Education and Humanism. Linking Autonomy and Humanity

EDUCATION AND HUMANISM

Moral Development and Citizenship Education Series Editors: Fritz Oser ([email protected]) University of Fribourg, Switzerland Wiel Veugelers ([email protected]) University of Amsterdam / University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht, the Netherlands Editorial Board: Nimrod Aloni, Kibbutzim College of Education, Tel Aviv, Israel Marvin Berkowitz, University of Missouri-St.Louis, U.S.A. Pietro Boscolo, University of Padova, Italy Maria Rosa Buxarrais, University of Barcelona, Spain Helen Haste, University of Bath, U.K. / Harvard University U.S.A Dana Moree, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic Clark Power, University of Notre Dame, U.S.A. Kirsi Tirri, University of Helsinki, Finland / Stanford University, U.S.A. Joel Westheimer, University of Ottawa, Canada William Wu, Hong Kong Baptist University, China ‘Moral Development and Citizenship Education’ is a book series that focuses on the cultural development of our young people and the pedagogical ideas and educational arrangements to support this development. It includes the social, political and religious domains, as well as cognitive, emotional and action oriented content. The concept of citizenship has extended from being a pure political judgment, to include the social and interpersonal dynamics of people. Morality has become a multifaceted and highly diversi¿ed construct that now includes cultural, developmental, situational and professional aspects. Its theoretical modelling, practical applications and measurements have become central scienti¿c tasks. Citizenship and moral development are connected with the identity constitution of the next generations. A caring and supporting learning environment can help them to participate in society. The series seeks to stimulate a dialogue between different points of view, research traditions and cultures. Titles in the series Moral Development and Citizenship Education: Oser, F.K., & Veugelers, W. (Eds.). (2008). Getting involved. Global citizenship development and sources of moral values. Tirri, K. (Ed.) (2008), Moral sensibilities in urban education. Klaassen, C. & Maslovaty, N. (Eds.). (2010). Moral courage and the normative professionalism of teachers. Prospective authors and editors are invited to send their book proposals to the series editors or to [email protected]

SensePublishers For Wisdom and Awareness www.sensepublishers.com

Education and Humanism Linking Autonomy and Humanity

Edited by Wiel Veugelers University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht/ University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

SENSE PUBLISHERS ROTTERDAM / BOSTON / TAIPEI

A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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CONTENTS

Introduction: Linking Autonomy and Humanity

1

WIEL VEUGELERS

A Humanist Perspective on Moral Development and Citizenship Education

9

WIEL VEUGELERS

Humanistic Education: From Theory to Practice

35

NIMROD ALONI

Moral Education from a Humanist Perspective

47

MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN

The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Education in South Africa

67

LESLEY LE GRANGE

Why We Are Not Democratic Yet: The Complexity of Developing a Democratic Attitude

79

ISOLDE DE GROOT

Practicing Democracy

95

JOEL WESTHEIMER

Signi¿cance of Humanist Education in Developing Countries. The Indian Scenario

105

VIKAS GORA

Literary Humanism in Multicultural Education

115

MARTIEN SCHREURS

Teachers’ Training towards Active Involvement in the Public Domain

127

ESTHER YOGEV

Humanistic Teaching in Practice: Exploring Normative Professionalism

145

DIEUWERTJE BAKKER

Fostering Humanity Through Interpretive Dialogue in Teacher Communities 163 EVANGELIA FRYDAKI

The Moral Side of Education: Helping Teachers to Develop a Moral Perspective on Teaching

181

YVONNE LEEMAN & WILLEM WARDEKKER

The Challenges of Multiculturalism. Educational Dilemmas for Humanists in Flanders GILY COENE

v

195

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WIEL VEUGELERS

INTRODUCTION: LINKING AUTONOMY AND HUMANITY

Education is a moral enterprise that shapes human development. The pedagogical visions of educators can be inspired by different worldviews, cultural experiences and political ideas. Moral values are at stake at the level of educational systems, of schools and of individual teachers. At each of the distinguished levels own articulations in moral values, pedagogical goals and suggested practices can be made. In this book we bring together authors who are inspired by humanist ideas. Humanism is an open worldview that stresses personal autonomy and humanity. Within humanism there is diversity in thinking, and ideas are developing under different cultural, social and political conditions. Education from a humanist perspective focuses on developing rationality, autonomy, empowerment, creativity, affections and a concern for humanity. This concern for humanity expresses the relation to other people. This social component can range from empathy to solidarity, and from the own community to the global world. Appreciating diversity and democracy are humanist ways of living together as human beings. A challenge in humanist thinking and acting is the linking of autonomy and humanity. Autonomy is not isolated individuality but it is the way a person relates to the other. It’s the agency of the situatedness of people. It implies the possibility of taking responsibility for your own life and your own ideas. Humanity is the condition that gives people the possibility of developing human capabilities: of being a reÀective and dialogical person, of getting the sources to live a good life, of living together ruled by moral values, of helping others to live a good life too. Developing autonomy and humanity is not a natural process, but an interactive process between people under social and political power relationships. Enhancing autonomy and humanity is part of social, cultural and political developments. Like autonomy that can not be separated from humanity, human development can not be separated from social, cultural and political struggle for a world of social justice. LINKING DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

Humanistic education has different philosophical foundations. Aloni (2002) distinguishes the cultural-classical, the naturalistic-romantic, the existential and the critical-radical approach. From the cultural-classical tradition we can learn that develWiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 1–7. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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oping rationality, autonomy and knowledge about human traditions can strengthen a persons’ agency and develop ef¿cacy in learning and in the world as a whole. The naturalistic-romantic tradition sees learning as affective and creative and shows that giving space to personal interest can make learning meaningful to the learner and gives the feeling of authenticity. The existential tradition lets us realise that a human being has to develop his own meaning system, worldview and practice and that one has the moral obligation to live a human life and take care of humanity. The critical-radical tradition shows that possibilities for Àourishing, learning and living a human life are not equally distributed in the world. Individual development is embedded in a social world of unequal social and political relations. Changing possibilities for Àourishing and empowerment should enhance the possibilities for learning and development for all, in particular people with less social and political power. At the heart of humanistic education is this tension between personal autonomy development and social change (Veugelers, 2007). From a humanist point of view social change is not possible without strong and critical autonomous people. Autonomy development without an embedding in social change is glorifying the individual not humanity. Autonomy and social concern should be considered as interlinked. Autonomy development should be embedded in social change processes (Freire, 1985). For education this means that learning is not a technical-instrumental rationality but identity development in a reÀective and dialogical way in a social context; it is morally social constructivism MEANINGS OF LIFE AND MORAL VALUES, A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE

Human beings have the possibility to give meaning to their lives and to create coherence in experiences. Making meaning gives direction and signi¿cation to ones own life and to a personal view on life (Baumeister, 1991). The development of moral values of people takes place through meaning giving and people can contribute to the development of norms in their neighbourhood, in groups and cultures, and in society as a whole. Education, in the family, in civic institutions, and at school, can contribute to young people’s meaning giving processes. Personal meaning giving might be inspired by worldviews. Religions are worldviews, but also nonreligious views on life that are shared by many people are worldviews. Humanism is one of these, but also the more political worldviews like liberalism and socialism. A humanist perspective on giving meaning is based on personal responsibility, not on insights provided by a God, and on repeatedly trying to realize human potential (Derkx, 2002). It is an attitude of mind of striving for humanity, for humanization. Humanism is regarded as an open worldview. There is no ¿xed, absolute criterion for what higher humanity is, for what is beautiful or true. The normative criterion is the never ¿nally concluded dialogue in which everyone involved participates and where one also reÀects on the unique context of this dialogue itself. 2

INTRODUCTION: LINKING AUTONOMY AND HUMANITY

Besides a cognitive and a moral aspect, every worldview also has motivating, inspiring or spiritual aspects. What might be called a ‘humanist spirituality’ refers to humanism as ‘art of living’ (Dohmen, 2003). It is drawing strength from beauty, from the life stories and imaginations of people, and from the experience of belonging. It is the experience of belonging without feeling restricted. Within humanism there is much attention for the development of the Ancient Greek culture, the Renaissance, the French Revolution and the emancipation movements of the twentieth century (Aloni, 2002). These are examples of humanization and active meaning giving processes of people involved. Present-day humanism strongly focuses on personal development in relation to others. It is this tension between personal development and advancement of humanization, that is creating the opportunities for the personal development of every world citizen, that dominates the current debate on humanization. Humanism is about personal autonomy, moral responsibility, and about solidarity with humanity. Human solidarity restricts autonomy and connects the individual and his environment. It is always about the dynamics between autonomy and social involvement. These dynamics can still have a large diversity of theoretical and practical interpretations. The diversity should be judged as positive, because it will contribute to a lively communication about moral values and will prevent that the values of one group are all too easily established as the norm for everyone. Diversity challenges everybody to reÀect on one’s personal values (Veugelers, 2008). WHAT CONNECTS PEOPLE?

The source of autonomy can easily be localized. It is, after abandoning God, falling back on oneself. Autonomy is an achievement, acquired by social movements like the Enlightenment (Aloni, 2002). The achieved autonomy challenges people to make their own choices, to take their own responsibility. In modern times one is even forced to make choices, to develop personal life-politics (Giddens, 1981). The existential approach in humanistic education too denies a predestination and argues that man can only try to make the best of it all. There is no human script, but there is a human responsibility to shape one’s personal life. The concept autonomy is problematic though. Autonomy can not be created without the other. From two different theoretical positions both Levinas and Vygotsky clearly show that human development is only possible in relation to the other. Man is per de¿nition a relational being. One relates to the other. This relation can take very differing forms: from oppression through ignoring to a form of involvement. Involvement can again have several qualities, from empathy through sympathy to solidarity with certain groups. Human being actively position themselves in cultural practices and discourses (Haste, 2004; Veugelers & Oser, 2008). What are the sources of this social dimension? Biology and modern brain research are assiduously searching the biological sources of involvement. Biologists like De Waal have shown that some animals display forms of empathy (Verbeek, 3

WIEL VEUGELERS

2006). The neurosciences show us that several moral qualities can be localized in the brain. Even with an embedding of morality in the brain, social and cultural processes can have produced this brain source of morality. The growth of the brains could have resulted from a long-term human training in this form of involvement that led to its lodging in the brain. This would be similar to the development of certain muscles by an athlete in a speci¿c sport, or populaces with certain physical habits that became embedded in the body. With moral human capabilities like the facilities for empathy and dialogue, still speci¿c motives are needed for developing and strengthening these capabilities. When subjecting to the word of a God is no longer the motive, other sources must be found. In the humanistic tradition there has always been much attention for examples that actively shaped autonomy, like in the Bildung tradition. There is also much attention for exemplary ¿gures who connected the development of autonomy with social development, for instance Montaigne, Erasmus and Spinoza. Or in the ethics of care of Tronto and Noddings. There is furthermore attention for people who have resisted oppression, like Hanna Arendt, Etty Hillesum, Primo Levi and bell hooks or people who criticised a dominant western cultural orientation like Edward Said and Amartya Sen; or who proposed more political forms of involvement, like Antonio Gramsci and Paulo Freire. The broad list of moral examples shows that the social dimension of humanization can take many forms: from a mainly affective empathic capacity to advancing social justice and to a political struggle of solidarity with powerless people, and to a shift in power relations. The articulated forms express different combinations of autonomy and social involvement. Characteristic for this humanistic relation is that one of the poles is never disconnected from the other. Autonomy without social involvement would imply an extremely individualistic position. Social involvement without autonomy would merely imply adaptation. The tension between autonomy and social involvement is the core of humanism. Education supports persons in their development. The authors brought together in this book all address issues of developing autonomy and humanity in educational practices. All the chapters try to link theory and practice. They either make theoretical ideas more practical or they use practical experiences and concerns to rethink theoretical notions. INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTERS

In the ¿rst chapter A Humanist Perspective on Moral Development and Citizenship Education Veugelers presents a humanist perspective on the development of values and norms. He shows how discourses on values have changed in the last decades and what the possibilities are for a humanist perspective on both autonomy and social involvement. Instead of focusing on autonomy he pleads for a criticaldemocratic citizenship with a strong focus on meaning-making, diversity, bridging, and embedding morality development in political processes of social justice. 4

INTRODUCTION: LINKING AUTONOMY AND HUMANITY

The identity development of both students and teachers needs to be reÀective and dialogical, aiming at enhancing a social situated self that supports justice-oriented social, cultural and political change. ReÀective learning, dialogical learning and democratic learning are at the heart of humanist education. In Humanistic Education: From Theory to Practice Aloni brings his theoretical ideas expressed in his well know book ‘Enhancing Humanity’ (Aloni, 2002) into practice. He stresses the importance of the professional self-image of interpersonal trust, cultural idealism and personality. These ideals can be developed in a humanistic school culture of security, fairness, dialogue and social involvement. The curriculum should translate knowledge into life-literacies that allow learners to identify the value-laden messages of issues discussed in classes and to plan their actions with greater reason and responsibility. The next three more theoretical chapters focus on fundamental concepts of a humanist perspective of education. First on the personal human being, second on Ubuntu as interconnectness of human beings, and third on democracy as a way of living together as human beings. In Moral Education from a Humanist Perspective Buxarrais and Esteban analyse the liberal-communitarian debate and design a moral education in postmodern times. They propose a model that accounts for the uncertainty of the human being as the foundation of their being human; the desire towards excellence as typical human; reason as the guide for the critical spirit and action; and the widening of horizons. This model asks for pedagogical conditions of presence, planning, inconvenience, patience and individualization. Starting from theoretical work the authors end with practical descriptions of teachers’ pedagogical acting. In The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Education in South Africa Le Grange shows how the concept of Ubuntu functions in public and philosophical debates in South Africa and what the possibilities are for working with this concept in education. Ubuntu means that each individual expression is ideally expressed in relationship with others. Ubuntu is a concrete manifestation of the interconnectedness of human beings. Le Grange shows how different philosophical trends balance between the universalism of the concept and its meaning interwoven in cultural practices and lived experiences of African peoples. It is the deconstructive/reconstructive potential of Ubuntu that might have transformative effects on education, in particular in South Africa. Democracy as way of living (Dewey, 1923) can be seen as a humanist way of organizing society and social life. In the chapter Why We Are Not Democratic Yet: The Complexity of Developing a Democratic Attitude De Groot analyses the concept of democracy, in particular its psychological and social conditions. De Groot distinguishes ¿ve dimensions. First, an elaborate understanding of democracy and diversity, with a sensitivity to social justice issues. Second, the development of capacity with internal and external ef¿cacy. Third, the development of active relations by commitment and connection. Fourth, the willingness to transform, openmindedness and doubt. Five, the ability for empathy and dialogue. Experiences, reÀection 5

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and dialogue on practices and ideas should encourage this democratic citizenship development. The book continues with more practice oriented chapters in which authors analyse current educational practices and try to translate theoretical concepts into recommendations for a more humanistic education. Westheimer in Practicing Democracy argues against the narrowing of the curriculum by testing, pathologizing of dissent and de-professionalization of teachers. Westheimer pleads for more democratic educational practices and for learning from multiple perspectives and on real-world problems. Gora describes in Signi¿cance of Humanist Education in Developing Countries the theoretical foundations and practical work of the humanist movement in India. In the Atheist Centre, in schools, in study camps and through media they support freedom of speech, rationality, humanity, and the signi¿cance of atheism and humanism as a positive way of life. The priority in their adult education and social work is on liberating people, in particular women, and to empower them socially. In Literary Humanism in Multicultural Education Schreurs follows Said (2004) in criticizing classical Bildung for the dominance of a Christian humanist culture. Instead he pleads for a postmodern view on Bildung in which different cultures are valued more equally. In teaching in a multicultural class he tries to practices a literary humanism that gives voices to different perspectives. In Teachers’ Training towards Active Involvement in the Public Domain Yogev shows the theoretical foundations and practical work on educating students to become public involved and democratic intellectuals by participation in community life and by ethical and sociopolitical reÀection. Nurturing political literacy and experimental service learning are integrated in this teacher education programme. Bakker explores the normative professionalism of teachers in Humanistic Teaching in Practice. She presents an empirical study on the experiences of humanistic teachers and the affective characteristics of these experiences. The teachers express many personal valuations which inÀuence their work and they are much connected to their work. The outcomes of the study stress the importance of the professional’s personal meanings as a substantial part of normative professionalism. In Forstering Humanity through Interpretive Dialogue in Teacher Communities Frydaki develops a theoretical framework for researching teachers in dialogical learning communities. She demonstrates the application of her framework in a case-study on the inÀuence of supportive educational contexts on the moral values and professional development of a teacher. This study highlights how teachers’ participation in dialogical meaning making processes can generate new shared values and value communication processes. Leeman and Wardekker developed materials that help teachers to develop a moral perspective on teaching. In The Moral Side of Education they show that nowadays for many teachers it is quite dif¿cult to talk about the moral sides of education and that their thinking is fragmented. Narrative professional identity development should therefore include moral qualities. By the use of statements and dilemmas 6

INTRODUCTION: LINKING AUTONOMY AND HUMANITY

teachers are challenged to articulate and discuss moral values. A group approach advances reÀection, multi-perspectives and dialogue. Coene gives in The Challenges of Multiculturalism. Educational Dilemmas for Humanists in Flanders a historical overview of humanist education in Flanders. Students in public schools can choose for nonconfessional ethics organized by the freethinking humanist community. This course balances between neutrality and an explicit humanist philosophy of life. The complexities of our contemporary multicultural society asks for active pluralism. A humanist perspective, Coene argues, should therefore include a dialogue between different religions and worldviews. Together the chapters in the book give a broad overview of theoretical foundations, concrete research, and practices in education. The book shows a diversity that can inspire scholars and practitioners in further developing their perspectives. Creating meaning is an essential part of all education. Focusing on the linking of autonomy and humanity is the humanist perspective in it. REFERENCES Aloni, N. (2002). Enhancing humanity. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Baumeister, R.E. (1991). Meanings of life. New York: The Guilford Press. Derkx, P. (2002). Modern humanism in the Netherlands. In A. Halsema & D. van Houten (Eds.). Empowering humanity (61-97). Utrecht: De Tijdstroom. Dewey, J. (1923). Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan. Dohmen, J. (2003). Philosophers on the ‘Art of Living’. Journal of Happiness Studies, 4(4), 351-371. Freire, P. (1985). The politics of education. South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey. Giddens, A. (1981). Modernity and self-identity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Haste, H. (2004). Constructing the citizen. Political Psychology, 25(3), 413-440. Oser, F., & Veugelers, W. (Eds.). (2008). Getting involved. Global citizenship development and sources of moral values. Rotterdam/Taipeh: SensePublishers. Said, E.W. (2004). Humanism and democratic critism. New York: Palgrave. Verbeek, P. (2006). Everyone’s monkey: Primal moral roots. In M. Killen & J. Smetana (Eds.). Handbook of Moral Development (423-459). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Veugelers, W. (2007). Creating critical-democratic citizenship education: empowering humanity and democracy in Dutch education. Compare, 37(1), 105-119. Veugelers, W. (2008). Youngsters in transformative and reproductive processes of moral and citizenship education. In K. Tirri (Ed.). Moral sensibilities in urban education (79-91). Rotterdam/Taipeh/ Boston: SensePublishers.

Wiel Veugelers Department of Education University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht Graduate School of Child Development and Education University of Amsterdam

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A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION Empowering autonomy, humanity and democracy

Worldwide there is currently an enormous interest in values and norms and in the role of education in this matter. This interest stems in particular from the postmodern situation of a lack of common values and norms. The positive side of the postmodern development is the greater autonomy individuals have in constructing their own identity and morality. The problematic site of this postmodern development is the uncertainty about which values are important to live and the dif¿culty of constructing norms together. Value construction is a psychological process that involves the personal life. Constructing norms together is a sociological process of living together, of dealing with differences and jointly constructing social life and society. Processes of value and norm constructions are important for the individual, for social and cultural groups, and for society. Cultural groups articulate which moral values are important for them and how norms can be constructed. In this chapter we want to present a humanist perspective on these processes and on the role education can play in developing moral values and social norms. We will demonstrate that there are different ways of thinking about values and norms and the associated task of education. These different ways are grounded in different social-political and philosophical ideas. We opt for a humanist perspective with a focus on both autonomy and social concern. We will outline the contours of a more humanist pedagogical approach for moral and citizenship education which, more than is currently the case, stresses the development of personal moral values and social norms. Our work is embedded in the context of the Netherlands.1 However, we will analyse the Dutch developments in more global perspectives. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VALUES AND NORMS

In the public debate the terms values and norms are usually mentioned together, although they are actually two very different concepts and individuals have a different relationship with values then with norms. Moral values are opinions based on an idea of what is good and bad. They refer to concepts of the ‘good life’. Moral values are not personal preferences based on taste, but are more or less explicit and fully developed ideas about how a person relates to his or her life and social and natural Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 9–34. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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environment. Moral values are affectively loaded cognitions related to behaviour, these values drive behaviour (Berkowitz, 1995; Oser, 1997; Veugelers & Vedder, 2003). Moral values are personal choices and are situated on the cultural level. Each person constructs his own value con¿guration. This construction can be more or less reÀective, often however this process is implicit and hidden. Moral values give meaning to personal life. It’s a process of creating personal meanings of life. People who support the same values may congregate in subcultures, ideologies, religions or other worldviews. Together they can live and celebrate their common values. They can inspire each other, create a moral community that binds together and gives the participants a moral home. These moral communities give the participant a feeling of belonging and helps in constructing a personal value system. These moral communities can be ‘thin’ or ‘thick’, they can be connected loosely or strictly, they can be horizontal or hierarchical. People also participate in different communities. Norms are different from moral values. Norms are encapsulated in rules. Norms are standards which are based on values, and are highly context dependent and have the attributes of agreements (Joas, 2002). Norms are developed within every group in society, for example in a family, a sport team, a school class, a local community, a worldview organisation, in a country, or in the United Nations. The development or construction of norms is a process in which the moral values of the different participants struggle for hegemony. This is not an open communication and competition; in these struggles power relations are at work (Mouffe, 2005; Castells, 2009; Todd, 2009). In norm construction the values of the dominant group are elevated, to a greater or lesser extent, to the norm of the whole group. Norms are like values that are imposed on all concerned. Norms may be formulated very broadly and give participants the possibility for a personal articulation, but norms may equally be very restrictive and demand only adaptation. Norms are implicit and explicit agreements on attitudes and on particular behaviour, while moral values are developed by an individual, in a process of giving meaning to life. Attributing signi¿cance, sense making and giving meaning are human capacities. Human beings have the cognitive possibility for sense making and to reÀect on values and norms, human beings can develop moral values. Because of these cognitive and social capacities human beings can in reÀective and dialogical processes jointly create norms. Education can stimulate these reÀective and dialogical processes of personal value development and social norms development. Education can challenge people to reÀect on their value construction, to get engaged in moral dialogues and to jointly build norms. CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE ON VALUES AND NORMS

Attention for values and norms and educational discourses and practices change over time and are part of larger cultural struggles and social and political devel10

A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

opments (Apple, 1996; Goodson, 2005). After the Second World War, values and norms have been visible in various forms in Dutch education, educational policy, and educational discourses. The developments in the Netherlands are part of the developments in the Western world and of globalization worldwide. What is special about the Dutch society is the strong denominationalism. Dutch civic society is, and in particular has been, organised along denominationalized lines. Protestant churches and the Catholic Church each have their own broadcast, their own schools, and sometimes even their own leisure activities. There is also a Jewish denomination, and in the last decades the Muslim immigrants created their own Islamic denomination. 70% of all Dutch schools are religious schools, mainly Protestant and Catholic schools. These schools are fully funded by the national government. All schools have to follow the national curriculum, except for the subject of religious studies. These schools can however select their own teachers and students. The humanist movement has been recognised in the Netherlands, in the Fifties, as a formal worldview. As a reaction to the Second World War a strong moral and ethical humanist movement emerged. The humanist movement has its own social and cultural institutions. In education it has its own university, the University of Humanistic Studies (see e.g. Halsema & Van Houten, 2002). For primary and secondary education the humanist movement has not opted for own schools, arguing that it was better if children of different worldviews all come together in the public school. In public schools the parents can ask for worldview education, like humanist worldview lessons. About 1/3 of the public schools have this humanist worldview education. There are also schools based on pedagogical views like Montessori, Dalton, Steiner, etc. Often these schools favour humanist ideas and work closely together with the University of Humanistic Studies and the organisation for humanist worldview education (HVO). All public and political debates on values and norms in the Netherlands are strongly inÀuenced by this denominationalism. For the different religions, the school is a very important pedagogical environment. Many pedagogical debates circle around issues of worldviews. What have been the developments in moral practices and discourses after the Second World War? In the 1950s, the denominationalism in society was still identi¿ably in evidence. Established values and norms were transferred within the individual denominations, also in their educational institutions. In the rebuilding of the Dutch nation and civic society after the German occupation, the religions and the humanist worldview took a lead. Protestant and catholic denominations reconstructed their institutions, in particular in education, to reinforce their moral values and to inÀuence the norm development in society. In the 1960s, the discussion on moral values took another turn. There was a growing awareness in the so-called ‘Sixties’ that values are personal choices and that norms should therefore be based on consultation and dialogues with all concerned. In this view, values are considered to be dynamic entities in constant development, 11

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which could crystallize in group processes into social norms. And these norms are continuously being questioned and reformed. Romantic views on personal development like in humanistic psychology (Maslow, Rogers, Fromm) and in child-centred pedagogy inÀuenced discourses on education and values and norms. In line with the modernisation project, personal development, or personal emancipation, attained a central focus. The modern individual abandoned social and cultural traditions and tried to become the ‘master of his own universe’. Present reviews of the ‘Sixties’ mostly stress this personal emancipation. This is however only a partial reading of social and cultural history. The 1960s – actually the period from 1965 to 1975 which is generally referred to as the ‘Sixties’ – had a broader social, cultural and political project: both the personal and the collective emancipation had centre stage. Collective emancipation was concerned with eliminating, or at least reducing inequality in society and creating possibilities for personal emancipation for all. Society was expected to create through collective emancipation the conditions for everyone’s personal emancipation. In this political project, social class, gender and ethnicity should not restrict personal emancipation – neither in the Netherlands nor in the rest of the world. Personal emancipation and collective emancipation were linked and further democratization of society was seen as a necessary condition for human Àourishing. Much attention was given to moral values like social justice and equality. Educational theories of empowerment like those of Freire and Illich where inÀuential, as well as the German political education movement of Negt and the critical ‘Bildung’ of Von Hentig and Rolff. In the Netherlands the work of the sociologist Matthijssen, the psychologist Deen and the pedagogue Van Gelder were signi¿cant in this emancipatory educational movement. Educational ideas and practices relating to a collective emancipation like projectbased learning, linking learning in school with learning outside school, political education, student involvement and democratic education, provoked considerable resistance in society. The collective emancipation function of education, which in fact had just started to develop, came under increasing political pressure and was marginalized in policy, theory and in practice. The formal argument was that education should be neutral and not be politicized and education should, in line with the discourse on personal emancipation, be child-centred. In many Western countries like the Netherlands the political control over secondary education and vocational education was tightened – through standards, national curricula and central assessments. The paradox is that the political has been abandoned by political means that were presented as neutral. Education in the Eighties became, more than before in history, characterized by a process of rationalization and by a technical-instrumental way of thinking. It was not only education that was oriented towards collective emancipation that suffered from this process of rationalization. All value-laden education, also religious education, was strongly neglected in the technical discourse. Education should in this view be considered as neutral and value-free. The traditional transfer of values – in 12

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so far as it still existed in education – was also obstructed and made ‘hidden’ by the denial of the moral nature of education. The contribution of education to identity development was no longer content and values-oriented, but only aimed at psychological processes of control and well-being. Personal emancipation in education was still permissible in the 1980s. Personal emancipation was incorporated in the new spirit of the times, the rational and the technical-instrumental with the emphasis on established knowledge and skills, and oriented to easily measurable output. Personal development in education increasingly became the individual and personal exploitation of opportunities. Values were reduced to individual well-being and disappeared from the curriculum, especially from the subject matter. The teacher increasingly became a knowledge manager and a supervisor of learning processes. The moral element only came into view when order, or the norm, was disturbed by for example bullying. The dominance of technical rationality meant that there was little explicit attention to values in education: neither in the sense of a transfer of values, nor in the sense of value development or construction. Attention to norms was reduced to enforcement and therefore the imposition of values. This adapting value orientation in education is still present to this day, especially through all manner of rules and forms of discipline. In the 1990s, the technical-instrumental thinking was mixed with the ‘marketing’ of education. The discourse on education and the organization of education had to be more market oriented (Apple, 1996; Giroux, 2001). Students, teachers and schools should take more responsibility for their own learning process, teaching and school organization. The central concept was self-regulation, on the level of students and teachers and on the level of the school (Bandura, 1995; Veugelers, 2004). In terms of citizenship, in educational practice and in educational policy the developing of values was oriented to adapting and conforming to society, whereas the one-sided orientation on autonomy led to an individualistic citizenship. Almost no attention was given to the development of critical-democratic citizenship, oriented to both autonomy and social concern. Adaptive socialization was in particular achieved by the ‘hidden curriculum’. An explicit moral message was mostly disappearing from the curriculum. At the end of the past millennium the discourse changed. Increasing apathy – in particular among youngsters – towards politics and civic society; violence in public life and more calculating behaviour in all parts of society resulted in a renewed interest in the moral task of education. These ‘moral and social crises’ were articulated strongly. These crises in society were posed as educational challenges. Education was asked to renew its pedagogical task and to compensate for its instrumental approach. That education was invited to reinvent their moral task was an expression of the new landscape of ideological apparatus. The socializing effects of politically led institutions like social services and the switch from compulsory military service to a voluntary service had diminished. In civil society, the Christian religions had lost a major part of their members, and those who stayed on favoured a more 13

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personal choice and even a personal religious ‘bricolage’. Compared with the other ideological institutions, education was, even after decades of technical rationality, considered to be a strong moral education institute. Till the end of the past millennium moral education was separated from multicultural education. In practice, politics and in the academic world, the moral was not linked to cultural diversity. In multicultural education itself, all students had to learn about the cultural activities and ideas of the different ethnic groups in the country, in particular the nonwestern immigrants (Leeman, 2006). Teachers had dif¿culties in realising these pedagogical goals. It was not easy for multicultural education to go beyond just the most visible differences between cultural practices. Learning about the more fundamental ideas underlying these cultural practices and analysing identity development as a complex and multifaceted process was not part of the curriculum in most schools. ‘9/11’ and other forms of terrorism and their accompanying social, cultural and political debates have challenged multicultural issues strongly, and contributed to a change in the discourse on moral education and citizenship education (Veugelers, Derriks & De Kat, 2006). In many Western countries citizenship education became in the beginning of the 21st century a formal task of education. The pedagogical function of education was restructured in the light of these cultural challenges. In the Netherlands the aims of citizenship education were formulated as ‘active participation and social integration’. Citizenship was not seen as a dynamic interplay of people creating society, but as adapting to a traditional national citizenship. Moral education no longer aimed at developing individuals but mainly focused on adapting to the traditional national citizenship. What became the position and articulation of citizenship education in educational policy and practice? CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES

Nowadays the moral and social function of education is articulated by the concept of citizenship education. In public debate, policy and academic work, citizenship is not limited to the political level. The concept has been deepened into the social and cultural levels, the concept has also been broadened by crossing over the national borders and speaking of European citizenship and global citizenship. Citizenship education has been incorporated into educational policy and practice. Educational policy is the result of public discourses and political decision making about education. Spring (2004), in his book How educational ideologies are shaping global society, distinguishes three important educational ideologies: ‘Nationalist Education in the Age of Globalization’; ‘Schooling Workers for a Global Free Market’ and ‘Globalizing Morality’. The nationalist educational ideology emphasizes the native language, the national culture, the national history, nation-building and security. The global free market ideology emphasizes comparability and standardizing, economic and technological development, and the international competitive position of countries. In subject matter the emphasis is placed on languages, on 14

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mathematics and science. This ideology is strongly promoted by organizations like the World Bank and the OECD. The globalizing morality ideology emphasizes human rights, democracy, cultural diversity and sustainability. In content, the emphasis is on moral development and a morally founded sustainable world citizenship. This ideology is especially promoted by UNESCO and NGO’s. According to Spring (2004) each educational system possesses a speci¿c combination of these ideologies. He presents case studies from several countries. Which ideological mix is found in the Netherlands, especially in relation with citizenship education? With some caution we present the following analysis. The nationalist ideology with its emphasis on the national culture and history and much attention for security and safety is strongly present in the Dutch educational policy discourse on citizenship education. There is also attention for the global morality ideology, but this is not as strong as for the nationalist ideology. The global free market ideology is dominant in the Dutch political educational discourse and is even strong enough to marginalize the nationalist ideology in educational policy. The emphasis in Dutch educational policy is on the international competitive position and the ‘knowledge society’: languages, mathematics and science. Citizenship education in it’s global, and especially in its nationalist perspective, is important in Dutch national policy, but subsidiary to education for the ‘knowledge society’. Citizenship and moral values What is the practice of citizenship education and what are its goals? Citizenship as a system of rules has to do with norms, but for an active and lived citizenship moral values are important. Moral values give the person a drive to contribute in making norms or to accept existing norms. Moral values are important for the persons involved in developing citizenship. Different perspectives on values and value development are possible. Values may be oriented towards adaptation, personal emancipation or a more collective emancipation (Giroux, 1989; Veugelers, 2000). Citizenship relates not only to the formal political domain, but also to daily life. Dewey (1923) speaks of citizenship as lifestyle. It is concerned with how a person stands in society; the meanings of life on the personal, the interpersonal and the sociopolitical levels. Over the past ten years we have conducted much research into moral values in education. Parents, teachers and students were asked whether any of a wide variety of values should be educational objectives and whether they are practiced. We consistently ¿nd three clusters of objectives: – ‘Disciplining’, where the objectives include obedience, good manners and self discipline; – ‘Autonomy’, where the objectives include forming a personal opinion and learning to handle criticism; – ‘Social concern’, where the objectives include empathy, showing respect for people with different views, and solidarity with others. 15

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These clusters of objectives have many similarities with the three fundamental characteristics of moral behaviour identi¿ed earlier by Durkheim (1923): discipline, attachment to or identi¿cation with the group, and autonomy. The above mentioned clusters of educational objectives can be linked in a speci¿c way with the three types of citizenship (see for the empirical studies Leenders, De Kat & Veugelers, 2008a; 2008b): – The adapting citizen attaches great importance to discipline and social concern and relatively little to autonomy; – The individualistic citizen attaches great importance to discipline and autonomy and relatively little to social concern; – The critical-democratic citizen attaches great importance to autonomy and social concern and relatively little to discipline. The individualistic and the critical democratic citizenship are two variants of an autonomous citizenship. The individualistic type reasons more from the individual, whereas the critical-democratic type reasons from an involvement with others. A survey among teachers in Dutch secondary education showed that 53 % of the teachers aim at a critical-democratic type of citizenship, 39 % at an adaptive type, and 18 % at an individualizing type. In vocational education the emphasis was slightly more on adaptation, while in pre-university educations an individualizing type was slightly preferred (Leenders et al. 2008a). It is remarkable that parents, teachers and students alike, indicate that the cluster of discipline is more easily realized than the clusters of autonomy and social concern. They argue that a really well founded and self-regulated autonomy is more then just giving your opinion and is therefore a dif¿cult to realize pedagogical developmental task. The social concern is also dif¿cult to realize in particular in its more engaged and social justice oriented forms. And youngsters have problems in balancing autonomy and social concern, autonomy is very important for contemporary youngsters (Veugelers, 2008). Even if the pedagogical goals are aiming at a critical-democratic citizenship, the practice and the effects are strongly adaptive and individualized. The three types of citizenship have a differing emphasis in their goals and are connected with differing pedagogical and didactical practices. Methodically, the adaptive type emphasizes the transfer of values and the regulation of behaviour; the individualizing type independent learning and developing critical thinking in a neutral way, and the critical-democratic type cooperative learning, developing critical thinking through social inquiry and dialogue, and on questions of social concern and humanity (Leenders & Veugelers, 2006). Westheimer and Kahne (2004) found a similar threesplit in citizenship (see also Westheimer, 2008 and Johnson & Morris, 2010). Westheimer and Kahne identify a personally responsible citizen, a participating citizen and a citizen who strives for social justice. These studies on differences in citizenship show that developing citizenship is not a linear process from passive to active, but that citizenship can have different meanings and sociopolitical orientations. 16

A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

What do students feel about moral and citizenship education? The results are very diverse (Veugelers, 2008). Students think that it is the teacher’s task to discipline the students, preferable of course the other students. And students like to further develop their autonomy through moral and citizenship education. Autonomy development is very important for youngsters. Social involvement and developing a critical-democratic citizenship is overall less important to them. In several studies we found however that students like to broaden their horizon. Interesting is the result that students, even more than the teachers, want to discuss politics in the classroom. Our research also showed that students have the opinion that teachers should not interfere too much with their identity development. In their pedagogical relations, teachers must ¿nd a balance between on the one hand providing space and keeping their distance, and on the other hand supporting students in their identity development. INDIVIDUALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY

These struggles around morality, citizenship and citizenship education take place in a changing society in which the relation of the individual to society has altered strongly. The Enlightenment process of rationality and personal responsibility resulted in the individualization of society. At ¿rst modernization was oriented to structuring society, whereas now it is oriented to individualization (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1992; Bauman, 1993). Life development was considered to be linear, in the sense of following rules. Life development is now more a question of ¿nding rules and of reÀective judgment. Human beings can, and even must make an increasing number of choices. People construct their own life-politics, they even have to do this, and they can not escape of it! These social and personal developments seem in line with the humanist plea for autonomy, that people have the freedom to make choices for themselves and take responsibility for their own life. Humanist thinkers, among them Dutch philosophers like Erasmus and Spinoza, have continuously argued for developing human capacities and the agency of living an own life. Sociological analyses of modernization stress more the falling apart of societies and communities into individuals than the gain of modernity and humanity to create more possibilities for living a personal life. Sociologists focus more on the problematic aspects of modernization. A human characteristic is that human beings can reÀect on their relationship with other human beings. An interesting question is: How can human beings people live together in these modern conditions that are full of contradictions (Halliwell & Mousley, 2003; Said, 2004)? Human beings themselves must increasingly organize their own lives and bring their own order into the chaos. This begs the question of whether it is still possible to integrate highly individualized societies. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) reject two possibilities: First, the integration through shared values – the old way. The dif¿culty with this is that the very diversity of cultural orientations has swept away the foundations on which the traditional value societies formed and constantly 17

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renewed themselves. Secondly, the cultivation of a national awareness. This is not only awkward in view of the polarization between individualization and globalization; it is also too abstract in relation to actual and highly tangible differences between groups. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) put forward two proposals: First, developing a clear understanding of the problem of how to keep a strongly individualized society together; secondly, attempting to mobilize and motivate people for the challenges that exist at the centre of their lives (for example, related to work, the destruction of nature, and life itself). These proposals mean that society has to be continuously reinvented, with new forms of politically open and creative links. Creating society and linking human beings is a permanent process. Society itself is in this perspective what Bauman (2008) calls a ‘liquid identity’. These processes of building links and building society implies, in our conceptual framework, that space has to be given to value development (creating meaning) and to the construction of norms – norms that have to be constantly reformulated. Constructing norms is ¿nding possibilities for humanising interpersonal relations, communities and society. To participate in these constituting processes people have to acquire reÀective, dialogical, and action skills that enable them to construct norms. But behaviour is not only a question of skills or competencies. Participative behaviour depends on an intention, on a will to act. This sense oriented intention is valuedriven. Again we are back at the moral level. Moral values are necessary to drive participation human beings in society. Social concern and democracy Linking the individual and the society is currently formulated by European politicians in terms of integration and social cohesion. We opt for the term ‘democracy’, which expresses more active participation and involvement of citizens and dynamic social processes in which power relations are at stake. Following Dewey (1923) and Freire (1985) democracy can be considered as a humanistic way of life that emphasizes humanising processes and creates space for giving meaning to life. Real democracy needs citizens that are both socially involved and autonomous; therefore we use the concept of critical-democratic citizenship. The addition of ‘critical’ expresses the dynamic process and the right to take one’s own stance. Democracy as lifestyle relates not only to the political but also to the interpersonal level, the daily interaction in schools, in work organizations and in the public domain (Touraine, 1997). Democracy is not a ¿xed state, the ¿nal stage of a social and political process. Democracy must be repeatedly won and maintained. Society has to be developed by means of democracy, also in the individualized modern era. Democracy, and in particular democracy as a process, can stimulate, organize and connect value development and norm development (see also the chapter of De Groot). The social concern in critical-democratic citizenship can range from affective empathy to engagement and political action for social justice. 18

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Democracy must not be equated with consumer behaviour, market operation and privatization (Giroux, 2001). Therefore topics such as empowerment, power relations, ethics and giving meaning to life must be reintroduced into the public debate and into education. Through citizenship development, education is able to equip young people with the competencies to participate in the social and political domains, but education should also attempt to make young people morally prepared to use these competencies, that is to say, to develop social concern and humanity, to show civic courage and critical-democratic citizenship. Contemporary society, characterized by individualization and globalization, continuously demands value development and the active and creative dialogical and joint formulation of norms. A continuing democratization of society, so people on all levels are able to participate actively, must be the fertile ground for this value development, development of norms, and identi¿cation and engagement with norms. The quality of the education should be assessed, according to this view, not only in terms of individual ‘academic’ school performance of students, but also on the contribution education makes to social justice and motivation for social change. CREATING EDUCATIONAL SPACE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES AND NORMS

How can education practice these ideas? Contrary to what is often stated, education must not ¿rst and foremost pay attention to knowledge and skills also in the moral and cultural domain, but to the development of a personal identity – for giving meaning to life. Education should challenge students to think about values and norms and their own moral development. Of course students should relate in this process of reÀection to important value systems. Relevant knowledge must be transferred, but it is more important that attention is given to the moral development of young people: to their values and social norms, their process of giving meaning to life, and their skills for thinking about values, to communicate about them, to act accordingly, and to reÀect on this action. These cultural processes are the heart of education (Bruner, 1998) and are part of identity development (Goodson, Biesta, Tedder & Adair, 2010). Often students have to experience these processes ‘hidden’, nonreÀective and without feedback of teachers and other students. We think it is desirable in educational practice to create more space for giving meaning to life, personal meaning construction, and the development of a personal life view, and that attention is created for the social environment and for the processes of power and inequality that entail these dialogical processes of meaning making. Education should challenge students to relate to the world around them and to the ‘global world’; to learning how to assess differences and being able to deal with and to appreciate those differences. To be constantly working with the tension between autonomy and social concern. Students should be given the opportunity to explore domains in the curriculum and to further develop their values in these domains. Attention to different per19

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spectives is important in order to develop values in a dialogical way (Schuitema, Veugelers, Rijlaarsdam & Ten Dam, 2008). Students need to have the opportunity to become familiar with value orientations woven into cultures. Students develop their personal values in a dialogue with the values that are woven into the subject matter. By interacting with other people or with materials, students develop skills for moral reasoning, moral action and reÀection on that action. Students should perceive education as a moral practice in which they are challenged to further develop their own values and getting engaged with values (Veugelers & De Kat, 2002). Developing values is one part of the story, developing norms is the other part. Students develop norms when they have to reach agreement with others. This development of norms as part of the educational teaching process may take place in the school and in the outside world. During their education, students must be given many opportunities in and outside school to develop norms with each other, with the teacher, and with fellow-citizens. The process of developing norms is dialogical in seeking for agreements, of course contradictions will remain but the intention is to give voice to everybody, to accept differences and to ¿nd ways to live together and to jointly build communities. Whereas dominant educational thinking ¿rst emphasized the knowledge paradigm, it now emphasizes using skills to acquire knowledge. The more radical variants focus on knowledge construction. Even when there is attention for constructive processes the personal moral is mostly outside the scope of education. The challenge for education and educational studies is the incorporation of values into the educational learning process, and the creation of pedagogical practices in which students are able to work in a reÀective and dialogical way on the development of values and norms, on sense making and humanising their own world and the global world.. SOURCES FOR A HUMANIST EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: MORAL EDUCATION, CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

This morally embedded humanistic critical-democratic citizenship education is not that easy to realise. We need a more dynamic view and practice of human development and education, of interaction between the individual and the environment, between the individual and structure, and between the individual and culture. Nascent forms of this can be found in various academic educational traditions such as pragmatism, cultural activity theory, moral education, critical pedagogy and democratic education. We will concentrate on the signi¿cance of moral education, critical pedagogy, and democratic education for more humane practices. Moral education A number of issues from the moral education tradition are relevant to pedagogical practices oriented to critical-democratic citizenship: 20

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– With procedures such as value communication, where students learn to think and to act with respect to values, it is necessary to take account of moral values as criteria (McLaren, 1994; Veugelers, 2001; 2010a). Moral judgement necessitates the use of criteria (values) for assessing behaviour, in particular a value such as justice (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989); – Values drive behaviour, the affective component of moral development therefore deserves attention. Concern, involvement (‘caring’) and engagement are the affective components in the social domain (Noddings, 2002); – To ¿nd out where moral values are at stake, the development of moral sensitivity, and being able to deal with emotions is important. (Tirri, 2008); – Some current approaches to moral education in the educational ¿eld are characterized by an integrated approach to acquiring skills for value communication, stimulating certain values – often oriented to critical- democratic citizenship – and attention to the school as a community (Solomon, Watson & Battistisch, 2001; Veugelers & Oser, 2003). Critical pedagogy and democratic education Critical pedagogy sets out to provide social relevant education and to give the participants more control over their own lives. In the tradition of Dewey and Freire it argues for transformative practices where both personal and collective emancipation are worked on. The work of Giroux (1983, p. 168) ¿ts best with the classical Greek de¿nition of citizenship education, in which: a rationality can be identi¿ed that is explicitly political, moral and visionary. In this model, education is seen as intrinsically political, developed to educate citizens to be intelligent and active participants in society. Furthermore, intelligence is seen as a supplement to ethics, a manifestation and demonstration of the principles of the good and just life. Its goal was to form a sound character oriented to the permanent search for freedom. Giroux (1983, p. 202) lists six points that are from a critical pedagogy perspective essential to educational practice: – Active participation, – Critical thinking, – Developing an individual autobiography, – Tracing values that are woven into human existence, – Learning about the structural and ideological forces that obstruct opportunities for development, – Show how to jointly make political structures that challenge the status quo. This type of critical pedagogy must be inÀuenced by a passion and optimism that appeals to opportunities. The concept ‘democratic education’ refers to an educational practice based on critical pedagogy. In this tradition there is a lot of attention 21

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for organizing democratic processes in education and in linking school and social action (Goodman, 1992; Apple & Beane, 1996; Parker, 2004; Veugelers & O’Hair, 2005). TEACHERS’ NORMATIVE PROFESSIONALISM AND MORAL VALUES

Till now we have been speaking in particular about educational concepts and practices. In these sections we spoke a lot about teachers. In this part we will concentrate on the position of teachers in relation with moral values. In all education the teacher has a crucial position, in value embedded education this role is complex. Teachers can work in different ways with moral values (Veugelers, 2010a). Based on a review of the literature we distinguish the following perspectives: Value transfer, reÀective practitioner, moral sensitivity, participation and dialogue, and moral politics. The various perspectives have different ideas about the teaching and learning of moral values, the kind of citizenship society needs and the very task of education. The perspectives articulate different educational practices that assume different types of methodology and pedagogical goals of teachers. When presenting the ¿ve perspectives, we articulate what makes this approach unique. Value transfer This approach focuses on the transfer of moral values in education (Sockett, 1993). In this view, morality consists of virtues, of traits that support good behaviour. Being a good moral example, and teaching students about good moral people are important teaching methods in this approach. Student reÀectivity is not really strengthened. The value transfer method is part of a pedagogical vision that has well-de¿ned ideas about the good life and about important cultural traditions. The focus is more on getting youngsters involved in existing cultural practices rather than on challenging them to position themselves in an open, multicultural and changing society. This approach can be situated in a national educational system that is concerned about its cultural heritage, or in a tradition that is based on a religious worldview that perceives its worldview to be more static than dynamic. ReÀective practitioner According to many sociological analyses, modern society needs citizens who are Àexible and reÀective. Many professions require professionalism based on what Schön referred to as reÀection-in-action. In education this calls for a practice in which youngsters reÀect on their behaviour, take responsibility for their actions, and try out new behaviour in an experimental and reÀective manner. The reÀective paradigm has had considerable inÀuence on the thinking about teachers and teacher education. In reÀective-oriented teaching, teachers are continuously challenged to inquiry their beliefs and their teaching behaviour. The emphasis in the 22

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reÀective practitioner approach is on reÀection on one’s own professional behaviour (Korthagen, 2004). The assumption is that one’s personal beliefs inÀuence one’s pedagogical-didactic behaviour. Teachers should learn to consciously handle their methods and actions. Moral values can be part of the reÀection process, but the method is presented more as a process than a moral content. Moral sensitivity Moral values are abstract and are normative because they say something about the good life, about good and bad. Moral values are embedded in all narratives and practices, but how to detect them? Following the reÀection perspective we can ask questions about why you choose for a certain alternative. We can do it critically and ask on which moral values the statement or behaviour is based. For moral reasoning and acting you must not only know cognitively that moral values are involved, you must also have the sensitivity to feel and be aware of where moral values are at stake. The third perspective is therefore moral sensitivity (Campbell, 2003; Tirri, 1999). Teachers should develop the awareness to detect when moral values are involved. and how meaning is giving to them. This implies seeing how students position themselves; give meaning to their experiences and the world around them, and how they work with the values involved. Teachers should incorporate this moral sensitivity in the art of their teaching. Participation and dialogue More cultural-oriented analyses of society argue that youngsters need to develop dialogical competencies and an active action-oriented participation in society. Education should therefore pay more attention to dialogical learning, learning by experience, and activity-oriented learning. Dewey’s pragmatism and Vygotsky’s cultural activity theory have inÀuenced the development of this perspective. From a Deweyan perspective, participation itself is not enough; experiences should lead to the transformation of knowledge and active processes of knowledge construction and competence development. A dialogical approach, based for example on the discourse theory of Habermas, has always been an important element in Kohlbergoriented moral education (Oser, 1994). Students should be involved in communication actions that challenge their ideas, deconstruct the values interwoven in their ideas, and this can help them reconstruct their own personal beliefs. A perspective aimed at participation and dialogue, as mentioned above, can create dialogical learning and change. Hansen (2001) shows how moral assumptions are manifest in rituals, such as classroom beginnings, in teachers’ style and in the curriculum. Hansen argues for more attention for moral knowledge and moral judgment in education. Participation, action and reÀection should include concern about moral values involved.

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Moral politics We refer to the ¿fth perspective as moral politics. Morality, in this view, is seen as embedded in a political context, and the aim of education is formulated as political action for social change. Teachers’ work and social action are linked in this perspective. Beyer (1996) speaks of democratic education, Oakes and Rogers (2006) use the concepts teaching for changing the world, and teaching for social justice. Empowerment of people and working on structural changes that enhance humanity and change at grassroots level are considered to be pedagogical goals. The work of Dewey, Freire and Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy has inÀuenced the development of this perspective. Teachers attempt to create democratic classrooms, to include minorities’ perspectives in the curriculum, and organize participatory social inquiry in and outside the school. Teaching is seen as social and moral engagement and as creating a better and more just world. ReÀection and action are linked and aimed at realizing these moral goals. Teachers are clear in their critical emancipatory view, and their particular choice for schools that serve disadvantaged children. They choose for this kind of education. We can argue that the ¿ve perspectives all have their particular strengths depending on the goals one has with education and the corresponding teaching method. If one wants to focus in education on character building and on making clear which values one ¿ nds important, then the value transfer perspective is the most useful perspective. When education is seen as very Àexible in its content, structure and teaching methods, and in which teachers are autonomous and considered to be professionals, then a more reÀective perspective is necessary. If this kind of education considers the development of morality as crucial and important, then the moral sensitivity perspective is desired. If learning is seen as transforming practices and learning by doing and dialogue, then the participation and dialogue perspective is needed. And if this transforming practice is seen as part of a struggle for social justice and democracy, then the moral politics perspective is useful. We are aware of the fact that concrete practices will often show a unique combination of elements of these perspectives. A humanist perspective embraces at least the moral sensitivity and the participation dialogue perspectives. If a more political social justice position is taken then the moral politics perspective can be part of it as well. CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION

Realising the ideas outlined in this chapter in educational practice encounter the context and institutionalisation of education. In this section we will discuss three very relevant topics in contemporary education that inÀuence the possibilities for a humanist perspective on education: – Religions and worldviews in education;

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– The relation of the moral and the political; – Schools, community and segregation: bonding and bridging. Religions and worldviews and education Education can not expel worldviews from schools. Even when there is a formal distinction between education and worldviews like in France, worldviews are embedded in educational practices and students are developing identities. How can education pay attention to worldviews? We developed four models that may provide a better insight in the relation of worldview and education (Veugelers, 2010b). We call these four models: 1. Educating for a worldview; 2. Learning about different worldviews; 3. Personal development of a worldview within a tradition; 4. Personal development of a worldview within a democratic framework. 1. Educating for a worldview The student is socialized within a worldview. The student gets acquainted with its tradition, learns its basic principles and becomes familiar with its rituals. The emphasis is on growing into the worldview. There is hardly any attention to other worldviews and there is no critical reÀection on one’s own worldview. 2. Learning about different worldviews The student gets to know the important traditions in religions and worldviews. Learning is strongly cognitive and oriented towards knowing and identifying important events, stories and rituals in various traditions. The emphasis is on ‘knowing about’, not on judging the various worldviews. 3. Personal development of a worldview within a tradition The student is supported in his or her development of a worldview. It is acknowledged that the student makes his or her own choices in this process of developing that worldview. The student learns about several worldviews, but especially about the tradition that is adopted by the school. The inÀuence of that tradition is fairly large in learning about rituals, stories and events (the ‘hidden curriculum’), especially in the school’s daily practices. 4. Personal development of a worldview within a democratic framework The school is, in a formal sense, neutral with regard to the various worldviews. The student is responsible for his or her choices in the development of a personal worldview. The school approaches worldviews from a democratic stance with an emphasis on civic rights like freedom of speech, freedom of religion and a ban on discrimination. ReÀection and action on a personal worldview is aimed at the peaceful solution of conÀict, respect for minorities, and a joint agreement on public 25

WIEL VEUGELERS

affairs. The school stimulates the student to critically compare various worldviews and to participate in a dialogue on worldviews, and supports the student in his or her development of a personal worldview. In an empirical study we interviewed teachers about their practice. The interviews show that in many religious secondary schools there is a stage between models 3 and 4, between ‘personal development of a worldview within a tradition’ and ‘personal development of a worldview within a democratic framework’. The distinguishing factor is how strong the adherence is to the tradition of the worldview of the school and the teachers. The argument to stay close to model 3, ‘within a tradition’, can be derived from the denominationalism in Dutch education. From the viewpoint of a divers society, an argument to stay close to model 4, ‘within a democratic framework’, can be derived from the cultural and denominational diversity in the Netherlands and the democratic rights of freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The denominational schools based not on a religion but on pedagogical ideas can make the same choice. Some of these schools in the Netherlands are very interested in a humanist perspective and choose for model 3 ‘personal development of a world view within a tradition’ in which they combine their own pedagogical views with humanist ideas, in particular autonomy. Public education is supposed to give attention to worldviews without taking a position. They can organize, if parents ask for it, special lessons in religious studies or humanist ethical education (HVO). In particular public schools can promote democratic values. Public schools especially could express model 4, ‘personal development of a worldview within a democratic framework’. There are good arguments to call this perspective very humanistic: it enforces both autonomy and social concern. The Dutch educational system gives religious schools the possibility to work from their own pedagogical and religious worldview. These schools however have to prepare students for a divers society in which these youngsters need to live in a democratic society with people that have other religions and worldviews. These private schools have to bridge the own worldview with pluralism and democracy. Public schools and nonreligious private schools are not so much involved with religions and worldviews, but they too have to help students in developing an identity and in living in a plural and democratic society. Education can not avoid worldviews, even in a secular state with a separation of education and religions schools have to pay attention to worldviews and have to support students in their identity development. The moral and the political A second issue is the relation of the moral and the political. The concept of citizenship itself is continuously broadened and deepened. It is broadened in the sense that citizenship is no longer limited to the own country, but also relates to the continent and even to world. citizenship. From a critique on the linking of the concept of citizenship to one’s own country, a more morally inspired cosmopolitan citizenship has 26

A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

been advocated (Nussbaum, 1997). This concept is about moral values that concern responsibility for the whole world and all its inhabitants. An open attitude towards other people is one of its important aspects (Hansen, 2008). Recently this morally inspired global citizenship has been criticized for its lack of attention for political power relations (Mouffe, 2005; Thayer-Bacon, 2008; Todd, 2008). A stronger relation between the moral and the political are advocated here: moral values should be analysed within social and political relations. Moral values get, due to power relations, different connotations. Abstract values hide contradictions in reality. In a recent research project we studied the views of teachers with regard to global citizenship (Veugelers, 2011). In the theoretical orientation a distinction was made between an ‘open global citizenship’, a ‘moral global citizenship’ and a ‘social-political global citizenship’. We also formulated seven elements of global citizenship. On the basis of the empirical part of the study (interviews with teachers), we are able to connect these elements and forms of global citizenship. Open global citizenship a. As a result of globalization, people have become closer connected. Therefore they need knowledge of other cultures in order to work together (knowledge). b. Global citizenship expresses that you are focused on the world as a whole and that you are open to new experiences (open attitude). Moral global citizenship c. Global citizenship means that differences between people and groups are being appreciated (diversity). d. Global citizenship expresses that you are prepared to cooperate in increasing the opportunities of all people to enjoy a decent existence (increasing opportunities). e. Global citizenship expresses that you take responsibility for the world as a whole and for humanity (taking responsibility). f. Global citizenship has a global and a local component. At the local level as well, one should acquire knowledge, openness, take responsibility, create opportunities and appreciate differences (local component). Social-political global citizenship g. Global citizenship involves social and political relations and works towards more equal relations (equality in relations). The interviews with the teachers have shown that these distinctions are useful, and also that the three types of global citizenship that were distinguished are connected with different educational practices. For pedagogical reasons, teachers usually opt for a moral global citizenship. They feel that an open global citizenship neglects its moral dimensions. A moral global citizenship, on the contrary, does pay attention to moral values like diversity, increasing opportunities, and taking responsibility. 27

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Teachers also try to connect the global and the local, but they do not make a clear choice for a social-political global citizenship. Teachers acknowledge though, that global citizenship is embedded in social and political relations and that a political stance is always implicit. But the teachers do not want to put too strong an emphasis on political relations because politics is a rather sensitive area in education and because of the age of their students. An explicit choice for social change, i.e. reducing social inequalities, is not made by these teachers, because according to them that would mean a reversal to forms of value transfer, even if it is in a transformative way. The social-political nature of global citizenship is therefore at the same time present and not present in secondary education. Present, because moral values are always embedded in social and political relations. Not present, because teachers are reluctant to explicitly stress this embedment and because they do not want to impose their own opinions on the students. Teachers try to develop a moral consciousness in their students, along lines as involvement and appreciation of diversity. Social-political global citizenship as one of possible perspectives Teachers are reluctant to work from a social-political global citizenship. A socialpolitical global citizenship presents itself only when the moral global citizenship is embedded in concrete contexts and when these contexts are analysed for their social and political power relations. This happens seldom, according to the teachers. In education there is always a tension between forces that focus on social reproduction and forces that focus on social transformation (Veugelers, 2008). In most countries however the reproductive forces are much stronger then the transformative forces (Apple, 1999). This is also the case in the Netherlands. It restrained the teachers in their possibilities to choose for a social-political global citizenship. Given the strong reproductive tendency in citizenship education policy and practice and the reluctance of teachers in the social-political domain what would be pedagogical possibilities for a more critical form of global citizenship education? Instead of a social-political global citizenship practice where teachers put values in a social and political context we would plea for a more multi-perspective approach by showing that a social-political global citizenship is one of the possible perspectives. It implies that global citizenship can be interpreted in several ways and that a social-political view is one of these perspectives. In such a multiplied pedagogical approach, the teachers will tend to show less explicitly which view of global citizenship they personally have. They will show that different perspectives are possible, including a social-political view. The fear of over-politicizing global citizenship education seems to have led to an over-moralizing of global citizenship. Demonstrating the moral in the political, without emphasis on one’s own political choice in these power relations, might achieve that the social-political will become part of a dialogue on global citizenship in schools: that the social-political is recognized as one of the perspectives.

