Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition

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Â£ui 9Â°"

theologie historique

EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

AND THE

CLASSICAL INTELLECTUAL TRADITION


THEOLOGIE HISTORIQUE

COLLECTION FONDEE PAR JEAN DANIELOU

DIRIGEE PAR CHARLES KANNENGIESSER

54

iEARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

AND THE CLASSICAL

INTELLECTUAL TRADITION

IN HONOREM ROBERT M. GRANT

edited

by

r.[SCH(

by \

WILLIAM R.[sCHoeDEl

ROBERT L. WILKEN '

Editions beauchesne


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Â© 1979 by editions beauchesne

CONTENTS

In honorem Robert M. Grant 7

Introduction 9

1. Tertullian's Principles and Methods of Exegesis

byJ.H. WASZINK 17

2. Theological Speculation and its Limits

by W.C van Unnik 33

3. The God of the Greeks and the Nature of Religious Language

by Frances M. Young 45

4. Enclosing, not Enclosed : The Early Christian Doctrine of

God by William R. Schoedel 75

5. The Transcendence and Freedom of God : Irenaeus, the

Greek Tradition and Gnosticism

by Richard Norris 87

6. From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy

by Marcel Simon 101

7. Pagan Criticism of Christianity: Greek Religion and Chris-

tian Faith

by RobertL. Wilken 117

8. The Relativity of Moral Codes : Rome and Persia in Late

Antiquity

by Henry Chadwick 135

9. Greek and Jewish Heroes : Fourth Maccabees and the

Gospel of Mark


by Sherman E. Johnson 155

10. Greek Rhetoric and Pauline Argumentation

by Wilhelm Wuellner 177

11. God is Eros

by G. Quispel 189


IN HONOREM ROBERT M. GRANT

Friends and students of Robert McQueen Grant have contributed the

essays in the following pages to honor an outstanding scholar of the

twentieth century. When W. C. van Unnik surveyed the field of Patris-

tics for Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (5. 154-156) in

1961, he noted that the study of the church fathers had "experienced

after 1945 a new period of flowering" and named Robert M. Grant

along with Johannes Quasten and Werner Jaeger as the American

participants in this renaissance.

Robert M. Grant was born inEvanston, Illinois, November 25, 1917.

He is the son of Frederick C. Grant, the well-known New Testament

scholar, and Helen McQueen (Hardie) Grant. He obtained his A.B.

from Northwestern University in 1938, attended Episcopal Theological

School in Boston in 1938-39, moved on to Columbia in 1939-40, and

took his B.D. from Union Theological Seminary in 1941. His higher

degrees include a S.T.M. from Harvard in 1942, a Th. D. from the

same institution in 1944, and aD.D. from Seabury-Western Theologi-

cal Seminary in 1969 and the University of Glasgow in 1979.

Robert Grant married Margaret Huntington Horton, December 21,

1940. He was ordained in the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1942 and

ministered at St. James Church, South Groveland, Massachusetts,

1942-44.

Robert Grant served as instructor and ultimately professor of New

Testament studies in the School of Theology at the University of the


South from 1944 to 1953. He became associate professor at the Divinity

School of the University of Chicago in 1953 and professor in 1958. In

1973 he was named Carl Darling Buck Professor of the Humanities.

Among the honors accorded Professor Grant were his appointment

as Fulbright Research Professor at the University of Leiden (1950-

51) and his winning of three Guggenheim fellowships (1950,1954, and

1959). He has served as visiting lecturer at Vanderbilt University

(1945-47), visiting lecturer at Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

8 IN HONOREM ROBERT M. GRANT

(1954-55), and visiting professor at Yale University (1964-65). He was

lecturer in the history of religions for the American Council of Learned

Societies in 1957-58. He has served as president of the Society for

Biblical Literature and Exegesis (1959), the Chicago Society of Biblical

Research (1963-64), the American Society of Church History (1970),

and the North American Patristic Society (1975). He is adirector of the

Anglican Theological Review, an associate editor of Vigiliae Chris-

tianae, and co-editor of Church History.

No single formula can capture the significance of the wide range of

Robert Grant's contributions to the study of the early church. He has

always avoided the hackneyed and has always found himself among

those seeking to illuminate the early period from fresh points of view.

Here we may mention especially his explorations of the history of

Biblical interpretation, his contributions to the study of Gnosticism, his

participation in the rediscovery of the importance ofOrigen andOrige-

nism, and his attention to the Graeco-Roman intellectual background

of the church fathers. At times he has brought to light unexpected

features of the thinking of the fathers by asking to what extent they

anticipated problems that preoccupy scholarship and theology today â€”

their use, for example, of rhetorical criticism on the gospels as a kind of

early historical-critical method. In all his work, however, Robert Grant

has avoided the temptation of the churchman to exaggerate the intellec-

tual depth or sanctity of the fathers. Indeed, it often appears that he


takes the religious substance of the tradition for granted, regarding as

more significant and interesting the quarrels about it and the attempts

of groups and individuals to use it to satisfy their ambitions. It is

perhaps for this reason that the interaction with the Graeco-Roman

intellectual tradition and (especially more recently) the social dimen-

sions of the life of the early church have played so important a role in his

work. Although it may appear to some that in this way the central issues

are often simply by-passed, the old questions also take on fresh life when

looked at from the perspective of the scholarship which Robert Grant

represents.

The essays in this volume are intended as expressions of respect and

friendship for Professor Grant. The contributors share with him the

conviction that the interaction of the early church with the Graeco-

Roman tradition â€” the theme to which this Volume is devoted â€” is

among the most fascinating topics in contemporary historical and

theological debate.

INTRODUCTION

Among the issues which have dominated the study of early Christian

literature and thought since the nineteenth century, the interaction

between Christianity and Greco-Roman culture has been the most

alluring, and the most persistent. The reasons for this are not far to seek.

Christianity began as a movement within Palestinian Judaism, but it

rapidly moved beyond the confines of its native environment. Its

earliest writings are written in Greek but it is not the Greek of Plato or

Demosthenes; it has a strongly Semitic cast. If one turns, however, to

later Christian writers, little more than a century later, they seem

thoroughly at home in Greek ideas, Greek rhetoric, Greek mores.

Christians speak the language of Plato, freely citing Greek poets and

philosophers. When Christianity appears to public view within the

larger cultural world of the Roman Empire, it seems changed, transfor-

med, embracing enthusiastically what it had rejected at an earlier stage

outright.

A striking illustration of the change can be seen in the Christian

attitude toward philosophy. "Take care that no one comes to take you

captive by the empty deception of philosophy, based on a man-made

tradition of teaching concerning the elements of the material world, and

not based on Christ", wrote an early Christian influenced by St. Paul.

Several centuries later Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea could say, "No-

body can deny that our Savior and Lord was a philosopher and a truly

pious man". Christianity was presented as the supreme philosophy and


its teachers, including Paul, were thought to have surpassed Socrates

and Plato.

The process by which this transformation from a Palestinian Jewish

sect to a universal religion took place, as well as the evaluation of its

cultural and religious significance, has long fascinated historians, theo-

logians, and philosophers. What is more, the judgments made on the

events of this period have seldom been calmly historical, balanced; they


have been passionate, sometimes emotional, filled with intellectual

fervor, as though this distant past reached across the century to touch the

present. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, "The whole labor of the ancient

world was in vain: I have no word to express my feelings about

something so tremendous... All the presuppositions for a scholarly

culture, all scientific methods were already there... What today we have

again conquered with immeasurable self-mastery... that had already

been there once before". Christianity was considered to have been the

great anti-intellectual movement of antiquity. Other lovers of antiquity

use less emotive, but no less telling language, "the twilight of the

gods", the "exhaustion of Greek rationalism", blotting out the "sun-

shine of hellenism".

For Christians this period is equally charged with intensity. To some

the adaptation of Christianity to Greco-Roman culture symbolized the

"fall of the church", that fateful accomodation to culture which

marked the demise of primitive Christianity. To others it offered an

intellectual bill of rights, an ancient legitimation of modern efforts to

construct a "liberal" Christianity, as one scholar subtitled his book on

Clement of Alexandria. For Harnack and his school it was a time of the

"hellenization of the Gospel", when Christian faith was reduced to "a

deistical religion for the whole world", a disastrous mixing of religious

faith and philosophy which would mark catholic Christianity for centu-

ries. The interaction of Christianity with Greco-Roman culture was


paradigmatic for an understanding of the church's later history.

Modern writers are equally divided. Even today the study of Chris-

tian and classical antiquity is not simply a field of specialization but a

historical period which interests and often excites modern intellectuals.

Several years ago a book appeared with the title The Death of Classical

Paganism. Echoing a theme which has resounded for centuries in our

civilization, the author, John Holland Smith, lays the ills of western

civilization at the doorstep of Christianity. "From the beginning the

Christians set out to destroy the gods of the classical world. They all but

succeeded. And there can be no doubt that of all the crimes committed

in Christ's name this has been the most devastating in its consequences.

During their attempts to murder the gods, the Christians destroyed the

world of those who loved them and could laugh at them while serving

them".

Modern attitudes toward Christian and classical antiquity echo the

ancient conflict between Christianity and paganism, but it was the

INTRODUCTION 1 1

Enlightenment which gave modern discussions their unique character.

The philosophes set Christianity and classical antiquity in opposition to

one another, Christianity symbolizing religion and authority, paganism

symbolizing reason, learning, and enlightenment. Christianity opposes

the rational spirit of free inquiry. "Contempt for the humanities",

wrote Condorcet, "was one of the principal characteristics of Christia-

nity ... It had to avenge itself against the insults offered by philosophy''.

This polarity between Christianity and classical antiquity demanded a

choice, either religion or reason, classicism or Christianity. One must,

it seemed, love either the Greeks or the Christians â€” not both. The

Christian movement was set in opposition to the culture in which it

emerged and the spiritual world created by Christianity was seen not as

an outgrowth of classical antiquity but as a reaction against its gods, its

philosophies, its life style, and finally its politics.

This antinomy between Christianity and classical culture still exists

in many circles today as the book by Smith indicates. It has also had

enormous influence on the way scholars approach the period of Chris-

tian antiquity. Polarity seems the rule. Tertullian, supposedly the foe of

culture, the "Christ against culture" theologian par excellence is

contrasted with Clement of Alexandria, the great compromiser. Eccle-

siastical and "churchly" theologians are distinguished from the apolo-

gists. Christianity and Greco-Roman culture are viewed as though they

are two independent entities, each with its own spiritual and intellectual


visions.

The essays gathered in this volume challenge the sharp dichotomy

between Christianity and Greco-Roman culture. They reflect a slow,

but deliberate, shift which is taking place in the understanding of

Christianity in relation to ancient culture. They offer an attempt at

synthesis, not by an analysis of the problem as a whole, but by the

patient scholarly discussion of what sometime appear as minor points

but which illustrate the changes which have taken place in the study of

the early church since the nineteenth century. They present Christianity

not as a reaction against classical culture, but as a new spiritual force

uniting the classical world with the religious impulse which came from

Palestine and the Jewish Scriptures.

As good an example as any is Irenaeus, the Christian bishop from

Gaul at the end of the second century, author of the massive Adversus

Haereses, a defense of Christianity against Gnosticism. In the hand-

books on the early church Irenaeus is usually sharply contrasted with


apologists such as Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, who were roughly

his contemporaries but who wrote in defense of Christianity to pagans.

It is assumed that these men were concerned chiefly with interpreting

Christianity to the sophisticated culture of the Greco-Roman world,

whereas Irenaeus devoted himself to pastoral and ecclesiastical matters,

as he himself announces in the preface to his Adversus Haereses.

Irenaeus is seen as a representative of "catholic orthodoxy" as the

Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church calls him.

In the scheme of interpretation handed down since the nineteenth

century, then, Irenaeus plays a role in early Christianity distinctly

different from that of the apologists. His method of doing theology was

based chiefly on the regulafidei, the Scriptures, and the succession of

bishops in the chief cities, whereas the apologists appeal to what is most

universal, i.e. philosophical, to substantiate their religious claims.

Though Irenaeus wrote in Greek, his use of stylistic and rhetorical

devices familiar to pagan writers, is limited and controlled. Franz

Overbeck, a contemporary of Harnack, in his little book, On the

Beginning of Patristic Literature, wrote, "The work of Irenaeus still

leaves it undecided whether the form of the world's literature, as found

in the Christian church, is destined only to remain a weapon to combat

its enemies, or is to become an instrument of peaceful labor within its

own territory". In his scheme Clement and Origen are the first to move

fully into the literary world of the Roman Empire.


Over the last several decades this judgment of Irenaeus has been

gradually undermined by the study of his rhetoric and his use of

philosophic reason. Robert Grant, as well as several of the contributors

to this volume, have shown that Irenaeus, no less than the apologists (or

Clement and Origen) was not only familiar with the intellectual tradi-

tions of Hellenistic culture but used them with skill and understanding

in his refutation of Gnosticism. Irenaeus, like others, in his time, used

philosophical handbooks to develop his arguments, not simply the

Scriptures or the church's tradition. Indeed it now seems that the

neglected second book of Irenaeus' Adversus Haereses, the philosophi-

cal section of the work, was as important to Irenaeus as were the

arguments from Scripture and tradition in books three to five. In this

volume van Unnik offers an analysis of a passage from book 2 dealing

with, of all things, the overflowing of the Nile, and uses it to underscore

the new interpretation of Irenaeus. "Irenaeus", writes Professor van

Unnik, citing Robert Grant, "chooses from the maelstrom of Greek

INTRODUCTION 13

thought what he thinks will be adaptable [and I should like to add:

useful] to the Christian religion".

Another example is Tertullian who, because of his sharp and tempes-

tuous style, has been widely presented as a foe of Greco-Roman culture.

Every beginning theology student, indeed many intellectuals who know

nothing of theology, has heard of Tertullian and read the famous words

attributed to him, "I believe because it is absurd". Recently the New

York Times Book Review ran an article prefaced with this very formula,

"Credo quia absurdum". Many have "heard his other famous dictum,

"What has Athens to do with Jerusalem". But Tertullian, like other

educated Christians of his day, recognized and used the intellectual

traditions of the Greco-Roman world, discriminating between those he

could accept and those he rejected. J. Waszink's massive commentary

on Tertullian's treatise, De Anima, as well as the study by Fredouille,

give ample documentation of Tertullian's intellectual style. In the

present volume Waszink presents another side of Tertullian, the neglec-

ted area of his exegesis of the Holy Scriptures. Tertullian, as Fredouille

remarks "disconcerts", and one area where he has been most puzzling

is his use of the Bible. In a world where multiple meanings abounded

Tertullian defends simplicity, insisting that exegesis should not be

arbitrary. He seems to presage later Christian exegesis intimating an

early fundamentalist attitude.- But Waszink carefully draws out some of

the principles which governed legal code? and courtroom argumenta-


tion and shows that Tertullian reflects the lawyer's interest in precision,

perspicacity, simplicity. The interest in avoiding arbitrariness does not

arise out of Christian theological ideas but out of a way of dealing with

legal texts and legal argumentation.

Let these two illustrations, then, serve as a general introduction to the

essays in this volume. In a volume of essays written by scholars from

various parts of the world it is perilous to generalize. Each writes from

his own perspective, but taken as a whole the essays in this volume

indicate that one can no longer talk about Christianity and Greco-

Roman culture as though these were two independent worlds. Christian

writers, from a much earlier date than has been recognized, became part

of the intellectual world of late antiquity and went about their work in

much the same style as their pagan counterparts. This is not to say there

were no differences or to ignore the conflict, but to suggest that many of

the differences have less to do with Christianity than they have to do

with the particular views each Christian thinker espoused from the


options available within the larger culture. The question is not "how

does a Christian relate to Greco-Roman culture", but what particular

use does he make of specific resources within the culture. Greater

discrimination in our analysis of the writings from this period helps us

recognize that differences between Christians are explicable, not on the

basis of their attitude toward the culture as a whole, but on the critical

and selective use of materials from within that culture. Christian writers

shared a similar education, as well as similar social, and intellectual

backgrounds with pagan thinkers. In many cases Christians appear as

conservative spokesmen of the values which non-Christians from simi-

lar backgrounds also took for granted.

The essays in the volume are arranged to reflect different aspects of

the interaction between Christianity and classical culture. In the first

two essays the stress is on intellectual style or method. The first deals

with the flamboyant Tertullian and the second with the sober Irenaeus,

two figures who, as we have already seen, are usually thought to stand

against the intellectual currents of antiquity or at least independent of

their pagan contemporaries. The next three essays explore the same

theme but with particular emphasis on the doctrine of God. Christians

and pagans worked within the same intellectual traditions often inter-

preting earlier philosophers in a similar way. Frances Young's interest

is chiefly on fourth century Christian writers, in itself interesting,

because by the fourth-century the Christian intellectual tradition was


much more firmly fixed than it had been at the time of Irenaeus and

Tertullian. Nevertheless the intellectual style of second and third -

century Christian thinkers was not abandoned. F. Young cites passages

from Gregory Nazianzen reflecting an approach to the doctrine of God

similar to Albinus, Apuleius, Celsus, Numenius, Maximus of Tyre, all

second-century pagan authors. The essays by Schoedel and Norris draw

on similar material to show that Christians did not simply reflect pagan

ideas but used them to develop a new interpretation of the doctrine of

God. Greek tradition, argues Schoedel, had identified the intelligible

with the limited. Consequently it was difficult to associate the unlimi-

ted, the boundless with the divine. If there were no bounds there could

be no perfection. Origen, for this very reason, refused to call God

"unlimited" and his translators in the fourth-century deliberately mis-

translated this passage in his De Principiis. At a later date, however,

after the Nicene controversy, some Christian thinkers, notably the

Cappadocians, discovered the resources within this same tradition

INTRODUCTION 15

"for a new doctrine of a God that ultimately resulted in a reversal of the

Greek evaluation of the infinite."

In the next group of essays we have tried to show several ways in

which Christians and pagans shared a common spiritual and ethical

horizon; in the surprising approbation of heresy in some Christian

writers, in the attempt of the philosopher Porphyry to offer a positive

interpretation of Jesus within the traditional Greco-Roman religious

framework, and in the approach to moral codes. Even though Diocle-

tian was the great persecutor of Christianity, observes H. Chadwick,

Christians preserved and defended his laws on incest and sexual cus-

toms, opposing Persian practices, e.g. intermarriage between uncles

and nieces, on the grounds that this was not the custom of the Romans.

The essay by M. Simon raises critical questions about the work of

W. Bauer, Heresy and Orthodoxy in Earliest Christianity, a book which

has achieved an almost orthodox status in modern scholarly circles.

Simon shows that some Christians viewed heresy not as deviation from

orthodoxy, but in the same way that pagans viewed differing philoso-

phical schools. Differences between Christian sects were not a sign of

error but of the seriousness with which they pursued truth.

In the final section we have included essays dealing with Greco-

Roman culture and the New Testament. We think this important for two

reasons: 1) The New Testament cannot be arbitrarily set off from early

Christianity. The study of later Christian literature and thought sheds


interesting and important light on the earliest Christian documents. 2)

Many of the features which mark second and third-century Christian

literature are present already in the New Testament. As the studies of E.

Bickerman, M. Hengel and others have shown, Palestine was deeply

hellenized at the time Christianity began. Sherman Johnson's essay on

Mark shows how an early gospel, Mark, presents Jesus in a way to make

him intelligible to hellenistic readers. In his essay on Paul, Wilhelm

Wuellner pushes the use of Greek rhetorical devices back to the writings

of Paul, arguing that Paul's use of such devices was not accidental or

peripheral but "self-consciously Greek" and essential to this style of

argumentation.

The essay by G. Quispel offers a fresh interpretation of the old

problem of agape and eros in early Christian literature, and returns us to

the problem posed at the beginning of this introduction. Quispel chal-

lenges the sharp dichotomy between Eros and Agape, one representing

Greek love, the other uniquely Christian love, a dichotomy which has


been repeated over and over in Christian theological and exegetical

writings. Not only did Christians speak about Eros, but pagans spoke

about divine love in a way similar to Christians, and, argues Quispel,

Greek ideas of love lurk behind the Gospel of John, the apostle of love.

A collection of essays always runs the risk of arbitrariness; often

unity is apparent and not real, and the relation of the essays accidental

and idiosyncratic. The essays in this volume, however, reflect, we

think, a common set of problems, as well as broad agreement as to the

direction modern scholarship is moving in its interpretation of the

interaction between Christianity and Greco-Roman culture. Many of

the contributions to this volume are by the same people who have been

responsible for the vitality and the originality of patristic scholarship in

the twentieth-century as well as for the revision of our understanding of

the early church. We offer them as an indication of the state of scholar-

ship in the present as well as a contribution to the larger questions of the

relation between Christianity and the inheritance of classical antiquity.

They reflect, we believe, a tradition of scholarship and a style of

intellectual inquiry of which Robert M. Grant is a preeminent represen-


tative.

J.H. WASZINK

TERTULLIAN'S PRINCIPLES AND METHODS

OF EXEGESIS

There is no one exegetical method in Tertullian. The more one

studies Tertullian's intensive activity in the field of biblical exegesis,

the more one reaches the conclusion that the whole of this activity

cannot be summed up in a single formula without straining the sense of a

considerable number of passages. If I am not mistaken, there are two

reasons which prevented Tertullian from succeeding in constructing a

unified exegetical method.

The first reason is that Tertullian, both on account of his character

and of the situation in which he found himself after his conversion, was

driven at once into a series of controversies which were as various as

they were continuous. The debate both with the pagan authorities and

with many forms of the Christian faith which he felt constrained to

regard as faulty or even corrupt, remained for him throughout his life a

living reality and even a necessity. It has often been said that in this

entire activity the only vital element was Tertullian's own personality.

But in saying this one loses sight of the fact that the critical controversy

with Marcion on the one hand and the debate with the docetism of

various sects of Gnostics on the other hand were unavoidable in that

stage of the evolution of Christian doctrine, and that such controversies,

be it less vehement and personal, occur equally in the work of his

contemporaries.


With a certain amount of exaggeration for the sake of clarity, the

second reason may be stated as follows: for the Christians in the western

part of the Empire, exegesis in the ancient sense of the word â€” that is, a

thorough interpretation based upon an examination of the question and a

judgment as to which form of the various possible methods was best

adapted to the case at issue â€” was not yet an immediate requirement

before the Edict of Milan. In the given situation the first necessity was

18 J. H. WASZINK

the production of increasingly more effective forms of apology and the

refutation not so much of interpretations regarded as faulty as of erratic

doctrines in their entirety. It is true that a capacity for a clear and

unambiguous interpretation of controversial passages from Holy Scrip-

ture was constantly in demand, but in the given situation there could not

yet be any question of exegesis for its own sake. Yet even this primarily

polemical activity required a familiarity with methods which had a long

history in the Greek intellectual tradition; and it is for this reason that the

Latin apologists were for almost a century greatly behind their Greek

colleagues who, as Greeks, had been educated in this tradition. In the

time of Tertullian there did not yet exist â€” a fact often overlooked â€”

detailed commentaries on Vergil and Cicero that could be compared to

the commentaries on Homer, Pindar and Demosthenes which were so

important for the development of the technique of exegesis in general,

and consequently also for Christian exegesis. The only really thorough

form of commentary which existed in the Roman world of his time is

found in the sphere of Law, its starting-point being the explication of the

Law of the Twelve Tables and of the edicta praetorum, especially after

the collection of the latter by Salvius Julianus; in fact, it is particularly

this knowledge, and also the mental training which its perusal required,

with which Tertullian was familiar.

From these statements and considerations it is evident, first, that

Tertullian could not yet produce an exegesis of Holy Scripture for its


own sake (in the Roman world this activity begins with St. Hilary and

St. Jerome); secondly, that he drew upon the achievements of the Greek

apologists and upon his own rhetorical and legal training. I want to

observe here in passing that, in my opinion, the endlessly discussed

question whether he was identical with the Tertullianus who is quoted in

the Digest, or merely a solicitor, is not of primary importance for our

theme. For here the essential thing is that at all events he had at his

disposal that general rhetorical and legal training which led to the

possession of the technique of the genus iudiciale. In this context the

observation may not be superfluous that for a correct understanding not

only of Tertullian's technique of debating but also of his exegetical

methods Quintilian's Institutio oratoria is much more important than

the Institutiones of Gaius.

If I am not seriously mistaken, it is from this training, conferring as it

did familiarily with a number of basic notions of Roman Law, that we

may explain a leading principle of Tertullian's exegesis of Holy Scrip-

TERTULLIAIM'S PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF EXEGESIS 19

ture â€” namely, the continuous endeavour to exclude by all means

arbitrariness from interpretation. His conscious aim was to attain a

certitude that the opponent cannot undermine by any form of argument.

The point at issue is that in the debates with the heretics, and afterwards

with the official Church, Holy Scripture is, in Tertullian's opinion, to

be cited as a witness for the correctness of his statements and assertions,

and the only thing required from witnesses is that they be reliable.

I wonder whether enough attention has been paid to Tertullian's

frequent references to the testimonium Sacrae Scripturae (or sacrae

paraturae or utriusque Testamenti). In this phrase the word testimo-

nium is not just a metaphor, for the courtroom is never far from his

mind: Tertullian is the plaintiff, the heretic in question (or the pagan

opponent or, in the last stage of his life, the official Church) is the

defendant, and Holy Scripture is the chief witness. Very quickly

Tertullian's own explication of the relevant passages from the two

Testaments becomes less important to him than the refutation of the

ever increasing stream of surprising and even horrifying interpretations

given by the Gnostics. The aim is certitude, and the certitude based

upon truth has, according to Tertullian's conviction, two main qualities:

it is concise, and it is simple. The first point is explicitly expressed in a

number of statements, which have been collected almost completely by

Zimmermann in his inaugural dissertation1. Particularly clear is the

introduction of the Treatise on the Soul (ch. 2, end): " Forthe Christian,


however, few words are necessary for the understanding of this matter.

For certainty attends brevety, and he is not at liberty to give a wider

range to his search than the solution permits ". As to the second point,

J.P.O'Malley rightly observes: " for him the simplicitas naturae is not a

fault of style, but the directness of the truth "2.

A connection of the two leading notions of conciseness and simplicity

occurs in a sentence in which Tertullian characterizes the interpretation

which Carpocrates the Gnostic had given of the worlds from the

Gospel of Matthew "until he has paid the last farthing" (Matt. 5:26) in

the following terms: "For this is how he tampers with the whole of that

allegory of the Lord which is clear and certain in its meaning and is from

1. Die hermeneutischen Prinzipien Tertullians (Leipzig, 1937).

2. Tertullian and the Bible (Nijmegen, 1967) 117.

20 J. H. WASZINK

the start to be understood in its simple sense" (De anima 35)3. The

expression simplex intellectus, which afterwards was adapted by Je-

rome and Rufinus in order to denote the intellectus corporalis in the

threefold interpretation of Holy Scripture, certainly goes back to the

term &Jik6vt\z, of the oldest Christian interpretation of the Bible. In the

Epistle of Barnabas (17.1) simplicity (djtXoTrig) is opposed to parables

(jtaqaPoXai). This striving for certitude and simplicity had as its

natural consequence a continuous fight against any form of superfluous

curiositas in the interpretation of Holy Scripture. This notion is of such

fundamental importance for Tertullian's polemics, and also so frequent

in his works, that it requires special attention. I can be brief since

Professor J.-CI. Fredouille's very important book, Tertullien et la

Conversion de la Culture Antique 4, devotes a whole chapter to the topic

"Curiosite et conversion" (pp. 411-442). But as Professor Fredouille

does not discuss this notion primarily in connection with the exegesis of

Bible, there is still room for a few remarks.

The point at issue here for Tertullian is that the form of Holy Scripture

presents an opportunity for speculations which could go on forever and

which may lead us away from the truth. Particularly important in this

context is a statement in De praescriptione haereticorum 14, where

(quoting Luke 18:42) Tertullian observes (par. 3) : " 'Your faith', it

says, 'has saved you' â€” not your preoccupation with Scripture (exerci-

tatio scripturarum)'\ Then there follows a passage (par. 4-5) in a form


highly concentrated even for Tertullian : "The Faith [the subject of the

preceding sentence!] has been deposited in a rule; it has a law and

salvation which comes from the observance of that law. Preoccupation

(exercitatio), however, consists of inquisitiveness (curiositas) which

has its sole glory in its pursuit of proficiency. Let inquisitiveness yield

to faith, let glory yield to salvation".5 Here the essential thing is the

connection of the three notions exercitatio, curiositas, and gloria; a

continuous occupation â€” for that must be the meaning of exercitatio â€”

with the exegesis of Holy Scripture is strongly connected with, nay,

even proceeds from curiosity, and this curiosity is in its turn equally

3. Hue enim tempera! totam illam allegorian domini certis interpretationibus relucen-

tem et primo qu-idem simpliciter intellegendam.

4. Paris, 1972.

5. Fides in regula posita est, habet legem et salutem de observatione legis. Exercitatio

autem in curiositate consistit, habens gloriam solam de peritiae studio. Cedat curiositas

fidei. cedat gloria saluti.

tertullian's principles and methods of exegesis 21

strongly connected with a striving for glory. As to the concluding

sentence, Cedat curiositasfidei, cedatgloria saluti, Fredouille (427, n.

65) rightly points out that formally it must have been suggested by the

well-known verse of Cicero: Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea

laudi. However, by pointing out the literary reminiscence we have not

yet said the essential thing â€” namely, that even in this purely Christian

context these words retain their full function, since for Tertullian gloria

is strongly connected with another notion, that is, with pagan philoso-

phy . The number of relevant passages is remarkably high â€” it is evident

that this is a fixed element of Tertullian's thought. I limit myself here to

quoting the most famous of these passages â€” namely, the words

occurring at the beginning of the De anima: philosophus, gloriae

animal. From the construction of the sentence in the De praescriptione

haereticorum it is evident that, for Tertullian, as Faith is on one level

with Salvation, an erroneous kind of curiositas is on one level with the

equally erroneous striving for glory among the philosophers.

From these statements it becomes understandable that Tertullian

regards exegesis of Holy Scripture in itself as a risky undertaking

which may lead from start to finish to faulty interpretations and which,

for that reason, needs an equally continuous control. This attitude was,

of course, primarily caused by a long familiarity with the consequences

of exegesis as practised by the Gnostics; but this fact, which in itself

might be a causa sufficiens does not offer a complete explication. After


all, Irenaeus had the same or even more experience in this field than

Tertullian, but there is a clear difference between the two authors. (In

this context we should not forget that Tertullian knew Irenaeus' work

thoroughly.) Kattenbusch observes that, in spite of all his activity and

all his vehemence, Tertullian, at least in his pre-Montanist period, is

almost listless ("fast verdrossen") in his explication of the Bible,

whereas a definite pleasure in exegesis is evident throughout Irenaeus'

work6.1 cannot subscribe to this statement, though I must agree that the

evenness which characterizes Irenaeus' interpretation is entirely absent

from Tertullian's work. In this context it is interesting to note that for his

description of the doctrines of Simon Magus and Carpocrates, Tertul-

lian gave a paraphrase, which is as much rhetorical as it is sarcastic, of

the description of these systems by Irenaeus. But Tertullian does not do

6. Das apostolische Symbol (Leipzig, 1894) 2. 77.

22 J. H. WASZINK

exegesis in a mirthless mood, as is suggested by Kattenbusch, but rather

in a concise and severe form, because he wants to avoid at any price an

interpretation which is incorrect either juridically or theologically.

This consideration, it seems to me, leads us in an entirely natural way

to the two main features of Tertullian's exegesis of Holy Scripture. Let

us first examine the idea of an interpretation that is juridically correct.

As a lawyer Tertullian knows perfectly well that, as Kuss obser-

ves7, "it belongs to the essence of every written text, that it often

admits of various and partly opposed explications". In this connection

two notions become particularly important and suggestive. The first is

the famous rule of the praescriptio, as it is explicitly developed in the

De praescriptione haereticorum. I limit myself here to a paraphrase of

the major theme : " In he debate between the orthodox Christians and

the heretics the latter need not even be admitted to an appeal to Holy

Scripture, for we, the orthodox Christians, can prove without appealing

to the Bible, that Holy Scripture does not even concern them".

Therewith a discussion with the heretics about the Bible has a limine

become superfluous so that there is no need further to examine their

falsa curiositas in exegesis.

This rule, however, which Tertullian had established himself, does

not prevent him from using scriptural passages continuously in his

polemics against the Gnostics. This was unavoidable, since all the

Gnostic systems were founded on interpretations of scriptural passages.


But the concept of praescriptio provided the advantage that, at the

beginning of the debate, the heretics could be considered to be already

defeated.

Particularly important in Tertullian's exegesis of the Bible is the

status or controversia ex scripto et sententia, which is too often

overlooked in the literature concerning this subject. In the schools of the

rhetors this notion used to be treated with particular thoroughness, as is

immediately evident from the treatment which it receives in Cicero De

inventione 2.42.121 ff. This status concerns all cases in which the text

of the law could raise doubts and lead to technical discussions. Cicero

makes the following distinction concerning controversies which turn on

written documents (2.40.116): "this arises from ambiguity, from the

letter and intent (ex scripto et sententia), from conflicting laws (ex

7. "ZurHermeneutikTertullians", Neutestamentliche Aufsatze, FestchriftJ. Schmid

(Regensbuig, 1963) 140-158; here p. 144, n. 24.


contrariis legibus), from reasoning by analogy, from definition". For

Terrullian the important issues are the categories ex scripto et sententia

and ex contrariis legibus. The first case concerns the endeavour to state

a contrast or at least a difference between the literal text of the law and

the intention of the lawgiver, the second the statement of a contradiction

between two laws. Thus in the De exhortatione castitatis (ch.4) in the

discussion of 1 Cor. 7:9 and 27-28 Terrullian makes a distinction

between passages in which Paul speaks in his own name (where he

permits second marriage) and passages in which he proclaims God's

will. The case is then declared to be one of leges contrariae in which, of

course, the lex divina has precedence. The status scripti et voluntatis

occurs in Adv. Marcionem 4.12.5 ff., a difficult passage, in which the

text is probably corrupt8. The starting-point in the passage is the Gospel

of Luke (6:1-5) in which it is narrated that Christ was rebuked by the

Pharisees because he had allowed his disciples to rub grains of corn

between their hands on the sabbath. On this Marcion observed that in

that case Christ is said to transgress an order of the just Creator of the

Old Testament, which statement may serve as an argument in favor of

his thesis that the just Creator of the Old Testament is different from the

good God of the New Testament. Tertullian's reaction is that the

situation is entirely different â€” namely, that in this case there is a

divergence between the scriptum of the Law and the voluntas of the

Creator who is the one and only God; at all events it is not necessary to


assume that Christ is acting here against the will of God. To this

Marcion is said to have given the following reply (whether he actually

ever did so is not entirely certain since Terrullian often follows the

rhetorical practice of occupatio, that is, the anticipation of his

opponent's possible objections9): in this case the law of the Creator God

does not diverge from His own will but from that of Christ, and that

consequently the distinction between the two Gods postulated by him

can be maintained.

At this point two observations are in order. In the first place,

Tertullian's habit of quoting so great a number of passages from Holy

8. The text gives (4.12.5; Corpus Christianorum pp. 569-570): Marcion captat statum

controversiae quasi... 'scripti et voluntatis'. De scripture enim sumitur creators et de

Christi voluntate color, on which Kroymann observes: "de Christi voluntate: animad-

verte to okoooooktitov; postulatureiiim : de creatoris."

9. Cf., for instance, my note on De anima 35.5 (pp. 415-416 of my edition, Amster-

dam, 1947).

24 J. H. WASZINK

Scripture has undoubtedly been prompted by rhetorical practices, as

was rightly observed by Heinrich Karpp10, but also by the habit of

quoting earlier experts in the entire legal literature of the time. Secon-

dly, the way of employing the regula fidei, which we are about to

discuss, is, as Karpp has also observed (40), clearly parallel with "the

way in which the Roman lawyer handles his regula iuris" â€” that is,' 'as

the latter derives his decision from recognized law, not from its sum-

mary in formulas, so Tertullian draws from the Christian faith as it was

handed on and from Holy Scripture, both of which are summarized in

the regula fidei."

We turn now to the second point â€” Tertullian's polemic against any

form of exegesis which is, in his view, theologically incorrect. From

what has been observed it is evident that this negative formulation is to

be preferred to a positive one since Tertullian never considered compos-

ing a running commentary on one of the books of Holy Scripture11. The

only thing which occupies him is to maintain correct norms of exegesis

in a polemical context.

At this point, Tertullian's opinion concerning the relation between

Holy Scripture and the regula fidei must be examined once more since

here there is still sub iudice lis, and a decision is necessary before we

can take further steps.

Let us first examine the different points of view. O'Malley arrives at

the conclusion that in Tertullian's works the Rule of Faith is much more


important than Holy Scripture â€” to say it in his own words:'' Tertullian

has taken a long step towards making the Scripture irrelevant". A

similar view is held by G.T. Armstrong: "In Tertullian the norm [for

exegesis] is firmly rooted in the regula fidei. The correct interpretation

of the Bible will always agree with the regula fidei, i.e. it will be

dogmatically correct. For that reason we may call the regula fidei the

fundamental principle of his hermeneutic"12. The opposite view is

defended by Flesseman-van Leer: "When... Tertullian demands that

each passage should be interpreted according to the meaning of the

entire Scripture, this is essentially the same as saying that it should be

interpreted according to the regula''13; and a little later:' 'But Scripture

10. Schrift undGeist bei Tertullian (Gutersloh, 1955) 22, n.l.

11. A commentary on a short passage is the De oratione, which is an explication of the

Pater noster.

12. Die Genesis in der alien Kirche (Tubingen, 1962) 97.

13. Tradition and Scripture in the Early Church (Assen, 1953) 179.


in its entirety expresses the regula" (see also 177, where the regula is

called an expression of Revelation itself: "not merely the fixation of

faith, but its innermost intention"). A similar view is held by Moingt,

who hardly mentions the Rule of Faith and observes: " 'La conson-

nance des declarations de la Prophetie et de celles du Seigneur' est la

grande regie d'exegese que Tertullien repete et applique partout"14.

In my opinion, the argument of Flesseman-van Leer cannot be fully

maintained. She begins with the observation that only in three passages

in Tertullian's works is the Rule of Faith explicitly connected with the

exegesis of Holy Scripture. First she quotes Depraescr. haer. 12: "Let

us seek... that which is able to become a topic of investigation without

harming the rule of faith." On this text she observes: "ThatTertullianis

thinking here in the first place of an investigation of the importance of

Holy Scripture is evident from the fact that a few chapters after he calls

these investigations proficiency in the scriptures." In support of this

interpretation she quotes from chapter 14 the words exercitatio scriptu-

rarum. However, these words are part of a sentence already quoted in

which the starting-point is Lk. 18:42, "Your faith has saved you", to

which Tertullian adds non exercitatio scripturarum. In that context,

however, the expression exercitatio scripturarum is contrasted with

fides: therefore, it cannot mean' 'proficiency in the scriptures" but as an

almost pejorative secondary meaning: "a continuous, restless preoccu-

pation with passages from Holy Scripture". After all, as we have seen,


this exercitatio is put there on a level with the wrong kind of curiositas.

