoro’s political maneuvering was aided by constitutional provisions that granted him an ample array of legal powers to enact and implement policies, including economic policy. Besides the urgency of the crisis, the legal powers allowed Paz Estenssoro and his economic team to design the NPE independent of the legislature. Yet to implement the NPE, Paz Estenssoro’s constitutional powers were challenged by those conferred to Congress. According to Article 59 of the Bolivian constitution, Congress is allowed to exert, through the various commissions of both chambers, an oversight role on economic matters. Censure and interpellation were used as opposition tactics. Using the Power of Interpellation By having implemented policies ending the state-led economy, the president faced opposition from the left not only in the streets but also in Congress. After the NPE was decreed, opposition from the leftist bloc in Congress that had supported his election exacerbated. Congress was able to question cabinet ministers through a process known as interpellation. Soon after the Supreme Decree 21060, the Chamber of Deputies resolved to interpellate the whole cabinet of the NPE through a parliamentary resolution dated September 3, 1985. The chamber was declared in permanent session and disposed that the interpellation be transmitted “live and in its entirety” through state television and Illimani Radio (Abecia Valdivieso 1999: 370). In 1986, there was another interpellation that was derived into a cabinet censure by Congress, supported even by the ADN, the coalition partner. The opposition parties in Congress, in other words, the MBL, FSB, PS-1, the MRTK, and MRTKL, proposed the interpellation of the minister of planning, chief of the economic cabinet, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who was in conf lict with the regional civic committees. Sánchez de Lozada (2004) recounts that the civic committees of the gas and petroleumproducing departments of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija presented their demands for financial reimbursements for the production of these resources from the central government, but there was no mechanism to distribute these funds. Without a decentralization structure in place, the government had to use regular channels to distribute funds. To protest, the deputies from the three regions proposed to interpellate him.

46


Opposition parties understood that the interpellation would not advance but found hope when the ADN showed interest in participating in it. Interestingly, coalition partners also found in the interpellation processes a way to either neutralize the opposition or to renegotiate the terms of the agreement. Opposition deputies would present a request for an oral report or an interpellation, and 30 parliamentarians from the governing coalition would adhere to the measure. The parliamentarians from the governing coalition would usually join with the purpose of initiating the interpellatory action to not only demand more payoffs, but to also extend it as long as possible as a way to protect the decisions of the coalition. In this case, the ADN wanted to take advantage of the interpellation procedure to readjust support and payoffs. It sought a concession, so the ADN party caucus decided to support the interpellation, even to censure the minister. With 67 deputies present, the minister of planning as well as the whole cabinet was censured with 66 votes for censure and 1 against. At the time, the whole cabinet was censured since a “solidarity” mechanism existed by which if one minister was censured, the whole cabinet considered itself censured; the idea was that they all were co-responsible for the policies implemented.21 At the end, however, no cabinet or political crisis occurred because hours later the party leaders, Paz Estenssoro and Banzer, resolved their differences. In the negotiation, the ADN received two new payoffs: (a) positional payoffs through the granting of two prefect’s offices and (b) a policy concession by bringing into the legislative agenda a law that mandated a one-time reimbursement to the departments that needed to be compensated (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 192). After this interpellation, Sánchez de Lozada did not want to go back to the Ministry of Planning and even offered his resignation to Paz Estenssoro, who refused it, indicating that, if he accepted it, he “would be resigning too because I will not accept it if they are going to start questioning my ministers.” Sánchez de Lozada asserts that it was obviously acceptable for Paz Estenssoro to say this because he was “a sort of walking voice” (voz caminante), and he was precisely such a voice in the heat of the controversy.22 Other cases of oppositional tactics by the congressional opposition included, ●

MRTKL deputy Victor Hugo Cardenas attempted to interpellate Minister of Defense Alfonso Revollo in relation to the case of Vicente Nina, a peasant who was found dead in the Achacachi barracks.23 In this opportunity, 54 ADN and MNR deputies voted to


●

●

●

●

●

●

●

47

close the order of the day, and 30 to censure Revollo. The MNRADN deputies were able to avoid the censure of the minister. The lower chamber declared a recess for seven days to avoid the discussion of the request, and the matter remained unresolved.24 The interpellations to the ministers of the Interior Ministry, the National Defense Ministry, and the Education Ministry as a result of the events that occurred in Huatajata, Sucre, and Parotani. Opposition through the media on the increase of parliamentary diets.25 The interpellation of the interior minister as a result of the clash between coca growers and the military that occurred in the Chapare.26 The Chamber of Deputies interpellated the information and planning ministers to clarify whether supplementary salaries, paid through a parallel budget, indeed existed in the public administration.27 Alfonso Ferrufino of the MBL and seven other deputies requested an oral report from the minister of communications on the arrest of Antonio Peredo, director of the AQUI weekly newspaper.28 The Senate requested oral and written reports by the minister of energy and the minister of transportation to ascertain the government’s plans for the exploration of hydrocarbons in the Altiplano. Senator Jaime Villegas requested a written report from the minister of labor and the minister of mining on the labor policy applied to the COMIBOL.29

However, interpellations were not frequent. Apart from these instances, the congressional opposition was neutralized by the Pact for Democracy majority.30 More interestingly, censure became a mechanism to not only question the government policy but to also pressure and obtain benefits and payoffs. In May 1986, the MIR announced that it would carry out “constructive opposition” in Congress. The MIR’s votes were not necessary to impose the state of siege; however, it is important to note that the MIR did not join any interpellation maneuvers that could have threatened the government’s attempt to defeat organized labor’s strikes (Gamarra 1994: 109–124). It was even granted some positional payoffs. Indeed, under this pact, the MIR occupied the leadership of the Chamber of Deputies during the first year of the mandate. MIR deputy Gaston Encinas became the president of the Chamber of Deputies. They also had some prefect offices, minor posts, and some second- and third-tier diplomatic positions. They were not part of the pact but

48


served as the “wild card.” Among the three (ADN, MNR, and MIR), they had a strong congressional majority. Neutralizing Pockets of Congressional Opposition Paz Estenssoro used payoffs to secure deals but, by and large, political affinity took precedence leaving this bargaining technique as a last recourse. Instead, Paz Estenssoro used three available bargaining techniques that more intimately involved the assembly in actual policy decision making: (1) agenda setting, in other words, the ADN supported and had input in terms of the implementation of the NPE; (2) policy concessions, that is, the ADN was allowed to propose policy reforms, including the 1986 electoral reform; and (3) positional payoffs, namely, the ADN was granted access to state patronage, albeit in very limited numbers. 1. Agenda setting: Implementing the NPE. Allowing the ADN to have a say in setting the legislative agenda was also utilized as a strategy by Paz Estenssoro to secure their support for his policies. Similarly, having political affinity and a commitment on the part of ADN, and the MIR in many instances, to further the NPE, made easier these parties‘ incorporation in setting the legislative agenda and in implementing policy. 2. Policy concessions. Policy decisions were negotiated directly by Paz Estenssoro and Banzer, who then instructed their caucuses on how to vote in Congress. By 1986, the MNR had proposed a tax-code reform to complement the NPE measures. ADN, already part of the pact, conceded to these reforms in exchange for continued access to policy decisions. The understanding behind the pact was ADN’s promise to support the government’s economic efforts in exchange for the MNR’s support on electoral law reforms. This proposal was also backed by the MIR, which also offered to give support to the tax-code reform in exchange for the electoral reform. Both parties, and even the MNR, were interested in moving forward with electoral reform. Although it would maintain previous electoral arrangements, an important change would take place in terms of districting and the formula utilized for the distribution of seats to members of Congress. The D‘Hondt formula established in 1956 and favoring smaller parties was replaced in this 1986 electoral reform by the “double-quotient” formula of participation and assignment of seats. With this proportional representation formula,

49


the intention was to avoid the entrance of small parties into the chambers of Congress. By doing this, Paz Estenssoro, Banzer and Paz Zamora saw an opportunity to concentrate parliamentary representation in their parties. 3. Positional Payoffs. An option available to Paz Estenssoro to secure the pact was to make use of the patronage network to give positional payoffs. However, the ADN support to Paz Estenssoro through the Pact of Democracy was not necessarily conditional to ADN’s participation in state patronage. 31 State patronage had a secondary role in facilitating this agreement. Indeed, the pact did not officially bring the ADN into the cabinet, although it allowed the party to head the legislative chambers. Except for the first year when leadership was shared with the MIR, the two parties monopolized the leadership of the legislative chambers. Table 2.2 shows how legislative leadership posts were distributed among the parties. The pact also gave the ADN a number of appointments in key state enterprises. According to Fortún, the ADN national adjunct chief from 1985 to 1989, during the Pact for Democracy the ADN administered the Railroad National Company, the Customs Autonomous Administration, the Airport and Auxiliary Services to Air Travel Administration, Lloyd Bolivian Airlines, the Insurance Superintendence, the Agriculture Bank of Bolivia, and the Development Corporations in Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Cochabamba. An ADN militant, Luis del Rio, was appointed as superintendent of banks.

Paz Estenssoro

Table 2.2

Legislative Leadership, 1985–1989

Legislature

President of the Senate

Party

President of the Chamber of Deputies

Party

1985–1986

Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada

MNR

Gastón Encinas Valverde

MIR

1986–1987

Ciro Humbolt Barrero

MNR

Willy Vargas Vacaf lor

ADN

1987–1988


MNR

Willy Vargas Vacaf lor

ADN

1988–1989


MNR

Walter Soriano Lea Plaza

ADN

50


With the pact, the ADN also received control over some of the municipal governments and regional development corporations. The condition for the coalition was, however, mainly contextual and structural as the pact was not an alliance for cogovernment. A greater positional payoff was settled in May 1988. Paz Estenssoro and Banzer signed a secret addendum to the original pact by which the MNR committed itself to supporting Banzer in the 1989 elections. Exerting his political dominance, Paz Estenssoro’s cabinet was composed of MNR party people as well as technocrats associated with the party. A number of senior MNR members joined this first cabinet in strategic positions, including the Ministry of Planning that was supposed to implement the economic structural adjustment package. The ADN did not receive any positions, as table 2.3 indicates. To guarantee the success of the application of Supreme Decree 21060, Paz Estenssoro dispensed his first cabinet, formed by MNR militants, and sought the collaboration of private entrepreneurs, who were close to the leadership of the MNR. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was then president of the Senate. In Paz Estenssoro’s first cabinet shift, Sánchez de Lozada left the Senate and moved to the Ministry of Planning to coordinate the application of the new economic model (Baptista Gumucio 1996: 348). Guillermo Bedegral, who was originally in charge of the implementation of the model, was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. MNR’s more technical militants, Juan Cariaga and Juan Carlos Duran, also joined the second cabinet, which was composed as table 2.4 illustrates. Paz Estenssoro’s third cabinet was composed of ministers who had served with him before. The third shift also involved the departure from the cabinet of Juan Cariaga, minister of finance and one of the key implementers of the NPE. Cariaga resigned from his position in the cabinet stating that his cycle of participation in the government had concluded. 32 There was also pressure by the MNR for the “movimientization of the cabinet,” in other words, for the inclusion of more MNR party militants. Carlos Ponce Sanjinés, leader of the MNR executive committee, publicly indicated that although it was a prerogative of the president, a higher representation of the party in the cabinet was desirable.33 With the departure of Cariaga, Paz Estenssoro joined the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Tax and Ramiro Cabezas, an independent economist, was designated as the new head. Table 2.5 shows the composition of Paz Estenssoro’s third cabinet. On September 20, 1988, eight months before the election, the whole cabinet presented its resignation on the grounds that with the coming of

Table 2.3 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinet 1 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Gaston Levy Araoz

MNR

August 6, 1985

January 22, 1986

Federico Kaune Arteaga Fernando Valle Quevedo Roberto Gisbert Bermudez Guillermo Bedegral Enrique Ipina Melgar Nestor Dalenz Mejia Eduardo Douglas Ascarrunz Walter Costas Badani Hugo Serrano Rodriguez Sinforoso Cabrera Romero Mauricio Mamani Pocoata Orlando Donoso Torrez Carlos Aliaga Ayoroa Guillermo Riveros Tejada Reinaldo Peters Arzabe Fernando Caceres Romero Antonio Tovar Pierola Fernando Barthelemy Martine

MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR

Minister of Foreign Relations Minister of Interior/Justice Minister of Defense Minister of Finance Minister of Planning Minister of Education Minister of Transportation Minister of Industry Minister of Labor Minister of the Presidency Minister of Mining Minister of Peasant Affairs Minister of Energy Minister of Urban Affairs Secretary Minister of Information Minister of Integration Minister of Aeronautics Minister of Interior/Justice

August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 6, 1985 August 27, 1985

August 25, 1985 April 04, 1987 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 August 06, 1989 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 02, 1986 January 22, 1987 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 February 26, 1987 February 26, 1987 February 26, 1987

Table 2.4 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinet 2 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Guillermo Bedegral

MNR

January 22, 1986

March 03, 1989

Juan Cariaga Osorio Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada Andres Petricevic Rastanovic Roberto Gisbert Bermudez Walter Rios Gamboa Carlos Perez Guzman Jaime Villalobos Sanjines Edil Sandoval Moron Carlos Morales Landivar Frankin Anaya Vasquez Juan Carlos Duran Herman Antelo Laughlin Fernando Moscoso Salmon Ramiro Cabezas Masses

MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR

Minister of Foreign Relations Minister of Finance Minister of Planning Minister of Transportation Minister of Industry Minister of Labor Minister of the Presidency Minister of Mining Minister of Peasant Affairs Minister of Energy Minister of Urban Affairs Minister of Energy Minister of Information Minister of Industry Minister of Tax Collections

January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 January 22, 1986 December 26, 1986 January 05, 1987

August 10, 1988 September 20, 1988 March 03, 1989 May 30, 1987 February 26, 1987 September 20, 1988 August 06, 1989 February 26, 1987 October 07, 1997 March 03, 1989 February 26, 1987 August 06, 1989 September 20, 1988 August 10, 1988

53


Table 2.5 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinet 3 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Juan Carlos Duran Aifredo Franco Guachalla Jose Guillermo Justiniano Walter Zuleta Roncal Jaime Zegada Hurtado Alfonso Thenier Revollo Fernando Illanes de Ia Riva Ramiro Cabezas Masses

MNR

Minister of the Interior Minister of Labor Minister of Peasant Affairs Secretary Minister of Aeronautics Minister of Defense Minister of Energy

February 26, 1987 February 26, 1987 February 26, 1987 February 26, 1987 February 26, 1987 April 08, 1987 October 07, 1987

March 03, 1989 September 20, 1988 August 06, 1989 August 06, 1989 August 06, 1989 August 06, 1989 August 06, 1989

Minister of Finance

August 10, 1988

August 06, 1989

MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR MNR

MNR

an electoral campaigning period, they thought the president should have more liberty to compose his cabinet. President Paz Estenssoro indicated that the change in cabinet did not mean a change in government policies but accepted their resignation nonetheless. Four new ministers were sworn in: Fernando Romero Moreno for the Ministry of Planning, Luis Palenque Cordero for Industry, Alfonso Peña Rueda for Labor, and Joaquin Arce Lema for Social Security and Health. They were all MNR affiliated. The rest of the cabinet members were ratified as ministers. 34 This cabinet lasted for eleven more months, from September 1988 until August 1989, as table 2.6 indicates. While the NPE was the most notable policy innovation of the Paz Estenssoro government, other important changes were also introduced. In 1985, the same year that the economic package was introduced, another decree tackled the problem of state reform by introducing public sector downsizing, including severe reductions in the state enterprise sector, and a series of austerity measures.35 Two years later, banking, foreign trade, and debt policies were greatly improved (Grindle 2002: 3).

54


Table 2.6 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinets 4 and 5 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Fernando Romero Moreno Luis Fernando Palenque Alfonso Peña Rueda Joaquien Arce Lema Valentin Abecia Baldivieso

MNR

Minister of Planning

September 20, 1988

August 6, 1989

MNR

September 20, 1988 September 20, 1988 September 20, 1988 March 3, 1989

August 6, 1989

Eduardo Perez Beltran Alfonso Balderrama Maldona Roberto Roca

MNR

Minister of Industry Minister of Labor Minister of the Presidency Minister of Foreign Relations Minister of Interior Minister of Transportation

March 3, 1989 March 3, 1989

August 6, 1989

Minister of Urban Affairs

March 3, 1989 August 6, 1989

MNR MNR MNR

MNR

MNR

August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989

August 6, 1989

The successful passage of the national budget, a new tax code, and a new electoral law that would allow the MNR, the ADN, and the MIR to control political power were some of the elements of the ADN-MIR Pact (Gamarra 1987: 411). Finally, the controversial Law 1008 on Controlled Substances, and with specific mandates for coca eradication, was also approved during this administration. However, Bolivians‘ faith in the legislature as a reliable democratic institution eroded. For example, with the approval of Law 1008, Congress was critiqued for having approved it in merely two sessions and for having accepted the terms imposed by the U.S. embassy. In fact, the law became known by some sectors as the Sheraton Project because it was drafted at the Sheraton Hotel in La Paz by Bolivian and U.S. officials. 36 Until this point since 1985, Evo Morales had been general secretary of his coca growers union in San Francisco. When the Law 1008 was being approved by Congress on July 19, 1989, Morales was


55

being elected executive secretary of the coca growers’ Tropic Federation (Federación del Trópico). The Paz Zamora Administration: A Heated Electoral Campaign and the 1989 Election Results In May 1988, after significant pressure from the ADN, the MNR and the ADN secretly outlined mechanisms for the institutionalization of the Pact for Democracy. The so-called Historic Ratification of the Pact for Democracy (Ratificación Histórica del Pacto por la Democracia), signed on May 25, 1988, called for a stronger commitment by both parties to democratic rule, as well as to the NPE, the elimination of illegal drug trade, and toward a transparent electoral process. The key aspect of this addendum was a pledge by both parties to vote in Congress in the May 1989 elections for the candidate with the highest plurality of the votes. 37 Under the terms of the addendum, the ADN and the MNR were assured of control over Bolivian politics for at least the next four years. Also by May 1988, internal strife within the MNR made it impossible to predict who would be the presidential candidate. Minister of Planning Sánchez de Lozada was said to be “the president’s man.” He was covered by the press as the “one that implemented more coherently Paz Estenssoro’s economic policy and one of the few ministers that has told people the truth, no matter how hard it was.”38 Besides Sánchez de Lozada, other MNR militants, including the MNR veteran Ñuf lo Chávez Ortiz and Guillermo Bedegral, also showed their interest in participating in the 1989 elections.39 By July 1988, Guillermo Bedegral started a discrediting campaign against his MNR opponent, Sánchez de Lozada, and tried to organize the electoral machinery for the September 1988 primaries.40 Also by July, Sánchez de Lozada presented his 1989 government plan for consideration during the MNR convention. He proposed to guarantee “the continuity of a modern development policy.” 41 In the end, based on the belief that the NPE had popular support and this would drive the MNR to victory, the party named Sánchez de Lozada its presidential candidate at the September 1988 MNR National Convention.42 The other parties had less internal battles to appoint their candidates for the presidential–vice presidential tickets. In May of 1988, Antonio Araníbar Quiroga started a campaign through the leftist mass communication media and participated, with labor groups from the left, in all the social conf licts that were taking place in the country.43 There was no

56


dispute over the designation of Paz Zamora and Hugo Banzer as presidential candidates representing the MIR and the ADN respectively. The time for the 1989 electoral campaign was approaching, and due to fears of a breach of the pact, the ADN requested to make the secret addendum document public. The secret addendum was unveiled. It caused great commotion among the other political parties. MIR’s Oscar Eid Franco indicated that the addendum was just “a political barter that belittled democracy”44 because it basically guaranteed alternation between the ADN and the MNR. In January 25, 1989, the adjunct chiefs of the parties, Guillermo Bedregal and Guillermo Fortún, on behalf of their parties, MNR and ADN, ratified the agreements of the pact and agreed, once more, to run separate presidential tickets but only to support the candidate of either party that achieved the highest plurality.45 This renewed agreement lasted less than a month. An insufficient number of voters had registered in the electoral registry by February 1989, and a fierce debate arose amongst the parties in Congress on whether to extend the registration period and postpone the elections. On February 9, 1989, the MNR officially broke the Pact for Democracy with the ADN. In a public document published in national newspapers signed by Paz Estenssoro, Sánchez de Lozada, Bedegral, Chávez Ortiz, and other MNR party leaders, the party affirmed that the Pact for Democracy had been broken because of the ADN refusal to extend the period for Bolivians to register in the electoral registry for 45 extra days—something that, in the MNR’s view, violated the rights of Bolivians to the universal vote.46 If the MNR was a pragmatic party, Sánchez de Lozada was doubly pragmatic because of his MNR and business background. In reality, Sánchez de Lozada (2004) still asserts that due to the secret clause on alternation, the real key to the pact was that the MNR made a commitment to support Banzer even if the MNR achieved more votes than the ADN.47 Sánchez de Lozada (2004) was not comfortable with the stipulation that under the pact “when people voted for me, they were automatically voting for Banzer.” The Pact for Democracy thus lasted three years, three months, and 24 days. Six hours after breaking the Pact for Democracy, Sánchez de Lozada, as minister of planning and as MNR presidential candidate, asked ADN militants who held public positions to resign.48 He indicated in his declarations that the ADN held “60 percent of public positions in LAB, the National Railroad Company, etcetera.” The breaking of the pact profoundly offended the ADN. Banzer felt betrayed by the MNR, especially by Sánchez de Lozada.


57

As May 1989 approached, the issues of the campaign centered around four elements: (a) the competency of the candidates; (b) the political economy: attacks and defenses to the NPE; (c) social policies: including the lack of attention to social issues and offers for new and more effective socioeconomic policies; and (d) local demands: in this case, all parties made an attempt to address the diverse and contradictory local and regional demands for economic and social development (Müller & Asociados 1989: 72–73). Employment became an important issue during the campaign (Lazarte 1993: 29). Other campaign issues included the negotiation of the external debt as well as Bolivia’s access to the sea through Chile, and more importantly, the search for mechanisms to achieve the administrative decentralization of the country.49 In the 1989 presidential campaign, the MNR, ADN, and MIR candidates presented a political platform continuing, in varying degrees, the implementation of the NPE policies started by the Paz Estenssoro administration. The traditional method of electoral campaigning—that is, popular concentrations, ideological debates, and direct contact of the candidates with the electorate—was complemented by the use of new advertising mechanisms in which form was privileged over substance. Foreign political marketing companies advised the candidates in terms of the (a) elaboration and processing of data from public opinion polls; (b) the definition of the campaign objectives; and (c) the determination of the mechanisms to be used to reach the electorate.50 The MNR was advised by Sawyer and Miller, a company long known to Sánchez de Lozada; ADN relied on a Spanish consulting firm; and the MIR was coached by a Venezuelan firm.51 The 1989 campaign became a personal battle. Through mass media, conf licts amongst candidates were taken to the urban centers, especially the axis cities of La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. They all used TV more systematically and conducted harsh negative TV ads, thereby increasing the amount of money spent on the campaigns. In the end, political parties’ total campaign budget exceeded $37 million.52 At the beginning of the campaign, Banzer and Sánchez de Lozada did not attack each other. Instead Banzer attacked the MIR in its most vulnerable aspects. Banzer constantly sent public reminders of the MIR’s participation in the UDP and attributed to the party’s policies the hyperinf lation that took place in the early 1980s.53 Sánchez de Lozada’s campaign tactics were of a mixed tone. On the positive side, he ran on his record as minister of planning for the Paz Estenssoro government. On the negative side, he attacked the records of

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his two main adversaries, Banzer and Paz Zamora. With regard to Banzer, it was speculated that the MNR and Sánchez de Lozada manufactured a press debate on Banzer’s human rights record. The media kept associating his name with the term “dictator” for several weeks during the campaign. In addition, emphasis was placed on Jaime Paz Zamora’s record as Siles Zuazo’s vice president, with the implication that he would “restore the policies which created hyperinf lation” (Henderson 1989: 7–9). The left, represented by the United Left (IU) and the MIR, continued to stress a strong interventionist and redistributionist role for the state. Paz Zamora was criticized by leftist sectors for being “too much in tune with the forces of capitalism” and branded him a traitor.54 Throughout the campaign, Paz Zamora announced that, if elected, he would maintain the NPE policies but would discard its “insensible aspects.” In 1989, the new political party, CONDEPA, was starting to take up public space. In his presidential campaign, Palenque used the populist themes of ethnic unity and a persistent emphasis on “traditional values” and social responsibility to win a vast following in La Paz, the broadcast radius of his stations. Yet concrete policies and programs supported by Palenque remained vague throughout the campaign. By February 1989, the parties started to accuse each other of intent to commit fraud. Newspaper coverage for that period shows the MIR denouncing the MNR and the ADN; the ADN accusing the MNR; the MNR accusing the MIR and the ADN, etcetera. In this election, the media played a greater role than in previous years as television, radio ownership, and Bolivia’s overall electrification expanded. The attacks between candidates offended many in the electorate. Even the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights (Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos) rejected the campaign strategies used by candidates in this campaign, describing the television spots as “deceiving as well as offensive and insulting.”55 At some point, Banzer himself called for a campaign with no insults.56 The most effective and sustained television effort belonged to Carlos Palenque before the campaign had actually begun. Although his station was off the air for the year prior to the election, Palenque used El Compadre, a friendly character created for his highlight talk show to stress his compassion for the working class neighborhoods of the capital. Under this scenario, the 1989 elections took place on May 7, 1989. As results came in, they showed that MNR candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada had won a relative majority of the votes, with 363,113 votes cast in his favor. The second place belonged to General Hugo Banzer with


59

357,298 votes while Jaime Paz Zamora with the MIR achieved the third place with 309,033 votes (CNE data). The MNR and MIR together accumulated 72.72 percent of the vote. The results brought widespread surprise. First, there was a decline in support to Banzer who went from 32.83 percent of support in the 1985 elections to 25.24 percent. Second, the MNR also lost vote percentage, but this election was the only one in Bolivian history in which an incumbent party won the new election. The emergence of Sánchez de Lozada as the new MNR leader was confirmed through the presidential vote. Finally, for the MIR, the 1989 elections represented the best voting record for the party ever. With 21.83 percent of the votes, the MIR was never able to recreate results similar to these elections. CONDEPA emerged as the fourth political force with 12.25 percent. The remaining 15.03 percent was divided amongst the other six political parties running, namely, the United Left (IU), the Socialist Party-1 (PS-1), the MRTKL, Front of Katarista Unity (FULKA), the Falange Socialista Boliviana, and the National Independent Movement (MIN). These electoral results show the fragmentation of the vote among ten political parties, a situation that forced political parties to seek a broad electoral coalition. The most important trend that can be observed, however, is the growth in racial and ethnic tensions as shown in the massive voting for El Compadre, especially in the Department of La Paz. El Compadre’s appeal showed the inability of the traditional political parties to connect with the lower and lower-middle classes in the urban areas as well as the increase in the use of racial and ethnic overtones in the political debate. This is a trend that the MAS later capitalized on. For the first time in the country’s history, an indigenous woman from the CONDEPA party wearing traditional native attire served as deputy to the Bolivian Congress. An Electoral Scandal: The 1989 Composition of Congress and the Presidential Election of Paz Zamora The D‘Hondt formula, established in 1956, was replaced in 1986 by the double quotient of participation and seat distribution for the lower chamber. Used for the first time in the 1989 elections, Article 156 of the law in its Section A indicated that the first quotient, the participation quotient, would be obtained by dividing the total valid votes in a department by the number of seats to be distributed. Under this formula, those parties that obtained at least the same number of votes as the participation quotient would participate in the seat

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assignment (Art. 156, Section B). Once the participation quotient was calculated, the votes of all parties that participated in the distribution of seats were added, and this total was divided by the number of seats to be distributed in a department. With this quotient, seats were distributed only amongst the parties that qualified for the distribution. The double quotient method had a tendency to restrict the participation of smaller parties because it eliminated those that did not obtain the minimum to enter into the distribution of seats (Deheza 2000: 141–143). Even if the minority parties made it, their representation was restricted by the second quotient of seat distribution that favored the majority parties. All electoral laws in use from 1979 through 1985 contained a provision that permitted parties that failed to meet the participation quota to nonetheless obtain a seat, provided that their vote total was not less than the lowest remainder that earned a seat in the district. In 1986, this provision was changed through the introduction of what was known as the exception clause, giving the CNE the discretion to permit small parties which fell below the participation quota to earn a seat (Mayorga 2001: 195). Granting such discretionary powers to the CNE proved ominous to the democratic process. The MNR had been for many years the symbol of fraud in the Bolivian collective understanding.57 In the two elections of the 1950s, the MNR used far-fetched tactics to win votes. In those elections, it is argued that dead people and even animals voted! In small towns with 400 voters, 2,000 votes were counted. When Bolivian adults, not younger people necessarily, talked about fraud, they associated it with the MNR.58 Now in the 1989 elections, the MNR became the victim of fraud. The CNE was composed of seven members, three of which were appointed with the support of the MNR, three were appointed with MIR support and one with the ADN’s. A quorum (four members present) was needed to make most decisions, and it was impeccably formed with the MIR and ADN members. In 1989, and with the Pact of Democracy broken, the MIR and ADN members found it convenient to join forces at the CNE to exclude the MNR. The MIR-ADN formed an alliance that became known as the Band of the Four (La Banda de los Cuatro) within the CNE. The MNR was left out of the incipient ADNMIR alliance in the CNE. This marked the first great distancing between the MIR and the MNR. On the other hand, the Band of the Four was probably the immediate antecedent of the Patriotic Accord between the ADN and the MIR. All the last resolutions by the Band of the Four were approved without the MNR members present, they abandoned the meetings of the Court


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in protest of the decision-making procedure. Although results were questioned, MIR’s Eid Franco asserts that there was indeed a “triple tie” (triple empate) in these elections. According to Eid Franco, the parties “had similar votes, one had 49, another 46, and we [the MIR] had 41. We called it the triple tie, and it was constitutional that any of the three could be elected president.” The CNE members forced the so-called triple tie (Mesa Gisbert 2003a: 173), which in reality was not so since the MIR popular vote was slightly lower than the other two. The main controversy arose over the translation of the popular vote into seats in the Chamber of Deputies, then composed of only plurinominal deputies, and over one position in the Senate. The electoral system allowed the manipulation of votes. The system allowed three instances of decision making in legitimating votes: at the voting table during the vote count, in which the party delegates could question anomalies of the voting procedures or the recording of votes, and at the intermediate and central level. The Departmental Electoral Courts and the CNE in Bolivia could, in 1989, review the results and annul votes coming from the voting table. There were always simple mistakes of the voting records that parties could use to their advantage. With this in mind, the MIR and ADN members of the CNE shortened the differences between the parties by annulling records, modifying jurisdictions, and ignoring the resolutions by departmental courts. The alleged fraud was mainly done in the departments of Oruro, La Paz, and Potosí. In polling stations in the Department of Oruro, results from voting tables were strategically annulled to take votes away from the MNR. The MIR legitimately won the first two Senate positions from Oruro, but the third position was in dispute. It is alleged that votes were manipulated to grant the Senate post to the ADN when the MNR should have been the party to receive it.59 If the MNR lost a senator, naturally it would also lose one or two deputies in Oruro; the manipulation of votes for the distribution of seats affected the MNR in both chambers. The same was done in the departments of La Paz and Potosí. Thus, even though it won the popular vote, the MNR lost at least six or seven congressional seats in this manner, which impeded the party from winning the congressional election. Julio Garret Ayllón who had been vice president with Victor Paz Estenssoro in the previous administration was the candidate who ran for the Senate seat with the MNR in Oruro. He lost his seat. In that election, in a majority of the departments, the ADN, MNR, and MIR votes were very close. Thus by annulling 350 votes in one

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department, a senator could be decided. The changes were not in great numbers but enough to alter the composition of Congress. Similarly, the purpose of the ADN and MIR members of the CNE was not to take the victory away from the MNR but to produce a correlation of forces in the parliament more favorable to them. Besides taking parliamentarians away from the MNR, the Band of the Four left two very small parties out of Congress when they should have had one deputy each: the Socialist Party of Roger Cortez, and the MRTKL of Victor Hugo Cardenas. The two of them were supposed to receive one deputy position. The CNE members misinterpreted Section E of the electoral law to deny seats to the MNR, PS-1, and the MRTKL. They could have received a deputy seat by residuals, but the CNE chose not to grant the positions to them. Based on the popular vote, the ADN had 43 and the MIR had 35 parliamentarians, which did not give them the needed two-thirds majority (87 representatives). With the changes, they received exactly the 87 (or two-thirds) votes they needed. Indeed, the MNR made a public announcement stating that according to the results, the MNR had won in Cochabamba, Potosí, Tarija, Santa Cruz, and Beni. Thus, the parliament should have been organized in the following manner: MNR ADN MIR 50

43

IU CONDEPA PS-1

35

14

11

MRTKL

Total

1

157

3

The MNR contended that by annulling 150,000 votes, the CNE limited the MNR success to the departments of Tarija, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz and granted Beni to the ADN, and Pando and Chuquisaca to the MIR. With the vote manipulation, the PS-1 and the MRTKL had no parliamentarians and the IU parliamentary seats were reduced by 4 seats. According to the MNR leaders, the CNE organized the parliament in the following manner with the sole purpose of reducing differences between the top three 60: MNR

ADN

MIR

IU

CONDEPA

PS-1

49

46

41

10

11

0

MRTKL Total 0

157

With this, the MNR lost one parliamentarian, the ADN gained three more than it had achieved, and the MIR obtained six more than it should have received. Coincidentally, the ADN and MIR parties were the only


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ones that benefited from the vote manipulation. Besides the MNR, the IU lost four parliamentarians, and whereas CONDEPA maintained the same number of parliamentarians, the PS-1 and the MRTKL were left with none. The double quotient system made the calculation two times. Smaller parties were eliminated, and in the process, there was a manipulation of the votes to the detriment of specific parties. There was no time to prove the existence of fraud, and the final electoral results were confirmed for the Chamber of Deputies. Although the law favored small parties, the CNE members interpreted the law so that the least number of minorities would be elected. Víctor Hugo Cárdenas was unable to be deputy in 1989 because of this intentional misinterpretation of the law. These parties and the MNR complained. Presidential candidates for the MRTKL and the PS-1, Roger Cortez and Victor Hugo Cardenas, went on a hunger strike to protest the decision of the CNE to annul votes to their detriment. According to the strikers, 14 parliamentary seats had been stolen from them.61 In the Senate, the MNR, ADN, MIR and CONDEPA entered in relatively similar levels, especially the first three. The MNR called it a scandal and demanded the annulment of the elections before the Supreme Court.62 This was done to no avail. FULKA, MRTKL, IU also requested the annulment of the 1989 election results and the resignation of the members of the CNE.63 The ADN and MIR were now prepared to cross the “rivers of blood,” namely, to forge an alliance after a past of persecution, while the MNR, the winner of the elections, was positioned as the outsider and head of the political opposition. As the results of the composition of Congress were confirmed, negotiations for a governing coalition began. Crossing the Rivers of Blood: The Patriotic Accord (AP) With or without the electoral scandal, in 1989 no formula achieved the absolute majority of votes. Thus, Congress assumed the responsibility of electing the president once again. By the late 1980s, the trauma of the 1979 stalemate persisted. Throughout the first months of 1989, the word stalemate is mentioned by political leaders in public declarations numerous times (newspaper articles, TV, etcetera). In March 1989, Bedegral appeared speaking on behalf of the MNR asserting that the party “would not provoke another stalemate.” He also asserted in those declarations to the press, “that word should be forgotten because it is a bad word.”64

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From May 7 through August 6, 1989, intense negotiations took place between the ADN, the MIR, CONDEPA and the MNR to forge a winning alliance. Guillermo Fortún, Carlos Iturralde and Willy Vargas Vacaf lor composed the ADN-PDC convergence negotiating team.65 Juan Carlos Duran, Edil Sandoval, Oscar Bonifaz negotiated on behalf of the MNR, Palenque on behalf of his own party, and Oscar Eid Franco, Gonzalo Valda, and Luis Gonzales Quintanilla for the MIR. During these three months the leaders held many informal meetings in an effort to achieve an alliance. Through the media, the leaders would make proposals for the other parties to consider. In the process, there were proposals by the ADN to the MIR and CONDEPA, by the MNR to the ADN, MIR and CONDEPA, but there was no proposal by the ADN or MIR to forge an alliance with the MNR, neither party wanted to form a government with the MNR. In this climate, the MIR especially, saw that it had the possibility of obtaining the presidency. By June 1989, Kieffer, one of ADN’s chiefs proposed a tripartite agreement to govern with the MIR and CONDEPA.66 With no success, a month later the ADN asked the MIR, separately, for the congressional votes to elect Banzer.67 The MIR responded to Banzer that this was not possible because of their previous history of persecution. The MIR parliamentarians would not vote for Banzer (Baptista Gumucio 1996: 357) as he had persecuted them during his military dictatorship. With the pragmatism that characterizes the MIR leaders, Paz Zamora and Eid Franco, asked Banzer to support the MIR instead.68 Neither the ADN nor the MIR asked the MNR for support or a governing alliance, but the MNR returned to desperate measures to achieve the presidency. Sánchez de Lozada attempted discussions with Banzer and Paz Zamora separately to try to put together a government.69 The dislike for Sánchez de Lozada was such that the ADN only wanted to discuss with the MNR organic structure but not with Sánchez de Lozada. For a few weeks, Eid Franco asserted that the MIR did not trust the MNR,70 but there was a faction of the party that wanted to make a pact with the MNR rather than ADN. At the end of July, days before the congressional election of August 6, the MNR proposed a cogovernment plan to the MIR that would last until 2000 and in which they would share the cabinet, the development corporations, the prefect’s offices, alliances in municipal elections, and leadership positions in the judicial branch.71


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However, on the night of August 1, Banzer and Sánchez de Lozada met to discuss a possible alliance. After receiving no response from the MIR, on August 2, four days before the vote in Congress, in desperation the MNR sent a letter proposing a cogovernment this time with the ADN. The MNR proposal offered shared leadership of the executive branch, organization of the cabinet by consensus, as well as the equal management of the regional development corporations. The presidency of the Senate would be for the ADN and the Chamber of Deputies for the MNR.72 CONDEPA appeared in the news distancing itself from the MNR, as well as from the ADN and MIR. At some point, Palenque stated that the party would give the votes to the MIR in Congress but would not form a governing alliance. However, some meetings between the MIR and the ADN took place in Palenque’s residency, and it is even argued that the agreement between Banzer and Paz Zamora was sealed at Palenque’s house (Paz Ballivián and Cevallos 2001: 163). In the end, CONDEPA joined the 1989 coalition, and received minor posts within the Development Corporation of La Paz.73 The core of the coalition, however, remained with the ADN and MIR. After almost three months of negotiations, and after exhausting a series of scenarios that never materialized, the Patriotic Accord was forged.74 The ADN surprisingly decided to give the votes to the MIR. Under the agreement, the President was elected from one of the formulas (MIR), and the vice president was elected from the other formula (ADNPDC). That is how the Jaime Paz Zamora-Luis Ossio Sanjinés formula came into being. The agreement included the sharing of the executive posts, as well as leadership of the legislative chambers. It also included dividing the management posts of the state enterprises, and the regional development corporations. In the end, a clear model of cogovernment was put in place. The MIR decision to accept the ADN support was made by Paz Zamora, and the MIR negotiating team. However, the whole of the party was not involved in deciding to forge the Patriotic Accord. That is why the AP was such a surprise for everyone.75 By “crossing the rivers of blood,” as Paz Zamora put it, the ADN and MIR agreed to share the government in equal parts (Carvajal Donoso 2000: 43). It is important to mention that this was not the first alliance between the MIR and the ADN. The antecedent that preceded the Patriotic Accord in 1989, and the Commitment for Bolivia in 1997 for that matter, were the political agreements that the MIR made with General Banzer in 1978, and later

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with his party ADN in 1981. The MIR reached an agreement in 1978 with General Banzer to make democracy viable in Bolivia, and in 1981 another agreement was forged to overthrow the dictator Luis Garcia Meza. This time the two leaders decided not to sign any agreement and indicated that their “word” was enough, a direct message to Sánchez de Lozada who had breached a written agreement. A day before the congressional election, General Banzer publicly announced to Paz Zamora that “the Patriotic Convergence would give support to the MIR-New Majority with no conditions.” He also stated that his party would assume the line of constructive opposition in Congress. This was a curious misunderstanding since the negotiating teams of both parties had advanced in detail an agreement for cogovernment that none of the chiefs publicly mentioned. The misunderstanding was corrected in the morning hours of the next day (Fernández Saavedra 2004: 71). What this misunderstanding also shows is the disconnect between party leaders and party militants. The Patriotic Accord, just as the Pact for Democracy, was forged by negotiating teams with no involvement from the party militants, or at least some basic input. In this case, the different scenarios considered were discussed by the ADN and MIR negotiating teams in social settings, and at people’s houses, with no real participation of the party, much less the parliamentarians elected with the party. The main protagonists of this “marriage of convenience,” the MIR and ADN, had vital interests in brokering the pact. A series of facilitating factors in the forging of this alliance also existed. First, the electoral arrangements and its effects on the composition of Congress were crucial. The fraud perpetrated by the Band of the Four facilitated the election of the third most voted candidate. By minimizing the differences between the first three candidates and taking the Senate and deputy seats from the MNR and other smaller parties, the possibility of an ADN-MIR alliance became real (Mesa Gisbert 2003a: 34). Second, the decision by Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR to break the Pact for Democracy with the ADN repositioned the MNR away from the other two. Although Sánchez de Lozada won a slight plurality (23.07 percent) to Banzer (22.7 percent) and Jaime Paz Zamora’s (19.6 percent), neither the ADN nor the MIR would contemplate supporting the MNR’s claim. If Sánchez de Lozada maintained the pact, Banzer would have become president, and Sánchez de Lozada would have had to wait for another opportunity.76 Third, the campaign style adopted by Sánchez de Lozada was also ill-fated. The breaking of the pact and the negative campaigning adopted by the MNR fomented a strong personal dislike for Sánchez de Lozada


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by Banzer.77 Even a newspaper headline appeared stating that “personal problems between Banzer and Sánchez de Lozada impeded an MNRADN agreement.” 78 The bitterness between the MNR and ADN opened the possibility for the third candidate to play on the rivalry. Fourth, its formation and sustainability rested on their willingness to concede to the proposals of the other. Payoffs and concessions also had a role in the ADN’s decision to support Paz Zamora. In this sense, a fifth factor, ideological convergence, also had a role. The MIR had moved from a leftist position: radical and Marxist during the 1970s, to a socialdemocratic left in the moderate center. It was the same for Banzer who went from a fascist right during the dictatorship to a moderate centerright. So, most parties were converging to the center. Banzer knew he would not be elected president, so he decided to support the least dislikable option. The reason behind this decision was the strong rejection that various political sectors and important societal sectors continued to feel about constitutionally electing someone who had been one of the worst dictators of Bolivian history (Mesa Gisbert 2003a: 33). Thus Banzer was motivated to support the Patriotic Accord to reemphasize, once more, his conversion to democracy. Finally, policy continuity had an important role. The Patriotic Accord was brokered as a mechanism for Congress to pass legislation that would further the implementation of the NPE economic reforms. Paz Zamora assured the banking and financial markets that the NPE would be maintained.79 One of the more pragmatic reasons for the AP was the sharing of state patronage. The Accord was attractive to the ADN because it facilitated the party’s access to agenda setting and policymaking. Indeed, the ADN and MIR shared half of the government. ADN-PDC would be in charge of 10 of the 17 ministries 80 while the MIR had 7. In addition, also in August 1989, the Political Council of the Patriotic Accord or COPAP (Consejo Político Suprapartidario) was established under the leadership of Hugo Banzer.81 With this, the idea of a cogovernment between Banzer and Paz Zamora was materialized. The COPAP was composed of five members of the MIR and five of the ADN-PDC alliance. The Council was established for consultation and coordination purposes to sustain the national unity government (Soria Saravia 2002: 176–177). By chairing this political committee, ADN had direct access to policy formation as well as direct oversight and an advisory role over the legislative and executive branches of government. The COPAP was useful for promoting better relations between the ruling parties and it was praised as the instrument necessary for the consolidation of Bolivian democracy and the modernization of the Bolivian state (Gamarra 1994: 111). Table 2.7 shows the composition of the COPAP.