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Schools, community and segregation: Bonding and bridging In educational discourses the notion of linking school and community is very popular. The school should strengthen the contact with the local community. This is a statement that everyone is enthusiastic about. But a one-sided social and cultural composition of the local community is an inwardly directed contact, as opposed to one that is oriented to the plural society. It is therefore important to make a case for widening horizons, for acquiring new and different experiences. Due to denominationalism, the different school types and the free school choice there is a strong social and cultural segregation in Dutch education. The introduction of students to other social and cultural groups is however seen as an important aspect of citizenship education. In the framework of citizenship education, schools are explicitly asked by the Ministry of Education to bring different groups of young people together in order to introduce them to each other, to promote their mutual understanding and appreciation, and to further the cooperation between groups. Two theoretical debates are relevant to this topic: ‘bonding and bridging social capital’ of Putnam (2000) and the ‘contact hypothesis’ of Allport (1954). Putnam (2000) points out that a person’s social capital is composed of bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive). Bonding is a social-psychological necessity for a person in order to join and hold one’s own in a cultural group. What Putnam calls bridging, connecting with other people, is what a society needs to function as such, to create social cohesion. Bridging can take on various forms: being considerate, being involved, or showing solidarity with others. In social psychology much research has been done into the conditions under which such meetings of differing groups does promote understanding and appreciation (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) These studies show that this kind of learning processes are rather complex and that the results are usually not predictable. Schuitema and Veugelers (2011) studied several projects in which students from different social and ethnic groups meet each other. The study shows that effects are hard to prove, but that it is important that joint activities are undertaken during the meetings and that there is interaction at the individual level. The contacts between students in the projects could under favourable conditions stimulate an open attitude and awareness of one’s preconceptions about the other groups. Most of these programmes are however very limited in time and scope and cannot compensate for the segregation of students in different schools. Segregation and its social and cultural effects should be a really concern in a humanist perspective on education. CONCLUSIONS: LEARNING CRITICAL-DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP IN EDUCATION

Humanist thinking has always contributed an important role to education, either in the meaning of Bildung, human development or empowerment (Aloni, 2002). A contemporary humanist approach needs to balance these approaches. It should de-

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velop a more dynamic view that links on the individual side autonomy and empowerment and on the social dimension humanity, care and solidarity. For citizenship development this implies the development of a critical-democratic citizenship, with the stimulation of humanitarian, social and democratic values. At the same time, education must stimulate students to gain increasing control over their own process of giving meaning to life. Autonomy development should be a process of increasing empowerment and ef¿cacy. We started the chapter with an outline of the developments regarding values and norms in recent decades. We pointed in particular to the disappearance of the explicitly moral element from education, especially from the subject matter. We gave three reasons for this: the declining inÀuence of denominationalism on the content of education, the rejection of a more political content oriented to collective emancipation and the dominance of a technical-instrumental rationality. We argued that the moral element should be explicitly reintroduced into education. Not in the form of the transfer of values – neither from the perspective of a collective emancipation – but through supervising processes of giving meaning to life by students, the young people’s own values development. Students should learn to relate to important ideological, social and cultural traditions. They should learn to position themselves in modern society and to learn to use moral criteria in reÀecting on their own opinions and actions. Norms are the rules that apply in a group. These norms are continuously being reformulated. Students should not in the ¿rst place be obliged to acquire knowledge of which norms are dominant in society, but must acquire an understanding of the development of norms and be able to try out the development of norms in the school and in extramural learning activities organized by the school. In addition, students should acquire insight into how norms have changed through the activities of groups of people in the course of time. From the perspective of a critical-democratic citizenship, particular attention is desired for emancipation, democracy and empowering humanity. Insight into and experience with the development of norms is a better preparation for social participation in society than acquiring knowledge of the dominant standards in society. Education of this kind demands opportunities for a more active participation of students in school, much extramural learning, and teacher supervision of this identity development and dealing with social norms. All education stimulates certain values and in doing so works on the development of morality and citizenship. The adapting type of citizenship is already encouraged in that students have to comply with the norms of the school. Individualistic citizenship is already encouraged through a meritocratic educational system oriented to individual performance, in which an individual is personally responsible for success or failure at school. Only the critical-democratic type of citizenship received hardly any attention in education. Stimulating humanitarian, social and democratic values and autonomy should be given more attention in education. The pedagogical goal is to educate young people to have a critical, enquiring attitude, to have the courage and the creativity to tread new paths, who wish to scrutinize all knowledge – including their own knowledge – for the norms and underlying power 30

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structures it contains, and who are alert to the relationship between autonomy and social concern. Challenging students’ identity: autonomy and social concern As a humanist perspective on education we want to stress challenging of students’ identities by developing their reÀective and dialogical competencies. This challenging should help them in constructing their identity in which they combine socialpsychological elements and social-political elements. The social-psychological elements are ef¿cacy, self-regulation, trust, con¿dence, the feeling of agency, moral courage and to stand for their own personal worldview. More cognitive competencies like critical thinking, reÀective action and dialogical thinking and acting should found these more affective social-psychological elements. The social-political elements constitute how the individual relates to the other, to the community, to society. It articulates the relation between the person and the other. A humanist perspective on these social-political elements is on developing social concern, on caring, on building connectivity, on bridging, on empowerment, and on building a democratic way of life. Creating humanity for all is the leading goal. In contemporary research on moral development and citizenship, diversity is considered to be a moral value (Parker, 2003; Haste, 2004; Leeman, 2006; Oser & Veugelers, 2008). Appreciating diversity is a linking of autonomy and social concern. It is a concern about the autonomy of others: that other people can live the life they want to live. In this chapter we focused on the social functioning of human being, of being part of community and on getting control on their own life, on empowerment. In this social functioning the creation of meaning and human development takes place. Of course there are more personal intimate feelings and concerns, but the human being is a social being. The self is always situated and linked with others. As we showed, in many pedagogical ideas and practices the social has been neglected by celebrating the individual, the self. We are not arguing to neglect the self in the social but to develop a social situated self. The types of learning a humanist perspective on moral education and criticaldemocratic citizenship education needs are: reÀective learning; dialogical learning and democratic learning. They are three elements of learning that should support each other. ReÀective learning – Articulate one’s own interests, feelings, ethical and aesthetical concerns, meaning making, and moral values – Inquire into the own identity development and reÀect on the own learning process – Regulate the own learning process and taking responsibility for own autonomy and giving meaning 31

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Dialogical learning – Communicate in an open way with other people – Analyse and compare different perspectives – Analyse the social, cultural and political power relations involved Democratic learning – Concern for others and appreciation of diversity – Openness to jointly building agreements (developing norms) – Stand for your own autonomy and critical thinking and action – Involvement in enlarging humanity and in building democracy as a permanent process These reÀective, dialogical and democratic learning processes are at the heart of humanistic education. NOTE 1 Parts of this text have been published before in different articles. In particular in: Veugelers, W. (2007). Creating critical-democratic citizenship education: empowering humanity and democracy in Dutch education. Compare, 37(1), 105-119.

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A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION Giroux, H. A. (1989). Schooling for democracy. London: Routledge. Giroux, H. A. (2001). Public spaces, private lives. Lanham: Rowman & Little¿eld Publishers. Goodman, J. (1992). Elementary schooling for critical democracy. New York: Suny. Goodson, I.F. (2005). Learning, curriculum and life politics. London: Routledge. Goodson, I.F., Biesta, G.J.J., Tedder, M., & Adair, N. (2010). Narrative learning. London: Routledge. Halliwell, M., & Mousley, A. (2003) Critical humanisms. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Halsema, A., & Houten, D. van (Eds.) (2002), Empowering humanity. Utrecht: De Tijdstroom. Hansen, D.T. (2001). Exploring the moral heart of teaching. New York: Teachers College Press. Hansen, D.T. (2008). Curriculum and the idea of cosmopolitan heritage. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 40(3), 289-312. Haste, H. (2004). Constructing the citizen. Political Psychology, 25(3), 413-440. Joas. H. (2002). Die entstehung der werte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Johnson, L., & Morris, P. (2010). Towards for a framework for critical citizenship education. The Curriculum Journal, 21(1), 77-96. Korthagen, F.A.J. (2004). Linking practice and theory. The pedagogy of realistic teacher education. Mahwah NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Leeman. Y. (2006). Teaching in ethic diverse schools: teachers’ professionalism. Eiropean Journal of Teacher Education, 29(3). 341-356. Leenders, H. & Veugelers, W. (2006). Different perspectives on values and citizenship education. Curriculum and Teaching, 21(2), 5-20. Leenders, H., Veugelers, W., & Kat, E. de (2008a). Teachers’ views on citizenship in secondary education in the Netherlands. Cambridge Journal of Education, 38(2), 155-170. Leenders, H.., Veugelers, W., & Kat, E. de (2008b). Moral education and citizenship education at preuniversity schools. In F.K. Oser & W. Veugelers (Eds.). Getting involved. Global citizenship development and sources of moral values (57-74). Rotterdam/Taipeh: SensePublishers. McLaren, P. (1994). Life in schools: an introduction to critical pedagogy in the foundations of education. New York: Longman. Mouffe, C. (2005). On the political. London: Routledge. Noddings, N. (2002). Educating moral people. New York: Teachers College Press. Nussbaum, M.C. (1997). Cultivating humanity. Chambridge: Harvard University Press. Oakes, J., & Rogers, J. (2006). Learning power. Organizing for education and justice. New York: Teachers College Press. Oser, F.K. (1994). Moral perspectives on teaching. Review of Research in Education 20, 57-127. Oser, F.K. (1997). Attitudes and values, acquiring. In E.de Corte & F.E. Weinert (Eds.) International Encyclopedia of Developmental and Instructional Psychology (489-491). Oxford: Pergamon. Oser, F., & Veugelers, W. (Eds.). (2008). Getting involved. Global citizenship development and sources of moral values. Rotterdam/Taipeh: SensePublishers. Parker, W. (2004). Teaching democracy. New York: Teachers College Press. Pettigrew, T.F. & Tropp, L.R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1255-1266. Power, F.C., Higgins, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1989). Lawrence Kohlberg’s approach to moral education. New York: Columbia University Press. Putnam, R.D. (2000). Bowling alone. New York: Simon and Schuster. Said, E.W. (2004). Humanism and democratic critism. New York: Palgrave. Schuitema, J. A., Veugelers, W., Rijlaarsdam, G. & Dam, G. ten (2009). Two instructional designs for dialogical citizenship education. an effect study. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 73(3), 439-461. Schuitema, J., & Veugelers, W. (2011). Multicultural contacts in Education. Educational Studies, 37(1), 101-114. Sockett, H. (1993). The moral base of base for teacher professionalism. New York: Teachers College Press.

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WIEL VEUGELERS Solomon, D., Watson, M.S., & Battistich, V.A. (2001). Teaching and schooling effects on moral/prosocial development. In V. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching (566-603). Washington: AERA. Spring, J. (2004). How educational ideologies are shaping global society. Mahwah NJ : LEA. Tirri, K. (1999). Teachers’ perceptions of moral dilemmas at school. Journal of Moral Education, 28, 1, 31-47. Tirri, K. (Ed.) (2008), Moral sensibilities in urban education. Rotterdam/Taipeh/Boston: SensePublishers Thayer-Bacon, B. (2008). Beyond liberal democracy in schools. New York: Teachers College Press. Todd, S. (2009). Toward an imperfect education: Facing humanity, rethinking cosmopolitanism. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. Touraine, A. (1997). What is democracy. Boulder: Westview Press. Veugelers, W. (2000). Different ways of teaching values. Educational Review, 5(1), 37-46. Veugelers, W. (2001) Teachers, values and critical thinking. In S.R. Steinberg (Ed.). Multi/intercultural conversations (199-215). New York: Peter Lang. Veugelers, W. (2004). Between Autonomy and Control. Journal of Educational Change. 5(2), 141-160. Veugelers, W. (2007). Creating critical-democratic citizenship education: empowering humanity and democracy in Dutch education. Compare, 37(1), 105-119. Veugelers, W. (2008). Youngsters in transformative and reproductive processes of moral and citizenship education. In K. Tirri (Ed.). Moral sensibilities in urban education (79-91). Rotterdam/Taipeh/ Boston: SensePublishers. Veugelers, W. (2010a). Moral values in teacher education. International Encyclopedia of Education. Volume 7 (650-655). Oxford: Elsevier. Veugelers, W. (2010b). Teaching religions and world views in a plural society. In C. Klaassen & N. Maslovaty (Eds.). Moral courage and the normative professionalism of teachers (103-116). Rotterdam/Taipeh/Boston: SensePublishers Veugelers, W. (2011, in press). The moral and the political in global citizenship education. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 9(4). Veugelers, W., Derriks, M., & Kat, E. de (2006). Education and major cultural incidents in society: September 11 and Dutch education. Journal of Peace Education, 3(2), 235-249. Veugelers, W., & Kat, E. de (2002). Student voice in school leadership: promoting dialogue about students’ views on teaching. Journal of School Leadership, 12(1), 97-108. Veugelers, W., & O’ Hair M.J. (Eds.) (2005) Network learning for educational change. Buckingham: Open University Press. Veugelers, W., & F.K. Oser (2003). Teaching in moral and democratic education. Bern/New York: Peter Lang. Veugelers, W., & Vedder, J. (2003). Teaching values. Teachers and Teaching, 9(4), 377-390. Westheimer, J., & Kahne, J. (2004). What kind of citizen? The politics of education of democracy. American Educational Research Journal, 41(2), 237-269. Westheimer, J. (2008). On the relationship between political and moral engagement. In F.K. Oser & W. Veugelers (Eds.). Getting involved. Global citizenship development and sources of moral values (17-30). Rotterdam/Taipeh/Boston: SensePublishers.

Wiel Veugelers Department of Education University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht Graduate School of Child Development and Education University of Amsterdam

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NIMROD ALONI

HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

Starting from the existing consensus regarding the theoretical tenets of humanistic education, the present chapter faces the challenge of translating it into educational practice. Based on Aristotle’s insight that the supreme test of education is in actions and results, the present chapter undertakes to bridge the gap between theory and practice. This ‘bridge’ is deployed in four stages. The introduction presents the current consensus regarding the essential foundations of humanistic education. The second stage focuses on changing the professional self-image and pedagogical presence of teachers and the challenges such a change involves. The third stage discusses the translation of the humanistic worldview into educational policy, in terms of moral values and citizenship education. In the last stage, various educational principles, crucial for the creation of a humanistic school culture, are presented. INTRODUCTION

Over a period of 2,500 years, the humanistic tradition has been offering various models of ‘humanity at its best’ (what the Romans called humanitas). In the classical discourses of the West (Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman) as well as of the East (Confucian and Buddhist), this ideal comprised the central virtues of wisdom, justice, humanness, peace and harmony. More speci¿cally, we ¿nd in these traditions (in different proportion and emphasis) the qualities of broad-minded education, reÀective thinking, noble character, good taste, amiability, benevolence, and social responsibility. Modern humanist discourses – naturalist, liberal, existentialist, progressive, critical and radical – have added to the humanist ideal the following qualities: personal autonomy and authenticity, self-actualisation, critical thinking, creative imagination, respect for persons, empathetic caring, involved democratic citizenship, as well as adherence to global ethics of human rights, multiculturalism, and environmental responsibility. Towards the end of the ¿rst decade of the 21st century, it seems that beyond differences in emphases and formulations there is a wide agreement that humanism consists of a cosmopolitan worldview and ethical code that posits the enhancement of human development, well-being, and dignity as the ultimate end of all human thought and action; namely, giving priority to the values of human dignity, equity, growth and solidarity over any alternative set of values – religious, ideological, Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 35–46. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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economic or national. It further entails a commitment to form a pluralist and just democratic social order, devoted to both human rights and social solidarity: providing every individual with a fair opportunity to enjoy a full and autonomous life, characterized by personal welfare, broad education, cultural richness, self-actualisation, and involved democratic citizenship. Broad consensus exists not only regarding the ethical and pedagogical aims of humanism, but also regarding the means to achieve them. The main idea is that the goal does not justify all means. In other words, unlike authoritarian educational traditions, which condoned physical or psychological humiliation of unruly students, humanistic education is above all committed to a social and intellectual climate protecting students from intellectual oppression, physical punishment, and dishonour. Based on the humanistic stance that people’s unique dignity lies in their critical reason, moral sensitivity, creative imagination, autonomous will and unique personality, it is essential for humanistic education to prioritise the value of human dignity – including freedom of thought, moral autonomy and personal authenticity – over any other religious, nationalistic, economic, or ideological set of values. For an in depth discussion of the history and theory of humanistic educations see Aloni (2003), Enhancing Humanity. In view of Aristotle’s well-known observation that the most signi¿cant test of practical wisdom – in ethics, politics, and pedagogy – is not in its formal understanding but in its practical realization (Aristotle, 1980), the principal challenge facing educators today is to translate the above-mentioned theoretical consensus about objectives and means into practical models of humanistic education. The present chapter attempts to cope with this challenge in the following manner. First, I will deal with the need to change the professional self-image or professional identity of teachers as well as their modes of pedagogical presence. Then, I will present the implications of a humanistic world-view for an educational policy in the areas of knowledge, values, and virtues. I will conclude with some aspects constituting the humanistic school culture – a culture capable of empowering students in their progress towards a sovereign and complete humanity of signi¿cance, quality, and self-actualisation. THE PROFESSIONAL SELF-IMAGE AND PEDAGOGICAL PRESENCE OF TEACHERS

In the introduction to Education under Siege, Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) write: ‘Education should be more political, while politics should be more educational.’ In a certain sense, this may be interpreted in view of Adorno’s famous adage – ‘after Auschwitz, one cannot write poetry anymore.’ (Adorno, 1981). These two quotes are founded on the realization that the human race has produced such abominable atrocities, that we may no longer live our life as if it were just a matter of daily routine. The fact that political regimes in the 20th century promised a life of power and prosperity but, in fact, sentenced millions to death, agony, exile and misery requires 36

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educators to adopt a more activist political approach in creating mechanisms supporting the sacredness of life and the dignity of humans. In other words, the modernization of propaganda and control mechanisms – Orwellian politics, commercials and religious and ideological brainwashing – has meant increased possibilities and opportunities to depersonalise and transform people into fanatic soldiers, submissive workers and addicted consumers. The defence against these historic trends can only be conducted by those who identify them and see the proverbial writing on the wall: educators, academics and intellectuals who will organize themselves as an elite in service of society, and undertake to develop ‘immunizations’ to protect its younger citizens from hegemonic establishments that consider and treat people and ‘usable and abusable’ tools for achieving greater wealth and domination (Aloni, 2008a). From an educational point of view, the ¿rst obvious implication is the need to change teachers’ professional self-image and professional identity from that of ‘passive conduits’ for messages of political establishments to that of agents of social transformation and ‘active shapers’ of educational messages – messages that educational theory and research has identi¿ed as promoting personal growth and social welfare. This change means the substitution of educational ethics for political ideology as the highest instance in the formulation of educational policy – no more blind devotion to political regime and economic manipulation, but a focus on the development, dignity and welfare of the young; no more submissive socialization to the values of present society, but also active transformation into desirable society. As suggested by Postman and Weintgartner (1969) already in the late sixties and later by critical theorists like Giroux (1988) and Gur-Zeev (2007), such a move means that in a reality where instrumental manipulation and ideological ‘normalization’ have become the dominant modes of interaction and communication – in politics, religion, commercials and the mass media – the educator is required to ‘equip his/ her students with crap-detecting kits’, to provide forms of ‘counter education’, and empower them with cultural, critical, media and political literacies as immunization against the deceptiveness of power structures and public opinion shapers. Such a critical pedagogy, combining classical idealism with postmodern disillusionment, will reconstitute the teachers, in keeping with their original humanistic ideal, as experts in ‘training the young in the art of living’. Just as physicians take the Hippocratic oath to treat any person whatever the circumstances, and no of¿cial may dictate their medical code, educators should also establish an infrastructure of knowledge and values to serve as an overarching frame of reference for the practice of education. While such educators, who know where they’re coming from and wither they are heading – cultured, autonomous, and professional educators – may encounter some resistance by the establishment, they will also reaf¿rm their dignity and prestige. As suggested by Kant (1996), serious education always goes against the grain: against children’s natural rebelliousness; against parents who prefer their children to succeed in the present society – shallow and corrupt though it may be; and against the political, religious and economic establishments who seek submis37

NIMROD ALONI

sive people that can be ‘bought cheap’, rather than educated and critically minded citizens who stand up for their rights. Such educators, said the educational psychologist Mordechai Nissan (1997), will be better quali¿ed for, will ¿nd more meaning in, and will be more satis¿ed with their job; they will also be far more immune to pressures and manipulations on the part of students, parents and authorities. Besides the importance of professional wide-awakeness – moral, political and pedagogical – as a basis for educational activism and professional backbone (Greene, 1973), the change in educators’ self-image must also ¿nd its expression in pedagogic presence. I mean to say that in order for teachers to have an educative effect on their students, they must adopt unique modes of being, expression, and communication. I will explain this with the help of Martin Buber (1971), who sheds light on three qualities, which render the teacher’s presence educative: trust, idealism and personality. The ¿rst trait, interpersonal trust, is essential to any educational success: winning the students’ trust, making them feel that the teachers are on their side, for them and truly concerned with their growth and well-being. Without trust, the teacher is perceived as a stranger, as an oppressive enemy who must be tolerated, but never listened to or truly learned from, and with time, should the opportunity present itself, even ‘brought to account’. Conversely, when students trust the teacher as a person – when they have faith in her honest caring and concern for their dignity, growth and well-being – an infrastructure is being laid for goodwill and openness, empathy and mutual respect (including concern by the students for the teachers’ own well-being), for true pedagogical dialogue and meaningful educational work. Importantly, such trust must not be won through cheap tricks of fraternization, Àattery, and a subservient lapse into a ‘child-centered’ approach, marginalizing everyone else. It’s about a friendly ‘good morning’, extra-curricular activities, caring for the student and her family, noticing changes in appearance or mood, reading body language and facial gestures, offering help beyond strictly academic tasks – in short, authentic manifestations of basic humanity and pedagogic caring (Aloni, 2008b) The second trait is cultural idealism: the awareness, on the one hand, that some good and precious things are ‘worth getting up for in the morning’, worth making an effort to achieve and enjoy; and that, on the other hand, other things are so base, ugly and vile that one should steer clear of them and under no circumstances come to terms with. Whether we dub this trait ‘pedagogic Eros’ or human perfectionism, I mean those wonderful combinations of passions and sensitivities with insights and sensibilities, which prod man not to compromise and accept the shallow, the mediocre, the routine, the standard, the common and automatic, but strive for higher standards of meaning, knowledge, morality and re¿nement. When this cultivated passion disappears, it is very easy to lapse into vulgarity and barbarism, into an egocentric and hedonistic attitude of total contempt for accepted norms of thinking, talking and behaving. On the other hand, when this passion is truly felt, it suddenly becomes important to ¿nd out what is true, what is the best way of stating a claim, who indeed is right, what is really beautiful, how to build a just society, and 38

HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

most importantly, how I take responsibility for my own life and turn it into something precious, interesting and worthy. The problem is that such cultural idealism or ‘pedagogic Eros’ cannot be ‘triggered’ in the students by means of sober thought or scholarly lectures. In order to make it happen, the teachers must be present for their students as culture ‘freaks’: to share with them, in words and gestures, their excitement, impressions, interpretations, anger, enthusiasm, joy, gladness, acts of commission and of omission vis-à-vis cultural creations and social events. In brief, the teachers’ excited idealistic presence may trigger such a trait in their students, while an indifferent, Àat and uncommitted teachers’ presence might only increase poverty of mind, alienation, and moral desolation. The third Buberian characteristic of the educator’s presence is personality. This means, above all, the virtue of ‘practicing what you preach.’ In his daily and public conduct, with no special intentions or highbrow talk, the educator personi¿es the qualities that dignify any person. Such an educator, says Buber, is most effective educationally when not trying to educate at all: he is simply ‘there’, as a sensitive, fair, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, balanced and controlled person. This pedagogical mode of being is especially evident in times of crisis – when a student is physically or verbally violent, facing an aggressive parent, in embarrassing moments, or when someone tries to insult or offend another. It is then that the educator’s personality comes to light, when she or he manages to steer the situation towards solutions without ‘great sacri¿ces’, articulating standards of right and wrong, but under no circumstances demeaning to the teacher or offending the dignity of anyone involved. EDUCATING FOR VALUES: PROMOTING A HUMANISTIC AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

It is a commonly known fact that children’s education always begins with socialization to their culture and community, and only later – upon their exposure to other communities and acquisition of universal intellectual assets – do they adopt the ideas and practices of general culture. In view of this fact, it seems obvious to me why a humanistic and universally oriented education is preferable to an ethnocentric and provincial education. In the ¿eld of psychology we speak of the individual’s development from the primal or primitive phase of egocentrism through a familial, tribal, national, and religious phase of ethnocentrism to the highest phase (not reached by everyone) of recognizing the complete and equal humanity of every person. In an analogous fashion, we can speak of a trajectory leading from dogmatism and parochial narrow-mindedness to communality in the level of universal human achievements in science, morals, law, politics, and art. Cosmopolitan humanism doesn’t necessarily seek to diminish or extinct local communal bonds and cultural heritages – whether religious, socio-ideological, or political – but it does seek to inÀuence and qualify them in the light of common standards of human dignity and democratic culture (Nussbaum, 1998, 2002; Hansen, 2009). 39

NIMROD ALONI

The main reason for fostering cosmopolitan humanism lies in the realization that it would be irresponsibly naïve to expect humanist and democratic virtues to develop naturally. On the one hand, the motivation is to assist everyone in realizing their potential and leading a sovereign life of meaning and quality; on the other hand, we are well aware that both as individuals and as collectives, human beings tend to perceive themselves as better, more just or deserving privileged access to resources denied to other groups. Since such sel¿sh, ethnocentric, or even racist attitudes usually mean offending the humanity or denying the human rights of other groups, humanism seeks the universal application of basic norms of human dignity and equality. The Biblical ethics is a prime example for such norms. It opposes egoistic and ethnocentric tendencies with the such teachings as: ‘Steer away from falsehood and slay not one who is righteous and just… and take no bribe… and oppress no stranger’; ‘thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour. … love thy neighbour as thyself’ (Leviticus, 19:15,18); ‘But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt’ (ibid., 34); ‘Do not unto your neighbour that which you hate’; ‘May your neighbour’s honour be as precious to you as your own’. Though it may certainly be objected that even those humanistic checks and balances entail some coercion over the individual, such coercion is far more limited than any alternative imposition of religious, ideological or political contents – limited to such aspects and boundaries allowing everyone to actualise their mental potential and enjoy equal opportunities to inÀuence the character and practices of their social community. Naturally, those educating for universal humanism are usually disparaged by nationalist leaders or religious fanatics as betraying their unique heritage, since they want their Àock reduced to submissive devotees of the single truth that they cherish and represent. We are fortunate, nevertheless, in that after millennia of religious wars, ideological violence and brutal racism, the family of nations has ¿nally, on December 10th 1948, determined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth of other status… Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.’ The value of humanistic principles has recently received support, of all sources, from empirical studies on the quality of life in various countries. As opposed to the authoritarian bias of many that there is something unrewarding, ‘weakly’ or arti¿cial about the virtues of reÀective thinking and social justice, empirical data provided by the UN’s Human Development Index as well as by the OECD’s PISA international achievement tests indicate clearly that it is those countries which uphold humanism’s idealistic virtues are also those who offer their citizens the highest quality of life. The Scandinavian countries, for example, have been in the lead for many years, both in standards of public welfare, health, and education services, and in standards of individual liberties, social equity, gender equality, and political 40

HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

integrity. An examination of the fundamental values of these societies shows that they practice the fundamental humanistic elements: comprehensive education in the spirit of science, critical reasoning and the liberal arts, open and pluralistic democracies, and supportive and caring welfare societies that ensure no one loses his or her human dignity upon becoming impoverished. In sum, based on the humanistic philosophy of human dignity as well as on empirical ¿ndings regarding the prerequisites of quality of life, we are called to shape an educational policy having the following arch-objectives: (1) An intellectual approach based on open-mindedness and broad education, autonomous and critical thinking, logical reasoning and factual evidence; (2) A moral standpoint characterized by attributing equal human worth to others, striving for social justice and peaceful neighbourliness and showing respect, fairness and consideration for others; (3) Active democratic citizenship evidenced by social responsibility and political involvement, as well as by the dispositions of pluralism, tolerance and self-restraint; (4) Cultural richness supported by active curiosity, broad intellectual horizons, experiential depth, commitment to excellence and cultural diversity; (5) Being a ‘world citizen’, consisting in being informed and concerned not only about one’s local community and culture, but also about other cultures and about ethical and ecological issues that are of global and international concern. DEVELOPING A HUMANISTIC SCHOOL CULTURE

Apart from the signi¿cant change required from teachers in the areas of professional awareness, pedagogic presence, and normative commitment, it is very important to focus on some aspects of the school culture, so that this may serve as fertile ground for promoting the objectives of a humanistic education. In the following paragraphs, I will brieÀy discuss seven crucial aspects thereof: (1) multi-faceted cultivation of student personality; (2) developing a social climate of security and fairness; (3) using various types of dialogue with the students in order to reach out to and empower them; (4) developing a community approach and social involvement; (5) developing the students’ intellectual powers by means of general and liberal education; (6) developing teaching techniques in which ‘the tree of knowledge’ becomes the students’ and the community’s ‘tree of life’; (7) ensuring a safe and hospitable physical infrastructure. 1. Multifaceted Cultivation of Student Personality The humanistic principle of multifaceted cultivation of students’ personality is grounded in an old tradition – from the days of Athenian education in the complementary disciplines of gymnastics (physical education) and music (spiritual or mental education) to the recent innovations in the area of multiple intelligences, life skills, and ‘multifaceted literacy’. In view of this heritage, I believe I can point to seven critical facets or fundamental aspects of personality cultivation: (a) Helping the students develop a positive self-image or a sense of self-worth 41

NIMROD ALONI

– that they are worthy, important, accepted and capable – as a prerequisite for their faith in their own ability to lead a life of quality and meaning. (b) Foster their interest in both their human and their natural environment, in order to cultivate their joie de vivre and personal involvement in social activities and cultural contents. (c) Develop their emotional intelligence as well as their capacity for empathy, moderation and self-mastery. (d) Develop the intellectual virtues of curiosity, critical and reÀective thinking, sense of measure, sound judgment, creative imagination, and sensitivity to values. (e) Foster an autonomous standpoint of independent thought, personal accountability and perseverance in dealing with intellectual issues, social pressures and personal desires and urges. (f) Cultivate an authentic, personal voice, producing its own contents and shaping itself through an interpersonal dialogue of self-nurturing and selfmotivation. (g) Develop the courage to be ‘imperfect’ and act also in ambiguous situations defying simple solutions. 2. A Social Climate of Security and Fairness Paraphrasing the American humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow, the child’s social climate is akin to a gold¿sh’s aquarium conditions: for both, primary and basic conditions of security and well-being that are essential for survival, let alone thriving. Optimal conditions also prevent, or at least considerably reduce, students’ hostility and aggression, together with all the other disciplinary problems that encumber academic and educational success. In general, the optimal conditions forming a social climate of security and well-being include norms of humanity, fairness, transparency, rationality and dialogue. Speci¿cally, the following conditions are crucial: (a) A sense of physical, emotional and mental security, which translates into relaxation and personal well-being. (b) A family atmosphere of caring and empathy, together with personal attention by the teachers and a sense that the student is truly dear to them as a person. (c) A sense of belonging and partnership reinforced by active involvement in decisions related to the school culture. (d) Norms of reason, fairness, dialogue and transparency which minimize any sense of arbitrariness and authoritarianism. (e) Norms of mutual respect and caring about others as well as about social and environmental justice. 3. Empowering Dialogues By this I mean unique modes of pedagogic discourse and interpersonal communication that enrich the routine instruction with elements and content that enhances and 42

HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

empower the students’ personality above and beyond the subject matter learned. Educational tradition has offered empowering dialogues of various kinds. I suggest the following typology: (a) The Socratic dialogue which is intellectually empowering in that it does not offer regurgitated knowledge and ready-made answers, but creates discomfort concerning a given issue or dilemma and guides the student in a process of self-discovery and critical reasoning with a constant feeling of being ‘on the way’. (b) The Nietzschean dialogue which empowers the student’s autonomy and authenticity by rejecting the option of mass conformity and encourages the alternative of building the students’ selfhood based on self-de¿nition and selfcreation. (c) The Buberian dialogue which develops a caring and empathetic sensitivity in interpersonal relationships by substituting professional and hierarchic alienation with sincere and attentive encounters, in which both the teacher’s and the student’s personality are completely present. (d) The Rogersian dialogue which enhances the individual’s faith in her ability to lead a successful life by tuning in and getting to know oneself; (e) The Freireian dialogue which helps students from weak and oppressed social groups to free themselves of inhibitory and regressive forces through the development of active knowledge and critical literacy and their application in a political struggle for social justice and equal opportunities. (f) The ecological dialogue, reinforcing empathy for one’s natural environment, so that the student’s self-awareness of the necessary conditions for personal growth and well-being leads to caring for a thirsty tree, a drooping stalk, a turtle helpless on its back, a beached whale, endangered and con¿ned animals, polluted oceans and rivers, and the beauty of nature. 4. A Communitarian Approach and Social Involvement In the early 20th century, the educational philosopher John Dewey called for dismantling the barriers separating school from society and education from democracy. A century later, it seems that the communitarian approach and the democratic spirit have become an integral part of the living culture of most schools. This trend comprises the following aspects: (a) Greater involvement by parents and students alike in shaping the school’s characteristics and contents – including parental contribution in curricular enrichment and students contributing in the form of tutorship programs and determining school regulations. (b) Support systems for culturally deprived, economically disadvantaged or physically and mentally challenged students. (c) Collaboration with other social organizations in the community, such as culture clubs, youth movements, kindergartens, nursing homes and animal rights and environmental organizations. 43

NIMROD ALONI

(d) Active citizenship intent on abolishing social injustices and ensuring the integrity and propriety of both the public arena and the natural environment. 5. General Education and Cultural Foundations ‘Without knowledge there is no reason – for there is nothing to reason about’; ‘if we do not get to know past cultures we shall have no tools for deciphering the present and no vision with which to create a future.’ These two popular sayings articulate the great danger of ignorance, cultural mediocrity, conceptual barrenness, linguistic poverty, and associative shallowness – the lack of cultural context and frame of reference essential for any serious comparison, valid observation, balanced assessment, and responsible judgment. In referring to foundations of education and culture, I mean a system of comprehensive and ordered knowledge which, together with capacities for reasoning, observation and articulation, allows people to decipher the reality of their lives and act within it in a complex, effective and meaningful way. In order to cultivate such infrastructures, I believe the following elements are necessary: (a) Linguistic literacy, including comprehension and expression skills, the ability to analyse complex texts, organized and reasoned presentation of ideas, and the ability to discuss a wide range of issues. (b) A broad education, including knowledge about world-views and cultural heritages, basic concepts and research methods, current affairs and art. (c) Knowledge in curricular subject matters. (d) Cognitive skills evident in reÀective and critical rationality, mental Àexibility and creativity, the identi¿cation of relevant contexts and the ability to judge facts and values. (e) A philosophical approach which fosters caring for truth and justice, together with scepticism of whatever is being taken for granted and clarity and method in thought and expression. (f) Artistic literacy, taking pleasure and ¿nding meaning in experiencing art works as well as in exercising ones creative imagination and artistic skills. 6. The Tree of Knowledge as a Tree of Life In the spirit of Ecclesiastes – ‘wisdom giveth life to them that have it’ (KJV, 7:12) – and in accordance with such diverse educational theories as those of Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Montaigne, Rousseau, Nietzsche, Dewey, Whitehead and Korczak – learning must not be seen as a goal in itself, but as a means to the overarching end of training for the art of living – of an optimally developed humanity, personal growth and social progress, or overall excellence in the ¿eld of personhood. Instruction and learning in schools should therefore have the following qualities: (a) Substituting an educational development program for the discipline-based school curriculum as the school’s main content basis. (b) Meaningful teaching in touch with the students’ actual world and with current affairs. 44

HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

(c) Creating a ‘pedagogic Eros’ and an ‘academic drama’ by teachers who evidence enthusiasm for manifestations of truth, justice and beauty. (d) Translating knowledge into life literacies that allow learners to identify the value-laden messages of issues discussed in class and to plan their actions with greater reason and responsibility. (e) A holistic approach relying on multiple, and interpersonal, intelligences. (f) Diverse assessment approaches related to the whole gamut of student’s abilities, functions and contributions, avoiding any reduction of their personality to extraneous standards. 7. A Safe, aesthetic, and Hospitable Physical Infrastructure The school’s physical layout should facilitate the achievement of personal and cultural goals as well as communicate respect for humanistic and environmental values: (a) Safety of buildings, teaching aids and playgrounds. (b) Hospitable and aesthetic architecture as well as investment in design, facilities, artwork and vegetation. (c) Open and roomy spaces that optimise options for independents study, social interaction, and small group dialogue. Let me conclude now by stating again the challenge that stood at the centre of this article: to utilize, translate, adapt, and integrate the widely agreed upon tenets of Humanism and Humanistic Educational Theory into pedagogical elements capable of constructing the lived reality of humanistic schools. As we have seen, humanism has its roots in ancient traditions in both the West and the East, and out of these traditions evolved various humanistic educational philosophies – classical, romantic, existentialist and critical. It is a pity, however, that the popularity of the values and tenets of humanistic education has failed to be translated and put to work in the real life of educational practice and schools characteristics. It is my hope that the detailed portrayal of the practical aspects of humanistic education I have offered above would contribute to overcome the so familiar challenge familiar to us from so many spheres of life – moving from a worthy and promising theory to a desirable and rewarding practice. REFERENCES Adler, M. (1982). The Paideia proposal: An educational manifesto. New York: Macmillan. Adorno, T. (1981). Cultural criticism and society. Cambridge: MIT Press. Aloni, N. (2008a). The Fundamental Commitments of Educators. Ethics and Education, 3(2), 149-159. Aloni, N. (Ed.) (2008b). Empowering Dialogues in Humanistic Education (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Meuhad. Aloni, N. (2007). Enhancing humanity. Dordrecht: Springer. Aristotle (1980). The Nicomachean ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Aronowitz, S., & Giroux, H. (1985). Education under siege: The conservative, liberal, and radical debate over schooling. New York: Bergin & Garvey.

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NIMROD ALONI Buber, M. (1971). The education of character. In J.P. Strain (Ed.), Modern philosophies of education. New York: Random House. Davis, G.H. (1981). Technology – Humanism or Nihilism: A critical study of the philosophical basis and practice of modern technology. Washington DC: University Press of America. Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Seabury Press. Gadamer, H.G. (1976). Philosophical hermeneutics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Giroux, H.A, (1988). Literacy and the pedagogy of voice and political empowerment. Educational Theory 38(1), 61-75. Greene, T.M. (1940). The meaning of humanism. Princeton: Princeton: University Press. Greene, M. (1973). Teacher as stranger: Educational philosophy for the modern age. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Greene, M. (1988). The dialectic of freedom. New York: Teachers College Press. Gur-Zeev, I. (2007). Beyond the Modern-Postmodern Struggle in Education: Toward Counter-Education and Enduring Improvisation. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press. Halsema, A., & Houten, D. van (Ed.). (2002). Empowering Humanity. Utrecht: De Tijdstroom Uitgeverij. Hansen, D. (2009). Walking with diogenes: Cosmopolitan accents in philosophy and education. In D. Kerdeman (Ed.) Philosophy of Education 2009 (1-13). Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society. Held, D. (1980). Introduction to critical theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kant, I. (1966). Education. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Kurtz, P. (1988). Forbidden fruit: The ethics of humanism. New York: Prometheus. Nissan, M. (1997). Educational Identity as a Central Element in the Development of Educational Leadership [In Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Mendel Institute. Noddings, N. (2002). Educating moral people: A caring alternative to character education. New York: Teachers College Press. Nussbaum, M. (1998). Cultivating humanity: A classical defense of reform in liberal education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nussbaum, M. (2002). Education for citizenship in an era of global connection. Studies in Philosophy of Education 21(4/5), 289-303. Peters, R.S. (1970). Ethics and education. London: George Allen & Unwin. Postman, N., & Weingartner, C. (1969). Teaching as a subversive activity. New York: Dell. Goodlad, J.I., Soder, R., & Sirotnik, K.A. (Eds) (1991). The moral dimensions of teaching. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Sockett, H. (1993). The moral base for teacher professionalism. New York: Teachers College Press. Soltis, J.F., & Strike, K. (1985). The ethics of teaching. Teachers College Press, New York. Van Praag, J.P. (1982). Foundations of humanism. New York: Prometheus. Whitehead, A.N. (1967). The aims of education and other essays. New York: Free Press.

Nimrod Aloni Institute for Educational Thought Kibbutzim College of Education Tel Aviv

46

MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN

MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE

‘Any people that reach certain development are called to practice education’ Wegner Jaeger, Paideia. INTRODUCTION

Moral education is a topic that is very much present in the current social discourse. It is one of those subjects that has always been there throughout the history of humanity, as a proprium of our historical report, but above all, it is a question that we cannot evade for the simple reason that it is essentially human. Moral education has been, is – and most likely, will remain – a matter of debate, sometimes more intense and in different places and different ways. It is surprising that something so ethereal and abstract as moral and ethical values, and their potential transmission, call so much attention. We are talking about ideas that are not easy to agree on, about learnings of little use in the sense of pro¿tability. Despite of this, ethics and values are the best legacy that we can leave to the new generations of citizens. Morality is a human condition, is an ontological question, the drive that impels us to appreciate everything that happens to us, that allows us to appraise ourselves. In short, and as Jaeger states in the ¿rst sentence of his magnum opus Paideia, our human and community development is closely related to education, and particularly, to moral education. Moral education has a complex structure. Its treatment can be focused on the epistemology of values, on the psychological nature that facilitates its acquisition, or on the pedagogy that enables its transmission, among other ¿elds. Most studies and/or insights in each of these areas have made their own small contribution, and they have made it possible that can we continue to study this subject in depth. The machinery for moral education is on the go, with more pieces added every time, and new means are started that open unknown paths to explore. Nonetheless, present reality entails some danger, which is a sign of postmodernity: our obsession for hurry and ef¿ciency may bury the fundamental sense of moral education under too much pedagogical technique, strategy and theory. Moral education is a philosophical matter, and philosophy is born from the question: what is this? (Marias, 1985). Maybe now, more than ever, we cannot stop asking ourselves, what is education in Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 47–65. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN

the moral domain? It may seem that everything has been said about the matter, but the truth is that there still is a lot to be said (Berkowitz, 1995). Postmodernity urges us to look for answers to that question. We ¿nd ourselves at a time really unique, a number of social, economic and cultural conditions — unconceivable a few years ago — are taking place, and most of them, or at least the more signi¿cant, are closely related to our subject. Most important is that we are in the middle of a discussion on moral philosophy; we refer to the liberal-communitarian debate that has posed a series of questions and answers that will determine the development of moral education if they are not doing so already. The goal of our work is twofold. On the one hand, and on the basis of the liberal-communitarian debate, we hope to outline the current epistemological situation concerning the moral, that is to say, we hope to point out the different views about the moral and the potential transmission of values in our time. On the other hand, and after this conceptual review, we would like to present a proposal of moral education from a humanist perspective that we need for present times, and in particular, we would like to put forward the required conditions for this proposal. Of course, this proposal is not closed or dogmatic, but open and based on the principles of western humanism. LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE

As suggested in the introduction, in the last years liberals and communitarians have got involved in a philosophical argument, still not ¿nished, that allows us to glimpse the new premises from which we must build the discourses on moral education of the century that has just started. Before describing those assumptions, we must say that the liberal-communitarian debate strictly speaking started in the ¿eld of political philosophy, although as we shall see, main authors of this debate admit that this discussion also concerns moral philosophy. More than this, most of the analysed subjects end up in moral questions. As we can presume and we shall clarify, the impact of this discussion on moral education is critical. Liberal-communitarian debate is by no means contemporary but rather the continuity of the classic and well-known debate between Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, or, to say it plainly, between the individual and the community. However, the discussion that we are referring to begins in 1971 with the presentation of the book A Theory of Justice by John Rawls. From then on, the path is open to a series of criticisms, among which those of Michael Sandel (1982), Alasdair MacIntyre (1981; 1990), Charles Taylor (1990), and Michael Walzer (1983) stand out. These authors and some others have been classi¿ed within the communitarianism current, although they themselves do not agree on the label that has been set on this way of thinking. Certainly, it is more than a current of thought strictly speaking; they represent a series of criticisms to the liberals, a correction of liberal thinking in general, and of Rawlsian liberalism in particular. The number of stances is wide, and these go beyond the strict duality between liberals and communitarians. 48

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A proof of this is that in the course of the debate, authors such as Joseph Raz (1986) or Will Kymlicka (1989) have come to light, whose contributions are somewhere in between the liberal and the communitarian ideas. Nowadays, we already speak of positions like civic republicanism and liberal culturalism. In any case and for the purpose of clarity in our presentation, we will use the quali¿ers of liberals and communitarians to refer to ones and others, in spite of – we insist — their distinctive characteristics (Mulhall & Swift, 1992). Present reality has spurred on the debate on the moral subject. Almost four decades after the ¿rst edition of A Theory of Justice, the set of socioeconomic and cultural postmodern circumstances continue to stoke the ¿re lit by John Rawls’ book in 1971. There have been several authors, mainly sociologists that have analysed our present situation with relation to human development, or to put it better, to humanism. Most of them agree on the description of a society that affects conclusively the moral development, and reading one of the titles of their works is enough to realize that we are immersed in a series of circumstances that are not exactly positive or pleasing for good moral development (Lipovetsky, 1983). Having no intent to be comprehensive, their contributions could be summarized in several assumptions. Perhaps the sharpest of them is the one that states that we live in a society with little participation, where citizens are being taken by an excessive individualism (Bauman, 1993). Our present reality has little to do with that of few years ago when the community project was bound to the differing personal projects of the vast majority of citizens in the community. However, is the individual a being essentially communal, or is he a being that has the choice to live in community? As we shall see later, the concept of the individual is a critical aspect in the liberal-communitarian debate, and very likely, some of its reasoning has been the cause of the individualism that is so criticised today. Needless to say, the concept of the individual is very important in the educational task in general, and in the education in values in particular. On the other hand and closely related to our topic, those authors talked about a segmented society, which was made up of unconnected life chapters. Postmodern life project is not a continuous story any more with an inner sense or a purpose to achieve. New reality is organised in such a way that it fosters the so-called corrosion of character (Sennet, 1998). Certainly, new multicultural environments have exponentially increased in the last years where different ways of conceiving reality and different patterns of self-perception live together. The chance to an agreement in main community affairs has become a true need, and for many an absolute panacea after recent events. We refer to the armed conÀicts between several cultural groups in the United States, and the aftermath due to the attacks in New York in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005. Multicultural agreement through dialogue is important, but having a clear understanding of what we want to agree on is even more crucial. Therefore, in our nearer context, if a new Europe is to be built, before the willingness to undertake such an enterprise, we should know what the meaning of Europe is, its soul, the nature of its 49

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roots, and on all that, as George Steiner states, there is still a lot of work to do (Steiner, 2004). Concerning moral education, as in many other aspects of life, it is unlikely that we will get where we want if we do not keep in mind where we come from. We live in a time with the best available technology, with the greatest Àow of information and ideas (Castells, 1997), but it is also the most ephemeral time. Empty discourses have grown in number, namely those of ethical and moral nature, which have a remarkable inÀuence on moral education. There is some concern to fall in a kind of education that creates consumers of nice wording of no meaning or intellectual extent. There is this trend to educate in the good life and not in ‘the life is good’, when in fact both ideas are radically different (Cortina, 1997; 1999). Finally, it looks as if in the last decades our education systems have been placed in a permanent crisis. Social discredit towards our educational institutions is continuous in the last years, and reforms come one after another with the goal to change such impression. Some authors assure that the cultural and scienti¿c levels have been lowered with the corresponding outcomes, but most allegations to the school and university system are focused on the humanistic training, on the education in values and ethics (Nussbaum, 1997). Schools and teachers that work in it see the moral education of their students as a real problem and feel it as their Achilles heel in their daily work. Families, on the other hand, no longer see schooling as a projection of their education at home; most of them understand it as a compulsory and public add-on, and an increasing number of families see it as a real competitor. Having said this, we will get back to those issues that have been discussed in the liberal-communitarian debate that will allow us to distinguish more clearly some of the ideas that have been expressed, directly or indirectly, about moral education in postmodern times. Key aspects of the liberal-communitarian debate for the moral education Rawls liberalism (Rawls, 1971) departs from the assumption that all people are free and equal; therefore, for this assumption to be true, we must think of justice as being based on equality among people. In a nutshell: Rawlsian principles of justice are those that will come up from the sort of agreement that people would reach if they were unaware of their beliefs, individual backgrounds, social conditions, physical aspects, etc., as suggested by Rawls, if they were absolutely ignorant about themselves. It would be something like if we had to cut a cake without knowing beforehand which slice goes to whom. Logically, all slices should be equal so that no one feels hurt. Taking Rawls’ words, principles of justice as equality, place individuals in the ‘original position’. In this position, the person should disregard the socioeconomic status he might be in, or what defects or virtues he will have after applying such principles. This lack of knowledge is known by Rawls as the ‘veil of ignorance’. We could say that individuals are not responsible for being born in a certain cultural background, in this or that family, for being the way they are, therefore, it is not fair to ask for bene¿ts or advantages due to the social or personal condition. 50

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Justice as equality also requires to ignore the concept of ‘Right’ from the person, or at least, not to consider it in the public space. The important thing is not the different concepts of Right, but what is behind it, which is nothing else but the freedom to choose among all of them or have the choice to change. In any case, private moral should not interfere in the public life. From this brief explanation of Rawlsian liberalism, a number of philosophical subjects are inferred (Mulhall & Swift, 1992), which are part of what is commonly known as communitarian criticism. These subjects call for needful attention in order to suggest a proposal of moral education for our times. The ¿rst subject has to do with the concept of the individual. For Rawlsian liberalism, the individual must be conceived as something different from his singularity, his personal qualities, his speci¿c social condition, his particular idea of Right, and most of all, he must have a great interest to devise and pursue different concepts of Right. Such concepts can work in the con¿guration of fair and equitable communities, but to the communitarian eye, it is a wrong way to conceive the individual. Authors such as Michael Sandel (1982) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) argue that the Rawlsian ‘original position’ ignores that individuals are composed of moral aims, values, and concepts of Right; that the relation between individual and moral aims is essential, much stronger than what liberalism thinks. If so, may a rational being conceive reality and its circumstances regardless of his ethical and moral ideas? Can the individual change certain values so easily as liberalism says, or is the individual who he is according to his values? The debate is served. For liberalism the individual is regarded as a free, independent being, decisive for his project of life, while for communitarianism, the person is considered according to his personal values, which are a constituent part of his self, and to his project of life, which allows us to talk of someone as an individual. The second question refers to asocial individualism. For Rawlsian liberalism, society is a partnership between individuals that are privately associated, whose personal interests are de¿ned regardless of the community to which they belong. In other words, the individual is individualised prior to his choice of aims, his identity is set beforehand, therefore, there is always some distance between what one is and what one values. In Kantian terms we might say that what makes us human beings is not our aims, interests, or personal ideas, but our ability to think and act with independence, which is just the driving force of our private and personal choices. For communitarian authors, specially, for Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Charles Taylor (1990), liberalism ignores the extent to which communities where people live transmit their identity and values. The person is – if we can say so – parasitic of his community, since his own concept of person has a social and community origin. For liberalism society is a cooperation of individuals, while the community is much more than this. This subject is critically important in the moral education, and it underlies the sociological criticism to postmodern individualism. The third issue refers to universalism. Rawlsian theory has a universal approach, as it could be no other way coming from the philosophical ¿eld. The fact that the 51

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philosophy is devoted to the search of truth compels it to distinguish it from surrounding circumstances and conditions. For liberalism, any rational community can put the principles of justice as equality into practice, however, from a communitarian perspective (Walzer, 1983) this view overlooks the cultural and moral singularity, the fact that different cultural groups are also different ways to understand values and ethical principles. Communitarianism blames liberalism for having universal aspirations that nowadays cannot be accepted. We are faced with another subject, chieÀy educational. Our educational institutions are a cluster of moral communities, and any aspiration of universalism may spoil the moral project of one or several speci¿c moral communities. Now, is any moral project valid for the mere reason of being one? Won’t communitarianism fall into the same relativism for which it blames liberals? The fourth subject refers to subjectivism versus objectivism. With all that’s been said so far, we can infer that for Rawlsian liberalism the choice of aims, values, and concepts of Right are subjective preferences, and therefore not susceptible to logical reasoning. The rational and autonomous individual selects his preferences with no need to justify such a decision. For liberal thinking, which is based on Stuart Mill’s theory ‘over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’ (1985, p. 28), with the only one exception, of course, that he does not cause damage to the public. In summary, the subject is the beginning and the end of morality, moral preference has the individual subject as the creator and object of such creation. Communitarianism, on the contrary, does not agree with this assumption. Human beings are moral beings on the basis of the moral traditions of their own community (MacIntyre, 1981) or, in terms of an inner voice or an ideal of authenticity (Taylor, 1994), based on horizons of external meanings to themselves. Communitarianism does not believe that independence de¿ nes us as moral subjects, but rather that our moral character is closely related to the community in which we live and, therefore, it presumes some objectivism of its own. Again, we can realize how the liberal-communitarian debate provides us with a key subject for the postmodern education in values. The ¿fth and last issue is what we can call anti-perfectionism and neutrality. Liberalism relies on states, and that includes all its institutions — also the educational ones — that remain neutral in view of different concepts of Right. In other words, authorities must not support any modes of life since these belong to the ¿eld of individual life experience, and not to the ¿eld of justice, which is what the state should guarantee. On the other hand, communitarianism advocates states that meet the function of human and community perfection and that require taking sides. According to communitarians (MacIntyre, 1981), certain valuable forms of life exist that are above others, that, for instance, dignify the human condition more than others. If they are not fostered by the state, they run the risk to dissolve or simply disappear. Furthermore, communitarians argue that, under that assumed neutrality and behind the discourse of justice as equality, there is a disguised interest in how individuals should live and which are the acceptable 52

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forms of life. They claim that the pursued forms of life are neutral and released from any moral and ethical bet. These ¿ve issues, although brieÀy discussed, let us hint at the importance of the liberal-communitarian debate, and its close connection with education in values. We feel that this is a discussion on moral philosophy, which does nothing but pose questions to the education world. As pointed out above, an attempt has been made to answer these questions from a sociological perspective. The professionals in our postmodern educational institutions that work every day with the youngest members of our communities are called to reÀect on education, to feel sound in a liquid atmosphere (Bauman, 2007). Are the students valueindependent people and genuine main ¿gures in the choice of their projects of life, or by contrast, are they determined by the acquisition or not of certain values? Shall the students be raised up in the association between the individuals and in defence of Right (bonum), Truth (verbum), and Beauty (pulchrum)? Shall moral education strive for universal and ethical principles, or shall it focus on the singularities of each cultural group, on its moral history and its rational justi¿cation? Shall we think that the student is sovereign over himself, over his own body and mind, or that he will be sovereign as long as he acquires the values of the community to which he belongs? And ¿ nally, shall education be a neutral, non-aggressive act that should not get involved in the different concepts of Right, or shall it be a prospective act that ¿ts into certain concepts of Right and discards others? A PROPOSAL FOR HUMANIST MORAL EDUCATION

It is not easy to answer the previous questions, the ones that remain opened after the liberal-communitarian debate. Our goal is not to answer them, but rather to place them in what we call a proposal for humanist moral education. The ¿rst premise for our proposal is grounded on what in philosophy is called humanism, a cultural and literary movement that spread in Europe in the fourteenth and ¿fteenth centuries. Beyond the revival or resurgence of classics, and the value of the classics themselves, we focus on the humanist ideals, those so beautifully expressed by the young Italian scholar Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola (1956) in his work Oratio de hominis dignitate, which represents a true praise of human dignity. Hence, and on the base of this debate, we propose a model that takes into account the uncertainty of the human being as the foundation for his freedom; a model that considers the desire to excel as something typically human; that takes reason as the guide for spirit and action; that aims for peace as the means to knowledge; to the widening of horizons that makes knowledge into something universal; that claims the critical spirit that takes the measure of the opinions in public debate; that proudly fosters everything that has been achieved with talent and work, in order words, virtuously. In short, we put our trust in the essential nature of the human being, which is the main legacy of humanism.