Consequently it is not possible to quote the first passage as a statement

concerning the relation between the Rule of Faith and Holy Scripture.

But more damaging is the rash conclusion that the words "an exegesis

which is in accordance with the regula'' mean the same as "an exegesis

which is in accordance with the whole of Holy Scripture ". In support of

this she cites De carne Christi 8 where it is said that the texts, on which

Marcion and Apelles based their docetic Christology, should be inter-

preted secundum veritatem integri et incorrupti Evangelii. But here

Flesseman overlooks the fact that, when using the expression integrum

evangelium, Tertullian is not thinking of "The Gospel â€” or the New

Testament â€” in its entirety'' but of a pure text of it which is free from

14. Theologie Trinitaire de Tertullien (Paris, 1966-1969) 1. 174.

26 J. H. WASZINK

Marcion's continuous expunctions and alterations. In other words,

nowhere in Tertullian's work do we find a passage in which Tertullian

declares with so many words that for him the whole of Holy Scripture is

identical with the Rule of Faith. Therefore we shall, with the great

majority of scholars, stick to the statement that for Tertullian the regula

fidei (which he quotes four times apart from the passage under discus-

sion in Apol. 47.10, Adv. Praxean 2, andDepraescr. haer. 13-14), and

Holy Scripture exist beside each other as autonomous magnitudes.

However, as Kuss formulates it excellently (150):' 'Though the Rule of

Faith is the last and highest instance of the correct knowledge of Divine

Revelation and consequently of the legitimate meaning of Holy Scrip-

ture, the Scripture remains the source of the Revelation." In a similar

way H. von Campenhausen says that the term kanonlregula fidei

denotes "the essential contents of the Christian Faith itself, as it is

living in the Church, expresses itself in the tradition and the testimony

of the Church, and so, actually identical, also finds itself in Holy

Scripture"15.

A second argument may be advanced for my interpretation of the

relation between the Rule of Faith and Holy Scripture. The Rule of Faith

provides a norm for a correct and legitimate interpretation of Holy

Scripture only with respect to the true statements, the veritates, of

Biblical revelation which are contained in the Rule. Apart from these,

there are numerous things in Holy Scripture which can hardly be judged


immediately by the norm of the Rule of Faith. It is at this point that the

real exegetical work begins for Tertullian; and for this the most reliable

norms which are possible must now be created.

About these norms much has already been written, and in general we

may say that, thanks to the work of Zimmermann and Karpp we see the

main lines of Tertullian's thought on the subject with sufficient clarity.

Nevertheless, the subject is in my opinion more complicated than

Zimmermann realized. For we cannot â€” as this scholar does to a rather

high degree â€” limit ourselves to collecting a number of general state-

ments by Tertullian which pertain to the subject since, as we all know,

Tertullian has a gift for presenting a locus communis adapted ad hoc as

one of his firm and lasting convictions. Therefore we must always

15. Die Entstehung derchristlkhen Bibel (Tubingen, 1968)334.

TERTULLIAN'S PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF EXEGESIS 27

examine with great care â€” and caution â€” whether such a general

maxim is regularly, or at the very least more than once, at the base of his

interpretation and particularly whether it is in accordance both with the

general tendencies of his argumentation and of his conviction as a

Christian.

Now it is undeniable that the striving for certitude which, as already

observed, is the base of his entire system of thought, leads immediately

to two rules founded on the notions of clearness and frequency.

The starting-point should always be taken from clear and unambi-

guous passages, and these should always have precedence of figurae

and aenigmata. The most explicit statement occurs at the beginning of

the De resurrectione carnis 19. Here Tertullian is fighting opponents

who assert that in Holy Scripture the term 'resurrection' only indicates

the cognition of truth. Now Tertullian says: "If our opponents try to

throw any confusion into the discussion under the pretext of figurative

and allegorical language, everything will be established more clearly

and certainties will enter a demurrer against uncertainties." To be sure,

according to Tertullian allegorical interpretation should not be entirely

rejected, as demanded by Marcion; but as the old rule for allegories

(which we find already in Philo) has it, it may only be applied in cases in

which the literal sense of the words cannot possibly be regarded as the

correct one. This is stated in Scorpiace 11: "Nothing else will be

signified in Scripture than the very thing that occurs in actual fact."


Further, it is frequently said that Tertullian required the exegesis of a

passage to be in accordance with the whole of Holy Scripture. I must

confess that, in spite of repeated and intensive reading of his works, I

have never managed to find such a statement. The passage most fre-

quently quoted in this context is from Scorpiace 12: "Whom the Lord

chose both as disciples for himself to be instructed in all points and as

teachers for us to instruct us in all points." But from this no principle

can be deduced; and consequently we must conclude that there is no

reason to regard an accord with the whole of Holy Scripture as a

principle in Tertullian's work. On the other hand, Zimmermann is

undoubtedly right in saying that, according to Tertullian, the whole of

the Christian Faith should always be taken into account. But much more

important than is usually indicated is the requirement expressed in Adv.

Praxean 20 in the words "the few are to be understood in light of the

many (secundum plura intellegi pauciora)''. This is clearly directed

against the allegorical interpretation practised by the Gnostics who

28 J. H. WASZINK

frequently based a highly complicated construction of thought on just

one or two passages. It is hardly necessary to say explicitly that

Tertullian's thought is influenced here by the rules which applied to the

examination of statements of witnesses in Roman Law. The term

testimonium is here certainly more than a worn metaphor. And, if I am

not mistaken, it is also for this reason that, whenever it is somehow

possible, Tertullian wants to regard the literal sense of Holy Scripture as

the only one. Father Moingt observes in this context (1.177) : "car

sauver la lettre, c'est sauvegarder les realites de la foi". That is entirely

correct but it is on exactly the same level as the image of the witness who

has to speak in clear and explicit language. And parallel to the state-

ments in Holy Scripture are the utterances of the Soul which in De

testimonio animae 1.5 is formally treated as a witness: "Step up, soul

(consiste in medio anima)." It is this circumstance that explains

Tertullian's insistence on the correct description of the sensus vocabu-

lorum and his defence of the fides vocabulorum. This also explains why

whenever Tertullian regards a typological or an allegorical interpreta-

tion as the only possible one, he still does his best to give also a purely

literal explication. He insists that whenever one supposes that the text

contains a parabola or an allegoria, one has to stick to the tertium

comparationis and not look for an allegorical interpretation of every

detail which often only adorns or completes the metaphor; such "over-

interpretation" is a fixed habit of the Gnostics, who thereby come to


lose themselves in endless and useless phantasmagories.

One more norm is mentioned so frequently that we cannot but regard

it as an official requirement by Tertullian and give it the fourth place

after certainty, clearness and frequency. This is the rule that the cohe-

rence, both of the form and the matter of the text, should always be

taken into account. Of this rule we can find a great number of instances

in Tertullian's work, especially in the Treatise on the Soul. It leads to

the requirement in the interpretation of the Episdes not to allow Paul to

contradict himself. In De monogamia 11 we read: "Nothing is to be so

carefully guarded as to see that he [St. Paul] not be found self-

contradictory", and, more generally, in De anima 21: "But the state-

ments found in Holy Scriptures will never disagree." Further, no

contradictions between the Apostles are ever to be assumed, Depudici-

tia 19: "Consequently it is of importance for the whole sacrament to

believe nothing is conceded by John which has been denied by Paul.

Whoever observes this harmony of the Holy Spirit will be led by the


latter into his meaning; for the Old and the New Testament are inspired

by the one Holy Spirit, and it is there that their unity lies.''

Here we must turn our attention to the importance of allegorical

interpretation in Tertullian's work. Tertullian fully acknowledges the

existence of such interpretation as it had been mentioned explicitly in

Galatians 4:23-24; but he only wants to apply it in passages where the

literal meaning cannot possibly be what was meant. As we have already

observed, Tertullian tries to accept the literal interpretation as far as

possible. He seriously discussed this problem in two treatises â€” na-

mely, in the third book of the Adversus Marcionem and in the De

resurrectione carnis. In the former case his aim is to prove, or at least to

bring out continuously, that Christ, the son of the good God, is announ-

ced all the time in the Old Testament which, according to Marcion, is

the book of the merely just God. This leads to continuous typological

exegesis, in which allegorical interpretation, which was rejected by

Marcion, is also occasionally exhibited. But much more intensive, and

also more fundamental, is the discussion of allegory in the De resurrec-

tione carnis, the subject-matter of which is clearly for Tertullian one of

the most important articles of the Rule of Faith. Since for the dogma of

the Resurrection of the Flesh not many passages from Holy Scripture

could be cited, Christian thinkers had, for some time, begun to advance

further arguments; and Tertullian has tried, in the words of Zimmer-

mann (15), "in ever new forms and with all his ingeniousness to


formulate structural laws of allegory" ("Strukturgesetze der Allego-

ric, aufzustellen"). Thus we read: "So if allegorical passages and

significant actions and simple language throw light on the resurrection

of the flesh (even though the topic itself is not mentioned), how much

more determinative... are those which actually mention it?" (Res.

earn. 29). In Tertullian's opinion, the passages in Holy Scripture in

which garments are mentioned (the most important being Matt. 22:11

and Rev. 3:5) may be taken allegorically as indications of the resurrec-

tion. Further, this treatise contains long discussions of the level of

reality in imagines andfigurae which culminate in the sentence: "And

if all are figures, what are they figures of?" (Res. carn. 20). Karpp (28)

observes at the end of his enumeration of the rules of interpretation:

' 'Our conclusion is that it is true that, for his time, Tertullian understood

the rules of exegesis particularly clearly and that he enunciated them

with equal clearness, yet that his statements have the weakness of being

accidental: they are not rooted in an equally clear theological

30 J. H. WASZINK

perspective''. From what I have said it is evident that I agree with this

conclusion, though I must add at once that this fact should not be

regarded as a personal shortcoming of Tertullian. For Tertullian was

still fully occupied in building up a theology for the Latin speaking

Occident, and he was performing that task partly on the basis of his

knowledge of Holy Scripture, which he has acquired with such diffi-

culty, partly on the basis of his intensive education in rhetoric which

Fredouille and Sider16 have recently clarified. And although he has not

yet managed to acquire in this way a theological "Gesamt-

anschauung'', we must at the same time say that on account of this very

training his works display a fundamental tendency throughout â€” na-

mely, the striving for a certitude and a clarity which admit of no

ambiguity. Hence his continuous preference for what he calls the

simplex intellectus, that is, the literal sense of the words in question;

hence also the requirement, first, of the absence of contradictions and,

second, of an interpretation which, in the worst case, is in accordance

with the majority of the relevant scriptural passages. This is exactly

what Tertullian wanted to achieve and what he could achieve with the

means at his disposal. Whoever requires in his works a "theologische

Gesamtanschauung" is asking too much and is moving, so to speak,

against the course of history. For the absence of such a 'general view' is

the immediate consequence of the phase of the evolution of Christian

doctrine in which Tertullian lives, not of a personal wish to stick to


rhetoric and to rhetoric only. On the other hand, we are certainly

justified â€” a point strongly and rightly emphasized by von Campenhau-

sen â€” in speaking of a "Christian basic perspective" which is found

throughout Tertullian's works. For he is deeply convinced of the

truthfulness of the basic rules of the Christian Faith as they had been

formulated in the Rule of Faith which formally had not yet been entirely

established; it is in its defence that he needs all the techniques and all the

arguments furnished by his training both in rhetoric and in the rules of

Roman Law. Not infrequently this defence is carried out with much

spiritual fireworks and not without some very bad sophisms. It is the

fireworks and the sophisms which make us too often forget the strength

of the basic convictions which frequently have penetrated so deeply into

Tertullian's mind that he left them unmentioned where they could or

even should have been mentioned. But these basic convictions are

16. R. D. Sider, Ancient Rhetoric and the Art ofTertullian (Oxford, 1971).


always there, and it is these which induced a very important theologian

like Bossuet, who also knew better than anybody the limitations of

eloquence, to speak of "le grave Tertullien"17.

17. The phrase is attributed to Bossuet by A. d'Alte, La theologie de Tertullien (Paris,


1905)498.


W.C. vanUNNIK

THEOLOGICAL SPECULATION AND ITS LIMITS

In an article published in 1949 and later reprinted in the collection of

essays After the New Testament, Robert Grant showed that Irenaeus in

his Adversus haereses (2.28.2) made use of a philosophical handbook

very much like that of Aetius or Plutarch1. Irenaeus himself makes no

mention of his source. At first sight, it appears as though he sets down in

a casual way a number of topics where human knowledge falls short;

and the items listed appear to have little connection with each other.

Irenaeus starts the list with the flooding of the Nile, continues with the

migration of birds, the tides of the seas, et al., and he ends with the

differences between various metals and stones. Because the passage fits

the context so well, the impression is left that the bishop invented the list

himself. The only thing that makes a reader pause is the fact that the Nile

comes first of all. What importance could that Egyptian river have had

for an Asian living in Gaul? Readers as long ago as Feuardent in the

sixteenth century had seen that some of these topics were controversial

in antiquity 2. Grant was able to go farther and to establish beyond any

doubt the fact that Irenaeus had made use of a doxography. And this

fact, which can be corroborated by other observations pointing in the

same direction3, throws an interesting light on the bishop's cultural

heritage and his relation to the Greek intellectual tradition.

1. R. M. Grant, " Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture ".After the New Testament (Phila-

delphia, 1967) 158-164 (originally published in Harvard Theological Review, 1949).


2. F. Feuardant (1539-1610; see F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone, The Oxford

Dictionary of the Christian Church 2, Oxford, 1974, 509) published his edition of

Irenaeus in 1576; his notes were reprinted by A. Stieren, Sancti Irenaei.. quae supersunt

omnia (Leipzig, 1853) 2. 823, who also mentions Plutarch, Deplac. phil. 3, but only on

one item. See also the note of Grabe (in Stieren, 2, 828).

3. Cf. H. Dels. Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1958; reprint of the edition of 1879) 171,

on Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 2.14.2; W. R. Schoedel. "Philosophy and Rhetoric in the

34 W. C. VAN UNNIK

Once he has set the passage of Irenaeus in the framework of scientific

discussions on the points at issue in antiquity, Grant finds that Irenaeus'

attitude is much like that of the Stoics who "avoid inquiring into causes

because of their obscurity". This verdict, however, is not the last word,

for he modified it by adding: "But Irenaeus inclines toward skepti-

cism. .. With the skeptics he would say that there is no evident criterion

of truth" (163-64). Three years later he returned to the subject in

dealing with the role of doxographical manuals in education and re-

marks that "the obvious result of the study of such a compendium is

complete scepticism... In any event, our earliest witnesses to its use

employ it for sceptical purposes". Among these witnesses he finds the

case of Irenaeus "perhaps the most interesting because of the sceptical

conclusion he explicitly draws. He is stressing the complete adequacy

of scripture and the impiety of looking for solutions of problems not

given there. While he admits that there are problems in scripture itself,

he argues that they are not greater than the insoluble difficulties in

science"4.

Some seven years later William Schoedel took up the point again in

an article on "Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of

Irenaeus". He likewise demonstrated the bishop's use of a compen-

dium and then concluded that Irenaeus ' 'goes far beyond the Sceptics in

using philosophical doubt as a device by which to recommend Biblical

revelation" (24). Does that mean that Irenaeus was a companion and a


forerunner of those Christian theologians who had God serve as the

explanation of that which cannot be explained by human reason? Our

German colleagues have a fine expression for the phenomenon: "Gott

als Luckenbusser" ("God as stand-in"). The history of scientific

discoveries has revealed the dangers that beset this road, for the more

knowledge expands, the more God is replaced as explanation. Is Ire-

naeus on that path? It may be, and if so, we may deplore it, but we

cannot call him back. The question, however, is whether we can draw

this inference from his handling of that doxographical handbook.

Before we discuss the question, it will be helpful to look at the words

Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus", Vigiliae Christianae, 13 (1959) 23-24; W. C. van

UnnuX, "Two notes on Irenaeus", Vigiliae Christianae, 30 (1976) 208-209 on Adv. haer.

3.25.5.

4. R. M. Grant. Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early-Christian

Thought (Amsterdam, 1952) 80.

THEOLOGICAL SPECULATION AND ITS LIMITS 35

which serve as introduction to the topics picked from the manual. In his

refutation of Gnostic opponents Irenaeus reminded them that "we, inas-

much as we are inferior to, and later in existence than the Word of God

and His Spirit, are on that very account destitute of the knowledge of

His mysteries "(/Wv. haer. 2.28.1 )5. And then he continues in this way:

"And it is not surprising if this is our experience with spiritual and

heavenly things and in things that must be revealed to be known, since

even many of those things that are before our feet (ante pedes) â€” 1

mean (dico), that are in this creation, that are also examined by us and

are visible and are with us â€” have escaped our knowledge'' (Adv. haer.

2.28.2)6. To illustrate this point â€” namely, that some phenomena in

this world of ours are beyond our understanding â€” he mentions certain

cases which he has taken from his doxography. In the passage quoted

one expression attracts our attention, "those things that are before our

feet" (eorum quae ante pedes sunt), particularly because Irenaeus adds

a personal note of explanation: "I mean" (dico), etc6. He wants to

make it perfectly clear that he is speaking of things that belong to this

world of ours in contrast with the spiritalia et coelestia. It looks as

though Irenaeus is using a familiar phrase in the words "ante pedes",

but thinks it necessary to give it a certain definition so that misunders-

tanding is excluded.

There is another passage in which this expression ' 'ante pedes'' is

found in Irenaeus' work, namely in the last part of this same chapter


(Adv. haer. 2.28.9), where he is bringing his argument to a conclusion.

He directs his comments against men like Valentinus, Ptolemaeus,

Basilides and others who boast of their' 'universal knowledge" (univer-

sam cepisse eorum quae sunt agnitionem). Let them who pretend to

have such a "knowledge"about the invisible things, first explain the

causes for things on earth which we do not know. Then he rounds off his

argument by saying: "But if those who are perfect7 do not yet unders-

tand the very things in their hands and at their feet, and before their

eyes, and on the earth (quae in manibus sunt, et ante pedes, et in oculis,

5. Text according to the edition of W. W. Harvey. Sancti Irenaei... libros quinque

Adversus Haereses (Cambridge, 18S7); English translation of A. Roberts and W. H.

Rambaut in the Ante-Nicene Christian Library (Edinburgh, 1868-1869).

6. Dico = Xeyo), in the sense: "I mean"; see H. G. Liddell. R. Scott and H. Stuart

Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon9 (Oxford, 1940) 1034, s.v. m 9.

7. For the Gnostic as "perfect" see, for example. Adv. haer 1.6.4 ("they exalt

themselves by calling themselves perfect").

36 W. C. VAN UNNIK

et terrenis)... how can we believe them regarding spiritual and super-

celestial things, and those which, with a vain confidence, they assert to

be above God (de spiritalibus, et supercoelestibus, et de his quae super

Deum vana persuasione confirmant!)". Here again the expression is

used to define what is visible, earthly, in contrast to the heavenly; it

describes those things we can touch and see as distinguished from the

invisibilia... vel quae ostendi non possent, as Irenaeus had said in this

same context. In the description there is a certain climax: in handâ€” at

their feet â€” in their sight; the distance becomes greater, but it is still

within the reach of human perception.

It may appear that this is no more than part of a series involving the

senses: hand, feet, sight. Here lies the test for the ' 'knowledge" of the

Gnostics: if they can explain what is inexplicable on earth, they may be

trusted in their expositions of heavenly things. But of course Irenaeus is

absolutely certain that they cannot stand that test.

Is there not more, however, to this expression "antepedes"! It is

striking that in the former passage it is used without reference to other

parts of the body and that by itself it has the same significance as the

fuller series in Â§ 9. Moreover, the explanation that Irenaeus gives in Â§ 2,

introduced by the word "dico", prompts us to ask why it was added.

The impression is given that the author took up a familiar phrase to

which he wanted to give a special sense. The combination ante pedes

may mean "close by" or "in front of somebody" in contrast with a


long distance8. But it often has a more specialized sense, as in Pliny,

Nat. hist. 18.252, where the following question is put to a farmer:

"Why then should you look still higher and examine the very heaven?

Look, you have Pleiades [i.e. natural signs of the changing seasons]

before your feet (ante pedem)''. He should not look to heaven for signs

of the changing season, for he has them close at hand. The peculiarity of

the usage here is the contrast with heaven. Pliny the Elder gives in this

text a special application of a general rule: man should not gaze at and

search the heavens forgetting that he lives on earth. In the Latin world it

became almost proverbial9 in the famous line of the poet Ennius which

8. CiCERo. De oratore 3.160: ingenii specimen est quod Jam transilere ante pedes

posita et alia longe petita sumere, of an orator who use far-fetched metaphors; Tuscul.

5.114 : cum aliisaepe, quod ante pedes esset. non viderent, Me (sc. the blind Democritus)

in infinitatem omnem peregrinabatur.

9. A. OiTo, Die Sprichworter und sprichwortlichen Redensarten der Romer (Leipzig,

1890)274.


is quoted twice by Cicero : Quod est ante pedes nemo speciat; caeli

scrutantur plagas, "no one examines what is before their feet; they

search the regions of heaven" (Cicero, De republ. 1.18.30; De divin.

2.13.30). The dangers of such an attitude were often illustrated by the

famous story about Thales who looked to the heavens but fell into a pit.

The oldest tradition of the accident that befell the Ionian philosopher is

found in a famous passage of Plato, Theaet. 174a, where a slave-

woman mocks at the astronomer' 'that he should be so eager to know the

things in heaven yet should miss what is there before his feet". And as

Plato has Socrates say, the same holds good for a philosopher who,

when forced to speak on ordinary matters ("to discourse about what is

at his feet and before his eyes"10), arouses roars of laughter as he "falls

into a well and every kind of perplexity through inexperience" (174c).

But the name of Thales is not always mentioned, and the rule is

generally applied to astronomers and other people who occupy themsel-

ves with the heavenly world without knowing what happens on earth. A

storehouse of parallels collected from many authors was brought to-

gether by the immense learning of A. S. Pease to which we may refer

the reader11. From these texts it appears how well-known this rule was

in the days of Irenaeus, attested as it is by Lucian, Diogenes Laertius,

Tatian, Tertullian, and the doxography used by Hippolytus (Ref.

1.1.4)12. In this connection it is also good to remember the words

spoken by Creon in Sophocles, Oed. trag. 130, about the Sphinx: "She


caused us to let unclear things go and to consider what was at our feet".

My colleague W. J. Verdenius, professor of Greek in Utrecht

University, pointed out to me that the idea is already found in Pindar:

men must keep themselves within their own limits and leave the rest to

the gods; see, for example, Pindar, Pyth. 3.58-60: "A man must seek

from the divinities what suits the mind of mortals, knowing what is at

our feet and of what estate we are"13. It is, I think, clear that Irenaeus

appealed to this well-known rule in calling his opponents with their

lofty speculations about the heavenly world back down to earth (that is,

to what is ante pedes). He could have said about the Gnostics what the

10. Cf. Irenaeus' expression mAdv. haer. 2.28.9 quoted above.

11. A. S. PEasE, M. Tulli Ciceronis De Divinatione libri duo (reprint Darmstadt, 1963)

397-398; also J.G. P. Borleffs, De Tertulliano et Minucio Felice (Groningen, 1925) 43,

n. 3, with other references.

12. In addition to the references in Pease see also Aesop, Fabul. 72.

13. See also Pindar. Isthm. 8.12-15.

38 W. C. VAN UNNIK

unknown author of Pseudo-Justin's Cohort, ad Graecos 36 wrote

somewhat later about the Greek philosophers after Socrates: "Not

being able to know things on earth, they claim to know things in heaven

as though they had seen them". It is curious that the anecdote about

Thales is not found in Irenaeus' polemics since it would have served his

purpose so well. One more observation may be added. It is interesting to

see that the pagan Caecilius made use of this rule against the Christians:

If you have any wisdom or modesty, cease prying into the regions of

heaven and the destinies and secrets of the world; it is enough to look

before your feet, especially for those who are unlearned, crude, boor-

ish, and rustic; those who have no gift for understanding civil matters

are all the more denied the privilege of dicussing divine (Minucius

Felix, Octavius 12.7.). Here the same weapon is turned against the

churchmen.

The illustrations taken from Hellenistic usage will have elucidated

the contrast Irenaeus is making. Now the question remains why Ire-

naeus added that amplification in Adv. haer. 2.28.2. The expression

Jtod Jto6d)v (also with other prepositions) or ante pedes has the mea-

ning of "close by", "just in front of"; it could be used of any distance

either of space or time, but the distance is always very short indeed.

Some examples will suffice as illustration: Xenophon, Laced, republ.

3.4: "to look about in no direction but to fix their gaze on the ground

before their feet"; Aelian, De nat. anim. 16.33: in Libya one finds


cattle which are forced by the forms of their horns to graze going

backwards, because nature "does not allow them to see the ground

before their feet". Very interesting are two texts in 3 Maccabees14

about the Jews who had been driven together in the stadium during a

pogrom and expect death at any moment, "seeing the grave already

yawning at their feet" (4:8); they call upon God to rescue them with a

mighty manifestation of his power "from the fate already yawning at

their feet" (5:8)15.

14.C.W. Emmet, in R.H. Charles (ed), The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old

Testament (Oxford 1913) 1. 168-169.

15. The text of Addition to Esther E 7 =LXX 8:12 g is slightly corrupt, but for the

present purpose it is sufficient to see that the contrast is there between 6oa krtiv Jtaga

Ji66ag and iK tiov naXatoTEfxuv tatoqturv (cf. J. A. F.Gregg, in Charles, 1.681). Cf.

LUcIAN, De arte conscribendae hist. 13: only a stupid man can be pleased by praise of

which "the refutations are so obvious (jiapa jrooa?)"; Alexander 33 about an oracle

that was proved to be false because the boy who was concerned died a few days later


From these and other examples of this expression given in the

preceding pages it will be clear that taken by itself the words ante pedes

and the Greek equivalent denote a very short distance in space or time

ahead of a certain person. In the context of the contrast with "heaven"

it is an excellent expression to bring home to a person the small reach of

his existence. But Irenaeus while maintaining the absolute difference

between God and man, heaven and earth, grants his opponents a wide

extension of that reality expressed in what is "ante pedes'', within his

reach, namely this world ("such as belong to this world, which we

handle, and see, and are in close contact with").

After having brought down to earth his opponents Irenaeus demons-

trates that the physical world offers a number of phenomena, the causes

of which are beyond our knowledge. He does so, as we have seen, by

picking a number of topics from a philosophical handbook. He is well

acquainted with what was going on in the schools of his day: "on all

these points we may indeed say a great deal while we search into their

causes". For ages the discussions on these points had been intense and

lively in Greek and Hellenistic culture, as is seen in the history of

philosophy. They left their deposit in the manuals. It was not just

curiosity. It reminds us of the "beatitude" of Vergil in Georgics

2.490-92: "Happy is he who can understand the causes of things and

who can trample underfoot all fears and the belief in an inexorable

fate".


The first item in Irenaeus' list deserves separate comment. Grant has

already pointed out, that the curious phenomenon of the rise of the Nile

had aroused a lively discussion among Greek travellers and philoso-

phers ever since the days of Thales16. It is remarkable that Irenaeus at

this point shows his acquaintance with such debates, as is seen from his

words: "We can say many things â€” persuasive perhaps, or not â€” on

the subject" (multa quidem dicimus, et fortassis suasoria, fortassis non

suasoria). The word "suasoria" is taken from the school-terminology

" The oracle having been refuted so obviously (naoa Jiooag)". From Latin Literature

we may take two illustrations: Terentius, Adelphi 386: "This is what it means to be wise:

not only to see what is before one's feet, but also to foresee what the future brings ";

Tertullian. Deanima 6.8: "But intense mental preoccupation is generally unable to see

even before its feet".

16. Grant, After the New Testament, 161-162, and the monograph of D.Bonneau, La

crue du Nil (Paris, 1964) which does not mention Irenaeus.

40 W. C. VAN UNNIK

of the rhetors17. Among the many others who tried to find a solution for

this problem there is one to whom some special attention may be given,

because he was a fellow-countryman and a slightly older contemporary

of Irenaeus, namely Aelius Aristides. This famous rhetor devoted a

long discourse to the question (Aegyptius, 48 Dindorf = 36 Keil)18. For

our present purpose it is not relevant to go through the arguments and to

evaluate the scientific value of Aristides' discourse. Suffice it to say that

he informs his readers that he has travelled Egypt to its southern border

four times and has investigated everything. Unfortunately he had lost

his notebooks; otherwise it would have been very easy to solve the

problem. On this subject (he says) it is unlikely that anyone can take

anything for certain; but people talk much nonsense, some because they

stick to their own opinions, and others because, though not themselves

really convinced, jtejteiauivoi19, they pretend to be so to give the

public the impression that they possess knowledge about obscure sub-

jects (Dindorf, 438). Aristides passes in review various solutions that

have been brought forward and finds them inconclusive. In the final part

of his discourse he returns to his first point: those who express an

opinion on the subject do it only for the sake of controversy; they all

refute each other and "all guess, nobody knows": and he confesses that

he himself is not so clever that he can find a physical cause (Dindorf,

477). His own answer ascribes the solution of the problem "to the great

wisdom and providence of the God" â€” that is, Serapis (Dindorf, 488)20.


We do not know whether Irenaeus had ever heard of Aelius Aristi-

des. But the latter's discourse is relevant here not only because it has an

interesting verbal parallel to the passage under discussion but also

because it reveals the opinion of an esteemed author in Irenaeus'

homeland who had visited Egypt himself. When such a man could offer

no solution, it was clear proof that the truth had not been found21. In this

17. Cf. H. Lansberg. Handbuchder literarischenRhetorik (Munchen, 1960)2. 819, Â§

1244, s.v. for references. See also the word in Aelius Aristides at note 19.

18. References are by page numbers to the edition of Wilhelm Dindorf, Aristides

(Leipzig, 1829). The Aegyptius is contained in the second volume of this edition.

19. Cf. Irenaeus: suasoria, and note 17.

20. Cf. Bonneau, La cruedu Nil, 141: "fatigue a son tour d'examiner la chose en trente

pages, il finit son expose de facon fort peu scientifique: il attribue la crue a la puissance de

Sarapis".

21. Compare the words of Irenaeus, fugerunt nostrum scientiam, with the statement of

Aelius Aristides, Or. 48, Dindorf, 488: "how it comes to this point and whence it took its

rise escape observation". The last word (lotopiov) refers to scientific observation,

science; see Liddell, Scott, Jones, Lexicon, 842, s.v.


way views of the pagan rhetor from Asia shed an interesting light on the

statement of Irenaeus who, as is most probable, had spent his boyhood

in Smyrna.

For illustration of the other items22 in the list we may refer to Grant's

article. There is one final question: what is the structure of Irenaeus'

argument here? He reminds his Gnostic opponents of their actual

situation as human beings, living on earth, not in heaven. How do

matters stand with our knowledge of the physical world? It may be

thought that implicitly Irenaeus makes use of the argument a minori ad

maius: if even here on the world we see that so many questions remain

open, how can one dare to speak so audaciously on heavenly matters.

Some time ago I came across an interesting parallel to such an

argument in the Testament of Job 38:2-523. In a discussion with his

friend Bildad, Job says: "Who are we to pry into heavenly things as

men of flesh whose lot is earth and ashes"? Then he poses a question

about human physiology24; and when Bildad confesses his ignorance,

Job declares: "So, if you do not grasp the ways of the body, how will

you grasp heavenly things"? Consider also Wis 9:16, "And we can

scarcely guess at things on earth, and things at hand we find with labor;

but who has traced out things in heaven25"? Is this similar to Irenaeus'

train of thought? It certainly seems so from the end of the chapter (Adv.

haer. 2.28.9), but is it really the same? This question brings us back to

the point at issue.


Did Irenaeus draw a sceptical conclusion from his use of the doxograv

phic manual?

In answering this question it should not be left unnoticed that Ire-

naeus has something more to say. He accepts, indeed emphasizes, that

there are open questions about phenomena in the physical world, where

men have not reached a generally accepted, conclusive answer, but that

22. On the passage about rain, thunder etc. one may also compare the journey of Enoch

in 1 Enoch 17-18. They are in mysterious places and Enoch is permitted to see them in a

vision, but that is a unique distinction.

23. The date is uncertain: 1st or 2nd cent. A.D.; A. M. Denis, Introduction aux

Pseudepigraphes grecs dAncien Testament (Leiden, 1970) 103. We follow the edition of

S. P. Brock (Leiden, 1967).

24. Test. Job 38.3: "Food enters through the mouth, and again water is drunk through

the same mouth and travels in the same throat. But when the two go into the latrine, they

are separated from each other. Now who divides them"?

25. John 3:12 has a similar contrast but a different focus: "If I have told you earthly

things and you do not believe, how can you believe if I tell you heavenly things"?

42 W. C. VAN UNNIK

does not lead him to conclude that for that reason truth is impossible to

attain. Nor does he simply say with Aelius Aristides: God's providence

is the cause. Irenaeus could have done so, but refrained.

What is his position? His admission ' 'many things (sc. on earth) have

escaped our knowledge", is followed by the words: "and these very

things we leave to God''. This confession is repeated with regard to the

open question about the flooding of the Nile: There is no conclusive

answer; "What is true and certain and sure belpngs to God". At the end

of the list, he declares that we may "say a great deal (loquaces) while

we search into their causes";' 'God alone who is their maker can speak

the truth". So, when there are these open questions where men cannot

find the causes, Irenaeus is not led to resignation and a state of unending

doubt; but he leaves such matters in the hands of God. His answer "God

knows ", is not one of despair, but of firm faith in God. We men on earth

have partial knowledge. Irenaeus finds his epistemological position in

the words of St. Paul: "we know in part, and prophecy in part" (1 Cor

13:9, quoted in Adv. haer. 2.28.9). So Irenaeus does not hold the view

that uncertainty reigns everywhere and that no knowledge whatever can

be obtained by men. However from the study of his handbook and the

questions it raises, he draws the conclusion that in nature â€” that is, in

creation â€” "there are some matters that are unknown to man and

reserved for God, while others have come within the range of our

knowledge" (2.28.3).


Arguing then a minori ad majus he concludes: if this rule holds good

in the created world, it can also be applied to the spiritual world: "we

shall leave some questions in the hands of God" (Â§ 4). One such

question, and a famous one at that, Irenaeus mentions here: what did

God do before He created the world? His answer is this: Scripture

teaches us that the world has been made by God, but nowhere does it say

what he did before that moment (Â§ 4: Quid autem ante hoc Deus sit

operatus, nulla Scriptura manifestat. Subjacet ergo haec responsio

Deo). Irenaeus also refers to the example of Jesus who admitted His

ignorance (Matt 13:32).

All this serves to confirm his thesis at the beginning of Adv. haer.

2.27.1: "A sound mind, and one which does not expose its possessor to

danger, and is devoted to piety and the love of truth, will eagerly

meditate upon those things which God had placed within the power of

mankind and has subjected to our knowledge... These things are such as

fall (plainly) under our observation and are clearly and unambiguously


set forth in express terms in the sacred Scriptures''. There is no need for

us to enter into a full discussion of the role of revelation, Holy Scripture

and Regula Fidei in Irenaeus' works after the excellent treatment of that

subject by Brox26. Let it be sufficient for the present purpose to state

that Irenaeus distinguishes between two levels of knowledge, namely

the spiritual or heavenly and the earthly. In the latter some phenomena

can be known by men and others cannot; about the former, knowledge is

found in the clear statements of Holy Scripture, though there may be

difficulties that can either be solved by-starting from what is evident or

that must be left in the hands of God. But what God has revealed is

sufficient for man to attain full communion with him.

The experiment with doxographical knowledge did not lead to scepti-

cism, but to differentiation in our human knowledge of physical pheno-

mena: some things are known, other things are not. It should bring the

Gnostic who "imagines that he has acquired not a partial but a universal

knowledge of all that exists" (Adv. haer 2.28.9) to the confession that

now even with regard to the physical world this high opinion of his

cannot be maintained. What then are we to think of his knowledge of the

heavenly world that goes beyond and against God's revelation?! It has

to be rejected as totally unfounded. That is why Irenaeus calls his

Gnostic opponents back to what is ante pedes and confronts them with

questions from the handbook.

The opinion of Grant, expressed at the end of his article in 1949, still


stands: "The camera needs to be refocussed and the picture (of Ire-

naeus) taken over again... He represents the confluence of Hellenism

and Christianity no less distinctly than the apologists do". And though I

do not follow Grant's inclination to see a tendency toward scepticism in

Irenaeus, as I have argued in this contribution in his honor, I wholehear-

tedly subscribe to Grant's words: Irenaeus "is choosing from the

maelstrom of Greek thought what he thinks will be adaptable [and I

should like to add: useful] to the Christian religion" (After the New

Testament, 169). This I hope to have demonstrated at a particular point.

May it be accepted as a symbol of continuine friendship!

26. N. Brox. Offenbarung, Gnosis und gnostischer Mythos bei Irenaus von Lyon

(Salzburg-Miinchen, 1966). See the index (p. 221) for the pages of his book where Brox

deals with Adv. haer. 2.28 and its context.


FRANCES M. YOUNG

THE GOD OF THE GREEKS

AND THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

In his Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Chris-

tian Thought, a book whose scholarship and clarity of exposition is cha-

racteristic of its author, Robert Grant showed that a debate, generally

assumed to be peculiar to modern thought, in fact had its counterpart in

ancient philosophy and in early Christian apologetic and theology. In a

paper written in his honour, it seems not inappropriate to take another

philosophical problem which looms large in modern discussions and

enquire how far it was recognised and discussed by philosophers of the

ancient world and in particular by patristic theologians. The problem

chosen is that of religous language: to what does such language refer?

What sort of meaning does it have? How does it function? My purpose is

to show that ancient philosophers and the early Christian Fathers were

aware that religious language has peculiarities, and does not function in

precisely the same way as ordinary language.

Of course, the intellectual context of the ancient world was markedly

different from our contemporary situation; the questions do not always

appear to be the same, and the arguments were conducted according to

different presuppositions and terms of thought. Underlying modern

discussions is the suspicion that God-talk is somehow all a misleading

hoax, that in the absence of empirical tests theology can have no claim

to be a formal discipline of enquiry into reality; whereas in the ancient


world the issue was how to talk about a being defined as inexpressible.

It is important that this difference not be obscured, and that we avoid the

pitfall of distorting the ancient intellectual tradition in an artificial

attempt to solve modern problems. In order to keep the discussion

firmly anchored in its proper intellectual context, a patristic text will be

taken as a basis from which arguments and presuppositions may be

46 FRANCES M. YOUNG

extracted, then to be explained and illustrated from other ancient mate-

rial. The Five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen seem admi-

rably suited to serve as a springboard of this kind, partly because they

may be regarded as a concise summary of the patristic theological

consensus, but more especially because a central issue in the contro-

versy with Eunomius, the extreme Arian theologian of the time, was the

possibility of knowing and talking about God. Selected passages rele-

vant to these issues will provide triggers for our discussion.

