The World's Strongest Trade Unions: Scandinavian Labor Movement

THE WORLD’S STRONGEST TRADE UNIONS: The Scandinavian Labor Movement Walter Galenson QUORUM BOOKS THE WORLD’S STRONGE...

Author: Walter Galenson

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THE WORLD’S STRONGEST TRADE UNIONS: The Scandinavian Labor Movement

Walter Galenson

QUORUM BOOKS

THE WORLD’S STRONGEST TRADE UNIONS The Scandinavian Labor Movement Walter Galenson

QUORUM BOOKS Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Galenson, Walter, 1914– The world’s strongest trade unions : the Scandinavian labor movement / Walter Galenson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–56720–183–0 (alk. paper) 1. Trade-unions—Scandinavia. 2. Industrial relations— Scandinavia. I. Title. HD6737.G35 1998 331.88'0948—dc21 98–10827 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 1998 by Walter Galenson All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 98–10827 ISBN: 1–56720–183–0 First published in 1998 Quorum Books, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America TM

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Acknowledgments

vii

Abbreviations

ix

Introduction

1

1

The Unions

7

2

Collective Bargaining

17

3

Trade Union Structure

31

4

Trade Union Policies

43

5

The Unions and the Social Democrats

61

6

Women in the Trade Unions

73

7

White-Collar Unionism

81

8

Interfederation Relationships

91

9

Union Membership Benefits

99

10 How Members View Their Unions

105

11 Why Scandinavian Unionism Has Prospered

131

vi

Contents

Epilogue

141

Bibliography

155

Index

157

Acknowledgments I would like to thank the following for their courtesy in supplying materials that would otherwise have been difficult to obtain: Center for Labor Market Research, University of Aalborg; Charlotte Fuglsang and Hanne Jacobsen, Danish Federation of Trade Unions; Stale Dokken, Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions; Bernt Schiller, University of Gothenberg; Lars Bjo¨rlin and Arne H. Ericsson, Swedish Central Organization of Salaried Employees; Mogens Mansson, Swedish Federation of Professional Associations; and Ake Zettermark, Embassy of Sweden, Washington. My overwhelming obligation is to Haakon Lie, former secretarygeneral of the Norwegian Labor Party, who first persuaded me to study Scandinavian labor relations and kept me informed about what was happening in that fascinating part of the world for the next half century. Note: All trade union publications except where specifically noted are in the original languages. Translations into English are the author’s.

Abbreviations DENMARK LO

Danish Confederation of Trade Unions

FTF

Federation of Civil Servants and Salaried Employees

AC

Federation of Professional Associations

FR

Federation of Foremen and Technical Employees

NORWAY LO

Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions

YS

Confederation of Vocational Unions

AF


SWEDEN LO

Swedish Federation of Trade Unions

TCO

Confederation of Professional Employees

SACO


Introduction Not many years ago there was a realization that the trade unions of the Western world were not growing as they had been for almost a century. In fact, their organizational density, the ratio between union membership and the labor force, was on the decline in all but a few countries. There had been earlier interruptions in union growth due to economic and political disturbances such as the Great Depression and the rise of communist and fascist dictatorships, but economic recovery and the restoration of democracy had put union growth on a rising curve once more in these cases. A spate of books and articles appeared, examining the unusual phenomenon of decline. There were many hypotheses to explain what was happening: changes in the structure of the labor force as employment in services replaced that in manufacturing, a growing belief that wages and other conditions of labor should be determined by the free market rather than by collective bargaining, the influx of women into the labor market, increasing hostility toward unions by government and the business community, a fall in public opinion with respect to the quality of unions and their services, and other causes as well. While all these factors were relevant, not all applied to all countries. Satisfactory industrial relations were not necessarily a guarantee of union progress. Union density could decline even where

2

The World’s Strongest Trade Unions

governments were friendly. Women turned out to be organizable to the same extent as men when the right appeals were used. There was no model based upon convincing correlation coefficients. A few labor movements stood out as exceptional. Among them were those in three Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Not only have they been able to hold their own, but in some respects thay have actually improved their situations, although concessions had to be made. The employers with whom they bargained made no real effort to achieve a union-free environment. But the unions were obliged to make some changes in structure and policy, on occasion abandoning ideological beliefs that put them at the apex of organized labor. Although the three Scandinavian countries (Finland and Iceland are sometimes included in this grouping but are not covered here) are often thought of as politically and economically identical, there are many differences as well as similarities among them. Denmark, with a flourishing agriculture, was historically the richest of the three. Few Danes left their country’s shores at a time when Norway and Sweden were exporting large numbers of people, mainly to the United States, in search of a better livelihood. Malthus based a good deal of his gloomy population theory on the parish records of Swedish churches, where he found a good negative relationship between trends in food crops and death rates. The Norwegians who stayed put were largely engaged in forestry and fishing, including whaling. All three were late to industrialize. Industrial development was by no means uniform in the three countries. It came gradually in Denmark, and depended a good deal on the tradition of craftsmanship that prevailed, inherited from the guilds. Danish furniture and ceramic manufacture has prospered despite high labor costs. Sweden went in for large-scale industry, including steel and paper and pulp as well as automobiles, later. Norway was never heavily industrialized, relying on smaller manufactures and such natural resources as timber, water power, and, very recently, oil. Their labor movements were shaped to a considerable extent by the rapidity and character of their industrial rise. The Danish labor movement was quite conservative and eschewed revolutionary thought or activity. Its tenets were well suited to the requirements of collective bargaining. Craft unionism remained strong, with the

Introduction

3

labor movement split between craftsmen and semiskilled industrial workers. Industrial unionism was predominant in Sweden almost from the start, since early craft training was only modestly developed. The Norwegian labor movement was the most radical: the Norwegian Labor Party was a member of the Comintern for a few years after the First World War, although the trade unions remained outside communist internationals. Despite differences in initial resources and industrial structure, the three countries have moved to top places among the wealthy nations of the world. Their economies still differ in many respects, but they share certain characteristics for which they are famous. Income differentials among their inhabitants are very low, and poverty has all but disappeared. They are welfare states; that is, their governments provide for their citizens a panoply of benefits that is unmatched. Though they have market economies, there is more government intervention and regulation than prevails in many other countries. They are not immune to economic fluctuations, but their citizens are well protected against resultant hardships. Common political and social institutions tend to cement their closeness to one another. All are democratic parliamentary kingdoms, although there are significant differences in their electoral systems. The Dano-Norwegian and Swedish languages are not identical, though they are close enough to be understood by all. The Danes have a different lifestyle than the others; Denmark is heavily populated, and the Norwegians and Swedes are thinly spread over a large area that is mainly forested and rougher than the neat Danish landscape. The three countries are politically independent of one another but can be counted on for mutual aid and assistance. When Germany invaded Denmark and Norway in World War II, Sweden gave refuge to many Norwegians who were in danger of arrest and to most of the Jewish population of Denmark after their dramatic evacuation. There are many meetings and conferences among the political leaders as well as the trade unionists. Intellectual life is closely knit in the three nations; it is not at all unusual to find a professor who is a citizen of one country holding a position at a university in another. It was inevitable that the trade unions of the three countries should have developed close relationships and that their industrial-

4


relations systems should have much in common. Yet they are by no means identical, and this must be taken into account in reading the chapters that follow. Structures differ; the older Norwegian and Swedish federations are largely industrial in character, while there is still a substantial admixture of craft unionism in the Danish federation. The Swedes have reached a level of union organization that is virtually complete, unique among the democratic nations of the world. The Danes are not far behind, while the Norwegians have some way to go. This bears upon the degree of their devotion to organizational activities. There is an anti-alcoholic tradition in Norway and Sweden, whereas the Danish trade unions once owned a brewery, the profits of which were allocated to workers’ education. Recent economic developments in the three countries have accentuated policy differences. The emergence of heavy unemployment in Sweden, a country that was famous for its so-called active labor market policy, has obliged its unions to give it their full attention. It came as a shock and bewildered not only the unions, but employers and the government as well. Earlier concerns with the minutiae of industrial relations have given way to this unexpected problem. The Danes, on the other hand, long had a fair level of unemployment and tended to carry on with their usual preoccupations. The Norwegian unions are in a completely different situation. Their unemployment is as low as Sweden’s is high, but they have to wrestle with the problems created by the flow of oil from their North Sea fields. Many of their members do not see why this liquid gold should not be devoted to higher wages, pensions, and other government and union benefits. The task of the unions is to convince them that a policy looking to the future and avoiding inflationary instability is a better one than immediate increases in consumer purchasing power. It would not be correct to attribute the success of the Scandinavian unions to the absence of the developments that led to their decline in other countries. There has been a major change in the distribution of their working population, from manufacturing to services. Their rates of female labor-force participation are among the highest in the world, leading to a proliferation of part-time workers. Employers have not been hostile to the union movement, but, particularly in Sweden, they have modified their bargaining

Introduction

5

tactics in an effort to reduce union power. Their allies in the Social Democratic parties are still in leading positions, but the days when they could govern with parliamentary majorities rather than in coalitions are over. The concept of brawny sons of toil as the driving force in the economy has given way to that of college-educated young people contributing their human capital to the nation’s growth. What is interesting is how the trade union movement in Scandinavia was able to overcome these and other negative factors and emerge unscathed. It was not an easy process. There was more contention within the unions than there had been in decades. It was reported that some recent federation congresses were angry affairs. In the end, cooler heads prevailed and necessary changes were made. The following pages concentrate on the years since 1985. New leaders came to the fore, new policies were adopted. The bottom line is that trade unionism is alive and well in Scandinavia.

Chapter 1

The Unions MEMBERSHIP PATTERNS Membership data for the major Scandinavian trade unions as of 1985 and 1995 are shown in tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. The first thing to be noted is that the absolute number of members in the traditional unions rose in Denmark and Norway and fell slightly in Sweden over the decade. The newer white-collar and professional unions grew more rapidly, with the result that by 1995 they represented a larger proportion of all employees than they had in 1985, particularly in Norway. These data are used in table 1.4 to determine the union density ratios (trade union membership divided by the labor force). They must be taken with caution on several counts. Membership figures may differ in concept among unions; some may include the unemployed and pensioners, and others may not. The labor-force data may not be determined in exactly the same way. There are other estimates. For example, the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm cites a density of 87 percent for Sweden in 1994, although it does not indicate how this calculation was made.1 Despite these reservations, the data permit some general observations. Density is clearly highest in Sweden, followed by Denmark and Norway. The latter is nevertheless at a higher level than any

8


other democratic industrial nation. Workers have sometimes been herded into government-controlled labor organizations in communist and other dictatorships, but these are not relevant for comparative purposes. Union densities rose in all three Scandinavian countries during the 1985–95 decade. To a considerable extent this reflected the unionization of occupational groups that were affected by the expansion of the service sector. However, the LOs (the traditional unions) also made some headway among these groups, as evidenced by membership growth. For example, an affiliate of the Norwegian LO, the Fellesforbund, formed by the merger of three blue-collar unions, lost almost 15,000 members during the decade, while another affiliate, the Municipal Workers Union, gained 47,000. The Swedish Metal Workers lost 15,000, but the Municipal Workers picked up 28,000 and the Civil Service Union 19,000, all in the LO. The figures shown for total LO membership thus conceal intrafederation shifts. The figures reflect not only the movement from manufacturing to service employment, but also the growth of the public sector. Between 1975 and 1990, the number of unionized public-sector employees in Denmark rose from 579,000 to 792,000; the LO share fell from 68 to 61 percent.2 A report to the 1991 Swedish LO Congress stated that ‘‘public sector activity will increase some 1.5 percent per annum during the 1990s. . . . The public sector is recruiting about 90 percent of the entire increase in the labor force at present,’’ and an officer of the LO added ‘‘we have in Sweden established a general welfare system with a high degree of public

The Unions

9

redistribution and a small private sector. . . . We affirm with pride that no one is outside the protective net.’’3 A large proportion of the new jobs have been filled by women, particularly in the municipalities. Table 1.5 contains data showing the percentage of women in the major unions for 1985 and 1995. By the latter year, they were almost half of all LO members in Denmark, but they dominated the white-collar union. Their representation was somewhat lower in Norway and Sweden, though it may be noted that they were the majority in the Swedish whitecollar federation, TCO. THE TRADITIONAL UNIONS The pioneering unions in all three countries date back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Danish LO was founded in 1898, the Norwegian LO in 1899, and the Swedish LO in 1902. For the next fifty years they had a virtual monopoly. It was only after World War II that challenge from new organizations of white-collar and professional employees arose. The LOs were based on craft or industrial affiliates, which in turn were composed of local unions covering one or more workplaces. They were governed by congresses held every four or five years. In the interim they were run by representative councils selected by their affiliates on the basis of membership strength and by smaller executive committees, usually including the chairmen of the larger affiliates. While this is the broad structural picture, there were some dif-

10


ferences among the three federations. Denmark had a strong craft tradition and its LO resisted the pressure for industrial unionism that motivated the Norwegian and Swedish LOs. The unskilled and semiskilled workers in Denmark, excluded from the craft unions, formed their own organization, which is now known as the Special Workers Union. By the end of 1995, it had enrolled 20 percent of all LO members, workers employed in many industries. Great Britain is the only other country in which this form of general unionism prevails. Another unique Danish labor organization is the Women’s Trade Union, with 93,000 members constituting 7 percent of LO members. The women are employed mainly in a service capacity in hotels and other enterprises, not in manufacturing, where the Clothing and Textile Workers Union caters primarily to women. In general, women were less well organized than men until the beginning of the 1980s, when they began to catch up. In 1995 the Danish LO had twenty-four national affiliates. Some of them were quite small, reflecting craft traditions among artists, bookbinders, hairdressers and cosmetologists, noncommissioned military personnel, and plumbers. The five largest LO unions, in addition to the Special Workers and Women, cover commercial, public, and metal workers. These unions constitute almost threefourths of the entire LO membership. This split among craft, industrial, and female unions complicated the structural reform recently undertaken by the LO. The Norwegian LO numbered twenty-seven national affiliates in 1995, including such occupationally defined groups as newspaper

The Unions

11

employees, prison guards, singers and organists, and interpreters. The largest union was the Municipal Workers, which had grown by 28 percent during the previous decade. Its five largest unions (municipal, metal, civil servants, retail, and commercial) accounted for 65 percent of LO membership. The LO had been an organization rooted in the working class, closely intertwined with the most radical of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, but had to scramble for government employees to maintain its market hegemony. The Swedish LO has also undergone a change reflecting the shift in sectoral employment. The largest unions in the LO included the Municipal Workers (81 percent female), the Civil Servants, and the Commercial Workers, contributing 46 percent of its membership. Countering them are the Metal Workers Union, the Construction Workers, and the General Factory Workers. The only unions with less than 10,000 members were those of sheet-metal workers and musicians. The big push toward the services and the public sector began well before 1985. However, the Municipal Workers gained 30,000 members during the 1985–95 decade, while the Metal Workers lost 15,000.

12


THE NEW UNIONS The unions of white-collar employees and professionals have developed alongside the LOs in all three Scandinavian countries. The latter have tolerated them in varying degrees, depending on the extent to which they overlapped LO affiliates. They have flourished particularly in Sweden, where they represented 43 percent of all union members in 1995, compared with 24 percent in Denmark and 37 percent in Norway. The Swedish unions, TCO and SACO, which have been the models for similar organizations in other countries, will be dealt with in some detail in chapter 7. Their Norwegian counterparts, AF and YS, are not as powerful, but they have grown more rapidly during the last decade. AF, the larger of the two, increased its membership during this period by 75 percent as a consequence of

The Unions

13

gaining the affiliation of previously independent associations. Formed in 1975, it still reflects its origin as an amalgamation of purely professional bodies. Half its forty affiliates had less than 1,000 members each in 1991, including unions of local tax directors with 34 members, ship’s officers with 72, and foreign service officers with 145. The largest AF affiliate in the same year was the Nurses Union, most of whose members were employed by municipalities. Next in order was an association of engineers founded in 1936, operating in both the private and public sectors. Its members normally have three years of schooling at a technical college, and the union spends a great deal on training to keep them au courant of the latest technology. Among the other sizable affiliates are unions of civil engineers, physicians, and educators. AF operates in a decentralized manner. It has a representative council consisting of two delegates from each affiliate, and an executive committee of fifteen. There are four sections, one each for civil servants, municipal employees, private-sector employees, and the so-called free professions. The central organization handles legal and economic problems of a general nature, but it is not involved in private-sector negotiations and has little influence in the representation of public employees. Each affiliate has its own dues structure. In sum, ‘‘the affiliates of AF have a great deal of independence. The secretariat of the Federation has a much smaller leadership role than the LO’s central organization.’’4 But it is nevertheless a genuine labor federation. The third Norwegian federation, YS, was founded in 1977. It has been unwilling to charter organizations with fewer than 1,500 members, and as a result has only seventeen affiliates. A small governing bureaucracy may on occasion bargain for its constituents. Its largest affiliate is a union of assistant nurses, followed in size by an association of municipal workers. One of the most interesting from an international standpoint is the National Bank Employees Union, which has succeeded in organizing 95 percent of all bank employees in the country. Sixty years old, it became one of the founders of YS after having refused to join the LO. A majority of its governing body are women, as is the case with its membership. ‘‘NBF has had considerable success in recruiting middle-managers; indeed a majority of its top governing board comes from these ranks. . . . Many

14


banks encourage union membership.’’5 Several other YS affiliates, including defense department civilian employees and bus drivers, are in direct competition with LO unions. There are some independent unions, many quite small. The largest is a union of teachers, mainly at the elementary-school level. The LO has abstained from invading its jurisdiction. There was a similar compact with the Nurses Union, but that collapsed when the nurses joined AF. LO has mutual assistance pacts with unions of actors and ballet dancers. The new unions have made less headway in Denmark, where the Danish LO has organized many white-collar employees. Its principal competitor is FTF, founded in 1952. The largest affiliates of this federation are unions of primary-school teachers, nurses, bank clerks, and insurance agents. The main strength of FTF is in the public sector. AC is the third and smallest of the new unions in Denmark. However, it has almost doubled its membership during the past decade. It represents a wide variety of occupational groups—engineers, lawyers, and economists, among others—but not physicians, who withdrew on the ground that AC had not been sufficiently aggressive in bargaining with government officials. The relationship between LO and AC has been described in the following terms: ‘‘LO has neither the possibility nor the desire to attempt organization of the academically educated employees. Consequently there have never been problems in relations with AC. At the same time it may be said that up to the present this area has never been of a size that made it an LO priority to seek control. It has not threatened LO’s well-defined contract area in the public sector.’’6 THE EMPLOYERS A few words are in order about the organized employers with whom the unions bargain. The first of the national employer groups, the Danish Employers’ Association (DA) was formed in 1898, the same year as the Danish LO. For a century it has been the most representative labor-market organization of employers in the country. It has had differences with the union, but its contribution to peaceful industrial relations has been great. In 1993 it consisted of 34 affiliated associations, down from 151 in 1986 due

The Unions

15

to consolidation. In the latter year, some 28,000 of its member firms employed 590,000 people. It required a good part of a recent 500-page book to trace the changes in DA structure over the years of its existence.7 Suffice it to say here that DA is governed by a general assembly that meets annually, a general board meeting quarterly, and a small executive committee. It has a large secretariat, which, among other things, compiles the nation’s official wage statistics. Danish employers have not been motivated to organize by any collectivist philosophy, but rather by the perception that they stood to gain from centralized collective bargaining. The Swedish Employers’ Association (SAF), which represents employers in the private sector, was founded in 1902, four years after the LO. It has 42,000 members employing 1.3 million people, a substantial majority of those in manufacturing, construction, commerce, transport, and various services. There are thirty-six national affiliates gathered into nine large groups for bargaining purposes. Historically, power was centralized in SAF, but recently the constituent associations have become more independent, and SAF has become a coordinating body. The impetus to change came from employer desires to adjust wages and working conditions to the requirements of individual enterprises. This does not mean adoption of the level of bargaining prevailing in the United States, for example. The associations still do a good deal of the bargaining. Public-sector employers have their own independent federations: the National Agency for Government Employers and the Federation of County Councils. They bargain with LO, TCO, or SACO depending on the employment category involved. It should be noted that Scandinavian public employees enjoy the right to bargain collectively, including the right to strike. Finally, there is Norway, where employer organization has not been as centralized as in Denmark or Sweden. The largest employer group in the private sector is the Association of Business and Industry (NHO), formed in 1989 by the merger of three preexisting organizations and representing 10,000 firms with 225,000 employees. NHO itself and its thirty affiliates represent employers in general business as well as labor matters. A smaller federation, the Commercial Employers’ Association, combines enterprises with fifty to sixty thousand employees. There

16


are smaller independent employer groups in shipping, banks, insurance companies, and private health institutions. The central and local governments are separately organized for bargaining purposes but confer with one another through a cooperation committee. Data for 1993 suggest that on the order of 1.035 million employees worked in associated employer enterprises.8 This was about half the labor force. This means that not all employees in an associated firm bargain collectively and that not all employees are covered by contract work in associated firms. NOTES 1. U.S. Department of Labor, Foreign Labor Reports: Sweden, 1994–95, p. 651. 2. Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, and Carsten Strøby Jensen, Den Danske Model Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing, 1994, p. 311. 3. LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 1306, 1314. 4. LO in Norway, 1993 Congress, Organisasjonsprosject, Temabok, 1993, p. 96. 5. Everett Kassalow, White-Collar Unionism in Selected European Countries (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1995), p. 52. 6. Due, Madsen, and Jensen, Den Danske Model, p. 306. 7. Ibid. 8. LO in Norway, Temabok, pp. 108–112.

Chapter 2

Collective Bargaining Collective bargaining procedures are a century old in Scandinavia. Although they differ from one country to another, a common thread runs through them: a fair degree of centralization. Some matters may be the subject of discussion between a firm and its employees, but generally wage levels and hours of work have been determined collectively on both sides of the table, sometimes on a national basis, sometimes by industry. There have been major changes in previous bargaining patterns during the decade 1985–1995, which necessitated structural changes in the organization of both labor and management. The underlying causes have been economic in nature and have centered on efforts to bring employee compensation nearer the level of the individual enterprise. The process has been particularly difficult for the unions, which is the subject of chapter 3. We deal here with traditional practices and current innovations. DENMARK The Danish bargaining system was the oldest and most firmly established of those in the three countries. It involved bargaining on a national scale between the Employers’ Association and the LO over agreements that covered portions of the economy with similar

18


work requirements. All had a uniform expiration date, usually the first of March, with a duration of two years. Bargaining began at the industry level, and if an agreement could not be reached in a specified time, it went up to the top. Up to this point in the procedure, there was no government intervention apart from occasional mediation. In the event of continuing disagreement, a public conciliator, nominated jointly or appointed by a government ministry, intervened. He attempted to bring the parties together and could make proposals for a settlement with or without the concurrence of the parties. Since either party or both could reject the proposal, this did not amount to compulsory arbitration. The conciliator could require postponement of strikes or lockouts while the bargainers polled their members on acceptability of the proposal. If it was rejected, strikes or lockouts could be declared unless the Parliament enacted the proposal or a variant of it into law. The latter alternative proved to be necessary on seven occasions since 1945.1 The conciliator had the authority to determine the units on which his proposal was polled, so agreements under discussion could be linked in a single referendum or divided. This normally did not cause problems for employers, but it did for the unions, and it has been the subject of considerable debate. In 1970, the voting rules were amended to make rejection more difficult. Not only was a majority of No votes required, but the No majority had to constitute at least 35 percent of those eligible to vote. In 1991, worker participation in the bargaining was 34.4 percent, with the result that a 75 percent negative majority was not sufficient to defeat the proposal. A majority of the committee on resolutions at the 1991 LO Congress voted to change the rule from 35 to 25 percent, while a minority favored elimination of the participation requirement entirely. The 25 percent rule was adopted, but it was modified by an agreement with employers. Under the new rule, a simple majority No vote could reject a conciliator’s proposal provided that at least 40 percent of those entitled to vote did so. If the participation rate were lower, at least 25 percent of the eligibles had to cast a negative ballot for it to be defeated. This made it easier to defeat a proposal in the face of widespread worker apathy. The agreement also em-


19

powered either the LO or the Employers’ Association to limit the pooling of units. The Agreement strengthens trade union democracy by making it more difficult to force a conciliation proposal where large groups of members are opposed. . . . The Agreement provides that members of LO’s negotiating committee in the last phase have the power to approve or reject pooling of the voting results. It is the union represented on the negotiating committee that determines whether a particular group shall vote alone or join up in a common proposal.2

The first recent culmination of collective bargaining without government intervention took place in 1981, but two subsequent rounds did require conciliation. After 1985, however, the Employers’ Association initiated steps toward decentralization. But complete decentralization would have endangered the coordinating role that it was anxious to continue. As Due and his associates put it: If the structure of Danish industry (and commerce), still characterized by the high percentage of small and medium-sized firms, were not to cause a certain measure of chaos when bargaining competence was decentralized, the organizations would have to be centralized to form entities capable of controlling and coordinating developments. The resulting process would be centralized decentralization, which explains the strategy adopted by the employers to safeguard their interests.3

This entailed consolidation of employer affiliates into larger units. Employer motivations lay in the labor-market economics of the 1980s. Cost-of-living allowances in contracts led to relatively higher wage increases for lower-paid workers, and those at higher levels resorted to adjustments during contract periods to maintain their wage differentials via wage drift. The result was wage-price inflation, which was felt particularly by the export industries. The employer initiative led to a vigorous debate within the LO. The major adversaries were the Special Workers Union, representing the semiskilled, and the Metal Workers, who resented the limitations imposed on higher-paid groups by centrally controlled bargaining and the consequently narrow wage differentials. A Special Worker delegate to the 1991 LO Congress blamed the some-

20


what decentralized patterns of 1989 and 1991 for low wage settlements. The LO chair attempted to adopt an intermediate position. ‘‘There is no signal in the LO’s prospective position for contract negotiation in the 90s of any diminution in our solidaristic wage policy. The role of the LO should be to secure wage cost developments between different branches or contract areas that prevent weaker groups dropping behind.’’4 But this did not imply penalizing the higher paid. The extent to which the bargaining system has been decentralized can be illustrated by the last bargaining round at the time of this writing, that of 1995. The LO leadership advised affiliated unions to ask for three general improvements: establishment of a central maternity fund, creation of a pool in each improvement area to supplement government benefits up to full pay for members who signed up for labor-market training, and contract clauses that would secure for the longtime unemployed and disabled persons with reduced working capabilities the possibility of work in the private sector at special wages and working conditions. In addition, it recommended increased wages sufficient to protect real wages but that would not weaken the country’s foreign competitive ability.5 On January 14, 1995, the Trade, Transport, and Service Employers’ Association reached an agreement with the Special Workers raising wages over a two-year period plus allowing leave for workrelated training. The Industry Association, a powerful employer group, notified the top Employers’ Association (DA) that this agreement would undermine Denmark’s competitive ability, and DA rejected it. Some employer groups complained that this violated their right to conclude their own collective agreements, whereupon DA signaled to all negotiators that decentralized negotiations would be suspended until an agreement had been reached in manufacturing as a whole. Nevertheless, the Special Workers reached another agreement with the Contractors’ Association, while a new union echelon, the Construction cartel, signed up with the Building Employers. Finally, the Industry Association and the Industrial Union cartel agreed on terms that differed in many ways from the agreements previously reached. The most unusual clause was that setting a three-year term, breaking a tradition of two-year contracts that


21

dated back to 1916. This was followed by agreements in other areas. LO and DA moved in to assist in negotiations covering painters, electricians, the graphic trades, and others. At that point a conciliator framed a proposal pooling all agreements for the entire LO/ DA area. His proposal was approved. Under the voting rules in effect, participation was very low, so defeat was unlikely no matter what the negative vote. This outcome represented a break with the past in that the final agreements reached by the immediate parties were not uniform, including the contract term. The employer strategy of bringing collective bargaining closer to the individual industry or enterprise began to take shape. The most significant point, however, is that there appears to have been no employer effort to weaken or destroy the unions. The labor market remained organized, though there was some redistribution of power downward. It was not every man for himself. Many years ago the present writer characterized Denmark’s collective bargaining system as a product of the ‘‘Danish genius for compromise.’’ The transformation of the traditional centralized system into one that is more flexible and better suited to the contemporary economy provides a good example of how far-reaching reforms can be achieved with a minimum of conflict.