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The student as person Presently, moral education deals with the presumption that behind a student there is a contingent person. The student, as a person, is someone who lives experiences that might not have happened to him. The student, as any human being, is someone vulnerable in the deepest sense of this word (Castiñeira & Calsina, 2005). There are students with more or less ability to learn certain curriculum contents, students that come from families more or less broken, students with more or less social and affective development – all these are contingent circumstances, conditions that are real but might not have been, or they might have been very different. As far as values are concerned, we can think similarly, namely, behind a student with certain values there is a person that ultimately has autonomy of choice over himself. At last, the person ends up being contingent for a matter of choice, which is also contingent; he resolves to engage to certain values through a voluntary personal act. Respect for the autonomy of the student is, from a liberal perspective, the value that must prevail in the educational task, since ignoring it implies a lack of respect for the person, the student. Therefore, moral education must consider that every student is distinct and singular within the diversity of distinct and singular people he lives with, and his interests can be the same or not as those of his colleagues and teachers. Now, communitarian criticism helps us realize that current moral education, if we understand it only in a liberal sense, can distort the education task. Choice of values is not only a matter of autonomy and will, but also of knowledge and emotion. It is not only a matter of choosing from a showcase of values, but to ¿nd out, get to know and get to love them. In Maslow words: ‘The learning of content is not an enemy of the personal development’. In this sense it is not possible from the liberal perspective that the student regards his belonging to the community as something essential to his identity. If we consider that the student is an absolutely contingent person, and we have to respect at last his autonomy on his choice of moral aims, that prevents the student from explaining himself some of his basic moral experiences, his way of doing, attitudes, self-reÀection, etc. The student, when regarded from an absolutely liberal view, will not be able to take on the whole range of ethical learning (Martínez, Buxarrais & Esteban, 2002) and concepts of oneself that are rooted in the knowledge of the community that he belongs to. The awareness of living in a community and the learning of its values, albeit they have not been autonomously chosen, is not a feasible goal in education in values, but a required ingredient of itself. We might say that the moral education project placed in the most absolute liberalism, would create a cooperation system among citizens with the goal to obtain those bene¿ts that they can not gain by themselves, but it does not contribute to the binding through ties that condition their personal identity (Cortina, 1997). Thus, communitarianism provides a digression from the liberal perspective that cannot be overlooked when we talk of moral education. Values are qualities (Frondizi, 1977)

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that shape personal identity; they are not contingent attributes of the self. Our perception of identity cannot be separated from the fact that we are regarded as members of a certain family, community, town, and certainly, educational institution. From a humanist conception of moral education, we can draw two conclusions that we should not lose sight of. On the one hand, participation in the educational task is a way to develop personal identities while developing forms of community with which to identify. The student needs to develop his community ontology and learn to improve his social environment. On the other hand, the riches provided by these historically built communities – an essential aspect of humanism, by the way –, are riches that can unlikely be known in an individual and autonomous way. In any case, leave them under the hands of his own free will is too risky if the goal is to build more equitable, fair and free communities. The student in view of education We can understand the educational act as a process whereby new generations of citizens are gradually introduced into the cultural group that they belong to. As it was made clear in the previous section, moral education must not abandon such a principle. However, this statement can be interpreted in a number of ways that are not always complete. As we were saying, we may think that moral reasoning is autonomous and elective. The student has to develop in an educational environment that permits him to reach a rational conclusion on values, where this conclusion is regarded as the outcome of a personal and deliberate exercise. Again, the liberal stance reminds us of the pressing need to respect the student as a person. Nevertheless, a quick analysis of the current situation tells us that it is not clear that the different postmodern moral views are a rational outcome, or that, contrary to what is commonly thought they have been worked out most independently. The student, as any postmodern individual, ¿nds himself at a time when he is prompted to work out his own self-de¿nition, another sign of the previously mentioned individualism, or the ‘emotivist self’ as others would call it (MacIntyre, 1981). In building his own self-de¿nition as moral being, the student is not clear about the point of arrival; he does not always have an external reference since in the present context personal and impersonal reasons can no longer be distinguished. We think that moral education is the perfect framework to indicate the aim of the individual, to make him see the essence of all that, as persons, are called to see. We believe that the Aristotelian principle cannot fall into oblivion. According to this principle, the individual is what he is, but above all, he is what he might be if his nature was developed. Ethics is nothing else but the science that shows how to go from the ¿rst condition to the second one. Moral education must lay down a plan, it must offer rational criteria that allow to distinguish among the different moral perspectives, otherwise everything can be criticised, even the same perspective. By discarding the concept of the aim of the individual, whichever that is, we deny that this individual can reach a greater or 55

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better status. We feel that passing on the knowledge of the aim of the individual is basic for moral education since it allows us to understand that the moral is rational and objectively reasonable, and for going from particular facts to the values as ethical duties. To give an example: from this perspective moral education must teach that we are vulnerable beings and we are called to help each other. Only this way the reality, such as that there are lots of people that need help, develops into a moral duty. The ethics of help has to become something objective, rational, the essence of our human nature. Otherwise, helping the needed would be a matter of choice up to the personal interests of every one (Buxarrais, 2006). This teleological view of moral education takes us back to the communitarian criticism. The community in general and the educative institution in particular must indeed encourage the practise of ethics, the change from what one is to what one could, and should, become. Current school practise needs to become a human activity morally effective. The diverse education situations that students go through must include moral goods that they have to experience. We consider that this is important in the sense that there are values that either are learned in certain educative practises or maybe are never learned. Values such as effort, commitment, fellowship, etc, are at the root of the educational institution, with the invaluable contribution, of course, of the family environment. It is worth to say that taking part in an educational practise requires the observance of its guidelines, rules, and models. Therefore, the student must submit his likings, preferences and attitudes to the guidelines, rules and models that give sense to such a practise. This is not conservatism, since once entering it, not everything has to be accepted without rational discussion. In summary, the humanist moral education that we suggest includes the concept of a process that guides the students towards a better self. We are not proposing a particular point of arrival translated into moral values because we believe in the pluralism of human existence, and the multiple moral and virtuous practises. However, what we do understand very clearly is that such point of arrival is the one that makes the student realize what is best for him and the community, and what makes him happier. Moral education as universal Moral education is a kind of education typically universal in the deepest sense of the word. Even more, if it is grounded on a humanist basis as supported by us. It is needless to mention the universal character of ethics and moral, its fundamental human nature and its transcendence in time and space. In this sense, postmodernity is a special reality and our education systems are a mirror of such reality. Most of our teachers are faced with the question how to continue to support the universality of values, to uphold for a world citizenship (Cortina, 1997), while at the same time they are confronted with the presence of several cultures and patterns of moral thinking in the same classroom. Obviously, education for universality is not the 56

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same as education in universality, and now universality is present in the same room, day by day in the educational task. A liberal understanding fosters a civic coexistence and an absolute respect for the different cultures, specially the minorities, and for this intercultural education (Kymlicka, 1995) has been organized as a civic and harmonious exchange between cultures that currently coexist. Some intercultural education projects have probably been successful, however, we cannot deny that cultural problems of interaction signi¿cantly characterise the beginning of this new century. Communitarianism reminds us again of the importance of the community in the development of personal identities. From this standpoint, the danger exists that the obsession with intercultural education may cause us to forget cultural education, and a proof of this is the rise of cultural nationalisms that we are presently seeing as claims of the own culture. We are essentially intercultural beings (Maalouf, 1998), looking at our ancestral past is enough to appreciate this, but that does not mean that we have to stop being cultural beings. Moral frameworks, closer or farther, and in particular those of our moral community, are the means that guide us in certain ethical and moral questions, and such moral frameworks, or values, exist regardless of our ability to ¿nd our place in it. We might say that this is an important aspect of human ontology, as it is like a map when we have to locate a street in a city. In such a case, disregarding universal goods like liberty, equality and fraternity, freedom not only is problematic but also ignoring one’s own stance in relation to those values. Multicultural fellowship should not hinder the education in one’s own cultural framework, and for as long as possible, it should harmonize the coexistence of diverse cultural frameworks. We do not propose to enter the ‘Social Darwinian’ debate according to which there are cultures morally superior to others, or whether the education policies of our states should be open to other cultures. We just wanted to point out that intercultural education requires an education in one’s own culture, that it will be dif¿cult to appreciate the distance if we do not appreciate the proximity beforehand. Moral Education in View of the Truth or Truths Current moral education has to deal with one of the philosophical and pedagogical predicaments that accompany us since the history of thought. Liberalism argues that we are equal and free persons. The individual is independent, and with his presumed ability to think, he is the only one responsible for his search of the truth. The heteronomy, the search of values outside or through others, is an illegitimate source of moral, since the categorical Kantian imperative source of liberalism requires autonomy. The person, at last, must reach a conclusion about how to act, even regardless of what he wants. In this sense, moral education has to support the students’ autonomy while respecting their absolute freedom. For the communitarian critics, however, autonomy does not de¿ne how it is that we are subjects with values (Thiebautt, 1998). People are moral beings on the basis 57

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of particular traditions of our communities, or on the base of horizons of moral meanings beyond us. Here, a possible solution to one of best known desiderata in moral education comes along, that is, the raising of real people. Moral education that pursues thereto has to present these horizons of moral meanings to the student that guide towards the ‘good’ of the community, which will allow him to ¿nd out his own originality on the base of these horizons. The ideal of self-realization or selfknowledge (Puig, 1995) without external horizons of moral meanings creates, as in a relativist environment can be observed, something like a ‘culture of narcissism’ or egocentric forms of identity (Lipovetsky, 1983). In this sense, the educational task should not so much go in search of the person, but be after what makes us better persons, that is, the values of reference that are placed in the external horizons of moral meanings. What is the use of attending the student in his individuality if he is not guided towards where he should be heading for morally speaking? The ideal of subjectivism, or personal autonomy, presents another question closely involved with moral education. Postmodern moral projects aim at nurturing independent citizens, individuals that do not feel overcome by external moral agents, individuals that, in a word, do not feel manipulated, yet at the same time postmodernity has become a reality where all manipulate each other. Human need of presence implies a certain degree of manipulation. We cannot morally educate the person in the dark or in the most absolute disorientation. We should think for instance, as some authors suggest, in restoring the idea of tradition (Arendt, 1958), but not as something obsolete or archaic, but as that decision historically developed and socially integrated that has to do with its constitutive values. The student must feel free of tradition, in the exercise of those virtues that keep it alive and in the abandonment of those that weaken it. Moral education in tradition or community is not synonymous with educating in the majority option, since the tradition assumes the existence of individual rights that state the division between private and public. Humanist moral education relies on a set of civic responsibilities and a strong sense of community, without going against the individual rights. Moreover, any tradition or community morally strong and reasonable accepts the individual rights of its citizens (Bolívar, 2007). Subjectivism and objectivism are not so disunited as it may seem, both need each other and both are independent. Our model for a humanist moral education has to take care of the student as much as of those values that will help him grow as a moral being. Neutrality in Moral Education The subject of neutrality in moral education has been another constant debate along its history (Trilla, 1992). This subject is controversial. On the one hand, we ¿nd arguments in favour of the transmission of certain values and moral habits, and on the other hand, reasoning arises that supports a neutral education. The appearance of a free, secular state education gave some direction, but the controversy continues, 58

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as we can see from the liberal-communitarian debate. Shall the public school support a model of moral identity, or shall it keep a neutral position so that the students become choosers of their own network of values? In any case, can education on the moral be neutral? Neutrality in the humanities is a concept much more complex than it may be in the sciences, and even more if we undertake to educate in it. We can understand neutrality as the exclusion of ideals or concepts of ‘Right’ that some have called justi¿catory neutrality (Kymlicka, 1989). In this case, the educational institution cannot present an education on any concept of ‘Right’, and cannot work on any base that allows the students to pursue a speci¿c ideal of ‘Right’. The school and certainly the education task, must exclude any moral project for it to be neutral. Neutrality can also be restricted, which is even more contentious than the previous. In this case, we cannot bet on a concept of ‘Right’ if this means an increase in the probability of having more students supporting it rather than others, that is to say, no moral option can have an advantage. Finally, we could identify a comprehensive or consequentialist neutrality which means that all students have the ability to pursue the idea of ‘Right’ they may choose in their lives and foster it in their communities. Despite the signi¿cant differences among the various types of neutralities, we can conclude that following the liberal assumptions public and privates arenas must remain separate. The school is not the place where certain values are transmitted to the students, even less if they come from religious or theological options. Communitarianism, by contrast, does support the transmission of a concept of ‘Right’, whichever that is, but it must link the values of each community. Education in values must aspire to human perfection, or if preferred, must rely on the pedagogy on the human and existential perfection of the students. Our con¿dence in a model for a humanist moral education forces us in a liberal and perfectionist position at the same time (Raz, 1986), provided that under perfectionism we understand something not exclusive and under liberalism something not sceptical. Postmodern reality needs citizens with a personal welfare, and such welfare depends on the moral value of their aims and their life goals rather than the mere belief in certain values. Therefore, for example, living a life of solidarity, that is, practice solidarity is more valuable than to believe in it. In any case, you can only believe in solidarity when you lead a life devoted to others. Individual welfare depends on our global achievements, which are based on social forms of behaviour, on civic attitudes. We dare say that autonomy, even in the choice of a moral project, is valuable only if it is used to pursue the ‘Right’, understanding as such the defence of the human dignity, the ultimate principle of humanism. Autonomy in a humanist sense does not exclude moral pluralism but reinforces it as long as it is a real pluralism. Hence, moral education must allow the students to choose among several moral options, and therefore, among several valuable options. Our bid for neutrality, whichever type, is a bid for an option and a rejection of others, therefore moral pluralism overcomes neutrality. 59

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So we conclude that moral education nowadays must respect any reasonably moral project, and hence any reasoned personal life project, bearing in mind that personal life projects can be justi¿ed only if they provide inherently social goods, such as the own good of living in a society morally plural. PEDAGOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR A PROPOSAL OF HUMANIST MORAL EDUCATION

Moral education is not a matter of guidelines, rules, pedagogical techniques or recipes, but of conditions, and we present them now. They are addressed to school education and, mainly, to teachers; to those professionals that every day have to deal with the education in values of their students (Buxarrais, 1997). The Condition of Presence The ¿rst condition we would like to refer to is the assumption of presence. Moral education needs to openly accept that the educational task is an ethical act, that it is per se an ethical and moral event (Bárcena & Mèlich, 2000). To educate is more than to transmit, teach or instil; to educate is to transform and to be transformed. We could say that the educational process, as far as the moral is concerned, is a process of ‘quixotization’, where nobody is the same at the end as at the beginning of his participation in it (Ortega y Gasset, 1981). How can this condition of constant presence in moral education be accepted? More than this, how to manage that professional teachers do not become less attentive in their educational task, precisely because such a task is a moral and ethical event? We may search for the answer to this question in the word vocation that, surely, is signi¿cantly different from that of personal interest. Today moral education, more than ever, needs professionals with a disposition for the educational task, not only people with more or less interest in education, or as commonly said, people that feel a certain regard for children. European Higher Education Aera (EHEA) should think about this now we are in the middle of a restructuring process at the university. We understand vocation in the sense that Max Weber (Beruf) did, among others, and particularly for the second dimension that he gave it, namely: the acquisition of a strong conviction that our destiny in life is to do what we think we want to do (Weber, 1958). In this sense, a person with vocation is similar to the craftsman that Richard Sennet presents us in his last and interesting book, the person that has acquired ‘an enduring, basic human impulse, the desire to do a job well for its own sake.’ (Sennet, 2008). In consequence, doing a job and commit to it is not the same, especially if we are talking about the world of humanities, and in particular, of education (Derrida, 2002). Undertaking a sense of teaching life, for oneself and for the education community, committing to the education activity, being eager to do things well just for the sake of doing it well. We think that this is what guarantees that one will not stagger when asked for the reasons why a teacher 60

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and a group of students should meet in ‘a place called school’ (Martínez, 2001); when he is questioned about what a teacher does nowadays that Internet, the family or the media cannot do. A teacher with an acquired vocation is someone ¿lled with clear and sound answers, and therefore convincing answers, that only those that live for and because of their profession can give. The liberal-communitarian debate makes us get the point of this condition. It is true, as liberalism argues, that a private and a public dimension exists in the life of peoples, and each has its goals and particular ends. However, it is also true, as communitarianism states, that private life is grounded in the community; it does not start from scratch because, like it or not, we are community beings. A teacher cannot pretend to ignore the private life of his students as he should not also disregard his when he enters the school and/or the classroom. The job of a teacher consists in entering the sphere of his students, sure with respect, attention, and the wish to help. Entering the life of a student to spoil, mess up, humble, and leave, is not the job of a teacher or anybody. The teacher is the bastion of the social community, its main representative in front of the students, as the school contents are for science and culture. The teacher not only transmits values, deliberately or not, but also represents them unavoidably. We may say that a teacher is a set of values, a living representation of what one can become, and what one can achieve, maxim that by the way should be seriously taken into account when appraising the teaching task in the social debate. We are aware that this condition of moral education is very personal, but we regard it as a sine qua non condition for the upbringing of more committed, free and fair citizens. If humanism is the revival of the best, the rise of the person to high ethical and moral levels, the process of humanization of the new generations of citizens must be carried out by people who feel that their life and professional task consist in supporting such revival. The Condition of Planning The opposite of planning is improvising. Planning is to submit the development of any activity to a detailed plan, while improvising is to do something suddenly, without study or preparation. With planning one can get somewhere, with improvisation that is very different, no to say quite impossible. The human condition needs a planning for his development, because his wilder nature is exactly the improvisation. Rousseau’s Émile (1979) is a treatise of a planned education, as liberal and impulsive it may seem, and also the works of modern educational psychology (Piaget, 1969) are focused on planning. We have reasons to think that moral education must seriously be planned, and we have proof enough to state that leaving it under the hands of improvisation is a risk. The rise of youth violence, indifference towards the public sphere, little attention to the development of good manners, in many cases these are due to a lack of planning and an abuse of educational improvisation. Talking about planning in moral education is not only a matter of organizing for future presentation of those values that 61

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are worth to be learnt when the development of the abilities of the students make it possible. This type of planning does not guarantee that the students will acquire those values, that they will internalize them in the deepest sense of the word. Planning in moral education consists in organizing the moral development of the students from the lowest level onward and, why not say it, from the most important one. As we have indicated, autonomy is conquered from the life in community, and life in community is governed by moral habits, by the participation in social and cultural events that require to behave in a certain way and not another. If the virtues, now values, are human qualities, it is not wrong to think that this proves it pedagogically necessary to plan the learning of such qualities by exercising them. The good life is the practise of the good life, teaches Aristotle. We do not want to ¿nish without saying that we do not support a closed planning. Moral education, as we will show in the next condition, has a certain degree of improvisation that must be observed. What we do maintain, however, is that between planning and improvisation we keep with the ¿rst, and that a reference to those values that we pretend to educate on is useless if they are not considered in the educational practise, in any school activity, how meaningless it may seem. The Condition of Inconvenience As we have just pointed out, we are aware that education in values involves some moments of inconvenience, moments that have not been thought over, unexpected situations, gestures or words. They may be pleasant, and if so, we are glad for our success, but they can also be unpleasant, annoying, and not appropriate. We dare say that in the last years these have increased dramatically. They are likely not a result of postmodernity, but they are very typical of our time. A teacher in such a situation ¿nds himself on a crossroads, where one direction appeals to him and the other shuns him away. Taking one or the other is dif¿cult, and our suggestion consists in moving closer to the complexity, to the student or group of students in particular, and to the unfortunate situation in general. Liberal thinking, applied to this type of educative moments, recommends us to leave, or at least, take some distance except in exceptional cases, of course. The imperative respect for the autonomy of the student and his liberty suggest that it is best that everyone goes his way, as long as it does hinder somebody else. There is no reason, then, to act up in front of an idea that is morally strange, to be negative about the practise of a moral habit that you do not see the point of, or to show passive or active contempt for the values of other colleagues or the own teacher. Nevertheless, respect for the student cannot be shown from distance, but only from proximity. Distant respect, if we can call it this way, is closer to laziness than to the help, and the educational action is an act of help (Levinas, 1993). Now, a wrongly understood attention with the mere objective of avoiding uncomfortable situations just to turn them into false moments of peace and calm, is also a lack of respect, equal to or greater than postponing it. 62

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Our proposal for moral education must respect the condition of facing up to complex situations, of facing up to those moments when the student is calling the attention of his teacher, when he is asking him to exercise his responsibility in the deepest sense of this word (Jonas, 1994). With touch, education, caution, and courage, the teacher must reorientate certain behaviours, calm down certain opinions, and certain attitudes, always when he reasonably thinks that these go against the humanism he is trying to instil on his students. The Condition of Patience Education in the moral domain is a rather slow process, and most of its results are obtained in the long term. With a few honourable exceptions, ethical learning in a short period is a bad sign, since something tells us that we enter the ¿eld of indoctrination and instilment. The hurry that rules postmodernity – everything should have been done yesterday – has also overrun the educational arena in general, and moral education in particular. This being the case, and after having some time devoted to moral education of his students, the teacher may have a feeling of failure if these do not behave as expected. Educational reality is pressing hard, de¿nitely, but moral education requires its time. Appreciating values is not easy (Cortina, 1999), feel that it is worth to behave in a certain manner instead of another, that is better to exercise certain attitudes and not others, that it is worth to develop certain feelings and not others. We can ¿nd the explanation for this in the same human nature; our instincts push us towards the easy and move us away from the dif¿cult. To all this, we should add that moral education cannot either be in eternity, it needs its time, no less no more than the necessary. We suspect that some values are not learned just because we let too much time go by in their learning. Anyhow, we believe in a moral education that is patient, with teachers involved in the time required for the nurture of moral persons. The Condition of Individualization Finally, we would like to mention a condition that may seem obvious after all that has been said, but that needs to be reminded as often as necessary. Something special, real and wonderful takes place in the education in values at the school. The teacher ¿nds himself in the middle of a group of people that are absolutely unique and unrepeatable and, at the same time, are part of a group, maybe with different cultural backgrounds, but from one and the same universal human group (Cortina, 1997). The teacher is surrounded by several persons with different life stories, and his job lies in developing each and every one of them, each one his own way, his own manner. The liberal-communitarian debate has made us realize that each one of the students needs to develop his authenticity, and the teacher is one of the main ¿gures in such a development. It is maybe in individualization where the art of education 63

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can be best admired. In individualization of moral education, equal words, equal gestures, equal comments, equal looks are of no use. Certainly, this does not mean that the teacher has to give each student what he demands but what he needs. Moral education is not an a la carte menu, it is not a matter of preference. Authenticity is not born from free choice but from choice placed in time and space, that is, in a reasonable moral community. Clearly, this condition to a large extent has to do with teaching experience, with the accumulation of many personal and individualized relationships, but this does not mean that it cannot also be taught in the Faculties of Education. The transmission of knowledge of human nature, and a high regard for moral and ethical development, are good ways to train teachers that are willing to communicate with each student, as he or she deserves. REFERENCES Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago: University Chicago Press. Bárcena, F., & Mèlich, J.C. (2000). La educación como acontecimiento ético: natalidad, narración y hospitalidad (Education as Ethical Event: Birth-rate, Account, and Hospitality). Barcelona: Paidós. Bauman, Z. (1993). Postmodern ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Bauman, Z. (2007). Liquid times: Living in an age of uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press. Berkowitz, m. (1995). Educar la persona moral en su totalidad. Revista Iberoamericana de Educación, 8. (73-103). Bolívar, A. (2007). Educación para la ciudadanía: algo más que una asignatura (Education for Citizenship: Something more than a Subject). Barcelona: Graó. Buxarrais, Mª R. (1997). La formación del profesorado en educación en valores: propuestas y materiales. Bilbao: Descleé de Brouwer. Buxarrais, Mª R. (2006). Por una ética de la compasión en la educación. Teoría de la Educación. Revista Interuniversitaria, 18. 201-227. Castells, M. (1997). La era de la información: economía, sociedad y cultura. Vol I. La sociedad red. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Castiñeira, A. & Calsina, M. (2005). Catalunya reptes ètics (Catalonia Ethical Challenges). Barcelona: Proa. Cortina, A. (1997). Ciudadanos del mundo. Hacia una teoría de la ciudadanía (Citizens of the World. Towards a Theory of Citizenship). Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Cortina, A. (1999). Los ciudadanos como protagonistas (Citizens in the Crosshairs). Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg. Della Mirandola, Pico (1956). Oration on the dignity of man. Chicago: Regnery Publishing. Derrida, J. (2002). Universidad sin condición. Madrid: Mínima Trotta. Frondizi, R. (1977). Introducción a los problemas fundamentales del hombre (Introduction to Fundamental Problems of Man). Mèxico: Fondo del Cultura Económica. Jonas, H. (1994). El principio de la responsabilidad. Ensayo de una ética para la civilización tecnológica. Barcelona: Herder. Kymlicka, W. (1989). Liberalism, community and culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. (Ed.).(1995). The rights of minority cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Levinas. E. (1993). Humanismo del otro hombre. Madrid: Caparrós Editores. Lipovetsky, G. (1983). L’ère du vide. Essais sur l’individualisme contemporain. Paris: Éditions Gallimard. Maalouf, A. (1998). Les identités meurtrières. Paris: Grasset & Franquelle.

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MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE Macintyre, A. (1981). After virtue. London: Ducworth. Macintyre, A. (1990). The rival versions of moral enquiry. Encyclopedia, genealogy and tradition. New York: Scott Meredith Literacy Agency. Marias, J. (1985). Historia de la ¿losofía. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Martínez, M. (2001). Un lugar llamado escuela: en la sociedad de la información y la diversidad (A place called school: in the society of information and diversity). Barcelona: Ariel. Martínez, M; Buxarrais, Mª R., & Esteban, F. (2002). La universidad como espacio de aprendizaje ético (The University as a Place of Ethical Learning). Revista Iberoamericana de Educación, 29,17-45. Mulhall, S., & Swift, A. (1992). Liberals & communitarians. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Nussbaum, M. (1997). Cultivating humanity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ortega Y Gasset, J. (2000). Meditations on quixote. Illinois: University of Illinois Press. Piaget, J. (1969). Biología y conocimiento: ensayo sobre las relaciones entre las regulaciones orgánicas y los procesos cognoscitivos. Madrid: Siglo XXI. Puig, J. Mª. (1995). La educación moral en la enseñanza obligatoria (Moral Education in Compulsory Education). Barcelona: ICE-Horsori. Puig, J.Mª., Batlle, R., Bosch, C., & Palos, J. (2006). Aprenentatge i servei. Educar per a la ciutadania (Learning and Service. Education for the Citizenship). Barcelona: Octaedro. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Raz, J. (1986). The morality of freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rousseau, J. (1979). Emile, or on education. New York: Basic Books. Sandel, M. (1982). Liberalism and the limits of the justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sennet, R. (1998). The Corrosion of character: The personal consequences of work in the new capitalism. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Sennet, R. (2008). The craftman. London: Penguin Books. Steiner, G. (2004). The Idea of Europe. Tilburg: Nexus Publishers. Taylor, Ch. (1990). Sources of the self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Ch. (1994). Ética de la autenticidad. Barcelona: Paidós ICE/UAB. Thiebaut, C. (1998). Vindicación del ciudadano. Un sujeto reÀexivo en una sociedad compleja (Citizen Vindication. A Thoughtful Subject in a Complex Society). Barcelona: Paidós. Trilla, J. (1992). El profesor y los valores controvertidos: neutralidad y beligerancia en la educación (Teacher and Controversial Values: Neutrality and Belligerence in Education). Barcelona: Paidós. Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of justice. New York: Basic Books. Weber, M. (1958). Science as vocation. New York: Oxford University Press.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

Education which was a site of struggle during apartheid has become a site of transformation (at least at the level of policy) in post-apartheid South Africa. Following the democratic elections in 1994, a myriad of policies were developed (including education ones) signalling widespread changes to the education system. The changes are associated with challenges presented by a rapidly changing and globally interconnected world on the one hand, and on the other hand, the restoration, rejuvenation and reimagining of traditional values that had become eroded during the colonial and apartheid periods. One such value is that of Ubuntu, a linguisticphilosophical construct that has gained prominence in multiple discourses (business, education, popular, etc.) in post-apartheid South Africa. In this chapter I wish to critically discuss the construct Ubuntu and its potential to transform education in South Africa. I shall begin this chapter by providing a brief background of curriculum policy change in South Africa post 1994 so as to trace the infusion of indigenous knowledge and notions as such as Ubuntu in the national curriculum. THE INFUSION OF UBUNTU IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL CURRICULUM

In the immediate years following South Africa’s ¿rst democratic elections in 1994, curriculum change was not necessarily substantive. Jansen (1999, p. 57) goes as far as to argue that syllabus alterations which took place during this period had very little do with the school curriculum and more concerned with an uncertain state seeking legitimacy following the national elections. In the main, curriculum revision involved exorcising of racial content as well as outdated and inaccurate subject matter of school syllabuses. Jansen (1999, p. 57) points out that the haste with which the South African state pursued what he terms, ‘a super¿cial cleansing of the inherited curriculum’, needs to be understood in terms of a set of pressures faced by a South African state in transition. Jansen (1999, pp. 64-65) points out that syllabus alterations immediately after South Africa’s ¿rst democratic elections might be understood in four ways: in the context of the constitutional and bureaucratic constraints of political transition under a Government of National Unity; as a process that emerged in the context of weak political leadership in the then Ministry of Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 67–78. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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Education; as a process propelled by mounting pressure on the Minister of Education from the media; as a process made possible by a weak political challenge from the education community on the educational terms of the project. However, in March 1997 the National Education Ministry launched the new curriculum entitled Curriculum 2005. Curriculum 2005 was the ¿rst comprehensive curriculum framework produced by the post-apartheid government. It was launched in 1997 and introduced into grade 1 in 1998. The curriculum focused on general education and training (GET) and after revision was called the Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS) for GET. This curriculum was envisaged to replace content-based education with outcomes-based education and teacher-centred pedagogies with more learner-centred pedagogies. Another change was the replacement of the 42 school subjects offered to learners in South African primary schools by eight learning areas. The learning areas combine the old subjects, in a sense, ostensibly to promote a more holistic and integrated approach. Each learning area has curriculum-linked outcomes which learners should attain through engaging with learning activities. Since the gradual phasing in of the new curriculum, the curriculum had undergone revision. The curriculum revision process followed a period of vociferous debate and ¿erce contestation as to the merits of outcomes-based education (OBE) (see, for example, Jansen and Christie, 1999). There were also other concerns such as dif¿culties with implementation of the new curriculum in resource poor contexts. For example, authors of the Report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005 observed that historically disadvantaged schools did not have the resources (reference and textbooks, stationery, photocopying facilities and other technologies of teaching) to implement Curriculum 2005 effectively (Chisholm et al., 2000). In response to some criticisms levelled against Curriculum 2005, South Africa’s second post-apartheid Minister of Education commissioned a committee to review Curriculum 2005. The review committee made several recommendations based on visits to schools by its members; its review of published literature on Curriculum 2005; its review of submissions made by organisations and individuals; and further investigation (for detail, see Chisholm et al., 2000). The developments that I have just discussed have relevance to the General Education and Training (GET) band. South Africa’s National Quali¿cations Framework (NQF) has three bands: General Education and Training (GET); Further Education and Training (FET) and Higher Education and Training (FET). In short the GET band comprises pre-school, primary school and junior high school (grades 0 – 9); the FET band senior high school (grades 10 – 12); and the HET band, university education (degrees/diplomas and higher degrees/diplomas). In the year 2006 a new curriculum phased in for the FET band. One of the principles on which the National Curriculum Statement (NCS) for Further Education and Training (FET) is based is: ‘valuing indigenous knowledge systems’ (DoE 2003, p. 4). The principle is elaborated as follows: ‘Indigenous knowledge systems in the South African context refer to a body of knowledge embedded in African philosophical thinking and social practices that have evolved over thou68

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sands of years’. Furthermore, the ten values1 identi¿ed in South Africa’s Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (DoE 2001) are purported to ¿nd expression in both the GET and FET curriculum statements. One of the ten values is Ubuntu (human dignity). Ubuntu is an African word comprising one of the core elements of a human being. The African word for human being is umuntu which is constituted by the following: umzimba (body, form, Àesh); umoya (breath, air, life); umphefumela (shadow, spirit, soul); amandla (vitality, strength, energy); inhliziyo (heart, centre of emotions); umqondo (head, brain, intellect), ulwimi (language, speaking) and Ubuntu (humanness) (Le Roux, 2000, p. 43). The humanness referred to here ¿nds expression in a communal context rather than the individualism prevalent in many Western societies (Venter 2004, p. 151). Battle (1996, p. 99) presents the concept Ubuntu as a concept that originates from the Xhosa expression: umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye Bantu. He writes: ‘Not an easily translatable Xhosa concept, generally, this proverbial expression means that each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed in relationship with others and, in turn, individuality is truly expressed. Or a person depends on other persons to be a person.’ Ubuntu then, is to be aware of one’s own being, but also of one’s duties towards one’s neighbour. According to Venter (2004, p. 156) Ubuntu is a concrete manifestation of the interconnectedness of human beings – it is the embodiment of (South) African culture and life style. Evidently, African philosophical thinking generally, and Ubuntu more speci¿cally, are central features of post-apartheid curriculum frameworks. The inclusion of values such as Ubuntu is intended to restore through education values that have become eroded as a consequence of centuries of colonialism and decades of apartheid. Given the reference made to African philosophical thinking in the curriculum statements I shall brieÀy outline major trends in African philosophy so as to provide an understanding of Ubuntu. FOUR TRENDS OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

I use the four trends that Oruka identi¿es for framing my discussion but I am aware that these are not the only identi¿able strands in African philosophy and that Oruka himself later expanded his four trends to six (for details see Gratton, 2003). Oruka (2002) identi¿es the following four trends in African philosophy: ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity, national-ideological philosophy and professional philosophy. Ethno-philosophy is exempli¿ed in the work of Placide Tempels on the ontology of the Bantu. Tempels was probably the ¿rst person to use the term ‘philosophy’ with regard to the thoughts of African people. Gratton (2003) points out that for the ethno-philosopher, ‘philosophy is latent within the everyday actions of a people; philosophy, as such, is also the worldviews that guide and maintain a culture’. He notes that ethno-philosophers reproduce both the latent and the explicit philosophical doctrines in the hope of providing future African philosophers with an ‘intellectual matrix’ indigenous to Africa. Ethno-philosophy has been subjected to various criticisms. For example, Hountondjii argues that ethno-philosophy is not African, 69

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because it is addressed to Western audiences and in so doing reinforces stereotypes of African thought as being pseudo-philosophy or pre-scienti¿c. Bodunrin also argues that ethno-philosophy provides a false sense of the ‘tradition’ as devoid of the problems and struggles which characterise all societies. Oruka’s second trend, philosophic sagacity, is based on his own research on Kenyan wise men and wise women. For Oruka (1990, p. 28) philosophic sagacity is the ‘thoughts of wise men and women in any given community and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that Àuctuates between popular wisdom and didactic wisdom.’ He argues that ‘one way of looking for the traces of African philosophy is to wear the uniform of anthropological ¿eld work and use the dialogical techniques to pass through the anthropological fogs to the philosophical ground’ (Oruka, 1990, p. xxi). Oruka regards philosophic sagacity as being distinct from ethno-philosophy, since sages do not simply transmit the thoughts of their communities, but rather critically evaluate what might be unquestioningly accepted by members of communities. One of the dif¿culties with philosophic sagacity is that one cannot easily distinguish the source of the ¿eld reports when the researcher is a trained philosopher – are the ¿eld reports a record of the philosophic ideas of the sages or a reconstruction of them by a trained philosopher (as was the case with Oruka) after engagement with the ideas of the sages (Gratton, 2003, p. 68)? Bodunrin (1984) has sympathy with Oruka’s notion of philosophic sagacity, but argues that, together with ethno-philosophy, it comes perilously close to non-philosophy, because it is based on the views of everyday people. The third trend in African philosophy that Oruka identi¿es is the nationalist ideologies produced by Africa’s ¿rst post-colonial leaders, including Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah. These African leaders sought not only to decolonise the nations they led, but also their people’s minds (Gratton, 2003, p. 69). Although these leaders were strongly Pan-Africanist; they were inÀuenced by Western ideas ranging from Existentialism to Marxism. Bodunrin (1984) argues that these national leaders took up ethno-philosophy ‘to glorify an African past in order to forecast an almost utopian non-colonial future’. However, Bodunrin argues that the ideas of these nationalists lacked rigour and systemisation, and therefore cannot be regarded as philosophy. The rigour and systemisation that Bodunrin refers to is provided by Oruka’s fourth trend, professional philosophy. Bodunrin (1984, p. 2) describes this trend as the work of trained philosophers. Many of them reject the assumptions of ethno-philosophy and take a universalist point of view. Philosophy, many of them argue, must have the same meaning in all cultures although the subjects that receive priority, and perhaps the method of dealing with them, may be dictated by cultural biases and the existential situation in the society within which the philosophers operate. According to this school, African philosophy is the philosophy done by African philosophers whether it be in the area of logic, metaphysics, ethics, or history of philosophy. Gratton (2003) points out that this trend identi¿es strongly with the analytic tradition of Western philosophy as evidenced by the fact that universalists such as 70

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Wiredu, Hountondji and others have referred to themselves as the Vienna circle of African philosophy. It is this association that universalists have with the analytic tradition that has been a source of critique. For example, Ikuenobe (1997) refers to the universalist position as parochial, because its uses Western analytic philosophy as the yardstick by which to measure whether the other trends in African philosophy qualify to be called ‘philosophy’. He argues that there is an array of traditions and approaches within Western philosophy that universalists do not account for. In summary, the four trends in African philosophy provide a continuum with extreme positions of a narrow particularism characteristic of ethno-philosophy at the one end and a narrow universalism of professional philosophy on the other. What I wish to suggest is that the four trends might also be used as a heuristic for mapping nuanced understandings of notions such as communalism and Ubuntu. In this chapter, however, I shall use the broad categories of particularist and universalist to frame my discussion. For particularists philosophy and culture are tightly intertwined – so much so that cultural values/expressions are perceived as commensurate with philosophy. For particularists Ubuntu is not only a cultural value but a philosophy. For universalists the notion of Ubuntu may be the object/subject of philosophical inquiry, but cannot simply be referred to as philosophy – it has to pass the test of rigour and systematisation. ‘PHILOSOPHY’ OF UBUNTU AN ETHNOPHILOSOPHY?

Ubuntu like all other African cultural values have circulated primarily through orality and tradition – its meaning is interwoven in the cultural practices and lived experiences of African peoples. However, Ubuntu has become abstracted from its geographical and cultural situatedness and has been taken up in several written discourses. It is in written discourses that much of the contestation around Ubuntu may be found. Traces of ethnophilosophy may, for example, be found in Makgoba’s perspective on Ubuntu. He writes: Ubuntu is unique in the following respects: it emphasizes respect for the nonmaterial order that exists in us and among us; it fosters man’s respect for himself, for others, and for the environment; it has spirituality; it has remained non-racial; it accommodates other cultures and it is the invisible force uniting Africans worldwide. Therefore unlike Confucian or European philosophies, it transcends both race and culture (Makgoba quoted in Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004, p. 24). Reference to ethnophilosophy is evident in Makgoba’s suggestion that Ubuntu is distinct from Chinese and European philosophies and that it is the invisible force uniting Africans (in an ethnic sense) worldwide. Likewise Higgs (2003) and Venter (2004) ascribe to Ubuntu uniqueness with the African experience. 71

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Representing Ubuntu in ethnophilosophical terms might be problematic for a number of reasons. Ethnophilosophies take a phenomenological approach to cultural values/practices/knowledges which tend to reify it. As Price (2005, p. 3) so cogently puts it, ‘the phenomenological approach to indigenous knowledge tends to reify it – if people say something is true, then it is true for them, and since this is ultimately the only truth, we can’t argue with it’. Also, cultures are not monolithic entities but rather subsume nuances, contradictions and contestations. Cultural values/practices/knowledges do not reside in ‘pristine fashion’ outside of the inÀuences of other cultures that ethnophilosophers seem to suggest. Dei (2000, p. 113) points out that bodies of knowledge (and I would add cultures) continually inÀuence each other demonstrating the dynamism of all knowledge systems/cultures. Rendering a false dichotomy or moral evaluation between good (African) and bad (Western) knowledges/cultures (Dei, 2000, p. 113) is not useful. Therefore arguing for African philosophies that are intrinsically unique could be problematic. Moreover, there is a parochialism associated with ethnophilosophies that Ramphele (quoted by Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004, p. 24) neatly captures with respect to certain interpretations of Ubuntu: Ubuntu as a philosophical approach to social relationships must stand alongside other approaches and be judged on the value it can add to better human relations in our complex society. (…) The refusal to acknowledge the similarity between Ubuntu and other humanistic philosophical approaches is part a reÀection of the parochialism of South Africans and a refusal to learn from others. (…) We have to have the humility to acknowledge that we are not inventing unique problems in this country, nor are we likely to invent new solutions. Ramphele’s perspective demonstrates that all Africans do not hold the same view of Ubuntu - that it is not a cultural value/practice/knowing that has been preserved and withstood all the storms of history – that the rei¿cation/objecti¿cation of Ubuntu might problematic. Rather, Ubuntu is a term that is open to interpretation and contestation and, moreover, an idea that is not simply natural but rather imagined and politically driven - that our thinking and writing about Ubuntu represents (re) constructions or (re)imaginings of the term that cannot be separated from the sociopolitico-cultural discourses that are available to us in post-apartheid South Africa. Discourses on Ubuntu represent in similar ways to Oruka’s philosophical sagacity (re)constructions which might be called philosophy. The research for a unique African difference through the invocation of notions such as Ubuntu promises to remain illusive if the term is rei¿ed/objecti¿ed. Masolo’s (1998) caution in this regard is worth noting: The search for this [African] identity [through Ubuntu] and for what is authentic about it is the thread that runs through Oruka’s idea of ‘The four trends in African philosophy’, and it reveals its own contradictions in the very search for a universal and homogeneous African difference. For, so long as the mono72

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lithism of the above assumptions remains suspect, the efforts of postcoloniality remain only, and validly so, a search for something that remains constantly illusive. PROFESSIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU

As a background to my discussion on professional philosophy I wish to raise some critical perspectives on Western philosophy/knowledge. My concern here is not with Western knowledges/philosophies per se, but rather with particular con¿gurations of Western knowledge/philosophy such as Eurocentrism. ‘Eurocentrism’ is the assumption that Europe functions independently from other parts of the world and that Europe and people of European descent owe nothing to the rest of the world (Harding, 1993, p. 2). In fact, many Westerners would contend that the exemplary achievements of ‘their’ science and technology prove that they are different from those of other cultures. Moreover, that ‘their’ science and technologies are the most important measures of progress. Harding (1993, p. 7) asserts that many Westerners ‘insist that the development of modern science shows how progressive, rational, and civilised is the modern West in contrast to the backward, irrational, and primitive rest’. I suggest that it is important to understand that Western knowledge systems/philosophies only have the appearance of universal truth because of colonialism and imperialism. As N. Gough (1998, p. 508) notes, ‘European imperialism has given Western science [philosophy] the appearance of universal truth and rationality, and often is assumed to be a form of knowledge that lacks the cultural ¿ngerprints’ that appear to be much more conspicuous in other knowledge systems/philosophies. Harding (1993, p. 8) expresses similar sentiments to Gough and writes: ‘European sciences [philosophies] progressed primarily because of the military, economic and political power of European cultures, not because of the purported greater rationality of Westerners or the purported commitment of their sciences [philosophies] to the pursuit of disinterested truths’. Western philosophies might therefore be understood as ethnophilosophies (situated knowledges) that have moved from their sites of production as a consequence of European imperialism and colonialism. The hegemony of Western science/philosophy as a consequence of military, economic and political power means that Western science/philosophy has not been objectively situated in world history nor have nonwestern sciences/philosophies been assessed in objective ways. Consequently, in recent years there have been increasing calls from among others, postcolonialists, anti-colonialists, philosophers of science, feminist poststructuralists for the democratisation of science/philosophy so that Western science/philosophy can be decentred and non-Western sciences/ philosophies demarginalised (see Harding, 1993; Harding, 1994; Harding, 1998; A. Gough, 1998; N. Gough, 1998; A. Gough, 1999). This however, does not mean that those of us who have been interpellated by Western traditions should totally abandon the Western sciences/philosophies. As Harding (1993, p. 2) neatly formulates 73

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the point: ‘Our solution cannot be escape to ‘elsewhere’. Instead, we must learn to take responsibility for the sciences/philosophies we have now and have had in the past, to acknowledge their limitations and Àaws as we also value their indubitable strengths and achievements. But to do so requires a more realistic and objective grasp of their origins and effects ‘elsewhere’ as well as in the West.’ I am also concerned about more subtle forms of colonisation as knowledge is produced and rapidly disseminated across the globe in contemporary society. I am particularly concerned with a danger that indigenous ways of knowing/African philosophies might become assimilated into an imperialist archive in the light of complex globalization processes currently prevalent. My usage of the term ‘archive’ is borrowed from Foucault (1972). Smith (1999, p. 44) points out that Western knowledges, philosophies and de¿nitions of human nature form what Foucault (1972) has referred to as a ‘cultural archive’. It could also be referred to as a ‘storehouse’ of histories, artefacts, ideas, texts and/or images, which are classi¿ed, preserved, arranged and represented back to the West and Nonwesterners. Although shifts and transformations may occur within Western thinking, Smith (1999, p. 44) argues that this happens without changing the archive itself, and without the modes of classi¿cation and systems of representation contained within it, being destroyed. She holds the view that systems of classi¿cation and representation enable different traditions or fragments of traditions to be retrieved and are formulated in different contexts as discourses, and then played out in systems of power and domination, with material consequences for colonised peoples. It is in the light of this that I ¿nd the universalism of professional philosophy (Oruka’s four trends) problematic. Professional philosophy as a strand of African philosophy uses the same methods/philosophical strategies of Western philosophy, because the belief is that these methods/strategies are universal rather than speci¿c to a culture/philosophical tradition. What makes Oruka’s professional philosophy African is that it focuses on African cultural values/practices and Africa’s problems. It does not equate African cultural values with philosophy, but these become the objects of philosophical inquiry or needs to meet the test of rigour to be called philosophy. Though the focus of philosophical inquiry is different for the African professional philosopher, the methods and forms of representation are not different to those of Western philosophy. I would argue that professional African philosophy therefore becomes not just a strand of African philosophy, as Oruka suggests, but a strand of Western philosophy alongside analytic, continental and North American pragmatism – probably the reason why it has been embraced by several universities in the United States of America. Professional African philosophy does little, if anything, to disrupt the hegemony of the Western cultural archive and as such holds the danger of (re)producing (neo)colonialist discourses. Methods/philosophical strategies cannot simply be separated or abstracted from social/cultural contexts, as they are socially/culturally (re)produced/constructed Therefore it is my interest to take the discussion beyond the particularism of ethno-philosophy and the universalism of professional philosophy. 74

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TOWARDS A DECONSTRUCTIVE/RECONSTRUCTIVE VIEW OF UBUNTU

As mentioned, my interest is to decentre Western philosophy so that it is situated more objectively in world history – to show that it is a situated philosophy (I use philosophy here in a plural sense), an ethno-philosophy that has moved from its site(s) of production to other places not necessary because of its superiority or universalism, but rather because it was aided and abetted by military power, imperialism and colonialism. My interest is to disrupt the hegemony of the Western archive by using philosophical strategies that might themselves be considered to be Western – that is, I use Western philosophical strategies reÀexively. Though I may be accused of contradicting some of my earlier arguments, I shall use the strategy of deconstruction so as to open up possibilities for moving beyond standpoints of narrow particularism and unreÀexive universalism. Deconstruction, I argue, has the potential to disrupt hegemonic Western philosophies (it disrupts rather than (re)produces the Western cultural archive) and new orthodoxies linked to ethno-philosophies that may gain momentum in African contexts. My critique of Ubuntu speci¿cally and African philosophy more generally is not to be dismissive of them, but rather to lay bare some of the problems of Ubuntu/African philosophy when it is viewed through ethno-philosophical lenses. I argue that African philosophy/Ubuntu must be brought into our conversations and discourses – that it must be invoked if we are to decentre and deconstruct Western philosophy. The future of an African philosophy lies in the recognition that the post-colonial present is hybridised and that a transcendental synthesis (of traditional and Western) is unworkable (Gratton, 2003). However, the hybridised post-colonial presence does not mean the conservation of two competing identities, but rather invokes ‘the important ways in which post-structuralists use the language of the dominant structure in order to re-organize it from within’ (Gratton, 2003, p.73). As Bhabha (1985, p. 2) writes: A contingent borderline experience opens up in-between colonizer and colonized. This space of cultural and interpretive indecidability produced in the ‘present’ of the colonial moment (…) The margin of hybridity, where cultural differences ‘contingently’ and conÀictually touch (…) resists the binary opposition of racial and cultural groups. Recognising the reconstructive/deconstructive force of African philosophy negates the idea of African philosophical practice being ‘reduced to that which is at worst an a-historical (universalist) or relativist (particularist) enterprise’ (Gratton, 2003, p. 65). Gratton (2003, p. 65), argues that by working on the margins of the dominant colonial and metaphysical discourses, African philosophy ‘is able to render their (i.e. Eurocentric philosophies’) blind spots and ¿ssures in order to displace them’. African philosophy is at best a recounting/reconstruction of the African lived ex-

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perience, but when it is invoked the consequence is the deconstruction of (Western) philosophy. As Gratton (2003, p. 65) writes: ‘African[a] philosophy’ is a performative signi¿er that by its very name brings together and calls into question an endless number of oppositions: past/future, universalist/particularist, African thought/philosophy, etc. It is the deconstructive/reconstructive potential of African philosophy/Ubuntu that needs to be explored and become part of our conversations and discourses within/ on a (South) African philosophy of education. In (South) Africa, where indigenous knowledge systems reside among the majority of its people and Western philosophies remain dominant through new forms of colonisation latent in processes such as globalization, an African philosophy of education is vital. Hope for education in (South) Africa depends on recounting visions of Africa’s history and reconstructing it to the present, but also in displacing dominant discourses, including those evident in South African education policy documents. African philosophy (of education) as a reconstructive/deconstructive force might offer hope for education in (South) Africa. It will also avert the danger of a single African philosophy (of education) from becoming dominant in the way that Fundamental Pedagogics2 did under apartheid. African(a) philosophy (of education) as reconstructive/deconstructive force is singular-plural. CONCLUSION

As noted indigenous knowledge generally and Ubuntu more speci¿cally, have been incorporated in South Africa’s national curriculum statements. Although Ubuntu as a cultural value does reside among many (South) Africans and it derives from aphorisms in different African languages (it is a linguistic phenomenon) there is contestation concerning the concept in much of the recent writings on African philosophy of education in South Africa (see Higgs 2003; Parker 2003; Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Horsthemke 2004; Le Grange, 2004; Waghid, 2004). Moreover, in multicultural South African classrooms teachers’ interpretations of Ubuntu and related notions could be crucial for the project of transformation in South Africa. A narrow interpretation (with ethnophilosophical leanings) of the concept might lead to antagonism in classrooms and thwart critical deliberation. By this I mean that certain groups might claim that the concept belongs to them (even though this might contradict the meaning of the term) or hold the view that it cannot be subjected to critical scrutiny. There is a danger of othering here – a narrow humanism that could emerge leading to atrocities such as the spate of xenophobia experienced in South Africa in recent times. On the other hand, if Ubuntu and related concepts are to be subjected to the criteria of Western philosophy/knowledge for it to have legitimacy it might simply be reconstructed in Western terms and assimilated into a Western cultural archive, thus eroding its Africanness. 76

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Guattari (2001) argues that we cannot create new ways of living by reversing technological advancement and go back to old formulas, which were pertinent when the planet was less densely populated and when social relations were much stronger than they are today. And so invoking Ubuntu can’t simply mean yearning back to how things were in the past. It also can not only be legitimated by using so-called universal criteria as professional philosophers suggest. It is the deconstructive/reconstructive potential of Ubuntu that might have transformative effects on education in South Africa. The transformative potential lies in (re)imagining Ubuntu anew. NOTES 1 The ten values in The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy are: Democracy, social justice and equity, non-racism and non-sexism, Ubuntu (human-dignity), an open society, accountability (responsibility), respect, the rule of law, reconciliation. 2 Fundamental pedagogics can be traced historically to C J Langeveld’s publication Beknopte Theoretische Pedagogiek in the Netherlands in 1944. The ¿ rst publication in South Africa was C K Oberholzer’s Inleiding in die Prinsipiële Opvoedkunde, published in 1954. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s Fundamental Pedagogics was a powerful doctrine in Afrikaans-medium universities. It was also powerful in black colleges of education and in education faculties of historically black universities that were dominated by Afrikaner lecturers. Fundamental Pedagogicians argued that the ‘scienti¿c method’ was the only authentic method of studying education.