1. Religious Language and the Being of God.

The Second Theological Oration (Or. 28) is concerned with the

question of God's being, and it is here that we find statements about the

possibility of using meaningful theological language. Gregory distin-

guishes two problems, the question of God's existence and the problem

of his essence or nature. His concern is with the latter. At the outset,

then, we meet the difference between ancient and modern discussions

â€” though the problem of God's existence is not entirely independent of

the question of what sort of a being we are discussing. Gregory,

however, assumes an intellectual tradition which required a cosmologi-

cal first cause in order to avoid an infinite regress, and indentified that

first cause with God1. Gregory dismisses the whole question of God's

existence in a brief paragraph whose very language reflects a long

tradition of philosophical thought (Orat. 28.6):

For, that God exists and that he is the creating and sustaining


cause, sight and natural law teaches us, sight by encountering

visible things beautifully ordered and progressing, immovably

moved, so to speak, and carried around, natural law by reasoning

back through things seen and ordered to their author. For how

could all this be established or constituted unless God brought it

all into being and sustains it? For no one who sees a beautifully

made lyre, well-tuned and in good order, or who hears its me-

lody, thinks of anything else but the lyre-maker or musician, and

1. Proclus, Elements of Theology Proposition 11: there must be a first cause to

avoid an infinite regress (cf. Aristotle. Metaphysics 994a). For discussion of the

cosmic god as the first principle, see e.g. Arnold Ehrhardt, The Beginning (Manches-

ter, 1968); A. J. Festugiere, La Revelation dHermes Trismegiste, Vol. 2: Le

Dieu Cosmique (Paris, 1949).

THE GOD OF THE GREEKS 47

inevitably imagines him even if he does not know him by sight; so

the creating principle is clear to us also â€” the one which moves

and preserves created things â€” even if he is not comprehended by

mind. Anyone who does not willingly proceed thus far in follow-

ing natural demonstrations is wilfully ignorant2.

At first sight it might appear that Gregory is using a form of the

cosmological argument and that therefore he did feel it necessary to

prove God's existence. However, the argumentative style belongs to

the tradition on which he is drawing and is by now no more than

shadow-boxing. For he goes on:

"but even this which we have formed in our fancy or imagina-

tion, or which reason has sketched for us, is no proof that God is,"

and proceeds to argue that God's being is not demonstrable or compre-

hensible.

Gregory, then, is concerned with the difficulty of expressing, or

indeed of knowing, one whose existence is presumed. For in the

background of Gregory's Second Theological Oration is the EUnomian

claim to define the nature of God. Gregory summarises his position as

follows:

To know God is difficult, to speak of him impossible, as one of

the Greek theologians taught â€” quite cleverly it seems to me; for

in saying it is difficult/he appears to have comprehended him and

yet escapes examination because of his inexpressibility; but in my


opinion, to speak of God is impossible and to know him even

more impossible. For what is known, some word can perhaps

make plain, if not adequately at least obscurely, to anyone who

has not completely lost his hearing or is mentally slow. But it is

altogether impossible and impracticable mentally (tf) Siavoio;) to

encompass so great a subject, not merely for the indolent with

lowly inclinations, but even for those who aim high and love God

â€” indeed for all created nature, in that this darkness and this thick

fleshiness gets in the way of perceiving the Truth... (Orat. 28.4).

[A little further on he adds:] It is not just the peace of God which

passes understanding and knowledge... but his very nature,

which is beyond our grasp and comprehension (Orat. 28.5).

2. The allusiveness of his words may be quickly observed by turning to the following

passages: PlATO, Timaeus 37-39, 47; Laws 10, 896D-902E; Laws 12, 966D ff.;

Aristotle, Metaphysics 1073a; Cicero. De natura deorum, book 2.

48 FRANCES M. YOUNG

As Gregory himself hints, a respectable philosophical heritage enables

him to indicate the intellectual absurdity and blasphemous character of

Eunomius' claims. The Greek theologian to whom he refers is Plato,

and the text to which he alludes is Plato's much quoted remark in the

Timaeus (28e):

But it is an effort to discover the Father and Maker of all this

universe; and it is impossible for the discoverer to speak of him to

all men3.

Gregory clearly takes this to mean that Plato thought that God was

inexpressible though not incomprehensible, and he proceeds to argue

that it is necessary to go beyond Plato. Thus he asserts both the

indescribability and the incomprehensibility of God. He therefore reco-

gnizes the problems both of religious language and religious

knowledge. Let us examine the background to these assertions.

/. God's indescribability: from anthropomorphism to the apophatic

theology ofPlatonism.

It is important to remember that all through the history of Greek

philosophy the gods of literary myths and religious rituals were in the

background if not the foreground of theological discussion. Philoso-

phers moved from criticism through toleration to what can only be

described as sophisticated credulity in respect of these beings, and their

philosophical theology was undoubtedly affected by these reactions to

traditional religion. The issue at stake was the character and nature of


the god or gods.

Cristicism of popular religion began in the presocratics, and is

especially associated with the figure of Xenophanes. Since in their

attacks on polytheism and idolatry Christian apologists used criticisms

drawn from the philosophers to reinforce motifs borrowed from Ju-

daism, it is not surprising to find several of Xenophanes' fragments

preserved in the works of Clement of Alexandria. From these'we learn

that Xenophanes had observed that men make gods in their own image:

3. A list of places where this is quoted will be found in J. Geffcken. Zwei griechische

Apologeten (Leipzig, 1907). It is found in two passages to be discussed later in this paper:

Clement.Strom. 5.12; Origen.Contra Celsum 7.42.


Ethiopians make their gods black with turned up noses, Thracians

make them with red hair and blue eyes; mortals think that gods are

born and have their own food, voice and shape; but if oxen or

lions had hands and could draw or produce images like men,

horses would draw the shapes of the gods like horses, oxen like

oxen, and they would produce such bodies as the bodily frame

they have themselves4.

Elsewhere fragments survive in which Homer and Hesiod are criticised

for attributing to the gods human faults like stealing, adultery and

mutual deception, and those who tell stories of the birth of gods are

accused of blasphemy no less serious than the blasphemy of those who

say they die (Ritter and Preller, Â§Â§ 98, 99). According to Clement,

Xenophanes asserted that there must be one god who is quite unlike

mortals in form and thought; and elsewhere we find accounts describing

this god as eternal, unoriginated (dyevnTog) and impassible

(djraOfjg), as one and everything, as neither finite nor infinite (cmei-

oog), neither moved nor at rest, but the greatest and best of all things5.

It is probable that late witnesses have distorted Xenophanes' vocabu-

lary, but it is not insignificant that later tradition thought that his

description anticipated Parmenides' One and the apophatic theology of

later Platonism; apophatic theology was clearly associated with radical

criticism of anthropomorphism.

This criticism of anthropomorphism, coupled with Plato's moral


objections to the traditional gods of mythology (Republic 2, 363-366;

377-383), made a significant contribution to later Platonic development

of a monotheistic doctrine of a transcendent Being with largely negative

attributes. That God has no beginning or end, is beyond time and place,

has no needs and, being perfect, is unchangeable, are deliberate,

contrasts to the gods of popular religion and mythology, even if other

more philosophical concerns have contributed features of Plato's Ideas

and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover to the total picture. The resultant idea

of God is summed up for us in Maximus of Tyre s Eleventh Discourse

entitled Who is God according to Plato? (9 c-d; 11 e):

He is the Mind which is Father and Maker of All, whose name

Plato cannot tell because he does not know it, whose appearance

4. Ritter and Preller. Historia Philosophiae Graecae (Gotha, 1913) Â§ 100.

5. For discussion see W. Jaeger. The Theology of the Early Greek Philoso-

phers (Oxford, 1947), ch. 3. RrrrER and Preller. Â§Â§ 100, 102, 106a.

50 FRANCES M. YOUNG

he cannot describe because he cannot see it; whose size he cannot

estimate, since he cannot touch it. "The divine is invisible to the

eyes, unspeakable with the voice, untouchable with the flesh,

unknown to the hearing; only by the most beautiful, most pure,

most intellectual... aspect of the soul is it seen through its like-

ness and heard through its kinship, the whole together being

present to the whole understanding..." God has no size, no

color, no form, nor any other accident (jitiOog) of matter, but he

has a beauty unlike any other beauty.

Clearly, Maximus interprets Plato in the same way as Gregory did: God

is indescribable but he can be perceived by the mind. Such is the

position found also in Albinus, Apuleius, Celsus and Numenius, as well

as some Christian philosophers6. Even though there is a possibility of

religious knowledge by means of direct intuition, religious language is

not possible, because there is no category by which we can speak of

God; Albinus puts it thus, so indicating the influence of Aristotle in the

Platonist traditions of this period:

God is unspeakable (&qqT|tog) and grasped by the mind alone

(ta> vu> u,6vq) \r\Kiog) because he has no genus or form, no

differentia or accidents; no quality or lack of quality, for he is not

deprived of anything nor is he composed of parts; he is neither

identical to nor different from anything else; he is not affected by

anything; he neither moves nor is moved (Didaskalikos 10).


In respect of such a Being, description, analysis and definition are

impossible. The categories of human logic are inapplicable.

2. God's incomprehensibility: other influences on apophatic theology.

Given that Gregory's interpretation of Plato is clearly consistent with

that of the Middle Platonist tradition, we might suppose that the more

far-reaching idea of God's incomprehensibility even by the mind has a

different source and background. In fact this very question has been the

subject of some debate since the publication of Norden's Agnostos

Theos in 1913.

It is in Gnosticism that extreme emphasis is placed upon the unknow-

6. A J. Festugiere, La Revelation d'Hermes trismegiste. Vol. IV: Le Dieu

Inconnu et la gnose (Paris, 1954), ch. 6.


ability of God. In the Apocryphon of John, for example, God is present-

ed not only as invisible and imperishable, beyond quality, perfect and

without needs, immeasureable, and undifferentiated, unnameable and

therefore indescribable, but he is also infinite and incomprehensible;

and in the Gospel of Truth, he is repeatedly called the illimitable,

inconceivable one7. The more graphic Bythos or Depth of Ptolemaic

Gnosticism expresses the same idea. Sophia's hybris was a desire to

know what is incomprehensible (Ireaneus, Adv. haer. 1.1.1; 1.2.2.).

Two questions can be asked. Where did Gnosticism get the idea from? Is

there any possibility that Neoplatonism and later orthodox Christian

theology reached the conclusion that God trancends knowledge through

Gnostic influence?

To give a clear answer to these questions is as difficult as it is to

produce a theory of Gnostic origins. At a time when scholarship was

dominated by the theory of the History of Religions School that Gnosti-

cism was derived from Iranian religion, Norden argued that God's

incomprehensibility was not a genuinely Greek idea, but was an adapta-

tion of oriental mysticim in a syncretistic age â€” so confirming the

suspicion of some scholars that Plotinus and the Neoplatonists came

under eastern influence. E.R. Dodds8, however, showed that Plotinus

based his teaching upon certain Platonic texts and the case for indige-

nous Platonist development was further argued by A.J. Festugiere (Le

Dieu Inconnu). Three passages in Plato are of particular importance ;


In the Symposium (210e - 211b; Festugiere, 79ff), absolute

beauty is described as beyond time, change, relativity, definition

or knowledge. In the Parmenides (142a; Dodds, 311), we read

that the One "is not named, nor defined, nor conjectured, nor

known, nor sensed...", and this text was understood to refer to the

Supreme God by the Neopythagoreans as early as the First

Century A.D. And the passage in the Seventh Letter (341 c-d;

Dodds, 311): "it cannot in any way be expressed in words like

other studies, but is suddenly born in the soul, as light that is

kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter nourishes itself, was

interpreted by Plotinus as meaning that the One is unknowable

except by a mystical union with it which is incommunicable.

7. R.M. Grant. A Gnostic Anthology (London, 1961) provides convenient transla-

tions of both these documents: see pp. 70-71 and 146-161.

8. E.R. Dodds. Proclus, The Elements of Theology (Oxford, 1963),

Appendix I.

52 FRANCES M. YOUNG

Thus Plato himself suggested to Plotinus that the One is beyond

knowledge (Enneads 5.3.12ff.); and in Proclus, the word ayvuicnoc,

is closely associated with aoor)tog (Elements Prop. 123, 162), a

word we have already found firmly entrenched in the Platonist tradition.

Platonist teaching was clearly amenable to development of a more

transcendent doctrine than previously outlined, though for much of its

history, that development did not take place. The reason for this was the

fear of likening God to non-being or matter; for in the Sophist (238c),

non-being is described as "incomprehensible and inexpressible (ocq-

qtjtov) and unspeakable and irrational (aXoyov, i.e., not subject to

rational discourse)"; and Numenius reflects a common Platonist view

when he argued, "If matter is infinite (ajieigog), it is unlimited

(doqiorog); if it is unlimited, it is irrational (aXoyog); if it is

irrational it is unknown (dyvajorog)9". Incomprehensibility was the

outcome of irrationality and infinity, which were characteristics attribu-

ted to formless matter. In the case of God, therefore, there was usually

an appeal to the possibility of intuition by the mind, even when it was

admitted that God's indescribability implied that he is hard to know and

certainly not knowable by the normal processes of naming, defining,

representing or categorising. Indeed, Numenius describes ways of kno-

wing God with the mind exactly like the Middle Platonists10, and yet

asserts that Plato said he was totally unknown11. Thus he admirably

reflects a basic tension in the Platonist tradition, though claiming


himself to be a Neopythagorean.

The interesting thing about Numenius, however, is that he clearly

knew something about Judaism12; and while God's incomprehensibility

was a possible development within Platonism, the texts of Hellenistic

Judaism feature this idea more prominently. It is doubtful whether

Wolfson13 was right when he argued that the doctrine of God's incom-

prehensibility entered the Platonist tradition through Philo, for even

though Philo is our earliest evidence for the idea, direct Philonic

influence on mainstream Platonism seems extremely unlikely14. Yet

9. Numenius. Fragments (ed. E. Des Places; Paris, 1973): 4a (13 Leemans); cf.

Proclus. Elements Prop. 11.

10. Frg. 2 (11 Leemans).

11. Frg. la-c (9a-b; 32 Leemans).

12. Frg. 17 (26 Leemans).

13. H. A. Wolfson.Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), vol. 2, ch. 11.

14. Danielou also assumes that Middle Platonism came under the influence of Judaism

Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture (London/Philadelphia, 1973); but cf. John

Dillon. The Middle Platonists (London, 1977) 144.


Norden was certainly right in noting that this idea is more obviously to

be found in the writings of Jews like Philo and Josephus, and texts

where there is the most striking development of these doctrines, namely

the Hermetic writings and the literature of Gnosticism, are now thought

to have come under the influence of Judaism as well as Hellenistic

philosophy. If Judaism in general and Philo in particular had little

influence upon mainstream Platonism, both certainly affected Christian

philosophy; and it is the congruence of Platonic and Hellenistic-Jewish

motifs which contributed to the Christian understanding of God. The

fact that Jews never pronounced God's name, never made images of

him, and used scriptures which asserted that the greatest prophet of all

had no direct confrontation with God, "for no one can see God and

live", undoubtedly contributed to this "negative" Jewish theology.

Words emphasising God's otherness and incomparability seem to have

been particularly characteristic of Hellenistic Judaism, and so entered

Christian tradition: God is unapproachable (outoooitog), untraceable

(dveîxviaarog) and inscrutable (dveêqeuvntog)15; so he is incom-

prehensible (dKatdXriJTrog). Not surprisingly many of the terms of

Hellenistic Judaism and of philosophy overlapped, and in Christian

tradition they tended to be amalgamated, as previously in Philo, so as to

point to a more ultimate transcendence than the mainstream Platonist

tradition suggested. Thus God came to be regarded as beyond human

understanding, as well as beyond human language.


3. The apophatic tradition in Christian writings.

In Gregory's Second Theological Oration, many of the terms of apo-

phatic theology make their appearance: the divine is incorporeal

(doxoumov) and therefore infinite (djteioov), unlimited (dooiorov),

without shape (doxTiudtiotov), untouchable (dvcuprig) and invisible

(dogatov); he is unbegotten (dyevvTitov)/without beginning

(dvctqxOv), unchangeable (dvaXAoiwtov),imperishable (dqp6ao-

tov); he is the One who is "incomposite and incomparable by nature"

But none of these nagative terms, Gregory argues, tells us what he is in

his being and hypothesis; their opposites, corporeal, mortal, begotten

and so on, may be used of a man, a horse or a cow, but we need to know

15.1 Tim 6:16; Rom 11:33; Ephes 3:8; + LXX, Philo, Josephus.

54 FRANCES M. YOUNG

what the subject is in order to present these objects clearly to the mind.

Eunomius' claim to define God as agennetos, and so to know his Being,

is therefore a false claim. God's Being is beyond our grasp and compre-

hension (dXriKiog iced cutepiA,r|jr.Tog).

In using these negative terms Gregory was drawing upon a tradition

of Christian theology reaching right back to the early apologists, who

had not been slow to adopt a philosophical inheritance which so admira-

bly suited their purposes16. On the one hand. Christians had quickly

adopted the refined theism of philosophy to characterise the God they

proclaimed as the one being to whom worship should be offered; on the

other hand, Christian apologists emphasised the criticisms of anthropo-

morphism produced by earlier Greek philosophy. However, as a result

of adopting these two intellectual traditions, Christians were driven into

a defensive position in respect to the anthropomorphisms of the Old

Testament. This problem pervades the works of Origen. He is not by

any means an isolated case, but he is an interesting one in that he was

obliged to deal with the problems in two quite different contexts. In the

first place he was confronted with the problem in his exegesis of

scripture, where he found it necessary to allegorise not only God's

hands and face, but also his wrath and his repentance17 â€” for emotions

and change are alike foreign to the nature of God as Origen conceived

him. Secondly, Origen faced the criticism and ridicule of the pagan

Celsus for whom the bibical narratives made an identification of the


Christian God with the Supreme Being incredible (Contra Celsum

4.13,71,72). "God-talk" which uses personal language of the divine

bristles with difficulties for the Greek intellectual tradition, and those

difficulties were fully acknowledged by an intellect as fine as that of

Origen. Origen was certainly aware that to speak of God reacting to or

intervening in the affairs of men was distinctly problematical. Neither

pagan nor Christian philosophers took traditional religious language

"literally"; but it suited their convenience to accuse each other of doing

so.

16. Typical passages will be found as follows: Aristides. Apology 1.1; Justin. Apology

2.6;Dialogue 114, 127; Tatian. Ad Graecos 4.1.2; Athen agor as. iegario 10.1;Theo-

phiijus. Ad Autolycum 1.3.4. For discussion see G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought

(London, 1936); R. M. Grant, The Early Christian Doctrine of God (Charlottesville,

1966).

17. E. g. Hom. inJer. 18.6. For discussion see R. P. C. Hanson. Allegory and Event

(London, 1959), especially ch. 8.


The problem of anthropomorphism is still at issue in Gregory's time;

for in the Second Theological Oration, Gregory replies to the objection

that Spirit, Fire, Light, Love, Wisdom, Righteousness, Mind, Reason

and so on, are all intelligible descriptions of the First Nature by saying

that none of these can we envisage without corporeal associations (Orat.

28.13):

How do you conceive of mind ? Is it not that which is inherent in

something not itself, and are not its thoughts, silent or uttered, its

movements? ...And Justice and Love, are they not praiseworthy

dispositions... making us what we are and changing us as colours

do bodies? (His point is that mind as we know it is contained,

moves, and is subject to change and interaction, while justice and

love are mere qualities of something else.) Must we not leave all

these things, (he continues,) and look at the Deity absolutely...?

What then is this subtle concept (utppavn, â€” mental contrivance),

which is (built out) of these (notions) and yet is not them...? For

every rational nature longs for God and for the First Cause, but is

unable to grasp him.

The radical rejection of anthropomorphism meant that the problem of

religious language certainly did not go unrecognised. In fact Christian

theology has proved incurably anthropomorphic, and one suspects that

some of the problems with religious language today are related to the

fact that Christian theism has tended to replace the apophatic tradition


with a kind of refined and sophisticated anthropomorphism; for God is

usually regarded as in some sense personal. The problems of that kind of

theology were patently obvious to the Greek intellectual tradition, and

Christian theologians affected by this tradition could not avoid recogni-

sing that religious language is not like ordinary language. To some

extent this was even imparted to the masses in the effect it had on

liturgical language, where apophatic terms heightened the sense of

God's mystery and were a constant corrective to the highly anthropo-

morphic language predominantly found in scripture and in expressions

of the Christian Gospel18.

For Gregory, however, the prime object was to discredit Eunomius,

and simply to reassert the traditional negative theology was not suffi-

18. F.E. Brightman, Liturgies Eastern and Western (Oxford, 1896) 1. 310, 322,

etc.

56 FRANCES M. YOUNG

cient for his purposes. Eunomius too inherited the traditions of apopha-

tic theology, indentifying God as the single, absolute One which is

invisible, without size or form, incomposite, undifferentiated and un-

changeable. The problem was that Eunomius thought that God's identi-

fication as the First Cause meant that his nature was definable in terms of

the negative attribute agennetos; and that God's unitary simplicity

implied two things, first that any secondary being, like the Son, must be

totally unlike Him, and secondly that definition and knowledge of God

was not merely possible but simple. An already observed tension within

the apophatic tradition itself became polarised in the Eunomian debate:

on the one hand, God was regarded as beyond the senses but known to

the mind; on the other hand, he was conceived as infinite and incompre-

hensible, though known indirectly through his works. Gregory takes the

latter position; Eunomius the former.

The Alexandrians, Clement and Origen, provide a good illustration

of the typical lack of clarity to be found among Christian thinkers before

the Eunomian debate. In theDe Principiis (1.1.6; 2.4.3; 4.4.9-10), God

is identified as incorporeal substance of Mind, invisible because he has

no shape, size or color, but perceived by intellectual beings through

their kinship with him. Yet even so Origen states that God is incompre-

hensible and immeasurable. In what sense then does he understand these

words? Origen explains that God is incomprehensible to the human

mind because "he is far and away better than our thoughts about him";


for "our mind is shut up within bars of flesh and blood and rendered

duller and feebler by reason of its association with material substances"

(1.1.5). In fact Origen has picked up an idea found in Albinus alongside

the insistence that God is Known by the mind (Didaskalikos 10), and

indeed this explanation is the one later offered by Gregory in our

passage from the Second Theological Oration. God's incomprehensibi-

lity does not mean that the mind cannot ultimately comprehend him, but

that it cannot until purified and released from earth. But Origen also

suggests that "no created mind can... possess the capacity to understand

all", and that even intellectual natures purified of the flesh, though they

acquire a good deal of knowledge, cannot comprehend everything (De

princ. 4.3.14; cf. Comm. inJn. 19.6.37). Is this a hint that Origen may

have recognised that God's being is in principle incomprehensible?

Hardly, for Origen in fact denied God's infinity on the grounds that this

would mean he was by nature incomprehensible â€” even incomprehen-

sible to himself (De princ. 2.9.1). Festugiere has argued that God's


incomprehensibility was admitted in the Platonist tradition in the sense

that God is beyond the normal processes of reason and definition; but

though incomprehensible to reason, he was not regarded as in principle

unknowable since he may be grasped by the direct intuition of the mind

after a process of purification (Le Dieu Inconnu, Ch. 6). On the whole,

Origen's thought moves firmly within this Middle Platonist tradition19,

though his suggestion was to be developed more radically by the

Cappadocians.

Philo had argued that God was incomprehensible in his essence, and

only known indirectly through his works20; this suggests a different

sense of the word "incomprehensible". Further hints of a more pro-

found understanding of God's incomprehensibility are to be found in

Clement of Alexandria. In an important discussion in Stromateis

5.12.81-8221, Clement repeats familiar texts from Plato and many

Middle Platonist axioms:

the first principle of everything is hard to find; ...how could that

be spoken of which is neither genus, nor differentia, nor species,

nor individual, nor number, and on the other hand is neither

accident nor that to which an accident pertains; ...he is not

understood by scientific demonstration, for this depends on prior

and more readily known principles, and there is nothing prior to

the Unoriginated.

But Clement also accepted that the logic of the Parmenides was right


when it passed from indivisibility, formlessness and namelessness to

infinity:

Therefore it is infinite, not merely in the sense that one cannot

give an exhaustive account of it, but in the sense that one cannot

analyse it into parts and that it has no limit and is therefore without

form or name.

Clement thus seems to acknowledge God's inexpressibility and incom-

prehensibility in a way more radical than that of most Middle Platonism

19. Cf. J. Whittaker. "foieKeiva voti Kaiouoias", Vigiliae Christianae, 23 (1969)

91 -104, for ambivalence in Origen and other Middle Platonists.

20. Philo. Leg. alleg. 1.91; Post. 169. Cf. Josephvs. Contra Apionem 2. 167;Aristi-

des. Apology 1.1; Justin. Apology 2.6. For discussion and references to Aristotle, see

Festugiere. Le Dieu Inconnu, ch. 1.

21. For discussion see E.F. Osborn. Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, 1957).

58 FRANCES M. YOUNG

which did not easily accept the idea of infinity into its understanding of

God; for, as we have seen the concept was firmly attached to the

formlessness of matter. As far as our evidence goes, both Philo and

Clement, probably under the influence of the Neopythagoreans, made

more of this aspect of the argument of the Parmenides than their Middle

Platonist contemporaries22. Yet even they do not seem to have deduced

from such a radical understanding of God's 'unlikeness' that knowledge

of him becomes impossible even for purified and perfected intellectual

beings.

In Gregory's Orations, we can detect a growing awareness of the

extent of God's incomprehensibility. In the SecondTheological Oration

(28), Gregory largely follows the position of Origen in that he explains

God's incomprehensibility as the result of impurities and deficiencies of

the human mind, especially in its incarnate state; he has, however,

adopted the distinction between essence and existence, claiming that

God's works give us knowledge of the latter, though his essence

remains incomprehensible to us. By Oration 38.7-8, however, his

understanding of incomprehensibility seems to have advanced further:

The divine nature is infinite and hard to understand; and all that

we can comprehend of him is his infinity â€” granted that one may

assume that because his nature is simple, he is therefore either

wholly incomprehensible or perfectly comprehensible.

He goes on to speak of the mind having no resting place as it seeks to


contemplate the "depth above", affirming again that God is infinite and

it is impossible to get to the end of him. Thus Gregory seems to suggest

that God's Being is incomprehensible because there is no possibility of

completely comprehending something that is infinite; God's incompre-

hensibility is no longer attributed to the inadequacies of the imperfect

mind, but to God's very Being.

Such a radical assertion of God's incomprehensibility is reminiscent

of the extreme statements of Gnosticism. Throughout most of the

orthodox tradition it had been overlayed by the Platonist confidence that

once the mind was sufficiently purified, it would know God through its

likeness to him. Where then did Gregory get it from? Gregory's imme-

22. S.R.C. Lilla. Clement of Alexandria (Oxford, 1971) 206: but see J. Whittak-

F.Rinote 19).


diate source Â£eems to have been the Contra Eunomium of his friend,

Gregory of Nyssa. E. Muhlenberg has made a largely convincing case

that the latter Gregory was the first philosopher-theologian to use the

idea of infinity in a positive sense, and that it was in the context of the

debate with Eunomius that this notion was fully developed23. Muhlen-

berg dismissed the hints in writers like Philo and Clement too cavalierly,

I think, but it is certainly true that God's incomprehensibility is more

consistently grounded in the infinity of his Being, and more positively

developed as a central theological concept in Gregory of Nyssa's works

than in any earlier writer.

Gregory's Contra Eunomium contains more explicit discussion of the

problem of religious knowledge and religious language than any other

patristic treatise, except perhaps for Clement's Stromateis. Gregory

asserts the utter unlikeness of the infinite creator and finite creatures, so

that no intuition of God's being is possible through realising one's

kinship with him24; and he insists that the traditional negative terms

suggesting that no rational discourse can give an account of God, and

that no analysis or definition is possible of an infinite being, means that

complete knowledge of God is logically impossible. He thus takes

Clement's assertions to their logical conclusion. God has no limit or

boundary; he cannot be compared with anything else; so he is inconceiv-

able. This is not simply due to the disabilities of human reasoning, but

it is a feature of God's very Being.


The simplicity of true faith assumes God to be what he is, namely,

incapable of being grasped by any term or any idea or any other

device of our apprehension remaining beyond the reach not only

of the human but of the angelic and of all supramundane intelli-

gence, unthinkable, unutterable, above all expression in words,

having but one name that can represent his proper nature, the

single name being "above every name"25.

Thus the apophatic tradition reached its epitome and the possibility

both of religious language and of religious knowledge was denied. The

denial was partly philosophical: there is no logic common to ordinary

23. E. Muhlenberg. Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa (Gottingen, I

1966).

24. E.g. Contra Eunomium 1.373-4 (Jaeger 1. 132); 1.446ff. (Jaeger 1. 156ff.) denies

the possibility of analogy on the basis of likeness: 2.67ff (Jaeger 1. 245).

25. Contra Eunomium 1.683 (Jaeger. 1.222); cf. 2.586 (Jaeger. 1. 397). .

60 FRANCES M. YOUNG

language and language used of the divine. But it was also partly

religious: a God worthy of worship is beyond comparison with anything

derivative from him. Gregory Nazianzen already recognises the latter

point in his Second Theological Oration when he asks how is God

"worshipable" if he is circumscribable26. If God is God, he cannot be

pinned down. Chrysostom too when he preached against the Eunomian

position stressed not merely the philosophical basis of apophatic theo-

logy but the religious awe inspired by one beyond speech or

knowledge27. The possibility of religious language has thus been denied

not just in the context of modern empirical scepticism, but as an

assertion of the profoundest religious faith. However, the nearest prece-

dent to Gregory of Nyssa's position is to be found in the Gnostic

Basilides, who wrote "the truly ineffable is not ineffable but above

every name which is named"; and even spoke of the non-existent God

making a non-existent universe out of the non-existent (Hippolytus,

Ref. 7.20-21). Certainly it is ironic that Gregory attributed to God all the

characteristics attributed by Plato to non-being (Sophist, 238c) â€”

/perhaps after all the logic of Gregory's position was a denial of the

' existence of God.

II. The reentry of religious language.

The Second Theological Oration (28.31) concludes that the nature of

the First Being surpasses the power of mind (vou kqeittwv); yet in the

following discourses, Gregory is able not only to give a detailed account


of his Trinitarian God and relationships within the Trinity, but also to

discuss many names given to God, particularly to the Second Person of

the Trinity. Does he give us any clue as to how he is able to use religious

language when his previous discussion suggests that it is impossible?

The only explicit clue in Gregory's theological orations is his state-

ment that God is not known in his essence but in his attributes (Orat.

30.17):

The divine cannot be named... For no-one has ever breathed the

whole air, nor has any mind located or language contained the

26. Orat. 28.7; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 3.109ff. (Jaeger. 2.

40ff.).

27. Chrysostome, Sur V incomprehensibilite de Dieu (Sources Chretiennes, ed.

R. Flaceliere; Paris 1957).


Being of God completely. But sketching his inward self from his

outward characteristics, we may assemble an inadequate, weak

and partial picture. And the one who makes the best theologian is

not the one who knows the whole truth, for the chain (of the flesh)

is incapable of receiving the whole truth, but the one who creates

the best picture, who assembles more of Truth's image or sha-

dow, or whatever we should call it.

It is on this basis that Gregory proceeds in the following paragraphs to

list significant names of the Godhead and of each person within it,

distinguishing names which are of God's essence and names which are

"relative" to his creatures.

Gregory was not, of course, the first to be faced with the problem of

speaking about the unspeakable. The problem had long since arisen in

the Platonist tradition. Platonism recognised three ways of knowing or

speaking about God, namely synthesis, analysis and analogy. Accor-

ding to Origen (Contra Celsum 7.42-44), Celsus quoted the famous

saying from the Timaeus and then added:

You see how the way of truth is sought by seers and philosophers,

and how Plato knew that it is impossible for all men to travel it.

Since the reason why wise men have discovered it is that we

might get some conception of the nameless first Being which

makes him manifest, either by synthesis with other things, or by

analytical distinction from them, or by analogy, I would like to


teach that which is otherwise indescribable...

Albinus (Didaskalikos 10) explains the three ways for us: synthesis

means building up a picture starting from the beauty of physical objects,

going on to the beauty of the soul, from there to the beauty of customs

and laws, and on to the vast ocean of the beautiful, so proceeding to the

good, lovable and desirable (an example taken straight from the Sympo-

sium); analysis means successive abstractions, just as we get to the

concept of a point by removing the idea of surface and then that of line;

the way of analogy means the kind of thing Plato did when he used the

simile of the sun in the sixth book of the Republic. In this way, the

Platonist tradition asserted the possibility of knowing God, and a more

popular account of a similar process is to be found in Maximus of Tyre

(Dissertationes 11. 7-9). The way of analysis clearly produces the

apophatic theology discussed in the previous section, but is counterba-

lanced by constructive processes of enlarging as well as purifying

62 FRANCES M. YOUNG

human experience so as to reach an intuitive grasp (sometimes regarded

as a mystical union) with the divine. Underlying these ways is the

assumption that man in his intellectual being is akin to God; by compari-

son with our knowledge of physical entities, God is unknown and

indefinable, but kinship with him makes possible a cumulative process

of overcoming the restrictions of the physical world so that the intellect

achieves an immediate rather than discursive knowledge of him. This

account derives, I suggest, from the need for an epistemology rather

than some kind of mystical experience, yet the Platonist tradition

certainly spoke of purification and of a process closer to religious

devotion than to a logical exercise.

The earlier Christian Platonists knew of these approaches to the

problem, but were not entirely satisfied with them. Thus, Clement

accepts the way of analysis (Strom. 5.11.71):

Abstracting from the body all physical attributes, taking away

from it the three dimensions of space, we arrive at the conception

of a point having position; from which if we abstract position,

there is the concept of unity.

As in other Platonist writings, the way of analysis, or the via negativa

produces the radical apophatic theology discussed in the last section:

"We know not what he is, only what he is not''. Origen (Contra Celsum

7.42-44) quotes Celsus'description of the three ways, and admits in

reply that what Plato has to say is impressive and that it is probable that


knowledge of God is beyond the capacity of human nature, but Origen

was less inclined to radical apophatic theology than Clement. Neither of

them make much positive use of the three ways. Rather they introduce a

quite different factor which enables them to speak of God positively â€”

namely the revelation of God through the incarnate Logos.

We affirm (says Origen) that human nature is not sufficient in any

way to seek for God and find him in his pure nature, unless it is

helped by God who is the object of the search... (Plato) does not

say that he is indescribable and nameless, but that although he can

be described it is only possible to declare him to a few... (God is

seen; for) "he who has seen me has seen the Father". (God is not

known by synthesis, analysis or analogy, but) by a certain divine

grace... by God's kindness and love to man...

Earlier (Contra Celsum 6.65ff.) too in reply to Celsus' claims that God

is unattainable by reason and unnameable, Origen had already asserted


that God is comprehended through his Logos and that it is possible by

names (in fact, those revealed in scripture) to show something of his

attributes so as to give an idea of his character. It is not philosophy but

revelation and grace which makes religious knowledge and so religious

language possible. The contrast between the philosopher's hopeless

search for God and the Christian's revealed access to him was becoming

commonplace in Christian apologetic literature, but Clement could put

the Christological claim in a more obviously philosophical framework

(Strom. 4.25.156):

The divine then being indemonstrable, is not the object of

knowledge, but the Son is Wisdom and Knowledge and Truth and

whatever else is akin to these, and so is capable of demonstration

and definition. All the powers of the divine nature gathered into

one complete the idea of the Son... He is not then absolutely one

as unity, nor many as divisible, but one as all in one.

Clement is utilising the Platonic distinction between a simple unity, a

one, and a composite untity, a one-many; for Clement, God is the

transcendent One, but the Logos is the composite One-Many, the

ontological link between the One and the multifarious creation to which

he gives unity. This being is knowable, but he is also the image of the

One, and therefore the one through whom some knowledge of the

transcendent God is revealed. The way of analysis may be counterbalan-

ced by "casting ourselves into the greatness of Christ" (Strom.


5.11.71); for the unknown is known by divine grace. Clement gives

further philosophical backing to the Christian way of knowing the

incomprehensible divine by a careful evaluation of the epistemological

value of faith, building up his discussion on the basis of both Platonist

and biblical precedents (Strom. 2.2.4-6.31; 10.46-12.55)28.

Thus the notion of divine revelation also provided justification for the

Christian claim to religious knowledge. The Logos of God was not

simply identified with the person incarnate in Jesus, but with revelation

in the word of scripture and in the works of creation. Thus, scripture and

tradition supplied possible "names" of God, all of which could be

regarded as revealed by the Logos; and further attributes could be

adopted from philosophy, since the best philosophy was plagiarised

28. For discussion see Ulla. Clement, 118ff.

64 FRANCES M. YOUNG

from Moses and so was equally derived from the revealing activity of

the Logos (e.g. Strom. 2.5.20ff.; 5.14.89ff.).

But what exactly was the status of the names? In what sense could

sucti language be regarded as descriptive of or corresponding to the

reality it sought to express? For Clement (Strom. 5.4.20-10.66; 12.82),

all religious truth was to be found in prophecies and oracles spoken in

enigmas; the mysteries were not conveyed to all and sundry, but only to

certain people after certain purifications and previous instructions. He

points out that symbols are characteristic of Egyptian religion, the

mysteries and Pythagoreanism, and that in the Old Testament the

tabernacle and its furniture have mystical meanings. Plato composed

myths which should be interpreted allegorically; myriads of enigmatical

utterances by poets and philosophers are to be found. So it is proper that

the "barbarian philosophy" should prophesy obscurely and by sym-

bols. The truth of scripture comes through a veil; we need an interpreter

and guide. The language of scripture is only an expression of the

inexpressible God in a very indirect way, and the problem of religious

language is closely connected with the problem of exegesis. Yet Cle-

ment is confident that somehow the hidden mysteries have been un-

locked; for the key is Christ. The true Gnostic inherits an unwritten

tradition by which he comprehends what is incomprehensible to others;

for nothing is incomprehensible to the Son of God. Through his incarna-

tion, faith has become knowledge, and the solution of riddles and


enigmas. The gnostic is taught by Christ to become like God and so to

know him. However in the last analysis, Clement's religious ideas are

negative. His God is the One, above change and passion, his Christ a

virtually docetic revelation of this static God, and his ideal Christian

(gnostic) an ascetic trying to emulate such a being. Clement is not really

attempting to find a basis for a religious language which has any life to

it. He regards the traditional language of the Church as allegorical and

symbolic, and the reality of God remains elusive and abstract. The One

is "without form or name, and if we name it, we do not do so properly,

even in terming it the One, or the Good,... or God, or Creator,... etc.

