Why the Boers Lost the War

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Why the Boers Lost the War

Leopold Scholtz

Why the Boers Lost the War

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Why the Boers Lost the War Leopold Scholtz

© Leopold Scholtz 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in Afrikaans by Protea Bookhouse; This edition published 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–4880–9 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–4880–1 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Scholtz, Leopold. [Waarom die boere die oorlog verloor het. English] Why the Boers lost the war / Leopold Scholtz. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–4880–1 1. South African War, 1899–1902–Campaigns. I. Title. DT1899.S3813 2005 968.04¢8–dc22

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents List of Maps

vii

Preface

ix

Introduction

xi

Background

1

The Campaign Plans

13

The Boer Offensive

27

The First British Offensive

41

The Second British Offensive

53

Guerrilla Warfare: The First Phase

83

Guerrilla Warfare: The Second Phase

109

Conclusion

131

Notes

161

Sources

185

Index

195

v


List of Maps Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 Map 4 Map 5 Map 6 Map 7 Map 8 Map 9 Map 10 Map 11

The War Terrain, 1899–1902 The Original British Operational Plan The Ideal Defensive Positions of the Boers, 1899 The First Boer Offensive, 1899 The Natal Campaign, 1899–1900 The First British Offensive in the West and South, 1899–1900 Lord Roberts’ Offensive, I Lord Roberts’ Offensive, II The Syferfontein Campaign Plan, 1900–1901 The Waterval Campaign Plan, 1901 The Blockhouse Lines

vii

2 14 28 31 34 42 54 68 84 110 120


Preface My father, the Afrikaans historian G.D. Scholtz, was born in 1905, a few years after the Anglo-Boer War. As a child growing up in the small Free State town of Ventersburg he often listened to war veterans in his vicinity reminiscing about their war experiences. This led to a special interest on his part in this war, which was later reflected in the dozens of books on this subject he had in his library and the numerous books and articles he personally wrote about this or similar subjects. By way of his interest in this subject my own was also stimulated and I too in due course started reading and researching regarding this eventful period. One question though always fascinated me: If the Boers were so brave, fought so well and so often had the Rooinekke (‘Red necks’) on the back foot, how did it then happen that they lost the war? The stereotyped answers that I always heard were that the British were much stronger than the Boers. This answer undoubtedly contains a part of the truth, but this was not sufficient for me. That is why I decided to do some proper research in order to reach a conclusive reply to this question. Having read this book I hope that the reader will also conclude that this question has been answered.

ix


Introduction In 1995 the British historian Richard Overy published a book about the Second World War with the title Why the Allies won. In the introduction he wrote: ‘To ask why the Allies won is to presuppose that they might have lost or, for understandable reasons, that they would have accepted an outcome short of total victory. These were in fact strong possibilities. There was nothing preordained about Allied success’.1 Can the same question be asked about the Anglo-Boer War? Is it possible that the British actually might have lost? Merely to contemplate this possibility seems in the same realm of fantasy as an assertion that the Allies might have lost in 1939–45. And yet the question needs to be asked, if only to explain the British victory of May 1902 and the nature thereof logically and rationally. Indeed, there was nothing preordained about British success. There are many examples of small states taking on bigger ones, especially when utilising guerrilla warfare, and inflicting a humiliating defeat on the stronger one in the end. The wars of the Viet Minh against the French or the Indonesian nationalists against the Dutch after 1945 are two cases in point. There are more. So, could the Boers have won? It certainly seemed that way after Black Week in December 1899, when the British were heavily defeated at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso. The main responsibility for this lies with the then British Commanding General, Sir Redvers Buller, whose unimaginative battering ram-like tactics – basically charging like a bull at the strongly and cunningly defended Boer defence lines – had the British forces reel back shocked and bloodied. Who knows what would have happened if he remained in command, instead of being replaced by Lord Roberts. After all, the credit for turning the conventional phase of the war around belongs to Roberts, who came with a highly intelligent indirect approach, turning the Boers’ flanks, encircling their main force on the western front at Paardeberg and forcing them into a decisive surrender. If Buller had stayed in command, Paardeberg would not have taken place. Who is to say that the British would not have been xi

xii Introduction

inclined to accept Boer peace terms, based on the independence of the two republics? Seen from the opposite angle, what would have happened if the Boers invaded the Cape Colony at the beginning with force and verve and occupied the main ports, like the perceptive State Attorney Jan Smuts, later a highly successful General, suggested before the war? (Of course, given their highly unorganised state, it is very doubtful that they could have pulled it off.) Another question, more in the realm of possibility, is: would Roberts have been able to turn the war around if the Boers had occupied all three main railway junctions at Stormberg, Noupoort and De Aar? At the very least, one may argue that his task would have been enormously more difficult. And, during the guerrilla phase, would a stalemate have been possible if the Boer plans to invade the Cape Colony and galvanise it into a general uprising have borne fruit? Would the British in the end have prevailed without Lord Kitchener’s draconian measures, such as laying waste to the two republics and imprisoning a large part of the civilian population, white and black, in concentration camps? These questions tend not to be asked, understandably so, because people are mostly inclined to believe that because something did happen in a certain way, it had to happen that way. And historians are rightly more occupied with what did in fact happen that with what could have happened if this or that event went the other way. It is only in recent years that some historians have started looking at ‘virtual history’ seriously.2 The fact is that asking these questions are more than interesting speculations. Answering them helps us to understand what did in fact happen, why, and what it meant. If we want to explain why the British won and the Boers lost, we need to look at the war in a multi-faceted way. We need to look at their strong and weak points. We need to identify the decisive moments, the alternatives available to the opposing sides, the way in which they handled these moments and alternatives in terms of their strategy, operations and tactics. And finally, we need to analyse the war in the light of certain widely accepted principles of warfare in order to arrive at something like an objective explanation of why the Boers finally lost the fighting.

Introduction xiii

There is no shortage of literature on the Anglo-Boer War. Some historians approach their task more scientifically than others, and some works are more detailed than others. All, however, have a common shortcoming: not one covers the strategic and operational planning and decisions on either side in the light of modern military science. Admittedly the British official war history and the Times History cover the strategic and operational thoughts of the British supreme command fairly extensively. The analyses and conclusions by especially the Times History are generally still valid today. But the theory of military science has developed so much since then that a much better perspective could be placed today on the events of 1899–1902. Whereas the basic work has already been done on the British side, there is still a virtual vacuum on the Boer side. One of the biographers of General Jan Smuts remarks quite correctly: ‘Yet one might read many histories of the Anglo-Boer War without discovering that the Boers possessed any grand strategy at all’.3 If this is true of the strategy, then it is even more valid in terms of the art of operations (these concepts will be defined shortly). It is true that the late J.H. Breytenbach, official South African State historian of the Anglo-Boer War, did some magnificent work in his monumental series on the war. He to a large extent has provided the building blocks without which no historian could proceed. It is, therefore, time that someone wrote something similar on strategy as the professional South African military historian C.M. Bakkes did on a more limited scale regarding tactics.4 A word or two regarding the list of sources: only sources that were actually used and appear in the footnotes were listed. Many more sources were consulted than appear in the list. A considerable number of sources that a connoisseur may immediately miss do not contain any information on the subject matter and are thus not listed. Finally one should briefly define three concepts relating to military science, because they are fundamentally important to this work. These are the concepts of tactics, the art of operations and strategy. • Tactics are the deployment and control of troops during a skirmish or battle.

xiv Introduction

• The art of operations indicates the ability to employ military means – e.g. troops, supplies, and also battles – to attain the objective of the war. • Strategy is the co-ordination and use of all the means at the disposal of a state or coalition to reach the political objective of the war, as defined by the leaders of government. It is important to discuss the relationship between these concepts briefly. Operations should be subordinate to strategy, because the latter defines the aim and limits of the former. Tactics are more independent, although they are sometimes influenced by operations. But, whereas operations could only exercise some limited autonomy during the course of hostilities, tactics remain largely independent once a battle has commenced. The aim of an operation on the one hand is to create the most favourable conditions for tactical successes, and on the other hand to serve as well as it can the political aims, prescribed and limited by the strategy. Strategy is conducted by the collective political leadership of a state or coalition; operations by the supreme command of the armed forces; and tactics by the leadership of larger or smaller forces, from the level of a corps to that of a platoon. This study will clearly concentrate on the strategic and operational dimensions, but in some exceptional cases attention will also be given to the tactics where tactical decisions or developments exerted some influence on the operations.

1 Background

The strategic importance of the Boer Republics Upon the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War on 11 October 1899 the British government explained its aggression with the argument that the British foreign nationals (Uitlanders) in the Transvaal were being treated unjustly and the Boers did not want to concede to their demands for political rights. It is accepted nowadays that this was a political pretext to manipulate public opinion in Britain. On the other hand, even today many people believe the British aim was actually to take over the Johannesburg gold mines. Both beliefs are mistaken. Joseph Chamberlain, British Colonial Secretary, for instance wrote in a private letter shortly before the war broke out: ‘[T]here is a greater issue than the franchise or the grievances of the Uitlanders at stake …’1 And Lord Milner, British High Commissioner in South Africa, stated shortly after peace was declared in 1902: ‘I do not regard this war as having been a struggle for the mines …’2 What were the true reasons then? Although there were obviously more than one reason, the most important answer needs to be found in the global strategic policy of the British government. Already in 1795, when the British annexed the Cape for the first time, Sir Francis Baring of the British East India Company referred to the strategic importance of the Cape. Britain was waging war with France at that stage, and if France took over the Cape, it would have had a negative influence on the British strategic position, according to Baring. ‘It commands the passage to and from India as effectually as Gibraltar doth the Mediterranean …’ he wrote.3 Baring’s remark 1

Limpopo

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Lydenburg Komatipoort Belfast Barberton PRETORIA Mafeking Bronkhorslspruit LOURENCO Johannesburg Heidelberg Carolina Komati MARQUES Vereeniging Ermelo Potchefstroom SWAZIStanderton Vryburg Klerksdorp LAND Volksrust Piet Retief Bloemhof l a Heilbron Frankfort Wokkerstroom Va Utrecht Hoopstad Kroonstad Vryheid Newcoshe Worrenton Bethlehem O.V.S. Dundee Harrismith Winburg Boshof Ladysmith Kimberley Colenso BLOEMFONTEIN Estcourt D AN Fouresmith PIETERMARITZBURG TOL U S BA NATAL Durban Zeerust

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Map 1

The War Terrain, 1899–1902

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Railway line River Border

Background 3

becomes even more meaningful when one bears in mind that India at that stage was a major supplier to the British economy.4 For this reason the British government was all too ready to accept the offer of the Dutch stadtholder William V (who was expelled from the Netherlands by the French) to annex the Cape. Although the Cape was returned to the Netherlands after the Peace of Amiens in 1803, the renewed outbreak of the war forced Britain for the same reason to annex it again three years later, this time permanently. This ensured the safety of the important maritime route to India – and also the safety of the British economy. But the mere possession of the Cape was not sufficient for Britain. The British also had to safeguard this possession. It is, therefore, understandable that the British colonial authorities were not overjoyed when the Voortrekkers left the Cape Colony in the 1830s. When the Voortrekkers established the Republic of Natalia in 1839, Cape Governor Napier pointed out in a perceptive letter the danger that the Voortrekkers could seek the protection of a foreign power. He pleaded that ‘the interests of the British Government imperatively demand resistance to any other nation affecting a settlement in that country’.5 This was one of the most important reasons for the British annexation of Natal in 1843. Matters subsequently changed again. The Voortrekkers left Natal, trekked inland and settled in what later became the Transvaal and Free State. They were now isolated from the outside world and, therefore, did not pose any threat to the British supremacy in South Africa. In addition, the British colonial policies also changed significantly. The aggressive and fickle actions of Louis Napoleon, the French President and subsequent Emperor Napoleon III, elicited much concern in Europe. Against this background the British felt that possessing the interior of South Africa was undesirable ‘beyond the very limited extent of Territory acquired for the security of the Cape of Good Hope as a naval station’.6 The independence of the Boer republics in the Transvaal and the Free State was consequently recognised in 1852 and 1854. Scarcely two decades later the British attitude changed once more. Germany was united in 1871, and the strong new state effectively upset the balance of power in Europe. Britain was anxious about any foreign power gaining any influence over the Boer republics and thereby threatening the strategic value that the Cape had for them.

4 Why the Boers Lost the War

Although this was not the only reason, it was nevertheless one of the main reasons why the Transvaal was annexed in 1877. As historian G.D. Scholtz put it: ‘There was a causal connection between the cheers emanating from the palace of Versailles on 18 January 1871 when Wilhelm I was pronounced Kaiser of Germany and the cheers on Church Square in Pretoria on 12 April 1877 by the supporters of Britain’.7 The Transvalers, however, rebelled in 1880 and regained their independence through the Conventions of Pretoria (1881) and London (1884). The new Liberal government of William Gladstone did not regard an independent Transvaal as a threat. The 1880s and 1890s brought about increasing pressures on the two Boer republics, notably the Transvaal. In 1886 large quantities of gold ore were discovered on the Witwatersrand in the Transvaal. This caused the Transvaal to become a rich country that established close economic ties with countries such as Germany and France. This enabled President Paul Kruger to pursue a more independent foreign policy, which in turn resuscitated the old British fears that its supremacy in South Africa may be challenged by foreign powers. In March 1897 Chamberlain warned that certain persons were apparently striving for a South Africa ‘in which Dutch influence would be predominant, and which would look for sympathy and support rather to the Continent of Europe than to this country. If such an aspiration exists, in my opinion it is incompatible with the highest British interests …’8 Lord Milner also feared that the Transvaal could be a threat and a ‘focus of disaffection in all our possessions’.9 In other words, he felt that British supremacy in South Africa was important for the continued existence of the whole of the British Empire, which of course places the matter in a considerably broader perspective. This idea was confirmed by a British commission of inquiry that reported in 1887 on the strategic importance of the Cape sea route. According to the commission the Cape route was not only economically important, ‘but [it] assumes a far higher degree of importance to the Empire at large, as being essential to the retention by Great Britain of her possessions in India, Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore and even Australia’.10 This was confirmed by nobody less than Admiral Jackie Fisher, the influential Commander in Chief of the Royal Navy before the First

Background 5

World War. His geopolitical analysis of the global strategic position was: ‘Five keys lock up the world!’ These five were Dover, Gibraltar, Alexandria, Singapore – and the Cape. They were all in British hands and for the sake of security of the British Empire this situation had to remain so.11 On these grounds the British historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote: ‘The essential British problem was strategical and political, not economic … the British Empire needed a united white South Africa in order to have strategic security at the Cape – the lynch-pin of the British Empire. The Boer Republics hampered this’. And somewhat further on he added: ‘The naval station at the Cape was … fundamental to them [the British]’.12 It is true that all historians do not share this opinion. J.S. Marais opined that the Boer republics were not in position to be any effective threat to the Cape as a naval base, because the British garrison and naval squadron offered adequate protection there.13 But this was not the point. The British did not really fear the Boers, but rather the foreign influence that could become a threat. These words by the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, during the Anglo-Boer War, ought to dispel all doubt: ‘India was the decisive factor in each British undertaking of note east and south of the Mediterranean. After we had once obtained a footing in India, we let our Oriental policy … be guided by considerations of the safety of our possessions in India. Only because of India Lord Beaconsfield bought shares in the Suez Canal company and only because of India we are now in Egypt. The historic contradictions and clashes with Russia during virtually a century originated from the accepted need to keep it far from the borders of India. Only because of India we annexed the Cape of Good Hope and did we start that process of South African expansion which recently [the outbreak of the AngloBoer War] entered such a decisive phase’.14 In other words: In order to safeguard British economic interests in India, the Cape sea route was indispensable. And to safeguard the Cape sea route, uncontested British supremacy in South Africa was indispensable. And in order to ensure this, the Transvaal and the Free State had to be eliminated. Coupled to the British efforts to safeguard its Empire, another factor needs to be mentioned. This is that British government leaders were very concerned towards the end of the century about


their country’s isolated international position. They perceived that Britain’s traditional policy of ‘splendid isolation’ no longer conformed with the demands of the time and that a more active role in the European international political scene was necessary. This, together with the country’s population and economic growth (both factors exercising a major influence on a state’s international position) that started receding in comparison with the rest of Europe, made the British decide to prove to the world that Britain was still a major power of the first order. ‘The place on the globe where they saw the best opportunity to display the British power, was South Africa’, is the conclusion drawn by G.D. Scholtz. ‘Here the destruction of the two small Afrikaans republics had to demonstrate to the world how big Britain’s power was. It had to reconfirm its position as one of the world’s leading powers’.15 From all this, the identification of the British strategic objective of the war becomes clear: the destruction of the Boer republics, which could eventually unite with the Cape Colony and Natal – and possibly also Rhodesia – to form a united South Africa under the Union Jack. It is true that the British – at first, at any rate – were willing to allow the republics limited internal autonomy. ‘I agree we do not want in any case to make ourselves responsible for the Government of the Transvaal’, Joseph Chamberlain, colonial secretary, wrote to Milner. ‘It must be a Republic or a self-governing Colony – under the British flag in either case’.16 It was in other words quite a drastic aim with coercive motives. On the other hand the strategic aims of the Boer republics were equally clear: the retention of their sovereignty. Whereas President M.T. Steyn of the Free State indicated on various occasions that he saw the Afrikaans nation in the long term as a single political unity, President Kruger of the Transvaal never gazed beyond his own boundaries. In the words of F.A. van Jaarsveld he ‘only thought in terms of an independent Transvaal and the preservation of the identity of the Transvaal nation’. 17 In addition one could deduce from the defensive nature of the Boers’ war plans (which will be described in the next chapter) that they were not concerned with any territorial expansion or a change of the status quo. They merely wanted to preserve their independence.

Background 7

Two aspirations thus clashed head-on, both driven by powerful motives. In essence a compromise was not possible: the fight was as it were predestined to continue until the one party had coerced the other to accept its will. The German military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz, pointed out that the stronger the motives for a war and the greater the tensions preceding the war, the more likelihood that the war would take the form of an absolute or total character.18 It is true that the British initially completely underestimated their opponents’ tenacity – Milner for instance predicted in May 1899 that 40 000 soldiers would be sufficient to subject the Boer republics19 – but once they were disillusioned, the war developed the grim character for which it became known. This is the fundamental cause for the massive destruction and the concentration camps that exercised such a fundamental influence on the strategic aspects of the war. It was no limited war, ‘the last of the gentlemen’s wars’; it was the ominous harbinger of the absolute or total war that Clausewitz had still regarded as a completely abstract notion and as something impossible in his time. In warfare one does not only deal with two aspirations pitted against each other and their relative intensity; these factors also need to be bolstered by the means of power. In this connection there could be little doubt that Britain’s large population and economic power made it immensely more powerful than the Boer republics. In addition the Boers were completely isolated. Although countries like France, Germany and Russia were not particularly friendly towards Britain, they were not able to lift a finger to come to the aid of the Boer republics. The Transvaal diplomatic representative in Europe, Dr W.J. Leyds, repeatedly warned his government that it could not depend on the intercession by any European power.20 This isolation of the Boer republics was primarily determined by the Royal Navy’s supremacy on the world’s oceans. No single power in 1899 had the maritime means to wage a successful war against Britain. It is true that Germany recently had started a large scale naval construction programme, but it had not yet advanced far enough to challenge the British maritime might. The Boer republics were isolated internationally, and all that they could expect from the European continent were nice words and expressions of sympathy.


Military thinking in 1899 There is a somewhat cynical, but often correct, saying that the military prepare themselves for the war that has just ended. This was certainly true of the British army of 1899. To put it differently: the British officers corps was not focused on waging a modern war, despite the fact that various aspects in this respect became clear already during the American Civil War (1862–1866), the AustroPrussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1871). It will be necessary to dwell a bit on this subject, as it explains a lot about the initial British conduct of the Anglo-Boer War – and why the Boers, during the first months, fared so well. The first British military theorist who wrote a comprehensive work on the art of warfare was Major-General Sir Patrick MacDougall (1819–1894). The Theory of War, published in 1856, contained no original thoughts, but was rather a summary of the thoughts of strategists such as Frederick the Great, Jomini, Archduke Charles of Austria, and Major-General Sir William Napier, who was in charge of the British forces in Spain and Portugal during the Napoleonic wars. A few years later in 1873, MacDougall though came to some further conclusions regarding the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War. On the grounds of the vastly increased firepower of modern arms he thought that the Napoleonic principle of the superiority of the offensive was obsolete. In his opinion defence now held an advantage over the offensive. He stated ‘that a front held by good troops undemoralized is practically unassailable under the present conditions of fire’ and that future campaigns ‘will in all probability be decided by strategic rather than by tactical manoeuvring’. He thought in general that it was best to seize specific strategic points, ward off an enemy attack and then to follow up on this success.21 A second author who exercised a considerable influence on British military thought of his time was General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley (1824–1893). But neither did Hamley’s study, The Operations of War (1866) comply with the demands of the time. Essentially it was nothing more than a sound and intelligent analysis of the thoughts of Jomini, Archduke Charles, Napoleon and Wellington. It was, therefore, already obsolete when it was published. The only real

Background 9

change to this work that Hamley later added was an explanation of the decisive role of the railways in operations.22 Despite its shortcomings this work was the only handbook from 1870 to 1894 in the British military training institutions. It subsequently fell somewhat into disgrace, but – according to Jay Luvaas – ‘it is no exaggeration to say that Hamley continued to instruct the British officer in the rudiments of strategy until well into our own era’.23 The last author who needs to be mentioned is Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.R. Henderson (1854–1903). His writings had not yet exercised much influence on British operational doctrines toward 1899, although it would become a valuable tool to the campaign of Lord Roberts in South Africa. It would, therefore, be advisable to devote more attention to Henderson’s role when the activities of Lord Roberts are described. It is thus a fact that on a military-intellectual level the British army was largely unprepared to wage a modern war on the eve of the Anglo-Boer War. As a second lieutenant commanding a platoon on the Cape Southern Front, the later influential Major-General J.F.C. Fuller wrote to his parents: ‘I have not been in the army very long but quite long enough to see that nine officers out of every ten, I might say ninety-nine out of every hundred, know no more of military matters than the man in the moon and do not intend or want to know more … It is no more a profession than shooting pheasants or hunting foxes …’24 The fact is that the military thoughts of many officers had not progressed in this respect beyond those of the Napoleonic era. ‘While officers were busy being gentlemen in or out of gorgeous dress uniforms, their men’s welfare counted for little’, Rayne Kruger writes. ‘When it came to actual manoeuvres the new weapons were so little regarded that many exercises dated from a hundred years earlier. The accent was on solid line formations, mechanical precision, rigid dependence on orders firing strictly in volleys at a word of command, bayonet charges. My good fellow, had not Napoleon been broken by such methods? Only two months a year was spent on training. For the rest a man was parading, pipe-claying or polishing his gear, scrubbing floors, or acting as gardener, cook, valet, porter or clerk’.25 On the lower end of the ladder, things were not much better. Because of the poverty-stricken situation in which so many of the


recruits for the ‘other ranks’ were drawn, the soldiers’ physique was not very good, and, as Denis Judd and Keith Surridge write, ‘as the war dragged on and more men were needed, standards dropped even lower’. In many ways, they state, ‘the spirit of the late-Victorian army was willing, but the flesh was weak. Despite the intention to try to adapt the army’s training and tactics to modern conditions, army life was not conducive either to the study of war or to its application beyond the requirements of Britain’s small-scale colonial warfare’. As for the officers, ‘[s]ocial status and wealth were far more important than professional expertise …’26 On the other hand, little is known on the state of Boer military thought. Firstly no research has been done on this subject and secondly there were probably very few such thoughts. The only leading Boers who had received a proper military training were a number of artillery officers including Major R. Albrecht, the Prussian commander of the Free State Artillery, and Major P.E. Erasmus of the Transvaal State Artillery. Even the officer in command of the latter unit, Lieutenant-Colonel S.P.E. Trichardt, did not receive any formal military training.27 At any rate, because these officers were never in a position to exert any influence on strategic or operational planning, their role can be ignored. According to the available sources, there were only two leading personalities on the Boer side who were somewhat familiar with military literature and who gave any semblance of any reasoned military-theoretical thinking. They were the Transvaal Attorney General J.C. Smuts and Free State Judge J.B.M. Hertzog. In a memorandum that Smuts addressed to his government shortly before the war, he advocated an offensive strategy: ‘The best military writers of this century have proved how much more advantageous it is in war to take the offensive than to act defensively’, he wrote and furnished the following arguments: the offensive increases the morale of the attacking army; it demoralises the defensive party; it decreases its general prestige and the trust of the soldiers in their commanders; the attacker is always in a position to choose the place where he wishes to attack, whereas the defender has to await with demoralising anxiety whence the attack is to come; and the offence enables the attacker to take the war to enemy held territory and to live off the enemy’s supplies.28

Background 11

Unfortunately we do not know who the ‘best military writers’ are whom Smuts had referred; we do know, however, that Hertzog had studied Carlyle’s biography of Frederick the Great. Because of this he became aware of the advantages of a strategy along the inner lines (the Boer republics, similar to Prussia in the eighteenth century, were threatened from different directions, which meant that they could use their central position for greater manoeuvrability); that enemy supply lines had to be blocked; and that the struggle had to be taken to enemy territory.29 It is clear that especially Hertzog was not au fait with the most recent literature. The methods of Frederick the Great could at the end of the nineteenth century only have been valid in a very general sense, because warfare had changed drastically since his times. The emphasis by Smuts on the offensive at all costs was very much in accordance with the thoughts of especially the French and German authors of the time; an attitude that some years later would help determine the tragedy of 1914–1918. However, neither Smuts nor Hertzog was in a position to influence to any extent the operational planning during the initial phases of the war. Their opportunity would only arise during the transition to guerrilla warfare in October and November 1900. In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the most important Boer commanding officers obtained their military experience in the conflicts against black tribes and during the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881). Apart from the fact that these wars were not actually sufficient to prepare them for modern warfare, it is logical to expect that they would have preferred to use again those methods that were successful at the time. This meant that they would persevere with slow and tardy actions, offensive operations combined with defensive tactics, and also surrounding and besieging defensive positions. All these elements were, to some extent, employed during the first months of the war. The Anglo-Boer War broke out on 11 October 1899. This war not only exercised a decisive influence on the South African history, but was also a struggle which was to become an important milestone on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the early history of modern warfare.


2 The Campaign Plans

The British campaign plan It is normal practice that states compile several war plans in the event of becoming involved in a war. For instance, Germany compiled the well-known Schlieffen plan in 1905 with a view to a war against France and Russia which only broke out in 1914. After the unsuccessful Jameson raid of 1896 in the Transvaal it became clear to the governments of both Britain and the two Boer republics that the possibility of a war could fast become a reality. Both sides thus started preparing themselves for such an eventuality. It is worth noting that on the British side documents of the Intelligence Division referred to war as being inevitable. The British actually drew up two war plans; an offensive and a defensive one, of which the former was compiled in June 1899.1 In an explanatory memorandum Major E.A. Altham of the Intelligence Division proceeded from the assumption of an offensive war and considered various possible routes for an offensive with Pretoria as the main target. An advance from Fourteen Streams (where the Transvaal, the Free State and the Cape borders met) was to be excluded, he wrote. There was no railway to support such an advance. He equally dismissed an advance through Natal. Apart from the fact that there was only one port and railway to supply the attacking army, its entire left flank would constantly be prone to attack from the Free State. In addition the north of Natal was completely unsuitable for any largescale offensive because of the difficult terrain of mountains and rivers. 13

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The Original British Operational Plan

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14

PRETORIA

The Campaign Plans 15

In contrast, he went on, the conditions were very suitable for an advance from the Northern Cape via the Free State to the Transvaal. Altham thought that in such an event the only real obstacle would be the Orange River. Thereafter the British would be able to operate on vast open plains with comparative ease. In addition the Cape Colony had three ports – Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London – each connected with the interior by way of a railway line. Supplying an army would, therefore, be a fairly easy undertaking. Altham thus submitted that ‘the main line of advance against the Transvaal should be based in the Cape Colony, and should follow generally the line of railway through the Orange Free State to Johannesburg and Pretoria’.2 This war plan was of course based on an important assumption, namely that the British would have a large majority of forces. And by October 1899 they had not yet achieved this. The political barometer fell rapidly during August and September and to any astute observer it would have been clear that war was becoming virtually inevitable. It was clear that the British were preparing for war. Already on 22 September they drew up an ultimatum to be presented to the Boer republics as soon as they had sufficiently reinforced their forces to execute the Altham plan.3 In the meantime, however, they had to seriously contend with the possibility that the Boer republics would declare war before they were fully prepared, and this is the reason why a second – defensive – war plan was drawn up. In this event the British were faced by two possibilities. On the one hand they could withdraw their troops from the long borders to form a more compact line of defence. They would be able to prepare reasonably strong defensive positions at the Tugela in Natal and at the Storm Mountains and the three important railway junctions in the Northern Cape (De Aar, Noupoort and Stormberg). However, pure military considerations are not always the most important element in defining a country’s strategy, and in this case political considerations took precedence. It was unthinkable that the almighty Great Britain could withdraw even before a single shot was fired, and it could furthermore encourage a rebellion among the Afrikaners living in the evacuated territories. It was accordingly decided to maintain the unfavourable military positions along the borders. To illustrate how risky this decision was, one should recall


that only 27 054 British troops were present in the whole of South Africa on the day war was declared on 11 October 1899.4 As a British historian observed: ‘Behind the weak line thus boldly pushed out in the face of the enemy there were no regular troops whatever in the [Cape] Colony, except half a battalion and a handful of garrison gunners in the Cape Peninsula’.5 Amongst other factors it was this military weakness that enabled the Boers to score such notable successes during the first weeks of the war.

The Boer war plan In contrast with the carefully prepared war plan of the British, the Boers woefully neglected this aspect of their war preparations. When J.A. Kretschmar van Veen, Director of the Dutch-South African Railways Company (commonly known under its acronym of NZASM, or the Transvaal railways) consulted with CommandantGeneral Piet Joubert on this matter, he discovered to his dismay that the Transvaal Commander in Chief had not even given any thought to a war plan.6 Neither did the Free State have any war plan. In terms of the Political Agreement of 1897 between the two Boer republics the Free State was obliged to come to the aid of the Transvaal in the event of an attack by a foreign power.7 According to the Commando Acts of the two states the Free State forces would be under Transvaal command in the event of the Free State coming to the aid of the Transvaal during a war situation.8 Because it was clear that the real fight was between Britain and the Transvaal, the Free Staters left all operational planning to their Transvaal brethren. It would appear from a letter of 2 October 1899 by President M.T. Steyn to the magistrate of the Free State town of Boshof, that Steyn was only informed a day or two before of the Transvaal’s intentions.9 It is not clear when the planning for war eventually commenced. Apparently it started only shortly before the war broke out, because the first evidence only then starts surfacing in the sources. Nothing is known about the process of developing this planning. In attempting to reconstruct the Boers’ war plan, it should be emphasised that it is not to be found in any single document. Various documents refer to it in passing, which would indicate that


the Boers’ strategic and operational planning was very superficial and inadequate. In later years Smuts expressly stated that ‘no comprehensively planned war plans were prepared’, only ‘the broad outlines of such a plan’.10 This is confirmed by the letter from Steyn to the Magistrate of Boshof, referred to above. Steyn quotes the war plan as he received it, but it merely boils down to a vague explanation of the deployment of the Transvaal commandos.11 It is possible that the known reluctance of Joubert to become involved in a war with Britain had something to do with this lack of a properly conceived war plan. It may nevertheless be deduced from the widespread and fragmented sources that the war plan of the Boers, such as it was, rested on two pillars. The first one was that the Boers had to attack at an early stage, before the British forces in South Africa became too strong. Already on 30 September Kruger pointed out to his Free State counterpart, President Steyn, who was still trying to solve the crisis by diplomatic means, that peace was now out of the question and that the whole matter now had to be regarded from a military point of view.12 The Transvaal State Secretary, F.W. Reitz, stated: ‘We have no plans to wait for the enemy to assemble a force that cannot be resisted anymore …’ Therefore, the Boer republics had to deliver the first blow.13 On 7 October Kruger urged Steyn to concur to the delivery of an ultimatum, as every day that was lost was a day gained by the British and ‘because of survival we are forced to act decisively now’.14 Steyn acquiesced the same day,15 and two days later the ultimatum was handed to the British diplomatic representative in Pretoria. The ultimatum demanded amongst others that all British troops on the borders of the Boer republics be withdrawn; that all troop reinforcements that arrived after 1 July 1899, be withdrawn; and that all troops still en route to South Africa not disembark. Should the British not comply with these demands, war would be declared in 48 hours.16 A few words on this ultimatum would not be inappropriate. If one bears in mind that when war broke out on 11 October 1899 there were only 27 054 British troops present in South Africa,17 the ultimatum was timely from an operational point of view. By exploiting this British weakness, the Boer republics acted in accordance with


the principles of warfare. But if they wished to maintain this advantage they would have had to act rapidly and decisively – and this is exactly where they faltered. The second pillar on which the Boer republics’ war plan rested was based on both political-moral and operational considerations. It was their intention to invade the British colonies and to isolate and cut off the British troops on the borders. In view of the British intention to maintain their troops in their precarious positions on the borders, this plan had an excellent chance of success. The next step would then be to take up defensive positions at appropriate places not too far from the borders to await the enemy’s expected offensive. The political-moral aspect was based on the premise that the Boer leaders did not wish to wage a war of conquest. Their aim was to defend their own independence. According to the Dutch journalist Frederik Rompel, who in all likelihood obtained his information from Abraham Fischer (a member of the Free State Executive Council), the Boer leaders regarded a war of conquest as directly opposed to the Afrikaner’s conception of Christianity and civilisation.18 Especially Steyn posed some moral objections. Apart from the fact that he expected the Boers to display more prowess in the defence than in the offensive, he especially did not wish to be branded as a conqueror and imperialist in the eyes of the world.19 Joubert, too, was opposed to an offensive war. He learned (incorrectly) a few days before the war that the British were on the verge of retreating to Pietermaritzburg and would leave the whole of northern Natal to the Boers. Rather than rejoicing about this news, he lamented that this would be to the detriment of the republics because they (the British) ‘would want to accuse us of really being the invaders of Natal’.20 In other words, the Boers refused to be ‘invaders’. In his Proclamations of Occupation of certain Cape districts Steyn also emphasised that the Boer commandos were crossing into the Cape Colony ‘with no other aim than the defence of my country and nation and to preserve our independence’.21 A further reason for this war plan was quite likely the example of operations during the first Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881), when the Boers took up defensive positions close to the Transvaal border on the Natal side at Laings Nek.22


It should be mentioned that two sources do not support the above. The one is an affidavit by P.C. Joubert, a member of the Transvaal parliament; the other is a letter by General Smuts. Both documents date from the 1940s. Joubert averred that the proposed Boer war plan was discussed at a secret meeting by the two parliaments of the Boer republics. According to him it was agreed that the plan tabled by General Piet Joubert be put in notion to advance rapidly on Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban.23 Smuts also stated that it was planned to ‘advance to the coastal ports of Natal and the Cape’.24 Especially the declaration by Joubert needs to be evaluated critically. His war memoirs which were written at the same time25 are bad and contain many errors. For instance, he puts the Battle of Bakenlaagte (30 October 1901) before the Battle of Chrissiesmeer (6 February 1901). In any event, there is a discrepancy between the proposal that Joubert is supposed to have tabled and both his peaceloving and vacillating character, and the telegram, dated 6 October 1899, quoted above. It is not clear why Smuts, who was a member of the Transvaal government, would have stated something along the same lines. It should be borne in mind that his letter dates from 1948. As the sources dating from the wartime all more or less agree, one cannot but dismiss the sources that were written forty years later.

Evaluation Any war plan should be evaluated on the basis of three elements. Firstly, certain relevant theoretical military questions need to be expounded, especially as regards the theory of war plans in general. Secondly, one should analyse the practical strategic and operational situation on which the war plans were based. In other words: what were the demands on the practical situation on 11 October 1899 regarding the British and the Boer war plans? In conclusion one would also need to investigate to what extent the two war plans responded to the challenge set by the two above mentioned elements. Clausewitz’s dictum on the nature and essence of war is wellknown: ‘War is the continuation of policy by other means’. This quotation harbours a complete philosophical mindset, because Clausewitz approaches war as a certain type of interaction between


states. But war is not only a specific form of political action, it is a political instrument and a continuation of political action. This means that the political objective formulates the aim of the war and that war is merely the means to an end. War is thus clearly subservient to politics, ‘it is policy that creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa’.26 From the above it is clear that there is, therefore, an important criterion with which which a war plan is to be measured: it serves to achieve a specific political end, and consequently every war action is interwoven with political considerations. It follows that there can be no pure military evaluation of a war plan, or even of any strategic or operational action. Because operations are subject to politics, one needs to analyse to what extent the war plan serves the relevant political aim. Of course, this does not mean that the political aim is unassailable. This aim is also limited by its feasibility. Hitherto mention was only made in passing of the political war aim. Clausewitz states that ‘[w]ar is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’.27 There are obviously a myriad of possibilities of what could constitute ‘our will’: the conquest of another state or a part thereof; the expansion or maintenance of one’s own international political and/or economic position; preservation of one’s national sovereignty; mere survival, etc. It is logical that one could employ a multitude of different methods to achieve the war aim in practical terms. ‘We can see that in war many roads lead to success …’ according to Clausewitz.28 Having provided the theoretical background we can now evaluate the demands of the practical situation on the eve of the Anglo-Boer War on the British and the Boer war plans. Two factors dominated the strategic and operational situation: the relative geographic location of the two Boer republics in a sea of British territory (which will be elucidated shortly) and the increasing importance of the railways. The railways started playing an increasingly important role during the second half of the nineteenth century. Previously armies were supplied only by ox- or horse-drawn transport, but the development of the railways brought about a complete revolution in this respect. This led to two contrary consequences. On the one hand, it dramatically increased armies’ operational mobility, because a train could move so much faster, and could


carry much heavier loads than ox- or horse-drawn transport or the individual soldier’s back. On the other hand, armies became increasingly dependent on this useful instrument and subsequently any form of operational planning became inconceivable without taking into account the location of the railway networks. In other words, the increased mobility was limited to the vicinity of any railway lines, which meant that armies were unwilling to move too far from them. This already emerged during the American Civil War, the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War. Prior to the First World War especially the Germans and French even built their railways with the purpose of becoming part of their operational planning.29 This dependence on the railways also played a significant role in the Anglo-Boer War. Lord Roberts, Commander in Chief of the British forces in South Africa, acknowledged in one of his reports: ‘A railway is of the greatest assistance, it is indeed essential to an army for the conveyance of stores and supplies from the base, and it is a most valuable adjunct if it runs in the direction of the objective …’30 Bearing this in mind, a theoretical exercise can only elucidate the real situation. Let us make an informed guess about what could have happened if this, that and the other thing happened or what could have been different – not for the sake of guessing, but in order to better understand the real situation. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Free State did not enter the war; that Britain and the Transvaal constituted the sole opposing forces. Recalling the British dependence on the railway network, the best route along which to advance would be the one through Natal. From here they would have been supplied from the Durban harbour and the railway line to the Transvaal. Because of a lack of railways any offensive from the north western Cape would have been exceedingly difficult. (None of the British commanders of the time were as audacious as Lord Roberts who, as we shall see, did exactly that in February 1900. But he was an absolute exception.) Sir John Ardagh of the British Intelligence Division acknowledged this fact already in 1896: ‘Neutrality of the Free State covers the greater part of the southern frontier of the Transvaal, and limits our choice of operations …’31 In fact, Field Marshal Lord Wolseley, supreme commander of the British armed forces, stated after the war that his headquarters considered violating any Free State neutrality,


because the British offensive war plans would have been seriously thwarted by such an eventuality.32 The fact that the Free State in fact did enter the war – and here we return to the realm of reality – drastically altered the strategic and operational situation. In terms of manpower the total number of burghers who could be conscripted increased by 22 314 men from 32 353 to 54 667,33 an increase, therefore, of 40 percent. The number of burghers who were actually drafted, increased by 14 000 from 21 000 to approximately 35 000.34 But, by looking at a map, one would observe that the length of the combined borders of the Boer republics with Natal and the Cape Colony increased by more than 40 percent. They now had to safeguard the whole of the long and exposed border from Mafeking in the north west to Bethulie in the south to Vryheid in the north east. In other words – and this is of the utmost importance – the Free State’s entry in the war effectively impeded a defensive war by the Republics and facilitated an offensive strategy on the part of their opponents. The British were well aware of this factor.35 But the opposite was also true in the sense that an offensive conduct by the Boer republics became much easier. The Free State juts deep into the Cape Colony, and therefore the Cape heartland, with the ports, was within reach of the Boer commandos. And although the Boer top command did not make any strategic or operational planning for the war, the Transvaal Department of Justice under Attorney-General Smuts was well prepared. Some considerable time before the war Smuts ordered his secret service to investigate the political sympathies of the Cape Afrikaners. He wanted to learn where any invading Boer commandos would receive sufficient support.36 The only highly placed personalities in the Boer republics who apparently recognised the need for such an offensive action, were Smuts and Hertzog in the Free State. In a memorandum early in September 1899 Smuts urged the Transvaal government to invade at least Natal rapidly and advance deep into the territory before enemy reinforcements could reach the scene. Smuts perceptively saw that Britain’s maritime supremacy would, in time, make the Republics’ position as independent states ever more untenable and weak. A grand offensive would not only strengthen Boer morale and undermine British morale, but there was also a possibility ‘that by such


action the interior districts of the Cape Colony would be encouraged to rise and to form themselves into a third great republic’.37 For his part Hertzog advised Steyn in August to invade deep into the Cape Colony to occupy certain strategic positions. Steyn was, however, reluctant to do so for the reasons that were already pointed out above.38 It emerges from the above that the operational situation required the Boer republics to wage an offensive war. The manner in which the British invited an attack by deploying their slender forces along the borders, created an excellent opportunity to isolate and destroy them with an overwhelming force. The way would subsequently have been open for them to advance rapidly to the Natal and Cape ports, to impede the landing of any additional British forces or at the very least to seriously disrupt any such efforts and to foment a general uprising among the Cape Boer population. Such an operation would, however, have exceeded the selfimposed limits of the Boer strategy. After all, the republics did not wish to wage any war of conquest and merely wanted to preserve their independence, whereas a rebellion amongst Cape Afrikaners could potentially have had profound consequences for the political constellation in South Africa. Measured against the operational situation, the limited strategic objective of the Boer republics was, therefore, completely deficient. It prescribed a defensive posture to the generals in the field, whereas the practical situation cried out for an offensive stance. Later in this work we will be discussing the change of heart by the Boer leaders who changed their strategy to an offensive one. But in the meantime the generals had to contend with the war plan that shackled them to a limited operational approach. This meant in practice that they had to destroy the British forces along the borders and then to choose the most advantageous positions from whence the expected enemy attacks could be repulsed. In Natal the best position was along the Tugela River, whereas it would have been advantageous in the Cape to occupy the three railway junctions of Stormberg, De Aar and Noupoort. The question obviously needs to be posed whether or not the Boers were ever in a position to take a large-scale offensive. In order to succeed, they would have had to have excellent and audacious officers in the spirit of an Alexander the Great, a Napoleon or a


Rommel. It would have demanded an efficient organisation, good co-ordination, sufficient logistical apparatus and sound discipline. Alas, the Boers did not comply with any of these conditions. The leading first-generation commanders, Generals Piet Joubert and Piet Cronjé of the Transvaal, and Chief Commandants Marthinus Prinsloo, E.R. Grobler, J.H. Olivier and C.J. Wessels of the Free State, were either overly cautious or simply incompetent. Discipline, organisation and co-ordination were virtually unknown concepts among the Boers, while their logistical apparatus was extremely cumbersome and deficient. Smuts conceded after the war that the Boers’ organisation was simply too bad to enable an offensive war to be waged.39 While the Boers thus accepted exactly the opposite plan prescribed by the strategic and operational situation, they were, at the same time, not able to execute the correct plan. It is, therefore, not surprising that they were only able to maintain their defensive posture for only four months against the growing superiority of the British forces. One could say that the British breakthrough at the end of February 1900 on all fronts was, in a sense, already a fait accompli in October 1899. Another shortcoming that would seriously impede the first operations was the under-utilisation of the Free State forces. The Free State officers were completely in the dark and did not know what to do. They were merely ordered by their government on 11 October 1899 to maintain contact with the Transvaal top command and to await further instructions.40 Consequently Chief Commandant Prinsloo telegraphed at 14:05 on 11 October 1899, in other words, three hours before the expiration of the ultimatum: ‘The men are in position and we are awaiting instructions’.41 Three hours before the outbreak of war, the Free State commander on the Natal border did not yet know what he was supposed to do! It is equally clear that the British war plan had its deficiencies. The British had an encompassing strategic objective in mind, namely the destruction of the two Boer republics. But they completely underestimated the fighting spirit and determination of the Boers. Chamberlain wrote on 7 October 1899: ‘I have never believed that the Boers would take the offensive at this stage – nor do I fear a British reverse if they do. There must be risks in all wars, but I think the risk of a successful attack on a fortified position chosen by us is


a very small one. When all the reinforcements are landed my own feeling is that we shall be quite a match for the Boers …’42 And after the war Lord Lansdowne, War Secretary until 1900, stated quite clearly that the British had underestimated both ‘the fighting value of the Boers’ and ‘the kind of effort that would be necessary to overcome them’.43 Because the Boers were willing to defend their independence to the limit, the British had to adopt an operational plan aimed at defeating the Boer forces in the field. The Boer republics could not be defeated without rendering the Boer forces harmless. The British, however, thought that they would be marching over the Boers with the aid of the three Cape railway lines and occupy Bloemfontein and Pretoria, after which all resistance would crumble. This expectation, of course, did not coincide with reality. We will be examining in due course how Lord Roberts had to amend the British operational planning in accordance with this reality. In any event, the whole direction of the advance along the railway lines constituted too direct an approach. Any child as it were could grasp that an offensive along the railway line from the south was in the offing. It did not strike the planners that it would be advisable to attack from an unexpected direction. The original British war plan has only some academic value today because it was never executed. The Boer offensive caught the British completely off guard, with the result that they eventually had to discard their plan.