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Table 2.7 Composition of the Political Council of the Patriotic Accord or COPAP MIR*

ADN

Gastón Encinas Valverde Guillermo Capobianco Samuel Doria Medina Mario Rueda Peña Gonzalo Valda

Marion Rolon Anaya Antonio Ormachea Ronald McClean Franz Ondarza Jorge Agreda

*

Presencia, 8/10/1989.

Like his uncle, in an August 24 speech from 1989, in the event of the establishment of the Council, Jaime Paz Zamora asserted that the Patriotic Accord “responded to more profound tendencies.” Paz Zamora continued to distance the MIR from its leftist origins. He asserted that it was time for “political consensus-building and coalition governments . . . Because now the pragmatic component is the most important one in which no ideology is able to become viable. Seeking solutions to concrete problems does not require for one to renounce to one’s principles” (Paz Zamora, Jaime. La Bolivia de Hoy, Tres Discursos del Presidente. La Paz, 1989–1990). Also on behalf of the MIR, Eid Franco appeared in the media indicating that ideological differences would not be a reason not to make good government.82 Furthering the NPE: The Privatization Law The Bolivian electorate voted for the continuation of the economic adjustment model. The three parties that bowed to support the NPE— the MNR, ADN, and the MIR—obtained 72.72 percent of the popular vote in the 1989 elections. It was thus logical that further implementation of the NPE would take place. By 1989, inf lation had dropped to 16.56 percent (National Statistical Institute data), but various NPE policy initiatives did not get to be implemented during the Paz Estenssoro administration. For one, the decentralization of the administration of health and education was not carried out due to massive protests which prevented it from happening. The program to reactivate the economy by extending fresh credit to the private sector lagged. Some short-term macroeconomic problems reappeared. And finally, the privatization of public enterprises was not significantly implemented (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 186). The


69

antecedent to the Privatization Law by Paz Zamora was Supreme Decree 22407 of January 1990, which focused on differentiating his policies from the previous administration’s, though they were different at a minimal level, and on furthering some of the measures. Through Decree 22407, the Paz Zamora government established four objectives: stability, growth, human development and the modernization of the state. In terms of stability and economic growth, the decree ratified the policy of price liberty, and proposed to elaborate and approve legislation for the financial sector and to establish the rules of the game for national and foreign private investors. It also proposed the further privatization of state enterprises, and the opening up of the economy to foreign investment, especially in mining and hydrocarbons. In terms of human development, the administration sought to promote programs to link more actively the private sector with labor organizations and thus promote employment, education and social services, and reduce poverty. In terms of the modernization of the state, Paz Zamora proposed to reduce the size of the state coining another famous phrase regarding this: “To reduce the state is to aggrandize the nation.” At the beginning of its tenure, the government dissolved 20 subsecretaries of the 57 that existed. The Minister of Finance indicated that this would allow the saving of Bs. 140,000 millions that would be destined for public investment and the payment of the foreign debt.83 The adoption of this decree also allowed the government to propose an increase in revenues from taxes and the control of public spending. By doing this, the Paz Zamora administration expected to receive an average of $265 million per year from direct investment, a portion of which could be used toward the mining industry.84 Whereas President Paz Zamora saw acceptance on the part of society toward the Supreme Decree 22407 stating that he was “optimistic because I see that people have no prejudices against the government, and accepted the new administration with good faith,” the Supreme Decree 22407 was qualified by the opposition as a continuation of the 21060. For instance, Sánchez de Lozada (2004) asserts that he has always thought that, as the Bolivian saying goes, the Supreme Decree 22407 was “the same chola (indigenous woman) with another pollera (skirt).” Government representatives denied this by indicating that whereas the Paz Estenssoro’s decree sought stability, the Supreme Decree 22407 sought economic growth with social development,85 two elements the Supreme Decree 21060 supposedly lacked. Ongoing public protests started as the Supreme Decree 22407 was decreed. To control opposition, Paz Zamora also had to resort to repression, through a state of siege declared on November 15, 1989.

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However, he guaranteed the political rights of the citizens and parties participating in the 1989 electoral municipal process to take place the following month.86 Law 1330 or Privatization Law served to further the NPE. This piece of legislation was sanctioned by Congress on April 24, 1992 and followed Paz Zamora’s unilateral attempts to pass privatization reforms. However, it was only with the approval of Congress that the privatization of the majority of the state-owned enterprises would take place. The proposal of a privatization law emerged from two different realms, one international and one internal to the AP. On one hand, privatization measures accompanied the package of structural adjustment reforms proposed by the Washington Consensus. In that sense, Paz Zamora and his party did not propose the privatization measures but responded to outside dynamics.87 The government itself indicated that it promised to launch the privatization decree as a commitment made with the World Bank.88 On the other hand, the privatization decree and later the law were also a product of the impetus of two of the AP ministers: the Minister of Planning, Samuel Doria Medina (MIR), and the Minister of Finance, Jorge Quiroga (ADN), later political rivals in the 2005 presidential campaign. Doria Medina and Quiroga had previously worked together in the Ministry of Planning when Quiroga was Minister and Doria Medina was undersecretary for Public Investment and International Cooperation. They were both interested in advancing privatization, and were the technical designers of the law. The reforms that took place in Paz Estenssoro’s administration mainly focused on restoring macroeconomic activity, liberalizing trade and the market, and correcting price relativity to bring them into line with those of the market. The Privatization Law also sought to refine the relationship between the state and the private sector and between central government and local government. What later became known as the “capitalization” of former state companies entered a first stage of implementation with this law. The law also proposed the establishment of the National Economic and Planning Council (Consejo Nacional de Economía y PlanificaciónCONEPLAN). This body would be in charge of regulating and monitoring the privatization process and defining the appropriate strategies to implement the law. It was designated as the sole representative of the interest of the Bolivian state. Through the sale of state enterprises, in other words, actives, assets, values and properties, Article 7 of the law aimed the net earnings toward investment projects and the building of economic and social infrastructure of the department in which the


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enterprises were located—a form of decentralization. While the income generated from the sale of public enterprises had to stay with the central government and be incorporated into the public investment budget, the law stipulated that investment had to be directed, as a priority, in favor of extreme poverty groups. Article 9 of the Privatization Law regulated its approval by the executive. It indicated that the executive had to make the law valid no later than 30 days after its enactment by Congress. Given that the law had been accepted by the legislature as sent by the president, no major conf licts took place in terms of its approval. The ADN-MIR stranglehold on the legislature facilitated a quick, although dubious, approval of the law. In a controversial legislative procedure, the law was approved by the lower chamber with no quorum (Morales 1994: 141). For these reasons, from April to December 1992, a threat of an annulment of the law by the MNR-controlled Supreme Court existed (Gamarra 1994b: 57; Morales 1994: 141). The law contained the list of state enterprises that would be transferred to the private sector. According to the government, the national airline, Lloyd Bolivian Airlines (LAB), would be privatized first. The regional development corporations would follow although there were some “unnecessary ideological debates in terms of their privatization,” as former Minister of Finance, David Blanco asserted.89 Privatization increased somewhat after the sale of the cooking oil factory. But the process was plagued by problems ranging from incompetence to an overwhelming emphasis on details to sell off factories which in one case went for only $500 (Morales 1992). By December 1992, the government had failed to privatize the companies proposed in the law. Gamarra (1997a: 126) asserts that “as of December 31, 1992, the government had [only] sold off a trout farm for $28,750, three ceramic factories for approximately $1.4 million, and a chicken farm for $16,300.” Moreover, privatization was not done in a timely manner. There was no time to privatize the important state-run enterprises such as the Bolivian Oil company (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Bolivianos-YPB), or the National Telephone Company (Empresa Nacional de Telefonos-ENTEL). There was little advancement in terms of the joint venture contracts signed by the State Mining Corporation or COMIBOL with private companies. The case of the Lithco Corporation from the United States is also illustrative. Lithco wanted to extract lithium reserves in the Uyuni area. An agreement had been negotiated by the government but found opposition by the Potosí Civic Committee. After major protests and strikes in Potosí, Lithco left to seek similar reserves in Argentina. The privatization plan of

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this administration then was limited to the privatization of two hotels confiscated from the owners due to debt, an oil manufacturing company and other smaller factories (Baptista Gumucio 1996: 359). Sustaining the Patriotic Accord The Patriotic Accord was mainly dependent on two factors. On one hand, political affinity supported and sustained the political alliance— both the ADN and MIR had shown an explicit commitment to the structural adjustment measures initiated with the NPE. On the other, state patronage motivated the ADN and even members of Paz Zamora’s own party to guarantee him a legislative majority. The Bolivian electoral arrangements for the election of the president, and the constitutional powers ascribed to the Bolivian executive and legislature necessarily forced Paz Zamora and the 1989–1993 legislature to coexist as well as utilize interinstitutional negotiation to be able to move policy proposals or legislation forward. Outside challenges were resolved through the adoption of the Patriotic Accord in the sense that the ADNMIR majority neutralized the MNR opposition. However, this Accord was also based on political clientelism. Payoffs were necessary to sustain the governing coalition: Positional Payoffs Through the Accord, the ADN received the vice presidency and nine key governmental posts, while the MIR received the presidency and the other half of the governmental posts. The Political Council had five representatives of each party, and served as a supranational institution with control over all government affairs. The leader of the Council was Banzer (ADN). The distribution of posts was almost symmetrical. Indeed, the MIR had to concede power, otherwise, it would not have been able to govern. In his cabinet, positional payoffs were also distributed as table 2.8 shows. Indeed, the exchange of positions for political support became more explicit. Although the AP was criticized for dividing power so bluntly, its leaders found the sharing of state patronage completely appropriate. Oscar Eid Franco (2004) asserted that the positional payoffs were distributed in normal levels: “Distributing positional payoffs is normal and should continue, why is that bad?” In Paz Zamora’s second and third cabinets, the ADN and MIR also shared posts on relatively equal terms.

Table 2.8 Paz Zamora Administration: Cabinet 1 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and newspapers) Name

PP

Carlos Iturralde Ballivian

ADN

Guillermo Capobianco Rivera Hector Ormachea Penaranda Enrique Garcia Rodriguez David Blanco Zavala Mariano Baptista Gumucio Willy Vargas Vacaf lor Guido Cespedes Argandona Oscar Zamora Medinacelli Mario Paz Zamora Walter Soriano Lea Plaza Angel Zannier Claros Mauro Bertero Gutierrez Gustavo Fernandez Saavedra Manfredo Kempff Suarez Enrique Prada Abasto Guillermo Fortun Suarez Luis Gonzalez Quintanilla Elena Velasco de Urresti Mario Rueda Pena Carlos Saavedra Bruno

Ministry

Minister of Foreign Relations ADN Minister of Interior ADN Minister of Defense ADN Minister of Planning ADN Minister of Finance MIR Minister of Education ADN Minister of Transportation MIR Minister of Industry MIR Minister of Labor MIR Minister of Social Security ADN Minister of Mining MIR Minister of Energy ADN Minister of Peasant Affairs MIR Minister of the Presidency ADN Minister of Information ADN Minister of Urban Affairs ADN Minister/no portfolio MIR Minister of Aeronautics MIR Minister of Urban Affairs MIR/ID Minister of Information MIR Minister of Interior

Starting Date

End Date

August 6, 1989

March 17, 1992

August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 August 6, 1989 October 27, 1989 January 4, 1991 March 15, 1991

March 15, 1991 August 9, 1991 August 9, 1991 March 17, 1992 August 9, 1991 March 17, 1992 August 9, 1991 November 12, 1992 March 17, 1992 August 9, 1991 August 9, 1991 March 17, 1992 August 6, 1993 July 3, 1990 October 25, 1989 August 1, 1991 July 3, 1990 August 9, 1991 March 17, 1992 August 6, 1993

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Paz Zamora’s last cabinet was composed of members of both parties. This time the majority of them were from his party, but it lasted less than a year, until the end of his presidency in August 1989. In the legislature, the AP also divided the legislative commissions: the constitution and justice commission, international affairs, economic policy, education, communications, etcetera, in the lower chamber, excluding minority and opposition groups from the commissions. The posts were distributed to MIR and ADN militants: 11 under the leadership of the MIR, and 10 under the leadership of the ADN.90 The leadership of the chambers was also divided between the two parties. Agenda-Setting Naturally, with the distribution of posts also came the division of responsibilities in terms of the design of public policy. Much more than in the case of the Paz Estenssoro administration, policy concessions were another incentive for the maintenance of functioning executive-legislative relations in Paz Zamora’s government. Indeed, through its leadership of the Political Committee, and of the Chamber of Deputies, the ADN was given direct access to the setting of the legislative agenda, which still focused on the commitment to the continuity of the NPE.91 Congressional Opposition: How effective was it? The MNR, less than a month since the inauguration, presented a request for an oral report to the whole cabinet to appear before the lower chamber and inform the legislature of the plans of the new government.92 In January of the following year (1990), the cabinet presented the oral report to the lower chamber. The MNR was unsatisfied with the report and the party caucus walked out of the chambers.93 Constitutional provisions allowed Paz Zamora to govern without the consent of the assembly in certain situations. As with the case of Paz Estenssoro, Article 96 gave Paz Zamora the authority to implement policies by decree, but his legal powers were not unfettered since Article 59, and more strongly, Article 70 of the CPE, allowed the Bolivian Congress to exert an oversight role by questioning cabinet ministers. Within the MIR, as would be expected, his acceptance of liberal economic policies caused resistance amongst the most radical groups. Outside his party, Paz Zamora faced popular opposition by the labor sectors, and he was forced to deal with the MNR as the leader of the opposition


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within the legislature. The intraparty challenges were resolved through political clientelism and the practice of co-opting intraparty dissenters with public appointments (Morales 1994: 132). The president had a harder time dealing with the MNR. Although the fiscalization role of Congress was limited by the force of the AP majority, opposition parties managed to exert opposition tactics to disrupt the Paz Zamora administration. Some of these included: ●

●

●

●

In the second year of the administration, opposition deputy Edwin Rodriguez attempted a Malfeasance Trial against President Paz Zamora, Congress denied the motion. The reason for the request for a trial was Paz Zamora’s decision to deliver former Minister of the Interior, Luis Arce Gomez, to the US to be tried there on narco-trafficking charges.94 In the legislative session, of 114 parliamentarians, 24 voted for the trial, 87 rejected it, and 3 voted blank.95 The MNR deputy Juan Pereira Florillo requested the interpellation of Minister of Foreign Relations Carlos Iturralde, Minister of Finance David Blanco, Minister of Energy Angel Zanier, due to the commercialization of hydrocarbon subproducts and the allocation of $600,000 to the National Electricity Company (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad—ENDE), without consulting Congress.96 Eudoro Galindo, an opposition senator, established a record in the Senate by speaking without interruptions for 9.30 hours to delay, and possibly avoid, the approval of the hydrocarbons and mining laws.97 Minister of Planning, Enrique Garcia, and of Finance, David Blanco presented an oral report to the Commission of Regional Development of the lower chamber on the situation of the regional development corporations and decentralization in Bolivia.98

Although the requests for oral reports by the MNR were initiated in the chamber of deputies, they were not completed in the 990 congressional sessions of the 1989–1990 legislative period.99 Paz Zamora also faced confrontation in the declaration of the state of siege. Immediately after being declared, CONDEPA, the Socialist Party (PS-1) and the MNR rejected the declaration of state of siege and demanded the respect for civil liberties.100 To demand the end of the state of siege, six deputies also declared a hunger strike.101 In this state of siege, leaders of various sectors were arrested, mainly those on the hunger strike. While some were taken to different locations in the eastern part of the country, other professors

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and students were exiled to Argentina. One hundred and sixty-eight people were relocated from La Paz to Ibibobo in the Department of Tarija, to Ramon Dario Gutierrez in Beni and to Apolo in the Department of La Paz.102 The Paz Estenssoro and Paz Zamora Administrations: Street and Strike Politics With the state of siege declared on September 1985, Paz Estenssoro was able to arrest and send to internal exile in the departments of Beni and Pando, over two hundred COB leaders, including Juan Lechin Oquendo, the legendary COB leader. Without legal recourse, these people were kept in exile until October 1985 when the COB called off the strike and showed a willingness to engage in dialogue with the government (Gamarra 1987: 410). In 1986, mining workers went on strikes again and peasants, the COB, teachers, coca leaf growers, etcetera, started various protests against the government. In March 1988, The March for Life saw 50,000 people march to La Paz to protest against Paz Estenssoro’s administration. The March went from the mining camps in Oruro to the capital to protest a government proposal to decentralize the health and educational systems. The marchers were dispersed when they reached the Altiplano under another state of siege declared by Paz Estenssoro.103 In April 1988, the COB continued promoting social unrest. In late April the government faced widespread social unrest and harsh opposition from labor unions and attempted to reach a truce so that Pope John Paul II could start his 9-day visit to Bolivia. Street and strike politics were characteristic of this period. During the Paz Zamora administration, the effects of the NPE were also felt mostly by the lower classes, including unionized teachers. In November 1989, hundreds of people throughout the country went on hunger strikes to protest the continued economic measures and to demand benefits from the state. The teacher’s union leaders Miguel Lora and Telmo Roman held a three-week hunger strike to demand a bonus of 300 Bolivians for teachers who had been negatively affected by the NPE and privatization policies. Militants of the Revolutionary Worker’s Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario) were accused of altering order, promoting violence, and attempting suicide. Other teachers such as Wilma Plata, Eliodoro Tiniti, Oscar Vega, and Eduardo Flores were involved in the hundreds of hunger strikes (or “piquetes”) throughout the country.


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Vega and Flores tried to crucify themselves at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA).104 Law 1330 also had opposition both in Congress and in the streets. Although the ADN-MIR alliance was careful to put forth the argument that privatization would end state corruption, the MNR opposed the privatization law approved by the AP in Congress, and did not endorse any of the attempts at selling off state property, especially the largest state enterprises which it then believed should remain in state hands. MNR spokespersons were also vociferous critics of the sale of the former La Paz Hotel. Populist and leftist political parties, especially CONDEPA and the MBL also opposed privatization from the outset (Gamarra 1997a: 103). There were less protests during the Paz Zamora administration as compared to that of Paz Estenssoro, however. The number of strikes dropped from 945 between 1983 and 1985 (13 were by the COB), to 506 between 1986 and 1989 (19 by the COB). The Paz Zamora government only had 109 strikes from 1990 to 1993 (8 by the COB) (Romero Ballivián 1999: 39). In sum, forging these political agreements allowed these two presidents to ignore popular opposition and move forward with economic stabilization measures; but popular resistance to the measures was present. With a legislature brought into policymaking vis-à-vis state patronage and access to legislative agenda setting, trade unions and organizations opposing the measures were left without representation inside the institutional apparatus of the state. Their only available mechanism to protest were “street and strike” politics—a tactic that became more popular as time went on. The Pact for Democracy and the Patriotic Accord: General Ref lections Various factors were crucial to the sustainability of these political pacts from 1985 to 1993. ●

●

Ideological affinity, in terms of the adoption of the economic stabilization measures to stabilize the national economy, had a direct impact on the parties‘ interest to build the coalitions. Also, the economic situation, and the pressure from international and bilateral donors forced a political affinity around the NPE that probably could not have been possible in other circumstances. Political negotiation and bargaining were also crucial to the sustainability of pacted democracy. It was needed both at the electoral and

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●

●

●

governing levels. Paz Estenssoro was able to secure legitimacy and democratic support for the NPE through a decree, but its sustainability depended on the pact. Political negotiation took even more precedence in the Patriotic Accord, in which two historically opposed parties formed and sustained a governing coalition. Paz Estenssoro, Banzer, and Paz Zamora’s political savvy also facilitated the emergence and sustainability of these political agreements. By exerting their political leadership, they were able to reach relative interparty consensus on economic policy, which at the same time produced functioning institutional relations needed to implement the NPE. The three leaders used their personal control over their respective parties to stabilize the party system and ensure that it would not emerge as an obstacle to the maintenance of the NPE (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 193). There was further exclusion of the minority parties and civil society sectors. The application of the NPE was through the practice of regulating the economy via presidential decrees that circumvented Congress. In the few cases in which the executive opened discussions in the national legislature, the congressional majorities were quickly utilized to approve the measures before the emergence of widespread public debate. This practice was taken to extremes by Paz Zamora.105 Finally, the electoral system, especially the congressional election of the president when no candidate had reached a majority, also prompted these political leaders to negotiate and reach political deals. The election of the president by Congress forced the political parties to form coalitions at the electoral level. But to govern, presidents also needed to forge coalitions. Also, in this period, the electoral system for the election of legislators tended to favor bigger parties to the detriment of smaller ones. The 1986 electoral reform had the principal objective of concentrating parliamentary representation in a few parties (ADN, MNR, MIR) through the revision of a proportional coefficient that had favored minority parties. Moreover, the electoral system allowed the parties to manipulate the voting counting procedures. With this, the majority parties had the best scenario to monopolize congressional seats. Giving the ADN, MNR and MIR predominance in the party system, and the legislature, the electoral system facilitated coalition building.

Gamarra (1994: 123) proposes that the creation and sustainability of these two coalitions from 1985 through 1993 reveal various trends about


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the nature of politics in Bolivia. On one hand, they reveal that long term pacts can allow executives to overcome recalcitrant congressional opposition. Similarly, it shows that by 1993, Bolivia’s political class was showing a great degree of political maturity. Finally, we see that coalition building can contribute toward the stability of the Bolivian political system. In the same way, these early Bolivian experiences with coalition building also revealed the early signs of what later became a major f law of the Bolivian political system, the emerging formal dependence of political groups on state patronage. This tendency toward job factionalism generally drove the logic of political party competition and became crucial to the survival of presidents in Bolivia in the years ahead. The greatest limitation of these pacts, as it was observed toward the end of the Paz Zamora administration, was the beginning of a move away from programmatic goals toward clientelism and job factionalism. Starting with the AP, the concept of a governing coalition with direct proportions of participation in the state apparatus also became open, and accepted. In 1989, a stronger connection between parliamentary support and the responsibilities of the executive existed. This period also saw the beginning of generalized corruption.106 As later events reveal, for these pacts to continue to have an impact, programmatic content could not be discarded for the substitution of political patronage. Moreover, the pacts needed to take into account the demands emerging from society to connect the programmatic goals to the needs and demands of the citizens. This could have been done by creating spaces for dialogue between government and civil society, among other strategies that favored inclusion and citizen participation.


CHAPTER 3

PAVING THE WAY FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOLIVIAN POLITICS: ELECTORAL REFORMS AND COALITION BUILDING

A

fter serious allegations of partisanship and a major fraud scandal in the 1989 elections, by 1993, the National Electoral Court (CNE) had recovered its credibility and was considered by all parties a legitimate institution to oversee the electoral process. Political parties had agreed to strengthen the Electoral Court by incorporating highly qualified individuals as members. The 1993 elections took place after a campaign with three basic characteristics: (a) the marriage between the right and the left continued; this time the ADN and the MIR launched a joint ticket for the presidency and vice presidency through the AP electoral coalition; (b) the MNR assertively sought the presidency, building on the image of the “victim” whose victory had been stolen in the 1989 electoral process 1 and capitalizing on the indigenousness of the vice presidential candidate; and (c) neopopulism emerged; new parties CONDEPA and UCS used their populist and indigenous extractions to amass political support. The outcome was an interesting one. Before 1993, the greatest concentration of votes had occurred in the 1982 election when the UDP won 38 percent of the vote. In this election, votes concentrated in relatively similar levels. The MNR had its best voting record in history with 35.56 percent going to Sánchez de Lozada, who won in eight of the nine departments. This time, mistakenly thinking

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they could build on the results of the AP alliance, the ADN and MIR launched a joint ticket. Hugo Banzer tried to become a democratically elected president for the third time. This time, former MIR president Jaime Paz Zamora’s half brother, Oscar Zamora Medinacelli, ran with Banzer for the vice presidency. Together, they achieved 21.05 percent of the vote. Two parties disputed the third place: CONDEPA received 14.29 percent of the votes, and Max Fernández’ UCS 13.77 percent, as figure 3.1 illustrates. These parties captured the vote of the marginalized and popular sectors of society that were disenchanted with the political and economic models designed and implemented by the majority parties. Although small, the MBL had the best voting record in any election. Receiving 5.36 percent of the votes, the MBL became the fifth political force in Congress. Nine other parties received a small plurality of the votes. Although he was not elected by Congress, Sánchez de Lozada received the highest plurality of the votes in the 1989 elections. The main reason was the electoral system. Four basic factors can be attributed to Sánchez de Lozada’s success this time. First, to get votes the MNR capitalized on its image of a victim of CNE fraud. Second, the MNR put together an electoral campaign with modern political marketing tools. Sawyer and Miller, the U.S. polling firm that had advised Sánchez de Lozada in the

1.27%

1.10%

1.28%

0.98%

0.77%

0.38%

0.48% MNR-MRTKL

1.84% 1.87%

AP

5.36%

CONDEPA 35.56% 13.77%

UCS MBL ARBOL ASD

14.29%

FSB 21.05%

EJE VR-9


T R A N S F O R M AT IO N O F B O L I V I A N P O L I T I C S

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1989 electoral campaign, advised him again in 1993 and partly directed the campaign using innovative ads and mass media elements. The MNR’s other strategy was the so-called New Plan (Plan Nuevo), that is, visiting from door to door as many households as possible throughout the territory to present Sánchez de Lozada’s candidacy and his government plan.2 Third, Sánchez de Lozada chose an indigenous person as his running mate—the leader of a fraction of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari L. 3 An internal decision-making process was undertaken to decide who would be Sánchez de Lozada’s running mate. The process was greatly inf luenced by Sánchez de Lozada. As Oscar Arrien Sandoval, a MNR Deputy, recounts, there were two possible candidates to run for the vice presidency on the MNR ticket in 1993: Cardenas, the welleducated Aymara who was the leader of the MRTKL party, and Percy Fernández, an MNR strong man from Santa Cruz. Arrien Sandoval recounts that the majority of the National Command of the party was leaning toward Percy Fernández because he was from Santa Cruz, an economically important region of the country, and had a powerful political demeanor. However, “Goni imposed his view; he imposed Victor Hugo Cardenas, creating a risk for an internal confrontation of the party.” According to him, Sánchez de Lozada proposed Cardenas at the beginning of the National Command Meeting; the vote was 2 to 1 in favor of Percy Fernández. To avoid getting to a vote, Sánchez de Lozada arbitrarily decided to suspend the meeting. He then held individual meetings with about 100 delegates to explain the reasons why his running mate had to be Víctor Hugo Cárdenas. Sánchez de Lozada got their votes, and the MNR party launched the 1993 electoral campaign with Cardenas as the running mate for the vice presidency. The MNR thus built the electoral campaign on two things: (i) the image of Victor Hugo Cardenas as “a son of the Revolution,” an attribute Sánchez de Lozada did not have, and as an effort to appeal to indigenous voters and (ii) a brutal attack on corruption. He also capitalized on his success as a businessman. Without a well-developed discourse and using a memorable phrase (very common for Bolivian political leaders to do)—“Victor Hugo doesn’t know how to steal, and I don’t need to”4 —Sánchez de Lozada tried to differentiate his party from its contenders. This phrase granted him credibility but also two of the attributes Bolivians were looking for in the next administration: honesty and efficacy (Müller & Asociados 1993: 7). Surely his relaxed demeanor, wittiness, and directness when communicating with the populace also helped.

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The fourth factor had to do with the configuration of forces in Congress, including the entrance of populist parties as potential coalition partners, and the very ambitious government plan proposed by the MNR during the campaign: the Plan for All (Plan de Todos). This electoral platform proposed reforms as profound as those of the 1952 Revolution in the economic, political, educational, and electoral realms. In the economic realm, the plan proposed the innovative “capitalization” law that would allow for the sale of 50 percent of the shares of certain government enterprises in exchange for infusions of capital into these firms. Shares for the remaining 50 percent would be distributed to Bolivians and vested in a pension program. Under these reforms, dividends emanating from the pension accounts were channeled to the BonoSol, a program of annual payments to Bolivians over the age of 65. In the political realm, the Plan for All proposed the design and implementation of a Popular Participation program that would create municipalities throughout the country; it would give them funds and significant autonomy to administer them and invest in health, education, and infrastructure development. It would also enable local citizens to vote for local officials and hold them accountable for their actions. In the educational realm, the Plan for All proposed a broad educational reform that would provide for a bilingual system of education such that Spanish and indigenous languages could be taught in schools. The Plan also included improvements in teacher training and compensation based on performance, changes in teacher qualifications, a strengthened ministry of education, merit hiring of school supervisors, special attention to girls’ education, national testing of students and teachers, and local school councils, among other measures. Although the MNR had the highest number of votes, Article 90 of the Constitution still forced parties to agree on a congressionally elected president given that no candidate received 51 percent of the votes. As opposed to the uncertainty in 1989, in 1993, all political parties recognized the MNR’s victory the day of the vote (Romero Ballivián 1999: 42). The coalition-building process began. Bolivian political leaders 5 relate that putting together these coalitions is usually done over dinner or drinks, and the most pragmatic of them usually conduct parallel negotiations with different parties. In this case, forming an alliance with the ADN or MIR was not an option. Instead, Sánchez de Lozada and his aides started negotiations principally with CONDEPA and the UCS, but also with the MBL.


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The Impact of the Electoral System on the Composition of Congress The experience of the 1989 elections showed that an important transformation of the electoral system needed to be made. Thus, for the June 6, 1993 elections, the electoral arrangements were modified according to the terms agreed by political party leaders at a “political summit” held in 1991. At this summit, the leaders of the MNR, ADN, and MIR as well as CONDEPA and the MBL met and signed the “Agreements of February 5, 1991.” The document contemplated a series of reforms to the electoral system to be implemented through Congress. Party leaders then instructed their party caucuses in Congress on the results of the summit and an interparty commission proposed a Draft Law on an Electoral Reform. The law was approved and enacted on July 5, 1991. Four important characteristics of this agreement need to be mentioned. First, the agreement was done outside of the legislature with no inclusion of political party militants or societal sectors. Second, the representatives of the parties present at the “summit” were not the chiefs of the party caucuses in Congress; they were the party chiefs who had not been able to enter Congress. Since the agreement was made outside of Congress, parliamentarians had no input in the decision-making process and were limited to following instructions on how to vote in Congress. This created a huge disconnect between the chief, the parliamentarians, and the people. MIR parliamentarian Hugo Carvajal Donoso (2004: 67) defines this as the jefaturismo phenomenon. The jefaturas (chiefs) of the parties monopolized the decision-making process on issues related to the party and to the country in general. Through the so-called political summits, the chiefs agreed on changes on specific issues and instructed the rest of the party on the decisions made and on the next steps. In his view, the effects of this phenomenon were devastating for the party system because (i) the organic and deliberative culture within political organizations was annihilated, (ii) the possibility of the emergence of new leadership was annulled, and (iii) the historic visibility of democracy in the country was obscured. The third factor relates to the strength of the chiefs present relative to the votes received in the election. The political summit was not a meeting of equals. Each chief participated and negotiated the 1991 agreements knowing the weight each had in Congress.6 This inf luenced the outcomes. Finally, the agreement did not include all the parties. It was made by five of the ten parties elected to Congress in 1989.

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The greatest achievement of the 1991 reform, however, was the institutionalization of the CNE. This effectively disassociated party politics from the electoral process. The parties agreed that the CNE needed autonomy. Thus, they agreed that it would be composed of five members not associated with any political party who would be elected by two-thirds of the votes in the National Congress, plus one member appointed by the president. The reform also included the “principle of preclusion” (Art. 171, 1991 Electoral Law), which eliminated the mechanisms that allowed the departmental and national electoral courts to review the voting procedures and annul votes if they thought them invalid. The party leaders also thought it would be important to guarantee minority representation. They eliminated the quotient (simple or double of the D’Hondt formula) and proposed the “odd divisor” on the grounds that it was more accurate. The problem became political rather than technical. In the end, there was consensus, and the procedure to calculate the translation of votes into parliamentary seats was changed substituting the double quotient system, established in 1956, with the D’Hondt formula using the odd divisors variant.7 No legal threshold for entrance in the legislature was established. The 1993 Electoral Law also conferred, in a more systematic manner, rights and obligations to political parties. With this reform, electoral legislation also became more systematic with regards to presidential and congressional elections. Article 130 stated that to be elected president and vice president, the party ticket had to obtain the absolute majority (half plus one) of the valid votes. This prohibited parties from granting the presidency and vice presidency to candidates of different tickets, a practice that occurred in the previous administration. For the election of senators, the same arrangements were maintained. Previous electoral reforms in Bolivia generally had the intention of limiting the entrance of small parties into the chambers of Congress and concentrating the vote in the majority parties. However, the intention of the 1991 reform was not to marginalize smaller political parties but to open a space for them to enter Congress. With this electoral arrangement, eight parties obtained seats in Congress. In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, three small parties obtained one seat each while the bigger parties together obtained more than 107. The 36 percent of the popular vote guaranteed the MNR about 53 percent of the seats in the lower chamber, because the seats distribution system was not perfectly proportional. The composition of the Chamber of Deputies was as figure 3.2 indicates.

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T R A N S F O R M AT IO N O F B O L I V I A N P O L I T I C S 52

35

20 13 7

E

1

EJ

D

1

AS

L AR BO

BL M

N D EP A C O

AP

U C S

M

N R

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Two important elements of analysis regarding the electoral system and its impact on the composition of Congress need to be mentioned. First, although the UCS and CONDEPA received a relatively equal share of the votes, the difference in the lower chamber was seven seats. How can a 0.52 percent voting difference represent seven seats in Congress? The explanation resides in the regional orientation of the electoral system. Because of the region-wise parliamentary seat distribution system, the CONDEPA votes were concentrated fundamentally in the highlands (Altiplano), and so were the parliamentary seats. UCS received a more uniform national voting and thus obtained seven parliamentarians more than CONDEPA, which had votes in only one region (Paz Ballivián and Cevallos Rueda 2001: 166). Second, the nature of the electoral reforms suggests a trend toward granting more opportunities for smaller parties to enter into the legislature. The numeric difference has been small (one to two seats) from one formula to the next, but the political implications of a small numeric difference are great. This is especially true when the composition of Congress is finalized and the presidential election follows. This time, more representation was guaranteed. Because the election of presidents and senators was done on the same ballot, the distribution of seats in the Senate ref lected the presidential popular vote percentages. The simple majority elements of the electoral system concentrated the seats in the four most voted parties, excluding

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minority parties from the Senate. The MNR won the Senate race in eight of the nine departments, and in the ninth one the MNR obtained the second place. Thus the party obtained 17 Senate seats out of the 18 for the two-thirds majority needed in the Senate for certain laws, including constitutional reforms. The MBL, with 5 percent of the popular vote, obtained no seats in the Senate. In this election, however, it became obvious that Sánchez de Lozada would be able to form a congressional majority. With 36 percent of the vote, Sánchez de Lozada had a commanding force in the parliament, to the point that there was not much the opposition could do in the legislature.8 He needed a very small margin of seats in Congress to secure a majority. Negotiations started to consolidate a governing coalition. Governing Coalitions: The Pact for Governance and the Pact for Change The newcomers, CONDEPA and UCS, challenged the dominance of the MNR, ADN, and MIR in the 1993 elections. CONDEPA, led by “El Compadre” Carlos Palenque, had participated for the first time in the 1989 municipal elections, achieving important results—especially in the Department of La Paz. In the 1989 presidential elections, it achieved 12 percent of the votes and gave its seats in Congress to support the election of Paz Zamora. The other newcomer, Max Fernández with the UCS, followed a similar patrimonial logic to attract followers. Beginning in 1989, Fernández converted the UCS into a mechanism to deliver promises and favors to vast and remote sectors of Bolivian society, thus establishing the slogan “Max obras” (Max Works)(Gamarra 1996: 75). The MBL obtained a very small margin of votes (seven in the lower chamber and none in the Senate), but it enjoyed widespread respect among Bolivians because of a track record of honesty and intellectual capacity. The respect was such that they became known as the “clean wheat” (trigo limpio). Alfonso Ferrufino, an important leader of the MBL, recounts that by 1989, the MBL adopted the motto “we are clean wheat,” doing so was, in his view, a monumental mistake because it was aggressive and exclusionary to tie all other parties to corruption. The motto was proposed by a group of MBL militants and quickly taken on by the media. With 33.32 percent of the vote and 44 parliamentarians altogether, Sánchez de Lozada sought to put together a coalition with these parties.


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Parallel negotiations were thus started with CONDEPA and UCS, which had the votes to guarantee Sánchez de Lozada a majority. Sánchez de Lozada (2004) recounts that it was not that hard to negotiate with Max Fernández and the UCS because “Max was a populist and did not really have a strong party.” In other words, the UCS was not going to request many payoffs, such as government quotas. At the outset, the main concession Max Fernández requested from the MNR candidate to guarantee him a majority in Congress was f lexibility in the payment of taxes.9 With the UCS, Sánchez de Lozada would get exactly two-thirds of the Senate, and four deputies over and above the two-thirds majority needed in the Chamber of Deputies to pass legislation. He still tried negotiating with CONDEPA. Some polls by the Catholic University in La Paz, and other reliable polling companies, indicated that by early 1993, Fernández enjoyed great popularity and the highest percentage of vote intention for the presidential election. The success in the 1991 municipal elections results also showed that UCS could become a strong national political force. During the 1993 electoral campaign, UCS realized that its strongest challenger in getting the votes from the same electorate was CONDEPA; thus Palenque started an aggressive campaign against Fernández alleging that the beer baron had ties with narco-trafficking and accusing the Fernández family of tax evasion (Paz Ballivián and Cevallos Rueda 2001: 165). Thus, in its negotiations with Sánchez de Lozada, CONDEPA conditioned its participation in the coalition to the exclusion of the UCS. CONDEPA’s Palenque and Paz Ballivián then forced Sánchez de Lozada to make a decision between the two: “whether to make an alliance with a strong party that would probably want to be involved in the policymaking process and had less parliamentarians, or with a party that had no real interest in policymaking but in receiving tax deferments, but had more parliamentarians.”10 With the pragmatism that was characteristic of him, Sánchez de Lozada chose UCS as the coalition partner. Paz Ballivián relates that at a dinner hosted by Sánchez de Lozada for the CONDEPA leaders, the would-be president asserted “You know, this is arithmetic, they have more [parliamentarians] and you have less, I insist Mr. Palenque, I want to ‘make government’ with you, but I will not give up the UCS.” It is important to mention, however, that MNR militants were not involved even in the decision of choosing which party to make the alliance with. Some sectors within the party considered Carlos Palenque’s CONDEPA as a more suitable and strategic partner. CONDEPA was seen by these MNR sectors basically as a stronghold in the western part

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of the country. Although Carlos Palenque had no Aymara or indigenous origin, “El Compadre” Palenque reached all the popular classes and the ethnic majority and appealed to both urban and rural sectors. Both CONDEPA and UCS were populists, but Palenque had what the MNR was never able to obtain, the indigenous vote. These MNR sectors thought they could have reached the indigenous sectors even more with an ally such as CONDEPA.11 The agreement was then made with the UCS. What became known as the Pact for Governance (Pacto por la Gobernabilidad) served as the coalition vehicle for the alliance of the MNR with Max Fernández. Under the terms of the MNR-UCS pact, Fernández followers secured, among other tradeoffs, one ministry, two undersecretary posts, two ambassadorships, and the first vice presidency of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Gamarra 1997a: 384). The MNR also forged a pact—the Pact for Change (Pacto por el Cambio)—with the MBL. With 5 percent of the votes and seven parliamentarians, the MBL was not a strong coalition partner but the MNR sought to capitalize on their image of honesty and political integrity. With the offer of one ministry, some congressional and diplomatic posts, and a genuine interest in the Plan for All, the MBL decided to ally with the MNR. Although viable, some of its members say that the alliance was not strategic because the number of parliamentarians gave the MBL no real power in the coalition to inf luence policy decisions, or at least not enough to attempt to inf luence the policy formulation process. The offer to form the Pact for Change was made to Antonio Araníbar Quiroga, head and presidential candidate of the MBL, but was collectively decided by the party’s National Board. Only three members of the party opposed the decision: Alfonso Ferrufino, Luis Fernández Fagalde (Mesa’s first minister of labor), and Maria Mercedes Boiti (who later retired from the party). Ferrufino asserts that forming the Pact for Change was a democratic decision, but a strategic error as the 1997 and 2002 election results for the party would later reveal.12 The Sánchez de Lozada Administration: Popular Participation and Capitalization With the Plan for All, the MNR entered the electoral game and won. Political reforms characterized this coalition government. Initially, it appeared that the demands of the people had finally reached the ears of their representatives and a series of reforms were implemented in various realms. According to Sánchez de Lozada (2004), the political reforms


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were profound and produced results as important as those of the 1952 National Revolution. Most of the proposals made during the electoral campaign were delivered, albeit slowly. Two of the most important pieces of legislation during this period are evaluated below: the Law of Popular Participation, and the Capitalization Law. Law 1551 of Popular Participation (LPP) The discussion and formulation of the Law of Popular Participation, emblematic of the period from 1993 to 1997, were done without the MNR’s participation. The MBL claims the origin of the law, or at least the basic elements of what became known as the Law of Popular Participation. Apparently, Miguel Urioste Fernández, who became the 1997 MBL presidential candidate, led a working group that produced a draft law, designed mainly for the rural area, with elements that were later used for the LPP.13 However, the most credible account attributes the content of the law to Carlos Hugo Molina, a lawyer from Santa Cruz. Molina, had strong connections with a progressive sector of the Catholic Church and worked at one of the oldest NGOs in Bolivia, the Jesuit’s Center for Peasant Research and Promotion (Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado-CIPCA). Other sources indicate that some of the technical elements of the LPP were a product of the World Bank project EMSO that between 1988 and 1994 prepared various decentralization proposals for the country (Galindo Soza 1998: 228). At the end of the 1980s, the CIPCA put together a publication—“For a Different Bolivia” (Por una Bolivia Diferente)—that proposed a revision of the administrative organization of the country, taking indigenous people’s rights into account. CIPCA organized a conference and invited Carlos Hugo Molina to present a proposal on how to politically operationalize the main tenets of the book. His proposal was to work this revision of the country by strengthening the municipalities. “The only municipalistas 14 in Bolivia before the LPP were Carlos Hugo Molina and Ruben Ardaya . . . Their proposals were never received very enthusiastically because most thought that in a country with a weak state, it made no sense to create mini-states.”15 In 1994, Carlos Hugo Molina and others put together a proposal for the constitutional reform on behalf of Millennium Foundation (Fundación Milenio), one of Bolivia’s think thanks. Their proposal strengthened the municipal regime, the municipal councils in particular, and even included the figure of the Vigilance Committees (VCs) that later became part of the LPP. Sánchez

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de Lozada’s logic for the VC was that if more responsibility was given to municipalities, they also had to have more control.16 The proposal was well received and Carlos Hugo Molina was later selected to head the popular participation team that prepared the draft law to be approved by Congress and then worked in what became the National Secretariat for Popular Participation within the Ministry for Sustainable Development. He put together a team of specialists with no real political party affiliation and gave them freedom to work toward a draft, but not without a close monitoring of the process by Sánchez de Lozada, who got involved in all aspects of the formulation of the policy proposal and its implementation. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and his team of specialists put together the proposal that was sent to Congress. The Capitalization Law, and the education reform were identified in the media as the “damned laws.” The LPP was added to this group of laws. The claim of those that did not support it was that the law was deceiving. They argued that the law was not really aimed at decentralization, a long-standing demand from civic movements in Bolivia, but rather at resolving conf licts in the interior of the country. Neither members of the MNR nor members of the coalition parties participated in the design of the law, thus the law became a reality without broad political party support. It stayed in the hands of a select group of well-educated and independent professionals. As a result of this disconnect, there was constant tension. Parliamentarians, government representatives, and political party militants did not really respect the work of the National Secretariat for Popular Participation. In the words of a secretariat staff in charge of the political monitoring of the law, politicians saw them as “crazy intellectuals” who were taking advantage of the political momentum to assume administrative tasks that were assigned to parliamentarians and ministers. Headed first by the minister of sustainable development and later by Sánchez de Lozada himself, this group of people devoted more than 300 hours of work to facilitate the implementation of the Popular Participation Law (Galindo Soza 1998: 234). The Law 1551 was sent by the executive to Congress, which approved it on April 20, 1994. In its four sections, the law radically changed the territorial, economic, and democratic conditions of local government in Bolivia. In its Article 1, the law recognized, promoted, and consolidated the process of popular participation of indigenous communities, both urban and rural. The stated purpose of the law was to strengthen the economic and political instruments to improve representative democracy,


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facilitate citizen participation, and guarantee equal opportunities and representation for both men and women (Art. 2). In its first section, the law recognized the legal existence of all communities by establishing them as Base Territorial Organizations (Organizaciones Territoriales de Base-OTBs). The second section introduced districtization, a mechanism to define municipal jurisdictional territory within sectional provinces, widening their effective scope, and adding more and newer resources. In its third and fourth sections, the law established the equal distribution of resources throughout the country and reordered the power structure of public bodies to implement the law. The law granted legal recognition to the OTBs and created the province as a geographical territory within departments. Indeed, Article 3 recognized the authority of neighborhood associations and indigenous communities, thus giving legitimacy to “captains, jilacatas, mallcus, and curacas”17 according to their native customs and laws. After the recognition process, the OTB was given the right to have access to resources assigned to the community through the law. In addition, the OTB could propose, request, control, and supervise public services and works according to the needs of the community (health, basic necessities, sports etc.); modify actions contrary to community interest; propose justified changes or ratifications to their education and health systems; and ask the municipal government about financial resources available to them from the LPP. The organizations were also given the responsibility to oversee the use of the funds, take care of the public works, and inform and be accountable to the communities that they represented. Article 18 created a new level of government through the districting process 18: municipalities within provincial sections. These municipalities would have a minimum of five councilors or a maximum of eleven depending on the number of inhabitants. Districting then served as the convergence of political administrative divisions and established social structures and public services within the territory of sectional provinces. A third section of the law distributed resources equally among inhabitants of a department, thus closing the gap between resources being assigned more to urban than to rural areas. Before the LPP, most municipal government expenditures were concentrated in urban areas, particularly in the nine department capitals. The law assigned resources according to the number of people who lived in each area. Article 20 assigned 20 percent of the national revenue to the municipalities instead of the 10 percent previously given to localities. To receive the 20 percent, a municipality

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had to have a minimum population of 5,000 inhabitants. Of the resources assigned to the municipality, the municipality had to assign 90 percent to the Popular Participation Plan. Sánchez de Lozada (2004) asserts that giving municipalities 20 percent of the resources was “a revolution” because these regions had never received funds from the central government, instead funds were taken from the regions to the cities. Until 1994 when the law was enacted, 62 percent of public investment was concentrated in the “central axis” of the country, that is, La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz (Galindo Soza 1998: 233). This law alleviated that. The last component of the law reorganized the power structure of the local bodies. Article 28 created the Development Corporations, responsible for administering resources in the municipality. Representatives from each OTB were elected in each municipality, and they were given the right to form VCs. The VCs were responsible for informing the community about municipal affairs and for acting as a liaison between municipal structures and the community. In the area of social control, the committees had the responsibility of ensuring that communal plans were carried out correctly and that they were coordinated with all civil society organizations as well as with local governments and community actors. They also were given the responsibility of overseeing resource distribution, earnings, and expenditures. The VCs were created to give oversight to the transfer and distribution of funds. In case of alleged misuse of funds from a VC, the executive could stop the disbursement of funds to the accused municipality (Art. 11). The LPP had both critics and followers. Gamarra (1996: 85) asserts that the OTBs and VCs were the most criticized elements of the law because they were perceived more as instruments of the MNR to control local government than as instruments of government “accountability.” Criticism also came from civic movements from Santa Cruz, Tarija, and other regions that were patiently waiting for a decentralization law, but to no avail. Political unrest went to the streets as massive protests by these sectors in April 1995 forced a discussion on decentralization again.19 The Decentralization Law, or Law 1654, was approved on July 28, 1995. The objectives of the LPP were widely praised throughout the world, especially for incorporating indigenous, peasant, and urban communities into the judicial, political, and economic life of the country. Praise was also given for improving the quality of life of Bolivians through fairer distribution and better administration of public resources, and for improving representative democracy by facilitating citizen participation and guaranteeing equal opportunities for men and women in their local governments. The approval of this law had an effect on the incorporation


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of new political movements into the electoral realm. The MAS, one of the beneficiaries, became the most voted political organization in 2005. Law 1544: Capitalization Law Also proposed by Sánchez de Lozada in the first six months of his administration was the Capitalization Law. The purpose of the law was to privatize public enterprises through what some thought was an interesting and innovative mechanism. It was, indubitably, a process led by technocrats—a process that included neither MNR-elected members of Congress nor other parliamentary members of the coalition. The draft law was developed by a series of interdisciplinary working groups that were organized within the then established Ministry of Capitalization (Salinas, Lema, and Espinoza 2002: 19). Political parties in Congress had an accompaniment role and the responsibility of dealing with the citizens in critical moments, but they had no real involvement in the policy-formulation process.20 The positive effects of the New Economic Policy had slowed down. Thus Sánchez de Lozada looked at the privatization system in England 21 as a model for securing resources and promoting investment, an important determinant of economic growth. Realizing that privatization measures were never popular, Sánchez de Lozada decided to propose a plan where 50 percent of the privatized industries would stay in Bolivian hands.22 The reasoning was that state enterprises lacked capital and, according to Sánchez de Lozada (2004), administration and technology too. Therefore, instead of selling the enterprises to investors, the state would regulate the sale of half the shares in a public bid and would grant the investor the administration of the enterprise giving her/him the responsibility of also investing capital into the company. Sánchez de Lozada proposed that those shares that belonged to the state be put in a collective capitalization fund that would pay the BonoSol, a pension given to Bolivians at the age of 65—something that a majority of Bolivians do not have access to. Although $250 was not much, according to him, it was a lot for the more than 90 percent of Bolivians who lived in poverty then. The president sent the project of law to the Bolivian Congress on January 31, 1994. The Bolivian Congress approved the Capitalization Law, thus establishing the framework to carry out the government’s program in February 1994; a month later, President Sánchez de Lozada signed the bill into law. The law allowed (Art. 3) the executive to decree a series of laws regulating its implementation.

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Promulgated on March 21, 1994, the law provided a program in which outside investors would match the value of six of the largest state-owned enterprises in return for 50 percent of their equity with full management control. In its Article 1, Congress allowed the president to “contribute the assets and/or rights of the public enterprises to the capital paid in the constitution of new companies of a mixed economy.” Both national and international investors could buy into the company (Art. 4) through an international public bid. Unlike privatization, the funds from the sale of half the state enterprise would be invested in the company instead of being transferred to the government. Shares equal to the other half of the companies would be given to all Bolivians 21 and older in the form of individual pension funds. Upon reaching retirement at 65, citizens would receive a pension payable annually for life earnings. Through this law, Bolivian Fiscal Oilfields, National Electricity Company, National Railroad Company, and Vinto Metallurgical Company (Empresa Metalúrgica Vinto) would be capitalized (Art. 2). Article 4 of the law guaranteed that no investor (national or international) could own more than 50 percent of the stock of the company, even if that investor bought it from a third party. An anticorruption component was also included through Article 8 that prohibited representatives from the government (executive, legislative etc.) or their family members from participating in the bid for the privatization of these companies.23 In summary, through the attraction of massive private investments, the law sought to promote an economic transformation to stimulate the creation of new jobs and improve the income of Bolivians; guarantee efficiency and the modernization of the productive and service sectors; create a long-term savings system (the government proposed the goal of saving 20 percent of the GDP); restructure the energy, telecommunications, mining, and transportation sectors; capitalize the six most important public enterprises; and establish a regulating entity for the privatized sectors. The government claimed that this program would result in the creation of half a million new jobs. In mid-February 1994, Ramiro Ortega Landa, national secretary for capitalization and investment in the Ministry of Finance, published paid advertisements in the Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition, 2/15/94) and The Economist (No. 7851, 2/19–25/94) promoting the capitalization program and recruiting firms with experience in privatization and the administration of pension funds. By 2005, four public enterprises were capitalized via international bids on the basis of market prices of share packages, using the recommendations and conditions of an international team of privatization advisors.


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There were 10 new mixed enterprises: ENTEL in the telecommunications sector; Chaco Oil Company (Petrolera Chaco), Andina Oil Company (Petrolera Andina), and hydrocarbons conveyor company (Transportadora de Hidrocarburos) in the hydrocarbons sector; Corani Electric Company (Eléctrica Corani), Guaracachi Electric Company (Eléctrica Guaracachi), and Valle Hermoso Electric Company (Eléctrica Valle Hermoso) in the energy sector; and Oriental Railroad (Ferroviaria Oriental), Andina Railroad (Ferroviaria Andina), and Lloyd Bolivian Airlines in the transportation sector (Napoleon Pacheco 2004: 50). Politics of Pacts Like his predecessors, Sánchez de Lozada also had to take recourse to his constitutional authority to declare a state of siege to control some instances of massive protests against his policies, especially protests against the so-called damned laws. Like the others, he depended on the legislature to continue the state of emergency. Throughout its history, the MNR had shown great political capacity in forming coalitions both at the level of Congress and with different sectors in society. To implement the proposals of the Plan for All, Sánchez de Lozada, needed to act quickly. Through the two pacts, Pact for Governance and Pact for Change, he was able to corral the necessary congressional votes to pass these laws. How was he able to do this? The MNR and its coalition allies were essential to the approval and sustainability of the reforms, even though, they were largely excluded from the policy-formulation process. In early 1993, amidst the electoral campaign, the Senate approved the Decentralization Law and sent it to the lower chamber for consideration. Time constraints impeded the bill from being signed into law. In addition, new elections took place. The MNR was elected and Sánchez de Lozada, soon after assuming office, gave priority not to the Decentralization Law but to a reform of the executive branch. He sent to Congress a draft law that became known as the Law of the Executive Power or LOPE Law (Ley del Poder Ejecutivo).The law stipulated that the number of ministries would be reduced from 18 to 10, keeping some of the political ministries, such as foreign relations and the presidency, and making some of them “super” ministries. The “super” ministries of Bolivia were not functional or specific anymore but became sectoral. These were the Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Sustainable Development, and the Ministry of Economic Development. A series of subspecialties, national secretariats, and subsecretaries were grouped under each of these

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three ministries to address particular issues. Until then Bolivia had a hybrid model of cabinet structure emulating the French and American systems. During the first six months, congressional sessions were devoted to cabinet reform. During this time, civic movements decided to postpone their demands for decentralization to give the new administration some time to organize. The next two tasks were the popular participation and capitalization laws. The popular participation law was introduced in January 1994. On its heels came the Decentralization Law. However, as Congress was considering it, Sánchez de Lozada realized that in order to move his project, his vision, and convictions forward, he first needed to reform the Constitution to eliminate departmental governments. Otherwise the Decentralization Law would have strengthened them and not the municipalities he wanted to create.24 Thus the coalition faced its first real test in trying to get the constitutional reform approved. The electoral system had an impact on the configuration of forces in Congress, which the MNR managed to articulate in a congressional majority. Sánchez de Lozada needed to approve the reforms stipulated in the Law of Necessity for Constitutional Reform sanctioned by the 1989–1993 legislature.25 The Bolivian Constitution stipulates that for the Constitution to be reformed, it has to be approved by two subsequent legislatures. In other words, one legislature approves a law on the need for the reform of the Constitution, and the following legislature approves the measure. The coalition was effective and the reform was approved. There was opposition from noncoalition parties, but the implicit agreement in terms of the needs of the country and the demands of its citizens took precedence. The reform allowed for decentralization via the municipalities. Other reforms to the constitution included a recognition of the multiethnic character of the country, the increase in the number of legislators voted into office through a simple plurality system, a modification to Article 90 limiting the congressional election of the president when no candidate achieves the majority to the top two electoral tickets. The reform aligned the timing of the election of executives and legislators and lengthened the term of office of presidents, legislators, and mayors to five years. The most significant reform was the creation of uninominal deputies, elected independent of their parties and in a specific circumscription, in an effort to strengthen the link between the representative and her/his electorate. Thus, almost simultaneously, the executive sent to Congress both the popular participation and capitalization laws. The law of popular


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participation came first. Political inertia dictated that the first reaction of the opposition parties (MIR, ADN, and CONDEPA) was to oppose the law. However, they soon realized that the law was very progressive. As some parliamentarians from the opposition suggested, “Who could oppose such a law?” 26 —a law that facilitated citizen participation and guaranteed citizens’ input into the distribution of local resources. In the approval of these laws, and generally throughout the administration, the CONDEPA opposition was the most recalcitrant. To slow down the approval of the laws in Congress, parliamentarians used, among other means, interpellating ministers and requesting them for oral and written reports. The channeling of the requests for oral or written reports was discretional and rather authoritative. Congressional records show that from the date of an oral/written request by a parliamentarian to the date that the report was submitted the average wait was three months long. Often the delays made the requests for reports inconsequential upon arrival. Indeed, the 1993 Debate Rules had no stipulations regarding promptness in response. In the 1997 reform of the congressional debate rules, Article 152 established that a request for an oral/written report or interpellation had to be addressed, discussed, and concluded in the same session it was requested. Regardless, the tactic of requesting reports was primarily meant to slow down the reform process.27 Congressional opposition was also exerted by the ADN and MIR. In November 1993, three months after Sánchez de Lozada assumed office, a request for his impeachment and/or the calling of new elections was made in Congress by some ADN and MIR parliamentarians. A month later, in December 1993, when the MNR-controlled Congress amended the electoral law, the opposition parties charged Sánchez de Lozada with attempting to rig the rules of the game to favor his party (Gamarra 1996: 90). However, in the case of the MIR, during this administration, this party was both the persecutor and the persecuted. While Sánchez de Lozada publicized allegations of MIR ties to narcotrafficking, MIR exerted opposition in the legislature rejecting his policy proposals.28 Sánchez de Lozada (2004) asserts that MIR, with Jaime Paz Zamora and Oscar Eid Franco as the leaders, financed their campaigns with illicit money. He relates that the U.S. embassy wanted him to force a responsibility trial against Paz Zamora. He replied telling them to request his extradition if they had information but refused to try him. According to Sánchez de Lozada, the information he had was not same as the information the U.S. embassy had. He refused to do it also because he was president then and feared that if he did it to Paz Zamora, they would probably do it to him later. He battled the U.S. embassy but they did not

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have sufficient evidence to get Paz Zamora tried in a U.S. prison, so they wanted, as Sánchez de Lozada recounts, him to do the “dirty work.” Instead of Paz Zamora, the second in command would take the heat. In December 1994, Oscar Eid Franco, the party’s principal strategist, was arrested, tried, and sentenced to four years in prison, the duration of Sánchez de Lozada’s government. The two laws, capitalization and popular participation, were sanctioned by Congress and promulgated by the president. The law of popular participation was somewhat accepted by the public—and by the parties in Congress, who could in no way oppose a law that promoted citizen participation.29 It would have been “political suicide,” as many of them assert. Even CONDEPA approved the law, although, of course, with minor modifications. Yet the law enjoyed widespread national consensus. The capitalization law had been designed by technocrats, not parliamentarians, though the elected leaders would be the ones to ultimately approve it. To facilitate the approval of the law by the coalition members, the government put together a “crash course” for the coalition parliamentarians. The parliamentarians who were members of the coalition attended workshops every morning over four days where they listened to presentations on the main elements of the law. As some participants of the workshops suggested, these lectures helped them understand only 15–20 percent of the proposal because it was so complex.30 The members of the coalition voted the proposal into law in Congress with a very low level of information. The decisions about the law then were not made by the parliamentarians. Rather, they received instructions from the party leadership. The capitalization law caused an all-out war in the legislature. Both the capitalization law and the Hydrocarbons Law were strongly fought by the opposition, especially CONDEPA, on the basis that they meant the denationalization of state enterprises or a deferred privatization. In the congressional debate on the law, Ricardo Paz Ballivián, a CONDEPA deputy and executive secretary of the party, talked nonstop for 48 hours to delay its approval.31 ADN and MIR also joined the anticapitalization bandwagon on the grounds of nationalist sentiments. Differentiating its own privatization attempts in 1992–1993 from capitalization, the MIR argued that capitalization was equivalent to selling the country’s jewels to the highest bidder (Gamarra 1997a: 115). MIR and ADN parliamentarians, who belonged to the group that favored structural adjustment measures, tried to exert opposition but found themselves, as well as CONDEPA, unable to do anything against the


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strength of the congressional majority. They exerted opposition through activities such as public declarations and interpellations, but the MNR and its coalition partners had the necessary seats in the legislature to approve these two and any other laws. On the day of the approval of the capitalization law, the parliamentarians from the opposition chose to leave the chamber, to delegitimize the law and the subsequent legislation. At the end they had no choice but to accept its passage. Parallel Opposition from the Streets and the State of Siege The year 1995 began with an accumulation of unattended demands, and no tangible results from the capitalization policy adopted the year before. The administration started facing opposition from the streets. Demands were put forward by four main social groups: those protesting against the educational reform, those protesting against coca eradication measures, COB members protesting against low salaries, and finally those protesting against the government’s neglect of the final passage of the Decentralization Law. By early 1995, a group of protestors were demanding that the government suspend the implementation of the educational reform that, according to them, would leave teachers unemployed. Roadblocks and confrontations with the police paralyzed life in the capital city. The unionized coca growers from the Chapare organized protests against what they thought was an imposed coca eradication program. Coca union leaders rejected Sánchez de Lozada’s coca eradication measures and joined forces with the teachers’ unions to stage massive uprisings around La Paz. The COB, in turn, was in its thirteenth day of a general strike to protest low salaries, the government’s refusal to give in to demands for higher levels of social spending, and the education reform that in their view would affect teachers’ salaries. Simultaneously, civic leaders from Tarija threatened to secede from the country if the central government refused to implement the Decentralization Law that would establish local governments (Gamarra 1996: 96). A march of 20,000 supporters further complicated the scenario. With three weeks of protests, some of them violent, Sánchez de Lozada made the decision to declare a state of siege on April 18, 1995, for a 90-day period, as established in the Constitution. More than 100 people were detained, according to official records. Evo Morales and a group of coca unionists were arrested in Copacabana in the Department of La Paz

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while attending the V Meeting of the Permanent Council in Defense of Coca Growers in the Andean countries. A group of Peruvians were also arrested. On April 19, 1995, the day after the state of siege was declared, public opinion generally favored President Sánchez de Lozada’s decision to mobilize the armed forces and arrest labor leaders (Gamarra 1996: 96). Through the media, Carlos Sánchez Berzain, Sánchez de Lozada’s minister of government, stated that the measure was inevitable since dialogue with the unionists became impossible. In July 1995, the state of siege was extended for another 90 days. When it was finally lifted, social unrest continued, with students, coca growers, members of opposition parties, and others still on the march (Gamarra 1997a: 391). The government coalition gave Sánchez de Lozada the authority to establish and maintain the state of siege. Neutralized by the two-thirds majority of the governing coalition, again, the opposition had no other choice but to accept the will of the coalition. Overreliance on the Cabinet For the passage of these two pieces of legislation to be successful, Sánchez de Lozada knew that they had to have a minimum of societal support and legitimating congressional approval. However, privatization experiences in other countries showed that opening up the discussion of the law had the potential of delaying the process indefinitely. Thus, Sánchez de Lozada favored keeping the discussions limited and relied on a team of specialists to design and implement the proposals for these two laws. Sánchez de Lozada’s first cabinet was comprised of technocrats and businessmen. Most leadership positions in Congress were headed by the MNR. As table 3.1 indicates, during the August 1993–March 1994 period, the MNR retained much control of the cabinet, ceding only two ministries to its coalition partners, UCS and MBL, as the following chart shows. The alliance with the private sector guaranteed two Bolivian Chamber of Commerce members (Central de Empresarios Bolivianos-CEPB) with connections to the MNR and Sánchez de Lozada the leadership of two of the “super” ministries. The ministries of Economic Development, where the National Secretariat for Popular Participation was housed, and the Ministry of Human Development were occupied by independents associated with the CEPB, while the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two of the political ministries, were given to the UCS and MBL respectively. The complaints coming from the MNR called for more positional payoffs for the militants of the party (San Martin Arzabe 1998: 524). Having a team of specialists follow up on the implementation of this legislation would have been the ideal scenario for Sánchez de Lozada.


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Table 3.1 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinet 1 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Fernando Illanes De Ia Riva Fernando Romero Moreno Antonio Cespedes Toro Herman Antelo Laughlin

MNR

Minister of Finance Minister of Human Development Minister of Defense Minister of Social Communication Minister of Government Minister of Sustainable Development Minister of Justice Minister of the Presidency Minister of Foreign Affairs/ Culture Minister of Labor

August 6, 1993 August 6, 1993

March 24, 1994 March 24, 1994


March 24, 1994 March 24, 1994


December 16, 1994 January 6, 1995


March 24, 1994 January 6, 1995 August 6, 1997

August 6, 1993

June 9, 1994

German Quiroga Gomez Jose Justiniano Sandoval Carlos Morales Guillen Carlos Sanchez Berzain Antonio Aranibar Quiroga Reynaldo Peters Arzabe

MNR

UCS MNR

MNR MNR

MNR MNR MBL

MNR

However, problems with its allies in the private sector, tensions with the UCS, but more importantly, within the MNR, especially its members in the party caucus who had been left out of the policy process, produced a cabinet shift in March 1994. There had been tensions also as a result of the internal battles of movimientistas who did not want Sánchez de Lozada to be the head of the party. It produced the separation and, sometimes, expulsion of old MNR militants such as Edwin Rodriguez, Jorge Alderete, Ciro Humboldt Barrero, Alvaro Perez del Castillo, Ñuf lo Chavez, and some others (San Martin Arzabe 1998: 518). Factions of the MNR, including Guillermo Bedegral (1996: 27), rejected the work of the technocrats on the grounds that there was a “lack of commitment of the technocrats

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who held political power, and very little political responsibility.” In the view of these MNR militants, power without responsibility produced a threat to governance and politics. As a result of their pressure, the cabinet was reconfigured taking the two “super” ministries from the CEPB members and granting them to strongmen within the party. By early 1994, the cabinet became MNR-controlled, as table 3.2 shows. Table 3.2 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinet 2 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and newspapers)

Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date End Date

Alfonso Revollo Thenier Alvaro Fernando Cossio Enrique Ipinha Melgar

MNR

March 26, 1994 March 26, 1994 March 26, 1994


MNR

Minister of Capitalizacion Minister of Finance Ministry of Human Development Minister of Defense Minister of Social Communication Minister of Justice

MNR

Minister of Labor

MNR

Minister of Labor

MNR

Minister of Economic Development Minister of Government Minister of Sustainable Development Minister of Sustainable Development Minister of the Presidency

March 26, 1994 March 26, 1994 March 26, 1994 June 9, 1994 August 9, 1994 November 24, 1994

August 31, 1995 August 31, 1995 December 1, 1996 August 9, 1994 December 1, 1996 August 6, 1997

December 16, 1994 December 16, 1994

December 1, 1996 August 31, 1995

January 6, 1995

January 16, 1995

January 6, 1995

August 6, 1997

Raul Tovar Pierola Ernesto Machicao Argiro Rene Blattmann Bauer Marchcelo Cespedes G. Reynaldo Peters Arzabe Jaime Villalobos Sanjines

MNR MNR

MNR MNR

Carlos Sanchez MNR Berzain Luis Lema Molina MNR

Alfonso Kreidler Guillaux

MNR

Jose Justiniano Sandoval

MNR


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There were constant doubts about the sustainability of the ruling coalition. Although the MBL support seemed stable, Fernández’ support for the coalition varied with his mood. He felt excluded from the decisionmaking and policy-formulation process. He had originally been granted the Ministry of Defense, but he later requested the Ministry of Sustainable Development to be able to inf luence the implementation of the popular participation law. He was offered this ministry, but Sánchez de Lozada decided to move the National Secretariat for Popular Participation to the Ministry of Human Development to retain control of this portfolio. After serious confrontations and constant requests for more political presence in the state apparatus (Romero Ballivián 1999: 112), the UCS leader left the coalition in late 1994; later he came back and left again in 1995 (in November that year, Fernández died in an airplane accident). There were no threats of a broken alliance with the MBL. Antonio Araníbar Quiroga, the MBL foreign minister, was one of the most popular members of the cabinet, according to opinion polls, and was the only minister who completed the five-year mandate. The rest of the cabinet remained in MNR hands for the duration of the administration. Table 3.3 shows how the cabinet was reconfigured two more times. With every change, however, the MNR never rescinded control. In his first two years in office, Sánchez de Lozada relied mainly on his cabinet to design and implement policy and used Congress merely as a rubber stamp mechanism. Later his party was incorporated into the cabinet to facilitate the party’s participation in the policy-implementation process. Congress continued to amend, veto, or—as in this case— approve executive proposals. During the 1993–1997 legislature, parliamentary work was subjected to the initiatives and calendar fixed by the executive (Grebe Lopez 1998: 41). However, because of the weak parliamentary force and the scant ideological strength of the UCS, Sánchez de Lozada many times threatened their identity with policy actions that did not correspond to their party line. On several occasions and in getting approval for these laws, the MNR made the UCS parliamentarians act as an appendix to the MNR without Max Fernández’ knowledge (San Martin Arzabe 1998: 523). Legislative support was secured using the following payoffs. Positional Payoffs The UCS had the deputies and the senators Sánchez de Lozada needed to pass these controversial laws, but since there was no strong party structure, payoffs were mostly limited to prebendas (or payments made from public

Table 3.3 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinets 3 and 4 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Juan F. Candia Castillo

MNR

Minister of Finance

August 31, 1995

August 6, 1997

Freddy Teodovich Ortiz

MNR

Minister of Human Development

August 31, 1995

January 14, 1997

Jorge Otacevich

MNR

Minister of Defense

August 31, 1995

December 1, 1996

Irving Alcaraz del Castillo

MNR

Minister of Social Communication

August 31, 1995

April 19, 1996

Moises Jarmusz Levy

MNR

Minister of Environment

August 31, 1995

July 10, 1997

Guillermo Richter Ascimani Alfonso Kreidler Guillaux

MNR MNR

Minister of Social Communication Minister of Defense

April 19, 1996 December 1, 1996

December 1, 1996 August 6, 1997

Mauricio Balcazar Gutierrez

MNR


December 1, 1996

April 2, 1997

Franklin Anaya Vasquez

MNR

Minister of Government

December 1, 1996

January 14, 1997

Raul Espana Smith

MNR

Minister of Justice

December 1, 1996

January 14, 1997

Hugo San Martin Arzabe

MNR

Minister of Labor

December 1, 1996

April 2, 1997

Franklin Anaya Vasquez

MNR

Minister of Human Development

January 14, 1997

August 6, 1997

Carlos Sanchez Berzain

MNR


January 14, 1997

April 2, 1997

Rene Blattmann Bauer

MNR

Minister of Justice

February 14, 1997

August 6, 1997

Mauricio Antezana

MNR


April 2, 1997

August 6, 1997

Victor Hugo Canelas

MNR


April 2, 1997

August 6, 1997

Alberto Vargas

MNR

Minister of Labor

April 2, 1997

August 6, 1997

Jose G. Justiniano Sandoval

MNR

Minister of Economic Development

July 10, 1997

August 6, 1997


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sources; parliamentarians were given payments in the form of “extra” resources, bonus, and the like in exchange for their vote in Congress) and some quotas of power. Through the coalition, the UCS was given one ministry, two undersecretary posts, two embassies, the presidency of one regional development corporation, and the first vice presidency of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Gamarra 1997a: 384). The five votes of the MBL parliamentarians did not really make a difference; however, Sánchez de Lozada gave them the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other minor positions in government. As Sánchez de Lozada recounts, fortunately the ministries contained general secretariats, secretaries, and general directors within the ministries to distribute amongst the coalition partners, so “it worked fine.”32 Other Types of Concessions Other concessions were generally demanded by the UCS. After tensions with the U.S. embassy because of allegations of ties to narco-trafficking, Sánchez de Lozada facilitated the first meeting of Max Fernández with the U.S. ambassador. In addition, Max Fernández constantly requested more f lexibility in the payments of taxes to the Internal Revenue Office on the profits of his beer industry. Sánchez de Lozada distributed positional payoffs with political audacity. The objective was to control the portfolios without the immersion of the coalition partners. He wanted to limit the MNR’s participation too. Throughout the administration, the MNR neither supported nor opposed these two laws, but it never took ownership of them. Probably because of the lack of involvement of the party in the formulation of the policy, the MNR just voted for the law through the party caucus in Congress, but it had no role in its implementation. In this analysis, two important observations come to light. The first is the permanence of an implicit agreement among political parties on a politicoeconomic agenda for the country, that is, democratic consolidation and neoliberal economic policies. The ADN supported privatization because its constituency included large numbers of entrepreneurs who would benefit from the policy. MIR agreed with these proposals in 1989. The MNR was its most outspoken advocate. Second, the design and implementation of the popular participation and capitalization laws did not involve the parliamentarians, who were supposed to represent the interests of the citizens. Instead, they only followed the instructions on how to vote from the party leadership. This great disconnect between Congress and the party leadership became

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characteristic of Bolivian politics. By not incorporating into Congress the national party leaders (presidential candidates) who received relative electoral support, the electoral system directly inf luenced the interaction between Congress and the president, Congress and the party leadership, and, more importantly, the party and the electorate. A situation where the political party leader is in no manner accountable to the electorate and only instructs parliamentarians of the agreements that are made outside of Congress has had pernicious effects on the Bolivian political system. The next presidential period substantiates these claims. The Banzer-Quiroga Administration: 1997–2002 The tacit agreement amongst political parties on the neoliberal and democratizing agenda continued in this administration. Similarly, the growing disconnect between Congress, the party leadership, and the people, prepared the terrain for serious social confrontations. An aggravating factor inf luenced the challenges the executive and legislature faced in this period: the Banzer-Quiroga administration confronted a dramatic economic slowdown emerging from domestic and international factors and was unable to find adequate and timely measures to address it. Napoleon Pacheco (2004), Bolivian economist and executive director of the think tank Millennium Foundation, asserts that the Banzer-Quiroga administration ignored the economic crisis early on. He narrates a joke circulating amongst Bolivians around 1997 saying that “the crisis is passing by sea level, therefore, the crisis is not going to arrive in Bolivia”—most Bolivians live 3,000 meters above sea level. This was a way for Bolivians to mock the perceived inaction of the Banzer administration. The majority of Bolivians believed that when measures were taken by the administration, they were adopted late and executed with poor policy designs that ultimately contributed to deepening the economic problem. An opinion poll by the newspaper La Prensa in 2001 (Pg. 1, 10/5/2001) reveals that 44 percent of those polled thought Banzer’s performance was poor, 50 percent thought it was not as good, while only 5 percent thought the performance was good. At the domestic level, the coca leaf eradication measures of this and previous administrations caused high levels of unemployment, a reduction of the national income, and unmanageable sociopolitical conf lict as social sectors demanded alternative modes of sustainable development. At the international level, the Asian and Russian crises shocked Latin American economies. In particular, the Asian crisis affected the Brazilian,


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Argentinean, and Chilean economies that had direct links with the Bolivian economy (Fernández Saavedra 2004: 117). In a spillover effect, the Brazilian and Argentinean economies suffered severe slowdowns that had two main impacts on the Bolivian economy from 1997 to 2001. On one hand, as other nations devalued their currency, the Bolivian government also enacted a devaluation. In a country with so many Brazilian, Chilean, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan products on the market, people chose to buy cheaper imported products than Bolivian-made products. Thus, both national production and employment decreased. On the other hand, the crisis in Argentina and Brazil brought Bolivian migrants back to the country,33 producing a dramatic decrease in remittances from abroad and a greater number of unemployed people in Bolivia. Attributing the economic crisis merely to financial factors—in a country with an incipient financial market—the Banzer administration seriously underestimated the effects of the crisis on the Bolivian economy. A recession ensued as the government was unable to effectively respond to the challenges. Some economic corrective measures were pursued but not early enough to avoid the economic decline. The Banzer administration devised, on its third governing year (2000), the so-called Economic Recovery and Social Development Plan—a plan that proposed tax, public investment, and public procurement initiatives.34 The country was also suffering a severe democratic deficit that was aggravated by the economic recession. Popular mobilizations became the mechanism for Bolivians to gain political space and demand tangible results as elections became ineffective in channeling citizen demands. Politics went, once more, to the streets. The 1994 Constitutional Reform and Its 1997 Application During the Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993–1997), a constitutional reform brought important changes to the Bolivian Constitution. The reform was a result of the July 1992 agreements on the modernization of the state and the strengthening of democracy among political party representatives. Interestingly enough, the driving cause behind the reforms did not have to do with the economic or social crisis developing in Bolivia, but with relatively serious representativeness and legitimacy problems of Congress and the party system. Again, it was left to parliamentarians to give practical application to the agreements reached by their chiefs. The 1993–1997 governing coalition in

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Congress had the lead, but the international community also had a role. The system to be implemented emulated those of Germany and Great Britain. Proposing the mixed-system as a useful mechanism to address the growing disenchantment of Bolivians with the party representation system, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation invited a Bolivian multiparty committee to visit these two countries to see how the models worked. Carlos Börth, Alfonso Ferrufino, Luis Ossio, and a group of five more parliamentarians visited two electoral districts in Germany to observe first-hand the relationship between the representative and her/his circumscription. Another visit to England was arranged with the same purpose. The multiparty committee obtained ideas on how to organize the work of the uninominal deputies and posited that this could be a useful device for developing a representative and effective legislature with a greater degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the executive power and more responsive to the interests and demands of citizens. The multiparty committee proposed that the system had the potential effect of positively impacting the ability of historically marginalized sectors of society to occupy political spaces by linking them to their local constituencies. However, some of the parliamentarians saw the reform as another mechanism to concentrate power in a few majority parties. For them, the SMD reform would allow them to connect the representative with her/his constituency but on the basis of the party since there were few parties that had the possibility of achieving a relative majority in every circumscription. The first results confirm this hypothesis. In the 1997 elections, the SMD system favored the majority parties (ADN, MIR, MNR, CONDEPA, UCS) except in Cochabamba where Evo Morales’s first electoral platform, the United Left (IU), obtained the first important quota of power. This was an isolated case then. If, in fact, the underlying intention was to concentrate power and strengthen the majority political parties, history will later radically alter the purpose of the measure. The previous PR electoral system utilized closed and blocked lists and the D’Hondt formula to assign seats. With the closed and blocked lists, the voter had no knowledge of who was getting elected for the Chamber of Deputies. They just voted for the parties. The decision on who would become a deputy on behalf of the party was made by the party chiefs. The electorate in nine plurinominal districts (according to the nine departments in the country) elected 130 deputies using the closed lists belonging to the candidates for president and senators. Besides uninominal and plurinominal deputies, the reform incorporated a 3 percent threshold for multiseat districts in the Chamber of


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Deputies. The threshold, however, did not affect uninominal candidates who would occupy the seat in Congress even if their party did not achieve the 3 percent of votes required to participate in list allocation. The split vote—in other words, one vote for the uninominal circumscription and another for the plurinominal candidates to deputies attached to the party list—permitted voters to vote for two different parties, if they so chose. The mixed system of elections was generally regarded as a good mechanism to force representatives to develop specific ties with the districts that they represented. Bolivians liked the idea of creating mechanisms to guarantee more accountability since the plurinominal system of elections with closed lists had not strengthened the relationship between the representative and the locality he or she was supposed to represent. This had caused great discontent since people voted without really knowing who was representing them.35 Results of the 1997 Election: Growing Multipartism Although it is often characterized as a three-party dominant system, Bolivia has many features of a multiparty system. Since 1958, there have been approximately 418 political parties contesting power. The average number of parties participating in presidential elections since 1985 is 12.6 per election. The 1997 presidential elections were contested by 10 different political parties.36 This time, the electoral campaign had both political veterans and novices. Political veterans Jaime Paz Zamora and Hugo Banzer had left their political parties but came back to the political game on time for the elections. On the other hand, although not new to politics, René Blattman with the MNR and Ivo Kuljis with the UCS, for instance, were beginners in electoral campaigning. The MNR started the campaign with René Blattman as the presidential candidate, but he decided to resign from the ticket four months before the election. Newcomer Juan Carlos Duran assumed the candidacy. Duran had the MNR support but was not a favorite of the president and MNR chief— Sánchez de Lozada (Romero Ballivián 2003b: 42). In fact, Duran and Sánchez de Lozada had been rivals in the race for the MNR leadership and candidacy for the 1993 elections. Sánchez de Lozada won the race for the MNR leadership and ultimately the presidency, but their rivalry continued. The new MNR candidate decided to distance himself from the Sánchez de Lozada administration overlooking the continuity of the Plan for All.37 Interestingly, the only party that tried to build on the Plan for All and defended the reforms during the campaign was the MBL, the more leftist political party in the election, which only received 3 percent of the votes.

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High levels of political bickering characterized the climate of the campaign. The political parties and candidates took issue with each other and traded insults throughout the campaign. At the proposal of the CNE, the CNE and the political parties participating in the elections signed a so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement in which, with a view to guaranteeing and strengthening democracy in Bolivia, they proclaimed their commitment to avoid a “dirty war” in their electoral campaigns and to ensure mutual respect vis-à-vis all the participants in the process. The meeting was attended by all leading political forces, except for the MNR and the MBL that indicated their intention to support the proposed agreement but refused to sign it.38 Banzer built on the opposition to capitalization as a strategy against Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR and was first in the polls leading up to the June 1, 1997 election (Gamarra 1997a: 115). In this process, the Banzer-Quiroga ticket obtained the first place in the elections with 22.26 percent of the vote. Reminiscent of old practices, there were serious allegations of electoral fraud in the 1997 elections. The MIR was accused of fraud in circumscription No. 41 of the localities of Colquechaca, Ocurí, and Maragua in the Department of Potosí, where the voting records of the polling stations had been replaced favoring MIR candidate Edgar Lazcano. Potosí senator Edgar Lazo, senator and Potosí department chief Gonzalo Valda, the Potosí adjunct chief Marco Antonio Villa, and the ex-mayor of Colquechaca Edgar Lazcano were accused of the fraud. Later in 2000, Valda, Villa, and Lazcano were suspended from their party functions by the MIR National Executive Command.39 The election results, however, were generally accepted and they brought another shift in power between two competing party blocks. The results also show great fragmentation within the core of major parties. While the MNR lost 17.36 percentage points from the previous election, almost half the votes; the ADN improved by only 1.21 percentage points. Three parties—CONDEPA, MIR, and UCS—received relatively comparable levels of votes (around 16 percent), however, the MIR obtained fewer votes than CONDEPA, and the UCS was only 0.66 percent below the MIR. Five other parties received very small pluralities. Evo Morales ran as a uninominal candidate with the United Left (IU), which obtained only 3.71 percent of the votes but concentrated most of its votes in Cochabamba, allowing for the entrance of Morales into Congress for the first time. The electoral campaigns for uninominal deputy posts had a different orientation than those of the presidential, senatorial, and plurinominal


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candidates. The majority of uninominal deputies ran campaigns with plans for municipal development and improvement of such infrastructure as water services, sewer systems, and street maintenance—all tasks assigned to municipal governments. As one uninominal deputy asserted, “I had clearly understood the reform, as a candidate, I refused to enter into a municipal bid but later did, to secure my election; I had no other choice but to do what other candidates were doing and I started to make ‘offers’ as if my election was for mayor” (Ardaya Salinas 2003: 37). Some deputies knew the difference between a legislative and a municipal bid, others reached the Chamber of Deputies without really knowing what was their role as parliamentarians. The objective of the reform was to have open lists that would include candidates more closely connected to their circumscriptions. However, following previous party customs, the five most voted parties, ADN, MNR, UCS, MIR, and CONDEPA, nominated strong party people as candidates for uninominal deputies. The case of the MIR is illustrative. The uninominal lists for the 1997 election were determined by the MIR departmental leaders. This meant that in the uninominal lists, the “determination of the consequences and the electoral projection corresponded to the party elites” (Carvajal Donoso 2002: 50). The MNR also operated this way. To win an election, the uninominal deputy first had to win the space within the party, and to achieve this, s/he had to be confirmed by the territorial section as a candidate.40 It seemed that the intention of majority parties was to have deputies whose first loyalty was to the political party and not necessarily to her/his circumscription.41 Translating Votes into Seats: The Uninominal Deputy and Its Impact on Congress The popular vote was divided amongst ten political parties in the 1997 election, seven of which won representation in the legislature; in 1985, ten parties had achieved representation in Congress. In 1989, five parties reached Congress, and in 1993, seven parties secured parliamentary posts. The incorporation of the uninominal deputies, the 3 percent threshold, and the D’Hondt formula did not produce the expected result of increasing the number of parties represented in 1997. Only seven parties reached Congress. In the Senate, seats were allocated through closed lists linked to the candidates for the presidency, vice presidency, and plurinominal deputies. Using a simple majority formula for the distribution of seats in the Senate, votes were dispersed and five parties reached the Senate: ADN, MIR, UCS, CONDEPA, and the MNR.

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The Chamber of Deputies was divided amongst seven political parties. The ADN, MIR, MNR, and CONDEPA achieved more than 25 deputies each. ADN obtained the highest number of deputies (32), of which 18 were uninominal deputies. It was also the only party that achieved uninominal deputies in all departments of the country, especially in Pando where it obtained the totality of the uninominal seats. The MIR obtained 12 uninominal deputies out of a 23-seat party caucus. It had uninominal deputies in the three regions of the country, except in the departments of Beni and Pando. This time these two parties were more able to exert their representation and effectiveness as an electoral force and secured a significant representation in Congress. The MNR also obtained 12 uninominal deputies in the three regions of the country except for Tarija, Pando, and Cochabamba. UCS deputies were mostly plurinominal (16 out of 21), and uninominal deputies were concentrated in Santa Cruz. CONDEPA concentrated its uninominal deputies in La Paz and Oruro. The MBL and one of the newcomers, United Left (Izquierda Unida-IU), obtained few parliamentarians, but they all were uninominal deputies. The former obtained five parliamentarians, all uninominal deputies, in Chuquisaca, Potosí, and La Paz while the latter had only four uninominal deputies all in the department of Cochambamba. In this case, Morales assumed the first democratically elected post in his political career. Morales was one of the IU candidates who obtained a congressional seat for the circumscription of the provinces of Chapare and Carrasco. He obtained an overwhelming 70 percent of the vote, the highest percentage vote obtained by any of the 68 elected candidates through this new uninominal system, and the highest voting ever received by a Bolivian parliamentarian. He asserts that “in 1997, it was very difficult for me to believe, I became the deputy that received the most votes in Bolivia.”42 The reform bolstered two prevailing features of the Bolivian party system: the personalization and the territorialization of the votes. As the 1997 results show, the uninominal distribution did not necessarily mean the consolidation of the majority parties. Instead, national electoral tendencies were exacerbated. Moreover, it allowed the election of electoral minorities (e.g., IU and MBL), but not necessarily social minorities. Indigenous peoples and women were, in fact, excluded since parties were interested in occupying those seats and restricted the access to other actors (Ardaya Salinas 2003: 29). For example, women obtained only 3.1 percent of representation through uninominal deputies (only 2 out of the 68 uninominal deputies elected were women—one was reelected). The uninominal and plurinominal seats in the 1997–2002 lower chamber were distributed as shown in table 3.4.


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Table 3.4 Uninominal and Plurinominal Deputies in the 1997–2002 Chamber of Deputies (Prepared by the author using National Electoral Court [CNE] data)

ADN MIR MNR CONDEPA UCS MBL IU Total

Uninominal Deputies

Plurinominal Deputies

Total

18 12 12 12 5 5 4 68*

14 11 14 7 16 0 0 62

32 23 26 19 21 5 4 130

* Of the 68 uninominal deputies elected, only 17 had been deputies before and won the election. The remaining 51 were political newcomers.

As shown in the composition of Congress, the new system benefited majority and minority parties differently. On one hand, majority parties with national constituencies—ADN, MIR, MNR, UCS—obtained more than 20 parliamentarians each under both formulas. The MNR and UCS votes also showed the continued personalization of politics since they achieved more plurinominal than uninominal deputies. Second, the reform benefited small and/or medium-size parties with local and regional strongholds, such as CONDEPA and IU, which could benefit from the support of voters in single-seat districts (Mayorga 2001: 434). Coalition Building in the Late 1990s: The Megacoalition With only 22.26 percent of the votes, Banzer leaned on the support of a congressional coalition to be elected president. The ADN was seven senators short of achieving the two-thirds majority in the Senate and needed 87 out of the 130 seats to achieve the two-thirds majority needed for most legislation to get approved in the Chamber of Deputies. Only 32 ADN candidates won seats in the lower chamber. Thus, Banzer needed to secure 54 more deputies to support him and his party in government. Intense negotiations amongst political parties started. Positional payoffs were a determining factor to secure this 1997 alliance. Banzer and

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his negotiation team relied on the distribution of positions at the executive and legislative levels, including ministries, secretaries, prefect’s offices, and the leadership of the legislative chambers, commissions, and parliamentary regional brigades. Indeed, the payoffs to put together this coalition were quotas of power in the executive branch—including departmental prefect’s offices—and in the legislature. Walter Guiteras Denis, ADN deputy-elect, was responsible for the negotiation of the coalition with the MIR, CONDEPA, and UCS on behalf of the ADN. Paz Zamora, Fernández Saavedra, and Eid Franco were among the MIR negotiating team. For the MIR, positional payoffs were crucial as congressional support would be conditioned by representation within the cabinet. Oscar Eid Franco (2004) asserts that in 1997, the MIR “joined the alliance because it allowed for the continuity of democracy, but the alliance started to erode . . . the moment came when the alliance was not enough.” It was enough, however, for Hugo Banzer to be elected president. The UCS also had pragmatic interests in joining the alliance. The UCS always pursued positional payoffs as well as other types of “favors,” that is, tax deferment benefits or the elimination of tax payments altogether. Obtaining the leadership of the lower chamber, a historic demand of the UCS even in the previous administration, became the goal in joining the coalition. The widespread democratic and economic deficits were being expressed through the CONDEPA votes. CONDEPA’s interest in joining the coalition was being able to have greater inf luence on how to provide tangible results to the people. No party, including the ADN, launched a proposal for a government plan to implement once elected. Gustavo Fernández Saavedra (2004) asserts that “the basis of the Megacoalition was purely utilitarian . . . There was a clear distribution of quotas of power, and of the so-called ‘reserved expenses’ (gastos reservados).” The Megacoalition thus became more an agreement amongst the political party operators over state patronage than amongst political party representatives in search of access to the policy agenda, or the policy formulation process. The Commitment for Bolivia (Compromiso por Bolivia) was consolidated through the Megacoalition composed of five political parties: ADN, MIR, NFR, UCS, and CONDEPA. Together these parties jointly represented 71 percent of the popular vote, and 118 parliamentarians between senators (23) and deputies (95), enough seats to guarantee a legislative majority for the president. This was the broadest coalition created in the country until then, but at the same time the most heterogeneous. Two consequences of the


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grouping of such a widespread collage of political parties are clear. First, parties suffered a progressive loss of radicalism in the ideology. Their positions accommodated to the objectives and interests of the rest of the members of the coalition. Second, there was great structural and cultural heterogeneity amongst those who supported the coalition. Its broadness also represented a great threat to its cohesion. By 2000, serious problems within the coalition became obvious. Water and Coca: Legislation and Policies Enacted Banzer’s electoral campaign was initiated without a government plan, which obstructed the expeditious formulation of public policies once in government. In October 1997, two months into the administration, the Banzer-Quiroga administration initiated National Dialogue I, a dialogue process amongst social organizations, political parties, public institutions, economic actors, and other key actors, to formulate a plan based on longterm strategic policies for the economic and social development of the country. Through this dialogue process, the administration organized its work around the Plan of the Four Pillars (Plan de los Cuatro Pilares): Institutionality Plan, Integrity Plan, Opportunity Plan, and Dignity Plan (Plan Institucionalidad, Plan Integridad, Plan Oportunidad, Plan Dignidad). Based on these four broad priority areas, the Banzer administration and the Megacoalition, among other actions, outlined a national plan to fight poverty; developed community projects on production development, microenterprise, and a system of microcredit favoring deprived zones; and proposed the creation of a national indigenous confederation run by traditional authorities. The economic crisis starting in 1998 reduced the maneuverability of Banzer. Also, at almost the same time, the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon started a criminal process against former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. The news affected Banzer’s spirits, and he sought refuge in the ADN’s old guard. His fears were confirmed, and his family’s paranoia increased when an Argentinean judge, Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, requested his extradition in a criminal trial for the disappearance of an Argentinean refugee during his military regime in the 1970s.43 Although he was never extradited, the fear of a trial was latent. By 2000, there were allegations of political rivalry between Banzer and Quiroga.44 For instance, in 2000, Otto Ritter, an FSB militant, publicly accused Quiroga of organizing a “plot” to remove Banzer from power. President Banzer, however, responded that he “never doubted

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Tuto Quiroga because I have no reasons to do it. Those are speculative comments and mere judgments . . . I cannot believe them.”45 Later, NFR’s Manfred Reyes Villa also made similar accusations. Banzer’s family, especially his wife, Yolanda Prada, and daughters, also had a role in spreading this perception. Bolivians remember the instance when Quiroga was not allowed to work from Banzer’s desk in the Palacio Quemado (Presidential Palace), when substituting Banzer in one of his institutional absences. As Bolivians recount, Banzer, on his daughter’s demand, accused Quiroga of wanting to take over; after that, Quiroga never went back to the government palace. This produced a perception in the collective imaginary that there was a rupture between the two political authorities. In general, Bolivian vice presidents do not generally have an agenda independent of the president. Baptista Gumucio et al. (2003) refer to two responsibilities of vice presidents in Bolivia: to support the functions of the president in the executive branch and to coordinate the functions in the legislative branch as president of Congress.46 Quiroga, however, appeared to be the power behind the throne as he took on a series of important responsibilities, including the implementation of the Plan Dignidad. Unfortunately for the wife and daughters, who wanted to continue inf luencing politics, Banzer was diagnosed with cancer in 2000 and on August 6, 2001, he resigned from the presidency leaving Quiroga as the constitutional president of the country for one year. The manner in which Quiroga’s presidency was accepted was an interesting phenomenon in the sense that people did not question his legitimacy and accepted him as someone completely disconnected from the Banzer administration. The continuous perception of a break between these two political authorities might have helped. One piece of legislation and a government policy need to be analyzed in this section. The lack of a coherent government program at the start of the administration and the slow process for the formulation of a plan showed the predominance of the political logic of patronage and distribution of posts when it came to responding to the demands of voters who initially allowed them to accede to public positions. Law 2029: The Law for Drinking Water and Sanitary Sewer Systems Although consensus was never reached, the parliamentary discussion of a law dealing with water resources dates back to the 1970s. To address this


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unresolved matter, the Banzer administration decided to advance a public policy on water issues through the SEMAPA concession and the implementation of the Misicuni Project. For this project, Banzer decided to incorporate the private sector. Banzer’s Supreme Decree 24841 of September 1997 authorized the participation of the private sector in the provision of the public services of drinking water and the sewer system, specifically in Cochabamba and in the Misicuni Project. Supreme Resolution 218144 designated the president of the directory of the Misicuni Company as the official responsible for promoting the project and engaging private investors. A series of decrees and agreements were signed from November 1997 to August 1998, ending on an international bid to select the company to build the water tunnels in Cochabamba. The international bid was opened, granting the winner not only a concession for the extraction of water resources and the building of the sewer system but also the business of distributing and selling the water to the public for 40 years. The bidding process did not have the success that was expected and so, through Decree 25351, in April 1999, the government cancelled the international public bidding and authorized direct and exclusive negotiations with the Tunari Waters (Aguas del Tunari-AT) consortium (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 33). The proposal given by Tunari Waters to the government had serious deficiencies, especially in terms of the proposed increment of 34 percent in consumer rates for drinking water and sewer system services. However, following a brief negotiation, the administration accepted the proposal and Tunari Waters was granted rights to (a) provide water and sewer systems, (b) generate energy, and (c) rent the SEMAPA and Misicuni properties (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 39). As part of the concession process of the SEMAPA-Misicuni project, President Banzer sent to the legislature in 1999 the draft of the General Law on Water. The basis of the law provided for a change in the logic for the provision of services, namely, moving the monopoly for the provision of basic services from the state to the market. The law established as a basic principle that water was a “social and ecological good with economic value.” Resistance to the law started when a series of NGOs, the peasant sector, indigenous sector, and other social groups made a counterproposal in which they stated that water was not simply “a good with economic value,” but “a social and ecological good for the benefit of people and families’ socio-economic development” (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 42). This counterproposal was not considered by the legislature as discussions for the approval of the law were underway.

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Then, Law 2029, containing four basic components, was approved by the legislature on October 1999. First, it regulated the concession, licenses, and provision of drinking water and sewer services by establishing the Superintendence of Basic Cleaning, which substituted the Superintendence of Water, as the regulating body of the concession. This superintendence had the responsibility of granting concessions and licenses, approving the prices and maximum tariffs for the services, as well as the sanctions and obligations of both service providers and users. Second, the law defined the characteristics of the concessions by limiting concessions and licenses only to Drinking Water and Sewer System Providers constituted as public municipal companies, mixed anonymous companies, private companies, and cooperatives or civil associations. Third, the law restricted the areas included in the concession based on the concentration of population and prohibited the illegal perforation of wells and other forms of water extraction, that is, acting without the appropriate concession or license given by the corresponding superintendence. Finally, the law established the rights and obligations of users benefiting from the service.47 When users were forced to pay higher prices for the same service, a new social struggle was in the making. In April 2000, the Water War erupted. Dignity Plan Coca eradication measures were government rather than state policy. Previous administrations had implemented their own versions of the policy. Sánchez de Lozada sought an option zero program 48 that called for industrial projects and mass training programs for coca growers in exchange for the complete eradication of illegal coca leaf crops. He also concentrated efforts on extradition measures. In his administration, the United States and Bolivia signed an extradition treaty. Under this agreement, a group of Bolivians were tried in U.S. courts and sent to U.S. jails, something that caused great controversy. In 1994, Sánchez de Lozada faced an all-out confrontation with Chapare coca growers who clashed violently with eradication workers. Evo Morales, as leader of the Tropic Federation of coca growers, was arrested. The Banzer-Quiroga administration also put together a plan with specific goals and mechanisms to achieve the eradication of illegal coca. The Dignity Plan and accompanying legislation were designed without the participation of political parties. ADN’s Osvaldo Antezana, a technocrat and an agricultural engineer who specialized in these issues, was the


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brain behind the policy.49 Antezana belonged to Jorge Quiroga’s team of experts and was at the time vice minister of Alternative Development. Antezana and Quiroga designed the plan and managed to secure international support, especially by the United States. The fact remained that coca eradication programs in Bolivia were usually not enforced without the support of the U.S. embassy in La Paz. The mechanism to show approval was through “cooperation.” In other words, should the embassy not agree with a proposed coca eradication plan, it did not provide financial support for it. This was also linked to the U.S. policy of certification, a very delicate area of U.S.-Bolivian relations. It was a difficult issue to deal with in Bolivia that required an adept combination of technical, political, and diplomatic skills. Although most key sectors and political parties in Bolivia participated in the National Dialogue process, very few had an opportunity to provide inputs on the technical components of the plan. The National Dialogue served to sanction only the technical content of the coca eradication plan. But it was enforced and the Banzer-Quiroga administration unilaterally entered into a coca eradication program based on the use of force with weak signs of a viable alternative program for economic and social development. For this, the Banzer administration constantly faced confrontation from social sectors, and Quiroga and his team were often the target of angry coca growers from the Chapare. By 2000, President Banzer announced that “in the Chapare, the Dignity Plan, started in 1998, was completed with the elimination of 38,000 hectares of coca leaves, thus only 600 hectares are left to be eradicated.”50 By February 2001, however, other numbers suggested that the Dignity Plan had not been as effective as initially planned. In February 2001, military authorities admitted that there were still between 3,000 and 4,000 hectares of coca leaves left to be eradicated. By March 2001, President Banzer denied having referred to the achievement of “zero coca” and insisted that he had used the phrase “zero drugs.” Once he assumed the presidency in 2001, Quiroga was forced to make some critical decisions regarding the continuity of the Dignity Plan. First, he was forced to admit publicly that zero coca had not been attained and that a satellite error was responsible for the premature declaration of success (Gamarra 2002: 7). In September 2001, the new minister of government admitted the existence of 6,000 hectares of surplus coca, which confirmed the inability of the administration to attain the goals of the Dignity Plan.51 He also had to admit that the social and economic impact of the plan in the coca-producing zones was negative.52

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Second, to reverse the negative results, Quiroga’s immediate decision was the militarization of the illegal coca-producing areas,53 namely, the Yungas of La Paz and the Chapare. Quiroga secretly ordered the entry of 4,000 military and police troops into the Chapare to control an inevitable mobilization of the coca growers’ federation. This decision was significant in the sense that control of the Chapare region became dependent on the long-term presence of security forces there (Gamarra 2002: 7). This militarization provoked a new escalation of violence and a disregarding of the agreements made between the government and the coca union movement in the past. Because of a lack of internal coherence within the Megacoalition, in the final analysis, the Banzer administration was characterized by (a) a significant decrease in authority in terms of the decision-making process, and (b) the inability of the administration to deliver on the proposals of the Four Pillars. There was also excessive patrimonialism and nepotism in the government administration, a deficient level of coordination and lack of leadership that produced more inefficiency in the institutional and political management of the executive. According to accusations by various newspapers, a significant number of relatives or people close to the president, and his wife Yolanda Prada, served as officials and highlevel executives in the national administration. For example, there were a significant number of Banzer’s relatives in the Foreign Service, and his son-in-law, Luis Alberto Valle, was appointed prefect of La Paz. Similarly, numerous cases were denounced regarding corruption in his administration, including the case charged by General Jose Ernesto Ayoroa Argandoña on the irregularities in the use of the resources destined to help the victims of an earthquake in Aíquile 54; the case of Minister of Health Tonchy Marinkovich and the anomalies committed by the sale units of the National Health Bank through the overpricing of some food items, and the embezzlement of a million dollars in the transfer of equipment; the so-called Chito Casos referring to the corruption committed by the ex-prefect of La Paz, Luis Alberto Valle (Banzer’s son-in-law); the connections of Italian mafia’s Marino Diodato with the government and the president’s family; the irregularities of the mass communication unit of the Cochabamba Customs Office; and the loss of $160 million of the FONVIS invested in supposed housing “mega” projects (Costa Benavides et al. 2000: 8; Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 26). The increase in corruption, the effects of Law 2029 and the Dignity Plan, and the scant results of the economic reactivation policies put Banzer in a delicate state of democratic governance.


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The ADN as a party weakened considerably in this period as did Banzer’s image as party chief and articulator of the Megacoalition, especially as a result of the April 2000 events in Cochabamba.55 Within the party, there were serious risks of disintegration. By mid-July 2000, there were three well-defined currents within the ADN party: “the Dinosaurs,” who grouped around Minister Guillermo Fortun, “the Snurfs,” who grouped around Vice President Quiroga, and “the Pitosaurs,” who grouped around National Deputy Fernando Kieffer. This resulted in serious challenges in keeping the Megacoalition coherent. Two types of payoffs allowed Banzer to secure his fragile support. First, the use of “reserved expenses,” more common in this administration than in previous ones,56 that allowed controversial laws to be passed by parliamentarians once they received an extra remuneration. The reserved expenses did not go to all parliamentarians approving the law, however. It only went to parliamentarians belonging to the coalition. Second, positional payoffs were also strategic. Electing the presidency of the Chambers of Deputies and the Senate was a space to grant positional payoffs in exchange for support. The election of local governments was also a space to negotiate positions. For instance, in the 1999 elections, the election of mayors by the elected councilors also ref lected the composition of the Megacoalition; however, there were serious confrontations in Oruro, between the ADN and the MIR, and in Santa Cruz between ADN and the UCS. But the most important space for this type of payoffs continued to be the cabinet. The MIR had an important presence in the ministerial cabinet. Throughout the administration, however, the party adopted an ambivalent strategy of disconnection and critique as well as support to the administration. On some occasions, the MIR functioned more as opposition than as an ally of the ADN and the government. During the 2000 events in Cochabamba, the MIR attempted to capitalize on the situation of a governance crisis to promote a restructuring of the ministerial cabinet to resolve the crisis, but with an aim of occupying more spaces of power (Costa Benavides et al. 2000: 23). In the case of the legislature too, payoffs were used. Through the Megacoalition, the UCS was finally able to lead the Chamber of Deputies. On July 29, 2000, ADN, MIR, and UCS made it official that the president of the Chamber of Deputies would be a UCS militant. The UCS’s Deputy Jaalil Melgar Mustafa was named president then. In 2000, the ADN obtained the leadership of the Senate when ADN’s Senator Leopoldo

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Fernández Ferreira was elected president. In exchange for giving up this post, the MIR received one ministry in the executive branch. Cabinet composition continued to be a strategic space to distribute positional payoffs. The MIR was also experiencing internal conf licts. The Supreme Court ratified Oscar Eid Franco’s sentence on narco-corruption charges on June 6, 2000. He had to leave his position as coordinator of the coalition. To replace him, the party’s National Executive Committee (CEN)— Samuel Doria Medina, Carlos Saavedra, Jorge Torres, and Marco Antonio Oviedo—assumed Eid’s work 57 while Eid stayed as the internal articulator. The Supreme Court also allowed the trial of Tonchy Marinkovic for the irregular purchase of vaccines in 1988 when he was minister of health. The MIR party caucus requested his voluntary retirement.58 As part of the Megacoalition, the UCS’s support to the BanzerQuiroga administration was strategic on two fronts. On one hand, the UCS gave the coalition the support needed to pass government policies. On the other, its regional strength in the department of Santa Cruz guaranteed relative governance in the municipal administration. An ally in the municipality was helpful in furthering regional support to the government. The UCS showed, however, greater interest in quotas of power than in intervening in the setting up of the policy agenda. The Megacoalition weakened with the departure of the NFR. The NFR quotas of power were distributed between the MIR and the UCS; the MIR obtained the Ministry of Sustainable Development and the UCS obtained the Vice-Ministry of Popular Participation. The ADN had to accept only minor quotas of power (Orozco et al. 2000: 1) such as the leadership of the Fund for Peasant Development, the direction of the Petroleum Bank in the executive branch, and the presidency of the Finance Commission in the Chamber of Deputies, previously held by the NFR. After the April 2000 events, President Banzer decided to make a political change with very few novelties. He decided to govern with the same group of men: Claudio Mansilla, a businessman from Santa Cruz; Hugo Carvajal Donoso, the well-known leader and parliamentarian from MIR; and Jorge Pacheco, from the UCS, all came back to the cabinet this time as minister of labor. The cabinet shift had no changes in members, but rotations did occur in the remaining ministries; four ministries changed positions: Ronald McLean (ADN), who was minister of finance, moved to the Ministry of Sustainable Development; Jose Luis Lupo moved from Economic Development to Finance; Minister of Labor Luis Vasquez (MIR) went on to become the minister of justice; Carlos Saavedra (MIR) went to occupy


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the Ministry of Economic Development.59 The cabinet was reconfigured with limited posts for the UCS. Quiroga assumed power in 2001 and immediately showed his intention to avoid the distribution of positional payoffs. The MIR and UCS decided to relinquish the ministries they had occupied but guaranteed Quiroga the 50 parliamentarians in Congress. In the legislature, however, there was great controversy in electing the leadership of the two chambers. Luis Vasquez (MIR) was elected president of the Chamber of Deputies, and Enrique Toro (ADN) was elected president of the Senate. Regardless of the MNR opposition to these appointments, the ADN, MIR, UCS, NFR, CONDEPA, and IU with 94 votes imposed the decision to elect the 2001–2002 congressional leadership. The MNR abandoned the chambers in protest and announced that it would start a process before the Constitutional Tribunal for the illegal election of Vasquez (who was accused of violating the Debate Rules) as president of the lower chamber. The leadership of the chambers was thus in the hands of the Quiroga administration’s governing coalition.60 Quiroga organized his cabinet in three working teams: an economic team led by Jorge Torres, a second team in charge of managing external relations led by Jose Luis Lupo, and a third team in charge of the political agenda and the coordination with coalition political parties, led by Walter Guiteras. He also appointed Javier Nogales and Jacques Trigo as minister of housing and minister of finance respectively; both had close ties to MNR’s Sánchez de Lozada. This was seen as a sign that he wanted to build strategic alliances with opposition parties. Sánchez de Lozada had no choice but to confirm his support for these changes.61 A La Razón article (7/28/2001) read “President Quiroga wants to successfully address two issues: the economic crisis and a secure transition process. To do that, he will bet on a new cabinet that would balance the technical with the political.” Other newspapers such as La Prensa and Los Tiempos had similar headlines. During 2001, Banzer was accused of nepotism. The prefects’ offices of La Paz and Santa Cruz were occupied by family members Luis Alberto Valle and Ramón Prada respectively. In the Bolivian Foreign Ministry, there were 13 cases of nepotism. The situation was such that 13 Banzer family members were suspended from their responsibilities by Quiroga in 2001 (Costa Benavides, De la Riva et al. 2001: 58). Quiroga did not resort to positional payoffs at the levels Banzer did. However, the parliamentary majority, facilitated through payoffs in exchange for support, was the mechanism that allowed the passing of Law 2029 and the

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implementation of coca eradication measures in the Dignity Plan. In the case of the Law of Water, regional newspaper coverage in Cochabamba suggested that the president exerted pressure on the parliamentary coalition to approve Law 2029.62 For example, an article in a local newspaper said, “The government pressures the parliamentarians. Bolivia will lose 80 million dollars if the Law of Water is not approved, according to information provided by the president of the Commission on Sustainable Development of the Chamber of Deputies, Edgar Zagarra.” Various political parties and key sectors in Bolivian society exerted opposition to the administration through demands for Banzer’s resignation. After the conf lict in Cochabamba, Sánchez de Lozada lobbied for a constitutional mechanism that would allow the legal removal of the president: “the idea is for people to have the option of changing the leaders that are bad, and demand that the good ones remain in power longer.”63 The MBL’s Antonio Aranibar also demanded Banzer’s resignation after the failure of the state of siege declared by the president. Aranibar stated that the state of siege “served to show the impotence of the government . . . General Banzer must resign allowing for a constitutional succession.”64 Later, in light of Banzer’s illness, private businessmen from Cochabamba also demanded his resignation and the appointment of Quiroga to end the power vacuum.65 Sánchez de Lozada also requested Banzer’s resignation when the president was attending the Summit of the Americas Meeting in Quebec, Canada, in January 2001. Parallel Opposition: The Water War and Confrontations with the Cocalero Movement The popular mobilization movements that started in 2000 were a byproduct of the inability of the political class to guarantee concrete socioeconomic results for the population through effective executive-legislative policymaking. Additionally, the 2000 events clearly show the divorce between representatives and their constituencies. Demands emerging from society in terms of the conditions for the provision of such a basic service as water did not find institutional channels of expression. The Law of Water affected peasant and agricultural organizations in the sense that the main traditional source for consumption and irrigation in Cochabamba was the water found under the soil. The peasants extracted this water through wells without a license or paying fees; this was deemed illegal by the government. In October 1999, as the law was approved, various social and indigenous groups started a process of political pressure in the streets to defend the “uses and customs” of water by the peasant


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organizations and to protest the privatization of such a basic social service. Things became complicated when the general director of the Tunari Waters, Geoffrey Torpe, announced that there would be an increase in the tariffs starting on January 1, 2000.66 The response was marked by massive popular protests against the increase of water bills (tarifazo) in the city of Cochabamba without an equivalent improvement in water services. Conf licts started as people protested against the tarifazo. In response, the popular opposition utilized three basic protest mechanisms: (a) road blocks in January 2000; (b) the pacific occupation of the city in February 2000, and finally (c) a general strike that paralyzed Cochabamba in April 2000. The two key social groups exerting pressure were the Committee for the Defense of the Water and the Popular Economy (Comité de Defensa del Agua y la Economia Popular-CODAEP) and the Departmental Coordinating Group for Water and Life (Coordinadora Departamental del Agua y la Vida). The CODAEP had been created in July 1999 led by the Uninominal Deputy Gonzalo Maldonado. The Coordinating Group was created in an ad hoc manner specifically to demand the annulment of the concession contract of the SEMAPA project to Tunari Waters and the modification of Law 2029. To initiate opposition, the Regional Civic Committee organized a one-day strike for January 13, 2000, while the Coordinating Group organized three days of massive roadblocks with the support of the peasant sector. Unable to control social unrest, the government, through four of its ministers—Carlos Saavedra Bruno, the minister of external commerce, Herbert Müller, minister of economic development, Erick Reyes Villa, minister of sustainable development, and Jose Luis Lupo, minister of housing—decided to sign the first agreement to contain confrontations. The Civic Committee also signed. Maclovio Zapara signed on behalf of the transportation sector, and Nestor Guzman on behalf of the Cochabamba Parliamentary Brigade (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 57). The agreement did not stop the Tunari Waters Consortium’s measures. The Coordinating Group announced the pacific occupation of the city to pressure for the freezing of the tariffs on drinking water, the annulment of the contract with the AT company and the abolishment of Law 2029. With mobilizations and social pressure and being unable to provide a state subsidy to water services, the government accepted for a second time to revise the tariff structure, revise the contract with AT, and modify Law 2029 (De la Fuente 2000: 3). It proposed to reduce the increase in tariffs from 35 percent to 20 percent.

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The Megacoalition supported the proposal, and in March 2000, all political parties in the governing coalition, except for the New Republican Force (NFR), signed a public document stating their support. But in reaction to this, Manfred Reyes Villa, mayor of Cochabamba and chief of the NFR, rejected the presidential proposal and distanced himself and the NFR from the governing coalition. In a press conference, Reyes Villa stated that “we [the NFR] are not in agreement with the government decision. Although we [the NFR] made an effort to reduce the increase, we decided not to sign the document presented to the public by the governing parties.” 67 With this, the coalition weakened and lost its main ally in the city of Cochabamba. Following the pacific takeover of the city, President Banzer decided to send from La Paz his minister of the presidency, Walter Guiteras (ADN), accompanied by 700 police officials, the Special Security Group (GES), and various army officials to support the government actions in Cochabamba. Minister Guiteras was supported by Vice Minister of Government Jose Orias. By February 4, 2000, the city became a battleground. The Civic Committee divided from the Coordinating Group. The Catholic Church exerted its moral inf luence and tried to persuade the government to withdraw its forces and negotiate. The Ombudsman Office also intervened. Under extreme social pressure, the government signed a second agreement, the Agreement for Cochabamba, with the Civic Committee and the Coordinating Group. The agreement signed on the night of February 5, 2000 contained nine points that intended to freeze tariffs, continue negotiations to establish a tariff structure based on consensus, revise Law 2029 and the contract with Tunari Waters (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 50–59). By March 2000, positions were radicalized. On March 25, 2000, the Coordinating Group called for a popular consultation process at the margins of the State.68 The results of the popular consultation showed a clear opposition to the government measures: 99 percent of the votes were against the increase in tariffs, 96 percent in favor of annulling the concession contract for SEMAPA-Misicuni, and 97 percent rejected Law 2029. Later, on April 4, 2000, the Coordinating Group organized a general strike joined by the municipal mayor, the president of the Civic Committee, regional deputies, and members of the municipal council.69 Representatives from the private sector and the Coordinating Group attempted to start a dialogue but that same night, the representatives from the Coordinating Group were arrested by the police.


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The president declared a state of siege, ordered the arrest of regional leaders, and suspended constitutional guarantees (civil rights)70 (Whitehead 2001: 12). Constitutionally, Banzer was entitled to this discretionary presidential power. Banzer opted to do this although he himself was criticized for using similar measures when he was a dictator. However, in order to maintain this state of siege, the president needed the legislature’s support.71 On April 12, 2000, the coalition in Congress approved the state of siege.72 Immediately, opposition parties, MNR, CONDEPA, MBL, IU, and NFR resolved to request the Constitutional Tribunal to declare unconstitutional the congressional resolution that ratified the state of siege.73 Even with the April 8 declaration of a state of siege, the government was unable to stop the mobilizations and street protests that became even more violent, leaving dozens of people hurt and one dead. Two days after declaring the state of siege, the situation had become unsustainable for the government. The government lost control of the city and of the country in general. The Cochabamba demonstrations were also joined by road blockades and protests in other areas of the country, including in the traditionally conf lictive Altiplano peasant settlement of Achacachi (Whitehead 2001: 12). Armed officials deployed in the city were not able to counterrespond to the street barricades. Banzer was forced to cut the state of emergency short. Cornered by social pressure, the government decided to accept citizen demands. There was still uncertainty on April 9, but Tunari Waters announced in the afternoon that it would leave Cochabamba. Almost immediately, the superintendent informed the public of the end of the contract. Vice Minister Orios made an agreement with the Coordinating Group. The state of siege was suspended on April 20,74 but the renegotiation of Law 2029 was still pending. On April 10, the last march took place and an agreement was signed to confirm what Orios had promised verbally. On April 11, Banzer promulgated a new law, Law 2026, that ended the Water War. One of the key factors in the Water War was that uninominal deputies, and the Regional Parliamentary Brigade for the department of Cochabamba, were unable to channel citizens’ demands regarding both water and coca eradication measures adopted by the Banzer administration. This parliamentary group had no coherent line of thought. On the contrary, it was divided because of the divergent positions between opposition sectors and the party line and interests defended by the uninominal and plurinominal deputies. This caused fragmentation and

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thus its participation had a very limited impact (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 80). Within the Regional Parliamentary Brigade there were two divergent currents. Evo Morales, elected for the first time as a uninominal deputy for the IU party stated that “the Brigade is divided between those who support the Government and the opposition against the tarifazo.” 75 He was in the group opposing the government measure. The other group within the Brigade maintained a supporting position toward the measures adopted by the administration regarding the issue of water in Cochabamba. The president of the Brigade, Deputy Nestor Guzman, stated that “the Brigade is not in agreement with the annulment of the contract and the fight will focus on negotiating a subsidy to reduce the tariff increase.” 76 Similar declarations were made by Deputy Eloy Lujan.77 The Brigade appeared at the scene of conf lict only when Law 2029 was questioned by the people. Law 2029 was a law that the Brigade itself had approved earlier in the legislature without really discussing it, much less consulting with the beneficiaries or affected population. Censured by its role and because of its representatives, the Brigade took a proactive attitude and was willing to revise and modify Law 2029. In January 2000, the parliamentary group signed the first agreement to present before Congress within 45 days a modified and complementary draft of Law 2029 that would be the product of joint work with the Coordinating Group and the Civic Committee. This did not happen. On February 5, 2000, the Brigade signed the second agreement with the same commitment but did not act on it. Regional newspaper coverage stated that “the Brigade continues divorced from the Coordinating Group. It was supposed to meet on Saturday and Monday with the Coordinating Group to analyze Law 2029, however, its members did not show up.” 78 There were very slow negotiations to modify the law. The first modifications to Law 2029 were made only on April 5 in the lower chamber. Two issues became clear to the political class and to the rest of the population during the Water War. On one hand, the water crisis made it obvious how disconnected both the government and political parties were from popular sentiment. On the other, it revealed the growing inefficiency of political institutions, such as the Congress, to address legitimate grievances coming from society. The uninominal deputies from that district were indeed unable to bring and resolve the longstanding local dispute to the formal institutions of power and promote a serious discussion in parliament. The weak institutions were overwhelmed by the local nongovernmental organizations such as the Pro-Water Committee


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and the Coordinating Group, which were able to amass the popular discontent and use it to demand action from the government. A similar situation occurred with the cocalero movement and their opposition on the streets against the Dignity Plan measures. The social conf lict that took place in September 2000 was the result of the accumulation of multiple particular and small conf licts that eventually coincided (Laserna 2001) and took advantage of the vulnerability of the national government. The protests mainly consisted of the blocking of the main roads of the country, and a violent response by the military sent by the national government to regain the roads. The two main issues of protest in September 2000 were voiced in the Chapare, Cochabamba, and Achacachi, La Paz. In the Chapare, coca producers demanded for the end of the forced eradication of coca plantations that had been part of the state policy, Dignity Plan, in the framework of the plan to fight narcotrafficking. The people of Achacachi, mainly peasants of Aymara origins, initially supported the Chapare movement, but their discourse later changed toward a questioning of the ethnic inequities of Bolivian society (Ames, Pérez, and Seligson 2004: 5). September and October 2000, June 2001, and the second half of 2001 saw an increasing number of popular demonstrations as a result of the accumulation of unattended demands of coca-leaf peasants and indigenous groups in the Altiplano, including Evo Morales’s coca sector and Felipe Quispe’s Union Confederation of Peasant Workers in Bolivia (Conderación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de BoliviaCSUTCB). Social demands for better prices for peasant producers, higher wages for school teachers, and the withdrawal of military presence in the coca zones, among other issues, were expressed through massive road blockades. By the end of 2001, Bolivia was rife with social conf lict. The discontent of the cocaleros and peasant groups emerged also from their perception that the opening up of the political system had not been paired with solutions to their problems, and that the generation of liberalizing reforms had failed to deliver tangible benefits to the majority of the people. The gap between the numerous reform objectives and the results the reforms produced was exceedingly wide.79 Political parties had become self-serving groups pursuing only their party and personal interests, and not national problems, so people used confrontation as a mechanism to bring about changes to their situation. By the end of 2000, Bolivia’s Permanent Assembly on Human Rights estimated that the protests against the Dignity Plan had resulted in 20 deaths (15 civilians and 5 soldiers), 335 injuries, 152 arrests, 26 cases of torture, and 1 disappearance 80 (Whitehead 2001: 13). Indeed, newspaper

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coverage documents the violent confrontation between the cocalero movement and the government. By 2001, one year before the electoral process, there was a military apprehension of peasants. Felipe Quispe led a 29-day blocking of the city of La Paz. A truce was negotiated between the government and the CSUTCB and signed into an agreement by the Quiroga ministers and peasant sector representatives. Marches and demonstrations, however, became the order of the day. By January 2002, when Jorge Quiroga was already president, another big conf lict escalated in Cochabamba in opposition to Decree 1008 that prohibited the sale of coca leaves from the Chapare in the local market. Other confrontations and passive manifestations of conf lict regarding the coca issue ensued. Throughout the last two years of Quiroga’s presidency, there were numerous confrontations between cocaleros and the military in the Chapare as well as roadblocks, marches, and other protests in La Paz. Unfortunately, the encounters between the police and the cocaleros ended with many dead on both sides. The government accused Evo Morales, already a legislator in the lower chamber with the IU, for the death of a policeman in the Chapare and managed his expulsion from the legislature. The decision to expulse him from the parliament was made on January 2002.81 The expulsion took place following a vote where both the official and opposition sectors agreed to expel him from the legislature: 104 deputies voted to expel him, 14 to allow him to stay, and there was 1 blank vote.82 The Banzer administration, counting on the governing coalition, was able to expel Evo Morales without even presenting evidence for the accusation. Opposition in the Legislature For the approval of Law 2029 and the Dignity Plan-related measures, Banzer and Quiroga relied on the traditional mechanism of the parliamentary majority. By then, the Megacoalition had 23 of the 27 senators in the Senate, and 95 of the 130 in the lower chamber. This allowed them to surpass both (a) the weaknesses of the governing coalition and internal confrontations within it and (b) the confrontation on the part of opposition parties. Within the coalition, the MIR showed great apprehensiveness toward the ADN and many of the government measures. In various opportunities, Paz Zamora attacked the ADN and asserted on some occasions that he “was not a politician of the Megacoalition.” However, the MIR supported the agenda proposed by Banzer through 2002.83 Ericka Brockman,


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chief of the MIR’s party caucus (1997–2002), asserts that the MIR coordinated the legislative agenda with the executive. She asserts that “before they were sent to Congress by the executive, the MIR party caucus had an input on the items that were important, and on deciding which ones to consider in the legislature. This was done through a political commission for the coalition with members of the legislative and executive branches.”84 Banzer also faced confrontation from the UCS, which constantly threatened him with abandoning the Megacoalition. This would leave the government coalition with only 53 of the 74 votes needed to maintain a parliamentary majority, that is, 21 seats short. Fernández’ threats came as a result of Banzer’s unwillingness to absolve the Fernández family of accusations of tax evasion. The demand by the Internal Revenue Service dates back to 1990, when the Santa Cruz IRS office produced two rulings that established debts with respect to the added valued tax as well as consumption taxes owed by the Fernández Distribution Company, which is linked to the National Beer Company (Cervecería Nacional Boliviana-CNB). By June 1999, the CNB refused to pay the initial debt amount of 32 million Bolivians (Orozco et al. 2000: 7). By mid-2000, the Bolivian Internal Revenue Service pressured the Fernández family to pay a debt of Bs 60 million, owed to the institution by the Fernández (Beer) distribution company, a Fernández family property. Faced with the accusation, Johnny Fernández threatened his allies with leaving the coalition if they did not help them with the IRS situation.85 Fernández later retreated from his proposition, but demanded more quotas of power, including the Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Labor in exchange for staying in the coalition (Costa Benavides et al. 2000: 25). As a result of the IRS scandal, covered widely by the news media, the UCS unilaterally broke political relations with the Megacoalition in the middle of a series of MIR accusations of alleged corruption in the payment of taxes.86 The NFR also behaved erratically both within the coalition and as part of the opposition. The NFR joined the ADN ticket for the presidential elections and was since the beginning an ally to the administration. With Reyes Villa as the mayor of Cochabamba and chief of the party, support was supposedly guaranteed. In the case of Law 2029, the NFR shifted positions. At the beginning of the SEMAPA concession, the NFR adopted an official stance. Later, the NFR adopted a confrontational position, broke with ADN, and moved to exert opposition in Congress. Reyes Villa publicly declared that “at the moment of signing the contract,

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[he] trusted the good faith of the government, but the interest in making the Misicuni Project a reality was stronger. We were all deceived.”87 Just as the MNR had done earlier, in July 2000, the NFR attempted to put together its own opposition block—a “mega-opposition.” By July 2000, newspaper coverage announced that Johnny Fernández, German Gutierrez, Manfred Reyes Villa, and Evo Morales had advanced negotiations to put together a political party alliance, what they called a centerleft alliance, to confront the MNR, MIR, and ADN in the 2002 elections. This opposition alliance never consolidated. Opposition was exerted more efficiently by the MNR. This party caucus exerted opposition using two key strategies. On one hand, the MNR through its deputies, senators, and other leaders used the media to continuously criticize the government on various issues, such as gas subsidies, suspension of the payment of the pension plan “BonoSol,” the National Dialogue, the monopoly of the district attorney’s offices by the official parties. They also questioned key legislation advanced by the Megacoalition on the f loors of the Senate and lower chamber. On the other hand, MNR parliamentarians also used a series of mechanisms through the party caucus to exert pressure on Congress, some of which are: ●

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A request for the interpellation of Foreign Minister Javier Murillo and the destitution of Ambassador Bedoya Ballivián, Bolivian ambassador to Argentina, made on July 18, 2000, for rejecting a special event organized by the autonomous legislature of Buenos Aires to honor the disappeared Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz.88 Requests for the interpellation of the ministers in the economic realm. For example, an August 8, 2000, La Prensa headline states that the “MNR Deputy Carlos Sánchez Berzain, jointly with other opposition deputies Evo Morales and Andres Soliz, announced in the legislature an interpellation of three ministers in the economic realm because of their inability to provide solutions to the economic crisis.” The demand of the transfer of the National ID Registry (Registro de Identificacion Nacional-RIN) to the CNE in an effort to guarantee transparent elections. As president of the Commission on Human Rights in Congress, former MNR plurinominal deputy Manuel Suarez (2004) recounts that the party caucus requested the questioning of military authorities. Having the military questioned was really uncomfortable for any government, and this was especially uncomfortable to former


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military leader Hugo Banzer. Requests for oral and written reports from the minister of defense, minister of government, and other military authorities generally with regard to the management of the conf lict with the cocalero movement were made.89 In July 2001, after serious confrontations with the cocalero movement, the minister of defense, General Oscar Vargas, and the police chief, Walter Osinada, presented an oral report to the Human Rights Commission in the Chamber of Deputies in relation to the deaths of a group of peasants in the Altiplano. Minister of Government Leopoldo Fernández also presented an oral report.90 Accusations on La Paz ex-prefect Luis Alberto Valle of administrative irregularities. A rejection of the declaration of the state of siege in April 2000, as well as the measures adopted to control social protests in Cochabamba. The condemnation of the distribution of quotas of power within the district attorney’s offices amongst the three majority parties within the coalition on the grounds that it affected the transparency of the Judicial branch (Orozco et al. 2001: 24). The request for the censuring of President Banzer for trying to resolve the September 2000 crisis with the armed forces first before resolving the crisis with its political counterparts.

In an attempt to move away from confrontation, the MNR attempted to get close to the administration by calling for another summit of political party chiefs to find measures to address the economic crisis.91 By August 2000, the Banzer administration recognized unanimously that the economic crisis deserved to be addressed urgently and indicated its willingness to sit in a consensus roundtable with the opposition, the private sector, and civil society.92 At the same time, the MNR advanced its interpellation procedures. The government considered the requests for interpellation on the part of the opposition, especially the MNR, as a “double discourse” and rejected any possibilities for consensus building.93 In declarations to the media, Quiroga asserted that “the president was going to convene the consensus roundtable via an invitation letter to the opposition; [the government] prepared statements to the private sector, and the political leadership, and agreed on [new] instructions to the economic cabinet. However, we wanted this to take place in a calm and relaxed environment.” Although Sánchez de Lozada apologized and recognized that the interpellation request altered the consensus-building process, he still asserted that the

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interpellation needed to be done because that was one of the censuring functions of the legislature.94 With other opposition parties, the MNR had a relatively amicable relation. In August 2000, the MNR took advantage of a weak moment of the Megacoalition that had only 61 votes in the lower chamber (ADN with 16 votes, UCS 21, FRI 2, the MIR 21, and the PDC 1) as compared to 60 votes of the opposition parties (MNR with 26 votes, NFR 13, CONDEPA 10, MBL 5, IU 4, KND 1, and FSB 1). With a slim difference of only one parliamentarian to be able to crush the administration, the MNR tried to put together a parallel opposite alliance, but without success. Only nine votes were to be defined, and these were the votes of the rebellious deputies from CONDEPA. The MNR was unable to put together a majority opposition in Congress. The Banzer administration faced opposition from the MNR as well when the state of siege was declared. The national command of the MNR demanded, during the most violent moments in April 2000, the immediate convening of the national Congress to discuss the end of the state of siege. However, the governing coalition finally secured support for the state of siege.95 As Sánchez de Lozada (2004) recounts, the MNR caucus tried to block the state of siege, but the Megacoalition had the majority and neutralized any kind of opposition. The opposition parties could do nothing to lift the state of siege in Congress, while at the same time social confrontation limited the administration’s maneuver. By the end of 2001, the Megacoalition decided to appoint the members of the CNE without the required consensus that included the MNR.96 The administration once again faced opposition by the MNR. This time the MNR was successful and, by the end of 2001, the Quiroga administration called for a summit of chiefs and political representatives with the support of the Catholic Church 97 to resolve the impasse. On June 21, 2001, an agreement was signed by the Catholic Church, CEPB, MNR, ADN, UCS, MIR, MBL, MSM, CONDEPA, PDC, FSB, KND, and FRI with a commitment based on a four-point agenda, namely, (a) the composition of the new CNE with independent authorities; (b) the approval of the Law of Necessity for a Constitutional Reform; (c) the approval of an anticorruption law; and (d) the establishment of a povertyreduction mechanism. In this context, the agreement would facilitate the approval of the Dialogue Law, the Fiscal Code, an anticorruption strategy, and the institutionalization of the Roads Service (Costa Benavides et al. 2001: 28). In the end, the members of the CNE were impartially and transparently appointed within the framework of this agreement between the government sector and the opposition.


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An extraordinary congressional session was required for the vote, as both chambers, especially the chamber of deputies, were very slow in addressing the issue (Orozco et al. 2001: 12). Executive-legislative relations were stagnant. As the La Razón headline (3/19/2001) read, “not only the designation of the electoral authorities is at risk. The political consensus has weakened, 35 laws are stuck in Congress.” The Free Bolivia Movement (MBL) did not join this coalition and instead chose an oppositional position to defend democratic institutions by requesting the removal of the CNE member Alcira Espinoza as the controversy over the 1999 municipal elections emerged. The MBL decided to request her removal from the CNE following her decision not to annul the irregular lists of the “cross-dressing” council member candidates 98 from Colquechaca, Maragua, and Ocurí in the 1999 municipal elections, and following her voting contrary to the CNE resolutions regarding these cases and in favor of the MIR (Benavides et al. 2000: 33). With only five parliamentarians and incapable of making a difference, the MBL was marginalized. Designating independent people to these posts required two-thirds of the parliamentary votes. In this case, the official and opposition sector had to form sobrepactos, that is, agreements that went beyond the governing coalition and included the opposition. In these designations by two-thirds majorities, the Catholic Church, the armed forces, and the U.S. embassy—all sectors in Bolivia—made recommendations. A Different Bolivia: Concluding Remarks The paradox of Bolivia’s electoral reforms was the unintended consequence of having strengthened emerging political parties, such as the MAS, as well as the ranks of local organizations in the country. The unintended effects of these reforms facilitated the ability of the population to mobilize and protest for local demands and openly question the status quo. The Water War in the year 2000 marked a critical juncture for the country. Throughout the period, the Megacoalition lacked serious cohesiveness. The analysis suggests eight main features of this alliance. First, confrontation and apprehensiveness were characteristic of executivelegislative relations especially because the Megacoalition lacked internal hegemony. Its members behaved contradictorily and sometimes acted as the opposition. Second, the assembly, unlike the opposition, lacked internal articulation. This made the decision-making process and the implementation of public policies dependent on the ability of coalition partners to resolve

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internal confrontation through negotiation. This also harmed the image of the government before society and diminished the efficacy and efficiency of the administration. Third, the precarious majority in the National Congress—with the departure of CONDEPA in 1998 and the NFR in 2000—also impeded the administration from making decisions by consensus in order to resolve conf lictive situations or to maintain authority. Fourth, social movements exerted an increased level of social pressure. Indeed, the Banzer administration lacked the authority to impose policy decisions and generally ceded to the demands and impositions of social movements. Moreover, Evo Morales acquired popularity after having been arrested in 1995, having won a deputy post in 1997, and having been arbitrarily expelled by his colleagues from Congress in 2002. The image of a leader questioning the political system and being victimized by the political class worked in his favor. Finally, the ADN, once in government, gave excessive attention to the behavior of the opposition instead of addressing social demands. However, both the coalition parties and the opposition were unable to bring the debate on social demands to the f loor of Congress (Costa Benavides et al. 2000: 11). The reform incorporating the Single Member District (SMD) system gave deputies another opportunity to inf luence policymaking on behalf of their districts, but the Cochabamba conf lict revealed the inadequacy of parliamentarians to push for citizen demands and to inf luence parliamentary activity. Unfortunately, uninominal deputies suffered even an identity crisis as some did not even know what they were and what they represented.99 Indeed, when the reform was applied in 1997, it was not easy for the candidates for uninominal deputies to make explicit the distinction between themselves and the plurinominal deputies. As the events in Cochabamba revealed, when it came to voting in Congress, uninominal deputies did not vote in response to the local demands but in response to the demands of the party.100 Bedegral (2001) asserts that the first experience with the SMD system suggests that uninominal deputies maintained loyalty to their parties and not to their constituencies.101 To be fair, uninominal deputies faced significant limitations on their performance. First, uninominal deputies suffered the great institutional limitations of the Congress, both institutionally and economically, especially the Chamber of Deputies. Uninominal deputies did not have any infrastructure such as office space, computers, or phones in the lower chamber premises,102 unless they held the presidency of the chambers or


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the leadership of the Regional Parliamentary Brigades or specific commissions. Former minister Sánchez Berzaín asserted that each party caucus was assigned an office. For instance, his 23-party caucus shared an 18-square meters office.103 Also, these deputies did not have personal funds or mechanisms to visit their regions, or for an office to meet with their constituencies in their districts.104 Another limitation of the reforms relates to the configuration of the circumscriptions to elect the uninominal deputies. Some circumscriptions, especially in the rural areas, were vast; the circumscription in the north of La Paz, for instance, was extensive in territory. Only one deputy was elected for a population that was small and dispersed. Thus, the deputy very rarely went back because the costs of going back to these territories were too great for a deputy to assume. This happened to many other deputies. The relationship between representatives and districts that the reform intended to strengthen was then affected by these kinds of institutional obstacles. Some were able to connect to their constituencies, but not many of them, as the 2002 election results show. Very few of the uninominal deputies were reelected. The majority of uninominal deputies were not able to find a mechanism to connect to their electorate. However, the 1997 reform did have its benefits, especially in terms of the mechanisms that the uninominal deputies did find to connect to their constituencies, namely, the Public Audiences, the so-called Concurrent Decisions Encounters, and the sessions of the Regional Parliamentary Brigades in the regions and in the uninominal circumscriptions (Rodriguez Calvo 2002: 12; Luna 2004). Thus, the results of this election and the performance of the administration and the 1997–2002 legislature suggest three basic effects of the implementation of the SMD system. 1. Stronger personalization of politics: By abolishing the closed party lists for more than a half of the Chamber of Deputies, the mixedmember proportional system helped create direct linkages between parties, constituencies, and legislators. Although a more direct connection between parties, their legislators, and constituencies would bring more legitimacy and representativeness in the legislature, there were still many instances of disconnection between representatives and constituencies in the 1997–2002 period. 2. Increased regional decentralization: By creating 68 single-seat districts, the mixed-member PR system strengthened local representation; more importantly, it encouraged stronger geographical representation by the different parties that reached Congress via the SMDs.

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3. The split vote enhanced the choices of voters: The possibility of vote-splitting by giving two votes to voters was considered as an adequate mechanism to broaden their choices (Mayorga 2001: 205). As electors themselves indicated, they now could both “vote and elect.” This was not uniform throughout the country, but two chief examples where this occurred are those of circumscription No. 10 in La Paz (including Sopocachi, San Padre, and part of the west of the Ladera) where Banzer’s success was parallel to the MBL’s Juan del Granado, or circumscription No. 8 where Banzer’s success was equivalent to the MNR’s Guido Capra (Romero Ballivián 2003b: 44). Uninominal deputies attempted to find ways to show that they were connecting to their constituencies, proposing to fix roads and provide basic social services; however, they had no competency to do this. The electorate was also expecting uninominal deputies to resolve larger problems that affected them. However, these functions were the responsibilities of the municipal authorities. This was disenchanting for both parliamentarians and Bolivians in general. Those parliamentarians who thought they could resolve these kinds of issues from Congress, two months into the election, realized that they were unable to do it. As Sucre uninominal deputy Fernando Rodriguez Calvo (2002: 12) simply put it: “We have to recognize that the uninominal deputies created great expectations that in the majority of the cases became great frustrations.” All in all, the effects of the reform were not uniform. In some circumscriptions, uninominal deputies were successful, in others, not as much. For instance, Rodriguez Calvo (2002) asserts that, besides playing his traditional roles of legislating and censuring, he was able to do a lot in terms of education, housing, pensions, departmental budgets, as well as a series of censuring initiatives including requests for oral reports and was able to pass 24 pieces of legislation related to his region. The Regional Parliamentary Brigade was able to meet in each of the uninominal circumscriptions (Rodriguez Calvo 2002: 14–24). Some other interesting success stories are those of Juan del Granado in circumscription No. 10 in La Paz, Jose Luis Paredes in circumscription No. 14 in El Alto, and that by Evo Morales in circumscription No. 27 in Cochabamba. These three former deputies reached broad political notoriety after having served as uninominal deputies from 1997 to 2002. In the first exercise very few deputies stayed in Congress. No representative from previous administrations was able to get reelected and few were reelected as uninominal deputies.105 Indeed, out of the 157 parliamentarians


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probably only 20 had been in Congress before, and out of those 20, only 3 or 4 were elected this time as uninominal deputies. The militarization of the Chapare continued. In early 2001, President Quiroga decided to send three of his ministers to Achacachi to establish a dialogue with Felipe Quispe and coca union leaders. Regional demands from La Paz and Potosí joined the demands of the cocaleros and the teacher unions to create massive protests.106 The government, however, was not willing to negotiate centimeters of coca per family, or what Morales later called “un cato de coca por familia” (an area of coca per family)107—an area of 40 square meters. Road blocks ensued, and confrontations with the military increased as the 2002 electoral process came about.108


CHAPTER 4

CRUMBLING COALITIONS? ASSESSING THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOLIVIAN POLITICS

W

hereas the period from 1985 through 2002 was characterized by relative democratic stability and the existence of “pacted democracy” in Bolivia, recent events have signaled a process of reordering of coalitional politics in this country. Starting in the year 2000, Bolivia underwent a process leading to a critical juncture, or what Calderon (2002) calls “a moment of inf lection”—a historical moment in which political patterns start to change. With the electoral reforms that created spaces for greater representation, new patterns in citizen-state relations positioned the general population, especially those historically marginalized, as key players in the political game. The cumulative process that composes this historic moment started in 2000 with the Water War, as well as with other major mobilizations on the part of popular sectors to voice socioeconomic demands, and culminated in 2003 with the Gas War and the forced resignation of Sánchez de Lozada from the presidency. Its legacies were seen in 2003, when major changes in the way of doing politics in Bolivia occurred, including, among other reforms, a major reform in the following year of 16 articles of the Constitution that allowed for referenda in 2004 and 2006, the direct election of members of civic organizations and indigenous movements without links to political parties in the 2004 municipal elections and the election of prefects in 2006, and the call for a Constituent Assembly for 2006. The

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most important outcome was the election of Evo Morales with more than 50 percent of the popular vote in 2005. The 2002 Elections and the Increasing Force of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) The 2002 electoral process confronted some early challenges. The CNE faced delays in dividing circumscriptions throughout the country. Although the electoral norms required the CNE to distribute the circumscriptions according to population data from the 2001 National Population and Housing Census, there was no time for this. To avoid a postponement of the election, the parties in Congress decided that, since the National Statistics Institute had not finished processing 100 percent of the data in some localities, and those were not official results, they could postpone the redistribution of circumscriptions for the 2007 elections. Similarly, controversy also arose around the CNE members who apparently did not get along. Eventually, all members resigned or were asked to leave. For this election, deciding on presidential nominees was not a complicated matter. The MNR once more nominated Sánchez de Lozada for the presidency, accompanied by the independent Carlos Mesa; Jaime Paz Zamora was nominated as the candidate for the MIR; and the NFR launched the regional leader Manfred Reyes Villa as its presidential candidate. Of the two other parties, the MAS nominated its leader and former deputy, Evo Morales, for president, and the Pachacuti Indigenous Movement (Movimiento Indígena Pachacuti-MIP) proclaimed Felipe Quispe as its candidate.1 Political marketing was again at the heart of electoral campaigning. This time, the MNR hired the services of an international consortium of political strategists of the firms Shrum-Devine-Donilon, GCS-UK, and Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research. This team of specialists worked as campaign advisors to Bill Clinton (United States) and Tony Blair (United Kingdom). Sánchez de Lozada’s electoral campaign focused on the fight against corruption (as evidenced by his choice of vice presidential candidate, the independent Carlos Mesa), unemployment, and social exclusion. In the 1993 campaign, Sánchez de Lozada had promised 500,000 new jobs. The 2002 campaign promised double that number. By 2000, politics became the politics of employment. All parties worked the same way, but especially the MNR. The issue with jobs was such that at the end of the campaign, all the activists who participated in the MNR campaign received a certificate of participation so that they could take

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part in the public distribution of jobs.2 The patrimonial logic was exacerbated in this election. Using modern marketing tools, the MNR campaign also focused on negatively attacking Manfred Reyes Villa, the NFR presidential candidate. In comparison to the young Reyes Villa, the issue of public image also became important. Sánchez de Lozada started preparing a year before the election. He went on a special diet for weight control and for improving his appearance and youthfulness. The MNR also made alliances with smaller parties, the MBL, the PS-1, and the Pachacuti Axis and utilized a very positive slogan for the campaign: “It can be done” (Sí Se puede) (Costa Benavides et al. 2002: 31–34). The MIR electoral campaign used the slogan “Bolivia is not for sale” (Bolivia no se vende) as the core of its message. Paz Zamora was initially advised by a Brazilian team of campaign advisors but later on in the campaign, advice came solely from members of his family and friends as well as from party colleagues.3 His campaign focused on three issues: generating employment, the call for a Constituent Assembly, and the issue of gas and the need to derogate capitalization. A lot of the MIR energy during the electoral campaign also included attacks against Sánchez de Lozada, the MNR candidate. The MIR labeled Sánchez de Lozada as a “seller of the country” (vende-patria), referring to the capitalization process of the 1993–1997 administration. The NFR sought the campaign advice of Ralph Murphine, a very well-known political strategist in Latin America who had advised President Chavez in Venezuela. Former CONDEPA executive secretary Ricardo Paz Ballivián also advised Reyes Villa in his campaign. Reyes Villa capitalized on his experience as the mayor of Cochabamba and used his personal appearance to his benefit. His good looks were often a topic of conversation amongst voters. He even became known as the bombon (chocolate truff le)—an expression used in some Latin American countries to refer to a man who is handsome or a woman who is beautiful. As expected from the type of advisor he had, Reyes Villa’s campaign contained important media elements but he also emphasized direct contact with people. Unfortunately, public TV debates did not work in his favor. In the debates, he often contradicted himself and seemed unable to answer technical questions. The NFR did not propose a government plan but presented itself as a break from the traditional parties. Reyes Villa urged voters to support “a positive change” without clearly defining the policies he would pursue in office. His message seemed to tap into the widespread political and economic discontent. The May 2002 polls in 10 cities showed that he had

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about 40 percent of the vote intention.4 Some political analysts even suggested a strong possibility that he would achieve an electoral majority and avoid the congressional vote to become president. However, the negative attacks on Reyes Villa appeared to benefit Morales more than the attackers. Indeed, the main recipient of the NFR’s losses was Morales who, polling at 6 percent only six weeks before the election, became the fourth contender in the final three weeks of the campaign, reached the third and second places the week prior to the election, and ended up obtaining the second place in the election. A group of students from the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA) and Catholic University participated in his campaign as volunteers. He also relied on a group of advisors including political analysts Filemón Escobar and Alvaro García Linera, later his vice president, to plan his electoral strategies. It was even speculated that Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, as well as left-wing U.S. and European NGOs, helped finance the campaign. The fact remains that by November 6, 2002, Evo Morales returned half of the subsidy for the campaign given to his party by the CNE.5 The MAS slogan became “We are more each day” (Cada día somos MAS; más is Spanish for more) to convey the idea that the party was progressively capturing more militants as people became discontent with the traditional parties. One of the biggest banners of Evo Morales was the challenge to U.S. policies in Bolivia, specifically the U.S.-imposed measures for coca eradication. His message was also an attack on the neoliberal and pacted democracy models. He proposed a Constituent Assembly, the derogation of Supreme Decree 21060 or New Economic Policy, and the nationalization of the capitalized companies. The fact that he was expelled from the parliament also helped him gain popularity through the campaign. The UCS began the electoral campaign at the end of 2001. Johnny Fernández, who was mayor of Santa Cruz, refused to leave the leadership of the party to start a process of internal democratization. That year, he requested permission from the municipal government of Santa Cruz to start the electoral campaign and improve his deteriorated image, a product of the tax evasion scandals. Johnny Fernández’ image was so deteriorated that the UCS leadership even thought of proposing the UCS candidacy to ex-minister of justice (and ex-MNR) René Blattman or to former judge Alberto Costa Obregón.6 Although at some point the CNE ruled the leader out of the presidential race, by May 31, 2002, a month before the elections, he was back in the game.7


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He ran his campaign with Marlene Fernández as his running mate. His brother Roberto Fernández assumed Johnny’s position in the municipal government in Santa Cruz while the UCS chief started his national tour. He moved to La Paz to advance his preelectoral campaign using the UCS’s traditional populist style. For instance, on July 20, 2001, Johnny Fernández gave the locality of El Alto a campaign house (casa de campaña) and informed La Razón that he had 10 million notebooks made with his picture on it and 5 million party f lags to distribute around the country.8 The 2002 elections had a (party) newcomer: the Freedom and Justice Movement (Movimiento Libertad y Justicia-MLyJ). The MLyJ responded to popular demands and the highly affective Bolivian political culture: the movement was organized around and based on the figure of former judge Alberto Costa Obregón. MLyJ had no real party structure. However, the authoritarian and arrogant image of the leader had a high impact on collective emotions. Costa Obregón was seen as being antisystem. He relied on a strong support base in La Paz and El Alto and on some level of support in Oruro. The 2002 electoral campaign amongst these parties had many negative overtones. The attacks against Sánchez de Lozada and especially on Manfred Reyes Villa were such that the La Paz Electoral Departmental Court ordered the MNR to stop running TV spots that attacked the image and trajectory of Manfred Reyes Villa. In the ads, the MNR accused the leader of having transferred millions of dollars to six of his relatives to conceal funds from the CNE.9 The preelection climate was somewhat perturbed by two key issues mere weeks before the elections: a massive march composed of various indigenous organizations moving from many parts of the country to the city of La Paz, and the remarks made by the U.S. ambassador about the electoral process. On one hand, the massive demonstration was being organized with the support of the nontraditional parties and some sectors of the traditional parties.10 The demands were for constitutional reforms that many indigenous sectors considered essential for increasing their participation in the decision-making process, in other words, the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to review all constitutional and electoral arrangements and incorporate more access to representation and participation by all sectors of society. Faced with the possibility that these marches could contribute to destabilizing the elections, the Quiroga government negotiated a truce. In exchange for peace and the dissolution of the marches, the government

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agreed to hold a special session of Congress to review the issue of a constitutional reform after the elections. Two days before Quiroga stepped down from the presidency, Congress approved the bill to allow the reform of the Constitution that would in turn allow the holding of a Constituent Assembly in 2006. The second issue that had an impact on the dynamics of the electoral campaign shortly before the elections was a statement made by the U.S. ambassador, Manuel Rocha, during the inauguration of the El Chapare airport. In his speech, he said that “if Bolivians elected those who want Bolivia to become a major cocaine exporter again, the future of U.S. assistance to the country will be put in jeopardy.” This referred specifically to technical cooperation with the United States and to Bolivian access to the U.S. petroleum and textile markets. The ambassador’s comments were widely interpreted in relation to Evo Morales, the leader of the coca farmers and MAS presidential candidate.11 This gave Morales a big boost in the polls and proved significant because it allowed Morales to quickly amass wider support at this essential moment. As it furthered the view that the Untied States wanted to control the political choices in Bolivia, Rocha’s comments enraged not only those supporting Morales’s anti-U.S. stance but also those who were undecided. The effects could be observed years later. Sánchez de Lozada himself still asserts that his “government was a disaster,” especially because of the “the really tragic intervention of the U.S. Ambassador” who attacked Evo Morales. With this, among other facilitating factors, the ambassador helped Morales reach second place in the election. Indeed, had there been more time before the election, Morales probably would have won the presidency in 2002. Moreover, some sectors considered that the comments made by the U.S. ambassador constituted interference in Bolivia’s internal affairs, and strong reactions came from both the political sector and the CNE. The CNE made a public statement requesting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to summon the ambassador to prevent a recurrence of the situation since it considered that the statement affected the normal evolution of the electoral process. This comment by the U.S. ambassador made Evo Morales gain more exposure to the electorate and the electoral process took place as planned. On June 30, 2002, the World Cup game between Brazil and France was not the only thing that captured the attention of most Bolivians. That day Bolivians were also exercising their right to vote for their presidential and legislative representatives. The Bolivian elections were held in a scenario characterized by a difficult economic and social situation, as well as by the existence of growing voter dissatisfaction with the political


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parties and political leaders. This dissatisfaction facilitated the emergence of a series of new parties, some of them perceived by some sectors as antisystem. The electoral registry used on June 30 comprised 4,164,909 voters distributed across Bolivia’s nine departments. Eleven political parties and their presidential candidates took part in the elections. At the end of election day, the media began to broadcast a series of projections about the results. Even though they ref lected differences as to the winner of the election, they all projected very close results among the top candidates. This trend was confirmed in the following hours, as the partial official results were announced and it was confirmed, once again, that none of the candidates obtained an absolute majority of the votes for president. Even though former presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Jaime Paz Zamora from the traditional parties ended up in the forefront of voter preference, the presidential candidates of the emerging parties—Evo Morales of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), Manfred Reyes Villa of the New Republican Force (NFR), and Felipe Quispe of the Pachacuti Indigenous Movement (MIP)—obtained a substantial number of votes. By July 9, the CNE finalized the count of all the polling stations, placing the MNR of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in first place with 22.46 percent of the valid votes, followed by the MAS of Evo Morales Ayma with 20.94 percent. As figure 4.1 shows, the NFR ended third with 20.91 percent, whereas the MIR obtained 16.32 percent. This election saw the clear decline of the ADN as a major political party: the ADN got only 3.4 percent of the votes and a group of other six smaller parties received the remaining 19.38 percent. The election results showed three clear trends. First, the ADN disappeared as a strong party within the party system. Second, the neopopulist front parties emerged as strong contenders. Finally, the MAS emerged as the second electoral force and as the main opposition to the block of traditional parties, thus paving the way for it to become a hegemonic political force in the country. The difference between the first and the second most voted parties, MNR and MAS, was a mere 1.52 percent. The vote also followed clear geographic patterns. Both Morales and Reyes Villa received most of their support in the indigenous western highlands (La Paz, Cochabamba, and Oruro), while Sánchez de Lozada and Paz Zamora received most of their support in the economic center of Santa Cruz and the Amazonian lowland provinces of Beni and Pando. Besides ref lecting cultural and economic differences across regions, this geographic pattern also demonstrated the stronghold that traditional

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ADN 3%

LYJ 3%

MCC 1%

PS 1%

UCS 6% MIP 6%

CONDEPA 0%

MNR 22%

MIR-NM 16% MAS 21%

NFR 21%


parties still had in the east of the country, and the growing dominance of peasant and labor organizations, especially the MAS and the cocalero sector in the west. The CNE had to address the consequences of the not-so-rigorously conducted opinion polls. Opinion polls before the election had indicated that NFR’s Manfred Reyes Villa would be the winner of the election with a large margin, even with an absolute majority, but that was not the case as Sánchez de Lozada achieved the highest plurality and Morales the second place. The inaccuracy of the prediction was due mainly to the use of data from opinion polls that ref lected electoral tendencies only in very specific areas of the country. The polls were conducted mostly in urban areas, and the NFR did very well in the cities but poorly in the rural areas as opposed to the MAS that had a strong rural appeal. This distinction was enough for the MNR to beat the NFR, overall. Although the polls taken five days before the election confirmed that Morales’s support was rising and Reyes Villa’s falling, the popular consensus was that the NFR candidate would still gain a narrow victory over Sánchez de Lozada.12


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Another problem the CNE faced was its webpage. The CNE failed to report the accurate results of the voting tables when results were downloaded. When they were published for the first time, the results for president and deputy seats were inverted. When the page was refreshed the accurate results would come up. However, this caused great controversy, and the NFR accused the CNE of fraud. These elections ref lected what had been occurring in the Bolivian party system since at least 2000, a process of reordering of the political system. CONDEPA disappeared, the UCS subsided, and the ADN deeply weakened; only two parties of the 20-year-old model stayed in the game: the MNR and the MIR, this time accompanied by the neopopulist NFR. The MAS emerged as a strong contender. Translating Votes into Seats: The Composition of the 2002–2007 Congress In 2002, the SMD system was used for a second time. By this time, there was more plurality and local interests represented in Congress, but also more dependence on positional and pork-and-barrel payoffs to sustain coalitions. Thus a more difficult situation for the president and Congress to advance policy proposals and sustain democratic governance ensued. For the election of the members of the Chamber of Deputies, the 1996 law was maintained: the D’Hondt formula of proportional representation for the translation of votes into seats and the electoral threshold of 3 percent for legislative seats that corresponded to the plurinominal circumscriptions in the Chamber of Deputies. According to the mixed system used for a second time in 2002, 68 deputies out of the 130 constitutionally ascribed members were elected by plurality, or absolute majority, in plurinominal districts while the other 62 were elected in nine departmental uninominal districts on the basis of a complete and closed list according to the D’Hondt proportional representation formula. The MNR obtained 36 deputies in the lower chamber, including 24 uninominal and 12 plurinominal deputies. The party with the second highest number of deputy seats was the MAS that obtained 14 uninominal and 13 plurinominal deputies, mostly in the departments of Cochabamba, La Paz, and Oruro. Its performance greatly improved as compared to the 1997 election in which the IU, the electoral platform then, obtained only four uninominal deputy seats and no plurinominal seats. The MIR and the NFR obtained 26 and 25 seats respectively; however, the majority of MIR’s deputy seats were uninominal, that is, linked to regional figures

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rather than to Jaime Paz Zamora while the NFR obtained 20 plurinominal seats linked to the vote for Manfred Reyes Villa, against only five in uninominal districts. The smaller parties MIP, UCS, and ADN obtained less than six deputy seats and the PS-1 came back with only seat. The composition of the lower chamber and the distribution of uninominal and plurinominal seats are shown in table 4.1. The Aymara and coca leaf leader Evo Morales became the main leader of the opposition in Congress. Building on an appeal at the local level, the majority of MAS deputies were uninominal. Morales built his image around the opposition to coca eradication measures in the country and used the indigenous identity to appeal to people in the struggle. The proposal for a Constituent Assembly also became a winning strategy for the MAS, as public opinion was strongly demanding a Constituent Assembly to revamp the national Constitution. On this occasion, and for the first time in Bolivian history, 21 titular deputies and three Senate posts were occupied by indigenous people. For the first time in the history of Bolivia and America, the first session of the parliament in August 2002 had a system of simultaneous translation of three indigenous languages plus Spanish. The composition of the Chamber of Deputies is illustrated in figure 4.2. CONDEPA and UCS lost all the circumscriptions the parties had won in 1997, and the ADN party caucus was greatly reduced from 18 to only

Table 4.1 Uninominal and Plurinominal Deputies in the Chamber of Deputies, 2002–2005 (Prepared by the author using National Electoral Court [CNE] data) Uninominal Deputies

Plurinominal Deputies

Total

MNR MAS MIR

24 14 15

12 13 11

36 27 26

NFR MIP UCS ADN

5 5 0 4

20 1 5 0

25 6 5 4

PS Total

1 68

0 62

1 130

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C RU M B L I N G C OA L I T IO N S ? 36

27

26

25

6

5

4 1

MNR

MAS

MIR

NFR

MIP

UCS

ADN

PS


4 uninominal deputies. The results also show the ascendance of the MAS, which obtained 27 deputy seats. Seven of the eight parties with parliamentary representation obtained more uninominal deputies than plurinominal. This meant that the majority of these parties were dominant locally and had mass movements that were regional. The results also showed there was a significant shift of representation in the chambers as 123 of the 157 deputies were new. Of them, seven were women deputies and nine were women deputy substitutes. The MAS main contender then was not the MNR but the NFR. This party was strong in regions dominated by the MAS. It captured only five single-member seats and two senators, but it obtained 20 other plurinominal deputies. For the Senate, only five of the twelve parties that ran for election obtained seats. Of those, the MNR obtained the highest number of Senate seats, as expected from the presidential vote. Interestingly, the MAS obtained seven Senate seats. In the department of Potosí, however, the MAS won the plurality of the votes but had nominated only one candidate for senator. The seat stayed empty. The MIR obtained more senators than the NFR and the ADN, even though it achieved fourth place in the presidential votes, as figure 4.3 indicates. This was due to the regional orientation of the electoral system and the hold of each of the parties on different regions of the country, with greater concentration of votes in some areas than in others. Whereas the MAS and NFR concentrated votes in the western areas of the country,

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E L E C T O R A L RU L E S A N D B O L I V I A N P O L I T IC S 11

7 5

2 1

MNR

MAS

MIR

NFR

ADN

Figure 4.3 Composition of the 2002–2005 Senate (Prepared by the author using National Electoral Court data)

the MIR votes were more evenly distributed throughout the country and in some cases disputed the Senate seats. The ADN weakened considerably but it was still able to obtain a Senate seat in the department of Beni, a traditionally ADN locality. Plan Bolivia 2002: “How Hard It Is to Love Bolivia” In the 2002 election, 78 percent of the electorate had not voted for Sánchez de Lozada, and various surveys showed that he had about 60 percent negative-perception ratings. It seemed, though, that the most likely outcome was having him as president of Bolivia. While waiting for the last few precincts to report, Sánchez de Lozada and Reyes Villa opened negotiations with the MIR for support in the congressional election of the president. Morales had previously declared that his party would not negotiate with any party over government formation, even if it finished among the top two.13 As it increasingly seemed that his strong showing would result in only a moral victory, Morales announced his intention to form a “government in the streets,” suggesting he would use social mobilization to achieve the party’s goals.14 The UCS soon declared that it would support Sánchez de Lozada both in the congressional election and in the government, whereas the ADN later joined the group but limited its support to the congressional


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election.15 In fact, by the end of July, the ADN confirmed that after the vote in Congress for Sánchez de Lozada, the party would exert opposition to the government in Congress.16 The UCS and the ADN votes were not enough to guarantee Sánchez de Lozada a legislative majority. Hence, Sánchez de Lozada entered into negotiations with both the NFR and MIR. However, Reyes Villa soon confirmed that he and his party would not vote to make Sánchez de Lozada president. So did the MIR. After a meeting of its Directive Council that took place in Tarija, the MIR party decided not to support Sánchez de Lozada but to govern through the parliament. This so-called Tarija decision defined the position of the MIR right after the election. Given the direct refusal of the NFR to support Sánchez de Lozada, the MNR thus decided to concentrate energy in negotiating for MIR support. However, on July 11, the MIR announced its intention to void their congressional votes, thus forcing the MNR to negotiate with the NFR.17 The MNR advanced some negotiations with the NFR, but they broke down on July 21, 2002, when the MNR and UCS announced they would not support the NFR’s proposal for a Constituent Assembly. Morales maintained his position of not negotiating with the other parties but invited other parties to support the MAS. However, he refused to compromise on policies with other parties or to promise cabinet positions in exchange for support.18 This probably prevented him from gaining support from the NFR, which had previously stated it would support Morales over Sánchez de Lozada.19 Negotiations were started again between the two adversaries, the MNR and the MIR. Sánchez de Lozada asserts that the MNR had no other choice but to negotiate with the MIR: “I had no other choice but to forge the alliance with the MIR, they were the only ones that gave me a majority, the MIR plus UCS gave us majority. The other option was Manfred Reyes but the NFR did not give me the majority.” Oscar Eid Franco, the MIR party strongman, was involved in the negotiations and suggests that the party was in a difficult situation because if the MIR did not participate in the agreement, “there would be no president and no democracy for anybody.” Besides preventing Morales from becoming president, factors external to the parties also facilitated or, better yet, inf luenced the forging of a coalition. The international community pressured the MIR as there were risks of more hyperinf lation. The MNR-MIR pact emerged after pressure from the U.S. embassy, the private sector, the Catholic Church, and the middle classes 20 that feared an economic breakdown of the country if a coalition that could guarantee a parliamentary majority was not formed.

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By July 2002, and as the August 6 election day in Congress approached, uncertainty was growing; the banking system almost collapsed; savings dropped. All sectors in Bolivian society were asking for an agreement. This is the main reason MIR militants decided to forge the agreement with the MNR. Faced with increasing pressure, the MIR decided to reverse the Tarija decision. Jaime Paz Zamora declared that support would be given to Sánchez de Lozada. In light of their past as political enemies, Paz Zamora coined another phrase to describe the situation, he stated that in situations such as this one, it was “very difficult to love Bolivia!” (Que difícil es amar a Bolivia!). Although for politicians it was understandable to forge the pact, Bolivians had a hard time understanding its nature. In their view, the parties were putting together alliances only for pragmatism, prebendalism, and quotas of power. However, the pact was necessary to prevent a crisis; had it not been forged, the October 2003 crisis would probably have occurred in July 2002.21 On July 25, nearly four weeks after the election, the MNR, MIR, and UCS agreed to form a “Government of National Responsibility”22 (ADN initially offered support but in the end it did not join due to disagreements with the MNR’s decision not to call a Constituent Assembly). The pact was forged through the so-called Plan Bolivia 2002. This coalition was not an ideological formation but an arrangement to deal with the critical phase the country was going through. Plan Bolivia included the revision of the Hydrocarbons Law and of capitalization, among other things, but not the call for a Constituent Assembly.23 With Plan Bolivia, “pacted democracy” and coalitional politics as Bolivians knew it had survived, but the fact remained that the transformation of Bolivian politics was more palpable. Unlike all previous pacts, Plan Bolivia assured Sánchez de Lozada a slim majority in the legislature and virtually no control over the rest of the country. Morales and his party were strong in Congress with 34 seats but they were also strong in “the streets.” This scenario had repercussions in terms of the political costs to construct and maintain the coalition. The coalition partners agreed to support Sánchez de Lozada and he was officially elected president by Congress on August 4, 2002, receiving 84 of the 127 congressional votes against 43 that were given to Evo Morales—the coca leader and MAS candidate. As expected, the alliance formed by the MNR, the MIR, and other parties facilitated the advantage that Sánchez de Lozada had over the cocalero leader.24 The legislative session that confirmed Sánchez de Lozada as president was prolonged for


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more than 23 consecutive hours and was transmitted live by the state television station. In exchange for support, the MIR received 7 of the 18 ministries, and the leadership of the Chamber of Deputies. Other minority parties joined this congressional coalition. The official legislative majority that supported Sánchez de Lozada was composed of the MNR (47), MIR (31), UCS (5), and ADN (5). The opposition, which did not necessarily behave as a coherent opposition, was composed of the MAS (34), NFR (27), and the remaining parties (7). Sánchez de Lozada and Evo Morales: The Road to Black October Sánchez de Lozada began his second period as president in a very precarious way. More than 70 percent of the voters had not supported him in the electoral vote, and in the end it was Congress once again that elected the president. As they had been stating since at least 1989, Bolivians felt that though they voted they never actually elected their presidents. During the first six months of his administration, Sánchez de Lozada faced great opposition from the second political force, the MAS, and attempted various unsuccessful negotiations with Evo Morales on the coca issue. Starting in 2002 and until the end of the year, pressure from the streets intensified around the issue of coca. However, soon the MAS realized that the coca issue was not enough to win followers and the opposition was broadened to include issues of land, rejection of the FTAA, and, finally, gas. Sánchez de Lozada met five times with Morales to discuss the possibility of a social truce, but with no success. One of the initial points of contention was over which points needed to be addressed. While Sánchez de Lozada wanted to address the coca issue independently, Morales said that the government had to deal with all issues at once and not only with those related to coca eradication. Peasant and cocalero sectors attacked the government while the United States pushed for eradication measures. Domestic and international pressures complicated the scenario for the new administration. In the institutions of democracy, Congress was also blocking and censuring executive proposals. Sánchez de Lozada had a slim majority; Morales, Quispe, and their parties managed to confront the coalition partners. An extreme case of this opposition occurred on January 23, 2003, when the MAS representatives joined with MIP representatives and attended a congressional session with wood sticks in their hands.

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They threatened and attempted to use physical violence in the chamber if the session was not stopped.25 By June 6, 2003, Sánchez de Lozada threatened to govern by decree.26 He also made use of the relative majority he obtained through the coalition. But confrontation occurred not only in the interaction with the opposition in Congress but also within the cabinet itself. In particular, the cabinet sessions were filled with tension as the presence of so many parties prevented the president and his ministers from reaching consensus on government policies. What cost the coalition the most was its need to frequently resort to the distribution of posts to sustain itself. Perhaps more than any pact since 1985, Plan Bolivia was fundamentally patronage-driven, with the MIR extorting a high price in cabinet posts, embassies, and other government posts. While the weakened traditional parties retained control of the legislature and the executive branch, Evo Morales and the opposition forces retained effective control over the rest of the country, especially the streets, and provided the space to build party identity among the public. Plan Bolivia allowed the parties in the governing coalition to systematically apply their congressional majority to prevent any measures proposed by the MAS or MIP from getting approved. The coalition parties also continued moving forward the unpopular measures to export gas. In light of this, after five months of truces, failed dialogues, and confrontation, the struggle moved to the streets. Challenging Coalition Governments and Coalitional Politics in Bolivia: February–October 2003 In 2000, it was the Water War; in 2003, it was the Gas War. Gas exportation became the key item on the domestic agenda. The most important result of the capitalization law of 1994, also designed and implemented by Sánchez de Lozada, was that the oil multinationals that had obtained access to explore the Bolivian land found great reserves of natural gas. Since then, the number of proven reserves had multiplied enormously.27 An opportunity to secure a contract to export natural gas to the United States emerged. Although this was presented as the immediate answer to the economic crisis the country was suffering, more time was needed to have Bolivians accept the terms of the exportation, especially in light of the conditions imposed by the multinationals. Indeed, to address the economic crisis, in August 2002, Sánchez de Lozada offered to develop a package of economic measures to resolve the


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economic crisis within 90 days of assuming power.28 But he generated too many expectations about the measures and later approved a very scant and not-so-timely group of measures. The model proposed by the 2002 administration advocated an opening of the national economy to foreign commerce and international capital f low, a government reduced in its functions and participation in the economy—although with the capacity to maintain price stability—and a structure of incentives favorable to private economic activity (Morales 1994: 143). However, the core principles of Sánchez de Lozada’s economic strategy and his rather arbitrary moves to implement them explain the crisis that unfolded in 2003. The reforms of the 1990s represented important steps forward in granting more inclusiveness to different sectors of society. The law of popular participation gave localities a voice in the decision making for the distribution of resources. The electoral reforms promised to better connect the representatives with their constituencies, thereby reducing representation deficit. However, these measures to guarantee Bolivians more inclusive social policies proved short-lived. They did not really establish a consensual framework for policymaking (Whitehead 2001: 14), nor did they really bring concrete improvements to the lives of Bolivians. Confrontation was inevitable as discontented sectors demanded real representation and tangible benefits from policy decisions. The year 2003 arrived in a political atmosphere of “wars” and “truces,” a time when Bolivians felt a serious lack of government attention to their basic necessities. By early 2003, however, peasants put roadblocks in protest, thus stopping traffic in various parts of the country for almost two weeks. There was confrontation between peasant groups and the military sent by Sánchez de Lozada, resulting in the death of several peasants. The Catholic Church called for a dialogue process through which the government agreed to comply with a series of agreements to improve their interaction with peasant and indigenous groups (Albó 2003: 6). On February 9, 2003, the government announced work on a new law that would increase the income tax on the salaries of the majority of the population, without a proportional increase in the salaries of people who earned the most. This tax increase was one of the mechanisms proposed by the IMF to raise funds and to reduce the country’s staggering fiscal deficit of almost 8.5 percent of GDP (Gamarra et al. 2003). The purpose was to improve state revenues in the middle of the crisis. It was imposed although the government knew that social protest and tensions would emerge, especially from the middle class—the sector most affected by the economic crisis. Rejection of the government measure

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was not voiced through formal political institutions and so on February 12 and 13, 2003, a severe political crisis took place. In light of the impact of the tax (impuestazo) to their daily lives, the police, supported by some other civil society groups, revolted and almost took over the Government Palace.29 The situation became complicated when Sánchez de Lozada decided to send in the military, a longstanding “rival” of the police, to control the mobilization. The military stopped the confrontation on February 12 with an exchange of fire in front of the palace, but the hostilities continued. Sánchez de Lozada and a few of his ministers had to be escorted by the military out of the palace. Sánchez de Lozada (2004) asserts that the events of February 2003 were also an attempted coup d’état. In the process, the headquarters of the governing political parties were attacked, some of them were burned, as were some of the stores, mainly in the cities of La Paz and El Alto. As a result of this confrontation, the Sánchez de Lozada administration retracted the tax proposal. It was not even sent to Congress for consideration. In turn, Sánchez de Lozada was forced to restructure his whole cabinet eliminating some ministries to reduce the deficit. Reminiscent of the political instability and violent confrontation characteristic of the predemocratic era, the February crisis was felt by Bolivians as the worst crisis they had suffered since 1982 when the democratic transition started. However, the worst crisis was yet to come. Starting in February 2003, the MAS opposition in Congress confronted the Sánchez de Lozada administration with the same passion they expressed in the streets. They started by demanding malfeasance trials against the president and his ministers for the February events, requesting to change the cabinet, calling for the expulsion of Minister of the Presidency Carlos Sánchez Berzaín, and using other pressure tactics including threats of hunger strikes. Later, a hunger strike was started by the MAS and the MIP to call for social support against Sánchez de Lozada. The request for the resignation of the president was the banner of the MAS since February until the end of Sánchez de Lozada’s term. Carlos Mesa was responsible for maintaining working relations with the parliament. However, he was ineffective at the task as he openly showed his contempt for the parties and the politicians. The parliamentarians did not like him either. For example, the leader of the MIR and former president Jaime Paz Zamora once walked out of the Congress chambers while Carlos Mesa was addressing Congress as vice president and president of Congress. Confrontation between the executive and legislature started with Mesa himself. The vice president denounced

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slowness on the part of the parliament to move legislation forward and the parliament in turn accused the government of being slow.30 Following the February events, Sánchez de Lozada was forced to expel Sánchez Berzaín from the cabinet, giving in to the pressure exerted by popular sectors, the media, and his own vice president.31 The second cabinet was reorganized as table 4.2 shows. The months following the events of February 2003 were filled with confrontations, roadblocks, and numerous popular demonstrations. Instead of attempting to engage the opposition to strengthen his position, the Sánchez de Lozada administration relied on the military to maintain order. People perceived that human rights violations were taking place and that Sánchez de Lozada was not really paying attention to their demands. Sánchez de Lozada continued to try securing support from both legislators and the general public to control the violent demonstrations but to no avail. A decision to bring Sánchez Berzaín to his cabinet once

Table 4.2 Sanchez de Lozada: Cabinet 2 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, the National Electoral Court, and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Jose Justiniano Sandoval

MNR

Minister of Presidency

Februray 19, 2003

October 18, 2003

Yerko Kukoc del Carpio

MNR


Februray 19, 2003

October 18, 2003

Moira Paz Estenssoro Cortez

MNR

Minister of Sustainable Dev.

Februray 19, 2003

August 4, 2003

Juan Walter Subirana Suarez

NFR

Minister of Labor

Februray 19, 2003

August 4, 2003

Hugo Arturo Carvajal Donoso

MIR

Minister of Education

Februray 19, 2003

October 18, 2003

Jorge Torres Obleas

MNR

Minister of Februray 19, Economic Dev. 2003

October 18, 2003

Carlos Morales Landivar

NFR

Minister of Mining

Februray 19, 2003

October 18, 2003

Jorge Berindoague Alcocer

MNR

Minister of Hydrocarbons

March 21, 2003

October 18, 2003

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more, as minister of defense, proved fateful. To complicate matters further, at around the same time, Sánchez de Lozada also removed Ana Maria Campero, the ombudswoman and a very well-respected notable in Bolivia, and appointed an MNR loyal with no real expertise. Only one year after his election, it was obvious that the Sánchez de Lozada administration had lost control. The opposition in Congress and on the streets made him powerless, unable to move any of his policy proposals forward, especially those concerning the export of gas. By August 2003, the MNR, and the MIR allowed a new member into the coalition: the third most voted party in the elections—the NFR. The MNR, MIR, and now the NFR consolidated a governing coalition that could be defined using a phrase of the famous Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges: “It’s not love but fear that unites us” (no nos une el amor sino el espanto), that is, the fear of the emergence of new parties, such as the MAS, the fear of having more indigenous people sit with them legislating, the fear of the collapse of Bolivian politics as its citizens knew it. The entrance of the NFR gave Sánchez de Lozada a more comfortable majority in Congress and allowed the government coalition to face some decisions in which a qualified majority was needed, especially in terms of the designation of public positions. It also had an unintended effect: internal strife within the coalition. The entrance of the NFR provoked disputes within the coalition because of the distribution of posts and changes in the positions of power. The MIR resisted the entrance of this new party on the grounds that they had not been involved in the decision to allow the NFR to enter the coalition, and on the grounds that it meant losing posts for their party. Whereas the 2002 coalition between the MNR and the MIR was supported by a distribution of positions, 60 percent and 40 percent representations by MNR and MIR respectively, with the entrance of the NFR this changed. Disputes between the government partners emerged. The worst encounter was due to the distribution of nine vice ministries to the NFR, of which four had previously been in the hands of the MIR. The MIR refused to give them over, claiming they were not involved in the decision.32 Thus, while the MNR and the MIR had two-thirds majority in Congress, they could not run the cabinet. In this cabinet shift, the NFR received three ministries: the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Sustainable Development, and the Ministry of Financial Services. Nine vice ministries and fifteen general director offices were also granted to the party. In exchange, the NFR guaranteed the MNR a two-thirds majority in Congress. As table 4.3 shows, four new ministers were appointed.33

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Table 4.3 Sanchez de Lozada: Cabinet 3 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, the National Electoral Court and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Erick Reyes Villa

NFR

Minister of Sustainable Development

August 4, 2003

October 18, 2003

Adalberto Kuajara

NFR

Minister of Labor

August 4, 2003

October 18, 2003

Dante Napoleon Pinto

NFR

Minister of Financial Services

August 4, 2003

October 18, 2003

Mirta Quevedo

MNR

Minister of Popular Participation

August 4, 2003

October 18, 2003

Although it was a new player in the political game and a novice in forming governing coalitions, the NFR behaved in the same patronage-driven manner as traditional parties. In its August 5, 2003 issue, La Razón reported the entrance of the NFR into the government coalition, however, it also reported that blatant positional payoffs were being distributed. Meanwhile, and in contrast to the new force that this alliance was giving to the parliamentary majority, the opposition and other popular sectors, led by Evo Morales and the MAS, were taking to the streets and the roads, with a growing number of claims from different fronts. Although there was no real articulation of the demands of the various opposition fronts to the Sánchez de Lozada administration, the cumulative effect of their protests both in parliament and in the streets was causing commotion across the country. Open confrontation was imminent. During this period, there was constant political conflict and disagreements with no real possibilities for a dialogue in the parliament and/or on the streets. There was no legislation moving in a functional manner through the legislative process, and those executive policy decisions, such as the tax increase to reduce the fiscal deficit, had to be reversed. An additional factor complicated this further, namely, the ability of the opposition to exert tension both in the parliament and in the streets. Political impasse and immobilism eventually foretold the demise of the Sánchez de Lozada administration.

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Street Politics: The Gas War In early September 2003, demonstrations started against the export of gas, especially against Sánchez de Lozada’s proposal to transport it through Chile. Sánchez de Lozada convened the MAS to discuss a proposal to resolve the impasse over the sale of gas. The MAS rejected the invitation and a possible agreement because the proposal did not provide for more oil revenues for the state and did not stipulate the holding of a Constituent Assembly, or a change in the economic model. Although the Catholic Church attempted to facilitate a dialogue between the government and their civil society counterparts, including Morales and his followers, Morales refused to comply, much less to sign the document for the so-called Reencuentro (Reencounter).34 The majority of the Bolivian population shared his position. Besides the conditions imposed by the multinationals in terms of the very limited benefits from gas extraction and exportation to the country, one of the conditions most resisted, psychologically, by Bolivians was the idea that the best way to resolve the economic crisis was to export gas through Chile. In 1879, Chile and Bolivia had disputed access to the Pacific coast through an area with vast reserves of mineral resources. Bolivia lost access to the sea, and as a consequence, diplomatic relations with Chile were suspended. To this day, the issue of recovering the access to the sea is in every Bolivian’s mind and heart, it is a central theme in primary and secondary education, it is present in the doctrine documents of most of the political parties, and it is even one of the top issues in every political campaign. Besides Morales, “El Malku” Felipe Quispe also opposed Sánchez de Lozada’s measures on the streets. Apart from being the leader of the MIP and a member of Congress, “El Malku” was also the leader of the Conderación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Union Confederation of Peasant Workers in Bolivia). Similarly, the COB emerged as a strong opposition force. Their requests included the call for a Constituent Assembly, the elimination of the Hydrocarbons Law and a referendum to decide the issue of the export of gas.35 On September 19, 2003, the MAS called for new demonstrations in various cities in the country against the sale of gas. The mobilized population demanded changes to the Hydrocarbons Law and the elimination of Decree 24806 signed by Sánchez de Lozada two days before concluding his 1993– 1997 mandate, which provided favorable conditions for oil transnational companies. These protests demanded not only a cessation of the sale of gas through Chile but also the resignation of the president.36


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By September 30, the so-called Gas War had started. By early October, the Gas War threw the country into confusion. Some students were wounded and others were detained during the protests in front of the government headquarters. From August to October, instead of becoming strong, the government coalition weakened. Coalition partners MIR and NFR asked to modify the Hydrocarbons Law and its Article 55, to change profit margins and/or royalty payments by the transnational companies from 18 to 50 percent.37 By the end of 2003, the Gas War and the Iraq War were being fought at the same time. Throughout the fall, the marches, demonstrations, hunger strikes, and roadblocks continued all over the country. An aggravating factor was the kidnapping of foreign tourists by Quispe loyals in Achacachi and Sorata. The death of peasants as a result of the confrontation with the military sent by Sánchez de Lozada triggered even more protests and demonstrations, including a march to La Paz. By October 2, 2003, MAS deputy Dionisio Nuñez indicated that his party block had presented a draft bill to the plenary of the Lower Chamber. The draft bill for the modification of Article 55 would require multinationals to increase the royalties to the Bolivian government from 18 to 50 percent for the exploitation of the mineral resource.38 The opposition to the government was being conducted in parallel fashion, in Congress and on the streets. On October 8, 2003, promoted by the local COB and the neighborhood associations, a new civic strike against the sale of gas started in El Alto. Major protests in La Paz stopped traffic. By the second week of October, stores were closed, there were fires on many street corners, and there were demonstrations by several neighborhood associations. La Paz and El Alto were in chaos. Strikes and demonstrations continued during the following days, and on October 11, 2003, the conf lict escalated. Given how easy it is to block the entrance to the city of La Paz through El Alto, the protest was successful and after a few days, residents experienced shortage in gas, food, and other basic necessities. To address the shortage, the government sent a convoy of military men to El Alto to open the way for distributor trucks to enter the city to deliver these items. A confrontation ensued between the military and El Alto residents coordinating the blockade when the military opened fire to push people away from the truck.39 In the midst of violence all over the city, Sánchez de Lozada approved a Supreme Decree establishing that natural gas would not be sold to foreign countries until the population and its social sectors were consulted on it.40 The situation prompted Sánchez de Lozada to consider the idea of a consultative referendum.

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This was not enough for Bolivians. By mid-October, the situation became radicalized with demonstrations and other forms of violence as well as a transportation strike that paralyzed the city of La Paz. Whereas most ministers still stayed in the cabinet, Minister of Economic Development Jorge Torres Obleas—from the ally party MIR—presented his resignation. Sánchez de Lozada, however, declined the resignation and accused the union movement and social sectors of “trying to end the democratic regime and institutionalize a dictatorship.”41 On October 13, 2003, after unsuccessfully having urged the president to find a solution to the matters, Mesa distanced himself from the government. Four more ministers distanced themselves from the administration when the demonstrations had escalated into violence. New protests erupted in the Department of Potosí and in the central city of Cochabamba, this time asking for Sánchez de Lozada’s “head.”42 By October 15, 2003, the slogans chanted by those demonstrating were not about gas anymore but about Goni “the assassin.” Protesters were sending a clear message asking him to resign.43 There were also mobilizations in Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, Sucre, and Santa Cruz; the demand for the president’s resignation was heard everywhere. Another event took place on October 15, 2003, when ex-ombudswoman Ana Maria Campero started a hunger strike with a select group of intellectuals and professionals in a parish close to the central headquarters of the police and the Ministry of Defense. The motive for the hunger strike was to ask Sánchez de Lozada to resign because he had lost political support. Many other hunger strikes followed. By this time, the middle class and intellectuals had joined the opposition to the government. Also on October 15, Sánchez de Lozada appeared at a national press conference with his MIR and NFR allies and said he would defend democracy against the “plotting” and “sedition” organized against his government and confirmed that he was not going to resign. As part of his commitment to resolve the crisis, Sánchez de Lozada promised to hold a consultative referendum on the issue of gas, to revise the Hydrocarbons Law, and to call for a Constituent Assembly. In his press conference, he never once referred to those people who died in the confrontation. People resented this omission. The situation became more complex when Sánchez de Lozada’s closest allies, who had publicly expressed their solidarity with the president days earlier, started to withdraw their support from the coalition. First the NFR’s Manfred Reyes Villa announced his party’s exit from the coalition, then Jaime Paz Zamora met with Sánchez de Lozada to discuss his resignation. The MIR also left the coalition at a critical moment: two days


167

before the fall of the government. MIR leader Oscar Eid Franco stated that the party left the coalition for a purely strategic reason: preparing its future. The MIR “ran the risk of collapsing with the government, and that needed to be avoided.”44 “Goni, become gas!” (Goni, házte gas!) or disappear was the slogan chanted by the masses and written with spray-paint on the walls of La Paz. On October 16, Sánchez de Lozada prepared his helicopter to leave from Santa Cruz on the Lloyd Bolivian Airlines f light to Miami, FL, and he sent a letter to Congress with his resignation. All members of Congress voted to accept his resignation except for those of the MNR who still supported him. Only one MNR parliamentarian voted for his resignation. Sánchez de Lozada (2004) vehemently asserts that the problem of that coalition was that force started to emerge from the streets. Additionally, close election results and the participation of the MIR as coalition partner were two other aggravating factors according to him. He asserts that “the irony was that I decided to resign when Manfred left the coalition. Since I think as a parliamentarian, I realized that I had lost the majority; I could not impose a state of siege. What I should have done earlier is to stay on, and retire to Santa Cruz and start a civil war, at least I wouldn’t be accused of what they are accusing me today.”45 October 2003 saw the first open demonstration of the strength of the popular actors after the events of February 2003 and since the Bolivian transition to democracy. The Gas War showed an enormous weakness— almost decomposition—of the state apparatus, and the crumbling of coalitional politics in Bolivia. Mesa’s Critical Juncture: 2003–2005 The collapse of coalition governments and coalitional politics in Bolivia occurred parallel to the collapse of Sánchez de Lozada’s government. Just as Sánchez de Lozada was f lying to Miami in October 2003, in a relatively smooth constitutional transition, Vice President Mesa was sworn in as interim president by Congress. As soon as he took over, Mesa took the first steps toward restructuring the political system. In his first address to Congress as president, Mesa presented his government program. He distanced himself from political parties and asked them to reconsider their performance and role in politics. To address the people’s rejection of state patronage and discontent with the “pacted democracy” model, Mesa established a cabinet mainly composed of independents with technical expertise in the various subject matters,46 as table 4.4 shows.

168


Table 4.4 Mesa Administration: Cabinet 1 (Prepared by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, the National Electoral Court, and newspapers) Name

PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Juan Siles del Valle

None

November 2, 2003

November 20, 2003

Jose Galindo Neder Alfonso Ferrufino

MNR

Minister of Foreign Relations Minister of the Presidency Minister of Government Minister of Defense Minister of Finance Minister of Economic Development Minister of Labor Minister of Peasant Affairs Minister of Sustainable Development Minister of Public Services Minister of Peasant Affairs Minister of Popular Participation Presidential Delegate

November 2, 2003 November 2, 2003 November 2, 2003 November 2, 2003 November 2, 2003

November 20, 2003 November 20, 2003 November 20, 2003 November 20, 2003 November 20, 2003

November 2, 2003 November 2, 2003 November 2, 2003




November 2, 2003

November 20, 2003

Gonzalo Arredondo Millan Javier Cuevas

None None None

Xavier Nogales Iturri

None

Luis Fernandez Fagalde Diego Montenegro Ernst Jorge Cortes Rodriguez

None

Jorge Urquidi Barrau Justo Seoane Parapaino Roberto Barbery Anaya

MNR

Guadalupe Cajias

ADN

None None

None ADN

Mesa also promised to hold a referendum on the issue of natural gas and to promote a draft law to modify the old Hydrocarbons Law. However, he said nothing about the rest of the capitalization enterprises. He also pledged to promote the holding of a Constituent Assembly.47 Since the beginning, he insistently declared himself to be leading a government of transition.


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In developing this agenda, the Mesa administration faced various challenges. First, popular movements gave him a deadline, a 90-day grace period, to comply with the proposals of the October Agenda. The accumulated popular discontent and impatience forced him to provide the population tangible results in a timely manner. This was aggravated by the need to foster immediate economic growth that could have a visible impact in the lives of Bolivians. Second, by excluding political parties from the game and choosing not to form a coalition with them, Mesa would face the reprisals of the political parties represented in Congress.48 The fact remained that despite their ineffective governing capacity, political parties still controlled the bureaucratic and political structures of the state. Finally, he faced the pressure from local elitist groups who wanted to inf luence the decision making in terms of governing policies and turn them in their favor, especially when it came to economic policies. A survey taken a few weeks after Mesa took office showed that an average of 77 percent of the population supported him (85 percent in La Paz and El Alto, 83 percent in Cochabamba, and 73 percent and 68 percent support in Santa Cruz and Tarija respectively). A reorganization of the cabinet took place in November, days after he had appointed his first cabinet. Table 4.5 shows how, without major modifications, the cabinet was formed with technocrats and specialists on particular issues for the remainder of 2003, 2004 and 2005. By December 2003, newspaper coverage highlighted how the parties blamed each other because the discussion of the crucial items in the political agenda (that is, the issue of the Constituent Assembly, the Hydrocarbons Law, etc.) was being postponed for 2004.49 The new combination of forces made consensus building difficult. Congress and the mobilized sectors that had opposed Sánchez de Lozada wanted tangible results in terms of the principal themes of the new national agenda. The president of the Chamber of Deputies, MNR’s Oscar Arrien, even suggested that President Mesa should temporarily govern through decrees so that the functioning of different powers would not stop. A similar position was taken by Arrien later when he suggested that President Mesa should reduce the BonoSol 50 through a decree and not through a congressional law. MIR representative Rafael Oviedo and NFR representative Johnny Antezana were not in agreement with Arrien’s vision, since, as they suggested, “It would be a bad sign that the Executive should assume the tasks of the Legislature.”51


PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Diego Montenegro

None

Minister of Agriculture

November 20, 2003

February 3, 2005

Gonzalo Aredondo None Millan

Minister of National Defense

November 10, 2003

February 3, 2005

Donato Ayma

None

Minister of Education

November 20, 2003

June 11, 2004

Alfonso Ferrufino Valderrama

None

Interior Minister

November 20, 2003

June 11, 2004

Javier Cuevas

None

Minister of Finance

November 20, 2003

February 3, 2005

Jorge Espinoza

None

Minister of Mines and Metallurgy

November 20, 2003

February 3, 2005

Juan lgnacio Siles

None

Minister of November 20, Foreign Affairs 2003

February 3, 2005

Fernando None Antezana Aranibar

Minister of Health

November 20, 2003

June 11, 2004

Luis Fernandez Fajalde

None

Minister of Labor

November 20, 2003

February 3, 2005

Jorge Urquidi Barrau

MNR

Minister of November 20, Public Services 2003

February 3, 2005

Guillermo Torrez Orias

MNR

Minister of Hydrocarbons

November 17, 2003

February 3, 2005

Ricardo Calla Ortega

None

Minister of Indigenous Affairs

November 17, 2003

February 3, 2005

Guadalupe Cajias

ADN

Presidential Delegate

November 20, 2003

February 3, 2005

Jose Antonio Galindo Neder

None

Minister of the November 20, Presidency 2003

February 3, 2005


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With the postponement of these issues until the following year, the “grace period” given to President Mesa by the social movements was expiring. The COB threatened to take over the National Congress and indicated that “things would be stirred up starting in January, when people could start to demand again” because the people had “lost confidence in the president.”52 With respect to this, Morales, now with a more moderate discourse, asserted that “closing the Parliament was an attack on democracy” and qualified this measure as “an imposition of a dictatorship.” Moreover, Morales indicated in a press conference that “not because the parliamentarians are bad should we have to close Congress. One thing is the person and another one is the institution, and here we need to defend the institutions.”53 Morales seemed so eager to protect democratic institutions, mainly because Mesa allowed him to have inputs in major political decisions. By now, Morales had broadened MAS’s support and transformed the party from a cocalero movement to a national movement with a middle-class constituency, especially in some urban centers in western Bolivia. His international projection also inf luenced his attitude. In November 2003, Mesa gave Morales a platform to address the participants at the Development Summit of heads of state held in Santa Cruz, and his international popularity was growing. With relative support from political parties and the key social forces, what Mesa started to lead was a “moment of inf lection” that presumed the need for changes and the creation of new opportunities for development. Starting on October 20, 2003, Mesa asked for congressional support to govern, stipulating that it had to be based on national interest and not on payoffs. He heartily asked the presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies to give him political backing (un espaldarazo). Admitting the risk of making a government without political parties, the president also admitted that “we should make a Government with the Parliament if we want to have possibilities of success.”54 The problem continued to be that Mesa considered political parties, and Congress also, corrupt institutions. This made functioning executive-legislative dynamics difficult. President Mesa met with the leaders of the legislative chambers. He also met with the chiefs of the political party blocks in Congress. They all agreed to start working on revising the Hydrocarbons Law and on drafting a bill to call for a referendum and a Constituent Assembly.55 According to Johnny Antezana, the leader of the NFR in Congress, the participants of the meeting agreed that the executive in power should be the one to manage directly, in coordination with the legislature, the revision to the

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Hydrocarbons Law and the binding referendum on the sale of the gas. Calling for a Constituent Assembly would be the legislature’s responsibility, in coordination with representatives from the regions, their civic committees, and civil society.56 At the beginning of Mesa’s administration, it seemed impossible to modify the Constitution.57 Indeed, Article 230 of the Constitution makes it extremely complex to carry out reforms. In order to partially amend the Constitution, the proposed reform has to be initiated by Congress and then approved by the following Congress. The law must enumerate the changes to be made. Only those changes included in the law can be subsequently approved. It is the subsequent legislative session, also with two-thirds of the votes, that approves the reform. The logic was to avoid too many changes, especially those tied to the interests of a particular set of leaders. The discussion of the Law of Necessity of Constitutional Reform was approved on August 5, 2002, on the last day of the mandate of President Quiroga. Its approval was to be discussed during the next session, but it was postponed during the 14-month Sánchez de Lozada administration.58 By February 2004, at 78 percent of popularity 59 in La Paz, Cochabamba, El Alto, and Santa Cruz, Mesa was showing levels of support never achieved by any president in Bolivia since the transition to democracy.60 Unlike Sánchez de Lozada, Mesa was able to promote the constitutional reform. However, he approved more measures than were originally listed and approved by the previous legislature. With such high levels of popularity, the party caucuses in both legislative chambers had no choice but to support it. By February 2004, Bolivia had initiated a new phase in their democratic history by approving the constitutional reform. In an act celebrated at the Government Palace in La Paz, President Carlos Mesa promulgated the law that modified 16 of the 235 articles of the current Constitution.61 The law was passed with the support of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Mesa said that the reform signaled a “process of historic transition” and that it was “a step ahead” in the construction of a “new social pact amongst Bolivians.” Besides the stipulations for the referendum and the call for the Constituent Assembly, the reform allowed citizens to present candidates through indigenous movements and civic associations, without having to belong to a political party, and they were now also able to complement Congress by initiating legislation. On February 1, President Mesa also presented his economic plan and gave no role to Congress to implement it since he moved it forward by


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promulgating 23 Supreme Decrees. In the end, a limited number of laws were actually sent to the legislature for their approval.62 Agreeing on a Hydrocarbons Law After October 2003, there was a complete change in the attitudes of the parliamentarians. They now wanted to respond to citizen demands but in terms of the agenda set in October 2003. Starting in October 2003, however, and given that Mesa had distanced himself from Congress and political parties, Congress was “revitalized” in the sense that it assumed positions independent of the executive. Along with the transition to democracy (1982–1985), this is the time in Bolivian history when Congress became a proactive institution. In terms of the Hydrocarbons Law, there was no homogenous position in the parliament, but all parties were proposing their own elements to the law. By assuming their own institutional position, some governance problems emerged but at the same time, Congress revitalized its role. In the Mesa government, all the problems went to the extreme. A referendum was held in July 18, 2004, as part of the October commitments to let Bolivians decide on the basic terms of a new Hydrocarbons Law and, most importantly, on the relationship with the transnational corporations that would extract the resources. The fact remained that President Mesa needed to build a working relationship and synchrony with political parties to prevent them from interrupting his initiatives. Indeed, it would have been impossible for Mesa to work through the remainder of his mandate in 2007 if Congress had not been an essential protagonist in making the changes that the country was demanding. By November 2004, there were rumors of a coup d’état against President Mesa. A bombing in front of the Ministry of Defense in Sopocachi, La Paz, caused commotion and speculation on whether it was part of a plot to oust President Mesa. Most argued that the alleged coup was being crafted inside the walls of the U.S. embassy by opponents to the governments while others argued that it was part of a strategy by the MIP and MAS to destabilize the regime. As tensions resumed after the Christmas holiday, Mesa made the decision to reorganize his whole cabinet. He faced a lot of confrontation from the same mobilized sectors that pressured Sánchez de Lozada; Mesa resorted to this traditional method in an attempt to reorganize politics in the country. As table 4.6 indicates, this time some MNR militants, or those who had belonged to the party, were invited to the cabinet. This


PP

Ministry

Starting Date

End Date

Juan Siles del Valle

No party

February 3, 2005

June 2005

José Antonio Galindo Saúl Lara T.

MNR

No party No party

Erwin Aguilera

No party

February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005

June 2005

Gonzalo Arredondo Millan Luis Jemio M.

Walter Kreidler

No party

Minister of Foreign Relations Minister of the Presidency Minister of Govermment Minister of Defense Minister of Finance Minister of Sustainable Develop. Minister of Economic Develop. Minister of Public Works Minister of Hydrocarbons Minister of Education Minister of Health Minister of Labor Minister of Peasant Affairs Minister of Mining Minister of Popular Participation Minister of Health

February 3, 2005

June 2005

February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005 February 3, 2005

June 2005

February 9, 2005

June 2005

No party

René Gomez No party Garcia Guillermo MNR Torres O. M. Soledad Quiroga No party María Teresa Paz

MNR

Audalia Zurita

MNR

Victor Barrios A.

No party

Jorge Espinoza M

No party

Gloria Ardaya M.

No party

Rosario Quiroga

No party

June 2005 June 2005 June 2005 June 2005

June 2005 June 2005 June 2005 June 2005 June 2005 June 2005 June 2005


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was the third cabinet shift in an administration that had lasted less than two years. In March 2005, however, President Mesa almost forced Congress to approve a law that would grant the country 50 percent in benefits from gas extraction—18 percent royalties and 32 percent taxes to the transnational companies. Evo Morales and a group of like-minded individuals continued supporting the 50 percent (and not just 18 percent) royalties proposal. A congressional vote initially favorable to the proposal of the president provoked a campaign of mobilizations and roadblocks led by Evo Morales to force Congress to approve the law that he defended. Under these conditions, the president sent a message to the country on the night of March 6 and presented his resignation.63 Confusion prevailed the following day, during which Congress refused to accept his resignation and pacted a legislative program with the president that would include the approval of the Hydrocarbons Law, the call for the Constituent Assembly, the election of prefects, and the referendum on regional autonomies, all in 2005. As time passed, President Mesa became more dependent on Congress to push these commitments forward, but the pressure continued. In June 2005, Carlos Mesa resigned, and in an unprecedented turn of events, all succeeding authorities waived their constitutional succession at the presidency, and Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé, chief justice of the Supreme Court of Justice, took over as president. He promised to lead a government of transition with new presidential elections as the only issue in the agenda. New elections were called for December 2005. The Election of Evo Morales: A New Hegemonic Political Force in Bolivia The new president, Rodriguez Veltzé, called for early general elections to be held in December 4, 2005. This election would also include the vote for departmental prefects, a promise that had been made by Mesa. A controversy emerged again over the application of the latest (2001) National Population and Housing Census to the distribution of departmental circumscriptions. When the decision was left to Congress, no consensus could be achieved. In the interest of facilitating an early election, President Rodriguez Veltzé, by way of Supreme Decree 28429 of November 1, 2005, redistributed the seats to ensure an equitable allocation in terms of population and economic development. In the new distribution, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba both received three and two more seats respectively, whereas La Paz’ seats were reduced by two, Oruro and Potosi by one each. Considering the delays in the electoral calendar,

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the decree also changed the date of elections from December 4 to December 18, 2005. There were eight political parties participating in the elections that took place December 18, 2005. The top three contenders included Evo Morales for the MAS, Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, who abandoned his old party ADN and ran with the civic association Democratic and Social Power (Poder Democrático y Social-Podemos), and Samuel Doria Medina, who abandoned the MIR and created the party National Unity (Unidad Nacional-UN). Other contenders included Felipe Quispe for the MIP, the newcomer Michiaki Nagatani for the MNR, Gildo Angulo for the NFR, Eliseo Rodríguez for the Agricultural Patriotic Front of Bolivia (Frente Patriótico Agropecuario de Bolivia-FREPAB), and Néstor García Rojas for the Social Union of Workers of Bolivia (Unión Social de los Trabajadores de Bolivia-USTB). The general trends in political party decay and the emergence of the MAS as the new hegemonic political actor could be observed at the beginning of the campaign. The campaign was thus characterized by the following. First, there was an increase in the participation of new political groups, especially civic associations, in light of the 2004 constitutional reform that allowed indigenous movements and civic associations to contest power along with political parties. This was especially true for the election of prefects—18 different groups participated in the elections. The MAS was in a special situation since it was the only political group that remained unhurt by the events of 2003 and that managed to successfully participate in the 2004 municipal elections. Conversely, a majority of the so-called traditional parties did not run candidates with their own party nomenclatures, except for the MNR. Second, the campaign showed a greater trend toward the polarization of the political debate. The presentation of highly differentiated proposals or “visions of the country,” as it was often referred to by the media, became clear. In this sense, although the themes of the campaign were generally the same for the top three parties, their approaches were significantly different. First of all, the exploitation of petroleum reserves and natural gas deposits continued to be the key issue in the campaign. Seen as a strategy to increase foreign trade and investment, the only difference of how the issue was addressed related to the MAS proposal to completely nationalize the industry, whereas Podemos and UN proposed a negotiated resolution of the matter with the investment companies. A second theme in the debate was related to coca growth and production, and the implicit challenge to U.S. policies toward the country. Morales pledged throughout the campaign not to accept the terms of the


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U.S. government’s policy on coca eradication. Instead, he advocated for the legalization of the coca leaf and for the right of families to produce it and consume it. On the other hand, Quiroga, who had been a key implementer of the 1997–2002 administration Dignity Plan, proposed to continue an alternative development approach in which coca cultivation would be replaced by other crops. A last theme in the political debate was the Constituent Assembly, a project that all parties supported. As part of the campaign strategy, Podemos even presented a proposal for a new Constitution that included political reforms such as the runoff election, the direct election of council members, departmental autonomies, among others. Morales’s commitment to a Constituent Assembly process was also clear although no proposal was presented during the campaign. These two visions of the country remained unresolved throughout the electoral process and the Constituent Assembly later became the place to discuss and resolve them. Through the media, Morales positioned the MAS as the vehicle for marginalized and underrepresented sectors to voice their opinions. By then, the middle class and most other sectors in Bolivia were fed up with the constant mobilizations that had paralyzed the country previously. Thus, the MAS also promoted the idea that the party was the only one that, once elected, could control social mobilization. They were helped by Quiroga’s strategy of generating fear of a Morales election, since people were given the idea that if Quiroga were to become president, he would not be able to withstand the mobilizations initiated by the MAS; thus stability could be guaranteed with a Morales election. This kind of “dirty war” or personal attacks between contenders became common, as in previous electoral processes. Throughout the campaign, Morales associated Quiroga with the traditional parties and pacted democracy in Bolivia as well as with continuing the policies of previous regimes. On the other hand, Podemos depicted the MAS, including Evo Morales himself, as a group of extremist and undemocratic followers of “the Venezuelan model.” Podemos lost this “dirty war” when it was discovered that the “textile worker” who had declared in a Podemos TV spot that he was scared he would lose his job if Morales was elected was in fact just an actor and not a textile worker. The marketing strategies of the three were different. Whereas Podemos focused on securing mass media spots and announcements and also relied on an Argentinean firm for political marketing advice, Morales took advantage of his visits to indigenous localities and other mass events to get media coverage and designed a campaign with his own group, including Juan Ramon Quintana, his campaign chief and later minister of the

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presidency. By having obtained the second place in the previous election, his party received resources from the state to run the campaign. As opposed to the 2002 elections when mass media campaigning was scant, the MAS was able to run TV and radio propaganda. In the rural areas, mass media campaigning became almost irrelevant as the campaigns took on more traditional mechanisms. For this, the parties had to rely on their party structures. The MAS overpowered Podemos throughout the country, but especially in the western part and even in the agricultural colonies in Santa Cruz where the highest amount of registered voters were found. The 2005 Election Results On December 18, 2005, Bolivians turned out in massive numbers to elect the president, the vice president, 27 Senators, 130 Congress members, and 9 prefects. The main problem of the entire process was caused by the high number of people who were unable to vote because they had been purged from the voter registration rolls because they had not voted in the previous elections and had not re-registered. On election day, this matter was the permanent target of comments by the media, political groups, candidates, and the population in general. At some point, it generated confusion and certain social unrest. Some political parties interpreted the purging as an effort to reduce or hamper their victory. The MAS asserted that a large number of the purged persons belonged to lower middle-class and low-income social strata and that, therefore, the purging affected MAS’s natural voter base. This situation was mentioned by Evo Morales in his acceptance speech in which he said that instead of citizens, “it was the CNE that needed to be purged.” Regardless of this problem, on January 6, 2006, the National Electoral Court (CNE) presented the official count of the votes in the framework of a plenary session attended by four CNE members and the delegates of the political parties. Evo Morales obtained 53.7 percent of the popular vote, the absolute majority needed to avoid a vote in Congress, whereas Quiroga was 25 percentage points below Morales with 28.6 percent of the votes, below even the best ADN electoral performance in 1985 when it won 32.8 percent of the votes. Doria Medina obtained 7.8 percent and the MNR obtained 6.5 percent. The other four parties captured the remaining 3.5 percent. No poll was able to predict the great success of the MAS in the election. In most polls, Morales was nowhere near the 30 percent popularity that Quiroga enjoyed. Other analysts predicted a close election with an


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electoral difference of small percentage points. This became known as the “catastrophic tie” in the last months of the campaign. The biggest fear was the possibility that one of the formulas would not accept the results. If Morales won, most analysts predicted that he would not get the needed 50+1 percent of the popular vote and would be forced to establish an electoral alliance and governing coalition with Tuto Quiroga, his nemesis in the contest. However, that was not the case, and for the first time in Bolivian history a candidate captured more than 50 percent of the vote in the general election. This election was unprecedented for Bolivia for various reasons. For one, there was an extraordinarily high voter turnout. The CNE data shows that for these elections, there were 3,671,152 citizens eligible to vote. Of these, 3,102,417 Bolivians voted, that is, 84.508 percent of those eligible. According to the CNE, this was the highest participation in general elections since the return to democracy in 1985. The case of women is interesting too as they participated in greater numbers (86.8 percent) than men (86.1 percent), an uncommon occurrence in Latin American elections. Second, there was a clear and easily identifiable choice by the voters for one of the candidates. This choice gave the MAS the absolute majority of the votes with no need for a congressional election of the president. Third, a trend toward vote concentration was observed. Whereas the historical trend in Bolivian elections had been toward dispersion, in these elections the two candidates with the highest number of ballots accounted for 82.2 percent of the votes. Finally, the figure of the vice president also became very relevant in these elections. In almost all of the formulas, the VP figure carried a strong symbolism not seen in previous electoral processes, except for previous MNR choices. In the case of Podemos’s VP candidate, Maria René Duchen, the civic association sought to tap into her popularity as a journalist and to even demonstrate their commitment to the inclusion of one of Bolivia’s underrepresented groups—women. In the case of UN’s VP candidate, the party sought to incorporate a geographical balance. In other words, by including Carlos Dabdoub from Santa Cruz, Doria Medina attempted to secure the vote from the eastern region of the country, especially given that he was from the west. The idea was to give equal importance to the eastern and western votes. Finally, in the case of the MAS’s VP candidate, the MAS sought to guarantee a socioeconomic balance in the voting. By including Alvaro García Linera, a leftist intellectual who had started in the radical Tupac Katari Guerilla Group (Ejército Guerrillero Tupac Katari-EGTK) but later moderated his discourse, it was clear that the MAS was seeking to project its image as a

180


moderate actor and thus secure the votes of the intellectuals and the middle class of the country, both in the west and in the east. García Linera had become popular through TV programs on which he often appeared as a political analyst. Without the need to refer to Article 90 of the Constitution that requires the congressional election of the president when no candidate achieves an absolute majority, the Proclamation Act was unanimously adopted on January 20, 2006, once President Morales had returned from his famous first trip abroad as president-elect. His election to the presidency marks the first time an indigenous politician has reached the presidency in Bolivia. His victory thus marks a socioeconomic and political moment of inf lection, perhaps a continuation, or conclusion, of the uncompleted revolution of 1952. It also served as the basis for the strengthening of a new political hegemonic force in Bolivia. The 2005–2010 Congress: Dominance of the MAS As results came in, it seemed that the MAS would have a comfortable congressional majority with 72 out of 130 deputies, and 12 members of the Senate. Only four parties reached Congress this time, namely, the MAS, Podemos, UN, and the MNR, confirming that vote concentration was possible. In terms of representation in the Chamber of Deputies, the SMD reform greatly benefited the MAS, which obtained 45 uninominal seats, 23 seats more than the second party. From 2002 to 2005, the MAS managed to capture 31 more uninominal seats. No other party showed such improvement. In the case of Senate, the majority went to Podemos, which obtained 13 posts, with a Senate post each for the UN and the MNR. The success of the MAS in the Chamber of Deputies and a less successful performance in the Senate as compared to Podemos can be explained by the geographical nature of the electoral system. Although Podemos was a new nomenclature, in practice it included the most popular ADN politicians from the Amazon region, Beni and the Chiquitanía in the Santa Cruz region, who had been active in the recent electoral process. The Senate posts went to Podemos from these Amazonian provinces of Beni and Pando, former ADN strongholds, and in which the MAS was not yet strong. Moreover, Podemos managed to be second or third in all nine departments, guaranteeing the party at least one senator per department.


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While the electoral bases of the rest of the parties decreased, the results showed a significant improvement in electoral performance for the MAS. This was expected in the western departments, but it was surprising to see that it was also the case for the departments in the eastern part of the country, where competing parties had more support. In the case of the departments in the west, whereas in the 2002 election the MAS had achieved 22.5 percent of the vote in the province of La Paz, the party support base increased by 44.1 percentage points obtaining 66.6 percent of the vote in that province in 2005. In his own department, Cochabamba, Morales had obtained 37.6 percent of the vote in 2002, but in the 2005 election it reached 64.8 percent. The same can be said for Oruro and Potosí, where his support base increased from 20.2 percent to an amazing 62.6 percent and from 27 percent to 57.8 percent, respectively. In the east, the increase in the popular vote was remarkable. In the department of Tarija, his vote share went from 6.2 percent in 2002 to 31.6 percent in 2005, whereas in Chuquisaca, it increased by 37.1 percent. Although Morales was still unable to obtain the majority of the votes here, he showed similar improvements in Beni and Pando where his voting went from 3.2 percent to 16.5 percent and from 2.9 percent to 20.9 percent respectively. The most unexpected results were those in Santa Cruz, where Quiroga won over Morales only by 8.5 percent. His support increased from 10.2 percent in 2002 to 33.2 percent in the last election. After results were confirmed and Morales assumed power with ceremonial events in Tihuanaco and La Paz, the next task was composing the cabinet. There were demands from social movements and labor unions for ministerial positions. In the end, President Morales put together a cabinet made up of party militants with backgrounds in the social and union movements. They were sworn in on January 23, 2006. He governed his first year in power still with the majority of these members, except for a change in the Ministry of Mining due to an incident in Huanuni, Potosí, in which 16 people died, and another change due to the resignation, in September 2006, of Hydrocarbons Minister Andres Soliz. At the completion of his first year of government, the MAS opened the space for social movements and unions to evaluate the group of ministers. More than 400 people, including MAS leaders and militants as well as leaders of union organizations participated in this meeting. Following this consultation process, on January 24, 2007, President Morales changed seven of his ministers with militants with strong leftist backgrounds.

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The 2006 Election of Members of the Constituent Assembly The first commitment that Morales sought to comply with was the call for a Constituent Assembly process that would allow for the revamping of the political Constitution. In coordination with the opposition, Congress approved the Special Law for the Call of a Constituent Assembly through which it was established that Bolivians would elect its members on July 2, 2006. A referendum on regional autonomies was also set for the same day. The campaign made evident a relative imbalance in terms of electoral propaganda. The broadest political movements or parties had a considerable volume of electoral propaganda, both qualitatively and quantitatively, as compared to smaller and more local forces that had very limited exposure. In the western part of the country, the presence of the MAS was very evident, especially in rural areas, where the presence of political propaganda from other parties was almost inexistent. The electorate was generally uninformed, at times misinformed, about the process. The majority of the population had no real knowledge of the main issues that were being decided on election day as well as the meaning of the Constituent Assembly or the consequences of an autonomic process. Aside from the four political parties with parliamentary representation— MAS, Podemos, UN, and MNR—the following political forces obtained seats in the Constituent Assembly: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

A3MNR (an MNR division in Santa Cruz) Camino al Cambio (CC, an MNR division in Tarija) National Concertation (Concertación Nacional-CN) Autonomy for Bolivia (Autonomía para Bolivia-APB) The MIR and the MBL Social Alliance (Alianza Social-AS) AYRA Andrés Ibáñez Group (Agrupación Andrés Ibáñez-AAI) San Felipe de Austria Citizen Movement (Movimiento Ciudadano San Felipe de Austria-MCSFA) 10. Social-Patriotic Alliance (Alianza Social Patriótica-ASP) 11. The Popular Native Movement (Movimiento Originario PopularMOP) The electoral campaign for this election was done without major problems, and Bolivians voted in greater numbers than in the 2005 election. In fact, 3,138,324 citizens voted—35,907 more than the highest record of


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2005 in which 3,102,417 voted. In the end, the MAS again obtained the absolute majority. However, this time there was a greater dispersion of the national vote as compared to the December 2005 elections as there were many local political groups contesting the election. Based on the results, the new Constituent Assembly was composed. The Special Law for the Call of a Constituent Assembly established not only the nature, duration, and objectives of the Constituent Assembly but also the rules to adopt the new articles in session. Article 25 of the Special Law states that “the Constituent Assembly will approve the text of the new Constitution with two-thirds of the votes of the members present in the Assembly.” This article was very important in the sense that it forced the establishment of consensus, given that, considering the mechanisms for the distribution of assembly seats, no party achieved the two-thirds needed to approve matters in the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly faced many problems since its inception. Along with the issue of deciding where to place the capital of the country, or how regional autonomies will be integrated into the Constitution, the most difficult challenge was agreeing on the procedure to approve articles of the new Constitution. The MAS, in alliance with other smaller parties, controlled about 155 votes. With support from other groups, it could reach the two-thirds majority needed to approve proposals. Moreover, opposition groups, including Podemos, UN, and the MNR, interpreted Article 25 of the Special Law as suggesting that not only the whole text of the Constitution but also every article must be approved with a two-thirds majority. After weeks of this issue remaining unresolved, the MAS proposed that only the final document should require a two-thirds majority and that all other decisions should be taken by simple majority. A September 2006 vote on this proposal by the MAS was invalidated when opposition members left the chamber. The discussions stalled because of strong opposition to the MAS proposals to redistribute property and wealth and to incorporate the indefinite election of the president, as was proposed in Venezuela. The year 2007 passed and the Constituent Assembly was not able to initiate the more important discussion on the contents of the new Constitution. In November 2007, in an unorthodox turn of events, Morales’s followers decided to vote on a constitutional draft at a meeting that excluded the opposition. As a result, marches and demonstrations took place in which three people died. On December 9, 2007, in Oruro, the draft document was approved in another 16-hour marathon ad hoc session of 164 members out of the 255

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and of 10 out of the 16 political groups that composed the Constituent Assembly. The opposition did not participate in the session on the grounds that the document was illegal and ignored the legal requirement that called for a two-thirds majority of the Constituent Assembly votes in favor. The 411 clauses of the new Constitution include provisions that recognize even more the rights of indigenous Bolivians and it further recognizes more than 30 official languages. It incorporates, among other things, provisions for both regional as well as indigenous community autonomies. Controversy continued in Bolivia as the leaders of four of the six departments questioned the draft Constitution to be approved in a referendum and threatened with a plan to declare regional autonomy. President Morales responded to this opposition by calling on a recall referendum on his own tenure and those of the departmental prefects. The debate on the content of the draft Constitution continued since it seems that far from “refounding” Bolivia, as President Morales proposed during his campaign, the constitutional reforms seemed to have exacerbated the political confrontation that divided the country and forced the resignation of two presidents since 2003. General Reflections Analyzing coalitional politics since 1985, it is obvious that political pacts were slowly degraded and became less programmatic and more oriented toward the distribution of positional payoffs to sustain weak government plans. Whereas at the beginning of Bolivia’s democracy pacts were key to the sustainability of those who governed and their parties, the governing powers were discredited as a result of “pacts of governance” between elite members seeking to satisfy only their personal and party interests. As former president Quiroga recently stated, “the model of alliances has been exhausted because it was only used to distribute spaces for power,” instead of being used as “an instrument that responds to the people.”64 The Bolivian case until the late 1990s showed that multipartism could effectively work with presidential systems to bring democratic stability. Although Bolivia’s hybrid presidentialism with a mixed system for the election of the legislature had the effect of creating ideological polarization and system fragmentation, and thus executive-legislative deadlock, Bolivian political leaders throughout most of the country’s democratic history were able to form effective coalitions and coalition governments. Similarly, the hybrid presidential system and the greater opening of the system to new actors through electoral reforms such as the 1997 SMD


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election also had a countereffect in the sense that they opened spaces for social groups to enter into Congress and to challenge the government both from the parliament and from the streets. Thus, Bolivia’s electoral system has important political consequences. By 2000, the Bolivian electoral system was one that allowed a high level of representation of minority interests in Congress, but this time it threatened the stability of the government. Starting in the late 1990s, by providing spaces for participation without concrete benefits to people, political leaders failed to manage system fragmentation and democratic instability. The concerns of the political parties were remote from the concerns of the masses, who suffered the effects of the economic measures adopted in the previous twenty years but who, at the same time, also benefited from the creation of spaces to contest political power. The analysis suggests that the problem of representativeness, which has been a major source of tension since 2000, cannot be addressed only through electoral engineering. This representation deficit requires an integral treatment that would include the renovation and internal democratization of the political parties, the promotion of a democratic political culture, the strengthening of legislative functions, and the promotion of effective economic growth, especially in terms of concrete benefits to the masses. Political parties have been unsuccessful in fulfilling their functions of creating political identities, representing social plurality, seeking individual interest aggregation, and defining and managing a political agenda. They have not been capable of turning the votes garnered in elections into stable broad-based coalitions, including social coalitions, to support or oppose important policies. Nor have they been successful in performing a programmatic function, that is, in generating policy agendas for governments to put into practice after elections. The analysis suggests that nowadays, for pacts to have an impact, they need to bring back that which is programmatic, that is, to reinvent or create new public policies that bring tangible benefits to citizens. Political leaders need to connect these agreements to the streets, perhaps by creating spaces for dialogue and public deliberation of key public policies between government and civil society and making the decision making inclusive of these sectors. The 2003 experience showed that in Bolivia, pacted democracy is not enough. Political parties and political leaders failed to see that parliamentary majorities are not enough to deal with the real problems at hand. Guaranteeing democracy governance goes beyond avoiding a deadlock

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and executive-legislative immobilism. The 2002 and, more clearly, the 2005 results show an increased political dominance on the part of the MAS. Morales narrowly missed a victory in the 2002 presidential elections by 42,000 votes. However, it is obvious that this does not resolve the longstanding issues dividing the country’s disparate populations along ethnic, economic, and political lines. In sum, the fundamental problem in Bolivia today is the disconnection between a civil society that has exerted power on the streets and has questioned the political system, and a political class that does not prioritize the agenda demanded by the society that they claim to represent. In the 2003 conf lict, the MAS deliberately left the parliament as the secondary space to engage, and it did that because its roots were in the union and not in a party structure. As power has shifted to the streets, power has also shifted toward the MAS. The essential challenge for this new hegemonic political force remains how to give an institutional form to the street demands and reform the institutionality that gives them form. President Morales faces a difficult but fascinating scenario.

CHAPTER 5

EXPLAINING EVO MORALES’S RISE TO POWER: THE UNINTENDED [OR INTENDED?] POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS

A

lthough the socioeconomic climate in the country was starting to deteriorate by 1997, important reforms to further representation mechanisms were yet to be implemented in Bolivia. The establishment of the mixed-member electoral system for the election of the members of the Chamber of Deputies was seen as a major effort to connect citizens with their representatives. As a result of a long process of electoral reforms, there were more plurality and local interests represented in Congress, but there was also a greater dependence on positional and pork-and-barrel payoffs to sustain coalitions. The creation of new opportunities within the political sphere through various electoral reforms helps explain the emergence of Evo Morales as the new predominant leader. Although President Morales was expected to receive a majority of the votes, no analyst was able to predict that he would do it with over 50 percent of the votes—a historic majority. Besides producing the first indigenous president in the country and in the Americas, his election has important implications for the country as well as for the region in a comparative perspective. The Political Consequences of Electoral Systems The Bolivian electoral system has important political consequences. For the last 20 years, it effectively dealt with the challenge of guaranteeing

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representation without threatening the stability of the government. The electoral system certainly facilitated the emergence of more than 400 parties in 20 years, but political leaders managed system fragmentation and democratic instability through coalition building. In the context of Bolivian politics, the arguments for majoritarian systems (two-party systems) and against PR and Mixed systems (multipartism) do not stand. In other words, the Bolivian case shows that multipartism can effectively work with presidential systems to bring democratic stability. In terms of coalition building, the country’s political history shows that although the Bolivia’s mixed system for legislative elections and its executive formula favor multipartism, these electoral systems do not necessarily engender executive-legislative confrontation in Bolivia. Indeed, the aforementioned electoral arrangements may not create executive-legislative confrontation because in promoting political representation, they have increased the likelihood of coalition formation and government efficiency. This is so because the Bolivian electoral system was capable of ameliorating system fragmentation and ideological polarization among the political class, especially from 1985 through 2002. However, events since 2000 suggest that political institutions are not ameliorating system fragmentation and ideological polarization in the streets, beyond the political class. The electoral system also produced an environment conducive to the exercise of politics outside of democratic institutions, and to the emergence of political forces such as the MAS that effectively practice politics within the institutions of democracy and at its base—the people. The Bolivian electoral system inf luenced the performance of Congress, as the legitimate actor in charge of channeling citizen demands, and that of the president. It also had effects on the political system as a whole, that is, on the way politics is done. With regards to the effects of the electoral system on the performance of Congress and the president, the following consequences of the Bolivian electoral system can be identified. Effect No. 1: Subordination of Congress to the President Electoral systems that foster multipartism produce the need for government coalitions. By doing this, they can also produce, in fact, a weakening of parliamentary activity and a subordination of the assembly to the executive and to the government coalition.

Pacted democracy in Bolivia had as a consequence the subordination of the legislature to the executive. Except for the 2005 election, since 1979, all presidents have been elected by Congress. The result was that

E X P L A I N I N G M O R A L E S ’ S R I S E T O P OW E R

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Congress never achieved the expected level of preeminence, and the system was generally executive-led. The legislative branch became the center of consensus and political negotiation, but at the same time, the legislative power became completely incapable of exerting its functions of representation, oversight, and legislation (Calderon 2002: 113). Bolivian political leaders assert that the checks and balances mechanisms between these two branches worked in Bolivia “from August 3rd when the parliamentarians are given their credentials, are sworn in as parliamentarians, and the congressional session is installed, until August 6 at 5pm when the president is elected by Congress. The moment the president starts his mandate, the legislative control functions end.”1 The analysis shows that in every administration from 1985 to 2003, the president generally decided the government agenda and how to carry it out. Indeed, it is only in such a subordination framework of the legislature to the president, that the Bolivian recent experience, with political conf lict starting in 2000, can be understood. Thus, the study concludes that an effect of the electoral system and coalitional politics in general is that government and policy decisions tend to be executive-led. Congress did not play a major legislative or debating function but joined the agenda agreed through the government coalition. There was always, however, a part of Congress that usually exerted great independence of the executive—the opposition. Throughout democratic history, every coalition had a congressional opposition with varying degrees of strength. The strength of the congressional opposition varied with the choice of electoral systems. The more inclusive the system, the greater the opportunities for the entrance of political parties and the greater the opposition exerted in Congress. Effect No. 2: Duality in the Origin of Congressional Powers The control function of Congress is affected by the fact that many of the decision-making processes and discussions on important issues usually take place outside of Congress, particularly during meetings between the leaders of the parties of the government coalition who actually are not members of Congress.

This analysis of the interaction of presidents and congresses in Bolivia demonstrates that the design and implementation of the most important laws in the country—the NPE, popular participation, privatization and capitalization laws, the water law, and more recently, the constitutional reform—did not involve the parliamentarians, who were supposed to

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represent the interests of the citizens. Instead, these leaders only followed instructions their party chiefs gave on how to vote in Congress. The electoral system was instrumental in furthering this great disconnect between Congress and the party leadership by not allowing the national party leaders (usually presidential candidates), who received relative electoral support in Congress, into Congress. A situation where the political party leader was not accountable to the electorate and instructed parliamentarians to support and act on agreements that were made outside of Congress had pernicious effects for the Bolivian political system. Effect No. 3: Duality of Worlds—Parliamentarism in Congress and in the Streets The electoral systems and various reforms of the Bolivian political system have had a dual effect on the formal institutions and on the informal sectors. The reforms gave marginalized actors an opportunity to occupy political spaces. Also, a situation where political action is taken both in Congress and in the streets was exacerbated.

Laurence Whitehead (2001) underscored the importance of taking into consideration two traditions in Bolivian political history when it comes to interpreting the democratization process in that country: the “constitutionalist” tradition and the “mobilization” tradition. In a similar line of analysis, this present study recognizes that there has generally been a duality of political worlds in this country. Political pressure has been exerted both from the institution of Congress, following the “constitutionalist” tradition, in Whitehead’s terms, as well as from the streets, following the “mobilization” tradition. In many cases, instead of functioning as a pendulum, as suggested by the author, the study shows that in many instances these two traditions have simultaneously existed. Effect No. 4: Neutralization of the Opposition and the Oversight Role of the Congress by the Congressional Majority An instinctive reaction to the formation of a strong parliamentary majority through coalitions was always for the opposition to become radicalized in order to balance the system.

The strength of the congressional majority usually tended to neutralize effective legislative decision making in the sense that most decisions on particular issues have been taken by the governing coalition. The study


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does not find the use of congressional majority as a feature that is necessarily negative. On the contrary, this feature has served to guarantee government efficiency and ultimately democratic governance. Moreover, parliamentarians voting with congressional majority usually represent (at least in theory) more than 60 to 70 percent of the popular vote. The political class failed because it completely distanced the opposition and social sectors from a serious dialogue on the legislation and policies under discussion, especially those that directly affected the well-being of the population, such as the water law and the Hydrocarbons Law. This produced a situation in which congressional opposition, to balance the force of the government coalition, engaged in a battle to control, interpellate, and sometimes censure government actions. The Electoral System: Explaining Bolivia Today and Evo Morales’s Rise to Power The electoral system had important effects on the political system as a whole. The following political effects of the electoral system can be identified. Effect No. 1: Regionalization of Politics The electoral system encouraged the regionalization of party representation that benefited both major and minor parties with local and regional strongholds.

The electoral system, especially the inclusion of the single-member district system for the election of 68 deputies of the lower chamber benefited smaller parties with regional strength. Minor local parties such as the New Republican Force (NFR) and the Front of the Revolutionary Left (FRI) have also been able to take part in alliances with major parties because of their inf luence in single-seat districts (Mayorga 2001: 434). By promoting the regionalization of party representation, the electoral system also strengthened the representation of corporate and ethnic interests, especially in the case of the Quechua peasants of the Chapare. The system greatly favored the formation and strengthening of the MAS party. The ability of Morales to get elected in Cochabamba as a uninominal deputy represented the first move toward political dominance of the party. It was facilitated through the reform. Morales’s inf luence in the western part of the country and in the regionalization of the MAS vote helped him get elected in 2005 and will further guarantee the party’s prominence in the future.

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The regionalization of votes also had an effect on the composition of Congress. Because the concentration of parties and the distribution of seats according to votes varied throughout the country, there have always been minor but crucial differences between the popular vote and the votes assigned to parties in Congress. In 1985, for instance, although the ADN had won the popular vote over the MNR, the MNR obtained two more deputies and six more senators than the ADN. In this particular case, the ADN won the popular vote but its voting was concentrated in two departments, whereas the MNR won in more departments. The case of the additional Senate post won by Podemos as opposed to the MAS, the party that won the popular vote, in 2005 can also be explained by the regional nature of the electoral system. Effect No. 2: Important Changes to the Party System The reforms to the electoral system have helped reduce the number of parties, as well as the unproportionality of previous electoral systems. The MNR, MIR, and the ADN monopolized votes for most of the first 20 years of Bolivian democracy, but the party system as we know it was completely overhauled. Although it remains to be seen, there is a strong possibility that Bolivia will consolidate a dominant one-party system headed by the MAS.

The electoral system has not had a dramatic effect on the interparty dimension since its PR nature has been maintained (only formulas have been modified). The D’Hondt formula and the legal threshold of 3 percent have brought about the disappearance of three very small parties (CONDEPA, UCS, MBL), while it has weakened the representation of a majority party, the ADN. This decline can be attributed not just to the electoral system but to a combination of factors, including past performance while in government and the absence of legitimate leadership. However, reforms such as the SMD system helped spearhead the development of parties such as the MAS. Effect No. 3: Stronger Personalization of Politics The most recent electoral reforms have sought to link the constituent with the representative. Specifically in the circumscriptions with uninominal candidates, the force of the party was combined with the personalization of the vote.

By abolishing the closed party lists for more than a half of the Chamber of Deputies, the mixed-member proportional system helped create direct linkages between parties, constituencies, and legislators.


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There were still degrees of disconnection between representatives and constituencies in the 1997–2002 period, but the reform ultimately strengthened their interaction. The 2004 reform promised to do the same. Votes were cast in support of the party but ultimately it was the appeal of the candidate to the constituents in her/his circumscription that determined the voter’s preference. That was the case in the Chapare, where Morales set the highest voting record for any parliamentarian in Bolivia. Effect No. 4: The Split Vote The split vote enhanced the choices of voters. The possibility of vote-splitting by giving two votes to voters was considered as an adequate mechanism to broaden the choices offered to electors.

As electors themselves indicated, with the reform they now could both “vote and elect.” This was not uniform throughout the country, but two examples where this occurred the first time the system was used are those of circumscription No. 10 in La Paz where Banzer’s success was similar to the MBL’s Juan del Granado, and circumscription No. 8 where Banzer’s success was equivalent to the MNR’s Guido Capra (Romero Ballivián 2003a: 44). Other examples include those of circumscription No. 51 where UCS’s Ivo Kuljis had almost equal voting as ADN’s Stelzer, No. 52 where Banzer had as much as MIR’s Añez, and circumscription No. 54 where Kuljis had as much as MIR’s Añez. Effect No. 5. Municipalization of the Legislature Legislative politics became “municipalized.” The most distinctive effect of the SMD system was the municipalization of legislative politics as uninominal deputies ran campaigns similar to (local) mayoral campaigns.

In running uninominal campaigns, however, the experience of legislators shows that there was confusion regarding the parliamentary role of uninominal deputies. Thus, with the reform, a trend toward locality-centered politics was strengthened at the expense of national politics. Most uninominal deputies have had “identity crises” as they did not clearly understand their role and responsibility toward their constituents. Effect No. 6: Patronage and Political Pacts Patronage became the privileged way to seal political pacts. In Bolivia, coalitional politics rested not only on an ideological or programmatic basis but also, and mainly, on patronage.

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The primary political motivation to forge and maintain coalitions has been office seeking and patronage-based distribution of power resources rather than policy-seeking motivations. Political parties have attributed their survival and strengthening to the control over the state apparatus they have been able to exercise (Mayorga 2001: 442–443). However, through such a control, the opportunities for corruption have increased, and parties have distanced themselves from engaging with societal sectors to address their demands and needs. Effect No. 7: Representativeness versus Efficiency The electoral system reconciled the dilemma between representativeness and government efficiency. The personalized proportional representation system attempted to enhance the representativeness of the system. At the same time, the election of a large share of the legislature through singlemember (or small) districts by plurality fostered a stronger link between representatives and voters. The system to elect senators and plurinominal deputies guarantees a two- or three-party majority. The combined elements meant a reconciliation of the two goals.

In terms of the dilemma between representativeness and government efficiency, the project contends that the challenge should not be about choosing efficiency over representativeness, or representativeness over efficiency, but about finding a reasonable and efficient equilibrium between the two goals. Whereas a high degree of representation could hamper the ability of a government to implement its plans, a relatively smaller degree of representativeness would generally (although not always) allow for an easier execution of a government plan, regardless of how severe it is and regardless of the negative weight that it represents for society. Such was the case of the Paz Estenssoro administration (1985–1989) and its antiinf lationary plan. However, representativeness without efficiency would bring about crises of governance (as in the case of the UDP government). Finally, pure government efficiency without representativeness would make governments illegitimate and would create conditions for political crises (Banzer-Quiroga 2000; Sánchez de Lozada 2002). Latin American electoral systems for the lower house tend to serve the function of representativeness to the detriment of effectiveness and participation. In Bolivia, for the Senate, citizens elect senators by plurality with a representative of the minority. It favors more efficiency with a low degree of representativeness. The election of the members of the lower chamber reconciles this gap of representativeness by incorporating uninominal deputies. A comparison of these reforms suggests that more representation usually meant less


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government efficiency but not for the expected reasons. The limited government efficiency and political instability in this country were due to the decay of the model of pacted democracy and due to the ability of marginalized sectors to occupy spaces not only in formal political institutions but also in the streets. In Bolivia, as opposed to what the argument suggests, the periods in which efficiency was privileged over representativeness brought unmanageable political crises, such as the Water War and the Gas War. Table 5.1 summarizes the reforms that have taken place in Bolivia and how they have favored representation or efficiency. Effect No. 8: Duality of Coalitions—Congressional Coalitions and Ministerial Coalitions One of the most important points of analysis emerging from this study relates to the practicality in Bolivia of not only forging coalitions in the legislature, a common practice of both parliamentary and presidential democracies, but also doing so at the executive level.

Following similar practices of parliamentary democracies, Bolivian presidents have incorporated members of the coalition partner into the cabinet. In many cases, the party composition of the governing coalition Table 5.1 Electoral Reforms in Bolivia, 1986–2004 1986 1991

1994

2004

Seat allocation formula changed from D’ Hondt to double quotient Seat allocation formula changed from double quotient to Saint-Lägue divisor system (the double quotient requires that parties receive at least one quota (total valid votes/seats contested) before they can receive any seats through remainders. Changed system from proportional representation list to personalized proportional representation (about half of deputies elected through plurality in single member districts); plurality vote separate from vote for president, vice president and senate; threshold of three percent introduced at the national level. Opened the electoral scenario for indigenous movements and civic groups to launch candidates.

Representation − Efficiency: + Representation + Efficiency −

Representation + Efficiency −

Representation + Efficiency −

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usually ref lected the party composition of the cabinet in almost proportional ways. This attempts to shed some light on the question posed by scholars such as Amorin Neto (2002: 48–78) who assert that cabinets with proportional correspondence between cabinet shares and the coalition parties’ legislative weights can generally be considered a coalition executive. Coalition Building and Hegemonic Political Parties A basic ref lection on the analysis suggests that the Bolivian system gave the political class institutional incentives to forge and maintain functioning coalitions. The fact that the winning party does not have an absolute majority in Congress seems to be an incentive powerful enough to make the president negotiate with other parties. This is, of course, a structural factor that works as an incentive both in presidential and parliamentary systems. The Bolivian political system functioned in such a way so as to sustain democratic stability. Bolivian leaders have had to rely on coalitions in order to govern and maintain democratic stability. As a result and as Gamarra (1997: 392) asserts, the recurrent need to form coalitions paradoxically became both the strength and the weakness of the system. Coalitions allowed executives to manage congressional opposition so that national policies could be moved forward. Various factors that favor and undermine coalition building can be identified. On one hand, four factors have facilitated coalition building in Bolivia from 1985 to 2003: Article 90 in the constitutional structure that provides for the congressional election of the president, the formulas that translate popular votes into congressional seats, the emergence of an implicit consensus on the economic and political models for the nation, and finally, the access to positional payoffs and state patronage to secure congressional support. On the other hand, the duality of opposition in the streets and in Congress, the use of the parliament as an instrument of sectors to push particular political agendas, and the inability of the political class to provide viable solutions to the economic situation have undermined pacted democracy in Bolivia. Facilitating Factors ●

Article 90 of the CPE. Article 90 of the Bolivian Constitution requires the president to be elected by Congress in case no presidential candidate achieves an absolute majority. This selection is done


●

●

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by a Congress elected in the same elections by constituents with a corrective mixed electoral system combining both majoritarian and proportional representation features. The corrective nature of the mixed system for legislative seats favors the representation of a wide variety of interests while also promoting the proliferation of minority parties with the aim of contesting power. With this mixed system that is corrective of the f laws of the majoritarian aspect of the electoral system, Bolivia has had throughout its history more than 400 different political parties. However, the election of the president via the legislature in Bolivia forced an interdependent and cooperative presidential-legislative relationship. Although it made the congressional opposition, but harsh, somewhat ineffective, Congress and presidents have managed to maintain functioning relations. It has historically been imperative and feasible for Bolivian political leaders to form coalitions in order to be selected as president, to obtain executive power, and to govern. The Composition of Congress. The Mixed PR and Majoritarian Electoral System for the Translation of Votes into Seats. Under the Saint-Lägue formula, and even under the D’Hondt formula, and given the magnitude of the plurinominal districts, the proportional representation system facilitated the survival of minority parties, but this tendency toward fragmentation was offset by the centripetal logic inherent in Article 90 of the Constitution that advanced a process of party concentration with effective presence and parliamentary inf luence and a process of pacts of minor parties with major ones. The electoral system reasonably resolved the dilemma between representativeness and governance—two aspects that a democratic regime must reconcile. In other words, it allowed the efficient translation of votes into seats that guarantee a wide representation of interests, and at the same time, it made possible the building of parliamentary majorities that could guarantee government action. The Existence of an Implicit Consensus on the Economic and Political Models and the Move away from Ideologies. Starting in 1985, there has been a progressive ideological convergence and a move by all parties toward the center of the political spectrum. There was no strong discussion of the government agenda because of the implicit consensus that existed amongst the political parties on the need for neoliberal reforms and on the need to further the democratization process in the country. The consensus on basic issues—namely, monetary policy, economic liberalization, democratization, and the opening of

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the system to indigenous communities and other marginalized groups—has consolidated over the years since 1985. An important characteristic of the democratic process of the years under study in this project is that the incumbent government never won an election and the opposition always won. However, they all maintained fiscal and economic discipline and the logic of agreements. The support for the 1985 economic measures to halt hyperinf lation ref lected not just a political accord on the need to take action, but a broader social consensus forged by the way in which the trauma of economic instability had affected all sectors of the population. As parties entered government coalitions, their ideological identity tended to take a backseat because of the acceptance of the economic model and the attractions of state patronage.2 ●

Access to positional payoffs and state patronage to secure congressional support. The UNDP Human Development Index for Bolivia (2002: 110) asserts that political parties have always depended more on the state for their resources than the class groups or interest groups that sustain them, or worse, on people in general. In fact, the dependence has been so great that in a way, parties have been extensions of the state and thus a political society that is linked to the state has existed, just as the other sectors are linked to the economy or the civil society.