We speak not as supplying his name, but out of helplessness (djiooia)

we use good names, so that the mind has these for support and does not

wander after others". At bottom, the via negativa has obscured more

positive use of religious language, and Clement is remarkably close to

his contemporaries who accepted Homer by removing through allegory


the anthropomorphic elements and so the dramatic impact of the

poem29.

Origen, though sharing many of Clement's philosophical presupposi-

tions, was perhaps more successful in providing a basis for religious

language. For, recognizing the parallel between the Logos-in-scripture

and the Logos-in-flesh he spoke of both as divine accommodation to the

conditions of fleshly existence. Thus religious language, while recogni-

sed to be inadequate, was grounded in God's character and activity. The

scriptural "names" of God may need interpretation, and Origen is the

master of allegorical exegesis, but they cannot be dismissed as wholly

misleading. Indeed, Origen delights in listing the fascinating array of

attributes and titles which scripture gives to the Logos (e.g. Comm. in

Jn. 1.22; Contra Celsum 6.65); for these names are indicative of his

laving accommodation to mankind, just as the names of God himself

show something of his attributes and character. For Origen, the problem

was not quite so acute, since he clearly stated that God was knowable, at

least to spiritual beings; in Jesus Christ as much as possible of that

knowledge was made available to men in their present incarnate state.

Ultimately it seems, Origen allowed the Gospel of a loving God to

modify the God of Platonist philosophy (Grant, Doctrine of God, 29ff.);

he accepted that God's loving care for his creatures was real, however

anthropomorphic the idea, simply because of the evidence of divine

accommodation to the condition of men. Religious language, like the


incarnation, could thus serve as the flesh in which truth was clothed and

partially hidden; but the veil was not totally opaque.

Thus it was that Gregory inherited a tradition which dwelt upon the

attributes and names of God as indications of his being, as a basis for

religious language which was not totally misleading. This tradition he

assumed. He also inherited the assumption that the incarnation was the

basis of religious knowledge. But it was precisely this assumption

which was threatened by the Arian controversy, as many of the chief

protagonists realised. Athanasius repeatedly asked how Christ could be

the revelation of the Father if he was not truly his Son and entirely one

with him in.his being; but it was Gregory's friend, Gregory of Nyssa,

who came closest to grappling with the profound problem raised by the

29. For discussion of Hellenistic and Christian allegory, see R.M. Grant, The Letter

and the Spirit (London, 1957).

66 FRANCES M. YOUNG

Arian-Eunomian debate, and so with the difficulties of the relationship

between religious language and that to which it refers. What was the

problem he faced?

Up to the time of Arius, the prevailing assumptions of Christian

theology were those of the Platonist tradition, expressed in more or less

sophisticated form. The ultimate transcendent God was linked with

creation through a hierarchy of being which in varying degrees shared a

certain kinship with the divine. The Logos was at the apex of this

hierarchy, linked, as Clement had explained, with the one transcendent

God in his oneness and with the multifarious creation through his many

aspects and activities. Thus he fulfilled the same functions for religious

knowledge as the ways of synthesis, analysis and analogy, emodying

both-the difference and likeness between creator and creature. For this

ontological, indeed epistemological, structure to work, the Logos had to

remain poised between the transcendent God and everything else.

Arius, however, destroyed the hierarchy by focussing attention upon the

utter unlikeness of creature and creator, an emphasis certainly present in

scripture as well as implicit in the via negativa, but not so far allowed to

disrupt the continuous chain of Being. Arius in effect raised the question

where the line between God and his creation was to be drawn across this

hierarchical triangle, answered it by placing the Logos firmly on the side

of creation, and so destroyed the possibility of genuine revelation of

God in the incarnation, or genuine knowledge of God based upon man's


kinship with the divine. The orthodox reaction was not to deny the

existence of the line, but to re-draw it, so that the Logos was placed on

the divine side; but that solution also destroyed the hierarchy, made the

problem of Christology intractable, and undermined the account so far

offered of the basis of religious knowledge and religious language; for

now the Logos as well as God was defined as transcending human

comprehension. The consequences of this development and the new

theological structures it produced are to be seen most clearly in Gregory

of Nyssa, who more than any other, recognised that the radical distinc-

tion between creator and creature rendered the traditional accounts of

religious knowledge unusable.

Gregory's answer to the problem seems to have been two-fold: in the

first place, he grounded all religious knowledge in God's will to make

himself known; in the second place, he established on this basis a

symbolic theology through which some degree of theological

knowledge was made possible (Muhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Got-


tes). These two points may be clarified by examining his treatment of

"names", a recurring theme in the works against Eunomius .

Gregory basically believed that "reason supplied us with but a dim

and imperfect comprehension of the divine nature; but nevertheless the

knowledge that we can gather from the names which piety allows us to

apply to it, is sufficient for our limited capacity"30.

1. The names are inadequate and humanly contrived expression.

Gregory grounds his theory of religious language in a general theory of

language: all language depends upon created human speech and the

existence of different languages is a clear indication that God allowed

men the freedom to invent and develop linguistic expression31. This

means that no human language is God-given, not even Hebrew32.

Gregory, because of his high doctrine of God's transcendence, has

come close to recognising the cultural relativity of scripture, and he

certainly asserts that the names of God are the work of human thought

and conception. Gregory does not hesitate to speak of the vast range and

variety of nomenclature devised by man, and he thinks men "have a

right to such word-building"33. "We allow ourselves the use of many

diverse appellations in regard to him, adapting them to our point of

view. For whereas no one suitable word has been found to express the

divine nature, we address God by many names, each by some distinctive

touch adding something fresh to our notions of him â€” thus reaching by a

variety of nomenclature to gain some glimmerings for the comprehen-


sion of what we seek"34. Gregory realised that man creates his own

conceptions of God.

2. The names are not arbitrary, but are grounded in the prior existence

and activity of God.

The inventive activity of man is not independent of a prior reality:

" we do not say that the nature of things was of human invention but only

30. Contra Eunomium 2.130 (Jaeger. 1. 263).

31. 2.200ff; 246-250; 284; 406 (Jaeger, 1. 283; 298-9; 310; 344).

32. 2.260-61 (Jaeger, 1. 302).

33. 2.148 (Jaeger. 1.298).

34. 2.145 (Jaeger. 1.267).

68 FRANCES M. YOUNG

their names"35. Likewise religious language is grounded in what man

perceives of God's operations36: through contemplation of the works of

God, certain peculiar and appropriate names are derived. Creation and

scripture guarantee that the names of God are more than a figment of the

human imagination; for creation and scripture are expressive of God's

will and God is truth. They provide an adequate though limited means of

communication, like the gesture and signs used in communicating with

the deaf37. Though he has to accommodate himself to the limitations of

human perception, God cannot be a party to deception38. So when

scripture honours the only-begotten with the same names as the Father,

it must imply that he shares the dignity and honour of the Godhead.

Furthermore, if the Word of God names God the Father, he must

eternally and unchangeably have been Father, and therefore must have

had a Son39. The names have sufficient grounding in reality to form a

basis for theological argument.

3. The names cannot be totally misleading, but they do have to be

interpreted by indicating the similarities and differences between their

application to human beings and to the divine.

"There is a similarity of names between things human and things

divine, revealing nevertheless underneath this sameness a wide diffe-

rence in meanings"40. For example, "We think of man's generation

one way; we surmise of the divine generation in another"; for in the case

of divine generation, the mind has to reject notions of sex and passion,


of time and place, and think simply of the Son as being eternally derived

from the Father. So wide is the gulf between creator and creature, finite

and infinite, that different attributes or names have to be associated

together in order to correct one another. But Eunomius' attempt to treat

all titles of the Logos, including Son of God, as metaphorical will not

do41. Even though "the infinity of God exceeds all the significance and

35. 2.283 (Jaeger. 1. 310); cf. 2.171 (Jaeger, 1. 275); God is not a concept of mind.

36. 2.149-154(Jaeger, I. 268-70); cf. 2.12ff. (Jaeger, 1. 230).

37. 2.417-21 (Jaeger, 1. 348-9).

38.â€¢2.325 (Jaeger, 1.321).

39. 2.15 (Jaeger, 1. 231); cf. 1.556, 591ff. (Jaeger, 1. 187, 196ff). Refutatio

Confessionis Eunomii 7 (Jaeger, 2. 315).

40. 1.620-633 (Jaeger. 1. 205-208); 3.76-7 (Jaeger, 2. 30-31).

41. 2.294ff (Jaeger, 1. 313ff); cf. 3.128-9 (Jaeger, 2. 46-7).


comprehension that names can furnish"42, if such names are truly

predicable of God, they should be understood in their most natural and

obvious sense, though with a heightened and more glorious meaning43.

4. The names do not all have the same status; some refer to God

absolutely and some are relative, and theological discourse can only

proceed by distinguishing these senses.

In a number of passages44, this kind of distinction is made: "God is

called Father and King and other names innumerable in scripture. Of

these names, some can be pronounced absolutely... like immortal etc.;

others express his service towards something, like Helper, Champion,

Rescuer... Some are both absolute and relative, like God or good."

Gregory makes use of this distinction when he insists that Fatherhood is

an absolute not a relative term: "Son of the Father" must be distinguish-

ed from "Shepherd", "Light", "Resurrection", etc. This discussion

easily slips into a traditional Christological pattern with a tendency to

assign the former kind of terms to Christ's Godhead and the latter to his

Manhood; thus the rhetorical use of Christological paradoxes, so cha-

racteristic of Christian preaching and liturgy, is grounded in an attempt

at logical distinctions. The whole point of the exercise was to clarify the

status and therefore the theological usefulness of the symbols implied by

the names. The kind of thing they wanted to say was that God is

absolutely Father of the Son, but not absolutely our Father47. They were

attempting to distinguish degrees of symbolic usage in religious lan-


guage â€” from the purely metaphorical to a closer approximation to

truth. Hence this analysis of the status of names and also the somewhat

tedious effort to explain in what respects the names are and are not

applicable. If this analysis strikes us as somewhat arbitrary, that does

not detract from the fact they recognised the need for a critical evalua-

tion of the symbols used in religious language.

42. 3.110 (Jaeger. 2.41).

43. 3.87ff, 135ff (Jaeger, 2. 33ff, 48ff).

44. 1.570ff (Jaeger 1. 190ff); 2.130ff (Jaeger. 1. 263-4); 3.131ff. (Jaeger. 2. 47ff).

Cf. Gregory Nahanzen, Orat. 18 (Masson, 135ff).

45. 2.558 (Jaeger, 1.389).

46. 3. 131ff (Jaeger, 2. 47ff.). Cf. Gregory Nazianzen. Orat. 30.20ff.

47. 1.570ff (Jaeger, 1. 190ff.).

70 FRANCES M. YOUNG

5. The names can provide a positive theological language by indicating

a variety of attributes without endangering the transcendent unity of

God's nature.

Gregory's discussion appears in the context of Eunomius' attempt to

reduce the names to one essential definition entirely expressive of God's

Being. Gregory counters this by insisting that no name provides a

definition, all are simply attributes48, and all are necessary to express

different aspects of the total infinite reality beyond our grasp: "while the

divine nature is simple... and cannot be viewed under any form of

complex formation, the human mind...in its inability to behold clearly

the object of its search, feels after the unutterable Being in diverse and

many-sided ways, and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea

alone"49, and "because in such cases there is no appropriate term to be

found to mark the subject adequately, we are compelled by many and

differing names... to divulge our surmises as they arise within us with

regard to the deity"50.

Statements of this kind take us back to the passage of Gregory

Nazianzen with which we began this section. The two Gregories adop-

ted earlier traditions, but in a new theological setting they concluded

that theology can only produce a partial picture of divine reality. The

meaning of religious language can only be made clear by endless

qualifications. But through the attributes revealed by God's will, some

grasp and advance in understanding is made possible. The biblical


narratives, treated imaginatively rather than literally, can become lumi-

nous of a divine reality beyond human expression; and the complete

incarnation of one who was by nature totally transcendent was the crown

of God's loving accommodation to men and the triumph of sheer grace

which made possible man's assimilation to God. The possibility of

religious language was located not in man's natural kinship to the

divine, but in God's will to create and redeem; and the symbolic

character of religious language was no longer confined to allegorical

exegesis but was fully recognised in formal theology. It is likely that the

epistemological questions at issue were more important for this deve-

48. 1.587ff (Jaeger, 1.195ff.).

49. 2.475 (Jaeger, 1. 364-57).

50. 2.577 (Jaeger, 1. 394-5).


lopment than the mysticism so long presumed to be the basis of Gregory

Nyssen's theology51. The Eunomian debate forced him to face the

question how we can speak about an unutterable being, or know an

incomprehensible God.

III. Religious Language and its User

If God is beyond the grasp of human comprehension, then the normal

processes of human logic are inapplicable; as Gregory Nazianzen says

(Orat. 30.17), "the best theologian" is not the one who can give a

complete logical account of his subject, but the one who "assembles

more of Truth's image or shadow". The one best able to do this will

need special qualities of perception, and it is not unimportant that the

first of Gregory's theological orations (Orat. 27) is devoted to the

character of the true theologian.

In this discussion, Gregory draws upon two traditions: on the one

hand, he picks up the moral contrast between those who just talk and

those who act, a contrast which reflects the scriptural insistence on

doing God's word and not just saying, "Lord, Lord"; on the other hand

he utilises the catch-phrases of philosophers condemning sophists, criti-

cising the clever tricks of logicians who perform acrobats with words,

twisting absurdity into apparently reasonable syllogisms. Heretics are

accused of priding themselves on their eloquence and delighting in the

antitheses of knowledge falsely so-called (a phrase reminiscent of the

earlier battle with the gnostics); they make theology cheap by disputa-


tions in the market-place and at the dinner-table. Throughout the works

against Eunomius, the other Gregory also confronts his opponent with

the charge that his theology is confined to false syllogisms and quibbling

sophistries; his eloquent phrases and rhetorical rhythms are the product

of fussy conceit; his claim to have mastered God by the powers of

human reason is nothing short of blasphemous; he has been misled by

the pretensions of philosophy. By contrast, the true theologian, accor-

ding to the First Theological Oration, must qualify by meditation, by

purification of soul and body, and by genuine concern about the subject.

51. The case is argued by Muhlenberg (Die Unendlichkeit Gottes), for the Contra

Eunomium; and is developed in relation to the Vita Moysis by R.E. Heine, Perfection

in the Virtuous Life (Patristic Monograph Series, 2; Philadelphia, 1975).

72 FRANCES M. YOUNG

A hostile listener is incapable of receiving what the true theologian has

to say; he is bound to misunderstand it. For what the true theologian has

to impart is strictly speaking incommunicable, and the reward of both

moral and intellectual purification. The need for purification has deep

roots, of course, in the Pythagorean and Platonist traditions, and was

reinforced in Christian literature by the scriptural stress on morality as

the way of response and access to God; it had reached profound Chris-

tian expression in Clement of Alexandria's description of the true

gnostic. The description of the true theologian is rooted in a tradition,

and conventional polemic also supplied the motifs for characterising the

obnoxious heretic.

Yet these traditional elements should not blind us to a significant

point about religious language which is being recognised. Just as mo-

dern discussions of language have drawn attention to the importance of

the language user and his intellectual, social and cultural context, so

Gregory and his friend have come close to recognising that the language

of theology may have different meanings depending upon who is using

it and how it is being used. Ultimately religious language is grounded in

a Sitz im Leben outside which it is inevitably distorted. It is the Sitz im

Leben of religious language which permits the use of traditional, bibli-

cal and paradoxical expressions, for in their proper context, these

symbolic utterances are grasped by the attuned imagination. The atti-

tude of worship, the activity of contemplation and devotion to a particu-


lar life-style contribute to developing the necessary faculties for percep-

tion of meaning in what is meaningless according to the normal functio-

ning of human logical categories. For the Gregories, the Sitz im Leben

was the orthodox tradition of the holy catholic and apostolic church.

This tradition was their safeguard against arbitrariness in exegesis or

analysis of theological meanings. The heretic, they assumed, had put

himself outside the moral and spiritual context in which theological

language could be properly understood.

But their condemnation of this particular heretic was also closely

related to the theological problems examined in the last two sections.

According to the Gregories, Eunomius' principal error was to imagine

that God could be defined, that a complete analysis of the divine nature

was possible by using human reason. How easy it was to link this

particular theological position with blasphemous pride and relate the

epistemological question to the whole moral and religious life! It was

natural to suggest that Eunomius dragged Aristotelian syllogisms into a


field of study to which they were totally inapplicable, and so condemn

him for distorting the biblical revelation with philosophy. But the

fundamental conflict was not between Christianity and philosophy; nor

was it between a revived Aristotelianism and a Christianised Platonism.

It was a conflict within an intellectual tradition made up of all these

elements, a conflict involving different evaluations of the status of

religious language. For Eunomius, religious language, though often

utilising metaphors, ultimately had some objectivity since God's Being

was definable; the consequence of his position would be to regard

theology as an objective science available to all reasonable men. For his

opponents, however, religious language referred only obliquely to its

object, and yet not all theological language was merely metaphorical;

the theologian therefore had to operate within the context and rules of

this particular "language-game". Religious language could never be

completely accurate but must be symbolic; it is therefore in need of

constant correctives, and can only be appreciated in its proper Sitz im

Leben by a person totally committed and prepared by moral and intellec-

tual purification. Such a position never implied the absence of the object

to which religious language referred â€” simply the impossibility of

access to it, and the importance of sympathetic awareness in gaining

some faint glimmering of this incomprehensible reality. The theologian

is one who is sensitive to "disclosure situations".

In this brief concluding section, a process of natural drift has shifted


some of the terminology used from that of the ancients to that of our

contemporaries â€” for it should be clear by now that there are points of

similarity as well as difference in the two intellectual traditions. I do not

wish to pretend that there are patristic solutions to the problems of

modern theology â€” our self-consciously pluralistic world has become

too sceptical of appeals to a unique special revelation to accept such an

idea as a basis for religious epistemology, and the fragmentation of

Christendom into a welter of differing groups has rendered impractica-

ble an appeal to the catholic orthodox tradition as guaranteeing Truth.

What I do suggest, however, is that there are patristic counterparts to

some problems of modern theology and some of what they have to say is

extremely suggestive. A persistent conundrum is the relationship

between the logic of scientific explanation and the logic of theological

discourse. A persistent defence of religious language is based upon the

need for insight â€” for the response of faith â€” in order to appreciate its

meaning and to grasp in some measure both how religious language

74 FRANCES M. YOUNG

functions and to what object it refers. A suggestive direction is provided

by the patristic denial of anthropomorphism and consequent recognition

of the entirely symbolic character of religious language52. But how are

the symbols to be evaluated? By what criteria are they to be classified,

and interpreted? These are questions worthy of further exploration53.

52. Since this paper was written, Joseph C. McLelland's God the Anonymous

(Patristic Monograph Series, 4; Philadelphia, 1976) has reached me. A more detailed

account of the relevant material in Philo, Clement and Origen will be found in that work,

and a somewhat different theological assessment.

53. Note the important book by David Burrel. Analogy and Philosophical


Language (Yale, 1973).

WILLIAM R. SCHOEDEL

ENCLOSING, NOT ENCLOSED :

THE EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD

One of the baffling philosophical issues that sends Lucian's hero,

Menippus, on his flight to heaven for answers is whether the universe is

finite or infinite, whether the All is circumscribed or not (Icaromenip-

pus 7). It is generally conceded that the Greek intellectual tradition

indentified the intelligible with the limited and found it difficult there-

fore to associate the unlimited with the divine. Yet it was in this same

tradition that Philo and the church fathers found resources for a new

doctrine of God that ultimately resulted in a reversal of the Greek

evaluation of the infinite. The importance of the development can

hardly be exaggerated. On one reading of the evidence, it may even be

said that the conception of God's infinity served, aftermany transforma-

tions, as a presupposition in the emergence of the modem physical

sciences1. It was one of the merits of Robert M. Grant's book on the

early Christian doctrine of God to have uncovered some of the complex

sources of the new teaching2, it is our intention here to extend the range

of considerations that have a bearing on this issue.

The debate in the early church came to a focus in the formula

' 'enclosing, not enclosed'' and related expressions. The use here of the

verb "to enclose" (Tteoiexeiv) seems to have two main sources: (a) the

pre-Socratic description of the originative substance as divine and

enclosing all things3, (b) Aristotle's discussion of the infinite (Phys.


3.4-8, 262b' 30), of place (4.1-5, 208a 27), and of the void (4.6-9,

1. Ivor Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence (London, 1972).

2. The Early Christian Doctrine of God (Charlottesville, 1966) 105-10.

3. Cf. Aristotle.Phys. 3.4,203bl;Decaelo3.5,503b HY.Metaph. 12.8,1074a38.

76 WILLIAM R. SCHOEDEL

213a 12). The antithesis, "enclosing, not enclosed", first gains cur-

rency in Philo as a description of God and seems to owe its striking

formulation to an impulse to go beyond the Greek tradition in emphasi-

zing the divine transcendence4.

To say that God encloses all things and is not enclosed means for

Philo (a) that God is immaterial and not in a place5, (b) that he is

unknowable in his essence6, and (c) that he is creator of all things

(Migr. Abr. 183; cf. Leg. alleg. 3.51). Such themes presuppose a God

who transcends the cosmos and is not simply (as in Greek philosophy) a

factor in the totality of things. To be sure, the emphasis on God's

immateriality reflects, as an isolated theme, Plato more than the Bible.

But it points here in a new direction. For ultimately, it was to provide a

context within which the infinite "could be detached from the concept

of the corporeal, with which it had been essentially united in Greek

thought"7. An indication of the novelty of Philo's thought in this

connection is the emphasis, perhaps for the first time, on the idea that

the essence of God is unknowable8.

Philo, however, has an ambivalent attitude toward the infinite as

such9. Once he goes so far as to say that it is not right to think that God is

in contact with "infinite and confused matter" (Spec. leg. 1.329). In

such sentiments the influence of the Greek philosophical tradition is

strong. To be sure, that tradition was itself changing, but the very

restricted application of the term "infinite" to the divine hypostases by


Plotinus illustrates how even the most mystical of the Greek philoso-

phers drew back from a positive evaluation of the unlimited10. One

reason that the church fathers went farther than Philo in this regard is

4. Cf. Harry A. WolfsoNiViiVo (2 vols.; Cambridge, 1947) I. 247-51. 317-22.

Wolfson connects the formula with the Rabbinic teaching that God "is the place of the

world, but the world is not his place" (Gen. R. 68.9).

5. Migr.Abr. 182; 192-93;Somn. 1.63; 1.185;Sobr. 63;Post. Cain. 15; 18.

6. Somn. 1.184; Conf. ling. 138; Post. Cain. 15; 18.

7. Leclerc. Physical Existence, 65. Leclerc is speaking of Origen, but the comment is

equally relevant to Philo.

8. Wolfson. Philo, 2.94-164. But see now John M. Dillon (The Middle Platonists

(London, 1977) 155) who suggests tliat Philo was dependant on Platonism for his view of

God as incomprehensible.

9. A.M. J. Festugiere. La revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste, Vol. IV: Le Dieu

inconnu et la gnose (Etudes Bibliques; Paris, 1954) 109.

10. Hilary Armstrong. "Plotinus's Doctrine of the Infinite and Its Significance for

Christian Thought", Downside Review 73 (1955) 47-58.

THE EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD 77

that (largely because of the conflict with Gnosticism) they looked more

deeply into Greek sources and found there arguments that linked the

Oneness of Being with its infinity.

1. IRENAEUS AND THE GNOSTICS

That God "contains (xojqojv) all things and is alone uncontained

(dx(i)qTitos)" was given a position of central importance in Christian

thought by Hermas (Man. 1.1; cf. Sim. 9.14.5). The verb x^qeW

expresses fundamentally the same idea as the verb jieoiexeiv*1, and the

two come to be used side by side12. The close relation between place

(tojios) and space (xtoooi) in Stoicism may account for the appearance

of the new term13. In any event, the epithet "uncontained" had one

advantage over the expression "not enclosed": it suggested more rea-

dily that God cannot be grasped with the mind14.

In Hermas the reference is to God as the creator. In other early sources

such language is used (as in Philo) to attack polytheism or to explain

away Biblical anthropomorphisms15. The development of the theme in

Theophilus (AdAut. 1.5; 2.3),and Teach. Silv. (99.31-100.4) strongly

suggests the continued influence of Hellenistic Jewish ideas16.

But Valentinian Gnostics also knew that God was "uncontained"

(Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1.1.1) and applied the formula "enclosing, not

enclosed" to him (Epiphanius, Pan. 31.5.3). Moreover, there is asso-

ciated with this language an emphasis on divine transcendence inclu-

ding (somewhat vaguely) God's infinity and ineffability17. The fre-


11. In a saying attributed to Thales (Diogenes Laertes 1.35) we are told that "place

(tojios) is the greatest thing, for it contains (xcooel) all things".

12. Cf. Hippolytus,Pasch. 3;Clement,Strom. 2.2,6.1-3 ;DidYMUs,Derri*i7. 2.6.2:

Gregory of Nyssa. Contra Eun. 2.67-70, PG 45. 932C;MAXiMUs.AmWgu. lb., PG9\.

1184B.

13. Cf. Sextus Empiricus. Pyrrh. hyp. 3.124; Aetii plac. 1.20.1-2; Philo. Somn.

1.63-64; 1. 185; Conf. ling. 136.

14. G.W.H. Lampe.A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford, 1961-68)280-81.

15. Kerygma Petri, in Clement. Strom. 6.5, 39.3; Aristides. Apol. 1.4-5 (Syriac);

Justin. Dial. 127.2; Athenagoras.LÂ«/?. 10.1.

16. William R. Schoedel, "Topological Theology and some Monistic Trends in

Gnosticism'', Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour of Alexander Bohlig

(ed. Martin Krause; Nad Hammadi Studies 3; Leiden, 1972)88-108.

17. Cf. Ekkehard Muhlenberg. Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregory von Nyssa

(Gottingen, 1966) 178-83.

78 WILLIAM R. SCHOEDEL

quency of the view in the Corpus Hermeticum that the cosmos or God

encloses all things (11.18-20; 16.12; Exc. 6.3; 14.1; 15.1; 23.7, 48;

Frg. 26) suggests the inevitability of its appeal to Gnostics.

The problem that this language raised for dualistic Gnosticism is.

obvious, and it was exploited to the full by Irenaeus in the second book

of his work Adversus haereses. Irenaeus, who strongly advocates the

formula "enclosing, not enclosed" (the verb is continere or circumcon-

tinere â€” that is, jieqiexeiv)18, first attacks Gnostic theology on the

assumption that its two gods are outside each other. The main points are

as follows: (1) If there is more than one Fulness or God, he is no longer

the Fulness: he will lack what is beyond him; morever he will have

"beginning, middle, and end" with respect to those beyond him and

will be limited and enclosed by them (2.1.2; cf. 2.1.5). (2) Again, if

there is something outside the Fulness, either (a) the Fulness will

enclose it (apparently by definition) yet be enclosed by it (since there is a

Fulness outside the first Fulness), or (b) if they are separated by an

immense distance, there will be a third kind of thing that separates them

and encloses them; moreover, if it is assumed that this third thing is itself

limited, the process will go on ad infinitum (2.1.3-4).

This argumentation shows the influence of a stream of ideas reflected

most clearly in the Pseudo-Aristotelian, De Melisso, Xenophane, Gor-

gia (first century A.D. according to Diels) where the thought of Xeno-

phanes and the Eleatic philosophers are inextricably mixed. First, it


should be observed that Irenaeus is leading up to a description of the

divine being (Adv. haer. 2.13.3; 2.13.8) modelled on Xenophanes'

"One" of whom it is said, "All of him sees, all thinks, and all hears"

(Frg. 24; cf. De Melisso 3, 977a 36; Diogenes Laertes 9.19) â€” that is,

he is undifferentiated throughout19. The ancient opponent of polytheism

18. Bruno Reynders, Lexique compare du texte Grec et des versions Latine, Arme-

nienne et Syriaque de VAdversus Haereses de Saint Irenee (Corpus Scriptorum Christia-

norum Orientalium 141-42; Louvain, 1954) 1.87; 2.52,68.

19. The formulation is not unknown elsewhere in the early church. In Orac. Sib.

8.284-285 it is applied to God as the creator. More complex and interesting for our

purposes is the connection between it and the description of God as enclosing everything

(cf.CleMeNt, Strom. 7.2, 5.5; Eugnostos 73.6-11; Hilary, De Trinit. 2.6; Tract, super

psalm. 118.19.8; 129.3; Ambrose, Defide 1.16.106). Justin (Dial. 127.2)andTheoPm-

lus (Ad Aut. 2.3) offer what look like Biblijized versions of the same thought (God sees

and hears all things) â€” though a similar modification in Orac. Sib. 8.282 finds its best

parallel in Orph. Hymn. 64.8. Pagan interest in the formula is exemplified by Pliny, Nat.

hist. 2.5.14 (against polytheism).

THE EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD 79

is pressed into service against Gnostic dualists who, as Irenaeus sees it,

are led into error by thinking too anthropomorphically (2.13.3-4)20.

Irenaeus' description of God as "altogether like himself (totus ipse

sibimet similis) also reflects language especially characterictic of the

Eleatic theology21.

Second, the argumentation itself reflects features of the Eleatic rejec-

tion of the many. Xenophanes (like Irenaeus) begins by ruling out the

possibility of two or more gods by definition: God, to be God, must

"rule and not be ruled" (3,977a 27) â€” observe that this is a reasonably

close parallel to the formula "enclosing, not enclosed"22 â€” which

leaves no room for more than one. "For if there were two or more, he

would no longer be mightiest and best of all" (3, 977a 24)23. Again,

both Melissus (1, 974a 11) and Xenophanes (3, 977b 6) were unders-

tood to argue that if the One is thus supreme (or infinite, in the case of

Melissus) another existent would set limits to it (jreoaiveiv eiq or

jiqoc; or some such expression bulks large in the discussion) and thus

negate its supremacy (cf. Melissus, Frgs. 5-6). Moreover, having

beginning, middle, end is regarded as the mark of something finite in

this context (3, 977b 4; see also Melissus, Frgs. 2-4, where reference is

made to beginning and end and where these temporal categories acquire

spacial significance)24.

Irenaeus' second set of arguments reflects the same atmosphere. The

contradiction involved in the first alternative of thinking of a being


which both encloses and is enclosed reflects the mental habits of one

exposed to an argument like that of Xenophanes according to which if

God were not everywhere alike, the parts of God would both rule and be

ruled by one another, "which-is impossible" (3, 977a 38). The second

20. Philo probably harks back to Xenophanes too when he says (against. Stoic and

Epicurean views of divinity) that God is ' like (Suxnov) nothing of things in creation"

(Sonrn. 1.184-185; cf. Xenophanes. Frg. 23; Diogenes Laertes 9.19). Otherwise Philo

shows no special interest in this pre-Socratic philosopher.

21. Parmenides. Frg. 8.22; Melissus, in De Melissa 1, 974a 13; 974a 15; 974b 8;

Diogenes Laertes 9.24; Xenophanes. in De Melisso 3,977a 37:977b 1.

22. For the close relation between ntQitxeiv and Koatetv in relevant contexts see

Philo. Aet.mund. 106; 114; AthENAgorAs.L

us" may have been a selection of biblicial texts, i.e. a compilation of

passages showing contradictions in the Bible, to which Porphyry added

critical comments. Its purpose was to embarrass Christians by exposing

the fabrications of the Christian and Jewish scriptures. Sophisticated

Christians tried to gloss over such passages with allegory; Porphyry

unveiled them for public scrutiny and ridicule.

In his literary efforts Porphyry may have been helped by Origen who

recognized the difficulties within the scriptures and had published a

work entitled Stromateis on the problem. In this work he attempted to

rid the Scripture of its crudities and contradictions. As Robert Grant

observed in an article on Origen's Stromateis: "When he (Porphyry)

encountered the Stromateis of Origen, with their criticism of the Bible

and their subsequent allegorizations, he presumably found that a good

deal of his anti-Christian task had been done for him. All he had to do

was accept Origen's negative statements (although in many instances he

went farther along this line) and reject the deeper spiritual meanings

which Origen had sought to find. In this regard the critical work of

Origen provided a praeparatio Neoplatonica for the work of

Porphyry13".

If the "syskeye against us" could be identified with a work of

Porphyry attacking the Jewish and Christian Scriptures14, it may be that

the Phil. orac. can be identified with the work mentioned by Lactantius


in his Divine Institutes (5.2). There Lactantius mentions that while he

was living at Nicomedia in Bithynia, emperor Diocletian's eastern

capital, at the beginning of the fourth century, two works were written

against Christianity. One was written by a "priest of philosophy".

Although Lactantius seems to be referring to Porphyry, his reference

has puzzled scholars because the anti-Christian work included only

three books (Barnes, 438). It is assumed that Porphyry's work against

the Christians bore the title Ad Christ, and included fifteen books.

13. Robert M. Grant. "The Stromateis of Origen", in Epektasis. Melanges Patristi-

ques offerts au Cardinal Jean Danielou (Paris, 1972) 292.

14. There are difficulties with this identification. The fragment from Porphyry cited in

PE 5.1.10 (Harnack Frg. 80) deals with the rivalry between Asclepius and Jesus and

seems to fit better in Phil. orac. Yet Eusebius says it comes from the "syskeye against

us''. Here syskeye does not seem to refer to a book on the Scriptures. A further possibility

is that the syskeye was a compilation of several works written against the Christians,

among which was the Ad Christ, and the Phil. orac, but this hypothesis too has

difficulties.

PAGAN CRITICISM OF CHRISTIANITY 131

However, if Porphyry wrote more than one work against the Christians

and one of these works was the Phil. orac. it could be that Lactantius has

in mind the Phil. orac. which did include three books.

In his Ad Marcellam (4), a letter written to his wife when Porphyry

was an elderly man, he mentions that he had undertaken a trip because of

a "need of the Greeks". Porphyry's destination as well as the purpose

of the trip is not stated. Henry Chadwick has made the ingenious

suggestion that Porphyry was requested by the emperor to prepare a

defense of traditional religion to be used in repressing Christianity15.

When this suggestion is placed alongside Lactantius' mention of an

anti-Christian book written by the "priest of philosophy" it is not

implausible to suggest that the Phil. orac. was the result of this trip.

These circumstances would account for its novel approach to Chris-

tianity, when compared with other anti-Christian works. Instead of a

frontal attack on the Christian movement. Porphyry offered a positive

statement of traditional religion drawing his material from oracles and

the writings of ancients. Arguing from tradition and accepted religious

authority rather than philosophical ideas. Porphyry was able to give the

defense of traditional religion a popular appeal.

Date of the Phil. Orac

A major difficulty with the above argument is that the Phil. orac. is

usually considered a youthful work of Porphyry before he had become

the disciple of Plotinus. This view, championed by Bidez and Beutler, is


based partly on the statements of Porphyry's biographer Eunapius in his

Vita sophist. (457), and partly on an interpretation of Porphyry's philo-

sophical development16. A work defending sacrifices and appealing to

15. Henry Chadwick. The Sentences ofSextus (Texts and Studies. 5; Cambridge, 1959)

66.

16. R. Beutler in Pauly-Wissowa, RE XXII (1953) 287; so also Grant in "Porphyry

among the Early Christians", in Romanitas et Christianitas, ed. W. den Boer et al.

(Amsterdam, 1973) 181-187.

In dating Phil. orac. the statements of Eusebius should also be considered. In the PE

Eusebius refers to Porphyry as the one "who gained distinction in our time (icaO' ryuiz>

for the things against us" (PE 1.9.6). He says that he prepared the "syskeye against us in

our time" (5.1.9); that he was "celebrated in our time for his accusations against us"

(4.6.1). It seems that the phrase "in our time" refers to the very recent past; in Hist. eccl.

132 ROBERT L. WILKEN

the authority of religious oracles seems out of place after Porphyry has

come under the influence of Plotinus. But the reference in Eunapius is

unclear, as O'Meara (33-34) has shown, and cannot be used to date

Phil. orac.; furthermore, the assumption that Porphyry moved from a

traditional and credulous religious outlook to a critical view of religion

oversimplifies his intellectual development17. All through his life Por-

phyry respected the traditional worship and his student Iamblichus,

building on ideas he had learned from Porphyry, gave a theoretical

justification for animal sacrifice and even extended his religious practi-

ces to include theurgy.

Within the Plotinian school the Phil. orac. can be seen as a continua-

tion of work begun by Plotinus to refute the "Christians and others,

sectarians who had abandoned the old philosophy..." (Vita Plot. 16).

Plotinus, it should be remembered wrote a work against the Gnostics in

which he criticized them for their "innovations" which had degraded

the teaching of the ancients, particularly Plato (Enneads 2.9.6). The

work of Porphyry against the Christians may have grown out of the

series of polemical treatises written by members of the school of

Plotinus against upstart philosophical schools within the Empire. Por-

phyry, however, made his unique contribution by grounding his views

in traditional religious authority, i.e. oracles, thereby making his argu-

ments more accessible to non-philosophers, i.e. emperors and provin-

cial governors.


8 prf. Eusebius begins an account of "things in our own day", i.e. the "persecution in our

day" by which he means the years immediately after 300 A.D. When he wishes to speak

of events twenty or thirty years earlier he often uses phrases such as KaO' 6v (Hist. eccl.

7.29.1), in the time of Aurelian Ka6' oug (7.32.1), in the time of Felix; or similar

phrases, e.g. Kata TCriJoos (7.32.2). But Eusebius is not consistent. He refers to Paul of

Samosata who flourished ca. 270 A.D. by the phrase "in our time" (Ka9' r\udz) (Hist,

eccl. 5.28.1) to Theotecnus, who became bishop of Caesareaca. 260 A.D. with the same

phrase (Hist. eccl. 7. 14). He distinguishes events of the past from those "in our own

generation" but his own generation seems to include the years ca. 270 A.D. and following

(Hist. eccl. 7.26.3). The one reference to Porphyry's attack on the Christian scriptures

(Hist. eccl. 6.19.2) places them "in our time" (ko6' f|(i&5). The context suggests that

Eusebius did not mean the very recent past, yet the citation from Porphyry mentions that

he met Origen when he (Porphyry) was still "quite young" (6.19.5). But this phrase too is

ambiguous: Porphyry could be looking back some fifty years, i.e. from ca. 300 A.D. to

250 A.D., or he could be writing ca. 270 A.D. and looking back some twenty years.

17. A.C. Lloyd in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval

Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967)285.