3 The Boer Offensive

The Natal front We have already seen that the Boers would have had to act rapidly and decisively if they were to exploit the range of potential advantages that the first pillar offered. This was, however, by no means the case. Rather than crossing the border immediately from Volksrust, Vryheid and Harrismith after the ultimatum had expired – and the Boer commandos were deployed ideally for such a manoeuvre – the incursion in fact took place slowly and sluggishly. Joubert only crossed the border with his commandos near Volksrust on 12 October 1899.1 From here he slowly advanced southwards and reached Newcastle a full four days later.2 He thus needed four whole days to advance a distance of about 28 miles; approximately 6.5 miles per day! The Transvaal forces in the district of Vryheid only crossed the border on 19 October, shortly before the Battle of Talana Hill.3 Matters were even worse on the Free State side. The Free Staters, who were mainly concentrated around the Van Reenen Pass in the Drakensberg, merrily picknicked and barbecued during the first few days. Only on 14 October, three days after the outbreak of the war, they bothered to call their first council of war where it was decided to wait yet another three days before crossing the border.4 Because of their pathetic lassitude during first few days of the war which, from a military point of view, bordered on criminal negligence, the Boers in Natal lost any advantages they could have derived from their war plan. This was their first major blunder. 27

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The Ideal Defensive Positions of the Boers, 1899

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The Boer Offensive 29

The Battle of Talana Hill near Dundee followed between the combined Transvaal commandos and a contingent of British troops. Although the battle resulted in a tactical defeat for the Boers because of a lack of co-ordination and the incompetence of certain officers, it was nevertheless an operational victory for the Boers because the British decided to withdraw back to Ladysmith.5 In the meantime the Free Staters advanced slowly from the west in the direction of Ladysmith. The initial aim of Chief Commandant Marthinus Prinsloo was to execute an outflanking manoeuvre south of Ladysmith, to destroy the railway line, and then to go to the aid of the Transvaal commandos at Dundee. But good intentions, of which the Boers at this stage had no shortage, are not exactly tantamount to deeds and Prinsloo’s plans came to nought. On 19 October his advance guard was still near Bester Station on the railway line between Harrismith and Ladysmith, about 20 km west of the latter.6 In order prevent the Free Staters from cutting off the British who were retreating from Dundee, General Sir George White, officer in command in Natal, attacked them at Rietfontein on 24 October. Although the attack was warded off and no tactical advantage was obtained, White nevertheless achieved his operational objective. Two days after the skirmish the retreating troops safely reached Ladysmith without the Boers being able to stop them.7 The same day the Transvaal and the Free State commandos joined forces at Rietfontein.8 The important Battle of Modderspruit and Nicholson’s Nek ensued on 30 October. Although this study is concerned more with the strategic and operational aspects of the war, the tactical aspects of this battle are nevertheless interesting, as they had a decisive influence on the subsequent operational development of the conflict in Natal. The Boers, under the command of Joubert, took their positions in a semi-circle on the hills north and east of Ladysmith to await the expected British attack. According to his report White was planning to attack the Boers on two fronts, on the left flank and in the centre. Simultaneously a third force was sent during the previous night past the Boers’ right flank to take Nicholson’s Nek behind them. The idea was that this force would act as a stopper group to cut off the Boers’ direction of eventual retreat.9 The plan failed in all respects. The two main attacks on the centre and left flank were repulsed and the soldiers had to fall back,10 while


the plan to retake Nicholson’s Nek was thwarted thanks to Commandant G.M.J. van Dam of the Johannesburg Police and Acting Commandant Christiaan de Wet of Heilbron (the later famous general).11 The soldiers were fleeing from all sides back to Ladysmith, but Joubert forbade his burghers to pursue the enemy. He reasoned that it was ‘unchristian to pursue a fleeing enemy’.12 Historians differ on the wisdom or lack thereof of Joubert’s decision. The author of the Times History states: ‘For an enterprising enemy it was an opportunity for a vigorous counterstroke such as rarely occurs in war, and such as the Boers never had again … But Joubert was not capable of such generalship …’13 In contrast, J.H. Breytenbach, who compiled the official South African history of the war, had a different point of view. He argued on the one hand that the Boers did not have a disciplined army and that Joubert consequently, ‘especially since they were exhausted after the intensive fighting, could not impose those demands that a career officer was able to do on his regular troops’. On the other hand he thought that the Boers were too weak for a counterattack.14 When analysing this very important decision by Joubert, one should bear in mind two factors: the condition of the British troops and the opinions of certain Boer officers who were present and who later during the war proved that they had a sound tactical insight. As stated above, the British soldiers started retreating in the direction of Ladysmith after their attack had failed. Deneys Reitz observed the retreat from the direction of Nicholson’s Nek and described the scene: ‘Great clouds of dust billowed over the veld as the troops withdrew, and the manner of their going had every appearance of a rout’.15 These were Nico Hofmeyr’s impressions: ‘I presently saw the infantry running. Sauve qui peut seemed to be the order of the day. They were not in formation, or in groups. Divided, separate, each one for himself, they were riding across the plain. There had to be panic stations judging from the confusion reining. They were directionless like sheep without a shepherd’.16 Dr T.C. Visser, in later years a Member of Parliament and Senator, told the historian G.D. Scholtz during the 1940s that, being present in Ladysmith, he saw ‘how the British troops after their defeat against the Boers were pouring into the town in a disorderly fashion, abandoning their arms, sitting around in the streets, waiting to

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BLOEMFONTEIN

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Kimberley

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LOURENCO Carolina Komati MARQUES

Johannesburg

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Fauresmith

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Estcourt PIETERMARITZBURG

BASUTOLAND

je

an

Durban

De Aar

Colesberg Noupoort

Bethulie Stormberg Burgersdorp

Middelburg

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Beaufort-Wes

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The First Boer Offensive, 1899

In


31

Map 4

O

a di

East London


surrender to the Boers. The Boers, however, never arrived and thus the morale of the British troops were revived again’.17 One could undoubtedly conclude that a counterattack at this stage was tactically of the utmost importance. The British were completely demoralised and in fact had no reserves to ward off any such counterattack.18 By forbidding his burghers to pursue the British, Joubert thus allowed a golden opportunity to slip through his fingers. Given the chaos among the British troops, a vigourous counterstroke would certainly have culminated in a major victory. In the most positive scenario this would have resulted in the surrender of either all or at least most of White’s forces, and at the very least White would have had to retreat. In either case the Boers would not have needed to contend with the eventual disastrous consequences of the ill-conceived siege of Ladysmith. Thousands of burghers were forced to lie around the town whereas they were urgently needed at the front. The way to Durban and the sea would have been open to them. But what about the assertion that the Boers, because of their exhaustion and lack of discipline, would not have been able to counter attack? It strikes one that various Boer officers who personally participated in the battle thought differently. General Jan Kemp, at that stage still a commandant, subsequently wrote: ‘If we had pursued the enemy, we could have captured Ladysmith that day and all the Khakis [i.e. British] who were there’.19 General Louis Botha, who was present on the left flank, urgently requested Joubert to pursue the British, but permission was denied.20 And where the future guerrilla commander Christiaan de Wet was watching the situation from the direction of Nicholson’s Neck, he muttered in impotent frustration: ‘Release your mounted men, release your mounted men!’21 These officers knew their men well and were convinced that they were capable of counterattacking. And so a single unwise tactical decision by Joubert fatally influenced the whole of the ensuing operational progress of the Natal campaign. After this battle the fatal decision was taken to besiege Ladysmith, while a combined force of 1,500 men on 15 November penetrated deeper into Natal. It is not known what Joubert’s motivation was. The sources merely state that the Boers were not able to lie around Ladysmith without any action, because ‘our position would become


untenable’.22 According to another source his objective was not to impose any further sieges on towns such as at Ladysmith, but rather to go and destroy the railway line.23 It is not completely clear whether he merely had in mind a reconnaissance in strength or whether he wished to launch a full-scale offensive. The fact that he took only 1,500 men with him when he left on 15 November for the south,24 seems to indicate the former. Regardless how wise the decision may have been to advance deeper into Natal, it was nevertheless a clear deviation from the spirit of the original war plan. Compliance with the plan would probably have meant assuming defensive positions alongside the strong Tugela line. In fact, when this line was occupied later on during the war, the Boers were repeatedly unwilling to occupy any positions south of the river.25 After advancing up to Willow Grange (about 19 miles south of the Tugela) he decided to return to the north, despite General Louis Botha urging him to advance down to the sea.26 It strikes one that he did not put forward any moral or political reasons for his decision in accordance with the original war plan. ‘If we were 4,000 men, or have been able to call in reserves to us, then we could have tried to advance further. But our forces on such an exposed terrain, difficult positions and difficulty in supplying provisions of ammunitions and food, mean this is an untenable situation’.27 Joubert thus decided to return on military grounds alone. Taking all these factors into account, and in the light of the leading Boer patrols having advanced as far as between Howick and Pietermaritzburg,28 it becomes clear that Joubert and his burghers, in terms of his own words of 6 October quoted above, in fact became ‘invaders’ of Natal, without deriving any operational advantage from this action. After their return the Boers took up their positions along the Tugela.29 The subsequent battles, during which General Sir Redvers Buller attempted to penetrate through the Boer positions and to relieve Ladysmith, will be discussed in the following chapter.

The Cape western front Similar to the position in Natal, the invasion on the Cape western front proceeded very sluggishly and slowly. In addition the Boers’ operational actions were quite incomprehensible. General Piet


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Newcastle

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Dundee B I G G A R S B E R

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TALANA HILL

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Elandslaagte Modderspruit

NICOLSONSNEK LOMBARDSKOP

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SPION KOP HLANGWANE

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VAALKRANS Colenso

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DOORNKOP

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BRYNBELLA

BASUTOLAND

Map 5

The Natal Campaign, 1899–1900

Town Fight Railway line Border River Contour


Cronjé, who was Commander in Chief here, decided to choose Mafeking as his objective, a town which was operationally insignificant for two reasons. Firstly, the town garrison consisted of only 716 men when war broke out.30 Secondly, any observation of the map would indicate that the town is situated close to the Transvaal border, far from the strategically and operationally important heartland of the Cape Colony. It would not have been worth it occupying the town to the extent that Cronjé had to concentrate his whole force of 6,000 men here.31 Someone very much aware of Mafeking’s lack of any strategic and operational value was General Koos de la Rey. Shortly before the war broke out, he approached Cronjé to convince him to ignore Mafeking and rather to invade the Cape Colony at Fourteen Streams. His usual obstinacy, which was later to become so infamous, led Cronjé to refuse.32 Later, when he was ordered to advance southwards to the Modder River, he left behind 2,500 men for a totally useless and even a harmful siege from the Boer point of view.33 The Free Staters also blew their chances in the vicinity of Kimberley, which was a much more important objective. Instead of acting rapidly and purposefully, they only crossed the border on 14 October.34 Although they assumed positions around Kimberley, they made no attempt to attack the detachment of 2,582 men under the command of Colonel R.G. Kekewich,35 the British commander, although the Boers had no fewer than 4,800 men.36 Because they did not feel they had sufficient forces to impose a siege on Kimberley – they evidently never considered attacking the town – Steyn insisted on 17 October that Transvaal reinforcements be sent from Mafeking.37 Consequently de la Rey and his commando were ordered on 22 October to advance to Kimberley in the south.38 It was only possible to surround the town completely after his arrival on 3 November.39 Steyn then thought that a strong Boer force should be sent in the direction of Hopetown on the Orange River to take up position there. Once this had been done the Boers could again devote some attention to Kimberley.40 The Boers accordingly moved southward and advanced as far as Belmont Station on 16 October.41 It is not clear why they did not advance up to the Orange River. Bearing in mind the intention of the war plan to invade the Cape


Colony and then to assume defensive positions, this was certainly a major blunder. Even their non-aggressive war plan allowed them to take up the most advantageous positions. The wide Orange River would have been a significant obstacle to any attacking force, regardless how strong it may have been. In addition, defensive positions at these points would also have been of great operational value, because these would have protected the whole of the southwestern flank of the Free State. A major tactical and operational advantage of immeasurable value was lost by allowing the advancing forces of Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen to cross the Orange River unopposed. Thus the British forces succeeded in surmounting a major tactical obstacle without firing a single shot and were able to organise a bridgehead north of the river. In addition the Boers also left open a vulnerable stretch of 50 km along the border as if inviting the enemy to occupy this. The Boers were really courting trouble and Lord Roberts would use this opportunity a few months later to his advantage.

The Cape southern front Although the Boers crossed the borders on the Natal and the Cape western fronts within a few days after the outbreak of war, this was not the case on the Cape southern front. It is obvious that the Boers were weaker in this sector than the British – 2,500 men against between 3,750 and 5,150 men.42 But this was not the only real reason. According to Frederik Rompel the Boers could still be persuaded to invade Natal and the Cape western front, but here the unwillingness to appear like aggressors played a major role in the Boers’ thinking. ‘Nevertheless one could only adduce sentimental reasons against such an invasion’, Rompel remarked.43 It was pointed out in the previous chapter that the Cape southern front was very important for both offensive and defensive reasons. It was a logical base for the Boers from where to penetrate rapidly and deeply into the Cape Colony, while it was at the same time also the most logical base for the British from where they would invade the Boer republics. In fact General Sir Redvers Buller, who was at that stage still the British Commander in Chief in South Africa, had already decided on 1 November to launch his invasion from here.44 It is, therefore, quite incomprehensible why the Free Staters refused


to cross the border in the face of these considerations and at the very least to prepare some defensive lines. Kruger counselled his Free State counterpart on 20 October to do just that. He recommended that the Free Staters destroy the railway line between De Aar and Noupoort and, if possible, also south of De Aar.45 For the time being, however, nothing was done. It is not difficult to criticise the Boers repeatedly because they did not assume an offensive posture, but this would become boring and pointless in the long run. Their war plan was defensive and this should be the frame of reference henceforth. But even then the Free State inaction remains incomprehensible. Kruger’s recommendation did not deviate from the defensive war plan and in addition this would have brought significant dividends to the Boers. Occupying De Aar and Noupoort (of course, together with Stormberg, which was indeed later on occupied) would have meant that the Boers dominated all the railway routes between the Cape ports and the interior. This would not only have impeded the British advance, but it would also have made Lord Methuen’s positions between the Orange and the Modder Rivers completely untenable. After all, no army can survive without its supplies. Steyn obtained partial relief only on 27 October. This was when he telegraphed Kruger that he had learned of enemy troop concentrations around De Aar, Noupoort and Stormberg. He thus requested from his counterpart a few thousand battle-hardened reinforcements.46 Kruger immediately reacted by assembling a force of 700 men from the German Corps and reserve burghers from Johannesburg and Pretoria.47 This force, arriving on 1 November at Norval’s Pont,48 was placed under the command of General H.J. Schoeman.49 Schoeman’s arrival, however, did not bring about any significant change in the attitude of the Boers on the Cape southern front. They did occupy four bridges across the Orange River during the night of 1 and 2 November,50 but never followed this up, although Buller got such a fright that he immediately withdrew his troops directly to Queenstown and De Aar.51 The commandos at last breached the border in significant numbers on 13 November – more than a month after war had been declared.52 Aliwal North was occupied that same day by Chief Commandant J.H. Olivier.53 To the west the commandos of Chief Commandant E.R. Grobler and General Schoeman occupied Colesberg after they had joined forces


at Allemans Drift.54 A few other smaller towns, including the important railway junction of Stormberg, were taken without any opposition.55 No further advances took place. The burghers prepared their defensive positions and calmly awaited the coming British offensive.

Conclusion As explained above, the Boer war plan contained certain advantages, provided its execution met with certain conditions. Let us now examine what happened to these conditions in practice. It is obvious that both pillars of the war plan were executed extremely badly. The first major error by the Boers was their failure to capitalise on the British weaknesses and failing to invade the colonies quickly. The invasion progressed in a tardy, slipshod and at times chaotic fashion. This provided to the British an opportunity to dig in and to create three Achilles heels behind the Boer lines, namely the surrounded garrisons at Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking. This forced the Boers to employ thousands of burghers in senseless sieges; men who were sorely needed on the battle fronts. This effectively meant that they neglected to isolate and destroy the small enemy forces on the borders, although being very much in a position to do so. The second major blunder was that the Boers did not occupy the best operational and tactical positions from where they could repulse the expected British attacks. The strong Tugela line in Natal was in fact occupied, but the Boers never seized their opportunities anywhere in the Cape Colony. If they had advanced to the three railway junctions of Stormberg, Noupoort and De Aar immediately after 11 October 1899, they could have stopped the British efforts to invade the Free State in their tracks for some considerable time. A look at the map should convince anyone that the whole of the Cape western front would have become superfluous in such an event and that all the available burghers could have been employed at the southern front. The Boers, however, occupied only Stormberg, resulting in the way being clear for Lord Methuen to advance to the Orange River via De Aar and Noupoort. And even at the Orange River, offering such excellent defensive positions, the Boers made no effort to take


up the best possible positions. Methuen was permitted to cross the Orange without any opposition being offered. This created the main plank for the success of the eventual offensive of late February 1900 by Lord Roberts. The Boers’ offensive stance reached an end towards the end of November 1900 and in the process they achieved very few operational advantages. Whereas the total strength of the British forces was only 27 054 men on 11 October 1899, this increased to 72 719 men at the end of November, while another 10 000 men were still at sea en route to South Africa.56 Buller later stated that, had the Boers exploited the initial British weaknesses and confusion, ‘it would have been extremely difficult for me to have prevented them, from sheer lack of troops’.57 Thus it is clear that the Boer republics failed in even the most basic strategic objectives of their war plan. These considerations invariably lead to the conclusion that it was only a question of time after early December 1899 before the British offensive would succeed.


4 The First British Offensive

The British go back to the drawing board For the time being, the failure of the Boers’ offensive did not signify that the strategic and operational initiative shifted to the British side. The burghers took up widespread defensive positions and left it to the British to decide on what basis the war would be conducted. In view of the fast growing British troop strength it is logical that these forces would breach the Boer lines sooner or later. Nevertheless, the British military position on 31 October 1899, when Buller assumed command in South Africa, was decidedly not rosy. Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking were under siege and surrounded. The retention of especially the former two were important because of political considerations and prestige, and the fall of one or more of these would have undermined the British image in the rest of the world. The Boers also scored some notable victories that had to be avenged at any price. The prestige of the British Empire thus depended on Buller. Initially Buller decided to circumvent the towns under siege and rather concentrate on an invasion from the south. He telegraphed to London: ‘I ought to strike straight at Bloemfontein … I shall be sorry if Kimberley and Ladysmith go, but I cannot help them better, though it will be a month before I can reach it at the earliest, probably more, and the situation is likely to become very acute before that’.1 Buller’s initial plan was thus a replica of the original British war plan of June 1899. 41


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Kimberley

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Mod t

Magersfontein

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Poplar Grove Abrahamskraal PAARDEBERG

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Bloemfontein

Graspan Belmont

Riet

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Fauresmith Colesberg

PIETERMARITZBURG

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Noupoort

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Springfontein

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Bethulie 100 km

Norvalspont

De Aar Colesberg

CAPE COLONY Burgersdorp Railway line River Contours

Noupoort

SUURBERG Stormberg

Map 6

The First British Offensive in the West and South, 1899–1900

The First British Offensive 43

Within 36 hours he was forced to change his mind. Reports by White and his chief of staff, General Archibald Hunter, who were both surrounded in Ladysmith, described the conditions there as extremely serious. At the same time Buller was also informed that the Boers had occupied several bridges across the Orange River and were apparently about to invade the Cape Colony. Because Buller would not have been able to launch his offensive against the Free State within less than a month and he also feared that the fall of the surrounded towns could induce a general uprising among Cape Afrikaners, he provisionally decided to amend his plans. He first concentrated on the relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith. Lord Methuen was tasked to relieve Kimberley, whilst Buller personally travelled to Natal to liberate Ladysmith. Buller, however, did not completely abandon his original war plan. After the relief of the two towns, he planned to proceed in conquering the Boer republics from the south.2 It is well known how Buller’s plans failed. These plans gave rise to some of the most ferocious and bloody battles ever seen in South African military history. Basically the British operations and tactics consisted of wave upon wave of full-frontal assaults which reflected little or no military insight or imagination. In the west Methuen initially only had to contend with a commando of inexperienced Free Staters under General Jacobus Prinsloo, and he was able to put them to flight on 23 November near Belmont with comparative ease. Two days later he repeated this exercise at Graspan, somewhat to the north, although the Boers had in the meantime received some reinforcements in the form of a thousand men under General de la Rey. Meanwhile Cronjé, still continuing his worthless siege of Mafeking, was ordered to advance as rapidly as possible to the south in order to reinforce the Boer commandos retreating before Methuen’s forces. He reached them on 27 November, just in time for the Battle of Modder River, which took place a day later. Here the Boers were pushed back a third time. The Boer officers, and specifically de la Rey, nevertheless learned sufficiently from their tactical experiences, and when Methuen attacked his opponents for a fourth time at Magersfontein on 11 December, the Boers completely reversed the odds and defeated Methuen decisively.3 Hereafter the position stagnated on the western front until Roberts changed the situation.


In the meantime, matters went form bad to worse in Natal, where Buller personally took command. At Colenso Buller attempted on 15 December to burst through the strong Tugela line, but received a bloody nose for his efforts. The Battle of Spion Kop took place a month later, from 18 to 24 January, when he tried very ineptly to advance around the Boers’ right flank. He was also defeated heavily here. Yet a third attempt to relieve Ladysmith came to nought at Vaalkrans on 6 and 7 February 1900.4 On the Cape southern front the British forces under the command of General W.F. Gatacre clashed head-on with a Boer commando under Chief Commandant J.H. Olivier at Stormberg on 9 December and were also repulsed by the Boers with heavy casualties.5 Buller’s generalship thus did not salvage the British national honour; quite the contrary. It is, therefore, understandable that he was relieved by Lord Roberts after the so-called Black Week, during which the defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso occurred. What Buller failed to achieve through his inept methods, Roberts would succeed by using common sense and an intelligent grasp of the fundamentals of the operational art.

Operational shortcomings of the Boers Being on the defence does not mean that a force necessarily must remain inactive and passive. Neither does it need to await the decision by the enemy where and when he wants to strike. Any defending force should be wide awake to use any opportunity to harm the enemy or to improve his own position. Although the Boers initially neglected taking up the best defensive positions, they now had sufficient opportunities to rectify their previous errors. Although numerous possibilities presented themselves, the Boers repeatedly allowed these to pass. After the Battle of Magersfontein, which was a brilliant testimonial for the tactical skills of the Boers and especially of de la Rey,6 a long period of inactivity on the western front ensued. The two most enterprising Boer officers, de la Rey and de Wet, wanted to use this opportunity to test the enemy and to lure them from their positions. Having been promoted from Acting Commandant to Combat General, de Wet arrived at Magersfontein from natal on 16 December.7


de la Rey and de Wet were of the opinion that the Boers could not remain inactive for too long, especially while Methuen was constantly receiving reinforcements. They approached Cronjé, now Commander in Chief on the western front, to allot a commando of 1,500 men to them. They wanted to march into Methuen’s rear to disrupt his supply lines. It is not exactly clear how far they wished to advance in the process. According to de la Rey they intended to proceed up to the Orange River, while de Wet even set De Aar as an objective.8 The operational wisdom of such a proposal is quite evident. In his unpublished memoirs de la Rey states that this would have had the advantage of ‘forcing Lord Methuen to venture outside his lair’.9 If they succeeded in disrupting Methuen’s supply lines at the Orange River or even to occupy De Aar, this would have made Methuen’s position on the Modder River untenable. Provided the manoeuvre was executed efficiently and was sustained, it could have put an end to the British presence north of the Orange River. Neither would it have militated against the spirit of the original Boer war plan.10 Urged by Steyn to do so11 the Transvaal government approached Cronjé in this regard.12 A council of war then discussed the matter. According to Cronjé the meeting concurred in principle on the condition that the 1,500 men needed for the expedition be substituted,13 but de Wet’s war memoirs record Cronjé’s opposition as much stronger.14 In any event, it was not possible to find the additional 1,500 men, and so the whole plan collapsed.15 Eventually Cronjé permitted the two frustrated generals to launch a limited operation on condition that no more than 200 men be used16 and that the complete operation be completed within one night, which – according to de la Rey – ‘could have no positive outcome in my judgement’.17 Consequently de Wet and de la Rey assembled their burghers on 4 January 1900 at Jacobsdal.18 That night they attempted to blow up the railway line, but the operation resulted in chaos because of bad co-ordination and the disobedience of a few men. The generals had to return to Magersfontein, the operation having ended in failure.19 This was to be the Boers’ last effort to operate against the British forces on the western front. They would henceforth not take any more initiatives and await the offensive by Lord Roberts in February which would take them completely by surprise.


In the meantime an enterprising young Boer, Koos Jooste, proposed shortly after the Battle of Magersfontein to lead a small band of 20 to 25 men in an audacious plan to the north west region of the Cape Colony in order to launch a recruitment drive among the population who, generally speaking, was sympathetic to the Boer cause. After this Jooste proposed to attack the railway line behind Methuen’s back at Richmond Road. He personally lay these proposals before Kruger, Steyn and Joubert and then proceeded to Stormberg, where he met up with an enthusiastic brother in arms, Andries de Wet.20 On 10 January they telegraphed their plan to Kruger. They wanted to cross the border near Kimberley with 50 to 100 men and then cross the Orange River near Prieska to recruit a commando of young Afrikaners in the districts of Victoria West, Carnarvon, Kenhardt, etc. They would follow this up by advancing to the railway line near Richmond Road to destroy this in order to stop British reinforcements arriving from Cape Town.21 As happened so frequently with many of the best plans by the Boers, this initiative, too, failed. Because Jooste was rather outspoken about the Boers’ inactivity, Kruger regarded him as too young and inexperienced to lead such an expedition and preferred giving the command to Commandant Lucas Steenkamp, who was born in the north western Cape. Eventually even Steenkamp was bypassed and the extremely incompetent General P.J. Liebenberg was appointed as commander.22 After weeks of dithering Liebenberg’s commando at last left Magersfontein on 26 January.23 With this the Boer leadership committed another serious blunder. Liebenberg was a weak and overly cautious commander who did not display the least bit of initiative or enterprise. He was simply not the correct choice to lead such an audacious and important operation. Later in the war his men gave him the nickname of Generaal Agterom (‘General Backwards’) because of his extreme unwillingness to act decisively against the enemy.24 Apparently the objective of the expedition was also amended, because on the day of their departure, the Secretary of Commandant Steenkamp, R.M. Cleaver, wrote to his mother: ‘Our mission is political and not military, for the first while at any rate, as the English are remote from these parts at present’.25 One could deduce from this that the main objective was now to conquer and occupy some


territory and to embark on a recruitment drive. The important operational objective to attack the railway line seems to have been put on the backburner. There is not much to relate in this chapter regarding the Cape southern front. After occupying the most important towns, General Schoeman, who in general proved himself to be an incompetent commander, realised that an advance in the direction of Noupoort and De Aar had become necessary. He proposed that this be done when he met Chief Commandant Grobler at Stormberg, but because of various considerations it was never done. Firstly, the British attacked Stormberg on 9 December, and although the Boers scored a decisive victory, this quickly dissipated all Grobler’s delusions of heroism. Secondly the continuous activities of Major-General John French, the British commander on this front, deterred Schoeman to the extent that he also completely abandoned the plan.26 Thus the Boers continually allowed important opportunities to obtain some operational advantage to slip between their fingers and concentrated merely on their defensive role.

The Boer republics and the conquered territories In order to judge the original Boer war plan, one also needs to evaluate the strategic actions by the Boer leadership. It has been stated repeatedly that the Boers did not wish to wage a war of conquest and that their overriding objective was to preserve their independence. However, quite soon after the outbreak of war they started deviating from this plan, at least on the political level. Kruger for instance already on 18 October 1899 stated that he foresaw the Cape Afrikaners rebelling and joining the Boer forces.27 Matters progressed beyond Kruger’s wish. On 4 November the Free State Executive Council took a decision with far-reaching consequences. It was thought that it would be ‘as yet’ unwise to annex the conquered Cape districts. It was nevertheless decided that all males of those ages who would normally qualify to do military service be conscripted. Secret instructions would, however, be sent to all commandants that only those persons be conscripted whom they thought would be willing to perform military service.28 Accordingly Cronjé received orders to call up the males in the districts of Kimberley, Vryburg, Barkly West, Hay and Herbert.29


Chief Commandant J.H. Olivier at Aliwal North was, however, not satisfied with this decision. He telegraphed Steyn on 15 November 1899 that the supporters of the British would do all in their power to dissuade others to take up arms at the behest of the republics. Hence Olivier proposed that every single male be called up in order to force the ‘jingoes’ to leave town. ‘This will help a great deal to rid the town of them’.30 Kruger subsequently approved Olivier’s proposal.31 This forced all male citizens of the Cape Colony – British citizens – to rebel against their lawful government and to commit high treason. Colonial citizens who refused to obey this order were punished.32 In Aliwal North such persons received fines ranging between £27/10/- and £37/10/-,33 while persons in similar positions in Barkly West were expelled from their homes and deported across the Orange River.34 This obviously placed the Cape Afrikaners before a considerable dilemma. Although they were generally sympathetic towards the Boer cause, they were reasonably happy under the Colonial authorities and had no particular axe to grind. In fact they were very loyal to Queen Victoria, against whom they were now forced to rebel. There were, of course, a minority who joined the Boer forces freely and out of conviction.35 J.H. Snyman, who studied the conditions of the Afrikaners in the Cape Colony during the Anglo-Boer War, wrote: ‘It is clear from the above that the Transvalers and Free Staters did not care much for the feelings of their Cape neighbours. They simply expected the Cape citizens to leave home and hearth and to actively serve the Boer cause’.36 Steyn telegraphed the Cape Premier, W.P. Schreiner, on 20 November 1899 that calling up these citizens was simply aimed at maintaining law and order in the relevant districts and to guard against any hostile actions by the blacks.37 Nevertheless, this smacks of bending the truth somewhat. Cases of enforced conscription also occurred in the north western Cape Colony. A publication of the pro-British Dutch language newspaper, Di Patriot, (‘The Patriot’) quoted the testimony of several persons who were even imprisoned because they refused to join the Boer forces.38 Even taking into account this periodical’s well-known stance against the Boer republics, these stories nevertheless reflect negatively on the Boer actions. One of the few motivations traced was that of the Free State Chief Commandant Ignatius Ferreira, who


was elected on 8 January 1900 to this position: ‘It is not only necessary for us, but [also] to shield them from the consequences of high treason while fighting under our flag …’39 This motivation does not appear to be very convincing. If the reason was to protect the rebels against the consequences of high treason, then the Boers could have conscripted only those who specifically requested this. It would then have been unnecessary to compel the unwilling to take up arms, or to fine or to imprison them. In contrast Kruger’s views were clear: while the Boers were involved in a struggle for life and death to preserve their independence, the Cape Afrikaners could not be expected to remain at home in peace and security.40 Matters progressed beyond the calling up of British citizens. In late November 1899 Steyn proposed that the occupied districts in the Cape Colony should unilaterally declare themselves independent and establish their own republic. His main motive was that the Cape Colony citizens could thereby be recognised as lawful participants in the war and thus obviate the danger of prosecution for high treason.41 Kruger, however, was more cautious, because it would have been a rather drastic measure and he thought the Cape colonists should first be consulted.42 Two days later Steyn provisionally decided to postpone dealing with the matter. ‘[I] consider it worthwhile waiting a while until [the] matter has taken its course and more [persons] have joined [us]’.43 The conscription of Cape Afrikaners had an interesting sequel. Joubert’s proposal to lodge a protest against the British plan to punish those rebels they captured44 was accepted by the two Boer republics, which were still planning to treat the Cape rebels on an equal footing with their own citizens.45 The two presidents telegraphed Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister, that such rebels ‘are regarded and treated by us as citizens of that state in whose forces they are serving’. The presidents demanded that the rebels thus be treated as prisoners of war. If this demand was ignored, retribution against British prisoners of war in Boer custody would be taken.46 As could be expected, Salisbury absolutely refused to be moved by this legally untenable demand. He informed Kruger and Steyn that he would hold them personally responsible if they executed their demands.47 The matter was then dropped.


Conclusions The Boer republics based their war plan on high moral principles and, therefore, did not wish to wage an imperialist war. They soon, however, deviated from these principles. In addition the operations underlying their war plan were badly executed. They displayed some considerable prowess on the tactical level, but on the operational level they repeatedly botched up excellent opportunities. If the plans of de la Rey, de Wet, Hendrik Schoeman and the young Koos Jooste were executed with daring enterprise, then the Boers would have been able to rectify much of the mistakes that they made in their own offensive. Unfortunately most of the leading officers were incompetent, with the result that the younger generation of generals were considerably frustrated by the one chance after the other being lost. They would have their day at a later stage. But it is mainly on the strategic domain that the Boers exposed themselves to heavy criticism. It was described in a previous chapter that the Boer governments regarded a war of conquest – again quoting the words of Frederik Rompel – ‘as contrary … to the precepts of the Afrikaners regarding Christianity and civilisation’.48 This theory and the hard practical world, as it manifested itself during the first months of the war, clearly clashed. Compelling British citizens to rebel against their lawful authorities was absolutely contrary to the Boers’ high moral principles before the war. The Boer attitude towards the inhabitants of the occupied districts, together with Steyn’s short lived proposal that these districts unilaterally declare themselves independent, were in reality the first steps in the direction of abandoning the limited strategic frame of reference guiding their approach to the war. The decision of the Free State Executive Council of 4 November 1899 that it was ‘as yet’ not advisable to annex the occupied districts, was in principle a clear deviation of the initial unequivocal principle. This deviation would for the time being not have any practical negative spin-offs. Firm decisions in this regard would only be taken later during the war. The British are not beyond criticism either. With the hindsight of a century it is clear that Buller committed a major blunder by abandoning his original war plan. His major reasoning involved the siege of Ladysmith and Kimberley and his fear that these two towns


would fall in the hands of the Boers, which would have had disastrous political consequences for the British government. Today we know that his fear was exaggerated. After all the towns resisted until 15 February and 1 March respectively until they were liberated. But Buller obviously could not have known this at the time. One can today, with all the facts at one’s disposal, look at the matter dispassionately and come to the conclusion that the war would probably have progressed differently if Buller had persevered with his original objective to invade the Free State from the south during the course of December 1899. At that stage the Cape southern front was the weakest from a Boer perspective. Apart from the 2,500 men who were stationed there at the outbreak of war, only 700 men under General Schoeman reinforced this force. Their total strength was, therefore, 3,200 men.49 It is safe to assume, then, that the British force of 40 000 men would have had an excellent chance of succeeding in their objective.