NORWAY Collective bargaining has not been as centralized in Norway as in Denmark. The role of the LO varied from year to year, depending on economic circumstances. There has also been a tendency for greater government intervention. There were at least three possible bargaining procedures in the private sector: 1. Each union affiliated with the LO bargained for itself with a corresponding employer association. 2. There might be common bargaining conducted jointly by several national unions.

22


3. The LO might be involved with its affiliates on matters of general interest, followed by joint voting on agreements. National unions could conduct parallel bargaining on matters of special interest to them.

Looking back at recent rounds, the 1986 negotiations were the first in some time that led to a major work stoppage. An economic downturn had resulted in employer determination to create more flexible and finely adjusted wage systems. The representative council of the LO went along with a pattern based on individual unions despite the fact that the LO chair feared that the authority of the LO might be undermined as a result. Some unions were asking for a reduction of working hours in line with those enjoyed by civil servants. The employers rejected the union demands, and when mediation proved fruitless, they made the first move by locking out 100,000 employees, including 53,000 in the metal trades. Public opinion swung against this action, and some employer associations that were involved requested that they be relieved of the mandate to participate in the lockout. The Conservative government then in office refused to intervene, and the employers were forced to ask for a resumption of mediation, a sign of surrender. The lockout was terminated a week after it was imposed; wages were increased and hours of work reduced. The employer decentralization ploy failed. The next bargaining round, in 1988 when the Labor Party had regained control of the government, was centralized. The LO adopted a moderate line in cooperation with a government-imposed wage freeze. There was a good deal of criticism within the LO for failure to follow up the victory in 1986.6 This was a factor in a later debate on the ties between the LO and the Labor Party. Negotiations in 1990 followed a similar course. A central agreement between the LO and the Employers’ Association was reached, providing for a limited overall wage increase with an upward adjustment for low-paid workers. Within this constraint, industry and local bargainers were permitted to adopt some refinements (option 3, listed earlier). The pattern was repeated in 1992 and 1994. ‘‘Although this represented a kind of return to normalcy, both the social partners and the state confirmed their commitment to continue along the line of moderate, centralized corporatist incomes policies.’’7


23

Acceptance of this policy line was not without risk to the LO. There was grumbling among rank and filers who could not understand the need for moderation when oil was flowing from Norway’s North Sea platforms. A defense was offered by an LO official at the 1993 Congress: ‘‘In cooperating to restrain inflation and strengthen competition we must accept limitations on our bargaining rights at the onset of the campaign. This was no easy matter for trade unions but it was necessary first and foremost to make certain that groups outside our ranks did their share. It is a positive sign that in the course of recent years it has been possible to normalize the situation in contract policy simultaneously with following an incomes policy line and curbing inflation.’’8 Despite concerns about membership protests, the policy of cooperation continued in the two years that followed and dominated Norwegian industrial relations. It has been given credit for causing persistently low levels of unemployment and inflation. The Swedish government and trade unions sent a delegation to Norway in 1996 to find out more about the policy and determine whether it might be adapted for Swedish use. The Labor government made strenuous efforts to convince workers that extension of the policy of moderation was wise. Opposition may have centered in the white-collar federations, which were demanding higher wage increases. However, there was a price to pay that may result in the termination of the policy in 1998. The principal one lay in the outcome of the 1997 general election. The Labor Party suffered a slight loss, but the main winner was the Progress Party, a recently formed organization that tripled its 1993 vote by advocating higher government spending out of oil revenues for medical care, pensions, and school supplies. This party has been compared with that of Le Pen in France and capitalized on the electoral dissatisfaction that may have been a consequence of the moderate wage policy followed by the unions. Whether it can be continued remains to be seen. SWEDEN The widely known Swedish model of collective bargaining brought peaceful and profitable industrial relations to the country for many years. It was a highly centralized system based (in the

24


private sector) on two powerful organizations, the LO and the Swedish Employers’ Association (SAF). It had a three-tiered structure: LO and SAF negotiated a frame agreement that set a general level of wage changes for the entire private sector. Unions and affiliated employer associations then negotiated on matters specific to each industry. This was followed by a third stage at the local level in which industry agreements were applied to both the amounts and the distribution of the monetary portions. Employers liked the system because it helped moderate wages. Individual unions were constrained from securing the large wage increases that they might have been able to exact from the most profitable firms. Competitive prices could be protected. Disruptive work stoppages and government intervention were minimized. For their part, the unions pursued what was called a solidaristic wage policy, which meant that special consideration was given to low-paid workers at the expense of what pure market forces might have delivered to those at the top of the wage scale. Wage differentials became very narrow. Skilled groups were not always happy with limitations on their bargaining power, but they were assuaged by the extension of the welfare state to the factory in the form of codetermination, shorter working hours, well-administered protection against hazardous working conditions, and other benefits that were imposed on employers by legislation. This was the heyday of the welfare state, financed by high taxation. The bargaining system began to fall apart in the 1980s. Wage moderation was undermined by wage drift, the result of a practice that permitted individual firms to raise compensation beyond the contractual level. Growth of the service sector and independent white-collar unions reduced the ability of LO to restrain wages. Neither TCO nor SACO was committed to wage solidarity. Their members came to enjoy higher compensation than skilled LO members were earning. A serious break occurred in 1983 when the Association of Engineering Employers (VF), which numbered among its members some of Sweden’s largest firms, including Volvo, Electrolux, and Ericsson, prevailed upon the Metal Workers Union to enter into separate negotiations in advance of the national round and reached an agreement. Other associations and unions followed suit. This ushered in a new era.9


25

It may be wondered why there could be a successful challenge to the powerful SAF. The fact is that the large corporations had become restive under the centralized system and had even hinted at secession. In 1982 the Engineering Association had pushed through a change in the SAF constitution allowing its member associations greater independence. LO was not happy with this trend but had been offered some concessions that it had long wanted. ‘‘It was beneficial to both VF and Metall to negotiate separately in 1983. The reactions from other unions were mixed. The agreement did not differ much from the rest of LO-SAF agreements. The lowwage unions were however concerned about the future if there were not to be any low-wage supplements.’’10 In return for a low-cost offer by LO in 1986, SAF suggested a centralized resolution. VF torpedoed the idea, and talks began at the association level. They were interrupted by the assassination of Prime Minister Palme, and in the aftermath, LO and SAF reached a framework agreement. In preparation for a new round two years later, VF notified SAF that it was prepared to deal separately with the Metal Workers on all issues, arousing concern among other employers. In the end, LO and SAF signed a contract covering all employers except those in VF, who agreed to wage terms that were regarded by other employers as excessive. The end result was a determination to develop a more stable bargaining structure. This began in 1990, when the SAF proclaimed that it would no longer negotiate directly with LO on wages and other working conditions. Affiliated employer associations were given the freedom to institute lockouts and set up their own strike funds. The chair of the SAF issued the following statement: ‘‘I am convinced that SAF’s role during the 1990s will be more significant for Swedish business than recently. After a long-term illness the ‘Swedish model’ is dead. The historic decision made by SAF on 2 February means that there is no return. The course for our wage policy is totally clear. It is focused upon decentralization—with the intent of providing a dominant role for firm-level bargaining.’’11 The Social Democratic government, concerned with the possibility of inflationary wage increases under the new system, called the parties together and suggested a return to centralized bargaining. The employers refused and offered instead acceptance of a price freeze and dividend ceiling in exchange for a wage freeze and strike

26


ban. After consultation with top union leadership, the government imposed these restraints for a two-year period. This aroused an immediate protest from many union members; some affiliates refused to go along, and a number of union officers disassociated themselves from this scheme, leading the government to resign, although it was soon succeeded by another Social Democratic government. At the 1991 LO Congress, a resolution was introduced that condemned Stig Malm, its chairman, for accepting the suspension of the ‘‘holy’’ right of trade unions to strike and called upon him to resign. There was a vitriolic debate in the course of which Malm defended his action on the ground that it was necessary for the preservation of the welfare system. The resolution was defeated and Malm remained loyal to the new government, but his position was weakened.12 Malm finally was forced to resign two years later on the ostensible charge that as chairman of the union building association he had approved an excessive payment to a departing administrative director. In fact, he was involved in what were considered improprieties by the Swedish labor movement: a high-priced automobile for his personal use and some uncomplimentary references to several members of Parliament, among other things. Perhaps of greater importance was the fact that there were groups in the LO, led by the chairman of the Civil Service Union, that wanted to further limit the role of the LO secretariat in wage negotiations. This was the first time in LO history that a chairman had been forced out. SAF had long been represented on a number of government commissions and administrative boards. To signal its new role, it withdrew from all these bodies, thus bringing to an end another facet of the Swedish model. The 1993 negotiations were conducted by national unions and employer associations without LO or SAF coordination. The alteration in the bargaining structure was a major blow to the unions. A report on wage policy to the 1991 LO Congress shows how seriously they regarded it. The report began by asserting that it might be possible to negotiate in a reasonable manner without formal centralization. But with an opponent that was doing all it could to split the unions, it was essential to have a heightened degree of solidarity. The threat to collective bargaining came from two sources: employers who were attempting to replace agreements


27

by unilateral decisions, and politicians who were legislating incomes policies. The report noted that the unions had not yet found any effective means of countering employer efforts to decentralize wage determination. Decentralized bargaining made greater demands for cooperation among unions. The replacement of central coordination by union-by-union negotiations makes it impossible to deal with wage policy problems. It does not mean that all contract terms in different sectors must be identical. As was the case earlier, it is possible to adapt agreements to conditions prevailing in the various branches. What is important is that the general direction should correspond with the basic conditions for solidaristic wage policy, not that contracts be formulated identically.13

The same theme was repeated at the next LO Congress five years later. The chairman of the large Municipal Workers Union declared that the new scenario in which LO was no longer a bargaining partner of SAF made it necessary for the unions themselves to coordinate their demands and actions. This was particularly important in order to preserve wage solidarity. Wage glide was producing inequities. The congress adopted a resolution embodying these sentiments.14 The demise of the Swedish model has complicated industrial relations in Sweden. The Danish model proved more durable, in part because corporate power was not as great as that in Sweden. There were no giant firms that could impose their will on the smaller employers. The Swedish LO was shaken by the employer offensive, but only to the extent that it was obliged to consider its bargaining structure. The employers showed that they could force a major change in procedures, but this was a far cry from causing a permanent impairment in LO strength. And the offensive provided an opportunity for those in the LO who were not enamored of the solidarity wage policy to get out from under it. WORK STOPPAGES Labor relations have not always been peaceful in Scandinavia. There were strikes and lockouts during the era of centralized bargaining, occasionally wildcat in character. Data on working days lost

28


due to work stoppages are shown in table 2.1. One year in the decade stands out in each of the three countries. For Denmark it was 1985, when the central organizations could not agree on contract terms. The state conciliator gave up his efforts to bring the parties together, and a walkout took place on April 24. A few days later the Conservative government enacted into law a settlement that the LO branded as grossly unfair, but which was nonetheless accepted. There has not been a major strike since.15 The year 1986 marked the stoppage peak for Norway. That was the year the employers locked out 100,000 workers in a futile attempt to secure decentralization. The relatively high Swedish figures for 1988 and 1990 were associated with the conflict over bargaining structure. The highly organized Scandinavian unions are able to mount strikes without undue concern for their survival or for the jobs of


29

their members, an option not always available elsewhere. While this may tend to raise the strike level, high union densities may discourage employers from refusing concessions. Whatever the reason, the strike weapon has had relatively little use in Scandinavia during recent years. It has not rusted, as the reaction of Swedish LO members in 1991 attests; it remains in reserve should an appropriate occasion arise. NOTES 1. Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen, and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model (Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing, 1994), pp. 134–135. 2. LO in Denmark, Arsberetning, 1995–1996, Copenhagen, p. 19. 3. Due et al., Survival of Danish Model, p. 190. 4. LO in Denmark, 1991 Congress, Protokol, pp. 102–103. 5. LO in Denmark, Arsberetning, 1994–1995, p. 17. 6. For example, see LO in Norway, 1989 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 27– 31. 7. Jon-Erik Dølvik, ‘‘Norwegian Trade Unionism at a Crossroad,’’ in Finnish Labor Relations Association, Transformation of Nordic Industrial Relations in the European Context (1995), p. 95. 8. LO in Norway, 1993 Congress, Protokoll, p. 236. 9. For details of this event see Hans de Geer, The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model (Chicester: Carden Publications, 1993), pp. 143–144. 10. Anders S. Olsson, The Swedish Wage Negotiation System (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1990), p. 56. 11. Quoted in V. Pestoff, ‘‘The Demise of the Swedish Model,’’ Journal of Area Studies (Nov. 5, 1994), p. 110. 12. LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 103–107. 13. LO in Sweden, Lo¨nepolitik for Framtiden, 1991 Congress, pp. 103– 107. 14. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, Sept. 9, pp. 60–61. 15. For an account of this episode, see LO in Denmark, Arsberetning 1985–1986, pp. 32–41.

Chapter 3

Trade Union Structure The success or partial success of Scandinavian employers in decentralizing collective bargaining imposed difficult problems of structural adjustment on the unions. The employer associations consolidated their affiliates into larger units, as a means of simplifying contract coverage, at the same time as they were moving away from nationwide frame agreements. If the unions did not follow suit, they faced the prospect of being divided and conquered by their opponents. Changing union structure is not an easy matter, as anyone who has dealt with unions knows. The simplest procedure is to merge related national unions, and some of this is going on all the time as industrial structure and technology develop. But this means giving up old traditions as well as a degree of solidarity, and apportioning leadership positions. Mergers are best accomplished when one of the merging partners cannot go it alone for economic reasons, but this was not generally the case in Scandinavia. The recourse was rather to an echelon of union structure called the ‘‘cartel,’’ which had already been adopted in a few industries prior to 1990. This was essentially a loose association of national union affiliates for bargaining purposes. However, this solution raised its own problems. Which unions should be included in a cartel? Should a single union be permitted to participate in more

32


than one cartel? What functions should remain the province of each participant? How were voting rights to be apportioned? These and other issues had to be discussed and tried before the cartel structure was firmly installed. The solutions were not identical for all the Scandinavian federations, because they came to the process with different structures and power. Committees were set up to generate specific proposals; these were discussed at congresses and eventually adopted or rejected. There has not yet been sufficient experience to evaluate the plans that have been effectuated, but an account of the restructuring process provides a good example of how Scandinavian labor tackled a tough problem. DENMARK Restructuring in Denmark was more complicated than in the other two countries because of the unique structure of the Danish LO. There was overlapping membership in many industries and enterprises because of the separate existence of a union of unskilled workers. Employers were anxious to bring about a single contract for each enterprise rather than deal with a union committee composed of people with different, if not conflicting, interests. The momentum that eventually led to reform began at the 1987 Congress of the LO when Finn Thorgrimson, its chair, introduced the issue directly: ‘‘Now the cartel structure must be given a good chance. It must start in a flexible form and leave it to the future to judge whether cartels will end as true unions or whether the future will be cooperation among sovereign unions.’’1 A committee developed recommendations to the effect that no final structural form should be adopted before there was ample time for review. What were existing and new units to be doing? How many cartels were there to be? For example, should city bus drivers be placed in a municipal or a transportation cartel? Queries were raised from the floor. Were the members of the Women’s Union to be distributed over the cartels and thus lose their bargaining power? The chair of the unskilled union warned that his union could only go along with a structure ‘‘in which all workers in an enterprise shall have equal access to training facilities for similar work, that there be equal wages for work of the


33

same value whether it is termed skilled or unskilled, whether it be a man or a woman who does the job.’’2 A special congress held two years later adopted a structural resolution by a majority of 82 percent of those voting. It proposed that five cartels be established. One of the key provisions was that all employees of a single employer should be members of the same cartel. Each national union would determine to which cartel its members were to be allocated, which meant that they could be spread over all the cartels. The issue was referred to the next regular congress in 1991. It soon became clear at that congress that unanimity could not be achieved. The metal and graphic industry unions proposed that the number of cartels be increased to eight or nine, an idea that the organization committee deemed unrealistic, leading potentially to a split in the labor movement. The unskilled union raised this objection: ‘‘We are categorically opposed to any thought of industrial unions, so if it is that which the cartels signify, it should be made clear here. . . . When we in SID stand firm behind five cartels it is because we do not want our members to be too spread out.’’3 The chair of the Metal Workers denied that his goal was an industrial structure and pointed out that there were already two wellfunctioning cartels in operation, metal and graphic, that would be disrupted by the proposal for only five cartels. In fact, the objecting unions were reluctant to dilute their strength by adding unskilled workers. The LO thereupon withdrew from any further efforts and left it to the affiliated unions to seek accommodation. This proved to be a better way of reaching agreement. By 1995, six cartels had been formed, with the following membership: Building and construction

158,000 members

Industry

337,000 members

Municipal workers

399,000 members

Graphics and media

32,000 members

Trade, transport, service

395,000 members

Civil servants

108,000 members

Unskilled workers were assigned to five cartels with large blocs in construction, industry, and trade. Almost all the metal workers

34


were in the Industry cartel, as were a large group of Women’s Union members. The metal and unskilled unions were apparently satisfied with having a substantial membership in the Industry cartel to represent their interests. The Graphic Union succeeded in preserving a separate cartel. The LO financed the cartels to start them off. It was agreed that beginning in 1998, membership dues payments to the LO will be reduced and that the cartels will be supported by direct payments from the member unions on a per capita basis. The cartels are to handle all interunion tasks related to the industries and sectors that they represent. Individual unions will remain responsible for the working environment and relevant industrial policy. The LO is to represent the labor movement in its relations with the Social Democratic Party, the government, other labor federations, and international affairs. It will also deal with the Employers’ Association on matters not related to collective bargaining.4 The survival of the national unions appears to be assured, but such key questions as division of power and control of the cartels will determine the viability of the new structure. The next regular congress, to be held in 1999, should be an interesting one. NORWAY Structural change proved easier in Norway than in Denmark. Although industrial unionism had been favored in the past, there were still a number of craft unions, and there was no separate organization of the unskilled. The 1989 LO Congress voted to set up a committee to look into the question. It was directed to consider several possible models, including one that eliminated national unions entirely, a remnant of a syndicalist tradition. The committee was to complete a report a year and a half before the next congress and send it to all affiliates; it would then be discussed at the congress. At the same time, the committee was to consider several other issues, including organizing strategy, improvement of local units, and relations with other labor federations. The idea of one big union received very little support at the 1993 LO Congress. Overwhelming difficulties for it were foreseen. However, the committee came up with an ambitious blueprint for re-


35

modeling the LO, which was adopted by the congress with a few modifications and referred to the LO secretariat with instructions to make some refinements and then refer it to the representative council. More than a quarter of the congress delegates participated in the debate, the most thoroughgoing discussion of structure in the organization’s history. There was no lack of opposition to change. One delegate argued that the existing model was better than the one proposed because it emphasized the role of the individual union. A representative of the Municipal Workers argued that for his union, strong locals were critical to success in attracting new members and that 68 percent of the members opposed any structural change. Another delegate stated, ‘‘Graphics believes that the Norwegian labor movement is best off with special unions that protect the special interests of members, but that there is also a need to strengthen and unite the LO. The latter must not be at the expense of the structure we have today.’’5 There was clearly a reluctance on the part of many unions, including some larger ones, to sanction the creation of cartels, which was the heart of the committee proposal. Almost 40 percent of the delegates voted against cartels. Nonetheless, the representative council approved the cartel plan in 1994.6 The new scheme provided for the formation of four cartels, two in the public sector and two in the private sector. All members employed at a particular place of work were to be assigned to the same cartel for bargaining purposes. Boundary problems were to be settled directly by the unions involved. The LO was to continue to handle general economic problems. It still had to approve requests for permission to call strikes. The main function of the cartels was to design bargaining strategies, conduct coordinated bargaining among its affiliates, and develop industrial policies for individual sectors. One matter that remained controversial to the end was the proposal to establish some sixty LO district offices, each with a service center. The large Municipal Union was opposed, presumably because of possible conflict with its own local network. It was decided to run an experimental program, the outcome of which would be reported to the 1997 Congress. The Municipal Union stated firmly

36


that it would not join such offices, either during the trial period or later. Following are the cartels that were set up: Members

Unions

Civil service

100,000

18

Municipal

178,000

6

Industry

210,000

10

Services

88,000

7 large plus some small

Source: LO in Norway, Organisasjonsprosjekt, Instilling, 1994.

At this time the LO had twenty-eight affiliates, so some unions had multiple cartel attachments. Some of the problems of the new structure were already evident at the 1997 LO Congress. The Graphics Union was very bitter: ‘‘It is natural to have one cartel for those who work for the state and one for the municipalities. It is not natural to have cartels for industry and service. . . . The choice of an organizational form must be based on the trade and economic requirements of our members, not on power positions in the LO’s secretariat. . . . We are forced into a cartel model which suits us badly today and is totally useless in the future.’’7 What this union wanted was a separate cartel for communications and the media. A more serious controversy arose over the line between the public and private sectors. If a public-sector job were privatized but otherwise remained the same, which cartel would determine its compensation? The Municipal Workers Union offered a resolution to the effect that the LO secretariat should make a finding defining the public sector and vest in the public-sector cartel the right to bargain for wages regardless of the sector in which a particular enterprise was located. The resolutions committee conceded that ‘‘the agreement structure in the various sectors have different bases and there are no clear rules as to which employer association the individual enterprise should be attached. That gives the enterprise the possibility of choosing an employer association, contrary to trade union interests.’’ To strengthen unions in collective bargaining, the


37

committee found it imperative to have a broad review of this entire matter, which the LO secretariat was directed to undertake.8 Tied into this discussion was a strong attack on privatization by the public-sector unions. There were two main arguments. The first involved protection of the welfare state and social development. The second, and more specific, was that privatization threatened job security and conditions of labor, including wages. ‘‘We do not want working conditions in which competition steadily places greater burdens on the employee, where the oldest and weakest are pushed out, where there are people who constantly find themselves with heavier loads in the form of greater pressure of work, insecurity, and attacks on rights that have been won.’’9 Spokespeople for private-sector unions replied that many private-sector firms producing services could offer better labor conditions than government. This promises to be a difficult problem for the future should privatization gain ground. On the matter of establishing LO service centers throughout Norway, a number had been set up on a trial basis, and their experience was discussed at the 1997 Congress. There was no unanimity on this issue, and it was agreed that LO centers could be set up on a voluntary basis by affiliated unions, with their duties to be determined in each case by the participants. While the new structure of the LO decentralizes power and resources, the top level retains considerable authority. Presumably it will turn its energy to organizing strategy, politics, relations with rival labor federations, and foreign affairs. However, the restructuring was the most radical the LO had undergone for seventy-five years, and it was pushed through despite considerable opposition in the belief that it was essential to the survival and growth of the LO. SWEDEN The impetus to structural change in the Swedish LO came not only from the employers but also from an old problem that was getting worse—jurisdictional disputes between member unions. Under its constitution the LO itself was to adjudicate such disputes. Some of them not only had given rise to bitterness within the LO, but had led to unfavorable press criticism. In a way disputes were

38


almost inevitable where high union density meant that the only employees left to organize were those already in other unions. A committee was set up in 1986 to tackle this problem as well as the structure of collective bargaining.10 The committee delivered a landmark report to the 1991 LO Congress.11 It pointed out several factors that necessitated change: new technology, alteration in the nature of jobs, expansion of public services, the growth of subcontracting, the shrinking of older sectors, and new materials, to say nothing of the employer offensive. The traditional ‘‘industrial union’’ principle had come into conflict with the ‘‘ownership’’ principle, that is, the enterprise as a whole was now to be considered as the appropriate unit of organization regardless of industry boundaries. Interunion coordination had become a critical factor after collective bargaining was decentralized. At the same time, each union was sovereign and had to take the interests of its members into account. Coordination, it was stated, had to be voluntary and could only succeed when a large majority favored it. The new criteria implied that anyone joining a union belonged in the one with jurisdiction over the enterprise involved. The employer could not be permitted to determine with whom he had to contract. The difficulty was that new methods of work could call into question the hegemony of an old union. The committee reached the conclusion that the best approach would be amalgamation of contesting unions. For example, smaller unions might be unable financially to provide adequate services. The principles on which such mergers were to be made were outlined in four points: 1. The new organization must be effective. 2. Each affiliated union must be capable of managing its own affairs without subsidies from the LO. 3. Wherever possible there should be one agreement per workplace. 4. There must be room for fewer jurisdictional disputes.

With respect to subcontracting, bargaining rights would belong to the union at the permanent workplace if the subcontracted work had been included in the product for a long period. Thus, most


39

outsourcing as it has developed in the automobile industry of the United States would come under control of the Metal Workers Union if the proposed system were installed. Where subcontracting was on the order of repairs or small-scale maintenance, the contract would belong to the subcontractor’s union. Another feature of the merger proposals was elimination of the division of jurisdiction into private and public sectors and replacement by the criteria of goods and services. If this classification had been adopted, the number of affiliated unions would have fallen from 23 to between 8 and 13. Sharing a common area of activity would have been another touchstone. For example, merger of the Transport Workers, the Seamen, and portions of the Government Employees would have gathered under one roof the railways, the airlines, shipping, and road transport, all engaged in providing services. The committee also found that the line between blue- and whitecollar jobs was being blurred by the fact that some managerial, planning, and administrative jobs were becoming part of direct production. However, the committee believed that progress toward merger of the three labor federations was neither realistic nor desirable. Each of the three had high levels of organization, enjoyed reasonable social influence, and had no difficulties in concluding collective agreements. This radical proposal, which meant that at least half the LO unions would have had to give up their independence, aroused a storm when it came before the 1991 LO Congress. The Transport Workers called attention to the fact that their members worked in many industries, some production, others services. The firm Svelast in Norrkoping uses 27 drivers, all members of Transport. . . . Ten drivers are constantly employed by Edstrand, three drive for SJ, three for Philips, two for Spedex, and two for IBM. One drives for Chemical. . . . Because the volume of goods varies there is constant fluctuation of demand among firms. . . . It is now one firm, one contract, one union. Tomorrow it would be one firm, seven contracts, and as many unions. Is that good? That does not please the employees, who have expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the new organizational plan.12

The spokesperson for the Electrical Workers said that they would resist becoming part of a unified building union. A delegate of the

40


Painters declared that his union was functioning well and needed no improvement. A representative of the Municipal Workers favored a better allocation of jurisdiction, ‘‘but what happens when feelings come into the picture? We have crane operators who, during the 81 year existence of the union, have always been loyal and stood up in all situations when asked by the union.’’13 And a Sheet Metal Worker stated that no question was designed to arouse adverse feelings and indignation to the same extent as the risk of losing colleagues to another organization. No immediate decision was taken, nor was one expected. Working parties were established to explore the implementation or modification of the proposals, with further discussion planned for the 1996 Congress. Several mergers took place during the next five years, between the Clothing and Textile Workers and between the Mine and Metal Workers, but the 1991 recommendation appears to have dropped out of the picture. The 1996 Congress instead turned its attention to the LO governing structure. There were two critical issues. First, should every affiliated union have full membership in the executive council (landsecretariat) of the LO? Under the constitution in force, eleven unions were represented on the council, while seven others had observer status without the right to vote. The four top LO officers were also full council members. The second critical question was, should the representative council (representantskap), of which all unions were full members but which met only several times a year and was a less important body, be retained or abolished? The smaller unions, which were not represented on the executive council, argued that democracy required a change. One delegate after another took the floor to denounce the prevailing situation. Alf Norberg of the Electricians stated: ‘‘Some of the large unions have said that the small unions will be over-represented and the large ones risk being overwhelmed. That is nonsense. . . . I never thought that in 1996 we would hear this kind of argument. Will there be too many in the committee room, an unmanageably large group? No, hardly, since there will be no observers present. Why not go the whole way and give the small unions the right to vote as in a democracy?’’14 Kjell Johansson of the Painters Union averred: ‘‘How can one go home and continue to work for justice if we who have shackles on our legs know that in our organization


41

there is another kind of justice than what we are fighting for? We are deciding whether the LO has different values for its members, one group that has full and equal rights and obligations and another that has full obligations but limited rights.’’15 Those who favored the status quo had several arguments. One was that a committee with twenty union representatives plus several from the LO administration would be too large to be effective. Another was that the number of delegates to the congress, the highest decision-making body, was based on membership, giving the large unions more power than the smaller in a one man–one vote arrangement. In the end it was decided that a new committee should study the matter and report its conclusions to the next congress five years hence. Thus a decision on this delicate matter was put off. The future status of the representative council was more or less implied by the outcome of the preceding issue. If all unions were represented on the executive council, there was little need for the representative council. On the other hand, if the small unions did not succeed in becoming members of the former, an equal voice in a high-level body would provide an occasion for all the union chairmen to meet and discuss matters of mutual interest several times a year. A jurisdictional dispute intruded into the congress deliberations. Under the slogan ‘‘One workplace—one contract,’’ the 1991 Congress had awarded jurisdiction of urban bus drivers to the Municipal Workers. During the next five years, teamster locals that had been directed to switch their affiliation rebelled and refused to move, even threatening to leave the LO. The 1996 Congress upheld the previous decision and urged further negotiations. During these five years, fifty-two jurisdictional disputes had been referred to the LO adjudicatory machinery, about one per month.16 Plans to restructure the Swedish LO have thus far run up against opposition from some of its constituent unions. The demise of the country’s centralized collective bargaining model does not appear to have had sufficient impact on the unions to persuade them to forego their sovereignty. It may have been the shock of the sudden wave of unemployment beginning in 1991 that dissuaded them from experimenting with an existing structure that had been so successful in the past. As the LO chairman declared in his opening

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address to the 1996 Congress, ‘‘It is a powerful trade union movement that now starts its congress. Despite all the attacks and all the doomsday prophets, we are a very strong movement. 85 percent of all employees are unionized. Among LO women the percentage is even higher—87 percent. Never have we had so high a degree of organization.’’17 NOTES 1. LO in Denmark, 1987 Congress, Protokol, p. 172. 2. Ibid., p. 181. 3. LO in Denmark, 1991 Congress, Protokol, p. 216. 4. Danish Labor News, January 1995. 5. LO in Norway, 1993 Congress, Referat, p. 98. 6. For a resume of the debate at the representative council, see LO, Aktuelt, July 6, 1994. 7. LO in Norway, 1997 Congress, Rettferd, May 14, p. 13. 8. Ibid., Rettferd May 15, p. 53. 9. Ibid., Rettferd May 14, p. 12. 10. LO in Sweden, 1986 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 423–446. 11. For the English version of this report, see Trade Union Organization in the Future: Summary of a Report to the 1991 LO Congress. 12. LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Protokoll, p. 402. 13. Ibid., p. 390. 14. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, September 8, p. 81. 15. Ibid., p. 86. 16. Ibid., September 10, pp. 86–89, 97–100. 17. Ibid., September 7, p. 1.

Chapter 4

Trade Union Policies The economic policies advocated and followed by the labor movements in the three Scandinavian countries are roughly similar. They all adopted so-called solidarity wage policies, though the Swedish variant is the most famous. Some degree of employee participation in corporate management, codetermination, has also been effectuated, though it is not as far-reaching as in Germany. There has also been a good deal of emphasis on job security and on provision for the unemployed. Some of the benefits flowing from these policies are provided by the welfare state, and others emanate from collective agreements. Many of them have been questioned recently by employers as hindrances to international competitiveness, but they have become articles of faith to the unions and their members. Even tinkering at the margins has evoked widespread protest. This is an area in which politicians tread carefully. DENMARK Solidarity wages depended to a great extent on centralized bargaining. If skilled workers could bargain on their own, they would be likely to augment their wage advantage, one of the principal reasons for opposition to decentralization by unions of the un-

44


skilled. This problem was solved in part by the creation of cartels in which employees at all levels were represented on the basis of industry. This idea came out clearly in a statement by a clerical union delegate at the 1991 Congress of the Danish LO: ‘‘I am a little nervous that talk of an individual union bargaining system will result in a diminished future role for the solidarity wage system. It is clear that when one negotiates on a decentralized basis, it is every man for himself. . . . If we hold steady we will have a solidarity wage policy whether we have centralized negotiations between the top organizations or decentralized negotiations with the support of the cartels, so the way forward for our unions will be intact.’’1 Solidarity implies small wage differentials. A comparison of a lowwage industry (textiles) with a high-wage industry (metal products and machinery) for 1985 and 1992 (table 4.1) suggests that there was almost no distance to go between the two in 1985 by this measure of wage inequality. The available data do not permit com-


45

parisons for all industries or between sectors, but it appears that the Danes had achieved something close to equality. With respect to codetermination, LO entered into an agreement with the Employers’ Association giving employees a voice in management decisions apart from issues that were covered by collective agreements. In any company with more than thirty-five employees, either the employer or a majority of the employees could propose the establishment of a committee of cooperation composed of an equal number from each side, with the function of discussing labor conditions and work organization. Disputes could be referred to a national cooperation board. By 1990, a third of the enterprises in the country had committees. In addition, legislation requires firms with more than fifty employees to permit the employees to elect representatives to corporate boards, numbering half as many as those elected by shareholders, with a minimum of two. There have been complaints about the cooperation committees, almost all raised by employees. In an LO survey of committee chairs and vice-chairs, 70 percent replied that they were working well. The rest attributed the main cause of problems to employer failure to follow the agreements.2 The unions are heavily involved in health and safety conditions at workplaces. The Working Environment Act established a government commission to consider proposals for improvement. There are bipartite groups in all but the smallest firms; these groups monitor working conditions. If the group and the employer cannot agree, the employer has three weeks to decide whether he or she will follow employee suggestions for change. If the response is negative, appeal may be taken to the Labor Inspection Service for determination. The LO has been putting emphasis on prevention by empowering local committees to act in advance of accidents.3 Unemployment has been a difficult problem for Denmark during most of the years between 1985 and 1995 (table 4.2). The first line of defense was the attempt to preserve jobs by making discharge difficult. But a number of contractual provisions calling for prenotification did little to improve things, and the unions then concentrated on bettering the conditions faced by the unemployed. Labor-market councils were set up in every county to coordinate reemployment efforts, among other things.

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Unemployment benefits can be paid for a maximum of seven years. After two years on benefit, the individual has the right to an offer of employment of at least twelve months in duration. If there appears to be a particularly high risk of long-term unemployment, the offer must be made earlier. If after four years, permanent employment has not been obtained, the individual is placed in a special category and is entitled to an employment offer after one year. The employment that is arranged may be in the public or private sector. This ambitious system was part of a labor-market package enacted in 1994. Unemployment has declined since, but the time is too short to determine whether the reform was the effective cause. The unions believe that it was. ‘‘The labor market councils have now managed to fulfill their tasks at the regional level and initiatives in favor of the unemployed are now well on the way to fulfillment of the objectives of a targeted and individually planned approach to-


47

wards the unemployed, which improves their possibilities in the regular labor market.’’4 A more recent union program has been the promotion of what is called ‘‘labor-market’’ pensions to supplement national social security. They are based on collective agreements negotiated for both the public and the private sectors and are mandatory for all covered employers. They are protected against loss due to job mobility.

NORWAY A solidarity wage has also been a feature of Norwegian LO policy. The results are shown in table 4.1. The differentials between highand low-wage industries appear greater than in Denmark and Sweden, but care must be taken in comparing the three countries. Different structures of the industries involved, particularly the metal products and machinery category, could account for some of the differentials. What the Norwegian data appear to show, however, is that wage differentials scarcely changed from 1985 to 1995. In 1980 a special fund financed jointly by employers and employees was set up to guarantee that no worker is paid less than 80 percent of the average wage in his or her industry. The fund was applied particularly in the hotel, restaurant, and cleaning industries. A recent LO publication sets out the organization’s continuing commitment to solidarity wages: ‘‘It is an important objective for LO to iron out income differences in Norwegian society. The strategy of the labor union’s wage negotiation is founded on the principle of solidarity, that is, wage policy that gives most to the lowest paid and that evens out wage differences between men and women.’’5 The LO claims credit for helping produce what it terms one of the most equal patterns of income distribution in the world.6 As for codetermination, a comprehensive system was already in place in 1985 based upon legislation and collective agreements. Employees are entitled to nominate a third of governing-board members in every company with more than thirty employees. There are works councils with consultative rights over production, sales, investments, and finance, and they must be notified in advance of planned changes in working conditions. There are in addition corporate assemblies consisting of at least twelve members, one-third

48


elected by the employees, that may adopt resolutions to be forwarded to the governing boards dealing with almost all corporate decisions. The system is not without its critics. A delegate to the 1993 LO Congress called for strengthening so that ‘‘members and the LO have more influence and codetermination rights on all matters relating to the work situation,’’ while another wanted more power on personnel matters vested in the councils: ‘‘People use the hard times as pretexts for constantly tougher personnel policies. Hard rationalization has been followed in many plants, but this has not resulted in fewer employees, only fewer regular employees. Many get contract offers after they have been fired. These are often for shortterm jobs, and the purpose is to free the employer from responsibilities.’’7 The vice-chair of the LO told the 1997 Congress that ‘‘the provision for enterprise size with respect to the right of employees to be represented in the governing board is too high in Norway with all our small firms. We propose therefore to lower the provision to 10 employees. . . . Through changes in the law and agreements, we must guarantee real economic democracy regardless of the firm’s organization or ownership.’’8 Unemployment was low for most of the decade, but the unions have been concerned about maintaining the loyalty of members who lose their jobs. A recent proposal by the LO secretariat outlines a number of measures that may help solidify attachment to the union: 1. Some unions have a greater unemployment problem than others because their trades are shrinking or because they have many older members. They may find it difficult to cover costs, and it may be good policy for the LO to assist them financially. 2. While there are various schemes for helping the unemployed, there is no single model for the LO as a whole. Among the benefits offered are partial or no membership dues, payment of insurance premia on condition that there are arrangements for repayment, the opportunity to continue insurance payments at group rather than individual rates, and direct financial assistance in addition to regular unemployment compensation for particular groups that have the greatest need—young people who are just starting families or those living in high-cost areas. 3. Provision of information on the employment situation, help in job searches, and access to consultants.


49

4. The summation of these and similar efforts is to make it clear that the union is concerned about its unemployed members. This does not mean that assistance to the unemployed is not a governmental responsibility. But such actions provide a natural role for unions to inform, guide, and encourage the unemployed to rely upon them and properly use the help that society affords.9

As the labor movement with the lowest degree of organization among the traditional federations in Scandinavia, the Norwegian LO has been constantly occupied with organizing new members. A letter from the LO to the general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, dated May 29, 1995, recounted what the LO was doing to recruit young people. It conceded that there had been a negative membership development among its affiliates during the five previous years, attributing this to an increase in temporary and part-time employment. According to the letter, the majority of those entering the labor market made an easy adjustment and were as willing to join a union as other workers. Those who experienced difficulties tended to have unstable employment conditions with high turnover and low wages. Youth activities are integrated in general union programs, but there are youth committees at the central and county levels to monitor operations. Recruitment is the obligation of individual unions; these are supported by the LO, which keeps tabs on their efforts. At the end of each school year, youth representatives visit secondary schools to inform students of their working rights. There is also a summer patrol to provide similar information to those who have summer jobs, emphasizing particularly their legal rights. There were 200 such meetings in 1995. The LO has entered into a formal agreement with the Norwegian Students’ Association to market its benefits. The Civil Service Union has a project called Active Athletes, which runs recruitment activities directed toward young people engaged in football, helping to provide insurance arrangements, among other things. The Military Officers’ Union helps members set up local organizations to take care of the interests of officer cadets. The Musicians’ Union has been involved in relevant activities, including rock music, in which there are uncertain conditions of work and pay.

50


The rate of unionization is clearly less for young people than for other groups. The reasons vary from union to union, particularly those competing for members with the newer white-collar unions. The LO tactic, shared with some of its competitors, is to work within the educational system in order to get in contact with young people at an early age. While general organization is also regarded as a matter for the individual union, the LO has provided special assistance to several unions with particularly low degrees of organization. Among them were unions in hotels and restaurants, commerce and retail trade, and sections of transport workers. Special efforts were made to attract part-time workers. Nevertheless, there are still fairly large unorganized groups of employees, and the LO regards continuous organization drives as necessary to bring them under its fold. High density is no excuse for complacence. SWEDEN Wage equality has a long history in Sweden. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a major decline in differentials. Compression ceased thereafter (Table 4.1), but it has been argued that fluctuation in the supply of highly educated labor and in the sex composition of the labor force were as significant as changes in union policy.10 Wages were a major subject of discussion at the 1986 LO Congress. There was complaint against the central bargain between LO and SAF for insufficient attention to low wages: ‘‘There are people in this community who say compression has gone too far. That we had to see to it that better educated people did not leave Sweden.’’11 The truth of the matter was that while trade unionists were unwilling to speak against a hallowed policy, some of them feared that it would be difficult to organize skilled workers if it remained in force. Moreover, a powerful market force was working against solidarity—wage drift. The bargaining system permitted employers to grant individual wage increases on top of those contained in collective agreements. This was particularly prevalent where skilled workers were in short supply, with the result that collectively determined wage scales were undermined. The issue arose once again at the 1991 LO Congress. The sec-


51

retariat had prepared a lengthy report entitled Wage Policy for the Future that served to focus the discussion.12 It began with what were termed two basic principles, justice and equality. Justice meant equal pay for the same jobs regardless of economic sector or geographical location. Equality was the traditional quest for low wage differentials. An implication of justice was that different work should be compensated differently. Moreover, wage policy was not the determinant of income distribution. The latter depended on working time, taxes, and transfer payments, among other things. For example, solidarity for the handicapped had to be achieved by measures other than wages. The report cited two main wage-policy questions: how much room is there for wage increases, and how should the available amounts be distributed? The first had to be decided in the light of economic reality. For the second, unions had to use the tests of justice and equality. In this context the first question was not very controversial; employees were entitled to a portion of total output, though of course there could be different views on how much. The second was more difficult, since it was a matter not only of employer-employee controversy, but also of possible conflict between groups of employees. The crux of the problem in achieving solidarity was to prevent loss of respect for collective agreements. Increasingly, wages were being determined locally, making it more difficult for overall union policy to prevail. The report conceded that in the past equality tended to overshadow justice, and suggested that the time had come to eliminate this disparity. This was a neat way of maintaining solidarity and at the same time allowing for greater market play. ‘‘Future wage policy must aim at an increase in the valuation of low paid jobs, both through a change in the perception of the traditional low paid job and through providing the low paid job more qualified work elements and therefore better compensated.’’ This could be done by providing the opportunity for all employees to raise their skills through appropriate work organization. It was suggested that job evaluation techniques might also be used to eliminate inappropriate wage differences, though it was conceded that the variation among these techniques made it impossible to guarantee equal pay for equal work across the whole labor market.

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The congress received this policy instrument with satisfaction, agreeing that the secretariat should make a systematic effort to increase support for it. From the LO point of view, the virtue of the new approach was that it reduced friction between high- and lowwage unions. The chairman of the Garment Workers, one of the latter group, noted, ‘‘How did the solidarity wage policy function during the 1980s? Badly. The lowest paid, especially women, were left behind. . . . Now we can hope that there will be true unity behind the solidarity wage policy. If we cannot proceed in this manner, the Garment Workers will come to the next LO congress with the same low wage we had when the policy was initiated in 1950.’’13 The unemployment problem moved wage policy to a lower level of concern. It was not a controversial subject at the 1996 LO Congress. In an opening statement, a member of the secretariat outlined eight policy points on wages: 1. Better wage statistics for the entire labor force. 2. More study of and information about wage setting, taking into account both the economic background and members’ needs. 3. LO to take the offensive in informing the public about wage questions. 4. Cooperation with other domestic and foreign labor organizations. 5. Determination of a general social norm for establishing the room for wage increases. 6. Return to the uniform terms and expiration of collective agreements that were disrupted in recent bargaining. 7. Eliminate the negative effects of the wage glide, which makes it impossible to assess the full magnitude of wage agreements. 8. Improve the rules for collective bargaining.14

There were few comments on this list. A delegate of the Building Workers warned that there could not be a single wage model for all sectors. For example, while piecework had been eliminated in many areas, it was still the dominant form of payment in construction; workers were determined to retain it against the efforts of employers to replace it with a monthly wage plus a small bonus. The only reference to wage policy was the insistence of another delegate that everyone should be assured of an increase in a general wage movement, but he then went on to say that there was a need


53

for a dynamic procedure to take account of changes in the nature of work, training, responsibility, and competence. The Swedish LO has been a warm supporter of codetermination. However, given its representation status and the strength of its local unions, it saw no need to displace the unions with works councils. Companies with more than twenty-five employees are required to permit them to elect two members of governing boards. ‘‘Generally, board representation has come to be regarded as a means of keeping the union informed rather than of directly influencing corporate decisions.’’15 The Codetermination Act of 1977, supplemented by collective agreements, provide for consultation with local unions on a wide range of matters. Ad hoc groups may be set up in the event of projected major changes in working conditions so that the local unions may have full access to information. An important aspect of codetermination involves safety and health. In any plant with more than fifty employees, there must be a joint committee to deal with these matters. In the event of specific worker complaints, an investigation is conducted by a safety shop steward, and if he or she determines that the complaint is justified, the steward may order the work suspended. Should the employer disagree, the steward may appeal to the government labor inspectorate, but the suspension continues in the interim. In most countries, the shoe is on the other foot: the work goes on while the union appeals. Swedish unions receive a good deal of corporate information. For example, a firm cannot negotiate a merger or close a plant without preliminary discussion with its union. A recent study concluded that the unions ‘‘were very successful in preventing representation outside union control. One expression of their strength was their ability to limit the spread of quality circles. In the second half of the 1980s, the quality circle movement receded, not least as a result of union protest and resistance.’’16 There is an unusual addendum to a discussion of codetermination in Sweden. In 1982, under pressure from the LO, a Social Democratic government enacted a scheme for worker stock ownership with the following purposes: 1. To complement wage solidarity in such a way as to prevent enrichment of executives in highly profitable firms.

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2. To counteract the increasing concentration of capital and hence the ability to self-finance. 3. To reinforce the influence of wage earners at the workplace through ownership participation.

Five regional funds were established, to be financed by a 20 percent tax on profits in excess of specified levels and an increase of 0.2 percent in the employers’ contribution to the state pension system. The money was to be invested in Swedish corporate stock, with each fund limited to 8 percent of the voting stock of a single firm. The funds were to be administered by nine-member boards, at least five of whom represented employees. This was considered a good arrangement by the LO because employees would not have large stakes in their firms, which could dilute their union loyalty. It was anathema to employers, who called it ‘‘socialism by the back door’’ and campaigned vigorously against it, even demonstrating outside the Parliament building, a highly unusual form of protest for Sweden’s conservative employers. One of the first acts of a nonsocialist government was to repeal the law. The author of the plan was Rudolf Meidner, the chief economist of the LO. It is not clear why a pragmatic organization like the LO was prepared to espouse it. There have been suggestions that it was meant to appease some radical groups in the labor movement. There was no talk of reviving it when the Social Democrats again came into office. Apart from the procedures of collective bargaining, the most critical challenge faced by the LO during the past decade was unemployment. The rates for the years 1985 to 1996 are shown in Table 4.2. The levels up to 1991 were very low, but they must be taken with a grain of salt, since they excluded people engaged in government training and other labor-market programs. For example, three percentage points should be added to the figure in the table for 1990, which would raise the rate to 4.8 percent, still a favorable level. No country was more dedicated to the cause of full employment than Sweden. Its commitment to low unemployment was widely known as the ‘‘active labor-market’’ policy, initiated by Go¨sta Rehn, an LO economist. At the core of the system was the National Labor Market Board, operating through 24 county boards, 360 employ-


55

ment offices, and 120 employability institutes. The national board was originally tripartite, but when the employers withdrew in 1991, the labor members followed them out. Unemployed workers receive benefits from government-financed, union-operated funds. They must also register with employment offices, which maintain inventories of job vacancies based on compulsory notification by employers. In the event that a job seeker can find no suitable vacancy, he or she is assigned a caseworker, who determines an appropriate training program. Training is a major part of the scheme, absorbing about half of the operating budget. Participants receive payments commensurate with their unemployment benefits. Courses are given in special centers, educational institutions, and business enterprises. Job seekers can receive relocation grants, including travel allowances for themselves and family members as well as moving expenses. Temporary relief jobs may be available for a maximum of six months for those who have exhausted their unemployment benefits. Employers may be subsidized for replacing employees who are on educational leave or are unemployed, again for six months. There are special programs for young people and for the handicapped. The rationale for the active policy has been well summarized as follows: The unemployed should primarily be offered active labor market programs on the basis of their individual capabilities and needs, instead of cash labor market assistance. The programs include employment training and State subsidized jobs. . . . If labor market policy is perceived as part of economic policy, it performs important functions during both boom and recession periods. Its main task is to achieve a good balance between labor supply and demand.17

The recession that struck Sweden in 1992 came as a great shock to the trade unions, which had believed that they were insulated from unemployment. This was the first time since the 1930s that they had experienced such high levels. The first to feel the impact were the building workers, who reported 20 percent unemployment rates in 1992. To save money, LO reduced its personnel from 230 to 170. Women were hit harder than men. The LO proposed several programs to increase employment, with road building, home

56


repair, energy savings, and security positions among them. But things became worse, and high unemployment persisted. The debate on the subject at the 1996 LO Congress was introduced by Wanja Lundby-Wedin, the newly elected vice-chair: ‘‘We have come to the point on the agenda that we all know is the most important. Much depends on how we are able to increase employment and take real measures against unemployment.’’ She then went on to declare that the goal of cutting unemployment in half was worth any price. The American experience was rejected, since she asserted that its main benefits had gone to the higher-paid employees. Among the measures suggested were better credit facilities for small enterprises, the possible use of building and pension funds as venture capital, more housing, and lower interest rates. Among the unacceptable measures were the reduction of job security rights and denial of satisfactory conditions for the handicapped.18 The congress laid a good deal of the blame for high unemployment at the door of the Conservative government that had been in office when the recession began, accusing it of undue reduction of expenditures on employment-creating activities. The Social Democratic government that replaced it in 1994 was criticized for excessive timidity. In a speech to the congress, Prime Minister Go¨ran Persson promised to reduce unemployment by half by the year 2000: ‘‘It is true that we must do this, and I think it is right to take a political risk on the question that is most important to the labor movement, namely unemployment. If we are not prepared to take a risk on this question, we should not govern. We have cleared up government finance, and now we will also press down on unemployment.’’19 In closing the congress, the LO chair declared, ‘‘Unemployment is the most destructive event of our time. It erodes welfare. It threatens wages and agreements. It frightens people into silence and makes them lose hope for the future. We have agreed on a proposal for 80,000 new jobs.’’20 The LO lost 17,000 members between 1991 and 1995, but this represented a decline of only 1 percent. Heavy unemployment made hardly a dent in its economic power. HOURS OF WORK A considerable amount of attention was devoted to working hours at the most recent LO congresses. In the case of Norway,


57

where unemployment was low, the motivating factors were more social than economic. This was also true in Sweden in 1991, but the tenor of the debate had shifted five years later in the face of heavy unemployment. The complainants in Norway were primarily women, who objected to overtime and part-time work and some of the consequences of flexible hours. As one put it, ‘‘More and more groups are exempted from overtime regulations, and unnecessary overtime is becoming more common. . . . When you add up the use of overtime in the various branches, it corresponds to many unfilled jobs. And that is only registered overtime.’’21 As for part-time work, it was acknowledged that many women elected it because it enabled them to fulfill their domestic obligations or because a job was too difficult physically and mentally. The result was often low pay. The answer, according to a number of speakers, was the six-hour day. That would constitute a good working day for women, put them on a plane of equality with men, and make flexible hours more feasible. There was also another advantage: ‘‘If we move from the labor market to the home, even when women go out to work men do not stay home to a corresponding extent. When both work full time, men devote 2 hours and 36 minutes per day to household work, while women devote 4 hours and 8 minutes. This difference is about the same as it was 10 years ago.’’22 The male delegates who addressed the subject took another tack. For them, a six-hour day would guarantee full employment, prevent underemployment, and provide workers with sufficient time for daily rest and recreation. The resolutions committee adopted a more careful approach designed to please everyone: ‘‘Working time must eventually be reduced. There must be full compensation. Different groups can have different interests in this area. The need can also vary by age or the individual life situation. Actual reduction should be the result of experimentation. For many a five-week vacation will be more important. For others shorter daily or weekly hours would be preserved. A long term goal is the possibility of a 6-hour day/30-hour week.’’23 The 1991 discussion in Sweden was very much like that of Norway in 1997. It was primarily women who urged the LO to press for a thirty-hour week in order to eliminate part-time work and raise their incomes. Other delegates felt that wages were a more important issue than a reduction in hours. The secretariat argued that

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‘‘we cannot see any real circumstances for an increase in productivity that makes possible a shortening of hours in the coming years,’’ and the issue was put on the back burner, where it had lain for years.24 The discussion that took place five years later was much more serious. A delegate from the Metal Workers asserted that his union was planning to reduce working hours by 100 per year, to 37.5 hours per week. The TCO had already resolved to seek a week of this length, but the secretariat warned that the LO was a much larger organization and had to weigh its position more carefully. Switching available resources from welfare benefits to shorter hours might have a negative impact on the livelihoods of many people. But the Metal Workers warned that they would wait no longer and would seek the hourly reduction during the next contract period. The discussion went back and forth. The Transport Workers observed that their members often worked four ten-hour days a week and that for them a thirty-hour week would be more suitable. A counterargument was that a fully compensated reduction would absorb any potential wage increase. In the end, the congress did not say no to shorter working hours, but said no to a reduction in welfare payments. Individual unions could act as they wished, but the LO itself adopted no fixed position for the short term. OUTSOURCING Outsourcing is an employer practice that has aroused a great deal of union concern in the United States and other advanced countries. The principal producer of a product subcontracts the production of parts to a secondary producer paying lower wages, thus depriving the employees of the principal producer of the opportunity to do the work. This has not been a problem in Scandinavia; because of the high degree of organization, work cannot be readily contracted out to nonunion firms. There have been complaints in Norway, however, that public-sector enterprises have used private firms that may have lower costs, and on occasion private firms have gone to other union firms with lower contract scales. There were a number of references to this issue at the 1997 Norwegian LO Congress. One delegate declared, ‘‘We must have laws


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and rules that require an enterprise to be so staffed that there will be smooth production and a reasonable share of new production for the firm’s own employees.’’25 A solution that was recommended to the LO was the promotion of ‘‘vertical’’ agreements, that is, agreements that cover all workers in an industry doing similar work and thus make it unprofitable for an employer to outsource. Thus far, no concern for possible subcontracting to developing countries has emerged. All these issues are among the advantages to unions of high organizational densities.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

LO in Denmark, 1991 Congress, Protokol, pp. 64–65. LO in Denmark, Beretning, 1995–96, p. 138. LO in Denmark, 1987 Congress, Protokol, p. 196. Danish Labor News, Copenhagen, January 1995. LO in Norway, This Is LO, Oslo, 1996, p. 15. LO in Norway, Utvikling i intekts Fordeling, February 1997. LO in Norway, 1993 Congress, Protokoll, p. 367. LO in Norway, 1997 Congress, Referat, May 12, pp. 9–10. LO’s Organisasjons Prosjekt, Instilling, Oslo, June 1994, pp. 32–

38. 10. Per Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund, The Swedish Wage Structure: The Rise and Fall of the Solidarity Wage Policy, Working Paper 4257, National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, Mass.: 1993). 11. LO in Sweden, 1986 Congress, Protokoll, p. 1124. 12. LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Lo¨nepolitik for Framtiden. 13. LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 591–593. 14. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, September 9, pp. 33–36. 15. Go¨ran Brulin, ‘‘Sweden: Joint Councils Under Strong Unionism,’’ in Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Works Councils (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995), p. 197. 16. Ibid., p. 213. 17. Pa¨r Treho¨rning, Measures to Combat Unemployment in Sweden (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, 1993), p. 50. 18. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, September 7, pp. 23–29. 19. Ibid., September 11, p. 54. 20. Ibid., September 12, p. 48. 21. LO in Norway, 1997 Congress, Referat, May 15, p. 20.

60 22. 23. 24. 25.

The World’s Strongest Trade Unions Ibid., p. 30. Ibid., p. 33. LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 813–855. LO in Norway, 1997 Congress, Referat, May 12, p. 16.

Chapter 5

The Unions and the Social Democrats The early trade unions in Scandinavia contributed heavily to the formation of socialist political parties. Until the 1990s, the bluecollar federations of labor and the Social Democratic parties were considered two parts of the labor movement. It is only in the last few years that the ties have begun to loosen. The alliances were reflected in various ways. Not least in importance was financial support. The unions supplied the bulk of party funds for election expenses and newspapers. In some cases this was done through so-called collective affiliation, whereby union members would vote to become party members through their unions. In others, there were direct subsidies from national unions or federations to the parties. However this was managed, the unions expected a quid pro quo in the form of political action consonant with union interests. There were occasional policy differences, but these were usually settled without difficulty. Many socialist politicians had trade union backgrounds. Relations between the unions and the parties were both formal and informal. Unions were usually represented on party committees. The chairpersons of the LO and its corresponding political organization maintained close contact. The party chair, who in later years was often the prime minister of the country, usually delivered

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an address to the LO Congress. Voting socialist was almost a reflex action for most union members. Things began to change as the end of the twentieth century approached. Most important was the shift in the structure of the labor force. As manufacturing employment gave way to services, the loyalty of the new recruits to socialism could no longer be taken for granted. The class appeal, the essence of socialism, began to lose its power. This was heightened in Scandinavia by its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union. Communism never made headway in Scandinavia, but some of its tenets had been part of traditional socialist ideology. The conduct of Soviet internal affairs tended to reflect negatively even on the mild Scandinavian form of socialism. It was no longer out of the question for union members to vote for ‘‘bourgeois’’ political parties. The rift between the two wings of the labor movement did not come easily, as the pages that follow will show. But come it did, in all three countries, although it took different forms in each. It took painful actions by the trade unions to adjust to the realities of a changing labor market. DENMARK At its annual meeting in September 1985, the Danish Social Democratic Party presented an economic and political program that had been developed in close cooperation with the LO. There were five major points: 1. Economic democracy: ‘‘We say clearly that understanding of the democratization of our workplaces and property rights is now greater than ever.’’ 2. Working time: ‘‘The 35 hour week should be made a reality quickly.’’ 3. The labor market: ‘‘We have no use for a conflict-prone labor market divided like the American and Japanese. Do not forget for a moment that the basis of the labor market in these countries is first and foremost that 1/3 are engaged in elite occupations while 2/3 do very poorly— miserable social and wage conditions. Such a market we will not have in Denmark.’’ 4. Pension reform: ‘‘We have let this problem, which is quite decisive for the labor market, rest for many years.’’


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5. Policies for industry, building, and technology: ‘‘Here lie the new possibilities for future enterprises. Here lie the economic potentials for growth.’’1

This was completely in line with LO philosophy. The LO vicechair, speaking at its 1987 Congress for a sick chair, noted that while the Social Democrats had suffered defeats in two recent elections, the LO continued to support it in the belief that a strong social democracy was a condition for stability and long-run efforts. ‘‘We cannot see any alternative to the attainment of the political strength that we value so highly.’’2 Yet there were some doubts raised in the ensuing discussion. A delegate from the unskilled union urged that a party to the left of the Social Democrats be added to the picture. A carpenter declared that it might be time to admit other groups to May 1 celebrations. ‘‘The LO should awake from the slumber that ties it exclusively to the Social Democrats. The next largest labor party is called the Socialist People’s Party.’’ Another delegate declared that no single party had a patent on the trade unions. In the same vein, a Metal Worker complained that the trade unions were not owned by social democracy. In his reply, the vice-chair pointed out that the complaining speakers were well-known partisans of the People’s Party, which he hoped would show some reformist tendencies that might make cooperation with the social democrats possible, ‘‘but we will not split our own strength into many and small parties.’’3 Motions to provide support to the People’s Party and to set up an LO committee that would include other ‘‘labor parties’’ were defeated. A problem faced by the LO at the time was that in the general elections of 1988, the People’s Party had won 24 parliamentary seats compared with 55 for the Social Democrats out of a total of 175. The two of them together would still have lacked a majority, but if a small centrist party could have been persuaded to join them, a Social Democratic–led government (something that the LO badly wanted) would have been possible. The Danish economy was in bad shape and unemployment had risen sharply. The LO leadership thought that the socialists would do more to stimulate the economy. Left-wing pressure on the LO was relieved in 1990 when, in a

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new election, the Social Democrats won 69 seats and their rival was reduced to 15. The party told the 1991 LO Congress that despite rumors of a break with the LO, the two groups were joined as firmly as ever: ‘‘We belong to the same family and we must never be ashamed of that. Never. Think of how happy it would make our opponents, and our friends sorrowful, if political and trade union work were split.’’4 The LO chair backed the spokesperson up: ‘‘Let me say so strongly that it cannot be misunderstood—either here in the congress or by the public—that back of every thought that the LO has had in this connection there is a clear and unequivocal desire to improve—and I underline—to improve cooperation—between party and trade union.’’5 The year 1992 witnessed a major change in the political scene. The Social Democrats were able to form a minority government with the support of several centrist parties. A general election two years later yielded little change, and the same arrangement continued. This was the political background for the 1995 LO Congress. Between 1991 and 1995, opposition to any organic relationship with the Social Democratic Party had grown within the LO. It came from the Right as well as the Left, and included those who favored political neutrality. The opposition alleged that the socialists had made too many concessions to its coalition partners. Several unions had already severed formal relations with the Social Democrats. To defuse what might have been a rancorous congress debate, the LO leadership decided to recommend elimination of party representation on the LO executive committee. The LO chair, Finn Thorgrimson, explained it this way: Our support for the Social Democratic-led coalition has not weakened. . . . It is not against a background of policy that we today debate cooperation between social democracy and the LO. It is because we ought to weigh both the form and content of cooperation in the light of general social development. . . . Cooperation should not be regarded as an unshakeable colossus. We must not end up where a new generation regard us as locked in it without dialogue with those around us.6

The LO vice-chair put it as follows: The LO is not preparing to break with the Social Democratic Party, which will continue as the party in which the trade unions can secure their eco-


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nomic and political demands. . . . One can well be active in union work without being in possession of a particular party book. . . . We seek optimal political influence through social democracy. And we also want to show respect for differences among our members, engage in open dialogue with them, and make room for debate about trade union goals and visions.7

Formal ties between the LO and the Social Democratic Party had lasted almost a century. The change in the character of the membership and competition with newer, politically neutral unions played important roles in bringing about the shift. Rather than risk alienating a growing segment of its clientele, the LO decided to make the break. But as the Social Democratic prime minister told the 1995 LO Congress, ‘‘The trade unions and the party solve different tasks under different conditions in a modern society. . . . We have different tasks and different roles but we have the same goals.’’8 NORWAY Relationships between the Norwegian LO and the Labor Party had long been close. A joint cooperation committee composed of the top leaders of both organizations met weekly. Many workers were members of the party through their unions; in 1952, for example, 90,000 LO members were collectively affiliated in this manner. The link appeared to have continued strong in 1985, when the LO Congress voted to allot 1.5 million kroner to the party election fund with only a few objections, mainly from adherents of the Socialist Left Party (SV). As the decade wore on, there were calls for a wider political stance. The agenda for the 1989 LO Congress, while calling for continuing cooperation with the Labor Party, contained the following reservations: ‘‘Collective membership will have less significance, and will be replaced by other forms, including occupational groups and meetings between LO and Labor Party representatives.’’9 The newly elected LO chair, Yngve H˚agensen, considered withdrawing from membership on the central committee of the Labor Party on the ground that he might have to take positions of disadvantage to the unions, but he was persuaded to remain.10

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Collective Labor Party membership had fallen to 30,000 by 1990. A poll of LO members indicated that 59 percent would vote Labor and 18 percent SV. An LO report in 1991 noted that many members regarded the tie with the Labor Party as the greatest obstacle to new recruitment. A number of affiliated unions had already adopted party-neutral systems. The mood for political independence was growing. A report to the 1993 LO Congress clarified the status of unionparty cooperation. ‘‘The relationship between LO and the Labor Party has changed. Today there is a clear sign against greater dependence between the two. That is based on several circumstances. Traditional forms of alliance are of less significance. Collective membership, which meant that trade unionists joined the party collectively, was more usual earlier. Today those affiliated collectively are a very small proportion of LO membership.’’11 A new form of relationship was proposed: In addition to cooperation with the Labor Party closer contact with other parties can be an important strategic task. Many see SV as part of the labor movement and believe that the development of effective political ties with SV should be a goal. . . . That union members and officers participate actively and have duties in different parties is an important form of political influence. This is not true only of the Labor Party. Key officials in the trade unions also have important positions in SV.12

A delegate from the Commercial Union who was also a member of the secretariat of LO proposed that the LO go all the way, with the following declaration: ‘‘The trade unions are based on union ideas and values. LO is free and independent without formal links to political parties or their youth organizations.’’13 She withdrew her proposal in the light of a statement by the resolutions committee that the unions were already independent, bound only by their own decisions, and not subordinated to outside forces. The upshot of the discussion was that collective membership was discontinued, but the life of the LO–Labor Party cooperation committee was extended. Some 87 of 350 delegates voted against this compromise. LO’s connection with the Labor Party’s youth organization was severed. The congress voted to allot two million kroner to the Labor Party election fund, but refused any subsidy to SV.


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The 1997 LO Congress indicated that little had happened in the preceding four years to bring about further changes in LO-party relationships. By large majorities, the congress voted 2.5 million kroner to the Labor Party and turned down any subsidy to SV. In a contested vote for membership in the LO secretariat, a candidate supported by SV lost to a Labor Party nominee by a margin of 192 to 120. The cooperation committee continued as before, a tie that the unions found difficult to break with a Labor government in office. Labor continues to be the party of choice for most LO members, although the close institutional links of the past have weakened. Conflict between adherents of Labor and SV within the LO will probably follow the election returns. SWEDEN The organic connection between the Swedish LO and the Social Democratic Party (SD) was primarily at the local level. The number of union members affiliated collectively had been decreasing steadily, and by 1985 numbered only 30,000. A long debate at the 1985 LO Congress centered on this practice, but it did not mean that support for the SD had fallen; at the previous election, 70 percent of LO members had voted for SD.14 There had been efforts in the Parliament to ban collective membership, and this had become a well-publicized political issue. It was called undemocratic, though the unions pointed out that an individual union member did not have to go along with the local decision to affiliate. There were other objections, such as the following by a congress delegate: ‘‘Collective membership is a millstone around the neck of the labor movement. . . . [T]his does not necessarily mean that union-party cooperation should cease. It means the substitution for collective membership of better forms of cooperation which lead to greater political activity and increase the influence of union members in the party.’’15 LO chair Stig Malm reflected some unease about collective membership but supported the proposition that it should not be banned by the congress: ‘‘I think we should not say that collective membership is the only form of union-party cooperation. . . . We can show many examples of cooperation which are extraordinarily good without collective affiliation. . . . But back to the question. I

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have already said that this question has nothing to do with the LO Congress. Many of us who are delegates will attend the party congress next year, and we will discuss the matter there.’’16 His position was sustained. A membership survey conducted in 1988 indicated that 61 percent of LO members favored either increasing or maintaining the existing level of LO-SD cooperation, while 23 percent were of the opinion that it should be reduced or eliminated, with the rest undecided.17 However, the Social Democratic Party resolved the problem for the LO by itself banning collective union membership. But this did not end the discussion. Other forms of cooperation were discussed at the 1991 LO Congress. One proposal was for local unions to pay subsidies to the party that could cover dues for individual members who wanted to join the party. A member of the secretariat noted that this form of cooperation was permitted by party statutes. This and similar proposals were met with outrage by delegates. One observed, ‘‘The union must be independent of party politics and can no longer be led by the nose by SD and particularly not by an SD government . . . quite simply because SD interests and those of LO do not coincide at every point. LO cannot be a funnel for an SD government. LO people are not SD footmen.’’18 Stig Malm warned once more that ‘‘we must be careful of what we have the possibility of deciding at an LO congress. We must be careful in not interfering with what a local union has the right to decide.’’19 By a fairly small margin, the congress backed this position, leaving the way open for an alternative to traditional collective membership. This turned out to be a prelude to the tortuous political events of the next five years. In the general elections held in 1991, the Social Democrats suffered their greatest defeat since 1928. The conservative government that gained office was anathema to the LO. Unemployment benefits were reduced, employer and employee contributions to unemployment funds were raised, and worst of all, the government decided to establish its own unemployment fund in competition with those operated by the unions. In a sense, the welfare state was under attack. The result was stronger union support for SD in the 1994 elections. In 1991, 53 percent of LO members had voted SD; in 1994,


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55 percent. The unions believed that they were entitled to revocation of conservative legislation and favorable action on their demands. To some extent, their expectations were realized. For example, the government unemployment fund was closed. But SD was obliged to form a coalition with the Center Party in order to secure the necessary parliamentary support. The country was facing inflation and a large budget deficit, and the new SD government was obliged to compromise with its coalition partner by modifying some welfare programs, including benefits for low-paid workers and a reduction in job security in the interest of greater labor-market flexibility. The unions were outraged. The LO chair opened the 1996 Congress with a broadside attack on SD. ‘‘The social democratic government has set forth a proposal for destroying labor rights that a unanimous secretariat regards as wholly unacceptable. The proposal weakens the basic security and labor market status of all employees, and this at a time when because of very high unemployment they are already weakened.’’20 He outlined three areas specifically: a new type of limited-time employment that directly contradicted current agreements, a shorter period for reemployment rights, and the right of local parties to waive legal requirements that were designed to strengthen job security. All of this, he said, broke with the ideology of the labor movement. The government elected to follow a policy ‘‘in cooperation with the Center Party designed to split the Right and win a majority in the Riksdag. That’s fine as long as it does not react against us also. Instead, the Center Party is splitting the labor movement.’’21 He concluded by saying that the LO should not break with SD but rather should work within it to change its policies. Resolutions were introduced with the aim of variously removing the LO chair from SD’s executive committee and advocating a new party. The SD loyalists argued that a break would mean a weaker party and a weaker union. The debate went back and forth: The party did not speak for the working man. Why should we build a new party when we already have one? The automatic membership of the LO chair in party committees served to promote LO views. ‘‘I am ashamed of my party that cannot pay more attention to its members who come from LO unions and vote for it in elec-

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tions.’’ ‘‘They say that women are illogical, but I must say that we have heard so many illogical men that it must be a new world record.’’ Speaking at the close of the debate, the LO chair defended the continuation of cooperation with SD. He observed that the prevailing ideological tendencies in the West were moving to the right and that a political party that wanted votes had to move in the same direction. ‘‘This resulted in differences between the Social Democratic Party and the unions. The party had to manage a very tough period of depression, a very large budget deficit, a demand for compromise, and winds from the Right. But if our marriage is to persist, it is necessary that the party once more take its traditional leftist role in Swedish politics.’’22 It was finally agreed that cooperation was to continue and that the LO chairperson would remain a member of the SD executive committee. Unemployment had fallen considerably by mid-1998, but whether the target for the year 2000 will be reached is not certain. In any event, realtionships between LO and SD will probably continue to be an issue.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

LO in Denmark, Beretning, 1985–86, pp. 24–25. LO in Denmark, 1987 Congress, Protokol, p. 34. Ibid., p. 124. LO in Denmark, 1991 Congress, Protokol, p. 139. Ibid., p. 48. LO in Denmark, 1995 Congress, Protokol, p. 43. Ibid., pp. 143–144. Ibid., p. 23. LO in Norway, Aktuelt, September 27, 1989. Ibid., September 18, 1990, and November 13, 1990. LO in Norway, 1993 Congress, Organisasjonsprosjekt, Tema, p. 49. Ibid., Instilling, p. 18. LO in Norway, 1993 Congress, Referat, p. 90. LO in Sweden, 1986 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 385–386. Ibid., p. 397. Ibid., pp. 407–408. LO in Sweden, Ro¨ster om Facket, 1989, p. 71.

The Unions and the Social Democrats 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

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LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Protokoll, p. 368. Ibid., p. 369. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, September 7, p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, September 8, p. 29.

Chapter 6

Women in the Trade Unions In 1985 the female labor-force participation rates were higher in Scandinavia than in any of the other OECD countries except Finland (see Table 6.1). This meant that the unions had to organize women workers if they wanted to sustain their density ratios. A glance at table 1.5 (see p. 12) indicates they did so during the decade 1985–95 except for the Swedish TCO, which already had a majority of female members in 1985. For the Norwegian LO, the gain was substantial. The issue of equality for women in wages and positions played an increasingly important role in the Scandinavian unions, consonant with their relative membership growth. The expansion of the service sector and public employment, the predominant source of new female jobs, complicated union problems. Jurisdictional lines became more fluid within the LOs, which were also challenged increasingly by the white-collar unions. Female members became more assertive and demanded more leadership positions. Flexible working time and child care found their way into union agendas. DENMARK The Danish LO is unique in having had an all-female national affiliate for many years. It consisted primarily of unskilled workers

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in hotels and other service enterprises. However, most women LO members were employed elsewhere. The LO had a consistent policy of seeking equality of pay and other equitable working conditions for its female members. The LO chair cited some interesting figures to the delegates at the 1987 Congress. During the previous twenty years, LO membership had tripled, whereas the number of male members had risen by only 25 percent. For all the labor federations taken together, the percentage of organization among women was higher than that for men in 1987. However, 37 percent of the women were working part-time, with a weaker attachment to the labor market.1 It was also true that the male-female wage differential had not changed since 1979 and that 54 percent of the women in the labor market had no vocational training, thus handicapping them in securing better-paid employment. Unemployment among women was more than double that of men, and two-thirds of the longtime unemployed were women. The labor market was strictly divided along sex lines; women were concentrated in 30 job categories, compared with 300 for men.2 As for internal union authority, only 17 percent of elected LO committee members were women. The LO executive committee recommended that two women be added to all its committees, and the representative council urged that this be extended to all affiliates. In 1989, unskilled women were earning 88 percent as much as unskilled men, but in the white-collar area the ratio was only 71 percent.3


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The year 1991 marked the negotiation of a major agreement between LO and the Danish Employers’ Association (DA) on female equality. The agreement pledged the parties to a more equitable allocation of employment, taking parental responsibility into account. Local cooperation committees were to plan for the effects of restructuring on equal treatment. They were to survey malefemale relationships in employment, dismissal, wage fixing, training, and promotion. The central organizations were to provide information and advice to local cooperation committees. Any disputes that could not be handled by the committees were to be referred to a national cooperation board, supplemented by experts if the parties found it desirable.4 The LO conducted surveys among its affiliates on the number of women holding union office. Regional bodies that had not taken concrete steps to further equality were invited to attend semiannual conferences designed to move them in that direction. Municipal child-care centers were urged to extend their hours. The LO also expressed concern over the discharge of women due to pregnancy or childbirth.5 The LO chair conceded at his 1995 Congress that satisfactory results had not yet been achieved and that there was still a large wage gap between men and women for the same work. It was generally believed, he said, that if the two had equal education, their wages would be equal. ‘‘But education is not enough. In the debate it was suggested that we introduce job evaluation, which is known in other countries. It is possible that a completely cross-sectional job evaluation will reduce wage differentials. But the question is whether a job evaluation system can be developed, and whether we are interested in it.’’6 These remarks were followed by the comments of a number of female delegates, who constituted one-third of all the delegates present. Lillian Knudsen, the chair of the Female Union, felt that the equality area was in need of priority treatment and proposed that she be replaced as chair of the LO’s equal-wage committee by a prominent man to emphasize that the problem involved both sexes. Another delegate from the same union asserted that ‘‘the greatest problem is that the jobs of men and women are not evaluated in the same manner. Women’s jobs continue to be low wage jobs, and women are marginalized in the labor market because of

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absence due to childbearing and care, among other things. To change this demands a change in attitude, the recognition that our children are a joint responsibility.’’7 As part of its operating plan for the coming four years, the 1995 Congress resolved that women were to be given more equal representation on union committees, that contract models providing solidarity should be developed, that the situation of families with children should be improved to facilitate access to the labor market, that women’s employment rights with respect to pregnancy and childbirth should be strengthened, and that efforts for equality should be extended to the international sphere, particularly to the European Union. A new committee on equal rights and family policy soon thereafter formed a network of experts in these matters from among the affiliated unions and prepared a manual for use at the workplace.8 Whether this will advance the cause of female equality remains to be seen. NORWAY The proportion of female members in the Norwegian LO is lower than in Denmark or Sweden, though it rose rapidly from 1985 to 1995. One motif runs like a red thread throughout the Norwegian discussion of equal rights for women—quotas. This had its origin in the country’s political sphere, where women’s organizations threatened to desert the major parties unless they allocated sufficient places on their electoral lists to bring about greater equality in the Parliament. This tactic proved successful and resulted, among other things, in a female Labor Party prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, for a number of years. The issue came in for extended debate at the 1985 LO Congress. When it was pointed out that LO membership had not kept up with the labor-force increase, a male delegate declared, ‘‘I believe that female voting can be a means to secure a better growth of membership. Then perhaps we will be more willing to use the slogan ‘The trade unions shape the future’.’’ Next, a woman delegate observed, ‘‘Why are so many men frightened of female representation? Today women must be twice as clever as men to be elected to union positions. But just wait: women are tough. We live longer than men, so we will eventually achieve our goal.’’9


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When the discussion shifted to quotas, two women mounted the most telling attacks against the idea. Ruth Kolstad of the Food Workers Union declared her satisfaction with the action of her own union in rejecting quotas because of the practical problems that would be involved in administering them. Her union had 315 locals, many with less than forty members, plus branches and districts. Liv Buck, a member of the LO secretariat, added: I would be very, very, happy if the congress elected four or five women to the LO leadership. The same for committees. But that would be because these women had the confidence of the congress and the membership, not because it was decided beforehand that there should be women. . . . What is the situation compared with that the world over? We believe it has moved slowly, but compared with other trade union movements, as I know them, and from a woman’s viewpoint, Norway is clearly among the leaders where it concerns the place of women in the trade unions, whether we look to the East or to the West.10

A resolution favoring quotas failed to secure adoption. Harriet Andreassen, another secretariat member, introduced the debate on future LO policy by listing the important issues for women. Part-time workers were poorly organized and needed advice. She called for movement toward a six-hour day and a thirtyhour week. Most critical was equal pay for equal work. ‘‘I have no doubt that this is one of the most important areas for the trade unions in coming days; we have not been smart enough. It is here that we have a large potential for membership if we position ourselves so that women will come to us.’’11 Four years later, at the 1989 Congress, there was only peripheral reference to quotas. However, the requirements of women came in for a good deal of discussion. Esther Kostol, who was elected LO vice-chair, spoke at length about female grievances, including low wages, an insufficient number of nurseries, the fact that 90 percent of single parents were women, unhealthy workplaces, and part-time work.12 There were two slates of candidates for top LO positions, one of which included a woman. A supporter argued that ‘‘it is important and necessary as part of the process toward equality that women have a chance to show what they can do. Now it is Esther’s turn. We already know that she is smart, and now we have the

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possibility of going with a woman who can shape our contact with large new groups.’’13 This slate prevailed. Quotas came up again at the 1993 Congress when the Civil Service Union proposed that women nominees should constitute 40 percent of all those elected to LO positions. The Municipal Employees had already adopted a preference system and reported that it was working satisfactorily. The secretariat was against the proposal, and the resolutions committee agreed: ‘‘The use of quotas in the form of rules or practical politics is an important cause of increased women’s representation. Where our own organization is involved, some unions have adopted it. For others it has not been natural because of union or membership structure. . . . Formal quota rules are not easy to adopt. Selection of delegates to the LO Congress, the representative council, and not least the secretariat, is difficult to reconcile with quota rules.’’14 Quotas lost once more. But they came to the fore with greater force at the 1997 LO Congress. The voices raised in favor of quotas were more numerous and sharper. The final result was a compromise resolution that was described as follows: ‘‘Another question on which the [resolutions] committee spent a great deal of time in the area of equality was quota voting. A proposal was offered to provide a means of action in addition to more training for women. The LO project ‘from the bottom to the top in the labor movement’ opened the way for quotas where that is possible. It was a very careful formulation that the committee supported wholeheartedly.’’15 Although compulsory quotas were not adopted, the outcome was a clear victory for the cause of female equality. Quotas were sanctioned for those unions that favored them. As for the LO itself, five of the eight top LO officials elected by the congress were women. It would not be surprising if Norway should become the first country with a female head of the largest trade union federation. SWEDEN The last decade has marked a step forward for the position of women in the Swedish labor movement. A woman was recently elected vice-chair of the LO, and another to a new office, second vice-chair. The latter made the following point in a speech at the 1996 LO Congress: ‘‘The wages of women compared with those of men have increased steadily, and more women have trade union


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and political positions. More attention has been paid to differences in the living conditions of men and women. We have a new law on equality which provides better opportunities for unions and society to make sure that the wages of men and women are equal.’’16 But nirvana had not yet arrived. There were still complaints of unequal treatment. In 1993, only 25 percent of LO officials were women. A former labor minister charged that there were maximum quotas for women at all LO levels.17 Women’s wages were still said to average only 85 percent of men’s. There were two relevant motions from the floor at the 1996 Congress. One called for the LO executive committee to develop an action plan for equality and charged the preparatory committee for the next congress with the task of preparing an appropriate resolution; this was adopted. Another motion stipulated that all wage increases emanating from collective bargaining should be made in monetary amounts rather than in percentages as a means of wage equalization. This was defeated. Statistics comparing the wages of men and women are difficult to interpret without going into detail by industry and occupation.

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The data in table 6.2, which relate only to manufacturing, suggest that there was little change in the differential from 1985 to 1995 in Denmark and Sweden, but some closing of the gap in Norway. If these figures are taken at face value, it would appear that the Scandinavian countries are among the world’s leaders in approaching full wage equality for women. The trade unions must be given a great deal of the credit for this achievement. NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

LO in Denmark, 1987 Congress, Protokol, p. 48. Danish Labor News, August 1988, p. 10. LO in Denmark, Beretning, 1988–89, pp. 117–118. Danish Labor News, May 1991, pp. 3–5. LO in Denmark, Beretning, 1994–95, p. 104. LO in Denmark, 1995 Congress, Protokol, pp. 56–57. Ibid., p. 86. LO in Denmark, Beretning, 1995–96, pp. 113–114. LO in Norway, 1985 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 64–65. Ibid., pp. 71–72. Ibid., pp. 171–175. LO in Norway, 1989 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 67–71. Ibid., p. 226. LO in Norway, 1993 Congress, Referat, pp. 461–462. LO in Norway, 1997 Congress, Referat, May 15, p. 23. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, September 9, p. 71. LO in Sweden, Tidningen, May 15, 1992.

Chapter 7

White-Collar Unionism A unique aspect of Scandinavian unionism is the extent to which white-collar employees are organized. This helps to account for high union densities. The traditional unions have done well on their own, but the figures in table 1.4 (see p. 11) reflect the added impact of the newer arrivals. Sweden led the way in the formation and growth of independent white-collar unions. In 1995, 43 percent of all organized employees were in the independents, compared with 24 percent for Denmark and 37 percent for Norway. The Swedish independent federations got an earlier start and have attained greater influence than their Danish and Norwegian counterparts. Detailed accounts of all these organizations would require another volume—one that is well worth doing—but this chapter will concentrate on the two major Swedish federations, which typify the others as well. The largest and most important is the Confederation of Professional Employees, widely known as TCO. This English translation of the Swedish title is a recent upgrading of its original English title, the Central Organization of Salaried Employees, in recognition of its rising social status. This brings it closer to and more competitive with SACO, the Federation of Professional Associations, which will be dealt with later in this chapter. The present TCO was founded in 1944 by a merger of two earlier

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groups, the Salaried Employees’ Central Organization, in the private sector, and the Public Employees’ Central Organization. It had 100,000 members initially, 1.1 million members in 1985, and 1.3 million members in 1995. Together with SACO, 85 percent of all white-collar employees in the country are organized. The heterogeneity of TCO is exemplified by the largest affiliates: at the top of the scale, the Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry and the Teachers (with 318,000 and 205,000 members, respectively), and at the bottom, the Forest and Agricultural Employees and the Scientists and Researchers (1,000 and 600 members, respectively). There were nineteen affiliates in 1996, about half employed in the private sector, 37 percent in local government, and 12 percent in the national government.1 TCO is governed by a biennial congress and an executive committee of sixteen plus the TCO chairperson and a representative of its own personnel. Until 1995 there were fixed regional departments, but these have been replaced by ad hoc councils. Why is TCO an independent federation? Why didn’t the LO seek to bring the TCO unions within its orbit? The AFL-CIO, for example, chartered unions of teachers, federal and local employees, police and firemen, journalists, musicians, actors, and others, many of whom are TCO members in Sweden. In fact, the LO has been open to white-collar membership since its inception, but considerations of status tended to keep professionals apart. White-collar employees were often more likely to identify with their employers than with the blue-collar proletarians. They tended to regard strikes as undignified. And a very important factor was that the close relations between LO and the Social Democrats did not appeal to many in white-collar occupations. For its part, the LO did not put obstacles in the way of the nascent TCO, but actually assisted it. The editor of the LO newspaper, Sigfrid Hansson, whose brother, Per Albin, was later chair of the Social Democratic Party and prime minister of Sweden, was a consistent supporter of TCO’s predecessor organization. Hansson and others may have hoped that once the white-collar groups had been organized they would join the LO en bloc. But by the time class lines began to be eroded as a consequence of structural changes in the economy, it was too late. In any event, the LO did not attempt to prevent the development of an independent TCO.2


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The policy of the LO turned out to be a fortunate one. It is unlikely that Swedish trade union density could have reached the present level if the LO had not been so permissive. The Danish LO followed a somewhat similar policy, but the Norwegian LO attempted to incorporate white-collar employees into its own ranks, with the result that the independent federations were less friendly and weaker. The special character of TCO has a number of facets. One of them is its uniqueness. ‘‘In other countries white-collar employees are almost entirely unorganized or divided among many small organizations with limited union goals. A strong white-collar organization which approaches 100 percent unionization with considerable political influence . . . that is found only in Sweden. . . . TCO is a unique occurrence, not only in Europe but globally.’’3 Another unusual aspect of TCO is that a substantial majority of its members are women. A few of its constituent unions are predominantly male or female, but most are mixed. The male majority in the large Clerical and Technical Union reflects its origin in manufacturing, where all nonmanual employees, from clerks and typists to technicians, engineers, and scientists, were organized. But the membership percentages do not carry over to TCO leadership positions, where only 30 percent were women in 1995. However, the chairperson of the TCO was a woman—Inger Ohlsson. The TCO executive committee had decided in 1991 that by the time of the 1997 Congress at the latest, its officialdom would reflect the membership sex ratio. It is now acknowledged that this ratio will not be reached; women will have to be persuaded to engage in union activity. However, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson spoke of improvement in the female labor market over the previous decade: ‘‘Women’s position in working life has changed dramatically. The public sector and its growth have provided many women with jobs and have shaped the possibility for women to enter the labor market. Without child care and care for older people, it would have been much less possible for women to take jobs outside the home and increase their freedom.’’ The fly in the ointment was that parttime jobs had doubled since 1992, and three-quarters of them were held by women.4 In its program for 1995–97, TCO placed emphasis on further equalization of wages and working conditions between men and women.

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Unemployment in the TCO area hit women particularly hard, and they are still finding it difficult to regain their jobs as the economy improves. The fact that many were employed in small enterprises such as retail stores makes their plight less visible than it has been among LO members. According to the TCO, male-female wage differentials have widened recently. The TCO has been bargaining to help its low-paid members, but has not gone as far as the LO with a solidarity wage policy. Great variation in wages among its affiliates has forced it to recognize the necessity of pay scales for different work as long as discrimination is not involved. The union put it this way: ‘‘Women are still paid less than men for the same work, despite the fact that Swedish law prohibits discrimination on the ground of gender. The development of methods for dealing with unjustifiable differences in pay is one of the central elements of TCO’s efforts to establish a working life marked by equality of opportunity’’5 (italics added). Education is another TCO priority. To promote in-plant job training, the union has offered employers a wage reduction of 20 percent for time spent in training. Colleges and universities are seen as major recruiting grounds for new members. Student associations sponsored by TCO and its affiliates had 50,000 members in 1996. Swedish high schools (the equivalent of community colleges in the United States) currently graduate about 30 percent of all young people, a figure that TCO wants raised to 50 percent. The fact that the level of education among TCO members is higher than that of LO’s makes the TCO emphasis on education more than a vague welfare goal. A congress delegate spelled out the TCO interest: ‘‘Now that more and more are coming to working life through colleges and high schools, it is of decisive importance that the labor movement is visible and active there as social guides, as molders of opinion, and as a source of influence.’’6 And as a source of new members, no doubt. Among the other goals of the TCO are the following: 1. Full employment, with an average of 3 percent unemployment by the end of 1997 (a figure that was not achieved). 2. Dampening of inflation through greater competition in the domestic market.


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3. Raising the proportion of employees currently receiving more education from the current 3 percent to 10 percent. 4. Unemployment and sickness benefits to be not less than 80 percent of previous earnings. 5. An active labor placement policy, with greater resources. 6. A closer relationship between wage policy and skill development in the interest of higher productivity.7

TCO unions are not strike prone, but they have been militant. This has been particularly true of the Clerical and Technical Union.8 Strikes and strike threats have been an integral part of bargaining. Legislation enacted in 1976 gave public employees the same rights to strike and engage in other forms of industrial action as those enjoyed in the private sector, though these rights are limited to disputes over pay and working conditions. The TCO has been in the forefront of the search for industrial democracy. Four key democratic rights were outlined in a recent publication: the freedom to observe and speak, security in the face of enterprise changes, individual rights to freedom and integrity, and rights in working life. These translate into a variety of privileges within the enterprise, including codetermination. ‘‘Employees must have increased power over their jobs and conditions of labor. Details must be worked out through collective agreements rather than legislation. Small enterprises must not be excepted.’’ The conclusion: ‘‘The right to negotiate with employers should be strengthened, not weakened. It is clear that employees have too little influence in situations where there is need to improve an enterprise or the economy. The possibility of having a meaningful and personal engagement in work must widen. The right to participate and decide, and to take responsibility for one’s own and joint work, must be guaranteed.’’9 Finally, TCO is firmly committed to collective bargaining in the conduct of industrial relations. The chair emphasized this in her concluding address to the 1995 Congress: ‘‘It is disturbing that so often in recent years the Parliament and the Government have interfered with free bargaining. Therefore we must take every opportunity to consider how to protect the bargaining model and continue to defend it. It is through trade union methods that we

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seek to shape a good climate in the enterprise and manage to bring about cooperation. From the TCO side we reject any form of government interference which undermines a negotiated agreement.’’10 Whatever one can say about the unions affiliated with the TCO, which is perhaps the most successful white-collar labor federation in the world, it is clear that they are genuine trade unions that operate independently of their employers. Another union organization that has few if any counterparts elsewhere is the Swedish Federation of Professional Associations (SACO). Beginning in 1947, professional societies began to band together to protect the economic interests of their members. These societies are composed of people who normally preserve their professional independence in other countries, but in Sweden they felt impelled to unionize for a number of reasons. Among them were the power of the blue-collar unions, which threatened to reduce income differentials; increases in the level of taxation to finance the welfare state; and increasing educational costs. Starting with 15,000 members in 1947, SACO reached a total of 407,000 at the end of 1996. It is estimated that between 70 and 80 percent of all people in the country with a higher education were in a SACO union. Following is the sectoral distribution of the membership: Local government employees

32 percent

National government employees

20 percent

Private employers

22 percent

Students

12 percent

Professional occupations Pensioners

3 percent 11 percent

The almost 50,000 students in SACO are scattered among the various unions depending on their academic specialities. About 10 percent of SACO members operate their own practices. A large number are in the health sector, while most of the others are consultants in other industries. Many of the practices were established in the 1990s when unemployment became prevalent. Competence in work for which there was demand was another important factor.


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These people have maintained their membership for various reasons, and SACO has set up a commission to determine their needs. The bargaining units vary with the nature of employment. In the national government sector, SACO is represented by SACO-5, a permanent body embracing all affiliates with members in that sector. Each union with members working for municipalities bargains for itself or with other unions when that is desirable. There is a cartel, PTK, in the private sector, with seventeen SACO unions and ten from TCO. Another eight SACO unions bargain for themselves. SACO is strongly committed to local bargaining on matters of compensation. This is made clear from a recent SACO publication: ‘‘Wage determination in Sweden has not functioned well. It has been inflationary without stimulating increased skill, the acceptance of more responsibility or higher productivity. . . . We must introduce a new system based on individual knowledge, the nature and difficulty of work and the results that obtain. We must make wage changes more flexible, so that increased demand in some sectors and jobs can lead to higher wages and a better supply of a qualified labor force.’’11 SACO maintains that many employees with advanced degrees working for municipalities earn lower lifetime incomes than those with only a high-school degree. It claims that Swedish economists and engineers are less well paid than their counterparts in the United States and Western Europe, with the result that many of them have migrated abroad. ‘‘From an international point of view, Sweden has a relatively low share of the highly educated in the labor force, and particularly in industry. Japan, the USA, and Great Britain have higher shares than Sweden.’’12 There is no mention of solidarity wages in SACO literature. On the contrary, compensation based on the worth of the job is the ‘‘natural’’ wage principle for the organization. ‘‘Central wage determination is out of date as a method for setting wages. New forms of labor require new wage determination requirements.’’13 SACO advocates a new system of social insurance that involves merging existing benefits—unemployment compensation and sickness payments—to provide insurance against loss of income. It asserts that this would lead to greater job flexibility; people could move more easily between paid work and self-employment, for ex-

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ample. A single administration would handle claims on an individual basis to prevent abuse of the system.14 The organization adopted five general goals at its 1993 Congress. (These meetings, held every fourth year, are attended by 101 delegates elected by affiliated unions on the basis of membership.) The five goals were as follows: 1. Education and research. This requires quality on a par with other nations, independent and critical thinking, and stimulus to lifetime learning, as well as government support to motivate young people. 2. Labor market policy. Unemployment should be reduced to prevent deterioration of skills. There should be new rules providing for flexible working hours by agreement between the labor-market partners. 3. Wages, taxes, and economic policy. Correspondence between wage determination and economic policy should be arranged so that economic growth will be achieved without inflation or unemployment. Small enterprises should be encouraged. There should be free wage negotiations on a local or individual basis. 4. Personnel policy. Human capital theory should be the guiding principle in this area. Psychosociological factors should receive more attention in the work milieu. 5. Social policy. ‘‘The sickness and pension insurance system should be reformed so that it is economically robust, sound in the long run, and not open to political interference, which causes insecurity, works against future confidence, economic security, and an effective market economy. It requires firm connection between contributions and benefits so that the individual is assured that his contributions will finance his account and will not be used for other purposes.’’15

A first approach to this program might convince one that SACO is hardly a trade union, at least in the Scandinavian sense. In fact, its constituent unions are tough bargainers and are subject to general labor law, which among other things allows them to engage in strikes. These are rare events, as they are in the Swedish labor market generally. SACO is politically neutral and tends to stay away from issues that do not directly concern its role as a trade union. It is not yet a member of the European Labor Federation, but TCO has agreed to sponsor its membership. SACO has placed a great deal of emphasis on its relations with


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students, who constitute about 12 percent of its membership. There is a students’ council consisting of representatives of local councils. Its chair is a member of the union’s national executive committee and has the right to submit motions. It publishes information on future job seeking, including details of the work involved in particular professions, and salaries. Students are also provided with data on loans and grants, accommodations, and essential professional work experience. Collaboration with universities is a related function. SACO has taken the initiative in helping set up career centers at the universities and has encouraged them to maintain contact with potential employers. Assistance to students who wish to enroll in foreign countries is facilitated through connections with the European Union. SACO has even set up a Web site on the Internet called ‘‘the Direct Line to a Career,’’ which helps to establish it as a permanent partner in career choice. Efforts are also made to keep in touch with pensioners, who may maintain their membership at a reduced rate of dues. This enables them to influence pension policy if it is under negotiation, among other things. What makes SACO so singular is that it represents the interests of a social group that is not customarily organized in unions. The fact that so many of its members are employed in the public sector—physicians in the national health system, teachers in the schools and universities, the clergy in the state church, military officers, and railway officials, to name a few—gives it an important function; collective bargaining has greater potential for income determination than would individual bargaining with government officials. It is the willingness of employees to join organizations like TCO and SACO that makes it possible for Swedish labor to achieve such high levels of union density. The success of these organizations is a major factor in preserving Sweden from the worldwide decline in trade union strength. NOTES 1. These figures are for 1996 and are derived from the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations, This Is TCO (Stockholm: 1996).

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2. For a history of the TCO, see Christopher Wheeler, White-Collar Power (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Thord Wallen, Suveranitet och Samverkan (Lund: Bokforlaget Bra Bo¨cker, 1989); Per Sandberg, Tja¨nstemenna Ro¨relsen, Stockholm: Tidens Forlag, 1969. 3. Bernt Schiller, ‘‘Tja¨nstemenna ro¨relsen i Sverige,’’ in Irka Cederberg and Bjo¨rn Kumin, Tja¨nstema¨n—finns dom? (Stockholm: 1992), p. 41. 4. TCO, 1995 Extraordinary Congress, Protokoll, p. 12. 5. TCO, This Is TCO, 1996, p. 4. 6. TCO, 1995 Extraordinary Congress, p. 4. 7. TCO, Arbete, 1995–97, June 1995. ¨ r, p. 42. 8. See Historia och Framtid: SIF 75 A 9. TCO, Mer Makt a¨t de Ansta¨llda, 1994, p. 14. 10. TCO, Extraordinary Congress, p. 6. 11. SACO, Lo¨n efter Va¨rde, Stockholm, p. 5. 12. SACO, Va¨g Valet, Stockholm, p. 3. 13. SACO, Va¨xel Verkan, Stockholm, p. 4. 14. SACO, Ett Ba¨ttre Fo¨rsa¨knings System, Stockholm, pp. 2–3. ¨ r, Go¨r, Vill SACO (Stockholm: 1997). 15. Magens Mansson, Vad A

Chapter 8

Interfederation Relationships The growth of new labor unions that competed for members with LO unions, at least at the margin, might have been expected to result in serious rivalries. In fact, differences were settled without the stress that characterized dual unionism in other countries. The formation of the CIO in the United States led to bitter competition with the older AFL over a thirty-year period, even though many of the CIO unions were in industries that the AFL had not organized. It is interesting to see how differences were worked out in Scandinavia. By 1985 the new unions were well established in the Scandinavian countries and contributed much to union growth during the next decade. Had they not been founded, the LOs would probably have organized some of those who joined them, as suggested by jurisdictional disputes. Industrial unions in the LO were able to attract many white-collar employees in their industries. There was even some conflict over professionals, factory engineers, for example, though it is unlikely that the professional associations would have provided many LO members. DENMARK The combined membership of the two major new unions contributed 24 percent of total Danish union membership in 1995, less

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than in Norway and Sweden. The relatively strong position of the LO enabled it to enter into good relationships with its neighbors. In an opening report to the 1987 LO Congress, the vice-chair cited the satisfactory degree of cooperation that existed. For example, there had been a successful joint initiative against government attempts to reduce unemployment compensation. Some jurisdictional problems had arisen. ‘‘Unfortunately this type of situation cannot be avoided entirely. However, there is full agreement to see that such conflict is settled as quickly as possible.’’1 This assessment came a few months after LO and the Federation of Civil Servants and Salaried Employees (FTF) had set up a committee to revise an earlier peace agreement between the two federations. At a special congress held in 1989 to reform the LO structure, the vice-chair raised the possibility of merging the three federations. ‘‘There is need for the start of a discussion with other organizations, including those outside the LO. Not because we cannot manage by ourselves, but to make sure that our members have a greater opportunity of securing employment in the future.’’ He called for a dialogue among the federations, citing as another reason the ability of a combined labor movement to exercise more influence in European economic affairs.2 Nothing came of this initiative. It proved difficult to reconcile all the boundary problems between LO and FTF. For example, unions of technicians and bank employees affiliated with the latter claimed jurisdiction over all employees in these occupations for purposes of unemployment compensation, regardless of the fact that some belonged to LO unions. In a speech at the 1995 LO Congress, the LO chair made the point that relations with the Federation of Professional Associations (AC) were good, but not with FTF: ‘‘There is naturally room for differences between LO and FTF. But it appears that the desire of FTF to go after special interests has become stronger than the tradition of many years of good cooperation. . . . I deeply regret this. But it does not make us wring our hands.’’3 It was not until 1996 that a committee set up years earlier to update the LO-FTF agreement held its first meeting. The fact that developments proceeded at this slow pace suggests that the occasional controversies that arose were not of major concern to either party. The situation was well summarized by the LO as follows:


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The rapidly increasing group of salaried employees never formed a single, coherent group covered by the same collective agreement. These employees work in three distinct areas: 1. the traditional LO/DA area; 2. the remaining part of the private sector labor market; and 3. the public sector labor market, which operates two inter-related collective bargaining systems, one for state employees, the other for municipal/county employees. This fragmentation has enabled LO 1) to unionize a relatively high percentage of all salaried employees (directly, i.e., via its member organizations) and 2) to secure a division of the organizational areas, thus preventing—by and large—a direct and enervating clash with trade unions outside the LO. LO and its member unions have even proved capable of establishing a direct working relationship with these other trade union federations and their member unions, especially in the public sector, on terms that ensure a dominant position for LO.4

Between 1985 and 1995 FTF membership rose 7.4 percent, compared with 7.9 percent for LO. The growth of AC was higher, but that organization is not a threat to LO hegemony. LO has held its own despite the changes in the structure of the labor market. NORWAY Norway presents a different picture. Its white-collar and professional unions have been growing more rapidly than LO in recent years. Relations with the newer federations and independents have been more difficult for the LO in Norway than in Denmark. A speaker at the 1989 LO Congress noted that cooperation agreements with independent national unions such as that of schoolteachers required evaluation. They limited the ability of LO to seek new members in the areas they covered, some of them important to the LO. The agreements may have disappointed nonLO members who believed that they would receive special preferences by cooperating with LO.5 There was also some debate in connection with LO’s proposed structural changes. Several speakers warned against undermining professionalism lest it render difficult the recruitment of people who wanted to retain their special interests. Both the Federation of Professional Associations (AF) and the Confederation of Professional Unions (YS) numbered among their affiliated unions some with narrow skills that catered to these interests. The newly elected LO

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chair, Leif Halvorson, countered with the assertion that narrow sectoral interests were one of the worst current LO problems, since they caused members to divide up and the labor movement to weaken.6 A review of the situation in 1992 yielded the finding that there were twenty-four independent national unions, the largest of which was the Teachers Union with 60,000 members, as well as unions of journalists, oil workers, and policemen. LO was in competition for members with both YS and AF, particularly the former. YS had been founded in 1977, and its affiliates were divided into three sectors for bargaining purposes: private, commercial, and government. AF originated in 1975. Many of its unions required applicants for membership to take qualifying examinations.7 The issue of interfederation relationships came to a head at the 1993 LO Congress. A report noted that competition among federations had grown because the work groups that tended to join YS and AF had been increasing rapidly. Unlike the case in Sweden, the Norwegian labor market was not divided into clearly defined jurisdictional areas. LO was following the principle that any union could enroll any type of labor. Unions outside LO were dominant in some areas and presented a logical alternative for many potential employees, including those in education, health, banking, and insurance. The conclusion was that ‘‘the relationship to other organizations is not only a question of finding suitable forms. Some of the unions outside the LO see it as their most important task to compete with LO unions. To strengthen LO unions in competition with these unions is another strategic problem for the future.’’8 There was a frank analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the LO. It was strong among industrial workers both in the private and public sectors. Its share in building and construction was somewhat lower, but it was strong among the middle and lower levels of the public sector. It was weakest among white-collar employees in the private sector; for example, LO was particularly poorly organized in private-sector occupations that required a higher education, except among engineers. The LO unions were urged not to confine their organizational efforts to areas of weakness. Even traditional LO areas such as construction were being divided into smaller employer units in which it was difficult to retain members. There followed, industry by in-


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dustry, estimates of employees in independent unions, in competing unions, and unorganized, a blueprint for LO recruiting.9 One of the first fruits of this appraisal was a comprehensive agreement between LO and AF in November 1993. It began with the common interest of the two organizations in government economic policy, education, and research. Among the goals mutually specified were the right to bargain collectively, including the right to strike; complete safety and health measures; full pay during illness; codetermination; satisfactory unemployment compensation; and pensions. Women were to have full-time jobs and wage equality. On the key issue of bringing about closer relations between LO and AF, there was to be frequent contact between the leaders, with at least four formal meetings a year, Contacts among national unions were to be encouraged. Joint projects in priority areas were to be organized: ‘‘LO is represented in more official committees than AF. The parties will consult as to how their breadth in competence and viewpoints can be coordinated and advanced, for example, in order to strengthen the influence of LO and AF in national and international social development.’’10 No standing committee was appointed to adjust jurisdictional or other disputes between the two organizations, but there was a clear implication that if they should arise, the unions would confer and attempt to effectuate a settlement. The different types of employees represented by LO and AF militated against a multiplicity of problems, but the agreement represented an effort on the part of LO to create a more orderly labor market. A new agreement was reached between LO and the independent union of teachers, covering wage, school, and social policy. The LO had hoped that an affiliation could be brought about, but the teachers were not prepared to join. There were some complaints at the 1997 LO Congress about the operation of the LO-AF agreement. A delegate observed that young people came into the labor market with AF cards in their pockets in the belief that LO catered mainly to the low paid. He urged the LO to take steps to clear up this misconception. A Civil Service delegate criticized the LO for giving AF the Norwegian seat in the executive committee of Eurocadres, a unit of the European Federation of Labor, as not being in the interest of the LO. To such criticisms, the LO leadership denied that the LO had a low-wage profile. Moreover, ‘‘many academics do not consider themselves

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particularly well paid, and these people believe that the LO will best serve their interests.’’11 The last decade has witnessed a decline in the LO share of organized workers. YS, which increased its membership by 70 percent over the period, represents the only potential threat to LO dominance. But in absolute terms, LO is still, as of 1998, Norway’s most powerful labor federation and YS is not likely to challenge it seriously in the ascertainable future. A recent research study concluded that unions based on craft or profession were doing better, in or out of LO, than the larger LO unions, such as the Municipal Workers, which organizes many different work groups. Better-educated people appear to be attracted to the narrowly based unions. It may be that LO will eventually have to move in that direction to protect itself against such YS unions as customs officers, machinists, civil defense personnel, insurance underwriters, and research workers, each with less than 5,000 members. SWEDEN The share of the Swedish LO in total union membership was only 57 percent in 1995, less than in its Scandinavian counterparts. Yet the threat offered by the two newer union federations was not severe. The reason was the very high density of the labor movement as a whole. Competition was limited by the fact that there were not many unorganized employees available for recruitment. Shortly after the opening of the 1986 LO Congress, the chair of the TCO delivered what was described as a traditional address. He began by wondering whether TCO could have developed without LO encouragement from its very start. ‘‘Swedish experience shows that an independent white-collar union with a separate central organization is not a disadvantage for workers’ organization. Rather, it strengthens the position of all wage earners.’’12 However, he discounted the possibility of a merger between the two federations. Each had its own traditions and ties. He thought that merger might lead to a lower level of organization for all. He cited as a reason for union success in Sweden the fact that the two federations had been able to settle potentially divisive events. Jurisdictional disputes he described as a scourge that created


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a negative view of union activity. He observed that public-sector employees had bargaining rights greater than in any other country, a situation that had come about because of the combined efforts of the entire labor movement. He concluded, ‘‘Much unites TCO and LO. Together we have a stronger organization of employee interests than in any other country.’’ His speech was received with warm applause.13 Five years later there was a repeat performance. In introducing the TCO chair to the 1991 LO Congress, the LO chair expressed the view that a merger of the two federations would benefit both. For his part, TCO chair Rosengren declared that his organization was politically independent and would remain so, in contrast to LO ties to the Social Democratic Party. He then went on to attack the market ideology of employers and to denounce their monopolistic tendencies. He criticized efforts to privatize government activities, repeating a favorite LO theme, and advocated a massive national campaign for developing skills. But he did not think it was a good idea for his constituents ‘‘to join together with our big brother.’’14 The good relationship continued during the ensuing economic recession. A delegate of the powerful LO Metal Workers to the 1996 LO Congress described joint LO-TCO bargaining for whitecollar employees in industry and termed this arrangement to be of the utmost importance. But there was some grumbling about the TCO practice of bargaining on an individual basis at the local level when the LO was trying to determine wages collectively: ‘‘In the past we were irritated by the fact that the white-collar employees got raises with the help of our negotiators. Now it is beginning to irritate us that our membership groups are getting increases with the help of the white-collar negotiators.’’15 The new chair of the TCO, Inger Ohlsson, received a warm welcome from the Congress. She acknowledged that she had full respect for the idea that there was no easy way to attain full employment, but called upon the government to introduce measures that would reduce unemployment. She listed three areas that she regarded as essential in future trade union activity. The first involved job rights, including nondiscrimination, which were nonnegotiable. The second was the issue of working hours and employer desire for flexibility, but she warned that while these issues were negotiable, the unions would never accept unilateral employer

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determination. The third had to do with international problems in the light of the Swedish decision to join the European Union.16 These were all in line with LO thinking. SACO is much smaller than TCO, and it is sharply differentiated from LO by its academic requirements. There is little overlapping jurisdiction between the two. It would not be accurate to say that there have been no differences among the three Swedish labor federations over the years. Their bargaining goals were not always identical. Their views on economic policy, particularly taxation, varied; SACO tended to represent the interests of the better-paid members of the community. However, divided institutions and aspirations cannot be said to have had an adverse impact on the Swedish labor movement, as it has had in many other countries. Norway is the only Scandinavian country in which union rivalry may have been a significant factor in union growth. Even there, the impact has been marginal. The general policy has been to ‘‘live and let live,’’ a commendable one if the ultimate goal is the preservation of union power. NOTES 1. LO in Denmark, 1987 Congress, Protokol, pp. 44–45. 2. LO in Denmark, LO Bladet, November 16, 1989. 3. LO in Denmark, 1995 Congress, Protokol, p. 38. 4. Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen, and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model (Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing Co., 1994), pp. 159–160. 5. LO in Norway, 1989 Congress, Protokoll, p. 232. 6. LO in Norway, Aktuelt, November 1, 1989. 7. Ibid., January 14, 1992. Late in 1997, a number of unions, including those of lawyers, physicians, economists, engineers, and dentists, withdrew from AF to form a new federation, taking 84,000 members with them. 8. LO in Norway, LO Organisasjons Prosject, Instilling, 1993, p. 12. 9. Ibid., pp. 64–78. 10. LO in Norway, AF and LO, Intensjons Avtale om Samarbeid, 1993. 11. LO in Norway, 1997 LO Congress, Referat, May 14, p. 18. 12. LO in Sweden, 1986 Congress, Protokoll, p. 18. 13. Ibid., pp. 20–29. 14. LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Protokoll, pp. 28–37. 15. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, September 9, p. 43. 16. Ibid., pp. 49–53.

Chapter 9

Union Membership Benefits The basic function of trade unions is to represent their members in collective bargaining over wages, hours, and other conditions of labor. Unions in many countries have added additional services to attract and hold their members. These can be of great importance, particularly when economic recession and international competition press upon labor costs and limit traditional improvements. Unions may then devise benefits of a protective nature that help retain membership loyalty. When times are good this may be the icing on the cake. The Scandinavian unions have been profilic in this area. Some of the benefits and services have already been noted. Codetermination serves to make jobs more interesting and secure. The status of women in the labor market has been greatly improved. Others that will be noted are by no means confined to Scandinavia, but their extent and coverage tend to be quite encompassing in that part of the world. Few things are more sacred to Scandinavian employees than the programs offered by the welfare state, designed to provide protection against the vicissitudes of the market. Among them are universal medical care, pay during illness, long-lasting unemployment compensation, pensions that provide retirees with a fairly generous standard of living, training and retraining facilities, and child care. They were introduced by Social Democratic governments, but the

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muscle came from the trade unions, which financed their allied political parties and still continue to act as watchdogs. A government that tampers with the system is courting disaster. There have been some adjustments, but the basic welfare state remains intact. The union attitude toward the welfare state was expressed by the chair of the Swedish LO at the 1986 Congress of his organization: Now that we have come to a period when the expansion [of the welfare state] is essentially accomplished, we must not rest. There are new, important tasks. The public sector is today self-supporting, for most ideas of solidarity are deep. Voices are occasionally raised for reduction and depreciation in various areas. The arguments vary. But the arguments and those who campaign against the public sector are the same. They are the well-to-do who view equality as a threat to their own positions. They are the men who will make quick gains from people’s misfortunes and from their basic needs.1

A good example of the readiness of the unions to defend welfare components is provided by unemployment compensation. In Denmark and Sweden, the unemployed receive government benefits through offices maintained by the unions. This is a carryover from the early practice of union-funded schemes. The Conservative government that came into power in 1991 set up some unemployment offices independent of the unions. This aroused a strong union protest, for unions were concerned lest it might loosen contacts with unemployed members. One of the first things on the agenda of the Social Democratic government when it regained power in 1994 was to close the new offices. This raises the question of whether in fact union unemployment offices contribute to union stability. Unemployed individuals have the right to draw benefits from union offices without joining the administering unions, and there has been a recent trend in this direction. It is an exaggeration to regard the benefit system as the most important factor in creating and maintaining high union densities, but it is true that the offices provide a convenient mechanism for keeping the unemployed in touch with union activities. Adult education and training are other union concerns. These activities are considered to be an integral part of the labor market in raising skill levels and promoting income equality. The unions


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have bargained for specific training periods for employees who are interested in taking advantage of them. As the Danish LO chair remarked in 1985, ‘‘Adult education is a key word for the 1990s. Only through intense application can the labor force prepare for rapid changes in the labor market. . . . It is right for the labor market parties to finance adult education to a greater extent through bargained funds.’’2 A resolution introduced at the 1991 Swedish LO Congress calling for obligatory training of all employees for two weeks a year was defeated on the ground that it would have been unwise to bind the hands of union representatives on a government commission which then had the matter under advisement. It had been charged that during 1989, only one-third of LO members had received training, compared with half of TCO members and more than half of SACO members. An LO vice-chair told her congress in 1996 that people were complaining that it was becoming more difficult to keep up with technology when more and more instructions were in English. ‘‘Education has become a class matter. As a trade union organization, we want our members to be equipped to seek work. They must be sufficiently competent in the breadth and depth of skills so that they can advance in their work.’’3 The negotiation program of the Norwegian LO for the period 1997–2001 contains a demand for the legal right of employees to use 10 percent of their working time for training, even when this goes beyond the employer’s determination of the need for skill development. Unions were urged to motivate their members, particularly those with less education, to take advantage of training opportunities.4 Child care is another benefit that unions have been emphasizing, responding to their growing female contingents. The Norwegian LO had a brief experiment with a union-financed plan that failed for lack of funding. The widespread view is that this is an appropriate task for municipalities, which have been urged to expand their services. A Norwegian congress delegate complained that while in Denmark the waiting time for a place in a child-care center was a year; it was much longer in Norway, if a place was available at all. ‘‘Can it be that women in this hall and organization have so little power that we cannot get full child care?’’5 Unions have long lobbied for a lower retirement age. The Nor-

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wegian LO took up the cudgels in 1988 and succeeded in bringing about the reduction of the pensionable age from 67 to 62 years by the year 1998. A long debate at the 1996 Swedish LO Congress exemplifies union concern with the issue. A delegate put it this way: ‘‘We have had a number of points of view about pension reform. I believe that most metal workers as well as many in other unions believe that the reform proposals are not good. They are not favorable to our members overall.’’ He cited the pension plan in the American auto industry, one in which the union had some control over pension reserve funds, as a desirable example. The LO leadership defended its participation in governmental reform discussions by citing its own dissatisfaction with some proposals on the table.6 The LO was a major player in the reform movement. Government housing subsidies have provided the Scandinavian countries, Sweden in particular, with one of the highest housing standards in the world. The unions have recently been concerned with housing prices that have outrun the consumer price index. They have worked to reduce taxes on homes and to increase subsidies for high-price areas and for groups that are disadvantaged thereby, young people in particular. The most frequent conflict has been over the waiting period required before sickness pay begins. The unions have argued for a zero income gap, while governments wanted short waiting periods. The payments are generous. In Norway, for example, when they become due, benefits equal 100 percent of the wage earned during the four weeks preceding illness and may continue for as long as 52 weeks. Employers pay for the first two weeks; the government finances the rest. A worker is entitled to 10 days of wages for absence each year to attend a sick child. In addition to the welfare-state benefits that the unions monitor, the unions themselves provide a number of services that are available to their members. Among them are the following: Home insurance. The Swedish LO recently urged its affiliates to poll its members on the adoption of obligatory collective insurance on their homes. Some unions had already installed it; others reported opposition. The purpose was to reduce costs, particularly in the cities.7 By 1991, all but two Norwegian LO unions had instituted collective, though not obligatory, home insurance. Collective insurance of land ownership was mandatory for members of sixteen unions.


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Other insurance. The Norwegian LO has inaugurated a variety of insurance schemes available to its members only, among them travel and accident insurance. Free time and vacations. The Swedish LO has launched conferences and other means of providing members with information on how to use free time profitably and advice on good, cheap vacations. The Norwegian Peoples’ Vacation Organization is almost sixty years old and offers LO members special rates for hotels and tours. Consumer advice. A number of unions, particularly in Sweden, have undertaken to provide advice to members on the prices and quality of commodities as well as coupons to promote advantageous sales. ‘‘In the [LO] program we know how important knowledge and education are so that households get the best and most out of their incomes. . . . We even explore the practices that lead to high food prices.’’8 Banking. Unions have established banks that offer special rates for loans and deposits. The Norwegian LO plans to issue membership cards that will also provide a list of the collective insurance schemes to which members have subscribed. A second card will be a credit card through the union bank. Cultural activities. In preparation for the observance of its hundred-year anniversary, which will take place in 1998, the Danish LO will sponsor a number of cultural events. Among them are a series of books on the history of Danish labor; an opera based on a famous Danish novel with a trade union theme, Pelle the Conquerer; and a number of concerts. There will also be videos dealing with episodes from the history of the Danish labor movement; among the titles are Pioneers of the Welfare State, Danish Syndicalism, The Fight for the Eight-Hour Day, and Danish Communism.

This is not a complete catalogue of Scandinavian union benefits. Others that might be mentioned are legal counseling, home mortgages at preferential rates, and reasonably priced vacation facilities. GOVERNMENT POLICY Scandinavian unions have been prepared to take positions on government policy not immediately related to the labor market. Most of the issues are of a microeconomic nature, but some are of a more general character. For example, the Norwegian LO participated in the debate on the disposition of oil revenues. It noted that there had been an

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excessive use of these resources during the 1970s and 1980s and that this had led to a rise in the industrial cost level. A more careful policy in the 1990s, involving saving these funds and investing them in foreign countries, resulted in higher growth and less inflation. The LO was willing to participate in a national incomes policy to achieve the same objectives. A stable value of the currency was important in order that firms might plan successfully and in order to avoid the creation of a ‘‘new Switzerland’’ by permitting the Norwegian crown to become too expensive. Greater equality of income and education was a constant refrain, leading among other things to a more democratic society. ‘‘A knowledge society can easily develop into a new class society divided on the basis of those who have education and those who do not. We can easily find ourselves in a situation where those who do not have access to competence fall outside the labor market. Educational efforts are therefore a central area for the solidarity alternative.’’9 NOTES 1. LO in Sweden, 1986 Congress, Protokoll, p. 778. 2. LO in Denmark, 1985 Congress, Protokol, p. 49. 3. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, September 9, pp. 114–117. 4. LO in Norway, 1997 Congress, Rettferd, May 12, p. 10. 5. Ibid., p. 25. 6. LO in Sweden, 1996 Congress, Snabbprotokoll, May 14, pp. 63–72. 7. Ibid., September 12, pp. 12–15. 8. LO in Sweden, 1991 Congress, Protokoll, p. 1525. 9. LO in Norway, 1997 Congress, Rettferd, Part 7, p. 9.

Chapter 10

How Members View Their Unions During the 1990s the members of LO and occasionally of other federations in all three Scandinavian countries were asked to express their opinions on the manner in which their unions were performing. Their responses throw a good deal of light on why the unions have managed to retain their strength so well. The questions asked were different in each country, which makes it necessary to report on them separately. The Danish survey was conducted by the Institute for Labor Market Research at Aalborg University in 1992. Some 5,400 members of Danish LO unions were asked to complete questionnaires about their working lives, their unions, the welfare state, and family circumstances. A smaller group was selected for deeper personal interviews. The results appear in three large volumes replete with tables and textual analysis.1 The Norwegian survey was less ambitious. It was done through telephone interviews of 1,502 people chosen at random from lists of telephone subscribers, not necessarily union members. Some groups, including union members, were singled out for special questions of particular interest to the Norwegian LO. The survey was conducted by a commercial polling organization, and the results appear in a book of 245 statistical tables.2 The Swedish survey was conducted for the LO in 1993 by the

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Central Statistical Bureau of Sweden. It sampled about 3,800 employees who were members of LO, TCO, and SACO as well as nonunionists. Its findings appear in five volumes of tables and analysis.3 There is a wealth of information in these surveys, but it is not possible to reproduce here more than a small portion of the tabular material. The tables that appear are those that are the most germane to the issue of union survival. All the tables that follow are derived from these surveys. REASONS FOR JOINING UNIONS Tables 10.1 and 10.2 deal with the attitudes of Danish LO members toward their unions. They clearly have a strongly felt need for union membership. Almost three-quarters joined because their interests were thereby protected; women seemed a bit more certain about that reason than men. One interesting and somewhat surprising fact was that the importance of union membership was somewhat stronger in the public than in the private sector. The strongest reason given for membership was to have access to a union unemployment office. It will be recalled that anyone, union or nonunion, can draw benefits from a union office because all the money is provided by government. It is apparently difficult or awkward for a nonunionist to register with a union office. It is easy to see why unions like the present arrangement. Almost three-quarters of the respondents joined because it was the thing to do, a commentary on the status of the labor movement in Denmark. Somewhat fewer thought that solidarity with fellow employees was important, which is somewhat of a contradiction. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that more than half joined because it was required at their place of work. The contractual closed shop is not common in Scandinavia, as evidenced by the fact that almost 30 percent disagreed with this reason for membership. There is no direct question in the Norwegian survey of why members joined a union, but the data in table 10.3 provide some insight into how members view union policy. The replies do not necessarily imply approval or disapproval of the policies pursued; they merely indicate whether the members perceived them. There is nearly complete agreement with the proposition that the LO is concerned with

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equality for women and the pursuit of more jobs. Three-quarters of the respondents thought that there was more concern about training and pensions than about wages. Opinion was more split on international affairs than on any other question, with nearly half the respondents disagreeing with the statement that the unions were too involved internationally. The only comparable question in the Swedish survey asked what LO members got from their membership. The data in table 10.4 indicate that a very large percentage cited support against unemployment, security in strikes and lockouts, help in the event of a labor dispute, and an increased possibility of attending training courses. Safety conditions and job security also ranked high. Surprisingly few believed that the unions gave them more influence over their working conditions and the possibility of higher wages

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through local negotiations, while still fewer thought that membership gave them a better opportunity to influence political developments. Further analysis of the Swedish responses, not shown here, revealed the following: 1. There is substantial agreement among members of LO, TCO, and SACO on most of the benefits derived from their unions. 2. Safety protection is particularly important in the private sector, with the reverse in the public sector. Job security scores about the same in both sectors.

WHAT SHOULD UNIONS DO? Table 10.5 contains a list of possible union functions and the reply of Danish LO members to the question of which functions


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they regarded as the most important. Not all the respondents selected all the items on the list. However, the volume of the responses, as well as the opinions expressed, do provide a good index of membership opinion.

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Higher wages, job security, an improved work environment, and equality for women drew a large number of favorable responses. Similiar findings for income equalization, greater availability of education and training, better pension systems, interesting jobs, and concern for the external environment are in line with what Scandinavian unions tend to emphasize in their appeals for support. On the other hand, there was less interest in profit sharing, joint ownership of enterprises, union insurance schemes, and union vacation and leisure organization. Codetermination had a fair degree of support, but a clear majority had a dim view of union media activities. One of the most surprising results was the lukewarm interest in shorter hours of work, although this may have been influenced by the substantial number of employees who worked part-time. Very few of the respondents believed that unions could do much to fight unemployment. When the responses were divided by sex, the priorities of men and women were largely similar, although women were generally more optimistic than men in their support of most union functions. As might be expected, members of low-wage unions placed greater emphasis on income equalization than those catering to skilled workers. The relevant Norwegian data, shown in table 10.6, cover all three federations rather than just the LO. One unexpected result is the high priority accorded to lowering the pensionable age, particularly in the case of YS. None of the remaining items, including higher wages, emerges as particularly important to the respondents. This is difficult to interpret, since the staples of collective bargaining, wages and hours, usually predominate in surveys of this nature. Longer vacations were at the bottom of the list, and shorter hours of work were not a prominent choice. YS members were more interested in a lower pensionable age than the other federations and less interested in higher wages. The second choice of AF members was for better training facilities, perhaps reflecting their desire to master new, more complicated technologies. If these data represent an accurate picture of Norwegian employee preferences, they appear to have been satisfied with their earnings and working hours and preferred to leave the labor market earlier. The Swedish survey, some of the results of which appear in table


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10.7, also covered the country’s three major federations. In a situation of heavy unemployment, job security was almost unanimously chosen as the top priority for union activity. Fighting unemployment was also favored, though not as much by SACO members. Improvement in the working environment ranked almost as high, as did wages, protection against income loss due to sickness and unemployment, and equality for women. Working time, union provision of information on social rights, vacation opportunities, and union social work (which implied support of fellow members) occupied an intermediate position. There were some items that received little support from all the respondents, among them union monitoring of food prices, housing costs, and taxes. In general, the LO members were more in favor of union intervention in a wide variety of activities than were TCO and SACO members, but the differences were not great, except perhaps in child care and the development of membership benefits. When it came to the major items—wages and employment—there was unanimity. It is difficult to pinpoint the differences among the three countries on what employees want from their unions because the survey


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questions were not uniform. The Norwegian survey, for example, gave the people who were questioned a much more limited selection. It does appear, not surprisingly, that there was more concern with unemployment in Sweden, and the Norwegian interest in lowering the pensionable age stands out. The union drive for female equality appears to have firm membership support, while union benefit schemes do not. It would be of great interest if the unions in the three countries were to sponsor identical and simultaneous membership surveys; only then would a clear picture of the differences among them emerge. MEMBER VIEWS ON UNION OPERATIONS The Danish survey contained a number of questions and propositions to elicit member perceptions of the manner in which their unions functioned. Those relating to contact with the union and its agents appear in table 10.8. About two-thirds of the workplaces were reported to have stewards present, though there was a heavy weighting in favor of the large enterprises. In replies that are not shown here, about one-quarter of the respondents said that they were holding or had held a union position. Forty-four percent had participated in union meetings during the year preceding the survey. There was considerable satisfaction with union services; only 14 percent expressed dissatisfaction. More than half the respondents had contacted a union during the previous year, on a variety of matters, including grievances on salaries and the work environment as well as questions and advice on educational and training opportunities. Tables 10.9 and 10.10 deal with both local and national unions. It appears that while it was relatively easy to contact the local union and learn what it was doing, it was more difficult to get one’s opinions across. With respect to the broader labor movement, there was an equal division on the question of whether the leadership always acted in the interests of members. Skepticism was expressed on the suitability of relationships between local and national unions and between workplace events and union decisions. These differences were almost inevitable, given the proximity of different union echelons to the individual member. The Norwegian survey does not cover this range of issues, but

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the Swedish survey does (table 10.11). A substantial majority indicated that they would not consider holding local union office. It turns out that only 14 percent had actually held local positions, and three-quarters of this group were either safety shop stewards, members of the local executive committee, or ombudsmen. Most of those who were not interested in union office gave as their reasons that they had too much to do in their free time or felt that they were not qualified. Other data reveal that 40 percent of LO members had attended a union meeting during the preceding twelve months, but only 15


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percent had been at three meetings, 10 percent at four meetings, and 4 percent at ten meetings. Attendance was greater among TCO and SACO members, but not sufficiently to establish the conclusion that Swedish trade union members are more prone to devote time to union meetings than their counterparts in other countries. Even though most Swedish workers are not regular attendants at union meetings, they do know their local representatives and are in touch with them either to secure or provide information (table 10.12). About three-quarters read their union newspapers entirely or in part, while the rest scan them. The Swedish labor movement seems to have established a good line of communication with its members. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING The factors that determine wages as seen through the eyes of Danish workers appear in table 10.13. Centralized bargaining appears as the most important factor, and local bargaining as considerably less important. Not many cite production results, but individual skills rank high. The union is viewed as playing an important role, although a substantial majority are not certain how this is effectuated. As for the modi operandi of collective bargaining (see table

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10.14), workers regard negotiations with employers as the principal means by which unions can reach their objectives, though central negotiations have the best support in the public sector and local negotiations in the private sector. The strike weapon is downgraded, reflecting the peaceful history of labor relations in Denmark. Influence through the Social Democratic Party is not considered important, though influence in the government and Parliament ranks fairly high. It is not surprising that public-sector employees place greater importance on influence with local authorities than do those in the private sector. On the basis of table 10.15, Norwegian workers appear to have a more militant approach to industrial relations than the Danes. The great majority of them favor the right to strike, although they strongly oppose strikes that endanger public health and welfare. Almost two-thirds opposed the notion that other means of securing gains made strikes unnecessary. The Swedish survey covers several areas germane to collective bargaining. Table 10.16 asks members of the three labor federations what they think about existing wage differentials between men and women. The overwhelming number believe that women’s wages are too low compared with men’s, but no one believes that men’s wages are too low relative to women’s. The virtually unanimous cure suggested is to raise female wages. It is interesting to note that the percentage of membership responses for all three federations is al-

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most identical despite the fact that there is considerable variation among them in the percentage of female members. Views on occupational differences are contained in table 10.17. The solidarity wage principle is backed by a large majority of LO members, judging by their responses. TCO members are not as committed to a reduction of differentials, while SACO members are split on the issue. A guess might be hazarded that this reflects the manner in which SACO was formed: gradual amalgamation of preexisting professional associations with widely varying income and academic credentials. Its members came with fixed notions of what their services were worth in comparison with other groups, and these are difficult to change, if indeed there is any inclination to change. UNION BENEFIT PROGRAMS The only union benefit program covered by the Danish survey is the unemployment fund, which is financed by the government and

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administered by the union. The material in table 10.18 indicates that while members are generally satisfied with their treatment by the funds, they think that the funds should play a more activist role in helping to arrange training opportunities and in finding new jobs for the unemployed. A surprising number thought that the funds should exercise more supervision over the unemployed who are receiving benefits. The large number of ‘‘Don’t Know’’ responses may largely represent employees who have had no contact with the funds. The Norwegian survey contained several direct questions on union benefit programs. Ninety-two percent of the LO membership sample reported that they subscribed to collective home insurance, half of whom found the program very good. Only 5 percent thought it was poor. More than half believed that the LO would offer additional programs. Table 10.19 indicates that new programs the respondents expect and presumably welcome are in the areas of insurance, education, and economic and legal advice. Fewer looked forward to vacation advice, consumption discounts, and bank services. UNIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES The only reference to trade union cooperation with political parties in the Danish survey was the lack of membership conviction


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that the unions could solve their problems by close association with the Social Democratic Party (table 10.14). The Norwegian survey, perhaps because of internal union conflict on this issue, covered it more fully, and included replies from members of all three federations (see table 10.20). LO members were of the opinion that the LO was currently more independent of the Labor Party than it had been in the past, a view that was not shared by YS and AF members. All three groups disagreed with the proposition that the LO dealt freely with all political parties, a conclusion that would be easy to corroborate by looking through LO publications. There was also general disagreement with the statement that the LO had recently been moving to the left politically, which again was not surprising. The Swedish survey asked LO members directly what they thought of union cooperation with the Social Democratic Party. Only a quarter believed that this should be strengthened, while almost a third opted for the current level (see table 10.21). Men and women showed the same proclivities on these questions, but almost 30 percent of the men favored either reduction of cooperation or a complete break, a position that only 20 percent of the women considered desirable. These results appear to be consistent with the negotiations that were then taking place in an effort to resolve the problem. On the whole, these surveys suggest that the unions in all three countries were favorably regarded by their members, although pri-


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orities varied. Wages, job security, and workplace safety all ranked high in what the members thought their unions should be doing, although Norwegian workers were unique in giving the top rating to lowering the pensionable age. Union benefits generally received support, though not enthusiastic support. There are differences in the extent to which members believe that unions ought to work closely with the Social Democrats. The surveys sustain the thesis that trade unionism remains a popular institution in Scandinavia. There are some nonunionists, but they constitute a small minority. Nothing in the surveys suggests that Scandinavian trade unions face the decline that has already occurred in many Western nations.


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NOTES 1. Henning Jørgensen, Morten Lassen, Jens Lind, and Morten Madsen, Medlemmer og Meninger, 3 Vols. (Carma: Aalborg University, 1992). Danish survey. All table years are as of the dates of the survey. 2. Opinion AS, Landsrepresentativ undersøkelse for LO (Bergen: June 1996). Norwegian survey. 3. Sven Nelander and Viveka Lindgren, Ro¨ster om Facket och Jobbet, 5 Vols. (Stockholm: LO i Sverige, 1993). Swedish survey.

Chapter 11

Why Scandinavian Unionism Has Prospered We return now to the question raised at the start of this volume: What accounts for the ability of the Scandinavian labor movement to maintain its membership and power during recent years— roughly 1985 to 1995—at a time when labor in most of the world’s advanced nations experienced a decline in both these attributes? Scandinavian union densities, measured by the ratio of union membership to the labor force, have attained levels unmatched elsewhere. What follows is not a blueprint of how to build strong unions in the twenty-first century. Some elements in the policies and practices of Scandinavian unionism may provide food for thought for those involved with unions in other countries, but differences in economic and political history, to say nothing of variation in the scale of enterprise and organization, militate against literal imitation. Still, there is something to be learned from foreign experience. The history of labor movements throughout the world is replete with examples of international borrowing. The generalizations that follow are not necessarily equally applicable to the three countries covered—Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—but they are relevant to all in some degree. The three are all relatively small kingdoms with similar languages and other institutions. Their unions have long been allied with Social Democratic

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parties that were major actors on their political scenes. All are welfare states with broad programs of government—funded benefits that have virtually eliminated poverty. Apart from recent oil discoveries in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, they have achieved high living standards primarily through raising the quality of their working people. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the principal exports of Norway and Sweden to the United States were emigrants; now these countries are players in international commodity markets. All of these factors create a degree of homogeneity that makes it possible to treat the three countries as a unit without qualifying footnotes at every turn. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO UNION GROWTH Initial Strength of the Blue-Collar Unions By 1980, when decline had already impacted most labor movements, the Scandinavian unions had reached density levels that were all but unassailable. There is no fixed level at which unions cannot be undermined by employers seeking a union-free environment. However, the traditional blue-collar federations of the Scandinavian countries had reached positions of strength that apparently made them immune to serious employer attack. The trick was getting there in the first place. Almost a century earlier, when the original organizations were founded, employers were by no means inclined to accept them and made strenuous efforts to prevent their growth. A combination of political and economic action enabled them to survive and prosper. By the 1930s they were fixtures on the institutional scene, already difficult to remove. This does not mean that employers have always been willing to cooperate and accord them unhesitating recognition. For example, the employer offensive of 1991 against the famous ‘‘Swedish model’’ can be interpreted as an effort to reduce their bargaining power. But that is a far cry from any intention to destroy the unions; it was rather a ploy that had repercussions in all three countries and forced the unions to modify their structures and policies. It is hardly useful to advise unions elsewhere to attain positions of power as a condition of growth. The details of how it was done

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in Scandinavia are available in the written histories of the three labor federations. All that can be said here is that a high density level is an excellent place to occupy for a union that is facing attack. Organization of White-Collar and Professional Employees The labor forces of the advanced nations have undergone a tremendous change in the years since World War II. The manufacturing sector has given way to services, with the result that trade unions were faced with the necessity of attempting to enroll people who were entering the new occupations. This could be done either by traditional blue-collar unions or by new organizations catering primarily to service-sector employees. A glance back at tables 1.1 (see p. 8), 1.2 (see p. 9), and 1.3 (see p. 10) indicates what happened in Scandinavia. The LOs in Norway and Sweden had little growth during the last decade. The Danish LO already had substantial unions of service employees and was thus able to pick up a large proportion of the new entrants. The increases in density during this period were due largely to the expansion of independent federations of labor. Why did the LOs themselves fail to organize the new cohorts instead of watching them develop separately? The Swedish LO even helped the whitecollar TCO get started. Several possible reasons may be cited. The pioneers of trade unionism were largely workers in manufacturing and construction who were imbued with class consciousness, a legacy of their socialist beliefs. Employees in commercial enterprises and the professions were looked upon as middle-class and not considered potential union members. If they really wanted to organize, there was nothing wrong with extending them a helping hand. But there was skepticism about their long-term loyalty and the ultimate strength to be gained by welcoming them into the traditional brotherhoods. There was a feeling that white-collar employees identified themselves too closely with the interests of their employers, and would not stand up to them in a showdown. For their part, the groups that established TCO and SACO in Sweden and their counterparts in Denmark and Norway were quite prepared to organize separately. Class was also a consideration.

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Many of them enjoyed educations superior to those of factory workers and regarded themselves as more socially advanced. This was particularly true of professionals with university degrees, who eventually ended up in their own labor federations. The social differences were accentuated by politics. A substantial majority of LO members consistently voted Social Democratic. The LO contributed financially to the parties of the Left, and many of their members held party office. Nonsocialist parties were lumped together in the ‘‘bourgeois’’ category, almost a term of opprobrium. On the other hand, a majority of the new groups did not have a socialist orientation and insisted that their unions remain politically neutral. When the LOs dominated the labor side in collective bargaining, they naturally emphasized the interests of their members, sometimes to the detriment of outsiders. Organization by the latter was partly a defensive reaction, particularly when Social Democrats held political power. White-collar employees were beneficiaries of the welfare state, but feared that their income advantages might be eroded unless they were able to exert their own collective strength. For example, by unionizing they gained a seat at government-labor conferences involving income tax rates. Will it be possible to emulate the Scandinavian model of whitecollar and professional organization in countries where this has not been achieved? The answer must be that the Scandinavian experience is not determining. The concatenation of elements that led to the result in Scandinavia may not be present elsewhere. Where there is no strong socialist tradition, where class feelings are not prevalent, where income differentials are not wide, unified federations embracing all employees may be the pattern. In the alternative, nascent independents may eventually attain full union status. However, such a development is not likely without the forbearance and even the encouragement of the entrenched trade unions. Organization of Women The female labor-force participation rates in Scandinavia did not increase greatly in the decade 1985–95, but the proportion of women in trade unions did. The female component came to exceed


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half the total membership in some LO unions, and was approaching that level in others. TCO and its counterparts were becoming female dominated. It was in their self-interest that unions gave priority to objectives and administrative changes that were approved by women. Equality of pay for men and women became a prime union concern. The overall wage differentials for the two sexes in manufacturing changed very little over the decade, but they were already narrow in 1985, about 10 percent in Sweden and 15 percent in the other two countries. A substantial majority of part-time workers are women, and this has been another matter of concern to unions. A difficulty here is that many women prefer this arrangement in order to combine outside work with household obligations. There has been some discussion of flexible working-time arrangements to accommodate women, but it has not gotten far in practice. Child care has become a theme for debate at recent union conventions, but apart from a failed Norwegian experiment in which several unions agreed to finance day-care centers, little has been done by the unions to replace wealthy competitors—the municipalities. On one issue Scandinavian women trade union members have made considerable progress in recent years: leadership positions. By the mid-1990s, the first and second vice-chairs of the Swedish LO were women, and five of the eight top offices in the Norwegian LO were occupied by women. Only the Danish LO lagged behind. This came about in part through pressure tactics that were used to good effect in Scandinavian politics—quotas, whereby political parties that did not include specified proportions of women in their electoral lists were threatened with loss of the female vote. Outright quotas were rejected by the unions, but the handwriting was on the wall. There has not been a similar change at lower levels of union officialdom, where men still predominate. For example, TCO has a woman chair, but only 30 percent of those holding union offices are women. The notion that women do not make good union material has been thoroughly dispelled by the Scandinavian experience. Few things will contribute more to raising density ratios than the organization of women, who predominate in many of the service

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trades and will organize if a proper appeal is made to their interests. Many may prefer to join independent organizations, and it would be a mistake to denigrate the contribution that this form of unionism could make to the status of the labor movement. That is one of the lessons that the Scandinavians have contributed. Union Structure The Scandinavian unions found their bargaining positions threatened in the early 1990s when the national employer associations declined to continue conventional bargaining practices. The employers decided to move away from centralized bargaining to negotiating at lower levels: with industries or even individual enterprises. They hoped that this would lead to greater wage differentiation, in better accord with market requirements. Unions might also find it more difficult to pursue solidarity wages and be less willing to subordinate their own interests to the common good. In wrestling with this problem, the union leadership came up with the idea of putting another bargaining echelon between the federation and its constituent unions—the cartel. Instead of bargaining separately and reaching a variety of different contracts, each national union would join one or more cartels established for bargaining purposes, depending on their interests. There was a good deal of resistance to this proposal, particularly from the unions that were positioned to do well on their own. There was also concern that the cartel might fall under the domination of the union with the largest membership employed in the industry or occupation being cartelized. After a good deal of argument pro and con, the Danish LO established six cartels and the Norwegian LO, four. No agreement could be reached in Sweden, where the matter was put off for future consideration. How well the new structure works will be determined in the coming years. The significant point, however, is that the unions were flexible enough to accept radical structural changes as a defensive measure. The power of the central federation will be reduced, but on the other hand, individual national unions will be ceding some of their sovereignty. If all goes as planned, the LOs will be less likely to split under employer pressure.


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Political Action Close alliances between the LOs and the Social Democratic parties may have become a hindrance to recruitment. It has also occasioned internal conflict. Not all LO members vote for the Social Democrats; many, particularly among the younger members, tend to support political parties to the left or right. Complaints have been voiced at recent LO conventions about the traditional policy. Competition with the politically neutral federations for marginal groups can be more difficult if enough of the people who are being solicited are unwilling to have their dues used to help finance the Social Democrats. Another issue that has arisen is the occasional divergence of policy views between the unions and the political parties. The Social Democrats have not enjoyed absolute parliamentary majorities in recent years and have had to make concessions to coalition partners. When this happens, many LO members ask: Why support a party that does not further your demands when it attains power? As a result of these and other strains, there has been a loosening of union-party relationships since about 1990. Collective party membership, in which a local union affiliates as a unit with the party, has become a thing of the past. The Social Democrats continue to receive financial assistance from the unions, but this has become less important because of government subsidies to the parties in general elections. The LO leaders remain loyal to the Social Democrats and sit on joint committees. The LOs continue to be Social Democratic in outlook, but organic ties are no longer the principal means of communication. Has this development strengthened or weakened the labor movement? When the Social Democrats dominated political life and a large proportion of their leaders had working-class origins, close cooperation was undoubtedly a major source of union strength. The recent growth of white-collar and professional employment has weakened the logic underlying an arrangement that worked well in the past. The Scandinavian LOs have come to the realization that the old pattern is no longer optimal and have retreated gracefully.

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Union Benefits Scandinavian unions provide their members with access to benefits that are not contained in collective agreements. One that is not strictly a union benefit but is administered exclusively by unions is unemployment compensation. This is financed by the government and paid in accordance with legislative enactment. Union membership is not required for access to these union funds, though most of the clients are members of the administering union. This arrangement, a carryover from early days when the funds were union financed, is often cited as a means of cementing member loyalty. When Danish LO members were asked why they had joined, inclusion in an unemployment fund was cited more than any other reason. The creation of a purely governmental unemployment fund by a nonsocialist government that gained power in Sweden in 1991 aroused great protest, and one of the first acts of its Social Democratic successor government was to close the fund. In the surveys of union members undertaken recently, only Norwegian workers were asked directly how they valued other union benefits. Collective home insurance, educational programs, and legal and economic advice were the most highly rated, though purchase discounts and banking services had many supporters. Availability of education and training programs have been cited as very helpful by Danish and Swedish trade union members on other occasions. There is very little criticism of union benefit programs in conventions at which many grievances on other matters are raised; most members seem to regard the benefits as a good return on their dues. The Welfare State The existence of welfare states provides unions with a major function. They are deeply involved in monitoring the intricacies of government regulations on old-age pensions, employment tenure, workplace environment, child care, education, training, housing, and general social assistance. In a country like Sweden, one of the difficulties of making even minor downward adjustments to benefit programs is that unions representing almost 90 percent of the working population are apt to lobby against them.


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The unions are also relieved of the necessity of bargaining about many issues that are of major concern in other countries and can concentrate on wages and hours. Employers need not concern themselves with health insurance or compensation during periods of illness. The concept of the ombudsman originated in Sweden, and it simplifies the grievance system. The welfare state embodies other sources of strength for the unions. Among them is the large public sector required to administer the benefits at both national and local levels, creating areas of employment in which resistance to union demands is apt to be less than in the private sector. Wages in the public sector need not meet the market demands of international competition. This completes the catalogue of factors that have contributed to the stability and growth of Scandinavian unionism. It was distilled primarily from the various publications of the unions themselves— newspapers, annual reports, congress proceedings. There are undoubtedly other factors, but these are the ones that stand out for the period 1985 to 1995. Things can change sharply with variation in the political winds or the economy, but there is nothing threatening on the horizon. The Swedish LO recently published a pamphlet entitled The Trade Union as a Popular Movement. The implication is that Swedish unions, as well as those in the other Scandinavian countries, are not solely devoted to the narrow interests of their members, but are also key players in all societal affairs. This claim makes sense for countries in which democratic, voluntary unionism has attracted the allegiance of so large a proportion of the working population.

Epilogue It has been emphasized that literal borrowing from the Scandinavian experience is not feasible for most labor movements. There are differences in history, size and structure of the state, employer attitudes, ideological backgrounds, and many other factors. Nevertheless, a knowledge of individual Scandinavian union policies and practices may provide some assistance to the trade unions of other countries, particularly those that have been losing members and influence. At the present time, decline rather than advance would be an accurate description of what is happening to the labor movements of most industrial countries. Estimates by the U.S. Department of Labor for the decade 1980–1990 confirm this view for all of the advanced nations with the exception of Canada and Scandinavia. Nothing has happened since to alter this conclusion. This is an unprecedented development and has led to a good deal of analysis and activity by the various unions in decline, in search of solutions that might result in a reversal of this trend. Some ideas that can be distilled from the preceding chapters of this volume may contribute to the ongoing search.

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ORGANIZING There is no substitute for efforts to unionize new members. Allocating the bulk of available union resources to servicing the existing membership may help preserve the jobs of those in positions of leadership, but it will almost inevitably result in decline. There is a natural rate of attrition due to retirements, technological change, and industrial mobility. Standing still is not a solution. What is needed is an adequate and persistent expenditure of funds for organizing campaigns. They may be devoted to customary or new fields, depending upon the circumstances of the individual union. Where the union covers a broad spectrum of industries or occupations, the problem involves a choice of those that appear to be most productive. In the frequent case of the more traditional unions with limited jurisdictions, the only alternatives may be mergers with organizations without similar constrictions or broadening jurisdictional horizons. For example, a union whose members are engaged in the manufacture of garments may be heavily impacted by the movement of jobs to low-wage, developing countries. Fighting the trend by import restrictions or government subsidies to unemployed garment workers, or by merging with organizations faced with similar problems, may delay decline but not prevent it. There are difficulties in the more promising solutions involving jurisdictional extension. Effective mechanisms for containing open interunion disputes have to be developed. Perhaps of even greater importance is establishment of the view that the future of the labor movement as a whole outweighs the interests of individual constituent unions. Creation of the so-called Scandinavian cartels—against the wishes of some unions that were not enthusiastic about limitations on their autonomy—because cartels appeared necessary due to changes in collective bargaining practices is an example of an essential major shift in structure. An example from recent American experience is the agreement among three large AFL-CIO unions— the Auto Workers, the Steel Workers, and the Machinists—to create a new combination by the year 2000. This may lead to a more economical administration of their activities, but since all three cater primarily to industrial workers, they may eventually face the same problems of stagnation that confronted the separate unions. It may be necessary for them and for the labor movement as a whole to devote their resources to completely new areas.

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The Service Sector Few contemporary union movements can hope to improve their standing unless they are able to make substantial inroads into service-sector employment. This is a clear message from Scandinavia. In all three countries, the traditional unions of blue-collar members were in a position to make little, if any, progress during the past decade. Few labor movements around the world have made substantial inroads into this sector of the labor market. What success there has been is primarily in low-wage, manual occupations in retail and wholesale trade, hotels, and restaurants. The main exception involves schoolteachers, who are well organized in many countries. Failure to organize service employees is not for want of trying. Almost every union federation leader is aware of this necessity and has advocated it. What is less clear is the nature of the obstacles involved in this area of recruitment. For reasons of status, ideology, or tradition, many white-collar employees are reluctant to throw their lot in with unions of manual industrial workers. This is overwhelmingly true of professionals, particularly those with higher education. To them the very idea of unionism may be repugnant, demeaning, unbecoming to their places in society. Unionism is seen as for the lower classes and as a threat to their personal independence and earnings. There are many associations of service employees with functions ranging from the promotion of intellectual exchange to the imposition of standards. Associations of economists, engineers, physicians, managers, accountants, actuaries, college professors, lawyers, and military veterans are just some of the hundreds that have flourished in the United States. Few of them would relish being called unions, although many engage in quasi-union functions. The problem for unions is to bring these associations and the millions who are not yet associated with them to the realization that the contemporary structure of society requires them to evolve into formal organizations if their economic interests are to receive adequate protection. Once they reach this realization, they are more likely to form unions of their own than to join the older, established unions. It is very important for the latter to recognize this fact. For any of the reasons specified above, the newcomers are likely to feel more com-

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fortable in organizations of their peers and headed by people from the same strata of society. They are less likely to respond to appeals to which blue-collar workers are accustomed. It is absolutely crucial that the traditional unions do not work against the formation and growth of these nascent unions, but rather remain neutral or even assist them in the early stages of their existence. To oppose them on jurisdictional grounds, or out of fear that an alternative power center will be established, may lead to the result that the existing federation will face an unorganized gap in a large sector of the labor market. A new, independent federation of labor may compete for members, particularly where jurisdiction is clouded by technological change. Do the growing number of computer specialists belong with telephone or other communications employees or in a union of their own? What the Scandinavian experience shows clearly is that having independent white-collar unions alongside the older federations is a source of strength rather than weakness for the latter. Their interests may come into conflict on occasion, but in most cases a solidly organized labor market is a source of strength against hostile actions of employers or government. Another example from the United States involves the organization of teachers in elementary and secondary schools. There are two large unions, the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, and the independent National Education Association, which developed from a noneconomic association into a full-fledged union and has grown into the largest national union in the United States. The AFL-CIO would very much like to see the two organizations merge under its aegis, but prolonged negotiations have failed to result in agreement. The question is, Would the AFT be in a better position to achieve its goals if there were no NEA and only a portion of the latter’s members were willing to join the AFT? On the basis of their history, the Scandinavian reply would probably be in the negative. In fact, the entire teaching profession would probably gain from the conversion of the American Association of University Professors or some other association into a trade union that was able to become the spokesperson for a majority of university faculty members rather than the present situation of relatively small groups spread among several organizations. Educational goals would certainly be easier to achieve.

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The clear lesson is for the labor movements that are weak or on the decline to do all they can to further the organization of service employees. If these employees can be induced to join existing unions, well and good. If the price is independent organization, the unions should be prepared to pay it, even to the extent of helping financially. In the long run, this will be a profitable investment. Women By 1995, the labor-force participation rate of women exceeded 50 percent in all but a few of the advanced countries. Labor unions were well aware of this development and endeavored to organize them. In most countries there is a considerable distance to go before the rate of female unionization is equal to that of men. In a sense, the process of organizing women is subsumed under that of organizing service employees, where women are most heavily represented. There are other considerations, however, which are illustrated by Scandinavia, where there are exceptionally high rates of both female labor-force participation and female percentages of union membership. This did not come about automatically; it required aggressiveness by women and a degree of male forbearance. Scandinavian women have had considerable success in politics through pressure on political parties, and more recently on trade unions. Women appear to be more prone to join unions in occupations in which they constitute a majority when the union leadership is female. Where they are in a minority, they tend to be dissatisfied with token positions. They want equality of representation, and they are not reluctant to become union activists because of their household obligations. The old saw that women do not make good union material has lost whatever truth it once held. They are as militant as men in fighting for their rights during the collective bargaining process and in the event of an industrial conflict. The addition of a woman to the union membership roll does as much to strengthen union power as does that of a man. Union density is sex blind. In the great majority of unions worldwide, leadership is predominantly male. It is difficult to point to labor federations outside Scandinavia that have female presidents or other top officials. This also tends to be true of national unions, even among those in which

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the membership is predominantly female. If they are anxious to organize women, unions should employ women organizers and promote the presence of women officials along the entire union structure, from shop stewards and local presidents to officials of national unions and federations. It is not easy to persuade men to elect women to union office. The historical origins and development of trade unions have been largely male affairs. Female heroines are few and far between. Men must be persuaded that the composition of the contemporary labor force requires a new look if unions are to prosper and grow. One of the Scandinavian countries is likely to be the first in the world in which a woman becomes president of a traditional labor federation, and it is no accident that this is correlated with labor strength. Part of the price of progress will have to be replacement of the old slogan, ‘‘Working Men Unite,’’ with ‘‘Working People Unite.’’ Union demands that meet the special needs of women have also evolved as a means of attracting women to membership. Among them are making available full-time work to those who are on parttime arrangements not of their own volition. Some unions have dabbled with child-care facilities but have found it too costly to compete with municipal centers, which are more or less adequate in Scandinavia. Where the latter are not generally available, the usual situation, union-sponsored day-care centers, can be a powerful appeal to potential female members. Young People Students in secondary schools, vocational schools, and colleges and universities are potential union members and should be cultivated. Unions tend to devote only a small portion of their resources to these groups, which retards their growth opportunities. Creating a favorable union image in the mind of an impressionable girl or boy will have a great deal of influence on their future assessment of the value of union membership. There are various means of achieving this objective. Appointing students as union representatives and providing them with relevant material may serve not only to create a cadre of union activists but also to spread union values. The promotion of clubs addressed periodically by union officials may have the same result. More ambi-

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tious programs include union-supported schools and internships during vacation periods. They may be costly, though they are highly effective. Schoolteachers can also be invited to attend classes conducted by guest lecturers, if only to balance the information they receive from management sources. Activities of this nature are usually neglected by unions, or at most regarded as worth only marginal attention. They are much less expensive than television and radio presentations and may well have a greater impact in the long run. They should be considered an integral part of organizing campaigns. RELATIONS WITH NONWORKING UNION MEMBERS Unions generally have no problem identifying their current members, those who require the various services that they are prepared to supply. It is easy in the computer era to maintain full records of age, occupation, and other attributes that may be of concern. There is less interest in unemployed members or pensioners, groups that may be of less immediate concern. This can be a mistake. The Danish and Swedish trade unions enjoy an arrangement that is available in few other countries: they administer the national unemployment benefit system. This gives them continual access to their unemployed members and to others who choose to use their services. Applicants for unemployment benefits never lose touch with their unions and can be reached with information on available jobs and training opportunities. Benefits are usually paid out by government offices in other countries, but this does not mean that unions should fail to maintain steady contact with their unemployed members. They are in a unique position to accumulate information on the employment situation in the industry or occupation that they cover, information that should be distributed in a timely fashion to their local offices in order to encourage visits by the unemployed. The same is true for the training and retraining programs that are proliferating in countries with heavy unemployment. Members can be steered away from undesirable jobs as well as referred to good ones. Some of the same considerations apply to retired members. They may need advice on their pension rights, both public and private.

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Some may desire part-time work to supplement their pensions, to which their former unions can steer them. Occasional meetings and social affairs will keep them informed about what their unions are doing and help maintain their ties to the labor movement, a not unimportant consideration, since retirees tend to constitute major voting blocs in national and local elections.

POLITICAL ACTION The relationship between trade unions and political parties is a complex one, often going back many years. There are some key variables: Did unions help establish labor parties (Great Britain) or did parties sponsor unions, a common situation where parties of the Left competed for the labor vote (France, Italy)? Were early bluecollar unions traditionally neutral (the United States)? Were the newer service-employee unions neutral from their start as a condition of organization? What is the nature of the political system— parliamentary, proportional representation, or other forms? These are some of the factors that determine the political stance of trade unions. The older Scandinavian trade unions are not a fully satisfactory model in this area. All of them enjoyed close relationships with Social Democratic parties, but during the past decade the ties have loosened, for reasons spelled out in chapter 5. The newer federations that grew up since World War II were neutral from the beginning. The Social Democratic alliance was of great value in the past, but less valuable at present, where it presented an obstacle to the recruitment of new members. There is no question that unions should be politically active. The nature of the political involvement depends on their immediate situations. Foremost is the political orientation of members. Do a large majority adhere to a single party, or is the vote split? In the latter case, a unilateral policy creates the risk of fission, if it is possible at all. When communist, socialist, and Catholic political parties existed in a number of European countries, separate trade union federations were divided along political lines and competed fiercely for members, a situation that limited their influence. Where political

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parties were strongly anti-union, the unions had no choice but to support those that were friendly. Take the case of the United States. The American Federation of Labor, formed in 1886, did not support a presidential candidate until the 1940s. Its rival, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, backed the Democratic candidate during its entire existence. After the merger of the two in 1955, the AFL-CIO came out in favor of the Democratic Party candidate in every election year except 1972. Individual national affiliates were at liberty to stay neutral or support Republicans, which a few of them did. This record stands in sharp contrast to the history of the British labor unions, which initiated the creation of the Labor Party and have remained closely allied with it ever since. Yet Labor’s victory in 1997 was accompanied by a reduction of union influence in the Labor Party. By way of contrast, the trade union movements of France and Italy have been divided along ideological lines, while in the Netherlands, division was along religious lines until recently. Different combinations are to be found in other countries. Ideally, trade union federations should concentrate on furthering the economic interests of their members, who should be left free to choose the political parties whose programs meet with their approval. This is the direction toward which the labor movement is moving in Scandinavia, where the white-collar and professional unions are already politically neutral, while the blue-collar unions and the Social Democrats have become more independent of one another. A complete schism would probably not endanger the unions because of their all-encompassing stature. This would not be true where union status might be threatened by a victory for antilabor parties, particularly where employers are intent on creating union-free environments. In such situations the unions have little choice but to support their political friends and batten down their hatches in the event of political defeat. In sum, a united labor movement has a better chance of attaining its objectives and remaining a powerful social force if it can speak in the name of all employees, or at least a majority of them. This appears to be an unlikely development, at least in any advanced country outside Scandinavia. A second-best solution is unity among coexisting federations of labor on major matters of mutual interest

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affecting all employees without necessarily agreeing on other issues that divide individuals. Taxation and income distribution might be examples of the former; religious and educational issues, examples of the latter. RELATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS Scandinavian unions and employers have developed relatively friendly relationships over time, although there have been some rough spots. One of them was the imposition of some form of codetermination, by a combination of contract and legislation. Once a system was established, it functioned in a generally satisfactory manner. Having a voice in the decisions taken by their employers appears to be popular among employees, while the fears of employers that their operations would be disrupted have been allayed. There have been movements toward the establishment of harmonious relations between employers and employees in almost all advanced countries, but they have not advanced very far. Employers have not been willing to cede sufficient authority, and unions have feared that their members might be alienated if they became too closely identified with employer interests. Fine lines of divided authority have been established in a number of countries, contributing to the smoothness of collective bargaining and the prevention of overt industrial conflict. In others, including the United States, Britain, and Japan, successful codetermination has not been achieved. Employer hostility has accentuated union decline in some countries, though good industrial relations are not necessarily a guarantee of union progress. Where it does not already prevail, codetermination in some form should be a major union objective, and unions should be prepared to make some sacrifices to achieve it. For example, the works councils under the pioneer German system are independent of the unions, a concession that the German trade unions were prepared to make in return for representation on corporate boards of directors, among other things. There have been strikes and lockouts in Germany, but the unions there have gained a greater appreciation of business problems, while the employers have a better feeling for what employees want. Codetermination is not the only means of improving industrial

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relations, but it is one that has been successful in northern Europe. Employers must be convinced that strong unions will not impair their managerial authority and might even enhance it; the codetermination model has proven successful in this respect. The Scandinavian countries have undergone economic vicissitudes along with their neighbors, but their labor-market organization has not been a factor. Indeed, their industrial-relations systems have made a major contribution to raising them to the top ranks of the world’s affluent nations. UNION BENEFIT PROGRAMS Most trade unions in advanced countries offer their members benefit programs beyond the normal wage, hour, and grievance services. This is also the case in Scandinavia, where benefits are comprehensive and of long standing. There is not sufficient coverage to enable a member to live a fully union life, although it has sometimes seemed that unions were pursuing such an objective. Among the most popular programs is group insurance of dwellings. Some local unions have made it compulsory, in order to reduce costs. Where these programs have been introduced, they are quite popular. This type of group insurance is a program that is not often found elsewhere. Other programs of considerable interest are group travel arrangements and union-owned vacation facilities that can be coordinated with periods of vacation leave. There are union banks that provide favorable interest rates on mortgages and credit cards, but in this area there is a question of whether a union can avoid losses in what is a very competitive market. Legal advice and assistance can also be of great value, particularly in countries where litigation is prolific. Union educational programs are useful in cementing membership loyalty. These can be of a cultural or vocational nature and either arranged in cooperation with educational institutions or by the union on its own. They can be coordinated with such governmentsponsored programs as apprenticeship training; the important thing is to affix the union label in some way. These and other programs can be expensive, and may be regarded as an impossible burden on strained resources. If they are looked upon as investments that may yield high returns, they may appear

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more attractive to those who control the flow of union funds. It should also be remembered that they have been widely used, and unions have found them to result in a profitable return in terms of stability and growth. WELFARE MONITORS Not every advanced country can be characterized as a full-fledged welfare state. However, most of them have established programs for the benefit of the entire population. These include health care, payments for children, government pensions, housing subsidies, environmental protection programs, and education loans and grants, among others. Trade unions are almost always known for their lobbying activities in favor of programs of immediate concern to their members, such as minimum wages, employment promotion, and job protection. They should also concern themselves with other people. This tends to enhance their role as what might be termed ‘‘social institutions’’ and helps create favorable public opinion. They become more than partisan organizations and are regarded as helping to further the public weal. The same thing is true with respect to broader issues of policy. In principle, they should take public positions and argue them at both national and local levels. In the United States, for example, the AFL-CIO has been a major participant in the debate on foreign trade, but this is seen as a matter of concern over jobs. There may be some issues that unions find difficult to address because of sharp divisions among their members; abortion is one and affirmative action, another. However, they should make themselves heard on foreign policy, budget determination, and constitutional questions. At the local level, there are educational problems (apart from those that are considered to be in the exclusive province of the teachers’ unions), commercial zoning regulations (not only to keep out nonunion firms), and police matters, among other issues. All of this can be expensive, but the recruitment of volunteers among members can help keep costs down. DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION It goes without saying that democracy is an essential attribute of successful unionism. There is a discussion of democracy at almost

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every Scandinavian union convention, relating not only to local problems but to national arrangements as well. What sort of representation should individual unions have in a federation government? What should be the procedure for ratifying contracts? Should officers be elected at meetings or by referendum? What remuneration should they receive? How should strikes be called and terminated? Endless debates on questions like these are integral parts of union democracy and should be encouraged rather than stifled. Nothing can sully a union’s reputation and lead to its destruction as surely as the presence of corruption. There has been very little of this in Scandinavia, and this has helped to maintain the position of unions as national institutions. One of the things held against a former chair of the Swedish Federation of Labor was that he drove a luxury automobile. The old syndicalist policy limiting the salary of a union official to that of the maximum wage in the unit over which he presides is not practiced there, but union salaries are comparatively modest. The revelations before a U.S. Senate committee in the 1950s did almost irreparable harm to the American labor movement. Adoption of ethical practice codes by the AFL-CIO has helped, but accounts of corruption have continued to be published by the press, particularly at the local level. The United States is by no means the only country in which union officials have used their positions for personal profit; instances of corruption have contributed to union decline elsewhere. It is not an easy matter to discipline dishonest officials. Democratic procedures may complicate the problem, and there are often internal political considerations as well. Whatever the cost, however, decisive and rapid action to correct instances of corruption is absolutely essential to the restoration of trade union growth. These are some of the precepts that emerge from examining the activities and governance of the Scandinavian labor movement. While they may not all be suited for countries with different political and economic environments, a good deal can be learned from the factors that have made the trade unions of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden the world’s strongest.

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Index AC (Danish Federation of Professional Associations), 14 Active labor market policy, 54–55 AF (Norwegian Federation of Professional Associations), 12–13, 93–95, 98 n.7 Andreassen, Harriet, 77 Association of Engineering Employers (Sweden), 24 Bargaining units, 18–19 Benefits, trade union, 122–24, 127, 138, 151–52 Blue-collar unions, 132 Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 76 Carlsson, Ingvar, 83 Cartels, trade union, 32–36 Center Party (Sweden), 69 Child care, 101 Civil Service Union (Sweden), 8, 11, 26, 49 Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry (Sweden), 82, 83, 85

Clothing and Textile Workers Union (Sweden), 40 Codetermination, 45–48, 53, 150– 51 Codetermination Act of 1977, 53 Collective bargaining decentralization: Denmark, 17–21; Norway, 21–23; Sweden, 23–27 Conciliation, 18–19 Construction Workers Union (Norway), 11 Danish Employers’ Association (DA), 14–15, 75 Density of union organization, 7– 8, 11 Education, trade union, 84, 101 Employer associations: Denmark, 14, 20; Norway, 15–16; Sweden, 24–26 European Labor Federation, 88, 95

158 Fellesforbund (Norway), 8 Food Workers Union (Norway), 77 Forest and Agricultural Workers Union (Sweden), 82 FTF (Federation of Civil Servants and Salaried Employees, Denmark), 14, 92–93 Government of Trade Unions, 40– 41, 82 Graphics Union (Norway), 36 Ha˚gensen, Yngve, 65 Halverson, Leif, 94 Hansson, Per Albin, 82 Hansson, Sigfrid, 82 Health and safety, 45, 53, 102 Home insurance, 102 Hours of work, 56–58 Housing, 102

Index 36; Sweden, 8, 27, 31, 40–41, 97 Musicians’ Union (Norway), 49 National Agency for Government Employees (Sweden), 15 National Bank Employees Union (Norway), 13 Norberg, Alf, 40 Nurses Union (Norway), 13 Ohlsson, Inger, 83, 97 Operation of unions, 115–19 Organizing, 49–50, 142–43 Outsourcing, 58–59

Johansson, Kjell, 40 Jurisdiction, 37–41, 90, 93–94

Painters Union (Sweden), 40 Pensions, 47, 102 Political action, 148–50 Political relationships of unions: Denmark, 62–65; membership views of, 124–29; Norway, 65– 67; Sweden, 67 Privatization, 37 Public sector, 8

Knudsen, Lillian, 73 Kolstad, Ruth, 77 Kostol, Esther, 77

Reasons for joining unions, 106– 10 Rehn, Go¨sta, 54

LO-AF Agreement (Norway), 95 Lundby-Wedin, Wanja, 56

SACO (Swedish Federation of Professional Associations), 86–89 Scientists and Researchers Union (Sweden), 82 Service Sector, 143–44 Social Democratic parties, 25–26, 62–70 Socialist Left Party (Norway), 65– 67 Solidarity wages, 24, 43–44, 47, 50–52, 136 Special Workers Union (Denmark), 10, 19

Industrial democracy, 85

Malm, Stig, 26, 67–68 Meidner, Rudolf, 54 Mergers, 38–40, 91–92 Metal Workers Union: Denmark, 19, 33; Norway, 11; Sweden, 8 Military Officers’ Union, 49 Municipal Workers Union: Denmark, 19, 33; Norway, 8, 11, 35–

Index Stock ownership plan, 53–54 Structure of trade unions, 9–12, 31– 42 Swedish Employers’ Association, 15, 24–25 Syndicalism, 34 TCO (Central Organization of Salaried Employees, Sweden), 81– 86, 97 Thorgrimson, Finn, 32 Trade, Transport, and Service Employers Association (Denmark), 20 Trade unions: corruption in, 152; functions of, 110–15; membership in, 7–11; member views on operations, 115–19 Training, 100–101 Transport Workers Union (Sweden), 39

159 Unemployment, 4, 22, 45–46, 48– 49, 53–55, 100 Unemployment funds, 100 Wage differentials, 44, 87 Wage drift, 50 Welfare state, 3, 99–100, 138–39, 152 White-collar unions, 12–14, 133, 143–44 Women’s Trade Union (Denmark), 10, 73–74 Women workers: labor force participation rates, 4, 9; organization of, 12, 74, 134, 145; quotas, 76– 78; union office, 74–75, 79, 83, 135; wages, 78–80, 84 Work stoppages, 22, 27–29 Young people, 49, 89, 146–47 YS (Confederation of Vocational Unions, Norway), 13, 96

About the Author WALTER GALENSON has held teaching positions at Harvard, University of California, Berkeley, Cornell, and Cambridge University. He is the author of more than 30 journal articles and book chapters, and four books published by the Greenwood Publishing Group. The most recent ones are: Trade Union Growth and Decline (1994), Labor and Economic Growth in Five Asian Countries (1992), and The American Labor Movement, 1955–1995 (1996).

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The Scandinavian Reformation: From Evangelical Movement to Institutionalisation of Reform

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Globalization: Encyclopedia of Trade, Labor, and Politics

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The World's Strongest Trade Unions: Scandinavian Labor Movement

The Anthropology of Labor Unions

European Trade Unions

Trade unions under socialism

American Labor Unions in the Electoral Arena

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The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions

Creation According to the Trade Unions

Unions and Labor Laws (Point Counterpoint)

The Future of the American Labor Movement

On the left in America: memoirs of the Scandinavian-American labor movement

Mobsters, Unions, and Feds: The Mafia and the American Labor Movement

The Decline of U.S. Labor Unions and the Role of Trade (Globalization Balance Sheet)

Hard Work: Remaking the American Labor Movement

Trade Unions and Politics in Western Europe

Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market

The Strongest Shape

Only the Strongest Survive

Labor unions and the economic performance of firms

Unions in Crisis: The Future of Organized Labor in America

Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa

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The economic effects of trade unions in Japan

Globalization: Encyclopedia of Trade, Labor, and Politics

Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement

Witnesses to the struggle: imaging the 1930s California labor movement

Labor and the Environmental Movement: The Quest for Common Ground

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