PAGAN CRITICISM OF CHRISTIANITY 133

Conclusion

The Phil. orac. was a mature and sophisticated work designed to

defend the traditional religion of the Greco-Roman world. Reflecting a

profound understanding of the religious customs of the ancient world, it

was not an uncritical and naive collection of oracles, but an attempt to

link the religious traditions of the cities with the philosophical religion

of belief in the one high God. Although the Phil. orac. was primarily a

positive statement of traditional religion and theology, its further pur-

pose was the refutation of Christianity. To accomplish this purpose

Porphyry distinguished between the Christians and Jesus, praising Jesus

for his piety and wisdom, vilifying the Christians for their foolishness in

making him a rival to the supreme God. The growing importance of

oracles as authoritative religious sources in the third century provided

Porphyry with a new way of grounding the philosophical and religious

concerns of the neo-Platonic school.18 Phil. orac. is a testimony to his

brilliance in appropriating new developments within the religious mi-

lieu of the Roman Empire and his ingenuity in adapting these religious

currents to serve his philosophy as well as expose the weakness of

Christianity.

Porphyry's Phil. orac. also sheds light on the relation of Christianity

to Greco-Roman culture and on the milieu in which the Nicene contro-

versy took place. The reluctance of many Eastern bishops, among them

Eusebius of Caesarea, to go along with the theology of Athanasius may


in part have been determined by the presence of pagan critics looking

over his shoulders. For a man who took the apologetic task as seriously

as did Eusebius, it was surely disconcerting that some Christians

claimed Jesus was homoousios with the Father. How could Christians

hope to answer men such as Porphyry who argued that Christians had

abandoned belief in the one high God by making Jesus an object of

worship? In his apologetic works Eusebius' characteristic phrase forGod

is the "God above all" (DE 3.7.30-35; 8.3.13-15), aview he shared with

Porphyry and many other religious thinkers, both pagan and Christian.

18. Hans Lewy. Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy. Mysticism, Magic, andPlatonism in

the Later Roman Empire (Cairo, 1956); K. Buresch. Claros. Untersuchungen tum

Orakelwesen der spaeteren Antike (Leipzig, 1889).

134 ROBERT L. WILKEN

If, to appease some Christians, Eusebius were to compromise this belief

in the one God, there was no way he could offer a reasonable defense of

Christianity.

A study of Porphyry's Phil. orac. and Christian response to it during

the period that the status of Christ was being debated within the church

will help us understand why there was such resistance to the creed of

Nicaea throughout the fourth century. It was not simply that the bishops

of the East were committed to a certain theological idea of the unity of

God, but that they were faced with a pagan opponent who offered a


different, though positive, interpretation of the relation of Jesus to God.

HENRY CHADWICK

THE RELATIVITY OF MORAL CODES :

ROME AND PERSIA IN LATE ANTIQUITY

The arch-persecutor of the ancient Church, the emperor Diocletian,

was treated by his victims with a generosity that has not been much

noticed. Not only did they preserve at Spalato his palace and transform

its noble mausoleum into a Cathedral used to this day, but they also

allowed his portrait to remain on its ceiling1. It is also almost entirely

through Christian sources that a large quantity of his edicts have been

transmitted2: the great majority (many hundreds) through Justinian's

Codex of the sixth century3, a few through an earlier more curious

work, probably but not certainly Christian, the anonymous comparison

between the Mosaic and Roman legal systems which moder n scholars

(not the mediaeval manuscripts) have agreed to call Mosaicarum et

Romanarum Legum Collatio*. Two exceptionally important edicts.

1. For a clear summary of the remnants of Diocletian's palace see J.J. Wilkes.

Dalmatia (London, 1969) 387-391. J. Zeiller and E. Hebrard.LePalaisdeDiocletiena

Spalato (Paris, 1912), remains valuable.

2. The price edict is otherwise transmitted: see S. Lauffer. Diokletians Preisedikt

(Berlin, 1971); K.T. Erim and Joyce Reynolds, "The Aphrodisias copy of Diocletian's

edict on maximum prices", Journal of Roman Studies 63 (1973) 99-110.

3. The sheer size of the material from Diocletian and the tetrarchy included by

Tribonian can be seen at a glance from P. Kriiger's index to his edition in the second

volume of the Corpus luris Civilis.


4. The Collatio is critically edited by T. Mommsen.Collectio librorum iurisanteiusti-

niani (Berlin, 1890) 2. 108-198, and by M. Hyamson (Oxford 1913). A convenient text

without critical apparatus by J. Bavierajs in Fontes iuris romanianteiustiniani (FIRA) 2

(ed. S. Riccobono and others; 2nd ed.; Florence, 1968). For bibliography see F. Schutz.

History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford, 1946)311-314, 344; M. Kaser. Das romische

Privatrecht (2nded.; Munich, 1975), 2.

136 HENRY CHADWICK

against the Manichees and against incest, owe their preservation to this

strange work5.

The Collatio raises too many complex questions to be treated here

without a gross extension of this offering to a scholar who has always

been a master of terse statement. Suffice it to say that the author of the

Collatio transcribed both edicts from the Codex Gregorianus, that is,

from a juristic compilation made during the last decade of Diocletian's

reign by an Eastern lawyer, possibly a prominent member of the chan-

cery, named Gregorius. Mommsen thought Gregorius likely to have

been a professor in the law school at Berytus (Beirut), but it is no more

than a guess6. From his reference to Diocletian and Maximian as

'd(omini) n (ostri)' when citing an edict of 2907, it is clear that Gregorius

published his work under Diocletian. The latest dated edict attested for

inclusion in the Codex Gregorianus is Diocletian's edict against incest

of 1 May 2968, so that the presumptive date of publication of Gregorius'

collection is not long after that time.

Gregorius' collection was not the only collection of Diocletianic

material used by Tribonian and his assistants in the making of the Codex

Iustinianus. A second standard collection of imperial edicts was also

made, apparently on different organisational principles, by Hermoge-

nianus. It is certain that Hermogenianus included in his collection many

Diocletianic edicts of 293 onwards, and a few of earlier years as well.

The fifth century Consultatio veteris cuiusdam iurisconsulti expressly


cites several edicts of the years 293-295 from Hermogenianus. The

same juristic Consultatio gives two edicts of the year 294 'ex corpore

Gregoriano'9. It would be tidy if one could simply adopt the view

advocated by Rotondi in 191410, that the work of Gregorius was

completed and published in 291, that the large mass of constitutions of

293-4 and later years preserved in the Codex Iustinianus were all drawn

from Hermogenianus, and that the edicts preserved by the Collatio and

5. Diocletian's edict against the Manichees is also cited by Ambrosiaster, in his

commentary on 2 Timothy 3:6; an allusion also in his Quaestiones 127.18. Ambrosiaster

and the Collatio have other points in common also.

6. Th. Mommsen.Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, 1905)2. 366-370.

1: Collatio 1.10.

8. Collatio 6.4.

9. Consultatio 9.18-19 (FIRA, 613).

10. G. Rotondi.Scrittigiuridici (Milan, 1922) 1. Ill ff., reprinted from Bullettino

dell'Istituto di diritto romano 26 (1914) 175 ff.

THE RELATIVITY OF MORAL CODES 137

the Consultatio as coming from Gregorius with a date later than 291

attached to them must have been drawn from an edition of Gregorius

which had suffered interpolation and expansion. Although tidy, it is a

conjecture that deals roughly with the evidence. It seems that Hermoge-

nianus did not merely compile a supplement to his predecessor Grego-

rius, but composed a work with a different structure and purpose and

with considerable overlap with the Codfx Gregorianus". That there

was such an overlap between the two collections is directly attested in

the Collatio, where the compiler notes that the constitution he is citing

appears in both Gregorianus and Hermogenianus but with divergent

dates attached to it â€” 287 in Gregorianus, 291 in Hermogenianus12.

Accordingly, although Rotondi's hypothesis has been followed by

distinguished authorities13, the evidence suggests rather than the publi-

cation of the Codex Gregorianus was not as early as 291, and that one

ought to date it a year or two after the last dated constitution attested as

having been drawn from it, that is, Diocletian's edict against incest

dated from Damascus on 1 May 295. This consideration, however,

affects the probable date of the same emperor's edict against the Mani-

chees.

The edict against the Manichees is a rescript addressed from Alexan-

dria on 31 March of a year that is unspecified, to Julian proconsul of

Africa14. The edict is an expression of strong religious conservatism,

combined with that fear of occult forces which may be discerned in


Diocletian's mind both in an edict which he issued against astrology in

29415 and in his reaction against the Christians in 302 when he found

that Christians in his train by making the sign of the cross could nullify

the traditional sacrifices for the purpose of divination16. "It is", he

11. On Hermogenianus see D. Liebs. Hermogenians Iuris Epitomae (Abhandl. Gottin-

gen, phil.hist.K 1., Dritte Folge 57 (1964); A. Cenderelli. Ricerche sull Codex Hermo-

genianus (Milan, 1965).

12. Collatio 4. 5-6.

13. F. Schutz. History ofRoman Legal Science, 287,,309; J. Gaudemet. La Formation

du droit seculier et du droit de I'eglise aux IV et V siecles (Paris, 1957) 42: Cenderelli.

Ricerche, 21. Mommsen dated the publication of the Codex Gregorianus in 295 (preface

to his posthumous edition of the Codex Theodosianus, 1905, xiii, xxix), as also Jors in

Pauly-Wissowa(PW)4(1901) 162.

14. Collatio 15.3. There is also an allusion to the edict in the 18th novel of Valentinian

III of 19 June 445, issued after Pope Leo the Great's inquisition of Manichees hiding

among his flock in Rome.

15. CJ9.1.8.2.

16. Lactantius De mart, persec. 10. Cf. Ambrosiaster. Quaest. 114, 8: praesente

signo crucis obmutescit paganitas; 114,22: etiam modo (= nunc) demonia nominata cruce

Christi terrentur.

138 HENRY CHADWICK

declares, "a very great crime to revise those religious customs which

have once been determined and defined by the ancients and which still

retain and possess their validity and status". The Manichees, however,

are not merely wrong because they are new. They suffer from the even

graver demerit of being an import from Persia, "a race hostile to us",

and commit acts of the gravest enormity to the disturbance of quiet

citizens. Because they may corrupt men with the execrable customs and

savage laws of the Persians, drastic action is necessary to suppress the

new cult. Accordingly, their leaders, with their abominable books, are

to be burnt, their property confiscated. If any person of rank or quality is

converted to this immoral and infamous sect or to the doctrine of the

Persians, his estate is confiscated and he himself condemned to the

mines at Pheano in Palestine or Proconnesus in the sea of Marmara.

The bitter hostility towards the Persians expressed in the language of

this edict has led to various attempts to assign it to a period when a

Roman army was engaged in hostilities in Mesopotamia. The difficulty

is to combine this with two other requirements, namely that the year be

one in which Diocletian could have been in Alexandria at the end of

March, and that the records of the proconsuls of Africa should not make

it impossible simultaneously to fit in a proconsulate for Julian. A fourth

requirement is that the edict cannot be dated too late to have been

included in the Codex Gregorianus, from which source the authorof the

Collatio expressly notes that he has drawn it. As noted above, the latest


dated edict in Gregorianus is of 1 May 295, so that the presumptive date

of publication is not very long after that time.

The date of the edict against the Manichees has frequently been

invoked by recent studies in attempts to determine the chronology of

Diocletian's and Galerius' campaigns between 296-298. In Egypt there

was a revolt against Diocletian's rule led by Achilleus, a corrector, on

behalf of the usurper L. Domitius Domitianus17. A papyrus (P. Cair.

Isidor. 1) preserves an edict by the prefect Aristius Optatus which

17. This revolt has lately been the sujectof a fundamental study by J.D. Thomas. "The

date of the revolt of L. Domitius Domitianus", Zeitschrift fur Papyrologie midEpigra-

phik 22 (1976) 253-279. He thinks March 297 possible for the anti-Manichee edict, but

March 302 more probable (p. 262) because 'psychologically this edict would fit well in the

same period as the edicts against the Christians'. This last conjecture has, 1 think, no

substance to it as an argument.

The detailed evidence for the chronology of events is admirably set out in Thomas'

article, and it is needless to repeat it here. See also the remarks by A.K. Bowman. Journal

of Roman Studies 66 (1976) 159f.


introduced fiscal changes in Egypt on 16March297. It seems a probable

hypothesis that the new tax arrangements may have been the cause for

the rebellion. If so, the rebellion began in the summer of 297 and ended

in 298. Both Eutropius and Jerome speak of the revolt ending after an

eight-month siege of Alexandria. Some modern scholars have sugges-

ted that they really meant to say that the duration of the entire rebellion

was no more than eight months. If, however, they meant what they

said, then the revolt did not finally receive the coup de grace until the

summer of 298. The chronological point may be of importance for the

year of the anti-Manichee edict, since if the siege of Alexandria ending

the rebellion did not end until May 298, then Diocletian could not have,

issued an edict from the city on 31 March 298. It remains possible that

he was in Alexandria in March 297. The anti-Manichee edict cannot be

used to date the rebellion of Achilleus. But the possible date of the latter,

now emerging from the study of papyri and ostraca, may help to exclude

years from consideration for the anti-Manichee edict.

Diocletian's first encounter with the Persians fell in 288 and ended in

amicable exchanges. The panegyric delivered by Mamertinus to salute

Diocletian's imperial colleague Maximian at Trier on 21 April 289

speaks of "gifts offered by the Persians". His speech to celebrate

Maximian's birthday in 291 speaks of' 'the Parthian currying favor with

you by wonderful presents18". Such courteous exchanges of munifi-

cence were often motivated by more warlike long-term intentions (an


instance on the Roman side is recorded by Ammianus for the year

35819), and two years later Diocletian was in Syria fighting against Arab

tribesmen apparently stirred up by the Persians to cause trouble to the

empire20. A subscription to a law of 10 May 290 records Diocletian in

Emesa21. An inscription of 294 found in Switzerland (Dessau, ILS 640)

gives Diocletian and Maximian the title "Persicus Maximus", celebra-

ting the victory of Roman arms on the Mesopotamian front. Mamertinus

in his panegyric of 291 rejoices that the power of Rome extends to the

Tigris. The unnamed panegyrist who saluted Constantius Chlorus on 1

18. Panegyrici Latini 10 (2).9.2: doma Persica; cf. 10.6 Parthum vobis munerum

miraculis blandientem. 11 (3). 5.4.

19. Ammianus Marcellinus 17.5.15.

20. Paneg. Lot. 11 (3). 4.2. W. Ensslin. "Valerius (Diocletianus)". PW, 7A, (1948)

2431, 28ff.

21.C/9.41.9

140 HENRY CHADWICK

March 297 speaks of 'the Parthian driven back beyond the Tigris22'. In

290 Diocletian seems to have been able to pursue the usual Roman

policy of containing Persian power by installing a client king in

Armenia23.

Diocletian's second war with the Persians was a graver and more far-

reaching affair, and is more fully reported by .the sources (Lactantius,

Eutropius, Festus, Aurelius Victor, Orosius). Unfortunately precise

dates are not easy to obtain. The Codex lustinianus includes no edicts of

Diocletian at all for the three years 296-298, so that his movements

cannot be easily controlled. It seems certain that the war opened with an

invasion of Armenia by the Persian king Narses. Diocletian moved with

his Caesar Galerius to check the pressure.. But the Romans went into

battle with too modest a force, were caught by Narses between Callini-

cum and Carrhae, east of the Euphrates, and suffered a humiliating

defeat. Galerius withdrew to the Balkans to obtain large reinforcements

and returned, probably in 297, to advance with startling success through

Armenia. He captured not only Narses' camp but his harem. Galerius

proceeded beyond the Tigris but came back (reluctantly according to

Aurelius Victor, who suggests an ambition to turn Persia into a new

province) to meet Diocletian at Nisibis. There peace terms were impo-

sed on the Persians. The chronicle of Joshua the Stylite, written near

Edessa about 507, dates the fall of Nisibis to the 'Greeks' in the year 609

of the Seleucid era (October 297 to October 298). As an example to the


ethically uncivilised Persians and as a political tool in the peace

negotiations25, Narses' harem had been preserved inviolate. The Per-

sian negotiators, records the historian Festus, were happy to

acknowledge the moral superiority of the Romans. They also conceded

territory to the Tigris and five provinces beyond it. But they felt

difficulty about a Roman demand, evidently motivated by fear for the

security of a frontier virtually impossible to defend, that henceforth all

exchange of trade and immigration control between Persians and Ro-

22. Paneg.Lat. 11(3). 6.6; 8(5).3.3.

23. See Ensslin. PW, 7A, 2432 f.

24. The evidence is penetratingly assessed by T. D. Barnes. "Imperial campaigns.

A.D. 285-311",Phoenix30(1976) 174-193.

25. In the drive towards Amida in 359 Sapor with similar motives respected some

Christian virgins captured in a fort: Ammianus 18.10.3-4. Julian in 363 respected captive

Persian girls of outstanding beauty (24.4.27) to show his self-control.


mans must be concentrated at Nisibis26. A similar demand recurred 110

years later, when the Roman frontier was much contracted after Jovian's

humiliating peace of 363. In 408-9 merchants in Mesopotamia were

forbidden to hold markets anywhere they pleased, for fear that such

occasions would be used to spy out the defences of the frontier, but must

concentrate their commercial exchanges at Nisibis, at Callinicum on the

Euphrates, and at Artaxata on the Armenian border27. (The decisive role

played by spies in Mesopotamian campaigns has many illustrations in

the pages of Ammianus.)

If the date for the fall of Nisibis offered by Joshua the Stylite is to be

accepted, which seems inherently probable, then the campaigns in

Mesopotamia could have been going on during 295-298, with a period

of considerable intensity in 297. At the same time, tension on the Tigris

frontier created by humiliating peace terms imposed on the Persians is

very likely to have been sustained after Narses' defeat and withdrawal.

While, therefore, March 297 would be a possible moment both for high

anti-Persian feeling and for the presence of Diocletian in Alexandria, it

need not be regarded as the only possible or probable time. Although the

frontier remained unnegotiated until 363, Persian raids can have been

fairly continuous at any time.

In any event the Fasti for the proconsulate of Africa in the period

290-305 make it difficult to fit in Julian except in two periods when gaps

in the evidence offer no rival claimant28. The first gap occurs between


July 296 and 297. This looks possible, and would be compatible with

Diocletian writing from Alexandria in March 297. On the other hand, it

is perhaps a tight squeeze, and there is a longer gap in the records of the

African proconsuls for 301-303. The attraction of this latter period is

increased by evidence that Diocletian may have visited Alexandria

about 302. Such a visit at this time is asserted by the sixth century

26. The evidence for this point is in the sixth century Peter the Patrician (Muller.

Frag.Hist.Gr. 4. 188-89).

27. CJ 4.63.4. Such an edict if enforced must have been fatal to the great fair at Batnae

near the Euphrates held each September, at which goods from India and China could be

bought (Ammianus 14.3.3.).

28. See the list of proconsuls of Africa in A.H.M. Jones. J.R. Martindale and S.

Morris. Roman Empire (PLRE) (Cambridge, 1971) 1. 1073. The authors are tempted to

identify Julian with Amnius Anicius Iulianus (23), consul in 322, prefect of Rome 326-9.

It seems a long gap between his proconsulship and his consulship, slightly reduced if the

edict was of 302 rather than 297.

142 HENRY CHADWICK

Paschal Chronicle and by the Annals first printed in 1606 by Scaliger

and since known as Barbarus Scaligeri29. The Barbarus is a Latin text

(from cod. Paris, lat. 4884, s. viii/ix), and is an uncouth version of a

Greek original apparently composed at Alexandria not long after 412.

Both the Paschal Chronicle and the Barbarus Scaligeri assign to the year

302 the beginning of a distribution of free bread, authorised by Diocle-

tian, to the people of Alexandria: thereafter, as Procopius shows, it was

an annual grant associated with Diocletian's name30. The two chroni-

cles also record Peter the martyred bishop of Alexandria. The Barbarus,

unlike the Paschal Chronicle, makes Diocletian responsible for the

persecution of the churches in which Peter died. Since Peter certainly

did not die until 311, six years after Diocletian's abdiction. some have

felt that a visit to Alexandria by Diocletian in 302 is ill grounded31. This

exaggerates the uncertainty. The visit remains a probability. Dr. A.K.

Bowman has recently drawn attention to a papyrus text (P. Flor. 33)

written between 305 and 307, and lately republished

by J.R. Rea. It records an official of Hermopolis Magne in the

Thebaid whose activities have required several public examinations,

one of which was in presence of the emperor Diocletian. The unsatisfac-

tory official was still in office when the papyrus was written; accor-

dingly, the process before Diocletian is more likely to have been in 302

than in 297 or 298s2.

The arguments, however, for moving the anti-Manichee edict to


March 302 do not need to include the consideration that the psychologi-

cal attitudes reflected in it show kinship with the attitude expressed in

the persecution of the Christians initiated early in 303. It is noteworthy

that the anti-Manichee edict says not a word to suggest that the Mani-

chees are also objectionable because their religion is a deviant form of

Christianity. They are morally offensive, new, and Persian, but do not

have the further disadvantage of being a para-Christian group. In fact, if

the edict were of 302, one might have expected some such argument to

29. PG 92, 688; Th. Mommsen. Chronica Minora (Berlin. 1S92) 1. 290.

30. Procopius. Historia Arcana 26.40. C. Vandersleyen. Chronologie des prefers

d'Egypte de 284 a 395 (Coll. Latomus 55; Brussels, 1962) 68-70, wants to date the start of

the distribution soon after the end of the revolt of L. Domitius Domitianus. The date given

by the chronicles is accepted by A.K. Bowman. Journal of Roman Studies, 66(1976) 160.

31. PLRE 1.474.

32. BowMaN.7Â«5 66(1976) 159f.


have been deployed. Accordingly, while 302 may remain easier in

providing more space for Julian's African proconsulship, 297 has not

yet been shown to be impossible; and it has the additional advantage of

bringing back the publication of the Codex Gregorianus to a time nearer

to that of the latest dated edict known to have drawn from it.

There is one last consideration concerning the anti-Manichee edict,

namely, that there is no inherent improbability about a date as early as

the nineties. The Manichee mission in Alexandria led by Addai seems to

have begun very early, probably by the 250s, and was met by far-

reaching success33. The strength of the Manichees in Alexandria and

Egypt is clear from the well known Rylands papyrus 469, published in

1938 by C.H. Roberts, containing a formal denunciation of the Mani-

chees by a high official of the church who is in all probability a bishop of

Alexandria34. This encyclical is written in a hand that Roberts would

assign to the second half of the third century, without absolutely exclu-

ding the possibility of a date early in the fourth century. The encyclical

is much better informed about Manichee belief than Diocletian's edict.

It is aware that they have a group called the Elect, that they sing special

psalms, and that they venerate the sun. It is also the earliest source to

accuse the Manichees of obscene cultic practices. A date in the nineties

or even in the eighties for this encyclical would be compatible with the

spread of the Manichee mission, which always tended in practice to be

shadowing the church and to be specially appealing to those many


Christians who desired a stricter asceticism and a darker view of this

world. Athanasius' Life of Antony (68) singles out for particular praise

the saint's refusal to associate with Manichees, in a way which suggests

that this might have been unusual among Christian ascetics. Round

about 300, Alexander of Lycopolis was moved to produce a philosophi-

cal refutation of Manichee dualism35. He knew that Mani was a Persian

33. See Robert M. Grant. " Manichees and Christians in the third and early fourth

centuries", in Ex Orbe Religionum. Studia Geo Widengren oblata (Leiden, 1972) 1.

430-439: Peter Brown. "The Diffusion of Manichaeism in the Roman Empire", reprin-

ted from JRS 59 (1969), in Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine(London,

1972) 94-118 (at p. 112).

34. Published with an excellent commentary in Catalogue of the Greek and Latin

Papyri in the John Rylands Library Manchester 3 (1938). The text is reprinted in A.

Adam. Texte zum Manichaismus (2nd ed. Berlin; 1969) 52-54 (no. 35).

35. This important work, edited by A. Brinkmann for the Teubner texts (1895), is

translated and annotated by P. W. van der Hqrst and J. Mansfeld. An Alexandrian

Platonist against Dualism (Leiden, 1974).

144 HENRY CHADWICK

executed (he thought) by king Shahpuhr and that the first Manichee

missionaries at Lycopolis had been 'Papos' and Thomas. According to

the Acta Archelai (13), Addas preached Mani's doctrine in the East,

Thomas in Syria, Hermias in Egypt. Later (64) it is said that Addas went

to Scythia. Thomas to Egypt, Hermias staying with Mani. The heroic

status of Pappos and Addas appears in the Coptic Manichaean Psalm-

Book (p. 34 Allberry); and Thomas may be the author of the famous

psalms which conclude the book (pp. 203 ff.). In short. Manicheism

spread fast in Egypt from the fifities of the third century on, provoking a

denunciation from episcopal authority that may well be before 290, and

eventual notice from the emperor himself, when the proconsul of Africa

wrote to inquire about its spread there. Diocletian is poorly informed

about any detail of Manichee belief or practice. For him it is enough

condemnation that the religion is Persian, and encourages moral enor-

mity.

It would be extravagant to go further and to speculate that the

Manichees in Egypt of Africa were felt to be an active fifth column

hoping for Persian victory in the Mesopotamian campaigns36. But this

is not to say that Diocletian himself may not have regarded the Manichee

mission, spreading so rapidly through his empire, as evidence of a most

dangerous infiltration from a morally depraved nation, designed to

erode the integrity of Roman family life and religious tradition; much as

in England during the Wars against Napoleon, Shute Barrington, bishop


of Durham (according to the report of his speech in the House of Lords

on 2 March 1798. as reported in Hansard 33, 1818, col. 1307) could

believe that troups of French dancing girls who crossed the Channel to

entertain the English had been deliberately sent over by the French

government with the specific purpose of undermining the moral fibre of

the British people, while behind it all lurked a vast conspiracy against

the Protestant Establishment organised by the Roman Catholic Church.

Whatever may be the final verdict in regard to the year of Diocletian's

edict against the Manichees, its attitude towards Persian social ethics is

36. W. Seston's plea for dating the anti-Manichee edict in 297 (Melanges dephilologie,

de litterature, et d'histoire offerts a Alfred Ernout [Paris, 1940] 354) is accompanied by

unconvincing speculations on this point (p. 352). For a much more restrained view see

E. VolterrA. "La costituzione di Diocleziano e Massimiano contra i Manichei", Pro-

blemiattualidiscienza e di cultura (Accademia dei Lincei. 76: Rome, 1966) 27-50.


of considerable interest. Is his edict against incestuous marriages

connected with the same concern? This latter edict has a precise dating

from Damascus on 1 May 295. Its full text is preserved by the Collatio,

(6.4) and a brief excerpt of the essential section is also given in the Code

of Justinian (5.4.17) where the same date and place are given.

The edict against incest explains that the emperors hold in the utmost

awe the chaste provisions of Roman law which have the sanction of

religion. They do not think it right to conceal that in times past cases of

incest have occured in the empire. But it is now their duty to undertake

the repression of the practice in accordance with that new discipline

which is the mark of their times. Moreover, they can then be sure of a

quiet life under the favour of the immortal gods who can be expected to

be propitious to the Roman name if incest is stamped out. The institution

of matrimony is necessary for the legitimacy of the offspring. In time

past, whether because of inexperience or because of ignorance of the

law, by a rite of uncivilized barbarians, some offspring have been

accepted from illicit unions. Although such unions ought to be judged

severely, yet Diocletian mercifully rules that those who in the past have

polluted themselves with illicit or incestuous marriages may know

themselves to be pardoned for offences up to this point in time. They

may congratulate themselves on being granted life after committing

such dreadful crimes. But let them know that their children are not

accepted as legitimate. For the future none shall dare to give way to


uncontrolled lust. All are to keep religion and sanctity and to remember

that they belong to the discipline and laws of Rome. Only those marria-

ges are licit which are allowed by Roman law. The following kindred

fall outside what is permitted in marriage: daughter, granddaughter,

greatgranddaughter, mother, grandmother, greatgrandmother, paternal

or maternal aunt, sister, sister's daughter and granddaughter, step-

daughter, step-mother, mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, and other de-

grees prohibited by ancient law. So the majesty of Rome will be brought

to greatness by the favour of all the gods. Past faults are pardoned only

down to 30 December 294. Any offence after that date will be treated

wih severity.

This statement was not Diocletian's first attack on incestuous marria-

ges. The Collatio (6.5-6) also preserves an earlier, much brieferedict on

the same subject â€” the edict of which the author interestingly records

that different dates are appended to it by Gregorius and by Hermogenia-

nus. In the Gregorian Code its date is given as 9 June 287, whereas in

146 HENRY CHADWICK

Hermogenianus it is given as 15 March 291. We have already seen

reason to think Diocletian's campaign of 290 had brought him to Syria

and Mesopotamia. He would then have had opportunity to discover that

Mesopotamian marriage customs were strikingly different from those of

the rigidly exogamous Roman empire. He may also have been made

aware of continued endogamy in the Nile valley.

The acceptability in Persian society of marriages between a brother

and sister, or even between father and daughter or mother and son, had

for many centuries been a matter for astonished comment among both

Greeks and Romans. Herodotus (3.31) was so surprised that he attribu-

ted its beginning to the madness of Cambyses, who fell in love with his

sister and, having ascertained that by law the king of Persia could do as

he pleased, made her his wife. The fifth century Lydian Xanthos wrote a

book on the Persian Magi, cited by Clement of Alexandria (probably

indirectly), in which Xanthos reports on Persian incest37. Ctesias, a

Greek who was physician to the Persian king Artaxerxes Mnemon (king

from 405), fixed the Greek tradition about Persian customs by his

accounts of the hair-raising lady Parysatis, mother of Artaxerxes Mne-

mon and Cyrus, and wife of her brother Dareios Ochos. Ctesias' work

was much used by Plutarch for his life of Artaxerxes; it is preserved in

jejune summary by Photius, Bibliotheca H38.

Naturally conservative minds were stretched on being asked to

believe that such diversity in fundamental ethics was possible. Xeno-


phon (Memorabilia 4.4.19 ff) affirms that certain moral rules are so

basic that no one disagrees about them: viz. that the gods should be

venerated, parents honoured, incest avoided (transgressors of this last

rule, he remarks, are punished by the gods and have bad children); also

the golden rule in positive form. If there is an actual diversity in existing

codes, nevertheless conservatives can appeal to transcendent "unwrit-

ten laws" in the mind (see Sophocles, Antigone 454 ff., or Pericles in

Thycydides 2.37). But the radical sophists of the fifth century delighted

37. Clement, Strom, 3.11.1 = F. Jacoby, FGH, 3 C (1958), 765 F 31. Jacoby

(p. 757 n.) suspects Xanthos' Magica.oi being inauthentic. The report is accepted by

K. Ziegler, "Xanthus", FW, 9A (1967) 1371-2. Athenaeus (12.11, 515 DE) shows

Xanthos' interest in unusual sexual phenomena. On evidence in the ninth century

Denkart for consanguineous marriages in Iran see A. Christensen, L'lran sous les

Sassanides (Copenhagen, 1944) 323-325.

38. Jacoby.FGH, 3 C (1958). 688 F 15. Cf. Tertullian.Apologeticum 9.


to point out the differences in moral code between various races and

regions to reinforce their contention that all morality is relative and

conventional, without any element of "objectivity" â€” that is, without

anyone being able plausibly to say that, if two people disagree on some

major point of ethical principle, at least one of them must be mistaken.

Aristotle, who was well aware of the argument that morality is merely

an artificial social convention, not a divinely ordered system inherent in

the nature of things (Nicomachean Ethics 1.3) wrote a lost treatise on the

customs of barbarian nations (frg. 604-10 Rose). Collections of such

ethnographical material came to be a common interest in the hellenistic

age. Porphyry preserves a piece of Hellanikos on this subject; Clement

of Alexandria cites Nymphodorus of Amphipolis as a contributor to the

same debate39. From such works Sceptic philosophers derived rich

material for argument about the relativity of morality (see Sextus Empi-

ricus. Adv. math. 11. 42-67). Cicero summarises the contentions of

Carneades a century before his time: each race has its own customs. If

God had provided law. all men would keep the same laws. The diversity

proves that the various codes are based on utility, not on objective

justice40. Sextus Empiricus provides one of his neat school-masterly

summaries, listing practices wholly unacceptable in the Graeco-Roman

world which elsewhere are thought to be right and to have religious

sanction: sodomy in Germany, public acts of sexual intercourse in

India, cultic prostitution in Egypt, incest in Persia41. The Sceptics also


39. Porphyry cited by Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 10.3.16, 466 B. Clement of

Alexandria.Protr. 65.1. SeeJahrbuchJurAntikeundChristentum 10(1967)255b. 256b.

s.v. "Barbar".

40. Cicero. De republica 3.14ff.

41. Sextus Empiricus. Pyrr. hyp. 1. 148-151; 190-218. On Egyptian brother/sister

marriages see Diodorus Siculus 1.27; Sextus, Pyrr. hyp. 3.205. The papyri have been

combed for supporting evidence. Instances of uterine brother/sister marriages undoubte-

dly occur in papyri both of the Ptolemaic and of the Roman periods. See H. I. Bell.

"Brother and sister marriage in Greco-Roman Egypt", Revue Internationale des Droits

de I'Antiquite 2 (1949) 83-92; M. HomertandC. Preaux.Recherchessurle recensement

dans I'Egypte romaine (Leiden 1952), 149-153; H. Thierfelder.Die Geschwisterehe im

hellenistisch-romischen Aegypten (Minister, 1960); above all, J. Modrezejewski. "Die

Geschwisterehe in der hellenistischen Praxis und nach romischem Recht" Zeitschrift der

Savigny Stiftung, Rom. Abt. 81 (1964) 32-82. His view that incest was acceptable among

Greek families, however, seems irreconcilable with Plato, Republic 9, 571 B ff. (cf.

Artemidorus 1.79); Laws-S, 838f. And could Sophocles then have had a play to write

about Oedipus?

The Constitution Antoniana of 212 made the Greeks of the Nile valley citizens subject

to Roman law. Thereafter instances of incest are rare and the records concern penalties:

BGU, 1024, late 4 cent; cf. CTh. 3112.1 (342).

148 HENRY CHADWICK

found in this moral diversity an additional argument against the validity

of astrology42.

The varieties of local moral and religious custom came to support a

well known argument for polytheism: if in Scythia sons ritually kill their

fathers, if in the Chersonese the Taurians offer up strangers in sacrifice

(like Iphigeneia), if in 'Ethiopia' (black Africa) men are cannibals, this

demonstrates not that morality is a private guess or that there is no divine

providence active through the human conscience, but rather that each

region of the world, each race, is under its own tutelary deity. Local

deities are subordinate, provincial administrators for Zeus, and are

allowed as much individual freedom as provincial governors under the

empire. Each god should therefore be worshipped according to ancestral

custom. Hence the basis of Celsus' declaration that while the religion of

the Jews may be utterly peculiar (and to him contemptible), yet it is at

least the religion of their fathers43. What is valid in religion is whatever

is valid for the particular community tradition â€” a striking anticipation

of Durkheim.

The Jews of antiquity were disinclined to be grateful for such conside-

rations. Philo of Alexandria regarded the deplorable Persian marriage

customs as an explanation of that nation's miserable record of civil strife

and continual warfare44. As a loyal Jew Philo would naturally see in

Gentile departure from the divinely given commandments (Noachic if

not Mosaic) a transgression bound to entail social penalties, in much the


way that the apostle Paul treats the matter in the first chapter of Romans.

If the argument to assert the relativity of all moral codes is equally valid

for those who believe them (with the happy corollary that all are equally

invalid for the natural sociologist and detached observer), then it is an

effective criticism of this contention to show that those who live under a

code of social ethics dramatically divergent from that of the majority of

mankind enjoy little felicity in their dealings with one another.

42. See, e.g., FiRMicusMatERNUs.WarA. 1.2; Ambrosiaster.Quaest. 115. 16-20; a

classic statement in Bardaisan's Laws of the Nations (Patrologia Syriaca 2). See also F.

Boll, "Studien iiber Claudius Ptolemaus", Jb. fur class. Philologie. suppl. 21 (1894),

181 ff.

43. See Origen, Contra Celsum 5.25; De Principiis 2.2.5-6. For the 'cuius regio eius

religio' principle, see Claudius cited by Josephus, Antiq. 20.13; or JuuAN.Adv. Galilaeos

143 AB.

44. PMlo.Z>#spec. leg. 3.13; cf. DeProvidentia 1.84-85.


Philo's attitude of frank disapprobation is not, of course, peculiar to

him nor does it arise from his loyalty to Judaism. Catullus (90) speaks of

incest as a scarcely credible part of the "impious religion of the Per-

sians". When Tacitus came to write his biting chapter on the Jews in the

fifth book of his Histories (echoing perhaps much anti-Jewish propa-

ganda at the time of the first Jewish revolt), he did not adopt the tolerant

scorn we find in Celsus. Tacitus thought it disgusting that "everything

we hold sacred is profane to the Jews; whatever is abhorrent (incesta) to

us is permissible to them". The consideration justified the obliteration

of Jerusalem by the Roman legions.

Christian writers in many cases notice the old Greek argument about

moral variety or relativity and in this context mention the acceptability

of incest among the Persians. Their general view, however, is that such

moral diversity is to be expected in pagan society and is contrasted with

the homogeneous ethic of Christ's followers. The most interesting and

important author is Bardaisan of Edessa, about 200 A.D., whose open-

ness to mythological speculation seemed dangerously gnostic to

Ephrem and later orthodox writers of the Syriac-speaking churches. The

Book of the Laws of the Nations catalogues the diversity of local national

customs with the intention of refuting the astrologers, and includes the

observation that Persian marriage customs are practised by Persians not

only in Persia but wherever they have settled. He is writing at Edessa

and evidently felt his argument reinforced by observation. He notes that


when the Romans incorporated Arabia as a province, they enforced

changes of social customs on the Arabs. But all the diversities, for

Bardaisan, stand in antithesis to the universal ethic of the Christians

shared by all believers irrespective of theirethnic origin. He specifically

mentions the Persians among those whose customs,need the reformation

of the gospel, much as the Gauls among whom not incest but homose-

xual practice is socially acceptable45.

In the fifth century, one of the letters of Theodoret of Cyrrhus46

protests to three magistrates of Zeugma on the Euphrates at the news that

45. Bardaisan's book is edited with Latin translation by F. Nau in Patrologia Syriaca

(1907, Paris). See H.J.W. Drijverg. Bardaisan of Edessa (Assen, 1966) 90-92; Robert

M. Grant. Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and early Christian Thought

(Amsterdam, 1952) 111 f.

46. Theodoret, Ep. 8 (7 Sakkelion), reedited by Y. Azema in Sources Chretiennes 40

(Paris, 1955)79-81.

150 HENRY CHADWICK

some of them, even though descended from episcopal families and

claiming the name of Christian, have nevertheless affianced their

daugthers to their nephews, while uncles have undertaken to marry their

nieces. Theodoret sternly reminds the magistrates that such marriages

are contrary not only to divine but to human laws. Such customs are (he

adds) Persian, not those of Romans who are sons of the faith.