5 The Second British Offensive

Roberts’ new campaign plan As stated before, the original British war plan entailed the invasion of the Free State from the south and then to advance along the railway line to Bloemfontein and Pretoria. Despite the initial successes by the Boers, Buller initially intended not to deviate from this plan, but in order to relieve Ladysmith he decided to postpone it.1 However, not long afterwards he decided to abandon the plan altogether and to draft a new one. According to this the Free State would be invaded from the west. He therefore started assembling a large force along the railway line between the Modder River and De Aar. As soon as his reinforcements had arrived by sea, he planned to advance from his base at Heuningneskloof Station to Jacobsdal. He thought that Cronjé would feel so threatened that he would evacuate Magersfontein. Then the road to Kimberley would be open for Methuen. To bolster his plans he ordered that a side line be constructed from north of Heuningneskloof Station to Jacobsdal. From Jacobsdal this railway line could be extended fairly cheaply and at a daily rate of one and a half kilometre towards Bloemfontein. The army would advance slowly in front of the railway builders and the troops would receive their supplies via this same railway line.2 Buller’s new war plan was never brought to fruition, because he was replaced by Lord Roberts as Commander in Chief. Roberts left for South Africa a week later by ship and arrived in Cape Town on 10 January 1900.3 He had been thinking for some time that the 53


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Lord Roberts’ Offensive, I

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The Second British Offensive 55

official plan to invade the Boer republics from the south was not the best one. As early as 1897 he showed two staff officers his plan according to which the British forces would first advance along the western railway line to Kimberley and thence to Bloemfontein.4 It would nevertheless appear that this was, while being at sea at least, not in his mind. On the day of his departure he telegraphed to Buller that he intended ‘carrying out the original plan and advancing in force through the Orange Free State’. If Buller could succeed in relieving Ladysmith he should evacuate the town and take up defensive positions along the Tugela. Similarly Methuen, should he liberate Kimberley, had to evacuate the town and retreat to the Orange River ‘in view of a strong concentration on that line preliminary to an advance on Bloemfontein’.5 One may deduce from this telegram that Roberts at first wanted to continue with the original war plan to invade the Free State from the south. According to the Times History the reference by Roberts to ‘the original plan’ was actually meant in contrast ‘with the diversion of forces to Natal’ by Buller, and that he was indeed, as he wanted to in 1897, still planning to advance to Bloemfontein via Kimberley.6 This does not seem right. The reference to ‘the original plan’ is quite clear and is further supported by the order that Methuen should retreat to the Orange River after the relief of Kimberley in order to prepare for an advance on Bloemfontein. Should Roberts at that stage already have been planning to march to Bloemfontein via Kimberley, then he would not have been willing to give up the operationally important territory between the Modder and the Orange Rivers. It is nevertheless clear that he had not yet made up his mind and that he expected – prior to his arrival in South Africa where he would be able to judge matters for himself – his generals to assume basically a defensive stance. Shortly thereafter he received a telegram in which Buller laid out his plans, as explained earlier in this chapter.7 It is possible that this prompted Roberts to revamp his plan of 1897. In the meantime he had many conversations with his intelligence officer, Major (subsequently Lieutenant-Colonel) G.F.R. Henderson. This officer was at that stage arguably the best military thinker in Britain. He was the author of two works, being a biography in two parts on General Stonewall Jackson, one of the best commanders of the Confederate South during the American Civil War, and of a book, Thoughts on War.


Henderson knew that the firepower of modern arms advantaged the defending side, but he did not think that it would be impossible to take the offensive. Jay Luvaas summarises his main line of thinking: ‘Henderson considered mobility the best antidote to trench warfare. Sudden seizure of key tactical points, outflanking manoeuvres, and marches against the enemy’s line of retreat had frequently enabled the Americans to overcome the natural advantages of the defences. Thus Grant’s ability to manoeuvre had forced Lee out of successive defensive positions in Virginia, while Sherman’s campaigns in Atlanta offered additional proof that ‘against troops which can manoeuvre earthworks are useless’.8 According to Luvaas Henderson’s thoughts had a major influence on Roberts. This indeed appears to have been the case, as the war plan of Roberts and its execution reflected Henderson’s thoughts to a considerable extent.9 The sources tell us that there was yet another important aspect where Henderson influenced Roberts. Jackson’s campaign in the Shenandoah Valley repeatedly threatened the Federal capital, Washington DC. This forced the Federal leadership repeatedly to despatch troops needed elsewhere to the vicinity of Washington.10 By studying Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, Roberts apparently thus became aware of the strategic value of threatening the enemy’s capital city.11 This would explain why he so resolutely marched on the Boer capitals and why he repeatedly refused to be drawn in by de Wet’s actions in his rear, aimed at deviating him from his objective. It is clear that Roberts refused to become involved in the senseless full-frontal assaults that had caused so many casualties and only led to several spectacular defeats. The day after arriving in Cape Town he wrote to Methuen that even if he had been in a position to send him any reinforcements, ‘I doubt if the enemy’s extraordinary strong positions [at Magersfontein] could be forced without a lamentable loss of life’. Therefore, he charged Methuen not to launch any further attacks, but to remain on the defence.12 In Natal Buller, of course, was in an independent position. Roberts did not wish to prescribe to him. He thought that because Buller was the man on the spot he could best judge how to act.13 The sequel was, of course, two further bloody defeats for Buller, at Spion Kop and Vaalkrans, before he was eventually able to burst through


the Boer lines at Pieter‘s Heights on 27 February 1900, having again suffered a considerable number of casualties. After finally arriving in Cape Town, Roberts devoted all his energy to draw up a new campaign plan. He initially planned to advance from Orange River Station – where the western railway line crossed over the Orange River – to Springfontein. This amounted to a giant outflanking manoeuvre to compel the Boer commandos at Colesberg and Stormberg, who were previously considerably reinforced considerably, to abandon their positions and to retreat northwards.14 By doing this he also hoped to break the Boer stranglehold on Kimberley and Ladysmith, because of the threat to Bloemfontein that his planned manoeuvre would entail.15 In essence this was simply an intelligent variation on the original war plan. It was much more indirect and thus had a commensurately better chance of succeeding. Shortly afterwards, however, he amended it in one important respect. In accordance with his original 1897 plan, he proposed to enter the Free State from the west. Using the Modder River as pivot, he wanted to outflank Cronjé at Magersfontein from the east and then to relieve Kimberley. Cronjé would thus be enclosed from three directions, raked with fire and forced to surrender. Events on the ground would dictate what happened afterwards, but if it was at all possible, he planned to march on Bloemfontein.16 Testifying before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa after the peace, Roberts explained that there were three reasons for his choice of this route. Firstly, he said, this route had the advantage of having the only bridge across the Orange River not in enemy hands. Using the other bridges on the southern front would have entailed breaking through the strong Boer forces at Colesberg and Stormberg. In that case it was entirely possible that the Boers would destroy the bridges before the British could take them. (In this respect, of course, the Boers’ failure to advance directly to the Orange River in October 1899, or to occupy the important railway junctions of De Aar and Noupoort, together with Stormberg, presented Roberts with a chance he would grasp with both hands.) Secondly, he went on, only via this route could Kimberley be relieved in time. If this town fell, the same would also happen with Mafeking, together with all the concomitant political consequences.


Thirdly, Roberts thought that this was the only way to defeat the different Boer forces separately. Only in this way Cronjé could be eliminated as a factor before any reinforcements reached him. The southern route would have entailed such a slow and tortuous advance that once he had reached Bloemfontein, that ‘I should have between me and Kimberley not only Cronjé, but the whole of the Boer force which was not engaged in Natal’.17 In accordance with the lessons Roberts drew from the American Shenandoah campaign, ‘I felt convinced that an advance on Bloemfontein must draw the Free Staters back from Kimberley and Natal, and that the occupation of their capital would render the Boer positions to the south of the Orange River untenable’.18 This decision meant that virtually all the British forces in the whole of the Cape Colony would be earmarked for this campaign. Sir Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, concerned that this might increase the possibility of an uprising among Cape Afrikaners, opposed it. But Roberts assuaged him. He explained that the only opportunity to deliver a decisive blow was to take the war to the Boer territories. Roberts expected any rebellion in the Cape Colony to dissipate when he lured the Boer commandos away by invading the Free State. Putting the uprising down would, however, not defeat the Boer republics.19 To Lansdowne he reinforced the point by writing a few hours later that ‘the only chance of bringing the war to successful conclusion is to carry it into the enemy’s country’.20 Only one aspect of the Roberts war plan remains to be discussed. That was the extraordinary lengths to which he went in order to mislead the Boers about his real objectives. It entailed three consecutive steps, one on the operational and two on the tactical level. To begin with, he instructed Major-General John French, who commanded the British on the Southern Front in the vicinity of Colesberg, to attack the Boers in force and to spread false rumours to mislead the Boers to make them believe that he was planning to launch his offensive along this route.21 Secondly he despatched two brigades shortly before the start of the offensive to Koedoesberg, west of Magersfontein, to mislead Cronjé into believing that his eventual efforts to relieve Kimberley would be conducted on the Boers’ right flank rather than their left flank.22 And in the third place he planned to have his troops advance from Enslin Station


initially in a southeasterly direction to the farm Ramdam. They would then turn to the northeast, cross the Riet River, and advance rapidly to Kimberley. This plan harboured a brilliant tactic, because he wanted to let the Boers believe that he was aiming to advance directly on Bloemfontein via Koffiefontein without advancing to Kimberley. This would confuse the Boers and the true objective of his advance would remain unclear during the crucial first days of the offensive.23 This war plan proves Roberts as one of the foremost military brains of his time. Apart from him, this era did not really produce any other strategists of renown. His plan evokes much admiration because of its subtlety and its indirect approach. It is a commander’s task to achieve victory with the largest possible effect at the lowest possible cost. Any commander who in such circumstances launches attacks against the enemy’s strong points or well fortified positions, does not deserve to be a leader. This is exactly what Buller and Methuen repeatedly did between November 1899 and February 1900. These unintelligent and bloody methods would also be very popular among the commanding officers of both sides during the First World War. One cannot, of course, necessarily exclude all chances of success when using these tactics, but victory is virtually always bought with a horrific loss of life. The British strategist Sir Basil Liddell Hart, arguably the most influential military historian of the twentieth century, formulated a new theory in reaction to the senseless bloodletting of 1914–1918: a commander ought to follow an indirect approach by manoeuvring in such a manner that the likelihood of any resistance is minimised. The ideal, he said, should be to overcome this resistance without violence: in others words, a victory without spilling any blood. According to Liddell Hart Napoleon succeeded in doing this when he cut off the Austrian General Karl Mack von Leiberich’s supply lines in 1805, after which Mack capitulated at Ulm without firing a shot. Obviously, in practice this hardly ever happens, but in theory it remains the ideal. ‘Let us assume that a strategist is empowered to seek a military decision’, Liddell Hart wrote. ‘His responsibility is to seek it under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the most profitable result. Hence his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that it does


not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. In other words, dislocation is the aim of strategy; its sequel may either be the enemy’s dissolution or his easier disruption in battle’.24 This may be achieved by misleading the enemy with regard to one’s route of attack; by attacking him at his most vulnerable point; by launching flanking attacks; by breaking through and then to sever his lines of supply and retreat, etc. With the benefit of this insight we can now look at the general operational situation of February 1900. In principle it was not much different from the one of five months before – the geographical position still favoured a British offensive campaign from the Cape Colony as much as before – but two additional factors came into play. Firstly, the balance of power had clearly swung in favour of the British. After entering the war in South Africa with only 27 054 men in the theatre, this number grew to 180 000 men at the end of February 1900.25 Of these Roberts had at his disposal approximately 50 000 troops on the Cape western front – four infantry divisions and one cavalry division.26 At the same time, the fairly easy opportunity to invade the Free State from the south did not exist any more. In a moment we will see how the Boer commandos at the southern front had been reinforced. Execution of the original British war plan consequently would have entailed attacking the Boers in well fortified defensive lines. Roberts rightly wished to avoid that. The same situation also applied to the Natal front, where the Boers occupied the formidable Tugela line. What remained, then, was the western front, where the only truly strong position was Cronjé’s at Magersfontein, but where both his flanks hung in the air. The distance between Jacobsdal and the Orange River was controlled by no more than a thousand men, of whom a sizeable percentage was constantly absent with or without leave.27 It ought to be clear that the plan of Roberts complied to a large extent with the demands set by the military situation and military theory. This could be regarded as a classical example in the operational art of indirect approach. This does not mean though that the plan was without risk. The original plan depended on three railway lines (or actually two, because Stormberg was occupied) up to close to the Free State


border. In actual fact, north of De Aar Roberts now only had one railway line which would complicate his supply lines. The greatest risk was undoubtedly to advance 120 km beyond Kimberley without the aid of any railway line whatsoever. It would be recalled that the second chapter described how the major armies of the time were dependent on the railways.28 In order to minimise any problems Roberts thus assembled a huge fleet of ox- and horse-drawn transport to supply his army.29 The question is to what extent the Boers were taken in by the efforts of Roberts to mislead them. As explained above, Steyn was convinced from November 1899 that the British offensive would be launched from the south.30 By inundating Kruger with a neverending stream of telegrams to send reinforcements from Natal to Colesberg, Kruger also in due course became convinced that this would happen. Colesberg now became ‘one of our weak points’,31 on which ‘our whole effort’ depended.32 Mainly as a result of Steyn’s incessant urging, a stream of reinforcements were sent to Colesberg. Commandant G.M.J. van Dam with the Johannesburg Police; Assistant Commandant-General F.A. Grobler with contingents of the Waterberg, Soutpansberg and Johannesburg commandos; further contingents of the Waterberg and Bethlehem commandos; and also Commandant C.J. Spruyt with a part of the Heidelberg commando were consecutively sent from the Natal Front, the Cape Western Front and from the Transvaal. In addition de la Rey was also transferred from Magersfontein to Colesberg.33 The total number of reinforcements amounted to 4,412 burghers.34 According to the available sources only one prominent Boer war leader was never impressed by the possible threat against the Cape southern front, namely the obstinate Piet Cronjé. He repeatedly warned the two Presidents that the British operations at Colesberg were a ploy to weaken the Boers’ position so that the British could breach their lines there.35 Apparently impressed by this argument, Kruger also issued a similar warning at the end of January.36 It is however, very, doubtful whether Cronjé grasped the full dimension of the Roberts war plan, even though some historians do credit him with that insight.37 Cronjé always had an uncomplicated approach to warfare. He did not know the meaning of fear, but neither did he have any insight at all into modern warfare. ‘Go and


shoot the so and so’s and catch the rest of them!’38 This was the brief message he sent de Wet a few days later, typical of his approach. He simply did not have the intellectual capacity to grasp what the Roberts plan entailed. After all, having effected the relief of Kimberley Roberts was planning to advance directly across the veldt and without the aid of a railway line to Bloemfontein. This was exactly what Cronjé refused to believe. The altercation between him and de Wet regarding the latter’s conviction that the British would not necessarily advance along the railway line to Kimberley, but would rather execute an outflanking manoeuvre, has been well recorded.39 In his memoirs Cronjé wrote that even after the start of the British offensive he was still under the impression ‘that a railway line was indispensable for the advance of such a large force and for the immense supplies of victuals that the troops would be needing’.40 Roberts also scored some success in his manoeuvre in the direction of Koedoesberg to mislead the Boers. de Wet, who was sent to block the enemy advance there, was convinced that this was the expected major offensive to reach Kimberley. Although Cronjé was not exactly impressed by this manoeuvre, there are nevertheless indications that he did not discard the possibility either.41 The third manoeuvre to mislead the Boers, the initial advance in the southeasterly direction towards Ramdam, will be discussed presently. In summary one could state that in early February, on the eve of his offensive, Roberts held all the strategic and operational aces. He not only had assembled vastly superior forces, but his intelligent war plan was about to achieve a turning point in the war. The Boers ultimately had no inkling of what was about to hit them.

To Kimberley and Bloemfontein Roberts’ great offensive that would alter the course of the war commenced during the early hours of 11 February 1900 in a southeasterly direction with the cavalry of General French leading the way. After passing across the farm Ramdam, they changed their course to a northeasterly direction. A Boer patrol observed the change of direction in time and reported it, but this made no impression on Cronjé. His disdain for the British was too great to take this new


threat seriously. He despatched de Wet with only 450 men and two cannon to join up with Commandant David Lubbe in the vicinity to stop the British from crossing the Riet River.42 Cronjé was completely deceived. French neutralised de Wet’s defence at the Riet by pretending that he was going to cross the river at Watervaldrift, but in fact sent the vast majority of his force out of sight of the Boers in a southwesterly direction to cross the river at Dekiels Drift without meeting any opposition. Outfoxed, de Wet realised that he could do little to salvage the matter and quietly retreated to the farm Winterhoek, east of Dekiels Drift, where he waited to attack the enemy from behind when the opportunity presented itself. As could be expected, Cronjé was steadfast in refusing to believe that the British manoeuvres constituted any danger to his position. Replying to the Austrian Count Adalbert Sternberg, who witnessed the British crossing the Riet, Cronjé was dismissive of the British cavalry, stating that they were not worth much and could easily be shot or captured.43 He never considered the possibility that the British manoeuvre to the east could isolate him and his force from Bloemfontein. On the other hand de Wet was very much aware of how serious the situation was, even having been misled by the initial thrust of French’s cavalry towards Ramdam. There is ample proof that he was expecting an offensive via Koffiefontein to Bloemfontein and thus considered the movement of French on the morning of 13 February in a northerly direction as a diversion. This would explain why he retained his forces so long at Winterhoek without committing them to counter French’s advance.44 There is no need to follow the movements of the following days in any detail, as this study is primarily interested in the strategic and operational aspects of the war. It should in any event be stressed that the Boers in general were deceived by the direction of Roberts’ offensive and that their countermeasures were completely deficient. As a result French was able to reach the Modder River without encountering any opposition. There a Boer commando under Commandants Stoffel Froneman and Tollie de Beer was awaiting him, having been despatched by Cronjé. It was a futile exercise, as French broke through the defence with comparative ease and immediately proceeded to Kimberley, which he duly liberated on 15 February.


For his part on the same day de Wet succeeded with a counterstrike that threatened to derail the whole of the British offensive. Having at last realised what the intentions of the enemy were, de Wet attacked a virtually unprotected supply convoy near the Riet River on 14 February, and the next day captured it. The British in fact did have sufficient forces to launch a counterattack, but on the last moment Roberts decided against it. In his report to the War Secretary he explained: ‘The wagons contained a quantity of supplies of groceries for the troops and of grain for the animals, and I felt that to abandon them meant a considerable loss to the stores on which we had to depend. In view, however, of the absolute necessity of pushing on the advance, and realising, as I did, that to leave troops at Waterval Drift until such time as the convoy could again be set in motion would weaken my force and probably cause it to be delayed I decided to abandon the supplies, wagons and oxen …’45 This decision was a calculated risk and indirectly the result of Roberts’ decision to take the western route to Bloemfontein, rather than the southern route via Colesberg. This meant that his troops had to survive on half-rations until the end of February,46 but Roberts had to weigh this up against a loss of momentum and the resulting danger of the majority of Cronjé’s forces escaping. His decision to press on regardless is the hallmark of an excellent commander; a cut above the rest. He displayed cool nerves, and the result was the surrender a few days later of Cronjé and some 4,000 men. In the meantime Cronjé at last dimly realised the danger to his left flank. He consequently moved his camp during the night of 14 and 15 February a few miles to Bossiespan, and the following night commenced a retreat eastwards along the Modder River. He was finally trapped near Vandisie Drift on 17 February. Although de Wet went to his aid with reinforcements the following day, it did not change the situation. de Wet’s forces took up position southeast of Cronjé’s beleaguered camp, but there was never an opportunity to break out of the British stranglehold. 47 Also, de Wet was only able to cling to his position until 21 February, before he was forced to retreat. An effort two days later to counterattack failed, and at last that sealed the fate of Cronjé and his men. The morning of 27 February – the nineteenth anniversary of the Battle of Majuba during the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1881 – saw at


Paardeberg the wholesale surrender of Cronjé’s entire Boer force to the British. This surrender had far-reaching consequences for the struggle on the other fronts. From the Cape Southern Front – where the Boers under the inspired leadership of de la Rey drove the British to back Arundel and whence the way to De Aar was open – reinforcements were continuously withdrawn to proceed to the western front.48 Kruger at this time, having a sound grasp of the military situation, telegraphed on 16 February to his Free State counterpart that it appeared to him that the British forces were considerably weakened on the southern front. He proposed that the commandos at Stormberg and Colesberg to advance to Steynsburg and Noupoort and to threaten De Aar. ‘Not only do we now have an excellent opportunity to advance deep into the Cape Colony and thus to augment our forces, but such an advance would also help to confuse the British who are now advancing to Kimberley through the Orange Free State by upsetting their lines of communication’.49 Joubert also encouraged de la Rey to undertake such an operation.50 de la Rey agreed in principle, although he had doubts on the detail of the matter. According to him it would be extremely difficult to march on Noupoort and De Aar, and therefore proposed instead to advance with the greater part of his men westward in order to attack the British at the Orange River from behind and to disrupt their railway connections.51 The wisdom underlying these proposals is self-evident. Should de la Rey have succeeded in disrupting the supply lines to Roberts, whether at Noupoort, De Aar or the Orange River, this would no doubt have created considerable problems for the British offensive. After de Wet’s attack on the supply convoy, the British troops were in any event on half-rations, and a further disruption of their already meagre supplies could well have resulted in the failure of the whole offensive. But, when drawing up his campaign plan originally, Roberts foresaw the Boers’ reaction. One of the reasons why he chose the western route was, after all, that it would weaken the Boer resistance on the southern and Natal fronts by drawing forces away to the west, and this he achieved. Steyn – undoubtedly a great statesman, but not equally endowed with military insight – had a fixation with the enemy threat to Bloemfontein. He again urged Kruger on


24 February to despatch reinforcements to de Wet on the Western Front. ‘If we procrastinate and allow Bloemfontein to fall in enemy hands, then, humanly speaking, our cause will be lost’, he cried out to Kruger as if on the verge of panicking.52 The result was that Kruger, against his better judgement, was compelled later on the same day to withdraw de la Rey and 1,500 men for the defence of the Free State capital.53 de la Rey was extremely upset about this order, but he simply had to obey the order. ‘Seldom if ever I executed an order less willingly than this one, because I was convinced that an excellent opportunity was being lost. But I had to comply …’ he wrote after the war in his unpublished memoirs.54 This also brought about the death knell of Cronjé’s forces. The remaining Boer forces on the Cape Southern Front were much too weak to offer any effective resistance against the British. No wonder then the British crossed the Orange River on 15 March and slowly advanced along the railway line in the direction of Bloemfontein.55 Moreover, Buller succeeded in breaching the Boer lines on the Tugela on the same day Cronjé surrendered, whereupon Ladysmith was relieved too.56 This finally meant Roberts’ vindication on all fronts. In Natal the Boers had to withdraw northwards to the Biggars Mountains. On the Cape Southern Front they had to pull back as well, and, in doing so, kept the Boer command on tenterhooks because of the danger of being cut off. Only at the end of March they managed to reach safety.57 On the western front the Boers would twice – at Poplar Grove (7 March) and Abrahams Kraal (10 March) – offer resistance to the British advance, but to no avail. On 13 March the British entered Bloemfontein exhausted, but victorious. This concluded the first phase of the Roberts offensive. One matter remains to be mentioned. On 22 February Steyn telegraphed his Transvaal counterpart that a ‘dependable friend’ from Burgersdorp had visited him. As a result Steyn proposed that an adviser be sent to Burgersdorp to assist ‘in establishing [a] republic or at least [an] autonomous government there’.58 There is no further correspondence in the archives and one could deduce that the increasing pressures on the Boer republics allowed this matter to lapse. It nevertheless emphasises again the awareness on the part of the Boer leadership that their original limited war


plan was untenable. There would be no movement in this respect for the time being – further developments would only come about later.

To Pretoria and Komatipoort Although Roberts did not want to remain too long in Bloemfontein, he was only able to resume his offensive towards May. After the war he explained that he first wanted to ensure that all Boer forces were expelled from the southern Free State, that his army was rested and that they were fully supplied.59 Hitherto he was dependent for his supplies on the convoys that reached him from the De Aar-Kimberley railway line. The direct railway line between Bloemfontein and the Cape Colony was opened on 19 March.60 Although this facilitated the flow of supplies, his position in the Free State nevertheless remained quite precarious. The railway line constituted an open invitation to any determined Boer commando to disrupt the traffic. The operational significance of this fact will be discussed presently. One of the most important military principles is that when the enemy loses his balance, he should not be permitted to regain it. Roberts realised this throughout, but because his army was so exhausted by their march on Bloemfontein, this also enabled the Boer forces to regain their equilibrium. The Boer forces now assembled around Brandfort received a fortnight’s home leave from de Wet.61 On 17 March an important council of war took place in Kroonstad. Apart from both presidents, Generals Joubert, de la Rey and de Wet were also present. Here it was decided to continue the war with all possible means, notwithstanding the setbacks of the previous weeks. It was also decided not to continue with the traditional practice of wagon laagers, that the enemy would be confronted with light and mobile commandos on horseback and especially that commandos should always be prepared to disrupt the enemy’s lines of communications.62 Although it would take some time before these decisions were implemented uniformly, it nevertheless constituted a major advance. This was the first step in the direction of a full-scale guerrilla warfare which would enable the commandos’ mobility to be fully exploited.

BECHUANALAND

Lydenburg Belfast

Komatipoort Middelburg Barberton Johannesburg K Heidelberg Carolina omati LOURENCO Vereeniging Ermelo MARQUES Potchefstroom Standerton SWAZIKlerksdorp Piet Retief LAND l Volksrust Frankfort Bloemhof Vaa Heilbron Wakkerstroom Utrecht Kroonstad Hoopstad Vryheid Newcastle Bethlehem O.F.S. Dundee Harrismith Winburg Boshof Ladysmith Colenso BLOEMFONTEIN

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De Aar

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Bethulie Stormberg

Burgersdorp

Middelburg Queenstown Graaff-Reinet Beaufort-Wes

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Map 8

Lord Roberts’ Offensive, II

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68

PRETORIA

Rustenburg

Mafeking

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In accordance with this new sense of determination de Wet left Brandfort on 28 March with a large commando in a southerly direction. Three days later he lured a British column under BrigadierGeneral R.G. Broadwood at Sannaspos, 37 km east of Bloemfontein, into a trap and dealt them a humiliating defeat. He repeated this success on April 4 and 5 at Mostertshoek near Reddersburg by forcing a smaller column under Capt. W.J. McWhinnie to surrender.63 Unfortunately for the Boers, these two resounding victories did not bring about any enduring consequences for de Wet’s campaign. After failing between 9 and 24 April to force the surrender of a force of colonial troops at Jammerberg Drift near Wepener, such a large body of British troops were deployed against him that he had to break off his actions and retreat to a strong defensive position near Thaba ’Nchu.64 There were two main reasons for the operational failure of this campaign. The most important one is without doubt that de Wet based his campaign on a defective goal. It appears from his correspondence before he left Brandfort that his main objective was to retake territory in the southern and southeastern districts of the Free State. He telegraphed Joubert on 22 March: ‘Every minute that we delay, gives the enemy space to gain the initiative and makes it so much more difficult for us to regain what was lost. The more towns the enemy take here and there and everywhere, the more this weakens our forces’.65 The aim to regain the lost parts of the Free State was indeed reflected in de Wet’s actions. One would have expected the Free State General to attack the railway line south of Bloemfontein – the sole supply line with which Roberts had to secure his precarious position around the Free State capital – but de Wet limited himself to attacks on the enemy forces in the southeastern Free State in an effort to expel them. He also exposes himself to some heavy criticism for his futile efforts, lasting a full fortnight, to beleaguer Wepener, a town without any strategic significance.66 A second reason why de Wet failed was because of the resolution and generalship of his opponent, Lord Roberts. Although the Boer general’s tactical successes caused great consternation in the British headquarters, Roberts again displayed his qualities as strategist by refusing to deviate from his main objective.67 It is true that de Wet’s


activities delayed his march on Pretoria, but he did not consider for one moment to change his plans. After a while de Wet presumably saw the error of his ways, because immediately after his futile effort to beleaguer Wepener and the failure of his defensive battle at Thaba ’Nchu at the end of April, he nevertheless seriously considered attacking the British lines of communications at Norvals Pont or even in the Cape Colony. But Steyn could not be moved to approve this plan. He feared that the Transvalers would accuse the Free Staters of leaving them in the lurch.68 While Jammerberg Drift at Wepener was being beleaguered, Kruger had indeed protested against de Wet’s operations so far to the south.69 de Wet reacted by pointing out to Kruger that virtually the only operational activities since the fall of Bloemfontein took place in the southern regions.70 For the sake of the alliance he, however, he had to abandon his plans. The British advance was restarted at the beginning of May. A tactic employed during the whole of the campaign was to throw General French’s cavalry and Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton’s mounted infantry ahead of the main advance to surround the Boers simultaneously from the left and the right. By now the Boers had a healthy fear of these encircling manoeuvres and as a rule retreated immediately, although they still offered stiff resistance from time to time. Brandfort fell on 3 May. The British forces crossed the Vet River three days later, the Sand River on 10 May, while Kroonstad was occupied on 12 May. After a short rest the march continued and the British crossed the Renoster River on 22 May The British advance guard reached the northern shore of the Vaal River two days later.71 The Free State commandos did not retreat with their Transvaal brothers in arms across the Vaal River. In accordance with an agreement between the two Boer republics the Free State forces remained in the Free State in order to continue with the struggle from behind the advancing British forces.72 The British steamroller continued inexorably. Johannesburg fell on 30 May, while Pretoria, the main objective of Roberts since his arrival in Cape Town, was occupied on 5 June.73 The Transvaal forces under the command of the new Commandant-General, Louis Botha – Joubert died on 27 March – took up new defensive positions along the Delagoa Bay railway line, east of Pretoria.74


Roberts’ rapid and determined march on Pretoria characterised him again as a focused and capable military leader. Although the retreating Boers repeatedly destroyed the railway line ahead of his advance and the Free Staters under de Wet were able to evade the British right flank and safely retreated to the eastern Free State in order to maintain some pressure on his supply lines, Roberts refused to relax his stranglehold on the Boers. ‘My object then’, he informed secretary Lansdowne, ‘was to push forward with the utmost rapidity … I felt that the enormous advantage to be gained by striking at the enemy’s capital before he had time to recover from the defeats he had already sustained, would more than counter-balance the risk of having our lines of communication interfered with – a risk that had to be taken into consideration’.75 Because the Boers were retreating on all fronts, Roberts was like a boxer who did not want to stop hitting before landing the knockout blow against his opponent. The Boers were to receive no respite to regroup. He recognised that he was taking a calculated risk. In his rear de Wet caused a potentially dangerous situation as Roberts was awaiting some supplies from the Transvaal. de Wet would have been able to weaken the British position in Johannesburg and Pretoria, had he succeeded in launching some audacious and well executed assaults on the railway line. Roberts thought that his advance and occupation of the Transvaal capital, as was the case with Bloemfontein, would paralyse the Boers. However, in this assumption he was only partially correct, because after receiving sufficient arms and supplies de Wet renewed his assault on the British lines of communications. He launched a series of pointed attacks on the railway line north of Kroonstad, and effected some heavy losses on the British. Especially the Battle of Rooiwal was a resounding success, bolstered by two further attacks at Leeuspruit (15 June) and Heuningspruit (22 June).76 Although Roberts conceded that it was ‘a great nuisance being cut off from communication from the outer world as we have been the last fortnight’, he nevertheless thought that ‘it would have been a more serious matter before we crossed the Vaal, and I am thankful that de Wet and Co. did not take to guerrilla warfare while we were on the road from Kroonstad’.77 In any case, de Wet abandoned his campaign against the railway line after 22 June and moved eastwards to Lindley and Bethlehem.


It is not clear why, but it effectively meant that his efforts to disrupt the supply line to Pretoria had come to nought. It would be sufficient to give only a brief description of the further course of military activities until September. Shortly after taking Pretoria, Roberts attacked the Boers at Donkerhoek (11 to 12 June) and forced them to retreat eastwards. In August he advanced further and met up with Buller, who in the meantime broke through the Boer defensive lines in Natal. After the drawn-out Battle of Dalmanutha (22 to 27 August), during which the Boers again had to retreat, the British resumed their advance until Komatipoort on the Mozambique border was reached on 24 September.78 The Transvaal Executive Council now agreed with Kruger’s proposal that, because of his advanced age, he leave for Europe. He was no longer able to endure the hard life in the field.79 After the Battle of Dalmanutha, which was to be the last conventional battle of the war, Botha also decided to follow de Wet’s lead and henceforth to wage a guerrilla war.80 It became necessary to reorganise and to plan afresh, especially since the Transvalers’ morale was never as low as at that stage. One could ponder on the question why Botha continued so long to oppose the British by way of conventional methods. In essence the battles at Donkerhoek and Dalmanutha were no different than those along the Tugela in Natal. One could speculate that he must have realised after the British breakthrough at the lower Tugela on 27 February, and again after his long retreat from the Vet River in the Free State to beyond Pretoria, that his tactics proved to be impractical. There was never again the opportunity to occupy such strong positions as those along the Tugela, the Boers’ organisational structures were continually deteriorating and the British were simply too powerful to be stopped. Common sense ought to have indicated that conventional warfare had served its purpose and that the answer lay in a rapid and mobile style of guerrilla warfare. de Wet was acutely aware of this. Shortly after his victory at Rooiwal he started encouraging Botha to change his tactics ‘to fight the enemy as much from behind as from the front’.81 It appears from Botha’s reply that he agreed only partially with de Wet. He had already ordered two commandos to do exactly that. However, he continued, ‘your proposal [to] let the enemy pass, [is] impractical to my mind, because the enemy is aiming to capture our


government, and he can do that quite easily if I allow him [to] advance along the various routes’.82 This reasoning is not entirely without merit. It was after all in the Boers’ interest to keep the important railway line to Lourenço Marques in Moçambique open for as long as possible. Unfortunately we do not know whether Botha thought that he would be able to continue indefinitely with this kind of conventional operation. It is nevertheless clear that Botha – as de Wet in the Free State had done since March and de la Rey in the western Transvaal since July – in any case would have been forced to switch over to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, his statement that he had to protect the government was overtaken by events, because Kruger was going to leave for Europe in any event. It is, therefore, a valid question whether Botha should not have embarked on a widespread guerrilla warfare soon after the fall of Pretoria. Meanwhile de Wet was marshalling his Free State forces around Bethlehem. After a heavy conventional battle, the last in the Free State, he was forced to retreat to Fouriesburg in the Brandwater Basin.83 A determined army could have defended this narrow valley for months on end, but it would also have meant that the army was to be trapped. de Wet realised this full well and immediately decided to effect a break-out. He was aiming to advance on Rooiwal to dig up the ammunition he had buried there after the fight of 7 June. Shortly afterwards, while on his way there, he decided to follow that up with an advance southwards with a view to invading the Cape Colony.84 On 15 July he and Steyn proceeded with a commando of 2,000 men across Slabberts Nek. The British were, however, lying in wait and pursued and chased him right across the northern Free State up to the Vaal River. While he was waiting there for some supplies, the distressing news reached him that Chief Commandant Marthinus Prinsloo, who had to guard the entrance to the Brandwater Basin, had surrendered to the British on 30 July with more than 4,000 men. This was a heavy blow. Because the British were impeding his planned southerly advance, de Wet consequently had to cross the Vaal River and enter the western Transvaal, incessantly pursued by a great number of British columns. Having escaped through Olifantshoek near Rustenburg after an epic flight which taxed man and beast to the utmost, Steyn


left him for consultations with Kruger in the eastern Transvaal. de Wet then returned to his own state to revitalise the Free State war effort.85

Roberts’ strategy It is generally recognised that an erosion of an enemy’s capacity to resist is the best way to victory. It was of course Roberts’ objective to conquer both Boer republics, but he did not limit himself to military means to achieve this goal. He also tried to reduce the resistance of the Boer forces in the field by using psychological warfare, or psywar in the American parlance. Shortly after crossing the Free State border in February he issued a proclamation, warning Free State citizens not to resist his troops. He stated that his government did not harbour any ill-will against the Free Staters, only against their government. He thus undertook that those who gave up and stayed in their homes, would not be persecuted. Free State citizens who do resist or support the Boers by supplying arms or information ‘will be dealt with according to the customs of war’.86 Not long afterwards he gave the Free Staters the opportunity to take an oath of neutrality. Persons doing so would not be made prisoners of war, nor would their property be taken from them.87 A similar proclamation followed after he crossed into the Transvaal.88 It is clear what Roberts’ aim was. He hoped that the number of burghers in the field would decrease because of this undertaking and thus undermine the morale of the Boer forces. He initially scored some notable successes in the southern and south western Free State. More than 4,700 Free State burghers lay down their arms between 15 March and 5 June 1900.89 Roberts, however, underestimated the power of Afrikaner nationalism. Many Boers who took the oath of neutrality again took up arms. His promises were moreover not kept universally. de Wet wrote after the war: ‘Thanks to Lord Roberts personally these burghers again joined our forces. He did not keep the undertaking in his own proclamations in which he guaranteed the property and personal freedom of the burghers. In the vicinity of Bloemfontein, Reddersburg and Dewetsdorp, and wherever the opportunity arose, burghers who were quietly going about their business on their farms


were arrested by the British … Ignoring his own proclamations brought Lord Roberts in ill repute among the burghers. They said that they could not believe the word of an English gentleman and being concerned for their own safety, they rejoined the commandos’.90 The Boer cause thus considerably benefited from Roberts’ clumsy approach. It is therefore noticeable that the tone Roberts assumed in his proclamations after May 1900 started changing. He thus issued a proclamation on 1 June to the effect that since he had annexed the Free State a week before,91 all burghers still bearing arms after a fortnight would be regarded as rebels.92 If he was under the impression that this would swing the war, he was sadly mistaken. A week later de Wet commenced his campaign to destroy railways line, scoring some notable successes. Roberts reacted on 16 June by decreeing that the inhabitants of the vicinities where the railway lines were destroyed would be held responsible for such actions. They would be arrested and their homes burnt down.93 The example was set by burning down de Wet’s house first.94 ‘Let it be known all over the country’, Roberts wrote to Kitchener, ‘that in the event of any damage to the railway or telegraph, the nearest farm will be burnt to the ground; a few examples only will be necessary, and let us begin with de Wet’s farm’.95 Apart from any moral objections against such a practice, it is also questionable from a legal point of view. S.B. Spies, who studied the matter thoroughly from the perspective of the law of war, came to this conclusion: ‘An occupying power has every right to impose stringent qualities on civilians captured while attempting to commit acts of sabotage by damaging communications or wrecking trains, but attacks on communications by organized bodies of the armed forces of the opposing power are different: there is no justification for the belief that the destruction of railway and telegraph lines are contrary to the customs of war. Roberts and Kitchener throughout the war acted as if these deeds, committed by combatants, in areas ostensibly occupied by British forces, were crimes’.96 There was more. In July the policy became more stringent: The burning down of houses and other measures to destroy possessions of the ‘guilty’ would henceforth not only be a method of punishment. From now on a policy of scorched earth was instituted to


eliminate any means of subsistence that the commandos may have had. Kitchener described this policy in a confidential order issued to senior officers on 25 August: ‘Whilst giving protection to loyal inhabitants in his district, the General Officer Commanding will see that the country is so denuded of forage and supplies that no means of subsistence is left for any commando to make incursions’. In November the British softened their stance somewhat: The burning down of houses was again to be regarded as a punishment, but the large-scale destruction of forage and supplies was to continue as before. This would not change the fact that this was a legally untenable practice.97 It must have become clear to Roberts in due course that his policy resulted in a fiasco. The Boer resistance in the long run did not lessen; and in some cases it even intensified. Although he continued burning down houses, he added another plan during July. He informed Botha that he was planning to dump the women and children who had become destitute in the veldt.98 The Boer leadership protested vigorously, but to no avail. A few thousand women and children were sent by train to Botha’s positions in the eastern Transvaal. The consequence of this step was described after the war by Jan Smuts: ‘Immediately after the Boer women and children were sent out and every commando was thrown in utter confusion by the universal eagerness to ascertain who had been sent out, a general advance was made against the Boer forces, who were, in the confusion which followed, pushed back without any signs of resistance, beyond Middelburg’.99 When Roberts wanted to offload another consignment of women and children on the Boers, Steyn – who was in the eastern Transvaal for consultations – advised Botha to reply to Roberts that these women and children would then be shipped to Europe. This would of course have considerably strengthened the pro-Boer sentiment in Europe and consequently Roberts dropped the matter.100 Roberts not only attempted to undermine the resistance of the burghers; he also targeted their leaders. He thus offered Botha a salary of £10 000 per annum and a guarantee that he would be left in peace should he agree to surrender.101 As could be expected, Botha indignantly rejected the offer.102 Moreover Roberts tried to arrange a meeting with Botha and wrote a number of letters to him, explaining the futility of continued


resistance. ‘After the gallant struggle of your Honour and the force under your command have made, there can be no question of loss of honour should you decide to accept the council I now venture to proffer’, is but one typical example.103 In this respect too Roberts failed. The proposed meeting never took place and Botha never surrendered. de Wet was also consulted indirectly about his own personal considerations regarding a possible surrender. However, he snubbed Roberts brutally. He was adamant that the only basis for peace was the continuation of the Boer republics as sovereign independent states.104 It is true though that both Kruger and Botha at the end of May and the beginning of June, and also again at the end of August, were pessimistic and became resigned to the eventual loss of independence. It took the indomitable Free State duo, Steyn and de Wet, by means of several urgent telegrams and personal conversations to lift the Transvalers’ spirits. This, however, led to a cooling off in the relations between de Wet and Botha which would bring about some negative operational consequences later on during the war.105 Roberts transferred his command on 29 November 1900 to Kitchener and shortly afterwards returned to Britain, completely convinced that the war was all but won.106 We will discuss his merits as commander in the next part.

Conclusion Any objective observer cannot but acknowledge that Roberts waged his campaign operationally with great finesse and subtlety. Buller mainly charged the Boer positions like an enraged bull in a Spanish bull-fighting ring and was repeatedly repulsed with considerable loss of life. In contrast the February plan of Roberts was designed to neutralise the Boers’ resistance. As described above, its practical execution was the make of a subtle and sound military thinker. When he arrived in Cape Town on 10 January, the military situation was one of total stagnation. The British tactics of full frontal attacks had inevitably led to the bloody defeats of Colenso, Spion Kop, Vaalkrans, Stormberg and Magersfontein. When departing from Durban in December, Roberts saw the Boer republics being


occupied, the Boer forces defeated, scattered and demoralised, save a few core units. A close study of the Roberts campaign allows some interesting comparisons to emerge. The first is the surrounding and subsequent surrender of Cronjé’s forces on the Western Front at Paardeberg. One of the leading military theorists of the era was Count Alfred von Schlieffen, then Chief of the Great German General Staff. He was the brain behind the German war plan of 1905, which to a large extent determined the opening campaign against France in 1914. His military-theoretical thoughts were primarily shaped by one obsession: surrounding and destroying the enemy forces. He regarded this as the only method to wage war. His prime historical example was the Battle of Cannae (216 B.C.) in which Hannibal, the main Carthaginian commander, was cleverly able to lure the Roman legions into a trap, whereupon his forces surrounded and virtually annihilated them. To Schlieffen this was the best example of how a campaign or battle should be conducted. In 1903 he even ordered the Historical Section of the German army to search for additional examples in history to support his theory.107 As it happens, the report by the same Historical Section on the conventional phase of the Anglo-Boer War, based on the observations of the German military attachés in South Africa, was published at the same time.108 This work devoted extensive attention to the build-up and course of the Battle of Paardeberg, which ultimately corresponded very well with Schlieffen’s war theories. It is logical to assume that Schlieffen would have read this with some considerable interest. It is unfortunately not known whether he did in fact read this and in his own book he does not mention Paardeberg as an example to prove his theory.109 Nevertheless, one cannot but postulate that this must have played some contributory role in formulating his theory. The Anglo-Boer War attracted much attention in international circles at the time and the Battle of Paardeberg displayed a remarkable similarity with Schlieffen’s thoughts. The battle must surely have exerted some kind of influence on his thinking, however indirectly. A second factor to be considered was the adept handling by Roberts of his cavalry, mounted infantry and the infantry. It would be recalled that he usually deployed the mounted soldiers as an


advance guard in rapid breaking-through manoeuvres, backed up by concentrated artillery barrages, to advance around the Boers’ rear guard and lines of communications, and then finally to surround them. The infantry was then deployed in a mopping-up operation to occupy the ground previously gained by the cavalry and to consolidate the positions. He scored his first major success in February 1900 by using his brilliant unexpected flanking manoeuvre, although he was, of course, also assisted by Cronjé’s obstinate refusal to acknowledge the serious position in which he had landed himself. Although he repeatedly afterwards used these manoeuvres, the Boers became wise and, by retreating rapidly, saw to it that they did not fall in the trap set by the fast encircling mounted troops. This last consideration caused some observers to criticise Roberts. For instance, according to the German military attachés he should rather have concentrated on taking on the centre of the Boer columns than on repeating his failed efforts to surround them. This would have prevented the Boers to withdraw comparatively easily and thereby continue fighting the war.110 Rayne Kruger states: ‘Only once did he defeat the enemy – at Paardeberg … For the rest he was content to push back the Boers like water before the bows of a ship, under the happy illusion he was defeating them’.111 This criticism does not seem to be justified. Roberts as military commander was in reality far in advance of his time. His methods are remarkably similar to the German use of the rapid panzer advance guard and infantry mopping up during the Second World War and with the Israeli tactics and operations during the Six Day War of 1967. Roberts’ mounted troops played the same role that armour subsequently did. The pincer-like thrusts during the first two years of the German campaign in the Soviet Union (1941–1942) and the rapid Israeli advance to the Suez Canal in June, 1967, closely resemble the movements that Roberts executed in 1900. Furthermore, the rapid advances to Bloemfontein and Pretoria, without being overly concerned about his flanks, was a typical characteristic of the German advances forty years later in France and those of the Israelis in 1967. A common consideration in all these examples was the assumption that the rapid advance by itself would


create sufficient chaos among the enemy to prevent or to minimise any counterattacks against the flanks. There was a very good reason for the fact that he scored only one outright victory, at Paardeberg. The British mobility in 1900 could not match that of the Boers – in contrast with the Germans and the Israelis whose mobility during their years of success was always far greater than that of their opponents. Without the required degree of tactical and operational mobility Roberts’ methods would not necessarily have been successful, especially since the Boers were very wary of being surrounded after their experience at Paardeberg. The Boers never defended a position simply for the sake of defending it and always saw to it that they retreated soon enough so as to escape from the pincers’ movements. The British cavalry and mounted infantry could never move rapidly enough to surround the Boers. In other words, it was the means, rather than the instruments, that caused Roberts to fail in this undertaking. In 1909 Roberts explained the Boers’ ability to escape repeatedly to ‘the Cavalry themselves never having been taught to fight under the altered conditions of modern warfare’112, which was, perhaps, another way of putting it. It would be incorrect to say that Roberts’ operations had a direct or indirect bearing on the German or Israeli warfare during the Second World War or the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars. Both the Germans and the Israelis were rather influenced by the strategist Basil Liddell Hart113 and there is no evidence that he ever seriously studied the Anglo-Boer war. Although there may, therefore, not have been any causal relationship between Roberts and the more modern cases, one cannot but be struck by the remarkable similarity between Roberts’ operational methods and those of the German and the Israeli blitzkrieg. The failure of the Roberts campaign could, then, be ascribed to his inability to continue with the methods used to defeat Cronjé so decisively. It has repeatedly been pointed out that the defeat of one’s enemy is but one of the many methods that a commander may employ. In this case it was certainly the most desirable option for the British. His rapid advance from Paardeberg to Bloemfontein and Pretoria – without being able to destroy any sizeable commando – did in fact dislocate the Boer commandos considerably. Their forces, however, remained more or less intact, so that they were in a


position to regroup and convert to waging a guerrilla warfare. Despite his operational prowess, Roberts was not able to reach his strategic goal because of factors largely beyond his control. In spite of its operational brilliance his campaign was, therefore, a strategic failure.


6 Guerrilla Warfare: The First Phase

Fresh Boer planning In the previous chapter it was related how the Boers, especially those in the Transvaal, became very demoralised towards August and September 1900. It became necessary, therefore, to reorganise the commandos and to rethink the whole strategic and operational approach to the war. In the Free State de Wet tasked some officers to recruit those burghers who had laid down their arms again and to launch a strong guerrilla campaign. His principal goal was to restore the resistance to the British to a solid basis and subsequently to invade the Cape Colony.1 In the Transvaal Botha saw to it that his commandos evade the British by retreating towards the northern Transvaal. Whilst in Pietersburg, the largest town in that region, he announced some farreaching reforms. In future officers would not be chosen any more; the Commandant-General would appoint them. He also ordered General Ben Viljoen to return to the eastern Transvaal north of the Delagoa Bay railway line to attack the British in that sector. Botha himself would also return to the eastern Transvaal, but south of the railway line, to continue leading his men from there. de la Rey, who assumed command in the western Transvaal a few months earlier, would remain there, while Beyers was appointed as General Commanding in the northern Transvaal.2 After reorganising the Transvaal forces, Botha decided to accompany Steyn, who was in Pietersburg after visiting Kruger in the eastern Transvaal, for part of his journey back to the Free State. After 83

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The Syferfontein Campaign Plan, 1900–1901

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Guerrilla Warfare: The First Phase 85

that, he hoped to remain in the western Transvaal in order to meet up with both de la Rey and de Wet. After some days they reached the camp of General Jan Smuts at Syferfontein in the district of Ventersdorp. Here a decisive council of war took place between Botha, de la Rey, Smuts and Steyn on 27 September. de Wet was also requested to attend, but he had already returned to the Free Sate after failing to vanquish a British column at Frederikstad.3 This was an unfortunate turn of events, as his absence had decisive negative consequences for the conduct of the rest of the war. The background to this meeting was Steyn’s feeling that something had to be done to change the British perception that they had already virtually won the war.4 After all Roberts had stated in a speech a few weeks earlier: ‘There is nothing now left of the “Boer army”, but a few marauding bands’.5 The ‘settlement of the country will be more a civil than a military duty’, he wrote to Lansdowne.6 The underlying reason for Steyn’s intentions had no direct military significance, but was nevertheless politically very significant. According to international law the assumption of power on the basis of the violent overthrow of a legally recognised government will be recognised only when two criteria are met. The assumption of power needs to be recognised internationally and the new rulers need to be de facto in charge of the whole country and govern effectively. Although the two Boer republics were already officially annexed by Roberts on 24 May and 1 September respectively,7 these annexations were not recognised internationally. Dr W.J. Leyds and Dr H.P.N. Muller stayed recognised as the accredited diplomatic representatives in Europe of the Transvaal and the Free State respectively until the end of the war.8 The only remaining question was, therefore, whether or not the British were de facto in control of the two states. Probably for this reason they emphasised so often that there was no ‘formed body of Boer troops in the Transvaal or Orange River Colony’ and that ‘the war is degenerating into operations carried out by irregular and irresponsible guerrillas’.9 They also throughout refused to recognise the status of the two presidents, referring to them as ‘ex-presidents’. Although there is no direct proof, this could very well have been the reason why Steyn wished to prove to the world that the war had not yet come to an end. The British parliament was to convene shortly after the death of Queen Victoria and this presented a


favourable time for Steyn’s plan to be executed. When his term of office lapsed in February 1901, Steyn ensured that he was legally re-elected and for the same reason he thus wrote in August 1901 to Kitchener: ‘I need to remind Your Excellency that your authority only extends as far as your cannons reach’.10 Steyn was correct. More than thirty years later a legal expert came to the conclusion that the British annexation was ‘untimely and premature’ and that the Boer republics remained sovereign and independent states until the signing of the Peace of Vereeniging in May 1902.11 It can thus be seen that the Boers also included political considerations in their operational planning. A number of very important decisions were adopted at Syferfontein. A wide ranging war plan with two components would be implemented. The first was that a large combined Transvaal and Free State force of 12 000 to 15 000 men would attack the gold mines of the Witwatersrand and destroy them.12 Immediately afterwards Botha would invade Natal with 5,000 to 6,000 men, while de la Rey and de Wet, each accompanied by 5,000 men, would do the same regarding the Cape Colony. Should Botha encounter too strong opposition in Natal, the plan foresaw that he would advance through Pondoland and Griqualand East to join forces with de la Rey and de Wet in the Cape Colony.13 It is not quite clear what the strategic objective of the invasion into the Cape Colony was. Two sources do provide some clues, namely letters of de Wet and Smuts. In a letter to Commandant (later Assistant Chief Commandant) C.C.J. Badenhorst de Wet wrote: ‘It is certain that the ways of the Lord are mysterious, but from it all it appears to me that the day of a united South Africa is not far off’.14 For his part Smuts wrote: ‘My intention is and remains to effect a constitutional revolution in the Cape Colony, so that Colonial Afrikaners taking up arms would obtain the status of legal combatants rather than rebels.’15 It seems that these two officers were of the opinion that either the Cape Colony had to be incorporated with the Boer republics or be converted into a Cape Boer republic. This was obviously a drastic deviation from the original war plan, according to which the aim of the war was simply the preservation of the two republics’ independence. But we do not know whether this represented the policy of both governments, or simply the personal opinions of de Wet and


Smuts; the available sources do not provide a clear indication. One could argue that at least Steyn would agree with such sentiments, as he had already twice before made statements to this effect (in November 1899 and February 1900).16 One cannot, however, make any categorical statement about this without the necessary documentary evidence. At any rate, Botha’s proposal to attack the gold mines indicates that he still did not realise that the time for large scale and concentrated battles was past. It will be indicated presently that the huge concentration of force needed for such attacks did not correspond to the demands of that time. Now, more than ever before, a dispersion of the commandos as widely as possible was necessary. Experience hitherto had indicated that the British were far better equipped for conventional battles of the kind that Botha may have been envisaging. The Boers were simply not able to conduct this kind of conventional warfare as their discipline, organisation and co-ordination were deficient. It strikes one that the Boers did not achieve any success in any single large battle where they took the tactical initiative, with the exception of some minor ones, such as at Rooiwal. They invariably scored their victories when they were on the tactical defensive, where factors such as discipline and coordination were not as decisive. At this stage of the war they admittedly did have some excellent leaders who weeded out a lot of the earlier malpractices. Nevertheless, if the attack on the mines had been carried out, it would in all likelihood have failed. Botha’s attack on the Delagoa Bay railway line during the night of 7 and 8 January 1901, which was a similar operation on a more modest scale, failed for inter alia the same reasons: a lack of discipline and co-ordination.17 A defeat at the gold mines would have made a successful campaign in the Cape Colony more difficult. On the other hand – regardless of who had proposed this – the plan to invade the two British colonies reflected some sound strategic and operational thinking. Alas, rumours of these invasion plans soon reached the British headquarters. According to a British intelligence report the Transvaal commandos would initially be concentrated in the area around De Aar and then advance deeper into the Cape Colony ‘to show the Dutch their strength and determination and to raise the whole Colony in rebellion again’.18 Notwithstanding, the British


were completely unprepared for the renewed resumption of guerrilla warfare. As early as 18 August Roberts had to acknowledge in growing exasperation: ‘Moreover, the guerrilla aspect that the war has assumed is an infinitely more troublesome phase of the war than which has gone before’.19 Apart from the fact that they were not psychologically and emotionally prepared for the new phase of the war, the British army did not have any widespread military theory for guerrilla warfare.20 As the Times History commented: ‘The conflict bore not the least analogy to any waged by Britain in the past, save the great struggle with her own colonies in North America. But, owing to the poverty of our military literature and the narrow horizon of our general education, the history of that war had become almost a sealed book to several generations of British officers’.21 Practical proof that the British were unprepared for this phase lies in the number of mounted troops at that stage being approximately one third of the number of mounted Boers.22 The Boers took full advantage of their superiority. After de Wet’s return from the western Transvaal and the first drive against him, he completely reorganised his commandos and launched numerous attacks against the British. de la Rey in the western Transvaal had been doing this since July, scoring some notable victories in the process, while Beyers in the northern Transvaal also made much progress in this respect.23 Only the eastern Transvaal remained where Botha had to reorganise his commandos. The last phase of the conventional war had just been concluded there and he first had to concentrate his organisational efforts on the northern and western Transvaal. The consequence of this reorganisation was that the British would simply have been incapable of countering any sudden invasion of the Cape Colony by 15 000 to 16 000 mounted men from three directions. Another factor that leads one to the domain of military science, is the relation of space and force. These two elements are present in all kinds of warfare, but there is an additional dimension regarding guerrilla warfare. The anti-guerrilla force has to physically dominate the whole of the relevant territory and have troops at the ready in all the regions if the guerrilla forces are to be effectively countered. It stands to reason that if a certain area has been pacified or if the guerrillas are not able to effect a rebellion in that area, then the


regular army is able to reinforce its troops in the remaining trouble spots. It is, therefore, the ideal of any guerrilla force to disperse its fighters as effectively as possible and to take the struggle to all corners of the relevant territory. This means that the occupier has to deploy more troops (force) per surface area (space). In addition other variables need to be considered, such as the geographical features of the war terrain, training, morale, equipment, mobility of the opponents, the attitude of the local population, strength of the guerrilla force, etc. When considering these theoretical factors, one could postulate that there has to be an optimal relation between the elements of force and space if the guerrillas are to make headway. This is equally true, of course, for the anti-guerrilla forces. This could be expressed in symbols. In this theoretical case it could – for argument sake – be x: y, where x is the symbol representing force and y representing space. The relation will differ in every concrete case as a result of the variables; which is the reason for using symbols. If the occupier cannot reach this theoretical relation, his chances for success become commensurately smaller. To put it differently: If the guerrillas succeed in dispersing their forces – and the occupier is also forced to follow suit – resulting in a disequilibrium between the two factors, then their chances to succeed increases. Let us assume that the guerrillas expand the terrain of operations to (y + 20), while the occupier is only able to reinforce his forces to (x + 10). This will then give rise to the disequilibrium referred to above. This is the reason why the guerrillas only need to deploy a fraction of the occupier’s forces. Whereas the anti-guerrilla forces need to saturate the whole of the territory, the guerrillas can be effective with only a relatively small force, provided they operate actively and operate effective hit and run actions. The British commanders had to contend with this kind of actions throughout the war. In his last report as Commander in Chief in South Africa Roberts complained: ‘Large as the force appears to be in South Africa, it has proved all too small for the duties it has been required to perform, and I have not found it practicable to occupy in sufficient strength the many places it would have been advantageous to have held. Every garrison thus isolated not only reduces the power and mobility of the several columns in the field, but necessitates the withdrawal of these columns from other important


duties to periodically escort convoys of supplies for its use’.24 MajorGeneral Charles Knox, arguably one of the best British field commanders during the guerrilla phase, stated after the war that ‘we had at no time a sufficient number of men to make our occupation effective’.25 To tie this to the Syferfontein war plan: we already saw how badly – intellectually and materially – the British were prepared for the transformation of the conflict to guerrilla warfare. A sudden and determined Boer invasion of the Cape Colony could have negatively influenced the British ratio between force and space. Whether or not this theoretical possibility could have been converted into the real, practical world, would still have depended on the abovementioned variables. Let us, therefore, now evaluate them in terms of the practical situation towards the end of 1900 and see what deductions we may draw. • There is no doubt that the larger part of the Boer republics and the two British colonies were well suited to guerrilla warfare from the geographical point of view. Guerrilla forces flourish, in geographical terms, in inaccessible territories. These would include areas with an underdeveloped infrastructure. In modern times – because of the comparative ease of aerial reconnaissance and rapid troop deployment by aircraft and helicopters – this would generally mean mountainous terrain and/or terrain with dense vegetation, as the experience in Cyprus, Vietnam, the former Rhodesia and Namibia/Angola has indicated. In order to combat the guerrillas they need to be pursued relentlessly and, in doing so, it is necessary to keep track of their whereabouts. • Modern means of tracking and communication obviously did not exist in 1900. At that stage roads were limited to dusty tracks between farms and towns, and the railway network was only rudimentary. Guerrillas, therefore, could operate with comparative ease on both the open plains and the mountainous areas of virtually the whole of South Africa. It is doubtful whether a guerrilla unit would nowadays survive more than a few days for example on the eastern Highveld or the southern, northern and western Free State, but at this stage, before the Kitchener countermeasures of 1901, the Boers were able to move around reasonably easily, conducting hit and run operations. General de


•

•

•

•

Wet achieved a great deal of admiration for these guerrilla exploits between 1900 and 1902. In contrast he was not able to operate successfully during the Rebellion of 1914, because of the higher mobility of his opponents and the better developed physical infrastructure of the country. Closely allied to the geographical factor is the question of mobility. It would be recalled that the British at the end of 1900 had considerably less mounted troops than the Boers. Moreover the British treated their horses very inexpertly, so that the Boers were much more mobile on their horses than their opponents.26 This was an important consideration, because without the mobility to pursue and eliminate the Boers the British would not have been able to conquer them. The only sector where the British were more mobile than the Boers were in terms of the railways, but – as indicated above – the railway network was not fully developed and covered only a limited area. Referring to the training and equipment of the respective opponents, it is difficult to draw valid comparisons. The average Boer nevertheless had a vastly superior tactical ability than his British counterpart. The British soldier had a rather limited period of training. He received little practice in marksmanship and was not able to display much initiative.27 The equipment did not differ materially and moreover, as the war progressed and the ammunition for the Boers’ Mauser rifles was becoming scarce, they abandoned their rifles and used captured British Lee Metfords. The British had many more artillery pieces than the Boers, but these had only a limited applicability in the guerrilla warfare stage. As regards morale it could be stated that the hard core of the Boers still remaining on commando after others had earlier laid down their arms, displayed a far higher degree than their British counterparts. The ordinary British soldier was fighting far from his kith and kin for a cause that did not really interest him. From their point of view the Boers were fighting inside their own country for their freedom. Objectively speaking, of course, the lack of discipline among the Boers to a large extent nullified this advantage. They only intermittently operated as disciplined fighting units. Furthermore sound organisation and co-ordination were of less importance during the guerrilla phase than during the opening


conventional stages, with the result that the initial British advantage at this stage had been greatly diminished. • The last two factors – the attitude of the local population and the strength of the guerrillas – are interdependent and should be regarded together. The attitude of the local population is often decisive for the success or failure of any guerrilla movement. Mao Zedong coined the catchy phrase that a guerrilla can be compared to the local population as a fish to water. Just as a fish cannot survive without water, so the guerrilla cannot subsist without the active assistance and protection of the local population.28 To a large extent he is dependent on them for food, clothing, shelter, information and new recruits, but above all their unwillingness to betray him. Such loyalty could obviously be imposed by terror, but it is of course of great value if the population is naturally sympathetic to the guerrilla cause. The question arises to what extent the Boers were able to depend on the aid and sympathy of the local population. Inside the Boer republics the answer is of course selfevident. Although there were some surrendered Boers living on their farms, very few were willing to support the British openly. The situation was obviously different in the two British colonies. The Natal whites were mostly English-speaking and, as one could assume, they were hardcore supporters of the British cause. A Boer commando would not have been able to survive too long in such circumstances. The same circumstances occurred to a lesser extent in the eastern Cape interior. In the rest of the Cape Colony the Boers would have been able to receive much more support. When General J.B.M. Hertzog (who later became prime minister of the Union of South Africa) and Commandants Gideon Scheepers and P.H. Kritzinger entered the Cape Colony with their three small commandos, all of them reported to de Wet how enthusiastic and widespread the support was they received from the Cape Afrikaners and that the whole of the Cape Colony as it were was awaiting de Wet’s arrival before embarking on a general uprising. Kritzinger was pleasantly surprised ‘to see in the proclaimed territory how all sympathise with us and we have also learned from confidential sources that as soon as we advance further south from Middelburg [they] will initiate a unanimous uprising right down to the Cape …’29


Reality proved to be a bit less rosy, though most Cape Afrikaners were very much dissatisfied about the severity of the British martial law. But despite being undoubtedly sympathetic towards their northern brethren, they were not willing to burn the bridges behind them and commit themselves to the drastic step of becoming rebels.30 It should be borne in mind that Hertzog, Kritzinger and Scheepers had at their disposal no more than 1,500 men;31 too few to instigate a general uprising. Many Cape Afrikaners already committed themselves by joining the invading Boer commandos, but were left in the lurch when the Boers retreated towards February and March 1900. It is only logical that they were wary to put their livelihood in jeopardy again. It is nevertheless within the realm of the possible that the political and psychological effects of a large scale and irresistible invasion would have had wide ramifications. The victorious presence in the Cape Colony of thousands of burghers could well have ignited the already overheated political atmosphere. The ideal circumstances were already present. Milner’s words earlier in the war to Lord Selborne were as true now: ‘[T]he Colonial Boer is the enemy’s only reserve. They have got their last man and boy in the field. Let them at once get into the heart of the Colony, even with a mere handful of men and a flag, and get certainly 10,000, and perhaps, even 15–20,000 excellent recruits’.32 One theoretical military aspect remains to be discussed. According to the classical theoretical model of guerrilla warfare, as expounded by Mao Zedong, the struggle is conducted in three stages. In the first stage the struggle commences on a modest scale and expands in due course to become a widespread war. This culminates in the second phase where the guerrillas consolidate their position, liberate certain areas and establish an alternative government and administration. When the third phase commences the guerrillas have become so powerful that they are able to attack the government forces conventionally and to defeat them.33 Various commentators have pointed out that it may not be absolutely necessary to reach the third phase.34 The situation may arise where the government or occupier is forced by internal or external pressure to give up the struggle, as happened for instance to Portugal in its African territories of Angola and Mozambique or South Africa in Namibia. The other alternative is that the troops are not able to keep the attacking guerrillas at bay any more, which


results in a situation where continuation of the conflict would have more disadvantages than advantages – as happened in Rhodesia. We will presently be linking these theoretical aspects to the practical situation, but it is worthwhile bearing this in mind. All of this leads to the conclusion that the Syferfontein war plan, obviously minus the part about the plans to attack the gold mines, had an excellent chance of succeeding. On the one hand the British were not able to stop a large-scale invasion of Natal and the Cape Colony, and on the other the invasion could potentially have had extremely negative consequences regarding the equation of force and space. Virtually all of the concomitant variables were in the Boers’ favour, with the exception of the attitude of the English speaking local inhabitants of Natal and parts of the Cape Colony. Although the Boers could not have hoped to progress to Mao’s third stage of guerrilla warfare, a general uprising by the Cape Afrikaners could conceivably have led to his second stage and the collapse of the British forces in South Africa. It is, therefore, not impossible that the envisaged invasion of the Cape Colony could conceivably have resulted in a success for the Boer republics. It is of course another question whether or not this would have culminated in the Boers ultimately winning the war. Smuts was convinced in his own mind that this could have happened: ‘When I reflect what I was a year afterwards enabled to do with my handful of men in the Cape Colony when the situation had changed much for the worse, I have no hesitation in saying that our plans would, if carried, have meant the speedy conclusion of the war or else the total loss of South Africa to the British Empire’.35 Although this may have been too optimistic, it remains a fact that the Boers towards the end of 1900 held the majority of the operational aces. Although this may have been so in theory, it is obviously impossible to state how matters would have developed in practice. Ultimately only hard, practical facts matter. In this case the theory appeared to be a promising one, but in contrast events turned out to be very different.

Failure The Boer leaders were not able to extend their meeting too long, because the British were on their track. The Free State Postmaster


General, R.F. Acton, accompanying Steyn, had some apparatus that enabled him to tap the British telegraph lines. He discovered that the British were aware where the Boer leaders were meeting and that they would be surrounded soon. Steyn immediately left for the Free State, while Botha hastily travelled to Pietersburg to brief Beyers en route to the eastern Transvaal. de la Rey and Smuts too disappeared in the face of the advancing British forces.36 When de Wet in the Free State was informed about the return of his head of state, he immediately despatched his commando in the direction of Bothaville and personally crossed the Vaal River to meet Steyn. They met on 1 November at Bulskop in the Ventersdorp district. Steyn undoubtedly informed de Wet about the decisions of the Syferfontein meeting. It was agreed that de Wet and Botha would correspond with one another about the details and that they should meet, if at all possible, to pursue the remaining details of the planned operations.37 How were these decisions converted into action? As Smuts put it: ‘Alas, to our bitter disappointment our grandiose plan soon came to take its place in the limbo of might-have-beens, and with that disappeared our last chance of bringing the war to a successful conclusion’.38 A litany of misunderstandings, sheer stubbornness, and bad co-ordination contributed to the dismal failure of the plan. Regarding the proposed attack against the Witwatersrand gold mines, it would appear that a misunderstanding arose between Beyers and Botha about the former’s part in the operation. Because there is no documentary evidence, it is not clear what exactly Botha told Beyers when they met in Pietersburg, when Botha was on his way back to the eastern Transvaal. We do know, however, that Beyers was informed that he had to collaborate with de la Rey.39 He consequently left on 6 December to meet de la Rey in the western Transvaal. It seems clear from a letter Beyers wrote to Commandant H.A. Alberts that he had a clear understanding of what he was supposed to do: ‘The reason why I am in the vicinity of Krugersdorp is to execute certain war plans, which plans would certainly enjoy your approval if you knew what they entailed’.40 He arrived in the western Transvaal barely in time to assist de la Rey in attacking a force under the command of Major General R.A.P. Clements at Nooitgedacht and to inflict a humiliating defeat on them.41 But Botha was extremely upset when he heard about


this. He did not know why Beyers went to the western Transvaal, Botha wrote to Acting President Schalk Burger. ‘He had no instructions from me to do so’. Major operations, such as the one to attack the gold mines, therefore, would have to be postponed until Beyers arrived in the eastern Transvaal, according to Botha.42 It seems that Botha had actually wished Beyers to meet him directly in the eastern Transvaal or perhaps that he was to have attacked the Witwatersrand from the north. The whole plan to attack the gold mines was in an case a non-event and it is probably the reason why Botha decided to attack the Delagoa Bay railway instead, which happened on the night of January 6 and 7 1901. Matters on the Free State front did not develop satisfactorily either. de Wet decided not to co-operate in any aspect of the Syferfontein plan, but rather to invade the Cape Colony on his own, a decision which would have disastrous consequences for the Boers’ war effort. One reason may be that de Wet and Botha on a personal level never got along particularly well. They had considerable temperamental differences. de Wet was a man of action who did not consider matters too long before taking a decision. ‘I only consider a fact when I have to eliminate it’, he stated brusquely at the Vereeniging peace negotiations.43 In contrast Botha was a likeable and sensitive person who would often harbour serious doubts and qualms of conscience on any given matter. This meant that Botha was ultimately amenable to conclude a peace treaty that gave up the Boers’ independence, while de Wet continued struggling to the bitter end in a relentless and uncompromising belief in his country’s independence.44 de Wet knew at this stage that Botha had already twice considered surrendering. In the light of his uncompromising personality this probably meant that he did not trust Botha fully any more.45 Although this may have been the underlying reason why he did not wish to collaborate with Botha, there were also some more direct reasons. On 5 November 1900 Steyn received a crucial letter from Hertzog in the southern Free State.46 Hertzog thought that the ideal opportunity to invade the Cape Colony had come. ‘The time is now opportune and we need to act without delay’. He proposed that three commandos of a thousand men each should advance to Noupoort, De Aar and Beaufort West. ‘In this manner we would


always have sufficient forage and horses and we will thus enable the Cape Colony in its entirety to rise up’. Hertzog wrote that it might be advantageous of the Transvaal could also send some 2,000 men, but that would not be absolutely necessary: ‘The name of Chief Commandant C. de Wet has so much influence that his presence alone would be enough to inflame the Colony’.47 More likely than not these words galvanised de Wet into action. It was indicated above that he already had planned to invade the Cape Colony twice, but that the conditions were not yet quite right. Hertzog was not present at the Syferfontein meeting and he was probably not aware that a similar, but more wide-ranging plan had been forged there. de Wet sent a copy of Hertzog’s letter to Botha and informed him that although he would have liked to meet him and de la Rey before departing for the Cape Colony, this would have taken up too much valuable time and that he was in fact already on his way to the Colony.48 Moreover, a British column under Lieutenant Colonel P.W. le Gallais unexpectedly attacked him at Bothaville on 6 November and he had to abandon all his artillery – which would have been indispensable for the attacks on the gold mines – in an effort to escape. According to Steyn’s memoirs this was the reason why he decided not to collaborate with Botha, but rather to invade the Cape Colony.49 It would nevertheless seem as if de Wet had already decided to invade the Cape Colony before this incident. In the meantime Botha was anxiously waiting for de Wet to contact him, as agreed at Syferfontein, in order to work out the details of their collaborative effort. It is not known when Botha received de Wet’s letter of 7 November, accompanied by Hertzog’s letter. On 24 November he wrote to Steyn that neither de la Rey nor de Wet had contacted him as yet. He thought it was imperative to call an early meeting to discuss matters thoroughly and to avoid any misunderstandings. Botha sent this letter with one of his aides, Captain Hugh Fraser.50 There is positive proof that Steyn received this letter on 8 December.51 de Wet, though, did not acknowledge receipt.52 It is virtually impossible that Steyn, who spent a great deal of time in de Wet’s company, would not have given this letter to de Wet to read. It is strange, therefore, that de Wet denied a few months later


that he ever received this letter.53 It is clear that de Wet was not completely keeping to the truth, but it is not known why. Whatever the case may be, the result of the effort to invade the Cape Colony is well known. Although he successfully beleaguered and captured the British garrison at Dewetsdorp, he failed to enter the Colony. To exacerbate matters, he spent some eleven fruitless days in skirmishes and thereby lost the element of surprise in attempting to invade the Cape Colony. This enabled the British to assemble a strong defensive line along the Orange River, aided by mother nature by way of an inundated river. When he thus attempted to ford the Orange River at Odendaalstroom, he had to return because heavy spring rains had caused the river to overflow its banks. After an adventurous, but difficult, voyage, he returned to the northern Free State during the latter half of December.54 From his point of view his effort was, however, not completely in vain. The Free State commandos under Hertzog, Kritzinger and Scheepers succeeded in crossing the Orange River and to venture deeper into the Cape Colony.55 Paradoxically though, this also dealt the death blow to the Boers’ large-scale plans. Although these three officers scored some notable successes in their operations, obtained a lot of supplies and horses from the sympathetic Cape Afrikaners,56 these operations nevertheless alerted the British leadership to the possibility of a renewed large scale invasion of the Cape Colony. Martial law was imposed in the larger part of the Colony and the whole of the territory was mercilessly stripped of horses and ammunition by confiscating these on a large scale.57 Lord Kitchener reported at the beginning of February 1901 to the new War Secretary, St John Brodrick: ‘One having kept them [de Wet and Steyn] out all the time has given us time to do a good deal towards organising the colonials for resistance and preparing the country, by removing horses, forage, etc. for invasion. I think more in these ways might have been done but a good deal has already been accomplished’.58 Should a simultaneous invasion of 15 000 to 16 000 men have been launched in accordance with the Syferfontein plan, there certainly would have been considerable consternation and even chaos in the British army. The invasion by the three small commandos of Hertzog, Kritzinger and Scheepers was, however, not sufficient to


turn the war, and moreover gave the British the opportunity to prepare for a major invasion. This would have severe consequences for de Wet’s subsequent invasion of February 1901. Although Botha was informed of de Wet’s failed incursion,59 he continued with his planning in terms of the Syferfontein plan, though this now had to be amended. The incursion of Hertzog, Kritzinger and Scheepers was now regarded as the precursor to the large scale invasion.60 Botha obviously did not know yet about the quick and thorough British reaction to the incursion of the three officers. According to Beyers’ biographer, Botha summoned a number of senior officers to Bethal in the eastern Transvaal in January 1901 to inform them about his plans. He told them he would be sending a commando of 3,000 men to the Colony in co-operation with de Wet. Beyers would be leading the force and General Jan Kemp would be the second in command. When ‘a genuine uprising’ occurred, he would then personally invade Natal with 4,000 men to advance via Pietermaritzburg, Kokstad and Barkley East to King William’s Town in the Eastern Cape.61 Botha later acceded to the request of Acting President Burger not to lead this invasion personally, as he had initially intended. Smuts, who was a firm supporter of an invasion into the Cape Colony ever since before the war, requested to join the envisaged invasion. Botha consented, but placed him too under the command of Beyers.62 As stated, the invasion would take place in co-operation with de Wet. Botha wrote to de Wet in this regard, but apparently never received any reply.63 Because of gaps in his preserved correspondence, it is not known with certainty what de Wet’s attitude was, but one could assume that there was little or no change in his attitude of November 1900 when he decided to unilaterally invade the Cape Colony. It would be recalled how enthusiastically Hertzog, Kritzinger and Scheepers reported the situation in the Cape Colony, as if everybody was waiting for de Wet’s arrival before initiating a large scale uprising.64 Apparently, de Wet was initially interested in co-operating with the Transvalers, because in January 1901 he wrote to Steyn and Commandant C.C.J. Badenhorst that he was on his way to the western Transvaal.65 His aim was ‘to discuss the desirability to have


a Transvaal commando under a general also advancing to the Cape Colony’. Apparently Smuts shortly thereafter sent him a report explaining what Botha had in mind. This caused de Wet to change his mind and not to go to the western Transvaal after all, because the Transvalers were in any event planning to invade the Cape Colony and the need to have any discussions – to his mind – now became superfluous.66 Just before his departure de Wet wrote a letter to Smuts a letter which has not been preserved. In a report soon afterwards Smuts informed Botha about this letter, according to which de Wet’s hasty decision to leave for the Cape Colony was influenced by the British efforts to disarm the Colony’s citizens. This ‘forced him to depart as fast as possible’.67 It seems clear in any event that de Wet envisaged a far more loosely structured co-operation between the two allies than Botha had in mind. The result of de Wet’s second effort to invade the Cape Colony is also well known. In the words of Smuts, it ‘failed still more disastrously’.68 After assembling his commandos at Doornberg in the present Willem Pretorius game reserve, he departed southwards with 3,000 men and crossed the Orange River a fortnight later. He brilliantly neutralised the British defences on the way by first feigning to cross the Orange River east of the Bloemfontein-Cape Town railway line. This enticed the enemy to dispatch a force to defend the corresponding sector. Unseen by the British he then however advanced eastwards and crossed the river on the other side of the railway line. Because he waited too long for his rearguard after crossing the river, he was forced west- and northwestwards by the overwhelmingly large British forces pitted against him. After being harried day and night, and testing the endurance of man and horse to the last, de Wet was forced to return to the Free State on 28 February. In the meantime Hertzog had joined forces with him and also crossed the river with de Wet.69 Having been alerted by Hertzog, Kritzinger and Scheepers, the British preparations against any further invasions were thus entirely successful. de Wet openly acknowledged to Botha that the situation he encountered was completely contrary to what he had expected, based on the three officers’ reports. However, he could not fault them, he wrote, because ‘after their reports to me … the British


government disarmed all Colonial citizens and also confiscated all useful horses’. The only horses still to be found were in the district of Hopetown.70 Although his advance to the Colony was a tactical triumph and his survival was a major feat, it was an operational and strategic failure. When Botha heard that de Wet had tried to invade the Cape Colony a second time on his own, he was most indignant. ‘I regret it that chief commandant de Wet … in accordance with the agreement with president Steyn did not meet me first’, he wrote to Smuts, ‘because the manner we are invading the Cape Colony leaves much to be desired … To undertake a successful advance on the Cape Colony, means that we have to go in with a well organized force of at least 6,000 men …’71 It was certainly not conducive to good co-operation between the two Boer leaders that de Wet had chosen to invade the Cape yet a second time without consulting with Botha. It gave him the impression that de Wet was arrogant and had an inflated sense of his own military leadership.72 After the war Botha contemptuously remarked to Sir Percy Fitzpatrick that de Wet was no more than a ‘newspaper hero’. He remarked that de Wet’s reputation came about because of war correspondents’ reports which exaggerated everything.73 Still unaware of de Wet’s failure, Botha in the meantime continued with his organisation and preparation, which he now had to accelerate because of de Wet’s untimely departure. Smuts also urged him to leave as soon as possible. If the operation was not executed soon, Smuts stated, ‘we will be too late, as usual, and arrive there when our colonial friends have already been disarmed or shattered’. Botha reacted by urging Beyers to speed matters up.74 But one delay after the other arose. First Beyers informed Botha that many of his burghers were unwilling to embark on the long journey to the Cape Colony. He, therefore, sought permission to ask for volunteers from other commandos for this operation. Two weeks later he wrote again to Botha that he had to send the men for a few days back to the northern Transvaal region of the Waterberg – hitherto in Boer hands – because they had virtually no clothes or shoes left. They were unwilling to leave without these and had to return home first to fetch these. Ultimately equine-sickness also broke out among the horses of his commando.75


Another problem was caused at the beginning of February by a massive sweep by Kitchener in the eastern Transvaal. This caused some considerable consternation among the Boers, which complicated the organisation of the expedition.76 Towards the end of February, when the final phase of the preparations was not far off, a new problem arose around the person of Smuts. He refused to serve under the command of Beyers. ‘As State Attorney I … cannot be placed under the command of any general, as I am responsible, in accordance with my oath of office, only to my government’. He proposed that he and Beyers be placed at the command of two separate and independent commandos for the expedition to the Colony. de la Rey supported this request.77 Before this could be settled, two other matters arose that put paid to all the plans. The first was the news that de Wet had to return to the Free State from the Cape Colony. Botha immediately grasped the enormity of the disaster. According to Frederik Rompel he received the news at Ermelo soon after his return from Middelburg where he had met with Kitchener on 2 March. Hertzog also wrote to de la Rey, strongly advising him to halt all plans to invade the Colony, ‘as all horses and forage have been confiscated from the farmers, as well as all rifles and ammunition’.78 While the Transvaal leadership was still reeling from this disaster, the second event occurred. The Transvaal government got wind of a British plan to advance into the northern Transvaal, which was hitherto in Boer hands. Despite virtually being ready to depart for the Cape Colony, this was the final straw. Beyers was ordered to remain in the north to defend it against the British advance.79 This decision did not exactly help the Boers. Brigadier-General H.C.O. Plumer left Pretoria on 26 March, commanding a considerable number of men and occupied the most important towns of the northern Transvaal within a few days.80 de la Rey was ordered not to allow Smuts and Kemp, who were still with him in the western Transvaal, to proceed with their plans, and to scuttle the whole invasion.81 And so all the months of hope, sorrow, effort and trouble were in vain. If de Wet only had been present at Syferfontein, the whole course of the rest of the war might have been completely different. Only Steyn was able to draw some positive conclusion from the events of the previous months: ‘We have achieved our goal in informing the world that the war is by no means past …’82


Superficially Steyn may have been correct. In September and October 1900 the Boers were all but defeated, demoralised and despairing. Towards March 1901 they were again active on all fronts and organised much more effectively. Whereas they were fleeing before the British six months before, they now again were purposeful and inspired and fought the enemy with a vengeance. Observing under the surface, though, matters appeared differently. Without ignoring the validity of the above, it is nevertheless true that the republics’ operational and strategic position had weakened considerably. de Wet was quite correct when he stated a year later in a letter to Smuts: ‘I am convinced that we are of the same opinion, viz., that the (key) question of the absolute Independence of the people will be decided in the Cape Colony’.83 This was indeed the crux of the matter. After the fiasco of the months of October 1900 to March 1901 the opportunity to launch a large scale invasion into the Cape Colony was irrevocably lost and thereby also the only chance to win the war.

Kitchener’s new strategy The Boers lost their last real chance to regain the operational initiative when their Syferfontein war plan failed. Henceforth the initiative passed to the British and despite efforts by the Boers to wrest it away, the British maintained a steady hold of it until the end of the war. It would be premature to state that the British had won the war by 1901. As indicated before, the British were caught on the wrong foot by the Boers’ guerrilla warfare. As late as March 1901 Kitchener had to write to Brodrick: ‘The difficult problem is to see how to get any finality to this war, it is always before me, and I can find no infalible [sic] solution’.84 The answer came in stages to Kitchener, through a process of learning from his mistakes. In theory his problem was threefold: to increase the mobility of his troops, to safeguard his lines of communications and to corner and eliminate the fast moving Boer forces. In order to solve his first problem, immediately after assuming command in South Africa, he made an appeal in all parts of the British Empire for seasoned horsemen to volunteer for service. He recognised that the conventional cavalry was virtually worthless in


the changed circumstances of the new type of warfare. Copying the Boers, he recruited mounted infantry; soldiers who could fight on foot, but who had the mobility of light cavalry.85 The second problem was more difficult to solve. The Boers’ attacks against the railway lines were assuming alarming dimensions towards January 1901. In the eastern Transvaal officers such as Jack Hindon and Henri Slegtkamp put the fear of God among the British and derailed and wrecked countless trains and robbing their contents for the Boers’ war cause.86 In the Free State too rail traffic was seriously disrupted.87 Kitchener’s reply to these actions was the construction of blockhouses along the railway lines. This measure was initially a purely defensive one to protect the lines of communications. Presently Kitchener however realised that the lines of blockhouses could also fulfil another important function: ‘By fortifying and increasing our posts on the railway lines, they form barriers which the Boers cannot cross without being engaged’.88 This was the origin of the long lines of blockhouses later criss-crossing South Africa and the remains of which in places can still be seen. This introduced the third problem of how to destroy or neutralise the Boer commandos. Kitchener summarised the hub of the problem well when he wrote to Brodrick in February: ‘It is a most difficult problem, an enemy that always escapes, a country so vast that there is always room to escape, supplies such as they want almost everywhere’.89 In theory the answer to this was very simple. The ease with which the Boers got their supplies had to be stopped, and the country had to be made ‘smaller’ to impede the Boers’ ability to move around and escape. This theoretical reaction was converted into practice by three measures. Firstly, Kitchener started by dividing the country into sectors by erecting blockhouses not only alongside the railway lines, but also across the whole countryside. Secondly, he instituted a scorched earth policy to convert both Boer republics into a smouldering heap. Thirdly, he depopulated the two states by carting off all (white and, to some extent, also black) women and children to concentration camps. We will be discussing these measures in a next chapter, because they were instituted principally after March 1901.


But these measures were basically defensive and could not by themselves ensure a victory. Kitchener accordingly instituted his well-known drives. Such a drive normally consisted of several columns who acted in concert with one another. The aim was to drive the Boers ahead of them and then to corner them against a blockhouse line or international border. At the same time the aim was to destroy and depopulate the country.90 In order to conduct such drives Kitchener needed sufficient troops, which he did not have. The fact of the matter is that he at this stage had about 200 000 troops at his disposal – a considerable force, one would say. However, about 178 000 of these were used to guard the lines of communication and on logistical duties, which left 22 000 available for the columns pursuing the Boer commandos. And of these, only 13 000 served in combat units.91 He consequently had to make a difficult decision. For the sake of making available more troops for his mobile columns and the defence of the railway lines, he was forced to abandon some smaller towns, especially in the Free State.92 Kitchener motivated his decision thus: ‘The difficulties of the present situation out here are that we have to protect very long lines of railway and road and supply garrisons to the many towns and villages that have been occupied all over the country whilst the mobile columns we have in the field are principally taken up in escorting supplies to the various garrisons. We have therefore no striking force of any importance and it is most difficult to find troops in any case of emergency …’93 In this way he solved the classic problem of anti-guerrilla operations, namely force and space, in an innovative manner. In a sense he conducted an operational retreat and abandoned less important towns where theoretically the Boers could perhaps regroup, but in return he was able to considerably increase his army’s offensive capabilities. Combined with his other measures – drives, blockhouse lines, destruction and depopulation – these yielded much more advantages than disadvantages. The British were prepared towards January 1901 to conduct their first drive in the eastern Transvaal. Eight columns of 15 000 men and 63 artillery pieces advanced eastwards from Pretoria.94 As far as they went, they destroyed pastures, killed cattle or confiscated them, burnt down houses and carted away women and children.


The Boers were taken completely unawares by these moves, as Deneys Reitz witnessed: ‘During the course of the morning, pillars of smoke began to rise behind the English advance, and to our astonishment we saw they were burning the farm-houses as they came. Towards noon the word spread that, not only were they destroying all before them, but were actually capturing and sending away the women and children. ‘At first we could hardly credit this, but when one wild-eyed woman after another came galloping by, it was borne in us that a more terrible chapter of the war was opening’.95 The results of the drives were disappointing. The commandos soon recovered from their initial shock and discovered that the advancing columns did not constitute one solid block but that there were gaps between them. Beyers made good use of these and on 28 January scythed through two columns and escaped. Botha equally escaped on 6 February after a skirmish at Chrissiesmeer.96 After the war the Times History described the drive thus: ‘Strategically [i.e. operationally] impressive, it was destitute of tactical cohesion and tactical vigour’.97 Just as Roberts had done before, so Kitchener did not limit himself to military means and continued his predecessor’s methods of psychological warfare. The aim was to undermine the Boers’ morale. He employed two methods to achieve this. Firstly, he employed Boers who had surrendered to convince their brethren also to capitulate. Early in December 1901 a Burgher Peace Committee was established under Kitchener’s auspices. Milner explained: ‘Advances to leaders in the field had all totally failed, but it seemed to us that those who had already surrendered would have means not open to us of communicating with the bulk of the Boers still under arms persuading them of the helplessness of their resistance, and removing misapprehension of our intentions …’98 One of the leaders of this Burgher Peace Committee was General Piet de Wet, Christiaan de Wet’s brother. In February 1901 he wrote an open letter to his brother, trying to convince him of the futility of further resistance. Similar efforts were undertaken vis a vis Transvaal officers, but all these efforts failed miserably. The Boers reacted by arresting the Committee’s emissaries and severely horsewhipping them. At least two of these envoys, Meyer de Kock and J.J. Morgendaal, were executed. de Wet also threatened to kill his brother like a dog if he ever encountered him.99


Not one of the Boer leadership was impressed by the efforts of this Committee. Botha for instance wrote to them that he refused to deal with traitors.100 de Wet had such a violent disdain for these persons that he refused to allow the emissaries anywhere in his vicinity.101 The second method that Kitchener employed was direct consultations with the Boer leadership. He did not attempt though to contact the Free Staters, because he knew they took a much harder line than their Transvaal counterparts, who were less convinced of their cause. ‘ great difficulty is de Wet – he and Steyn are more fanatical than Botha …’, Kitchener informed Brodrick.102 He consequently tried to negotiate with Botha through the elderly ex-President M.W. Pretorius. After some correspondence the two generals met one another at Middelburg on 28 February, but they left the meeting without any agreement being reached.103

Conclusion The period between October 1900 and March 1901 was of crucial importance to both parties. Because the British were initially totally unprepared for this phase, the operational advantage lay with the Boers and cards were in their favour. The successful execution of the Syferfontein plan would have put them in an advantageous position to win the war. But the operational level did not really represent the Boer leadership’s strong suit. Because of his obstinacy, mistrust of Botha and exaggerated individualism, de Wet twice acted on his own and thereby scuttled the plan. This deprived the Boers of the last chance they conceivably had to win the war. Once the British recovered from the surprise, they energetically instituted countermeasures to prevent more invasions of the Cape Colony and simultaneously started exerting a great deal of pressure on the Boers. The Boers would never again be presented with the opportunities they had at the end of 1900. The rest of the war should thus be seen in principle as a violent death struggle by a military force who had no rational hope left to achieve the ultimate successful conclusion of the war.


7 Guerrilla Warfare: The Second Phase

Renewed Boer planning Although the Syferfontein war plan had failed, the Boers nevertheless still intended to implement it one way or another. After March 1901 there was, however, no opportunity to do so and the Boers had to concentrate on small-scale guerrilla warfare. In May 1901 de Wet wrote to Commandant Kritzinger, who was still in the Cape Colony: ‘Here, [as] in [the] Transvaal skirmishes still regularly occur, although no large battles. Nevertheless the losses of the enemy continue much as earlier. Railways are being destroyed more than ever, as are trains being derailed’.1 On 27 March the long expected meeting between de Wet and Botha eventually took place near Vrede in the northern Free State. As no detailed record of the meeting exists, it is not known whether they discussed the failure of the Syferfontein plan and de Wet’s non-participation. They did discuss, though, Botha’s meeting with Kitchener and agreed to intensify the struggle and to replenish their meagre supplies of ammunition.2 The two governments subsequently met on 15 April as well, also near Vrede, and agreed to continue the war to the bitter end.3 A fundamental political change followed soon afterwards. As a result of pressure by certain Transvaal officers, the Transvaal government addressed two important letters to Steyn from the eastern Transvaal town of Ermelo. In an official missive the members expressed despair about the ever decreasing chances of winning the war. Shortages of arms and ammunition, and also the increasing 109

Limpopo

110


N TRANSVAAL 0

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BECHUANALAND Komatipoort

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Johannesburg Vereeniging

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Bethlehem Kimberley

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Colenso

la PIETERMARITZBURG Durban

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CAPE COLONY

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East London Cape Town

Map 10


The Waterval Campaign Plan, 1901

O

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Guerrilla Warfare: The Second Phase 111

number of burghers being captured or surrendering, engendered a spirit of pessimism amongst the Transvalers. They thus informed Steyn that they had sought Kitchener’s co-operation in sending Boer emissaries to Europe to consult with President Paul Kruger in exile about the chances of mediation by any European state. In the event of Kitchener refusing to co-operate, they intended obtaining a truce in order to consult with all Transvaal citizens.4 In addition Smuts wrote a private letter to Steyn – the original of which was lost – stating that it may be advantageous to sue for peace and perhaps to rebel at a later stage when Britain was experiencing some other international problems.5 Steyn reacted vehemently to these letters. The arguments regarding the bad military situation of the Boer republics he swept aside. God, who had always been their refuge, would continue to be so. If the Transvalers were to surrender, this would deal a death-blow to the whole of the Afrikaner nation, because this would introduce perpetual mistrust between brethren. Steyn thought there was only one solution: continue fighting until the Boers’ independence was safeguarded.6 This correspondence indicated a serious development. In any military coalition basic agreement about the war aims is fundamental. The more the allies are dependent on each other, the higher the need for unanimity among them. As the two republics were involved in a desperate struggle for survival, it is logical that any fundamental difference regarding the strategic objective – the preservation of the Boers’ independence – would have had negative consequences both for the alliance as such and for the chances of eventual success. Steyn realised this and, therefore, reacted so strongly. It was at any rate clear that the political and military leaders had to meet again to feel each other out about the way forward and restore their unanimity. The meeting took place on 19 and 20 June at Branddrift on the Waterval River in the eastern Transvaal district of Standerton. Although Louis Botha and Ben Viljoen remained pessimistic, the other Transvalers were encouraged. After some exhaustive deliberations it was decided to continue energetically with the war. The alliance was saved by especially the resolute attitude of Steyn.7 The Boer leadership undoubtedly recognised that resoluteness, heroism and will-power were not sufficient. These also had to be


bolstered by military deeds. There are unfortunately no minutes extant of this meeting, but it can nevertheless be deduced from other sources to what conclusions the meeting came. A new war plan was drawn up, essentially a scaled-down version of the Syferfontein plan. The officers decided to renew their efforts to invade the Cape Colony and Natal.8 They no longer considered attacking the gold mines, since these were protected too well. According to some sources Smuts was the driving force behind these decisions,9 but there is no sufficient confirmation to confirm this. It was furthermore agreed to divide the two British colonies into three command zones. Natal would be under Botha’s purview, the Cape Colony west of the railway line between Kimberley and Cape Town would be under de la Rey’s and the part east of the railway under de Wet’s command.10 There are no records about the detailed planning. Taking subsequent actions as a lead, it would appear that Botha was personally in charge of invading Natal, which indeed happened a few months later. It is known that de la Rey would have been in charge of the invasion into the Cape Colony, but it is not clear what de Wet’s share in the operation would have been. It is possible that he had no separate, active role. de Wet had at any rate by then lost an interest in large scale operations, such as the one planned at Waterval,11 and perhaps his capricious actions of a few months before were still too fresh in the participants’ memories. There is clear and unambiguous evidence though of what the strategic objectives for the Cape Colony campaign were. According to what Smuts told delegates at the peace negotiations at Vereeniging eleven months afterwards, it was the intention that de la Rey would assume command of the Cape Colony ‘as soon as the Cape Colony was strong enough to be recognized as a third party’.12 In a letter to all the Free State officers in the Cape Colony Steyn wrote that the two governments ‘had in mind, in accordance with the practice laid down by international law, to recognise our brothers in the Colony, when they were strong and numerous enough, as combatants with all the rights attached thereto’. Steyn also informed his officers that both governments agreed that de la Rey would be Commander in Chief of all the Boer forces in the Colony. His mandate was ‘when he thought the time was


opportune, to advise us to act accordingly’ to establish a Boer republic in the Cape.13 Shortly afterwards, possibly soon after de la Rey’s return to the western Transvaal after the Waterval meeting, Smuts explained at the peace deliberations, ‘the feeling arose that it would be advisable to act more carefully’. It was then decided that Smuts would proceed to the Cape Colony in de la Rey’s place to evaluate the situation and then to advise de la Rey whether or not to join him.14 Finally, after the idea was repeatedly mooted, it thus became official policy to establish a third Boer republic in the Cape Colony. For the first time since the war broke out in October 1899 the original war plan – the preservation of the republics’ independence – was officially amended. Did this indicate that the Boer leaders, and Steyn in particular, had renounced their earlier moral qualms and now were ready to wage a war of conquest? An unequivocal answer is difficult because the sources are scanty and contradictory. One, therefore, needs to rely on extrapolations and hypotheses. One can deduce from Steyn’s letter that his motive was not principally strategic, but rather that he was concerned about the fate of the Cape rebels. After all, when they were captured, they were accused of high treason and many of them were in fact executed. Steyn’s motivation were, therefore, moral in nature. But this is contradictory to what he replied to two Dutch Reformed clerics in the Cape Colony, the Reverends C. Murray and J.F. Botha, whom he met in August 1901 and who requested him to withdraw the Boer commandos from the Cape Colony. Steyn harshly replied that the Cape citizens were masters of their own destiny. They could pressurise the British to withdraw their troops from the Boer republics and if this did not succeed, then they could organise a massive uprising and thus compel the enemy to vacate their colony.15 We have already seen that de Wet had made statements in favour of a united South Africa,16 and probably Steyn, who was after all an intimate friend of his and more politically attuned than de Wet, would have shared similar opinions on a united South Africa. Smuts too was a longstanding supporter of an independent Cape Colony and a united South Africa. His correspondence until the end of February 1901 is replete with references to it.17 Smuts propagated the philosophy of holism, which in later years came to signify his


belief that smaller political units should unite to form a larger whole. Whereas he initially directed this idea to a united Afrikaner republic in South Africa, it would seem as if at this late stage of the war he started losing his belief in such a united republic. Although he would continue fighting resolutely for the independence of the republics until the end of the war, he seems to have started looking forward to the time that a united South Africa would fall within the British Empire.18 The same underlying considerations vis a vis the Syferfontein war plan, as described in the previous chapter, were also valid in terms of the Waterval plan, because they were basically similar. But the conditions of June 1901 were much less favourable than those in October 1900. If it had still been a viable plan in October 1900 to foment an uprising among Cape Afrikaners, by June 1901 this became an impossible dream. Since the invasion of the Cape Colony in December by Hertzog, Kritzinger and Scheepers, the British had acted decisively and clamped down on any possibility of an uprising. The strategic initiative, therefore, remained throughout in the hands of the British and consequently the Waterval plan was doomed since its inception to fail.

Yet another failure Whereas the execution of the Syferfontein was shattered on the rocks of deficient co-ordination, misunderstandings and the plain obstinacy of de Wet, the Waterval plan would be doomed by betrayal and a strategic and operational situation which was already negatively loaded against the Boers. No particulars of Botha’s planning for the invasion of Natal could be traced. It is quite possible that he had in mind repeating his previous intentions by advancing through Natal and Griqualand East into the eastern Cape Colony. His effort to invade Natal commenced in September 1901. Unfortunately for him a family member of President Kruger’s informed the British about his intentions. Consequently thousands of British troops were awaiting Botha to stop him in his tracks.19 After heavily defeating a British contingent under Major H. Gough at Bloedrivierspoort, he advanced southwards through the districts of Vryheid and Utrecht to Natal. The inundated Buffels River saw to it that


his plan came to nought and Botha had to be content with two sharp attacks against the British forces at Itala and Prospect. He was back on the eastern Transvaal highveld towards the beginning of October.20 To take revenge for failed invasion he attacked and severely mauled a column under Colonel G.E. Benson at Bakenlaagte, between Bethal and Middelburg.21 Botha could record some successes though amidst his failed invasion. ‘We had an extremely difficult voyage, but attained our objective to a large extent’, Botha wrote to Ben Viljoen. ‘The enemy streamed from all directions to Natal and now have to return again’.22 de la Rey used the opportunity, during the absence of many of the British troops in Natal, to successfully attack isolated columns at Moedwil on 30 September 1901 and at Kleinfontein on 24 October.23 The invasion was nevertheless clearly an operational and strategic failure. The invasion by Smuts into the Cape Colony achieved more of an operational success, but in the long run had no positive strategic influence on the Boers’ war effort. After their return to the western Transvaal from the Waterval meeting, de la Rey and Smuts started planning. They assembled a select commando of 340 men and prepared for the long journey to the Cape Colony. On the advice of General Piet de Villiers de la Rey recommended that Smuts advance directly through Griqualand West to the northwestern Cape Colony. According to de Villiers, who knew the area well, this route would have many advantages. The Cape Afrikaners in this vicinity would be willing to join the Boer forces in fairly large numbers. ‘Since the eastern sectors are under de Wet and Kritzinger, I would like you to consider whether or not it would be advantageous to enter the western areas only’, de la Rey wrote to Smuts. He said that because the western areas were arid and without any railway lines, it would be difficult for the British to concentrate large forces there to fight the Boers. In addition there would be enough food for the invading commando. 24 Smuts’ reply, if it still exists, could not be traced. From a second letter which de la Rey wrote to Smuts on the same day, it may be deduced that the latter was being obstinate. Apparently he planned to advance through the Free State and the eastern Cape, as he subsequently did.25


This decision by Smuts appears strange, because during January and February he had been planning to follow exactly this route now proposed by de la Rey.26 Moreover the British command, apparently because of treachery, was already aware on 14 July of his proposed invasion,27 which was to complicate his plans considerably. Smuts departed in any event on 1 August.28 In order to keep open the lines of communication between him and Smuts, de la Rey acted very intelligently. He ordered Piet de Villiers to return to Griqualand West and to act as his liaison with Smuts. He simultaneously forbade de Villiers to impede the railway traffic between Kimberley and Mafeking, because this would cause the British to fortify the line. This would obviously have complicated the possibility to maintain contact with de Villiers, and thus also with Smuts.29 This railway line of course had almost no military significance, because it was the connection to Rhodesia – a territory which was strategically unimportant. This again indicated that de la Rey had a well developed sense for the principle of indirect approach in warfare. It is self-evident from the course of the advance by Smuts to the Cape Colony that he erred not by following de la Rey’s advice. He chose the most difficult route. In the Free State he got involved in a major British drive from which he had to extricate himself and his men. Having entered the Cape Colony on 4 September near Herschel, Smuts and his men had to endure virtually indescribable hardship and suffering on their way through the Eastern Cape, the southwestern districts and the southern Karoo until they reached their destination – the northwestern Cape – during the second half of November. Forunately for the Boers Smuts’ tactical skills saved him and his men more than once when conditions seemed to be desperate.30 In the Cape Colony Smuts encountered a rather chaotic situation in terms of the Boers’ war effort. He thus spent the first few months reorganising the Boer commandos. In terms of the Political Treaty of 1897 (which formally placed the Free State forces under the leadership of the Transvaal Commandant General) he assumed supreme command of all the Boer commandos in the Cape Colony.31 In early February 1902 de Wet formally sanctioned this step on behalf of the Free State.32 This reorganisation was much overdue. The previous officer who was de facto in command of the Boer forces in the Cape, Assistant


Chief Commandant P.H. Kritzinger, was in the Free State since August the previous year and was captured when he attempted to return towards the end of the year.33 There was consequently very little co-ordination and effective joint operations between the various commandos. With a few exceptions most of the commandos in the eastern districts were driven across the Cape Town – Kimberley railway line and were now operating in the northwestern Cape. The only commandos still operating in the Cape midlands when peace was declared in May 1902, were those of General Wynand Malan and Commandant Willem Fouché. In the rest of the Cape Colony, east of the Cape Town – Kimberley railway line, life became impossible for the Boer commandos.34 There was thus an over-concentration of Boer forces in this sector and moreover the arid climate could not provide sufficiently in the needs of such a relatively large force. Smuts realised this and thus took some measures to expand the territory and scope of the struggle. He instituted four military sectors: • The districts of Fraserburg, Hopetown, Carnarvon, Victoria West and Philipstown under the command of Commandant Wynand Malan, who was promoted to Combat General; • Commandant Jaap van Deventer (also promoted to Combat General) had to occupy the British attention in the direction of Worcester ‘until I am able to conduct more definitive operations’; • Commandant Manie Maritz in Namaqualand and • Commandant Hans Lategan along the Orange River in the vicinity of Upington.35 Although this reorganisation only involved the sectors west of the railway line, it is conceivable that Smuts would have done so too regarding the areas to the east had the peace process not intervened. In the meantime Smuts made a number of proposals to intensify the struggle in the Cape Colony. In terms of the agreement with de la Rey he investigated the need for the latter proceeding to the Cape Colony. He recommended that if de la Rey could find a replacement for himself in the western Transvaal, he should definitely and ‘post haste’ come to the Colony. Smuts also proposed that both governments should dispatch at least a further 1,000 men in groups of 50 to 100 men each to the Cape Colony. In terms of the best route he


indirectly acknowledged that he erred before: ‘As it is practically impossible to enter the Cape Colony east of the railway line, I consider the route via Griqualand West the best one’, he wrote.36 Smuts also recommended a clear operational plan, namely ‘taking and occupying all the western and northern districts to the north of the Cape Town – De Aar railway line and then proceeding from these districts as base to the southern and eastern [areas]’. He believed that these operations would turn the Boers’ war effort round within a year. ‘We would be forcing the enemy to concentrate 30,000 to 50,000 men around the railways to protect it and to introduce a large number of columns to combat us and even all of that will not help them’.37 He thus devoted a few months to consolidating his base in the north west. The districts of Calvinia, Nieuwoudtville, Van Rhynsdorp, Springbok, O’Kiep, etc., all gave refuge to Boer commandos at one stage or another. Nevertheless all these ambitious plans by Smuts never came to fruition. Firstly de la Rey was not able to proceed to the Cape Colony and remained in the western Transvaal to the end of the war. He informed Botha as early as October 1901 that he could not leave until someone had been appointed in his place.38 In February 1902 he undertook to dispatch a strong force by April via Griqualand West to the Colony,39 but before this could happen the peace negotiations started that culminated in the Peace of Vereeniging on 31 May 1902. But this was not all that important, because Smuts proved to be a very capable replacement for de la Rey. What did prove to be decisive, was the fact that Smuts was not able to engender a general uprising among the Cape Afrikaners. Their attitude towards the Boer cause was, to quote Smuts, ‘very positive throughout’. He wrote that thousands of Afrikaners wish to join ‘but they have no horses, as virtually all districts have been stripped of horses by the enemy’. If it were not for this factor, Smuts thought he could have organised a general uprising within a fairly short period. He, however, acknowledged that the time was past that the arrival of an important Boer personality, such as de la Rey, could encourage the Cape Afrikaners to rebel. He thus concluded that the time for the actions of a third party (in other words, the unilateral independence of the Cape Colony) was not yet ripe.40 And, as events proved, it would never happen.


During the peace negotiations at Vereeniging Smuts, therefore, had to inform his colleagues that there was no hope any longer that the Cape Afrikaners would rebel. Since his arrival in September 1901, only 1,400 men joined his commandos because of the restrictive measures of the British.41 The total number of Colonial citizens who had rebelled were only 3,000 men. He told his fellow delegates that ‘we have erred and the Cape Colony was perhaps not yet ready for our efforts. In any event we could not expect a general uprising there’. He called the 3,000 Cape rebels heroes who could not be honoured highly enough., but they would not regain the Republics’ independence. Recent research indicates that Smuts underestimated the number of Cape rebels. Instead of the 3,000 men referred to, it would appear that there were in reality some 6,000 to 7,000.42 However, even this number was never sufficient and Smuts was correct in saying that the Cape Colony would not deliver the salvation that Boers had been hoping for. The failure of the Waterval war plan and the defeat of the Boer republics were now a fait accompli. The Boers also attempted towards the end of 1901 to regain the initiative in their own territories. In this process they scored some notable tactical successes and dealt the British a few bloody noses, but these did not change the strategic and operational course of events.43

The stranglehold intensifies While the Boers’ last efforts to take the operational initiative came to nought, the British operations after about the middle of June 1901 started exerting a growing stranglehold on the commandos. The relevant elements were briefly indicated in the previous chapter and will now be discussed. It already appeared in 1900 that it served very little purpose to dispatch so-called flying columns to pursue the Boers. Kitchener wrote to Brodrick, ‘There is no doubt that these flying columns, on extended operations in this vast country, only in great measure beat the air, as the Boers clear off the moment they hear of the columns being sometimes 20 miles away’. His policy was consequently aimed ‘to divide the country up into paddocks by lines of blockhouses and so restrict the area in which [the] Boers could operate’44 A whole

120

Map 11

The Blockhouse Lines


network of blockhouses was constructed up to the end of the war across both republics and also to a lesser extent in the Cape Colony. Massive drives were subsequently organised to force the Boers against these blockhouse lines and to capture them. But it is equally true that most of the drives –such as those of February 1901 that were described above – did not reach their objectives. Although a few individual Boers were captured the vast majority escaped each time they were cornered. The Times History lists two probable causes. Control over these drives was centralised in Pretoria with a ‘programme too often formal and sterile’. The second was a lack of tactical co-operation. It was impossible for all involved in these drives to form continuous lines without any gaps. And it was through these gaps that the Boers always escaped.45 Another way to catch the Boers had to be found. This involved two components. On the eastern Transvaal highveld Colonel G.E. Benson discovered a way that harmed the Boers immensely. Together with his intelligence officer, Colonel W.F. Woolls-Sampson, he started recruiting Boers, regarded as traitors by their own people, and blacks who knew their areas well. He used his roving camp as a base to launch attacks at night, taking the sleeping Boers by surprise.46 Benson was killed during Botha’s attack on the columns at Bakenlaagte on 30 October 1901, but his ideas continued to be implemented. In co-operation with Wools-Sampson, a Boer, [de ?] Lange, instituted a similar scheme. In the Free State this method was also used and adapted by Colonel M.F. Rimington. Although some Boers were able to escape from such nocturnal attacks, those without horses were invariably captured, which accelerated the process of attrition and war fatigue among the Boers.47 After the war de Wet acknowledged that this was a successful tactic against the Boers.48 The second and most important aspect was, however, the socalled New Model Drive. The fundamental idea was similar to the original, but henceforth a single, unbroken line would be maintained. There would be no more gaps through which the Boers could escape, and they would have to fight their way clear. This method was not without its drawbacks. It was obviously extremely difficult to maintain a single coherent line of soldiers, sometimes up to 80 km long, in a drive without the cohesion being


lost. This discouraged independent tactical decision taking by individual officers, because the success of a drive depended on its maintenance of strict cohesion. If a Boer force succeeded in escaping, it could not be pursued, because the drive had to continue at any price. In addition the line, because of its length, was necessarily weak everywhere and never really strong anywhere. A determined group of Boers would always succeed in escaping, as happened in practice. Let us illustrate how the New Model Drive – which the Boers called a kraal (corral) – ideally operated. The first of these was used in February 1902 against de Wet’s commandos in the northeastern Free State. The objective was to drive the Free Staters in front of a line of 87 km long and consisting of 9,000 troops westwards from Liebenbergsvlei and to corner them against the railway line or the triangle formed by the railways between Wolwehoek and Heilbron and Wolwehoek to Kroonstad. The blockhouse lines north and south of this area where the drive was to take place, were specially reinforced.49 The sharp-eyed de Wet soon grasped what the enemy was attempting to do. He concentrated a part of his commando on one spot and burst relatively easily through the blockhouse line, between Lindley and Kroonstad. Other commandos had to fight their way clear against the uninterrupted line of troops. For all their trouble and organisation the British captured 284 Boers, among them some children.50 Immediately afterwards Kitchener ordered a second drive in the same area with the same forces, but in the opposite direction. This time de Wet was able to escape on 24 February 1902 only with some considerable risk and after a pitched battle at Kalkkrans. Fifty burghers fell on the battlefield and 778 were captured.51 In March and April a number of further drives were undertaken in the Free State and the Transvaal.52 The consequences will be described at the end of this section. Another aspect of Kitchener’s operations which were closely linked to the drives and blockhouses was the scorched earth policy in the two Boer republics. The Boers, as is the case with all guerrillas, were dependent on the forage they found in the field. Consequently the whole of the countryside that nourished the Boers had to be


systematically destroyed to deprive them of every livelihood. Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister, stated: ‘I should prefer to see a complete protection of lines and bridges; and then you ought to be able to destroy food with flying columns of considerable strength. You will not conquer these people until you have starved them out’.53 On 15 March 1901 Kitchener expounded his scorched earth policy quite chillingly in a circular letter. Apart from all families having to be relocated from farms to concentration camps – and we will presently look at this aspect – all crops, fodder, cattle, horses and vehicles had to be confiscated or destroyed completely. Ovens and mills also had to be destroyed.54 The action to burn down all farmhouses was already by then well under way. The consequences were horrific. Cattle and sheep were often maimed and left to die of hunger and thirst.55 Approximately 30 000 farm dwellings were destroyed, at least 40 towns were razed to the ground and another 15 were virtually destroyed.56 Just between March and August 1901 some 714 300 head of cattle, 1,000 bags of meal and 184 400 lbs of grain were destroyed or confiscated merely in the northern Free State.57 de la Rey was not exaggerating when he wrote in December 1901 to Kruger in exile: ‘Our country lies in ruins’.58 Another aspect of the British operations concerned the establishment of concentration camps. We have already seen that the sympathy and support of the local population is an indispensable condition for the success of a guerrilla war. Because Kitchener knew full well that he would never voluntarily obtain any support of the Boer women and children on the family farms, he simply confronted the problem by relocating every woman and child, almost without any exception, to the concentration camps. The British were, however, not prepared for housing such large numbers of persons. This practice also appeared in Cuba where the Spanish General Weyler tried to depopulate the island by establishing concentration camps. One could also draw some more modern parallels by referring to the aldeamentos, or fortified villages, which the Portuguese employed in the wars in their African possessions. The USA in Vietnam and the Rhodesians also used the same method. Although the practice and execution of each differed in more ways than one from Kitchener’s, the underlying policy and strategic motivation remain the same.


Kitchener initiated his policy in December 1900, when he issued a proclamation that Boers who surrender voluntarily would ‘be allowed to live with their Families in Government Laagers until such time as the Guerrilla Warfare now being carried on will admit of their returning safely to their homes’.59 Milner summarised the motivation for this proclamation: ‘Every farm had become a supply depot for the enemy, enabling him to concentrate at will and refit his commandos with food and munitions of war … the women had actively assisted the combatants by furnishing them with exact information regarding all British movements. The military situation demanded that the enemy be deprived of such a system of intelligence …’60 J.C. Otto comes to the conclusion that the ‘aim of the British vis a vis the concentration camps was … exclusively of a military nature’.61 However this may have furthered the British military cause, in the long run it was a political blunder par excellence. By May 1901 there were already 77 000 whites and 21 000 persons of colour being accommodated in the camps. By October the numbers had sharply increased to 118 000 and 43 000 respectively.62 Bad organisation, sub-standard housing and insufficient nourishment and medical care were the reasons why the death rate reached crisis dimensions within a short while. Although the British were forced to improve the living conditions towards the end of the war, official statistics reveal that the number of persons who died in the concentration camps when the war ended were 27 927, of whom 26 251 were women and children under the age of sixteen.63 There are no available figures for the total number of persons of colour who died in the camps, but between June 1901 and May 1902 at least 13 315 black and coloured persons died there.64 Milner quite rightly acknowledged at the end of the war: ‘The whole thing, I think now, has been a mistake’.65 During December 1901 Kitchener emerged with a cynically intelligent amendment to his concentration camp policy. He refused to admit any more people to the camps. He wrote to Transvaal Acting President Schalk Burger that since the Boers were complaining to him about the atrocious treatment of women and children in the camps, he assumed that the Boer commandos would treat their own people better. All the families who wished to leave the camps would be permitted to do so and be handed over to the commandos.66 He


ordered his officers on 15 December not to admit anyone to the camps, although this order was ignored to some extent thereafter.67 This order was given a few months after the so-called Ladies Committee under the chairpersonship of Mrs M.G. Fawcett was appointed to investigate the conditions in the camps. They reported that, ironically enough, the lives of the women and children now depended on their continued stay in the camps. The reason was that the scorched earth policy would see to it that certain famine awaited those who were released from the camps.68 Anyhow, the conditions in the camps were by now slowly improving and the rate of deaths was also starting to tail off, while the scorched earth policy was still being intensified. There was simply no food available outside the camps. The British were systematically destroying all victuals during their drives. The four New Model Drives between February and March 1902 in the north eastern Free State caused the death, destruction or confiscation of at least 33 000 heads of cattle and horses.69 It was amidst these conditions that the commandos now had to assume the duty of looking after women and children. Just in the Transvaal the commandos had to care for 2,540 families.70 The British quite often poisoned the food and supplies left behind by the commandos for the women and children in need.71 At Vereeniging Botha summarised the position somewhat ironically: ‘When we still had lots of food, the enemy loved carting off our families to the camps. Now that they are in dire straits and the British can do something for them, their charity has dried up’.72 Kitchener’s objective was clear: to force the women and children to become an additional burden and thereby to lessen the military efficiency of the commandos. The other element in Kitchener’s operations that also need to be looked at is his efforts to psychological warfare. After the failure of the Burgher Peace Committee and the Middelburg meeting with Botha, Kitchener provisionally gave up his efforts to psychological warfare. He renewed his efforts in August 1901 when issuing a proclamation that all Boer officers who did not surrender before 15 September would be sent into exile and their possessions be confiscated.73 But his efforts failed again. Steyn wrote: ‘I must confess that I am honestly glad about this proclamation, because an officer who now


surrenders can be accused quite rightly of cowardice’. 74 All the leading Boer figures replied to Kitchener, expressing their indignation and surprise.75 This attitude also applied to the officers and burghers,76 and in the event only a few individuals surrendered.77 Kitchener’s policy to employ Boer turncoats was an essential element in his psychological warfare, although it also had some immediate military value. The previous chapter referred to the establishment and failure of the Burgher Peace Committees. But the failure of the August proclamation had another consequence. The central Peace Committee decided on 20 September that since its efforts of the previous nine months had been fruitless and the guerrilla warfare was continuing, the Committees would disband and would not seek any further contact with the commandos. In their stead a properly organised force of scouts would be established to aid the British columns in the field to fight against their own people.78 Two units were established; the National Scouts in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony Volunteers in the Free State. The respective leaders were General A.P.J. Cronjé (a brother of General Piet Cronjé) and General Piet de Wet (a brother of General Christiaan de Wet). The members of these units received an undertaking that after the war they would be given sufficient ground and in certain cases also influential jobs. At the end of the war there were 1,480 National Scouts and 480 ORC Volunteers,79 although in total some 5,464 Boers fought on the British side.80 Kitchener described their value: ‘This has a twofold advantage as it gives employment to the young men who have surrendered and have nothing to do in the burgher camps and it also greatly depresses the Boers in the field seeing their own people fighting against them …’81 The Times History opined that ‘[i]t was in raiding and scouting that their chief military value lay’.82 On the Boer side the Reverend R.D. MacDonald thought ‘they were able to betray from time to time details about our tactics and to divulge our military secrets to the enemy’.83 And de Wet acknowledged after the war: ‘We experienced that these tactics by the British were the most difficult that we had to contend with’.84 One nevertheless has the impression that the war ended before these two units had attained their full military value. It is clear in any event that Kitchener also committed a political blunder in this respect. It caused a deep seated bitterness among


Boers loyal to their own cause; perhaps even deeper than the feelings engendered by the widespread destruction and the concentration camps. Members of the National Scouts and the ORC Volunteers were completely ostracised from their communities after the war and even had to establish their own church.85 Moreover, the British reneged on their undertakings to the Scouts. According to a report after the war in the Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail an ex-National Scout stated: ‘They went and fought against their own fathers and brothers, proving their loyalty to the British Government’. And what happened then? ‘They had seen nothing of what had been promised to them. What they were more likely to get was a grave dug for them and into which they would be thrown. Their children would trample on them and curse their parents’.86 In the long term the British operations were successful in a military sense. It became increasingly difficult for the Boers to attack and disrupt the railways which were indispensable for transporting the British supplies. For instance, when General Ben Viljoen wanted to launch a series of attacks in January 1902 against the Delagoa Bay railway he discovered that it was impossible. The blockhouses were protecting the railway line too well.87 Official figures confirm Viljoen’s statement. The number of cases where a railway line was cut reached a high (30 times) in February 1901 and then decreased to four cases per month between July and September.88 Statistics to May 1902 could not be traced, but there can be no doubt that this downward trend was maintained. The scorched earth policy obviously meant that it was impossible to obtain sufficient food and fodder in many places. The New Model Drives caused a situation of famine among the commandos in the north eastern Free State.89 After the war de Wet wrote that the commandos had sufficient food only in the southern and western Free State.90 There were problems too in the Transvaal. Botha stated unequivocally at Vereeniging that he would have had to evacuate his men from eleven districts, roughly half of the Transvaal, if the war was to continue. This was because of the destruction brought about by the drives.91 The blockhouse lines moreover seriously hampered the Boers’ famous mobility. Kitchener stated in August 1901 that his policy was ‘a considerable obstacle to the free movement of the enemy’s


roving bands’.92 To what extent this was true, appears from two letters by Botha. He wrote on 13 December 1901 that ‘our communications with the O.F.S. are impossible at the moment’.93 Six weeks later he again wrote, ‘Have not heard anything from O.F.S. Will try this week to despatch reports but it is difficult at present, so I will have to send a strong commando along otherwise the despatch riders will not get through’.94 The Transvaal and Free State governments met during April at Klerksdorp in the western Transvaal, where de la Rey described the problem: ‘The enemy has cut the western districts into two parts and complicated matters for us … Our access to food supplies was impeded by blockhouse lines which was to our detriment’.95 At Vereeniging Botha said: ‘Ten months ago we had in my sector not a single blockhouse. Presently lines of blockhouses criss-cross the whole of the area. One can cross the lines only at night and then with considerable effort. We are now compelled to divide our forces into small sections so that the enemy will not know where a commando actually is. Because we are divided by the lines of blockhouses we are liable to being captured and many are in fact captured’.96 This process was also repeated in the Cape Colony. The drives and blockhouse lines forced the majority of the Boer commandos during the last months of the war into the relatively inaccessible north western Cape. Guerrillas could operate here with greater ease than elsewhere, but this was probably the least strategically and operationally important region of the Cape Colony. The manoeuvrability of the Boers was thus also very limited in this region of the country. de Wet later denied the importance of the blockhouse lines.97 Although there were obviously formations who could cross the lines at will, one nevertheless gains the impression that the commandos could not operate freely anymore. Everything taken into account, the massive New Model Drives of 1902 meant that many commandos were on their last legs. There were too few isolated columns to attack in order to obtain supplies from the enemy. The Boers now had to concentrate on literally staying alive. In the Free State, for instance, de Wet tried to take the operational initiative after November 1901 by assembling a commando of 700 men. But he had to disband this force again after a mere six weeks after attaining only one victory at Groenkop on


Christmas day 1901. After February 1902 one drive after the other flowed across the operational sector of the north eastern Free State, which forced him to move to the western districts.98 In the eastern Transvaal Botha scored his last major victory at Bakenlaagte on 30 October 1901 before he was forced in February 1902 to take refuge in the districts of Vryheid and Utrecht in the southeast.99 The Boers’ critical state was exacerbated by the increasing role of some blacks in assisting the British. We have already discussed the use of black scouts by Colonel Benson in the eastern Transvaal and Colonel Rimington in the Free State as a factor that complicated matters for the Boers during the final months of the war. But there was another, perhaps even more important, factor. A number of black tribes in especially the western, northern and eastern Transvaal refused the commandos entry to their tribal territories. Elsewhere blacks occupied abandoned Boer farms and obtained firearms to prohibit the commandos from crossing such properties. This also occurred to a lesser extent in the Free State. The sum total of these factors inhibited the Boers’ mobility even further.100 The role in the war of persons of colour should not be exaggerated. It was and remained a war primarily between the British and the Boers, even though this strict dividing line started fraying at the edges towards the end of the war. From the minutes of the Boer conference in Vereeniging it would appear that mainly the Transvalers were concerned about the increasing militancy among the blacks, but the Free Staters did not seem to experience this. The latter experience was shared by the Boer commandos in the Cape Colony, even if it may be ascribed to the fact that they avoided entering traditionally black areas, such as the Transkei, where they would conceivably not be welcomed. Eventually it was only the Transvalers who really experienced this additional form of pressure as a problem. This could, of course, conceivably have increased if the war continued much longer. At this stage it was, however, not decisive in moving the Boers to lay down their arms. Nevertheless, it was no wonder that Kitchener wrote in December 1901: ‘I think that about April we shall have pretty well exhausted the Boers and so enclosed them in areas that they will find it very hard to keep up much form of resistance’.101 Prophetic words indeed.


Conclusion If the period of September 1900 to March 1901 was decisive in wresting the strategic and operational initiative from the Boers, then the subsequent period until May 1902 served to confirm this trend. Having taken the initiative towards March 1901, the British never relinquished their stranglehold on the Boers. The Boers, after the Waterval meeting, did try to regain the initiative, but the only advantage they could attain were a few isolated tactical successes such as those at Bakenlaagte and Groenkop. Botha’s effort to invade Natal was a failure. And although Smuts succeeded in invading the Cape Colony, the expedition scored very few strategic and operational successes. He could not foment a general uprising among Cape Afrikaners and ultimately had to limit himself to tactical operations in the strategically relatively unimportant northwestern Cape Colony. In contrast the British measures, from a military point of view, were starting to bear positive results. Whatever could be said from an ethical and moral standpoint regarding Kitchener’s widespread destruction of the two Boer republics and the concentration camps, this policy was an undoubted success, judged from a purely military point of view. The commandos were enveloped in such a tight stranglehold that the republics were completely exhausted by May 1902 and simply not able to continue their struggle. Denis Judd and Keith Surridge’s conclusion is very generous to the Boers when they write: ‘They were not, however, a beaten army. They had kept at bay a force vastly superior in numbers and equipment’.102 If one defines a ‘beaten army’ one like the Germans or Japanese in 1945, then the Boers were not one. But if the yardstick was whether they were able to continue the struggle in any meaningful way and have a realistic hope to better their position, then they were indeed beaten. There is no two ways about it, negotiated settlement or not. The two Boer governments met at Klerksdorp on 9 April 1902, which led to negotiations with the British in Pretoria and the peace conference at Vereeniging in May. On 31 May 1902 at 23:05 the Peace of Vereeniging was signed in Melrose House, Jacob Maré Street, Pretoria, in accordance with which the independent Boer republics became British crown colonies. And so the British attained their ultimate strategic objective and the Boers gave up theirs.

8 Conclusion

The principles of warfare Throughout history some military thinkers have attempted to reduce warfare to a basic formula. Their aim was not necessarily a sterile mathematical exercise, removed from the blood, fear and toil of real warfare, but rather to create an intellectual instrument on the basis of which the academic study of warfare could be structured more soundly. The thinker who perhaps contributed most to formulating the principles of warfare still recognised fairly widely was the British officer, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller. It would be recalled from the first chapter that he served as a young subaltern in the Anglo-Boer War, quite disgusted with the lack of theoretical knowledge amongst his superior officers. Having studied Napoleon’s published correspondence, in 1912 he identified six principles, ‘objective, mass, offensive, security, surprise and movement’.1 These principles are timeless and are valid for warfare per se regardless of time or circumstances. He explained in an article, published in 1915: ‘Do not let my opponents castigate me with the blather that Waterloo was won on the playfields of Eton, for the fact remains geographically, historically and tactically … that it was won on fields in Belgium by carrying out a fundamental principle of war, the principle of mass; in other words by marching on to those fields three Englishmen, Germans or Belgians to every two Frenchmen’. By then Fuller had identified two further principles, ‘economy of force’ and ‘co-operation’.2 Towards the end of his life 131


Fuller emphasised seven principles, ‘Maintenance of the aim, security, mobility, offensive, economy of force, concentration of force and surprise’.3 Fuller’s thoughts exerted a major influence on military curriculums worldwide. The United States armed forces today recognise nine principles, as do many other armed forces: the objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity. By applying these nine principles the late Colonel Harry Summers – arguably one of the foremost strategic thinkers in the USA – delivered a shattering indictment in the early eighties on his country’s actions in Vietnam. This provided a stimulus to the intellectual renaissance in the US armed forces that directly led to the allied victory in the 1991 Gulf War.4 A decade later Summers published a similar review of the Gulf War by using the same nine principles as the basis of his analysis.5 If this approach was useful in analysing the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, then one would certainly not err in using this method to assess the Anglo-Boer War.

Objective This principle refers to the basic war objective. It revolves around the question of what the politicians, who are after all responsible for declaring the state of war, would like to achieve. In an earlier chapter it was seen that Clausewitz stated that war is fundamentally a political instrument to force ‘our will’ on the enemy. This section will examine the question of how the relationship between politics and the war was applied by both parties during the AngloBoer War. The Boers’ initial war aims were expressly of a limited nature. We indicated that the republics’ leadership did not wish to wage a war of conquest nor did they pursue the ideal of territorial expansion or redrawing the Southern African map. They merely wished to maintain the Boer republics’ sovereignty. With this in mind their practical actions displayed a strange dichotomy. Firstly, in the annexed territories, and especially in the Cape Colony, they acted as if they were the permanent governors and not temporary sojourners. They did not only compel the local citizens – who were British subjects – to perform military service and thereby to commit high treason, but

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those who refused to bear arms for the Boer cause were fined or imprisoned. The relevant districts were all but formally annexed in direct disregard of the abovementioned limited political objective. It is true that Steyn twice – in October 1899 and February 1900 – proposed that a third Boer republic be established, which would have been more consistent with the official policy, but matters never developed to that point. The peace offer that Kruger and Steyn directed to the British on 5 March 1900 on the recommendation of Joubert6 appears to be out of character. In this offer the two heads of state maintained that they initiated the war for the sole purpose of defending their independence and not to undermine the British authority in South Africa or as a result of some conspiracy to extend the Boers’ authority over the whole of South Africa. According to them the war was being continued merely ‘to ensure and maintain the indisputable independence of both our republics as sovereign international states’.7 It was to be expected that the British would reject the offer8 and it is not overly important for the purpose of this study. It was surprising though that the republics lay so much emphasis on their status as sovereign states. Transvaal did not fully comply with this status, as Art. 4 of the 1884 London Convention stipulated that the Transvaal was not empowered to conclude any treaties with any third state – save with the Free State – without British concurrence.9 It was clear in any event that that the Boer leadership in due course became convinced that this initial war objective was impractical. Practical experience indicated that the Boers could only win the war if it was to be expanded to the whole of South Africa and if the Cape Afrikaners were to rise en masse. Especially the latter event would engender fundamental political changes, and thus the war objective would have had to be expanded. For this reason it was formally decided at the Waterval meeting on 20 June 1901 that the Cape Colony should declare a unilateral independence and become a ‘third party’ to the war, in other words, a third Boer republic. This idea was never concretised for the simple reason that it came too late. In this case we are, therefore, dealing with an event where operational considerations dictated an amendment to the strategy, although the reverse normally happens.


Another important aspect of the strategy was the functioning of the military alliance between the Transvaal and the Free State. Both states were completely dependent on the other and it was thus unthinkable that one party could unilaterally withdraw from the conflict, as has happened in other military alliances in history. The Boer republics had a single common strategic objective and their survival depended on a continuing unanimity regarding that objective. It strikes one, however, that the Transvalers repeatedly lost heart and tried to renege on their agreement with the Free State. Steyn was quite outspoken before war broke out: ‘I will not agree to the war until one minute before the inevitable, but know this: if I at last utter the word ‘war!’, then you must not come back and speak to me of peace. Once we are at war we will continue to the bitter end’.10 But because he was attempting to avoid going to war until the last inevitable moment, some prominent Transvalers accused Steyn of cowardice. ‘The Free State only wants to escape – but this is nothing; the Transvaal once fought alone [1880–1881] and could do it again’.11 This accusing finger came from Schalk Willem Burger, member of the Transvaal Executive Council (cabinet) and subsequently Acting President after Kruger went into exile. After the war the Transvaal’s envoy in Europe, Dr W.J. Leyds, described Burger as the ‘most vacillating among all the leaders’.12 Steyn observed the first sign of the Transvalers’ vacillation when he visited Pretoria during the first half of May 1900. He encountered an aged Kruger who was so pessimistic that he was contemplating surrender. It required all Steyn’s powers of persuasion to assuage Kruger’s negativity.13 Only a fortnight later Kruger, having been influenced by Botha and other Transvaal officers, again expressed the notion to lay down arms, albeit under protest. Again Steyn and de Wet had to step into the breach to encourage and put some backbone into their Transvaal counterparts.14 But matters went from bad to worse. After the drawn-out Battle of Dalmanutha (22 to 27 August 1900) Botha was in a despairing mood and again tried to convince Kruger to throw in the towel. Kruger was quite amenable and Steyn had to intervene yet a third time to shore up the Boer war effort.15 Then followed the disagreeable episode of the Transvaal letters to Steyn and the latter’s reply in May 1901 which was elucidated in a

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previous chapter.16 And later during the war Steyn conducted some exhaustive correspondence with Burger to encourage the latter amidst his vacillation.17 The frequent differences of opinion between the two allies on such a fundamental matter as the strategic objective of the war invariably had demonstrable effects on the operational conduct of the war. It was indicated in Chapter 6 that de Wet knew full well that his Transvaal counterpart did not share his own strong feelings regarding the preservation and continuation of the republics’ independence. This was more likely than not the reason why de Wet did not participate in executing the Syferfontein war plan.18 And this was in turn one of the most important reasons why this ambitious plan came to nought. The British also realised fairly soon that the Free Staters were much more determined than their Transvaal brethren and they attempted to capitalise on this factor. Kitchener already knew about this by January 1901.19 He was dealt even a stronger hand when the correspondence Between Steyn and the Transvalers of 10 and 15 May was intercepted. ‘The correspondence found in Steyn’s baggage … shows very clearly the state of affairs – The Free Staters are evidently those that now keep the war going and I will do my best to make them regret it’, Kitchener wrote to Brodrick.20 He took his chance towards the end of the war. In January 1902 the Dutch Prime Minister, Abraham Kuyper, offered to mediate between the British and the Boers. The British reply was a courteous refusal.21 Kitchener then sent copies of this correspondence to Burger and Botha.22 It strikes one that he did not have the courtesy to inform either Steyn or de Wet. There is no documentary proof, but it is certainly consistent with Kitchener’s attitude that he would hope that this correspondence would nudge the vacillating Transvalers in the direction of surrender, while he knew that this correspondence would not cut any ice with the Free Staters. In the event, the Transvalers reacted exactly as he had hoped. At the April 1902 Klerksdorp meeting with their Free State counterparts they took the lead in seeking peace. On the other side, the British political objective was quite drastic, being the destruction of the independent Boer republics and establishing in their stead British crown colonies. This objective remained


constant throughout the war although this was executed by different means. Only towards the end of the war signs of doubt started emerging. More than a month before the outbreak of war, Chamberlain and Milner, being the politicians in charge of Britain’s policy towards the Boer republics, reached consensus about the British war aims. In a letter on 4 September 1899 Milner identified the following three points: • ‘Absolute equality of status for all resident whites. • ‘Recognition of British paramountcy, including not only control of foreign relations but ultimate right of interference even in internal affairs, when welfare of S. Africa is affected. • ‘Disarmament measures, including dismantling of forts at Johannesburg and Pretoria, restriction on number of men and guns – these not to be increased without British permission’.23 The British were, therefore, initially willing to countenance a limited form of self-government, but wanted to take complete command of the Transvaal’s foreign and security policy, and even reserved the right to interfere in internal policies. For his part, Chamberlain wrote explicitly that not the franchise for the Uitlanders was at stake, but rather ‘that our supremacy in S. Africa and our existence as a great Power in the world are involved in the result of the present controversy’.24 An ultimatum was drafted to implement these aims. Among other things, Britain demanded the status of most favoured nation, not only regarding trade, but all matters pertaining to British subjects in Transvaal. Furthermore, Transvaal had to rescind its treaty with Portugal about the import of weapons through Mozambique and take steps to limit its ‘excessive armaments’.25 After the conventional phase of the war turned against the Boers, the British escalated their war aims considerably. The reply of 11 March 1900 by the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, to Presidents Kruger and Steyn regarding the latters’ offer of peace reflects great determination and self-assurance. The British government was of the opinion that the republics had abused their independence and, therefore, could not continue in existence.26 In other words, even limited self-government, as envisaged before the war,

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was out. And a year later when Kitchener met Botha at Middelburg, the latter was not willing to consider the republics’ independence at all, though he indicated that he was amenable to subsidiary matters being discussed.27 It appears as if Chamberlain’s attitude at the end of December, 1900, that ‘the best settlement would be one which left them [the Boers] fairly satisfied with their condition’, was, for the time being, not acted upon. At any rate, the British government rejected almost every condition put forth by Botha at the talks.28 In the meantime the war continued and cost the British tax payer a fortune. At the end of 1901 the war had already consumed £200 million; a huge amount for those days.29 Three quarters of the members of the British Cabinet in 1902, and Kitchener too, were prepared to grant substantial concessions to end the war forthwith.30 At the same time, the government was pressuring Kitchener to reduce the number of troops in South Africa, possibly to as little as 140 000 men.31 Quite independently of each other two leading Liberals, Lord Morley and David Lloyd George, sensed a weakening of the official intransigent stance. Both agreed that Britain would have agreed to the recognition of the Boer republics’ independence if the Boers had been able to continue the struggle some time longer.32 Historians do not provide conclusive evidence of this. Arthur Davey concludes, for instance, that although the Liberal Party and other pro-Boers were rather weak and demoralised in 1899, they nonetheless did play a role to diminish the British public’s enthusiasm for the war in the period up to 1902.33 On the other hand, Stephen Koss is of the opinion that the pro-Boers’ influence only showed with the general election of 1906, when the Liberals beat the Tories.34 Nevertheless, the important factor here is that the British did not publicise that they were harbouring doubts about their conduct of the war. Their opponents could, therefore, find no solace or encouragement in this doubt. The Boers were in any event simply in no position to continue fighting after May 1902.

Unity of command Unity of command is another factor shaping the relationship between politics and war and this is of great importance in virtually


every war. There should be a proper demarcation between the respective areas of political and military authority. It should be clear who is in supreme command in the military hierarchy. If the unity of command becomes diluted then it is not clear who gives direction and the war effort will consequently lose its resolute character which is indispensable for obtaining the final victory. The formal position in the Boer Republics was that the political leadership of the Transvaal resided with the State President and the military leadership with the Commandant General. However, the latter was a politician, chosen in peacetime by the electorate. In the Free State the State President combined the political and the military leadership roles. During the first months of the war the Free State had no rank equivalent to Commandant General. According to the Commando Act the commandants were supposed to elect chief commandants on the various fronts to act as local commanders in chief. This formal position harboured a strange anomaly. In accordance with the Political Treaty of 1897 one Boer republic had to go to the aid of the other if the political independence of that republic was being threatened. They accordingly standardised their commando laws and agreed that the supreme command would reside with that state whose independence was threatened.35 Because it was primarily the Transvaal’s independence being threatened in 1899, the Transvaal Commandant General naturally became Commander in Chief of the combined forces. In other words the political leadership in the Free State resided in the person of President Steyn, but in terms of the Free State’s military leadership he had an inferior status to Joubert’s. It is clear that this anomalous position could create problems in the practical world because it did not cater for all eventualities. Joubert, however, never enforced the overall command position as he could have in theory. He devoted himself to the struggle on the Natal front and only gave advice on rare occasions to officers on the other fronts. In practice Kruger and Steyn executed the political and the military leadership; operating jointly and in close consultation. Their opinions were decisive in establishing the relevant military priorities on the one or the other front and they also took the most important strategic and operational decisions.36

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The two heads of state sometimes went further and involved themselves in tactical matters, although not by unacceptable means. Some examples: Just after the Boers had to retreat on the Cape western front at the Battle of Modder River (28 November 1899), Cronjé and de la Rey had a difference of opinion about what positions to occupy next. de la Rey eventually approached Steyn who personally went to inspect the terrain then gave the nod in de la Rey’s favour.37 Kruger also sent some urgent messages on the eve of the Battle of Colenso (15 December 1899) to Botha that he should not prematurely give up some of the relevant key positions on the Tugela River.38 Finally, Kruger advised Joubert during Buller’s offensive of February 1900 to occupy a specific line of defence. It so happens that these were exactly the lines that Botha also intended using.39 The above indicates that there was a sound relationship between the political and military leadership in the Boer republics during the opening phase of the war. It is generally agreed that the military would not become involved in politics and neither would the political leaders interest themselves in tactical decision making. When this happens, matters often go awry. During the First World War the German General Staff instituted what was practically a military dictatorship and prescribed to the politicians the strategic and operational conduct of the war. The other extreme is represented by President Lyndon B. Johnson who interfered in the course of the Vietnam War right down to the finest tactical detail and even pointed out the daily targets in the air war. It is also said that the South African government interfered in the tactical decision taking process during Operation Modular in 1987, when the South Africans were assisting Unita to ward off an offensive by the Angolan government MPLA troops in 1987. This interference apparently led to some strong negative consequences.40 This then was the position during the opening months of the Anglo-Boer War. It would change a great deal later on. de Wet was appointed as Acting Chief Commandant on the western front as his predecessor died in a shooting accident. His strong personality allowed him to rise in more sense than one above his fellow chief commandants, with the result that his position as Chief Commandant and Commander in Chief of the Free State forces was formalised on 18 April when Steyn formally appointed him.41


This step had two practical consequences for the Free State command structure. Firstly the rank of Chief Commandant was made equal to that of Commandant General, and secondly Steyn relinquished his theoretical position as Operational Commander in Chief in favour of de Wet, and retained the political leadership. This would remain the position until the end of the war. In all subsequent cases where Steyn became involved in military decisions he did so only with political considerations in mind. Joubert died in March 1900, Kruger went into exile during September and their positions were filled by Botha and Burger respectively. The formal relations between them initially remained similar to those between their predecessors. Burger for instance forbade Botha to proceed to the Cape Colony in February 1901 and in March of that year ordered to break off his negotiations with Kitchener, which culminated in the Middelburg meeting of 28 February 1901.42 But as the war progressed, so did the nature of their relationship also change. Botha had a much more dynamic personality than Burger and thus started assuming more political responsibilities. During the course of 1901 he received authority to appoint and to determine the localities of special courts, special native commissioners in certain districts, political prosecutors and magistrates (landdrosts).43 When the peace negotiations commenced in May 1902 it was Botha who took the political lead among the Transvalers. Botha, and not Burger, was thus de facto the political leader of the Transvaal when the war ended. It could, therefore, be deduced from the above that especially during the guerrilla warfare phase there was virtually never a proper division between the political and the military leaderships of the Boer republics. The theory that was supposed to govern these relationships was in any event nonsensical. The practical side was also completely deficient. Only during the latter half of the war was there some semblance of order in the Free State’s affairs. The reason for this state of affairs probably lies in the republics’ loose and informal character. The latter was directly responsible that influential politicians were elected as Commandant General or Commandants. These persons may conceivably have had some political leadership qualities, but they were virtually without exception completely unsuited to any military rank.

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The relationship between the political and military leaderships in Britain was much more formal and well established. Prime Minister Lord Salisbury left the political leadership virtually completely in the hands of the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, and the Minister of War (initially Lord Lansdowne and subsequently St John Brodrick). It could not be ascertained whether or not they ever involved themselves in any operational matters. It should be added though that Brodrick clearly exerted more direct control over Kitchener than Lansdowne did over Roberts. According to Keith Surridge, the government ‘gave Roberts carte blanche and in effect renounced any influence over the forthcoming campaign. Indeed, Lansdowne was quite content to let Roberts pursue his own plan of action, the only criterion being he should meet with success’. However, he adds the caveat that Lansdowne had little room to manoeuvre in the light of the avalanche of criticism directed to the War Office after Buller’s and Methuen’s initial reverses. ‘Thus, both he and the rest of the government were to find they had little room to manoeuvre in their dealings with the military and later found it very difficult to ensure that political requirements during the campaign were giver full and objective consideration by Roberts’. At the same time, Milner tried to interfere ‘in matters that were not his responsibility’, but found that his concerns were not taken into account either.44 In other words, during the first part of the war the military successfully determined not only operational matters, but also strategic ones, which were properly the politicians’ area of responsibility. Only once did Lansdowne make his displeasure known. That was about Roberts’ initial lenient handling of the Boers shortly after invading the Free State. As de Wet’s resistance campaign got underway, Lansdowne admonished Roberts that the Boers had ‘grossly abused’ his confidence. He encouraged the military commander in instituting ‘thorough going measures for disarming the suspect part of the population’ and inflicting ‘stern retribution where unfair advantage has been taken of your clemency’.45 This coincided in any case with Roberts’ own views, and he carried it out without being pushed. On the other hand, Brodrick twice successfully interfered in strategic matters. The first was when Kitchener proposed that most of the


captured burghers, women and children should be deported en masse to Fiji, Madagascar and Dutch India (modern day Indonesia). Brodrick nipped this plan in the bud.46 At another occasion Kitchener wanted to deport the wives of Steyn, Burger, de Wet, and Hertzog from South Africa. Fearing the negative international political fall-out, Brodrick forbade this.47 In contrast to the cordial and professional relation between Brodrick and Kitchener, the latter had a continual running fight with Milner about the conduct of the war. Kitchener was a professional soldier who wanted to win the war and go home, like all soldiers wish to do. In the process, he was prepared to deal quite leniently with the Boer leaders, for whom he even had a grudging admiration. Milner, on the other hand, wanted to undermine the Boer leaders’ authority and exclude them from future politics and replace them with a pro-British leadership.48 In the end, of course, Kitchener prevailed. With these exceptions Roberts and Kitchener had a free hand to conduct the war according to their plans.

Offensive Clausewitz wrote that quite apart from any other consideration, defence is intrinsically superior to the offensive.49 (This principle is still recognised today, as most armed forces require for any successful offensive a ratio of at least 3 attackers to 1 defender.) The objective of defence is protection, and that of the offensive is conquest. In other words, he said, defence has a negative objective, whereas the offensive has a positive aim. ‘If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned this as soon as we are is strong enough to pursue a positive object’,50 in other words the offensive. One can easily explain this apparent paradox. It depends directly on the political objective of the war. Should it be a party’s objective merely to preserve the status quo and to prevent the other party from conquering the defending party – in other words the objective is not to wage a war of conquest against the enemy – then it is perfectly in order to assume a strategically and operationally defensive posture (accompanied by both defensive and offensive tactical oper-

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ations). This happened for instance during the second half of the Korean War. Pres. Harry Truman abandoned his initial objective of subjugating North Korea and henceforth merely wished to preserve the status quo ante bellum. Consequently, the allied forces did not embark on any further offensive actions and remained on the defensive. If one, however, would like to conquer the other party’s territory, or to deal him a blow so hard that he will no longer constitute a danger to one’s security, then there is no other choice. One has to attempt to take the offensive. This would be the only way to obtain a favourable solution to the war. The two republics hardly fulfilled either of the above categories. They did not cross their borders with any offensive strategy in mind. They merely assumed some favourable defensive positions whence they could confront any British offensive. This matter was discussed in the second chapter. The conclusion reached then is also valid here: both the theory of war and the practice demanded that the Boers take the offensive. In view of their lack of insight in the above theory, their uncoordinated actions and a lack of discipline and organisation, it follows that their ‘offensive’ was doomed from the start. Later during the war the Boers attempted twice – the Syferfontein and the Waterval war plans – to take the strategic and operational offensive. Again a lack of co-ordination and mutual trust scuppered the plans. On the other hand the British were planning an offensive war even before it broke out. Their first pre-war plans, the initiatives by Roberts, and Kitchener’s drives all had one factor in common: The British had to assume the offensive and maintain it to the end. They realised that they could only conquer the Boer republics – which was after all their war objective – by taking the offensive in order to attain their goal. This was one of the crucial differences between the two parties and a reason why the British eventually conquered the Boers.

Mass and economy of force The following is an explanation of the principle of mass furnished in an American military handbook: ‘Superior combat power must be


concentrated at the critical time and place for a decisive purpose. Superiority results from the proper combination of the elements of combat power. Proper application of the principle of mass, in conjunction with the other principles of war, may permit numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive combat superiority’. This principle may also be termed concentration. The same handbook has this to say regarding the second principle: ‘Skilful and prudent use of combat power will enable the commander to accomplish the mission with minimum expenditure of resources. This principle is the corollary of the principle of mass. It does not imply husbanding but rather the measured allocation of available combat power to the primary task as well as the secondary tasks such as limited attacks, the defense, deception or even retrograde action in order to insure sufficient combat power at the point of decision’.51 There is thus a close relationship between these two principles. The one that mainly refers to tactical and operational matters also deals with sufficient power being concentrated at the crucial moment at the decisive location to ensure victory. The other, which is more strategically oriented, concerns the correct application of power to ensure that the war effort is as efficient and effective as possible on all fronts. When the war broke out the republics had two – temporary – advantages, namely superiors numbers and the freedom to decide how and where to take the strategic offensive. Starting with the second factor: the Boers lost all the advantage they could have obtained already during the first few days of the war. They were at a disadvantage in that the strategic and operational situation really dictated an offensive war to them, but they were simply not able to conduct such a war. They moreover neglected to destroy the British forces on their borders within a short time and to advance to those localities that were crucial to a successful defensive posture. It is for this reason that the Boers were not able to capitalise on their clearly superior numbers, which enabled the enemy to eventually amass vastly superior forces. Britain was able to tap its population of 42 million persons, 52 as well as the reserves from its Empire. In contrast the Boer republics in 1899 disposed of a total white population of 370 000, 53 and – because of strate-

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gic and operational shortcomings – were not able to augment their numbers from the reservoir of Cape Afrikaners. Eventually only some 6,000 to 7,000 Cape Afrikaners, from an Afrikaner population of 260 000, 54 joined the commandos. A few hundred foreign volunteers, mostly from Europe, also joined the Boer forces. These are the hard figures: 34 000 armed burghers (and about 20 000 in reserve) and 27 054 armed British troops saw the first few days of the war on South African soil.55 When peace was declared on 31 May 1902 there were 21 256 armed burghers left, opposing a total of 210 221 British soldiers.56 An important allied strategic fact was the British maritime supremacy. Britain is traditionally a maritime power and this materially contributed to the British conquest of Napoleon, and also the First and Second World Wars. This was also the case with the Anglo-Boer War. The Boers were not able to impede the transport of British reinforcements and supplies by sea. The only remaining route connecting the republics with the outside world was the Delagoa Bay railway line which became increasingly difficult to defend as the war progressed. Towards the end of the war a tenuous communications line was established between the Boer forces in the northwestern Cape Colony and German South West Africa. In effect the British maintained an economic stranglehold on the republics from which they were not able to escape. Their predominance and permanent emphasis on the operational offensive saw to it that the British were in a position to concentrate sufficient forces at the right places and times without weakening their position elsewhere. The British were thus able to execute the principle of mass better than the Boers. In terms of the economic utilisation of force, the republics seriously depleted their already scarce resources, especially towards the end of the war, and were thus not able to maintain themselves against the might of the British Empire. The British regarded their war effort in South Africa in a serious light, and they had to devote increasingly strong forces as the war progressed, but they had the wherewithal to achieve this and to maintain the rest of their responsibilities in the Empire at the same time.


Manoeuvre The essence of this principle is ‘to dispose a force in such a manners as to place the enemy at a relative disadvantage and thus achieve results which would otherwise be more costly in men and material’.57 The British military thinker, Basil Liddell Hart, devoted virtually his whole productive life in pursuit of this principle and its ramifications. Towards the end of his life he summarised the core of his thoughts in two parts: ‘The first is that in the face of the overwhelming evidence of history no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position. The second, that instead of seeking to upset the enemy’s equilibrium by one’s attack, it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully launched’.58 The Boer republics complied with these principles only in their breach. Their actions during the first, conventional phase of the conflict was in this respect strategically and operationally extremely amateurish and ran counter to every grain of common military sense. Operationally matters progressed much better during the guerrilla phase. Commanders such as de Wet, de la Rey, Botha and Smuts regularly deceived the enemy, caught them off-sides and thus dealt them heavy blows. After the vacillation and incompetence of the initial British commanders, Buller and Gatacre, a completely different figure took to the centre stage, namely Lord Roberts. In contrast with his predecessor he realised that the operational situation necessitated the destruction of the Boer forces, but that this could be achieved only by means of an intelligent and indirect approach in practice. The consequences of this approach was described in Chapter 5: although Roberts succeeded in defeating the Boers, he was able to put into practice the required destruction operations only once, because he lacked the military instruments needed for his subtle and indirect approach. This occurred when he forced Cronjé and 4,000 men to surrender at Paardeberg on 27 February 1900. The rest of his campaign was strategically not a success. The Boers’ transformation to the guerrilla phase caught the British psychologically and physically on the wrong foot. We indicated that the Syferfontein war plan had a chance of succeeding if it was properly executed and thus allowing the Boer republics to win the war. de Wet’s refusal to co-operate caused this plan to fail.

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In June 1901 the republics again tried to regain the operational initiative, but it was too late. Botha’s attempted invasion of Natal was an unmitigated disaster. Although Smuts advanced into the Cape Colony, he was not able to foment an uprising among Cape Afrikaners. It follows that his invasion was a strategic failure. Meanwhile Kitchener started exerting a stranglehold on the Boers from which they were never able to extricate themselves. The blockhouse lines, drives, scorched earth and concentration camps forced the Boers on their knees towards May 1902. In contrast thus with the operations by Roberts, Kitchener’s measures were successful and culminated in the British reaching their ultimate strategic objective on 31 May 1902.

Security and surprise These principles are inextricably intertwined. The first factor denotes ‘measures to prevent surprise, preserve freedom of action, and deny the enemy information of friendly forces’. Surprise ‘results from striking an enemy at a time, place and in a manner for which he is not prepared. It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively’. Surprise is achieved by means of speed, misleading the enemy, effective information and counter-information, etc.59 Both of these principles are to be found on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It is clear that the republics often excelled – but frequently also did not – in these principles. de la Rey’s idea to place the trenches below the Magersfontein hills, rather on the summit as conventional wisdom would have it, was a typical example of the virtually instinctive tactical skills of the Boer commanders and which they probably gained through their intimate knowledge of hunting and the veldt. Especially commanders such as de la Rey, de Wet and Smuts applied these principles frequently and with much gusto. de Wet completely deceived and outfoxed the British during his advance southwards in February 1901 and this jewel deserves being described in detail in any military handbook. At the same time it should be admitted that there were other commanders, especially at the initial stages of the war, who had absolutely no understanding of these principles. Persons such as Joubert, Cronjé and others were


obstinate, impudent and incompetent. Wherever they were in command matters invariably ended in a complete shambles for the Boers. On the other hand the British had only one commander who had a proper understanding of the art of deception, namely Lord Roberts. The manoeuvres by which he completely deceived the Boers at the end of February 1900, which culminated in Cronjé’s surrender at Paardeberg, was a master stroke and should equally be studied by every military student. His predecessors, Methuen and Buller, were the British equivalents of Joubert and Cronjé. His successor, Kitchener, was more of a manager than a strategist. The better Boer commanders, such as de Wet, de la Rey and Smuts excelled in gathering information. They frequently sent out scouts near and far to observe the British movements so that the Boers could take informed decisions regarding their own movements. Cronjé’s surrender was a direct consequence of not believing the reports of his scouts and also his deficient deployment of scouts. Only during the latter part of the war, as the British started using colonials and Boer traitors, this aspect gained acceptance among the British. As a result they scored greater tactical and operational successes than during the initial conventional phase of the war.

Simplicity An American handbook states: ‘Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Direct, simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. If other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferred’.60 The initial Boer war plan was simple in the extreme. In fact, for all practical purposes it was only a vague idea and not a true war plan. The Syferfontein and Waterval war plans that followed later during the war were also simple, but were elaborated in such a fashion that they too do not deserve being classified as real war plans. During the war the British had various war plans – in varying degrees of simplicity – but only one would gain high marks, namely that of Roberts.

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In summary the two parties complied with the classical principles of warfare:

The Boer republics Completely The objective Unity of command Offensive Mass Economic use of power Manoeuvre Security Surprise Simplicity

Partially

Not at all X

X X X X X X X X

The British Completely The objective Unity of command Offensive Mass Economic use of power Manoeuvre Security Surprise Simplicity

Partially

Not at all

X X X X X X X X X

It is striking that the British performed much better than the Boers. And this is the basic reason why the Boers lost the war.

The economy However important the above principles of war may be, they do not provide the full range of reasons why the Boers lost the war. The element lacking in this equation lies in the strategic domain. It has to do with international politics and the economy. A myriad of historians have indicated that the early economic advantages Britain gained by its industrial revolution after 1815 were lost to a certain extent during the last few decades of the nineteenth


century, as the USA and Germany, and to a lesser extent France and Italy, made up much of their lost ground. Britain manufactured 22.9 percent of all the world’s products in 1880, but this dropped to 13.6 percent in 1914. In 1880 Britain’s share of the world trade amounted to 23.2 percent, but it decreased to 14.1 percent towards 1911–1913.61 The following table indicates how its position of leadership was whittled away by other states, relating to the industrial capacity of the major powers between 1880 and 1938, using British production in 1900 as 100:

Britain United States Germany France Russia Austria-Hungary Italy Japan

1880

1900

1913

1928

1938

73.3 46.8 27.4 25.1 24.5 14.0 8.1 7.6

100 127.8 71.2 36.8 47.5 25.6 13.6 13.0

127.2 298.1 137.7 57.3 76.6 40.7 22.5 25.1

135 533 158 82 72 – 37 45

181 528 214 74 152 – 46 88

Source: Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers since 1500, p. 201.

Lawrence James writes: ‘Britain lagged behind in the development of new industrial technologies and production methods, leaving the United States and Germany to make the pace in chemicals, oil, electrical engineering and motor cars. It was paradoxical that during the 1870s and 1880s, those vital accessories for Britain’s imperial campaigns, Gatling and Nordenfelt machine guns, were manufactured in America’.62 The pessimistic head of the Royal Navy, Adm. Jackie Fisher, warned that ‘the United Kingdom by itself will not be strong enough to hold its proper place alongside the U.S., or Russia, and probably not Germany. We shall be thrust aside by sheer weight’.63 Nevertheless, in 1899 Britain was still by far the strongest world power, and even more so when compared with the two small Boer republics. Britain’s position as the world’s financial centre is reflected by the immense amount of $19.5 billion which British businessmen and financiers invested abroad during 1914.64 When the Anglo-Boer War broke out on 11 October 1899 there was no international power who was able or willing to challenge the British eco-

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nomic and maritime supremacy and to come to the aid of the Boer republics. In contrast with the mighty Britain the two Boer republics were insignificant. The Free State had a pastoral economy with a few diamond mines within its borders. The Transvaal economy, it is true, had expanded fast after the discovery of gold in 1886 and by 1898 the country already accounted for 27 percent of the world’s gold production. The mining tax earned by the fast expanding production figures brought some £138 000 to the Transvaal’s state coffers in 1887, which increased to £1 500 000 within two years after that and by 1895 the state’s income rose to 25 times its 1887 earnings. At the outbreak of war approximately £75 million were invested in the gold mine sector, approximately 75 percent of which emanated from Britain.65 But all this did not amount to much. The Free State had no industries at all and the Transvaal only had two dynamite factories at the outbreak of war.66 In terms of industrial capacity this meant that the republics were only able to manufacture some ammunition and to repair some firearms. This capacity ended during the guerrilla phase when the republics’ capitals were overrun and the Boers consequently had to seize all their supplies, from bullets to bully beef, from the British. In summary one needs to consider the question again: why did the Boers lose the war? When asked in 1988 how the Vietnamese won their war against the French and Americans, the famous General Vo Nguyen Giap told his American biographer, Cecil B. Currey: ‘How to gain victory [over the French and later the Americans] with fewer troops? Victory goes to the more powerful. Yet our country was feudal. France, Japan and the United States all came to Viet Nam; these three foreign nations were capitalistic with high industrial output at a time when Viet Nam was only in the handicraft stage of production. So we faced the factors of matériel, weapons, military means, and general logistics. ‘We had to solve our problems. We had to learn how to use inferior means to achieve victory. We had to discover how to make poor logistics work to gain victory over our enemies. For sixty to seventy years, the Vietnamese people failed to resolve these issues. They were courageous, but that wasn’t enough. Then we learned the secret method of a people’s war. Thirty million people provided


thirty million soldiers. Thus President Ho Chi Minh said when we began our resistance against the French, ‘Who has a gun should use it; who has a knife, use it; who has not, use sticks and stones’. That is the essence of a people’s war – they rose up to fight … an entire nation stood up to fight for freedom and independence’. The Boers had similar problems against the mighty British. Their countries were also predominantly pastoral, compared to the advanced industrialised British economy. After they had lost the conventional phase of the war, they also in essence tried a ‘people’s war’ in that their manpower was taxed to the utmost limit. Both elderly grandfathers and their teenage grandsons were a common sight on commando alongside men of a normal fighting age. But they could not emulate the Vietnamese ‘thirty million’ fighters; there were simply too few of them. In addition, no sympathetic foreign power would come to their aid; their organisational skills and discipline left much to be desired; and they allowed each and every opportunity that they may have had to clinch the war in their favour to slip through their fingers by virtue of a lack of knowledge, overconfidence, bad planning and a lack of drive. In contrast the British started the war badly, but they learned from their mistakes as time progressed and eventually subjugated the Boers by brute force and clever actions. Humanly speaking this war could not have had any other conclusion. It was a deed of faith and an audacious undertaking to take the British on in a war. This daring feat failed, but the deed of faith became a beacon of hope to the Afrikaners in the subsequent decades. In this respect, seen from the Afrikaners’ perspective, the struggle was certainly not in vain.

The significance of the Anglo-Boer war in military history Was the British strategy a wise one? In any war the military means and objectives are so closely interwoven with political, social and economic considerations that one cannot judge Kitchener’s actions in a historical vacuum. There is little doubt that neither Kitchener nor Roberts, who initiated many of Kitchener’s actions, had any sense of the wider implications of their strategic actions. Kitchener saw the war as a purely military matter. But the Peace of Vereeniging did not destroy

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the Afrikaners’ desire to be free; quite the contrary. It lay the foundation for decades of bitter enmity between Afrikaners on the one hand and Britain and English speakers on the other. It would hence bedevil the relations between these two South African population groups for years to come. In terms of modern warfare the Anglo-Boer war did not bring a revolution about. Only two factors made a first appearance in the war; both rather on the tactical level, but with operational implications. It was the use of trenches and smokeless gun powder. Although trenches were used in previous wars, the Battle of Magersfontein (11 December 1899) was the first one ever where they were used to conceal the defenders and the line of defence from the attackers. The Boers were thus able to allow the British to approach to a close proximity without the British having any idea where the defenders were. This enabled the defenders to shoot from a short distance and hence with considerable accuracy. The founder of this practice was de la Rey.67 The use of smokeless gun powder was a similar matter. Before the Anglo-Boer War every shot – be it by hand held fire arm or a large artillery piece – was accompanied by a large cloud of smoke, which immediately revealed the gunner’s position. The new smokeless gun powder employed for the first time in 1899 under warlike conditions favoured the defender tremendously if he stayed concealed, as the Boers succeeded in doing so well.68 Neither of these factors constituted a revolution in warfare, but rather the confirmation of a trend that became apparent some time before, namely the natural superiority of the defence over the offensive if all other factors were equal. This had valuable lessons for the operational art. Other military lessons from the war also confirmed what was apparent before. The important role of railways in modern warfare was again emphasised. In more recent times, of course, the railways has had to forego its monopoly as supply line provider because of the increasing importance of the internal combustion engine (motor vehicles) and the aircraft. But arguably the most important lesson that again became apparent from this war, was the importance of the art of the indirect approach. In principle it may not even have been worth it to refer to this aspect, because the indirect approach is timeless and has


proven its validity throughout history. But because the Anglo-Boer War was to be the last major war waged by the British before the First World War, it may be nevertheless be appropriate to devote some brief attention to this aspect. The most prominent Boer commanders, de Wet, Botha, de la Rey and Smuts all at times applied the operational art in such an indirect fashion that it would appear they mastered it at a military academy. But because the British operations drew more international attention at the time and one could, therefore, study these so much more exhaustively in all the published sources we will be employing these to illustrate the point. The attacking methods of Buller, Methuen et al were without exception extremely direct. In all their battles they only had a vague idea of where the Boer lines were and simply stormed in like a bull in a China shop and thereby tried to dislodge the enemy by brute force. In ideal circumstances such an offensive approach may have its advantages over the defence. But there was either no sign of any British attempts, or only inept ones, to discover the Boers’ weak points, to outflank or to surround them, or to sever their lines of supply. Then Roberts arrived. Rarely before in any war did such a marked and significant contrast occur between the direct and the indirect approaches within such a short space of time. If we are even today still impressed by this about turn then one would have thought that the contemporary military theorists would sit up and really take notice. But this was not the case at all. It is true that the Anglo-Boer War drew a great deal of attention and that various authors attempted to distil some lessons from the war.69 The British even instituted a Commission of Inquiry after the war that produced a lengthy report.70 Subsequently a number of other commissions took the matter further which eventually had a marked influence on the British military thinking regarding the country’s broad strategic situation.71 But these lessons were all exclusively in the domain of tactics, organisation and armaments. One cannot detect any of the lessons learnt from Buller and Roberts to have been passed down the line. Not one military thinker allowed his thoughts to roam over the theoretical and basic fundamentals of the strategy, as Clausewitz had

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done some 150 years before and Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller were to do a few decades later. The only person who may have progressed in this direction was G.F.J. Henderson who died at a fairly young age in 1903 before he could realise his budding potential. In other words no one paid the slightest regard to the most relevant operational lesson of the Anglo-Boer War. This is proven by the fact that the book The Operations of War continued exerting a great influence on contemporary Britain. The book was already obsolete when it was first published in 1866, but it nevertheless became the principle source of reference of the British Army. The Army headquarters had it revised in 1907 to continue serving as the standard handbook on the art of operations. The references on tactics were completely revised but, according to Jay Luvaas, ‘other than adding or interpolating a few paragraphs referring to the latest conditions, nothing was done to revise Hamley’s sections on strategy’.72 It was not only the first generation British after 1902 who did not draw any historical lessons from the Anglo-Boer War. Field Marshall Lord Wavell wrote that the Anglo-Boer War had ‘little general effect on the organisations of armies or the theory of war’. He adds: ‘The conditions of the war in South Africa were held by continental experts to be abnormal and the British army out of date’.73 Mankind is still suffering from the results of this shortsightedness. In direct contrast with all common sense the First World War became a massive killing field where the losses in the major battles regularly amounted to tens of thousands per day. These figures are self-explanatory: At Artois and Champagne 380 000 casualties; Verdun 1.2 million; the Somme one million; Ypres 300 000 etc.74 The commanders of both parties were of the same ilk as the foolhardy Buller rather than the intelligent Roberts. Another factor needs to be considered, namely the Anglo-Boer War as a stepping stone in the direction of total warfare. This obviously takes us off on a tangent because it does not concern the central theme of this study. However, when one would like to place the Anglo-Boer War in the context of military history (also in terms of strategy or the art of operations) then one cannot sidestep it. It stands to objective reason that warfare has perforce always been a matter of cruelty. In the antiquity one’s attention is drawn to


Rome’s drastic response to the cities of Carthage and Corinth which were both razed to the ground in 146 BC and their inhabitants abducted in slavery. Although these actions were abhorred in the then civilised world, the Romans nevertheless repeated this kind of action amongst others during the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD and leading to the subsequent diaspora of the Jews across the world.75 Genocide also occurred during the Middle Ages, as evidenced by Charlemagne killing huge numbers of heathen Saxons and the Crusaders’ large scale killing spree in Palestine where thousands of civilian Moslems lost their lives.76 This kind of action found its apogee during the Thirty Years War (1618–648) in which Germany was virtually destroyed and a third of its population was estimated to have been killed.77 The nature of warfare always closely follows social developments. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stood in the sign of the intellectual movement, known as the Aufklärung or Enlightenment. The most important characteristic of the Enlightenment was undoubtedly its rationality. It is regarded as the triumph of the reason over emotion and superstition. It found its expression in the natural sciences, philosophy and politics. But it was also reflected in the military field. Warfare assumed a limited character and adapted itself to the current thoughts, namely balance, rhythm and harmony. The Dutch military historian, F.C. Spits, wrote that war ‘had to be conducted as a game of honour: without fanaticism, passion or hate and as a game it was bound by a thousand rules’. War became a matter of the elite, the nobility, who did not wish to fight one another too hard. War took place on the periphery of society, which was involved only in passing.78 A turning-point occurred in 1789. The revolutionary wars that had Europe in their grip until 1815 brought two new factors to the fore which were to become more important. These were the industrialisation and democratisation of warfare. These phenomena were closely interlinked. The Industrial revolution on the one hand created the possibility to refine weapons of mass destruction, such as the rapid development of the breechloading gun, magazine rifle, machine gun, cannon and missile. These created the possibility of the rapid deployment of these arms and their crews by means of the railways,

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motorised transport, aircraft, helicopters. For this reason it became necessary on the other hand for the fighting parties to affect the economy of the opponents, who were manufacturing arms and transport. This is how the civilian population was again drawn into the spiral of violence.79 The foundation of nationalism in Europe, which at the time was an irrational and emotional ideology, signalled a clear break with the rational and scientific method of warfare of the Enlightenment. Nationalist aggression and imperialism increasingly brought about the transgression of the rules of the previous ‘gentlemen’s wars’ and concomitantly signified a higher propensity to wage war at the expense of the enemy’s civilian population. The establishment of conscription and mass armed forces accelerated this process. Admiral Lord Jackie Fisher thus summarised the psychological revolution in warfare: ‘It is quite silly not to make war damnable to the whole mass of your enemy’s population. When war comes, might is right …’80 The military history of the nineteenth century provides ample proof of this change of tack. During the American Civil War (1862–1865) Federal General William Tecumseh Sherman left a trail of blood and destruction through the Confederate South and created a significant precedent. ‘This was an example of total war, ruthlessly executed … He [Sherman] was waging war against the enemy’s civilian population just as much as against the armed forces of that enemy’, according to Montgomery.81 During the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) the Germans sometimes imposed strenuous conditions on civilians,82 although it did not approximate those of the American Civil War. We referred earlier to the actions of the Spanish General Weyler in Cuba, while the Americans also employed concentration camps during the uprising in the Philippines (1900–1902).83 The practice of the Anglo-Boer War added two new factors to this general line of development. The first factor was the total character of the British strategic objective, being the complete destruction of the two Boer republics. It should be recalled that the Europeans traditionally drew a distinction between a war of ‘civilised’ states and a war with ‘uncivilised’ tribes in Africa and Asia. In the latter event there were virtually no rules in order to subjugate by all means, fair or foul, such tribes or nations to the colonial masters.


Transvaal and the Free State definitely complied to be termed as ‘civilised’ states, even though the British saw them at best only as half-civilised. The international community freely accepted them as such and they maintained diplomatic relations with the major European powers. It was thus now unprecedented that one ‘civilised’ state demanded of another that it should subjugate itself completely to the wishes of that ‘civilised’ state and to abrogate its own independence. The second factor concerns not so much the British actions against the Boer civilian population (this was described elsewhere), but rather that this militated directly against international agreements, as embodied in the Hague Convention on the Law of War of 1899, a few months before the Anglo-Boer War broke out. The British frequently maintained that this Convention was not applicable vis a vis the Boer republics because the latter were not signatories. But, as S.B. Spies quite correctly points out, Britain happened to be a signatory and for its part was thus very much bound by its stipulations.84 It was the first time that a state was to ignore international rules regulating warfare. Ironically enough this was the exact reason that led to the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leaders after the Second World War and in more modern times the trials in The Hague against the Serbian war criminals. The post-1902 history is a direct continuation of the above developments. The Germans repeatedly violated the Hague Convention during the First World War. The examples from the Second World War are well-known: The Nazis’ barbaric actions against the Jews, Gypsies and other civilians; the carbon copy actions by the Soviets against innocent parties; and also the massive air bombing campaigns by especially the Allies in which tens and even hundreds of thousands civilians perished in a single night. During the Cold War the possibility of the most absolute and total war in all history hung like the sword of Damocles over all mankind. The nuclear threat meant that no person anywhere was safe. Even today there are still enough nuclear arms to obliterate the world and all forms of life ten to twenty times over. The whole of the world’s civilian population were mutual hostages in the struggle for power by the East and the Western blocks. This was the absurd epitome of the two factors introduced after 1789, namely the indus-

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trialisation and democratisation of warfare, in which the Anglo-Boer War played a modest role. The end of the Cold War caused the threat of a worldwide nuclear war to dissipate temporarily, but the notion that civilians represent ‘normal’ or ‘acceptable’ targets, is now deeply ensconced. The deliberate crashing into the World Trade Centre in New York of two passenger aircraft, controlled by fanatical terrorists, on 11 September 2001 is living proof of this trend. A return to the warfare conditions of the Enlightenment when only soldiers were pitted against each other will probably never occur again. More’s the pity.


Notes Introduction 1. Richard Overy, Why the Allies won (New York: Norton, 1995), p. 1. 2. Cf. Niall Ferguson (ed.), Virtual History. Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London: Papermac, 1998). 3. W.J. Hancock, Smuts, the Sanguine Years, 1870–1919, p. 107. 4. Cf. the excellent analyses of Bakkes in ‘Die Militêre Situasie aan die BenedeTugela op die Vooraand van die Britse Deurbraak by Pietershoogte’ [The Military Situation on the Lower Tugela on the Eve of the British Breakthrough at Pieters Heights] (Archives Yearbook for South African History, 1967(I), and Die Britse Deurbraak aan die Benede-Tugela op Majubadag 1900 [The British Breakthrough at the Lower Tugela on Majuba Day 1900].

Chapter 1 1 C. Headlam (ed.), The Milner Papers, I, p. 526 (Chamberlain – Milner, 2 September 1899). 2 G.D. Scholtz, Die Oorsake van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [The Causes of the Second Anglo-Boer War], I, p. 12. 3 G.D. Scholtz, Suid-Afrika en die Wêreldpolitiek, 1652–1952 [South Africa and World Politics, 1652–1952], p. 77. 4 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers – Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, p. 226. 5 J.H. Bird (ed.), The Annals of Natal, 1495–1845, II, p. 665 (Napier – Russell, 6 December 1841). 6 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner [The Development of the Political Thought of the Afrikaner], II, p. 29. 7 Scholtz, Suid-Afrika en die Wêreldpolitiek [South Africa and World Politics], p. 159. 8 J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger’s Republic, p. 159. 9 The Milner Papers, I, p. 359 (Milner – Hely-Hutchinson, 8 May 1899). 10 Scholtz, Suid-Afrika en die Wêreldpolitiek [South Africa and World Politics], p. 116. 11 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, p. 41 12 A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. 363 and 364. 13 Marais, The Fall of Kruger’s Republic, p. 325. 14 Quoted in G.D. Scholtz, Die Afrikaner en die See [The Afrikaner and the Sea], pp. 97–98 from E. Waldschmidt et seq, Geschichte Asiens, p. 271 15 G.D. Scholtz, ‘Die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Wêreldverband’, [The AngloBoer War in International Context], I, Historia 20(1), May 1975, p. 39. 161

162 Notes

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Iain Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899–1902, p. 376. F.A. van Jaarsveld, Lewende Verlede [Living Past], p. 248 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, VIII/3, pp. 582–583. The Milner Papers, I, p. 401 (Milner – Selborne, 24 May 1899). Scholtz, Suid-Afrika en die Wêreldpolitiek [South Africa and World Politics], pp. 226–228. Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army – British Military Thought 1815–1940, pp. 102–103 and 113–114. This aspect is further discussed on pp. ??? Luvaas, The Education of an Army, pp. 141, 143, 145, 149 and 150–151. A.J. Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller, the Intellectual General 1878–1966, p. 11. Rayne Kruger, Good-bye Dolly Gray – the History of the Boer War, p. 62. Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 62 and 64. G.D. Scholtz, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Staatsartillerie’ [The History of the State Artillery] Commando, 5(6), June 1954, p. 7. W.K Hancock and J. van der Poel (eds), Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 324 (memorandum from Smuts, 4 September 1899). F.A. Steytler, ‘General Hertzog as Krygsman’ [General Hertzog as Warrior], Hertzog-Annale, 9(13), December 1960, p. 16. Cf. Also C.M. van den Heever, Generaal J.B.M. Hertzog, p. 106.

Chapter 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8

9 10 11 12 13

Cf. WO 32/847, file 8501 (microfilm A353, TA). Ibid., memorandum by Major E.A. Altham, 3 June 1899. J.L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, III, pp. 463–464. British official History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, I, p. 2. This source will henceforth be referred to as the Official History. Ibid., p. 42 L.S. Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, II, p. 120. This source will henceforth be referred to as the Times History. See Transvaal Green Paper Traktaten gesloten tusschen de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek en den Oranje-Vrijstaat [Treaties concluded between the South African Republic and the Orange Free State], p. 5. Cf. OFS Parliamentary Minutes, 1897, Act No 13 of 1897, and Locale Wetten der Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek [Local Acts of the South African Republic], pp. 169–170, Act No. 16 of 1898. GS 1659(2), pp. 935–936, Steyn – Magistrate of Boshof, 2 October 1899. Office correspondence file TA 14/4/35, Smuts – Dr C. Beyers, 19 October 1948. GS 1659(2), pp. 935–936, Steyn – Magistrate of Boshof, 2 October 1899. Dr W.J. Leyds Archive 738, pp. 234–242, telegraphic conversation between Kruger and Steyn, 20 September 1899 (TA). W.J. Leyds (ed.): Tweede Verzameling (Correspondentie 1899–1900) [Second Collection (Correspondence 1899–1900)], I/I, pp. 31–32 (Reitz – Leyds, 1 October 1899).

Notes 163

14 Leyds Archive 738, p. 296, telegraphic conversation between Kruger and Steyn, 7 October 1899. 15 Ibid., pp. 314–316. 16 Cd. 9530: Further Correspondence relating to the Political Affairs of the South African Republic, No. 16. 17 Official History, I, p. 2. 18 Frederik Rompel, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, p. 66. 19 General J.B.M. Hertzog Collection 95, incomplete memoirs of Hertzog, p. 19. 20 KG 346(1), p. 31, Joubert – Under State Secretary, 6 October 1899. 21 Cf. J.H. Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in SuidAfrika [The History of the Second War of Freedom in South Africa], I, annex F, p. 479, where the complete Proclamation of Occupation is reproduced. 22 Rompel, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, p. 66; Leyds:. Tweede Verzameling [Second Collection], I/1, p. 32 (Reitz – Leyds, 1 October 1899). 23 A182 (TA). 24 Office correspondence file TA 14/4/35, Smuts – Dr C. Beyers, 19 October 1948. 25 H.J.C. Pieterse, My Tweede Vryheidstryd [My Second Freedom Struggle]. 26 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, VIII/6, p. 607. 27 Ibid., I/1, p. 75. 28 Ibid., I/2, p. 94. 29 Cf. J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789–1961, pp. 92–93 and 118. 30 Cd. 457: South African Despatches, I, p. 5 (Roberts – Lansdowne, 6 February 1900). 31 WO 2/847, file 8234 (microfiche A353, TA), memorandum by Sir John Ardagh, October 1896. 32 Cd. 1790: Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, p. 384. 33 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, p. 36. 34 W.L. von R. and I.M.E. Scholtz (eds), ‘Dagboek van C.J. Asselbergs’ [Diary of C.J. Asselbergs], 19 March 1900 (Christiaan de Wet-Annale, 5 October 1978), p. 56. 35 Cf. WO 32/847, file 8501 (microfiche A353, TA), memoranda by Sir John Ardagh and Major E.A. Altham, 6 September 1898 and 11 June 1896 respectively. 36 G.N. van den Bergh, ‘Secret Service in the South African Republic, 1895–1900’. (Military History Journal, 3(2), December 1974), p. 63. The author unfortunately does not state what the results of this investigation were. 37 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 326 (memorandum by Smuts, 4 September 1899). 38 Hertzog Collection 95, Memoirs of Hertzog, p. 19 39 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 562 (reminiscences of Smuts). 40 UR 17, p. 42 Minutes of the OFS Executive Council, Art. 2357, 11 October 1899.

164 Notes

41 KG 332(7), p. 64, Prinsloo – Joubert, 11 October 1899. 42 Marais, The Fall of Kruger’s Republic, p. 321. 43 Cd. 1791: Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, p. 503.

Chapter 3 1 P.A. Nierstrasz, Der Südafrikanische Krieg, II/2, p. 538. This unpublished source is in the Leyds Collection. 2 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, p. 182. 3 Times History, II, p. 153. 4 Leyds archives 709(a), p. 42 Steyn – Kruger, 14 October 1899 (containing Prinsloo – Steyn, 14 October 1899). 5 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, pp. 217–230. 6 KG 333(1), p. 62, Prinsloo – Joubert, 16 October 1899; KG 333(2), p. 195, Prinsloo – Joubert, 19 October 1899. 7 Official History, I, p. 154. 8 N. Hofmeyr, Zes Maanden bij de Commando’s [Six Months with the Commandos], p. 93. 9 Cd. 457: South African Despatches, I, p. 63 (report by White, 2 December 1899). 10 Cf. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, pp. 316–328. 11 Scholtz, Generaal. Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 35–37. 12 J.C.G. Kemp, Vir Vryheid en Reg [For Freedom and Justice], p. 213. Cf. also J.F. Naudé: Vechten en Vluchten van Beyers en Kemp ‘bôkant’ de Wet [The Fighting and Fleeing of Beyers and Kemp above de Wet], p. 45. 13 Times History, II, p. 235. 14 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, p. 328. 15 Deneys Reitz, Commando. A Boer Journal of the Boer War, pp. 42–43. 16 Hofmeyr, Zes Maanden bij de Commandos [Six Months with the Commandos], pp. 119–120. 17 Written report by G.D. Scholtz, 30 June 1970, in the author’s possession. The Times History, II, pp. 232–233 and the Official History, I, p. 185, also refer to the disorderly retreat. 18 Cd. 457: South African Despatches, I, p. 63 (report by White, 2 December 1899). 19 Kemp, Vir Vryheid en Reg [For Freedom and Justice], p. 210. 20 C.G.S. Sandberg, Twintig Jaren onder Krugers Boeren in Voor-en Tegenspoed [Twenty Years among Kruger’s Boers in Good and Bad Times], pp. 227–228. 21 Reitz, Commando, p. 43.

Notes 165

22 KG 352(2), pp. 93–94, Joubert – all Commandants and officers, 3 November 1899. 23 Ibid., p. 133, Joubert – Prinsloo, 11 November 1899. 24 Cf. Naudé, Vechten en Vluchten [Fighting and Fleeing], p. 50, C.J. Barnard: Generaal Louis Botha aan die Natalse Front, 1899–1900 [General Louis Botha on the Natal Front 1899–1900], p. 33. 25 Cf. ‘Dagboek van C.J. Asselbergs’ (Diary of C.J. Asselbergs), 21 February 1900. Christiaan de Wet-annale [Christiaan de Wet Annals], 5 October 1978, p. 24. 26 F.V. Engelenburg, General Louis Botha, pp. 28–29. 27 Dr S.P. Engelbrecht Collection 17, p. 58, Joubert – Kruger, 28 November 1899 (TA). 28 Barnard, General Louis Botha op die Natalse Front [General Louis Botha on the Natal Front], pp. 41–42. 29 KG 336(1), p. 65, HTD – Joubert, 2 December 1899 (containing Erasmus – Kruger, 2 December 1899). 30 Cd. 1791: Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, p. 427. 31 Cf. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, p. 153. 32 A313, General J.H. de la Rey Collection 17, p. 3, reminiscences of General de la Rey. 33 Cf. Official History, II, p. 409. 34 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, p. 396 35 Cd. 457: South Africa Despatches, I, pp. 207–209 (‘Weekly States of the Garrison of Kimberley’). 36 Cf. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, p. 153. 37 Leyds Archives 709(a), p. 86, Steyn – Kruger, 17 October 1899. 38 Leyds Archives 709(c ), p. 205, Cronjé – Government, 22 October 1899. Cf. also Leyds Archives 709(b), p. 112, Kruger – Steyn, 18 October 1899 (containing Kruger – Cronjé, 18 October 1899). 39 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], II, p. 371. 40 Leyds Archives 709(a), p. 86, Steyn – Kruger, 17 October 1899. Cf. also SS 8267, p. 96, R 881/99, Steyn – Kruger, 18 October 1899. 41 Leyds Archives 709(a), p. 62, Steyn – Kruger, 16 October 1899. 42 Cf. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, p. 153 and the Official History , I, pp. 42–43 and 495. 43 Rompel, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, p. 67. 44 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], II, pp. 2 and 457–463. 45 Leyds, Tweede Verzameling [Second Collection], I/1, pp. 150–151 (Reitz – Leyds, 20 October 1899). 46 SS 8267, pp. 84–86, R 878/99, Steyn – Kruger, 27 October 1899.

166 Notes

47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57

Leyds Archives 709(f), p. 477, Kruger – Steyn, 28 October 1899. Leyds Archives 710(a), p. 108, Schoeman – Reitz, 5 November 1899. SS 8739, BB 3485/99, Reitz – Schoeman, 28 October 1899. Leyds Archives 710(a), p. 35, Steyn – HTD, 2 November 1899. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I, p. 441. Leyds Archives 710(a), p. 423, Steyn – Kruger, 13 November 1899 (containing Olivier – Steyn, 13 November 1899). Ibid. Leyds Archives 745(a), HTD – Joubert, 17 November 1899 (containing Schoeman – Kruger, 17 November 1899). Cape Blue Book A.5-1900: Magisterial Reports having Reference to the Occupation by the Enemy of, and the Attitude of the Population in, the Districts now or recently under Martial Law, pp. 23, 35, 74 and 144. Official History, I, pp. 471–476. Cd. 1791: Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 172–173.

Chapter 4 1 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], II, p. 3. 2 Ibid., pp. 2–6. 3 Ibid., chapters II–VI. 4 Ibid., chapters IX–X; ibid., III, chapters III–VII. 5 Ibid., II, chapter VIII. 6 Although de la Rey was not personally present at the battle, he was responsible for the brilliant choice of the tactical positions in front of Magersfontein Hill. 7 C.R. de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 29. Although this book was translated into English as The Three Years War (Reprinted by Galago, Alberton, 1986), the translation is not always accurate. The original source was, therefore, used for this work. 8 Ibid., pp. 29–30; de la Rey collection 17, pp. 3–4, reminiscences of de la Rey. 9 de la Rey Collection 17, p. 4, reminiscences of de la Rey. 10 Steyn proposed something in this vein on 14 December. Because it is known that de Wet was in Bloemfontein on that day, one could pose the question whether de Wet did not in fact take up the matter with Steyn. Vide Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 22. 11 Cf. Leyds Archives 713(c ), No. 26, Reitz – Steyn, 18 December 1899. 12 Ibid., No. 27, Government – Cronjé, 18 December 1899. 13 Leyds Archives 713(e), No.25, Cronjé – Reitz, 19 December 1899. 14 de Wet: de Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], pp. 29–30.

Notes 167

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33

34 35 36 37 38

Leyds Archives 713(e), No. 20, Kruger – Cronjé, 28 December 1899. Leyds Archives 760, p. 126, Cronjé – de Wet and de la Rey, 3 January 1900. de la Rey Collection 17, p. 14, reminiscences of de la Rey. Leyds Archives 714(a), No. 21, Steyn – Kruger, 4 January 1900 (containing Capt. Fichardt – Steyn, 4 January 1900). Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 24. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 89–91. Leyds Archives 714(b), No. 21, Jooste and de Wet – Kruger, 10 January 1900. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 89–91. F.R.M. Cleaver, A Young South African – a Memoir of Ferrar Reginald Mostyn Cleaver; advocate and veldkornet, p. 50 (Cleaver – his mother, 26 January 1900). J.H. Meyer, Kommandojare – ‘n Oudstryder se persoonlike Relaas van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [Commando Years: A Veteran’s personal Renditon of the Second War of Freedom], pp. 135 and 145. Cleaver, A Young South African, p. 50 (Cleaver – his mother, 26 January 1900). Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], I pp. 192–193. Leyds Archives 709(b), p. 112, Kruger – Steyn, 18 October 1899 (containing Kruger – Cronjé 18 October 1899). UR 17, p. 75, Minutes of the Free State Executive Council, Art. 2446, 4 November 1899 (VA). Leyds Archives 710(e), p. 453, Kruger – Steyn, 14 November 1899. Ibid., p. 481, Steyn – Kruger, 15 November 1899 (containing Olivier – Steyn, 15 November 1899). Ibid., p. 489, Kruger – Steyn, 15 November 1899. Cf. Official History, I, p. 382, where a translated version of a telegram, dated 20 December 1899, from Kruger to Steyn is contained. Although this telegram could not be traced in the archives there is nevertheless no reason to doubt its authenticity. J.H. Snyman, ‘Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899–1902’ [The Afrikaner in the Cape, 1899–1902] Unpublished D Phil dissertation, Potchefstroom University, 1973, pp. 162–163. Official History, II, p. 282. Cf. also Cape Blue Paper A5–1900: Magisterial Reports, quoting literally dozens of such cases. Cf. Hofmeyr, Zes Maanden bij de Commandos (‘Six Months with the Commandos’), pp. 225–228. Snyman, ‘Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899–1902’ [The Afrikaner in the Cape, 1899–1902], p. 165. Ibid., p. 158. Di Patriot, de Rebellie en hare Gevolgen, voor het Nageslacht bewaard [The Rebellion and its Consequences, preserved for Posterity], Paarl, 1901.

168 Notes

39 Cleaver, A Young South African, pp. 51–52. 40 Cf. Official History, I, p. 382 where the above mentioned telegram of 20 December 1899 (vide footnote 32) from Kruger to Steyn was quoted. 41 Leyds Archives 711(c ), No. 30, Steyn – Kruger, 27 November 1899. 42 Ibid., No. 39, Kruger – Steyn, 27 November 1899. 43 Engelbrecht Collection 19, p. 231, Steyn – Kruger, 29 November 1899. 44 KG 349(1), Joubert – Kruger, 17 January 1900. 45 Cf. KG 365(1), Reitz – Gen. Du Toit, 27 November 1899; UR 17, p. 133, Minutes of the Free State Executive Council, Art. 2595, 12 January 1900. 46 Vide the Engelbrecht Collection 22/55, p. 38, Steyn – Kruger, 19 January 1900; Leyds Archives 715(b), No. 44, Kruger – Steyn, 19 January 1900; Engelbrecht Collection 22/55, p. 126, Steyn – Kruger, 21 January 1900; Cd. 261: Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa, No. 5. 47 Engelbrecht Collection 23/57, p. 89, Salisbury – Kruger and Steyn, 5 February 1900. 48 Rompel, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, p. 66. 49 Vide p. 60 ???.

Chapter 5 1 Vide pp. 25–26. 2 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 24–25; Official History, I, pp. 410–411; Times History, III, p. 340. 3 David James, Lord Roberts, pp. 264 and 278–279. 4 Ibid., p. 80; Times History, III, p. 338. 5 South African Telegrams and Letters sent by Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, I, p. 3 (Roberts – Buller, 23 December 1899). 6 Times History, III, p. 341n. 7 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 24–25. 8 Luvaas, The Education of an Army, p. 231. 9 Ibid., p. 237. 10 Cf. John Selby, Stonewall Jackson as Military Commander, pp. 74–75 and 99. 11 Times History, III, p. 342. Cf. also James, Lord Roberts, p. 279. 12 Telegrams and Letters, I, p. 4 (Roberts – Methuen, 11 January 1900). 13 Official History, I, p. 411. 14 Vide footnotes 33 and 34. 15 Official History, I, pp. 411–412; Times History, III, pp. 341–342. 16 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 102–103; Official History, I, p. 412. 17 Cd. 1790: Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, p. 460. 18 Ibid., p. 467. 19 Telegrams and Letters, I, p. 19 (Roberts – Milner, 5 February 1900).

Notes 169

20 Keith Terrance Surridge, Managing the South African War, 1899–1902. Politicians v. Generals, p. 79. 21 Official History, II, p. 16; Times History, III, p. 344. 22 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, p. 129; OfficialHistory, I, p. 439; Times History, III, p. 344. 23 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 27. 24 Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 339. The sentence in italics is Liddell Hart’s own. 25 Times History, III, p. 347. 26 Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [The History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 124–125. 27 Ibid., pp. 80–81. 28 Vide pp. 36–37. 29 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom, IV, pp. 105–107; Official History, I, pp. 416–418; Times History, III, pp. 349–354. 30 Vide p. [???] 31 KG 337(1), p. 32, Kruger – Joubert, 25 December 1899. 32 KG 338(2), p. 2, Government – Joubert, 3 January 1900. 33 Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR en die OVS’ [The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State], pp. 50–54; Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 27 and 69. 34 Official History, I, p. 435. 35 Leyds Archives 714 (a), Nos. 32 and 33, Cronjé – Kruger, 3 January 1900 and 5 January 1900; Engelbrecht Collection 21/52, p. 89, Steyn – Kruger, 3 January 1900 (containing Cronjé – Steyn, 22 January 1900). 36 Leyds Archives. 715(g), No. 25, Kruger – Steyn, 31 January 1900. 37 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 110–111. Cf. also p. 126. 38 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 42. 39 Ibid., p. 31. 40 Jack Hindon, ‘Herinneringen van genl. Piet Cronjé’ (Reminiscences of Gen. Piet Cronjé). Die Brandwag magazine, 15 October 1913, p. 297. 41 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 31–32. 42 Unless stated otherwise, all the information in this section is derived from the following sources: Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, Chapters IX–XVII; Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], Chapter 2; and J.L. Basson, ‘Die Slag van Paardeberg’ [The Battle of Paardeberg], unpublished MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1971. 43 Count Adalbert Sternberg, My Experiences of the Boer War, pp. 158–159.

170 Notes

44 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 34. 45 The True History of the War, being the Official Despatches from the General Commanding-in-Chief of the Forces in South Africa, III, p. 54 (Report by Lord Roberts, 16 February 1900). 46 Times History, III, pp. 400–401. 47 In his memoirs de Wet stated that he managed to fight his way through to the beleaguered camp (De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 56) but more recent research indicated that this was not the case. Cf. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], IV, pp. 324–332. 48 Leyds Archives 716(b), No. 25, Steyn – Kruger, 13 February 1900; Ibid., 717(a), No. 27, Steyn – Kruger, 16 February 1900. 49 Ibid., 717(a), No. 9, Kruger – Steyn, 16 February 1900. 50 KG 350(1), p. 178, Joubert – de la Rey, 17 February 1900. 51 Leyds Archives 717(b), No. 15, de la Rey – Joubert, 17 February 1900. 52 Ibid., 717(f), No. No.19, Steyn – Kruger, 24 February 1900. 53 Engelbrecht Collection 24/62, pp. 53–68, telegraphic conversation between Presidents Steyn and Kruger, 24 February 1900. 54 de la Rey Collection 17, p. 19, unpiblished memoirs General de la Rey. 55 Official History, II, pp. 249 and 255. 56 For a detailed description cf. Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], Chapters XI–XVI; C.J. Barnard, Generaal Louis Botha op die Natalse Front [General Louis Botha on the Natal Front], Chapter 6; C.M. Bakkes, Die Britse Deurbraak aan die Benede-Tugela op Majubadag 1900 [The British Breakthrough at the Lower Tugela on Majuba Day 1900], passim. 57 Cf. Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 57. 58 Leyds Archives 717(d), No. 43, Steyn – Kruger, 22 February 1900. Cf. also KG 341(4), Kruger – Joubert, 22 February 1900; and OfficialHistory, II, pp. 166–167. 59 Cd.1790: Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 466–467. 60 Official History, II, p. 258. 61 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], pp. 78–80. 62 Asselbergs, ‘Dagboek’ [Diary], 17 March 1900, pp. 47–53. 63 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 55–74. 64 Ibid., pp. 74–83. 65 Leyds Archives 720(a), No. 32, de Wet – Joubert, 22 March 1900. 66 Cf. Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 74–83. 67 Journal of the Principal Events connected with South Africa, III, p. 59 (telegram by Roberts, 3 April 1900).

Notes 171

68 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 122. 69 Official History, II, p. 314. It was not possible to trace the original of this telegram in the archives. 70 Leyds Archives 721(e), No. 24, Steyn – Kruger,16 April 1900 (containing de Wet – Steyn, 14 April 1900). 71 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], V, chapter XVII. 72 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 130. 73 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], V, chapters XIV–XVI. 74 Official History, III, p. 309. 75 The True History of the War, III, p. 76 (report by Lord Roberts, 14 August 1900). 76 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander), pp. 102–118. 77 Telegrams and Letters, II, pp. 111–112 (Roberts – Kelly-Kenny, 16 June 1900). 78 Official History , III, chapters XVI–XVII; Times History, IV, chapters VII, XI and XIII. 79 Leyds Archives 734, p. 117, Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 1145, 3 September 1900. 80 Ibid., 739, pp. 155–159, telegraphic conversation between Kruger and Botha, 27 August 1900. 81 Ibid., 726(g), No. 20, SKC – Kruger, 10 June 1900 (containing de Wet – Steyn, 8 June 1900). 82 Ibid., 727(b), No. 26, Botha – Kruger, 16 June 1900 (containing Botha – Steyn, 16 June 1900). 83 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 135–139. 84 Ibid., pp. 138–139. Cf. also J.A.J. de Villiers, ‘The Diaries and Recollections of Jacob Abraham Jeremias de Villiers’ (Christiaan de Wet-Annale, no. 8, Nov. 1990, p. 39.) 85 Ibid., pp. 225–252. 86 Cd. 426: Proclamations issued by Field-Marshal Lord Roberts in South Africa, p. 2 (Proclamation dated February 1900). 87 Ibid., p. 3 (Proclamation of 15 February 1900). 88 Ibid., p. 5 (Proclamation of 31 May 1900). 89 S.B. Spies, Methods of Barbarism? – Roberts and Kitchener in the Boer Republics, January 1900–May 1902, p. 318n. 90 de Wet, De Strijd tusscen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 118. 91 Cd. 426: Proclamations issued by Lord Roberts, p. 6 (Proclamation of 24 May 1900). 92 Ibid., p. 8 (Proclamation of 1 June 1900). 93 Ibid., p. 10 (Proclamation of 16 June 1900).

172 Notes

94 95 96 97 98 99

100

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113

Journal of the Principal Events, IV, p. 82. Telegrams and Letters, II, (Roberts – Kitchener, 16 June 1900). Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, p. 51. Ibid., pp. 120–127. The quotation appears on p. 120. Cf. Telegrams and Letters, III, pp. 135–136 (Roberts – Botha, 5 August 1900). Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 573 (reminiscences of General Smuts). Cf. also Naudé, Vechten en Vluchten van Beyers en Kemp (‘Fighting and Fleeing of Beyers and Kemp’), pp. 126–127. N.J. van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 65; Oskar Hintrager, ‘Dagboek’ [Diary], 5 September 1900 (Christiaan de Wet-Annale, No. 2, October 1973, pp. 138–140). Leyds Archives 734, p. 6, war report, 1 June 1900. Cf. Leyds Archives 739, pp. 127–128, telegraphic conversation between Kruger and Botha, 7 June 1900. Telegrams and Letters, II, p. 98 (Roberts – Botha, 12 June 1900). Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 177–179. Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR en die OVS’ [The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State], pp. 124–134 and 139–145. Times History, V, p. 43. Jehuda Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht, pp. 62–108. Aus dem Südafrikanischen Kriege 1899 bis 1902 (Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, Heft 32– 35), Berlin, 1903–1906. Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Cannae (Berlin, 1936). Aus dem Südafrikanischen Kriege, III, pp. 170–172. Rayne Kruger, Good-bye Dolly Gray, p. 369. James, Lord Roberts, p. 350. Vide Bond, Liddell Hart, chapters 8 and 9; Alex Danchev, Alchemist of War. The Life of Basil Liddell Hart, pp. 227–228 and 235–239.

Chapter 6 1 A787, Preller Collection 1, p. 61, de Wet – Botha, 7 November 1900. Cf. also Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 168–172. 2 W. van Everdingen, De Oorlog in Zuid-Afrika, Tweede Tijdvak [The War in South Africa, Second Phase], II, p. 182; B.J. Viljoen, My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War, p. 244; Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 339–340 (Executive Council Resolution, Art. 117, 16 July 1900); G.D. Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan Frederik Beyers, 1869–1914, p. 29. 3 A787, Preller Collection 60, p. 227, diary of G.S. Preller, 15 March 1901. The date has been arrived at through a reconstruction from the account of P.S. la G. Lombard, Uit die Dagboek van ‘n Wildeboer [From the Diary of a Wild Boer], p. 88; Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 620 (reminis-

Notes 173

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11

12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27

28 29

cences of Smuts). Cf. Also de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 226. Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 66. The Times, 21 September 1900. Surridge, Managing the South African War, p. 91. Cd. 426: Army Proclamations issued by Lord Roberts, pp. 6 and 16 (Proclamations of 24 June 1900 and 1 September 1900). S. Hofmeyr, Die Boere-Republieke en die Volkereg [The Boer Republics and the Law of Nations], p. 62. Telegrams and Letters, IV, p. 108 (Roberts – Botha, 2 September 1900). Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 66; de Wet: De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 321 (Steyn – Kitchener, 15 Augustus 1901). Hofmeyr, Die Boere-Republieke en die Volkereg [The Boer Republics and the Law of Nations], pp. 62–68.Cf. also Spies: Methods of Barbarism?, pp. 62–63. Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 626 (reminiscences of General Smuts); Naudé, Vechten en Vluchten van Beyers en Kemp (‘Fighting and Fleeing of Beyers and Kemp’), p. 185; Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 66. Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 626 (reminiscences of Gen. Smuts). A787, Preller Collection 49, p. 387 (war report, including Badenhorst – Smuts, 14 February 1901). Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 371–372 (Smuts – de Wet, 10 February 1901). Vide pp. 77 and 100 ??? Cf. Official History, III, pp. 35–42; Times History, V, pp. 122–125. LRP 58, p. 98, Col. Western – Roberts, 26 November 1900. Telegrams and Letters, IV, p. 45 (Roberts – Milner, 18 August 1900). Cf. Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla. A Historical and Critical Study, pp. 121–122. Times History, V, p. 67. Ibid., V, p. 5. Leopold Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 168–172; G.D. Scholtz, Christiaan Frederik Beyers, pp. 31–40. The True History of the War, IV, p. 100 (report by Lord Roberts, 15 November 1900). Spies: Methods of Barbarism?, p. 81. Cf. Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 659 (reminiscences of General Smuts). Cf. Cd.1789: Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, p. 46 (evidence by Lord Roberts); E.S. May, A Retrospect of the South African War, p. 44; Kruger, Dolly Gray, p. 62; Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, p. 60. Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare – the Countryside Version, p. 99. Preller Collection 2, pp. 289–290, Kritzinger – de Wet, 22 December 1900.

174 Notes

30 Snyman, ‘Die Afrikaner in Kaapland’ [The Afrikaner in the Cape Colony], pp. 178–181. 31 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 303 32 Surridge, Managing the South African War, p. 78. 33 Laqueur, Guerrilla, pp. 254–255. 34 Cf. Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 344–345. 35 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 626 (reminiscences of General Smuts). 36 Lombard, Uit die Dagboek van ‘n Wildeboer [From the Diary of a Wild Boer], pp. 89–90; P.J. du Toit, The Diary of a National Scout, p. 21, 1 November 1900; Preller Collection 14(a), p. 20, Botha – C. Botha, 15 November 1900. 37 A313, de la Rey Collection 17, p. 91, reminiscences of General de la Rey; de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 226; Lombard, Uit die Dagboek van ‘n Wildeboer [From the Diary of a Wild Boer], p. 90; Du Toit, The Diary of a National Scout, p. 21, 1 November 1900; Preller Collection 149(a), p. 35, Botha – Steyn, 24 November 1900; Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 66. 38 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 626 (reminiscences of General Smuts.) 39 Cf. Naudé, Vechten en Vluchten van Beyers en Kemp [Fighting and Fleeing of Beyers and Kemp], p. 185. 40 A787, Preller Collection 1, p. 224, Beyers – Alberts, 5 December 1900. 41 Cf. C.J. Barnard, ‘Grepe uit die Krygskuns van die Boeregeneraals’ [Aspects of the Military Prowess of the Boer Generals] (Historia 19(1), May 1974). 42 A787, Preller Collection 14(b), p. 31, Botha – Burger, 18 December 1900. 43 J.D. Kestell and D.E. van Velden (eds), De Vredesonderhandelingen tusschen de Regeeringen der twee Zuid-Afrikaansche Republieken en de Vertegenwoordigers der Britsche Regeering, welke uitliepen op den Vrede, op 31 Mei 1902 te Vereeniging gesloten [The Peace Negotiations between the Governments of the two South African Republics and Delegates of the British Government that culminated in the Peace, concluded on 31 May 1902 at Vereeniging], p. 92. 44 Cf. Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR en die OVS’ [The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State], pp. 124–134; 139–145 and 175–186. 45 Cf. Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 193–194. 46 Lombard, Uit die Dagboek van’n Wildeboer [From the Diary of a Wild Boer], p. 92. Cf. also Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 66. 47 A787, Preller Collection 2, pp. 276–282, Hertzog – Steyn, 28 November 1900. 48 Ibid., 1, pp. 276–282, de Wet – Botha, 7 November 1900. 49 Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 66.

Notes 175

50 A787, Preller Collection 14(a), p. 35, Botha – Steyn, 24 November 1900. Cf. also ibid., p. 30, Botha – de la Rey, 26 November 1900; A787, Preller Collection 60, p. 228, diary of G.S. Preller, 15 March 1900. 51 General J.C. Smuts Archive 96, No. 183, Steyn – Burger 30 November 1900; A787, Preller Collection 1, p. 202, Philip Botha – Louis Botha, 9 December 1900; Lombard, Uit die Dagboek van ‘n Wildeboer [From the Diary of a Wild Boer], pp. 102–103. (Although Steyn’s letter is dated 30 November, it is clear that he subsequently added some undated parts to the original.) 52 A787, Preller Collection 1, p. 212, de Wet – Botha, 10 December 1900. 53 A787, Preller Collection 2, pp. 34–35, de Wet – Botha, 6 March 1901. 54 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 293–309. 55 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], pp. 246–248. 56 Cf. A787, Preller Collection 1, pp. 218–221, Scheepers – de Wet, 20 December 1900; Ibid., 2, pp. 289–290, Kritzinger – de Wet, 22 December 1900; de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 262. 57 Edgar Wallace, Unofficial Dispatches, p. 98. 58 FK 1621, p. 62, Kitchener – Brodrick, 1 February 1901 (TA). 59 A787, Preller Collection 14(c ), p. 45, Botha – all Transvaal officers, 15 January 1901. 60 A313, de la Rey Collection 17, p. 103, reminiscences of General de la Rey. 61 G.D. Scholtz, Christiaan Frederik Beyers, p. 55; Preller Collection 11(c ), p. 15, Botha – Burger, 29 January 1901; Naudé, Vechthen en Vluchten van Beyers en Kemp, p. 214. 62 A787, Preller Collection 11(c ), p. 84, Botha – Smuts 14 February 1901; Ibid., p. 18, Botha – Burger, 29 January 1901; Ibid., p. 334, Burger – Botha, 2 February 1901; Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 359 (Smuts – Botha, 23 January 1901). 63 A787, Preller Collection 11(c ), pp. 78–79, Botha – Smuts, 14 February 1901. 64 Ibid., pp. 45 and 84, Botha – Smuts, 3 February 1901and 14 February 1901. 65 A787, Preller Collection 1, pp. 218–221, Scheepers – de Wet, 20 December 1900; Ibid., 2, pp. 289–290, Kritzinger – de Wet, 22 December 1900; de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 262. 66 Cd.903: Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa, p. 70 (de Wet – Steyn, 10 January 1901); C.C.J. Badenhorst, Uit den Boerenoorlog [From the Boer War], p. 85 (de Wet – Badenhorst, 13 January 1901; A787, Preller Collection 1, p. 323, de Wet – Smuts, 16 January 1901. 67 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 383, (Smuts – Botha, 27 February 1901). 68 Ibid., p. 626 (reminiscences of General Smuts).

176 Notes

69 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 235–248. 70 A787, Preller Collection 2, p. 34, de Wet – Botha 6 March 1901; de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 274; Wallace, Unofficial Dispatches. pp. 112–113. 71 A787, Preller Collection 11(c ), Botha – Smuts, 14 February 1901. 72 Ibid., 60, pp. 227–228, diary of G.S. Preller, 15 March 1901. 73 J.P.R. Wallis, Fitz. The Story of Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, p. 137. 74 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 369 (Smuts – Botha, 3 February 1901). 75 A787, Preller Collection 11 (c ), pp. 72–74, Botha–Beyers, 10 February 1901; Ibid., 1, p. 309, Beyers – Botha, 28 January 1901; Ibid., 2, p. 16, Beyers – Botha, 14 February 1901; A313 de la Rey Collection 17, p. 104, reminiscences of de la Rey. 76 Cf. Naudé. Vechten en Vluchten van Beyers en Kemp [Fighting and Fleeing of Beyers and Kemp], pp. 210–211; Reitz, Commando, pp. 147–149; A787, Preller Collection 11(c ), p. 43, Botha – Smuts, 3 February 1901. 77 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 419 (Smuts – Botha, 27 February 1901); A275f, de la Rey – Botha, 27 February 1901. 78 Rompel, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, p. 126. Cf. Kuit, ‘n Kommandoprediker [A Commando Chaplain], p. 45, 2 March 1901; A313, de la Rey Collection 10, p. 24, Hertzog – de la Rey, 4 March 1901. 79 Naudé, Vechten en Vluchten van Beyers en Kemp [Fighting and Fleeing of Beyers and Kemp], p. 228.Cf. also A313, de la Rey Collection 17, p. 104, reminiscences of de la Rey. 80 G.D.Scholtz, Christiaan Frederik Beyers, p. 61. 81 WO32/869, file 7782, Botha – Burger, 17 March 1901 (microfilm A371, TA). 82 A787, Preller Collection 2, p. 42, Steyn – Botha, 1 April 1901. 83 Official History, IV, p. 577, attachment 3 (de Wet – Smuts, 8 February 1902). 84 FK1621, p. 119, Kitchener – Brodrick, 22 March 1901. 85 Times History, V, pp. 78–79. 86 Cf. G.S. Preller, Kapt. Hindon: Oorlogsavonture van’n baasverkenner [Captain Hindon: War Adventures of an Ace Recce]; Dirk Mostert, Slegtkamp van Spioenkop [Slegtkamp of Spion Kop]. 87 Times History, V, p. 257. 88 G. Arthur: Life of Lord Kitchener, II, p. 6. 89 FK1631, p. 62, Kitchener – Brodrick, 1 February 1901. 90 This system should not be confused with the first drive against General de Wet during July and August 1900. The object and modus operandi were different. Vide the Times History. V, pp. 262–263. 91 Field Marshal Lord Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War, p. 202. 92 Times History, V, pp. 85–86. 93 FK1621, p. 62, Kitchener – Brodrick, 1 February 1901. 94 Official History, IV, p. 111.

Notes 177

95 Reitz, Commando, p. 148. 96 Scholtz, Christiaan Frederik Beyers, pp. 56–57; Naudé, Vechten en Vluchten van Beyers en Kemp, [Fighting and Fleeing of Beyers an Kemp], pp. 211–212. 97 Times History, V, p. 263. 98 Cd. 547: Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa, p. 28 (Milner – Chamberlain, 12 January 1901.) 99 Cape Times, 11 February 1901; Cf. A787, Preller Collection 2, pp. 5–11, open letter from the Burgher Peace Committee to all Transvaal officers, 13 February 1900; Viljoen, My Reminiscencesof the Anglo-Boer War, pp. 335–338; Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 219. 100 A787, Preller Collection 10, p. 18a, Botha – H.P.F. Janse van Rensburg, A.P.J. Cronjé et al, 30 January 1901. 101 O.T. de Villiers, Met de Wet en Steyn in de Veld [With de Wet and Steyn in the Field], p. 68. 102 FK1621, pp. 49–50, Kitchener – Brodrick, 25 January 1901. 103 A787, Preller Collection 16, pp. 44–61, minutes of the meeting, 28 January 1901.

Chapter 7 1 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 263. 2 Ibid., p. 258. 3 Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR. en die OVS’ [The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State], p. 162. 4 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], pp. 300–301 (Reitz – Steyn, 10 May 1901). 5 Cf. FK1622, p. 297, Kitchener – Brodrick, 19 July 1901, in which Kitchener refers to the contents of this letter. 6 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 389–391 (Steyn – Smuts, 15 May 1901). 7 Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR en die OVS’ (The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State), pp. 179–183. 8 A313, de la Rey Collection 17, second handwriting, p. 40, reminiscences of General de la Rey 9 Cf. J.C. Smuts, Jan Christiaan Smuts, p. 65. 10 A313, de la Rey Collection 17, second handwriting, p. 40, reminiscences of General de la Rey. 11 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 298. 12 Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], p. 60. 13 Badenhorst, Uit den Boeren-Oorlog [From the Boer War], pp. 139–140 (Steyn – Kritzinger et al, undated).

178 Notes

14 Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], p. 60; de la Rey Collection 11, p. 35, de la Rey – Kemp, 10 July 1901; Official History, IV, p. 577, attachment 3 (de Wet – Smuts, 8 February 1901). 15 Snyman, ‘Die Afrikaner in Kaapland’ [The Afrikaner in the Cape Colony], p. 309. 16 Vide pp. 129–130 ??? 17 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 329, 354 and 387 (memorandum by Smuts, 4 September 1899; Smuts – de la Rey, 25 December 1900; and Smuts – N.J. de Wet, 28 February 1901); Official History, IV, p. 75. 18 G.D. Scholtz, Hertzog en Smuts en die Britse Ryk [Hertzog and Smuts and the British Empire], pp. 37–38; Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR. en die OVS [The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State), pp. 167–168. 19 A787, Preller Collection 10, p. 27, Botha – de Wet, 14 October 1901. 20 Cf. D.M. Moore, General Louis Botha’s Second Expedition to Natal, passim. 21 Cf. Leopold Scholtz, ‘Die Slag van Bakenlaagte, 30 Oktober 1901’ [The Battle of Bakenlaagte, 30 October 1901]. (Historia, 19(1), May 1974). 22 A787, Preller Collection 10, p. 25, Botha – Viljoen, 14 October 1901. 23 Official History, IV, Chapter XVI. 24 A313, de la Rey Collection 11, pp. 48–49, de la Rey – Smuts, 15 July 1901. 25 Ibid., p. 51, de la Rey – Smuts, 15 July 1901. 26 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 362 and 372 (Smuts – Botha, 23 January 1901 and Smuts – de Wet, 10 February 1901). 27 Journal of Principal Events, XI, p. 17 (telegram by Kitchener, 14 July 1901). 28 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 407, diary of General Smuts, 1 August 1901. 29 A313, de la Rey Collection 17, second handwriting, pp. 42–43, reminiscences of General de la Rey. 30 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 430–437 (Report by General Smuts, 16 December 1901). 31 Ibid., pp. 443–444, ‘Report on the Position in the Cape Colony’ by Smuts, 16 December 1901. 32 Official History, IV, p. 576, attachment 3 (de Wet – Smuts, 8 February 1902). 33 Ibid., p. 367; Times History, V, p. 544. 34 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 441–442 and 500 (report by General Smuts, 16 December 1901 and Smuts – de la Rey, 26 January 1902); R.J. Constantine, ‘The Guerrilla War in the Cape Colony during the South African War of 1899–1902: A Case Study of the Republican and Rebel Commando Movement’, pp. 179–182. 35 Ibid., pp. 497–498 (Smuts – de la Rey, 26 January 1902). Cf. also Pieterse, Die Oorlogsavonture van genl. Wynand Malan, pp. 305–306. 36 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 443, report by Smuts, 16 December 1901. 37 Ibid., p. 498 (Smuts – de la Rey, 26 January 1902).

Notes 179

38 A313, de la Rey Collection 11, pp. 95–96, de la Rey – Botha, 18 October 1901. 39 Official History, IV, p. 461. 40 Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 441–442 and 443–444 (report by Smuts, 16 December 1901). 41 Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], pp. 60–61. Cf. Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, p. 515, (notes by General Smuts). 42 Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], p. 196; Constantine, ‘The Guerrilla War in the Cape Colony’, p. 177. 43 Cf. Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 274–296; Times History, V, chapters XII–XIII. 44 FK 1622, pp. 277–278, Kitchener – Brodrick, 5 July 1901. 45 Times History, V, p. 468. 46 Cf. Scholtz, ‘Die Slag van Bakenlaagte’ [The Battle of Bakenlaagte] (Historia, 19(1), May 1974, p. 63). 47 Times History, V, pp. 451–453. 48 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 329. 49 Times History, V, pp. 467–472. 50 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander, pp. 295–300. 51 Ibid., pp. 300–309. 52 Official History, IV, pp. 475 and 480; Times History, V, pp. 491 and 554. 53 Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, p. 175. 54 A.P.J. van Rensburg, ‘Die Ekonomiese Herstel van die Afrikaner in die Oranjerivier-Kolonie, 1902–1907’ [The Economic Recovery of the Afrikaner in the Orange River Colony, 1902–1907] (Archives Yearbook for South African History, 1967, II, p. 168). 55 Cf. Selections from the Smuts Papers, I, pp. 408 and 467 (diary of General Smuts 8 and 9 August 1901 and Smuts – W.T. Stead, 4 January 1902); Reitz, Commando, p. 189; Spies: Methods of Barbarism?, p. 177. 56 Van Rensburg, ‘Die Ekonomiese Herstel van die Afrikaner in die Oranjerivier-Kolonie’ [The Economic Recovery of the Afrikaner in the Orange River Colony], pp. 175–179; Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, pp. 118 and 176. 57 Van Rensburg, ‘Die Ekonomiese Herstel van die Afrikaner in die Oranjerivier-kolonie’ [The Economic Recovery of the Afrikaner in the Orange River Colony], p. 172. 58 Ambtelijke Verslagen van Generaal J.H. de la Rey en Generaal J.C. Smuts [Official Reports by General J.H. de la Rey and General J.C. Smuts], p. 3 (de la Rey – Kruger, dated December 1901). 59 Times History, V, p. 87. 60 J.E. Wrench, Alfred Lord Milner – the Man of no Illusions, 1854–1925, p. 231. 61 J.C. Otto, Die Konsentrasiekampe [The Concentration Camps], p. 42.

180 Notes

62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70 71 72 73 74 75

76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

Times History, V, p. 252. Otto, Die Konsentrasiekampe [The Concentration Camps], p. 170. Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, p. 266. The Milner Papers, II, p. 229 (Milner – Chamberlain, 7 December 1901). A787, Preller Collection 2, p. 92, (Kitchener – Burger, 1 December 1901). Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, p. 260. Cd. 893: Concentration Camps Commission. Report on the Concentration Camps in South Africa by the Committee of Ladies appointed by the Secretary of State for War …, p. 20, dated 12 February 1901. Cf. Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], p. 340 Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], p. 57 (evidence of General Botha). Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 87. Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], p. 186. Leyds Archives 741, pp. 17–20, Proclamation by Lord Kitchener, 7 August 1901. A412, S.W. Burger Collection 1, Steyn – Burger, 16 August 1901. Cf. Leyds Archives 94(1), pp. 46–51, Steyn – Kitchener, 15 August 1901; Ibid., 94(3), pp. 173–182, Burger – Kitchener, 5 September 1901; A787, Preller Collection 15, p. 48, Botha – Kitchener, 17 August 1901; A412, Burger Collection 1, de Wet – Kitchener, 15 August 1901. Cf. Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 78; de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 324; Badenhorst, Uit den Boeren–Oorlog [From the Boer War], p. 137. Cf. A313, de la Rey Collection 1, Brand – de Wet, undated. Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, p. 230. Times History, V, pp. 406–408. Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, p. 230. Ibid. Times History, V, p. 408. R.D. MacDonald, In die Skaduwee van die Dood [In the Shadow of Death], pp. 122–123. de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 329. G.D. Scholtz, Die Geskiedenis van die Nederduitse Hervormde of Gereformeerde Kerk [The History of the Dutch Reformed Church], II, pp. 129–137. Rand Daily Mail, 24 July 1904. Viljoen, My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War, pp. 444–445. Journal of the Principal Events, XII, pp. 69–71. M.J. Grobler, Met die Vrystaters onder die Wapen [With the Free Staters under Arms], p. 122. de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 329. Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], p. 85.

Notes 181

92 Cd. 820: South African Despatches, p. 3 (report by Lord Kitchener, 8 August 1901). 93 A787, Preller Collection 10, p. 50, Botha – Burger, 13 December 1901. 94 Ibid., p.77, Botha – Burger, 26 January 1902. 95 Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], p. 23. 96 Ibid., p. 81. 97 de Wet, De Strijd tusschen Boer en Brit [The Struggle between Boer and Briton], p. 326. 98 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 379–431. 99 Preller Collection 10, pp. 24–25, Botha – C. Brits and P.R. Viljoen, 12 February 1902; Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], p. 21 100 Cf. Fransjohan Pretorius, Kommandolewe tydens die Anglo-Boere Oorlog [Commando Life during the Anglo-Boer War], pp. 298–300; Peter Warwick, Black People and the South African War 1899–1902, pp. 21–22; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 498, 521. A fourth source on the role of persons of colour in the war – Bill Nasson, Abraham Esau’s War. A Black South African War in the Cape, 1899–1902 – does not offer any useful insights for the purpose of this publication on the military influence by the blacks in the war. 101 G. Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, II, p. 57 (Kitchener – Roberts, 13 December 1901). During January 1902 he thought the war would be over in July. Vide Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, p. 281 102 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, p. 298.

Chapter 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller, p. 31. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., p. 249. Cf. Harry G. Summers, On Strategy. The Vietnam War in Context. Cf. Harry G. Summers, A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. Leyds Archives 718(d), No. 2, Joubert – Reitz, 5 March 1900. Leyds, Tweede Verzameling [Second Collection], II, pp. 176–177 (Kruger and Steyn – Salisbury, 5 March 1900). Ibid., pp. 180–181 (Salisbury – Kruger and Steyn, 11 March 1900). Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner [The Development of the Political Thought of the Afrikaner], IV, p. 388. Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, I, p. 273. Ibid., p. 179. Leyds: Vierde Verzameling (Correspondentie 1900–1902) [Fourth Collection (Correspondence 1900–19020], I/1, p. XLIX. Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR. en die OVS’. [The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State], pp. 41–43. Ibid., pp. 125–130.

182 Notes

15 Ibid., pp. 141–143. 16 Vide pp. 166–167. ??? 17 Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR en die OVS’ [The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State], pp. 193–197. 18 Vide pp. 143–144.??? Cf. also Scholtz, ‘Die Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR en die OVS’ [The Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State], pp. 193–197. 19 Cf. FK 1622, pp. 49–50, Kitchener – Brodrick, 25 January 1901. 20 Ibid., p. 297, Kitchener – Brodrick, 25 January 1901. 21 Scholtz, Suid-Afrika en die Wêreldpolitiek [South Africa and World Politics], p. 238. 22 Kestell and van Velden, De Vredesonderhandelingen [The Peace Negotiations], pp. 1–8 (Kitchener – Burger, 4 March 1902); Preller Collection 16, pp. 90–93, Kitchener – Botha, 4 March 1902. 23 Smith, The Origins of the South African War, pp. 365–366. 24 Ibid., p. 365. 25 Ibid., p. 375. 26 Leyds, Tweede Verzameling [Second Collection], II, pp. 180–181, (Salisbury – Kruger and Steyn, 11 March 1900). 27 A787, Preller Collection 16, pp. 44–61, minutes of the meeting, 18 February 1901. 28 Surridge, Managing the South African War, pp. 120–121. 29 G.H. le May, British Supremacy in South Africa, 1899–1907, p. 125. 30 Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, IV, p. 55. 31 Surridge, Managing the South African War, p. 139. 32 Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, II, p. 88n; Leyds: Vierde Verzameling [Fourth Collection], II, p. 163, (memorandum of Dr W. Roosegaarde Bisschop, undated). 33 Arthur Davey, The British pro-Boers 1977–1902, chapter XI. 34 Stephen Koss (ed.), The Pro-Boers. The anatomy of an antiwar Movement, pp. xiii–xxxviii. 35 Locale Wetten der ZAR [Local Acts of the Transvaal], pp. 169–170 (Act No. 16 of 1898); Volksraadsnotule OVS [Parliamentary Minutes of the Free State], 1897 (Act No. 13). 36 Cf. Scholtz, ‘Betrekkinge tussen die ZAR en die OVS’ [Relations between the Transvaal and the Free State], chapter III. 37 Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog [History of the Second War of Freedom], II, pp. 97–102. 38 Ibid., pp. 246–247. 39 Ibid., III, pp. 463–464. 40 Cf. Fred Bridgeland, The War for Africa – Twelve Months that transformed a Continent, p. 32. 41 Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as Veldheer [General Christiaan de Wet as Military Commander], pp. 76 and 134. 42 A275f, Reitz – Botha, 8 March 1901. 43 Ibid., Reitz – Botha, 6 March 1901; UR 18, pp. 14, 28, 44–45 and 51, minutes of the Executive Council, Arts. 2, 8, 13 and 17, dated

Notes 183

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73 74

11 December 1900, 11 February 1901, 4 March 1901 and 12 April 1901 respectively. Surridge, Managing the South African War, pp. 75–76. Ibid., p. 86. Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, pp. 234–237; Philip Magnus, Kitchener – Portrait of an Imperialist, pp. 185–187. Ibid., p. 274. Cf. Surridge, Managing the South African War, p. 112. Clausewitz, On War, VI/1, p. 358. Ibid. Cf. Summers, On Strategy, p. 79. G.D. Scholtz, ‘Die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Wêreldverband’ [The Second War of Freedom in World Perspective], I (Historia, 20(1), May 1975, p. 13). Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner [The Development of the Political Thought of the Afrikaner], IV, p. 22. Ibid., p. 21. Vide pp. 31 and 38. [ ??? ] Cd. 988: South African Despatches, p. 3 (report by Kitchener, 23 June 1902); Official History, IV, attachments 14 and 16. Summers, On Strategy, p. 79. Bond, Liddell Hart, p. 55. Summers, On Strategy, p. 93. Ibid., p. 97. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers since 1500, p. 228. Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, p. 202. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers since 1500, p. 229. Ibid., p. 230. Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899–1902, p. 44; F.A. van Jaarsveld, Van Van Riebeeck tot Vorster 1652–1974 [From Van Riebeeck to Vorster 1652–1974], p. 184. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner [The Development of the Political Thought of the Afrikaner], IV, pp. 349–351. Cf. Scholtz, ‘Die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Wêreldverband’ [The Second War of Freedom in World Perspective], II (Historia, 20(2), September 1975, p. 129). Cf. Fuller, The Conduct of War, p. 140. Cf. E.S. May, A Retrospect on the South African War and T.D. Pilcher, Some Lessons from the Boer War. Cd. 1789: Report of his Majesty’s Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Military Preparations and other Matters concerned with the war in South Africa. Cf. F.A. Johnson, Defence by Committee. Luvaas, The Education of an Army, p. 151. Lord Wavell, ‘Armies’ in the chapter ‘Armed Forces and the Art of War’ (David Thompson (ed), The New Cambridge Modern History, XII, p. 256). Montgomery of Alamein: A History of Warfare, pp. 470–479.

184 Notes

75 Arthur E. Boak and William G. Sinnigen, A History of Rome to A.D. 565, pp. 138, 139 and 312. 76 Robert S. Hoyt, Europe in the Middle Ages, pp. 133 and 518. 77 R.R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World, pp. 130–131. 78 F.C. Spits, De Metamorfose van de Oorlog in de 18e en 19e Eeuw [The Metamorphosis of War during the 18th and 19th Century], pp. I–II. 79 Cf. Fuller, The Conduct of War, chapter V. 80 Quoted in Scholtz., ‘Die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Wêreldverband’ [The Second War of Freedom in World Perspective), II (Historia, 20(2), September 1975, p. 116). 81 Montgomery, A History of Warfare, p. 590. 82 Cf. Michael Howard, The Franco–Prussian War – the German Invasion of France 1870–1871, p. 378. 83 Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, p. 296. 84 Ibid., pp. 9–15.

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Index Abrahamskraal 66 Acton, R.F. 95 Afrikaner nationalism 74 Alberts, Commandant (later General) H.A. 95 Albrecht, Major F.W.R. 10 Aldeamentos 123 Alexander the Great 23 Alexandria 5 Aliwal North 37, 48 Allemansdrift 38 Altham, Major E.A. 13–14 America (USA) 8, 150, 157 American Civil War 8 Amiens, Peace of 3 Angola 90, 139 Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881) 11 Ardagh, Major-General Sir J.C. (John) 21 Artois 155 Arundel 65 Atlanta (Georgia, USA) 56 Australia 4 Austria-Hungary 7 Austro-Prussian War (1866) 8 Badenhorst, Commandant, later Assistant Chief Commandant C.C.J. 86, 99 Bakenlaagte 19, 115, 121, 129 Bakkes, C.M. xiii Baring, Sir Francis 1 Barkly East 99 Barkly West 47, 48 Beaconsfield, Lord 5 Beaufort West 96 Belmont 35, 43 Benson, Lieutenant-Colonel G.E. 115, 121, 129

Bester Station 29 Bethal 99, 115 Bethlehem 61, 71, 73 Bethulie 22 Beyers, Assistant CommandantGeneral C.F. (Christiaan) 83, 88, 95, 96, 99, 101, 102, 106 Biggars Mountains 66 Black people 129 Black Week 44 Blitzkrieg 79–80 Block houses 104, 121–123, 127–128, 147 Bloedrivierspoort 114 Bloemfontein 53, 55–58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 79, 80 Bossiespan 64 Botha, rev. J.F. 113 Botha, Commandant-General Louis 32, 33, 70, 76, 83, 86, 87, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 118, 121, 125, 127, 128, 130, 134, 135, 137, 139, 146, 154 Bothaville 97 Branddrift 111 Brandfort 67, 69, 70 Brandwater Basin 73 Breytenbach, J.H. 30 British East India Company 1 Britain 149–151 Broadwood, Brigadier-General R.G. 69 Brodrick, St John 98, 103, 104, 107, 119, 135, 141 Buffels River 114 Buller, General Sir Redvers H. xi, 33, 36, 39, 41, 44, 50, 51, 53, 56, 59, 72, 139, 146, 148 Bulskop 95 195

196 Index

Burger, Acting President Schalk W. 96, 99, 134, 135 Burgher Peace Committee 106, 125, 126 Calvinia 118 Cannae 78 Cape, strategical importance of 1–7 Cape Peninsula 16 Cape rebels 15, 23, 43, 47–49, 58, 86–87, 92–93, 95, 97, 112–114, 117–119, 130, 133, 145 Cape Town 15, 53, 57, 112, 117 Carlyle, Thomas 11 Carnarvon 46, 117 Carthage 156 Ceylon 4 Chamberlain, Sir Joseph 1, 3, 6, 24, 136, 137, 141 Champagne (France) 155 Charles, Archduke of Austria 8 Chrissiesmeer 19, 106 Clausewitz, Carl von 7, 19–20, 132, 142, 154 Cleaver, R.M. 46 Clements, Major-General R.A.P. 95 Cold War 158, 159 Colenso 44, 77 Colesberg 37, 57, 61, 64, 65 Commando Act 16 Concentration camps 123–125, 147 Corinth 156 Councils of war Kroonstad 67–69 Syferfontein 85–87 Cronjé, Assistant CommandantGeneral P.A. (Piet) 35, 43, 45, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62–66, 78, 79, 139, 146, 147, 148 Crusaders 156 Cuba 123, 157 Currey, Cecil B. 151 Curzon, Lord 5 Cyprus 90 Dalmanutha 72, 134 Davey, Arthur 137

De Aar xii, 15, 37, 38, 45, 47, 53, 57, 61, 65, 87, 96 de Beer, Commandant J.F. (Tollie) 63 Dekiels Drift 63 de Kock, Meyer 106 Delagoa Bay railway line 70, 83, 87, 96, 127, 145 de la Rey, Assistant Commandant-General J.H. (Koos) 35, 43, 44–45, 50, 61, 65, 66, 67, 83, 85, 88, 95, 102, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 139, 146, 147, 148 de Villiers, Combat General Piet 115, 116 de Wet, Lieutenant Andries 46 de Wet, Chief Commandant C.R. (Christiaan) 30, 31, 44–45, 50, 56, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 75, 77, 85, 86, 88, 91, 92, 95–103, 106, 107, 109, 112, 113, 114, 121, 122, 126, 127, 128, 134, 135, 139, 142, 146, 147, 148 de Wet, Chief Commandant P.D. (Piet) 106, 126 Dewetsdorp 98 Discipline 87 Donkerhoek 72 Doornberg 100 Dover 5 Drives 105–106, 121–122, 143, 147 Dundee 29 Durban 77 East London 15 Economy (as factor in wars) 149–152 Economy of force (as military principle) 143–145 Enslin Station 58 Equipment, importance of 91 Erasmus, major P.E. 10 Ermelo 102, 109

Index 197

Fawcett, Mrs. M.G. (Millicent) 125 Ferreira, Chief Commandant I.S. (Ignatius) 48 Fiji Islands 142 Fischer, Abraham 17 Fisher, Admiral Lord J.A. (Jackie) 4, 150, 157 Fitzpatrick, Sir Percy 101 Fouché, Commandant W.D. (Willem) 117 Fouriesburg 73 Fourteen Streams 13, 35 France 7, 13, 150 Franco-Prussian War 8, 157 Fraser, Captain Hugh 97 Fraserburg 117 Frederick the Great 8, 11 Frederikstad 85 French, Lieutenant-General J.D.P. (John) 47, 58, 62, 63, 70 Froneman, Assistant Chief Commandant C.C. (Stoffel) 63 Fuller, Major-General J.F.C. 9, 131–132, 155 Gatacre, Lieutenant-General Sir W.F. 44, 146 German South West Africa 145 Germany 7, 150, 158 Giap, General Nguyen Vo 151 Gibraltar 5 Gladstone, Sir W.E. (William) 3 Gold & gold mines 1, 86–87 Gough, Major H. 114 Grant, General Ulysses S. 56 Graspan 43 Griqualand East 86 Griqualand West 115, 116, 118 Grobler, Chief Commandant E.R. 24, 37, 47 Grobler, Assistant Commandant-General F.A. 61 Groenkop 128, 130

Guerrilla war 88–93 Theoretical model of Mao Zedong 93–94 Gulf War 132 Hague Convention 158 Hamilton, Lieutenant-General Sir I.S.M. (Ian) 70 Hamley, General Sir Edward Bruce 8, 155 Hannibal 78 Harrismith 27, 29 Hay (district) 47 Heidelberg 61 Heilbron 122 Henderson, Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.R. 9, 55–56, 155 Herbert (district) 47 Herschel (district) 116 Hertzog, Assistant Chief Commandant J.B.M. 10–11, 23, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 114 Heuningsneskloof Station 53 Heuningspruit 71 Hindon, Captain O.J. (Jack) 104 Ho Chi Minh 152 Hofmeyr, N.J. (Nico) 30 Hopetown 35, 101 Howick 33 Hunter, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald 43 India 4, 5 Indonesia 142 Intelligence Division 13, 21 International law 85 Itala (Fort) 115 Italy 150 Jackson, General Stonewall 56 Jacobsdal 53, 60 James, Lawrence 150 Jameson Raid 13 Jammerberg Drift 69 Jerusalem 156

55,

198 Index

Johannesburg 61, 70 Johnson, president Lyndon B. 139 Jomini, Henri 8 Jooste, Captain J.P. (Koos) 46, 50 Joubert, P.C. 19 Joubert, Commandant-General P.J. (Piet) 16, 24, 27, 32, 33, 46, 49, 65, 67, 70, 133, 138 Judd, Denis 10, 130 Kalkkrans 122 Kekewich, Lieutenant-Colonel R.G. 35 Kemp, Combat General J.C.G. (Jan) 32, 99, 102 Kenhardt 46 Kimberley 35, 38, 41, 46, 47, 50, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 65, 112, 116, 117 King William’s Town 99 Kitchener, Field Marshal Lord H.H. xii, 75, 77, 86, 90, 98, 102, 103–107, 109, 111, 119, 122–129, 135, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 147, 148 Kleinfontein 115 Klerksdorp 128, 130 Knox, Major-General C.E. (Charles) 90 Koedoesberg 58, 62 Koffiefontein 59, 63 Kokstad 99 Komatipoort 72 Korean War 143 Koss, Stephen 137 Kretschmar van Veen, jonkheer J.A. 16 Kritzinger, Assistant Chief Commandant, P.H. 92, 93, 98, 99, 100, 114, 117 Kroonstad 70, 71 122 Kroonstad, council of war at 67–69 Kruger, Rayne 9, 79 Kruger, President S.J.P. (Paul) 3, 6, 17, 37, 46, 47, 48, 49, 61, 65, 66, 70, 74, 77, 83, 111, 114, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139, 140

Krugersdorp 95 Kuyper, Dr. Abraham

135

Ladies’ Committee 125 Ladysmith 29–33, 38, 41, 50, 53, 55, 57, 66 Lange, one [De?] 121 Lansdowne, Lord H.C.K. 25, 58, 71, 141 Lategan, Combat General H.W. (Hans) 117 Law of war 75, 158 Le Gallais, Lieutenant-Colonel P.W. 97 Lee, General Robert Edward 56 Leeuspruit 71 Leyds, Dr. W.J. (Willem) 7, 85, 134 Liddell Hart, Sir B.H. (Basil) 59, 80, 146, 155 Liebenberg, Combat General P.J. 46 Liebenbergsvlei 122 Lindley 71, 122 Lloyd George, David 137 Local population, attitude of 92 London, Convention of (1884) 133 Long Tom (cannon) Louis Napoleon vide Napoleon III Lourenco Marques 73 Lubbe, Commandant David 63 Luvaas, Jay 9, 56, 155 MacDonald, rev. R.D. 126 MacDougall, Major-General Sir Patrick 8 Mack, General Karl Mack von Leiberich 59 Madagascar 142 Mafeking 22, 35, 38, 41, 43, 57, 116 Magersfontein 43, 45, 53, 57, 58, 60, 77, 153 Majuba 64 Malan, Combat General W.C. (Wynand) 117

Index 199

Manoeuvre (as military principle) 146–147 Mao Zedong 92, 93 Marais, J.S. 5 Maritz, Combat General S.G. (Manie) 117 Mass (as military principle) 143–145 Mauritius 3 McWhinnie, Captain W.J. 69 Mediterranean Melrose House 130 Methuen, Lieutenant-General Lord 36, 37, 38, 39, 43 46, 53, 55, 56, 154 Middelburg (Transvaal) 76, 102, 107, 115, 137, 140 Milner, Lord Alfred 1, 3, 6, 7, 58, 93, 106, 124, 136, 141, 142 Mobility 91, 103, 127–128 Modder river 35, 37, 43, 53, 57, 64, 139 Modderspruit and Nicholson’s Nek, Battle of 29–33 Moedwil 115 Montgomery, Field Marshal Lord Bernard 157 Morale 91 Morgendaal, J.J. 106 Morley, Lord 137 Mostershoek 69 Mozambique 73, 136 Muller, Dr. H.P.N. 85 Murray, Rev. C. 113 Namaqualand 117 Namibia 90 Napier, Sir G.T. (George) 3 Napier, Major-General Sir William 8 Napoleon Bonaparte 8, 23, 59, 145 Napoleon III 3 National Scouts 126, 127 Nationalism 157 Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg-Maatschappij (NZASM) 16

Netherlands 3, 135 New Model Drive 121–122, 125, 127, 128 Newcastle 27 Nicholson’s Nek 29–33 Nieuwoudtville 118 Nooitgedacht 95 Norvalspont 37, 70 Noupoort xii, 15, 37, 38, 57, 65, 96 Numbers Boer republics 22, 144–145 Britain 16, 144–145 Nuremberg trials 158 Objective (as military principle) 132–137 Odendaalstroom 98 Offensive (as military principle) 142–143 O’Kiep 118 Olifantshoek 73 Olivier, Chief Commandant J.H. 24, 37, 48 Operation Modular 139 Operational plans Original British 13–16 Original Boer 16–19, 148 Buller’s amended plan 41–44 Roberts’ amended plan 53–62 Kitchener’s plans 103–107, 119–127 Kroonstad war council plan 67–69 Syferfontein plan 83–87, 94, 96, 97, 98, 102, 103, 107, 109, 112, 114, 135, 143, 146, 148 Waterval plans 111–114, 119, 130, 133, 148 Orange River 15, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 46, 55, 57, 58, 60, 65, 66, 98, 100, 117 Orange River Station 57 Orange River Colony Volunteers 126, 127 Organisation and co-ordination 87, 91

200 Index

Otto, J.C. 124 Overy, Richard xi Paardeberg 64, 78, 80, 146, 148 Palestine 156 Philippines 157 Philipstown 117 Pietermaritzburg 33 Pietersburg 83, 95 Pieter’s Heights 57 Plumer, Brigadier-General H.C.O. 102 Political Alliance (1896) 16, 116 Police, Johannesburg 30, 61 Pondoland 86 Poplar Grove 66 Port Elizabeth 15 Portugal 136 Pretoria 53, 70 Pretorius, M.W. 107 Prieska 46 Prinsloo, Combat General Jacobus 43 Prinsloo, Chief-Commandant Marthinus 24, 29, 73 Prospect (Fort) 115 Psywar 74 Queenstown 37 Railways, strategical importance of 20–21, 153 Ramdam 59, 62 Rand Daily Mail 127 Rebellion (1914) 91 Reitz, Deneys 106 Reitz, F.W. 17 Renoster River 70 Rhodesia 6, 90, 94, 123 Richmond Road 46 Rietfontein 29 Riet River 64 Rimington, Colonel M.F. 121, 129 Roberts, Field Marshal Lord F.S. xi, 9, 21, 25, 36, 39, 43, 45, 53, 56–62, 62–67, 67–74, 74–77, 78,

79, 80, 81, 85, 87, 89, 106, 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148 Rome 156 Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin 24 Rompel, Frederik 17, 36, 102 Rooiwal 71, 72, 73, 87 Russia see also Soviet Union 5, 7, 13, 79, 150 Rustenburg 73 Salisbury, Lord 49, 123, 136, 141 Sand River 70 Sannaspos 69 Saxons 167 Scheepers, Commandant G.J. (Gideon) 92, 93, 98, 99, 100, 114 Schlieffen, General Alfred von 78 Schlieffen plan 13, 78 Schoeman, Combat General H.J. (Hendrik) 37, 47, 50, 51 Scholtz, Dr. G.D. 3, 6, 30 Schreiner, W.P. 48 Scorched earth policy 75–76, 122–123, 147 Security (as military principle) 147 Selborne, Lord 93 Simplicity (as military principle) 148–149 Singapore 4, 5 Shenandoah valley 157 Sherman, General W.T. 157 Slabberts Nek 73 Slegtkamp, Captain H.F. (Henri) 104 Smuts, Assistant CommandantGeneral J.C. (Jan) xii, 10–11, 18, 19, 22, 76, 85, 86, 87, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 111–119, 130 Snyman, J.H. 48 Somme, The (France) 155 Soutpansberg 61 Soviet Union see also Russia 79 Space versus force 88–89, 105 Spies, S.B. 75 Spion Kop 44, 56, 77

Index 201

Spits, F.C. 156 ‘Splendid isolation’ 6 Springbok 118 Springfontein 57 Spruyt, Combat General C.J. 61 Standerton 111 Steenkamp, Commandant L.P. (Lucas) 46 Sternberg, Count Adalbert 63 Steyn, President M.T. 16, 17, 23, 35, 45, 46, 48, 49, 61, 65, 66, 70, 73–74, 76, 77, 83, 85, 86, 87, 95, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 125, 133–137, 138–140 Steynsburg 65 Stormberg xii, 15, 37, 38, 44, 47, 57, 60, 65, 77 Strategy Suez Canal 5, 79 Summers, Colonel Harry 132 Surprise (as military principle) 147 Surridge, Keith 10, 130, 141 Syferfontein: see Operational plans, Syferfontein Talana Hill, Battle of 27–28 Taylor, A.J.P. 5 Thaba ’Nchu 69, 70 Thirty Years’ War 156 Thoughts on War 55 Three stages of Mao Zedong 93–94 Training 91 Transkei 129 see also Pondoland. Trichardt, Colonel S.P.E. 10 Truman, President Harry 143 Tugela 33, 38, 44, 60, 66, 72, 139 Ulm 59 Ultimatum 17 Unita 139 Unity of command (as military principle) 137 Upington 117

Utrecht

114, 129

Vaalkrans 56 Vaal River 70, 73, 95 Van Dam, Commandant G.M.J. 30, 61 Van Deventer, Combat General J.L. (Jaap) 117 Van Jaarsveld, F.A. 6 Vandisie Drift 64 Van Reenen’s Pass 27 Ventersdorp 85, 95 Verdun 155 Vereeniging, Peace of 86, 96, 112, 118, 119, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 152 Vet River 72 Victoria, Queen 85 Victoria West 46, 117 Vietnam 90, 123, 132, 139, 151 Viljoen, Assistant CommandantGeneral B.J. (Ben) 83, 111, 115, 127 Viljoen, Combat General Piet Virginia, USA 56 Visser, Dr. T.C. 30 Volksrust 27 Vrede 109 Vryburg 47 Vryheid 22, 27, 114, 129 Washington DC 56 Waterberg 61 Waterval See operational plans, Waterval Waterval Drift 63, 54 Wavell, Field Marshal Lord A.P. 155 Wellington 8 Wepener 69, 70 Winterhoek 63 Wessels, Chief Commandant, C.J. 24 Weyler, General, Valeriano 123, 157 White, Lieutenant-General Sir G.S. (George) 29–33, 43 Wilhelm I, Emperor 3

202 Index

Willem Pretorius Nature Reserve 100 William V, Stadtholder 3 Willowgrange 33 Wolseley, Field Marshal Lord G.S. (Garnet) 21

Woolls-Sampson, colonel W.F. 121 Worcester 117 Yom Kippur War Ypres 155

80

Why the Boers Lost the War

Why the Civil War Came

Why War?

Why War? Why an Army?

Why the Crimean War?: A Cautionary Tale

We All Lost the Cold War

We All Lost the Cold War

Iraq: A Lost War

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The Lost

The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us

The Lost

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