REFERENCES Battle, M. (1996). The Ubuntu theology of Desmond Tutu. In L. Huley et al., (Eds) Archbishop Tutu: Prophetic witness in South Africa. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau. Bhabha, H. (1985). Signs taken for wonders: Questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree outside Delhi, May 1817. Critical Inquiry, 12(1): 2. Bodunrin, P. (1984). The question of African philosophy. In R. Wright (Ed.) African philosophy: An introduction (1-23). New York: University Press of America. Chisholm, L et al. (2000). A South African curriculum for the twenty-¿rst century: Report of the review Committee on Curriculum 2005. Pretoria: Department of Education. Dei G. (2000). Rethinking the role of indigenous knowledges in the academy. International Journal of Inclusive Education, 4(2), 111-132. Department of Education (DoE) (2001). The Manifesto on values, education and democracy. Pretoria: Department of Education. Department of Education (DoE) (2003). National Curriculum Statement Grades 10 – 12 (General) Life Sciences. Pretoria: Department of Education. Enslin, P., & Horsthemke, K. (2004). Can Ubuntu provide a model for citizenship education in African democracies? Proceedings of the 9th biennial conference of the International Network of Philosophers of Education. Madrid: Universidad Complutense. Foucault, M. (1972). Archaeology of knowledge. New York: Pantheon. Gough, A. (1998). Beyond eurocentrism in science education: promises and problematics from a feminist poststructuralist perspective. In W. Pinar (Ed.) Curriculum: Toward new identities. New York: Garland Publishing Inc. Gough, A. (1999). Pedagogies of science (in)formed by global perspectives: encouraging strong objectivity in classrooms. In J. Weaver (Ed.) (Post) Modern Science (Education): Frustrations, Propositions, and Alternative Paths. New York: Peter Lang.

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LESLEY LE GRANGE Gough, N. (1998). All around the world: science education, constructivism, and globalisation, Education Policy, 12(5), 507-524. Gratton, P. (2003). What’s in a name? African philosophy in the making. Philosophia Africana, 6(2), 61-80. Guattari, F. (2001). The three ecologies. London: The Athlone Press. Harding, S. (Ed.) (1993). The ‘racial’ economy of science: towards a democratic future. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Harding, S. (1994). Is science multicultural? Challenges, resources, opportunities, uncertainties. Con¿guration, 2, 301-330. Higgs, P. (2003). African philosophy and the transformation of educational discourse in South Africa. Journal of Education, 30, 5-22. Hortshemke, K. (2004). Knowledge, education and the limits of africanisation. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 38(4), 571-587. Ikuenobe, P. (1997). The parochial universalist conception of ‘philosophy’ and ‘African philosophy’. Philosophy East & West, 47(2). Jansen, J,D. (1999). The school curriculum since apartheid: intersections of politics and policy in the South African transition. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 31(1), 57-67. Jansen, J.D., & Christie, P. (Eds). (1999) Changing curriculum: Studies on outcomes-based education in South Africa. Kenwyn: Juta & Co Ltd. Le Grange, L. (2004). (South) African(a) philosophy of education: a reply to Higgs and Parker. Journal of Education, 143-154. Le Roux, J. (2000). The concept of ‘Ubuntu’: Africa’s most important contribution to multicultural education? Multicultural Teaching, 18(2), 43-46. Masolo, D. (1998). African philosophy and the postcolonial: some misleading abstractions about ‘identity’. In E. Chukwudi (Ed.) Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Makgoba, M. (1996). In search of the ideal democratic model for SA. Sunday Times Oberholzer, C.K. (1954). Inleiding in die prinsipiële opvoedkunde. Pretoria: Moreau & Kie. Oruka, H. (1990). Sage philosophy. New York: E.J. Brill. Oruka, H. (2002). Four trends in current African philosophy. In P. Coetzee & A. Roux (Eds.) Philosophy from Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Parker, B. (2003). Back on the chain gang: some dif¿culties in developing a (South) African philosophy of education. Journal of Education, 30, 23-40. Price, L. (2005). Playing guessing games: abduction in social research, with particular reference to Indigenous knowledge. Paper presented at the 8th International Research Seminar on Environmental and Health Education. Grahamstown: Rhodes University, 15-17 March. Ramphele, M. (1995). Ubuntu doesn’t mean a friendly greeting to your greeting to your gardener. What is does mean is another question …, Sunday Independent, 24 September, p.15. Smith L. (1999). Decolonising methodologies: research and indigenous peoples. London: Zed Books. Venter, E. (2004). The notion of Ubuntu and communalism in African educational discourse. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 23(2-3), 149-160. Waghid, Y. (2004). Revisiting the African-Africana philosophy of education debate: implications for university teaching. Journal of Education, 34, 127-142.

Lesley Le Grange Faculty of Education Stellenbosch University

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WHY WE ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC YET: THE COMPLEXITY OF DEVELOPING A DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDE

To be able and willing to become a democratic citizen in a pluralist society, a person needs to develop a positive attitude towards democracy and diversity. This article discusses several elements that are considered prerequisite for a young person to be willing and able to develop this ‘real’ democratic attitude. These elements, structured along ‘¿ve dimensions of democratic citizenship’, resulted from a literature study on the main features of democratic citizenship, as described and conceptualized in several disciplines: sociology, psychology, philosophy, pedagogy and methodology. This theoretical frame is part of an empirical study that investigates the way in which young people in the Netherlands relate to their citizenship, especially concerning the democratic and pluralistic character of the Dutch society. INTRODUCTION

How is our democracy doing? And in which ways do citizens support the democratic character of their country? In the past decade, research on democracy and citizenship has lead to different conclusions. Some researchers claimed, based on survey studies, that many people in western societies prefer a democratic political system over other political systems. According to Dekker in the Netherlands for instance, 90 percent of Dutch citizens support the democratic political system, and 70% is satis¿ed with the way our democracy works (Dekker, 2002). This study was commented by Adriaansens (2006), who pointed to the fact stated that Dekker’s results also imply that a substantial number of citizens doesn’t support the democratic system, and is unhappy with the way our system works. He therefore argued for more research about the way different groups of citizens support our democracy. Another less optimistic conclusion was drawn from the 1999 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study among young people in sixteen democratic nations around the world. Here, researchers found that most young people believe that it is important to live in a democratic society, but they also concluded that a deeper understanding of what democracy entails seems to be absent (Torney-Purta, Lehman, Oswald & Schultz, 2001). Others researchers pressed that although many people say that they support the democratic political system, only a few are able and willing to participate in a demWiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 79–93. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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ocratic enlightened way (Savater, 2001; Parker, 2003b; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004; De Winter, 2004; Veugelers, 2007;). These scholars emphasized that our society cannot contain and develop its democratic character without us educating our children to become democratically enlightened, and to participate in this democratically enlightened way. Parker (2003b) conceptualized democratic enlightenment as a set of moral-cognitive knowledge, norms, values, and principles that shapes engagement, related to the understanding of democracy as something yet to achieve, and to the appreciation of the political, cultural, and racial diversity as the central feature of democracy. The studies outlined in the above illustrate that the outcomes of these studies are hugely affected by the way they conceptualise democracy and citizenship. Democracy was conceptualized respectively as a political system, and as both a political system and ‘a way of life’ (Dewey, 1916). This means that people also contribute to a just and caring environment in their daily lives. The different conclusions on the healthiness of the Dutch democracy, and the way Dutch citizens contribute to democracy, give rise to both theoretical and empirical questions. In this article we address one theoretical question: which attitude do young people need to develop in order to become citizens that are able and willing to support democracy and further develop the democratic character of their pluralist society? This means we look for elements that are important for the development of a democratic attitude in accordance with an inclusive and dynamic interpretation of democracy, in which diversity is considered a central feature of democracy, and in which special attention is paid to psychological and socioeconomic processes that might inÀuence peoples’ willingness to develop into democratic citizens. METHOD

Because of the impact of the conceptualization of democratic citizenship on the results of the study, we here pay speci¿c attention to choices that are made concerning the research question and the research design. Next, we discuss the normative dimension of this investigation. Speci¿cation of the research question Elaborate conceptualizations of democratic citizenship go beyond imagining how people can and should contribute to democracy by engaging in paid labour and voting activities. They focus on (different) ways to improve social justice in society, for instance by reducing inequality of power, socioeconomical inequalities, and cultural inequalities. Researchers who work with these elaborate conceptualizations have investigated what knowledge, skills and attitude would be necessary for active participation (Gutmann, 2003; Parker, 2003a; Banks, 2004; De Winter, 2004; Veugelers, 2009). This study focuses on one of these aspects: which attitude people 80

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need in order to be(come) democratic citizens. Perceived in an elaborate way, an attitude contains both cognitive, affective, and behavioural components (Bohner, 2001). Also, we distinguished between the attitude towards democracy of a person, and his or her willingness to develop a positive attitude towards democracy. In order to learn more about their attitude towards democracy, we asked students how they think about democracy and diversity; how they perceive their own role in supporting democracy and pluralism; what dif¿culties they experience when they engage with other people; how they relate to societal issues; when they consider somebody a ‘good’ citizen; and if they consider it important to become a good citizen themselves. Because of the complexity of the object of study and because students often didn’t reÀect on their citizenship identities before, we decided to conduct six interviews with each student: four group interviews, each about a central theme, and two individual interviews to further investigate the emergence of their attitudes towards the main themes. Thirty students participated in the investigation. Because we’re also interested in the impact of school type, we chose students from four different schools in the same city in the Netherlands. Normative research The model that is presented in this chapter has been developed in the context of an empirical study about the meaning of democratic citizenship in the lives of sixteen year olds in Utrecht. In such investigations, it is important to pay attention to the normative dimension of the study: a de¿nition of what ‘democratic way of life’ entails, always implies a vision on how citizens should – or should not – manifest this. Aim of both the theoretical and the empirical study is to elicit the complexity of developing into democratic citizens. The model therefore should not be understood as an ideal, where young people should try to ¿t in. Instead, this study wants to gain insight in the way these ideals are negotiated, embraced, shadowed, opposed, or left untouched. The validity of the model is also subject of research during the empirical study: it is investigated in order to ¿nd out if it needs further development, and to see if it is indeed helpful in eliciting the attitude young people develop towards democracy, diversity, and citizenship, and the issues they perceive while developing their citizenship identity. CONTEXT

Citizenship and democracy Social scientists and political and educational philosophers have studied different dimensions of citizenship. Isin and Turner (2002) note that the concept of citizenship evolved from ‘membership of a city or rural area’ in the eighteenth century, towards a legal concept in the nineteenth century, stressing the rights and duties of a citizen.

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They want to take the concept of citizenship one step further by focusing on the participatory aspect of citizenship and the need for people to connect to others in and outside their own society. From this perspective, citizenship can refer to membership of local areas, membership of several cultural groups, and membership of the human species as a whole. This allows them to present a more inclusive concept of citizenship, also referred to as cosmopolitan citizenship, that overcomes the discrepancy between citizenship rights and human rights (Benhabib, 1999; Isin & Turner, 2002; Appiah, 2005; Suransky & Manschot, 2005; Sen, 2006; Parker, 2007; Hansen, 2008). Hansen (2008) has focussed on the existential dimension of citizenship. He states that in order to be able to connect to others in and outside their society, people need to cherish conÀicts that emerge in ‘the space in between’: the space where you ¿nd yourself when you have entered a situation that demands that you re-evaluate your identity. For instance when somebody refuses to shake hands with you, claiming that this is his way of showing respect. The experience itself makes that your frame of references changes: it now becomes part of it, because you relate to both the experience and the person in this situation. Ramadan’s conceptualization of citizenship combines this existential dimension of citizenship with a political dimension. When explaining what he calls the ‘the psychological dimension of citizenship’, Ramadan (2007) stresses that the concept of citizenship is not only about rights and duties, but also about ‘the need to belong’: the need to be willing to belong to the society people live in. When applied to a country with a democratic political system, this means that citizens need to be willing to be part of this system and to adopt a democratic way of life. He also stresses that in order for people to be able and willing to belong to a society, a new conceptualization of citizenship is needed. Ramadan and others refer to the current conceptualization of citizenship as white, male, and middle-class; one that is individualistic and universalistic and blind of the power issues involved (Taylor, 1992; Mouffe, 2005; Moodod, 2007; Ramadan, 2007; Thayer-Bacon, 2008). They state that a new conceptualisation should be developed in which multiple dimensions and facets are included. People with different cultural, historical and social backgrounds need to be able to identify with this conceptualization, because it enables them to feel part of the society, and to share its language, memories, institutions, and common values. When, on the contrary, the conceptualization of citizenship is linked to economical participation, all people who are unable or unwilling to engage in paid labour will feel excluded. And if the conceptualization of citizenship implies that people should adapt the dominant customs, many people, both insiders and outsiders, will feel excluded. Given these arguments, attention needs to be paid to possible merits of differences and dif¿culties that stem from diversity issues. Ramadan underscores that although the re-conceptualization of citizenship is a very complex project, it is also a necessary one. He also states that both insiders and outsiders have a responsibility to open up to this deliberation. This responsibility stems from peoples’ existential ‘need to belong’ to the society they live in. 82

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Other social scientists and political and educational philosophers have tried to develop a theory of democracy oriented towards a more inclusive concept of democratic citizenship. These researchers aim to develop a theory of democracy that fosters diversity, and that covers both the social and the political level. This concept was ¿rst developed by Dewey (Dewey, 1916; Biesta & Miedema, 1999). He perceived democracy not only as a matter of political organization, but also as the way in which people organize their own social lives; as ‘a democratic way of life’. Many researchers of democratic citizenship education since then supported or further developed this theory of democracy (Young, 2000; Barber, 2003; Gutmann, 2003; Parker, 2003b; Banks, 2004; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004; De Winter, 2004; Mouffe, 2005; Veugelers, 2007; Thayer-Bacon, 2008). Thayer-Bacon (2008), in ‘Beyond Liberal Democracy in Schools. The Power of Pluralism’, presents a transactional view of democracy-always-in-the-making: a democratic theory that is intrinsically consistent with the relational and pluralist nature of a democracy. This means that a truly democratic citizen values both democracy and diversity in a positive way. Different types of citizenship Westheimer and Kahne (2003) and Veugelers (2007) have used a conceptualization of democratic citizenship that matches this more elaborate conceptualization of democracy. When evaluating citizenship education in the United States and the Netherlands, they both came to distinguish three types of citizenship. Although their typologies have a different focus, they both draw similar conclusions from their research: in order for a democracy to work, society needs to raise democratic citizens, and the majority of the schools in the United States and the Netherlands do not teach young people how to become democratic citizens. Westheimer and Kahne (2004) distinguish between a personal responsible, a participatory and a social justice type of citizenship. They state that, although each type is important to develop, a society needs the third type of citizens if it wants to preserve its democratic character. A democracy needs its citizens to be able to address social justice issues in a structural way, and they can only address social justice issues when they have developed knowledge, skills and dispositions that enable them to address these issues in a political way. Veugelers (2007) distinguishes an adaptive type, an autonomous type and a both autonomous and socially involved type of citizenship. He argues that it is important that people not just do as told, but succeed in making their own judgments, while being conscious of the interests of others. A democratic citizen is a citizen that is sensitive to the interests of others, and to the way these others relate to their own interests. Veugelers underscores that in order for democracy to work, it is not enough to raise autonomous thinkers. People also need to teach children to be sensitive to the needs of the society as a whole. Although most schools in the United States and the Netherlands have incorpo83

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rated citizenship into their curriculum, they often focus on knowledge, skills and attitudes that correspond with the ¿rst type of citizens (Westheimer & Kahne, 2003; Leenders & Veugelers, 2006). They teach children how to conform to standards, how to behave like good neighbours, and perhaps even to organize events that are bene¿cial to people in their environment. The knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to develop into a democratic citizen are less frequently taught. Conditions of democratic citizenship Many researchers have written about key-elements of democratic citizenship (Steutel & Spiecker, 2000; Gutmann, 2003; De Winter, 2004; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004; Leenders, Veugelers & De Kat, 2008). Although the content of the features might be very clear to the authors, and most people agree that certain features need permanent attention in educational settings, the abstract nature of these features makes it dif¿cult to see how these descriptions can guide young people as well as teachers, when confronted with complex issues in educational and societal settings. Implementation of these elements in educational settings asks for further and ongoing interpretation of these concepts; insight in how students make sense of these elements; and insight in how one can facilitate the development of these elements by students. Although all researchers mentioned above underline the importance of obtaining the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes to be able to act as a democratic citizen, few pay speci¿c attention to conditions that can inÀuence the will to become a democratic citizen. Westheimer and Kahne (2004) state that in order to be willing to adopt a democratic way of life, young people need to obtain internal and external ef¿cacy. This means that they need to feel that they can make a difference. They stress that proper attention must be paid to these more psychological agency processes in educational settings. De Winter (2000) addresses another condition for the emergence of a democratic attitude. He argues that education in democratic skills won’t work if children live in circumstances where deviant behaviour is paramount. De Winter refers to Anderson, who earlier de¿ned this kind of behaviour as ‘the code of the street’. Children who have been raised in certain districts do not see how they might bene¿t from a democratic way of life. It might even cost them their lives if they would adopt that way of life. De Winter stresses that citizenship education needs to be supported by policies that aim to improve conditions in troubled neighbourhoods, because improving the socioeconomic circumstances in which people live, is of crucial importance for the will to become democratic to appear more frequently. Biesta and Lawy (2006) also stressed that both researchers and policy workers should focus more on the various ways in which young people can actually be democratic citizens in different socioeconomical circumstances.

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Psychological and social conditions of citizenship development Because this study investigates which elements are necessary for the will to become democratic, we looked for elements that relate to the existential, moral, psychological, and social aspects of the development of a citizenship identity. This means we focused on elements that relate to ‘a democratic way of life’, leaving aside elements that relate speci¿cally to an enlightened understanding and to participation in the democratic political system. Hall, Coffney and Williamson (1999) refer to citizenship-identity as the need for belonging, space and place, that is perceived by young people while developing their identity. They argue that the development of identity automatically relates to the development of a persons’ citizenship, because they are two sides of the same package. We prefer to illustrate the interrelatedness of citizenship and identity by referring to some questions that illuminate the existential, moral, psychological and social aspects of a persons’ identity development: What does a child need to develop in order to: – feel that contributing to democracy is a necessary condition to be able to ‘exist’, because you are ‘free’ to make your own choices and your choices are both accepted and appreciated)? – feel responsible to treat others in a fair way? – feel capable to participate? – feel embedded in the society a person lives in? – be able to develop the necessary connections? Studying the relationship between elements of a citizenship-identity might provide more insight in the development of a citizenship-identity. This study focuses on elements that are prerequisite for a democratic citizenship-attitude to develop. We consider someone’s attitude, next to and in relation to the societal aspects of someone’s life stories an important part of a person’s citizenship-identity. Five different dimensions were distinguished, each referring to a speci¿c aspect of a positive attitude towards democracy and diversity. Next, several key elements were distinguished for each dimension. In the empirical study, the elements have been translated into interview questions. Both dimensions and elements that are prerequisite for the development of a democratic citizenship-identity, are displayed in the following paragraphs. DIMENSION 1: ELABORATE UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY & DIVERSITY

First of all, the development of people’s democratic citizenship identity is affected by the value they attach to democracy and diversity, and their interpretation of these concepts. In order to develop a ‘true’ democratic attitude, people need an elaborate understanding of the value of democracy and diversity for one’s own life and for the well-being of a society. This means they have to be aware that democracy is not only a political system, but also a way of life. It also implies that people seek to ap-

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preciate diversity, and are aware of the importance of agonisms for the development of democracy (Mouffe, 2005). In order to be willing to develop on this dimension, people need to be able to reÀect on their situatedness, the way they position themselves, the multiplicity of their identity, and on the interrelatedness of diversity and democracy. They also need to be aware when democracy and diversity are at stake. We refer to this element as moral sensitivity. Furthermore, in order to develop both reÀection and sensitivity, people need to become empathic: they need to learn how to look at an issue from different perspectives, and how to negotiate meanings. Because we want to emphasize the relationship between empathy and dialogical competencies, we discuss this element at the ¿fth dimension. ReÀection on own values, positioning, and personal diversity Appiah (2005) advocates reÀection on the multiplicity of people’s own identities. He ¿rst distinguishes between individuality and identity: individuality he understands as ‘who we are’ (the life we create), and identity as ‘what we are’ (our social identity). Ethics of identity then means that people have to decide what to do as ‘an embedded self with thick relations to others’ (Appiah, 2005, p. 24). People for instance have stronger commitments to family and friends than to people they do not know. In order to treat different af¿liations in a responsible way, a person needs to be able to adjust his rankings in different situations. He also points out that people need to be aware that their identity is ‘constructed in response to facts outside oneself ’ and that, although they are not free to choose, they still can and need to strive for autonomy (Appiah, 2005, p. 18). Autonomy here means being sensitive of one’s personal diversity and one’s situated perspective, and consciously interpreting and navigating between multiple identities. Because I study young people’s perceptions and interpretations of experiences, a developmental perspective needs to be added. Verhofstadt-Deneve (1988), a developmental psychologist who researched possibilities and limitations of reÀection in different stages of childhood and adolescence, found that young people usually do not start reÀecting on perspectives and interests of other groups and people, until the last period of adolescence. It is also in this period that young people often come to understand that there is a grey area between true and untrue. Until then they are inclined to simplify problems, which means that they search for the true perspective, not for various ones. At the same time however, young people necessarily do develop a way to deal with differences, because diversity is all around them in school and society. Therefore, we consider it important for young people to become aware of the way they cope with differences. Sensitivity to social justice issues Literature on democratic citizenship often lists ‘critical thinking’ as a key element. However, ‘critical thinking’ has been conceptualised in different ways. In philoso86

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phy and philosophy of science, ‘critical thinking’ is traditionally understood as logical reasoning and arguing. This means a person can, for instance, argue in a sound manner and plead for anti-democratic policies at the same time. From a critical pedagogy perspective, however, the argument has been given that critical thinking needs moral and political criteria to weigh the arguments (Mc Laren, 1994; Veugelers, 2001). Democratic citizenship therefore implies that people (are willing to) critically weigh moral and political arguments. This means that they need to become sensitive to when moral principles are at stake, and to when and why they prefer some moral principles over others. Because citizenship provides the context of my conceptualization, we are speci¿cally interested in sensitivity to social justice issues in daily life as well as in societal discourse. Being sensitive to these issues means that a person is able to identify when diversity is at stake (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). We distinguish between the interpersonal and the societal level of diversity. We understand interpersonal diversity as the different perspectives on knowledge, the nature of knowledge, values, and human beings (different worldviews) that emerge in contact with other people in daily life. Societal diversity, we understand as the emergence of different worldviews that appear in policies, legislations, scienti¿c discourses and in the media. Moral sensitivity also implies that all people are involved in political processes: choosing between different perceptions on the interpersonal level, and the way one relates to ‘other’ visions on a societal level, are intrinsically political activities. DIMENSION TWO: CAPACITY

The second dimension concerns people’s capacity to participate in a democratic enlightened way, for being democratically enlightened does not mean that a person knows how to become an active participant in a way that is consistent with democratic enlightenment. To be able to develop this capacity, people also need to develop a feeling of internal and external ef¿cacy. This means they need to acquire the feeling that they are able to inÀuence procedures and policies, and the feeling that policy-makers, politicians and other social and cultural leaders are receptive to their needs and ideas. Internal and external ef¿cacy These concepts where introduced into the discourse on democratic citizen by. Westheimer and Kahne (2003, p.54). They stated that in order to develop a democratic attitude, people need three C’s: Capacity, Commitment and Connection. We consider ‘commitment’ and ‘connection’ as a separate dimension, because they concern people in the environment that enable someone to develop internal and external ef¿cacy. For Westheimer and Kahne internal ef¿cacy refers to the feeling that one is capable of changing things, and external ef¿cacy to the feeling that the government or its institutions are receptive to one’s needs. If children for instance engage in an educa87

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tional project that aims to enhance equal treatment of a certain minority, but then ¿nd that nobody is interested in their project, it will be less likely that these children will participate in future projects or initiatives. Although this seems obvious, internal and external ef¿cacy rarely become the subject of conversation in educational settings. Even while students often highlight their limited ef¿cacy in conversations. DIMENSION THREE: ACTIVE RELATIONS

The third dimension concerns ‘active relations’. In order to develop active relations, a person needs to be able to connect and to commit. I will refer to these elements as connection and commitment. Commitment and Connection Westheimer and Kahne (2003, p. 60) state that: for long, psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists have recognized that an individual’s values and commitments are not predetermined human characteristics but rather the products of family, community, and the social setting. (Therefore schools) should consciously develop communities of support and foster connections with role models who can exemplify a life ¿lled with civic engagement [ ] A ‘social milieu’ should be created that reinforces values and behaviours consistent with active civic involvement. ‘Commitment’ here means caring for the well-being of people in a certain group. ‘Connections’ they understand as the acquaintances who enable people to come to active participation. Putnam stresses in this regard that it is crucial for the development of both social capital and democracy, that people participate in activities which foster commitment with people who hold similar preferences (bonding) and which stimulate commitment with people who hold different preferences, and who don’t share the same cultural heritage (bonding) (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). We expect that reÀections on these processes might help both teachers and researchers to recognize the complexity of the development of a citizenship-identity, as experienced on a daily basis by young people. Also, we believe it might help students to address these issues and to reÀect on the origins of their current commitments. DIMENSION FOUR: WILLINGNESS TO TRANSFORM

The fourth dimension is about the willingness to change. If people are unwilling to investigate their own values, ideas, worldview and customs, and those of others, they will not be able to help each other give meaning to societal developments in a

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way that supports the well-being of a society. Elements that need to be developed in this dimension are the ability (or habit) to doubt, to question, and the wish to develop, and make sense of things that do not match a person’s current worldview. As stated earlier, while discussing Ramadan’s ideas, both people who do consider themselves part of the dominant culture and the ones who don’t, need to develop this attitude (Ramadan, 2007). Not in the least because there’s no such thing as ‘static groups’. Instead, people constantly negotiate between different identities, or af¿liations, which gain or loose importance due to change of interests, temporal and environmental circumstances (Appiah, 2005). Elements that belong to this dimension are the ability – or the habit – to doubt, question, and the wish to develop and reÀect on things that do not match with your current attitude. In a way, these elements precede the development of the other dimensions: Your interest in developing your moral sensitivity or your empathic understanding highly depends on your willingness to develop your current attitude. We want to add that it is equally important for society to reÀect on the attitudes of (young) people: why is it that they rebel against some societal norms? Why is it that they (still) hold on to others? What can we learn from their experiences? And how do we want to cope with conÀicting norms that cause tensions in both the private and the public life? DIMENSION FIVE: DIALOGUE

In the ¿fth dimension, we address people’s ability, and willingness, to engage in dialogue. Parker (2003b) distinguishes dialogue from discussion, which aims to convince others of the righteousness of a persons’ opinions. Dialogue, on the other hand, implies that people can acknowledge and respect each other’s visions and that they have acquired deliberation skills that enable them to reach mutual understanding. Before zooming in on dialogue itself, we discuss an important condition for dialogue: the ability to be empathic. Empathy Although this concept appears in much of the research on citizenship education, only few like Noddings (2002) have conceptualized empathy. Smaling and Alma (2006) developed a more elaborate conceptualization of empathy, containing all three aspects that are signi¿cant to my de¿nition of an attitude: the cognitive, the affective, and the behavioural. They stressed, based on their research in psychology and methodology, that empathy is a condition to reach mutual understanding in daily life, in health care and in certain ¿elds of research, especially qualitative research. In their article, they focus on empathy as empathic understanding, which they understand as a concept with two dimensions: The mental dimension refers to affective, cognitive and interpretive facets or phases of empathic understanding. The 89

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social dimension refers to non-expressive, expressive, responsive, and interactive facets or phases of empathic understanding. Because of the interrelatedness of the dimensions, twelve types of empathic understanding can be distinguished. The most optimal form of empathic understanding being ‘dialogical-hermeneutical empathic understanding’ (p. 195). Inherent in ‘dialogical-hermeneutical empathic understanding’ is the testing procedure. ‘Empathic understanding as a process should include the hermeneutical circle, which implies testing, adjusting on the mental dimension’ (p. 200) and developing interpretations on the social dimension (p. 210). Translated to citizenship this would refer to the interpretative and interactive process of understanding and appreciating others, and their role in further developing and sustaining a democratic society, without having to agree with their understandings or actions. Dialogical competencies Many researchers agree that dialogue, or dialogical understanding, is a central feature of democratic citizenship. When they get to the theoretical and practical implications of dialogue, things become complicated. What does dialogue entail? If we want to advocate dialogue as a means to appreciate democracy and diversity, we need a conceptualization of dialogue which offers enough ground to acknowledge what Derrida calls la différence (Miedema & Biesta, 2004) that lies beyond each vision. This enables us to acknowledge the limited possibilities of coming to mutual understanding and action, and the limited possibilities of expressing and investigating our own visions. Such conceptualization should also recognize the impact of power issues in any conversation. For instance because somebody has a higher rank and therefore has little, or everything, to loose when a conversation fails, or because people have developed different languages to communicate with each other, and different ways to deal with conÀicts. Understanding dialogue as a conversation between equals, which aims for ‘mutual understanding’ and ‘ideal reversibility’ might in fact threaten the appreciation of diversity it aims for. Although we agree that it is important to stimulate equality, mutual understanding and ideal reversibility, we think dialogue should just as well foster the fundamental differences, impossibilities, and power issues involved in every dialogue, as advocated in the context of appreciating agonisms by Mouffe (2000). Dialogue then can be understood as a way to come to mutual understanding of the things that make it impossible for us to reach ‘true’ consensus or mutual understanding. CONCLUSION

In this article we tried to envision the complexity of a democratic attitude in a pluralistic society by specifying key elements of the development of the will to be(come) truly democratic citizens in a pluralist society. Although the model of democratic 90

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citizenship in this study serves as a frame for an empirical study, investigating the way students in the Netherlands relate to their citizenship in a democratic and pluralistic country, it also encompasses a vision on what citizens need to develop in order for a democracy to become more democratic. This vision is also investigated during the empirical study. In addition, we investigate the validity of the model that was developed from this vision of democratic citizenship. With Parker (2003b) and Thayer-Bacon (2008), we consider democracy and diversity to be intrinsically related. This means that a truly democratic citizen values both democracy and diversity in a positive way. We focused on the will to obtain a democratic attitude in a pluralistic society, because the proper knowledge, capacities and circumstances alone are not enough to come to democratic participation in a pluralistic society. People also need the will to be democratic and the will to appreciate diversity. We distinguished ¿ve dimensions of a positive attitude towards democracy and diversity. Next, we described how several key elements that have an impact on the will to develop into a democratic citizen on these dimensions, can affect students citizenship-identity. 1) An elaborate understanding of the value of democracy and diversity for one’s own life and for the common good: reÀection, moral sensitivity 2) Capacity: internal and external ef¿cacy 3) Active relations: commitment and connection 4) The willingness to transform: open-mindedness, doubt 5) The ability to engage in dialogue: empathy, dialogical competencies. Because of the normative character of the model, it is important to elaborate on the normative component of this study. We tried to develop a model of democratic citizenship which acknowledges the tensions people experience while developing their citizenship-identity. We think it is important that citizens learn to reÀect on issues of social justice, on tensions they experience, on the relation between democracy and diversity; that they become aware of the possible impact of their attitude on the development of our democracy, and that they learn to participate in accordance with these reÀections. Still, it is not our intention to judge students on their ‘democratic level’. Instead, we want to elicit the multiplicity of peoples’ attitudes towards democracy, and the way they relate to psychological, and environmental conditions. The recommendations we made in this article should accordingly be understood as a plea to talk about and reÀect on the way citizenship, democracy and diversity are mediated in the lives of our (future) citizens, and the way this relates to different visions on how we would like our democracy to develop. While conceptualizing democratic citizenship in this article, we focussed on the ways in which people relate to other people in the Netherlands. This focus has a pragmatic origin. We want to add that democratic citizenship in our perception also means that people engage with nature, and with people who live elsewhere, in a sustainable and respectful way. 91

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WHY WE ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC YET Smaling, A., & Alma, H. (2006). The meaning of empathy and imagination in health care and health studies. International Journal of Qualitative Studies on Health and Well-being, 1(4), 195-211. Steutel, J., & Spiecker, B. (2000). Multiculturalism, pillarisation and liberal civic education in the Netherlands. International Journal of Educational Research, 35(3), 293-304. Suransky, C., & Manschot, H. (2005). Patriotism or cosmopolitanism? On education and world citizenship. In C. Suransky, I. Dubel & H. Manschot (Eds.) Global civil society, world citizenship and education (59-69). Amsterdam: SWP Publishers. Taylor, C. (1992). The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Eds.) Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. (25-73). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Thayer-Bacon, B. (2008). Beyond liberal democracies in schools. The power of pluralism. New York: Teachers College Press. Torney-Purta, J., Lehman, R., Oswald, H., & Schultz, W. (2001). Citizenship and education in twentyeight countires: Civic knowledge and engagement at age fourteen. Amsterdam: IEA. Verhofstadt-Deneve, L. (1988). ZelfreÀectie en persoonontwikkeling (SelfreÀection and personal development). Leuven: Acco. Veugelers, W. (2001). Teachers, values and critical thinking. In S. R. Steinberg (Ed.) Multi/intercultural conversations (199-215). New York: Peter Lang. Veugelers, W. (2007). Creating critical-democratic citizenship in education: empowering humanity and democracy in Dutch Education. Compare, 37(1), 105-119. Veugelers, W., (2009). Active student participation and citizenship education. Educational Theory and Practice 31(2), 55-70. Westheimer, J., & Kahne, J. (2003). Teaching democracy: What schools need to do. Phi Delta Kappan, 34-40, 57-67. Westheimer, J., & Kahne, J. (2004). What kind of citizen? The politics of educating for democracy. American Educational Research Journal, 41(2), 237-269. Winter, M. de (2000). Democratieopvoeding versus de code van de staat (Democracy education versus the street code). Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht. Winter, M. de. (2004). Democratie moet je leren (Democracy must be learned) [Electronic Version], 3, from www.burgerschapindeschool.nl Young, I. M. (2000). Inclusion and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Isolde de Groot Department of Education University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht

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JOEL WESTHEIMER

PRACTICING DEMOCRACY

There is an old parable about a passer-by seeing a man on his hands and knees searching the ground on a corner under a streetlight. ‘What are you looking for?’ the passer-by asks. Hunched over on his hands and knees, the man replies ‘I’ve lost my car keys.’ The kind passer-by immediately joins him in his search. After a few minutes searching without success, she asks the man whether he is sure he lost the keys there on the street corner. ‘No,’ he replies, pointing down the block, ‘I lost them over there.’ Indignant, the woman asks ‘Then why are you looking for them here?’ The man replies ‘Because there’s light here.’ Behind the onslaught of testing and so-called ‘accountability’ measures of the last decade lurks the same perverse logic of the man looking for his keys. We know what matters to most teachers, parents, school administrators, board members, and policy-makers. But we are far less sure how to ¿nd out whether schools are successful in teaching what matters. Since we have relatively primitive ways of assessing students’ abilities to form healthy relationships, think, create, question, analyse, and work in concert with others to improve their communities and the world, we turn instead to where the light is: standardized measures of students’ abilities to decode sentences and solve mathematical problems. In other words, since we can’t measure what we care about, we start to care about what we can measure. Of course I am not being entirely fair. Educational testing enthusiasts do have some ways of measuring, for example, skills related to critical thinking. And the reading comprehension tests are evolving to consider not only whether students can understand the words and structure of a particular sentence or paragraph but also whether they can articulate something about its meaning and implications. But when researchers examine education policies broadly and the classroom practices and habits that follow those policies, it is becoming increasingly clear that our educational goals and the methods used to assess educational progress are suffering from an appalling lack of imagination. While lively debate about educational approaches between progressive humanistic educators, critical theorists, poststructuralists, ethical culturalists, and others are widespread, educators from all these perspectives are united in their distaste for the mechanistic, technocratic, and de-humanizing teaching and learning that now passes for schooling in many classrooms worldwide. When I speak of practicing democracy, therefore, I mean to invoke a discourse that draws from many theoretical traditions but that embraces a vision of education that is clear about the need to push back against

Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 95–103. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

JOEL WESTHEIMER

the narrowing of the school curriculum. For example, in July 2002, the International Humanist & Ethical Union met in Amsterdam and issued what came to be known as the ‘Amsterdam Declaration.’ The goals of the Amsterdam Declaration include many that are cause for debate and critique among and between many progressivelyoriented theorists – ‘humanism is ethical,’ for example, or ‘humanism is rational,’ and so on. But I aim to focus on these two declarations from that conference: Humanism supports democracy and human rights; The principles of democracy and human rights can be applied to many human relationships and are not restricted to methods of government. When applied to schools, these declarations echo John Dewey’s vision of the democratic school. As Dewey (1966) wisely wrote more than a century ago: The school is an institution in which the child is, for the time, to live – to be a member of a community life in which he feels that he participates, and to which he contributes. This fact requires such modi¿cation of existing methods as will insure that the school hours are regarded as much a part of the day’s life as anything else, not something set apart; and the school house, as for the time being, a home, not simply a place to go in order to learn certain things (…) The [goal] of the institution must be such as to enable the child to translate his powers over into terms of their social equivalencies; to see what they mean in terms of what they are accomplishing in social life. Many teachers, policy makers, researchers, parents, and students recognize the largely unful¿lled promise of a kind of schooling that embraces such a democratic way of life as one if its core principles. WHAT GETS TESTED GETS TAUGHT

For the past ¿fteen years I have been studying the effects of education initiatives such as the U.S. No Child Left Behind Act or the various provincial testing and accountability policies in Canada and their impact on teachers’ ability to connect teaching with the social, political, and economic world beyond the school. My concern stems from what colleagues and I have found. Almost every school mission statement these days boasts broad goals related to critical thinking, global citizenship, environmental stewardship, and moral character. Yet beneath the rhetoric, increasingly narrow curriculum goals, accountability measures, and standardized testing have reduced too many classroom lessons to the cold, stark pursuit of information and skills without context and without social meaning – what education philosopher Maxine Greene calls ‘mean and repellent facts’. Maxine Greene (2006, p. 1) credits John Dewey with reminding us that ‘facts are mean and repellent things until we use imagination to open intellectual possibilities.’ It is not, as I will explain shortly, that facts are bad or that they should be ignored. But democratic societies require more than citizens who are fact-full. They require citizens who can think and act in ethically thoughtful 96

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ways. If we are to take education’s democratic goals seriously, then we need the kinds of classroom practices that teach students to recognize ambiguity and conÀict in ‘factual’ content, to see human conditions and aspirations as complex and contested, and to embrace debate and deliberation as a cornerstone of democratic societies. There is a saying among teachers: Everybody likes to teach critical thinking, but nobody wants a school full of critical thinkers. Current education reform indicates that policymakers are taking this tongue-in-cheek dictum far too seriously. Although provincial (and state) education rhetoric almost always touts the importance of critical thinking, anti-bullying and other pro-social behaviours, and democratic engagement, the policies that actually affect classroom teaching run in the other direction. Because of a myopic focus on testing in math and literacy, it is becoming more and more dif¿cult to make time for deep consideration of important ideas and controversies. Students are being asked to learn to read but not to consider what’s worth reading. They are being asked to become pro¿cient in adding numbers, but not at thinking about what the answers add up to. In the United States, whole subject areas – in particular those that tend to embrace multiple perspectives and complex narratives – have been virtually eliminated from the class schedules of many students. In the wake of No Child Left Behind legislation, seventy-one percent of U.S. school districts reported cutting back time from or eliminating altogether subjects like social studies, the arts, and even science to make more space for reading and math test preparation (Rentner et al. 2006). In Canada, a retreat from in-depth problem-based learning, from science, history, and the arts, and even from recess are evident in school boards in almost every province. There are exception such as Prince Edward Island and Manitoba, which have, for the most part, resisted the onslaught of over-testing. Indeed, concern over restrictions on the kind of knowledge being taught to children is evident not only among teachers but also from a growing number of school principals. The Canadian Principals Association (2007) went to the unusual step of issuing a ‘statement of concern’ regarding student testing and its impact on thinking and learning. School-based administrators throughout Canada, they wrote, ‘are increasingly concerned that current policies and practices on student testing are leading to (…) a secretive or unintended shift of priorities to focus on a narrow range of student knowledge and literacy/numeracy skills.’ Have education policies, boards, or individual schools forbidden teachers to teach other subject areas or to encourage students to critically examine ideas in deep and meaningful ways? Have they forbidden students to recognize the importance of their education in the context of the common good and their relationships to other human beings? No. But a plain fact that every teacher, student and school principal knows seems to elude most proponents of a test-based curriculum. As Jack Jennings (2007), CEO of the Washington D.C.-based Center on Education Policy, notes: What gets tested gets taught. Under No Child Left Behind [and he could be talking about standardized testing and accountability measures in any nation], there is reading and math and then there is everything else. And because

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there is so much riding on the reading and math included on state tests, many schools have cut back time on other important subject areas, which means that some students are not receiving a broad curriculum. To the extent that a broad curriculum continues to be taught, in-depth thinking about the curriculum as it relates to universal human concerns, in particular, has been greatly circumscribed. Moreover, the culture of assessment that results from standardized testing in reading and math rapidly tends to spread to other subject areas as well. An English teacher in an urban high school told me that even novel reading was now prescriptive in her school’s rubric: meanings predetermined, vocabulary words preselected, and essay topics predigested. An American science teacher put it this way: ‘The only part of the science curriculum now being critically analysed is evolution.’1 In many ways big and small, school practices are in danger of becoming irrelevant to anything but the narrowest of educational goals. Engaging students in thinking about the world beyond the bubble-form answer sheet and their role in shaping the future of that world, is, in too many schools, an extra-curricular activity. THE TEST SCORE THAT ATE HUMANITY

As I have indicated, overemphasizing standardized assessments in a narrow band of subjects can lead to an intellectually emaciated curriculum. But it can also lead to a cultural shift in which it becomes dif¿cult to value anything at all that the tests do not measure. When activities other than mathematics and literacy instruction remain part of the school experience, they now have to be justi¿ed by being linked to better test scores. Arts? Maybe, if there’s time and money left after test-prep or if it can be demonstrated that participating in the arts raises mathematical literacy or literary prowess. Recess? Just enough so children can concentrate better on mathematics and reading instruction (sometimes recess is cut altogether – in particular for those students who are not performing well on the tests). Most readers will be able to name ¿ve or six activities that have either been curtailed or have had their mission statements refashioned so that they can be justi¿ed by citing evidence that engaging in these activities leads to better test scores. One example of this shift stands out beyond what might have been imaginable a decade ago. The quite excellent Ottawa School Breakfast Program provides 8000 Ottawa, Ontario schoolchildren breakfast each morning. Wonderfully committed volunteers and employees work for the Breakfast Program. What caught my attention was the Q & A section of their website. Question #2 reads as follows: ‘Why is it important to feed children who are hungry?’ That this question has to be asked is evidence enough for the point I am trying to make here, but the answer takes away any doubt about the need for educational programs to mould themselves in the image of test score improvement mechanism: Children who arrive at school hungry do not perform well in the classroom. Numerous studies have shown that students who are fed are more alert, devel98

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op greater self-esteem, have better attendance and fewer discipline problems. Children who receive a healthy, nutritious head start to the day show a marked improvement in academic achievement. 2 Feeding hungry children leads to better performance in school. In other words, it is not enough to feed children because they don’t have enough food to eat and are hungry. I will resist temptation to comment on those researchers apparently studying children to ¿nd out whether alertness and food deprivation are inversely related because I worry about the control group in these studies. Rather, gaining public and governmental support for such a program requires evidence that it will help children pass the test. WHEN CHILDREN DON’T CONFORM: PATHOLOGIZING DISSENT

If feeding hungry children in order to raise test scores chips away at our common humanity, pathologizing dissent should similarly be cause for grave concern. Over-prescription of drugs like Ritalin (methylphenidate) to control behaviours that were previously considered manageable through behavioural interventions is well-documented. But far less critical analysis has been directed at the increasing diagnosis rate for a relatively new category of illness known as conduct and oppositional disorders. The more the curriculum is narrowed to focus on a highly discrete set of skills, the greater the number of students who are quarantined in this emaciated swath and who act out as a result. The latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) includes a relatively new psychiatric disorder called Oppositional De¿ant Disorder (ODD), de¿ning it as ‘a pattern of negativistic, hostile and de¿ant behaviour. A child with ODD, according to the DSM-IV, ‘often argues with adults,’ ‘actively de¿es or refuses to comply with adult requests or rules,’ and is ‘touchy or easily annoyed by others.’ Various treatments and psychiatric interventions are recommended for treating ODD including cognitive behavioural therapy and even the prescription of powerful anti-psychotic medications such as Risperdal (risperidone) or Zyprexa (olanzapine). I am not a medical expert, and I do not in any way intend to disparage the dif¿culties children and parents might face when a child is legitimately diagnosed with ODD. It certainly is possible that there are children who have oppositional dif¿culties that are in need of treatment. A small but growing body of evidence, however, indicates that ODD diagnoses have increased signi¿cantly. Moreover, anecdotal evidence posits that those increases are largely attributable to concerns about student behaviour raised by schools. Statistics about rates of ODD diagnoses are remarkably hard to come by, but several exploratory studies indicate what might be an immensely troubling trend. In 1996, the diagnosis rate for ODD in school-age children was between 1 and 6 percent. In 2008, the National Institute for Health notes that some studies now indicate that 10 – 15% of school-age children can be diagnosed with ODD. Prevalence of ODD in primary-care settings (children ages

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2-5) has reached 17% or higher. Furthermore both Oppositional De¿ant Disorder and Conduct Disorder are more prevalent among youths from families of low socioeconomic status (Loeber et al. 2000). The implications of the rise in ODD diagnoses among school-age children led Oregon educator Norm Diamond to suggest that a new as-of-yet undiagnosed disease was sweeping the nation. He coined this new disease CAD: Compliance Acquiescent Disorder. Symptoms for CAD, Diamond joked, can be seen when a student often ‘defers to authority,’ ‘reÀexively obeys rules,’ ‘believes the commercial media,’ ‘fails to argue back,’ and ‘stays restrained when outrage is warranted.’ Like Diamond, I wonder if we had an inventory for CAD, whether we might ¿nd a virtual epidemic of the disease. As the technocratization and dehumanization of the curriculum continues, we are increasingly at risk of fostering an entire generation of those who – as education critic Al¿e Kohn put it – fail to be outraged by outrageous things. Indeed, at the same time that schools eliminate opportunities for in-depth connections between the subject matter students study and the sociopolitical world beyond the classroom, thousands of children who show resistant behaviour, perhaps refusing to ‘comply with adult requests or rules’ are being classi¿ed as mentally ill, disciplined, counselled, and in some cases, medicated. DE-PROFESSIONALIZATION OF TEACHING MEANS STUDENTS ARE ‘TOO BUSY TO THINK’

Although ideological battles over the school curriculum still exist, many teachers are experiencing a more insidious cause for erosion of their ability to teach students about their relationship to each other and to society. Rather than the legislative elimination of valuable educational goals, teachers and administrators face pressure to drop many of them to make room for test preparation. John Holt (1964) may have been the most prescient forecaster of this phenomenon. In his classic 1964 text, How Children Fail, he wrote that the most signi¿cant outcome of the drive for ‘so-called higher standards in schools is that the children are too busy to think.’ Teachers have to sacri¿ce social studies, science, arts, and in-depth analysis of topics in virtually every subject to be able to ¿t literacy and math drills into the schedule (Knighton, 2003). Perhaps the most common complaint I hear from both teachers and administrators in this climate is that they have been stripped of their professional judgment and ability to make decisions in the best interests of the students who populate their classrooms and schools. De-professionalization of teachers is nothing new. Historically, since education – especially in the primary years – was a women’s profession, teachers were bound by strict guidelines not only on what they should teach but also how they should teach it, what they should wear, and how they were to conduct themselves even outside of the classroom on their own time. What is surprising today is the newfound hypocrisy: ‘teacher professionalism’ rhetoric co-exists with top-down edicts that strip teachers of exactly the curricular and pedagogical decision-making authority that allow them to act as professionals. A bizarre example that is masked as 100

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a progressive educational initiative can be found in my home town of Ottawa’s recent foray into a late-assignment policy. In that recent legislation, teachers are forbidden to penalize students no matter when they hand in an assignment (possibly reasonable in select cases and patently absurd as an applies-to-all directive). An admittedly peculiar example of the trend of de-professionalization, it nonetheless represents accurately the lengths to which many school policies go to restrict the discretion allowed to teachers to make decisions on how to open the minds of individual students in a highly diverse student body. The more we see such policies enacted, the more far-reaching and troublesome mandated standardized testing becomes. JUST THE FACTS

Educators who seek to teach students to think and to interpret information – skills and habits essential for citizens of any democratic nation – are often criticized for having no respect for facts. They are soft, feel-good pedagogues, this kind of critique maintains, who are more interested in process than in knowing the right answers to questions. These tendencies are vili¿ed as un¿t for a rigorous standards-based education. Somehow critics have become convinced that those who say they want students to think for themselves simply do not care whether students can read, write, or perform addition or subtraction. This is plainly nonsense. We all want students to learn to read and write. Nobody wants student to be numerically illiterate. When I speak to groups of educators, policy makers, politicians, or advocacy groups, I sometimes ask whether anyone present has been recruited to join the group called ‘Teachers Against Kids Learning How to Add’ or ‘School Principals in Support of Illiteracy.’ You should not be surprised that I have not once found anyone aware of these or any similar groups. What I have found is countless educators and parents who want children to know more than formulas. They want the knowledge that students acquire to be embedded in the service of something bigger. They want their students to develop the kinds of relationships, attitudes, dispositions, and skills necessary for them to engage in democratic and community life. Teaching students to think beyond the isolated facts and skills of the fragmented curriculum will require reclaiming common assumptions about what thinking requires. There are few educators who believe that facts are unimportant components of a proper education. But at a time when vast databases of information are at our ¿ngertips in seconds, facts alone represent a profoundly impoverished goal for educational achievement. Furthermore, students tend to learn more ‘facts’ through thoughtful participation in meaningful projects of concern, but engagement in such projects of democratic importance is rarely driven by the acquisition of facts only. In short, knowledge does not necessarily lead to thoughtful participation. In many programs colleagues and I have studied that emphasize teaching about the workings of democratic government, legislative procedures, elections, and so on, students gained solid factual knowledge without necessarily gaining the inclination or the conviction required to participate (Llewellyn & Westheimer, 2009). To the contrary, 101

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we found that often it worked the other way around: participation led to the quest for knowledge. Once students gained experiences in asking dif¿cult and complex questions about their community, their province, their country, or the world, they sought out the facts they needed for evidence. DEMOCRATIC THINKING REQUIRES THE PURSUIT OF MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES

Much as Darwin’s theory of natural selection depends on genetic variation, any theory of democracy depends on a multiplicity of ideas. It is the responsibility of the citizenry, the media, and the schools to safeguard the expression of those ideas. Schools have particular responsibilities in this regard. Healthy critical analysis is one hallmark of a mature democracy, and educators have a responsibility to create learning environments that help to realize these ideals. There are many varied and powerful ways to teach children and young adults to engage critically – to think about social policy issues, participate in authentic debate over matters of importance, and understand that intelligent adults can have different opinions. Indeed democratic progress depends on these differences. If education policy makers, teachers, and administrators hope to contribute to students’ democratic potential, they must resist the narrowing of the curriculum. And many do. In every school district there are examples of individual teachers and schools that work creatively and diligently to engage their students in thinking about the ways their education connects to broader community and democratic development. In Vancouver, a schoolteacher engages her students in real-world problems with no easy answers. She has them conduct research on a community issue of their choosing and seeds their choice throughout the curriculum in every subject area. In London, Ontario, a principal meets with teachers monthly to brainstorm on ways to ful¿l provincial mandates without short-changing students on the curriculum options they deserve. Every school district has such examples. Approaches like these that aim to promote a democratic educational experience for both teachers and students share several characteristics. First, teachers encourage students to ask questions rather than absorb pat answers – to think about their attachments and commitments to their local, national, and global communities. Second, teachers provide students with the information (including competing perspectives) they need to think about subject matter in substantive ways. Third, they root instruction in local contexts, working within their own speci¿c surroundings and circumstances because it is not possible to teach democratic forms of thinking without providing an environment to think about. This last point makes provincially standardized tests (especially in large geographical areas with both rural and urban settings) dif¿cult to reconcile with in-depth critical thinking about issues that matter. There are many strategies available to help our students learn to think for themselves. I will conclude with one ¿nal comment about the parable that opened this 102

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chapter. Although, of course, shining a spotlight in an area where one did not lose one’s keys is not likely to uncover the missing keys, the effects are actually worse than that. When we illuminate one area, we simultaneously darken anything outside the circle of light. If you have ever walked at night with a Àashlight, you will recognize your blindness to anything beyond the light. If the man and woman in the story shifted their gaze from beneath the streetlight to where the keys actually lay, they would likely be blinded (at least at ¿rst) in the newfound darkness – darker seeming then if they had not been staring in the light for so long. It is the same with our narrowly illuminated spotlight on mathematics and literacy testing. The ¿rst step to drawing attention to the broader walk in the woods might be to soften the focus of the light that now shines so relentlessly bright. NOTES 1 Personal communication. 2 www.ottawaschoolbreakfastprogram.ca/faq2.asp

REFERENCES Canadian Association of Principals (2007). Valid uses of student testing as part of authentic, comprehensive student assessment – A statement of concern from Canada’s school principals. March 9, 2007. Dewey, J. (1966). Plan of organization of the university primary school. In A. Wirth, (Ed.) John Dewey as educator: His design for work in education (297-305). New York: Wiley Greene, M. (2006). From jagged landscapes to possibility. Journal of Educational Controversy, 1(1), 1. Jenkins, J. (2007). Choices, changes, and challenges: Curriculum and instruction in the NCLB Era. Washington DC: Center on Education Policy. Knighton, B. (2003). No Child Left Behind: The impact on social studies classrooms. Social Education, 67(5), 291. Llewellyn, K., & Westheimer, J. (2009). Beyond facts and acts: The implications of ‘ordinary politics’ for youth political engagement. Citizenship Teaching and Learning, 5(2), 50-61. Loeber, R., Burke, J.D., Lahey, B.B., Winters, A., & Zera, M. (2000). Oppositional de¿ant and conduct disorder: A review of the past 10 years, part 1. Journal of American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 39(12), 1468-84. Rentner, D.S., Scott, C., Kober, N., Chudowsky, N., Chudowsky, V., Joftus, S., & Zabala, D. (2006) From the capital to the classroom: Year 4 of the No Child Left Behind Act. Washington, DC: Center on Education Policy.

Joel Westheimer Sociology of Education University of Ottawa

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HUMANIST EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES The Indian Scenario

Education is an important instrument of social change. In the onward march of society, education plays a pivotal role. It is much more so in developing countries. In the past, education in India was con¿ned to certain sections of the society and the vast majority of the people remained illiterate, ignorant and superstitious. The common people had to follow the religious customs and traditions. As they were staying in villages, they had very little opportunity to get fresh breeze of ideas and attitudes. Only the upper-caste1 had the opportunity for education, where as vast majority of the people never entered the portals of the educational institutions. Religious customs and traditions ruled the roost. Conformity, rather than freethinking, was the guiding principle. The caste, clan and the tribal loyalties stood in the way of getting educated. It is the colonial era, which brought a sea change in the social, political and economic situation of the developing countries. The introduction of railways, communications, scienti¿c irrigation systems, modern systems of transport, leading to connectivity to the towns and cities, provided the villages, the opportunities for mobility. New types of administrative systems were introduced and schools on modern lines were started in some parts of the countries. The Christian missionaries, with the Colonial Government’s patronage, found educational institutions as a means to expand their activities and conversions in the rural and urban areas. In developing countries, education has become a signi¿cant means to improve the chances to have better livelihood options. Educational quali¿cations were required for government and for skilled industrial jobs. There is clamour for Government jobs, as they are secure with pension and other incentives. SEEDS OF REFORM

In the 19th Century, some of the educated Indians were harbingers of change and social reform. They had inner urge to reform the society from outmoded customs and traditions and religious obscurantism. In India, social reformers like Mr. Raja Ram Mohan Roy2 championed ban on Sati3, Mr. Eswara Chandra Vidya Sagar4 stood for widow remarriages, and championed women’s education. He was an atheWiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 105–114. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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ist. In Bengal, Bombay and Madras Presidencies, social reformers like Mr. Mahatma Phule5, Mr. Dhondo Keshav Karve6, Mr. Kesab Chandra Sen7, Mr. Kandukuri Veeresalingam8 and others, highlighted the value of education in reforming the society. Mahatma Phule started Satya Sodhak Samaj, a Free Thinkers Association, and schools for female education. Karve who lived for 104 years, not only championed women education and also started the ¿rst Women’s University in Bombay. Ms. Pandita Ramabai9 also played a pivotal role in women’s education. It is important to remember that in India, the term social reformer was in vogue in the 19th Century and the term humanist came into currency only in the 20th century. Many of the social reformers were progressive in their outlook, championed rationalism, fought against superstitions and blind beliefs. They were champions of education for common people – particularly of female education. Concerned with the plight of the poor and the downtrodden sections of society and the women, these social reformers either started or encouraged liberal and humanist education on rational and scienti¿c lines. Imparting education became an important ingredient of the social reform measures. The advent of the Colonial Rule in developing countries brought education on Western lines. It was instrumental in awakening the nationalist and patriotic spirit among some of the educated. It resulted in the yawning for freedom, and the agitations for democratization of political process with adult suffrage, a share in the job opportunities and secularization of institutions, without reference to caste and religion. EDUCATION OF THE MASSES

In the Twentieth Century, the nationalist spirit reached to its zenith, and the political struggles for liberation from the Colonial yoke brought tremendous awakening among people. Some of the champions of political freedom started Nationalistic educational Institutions. Mr. Rabindranath Tagore10, a great Humanist, who was the ¿rst in India to receive the coveted Nobel Prize in Literature, not only started Sree Niketan, A Rural Development Institute, but also founded Santi Niketan, a premier Educational Institution in Bengal which attracted students from all over the country. Its core principles were secular, and nationalistic and provided opportunities for free expression of ideas in arts, humanities, endowed with nationalistic spirit. Nobel Laureate Mr. Amartya Sen was also associated with Santi Niketan. Students not only came from India, but also from abroad. Education was imparted in the natural surroundings, under the shade of the trees. Santi Niketan was nationalistic in its outlook, humanistic and full of artistic expression, giving to the fore the innate talents of the youth. After Independence Santi Niketan became a National University. Similarly, the Gujarat Vidyapeeth in Ahmedabad, founded by Gandhi, Banares Hindu University by Mr. Madan Mohan Malaviya11, Kashi Vidyapeeth and many other institutions, and the National Colleges which sprang up in the freedom mo106

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ment, became Centres for secularism and national sprit. Some of the students became Congress, Socialist and Communist leaders of the nation. It is important to note that in the 20th Century, nationalism and humanism were almost synonymous in their approaches as they stood for freedom, democracy, secularism, liberal outlook and social equality. HUMANISM AND SCIENTIFIC TEMPER THROUGH EDUCATION

Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru12 was not only a prominent nationalist leader in Gandhi’s struggle for political freedom and was in prison for 11 years, but also was a staunch champion of humanism, secularism, and democratic socialism. He promoted scienti¿c temper and social, political as well economic equality. His progressive and nationalist writings left an indelible impression on the minds of the youth. As the ¿rst Prime Minister of India, for nearly two decades he piloted the Nation’s Constitution with democratic, secular and secular moorings and was instrumental in developing science and technology. It was his daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who made the secular and humanist commitment of the Nation explicit by stating in the Preamble to the Constitution that India is a ‘Democratic, Secular and Socialist Republic.’ She also incorporated the Fundamental Duties of the citizens of India stating ‘It is the Fundamental Duty of every citizen of India – to develop the scienti¿c temper, humanism, spirit of inquiry, and reform.’ (Article 51-A (h)). The Constitution also envisaged special provisions for the welfare of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes13 and Backward Classes14 for their educational, political, social and employment opportunities through the policy of reservations. The Constitution also envisaged the method of ‘Af¿rmation’, along with the provision for Oath in the name of God, at all levels. Millions of educational scholarships are provided to educate boys and girls from the Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes and the other socially and economically backward classes, coupled with the policy of reservations in the educational institutions as well as in job opportunities. Perhaps in no other developing country, such a massive and intensive and committed effort is made to educate the hitherto neglected sections of the society. No doubt, still there is a lot has to be done in improving the quality of education in the educational institutions. But India is making earnest efforts to improve the lot of the common people by imparting education and thus bringing them into the mainstream of society. It is a unique effort to improve its human resources and to achieve social change through education. HUMANISM IN INDIA

The term ‘humanism’ is a culture bound one. In Holland, Erasmus15 popularized the term “humanism’. In Germany and in the Scandinavian countries term ‘Freethinking’ is in vogue. In England “Rationalism” is in vogue. In America, ‘Secularism’ 107

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came to the fore. In some countries, ‘Skepticism’ is in currency. In India, and in other developing countries from times immemorial the term ‘atheism’ is opposite of theism. In British ruled countries the organizations are known as ‘Rationalist.’ With slight variations in nuances due to political, social and cultural conditions prevailing in different countries, nonreligious or atheist organizations are known by various names. But their content is almost the same. The freedom struggle against the Colonial powers is almost secular in nature. That is why till the advent of Independence in India, the term nationalism was inclusive of secularism. It is much more so in a country like India, where different religions, languages, cultures and other variations, the Nationalists harped on secular values and it is the uniting bond for them. Nationalist education reÀected secular and humanist moorings in India. ATHEIST AND HUMANIST LEADERS AND SOCIAL REFORMERS:

In colonial countries, in particular in India, after post-Independence, atheist, humanist and rationalist organizations tried to show their distinctive identity. Atheist, rationalist and humanist leaders like Periyar EV Ramsamy16, M.N. Roy17, Gora18, Tarkunde, were part and parcel of the freedom struggle and added strength to secular fabric of the nation. Periyar EV Ramaswami started DK in 1930s, Gora and Saraswathi Gora founded Atheist Centre in 1940, M.N. Roy established Renaissance Institute in 1954. The priority for the atheist, humanist and rationalist leaders in India was not to start formal educational institutions, but to focus on adult and social education, to ¿ght superstitions, blind beliefs and to strive for social reform and create awareness among women as equal partners in progress. In general, the text books of the Government reÀect the secular moorings of the nation. The concentration and priority of these leaders and workers was to provide immediate succour to the people by liberating women, the weaker sections of the society and to empower them socially. INSTITUTIONALIZING HUMANIST EDUCATION

Unlike in the developed countries, where the educational institutions like schools, colleges and universities have greater freedom in framing the syllabus and hiring the teachers, and conducting the examinations, in developing countries, in particular in India, the education is very much centralized. Even though education is a state subject, the Union Government guides in many matters. Thus Government has a larger say in educational institutions in matters of content, syllabus, examinations, appointment of teachers, admission of students, fee structure, grants-in-aid, and the over all policy. There is much more uniformity in text books and examinations are also very much centralized. Whether Government run, or the private schools 108

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recognized by the Government, they have to follow the same procedure leaving less scope for local planning and innovation. In addition to this, immediately after Independence, there were a large number of illiterate people – men and women – who were outside the education system. They were victims of ignorance, ill health and illiteracy. Hence, atheists, rationalists and humanists concentrated their efforts to render assistance and to create awareness among them. Hence they went into awareness building programmes in the areas of social reform, health, environment, child and woman rights, adult education, and empowering the people to face natural as well as social disasters. Their strategy was to organize short term, like one week, or even three or four day study camps on various aspects of atheism, humanism, rationalism, human rights and also promotion of science and scienti¿c outlook. It was focused on rights based approach. India has the large number of non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) in the world and they are promoting awareness, health and rendering assistance in natural and social disasters. The humanist and secular NGOs are also organizing meetings, conferences, workshops and even sociopsychological counselling programmes. Family, health and sex education are imparted. Free, medical and health camps have been organized. In the West, there are social security, health insurance, unemployment bene¿ts and many other comforts. But, in the developing world, people are exposed to vicissitudes of nature and social and political situations. Hence the role of the NGOs is of crucial importance in supplementing and complementing Government’s effort in many areas of development. SOCIAL EXPERIMENT: VASAVYA VIDYALAYA, ATHEIST CENTRE

Some experimental schools were started by some committed atheists and humanists. One such was Vasavya Vidyalaya at Atheist Centre. Vasavya is an abbreviation which stands for Vastavitakata (Reality), Sanaghadrusti (Social Outlook) and. Vyakthitva (Development of Individual’s personality with scienti¿c and rational outlook). It was founded by Gora (1902-1975) and Saraswathi Gora (1912-2006). They championed atheism as a positive way of life. With their constructive and positive approach, they placed before the society that atheism is not negative, but an alternate way of life. Vasavya Vidyalaya was founded in 1961 and the experimental school was run for one and half decade. As it was a private run school, it gave greater freedom to expose the young to humanism and atheism as an alternative life stance and to promote critical thinking and free inquiry. Vasavya Vidyalaya took steps to develop positive thinking among children and to change the outlook of their parents and guardians. The admission in school was non discriminatory. Half a century ago, when the school was started, caste and religion were dominant factors. Many of the children came from rural background where the practice of untouchability19 and caste dominated their thinking and actions. The concept of caste purity and caste pollution guided their behaviour. But 109

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once they joined Vasavya Vidyalaya which had the residential facilities, the children had to radically reorient their behaviour, raising above the petty differences and old habits. Slowly, but steadily, the children changed their way of thinking and adopted secular approaches. This unique approach inÀuenced many parents to change their children’s names which depicted gods and angles to secular names. Similarly, the students did not ¿ll in the caste and religion column in the application forms of the Government. The change of name without any reference to caste and religion brought a revolutionary change in the outlook and perception of the children and parents. In Vasavya Vidyalaya, classes were conducted on superstitious beliefs, sex education, magic workshops etc., were carried out to inculcate a spirit of inquiry into the young minds. Periodic science exhibitions were also conducted in the school to bring to the fore the talents of the students. As many of the parents were still illiterate, adult education programmes were organized to promote secular, scienti¿c, atheistic outlook. Child to parent literacy programmes were carried out. The school provided counselling to parents on the social ills such as child marriages, especially girl children, which were in vogue in rural areas. In Vasavya Vidyalaya, there were no punishments for children. They were gently persuaded to change their habits. The teacher was a guide and friend of the students. It is the mutual respect and con¿dence that enabled the students to acquire knowledge in a free and fair atmosphere. Under the inspiring guidance of Gora, Vasavya Vidyalaya, was run on ideal lines. Mrs. Mythri, Mrs. Hemalata Lavanam, Mr. Niyanta and Mrs. Sumathi Vijayam of Atheist Centre and a number of teachers carried out the educational experiment. The educational experiment yielded promising results and it was imparted to more than 1500 students. The students developed self con¿dence, humanist outlook and atheist approach towards life. Some of the students became social workers and they became social change agents. As Government rules changed with regard to examinations for matriculation20 and government expanded school network in the rural areas with incentives like tuition waiver and other facilities, Atheist Centre decided to close down Vasavya Vidyalaya and to concentrate on secular social work in rural areas. It also decided to organize more number of Atheist Study Camps for adults and science camps for children in different parts of the State. Thus the area of operation was extended to exposing superstitions, blind beliefs and to ¿ght social evils like witchcraft and sorcery. It also started supplementary educational programmes in rural areas, to improve the educational standards of the poorer sections of society. The aim of Atheist Centre was to supplement and compliment the efforts of the Government in its educational programmes and also to organize orientation programmes for the teachers in quality education, ecology and environment, and their role in social and natural disasters. Atheist Centre also took up advocacy programmes to improve the quality of education on secular and humanist lines.

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ATHEIST STUDY CAMPS

The Atheist Study Camps covered a wide spectrum of topics, dealing with science, scienti¿c outlook, sociology of religion, psychology, superstitions and customs that stood in the way of the onward march of humanity. In the Atheist Study Camps, a cross cultural understanding of the problem of the society was stressed. Much light was thrown on the signi¿cance of atheism and humanism as a positive way of life. Exclusive children ad women study camps were also organized by Atheist Centre. The participants in the Atheist Study Camps came from diverse educational backgrounds. They were in the age groups of 20 to 50 years of age. Some of them were active atheists and social change workers in the ¿eld. The Study Camps also helped to upgrade their skills, spirit of inquisitiveness, discovery education, and clear some of their questions in the interactive sessions. The resource persons of the study camps hailed from different backgrounds. University professors, social workers, atheist activists, medical doctors used innovative teaching methods to facilitate learning. The Atheist Study Camps, seminars and conferences organized by Atheist Centre in various parts of the State for the last half a century were helpful in upgrading the skills of the rural and social development workers and to create a new generation of social workers. They could acquire new skills and gain orientation on world issues and local actions. The world is moving towards a post-religious society. The religious bonds are loosened and people are following the religious customs more out of habit. The Atheist Study camps and other social and educational programmes organized by the Atheist Centre, and other humanist and rationalist organizations have been helpful in creating new awareness among people. THE ROLE OF PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA

The educational and social change programmes organized by Atheist Centre and its national and international conferences, received wide attention in the media. In South India, media is progressive and supportive of atheist, rationalist, and humanist programmes. Thus, there was wide dissemination of information on alternative to religious way of life. The publication of atheist and humanist literature also received attention of the public. The exposure campaigns of godmen21 and charlatans received good attention in the press and the media. With the centuries of accumulated wealth, the religious institutions are involved in tele-evangelism in the developing world. Religious institutions are sponsoring programmes of astrologers, palmists, godmen, religious preachers and are trying to brain-wash ordinary people to believe in miracles and absurdities. Atheists, humanists and progressive minded people endear people by their exemplary personal behaviour. Their efforts for promotion of castelessness and secularism receive positive response from people.

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In a democratic society every one has freedom of speech. When people develop critical thinking, rational behaviour, no amount of religious propaganda will deviate them from their path. In each generation, new challenges have to be met with innovative ways. Education increases the capacity of the people to make proper decisions by using their faculties of reason. With the growth of nonreligion in the Western world, the religions are now competing with one another in increasing their numerical strength in the developing world by pouring their material and human resources to convert the people to their religion. Politicization of religions and religionization of politics is taking place. Atheists and humanists have to strive on many fronts with grim determination. Constant efforts are made to undermine the secular underpinnings of these developing nations. There may be temporary gains to religions in some parts of the world. But with the onward march of society, in this scienti¿c age, people are bound to develop scienti¿c temper and critical thinking. WAY AHEAD

Humanists, atheists, rationalists must make a common cause at this critical juncture with all progressive minded people and to strengthen the secular ramparts we guard. The atheist, humanist, rationalist efforts in the developing countries require documentation and further dissemination to wider audience, so that the movement to promote humanist and critical thinking in education will be further strengthened. Humanist and secular education acquires crucial importance in this century. What Buddha advised people 2500 years ago is a cardinal principle for humanist education. He said: Do not believe what you have heard. Do not believe in the tradition because it is handed down many generations. Do not believe in anything that has been spoken of many times. Do not believe the written statements come from some old sage. Do not believe in conjecture. Do not believe in the authority or teachers or elders. But after careful observation and analysis, when it agrees with reason and It will bene¿t one and all, then accept it and live by it. NOTES 1 The pattern of social classes in Hinduism is called the ‘caste system’. It is believed that the works of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras are different, in harmony with the three powers of their born nature. The works of a Brahmin (upper caste) are peace; self-harmony, austerity, and purity; loving-forgiveness and righteousness; vision and wisdom and faith. These are the works of a Ks.atriya: a heroic mind, inner ¿ re, constancy, resourcefulness, courage in battle, generosity and noble leadership. Trade, agriculture and the rearing of cattle is the work of a Vaishya. And the work of the Shudra is service.

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HUMANIST EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1774-1833) is considered as a pioneer in Indian Renaissance in 18th Century, for his reforms in the abolition of Sati, Purdah System and child marriages. He formed the Brahmo Samaj, a group of people, who had no faith in idol-worship and were against the caste restrictions. 3 Sati was a practice in which the widow was compelled to sacri¿ce herself on the funeral pyre of her husband. 4 Eswara Chandra Vidya Sagar (1820-1890) is considered as one of the pillars of Bengal renaissance. He continued the reform movement of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and raised concern for the abolition of polygamy. 5 Mahatma Phule (1827-1890), was the social reformer of the 19th Century who revolted against the unjust caste system and courageously upheld the cause of the untouchables and took up the cudgels for the poorer peasants. He was a militant advocate of their rights 6 Dhondo Keshav Karve (1858-1962 ), was a social reformer and strove for educating the widows and empowerment of women. 7 Keshub Chandra Sen (1838-1884), was a Bengali social reformer 8 Kandukuri Veeresalingam (1848-1919) was considered as the prophets of Modern Andhra. He awakened Andhras out of their suffocating medieval orthodox customs and superstitions. He was not only a reformer, but also a literary activist. He was considered the father of renaissance in Andhra. 9 Pandita Ramabai (1858-1922) was a social reformer, a champion for the emancipation of women, and a pioneer in education. She established the Arya Mahila Samaj in Pune and other parts of western India for the cause of women’s education. 10 Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) was a great nationalist, highly gifted poet of Indian Renaissance. In 1901 he founded a school at Shantiniketan, near Calcutta which later became an international institution called Vishwa-Bharati. He was awarded Nobel Prize for literature in 1913. He relinquished knighthood in protest against Jallianwala Baug massacre in 1919. He was a sincere friend of Gandhi. 11 Mr. Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861-1946), Educationist, Social reformer and nationalist. President of Indian National Congress in 1909 & 1918. Member, Central Legislative Assembly. Founded Banaras Hindu University in 1915. 12 Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889-1964) – An architect of India. Gandhi named him as his political heir. First Prime Minister of independent India. 13 The framers of the Indian Constitution took note of the fact that certain communities in the country were suffering from extreme social, educational and economic backwardness arising out of age-old practice of untouchability and certain others on account of this primitive agricultural practices, lack of infrastructure facilities and geographical isolation, and who need special consideration for safeguarding their interests and for their accelerated socioeconomic development. These communities were noti¿ed as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as per provisions contained in Clause 1 of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution respectively. 14 Backward Classes are described as ‘socially and educationally backward classes’, and the Indian government is enjoined to ensure their social and educational development. 15 Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus (1466-1536), sometimes known as Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam, was a Dutch Renaissance humanist and a Catholic priest and theologian. 16 Periyar E.V. Ramasamy (1879-1973), propagated the principles of rationalism, self-respect, women’s rights and eradication of caste. He opposed the exploitation and marginalization of the nonBrahmin indigenous Dravidian peoples. The citation awarded by the UNESCO described Periyar as ‘the prophet of the new age, the Socrates of South East Asia, father of social reform movement and arch enemy of ignorance, superstitions, meaningless customs and base manners’. 17 M.N. Roy (1887-1954) was a Bengali Indian revolutionary, internationally known political theorist and activist. He was a founder of the Communist Parties in Mexico and India. He later denounced communism as exponent of the philosophy of Radical Humanism. 18 Gora (1902-1975) and Saraswathi Gora (1912-2007), world renowned atheists, social reformers and

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VIKAS GORA founders of the world’s ¿ rst known Atheist Centre in India. As close associates of Mahatma Gandhi they participated in the Indian freedom struggle and were imprisoned. Gora promoted positive atheism as a life stance and fought against untouchability. Commemorating his birth centenary and his life contribution towards atheism and secular social work, the Government of India released a postage stamp in 2002. 19 Untouchability is the direct product of the Indian caste system. The dalits and other lower castes are considered as untouchables and socially, economically and politically marginalized. 20 Matriculation is the ¿ nal year in high school which ends at tenth standard/grade. 21 Godmen claim to possess paranormal powers, healing abilities and as the descendents of gods on earth.

REFERENCES Associates of Gandhi. Available at: http://www.gandhi-manibhavan.org/gandhicomesalive/comesalive_associates_india.htm#Malaviya, Madan Mohan Atheist Centre: Available at: www.atheistcentre.in Cultural India. Available at: http://www.culturalindia.net/reformers/raja-ram-mohan-roy.html Dhondo Keshav Karve, Available at: http://www.indianetzone.com/7/dhondo_keshav_karve.htm Gora (1976). We become Atheists. Atheist Centre. Gora (1999). Positive Atheism. Atheist Centre. International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU). Available at: www.iheu.org Indian History – Caste System in India. Available at: http://www.indhistory.com/india-caste-system. html Mahatma Phule. Available at:http://www.mahatmaphule.com/aboutmahatma.html Murthy M. (1997). Education, Scienti¿c Temper and Development (originally published in Mainstream weekly, Sept. 27, 1997) National Commission for Scheduled Tribes. Available at: http://ncst.nic.in/index.asp?langid=1 Pandita Ramabai. Available at: http://www.ramabaimuktimission.com/webpag~2.htm Periyar. Available at: www.periyar.org Positive Atheism. Available at:www.positiveatheism.org Scheduled Castes of India. Available at: http://www.faqs.org/minorities/South-Asia/Scheduled-Castesof-India.html Sunanada Shet (2002) Gora – A social revolutionary. Atheist Centre. Veeresalingam Kandukuri. Available at: http://www.vepachedu.org/veeresalingam.html

Vikas Gora Atheist Centre India

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LITERARY HUMANISM IN MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION Possibilities to enhance dialogues in classrooms

This chapter demonstrates how the dialogical imagination of the novel can help to answer the question how students and teachers from different cultures can coexist and learn together. There are two reasons why the multicultural school is chosen as a case to demonstrate that literary humanism may offer an inspiring perspective on the questions concerning multicultural society. The ¿rst reason is personal. My concern with multicultural education emerged during the year I worked as a teacher of history and civics at a so-called ‘black school’. In the Netherlands schools with more than 70 % immigrants´ children are labelled ´black schools´. In some respects, the multicultural school can be viewed as a mini-multicultural-society. In their daily lives, students at that school extensively struggle with questions that arise in a multicultural society. For understandable reasons, whenever the media draw attention to crimes committed by Moroccan boys, Moroccan students feel more addressed than white Dutch students. The conÀict in the Middle-East has a substantial impact on the world of students who are rooted in North-African and Arabic countries. For many white students this conÀict is outside their direct interests. It is important to note this, because for teachers involved in citizenship education and history education, the students’ commitment to questions arising in a multicultural society is an important source for dialogue. In this respect I agree with Veugelers, Derriks and de Kat (2006, p. 235) when they write: ‘Education does not merely prepare students for society. Rather, society is already present in the school in the form of the academic content, the students and the teachers.’ The second reason for exploring the dialogical imagination of the novel has to deal with learning processes. Whenever human participation in a democratic society is at stake, teachers have to search for dialogical ways of communication. In these classroom-discussions students and teachers can engage in dialogues on questions that are highly relevant in the students’ world. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the analogy between dialogical imagination in the novelistic discourse and communicative interaction between the teachers and students in the multicultural classroom. In accordance with the tradition of literary humanism, by demonstrating this analogy, we aim to contribute to the development of dialogical forms of teaching that are applicable in multicultural education. Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 115–126. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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Drawing on my own experience in the multicultural classroom, I will ¿rst show how my dialogical approach opposes the dominant discourse on integration as assimilation as it resonates at the multicultural school in Amsterdam-West. In the second part, the form of literary casuistry is outlined. It is my claim that literary casuistry will stimulate the dialogue between students and teachers. THE MULTICULTURAL SCHOOL AS A MINI-MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

A comparison of the image of Dutch cities in the Fifties with the contemporary image of these cities reveals a transformation of a predominantly white homogenous society towards a colourful pluralistic society. This change is characteristic to all western European countries that experienced inÀuences of decolonisation and labour immigration. This mass immigration is in particular visible in the big cities. When new groups are entering societies there are always adaptations necessary for both newcomers and native inhabitants. The greater the cultural differences between native people and immigrants (newcomers), the more dif¿cult processes of collaboration, integration and acceptance of newcomers are. Nowadays, hardly anybody complains about the immigration from the former colonies. These people simply belong to Dutch society. In contrast, it will take a lot of time before the Dutch people accept that the children and grandchildren of the labour immigrants are unquestionable Dutch citizens as well. Many people echo that the ‘New-Dutch citizens’ did not integrate. However, native Dutch citizens may forget that at the start, in the Seventies, it was not intended to make them part of our society: they were meant to be guests. It was expected that they would return to their home countries the moment their labour contracts ended. When the majority of guest workers settled in the Netherlands and when they reunited with their families from their home countries, multicultural reality could not be denied anymore. As a consequence, the question rose how people from different cultures can coexist and interact. Since 2001 this question resulted in emotional debates. In the Netherlands there is a widespread concern about the tensions and problems in a multicultural society. Because policy makers and politicians did not succeed in preventing high rates of school drop-out as well as both underemployment and crime in the groups of New-Dutch citizens, both right wing and left wing politicians express their serious concerns about the multicultural situation. The political scientist Paul Scheffer (2000; 2007) speaks of a ‘multicultural drama’. In contemporary debate, advocates of multicultural dialogue have lost the battle in favour of the populist politicians claiming that the newcomers have to adapt to and comply with values and norms in western society. On a political level, the inÀuence of this assimilation-ideology is visible in the sharpening of rules with which newcomers have to comply in order to become worthy citizens of the new society. Education is an important theme in the debate on multicultural society. Ideally, education provides an opportunity for empowerment of all pupils, white and black. 116

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But from the very moment that the pupils´ performances are graded, there is a process of selection and exclusion at work. Children that are behind in terms of language skills are systematically underestimated in testing. Compared to their white peers nonwestern students run a relatively high risk of being discriminated by the system of tests and assessments and enter in a larger amount lower levels of secondary education. Another cause for the widening of the gap between western and nonwestern students is the freedom of school choice. Although as a policy this seems quite liberal, in practice parents representing the more wealthy, white middle class tend to opt for white schools, whereas the parents rooted in nonwestern cultures tend to send their children to the local school which then often becomes a black school. Local and national policy insist that citizenship education can only succeed when students with a nonwestern background encounter western pupils. Following this integration ideology, black and white schools have to develop into mixed schools, characterized by a more equal distribution of students with different cultures and social backgrounds. In order to stimulate this development towards mixed schools, new educational policy was designed in Dutch cities since 2006. For example, several local governments have prepared new entering procedures to stimulate that, at the beginning of their school careers, both privileged and underprivileged students are more equally distributed across the different schools. According to this new policy, schools should mirror contemporary multicultural society as much as possible. There should be a real encounter between students from different cultures. In reality however it is not easy to create mixed schools because many neighbourhoods are segregated as well. CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT

The question is how our educational ideologies change as a consequence of the new multicultural situation. Do schools aim for an all-embracing ideal of a collective Dutch identity, or is the premise that the Dutch identity does not exist and that, within the Dutch society, different cultures are recognized and equally valued? Arguments for answering this question might be found in contemporary academic discourse on building citizenship in a multicultural context. Citizenship is one of the key concepts in pedagogical texts on multicultural communication. Citizenship education includes the pupils’ development of values and virtues. The mass immigration challenges Dutch society to critically reÀect on our educational ideals. The question how we can raise our students to become responsible citizens does not have a simple one-dimensional answer. It is a challenge for teachers in the multicultural educational system to cope with this confusion and uncertainty in a constructive manner. For this purpose, according to contemporary intellectuals such as Karen Armstrong, Martha Nussbaum and Tariq Ramadan, it is necessary to explore the common ground of the different pedagogical styles. This common ground can only be found in an intercultural dialogue. 117

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This dialogical approach of the multicultural situation contrasts with the national policy to cope with the new multicultural confusion. Whenever the Dutch government addresses citizenship in the multicultural context, the focus is strongly on assimilation. The ‘New-Dutch’ will only be recognized as worthy citizens in our society under the conditions that they speak the Dutch language, that they obey to the Dutch law and that they acquire knowledge of the Dutch cultural traditions. The Dutch sociologist Willem Schinkel (2007) convincingly demonstrated that the national integration policy presupposes a more or less homogenous concept of the Dutch culture to which the New-Dutch have to adjust. However, it is impossible to continuously consider these immigrants as strangers or guests. We even label them as ‘allochtonen’ (foreigners) in order to express that they are and remain distinct form original Dutch people. But we should acknowledge that these so-called ‘allochtone’ newcomers are the children and grandchildren of migrants and that they actively participate in our western society. The multicultural society is not an ideal, but a reality. A reality we have to reÀect on again and again in order to understand that the change process is bilateral. ‘Autochtone’ (native) individuals or ‘the original Dutch people’ should be willing to face the question how they might broaden their horizon in order to get to a deeper understanding of people originating from nonwestern cultures. It is through the confrontation with individuals from other cultures that both western and nonwestern individuals can increase their insights in their cultural embeddedness. This is an enriching experience that can be understood in terms of Bildung. RETHINKING BILDUNG: POSTMODERN BILDUNG

In this chapter I suggest a horizontal dialogical approach to Bildung. This is in sharp contrast with classical Bildung. The latter aims to initiate students in the dominant bourgeois culture. This hierarchical ideal of education is controversial. See for example Nimrod Aloni who claims that often an idealised picture is drawn of the golden era of classical Bildungshumanism: ‘However, it is worthy to note that there is a vast gap between lofty talk about humanistic ideals and excellent attributes and the depressive and boring routine of educational endeavour – a fact that is manifested in historical studies and is well known to some of us through personal experience’ (Aloni, 2007, p. 28). According to Aloni, classical Bildungshumanism does not stimulate critical citizenship education. It just forces people to cite books and texts in ‘old dead languages’. To a large extent, the classical Bildung ideal is comparable to contemporary assimilation policy in terms of hierarchy. Both ideologies start from the premise that there is a superiority of a dominant Christian humanistic culture, to which people from minority cultures have to adapt. Alternatively, I propose a postmodern horizontal approach to the Bildung ideal, thus contrasting with contemporary assimilation discourse. Following the inÀuential humanist scholar Eward W. Said, I think the transformation from classical Bildung into a more worldly postmodern Bildung 118

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is necessary to adequately answer questions in late modern multicultural society. Said writes about ‘the changed bases for humanistic work in the worldly and historical situation in which (…) we ¿nd ourselves. My own classes and students at Columbia have changed enormously from the mostly white males I ¿rst taught in 1963 to the multiethnic and multilingual men and women who are my students today. It is a fact universally acknowledged that, whereas the humanities used to be the study of classic texts informed by ancient Greek and Roman and Hebrew cultures, a now much more variegated audience of truly multicultural provenance is demanding, and getting, attention paid to a whole slew of formerly neglected or unheard of peoples and cultures that have encroached on the uncontested space formerly occupied by European cultures’ (Said, 2004, p.34). These worldly postmodern approaches to humanistic Bildung adopt a dialogical approach of the multicultural situation. In a postmodern perspective, different cultures are valued equally. The challenge is to bridge the gap. In practice, particularly teachers in multicultural education have to take the lead in the Bildung project. Teachers in multicultural classrooms have to acknowledge that in the last few decades, our society fundamentally changed and that these changes have substantial consequences for the way in which students have to be raised towards citizenship. The multicultural society, in which they have to participate in the future, differs in fundamental ways from the homogenous white society in which most teachers were socialized. At the multicultural school in Amsterdam West, where I worked as a history and civics-teacher, this change is immediately visible when comparing recent class pictures with class pictures taken thirty years ago. The colour and culture of the school fundamentally changed. Nowadays, migrants´ children are the majority. Although most students were Moroccan and Turkish Muslims, the school held on to its Christian identity. Every Monday morning we gathered in the auditorium, participating in the same Christian ceremony: mostly the meeting was opened by the principal, reading to Muslims from the Bible. The principal and his assistants held the conviction that the New-Dutch should adapt to Christian values and norms. Of course, they had every right to honour the Christian tradition, but until the present day it puzzles me that they never asked themselves the question as to how the Christian identity relates to Islam as practiced by the majority of students at this school. Every suggestion to alternate between Bible reading and Koran reading was rejected, or, worse, negated. At several occasions and in different terms I asked experienced teachers, witnessing these changes during the long period they worked at this school, how their visions on citizenship education is inÀuenced by migration. They fully admitted that big changes are occurring in educational practice and that it is increasingly dif¿cult to discipline the pupils. What every teacher must learn, is that he or she must ¿nd a suitable way to safeguard hierarchy in the classroom. A similar observation is made by Bowen Paulle (2003), who compared a black school in AmsterdamSoutheast with a black school in the Bronx in New York. Paulle shows that the situ119

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ation at these schools has become impossible and that the teachers and principals of these schools should get more authority to get rid of the extremely bad behaviour: ‘Along with Devine (1996), I think we need to vastly increase regulations of youth’s minds and bodies in our schools of urban relegation. We need to stop thinking about this regulation of the young strictly in terms of the scary D-word – “disciplining”. Regulation can also be seen in terms of caring enough about children to offer support and consistency – at least from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon. The administrators of our most challenged schools must also be allowed to expel youth who, after repeated warnings, continue to demonstrate that they simply cannot function in what are formally mainstream educational institutions’ (Paulle, 2003, p. 52). Teaching and raising are synonymous for disciplining both individuals and groups. For Dutch teachers, that are more used to a dialogical pedagogical style, it is a problem to address migrants’ children that to a great extent are used to authoritarian pedagogical styles. Therefore the teachers at the school in Amsterdam West advocate an authoritarian style of teaching. I was highly surprised that these teachers developed their pedagogical styles in that authoritarian direction. They were of the opinion that children, particularly children from nonwestern cultures, need strong guidance and an authoritarian pedagogical style. Although they recurrently claimed that the so-called New-Dutch should adapt to Dutch values and norms, in fact they adapted to the imagined hierarchical Arabic culture. They apparently opted for one homogeneous, rather authoritarian pedagogical style. Equality and homogeneity were the parole. ‘Children are children’ was a much heard claim in this context. In the eyes of these teachers it was impossible, if not undesirable, to get acquainted with the different cultures of their students, because as one of the teachers said: ‘These students have to live and work here in Amsterdam and not in Turkey and Morocco’. Most teachers refused to enter in a dialogue on the tensions in the Middle-East, because they were convinced that their students were not capable of participating in such a dialogue. In their view, every discussion results in ¿ghts. To a certain extent their fear was understandable because of their bitter experiences with these discussions. For example when students brought Palestinian Flags to the school after 9/11 and therefore brought the war into the school. My ex-colleagues feared escalation. For this reason I understand their rejection of my claim that screaming and shouting could be the beginning of intercultural dialogue. From the beginning of my teaching in this school, I was engaged in a debate with my ex-colleagues. In contrast with them I claim that such a dialogue is a necessary condition for effective citizenship education in a multicultural context. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that there is some truth in what my colleagues claimed. When compared with their western peers from a socioeconomic perspective, migrants’ children are often the underdogs. When they repeatedly claim that they feel discriminated and that they feel unwelcome in our society, we need to take that seriously. There is much resentment amongst the students and I sense that this is an important cause for their antagonistic attitude towards their white teachers, whom 120

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they perceive to be the representatives of the ‘hostile’ western system. My colleagues were de¿nitely right when they pointed to the danger that dialogues on sensitive issues end up in yelling and shouting or even in ¿ghting. Of course, in homogenous white classrooms freedom of speech can be misused as well, but in multicultural education the danger of possibility of escalation is – because of more cultural differences – much more prominent. This is portrayed in an excellent way in the movie Entre les murs. The main character in this documentary movie is a teacher at a multicultural school in Paris. He tries to enter a dialogue with his students in which they express their opinions on themselves, on others and on the world at large. The teacher continuously encourages discussions with his students: on one of the crucial scenes the teacher and one of his students even start to ¿ght. Nevertheless, this movie offers a hopeful humanistic perspective on multicultural schools. In many scenes the dialogical encounter with cultural differences and conÀicts proves to be successful. The students feel recognized in their singularity and the teacher succeeds in inspiring them to be authentic and assertive. The movie is based on a book by Francois Bégaudeau, a teacher who reports on his experiences with teaching in a multicultural context. This movie is for me an inspiring example of a dialogical approach in multicultural education, because it provides a recognizable picture of the tensions in the multicultural classroom. The teacher should take up the challenge to develop a dialogical approach to cultural differences. In this respect, the contribution of this ¿lm is comparable to many of the novels that have been written about multicultural education. In the next section, I will show how the dialogical imagination in novels and movies serves as a paradigm for my own design of a literary casuistry. Literary casuistry is one of the methods that, for the purpose of intercultural dialogue, can be used in multicultural education. THE DESIGN OF LITERARY CASUISTRY

Starting point of what I call literary casuistry is the analogy between the way the narrator shapes his dialogues with the characters in the novel, and the way in which the teacher engages in dialogue with his students. The teacher should tell interesting stories that encourage students to think and use their imagination. In this regard, the teacher resembles the novels´ narrator. The novel enables us to enter the worlds of imaginary characters and empathizing with them. Literary imagination is dialogical imagination. In this respect I refer to the Russian philosopher and literary scientist Mikhail Bachtin who said: ‘The potential for such dialogue is one of the most fundamental privileges of novelistic prose, a privilege available neither to dramatic nor to purely poetic genres’ (Bachtin, 1981, p. 320). Analogous to Bachtin I make a distinction between the novelistic discourse and the novels. The novelistic discourse creates space for exploring the encounter of different worldviews of different communities. Speci¿c novels reÀect such encoun121

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ters. Authors of speci¿c novels – see for instance the novels about multicultural situations in high schools – challenge us to look at the multicultural situation from different perspectives. An interesting example is the novel written by the world famous Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007). The novel is entitled Adan & Eva. The novel narrates a love story between the Moroccan pupil Adan and the Dutch pupil Eva at a school in the south of Amsterdam where the majority of the students are rich and white. Ali shows how both students suffer from the prejudices by both Dutch and Moroccan parents. The gap between the different worlds is so deep that it gets impossible for Adan and Eve to meet. At the end of the story they are moved to other areas and other schools in order to make their connection impossible. Apparently, dialogue is a necessary, but not a suf¿cient condition for Bildung. This novel demonstrates that Bildung failed as a result of psychological barriers and social and cultural prejudices. Bildung emerges whenever we succeed in drawing lessons from confronting different perspectives. In other words, the dialogue is the process through which Bildung is formed. In a previous section, I introduced an analogy between dialogical imagination in the novel and the communicative interaction between teachers and students in the classroom. There are similarities between different roles. The role of the narrator is similar to the role of the teacher and the role of the reader is similar to the role of the student. In courses on history, philosophy, religion and civics, the teacher tells stories that show how people manage to really bring about change in society and the world. Of course, the teacher hopes that something interesting happens in the minds of the students and that this will inÀuence their daily activities. In order to fascinate the students, every teacher should be a good narrator. However, I strongly feel that narration is disregarded in contemporary teachers manuals on didactics that take a social constructivist view on teaching. Layered cases that stem from the various cultural and social worlds of the students are a basis for intercultural dialogue. A novel may evoke different interpretations and in a similar way the ambiguous layering of cases encourages plurality of opinions in the classroom. The aim is to explore the in-betweenness of different lifestyles and discourses that enables the development of intercultural dialogue. It is crucial that the different perspectives are bridged without obscuring the inherent conÀicts. Constructive controversy is my ideal of postmodern Bildung. The inference of this parole from novelistic discourse triggers questions that reveal the paradox of dialogical imagination. For example, how would a free interference of discourses be possible when the dialogue is introduced by the author? A similar problem is experienced by the teacher whose aim is to stimulate an intercultural dialogue. Following Bachtin, I understand this problem as a tension that can be made productive by intensifying dialogical activity. The best thing that could happen in a polyphonic classroom discussion is a dialogue through which insights are gained that reach beyond what could have been predicted. We must cross borders, take new roads and search for new crises to learn from. I ¿nd it intriguing that personal development and accompanying questions on 122

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identity are closely connected to emancipatory struggle in the multicultural society. I experienced a strong willingness among students to discuss controversial issues in multicultural society. Real Bildung emerges whenever the teacher succeeds in activating the empathetic capacity of students to really listen to the points of view of their counterparts. As a result, they will be able to make nuanced trade-offs between the contrasting perspectives regarding a certain dilemma. An issue emerging during the period I was a teacher at a multicultural school in Amsterdam-West that provided interesting food for thought, was the Iraqi war, that started in 2003. The war was very much alive in the minds of my students. I heard them discussing in the canteen. They reacted extremely emotional and I decided to give them all the space they needed to express their opinions. How could I as a teacher keep silent about this war that so deeply touched them? Unfortunately, the principal and his assistants urged me to stop discussing the matter with my students. For illustration purposes, I cite from the principal’s letter sent to the teachers at the beginning of the war: Dear colleagues, The tensions in the world are increasing. A war is about to break out. We have to consider the possibility that the atmosphere in the Netherlands or even within the walls of our school is inÀuenced by the war. The aim of this letter is to contribute to a steady living and learning climate. It is not unthinkable that you will be confronted with rather extreme expressions related to the conÀict in the Middle-East. We strive for an attitude of moderation – both from students and teachers. After all, our school is not engaged in any conÀict. In our opinion, we should not be provoked to engage in heavy debates, dif¿cult as this may be. There is no doubt that we maintain our policy that insulting, shouting etc. are not appropriate within the walls of our school. Might it be that you ¿nd yourself in such a situation with extreme expression, kindly contact the principal and my assistants. Of course, my students reacted in extreme ways and they called Bush a murderer and a fascist. But that can never be a reason to avoid the discussion with the pupils. Therefore, in contrast with the principal, I decided to consider the shouting of my students as an impetus for a discussion that should culminate in a dialogue about the differences, conÀicts and in-betweenness of Eastern and Western culture. For this purpose I was inspired by the example of the Bildungsnovel or the realistic novel of emergence (Bachtin, 1986, p. 23-25) in which diverse and conÀicting images of the world were confronted. See Bachtin on p. 23: ‘In such novels (…) , however, human emergence is of a different nature. It is no longer man’s own private affair. He emerges along with the world and he reÀects the historical emergence of the world itself. He is no longer within an epoch, but on the border between two epochs, at the transition point from one to the other.’ For me it’s the dialogical form of the novelis123

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tic discourse rather than the contents of the speci¿c novels that provides a paradigm for the way in which intercultural dialogue can be shaped in multicultural education. The contents of classroom discussions mirror the actual societal discussions. The beginning of the war in Iraq gave rise to plenty discussion themes. The teacher has to provide the students with relevant facts before discussions can start. But although the teacher tries to be as objective as possible in formulating the facts that might have caused the war in Iraq, the question immediately arises which facts are important and which facts are less important. For example, it was a fact that the search for weapons for mass destruction by the United Nations inspection team was sabotaged by Iraqi authorities. Another fact is that the oil reserves in Iraq are of extreme importance to the western world. Moreover, it can be objectively stated that Saddam Hussein was a cruel dictator and that the Americans sincerely believed that they brought democracy to the region. But of course, there are competitive interests. Therefore, the search for facts is a never ending story. Yet, such a summary of facts is essential to enable the students to transcend their prejudices into informed opinions. In that way the discussions focus on different possible perspectives on the facts. As a civic-teacher I illustrated the transcendence from facts to perspectives by means of videotapes. The videotapes showed material that was broadcasted by CNN and Al-Jazeera, just before the war started. Both the experts in the CNN program and the experts in the Al-Jazeera program referred to facts to support their arguments. The difference between the facts to which the experts at CNN referred on the one hand and the facts to which the experts at Al-Jazeera referred to on the other hand, were remarkable. Before I showed these tapes, I instructed my students to carefully observe this phenomenon. It turned out that the facts did not play a crucial role in choosing a point of view. At a closer look it proved that the experts had images of the world. The facts had to ¿t in these images and these images are mostly not discussable. The aim of humanistic education is to stimulate discussions about this hidden dimensions of western and eastern worldviews. Again I refer to the Palestinian humanist Edward Said who in his essay about humanistic resistance writes: ‘CNN and the New York Times present information in headlines or sound bites, which are often followed by slightly longer periods of information whose stated purpose is to tell us what is happening “in reality”. All the choices, exclusions, and emphases – to say nothing of the history of the subject at hand – are invisible, dismissed as irrelevant. What I have been calling humanistic resistance therefore needs to occur in longer forms, longer essays, longer periods of reÀection’ (Said, 2004, p. 73). I think it is fruitful to extrapolate this humanistic mission into the ¿eld of humanistic education. This is what I have tried to do in this classroom discussion. I tried to start a discussion on the differences between the images brought forward by the experts in the Al-Jazeera program and the experts in the CNN program. In this attempt, I was inspired by the narrator in the novelistic discourse. There is an analogy between a reader who is tempted by the narrator to empathize with the perspectives 124

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of the characters in the novel and the students who are challenged by the teacher to empathize with the western world view (CNN) and the eastern world view (AlJazeera). I indeed challenged my students to reÀect on these different worldviews. In this manner I want to encourage the students to learn in a way that is similar to the learning process that is evoked by reading a novel. Similar to the reader of the novel, the student must be challenged to engage with the perspective of ‘the enemy’. Although the development of this empathic capacity is not a suf¿cient condition, it is a necessary condition for the development of compassion. Compassion occurs whenever students respectfully listen to each other and start to understand the different perspectives. To that end the teacher should encourage and demand that the students carefully listen to each other. The ultimate aim of these polyphonic lessons is to gain an understanding of the inner motives and fears that are at the base of viewpoints and worldviews. The human world is the common ground on which people from different countries, cultures and classes can meet. As I expected, in my classroom an extensive discussion about the contrast between the eastern and western worldviews emerged. Before the discussion started, I set a ‘golden’ rule: we can shout against the world, but not against each other. That was perfectly clear. Most students believed in Al-Jazeera’s world view. But there also were some white students who believed in CNN’s worldview. The white students were a minority and they were criticized by the majority. Yet, there was no shouting against each other. The students followed the rule and the opponents didn’t give in. They continued to argue and due to the fact that they really listened to each other and gave each other the opportunity to speak their minds, the discussion continued. At the end of the lesson, some students climbed on their desks and loudly expressed their informed opinions. To me, it was a moment of hope: I had the strong impression that intercultural dialogue was about to begin at our school. The initiative of the teacher is the starting point. After listening to different stories about the world, we listen to the stories the students tell each other. Then the students become narrators. Just like the narrators in the novel, the student manifests himself as a storyteller. What matters, is the communicative interaction between the different storytellers. It is the teacher’s task to orchestrate this polyphonic discourse. Therefore, the teacher should be explicit about choices expressed in the stories of the students. Teaching is a way of reading that is inspired by the hermeneutical way of reading that is cultivated in the humanistic tradition. Again I refer to Edward W. Said who describes this humanistic ideal of reading in concise way: ‘And I think it is important to say that for the humanist, the act of reading is the act therefore of ¿rst putting oneself in the position of the author, for whom writing is a series of decisions and choices expressed in the words (Said, 2004, p. 62).’ In a similar way I think, for the humanist teacher the act of listening is the act of putting him/herself in the position of the student and to encourage the student to exercise this act of listening. Then there is the possibility to transcend own perspectives and to broaden horizons.

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CONCLUDING REMARK

My conclusion is that at multicultural schools dialogical approaches have to be developed in order to encourage students to critically reÀect on the question how they can participate in society without rejecting their own identity or cultural roots. To that end, the dialogical form of the novelistic discourse with its focus on the encounter between people from different cultural and social backgrounds, can serve as a paradigm. It has to be acknowledged, both by teachers and students, that the outcome of intercultural dialogue is uncertain. Teachers have to be willing to critically reÀect on their own worldview and prejudices. Only by communicating teachers and students will be able to break down walls between the different worlds. In a true dialogue, it should be possible to reach a point where the wisdom of uncertainty prevails over indifference, feelings of superiority and intolerance. We need continuously search for common ground that enables a real encounter for people from different cultures and countries. Citizenship education can make an extensive contribution to this humanistic aim for dialogue and compassion. REFERENCES Ali, A.H. (2007). Adan & Eva. Naarden: Gruppocreativo. Aloni, N. (2007). Enhancing humanity: the philosophical foundation of humanistic education. Dordrecht: Springer Bachtin, M.M. (1981). The dialogical imagination. Houston: University of Texas Press. Bachtin, M.M. (1986). Speechgenres and other late essays. Austin: University of Texas Press. Bégaudeau, F. & Cantet, L.(2008), Entre les murs (movie) Paulle, B. (2003). Contest and collaboration. In J.C. Rupp & W. Veugelers (Eds.) Moreel-politieke heroriëntatie in het onderwijs (Moral-political re-orientation in education (17-55) Antwerpen/ Apeldoorn: Garant. Said, E.W. (2004). Humanism and democratic criticism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Scheffer, P. (2000). ‘Het multiculturele drama’ (The multicultural drama). NRC Handelsblad, 29-12000. Scheffer, P. (2007). Land van aankomst (Land of arrival). Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij. Schinkel, W. (2007). Denken in een tijd van sociale hypochondrie (Thinking in a time of hypochondry). Kampen: Clement. Veugelers, W., Derriks, M., Kat, E. de. (2006). Education and major cultural incidents in society: September 11 and Dutch education. Journal of Peace education, 3 (2), 235-249.

Martien Schreurs Department of Education University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht

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TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Everybody claims to understand education, everybody needs education, and everybody talks about education. Yet, the situation in numerous Western education systems raises some knotty problems with regard to their quality. In those countries the ¿rst decade of the twenty-¿rst century has been characterized by waves of trenchant public debate on questions of education, teacher training and higher education. These waves of debate were often accompanied by proposals for educational reform (Shulman & Shulman, 2004; Cochran-Smith & Fries, 2005; Darling-Hammond & Bransford, 2005). In Israel, too, there is a lively debate on education but there are almost no points of contact between the reform proposals and the routine course of the education system’s life. The Israeli education system has been in deep crisis for many years: Israeli society lives in the reality of a prolonged regional conÀict and is also characterized by wide socio-economic gaps and intercultural and religious tensions. International tests present the achievements of Israeli students at a low standard compared with those from countries in the Western world, and Israel’s education system is characterized by a tribal division into religious and ideological streams. Analysis of the changes and crisis in the education system shows that the system usually adapts itself to the political zeitgeist in which it acts. The past twenty years have seen the de-politicisation of education in Israel, which has emptied the formal education system of any political-ideological content. As a result, a younger generation is growing up completely devoid of socio-political orientation and critical capability. It is super¿cially exposed to the negative aspects of the political culture and thus it abhors politics and views it as contemptible. This generation is developing hostile reactions towards political activity and avoids entering the public sphere. It does not ful¿l its democratic right to vote and thus control its future. Education researchers, experts, and of¿ce holders in the education system, school principals and teachers, all feel a genuine need to effect a change in this trend, and restore sociopolitical education to the school. They are examining ways of rehabilitating political education with the aim of nurturing political literacy in the younger generation, reinforcing its sense of citizenship, and rehabilitating the ‘political’ in the face of its devaluation by the politicians themselves, and the interest groups that inÀuence them. With this crisis situation the educational system must contend. Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 127–143. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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The education system has a leading moral and humanistic role to play in its ability to reduce educational gaps and grant a fresh opportunity to members of disadvantaged communities and help their children – the adults of the future – attain a respected place in the foreseeable future. It must enlist the best of its young people for teaching, and to this end every society holding quality democracy dear must make every effort to advance teachers’ status and also examine in depth the ideological objectives of teacher training that will provide appropriate solutions to the changing needs of the society in which it acts. Any attempt to lead a change in the Israeli education system requires a change in educators’ professional self-de¿nition and the training that shapes them. A demand such as this runs counter to the natural position of a professional training system, since its role in normal times is to adapt novice teachers to the existing system. But as we have seen, times are not normal. The crisis situation requires that teacher training institutions work in an inevitable inner tension that is far from simple. On the one hand they must train student teachers to function appropriately within the existing school framework; on the other, train them (or at least some of them) for the role of agents of change. Adopting a sociopolitical orientation in teacher training is a daring measure, and to a certain extent a subversive one, which seeks ways of repairing the deep crisis in which the education system ¿nds itself. Restoring sociopolitical orientation to teachers constitutes empowerment of their presence and expansion of their responsibility and involvement, both in the school and the community, and the society in which they work. It is a complex task, but it is possible on condition that it is discussed openly in the training process and provides the future teacher with a choice: to either conform to the school or act towards change. Recognizing the importance of teacher training on the one hand, and the challenges currently facing it on the other, the questions which stand at the basis of the present chapter are: what is the preferred professional identity of top-quality teachers, and how will teacher training act optimally to construct it? A further important question relates to the perception of the education system as a locale for advancing tools of democratic citizenship, and the development of human values of partnership in public life. The public sphere is always political, and like political behaviour, political thinking is vital for meaningful interaction between people. Nurturing the political identity of students at any age is a prerequisite for forming the foundations of civic republicanism in them, and for the future realization of democratic citizenship. The problem is that the education system usually avoids touching upon social and political issues and generally adopts a stance of neutrality which is acquired at the cost of separation between social critique and educational endeavour. Thus, the question of the legitimacy of political education in teacher training arises in all its force. The present chapter seeks to examine how teacher training can play an active role in nurturing teachers with sociopolitical awareness, and in what the image of this transformative teacher training will be. This attempt has taken shape over the last four years at the Kibbutzim College of Education, Technology and Art at Tel128

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Aviv. Founded by the Kibbutz Movement in 1939, before the establishment of the State of Israel, this college, numbering 5,500 students, is the biggest of its kind in Israel. It offers education tracks in all disciplines, from an early age to age 18, and has schools for the performing arts, the arts, cinematography, and various types of therapy. The college’s training model is directed towards a comprehensive concept of training teachers acting as ‘involved intellectuals’, teachers whose professional identity leans on strong intellectual self-image, awareness of social activism and on commitment to public activity (Yogev & Michaeli, 2009). The chapter will describe the training model from its theoretical and applicatory aspects, and will comprise three main parts. The ¿rst part will brieÀy present the Israeli social, cultural and educational contexts in which teacher training takes place and its effect on forming the professional identity of its graduates. It will present the arti¿cial division that has been created between educational endeavour and social critique of the reality of life in Israel, and will raise the need for teacher training that nurtures a position of pedagogic activism in novice teachers. As a basis to validate teacher training, which intensi¿es the sense of professional capability in novice teachers, the chapter presents a theoretical outline of the characteristics of the educator acting as an involved intellectual while employing the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and the philosophical-sociological theory of Axel Honneth Gramsci’s writings, known as the The Prison Notebooks, contain the tracing of Italian history and nationalism, as well as some ideas in Marxist theory, critical theory and educational theory. Gramsci is renowned for his concept of cultural hegemony as a means of maintaining the state in a capitalist society and for his ideas about the role of the intellectuals in society. Honneth’s work focuses on social-political and moral philosophy, especially relations of power, recognition, and respect. One of his core arguments is for the priority of intersubjective relationships of recognition in understanding social relations. This includes non- and mis-recognition as a basis of social and interpersonal conÀict. For instance, grievances regarding the distribution of goods in society are ultimately struggles for recognition. The third part of the chapter will present the training model for involved-educators that was developed at the Kibbutzim College of Education. This part will present the main points of the change introduced into training in two parallel application parameters: expanding the students’ experiential frameworks in the community and changes in the academic syllabi and in campus life. Finally, the chapter presents the ¿ndings of a selected study, which attends the assimilation process of the training policy and examines the effect of the changes on the perceptions of the teachers’ trainees. TEACHER TRAINING AS A FORMATIVE ELEMENT

Teacher training and the education system work within broad social, cultural and economic contexts and therefore any discussion of teacher training requires a basic knowledge of these contexts. This knowledge serves as a point of departure for an 129

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understanding of the problem inherent in the prevailing training model and of the proposed solution in training teachers acting as involved intellectuals. The Israeli educational system works within a complex social context: Israeli society lives in the reality of a prolonged regional conÀict and is also characterized by wide socioeconomic gaps and intercultural and religious tensions. In its early decades Israel developed a social-democratic structure and its society enjoyed high standards of cohesion and mutual commitment and responsibility. In the last three decades, it has undergone comprehensive change. From a society of solidarity, it has become individualistic and alienated. Since the end of the 1970s, Israeli society adopted the principles of neo-liberal economics and embarked on privatisation and decentralization processes in government and public institutions. These processes created a socioeconomic reality of widening gaps, erosion of the welfare state and massive growth in private spending required for health services, education and basic subsistence (Israel, A Social Report, 2008-9). In general terms, suspicion of public institutions in general and state-owned ones in particular become prevalent in Israeli society. Together with these processes, the Israeli public harbours feelings of frustration, despair, and even revulsion towards anything identi¿ed with politics. These social processes are deeply inÀuenced by the global post-industrial trends prevailing in the Western world. They include the consolidation of an exhibitionistic consumer society that justi¿es hedonism and living for the moment and displays sentiments of rejection and contempt for any aspiration towards social reform.. The philosopher-sociologist, Christopher Lasch (1991) called this phenomenon the ‘culture of narcissism’, which in his view spawned a ‘me’ generation devoid of social direction and compass, which spouted empty ‘freedom’ slogans and is characterized by detachment, boredom, violent tendencies and civil and political apathy. Together with a culture of social nihilism fostered by a Àamboyant consumer culture, global trends also led to a breach of traditional national boundaries and redrawing them in a particular, tribal and local direction. Zygmunt Bauman (2000) termed this phenomenon ‘glocalization’, a social division between the globally mobile and the locally stationary: the economic, technological, educated, political and successful elites move from one end of the world to the other while physically and mentally detaching themselves from the speci¿c identity space of their country. On the other hand, there is a growing stratum in local population, which due to the weakening of the welfare state, feels abandoned and nurtures universal tribalism on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender, etc Neo-liberal economic logic and radical relativistic trends in postmodernism have also left their mark on public education. The decentralization and privatisation processes being undergone by the Israeli education system are deepening historical schism and establishing ‘market’ patterns in the system. I shall mention three forces contributing to the weakening of and division in the public education system: 1. A government policy of public budget cuts, promoting decentralization and privatisation, and assimilating administrative concepts that lead schools to compete 130

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for students and resources and to focus their efforts on meeting the demands of their ‘clients’, i.e., the students and their parents. 2. Various cultural, religious and ethnic communities, which in the name of multicultural logic demand the expansion of their educational autonomy and reduction of the central system’s authority. Evidence of the power of this force is found in the inability of the state to consolidate a binding core curriculum, or in other words, to condition receipt of state funds upon accepting a minimal curriculum. 3. Parents of high socioeconomic status who seek to exercise their right to better their children’s education, and who open channels bypassing the public systems and institutionalise private or semi-private educational frameworks. At this point I seek to make the following argument: an education system in a democratic society plays two roles of cardinal importance – the socioeconomic role and the sociopedagogic role. In its socioeconomic role the public education system must consolidate the essential equality of opportunity and provide all its students with the possibility of an education that is a gateway to the world of employment, and an entry into modern society. A public-funded education system which operates programs designed to provide af¿rmative preference to weak populations is likely to reduce gaps and lessen inequality. In its pedagogic role the public education system in a real democracy should constitute a framework for encounter between groups from different populations, found an ideological and cultural platform, and facilitate the nurturing of social solidarity. An education system such as this will aspire towards dealing, on a day-to-day basis, with the dif¿culties and complexity of maintaining a partnership within otherness in a democratic society, and educate its students towards active citizenship and involvement in their adult life (Helsep, 1989; Mathews, 1996). In order to accomplish its pedagogic mission, the education system cannot settle for teachers with didactic skills and disciplinary professionalism who shut themselves off within the four walls of prevailing classroom instrumentalism. To achieve this end calls for politically aware teachers who see themselves as agents of social change and are active in the educational and community spheres. An education system for democratic citizenship must be staffed by involved intellectual teachers. However, training teachers as involved intellectuals requires planting the willingness and ability to become enlightened, critical teachers (Aronowitz, 2008). This approach, therefore, requires seriously addressing the intellectual and political aspects of the trainees. THE TEACHER AS INVOLVED INTELLECTUAL IN SOCIETY – A THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION

Antonio Gramsci spoke of the need for ‘organic intellectuals.’ He thought that civil society is the main sphere of activity of politicians and stressed that no economic factor, decisive though it might be, can act without passing through human con131

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sciousness and without it becoming an understanding or a position. He therefore thought that ‘organic intellectuals’ – people who are not detached from the very thin fabric of public life, but strengthen the dimension of knowledge within it – are the appropriate link between existing intellectual critique and those sections of the public that have not detached themselves from the consciousness boundaries of the hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci’s concept of an ‘organic intellectual’ marks a different option for describing the desirable characteristics of the educator as an educational leader. I will use the term as a springboard to justify teacher training that acts towards reinforcing the novice teacher’s intellectual self-image and nurturing in them a position of pedagogic activism and public responsibility. An analysis of the characteristics of educators functioning as transformative leaders will examine the three aspects vital to their training process: the epistemological aspect that exposes novice teachers to the interpretative multiplicity and partialness of understanding, and shows them ways for a critical reading of reality; the ethical aspect which holds that teacher training must nurture a culture of active caring about other people, while understanding the signi¿cance of what accepting this responsibility means; and the political aspect that seeks to reinforce in them an awareness of social activism and commitment to public activity. The Epistemological Aspect According to Gramsci, hegemony is a complex arrangement of values and meanings that accord legitimacy to social and political reality. A project becomes hegemonic when certain ways of life become the natural way of observing reality and accepting it as it is. At the same time, other ways of seeing are removed from the compass of public legitimacy and presented as inconceivable. For any social group to become hegemony it must adopt a perception. To achieve its objective the hegemonic group positions itself at the centre of social life as a kind of ‘core’ of society and ¿lls the entire space of public consciousness. Since Gramsci assumed that in every human being lies a potential intellectual and that this potential can also be fostered in the underprivileged that are not within the bounds of the hegemony, there is no ¿eld more appropriate for achieving this aim than education (Gramsci , 1971, p. 323). Raymond Williams, a pioneer of cultural studies, emphasized Gramsci’s contribution to the formulation of the notion of hegemony. According to Williams, hegemony is discrete from ideology in that it completely overlaps the experience of reality and thus precludes any possibility of conscious extrication from its grasp. This conscious grasp does not allow, of necessity, any practical aspiration towards changing social reality, and in his words: ‘This notion of hegemony as deeply saturating the consciousness of a society seems to me to be fundamental’ (Williams, 1976, p. 206). Following Gramsci, Williams argues that the education system constitutes a central force in the creation of a dominant culture. Schools are the most effective agents

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of a selective hegemonic tradition, since they determine a solid perception in their students whereby the economic and cultural reality they know is the only one possible. An educational process such as this emphasizes the ‘individual’ as an entity detached from social contexts and thus contributes to the nurturing of individualist ethics that weaken economic and political sensitivity (Williams, 1961). The condition for the advancement of social change is therefore the penetrating of that consciousness to whose entrenchment the education system contributes. Penetrating this consciousness requires intellectual activity which Gramsci imposes upon the mediating class of ‘organic intellectuals’. The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as an constructor, organizer, ‘permanent persuader’ and not just simple orator (…) from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history, without which one remains ‘specialized’ and does not become ‘directive’ (specialized and political) (Gramsci, 1971, p. 10). The Gramscian approach offers an optimistic and practical angle for analysing social reality. Unlike Williams’s somewhat despairing approach in light of the power of hegemony, Gramsci offers a loophole through which hegemonic consciousness can be breached and paves a practical way for achieving it. The idea of the ‘organic intellectual educator’ was reinforced by the epistemological-existential elements lying at the basis of critical pedagogical perception. Like Gramsci, leading critical pedagogy thinkers such as Paolo Freire (1970), Henry Giroux (1988), Peter McLaren (1989), Ira Shor (1992) and others view the formal education system as a clearly political locale that plays a leading role in shaping public consciousness, whereby the hegemony can reproduce itself. In his book, Teachers as Intellectuals: towards a Critical Pedagogy of Learning, Giroux proposes a critical concept of education in the sense of the educational praxis incumbent upon the intellectual, as set out by Gramsci. He is looking for educators who feel responsible for raising an involved, critical citizen with a developed sense of justice and who care about others. Critical education should empower and reinforce the learner so that he can decipher the language of the hegemony, identify through a critical reading of reality the factors and forces inÀuencing his life, and develop for himself an informed direction and appropriate skills that will enable him to lead his life for his own bene¿t and that of his community (Giroux, 1988). The dif¿culty with the prevailing critical pedagogy derives from the fact that the ‘enemy’ is not one of Àesh and blood but always the system, the ideology. But if the other is not a living, kicking and breathing human being, there is no place for pedagogy (Jansen, 2009, p. 257). Classrooms and schools are full of contention. Teachers and students possess problematic individual knowledge with educational implications, knowledge with which we must know how to heighten awareness, clarify and 133

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change. It is precisely the ‘knowledge in the blood’ that is in each and every classroom that must serve as a point of departure towards a different pedagogy. The key to social change is to be found in a speci¿c dialogue with the other. Therefore, in the epistemological aspect teacher training will seek to strengthen the awareness of novice teachers regarding the multiplicity of paths of knowledge, its interpretative alternatives and the partialness of their understanding. It will nurture critical reading and emphasize learning that examines how various patterns of ‘local’ and ‘of¿cial’ learning are created, and how a consciousness system is created that blocks alternatives from challenging hegemonic rule. This critical literacy will somewhat neutralize the attempt of the of¿cial education system to construct a ¿ctional reality which presents itself as the only truth and blocks any desire for change. The Ethical Aspect The ethical professional identity formed during the educators’ training process affords them the ability to navigate in the social and moral space: Who am I is linked to questions of what am I doing and how am I acting towards the other, what do I want and what is signi¿cant for me Well known in this context are the works of John Dewey (1916/1997), Lev Vygotsky (1978), Mikhail Bakhtin (1984), Charles Taylor (1992) and others, which also focus attention on the interpersonal dialogue as a practice of creating identity. According to their approaches, the students’ selfrecognition is bound up not only in their love of and esteems for signi¿cant others, but also in recognition of the public arena, recognition that has both symbolic and practical aspects. The philosophical-sociological theory of Axel Honneth, who currently heads the Frankfurt school of thought, can offer a theoretical framework for this concept. Honneth (2007) asks which social conditions enable people to develop fully and ful¿l themselves. He has formulated a social-ethical theory at the centre of which stands ‘recognition’. His main premise is that a just society is one that enables a person to gain recognition. A human being exists in complicated and complex networks of ongoing relationships with others and himself, and he builds his identity in a constant dialogue within those networks. In building a person’s self-identity the individual’s desire to gain the respect and esteem of others is of particular importance, as is his willingness to grant them to others out of esteem, identi¿cation or affection, not exclusive considerations of bene¿t. Exclusion, objecti¿cation, humiliation, scorn, oppression or discrimination towards an individual, or the group framework of which he is a member, do not enable a person to ful¿l himself. They are liable to impair his self-esteem as someone who is loved and cared about, as someone respected as a person and appreciated by virtue of his deeds and contribution to society. Honneth’s theory, which the above can only hint at several of its ideas, offers an interesting theoretical foundation for the pedagogical aspect of a teacher training program, since its implications can be 134

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tested in the classroom itself, in the relationships created in it between students, teachers and parents, as a consequence of familiarity that becomes recognition. A pedagogical program such as this neither sancti¿es the existing situation nor seeks to overturn it. The Sociopolitical Aspect As mentioned above, being a political individual means being an active citizen in the behavioural and value aspects of everyday life. At the basis of sociopolitical education is the premise that politics is the art of compromise and that the political way is a cornerstone of democracy. The absence of political language and tools for political conduct in young people can foster a culture of nihilistic indifference, and at times of crisis, the rotten fruit of violence, racism, radical nationalism and ruthless fundamentalism. In order to reinforce political language and the basis for cultivating a democratic culture, experiential locales and learning patterns must be created that will equip novice teachers with the tools required for advancing sociopolitical education in the education system, such as: ways of dealing with current affairs questions for discussion in the public arena; group study, developing curricula linked to the students’ real life questions, forming an ecology that makes the students partners in shaping the school community, familiarization with and activity in non-formal education systems, and so on. The pedagogical aspect of educating for political awareness in teacher training will be supported by two integrative anchors: deepening knowledge of society in novice teachers and service learning in the community. The pedagogical aspect of educating for political awareness in teacher training will be supported by two integrative anchors: deepening knowledge of society in novice teachers and service learning in the community. 1. Nurturing political literacy: Deepening social knowledge The novice teachers’ familiarization with the social ¿elds will include theoretical aspects of engaging with economic and cultural issues in both historical and contemporary contexts. Studying these theoretical aspects will be distributed over various disciplines such as sociology, political philosophy, history, political science and so forth. In addition to the theoretical aspects, social learning will also include concrete aspects and contexts comprising deepening familiarization with groups and classes, systemic macro data (in the ¿elds of economics, education, welfare and demography), and also discovery and analysis of historical and political processes (Walzer, 1998). In the Israeli context this anchor will consolidate the study of the national and ethno-political conÀict while deepening familiarization with the culture, historical narratives, and the different cultural points of view charging and constructing them (Yogev & Naveh, 2005).

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2. Experimental Service learning Nurturing teachers as involved intellectuals gains expression in the concept of service learning. The aim of this teacher-training model is twofold: to create meaning for practical personal knowledge within a context that does not leave learning solely on the theoretical level, and to enable students to experience learning encounters within community circles and beyond the school experience. Lave & Wenger (1991) speak of learning through authentic participation, attended by theoretical-professional discourse, as creation of new knowledge in the professional training of ‘Communities of Praxis’. Their premise is supported by a contextual approach that views learning processes such as these as a varying and subjective interpretation of reality in the immediate context in which the professional training takes place. Novice teachers’ theoretical studies will be enriched and accorded deeper meaning by social activity in the community. For example, by educational or therapeutic work with marginalized populations; initiating and promoting social projects in various spheres; working in organizations for social change; conducting research and writing position papers on topical social and political issues. Followup studies on students that studied while serving in the community found that the experience heightened their sense of responsibility and reinforced their belief in their power to lead a change (Patrick, 2003; Waltzer & Heilman. 2005; Kvieskiene, 2006). The combination of the two above mentioned pedagogical anchors – deepening knowledge of society and experimental service learning– constitutes the rationale that shapes the transformative teacher training model presented below. A MODEL FOR TRAINING TEACHERS AS ‘INVOLVED INTELLECTUALS’

Based on the outlined sociopolitical vision and the epistemological and pedagogical aspects deriving from it, a broad and comprehensive policy for teacher training was designed at the Kibbutzim College of Education. It is important to note that this policy seeks to create change in the entire sphere of college teacher-training, rather than merely creating a de¿ned boutique program. A training model encompassing all the College’s training programs and including all the students engaged in BA studies was designed in order to implement the program on the organizational level. A Social Involvement Unit was set up, consisting of a full-time project manager, a professor who supports and advises on academic issues and a research team. The wish to go beyond the classroom space and experience activities both at school and in the community, led to alliances between the College and speci¿c cities and neighbourhoods. These alliances were intertwined, starting from senior management level (relations between College management and mayors), through middle management level (relations between heads of training paths and municipal department heads) and up to the performance level (relations between the pedagogical instructors and principals, including community centre managers). At this stage of the program, the experience includes 3,500 students and about 100 faculty mem136

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bers. The program is in its experimental phase and receives an annual government budget in the sum $150,000, which is matched by the College. The teacher-training model at the College translated the pedagogical vision into two circles of implementation: (A) Including community involvement in pedagogical training as part of the regular practical experience process and establishing a program of social involvement in non-formal organizations. (B) Expanding opportunities for the students’ active involvement in campus life. As aforementioned, all the students at the College participate in these circles, which are implemented in all the study tracks. I shall now present them in brief, and then present the ¿ndings of studies that monitored the implementation of this new policy. Community involvement as part of the regular practical experiential process One of the unique and central components of teacher training is pedagogic competence that includes the novice teacher’s practical experience in the classroom and the attendant didactic-academic workshop. While recognizing the centrality and importance of pedagogic instruction in the training process and based on training approaches emphasizing reÀectivity, knowledge construction and community exposure (Shulman, 1998; Hargreaves & Fullan, 2000), we sought to extend the borders of pedagogic instruction to the social and community arenas. The applicative component for the changes undertaken in pedagogical instruction is the inclusion of experiencing extracurricular social activity as an integral and binding part of the College’s training program. In the course of their studies every student at the College is obliged to work in a social organization for 60 hours, and at the same time take part in an academic course attending that activity. The social activity gains academic accreditation, which obliges the various tracks to restructure their schedule and thus the program becomes part of the track core rather than accompanying it. These courses serve as an arena for conceptualizing and processing practical experiences accumulated in the social activity. In the circle of implementing social involvement, a large proportion of the students’ social activity, as well as the attendant academic courses, are channelled to the socioeconomic ¿eld. In the framework of social activity the students are placed in a variety of organizations engaged in economic-civic issues. The organizations are selected according to various criteria, including aspects of size, scope, and ability to provide monitoring and support for students, but it is the nature of the organization’s activity that is primarily examined. In selecting the organizations emphasis is placed on those acting towards social change, rather than organizations whose activities are primarily providing support and welfare. Thus, for example, students are active in organizations acting towards exercising the rights of disadvantaged populations; organizations that mentor children and adolescents of migrant workers and other minorities; organizations acting towards advancing workers’ rights. The courses include familiarization with Israeli society as one of immigrants compris137

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ing diverse cultural and social groups. While studying and analysing current macro economic data, privatisation, neo-liberalism, civil society and organized labour, the students are exposed to the Israeli economic reality. These courses use the experiences the students accumulate in the framework of their social activities, and thus the theory and the concepts being studied are linked to experiences. In this way experiences and feelings are conceptualized just as the theory and the concepts undergo a process of personalization and are translated into ‘faces’ and ‘names’. These courses also incorporate encounters with social activists and tours in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and areas – which are also designed to link the studied theories to everyday reality. Increasing student involvement in campus life Complementing the pedagogical training and social involvement components, a wide range of opportunities was developed for the students’ active involvement in the College’s academic, administrative and social spheres. This circle seeks to enable students to experience involvement ¿rsthand, to experience authentic initiative and inÀuence on the premise that a range of experiences such as this will enhance their orientation as well as their leadership skills. It is important to note that this involvement does not refer to the regular activities of the students union, but is an attempt to involve students in additional spheres of activity and decision making. These spheres include academic ones, such as, for example, student participation in the College Teaching Committee. The College Teaching Committee is a formal body responsible for the advancement and development of the College’s core experience and deals with fundamental issues of teacher training, and also with questions regarding teaching and learning. Although this body is formally comprised of lecturers, it was decided to co-opt student representatives from all the study tracks to take part in the fundamental discussions. For example, in the course of 2008 the lecturers and students sitting on the Teaching Committee formulated new teaching regulations that included rules binding the administration, the lecturers and the students. The students were partners to each stage of formulating the regulations that included study, discussion, writing drafts, and decision-making. In addition to this activity, joint lecturer-student steering committees were set up in each track that address teaching and learning speci¿c to the track and additional relevant aspects. In line with this policy, the College encourages and approves a variety of student projects. A few brief examples: a group of students asked to put the issue of the environmental crisis onto the College’s agenda. Following the group’s concentrated activities, a ‘green council’ (a committee for greening the campus) was established that included students, lecturers and administration staff who worked together to transform the College into a green campus. Their activity resulted in the College being awarded approval as a ‘green campus’ by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Another initiative led to the establishment of an academic conference 138

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on democracy and education, which is organized and run by students under the guidance and support of the faculty. Commencing 2009, the conference will be held every year on the Yitzhak Rabin Memorial Day. These examples illustrate a signi¿cant change in the College’s life culture and its willingness to nurture its students’ genuine experience and involvement in educational and social activism, even on the academic college’s campus. These opportunities for involvement complement the experience and insights gathered in lectures and practical teaching, and are a greenhouse for empowering the students as involved intellectual leaders. THE NEW TEACHERS’ TRAINING MODEL: A FORMATIVE ASSESSMENT

So far, the training model presented here is in its fourth year. The accompanying research is still in its early stages. It remains to be seen whether the research ¿ndings corroborate our hypothesis that the model can generate a change in the perception of the teachers’ vocation to become involved leaders in the community. The research examines the following questions: – Is there any change in the students’ concept of the professional teacher’s obligations between the beginning and the end of the student’s training? – Have the teachers involved in the program undergone any changes in their concept and approach? In addition to these two questions, assessment studies of speci¿c projects are made and their degree of success is examined in light of their goal de¿nition. One of the researches on social activity focused on students active in a number of organizations in the sphere of welfare and education in the Jewish-Arab city of Ramle (Shemer-Elkayam & Eitan, 2009). The study included pre-post student questionnaires (N=44) aimed at identifying their feelings and attitudes towards social involvement. Both questionnaires were anonymous and were matched by means of an identity code. The extensive questionnaires included ‘inter alia’, a 28-statement sub-questionnaire about the students’ expectations/attitudes regarding the contribution of social involvement to themselves, in which they were asked to rate the degree of contribution to themselves. Content analysis of their responses to this sub-questionnaire yielded ¿ve categories: contribution to teaching ability and the ability to plan and convey didactic content, contribution to personal development, contribution to development of social consciousness and motivation to create social change. A questionnaire for lecturers in the accompanying courses included closed and open questions about the primary objectives of the attendant course and the degree to which they were attained, course content, division of time in the course, general satisfaction with the course and the relationship with the pedagogical instructors. A questionnaire for the pedagogical instructors included closed and open questions about the role of pedagogical instruction in social involvement, the

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time allocated during pedagogical instruction lessons to social involvement and the content conveyed in the allotted time, and the relationship with the lecturers in the attendant course and the contact persons in the involvement sites. In addition, telephone interviews were conducted with the lecturers and instructors, whose aim was to expand the information obtained from the questionnaires. At the end of their social activity the students reported a high level of contribution particularly in aspects of their personal development (mean 3.72) and developing social consciousness (mean 3.72). By contrast, they reported a lower level of contribution (mean 2.98) to aspects of teaching and motivation to create social change. In addition, when they were asked about their satisfaction with social activity in general, the students expressed a medium to high level of satisfaction (mean 3.53). In the open questions as well, some detailed the contribution of social involvement to development of their social consciousness and familiarization with a different population: I understood the power of simplicity, the ability to connect and communicate with any person if you focus on the similarities and not the differences (…) the recognition that we are all one, and that the attributes of age, religion or culture are merely a secondary covering (Shemer-Elkayam & Eitan, 2009). When the students were asked about the level of contribution of their work to the children themselves, they reported a high level of contribution (mean 4.39). This study, too, shows that the aspect they felt was most lacking was practical support – the students expected more operative guidance from the lecturers and instructors, including discussion of speci¿c issues arising from the ¿eld, learning work methods, suggesting ideas for activities with the target population, and recommendations on learning aids. In addition, they recommended that the instructors hold more meetings in small groups to discuss issues and practical dif¿culties arising in the ¿eld (Shemer-Elkayam & Eitan, 2009). By means of the accompanying courses and the social activity, a window has been opened for the students to worlds that had been transparent for them until now. At the same time, the success of the program in its aspirations to nurture in student teachers a professional pedagogical identity that is founded on a sociopolitical backbone, is still doubtful and requires constant improvement of the model and further research. CONCLUSION

The educational vision of the Kibbutzim College of Education is de¿ned as follows: The Kibbutzim College of Education views its principal objective as the development and training of educators, teachers and therapists possessing a humanistic approach and environmental social responsibility (…) The College 140

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views teachers as educators involved in the community and society and holds an ideological position mandating increased contact between academe and the community. The College has set itself the target of heightening concern and sensitivity in its graduates to the social and environmental reality of the State of Israel, and positioning social involvement as an integral part of the educational and teacher training process. The objective of social involvement is to expose students to the diverse strata of Israeli society with the aim of nurturing social solidarity and willingness for social and environmental activism. This involvement is important for novice teachers on their road to developing a social consciousness that will serve as a basis for their educational endeavour and their ability to contribute towards reforming the reality (retrieved from the College website www.smkb.ac.il on 17.01.2010 [Hebrew]). The training model presented above blurs the borderline between formal and nonformal education and takes the students out of the classroom and brings them into contact with the community and society in order to introduce democratic conduct into the academic life of the College. This model constitutes an alternative to the accepted learning tracks at teacher training institutions: 1. Unlike conventional teacher training, the model presented above seeks to equip teachers with a critical approach to reality and to prepare them to act in it as pedagogic activists. 2. The new training model, unlike conventional teacher training, views the students as partners in the structuring of teaching and learning, in designing the curriculum and in shaping campus academic life. 3. The new training model seeks to expand the pool of experiences and viewpoints to additional circles of community and society. This broader and varied experience strengthens the novice teacher’s ability to observe the educational endeavour in the social and political ¿elds, which inÀuences and heightens his/her human and social sensitivity. The evaluation studies presented in the present article are a ¿rst attempt to empirically evaluate the new teachers training programs. Much more research has to be done. This ¿rst study, however attests to the fact that the training model, which has been operating in the Kibbutzim College of Education for almost four years, has taken an important step towards nurturing teachers with a social-public consciousness. But presently it still has a long way to go in order to achieve its objectives. Moreover, according to the reports of this study, the students’ sense of self-ef¿cacy has increased immeasurably; On the other hand, the study raises the question of the sustainability of these changes in their professional pedagogical identity. The question is whether the insights and perceptions that have been constructed in the students following their participation is the diverse components of the new training model will come together to form a role perception that will survive in a challenging education system with contradicting demands. At this stage it can 141

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already be stated that pre-service training policy, which is detached from the processes of entering the workforce and from continuing professional development, is liable to be swallowed up and blurred when its graduates are assimilated into the system with its constraints. In light of all this, coupled with continuing to nurture and re¿ne the teacher-training policy presented here, it is also necessary to develop continuing stages of development and professional support from the start. These stages complement and strengthen the achievements of the training model, and, in the complex reality of existence of Israeli society, will reinforce the activities of a class of teachers in the education system that function as involved intellectuals in society and the community. REFERENCES Aronowitz, S. (2008). Against schooling: For an education that matters. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. Bakhtin, M. (1984). Rabelais and his world. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Cochran-Smith, M., & Fries, K. (2005). Researching teacher education in changing times: Politics and paradigms. In M. Cochran-Smith, & K. M. Zeichner (Eds.) Studying teacher education: The report of the AERA panel on research and teacher Education, (69-109), Washington and Mahwah, N.J.: American Educational Research Association and Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Darling-Hammond, L., & Bransford, J. (2005). Preparing teachers for a changing world: What teachers should learn and be able to do. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Dewey, J. (1997). Democracy and education. New York: The Free Press, Simon & Schuster. Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Herder & Herder. Furco, A., & Root, S. (2001). Service-learning in teacher education: An overview of the research. In J. Anderson, & K. Swick (Eds.) Strengthening service and learning in teacher education. Washington DC: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. Gramsci. A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Giroux, H. (1988) Teachers as intellectuals: Towards a critical pedagogy of learning. New-York: Bergain & Garvey. Hargreaves, A., & Fullan, M. (2000). Mentoring in the New Millennium. Theory into Practice, 3(1), 50-56. Heslep, R. D. (1989). Education in democracy: Education’s moral role in the democratic state. Ames, Iowa: State University of Iowa Press. Honneth, A. (2007). Rei¿cation: A recognition-theoretical view. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Israel, A social report, 2008-9, retrieved from http://www.adva.org./default/asp?pageid=1002&itmid=574 on: 17.01.2010 Jansen D, J. (2009). Knowledge in the blood: Confronting race and the apartheid past. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kvieskiene, G. (2006). Civic education in pre-service training programs for teachers and children welfare professionals. Social Work & Society, 4(1), 123-138. Lasch, C. (1979/1991). The Culture of narcissism, American life in an age of diminishing expectations. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated-learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mathews, D. (1996). Reviewing and previewing civics. In W.C. Parker (Ed.) Educating the democratic mind (265-286). Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. McLaren, P. (1989). Life in schools. New York & London: Longman.

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TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN Patrick, J. J. (2003). Teaching democracy globally, internationally, and comparatively: The 21st century civic mission of schools. In J.J. Patrick, E. Gregory, E.G. Hamot & S.R. Leming (Eds.) Civic learning in teacher education: International perspectives on education for democracy in the preparation of teachers. Vol. 2. (21-44). Bloomington, ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education, Shor, I. (1992). Empowering education, critical teaching for social change. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Shemer-Elkayam, T., & Eitan, Y. (2009). Evaluation of a social involvement program in creative education. Study report of the college research Unit. Tel-Aviv: Kibbutzim College of Education. Shulman, L, S. (1998). Course anatomy: The dissection and analysis of knowledge through teaching. In P. Huthings (Ed.) The course portfolio: How faculty can examine their teaching to advance practice and improve student learning (5-130). Washington D.C: American Association for Higher Education. Shulman, L, S., & Shulman, J. (2004). How and what teachers learn: A shifting perspective. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 36(2), 257-271. Taylor, C. (1992). Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Waltzer, K., & Heilman, E. (2005). When going right is going wrong: Education for critical democratic patriotism. Social Studies, 96(4), 156-162. Walzer, M. (1998). Education, democratic citizenship, and multiculturalism. In E. Weiner (Ed.) The handbook of interethnic coexistence (153-161). New York: Continuum Publishing. Williams, R. (1961). The Long revolution. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books. Williams, R. (1976). Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory. In R. Dale (Ed.) Schooling and capitalism: A Sociological reader (202-210). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Yogev, E., & Michaeli, N. (2009). Training teachers as involved intellectuals in society and the community. The International Journal of Learning, 16(2), 129 – 141. Yogev, E., & Naveh, E. (2005). Dialogues between reconciled narratives: History as need, interpretation, and human encounter. In N. Aloni (Ed.) Interdisciplinary thought in Humanistic education. Vol. 1, (33-48). Tel-Aviv: Unesco Chair for Humanistic Education, Institute for Educational Thought, Kibbutzim college of Education.

Esther Yogev College of Education Kibbutzim College Tel Aviv

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HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE: EXPLORING ITS NORMATIVE PROFESSIONALISM

Teaching means working with values. Educating students to become teachers requires making them conscious of how values are embedded in all aspects of their practices and how to handle these values (Bergem, 2003). Bringing this reÀexivity into practice is not easy, especially when the level of consciousness goes further than just ‘talking about subject matters’ and extends itself to the level of personal involvement. At the University of Humanistic Studies (UH) in the Netherlands, a central aspect of teacher education concerns the professional’s personal involvement. One reason for this involvement is that their teachings’ subject focuses on existential questions, moral values and ethical dilemma’s on which the humanistic teachers also have their own views. Another reason is that these teachers have explicit normative ideas about educational aims and teaching strategies which are related to their worldviews. At the UH the term ‘normative professionalism’ is used to emphasize these aspects of their work. The term bears resemblance to ethical competence in teaching that refers to the teacher’s capability to analyse and solve the ethical dilemmas with which teachers are constantly confronted during classroom teaching (Bergem, 2003, p. 94). Teacher education at the UH is based on the so-called reÀective paradigm (Veugelers, 2010). The academic aim is to develop sensitivity and competencies to deal with situations where values are colliding on the personal, occupational, institutional and social level. However, little is known about what normative professionalism looks like in the teaching practice and what values are involved. In this chapter we will present an empirical study that focuses on these questions. After describing the context of the study, the concept of normative professionalism is clari¿ed. In order to get a deep insight into the concept normative professionalism in the practice of humanistic teachers, a speci¿c research instrument, the self-confrontation method, is used. This method allows for the investigation of personal meanings and is based on the valuation theory as a conceptual framework for researching a personal meaning system (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995). Finally, having described theory and method, a small-scale empirical investigation of normative professionalism in practice is presented. Special attention is paid to the relevance of the affective aspects of the meaning system for the concept of normative professionalism.

Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 145–161. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT

Before exploring the practices of humanistic teachers, the context in which these teachers operate must be made clear. Under certain conditions, everyone in The Netherlands can start a school grounded on a worldview, religion or pedagogical idea. These private schools are public ¿nanced and follow the national curriculum, and they make their own curriculum only for the area of religious, ethical or worldview studies. The of¿cial humanist movement does not support the option of private schools, but advocates state or public schools where children from various religious, cultural and social backgrounds are brought together and can interact. At these state schools, attention should be paid to all kinds of worldviews, like Christianity, Hinduism and humanism, but also to the broad scope of ethical and existential questions with which children are confronted nowadays. It is only since the early Eighties that teachers at secondary schools are of¿cially quali¿ed to teach ‘ethical and worldview education’ from a non-religious or humanistic point of view. Although there are only a few state secondary schools which have a subject like ‘ethical and worldview education’ on the curriculum, there is a growing number of private (religious) schools that welcome teachers with a humanistic background to teach this subject. An important reason is the changing population of these schools. More and more, their pupils vary in cultural backgrounds and worldviews. Given the desirable and necessary encounter between different belief systems and worldviews, humanistic teachers are supposed to be able to handle these differences, because they actively promote an open attitude towards diverse worldviews and to get involved in dialogical practices. Still, in absolute numbers, few humanistic teachers work at secondary schools. Some factors which make teaching ‘ethical and worldview education’ a dif¿cult job are obvious. There is often little room in the curriculum for a subject like ‘ethical and worldview education’; in most schools this subject is taught for just one hour a week and the marks the pupils get for the tests do not count in grading decisions. The teachers seldom have colleagues who teach the same subject and with whom they can share their experiences. Above all, most humanistic teachers cannot and will not fall back on standard programs or methods, because they have strong and often deeply rooted opinions about pedagogical aims and ways of teaching. These facts and opinions suggest that it is not an easy job to be a humanistic teacher, but, of course, one can only ascertain this by doing research in this ¿eld. NORMATIVE PROFESSIONALISM

The concept normative professionalism plays a central role in the training of humanistic teachers at the UH. Normative professionalism refers to becoming conscious of the differences and tensions between individual, professional, organisational and societal values. Coping with these different values and reÀecting on their own behaviour are essential elements of the occupational activities of humanistic teachers.

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A normative professional is a professional who is able to be explicit about, reÀect upon and justify in an argumentative way the normative orientation of the profession, and to act accordingly (Smaling, 2005, p. 89). Recent research into humanistic practices demonstrated that normative professionalism can meet with ‘places of strain’, i.e. situations one rather wants to avoid, because they are too dif¿cult or too painful to enter. One does not know how to cope with the situation at hand and there seems to be no way out (Wierdsma & Swieringa, 2003; Van den Ende, 2007). The concept normative professionalism has some history at the UH, especially with regard to the role it plays in practices of humanistic guidance and counselling. Less is known about normative professionalism in the practices of humanistic teachers. Of course, there is a lot of debate about values in education and especially about humanistic values. But how these values function in teaching practices, has never been a topic for research; neither is known what dif¿culties these teachers encounter when confronted with colliding values. So it is time to learn more about humanistic teachers, i.e. about their practices, because ‘people practice their principles, and in practicing and confronting limitations people often discover what those principles are’ (Bullough, 1997, p. 13). A former investigation into the practices of humanistic workers in other ¿elds showed that valuing is not a purely rational process, but that emotions are involved (Van den Ende, 2007, p. 16). However, it is still not self-evident for research on teacher practices to include the emotional aspects of teaching (Sutton & Wheatley, 2003, p. 237). Therefore, this investigation focuses on both the rational and emotional aspects of values in the teaching profession as they arise in everyday school life. It is assumed that there is much to learn about normative professionalism by letting teachers reÀect on their daily practices and examine the emotions involved. In fact, normative professionalism has to do with lived values and norms which show up in concrete experiences. Of course, normative professionalism also implies argumentation and justi¿cation of values and norms, but we start with the stories of humanistic teachers about their experiences in practice. INVESTIGATING HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE

The explorative research presented here focuses on the experiences of humanistic teachers with normative professionalism and poses three leading questions: 1. What experiences do humanistic teachers mention and do these experiences equally take place on all levels (person, subject, organisation, society)? 2. What are the affective characteristics of their experiences? 3. What experiences refer to normative professionalism: i.e. what are the ‘places of strain’ for humanistic teachers? These questions will be answered by analysing at the group level and by presenting an individual case to give more speci¿c insight into the interaction between reÀection and emotion. An important aim of this empirical study is to get recommenda147

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tions for the teachers’ training at the UH. It will produce information about themes which concern the teachers. Moreover, it can reveal the teachers’ innermost thoughts and feelings, and the personal signi¿cance of their experiences. This way of looking at teaching and teacher education is closely connected with Korthagen’s project on the inÀuence of personal beliefs on pedagogical-didactic behaviour (Korthagen, 2004). It is also related to Schön’s ideas about the reÀective practitioner who has a lot of knowing-in-action at his disposal (Schön, 1987). Therefore, an approach was needed that detects the teachers’ daily experiences and reÀections, as well as the emotional impact of these experiences. An appropriate approach for this kind of research is the self-confrontation method of Hermans (Hermans & HermansJanssen, 1995), which is based on the valuation theory. This method is sensitive to the affective properties of experiences and has been successfully used in a variety of research projects, for example on education by humanist parents (Bakker, 2004), religious development (Gerritsen, 1984), value crisis (Hermans & Oles, 1996) and professional identity (Vloet, 2007). This explorative study concentrated on the practices of humanistic teachers in secondary schools. Six persons were randomly selected from a list of eighteen graduates who work as a teacher in ‘ethical and worldview education’. They were all quite willing to explore their own educational practices with the self-confrontation method. The teachers, four women and two men, had 3-10 years’ experience; their ages varied between 25-53 years. They were told not to bother about the de¿nition of normative professionalism, due to the risk of academically correct answers which probably had little to do with their practices. Based on earlier research, it was assumed that a more real life picture of normative professionalism could arise by letting the teachers reÀect on their experiences and relive them. And also, that it would be possible to discover ‘places of strain’ by means of the self-confrontation method. VALUATION THEORY AND SELF-CONFRONTATION METHOD

Valuation theory is a theory of the self, developed for the study of individual experiences, their ordering into a meaning system, and their development over time and place. Central to the theory is a person who is involved in meaning construction by reÀecting on and telling about daily experiences (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995; Hermans & Oles, 1996). This process of story telling leads to valuations which include everything a person ¿nds to be of importance when thinking about his or her life situation. It can include a broad range of phenomena: an exciting experience, a dif¿cult task, a sweet memory, a special friendship. By means of a systematic reÀection process in dialogue with oneself or another person valuations become organized into a system. An essential feature of the valuation theory is the assumption that each valuation has an affective modality: a speci¿c pattern of affects. At the manifest level valuations represent the more conscious elements of human experience that are speci¿c 148

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to particular individuals. Also basic motives are assumed to be latently displayed in a valuation’s affective component. These motives are universal, and continuously active within each individual. Study of the affective component can reveal which basic motive is active in a particular valuation and in the system as a whole. In valuation theory two basic motives characterize the valuation system’s affective component: the striving for self-enhancement, or S-motive (self-maintenance and self-expansion), and the longing for contact and union with others and the surrounding world, or O-motive (commitment and devotion). This distinction concerning the basic duality of human experience has been present in the writings of Bakan (agency and communion), Angyal (autonomy and homonomy) and Klages (Bindung and Lösung) (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995). A valuation also reÀects positive (pleasant) and negative (unpleasant) feelings, and the difference between these feelings is an indication of well-being. The self-confrontation method has been devised to assess a person’s valuation system with special attention to the affects underlying the valuations. The method consists of two main parts: the valuations construction and the connection of each valuation with a standard set of affect-denoting terms. During the valuation construction phase a person reÀects on his situation with the help of the investigator. The self-confrontation procedure contains a series of open questions about persons or experiences in the past, present and future as sources of signi¿cant inÀuence. For example, ‘Has there been anything of major signi¿cance in your past that still continues to exert a strong inÀuence on you?’ In addition other questions can be asked to cover the ¿eld of interest. Generally 10 to 14 questions are used. These questions are presented to the person to elicit valuations in an intensive dialogue with the investigator; they function as invitations to mention personally relevant matters or themes. The person is encouraged to put the valuations in his own words so that the formulation is in agreement with the intended meaning and covers the experience as best as possible. A valuation is typically formulated in a sentence that expresses the meaning of an experience. It is quite possible that one question leads to more than one valuation. A session usually takes about three to four hours during which 20 to 40 valuations can be produced. Depending on the aim, the questions can focus on speci¿c aspects of the persons’ life situation. In this study, the questions were tailored to the occupational part, i.e. the teaching profession. For example, ‘Has there been anything of major importance in your past that still continues to exert a strong inÀuence on your experiences as a teacher?’ An example of a valuation is ‘Mr H (former teacher) always tried to get the best out of me’. After the formulation of the valuations the person investigates the affective component by means of a standard list usually containing 20 to 24 affect terms. This list includes four types of affects: self-enhancement (S), contact and union with others (O), positive (P) and negative (N) affects. In this study a list of 20 affect terms was used, 5 terms of each type. Psychometric studies con¿rmed the reliability and validity of the SCM (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen,1995; Hermans & Oles, 1996; Van Geel, 2000). The person is asked to concentrate on a single valuation and to indicate 149

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on a scale of 0-5 to what extent he experiences each affect in connection with that particular valuation. The affect scores of each type are added so that each valuation is characterised by a speci¿c affective pattern of each valuation. E.g. S=22, O=13, P=17, N=2 for the given example. The ¿rst and second indices, S and O, express the two basic motives; the third and fourth indices, P and O, refer to positive and negative feelings which a person experiences in gratifying the basic motives. The example valuation is quite ful¿lled regarding the S-motive, and accompanied with a high feeling of well-being too. At the end the following question is presented: ‘How do you generally feel these days as a teacher?’ The person answers this question only by applying the affect terms to this question and does not need to formulate a speci¿c valuation. Based on empirical research six general types of valuation have been postulated, which reÀect the organizational structure of a valuation system (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995) Each type contains a different combination of basic motives and positive and negative affects. In the most integrated form of valuation both basic motives, self-enhancement and contact, coexist on a high level together with more positive than negative feelings (SO+). This kind of valuation often reÀects a very ful¿lling and meaningful experience, in which a person feels powerful and connected at the same time. Autonomy goes together with commitment. A valuation’s type, quite opposite to this, contains a low level of both self-enhancement and contact. Both motives are unful¿lled, which often is associated with negative feelings (SO-). Powerlessness and isolation are typical for this kind of valuation. This combination often has a paralysing effect on the person. It is also possible that the S-motive and the O-motive are exclusively present, together with high positive feelings. The form of valuation that typically represents a high degree of autonomy and success, is called S+. Valuations of the O+ type have a lot of affect pointing to contact and union with another and can refer to ful¿lled love. Aggression and anger are typical of a valuation with a high S-motive and strong negative feelings (O+). A high O-motive together with strong negative feelings is indicative for unful¿lled love (O-). All these types are global, somewhat metaphorical descriptions and can represent many different speci¿c experiences.

150

Basic motive

Type

SO+

Strength and unity

SO

Powerlessness and isolation

-

S+

Autonomy and success

S

Aggression and anger

-

O+

Unity and love

O-

Unful¿lled longing

HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE

The scoring of the affect terms permits the calculation of indices which are used for an analysis of an individual’s valuation system. It is also possible to analyse the indices on group level. Both ways of analysis have been applied in this study. Furthermore the content of the valuations in combination with the affects involved is analysed. It presents information about the themes, worries and inspirations of the teachers that may be associated with normative professionalism. RESULTS

The ¿rst question raised in this study dealt with the experiences of humanistic teachers; special attention was paid to the level on which these experiences took place. Four experiential levels were distinguished: the personal, occupational, institutional and societal level. A professional can meet tensions between different values and norms on each level. Those tensions can be intra- or interpersonal, and they also can appear between the two levels (Van den Ende, 2007, p.16). The teachers’ valuations were sorted into categories, according to the level on which they were expressed. The categorisation of the valuations could easily be derived from the original teachers’ narratives and required little interpretation. In order to answer the ¿rst question, the combined valuations of the six teachers were analysed. Together, the six teachers formulated 120 valuations, varying from 12- 25 per person, which were distributed on all levels (table 1). Table 1 Number of valuations by level

Personal

37

Occupational

35

Institutional

10

Occupational-institutional

12

Societal

13

Occupational-societal

13

As can be seen in table 1, many valuations related to personal concerns. Some examples of valuations are: – I enjoy the relationship with my pupils. I get something in return from them. – I assume that you always have a choice: this choice is not always clear and can be dif¿cult. – Whether I will continue to be a teacher, depends on the success of my husbands’ newly-started enterprise.

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Almost as many valuations referred to occupational aspects. For example: – In my lessons I have just one rule: ‘We behave properly. And we are going to discuss what this means the whole year long’. – I ¿nd my work worthwhile when I succeed in breaking through the ¿rst layer of a student and when I really can see that student. – To make students aware of the effects of their behaviour, and that this can hurt sometimes: that is how I see my job. – I have learned to appreciate differences between people; that inÀuences the way I approach my pupils Many valuations were connected to the occupational level in combination with the institutional or societal level, such as: – I am bothered by colleagues who only are looking at the marks, and who don’t look at the pupil behind them. – In my subject, I have to teach things children should learn from their parents, who don’t have time for it. – I manage fairly well to treat the ‘internet’ as a phenomenon with many sides: beautiful and ugly, good and bad. Nearly one third of the valuations bore upon personal situations which inÀuence the teacher’s professional experiences. This raises questions about the interpretation of this outcome. Is the teacher’s person that important? Would a clear distinction between private life and work be a more adequate professional attitude? What kind of personal topics are mentioned by the teachers, and what affects are involved? In the discussion section will be elaborated on the relatively large percentage of personal valuations. To answer the second question, the affective properties of all valuations were studied, because they form a lead to tensions which may refer to ‘places of strain’. All valuations were assigned to one of the six motives’ types: SO +, SO -, S+, S -, O+, O -. It appeared that a substantial number of the valuations could not be assigned to any of these types. Besides that, these valuations had certain characteristics in common. They all had a high level of the S- and the O-motive, coupled with a combination of rather strongly negative and positive feelings. To put it differently: both basic motives were intensely present and frustrated at the same time. Feelings of self-enhancement and contact were accompanied by mixed, ambivalent feelings. Due to the number of this valuation’s type, a new category was created: SO +/-. The distribution of the valuations to the motives’ types is shown in table 2.

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Table 2 Number of valuations in relation to types of basic motives

SUM

SO+/+

S+

O+

SO+/-

S-

O-

SO-/-

SUM

50

12

2

31

5

3

17

120

Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn, bearing in mind that they come from a very small sample. Table 2 shows that both basic motives (S and O) were present in two thirds of all experiences. The need for self-enhancement (S) and the need for contact (O) are entangled with each other to a great extent in the experiences of these six teachers. The teachers appear to discriminate little between these two motives. This outcome requires further reÀection in the discussion section. On the whole, half the experiences of these teachers were positive (SO+/+, S+,O+) and half were negative or ambivalent (SO-/-, S-, O-, SO+/-). One can appraise this outcome in two opposite ways: positively or negatively. But an intuitive notion is that this 50%-50% picture should become more positive. The question is whether this study offers any clues as to how this can be done. In the following paragraph, a provisional answer is sought by analysing an individual case. The next step was to differentiate the number of valuations according to levels and basic motives’ types. Due to the small sample, the levels as mentioned in table 1, were brought back to a well-known classi¿cation, i.e., micro (personal and occupational), meso (institutional and institutional-occupational) and macro (societal and societal-occupational) (table 3) Table 3 Number of valuations in relation to types of basic motives and combined levels

SO+

S+

O+

SO+/-

S-

O-

SO-

SUM

Micro

39

11

2

13

1

2

4

72

Meso

3

1

8

3

1

6

22

Macro

8

10

1

7

26

SUM

50

31

5

17

120

12

2

3

Table 3 shows that the teachers were mostly occupied with the micro level, i.e. the personal and occupational level. Most valuations on this level were emotionally positive. When the teachers mentioned experiences on the meso or macro level, their valuations most likely were emotionally very negative or strongly ambivalent. The question is whether this outcome reveals something about normative professionalism. For normative professionalism implies facing dif¿cult situations especially with regard to differences in values: the so called ‘places of strain’. A self-

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investigation with the self-confrontation method can be considered an important step in the process of normative professionalism. It is a more profound step than just reÀection, because it takes the underlying emotions into account. In order to answer the third question about experiences referring to normative professionalism, three ways of analysing an individual teacher’s valuation system are presented. Because a valuation system is a unique representation of a person’s experiences, each system has to be approached differently. However, an analysis on the individual level can give rather speci¿c clues as to where to look for themes that pertain to normative professionalism. And in the end that can lead to indications how to train teachers in coping with normative dilemmas. Firstly, the valuation system of Brenda is more closely analysed by starting to look at the SO+/- valuations. These valuations came up in this investigation as a phenomenon not yet known. The assumption is that these valuations can shed a light on humanistic teachers’ experiences which are related to normative professionalism. Secondly, a more traditional approach is described by starting with a valuation in which content and emotions do not match. Thirdly, an explicit dilemma of a teacher is taken as a starting point for further analysis. Brenda, aged 26, works as a teacher at a secondary school for three years. She formulates 21 valuations, six of which represent very low basic motives and are accompanied by rather negative feelings (table 4). In these six valuations Brenda expresses feelings of loneliness; she places herself in a observer’s position from which she looks at some of her colleagues with great irritation and indignation. She is just one step away from expressing anger or aggressive feelings, but she still keeps them for herself, which probably costs her a lot of energy. In these valuations she encounters norms or behaviours with which she strongly disagrees. Brenda also formulates ¿ve valuations with an explicit high level of both basic motives and with many positive feelings. In these valuations she feels connected with her work, the pupils, a colleague; she freely expresses her vision and ¿nds herself doing a useful job. In between these two extremes are four valuations with rather high basic motives, but with a mixed positive-negative pattern. All these valuations regard her educational vision in which she strongly beliefs, but which she has to ¿ght for at school. So Brenda’s valuation system contains a group of ¿ve quite ful¿lling valuations (SO+) in which she experiences herself successful and acknowledged. She is in contact with others and feels positively connected to something or somebody outside herself. On the opposite a group of six valuations (SO-) refer to frustrated ideals and her outsider’s position. In these valuations she shows herself to be a sharp judge condemning the people in service of the system. Both valuations’ groups represent concrete experiences with clear feelings. The four valuations of the middle group (SO+/-) also have something in common: they all refer to an antagonistic feeling that Brenda would like to have under control, but which she clearly has not. These valuations pertain to professional norms for which she ¿ghts against a rather huge, anonymous mass or to a group she cannot reach, e.g. her pupils. Three valuations refer to the importance of the subject and one to the wish of a better contact with 154

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her pupils. Her statements are really normative and under great stress, but she still wants to ¿ght for them. In comparison, the valuations with low basic motives (SO -) are emotionally much more negative and the struggle seems already to be lost. Table 4. Examples of valuations of Brenda with low, mixed and high basic motives Low basic motives: SO-

Mixed basic motives SO+/-

High basic motives SO+

2. I feel very much irritated by colleagues who are only looking at the marks and not at the pupil who is behind these marks (9 5 4 23)* k=15

4. I ¿nd my pedagogical task at school much more important than the content of my subject and of the other subjects as well (23 15 20 17) k=54

7. Because of my involvement I get much satisfaction from my work (25 18 23 0) k=100

5. In my lessons I feel obliged to accentuate the theoretical instead of the pedagogical aspects in order that my subject is taken seriously and to inform my colleagues about my marks (8 8 6 21) k=22

9. I ¿nd it very dif¿cult to make enduring contact with 450 pupils (11 11 11 17) k=23

10. In worldview education pupils learn things they should have learned from their parents (22 20 23 2) k=92

6. I sometimes wonder whether I take my work too seriously (5 5 5 17) k=23

17. At meetings I ¿nd my input just as important (may be even more important) than the teacher who says: ‘He has a 3 for mathematics’ (20 13 15 16) k=48

12. The most wonderful thing of my job is when pupils show personal things of themselves to me and to the others (25 23 25 0) k=100

11. I am getting tired to explain to others why I ¿nd my subject meaningful (9 3 5 22) k=19

21. I like to convince other people of my vision on education (19 15 13 15) k=46

13. I feel acknowledged by Frank (a colleague). He says: ‘I see your quality, I know which way you want to go and I walk with you’. (25 24 25 1) k=96

14. I really don’t understand why P (a colleague) works in a school, because she even doesn’t care about people (7 3 0 24) k=0

19. I tell my pupils: ‘This is your picture: you have to colour it yourself as you want is, but you have to colour it carefully. And there are many people who want to help you with it’ (21 19 21 1) k=95

15. I am very much hindered by the ‘I don’t care’-mentality of pupils (6 5 6 15) k=29 *) The order of these scores corresponds with the indices S(elf) O(ther) P(ositive) N(egative).

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Not only the affective pattern of single valuations contains important additional information, but the affective pattern of the valuation system as a whole can lead to a more complete picture too. In order to look more closely at the correlations between the affective patterns of the valuations some additional idiographic analysis has been performed (Hermans, 1988). The correlations between the affective pro¿les of all valuations were assessed by using the product-moment correlation coef¿cient. It appeared that there is a remarkable difference in the number of correlations of the valuations of the high and low basic motive types (SO+, SO-) and those of the mixed basic motives type (SO+/-). The valuations with a high or low basic motive pattern have a mean of 13 correlations with other valuations (positive and negative), so they have a strong generalising emotional effect. Only two of the SO+/--valuations correlate with one other (17 and 21), one valuation (4) has a unique affective pattern and one valuation (9) correlates with ¿ve others, which is still rather few compared to the other two types which are correlated with many more other valuations. In other words these four valuations are not, or scarcely integrated in the valuation system as a whole. The meaning of this will be discussed in the next paragraph. The next step is to look more closely to the correlations between valuation 9 and the ¿ve other valuations. The following observations can be made (table 5). Four out of ¿ve valuations have a SO- pattern, that is to say, they are keeping Brenda at a position in which she feels rather hopeless and without much power. Although in this situation the S-motive is slightly more present, especially in valuation 3 which even has a S--pattern. The correlation with valuation 6 is remarkable too, because that valuation regards her work as a whole. The basic motives of valuation 9 obviously are not very high and there is a tendency for both motives to get really low. Eventually this can cause this valuation to become a SO--valuation. This possible outcome can shed another light on the absence of correlations of the other valuations with mixed basic motives. It con¿rms the special position of these types of valuations that may have something to do with the dif¿cult situations which are part of the teachers’ normative professionalism.

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Table 5 B’s valuations that are correlated with valuation 9 S

O

P

N

r

9. I ¿nd it very dif¿cult to make enduring contact with 450 pupils

11

11

11

17

2. I feel very much irritated by colleagues who are only looking at the marks and not at the pupil who is behind these marks

9

5

4

23

.68

3. When I look around in a meeting on the school reports, I wonder whether I am the only one who understands it or the only one who doesn’t

13

5

7

25

.68

6. I sometimes wonder whether I take my work too seriously

5

5

5

17

.83

11. I am getting tired to explain to others why I ¿nd my subject meaningful

9

3

5

22

.66

15. I am very much hindered by the ‘I don’t care’-mentality of pupils

6

5

6

15

.61

r is the product-moment correlation between the affective patterns of valuation 9 and other valuations

The second way of looking for traces of normative professionalism in an individual valuation system is starting with a valuation of which content and affective pattern are in contrast, because this may refer to an problematic experience. The valuation comes from Gwen, age 30, who has two years’ teaching experience: I practice the dialogue during my lessons to make clear the importance of the dialogue and I take the time and pay attention to the teaching of being and staying in dialogue (21 18 17 17). This valuation is formulated quite positively, but emotionally it is more complicated. Both basic motives play an important role in this valuation: Gwen feels power, self-esteem, involvement, inspiration and joy, and also she feels irritated, powerless and unsafe. This valuation appears to be of the SO+/- type. It is a clear example of a valuation that verbally and emotionally expresses something different. It can be an indication of a more troublesome situation. It is quite possible that a person, when confronted with a contrast between her verbalisation and her feelings, changes the verbalisation of her valuation in such a way that it approximates more precisely what she intends to express. Thirdly, a valuation can directly demonstrate a dif¿cult situation in which there is a tension between different values. For example, the valuation of Sarah, age 47 and 10 years of teaching experience: It’s a dilemma right now for me how I would like to teach my subject and what pupils and the head of the school ask me to do (10-11-7-19).

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It is obvious that this is a troublesome valuation in which both the verbalization and the affective pattern give important information about themes which occupy this speci¿c teacher and which may refer to normative professionalism’ themes. Looking deeper in the valuation system of Sarah, the correlations of this valuation with other valuations give a clue (table 6) Table 6 Sarah’s valuations correlated with valuation 2 S

O

P

N

r

2. It’s a dilemma right now for me how I would like to teach my subject and what pupils and the head of the school ask me to do.

10

12

7

19

3. The school population becomes less and less focused on learning and social behaviour. More and more we get pupils who have behavioural- and learning problems; it is just like you see outside the school, in society.

8

11

7

18

.92

5. Because of the workload and the stress I often ask myself whether I still want this.

5

5

5

20

.70

10. I have to put a lot more energy in teaching my pupils social and communicative (cap)abilities/ competencies because of the general acceptance of rude behaviour in our society.

9

9

5

21

.83

r is the product-moment correlation between the affective patterns of the valuation and valuation 2

Because of the correlations between valuation 2 with valuation 3 and 10 it is possible that the verbalized experience in valuation 2 is strongly inÀuenced by larger problems in society. The correlation with valuation 5 shows that the dilemma in valuation 2 is emotionally related to her doubt whether she will continue her work as a teacher. In this valuation S experiences very little strength to tackle this question, and neither does she feels supported (SO- ). Gwen’s values on the micro, meso and macro level make the situation very problematic. Her feelings are the most direct guide to discover this entanglement. DISCUSSION

This study explores normative professionalism in the practices of six humanistic teachers. Normative professionalism has previously been studied in varied humanistic practices, but not yet in the educational ¿eld. Neither have these studies been conducted with an instrument that takes into account the latent, affective level that

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lies behind the manifest level of self-narratives. In this study, the self-confrontation method was used. This method enables the teachers to explore the signi¿cance of their experiences by expressing their feelings associated with these various experiences. In this way, the teachers provided the researcher with a deeper insight into their professional narratives, and into the underlying relationships between their valuations and the inÀuence of the basic motives. The outcomes can be used for analysis on both an individual and a group level, as has accomplished in this study. It turned out that the six humanistic teachers have rather many personal valuations which inÀuence their work as a teacher. When these teachers reÀect on their work they reÀect on themselves; they do not differentiate sharply between their professional and personal life. A teacher teaches who she is, and work is an integrated part of her life and meaning system. Or, as Korthagen, citing Hamachek, put it: ‘Consciously, we teach what we know; unconsciously we teach who we are’ This outcome is important for teacher education, because the personal valuation system should be considered in close connection to the demanded competencies (Korthagen, 2004, p. 77) This study also showed that the teachers feel very much connected to their work, in spite of rather a large amount of negative and ambivalent experiences. According to Hansen, successful teachers conceive their work not only in purely functional terms, but they have an inner motivation for the job (Hansen 1995, p.151). This enables them to withstand the dif¿culties of everyday school life. The outcomes of this study stress the importance of the professional’s personal meanings as a substantial part of normative professionalism. These meanings refer to the teachers’ views of life, choices and dilemma’s in which values are involved like parenthood, aging, partnership and the future. These views can support as well as undermine the professional in his or her work. In fact, in this study, most personal valuations were supportive. The entangling of the S- and O-motive is more complicated to evaluate. Two thirds of the teachers’ valuations are founded on both motives. This phenomenon involves a certain risk, because it can signify a lack of differentiation in the valuation system and makes the system less Àexible in accommodating to various events. When the two motives are indiscriminately active, in extreme situations, this can lead to unrealistic aspirations and overinvolvement, and in the end to limitlessness. The underlying drive is to achieve the highest possible level of both self-enhancement and union with the other (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 182). The same phenomenon appeared in another study about the motivation of nurses who worked with elderly people (Weidema, 2007). It is possible that people who work with people have a high risk of becoming limitless, due to their involvement and their idealism. Humanistic teachers, as other normative professionals, certainly belong tot this group and they should know about the risks involved. The isolated position of valuations poses another risk, as is the case with the mixed motive-valuations of Brenda. These valuations show a high need for selfenhancement and for contact, together with a mixture of positive and negative feel159

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ings. In Brenda’s valuation system, these valuations are scarcely correlated with other valuations, which is in contrast with the other valuations in her system. According to Hermans (1995, p.157), fragmentation could be the case. The reason for this can be that a person wants to protect these valuations against becoming really emotionally negative. Brenda’s valuation system certainly shows a tendency in that direction. But at the same time, Hermans (1995, p.161) warns against this kind of interpretation: it is just an observation which can be brought to the attention of a person when he or she feels ready for it. However, as an outcome of this study it offers a more speci¿c lead to tracing normative professionalism in a person’s narrative. For these kind of valuations very much look like the ‘places of strain’, which a person would rather avoid and wants to approach at the same time. An essential part of the self-confrontation method is to elicit the emotions underlying a verbalised experience. Emotions often give new or even contrasting information, for example in Gwen’s valuation. A new light can be shed on a verbalised experience when the person is confronted with her own emotions that are in contrast with the content of a valuation. It can deepen her insight or bring her closer to a place of strain. It is even possible that she will change her valuation. So reÀection in normative professionalism should extend itself explicitly to the affective aspects of the experience. According to Sutton and Wheatley (2003, p. 335), researchers must also include measures that extend beyond self-report in order to gain a more complete picture of teachers’ emotions. Paraphrasing Westheimer (2005, p. 36), researchers might do better to examine the underlying emotions conveyed by the content of reÀections. In that way it is possible to discover underlying beliefs and tensions. And that will lead to the places of strain which normative professionalism is about. REFERENCES Bakker, D. (2004). Zelfconfrontatie in humanistisch levensbeschouwelijke opvoeding (Selfconfrontation in humanistic ethical education). Praktische Theologie 31(1), 58-76. Bergem, T. (2003). The quest for teacher professionalism: the importance of commitment. In W. Veugelers & F.K. Oser (Eds.) Teaching in moral and democratic education (85-105). Bern: Peter Lang. Bullough, R.V., Jr. (1997). Practicing theory and theorizing practice in teacher education. In J. Loughran & T. Russell (Eds.). Teaching about teaching: purpose, passion and pedagogy in teacher education (13-31). London: Palmer Press. Ende, T. van den (2007). Waarden aan het werk (Values at work). Utrecht: University for Humanistics. Geel, A. L. M. van (2000). Agency and communion: A psychometric study of the self-confrontation method. Nijmegen: Nijmegen University Press. Gerritsen, A. (1984). Religieuze ontwikkeling (Religious development). Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger. Hansen, D.T. (1995). The call to teach. New York: Teacher College Press. Hermans, H.J.M. (1988). On the meaning of idiographic and nomothetic research method in the study of personal meaning. Journal of Personality 56, 785-812. Hermans, H.J.M., & Hermans-Jansen, E. (1995). Self-narratives: The construction of meaning in psychotherapy. New York: Guilford Press.

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HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE Hermans, H.J.M., & Oles, P.K. (1996). Value crisis: Affective organization of personal meanings. Journal of Research in Personality 30, 457-482. Korthagen, F.A.J. (2004). In search of the essence of a good teacher: towards a more holistic approach in teacher education. Teaching and Teacher Education 20, 77-97. Schön, D.A. (1987). Educating the reÀective practitioner. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. Smaling, A. (2005). Aspecten van normatieve professionaliteit in beroepssituaties. (Aspects of normative professionality). Tijdschrift voor Humanistiek, 22(6), 83-89. Sutton, R.E., & Wheatley, K.F. (2003). Teachers’ emotions and teaching: A review of the literature and directions for future research. Educational Psychology Review 15(4), 327-358. Veugelers, W. (2010). Moral values in teacher education. International Encyclopedia of Education. Vol. 7. (650-655). Oxford: Elsevier. Vloet, K. (2007). Building professional identities on the platform: stories in dialogue. In J. van Swet, P. Ponte, & B. Smit (Eds.) Postgraduate programmes as platform: a research-led approach (69-82). Rotterdam: SensePublishers. Weidema, F. (2007). Mijn handen aan dit bed (My hands at bedsite). Utrecht: University for Humanistics. Westheimer, J. (2005). Dogmatic dogma: there is no one-size-¿ts-all approach to schooling for democracy. Our Schools/ Our Selves, 15(1), 25-40. Wierdsma, A.F.M., & Swieringa, J. (2003). Lerend organiseren (Organisational learning). Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.

Dieuwertje Bakker Department of Education University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht

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FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE IN TEACHER COMMUNITIES

By the 1990s, a renewed interest in the ways in which values could be re-integrated in the educational process appeared again in the academic and research world. This interest is presently revamped given the social innovations and changes, the weakening of cohesive traditional value systems, the expansion of the cultural continuum to which individuals are exposed today, and the plethora of choices available in the context of a globalized society (Veugelers & Vedder, 2003). This study starts from ¿ ndings concerning values in education and, in particular, inconsistencies between the values promoted in classroom settings and the appropriate value communication processes (Veugelers, 2000; Frydaki, 2009). Afterwards, it lays out a framework for the development and transformation of teacher knowledge informed by theorists of teacher learning communities, and also dialogical theorists adopting the post-positivistic view of knowledge as dialogical interpretation (Gadamer, 1976, 1979, 2001; Foucault, 1979, 1980; Habermas, 1984, 1987). The life story of a Greek teacher is also included providing an example of how teacher knowledge, as it is potentially developed and/ or transformed through interpretive dialogue in teacher communities, can permeate teaching and value communication processes in a meaningful and deliberative way. The meanings that education attributes to the concept of values have undoubtedly changed. Academic discourse and curricular tendencies seem to have shifted from the value of integration into the environment to the value of the autonomy of the individual, from the adherence to the past to critical thinking, from the discipline to social rules to individual responsibility, respect of difference, tolerance and cooperation (CIDREE, 1994; Frydaki, 2009). In other words, a new, to some extent post-modern aspect of humanity seems to emerge. While educational policies reconsider their orientations regarding values in education, the sciences of education also attempt various approaches to the same issue. However some relevant movements (Value Education, Moral Development and Critical Pedagogy) do not represent integrating approaches to the ¿eld. They seem to lack either openness (Value Education) or reÀective dialogical processes about the existing societal values, possibly internalised by the students (Moral Development and in a sense Critical Pedagogy) (Frydaki, 2009, pp. 115-116). On the other hand, both of them (openness and reÀective dialogue) are needed for the developWiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 163–179. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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ment of students’ values to be closely interwoven with the appropriate value communication processes (Veugelers, 2000; Frydaki, 2009). In parallel, research, as revealed in most studies, shows common issues, focusing on inconsistencies between the very values communicated in classroom settings and the appropriate value communication processes: most teachers do infuse values in classrooms through a variety of ways. Some of them defend eternal humanistic values, others are more inÀuenced either by the dominant values in the subject matter’s tradition or by their personal sociopolitical value-commitments. Particularly, research shows an important shift from academic goals to social and community goals, including social responsibility, cooperation, responding to the needs of others, respect, and participation (Ennis, Ross & Chen, 1992; Ennis, 1994; Husu & Tirri, 2007; Frydaki & Mamoura, 2008). On the other hand, this shift scarcely includes a new perspective concerning value communication processes. Most teachers seem to avoid involving themselves actively in the process of value communication by bringing into question some values to be taught. Therefore the danger is, in particular in practice, that values are seen once more ‘as something to be transmitted rather than as something to be communicated with students actively and dialogically involved in meaning making by taking into account their personal experience, commitments, worldviews and understanding of themselves’ (Frydaki & Mamoura, 2008, p. 118). It is often pointed out that teachers lack the skills required to critically reÀect on their values, integrating them more consciously in their sociopolitical or sociocultural practices, so that their students become co-players in the pedagogical game of signi¿cation (Veugelers, 2000). This occurs speci¿cally in Greece, where the teaching of values ‘is fragmentary and it more or less depends on the sensitivity of the educator …’ (CIDREE, 1994, p. 118). A reason for this is that the whole issue of values in education was strongly determined for many decades by the turbulent history of the Greek nation state, the need for creating or recreating its national identity, the spiritual and moral values of Christianity, as expressed by the Greek Orthodox Church, and the overemphasis on nation-centred values (Flouris, 1997). All values, which could be neither negotiated nor challenged. Nowadays, many scholars call for the ideal of an informed, active, socially responsible, open-minded and probably universal civil citizen (Flouris, 1997; Koutselini, 1997). This kind of citizen is also promoted by the European educational policy. Nevertheless, several Greek teachers are still handling value-laden issues in a hesitant manner remaining devoted to the ‘of¿cial’ curricular directions (Frydaki & Mamoura, 2008), contrary to their colleagues from the Netherlands, who handle such issues by a greater variety of strategies (Veugelers, 2000). In sum, despite the fact that the paramount values that teaching upholds seem to alter, the value communication processes seem to oscillate between moderate forms of inculcation and a value neutrality stance. Given all the pre-mentioned regarding the challenging issue of value communication processes, our focus shifts to the ways in which teachers could shape more meaningfully their own commitments, beliefs and values, and communicate them with their students. 164

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If, as there seems, the problem lays on value communication processes, a starting point for us is the assumption that knowledge, meaning, value-commitments as well as humanity itself are mediated by the interactive relationships de¿ning social life. According to Vygotsky (1978), all the previous are constructed and transformed through collaborative activities and meaningful interactions. From a different starting point, Noddings’ care theory has provided valuable insights into the construction of values such as liberty, rights and participatory democracy through dialogical collaborative activities (Nodding, 2010). Teaching processes belong to social situations in which people act with the others, towards the others and in relation to the others. Just as any social situation, schooling too is more oriented towards the others rather than towards the things. Without the reinforcing response of the other, the things, whether they represent knowledge or values, remain unactuated. Values and humanity, just as knowledge itself, are to be developed through an active interaction of students and teachers in meaning making. But teachers seldom have an awareness of what they do in the value communication processes, since they are de¿cient in realising and critically reÀecting on how they shape their own commitments, beliefs, and values (Frydaki, 2009). Thus, the teachers’ own value development needs to be part of their entire professional learning and development. TEACHERS’ LEARNING COMMUNITIES

Numerous authors (Lave & Wenger, 1991) equate teachers’ learning with the concept of ‘communities of practice’ which draw upon the Schönian notion ‘knowing in practice’; that is a dynamic process resulting from the collaborative actions of teachers and learners together in classroom settings. But, how could teachers support the collaborative learning endeavour and value development in the classroom settings without being themselves part of a learning community? A community, as Bellah et al. (1985, p. 333) de¿ned it, is ‘a group of people who are socially interdependent, who participate together in discussion and decision making, and who share certain practices that both de¿ne the community and are nurtured by it’. Senge (1990) perceived the learning community as a site where people expand their capacities to work in new and creative ways through working together. According to other scholars, for example Fenstermacher (1994) and Shulman (1987), the premise for teachers’ capacities to be expanded in learning communities is the development and transformation of their knowledge as a whole. Teacher knowledge refers to the totality of his or her personal practical knowledge including beliefs, values, attitudes, emotions, and resulting from formal and informal educational experience. As the participation in a learning community represents primarily a new kind of educational experience, teachers are expected to develop here their whole knowledge ¿rst and then they would develop the related behavioural capacities. In this line of arguing, the participation in a learning community has been considered as critical for a teacher to develop into an accomplished teacher. Shulman 165

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& Shulman (2004, p. 259) state: ‘An accomplished teacher is a member of a professional community who is ready, willing, and able to teach and to learn from his or her teaching experiences’. An additional criterion for a group of teachers to be acknowledgeable as a learning community is the well-being of their students. According to this criterion, ‘not all gatherings of teachers, even those in which teachers offer each other fellowship and support constitute professional community’ (Grossman, Wineburg, & Woolworth, 2001, p. 7). The well-being of students is identi¿ed not only with the enhancement of their learning but with their entire growth, enlightenment, emancipation and empowerment (Ayers, 2004). The above arguments and criteria reveal the potential humanizing dimensions of a learning community. ReÀecting on teacher own experiences, demonstrating to each other as well as to their students that their humanity is honoured, fostering humanity and freedom are expected to be main concerns in such a community. Therefore, it has become almost a commonplace in most research that teachers learn through working with others within the workplace by sharing experiences, information, questions, responses and demands (Eraut, 2002; Shulman & Shulman, 2004; Kelly, 2006; Wilson & Demetriou, 2007). Research on teachers’ learning communities usually explores features of professional development programs such as the key components of community formation as well as the collaborative interactions that occur when teachers work to examine and improve the quality of their teaching (Grossman, Wineburg & Woolworth, 2001; Borko, 2004). What lacks is how this sharing could be more meaningful in order to further enhance or transform teachers’ knowledge, to lead them to the accomplishment, and to ensure the well-being of their students. Under this perspective, the present study aims at demonstrating that viewing the teacher learning communities as teacher ‘interpretive’ communities could highlight the humanizing and transformative potential of these communities. Key-concepts for the notion of teachers’ ‘interpretive’ communities to be revealed are the post-positivistic view of knowledge as dialogical interpretation as well as the concept of dialogue as a way of transforming the existing interpretations and creating shared meanings. The underlying assumption is that teacher knowledge, as it is developed through interpretive dialogue in teacher communities, reÀects in classrooms and transforms the way teachers involve themselves in value communication processes. Regarding the pre-mentioned, I ¿rstly attempt a conceptual approach and afterwards I present capsule accounts of a Greek secondary teacher life story related to the nature, sources and development of her personal and professional knowledge. KNOWLEDGE AS DIALOGICAL INTERPRETATION

Differences in conceptions of knowledge reÀect disputes within disciplines and more general philosophical discourse about the nature of knowledge and how truth is established. In the late modern age the world changed, from one we could encompass with our minds, to one that holds us confused, with a need to tolerate ambigu166

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ity, to know that knowledge never ceases to grow, to change or to seem different as the case may be. Hence, it has become almost a commonplace in post-positivistic thinking that knowledge is a construction, even a convenient ¿ction, a view that has also had some popularity in literature, history, and the arts. Such conceptions of knowledge have been enriched through the post-modern conception of knowledge as interpretation. Although the foundations of postmodernity are various, they seem to share some common premises. According to Foucault (1979, 1980), knowledge is built through the everyday practices of speech coming from different groups of voices and opinions, which are not usually characterized by continuity and coherence. Lyotard (1987), introducing the notion of linguistic games, also emphasizes the multiplicity of voices, reasons, interpretations and ways of life. The commonplace is that knowledge is not an inherent quality of things and it cannot be achieved in an objective way. It is, rather, attributing the meanings to the objects by multiple interpretations. Literary texts, historical narratives, social theories, of¿cial texts, such as the curriculum, our lives as teachers and the whole of human experience are not given in a direct way but must be understood by the agency of language; moreover, they do not comprise inert and objective data providing the opportunity of ¿xed knowledge, but rather they represent semantic constructions which consist in the meanings attributed to them. What engenders knowledge is the ability to communicate with the implied meanings, by exchanging views with partners in the same game, that is, by participating in meaning making processes by which the meanings are constantly transformed (Gadamer, 1976; Savater, 2004). In other words, the linguistic dimension of understanding increased by the multiplicity of voices, reasons and perspectives suggests that there is no knowledge without regard to its interpretation which is integral to all that we do and face. Teachers’ knowledge couldn’t be the exception to such a shifting perspective regarding the meaning of knowledge. DIALOGUE – INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE

Dialogue seems to be a premise for teachers’ participation in meaning making interpretive processes to produce meaningful and transformative knowledge. Dialogue occurs when people appreciate that they are involved in a mutual quest for understanding and insight. A question is why dialogue can produce meaningful and transformative knowledge, and, in particular, what sort of dialogue can produce this kind of knowledge. Drawing upon ancient Greek philosophy (Plato’s, Republic), argumentative dialogue presumes that all participants are equally open to persuasion. Moreover, this means that each participant accepts a commitment to yield to the better argument, which is reÀected in the habitual expression ‘I am compelled to admit’. In this sense, dialogue seems to be directed by an internal submission to reason. Participants are required not to defend in any way their positions, as it could occur in a debate, but to supply reasons and evidence in support of their positions (Grant, 167

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1996). Dialogue seems to have a real humanizing impact on participants, who can develop their self-discipline, personal autonomy, responsibility, and ‘being reasonable’. Concerning this sense of dialogue and mainly its transformative potential, two issues could be challenged: Firstly, the participants are considered as already accomplished individuals taking part equally in power- and coercion-free communicative processes. Dialogue is considered as ‘conversation between equals’ (Bohm, 1997) and not as a process incorporating the potential of knowledge transformation. In a second deeper level, the promoted qualities and values such as self-discipline, personal autonomy, responsibility, even the commitment to reasonableness have a bit narrow individualistic connotations. They seem to reÀect more the priority to an instrumental-cognitive rationality rather than to the development and transformation of meanings via participation in meaning making processes. Habermas is the social theorist who suggested the shift from the instrumentalcognitive rationality into communicative rationality, which is established by the individuals who can speak and act when they understand themselves with reference to something. In this process of understanding, the individuals, when they act communicatively, make use of interpretations that are culturally transmitted and make reference to something in the objective world, in the social world they share, and each one can simultaneously make reference to something in its own subjective world (Habermas, 1987). The claims each and every statement has to make as to its own validity hold some possibility of dialogue and hence of further understanding. For the intersubjective nature of the possible understanding to be enacted, there is a need for ‘ideal speech situations’, a concept based on the theoretical stance that each one is able to participate equally in power- and coercion-free communicative processes. This competence is de¿ned by the fundamental principles of the communicative ethics and the rational discourse as well (Habermas, 1984, 1987). The ‘ideal speech situations’ foster both understanding and a humane collective life. Seen in the Habermasian critical context, dialogue generates a transformative and emancipatory knowledge rather than consensus, as the participants in communicative dialogical interactions, upholding reason over power, bring to the dialogue their preconceived and unreÀected ideas so that they reach their transformation (Habermas, 1984). Dialogue can be seen in a third way; in the framework of contextual hermeneutics developed by Gadamer (1976, 1979). Gadamer attempted to interpret in a historical manner the fore-structures of understanding which forms our openness to the world, de¿ning them as prejudices. Prejudices are transmitted by a speci¿c tradition and are considered as valuable starting-points in any attempt to understand. If we share the prejudices of our tradition, then hermeneutics clari¿es the context into which any act of understanding occurs. Understanding prejudices is a process similar to understanding a person in a conversation. We open ourselves, not only to receive the message of the other, but in a dialogical sense, to transform our consciousness after the contact with him or her. Gadamer introduces the interpretation as open-ended inquiry, and also the dialogical sense of hermeneutics. The 168

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‘dialogical’ character of Gadamer’s approach is evident, not merely in the central theoretical role he gives to the concept of dialogue in his thinking, but also in the discursive and dialogical, even ‘conversational’, character of his writing, as well as in his own personal commitment to intellectual engagement and exchange (Gadamer, 1976, 1979, 2001, 2003). Seen in the framework of Gadamer’s interpretive project, hermeneutical dialogue changes power relation, undermines self-certainty and reveals the possibilities for the participants to recognize the ambiguity and complexity of the matter under discussion taking into account their own prejudices, the prejudices of the others and the very fact of the different points of view (be it cultural, religious, or value-related). Recognizing that the important questions do not have easy answers, the participants can develop a genuine tolerance of the different and be oriented towards a mutual search for understanding rather than for defending particular views. Hence, they really participate in meaning making processes, transform existing meanings creating shared ones, and therefore they transform to some extent their own consciousness. However Habermas has criticized Gadamer’s interpretive project for concealing the dimension of ideology, and the inÀuence that powerful groups and forces within a tradition (textual, authorial, religious, cultural) have over the development of social justice and transformations anticipated in the conversations. Given the previous, the development and transformation of teacher knowledge in learning communities may be seen as the construction of a sense-making knowledge originating from their participation in dialogical interpretive processes in the sense of ‘ideal speech situations’ rather than a declarative technical knowledge even if the latter results from collaborative interactions. Collaborative interactions even including dialogues conducted with partners who do not explore beyond their horizons, as they remain within existing value frameworks and traditions, may be merely con¿ned to transactions of information (Habermas, 1984). On the other hand, the ‘ideal speech situations’ seem to be more produced in the Gadamerian framework: that is, on the understanding that the paths of communication remain open, all the persons involved, the languages of whom are partly convergent and partly divergent, remain open to the reconsideration of their beliefs and to the creation of new meanings. These new meanings derive from the shifts produced by the impacts of the communicative action itself on the language and the arguments of both parts. All interpretive attempts are subjected to inter-subjective control. The case I will present in the following chapter is used as an example of how teacher knowledge can be developed dialogically in teacher communities. In Anna’s story we distinguish her view of what an interpretive community is and how it leads to the development and transformation of teacher knowledge. We also distinguish her view of how this transformed teacher knowledge, along with the implicit value-development, can permeate teaching and value communication processes in a meaningful and deliberative way.

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THE NARRATIVE

Narrative discourse has been selected in order to illuminate the potential of teacher knowledge transformation via teachers’ interpretive communities. The numerous expressions used throughout literature –autobiography, biography, narrative, life story– embody a common spirit, as they are all referring to an account of a person’s life. ȉhe narrative mode transforms human experience into a coherent temporal pattern wherein ‘the answers are in the stories, indeed, the answers are the stories’ (Connely & Clandinin, 1995, p. 79). Thus, stories represent an interpreted knowledge, which, at the same time, needs further interpretation. The commitment to narrative gives priority to interpretive understanding and contextual learning, being a tool through which each autobiographer can understand oneself more fully, and each researcher can both facilitate the emergence of the former knowledge and obtain an interpretive knowledge of another person. In other words, the autobiographer and the researcher attempt a dialogical interpretation of the former experience. The autobiographer initiates and controls the interpretive activity with the researcher as a facilitator (Polkinghorne, 1988; Butt & Raymond, 1989; Conle, 2000). In this sense, narrative is itself consistent with the interpretive view of knowledge according to which knowledge is not obtained in an objective way, but is rather produced via participation in dialogical meaning making processes. I will present Anna’s oral story to provide the data that are then analysed to produce main themes. As regards what counts as ‘story’, I follow the biographicalinterpretive tradition, built on the theoretical principle that there is a whole that is more than the sum of its parts, informing each person’s life (Wengraf, 2001). For this meaning frame, known as ‘gestalt’, to be elicited, four principles suggested by Hollway & Jefferson (2000) have been adapted here: 1. Use open-ended questions: ‘Tell me about your stories of doing ¿eldwork’. 2. Elicit stories: ‘Relate examples of learning in ¿eldwork that are particularly memorable’. 3. Avoid ‘why’ questions, as they tend to promote intellectualization and can be threatening. 4. Follow up using respondent’s ordering and phrasing ‘You said working in a different environment was very complicated, can you tell some more about that? Three interviews were conducted in spring 2009 by the author of this article, who also conducted the initial analysis of the interviews transcripts and identi¿ed themes. Beginning in April 2009, all three meetings were audio recorded. The sections of audiotapes that were in line with the research orientation were transcribed. These transcripts allowed the author to step back from complete participation (Merriam, 1988) and make analytical observations. I searched for generating categories based on the emerging patterns, issues, concepts and themes/subthemes, deriving from the data, thinking of the initial conceptual framework of the study and the ‘gestalt’ as well (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Wengraf, 2001). I generated a list of

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patterns and themes that repeatedly appeared in the transcripts, which became the categories for analysis. The data were arranged according to each category. ‘This is the process of systematically classifying data into some sort of schema consisting of categories, themes, or types. The categories describe the data, but to some extent, they also interpret the data’ (Merriam, 1988, p.140). Simultaneously, Anna and I have comprised an interpretive community of her own story, as I was always asking her to tell and de¿ne her story in a way that would convey the meaning that she, as participant, would wish to be heard. From these conversations it became obvious that the process of reconceptualizing her ideas was a natural one, but also a process of which she was not aware until she engaged more fully in the dialogue with me. Moreover, after the interview was transcribed, Anna was given a copy, on which she was invited to write comments. Some of the themes raised were carried over from one to the next interview and through telephone conversation and e-mails, as the later were also analysed. The fact that we both (Anna and I) interpreted the data in the same way ensured a degree of reliability (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). For the reliability to be more ensured, I asked a colleague to verify the steps I went through in arriving at data analysis and interpretation (Lincoln & Cuba, 1985, pp. 108-109). He examined the data collection and analysis procedures asking exploratory questions, in order for me to reduce possible preconceptions, to present the ¿ndings impartially and to be guided to moderate conclusions. Through this systematic process, general themes were collapsed into overarching categories: – Commitment to communities of practice – Spontaneous engagement in communities of practice – Orientation to students’ well-being and empowerment – Pro¿le of interpretive dialogue (quality of listening, openness to new understandings, rethinking the existing value frameworks, respect of the others) – Humanizing effects of interpretive dialogue (generation of new shared values, transformation of teacher knowledge and value communication processes, change of power relations between the members of community and in classrooms as well). – Insuf¿ciency of other forms of collaborative processes (not including the collaborative exploration of existing value frameworks) to transform teacher knowledge and value communication processes. The data articulated on the previous categories are presented as a new story coconstructed by both the researcher and Anna. Quotations to illustrate points are also included. ANNA’S STORY

Anna is a 50 year-old secondary teacher with 25 years of experience. She is the second youngest in her family and came into world in a county town, where she lived 171

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until she ¿nished high school. She teaches language literacy in two classrooms in the Second Chance School (SCSc) in Peristeri, a middle-low socioeconomic suburb of Athens. The institution of SCSc was the Greek pilot speci¿cation of an EU program for adult education, which intended to eliminate functional illiteracy and social exclusion. During her studies in Athens University, Anna was given the chance to become involved in a powerful political student-movement. Anna’s personal, cultural and political background underpins her obsession with the emancipatory role of the teacher, mainly through her active participation in communities which offers her a kind of personal and political reinforcement. In Anna’s professional life three stages are distinguishable. She was appointed to her ¿rst teaching post in 1985 on a small Greek island. After ¿ve years, she was transferred to a high school in Athens, where she worked for ten years. Next, she asked for a new transfer to the Second Chance School (SCSc), which began to function in Peristeri, a suburb of Athens, at that precise year (2000) and was addressed to adult students which dropped out of compulsory education at school age (Hondolidou, 2003; Katsarou & Tsafos, 2008). While talking about her ¿rst years of teaching, Anna highlighted the ways in which she experienced her participation in a collaborative setting consisting of recently appointed secondary teachers on the island. Her colleagues were approximately of the same age, and the principal was barely older. This experience emerges as the main theme that is integrated into her teacher knowledge. Although the Greek school curriculum is permanently national and compulsory, including standard numbers of hours, content and textbooks dictated by the Ministry of Education, Anna describes how the group of her colleagues challenged the uniformity of curriculum guidelines; how they came together of their own free will, struggled to ¿nd a common language, and worked to develop a collective vision of a particular kind of student development. Anna says: We were only just eleven teachers, all recently appointed. Our meetings were held every afternoon at the school premises. We hardly ever left school before the nightfall. This entire endeavour was mainly focused on the curricular constraints, speci¿cally concerning the problems of weak learners as well as of the learners whose behaviour revealed an ongoing lack of engagement: We were always wondering to what extent we could go beyond the curricular constraints: how could we moderate the academic discourse permeating the school textbooks, how could we ¿t it with the learners’ code. Or, what pedagogies could capture and sustain students’ commitment to subject matters such as the Ancient Greek Language and Literature, even if the mandated curriculum was disappointing.

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Concerning these meetings, Anna underlines that the desirable orientation was more the meaningful interaction rather than consensus. The teachers involved held various but convergent political views and perceptions of what it means to be a teacher. A lot of them made a commitment to teaching toward a better world; others just searched for more helpful teaching ways. However, all these persons, instead of con¿ning themselves to an effortless interplay, seemed to make great efforts to understand and interpret the voices of others. As Anna says, partners were open to new understandings in order to create a shared world in which they may or may not agree. The key was how teachers listened to each other. This quality of listening appeared to be based on the respect, in the sense of the acceptance of the other person as they are. Most discussions revolved around questions such as ‘what does it mean for you to set this goal [mandated by the curriculum] in a history lesson?’, or ‘to what extent could an open-book literature examination support the students?’ Anna’s most illustrative words were: Every single bit of the lessons I’ve done these years has come directly from our discussions about what it means to be a teacher and what it means to think about the students’ growth and well-being. Anna considers that the quality of listening in the community and the respect of the others obviously reÀected in classrooms, as listening became a basis for the instructional conversation. Intense listening by the teachers affected the manner in which students listened to the subject matter, to the teacher, and to each other. The changed nature of dialogical conversation changed the power relations in classrooms: students initiated conversations on various topics they were curious about, they were willing to share their queries and experiences, and they became involved spontaneously in several activities transforming the every day curriculum. Teachers and students seemed to co-create a Gadamerian version of interpretive community, and also to acquire a kind of transformative knowledge, as this knowledge enabled them to do new things, to be active, to be genuine and human as well. At the second stage of her professional life, after being assigned to a high school in Athens, Anna’s narrative emphasizes on the educational climate that has changed signi¿cantly. It was in the 1990s, when performativity agendas, coupled with the continuing monitoring of the ef¿ciency with which teachers are expected to implement externally generated initiatives, have had adverse impacts upon teachers’ involvement in collaborative processes. Anna describes this kind of school as an impersonal organization into which a narrow sense of professionalism gradually emerged. Her colleagues were oriented to cover the curriculum, and maintain control. The pedagogical meetings usually revolved around predetermined issues, which were treated as matters of routine. Anna often returns to the following paradox: although the of¿cial curriculum and several textbooks appeared to become more open or student-oriented, all the same teachers appeared to use them uncritically; although pedagogical theory connected students’ knowledge with their expe173

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rience more and more, teachers appeared to connect their own knowledge with their own experience less and less. There was in particular a lack of experiences deriving from teachers’ participation in dialogical meaning making processes. Anna arrived at feeling frustrated, as she perceived her colleagues as unconcerned or at least as oriented to a context free knowledge transmission. Although she has seldom articulated as such, she was experiencing a distressing lack of meaningful interaction as well as students’ alienation. The of¿cialdom, the planning, the exams, all these instrumental assignments are weighing down on us. No more meetings, no critical discussions, no coplayers, no what it means (…) How would such a framework not alienate many of our students, speci¿cally the weak ones? The students’ alienation was interpreted by her colleagues as disrespect. The only discussions taking place revolved around how school could enforce discipline and respect. Nobody seemed to be orientated towards an alternative approach, for example bringing his/ her own prejudices or the existing value frameworks in question. Anna was disappointed with the obvious lack of sensitivity to the students’ needs, with the prevailing traditional understanding of learning environment, with the fact that her colleagues chose to wield authority rather than engage themselves in a mutual quest for understanding and insight. She began to wonder to what extent her own teacher knowledge could be improved and her own teaching activities could remain fruitful in such a framework limited on arid discussions about unimportant matters. One needs co-players for playing the game differently; she needs their opinions, their challenges, and their contribution. Anna’s experiences have allowed her to better understand what was essential for her in order to realize her teaching vision. Being aware that she had nothing good to expect, she opted to be assigned to a new post: the Second Chance School (SCSc) in Peristeri. The innovative character of SCSc network, supported by the scienti¿c advisor of each school who participated in a scienti¿c committee, consisted among other things in their collaborative orientation: teachers had to collaborate with each other, with their scienti¿c advisor and with teachers from other schools of SCSc network, in order to decide on teaching material and teaching/ learning processes (Hondolidou, 2003; Katsarou & Tsafos, 2008). The framework seemed fortunate, as teachers had to create a new curriculum, and to introduce whatever innovation they considered helpful aiming constantly at the learners’ empowerment. Their involvement in power-free communicative processes was ensured by the principles of the program itself. However, Anna has seldom experienced the communicative processes as interpretive or transformative. Teachers were almost forced to adopt unusual roles without being adequately informed and prepared. Hence, there was more 174

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a super¿cial exchange of information regarding the possible means of applying an innovation rather than a genuine exploration of how each one understood the issue. Moreover, the inÀuence powerful teachers had over the others did not facilitate the teachers’ team to reach a mature level of community interaction. We highly discussed for suggesting innovations but often we were quick to judge others rather than hear them out (…) I mean that each one had in mind more what they had to do rather than how they could share the way they had seen the point (…) Sometimes our discussions looked as if they were debates directly engaging the vanity of the participants. Anna began to wonder whether it was enough to share views with others without exploring and discussing the reasoning behind the views and choices; without exploring and discussing who each one is. However, some teachers did involve themselves in the communicative processes exploring and questioning their own experiences, views and commitments through open, supportive and reÀective interactions. In these cases, the communicative processes seemed to become meaningful, reÀecting somewhat the Habermasian notion of ‘communicative ethics’. This rather vague picture of teachers’ collaborative work seemed to have an equally vague impact on classrooms: some learners had been activated well enough, engaging authentically with their tasks; others remained passive, while others abandoned school. Hence, Anna attained to develop an ‘interpretive version’ of teachers’ learning communities arguing that teachers’ discussions constitute real meaning making processes, when the participants make space for the voices of others to be heard; when they bring their own value frameworks in question; when they de-stabilize prior ideas about what is normal; when they respect the others. This kind of discussions permeate obviously classroom settings and affect value communication processes in a meaningful way, as it has already appeared since Anna’s ¿rst years of teaching. Anna still works in this school. She has been trying for many years to establish and develop her interpretive communicative culture. She attained to a certain extent her goals into the teacher community and to a further extent into her classrooms. The last four years none of her students abandoned school. Even if they do not always reach the best academic achievements, they are willing to share their experiences, expressing and wondering about their own value-commitments, and they seem to develop their knowledge. DISCUSSION

In Anna’s story we have to look beyond the teachers’ learning communities, and focus on the entire educational context which can allow, or not, their participation in meaning making processes. It is obvious that the most supportive educational context was the ¿rst one, which granted teachers the time and space to engage spon175

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taneously with their tasks as educators, empowering them as subjects of education, and consequently as curriculum developers (MacLeod & Golby, 2003; Leander & Osborne, 2008). Additionally, the values and culture underpinning the entire endeavour were the well being of students as well as the implicit belief that the dialogue needs to be uninterrupted, and the paths of communication to remain open, including the reconsideration of their beliefs, views, unreÀected ideas, and commitments. This entire educational and value context was a reason for the ‘ideal speech situations’ to emerge. The ‘ideal speech situations’ create a space for genuine values to be produced and communicated with students. In contrast, the less supportive educational context, which reÀects the wider political and social circumstances of teacher work in Greece, was the second one. Such circumstances as well as values focused inclusively on raising students’ achievements by no means foster teachers’ participation in meaning making processes (Busher, 2005). With respect to the Second Chance School (SCSc) educational context, it had an ambiguous impact on both the teachers’ and students’ collaborative meaning making processes and their knowledge development. Although the communicative processes were almost mandated, a number of teachers did not often ful¿l the expectations of the programme. One could discern behind Anna’s words some possible weaknesses of this context: the mandated character of the collaborative processes inhibiting somewhat the teachers’ spontaneous engagement; some teachers’ ambition to be regarded as pioneers, who strangled the other voices; some teachers’ confused value system, who although they had accepted the collaborative orientation of the program, showed reluctance to meet the case. The limited ‘intellectual capital from which the school and teachers can draw in order to design, develop and evaluate an innovation’ (Katsarou & Tsafos, 2008, p. 127), may be seen as an unequal intellectual capital leading each one in differentiated ways of communicating and acting. This context reÀects somewhat the Habermasian remark that dialogues which are not interpretive may be able to produce a limited informational or declarative knowledge rather than new understandings incorporating the potential of knowledge transformation. However, Anna’s sociopolitical vision and also her commitment to dialogical processes affected several of her colleagues and students engaging them in communicative interpretive processes. Anna’s personal, cultural and political background and, mainly, her commitment to communities of practice appear to be a main source of her thoughts and actions. Subsequent professional inÀuences and experiences seem to enhance and re¿ne personal knowledge from the youth into her current form of professional knowledge. Her professional knowledge seems to be highly articulated with the collaborative interpretive exploration of her own experiences, which strengthens the position that teacher knowledge is built inter-subjectively through exchanges and negotiations within the ¿eldwork (Vygotsky, 1978). During her professional development Anna realised her teaching vision, and she became a curriculum developer constantly oriented to the well-being of her students (Clandinin & Connely, 1992). Her narrative enlightens and enriches the view of what a teachers’ interpre176

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tive community could be, and how the participation in dialogical meaning making processes could support the development of teachers’ knowledge reÀecting directly on students’ well-being. Anna’s story highlights also how teachers’ participation in dialogical meaning making processes can generate new shared values and value communication processes, as the second are closely interwoven with the way values themselves are produced or transformed. Shared values emerging via meaningful and participatory meaning making processes embody the humanity itself. The actual meaning making processes create a space for reÀection to the point that it becomes a transformative experience. This experience enables the involved persons to approach their world in a different and more meaningful way including the voices of others. In that case, value communication processes become necessarily meaningful, participatory and humanizing. Likewise, if predetermined sets of values are to be transmitted, then the value communication processes will also be predetermined and rather unfruitful. Ensuring meaningful interactions within a supportive environment of openness, Àexibility and trust seems to be a fool-proof way of transforming and humanizing ¿rstly our consciousness and after that the value communication processes themselves. REFERENCES Ayers, W. (2004). Teaching toward freedom: Moral commitment and ethical action in the Classroom. Boston: Beacon Press. Bellah, R. N., Madsen, N., Sullivan, W.M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S.M. (1985). Habits of the heart; Individualism and commitment in American life. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Bohm, D. (1997). On dialogue. London: Routledge. Borko, H. (2004). Professional development and teacher learning: Mapping the terrain. Educational Researcher, 33(8), 3-15. Busher, H. (2005). The project of the other: Developing inclusive learning communities in schools. Oxford Review of Education, 31(4), 459- 477. Butt, R., & Raymond, D. (1989). Studying the nature and development of teachers’ knowledge using collaborative autobiography. International Journal of Educational Research, 13, 403-419. Clandinin, D. J., & Connely, F. M. (1992). The teacher as curriculum maker. In P. W. Jackson (Ed.) Handbook of research on curriculum. New York: Macmillan. Connely, F. M., & Clandinin, D.J. (1995). Narrative and education. Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice, 1(1), 73-85. Conle, C. (2000). Narrative inquiry: research tool and medium for professional development. European Journal of Teacher Education, 23(1), 49-63. Consortium of Institutions for Development and Research in Education in Europe (CIDREE) (1994) Values education in Europe: A comparative overview of a Survey of 26 Countries in 1993. Slough: CIDREE & UNESCO. Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.) (2000). The handbook of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Ennis, C. D. (1994). Urban secondary teachers’ value orientations: social goals for teaching. Teaching and Teacher Education, 10(1), 109-120. Ennis, C. D., Ross, L., & Chen, A. (1992). The role of value orientations in curricular decision making: a rationale for teachers’ goals and expectations. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 63, 38-47.

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EVANGELIA FRYDAKI Eraut, M. (2002). Menus for choosy diners. Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice, 8, 371-379. Fenstermacher, G. D. (1994). The knower and the known: the nature of knowledge in research on teaching in teacher knowledge research. In L. Darling-Hammond (Ed.) Review of research in education (3-56). Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association. Flouris, G. (1997). The case of Greece: human rights in the educational legislation, school curriculum, teachers’ manuals and textbooks. In D. Evans, H. Grassler & J. Pouwels (Eds.) Human Rights and Values Education in Europe. Freibourg: Fillibach-Verlang. Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and punishment. The birth of the prison. New York: Vintage Books. Foucault, M. (1980). Power/ Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings. New York: Pantheon Press. Frydaki, E., & Mamoura, M. (2008). Exploring teachers’ value orientations in literature and history secondary classrooms. Teaching and Teacher Education, 24(6), 1487-1501. Frydaki, E. (2009). Values in teaching and teaching values: a review of theory and research, including the case of Greece, Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies, 14(1), 109-128. Gadamer, H. G., (1976). Philosophical hermeneutics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gadamer, H. G. (1979). Truth and method, London: Sheed and Ward. Gadamer, H. G. (2001). Gadamer in conversation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gadamer, H. G. (2003). A century of philosophy: a conversation with Ricardo Dottori. New York: Continuum. Grant, R. W. (1996). The ethics of talk: Classroom conversation and democratic politics, Teachers College Record, 97(3), 470-482. Grossman, P., Wineburg, S., & Woolworth, S. (2001). Toward a theory of teacher community. Teachers College Record, 103(6), 942-1012. Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action: Reason and the rationalization of society. Vol. 1. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action, lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason. Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon Press. Hollway, W., & Jefferson, T. (2000). Doing qualitative research differently. London: Sage Publication. Hondolidou, E. (2003). The multiliteracies challenge in the ¿eld of adult education: the case of the Greek Second Chance Schools. International Journal of the Humanities 1, http://ijh.cgpublisher. com/product/pub.26/prod.220. Husu, J., & Tirri, K. (2007). Developing whole school pedagogical values – a case of going through the ethos of good schooling. Teaching and Teacher Education, 23(4), 390-401. Katsarou, E., & Tsafos, V. (2008). Collaborative school innovation as a pivot for teachers’ professional development: the case of Acharnes’ Second Chance School in Greece. Teacher Development, 12(2), 125-138. Kelly, P. (2006). What is teacher learning? A sociocultural perspective. Oxford Review of Education, 32(4), 505-519. Koutselini, M. (1997). Contemporary trends and perspectives of the curricula: towards a meta-modern paradigm for curriculum, Curriculum Studies, 5(1), 87-101. Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning – legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leander, K. M. & Osborne, M. D. (2008). Complex positioning: teachers as agents of curricular and pedagogical reform. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 40(1), 23-46. LeCompte, M. D. & Preissle, J. (1993). Ethnography and qualitative design in educational research. San Diego: Academic Press CA. Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Lyotard, J. F. (1987). The postmodern condition. University of Minnesota Press. MacLeod, F., & Golby, M. (2003). Theories of learning and pedagogy: issues for teacher development. Teacher Development, 7, 345-361.

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FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE Merriam, S. (1988). Case study research in education: A qualitative approach. San Francisco: JosseyBass. Noddings, N. (2010). Moral education in an age of globalisation. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 42(4), 390-396. Polkinghorne, D. E. (1988). Narrative knowing and the human sciences. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. Savater, F. (2004). El valor de educar. Barcelona: Ariel. Senge, P. (1990). The ¿ fth discipline. New York: Doubleday. Shulman, L. S. (1987). Knowledge and teaching: foundations of a new reform. Harvard Educational Review, 57, 1-22. Shulman, L.S., & Shulman, J. (2004). How and what teachers learn: a shifting perspective. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 36(2), 257-271. Veugelers, W. (2000). Different ways of teaching values. Educational Review, 52(1), 37-46. Veugelers, W., & Vedder, P. (2003). Values in teaching, Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice, 9(4), 377-389. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological Processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wilson, E., & Demetriou, H. (2007). New teacher learning: substantive knowledge and contextual factors. The Curriculum Journal, 18(3), 213-229. Wengraf, T. (2001). Qualitative research interviewing. Biographic narrative and semi-structured methods. London: Sage.

Evangelia Frydaki Teaching Theory and Practice University of Athens

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THE MORAL SIDE OF EDUCATION: Helping teachers to develop a moral perspective on teaching

EDUCATION AS A MORAL ENTERPRISE

Websites of schools often feature well-sounding phrases like ‘we care for the wellbeing of all pupils’ or ‘we make sure that all students can develop all their potentials’, phrases that are open to multiple and conÀicting interpretations. Teachers have dif¿culty explaining how such statements translate into actual practice, but even more striking, they often do not see such statements as having moral quality. It seems that they do not interpret their professional identity in terms of moral issues. Read a mainstream text on education and your attention will be taken towards cognitive learning and effective teaching and testing. There is not much room for the cultural and moral aspect of education and, as a consequence, for the education of teachers to become normative professionals sensitive to the moral dimensions of schooling. However, in one niche of the educational literature many authors have asserted education to be an inherently moral enterprise. Both the way the system works and the way individual educators do their work have moral implications for the personal development and sense-making of pupils and for the way human beings live together. For instance, Van Manen (1998) points out that the whole idea of schooling started out as a moral enterprise with nationalistic overtones, and that moral values are intrinsically related to the aims of education as a whole and to the selection of the content of numerous school subjects. Claxton (2001) states that the choice of subjects to be (or not to be) treated in courses is a matter that can deeply inÀuence students’ lives. Values are also implied in the organization of the school system. When students are sorted over different school types on the sole basis of their intellectual capacities, this contains the moral message that an ef¿cient organisation of learning is most important, neglecting the social effects on equal opportunities for all. The hidden curriculum, materialized in school rules such as dress codes or rules about access to teachers outside teaching hours, the possibilities for co-operative learning and for dialogue with and personal coaching by the teacher, has a moral impact in itself. According to Hansen (2001) teaching is at one and the same time and inseparably an intellectual and moral endeavour. Teachers help bring into being environments in which intellectual and moral growth can occur, but, as the literature has established, that process is pains-

Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 181–193. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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taking, unpredictable, and emergent only over time. There remains much to learn about this process as it unfolds at all levels of the educational system. (Hansen, 2001, p. 855) Such an integrated view emphasizes the fundamental complexity of the moral dimension of education. However, in the actual political debate in the western world aimed at revitalizing schooling as moral, there is an emphasis on explicit moral education in separate subjects like social skills and citizenship education and on the measurement of the moral outcomes of these. Visibility, ‘smart’ goals, and easy-tofollow practical guidelines for schools and teachers are the keywords here. The discussion focuses on the question whether moral education should itself be a school subject, and if so, what form it should take (Stengel & Tom, 2006). In other words, this discussion is about explicit moral education as a task of schools versus the moral impact of rules, choices and actions of teachers. Accommodating these varied ways of talking about the moral aspects of education presupposes a rather broad de¿nition of what is meant by ‘moral’. It is certainly broader than an intention to have students take over the values and norms of their social environment. Stengel and Tom (2006, p. 139), for instance, employ the following description: We use the moral to call forth all aspects of schooling that lend meaning to life, that enable all involved to make sense of their lives in interaction with others. The moral resides not only in the values and behaviour of individuals but also in the quality of human interaction and the institutional structures that shape the interaction. This broadened view of the moral brings at least some elements of what might otherwise be identi¿ed as the religious, the social, the political, and even the economic under the moral umbrella. We agree that it is necessary to see that ‘elements’ of many terrains have a moral character or at least have moral implications. To get to grips with these elements, it helps to differentiate between the domains that Nucci (2001) has distinguished: the personal, the conventional, and the moral as such, which is related to the well-being of others. According to this view, anything called moral necessarily has to do with interpersonal relations. Without attempting to formulate a general de¿nition of the moral ourselves, we propose to use the term in relation to education for anything that a school system, a school, or a teacher does or fails to do, that inÀuences the personal well-being, the identity construction and the future possibilities of students, not just their moral behaviour. This reÀects what we see as the aim of education: helping and inducing students to build an identity that enables them to participate as autonomous, critical and moral agents in human social activities. Only a school in which humanity is a leading principle can contribute to creating and maintaining a humane society. Our usage of ‘moral’ thus implies the daily contact between teachers and students, but also the way the academic content is related to students’ (future) lives and the way access to that content is organized in the system.

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THE NEED FOR A MORAL LANGUAGE

From the above it is clear that the relation between education and the moral domain is a subject for discussion among philosophers, politicians and at least some researchers of education. It is far less so, however, among school teachers and principals. We do not mean to say that they are uninterested in the topic, or that they do not see thinking and talking about it as being necessary. Our experience with teachers in the Netherlands, based on an interview study (Leeman et al., 2005) and on training activities we organized, is that when invited to discuss the moral nature of their work in relation to topics like the aims of education, moral or citizenship education, or school rules, teachers generally react with enthusiasm. However, they also frequently remark that this reÀection and discussion is something they do not often do in the turmoil of their daily work. They would be delighted to be given more opportunities to reÀect on such issues. Given the emphasis on accountability, however, and the way schools are organized to be ef¿cient, such opportunities are scarce (Ballet, Kelchtermans & Loughran, 2006). During our interviews we found that talking about the moral sides and implications of education turned out to be quite dif¿cult for teachers and school principals alike. Teachers tend to think in terms of a separate moral domain, an extra to the curriculum or part of the religious education related to the religious identity of the school. For them ‘content teaching’, ‘care for students’, and ‘moral education’ are separate activities. Their thinking about moral matters is fragmented and not organized by a way of speaking, a discourse, that links the different elements. In our opinion, a vocabulary organised by such a discourse ought to be part of the professional identity of every teacher (Hansen, 2001). We decided to design materials to help teachers to develop such a moral perspective on teaching. We ¿rst explain the background of the problem and then present the principles behind our materials and our experiences with the material in educating teachers. In our conclusion we reÀect on the strength of our efforts. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

We see some of the causes for this lack of discussion of moral matters among teachers as inherent to the (western) school system, and some as particular to the situation in the Netherlands. Recent measures taken in the western world to heighten the ef¿ciency of school systems such as working with larger classes, combining schools into very large organisations, and pressures to raise test scores and examination successes, have contributed to the erosion of the moral quality of schools. Students in large schools feel that teachers do not know them and that they are being treated as numbers; teachers feel unable to relate to students on a human and personal level. More importantly, however, the emphasis on ef¿ciency and effectiveness threatens to deprofessionalize teachers (Hargreaves, 2000). Pressures from outside the school tend to reduce teachers to a ‘pre-professional’ status and conduct. Teachers are ex-

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pected to deliver a pre-set curriculum. As a consequence, there seems to be no opportunity, or even no felt need, to think about moral issues, as these are related to professional decisions that teachers consider to have been taken out of their hands. Related to this, teachers talk to each other about students, but hardly about the way they teach and their possible inÀuence on the behaviour of their students. Because moral deliberation is not part of the normal life of teachers in most schools, asking colleagues for moral advice could be seen as a sign of weakness. School statements of aims and ideals are aimed at the outside world, marking the position of the school in the competition with other schools, rather than as guides for one’s own teaching. The trend towards effectiveness has wider implications. Many teachers have been educated under the dominance of a technical view of education and schooling, of which the drive towards ef¿ciency is but one manifestation. They have been taught that their task is to create opportunities for ef¿cient cognitive learning. Professional development in this view consists of looking for and implementing ‘evidence based’ methods of teaching; professional success consists of students’ high test scores. Teachers generally do not see such matters as having moral implications. This does not mean that teachers think the well-being of students irrelevant. They just do not have the means to think of it in a manner integrated with the knowledge-oriented task of the school. De¿ning professional standards in high-status, scienti¿c and technical ways as standards of knowledge and skill, can downgrade, neglect or crowd out the equally important emotional dimensions of teachers’ work in terms of being passionate about teaching, and caring for students’ learning and lives. (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 152) High cognitive achievement and care for students thus become two separate areas of teacher concern; for some, the well-being of students is no more than a precondition for cognitive performance, while for others the two are equally important elements of their professionalism. The degree to which one or the other is the case is, certainly in the Netherlands, dependent on the sector of education a teacher works in. In primary education, care is almost more important to many teachers than achievement, while in secondary education, care is seen more as a precondition for meeting the demands of the academic subject area. In both cases, achievement and care remain separated areas; in both cases therefore, teachers often feel they have to manage some kind of trade-off between academic achievement and care. The situation of education in the Netherlands adds some speci¿c elements to this general picture. The school system in the Netherlands is divided along religious lines, with 1/3 catholic, 1/3 protestant, and 1/3 nonreligious schools. According to a study by Leenders & Veugelers (2004), there are marked differences between these factions in the way they talk about the aims of education and the place and necessity of moral elements in education. These differences are especially apparent in the choice of text books, in appointments of teachers, in student admission policies, in 184

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the way a school reacts to the growing cultural and religious pluriformity of society. However, such choices rest on patterns and ways of thinking that have been formed in a long time practice of the formation of separate institutional identities and are hardly thought about critically any more. In fact, the legal principle undergirding this division in the school system, the so-called ‘freedom of education’, has effectively made discussion about such matters dif¿cult and suspect, as it is seen as a threat to this freedom. A second element that is rather speci¿c to the school system in the Netherlands is the strict differentiation of school types in secondary education. The effect of sorting students, mostly on perceived intellectual capability, at the age of 12, is that 60% of students get assigned to preparatory vocational education, and students from lower SES strata are over-represented in this selection. Although this practice is often defended with reference to a ‘natural’ difference between students who like to work with their hands and those who like to think, both the practice and this defence have clear moral implications. HOW A MORAL LANGUAGE HELPS

There is a number of reasons why teachers and principals feel a pressing need to think and talk about the moral sides of education. They are confronted on a daily basis with students who only seem to care about themselves, and the diversity in ethnic backgrounds of their students leads to a loss of the trust between teacher and students, and between students that could once be taken for granted (Leeman, 2006). Maybe the most directly important development in the Netherlands is the recent law that requires schools to offer some form of citizenship education. Of course, this law is a consequence of wider changes in society, for instance the large inÀux of immigrants that West-European countries face. As a consequence, the student population of schools is more culturally diverse than ever. Such developments make changes in the curriculum necessary. In many cases, these changes are kept at a minimum, and they manifest themselves primarily in additions to the curriculum such as a separate subject area ‘citizenship education’, lessons in debating, or obligatory community service. Although teachers often do not feel quite at ease with such minimal measures, it seems dif¿cult for them to clarify the issues involved. It is in this situation that we started our project to develop ways to help teachers improve their speaking and reasoning about the moral aspects of education. Given the problems we described, we think such improvements necessary as an effort to ‘humanize’ education. This does not only reÀect our care for the immediate wellbeing of students and teachers, but also our conviction that, in the humanist tradition, the ultimate aim of education is not to equip students with technical know-how but to help them become ‘civilized’ and autonomous human beings caring for the well-being of others and themselves as well. We adopted several basic principles. The ¿rst set is related to the development of the teachers’ professional identity: 185

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– being aware of the moral aspects of education should be part of teachers’ professional identity, – a moral language and some knowledge of moral ways to look at education are necessary elements in the development of this awareness. The second set of principles is related to the motivation to participate in the procedures: – the way teachers are incited to develop this awareness should be motivating for them. It has to make personal sense, be related to and rooted in their own practice, and induce deliberation with colleagues, – but the procedure should do more than reÀect their own ideas: it should open a new ‘horizon of possibilities’ by asking questions and showing alternatives. These principles are connected to our view of professional identity development and learning of professionals. Professional identity Our ¿rst principle is that the way teachers see the moral aspects of education is, or has to become, part of their professional identity. We think of identity, be it personal or professional, in terms of narratives that guide, but do not determine, action decisions (Holland et al., 1998; Beijaard et al., 2004; Tappan, 2006). Human beings, at least in western cultures, learn to organize their valuations and interpretations of their position in the world into more or less coherent images of themselves, or rather, given the language-based character of thinking, into stories about themselves. As Tappan (2006) points out, such stories are not couched in the language of abstract ideas, but ‘in the vernacular’. They are constructed out of reminiscences of the past, of personal experiences, of projections of the future using models that are available in the culture in which one lives (e.g. a television personality, a football player, a colleague teacher, etc.) and of interpretations of ‘ascribed’ elements of identity (what does it mean to me to be a woman, a teacher, …) and so on. These stories are constructed and reconstructed as interactions with other people and with situations demand; experiences are integrated into them; new choices are made and obtain a place. Although adolescence is the period in which young people are explicitly involved in (re)constructing their identities, it is a process that begins much earlier and goes on over the life span. This is also true of the professional identity of teachers. One of the outcomes of the review study by Beijaard et al. (2004, p. 122) was that: professional identity is an ongoing process of interpretation and re-interpretation of experiences, a notion that corresponds with the idea that teacher development never stops and can best be seen as a process of lifelong learning. Human beings, at least in our days, use such stories as an instrument, as a kind of mirror, to ask ourselves who we are or want to be and what that means for how we 186

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want to act in a given situation. The answers we ¿nd in this way can always only be a heuristic: we do not need to act in a way we see as consistent. How we really act will depend on many factors: on the strength of our convictions about ourselves, on the quality of the analysis of the situation, but also maybe on our mood or our physical well-being. This is supposing that there are multiple courses of action open to us, which is not always the case. Also, the mirror does not always give us the same image: we have many stories about ourselves, directed at different publics, and some of them inconsistent with each other. Identity stories can be said to have moral qualities (Wardekker, 2004). These may be stronger or weaker, and more or less integrated, according to the nature and the strength of the valuations that underlie them, and to the extent to which a person has tried to give conscious attention to the moral side of the identity stories. Of course, in many situations we do not really ¿rst refer to a more or less elaborated story and then use it as a mirror to make a decision. Like many other actions, in well-known situations the process will have become automated – compare it with writing or with riding a bicycle. We might talk here about ‘moral intuition’ or ‘moral expertise’ (Narvaez, 2006). Learning to become an expert requires training under the guidance of others. Also, expertise is never fully unconscious: like writing, it can be made conscious again when the automatic response does not suf¿ce: in a new situation, or when the normal course of action is challenged. Such moments call for a restructuring of our identity stories and perhaps of the underlying valuations. This restructuring can be done in several ways, one of which is by systematically referring to the abstract value concepts that we normally think of as ‘values’. Learning to do that can be the subject of a systematic course of learning – but it will only be effective if there is an underlying need to restructure one’s identity. Such a need occurs, for instance, when the situation in which a person knows how to behave undergoes major changes – which some would say is almost a de¿ning characteristic of the present world. It is certainly true of the changes in education that teachers are confronted with (Hargreaves, 2000). Therefore, it can rightly be said that professional identity learning is the core process of educational change (Geijsel & Meijers, 2005). This narrative view of identity has a double function in our efforts. On the one hand, it implies that ‘helping students to develop an identity as civilized human beings’ may be seen as one expression of the ¿nal aim of education. Such a formulation draws attention to the moral aspects of the task of the school. On the other hand, the theory applies equally well to the formation and the operation of the professional identity of teachers. This theory about the way narrative professional identities guide teachers’ actions implies that asking teachers to learn to use abstract moral concepts as developed and discussed in research and philosophy, like justice, care, or respect, will not work in itself. Abstract theoretical concepts that do not make personal sense to teachers cannot easily become part of their professional identities or of their daily practices. Such concepts may function afterwards as a formal skeleton to organize and reÀect on narrative elements, but the problem with teachers at the moment is, as we have argued, that other narratives, e.g. that of 187

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the teacher as a technician, have gained priority in their views of their own professionalism. Therefore, we suppose it is better to start with discussions based on the way teachers talk about their concrete daily practices. In this phase, we take it for granted that these discussions will represent moral matters in a fragmented way. In this way we make certain that teachers’ learning is rooted in their own practices and in the communities they work in. Teacher motivation Identity development is a learning process which can cause deep changes in one’s accustomed ways of seeing, thinking and acting. Because of that, it often entails feelings of uncertainty and fear of the unknown. If such feelings are strong, and are not suf¿ciently balanced with a motivation to change and with a feeling of underlying continuity, they will inhibit learning and lead to avoidance. The danger of that happening is greater when one is confronted with views that are very different from one’s own. Also, as follows from the above discussion on the narrative element in identity, abstract texts tend to be less motivating than discussions of one’s own concrete work situation. For these reasons, our work with teachers started with a joint activity which focuses on eliciting their opinions about their own teaching practice. This is relatively easy, new, and suf¿ciently challenging that participants will be motivated to initiate learning instead of withdrawal. At the same time, a perspective is opened for them on discussions with a further reaching character. As will become clear, in the later steps of the procedure this principle of focusing on their own teaching practice is emphasized. HELPING TEACHERS TO DEVELOP A MORAL LANGUAGE

Based on the above principles on the development of the moral aspect of the teacher identity and on the motivation of teachers to participate in procedures to enhance this, we devised a three-step procedure. To initiate thinking and discussions, we planned a training activity of at least two hours in which teachers are presented with a set of statements concerning school practice. These statements were based on our reading of the mainstream practice-oriented literature on moral issues in education and on our prior research with teachers and school leaders in primary education and in the academic and vocational tracks of secondary education on their views on and practices of moral education (Leeman et al., 2005). We chose statements that reÀect all topics in the literature and mentioned by the teachers as important, such as safety, interpersonal relations, involvement in social activities in the school (like solving conÀicts and making decisions), the moral content of education, and the relation of school with parents and others in the environment of the school. True to the principle of personal interest related to teachers own practice, we thought it wise to include in these statements such topics as were represented in 188

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the results of our interview study. Wishing to create a horizon of possibilities we thought it important to give in the statements a complete overview of the moral landscape. We also chose to formulate these statements in the language teachers use and the problems they encounter on a daily basis, so that a connection to their daily practices is guaranteed. Examples of the statements we did use are: No pupil can be quali¿ed as hopeless. Pupils see the school as a place where they belong. Pupils work together and help each other. Contacts with parents about their children. A sound pedagogical policy of the school.’ Intervision and support between the teachers. Pupils understand why they have to learn something. Pupils can solve their conÀicts together. Pupils can approach issues from different perspectives. Pupils accept the rules. We used these statements to initiate discussions among teachers and prospective teachers in our own teacher education centre, and in other schools from different sectors of education. After individually choosing the ¿ve statements they thought most relevant, teachers discussed their choices in small groups. Each group was asked to note both the choices made and the gist of the discussion. The procedure emphasizes that the arguments that are brought to bear on the choice of statements are actually more important than the choices themselves, as these create a space for discussion. Although discussing these statements turned out to be a good opening that motivated teachers and sensitized them to differences in opinion on what ‘good education’ is, in itself this procedure is not enough to help teachers develop a language in which to discuss the moral aspects of education. As a second step, we presented the participants with an ordering scheme and conceptual framework we have developed. This framework helped them to reÀect on their own choices and discussions. It organizes the statements in three ways. Each of these represents a common dilemma faced by the teachers as we discovered during the training activities. The ¿rst dilemma is the choice between, or the balance in the priority on, the development of the students, the of¿cial aims of the learning process, or the interests of the school. This dilemma is about the question where the primary responsibility of the teacher lies: with the student, with curriculum delivery, or with the interests of the school as an organization. Teachers, when thinking about moral issues, commonly situate these in care for a safe learning environment and in the quality of the interaction with students, and do not at ¿rst glance see the morality in the aims of the learning process and in the identity or market position of the school. This is connected to the dominance of the technical paradigm; but even in progressive education, there is no theoretical principle that allows teachers to make a balanced choice between care and content. 189

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The second dilemma is the priority of care, discipline, or trust in students. This dilemma is essentially about what constitutes a good learning environment. Should students feel accepted and cared for, should their behaviour be strictly regulated to create a quiet atmosphere, or should the teacher give students as much responsibility for their own learning process as possible? The third dilemma is about different aims of education expressed in forms of citizenship. Does citizenship mean assertiveness and defending your own rights, or caring for the community you belong to, or thinking in terms of a greater whole, even of world citizenship; does it mean emphasizing sameness and togetherness or embracing differences? Participants were asked to note in which category the choices of statements they have made fall, and, given their explanation of the dilemmas, to think about revising their choices, either individually or collectively. As a third step in the procedure, we presented the participants with a book chapter in which we as authors give our own views on these dilemmas and ask participants to confront these with their own choices and arguments. Special emphasis is put here on the position that academic content and care for students are not two separate areas, and that both have moral implications. The chapter elaborates the view that the aim of education is to stimulate students to develop a view of themselves as autonomous, critical and moral participants in social activities – in short, what Aloni (2007) calls humanistic education. Readers are asked to discuss our propositions in relation to their own concerns and choices made in relation to earlier parts of the procedure. This chapter is part of a book (in Dutch) in which we present the three-step procedure with a number of optional procedures for choosing statements, explaining and arguing choices, and discussing these with others. The book (Leeman, Wardekker, & Majoor 2007) may be used by schools or teacher education centres. RESULTS

We worked with teachers from different sectors and levels of education, using all three of the procedures or part of them, on numerous occasions. The following reÀects our experiences on those occasions. General attitude Teachers participating in the ¿rst part of the procedures were generally very satis¿ed. It often happened that groups of teachers used much more than the allotted time for their discussions. Teachers we spoke to afterwards told us: ‘These cards concretize a subject that is often very vague. Now I can form a more concrete image. It is a way to make a heavy subject discussable.’ And: ‘A good thing that there is an opportunity to voice my opinion and that we work together to ¿nd a shared view.’

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Care There was an overall emphasis on the caring teacher, who cares for the school results and well-being of the individual students and for the social relations between students in the classroom and in the school. The statement ‘No pupil can be quali¿ed as hopeless’ proved very popular. However, its interpretations differed so much that in the discussions, important dilemmas were raised. For instance, teachers asked how far care for students should be extended, as care for an individual pupil can conÀict with care for the whole group. ‘Sometimes a student needs to act in a certain way, if only to get rid of stress. But such acting-out can be detrimental to the group process, and I am responsible for that process as well.’ It happens too that a teacher wishes to give more care than is possible. ‘Sometimes the situation is hopeless, but at the same time I do not want to see that student as a hopeless case.’ In a number of cases, teachers emphasized a topic that was not represented as such in the set of cards: enhancing the self-con¿dence of students. This topic was especially important for teachers in special needs education and the ‘lower’ tracks of vocational education. Their students have experienced years of disappointment in regular education and need to learn anew who they are and what they are able to do. However, opinions turned out to differ fundamentally on how to do this: by accepting them, or by challenging them to use their sense of responsibility and their own thinking power. The discovery alone that behind such statements hide different opinions and courses of action was a revelation for many teachers. Curriculum and learning Three aspects of the curriculum are touched upon in the card set: safety as a condition of learning, the goals and content of the curriculum, and teaching procedures. As to safety, teachers generally did not want to rely on technical measures such as metal detectors or policing; they emphasized the importance of building good relationships with their students. As important goals, teachers often chose two aspects: learning to see and interpret the world from different points of view, and learning to ¿ nd a balance between autonomy and social responsibility. Again, the argumentation for and interpretation of these statements differed enormously. For instance, the ¿ rst statement was sometimes interpreted to mean looking from different disciplinary perspectives (geographically, economically) without any moral implications; others gave it a more culturally diverse interpretation in terms of different ideas of ‘the good life’. This interpretation, which is connected to the goal of citizenship education, did not occur often. In fact, although citizenship education as well as student diversity are seen as important subjects, these are nevertheless hardly thought about by teachers in terms of their moral implications. Virtually absent also was a reÀection on moral education in relation to the kind of citizen the school educates. Especially, for most teachers there does not seem

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to be a connection between the aim of citizenship education and the treatment of the students inside the school as a community. Teachers could mention the aim of socially responsible citizenship and critical thinking as important, but did not connect this to giving students autonomy and responsibility for social relations in the school environment, let alone for their own learning processes. The statement ‘Students participate actively in decision making in the school’ was seldom chosen. It would appear that such teaching procedures are discouraged by the current emphasis on accountability and evidence based procedures. They involve a considerable amount of risk taking on the part of the teachers, and thus require moral courage. School context The set of cards did not contain many statements about the school as a context for teachers’ work, but those that were present were often chosen. These choices reÀect a desire on the part of the teachers for a consistent approach in terms of culture and paradigms of teaching and learning, and for more contact between colleagues on such matters. In many cases, they feel that at present their work context does not offer those possibilities. There was almost no reÀection on the school as an organization with a culture that shapes the kind and quality of indirect learning in the moral ¿eld. DISCUSSION

The procedures we developed are seen to work. In groups of teachers animated, even heated discussions occurred. In these discussions, teachers often discovered that behind the same words, fundamentally different ideas and opinions can hide. Especially helpful in this respect was the second part of the procedure, the confrontation with the dilemma framework. The set of procedures we developed helps teachers to combine the objective layers of their professional life with subjective interpretation and meaning. In that sense, our work with teachers can be quali¿ed as humanistic adult education in the sense of Aloni (2007), aiming at a more meaningful professional life. At the same time, the educational ideal that is contained in the procedures is also a humanistic ideal in relation to the development of students with its focus on autonomy and social responsibility. This is an ideal that does not sit easily in an environment dominated by the urge towards curriculum deliverance and accountability. Therefore, it tends to make teachers feel insecure and requires moral courage. Such a course of action is only sustainable in a school context that encourages such a focus on teaching and learning. It requires the support and co-operation of the school leadership and a connective and co-operative culture in the school.

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REFERENCES Aloni, N. (2007). Enhancing humanity. The philosophical foundations of humanistic education. Dordrecht: Springer. Ballet, K., Kelchtermans, G., & Loughran, J. (2006). Beyond intensi¿cation towards a scholarship of practice: analysing changes in teachers’ work lives. Teachers and Teaching: theory and practice, 12 (2) 209 – 229. Beijaard, D., Meijer, P.C., & Verloop, N. (2004). Reconsidering research on teachers’ professional identity. Teaching and Teacher Education, 20, 107-128. Claxton, G. (2001). Education for the learning age: a sociocultural approach to learning to learn. In G. Wells & G. Claxton (Eds.) Learning for life in the 21st century (21-33). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers). Geijsel, F., & Meijers, F. (2005). Identity learning: the core process of educational change, Educational Studies, 31, 419-430. Hansen, D. (2001). Teaching as a moral activity. In V. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of research on teaching, 4th ed. (826-857). Washington, DC: AERA. Hargreaves, A. (2000). Four ages of professionalism and professional learning, Teachers and Teaching: History and Practice, 6, 151-182. Holland, D., Lachicotte, W. Jr., Skinner, D., & Cain, C. (1998). Identity and agency in cultural worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Leeman, Y. (2006). Teaching in ethnically diverse schools: teachers’ professionalism. European Journal of Teacher Education, 29(3) 341-356. Leeman, Y., Wardekker, W., Blenkers, H., Uittenbogaard, B., & Valstar, J. (2005). Pedagogische kwaliteit, een inventariserend onderzoek in het onderwijsveld. (Pedagogical quality, an inventory). Zwolle: CH Windesheim. Leeman, Y., Wardekker, W., & Majoor, D. (2007). Pedagogische kwaliteit op de kaart. (Pedagogical quality on the map). Baarn: HBUitgevers. Leenders, H. & Veugelers, W. (2004) Waardevormend onderwijs en burgerschap. (Value inducing education and citizenship). Pedagogiek, 24, 361-375. Narvaez, D. (2006). Integrative ethical education. In M. Killen & J.G. Smetana (Eds.) Handbook of Moral Development (703-732). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Nucci, L. (2001). Education in the moral domain. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Stengel, B.S., & Tom, A.R. (2006). Moral matters. Five ways to develop the moral life of schools. New York: Teachers College Press. Tappan, M. B. (2006). Mediated moralities: Sociocultural approaches to moral development. In M. Killen & J.G. Smetana (Eds.) Handbook of Moral Development (351-374). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Van Manen, M. (1998). Morele waarden en het vraagstuk van de pedagogische opdracht vanuit een Noord-Amerikaans perspectief (Moral values and the moral character of schools from a Northern American perspective). In N. de Bekker-Ketelaars, S. Miedema & W. Wardekker (Eds.) Vormende lerarenopleidingen (Formation and teacher education). Utrecht: SWP. Wardekker, W. (2004) Moral education and the construction of meaning. Educational Review 56(2),183–192.

Yvonne Leeman Windesheim University of Professional Studies Zwolle University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht Willem Wardekker Windesheim University of Professional Studies Zwolle VU University Amsterdam

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THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM. EDUCATIONAL DILEMMAS FOR HUMANISTS IN FLANDERS

Nothing could be more crucial to democracy than the education of its citizens. Through primary and secondary education, young citizens form, at a crucial age, habits of mind that will be with them all through their lives. They learn to ask questions or not to ask them; to take what they hear at face value or to probe more deeply; to imagine the situation of a person different from themselves or to see a new person as a mere threat to the success of their own projects; to think of themselves as members of a homogeneous group or as members of a nation, and of the world, made up of many people and groups, all of whom deserve respect and understanding. (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 387) INTRODUCTION

Although humanism is a concept with a complex history and a wide range of possible meanings, humanists commonly agree that education is of crucial importance to give shape to substantial values as self-development, autonomy, equality, critical thinking and democracy. More controversial however is the question how this values or humanist methods should be implemented in education. In countries like Belgium and the Netherlands for instance, humanist education is organized and ¿nanced under similar terms as education into a particular religion. Some humanists argue that this contradicts other values, such as the freedom of religion and belief and the principle of secularism or separation of church and state (See for example Buitenweg, 2010). Other humanists emphasize a more pragmatic position, based on historical and sociological arguments, and defend a strategy of ‘equal treatment’ of religion and nonreligious philosophies by the state. In the wake of the headscarf controversies (Coene & Longman, 2008) and other issues that are related to the increasing presence and visibility of Muslims, debates over secularism and the position of humanism in education have revived in Belgium. Under the umbrella concept of ‘active pluralism’, the established regime that governs state-church relations and the organization of religious and humanist education in public schools is increasingly questioned. For instance, according to Hendrik Pinxten (2007), former President of the Flemish Humanist Association, Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 195–207. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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the current situation in which children in of¿cial schools have a constitutionally guaranteed choice to follow one of the recognized religions or nonconfessional ethics, would merely respond to logic of ‘passive pluralism’ and ‘multiculturalism’ that enables people with different religious and philosophical convictions to live respectfully ‘next’ to each other, but not to live ‘with’ each other (p. 208). Other critics have pointed to the ¿nancial and organizational burdens as well as the spread of xenophobic sentiments in society. In an essay for the newspaper ‘De Morgen’, Loobuyck et al. (2010) stated the following: That the Constitution obliges of¿cially organized education to offer the choice between the seven recognized religions, with their own teacher and their own classroom, implies a tremendous cost and leads to severe organizational problems. The worst for society is that in of¿cial education, the segregation of different life-views is organized. As far as life views are concerned, pupils are put apart according to an outdated paradigm of compartmentalization. How this ¿ts with the ideals of dialogue, active pluralism, striving towards mutual understanding and the struggle against prejudices is a mystery to us. Soon after this publication, four MP of the Flemish Liberal Party and one MP of the Flemish Green Party introduced a decree in the Flemish Parliament in which they propose that, during the last two years of secondary school, half of the hours that are foreseen for education into one of the recognized religions or nonconfessional ethics should be spend to the teaching of the other recognized religions (Vlaams Parlement, 2010). Their proposal is motivated as follows: The principle of free choice between the different religions and nonconfessional ethics is strongly judicially anchored and should not be touched upon. However, we have to ascertain that in an ever more complex society, inspired by processes of globalization, a good reciprocal knowledge and understanding of other religions and of nonconfessional ethics contribute in an important way to the self-development and the social perspective of youngsters. De utility of a basic knowledge in the comparative sciences of religion thus offers youngsters the opportunity to situate social and religious phenomena within a contemporary societal framework. In this contribution, we wish to offer a critical reÀection on the aforementioned debate. In the ¿rst part, we provide a historical overview of the current model of church-state relations, and its impact on the educational system in Belgium. Since education is delegated to the different communities in Belgium, there are some differences between the French-speaking and the Flemish community. Although no course exists with the speci¿c label ‘humanistic’, the organization of the course ‘nonconfessional ethics’ has been handed over during the nineties in Flanders to the freethinking humanist community. This has inspired a debate about the identity of the course, which will be further discussed in the second part. For some, the course is a neutral course, in the sense that is and should be open to all nonbelievers as well as to believers of the nonrecognized religions, for others it represents and should stand for a more particular freethinking and humanist philosophy of life. The third part then examines the arguments of the aforementioned proposals that criticize the 196

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existing system in terms of the need for more ‘active pluralism’ or ‘interculturalism’ in order to face the challenges of multiculturalism. Although this concern is an essential one, the proposals that are made have many dif¿culties and pitfalls and it is highly questionable whether they are really able to realize what they aim at, i.e. a more tolerant society. SECULARISM, NEUTRALITY AND EDUCATION IN FLANDERS

As a particular belief-system, humanism in Belgium is closely connected to a secular worldview, implicating the ideal of ‘vrij onderzoek’ (free scienti¿c inquiry), as well as the secularist demand for a separation of church and state. In Flanders, humanist organizations refer to themselves as ‘vrijzinnig’.1 Freethinkers are nonbelievers – in the sense that they do not adhere to a particular religion.2 In the French speaking part of the country, the term ‘laïque’ is used and explicitly refers to the French philosophy of laïcité. To a certain extent, Belgium and France have a common history in regard to church-state relations. After the French Revolution, Belgian territory was under French rule, and the anticlerical revolutionary spirit left some legacy. During this era, clerical property was con¿scated and a strict separation of church and state was introduced by the revolutionary authorities in 1795. Under the rule of Napoleon however, the Roman Catholic Church was recognized as the dominant religion, the maintenance of the church’s edi¿ces became the state’s responsibility as well as the salaries and pensions of priest, who, from then on, would be paid by the state. After the defeat of Napoleon, Belgian territory came under Dutch Protestant rule. Although the Roman Catholic Church kept its dominant position, a salary from the state was now also granted to the servants of Protestant religion, which caused a lot of ill-feeling among the Catholic establishment (Magits, 2007). Eventually, mutual discontents with Dutch rule led to an extraordinary coalition between Catholics and Liberals that guided the way to Belgian independency. In the 1831 Constitution, religious freedom was generously stipulated as both positive and negative. The freedom of worship and religious practice and the freedom to demonstrate one’s opinion on all matters was guaranteed as well as it was assured that no one could be obliged to contribute in anyway whatsoever to the acts and ceremonies of a religion, nor to observe the days of rest. Further, it was declared that the government should not interfere in the nomination or installation of clerics. At the same, it was assured that the government would continue to ¿nance the salaries of Catholic clerics as well as the ministers of Protestant and Jewish religion. Very soon thereafter this was extended to Anglican religion (1835), and in the twentieth century, to Islam (1974), the Greek Orthodox Church (1985) and eventually to the nonconfessional community (1993). Article 181 of the present Constitution, guarantees that the payments of the salaries and pensions of the ministers of the (recognized) religions are the responsibility of the state, as well as those of the moral counsellors that are appointed by the nonconfessional community. Obviously, the 197

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extension of the state’s ¿nancing of the recognized religions to the nonconfessional community has been very controversial within the freethinking community. For some, the equal treatment of the nonconfessional community compromised the ideal of laïcité, while others defended it is as the fairest feasible solution to safeguard the rights of nonbelievers. Although French secularism remained an appealing ideal for socialist and liberal movements in the continuing struggle against the Catholic dominance of society in the 19th and 20th centuries, it could never take ground in Belgian society as in France. In contrast to France where the law of 1905 established a strict separation of church and state, the Belgian state earlier adopted a regime of what has been described by some as an ‘active neutrality’ (Torfs, 2005, p. 16) in which the compensation regime became permanently institutionalized and was extended – following a logic of equal treatment – to other ‘recognized’ religions as well as to nonreligious or nonconfessional philosophies of life. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church remains to receive the vast amount of the budget, and the distribution of bene¿ts is very nontransparent and unequal (Husson, 2005). Not surprisingly, this so-called active neutrality is criticized, particularly in regard to the sociological reality of a decreasing adherence to the Catholic Church and an increasing diversi¿cation of religious and philosophical beliefs and organizations. As a result of the larger impact of the labour and socialist movement in earlier industrialized Wallonia, and the successive electoral successes of the Parti Socialiste, the secularization of civil society became more advanced in the French-speaking part of the country. In Flanders, subsequent Catholic and Christian parties were almost continuously in power. Up to the present, and in contrast to a general tendency of secularization of society and decline of religious practice, the Christian ‘pillar’ still embraces the majority of schools, hospitals and caring institutions in Flanders. Catholic schools are still in the majority in Flanders and are wholly subsidized by the state. This was one of the compromises of the famous 1958 School Pact that aimed to pacify the ceaseless furious conÀicts between Catholics on the one hand and Liberals and Socialists on the other. The 1959 School Pact Law con¿rmed the freedom of education and the existence of different educational networks, as well as their equal ¿nancing by the government (Devuyst, 2010). It was also con¿rmed that of¿cial education (organized by a local, provincial or national authority) would be neutral, in the sense that it would imply, amongst others, the respect for the philosophical, ideological and religious beliefs of parents and pupils.3 In addition, all schools that are organized by a public authority had from then on the duty to offer to all pupils the possibility to choose between instruction in one of recognized religions or nonconfessional ethics. If compared to the core values of republican laïcité, the Belgian philosophy and tradition noticeably diverges. From its early existence, Belgium did not adhere to a strict doctrine of separation between church and state.4 The extension of a similar treatment to different religions and nonreligious philosophies of life is close to what philosophers as Carens (2000) and Bader (2007) describe as ‘justice-as-evenhand198

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edness’. The notion is contrasted to what is defended by liberal thinkers as Rawls (1971) or Barry (2001) as ‘justice as impartiality’ and its corresponding ideal of ‘liberal neutrality’. Whereas the latter demands a hands-off approach from the state to religious issues, evenhandedness allows for a more active role of the government in the support of different religions and the recognition of their corresponding organizations and communities. Differences between France and Belgium are most noticeable in the ¿eld of public education. Given the importance of education to the republican project, the doctrine of laïcité has found its fullest application in state schools. As explained by Cécile Laborde (2005), the neutrality of schools in France implied the full avoidance of any reference to religion in the content of education, as well as the removal of any religious symbols from classrooms. Instead, children were to be taught about the basic principles of universal morality and the principles and their duties to the French Republic. Likewise, teachers were instructed to refrain from any offence or disturbance of children’s conscience or parents’ beliefs. The idea that true respect for the diversity of beliefs and inclusiveness requires that schools refrain from either endorsing or criticizing religious beliefs remains indicative in the recent headscarf debate. More in aspirations than reality, the French concept of laïcité left some legacy in both parts of the country. Although proponents of laïcité embraced the arrangement of the ‘Schools pact’ as a political victory, it was also regarded as a second-best solution to the ultimate goal of laïcité. Although many principally reject the recognition and ¿nancial support of religions, from a pragmatic perspective, they were ready to accept and defend the extension of this regime to the non-confessional community. UNIVERSAL ETHICS: NEUTRAL OR IDEOLOGICAL?

After more than hundred years of enduring conÀicts between a majority of Catholics, who have been dominating education in Belgium from its early existence, and a minority of contesting liberals, socialists and ‘laïques’, the Belgian government agreed in 1958 in the so-called ‘Schools Pact’ that public schools would not only provide instruction in religion, but also – and on an equal basis – in ‘nonconfessional ethics’. The Belgian Constitution (art. 24) thus stipulates that everyone has the right to a moral or religious education at the governments’ charge and that all of¿cial schools5 are therefore obliged to provide a choice between instruction in the recognized religions and nonconfessional ethics, until the end of the compulsory school leaving age. The ‘Schools pact’ thus created the space for the development of a moral education that was not based on a religious belief. Although it was clear from the beginning that the course predominantly served the claims of nonbelievers and freethinkers, no explicit reference was made to a particular nonreligious belief-system or worldview. Rather, the course was perceived as a ‘neutral’ one, open to everyone as 199

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it was perceived to be based on science and not on a particular ideology, worldview or philosophy of life. This perspective is prominent in the ideas of the philosophers Jaap Kruithof and Leo Apostel, who founded, at the beginning of the sixties, a new academic program that had to provide a suitable training for teachers in nonconfessional ethics. The program in ‘moral science’ was established at the (state) University of Ghent and the Free University of Brussels. 6 Apart from training teachers in nonconfessional ethics, Kruithof and Apostel aspired that the study would respond to what they perceived as an increasing scienti¿c need for research on ethical issues. Overtly inspired by both Durkheim’s appeal for a secular ethics based on a ‘science des moeurs’ and Marx‘s emphasis on ‘the primacy of practice’, ‘moral science’ had not be limited to the study, description and analysis of morality, but had to transform the world in a positive and emancipating manner. As such, the study embraced an empirical, normative and practical dimension that was reÀected in a multidisciplinary curriculum. For Kruithof (2003), an ideal teacher combined an expertise in scienti¿c inquiry, philosophical reasoning and practical counselling. Both Kruithof en Apostel (2003) explicitly af¿rmed that a ‘moral science’ was and had to be ‘neutral’, in the sense that it had to be an ‘ethics for all’: ethics as science makes overly clear that certain issues should be resolved in a particular way. If such a scienti¿c result is achieved, the moralist – as a scientist – should not doubt for a moment and clearly reject the parts of ideologies that contradict this. The mathematician that is asked whether imaginary ¿gures exist may not withhold his answer out a fear to hurt someone who believes in its nonexistence. But the moralist should and can be neutral where science does not have yet an opinion. (Apostel, 2003, p. 140-141) For us, who defend that moral science has a cultural historical necessity and is a beginning scienti¿c reality; there is no doubt for a moment that the present opposition between morality (…) and religion (…) has to be called an absurdity. Ethics as a science is a course for everyone. (Apostel, 2003, p. 140) That nonconfessional ethics was perceived as ‘scienti¿cally based’ rather than representing a particular philosophy of life or worldview is further emphasized by the suggestion of Apostel to establish a speci¿c course for freethinking children: Next to this course in ethics, intended for all, another course in ‘freethinking ideology’ should be established for nonbelievers. This would ¿nally make an end to an obviously confused situation that leads to all kinds of discussion in which some detect in this course an instrument of freethinking propaganda, while others, because of their extreme neutrality in ideological affairs, deny freethinking children a source of inspiration for a real philosophy of life. (Apostel, p. 140). Although both were freethinkers, the reservations of Apostel and Kruithof to lay connections between nonconfessional ethics and a freethinking life stance or any 200

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other ideology can at least partly be explained by their optimism at that time that the ongoing process of secularization would actually make an end to the compartmentalization along religious lines in Belgian society and their belief in the idea that science would eventually overcome religious and philosophical differences and disputes. According to Lucien Deconinck, lecturer of the course ‘biology and human behaviour’ in the program and president of the Belgian Humanist Association in 1968, the creation of the section ‘moral science’ and of the Humanist Association was based on the same concern, i.e. the crisis of morality (De cock, 2003, p. 191-192). For Eddy Borms (2008) however, it was clear from the beginning that the course ‘nonconfessional ethics’ was intended to serve the claims of nonbelievers and freethinkers, and could in that respect never be called ‘neutral’. From the nineties onwards, the organization of the course ‘nonconfessional ethics’ was handed over to the organized humanist community in Flanders7 whereby it obtained a more explicit ideological character. This went alongside with the Constitutional recognition of the nonconfessional community in 1993 and implied a more positive pro¿ling of humanism as a belief system, of the identity of freethinkers and their societal and institutional organization. However, the idea that the course represented an ethics for all became more controversial. Earlier, in 1985, The State Council ruled that a child should be allowed exemption if the parent was of the opinion that none of the offered courses – including nonconfessional ethics – was in accordance with their convictions. The exemption regulation was later implicated by the Flemish government. Exemptions have been predominantly asked by children of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The regulation however does not apply in the French and German community in Belgium, where the course nonconfessional ethics remains to be seen as suitable to all religious and philosophical beliefs (Wachtelaer, 2010). From this and a few other similar judgments concerning the right to exemption, Loobuyck & Franken (2009) conclude that the course ‘nonconfessional ethics’ in Flanders cannot be considered a neutral course, but that it represents a particular freethinking humanist ideology. However, when Apostel and Kruithof defended the idea of a scienti¿cally based ethics, they evidently did not mean that such an ethics could be neutral in the sense of value-free. They rather believed that it was possible to ground a universal ethics, in secular and scienti¿c terms, rather than on religious beliefs. Of course, this is not a morally neutral position, but it is not more ‘ideological’ than for instance the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the idea of a scienti¿c and philosophically based and universal ethics may seem outdated in today’s postmodern and multicultural times, it was and remains a cornerstone of the identity of the course and is translated in the basic principle of free enquiry, the necessity to approach moral issues from an interdisciplinary perspective and a commitment to respect universal human rights. As such, it does not matter whether a teacher is an agnostic, an atheist, a religious humanist or someone who has not yet a particular worldview; all that is required is that he or she is open to enquiry and critical rea201

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soning, avoids indoctrination and accepts the value of human rights and democracy (Borms, 2009). In ‘the declaration of attachment to the course nonconfessional ethics’ that prospective teachers In Flanders have to sign, one has to agree with the nonconfessional character of the course and with the principle of free enquiry. What this embraces is further explained in the deontological guidelines. The latter emphasize tolerance and respect for differences and others, a scienti¿c approach to value education and the method of critical inquiry. As such, a teacher should not defend a singular philosophical doctrine, although ‘on particular issues, and when the circumstances seems to require it – a teacher should be able to testify – in a thoughtful way – of his or her personal moral conviction and its foundations’ (Raad voor Inspectie Niet Confessionele Zedenleer). The values of the course are further exempli¿ed in the ¿ve process-goals of the curriculum: 1. Learning to think and act freely and independently, in order to attain the highest achievable personal autonomy 2. Learning to think ethically, which implies that pupils learn to go against indifference and develop empathic engagement 3. Learning to see the value of humanizing society, in an effort to build a more human world 4. Learning to take responsibility for current and future generations 5. Exercising in attributing meaning as well as learning to understand that an individual is never alone in attributing meaning to life and world [my translation] The values and norms that are reÀected in the process goals and deontological guidelines are clearly humanistic, although they are not grounded in a particular metaphysical view or doctrine, nor do they refer to laïcité as a political doctrine. IS ACTIVE PLURALISM AN ANSWER TO THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE?

Economic globalization and multicultural diversity make the call for humanist values in education all the more critical. According to the results of the ‘International Civic and Citizenship Education Study’ (2010), Flemish fourteen year old students score, compared to their peers in 38 other countries, very badly on ‘political’ citizenship, and particularly on their attitudes towards immigrants. Advocates of ‘active pluralism’ criticize the ‘passive pluralism’ of the Belgian model and its inability to deal with xenophobic attitudes. Although the concept is used in different contexts with different meanings and policy implications, it generally refers to the need of an intercultural attitude and a more active role of the government to facilitate, stimulate and organize initiatives to enhance interreligious exchange and dialogue. Although the concept remains vague, it is nevertheless a very popular one. On the website of the Council of Flemish Of¿cial Community Education, active pluralism 202

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is embraced and linked to ‘interculturalism’. There one can also read the following quote from Ludo Abicht, to whom the introduction of the term is attributed: Former state schools only combined neutrality with tolerance and passive pluralism, but could not deal with a crisis. Active pluralism is what we stand for now: we teach youngsters to approach diversity with a critical and balanced mind. Thus multiculturalism makes way for an interculturalism, which is a pedagogic task.8 However, in the very same schools, the wearing of religious signs such as headscarves has been forbidden. Hendrik Pinxten (2007, p. 208), former president of the humanist freethinking organizations in Flanders, proposed that a course in ‘intercultural knowledge and skills’ would be introduced in the general curriculum, in which pupils would learn about different life stances. A similar proposal was made by Franken & Loobuyck (2010) to introduce an inclusive pluralistic course about the recognized religions and belief systems. Both proposals aim at introducing a general course, that transcend particular religions and philosophies of life and is made compulsory for all pupils. Although these ideas may sound attractive, many dif¿cult issues are raised. Who will be deemed quali¿ed to teach this course? It is not possible to realize these aims with the existing courses? Is the ideal of active pluralism or interculturalism realized by the mere transfer of knowledge about different religions? Many ambiguities remain about the concept of active pluralism. For Abicht (2006, p 231) for instance, authentic pluralism implies an active interest in the other and an ‘inter-esse’ for other belief-systems. This implies a willingness to listen and an attitude of mutual respect that cannot merely be taken for granted, as is illustrated by the widespread prevalence of xenophobic attitudes in society. Interculturalism or active pluralism requires the cultivation of certain values and attitudes, such as tolerance based on mutual respect, equal respect for basic freedoms, including the freedom of opinion and the respect for dissident voices. Although it can be argued that this values are broader humanist values that are not connected to a particular philosophy of life and should therefore be part of the general teaching curriculum, current developments in the ¿eld of education does not seem to leave much room for this. From this an additional argument can be drawn to favour the continuing existence of religious instruction and humanist education in public schools above a more strict secularism that relegates religious, ethical and philosophical issues to the private sphere. A humanist position on this issue should therefore not only be informed by the mere concern about the separation of church and state and the question of neutrality, but should also attend to the question of how other humanist values and principles within education and society in general can be cultivated. Although the current system in which pupils can choose between different recognized religions and nonreligious ethics has its limits, it is more desirable than a system in which there is no humanist education at all.

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CONCLUSION

The Belgian situation in regard to the organization of religious and nonreligious philosophical education is a rather complex one and has its roots in the particular history of the Belgian state and its very typical policies of compromise between different cleavages. However, the constitutional recognition and equal treatment of the nonconfessional community is rather unique. Although some humanists may object to this system on the basis that it contradicts the principle of separation of church and state, it can be defended in accordance with the principle of neutrality, particularly in a society in which it is historically and sociologically very dif¿cult to attain neutrality in terms of a strict separation of church and state. The established institutional arrangements between the traditional groups, i.e. Catholics and Freethinkers, are challenged by the multicultural reality and the increasing diversi¿cation of society in terms of religion and belief-systems. The recognition of religions, their subsidizing and the organization of respective courses certainly has practical limitations that humanists cannot simply ignore. However, humanists should also be more and more concerned about global economic dynamics, the way they relate to humanist values and how they affects local educational policies. As the opening quote of Martha Nussbaum reminds us, our complex democracies need critical and reÀective citizens. The complexities of our contemporary societies make it highly unrealistic to pass on this crucial education task to the private sphere. As Nussbaum (2011) warns in a recent essay in which she comments on current reforms in higher education, humanist values are endangered by global economic dynamics that aim to reduce education to mere training in the service of global competition and the creation of short-term pro¿t. When politicians repeatedly praise countries like China and Singapore for their economic achievements, and urge educators to take an example, Nussbaum says, they forget to mention that ‘these are authoritarian states which have not a slightest interest in training democratic citizens who can think for themselves’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 41). Many humanists have been so occupied with the presence and challenges of other religions, and notably Islam, that they have been ignoring the – probably much more dangerous – inÀuential threats of global neoliberal economic dynamics to the educational system. When Martha Nussbaum (2002) refers to the importance of humanistic values in education (cf. introductory quote), she does not refer to a particular world-view or belief system, but defends a pluralistic ideal in the sense that it is relates to all human beings and that it concerns a variety of norms and traditions (2002). As contemporary democracies are inescapably plural, democratic citizenship requires essential capacities, such as the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s own traditions, the ability to understand that one is a human being that is bound to all other human beings – and not only a member of some local region or group - and the ability to put oneself in others’ places. Ideally, this should be implemented in mainstream education. The reality however in which education becomes increasingly instrumental to international economic competition in the global marketplace, and

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the internal diversi¿cation and tensions within contemporary democracies seem to back out the implementation of this humanist ideal. Within this context, the best option to promote and cultivate humanist values cannot be found in a formal secularist option that relegates religious, ethical and philosophical issues the private sphere. An overall concern for humanists is how different humanist values and ideals can be achieved – within contemporary and diversifying – societies. As such, a debate on humanist education can never be based on a mere principled position, nor cannot it be limited to the single issue of freedom of religion and conscience. NOTES 1 For the use of convenience I translate ‘vrijzinnig’ here as ‘freethinking’, although this can lead to some confusion with a different concept of ‘vrijdenkers’. 2 This is different from the use of the term in the Netherlands, where it refers to a liberal interpretation of a particular religion. 3 For a further discussion of what ‘neutrality’ implies, see: Verbeeck (2008) 4 The Belgian way of dealing with religious diversity is often equated with the Dutch ‘denominationalized’ model, however ‘denominations’ in the Netherlands are religiously delineated, while in Belgium they (the Christian, Socialist and Liberal) are de¿ ned in political and ideological terms. Different from the Netherlands, Belgium does not have a signi¿cant historical background of ‘religious’ pluralism, but has remained, like France, predominantly Catholic. 5 Governmental authority over education has become regionalized in Belgium, which allows the three communities (The Flemish, Francophone and German-speaking Community) to develop their own policies. In addition, education is institutionalized within different organizational frameworks or ‘pillars’ that enjoy a large degree of autonomy: i.e. of¿cial or public education (which can be governed at the community, provincial or municipal level) and free – mainly Catholic – education. While of¿cial education is more prominent in the French-speaking part, the majority of schools in Flanders are Catholic, yet fully state-subsidized. 6 The Free University of Brussels however is a freethinking university, established in the 19th century to counter the Catholic monopoly in the educational system and to guarantee free inquiry. Today, the University of Ghent organizes a Bachelor and Master program in Moral Sciences. The Free University of Brussels organizes a Bachelor and Master in Philosophy and Moral Sciences, with an option in Moral Sciences and Humanistics. 7 This is not the case in the French-speaking part of the country, in which the course is detached from the organized freethinking community. See Wachtelaer, 2010. This exempli¿es some differences in the interpretation of laïcité in the Flemish and French speaking part of the country. 8 http://www.opengeest.nu/wie-zijn-we/actief-pluralisme.aspx, accesed on 03/02/2011

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GILY COENE Barry B. (2001) Culture and equality, Cambridge: Polity Press. Borms E. (2008) Hebben ongelovigen dan toch een levensbeschouwing? Het levensbeschouwelijke vak niet-confessionele zedenleer in Vlaanderen (Do nonbelievers have a worldview as well? The subject of nonconfessional morality in Flanders). In G. Coene, C. Suransky, J. Verplaetse & W. Veugelers (Eds.), Onderwijs, levensbeschouwing en ethiek in Nederland en Vlaanderen, Themanummer Tijdschrift voor Humanistiek, 9(36), 33-40. Buitenweg R. (2010). Humanistische educatie en vrijheid van levensovertuiging (Humanistic education and freedom of worldview). In L. Devuyst & C. Van Waerebeke (Eds.), De toekomst van de levenbeschouwelijke vakken. De eerste stappen naar de gelijkberechtiging: 50 jaar schoolpact (104-121). Brussel: VUB Press. Carens J.H. (2000). Culture, citizenship and community. A contextual exploration of justice as evenhandednes. Oxford University Press. Coene G. & Longman C. (2008). Gendering the diversi¿cation of diversity. The Belgian Hijab (in) Question, Ethnicities, special issue, 8(3), 302-321. De Cock N. (2003). De moraal van het verhaal. Een reportage over de beginjaren van 40 jaar Gentse moraalwetenschappen (The morality of the story. A report on the beginnings of 40 years of moral sciences in Ghent). Ethiek en Maatschappij, 6(3-4), 189-206. Loobuyck P, De Knop P., Franken L., e.a. (2010) Breng godsdienstonderwijs bij de tijd (Bring religious education up to date). De Morgen, 12 mei 2010 Devuyst, L. (2010) Oorsprong en evolutie van de levensbeschouwelijke vakken (Origin and evolution of the subjects of religion and worldviews). In L. Devuyst & C. Van Waerebeke (Eds.) De toekomst van de levenbeschouwelijke vakken. De eerste stappen naar de gelijkberechtiging: 50 jaar schoolpact (33-48). Brussel: VUB Press. Husson J.F. (2005) Le ¿ nancement des cultes et de la laïcité en Belgique. In J.F. Husson (Ed.) Le ¿nancement des cultes et de la laïcité. Comparaison internationale et perspectives. (pp.23-49) Charleroi: Observatoire des Relations Administratives entre les Cultes, la Laïcité organisée et l’Etat. Kruithof J. (2003) De plaats van de moraalwetenschap in de universiteit van morgen (The place of the moral sciences in tomorrow’s university). (Originally published in 1965,) Rijksuniversiteit Gent) Ethiek en Maatschappij, 6(3-4), 145-188. Laborde, C. (2005), Secular philosophy and Muslim headscarves in schools, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 13(3), 305-329. Loobuyck P. & Franken L. (2009). Schoolpactwet 50 jaar later (50 years of School Arrangement legislation). Samenleving en Politiek, 5, 47-54. Magits M. (2007). België: een systeem naar Frans model? (Belgium: A system based on the Frech model?) In P. De Hert & K. Meerschaut (Eds.), Scheiding van kerk en staat of actief pluralisme? (31-57). Antwerpen: Intersentia. Nussbaum M. (2006). Education and democratic citizenship: Capabilities and quality education, Journal of Human Development, 7(3), 385-395. Nussbaum, M. (1997). Cultivating humanity: A classical defence of reform in liberal education, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Nussbaum M. (2010). Critical faculties. New Statesman, 31 may 2010, 40-41. Nussbaum, M. (2002). Education for citizenship in an era of global connection, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 21, 289-303. Pinxten R. (2007). De strepen van de zebra. Naar een strijdbaar vrijzinnig humanisme (The zebra’s stripes. Towards a militant freethinking humanism). Antwerpen/Amsterdam: Houtekiet. Rawls J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Raad Voor Inspectie en Begeleiding Niet Confessionale Zedenleer, Deontologische richtlijnen. Aspecten in verband met de rechtspositie voor personeelsleden belast met een opdracht niet-confessionele zedenleer. (De-ontologiocal guidelines. Aspects of the legal position of staff members entrusted with nonconfessional ethics). Retrieved at 05/01/2011 from www.ribz.be. Torfs, R. (2005). Eglise, ‘Etat et laïcité en Belgique. Remarques introductives. In J.F. Husson (Ed.). Le

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THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM ¿nancement des cultes et de la laïcité. Comparaison Internationale et Perspectives (15-21) Charleroi: Observatoire des Relations Administratives entre les Cultes, la Laïcité organisée et l’Etat. Verbeeck B. (2008) Neutraal en toch divers. Een moeilijke evenwichtsoefening voor het onderwijs in Vlaanderen? (Neutral but still divers. A dif¿cult balancing act for Flemish education?) In G. Coene, C. Suransky, J. Verplaetse & W. Veugelers (Eds.) Onderwijs, levensbeschouwing en ethiek in Nederland en Vlaanderen, Themanummer, Tijdschrift voor Humanistiek, 9(36), 11-21. Vlaams Parlement (2010), Voorstel van decreet van de heren Jean-Jacques De Gucht, Sven Gatz en Luckas Van Der Taelen, mevrouw Marleen Vanderpoorten en de heer Herman Schueremans, houdende wijziging van het artikel 55 van het decreet van 31 juli 1990 betreffende het onderwijs-II, wat de vakken godsdienst en niet-confessionele zedenleer betreft, ingediend op 7 juli 2010. Wachtelaer, C., Zedenleer in de Franstalige gemeenschap. Een overzicht (Morality in the Frenchspeaking community. An noverview). In L. Devuyst & C. Van Waerebeke (Eds.) De toekomst van de levenbeschouwelijke vakken. De eerste stappen naar de gelijkberechtiging: 50 jaar schoolpact (67-72 ). Brussel: VUB Press.

Gily Coene Department of Philosophy & Ethics Brussels University (VUB)

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