Theodoret's letter shows that Diocletian's edict laying down a table

of kindred and affinity had not had much effect on social customs in

Mesopotamia where the influences from the East were sure to be strong.

The contraction of the Roman Empire after the humiliating peace which

Jovian was forced to make on the death of Julian in 363 (though to

frontiers which in the long term were far more defensible, as Sapor II

had told Constantius II in 35847) did not mean that there were not still

many Roman citizens within the northerly province of Osrhoene and in

frontier towns and farms of Mesopotamia whose marriages failed to

conform to the more stringent requirements of Roman law. In the sixth

century Justinian's 154th Novel continued the attempt to check the

continuance of unlawful marriage customs in Mesopotamia and

Osrhoene48.

The temporary emigration of the most inveterate pagans from the

Roman to the Persian empire in the time of Justinian, recorded by

Agathias, provoked Agathias to further comment on the diversity of

moral codes49. Each nation, he remarks, thinks that any custom gene-


rally accepted in its society and with a long history must necessarily be

perfect and sacred; anything differing from it is wrong, abhorrent, and

unworthy. Agathias is content to show the relativity of Persian customs

by observing that they have not survived in that part of the world without

changes. Present-day Persians, he observes, think nothing of sexual

intercourse with sisters and nieces; fathers lie with their daughters;

worst of all, sons with mothers. But the ancient Assyrians, who occu-

pied that territory, did not accept incest. When Queen Semiramis of

Assyria approached her son Ninyas, he thought matricide better than

47. Ammianus 17.5.7.

48. Justinian's Novel 154 is probably from 535-6 A. D., and seems to owe something to

Diocletian's model. Incestuous marriages up to the date of the edict are not subject of

penalty, but henceforth the death penalty will be incurred by any, whether of high or low

estate, even by bishops and clergy, if they marry kindred within degrees forbidden in the

Roman empire and follow the corrupt example of the neighbouring Persians.

49. Agathias 2.24.


incest. Parysatis loved her son, who rejected her. Agathias concludes

that Zoroastrianism has entirely changed the Persian ethic, so that they

are now dualists like the Manichees. The demonstration of historical

change proves the invalidity of Persian mores. Agathias' argument does

not appear to be directed towards showing that the Persian ethic is

perfectly acceptable in Persia and just as right for them as the Romans'

ethic is in the Mediterranean world. Despite the relativism, worthy of

any social anthropologist, with which his discussion of Persia begins,

all the thrust of his argument is to the effect that the present Persian

customs are the consequence of an unhappy and, he hopes, temporary

aberration introduced by Zoroaster.

The emperor Julian instances the Persian view that it is right to marry

one's sister or daughter as a fact left sadly unexplained by Moses in the

story of the tower of Babel; for human customs differ more than human

languages50. Yet one wonders what Julian's own opinion was? Proba-

bly he followed the line we find in Porphyry who remarks that if some

races are savages, that is no reason for failing to uphold the values of

civilised ethics51. In late antiquity one may find both pagan and

Christian agreeing that despite all local variety there is one and the same

principle of moral law, whose pressure is felt through the conscience,

and which nevertheless speaks to men in diverse ways- in accordance

with their circumstances in time and space. The language here is that of

the pagan historian Ammianus Marcellinus (27.6.14). But almost


identical sentiments spring to the lips of Augustine himself when ma-

king reply to Manichee attacks upon the Old Testament which picked on

the polygamy of the Jewish patriarchs. Augustine rejects the view that,

because Abraham could sleep with Hagaras well as Sarah, Christians of

the fifth century could sleep with their serving girls as well as with their

wives (as pagans commonly did). In his inscrutable providence God.

knows what is right and appropriate for different times and places. In

any event. The Golden Rule remains for Augustine, as it was eight

centuries earlier for Xenophon, an absolute ethical principle univer-

sally valid in all circumstances for all peoples52.

50. Julian. Adv. Galilaeos 138 B.

51. Porphyry, De abstinentia 4.21.

52. Augustine, Corf. 3.7.13-8.17; Contra Faustum 22.30-59; De bono coniugali

25.33-34;Sermo. 51.15.25 and M.li.Dedoarinachr. 3.10.15ff. (esp. 14.22).

152 HENRY CHADWICK

The Romans were very tolerant in religion, and did not generally

regard the worship of one god as exclusive of many others. Indeed, it

was often argued that one of the causes of Roman success in establishing

its empire lay in Rome's hospitable reception of the cults of all the

peoples it had conquered. The pagan Caecilius in the Octavius (6) of

Minucius Felix observes that each race and tribe has its own individual

rites and worships its local gods, but the Romans worship all, so that

they have been rewarded with rule over the entire world. There was one

exception to the principle that the gods of conquered peoples should be

propitiated by incorporation in the state pantheon, namely, the God of

the Jews; an exception which to Augustine seemed ironical, since only

the one true God had willed to grant the Romans world power53. The

Edict of Milan, agreed between Licinius and Constantine in 313, inclu-

des the God of the Christians at this level by enunciating the principle

that free choice of worship is granted to Christians and to all men "in

order that all the divine powers may be propitious54''.

But Roman hospitality to foreign deities did not include foreign

mores. Diocletian had a strongly conservative mind. Pannonians were

adverse to change. It would have been natural to such a man to feel that

Persian marriage customs were a scandal that would provide an additio-

nal ground for conquering Mesopotamia to the Tigris and beyond. The

two edicts here considered, against the Manichees and against incest,

look like part of Diocletian's general justification of his eastern cam-


paigns.

When on 1 January 364 it fell to the orator and philosopher Themis-

tius to delivera speech before the emperor Jovian, who had just made so

humiliating a peace with the Persians after the death of Julian, Themis-

tius seized the moment to commend to the emperor the merits of

religious toleration. God, he said, actually enjoys diversity of belief, for

it shows his mysterious transcendence. The reason why each man

sacrifices to his own god is that he has no immediate knowledge of the

supreme power. Moreover, this recognition of human ignorance justi-

fies Jovian in having made peace with the Persians. This last argument

betrays that under Julian intolerance of Persian marriage customs had

continued to provide additional impetus for the Mesopotamian cam-

53. Augustine.De consensu evang. 1.12.1-19.

54. Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 10.5.4= Lactantius, De mortibuspersecutorum 48.2.


paign which had ended so catastrophically in June 363. Themistius

advises Jovian that he has been right to live and let live. Even morality

may be less than absolute55. A believer in theological relativism is

obviously more likely to be also an exponent of moral relativism.

55. Themistius, Orat. 5 (67b-70c), translated into French and discussed by G. Dagron.

"L'empire romain d'Orient au IV* siecle et les traditions politiques de rhellenisme: le

tcmoinage de Themistios'', in Travaux et Memoires du Centre de recherche dhistoire et


civilisation byzantines (Paris, 1968)3. 168ff.


SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

GREEK AND JEWISH HEROES :

FOURTH MACCABEES AND THE GOSPEL OF MARK

In recent years there has been much discussion of miracles in the

Gospel of Mark and their alleged relation to a theios aner or hero

Christology. So far as I know, however, New Testament specialists

have paid little attention to the Fourth Book of Maccabees, although

Moses Hadas and D.L. Tiede have mentioned aretalogical traits in that

book1.

In this essay I wish to test several hypotheses. (1)4 Maccabees has

been called an aretalogy of "impure type2", but it actually belongs to a

distinct type of aretalogy which is not a collection of miracles; at the

same time, the immortal life of the martyrs has a miraculous element.

(2) Mark can be considered an aretalogy of a mixed type in that Jesus is

portrayed through epiphanies and miracles, but also has some of the

traits of an ideal teacher and sage; the latter is given a special dimension

through a theology of the Cross and of lowly service; and, finally, Mark

contains an idea of Jesus' life after death that is usually expressed as his

resurrection but at other times contains elements that suggest translation

or assumption. These latter traits are found further developed in Luke.

(3) All these, including the Crucifixion itself, constitute the glory of

Jesus. In this respect" there are analogies between Mark and 4 Macca-

bees, even though Mark does not very explicitly make the connection

1. M. Hadas andM. Smith. Heroes and Gods (New York, 1965) 87-97; D.L.Tiede.


The Charismatic Figure as Miracle Worker (Missoula, Mont., 1972) 57 f.

2. Heroes and Gods, 90: "In itself the story of Eleazar may be only an imperfect

example of aretalogy, but it is an important monument in the history of the genre because

on the one hand it is so palpably influenced by the image of Socrates and on the other it is

so palpably a prototype for a long series of subsequent martyrdoms.''

156 SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

between the Cross and the other elements. It is more plausible to

suppose that he holds these together as signs of glory than that he sets the

miracles up in order to expose them as examples of a false Christology.

Ludwig Bieler's 0EIO2 ANHP3 is the starting point for all discus-

sions of divine men. This collection of hero stories is very miscella-

neous, and Hadas and Smith have made it clear that "aretalogy", as

most scholars understand it, covers a wide range of accounts, usually

with certain common features that can be summarized as follows: the

hero is a human being, or at least begins as such; he manifests certain

unusual, praeternatural or superhuman qualities, and does mighty deeds

or miracles; usually he leads a life of signal ethical virtue and teaches

wisdom; frequently he dies as a martyr and is deified or assumed into

heaven. He does not become a hero, strictly speaking, until after his

death4.

David L. Tiede has argued for a distinction between two types of

divine men, one whose arete consists in the working of miracles and the

other who is the ideal sage and teacher, who does not resort to the

miraculous or at least is portrayed in such a way that the miraculous

element is subsidiary5.

It is not surprising that most previous studies do not make a distinc-

tion between the two types, for in the early case of Pythagoras, images

of the shaman, the divine philosopher, and the idealized statesman are

already combined, and the traditions about Empedocles indicate that he


professed to be both wonderworker and philosopher. When we come to

a much laterperiod, Apollonius of Tyana is presented in the double role.

But much happened in the meantime. The later Pythagoreans divided

sharply, some understanding Pythagoras as the miracle worker and

others as the philosopher and scientist (Tiede, 15-20).

Thus there arose a clear distinction between two types. Socrates

becomes the Greek ideal of the divine man, and Plato portrays him as the

sage, whose rational and moral virtues constitute his godlike quality.

The situation, however, is complex; Socrates had adaimon, he attended

3. L. Bieler. 0eIos anhp (Vienna, 1935-36).

4. Heroes and Gods, 16: "For a true aretalogy we desiderate a subject who is, to be

sure, human but who can make a claim to preternatural potency by miraculous works or by

the circumstances surrounding his death."

5. TieDe. 4-13, Cf. the criticisms of Otto Betz, "The Concept of the Socalled

'Divine Man' in Mark's Christology", in D.E. Aune ed., Studies in N.T. and Early

Christian Literature (Leiden, 1972) 229-40.

GREEK AND JEWISH HEROES 157

to dreams and oracles, and he was a religious man and not a mere

rationalist. This left the way open for varying interpretations of Socra-

tes, as in the case of Pythagoras (Tiede, 31, 38).

Diogenes and Epicurus were regarded as divine men in the sense that

they were sages, not miracle workers. The same is true of the Stoic

tradition of the divine wise man, though of course reverence for such a

sage has a religious quality. This tradition can be seen clearly in Plutarch

and Seneca, and it is only when one comes to Lucian that one can see

that the two types have been mixed. Philostratus and Porphyry witness

to the same phenomenon, although they are aware of the philosophical

standard (Tiede, 43-55, 59,99). It can be argued, therefore, that the

separation of the two types of divine men was due to rationalism and that

most ancient authors were not aware of the distinction.

When we turn to Jewish Hellenistic literature, we find that Artapa-

nus, in the second century B.C., includes mostly miraculous elements

among Moses' aretai, while Aristobulus tends to demythologize

(Tiede, 151-66, 142). Philo is a much more considerable theologian. He

believed in the veracity of the Old Testament and therefore could not

disparage Moses' miracles. The Pentateuch made Moses a lawgiver,

revealer of divine truth, and a saint, but also one through whom wonders

were wrought. Philo understands these latter as functions of Moses'

virtue and wisdom; because he surpassed all men in understanding and

was the greatest of all prophets, God acted through him. He was the


culmination of a line including Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac and

Jacob, but he differed from them in degree, not in kind6.

Josephus actually calls Moses a theios aner (Ant. 3. 180), referring to

Moses' arrangements for the tabernacle, vestments of the priest and so

on, to show that in his arete Moses measures up to criteria for the divine

man mentioned by anti-Jewish writers. Philo also refers to Moses in this

way (Virt. 177). None of this is surprising, for in Deut. 33:1; Josh. 14:6;

Ezra 3:2; Ps. 89:1 LXX, Moses is called "man of God" and the phrase

6. Tiede. 103 f.. Ill, 120. H.C. Kee has objected tbatPhtio's Life of Moses, which

for our purposes is the most significant aretalogy prior to the gospels, is Jewish and based

on O.T. stories. See "Aretalogies, Hellenistic 'Lives' and the Sources of Mark",

Protocol Series of the Colloquies of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies, NÂ° 12

(Berkeley, 8 Dec. 1974). The answer is that it is what Philo does with the earlier stories

that is significant; the changes he makes are in line with the aretalogical tradition; cf.

Heroes and Gods, 129-31.


is also applied to Elijah in 4 Kgdms. 1:9 f., II f., 13, and to Elisha in 4

Kgdms. 4:7, 9, 21; 8:4,7. Yet the form theios aner is probably a

technical term that Jewish writers have adopted from the Hellenistic

world. The interpenetration of Judaism and Hellenism in this period is

now so well known that one should no longer have doubts about it. From

one point of view, Jewish culture at the beginning of our era was simply

a very special kind of Hellenistic culture. Judaism was more distinctive

than other religions and often more resistant to the dominant culture, but

the differences must always be defined, and one must be cautious in

tracing genetic relationships.

I

Fourth Maccabees is appropiate for us to consider, partly because of

its date; as Hadas has shown, it was probably written about A.D. 407.

There is almost no possibility that this document had any literary

influence on any of the four gospels; the most that can be argued is that it

reflects ways of thinking that were current at this time in Hellenistic

Jewish circles, almost certainly in Syria, perhaps in Palestine itself

(Hadas, 122).

The book presents itself as a diatribe or memorial oration on the

heroism of Eleazar, the seven brothers, and their mother, possibly

delivered on the anniversary of their martyrdom (1: 10; 3:19). It begins

as a philosophical discourse designed to prove that the devout reason is

sovereign over the emotions (1:1), and it carries this argument through.


The theme is in the Platonic and Stoic tradition, but according to the

orator devout reason is always in harmony with the Jewish Law, and this

can be seen in the attitudes and behavior of Hebrew saints from the time

of the patriarchs down to the martyrs of the Maccabean period. The

book is therefore a philosophical interpretation of a religious position.

The simpler account of Eleazar's martyrdom in 2 Macc 6:18-31 is

developed in 4 Maccabees in such a way that Eleazar becomes a

philosophical saint8. Of course, as Hadas and Smith say, the ultimate

7. M. Hadas. The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees (New York, 1953) 95-99.

8. Jonathan A. Goldstein. / Maccabees (Anchor Bible; Garden City, 1976) 56 n.

18, holds that the author of 4 Maccabees may have used the unabridged work of Jason of

Cyrene, but that his expansion of the account of the martyrdoms was probably his own


pattern is Socrates, and the ideas are basically those expressed in the

Gorgias and Protagoras9. This underlines Tiede's point: there are two

types of aretalogies, with their corresponding aretai. It is true, as Smith

says, that in the Hellenistic world arete usually means "miracle"10,

but this is not necessarily so in Philo, and certainly not in the New

Testament, where it is almost always used in the sense of "excellence"

or "virtue" (Phil. 4:8; 2 Pet. 1:3, 5). The only other occurrence is in I

Pet. 2:9, where Christians are bidden to declare the aretai of "him who

called you out of darkness into his marvelous light". Here the RSV

translates the word as "wonderful deeds", and while this can refer to

Jesus' miracles the reference is more probably to all of Jesus' ministry,

including his death and descent into the underworld (1 Pet. 3: 18-22). In

4 Maccabees aretai are not miracles11.

II

The orator begins by saying that his purpose is to discuss "whether

devout reason is sovereign over the emotions" (1:1; cf. 1:9, 13)12. The

highest virtue arete is rational judgment (1:2), and he intends to praise

the virtues of those who died for the sake of virtue (1:8,10). Reason is

the guide of the virtues (1:30), and these are essentially the four cardinal

work. Tiede. 57, remarks that 4 Maccabees tones down the miraculous motifs; cf.

RM.GRaht. Miracle and Natural Law (Amsterdam, 1952) 163, 223. That 4 Maccabees

eliminates references to the resurrection of the flesh only indicates a different type of

eschatology.


9. Heroes and Gods, 88-93; Hadas. 115-18. See especially Gorgias 472e, 508e,

510a, 522c-e. The Protagoras develops similar themes.

10. Morton Smith ("Prolegomena to a Discussion of Aretalogies, Divine Men, the

Gospels and Jesus". JBl., 90 (1971) 174-99), defines aretai as miracles (175). Aretalogia

"means both telling tall stories and the praise of a god... The use of arete in the sense of 'a

demonstration of divine power, a miracle', is also common" (175 f.). Like Tiede, he

recognizes that there are two types of aretalogies, "bare collections of miracle stories with

almost no connective material, and the life of the hero as a holy man" (177-79).

11. Thus 4 Maccabees does not demythologize aretalogy; it simply understands arete in

one of its recognized uses. On the other hand, aretai of God himself are present, e.g., in

the judgment on Appollonius (4:9-14).

12. 4 Mace I: 13, ^t|tou(iev 6f| toiwv el avTOKoatwp krtiv Turv jta6u>v 6

Xdyioux)? Josephus. Ant. 4. 327-31, says that Moses had complete command of the

passions(tujv jraOwv airtOKodnup); cf. Tiede. 236. Josephus writes at a later time, and

the phrase may be a commonplace.


virtues (1:2-4, 18: 5:23 f.)13. A man may not abandon virtue even for

the sake of his parents (2:10). Indeed God's Law is a virtuous law

(11:5). The seven brothers were all educated by the same Law and

trained in the same virtues (13:24), so that they had virtuous habits

(13:27). They maintain that they are suffering because of this godly

training (10:10), and that where virtue is concerned the sons of the

Hebrews alone are invincible (9:18).

Well-known athletic metaphors appear. The brothers are contestants

or champions (agonistas) for virtue (12:14) and believe that they will

have its prize and will be with God (9:8). The tyrant, whom they address

as "Hater of virtue" (11:4), observed the courage (andreia) of their

virtue (17:23)14. All of this is used for the purpose of instilling loyalty

to the Law; note the exhortations of 6:22; 7:8; 18' I f. The aretai mentio-

ned in 4 Maccabees, therefore, are not "miraculous" but they are

certainly marvelous. "Who did not wonder at the athletes of the divine

legislation? Who was not amazed?" (17:16; cf. 17:11-15).

Although the great miracle, as we shall see, comes after the death of

the martyrs, the incidental background contains wondrous elements.

The orator mentions past exploits of heroes that are not miracles, those

of David (3:6-16) and Phineas (18:12), along with the more miraculous

stories of Abraham and Isaac (13:12; 16:20; 18:11), and especially

Daniel, Mishael, Hananiah and Azariah (16:3, 21; 18:12f.). Thus arete

can involve both the natural and supernatural, but all aretai are won-


drous and can receive a miraculous reponse from God. In 4:8-14 there is

an epiphany in the Temple that is reminiscent of 2 Macc 2:21-23;

6:18-22. Nevertheless for the nine martyrs there is no escape from

death.

Eleazar is the first example. He reminds us of the men bearing the

same name in 3 Macc 6:1-15 and 2 Macc 6:43-46. He is an aged priest,

leader of the flock, learned in the Law, with a good reputation at

Antiochus' court because of his philosophy (4 Macc 5:4). He is even

13. The variations on the virtues in Plato are interesting, for sometimes episteme seems

to take the place of phronesis or sophia, and holiness (hosiotes) is a fifth, though it is

equated with justice, in that the former is directed toward the gods and the latter toward

men; cf. Gorgias 507 a-c; Protagoras 329 f., 361 b. This may be significant for 4

Maccabees.

14. Tiede. 108 and n. 14, cites several passages where Jacob the wrestler is an "athlete

of virtue"; cf. also de Somniis 1. 59. Cynics and Stoics used the term to describe the

virtuous Heracles.


called panagios (7:4)15. Before his martyrdom he utters two noble

speeches (5:16-38; 6:17-23), and when he is at the point of death he

raises his eyes to God and prays (6:27-29).

Unlike Jesus, who gives new teachings as well as old, the martyrs of 4

Maccabees offer no strictly new doctrines, but Eleazar's speeches are

certainly didactic; thus he carries on his vocation to the very end.

The seven brothers are similarly portrayed in ideal colors. They were

"handsome (kaloi), modest, noble (gennaioi), and accomplished in

every way" (8:3), as well as unswerving in obedience to the Jewish

Law: "they were righteous and self-controlled and brave and magnani-

mous, and loved their brothers and their mother, so that they obeyed her

even to death" (15:10); thus they had all the good qualities admired in

Judaism and in the Hellenistic world (cf. 13:19â€” 14:10). Before they

die they utter heroic speeches and encourage one another to martyrdom

(e.g., 13:9-18). They are confident that at their death Abraham, Isaac

and Jacob will receive them (as Eleazar also said, 5:37). The brothers fit

the pattern of the ideal sage in that they have complete control over their

emotions and are absolutely unflinching in their resolution to be loyal to

the Law.

The mother makes no speeches to the king and the guards, but throws

herself on the flames so that no one may touch her body (17: 1). Yetshe

also is a teacher. She had previously told her children the story of her

holy life and that of her husband (18:7-19) and had exhorted them to


stand fast in martyrdom (16:16-23). Both of these speeches are filled

with biblical examples. She is the greatest of all the heroes; note the

panegyrics, 14:11 â€” 15:32; 17:17-7.

Ill

The result of this heroism is salvation. The tyrant was conquered and

the native land purified16. But, even more, the martyrs became, as it

15. The Liddell-Scott-Jones lexicon gives only this passage as an example of the word.

In patristic literature it is used frequently to refer to God, the Logos, the Holy Spirit, the

Virgin Mary, Jesus' human body, and also to saints, ascetics, etc.; cf. G.W.H. Lampe.A

Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford, 1961).

16. Cf. Goldstein, 33, 73, 224. The tradition of 2 Maccabees, which is continued

here, is that Israel had been afflicted because of its sins and was redeemed by loyal

observance of the Law and martyrdom. 1 Maccabees holds that sin had caused the

affliction but that the land was saved through the heroism of Mattathiah and his sons,

whom God raised up.


were, a ransom (antipsychon) for the nation, "and through the blood of

those devoted ones and their death as an expiation (hilasterion), divine

Providence preserved Israel that previously had been afflicted" (17:21

f.;cf. also 6:27-29; 7:4; 8:15; 9:30; 11:24 f.; 18:4).

This is the public, national side of the marvel. On the other hand, the

heroes run the course toward immortality (athanasia). Signs of this

appear as they are dying. Eleazar was "unmoved, as though being

tortured in a dream'' (6:5), and the eldest of the brothers was' 'as though

transformed by fire into incorruptibility" (aphtharsia, 9:22). The

mother gave '' rebirth for immortality to the whole number of her sons''

(16:13); all of these heroes "have received pure and immortal souls

from God" (18:23). They went to death believing that Abraham and

Isaac and Jacob would welcome them (13:17), and the orator proclaims,

"Those who die for the sake of God live in God (or to God), as do

Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the patriarchs" (16:25), although

in another place this is promised to "as many as attend to religion with a

whole heart" (7:18 f.). The heroes "were deemed worthy to share in a

divine inheritance" (18:3; cf. 17:18).

The mother is given the highest honor of all: "The moon in heaven,

with the stars, does not stand so august as you, who after lighting the

way of your star-like seven sons to piety, stand in honor before God and

are firmly fixed in heaven with them" (17:5). The orator never steps

outside the boundaries of Jewish monotheism, but in his narrative and


panegyric he freely uses motifs belonging to the thought-world of pagan

aretalogy and comes as close as possible to the divinization of human

beings.

The heroes are savior-figures. Historically, their actions put an end to

persecution and inspired the holy people â€” who are called' 'the flock''

(5:4), "Hebrews" (5:2; 9:18), and "Israelite children, offspring of the

seed of Abraham'' (18:1; cf. II Cor. 11:22) â€” to stand fast in obser-

vance of the Law. But this is also a divine transaction, for the martyrs

become a ransom and an expiation. Eleazar had said in his prayer, "Be

merciful (hileos) to your people, and let our punishment suffice for

them. Make my blood their purification (katharsion) and take my life in

exchange (antipsychon) for theirs" (6:28 f.).

A few of these ideas appear in less developed form in 2 Maccabees.

Thus the youngest of the brothers says, "our brothers after enduring a

brief suffering have drunk of everflowing life" (2 Macc. 7:36), and he

hopes that through him and his brothers an end will be brought to the


wrath of the Almighty (7:38). In 12:43-45, however, when Judas

collects a sin-offering on behalf of the soldiers who had fallen in battle,

the author explains this was an atonement (exhilasmon) for the dead in

hope of their resurrection.

IV

When parallels from the New Testament are considered, the theologi-

cal language of 4 Maccabees seems closest to that of Paul and I

Timothy. Three times in 2 Cor 11:13-15 Paul refers to the false apostles

who transform themselves, (spuriously, however) into apostles of

Christ, and to Satan, who also disguises himself as an angel of light.

In Phil 3:21 the verb is used in a good sense of the "transforma-

tion" of the bodies of Christians into "conformity" with Christ's

glorious body. The word for change or transfiguration in 2 Cor 3:18 and

Mark 9:2, is a synonym, but it is not found in 4 Maccabees. "Immorta-

lity" occurs in I Cor 15:53 f. and I Tim 6:16, and "incorruptibility" in I

Cor 15:53 f. Hilasterion is found in Rom 3:25. Ignatius of Antioch uses

the word antipsychos to refer to his own martyrdom (Eph. 21:1; Polyc.

2:3)17. The word does not appear in the New Testament, but we have

antilytron in I Tim 2:6, and in Mark 10:45 the Son of Man is to give his

life as a " ransom (lytron) for many''.

While these words are the obvious ones to express such ideas, one

may conjecture that theological ideas and language similar to those of 4

Maccabees were current in circles with which Paul and Mark were in


contact, particularly since Paul's opponents in 2 Corinthians evidently

called themselves Hebrews, Israelites, and seed of Abraham (2 Cor

12:22; cf. the passages previously mentioned and 4 Macc 5:2; 9:18;

18:1). The orator of 4 Maccabees refers to his people by such honorific

words and never calls them simply "Jews18".

17. Ignatius uses so many expressions found in 4 Maccabees that if he does not know

document they must already have been commonplaces; e.g.., chorus (Ign. Rom. 2:2;

Eph. 19:2), pains of birth (Rom. 6:1), the prize of God's athlete is immortality and eternal

life (Pol. 2:3). Cf. O. Perler. "Das vierte Makkabaerbuch, Ignatius von Antiochien und

die altesten Matyrerberichte", Rivista di archeologia cristiana 25 (1949), 47-72.

18. S. Zeitlin has argued (JQR 43 (1953) 365-79) that the Jews of Antioch called

themselves Hebrews and reserved the term tovoaioifor the Jews of Palestine and Egypt.


In describing wonder at the miraculous, Mark seldom uses the words

employed by 4 Maccabees. All "wonder" at Jesus' deeds only once

(Mark 5:20). And people are "amazed" at his teaching except in Mark

7:37 where "he both makes the deaf to hear and the dumb to speak".

The usual reaction to miracles is fear (4:41; 5:15; 33; 6:50; 16:8).

Elsewhere fear is the response to Jesus' teaching (9:32) and his myste-

rious bearing, but such fear is also coupled with astonishment (10:32,

though expressed by a verb not found in 4. Macc); and this last is

significant because Jesus is on the way to Jerusalem to suffer.

At first glance it might seem unlikely that a comparison with 4

Maccabees would throw some light on the theology of Mark and its

sources. The two books differ greatly in genre and purpose. One can

contrast the erudite philosophy of the orator with the rich and complica-

ted theology of Mark. As an aretalogy, 4 Maccabees belongs to the type

celebrating the ideal sage and martyr, though it includes some supernatu-

ral elements. The writer of Mark, so far as we know, invented a new and

complex genre, the gospel. The first part of the book contains epipha-

nies, exorcisms and wondrous healings that establish Jesus as a hero

with divine power, and these have analogies in pagan tales, though the

influence of the old Testament is also present. Mark resembles Philo and

especially Artapanus in that traits of the divine man have been mediated

through Hellenistic Judaism.

The latter half of Mark is dominated by the themes of the suffering


Son of Man and the discipleship of lowly service, and, as we shall see,

in all parts of the gospel there are elements that picture JesUs as the ideal

sage and teacher, though these do not stand out so obviously. How then

is Mark's purpose to be explained? Does he set up the miracles only as

examples of a false theologia gloriae in contrast to the true theologia

crurisâ„¢. Or, on the contrary, is Mark saying that both of these elements

are part of the truth about Jesus' nature, and that together they manifest

the divine glory? In that case, how does he make the synthesis?

19. This is the thesis of T.J. Weeden. Mark: Traditions in Conflict (Philadelphia.

1971). For criticisms, see S. Brown. Theol. Stud. 33 (1972) 754 f.; Q. Quesnell, CBQ

35 (1973) 124 f.; E. Schweizer. EVT 33 (1973) 533-37; Tiede. 257-60.


Mark's miracle stories can be classified as (a) epiphanies, including

nature miracles; (b) exorcisms; and (c) other healings20.

Although the epiphanies have forms much like those of pagan theo-

phanies, every one of them except perhaps the Cursing of the Fig Tree

(11:12-14, 20) contains an echo of the Old Testament as an essential part

of the story, and here Jesus is to some degree a Man of God like Elijah or

Elisha. As in 4 Maccabees, we have a coalescence of Jewish and pagan

elements. The epiphanies occur at significant points in the story: at the

beginning of Jesus' ministry (1:9-11, 12f.), at the end of the discourse

on the parables of the Kingdom (4:35-41), just before the crucial

controversy over the clean and the unclean (6:30-44, 45-52), after the

healing of the Deaf Mute (8:1-9), and after Peter's confession and the

first announcement of the Passion (9:2-8). There is no suggestion of

secrecy in any of these except in the warning given afterthe Transfigura-

tion (9:9f.). The essence of an epiphany is revelation, not hiddenness. It

is true that Mark tells of the Baptism and Temptation in such a way that

Jesus can be thought of as the only witness of the marvels, so there can

be a secret epiphany (cf. Luke 10:18, where it is Jesus who sees Satan

fall); on the other hand, nothing could be more public than the miracu-

lous feedings21.

The exorcisms differ from the epiphanies in that they contain no

reminiscences of the Old Testament. Exorcism does not occur in the

Hebrew Bible; the nearest approach is the story that David restored Saul


to sanity by playing the lyre (I Sam 16:23). Exorcism is known in other

Jewish literature. Tobit (6:7, 16 f.; 8:2 f.) tells of charms for driving a

demon away. Josephus ascribes exorcism to Solomon and says that he

himself saw a man named Eleazar heal demoniacs in the presence of

Vespasian22. The motif of secrecy hardly arises at all in the exorcisms.

The demoniac of Gerasa is actually told to announce the news of his cure

20. For a different classification, see H.D. Betz. "Jesus as Divine Man", in F.T.

Trotter ed., Jesus and the Historian (Philadelphia, 1968) 117-19.

21. Morton Smith ("The Aretalogy used by Mark", Protocol of the Sixth Colloquy of

the Center for Hermeneutical Studies, ed., W. Wuellner (Berkeley, 12 April 1973) 16)

agrees with Cadbury that it is futile to try to find a single motive for all the details in the

gospel that can be interpreted as secretive; cf. H.J. Cadbury. "Mixed Motives in the

Gospels", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 95 (1951) 117-24; see

especially 119f.

22. Ant. 8. 46-49. R. Johanan ben Zakkai also had a technique for expelling demons;

cf. I. Mendelsohn, s. v. "Exorcism"â– , The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, 2, 199.


(5:19 f.). Although the exorcism stories may have been told primarily to

exhibit Jesus' power, the "Lord" of 5:19 may be not Jesus but the God

of Israel; Luke 8:39 of course makes this explicit. In the story of the

Syrophoenician woman's daughter, the emphasis is not on the exorcism

as such but on the faith of the woman and the fact that a Gentile is

healed.

The narratives of the other healings are not all of one pattern. In four

cases, Mark introduces an element of secrecy or heightens it. Some-

times the story itself contains at least a suggestion of secrecy, but in

most of the incidents Mark makes secrecy almost impossible. Indeed it

is not at all certain that Mark disapproves when, for example, the healed

leper spreads the news (1:45).

It seems, then, that Mark has no hesitation in portraying Jesus as a

hero with wondrous powers. Rather he takes delight in the stories. The

epiphanies describe the glory that is to be seen again, the exorcisms

show Jesus' triumph over demonic forces, and the other healings, like

the miraculous feedings, not only exhibit his power but also the benefit

to hungry and suffering people. Even the element of compassion comes

in occasionally, although it is a minor motif.

Not only does the Jesus of Mark have traits of the miracle-working

divine man; he is also presented as the teacher and sage. He teaches with

authority (exousia 1:22, 27), and, like the head of a philosophical

school, he gathers disciples and trains them. Goodspeed long ago


pointed out that in the Gospel of John the discourses resemble the

Platonic dialogues23.

Mark contains a substantial amount of teaching, and in this respect is

meagre only by comparison with Matthew and Luke. In the apoph-

thegms, he resolves the problem or controversy with a pithy saying

which may be a wisdom logion (e.g., 2:176, 21 f.; 3:25; perhaps 6:4),

an interpretation of the Old Testament (e.g., 2:27; 3:4; 7:15; 10:11 f.;

12:27, 37), or a pronouncement that exhibits his authority as revealer of

the will of God (e.g., 2:10, 28; 9:37, 39 f.; 10:15, 25). In this last

respect, he may be compared with Philo's Moses (Tiede, 123-32); the

difference is that Mark does not have to show that this is due to Jesus'

virtue. The story itself establishes that.

There are three major teaching sections in Mark. The pericopes

23. E.J. Goodspeed.An Introduction to the N.T. (Chicago, 1937) 308 f.


4:1-34 and 13:5-37 frame most of the public ministry and deal respecti-

vely with the themes of the Kingdom of God and the coming of the Son

of Man. The third collection might be considered as beginning with 9:9,

9:14, or9:33, and concluding with 10:45. It is more miscellaneous, but

its principal theme is discipleship, and here Jesus is pictured as substan-

tially completing the education of the Twelve.

The parables, which go back to the earliest Jesus-tradition, and no

doubt to Jesus himself, may have been collected, as Robinson believes,

as part of wisdom tradition24. If so, the original motive was to preserve

what Jesus, as a sage, had uttered. Chapter 4 includes other wisdom

sayings (4:21 f., 24). These parables are eschatological in nature, but,

since Mark includes the interpretation of the parable of the Sower

(4:13-20), he may not be quite conscious of this. What is most probable

is that Mark wishes to collect all the important teachings of Jesus that

have been handed down in his church.

Chapter 13 is a Jewish apocalypse combined with directions for

disciples, some of whom must flee Jerusalem, and others bear witness.

It is interesting that Jesus' discourse on the end of the age comes at the

end of his ministry, and one can compare Philo's statement that when

Moses is about to be summoned to heaven and to be transformed, soul

and body, into a single unity, that of mind, pure as the sunlight, he is

possessed by the spirit, making specific prophecies, no longer general

ones, of the destinies of the twelve tribes (VitaMos. 2.288;cf. Deut33).


The portrait of Jesus as the ideal sage is not confined to his teaching.

He exhibits the bearing of a divine man; he exercises such self-control

that he is not swayed by the enthusiasm of the crowds or mastered by his

own emotions (1:37 f.; 3:34 f.). At times he can seem distant and

detached.

Was such a stance thought to be appropriate to a rabbi, and, if so, was

this too a legacy from the Hellenistic world? We simply do not know.

Eccl 32 teaches restraint in speech, though the principal motive here is

modesty. The three Passion Predictions, which are highly stylized

(8:31; 9:31; 10:33 f.), picture a strong resolve to carry on in the face of

suffering and death, and in this Jesus is like Socrates and other sages (cf.

also 10:38). At the hearings before the high priest and Pilate he is silent

24. J.M. Robinson and H.Koester. Trajectories through Early Christianity (Philadel-

phia, 1971)71-113.


except for the words that in some sense admit his messiahship (14:62;

15:2-5).

Yet this must not be pressed too far, for Mark is not consistent in this,

perhaps because he is transmitting a tradition. Jesus shows strong

emotion in some of the Q traditions, and similarly in Mark he occasio-

nally shows compassion (1:41; 6:34; 8:2), affection (10:21), or indigna-

tion (1:41, D and some Old Latin MSS.; 3:5; 8:12). The Gethsemane

scene (14:33-36) and the cry from the Cross (15:34) display him as a

human being in torment or the Son of God appealing to his Father; which

or both? In these respects the Jesus of Mark is not as imperturbable as the

martyrs of 4 Maccabees.

VI

The theory of T.J. Weeden should how be considered. Several

criticisms of his book have already been published, and it is not my

purpose to deal with all parts of it. My principal difficulty with this

brilliant and stimulating monograph is that I do not think that an

evangelist like Mark, whose work rests on a variety of traditions, can

have had one single theological and polemical purpose. We should not,

of course, suppose that he is simply naif and combines traditional

materials with no concern as to whether they fit together. There are too

many signs of deliberate structure and theological reflection on the part

of the evangelist himself to make this plausible. I am not sure that we

can understand how all of his theological position fits together, but it


seems clear to me that Mark has a portrait of Jesus that combines the

hero who fights the demonic world, heals the sick, is an ideal teacher

who accepts the Cross willingly, and bids his disciples to follow the

same road of humble service25.

Much of Weeden's thesis rests on Mark's picture of the disciples as

blind, deaf, stupid, and rebellious. This is connected with the "messia-

nic secret". The two issues must be distinguished.

25. Similarly H.D. Betz. 116-25, holds that Mark completely transforms the "divine

man" type of Christology, which is the earliest in the pre-Synoptic tradition, without

substantially changing the pericopes which contain it. This he does through his theory of

the messianic secret, by historicizing the material, and by his eschatological emphasis. I

can see the logic of this, but 1 am not certain that the early Christians were always so

theological.


The disciples are sometimes almost unbelievably stupid and stub-

born, particularly in their rejection of the prophecy that the Son of Man

must suffer, and at times they are arrogant. Yet on other occasions they

are successful in healing and casting out demons (6:12 f.). They follow

Jesus most of the time, and the implication of the entire gospel is that the

tradition of Jesus' words and deeds comes from them. From what other

source would Mark have claimed to receive his tradition? The Twelve in

fact represent the leadership of the Church, which, although it often

fails, does not always do so.