The analysis suggests that presidents have increasingly depended on cabinet formation and the distribution of posts within the state apparatus to secure congressional support; however, this tendency to distribute positional payoffs was determined by the strength of the political party and the increasing inability of the government sector to control opposition both in Congress and in the streets. Figures 5.1 through 5.8 graphically present the percentages of political parties occupying ministries in each administration from 1985 to the present. The figures show that the distribution of cabinet posts varied depending on two factors: 1. The strength of the party vis-à-vis its structure and clientelistic traditions and commitments 2. The impact of the electoral system and the erosion of pacted democracy on the fragmentation of the political system The analysis shows that the greater the fragmentation, the more dependent presidents became on coalition partners and on patronage to secure


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0%

ADN MNR

100%

Figure 5.1 Party Representation in Paz Estenssoro’s Cabinet, 1985–1989

45.45% 54.54%

MIR ADN

Party Representation in Paz Zamora's Cabinet, 1989-1993

Figure 5.2

Party Representation in Paz Zamora’s Cabinet, 1989–1993

continued support. Figures 5.1 to 5.8, seen together, reveal how cabinet distribution varied throughout time and as coalitions evolved. The changes in percentages are clearly observed. The MNR, a party with a strong infrastructure of prebendalism, generally monopolized the distribution of posts to the party, thus limiting the participation of coalition partners in government positions. This was especially the case in 1985 and 1993. In 2002, however, as the MNR was unable to control opposition demonstrated in the streets, the party became more dependent on legislative support and decided to cede more positions of power to coalition partners. The MIR and ADN, the only other parties that reached government before 2005, however, have generally divided all

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2.43% 2.43%

MNR UCS 95.12%

MBL

Party Representation in S.de Lozada's Cabinet, 1993-1997

Figure 5.3 Party Representation in Sanchez de Lozada’s Cabinet, 1993–1997

2.12% 2.12% ADN 12.76%

MIR UCS

19.14% NFR 63.82% CONDEPA

Party Representation in Banzer's Cabinet, 1997-2001

Figure 5.4

Party Representation in Banzer’s Cabinet, 1997–2001

government positions with coalition partners, sometimes in an almost symmetrical way. This is the case of the AP (1989–1993) and more intensively in the 1997–2002 period when Bolivia had the most heterogeneous government coalition (five parties). In the 2002–2003 period, however, Sánchez de Lozada was not able to hold cabinet power for the MNR and had to divide it between the MIR and the NFR. Another pattern that can be


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11.11% ADN MIR

22.22% 81%

66.66%

UCS

Party Representation in Quiroga's Cabinet, 2001-2002

Figure 5.5 Party Representation in Quiroga’s Cabinet, 2001–2002

MNR 26.66% MIR 13.33%

60%

NFR

Party Representation in S.de Lozada's Cabinet, 2002-2005

Figure 5.6 2002–2005

Party Representation in Sanchez de Lozada’s Cabinet,

observed is that in 1985 when Paz Estenssoro was president, there was an extreme hegemony of cabinet posts by the governing party. The other similar case was that of the 2003–2005 period when Mesa formed a cabinet completely dominated by his group of nonideological independents. The progression in 2005, as compared to the fragmented scenario of the 1990s, shows a near return to a hegemonic political force—that of President Morales. Morales’s cabinets have been formed only with party

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9.21% 3.70%

MNR AND 87.09%

Independents

Party Representation in Mesa's Cabinet, 2002-2005

Figure 5.7

Party Representation in Mesa’s Cabinet, 2003–2005

0%

MAS Others

100%

Figure 5.8 Party Representation in Evo Morales’s Cabinet, 2005–Present

militants or representatives from sectors supportive of the MAS. It is expected that in every cabinet shift—which usually takes place in the anniversary of his presidency ( January)—President Morales will continue to appoint MAS militants. Indeed, the pendulum of hegemony went from the MNR to the MAS. The study demonstrates that postelectoral alliances in a democracy of relative majorities had, as an intrinsic consequence, the use of


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political quotas and the distribution of state entities amongst the member parties. Undermining Factors A series of factors have undermined coalition building and, ultimately, pacted democracy in Bolivia. Three factors are identified below. ●

●

●

Duality of opposition: Politics in the streets and in the Parliament: The eruption of social movements and political parties with radical proposals and a double strategy not only within the system but also outside of it confirmed the problem of double political legitimacy in Bolivia. Two understandings of political representation have begun to coexist: (1) that which is sustained in the citizenship and individual political rights of a representative democracy and (2) the corporativist logic that is part of Bolivian tradition that promotes the defense of sectoral interests. This was produced by the crisis of representativeness that the country has been going through over the past few years. In other words, neither individuals nor sectors saw their demands addressed by the political class, and so the search for new alternatives to voice these demands began. This duality in opposition allowed the MAS to secure a support base in the rural areas, in urban streets and neighborhoods, as well as in the union and social movements while also being in parliament. By effectively dominating these dual spheres, the MAS achieved control of most of political activity in the country, including the presidency. Congress as an political instrument: Moreover, some sectors have found parliament to be an instrument to push their political agendas. As that has not worked, they have resorted to pushing their agenda through force. Pressuring the government through roadblocks, protests, and marches became common in Bolivia. Alongside this, the same groups use the parliament too to exert pressure and demand legislation that is favorable to their views. The best example are the hydrocarbons law that provoked the Gas War in 2003, the tense relationship of the president with Congress in 2004, and his resignation in 2005. All political parties have pushed for their positions, but parties such as the MAS and associated groups have radicalized their proposals in Congress and in the streets. Inability of governing coalitions to deliver tangible benefits to society: Finally, the inability of the political class to resolve the economic

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situation put a heavy toll on the perceived usefulness of coalitional politics. The political crisis is connected to the economic crisis. Calderon (2002: 45) states that the effects of the economic crisis, exclusion factors, and the political management of the economy increased the levels of institutional trust and decreased the political credibility in Bolivia, thereby increasing the intensity of social protests. Bolivia in Comparative Perspective: The Andean Region In Latin America, governments have used electoral mechanisms in different ways to guarantee democratic stability. Most of them have been unsuccessful as crises of governance continue to occur throughout the hemisphere. Indeed, a commonality between all Latin America countries, especially those in the Andean region, is the political crisis they have faced with varying degrees. By 2003, Bolivia joined the Andean nations in this state of political crisis. The near elimination of the traditional political parties is another common and most visible element, which is accompanied by the emergence of political informality and other forms of neocorporativism. With the 2006 election of Hugo Chavez as president of Venezuela for another six years, Latin America closed an unprecedented and intense electoral cycle, marked by relatively free and fair elections and with results that were accepted by all candidates, winners and losers, as well as international observers. Eighteen presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005–2006 configured a new political map in the region, and what some analysts are calling the “Latin American new left.” Except for the close and indeed controversial election of the PAN candidate in Mexico, Felipe Calderon, and the clear reelection of President Uribe in Colombia, whose government faces serious charges of alleged ties to the paramilitaries, the right in Latin America does not seem to be the viable option in the region for now. The emergence of new figures such as Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, even Inacio Lula da Silva in Brasil, the reelection of President Chavez, the emergence of the MAS as the new hegemonic political force in Bolivia, and the election of President Morales, all can be understood in light of the discredit and decay of the neoliberal model and the crisis of traditional political parties that were unable to offer viable solutions to people. This “turn to the left” that is now occurring in Latin America, far from being homogeneous, is plural and diverse and forces a particular effort to understand its nuances and specificities. In the case of Bolivia,


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Evo Morales reached power with over 50 percent of the votes following the political tendencies critical of economic liberalism, against the institutions of representative democracy, and amidst the discrediting of the governing or “traditional” parties. Emulating his counterpart in Venezuela, Morales also favors the celebration of recall referendums to relegitimate his position as president. His electoral base, as that of other Andean leaders, was strengthened in July 2006 when Bolivians elected Constituent Assembly members, and the MAS once again obtained an absolute majority of the votes. As other Latin American nations have recently done, Bolivia underwent a process to draft a new Constitution. The Constituent Assembly Process President Morales faces great challenges to move the country toward greater development, economic growth, and tangible benefits to his followers. Previous electoral reforms and the MAS’s ability to strengthen its presence throughout the territory have left an impoverished but politically empowered indigenous population. Moreover, organized indigenous and social movements have a great capacity to pressure him and can easily mobilize masses against him. Pressure comes also from the people of Bolivia to benefit from the exploitation of the natural gas reserves. Balancing between a domestic demand for the nationalization of the gas sector and the international demand to satisfy international investors continues to be difficult. This is complicated by the demands of the eastern and wealthier part of the country for regional autonomy, and the need to use the results of the Constituent Assembly process to generate a more unified vision of a country. The Constituent Assembly was the ideal space for President Morales to further the reforms needed to restructure from the grassroots level the whole Bolivian political structure. Given the plethora of unresolved differences evidenced by the polarization of the 2005 campaign, it was also a space for confrontation, struggle between powers, stalemate, and social conf lict. At the same time, it was also an ideal place to amend the elements of the system that were not so efficient before. As various electoral processes filled the political agenda in Bolivia in 2008, the need for consensus building to obtain support for the new “social pact” became a priority for President Morales. The Unintended Consequences of Electoral Laws Political events throughout history have generally inf luenced institution building in Bolivia, as the case of the 1952 Revolution and the major

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reforms of the 1990s reveal. However, reforms did not typically provide tangible benefits to the population, paving the way for the events of 2000 and 2003. The lack of concrete results in the socioeconomic sphere, a better articulation of constituent-representative ties, and a growing dependence on positional payoffs to guarantee working executive-legislative relations became the characteristics of the pacted democracy model in existence in Bolivia since 1985. The electoral system served as a mechanism to ameliorate the situation and, more recently, to exacerbate it. Two basic unintended consequences of electoral reforms in Bolivia are identified through this study: 1. By guaranteeing more representation, the electoral system created spaces for nontraditional forces to emerge and challenge democratic constitutionality, and for the MAS to emerge as the new hegemonic political actor 2. The “difficult combination” between presidentialism and multipartism was ameliorated, arguably unintentionally

1. An unintended consequence of electoral reforms that progressively attempted to guarantee representativeness was the emergence of powerful forces questioning the political system. A possible explanation for this is that the reforms attempted to strengthen the representative capability of the political system while preserving the patrimonial privileges of political society. One of the central problems facing Bolivian political society was that of strengthening reforms that challenge the system of “trading favors” that traditionally existed in Bolivian politics. This system of patronage-based relationships blocked both party representation and the exercise of democratic citizenship—in other words, political modernization (Calderon 2002: 7). Finally, by guaranteeing more representation, it created spaces for new political forces to emerge and challenge the status quo. The MAS is the case in point that permeates all political structures. While it appears highly unlikely that democracy will collapse, the rules of the political game have changed and the MAS is consolidating broad support among people. Surveys indicate that Evo Morales enjoyed high levels of popularity among people in 2007.3 2. Government coalitions that are promoted by the system of congressional election of the president resolved one of the typical problems


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of presidential systems in Latin America: the presence of a minority government that is blocked in its capacity to govern (Barreda and Costafreda 2004: 169). The electoral system also contributed to the strengthening of a government system of hybrid presidentialism, which facilitated a sustained policy of pacts and interparty coalitions and in this sense guaranteed one of the essential conditions for democratic governance. Government capacity, in other words, being able to make decisions and implement them is intimately connected to the formation of majority governments that would have been impossible in Bolivia without the electoral pacts formed to elect the president. In this sense, the electoral system gave a strong stimulus to parties that did not obtain majority support from the voters to participate in coalition governments. The academic debate concerning executive-assembly relations in Latin America has focused mainly on the issue of the distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism (Mainwaring 1990, Linz and Valenzuela: 1994; Lijphart 1994). However, there is a gap in the literature on the institutional configuration of executive-assembly relations as an important variable affecting the prospects for democratic longevity. This study calls for more theoretical and empirical work on executive-legislative bargaining models in order to understand how institutional reforms can have an impact on the incentives that presidents and legislators have in forming coherent coalitions. Similarly, further studies can address more contextual factors that work to inf luence the behavior of individuals in the political system. A fascinating question is why coalitions worked in Bolivia until 2000 and not as well in other nations in Latin America. Perhaps Bolivia’s culture of coalitions matured much more as compared to neighboring presidential democracies. This study has shown that the constitutional structure in a democracy, encompassing the governmental and electoral design, provides the basic framework within which the nation’s political life functions. Comparative studies on electoral systems can also shed light on the degree to which the political system functions as well as on the importance of institutions in the consolidation of democracy. Therefore, in order to fully comprehend the political dynamics of any democratic regime, it is imperative to understand the constitutional and electoral components in different contexts. This is the task that awaits both comparativists and democratization scholars.


NOTES

1

The Rise of Evo Morales through an Electoral Lens: An Introduction

1. Venezuela 1993 (Carlos Andrés Perez), 2002 (Hugo Chávez), Ecuador 1997 (Abdalá Bucaram), 2000 ( Jamil Mahuad), 2004 (Lucio Gutiérrez), Bolivia 2003 (Sánchez de Lozada), 2005 (Carlos Mesa). 2. This claim is relevant to the Bolivian case since a group of scholars, following Gamarra (1997a), have pointed to the hybrid nature of its presidential system, contained in Article 90 of the Constitution, as the major determinant of its relative success. 3. Comparativists have consistently affirmed that the primary role of legislatures has been either “neglect and acquiescence or obstructionism” (Morgenstern and Nacif 2002: 7). Moreover, according to the latest Latinobarómetro (2007), the general population in Latin America regards legislatures as one of the most ineffective and one of the least trusted institutions. 4. In light of Article 90 of the Political Constitution of the State, which grants authority to Congress to elect the president in case no candidate receives a majority, Gamarra (1997a; 1997b) called the system “hybrid presidentialism.” Shugart and Carey (1992) followed Gamarra’s conceptualization while Jones (1995) identified it as a “majority congressional system.” Mayorga (1999) called it “presidencialismo parlamentarizado” (parliamentarized presidentialism). Regardless of the variations in the labels assigned to the Bolivian political system, these scholars agree that it exhibits features of both presidential and parliamentary systems. 5. The double quotient formula was calculated in the following manner: the first quotient, the participation quotient, would be obtained by dividing the total valid votes in a department by the number of seats to be distributed. Then, the votes of all parties that participated in the distribution of seats were added, and this total was divided by the number of seats to be distributed in a department. With this quotient, seats were distributed only amongst the parties that qualified for the distribution.

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6. In a closed-list system, the political party leaders decide on the list of candidates before the election, and the voter, rather than voting for a particular candidate, just exercises his or her vote for the party. The main criticism associated with this system is that it tends to concentrate power in the hands of party leaders and not its members who may be directly linked to the constituencies. 7. Article 134. 8. General Juan Pereda Asbun ( July–November 1978); General David Padilla Arancibia (November 1978–August 1979). 9. Article 161. 10. Article 162. 11. In 1985, municipal elections were also held for the first time since the 1952 Revolution. These municipal elections took place jointly with the general elections, according to the Organic Law of Municipalities enacted by Hernan Siles Zuazo on February 13, 1952. Elections for mayors and municipal councils were institutionalized then. Two years later, in December 6, 1987, with the Law of 1980 and the amendments of May 20, 1986, new municipal elections were held, but now independent of the presidential electoral process. This is still the case for Bolivia. 12. In June 1988, after the TV and radio owner Carlos Palenque allowed one of the most wanted narcotraffickers to speak to the nation through his radio network, Paz Estenssoro forced a congressional session to close down Palenque’s radio and TV network (Paz Ballivián and Cevallos 2001: 183). The MNR became Palenque’s greatest enemy for many years until UCS’ Max Fernández, CONDEPA’s nemesis, entered the political game. 13. Romero Ballivián, Salvador. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 14. Regarding this, Article 163 of the current Electoral Code states: “The results of the ballot, i.e., the counting of vote by vote, and the counting at the suffrage table, or addition of results, are exclusively done by the electoral jury [at the voting table] when they are elaborating and signing the final electoral record, by this no electoral organism can repeat or review the act.” 15. In Bolivia, under the D’Hondt formula, the cumulative votes obtained by each party, front, or alliance are divided by natural divisor series (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, etc.) in a correlative, continuous and obliged manner according to what is needed in each department. 16. With the Saint-Laguë formula, once all votes are counted, quotients are calculated for each party. The quotients are calculated by dividing the total number of votes that the party received by the number of seats the party is allocated starting with 0. The list with the highest quotient gets the next seat allocated, and their quotient is recalculated with their new seat total. The process is repeated until all seats have been allocated.

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17. Evo Morales webpage (http://www.evomorales.net/). 18. Article 4, Law for the Electoral Reform: Application of Article 60 of the Political Constitution of the State. 19. That code suffered its first modification on September 7, 1999, to clarify some articles for the next municipal elections. Later, other changes were approved through Law 2232 on July 25, 2001; Law 2282 on December 4, 2001; and Law 2346 on April 30, 2002, among others.

2 Bolivia’s Founding Pacts: The Pact for Democracy and the Patriotic Accord through an Electoral Lens 1. Carey, John. “Interview with Guillermo Bedegral,” MNR deputy. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001. 2. Leaders such as Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Gustavo Fernández Saavedra, Carlos Börth, Guillermo Bedegral, Hugo Carvajal Donoso, Ricardo Paz Ballivián, among others. 3. Siles Zuazo shifted ministers more times than any other democratically elected president in Bolivia, i.e., about 143 times. 4. Presencia, 1/1/1989. 5. El Diario, 11/27/1984. 6. Fernández Saavedra, Gustavo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 7. This term was coined by Siles Zuazo to refer to political parties composed of a small group of people, friends, and families that could actually fit into a taxi cab. The normative framework for the registration of political parties before 1985 was rather f lexible, the CNE recognized parties by a nominal declaration. In other words, by appearing in the CNE and declaring their existence and their interest in participating in the election, the CNE granted them juridical recognition to participate. Currently there are more requirements for parties to receive recognition: parties are recognized if their membership is equal to 2 percent or more of the total valid votes in the immediately preceding presidential elections (Political Parties Code, Art. 6), or if they can secure a minimum amount of citizens’ signatures in case they have never run in an election. 8. Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 9. Presencia, 7/16/1989. 10. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 11. Fernández Saavedra, Gustavo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 12. For an analysis of the economic crisis faced by the UDP, see Machicado 1995: 69–99. 13. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia.

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14. An MNR National Convention was called on March 29, 1985 with the purpose of electing a new party candidate for the July 14, 1985 elections. 15. Soon after the launching of the NPE, Guillermo Bedegral participated and won the Central Bank 1986 Annual Contest on Economic Essays with an essay entitled “New Economic Policy,” where he explained the reasons for the policy, its philosophy and ideology. 16. Presencia, 9/8/1989. 17. Presencia, 9/15/1988. 18. For an analysis of the role of Congress in this period, see Gamarra 1987. 19. Presencia, 8/28/1986. The march started in Oruro and was supposed to arrive to La Paz. Through the state of siege, the military was instructed to stop the mobilization and was able to dissolve it before reaching La Paz. 20. On the state of siege and deportation of union leaders, see Morales, Juan A. 1991. “Democracia y Política Económica en Bolivia.” In Síntesis, vol. 14, May–August 1991. 21. The existing constitutional disposition then did not force the censured minister to present his resignation. Nowadays, a censured minister must present his resignation and the president has the last word on whether to accept it or deny it. 22. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC. 23. Presencia, 10/25/1988. 24. Presencia, 10/28/1988. 25. Presencia, 1988. 26. Presencia, 8/5/1988. 27. Presencia, 8/14/1988. 28. Presencia, 8/16/1988. 29. Presencia, 10/20/1988. 30. Paz Ballivián, Ricardo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 31. For a thorough assessment of this aspect of Bolivian politics, see Gamarra, Eduardo A. and James M. Malloy. 1995. “The Patrimonial Dynamics of Party Politics in Bolivia.” In Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully. 1995. Eds. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 32. Presencia, 8/10/1988. 33. Presencia, 8/11/1988. 34. Presencia, 9/21/1988. 35. Grindle (2000) documents that between 1985 and 1986, public sector employment dropped by 24,600 people; by 1987, a further 8,550 people had been dismissed, and by 1988, public sector employment had dropped by 17 percent. 36. Presencia, AQUI, 7/9/1988; 2.

NOTES

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

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Última Hora, 1/26/1989. Agencia de Noticias FIDES, 5/24/1988. Presencia, 8/15/1988; Agencia de Noticias FIDES, 5/24/1988. Agencia de Noticias FIDES, 7/5/1988. Agencia de Noticias FIDES, 7/5/1988. Presencia, 9/5/1988. Agencia de Noticias FIDES, 5/27/1988. Presencia, 1/28/1989. Presencia, 1/26/1989. Political Declaration of the MNR. La Paz, February 9, 1989 (Presencia). Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC. Presencia, 9/8/1988, October, November, December 1988. Presencia, 9/8/1988, October, November, December 1988; 1989. For more information on this, see Müller & Asociados 1989. Presencia, 4/16/1989. Presencia, 5/7/1989. Agencia de Noticias FIDES, 7/5/1988. Presencia, 8/28/1988. Presencia, 4/20/1989. Presencia, 4/7/1989. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. Paz Ballivián, Ricardo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia; Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. Presencia, 6/1/1989. Presencia, 7/12/1989. Presencia, 5/29/1989. Presencia, 6/1/1989. Presencia, 3/28/1989. Presencia, 8/13/1989. Presencia, 6/14/1989. Presencia, 7/13/1989. Presencia, 7/13/1989. Presencia, 6/10/1989. Presencia, 6/10/1989. Presencia, 7/27/1989. Presencia, 8/2/1989. Rojas, Gonzalo. November 2004. La Paz. Bolivia. Interview with Ossio Sanjinés in Baptista Gumucio, Cordero Carraffa, Mesa Gisbert 2003: 227–229. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC.

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77. Eid Franco, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 78. Presencia, 6/17/1989. 79. Presencia, 8/4/1989. 80. Presencia, 8/3/1989. 81. Presencia, 8/1989. 82. Presencia, 8/11/1989. 83. Presencia, 1/10/1991. 84. “1989–2000 Economic Development Strategy Defined,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service-LAT, June 19, 1989, pp. 51–53. 85. Presencia, 1/16/1990. 86. Presencia, 12/3/1989. 87. Eid Franco, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 88. Presencia, 4/5/1989. 89. Presencia, 4/5/1989. 90. Presencia, 8/17/1988. 91. Fernández Saavedra, Gustavo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 92. Presencia, 8/30/1989. 93. Presencia, 1/16/1990. 94. Presencia, 11/23/1990. 95. Presencia, 11/24/1990. 96. Presencia, 10/21/1990. 97. Nuevo Herald, 10/28/1990. 98. Presencia, 9/13/1990. 99. Presencia, 4/20/1991. 100. Presencia, 11/16/1989. 101. Presencia, 11/23/1989. 102. Presencia, 11/22/1989. 103. Presencia, 9/21/1988. 104. Presencia, 11/29/1989. 105. For more on this, see Morales 1994: 131. 106. Arrien Sandoval, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia.

3 Paving the Way for the Transformation of Bolivian Politics: Electoral Reforms and Coalition Building 1. Arrien Sandoval, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 2. Arrien Sandoval, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia.

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3. The Aymara movement called Katarismo emerged in the 1960s seeking the promotion and restoration of Inca culture and communal social organization among the Andean peasantry following the abuses and discrimination suffered throughout history, and especially during the Banzer and Garcia Meza dictatorships (Soria Saravia 2002: 76). After a series of splits and name changing, the MRTKL (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación) led by Victor Hugo Cardenas came ahead and won a seat in the 1985–1989 legislature. Cardenas was then chosen as Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s running mate in the 1993 elections. 4. The phrase read in Spanish: “Victor Hugo no sabe robar y yo no necesito robar.” 5. Some of them included Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Börth, Alfonso Ferrufino, Ricardo Paz Ballivián, among others. 6. Laserna, Roberto. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 7. Currently, the Electoral Code establishes that seats in the Chamber of Deputies are assigned by the proportional representation system using the system of natural divisors. 8. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 9. Sánchez de Lozada. Interview by author. Washington, DC, November 2004. 10. Paz Ballivián, Ricardo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 11. Arrien Sandoval, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 12. Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 13. Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 14. A term used to describe those that favor strengthening municipalities as a viable option for the decentralization of a country. 15. Rojas-Ortuste, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 16. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2005. Washington, DC. 17. Indigenous social and political authorities. 18. This was deepened through the subsequent Administrative Decentralization Law of July 28, 1995. 19. Laserna, Roberto. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 20. Ferrufino, Alfonso; Börth, Carlos; Suarez, Manuel; Arrien Sandoval; Oscar. Interviews by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 21. For more on this, see Gamarra (1997a: 107), and Baldivia Urdininea (1998: 85).

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22. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC. 23. Later that year, on October 1994, associated legislation was passed, i.e., the Sectoral Regulation System (SIRESE) Law, establishing a regulatory and oversight framework for each sector that was to be capitalized. The basic objective of the SIRESE Law was to establish a new arbiter for the Bolivian economy. 24. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2005. Washington, DC. 25. This occurred twice in Bolivia’s democratic history, a constitutional amendment was initially approved by the 1989–1993 legislature and confirmed by the 1993–1997 legislature; another was approved by the 1997–2002 legislature and confirmed by the 2002–2005 legislature. The president and Congress called for a Constituent Assembly to revamp the Bolivian Constitution in its entirety in 2006. 26. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 27. Paz Ballivián, Ricardo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 28. Eid Franco, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 29. Roberto Laserna (Interview by author. La Paz, Bolivia, November 2004) asserted that without popular participation, the 1998–1999 economic crisis would have been worse. The deterioration of basic social services would have been felt stronger and the incapacity of the government to provide them would have been more obvious. 30. Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 31. Article 82 of the 1997 Debate Rules changed this limiting the discussion by a deputy in a congressional session to 15 minutes. 32. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC. 33. Aparicio, Jaime. Interview by author. February 2004. Washington, DC. 34. La Prensa. La Paz, 2000. 35. Aparicio, Jaime. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC. 36. Based on National Electoral Court data. 37. Rojas-Ortuste, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 38. El Diario, 5/6/1197; Hoy, 5/5/1997; Última Hora, 5/6/1997; Presencia (ERBOL Agency), 4/25/1997. 39. La Razón, 8/15/2000. 40. Carey, John. “Interview with Carlos Sánchez Berzaín,” MNR deputy. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001. 41. Luna, Luis. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 42. Evo Morales webpage (http://www.evomorales.net/).

NOTES

43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

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La Prensa, 7/27/2001. La Prensa, 4/18/2000. Pulso, 1/27/2000. For a more detailed analysis on the roles of the vice president and interviews to all vice presidents since the democratic transition in Bolivia, see Baptista Gumucio et al. (2003). La Razón, 29/10/1999. For more information, see Gamarra 2002: 7. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. La Prensa, 9/8/2001. La Prensa, September 2001. La Prensa, 9/9/2001. La Razón, 10/20/2001. La Prensa, 7/25/2000. These events will be analyzed in detail in the following sections. Luna, Luis. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. La Prensa, 7/27/2000. La Prensa, 9/9/2001. La Razón, 10/20/2000. La Prensa, 8/3/2001. La Razón, 8/17/2001. Los Tiempos, 6/10/1999. La Razón, 11/30/2000. La Prensa, 4/11/2000. Los Tiempos de Cochabamba, 7/14/2001. Opinión, 2/11/1999. Los Tiempos, 3/2/2000. Opinión, 28/3/2000. Los Tiempos, 4/5/2000. La Razón, April 2000. Section 2, Article 111. Also, Article 62 and Article 66, Section 9 grant the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate respectively, the responsibility of considering a declaration of a state of siege made by the president, having the option to either approve it or question it. La Razón, 4/12/2000. La Razón, 4/13/2000. La Razón, 4/20/2000. Los Tiempos, 11/1/1999. El Deber, 18/1/2000. El Deber, 11/1/2000. Rafael Puente, El Deber, 9/2/2000. Aparicio, Jaime. Interview by author. February 2004. Washington, DC. La Razón, 7/21/2001. La Razón, 1/23/2002. La Razón, 1/24/2002.

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83. Carey, John. “Interview with Ericka Brockman,” Chief of the MIR’s party caucus. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001. 84. Carey, John. “Interview with Ericka Brockman,” Chief of the MIR’s party caucus. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001. 85. La Prensa, 11/8/2000. 86. La Prensa, 7/3/2001. 87. La Razón, 13/1/2000. 88. La Razón, 7/18/2000. 89. La Razón, 7/5/2001. 90. Los Tiempos, 10/4/2001. 91. La Razón, 6/13/2000. 92. La Prensa, 8/20/2000. 93. La Razón, 8/24/2000. 94. La Razón, 8/25/2000. 95. An article on the newspaper Los Tiempos covered declarations made by the minister of information stating “The Government ratifies the State of Siege as a result of a parliamentary session. Military officials were mobilized to respond to the mandate for a state of siege. Also, a commission to analyze the situation with Tunari Waters was created, but the Coordinating Group was not allowed to participate because of its intransigent position “ (Los Tiempos 8/4/2000). 96. La Razón, 2/20/2001; Carey, John. “Interview with Ericka Brockman,” Chief of the MIR’s party caucus. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001. 97. La Razón, 8/20/2001. 98. The law requires a minimum amount of women to be included in the party lists. In this area of the country, the MIR registered men under female names. Thus, they were called the “cross-dresser” candidates. 99. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia; John Carey. “Interview with Victor Hugo Cardenas,” former vice president of Bolivia. 100. Carey, John. “Interview with Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada,” ex-president of Bolivia. May 15, 2001. La Paz, Bolivia. 101. Carey, John. “Interview with Guillermo Bedegral,” MNR deputy. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001. 102. Carey, John. “Interview with Hugo Carvajal Donoso,” MIR minister of agriculture. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001. 103. Carey, John. “Interview with Carlos Sánchez Berzaín,” MNR deputy. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001. 104. Luna, Luis. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 105. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 106. La Razón, 10/25/2001. 107. La Razón, 10/27/2001. 108. La Razón, 11/16/2001; 11/19/2001.

NOTES

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Crumbling Coalitions? Assessing the Transformation of Bolivian Politics

1. La Razón, 3/16/2002. 2. Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by the author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 3. A headline in El Nuevo Día (3/31/2002) read “Jaime Paz Zamora and a small group of people prepare the MIR strategies” ( Jaime Paz Zamora y un reducido grupo hacen las estrategias del MIR). 4. La Razón, 5/4/2002 Recta Final Poll. 5. La Razón, 11/7/2002. 6. La Razón, 11/16/2001. 7. La Razón, 6/1/2002. 8. La Razón, 7/22/2001. 9. Los Tiempos de Cochabamba, 4/23/2002. 10. El Diario, La Razón, BBC News, June 2002. 11. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC. 12. La Razón, 6/26/2002. 13. BBC, 6/27/2002. 14. La Razón, 7/5/2002. 15. La Razón, 7/8/2002. 16. La Razón, 7/30/2002. 17. La Razón, 7/11/2002. 18. La Razón, 7/6/2002. 19. “Manfred would even support Evo before supporting Goni,” La Razón, 7/6/2002. 20. Pressure: La Razón, 7/10/2002: MNR negotiates with the MIR and the pressure for a pact grows. La Razón, 7/11/2002: Jaime asks the MNR and the MAS to join and offers to be the mediator. La Razón, 7/23/2002: the private sector asks for a political pact, the Catholic Church raises its hands. 21. Eid Franco, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 22. “The MNR and MIR have the pact ready to govern,” (La Razón, 7/25/2002). “Sánchez de Lozada and Paz Zamora signed an agreement with 12 points that will be the basis of the so-called ‘Government of Social Responsibility’—Gobierno de Responsabilidad Nacional” (La Razón, 7/26/2002). 23. Eid Franco, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 24. LA TERCERA: CL, 2002 Election. 25. La Razón, 1/24/2003—“Chicote en mano, la oposición impide una sesión en el congreso.”

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26. “Goni threatened with governing through decrees,” La Prensa, 6/6/2003. 27. Bolivia is now the second largest country in the region, after Venezuela, in terms of available gas reserves. 28. “Sánchez de Lozada announced a trust shock (un shock de confianza) and asks for 3 months to resolve the economic crisis: Five projects will be produced in 90 days” (La Razón, 8/5/2002). 29. La Razón, 2/12/2003; 2/13/2003 and 2/14/2003. 30. El Deber, 4/6/2003; La Prensa, 4/8/2003. 31. Sánchez de Lozada reorganized his cabinet—anticonf lict ministers were nominated, Sánchez Berzain left, and nine new ministers were sworn in (La Razón, 2/20/2003). 32. La Razón, 8/18–25/2003. 33. La Razón, 8/6/2003. 34. La Razón, September 2003. 35. Pliego Único Nacional 2004. Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). November 2004. 36. Juarez, Jesus-Monsignor. Interview by author. March 2004. Lima, Peru. 37. El Diario, 10/2/2003. 38. El Diario, 10/2/ 2003. 39. La Razón, 10/12/2003, Interview with El Alto residents. 40. La Prensa, 10/13/2003. 41. EFE. La Paz, 10/14/2003. 42. El Tiempo, 10/14/2003. 43. Juarez, Jesus-Monsignor. Interview by author. March 2004. Lima, Peru. 44. Eid Franco, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 45. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC. 46. La Razón, 10/20/2003, the president puts together a cabinet according to the political crisis. 47. La Razón, 10/17/2003. 48. La Razón, 11/3/2003. 49. La Razón, 12/18/2003. 50. The Bolivian pension plan or Bonosol was a popular yearly payment of 1,800 Bolivians (about $250) to senior citizens over the age of 65. It was approved via the legislature during the 1993–1997 Sánchez de Lozada administration and repealed by the Banzer government. 51. La Razón, 12/18/2003. 52. EFE. La Paz, 1/5/2004. 53. La Razón, 6/26/2002. 54. La Razón, 10/20/2003. 55. Johnny Antezana, leader of the NFR block in Congress. 56. La Prensa, 11/3/2003. 57. On May 9, 2002, the Chamber of Deputies approved the Law of Necessity of Constitutional Reform (La Razón, 5/10/2002: A7).

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58. 59. 60. 61.

La Prensa, 11/3/2003. La Razón, 2/29/2004. Aparicio, Jaime. Interview by author. February 2004. Washington, DC. Parties approved the reform to comply with demands of citizens who had voiced for the need of the reforms through politics from the streets in October 2003. Eid Franco (2004) asserts that the MIR supported the reform “to end the phenomenon once in for all and so that the system would turn to political parties again.” 62. La Prensa, 2/29/2004. 63. “MNR, NFR and MIR parliamentarians asked the executive to jointly design an agenda for the country” (La Razón, 3/7/2005). 64. Jorge Quiroga in EFE. La Paz, 11/5/2003.

5 Explaining Evo Morales’s Rise to Power: The Unintended [or Intended?] Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 1. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia; Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia. 2. It is important to mention, though, that beyond the stability of government coalitions, there have been important inconsistencies and cohesion problems within them, precisely due to the political frictions between the member parties and because the coalitions are not established based on a common project for the country. 3. La Razón, survey by Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado, March 2007. The highest percentage of popularity for Morales was in May 2006, after he nationalized the hydrocarbons industry.


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El Deber El Diario OAS News Bulletin El Tiempo La Tercera: CL La Prensa El Clarin EFE Última Hora Los Tiempos de Cochambamba

Web Sites BBC News Morales’s Website

Interviews Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian (in November 2004 in La Paz, Bolivia; unless stated otherwise) in conversation with Aparicio, Jaime—ambassador of the Republic of Bolivia to the United States, Washington, DC, February 26. Arrien Sandoval, Oscar—MNR plurinominal deputy, and former president of the Chamber of Deputies 2001–2002. Börth, Carlos—researcher, and former senator and deputy (MIR/ADN). Eid Franco, Oscar—political strategist of the MIR. Fernández Saavedra, Gustavo—former minister of foreign affairs. Ferrufino, Alfonso—MBL militant, and former plurinominal deputy, former director of FUNDAPACC. Laserna, Roberto—professor, and director of the Conf lict Research Institute, Cochabamba. Lazarte, Jorge—professor and former member of the National Electoral Court. Loayza, Rafael—advisor to former president Jorge Quiroga, November. Luna, Luis—director SUNY Bolivia. Müller, Herbert—former minister of finance. Pacheco, Napoleon—executive director of Fundación Milenio. Paz Ballivián, Ricardo—advisor to President Mesa for constitutional affairs, and former executive director of CONDEPA. Rojas-Ortuste, Gonzalo—professor and former member of the Secretariat for Popular Participation, 1993–1997. Romero Ballivian, Salvador—member of the National Electoral Court. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo—former president of Bolivia, Washington, DC.

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Suarez, Manuel—advisor to former president Sánchez de Lozada, and plurinominal deputy 1997–2002. Toranzo, Carlos—professor, and director of the Latin American Institution for Social Research (ILDIS), November 2004, February 2005. Torrez, Andres—professor, Universidad Catolica de Bolivia.

Speech Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. “Bolivia: Turning Point for Democracy?” October 17, 2003, Kay Spiritual Life Center. Event sponsored by the Office of International Affairs, the Center for Democracy and Election Management, and the School of International Service, American University.

INDEX

1985 elections, 35–37 1989 elections, 55–63 and the Chamber of Deputies, 37 campaign, 55–56 main issues, 57 political marketing, 57 1993 elections, 81 characteristics of, 81 composition of Congress, 87 participating parties, 111 results of, 82, 114 1994 constitutional reform, 24–25, 109 2002 elections and Plan Bolivia, 154 and the campaign, 144 and the composition of Congress, 151–154 electoral results, 149–150 2005 elections characteristics of, 176–177 Congress, 180 parties participating, 176 results of, 178–181 Agreements of February 5, 1991, 22 characteristics of, 85 Antonio Araníbar Quiroga, 19, 55, 90 Article 90 of the Constitution, 27, 28, 84, 180, 196

Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos, 58 Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (ASP), 24 Ballot stuffing, 19 Banzer-Quiroga administration, 15, 108, 109, 117, 120–121 and the Plan of the Four Pillars, 117 Black October, 1, 157 Bolivian Communist Party, 24, 33 Bolivian Mining Corporation, 33, 45, 77 Bolivian Revolution, 17–18, 28 Bolivian Worker’s Union (Central Obrera Boliviana-COB), 18, 33 and the Gas War, 171 and street and strike politics, 76, 101 BonoSol, 95, 169 Capitalization Law, 14 description of, 95–97 Carlos Mesa, 1, 167, 168, 171, 172 cabinets, 168, 170 resignation of, 175 Carlos Palenque “El Compadre,” 21, 89, 90 and the 1989 elections, 58 Catholic Church, 22, 128

238

IN DE X

Center for Peasant Research and Promotion (CIPCA), 91 Central de Empresarios Bolivianos (CEPB), 102, 104 Chaco War, 16, 17 Chapare, 101, 121–122, 141 Coalitions, 13 Conscience of the Motherland (Consciencia de PatriaCONDEPA), 89, 90, 99, 100 formation of, 21 and the 1989 elections, 58 and the 1993 elections, 81–82 and coalition building, 87 and the Patriotic Accord, 65, 75 Constituent Assembly, 182, 205 approval of, 184 and the Special Law for the Call of a Constituent Assembly, 182–183 parties elected to, 182 “Damned laws,” 92 Decentralization Law, 97, 98, 101 D’Hondt formula, 23, 25, 36, 48, 59, 86, 110, 151, 195, 197 and the odd divisor formula, 86 Dignity Plan, 15, 117, 120–126 Double-quotient formula, 48, 63 Electoral dilemma (representativeness vs. efficiency), 12–13, 194–195 and the 2002 elections, 145 and the Bolivian electoral system, 187–188 and the Patriotic Accord, 75 Evo Morales, 1, 101, 120 election as president, 175 election to Congress, 25 and the Tropic Federation, 54–55 as uninominal deputy, 191 Executive-legislative relations, 4, 6–7 Falange Socialista Boliviana, 36

Free Bolivia Movement party (MBL), 22, 88–89 formation of, 34 Gas War, 15, 158, 164–167, 203 Hernan Siles Zuazo, 16, 20, 31, 33 Historic Ratification of the Pact for Democracy, 55 breaking of, 56 Hugo Banzer Suarez, 18, 20, 21, 31, 34, 82 and the 1989 elections, 56 election of, 26 and the Pact for Democracy, 38 and the Patriotic Accord, 66 Hybrid presidentialism, 10 Hydrocarbons Law, 15, 100, 171–173, 203 Jaime Paz Zamora, 19, 21, 31, 99 and the 1989 elections, 56 Jefaturismo, 85 Juan Lechín, 16, 33, 76 Law 1008 on Controlled Substances, 54 Law for drinking water and sanitary systems, 15, 118 formulation of, 119 Tunari Waters, 119 and the Water War, 126–132 Law for the Application of Article 60, 25 Lidia Gueiler, 16 Majoritarianism, 4, 13 March for Life, 44, 76 Max Fernández Rojas, 21, 22, 88, 90, 105, 107 and Max obras, 88 Megacoalition, 115, 121–126 characteristics, 122 and the Commitment for Bolivia, 116 negotiations for, 116

IN DE X

opposition to, 132–137 payoffs, 123 Movement Toward Socialist (Movimiento al SocialismoMAS), 2 and the 2002 elections, 144, 146 and the 2005 campaign, 176–177 and the Constituent Assembly, 182–183 election to Congress, 25 formation of, 24–25 National Agreement for the Modernization of the State, 24, 109 National Civic Union (UCN), 21 National Democratic Action party (Acción Democrática Nacional-ADN), 11 formation of, 19 National Electoral Court (CNE), 22 and the 1985 elections, 34 and the 1989 elections, 61 and the 1993 elections, 81 and the Band of the Four, 60–63 institutionalization of, 23, 28, 86 National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario-MNR), 11 formation of, 16–17 New Economic Policy (Nueva Política Económica-NPE), 14, 38, 41, 95 formulation of, 41–44 main objectives, 42 New Republican Force (Nueva Fuerza Republicana-NFR), 24, 191 and the 2002 elections, 145 and the Megacoalition, 124

239

Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTBs), 93 Oscar Eid Franco, 19, 56, 72, 99 Pact for Change, 88–90 Pact for Democracy, 37–44 bargaining strategies, 48–49 formation of, 38 incentives for, 39–40 interpellation to, 45 legislative leadership, 49 Pact for Governance, 88–90 Parliamentarized presidentialism, 9 Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), 36 Partido Obrero Revolucionario, 76 Patriotic Accord, 63 and the CONEPLAN (Consejo Nacional de Economía y Planificación), 70 government sharing, 67 negotiations for, 64–65 and the Political Council of the Patriotic Accord, 67–68, 72 positional payoffs, 72 Paz Estenssoro administration, 34 cabinet formation, 50–54 main outcomes, 44 Paz Zamora administration, 55 cabinets, 73 congressional results, 62 opposition to, 75 Plan for All (Plan de Todos), 111 Plan Nuevo (New Plan), 83 Popular Democratic Unity government (UDP), 31, 33, 38, 41, 81 Popular Participation Law, 15 description of, 91–95 purpose of, 24 Presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, 4–6, 12 and “the difficult combination,” 8

240

IN DE X

Privatization Law, 14 main tenets, 70–72 and the state of siege, 69–70 and Supreme Decree 22407, 69 and the Paz Zamora administration, 68 Revolutionary Left Movement, 11 and the 2002 elections, 145 formation of, 18 and the Megacoalition, 124 Saint Lague formula, 23, 192, 195, 197 Sánchez de Lozada, 2, 15, 21, 27, 82, 99, 101 and the 1989 elections, 55 and the 1993 elections, 113–115 cabinets, 103–106 and the Pact for Democracy, 45 and the Plan for All, 84 Single Member District (SMD), 2 and the 1997 elections, 113–115 and the 2005 elections, 185–192 description of, 26

experience of uninominal deputies, 140 uninominal circumscriptions, 26 Solidarity Civic Union (UCS), 82, 89, 90, 105, 107 and the 2002 elections, 146 and coalition building, 87 doctrine of, 22 formation of, 21 Split vote (voto cruzado), 26, 140, 193 Tupac Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement, 36, 46, 83 United Left (Izquierda Unida), 24, 58 Victor Hugo Cárdenas, 46, 83 Victor Paz Estenssoro, 16, 20, 31, 33 Vigilance Committees (VCs), 91 Walter Guevara Arce, 16, 20, 31, 33 War of the Pacific, 16 Washington Consensus, 44, 70 Water War, 126

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