Wrede and many commentators have held that the stupidity of the

disciples and the motif of secrecy about the healings are part of a single

theological theory held by the evangelist Mark. We have shown, how-

ever, that the note of secrecy is not consistently carried through, nor is

the adverse criticism of the disciples. The "messianic secret" in the

strictest sense ought to mean the secret of Jesus' nature, and this we do

have in Mark. There is also the secret of the Kingdom of God, which is

bound up with the obscurity of the parables in chap. 4. But it is doubtful

that all of this is directed against the Twelve and their later successors.

The story of the Crucifixion itself contains two elements. Johannes

Schreiber has attempted to account for this by assigning them to separate

traditions. Thus he supposes that 15:20&, 22, 24, 27 comprise a theolo-

gical apologetic resting on quotations from the Old Testament, and that

Mark, in order to present Jesus as a theios aner, added 15:25 f., 29a,


32c, 33, 34a, and 37 f.26. Weeden turns this theory completely around

and holds that Mark added the Old Testament apologetic to an earlier

hero-tradition (145-7; 165 f.). This is ingenious, and if such a separation

can be made, Weeden has the better of the argument; but both critics

arbitrarily cut to pieces a connected account in support of their theories.

If Mark had wished to deny the hero Christology he could have conclu-

ded the account with part of 15:37, "and Jesus... breathed his last". He

did not need to add the cry from the Cross and the testimony of the

centurion. We should not exclude the possibility that Mark added

elements, particularly Old Testament reminiscences, to the story; but if

he had wished to slant the theology in either of the two directions

indicated above, he could have done so more clearly.

26. J. Schreiber. Theologiedes Vertrauens (Hamburg, 1967) 24-40, 66-82.


VII

Both Jesus and the nine martyrs are presented as exemplary figures,

and the message in each case is that the exemplar must be followed and

imitated. But whereas it is presumed that any truly devout and coura-

geous Jew might equal the deeds of the Maccabean heroes and receive

the same reward, no deed of Jesus' disciples could have the significance

for salvation that is expressed in Mark 10:45 and in Jesus' actions at the

Last Supper. The disciples can only drink the cup that he drank and be

baptized with the same baptism (10:38); Jesus disclaims the right to

assign them special places in the Kingdom of God.

In both Mark and 4 Maccabees, then, we have stories of aretai that

culminate in martyrdom, and the deaths of the heroes lead to their

reception into heaven. We may now consider a view of the future life

that is found in the materials of Mark's gospel and possibly in the mind

of the evangelist himself.

Mark 12:26f., like 4 Maccabees, presumes that the patriarchs are

living in heaven. The ultimate background of this is probably the story

of Elijah (2 Kings 2:11 f.), coupled with the statement in Deut 34:6 that

no one knows where Moses' grave is. The pericope Mark 12:18-27 is of

course a controversy over the resurrection doctrine, but it concludes

with the affirmation that there can be life after death before the general

resurrection.

It has always been known that such a conception was present in


Judaism. In Wis 3:1-9 it is said that the souls of the righteous are in the

hand of God. The Messiah will open the gates of paradise (T. Levi

18:10), and elsewhere in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs there

are allusions to the patriarchs as living (T. Levi 18:14; T. Judah 25:1; T.

Benjamin 10:6).

Another book, the Testament of Job, teaches that the souls of the

righteous are taken to heaven and live there in a glorified state, while

their bodies are buried on earth in hope of the resurrection. We cannot

be certain of the date of this document, although most scholars assign it

to the first century B.C.

There are tantalizing parallels to 4 Maccabees. It is revealed to Job

that when he is raised up he "will be like an athlete who spars and

endures hard labors and wins the crown" (T. Job 4:8). His throne is in

heaven (33:2-9). He says that his children were taken up into heaven by


their Creator (39:9). In the latter part of the book, where Job is no longer

giving his "testament", and his brother Nereos is evidently telling the

story (53:1), Job's wife and the four "kings" see the children crowned

alongside the splendor of the heavenly one (40:5; cf. 47:3). Finally, one

who sits in a great chariot comes for Job's soul, while his body is buried

(52:4-6). Thus Job is another figure who lives a life of piety, suffers

grievous tortures, and at last is glorified in the presence of God27.

The view of the future life in 4 Maccabees contains less of the

mythological than this, and there is still less in the gospels. It has,

however, been argued that behind the gospels there is an early Christian

doctrine that Jesus was translated into heaven, and that this can be found

even in Mark. Midrashic use of Ps 110:1 may have had much to do with

this28. Thus it is not necessary to say more than that Jewish speculations

provided an atmosphere in which the idea of translation was acceptable,

and it may be pointed out that only the souls of Job and his children, not

their bodies, were taken into heaven. The same is evidently true of the

martyrs of 4 Maccabees.

The Gospel of John combines the idea of Jesus' resurrection with the

thought that his lifting up on the Cross is also his exaltation (John

3:14 f.; 12:32 f.). Neill Hamilton has even sought to prove that in Mark

Jesus' resurrection is a translation like that of Moses and Elijah29.

Jeremias holds that Mark's use of the verb anastenai (8:31), which

Matthew and Luke usually replace by egerthenai (e.g., Matt


16:21 = Luke 9:22), is earlier, and Jewish rather than Hellenistic30.

Luke usually presupposes the more dominant idea of resurrection,

and in 24:39, 42 f. he emphasizes the physical resurrection of Jesus.

Part of the apostolic preaching is that Jesus will be judge of the living

27. References are to the edition of R. A. Kraft. The Testament of Job (Missoula,

1974), which has a new system of verse numbering. The latter part of the book, from

chap. 46 on, contains ideas that suggest gnostic influence. Job's three daughters, bor n to

him after his miseries, learn the language of the angels, who are also called archons (49:2)

and cherubim (50:2), and sing hymns in that new dialect. I have not tried to investigate the

question of sources in this book.

28. B. Lindars, New Testament Apologetic (London, 1961)45-51)tracesthisdevelop-

ment.

29. N. Q. Hamilton. "Resurrection Tradition and the Composition of Mark", JBL 84

(1965) 415-21; cf. also Weeden. 106-180 and C.H. Talbert, What is a Gospel? (Phila-

delphia, 1977)40-41.

30. J. Jeremias. New Testament Theology (2 vols. ;New York, 1971) 1. 277 f.


and the dead (Acts 10:42), and Luke pictures Paul as contending for the

Pharisaic doctrine of resurrection (Acts 26:8; cf. 17:18,32). Yet Luke is

able to combine with this a doctrine of translation. Not only does the

story of the Rich Man and Lazarus say that the beggar was carried to

Abraham's bosom (Luke 16:22), but Jesus is also quoted as saying,

"Today you will be with me in Paradise" (22:43). Luke rewrites Mark

14:62 to read, "but from now on the Son of Man will be seated at the

right hand of the power of God" (Luke 22:69), and Lindars traces this to

Ps 110: l31. This type of belief in the future life in no way excludes the

general resurrection, but it does tend to make it less important.

What is perhaps most significant is Luke's idea of the Cross and its

sequel. As in John 20:17, the Resurrection is a stage toward the

Ascension. Neither of the two evangelists minimized Jesus' physical

resurrection, but the idea of assumption was in their tradition. For Luke

it is the Ascension that is the climax32. In Luke 9:51, Jesus begins his

journey to Jerusalem when he knows that the time for his "taking up"

has come. The corresponding verb is used in the LXX in 4 Kgdms

2:9-11 of Elijah's being received into heaven, and in 1 Macc 2:5s33.

Luke rewrites the Transfiguration story to show that Moses and Elijah

spoke to Jesus of his exodos which he would accomplish in Jerusalem

(9:31)34. The cloud (in the singular) of the Transfiguration (9:34),

corresponds to the cloud of Exod 19:16 and the cloud of the Ascension

(Acts 1:9). Thus the Transfiguration is connected with the Ascension


rather than the Parousia.

All of this lends significance to the fact that in the controversy with

the Sadducees, Luke adds "for all live to him" (20:38), words that are

almost identical with those in 4 Maccabees.

31. B. Lindars. "Re-enterthe Apocalyptic Son of Man " NTS 22(1975) 66.

32. H. Conzelmann. The Theology of St. Luke (New York, 1960) 202-6; Eric Franklin,

Christ the Lord (Philadelphia, 1975) 29-41.

33. Goldstein. 241: "At least from the time of the Greek translation of Kings, there

were Jewish authorities who were reluctant to believe that Elijah, a mortal, had been

taken up all the way into heaven (cf. Ps 115:16)".

34. Everything in Luke from 9:51 on is Jesus 'exodus, and the Central Section is the new

Deuteronomy; cf. CF. Evans, in D.E. Nineham, ed., Studies in the Gospels (Oxford,

1955)37-53.


VIII

I have attempted to isolate one or more collections of miracle stories

used by Mark 35. Reconstructions will continue to differ, depending on

the criteria used, but it is likely that much of the material had been

collected, probably in written form, before Mark received it. A few of

these stories may already have contained traditions that Jesus forbade

publicity of the miracles contained therein36. Mark exaggerated this

motif, perhaps with the latter part of his gospel in mind, to indicate that

the healings and exorcisms were only part of Jesus' ministry. To this

extent â€” but only to this extent â€” Weeden's perceptions are correct.

Here we must try to imagine the situation in which the evangelist

found himself. Like many others in his local church, he knew stories

that Jesus had cast out demons, healed lepers, fed a multitude, walked

on the water, and raised the dead. He accepted all of this without

question, and could recognize in the Old Testament analogies or types

for at least part of the items. Are we to suppose that he said to himself,

"Now I am going to sit down and compose an aretalogy of Jesus" or

"Here is a nice aretalogical collection that I can use in the first part of

my gospel"? Instead he was an evangelist with the task of winning

outsiders and instructing those who were already within, and these

stories filled him with awe and zeal.

He knew other traditions that pictured Jesus as a teacher, proclaiming

the Reign of God, engaging in controversies with the scribes overpoints


of the Torah (these were of concern to his community, which had not yet

perfected its identity and came into contact with non-Christian Jews),

and also training his disciples and uttering words of wisdom. The

tradition he had received was partly that of the ideal teacher.

Mark's church also had a lively expectation of Jesus' return as Son of

Man; he knew its apocalyptic-eschatological traditions. But what

35. P. J. Achtemeier, JBL 89 (1970) 265-91, concludes that Mark used two parallel

catenae of miracles. Morton Smith ("The Aretalogy used by Mark" [cited n. 21 above)

2-13) cites fifteen passages from the first part of Mark which he believes belonged to an

aretalogy. By contrast, the second half of the gospel shows Jesus's supernatural power

chiefly through prophecy, while p."ophecy is extremely rare in the aretalogy (13-15).

Smith combines various elements in reconstructing the aretalogy, whereas I would draw a

distinction between the exorcisms, where O.T. motifs are not obvious, and the epiphanies

and healings, where the O.T. is echoed.

36. Cf. A. Fridrichsen. The Problem of Miracle in Early Christianity (Minneapolis,

1972)110-118.


controlled his theological purpose most was what he had learned about

the night of Jesus' betrayal and Last Supper, his Crucifixion and burial,

and the message to the women at the Empty Tomb. In this sense, as

Marxsen says, the gospel is written backwards, with this always in

mind37. From this point of view, it does not matter greatly whether

Mark received the Passion Narrative as a unit or as several stories, or

whether he understood the promise as a resurrection appearance in

Galilee or as the return of the Son of Man. What is important to Mark are

the Cross and the fact that Jesus is alive.

It is conceivable that someone before Mark, thinking of the suffering

Servant in II Isaiah, concluded that the Son of Man must suffer;

sometimes it has happened that an unknown teacher gets an insight and

another theologian develops it. But, so far as we know, it is Mark who

first explicated this doctrine clearly. It tied together eschatological

predictions of the Son of Man with three sayings that he placed early in

his gospel. One of these proclaimed Jesus' authority to forgive sins on

earth as Son of Man (2:10) and another expressed his same authority as

lord of the Sabbath (2:28). A third, which he related closely to the other,

was a saying of Jesus as teacher, that the Sabbath was made for man and

not man for the Sabbath (2:27).

Mark may not have been conscious that he was combining the

miracle worker and the ideal teacher, as Philo did in a different way. He

was a theologian but he did not disclose the workings of his mind,


because his purpose was to proclaim the Good News, not to explain

himself. The curious context of the Feeding of the Four Thousand may,

however, give us a clue to his purpose. The miracle is followed by

Jesus' categorical refusal to give a sign (8:12). Does Mark include this

because no sign will be given the Pharisees as representatives of a

faithless generation? Or is it Mark's thought that the feedings are not a

"sign" in the sense of an arbitrary miracle worked to prove Jesus'

authenticity (cf. Matt. 4:3 f. = Luke 4:3 f.)? Mark follows this up with

8:14-20, on the blindness and deafness of the disciples, which in turn

leads to the transition miracle of the Blind Man of Bethsaida (8:22-26),

the Caesarea Philippi pericopes, and the Transfiguration. The point

here seems to be that no signs will be given except those that you should

37. W. Marxsen.Mark the.Evangelist(NashvMe, 1969) 30 f.


have been able to see. Although the disciples are criticized severely, the

epiphanies and other miracles are not repudiated; on the contrary, they

are emphasized. The disciples have simply failed to understand what

they mean38.

It is very significant that 8:14-20 presents Jesus as the teacher. His

next teachings (8:34-9:1), on the way of the Cross, set the theme for

much that follows. The epiphany of the Transfiguration is next explain-

ed (9:9-13), but what is most important is that the second Passion

Prediction (9:31) leads to the teachings on humility and service which

dominate most of the gospel through 10:45. This part of Mark portrays

Jesus as the model of the modest and humble leader, a trait that we see

also in Philo's Moses, although Moses was also used by God as the

agent of miracles. Jesus in Mark never ceases to be a man of power (cf.

11:20), and there are signs of theophany in the Crucifixion story itself

(15:37-39), yet the man who was crucified was also the one who spoke

in 10:35-45.

Mark seems to have been saying to the Church of his own time: "(a)

You must not think of Jesus as only a hero who could heal, cast out

demons, forgive your sins, and teach you the will of God; (b) he acted as

servant and slave toward God and toward other human beings; (c) but

equally, his shameful death is not the whole story, for he was victorious

in his work of proclaiming the Kingdom of God and in his life after

death''. All this is part of his glory.


Fourth Maccabees is, as we have said, very different from Mark. Yet

it shows, when it is compared with Mark, that in both Hellenistic

Judaism and early Christianity, it is possible to combine the idea of the

ideal teacher and martyr with some elements of the miraculous and

especially with the idea that the sufferings and death of such heroes are

glorious examples of arete and end in immediate union with God. The

difference is that Jesus was, at least from the time of his baptism, in

some sense divine, and that although Christian martyrs can imitate him

in suffering and death, they do not have the unique soteriological

significance that Mark ascribes to him.

38. E.C. Hobbs has pointed out that Mark's pattern is not so much secrecy as

"hidden-then-revealed"; cf. his article in H.D. Betz ed., Christology and a Modern

Pilgrimage (Missoula, 1971) 87-90.


WILHELM WUELLNER

GREEK RHETORIC AND PAULINE ARGUMENTATION

In a survey of Hellenistic Elements in 1 Corinthians 1Robert Grant

noted that in his use of materials Paul is Jewish but "his method is

self-consciously Greek". Among the cases cited in support of this

thesis he mentions two from ancient rhetoric: analogies and digressions.

According to Grant the clause and sentence structure in 1 Cor 13

indicate "rhetorical skill" based on "acareful study either of rhetorical

manuals or of some literary model or models". In this essay I wish to

follow up Grant's suggestions and show that digressions in Paul's

letters are illustrative of his rhetorical sophistication and that they serve

to support his argumentation. This view runs counter to the current

scholarly opinion that Paul's digressions are interruptions in his argu-

ments and often carry him off into irrelevant material2. Already in the

third century Methodius, bishop of Olympus, had a sounder view of

Paul's disgressions: "... the sudden shifts in Paul's discussions, which

give one the impression that he is confusing the issue or bringing in

irrelevant material or wandering from the point at issue, ... (are part of

Paul's) most varied style (charakter ton logonpoikilotatos)... Yet in all

these transitions he never introduces anything that would be irrelevant

to his doctrine, but gathering up his ideas into a wonderfully harmo-

nious pattern he makes them all tell on the single point at issue which he

has proposed3".

In modern times Johannes Weiss considered digressions "a solid


1. Robert M.Grant. "Hellenistic Elements in 1 Corinthians", in Early Christian

Origins. Studies in honor of Harold R. Willoughby (ed. A. Wikgren; Chicago, 1961)

60-66.

2. F. W. BeAre.S/. Paul and His Letters (London, 1962) 17.

3. Methode dOlympe: Le Banquet ed. H. Musurillo (Sources Chretiennes 95; Paris,

1963), 3.2.55-56.

178 WILHELM WUELLNER

structural principle4" serving different functions. One such digression,

1 Cor 6:1-11, as Weiss saw it, served the function of "casting light on

the main theme", while other digressions, such as 7:17-24 and chapters

9 and 13, were means by which Paul moved from the particular to the

general5. Modern exegetes have by and large ignored or thought to

have refuted the idea that Paul's letters reflected any degree of rhetorical

skill. Conzelmann's recent commentary on I Cor is a good case in

point. On the one hand he can maintain that, despite the "breaks and

joints" (such as those in 1 Cor 9, or 13, or 10:1-22), one can indeed

"detect interconnections that are plainly from the hand of Paul6". On

the other hand, his argument for the integrity and unity of 1 Cor rests

solely on theological considerations. By considering the form and

substance of Paul's argumentation separately he inevitably restricts

rhetoric to the level of ornamentation. Hand in hand with this restric-

tion, scholars have accented the irrational aspects of rhetoric7, mani-

festing itself in fanciful constructions of Paul's allegedly sanguine

personality traits.

Grant's thesis must be seen against the background of sustained

opposition to the idea that Paul's method of arguing was self-

consciously Greek. Bultmann had criticized Heinrici and Johannes

Weiss for their efforts at demonstrating the conscious use of rhetoric in

Paul8. Vielhauer in turn, while fully acknowledging the importance of

rhetorical elements for the precise understanding of Paul's letters,


argues like Conzelmann that the rhetorical features in 1 Cor are not due

to conscious rhetorical skill nor to literary ambitions, but due only to

Paul's school training9.1 wish to show that digressions, as part of Paul's

4. Johannes Weiss. Der erste Korintherbrief (Meyer 9th ed; Gottingen, 1910) xliii.

5. J. Weiss. 145on lCor6:1-11; 183on7:17-24; 198on7:29-35;231 onch.9;249on

10:lff.;3 1 lonch. 13; 362on 15:29-34. J. Ieremias (Abba, StudienzurNeutestamentli-

chen Theologie und Zeitgeschichte (Gottingen, 1966) 289) sees in ch. 9 and ch. 13

digressions with different purposes.

6. H. Conzelmann. Der erste Brief an die Korinther (Meyer 11th ed.; Gottingen,

1969) 19-22.

7. Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on

Argumentation (Notre Dame, 1971) 507-508.

8. R. Bultmann. Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe

(Gottingen, 1910)2.

9. P. VfelhAUer. Geschichte der urchristlichen Literatur (Berlin, 1975) 68. On the

influence of the Hellenistic school milieu on the Nag Hammadi scrolls, see A. Bohlig und

F. Wisse. Zum Hellenismus in den Schriften von Nag Hammadi (Gottinger Orientfor-

schungen, VI Reihe: Hellenistica, Band 2; Wiesbaden, 1975) 9-53.

GREEK RHETORIC AND PAULINE ARGUMENTATION 179

rhetorical skill, demand a different explanation. Our text-books on

introduction to New Testament literature acknowledge the existence of

digressions in 1 Cor, but offer poor accounts of their function10. It is

worth noting that for some time now efforts have been made to account

for digressions, as well as other rhetorical features, in terms of specific

literary genres, such as diatribe, homily, letter, narrative, and

wisdom11. In this literary approach to digressions one discerns an

interest in the function of digressions within the literary structure in

which they are employed. But there has been a gradual shift from the

traditional preoccupation with literary genre and with the historical

situation toward a concern with the argumentation and rhetorical situa-

tion.

Let us look at some passages in 1 Cor in light of their rhetorical

function.

I

Ancient and moder n works on rhetoric offer helpful suggestions for

the understanding of a letter such as 1 Cor. But before turning to 1 Cor

itself let us look at some recent discussions of ancient rhetoric13.

10. W. G. Kummel. Introduction to the New Testament, tr. H.C. Kee (Nashville, 1975)

278. For samples of modern Catholic views, see A. Wikenhauser and J. Schmid.

Einleitung in das Neue Testament (Herder 1973) 432; also E. B. Allo. Saint Paul,

PremiereEpitreauxCorinthiens (Paris, 1956) lxii.

11. See J. W. Bowker. "Speeches in Acts: A Study in Proem and Yellammedenu


Form",NTS 14(1967)96-111. Following P. BoRCEN.Breadfromheaven(NovJSup 10),

see W. Wuellner. "Haggadic Homily Genre in I Corinthians 1-3", JBL 89 (1970)

199-204. For comments on the puzzle of certain breaks in the sequence of thoughts in the

Sermon on the Mount, see W. D. Da vies, The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount (1964)

5-9, esp. 7; and 304-315 on Davies' solution of the puzzle. On the influence of Jewish

homiletical traditions on Paul, see H. Thyen. Der Stil der Jiidisch-Hellenistischen

Homilie (Gottingen, 1955). On disgressions in narratives, see N. Schmid.Kleine ringfor-

mige Kompositionen in den vier Evangelien und in der Apostelgeschichte (Unpublished

Ph. D. dissertation; Tubingen 1961). See E. Galbiati. La Struttura Letteraria dell'

Esodo (1956) "on the role of "intermezzos" in the Exodus narrative. R. G. Moulton. The

Literary Study of the Bible (London, 1896) 342, points out that the "elaborate series of

digressions, and digressions from those digressions'' functions in the Wisdom of Solomon

'' not as an accidental device, but as an end in itself'. For' 'flashbacks'' and digressions in

the Wisdom of Solomon see more recently J. M. Reese. Hellenistic Influence on the Book

of Wisdom and its Consequences (Rome, 1970) 115, 120, 122ff.

12. See W. J. Brandt, 7%*Rhetoric of Argumentation (Bobbs-Merrill, 1970)48.

13. H. Lausberg. Elemente der Literarischen Rhetorik (Munich, 1967), and his

Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik (Munich, 1960), 2 vols.


Lausberg, for example, categorizes digressions as "figures" of speech

serving the function of alterations in a given whole, which in turn may

be linear or circular by nature. Of the four categories of alterations â€”

omission, exchange, apposition, replacement14 â€” only the latter two

allow for the possibility of digressions. For a digression may simply be

appositive, i.e. an amplification of what is said; or it may function as

replacement of the expected development either by transforming the

argument or changing it15. Lausberg observes that digressions may

serve the purpose of softening the transition from the exordium to the

main body of the argument16, or serve as amplification like topoi or

loci communesâ„¢. He can also simply list them as excursus'16. More to

the point, however, are his comments on digressions as a form of

"invention"within the various parts of a speech: the exordium, the

narration, the argumentation, and the concluding peroration.

(a) Digressions in the exordium are called for if the aim from the start

is to "affect" the audience. Quintilian cites such a digression in an

exordium of Cicero. According to Quintilian any expression of "indi-

gnation, pity, hatred, rebuke, excuse, conciliation", or expression of

that which rebuts invective, is worthy of a digression. Other occasions

for digressions offer themselves "when we amplify or abridge a topic,

or make any kind of emotional appeal19".

(b) Digressions in the narratio or the statement of the case or plot or

main issue of the argument provide the foundation for the following


argumentation. As in the exordium, digressions may be employed again

for affective purposes, either at the beginning20 or at the end of the

narration21. Quintilian (4.3.1) indicates that most rhetors "are in the

habit, as soon as they complete the narratio, of digressing to some

14. Lausberg.Elemente, 32,58 - 63.

15. On aversio as a "figure of thought", see Lausberg. Handbuch, 1, Â§Â§ 848-851.

Digression is defined there as ' 'eine Sach-aversio'' (Â§ 849, see also Â§ 340) as over against

digressions of the speaker's orientation toward the audience (Â§Â§ 762 - 765 on apostrophe

as a special case of the general category of metabasis; see also Â§848). According to

Lausberg, digressions can serve as aversio for the purpose either of averting from the

speaker, or of averting from the immediate subject matter under discussion, or even of

averting the audience itself (ibid. Â§ 340. 848).

16. Lausberg. Elemente, 54.

11. Ibid, S3.

18. Ibid, 434.

19. Quintilian, Inst, or., 4.3. 15 and 17.

20. Lausberg. Handbuch, 1, Â§Â§ 301 - 340.

21. Ibid. Â§314.


pleasant and attractive topic with a view to securing the utmost amount

of favor from their audience". Though Quintilian warns against the

excesses in the use of digressions, he says that digressions can be

advantageously appended to the narratio as well as to different issues

under debate (4.3.4.)- A digression may serve as the conclusion of the

narratio or as the beginning of the following argumentatio (4.3.5).

Quintilian believes that digressions at the point of the transition from the

narratio to the argumentatio as the more useful (like a second exor-

dium) since they help the audience to be favorably disposed to the

proofs to be presented (4.3.9). The necessity for digression at this point

varies according to (1) the nature of the issue under consideration, and

(2) the disposition of the audience (see 4. 3. 10-11)22.

(c) Digressions in the argumentatio of a speech, which in the case of

Paul's letters would be the "body", are noted by Lausberg in terms of

the use of loci communes for the sake of amplification23. H.A. Fischel

has shown that the Rabbis use topoi in their arguments because of

influence by Hellenistic rhetoric24.

(d) Digressions in the concluding peroration because of some affec-

tive orientation, similar to that in the exordium and narratio25, should

be clearly distinguished from perorations which sometimes follow

digressions26. Since one of the two goals of the final exhortation is to

influence the readers or audience, digressions appear to heighten the

effect of the speech27.


Lausberg's contribution to the study of digressions shows that the use

of rhetorical devices is determined less by the literary genre and more by

the rhetorical considerations.

22. QUINtIlIAn.Inst. or. 4.3.15 judges digressions on topics designed to addcharm and

elegance to oratory, and that such topics as religion for instance, may "hardly seem to be

digressions as they are closely attached to arguments on similar subjects that they form

part of the texture of the speech" (trans. Butler; Loeb, 2. 129).

23. Lausberg, Elemente, Â§ 397; see also Handbuch, Â§Â§ 407 - 409. Longinus 13.1 saw

in digressions as amplifications (auxesis) a means by which a topic is invested with

grandeur.

24. H. A. Fischel. Rabbinic Literature and Graeco-Roman Philosophy (Leiden,

1973).

25. LAUsBerg. Handbuch, Â§Â§ 436 - 442. According to Cicero, digressions were

accorded a special role by Hermagoras who counted them for the sake of amplification

just before titeperoratio as one of the basic parts of every speech (see G. A. Kennedy. The

Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World (Princeton, 1972) 116f.).

26. Lausberg, Handbuch, Â§441. See below on 1 Cor 3:21-23 and 10:12-13.

27. Ibid, Â§Â§ 436 - 439,431, 441.


II

Let us now turn to 1 Cor. The framework of argumentation in 1 Cor is

determined by three basic factors: (1) the "argumentative situation" by

which is meant "the influence of the earlier stages of thediscussion on

the argumentative possibilities open to (Paul)28"; (2) the need Paul felt

to interpret his audience, i.e., the audience becomes "a construction of

the speaker29", and (3) the effects of argumentation and the relation

between argumentation and commitment30.

The argumentative situation is not the same as the historical situation

or the Sitz im Leben of form criticism. Rather it is constituted by three

relations: (a) the one between the Corinthians and their Lord; this

includes the thanksgiving section (1:4-9), the boasting and awareness of

having been "called", of being "wise" and "mature", and the eager-

ness for manifestations of the Spirit (12:12); (b) the relationship

between the Corinthians and other churches, as in 1:2; 11:16; 16: Iff,

and presupposed in 4:17 ("everywhere in every church"); and (c) the

relationship between the Corinthians and all those who are workers,

laborers, guides, as well as associates of Paul, such as Timothy and

Sosthenes. It is also important for the identification of the argumenta-

tive situation in 1 Cor that the Corinthians are acknowledged asphroni-

moi capable of judging for themselves (10:14).

In this light we see Paul doing two things: he sets a goal for himself,

and he aims at altering convictions or refuting certain views. The


desired goal is clearly stated in the firstparakalo sentence (1:10) which

expresses the main theme of the whole of 1 Cor. Like the other passages

introduced in this way (4:16; 16:16)31 it expresses intimacy and trust

between speaker and audience and strikes a tone that is free of injunc-

tion or submissivesness32. The goal as stated in 1:10 suggests that

Paul consciously chose the genos endoxon from among different

28. PERELMAN.The New Rhetoric, 491.

29. Ibid. 17-23, esp. 19-23; see also Brandt. Rhetoric of Argumentation, 205. See

here Lausberg's work on the genera causarum.

30. PERELMAN.The New Rhetoric, 45-47, and 59-62.

31. See C. J. Bjerkelund, PARAKALO: Form, Funktion undSinn derparakalo-Satze

in den paulinischen Briefen (Oslo, 1967).

32. SoH. Boers. "The Form-Critical Study ofPaul's Letters", NTS 22 (1976) 154f.,

and W. G. Doty. Letters in Primitive Christianity (Philadelphia, 1973) 39.


approaches33. The choice of the actual argument in 1 Cor is mainly

made in the light of the action or commitment desired by Paul, and only

secondarily so by the attitude of opponents34, i.e. the arrogance of

"some" (4:18), which calls for the refutation.

To see the audience as a construction of the speaker, which is the

second basic factor in the framework of Paul's argumentation in 1 Cor,

is to recognize that one cannot conceive of the knowledge of an

audience "independently of the knowledge of how to influence it (as

Paul has to). The problem of the nature of an audience is indeed

intimately connected with that of its conditioning35". This conditio-

ning and construction of the audience both precedes Paul's writing to

the Corinthians and it is achieved in the discourse by Paul's continuous

adaptation to his audience. The audience as a construction of the

speaker is balanced by the author becoming "a construction of the

audience36" as we see Paul adapting himself to the Corinthians.

The third factor necessary for appreciation of the framework of

argumention in 1 Cor is the relation between argumentation and com-

mitment. Such "acting on the minds of the (Corinthians)", whose goal

it is to produce "strong adherence" has two ramifications: it aims at

effective action and replacement. Reinforcement means "urging (an

audience)... to carry out the decisions once they were made". Reinfor-

cement is carried on "until the desired action is actually performed37".

And the desired action for 1 Cor is not the obtaining of "purely


intellectual results" (such as the answering of questions, controversies,

or "problem38"), nor the "declaration that a certain thesis (e.g. Paul's

versus Cephas' or Apollos') seems more probable than another39", but

is the one stated in 1:10, and restated in the recapitulatio in 16:13-14,

namely that they all be of "one mind". The latter introduces the

concluding peroration; the former concludes the exordium.

To accomplish this end Paul employed throughout what is known as

33. LAUsBerg. Handbuch, Â§ 64: 1. endoxon (the issue is agreeable to the readers); 2.

amphidoxon (provokes serious questions); 3. paradoxon (shocking); 4. adoxon (uninte-

resting); 5. dysparakoloutheton (baffling and obscure).


35. Ibid. 23.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid. 49.

38. Encyclopaedia Judaica 11 (1971) 55ff.



"tokens of contradiction". The primary emotions of praise, commen-

dation, affection, love, and the like are systematically contrasted by

evocations of shame (see 1:10 followed by 1:11 ff; the pathos evoking

rhetorical questions in 4:21 followed by 5:1-6:8; 11:2-16 followed by

ll:17ff; 15:1-11 followed by 15:12ff. and several others). Why does

Paul do this? He does it because the commitment of his hearers can be

"measured'' only by the obstacles overcome, which can be demonstra-

ted by (a) the action desired, (b) the sacrifices entailed, or (c) choices to

which such adherence leads and which can be justified by commit-

ment40.

It is in this connection that a case for the epideictic or demonstrative

genre of 1 Cor must be made. For "the argumentation in epideictic

discourse sets out to increase the intensity of adherence to certain

values, which might not be contested when considered on their own but

may nevertheless prevail against other values that might come into

conflict with them. The speaker tries to establish a sense of communion

centered around particular values recognized by the audience, and to

this end the whole range of means available to the rhetorician for

purposes of amplification and enhancement41". Digressions are one of

the means traditionally used in epideictic discourse. The appeal to the

audience to imitate the speaker, has a similar function. Paul's "ways in

Christ" (see 4:16 following 4:9-13; or 10:33-11:1 following ch. 9) are

an example, a paradigm of the values lauded, with Paul seeking to


increase adherence to these values on the one hand, and on the other

hand to strengthen the disposition toward action42. When Nils Dahl

says about 1 Cor 1 - 4 that it is distinct from the following chapters, he

rightly insists that "before Paul could answer the questions raised (i.e.

chs. 5-16) he had to overcome both false appraisals and false objec-

tions", but this is not because Paul had "to re-establish his apostolic

authority as the founder and spiritual father of the whole church at

Corinth43". Paul's references to himself and his apostolic office in 1

Cor are evidences of his rhetorical sophistication.

40. Ibid. 49.

41. Ibid. 51.

42. Ibid. 50.

43. N. A. Dahl, "Paul and the Church at Corinth according to 1 Corinthians 1 -4", in:

Christian History and Interpretation. Studies presented to John Knox, ed. W. R. Farmer

and C.F.D. Moule and R.R. Niebuka (Cambridge, 1967), 329.


"Epideictic discourse is less directed toward changing beliefs than to

strengthening the adherence to what is already accepted". With this

statement Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca give us another clue for the

rhetorical genre of 1 Cor and for the rhetorical functions of digressions

in it. While deliberative and forensic letters of Paul can be seen aiming

at obtaining a decision to act, the epideictic letters, among them 1 Cor

and Rom, are designed to "create a mere disposition toward action...

This distinction between kinds of oratory... offers the advantage... of

providing a single, uniform framework.for the study of argumentation:

seen in this way, all argumentation is conceived only in terms of the

action for which it paves the way or which it actually brings about44".

Ill

I have selected only three major digressions in 1 Cor (1:19-3:21;

9:1-10:13; and 13:1-13) to make the case for their rhetorical functions.

The first major digression appears as a "ring-composition" right after

the exordium. To understand the function of this digression we must

appreciate what leads up to it. In the opening section, 1:1 -10, the major

point is expressed in 1:1-3. Paul returns to this very same point, i.e. the

call status of the Corinthians in the conclusion (6:11) of his first

argumentative unit. The major term is followed by the second term

found in 1:4-9. Both of these lead to the main theme stated in 1:10. The

following section 1:11-18, the first of several "shaming" sections,

concludes with the contrast (v. 17: "not this... but that..., lest...; v. 18:


contrasting the perishing and the saved) concerning the apostolic call

and the call of all believers. It emphasizes the paradoxical nature of

divine power in "the word of the cross". At this point Paul could have

continued with the wording which is now in 4: Iff, but instead he

inserted this first major digression (1: 19-3:20) followed by a brief

peroration (3:21-23) which is a familiar ending for longer

digressions45.

The function of this digression becomes immediately clear when we

recognize that the conclusion of the "shaming" section (1:11-18)

expresses in 1:17 strong indignation or even rebuke which may be taken

44. Perelman. The New Rhetoric, 54.

45. See above n. 26.


as one of the "tokens of contradiction" mentioned above. Quintilian

had declared as "worthy of a digression'' any expression of indignation

or rebuke, or the like, even if it came as early as the exordium of a

speech. This first digression offers an amplification, in "intensive

terms", of what awaits all believers no less than all apostles (regardless

whether they are "fathers" or merely one of the numerous "guides" of

the believers), namely the only alternative there is to the "call"-status,

or being subject to the power of God (or kingdom of God in 6:9-10):

either doom or salvation. That this is the central concern in the first

argumentative unit (1:1-6:11) which prepares us for the second (6:12-

11:1) can be seen in the climax of the "shaming" section (1:11-18) and

in the climax of the final "shaming" section (5:1-6:8) in 6:9-11. Here

the deceivers or fools are once more contrasted as those "perishing" or

"not inheriting the kingdom" with those "saved". The function of this

first major digression is to highlight how "faithful God is" (1:9) to

those who wait for the revealing of our Lord Jesus Christ and as such

keep or hold themselves "to the end guiltless in the (last) day" (1:7-8).

The second major digression is not itself a ring-composition, but is

part of a ring-composition which begins in 6:12 and ends in 11:1 with an

imitation appeal that is related to the second digression (9:1 -10:13). It is

significant that this whole second major argumentative unit contains not

a single "shaming"section, but has the Corinthians asphronimoi judge

for themselves with respect to the two case studies of marriage and food


what are the appropriate actions when it comes to "glorifying God in

your body". The primary symbol from 6:12 on till the end of chapter 15

is ' 'soma''. Just as the first argumentative unit (1:1-6:11) is based on the

thoroughly traditional notion of the conflict between human nous,

gnome, logos etc. and divisive passion or the "irrational" side of

human nature46, so is the second unit (6:12ff) based on the same

notion, but this time the new premise is introduced and tested that

certain actions or attitudes are not profitable. The theme of the ring-

composition is stated in 6:12-20 with the two case studies on food and

sexuality, which are developed in chiastic order ih chs. 7 and 8. Why,

then, the digression in 9:1-23, followed by a metaphor with application

to the speaker (9:24-27) and a Scriptural "proof with application to

46. See F. Solmsen. Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment (Princeton,

1975), esp. chs. I and II on "Argumentation" and "Persuasion".


"us" (10:1-11) and a concluding brief peroration (10:12-13) which, as

noted above, is a conventional ending of digressions? The reason for the

digression at this point of the unfinished argument can be inferred from

the brief peroration at the end of the digression: inescapable temptation

had opened up the discussion over how the believer who thought

himself completely free would use his knowledge (8:4-6) in relation-

ships with the weak believer who was bound by his conscience. The

function of the digression is first of all to serve as aversion and then

prepare the Corinthians to be favorably disposed to the task of judging

(10:14-22) on the basis of the proofs presented.

There may be another reason for this second digression besides

turning away from the immediate subject matter under discussion. That

reason is brought out in the concluding peroration of this ring-

composition which starts in 10:23 and makes a final appeal in 10:31. It

is here that the main theme of 1: 10 with its appeal to one mind and one

judgement surfaces again, as well as the model character of the apostle

and his ways in Christ as they are taught "everywhere in every church"

by Paul himself (4:17; 11:1). For Paul introduces in this digression

himself as a model to assure that salvation reaches not just some but all.

That such a commitment calls for sacrifice is the point of the metaphor

and the Scriptural appeal47.

The third major digression (13:1-13) functions more like the first

digression; it amplifies by intensifying the point Paul leads up to with a


series of seven rhetorical questions (12:29-30), the premise of agape.

The digression is part of the third argumentative unit (11:2-14:40)

which, like the first unit, has two "shaming" sections (11:17-34;

12:1-3) following a praise or commendation section which, of course, is

the primary value in any epideictic speech. The three "tokens of

contrast" with which the digression opens (13:1-3) can be taken as three

aversions from excesses generated by eagerness for manifestations of

the Spirit (14:12). As with the two other major digressions there is here

an apocalyptic conclusion which is related to its first significant, place in

the exordium (l^b-S)48.

47. On the function of similes or metaphors followed by an appeal to classical

literature, seeM. H. McCall. Jr., Ancient Rhetorical Theories ofSimile and Comparison

(Cambridge, 1969).

48. See J. Baumgarten. Paulus una" die Apokalyptik: Die Auslegung apokalyptischer

Uberlieferungen in den echten Paulusbriefen (WMANT 44; Neukiichener Verlag, 1975).

He ignores, however, any rhetorical considerations.


The function of this third major digression is clearly to serve an

affective purpose, that of intensifying adherence, or "to enhance the

value of some of the elements of which one has actually been made

conscious 14:1, just as he could have gone from 1:18 directly to 4:1, but

only at49 ". Logically Paul could have proceeded from 12:31 immedia-

tely to 14:1, just as he could have gone from 1:8 directly to 4:1, but only

at a loss of what Perelman calls "presence" or intensified adhe-

rence. To paraphrase Paul's own words: logically it would be lawful,

but rhetorically it would not be helpful.

IV

There are other digressions in 1 Cor, but none of such magnitude as

the three we have reviewed briefly. The result of our analysis can be

summarized as follows: the use of digressions in Paul's writing is part of

his method which Robert Grant had called "self-consciously Greek".

The superficial impression that Paul in his writing "is confusing the

issue or bringing in irrelevant material or wandering from the point at

issue", mentioned by Methodius of Olympus in our introduction, has

been shown to be incorrect and Methodius' observation has been

confirmed that Paul by "gathering up his ideas into a wonderfully

harmonius pattern makes them all tell on the single point at issue which

he has proposed". The alternative to Deissmann's legacy will be found

neither in form-critical nor in epistolographical studies of Paul, but in

renewing the legacy of Methodius and other Patristic exegetes of Paul


with their appreciation of rhetorical traditions. We have advocated,

however, not simply a revival of classical rhetoric for moder n students,

but incorporated the efforts of what is known as "the new rhetoric" as

developed by Perelman. The combination of ancient and modern rheto-

rical studies has led us to an appreciation of the nature and function of

Paul's "most varied style" in communicating his gospel. Digressions,

like other rhetorical devices, must be viewed as more than evidences of

Paul's "style". Instead we have demonstrated that the stylistic devices

are functionally determined by the rhetorical situation. The implication

of the study of rhetoric is far-reaching, both for the exegesis of Pauline

epistles, and for the approach to Pauline theology.

49. Perelman. The New Rhetoric, 117.

G. QUISPEL

GOD IS EROS

Dante ends his Divina Commedia with the following words;

AH' alta fantasia qui manco possa;

ma gia volgeva il mio disio e '1 velle,

si come rota ch'igualmente e mossa,

Vamor che move il sole e Valtre stelle.

Here power failed the lofty phantasy;

but already my desire and my will were revolved,

like a wheel that is evenly moved,

by the Love which moves the sun and the other stars.

(TranslationCharles S. Singleton.)

Although the commentaries which I consulted do not mention it,

certainly someone will have observed already that the last line is a

quotation from Boethius:

That this fair world in settled course

her several forms should vary.

That a perpetual law should lame

the frightening seeds of things.

That Phoebus should the rosy day

in his bright chariot carry,

That Phoebe should govern the nights

which Hesperus forth brings.

That to the floods of greedy seas


are certain bounds assigned,

Which them, lest they usurp too much

190 G. QUISPEL

upon the earth, debar,

Love ruling heaven, and earth, and seas,

them in this course doth bind.

And if it once let loose their reins,

their friendship turns to war.

Tearing the world whose ordered form

their quiet motions bear.

By it all holy laws are made

and marriage rites are tied,

by it is faithful friendship joined.

How happy ye mortals are,

if the Eros which governs the heaven

does also reign in your heart.

O felix hominum genus,

si vestros animos amor

quo celum regitur re gat.

Consolatio Philosophiae 2.8

(Trans. H.F. Stewart).

The love of which Boethius speaks is a cosmogonic Eros, not only

ruling heaven and earth and seas, but also working in man as a social

sense and public spirit ("by it all holy laws are made") and, moreover,

as the instinct of procreation by which "marriage rites are tied" and

friendship is instigated among males1.


Very much the same concept is to be found in the contemporary of

Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, in his On the Divine Na-

mes (4.11-18). It is possible that both are using a common source. The

passage in Dionysius is one of the most daring and delightful in Greek

literature2. No wonder that translators did all they could to make it

incomprehensible, translating Eros by "Yearning" and glossing over

the erotic relation between David and Jonathan!

Eros has several aspects according to Dionysius.

1. The technical term "cosmogonic Eros" has been coined by the German philoso-

pher Ludwig Klages in his Vom kosmogonischen Eros (4th ed.; Jena, 1941).

2. Dionysius is leaning heavily here on Origen; cf. John. M. Rist. Eros and Psyche,

(Toronto, 1964)204.

GOD IS EROS 191

Inferior things yearn for the superior by being attracted (epistrep-

tikos). And those of the same rank love their equals in communion

(koinonikos). And the superior love their inferiors by taking care

of them (pronoetikos). And everything loves itself through the

instinct of self preservation, self love (synektikos).

Eros is alive in all its ramifications.

Dionysius observes that he is not contradicting the Bible when he uses

the word Eros instead of Agape. He finds it unreasonable and foolish to

focus on the words rather than their meaning. As if addressing an

invisible opposition, he remarks that such is the way of them that receive

the empty sounds without letting them pass beyond their ears and shut

them out, not wishing to know what such and such a phrase intends, nor

how they ought to explain it in other terms expressing the same sense

more clearly. "Nay", he says, "some of our writers about holy things

have thought the word Eros more appropriate for divine things than

Agape". This latter (agape) is used for human love, as in 2 Samuel

(1:26): "Your love (agapesis) was more delightful for me than the love

(agapesis) of women". On this basis this great mystic can describe Eros

as a mighty stream, coming from God and ruling the kosmos: this is

condescending love of the higher for the lower, eros pronoetikos:

And we must dare to affirm (for it is the truth) that the Creator of

the universe himself in his beautiful and good Eros towards the

universe is through the excess of his erotic goodness transported


outside of himself in his providential care for all things that have

being, and is touched by the sweet spell of goodness, love and

Eros and so is drawn from his transcendence up there to dwell

within the heart of all things.

Here on earth Eros also works as a uniting and commingling power in

men urging them to create community, "moves co-equal to a commu-

nion", be it in society or marriage. And finally this life force can be

sublimated into a desire for God: it "moves the inferiors to turn towards

their superiors in virtue and position" (eros epistreptikos).

And so the cosmogonic Eros forms a cycle, originating in God,

penetrating the kosmos, transformed in man into public spirit and sexual

desire and returning to its source as love of God, "revolving in a

192 G. QUISPEL

perpetual circle... with unerring revolution, never varying its centre or

direction, perpetually advancing and remaining and returning to itself.

And he quotes from the Erotic Hymns of his mysterious teacher Hie-

rotheos:

There is one simple power which of itself moveth all things to be

combined into a unity, starting from the Good and going to the

lowest of creatures and thence again returning through all stages

in due order unto the Good, and thus revolving from itself and

upon itself and towards itself, in an unceasing orbit.

Love (Eros) comes from God and returns to God.

In fact Dionysius here explodes the theories of all those who tell us

that Eros is never used in the Bible, and Agape alone is found there and

not in profane Greek literature, and that the Hebrew notion of Apape,

unselfish love, is the complete opposite of Greek Eros which is egoistic,

self-realising love. They forget to tell us that Agape in the Septuagint

(the Song of Songs) and in the Fathers as often as not has erotic, sexual

connotations and is virtually identical with Eros3.

It has been established long ago that in this passage, as so often,

Dionysius is leaning heavily upon Proclus4. This is obvious from the

fact that he, Dionysius, uses the same terminology as the Neoplatonist

philosopher of Athens in his commentary on Plato's I Alcibiades5. The

latter, too, uses such terms as eros pronoetikos (ch. 45, 55) and eros

epistreptikos (ch. 27). But, as Cornelia de Vogel has pointed out.


3. Like Dionysius, his predecessor Macarius (ca. A.D. 350. Mesopotamia) opposes

the "sarkos agape" as "fleshy love" (of man and wife) to the "ouranios eros" or

spiritual love of God (Homilies 4.15; ed. Domes 38, 234-243). In Hom. 25.5 (Domes

202, 74-75) Macarius speaks about "being wounded" by love, referring to Song of Songs

2:5, where the Septuagint uses "agape". Verlaine says: "MonDieu, vous m'avez blesse

d'amour" (not: "de charite").

4. J. Stiglmayr. Historisches Jahrbuch der Gorresgesellschaft (1895) 748, proves

that Dionysius used Proclus' work De malorum subsistentia (preserved in the translation

of Willem van Moerbeke, archbishop of Corinth, 1277-1281) when he argued that evil is

nothing but privation of good (Div. Nom. 4.18-35). Stiglmayr also mentions that Diony-

sius knew Proclus' commentary on Plato's Parmenides and his commentary on the First

Alcibiades. For the latter assertion he does not adduce any proof. H. Koch. Theologische

Quartalschrift (1895) 353-420, also discovered Dionysius' dependence on Proclus but

does not mention Eros in this context.

5. Edited by L. G. Westerink. Proclus Diadochus. Commentary on the First Alcibia-

des of Plato (Amsterdam, 1954); translated by W. O'Neill. Proclus: Alcibiades I. A

Translation and a Commentary (The Hague, 1965).

GOD IS EROS 193

Boethius, in the quoted Hymn on Eros must have used the same

source6.

Proclus died in Athens on April 17,486. Boethius is supposed to have

been born about 480 A.D. and died in the autumn of 524. Therefore he

probably was not a direct disciple of Proclus. In de disciplina schola-

rium he is supposed to declare: annis duobus de viginti Athenis convalui

(PL 64, 1232 B). But this treatise is generally held to have been written

in the thirteenth century and to have been falsely attributed to Boethius.

King Theodoric writes to Boethius in a letter: sic enim Atheniensium

scholas longe positus introisti (Cassiodorus, Variae 1.45.3). This pas-

sage means only that the philosopher, though far removed from Athens,

nevertheless in spirit has visited the schools of that city. It refers to the

famous translations and commentaries of Boethius. Therefore the great

master Pierre Courcelle denies that Boethius ever visited the Neoplato-

nic school at Athens in his youth7. He supposes that Boethius has learned

Greek not in Rome, but in Alexandria, where he visitied the Neoplato-

nic shool of the pagan Ammonius. Be that as it may, the curious fact

remains that two prominent and influential Christians appropriated

Proclus when they wanted to write about divine Love.

This has troubled some Christian scholars. They had been taught that

according to the Greeks the world loves God, whereas according to the

Christians, God loves the world; these generalizations (Aristotle = the

Greeks; John = the Christians) belonged to the basic presuppositions of


some theologians, but it seems that at least one Greek, Proclus, had

taught that love comes from God.

Anders Nygren, author of Eros and Agape, supposed that this must be

due to Christian influence on Proclus8. According to Nygren only a

Christian could know what divine love really is. Cornelia de Vogel, an

eminent scholar in this field who probably knows the sources better than

anyone else, admits in the above mentioned article that, however

strange and un-Greek it might seem to us, Proclus actually applied the

term Eros to the gods, and to the gods of the noetic level. Thus, in the

mind of this late Greek philosopher there proves to be in fact a divine

6. C. de VoGEl. " 'Amor quo caelum regitur' ", Vivarium I (1963) 1-34.

7. P. Courcelle. Les lettres grecques en Occident (Paris, 1943) 260.

8. A. Nygren.ErosetAgape (Paris, 1943) 133.

194 G. QUISPEL

descending love, stretching from the transcendental level of Nous down

to the souls of human beings living on earth.

In the Elementa Theologiae and the Theologia Platonis of Proclus the

concept of eros pronoetikos and even the term eros are said to be

lacking. From this Cornelia de Vogel infers that the idea of divine Love

was not very much alive in Proclus' mind when he wrote his theological

works proper. She fears that otherwise we might come to think that the

idea of divine Love took an important part in Proclus' theology and by

this might be led to suppose (as Nygren did) that he may have introduced

this idea in order to create a counterpart of the Christian God of love.

Such an intention must have been far from his mind, for the idea of

divine Love did not take a central part in Proclus' theological thought

anyway. My eminent colleague goes on to show that for Greek thought

in general it is a kind of anomaly (she says "monstrum") to speak of

divine love.

Plato could not attribute Eros to the gods. Aristotle, too, was very far

from such a use of the term. The supreme principle moves that which

directly depends on it, the first heaven, by a kind of attractive powerâ€”

that is, by "being loved". But it could not possibly be said that that

which is first would love that which is inferior to it. The situation is

similar with the Stoics. It is alleged that they never spoke of the love of

God either towards the world as a whole or towards man.

It is a moot point whether Plotinus defines God as love: "He is


loveable, Love itself and self love" (Enn. 6.8.15; Brehier 152). But

interpretation makes clear that Plotinus meant: "Love itself, that is (kai

explicativum), self love''.

According, then, to Cornelia de Vogel, Proclus does speak about

divine love; but this does not mean anything, because this was an

anomaly in Proclus, and a concept completely alien to Greek thought.

I find it very difficult to accept this view. Although I am not a

specialist in Greek philosophy and am therefore hesitant to contradict a

distinguished scholar in her own field, in reading Plato's dialogue /

Alcibiades (about the unselfish love of Socrates for Alcibiades) and

Proclus's allegorical interpretation of this love, I find in them the

cosmogonic Eros, which emanates from God: eros proeisiek tou Dios

(233)9.

9. Cf. 1 John 4, 7: "agape ek tou tneouestin", and my commentary, infra p. 204.

GOD IS EROS 195

Indeed, this is Proclus' basic idea, to which he comes back again and

again:

If, then, the lover is inspired by love, he would be the sort of

person who turns back and recalls noble natures to the good, like

love itself (27; O'Neill 17).

.. .The whole order of love is for all beings the cause of reversion

to the divine beauty, on the one hand elevating to, uniting with

and establishing in it all that is secondary, and on the other filling

therefrom what lies subsequent to itself and radiating the commu-

nications of divine light that proceed from it (30; O'Neill 19).

The whole series of love, then, produced from the cause of

beauty, gathers all things towards it, recalls them to participation

therein, and has set up a procession midway between the object of

love and the beings elevated through love... (31; O'Neill 19).

After the unitary primary principle of love and the triple and

self-perfecting substances thereof appears the manifold mass of

loves, whence the choirs of angels are filled with their share of

love, the bands of spirits through the fullness imparted by this god

accompany the gods in their ascent to intelligible beauty, the

armies of heroes revel with the spirits and angels because of their

share in the beautiful, and practically everything is aroused,

re-kindled and warmed around "the effluence of beauty". Fur-

thermore, men's souls receive a share of such inspiration, through


intimacy with the god are moved with regard to the beautiful, and

descend to the region of coming-to-be for the benefit of less

perfect souls and out of forethought for those in need of salvation

(32; O'Neill 21).

I must also take exception with the contention that this is not to be

found elsewhere, for it emerges in another work by Proclus.

For also the specific effect (idiotes) of Eros first enlightens the

gods (and then descends down to matter).

(InCratylum 164; Pasquali 90, 16).

And of course the Eros of Aphrodite must be conceived of as good ,

196 G. QUISPEL

in its effects and pronoetikos, because it is lavished by a higher

god on a lower god.

(InCratylum 180;Pasquali 107, 15)10.

Moreover how can one fail to trace the origin of this concept, since

Proclus indicates his source four times in his commentary on / Alcibia-

des? He says:

In general, too, since the whole order of love proceeds from the

intelligible Father (in all things, as the Oracles say, the Father

"has sown the fire-laden bond of love", in order that the whole

world may be held together by the indissoluble bonds of friend-

ship...) (26; O'Neill 16).

The reference is to the Chaldaean Oracles, a writing as authoritative

and canonical for Proclus as the Bible was for Christians of his day.

Proclus' recent translator, O'Neill says: "Proclus is always concerned

with harmonising his Neoplatonism with what he regarded as two

sources of divine revelation â€” the Chaldaean Oracles and the teachings

of theOrphics".

Another passage about cosmogonic, unselfish Eros also contains a

reference to the Chaldaean Oracles:

From above, then, love ranges from the intelligibles to the intra-

mundane making everything revert to the divine beauty, truth

illuminating the universe with knowledge, and faith establishing

each reality in the good. "For everything", says the Oracle, "is


governed and exists in these three"... (52; O'Neill 34).

Proclus quotes the "Logia" a third time:

What effects this bond of union between the inferior and the

superior if not love? For this god the Oracles call "the binding

guide of all things", and not, "binding together some and not

others"; he it is, then, who unites us with the care of the spirits

(64; O'Neill 41).

And in a fourth passage Proclus clearly shows where he found the basic

idea that cosmogonic Eros comes from God:

10. Eugenio Corsini. // trattato De Divinis Nominibus dello Pseudo-Dionigi e i

commentineoplatonicialParmenide (Torino, 1962)49.

GOD IS EROS

197

...the Oracles have termed the fire of this love binding: "who

first lept forth from Intellect", clothing his binding fire in the fire

[of Intellect =God]" (65; O'Neill 42).

If one does not disdain Gnosis (to which the Chaldaean Oracles

belong) and realises that Greek philosophy sprang from mythology,

then he will see that Proclus took his ideas on divine love from the

Chaldaean Oracles which had preserved the Orphic myth of cosmogo-

nic Eros. And in the Renaissance Leo Hebraeus, when writing his

influential Dialogues on Love, used Proclus' ideas on Eros11.

Even if Proclus had not acknowledged his source, the parallels would

be clear. This is what the fragments of the Chaldaean Oracles have

preserved of their author's concept of Eros:

The Paternal Self-begotten Mind [God], having conceived his

works, inseminated in all things the fire-laden bond of Eros, in

order that the All should continue to love forever, and that the

weavings of the Father's intelligent light should not collapse; it is

owing to the Eros that the stars of the universe keep revolving

(Chaldaean Oracles 39; edition E. des Places [Paris, 1971] 77; cf.

Hans Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theology [Cairo, 1956]

126).

[The portions of the world are held together] by the bonds of

admirable Eros, who first leapt forth out of Mind [God], wrap-


ping his binding fire in the fire [of Mind], that he might mix the

mixing-bowls of the Sources, spreading there the flowers of his

fire (42; des Places 77; cf. Lewy 127, and the first begotten Eros

or Phanes of Orphism).

Having mingled the spark of the soul with two like minded

faculties, with mind and divine will, [God] added to them as a

third chaste Eros, the binder of all things and their sublime guide

(44; des Places 78; cf. Lewy 179).

.. .The choking of true Eros... (45; des Places 78).

.. .Faith, truth and Eros... (46; des Places 78).

11. Leone Ebreo. Dialoghi d'Amore, ed. C. Gebhan.lt (Bibliotheca Spinoziana 3;

Heidelberg-London-Paris-Amsterdam, 1929).

198

G. QUISPEL

From these few lines it seems evident not only that Proclus but also the

authors of the Chaldaean Oracles were familiar with the notion that love

comes from God.

Our next question is: How did spiritualistic verses of the second

century A.D., which contain a curious mixture of Iranian, Babylonian

and Jewish lore, come to incorporate Eros, an eminently Hellenistic

concept? It was because of syncretistic tendencies that the Near East

integrated Eros, originally so alien to its mind and spirit. Indeed, we

now have a striking parallel from Nag Hammadi, which proves this was

the case.

Codex II of Nag Hammadi contains seven tractates in Coptic, the

fourth of which is entitled ' 'The Hypostasis of the Archons". It consists

clearly of two different parts, which originally were perhaps two diffe-

rent writings, to which a redactor added some Christian texts and views.

This small work of 384 lines (page 86, 20 to page 97, 29) seems not to

have originated among Christians. It seems to have originated in the

Jewish-gnostic sect of Sethians12.

It tells a myth very similar to that of the Apocryphon of John: from the

Unknown God a spiritual world emanates, which in turn is the origin of

the material world. The beginning of the work shows a definite anti-

Greek tendency: the Greeks allegedly say that the gods come from

chaos, whereas the author of this esoteric document affirms that chaos


comes from God.

A lower Aeon, Sophia, has made the firmament. She cast her shadow

which became matter, from which the rulers of the world arose, headed

by Jaldabaoth or Sakla (the Fool). Thereupon a female entity, Aphthar-

sia, looked into the primeval water of chaos and projected her image into

it. The powers of darkness saw this, loved it and made a human body

after this image. But it could not rise until it was given a living soul,

namely the spirit. So man is more than the rulers of this world and

contains an element which is indestructible. He is forbidden to eat from

the tree of knowledge in Paradise, but instructed by a messenger of God,

the serpent, he does acquire this Gnosis.

12. Edited by R. A. Bullard, The Hypostasis of the Archons. The Coptic Text with

Translation and Commentary (Berlin, 1970). Other translations by M. Krause/R. McL.

Wilson in W. Foerster (ed.), Gnosis, A Selection of Gnostic Texts, II (Oxford, 1974)

41-52, and by Bentley Layton. in Harvard Theological Review 67 (1974) 352-393.

GOD IS EROS 199

As a consequence, world history as described in this writing is the

continuous struggle of the spirit in man against the rulers of the world; it

is in fact an inversion of the biblical history. The document is meant to

be an interpretation of Genesis, full of allusions to the Bible and

Aramaic puns. It must have been written by a Jew, but a heterodox Jew,

who was familiar with the deviating view of the "minim" that the

creation of the world was due not to God himself, but to the anthropo-

morphic "Angel of the Lord13".

Immediately following in the same codex is the writing variously

called "The untitled Treatise" or "The Origin of the World14". The

material is the same as in the "Hypostasis of the Archons", though

rearranged. The most plausible explanation of this is that the author of

' 'The Origin of the World'' used the other writing as a source, or at least

a version very similar to it.

The elucidations on the Phoenix and on Eros, both typically Greek

themes, are new. This is what the author says about Eros, a cosmogonic

figure, born from the blood of a virgin and engaged in the organisation

of chaos:

From this first blood Eros originated, who is androgynous. His

male part is Himeros [Desire], who is fire from light. His female

counterpart that is with him is blood Soul [Psyche] being from the

substance of Providence [cf. eros pronoetikos]... He is excee-

dingly comely in his beauty, having more charm than all creatures


of Chaos. When all the gods and their angels saw Eros, they fell in

love with him. When, however, he manifested himself among

them all, he set them on fire. Just as from one single lamp many

lamps are lit and yet remain one and the same light and the first

lamp is not reduced, similarly Eros dispersed himself among the

creatures of Chaos and was not diminished...

As soon as in the middle region between light and darkness eros

manifested himself among angels and men; then the first copula-

tion of Eros took place. So on earth the first lust was bom. The

i3. A. Segal. Two Powers in Heaven (Leiden, 1978) shows that the doctrine of the two

Powers in Heaven is older than Philo.

14. Edited with a German translation by A. Bohlig and P. Labib, Die koptischgnostis-

che Schrift ohne Titel aus Codex II von Nag Hammadi im Koptischen Museum zu

Alt-Kairo (Berlin, 1962).

200 G. QUISPEL

female arrived with the earth. And marriage arrived with the

female. Birth arrived with marriage. Death arrived with birth.

(Origin of the World 157, 1-25.)

We notice that this Eros is androgynous (Himeros and Psyche), like the

old Orphic Phanes. There is a remarkable parallel with Apuleius' story

of Amor and Psyche (Voluptas is born here and there). And Eros is here

the origin of death, as in the Poimandres of the Corpus Hermeticum.

Michel Tardieu has shown in his excellent study of the myth of Eros in

this gnostic writing, that every detail of this myth can be traced to Greek

antecedents15.

For our purpose it is important to establish that the cosmogonic Eros

was still alive at that time in Greek civilization. Of course it is true that

Plato had demythologised and humanised Eros by saying that he was not

a god, but a daemon and by identifying him with the yearning for Being

in the soul. And Aristotle had perverted cosmogonic Eros by saying that

the world loved God and not the reverse. But that does not mean that

Eros, cosmogonic Eros, was not a principal feature of Greek civilisa-

tion. It is found in Orphism.

There are two different versions of the birth of Eros. The first is

recorded by Hieronymus and Hellenikos16. In this version from the

very beginning there was water and some solid matter that was to harden

into earth. Out of water and earth was born a monstrous figure. Endless

Time. Out of Time was born Aither and Chaos and Darkness. In them


Time brought forth an egg (which contained Phanes or Eros, the andro-

gynous god, the demiurge of all things and the whole world).

The second version is the version found in the cosmogony according

to the Orphic Rhapsodiesâ„¢. There Time is the first principle, but here

too Phanes (Eros) comes out of the world egg. There cannot be any

doubt that the cosmogonic Eros was an Orphic myth.

The study of Orphism has been bedevilled by the desire of critical

scholars to prove that their theories are correct and that the tradition is

incorrect. Hence arise the theories that the above mentioned views are

not older than the Alexandrian era. The Derveni Papyrus, from about

350 B.C., has shown how wrong they were. It contains a theological

15. M. Tardieu. Trois mythes gnostiques (Paris, 1974) 141-214.

16. W. K. C. Guthrie. Orpheus and Greek Religion (London, 1935) 79; text in O.

Kern. Orphicorumfragmenta (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1963) 130,frg.54.

17. Kern.Orphicorumfragmenta, 143, frg. 60.

GOD IS EROS 201

commentary on a mythical theogonic poem of the Orphics made in the

sixth century. And this commentary showed that the Orphics were

perfectly able to replace the imagery of their myths by abstract concepts

with the help of pre-Socratic philosophy18.

Professors of Greek Philosophy are extremely reluctant to admit that

their beloved thinkers have been influenced by mythology, especially

Oriental. And yet what is more plausible than that the image precedes

the concept? Therefore it is exceedingly probable that the Orphics spoke

about androgynous Eros sprung from the world egg long before Eros

was mentioned by the Presocratics, or even Hesiod (Theogony 120-

122).

In any case there seems to be little doubt that according to Parmenides

the All-God, a female being, planned and conceived cosmogonic Love:

"first of all the gods she conceived Eros" (frg. B, 13).

We may then conclude that cosmogonic, demiurgic, divine Love was

conceived by the Orphics, received by the Presocratics, saved by later

unknown mystics, perhaps Orphic, in a period of demythologisation

and revitalised by the Gnostics, both pagan (Chaldaean Oracles) and

Christian (Origin of the World)â„¢.

The observations are of some importance for the interpretation of the

Johannine Corpus of the New Testament. Recently Robert T. Fortna has

argued that the Fourth Gospel is based upon a Jewish-Christian gospel,

which has undergone a thoroughgoing revision20. I agree with him. I


18. Cf. F.St. Kapsomenos.Gnomon 35 (1963)222.

19. In a recension of the well-known sixth-century hymn: "Zeus is the head, Zeus is the

middle, from Zeus comes the end" it is said that both Metis and "the first begetter,

much-delighting Eros" originate in the All-God Zeus, "for all this lies in the great body of

Zeus" (Kern. Orphicorum Fragmenta, 201, frg. 168,9-10). This shows that a pantheistic

interpretation of the archaic myth, according to which Eros comes from God, did already

exist in Orphic circles at an early date. In the course of time this interpretation obviously

has been combined with Stoic, Posidonian ideas on providence, sympathy, syndesmos

and oikeiosis (instinct of self-preservation, self-love). When and where this happened, I

for one do not know. Cf. K. Reinhardt. Poseidonios vonApameia, der Rhodier genannt

(Stuttgart, 1954 (= article in Pauly-Wissowa's Realencyclopaedie)). It is clear that

Chaldaean Oracle 42: "Eros, who first leapt forth out of Mind (= God)" is an

interpretation of the Orphic concept of Eros as born from Zeus. The concept that he binds

together all things (44) seems to show that the Orphics had integrated the Stoic concept of

syndesmos. Therefore the unknown mystics who preserved cosmogonic Eros in a period

of demythologization might have been Orphic.

20. R. T. Fortna. The Gospel of Signs (Cambridge, 1970); "The Theological Use of

Locale in the Fourth Gospel", Anglican Theological Review, Supplementary Series 3

(1974)58-95.

202 G. QUISPEL

think that the prophet John, the author of the Apocalypse, wrote a gospel

for the congregation of Ephesus, which was heavily edited by a Helle-

nistic Jew, a member of the same community. We will designate the

author as John. The final redactor we will term his "editor''.

That this editor used a written Gospel is fairly obvious, because he

implies, but does not say, that Jesus was baptised by John the Baptist

(1:32). It was a Jewish-Christian work because even in its present form

it still says that Jesus, the Pascal Lamb, died on the 14th of Nisan, the

day on which the congregations of Jerusalem and Asia Minor mourned

and fasted in remembrance of what had happened and expected the

Second Coming. Indeed this was the Quartodeciman, i.e. Jewish-

Christian, Easter. The framework of this source probably comprised the

baptism of Jesus, sayings, miracles, passion and resurrection. These

sayings showed marked affinity with the Jewish-Christian logia in the

Gospel of Thomas: John, like "Thomas", does not speak of the love of

neighbour, or love of God, but of love of brother (John 15:12; 1 John

2:10; Thomas 25).

From these sayings the editor made discourses, amplifying them and

linking them with each other and inserting them into a certain situation

(the Farewell discourses, etc.). Of course, he added his own view,

namely the kerygma. Similarly he introduced the Greek Eros into his

redaction, just as the Chaldaean Oracles and The Origin of the World

had done, writings which are roughly contemporary with this editor.


We may suppose that John wrote in his Gospel, as he did in his

Apocalypse (1:5), that Jesus has loved us (agapesanti) once and for all

and has delivered us from our sins through the sacrifice of his life. And

he may have used the imagery of the Pascal Lamb, vicariously victi-

mised to save others from death and suffering. John's editor might have

used this as the starting point for very remarkable developments which

reveal not the slightest influence of Pauline theology (like the

Apocalypse)21 and have no parallel in Jewish or Old Testament litera-

ture, but show a very high appreciation of Greek Eros.

We give only three examples.

1. "This is my commandment: love one another, as I have loved you.

No man has greater love for his friends than he who gives his life for

them' '(15:12-13). The editor may have found in his source, the Jewish-

21. V.BMvLLER,ZwfriifichristlichenTheologiegeschichte(Cateis\oh, 1976)13-50.

GOD IS EROS 203

Christian Gospel of John, something like logion 25: "Love thy brother

as thy soul, preserve him as the apple of thine eyes22"

He made the general commandment historical, adding "as 1 have

loved you", and that our love should be like His, self-denying. Then he

adds something for which there is no parallel whatsoever in the Old

Testament, Talmud, Midrash nor Jewish literature in general, for the

simple reason that the Greek termphilos which occurs in the Septuagint

has no precise Hebrew equivalent, and the Greek idea of friendship is

quite foreign to the Hebrews23.

Friendship, however, is a well known topic in Greek and Latin

literature. Let us quote just two examples:

a) Love will make men dare to die for their beloved â€” love alone

(Plato, Symposium 179B; translation B. Jowett).

b) For what purpose, then, do I make a man my friend? In order to

have someone for whom I may die, whom I may follow into exile,

against whose death I may stake my own life, and pay the pledge

(inpendam) too (Seneca, Ep. 9.10; trans. R.M. Gummere).

Seneca says that out of love a man is ready to give his life as a

guarantor for his friend. This possibly is an allusion to the story of the

Pythagorean friends Damon and Phintias, jtwo young men in Syracuse.

This ancedote, as narrated by Iamblichus, Vita Pythagorica, 233ff.

(Deubner 125), tells how Damon is ready to risk his life, giving it as a

guarantee (thanatou eggue), for the return of his friend, Phintias.


"Those two men lived together and had everything in common".

Iamblichus alludes to the story of the hind that has replaced Iphigene-

neia as a victim in Aulis. "They mocked Damon suggesting that he

would be left alone by his friend and said jeering that he would be given

instead as a hind (elaphon antididosthai)". He clearly conceives of

Damon' s act of friendship in terms of a vicarious sacrifice. To suffer for

your friend and to die instead of him was for the Ancients, and possibly

also for John's editor, implied in the notion of Eros.

22. See my article 'John, Qumran and Jewish Christianity', in J. H. Charlesworth, John

andQumran (London, 1972) 143.

23. Cf. G. Stahlin, "Philos", Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 9, trans.

& ed. G.W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, 1974) 154.

204 G. QUISPEL

2. "One of his pupils, whom Jesus loved, was reclining on his bosom

during the meal" (13:23). Here again we must says that the notion of the

special favorite of a teacher, who is the privileged object of his affection

and even has a place of honour during the meal, is not Jewish, but

typically Hellenistic. Hundreds of examples of such special relation-

ships can be quoted from Greek literature, as for example the relation

between Socrates and Alcibiades. It is unthinkable that the editor found

this in his source, the Jewish-Chistian gospel written by the prophet

John. He has introduced something new by making the Last Supper into

a symposium.

3. No prophet, priest or writer of the Old Testament, nor any author of

Hebrew or Aramaic literature is known to have said that God loves the

world. And yet the Fourth Gospel says: "God loved the world so

much..." (3:16). Bultmann is probably right when he stresses the aorist

(egapesen): God loved, i.e. he showed his love for the world once and for

all by suffering on the cross to redeem mankind. Nevertheless the

concept of love descending from the Ground of being and coming to the

kosmos is thoroughly Hellenic, as is shown by Parmenides, the Chal-

daean Oracles and Proclus.

Nor is our editor afraid of such generalisations, if he is the same as the

author of I John. He writes:

Beloved friends, let us love one another, because love is out of

God.


Everyone who is loving is born from God and does know God.

Whoever is not loving does not know God, because God is love.

And his love was disclosed to us in this event, that he sent his

beloved Son to the world to give us Life (1 John 4:7-9).

This passage is very characteristic of the redactional work by the

anonymous editor. He starts, again, with the Jewish-Christian injunc-

tion to love the brother, but gives a very peculiar motivation for this

commandment. The Christian should love his brethren, his beloved

friends; this proves he has the love of God within himself and may

consider himself to be a child of God, because this Ground of being is

the source of all love, comes from God, because God as such is love.

Love originates in God, enters the human heart as a unifying force, an

eros koinonikos, the foundation of community and brotherly together-

ness, and returns as love of God from man to God. The initiative is in

GOD IS EROS 205

God, erospronoetikos, it founds the congregation, eroskoinonikos, and

at last returns to God, eros epistreptikos.

Therefore John's editor, describing love as the motivation of God's

condescension and the public spirit of the congregation, at last also

speaks of love of God.

This is real love, that God was the first to love us by sending his

Son to cover our sins and that we are only secondarily loving God

(1 John 4:10).

We love (God) because he loved us first (1 John. 4:19).

All this is typically Orphic and Hellenic. The best parallel for the

statement that love comes from God is in Proclus (In Alc. 233), as we

have shown above; and for the definition that God is Love, we find the

equivalent in Plotinus (Enn. 6.8.15).

From this we conclude that the Orphic and Hellenic tradition on Eros

is important to understand the true meaning of love in the Johannine

corpus of the New Testament and that its most thoughtful and sagacious

exegetes were Dionysius Areopagita and Boethius. Moreover, both

Dionysius and Beothius show how easily a Christian could integrate the

Orphic and philosophical concept of Eros into his own system, when he

wanted to speak about the love of God. The editor of John might have

done the same. In fact he did.

Acheved'imprimerenoctobre 1979

sur les presses de l'lmprimerie Laballery et C"


58500 Clamecy

Depot legal : 4e trimestre 1979

Numero d'imprimeur : 19191

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The interaction between Christianity and Greco-Roman culture

has been the most alluring and persistent issue among those

which have dominated the study of early Christian literature and

thought since the nineteenth century. The process of trans-

formation of Christianity from a Palestinian Jewish sect to a

universal religion has fascinated historians, theologians and

philosophers. The essays gathered in this volume challenge the

thesis of a sharp dichotomy between Christianity and Greco-

Roman culure and reflect a slow but deliberate shift which is

taking place in the understanding of Christianity in relation to

ancient culture. The essays are written by scholars from various

parts of the world, each writing from his own perspective, but

taken as a whole they indicate that Christianity and Greco-

Roman culture were not two independent worlds but that

Christian writers, from an earlier date than has been recognized,

became part of the intellectual world of late antiquity.

The essays are presented as expressions of respect and friend-

ship for Professor Robert McQueen Grant, Carl Darling Buck

Professor of Humanities at the Divinity School of the University

of Chicago. No single formula can capture the significance of the

wide range of Robert Grant's contributions to the study of the

early church. Among honors accorded Professor Grant were :

Fulbright Research Professor at the University of Leiden (1950-

51); three Guggenheim fellowships (1950, 1954, 1959) ; visiting


professor at Yale University (1964-65); president of the Society

for Biblical Literature and Exegesis (1959); president of the

Chicago Society of Biblical Research (1963-64); president of the

American Society of Church History (1970) and North American

Patristic Society (1975); a director of the Anglican Theological

Review, an associate editor of Vigiliae Christianae and co-editor

of Church History. The contributors to this melanges offered to

Robert Grant share with him the conviction that the interaction

to the early church with the Greco-Roman tradition is among

the most fascinating topics in contemporary historical and theolo-

gical debate.

$*

5 65

Imprime en France

Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition

Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition

Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition. In honorem Robert M. Grant (Théologie historique 54)

The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature

Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition

Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition (Cambridge Studies in Russian Literature)

The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature

Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature

Mystics of the Christian Tradition

Redrawing the Boundaries: The Date of Early Christian Literature (Bibleworld)

Liberalism In The Classical Tradition

Jonson, Horace and the Classical Tradition

Which Mary?: The Marys of Early Christian Tradition (Symposium Series (Society of Biblical Literature))

Jonson, Horace and the Classical Tradition

Classical Liberalism and the Jewish Tradition

Classical Liberalism and the Jewish Tradition

Semeia 65: Orality and Textuality in Early Christian Literature

Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature

Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth

Early Christian Literature: Christ and Culture in the Second and Third Centuries (Routledge Early Church Monographs)

The Early Enoch Literature

Chinese Literature, Ancient and Classical

Chinese Literature, Ancient and Classical

The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition

Early Christian Doctrines

Early Christian doctrines

Early Christian Fathers

Human Sacrifice in Jewish and Christian Tradition

Early Christian Creeds

Understanding Early Christian Art

Christian Spirituality in the Catholic Tradition

Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition

Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition