The Rise of Militarism in the Progressive Era, 1900-1914

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The Rise of Militarism in the Progressive Era, 1900–1914

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The Rise of Militarism in the Progressive Era, 1900–1914 ROGER POSSNER

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson, North Carolina, and London

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Possner, Roger, 1942– The rise of militarism in the Progressive Era, 1900–1914 / Roger Possner. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7864-4418-2 softcover : 50# alkaline paper 1. United States— History, Military — 20th century. 2. United States— Military policy. 3. Militarism — United States— History — 20th century. 4. Imperialism — Social aspects— United States— History — 20th century. 5. United States— Social conditions— 1865–1918. I. Title. E745.P67 2009 973.8 — dc22 2009016901 British Library cataloguing data are available ©2009 Roger Possner. All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. On the cover: Cadets drilling on Washington Monument grounds, ¡9¡4; U.S. Army Cadet Corps Seal

Manufactured in the United States of America

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Box 611, Je›erson, North Carolina 28640 www.mcfarlandpub.com

To Jan

Acknowledgments I want first of all to thank my adviser at the University of California– Riverside, Brian Lloyd, for all his help with the dissertation upon which this book is based. He constantly encouraged me to make connections to the history of the Progressive Era and to the interpretations of other historians, which made this a more significant work of history. I also appreciate the interest and support of Kenneth Barkin, who was one of my teachers and served on my master’s and PhD committees. I also thank David Biggs for being willing to step in and help a struggling PhD candidate at the last minute. I owe a debt to historians who have led the way in interpretation of the Progressive Era in American history. I relied upon overall evaluations of the era by John Whiteclay Chambers II, Michael McGerr, Gail Bederman, Sheldon Stromquist, and the late Robert Wiebe. Many distinguished historians have written on particular aspects of the history of the era, and their works are listed in the secondary sources section of the bibliography. It is a long list and all were helpful, but the works of Joseph Kett, Richard Slotkin, David Nasaw, the late Philip Foner, H. Bruce Franklin, Diane Ravitch, Joyce Kasson and David Montgomery were particularly useful. All the illustrations are from that indispensable source, the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Collection. During my research I used the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database much more than any other source. Having a keyword-searchable database of newspapers from around the nation shortened the research time considerably and revealed much that might otherwise not have been found. I note that the Library of Congress now has some historic newspapers online and hope that they will expand this service. I thank my day-job supervisor during the writing of this book, former city manager of Covina, California, Paul Phillips, for his interest and support. And finally to my wife, Jan McFarlane, daughter Carmen, and son Alex, thank you for your love and for being who you are. Those are the ways you support me and I couldn’t ask for more. vi

Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction: “Our blood is the most militant blood”

vi 1

1. “The hunchback sister of imperialism” 2. “Our new military prophets” 3. “The centers of soldier making” 4. “A glimpse of mimic warfare” 5. “Romance of the Recruiting Office” 6. “An army of marksmen” 7. “Expansion is a new idea with us” 8. “A fabric of falsehood and fallacy” 9. “The dull mutter of distant guns” 10. “A great army of the people” 11. “In the badlands” 12. “Seminaries to promote respect for peace” 13. “The third battle of Bull Run” 14. Invisible Guns 15. “A military nation nowadays”

5 10 14 38 63 84 101 107 129 154 167 183 194 215 227

Chapter Notes Bibliography Index

233 241 249

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Introduction: “Our blood is the most militant blood” All this nation is a standing army. There is a soldier in the breast of every free man. Our blood is the most militant blood on the face of the earth.... Militarism in America! It is here indeed, here in the blood we young men of America have inherited from our fathers. — Senator Albert Beveridge, 1900.1

This book is about the growth of militarism in the Progressive Era, from 1900 to 1914. Militarism has multiple meanings, but one of the most common definitions is the martial spirit among a people. A martial spirit includes respect for military values like deference to authority, controlled and directed aggression, and extreme nationalism. This book shows how the War Department and the United States Army worked to build support for the military and convince Americans that their Army was needed in the new century. We will see the Army and the United States government actively encourage the growth of a martial spirit in the land, by activities like supporting military education in the nation’s high schools, holding military tournaments in big cities, publicizing the attractions of military life through expanded recruiting, promoting marksmanship contests and encouraging public attendance at military maneuvers. This and much more would have the enthusiastic support of Theodore Roosevelt and most other Progressives. Due to their efforts Americans became much more aware of their military forces and the roles which they might be called upon to play in defending the nation, its colonies, and its values. The period 1900–1920 is generally called the Progressive Era by historians. It was a period of rapid change, characterized by massive immigration and the rise of America to the leading economic power in the world. The changes brought new problems. How were the immigrants, mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe, to be made into patriotic American citizens? How could the much larger number of workers needed by the expanding 1

2

Introduction

economy be integrated into the factories and mines? How were the nation’s children to be educated to take their place in American society? The Progressive Movement was a response to a changing nation. Progressives understood that industrializing America had to adapt to a new situation, but they were reformers, not revolutionaries. They wanted first of all to reform individuals, especially their morals and values. Progressives worked for reform and reform meant change, but they did not want change so rapid as to be disorienting or change that was undirected. Though the Progressives reforms were widespread and sometimes seemed unorganized, their movements were not leaderless or anti-authority. Their reforming predecessors, the Populists, and their successors, the New Dealers, made efforts to organize those who were being shunted aside by industrial capitalism, to protest and to demand systemic change. Progressives on the whole did not do this. They concentrated on improving the morals and behavior of individuals of low social status, like workers, and of high status, like the rich and powerful. Progressives thought that changed individuals would change and reform society. Their values included respect for authority and a desire for a society without class conflict. The strong Progressive interest in a harmonious society does not, however, obscure the class nature of Progressive efforts. Most reformers were middle class and so were the values of Progressivism — playing by the rules, esteeming hard work, being moral and knowing one’s place. This focus on changing people rather than institutions is not to deny the importance of their efforts to improve the institutions of government and the economy by establishing new laws like the child labor and pure food and drug laws and new institutions like the Federal Reserve and regulatory commissions. Most of these institutional changes, however, were also reforms intended to encourage more moral behavior. Characteristics of Progressive social reform included a willingness to place social duty above private desire, an abhorrence of vice and crime and strong efforts to combat them with education and laws, a vital interest in preventing or even ending class conflict, agreement on the worth of manly, white middle-class values and belief in an ordered society. The prime example of a Progressive is Theodore Roosevelt. He was a man of tremendous energy and varied interests who saw the need for reform in many areas of American life. He was also from a wealthy and privileged background and was always confident that he knew what was best for the country; he had no sympathy for radicals and revolutionaries. T.R. was a man of action and the most militaristic of our presidents. As we have seen, Progressives were great believers in order at home. A search for order and stability in the wider world could be seen as a requirement that the United States have colonies in areas where Europeans had not already done so, and for the most part Progressives supported imperialistic

Introduction

3

policies. According to historian Robert Wiebe, their “real spiritual leader ... was T.R., with his military preachments and his hearty appeal to unselfish patriotism.” The Progressives, however, seldom saw their foreign policy as imperialistic — just as there was an impulse to reform at home, there was a reformist impulse abroad. America and its army did build schools, improve sanitation and make other improvements in Cuba and the Philippines. However, the fact that many Cubans and Filipinos resented the American Army as a foreign occupying force was often not appreciated by Americans. An expanded army and more frequent use of it were favored by most Progressives. As Richard Hofstadter put it, the “mainstream of feeling in the ranks of the [Progressive] insurgency was neither anti-war nor anti-imperialist,” and presidents of the period were not reluctant to use the Army. Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft, was less outspoken than T.R., but was a former secretary of war and proconsul of the Philippines; not at all reluctant to support the army or to use force. The next president, Woodrow Wilson, intervened extensively in Latin America and began the pre–World War I buildup of American armed forces in 1915. The fostering of militarism is a psychological preparation for war and will be considered along with actual preparations for war such as military maneuvers and the growth of the Coast Artillery branch of the U.S. Army. At times this psychological preparation for war was overt, as when military officers discussed maneuvers as readying the populace for invasion and war, or gave target shooters a pin and enrolled them in a national reserve to be called upon first in the event of war. At other times the message was less direct, as in the military tournaments of the time, which showcased the athletic and drill expertise of soldiers, or the sham battles that were fought as a public entertainment. Indirectly or openly, the message was there and Americans were ready to see and hear it. As this book shows, there was little conflict between Progressive and military values. Progressives and the military wanted a well-structured society where people knew their places; it’s the nature of an army to be extremely well-ordered. Military officers and progressives wanted to at least ameliorate class conflict; if possible they would have liked to end it. Both put a high value on placing social duty above private desire; the Army compelled such choices. Both abhorred vice and crime as offenses to good order; the Army had wide power to punish misbehavior. Both subscribed to a manly middle-class worldview and made efforts to spread that gospel. The extent to which these are shared characteristics will become clear as we visit the places and events where the Army and the American public met: in the nation’s schools and at military tournaments, marksmanship contests, recruiting stations, and maneuvers. It will also be revealed in how the press of the period covered war scares and fiction writers speculated about future wars.

4

Introduction

Militarism has been seriously debated only once in American political history, in the 1900 presidential campaign. Democrats were suspicious of the new and larger American Army and Republicans were outraged by these suspicions. The charges and counter-charges show that at least some people were uneasy about the path on which the nation had embarked — but not enough to change direction.

1. “The hunchback sister of imperialism” The militarism issue is the hunchback sister of imperialism. She is a weazened and scrawny brat to whom nobody has paid any attention until recently.... Militarism ought to be kept in the dark. Put the miserable little thing under the limelight and she would inspire no terror — only pity. —New York Times, July 19001

Militarism was an issue in 1900, though discussion of it was often in the context of the war in the Philippines and imperialism. Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan spoke repeatedly of the danger to the nation of a large standing army. He said that in 1896 the U.S. Army was 25,000 strong, and pointed out that President William McKinley had called for 100,000 volunteers in December 1898, when the Spanish-American War was over and two months before the Philippine-American War began. Bryan questioned whether the president already knew that his decision to take over the Philippines would cause a “bloody war,” but said there was another reason why a large army would be wanted. If not for foreign adventures, then there would be a domestic reason, and a large army in this country might be idle, which would be a waste of the taxpayers’ money. If it was not idle, but “in action, what action can you suppose an army can be called upon for in this country? I believe that one of the reasons they want a large army is to build a fort in this city and use the army to suppress by force that discontent that ought to be cured by legislation.” Further, Bryan stated that “those at the head of syndicates [trusts]” in this country wanted a large army for this purpose, though they and the Republicans would never say so publicly.2 Secretary of War Elihu Root replied directly to Bryan’s New York speech during a visit to President McKinley’s home in Canton, Ohio, the following week. Answering Bryan’s charge of idleness, the secretary stated that America’s regular army was not idle over the past 111 years, but had fought 2,545 engagements since its establishment by George Washington in 1789. Almost 5

6


all of these engagements were during wartime, however, including the Indian Wars, and very few during the sometimes lengthy periods of peace. Root extolled the patriotism of Army officers and men and said that armies of 272,000 men during the Spanish-American War, and over 1 million at the close of the Civil War, were disbanded when the need for them was over. The Army now was a volunteer army and those who had served their three years were free to depart. Root made much of the quality of the men taken into the Army, as if this assured that the Army would never allow itself to be misused —“They are all Americans. They are intelligent Americans. None are admitted who cannot read and write. They are sound, wholesome Americans, of good habits and regular lives, for none are admitted who are not in perfect health.” Official recruiting standards were indeed as Root described them, though they may have often been honored in the breach, and the emphasis on morality and clean living is quite in keeping with the reformist Progressive ethos of the times. Root also seems to exhibit some of the racialization of nationality current at the time, with his repeated use of the “Americans are” for-

Senator Albert Beveridge, 1900. He wore militarism as a badge of honor.

1. “The hunchback sister of imperialism”

7

mulation, implying that Americans are a race apart from others. The secretary noted further that “there has never been a single act of disloyalty on the part of the regular army, to the supremacy of civil law and the principles of our free constitutional government.”3 Senator Albert Beveridge, another Republican who was an ardent expansionist, wore the accusation of militarism as a badge of honor: “Every generation of Americans has been soldiers. Militarism in America! Yes, indeed there is enough militarism in the blood of the free young men of this republic not only to defeat the world at arms, but to defeat every military uprising among ourselves that might seek to overthrow the republic. The future of the insti- The great proponent of military reform, Sectutions of the republic is in the retary of War Elihu Root, in 1900. hands of the republic’s young men, and in their hands those institutions are secure.”4 The reference to the “blood” of Americans indicates that Beveridge, as well as Root, was thinking of Americans as a race, and a very superior race at that, capable of dominating the world. The Los Angeles Times was almost as enthusiastic as the senator when it came to militarism. Their correspondent wrote after the election that it cost the United States $1,102 each year for the services of a soldier. He compared this to the cost to the City of New York for a policeman. The comparison was unfavorable — the policeman cost the city about $200 more per year and the service that he rendered was “the worst in the world.” Considering soldier’s pay as an investment, the reporter continued to list every war the United States had fought, including the action against the Barbary pirates in the early 1800’s. All these successful military ventures proved that the U.S. had received an excellent return on its investment in soldiers: “Cost of militarism! Militarism is the best investment the Republic has made.”5 The Times ran regular digests of editorial opinion from newspapers

8


around the country and didn’t find much disagreement with its own editorial positions. In one such digest published on October 23, 1900, the Baltimore American stated, “There is no more senseless or unworthy charge than this attack on the government for the maintenance of a force large enough to protect its interests and defend the honor of the United States.” The American noted that the population of the United States was now 90 million and opined that an army of 100,000 men was quite reasonable for a nation that size. It also noted that the country had spent many millions of dollars to establish a system of coast artillery, which was seriously undermanned and in danger of deterioration. During 1900, America had decided to participate in the expedition to China to rescue European and American diplomats besieged in Peking. This had been difficult, according to the American, because of the small size of the American Army and its obligations in the Philippines and Cuba. In another editorial titled “The Militarism Bogey,” the Omaha Bee noted that “one of the favorite mottoes displayed on popocratic transparencies this year in Bryanite processions reads ‘Regulars for Empires— Volunteers for Republics.’ The editorialist thought that this slogan was aimed at immigrants, who had unpleasant memories of the conscription, often forcible, of young men into European armies. There had never been peacetime conscription in America and never would be, according to the Bee. One of the reasons why this was so was that this country had a short term of service for those who enlisted, as opposed to some European nations where the term could be 10 years or more. The Army had also never had a problem obtaining enough volunteers, another factor which made conscription unnecessary.6 A larger military did have some opponents. Joseph Dana Miller refused to see any benefit from militarism or the military and believed that if the country was in danger, its citizens would volunteer for its defense. He wrote that the nation was blessed when it had an army of 25,000 men and recruiting was difficult, and then described the coarsening of character that he claimed military service inevitably produced. He cited Theodore Roosevelt as an example of what war could do to men; noting that in The Rough Riders Roosevelt gave an offhand description of the Spaniard he had killed, as if the killing did not matter at all to him —“with all the indifference of a nature that loves carnage for its own sake.” Miller also believed that a standing army of 100,000 men could indeed be a danger to the republic: Corrupting to the individual, and therefore corrupting to the nation, is the spirit of militarism at all times and everywhere. Let it rule among a people and however the forms of republicanism persist the Republic itself is moribund. However institutions preserve the outward garb of democracy, the Republic is slowly shaping itself to empire and is all purple within.... It gives us strange notions of heroism, and blinds us to the true nobility of civic valor, in this day fallen so low, and without which we shall perish of an inward cancer.8

1. “The hunchback sister of imperialism”

9

This seems to have been a call for a return to an older brand of patriotism, veneration of ideals of freedom and equality, rather than a patriotism increasingly identified with military values and strident nationalism. The Rev. Charles E. Jefferson saw some reasons for that recent elevation of the military ideal which so alarmed Joseph Dana Miller. What we now call the media were culpable; the reverend said if a man would “rub a newspaper over his brain six days a week,” by Sunday he would inevitably be “muddleheaded,” and magazines were no better. Jefferson said that over the past twelve years there had had been much coverage in the periodicals about the Civil War and its generals. This may be referring to the long illustrated articles on the Civil War that began appearing in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper in the late 1880’s. These articles were collected in a multi-volume set called Famous Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, which was in print through most of the twentieth century. The Reverend Jefferson asserted that hero-worshiping biographies of Napoleon followed, and then other famous military commanders, so that “our leading magazines have been burning incense to the military chieftains of history. That incense has become a war cloud, shutting the Christian ideal from the eyes of Americans.” Another factor was the militarization of Europe, which the Reverend Jefferson believed many Americans envied and foolishly wished to emulate. He admitted, finally, that not all clergy were pacific, but affirmed that he believed that preparation for war was not the best way to achieve peace. He was convinced by his reading of history that those who lived by the sword would die by it.9 The election of 1900 was the only presidential election in which militarism was a major issue. William Jennings Bryan, who took a critical view of militarism, was soundly defeated in November, and the issue seemed to go away, never to return in a significant way in twentieth-century America. In the period between the Spanish-American War and the outbreak of the First World War it can be demonstrated, by the wide and increasing interactions between the United States Army and the civilian public, that a martial spirit was alive and thriving in America. Next we turn to that Army, to briefly consider how it changed and grew between the wars.

2. “Our new military prophets” The teaching of our new military prophets that the Government when it goes to war is always right has put the old bankrupt [militarism] on his legs again and started him in a roaring business. — The Nation, October 1899.1

After the Civil War the United States Army dwindled rapidly to about 25,000 men. Between 1865 and 1898 it was scattered through the American West in many small forts, and the only fighting done was with Indians. As memories of the horrors of the Civil War faded, there was an increase in discussion of military values. There was also an effort on the part of many in the military and in veterans’ organizations to define patriotism to mean bravery in defense of the homeland, whether the “homeland” was North or South. Thus, all white Americans could come together in a militarized patriotism. Even so, the place of the Army in American life was not an exalted one. Many Americans believed that the Army was mostly a place for misfits, and the practice of giving young men in trouble with the law a choice between going to prison or enlisting in the Army was widespread. By 1898 many Americans had become concerned with what they saw as Spanish brutality towards the Cuban people. There was a sizable revolt in progress on the island. When the battleship Maine blew up in Havana harbor, probably accidentally, war ensued. The response to President McKinley’s call for volunteers was quick and overwhelming. Almost 250,000 men would volunteer and about 25,000 would actually get to Cuba, where almost all the fighting took place, except for a few skirmishes in Puerto Rico. The war was quick and victorious for the United States. In 1899, the year following the war, The Nation magazine responded to an article in the North American Review by Captain Alfred Mahan, who warned of the dangers of settling disputes between nations by arbitration. The Nation commented, “There has been no worse foe of mankind than the accumulation of vast physical force in the hands of one individual or one nation.... The great lowering of the moral tone in the United States which has occurred in our time has 10

2. “Our new military prophets”

11

been due to the feeling that our military strength has become irresistible.” The Nation quoted Ralph Waldo Emerson’s comment, during a trip to England some 50 years before, that “musket worship was perfectly well known to us; that it was an old bankrupt,” which was no on its legs again.2 The lessons of the war were many, and to increase efficiency President McKinley decided to replace his aged Secretary of War John Alger in 1899. He chose New York lawyer Elihu Root to replace him, and Root quickly became an ardent advocate of Army reform. His main objectives were the establishment of a general staff, expansion of the regular Army, promotion of professional education, bringing the National Guards of the states under federal control and pacification of America’s new colonial possessions. Most army officers supported reform, but some, including many in the National Guard, did not. These opponents asserted that an army of the “hired assassin stamp,” like that of the “Hessian and other continental monarchies,” could be harmful to America.3 The upsurge in patriotism, not to say jingoism, which followed the brief Spanish American War was substantial, but it was still difficult for most Americans to believe that this country, separated by vast oceans from other major powers, was in real danger. The upsurge was enough, however, to bring a threefold increase in the Regular Army, federal control of the National Guard, establishment of a general staff, closing of many small army posts in the West and establishment or reinforcing of army posts near centers of population. Measures like these, particularly the relocation of army posts, brought more civilians in contact with the military and presented more opportunities for impressing the public with the value of a strong army. The leaders of the Army could reasonably hope that the general public would support expenditures for the Army, and more recruits would be attracted as people became familiar with the military. Secretary Root was, along with Vice-President Roosevelt and Secretary of State John Hay, a firm believer in Anglo-American cooperation and concerned about the intentions of Germany in the Caribbean, South America and the Pacific, and especially Japan in Asia. Distrust of Japan increased when one of their consular officials was arrested and deported for assisting Filipino insurgents in April 1901. Suspicion of Germany did not prevent a delegation of American generals from visiting Germany to observe maneuvers in July and August 1902. The visit provided an opportunity for opponents of Army reform to call the visit “The Terrible Spectacle in Berlin” and an event that would lead to “whetting the American appetite for bloodshed.”4 Root, a lawyer and businessman all his life until he became secretary of war, worked ceaselessly for his reforms. He believed, along with most other Republican progressives, in free trade. He also believed in the necessity of a strong army in the Philippines, so that America could, in the words of an

12


Army general, “act instantly ... at any point in the East.”5 Root and many Army leaders believed that future wars were likely and America’s welfare depended on access to foreign markets. The size of the Regular Army was increased again in 1900. Major General John R. Brooke wrote in 1900 that this increase was welcome, but would not be enough. He admitted that no war was then expected, but gave his opinion that “war always comes unexpectedly” and “that was true of the war with Spain and all our other wars, and, I think, of the wars of other nations also.” General Brooke must have been referring to the exact time and circumstances of the onset of hostilities, for almost all wars are preceded by a period of heightened tension. He cited the extensive U.S. coastlines as one reason for the need for a larger army. Coastal defense by means of artillery was an Army responsibility, and Brooke wrote that this artillery required more technical expertise than naval guns. He did concede that the United States was much less vulnerable than were the other great powers, and thus an Army of 150,000 would be best and 100,000 would be adequate. From 1900 to 1914 the Army did not exceed 75,000, though it was authorized 100,000.6 Not American coasts, but the Philippines were seen as the weakest part of U.S. defenses, in a January 1902 magazine article by John Shafroth. The cost of fortifying the islands was estimated at tens of millions of dollars, and a permanent army of 40,000 soldiers would be required to hold the Philippines. Defense of the Philippines would also require a much stronger navy. Shafroth suggested that the U.S. help the Philippines establish its own government, which would allow us concentrate on peaceful trade as we had done since the founding of the republic.7 The American military saw the need for the Philippines to be defended. American naval officers bristled when a German squadron showed up at Manila Bay after Admiral George Dewey’s destruction of the Spanish fleet there in 1898. There were also war scares about Japan in 1901, 1902, 1907, 1910, and 1911.8 These scares were discounted by the civilian administrators of the islands, but General Leonard Wood and many others were convinced of Japan’s hostile intentions. In sum, the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Philippine-American War (1899–1902) convinced the Army and the federal government that there could be no return to pre-war troop levels. A larger Army was necessary to control the nation’s new colonies in the Pacific and to be able to intervene in Asia to protect American citizens and commerce, as, for example, the multi-nation expedition to rescue Westerners trapped in Peking (Beijing) during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. An enlarged Army redeployed from now unnecessary western forts might also be useful for containing civilian unrest in America’s burgeoning cities. Given that a larger Army was necessary, where were the recruits to come

2. “Our new military prophets”

13

from? And, tripling the size of the Army would mean that there would be substantial increases in federal spending. Public support would be needed for that. Fortunately, there was already a considerable amount of military training for young men going on in America. The War Department and the Army set out to assist and increase that training, to build support for the military and make more soldiers.

3. “The centers of soldier making” How widely distributed are the centers of soldier making.... No country can boast of a more patriotic volunteer military service than ours. — Day Allen Willey, 1908.1

Education was a particular focus for the efforts of Progressive reformers. They were responding to the needs of an industrializing economy and to the large influx of immigrants who were needed to serve that economy. The children of these immigrants needed to learn English and be literate and numerate enough to understand what was required of them in factories, workshops, and stores across the nation. This, however, was not enough. There were concerns that an urban society held many temptations for youth, and there was a determination that children would stay in school longer and learn in school to eschew the vices associated with uneducated immigrant workers: alcohol, tobacco, and the life of the saloon and brothel. They wanted the schools to make patriotic Americans with middle class values out of the children who attended them. One of the main ways in which this was done was a curriculum suffused with a militarized patriotism of “saluting the Stars and Stripes and understanding that America was the greatest nation in the world.”2 Military training fit in very well with such a curriculum. Just how irresistible the vogue for it was can be seen in a passage from Twenty Years at Hull House, by Jane Addams. Addams was one of the most famous Progressives and the founder of Hull House, a Chicago settlement house. She wrote about how her prohibition against military drill was lifted for a large association of Greek lads. She explained that these young men believed that they could be called back home to Greece at any time to fight against the traditional national enemies, the Turks, and it seemed “mere affectation” to deny the young men occasional use of Hull House facilities for military drill. Admitting this lapse led Addams to a further disclosure: Having thus confessed to military drill countenanced if not encouraged at Hull House, it is perhaps only fair to relate an early experience of mine with the “Columbian Guards,” an organization of the World’s Fair summer. Although the 14

3. “The centers of soldier making”

15

Hull House squad was organized as the others were with the motto of a clean city, it was very anxious for military drill. This request not only shocked my nonresistant principles, but seemed to afford an opportunity to find a substitute for the military tactics which were used in the boys’ brigades everywhere, even in the churches. As the cleaning of the filthy streets and alleys was the ostensible purpose of the Columbian guards, I suggested to the boys that we work out a drill with sewer spades, which with their long narrow blades and shortened handles were not so unlike bayoneted guns.... While I myself was present at the gymnasium to explain that it was nobler to drill in imitation of removing disease-breeding filth than to drill in simulation of warfare; while I distractedly readapted tales of chivalry to this modern rescuing of the endangered and oppressed ... as I withdrew ... our troops would first grow self-conscious, then demoralized, and finally flatly refuse to go on.3

Addams reflected that when one of the sewer spades would turn up in later years it made her think that the time of beating swords into plowshares was a considerable way off. That the leading pacifist of her time could write that it was a mere affectation that she denied the use of facilities for military training shows how pervasive it was. A larger Army needed more support from the public and more recruits. The Army and the War Department made considerable efforts to support military training in public and private secondary schools. Progressives approved of this work, since they were very concerned about the temptations facing contemporary youth. Increased discipline and respect for authority inculcated by military training would keep young men from going astray. It would also expose them to some elements of military life and perhaps encourage them to enlist. To Progressives there really was no downside to educating high school students about the military and military values. Military education was also widespread in land-grant colleges. The Civil War legislation (1862) establishing these schools provided that they should make military training available, but did not specify the type or duration of training, nor even whether all students were required to participate. Training was thus uneven, but extensive at some universities, and gave thousands of young men some basic training. Those who proved to be proficient would often become National Guard officers and the best might be offered commissions in the Regular Army. Military training for boys started during the Civil War, as an expression of support for the war effort in the North. The training consisted of drilling wearing “picturesque uniforms” and doing the manual of arms with wooden muskets. Apparently these activities were organized by the schoolboys themselves, and sometimes were pursued with such fervor that they interfered with classes. However, parents and teachers applauded the patriotic efforts of the boys. At that time, there was no thought that this drilling and marching would be of much value in later life. Near the end of the war, however,

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some boys who had such experiences went into the army, and “the drillmasters in the provisional camps found that they could teach them nothing.”4 After the war military training in high schools did not stop. It was evident that such training had real advantages. Boys who had received the training had a “manly bearing,” were more attentive, and were “prompt to execute and competent to give orders.” Not only that, but the wearing of the uniform “gave them dignity and promoted a spirit of good fellowship, which had a beneficial effect both on the individual and the institution.” The choice of words and phrases such as “manly,” “prompt to execute,” “dignity,” and “good fellowship” indicate a desire to see military training produce highly self-controlled men with strong middle-class values.5 It was of course not only public schools that provided military training. Most newspaper and magazine advertisements for boys’ private schools highlighted the military training available. At the specifically military schools training was patterned on the daily routines followed by the cadets at West Point. These private school cadets were roused at dawn by reveille, spent hours each day in military formation and marching, ate in mess halls, and went to bed in the barracks when taps was played by a bugler. Even maintaining proper alignment in company formation took practice, because the drill master had to be able to “run the flat of his sword across each chest without sticking it into a man.”6 The cadets may or may not have enjoyed the marching and the drilling, but the “sham infantry fights have a savor of real war that makes them of special interest to the young soldiers” and “the smell of gunpowder, the haze of smoke, the crackling of rifles, punctuated with the louder reports of the cannon, make the nerves tingle and the eyes glisten.” An observer of artillery drills with a small muzzle loading cannon thought that the young men looked quite realistic and serious and that a mob, of strikers perhaps, would not like to be opposed by the cadets. Cavalry drills, along with what we today would call trick riding, were also undoubtedly more fun than marching. The stunts included leaping on the horse without using the stirrups, riding standing up on the saddle, and mounting the horse while it was jumping over a hurdle. Day Allen Willey wrote that the cadets called these stunts “rough riding.”7 It was thought the products of such training was better citizens. Many of the graduates of these military schools would become officers in the National Guard and in the volunteer regiments that would be raised in time of war, but beyond this, the years of discipline were supposed to make them strong physically and mentally, self-controlled, and deferential to authority. “He has also drawn into his life a love of his country and a reverence for its flag [and] a true and stalwart Americanism.”8 The identification of patriotism with militarism is very nearly complete in statements like this. Some commentators thought that all boys took naturally to marching


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Washington, D.C., Central High School cadets in Civil War–type uniforms, 1900.

and drilling and that anyone could confirm this by watching a military parade. At the tail end of the parade groups of little boys could be seen imitating marching soldiers, trying to stay in step and match the strides of the marchers. Indeed, the “youngster whose eyes do not glisten at the sight of the gold and blue, or whose nerves do not tingle at the sound of the drum tap, is out of the usual in the boy line.” This propensity also had the effect of erasing lines of class, since “playing soldier puts all on a common level just as the terrible earnestness of war itself binds men into a common brotherhood, regardless of wealth or station.” Exactly how the military, with its rigid hierarchy and enforced separation of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men, “puts all on a common level” was not explained. It also does not follow that, since small boys enjoy imitating marching in a parade, teenaged boys will be just as enthusiastic.9 Whether it was fun or not, military training could “systematize the young American” so that he would “do one thing at a time” rather than flit from one task to another and never finish anything. Any school that could develop a cadet company of 150 boys could apply to the War Department to have an Army officer detailed to it, to supervise military training. Training at these public schools, along with military training at the land-grant universities, other colleges, military colleges (such as The Citadel in South Carolina and Virginia Military Institute) and private military academies, demonstrated “how widely distributed are the centers of soldier making.... No country can boast of a more patriotic volunteer military service than ours,” Willey wrote. “The

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Omaha High School cadets, 1914, wearing West Point–style uniforms.

gun and saber have entered the study room. The uniform has taken the place of the Eton suit and cap and gown.”10 Besides all the character-building taking place in secondary schools with military training, there was the added benefit of 10,000 young men every year graduated from colleges and universities and thus available for the defense of the nation. It is clear that many observers thought American youth were in need of more discipline. Progressives certainly approved of discipline, but many felt a lack of supervision was the core problem with youth. Unsupervised youth would be subject to strong temptations and unsupervised play could give rein to antisocial impulses. Military schools had round the clock supervision, for all and even a few hours of drill per week in public high schools might help keep boys out of peril. Military training was also activity-based learning, a favorite of Progressives. Such learning helped to produce a trained work force and was thought to be especially appropriate for immigrant children, few of whom would be going on to college.

Arms and the Boy As mentioned above, by law the Army could detail officers to supervise military training in private military academies and in selected colleges and universities. Major R.L. Gignilliat, an Army officer assigned to the Culver Military Academy near St. Louis, described the training and its benefits in a 1905 Scientific American article. The major described the parts of the training that he had observed boys enjoy the most, such as horseback riding, camping, drilling with the Gatling gun, and most of all “attacks with blank cartridges on an imaginary or represented enemy.” He also believed that military training


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produced not only good soldiers, but also good, capable, men, since it developed strength, steadiness, alertness, and good judgment. In concluding his article Major Gignilliat wrote that his account of life at Culver Military Academy showed how the boys were being educated to be good citizens, but that another purpose was served by this training. As he put it, the government regarded “military instruction as an end in itself, for it appreciates the value to a nation dependent largely on its citizen soldiery in time of war, of having so many of its youth trained each year in the soldier’s calling.” He stated that institutions that provided military training were divided into three classes, A, B and C. Culver Military Academy was a Class C school, one of those which had the most military training, such that its daily routine was closely patterned on that of a military garrison.11 Eleven years later Gignilliat, by this time a colonel, wrote a book on military education for youth. He considered what he thought some of the objections to such training might be. Discipline was important for all boys, he wrote, but some parents might feel that military-style discipline was inappropriate. A rigid kind of discipline would destroy initiative and “makes the boy wooden. Furthermore, they are warned that military drill will make the boy bloodthirsty, and will benumb the finer and higher elements in his mind.” As far as the physical benefits of regular military drill, some felt that not only were such benefits practically nonexistent, but the drill could actually be harmful: “It makes a boy so lopsided you can tell as far as you can see him that he has carried a rifle.”12 The colonel named some names. Doctor Dudley Allen Sargent, who was head of the Hemenway Gymnasium at Harvard, was a naysayer who believed that military drill was useless as exercise, since marching up and down did not “quicken the respiration and increase circulation.” When asked where West Point cadets obtained their graceful poise, if not from drill, Sargent replied that it came from the instruction in dancing (which the Army thought necessary if cadets were to become officers and gentlemen) given to all first year cadets. Gignilliat thought this unlikely, since the dance instruction was one hour per day for a total of seven weeks, but agreed with Dr. Sargent if he was speaking only of close order drill. Other forms of training, such as skirmish drills, were much better exercise. Gignilliat wrote that critics of military drill only seemed to know about dull close-order drill and not other, more interesting parts of military education. In this he was correct, but he ignored the fact that the first thing new students were taught is close order drill, and the drill remained a part of their daily lives for as long as they stayed at a military school.13 Colonel Gignilliat responded to criticisms of military training by relating an incident involving the cadets of the Culver Military Academy. In the early spring of 1913 there was serious flooding along the Wabash River, not

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far from Culver. Civilian authorities requested help from the school to rescue people stranded around the city of Logansport, Indiana. About a hundred cadets boarded a train to the afflicted area, and at three o’clock on a cold morning they were readying four “man of war cutters” for rescue work. As dawn broke the cadets set out in the boats and began to rescue people from the tops of houses and trees. They continued their work for two days through a snowstorm, and the citizens of Logansport were so grateful for their assistance that they erected an arch over the entrance to the school to commemorate their help. Colonel Gignilliat felt that boys from a civilian school would have wanted to help, but could not have done so as effectively as the cadets, who were used to working as a disciplined team: “Obedience had to be automatic; there were times when instant response to commands, absolute coolness and absence of confusion meant, perhaps, the lives of a boatload of people.... I consider such a fine demonstration of the effects of military discipline.”14 Colonel Gignilliat had more to say about the value of military-style discipline. He noted that in cadet organizations every boy who was appointed an officer or a sergeant received a letter ending with the phrase “he will be respected and obeyed accordingly.” This instilled the habit of obedience, which the colonel thought essential for success in military or civilian life. He wrote, “Educators are agreed that a lack of respect for authority is our greatest national defect.” As support for this he quoted E.A. Eiselman testifying before the Massachusetts Special Commission on Military Education and Reserve: “This country has already had a full fling of self-governed youth, with the result that in 1913 4,667 young men from 15 to 25 years of age were imprisoned in the State of Massachusetts. These are the statistics of boys who would not obey.” Progressive fears of growing disorder and a conviction that submission to authority was the cure for the disease are plainly on display here. It is also clear that reformist educators analyzed education’s shortcomings much the same way that proponents of military drill did. Not all of them did, however. Progressive reformers thought that the main defect in the public schools was a too-academic curriculum, which was not appropriate for every child. The ideas of reformers like John Dewey inspired educators to make education more individualized, but the results were very different for private and public schools. In private progressive schools, which enrolled the children of well-to-do families, the new education was child-centered, meaning that children’s interests and activities were the basis of the curriculum. In big public school systems, however, the “new education” meant vocational and industrial education to train the children of the masses for work in farms, shops, factories and homes. Such curriculum changes appeared to be socially efficient. They were identified with progress, reform, and modernity in an age when these qualities were revered.


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In their rebellion against the academic tradition, many advocates of progressive education envisioned a future in which schools would offer what both society and students needed, instead of what they considered “useless” cultural courses.... In a nation where practicality was valued far more than intellectual pursuits, the progressives’ demands for vocational and practical studies found a responsive audience among business leaders and social reformers, especially those who wanted to think themselves modern and up-to-date.15

The fact that some progressive education reformers were not concerned about a lack of respect for authority was not a bar to having military training, however, since such training could be seen as more practical than Latin and Greek studies that were a particular target of reformers. If men like Colonel Gignilliat had been more familiar with educational reform they might have strengthened their case for military training, though it seems they were quite successful anyway and had little serious opposition. Besides all the benefits to the individual, military training was seen as a great boon to the nation. Since America had a small army, it would always have to rely on volunteers in wartime. If these volunteers already had some military training, the job of fielding an enlarged force would be much easier. It was occasionally acknowledged that there could be a drawback to military training for youth, that a growth of militarism could lead to a disrespect for civilian government. This was, however, a “theory not worthy of acceptation,” since the American soldier has always “stood for law and order.” Boys who had been taught reverence for the flag and the nation and had shown themselves willing to participate in the national defense would be better citizens, not militarists.16 Good citizenship is here equated with respect for authority, not with democratic ideals.

Youthful Soldiers Almost all writers on the subject saw many benefits to military training. The discipline instilled in boys would teach them prompt and unquestioning obedience to lawful authority. Military training in public schools was seen as successful everywhere it had been tried, including most prominently the City of Boston, where two hours of drill per week was required of all boys in public high schools. “The strictest discipline is maintained while the cadets are in uniform,” and the training ended with a spring field day at the end of the academic year, in which all the “youthful soldiers” were required to participate. Referring to the boys as “youthful soldiers” rather than cadets shows confidence that a few hours of drill per week would make some important changes in character. Progressives wanted to change society by changing people and there was a feeling that if young men are reformed, then the nation

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will be too. Another example is the West Middle District School of Hartford, Connecticut, which had had military training for the past twenty-five years. This school had three hours of drill for the boys, which culminated in a spring parade reviewed by a prominent official, often the governor. Many of the students went on to become officers in the Army or the National Guard. All this was made possible because boys were “naturally interested in soldiering and heartily enjoy[ed] having it made a part of their school life.”17 There was occasional dissent about the value of military training in the schools. It was alternately praised and condemned in a 1909 Los Angeles Times editorial. On the one hand, “military training in the public schools might be made the most valuable part of the course,” but on the other, it “would probably be a farce.” The training would be valuable because it would be excellent mental training. The editorialist believed that the close order drill (sometimes referred to as “evolutions”) put the mind in a state of “tense receptiveness.” This was a good thing lacking in most Americans, the writer said, except for great businessmen, who are always on the lookout for new opportunities, and Jews. “The Jew has written his name in large letters across the face of the earth because his mind is open to receive. His mind is never fixed on far-off pipe dreams. When it looks like rain he corners umbrellas and lets someone else corner airship stock.” The tense receptiveness of great businessmen and Jews leads them to decisive independent action, while the tense receptiveness of schoolboys makes them eager to carry out orders, something of a contradiction. Besides opening minds, military training was a “great collector of scattered wits,” and “German statistics” showed that workers with military training were 30 percent more efficient in the factory than those who had not had such training. Presumably men who had learned to submit to Prussian military discipline would find factory discipline easy to tolerate. The writer of the editorial claimed that there were stories of sensitive young men who were ruined by harsh military training, but this was a minor thing when compared to what military training could correct: the nation’s “besetting sin ... contempt of law and unwillingness to accept discipline.” This commentator cited no evidence for his choice of America’s number one sin; apparently to him this would be obvious to any clearheaded observer of the national scene. With all this going for it, how could an editorialist think that military training in the schools might be a “farce”? Apparently the writer had seen some high school military training and was not impressed: “Wisely severe discipline and hard genuine military training would be the finest thing that could be introduced into our schools. But melancholy observation has shown that the ‘military training’ would consist of sloppy, inexpert, slipshod drills by giggling boys who huddle around the evolutions like sheep. It would be a waste of time.”18 It is likely that such behavior by adolescent boys was fairly widespread


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and not all eyes would glisten and nerves tingle at the prospect of marching around a high school athletic field. However, many observers seemed to believe that all boys were eager for close-order drill. The California Legislature did not agree with the above critical Los Angeles Times editorial. In 1911 it passed the Beban-Crosby Act, which supplemented War Department provisions assisting schools. According to the provisions of the act, schools which could provide 40 cadets, as opposed to the 150 required by the federal government, would receive assistance from the state. Assistance took the form of obsolete but serviceable rifles (the KragJorgensen rifles, which were standard U.S. Army issue until replaced by the Springfield Model 1903) and ammunition provided at low cost. The state would also detail California National Guard officers to drill the cadets, supervise their target practice, and conduct formal inspections at least once a year. The act specified that the cadets would wear the same uniforms as the National Guard, have the same officer hierarchy (elected, as were National Guard officers), and conduct drills per the regulations of the Regular Army. The legislature appropriated $5,000 for two years to fund the program, and “already a large number of cadet companies have been formed in the state.”19 Though the training provided by the Beban-Crosby Act was voluntary, at the Southern California Teachers Association meeting in Los Angeles in December 1911 a resolution endorsing it failed. According to a Los Angeles Times report, such an endorsement, urged by Assistant Superintendent Melville Dozier of the City of Los Angeles, seemed certain to be approved. Dozier stated that “compulsory military training was needed in the school as an aid to the development of strength of character and obedience to the law.” In response, County Superintendent of Education Mark Keppel spoke for 20 minutes in opposition. He said: Those nations which have made the greatest preparation for war have been the ones to have been mixed up in international controversy. All the great wars have been the result of the spirit of militarism.... The United States is a nation that will always be able to take care of itself. The spirit of justice is so well developed in the people that at any time the call will come the people will answer if the cause is just. It is, therefore, foolish to weaken ourselves as a nation by spending vast sums on armaments when this amount would feed the hungry and shelter the homeless poor of the nation.20

In the superintendent’s scheme it is the ideals of the nation that are its defense, specifically its feeling for justice. The people don’t need to be militarized; if they see the nation is in danger they will respond immediately, but preparations for war make unnecessary wars more likely. Keppel was calling for unmilitarized patriotism and he was persuasive. The meeting voted in favor of a resolution that stated, “We believe that the law providing for military drill in high schools is not in sympathy with the peace movement,”

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hardly a forceful statement, but one that avoided the imposition of compulsory drill.

Some Military Enthusiasts By the following year an Army officer saw two reasons for military training in public schools. One was the progressive deterioration in Americans, who might be called upon to form a corps of volunteers in an emergency. Captain James Parker believed that this deterioration came about because Americans now were not used to a rugged outdoor life, which most had been in earlier times, and that many fewer were good riflemen. There was also a mental and moral side to this degeneration. Americans were not as willing now as they had been to obey orders unquestioningly — they had to have everything explained to them and were much more liable to desert than they had been. This would never do for a military organization, which must be “controlled by sharp and decisive expressions of commanding will, regardless of whether the individual knows the reasons for them or not.” Parker believed that modern indiscipline was best illustrated by employee strikes. These, he wrote, were usually at the behest of a “walking delegate” and owed their effectiveness to the threat of violence: “The class of men who can plan, aid, sympathize with, profit by and contribute money to, commit and defend such conspiracies as the assassination of Governor Steunenberg and the wrecking of the Los Angeles Times, is not a class suitable for making soldiers.” Here Parker equates strikers with those who conspire to murder and terrorize by bombings. This same class of men, he wrote, will oppose military training of boys in the schools, since boys so trained will never join them in their lawless conspiracies. Additionally, “since 1898 ... this country faces the condition that it must be prepared to defend its worldwide interests at a moment’s notice.” Parker’s other reason why military training in schools was necessary was that the technology of warfare had advanced, so that there was much more to learn about being a soldier. He did not elaborate this second reason.21 Captain Parker’s solution for lawlessness and indiscipline was a national program of military training, established by law. The states and the federal government would cooperate; the federal responsibility being provision of supplies and instructors, while the states, subject to federal inspection, would conduct the training. He wrote that public high schools would be the best place to conduct this training, since the average American boy started high school, though most would not finish. Teenage boys’ characters were still being formed and could be molded in positive ways by the proper training. Parker seemed to realize that this might be a hard sell in many school districts.


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He wrote that “some military enthusiasts” should be recruited in each district to sell the plan. These enthusiasts could be retired military personnel, or perhaps the parents of boys who were currently being sent to private military academies for their secondary education. The captain thought that many more parents, who couldn’t afford the $500 or $1000 that these academies charged, would be eager to have military training for boys in their local school. Another Army captain, Charles T. Boyd, explained the military training given in the nation’s colleges and universities. The 1862 legislation that established the land grant universities specified that these schools were to provide military training, but left it completely up to the schools to determine what should be taught, by whom, and how often training should be conducted. It did provide that up to 100 active-duty regular Army officers could be detailed to colleges and schools to supervise the training and that rifles, ammunition and uniforms could be supplied. In 1903, however, further legislation mandated that an unlimited number of retired military officers could be assigned to the schools and prescribed the type and duration of the training. Captain Boyd believed that young college men would derive many benefits from being required to stand at attention. He wrote that a head-up, face-forward position would produce a direct outlook on life and “consequent fearlessness.” Squaring up one’s shoulders would prepare one to “bear responsibilities with resolute will.” Further benefits derived from marching would be proper breathing and walking with the legs alone (not using the arms, shoulders, or hands), though what good would come from legs-only walking was not specified. In view of all this, Captain Boyd opined, would it not be reasonable to think that upright posture would lead to upright character? It might, but this is another idea that Progressive educational reformers would probably have rejected. They were opposed to the idea of subjects such as Latin or Greek being valuable as good training for the mind. This was too abstract for them, and probably the idea of standing at attention as character-building would also have been. The practicality of military training as a preparation for a life-role or career would have been more congenial to them. Poor posture was not the only problem with youth, however. Boyd wrote that disrespect for authority by the young also concerned him. Since the ethos of the military was that of unquestioning obedience to orders, military training would obviously be useful here. Those young men who excelled at the training would be appointed as student officers, and since they had disciplined themselves well, they would be able to assist in the disciplining of the rest of the students. The instruction in the first year of college was in marching and marksmanship. In his second year the student would be a corporal and assist in the training of freshmen. Third year students would be sergeants and the best

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senior students would be officers. Upon graduation all students would have had infantry and artillery training and some exposure to military signaling. The best student officers might be offered commissions in the state National Guards, and some honor graduates would be offered regular army commissions. All of the young men would be qualified to serve in volunteer forces, should an emergency arise. Boyd was so taken with the value of this training that he proposed a similar national system for high schools.22 If such a system had gone into effect it would have gone a considerable way towards some sort of universal military service and formed the basis for a much larger army, but this never happened. Colonel Edgar S. Dudley of the Army Judge Advocate Corps agreed that military training for young men was essential and would stand them in good stead in military or civilian pursuits. He too thought that young Americans tended to be undisciplined and did not have the proper respect for authority. He proposed an experiment to his readers. He suggested that they compare young men after a year at a school with military training with those who attended a school without such training. The colonel was confident that those who had training would “have changed for the better; they will have acquired habits of self-control, respect for superiors, and, if correctly taught, principles of honor in word and conduct, a sense of responsibility for the performance of every duty devolving upon them that constitute the best foundation of character and for success in civil as well as military life.”23 As Captain Boyd did not, Colonel Dudley referred to world conditions as a reason for having a strong military. For this Army officer, the world was a dangerous place. Nations may be commercially strong, but militarily weak, and if they were weak they could be preyed upon. His examples of what happened to the weak were China, Africa, and the partitions of Poland. Though the United States had no compulsory military service, such as most European nations did, it still should prepare its young men for war. In fact, the colonel wrote, if it became necessary to compel young men to have military training the Republic would be in danger, since compulsion would only be necessary in the event of a lack of both patriotism and ideals of sacrifice for one’s country. Dudley shows an attitude common among many Progressive reformers and professional military men, a placing of social duty above individual desires. For both, the nation would be improved if individuals did the right thing for country and society before doing what would improve one’s personal life.

The Wyoming Plan The Army had a fervent advocate of military training in high schools in Capt. E.Z. Steever, creator of the Wyoming Plan. Steever was assigned to


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Wyoming in 1911 and apparently found a lack of interest in military training in the state’s high schools. He wrote that there were groups opposed to military training for youth, such as labor unions, parents, school teachers, women’s clubs, and most importantly, the boys themselves. Steever devised a series of what could be called sales pitches, to overcome the objections of these groups. The school teachers were told that the training would make the boys manlier and more amenable to instruction. The women’s clubs were reassured that the training was based on moral principles and would produce “non-smoking and clean-thinking boys.” Labor unions should not feel threatened, because Steever’s program was training for national defense, unconnected with local and state law enforcement, and had absolutely no “caste idea” in it. What he meant by this was that those boys who showed aptitude would become leaders, but would not have titles— they would not be captains and generals who would lord it over lesser beings. Steever believed that the most resistance to the idea was from the boys themselves, who were enthusiastically committed to competing in football, basketball and track. He met their objections by making the training more like a competitive sport and removing the dull routines associated with it. The routines would be replaced by contests, both within and between high schools. It was not until the final paragraph of a 7-page article that Captain Steever revealed some concrete details of what his method was. Apparently drill was taught, but the main emphasis was on field problems in leadership (making the right decision at the right time), map reading, and maneuvering troops. He believed that this type of training fostered the development of initiative, as opposed to the stifling of initiative that could be produced by a rigid disciplinary regime. By making his training like a sporting event, or indeed like the military tournaments described in the next chapter, Steever hoped to enliven it and make it attractive to boys who couldn’t become excited about marching in formation.24 He gave more information in a report that was published as an appendix in Colonel Gignilliat’s 1916 book. In it he wrote that good citizenship was the main goal of his plan, since it should not be expected to produce soldiers. The preparation for assuming the duties of a citizen would be of five kinds— military, moral, civic, business and educational. In his opinion a “thorough preliminary military training of its adolescent youth has been recognized in primitive as well as modern civilization as the first step in the greater training of the tribe or nation” and the “game is the medium of all successful training.” Progressives and young Army officers were great supporters of team sports, believing that the individual should subordinate his welfare, and indeed his goals, to the welfare of the team. With such backing, team sports in high schools and colleges expanded rapidly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For mostly middle-class students, aggressive team sports

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were a way of expressing their masculinity in a manner approved by society and controlled by manly self-restraint and morality. As to the nature of the competitions, the Captain noted that all units were to have an equal number of strong, weak, and “medium” boys. They would be competing in wall-scaling, infantry drill, troop leadership, scholarship, field firing, and in camp and field procedures. There would be sponsors for each unit and this is where high school girls were given a role. Girls were selected as sponsors, Steever did not say how, but did say that they were in every way members of the competing units— except that they did not compete. They were supposed to attend all drills and to be the leaders in “all social functions.” The sponsors also received any medals or ribbons that were awarded to competing units. Training within each school prepared the cadets for tournaments which were held several times during the year between different high schools. In the tournaments the cadets competed in everything except scholarship, which did not then lend itself to field day competition. Next in the report was a description of Wyoming Plan training that a cadet might receive during the course of a school year. The year is broken up into two month periods, each period working on particular areas with a minimum of drill. There was also to be camp each week, to harden them to the rigors of camp life, and a two week camp in the summer. In camp the boys were to be taught “sanitation, cooking, woodcraft, simple field engineering, plains-craft, castramentation [methods of laying out and organizing military camps], sketching, scouting, patrolling, the service of security and information, and [all this would] qualify them as guides in their own immediate surrounding territory.” As noted above, Steever saw the Wyoming Plan as preparing young people for good citizenship, in several different areas. All the above was military preparation, but there were several others. When he came to describe the moral preparation for citizenship, he asserted that nations rose or fell according to the “single standard” of “high-mindedness, cleanliness and manliness” that they kept — or lost. He claimed that “clean men morally are the surest kind of winners,” but did not explain how purity led to victory, apparently thinking this was self-evident. Under the pressure of preparing to compete, however, “smoking and immoral practices must go,” and he used the example of a squad of cadets from Casper, Wyoming, who set a world record in wall scaling, “not one of whom had ever smoked.” Steever’s thoughts illustrate the all or nothing quality of much Progressive thought about morality. Vice seemed to be everywhere and to range from cigarettes to bordellos. Reform of the individual was necessary as a basis for political and economic reform, and military training would help produce the morally clean men who would reform the nation after being reformed themselves. The civic and business preparations for citizenship were dealt with more


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summarily. The civic part was seen to depend on the election by the cadets of their leaders. Steever admitted that this was quite inappropriate for soldiers, but repeated again that the main object of the training was not to produce combat-ready soldiers but good citizens. The election of cadet leaders would demonstrate, he thought, the consequences of careless voting. Poor leaders would result in poor performance, and boys hate to lose. The business part was that the training the cadets received in, for instance, wall-scaling (his favorite example) showed them the crucial importance of efficiency, so important to business and military success. The last type of preparation, educational, was not commented upon.25 Further information about the Wyoming Plan was given by the superintendent of schools in Cheyenne, Wyoming, Ira B. Fee. The summer camp routine was described. As soon as the school year was over cadets hiked 26 miles into the mountains, accompanied by wagons bringing the supplies and food that they would need for two weeks. During the days the cadets practiced maneuvers and drilled, and there was a one night sham battle. Relaxation was afforded by fishing, hunting, and mountain climbing. The superintendent was very enthusiastic about the tournaments during the school year, which were well attended. He also reported that the state of Wyoming had finally decided to give military training in the high schools some financial support, in order to partially defray the cost of the uniforms. This aid was to be available to boys who signed a pledge not to use tobacco in any form. Use of the pledge had practically eliminated the use of tobacco among cadets in the state, according to Fee.26 Captain Steever may have been a critic of rote and routine, but he was a great believer in the virtues of the uniform and a strong supporter of gray as the proper color. He wrote that a spot does not show up very much on khaki or olive drab, but does on cadet gray. Since he saw an important benefit of military training as inculcating neatness and cleanliness, it was an advantage that dirt and spots showed up more on gray. Gray was also “becoming” and “attractive,” impressed the parents and was suitable for parades or for work in the field. He also thought that a uniform was a major drawing card for boys. His experience in Wyoming, Washington, D.C., and Chicago convinced him that if the schools could offer the uniforms for free, as opposed to the fifteen dollars that was usually charged, 90 percent of the boys might join the program. In 1917 Steever was stationed in Chicago, and stated he was willing to resign his commission if he could not get 10,000 of the 15,000 boys in the public high schools to participate — if the uniforms were free. Steever did not believe that military training should be compulsory. He was confident that he could interest large numbers of boys in his program and thought it better to work with those motivated to learn, rather than including those who might resent being compelled to participate. This might

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have set him apart from other military officers, but there was another idea he had that was unique. He proposed that there be military training, of a sort, for girls— to supervise the crowds of refugees that would be a result of war. His reasoning went as follows. The United States was “non-militaristic” and didn’t invade other countries. Thus, if war came, we would be invaded. It would be necessary to retreat away from the coast that was invaded and this would create throngs of refugees. Steever supposed that everyone had seen pictures from Europe of crowds of women and children fleeing the German armies, “with an utter lack of organization.” He believed that American women had executive ability and they should be trained, starting with high school girls, to manage refugee crowds. They could be trained on how to give marching orders such as “squads right and left, camp sanitation, and how to organize large bodies of women and children.” Steever was not thinking that they should be trained to handle weapons. This would imply that the men of the country were unable to defend women and would mean that they were in “a very, very bad way.” Not only should women forgo weapons training, they should be discouraged from sniping, since the laws of war provided that civilian snipers could be executed by opposing military forces.27 The boys were the main focus, though, and Steever thought of a way to increase participation. The selection process for the teams that would be competing was critical. He gave the example of selecting teams for wall-scaling competitions, assuming that there were enough boys to make up ten teams. Adult supervisors of the program would have preliminary practice at the event in order to rate the boys on their strength. The twenty strongest boys would be designated as “last men over,” since the last over have to help the others over and then get themselves over unaided, and be assigned by lot, two to each squad. The next strongest group of twenty would be assigned similarly, until all boys were on a team. The weakest group of twenty was never to be called that, but referred to as the “first men over” or the “gun passers.” The assignments to teams were actually to be made by the state superintendent of schools, in order to prevent having all the best on one team, which could lead to what happened in “athletics, a little group taking all the exercise for the school.” The boys would stay on these teams and all medals awarded would be to each member of the team. Teams for academic contests would be selected in the same way, so that competition in map reading and sand table exercises would be even as well.28 Proponents of the Wyoming Plan and military training in general claimed much for it. A comment from New Castle, Wyoming, was that military drill “awakens the stupid and puts snap into the whole student body.” Military training was the type of education that fit in well with Progressive ideals. Now that adolescence was recognized as a period of transition between childhood and adulthood, when a young person faced many possibilities of


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going wrong, it became important to keep them in school and well-occupied throughout the time of danger. Also, civilian and military educators were convinced of the lasting effects of educational experiences on young people. They both wanted a practical education, which would prepare young people for their roles in a changing society. Military educators were convinced that if the young men who drilled in high schools and colleges never had any contact with the military after graduation, they would benefit from the training no matter what role in society they came to play.

Peace Scouts Military training for boys was not the sole province of schools. The Boy Scout movement in this country began in 1910 and from its beginnings was subjected to some criticism as too militaristic. The movement’s founder, Lord Baden-Powell, was motivated by the poor physical condition of recruits for the British Army during the Boer War (1899–1902). He thought that exposing boys, particularly from the cities, to outdoor activities and camping would make them more ready for military service. Though scouts wore uniforms, were organized into troops, and used a military salute in flag ceremonies, proponents were firm that “the object is not to make soldiers of the boys. They are peace scouts.”29 Baden-Powell became aware of the “boy problem” after his tour of duty as inspector general of cavalry, 1903–1907. In 1908 his Scouting for Boys was published, which was a rewrite of his earlier military handbook, Aids to Scouting. In Scouting for Boys there is a direct association between manliness and the life and training of a military scout, trapper, and colonial frontiersman.... Throughout the book great emphasis is placed on individual self-discipline and improvement with a hostility to rote learning.... The fully equipped Scout is sketched as a fine upstanding young man striding purposefully towards adult life with an easy, self-confident gait in contrast to the street corner loafer, visibly depressed and round-shouldered, idling his time away with cigarette smoking and football matches.... There is an emphasis on practical skills and learning by doing and little space is devoted to book learning. Baden-Powell remained a persistent critic of the limitations of the public and the elementary school curriculum with its emphasis on either the classics or basic literacy.30

Baden-Powell remained firm that the Scouts were not military in any way, but his principles for them included two that that seemed militaristic to some observers. There were nine principles, and number two was “a Scout is loyal to his officers, to his country and to his employers.” Number seven was “a Scout obeys the orders of his Patrol Leader or Scout Master without

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Lord Baden-Powell (left), President Taft, and British Ambassador Lord Bryce on the White House Portico in 1911, about to review a parade of Boy Scouts.

question.” These rules were listed in a New York Times article that quoted an official of the New York YMCA, who described a visit promoting Boy Scouts by a British YMCA representative. The American stated, “If we could have another General Baden-Powell, like Theodore Roosevelt, for instance, promoting the idea [of Scouting], and if Japan, say, threatened an invasion, making an analogous situation to that prevailing in England, then the Boy Scout idea would sweep the country like wildfire, as it has abroad.”31 Another YMCA official agreed that if some great military man in the U.S. would get behind the idea its success would be assured, though there was not as much military spirit in America as there was in England. Another indication that the Scouts may not have been entirely peaceful is the illustration accompanying the article: English Scouts listening to a talk by a military officer at the Waterloo battlefield in Belgium. Baden-Powell himself visited New York in the fall of 1910 and a banquet in his honor was given at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Theodore Roosevelt was invited, but sent a letter expressing regrets. The letter stated that he gave his wholehearted support to the Boy Scout program and was willing to serve as vice president of the national organization, though he could not take an active


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A parade of Boy Scouts carrying staffs, during Lord Baden-Powell’s 1911 visit to the White House.

part in its affairs. TR wrote that industrial civilization had some unhealthy effects, so that many young men lacked “the essential virtues, which must be embodied in any man who is to be a good soldier and which, especially, ought to be embodied in every man to be really a good citizen in time of peace.” Here Roosevelt reversed the usual order, by stating that Scouting would make it possible for a man to be a good soldier and also a good citizen. He got back on track in the next paragraph, writing that “your especial aim is to make the boys good citizens in time of peace, and incidentally to make them good soldiers in time of war; although the latter inevitably follows, being what might be called a byproduct of the former,” a rather awkward construction for so accomplished a writer as Theodore Roosevelt. At the banquet Baden-Powell thanked Roosevelt for his support and predicted a great future for the Scouts in America. He made a rather odd point, agreeing with Roosevelt that it was necessary to put some of the “wild man” back into boys, apparently referring to TR’s comment about the “excessive development of city life.” Baden-Powell also thought that America had some advantages over England that would help Scouting, such as the availability of actual frontiersmen as role models and the establishment of an effective national organization at the inception of the Scouting program. He defined

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the main objective of Scouting to be the developing of the proper “spirit” in boys, also referred to as “character,” and stated that boys without the proper spirit would never be “of great service to the country.”32 In 1912 Baden-Powell visited America again, and this time a review and field day was held and attended by 5,000 Scouts. The headlines above the article read “5,000 Boy Scouts Drill for Baden-Powell” and “Fight a Sham Battle, Build Bridges, Light Fires, Indian Fashion, and Rig a 30-foot Tower.” This event was held in the New York National Guard 71st Regiment Armory in Manhattan and lasted three hours. Most of the time was taken up with demonstrations of various skills by the 110 Troops in attendance, which included bandaging the wounds of the injured and building “litters for the dead on the battlefield.” The climax of the day came when a bugle sounded and the Scouts on the Armory floor marched in an expanding spiral joined by Scouts in the stands until all 5,000 were on the floor to hear a speech by Baden-Powell. When the event was over, a scoutmaster thought that it had shown “that this country need never worry so long as it can boast of an army of Boy Scouts to protect its interests and its honor.”33 Another Scout event was described in a New York Times article in 1911, this time a series of long marches to a camp on Long Island and outdoor activities at the camp. One troop marched to the camp from 35 miles away in two days, in “heavy marching order,” which meant carrying “almost the regulation army baggage, a heavy blanket, rubber poncho and knapsack containing mess kit and all the clothes they had worn in the past two weeks.” This troop was accompanied by a base drummer who beat out the time, though he was small enough to be referred to as a “tiny tot.” The reporter who wrote this story told of the Boy Scout guards who patrolled the entrance of the camp and had to report visitors to the corporal of the guard. He also saw Scouts drilling in formation, a practice that Baden-Powell had said was not recommended. Once at the camp, however, it appears the Scouts spent their time swimming, practicing woodcraft, and working on getting their merit badges. There was criticism of the militaristic aspects of the Scouts. A letter to the New York Times in 1910 contrasts the celebration of the anniversary of the first Hague peace conference by the schools that year with the formation of the Boy Scouts. The writer thought Scouting encouraged militarism. His main complaint seemed to be the military trappings; their uniforms and brass buttons.34 An official of the Scouts replied and stated that while in the Scouts manual Baden-Powell discussed uniforms, he was careful to avoid the military style. As with most denials of militaristic elements of Scouting, this one fell a bit flat. The official concluded by writing that the “the military virtues of alert bearing, erect carriage, discipline and obedience are Scout virtues” and the Scouts should not carry their anti-military attitude too far, since a


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nation should be ready for “self-assertion when it is necessary. Excessive peace at certain times may be more disastrous and dangerous than war.”35 Among the most vocal critics of the militaristic aspects of the Boy Scouts were the labor unions. The unquestioning obedience to authority called for by the principles of Scouting made many in labor uneasy about the movement soon after it began in this country in 1910. Labor soon had some basis for this unease: “The Boy Scouts of Des Moines, Iowa had been used to break a strike of bootblacks, and ... in Ironton, Missouri the Boy Scouts had organized a band to perform when a union band was on strike.” These incidents provoked a reaction from the Western Federation of Miners, whose statement said that the Boy Scouts were intended to provide “an effective army of servile, dog-like automats ... a trained body of flunkies, strikebreakers, and in case of need, policemen and soldiers.” Some state federations of labor issued condemnations of Scouting, and there was enough concern for the AFL to take up the matter in their 1911 convention. They decided on further study and had some meetings, prior to the next convention, with Boy Scout leaders. These leaders decided to make some changes, specifically, to leave out references to employers as people who should be unquestioningly obeyed and to deemphasize the military aspects of Scouting. These changes were enough for the AFL leadership to decide that Scouting should not be opposed, that labor should instead attempt to influence its development as a less militaristic organization. Other groups supporting workers, such as the Industrial Workers of the World and the Socialist Party, remained adamantly opposed to Scouting. Wobblies, as members of the I.W.W. were called, were urged to approach Scouts and “point out the reason the capitalistic class is so anxious to make a soldier out of him ... be kind to him ... speak kindly to him ... it is not his fault.” In spite of the kindness recommended, the Wobblies were firm in their opposition: “We must be unrelenting in fighting this movement; the growth of the Boy Scout movement is fraught with danger for revolutionists.”36

Conclusions Though there were a few critics, the large majority of comments about military training for boys and young men were favorable. The inculcation of military discipline was seen as excellent preparation for citizenship, and the possibility that there might be better methods was not discussed. Not only would young men who had received military training be better citizens, they would also be cleaner, more moral, more masculine and think straighter. Military values were seen as a cure for what ailed the youth of America. The most important part of military training in schools was marching

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and drilling. It consisted in moving men as a unit and responding to commands to change the direction or speed of march. Originally these commands were used on the battlefield, to move units in or out of position. By the twentieth century, however, firepower had so increased its range and effectiveness that marching large groups of men around in the open was no longer advisable. When attacks were made they were usually preceded by skirmishers taking advantage of cover and defenders were entrenched or making use of fortifications. Then and today, however, marching and drilling are still taught. They are thought to train recruits to obey orders without question, respect hierarchy in the form of the chain of command and to submerge individuality into a group, effectively implanting these military values. There was anxiety about what would happen to unsupervised youth and young men are never more supervised than when marching on a drill field. This was seen as benefiting not only the young men, but society as a whole. Progressive values, such as an emphasis on reforming the individual, improving morals, and submission to group norms, were also well served by drilling and all other military training. Progressives wanted all children in school, longer school years, compulsory attendance, and practical curriculum — more rather than less regulation. Military training did not fit in with the type of education that John Dewey organized in his experimental school and wrote books about, but it fit in very well with the types of change that local school boards around the country implemented. Now that schooling was longer and peers were becoming more influential, military training was seen as an ideal way to prepare youth to fulfill their roles in society as obedient citizens who could mesh well with a group. It was definitely middle-class values that were being inculcated; there was none of the free-wheeling boisterous nature of working-class leisure here. Norms of conformity, hostility to intellectuality, and passivity (in the sense of regimentation) were well exemplified by military drill. There was much opportunity for self-restraint and compliance with imposed moral standards in a high school cadet company, but not very much scope for individual displays of strength, aggressiveness, or sexuality. Of course there was no scope at all for female students in the cadet companies in the high schools and colleges, apart from isolated and rather feeble attempts to have girls “sponsor” boys and the like. And if appearances of girls were isolated, appearances of African Americans and immigrants were practically nonexistent. Finally, other features of military training in the schools, especially those involving ceremonies such as flag raising and lowering and formal parades and reviews, very effectively reinforced a militarization of patriotism to young men and their families.


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During the Progressive Era and continuing to the present day, “progressive education” has been attacked as encouraging disorder in the classroom and hence in America, because it was thought to be without strict rules and effective discipline. The widespread acceptance of military training in the schools, then, shows that Progressive educators were not about to let the inmates run the institution. In the nation’s secondary schools and colleges the Army taught and exhibited military values to an audience supplied for them. Though officers like Major Gignilliat and Captain Steever took their responsibilities very seriously and tried to make the training interesting and enjoyable, nevertheless the audience of cadets and their families was a captive one. What about the public at large? They were not a captive audience provided by an organization with the ability to require attendance. They would have to be enticed to witness displays of martial spirit, and the Army was up to this challenge. They met it by putting on military tournaments across America, which entertained as well as encouraged support for military values. These events, which combined sporting competition and military display, are the subject of the next chapter.

4. “A glimpse of mimic warfare” The tournament is a token of the times, a glimpse of mimic warfare brought to our doors in this busy commercial city of ours, a touch of the mailed fist that arouses the Anglo-Saxon warrior spirit. — Town and Country, 1902.1

The lessons of the Spanish-American War were the basis of many reforms in the U.S. military. Younger officers were determined to improve the lives of enlisted men and to find ways to occupy their off-duty time that did not involve alcohol or prostitutes. They thought if they could do this, a more effective soldier would be produced, and this would help with the Army’s serious problem of desertion. Civilian officials in the War Department agreed with efforts to encourage athletics and set up an office to help. These men, up to and including the secretary of war, thought that sports were “the most efficient means to cultivate national vitality, citizenship, and the martial spirit. Military training, infused with a heavy dose of sports and athletics, would not only train American men in the “soldierly values” of obedience, citizenship and combat, but would also usefully repair class schisms and restore social order and patriotism to the nation.”2 It also became official policy to encourage competition with civilians in team sports such as baseball and football and in track and field competitions.

The 1908 Army-Navy Game Beginning in the 1890’s, the service academies of West Point and Annapolis increased their attention to team sports. The Army-Navy football game, from its inception in 1890, was an event drenched in military symbolism and terminology. At that first game a field had to be roped off on the Quadrangle at West Point, and the Naval Academy quarterback was heard giving a command to “clear decks for action,” while his Army counterpart ordered his team to “right front into double line.” 38

4. “A glimpse of mimic warfare”

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The 1908 Army-Navy game coverage in the New York Times was detailed and flowery. The subhead read “Grizzled Veterans of Uncle Sam’s Service Mingle with Youth and Beauty While Embryo Generals and Admirals Contest for Football Supremacy.” A sellout crowd of 30,000 saw the game at Philadelphia’s Franklin Field, where it was played into the 1960’s. The reporter noted that the battle was a “crucial” one, because the series was tied at six games apiece, and then described in breathless prose the importance of the game. The Army-Navy game was the “most sought-after institution in the whole country,” for two reasons. First, what the reporter called the “sentiment of the game” dealt with attitudes towards the players. They were “the sons of the country ... so dominant is the feeling of proprietorship and relationship in the Nation toward its boy protectors.” The game was seen as giving the spectators “assurances of sons for the defense of hearth and roof, promises which give birth to ties as deep and vital as those of blood and bone.” The second element which made the game such an epochal event was the “pictures” associated with the game, by which was meant images of the teams, the crowd, and the stadium which made it such a spectacle: “The picture is the highest fulfillment of the allied American arts. To it are contributed the beauty of her women and the splendor of their gowns and distinction of her bravest and finest men [presumably the many Army and Navy officers present] and bright comparison of her Army and Navy, the emblems of her patriotism, and the magnificent vitality and unalloyed enthusiasm of her youth.” The game was very much a place to be seen, and apparently had a tradition of allowing women to wear the large and elaborate hats of the times: “It is notoriously indulgent to owners of festive hats, who are constrained by ordinary football games to leave these treasures at home.” The cadets from West Point entered first. As they marched onto the field the “whole amphitheater caught the infection of the military rhythm and marked time with their heels.” Then the midshipmen’s “swinging step filled the air with a curious pulsing rhythm ... they did make a pageantry which elicited a whirlwind of applause.” When the game began Army scored twice quickly and then Navy scored. Army maintained its lead through the “slaughtering line play” that took up the rest of the half. Besides the women’s hats, this game had another tradition, that of the half-time promenade. When the teams had left the field for the half and the bands began to play, the spectators left the stands and began to walk around the field. One object of this was to try to get a glimpse of the distinguished guests, which included Alice Roosevelt Longworth and her husband, Representative Nicholas Longworth, and President-elect Taft’s daughter Helen. Everyone would “institute comparisons and inspect each other in passing.” The second half of the game was a defensive battle, since Army had

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decided to sit on their lead. In those times line play dominated the game and the kicking game was more important. Since there was little passing (in the first half there had been only one pass, none were mentioned for the second), most games were low-scoring. The final score was Army 6, Navy 4. When the final whistle blew, the cadets poured onto the field for their victory celebration. One of them stood in the middle of the field with their victory banner while all the other cadets moved back and joined hands: “The short hush before the order to charge was breathtaking.” When a whistle sounded the cadets all dropped hands and rushed toward the banner. The first man who reached it climbed on the shoulders of the bearer and the rest of the cadets lifted these two into the air and “with it all such a screaming and yelling as to almost deafen the fascinated spectators, who could not move away while the cadets were celebrating.” After the celebration the teams left the field, the Navy band silent, “for the band of the beaten team cannot play after the referee’s whistle.”3 The Army-Navy game was a reflection of the development of mass spectator sports in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Professional baseball led the way and had some qualities in common with football, along with some differences. Games of both sports were open to all and the contests were seen as events where Americans from differing backgrounds could come together and cheer together — always excepting African Americans, who might be allowed in the stadium for menial or demeaning roles, but not as players. These sporting contests always highlighted the necessity for the individual to submit his will to the needs of the team — any higher ideal and individual accomplishment, while admired, was not as great. Newspaper articles covering these games rarely mentioned individual players’ names; the star system had not yet arrived for football. This emphasis on the group is also clear in the military tournaments popular in early twentieth-century America, to which we now turn.

Tournaments In an era when movies and radio were in their infancy, practically all entertainment was live. In this chapter the Army presents itself as an exemplar of martial values in public performances. The popular military tournaments showed large groups of men submitting themselves to a patriotic discipline, working together as one. This demonstrated an overcoming of barriers between men, a transformation that was a goal of Progressive reform. The events must have also been reassuring to middle class men, whose fears have been an interest of historians from Richard Hofstadter to Gail Bederman. Everything was very manly, since it was under the control of highly self-controlled officers; all presumably moral men in service to a noble cause.


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Manly, but also masculine, since well-channeled aggression and mock violence were also on display. What the newspapers of the time called a military tournament was a track and field competition combined with a review, which had soldiers rapidly performing such military tasks as setting up and taking down tents. An annual tournament was held at Madison Square Garden in New York in the spring. This was more than a local event and units came from all over the country to participate. The New York tournaments were sponsored by the Military Athletic League, which was organized in 1897 and began sponsoring an annual tournament at Madison Square Garden in 1899, the year after the Spanish-American War. The original purpose of the league was to raise funds to support ill or incapacitated members of the New York National Guard. “Many of the most prominent men and women in New York City joined in the charitable undertaking to provide and endow beds in the Homeopathic Hospital for the use of National Guardsmen, and there was held in Madison Square Garden to raise the necessary funds a big military tournament.”4 The tournament was so successful that it became an annual event, and the proceeds from the tournaments were used to support and extend military athletics. In this work the league’s primary goal was to improve the National Guard, and Col. W.F. Morris, league president, was certain that it had done that. He wrote that interest and participation in sports in the military had grown tremendously since the league was founded and that the Army men of 1907 were much more physically fit, hence more mentally alert and better soldiers. This type of thinking was typical of Progressive reformers like those who promoted the Playground Movement’s principle that training the body trained the mind. Col. Morris felt that the league had played an important role in developing the tournaments, which had benefited the men, the military, and the nation.

Military Drill in the Show Predecessors of these tournaments included the circus, vaudeville, and wild west shows. The American circus developed from a one-ring show that traveled by wagons between rural towns to the railroad circus that had its own train with hundreds of workers, performers, and exotic animals on board. Reaching throughout the country by 1900, it became an American cultural form quite different from its one-ring European predecessor. The rapid pace of acts succeeding each other in three rings, stages and an outer hippodrome track made spectators feel they hadn’t seen it all and brought repeat business, as well as preparing its audiences for the “ascendancy of modern disembodied media technologies: Hollywood movies, radio, television and the Internet.”

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The railroad circus was an integral part of the rapidly developing mass culture of the early twentieth century. Like the wild west shows and the military tournaments, it “capitalized on middle-class notions of propriety to produce virtuous entertainment for all classes.” All of these entertainments were thought to be especially suitable for children — they taught “great moral lessons about courage, discipline, and bodily fortitude.” The Progressive educators who led the Playground Movement thought that physical exercise in a controlled environment could improve self-discipline, and the circus provided fine examples of body and self control, along with being an exciting outing. The circus also had a considerable influence on the development of advertising and public relations methods in the early twentieth century. Advance men for the circus worked cities for months in advance of the show’s arrival, putting up brightly colored posters and distributing press releases about the acts and the performers. Newspaper coverage of one of the military tournaments described below refers to the methods of “circus agents.”5 Vaudeville was another mass entertainment that tried, like circuses and wild west shows, to present entertainment to the widest possible audience. Its predecessor was the saloon concert, which needed considerable sanitizing before women and children could attend. A typical vaudeville show had a series of rather short variety acts, the whole show lasting about two hours with a brief intermission. By 1900 it was the most popular form of entertainment in America. Vaudeville, unlike the other entertainment discussed here, was highly centralized; the Keith Circuit dominated bookings for the vaudeville theaters across the nation. It mirrored the growth of trusts, which controlled the production of various goods such as steel, sugar, and matches. The Keith Circuit offered continuous shows from late morning to late evening and was called the “Sunday School Circuit” for its attention to propriety. Still, it managed to retain some of the flavor of its working class origins. A 1911 survey (the only done of vaudeville audiences) shows that it appealed across class— 60 percent were “working” class while 36 percent were “clerical.” It thus may be a mistake to see the process of middle-class values modifying the working class; perhaps also “it was the middle class that was doing much of the adapting.”6 Military tournaments bear the strongest resemblance to shows like Buffalo Bill’s Wild West, particularly in the rapid pace of well-choreographed events and displays of horsemanship. William F. Cody began his entertainment career in 1872 as a theatrical performer in a play written by Ned Buntline. Cody was a Civil War veteran and Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R., the Union Army veterans organization) member, proud of his service and likely to appear at military and veteran events, as he did at the 1901 New York military tournament described below. Though he was eager to associate himself with famous Union Army generals like William Tecumseh Sherman and


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Philip Sheridan, his shows were popular in the South, representing as they did the actions of brave and chivalrous white men against hordes of bloodthirsty Indians. “Mostly, of course, Cody’s shows portrayed the Indian wars. Buffalo Bill’s first reenactment of the Battle of the Little Big Horn came in 1887, only eleven years after the event. The popularity of “Custer’s Last Fight” led Buffalo Bill to increase the representation of military drill in the show. Military drill and trick riding teams had been a regular feature of American fairs and circuses since the antebellum period, and such teams, drawn from regular army units, performed in European nations as well.”7 When Cody toured Europe he brought back some military men from countries he visited to perform at the Columbian Exposition as part of the “Congress of the Rough Riders of the World.” Cody also added “representative horsemen of the nonwhite tribesmen recently conquered by the imperial powers,” and at the Wild West’s opening parade rode at the head of all these performers as the “King of all the Rough Riders of the World ... signifying the American assumption of a leading role in world affairs.” The reenactments became a staple of his shows, along with other depictions of fights with Indians: “Exciting battles with Indians appeared to be morally and emotionally authorized because they were understood as white retaliation against Indian aggression.... And yet ... encouraging audiences to hate the ‘savages’ but love the Indian performers, it suggested an attitude the nation could take — triumphant in war but magnanimous to its former enemy — that suited Americans as memories of the Civil War faded into the distant past.”8 Though generous in victory, the Wild West exemplified the “principle that violence and savage war were the necessary instruments of American progress”; the show’s program contained an essay entitled “The Rifle as an Aid to Civilization.” Cody’s direction of the 1887 show in New York solidified the Wild West’s reputation as a family show, suitable for everyone no matter what their station in life: One measure of his new venture’s success was that in contrast to the mostly working-class fans of his frontier melodramas, and his first Wild West show season, audiences at Madison Square Garden ... included a broad cross-section of New Yorkers. According to one journalist, “statesmen, artists, military men, teachers, writers, musicians, businessmen, politicians, artizans, mechanics, and others who desire to know as much as possible about the history of their country” flocked to the show.... The patronage of veterans and military officers validated the show as both historically accurate and socially acceptable. Cody’s press agents distributed lists of officers in attendance. General Sherman saw it twenty times.9

Similarly, the military tournaments were very definitely the cleanest of family entertainment and appealed to a wide audience. Some of them, such as the 1910 Chicago event, had ticketed and free seating available, so as to

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encourage everyone to attend. The composition of the audiences is seldom commented upon, but it does seem like the type of event that would appeal strongly to middle-class spectators, being highly organized and celebratory of a military that many working-class men had reason to not appreciate. In 1894 the Wild West played another engagement in New York, this time in Brooklyn, where Cody leased 24 acres for his camp. By this time show personnel totaled almost 700 and their camp living quarters became part of the show. Spectators were invited to come early and tour the camp. It became almost as big an attraction as the show itself. The camp was a “living representation of progress, against which audiences could measure the historical, political, and social advancement and meaning of their own communities.... Some called it ‘The White City,’ as if the Columbian Exposition’s moral messages about the supremacy of American civilization and its greater destiny were now conveyed by the Wild West show ... a spectacle of racial anarchy wrought into progressive order by American frontier genius.”10 The employee camp is another point of similarity with the military tournaments; newspaper reporters made much of the camps that the Army and National Guard set up for spectators to tour before or after tournament events. Another resemblance was the expected effects on audiences. Urban boys and young men were expected to benefit by learning to “play Indian” or “play soldier”: “The ways that Buffalo Bill’s Wild West incited such childhood play helped to naturalize urban neighborhoods through an old American ritual: playing Indian.... By inspiring such frolicsome Indianness, Buffalo Bill’s Wild West show assisted in the transformation of city children into adults who retained frontier virtues. Beyond its impact on boys, the show’s seamless performance and generally law-abiding cast provided a spectacle of urban order to audiences concerned about the social chaos of their own city.”11 Cody kept his show up to date. In 1899 “Custer’s Last Fight” was replaced by “Battle of San Juan Hill” and “the military elements of the show — the cavalry drills, the display of new model artillery and Gatling guns (a feature of the San Juan Hill attack)— began to eclipse traditional Western elements.” In 1901 the Boxer Rebellion in China and the ensuing siege of Peking that trapped Western diplomats in that city, brought military intervention by European, Japanese, and American armed forces. It also caused the replacement of the San Juan Hill battle scene with a Boxer Rebellion drama, both of which can be seen as reflecting America’s growing involvement in international and colonial affairs.

An Actual Exhibition of Military Skill In 1900 Troop G of the Third Cavalry, stationed at Fort Meyer, Virginia, would be participating in the big New York tournament. There were to be


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several unusual features of their participation. For one, it would be the entire unit; the Third Cavalry was not going to send a picked unit of the best riders in the regiment. A New York newspaper reporter did not think this would be much of a handicap — he wrote he had recently seen them in full marching gear returning from a funeral, and they were “splendid specimens of the American soldier.” For another, they would be commanded by Captain F. H. Hardie, the famous rough rider. The captain had been portrayed in one of Richard Harding Davis’ pieces, no doubt heroically, and “throughout the entire army he has become noted as a rider of exhaustless endurance, with all the courage and with all the dash that endear such an officer to his men.” G Troop’s exhibition was to consist of close order drill and rough riding; the centerpiece of the rough riding was three men vaulting onto the backs of three galloping horses, turning in the air as they did so. The Times also noted that a new method of packing was going to be demonstrated in New York, where it would be shown how a new system of loading mules could be used to transport supplies and ammunition where army wagons couldn’t go. The emphasis given to the group over the individual is clear here, even to the comments that all of G Troop will go to the tournament, not a picked team of the best riders. The military privileging of the group over the individual is evident in G Troop’s practices and would carry over to the tournament, where the large majority of events would be team competitions.12 Opening night at Madison Square Garden in 1900 demonstrated to the New York Times’ satisfaction that “the military feeling and spirit is not dead.” Proof of this was the fact that the crowd was 50 percent larger than on the previous opening nights (1900 was the fourth annual) and it applauded enthusiastically for all the events. On this evening the troops were reviewed by then–Governor Theodore Roosevelt and his military staff of New York National Guard officers. TR and his officers appeared during the athletic events and were cheered by the soldiers and the crowd. The athletic events, bicycle and three-legged races, finished by nine P.M. and were followed by the review: “The soldiers and sailors, headed by the Thirteenth Regiment Band, marched into the tanbark-covered arena to the applause of the spectators.” The first unit was dressed in regulation blue shirt and khaki trousers, but many following had other uniforms, so that the “arena looked like a forest in the Autumn, so variegated were the bright colors among the somber browns and grays.” As soon as the troops had been reviewed, the “actual exhibition of military skill and training began with a skirmish drill ... commands were given by the bugler and the men executed all movements ... with a precision that excited the admiration of all military men present.” A skirmish drill, described fully in the next section on shooting contests, involved a simulation of men advancing under fire, assuming various shooting positions,

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and firing their weapons. This account does not state that rifles were fired, and it seems as though it was the efficient response to bugle calls that was most impressive to the spectators. The evening concluded with some riding exhibitions by two cavalry units.13 A military tournament was, like a circus, an object lesson for children. It taught “great moral lessons about courage, discipline, and bodily fortitude.” Two nights later the show was attended by Secretary of War Root and the senior staff of the Army. Root and his generals were applauded by the crowd and the evening was said to be first time that a secretary of war and his staff attended such an event. In honor of the secretary a “special feature,” a “sham battle with an invisible enemy,” was performed. The article describing this evening noted that that over 1,000 children from “charitable institutions” were present at the matinée that day. It listed these organizations as the Children’s Fold, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Messiah Home, Five Points House for Industry, Hebrew Benevolent Orphan Asylum, Department of Public Charities, Hebrew Sheltering Guardian Society, Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum, Institute for Deaf Mutes, and the Sheltering Arms. A few nights later the reviewing officer was Major General Nelson Miles, who was also warmly greeted by the crowd, which “repeatedly cheered and compelled him to doff his hat.” This was an even bigger crowd, standing room only, and when the troops marched in review they were enthusiastically applauded, especially the “jackies” (jack tars; sailors) from the battleship Indiana, with their goat mascot. Next an infantry unit marched on, stacked arms and quickly erected 29 two-man tents. Then they did a “setting-up drill with their muskets” (manual of arms?) to the music of the band, ran back and struck their tents, slung them over their shoulders, and went into a skirmish drill. At the end of that drill they fired their weapons and ran off in formation, cheered by the crowd. The next event was a cavalry drill which featured a line of horsemen 16 abreast jumping over a hurdle, followed by a demonstration of the Gatling Gun. In this a New York National Guard battery changed the wheels on the gun and disassembled and put back together the piece. They finished with a “realistic exhibition of battery work in war time, the men dropping off under imaginary fire by ones and twos, and finally all, their commander firing the last shot.” This seems to have been a typical show, with many events, none of which lasted too long. The rapid pace and coordinated movement of groups of men, interspersed with dangerous riding and gunfire, must have given an impression of powerful efficiency. The next to last performance was by West Point cadets, and during their act a special visitor arrived. “Buffalo Bill, Col. William F. Cody, was escorted across the arena, doffing his hat to the plaudits of the spectators. He went up


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to the boxes occupied by the reviewing party, where General Miles cordially shook hands with him, Buffalo Bill remaining with Miles for the remainder of the show.” Cody took every opportunity to associate himself with Army officers, particularly famous ones like Miles. His image on Wild West posters was always labeled “Col. W.F. Cody,” not “Buffalo Bill,” and his show itself had more military participation and military-themed events as time passed. The evening was concluded with a drill by a detachment of the 7th Cavalry.14 The New York Times was not the only publication that was deeply impressed by the Madison Square Garden tournaments. Here is an excerpt from the April 5, 1902, issue of Town and Country magazine: The enormous throngs that gathered nightly last week to witness the military tournament at the Garden were enthusiastic and intensely interested in every detail of the programme. The performances of the State militia detachments were enlightening, because they showed how practical their work is, and the squads of the United States regulars, cavalry, and artillery gave the onlooker a thrill of pride and a sudden realization of the military power and strength of the nation. The nimble work of the rough riders, the ingenuity of the engineers in bridge and signal tower building, the thunderous and massive strength and efficiency of the heavy artillery — all these were stimulating and helpful to patriotism. The entire show was significant of our growing love of things military. We are, without doubt, a military nation nowadays. The pomp and panoply of war fascinates us and the army has latterly acquired a prestige never before equaled since we emerged as an independent government. Some of the most effective touches in recent popular books and plays have been those of military life. The American likes to see our bluejackets appear opportunely on the scene in fiction or drama, and to feel the thrill of pride at our flag worthily upheld by our soldiers.15

The writer comments on how “practical” the performances of the state militia units were, which may mean that he was impressed by how similar they were to the Regular Army exhibitions. The Regular Army performances made the audience realize how powerful the nation was and stimulated patriotism, demonstrating the growing militarization of patriotism in Progressive Era America. The claim that the Army was more popular in 1900 than it ever had been is likely an exaggeration, but the quick and relatively bloodless victory over Spain in 1898 undoubtedly did boost its prestige. The “sudden” realizing of the power of American arms was undoubtedly what the tournament sponsors hoped would happen. This 1900 tournament ended on March 31 with matinée and evening shows. Many children were in the matinée audience and, according to the Times, they especially enjoyed the cavalry show put on by West Point cadets. The evening performance was reviewed by General Wesley Merritt, commander of the Department of the East. Following the review U.S. marines entered and a “street riot and skirmish drill was gone through, the men forming in

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squares and firing off their muskets. The skirmish part of their drill ended with a charge.” This type of performance was probably reassuring to those who feared urban disorder and the violence that sometimes accompanied strikes. The rest of the events were similar to those described above, though there was a longer athletic program preceding the military program, which had foot races and an obstacle race, besides the bicycle races and the three legged race.16

A Thrilling Exhibition of Daring Horsemanship New York was not the only place where one could see military performances. In its coverage of the 1900 tournament, the Washington Post noted that weekly cavalry drill exhibitions at Fort Meyer, which had been suspended at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, were to be resumed. These drills were held on Friday afternoons and had been an attraction for Washington’s “smart set.... Fort Meyer presented the gayest scene imaginable.... The company streets of the fort and the parade grounds were alive with carriages and people.” A band was to play during the resumed drills. The reference to the “smart set” and the “alive with carriages” comment make it clear that the audience for these events was middle and upper class, as does the Friday afternoon timing. Although work hours were shortening and Progressives approved of entertainments that brought classes together, only upper-class and some middle-class Americans would be able to travel by carriage on a Friday afternoon for some recreation.17 In 1902 “military athletic exercises” were to be held at the fort, and it was thought they would be unusually interesting. Several major events were planned: a relay race, “tent-pegging,” an artillery event, “acrobatic horsemanship” and the pièce de résistance, the “rescue race.” The relay race was to have four runners on each team, who would pass a message along a prescribed course. The runners were to wear baseball uniforms and could wear whatever shoes they wanted. Racing in military uniforms and boots would probably have been a boring, if not comic, affair. The “tent-pegging” was a cavalry competition. Three ten-inch softwood pegs thirty yards apart were driven two inches into the ground. Riders were to go at the “maneuvering gallop” and try to pick up pegs “front point against infantry,” to catch them on the point of their sabers rather than slash at them. If they picked up the peg they scored two points; if they knocked the peg over with the point of the saber they scored one point. These soldiers had to be in full uniform. Next was to be the artillery event. Sections from the field artillery would move a limbered horse-drawn field gun one hundred yards forward, passing between two stakes eighty inches apart. They would then unlimber the gun, load and fire a blank


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cartridge, change a wheel on the gun, limber up and return to start. “Acrobatic horsemanship” was a contest between individuals, a sort of free-style event. Contestants could perform any movements specified in the Cavalry Drill Regulations for two minutes. A panel of judges would decide which rider showed the best form. The “rescue race” was the main event and featured riders armed with cavalry pistols. A rider would gallop forward, past a man lying on the ground, firing five blank shots from his revolver. When he reached 125 yards he would turn back and ride towards the man lying on the ground. He would dismount when he reached the man, put the man across his saddle and return to the start line. Cash prizes were to be awarded to winners of each event. Probably there were not enough troops stationed at Fort Meyer to provide teams for competition, so these performances had many events where individuals competed.18 The competition and training for it could be dangerous. Trumpeter Fred Mann took numerous falls in practicing for his specialty and it is no wonder. His forte was jumping over four, then six, charging horses. The horses would be galloping around a rink and Mann would be standing on the back of a horse on one side of the group. When the horses began their leap over a hurdle, Mann, given a lift by his jumping horse, would vault over the horses to land standing on the back of the horse on the opposite end.19 No mention was made of any injury to Mann, who was preparing for the New York tournament, but others were not so lucky. Practice for the weekly drill exhibition at Fort Meyer claimed a fatality in 1903. Four field artillery pieces were practicing galloping in a column around the drill hall when the lead gun’s outer wheel caught in an unnoticed rut and overturned. Three men were riding on the limber and were thrown to the ground, the gun landing on top of Corporal Charles Slavin, who was killed.20 Four days after Corporal Slavin was killed, another Fort Meyer soldier made a considerable sacrifice, though not of his life, to help his comrades do well at a competitive drill to decide which men and units would go to Madison Square Garden. Private William Denn was riding with other troopers about to jump over hurdles when his stirrup caught the stirrup of the rider on his left. His horse fell and Denn was thrown to the ground. He jumped up, remounted and continued to the end of the jumping. The next event was the saber drill. Denn could not obey the command to draw sabers because he had broken his collarbone in the fall and could not lift his hand. This day’s events were attended by an enthusiastic crowd and by senior military officers, some of whom were at Fort Meyer to investigate the death of Corporal Slavin. After the saber drill there was an exhibition of rough riding that made the audience “hold their breath with anxiety.” Twenty four bareback riders entered the hall and began slowly to put their horses through

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their paces. They gathered speed until they “flew” around the hall and then the men began to leap off their horses, running alongside them and jumping back on while the horses were still galloping. Then some of the men began the jumping over three or four horses, though apparently no one tried to jump over six. Following this, several men, who must have been quite longlegged, rode each standing on a group of four horses. This was done by having the rider stand with one foot on the horse on one side of a group of four abreast and the other foot on the opposite side horse, holding the reins of all four horses. This was done with all the “dash and go that has made the United States Cavalry the most perfect and at the same time the most reckless, fighting machine in the world.” The finale to the rough riding was the music drill, in which the horses performed movements to the music of a band, without any commands being given by their riders. With the cavalry drill completed, it was time for the artillery drill. The field guns, drawn by horses, performed a “stake drill,” where they were required to pass though a series of stakes in a winding course, calling for sharp eyes and coordination by the drivers. The artillerymen also demonstrated “embarkation,” simulating the loading and unloading of their guns on railroad cars, and then showed off their guns by firing blank rounds at various ranges and under several different simulated conditions. This firing filled the hall with thick smoke, which did not seem to interfere with anyone’s enjoyment. After this demonstration the artillery units left the hall to return in full dress uniform to perform their finale, a “thrilling exhibition of daring horsemanship.”21 The use of words like “thrilling,” “daring,” and “dash” indicates that there was real danger in some of these performances. The audiences must have been aware of this too, and perhaps it reassured them of the willingness of the military to face perilous situations. Cody’s performances reassured Americans of the bravery and skill of white Americans as opposed to Indians, Spaniards, and Chinese Boxers, and these military shows must also have been comforting in that regard. Danger and even death in preparation for such performances did not dissuade Army leaders from continuing. They must have been convinced of the value of the exhibitions in building support for military values and the Army. Drills demonstrating how the military would deal with “street riots” were a standard part of military tournaments. Progressive Era fears of urban unrest and class violence were widespread, so much so that to many, class war seemed imminent. Middle class spectators of these drills probably had such fears assuaged by the disciplined behavior of the troops. The New York tournament of 1905 gave a full description of a “street riot drill.” The evening performance of May 12 at Madison Square Garden was naval night. The reviewing officer was Rear Admiral Joseph G. Coghlan, commandant of the


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Brooklyn Navy Yard. The appearance of the admiral and his officers in dress uniform made a brilliant display as they entered the Garden. A special feature was the presence of about a hundred jackies from the U.S. gunboat Alabama, recently arrived from Cuba. Attired in their natty white seaman’s dress, they made a striking display as they took part in the regular review. Later in the evening they gave a spirited and splendidly conducted drill, illustrating the effective manner in which Uncle Sam’s naval boys could quell a street riot. Standing back-to-back in two long lines, they loaded and fired with rapidity, showing careful training and leaving a vivid impression upon the spectators that the men of the navy could use the small firearms quite as well as the larger guns. The jackies had only to appear on the arena floor for tremendous applause to burst forth from all parts of the Garden. They were clearly the heroes of the evening.22

In fact, sailors were hardly ever used for duty in case of riot; it was almost always National Guard troops from areas away from the trouble.

Cossack Head Cutting Individual military units would also have tournaments for the entertainment of relatives and friends. Cavalry Squadron A of the New York National Guard held such an event at its armory at Madison Avenue and 94th Street on the evening of March 8, 1902, before an audience of 600. The guest of honor was New York Mayor Seth Low. The first event appeared to be one of the most popular: “The first event, Cossack head cutting, and an exhibition of rough riding by a team of twelve men, four from each troop, won the greatest applause of the evening.” Other events included the manikin race, wrestling, tent-pegging, double pursuit, bareback jump, and melee. The wrestling was done on horseback without saddles or spurs, as riders attempted to pull their opponents off their mounts. During this event two members of the Troop 1 team must not have known each other well, because they managed to pull each other, rather than opponents, from their horses. The double pursuit had the horses saddled and one rider wearing a handkerchief around his right arm. Two riders pursued him and attempted to grab the handkerchief from the left side and the rear only, without touching the rider. This required the two pursuers to ride nearly touching each other at a fast pace. The tent-pegging contest had riders going around the ring twice attempting to collect tent pegs from the floor. Riders got 2 points for touching a peg, 3 for dislodging it, five for carrying it to the finish line, and 4 for style —“The regulations of the royal military tournament governed.” For the last event, the melee, Squadron A was divided into red and blue teams. The first attempt at this was graded a tie by the judges, but the crowd called for a rematch. The

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second attempt was also a tie, and again the crowd demanded another rematch. The third try was the charm, as the red team was the winner: “The armory resounded with the cheers from the galleries and from the losing team in honor of the victors.”23 The audience attending a Massachusetts National Guard tournament in Boston was noteworthy to the reporter for the Boston Daily. The Guardsmen invited participation by Regular Army units stationed at nearby Fort Warren. The National Guard troops had expected to do very well, since they had many well-known local athletes competing for them. In the end the regulars won decisively, showing their superiority especially in “military events,” such as wall-scaling. The Boston Daily reporter noted that the crowd was somewhat smaller than would attend meets sponsored by the Boston Athletic Association, but the evening had other attractions: it “presented a sea of feminine faces, surmounted by a perfectly bewildering display of millinery, and rarely has such a well-dressed and fine looking gathering assembled in that building.” The military men present also added to the appearance of the crowd, in dress uniforms, “the glitter of gold lace and military trappings making for a fine display.” As was common in many of these events, there were track and field staples such as the high jump and 100-yard dash, but the military events were the real crowd pleasers. One of the most popular was the blank cartridge race, which had five blank rounds of ammunition on pieces of paper on the floor at three yard intervals. Each contestant had to run and pick up a blank, then return to the start line and put the cartridge in the magazine of the rifle. After returning with the fifth round the soldier was to put it directly into the rifle’s chamber and fire into the air, thus signaling that he had finished the race. Then all contestants had to stand for inspection, one part of which was presumably to count the cartridges. This was said to be similar to the potato race which was then popular at athletic meets. Another event favored by the crowd was the equipment race, which had the men leave pieces of equipment (blanket roll, rifle, leggings, etc.) along the course and then return to pick them up. They, too, had to stand inspection at the finish. As a finale came, the “most impressive feature of the evening ... the playing of the Star-Spangled Banner ... everybody in the vast building [was] standing, the military men being at attention with their right hands raised to the visors of their caps.” Evidently it was necessary to explain military saluting to Boston Daily readers. The national anthem was not played at baseball games until World War II and the only way for most people to hear it in 1908 was if a band played it. It’s interesting that the anthem was the most “impressive feature” of the evening, perhaps because of its unfamiliarity.24 As did all other purveyors of entertainment, the sponsors of military


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tournaments advertised. The ad for the 1903 New York tournament appeared in the newspaper under “Amusements” in the classified section. It read: Closes To-Morrow Night-Madison Square Garden The Great Military Tournament-Management Military Athletic League Grand Review of Troops by Major General Adna R. Chaffee, Department of the East Drill by 43rd Reg., Duke of Cornwall’s Own Rifles, Canadian Militia Music Ride by 2nd U.S. Cavalry, Drill by 9th U.S. Infantry Gatling Gun Drill by 2nd Battery, N.G.N.Y., Calesthenic [sic] Drill by Company “C,” 12th Reg., N.G.N.Y. Drill by 1st Naval Battalion, Drill by U.S. Marines, Artillery Drill by 27th Battery, U.S.A. Athletic Events 7:30 o’clock, Military Programme 8:45. Admission 50¢. Reserved Seats $1.00 & $1.50. Last Matinée To-Morrow 2 PM. Full Military Programme, and Competitive Drills by Pupils of Peekskill and New York Military Academies.25

The prices are comparable to other types of entertainments listed and the series of performances must have raised a considerable sum for the New York Guard.

Mars Himself Can Learn Something New By 1909 a big military tournament was a prize to be competed for. In the early summer of 1909 the Army held a military tournament similar to today’s Armed Forces Day open houses at military bases. This event brought together over 3,000 soldiers to Bay View Park in Toledo, Ohio, during the week of Monday, July 5 through Saturday, July 10, 1909. Harper’s Weekly stated that it was the first event of its kind to be held, and would demonstrate the efficiency of the U.S. Army just as the round-the-world tour of the Great White Fleet had shown off the prowess of the U.S. Navy —“Our whole Army will be there in epitome, giving stirring exhibitions.... There will not be a dull moment.” According to the magazine, representatives of the “greatest city in the western world,” by which is probably meant New York, had attempted to get this event for their town, but were too late — Toledo had already acquired it and pledged $30,000 for preliminary expenses. This was to be a benefit for the Army Relief Society, which provided assistance to the widows and orphans of deceased servicemen, and was no small event — bleachers were erected to seat 11,000 and there was standing room for 30,000. Admission must have been charged, though the article did not say so. Harper’s printed the program for Wednesday July 7, 1909. Events began at 2:30 P.M. and seven were listed. They included target shooting, wall scaling, infantry and cavalry drills, including bareback riding, and exhibitions

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by machine gun platoons and Signal Corps detachments. There was another series of seven events that began at 8 P.M. Some of these were repeats of the afternoon activities, but added events were the erection and dismantling of a trestle bridge by a Corps of Engineers detachment, drill by a battery of field artillery and a mock battle with the troops firing blank rounds. Some touches of showmanship were added: “Here and there officer or man will stagger and fall as if actually wounded and the victim will be carried away on a stretcher by men of the Hospital Corps or on a travois dragged by a horse just as if a battle were really being fought. The bandaging of wounds, the marking of the stricken with diagnosis tags— all details will be attended to.”26 The audience must have been interested in the Signal Corps exhibits, particularly U.S. Army Dirigible No. 1, which a corps detachment brought with them and was “open for inspection ... ascents will be made daily.” Praise was heaped on everything and piled especially high on the Hospital Corps: “The field hospital will be efficient, clean, pretty and attractive enough to make illness a luxury.” The cavalry and the field artillery also came in for much comment. The cavalry events included trick riding, the purpose of which was stated to be “disciplinary,” intended to achieve perfect coordination of horses and men. Also included were “musical drills,” which were similar to circus acts where horses perform in time to music. There was also to be a mock cavalry battle, in which the opposing riders would stop just short of colliding with each other, a “melee” would be simulated, and then the victors would pursue the defeated troop out of sight. The field artillery would then demonstrate how quickly their guns could be unlimbered and fired. “Many a thrill can be expected ... and ... Mars himself can learn something new about the art of war if he will visit Toledo during the week of the Fourth of July.”27

A Soldier’s Life in its Entirety Other cities besides Toledo began to have military tournaments. The Madison Square Garden tournaments were the inspiration for Atlanta’s event, which was to “present the dash, the color, and the wonder of military life in a manner that will be universally appealing.” This tournament was sponsored by the Fifth Regiment of the Georgia National Guard, which was said to be “dear to the hearts” of Atlantans. A new auditorium-armory had recently been completed in Atlanta for the Fifth Regiment, and the tournament would be the first strictly military program to be held there. It was reported that all the larger cities in America were now holding military tournaments, because of the universal appeal of such programs. The success of the Atlanta event would make the city “one of the leading tournament cities of the United States.”28


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The event was promoted assiduously, with many predictions of how much the public would enjoy what was claimed to be the first such tournament in the South. It was planned to present “a soldier’s life in its entirety: to show what has to be done in a camp from sunup to dark; to show that there is whole world of work, play, humor, excitement, dash and hard thinking.” The humor part would be provided by the “side-splitting” shoe race. A large group of men would take off their shoes and throw them into a pile in the center of a circle. The pile would be mixed up and at a signal the men would rush forward to find their shoes. The first man to put his own shoes on and return to the start line would be the winner. The newspaper promised that there would be “scores” of other events equal to the shoe race in “human interest and impressiveness ... everything connected with real military life.”29 This was similar to many other comments in newspaper accounts, which seemed to want to convince their readers that what they were seeing was “real,” not a performance of things that never happened in a soldier’s actual life. In fact, the only other time soldiers would do things the way that they did in tournaments would be when they were practicing for tournaments. This same concern for authenticity is seen in the operation of Buffalo Bill’s Wild West. The show worked so long as it could convince spectators that it was authentic and at the same time an enjoyable performance. Both the tournaments and the Wild West had great success in presenting themselves as reality — or at least a near-perfect copy of it. The Atlanta promotion reached a crescendo on July 4, 1909, the day before the event. A newspaper article longer than any that came after the tournament bombarded the city with superlatives. Those lucky enough to have tickets would see “Gold braid and glittering sabers, gorgeous uniforms, plume, pomp, and panoply, soldiers—cavalrymen, infantrymen, artillerymen, musicians and hospital corps, beautiful women in wondrous creations and gowns, pretty girls, trained horses and just plain horses.” The show was to open with a “Gorgeous World Pageant,” meaning the march into the arena, which title was said to have been devised by “circuses and press agents.” Some observers were a bit conflicted about the purpose of the exhibition drills. On the one hand it was averred that such drills had been devised to relieve the soldier of the “tiresome, monotonous camp life.” On the other, these stunts “fit him for real service and make him more valuable to the country.” No matter why these stunts were done, spectators were promised that the cavalrymen were daredevils and would put on an unprecedented show. It would have been difficult to disappoint Atlantans. The day after the event they professed themselves entirely satisfied: “For daring originality, wonderful accomplishment, brilliancy of execution and splendid pantomime, Atlanta yields to the military the palm of praise.” Everything was so excellent that it was difficult to say which events were the best, though the “stirring and

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inspiring” guard mount by the hometown Atlanta Grays was a high point, as was the several minutes firing of a Gatling gun, that “life destroyer.”30

The Greatest Advertisement for the Army Tournament sponsors hoped for an audience that would put class and ethnic divisions aside to celebrate patriotism, nationalism, and militarism, as Progressives aiming for a harmonious society without class conflict would have wished them to do. Provision of both free and paid seating was common for military tournaments held outdoors and indicates a desire on the part of the organizers to attract spectators from all walks of life. At the next big tournament, 1910 in Chicago, the city erected stands to hold 40,000 onlookers, and 10,000 seats would be for sale —$1 daily for reserved seats and $2 for box seats. The other 30,000 seats were to be free for the public. The tournament was to start on the afternoon of July 4. Receipts from ticket sales would be used to pay the estimated $60,000 that the event was to cost; whatever was left over would go the Army Relief Society. Army General Frederick Grant, who was in charge, was explicit about the benefits of the Chicago arrangements, saying that unlike maneuvers which took place over a wide geographical area, at Grant Park everything would happen on a “‘stage’ ... about 600 by 400 feet, so that every detail of action is to be clearly seen.” Grant Park was on the shores of Lake Michigan and the tournament was a ten-day affair. Five thousand regulars were to camp in the park and give demonstrations every day except Sunday at 2:30 and 8:15 P.M. The purpose, according to the Chicago Daily Tribune, was to show that the American Army “should be classed among the most versatile and comparatively powerful armies in the world.” The choice of descriptive words is interesting. Why and how an army needs to be versatile is not clear, but it probably is a way of dealing with concerns that the American Army was an all-volunteer force much smaller than the conscripted armies of its potential enemies. If this smaller army were more versatile, this might make up for its lack of numbers. Also, it was “comparatively powerful,” meaning that due to its about-to-be demonstrated efficiency and perhaps a higher quality of soldier, it could be a match for larger armies. The main organization behind bringing the tournament to Chicago was the Sane Fourth Association. Their cause was to prevent the use of firecrackers and other explosives to celebrate the Fourth of July. Fireworks were much more widely available then and much more powerful than they are now. The president of the association, Marquis Eaton, said that in the past the group had mainly worked to get restrictions on fireworks, so as to decrease the “senseless killing and maiming that has marked the Fourth of July as a day


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Chicago military tournament, Grant Park, July 4, 1910.

producing more carnage than some of our greatest battles for independence.”31 This was not hyperbole. In 1909, 215 people died from Fourth of July fireworks injuries (125 of those from wound-caused tetanus), and there were 269 serious injuries (loss of eye, hand, etc.) and 4,823 minor injuries.32 An Army spokesman, Capt. A.J. Bowley, spoke to the Chicago Rotary Club on March 10, 1910, and described the Army’s plans. The captain said that this would be a unique event that would “gratify the desire of the public to see the Army.” He promised there would be plenty of movement and excitement and said there would be lots of noise and firing from sham battles, though the Army did not like the term “sham battle.” Bowley hoped that the tournament would renew interest in the military, for he believed that “the military spirit in America is dwindling. Men are too busy amassing fortunes to think about the possibility of war. People have the idea that since we are a courageous nation we need not fear invasion.” He probably had this a bit wrong. Opponents of militarism didn’t speak of invasion but of war. In the preceding chapter Los Angeles County Superintendent of Education Mark Keppel did indeed state that we didn’t need a large military establishment, because Americans were patriotic and courageous enough to rally to the flag when the country was in danger. Keppel did not think that an invasion would come out of a clear blue sky, but the captain said “certain countries” could land armies of 150,000 men (about the number the Japanese landed in Manchuria to begin the land battles of the Russo-Japanese War) on either coast, and it would take us months to respond effectively.33 As with some other tournaments, there was much publicity before the event and little reportage after it. The plans called for things to move quickly, with no event lasting more than fifteen minutes. A highlight was to be Army

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The grand review of U.S. Army troops at the Dallas tournament, 1909.

engineers building a bridge and then demolishing it with explosives. One of the bridges was to be built in shallow waters of Lake Michigan. There was ample lighting for the night programs, including large searchlights of the type used by the Coast Artillery. The sham battles were to display “volley firing from trenches, reconnoitering by skirmishers, advance by squads, and finally a bayonet charge in force.” The program for the first day was: 2:30 P.M. 1. Music drill, 27th Infantry 2. Cavalry drill, 3rd Squadron, 15th Cavalry 3. Shelter tent camp, extended order movements, and wall scaling by 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry. Care of wounded — exhibition by Company A, Hospital Corps. 4. Field Artillery drill, Battery F, 15th Field Artillery 5. Mounted fencing, teams of the 6th Cavalry. 6. Construction and destruction of trestle bridge by Company L, 3rd Battalion of Engineers. 7. Cavalry, school of the trooper, bareback, by Companies L and M, 15th Cavalry. 8. Retreat parade, 27th Infantry. 8:15 P.M. Field Artillery drill, Battery F, 15th Field Artillery. Music bayonet exercise, 10th Infantry. Cavalry, school of the trooper, bareback, Troops F and G, 6th Cavalry. Exhibition drill, Company A, Signal Corps. Mounted wrestling, 6th Cavalry vs. 15th Cavalry. Shelter tent camp, extended movements, and wall-scaling by 3rd Battalion, 10th Infantry. 7. Music ride by Troop E, 6th Cavalry. 8. Escort of the color, 10th Infantry.34 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The parade in downtown Chicago that was to open the tournament was probably the largest in the city up to that time. Plans called for upwards of 85,000 marchers in four divisions. These were the national division, the state division, the City of Chicago division, and the international division. This last was to represent “all the nations from which the foreign population was drawn” and was to include most European nations and “Negroes ... Chinese, and many others beside the most populous Germans and Irish.” Some of the


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groups marching would be accompanied by floats. There was an organization that wanted to be in the parade, but had not yet been approved to do so in June 1910. This was the Political Equality League, which planned to march with banners reading “Votes for Women” and “No Vote, No Tax.” Their spokesman, Minona S. Fitts-Jones, said that “by all means” the league should not be allowed to display their banners: “They would be certain to expose the irony of the situation. A celebration to jollify the independence of the people, when half the people are still dependent, still disenfranchised and still unrepresented is not the proper occasion to display the fact.” The Chicago Daily Tribune must have thought their readers might not understand the import of Fitts-Jones’ remarks, so their subhead explained it was “Sarcasm by Suffragette.” The Illinois Naval Reserve, however, was definitely in the parade and its message was allowed. It was to be that the Navy was the first armed force to be authorized by the Continental Congress and the American flag was first flown by a naval vessel.35 On July 4 it was noted that perhaps attendance at the Independence Day festivities in Chicago might be less than in previous years, since a “Reformed Fourth” might be perceived as dull. However, the parade and tournament were “advertised in circus style by shrewd railroad passenger agents for hundreds of miles around Chicago,” and as a result 500,000 visitors were expected over the ten days of the tournament. Hotel rooms were hard to find. The military camp was actually open for visitors on July 3, a Sunday when there were open air religious services in Grant Park. Sergeants were available to take visitors around the camp and answer questions and the artillery was the focus of much interest, as was the “wireless telegraph station.” It was estimated that about 200,000 people had visited the camp and there was but one problem — Arthur Burrage Farwell of the Chicago Law and Order League complained to Army officers that some of the soldiers were insulting girls. The complaint was passed to General Frederick Dent Grant, who called the chief steward of the Chicago Police, who in turn sent a squad of detectives to investigate. The detectives found no law violators, which did not surprise anyone. It was noted that most of the girls seemed to be relatives or close friends of the men, and even if they had just met, it seemed as though the “soldiers did not take, in fact did not need to take, the initiative in the matter.” Civic pageantry was widespread and popular in the Progressive Era. Parades like this one in Chicago were a means of uniting urban masses and fostering an appreciation of their identity as citizens of their city, state, and nation. If successful, such an effort would reduce class tensions and move an urban society closer to an ideal social harmony and peace. The program for the events of the holiday listed the order of march for the parade. The first part was federal, state, and local officials, veterans’ organizations, and Regular Army and National Guard units. The second part, called the “Great Historical

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Pageant,” consisted of marchers in costume and on floats. The pageant was divided into events concerning national, Illinois, and Chicago history, and each group of events was preceded either by marching heralds with banners or by mounted heralds. The floats and marchers for different national groups living in Chicago came last, and the last float in the parade was the suffragists’ float (Fitts-Jones seems to have won her argument) followed by the Hull House Cadets and the tailending Swedish and Greek marching groups.36 By the tournament’s second day at least one artillery officer was mightily impressed by the crowds and thought Army recruiting would improve. He told a Tribune reporter “This is the greatest advertisement that the Army has ever put over in these piping times. Did you know that recruits, young fellows dazzled by this display of military efficiency, will flock to recruiting offices as they never have since the Spanish-American War? Well, that’s what they will do.” Also by the second day there had been two accidents in the equestrian events, though no one had been seriously hurt, and one of the military guards had reported that he thought two Japanese spectators might be spying. The guard was reassured that the tournament was a public event which would not reveal any military secrets.37 When the tournament was over the Chicago Daily Tribune thought that the more than one million visitors benefited greatly from events in Grant Park and now appreciated the Army much more. It seemed to the editorialist that the way in which the crowds were controlled by soldier guards and ushers spoke very highly of military efficiency and compared favorably to other recent public gatherings where large numbers of people had become disorderly. The events on the field were also impressive: “With infantry, signal, and ambulance corps, and artillery going into action with military precision and the dash of the hippodrome, respect for the United States uniform grew amazingly.” Apparently some forms of respect could be confusing: “On one occasion the police mistook the uncertain attempts of the spectators to arise in honor of the national air and the flag for the beginnings of a disorder to be immediately suppressed, but they learned and the public learned.”38 The 1910 tournament was so successful that the Chicago authorities wasted little time in setting up a repeat for the next year. In March 1911 the preliminary plans for that year’s tournament were reported. It was planned for the last week in July and was to have 6,000 Army and National Guard troops participating, coming from twenty states, along with two units of British troops from Canada. Larger stands to hold 50,000 spectators were to be erected, and it was hoped that 1911 would surpass 1910 in every way. This tournament would cost $75,000, as opposed to the final cost of 1910, which was $48,000. The Sane Fourth Association was replaced by the Chicago Association of Commerce as chief sponsor. There was an early snag. In March, Secretary of War Henry Stimson


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announced that no Regular Army troops could participate, since most of the Regular Army stationed in the U.S. was on maneuvers in Texas, and it was not known how long these maneuvers would continue. Illinois sent a Congressional delegation to lobby President Taft about this matter, and it must have been resolved since some Regular Army troops did in fact participate. There were differences from 1910. It was planned that each regiment would have one day in which it would perform most of the events, for instance, and the 1911 event was to have a theme song, to the tune of “Tramp, Tramp, Tramp the Boys are Marching”: From many states they’ll come, with bugle and with drum, Husky soldier men and sailors from the fleet; Underneath the stars and stripes and to music of the pipes, They’re coming to our military meet. CHORUS

Tramp, tramp, tramp the boys are marching, To show us just what they can do: Chicago’ll be their queen, their camp Charles E. Deneen. Their numbers will be anything but few. Over there in big Grant park, when you hear the rifles bark, And the soldiers grab their packs and scale the wall: When you hear the cannons crash and see the signals flash, You’ll be sorry when the trumpets sound recall. CHORUS

Bang, zing, boom the sounds of battle, And all the sights of bloody war — There’ll be the National Guard, naval reserves working hard, Showing how the flag comes through without a scar.

John R. Young, the manager of the event, was the lyricist.39 Ten days before the event other changes from 1910 were evident. There now would be 10,000 soldiers in the camp and the camp would be open for three days before the performances began. There were attempts to interest Chicagoans in the pre-event events: “The maneuvers will merely show army life as it is in the advertising posters. The rehearsal will give Chicago a chance to look behind the scenes, to inspect the labor of encampment, drill, and the other military duties which lurk ever behind the brass button and the gilded epaulet ... the idea of the government is to expose, not conceal, the business background.” Some new things were also to be offered by a National Guard unit, which would perform “Roman races,” set up a bivouac in ninety seconds, and do a rapid-fire artillery drill that would “make the noisiest motorcycle on Michigan Avenue crimson with shame.”40 The organizers of these events evidently took many cues from commercial show business entrepreneurs, as particularly noted in the coverage of the Chicago tournament where specific reference is made to “circus agents” and

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the Atlanta tournament where the opening parade was done “circus style.” The tournaments were clearly seen as events which would draw audiences from all groups and not be the preserve of one or a few. They would unite the people to view the most wholesome and most patriotic entertainment possible. They also are also clear evidence of the increasing militarization of patriotism and widespread admiration for military values. As will be shown in the next chapter, tournament organizers were not the only military men who learned modern methods. Army recruiters became highly visible in American cities and began to use up-to-date advertising methods. It seemed at times that the Army was trying to reduce class conflict by energetically encouraging middle-class values in its soldiers.

5. “Romance of the Recruiting Office”1 The Army usually managed to get enough recruits prior to 1898, particularly when economic times were hard. Recruiting standards were lax, desertion rates were high, but somehow the Army got enough men to do what little it had to do. However, with the beginning of the twentieth century and America’s new role as a colonial power, the Army needed more men and better quality men. Many steps were taken to make Army service more popular, to increase morale and to interact with civilians in positive ways. The military training described earlier must have improved the Army’s image and made high schools and colleges a better source of recruits and officers. The public tournament performances described above did their part by familiarizing the general public with the Army and military values. But these efforts would not bring in all the men that a larger Army needed; recruiting would have to expand and improve. Between the Civil War and the Spanish-American war the prestige of the Army was low. Indians were less and less an object of fear and the Army of about 25,000 men was scattered in small posts throughout the western states and territories. Dull garrison routines, poor pay and food, and alcoholism were prevalent, and desertion rates were around 20 percent per year. After the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, the Army tried to present a more enticing picture of life in the service. As with any advertiser, recruiters highlighted their product in ways that they hoped would result in a sale. They stressed possibilities for a better life — saving and investing money, leisure activities, pensions, foreign travel — that sound like opportunities to enjoy a middle-class lifestyle. The advantage of having evenings free was particularly stressed and must have seemed very attractive in a time when this was an attribute of the middle — but not the working —class. At times, they would denigrate “masculinized” working class activities such as drinking, fighting and womanizing by stating that no brawlers were wanted in the Army. It wanted those who would join in the team sports opportunities which the Army provided, to occupy their time in 63

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ways that would benefit them and the service. Team sports were valued by the leadership because along with being healthful, they stressed qualities of hierarchy, obedience, and sacrifice for the good of the group. Recruiters concentrated on practical benefits of Army service, but they mostly ignored other possible reasons for enlisting. Following the U.S. war with Spain, young men increasingly looked to military service to develop and demonstrate physical prowess and to assert their manly character,2 but the Army did little to encourage such motivations. It was true in 1900 and remains true today that more people will enlist in the military when economic times are hard. This is an automatic source of recruits, but what can the military do to attract recruits no matter the state of the economy? In the Progressive Era the answer was, for the most part, to point out the economic advantage of enlisting, in the form of improved pay and free services, pensions, and opportunities for free leisure-time activities. Their efforts at persuasion had a decidedly middle-class and manly cast to them; their image of a desirable recruit is very similar to the picture of the expert marksman of the shooting contests described in the next chapter and the capable, well-trained soldier of the military tournaments. There are some ambiguities. After all, armies are supposed to be either fighting or preparing to fight, but the Army wasn’t looking for aggressive, combative, “masculinized” men. In addition, the official explanation of why men should enlist seems at odds with popular ideas of why men joined up, such as rejection by a lover or a desire to prove one’s self a good American.

Rowdies, Bums and Hobos Not Wanted In 1904 the Army produced a pamphlet which stated many Americans believed, falsely, that enlistment in the Army “means that those years of a man’s life have been wasted.” The Army was not then a career thought fit for most young men, and it was still possible for men in trouble with the law to be given the option of joining the Army to avoid going to jail. A Chicago Tribune article about the pamphlet, reprinted in the Boston Daily Globe, averred that everyone knew about military service in time of war. “The shock of battle ... the storming of cannon crested heights by long lines of cheering men behind the glittering steel of bayonets ... the joy of combat, the celebration of victory in blue, scarlet, and gold pomp and panoply of victorious war, have long been told in song and romance.” But what about army life in time of peace? The Army’s pamphlet set out to describe that life. If it ever had been, the Army was no longer a refuge for “the rowdy, the bum, the hobo and the dissolute.” This was because the Army had regulations forbidding the enlistment of such lowlifes. These regulations specified

5. “Romance of the Recruiting Office”

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that recruits must be between 21 and 35 years old, be American citizens or an applicant for citizenship, unmarried, of “good antecedents and habits, free from bodily defects” and able to speak and write English. A recruit could be penniless, homeless, friendless and hungry when enlisted, but from then on he would have food, shelter, clothing, comrades, “a club, a gymnasium,” opportunities for education and advancement, and a chance to save money, in an account drawing “a higher rate of interest than is paid by any savings bank in Chicago.” In addition, he would receive free medical care and if he chose to make the Army a career and became infirm, he could live at the Soldier’s Home near Washington, D.C., for the rest of his life.3 Though most of the recruits for the Army were working class or farm boys, the values and benefits described in the pamphlet are distinctly middle class. The emphases on money-saving, on education and training, and on pension benefits seem designed to attract men who valued these accompaniments to a middle-class lifestyle. The Army wanted a new type of recruit, one who would need less of the harsh discipline applied to former “dregs of society” enlistees.

Iron Beds The article described, based on the Army pamphlet, what a typical recruit would experience in his first few months of military life. He would be issued his uniform and some underwear and be sent to the recruit depot. There he would receive the rest of his clothing, blankets, shoes and stockings. All he had to do to get quarters and be well-clothed was to raise “his right hand and take the oath.” His training would begin when he was given his bed and bedding, shown his place in the barracks and told how to make his bed and keep his area clean. That was the easy part; learning to drill came next. Drill was taught for three hours a day five days a week and it would take the new man about a month to become “proficient in military evolutions.” The rest of his time was taken up with “lectures on various military duties” and his evenings, until lights out at 11 P.M., were free. Once the new soldier left the recruit depot and went to his permanent station, he would be assigned to company quarters and have a more settled life. He would have an “iron bed with woven wire mattress” and a locker. The barracks would be steam heated and the bathrooms would have hot and cold running water. A library, a school that held classes during the winter, an amusement hall “fitted up with stage and scenery,” athletic fields and equipment, a gymnasium and a post exchange would be provided. The exchange would have game rooms, but “gambling is not permitted and only soft drinks are sold.” An idyllic picture was drawn and indeed there was hardly anywhere

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that a young man “in ordinary employments [would] have so many conveniences so easily in reach and with so little to pay for them.” The food was certainly ample. For every man a company was issued a daily ration of 3 ⁄4 pounds pork, bacon, or canned beef (fresh or corned) or 1 and 1 ⁄4 pounds fresh beef, or 12 ounces of salt meat; 18 ounces of soft bread, 1 pound of hard bread or 1 and 1 ⁄4 pound of cornmeal. The daily ration also included an “ample supply of beans, or peas, or rice, or hominy ... and a lb. of fresh vegetables.” The meals were prepared by civilian company cooks, and if the men bought back game from hunting it was prepared by the cooks “free of charge.”4

Cigarette Face Masculinized working-class leisure activities like drinking, fighting, and womanizing could keep you out of the Army. Apparently recruits who admitted to such activities would not be welcome, at least by some recruiters. A recruiting sergeant told the Kansas City Star (as quoted in the Washington Post) that the Army did not want “toughs.” The sergeant said that he could not investigate the moral character of every enlistee, but if a man seemed to be of questionable morals and bragged about being a tough, he would not be enlisted. The sergeant was especially on guard when fathers accompanied their sons to the recruiting station and would check as carefully as possible into the background of the son, usually finding that he was an “incorrigible” and thus not enlisted.5 Smoking cigarettes could also keep you out of the Army: “An alarming percentage of the young men in the cities of the South are physically unfit to enter the Army, due to cigarette smoking, late hours, and other bad habits.... Cigarette smoking is the principal cause which disqualifies men in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas,” according to the officer in charge of the New Orleans recruiting station.6 Cigarette smoking had some well-organized opposition before the turn of the century, coming especially from Lucy Gaston, organizer of the National Anti-Cigarette League: “The heart of the stated moral argument against cigarettes was that their low price and mild taste made them uniquely tempting to boys, whose use of them arrested their mental and physical development and led inexorably to a life of depravity.”7 Gaston claimed that a combustion product of the glycerin used to moisten tobacco, called furfural, was the most damaging and produced a syndrome she called “cigarette face.” Her crusade gained considerable traction in 1898 when congress increased taxes on cigarettes by 200 percent as a war revenue measure. Three states had outlawed the sale of cigarettes by 1900 and others were considering a ban. The turn of the century was to be the high point for the opponents


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of cigarettes. The American Tobacco trust fought back and managed to repeal the tax and to prevent more states from imposing a ban. Laws prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to minors remained on the books, but were laxly enforced, if at all. The popularity of providing cigarettes to the soldiers of World War I was a final setback to the anti-cigarette activists, whose cause withered in the 1920’s.8

Good and Bad Atavism Being too short could keep you out of the Army, and if you were over 5'10" you couldn’t be in the cavalry. Atavism could also be a problem, as it was for Private Karl Ludwig William Christian Hugo Muller, who was 6' 8" tall and had to have custom-made uniforms. The Army decided to charge Muller the extra cost of supplying him with made-to-fit uniforms and these charges amounted to more than the young soldier’s pay. Muller’s father was called in to pay, and after a few years decided the cost was too high, so Hugo had to quit. At the time of the article he was said to be looking for a job where height was an advantage and clothing not a problem, and he had just passed the New York City Police examinations. This was an example of the bad sort of atavism. Muller’s parents were average size, but his maternal grandfather was said to be the tallest man in Denmark, so this could have been the source of his great height. As far as the good sort of atavism, there was President Theodore Roosevelt, who was “a man from the Stone Age, as it were, primal, forceful, a natural fighter” who was able to “drive the various trusts up trees and into holes, and to liberate the American people from the heavy bondage of the money power.” Why either being tall or being a fighter is a throwback to earlier humanity is not explained.9

Cornbread and Hookworm Being from the South could be a help or a handicap to a man thinking of joining the Army. Hookworm could be a handicap. Two Army officers had made a study of 168 recruits from the South in 1909 and had found that 83 percent of them had the disease. They also found that the physique of the Southern recruits was “less vigorous and robust” than recruits from other parts of the country and attributed this to the effects of hookworm on children and adolescents. This group of recruits also weighed less than others, though they were on average taller. The surgeon general of the Army stated, however, that he thought the sample of 168 was “too small for safe deduction” and that hookworm was not a serious problem for the Army. He reasoned

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that, besides the small sample size, all observers could not see differences in recruits with and without the disease “in many cases,” and that “microscopic examination” was necessary to reveal mild cases.10 Though hookworm could be detrimental to potential recruits from the South, one doctor thought eating cornbread was a help. Surgeon Alan Stuart, of the naval recruiting station in Atlanta, stated that “We accept more applicants here than in any other part of the country ... refuse practically no applicant because of bad teeth ... due to the fact that so much cornbread is eaten. The mastication necessary exercises the teeth and keeps them healthy and healthy teeth make for a healthy man. I made an effort to get cornbread adopted into the Navy diet — but it takes southerners to eat cornbread.” Surgeon Stuart, who was a native of South Carolina and a graduate of South Carolina University and Charleston Medical College, said that the major cause for rejection of volunteers in the South was low weight. He did not attribute this to hookworm, however, but to hard work on the farm that made “Georgia boys ... trimmed down to bone and sinew.”11

Not So Very Much Those who weren’t rejected learned about the vistas that would open for them. Lieutenant Franklin R. Kenney, a recruiting officer, wrote that now the American soldier could travel to “sunny Cuba, romantic Honolulu ... the Philippines ... Japan ... and back through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.” Lt. Kenney admitted that not every soldier would be able to do this, but those that did would do so as “guests of the U.S.A., with rations, clothes, medicines and medical attendance free and ... pay coming in every month.” He admitted, however, that the pay was “not so very much.” The other great advantage that the lieutenant saw to enlisting in the Army was education. He wrote that a young man could enlist for the Coast Artillery and receive valuable training in “electricity and mechanics” and eventually become a master electrician, earning $75 per month. Since “Uncle Sam does not object in the least to the tried soldier of this class, who has proved his industry and sobriety, taking a wife,” the married soldier could live in a “four room house with bath, lights and fuel free.” Lt. Kenney stated further that those interested in receiving training could also apply to the Signal Corps, where they could be trained in telegraphy, “wireless telephony” and even in “Aeronautics, the science of ballooning and airships. This includes the making of trips through the air in balloons handled by soldiers.” As additional inducements besides the benefits of travel and career education, Lt. Kenney wrote of “excellent libraries,” gymnasiums, pool and billiard tables, teams in baseball, football, basketball and track, and the Post


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Exchange, where one could get “mildly exhilarating but very filling ‘near beer.’”12 It was noted earlier that Progressive Army reformers placed a very high value on team sports. They felt that wholesome activities, particularly team sports, would be useful in keeping soldiers away from traditional offduty activities of drinking, gambling, and whoring. They would promote “soldierly values of obedience, citizenship and combat, but would also usefully repair class schisms and restore social order and patriotism to the nation.”

Bill and Andy Procedures at recruiting offices were not always highly selective. The Army had three large recruiting stations, Fort Slocum in New York City, a fort in Columbus, Ohio, and Fort Jefferson in St. Louis. Preliminary examinations in one of the eight New York substations that sent recruits to Fort Slocum were observed in 1908. Most of the men appeared to be unemployed, but occasionally there was a clean and alert young man who may have been able to make a career out of the Army. The men were sent to a room, told to disrobe, and were called up one by one to Sergeant William Smith and his assistant Andy, a “German corporal.” The men were weighed and measured and given a few tests. The hearing test consisted of the sergeant whispering words from across the room to a recruit facing the far wall. Though one recruit hears “San Francisco” as “May God bless you” and doesn’t get any other words completely correct, he has no other defects and so they decide to send him along to Fort Slocum for his final physical examination. The next recruit, though, presents problems: “Now there’s a nice looking little feller for you,” says Corporal Andy as a fairhaired, dejected youth shambles forward. “He won’t do, Andy, he’s knock-kneed.” “Oh, don’t be hasty; give him a chance, Bill.” “Well, git up on this machine,” the sergeant growls. “Quarter of an inch too short. Why didn’t you git your father to stretch you out before you came?” “He’s got his hair smoothed down, Bill. He’s the height sure enough. Give the little feller a chance.” The applicant just reaches the minimum weight with a few ounces to spare; his chest measurement is satisfactory also but he can only inflate it an inch and a half. “We can’t take him, I tell you.” “Oh, don’t be hasty, Bill. Give the poor feller a chance. He’ll grow.” “Stand up!” the sergeant shouts. “Lift up your legs. See if you can kick yourself. Wriggle your feet. I tell you once for all we can’t take him. He’s flat-footed. And narrow-chested and knock-kneed and just look at them spavins and ringbones. And an albino. Here, you, this ain’t no freak museum. Git your clothes on and git out.”13

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This sounds like more of what may be called folk Darwinism, the assumption that some physical characteristics indicate a poor and degenerated specimen of the race and must be inherited from equally poor specimens.

Arts of the Finished Ad Writer The Army in 1908 was 20 percent below strength and much of the shortfall was due to the continuing high rate of desertion. The Army stepped up its efforts. Men with signs would walk around city parks, weather permitting, and could be seen daily “expatiating to groups of interested but individually shy persons upon the advantages of an army life.” Signs were posted in streetcars; one read: “The United States Army wants men between 18 and 35 years of age. Board, lodging, baths, clothes, gymnasium, bowling alleys, school, libraries—free. For particulars apply to Army Recruiting Offices,” and then listed eight downtown and midtown Manhattan addresses. Another streetcar advertisement read, “A steady job 3 to 30 years. Retirement at the end of thirty years with a check each month for $33 to $79.50 each month.” Recruiting posters were also produced and put up in post offices, other federal buildings and in places where large numbers of people congregated. The Army was “not above resorting to all the arts of the finished ad writer”; posters and ads elaborated on monetary advantages: By care and economy a soldier can save from his clothing allowance a considerable sum payable to him on his discharge. A soldier can deposit his savings in sums of not less than $5 with any army paymaster, and for sums so deposited for the period of six months or longer the soldier, on his final discharge, will be paid interest at the rate of 4 per cent. annum.... In organizing new regiments, large numbers of positions as non-commissioned officers are to be filled, and an unusually favorable opportunity is thus afforded for active, intelligent young men who may enlist as privates and develop the necessary qualifications to secure early promotion to a non-commissioned grade.... The pay proper of enlisted men in Porto Rico, Cuba, the Philippine Islands, Hawaii and the Territory of Alaska is increased 20 per cent. over and above the regular rate of pay.

Though the Army in 1908 was under strength, in some respects things were looking up. The Army substations in New York were sending an average of 40 men per day for the final screening at Fort Slocum, where the only ones who did not end up in the Army were men with heart problems, or those who when the time came to sign on the dotted line decided against it. The quality of the men seemed better, too, perhaps because Army pay was about to be raised by 27 percent. Even those who might not have been very well motivated would be transformed — even a “shabby, unkempt, recruit, often with a Bowery slouch” would be a different man once outfitted with


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“Men Wanted for the Army,” recruiting poster, c. 1910. A coast defense gun is shown.

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“highest quality Army duds.” He would “emerge a different figure ... unconsciously straighter ... one with the Army.”14 In 1910 the Chicago Daily Tribune published an article about the recruiting station in Chicago commanded by Franklin Kenney, the Army lieutenant who wrote one of the 1908 Harper’s Weekly articles quoted above. The newspaper was highly impressed by the eight-color posters that the Army had been using to attract recruits, noting that they were a tremendous improvement over the drab sheets that were put up on post office walls. It was not only the high quality of the lithography that was impressive; it was the scenes that they portrayed. The new posters showed such sights as an officers’ field headquarters in the Philippines “after a brush with rebellious natives,” a field gun in use during maneuvers with a “wig-wag signal and a field telegraph instrument in operation,” a “cavalry bugler trumpeting orders” across a drill field in full dress uniform, and a crew working a coast artillery gun. According to the article, these posters could be found all over Chicago, in railroad stations, general stores, and “milk stations.” Lieutenant Kenney did not have to force anyone to display the posters— hundreds of business owners requested them.15 The posters also made an appearance in Boston, where two of them were brought on an iron standard to the Common, where the standard was planted in the ground and served as an advertisement for an accompanying officer. On one side was the poster of the bugler, described as an “ultramarine trumpeter mounted on a Vandyke-brown horse,” on the other were “salmon soldiers pointing a monster cannon, capable of ... carrying from here to Kurdistan and blowing the Kurds out of the whey.” The Common was known to be a central location where many unemployed men could be found, so the recruiting sergeants went there most days when the weather was good (if it was bad they were said to prefer the railroad stations). By “custom and regulation” no business was to be conducted on the Common, so the sergeants could not approach anyone. They could, however, answer questions and direct potential enlistees to the nearest recruiting station. Since they had been on the Common for three years running, it must have been a fertile field for them.16

Up Their Sleeves Kenney took an entrepreneurial view of his work. A typical recruiting station would be a third floor walkup on a side street, open very limited hours. A potential recruit might feel doubt growing as he trudged up the stairs and turn back before he reached the office. Kenney’s office, though, was on the ground floor at 488 State St., open all day and, brightly lit, into the


Recruiting poster showing field artillery and semaphore, c. 1910.

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night. It was said of the old type of office that one had to join the Army by “breaking in with a crowbar,” but that was hardly necessary in Chicago. Kenney’s station was a large, wide storefront on “the beaten path of male workers” where “an electric sign flashes on high.” Once inside one would find “active, intelligent young men with a good stock of commonsense arguments up their sleeves”; why commonsense arguments are up their sleeves is not clear. Maybe they were revealed one by one, as needed. A standard approach was the one already described, which concentrated on how much money it was (theoretically) possible to save during a three year enlistment, and the lure of having evenings free. Being able to seek entertainment on a weekday evening was an option for the growing number of white-collar workers; hours for blue-collar workers were still much longer. This feature of Army life must have seemed like upward mobility to many recruits and may have been a strong attraction. A further inducement was the possibility of learning a trade. The army needed all types of skills and it was possible to work as an electrician, a mechanic, an “aeronaut,” a blacksmith, a bookkeeper, etc. The Army was no longer a life “of gold braid idleness but ... the ‘one best bet’ in the workaday industrial struggle.... Brisk young military ‘advance agents’” had their pamphlets and brochures ready and were well-prepared to handle what in modern terms would be called sales objections. For instance, if a recruit were to doubt the quality of mechanical training in the Army, a recruiter would tell him that “Professor Hadley recently declared that a course in the Army Artillery School is better than an equal space of study at Sheffield.” To replace the glamour of the cavalry there was now the Signal Corps, where a young man could “get in contact with the science of aerial navigation and ballooning.” The Signal Corps was soon to get several Wright airplanes and was doing “constant tests in sky scaling”— the Corps would have “entire charge of these thrilling and novel experiments.”17 There was another reason to join the Army cited. Some recruits would want to develop their physiques, become athletic, and be a “man among men.” The Army was said to be no place for those who were not “husky” and this was confirmed by the recruiting posters which showed that “large muscles bulge beneath the blue and khaki of those handsome poseurs in the pictures.” A story was told about a local man well known for his skill with his fists, who had run out of challenges. He had beaten everybody willing to fight him, including the local police. He enlisted and his fellow recruits looked to be easy pickings, but when he got to the recruit depot he ran into two big sergeants who “singly dealt him a woeful drubbing.” He was told that these two were by no means the best fighters around, which likely made him regret his career choice. There is some ambiguity here; on the one hand the Army doesn’t want toughs, on the other hand it is filled with men who able to demolish newly enlisted toughs easily.18


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Pulling Literature Lieutenant Kenney must have really thrown himself into his work. He attempted to obtain the name of every single, able-bodied man of military age within a one hundred mile radius of Chicago. He did this by contacting postmasters, employment agencies, the YMCA and by obtaining “free mail delivery lists.” He sent letters, “pulling literature,” and flyers that read, “Young man, how much do you earn? Can you save money each month and still have lots of time for yourself ? If not, come to 488 State St. Open day and night.” Here again we see an appeal to the middle-class value of thrift and the middle-class prerogative of evenings free of labor. Kenny had his opponents, who referred to his methods as undignified. The Chicago Daily Tribune opined that those who thought along those lines would also be opposed to two other relatively new methods of obtaining recruits. One was to open up a small recruiting office near the location of a “labor disturbance in which thousands of men are thrown out of work.” This was not intended to threaten workers, but by “flinging forth the stars and stripes, ” the Army might get some men who wanted a more “certain means of livelihood.” Another method used by aggressive recruiters was to go after men who had recently lost out in the lotteries that were held when government lands were opened up for private ownership and exploitation. The newspaper reasoned that men who participated in these lotteries were “daring and adventurous in spirit” and thus might make good soldiers. The Tribune thus believed that Army service could appeal to those who wanted security and to those who wanted adventure.19 The adventure aspect, which would have included the possibility of being shot at in the Philippines, was not mentioned by Army recruiters nearly as much as the free evenings and money saving possibilities. A year later Kenney and his recruiting methods came under fire again, this time by Judge K.M. Landis (later famous as the man brought in to be commissioner of Major League Baseball and clean up the game after the 1919 Black Sox scandal). Judge Landis referred to the bright, attractive army recruiting posters as “deceptive” and not giving a true picture of life in the army. Colonel William L. Pilcher, commander of the 27th Infantry at nearby Fort Sheridan, replied forcefully that army recruiting was “No bunco game!” and it was all just an effort by the Army to put its best foot forward: “Anybody would be considered an ass who advertised the worst things he had.” Stating that Judge Landis was a “prince of a fellow,” the colonel averred that he must have forgotten what it was like to be on a camping trip and have to peel potatoes— the assignment of menial chores in the Army was no worse. He continued, “Why damn it all, men have a good time in the army.” Lieutenant Kenney was also quoted, saying that the current methods used by the

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Army in recruiting were the best that they had ever had and that the improved quality of recruits was shown by the fact that the desertion rate had been cut in half.20 Kenney did not lack for defenders. A general in Washington said that any recruiting officer who made false or misleading statements to recruits would be severely punished. E.E. Morgan of the Chicago Daily Tribune also weighed in. He wrote that he was very familiar with the State Street recruiting office and noted that Kenney had stationed “trim enlisted men alert for the stalwart young stroller who might be material” for the Army, on corners in the area of the station. He also had his red and blue colored flyers “fluttering from every mail box in the district” and had been known to engage “a brass band to discourse patriotic airs in order to gain the attention of crowded State Street.” Morgan visited the station several times without announcing himself as a reporter and talked with the men waiting to enlist. About a third of the men were re-enlisting and all assured the reporter that they had not been mistreated in the Army —far from it. He looked in the room where “grizzled sergeants” were having applicants read extracts from a “third reader” to satisfy the requirement to read English, and then saw the recruits handed forms to sign and a list of infractions and punishments for frauds committed while enlisting. He also witnessed the sergeants warning the men that there was some hard work ahead and that their three-year enlistment was a legal and enforceable commitment. It was Morgan’s opinion that even one of the “genus bonehead” could not go through all this and be deceived as to the true nature of their new life. There was even a final opportunity to be undeceived: Lieutenant Kenney had to sign a statement in every recruit’s paperwork that he had personally asked the recruit a list of questions, explained anything he did not understand, and recorded all the answers.21 Following the U.S. war with Spain, young men increasingly looked to military service to develop and demonstrate physical prowess and to assert their manly character. This being so, recruiters who stressed education and pensions may have succeeded in spite of themselves. Near the declared end of the Philippine-American War recruiting times were fat, according to the War Department chief of recruiting. In fact, the desire to join was so great that it was causing problems, such as too-young men lying about their age and potential recruits being accompanied by “fake parents.” Numbers attempting to enlist were so large that the Army now could take only one in eight that wanted to join, compared to the previous average of one in four. This embarrassment of riches enabled them to get “fine specimens” for the army. The unnamed chief of recruiting thought that most recruits were seeking adventure and foreign travel when they attempted to enlist.22


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American Militarism In fact, there never seemed to be much of a problem in getting recruits. An English observer, Colonel Sir Howard Vincent, noted that it was not necessary in America for recruiters to ply unwary young men with drink and “dazzling promises” to get them to enlist in the Army — all it took was a advertisement in the newspaper and more men would appear than were needed. Sir Howard had toured the United States several times and thought Europeans believed that America was unprepared for war. This was a mistake, he maintained. The United States could call upon 17 million men in an emergency (I don’t know how he arrived at this figure, perhaps from 1900 census), a number 2 million more than all the armies of Europe. It was not only a question of numbers— there was also “an immense growth of the military spirit in America.... Whither American militarism would lead he knew not. But it was a matter of which her neighbors should take note.”23 This was not to say that the Army did not try new methods to gain recruits. Charles Selden noted that times had changed. He believed that during and for some time after the Civil War, things had been very different than they were now. Then, he wrote, store windows were full of toy soldiers, toy guns, toy drums and bugles. If asked what they wanted to be when they grew up, boys would invariably say, “Going to be a soldier.” Now, however, toyshop windows were filled with toy dynamos, steamships, trains, and dirigibles, and every boy wanted to be a motorman. Why not adapt to the times, then, and try to attract recruits by telling them that the Army builds roads and bridges, operates power plants, and does “wonderful work in communication by wire and wireless and a dozen other contrivances”? Selden suggested that the Army target technical high school students, who might well be interested in the Army if they knew more about it. Charles Selden believed that most people knew little about the Army, and much of what they did know was mistaken. They thought, he wrote, that every enlisted man made $13 a month and that anyone who was willing to settle for such a wage was either starving or planning on doing very little work. They also believed that the food in the Army was atrocious and the morals of the men were depraved. All untrue, according to Selden. Thirteen dollars was the rate for the new soldier; most made two or three times that and had their room and board free. The food was excellent and ample, and the Army was not a refuge for the “worthless and degraded,” as shown by the fact that in 1907 they rejected 78 percent of those who applied as “physically or morally unfit.” Selden’s prime example for an Army branch that offered good technical careers and good pay was the Coast Artillery. Technical high school graduates who didn’t have to support families right away could join the Coast Artillery and receive excellent training while serving his country —

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many men in their twenties still had a “little old-fashioned patriotism and love of the army for its own sake.”24 An Army officer, Colonel H.O.S. Heistand, wholeheartedly agreed that the main reason why many young men would not consider the Army as a career was a lack of accurate information. He analyzed why this was so in some detail and found two major reasons. One was the distrust of standing (i.e. regular) armies which had been present in America since before the Revolution. The other was the diversion of national energies into commercial pursuits and the development of a large new country, which left little strength remaining to generate strong military forces. Another factor was a plain lack of familiarity with the military. Heistand gives the example of a Regular Army unit on a march through some villages in northern New York State, where the inhabitants told the soldiers that they were the first Army men seen in their towns since the War of 1812.25 If there were many towns like this in America, then the Army’s efforts to publicize and promote itself through military education in the schools, tournaments, and marksmanship contests were badly needed to support a larger and better force.

The Bugaboo of Militarism The colonel thought that the nation’s expanded role on the world stage since 1898 had laid to rest most of the fears of a standing army, including the “bugaboo” of militarism. He thought that anyone could now see that military forces were needed only to defend “the nation’s institutions and its interests.” Further, there were about 1,200 civilians to each soldier, “a disparity too great to leave any fear in the minds of the most timid.” He was not going to develop a final theme any further, he wrote, but it was also true that war was the “counterpart of commercial competition” and those qualities that made a nation economically strong and great were the same that made for success in wartime. Now, however, it was time to talk of enlisting in the Army. Col. Heistand forswore any efforts to “entice” men into the Army — his role was that of an honest information broker. He was going to assume in all that followed that he was addressing men who wished for a comfortable life for themselves and their dependents and a measure of security when their working life was over. He hoped in what followed to show young men that such a life was possible in the U.S. Army. In order to do so, he needed to correct (bad) ideas about the Army that he thought most people had. These ideas were much the same as what Charles Selden had written about — that the Army paid very poorly, that the work of a soldier was “of a degrading or belittling character,” that there was little opportunity for advancement and that the moral condition of soldiers was poor.


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All of these ideas had little basis in fact, according to the colonel, most especially the one about the moral atmosphere. The reality was quite otherwise, because of the Army’s “rigid set of requirements.” All recruits had to be in good health, literate in English, and of “good character and temperate habits.” No one who showed the effects of alcohol would be enlisted and every recruit had to have a letter of recommendation from “reputable citizens in the community where he is best known.” Colonel Heistand believed that recruiting officers would not deviate from this standard, leaving open the question of whether recruiting sergeants might do so. These requirements, in his opinion, meant that the moral tone of life in the Army was in fact better than in other groups of young men and no unfit man who managed to sneak in would be tolerated, unless he quickly reformed — and he would have to reform himself, since the Army was “not a reform school.” The idea that the soldier was poorly paid and had little chance of advancement was also quite mistaken, according to the colonel. While the initial salary was indeed $13 a month, soldiers who applied themselves could expect regular promotions and the pay increases that went along with higher rank. There was also retirement to be considered; at a time when pensions were quite rare, soldiers could retire at half pay after 20 years of service. Here the Colonel began to give figures on how much the retired soldier would receive, all based upon his idea that any reasonably clear-thinking soldier would save half of his pay and put the money in federal accounts that paid 4 percent per annum. He could then take each month from his savings an amount equal to his retired pay and thus have from about $100 to $175 a month for the rest of his life and be “free to go wherever he chooses.”26

Schooled in Tyranny and Oppression Coverage of recruiting in the newspapers was almost completely laudatory. In these articles recruits were usually plentiful and recruiters were straight shooters who laid out the considerable advantages of an Army career with candor. When recruiting was down, various reasons would be advanced. Often the closing of the soldier’s canteens under pressure by temperance advocates was brought up. In 1901 Col. “Pete” Hepburn told the U.S. House of Representatives that he thought recruiting problems were the result of the brutality that Army and Navy officers tolerated and encouraged. The House was debating a provision in a bill that would not allow Annapolis midshipmen to join the armed forces if they had been convicted of hazing while at the Naval Academy. Representative C.K. Wheeler of Kentucky stated that this was too harsh and indicative of government being too sensitive to the pressures of the moment: “events in Kansas, under the leadership of a “misguided and hysterical woman” were

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“evidences of an overwrought public sentiment.” This was the point where Col. Hepburn spoke, saying that recruiting was difficult and desertion rampant because Americans did not want to serve under officers “schooled in tyranny and oppression.” Prior speakers had attempted to belittle hazing at the service academies, but Hepburn would have none of that, telling the House that the hazing at West Point included brutal boxing matches. Hepburn gave an example of how military officers were not held accountable for their actions. He stated that 25 naval vessels had been lost after collisions with rocks or shoals since the end of the Civil War and only one ship’s captain had received serious punishment. In China ship’s captains who lost their vessels under similar circumstances were required to commit suicide and Hepburn wanted strict, though not as severe, punishment for incompetence here. Though his speech was well-applauded, he could not been have happy at the outcome, which imposed only a mild punishment for hazing.27 The continuing war in the Philippines was seldom mentioned as a deterrent to enlisting, but the Atlanta Constitution brought it up in an editorial. They quoted the Philadelphia Times: “Military service, the chief purpose of which is to shoot Filipinos who harbor a preference for self-government, does not appeal with much force to the able-bodied young men of the country.” Their own comment was that the “American is ready at all times to fight when it is for defense of the flag or to repel assault. He does not seem to see glory in the Filipino war; however, otherwise he would be on hand.”28 The Constitution published without comment, later in that same year, a brief item reporting that enlistments had fallen off since the Army had removed from recruiting posters a statement that soldiers were being sought for service in the Philippines.29 In 1911 George Jean Nathan, later famous as a playwright and critic, wrote an article called Romance of the Recruiting Office, which related several stories of why men enlist in the Army. Nathan went to interview a recruiter who laughed at his proposed title, saying there was never any romance in recruiting. Nathan then showed the officer a newspaper clipping about a girl who loved a man who was a clerk in a shoe store. She thought this was entirely too mundane an occupation and wanted a man who could be heroic if need be. According to the clipping the couple agreed that the man would enlist in the Army to be a “peace hero” and when his enlistment was up they would get married. The recruiting officer, rather hesitantly, agreed there could be more romance in recruiting than he thought.30

Forgetting the Old Game Nathan wrote that further interviews did indeed reveal romantic stories. The first story he found sounds remarkably like the newspaper clipping.


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A man named Estabridge comes to the recruiting station with a pretty young woman and tells the recruiter that he has spent the last twelve years in “safe cracking and jail.” He has been out of jail for nine months and has met the young woman accompanying him, whom he wishes to marry. She has pointed out “the rottenness of the life I’ve been leading,” but will marry him if he reforms. He believes he needs some help in renovating his character and thinks the Army might be able to provide it —“The life of service and discipline will help me forget the old game.” Another man named Johnstone wears his heart on his sleeve just like Estabridge. His intended, the lovely Carrie, has eloped with a rival, who is richer and more attractive than he is. Johnstone somehow knows that Carrie’s new husband is, although rich and attractive, “mean, bad-tempered, a heavy drinker, and dishonest.” Since Carrie is bound to find out, divorce is inevitable, and in the meantime Johnstone will join the Army to forget his troubles. The next vignette describes an unnamed young man who becomes an alcoholic and is helped by his loving sister. After several failures, he too arrives at the recruiting office and pleads his case to the recruiter: “Help me save myself, for my sister’s sake, while there’s still time. The Army will cure me, I know. It’s only my sister, old man, that I want to live straight for.” Nathan wrote that not only romance but drama was part of recruiting. He wrote about a black man named Adams, who grows up in the South and moves to the North, where he obtains a high school education, but not a decent job or acceptance as a human being. He manages to scrape by for a time playing the violin in a hotel in a Northern city, but finally becomes destitute and enlists in the Army, “wearing the uniform of the country that had turned its back on him, but the country he still loved.” Adams is killed in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, and a sealed letter is found on his body addressed to the recruiter that enlisted him, The letter thanks the recruiter for letting him in the Army and expresses gratitude for the “opportunity to prove that although his face was black his heart and his purpose were white.” The next anecdote concerns another man, William Tracy, whose thoughtless wife leaves him for another man. Poor Tracy has tuberculosis, which frustrates the several attempts he makes to enlist in the Army, where he believes he would stop obsessing about his heartbreak. He commits suicide, and a note is found which simply reads, “They wouldn’t let me forget.” The final drama concerns a man who whose mother had married a Frenchman in Paris. Shortly after he was born the Frenchman abandoned his young family and the mother was left to fend for herself without help from her family, who had opposed her marriage to the foreigner. She meagerly supported them by working in a bookstore until, when he was ten, the family in America forgave her. She, however, died on the day they were about to leave for America, and the boy was raised by his mother’s employer. When he is

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twenty, his foster father gives him a sealed letter, in which his departed mother begs him to “desert the France that deserted me, go back to the America that will understand me and you and our kind of love.” He does this and lives successfully in America for 8 years, but is unhappy. He wants to enter the “service of my mother’s-my own-country. In that way alone do I feel that I can do her memory honor and justice.”31 Nathan seems at times to be poking fun at folklore about Army recruiting, but I don’t know why he chose to write a story about recruiting and include no information from either recruiters or from men who joined as a career choice — perhaps, in spite of all the Army’s efforts, enlisting was still mostly a matter of no other option and Army life was not as comfortable as recruiting officers made it out to be. The forgetting an unhappy love affair function of military service survived until the mid-twentieth century in stories about joining the French Foreign Legion to forget such disasters, but becoming a soldier as a way of asserting a male identity is undoubtedly still done by some men and military service remains a choice for those with few other options

Not Destined to Be a Soldier George Jean Nathan proposed several reasons why a man might enlist, but according to the Chicago Daily Tribune joining the Army was all for love. If a young man was rejected by a girl he loved, then he would naturally think of joining the Army. There could be two reasons for this. First, he might be so depressed that he hoped to die heroically in combat, which would show the fickle girl how fine he was and cause her and the rest of the world to mourn him forever. Another possibility was that he might immediately become more attractive to her, since it was widely believed that females found men in military uniforms irresistible. Both possibilities were illustrated by supposedly true stories. The hope-to-be-killed-option story was about an obviously upper-class Englishman who enlisted after a marriage proposal was rejected, telling the recruiting officer he was sick of life. The British officer telling the story said the man “was not destined to be a soldier,” since two weeks later the girl and her mother showed up and took the young man away with them. This seemed to be a satisfactory conclusion to everyone, including the recruiting officer. The other possibility was shown by the experience of a young man who was a waiter in a Chicago restaurant and was unsuccessful in affairs of the heart. His intended said that she could never marry a waiter, so he decided to make the quickest career change possible and joined the Army. He had only to visit the girl in his new army uniform and “she capitulated at first sight.” They became engaged and the young man returned


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to duty. When he got a furlough he went to see the girl, only to find out that she had married the man who had taken his waiter job. The Tribune assured its readers that this outcome was untypical.32 Army recruiters in the Progressive Era certainly made use of modern methods to attract potential “customers,” even to the point of creating their own “fable of abundance” à la T. Jackson Lears.33 Enlistees were shown as having good food and plenty of it, being well-housed and clothed, with leisure-time opportunities equal to gentlemen’s clubs and sporting facilities. Also pouring out of the cornucopia were opportunities for foreign travel and a pension, both of which were seldom then available to any middle or working class man. Army recruiters seemed to want most to attract a man with solid middle class values, or at least aspirations to such values. Their most common strategy was to emphasize opportunities for advancement and better pay, foreign travel, free room and board, free leisure time activities, and pensions. Wanting these things seems like an aspiration to a middle-class lifestyle in that era, and stressing them as why one should enlist is putting a middle-class face on the Army. This is perfectly reasonable. The Army made it clear that they did not want “toughs,” brawlers, or alcoholics, and even had doubts about cigarette smokers. Those with middle-class values, steady moral men accustomed to deferring to authority, could be taught to obey orders quickly and completely, and that would make them good soldiers. Methods were the equal of other pioneers of consumer culture, at least in some larger cities. In Chicago there was a station open at night with a good location and a flashing electric sign. Its chief produced flyers, distributed the Army’s eight-color recruiting posters to eager businessmen, and developed mailing lists of young men to send his “pulling literature.” Though everyone agreed that the main factor affecting Army recruiting was the state of the economy, poor results couldn’t be blamed on lack of an advertising effort. Socioeconomic changes were working their way through the culture of the Progressive Era and affecting the ways in which the Army came into contact with the civilian public. The middle class was expanding and its values, very congenial to Progressive thinking, were expanding as well. The Army’s image as competent defenders of the nation, and the emphasis put on soldiers as being strong exemplars of a moral America, were assiduously promoted. Another venue for the display of military values was the big marksmanship contests held annually and heavily supported by the Army, which are the subject of the next chapter. These events were very popular, attracting thousands of spectators, and were a great opportunity for the Army to show its shooting skills and to showcase martial values. The Army’s great supporter in promoting rifle shooting was the National Rifle Association, which from its inception had many ties with the military and enthusiastically supported rifle shooting as a fit activity for patriots.

6. “An army of marksmen” We have prided ourselves on being an army of marksmen.1 — President Theodore Roosevelt, 1902

The National Rifle Association (NRA) was founded in 1871 by a group of New York National Guard officers, most of whom were Union Army veterans. The founders knew of the British Rifle Association, established in 1859. The British group was organized specifically to help train the militia in marksmanship and promote rifle shooting throughout Great Britain. There was little organized marksmanship training during the American Civil War. These men wanted to develop such training for the Army, state militias such as the New York National Guard and interested civilian shooters.2 Both rifle associations believed that the best way to encourage rifle shooting was to hold target shooting contests. In New York such contests were held at the Creedmoor Range on Long Island from 1873 onwards, and Creedmoor became the most important site for national and international shooting matches. After 1850 the rifled musket began to replace the smooth bore musket in armies around the world, and being able to shoot well became much more important. Smooth bore muskets were inaccurate at any range and wildly inaccurate beyond a hundred yards. There was little need for marksmanship training with these weapons. The usual method of use was for soldiers to march within less than one hundred yards of the enemy, halt, fire three volleys as quickly as possible, then charge with the bayonet. The rifled musket, however, was very accurate up to 300 yards and aimed fire could be effective beyond 600 yards. Rifled muskets had twisting grooves inside the barrel and used bullets rather than round shot, though the these bullets continued to be referred to as “balls,” as were the American Civil War Minie balls. There was another factor in the growing interest in marksmanship, and that factor was the increasing urbanization of society. Men raised on farms could be expected to know how to handle weapons, since hunting was an important source of food. Most city boys would not have this experience and 84

6. “An army of marksmen”

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there were few places to practice shooting in cities. It was obvious that urbanization was going to continue, and more and more recruits for the army would have little exposure to firearms. If more marksmanship training was available to non-rural populations, this could be a way to promote unity in society and between society and the Army. This was a particular concern of the founders of the NRA. From the beginning the NRA saw itself as supporting the military. Its founders’ intentions were clear: “An association should be organized in this city to promote and encourage rifle shooting on a scientific basis. The National Guard is today too slow in getting about this reform. Private enterprise must take up the matter and push it into life. Let us have our rifle practice association, also a Wimbledon on American principles.”3 (“Wimbledon” refers to the large rifle range established by the British Rifle Association at Wimbledon Common in Surrey.) Throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, shooting competitions were held by the New York Rifle Association at Creedmoor, the New Jersey Rifle Association at Sea Girt and other locations in other states. As the years went by and no threat of war developed, supporting the military seemed less and less important. Some states, New York among them, reduced the support they had been giving for the development of marksmanship, and the NRA declined in both membership and influence.

Rifle Practice as a Means of National Defense The Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War brought renewed interest in the military and new leadership to the NRA, which was formally reconstituted in 1900. The first board of directors meeting after the reconstitution was held in New York on December 17, 1900. A statement was issued by the new secretary of the NRA, Army Lieutenant Albert Jones, which stated the organization’s purposes. These were to make the sport of rifle shooting “one of the popular pastimes of the people,” to set up qualifying procedures to provide “finished marksmen ... who may be called upon to serve in time of war,” “encourage a public sentiment in respect of the necessity of rifle practice as a means of national defense,”4 and “increase innovations in the way of running-man targets, disappearing targets, up-to-date skirmish matches, and other attractive features at annual meetings.”5 A running-man target was a silhouette of a running man that moved. Disappearing targets would remain visible for twelve or fifteen seconds and the shooter fired five or six times during that span of time. Skirmish matches were team events which simulated the actions of a skirmish line advancing and retreating under fire and were thought to be one of the more “spectacular” events. The targets would be silhouettes.

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A typical targeting scheme would have a group of three targets for each team member — silhouettes of a standing man, a kneeling man, and a lying man. The team would line up at six hundred yards away from the targets with unloaded rifles and twenty rounds apiece. At the command “Fire!” the men would drop to a kneeling, sitting or prone position and fire once. They would then stand up and sprint until a bugle sounded, when they would again drop into position and fire, get up, and run until the bugle blew again. This would continue until they had reached the two-hundred yard line. Then they would fire their tenth rounds, the bugle would sound “Retreat,” and the men would shoulder arms and move back until the bugle sounded, when they would fire from a standing position and move back until the bugle sounded again.6 These matches were “colorful as well as invaluable for training men in the latest battle tactics in dispersed formation.” These skirmish matches proved so popular that a “reentry team skirmish match” was added in 1910. This was open to any team that wanted to enter. Teams that were entered in the national championship skirmish match, however, were only eligible for “prizes which correspond to their standing last year.” This was expected to produce a “wildly exciting match.”7

“Big Shoot” at Sea Girt The NRA Board of Directors scheduled a tournament at the Sea Girt, New Jersey, range for the summer of 1901. Until 1909, when the national matches would be moved to Camp Perry in Ohio, Sea Girt was the site of the yearly championship matches for all types of competition shooting. It had some advantages over the Brinton range previously used by the New Jersey State Rifle Association. Sand dunes provided a convenient backstop for the shooters— it was not necessary to build an earthen backstop as it had been at the Creedmoor Range. The climate was good and Sea Girt was not as subject to fogs as some other coastal areas were. It was a popular beach resort and there was good transportation by train available. During the annual rifle tournaments the railroads would offer discounted fares to Sea Girt. Notices for the late summer yearly competition would begin appearing in the newspaper in early spring. Referred to as “the Big Shoot” or just “Sea Girt” in the headlines, this was a major event. During the summer units of the National Guard would be encamped at nearby Camp Frank Murphy, but at the end of August or beginning of September visiting military units would be put up in tents on the Sea Girt range. In 1901 by a week before the event, teams from eight states, Canada, and Ireland had accepted invitations to participate. It was to be the “biggest international competition” up until that time and the range had been expanded to include over 80 targets for the various


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matches. American teams were either from civilian clubs or were “regimental,” i.e. military. The civilian clubs included the Zettler Rifle Club of New York City, the Crescent City Rifle Club of Scranton, Pennsylvania, the Iroquois Rifle Club of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the Hoboken (New Jersey) Independent Schuetzen Corps, the San Antonio Shooting Society, the Italian Shooting Association of New York City and the Elite Rifle Club of Brooklyn, New York. Many trophies were to be awarded, including the international Palma Trophy, which the U.S. won in 1880 and the team from Canada would be challenging for. This was to be the first year the trophy was in play since 1880. It had disappeared some time after 1880, but had been found in a Washington, D.C., museum and returned to the NRA. The Irish team from Ulster was invited after challenging the New Jersey Rifle Association to a match. According to the New York Times of August 25, 1901, the Irish team was veteran shooters while the New Jersey team was “inexperienced,” but coached by the “Philadelphia expert Foulke,” who had “great confidence” in them even though they had the “disadvantage of not being properly armed.”8 This newspaper account is very typical of the coverage of shooting competitions. These reports took the matches very seriously indeed and saw them as very helpful in fostering marksmanship. Improvements in the standard of marksmanship in turn were seen as contributions to the security of the nation. In addition to the challengers from abroad, there were invitations sent to other foreign nations to participate, and this practice continued. Up until 1913 most of the foreign competitors came from English-speaking nations and from South America. It was thus a very friendly competition and no teams from nations that the U.S. saw as potential enemies, such as Germany and Japan, appeared. In 1912, however, an “organization of international rifle shooting societies of the world” meeting in Paris voted to hold matches in the United States in 1913, as did the Pan American Shooting Union. Nine teams from abroad accepted invitations in 1913: Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Mexico, Cuba, Argentina, Peru and Canada. This was the first time Germany accepted an invitation, but all the other 1913 competitors had participated in previous years.9 If German and Japanese teams had competed regularly perhaps there would not have been such an air of bonhomie surrounding the contests. The 1901 event began on Friday, August 30, and was scheduled to end on Monday, September 7, with no shooting on Sunday, September 1, the day being set aside for a religious service. Future tournaments would also devote Sundays to services and relaxation. The 1903 Sea Girt tournament Sunday began with an open-air service, conducted by the Rev. J. Madison Hare, chaplain of the Third Regiment of the New Jersey National Guard: “Responsive Bible readings and the singing of the hymn ‘Adoration’ and ‘America’ preceded the sermon. Chaplain Hare’s theme was ‘An Improved Score.’ The text

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was taken from the twenty third verse of the third chapter of Romans—‘For all who have sinned [missed the mark] and come short of the glory of God.’”10 In 1901 a brief opening ceremony was held at 10 A.M., conducted by Governor Foster M. Voorhees of New Jersey, NRA president and tournament executive General Bird W. Spencer of the New Jersey National Guard, and assistant tournament executives Army Brigadier General Adelbert Buffington and Navy Rear Admiral John J. Read. Some of the teams, including the Canadian, had not yet arrived, but early arrivals had been practicing from dawn to dusk. Throughout the day were few moments when the “smart crack of the modern military rifle could not be heard.” Not only were the sounds military, but the range itself had the appearance of a military camp. Though most teams were staying in local hotels, some had pitched tents on the range grounds. Despite the military appearance, however, “military formality and routine are but little in evidence, the individuals of each team being at liberty to come and go at pleasure. Absence from quarters has been unusual, however, as rifle practice has kept the men busy ... from dawn till the light failed in the evening each day.”11 The rifle shooting competition was at ranges of 200, 500, 600, 900 and 1,000 yards. The Palma Trophy match was conducted over two days at distances of 900 and 1,000 yards. For this long range shooting the target was twelve feet long by six feet wide, with a circular bull’s-eye 3 feet in diameter, surrounded by a circle 41 ⁄2 feet in diameter. These were contained in an inner square 6 × 6 feet and an outer square consisting of 3 × 6 panels on both ends. A hit in the bulls-eye was 4 points, the outer circle 3, the inner square 2, and the outer square 1. The wide rectangular shape of the target had to do with the kind of long-range shooting that was anticipated to be necessary in war. It was thought that long-range rifle fire could be directed at formations of soldiers and at artillery emplacements. A shot aimed at the center of such targets that was wide to the left or right might still hit an enemy, but a shot that was too high would go over their heads and a low shot would hit the ground in front of the target.

An Army of Marksmen President Theodore Roosevelt paid a visit to Sea Girt in July of 1902. He spoke to a crowd of about 5,000 on the value of the service to the nation performed by the National Guard and urged the soldiers encamped there to attend to their duties. The President stated, “I earnestly hope and believe that you will never get into battle, but if you do it is going to be mighty important that you be able to hit the other fellow. You are going to be able to do it largely in consequence of the way you have put in your time and knowing


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Shooting at 1,000 yards, slightly more than one-half mile, at Sea Girt, Sept. 4, 1908.

your rifle until it is a part of yourself.... We have prided ourselves on being an army of marksmen.”12 Efforts by the Army to produce an “army of marksmen” began with the recruits. They were given much more practice with their rifles than nineteenth-century American soldiers received. With the increased accuracy of weapons, soldiers had to be trained how to shoot at greater distances and how to adjust the rifle’s sights in order to be accurate at long range. There were adjustments possible for distance and for the effects of wind on the rear sights of military rifles, called elevation and windage. Elevation was the most important, since typically on a windy day, the coaches of a team would signal when the wind had died down enough for accurate firing (in most matches there were no time limits). Adjustment for distance is called elevation because the farther away a target is, the more the rifle barrel must be elevated to take into account the action of gravity on the bullet. At short ranges there is no appreciable effect, but at longer ranges, if gravity is not adjusted for, all shots will fall short. Rifle sights were marked in yards so they could be adjusted according to how many yards distant the target was. In competition all distances were known. But in the field, how was a soldier to know how many yards away a target was? Army training attempted to give the soldier means to estimate distance. The training involved quizzes on the distance of objects in a field with colored markers. If a soldier couldn’t learn to estimate distance he would

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The rifle type of man — winners of company team and cavalry matches, Sea Girt, September 4, 1908.

lose his marksmanship pay. Soldiers were also taught some rules of thumb, such as at 200 yards “the outlines of the face become confused and rows of brass buttons appear as stripes. At 400 yards the face becomes a mere dot.” A soldier was supposed to be able to hit objects at 600 yards, though another rule of thumb taught him that a lying or kneeling man could not be hit at these distances. They were also taught to estimate distance by counting seconds between a muzzle flash and the report of a gun and about the effects of weather upon marksmanship. Every army post was required to set up a range which allowed for target practice at a range of 50 to 60 feet.

A Battlefield Heard But Not Seen Beyond the mechanics of shooting there were personal qualities that were thought to be required if one was to be a skilled marksman. Because holding the rifle motionless was essential for good shooting, being self-controlled and cool was thought to be desirable. A news article said one man, asked if he ever got nervous during a match, replied that he didn’t “know what nervousness means” and he looked it. A match at Round Hill, in Southern Cali-


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fornia, “seemed like some battlefield which could be heard but not seen.... Many of the contestants, including all the visitors, were heroes of the ten days’ shooting carnival just completed in San Francisco for the national championship.”13 A match between two visitors, one of whom was said to be the best shot in the U.S. and possibly the world, was described. The contestants were “cool as cukes” and although they were a “bundle of nerves” they didn’t show it. As soon as they fired, the gun was lowered and the shell ejected “like lightning,” and the marksmen would stand “immobile” until the score was announced. The exercise of a high level of self control was necessary, but one writer felt that this did not mean that a placid or phlegmatic man would be a good marksman. This type of personality would not be alert enough to fire shots when all conditions were right. “The rifle type of man is a muscular, lean, quiet fellow of nervous temperament, but whose nerves are under the complete control of the will. The phlegmatic man seems to lack the mental alertness and that instant thinking required to get the bullet started at just the right moment.”14 This sounds like a combination of qualities of manliness and masculinity. Manliness is shown by the “lean quiet fellow” with the complete control of the will and masculinity by qualities of competitiveness and even aggression as evidenced by his “nervous temperament.” It is very definitely the manly side that is control; it has unruly masculinity under tight control. An incident at the 1909 national competition at Camp Perry, Ohio, exemplified the kind of self-control that a good marksman was supposed to exercise. During a skirmish match a young Army lieutenant from Kansas reached the four hundred yard position where he was required to lie prone and fire five shots. As he fired his second shot the officer saw the grass waving in front of his rifle barrel, and a large snake appeared two feet in front of him. The lieutenant calmly fired his third, fourth and fifth shots, stood up, jumped over the snake and ran to his next position. At the conclusion of the match it was determined that he had fired a perfect score.15 Becoming a good marksman also required good physical condition, excellent vision, intimate familiarity with the peculiarities of the rifle, and a fine coordination between the mind and the muscles. In order to be successful at long range shooting a marksman must not be gun-shy, and the writer believed that few shooters were without any gun-shyness. “Gun-shy” meant blinking the eyes or tensing the muscles in anticipation of the shot and the recoil of the rifle. The proper way to fire a shot is often called squeezing a shot off. Pressure is slowly increased on the trigger so that the gun is held steady, rather than jerking the trigger, which would move the gun and result in a miss, except at very close ranges. Though it was felt that good marksmen are born and not made, it was also acknowledged that rigorous practice

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and training were necessary. Some of the shooting positions recommended do not seem natural. In the standing position the left hand should not grip the stock, which would tense the muscles, but rest on the palm. Standing shooters were photographed with their left elbows resting on their left hip and the rifle stock resting on the left hand’s fingertips. “It requires long practice to become comfortable and easy in these positions, for any constraint whereby a muscle is made tense results in poor and uneven shooting.”16 Most observers would certainly have agreed that self-control and long practice were necessary in order for one to become a good marksman. Captain T.T. Hyde of the South Carolina National Guard asked the ages of men competing at the 1907 Camp Perry shoot; he found them be on average between 37 and 40 years old, “showing that rifle practice has held the attention and interest of men longer than any other feature of military life.” After commenting that many of the men were well-known and influential citizens at home, Captain Hyde explained some other qualities of good marksmen. They must be very self-controlled, their “nerves must be in the very best condition,” and they must not “show the least evidence of dissipation”; they must be manly men, in other words. Summing up, the captain stated that marksmanship contests were “a great benefit in the development of true manhood and creating the highest interest in the State militia.”17

Service in Times of War Roosevelt continued to be an active supporter of marksmanship training and in 1903 he signed legislation that established the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice. This board was appointed by the secretary of war and chaired by the assistant secretary of war. Its charges were to oversee national rifle and pistol competitions, award prizes to the winners, and provide financial support for military teams to travel to the national competitions. After its first meeting on April 21, 1903, the Board recommended that every facility should be offered citizens outside the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and organized militia to become proficient in rifle shooting, and that this purpose can best be accomplished by means of rifle clubs. The Board therefore respectfully recommends the encouragement by the War Department of the organization of rifle clubs composed of those who would be eligible for service in times of war, but without special obligation for war service on account of such membership, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.18

The board cooperated closely with the NRA. In 1904 it established a “National Marksmen’s Reserve” qualification for which NRA and NRA-affiliated club members could compete. Members who could achieve a qualifying score


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in shooting at targets from two hundred, three hundred, and five hundred yard ranges would receive a lapel button from the NRA and become listed in the national “Second Line of Defense” list maintained by the War Department. In the event of a national emergency, members of the marksmen’s reserve were promised first consideration by the War Department after volunteering for active duty.19 The board’s plan for the National Marksmen’s Reserve was ambitious. In a 1904 statement they laid out the plan and the reasons for it. First they stated that “our regular army must be small [though they did not say why] and in the event of war with one or more of the first class powers of the world we must rely upon the militia and volunteers for our fighting force.” Secondly, they estimated that 80 percent of the military efficiency of a soldier was proficiency with the rifle, a very high percentage indeed. No basis is given for this estimate. Finally, with modern long-range rifles, it was imperative that a soldier be able to hit where he was aiming at long range. Otherwise, he would be like a quail hunter which fires at the flock and not at individual birds.20 The board believed that if its plan was faithfully followed, within a few years there would be one million men who would have almost all that was required of an efficient soldier, and this would be done at minimal cost. They noted that they had studied the methods by which other countries promoted rifle practice and stated that “knowledge of this skill will make a timid man brave and a brave man more courageous.” Special emphasis was given to training boys and young men. It was felt that if boys between 15 and 18 were not given training, they likely would not be able to find time for it when they were beginning their working lives. For this reason the board thought it was crucial that every secondary school, public or private, have an indoor shooting range and that the use of private outdoor ranges by these schools be encouraged and promoted in every way possible. The instruction provided was not to be limited to boys fifteen and older, however. Younger students were welcome to participate and compete in matches, and junior marksman and junior sharpshooter awards were planned for them. The younger the better, because it was essential when dealing with youth to “firmly establish the idea that everyone who expects to serve his country in time of need should educate himself in the use of the rifle while he may.” The type of weapon used was also important. The board recommended that the weapon should be similar to the type used by the U.S. Army and noted that college cadets were still using the Civil War Springfield muskets and black powder. They suggested that since the shorter and lighter Krag carbine used by the cavalry was about to be replaced, that these weapons be given to schools, ten to each school with an army instructor and one for every 25

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“scholars” in schools that had rifle practice in the curriculum. Promotion and supervision of rifle practice in the schools was to be done by a National Guard officer in each state, who would have the imposing title of United States inspector of civilian rifle practice and report directly to the even more imposing general inspector of rifle practice of the Militia Division of the United States Army. The importance of encouraging boys to participate was acknowledged, and the board thought one of the best ways to do this was for the government to sponsor contests in each state and pay for medals and permanent trophies that would be kept by the current winners for a year and then passed on to the next winner. The recommendation was that the federal government appropriate $5,000 annually for the medals and make a one-time expenditure of $20,000 for the permanent trophies. Almost all of these measures in support of rifle practice in the schools were to be extended to civilian rifle clubs, with the exception of the provision of Army personnel for training. The board recommended trophies, low cost arms and ammunition and other assistance be granted the clubs. The press was to be encouraged to inform their readers that “it is a patriotic thing for a man to learn how to shoot; furthermore, that those who do not know how to shoot will not be considered for enlistment in time of war, provided others can be had who possess this most necessary qualification.”21 The board also gave the NRA an explicit role in its support for rifle clubs. The NRA was requested to prepare bylaws for affiliated clubs so that these clubs could be made part of the national effort to improve marksmanship. The board further directed the adjutants general of the state national guards to encourage the formation of state rifle associations to be affiliated with the NRA. The NRA and its affiliates, by a 1905 law, were made eligible to receive military rifles and ammunition at cost, so long as they met the specifications of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice.

The Leashes of the Dogs of War By 1906 some changes had been made in the order of events at Sea Girt. The National Match, open only to teams from the military, was moved from the middle of competition to the first two days, so that military personnel who did not want to participate in the later individual matches could leave after two days. To be on one of the twelve man teams a soldier had to present a certificate from his home unit stating that he had performed at least seventy-five percent of his assigned duties— parades, inspections, drills, etc. This was probably only a requirement for the National Guard units, since regular soldiers would be expected to perform all assigned duties and would


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likely have been in trouble if they had only shown up seventy-five percent of the time. This rule was stated to be similar to the practice in intercollegiate athletics, where an athlete with poor grades would not be allowed to compete. It was also required that these soldiers be in uniform, which had not been a strict requirement in previous years.22 Rewards for the winners were substantial. The winner of the National Match took home the National Trophy, which was a large bronze tablet of Mars, the god of war, holding the leashes of the dogs of war. Perhaps the symbolism here was that war could be prevented if the standards of American marksmanship were so high that other nations would fear to attack the United States. It was, in any event, an imposing trophy presented by Congress and the winning team also received a cash prize of $300. The second place team received the Hilton Trophy, donated by Henry Hilton of New York. This was a “magnificent ... silver shield executed by Tiffany’s,” which read “Military and Naval Challenge Trophy” and had a scene of buffalo hunting in the center. The second place team received a cash prize of $200. The third place team received the Soldier of Marathon Trophy, presented by the State of New York and $150. Fourth, fifth, and sixth place teams received smaller cash prizes.23 There were eligibility rules in addition to the rule about performing 75 percent of assigned duties. The intent of all these rules clearly seems to be to make this a team effort and prevent teams from monopolizing the prizes, thus raising standards of marksmanship for all the armed services. Those who had competed for the National Trophy in the preceding year were not eligible in the current year. Any prize-winning team had to designate the four members who had participated the most in National Trophy competition as ineligible to compete for the next three years. By 1909 there were so many teams entered in the national match that a system of classes was set up to allow teams to compete against teams of similar skills. Classes A, B, and C were composed of teams who had finished in the top, middle and bottom thirds in the previous year’s tournament. Prizes were awarded for the top scoring team in each class. If a Class B team had the best score in the event it would be the Class A winner, but no Class A team could be awarded a Class B or Class C prize.24 There were places for the individual to shine, however. Following the two day National Trophy match was a one day individual national match with large cash prizes, first prize being $1,000 and a gold medal and progressively lower amounts to the 26th place winner, who received $5.

Rifle Clubs The NRA also helped establish rifle clubs in schools and colleges and under the quasi-direction of the Army, and the National Board for the Promotion

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of Rifle Practice sponsored a nationwide competition for school rifle teams. They were most interested in recruiting members from the agricultural colleges, which were required to provide military training, military schools and high schools with cadet companies. Students at any of these institutions could set up a rifle club affiliated with the NRA by collecting at least twenty members and obtaining permission from the administration of the school. They would then need to adopt bylaws supplied by the NRA and their club would be established. The NRA would supply them with official targets and medals to be awarded to those who could fire qualifying scores. Two sorts of qualifications were stipulated. Junior Marksman Medal qualifying rounds for boys under 18 were shot indoors at a range of fifty feet, using any .22-caliber rifle with a rear sight ahead of the firing pin (usually only special competition rifles, called match or free rifles, had rear sights in back of the firing pin, so the eye almost touched the sight), no glass (i.e. telescopic) sights allowed. The NRA-supplied target had a one-inch bulls-eye and the shooter was required to fire ten rounds offhand (standing) and ten rounds prone. Out of one hundred possible points, the shooter had to score forty offhand and forty-two prone, for a total of eightytwo points, to receive his medal. A young man could also qualify by using a “subtarget gun machine,” which recorded his shots electrically without actually firing bullets. For this a score of 45 firing ten shots standing was required.25 Students eighteen and above could receive the NRA Medal by shooting a qualifying score at the two hundred yard range using any military rifle and any ammunition. They were required to fire ten rounds standing and ten rounds prone, with two sighting rounds allowed for each position, and to use the NRA “A” target. The firing had to be done at an outdoor range, and if the shooter did not have access to one, the NRA would get permission from the nearest military rifle range for the student to use that facility.26 Marksmanship training in the schools was consonant with the ideas of Progressive educational reformers. Progressives wanted to make secondary education prepare students for their roles in society and become more practical, in addition to teaching young people the necessity of being willing to submerge one’s identity in a group effort. Being prepared through marksmanship training to serve in the Army or the National Guard must have been considered a practical and useful part of education, in view of the increased role that military force was called upon to play in the world and at home.

Little Shavers In April 1909 the NRA sanctioned a nationwide tournament for school clubs, to be shot under the rules for the Junior Marksman Medal. NRA judges


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were to oversee these contests, which were held on indoor ranges throughout the United States, and would award a gold and silver trophy to the winner. In Los Angeles there were two private schools competing, the Harvard School and the Urban Academy. This was the first event of its kind in the United States and was said to be “along the lines of the plan for teaching schoolboys the use of the military rifle followed by England, Australia, Canada and Japan.” Teams of ten could be entered from any public or private secondary school. Entry was free for teams from a club affiliated with the NRA and two dollars for teams that were not. Colonel Kelly of the Urban Academy, an ex–New York National Guardsman and a rifle enthusiast, was apparently the moving force behind getting the two Los Angeles schools to participate in this national event. The Harvard School was thought to have the better chance to score well, because its team members were older and more experienced. The Urban School was a small school and had a young team: “some of the little shavers are hardly strong enough to hold out a heavy rifle, but they are interested enough to enter in spite of the handicap against them.”27 The listing of the team members gives military ranks to many, so there must have been cadet companies at these schools. One year later this program was making good progress. There were seventy-three schools signed up across the nation and outdoor qualifying was to done the following spring. In the winter the indoor competitions would be held. Secondary schools in New York that would participate in the tournaments in 1910–11 were DeWitt Clinton High School, Morris High School, Manual Arts High School, Polytechnic Preparatory High School, Erasmus Hall High School, Commercial High School and Hamilton Institute.

Conclusions Target shooting was far more than a sport to the U.S. government, the Army, and the leadership of the NRA. In the competitions described here, there were determined efforts to make the shooting directly relevant to military concerns. While there were events for an individual to excel in and be recognized for his excellence, these received far less coverage in the press reports of the yearly “Big Shoot.” The team events, however, were covered in depth, and viewed as both exciting and a contribution to national security. The eligibility rules for the national matches made them accessible to aspiring marksmen and ensured that there would be new team members every year. The nature of the contests, particularly such events as the skirmish matches, was very much in line with the needs of the military. Most events required the use of the standard military rifle of the nationality of the team.

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The emphasis on the group and working together rather than pursuing individual goals, such a prominent feature of Progressive thought, is evident in these marksmanship contests. Progressives valued team sports as competitions that were a microcosm of what reformers would like to have seen in America — individuals submerging personal agendas and working to further the goals of society. There were contests between individuals, however, and sometimes what makes a champion marksman was discussed. The skilled marksman was admired for his iron self-control and disciplining himself by long practice. Interestingly, there are references to the “nervous” temperaments of good marksmen, though of course they were rigidly controlled. Writers on the topic must have felt that a too-placid individual would not try to excel. There is an acknowledgment of human drives and passions, but also a lauding of self-discipline in pursuit of individual and common goals, a middle-class value that Progressives wanted to see upper and lower classes adopt wholeheartedly. How much all this emphasis on accurate long range rifle shooting was valuable is very questionable. In the First World War far more men would be killed by massed artillery and machine gun fire than by aimed rifle fire. Even when rifles were fired in battle it would seldom be by squeezing off a shot as in a shooting match. Speed and volume of fire would be more important than pinpoint accuracy. Nevertheless, the NRA and affiliated rifle clubs had the enthusiastic support of President Roosevelt, the War Department and its National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and the Army. They all had good reason to think that they had indeed gone a long way towards creating “a nation of marksmen.” Socioeconomic changes were working their way through the culture of the Progressive Era and affecting the ways in which the Army came into contact with the civilian public. The middle class was expanding and its values, very congenial to Progressive thinking, were expanding as well. The Army’s image as competent defenders of the nation and the emphasis put on soldiers as strong exemplars of a moral America were assiduously promoted. During this period real wages were rising and hours of work and the cost of living were declining. There was more time and money available for recreation and a growing acknowledgment of the necessity and desirability of it. An urbanized and expanding middle class, which very often had rather routine and regimented jobs, wanted and was able to pay for diversion. Attendance at events like tournaments and shooting contests was a way for all classes to express their solidarity with each other and with the middle-class values such as conformity to group norms. At tournaments and shooting contests the individual was submerged in the group of spectators watching and cheering groups of Army men; what could be more progressive or patriotic? Such crowds would also epitomize the people — they would transcend


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class divisions, and overcoming class divisions was another important aim of the Progressives. The other side of overcoming class division was apprehension about what class divisions might lead to. Before and during the Progressive Era there were upper and middle class fears of working class resistance to and violence against the changes wrought by industrial capitalism. Mostly working-class immigrants had already taken charge of some city governments, which seemed to threaten the dominance of elite and middle-class men over their local environments. The mixed audiences of the Army tournament performer and the marksman must have reassured elites that the “people” were not so dangerous after all. How, then, did activities like military tournaments, expanded recruiting and marksmanship contests display and promote the spread of military values? The tournament was perhaps the most effective in this regard. It presented a disciplined group of men performing tasks together in a rapid and controlled fashion. For the most part the men were nameless and it was the team that was competing, if the event was competitive. This must have been comforting to those in the audience who feared that class conflict was increasing and may become uncontrollable. The demonstration of “street riot drills,” a common feature of the tournaments, probably reassured spectators that things were not going to get out of hand. There was also a machine-like quality to the seamless performances; apparently everything was exhaustively rehearsed so that verbal commands were not necessary. Obedience and conformity were constantly on exhibit, even if there were no orders heard. Courage is certainly a military value, and some of the performances were dangerous, particularly those involving horses. Events involving rough riding were the most popular in the tournaments and the most dangerous. Press coverage of the cavalry events stressed the troopers’ dash and willingness to take risks and praised it highly. Another highly popular event was the sham battle. The roar of cannon and rifle fire was very impressive, and while the audience knew that the weapons were firing blanks, they could still regard infantry bayonet charges as stirring and patriotic. The tournament was an event, like the Wild West show, that was for all ages. If parents could reach adulthood without being aware of the centrality of the military in American life, this would not be so for their children. The children would see the military as a noisy and exciting life, not as a repository for misfits and a refuge in hard economic times. This must have been very alluring to children in the early twentieth century. It is very likely that children would be “playing soldier” a lot more often after the military tournament left town, just as there would be a lot more “playing Indian” in the streets after the Wild West moved on to the next city. Patriotism was becoming increasingly militarized in the Progressive Era.

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Standing at attention when the national anthem was played, revering the flag, and admiring the military as the repository of national values were becoming more common. This was a change from older notions of liberty and equality as the foundation of American life. It was also something that people were learning, as shown by accounts of people at tournaments misunderstanding other people standing when the Star Spangled Banner is played and not knowing when Army men should observe military courtesies. The big marksmanship contests had a more restricted audience, since they were at more remote locations away from city centers. Nevertheless, they made their own contributions to the growth of the martial spirit. One of their most popular features, the skirmish drill, was modeled on what a skirmish line might do during a battle, though such a line would not be so rigid in its procedures. It was the speed and the simulation of battle conditions that made these events so popular with the crowds that it was referred to as being “wildly exciting.” Besides battle conditions, such a match simulated bravery under fire. This event also featured instant obedience to verbal commands and to bugle calls, demonstrating the deference to authority necessary for military units to function well. There was considerable discussion of the qualities of a good marksman and general agreement that self-control was paramount. An expert must have a degree of competitiveness, otherwise he would never be in a contest and never achieve expert status. However, his competitive instincts must be under strict self-control so as not to disturb his aim. He must be manly and able to control any wayward thought or impulse that might interfere with his shooting. Shooting well was estimated to be a major part of being a soldier. One commentator stated marksmanship was 80 percent of a soldier’s effectiveness. The War Department established a National Marksman’s Reserve list and stated men on the list would be the first to be called upon in a national defense emergency. By implication, then, the qualities of a good marksman were the qualities of a good soldier. These qualities were manly self-control, good health, and devotion to duty in the form of many long hours of practice. Civilians who practiced these virtues would be almost as effective as a soldier in an emergency. This made military values and a martial spirit available to any man who would devote time to practicing with a rifle. In the next few chapters we will consider how Americans saw the world outside their borders. If events like tournaments and shooting contests impressed people with the displayed efficiency and strength of their Army, there was still the question of what a larger and more powerful Army was for. As we will see, Americans were being told in the press and in books that the world was becoming a more dangerous place, a place where their Army might be needed not only for defense, but for survival.

7. “Expansion is a new idea with us” Expansion is a new idea with us. The defense of our rights is an old habit. We acknowledge no overlord to tell us how far we may profit by the excellence of our gunnery and the valor of our troops.1 — New York Times, 1898

The international environment of the period is the context for understanding reports and speculations about possible future wars. America’s place in the post–1898 world is the foundation for understanding of the war scares and stories about war in the Progressive Era. Though the United States moved onto the world stage in a decisive manner in 1898, American hemispheric and Pacific expansion began well before then. As Richard Hofstadter and many historians since have pointed out, there was little in Progressivism that militated against imperialism. The taking of colonies could be seen by Progressives as an effort to reform “backward” nations, even though these nations were “lesser races.” In Cuba and the Philippines the U.S. did in fact build schools, improve sanitation, and encourage a degree of local self-government, though movements for true independence were firmly put down. The United States was not the only power that was new to colonial enterprises in latter half of the nineteenth century. Japan, Germany and Russia had entered the arena to join colonial powers like Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. The United States did differ from all these powers, prior to the Spanish-American War, in that it did not annex territory but was usually content with economic concessions. Competing economic penetrations, however, caused problems between the United States and other powers before 1898. American leaders felt that a United States that had expanded to western coast of North America was entitled to further its commercial interests in the Pacific, all the way to China, in fact. And since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, it should be predominant in its own hemisphere, and would oppose by force new attempts to add colonies in the Americas to European empires. 101

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Spanish colonies taken over by the U.S. after the 1898 war were not the first lands brought under U.S. control after the Civil War. In 1867 Secretary of State William H. Seward arranged the purchase of Alaska from Russia. Alaska’s resources, especially its gold, were attractive, and the Aleutian Islands extended U.S. territory out into the Pacific in the latitude of New Zealand and the Marshall Islands. Alaska was also the first territory added to the U.S. which was not legally destined (at the time) for incorporation into the U.S., though all its “civilized” inhabitants could become citizens: “Promising citizenship but not incorporation, the Alaska treaty was a transitional episode between earlier treaties, which promised both, and treaty of 1898 with Spain, which promised neither. It was the first step on the road to ‘imperialism.’”2 Many Americans hoped that it would be the first step on the road to the annexation of Canada. It was not, but the purchase of Alaska produced controversies with Great Britain, over seal hunting and over the boundary between Alaska and Canada. Both of these issues were settled by arbitration, the seal matter in 1893 and the Alaska boundary in 1903. A more serious problem with Great Britain arose over a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. In 1895 President Grover Cleveland, citing the probably inapplicable Monroe Doctrine, involved the U.S. in the matter in a rather brusque way. The British firmly rejected the U.S. intervention and overheated rhetoric produced a war scare. A British contretemps with the kaiser over South Africa in 1896 caused the British Foreign Office to begin to conciliate the U.S., since issues with Germany were far more dangerous to the British government than the Venezuelan matter. This problem was also settled by arbitration with the U.S. in 1899. The results were mixed; the outcome accelerated a rising jingoistic spirit. Curiously enough, the anti-imperialistic Cleveland may have unintentionally become one of the real fathers of American imperialism. Finally, the top-dog pretensions of the United States in the New World aroused a vast amount of ill will in Continental Europe, especially Germany, and did much to determine the hostile attitude of these powers during the Spanish-American War.... Perhaps this incident — not the Spanish-American War — should date the recognition of America as a great power.3

Staring Each other Down The Venezuelan crisis was not the first to cause ill will between the United States and Germany. American naval officers had observed that there was an excellent, protected harbor in the Samoan Islands, Pago Pago, and in 1872, U.S. Navy Commander Richard Meade signed a lease of the port with Samoan chiefs. American missionaries and traders were already there, as were the Germans and the British. In 1888 the Germans, with the secret backing of the British for their claims, began to assert their rights more vigorously. Thirteen warships from the

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three powers, “whose men had been staring each other down,” were gathered at Apia harbor during negotiations for a conference, when a powerful hurricane struck. Only one British ship managed to escape. The ensuing Berlin conference worked out a three-power protectorate, with the U.S. receiving Pago Pago. This result came “from the clear U.S. choice of standing firm —for commercial and strategic reasons— regardless of instability, civil conflict, near war, and the danger of becoming embroiled in European colonial quarrels. Assistant Secretary of State John Barrett Moore later placed the episode in perspective: ‘No incident in the history of the United States ... better prepares us to understand the acquisition of the Philippines’ than U.S. policy in Samoa.”4 Germany also came into conflict with the United States over China. In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung province. In reply German forces took possession of the port of Tsingtao, imposed an indemnity and compelled the Chinese to grant exclusive mining and railroad rights in Shantung. Russia, France and later Britain extracted similar concessions from the helpless Chinese. Trade with “400 million” Chinese customers was seen as crucial to continuing expansion of the output of America’s farms and factories; the “Open Door for China was so important that not even the Chinese could close it.”5 Germany was a leader of the unsuccessful European diplomatic effort to avert war between the United States and Spain in 1898. Once the war was underway, however, the Germans were very interested in what would happen to Spain’s colonial possessions, so much so that they sent a naval squadron to Manila Bay. This force was “not only the most powerful neutral force there, but ... considerably stronger than Dewey’s.” The Germans did observe American blockade rules very strictly, but there was a series of incidents that caused Admiral Dewey to signal the German admiral that if he wanted a war the Americans were ready. The press in the United States made much of this, though finally the Germans withdrew. Germany was expanding economically in all parts of the world and in 1902 joined with Great Britain and Italy in a blockade of Venezuelan ports. This was to enforce collection of debts owed by that country, which had refused arbitration. Washington compelled Venezuela to accept arbitration, but before negotiations got underway the Germans bombarded Fort San Carlos in Venezuela, causing much indignation in America. This and similar controversies caused President Roosevelt to issue his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1905, which stated the United States would intervene in the hemisphere to correct “chronic wrongdoing ... or impotence [by] the exercise of an international police power.” Now that America was building the Panama Canal, it was more important than ever to prevent interventions that could result in foreign troops landing, and perhaps staying, in places from which the canal could be threatened.

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There were similarities between the situations of Germany and the United States. The economies of both countries were growing rapidly and both countries were newly unified by the outcomes of war, the American Civil War ending in 1865 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. Both countries were also building large new navies, expanding their global commerce and actively seeking trade concessions and coaling stations around the world. But there was another new power on the scene: Japan.

Gentlemen Agree Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s mission to Japan in 1853 and the Meiji Restoration of 1868 started Japan on the road to industrialization, trade and growing military power. Japan and China were rivals in Korea, which had long been paying tribute to both but was politically independent. In 1876 Japan made a Perry-like demonstration to Korea and obtained a favorable treaty. There ensued a period of intrigue for hegemony over Korea, between Japan, China and Russia. By 1893 both Japan and China had troops in Korea, brought in because of an anti-foreign uprising. After a series of incidents Japan went to war and in short order crushed Chinese naval and military opposition. The United States was officially neutral, though it leaned towards Japan. The peace terms were harsh: an indemnity, commercial concessions, and the cession of Formosa, the Pescadores Islands and the Liaotung Peninsula of southern Manchuria. The Liaotung cession was too much for Russia; backed by other European powers she forced Japan to give this up and take a larger indemnity instead. The outraged Japanese accepted this but determined to settle matters with Russia when the opportunity presented itself, which it did in 1904 after a prolonged period of tension. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 brought outstanding naval victories to Japan, but the czar’s armies provided stiffer opposition. President Roosevelt let Japan know that he was benevolently neutral, but as the war went on and it seemed that Japan might win a complete victory, for balance of power reasons T.R. wanted the war to end. By the spring of 1905, however, the Japanese were reaching the limit of their resources and they asked the American president to intervene, which he did by issuing a call for a peace conference to be held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August. The Treaty of Portsmouth awarded no indemnity to Japan, which had demanded a large one, but was in all other respects favorable to the Japanese. Though the public was outraged by the lack of the expected indemnity and rioted against the treaty, the Japanese government knew that Japan could not have continued much longer and was reasonably satisfied. As for the Americans, Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work, “but he failed

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Commemorating the Portsmouth Treaty, disliked by many in Japan.

to gain either a Japanese commitment to the Open Door principles or a balance of power that could protect U.S. interests in Asia.”6 The lack of commitment to the Open Door was soon demonstrated in 1906 by complaints of discrimination against American commerce in southern Manchuria, which Japan controlled. Also in 1906, the San Francisco School Board crisis erupted when the board attempted to segregate Japanese children, who had been going to school with whites, by assigning them to a school for Chinese and Korean children. There was rioting in Japan at this excrescence of racism, and Roosevelt called San Francisco officials to Washington. He was persuasive and the board rescinded its action. In turn the Japanese agreed, in the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, to further limits on Japanese immigration. T.R., however, was concerned lest the Japanese think him weak or fearful, and decided to send the American battleship fleet around the world in 1908. The “Great White Fleet” was greeted cordially wherever it called, including Japan. The same year saw the conclusion of the Root-Takahira Agreement, in which both nations agreed to respect the status quo in the Pacific, each other’s territorial possessions there (such as the Philippines and Formosa), and the Open Door in China. Some historians have seen Theodore Roosevelt as a reasonably successful peacemaker and balance of power maintainer, in spite of his bellicose language. According to Walter LaFeber, this was not his intent: Progressives like

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him “were driven not in the first instance by the quest for a more democratic stability, as were some Progressives at home, but by a search for markets, by the perceived need for strategic outposts, and a racism that emerged naturally from their history while blending with, and complementing, their overseas imperialism.”7 Whatever the motivation of Progressives like T.R., there were others who were staunch supporters of efforts to support the peaceful resolution of international disputes: peace organizations increased their membership rapidly and worked to promote arbitration, peace conferences, disarmament, and the establishment of a world court. They gained the attention of the public and of government leaders, and practical steps were taken to implement what in the past had been ideals. A different kind of activism was stimulated by the Spanish-American War and the annexation of the Philippines. An Anti-Imperialist League was formed in Boston to oppose the addition of overseas territories to the U.S. After the annexation treaty passed the Senate in 1899 and the PhilippineAmerican War broke out, the league expanded rapidly throughout the country. It supported William Jennings Bryan in the 1900 election, which Bryan lost decisively, and “shattered by Bryan’s humiliation, the League retreated into its hardcore bases in the urban Northeast.”8 There was a continuing tension between the nationalism of peace advocates and their support for increasing the use of international law and arbitration to settle disputes, particularly if the dispute was seen as affecting vital national interests or the national honor. Secretary of State Root negotiated 28 bilateral treaties in 1908–1909; these treaties were for minor disputes only and allowed the U.S. Senate to restrict the scope of the arbitration in any case that came before the tribunals. President Taft proposed a much more sweeping idea and negotiated treaties with England and France that called for the submission of all disputes to arbitration. These treaties failed to pass the Senate in 1910 and the course of American peace efforts from then until the outbreak of the First World War was decided. There would be no important disputes decided except by national power.

8. “A fabric of falsehood and fallacy” A psychologist would find it interesting to follow the building up of the fabric of falsehood and fallacy.1 — Viscount Aoki, 1907

War scares did not just materialize from thin air. The international environment positively encouraged them. The competition between expanding empires, the sharp struggle for commercial advantages, the rise of racism and notions of a struggle for racial supremacy, and the increasing power and reach of military forces resulted in a series of crises and a growing sense that wars were inevitable. This context was fertile ground for speculations about war and war scares.

A Greater Germany? The possibility of a war with Germany was often discussed in the press of the time. A 1900 example was a brief New York Times article that described a dispatch in the French newspaper “Patrie, an afternoon Nationalist newspaper, classed as sensational.” Patrie claimed to have determined the reason for what it said was the friendly attitude of Kaiser Wilhelm II towards Britain. The newspaper stated that there had been friction between America and Germany ever since the 1898 arrival of a German naval squadron in Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War. It averred that Germany wanted to establish a “Greater Germany” in Brazil and Argentina and realized that it would have to fight America to achieve this goal. It was the possibility of war with America, according to Patrie, that was driving the German naval buildup.2 A British newspaper agreed, opining that “no power but Germany would dream of invading America.” It went on to speculate that if Germany should get into a confrontation with Brazil, it might decide to invade that country. At that point no reminder to the Germans of the Monroe Doctrine would have any effect. The British journal disclaimed any intention of stirring 107

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up trouble between Germany and America, but said that if America wanted to enforce the Monroe Doctrine effectively it should keep building battleships.3 An article in the Los Angeles Times had more inflammatory comments, stating that Patrie declared that it was the “German Emperor’s belief that war between Germany and the United States is possible and in view of that contingency he wishes to win over Great Britain to neutrality.” The kaiser’s ultimate goal was to “make Brazil and Argentina dependencies of the German Empire.”4 The Patrie affair is very similar to others described here; somewhere in the world a newspaper speculates on the possibility of war, then newspapers in the countries that are theorized to be near going to war pick up the story and comment on the likelihood of war. Often the original story comes from a nation that might not have been terribly upset to see one of the potential combatants fighting someone else other than them. Talk of war between Germany and the U.S. received a major boost from the controversies over the sale of the Danish West Indies. Negotiations about a possible sale had been going on with both Germany and the United States. The Danish government apparently felt that the islands were a financial drain and wanted to sell them. There had been talk of a deal whereby the islands would be traded to Germany for the return of all or part of Schleswig-Holstein, which Germany had taken from Denmark after the German victory in the brief 1860 war between the two countries. Both countries were, of course, aware of American attachment to the Monroe Doctrine and there were also talks between the U.S. and Denmark. A bizarre incident in 1900 saw a representative of the Standard Oil Company attempt to take over the U.S. side of the negotiations, telling the Danes that the Standard Oil Company controlled the U.S. Senate and that they would have to deal with Standard Oil (and pay them a commission) in order to consummate the deal. The prospect of German ownership of these islands caused Secretary of War Elihu Root to make a statement that “the American people will have to within a few years either abandon the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it and we are not going to abandon it [cries of ‘Hear! Hear!’] If necessary we will fight for it, but unless there is a greater diligence in legislation in the future than in the past, when the time comes it may find us unprepared.”5 A German observer of press reports about a possible German-American war thought that he had an explanation for the war talk — the press itself was to blame, in particular the German press. M. Von Brandt wrote in 1900 that the German press was too narrowly nationalistic and saw in the imperialistic gains of other countries defeats for Germany. He gave the examples of the United States in the Philippine-American War and Great Britain in the Boer War in South Africa. Von Brandt thought it would have been better for the German press to support those countries in subduing their colonies, lest

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inhabitants of the German colonies be encouraged to revolt. According to this German observer, the “extreme agrarian and anti–Semitic press” was the biggest troublemaker. Their goal was to incite a trade war or perhaps even an actual war or wars, so that Germany would raise tariff barriers and even cause industrial workers to return to the countryside, all to the benefit of agricultural landowners. It is difficult to conceive of a plot to turn back the clock on industrial expansion in this way, but aristocratic Junker landowners did indeed powerfully influence the government of the German Empire.6 The next year, 1901, saw more war talk about Germany and America, concerning Brazil. A New York Times report said correspondents of major German newspapers were reporting that anti–German feeling was increasing in the United States and that many Americans were convinced that Germany planned to invade Brazil; American newspapers were “systematically inflaming the public mind to war against Germany.” The Berliner Tageblatt charged that Americans were “intriguing in Brazil against legitimate German colonial and commercial interests, poisoning the Brazilians’ minds and conveying the idea that Germany intends to go to war to seize Brazil.” The German papers called upon the Foreign Office to make it clear that Germany did not want colonies or bases in the Americas and would respect the Monroe Doctrine.7 Occasionally newspapers would retract stories that predicted war. On December 28, 1901, the New York Times ran a story headlined “Possibility of War with Germany.” This story, though it hemmed and hawed and took one step forward and two back, ended up by stating that unnamed sources had told the Times that U.S. Navy warships were concentrated in the South Atlantic, in case Germany violated the Monroe Doctrine while attempting to coerce Venezuela into paying back German loans: “The possibility of war with Germany over something or other is ever before the Government and persons of considerable importance in the War, State, and Navy Departments profess to believe that such a war is inevitable. Some of these men are saying that the war might as well come over Venezuela as over anything else.”8 A retraction was printed the following day. The Times called the previous day’s article “foolish ... unwarrantable ... one of those accidents or oversights that baffle the intentions of finite men.” There was no further explanation of how this dispatch came to be published, but the Times printed the strong criticisms made by other newspapers and admitted such censure was fully justified. Editors stated that, as far as the Times was concerned, relations between the two countries were entirely friendly and there was no indication that Germany planned to do anything that might violate the Monroe Doctrine — on the contrary, German adherence to international law and custom actually strengthened the doctrine.9 In its 1901 articles about possible war with Germany, the Los Angeles

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Times found some people willing to be quoted. For instance, C.F. Bauer, president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, stated that there was a pervasive sentiment about America among the Germans. Germans believed Americans to be “unscrupulous and ambitious.” Though he gave no details, Bauer seemed to think that Germans believed that America was stirring up trouble all over the world, in order to gain bases and colonies for themselves. Places mentioned were South Africa and South America, and Germans were said to believe that getting bases and colonies was the only reason that America had for declaring war on Spain two years previously.10 A December Times piece was based on an article in the British magazine Saturday Review, which the Times characterized as “a rabid hater of all things American.” The article claimed that a man named Gaston de Segur had visited the kaiser, who had told him that Europeans should not be quarreling, but uniting against the “growing danger from the West.” In view of remarks like this, the Saturday Review thought that the German ambassador to Washington’s statements that Germany wanted no coaling stations in the Americas should be viewed with “respectful astonishment.” The growing number of German settlers in Brazil made German “interference” there inevitable, the Spectator thought, and the interference would take the form of war. If Germany came to dominate South America and the British position in Canada remained secure, then there would be little to fear from the United States, but if Germany provided no counterweight to American power, then Britain might find herself forced out of both North America and South America. In this article imperial competition leads to war, and the rising American and German imperialisms are a danger to British imperialism, especially if they collaborate. The world was a dangerous place indeed to the Saturday Review.11 Brazil’s German immigrants also concerned the writer and novelist Stephen Bonsal. His 1903 North American Review article12 was full of grim prophecies about German intentions, but ended on an upbeat note that was quite different from the rest of the music of foreboding. There were many reasons that he was suspicious of the Germans. For one, the German minister to Brazil had recently toured southern Brazil, which had many German immigrants, making speeches full of “patriotism and love of the Fatherland”; for another, a German naval squadron was now permanently stationed in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. A third indication was the purchase by German interests of all the ships of the “Brazilian Lloyd.” Bonsal informed his readers that it was not only alert Americans who saw these portends, but also Brazilians. He quoted a speech by a Brazilian senator, Barbosa Lima, who said that Italian immigrants were learning to speak Portuguese and become Brazilians, while Germans did not. Even the children of German immigrants thought of themselves as Germans and celebrated German historic days and holidays enthusiastically. To Bonsal, once a German, always a German, no


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matter where that German may emigrate. This attitude would be even more pronounced among early twentieth-century Americans; when considering the nature of Japanese immigrants to the United States the “once a Jap always a Jap” formulation was common. This notion of unalterable basic natures reveals some of the nations-as-races thinking common in the early twentieth century. The Germans were not the only ones to be wary of, Bonsal wrote. Other Europeans and even the Japanese were settling in South America. It seemed plain to him that the European immigrants were a better class of people than the natives and were likely to dominate the countries in which they settled. They were also ready to defend their rights, and since the Monroe Doctrine worked “automatically,” a collision was a strong possibility. How did such a situation come about? Over the last fifty years, while the attention of America was on other parts of the world, the German population of southern Brazil grew to over 400,000. Even the Brazilian government did not realize how much this population had grown until recently. They had ceased encouraging Germans to come to Brazil and had attempted to encourage more Italians and Spaniards to come, to little avail. Complicating the situation was the fact that the Brazilians were very “materialistic” and lacking in patriotism, so much so that Bonsal claimed an upper-class Brazilian gentleman had written him proposing a dividing of his country into spheres of influence. The United States had made considerable investments in northern Brazil, which would never be profitable unless the U.S. took a more direct hand there. Great Britain would probably control the middle of the country, Italy the city of Sao Paulo, and Germany southern Brazil, unless the United States intervened. Bonsal found the activities of German travelers and explorers rather suspicious, observing that they were often the leading edge of German penetration. He contrasted the exploratory voyage of a U.S. gunboat up a Brazilian river with the “many German exploring expeditions which are constantly traversing the southern provinces of the vast republic,” noting that so-called scientific expeditions by Germany in Africa and the Pacific were often followed by the claiming of lands for the German Empire. After all these dark speculations, Bonsal concludes with a burst of sunlight: I cannot but add that I have never met an Englishman, a European, or an American domiciled in South America, who regarded the pacific development of Germany in southern Brazil with feelings of hostility. To many, as to myself, these prosperous, well-ordered communities have always appeared pregnant with hope for the future of the neglected continent, as oases of activity and industry in a dreary desert of intrigue and corruption that stretches almost without interruption or exception from Panama to Cape Horn.13

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In December 1903 General Arthur MacArthur made some comments about Germany and America that were discussed in a front-page article in the New York Times. The general was on an inspection visit to Hawaii and had conversations with Colonel Howard Jones of the Hawaii Militia. Jones made a written report of the conversations to Governor George R. Carter of Hawaii and, according to the governor, the report was made public through a “misunderstanding.” The report stated that General MacArthur said that war with Germany was likely in the near future and that it would be fought in the Pacific, with Hawaii being an important “objective point.” The general averred that the “Pan-Germanic doctrine” was being propagated all over the world by the German government. All Germans abroad, including those in the United States, even if U.S. citizens, were susceptible to it. MacArthur thought it noteworthy that very few Germans had served in the U.S. Army in the Spanish-American War and that the German government was directing emigration towards South America. Further, the rapid expansion of German industry meant overproduction of manufactured goods: The known policy of the Emperor is to acquire colonies which will provide markets for such overproduction.... Throughout all South American countries the Germans are advancing in commercial power and prestige. The conclusion seems inevitable that the interests of Germany in South America, where there are large colonies numbering hundreds of thousands, presage another testing and straining of the Monroe Doctrine and in all probability a contest of arms between that power and the United States in the near future.

MacArthur’s final comment, as reported by Col. Jones, was that seizure of the Hawaiian Islands would be a necessary preliminary to any attack on the West Coast of the United States. The general responded to the publication of Jones’ report by saying that it did reflect his views and in part misrepresented them, though he didn’t say which part. The governor told reporters that the general had told him that he thought Hawaii’s defenses should be strengthened, in the context of a discussion about the state obtaining federal property in Honolulu for use as an armory.14 In the month following the report of MacArthur’s thoughts about war with Germany, the Advocate of Peace took up the matter. It noted both the general’s remarks and the comments of Professor Small, head of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, who stated that the Germans would soon fight the U.S. for commercial supremacy. The Advocate editorialized that many such predictions had been made in the recent past and none had come to fruition. One possible reason there was a continuing audience for rumors of war was the “thrilling sensations” that the rumors produced. In the Advocate’s opinion most of these predictions came from military and naval officers who wanted to impress the public with the need for their services.


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MacArthur felt that Hawaii’s defenses needed strengthening; what better way to accomplish this than to claim they are in almost immediate danger of being attacked? The Advocate admitted that a sociologist could not expect a buildup of his department to come from predictions of war, but offered no alternative explanation for Professor Small’s comments. The editorialist wrote that it was difficult to imagine that Germany would send her fleet thousands of miles, far from any base of supplies, to fight the U.S. Navy. This would be a poor way to gain commercial supremacy, to attempt to destroy one of your best customers. Indeed, Germany had gotten where she was not by the strength of her military, but by the efficiency of her industries. As far as South America was concerned, there had never been any official or unofficial moves to incorporate German settlements there into the empire and no reason to think that that would ever be the empire’s policy.15 By 1906 the actions and intentions of Kaiser Wilhelm were receiving much attention. A New York Times article stated that, according to a “high Washington official,” the kaiser wanted to establish a naval base on the island of Santo Domingo. The chain of reasoning for his desire was complex. First, he was looking to expand German influence in the world and had recently been frustrated in an attempt to obtain a naval base in Morocco. This made him turn his attention to South America. He then inveigled Russia to advance the date of a Hague conference to July, when it would conflict with a Pan American meeting. One of the subjects of that meeting was to be a resolution to end the practice of use of force to collect international debts. According to the high official, Germany wanted to be able to use force on its debtor Santo Domingo, as a prelude to establishing a base there. The Times reporter went farther out on a creaking limb, stating that with a base in Santo Domingo, “German fleets would command Panama and ultimately the Pacific, would protect German colonial expansion and would dictate the destinies of South America.” Naturally, the Germans would run the risk of war with the United States, but the Times thought it might be willing to try to do it.16 As things turned out, the U.S. was determined to resist any change in The Hague or Pan American meetings and there was no rescheduling.

The Coming Struggle with Japan? A possible war with Japan was often discussed in the press, from the Spanish-American war onwards. A 1905 article titled “The Coming Struggle with Japan” called it “one of the most notable commercial wars in all history” that was predicted to occur.17 Two years later, the speculations were about an actual military struggle. A war between America and Japan seemed much more conceivable after

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the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, which saw the Japanese land large numbers of troops on a distant shore, with the landings protected by a powerful modern navy. The crisis that developed over the actions of the San Francisco Board of Education in 1906 gave a further impetus to talk of war between Japan and the United States; Americans speaking about problems between Japan and America began to take an aggressive tone. Senator George C. Perkins of California opened a 1907 address to the National Geographic Society by stating that Americans and Japanese were “two irreconcilable races.” He described the new United States position in the Pacific Ocean, with the Philippines in U.S. possession. Japan had recently defeated Russia, the “strongest European power,” and was a rising commercial nation, bound to draw other Asian nations to it and become their leader. “At some point in the course of future National destiny the pathway of National progress on the part of Japan and the United States will converge to a point of inevitable conflict,” he said. Thus the senator began his speech by talking of “irreconcilable races” and “inevitable conflict,” though the conflict seemed to be commercial rather than military. After speaking so definitely about the conflict to come, the senator changed course. He downplayed the school board crisis and said that it would not lead to war. He then stated that “racial feelings” should not lead to war and praised the “wise and progressive” Japanese government, which he believed did not want war. Perkins concluded by stating that both governments were reluctant to engage in war, the cost of which was multiplying rapidly. He also hoped that disputes could be sent to The Hague Tribunal, to which America should refer any question “not involving our national honor,” in other words minor disputes.18 Following the article about Perkins’ speech was another article describing statements made by Congressman Richmond Pearson Hobson of Alabama, at a meeting of the Peace Society in New York. Hobson was a retired U.S. Navy captain and spoke out at the meeting in favor of “universal peace and a great navy.” His reasoning was that universal peace was surely coming, but before it arrived, in about ten years, there was great danger of war. The U.S. needed a “huge” navy to for defense during this ten-year period. The moderator of the meeting did not see the logic and attempted, unsuccessfully, to silence him. After Hobson spoke the moderator commented that his naval policy would be to sell the battleships as “old junk.” The next speaker, however, thought that the ships should be “preserved as curiosities for future generations.” Hobson met with reporters after the meeting. He was asked about press reports quoting him as saying that Japan was looking for a pretext to declare war on the United States. The captain said he had not known that he would be quoted, but since he had been, it was indeed his opinion that “Japan was spoiling for a fight with this Nation.” He believed that the Japanese were only


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waiting until they secured some loans from European nations to finance their aggression and that Great Britain, in order to prevent American commercial expansion in the Pacific, would be happy to see such a war. Further, their preparations were well along, and included Japanese laborers in Hawaii, who were veterans of the Japanese Army and ready to rise up when supplied with arms. As did many in this era, Hobson seemed to believe that it was quite unlikely that Japanese immigrants could become loyal American citizens; he included no facts to substantiate his claim about Japanese laborers being military veterans ready to fight America. Under Richmond Pearson Hobson, naval officer and future Alabama congressman, in 1898. Hob- present conditions, he stated, son was convinced Japan would attack the both Hawaii and the Philippines would be conquered by United States. Japan in the event of war and Americans would have to eat “humble pie” or “crow.” The captain assured a nervous reporter, however, that California was not in danger of being invaded.19 Later in the year Captain Hobson predicted a third entrée for the U.S.: dirt. He was still convinced that Japan was looking for an excuse for war. If it came quickly, the Navy would be too weak to resist effectively, so the U.S. should be prepared to be humiliated while increasing its naval strength. “Our policy must be to build ships and eat dirt, and we cannot stop eating dirt until after the ships are built.” Now, however, Hobson did not think that war would come once Japan had enough money to finance it. The abdication of the Chinese Dowager Empress, which was to happen in 1908, would be the precipitating factor. Japan would move aggressively to impose a spheres of influence policy in China, which the U.S. Open Door policy was meant to prevent. The Japanese would then dominate China and transform it into a militaristic nation. Thus the “yellow race” would be unified and a struggle with the “white race” for world supremacy would ensue.

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Before that, however, America would be thrown out of China, never to return after the other powers established their spheres without it. These other powers, Hobson claimed, were actually in league with Japan to exclude America. The proof of this, he asserted, was clear in what he saw as differential treatment afforded us and the European nations. Europe’s immigration restrictions were much more restrictive than that of the U.S., and there was no outcry, according to Hobson, but any “trifling” incident in America caused a major uproar in Japan. (There were differences in the situations, however. The school board crisis concerned Japanese who were already here, not those who wanted to enter.) Captain Hobson was also known to expound on the nature of the white and the yellow races. He gave a speech in New York in December 1907, during which, as the New York Times put it, “the yellow peril came out.” Hobson claimed that the Japanese were hard at work fostering hatred of whites among the Chinese and preparing them for war. But this was not all, they were also fomenting unrest in India, and their victory over the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War had damaged the prestige of the white man. Everywhere the Japanese were “guiding the destinies of men of other colors.... The whole trend of events is, therefore, toward a contest by the yellow race, aided by other colored races, a struggle to wrest from the white man his current supremacy.” Again there are no facts in the article to back up charges about India and China, but Hobson may have been able to cite Japanese newspapers which called for Japan to take leadership of the “colored races” of Asia. In his opinion, the only hope for the white race’s civilization to prevail in this struggle lay in control of the world’s oceans. There was, however a problem in controlling the oceans, and the problem was the action of the “nation of the white race” that exercised the control. Hobson was apparently unwilling to say the words “Great Britain” for fear of making the problem worse by causing dissension among white men. The action that was the problem was the Anglo-Japanese Naval treaty, which Hobson thought had allowed Japan to beat Russia and was hampering America’s efforts to control the “yellow wave moving eastward over the Pacific and lapping the shores of America.”20 Americans who predicted war had quite a bit of support from foreign observers. The New York Times quoted M. Menshikoff, a Russian former naval officer and contemporary “feuilletonist” (from the French feuilleton, section of a newspaper devoted to light fiction and entertainment pieces; referring to someone as a feuilletonist may have been a disparaging editorial comment by the Times) that war between the U.S. and Japan was likely. Menshikoff gave seven reasons why he thought war was, to use his word, “indispensable.” The reasons pointed out similarities in the two nations, having to do with the fact that both were relative newcomers on the world stage, that Menshikoff thought made a collision inevitable. The one major difference he saw was


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that America had large “material” resources, while Japan had large “moral” resources. Menshikoff wrote that the Japanese had a simple plan that they would repeat. They had extracted a large indemnity from China after their victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and used that indemnity to build the armed forces that enabled them to defeat Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). The indemnity from that war was helping them to strengthen their military for the fight with the United States. They would use a large indemnity they would get from the Americans after defeating them to build the war machine that would defeat Britain and dominate the world. Beating the Americans shouldn’t be hard, Menshikoff claimed. In spite of Roosevelt’s “shrieking,” America was “defenseless” and would be easily mastered. When the time came, potential allies France and Britain would be unable to intervene, because of Japanese-inspired risings in their colonies and “Japanese torpedoes will suddenly appear in San Francisco and Manila, perhaps while American officers are gaily celebrating the birthday of Mrs. Bob Evans.” This was a reference to Admiral Robley Evans, a well-known advocate of expanding American naval power. As far as what would happen to Russia, Menshikoff preferred a long period of peace, which would allow neither country to dominate and cause the “souls of the valiant Samurai to rust in their bosoms.” Menshikoff did not seem to be perturbed about the possibility of Russia’s enemy Japan plotting war against America and Britain.21 News from Germany about Japan was not encouraging for Americans. Another New York Times article reported comments by unnamed “naval and military men” that war between Japan and America was unavoidable and that it was difficult to see how America could win because of its “geographical position.” Presumably this meant that the Japanese were much closer to the Philippines and China than the Americans were. In one of the course reversals common in such articles, however, an “eminent politician” told the Times reporter that Japan did not covet the Philippines, since the Japanese knew that the Filipinos were Christian and would not tolerate rule by non–Christians. He also commented, oddly, that the climate was “entirely unsuitable” for the Japanese.22 Another July article, this time in the Los Angeles Times, stated that tensions had dangerously increased in the last few days and that the United States was unprepared. Count Reventlow, the “well-known naval authority,” was pessimistic about America’s chances. Reventlow said that Japan might feel that it had to act before the Panama Canal was finished and before American naval forces were reinforced.23 A later Los Angeles Times article stated that the German Foreign Office had made it known through “press channels” that England would have to support its ally Japan in the event of war with the United States. It is not hard to see the attitude of the reporter towards England. The dispatch from Berlin insinuated that Japan would threaten Britain’s Asian possessions

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in order to compel British financial, but not military, support during a war with America. Then, Britain “could play the role of sympathetic condoler while Japanese guns devastate the California coast.”24 Count Reventlow was evidently a busy man. He published a book in 1907 titled World Peace or World War: Which Way Is Germany to Turn? Reventlow was interested in showing why Germany needed a large navy, so as to balance Great Britain’s, and how such a balance would preserve the peace. He wrote about what wars were likely in the near future and he estimated that a war between the United States and Japan over the Philippines was the most likely. This was because the Philippines had many resources that the Japanese needed and these resources were already developed, so they did not need to build an infrastructure to develop them. Some Germans, including Kaiser Wilhelm, expressed support for America during its problems with Japan. A German newspaper in Breslau proposed an alliance between Germany and the United States, stating that America could not reinforce its Pacific Squadron with the Atlantic Squadron, since that would leave her open to attacks on the East Coast by Japan’s ally, Britain. Germany could commit to defend America’s Atlantic coast and America could commit to defend Germany’s possessions in the Pacific. Thus both would be safe against English and Japanese plots against them. The New York Times, which reported the German newspaper’s “modest and dignified offer,” was more than a little skeptical: “Only in a Teuton’s mare’s nest could be found the plot of a Briton to wage a Japanese war on the United States.”25 Indeed there were many who were skeptical of the war talk, especially government officials on both sides. Japan’s vice minister of finance, Reiziro Wakatsuki, passed though New York in 1907 on his way to Europe and was interviewed by the New York Times. The vice minister stressed that Japan would always be grateful to the U.S. for Commodore Perry’s mission, which brought Japan into the modern world. Americans should remember this and also be aware that out-of-power politicians and “sensation-mongers” (this referring to newspapers) in both countries were the sources of war talk. He referred to the events in San Francisco as “local disturbances” and said that Japan hoped that they would stop soon. Controversies over immigration and naturalization were, he said, not part of his mission and he hoped there would not be any more of them. When asked if the possibility of war was being discussed in Japan, Wakatsuki “laughed freely ... and replied ‘That is out of the question.’”26 The “out-of power politicians” were, according to a New York Times article the following day, the Japanese Progressive Party. The Constitutionalist Party issued a statement saying that diplomacy could settle the questions, although the party “deeply regretted” the incidents. The Times saw great hope in that the Japanese stock market had recently bottomed out and “splendid


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investments are to be had, paying 6%.”27 A commentator on economic conditions believed it would be impossible for Japan to fight a war now, when she was still paying off the large foreign loans she had received to fight the war with Russia. These loans had come from the United States and England, and those powers would not make loans to Japan to fight the United States, though at least “one Great Power” would not be unhappy if such a war happened.28 Dr. Masuji Miyakawa, a Japanese educated in the United States, agreed. In his book The Life of Japan he asked the question “Shall it be war or shall it be peace?” between America and Japan. His answer was it would be peace, perhaps even leading eventually to “Congress of the United States and Japan,” which would have the power to solve all problems arising between the two countries. He thought this because the Japanese remained grateful for Commodore Perry’s 1854 visit and because both nations “loved humanity and abhorred war.” The New York Times noted that although Miyakawa had written that Japan was not a warlike nation, his account of Japan’s recent military victories was very admiring. He had also intimated that since England was Japan’s ally, in the nearly impossible event of war, Japan could attack the California coast while England menaced the Atlantic coast.29 Japan’s ambassador to the U.S., Viscount Aoki, put his disapproval of war talk much more strongly than did Dr. Miyakawa. The ambassador thought there was absolutely no real controversy between the two countries, which had always and should always be friends. He noted that the Pacific was a big ocean, too large for any one country to be master of, and that a modernizing China was too large a market for any one country. Aoki observed that there was talk of race war and said that such a war would never happen. The more people came to know each other, the less they would fear each other and the more their commercial interests would complement each other. He also believed that intermarriage was inevitable, being married to a “high-born German lady” himself. Aoki thought that “a psychologist would find it interesting to follow the building up of the fabric of falsehood and fallacy, as an irresponsible person here tells an irresponsible paper something which it prints and which an irresponsible agitator cables to a negligible Japanese jingo paper and which it prints in connection with irresponsible comment and invented interviews, the whole coming back here magnified and distorted.”30 A July 1907 visit by Japanese naval officers was the occasion for further dismissing of war talk. Admiral Gombel Yamamoto, who had been minister of marine during the war with Russia, led the delegation, which visited shipyards and vessels of the American Navy. In an interview with American reporters, Yamamoto stated that there was absolutely no basis for talk of war between America and Japan. He was asked about a recent report in a Japanese newspaper about comments made by Admiral Sakamoto in Tokyo. The

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paper, an organ of the opposition Progressive Party, quoted Sakamoto as saying that the American Navy would be no match for the Japanese Navy, should war break out. American officers made a fine appearance in their dress uniforms at balls, but were deficient in training and professionalism. It was doubtful that Americans were patriotic enough to put up much of a fight and most of the crews of American ships would probably desert in wartime. Admiral Yamamoto told reporters that he was sure this report was false. No Japanese naval officer was permitted to speak to reporters without authorization and he knew Sakamoto to be a highly disciplined officer, who had none of the opinions that the newspaper attributed to him. After his talk with reporters Admiral Yamamoto paid a call on Admiral Robley D. Evans, who was a favorite of the press ever since the Chilean crisis of 1891. In that year two American sailors had been killed after a brawl involving Chileans and men from a visiting American naval vessel. Then-Captain Evans was dispatched with his cruiser to show the flag. He was quoted as saying he would either obtain the immediate release of the sailors who had been detained or he would “fill Hell with garlic,” and earned the sobriquet “Fighting Bob” for his efforts. After his discussion with Yamamoto, Evans met with reporters and gave what the New York Times called a “characteristic Evans interview.” The admiral noted that he and the Japanese admiral were old friends and that the rumors of war had come up in their discussion: “We settled the whole question ourselves, and the first and last shots of the engagement were fired right here by the photographers.” Evans dismissed the war talk as “absolutely silly” and stated that Japan had no more reason to make war on the U.S. than China would if “some hoodlum had thrown a brick into a Chinese laundry.”31 Mr. Dooley, a fictional Irish-American created by newspaperman Finley Peter Dunne, was also of the opinion that there should be no war, but for a different reason. He thought it was every American’s birthright to insult foreigners, but the Japanese were now so fearsome that U.S. citizens should have to mend their ways and be respectful to them: “A few years ago I didn’t think anny more about a Jap thin anny other man that’d been kept in th’ oven too long.... I didn’t know how turrible a people they are.” Since then, Mr. Dooley had found out that they had guns that could shoot around corners and that a rowboat full of them could defeat the U.S. Atlantic Squadron. The soldiers were even more formidable; they could march three hundred miles a day and subsist on a piece of chewing gum. The thought of such a foe was enough to make Mr. Dooley long for the good old days, when Americans were not in the world power card game but played solitaire, only occasionally breaking up a fight in the game and stealing someone else’s winnings.32 The possibility of military intervention in Mexico seemed more likely than war with Japan or Germany, after the turmoil associated with the 1910


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Admiral Evans (left) and Admiral Yamamoto at their July 1907 meeting. Both men scoffed at the idea of war between America and Japan.

Mexican Revolution. Porfirio Diaz, the dictator who had ruled Mexico for almost four decades, stepped aside and was replaced by Francisco Madero, a moderate supported by many in the U.S. Americans owned “more than 22% Mexico’s surface” and “nearly $2 billion of American investments owned 43% of Mexico’s property.” Between 1900 and 1910 Mexico’s economic situation worsened. The rapid growth of export agriculture forced more and more of the rural population off the land: “The historically resistant agrarian and industrial working classes confronted food shortages, rising prices, and growing unemployment ... peasants experienced new levels of displacement as 15,000 American colonists armed with property titles and rifles occupied large areas.”33 It was not only peasants and workers that were ready to fight for changes. Local elites and a growing urban middle class saw their influence declining as the rulers of the “Porfiriato” clung to power and foreigners gained more and more influence. American interests in Mexico were so pervasive that “When Madero and his hacendado, peasant, and labor supporters challenged the Diaz government in 1910–11 they were questioning the role of U.S. imperialism in Mexico and the regime’s relation to the United States.”34 President Taft became worried about unrest in Mexico and ordered Chief

Porfirio Diaz in 1911. A rebellion against his rule brought 16,000 American troops to Texas in 1911.


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of Staff Leonard Wood on March 6, 1911, to concentrate military forces in border areas. Wood saw this as an opportunity to test the handling of a large body of troops and told the president that he could fairly quickly amass 16,000 men at Fort Sam Houston near San Antonio, Texas. The exercise began with a dazzling display of military efficiency by the Army and Navy. Just two days after the order had been given; the leadership could sit back in their chairs and observe things proceeding like clockwork. The “magnificent machinery” that had been constructed operated smoothly without the “turmoil and excitement” that had characterized mobilization for the Spanish-American War. The only current concern of the maneuver commander, General William H. Carter, was that his “favorite charger” would be well-cared for on the train trip from Washington to San Antonio. The Quartermaster Corps had prepared “typewritten statements” that covered everything to be moved and so far absolutely nothing had gone wrong and there were no complaints. A particular show of military efficiency was that three army transport ships had been recommissioned and were now taking on supplies. The vessels would be boarding two regiments of coast artillery the next day and the plan was apparently to fully man all the coast artillery emplacements along the Gulf of Mexico. A final detail that seemed significant was that all troops were being supplied with “ball cartridges, although it has been the invariable practice to supply troops with blank ammunition for practice exercises or peaceful manoeuvers.”35 On the same day that this rather ominous news appeared, comparing the maneuvers twice to preparations for the Spanish-American War and noting that the soldiers were issued bullets rather than blanks, another article about the situation quoted Mexican federal and “insurrecto” sources from El Paso. Spokesmen from both sides said that they did not expect armed U.S. intervention, but that if it happened it would mean war with “the whole Mexican people.” The spokesman for the Mexican government opined that talk of intervention was an invention of the newspapers and stated that the government of President Diaz had received no complaints from the United States that its citizens or its interests were being harmed by the troubles in Mexico. The speaker for the rebel forces, supporters of Francisco Madero, said that they had received so much support from the citizens of the United States that they could not conceive of an armed intervention to uphold the Diaz regime.36 The number of troops planned for Texas was now said to be 20,000 and everything was going marvelously well, except for some delays in obtaining enough railroad cars. It was reported that up to 8,000 militia officers would be invited to attend the maneuvers in “squads” of 1,000, so that all would not arrive at the same time. The maneuvers were to be “held vigorously, for a time at least.” The American ambassador to Mexico was “declared to have reported to President Taft that the revolution was far more serious than is generally

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known” and it was possible that the president would have to expand the Army by executive order, by about 6,000 men, in order to bring the units sent to Texas up to strength.37 Official statements said that the troop movements were going “marvelously well” and that the “great mobilization, unprecedented in peacetime” was intended for training officers and men in operations involving large numbers of troops and Army-Navy cooperation. However, it was noted that there was much that was mysterious about the affair. For instance, General Wood had avoided talking to reporters by slipping out one of the glass doors of the president’s office and making his way through a “secluded part of the White House grounds” to a rear entrance to the War Department (which was then located next to the White House in what is now called the White House Annex). Using the construction “it was said,” a New York Times story stated that the British ambassador had suggested that the United States take steps to show that it could defend foreign interests in Mexico, lest Britain and Germany feel “compelled” to do so. President Taft, too, was not very forthcoming about the maneuvers, stating only that Texas was a good place to hold them. This seemed odd to the Los Angeles Times, which commented that such “secrecy” was unprecedented — previously, army officers had been happy to talk in detail about maneuvers and encouraged public interest in them. Be that as it may, everything seemed to be going along “beautifully” and the plan was to have 20,000 men there within 5 days. The Navy and Marines were also participating. Ships from the Atlantic and Pacific squadrons were moving towards stations off both coasts of Mexico and 2,000 marines were being sent to Guantanamo Bay. A list of all the units being sent to Texas was published, which must have reduced somewhat the mystery that some felt was surrounding the operation.38 Army units from all over the country began leaving for Texas. “Wyoming boys” left Fort Russell near Cheyenne and “scenes similar to those witnessed at the opening of the Spanish war marked the soldiers’ farewells to their families.”39 The hospital ship USS Solace left Guantanamo Bay for New York with sick aboard, there to take on additional supplies and return immediately to the Atlantic Naval Squadron, now located at Guantanamo. This was seen as “adding to the significance of the operations.”40 A regiment of the Coast Artillery, 1,450 men, left New York on March 8, the largest troop movement from that city since “Spanish war times.” Repeated references to the 1898 war must have influenced New Yorkers to believe that much more than yearly maneuvers was at stake here. Officers of the regiment were able to hurriedly arrange for an Old Dominion Line cruise ship, the Jamestown, to take the men, each fully equipped including their Springfield rifles “carrying five steel-jacketed cartridges in the magazine and one in the barrel. Each man was supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition of this same businesslike type”;


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presumably the “business” was to be war. The conversion of the Jamestown into a troopship was accomplished in a few hours. The upper hold of the 325-foot ship, which had “electric lighting facilities,” was thoroughly scrubbed out and two inches of sawdust laid down. With the hatches removed most of the men could be accommodated in the hold, while some would be on deck. Four hundred tons of supplies arrived at the pier by wagons before the troops, who came from several New York forts, arrived to assist with loading the ship. They were underway at ten o’clock that evening, a considerable feat of mobilization.41 The following day the New York Times seemed sure that more than maneuvers was afoot. Many civilians were being hired as cooks, teamsters, blacksmiths and watchmen, and these men were notified that they were expected to go wherever the Army went, even if this included foreign countries. It was also thought significant that several regiments of coast artillerymen were being readied to serve as infantry — this might mean they were destined for “Mexican ports.” The condition of Mexican President Diaz was said to be grave, another reason for thinking there would be more turmoil in Mexico and more need for U.S. troops in Texas.42 By March 16 the assembly of army troops was complete. The Ninth Cavalry and the Fourth Field Artillery arrived from Fort Russell in Wyoming after a “long, tiresome ride of four days and nights.” Other arrivals included a German Army attaché, who commented on the excellent quality of the American troops and their encampment (British, French, Italian and Japanese attachés were to arrive later.) Along railroad sidings boxcars full of ammunition and several airplanes caught the attention of newspaper correspondents. General Carter noted that the ammunition was for target practice and told correspondents that “You may send your war cloud to the Balkans for the use of English correspondents. Nothing but maneuvers here.” This did not mean that there was no excitement. Test flights of two of the airplanes, one piloted by Lieutenant Benjamin Foulois of the Army Signal Corps and the other by Philip Parmalee from the “Wright team,” were witnessed by a “great throng.” They saw the biplanes make three long flights. “The speed with which the aviators circled over the tented city at times exceeded fifty miles.... The aeroplane was driven close to the ground at times and when it passed over Gen. Carter’s headquarters it seemed to be only a few feet above the tent.”43 The gathering together of so many soldiers in one place for an extended period of time reminded some of the disease-ridden camps in Florida where troops waited for transport to Cuba in 1898. Medical science had made progress since then, as a letter from a War Department official to the New York Times pointed out. The Army had on hand 20,000 doses of a typhoid serum and was vaccinating all the troops in Texas. In fact, Secretary of War

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The new: a Maxim machine gun crew poses with their weapon during the Texas maneuvers.

Stimson was vaccinated before he left Washington to visit the troops. In addition, the Hospital Corps now had “sanitary squads” that inspected waste disposal arrangements in the camps to make sure that proper procedures were being followed and to “defeat the dangerous activities of the common fly.” The writer believed that “methodical preparation in sanitary protection is no longer the exclusive secret of our friends across the Pacific.” Here he was referring to the Japanese, who had great success in preventing disease in their army during the Russo-Japanese War.44 In the spring President Taft decided that the “maneuver division,” as the troops in Texas had come to be called, would remain there at least through November, because of continuing unrest in Mexico (actually units began leaving for home in June and the maneuver division was officially disbanded in August). Taft continued to deny that there was any chance of war with Mexico and asserted that the main job of the troops was to prevent arms shipments crossing into Mexico from the United States— otherwise presented as enforcing American neutrality laws. The time would be put to good use by training the regulars and National Guard units and would give to the soldiers “instruction and experience similar to that which came to the Navy as a result of the cruise of the battleship fleet around the world.”45 The Army seemed to want to appear to be saving money, so it was announced that a planned movement of three regiments to the Philippines and the return of


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The old: Mule-drawn artillery moves up.

three regiments from there was canceled, thus saving the Army about $300, 000. General Carter in August pronounced the maneuvers a great success and stated that the experience of creating a maneuver division was worth five times the cost, but he did not specify what dollar cost he was talking about.46 In fact the Army did learn a lot from the Texas maneuvers. One thing was that it was easier to order the concentration of 16,000 soldiers than to do it. Many of the units that arrived were seriously under strength and so Army recruiters were ordered to increase their efforts and to send recruits to Texas. The number of soldiers in Texas never was more than 12,800, but still that number allowed the Army to carry out tactical exercises on a large scale, to test new equipment such as radio and airplanes, and to perfect command structure that would be needed for large divisions of the type the American Army would have in the First World War. It seems clear that President Taft did indeed send troops to Texas in case military intervention in Mexico became necessary. There would be another war scare in 1913 and finally intervention in 1916, when General John J. Pershing would lead a punitive expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa. In 1911 newspaper reports hyped the possibility of war at the outset, but it became clear after a few weeks that war was unlikely. There was little apprehension that Mexico might invade us and little disparaging of Mexicans; perhaps racism was not evident because Mexicans were not feared.

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The war scares involving Germany, which were most prevalent after the Spanish-American War and before the San Francisco School Board Crisis of 1906, seem less charged than later scares over a possible fight with Japan. Although there was a tendency to assign inheritable characteristics to nations and thus speak of a “German race” or an “English race” or even an “American race,” still, all these “races” were not so very dissimilar. Clearly things were different with the Japanese. They were different from us but they were all alike — united against the “white race.” Most Americans didn’t know that a race war was coming, but the all Japanese did, according to some American observers. Though there were occasional references to Germans always remaining German, it was a constant refrain about Japanese immigrants. Not only that, the immigrants were veterans of the Japanese Army and ready to take arms against America as soon as Japanese forces landed in California. They would have allies, too. Congressman Hobson stated that Japan was the leader of the “colored” races and would soon be leading them against the U.S. Racial antagonism against the Japanese had one similarity with feelings against the Germans. There was a considerable amount of respect shown to both, mostly because of military prowess. The Germans had defeated France in the 1871 war and Prussian military efficiency was admired around the world. The outnumbered Japanese fought the Russians to standstill in 1904–05. Racial animus towards the Japanese was thus quite different from the racism directed against other people of color, most especially blacks. There was little respect shown to African Americans, who were seen as irremediably inferior for all time by most other Americans. Besides racism, another case of projection by Americans may have been their estimations of the militarism of foreign powers. Those whom the U.S. might go to war with were seen as warrior nations who were aggressive, jingoistic and bent on expanding their empires. These characterizations certainly do apply to Japan and Germany, but Americans seldom saw that they could be applied to their country with considerable justification. The international context was full of competition between the colonial powers, now including the United States. There had been no war between great powers since 1871, but since then a naval arms race had started and the competition for colonies and markets in Asia and Africa had intensified. There were plenty of places in the world where imperial and commercial interests could collide, and they often did. There was no shortage of incidents and no shortage of journalists to report them and to speculate what would be the outcome. Many of these journalists seemed to think that war was inevitable. According to the writers of fiction considered next, that war would come very soon.

9. “The dull mutter of distant guns” They are singing “The Battle Hymn of the Republic.” How glorious it sounds to the accompaniment of the dull mutter of the distant guns!1 — The Shadow of Glory, 1910

Fiction that depicted possible future wars was not a new genre in 1900. The first full-blown example was published in Britain in 1871. The Battle of Dorking told of a war in the early twentieth century between Germany and Britain, resulting in the defeat of Britain, which the author portrayed as permanently destroyed as an independent nation. Sir George Tomkyns Chesney, a Royal Engineers officer, published his story in Blackwood’s Magazine and created an immediate sensation. Historian I.F. Clarke believed that the timing was not accidental. In 1870 Germany had stunned the world by quickly defeating France, which up until that time was thought to be the preeminent military power in Europe. The German victory made sudden but well-prepared attacks seem likely to succeed, and the accelerating advance of military technology was causing uneasiness in many circles. Chesney was an excellent writer who told his story in a gripping, realistic way, his major device being telling the story from the point of view of an eyewitness who relates it as an event in the past. He quickly had many imitators throughout Europe, almost all of whom paid tribute to him as their model.2 I.F. Clarke thought there were some requirements for a future-war literature to develop in a country. For one thing, the nation had to be involved in great power politics. Those that were not, such as Spain and Serbia, did not develop a “literature of anxiety and belligerent nationalities.” The other requirements were public perceptions of military or naval problems and a free press which would allow such literature to be published.3 The United States met these criteria and an 1881 article by Park Benjamin, “The End of New York,” created a stir: It soon launched an influential sub genre of American future-war fiction [that] turned America’s colonial history inside out, establishing what was to become a conventional pattern: the invasion of defenseless America by aliens from across 129

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the seas. With unintended and revealing irony, this literature often perceived the victims of domestic oppression — Chinese, “coolies,” blacks, Indians, European immigrants— as these foreigners’ confederates treacherously lurking inside the nation.4

These invasion stories began ominously but usually ended with America prevailing. Nineteenth and early twentieth century writers who looked ahead to the future were generally optimists. American writer Josiah Strong believed that the world would “enter upon a new stage of its history — the final competition of races, for which the Anglo-Saxon race is being schooled — this powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and Southern America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt that the final result of this competition of races will be the survival of the fittest?” Though Strong thought the competition of the races, and presumably wars, to be inevitable, he did not fear the result. The progress of Europe and America, their spreading empires, their seemingly insurmountable lead in science and technology, led him and other predictors to believe that wars of the future would be like wars of the past. There would be bloody battles, but wars would not be long and new weaponry would not drastically change the way that they were fought.5 Historian H. Bruce Franklin sees a super weapon/superior military technology motif in the “American future-war fiction that emerged in the 1880’s.”6 Franklin’s period of study begins with Robert Fulton’s writings on military possibilities of naval technology in the early 19th century and continues to the 1980’s. He writes in Chapter 2, “Fantasies of War, 1880–1917,” that “in the wake of Japan’s 1905 defeat of Russia, a tidal wave of novels and stories envisioning war with Japan swept across America.” Books in that vein, such as Homer Lea’s The Valor of Ignorance, “by far the best known of the works dealing with the Japanese peril,” are discussed later in this chapter, including Marsden Manson’s The Yellow Peril in Action and Ernest H. Fitzpatrick’s The Coming Conflict of Nations, or the Japanese-American War. None of these works has a war-winning technologically advanced weapon. Fitzpatrick’s book does give some attention to new weapons, but they are not decisive in his story. In all three it is the nation with the superior military values that is the victor and the racism is pervasive. The works also display essentially the same opening situation: “the invasion of defenseless America by aliens from across the sea.” Other books described by Franklin, such as Roy Norton’s 1907 The Vanishing Fleets (wherein “radioplanes” of an American inventor were able to pick up whole enemy fleets and deposit them where they can do no harm, until the leaders of their countries are ready to accept a Pax Americana) and J. Hamilton Sedberry’s Under the Flag of the Cross (which envisioned an apocalyptic race war in the twenty-first century) imagine a much larger impact for military technology.7

9. “The dull mutter of distant guns”

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Prepare for War Homer Lea, Marsden Manson, Ernest Fitzpatrick, Roy Norton, and J. Hamilton Sedberry were Americans, but one of the most popular novels of this type was written by a German, F.H. Grautoff, who used the pseudonym “Parabellum.” Banzai! was published in Berlin in 1908 and the English translation in New York in 1909. This book was the subject of much comment in the press, including a full-page synopsis and discussion in the New York Times, the sort of treatment not given to similar works except Homer Lea’s The Valor of Ignorance. The one-page foreword to the novel mentions the Great White Fleet sent on its cruise by Roosevelt in 1908. The author of the foreword (which is signed “P” but is evidently not supposed to be Parabellum) praises the book for a “remarkable grasp of facts coupled with a marvelously vivid power of description.” “P” disavows any intent to stir up trouble between Japan and the United States, but does want to encourage the growth of the right kind of patriotism — the kind that “prefers silent action to blatant braggadocio.” He writes that the purpose of the book is similar to the dispatch of the fleet — a desire to avoid war. He quotes from the Latin, Si vis pacem, para bellum: If you wish for peace, prepare for war.8 The supposedly American narrator of the story, Parabellum, begins by relating an incident supposed to have happened in San Francisco in the spring of 1907. Parabellum and his friend Arthur Wilcox are having a drink in a bar when there is a commotion in a restaurant across the street. Two men are being violently ejected from the restaurant by its Japanese proprietor, which caused Wilcox to say, “Well, what do you think of that? The Jap is attacking the white man.” Wilcox wanted to intervene, but before he can a tall Irish policeman arrived on the scene and collared the offending restaurateur. The policeman, however, ends up stretched out on the sidewalk, thrown by the “Japanese dwarf.” A riot ensues and the restaurant is wrecked by an angry mob. After the excitement Wilcox comments that there will likely be a confrontation between Japan and the United States some day in the distant future. Parabellum replies he thinks it will come very soon. Wilcox ridicules that idea, saying Americans have little to fear from “those dwarfs.” Parabellum responds, “The Russians said the same thing: Look at the dwarfs.”9 The opening scene is in an officer’s club in Manila, where Army Colonel Webster is accusing Navy Commander Harryman, captain of the American monitor Monadnock, of being obsessed with “your damned yellow monkeys.” Harryman suspects that the Japanese may be up to something. Manila has been cut off from all cable communication from the outside world for a week and only one Japanese merchantman has arrived during that time. That vessel brought newspapers from Hong Kong, which reported that a huge

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undersea earthquake caused widespread damage and cut off communications throughout the Pacific Ocean. Harryman wants to know why such a huge earthquake was not felt in Manila.10 When pressed to say why he is so suspicious of the Japanese, Harryman produces some pictures with text in Japanese and Tagalog. The pictures show the American “butchery of an Indian tribe” and an incident in the Philippine-American War, when many Filipino civilians were killed in the crater of an extinct volcano. The text calls for Filipinos to rise up against the Americans if they do not want to suffer the same fate. The officers in the club agree that this is now a serious matter and the Japanese (and perhaps their Chinese waiter) must be carefully watched. Harryman and Lieutenant Parrington, commander of the gunboat Mindoro, leave the club for their ships. In the morning the Mindoro goes out to patrol past Corregidor and meets a German merchantman on its way into the harbor. The captain of the merchantman comes aboard the Mindoro and asks to be piloted through the minefield. Parrington is baffled and asks why the German thinks the approaches to Manila would be mined. The answer is that Japan and the United States have been at war for a week and the German captain thought that surely by now the Americans would have sown mines to protect themselves. The Mindoro rushes back to Manila and while doing so radios the Army shore batteries the astounding news (in 1908 radio was short range and so news of war could not have been heard from outside the Philippines). They in turn radio the harbor and the transmission is overheard on board the Japanese merchantman, which proceeds to use “concealed torpedoes” to sink the Monadnock. The Japanese attempt to escape, but are sunk by the Mindoro, which then sails out of the harbor with three other gunboats in search of an American task force, which is on its way to the Philippines. Unfortunately, they learn that the task force was destroyed by the Japanese and are themselves attacked by a Japanese warship. Only the Mindoro survives and returns to Manila to await developments. From events in Manila Bay the action now moves to a discussion aboard an American passenger ship, the Tacoma, on its way to Japan. At dinner the passengers, unaware of the war, discuss the Japanese national character. There is heavy foreshadowing, as there was in the officer’s club, of the Japanese will to power over the entire Pacific and beyond. In short order those who think the Japanese a minor nuisance are shown otherwise, as the Tacoma is boarded by Japanese marines from a warship, who tell the passengers that they are prisoners of war and the Tacoma is to proceed to Yokohama as a prize of war. Here the narrative makes a sudden stop and moves off in another direction, in a chapter titled “How It Began.” A stationmaster in rural Washington State is surprised by a small group of armed Japanese soldiers in uniform, who have some unknown but likely nefarious purpose in mind. They attempt


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to force him to let an express train go by as if everything was normal, but he escapes and manages to warn the train and passengers. The train stops and backs up to the station, only to find the two men who had been drinking with the stationmaster have disappeared into the “wide, deserted prairie.” Naturally this puzzling incident is telegraphed to New York, where alert reporter John Halifax of the New York Daily Telegraph notices multiple reports of trains being robbed in the state of Washington. It soon turns out that the Japanese are not stopping trains to rob them but to cut off communications between the West Coast and the rest of the United States. Halifax puts two and two together and gets four: “I believe this means war!” In this description of the beginning of a Japanese-American War the Japanese attack comes without warning. However, periods of confrontation always precede wars, and nations who go to war have specific reasons for doing so, even if the confrontations and the reasons seem insignificant to outside observers. As noted in the above section on great power rivalries, there were incidents between Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea prior to the 1894 Sino-Japanese War and there was well-reported tension between Russia and Japan in Manchuria prior to the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. In the latter case the strong possibility of war was widely discussed in the international press. In both cases, and in the case of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, the time and place of the Japanese attack was kept secret and the Japanese achieved tactical surprise, but there was no strategic surprise. The attack in Banzai! and most of the other novels described here, however, is a complete surprise, except to those characters who know the nature of the Japanese “race” and understand that races are fated to struggle for supremacy. Another abrupt change of scenery takes the reader to the offices of piano manufacturer and financier Horace Hanbury. He has read about the ominous situation and calls his son and heir Gerald in for a talk about the financial facts of life in wartime. Hanbury explains that no one will want to buy pianos during a war, so he intends to lay off three of his four thousand workers and take his family to a safely neutral European country, like Switzerland or Norway. They’ll come back —“if things turn out better than I anticipate.” His idealistic son is shocked and thinks that his father is treating his workers callously, which to Hanbury sounds like “silly phrases from ... Karl Marx and Henry George.” The son leaves, and Hanbury begins to plan what to buy and what to sell on Wall Street before his ship sails. The senior Hanbury is an unusual character in Banzai, an unpatriotic American. Back at the offices of the New York Daily Telegraph star reporter Frances Robertson, the “Flying Fish” (so named because his coattails stream out behind him when he is hot pursuit of a scoop) is sent out into the night to contact “the headquarters of the various national and political societies,” presumably to gain some perspective on the crisis. Robertson finds the streets

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full of angry mobs shouting “down with the yellow race!” and “down with the Japanese!” All Asians are seen as alike in their hatred of the “white race” and in their readiness to take military action against their race enemy. The Flying Fish is carried along by the mob to the edge of a fortified Chinatown, where he sees Chinese unable to escape the mob hung from lampposts. He comes upon a crowd of the employees of the piano factory owned by Horace Hanbury, being addressed by a man who urges them to keep working at the factory and keep supporting their families. Gerald Hanbury arrives and speaks to the crowd, telling them that he agrees that they should keep working and that he is willing to donate all the money he has to keep paying their wages. He is cheered by the crowd, but at this point army troops are seen marching their way, and a cry goes up in the “mostly Russian” crowd to draw their revolvers. A gun battle erupts, in the midst of which a drunken Hanbury worker kills Gerald. When the firing subsides Robertson finds out why the troops have been summoned. The mob that attacked the Chinese was mostly “Russian and Italian rabble, on the one hand, and Irish workingmen who were defending their homes, on the other. The Russian contingent seemed to consist largely of the riff-raff which had found such a ready refuge in New York during the Russian Revolution [of 1905], and some of these undesirable citizens now had recourse to dynamite.”11 A hierarchy of “races” is evident here. The more recent Eastern and Southern European Russian and Italian immigrants are “rabble”; and the “undesirable” Russians are mostly revolutionary “riff-raff.” The Irish are not rabble, but workingmen protecting their homes and families from the rioters. The mob is dispersed, which allows the Flying Fish to accompany Gerald Hanbury’s body to his father’s house. The grief-stricken Horace Hanbury decides that his piano factory will remain open after all, and we are off to San Francisco, where the fog is unusually thick. The fog is a stroke of luck for the Japanese, who had managed to land troops almost undetected during the night. These soldiers then made their way to Chinatown, where they hide in the “underground labyrinth of the Chinese quarter — those thousands of pens inhabited by creatures who shunned the light of day ... those dens in which all manner of criminals celebrated their indescribable orgies.” Again Asians are seen as united in their scheming to bring down the white race, and now they are also physically and morally degenerate, underground creatures who celebrate twisted orgies. The invading troops are successful in taking over the city, because San Franciscans believe that all the military and naval activity is part of American maneuvers, that involve an American fleet commanded by Admiral Perry. The real maneuvers are scheduled to begin in two weeks, but the Japanese had managed to have a false news report from a Los Angeles newspaper sent to a San Francisco newspaper, informing them that the maneuvers were starting early.


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They had built up a reputation for veracity with the Los Angeles paper by having agents intercept American naval radio messages beamed from Mt. Wilson overlooking Los Angeles and passing the information to the paper. The intercept station was “wireless apparatus attached inconspicuously to the huge wind-wheel on an orange plantation between Pasadena and Los Angeles. The uninitiated would have concluded that the wires had something to do with a lightning-rod.”12 The Japanese took only 48 hours to extend their control over the entire West Coast of the United States. They had 170,000 troops on the ground, of which 70,000 had been landed from troop transports. The other 100,000 were Japanese immigrants, every one of whom was a trained soldier and many of whom were combat veterans of the Russo-Japanese War. It was not only men that had been infiltrated into America, but arms and equipment: “And when a Japanese farmer ordered a hay cart from Canada, it was no pure chance that the remarkably strong wheels of the cart exactly fitted a field gun [and] casks of California wine in reality enclosed machine guns.”13 Americans hoped that the main force of the Pacific Squadron, consisting of eleven battleships commanded by Admiral Perry, would be able to attack and destroy the Japanese fleet. Perry’s force, still unaware of the war, was surprised by Admiral Togo’s battleships and was completely destroyed. His maneuver opponent, Admiral Crane, in command of six battleships, was also destroyed by the Japanese in a sea battle. Parabellum wrote that “Nothing remained but the glory that not one of our ships had surrendered.... It was one thing to fight against the demoralized fleet of the Czar and quite another to fight against the Stars and Stripes. Our blue jackets had saved the honor of the white race in the eyes of the yellow race on the waves of the Pacific, even if thus far they had only shown them how brave American sailors die.”14 Thus far the war is indeed a race war and no quarter is asked or given. This would certainly have required the most extreme application of military values, those of obedience, courage under fire, and self-sacrifice. The loss of 16 battleships on the high seas, with apparently no survivors, would have meant the deaths of many thousands of American sailors, but there is no mention of death beyond the comment that they died bravely. At this point in the narrative, Parabellum pauses to explain the character of the Japanese people to his readers. Unlike most other immigrants, Japanese do not become like the people of their new country: “The Japanese remains a Jap for all time ... his whole energy, his thoughts and endeavors, are directed towards the upholding of the national, intellectual, and religious unity of Japan. His country is his conscience, his faith, his deity.” While the Japanese may be more fanatic than other nations, they do share with all people of color a “deep and undying hatred of the white race.” In the case of Japan

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this hatred was increased by recent political and military events. Japan fought a war with China in 1894 and forced China to pay a large indemnity and surrender valuable territory. The European powers acted together to force Japan to give up the territory. Parabellum believed that the Japanese used the indemnity to build a more powerful military, which she used to defeat the closest European power, Russia, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. That war was ended by the diplomatic intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese public was outraged by what they saw as a settlement favorable to the Russians. The settlement did not include the payment of an indemnity by Russia, which was the clear loser on the battlefield. Roosevelt’s thinking, according to Parabellum, was that without an indemnity Japan would not be able to strengthen itself for a confrontation with the United States. But this did not reckon with Japanese fanaticism, and made their choice for the next victim an easy one — it would have to be the United States.15 Back in the State of Washington resistance to the Japanese is stirring. A German immigrant, Martin Engelmann, is plotting with his sons Arthur and Richard to distribute an arms cache that has been overlooked by the Japanese. In glaring contrast to Japanese immigrants, it is “Germans to the front, that’s our slogan now, and we’ll show the people in Washington that GermanAmericans treat the duties of their new country seriously.”16 The plot to send the arms by way of a commandeered train to would-be rebels (described in some of the most vivid passages in the book) is successfully carried out by a band led by a heroic leader called Fighting Dick. Unfortunately Martin Engelmann’s two sons are captured and executed by the Japanese, who up to this point in the book have acted quite correctly. The American plan for freeing the West Coast is now revealed by Parabellum. A Northern Army, once it can be gathered and outfitted, will attack the Japanese in the West through the Blue Mountains. A Southern Army, reinforced by American forces from Cuba and Puerto Rico, will make a diversionary attack through Arizona. However, when the troopships arrive from the Caribbean at the Texas port of Corpus Christi, they are attacked by two huge Japanese battleships and all are sunk. American officers are baffled by the appearance of Japanese warships on the Atlantic Ocean side of America, but Parabellum explains this is another Japanese masterstroke of deception. The two ships were built in English shipyards for Brazil, but on the maiden voyages they rendezvous with Japanese transports carrying naval crews for them. These crewmen are recent Japanese immigrants to Brazil who now man the dreadnoughts and sail to intercept the reinforcements for the Southern Army. The Japanese have been greatly aided by the loose lips of American newspapermen, who continue to write extensively about the plans of the Northern and Southern Armies.


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By July the Northern Army is composed of three 30,000 man divisions and German and Irish volunteer brigades, a total of 110,000 men. This force, commanded by General Arthur MacArthur, is to attack through the Blue Mountains of eastern Oregon. This army is willing but has many organizational and supply problems, only alleviated by the “Americans’ strongly developed sense of humor.” 17 For description of the approach to the Blue Mountains the story focuses on the German Brigade, led by the stern Colonel Katterfeld, a veteran of the Boer War, and another of the helpful Germans who appear throughout the book. The American army reaches Hilgard, in the Blue Mountains, and launches a furious attack on the Japanese there. The attack appears to succeed, at great cost, but it soon becomes apparent that the Japanese have outflanked the Americans on both sides and they are in danger of being surrounded. The Americans must retreat with their battered forces so as to avoid capture and live to fight another day. When that day comes the Americans would be joined by some allies. Parabellum wrote that Australians, Canadians, South Africans and New Zealanders began to volunteer to fight with the Americans: “The racial feeling, so strong in every white man, had been aroused and could withstand any Mongolian attack.”18 These volunteers join the Pacific Army, which is about to attack in Colorado. The novel ends in the White House with the president receiving telegrams about the progress of the American armies. About dawn on a February morning, less than a year since the Japanese attack, the Americans win a decisive victory in the Colorado mountains. The final two sentences read: “That day marked the beginning of the end. The yellow peril had been averted!” The whites stick together as well as the Asians in Banzai!, perhaps better. The Japanese and the Chinese are in cahoots in San Francisco, yet the Japanese don’t have other Asians volunteering to fight for them. The Americans, however, have Germans, Australians, South Africans, etc., volunteering to fight with the Northern Army. It seems as though race is the basic, defining characteristic of a person, trumping nationality and everything else. Races are fated to compete for mastery of the world; such a struggle is evidently the reason for the Japanese invasion. No specific causus belli is mentioned; apparently none beyond race is needed.

A Possible Chapter in History A 1907 pamphlet by Marsden Manson hypothesized a different sort of yellow peril. In this “possible chapter in history” Manson had the Chinese declare war on America, after Chinese boycotts and race rioting on both sides of the Pacific bring about a crisis. Americans went about calmly preparing

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for war, since they sensed no immediate danger. They thought China had a large and modern army (it actually was relatively small and poorly equipped) but almost no navy and thus no way to transport troops. All calm evaporated when the Japanese produced a mutual aid treaty with China and also declared war on the United States. The evening of that day the radio tower at Pearl Harbor was blown up and before dawn the next morning military supplies were landed at beaches near the port. Waiting for the supplies were 8,000 Japanese and Chinese laborers, who transformed themselves into soldiers and attacked the half-built fortifications of Pearl Harbor, quickly seizing control of the lightly defended base.19 As in Banzai!, all Japanese immigrants were ready to take up arms against their new country. The capture of Pearl Harbor was a prelude to a naval battle which pitted an American force on its way to reinforce Manila against a superior Japanese fleet, which easily won the battle. This fleet proceeded to blockade Seattle, San Francisco and San Diego, while other Japanese and Chinese forces occupied the American bases in Samoa, Guam, the Aleutian Islands, and Manila. The blockade was maintained but the Japanese warships did not immediately attack shore installations. This was left to a fleet of miniature submarines, which attacked dry-docks, coal bunkers, and ships inside the American harbors on the same night. Two of the attacks were completely successful, but the other, at Seattle, was foiled by American minefields.20 Manson was prescient here; in 1941 the Japanese used midget submarines in the Pearl Harbor attack. The attacks on the harbors were the last real military actions of the war. There was no way for the United States to build a new fleet on the West Coast, and prior to the opening of the Panama Canal, no way to quickly bring the Atlantic squadron of the United States Navy to resume the naval fight. Manson believed that the economic and social effects of the ending of U.S. commercial relations with Asia would be devastating. He theorized, without stating a firm basis for it, that transcontinental rail traffic would be ruined and that a major transcontinental railroad would be taken over by the government. This would happen in order for the government to be able to ship military supplies and troops to the West Coast. All transcontinental railroads would have to lay men off and this would cause labor unrest and attacks upon Chinese and Japanese laborers, who would be blamed for the actions of the governments of their homelands. Manson is at times ambivalent about Japanese and Chinese in America. He blames them for some acts of sabotage but condemns attacks upon them by workers left unemployed by the blockade. Perhaps labor violence was as bad, or worse, than sabotage to Manson. Asians in America are not the only targets of disgruntled laborers. They also strike the railroads, in retaliation for layoffs and wage cuts. A further element of racial conflict developed when African American


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Regular Army cavalry troopers were brought in to protect Japanese laborers in Nevada. These troops were called in because local National Guardsmen refused to fire on “roughs” who were attacking the laborers. In a resulting melee both Army Ninth Cavalry and National Guard soldiers and officers were killed, causing a great uproar in the “yellow press.” Why an especial uproar in the yellow, or sensationalistic press, is not clear. Perhaps Manson meant that the more responsible press would downplay such incendiary events. A court-martial found that everyone did his duty correctly in the fighting, but this did not stop harmful agitation, which begins to look like a civil war between white workers and elements of the military.21 In fact black soldiers were never used for strike duty and it required considerable artistic license to portray them as ordered into action against white workers and National Guardsmen. The position of the U.S. seemed hopeless to the government and it asked the Asian allies for terms. A prompt reply stated that the U.S. must cede control of all its possessions in the Pacific, plus Catalina Island off Los Angeles and the Farallone Islands off San Francisco, to Japan and China. It must also pay an indemnity and agree to be bound by the decisions of a court of Japanese and Chinese jurists, which was to convene on Catalina Island. The Americans thought that they could agree to pay more indemnity and thus retain control over Catalina Island and the Farallones, but another provision of the terms seemed impossible to accept. Article IV stated that the U.S. must amend the Constitution so as “to extend to all aliens equal rights of citizenship.” This caused a sensation which became a tremendous outcry when the secretary of state instructed the American delegation on Catalina Island to accept Article IV without change. The American government, however, had no intention of complying with the article. Congress met to amend the Constitution to ban all immigration for ten years and restrict citizenship to those born on American soil and educated here. Manson did not explain why the Asian allies would accept this action, but apparently they did.22 As for the results of the fictional war, the author saw some positives. Though America could no longer control trade in the Pacific Basin, this situation may not last forever. The government takeover and operation of a major railroad has revealed the true costs of rail transportation and the true value of railroad stocks and bonds. Manson is a strong opponent of watered stock and financial profiteering and thought it a salutary lesson for “certain people” (Jews?) that their stock certificates are not the same as cold hard cash. “We have lost, it is true, all control of the commerce of the Pacific Ocean and may never regain it, but we have gained control of that of our own country. We have learned that there shall be no monopoly in transportation [boldface emphasis in original] is the prime, essential law of prosperity.”23 Manson waited until the end of his screed to reveal what seems to be his main

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point; that he believed that amalgamation of railroads was harmful to the economy. He also seemed to think that understanding this was a fair trade for the loss of all colonial possessions and a humiliating defeat by the “yellow race.”

The Flag, the Flag, Follow the Flag The yellow peril was a constant theme of books that prophesied war. A 1910 novel by the British author Arthur Wellesley Kipling postulated that aggressive behavior by Japan was the indirect cause of a German invasion of Holland, which then precipitated a world war. This rather involved chain of causation began with Japanese threats against Australia, where an anti–Japanese riot had resulted in the deaths of several Japanese. Japan threatened invasion and held Australian cities hostage unless a large indemnity was paid. Britain paid the indemnity, but also stationed a large naval force at Singapore, so as to have options for dealing with future Japanese belligerence. This had a cascading effect. The British now had fewer ships in the Atlantic and the Germans saw an opportunity to obtain naval parity, and perhaps even superiority, by embarking on an accelerated building program. Once they had improved their naval forces they demanded a military alliance from the Dutch, which if it were to come to pass would provide naval bases to attack Britain more effectively. Kipling further theorized that by this time the AngloJapanese naval treaty was a dead letter and that there was a secret United States–Great Britain agreement for mutual aid in case of war. Kipling presents himself as an American observer of this imaginary war and comments on the status of the United States as a military power. The American navy is superb and the Army is “second to none, what there is of it!” It’s necessary for all nations to have arms, since it is human nature to fight. The only way to prevent war is to prepare for it, according to Kipling, and the U.S. government had much to do to prepare. The way will be eased by the excellence of American arms, though there are too few soldiers. The Dutch refused German demands; the German invasion of Holland conquered that country and the Germans proceed to invade England. This invasion is defeated, but the naval battles did not go well for Britain and her allies. In Part II, “Blood Is Thicker than Water,” a still-neutral America prepares for war. The Senate debates a call for 300,000 volunteers, to be apportioned equally between the Regular Army, the National Guard, and a separate volunteer force. “Brave old Senator C____ addresses his colleagues and the nation: “We require a powerful army — and we require it now! I feel sure that the people are willing to bear the burden and I know that the fighting spirit is rife throughout the United States. Even now we are late! Only the splendid


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patriotism of our young manhood can compensate for their lack of training; in the name of Heaven act now, while it is yet day! Can you not see that the land lies fenceless? Then why let the months go by?”24 The bill was duly passed and the president issued the call for volunteers. The new soldiers were quickly absorbed into the American military structure and although there are some deficiencies in the resulting forces, they are mitigated by the “splendid patriotism” of the new troops. This harked back to romantic conceptions of battle as the field of honor, where love of country and fearless bravery would win the day. In only four years battlefields would be swept by rapid-firing artillery and machine guns; romantic notions would die along with millions of soldiers. As would happen in 1917, in Kipling’s imaginary war the United States was drawn into the conflict by German attempts to blockade England. First the Germans decided to declare that food is contraband, but a strong American reaction forced them to rescind this pronouncement. Then, for reasons that Kipling does not explain, the Americans took a more aggressive attitude towards interference with their commerce. They announced that they will not permit any interference with any ship flying the American flag, irrespective of whether its cargo is contraband or not, and sent the fleet out into the Atlantic to protect merchant shipping. There they met a German cruiser escorting an American merchantman, and the cruiser captain informed the American commander, Admiral F_____ (“A typical sailor, of middle height, not too corpulent, and gifted with an erect and dashing carriage”), that the merchantman was a prize of war. A battle ensued, which the American battleship won; “the pent-up rage of the gallant bluejackets ... released in the fierce joy of attacking the insulters of the starry flag.... The days of neutrality were over, the Eagle had screamed at last!”25 The U.S. fleet continued on to England, where it was just in time to help beleaguered British naval forces defeat a German attack. Germany had earlier invaded France, and a “Canado-American” army was sent to the Continent to fight alongside the British Army. Paris being besieged by the Germans, this army was sent to effect a relief. Kipling used the device of a diary to describe the fighting. The diarist, Captain Roger Taylor, was a staff officer attached to the combined force. He tried to sleep the night before the battle, but was kept awake by the American soldiers singing patriotic songs: “They are singing the songs of the old rebellion, ‘Marching through Georgia,’ ‘The Red, White and Blue,’ ‘Home, Sweet Home.’ God, it makes me homesick!”26 The sentimental picture of soldiers singing “Home, Sweet Home” and other songs of the American Civil War invokes notions of that war as a struggle that ennobled participants on both sides. This was an important part of the militarization of American patriotism underway in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Union and Confederate

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soldiers were both seen as patriots making gallant sacrifices for their homelands; patriotism is engaging in and honoring combat for the nation. Ideals of democracy and equality take a distant back seat. Joining in the current fighting will be another honorable crusade, Kipling seemed to say. Captain Taylor decided the next day that war can, however, be hell at times, as the Americans fought all day but made little advance toward Paris. The Germans lured several battalions of Americans into a village, when a huge explosion occurred and a “black, mushroom-shaped cloud” appeared, signifying destruction of the American forces there. A general sent Taylor to the American left flank, with orders to their commander to withdraw. Taylor mounted his horse and galloped off, seeing along the way the destroyed village “plastered ... with the shattered remains of our dead.” The forces on the flank could not retreat because they were under attack. Their commander told his men to stand and not retreat an inch; while exhorting the troops he took a bullet in the throat and died in the arms of Taylor, whose uniform was “stained by the hero’s blood.” The captain became mad with rage and “blood-lust” and took part in the hand-to-hand fighting that followed a German assault. After he emptied his pistol he took a rifle from a dead soldier, forgetting the sword at his side. Reminiscent again of the Civil War, a group of men, including Captain Taylor, gathered about the flags of American regiments. Their defense seemed hopeless, but then two Canadian regiments appeared while “notes of the charge rang in our ears.” Captain Taylor’s day ended with a mission to the commander of the opposing forces, a “kindly old gentleman, General von R_____.” Taylor requested, and was granted, a short truce to remove American wounded and dead from the battlefield. The German general agreed and praised the Americans for their fighting spirit.27 There are no kindly old gentlemen among Asian forces opposing America’s army, in Kipling’s or any other author’s depiction of future wars. Combat between white men may be honorable but Asians are not capable of nobility in these fictional works. The American commanding general decided on a night attack, and had huge searchlights brought up. These improbably blinded the German gunners to the fact that American infantry was attacking and the assault was successful. The attack continued on the second, third, and fourth German trench lines, but faltered at the fifth. The searchlights revealed that an American flag, “undaunted, glorious and alone,” had been planted in the enemy lines, inspiring Taylor to repeat, “and the rockets’ red glare, bombs bursting in air, gave proof through the night, that our flag was still there.” The flag continues to figure in the action. The commanding general of the American forces committed his reserve to the battle, telling his staff that “our turn has come, it is victory or death, kindly follow me.” He led the officers to the reserves where they dismounted, and he gave his orders: “In


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three lines, by battalions, flags to the front, regimental bands will play the corps into action from the rear. Forward!” These fresh troops had “stern, steadfast faces glorious with resolve,” and they fought bravely towards their objective. They faltered just before reaching it, but then a strange noise in the sky was heard, and at this crucial moment American airplanes appeared and dropped grenades on the German gunners. An officer seized the American flag and rushed forward. The American general shouted “The flag, the flag, follow the flag!” and the inspired troops took their objective, which was nine miles from Paris. The next day the Americans fought their way into the French capital and marched victoriously down the Champs Elysée. Captain Taylor foreshadowed General Pershing’s “Lafayette, we are here”: Americans had “wrested Paris from the clutches of Germanic hordes and sent 200,000 of our stalwart manhood to the help of the nation that had given us her sons in the days of de Grasse, Rochambeau, and Lafayette.”28 Another foreshadowing of events resulted in a major defeat for the Japanese fleet. The Americans came into possession of the Japanese naval code (not by code-breaking, as happened in World War II, but by accident) and were thus able to inform their allies about a planned movement of the Japanese fleet and move their forces to join their allies outside Port Arthur. The Japanese sortie before the American fleet arrived, however, and did much damage to the combined British, Dutch and Chinese forces arrayed against them. They revealed a new weapon: “helicopteres” took off from the decks of two passenger liners accompanying the Japanese warships and dropped mines on ships that had no means to shoot back.29 The outlook was grim for the allied ships, but at dawn the American fleet arrived and the “scepter of sea power was wrested from the hands of the Japanese by stern-eyed American bluejackets behind clean-muzzled American guns.” The American battleships got the best of the Japanese, but then the “fiendish bats,” the helicopters, appeared. They did some damage before the American admiral sent riflemen into the rigging and brought field guns on deck to shoot back. All of the helicopters were destroyed except two and these flew away. The remaining Japanese warships were sunk or disabled, but “a few heroic captains, superb in their sublime despair, fired their magazines and blew up their ships which the Emperor had entrusted to their courage and skill.” The final result of the battle was that the carnage had “freed the white race from the threat of Japanese arrogance and wiped the flag of the Rising Sun from the face of the Eastern seas.”30 Events were coming to a head in Europe as well. The Germans retreated across the Rhine and the pursuing allied armies were about to bring them to battle. Secret preparations involved a large American fleet of dirigibles, accompanied by “helicopteroplanes,” which would defend the 500 foot long airships from German attack. The origin of the American force was notable;

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“certain patriotic citizens” put up the money to establish the unit and the crews were drawn from the “elite of millionaire car owners and practical engineers.” Heavy security surrounded the air fleet and it was hoped that the Germans would be taken by surprise. The enemy was preparing a similar surprise for the Americans and their allies. They had assembled three powerful squadrons of airships at “aerial harbours” in eastern Germany. One squadron was to attack the allied armies besieging Metz. Another would drop bombs on the headquarters of the units at the head of the allied advance, thus anticipating blitzkrieg tactics of the Second World War. The last squadron would attack government buildings in Paris, in what Kipling (and late twentieth-century strategists) called a decapitating attack, an attempt to destroy the leadership of an opposing country.31 The ubiquitous Captain (now Major) Taylor was ordered to accompany one of the American airships, so as to report back on the action. The Germans launched their aircraft as well, and a large, see-saw battle ensued in the air. The American airships were able to get to a higher altitude than their German counterparts, which gave them a large advantage in the fighting. With the nick-of-time arrival of allied reinforcements, the air battle was won and Major Taylor returned to duty as a “galloper.” The fighting on the ground was also coming to a crisis point. “See this thing out!” became a sort of rallying cry for the Americans, who were pushing ahead. The casualty rates of Kipling’s imagination began to exceed even those of the actual World War I — he wrote that in over two days of hard fighting more than 100,000 men were “lost.” The author speculated that the artillery of future wars would have silencers attached: “What an improvement in warfare! No noise, no excitement — just business.” Even if it was just business, staff officer Taylor was unable to resist joining in a charge towards the German lines, where once again a regimental flag found heroes to protect it. Things looked a bit dicey for the flag and for the Americans, but Major Taylor saved the flag and American and French cavalry rescued the embattled Yanks. Taylor was wounded, at which point his faithful Irish American orderly Billy (“Houly Mither be praised, sor”) appeared with horses and both men ride to their quarters. Horrific though the battle casualties were, the toll from disease was rapidly accelerating and it was this factor which caused the King of England to suggest to the Kaiser that peace negotiations were in order. These went fairly quickly, since in Kipling’s world they were accomplished by “bluff and honest soldiers,” not scheming diplomats. The settlement of the war in Europe left Japan fighting alone in Asia against most of the rest of the world. Japan was now well blockaded so that food was becoming scarce, and when its navy was almost annihilated off Port Arthur, violent rioting caused the Japanese emperor to respond favorably when a U.S. battleship flying a flag of truce


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entered Tokyo Bay. A world conference was called to formalize the truce, and the Anglo-Saxon powers showed generosity towards the defeated, by calling for no indemnities or transfers of territory (though the French imposed both). “Proud and lofty, towering head and shoulders above the common throng of Latins, Teutons, and Slavs ... the destinies of the white race rest upon their broad shoulders.”32 Japan and the European nations were devastated by the war and its aftermath. Germany and Austria, in particular, were “beaten, angry and embittered.” They and their opponents faced the problem of reintegrating millions of soldiers back into civilian life. Only the United States was “calm, untroubled, and serene,” for the U.S. industry had profited greatly from the war and its bustling factories would have no problem absorbing veterans into the workforce. The future looked bright for the white race — if that race could withstand the rising Asian and Slavic powers. The novel ends on a Social Darwinist note: “Peace can only be founded upon civic virtue and an instant readiness to fight. The weak must go under; the strong only can survive.”33 Kipling’s device for bringing the U.S. into a European War, a secret treaty between America and England, was another contrivance requiring a lot of suspension of disbelief. As was proved in the aftermath of the First World War, secret treaties were common in Europe, but the U.S. never indulged. The author’s picture of Americans at war owes a lot to the American Civil War, when American soldiers on both sides set great stock on their unit flags and when such banners still had a communicative function, which died with trench warfare and later the advent of radio. For all this and absurdities such as regimental bands playing soldiers into battle, rallying cries like “See this thing out,” and silencers for artillery, Kipling was more accurate than most novelists in predicting the scale of the carnage, the expansion of war into world war and the beginnings of aerial warfare.

The Battle of Idaho Many authors seemed to have trouble describing what would cause war, particularly war between the United States and Japan. Ernest Hugh Fitzpatrick, in his 1909 effort, specified an incident between Japanese residents of San Francisco and some local toughs, which spiraled out of control. The militia was called in but was unable to control the disorder. The U.S. then made some quite unreasonable demands upon the Japanese government to control their nationals in San Francisco, but the Japanese response was to land large armies on the Pacific coast. These armies overpowered American forces and soon dominated the American West.34 Meanwhile, there was a rebellion against British rule in India, led by the

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charismatic Chanda Kara. At this point Fitzpatrick paused to give a fiftypage history of British rule in India, before returning to the action, which was now centered in Brazil. There was trouble between that nation and Germany and the Monroe Doctrine was violated by the Germans landing troops in Brazil, encouraged by the weakened condition of the invaded United States. The British now became involved and made some demands upon the Germans, which were rejected. War ensued and the British won a decisive naval battle, destroying the German fleet. The Germans were not the only ones to lose a fleet of ships. There was a confrontation between American and Japanese naval forces off the western coast of Panama. The Japanese had a secret weapon: an impenetrable smokescreen, which they laid over the American fleet. The Americans, blinded and helpless, were wiped out by the Japanese Navy. How the Japanese gunners saw through the thick black smoke was not explained.35 This would have been a novel tactic, since smokescreens were always used to hide one’s own vessels rather than the enemy’s. Japan’s land strategy was also innovative. Her next move was to invade Mexico. The U.S. dispatched an army to oppose the invaders, and a major battle was fought at Magdalena. Again the Japanese were victorious and at this point the British became more involved, since it now seemed that the white race was in real danger. The Japanese seizure of Panama was the last straw for the English and they took the offensive against Japan. They had an effective countermeasure against the deadly Japanese smokescreen and a naval clash had the usual result in Fitzpatrick’s world — a fleet was destroyed, this time belonging to the Japanese. Things now started to go better for the Americans and British. The rebellion in India was suppressed, but the Japanese managed to greatly reinforce their armies in the western United States. The British, however, were now fully engaged, and they landed large forces in the United States. The combined American and British armies advanced to meet the Japanese. A climactic battle was fought near Pleasant Valley, Idaho. The Japanese were defeated, with huge loss of life on both sides, and the victorious allies dispatched an expedition to invade Japan. The Japanese, however, had enough and sued for peace. Peace came quickly, but was almost a detail in Fitzpatrick’s story. The important outcome was a confederation of English-speaking nations, consisting of Great Britain, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. A “Confederated Congress” was established, which had representatives from the above nations plus “India, the Philippine Islands, and the various other British and American possessions.” The Congress was to have seven hundred members, apportioned by “standing and population,” and was to supervise the armed forces of its members and decide issues of war and peace. Confederation members pledged that “trade and commerce be forever


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free and unrestricted among the English-speaking nations.”36 Perhaps Fitzpatrick influenced Winston Churchill, who advanced the idea of a union of English-speaking peoples after World War II. Whether or not that is true, he does locate the cause of the war in racial animus and seemed quite convinced that it would be easy for the Japanese to invade the United States.

The Arrogant Government of the United States F.H. Grautoff, the pseudonymous Parabellum, did not take so rosy a view of Anglo-Saxon brotherly love. His second major novel, Armageddon 190–, theorized about a crisis arising in Samoa, a more realistic beginning than most other novels. The trouble was started by the Americans, who supplied arms to a rebel group in German Samoa. Unrest there caused the American and British consuls to demand to be allowed to land armed guards for their consulates and nationals, which was refused by the German authorities. The Americans and British determined to go ahead with landing their marines, but just before it was to take place the Americans received a telegram ordering them to avoid a confrontation at all costs. The American warship withdrew, the British went ahead, and a battle erupted. German reinforcements arrived, the British ships were sunk and the war was on.37 The war spread quickly. France, hoping to recover territory lost in the Franco-Prussian War, joined Britain. Austria sided with Germany and when Britain sent a threatening note to Italy the Italians were enraged and retaliated by fulfilling their Triple Alliance obligations with Germany and Austria. Naval battles dominated the action in Armageddon 190–, though there were also large land battles in Europe. Fighting continued until rebellions against European domination of Africa, the Middle East and Asia spread and threatened the colonies of all belligerents. At this point the kaiser proposed a settlement, everyone accepted it, and the imperial powers mounted expeditions to save their beleaguered nationals and re-establish control of their colonial possessions. Grautoff foresaw that a war between colonial powers would impel their colonies to strive for independence. This of course is what happened after both world wars, though independence was not achieved until after the Second World War. The war lasted nine months, and the final scene in the novel takes place in the British House of Commons. The prime minister related the terms of the armistice to the House members, who were shocked by its provisions. Britain had lost the land war, but still ruled the waves. Its help was going to be needed for the victorious Germans to send rescue expeditions to Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, the British had to pay a large indemnity. The prime minister told the Commons that

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THE DESTINY OF THE WORLD NO LONGER LIES IN THE HANDS OF THE TWO NAVAL POWERS OF THE GERMANIC RACE, NO LONGER WITH ENGLAND AND GERMANY [capitals in the original, perhaps the Prime Minister is shouting], but on land it has fallen to Russia and on sea to the United States of America.... This war has assisted Slavonicism and the arrogant Government of the United States, which is not friendly to us, without their needing to lift a finger, to a position of world power that we must reconquer —(loud cheers)— must reconquer in the future, for today our Navy is too weak.

There was further bad news for the members of Parliament: “The Prime Minister cleared his throat, and twitched at his collar, as though it had suddenly grown too small.... THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN TO WITHDRAW THE ENGLISH GARRISONS FROM HER COLONIAL POSSESSIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, FROM JAMAICA, THE BAHAMAS, BRITISH HONDURAS AND BRITISH GUIANA.”38 The Americans explained that since they were now the leading naval power, they had decided that the Monroe Doctrine should be every nation’s policy, not theirs alone. They also stated that with the building of the Panama Canal they felt responsible for maintaining free trade in the world and were determined to do just that. British Admiral Sir Edmund Robert Fremantle wrote an introduction to the English edition of Armageddon 190–. He thought that the picture drawn of the United States was far too harsh. He believed that although “our American cousins are certainly ‘cute’ enough, they have never shown themselves dishonorable in their political relations.” Admiral Fremantle also thought that after the British Navy had destroyed the German Navy, it was unlikely that it would submit to any German demands, or in fact to American demands.

The Throne of the Three-Toed Dragon Not all predictions of future wars were made in novels. An American named Homer Lea wrote about national strategies in the early 20th century. Lea was an unusual figure, a small hunchbacked man with an angelic face who had been admitted to West Point but was forced to withdraw when he could not cope with the physical demands made on cadets. He continued his deep interest in military affairs, and in the early 1900’s involved himself with Chinese revolutionaries attempting to overthrow the Ming Dynasty. Lea was an associate of Sun Yat Sen, was granted the rank of lieutenant general and actually did lead rebel forces in battle. Lea’s 1909 The Valor of Ignorance made use of a theory of “strategic triangles,” which purported to show how a series of triangles drawn around Japan, which touched bases controlled by the Japanese, put them in a very


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favorable strategic position. From this position Lea thought that Japan could wage a successful war to dominate the entire Pacific Basin. He wrote, “Upon this foundation of one-third the world Japan would begin the building of a new empire; and as the militant capacities of the nations of the West continued to deteriorate through Hague Conferences, the crumbling diseases of feminism, commercialism and socialism, one by one should they go into the great tumulus upon which, in due time, shall be raised the throne of the Three-Toed Dragon.”39 Though Lea did not use the term “race suicide,” he did see the white race as in decline, due to waning male power, money-grubbing, and labor activism. Part of the tumulus would be the Pacific Coast of the United States. Lea thought that Japan could easily take possession of the Philippines and Hawaii and then send an army of 100,000 men to invade Washington, Oregon and California. He wrote that only about 30,000 regular troops would be available in the entire continental U.S. and that perhaps ninety thousand National Guard could be mobilized. However, the large majority of these men would have to be transported over long distances in order to join the battle. Where would the issue be decided? Lea thought that San Francisco was the key point. To try to defend everything would be fruitless, but perhaps the San Francisco peninsula could become a defensive bastion, while volunteers were trained and formed into units that could be deployed to the fighting. This would entail giving up the Pacific Northwest, which Lea thought inevitable if the Japanese would only follow his plan, laid out in carefully drawn maps showing the landing points and objectives that a sensible Japanese commander would utilize: “By the occupation of this position she segregates and dominates the inhabitants, controls them and their activities, their productions and industries, to a degree of unity and absolutism now unknown in this Republic. With the seizure and fortification of the Bitter Root Mountains east of Spokane, together with the Blue Mountains in eastern Oregon, the dominion of Japan over these two American states becomes complete.”40 Southern California is projected to be almost as easy for the invading Japanese as the Pacific Northwest. Lea thought that all of Southern California depended on Los Angeles and that the only significant defenses were around the port of San Pedro. Lea repeatedly stated that the only value of coastal artillery was in support of a defending fleet, both attempting to prevent the bombardment of a coastal city and the capture of its fort. He believed that the American Navy’s Pacific forces could not prevent an invader from landing an army away from the port and attacking the defenses from the land side. This left Northern California. Lea thought that San Francisco was the great prize and would have to be defended by all available American forces.

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Their task, however, would be impossible. The Japanese could land their army well north and south of San Francisco Bay and then have several options in shifting their forces so as to achieve local superiority and overwhelm American positions one by one. The Americans would be no match for the welltrained veteran Japanese troops. Lea gave the Americans no more than two weeks before they would be forced to surrender. Lea’s final prophecy was grim. He speculated that it would take years for the Americans to build forces that could attempt to dislodge the Japanese. If and when these forces went to confront the invaders, he didn’t think much of their chances: These must then make their way over deserts such as no armies have ever heretofore crossed; scale the entrenched and stupendous heights that form the redoubts of the desert moats; attempting, in the valor of their ignorance, the militarily impossible; turning mountain gorges into the ossuaries of their dead, and burdening the desert winds with the spirits of the slain. The repulsed and distracted forces to scatter, as heretofore, dissension throughout the Union, brood rebellions, class and sectional insurrections, until this heterogeneous Republic, in its principles, shall disintegrate, and again into the palm of monarchy pay the toll of its vanity and its scorn.41

Suspicion of the Japanese developed into full-blown paranoia in the speculations considered above. Most people of color who have been conquered could be referred to as “niggers,” not so the uncolonized Japanese. Lea believed that nations define themselves by their battles; H. Bruce Franklin calls him a “protofascist” who placed “militarism at the heart of both national purpose and true peace.”42 This true peace would arrive when the winner of the racial war of survival ruled the planet. Social Darwinist conceptions of an international struggle for supremacy between different races seemed to fit reality much better after the confrontation of a weakening czarist Russia by the commercially expanding and militarizing Japanese. Theodore Roosevelt’s notions of the struggle of racial “bloods” and the possibility of race suicide resonated with fears of the rising influence of Japan. Roosevelt wrote about the American frontier, where challenging conditions supposedly drew the most superior “blood” among the immigrants, and an elite arose to dominate America. This elite was destined to be replaced in its turn, but it was struggle, especially armed struggle, that produced leaders. T.R. and others worried that with the disappearance of the frontier, increasing urbanization and development of a more comfortable and less challenging way of life, Americans might become a declining race, or a race committing a slow suicide. It was even possible that another race, such as the Japanese, might be able and willing to hasten the suicide along by inflicting economic and military defeats on a failing America.


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Conclusions America’s participation, after 1898, in the great game of world power politics had many consequences. Imperial attitudes seemed to be easily assumed; their assumption was made much easier by long-held racist notions of superiority over people of color. Military values developed in the Civil War and the Indian wars had a much larger stage for display now that there was an army three times as large as pre–1898 to display them. As described in earlier chapters, the Army was quick to find new venues, such as the nation’s high schools, military tournaments, and shooting contests, from which to show these values to an admiring public. The “new interventionism” noted by historian John Whiteclay Chambers II as a characteristic of the Progressive Era was in evidence in many walks of life. Progressives intervened in cities, classrooms and citizen groups to work their reforms, as did the Army in its work with urban recruiting stations, high schools, and shooting clubs. Interventions abroad and the acquisition of colonies helped bring the nation into the “great game” of imperial competition. Of course, Progressives did not think of themselves as imperialists. Many were able to view American colonialism as a reforming mission, as when President McKinley famously spoke of the civilizing mission of lifting up the “little brown brothers.” That mission was accomplished mostly by the Army and its engineers and doctors. This taking up of the white man’s burden fit in well with the Progressive desire and the Army requirement that individuals put aside personal agendas to work harmoniously for greater goals. Earlier chapters have shown how the American public was psychologically prepared for war by the war scares in the press and the war stories told in short stories and novels. The scares in the world press usually arose not from an actual confrontation or government actions, but from newspaper reports about statements of supposedly informed observers, sometimes named and sometimes not. Whatever the circumstances, they were reported uncritically. This type of war scare became less common after World War I. Perhaps the large-scale carnage produced by that war made a possible armed conflict too serious a matter to be casually discussed. That may have seemed like playing with fire. The war stories and novels about future wars were not, of course, taken as fact, though many of them used a diary or first person narration to simulate a factual account. Almost all of them presented the action with specific dates and in a straight chronological fashion, to try to add verisimilitude. Another “ism” grew along with militarism and colonialism in Progressive America: racism. The value of separating races and superiority of the Anglo-Saxon “race” were assumed by most white Americans of the time,

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whether Progressive or not. When it came to blacks, segregation, especially in the form of Jim Crow laws, was seen as a benefit for both blacks and whites. When it came to Asians, most could be repressed and ignored, except occasionally Japanese immigrants. Their home country had defeated a nation of white men, so perhaps they were not so inferior. Governments have been accused of seeing war as a solution to class conflict; a war could unify all classes against a foreign enemy. Statements on this possible effect of war were made by more than a few German observers of international politics before World War I. Reducing or even ending class conflict was important to Progressives, but there is no real evidence that they saw war as helpful in this regard. In Marsden Manson’s The Yellow Peril, defeat and consequent economic dislocation bring violent labor reactions; perhaps victory would have brought prosperity and labor peace. In this and all the other books, though, no group is disloyal during the fighting. Throughout the fiction, considered military values are on display. Americans show a militarized patriotism; they are willing to die for symbols like the flag and they submit to military discipline eagerly. There is little talk of American ideals of liberty or equality or how to maintain essential freedoms under the stress of war; America is and will always be the land of the free and the home of the brave. The military value of bravery is what is needed and it is what carries them through defeats to a final victory; their spirit is never crushed by setbacks. Even a pessimist like Homer Lea doesn’t seem to think they will give up, though he believes they will lose, and lose permanently, in the end. The next chapter discusses the military values of the National Guard and the role that race and class played in the development and use of the Guard in the Progressive Era. This chapter will bring issues of class conflict and the role of the militia to the fore. Conflicts were possible between a middle and upper class officer corps and enlisted men with less affluent and lower status backgrounds, especially if a unit was called for duty during a strike. As far as its role is concerned, since a large conscripted army along European lines was neither traditional nor politically possible in the United States during the Progressive Era, the Guard would fight with the Regular Army if there was an invasion by foreign troops. In spite of challenges, the martial spirit was not lacking. Local observers of guard units thought them quite military and able to participate effectively in defense against foreign invasion or local disturbance. Probably because of the good opinion of their community, the support given by military values to male identities, and the efforts of their officers to provide recreational opportunities, most Guard units didn’t seem to have much trouble recruiting new members. They would have known that being called to duty to police labor unrest was quite possible, but also that local units were usually sent to distant locations for strike duty. They would not have to face people they knew with a rifle in their hands.


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The design and purposes of National Guard armories will also be discussed. Armories were built to be small forts, in case labor unrest might make them subject to attack by strikers. This is another indication that the leadership of the Guard was apprehensive about working class men and unions. However, what divisions there were between officers and the men under their command were not strong enough to prevent use of the Guard in labor disputes.

10. “A great army of the people” We must have a great army of the people.1 — J.D. Whelpley, 1902

The war scares and war stories described in the preceding chapters were a psychological preparation for war, essentially unorganized by the government. In discussing the activities of the National Guard we are moving closer to actual preparations for war, since the Guard was projected to play a part should the nation be attacked and invaded. Besides this possible role, as a militia under the command of the governor of a state, the Guard could be called upon to police domestic disturbances. The concept of a militia has deep roots in American history. The colonists considered all able-bodied men to be part of a militia that could be called upon to defend the community against Indian attack. Article 1 of the Constitution, which deals with Congress and its powers, states in Section 8 that Congress is authorized to “provide for the organizing, arming, and disciplining of the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be called into the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline of Congress.” The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution reads, “A well-regulated militia being necessary, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” The militia was given more legal standing by the Militia Act which Congress passed in 1792. This act specified that all men between the ages of 18 and 45 constituted the militia. It defined the “organized militia” as those men who had formally constituted themselves as a military unit with a commander. The organized militia comprised the armed force of the state government and was called to duty by the governor. The federal government showed little interest until the late 1880’s, when Congress began to appropriate small amounts of money, no more than $1 million annually, to assist the state militias. There matters stood until the Spanish-American War, which had shown 154

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that it was possible for the United States to be in a war rather quickly and with little notice. It also revealed that the quality of the state militias was very uneven. This made many observers think that the federal government should take a much more active role in militia affairs. J.D. Whelpley, writing in the North American Review, was strongly in favor of this, though he acknowledged that there was considerable opposition, especially by states’ rights proponents. He believed that the militia should be “organized, equipped, trained, and supported from the national treasury, and under national direction, with the purpose of creating a great army of the people, which, in times of peace, should not be evident to a burdensome degree, but which, in time of war, could be quickly mobilized and sent to defend the frontier and the coast, thus allowing an interval of safety during which the regular army could be expanded or a volunteer army organized for war purposes.”2 Whelpley cited figures on the number of men in all the state militias before and after the Spanish-American War, which showed a decrease. He thought that this had something to do with the number of men who had joined the Army to serve in the Philippines, but said that the drop should “allay the fears expressed by politicians that the war spirit is becoming rampant among the younger generation of American citizens.”3 He further stated that this larger force would not be dangerous, because its use was restricted by law and because the basis of all military service in America was the volunteer — we had no conscription. The “great army of the people” that he called for would of course be part-time soldiers and so would not be “evident to a burdensome degree” as a large Regular Army might be. The Guard became more important to the War Department after the Spanish-American War. The military reforms of 1901 and 1903 brought the state National Guards under increasing federal supervision. They remained under the direct control of the governor of the state and could be mobilized by him in an emergency, but they now participated in training and maneuvers with the Regular Army and were subject to inspections by Regular Army officers. More and more the Guard was seen as necessary for the national defense and as possessing martial virtues similar to those of the Regular Army. National Guard units were a part of their local community and the community was usually more interested in their affairs than the affairs of the Regular Army. The community’s pride in its local “soldier boys” was substantial, and criticism was not welcome. The community felt that their unit was capable of defending them in an emergency, but as will be seen in the discussion of military maneuvers in the next chapter, Regular Army officers often didn’t agree. This was a continuing tension, but local communities remained proud of their military and there was no lack of martial spirit concerning the parttime soldier — even if some of the stories about them took a light-hearted view of military training and life in uniform.

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Issues of class are important in considering the place of the Guard in the life of communities, especially when units were called up for strike duty. There are only a few studies of the social composition of Guard regiments, but it is safe to assume that officers were middle-class and above, while enlisted men were mostly blue-collar and white-collar workers. Service as an officer was prestigious, especially in smaller communities, but all service associated the men with military values and manifested these values to their communities. The Progressive Era saw large increases in membership of all-male fraternal organizations; these groups strengthened male identities through their initiations and rituals. The National Guard was of course men only and had its own initiation ceremonies and many ritualistic behaviors, in the form of saluting, parading, forms of address, uniforms, display of weapons, etc. It too strengthened male identities and was available to those who wanted such strengthening and reassurance but did not to want to make the Army a fulltime job. A soldier was potentially a warrior and even perhaps a hero, substantial support for male identity indeed. Progressives saw class harmony as an ideal and wanted to end class conflict. National Guard officers appealed to a need for more maleness and a militarized patriotism in order to gain recruits willing to ignore class disparities. Class differences certainly existed in the Guard, but on the whole individuals were willing to disregard differences and personal agendas in service to group norms.

California Guard at Santa Cruz In 1901 the California National Guard consisted of 46 companies of infantry, four of cavalry, three signal companies, and a battalion of naval militia stationed in San Francisco. A company would have 50 to100 men. Five to ten companies formed a regiment and two to four regiments formed a brigade or division. The First Brigade covered Southern California and had “850 men with full equipments and 1000 rounds of ammunition to each company. In case of an insurrection or invasion by the enemy the brigade could be mobilized in less than twenty-four hours.”4 The Seventh Regiment, part of the First Brigade, was headquartered in Los Angeles with ten companies assigned. Companies A, C, and F were in Los Angeles, while Co. B was at San Diego, Co. D at Pomona, Co. G at Redlands, Co. I at Pasadena, Co. K at San Bernardino, Co. L at Santa Ana, and Co. M at Riverside. Troop D of the cavalry was also located in Los Angeles, as was one of the signal companies. The Los Angeles companies met once a week on different evenings at the armory at 8th and Spring Street downtown.


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During the summer months National Guard units would travel to a base for two to four weeks of drill and training, sometimes marching through city streets from their armories to board trains for camp. In June 1901 the California Guardsmen at Camp Gage near Santa Cruz knew that part of the training would be sham battles, but did not know when the sham battles would take place. The First Brigade attacked the camp when some units returned from a march, surprising the soldiers there. Units of the Second Brigade, on a march to Capitola, were held up by cavalrymen defending a bridge they were to cross. The men brought up their artillery to bombard (with blanks) the bridge’s defenders, and then circled to their rear, forcing them to surrender. Rumors, likely developing from the scandals of the Spanish-American War, circulated among the men at Santa Cruz, concerning possibly diseased meat being fed to them. Quick action was taken: “Four surgeons inspected the meat last night and today pronounced it first-class.” Trouble over this was averted, but another incident caused a stir. A guardsman had been arrested and imprisoned in a local jail for some infraction, and a group of soldiers, estimated by a reporter to be about 500, assembled during the morning at the local “calaboose” to demand his freedom. The commanding general arrived with a squadron of cavalry and arrested those soldiers who were making “ominous threats.” These men and the military residents of the “calaboose” were turned over to military authorities and the general told the men that any further offenders against good order would suffer the consequences. The evening was more peaceful, with a dress review witnessed by a large crowd of spectators. There was also a ball at the armory and a concert given at a local hotel. Celebration was general enough so that “the supply of beer in local breweries had become exhausted and a supply was sent from Watsonville.” The following year the California Guard had its summer camp near Santa Cruz again. Soldiers of the Second Regiment arrived at Camp Muller and were given a good workout by their officers, including a swim in the ocean. The article noted that the men were so well-behaved that their commander thought it unnecessary to detail guards to go after “belated ones,” indicating a good state of discipline. There was a reception and dance for the officers on July 30, 1901, and the following day the regiment was to walk eight miles to Capitola, where another reception, a band concert, and a luncheon were to be provided. In the evening a nautical bonfire was to entertain the visitors: “a ship will be burned at sea in front of the bathhouses, together with a display of fireworks.” On August 31, 1901, the camp was to be visited by a group of generals, who would be given full military honors. Camp Muller was to be “brightened” in preparation for the generals’ arrival and a sham battle was to take

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place in the morning. Soldiers, with twenty rounds of blank ammunition apiece, were to try to dislodge an opposing group from the top of a hill. The evening’s entertainment was to be a basketball game between a National Guard team and a local YMCA team. As was true of most Guard encampments, there was much military display for citizens to admire, and locals were likely impressed with the appearance and what they took to be the efficiency of the soldiers.5 July 4th celebrations were often the occasion for a sham battle put on by National Guard units. A very unusually timed sham battle occurred in Riverside, Calif., on the Fourth of July 1901: A noisy Fourth was ushered in shortly after midnight by the members of Co. M, who, in accordance with the laws governing the State National Guard, are compelled to parade in full uniform on Independence Day. As many of the company had planned out-of-town excursions for the day, Capt. Mitchell decided to get the ordeal through with early, very early, in the morning. The men assembled at the Armory at midnight in full force. They were divided into several squads and soon a fierce sham battle was raging in the business heart of the city, to the great grief of the people [likely including the “Resident Correspondent” of the Los Angeles Times, author of this report] who were trying to get a wink of sleep. The battle resulted in the capture of the company’s big cannon, which was making an awful racket out on Seventh Street. The rest of the day was comparatively quiet. There was a golf tournament on the Rubidoux links, in which about twenty players participated.6

Newspaper advertisements for Fourth of July excursions from Los Angeles to Catalina Island sometimes stated that a sham battle was part of the celebration. At other times the citizens could be surprised by the sound of gunfire. On Sept. 15, 1901, Marines in camp on Catalina Island began a morning sham battle, which caused the citizens to rush out of their homes to see what was happening. The cause of all the noise was discovered on a hillside near town: “Men were rushing hither and thither, firing their muskets as rapidly as possible and occasionally one would drop and some comrade would carry him to the rear.... It looked very realistic but was only a false alarm.” A few squads of Marines had established themselves on the top of a hill and other squads were attempting to gain the top. Finally the attackers won, after a “fierce and decisive” battle. Both sides were to fire over a thousand rounds of blank ammunition and no one was hurt.7 Besides their weekly meetings the Seventh Regiment companies would have encampments at various places around Los Angeles, Long Beach being a favorite spot. In September 1902 there was “great activity on the tented field which is about to be the camp of the First Brigade.... It will be officially designated as Camp George Stone.” The companies of the Seventh had arrived on September 6 and were preparing the camp for the rest of the men arriving in the afternoon. These included Troop D, a signal company, and the com-


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manding general of the First Brigade and his staff, for whom a welcoming ceremony was planned.8 Two days later the camp was laid out and the soldiers settled in their tents. After breakfast on September 8, General Dickinson, who had arrived on the “Owl” from San Francisco, was welcomed with the appropriate 11 gun salute, startling “quiet Long Beach almost to distraction.” After the formalities the rest of the day was spent in drills of various kinds, for the most part extended order drills which had the men going cross-country in skirmish lines, which would have seemed more like combat than a parade would to spectators, though both could be impressive. The men were told they would have to be vigilant to avoid “pitfalls” in the form of squirrel holes. The climax of the day was a review held in honor of General Dickinson. This was witnessed by several hundred spectators from Long Beach. A newspaper reporter thought that they saw a fine show. Some officers had problems with their mounts: “Their horses refused to go where they were reined, but jumped stiff-legged off on a tangent, which made the officers look like wooden men with arms and legs on hinges.” The men marched in companies and the reporter thought that some were “hay-footing” and others were “straw-footing,” but all in all it “looked well” as a display of military pomp and order.9 Three years later there were considerably bigger crowds to see events at the National Guard encampment at Long Beach. This time the commanding officers had decided to encourage the public to attend and promised them a sham battle. Apparently they got very much more than they bargained for. They were in reasonable control of their own men, but the spectators were not disposed to take orders. The Los Angeles Times account states that “between 5,000 and 6,000 lovely ladies and things planted themselves squarely between the opposing armies and refused to budge. Every time the bugle clarioned the charge, a long line of women, shrieking and waving parasols, rushed down the field in a panic.” Officers who tried to give orders to have an area cleared found that it was often difficult. A captain ordered a sergeant to have a young woman move back and was angered when nothing happened. When he demanded that the sergeant get the woman moving, the man replied, “I’m trying to, but she’s my wife and she won’t go.” Five or six thousand is very likely a gross exaggeration, as is the description of women panicking at bugle calls. It seems more likely that the “panic” was a mockery of large groups of men earnestly playing war on a sunny afternoon. A reporter evidently did not accompany the Seventh Regiment to its 1903 summer camp on North Island in San Diego Bay, but was mightily impressed by the appearance of the men when they returned. A special troop train brought the troops to the Santa Fe yards in Los Angeles on August 15, 1903. They looked like regulars, “dusty and worn, the fit was all wrinkled out of their uniforms.... But they were brown and business-like and soldierly.”

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When they left the train the men stood quietly and respectfully, waiting for orders from their commander. Acting Major Truman Cole formed the men into a column of fours and marched them to the Armory at 8th and Spring Streets. Observers along the way were reported to be impressed with the military bearing of the troops. Onlookers who did not know a “bayonet from a Gatling gun are quick enough to recognize good soldiering”; apparently the reporter is equating good marching with good soldiering. Major Cole was asked about the performance of his men and opined that they had won the sham battle in which they had taken part, turning their opponents into “corned beef hash.” The umpires, however, called it a draw.10

A Minstrel Show Sometimes local Guard units assembled not for training, but for fun. National Guard officers, like Regular Army officers, wanted to provide recreation for their men, to improve their physical condition and keep them away from unhealthy pursuits involving alcohol, gambling, and prostitutes. With the assistance of their leaders, Seventh Regiment soldiers put on an unusual show in 1908 to raise funds to equip the regiment’s gymnasium. It began with a minstrel show, but only “Tambo” and “Bones” were in the traditional blackface and costume.11 The rest of the men wore uniform blue shirts, khaki breeches and leggings. The opening of the show was not the usual “olio,”12 but showed the inside of a commanding officer’s tent. The players marched in, and the “commanding officer,” who was the master of ceremonies, rose to introduce the entertainment. The Los Angeles Times thought these innovations were clever and a welcome departure. The jokes were “old and familiar,” but even here the men added something new, some humor directed at the officers of the regiment. The olio portion of the show ended with the singing of a patriotic song, “The Old Flag Never Touched the Ground.” Blackface performance seems to have been a vehicle for the soldiers to poke fun at their officers. The soldier who played the commander was evidently “Mr. Interlocutor” and was not in blackface.13 It would be interesting to know if the 7th Regiment minstrels wanted to represent National Guard soldiers as black men oppressed and demeaned by foolish white commanders, but the whole evening seems more good-natured than subversive. The Seventh must have decided to have nonstop entertainment for the evening, because the regiment’s bugler played the daily calls, beginning with reveille, during intermission. The Times praised the musicianship of the bugler and reported that after retreat was sounded, the orchestra played the national anthem, at which point the audience stood up. These spectators, more closely connected to the military than those at the military tournaments


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previously described, had a clear understanding of their part in demonstrations of militarized patriotism. The bugler finished by playing “tattoo” and “taps” in the “glare of a calcium,” the house lights having been dimmed. The second part included variety sketches put on by Seventh men. One was a “good old standby” of burlesque, “Dr. Sawbones.” The humor here was mostly in the “Doctor’s” surgical instruments, which were tools such as mallets and hatchets, but again the Seventh soldiers added some unspecified new jokes. The next sketch was Robert Hilliard’s “The Littlest Girl,” a dramatization of the Richard Harding Davis short story “Her First Appearance.” The Times thought this was well done, except for the appearance of the actors. The man playing the villain, Mr. Carouthers, was a “little too corpse-like in appearance” and the actor playing the long-haired Van Bibber had a fresh haircut. After some songs by the Occidental Quartet it was time for the last act. Sergeant Mytton of the regiment led a group of uniformed men onto the stage, where they “gave a demonstration of the daily life of a soldier.” The soldiers pitched tents, folded them up, did drills, and as a finale, engaged in a sham battle with an unseen enemy somewhere in the wings.14 This must have been the smallest sham battle that the Seventh ever fought, but the exhibition of soldiers acting in concert under tight discipline would have supported notions that martial values of obedience and hierarchy were vital to success in the Guard and perhaps in other walks of life. National Guard encampments and weekly training were often observed by family, friends, and the public, and National Guard officers took their role seriously. Their respect for military values seemed genuine and they were eager to improve the morale and discipline of their units. When a newspaper reported on the activities of the Guard, they interviewed and quoted officers, usually the unit commanders. Information about the attitudes of the rank and file is more difficult to find. The scrapbook of Sergeant William Henry Stafford of the California National Guard, which covers the period 1900–1907, is available for viewing in the Rare Books Room of the California State Library. Snapshots are pasted on its pages, mostly of Guard activities where wives and girlfriends were present. They include pictures of a soldier in uniform thumbing his nose at the camera and pictures of a picnic. They indicate the Guard was as much a social as a military organization for enlisted men and officers. The enlisted men may or may not have had the same devotion to military values that their officers had. Nevertheless, they obeyed the orders of their officers. Comments by Regular Army officers such as Colonel Wilhelm complimented both officers and men for their efforts, but at the same time noted deficiencies that would have hampered them should they have to assist the Regular Army in defending against an invading force.

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Fortify the Harbor! One of the most unusual sham battles took place on the evening of July 4, 1908, in San Pedro harbor south of Los Angeles. Prominent citizens of the city, which had not yet been annexed by Los Angeles, arranged an all-day celebration, ending with a spectacular fireworks sham battle between mock battleships in the harbor and a mock “Fort Roosevelt” on the shore. The Los Angeles Times reported that the evening’s display was witnessed by “tens of thousands” of spectators from a hill overlooking the harbor. Four 110 footlong “battleships” had been built to look like warships, in profile at least, and floated in the harbor. On land a mock fort had also been erected and when darkness fell the excitement began with the “ominous booming of the heavy guns at “Fort Roosevelt”.... The stirring naval battle that followed lasted upwards of an hour; and from time to time the deafening roar of forty mortars added vivid and spectacular touches of reality ... making the tremendous picture resemble war in all its deadly aspects.” There must have certainly been a lot of noise from the artillery firing blanks, which could be considered one “deadly aspect,” though what the others might have been is not clear. The battleships began to hit home as they shot away first a corner of the mock fort and then the fort’s large flag. Parts of the battleships began to fall as the barrages continued and then torpedo boats from the fort attacked, sinking them all. The finale saw the replacing of the flag, and then “the motto blazing forth through the smoke and night over the ruins: Fortify the Harbor! It flashed out in broad electric lights at the fort and the crowd gave a great cheer.... The great harbor must be adequately protected, for fear that one day the mimic battle may become a terrible reality.”15 The flag is a powerful symbol here and a strong component of militarized patriotism — its disappearance means danger and possible defeat; when it reappears, it signifies military victory. This event was a kind of re-enactment of the bombardment of Fort McHenry, as portrayed in the “Star-Spangled Banner.” It also shows the same sort of reverence for the flag and its supposed place in deadly combat, as was demonstrated in much of the war fiction described in the previous chapter.

A Spy at the Sham Battle Also in 1908, the New York National Guard fought a sham battle in New York City’s Van Cortland Park, a popular site for Guard exercises. The sham battle held on Sept. 7 was between batteries of the First Battalion of Artillery. There were no injuries but a lot of excitement among the guardsmen that day. To some of the soldiers it looked like a real battle, but the spectators in the


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park saw men rushing around on horseback and heard an occasional cannon roar, which a newspaper reporter thought must not have looked much like a battle. Some among the audience saw an unusual stratagem by the attacking force that was not on the program of the day’s events. This was the use of a woman spy: “The introduction of this female warrior was somewhat theatrical, but it makes better reading than the technical recital of a bloodless battle fought by National Guardsmen.” Technical and bloodless though they might have been, the details of the battle were reported. Battery One, called the Army of the South, was to simulate a force evacuating the City of New York through the park. Bugles blew “Boots and Saddles” at 9 A.M. and the 65 men of the battery rode south with their 4 three-inch guns. The other two batteries masked their guns behind high points and waited for Battery One to appear. By 11 A.M. a large crowd of spectators had arrived and were spread out for a mile around the Guard camp. Captain John F. O’Ryan, commander of Battery One, was attempting to conceal his march northwards when the alert wife of one of the members of the opposing force observed a young woman on horseback talking to some officers on her husband’s side. The young woman waved goodbye to these officers and rode away to the south. The wife called out from her carriage that the young woman was a spy, and Lieutenant “Budley” Bolger went off in pursuit with a dozen troopers. They failed to catch the woman, but did capture an advance guard of the approaching Battery One. The enterprising Captain O’Ryan was not done with surprises. He successfully drew fire from all the opposing guns by a ruse and then positioned his guns on high ground. A noisy half-hour battle ensued, with the cannon firing 264 blank rounds. By the end of this battle the crowd was thought to be around 20,000 and many of them were women. More spectators kept arriving, and late in the afternoon there was a review in front of a local congressman witnessed by an estimated 40,000 people.

Half-Hidden in the Smoke of Battle A few years later there was a sham battle on Governors Island in New York. Many if not most of the spectators were women. The occasion was the annual garden party of the Army Relief Society, which provided support for widows and orphans of officers and men of the Regular Army. Many prominent people, including the new Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, were in attendance. Wives and daughters of military officers from posts around New York City staffed the many booths and helped with the day’s entertainment. The military program listed events as escort of colors, dress parade and manual

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of arms, shelter tent camp, musical drill, bayonet exercise, exhibition drill by the signal corps and sham battle. While the programme had many attractive military features it was the sham battle for charity, or attack upon the fort, which brought out the spectacular and unexpected. This attack came last in the programme and hundreds of fashionably gowned women lined the parade ground waiting for the first gun to be fired.... The onlookers, the majority of whom were women, grew more and more excited as the conflict raged and instead of stopping up their ears with their fingers they advanced step by step in a solid phalanx until they were between the firing lines. The guards rushed forward and tried to keep the women in place but they kept pushing a-field, many of them now half-hidden in the smoke of the battle.

General Frederick Dent Grant was observing the battle up on a hill with his wife and a group of women; all of these women left their seats to join the other women on the field. By now the women were mixed in with the attacking soldiers and accompanied them in the final charge of the fort. When the gun smoke cleared it revealed “hundreds of women facing the battlements cheering the flag.”16 The reporter thought that the women were carried away by the excitement of the battle; I think this may have been another female jape of grown men playing soldier.

A Lifelike Reproduction of the Slaughter The Governor’s Island sham battle was unusual; so was the 1902 sham battle at Sheridan, Wyoming. This was called the “first lifelike reproduction of the slaughter of Custer and his band,” the June 25, 1876, Battle of the Little Bighorn. The New York Times probably intended no disparagement of Buffalo Bill’s re-enactments, but likely thought the location and large numbers involved made this show more like the historical event. The re-enactment was done on July 4, 1902, by 260 soldiers from Fort McKenzie (this being the exact number in Custer’s force) and 1,500 Crow and Cheyenne Indians. The Times reporter thought that the re-enactment was “more authentic and certainly more vivid” than any contemporaneous account of the original event. This odd statement was made because the only eyewitnesses who survived were Indians who had been unwilling to say much, and all other accounts had been produced by writers who had to rely on their imaginations. Some 300 of the Indians were participants in the 1876 battle and taking part were famous Crow chiefs such as Spotted Horse, Red Tomahawk, Plenty Cuss, Iron Thunder, Pretty Eagle, and Bad Man. The Crow reservation was closer to Sheridan than the Sioux reservation and some Crows had been with


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the Sioux at the Little Big Horn. The Sioux were “now learning to plow corn and fix up a homestead just like a white man,” so many of them were not interested in participating. It took several days “until all the movements were thoroughly drilled into the red men’s minds,” but once this was accomplished the re-enactment went off without a hitch. How long it took to drill the movements into the cavalry troopers’ minds was not stated. “The red men were real warriors in appearance, with their shining, naked limbs and features fantastically colored and riding their mounts at top speed they presented a terrifying spectacle,” the Times reported. Spotted Horse played the part of Gall, a leader of the attacking forces who had prevented the soldiers from escaping and encouraged the attackers by calling on the Great Spirit. After the final charge the Indians simulated the taking of scalps, and the soldier playing Custer lay “undisturbed by the yelling horde which regarded him with awe as some agency of the Evil Spirit.... There he lay, as even did the Custer of a quarter century ago, his yellow locks undisturbed, his face only marred by battle smoke and his sword in his hand even in death.”17 As discussed in earlier, Buffalo Bill Cody had produced a re-enactment of the Little Bighorn battle long before this event, in 1886. The attitudes expressed by this Fourth of July event were, however, similar to those of the Wild West Show. The Indians are “real warriors,” not bloodthirsty savages, and some of them are capable of becoming more “like white men.” It seems as though the Indian is reconciled to the progress of civilization, just as former Confederates are reconciled to the restored Union, and the nation’s martial spirit and patriotism are strengthened due to these unifying factors.

Conclusions Army activities that could be observed by the public, like these sham battles, may have been objectionable to some, but it it’s difficult to find outright resistance. Partly this is because it was hard for some groups, such as African Americans and women, to gain the notice of the government and the press. During the Progressive Era women were finding roles for themselves outside the home in ways that did not require the support of a patriarchal society, such as the growing women’s club movement. Women and blacks were disenfranchised, but this did not mean that they were unorganized or never able to make their concerns known. And if open resistance was not feasible, there might be other ways to resist. At times it seemed like women were poking fun at Army activities. There were several instances of what may have been guerrilla theater at Army and National Guard maneuvers. In 1905 at Long Beach 5,000 to 6,000 (the number

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is surely a wild exaggeration, possibly for comic effect) “young ladies and things” got between the opposing forces in a sham battle, and every time a bugle sounded they rushed about shrieking and waving their parasols. In 1908 in New York a “woman spy” on horseback intervened in a sham battle in a New York park, and in 1911 on Governors Island in New York well-dressed women joined in a sham battle and outnumbered the soldiers. These women seemed to be indicating that the day’s events were shams in more ways than one. In the next chapter, labor organizing, strikes, and the use of the National Guard to suppress actions by workers are described. As will be shown, the Guard proved to be a reliable instrument for disciplining workers. In order to determine why this was so, it’s necessary to consider Progressive attitudes towards the working class.

11. “In the badlands” In the badlands, as the district occupied by the foreign miners is called, conditions were far different. Here the streets were deserted and every window closed and shuttered. Women and children peered out at the passing soldiers but not a man was to be seen.1 — Chicago Tribune, 1900

The modern industrial order centered on machines; men either tended machines or worked like machines on assembly lines. The assembly lines and the factories that housed them were growing larger and the “human scale of nineteenth-century labor thus fell away.”2 As this happened, ideas of scientific management pioneered by Frederick W. Taylor had the effect of further making the worker an extension of the machine. The major point of scientific management was that all thinking about work processes was to be done by management, who would arrange jobs so that productivity, and hence theoretically wages, would increase. Workers were to have no say in anything connected with the job and would have to be content with eventual higher wages, no matter working conditions, hours, or anything else. New workers for the assembly lines, from Southern and Eastern Europe and from the rural Southern United States, did not usually have craft-union backgrounds and so not much union organizing took place in the factories. The craft unions of native-born Americans, however, prospered: the building trades union membership more than quintupled between 1897 and 1904; total union membership in the same period about quadrupled. The “momentous anthracite strike of 1902, skillfully managed by John Mitchell to elicit the aid of a sympathetic Roosevelt Administration, brought permanent organization to the hard coal fields.”3 These union successes provoked employers to organize in opposition to unions and their demands. Their lawyers had some great victories in court, such as when the Supreme Court ruled that unions were subject to antitrust laws. Local courts became more and more ready to issue temporary and permanent injunctions against strikes, on the basis that the strikers were doing irreparable harm to the business being 167

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struck. What could have been a powerful defender of workers, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), was not an effective opponent of attacks by employer groups. It was conservative in its outlook and very concerned with protecting what turf it retained, though claiming to speak for all of American labor. Things began to go badly for unions: Corporate employers had grown too large and powerful; they were too unyielding in defense of management prerogatives; and craft leverage had weakened too much in technologically advanced fields.... In the metal trades, among the railroad shop crafts, in steel, meat packing, and textiles, bitter strikes were fought against the open shop and the deadly new efficiency systems. Still, the weight of advantage lay with management, and, for all the blood spilled and sacrifices made, the unions mostly went down to defeat4.... The trade union movement was strongly rooted, but narrowly confined, in principle encompassing the entire labor force, in fact incapable of reaching the mass of industrial workers.5

No one could speak for all of labor. Besides AFL craft unionism, there were “middle-of-the-road building trades practice, socialism, Catholic Action, syndicalism, and feminism ... different from one another but also often bitterly antagonistic toward one another.”6 There was not nearly so much division among employers, who made great and often successful efforts to enlist on their side members of the public not already committed to workers’ causes: “The employers’ crusade for the “open shop” everywhere sought to enlist the participation of concerned citizens from all walks of life ... Citizen’s Alliances in many towns. Local merchants, academics, professional men, supervisory personnel, fraternity boys from universities, and anti union workers were enrolled in local associations to combat ‘union tyranny.’”7 Though the general public usually reacted with enthusiasm whenever the military appeared, workers did not, especially unionized workers. The Knights of Labor issued a statement opposing an increase in the size of the Army, because they feared that more soldiers meant that they could be sent anytime and anywhere there was a confrontation between labor and management — and would always support management. Another union observed that the army was being used to break strikes in the U.S. colonies acquired from Spain and saw this as an omen of increased repression in the United States.8 Use of soldiers to break strikes was not the only reason for unions to oppose larger military forces. There was also a strong feeling that bigger military establishments made arms races and war more likely and it would be workers, not management, who would be the soldiers. Some of these would die in wars that might be caused, in part, by all the resources poured into the Army and the Navy. Labor also felt that the extra cost involved would bear more heavily on the workers and that this extra money would be much better spent on schools and parks, rather than bigger guns and more soldiers.

11. “In the badlands”

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Interestingly, union newspapers were not nearly so opposed to, sometimes even in favor of, a larger navy. For one thing, sailors were almost never used to suppress strikes. For another, shipyard workers benefited greatly from large orders placed by the U.S. Navy. Unions not involved in shipbuilding, however, retorted that a larger navy, just like a larger army, made war more likely. Also, the U.S. Navy was a highly aristocratic institution and a “threat to the democratic spirit.” This became an issue between locals of the Machinists Union, with the Washington, D.C., local (composed mostly of shipyard workers) coming out strongly in favor of a bigger navy. Most of the other locals in the union were opposed and the issue made its way to the leadership of the AFL. Their Committee on Resolutions decision was to support the construction of all naval vessels in government navy yards and thus remove it from company and corporation shipyards. The AFL thought that removing the profit motive would keep potential corporate warmongers from stirring up trouble that could lead to war. Apparently they felt that the U.S. government acted out of higher principles.9

The Propagandist of Slavery The Industrial Workers of the World, known as Wobblies, were not content with passing resolutions. They distributed leaflets urging soldiers to desert, stating that if they remained in the Army, the day would come when they would have to turn their rifles on workers. A Denver newspaper reported that thousands of the leaflets had been circulated in armories and military posts in and around the city, as well as at the homes of military and government leaders. The leaflet was double-sided, containing on one side a description of the soldier as “the propagandist of slavery. His example is not one of progress but one of reaction. Murder is in his heart, not murder of him by whom he is wronged, but murder of him who he has never known, and who bears him no ill will.” On the reverse was an extract from the “Good Soldier,” supposedly written by Jack London: “A good soldier is a blind, heartless, soulless, murdering machine.... All that is human in him, all that is divine in him, all that constitutes a man, has been sworn away when he took the enlistment roll. His mind, his conscience, aye, his very soul are in the keeping of the officer.”10 Another leaflet headed “The Trade of a Soldier” tried to stimulate feelings of solidarity: “We know you scorn the idea of shooting at workers, because most of you are working men, and you know that no man ever worked without getting into a fight with his boss. But after having seen two or three years’ service, your brain will have been sandpapered and all your foolish ideas removed. So you see if you want to be a strikebreaker, a man who kills

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his fellow worker, go ahead and join, see the world, be a hero. But you will no longer be a man.”11 The Wobblies had support in their anti-military campaign from the Socialist Party, which also strongly opposed military service and urged workers not to join the military. The AFL continued to oppose militarism, but would not join in appeals to workers to stay out of the military. Some in the federation felt that if more workers were in the Army and the National Guard, these might not be used much to repress labor. There is not much evidence of the social composition of the late nineteenth-century national guard. One study showed that in Ohio “young urban craftsmen and apprentices” were in the Guard but coal miners were not, and “whatever their origins, militiamen’s encounters with strikers took on an increasingly harsh quality during the many mobilizations of the 1890’s.” The reaction of the unions to the use of the military against them was to urge their members not to join; Samuel Gompers in 1892 stated that “membership in a labor organization and the militia at one and the same time is inconsistent and incompatible.” As the twentieth century began, workers saw the National Guard as “their enemy, not as the defender of their liberties.” Unions rarely opposed the Guard with arms, realizing the futility of this, but did advise their members not to join and to quit if already enlisted.12 It was mostly the Guard that was called to duty during strikes; use of the Regular Army had to be authorized by the president and was rare. Any Guardsman in the early twentieth century, however, had to be aware that his unit could be called upon for strike duty. Progressives were not opposed to this use of the National Guard; it actually fit in well with a new willingness to intervene in the economy and other sectors of national life, in the name of reform. This “new interventionism” was a local effort, for the most part, without a national mandate.

In the Badlands In the late summer of 1900 the Pennsylvania National Guard was ordered by the governor to the coal mining town of Shenandoah. A strike there had turned violent and more trouble was expected from the “thousands of Lithuanians and Slavs, the strikers,” when the owners announced they would reopen the mines in a few days. Both sides said that they were supported by more than 75 percent of the workers and there was no talk of nonunion miners. The day before the Guard arrived there had been a street battle between “rioters” and the sheriff and two deputies. The sheriff was outnumbered, but quickly 200 armed men, “English-speaking residents,” came to his aid. There was gunfire and a Polish miner was killed and a townsman wounded. That night 300 townspeople armed themselves with guns, clubs and sabers, and


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this “strange little army” patrolled the town until the Guard arrived. According to the Chicago Tribune, the first company of troops was welcomed to Shenandoah by a throng of 5,000. The men marched through cheering crowds into the town and each succeeding company was received as enthusiastically. The citizens gave the men meals, and “enough firewood was donated in an hour to supply campfires for a week.” Other citizens were wary of the soldiers: “In the badlands, as the district occupied by the foreign miners is called, conditions were far different. Here the streets were deserted and every window closed and shuttered. Women and children peered out at the passing soldiers but not a man was to be seen.”13 Thus the strikers were “Lithuanians and Slavs” portrayed as prone to riot, who lived in the “badlands”; they were opposed by “English-speaking residents” of the town. Progressives tended to speak in terms of a Darwinian struggle between the races and define national groups as races, such as the “English race,” the “German race,” even the “American race.” This kind of thinking provided a rationale for racializing the miners’ struggle: it was between “English-speaking” Anglo-Saxons and inferior races, “Slavs and Lithuanians.” General Gobin, the Guard commander, deployed his men on the heights around the town. The men pitched their tents and set up their four Gatling guns and two field guns. In the afternoon the general met with the mine owners and promised an armed guard for every mine that wanted to re-open. In a statement to reporters, General Gobin said that his men were ready for anything. Many of them were Spanish War veterans and “well acquainted with powder smoke ... each man in my command carries twenty rounds of ammunition and we have brought a big reserve supply. We are going to keep order here if it requires every soldier in the state to do it.... I am confident that we can take care of any force of rioters that may come our way. Why, every part of this town can be swept by the fire of my troops.”14 The following day, Sunday, Sept. 23, newspapers published telegrams from union leaders, beginning with United Mine Workers President John Mitchell, who predicted victory on Monday, “when the operators make their final effort to crush us.” Other leaders referred to the opening of the mines “under the bayonets of the National Guard,” and one asserted that the owners were using the Guard to intimidate: “Many of the foreign miners have experienced the brutal treatment of European regulars and the operators hoped that this dread of soldiery would induce many to return to work.” An organizer said the troops were not needed, and a telegram from Mother Jones (Mary Harris Jones, labor organizer) said that she was enlisting the wives and daughters of the miners in the struggle and that the battle was being fought so that the miners could live “as men should, not as animals.”15 One reporter had a different opinion about how the miners might react

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to the troops: “With the large proportion of ignorant foreigners among the miners— men whose warlike spirit is aroused by the sight of soldiers— it will be strange if some clash does not come. It may prove impossible to hold this element in check, although the mine workers officials realize any outbreak will imperil their cause.”16 The reporter also observed that the churches were full on that Sunday and that all clergy were urging that there be no violence. One of the spokesmen for the men was a Catholic priest, Father Philips. He told his parishioners that there must be no violence, because if there was, more troops would come. By the end of October the strike was settled and the miners won most of their points. There was relative calm in the anthracite coal region until the strike was almost over. On Oct. 17 there was an armed confrontation at Oneida and a mine guard was killed. This provoked the sending of another National Guard regiment, but there was no further violence.17 Attitudes were clear: union strikers were “Lithuanians and Slavs ... foreign-born” who feared and resented the Guard. Five or six thousand “Englishspeaking” residents welcomed the Guard and several hundred of these provided an armed patrol for the town before the Guard arrived. This large a welcoming crowd is possible, as Shenandoah had a population of 21,000 in 1900, but may well be exaggerated. It is also difficult to believe that no strikers were native-born Americans.

Rickety Pukes and Brainless Fops In May 1901 the Twenty-third Regiment of the New York National Guard, based in Brooklyn, was sent to the upstate New York cities of Albany and Troy during strikes there. The Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees had struck the United Traction Company some time ago, and the company announced its intention to begin operating streetcars with strike breakers on May 13, 1901. The attempt was foiled by crowds of strikers and their sympathizers (including women and children). A crowd of “thousands” had gathered at the car barn when a car manned by “nonunion” men emerged and began a trip down the line. It was met with a hail of stones and bricks but police managed to keep people off it, and it returned safely to the barn. A second car left the barn but did not get far because of the press of people. Men from the strike committee were allowed to go to the car and speak to its four man crew. “Don’t you want to come with us, boys? You won’t regret it.” The response of the crew was to sound the bells and move forward. The rain of missiles resumed and continued until the moving car met timbers piled upon the tracks and had to stop. Three of the crew then joined the strikers and the fourth, a man named Marshall who was from Long Island, was taken


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to the hospital because he had been hit in the head with a rock. The strikers then cut the overhead streetcar power lines and that evening a third car went out with a repair crew, but was prevented by the crowd form reconnecting the lines.18 General Manager John W. McNamara of the United Traction Company announced, “We intend to run our streetcars if it takes the entire New York National Guard to protect us.” The local National Guard was ordered to its armory, and the 23rd Regiment of Brooklyn, because it had “some experience with strikes and members ... were not familiar with strikers here,” was summoned that evening, by sending telegrams to its men and by having an announcement read from the stage of every theater in Brooklyn. One theater manager who was asked to read the announcement demurred for a time. When the acting commander of the regiment called him, the manager asked by what authority he was commanding him to read the order. Lieutenant Colonel Brady replied majestically, “By the authority of the people of the State of New York.” The manager complied.19 By May 15 more than 2,200 National Guard troops were in Albany. Their main task that day was to convey about 75 nonunion men from the railroad station to the streetcar barn on Quail Street. This was announced beforehand by United Traction Company officials. The men were put on wagons, surrounded by cavalry with sabers, and the whole assembly galloped down streets cleared by police and soldiers, but with crowds estimated to be first five then ten thousand pressing in on all sides. The “veritable storm” of rocks and bricks resumed, and twice during the wild ride troopers who were cut off from the main body swung their sabers blade edge first rather than using the flat of the sword, cutting several people. About twelve of the nonunion men lost their nerve and “sprang from the wagons that carried them to mingle and be lost in the crowd that demanded their blood,” but the rest were brought into the car barn. Next the soldiers cleared the way for the “tower car” which was used to repair the power lines. They had to clear the streets and the rooftops along the route the car took, the 23rd often using “a clever way of running toward a crowd with bayonets lowered and then suddenly raising the points over the heads of the frightened victims. It is effective and practically harmless.”20 Back home in New York the 23rd came in for some strong criticism. Several unions were holding a meeting at Cooper Union to protest a recent decision by the Court of Appeals that concerned prevailing wages. John Swinton, the moderator of the meeting, denounced the cowards of the 23rd Regiment of Brooklyn.... These are not the men who fought with the man whom I have seen standing on this very platform and whose name was Abraham Lincoln. They are rickety pukes, these whippersnappers I saw marching through Brooklyn the day before yesterday on their way to shoot down

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unarmed men, women, and children.... Don’t you believe that thousands of American workingmen are going to let those dry goods clerks, those brainless fops, mow them down for very long.

Swinton’s remarks were met with enthusiastic cheers and several other speakers commented on the subject during the evening. Henry George also mentioned Lincoln, stating that he believed Lincoln would have condemned the court decision that they were protesting. He said, “We fought out the question of chattel slavery and now comes the question of industrial slavery — now comes up the question of the right to make a living. And what do we see today? Armed troops brought in to settle a question where privilege has the power of the militia and the courts behind it (hisses and groans).”21

Four Shots Were Fired The following day began relatively peacefully but ended tragically. In the morning the National Guard began clearing the streets so that streetcars could run. Soldiers were the only passengers on the cars operated by nonunion men, and eight trolleys were put onto the streets. There were still thousands of people on the streets but they confined their actions to verbal protests. Late in the final run of the afternoon a trolley with soldiers aboard was moving on Broadway when someone threw a rock at it: “There was a sharp command, and as the car slowed down four shots were fired from it.... Some of the Guardsmen stepped from the car and reloaded their pieces. The startled crowd fell back at the first shot, and a moment later the Guardsmen sprang aboard the car and were rapidly wheeled from the scene.” The shots were fired at a range of twenty feet and a man was killed and two wounded, one fatally. The victims were prominent Albany businessmen, not connected in any way with the strikers or the United Traction Company, who were watching the unusual spectacle of street cars loaded with armed soldiers. General Roe of the National Guard made an immediate inquiry and told reporters that the streetcar was being followed by an unruly mob and several stones had been thrown, one wounding the motorman and one striking the officer in charge, Lieutenant Wilson. Wilson stated that he drew his revolver and fired at the man who had thrown the stone, and later it was found that the dead man had been shot with a revolver bullet. General Roe said that he deeply regretted the incident, but that his men had acted entirely properly. He reminded his listeners that all citizens had been warned to stay off the streets and that “if they continue to let their curiosity take them into disorderly crowds then they must accept the consequences.” The fatally wounded man was said to have told his pastor that he absolved the Guard of all blame and had no business being on the streets when he was shot. A newspaper


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found it remarkable that the son of one of the men and the nephew of the other were serving in the National Guard.22 The next day was calm. Negotiations to end the strike were held but deadlocked, the main sticking point being the status of the nonunion workers. The company stated it would retain them and the union said it could never accept this. The National Guard was now 3,000 strong in Albany and the city council had decided to impose arbitration and to revoke the company’s charter if a settlement was not reached in a few days. The company insisted that the city council had no such power. During the strike the United Traction Company acted confidently and forcefully, as did most employers during this time. Management was generally on the offensive and making considerable efforts to win the general public over in the Progressive Era. In Albany the National Guard was a solid support of management. In spite of its use of guns and swords, apparently it was not reviled by the citizens for this. The Guard was patrolling the city in force and prevented crowds from gathering by constant orders to move on. The city was quiet and little attention paid to the streetcars full of soldiers, who had been given orders that if they were attacked they were to reply with rifle butts, then bayonets, and only after these measures failed to fire weapons. Soldiers had chosen to disregard stones thrown at their camps the previous evening and at the baggage wagons of arriving troops the next day.23 Some of the Guardsmen returned to New York City the following day. Their commander, Colonel Morris, told reporters the only problem they had in Albany was their campsite’s clayey soil and the heavy rain that they had experienced. He said that they had patrolled sections of the city with orders to shoot anyone who threw stones, but had little trouble and never had to fire their weapons. Colonel Morris told reporters that the citizens of Albany had given them a warm send off, lining the two miles they had to march to the railway station and calling out to the soldiers, “You’re all right” and “We’re glad you came to help stop the strike.” A two-mile long crowd of well-wishers must have been quite numerous and the colonel summed up by saying, “On the whole, we enjoyed ourselves.” When these troops marched down Broadway in New York, with their band playing, “appreciative cheers greeted the soldiers all through the theatrical districts, except from the street car motormen.”24 The last unit to leave was the 23rd, which left the on the 19th. The strike had suddenly been settled, with the strikers winning most of their points. Apparently both sides agreed to leave the issue of nonunion workers aside. It was probably moot, however, since all strikers who had not been arrested for violence returned to their jobs. The flag-decorated cars returning to service with union motormen were hailed by enthusiastic crowds.

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During the Shenandoah coal strike considerable force was threatened but not used. In Albany the force was used, including deadly force. It seems remarkable to 21st-century Americans that a National Guard officer could shoot down an innocent bystander and face no official inquiry, let alone punishment, no matter that a Guard colonel observed that everyone had been warned to stay off the streets. It is likely due to a strong distaste for civic disorder, the opposite side of the coin of Progressives’ desire for an end to class conflict.

Red Flag of Anarchy There was strong reaction from unions in many parts of the country. The Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers amended their constitution to bar any member of the armed forces from joining the union. In turn the Central Federated Union of New York met to discuss the issue. The New York Times reported on the meeting of the Central Federated Union in its July 8, 1901, issue, noting at the outset that the amendment was qualified by language that made it inapplicable when the United States was engaged in a war with a foreign foe. The president of the Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers, Matthew Barr, read some excerpts from a Times editorial of the preceding week: “They are willing to fight a foreign foe — the Russians, or Turks, or Prussians, and particularly the Englishmen — but they are forbidden to bear arms for the suppression of civil disorder. The State Government may be overthrown and the red flag of anarchy be nailed to the flagstaff of the Capitol in Albany, but no member of President Barr’s trades union shall lift a finger to stay the violence of the mob.” Barr begged to differ. He stated that strikers were peaceable and it was the militia that was riotous— it was organized to do violence to strikers. He then moved that the Central Federation endorse his union’s action. Delegates from the cigar makers union said that many other unions had passed such a measure and that it should be referred to the member unions for their consideration. But there was an opponent to be heard, Philip Kelly of the Theatrical Protective Union. He said that the federation should not pass the resolution, since it would contribute towards the elimination of the militia and leave the nation defenseless when other governments “on the other side of the water would stand ready to gobble up this country.” Kelly was proud of the accomplishments of the American military in the war with Spain and in Cuba. When he was the target of some “sarcastic remarks,” Kelly replied that this country was the greatest and freest nation on earth, which was why immigrants continued to pour in from all over the world. One of the cigar maker union representatives replied that this country was not as free as it


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should be and there never should have been a war with Spain. After Kelly restated his position, Barr made a new motion that the matter be referred to the individual unions for their action, with an endorsement of the “sentiment” of his union’s amendment. A vote was taken, with only a few voting yes, but none voting no, and the measure passed. The New York Herald Tribune was outraged: “If this doctrine of incompatibility of union membership and military service is maintained when organized labor reaches its goal, we shall then have a great army of wage-earners consolidated on a principle of disloyalty to the government and bound by the rules of their union to refuse it assistance in repelling invasion or putting down domestic rebellion.”25 Some opponents of the exclusion of military men from unions theorized that if the militia could not be kept up to strength, then the standing army would have to be larger, which the unions might like less than having members who were also in the military. Opposition by unions to having the members join the militia continued to grow, however, and provoked a strong reaction from supporters of the National Guard. In several states, including New York, Texas, Michigan, Illinois and Maine, laws were passed that made it a crime to “prevent, obstruct or annoy any member of an organization or his employer in respect to such employment because such member ... is enlisted in the organized militia.”26

A Warlike Appearance The following year the National Guard was sent to Pawtucket, R.I., when there was violence over another streetcar strike. On June 11, 1902, when a streetcar with armed deputies on board was pelted with bricks and rocks, the deputies fired about fifty shots into the air from their revolvers. This was enough to call for the reading of the riot act and the dispatch of nine companies of infantry and two troops of cavalry of the Rhode Island National Guard. They arrived in the morning and went immediately to patrol the city. The Boston Globe thought that they “had quite a warlike appearance but were not looking for combat.” Around noon another streetcar, with deputies on board and its curtains down, went into a city square where there had been trouble on previous days. There were soldiers in front and behind the car, operated by nonunion men. “Instanter there was a shower of rocks, and lots of bricks and potatoes snatched from the baskets standing at the door of a neighboring grocery store. Smash went the missiles and they had a clear path to the car. Revolvers cracked.” There were a number of shots; some witnesses said fifty and some said far fewer, and the streetcar sped away. Eleven year old Vernon Peterson, who was bringing lunch for his sister to the mill, lay on the sidewalk shot through the neck. Later in the day one of the deputies

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was arrested, after being identified by a National Guardsman as the man who had fired the shot. The deputy denied having fired, but inspection of his weapon showed four defective bullets and one empty chamber. That evening it seemed like everyone was on the streets. The Guard got “hip-hip-hooray cheers” as they marched to and from the armory where they would spend the night “with mattresses spread to promote sleep.” During the day the soldiers had no confrontations and “men in uniform appeared to be popular.” Since the operators decided not to run any cars past 6 P.M., all the soldiers were in the armory by 8 P.M. It does not appear that there was any further need for the National Guard after this day.27

Silent, Staring Crowds General John P.S. Gobin and the Pennsylvania National Guard returned to the anthracite coal fields in 1902. This time the disorder was more widespread, so much so that Governor William A. Stone called out the entire State Guard at 11 P.M. on Oct. 6. There had already been unrest sufficient to cause the governor to call out a brigade of the Guard, about three thousand men, but now the other two brigades were called, making a total of more than ten thousand soldiers in the coal fields. The state commander was authorized to place the troops wherever he saw fit, and was ordered to “see that all men who desire to work and their families have military protection ... and arrest all persons engaging in acts of violence and intimidation and hold them under guard until their release will not endanger the public peace.” Things had been relatively quiet immediately before issuance of the order, but the 4th Regiment, camped near Mount Carmel, had an active night. Around midnight their sentries were fired upon from some woods, so a patrol returned fire and entered the woods. The rest of the regiment surrounded the woods and three men carrying shotguns were captured.28 This strike had national attention because of the “coal famine” that was said to have developed in the country. President Roosevelt was involved, trying to bring the two sides together for arbitration. According to the Boston Globe, Governor Stone had been under pressure from mine operators, leading merchants, the press and citizens to take effective action. When the mine owners agreed that they had enough men willing to work to re-open the mines, if these men and the owners’ property could be protected, the governor acted. Mine owners felt confident that this would break the strike, but the action had little effect. Few, if any, extra men showed up for work, and some mines may have lost a few. The Globe noted that several hundred of the National Guard troops on duty were mine workers and that these men had organized to contribute some of their military pay to a fund for the strikers,


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The National Guard camp outside Shenandoah , Pennsylvania, in 1902.

a rare instance of guardsmen being workers of the same type as the union men on strike. Later reaction to the sending of more troops included some statements from strikers that it was a good thing. These strikers said that it would prove false the coal operators’ statements about how most men would return to work if they could be assured of protection. Others condemned Governor Stone for his actions. When a train carrying First Regiment soldiers was stoned, the troops’ reaction was to close the blinds. When other units disembarked, they were met with “indifference by silent, staring crowds or actual welcome.” A welcome was given to many of the troops arriving in the Shamokin area who would set up camps from there to Shenandoah. Some of their railroad cars were cheered by crowds at stations and the soldiers returned the cheers: “Strikers and infantry engaged in friendly talk. Some of the soldiers took up collections for the strikers’ relief funds and turned them over to miners.” When the Tenth Regiment, a veteran outfit, arrived, people went aboard the train to see the soldiers who had “exchanged shots with the Spaniards and the Filipinos.” Their commander was said to be impressed with the respect with which his men were received. This was not accidental, because many strikers had been told at morning meetings that they should treat the soldiers courteously. The Third Regiment, while marching to its campground from the railroad station, was heard chanting, “What’s the matter with Mitchell? He’s all right.” Probably the finest welcome was given to the Second Philadelphia Regiment. “The strikers ... among them many foreigners, assisted the men to move their traps to camp, after which they mingled with the soldiers in the saloons and had a convivial time.” It seems as though the union changed its strategy here and made a considerable effort to win the Guardsmen over.

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Red Cross workers and friends, 1902 Shenandoah National Guard encampment.

There were some resolutions passed by miners, however, that said they would not return to work if Regular Army soldiers were sent to the coal fields.29 This strike was in the end one of labor’s biggest successes— it established union organization in the coal fields permanently.

Two Great Armies in the Country The romance between mine workers and the militia was limited — and temporary. At the 1902 convention of the Illinois Federation of Labor, W.D. Ryan of the United Mine Workers proposed a resolution stating that no union member should join the state militia and if any were now members, he should resign immediately. There was vigorous assent, with speakers calling the National Guard a “tool of the capitalist,” “foe to organized labor” and a “menace to liberty.” Others stated that the majority of the rank and file was workers, so that the militia “divided our homes.” The national president of the Teamsters, Albert Young, gave an example of divided homes, saying that he was “still scared by the lead shot at him by members of his own union during a strike in Colorado,” which Teamsters helped to organize. J. Smith of


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Quincy claimed that “plans are now on foot to take the militia from state to state. If this happens we have two great armies in the country.”30 Smith was probably referring to planning to provide more federal control over the state guards, which was accomplished by the passage of the Dick Act the following year. As already noted, it’s difficult to know the class background of National Guardsmen, but probably their backgrounds were varied. It is unlikely that many were union members, and the policy of bringing in guard units from another part of a state for strike duty must have helped make the soldiers more willing to follow orders. Even if some were union members, however, they would not be I.W.W. or Socialist Party members, the strongest opponents of the military. Also, in the Progressive Era most workers were not union members and personal situations may have made many indifferent to unionization. Newspaper coverage of strikes often refers to the ethnicity of the strikers; in the 1900 Pennsylvania coal strike a newspaper reports the strikers are “Lithuanians and Slavs,” and their part of the town is dark and mysterious, almost a foreign country. Though the strikers’ skins are white, they are portrayed as quite different people, a different race and one that the use of force against seemed acceptable. Except for striking workers, the public felt that their local National Guard unit was a competent military force, which would be able to assist in the defense of the nation. There was a great deal of pride in the hometown “soldier boys”; often they were admired and supported like high school sports teams. However, there did seem to be a feeling by many in the Regular Army and War Department that the National Guard was more competent to defend the public against unions than against other countries.

Conclusions Progressive reformers were very interested in transforming society by transcending divisions, especially class divisions. In fact, their ideal was a classless society where government would restrain the anti-social and harmful impulses of both the factory owner and the worker. Progressives had seen a possible future of increasingly violent strikes and they wanted to avoid it. If government could restrain business from overworking people (supporting limitation of working hours, outlawing child labor) and harming them (pure food and drug laws) and also improve workers by providing better education, urban environments, and recreation, social peace should be achievable. The National Guard was both a laboratory and a tool for reformers. Its leaders attempted, with a good deal of success, to avoid any acknowledgment of class differences in the Guard and to present it as a body united against

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domestic and foreign violence. Young men who enlisted in the Guard would be trained by its exclusively male commissioned and non-commissioned officers; a positive benefit in a time when there were fears of boys being “sissified” by their mothers and by female school teachers. Its use as a tool to restrain class violence without seeming to uphold management in labor disputes did not usually convince strikers of its impartiality, but other segments of a community were often supportive. The Guard itself, just like the Regular Army, could in fact be seen as an agent of reform by Progressives. In the next chapter armories and what they represented to the Guardsmen and to their communities are described. The armories were built like forts and were islands of discipline and order, a defense against urban unrest and a much more remote possibility of invasion by foreign armies. Changing times seemed to bring a loss of traditional controls over social behaviors, and National Guard armories were part of the response to this.

12. “Seminaries to promote respect for peace” To-day the foundation stone is being laid for a new seminary, a seminary not so much for the diffusion of knowledge regarding act of war, as to promoting respect for peace. You come here not only as soldiers, but as citizens engaged in and devoted to the pursuit of peace.1 — New York City Corporation Counsel Delaney, 1902

There have been concerns about moral order in America’s cities since Jacksonian times. At times it seemed like the forces of law and order were losing out to a population, often heavily immigrant, which did not subscribe to the same standards as did native-born and rural Americans. A wave of building new armories for National Guard units began after the railway strike of 1877, according to architect and historian Robert Fogelson. During that strike armories were beset by mobs and some were broken into and their weapons stolen. Thereafter state and city authorities were determined to provide secure and defensible quarters for their National Guard units. Armories were where Guardsmen stored their weapons and ammunition, drilled on evenings and weekends, had their social events and meetings, and would assemble in the event of emergency. Units which did not have armories rented space in buildings, often on the second floor, in the period between the Civil War and the development of large-scale strikes by unions. There was an accepted style for armories that made them look like fortresses. This was not accidental. National Guard officers wanted armories that were not only secure, but modern and attractive. Newer armories had recreation rooms for officers and men, gymnasiums, large indoor spaces for drilling and social events, and other amenities. These might include a reception room, saloon and dining room, reading room-library and swimming pool. Many commentators thought it would be difficult to recruit, train and retain guardsmen if proper 183

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facilities were not provided. The soldiers learned much at their yearly summer camps, but more training was obviously necessary to make them an effective force. Such training was best done in a well-equipped armory. Civic pride became involved and National Guard regiments pressed for armories that were equal to or better than those of neighboring units or units in other cities. Locating the armory could become contentious. In some cities plans to use park space aroused serious opposition. It was cheaper to obtain land outside the more developed areas of a city, so most new armories were built away from the downtowns and working class neighborhoods of the time. This was somewhat paradoxical, since in the event of an emergency involving domestic unrest, the armory could be far away from what would probably be the nexus of the trouble. National Guard officers, however, preferred what they saw as better neighborhoods for their units. An armory style of architecture developed; a “castellated” style that made armories look like medieval castles. Armories were built that had features like a main entrance defended by huge oak doors and a portcullis, sally ports, crenellations along the top of the roof, firing slits in the walls, and bastions at the corners. This style was in keeping with the tenor of the times. The Greek Revival style, which had been dominant in America since the early 19th century (everything tended to look like a Greek temple), was giving way to a more functionalist architecture in which the uses of a building would dictate its appearance —form was to follow function: “An armory was supposed to look like what it was, namely a building that housed a military organization ... and, in the event of siege, a fortress. An armory was also supposed to stand as a symbol of authority, of the overwhelming power of the state, of its determination to maintain order, and, if need be, its readiness to use force.”2 The castellated style also fit in with currently popular Romanesque and other styles with a medieval flavor.

Positively Repulsive Accommodations Armories were generally popular with state and local governments, but the guardsmen of the District of Colombia had a hard time getting a suitable armory. In 1901 they had a patron, a United States senator who wanted a multipurpose armory built. The new building was to be the site of some of the events of a presidential inauguration, replacing the rotunda of the pension office for this purpose, and was to be the largest armory in the nation. The Guard’s present armory, cramped rooms above the Center Market building, had some definite drawbacks. Efforts in 1901 and in 1902 to get Congress to appropriate money were, however, unsuccessful.

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By 1907 officers of the District Guard were losing patience. They referred to the Center Market Armory as a disgrace and stated that recruitment was bound to suffer if they did not obtain better facilities for their men. Most of the problems arose from the noxious fumes of the meat and vegetable stalls of the market and these were said to be powerful enough to discolor and then peel wallpaper that some Guardsmen put up in an attempt to brighten their quarters. Such decoration efforts not withstanding, the Center Market rooms were “small and crowded, low and dingy, and the worst location in the city.” In January 1910 the district’s guardsmen lobbied Congress in another attempt to get a new armory. This time they stressed the crowded conditions at the Center Market Armory, by enumerating all the units of the Guard that were using this one armory. Lockers for the men, who had to change into uniform for their weekly drills, were the smallest that inspecting officers had ever seen and the men had difficulty cramming everything into them. Other problems were broken ceilings, a leaky roof, insecure storage and a “threadbare, germ-harboring piece of carpet on the floor.” Again, the results of being located above a meat-packing operation were noted. Such “positively repulsive accommodations have deleterious consequences. Owing to the ammonia fumes arising from the packing quarters, which occupy the ground floor of the building, the rifles are kept heavily coated with grease and in most cases were presented for inspection in that condition.”3 Guard officers referred to the Center Market Armory as an eyesore and said it did not attract men who wanted to be in the Guard: “It is impossible for a club-like spirit to prevail under existing conditions.” The failure of the lobbying in January 1910 did not discourage the leadership of the D.C. guard. In November 1910 they were back with an official report on the deficiencies of the Center Market Armory. Colonel Weaver of the Regular Army called the conditions there “nothing short of disgraceful” and professed to not understand why such a “large body of efficient men” should have such an unfit armory. This report added that it was not only the Center Market that was in bad shape, but all other armories in the District; especially that used by the “First Separate Battalion, the colored division of the local militia” had serious deficiencies. The Guard planned to lobby Congress again over the coming holidays. I could find no more mention of the Center Market Armory through 1914, so it seems likely that the D.C. Guard continued using their smelly quarters for some time. The difficulty here was probably that Congress was not as amenable to pressure as city governments would be, and traditionally the needs of the District of Columbia are less important to Congress than the needs of home districts.

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Masters of the Situation The Fifth Regiment of the Georgia National Guard, based in Atlanta, also had difficulties in getting a suitable armory. In March 1900 a new armory was assured, according to the Atlanta Constitution. The Atlanta Guard officers had met and stated that architect’s plans for a large new building were entirely satisfactory. They included separate rooms for each company and an officers’ room, along with a large auditorium that would serve as a drill hall. Companies would drill there once a week and the officers thought that the hall was large enough to drill battalions. In this way all the soldiers would be better trained and this would “simplify the work of managing the regiment when dress parade occurs.” This article noted that the Second Battalion of the Fifth Regiment was to drill on Marietta Street the following week and that all the other battalions would be holding public drills throughout the summer. Assured though the Constitution might have been, the armory was not built. Although the land was to be donated, Fifth Regiment officers could not arrange for the $35,000 that the building was to have cost. By 1906 there were two additional reasons to build an armory, besides the inadequacy of current facilities. First, there was civil unrest. There had been riots in Atlanta, and the Atlanta Constitution thought this was shameful, especially since Colonel Anderson, the commander of the Guard, had been compelled to locate his headquarters in the Elkins Watson drugstore, for lack of a suitable armory. The second reason was that this time a very large building was planned. It would include an auditorium which would be the largest in Atlanta, furnishing a source of income for the Guard and the city. Mr. I.H. Martin, a past secretary of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, made a report on building a new armory. Mr. Martin dealt with what he thought would be a strong objection to a new armory by proposing a “sleeping detail.” The objection was that in the event of civil disorder, guardsmen had to be summoned from their homes to meet at a designated point, or at the armory. Gathering the men would take considerable time, armory or no armory. The sleeping detail would be a group of fifty men drawn from the entire Fifth Regiment, who would sleep at the armory each night; presumably the duty would be rotated: “Fifty men appearing on the scene of any kind of disturbance would be masters of the situation.” Martin seems to have been an optimistic fellow. He thought that there would be no problem in getting single young men to sleep at the armory every night as long as it was free, and the $5 or $6 weekly cost of board would also cause no difficulty. The auditorium was to be a large one, seating around 4,000. Its main purpose, as far as Martin was concerned, was to repair a moral deficiency in the lives of Atlantans. Sunday afternoons, except in the summer, were spent “in idleness.” The auditorium would provide a venue for concerts and lectures,


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giving the populace an alternative to “loitering in the streets ... attractions of a right and beneficial character ... would meet with the cordial approval of every religious organization in the city.”4 There was no further mention of this plan through 1914, so apparently this armory, like the Washington, D.C., armory, was not built for a few years.

The Dancing Feature of National Guard Life This appears to be the case also for the armory planned for the Seventh Regiment of Los Angeles. The State of California had approved $100,000 to be spent on a new armory, which was to be located in Agricultural Park. This location was not favored by the California National Guard. General Robert Wankowski thought that Agricultural Park (now called Exposition Park) was too far away from downtown Los Angeles, where most of the soldiers were employed in factories, shops and stores. Money for the streetcars was not the issue, since as General Wankowski noted, the state legislature had just passed a law that paid guardsmen 25 cents for every drill that they attended, providing that they attended at least 50 percent of the drills held during the year. The General stated that if the Guard could obtain a site closer to downtown, he believed that public-spirited citizens might raise $50,000 to pay for the land. The Los Angeles Times was skeptical that enough money could be raised to pay for a large property in the center of the city, and the skepticism was justified. General Wankowski and his officers made a virtue out of necessity and announced plans for building the new armory in Agricultural Park. Lieutenant Colonel Follmer told the Times that the site was a little out of the way, but then, we will have lots of room for outdoor sports, and that is what will bring the boys out. We can have a baseball diamond, football grounds and room for any other open-air diversions, all of which will make membership in the regiment still more desirable ... making a club of the armory will do wonders to bring in new men and the boys will be quite as ready to go to Agricultural Park as to any other place. The only inconvenience is that it will take a little more time to get there.5

Col. Follmer concluded by stating, “The mere honor of belonging to the regiment and the privilege of attending drills do not provide a sufficient inducement for enlistment in the National Guard.” The building was to be three stories with company rooms and offices in the front. The first floor behind the front was to be the drill hall which was to be paved with asphalt. The second floor was to be a gallery with seating around the drill hall, while the third floor was to be the regimental ballroom. At this time one of the armories in Los Angeles had a combination drill hall and ballroom, but the “constant dropping of rifle butts on the floor has made

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it hard for dancing.” The new ballroom was to be for dancing only. There is a drawing of the proposed armory in the Los Angeles Times of May 23, 1909. The details are not clear, but the building is not in the castellated style. The only features that seem to indicate a military purpose are the watchtowers at the corners. Lt. Col. Follmer stated that although the $100,000 provided by the state would not be enough to erect such a large building, if the plans were accepted by the parties involved, construction could begin and more money would be requested from the state. The ballroom of May died in September: “It was decided with scorn to sacrifice the dancing feature of National Guard life for strictly military duty,” the Times noted. General Wankowski (who seemed to be involved every step of the way) stated rather sternly, “If the men want to give dances they can hire halls. Giving dances is not our job.” The large drill hall was to remain, but the men would drill on a dirt rather than an asphalt floor. There would be a rifle range, but it would be suitable only for “rifles of very small caliber.” Finally, “If possible, a swimming tank.” The Los Angeles Guard would not be sending any plans to Sacramento, they would indicate what they wanted and trust the state architect to produce the plan for their new armory. There was a new requirement, a kitchen to prepare meals. This would be necessary for times when there would be “men sleeping ‘under arms,’” as they have more than once in times of public danger.”6 There was no further talk of this armory for the next five years. The description of planning for a new Los Angeles armory reveals something about the class structure of the Guard. The quote about Guardsmen being employed in the factories, shops, and stores of downtown Los Angeles indicates that the enlisted men were working and lower-middle class men. Their officers called them “boys” and were intent on providing sports facilities and a “club” atmosphere. The belief that team sports were an extremely valuable training was strong among Regular Army officers in the Progressive Era, and it seems that the Los Angeles area Guard officers as well were convinced of the value of sports.

The Best Floor in the World for Dancing Many armories were constructed in the Boston area, some for much smaller units than Los Angeles or Washington, D.C. An armory was built in Somerville in 1902 for two companies of the Massachusetts National Guard, in the castellated style. The architect’s drawings show a building with round turrets at the corners, watchtowers, and narrow windows reminiscent of firing slits. One of the companies that would use the armory was located at a police station, said to be quite inadequate. The other company was a unit just formed,


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apparently for the purpose of obtaining an armory for Somerville. The new building was to cost $60,000 and was to have three floors in the front portion. All of the floors were to be covered in monolith, flooring laid down in sheets. The monolith was said to be extremely durable, and when “waxed it makes the best floor in the Cambridge armory with its square towers in the middle instead of at the corners. world for dancing.”7 Cambridge had a new armory built in 1903, one with considerable amenities. This four story building was also in the castellated style, though it had square rather than round towers and the towers were located in the middle of each side of the building rather than at the corners. There were towers on the sides of the large main entrance, as if to defend it. The walls at the top of the building were crenellated, so as to provide rests for weapons, and the “roof is flat.... The whole structure being so built as to command every approach.” The amenities included a card room, billiard room, and bowling alleys. The Cambridge Guard wanted to dance too. There was not enough money to pay for completing the furnishing of the building, so a military ball was planned and only dues-paying “associates” and guardsmen would be able to attend what was supposed to be “one of the great military and social events of the season.”8 There were also to be new armories for Marlboro, Brockton and Chelsea, Massachusetts. The Marlboro building was built in the French Renaissance style and had a peaked roof. Square towers stood at the corners and on either side of the tall main entrance. The towers were turreted and crenellated, but it does not appear from the newspaper rendering that riflemen could use them to defend the building.9 The new Brockton armory had square towers at the corners and walls crenellated at the top, but only a decorative hint of towers around the entrance. It had “heating by hot air and lighting by electricity.”10 The new state armory at Chelsea was more traditional in appearance. It had round crenellated towers at the corners and a large square tower in the center, which was the main entrance. It was erected on the foundations of the old armory, which perhaps is the reason why it retained the castellated style. It had many internal improvements, including a telephone system which

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The Columbus, Ohio, armory around 1904, looking very much like a medieval castle.

was “an entirely new feature.” The Globe noted that the building would fly both the Massachusetts and the U.S. flags, as “required now by law.”11

Always Ready for Strike Duty Massachusetts had a state armory board that selected and funded armory projects. The City of New York also was active in promoting the growth of armories. In 1903 the city appropriated $4.5 million for the construction and renovation of its armories. This amount of money was to build or renovate nine large armories and included some purchases of expensive New York City real estate. As the New York Times put it, the administration of Mayor Seth Low wanted to support “the volunteers, always ready for strike duty and ... foreign or domestic disturbances.” The armories were to be well appointed, with “elaborate” offices for commanding officers and extras such as game rooms and bowling alleys to “attract young recruits to enlist for social diversion.”12 The Times was explicit in its coverage of a new armory for the 69th Regiment, stating that it would not be built in the “castellated style consecrated to armories.” R.H. Hunt, the architect, was quoted as a saying he could not assign a name to his design, but that he wanted the building to look like an


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armory in a city, not a “medieval castle demanding for completeness a moat and a country setting.” Hunt also said he was more concerned with the internal arrangement of rooms so as to provide “the social features necessary to keep up the interest and enrollment of a militia regiment.” Though Hunt could not name the style of the building, details of the design would have helped to identify it as an armory. The large, arched front entrance had an eagle above it, which supported a large “oriole” (probably meaning an oriel window, a curved, projecting window in an upper story) in the second story. To the right and left of the entrance were panels on which were engraved the names of famous battles of the 69th — Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Space was left for the battles of future wars.13

A Military and Patriotic Spirit New York’s 71st Regiment was evidently unimpressed with the modern style of the 69th’s armory. Theirs was to be traditional, in the “style of a medieval castle with turrets and a lofty tower, the latter to be occupied by the Signal Corps.” This may have been because their new building was replacing, on the same site, their older headquarters which had burned down. The cornerstone was laid on May 1, 1904, a rainy day in New York. The regiment assembled at its temporary armory at the Lenox Lyceum, and, preceded by its band, marched down Fifth Avenue towards the construction site at ThirtyFourth Street and Park Avenue. Because of the wet weather, the men wore undress uniform and “rubber conchos [sic.]” The large crowd present heard Mayor George B. McClellan tell the regiment of his keen interest in the building of a new armory for them, and of his confidence that the new building would inspire them to continue to exemplify “all that was manly in the National Guard.” The “oration” for the day was given by City Corporation Counsel Delaney, who spoke on a very high, even exalted, level: You come here not only as soldiers, but as citizens engaged in and devoted to the pursuit of peace. This country was never designed to be a school for military despotism. It was designed to be, as long as the grass grows green, the home of the brave and the land of the free, and so it shall remain as long as strong hands and stout hearts such as yours are working to secure the perpetuity of its institutions.14

The peace that Delaney spoke of sounds like the kind of peace that Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root desired, a peace achieved through American military strength and the domination of the world by the Anglo-Saxon “race” and what they saw as Anglo-Saxon law and order. After the building was finished two years later, the 71st approached the city for $55,000 to complete its furnishing. The Times published a letter by

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Chandler Withington, critical of the request for funds. A “boiling white hot” guardsman wrote to the Times, lambasting Withington for his ignorance of the poor condition of armories, which made recruiting difficult, and of the sacrifices of guardsmen, who got “almost nothing” for their weekly attendance at “hours of good, hard drill work.” The “Guardsman up in Arms” urged Withington to remember the 71st’s service in the Spanish-American War.15 There was to be no expense to New York City to provide a new armory for the 22nd Regiment of Engineers. The city planned to sell the land on which the 22nd’s old armory had been located and estimated that the proceeds would be more than enough to pay for the new building, even though it was to cost $1 million and be the finest in the state. It too was to be wellappointed and to have some innovations in its floor plan. It was to have the drill hall on the third floor and the rifle range on the second, whereas usually the drill hall was on the ground floor and the rifle range in the basement. The usual amenities, such as bowling alleys and a swimming pool, were included. The 22nd also had a cornerstone laying and marched through the streets of New York to attend the ceremony, which ended with the playing of the “Star Spangled Banner” and a 21-gun salute. That evening Acting Mayor McGowan attended a dinner celebration given by the officers of the 22nd and praised the Guard in terms they had probably not heard before: I will speak only of one point of your usefulness. I mean your inspiration of the youth of this city, your cultivation in them of a military and patriotic spirit. And this works not on the boys only. I believe that the desire to emulate the military organizations has taught the girls too how to march bravely in danger. We have had several bad school fires, where whole buildings were destroyed, but not one child wilted. That was because they had the courage and dedication of soldiers, and this they got largely from the ambition to emulate you.16

Perhaps McGowan was thinking not only of the activities of the 22nd Regiment, but also of the increased visibility of the Guard and the Army in the schools, military tournaments, and marksmanship contests. Children and adults had many more opportunities in 1909 than they had ten years earlier to see soldiers and absorb some of their martial spirit.

Conclusions Fear of class warfare was the original motive behind the increase in armory building, which began in the 1880’s and continued through the Progressive Era. Armories were built as military outposts that might have to be defended one day, either from mobs of workers or invading foreign armies. There were class divisions within as well as without the National Guard in the Progressive Era. Officers were better educated and more affluent, middle


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or upper class men, while enlisted men would have had lower middle class or working class backgrounds. The soldiers, many of them young men who worked in the growing cities, must have at times seemed like a challenge to their officers, who were subject to fears that middle-class white males were losing that manly authority over society that had been their birthright. Young men enlisted for many reasons, but their officers seemed to think the sporting and social amenities an armory could provide were extremely important in attracting recruits. Nevertheless, the safety valve of being able to elect their own officers, at the lowest level, probably mitigated some of the tension. Discipline in the National Guard was also rather lax in the early twentieth century, which may have encouraged some less highly motivated men to enlist and stay in the Guard for whatever needs of theirs that it met. As is evident from the concern of Guard leaders for sports and for social amenities at the armory, often called a “club-like atmosphere,” the leadership believed in the beneficial effects of team sports and planned recreation. An armory that facilitated these activities would be quite in keeping with the ideals of Progressive reformers. What divisions there were between middle and upper class officers and the men under their command were not strong enough to prevent use of the Guard in labor disputes, and in general it was a reliable instrument in repressing strikes and for maintaining domestic order. One of the main reasons for its success in strike duty was the practice of bringing in troops from outside the disturbed area, such as sending a regiment from Brooklyn for strike duty in Albany. Local units would have been extremely reluctant to use force on friends and neighbors, and so they were not usually asked to do so. The widespread construction of armories indicates that there was a continuing fear of unrest in urban and suburban America. Since a large conscripted army along European lines was neither traditional nor politically possible in the United States during the Progressive Era, the Guard would have to fight with the Regular Army if there was an invasion by foreign troops. The martial spirit was not lacking and most Guard units didn’t seem to have much trouble recruiting new members. Guard units were very much a part of their local communities, which took considerable pride in their public displays of military values such as discipline, hierarchy, and deep respect for flag and country. In fact, the local Guard was the main focus of attention towards the martial values and spirit, in view of the small size and mostly distant outposts of the Regular Army. However well the Guard might perform its domestic duties, there were increasing concerns that it might have to fight a foreign enemy. In the next chapter I will describe Army maneuvers that included Guard units; these maneuvers usually premised an invasion of America very much like the one prophesied in the future war novels discussed earlier.

13. “The third battle of Bull Run” The battle game, the show part of the encampment, will reproduce the lines of battle along which McDowell moved upon Beauregard in July of 1861, and which Pope was forced to form to meet Jackson’s swing about his right flank 13 months later. It will be the third battle of Bull Run. One of the primary ideas in the selection of the site was this sentiment.1 — General Rutherford Corbin, 1904

Maneuvers can be seen as an intervention in the lives of civilian Americans and as part of a “new interventionism” on the part of Progressive reformers. In most areas of society, Progressives did not advocate government intervention, but they were very willing to intervene at the local level, to try to reform people. This comes across very clearly in the efforts of Progressive educators across the country, who wanted to make education more practical and serve the needs of industrializing America. Progressives were very willing to have the military participate in the education of young adults and expose them to military values such as hierarchy and obedience. Other activities of the Army, such as military tournaments and marksmanship contests, displayed the martial spirit to the general public, not just students, parents and teachers. Maneuvers, however, brought average citizens face to face with martial values and with the possibility of war, right in their own backyards— and no admission was charged. General Leonard Wood wrote an article in 1909 describing what military maneuvers were intended to accomplish. The main object was training officers in how to command large bodies of troops, such as would be necessary to defend against a sudden attack and invasion; to do “exactly what would be done if war were declared.” Wood commented that European conscript armies had large yearly maneuvers, but the U.S. Army was too small to have real maneuvers. For this reason it was necessary to have joint maneuvers with the organized militia — the state National Guards. Wood specified several requirements for successful maneuvers. First, he thought maneuvers should always have an objective — they should describe 194

13. “The third battle of Bull Run”

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a situation and a problem arising out of the situation to be solved. Second, the maneuvers should take place in a probable area of conflict, so as to add realism. If these requirements were met, Wood wrote, it would arouse “widespread interest on the part of the general public, which sees ... its practical application to the problems which would arise in case of war.” Properly done maneuvers could greatly benefit the armed forces, and “the public, once it appreciates the value of the work being done, will ... see to it that the organized militia and the regular army are given much fuller support than at present.”2 Maneuvers on the scale that Wood proposed were one of two main efforts to prepare for a possible invasion of the United States; the other effort being strengthening the Army’s Coast Artillery. The Army wanted people to see soldiers practicing war, as the above quotes make clear. This public aspect, much like a large tournament or shooting contest, was intended to impress spectators with the strength and power of the Army. Reporters always accompanied some Army units and reported on their movements and activities, usually with great admiration of the power and efficiency of the military.

The Most Military Nation in the World Before joint Army–National Guard maneuvers began in 1903, large scale maneuvers of the California National Guard were held at a 1901 summer encampment near Santa Cruz. James F. Archibald, writer of an article about the Santa Cruz maneuvers, had an eye for detail. He wrote that he thought the men all understood that they should “play the game to the best of their knowledge,” by which he meant military courtesies should be observed. He commented with considerable annoyance on two men who did not play the game. One was an enlisted man who was familiar with the officers, greeting them jovially and slapping them on the back. This man must have been wealthy, for he brought his own fine thoroughbred horse and valet to camp with him. Another enlisted man was well turned out in his uniform but wore a “flaming red bow tie” that the writer was sure would haunt his memory, whenever he thought of the guilty man’s battalion. Military niceties aside, Archibald thought the maneuvers a great success, particularly in the support functions such as food service, medical corps, and supply. He attributed much of this success to the fact that the officers commanding these support units were “clever business or professional men [who] make the best of soldiers even on active campaign,” an indication that it is not only historians who see a congruence between military and middle class values. Archibald believed that the National Guard and the Army would soon be coordinated much more closely and hold joint maneuvers (he was

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correct). The many state militias were one reason why he thought that “we are the most military nation in the world today, and volunteer principles are the strength of the republic. Our cadet corps, private military schools, and volunteer regiments are almost unknown except in England, and even there the private military school system is quite unheard of.”3

No Troops Are Perfect A professional observer at Santa Cruz, Colonel Thomas Wilhelm of the Regular Army, noted some more serious deficiencies in his report to the commanding general of the California National Guard, though he had much good to say about the troops. Almost all of his criticism had to do with the duties of the officers. In general, the commanders of the support units were praised, but in some instances they had few or no trained subordinates to assist them. The quartermaster, or supply department, had allowed the officers and men to bring whatever baggage they wished to camp: “This extra tonnage is cumbersome and exceedingly unmilitary, to say nothing of lumbering up the tents and camp with effects far beyond the requirements of the soldier’s kit or needs.” Colonel Wilhelm also pointed out that this was an extra expense incurred by the quartermaster, and not the only one. One of the regiments departing the camp left over half their tent pegs scattered on the ground, an “unpardonable carelessness” that cost extra time and money to correct. Also, some units had taken to cutting tent poles to shorten them, rather than digging a hole to set them in — another needless expense in Wilhelm’s eyes. Though there was some carelessness with the equipment, it was generally of good quality; indeed, the colonel found the California Guard to be the best equipped that he had inspected. It was, however, still furnished with the Civil War Springfield rifle, “which should be replaced by the small caliber.” Wilhelm reserved his strongest criticism for defects in the administration and personnel systems. In administration, the ignoring of official channels and general inattention to paperwork horrified him; the result was a pervasive lack of information at the higher headquarters about the conditions on the ground. The worst example was “shown in one case where eight communications had to be written to a subordinate before the official information asked for in the first could be obtained. Surely this is inattention that deserves severe rebuke. When an officer is willing to hold a commission, he should be willing to perform the duties pertaining to it.” But his strongest condemnation was of fraternization between officers and men: “It was frequently noticed that officers and enlisted men together visited drinking saloons and treated each other to intoxicants at public bars. This at once shows an entire absence of a proper understanding of their duties as officers


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and enlisted men. Whatever the home relationship, such an attitude here is destructive.” Wilhelm was apparently a firm believer in an old maxim of the officer corps, “Familiarity breeds contempt.” He objected not to drinking, but to officers and enlisted men drinking together. He noted that it was evident in general that the training of the men in the basics of drill and military courtesy was uneven. It was assumed, he wrote, that when the commander of the state guard issued an order for such an encampment as the one at Santa Cruz, all units had received such training. His inspection revealed that this was not the case. For a civilian observer of the military, the courtesies of saluting, and use of titles, forms of address and the like seemed stilted and pointless. Military officers, however, usually believed that all this acknowledgment of hierarchy was valuable and trained everyone to respect rank and to obey orders of anyone possessing the symbols of rank, thus reinforcing martial values of discipline and good order. The colonel concluded his report by stating that his criticisms should not detract from the overall good performance of the troops. They were to be commended, he wrote, for taking the time to serve and to learn more about being a soldier. “No troops are perfect, and these, like all others, are assembled for instructions, and must have much praise for their progress.”4 These California maneuvers show the National Guard attempting to educate its men in how to be soldiers. The efforts are similar to those of Progressive educators who aimed for practicality in their instruction. They added vocational training and workshops of various kinds to schools, trying to prepare students for their roles in society. Military training was also very popular in schools. Maneuvers like these were a kind of hands-on workshop for soldiers, a practical education in their duties quite in line with Progressive values and Progressive thinking on how people should be trained. In 1903 joint maneuvers of the kind anticipated by Archibald took place at Fort Riley, Kansas. Modern improvements were in evidence; there are photographs of Army troops stringing telephone wire. There were some new procedures— such as not allowing opposing units to approach closer than one hundred yards to each other — to prevent accidents that could happen even though blanks were being used. When not in the field the soldiers in Kansas were supported as well as those in California. There was a sports day in which the enlisted men competed in “running, jumping, obstacle races, wall scaling for infantry, artillery drivers’ contests, tent-pegging and tent-pitching contests, mounted bareback wrestling for cavalrymen, and hurdle races for man and horse.” The officers played polo.5 The Fort Riley maneuvers seem much like the tournaments described earlier; both were demonstrations of highly disciplined teams of men performing athletic and military tasks, highlighting martial values of hierarchy and obedience.

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The Third Battle of Bull Run For maneuvers in 1904 the Army inspected several sites and narrowed the field to Manassas/Thoroughfare Gap, Virginia, and Middletown/Pine Bush, New York. Since farmers in the New York area raised many objections to Army lease of their lands, the Virginia site was chosen. Not everyone in Virginia was happy, either. One farmer absolutely refused to allow the Army on his land, and since there was no Sedition, Espionage, or Patriot Act to compel him, the Army marked off his land as an impassible swamp for the maneuvers. Senior Army officers had a series of meetings with landowners and finally settled on a lease price of 20 cents per acre for the five days that the maneuvers would take, the total area being 30,000 acres. The Southern Railroad built spurs and sidings so as to be able to efficiently bring thousands of troops to the site. The setup for this event was different from those of the past. General Rutherford Corbin, the commanding general, wanted no firing of blanks in sham battles. His plan was to station the opposing forces close to each other and to move parts of one of them. Both sides would thus have to station outposts and send out patrols to find out what their enemy was doing. Corbin thought officers and men would learn valuable lessons from this work; he thought they learned nothing by firing blanks at each other. He was, however, cautioned by General Adna Chaffee, his chief subordinate, that he might need some shooting to keep the troops from being bored. Chafee might have added that spectators would also be bored by silent maneuvers. The selection of Manassas as the site of the maneuvers caused much interest in the press. Some newspapers stated explicitly that the maneuvers were to be re-enactments of the Civil War battles at Bull Run. General Corbin agreed with the newspapers, saying the “battle game” and “show” parts would reproduce the motion of that battle.6 The general was in no doubt about the several purposes of the exercise. The Washington Post commented on the site selection by stating that the troops would be going through many of the same marches and fighting at the same points as the Second Battle of Bull Run, which took place in August 1862. This was because the roads and especially the strategic points had not changed since 1862 — an army advancing on Washington from Virginia would need to go by the same routes and take the same objectives. General Corbin had another objective besides imitating the Civil War. He wanted to show the “American people ... what kind of a thing their new fighting machine had become. It will be a mimic war with a distinct purpose.” That purpose was to see how effectively state National Guard and Regular Army units could work together, since that is what they would have to do if the country was invaded. The “new fighting machine” refers to the extension of federal control


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over the National Guard and Army reforms made as a result of the lessons of the Spanish-American War. General Corbin’s article shows a continuing concern for the reconciliation of North and South, even though it was almost forty years after the end of the Civil War. Beginning in the late nineteenth century there had been a strong trend towards the militarization of patriotism, one facet of this being the lauding of both Confederate and Union soldiers and leaders as noble fighters for their respective causes. If both can be seen as patriots defending their homes, then the nation should be united in admiration of their bravery and better prepared for future conflicts. Though the maneuvers were a partial re-enactment of Civil War battles, they were even more a show of martial values drawing the country together. The orders for the maneuvers specified that there were was to be a Blue Army which would be moving out of the Washington, D.C., area and a Brown Army moving from the Shenandoah Valley; the two armies were to meet in the area of Manassas. Two scenarios enacted; in the first scenario the Blue Army would attack and in the second the Brown Army would do so. The newspaper article that reported the orders stated that the Army Quartermaster Corps denied rumors that sufficient water for the troops would not be available, commenting that the streams in the area, including Bull Run, would be safe for animals to drink from, but not soldiers. This was due to the danger of typhoid fever. Preliminary matters were decided in an officer’s conference in Gainesville, Virginia, on September 1, 1904. The opposing armies were not allowed to employ civilian spies: “The man in the straw hat will not be tolerated.” Though any civilian spies were not to go before a firing squad, they would receive unspecified harsh punishment, a newspaper reporter joked. Also, the opposing commanders must maneuver within the confines of official maps— any attempt, in an “excess of belligerent zeal,” to do otherwise would be disallowed by the umpires. The maneuvers had some controversial features. General Corbin, for instance, instituted an elaborate general’s mess for high-ranking officers and visiting dignitaries, serving nightly multi-course meals with wines and champagne. A dispatch from the Cleveland Plain Dealer, reprinted in the Washington Post, called these dinners “lawn fetes” and stated that General Corbin had seen a similar practice when he observed German Army maneuvers attended by the kaiser: “Grim visaged war has smoothed his wrinkled brow with a vengeance when diners in evening dress are discovered feasting on that blood-soaked battlefield of Manassas.”7 Two days after the Plain Dealer dispatch, the Post editorialized that there was no evidence that General Corbin was using public funds for entertaining his guests. The newspaper believed that all the attention to the general’s

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mess was just the press poking fun, and then proceeded to evaluate maneuvers as mostly a waste of time and money: “It is and always will be difficult to make intelligent men believe that all this hurrah of belching batteries, and snorting cavalry, and flaming lines of infantry, amount to anything more than flat and unprofitable fustian.”8 A retired Army officer responded to the Plain Dealer article that all Army officers were responsible for their own messing arrangements and the costs thereof, and also that these maneuvers were held in a rustic setting with no hotels and restaurants available for the many foreign military attachés in attendance; it would have been quite boorish for General Corbin not to provide decent food and some entertainment for his many guests. Other newspapers carried headlines like “Sham Battles and Champagne” and “Warfare and Pink Tea.” Criticisms like these brought a warning from President Roosevelt’s secretary that officers should stick to the business at hand.9 More serious friction arose from the bringing together of black units with Guard detachments from the South. The Progressives were by and large not progressive on race relations, viewing the world as racially ordered and having no real objections to segregation. They tended to believe that African Americans were not, and perhaps never would be, ready to assume the full responsibilities of citizenship. This attitude contributed to the ease with which Jim Crow laws increased the severity of the repression of blacks in the South in late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Progressives did, however, find the thought of Booker T. Washington quite acceptable. His ideas of separate development and extensive vocational training for African Americans, with any degree of social equality in the far future, if even then, were much more congenial to Progressives than the ideas of more egalitarian thinkers like W.E.B. Du Bois. Washington’s image of the races as fingers on a hand, separate yet able to work together, also found favor with many Progressives. Contact between the races that carried even the vaguest hint of equality — such black and white men wearing the same uniform, carrying weapons, and subject to the same discipline — was unacceptable to Southerners and many others. No amount of development could make blacks fit to mix with whites on a basis of equality. “Considerable hard feeling” arose between three units from Texas, South Carolina and Georgia and a “colored Connecticut regiment” when the Southerners refused to salute black officers and predicted trouble if the units came into contact during the maneuvers. Officers in both armies were making special efforts to make sure that soldiers did not have any live ammunition, going so far as to check each soldier’s ammunition belt. This procedure was stated to have nothing to do with the racial animosity, however, but to be caused by accidental use of live ammunition in recent Ohio maneuvers. Two soldiers were killed there in 1903. Regular Army officers


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condemned the attitude of the Southerners and called for courts-martial for anyone “who declares he would like to use ball cartridges instead of blanks against the colored troops.” This might have proved difficult to accomplish. The judge advocate general of the Army had just the previous week issued an opinion that while regular army officers could command militia units, they could not initiate courts-martial against state troops. This would have to be done by the state militia officers. Southern officers were thought to be reluctant to press charges against any of their own men who might have expressed a desire to “pour real lead into negro ranks.” A Regular Army officer was quoted as saying that if a court-martial could not be obtained in such a case, there was another deterrent to “aggression against the negro troops”— the unit of the offender(s) should be notified that they would not be invited to future maneuvers.10 A Washington Post editorial criticized Southern militiamen who complained about having to have contact with black soldiers from Connecticut, stating that if it was such a burden for them to bear, they should have stayed home. The editorial quoted an article from the Greensboro, North Carolina, Record that told of the conduct of militiamen from Georgia who were being transported by train to the Manassas maneuvers. According to the Record, these men attacked a black man near Charlotte, North Carolina, putting out an eye and nearly killing him. In Greensboro they gave a black man a severe beating, and as their train was leaving they threw a rock at a black teacher, gravely injuring him. The North Carolina paper compared the Georgia troops unfavorably to Texas troops, who apparently also passed through North Carolina, stating that the Texans would never have done what “some of the Georgia troops had done at Statesboro— allow a mob to take two negroes right from under their eyes and burn them at the stake.” The Post then discussed the propriety of sending a unit of black troops to go on maneuvers with white state militias. It notes that the black troops were said to be “respectable young colored men, mostly waiters and servants at Yale University,” but even so, no one could approve of “permitting a handful of negroes to introduce discord and discontent into a gathering of many thousands of whites.” There was also the fact that white women were present observing the maneuvers, which the Post thought made the presence of black troops even more questionable. Though the newspaper thought the actions of the Southern militiamen regrettable, they were also characterized as “inevitable from the outset,” a classic case of blaming the victim.11

As Pretty a Battle as Was Ever Fought The maneuvers began on Sept. 6, and the following day the defending Blue Army won the first series by decisively defeating the Brown Army at

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Thoroughfare Gap, their commander General Frederick D. Grant directing “sledgehammer blows” like those of his famous father. In spite of its earlier editorial questioning the value of maneuvers, the Washington Post was mightily impressed: “Spectacular and realistic to a degree approaching actual warfare was the battle which was waged in a series of brilliant moves.” By midmorning the Blue Army was concentrated for an attack on the Brown Army’s center and was moving infantry forward, its men appearing “business-like and formidable.” It appeared as though “a charge across the lowlying cornfields between the hostile positions would produce a spectacle such as never could be witnessed save in actual warfare.” The Blue artillery was moved up to support an attack and soon the “roar of guns echoed across the green Virginia countryside.” The attack on the center began. There was enthusiastic participation by both sides, at times too enthusiastic. The Second Connecticut Infantry and the Third Maryland Infantry became involved in a close-range fight and at once both sides stopped firing and fixed bayonets. A nearby umpire intervened with new orders for the Connecticut militia — retreat. The final attack by the Blue infantry, across a field of goldenrod, brought them into the center of the Brown Army, and at this point General Corbin called a halt. Both sides cheered, thinking they had won, but the umpires called it a Blue victory.12 There were some unfortunate incidents. A private in the Seventh Cavalry was critically wounded when he was on a scouting mission. He and several other cavalrymen were investigating a house when they turned a corner and physically collided with enemy infantry, one of whom had a pistol in his hand, which discharged while touching the unfortunate private’s chest. Though the pistol was loaded with blanks, the paraffin round penetrated the man’s lung, causing “general regret among the troops.” Then there was the breakdown of order as the Blue troops returned to their base at Manassas about 12 miles away (the Brown Army was only about a mile way from its camp). Instead of marching by the roads, men began to cut across farmland in search of shortcuts and few units reached Manassas whole. Some decided not to do any walking and rushed aboard the 1 P.M. northbound train from Thoroughfare Gap, disregarding shouted commands from their officers. At the next station there were more soldiers and these filled up the remaining space in the passenger cars, the tender, and the locomotive cab. Some even climbed on top of the cars. The thousand soldiers waiting at the next station were out of luck and the overloaded train groaned forward to Manassas, reminding the Washington Post reporter of Civil War troop trains and providing an excellent subject for the many photographers present. Disorderly as this was, those forced to march did not behave with much discipline either. They also ignored orders from their officers to stop firing off their blank ammunition, and “at farmhouses they made sorties for food.”


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The Post concluded its coverage of the day’s events by quoting Pension Commissioner Ware, who was gratified that there would be no widows or orphans to care for after this battle. He was willing to allow all the soldiers to be added to the pension rolls and even stated that the newspaper reporters should be given pensions. This was, according to the newspaper article, “just only sarcasm.”13 The tables were turned in the second part of the maneuvers, which found the Brown Army attacking the Blue Army’s positions on the 1861 battlefield, in “as pretty a battle as was ever fought ... one of the most remarkable spectacles ever witnessed.” The Blue Army held almost exactly the same positions as the Union Army had held in the First Battle of Bull Run, and some of the participants and spectators could see the white crosses of the cemeteries established after the Civil War. The outcome was the same as in 1861. The attacking force won a crushing victory, witnessed by General Joseph Wheeler, an active duty army officer who was a teenaged Confederate soldier in 1861. The newspaper coverage was full of references to the Civil War and the soldiers participating in the maneuvers were said to be as noble and brave as the 1861 warriors. The battle was witnessed by wives of the generals, who were driven in a “white steam auto car,” foreign military attachés, and thousands of spectators. 14 The spectators came from Washington, Richmond and points in between and appeared on horseback or in buggies. Many made their way across the farmland by removing rails from fences, or cutting “plaguey barbed wire” and seemed just as at home as if “Pennsylvania Avenue were just around the corner.” All the talk about the battles of Bull Run apparently influenced Virginian spectators to become partisans of the attacking Brown Army. A Washington Post article claimed that local people resented the victory of the Blue Army in the first part of the maneuvers, since they were convinced that the Brown Army was reenacting the part played by the Confederate forces forty-odd years ago. According to the Post, they gave the Brown Army detailed information on the location and movements of the Blue Army. Several of them were captured and sent to the rear of the Blue Army, but did not face the firing squad. All efforts of the Blue Army to find out what the Brown Army was doing by trying to get information from civilians failed.15 There were positives. Again because of the lessons learned in the Spanish-American War, camp organization and especially sanitation were greatly improved. The emphasis on the movement of troops, rather than the exchange of gunfire, seemed a step forward. Some prior maneuvers were described as the gathering of a large amount of soldiers in an open area, then dividing them in two and having them shoot blanks at each other. One newspaper article commented that the firing of blanks at the Manassas maneuvers was a sort of sop to the militia involved. These soldiers would not be content to have

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forced marches to a particular spot and then wait for the decision of the umpires as to who outmaneuvered whom. In order not to disappoint them, they were supplied with blank cartridges and opportunities to fire them off, so that “the spectacular and realistic features of real war enter into the maneuvers, lending them touches of color attractive to the eye and satisfying to the inborn love of war.” Even though some of the regulars were Spanish-American and Philippine-American War veterans and knew what real war was, they “entered into the game with zest ... they have taken part in the battle as though a real enemy were under their guns.” The maneuvers also provided an opportunity for testing new equipment. Several steam-powered automobiles were used and proved able to keep up with troops moving cross-country. Finally, to nonprofessional observers it appeared as if the National Guard and the Regular Army worked together flawlessly. Military evaluators were not so complimentary. Some of them questioned whether it was wise to include National Guard units in extended maneuvers, since their training and conditioning was not nearly as good as the Regular Army. There were also deficiencies in the umpiring and a lack of realistic rules for the conduct of operations—for example, operations were halted at 1 P.M. each day, not very likely in case of war. The cost of the maneuvers, $700,000, was thought by some to be excessive.16 Racism and militarism were both on display at the Manassas maneuvers. The racism was so ingrained that newspapers could only bring themselves to mildly disapprove of brutal and violent behavior towards African Americans. The strongest condemnation by the Washington Post was to state that those well-behaved Texan guardsmen would not act as the unruly Georgians, who had in fact savagely attacked several black men while traveling by train to the maneuvers. It would have been difficult to find who was responsible for the outrages, but no thought was given to making an attempt to do so. Military values of obedience and bravery under fire were also on display for the spectators. As with the tournaments, shooting contests, and sham battles, everyone obeyed orders perfectly, no one disobeyed out of fear or confusion and there was no blood, no dead bodies, no wounded. Advances were made by cheering troops following their banners and it was a noisy and exciting way to spend a summer morning.

The Horrors of War Eliminated In August 1909 Harpers Weekly announced a joint Army-Navy war game in the Boston area: “Grim-visaged war will show his wrinkled front, only slightly smoothed, in Massachusetts during the week of August 14–21.” The plan was to land an invading force of about 9,000 men around New Bedford,


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where there was no coastal artillery. Boston was to be defended by a force of 7,000 men. The invaders would attempt to capture Boston, and all confrontations between the Red (attacking) and Blue (defending) armies would be rated by umpires, who would award victories to the side whose movements and tactics were judged to be successful. “In every detail, except the actual shooting of bullets, the slashing of swords, the stabbing of bayonets, the harsh business of war will be carried on relentlessly,” though it wouldn’t be too harsh without the shooting and the stabbing. Most of the troops were National Guard soldiers from the Eastern U.S., including almost all units of the Massachusetts Guard. Although the officers said they did not want crowds of spectators, there was not much they could do to prevent it. It promised to be an interesting spectacle and since the land where the action would take place was hilly, “some pretty fighting may be witnessed every day throughout the week, with all the elements of danger removed and the horrors of war eliminated.” At these maneuvers a primary “object was to see how much our militia soldiery are worth in the vital business of defending our country against foreign foes.” The writer hypothesized that at some future date the United States could be attacked. With its small army, the only means of defense would be the State National Guard. If the National Guard failed, then the attacker could capture an American city and compel the payment of a huge indemnity, “to say nothing of the humiliation of having to sue for peace.”17 The Boston Globe naturally covered these maneuvers in detail. The week before, the paper reported on the imminent arrival of three troops from the Tenth Cavalry. The Tenth was a black regiment stationed at Fort Ethan Allan in Vermont and had recently returned from service in the Philippines. They were a “husky, able-bodied lot of men” and they were given a scenic route to ride, since the commander said that many of the men had never been east of the Mississippi and he wanted to show them “some of the most delightful country in New England.” They stopped one night in Worcester, where hundreds of people visited their camp. The reporter thought them a “happy lot of men,” noted that most were veterans with 15 or twenty years service and were wearing the San Juan (Cuba) campaign medal, and pronounced their behavior “exemplary.”18 The plan was for the troopers to serve as runners and orderlies, mostly dismounted, so that their horses could be used by participating officers and umpires. There would be thus no danger that black soldiers would participate as an armed unit; they would in effect be servants. The year’s maneuvers were said not to be inspired by fear that any country would invade the United States, in 1909 or at any future time. The War Department had simply decided that it was New England’s turn to “enjoy the spectacle,” indicating that civilian leaders of the Army were well aware of the public and show business aspects of maneuvers. However, it was also true that Germany, France, and England were the nations who were best prepared

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to make an attack such as the one envisaged by the plans for the maneuvers— and if the maneuvers were being held on the West Coast, it would be Japan that would be the most ready to attack. Germany was said to be the most likely aggressor: “The German General Staff has the most complete set of plans of campaign of any nation. Her tacticians have been planning out the best way to fight every important nation on the globe for a generation.” This theorizing was followed by a statement from Assistant Secretary of War Stimson, that he heard nothing about any enemy against whom the maneuvers were planned and that maneuver plans were the province of the general staff, not his department. An unnamed officer, said to be on the staff of Major General Leonard Wood, evidently had heard a lot about Germany. He was quoted as saying that the Kaiser had a force of 165,000 men, ready to be transported by sea to attack any nation that became involved in a war with Germany. The officer said that President Roosevelt had been aware of Germany’s “movements” and had decided that America’s coast defenses needed testing. At his order a plan was devised to assemble a naval force with transports at New Orleans. This force would sail with sealed orders, which when opened would direct them to attack coastal defenses at various points along the whole Atlantic coast, “surprising the forts of all the city harbors and ravaging the country’s whole seaboard. The defenses were to be alerted that the attacking force was coming, but no one would be told when they would be attacked. The officer said that Roosevelt was greatly disappointed, when he learned that there was no ship “big enough ... was available” to carry out the plan.19

A Blaze of Excitement After a landing delayed eight hours by heavy fog the Red Army was put ashore at New Bedford and began its march towards Boston. The soldiers were warmly received by the residents of Massachusetts, often being cheered by the “country folk” and often photographed, since many farmhouses had a “camera fiend picturing the troops.” Near towns and cities many people traveled on streetcars to where they had been told the soldiers were camped, often being disappointed to finding the camp abandoned. Whether people got to see many soldiers, local hotels and restaurants did a booming business. Salesmen of various kinds, “fruit men, souvenir card peddlers, news dealers, frankfurt vendors” and others also did well, particularly when the soldiers stopped for breaks. Hundreds of automobiles, many decorated with flags, greeted the marching soldiers and some of the “petty officers” were given lifts while others availed themselves of the streetcars. There were skirmishes during the day which saw the invading Red Army joined by Uncle Sam. John G. Ryder, of “the G.A.R. post at Bourne,” was known throughout Cape


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Cod for dressing as Uncle Sam and attending every “cattle show, fair, and parade” for miles around. He was a classmate of General Wood and was given permission to join the Red Army, where his “absolute knowledge of every foot of country in this region may be of infinite value to the invaders.”20 The following day a heavy rain and strong wind soaked all the participating troops. This kept the number of spectators down, except for periods of excitement such as those in Middleboro during the afternoon. Red troops were guarding the town when Blue troops suddenly appeared in the town center and “checked business” by opening fire with their rifles. Red troops took cover, but the sound of gunfire caused a “blaze of excitement ... the populace ... appeared in all streets and at all corners coming on the run to the call of the guns.” The townspeople were cheered by the thought that their defending Blue troops were going to win a sudden victory in their hometown, but it was not to be. Troopers of the Red 10th Cavalry arrived “Sheridan-fashion,” just in time to save their retreating comrades and capture a few Blue soldiers. They in turn were menaced by the some Blue cavalry, but these soon had to withdraw, leaving the Reds in possession of the town center. When night fell, officers and men who had enough money sought dry beds wherever they could find them, in hotels or private residences. Those without funds spent what must have been a miserable night in their tents. They built little fires in front of their pup tents and turned around like “a goose on a skillet” in an effort to dry out, mostly unsuccessfully, as rain continued to fall. Larger cooking fires were put out by the rain so that most men had to make do with cold beans.21 Things did not go well for the defenders, and at the end of five days of fighting the Blue Army commander claimed victory, stating that the way to Boston was now open and he had only minimal opposition before him. General Pew of the Red Army disputed this, but newspaper correspondents agreed that the Blues were the clear victor. With the maneuvers completed, the units began their return trips home, but not before a parade was held in Boston by the units of the District of Columbia National Guard. These troops formed up on the docks and marched to Scollay Square. Along the way the streets were “packed” with onlookers and a crowd of several hundred waited in the square, where the troops were reviewed by the Massachusetts governor. They then marched back to the harbor and boarded two transports for Washington, “to the accompaniment of ringing cheers by the hundreds gathered on the pier.” The author of the article believed that the soldiers performed excellently; “their conduct was as near perfect as mere human beings could achieve.” The men demonstrated a “joyous endurance of suffering from cold and rain,” highly unusual behavior for soldiers. In spite of the nasty weather the invaders made steady progress. The roads in the area were “about evenly divided between smooth, macadamized highways and hideous sandy troughs,

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although every man who marched over them will swear that they are all sand.” Swearing is usual behavior for soldiers who face suffering. Roads, however, were not always necessary. The first prisoners were taken when a Blue cavalry troop encountered some Red scouts on motorcycles. The motorcyclists turned around and roared off, pursued by the horsemen. The cavalry officer was able to gallop his men across some fields and cut off the motorcyclists confined to the roads, thus capturing them. Not everything went the invaders’ way. The defenders could slow the attackers by using their engineer companies to destroy bridges. If the engineers had explosives with them, their use could be assumed and they could label the bridge “destroyed.” The attackers would then have to wait as long as it would take for their engineers to build a pontoon bridge before they could cross the river.22 Most observers evaluated the exercise as a complete success. There were some problems with supplying the men with food, but overall everyone was well fed. It was asserted that the National Guard was no longer a collection of independent state militias, but “is the guard of the nation against invasion” and a “vital part of the regular army of the United States.”23 Officers of the Regular Army were in charge on both sides and everything was supposed to be done as it would be in an actual war. There were a few exceptions, such as the exercise beginning at 5 A.M. each day and stopping at 1 P.M. The reason for this was that the standards of physical training of the National Guards varied considerably. Another difference from wartime was the people of Massachusetts “generously supported the new project.” They also “made a good profit, for the gathering of 16,000 men in the district put a lot of money into circulation.” An editorial pointed out some minor problems and a major deficiency. It commented that some men had to go for twenty-four hours without food, and asserted that the Army’s plan to have the soldiers requisition (with payment) farmers’ carts for transport was a failure, since many of these carts broke down.24 The Nation agreed that it was a good idea in general to teach the troops “what to do when turned adrift in a strange country, but that “this was carrying realism too far.” The larger problem that The Nation saw was that National Guard soldiers, who trained one day every other week and spent two weeks in camp every other year, were being asked to do a job that was beyond them, defending against the regular troops of an invading army. The Nation believed this was the job of the Regular Army and could be the job of a trained reserve, should one be established.25

Ginger Pop and Doughnuts A former Army officer wrote after the Boston maneuvers that joint maneuvers with the Regular Army were harmful to National Guard units. He


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said he had been a Regular Army officer who participated in the 1904 Manassas maneuvers (the “Third Battle of Bull Run”) and later served with the New York National Guard. He condemned the practice of throwing National Guard troops into strenuous maneuvers with the Regular Army and recommended that Guard troops be given at least a week’s training in camp before going into the field. Even better, he suggested, would be to have a training of one month every other year, rather than put untrained militiamen into rigorous maneuvers for two weeks every year. He claimed that he had seen militiamen “with tender bleeding feet bound with their handkerchiefs ... sweltering in stale clothes that stank with the sweat of days ... crawl like filthy animals from under insufficient covering to take up the labors of an endless day, filling their stomachs with ginger pop and doughnuts, while the nearby regulars, warm and dry, breakfasted on good hot coffee, bacon, hash and bread.”26 Leonard Wood mentioned few of the deficits noted by these other observers. He judged the effort to be a resounding success. One fact not noted by others was that the cost was low. He estimated it to be about $100,000 for the Regular Army, and since it could be taken out of already budgeted funds, no new appropriations needed to be approved by Congress. No new Congressional oversight was good news then and remains so now. The impression upon the public was excellent, according to Wood. He wrote that there had been some apprehension by the public that their farms and fields would be damaged by the troops and that disorderly, possibly intoxicated soldiers might damage their property. Officers with funds at the ready had accompanied the troops to compensate the citizens, but they had almost nothing to do and none of the soldiers got drunk. On the contrary, Wood felt the public was appreciative of the efforts of the troops, and even tried a little minor harassment of the invading “foreign” army, so as to help the gallant American army. He agreed with all other commentators on one point — the success of the invading army proved “the entire inefficiency of our available force to meet any sudden, well-organized attack and the necessity of a decided enlargement of our organized militia and its thorough instruction and equipment.”27 Though at least some in the War Department and the Army did not encourage the public to come and witness the Boston maneuvers, they did nothing to prevent it, and they were nevertheless well-attended. These maneuvers did not have the extra added attraction of Civil War battlefields, but there was the same choosing of sides by the public. At the Manassas maneuvers local people chose what units they thought represented the Confederate Army for support, around Boston they supported Massachusetts Guard and others defending against the alien invaders. To this limited degree the Army leadership succeeded in convincing the public that an invasion similar to that depicted in future-war fiction (described earlier) was indeed possible — and might well be successful.

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Win a Warlike Triumph In 1912 large-scale maneuvers were held in Connecticut. The event was well publicized in advance and newspapers printed several lengthy articles with maps and photographs, explaining the general idea and the scenario of the maneuvers. Two forces were encamped west of New Haven, totaling 20,000 men from the National Guard (half of the National Guard troops were from New York City) and the Regular Army. The defending Blue Army was commanded by the scholarly appearing Brigadier General Albert L. Mills, while the invading Red Army was led by Brigadier General Frederick A. Smith, who wore a plumed dress helmet in his photograph and seemed considerably more warlike. The maneuvers were to be the occasion of an extensive test of U.S. Army aviation. Some of the Army’s most experienced fliers were putting their aircraft together (in these early days of aviation airplanes could be disassembled and loaded onto a truck or wagon) and one made a test flight on the evening of the tenth: “The first flight was made tonight by the BurgessWright machine with Lieutenant Milling in the seat. Conditions were excellent and he made a spiral ascent around the wireless aerial to 2,000 feet and then with a sweep returned to the starting point.” Lieutenant Milling flew before it rained that night, which the newspaper said was a blessing to the ground troops, by laying the dust stirred by the movements of thousands of men, horses and vehicles. The maneuver plan called for each Army to have an airplane aloft during daylight hours to monitor the movements of opposing forces.28 For these maneuvers a situation was specified: “The theoretical war that is now raging in New England started more than six weeks ago, when a certain unnamed foreign power is supposed to have declared war on this country, defeated the Atlantic Fleet, and then established an effective blockade of Hampton Roads, Va. In the language of the General staff, this is what has happened to the United States since June 25 last”: Seizing a favorable opportunity, a European power (Red) unexpectedly precipitated a war with the United States (Blue) on June 25, defeated its principal fleet, and blockaded the remainder in Hampton Roads Va. by June 30. On June 25 the United States ordered the concentration of the Regular Army and its recruitment to war strength; the organized militia was called into the service of the Federal government, and the President called for 500,000 volunteers. By July 17 one division of regulars and two brigades of cavalry were concentrated at Boston, two more divisions (incomplete) of regulars and one division of cavalry were concentrating near New York and Washington. The organized militia had concentrated in state camps, part having been moved to the Atlantic and Gulf seaboards and the remainder moving in the same direction. The volunteers were being recruited and their training had begun. On July 20 the Red government suddenly began landing an expedition of 100,000 men near New Bedford, Mass. and quickly overcame the weak detach-


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ments of Blue troops in that vicinity. An advance on Boston was at once begun and on Aug. 5 the Blue field army (80,000 men hastily concentrated, comprising practically all the available regulars and instructed militia) was defeated near Boston and retired via Worcester towards Albany, its new base, vigorously pursued by the Red force. On July 24, when the First Red Army occupied Providence R.I. in its advance to Boston, the First Red division was detached, apparently to move westward and cover the exposed flank of the Red line in communication, protect the line of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad, and threaten the water system of New York City. This division moved west, its detachments unopposed, occupying the important junction points east of Providence to the Connecticut River and as far north as Hartford. Small garrisons were left at New London, Williamantic, Hartford, and Middletown to protect the railroad facilities. On Aug. 9 a second Red expedition of 100,000 men began landing near New Bedford, and the First Red Army passed through Worcester in pursuit of the main Blue force retiring to Springfield. The Blue troops in New York City, just organized into the Provisional Blue Division, were rushed towards Danbury and Bridgeport. The leading troops of the First Red Division reached New Haven and drove back a Blue regiment which had just arrived at that city, and a Red detachment occupied Waterbury. The Blue government had succeeded in withdrawing to New York City and Albany the bulk of the railroad transportation from the New England railroads. However, enough was collected by the Red forces for supplying the troops, but there is practically no available transportation for moving troops. A large portion of the rolling stock withdrawn to New York was used for concentrating the Blue army in Boston. This shortage, together with the demands on the railroads in transporting troops and other supplies from the Middle West, has seriously interfered with the movement of the Provisional Blue Division from New York City toward Bridgeport. Several secondary Blue naval craft occupy Long Island Sound and are able to interfere seriously with the Red transportation over the shore line of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad, and to give support to the Blue detachment near Milford.29

These were official Army descriptions of the background of the maneuver scenario. They might have been written by Homer Lea or “Parabellum” as part of a description of how a future war would begin. Like those authors, the Army specified no proximate cause for the war, and it comes unexpectedly. Also like the fictions, the enemy has little problem in landing large armies on our shores. The press and the public seem to have little problem in accepting that such a surprise attack could happen. The job of the opposing commanders was to “try to outwit the other and win a warlike triumph in a time of profound peace.” The peaceful Connecticut countryside was about to be disturbed, however, and large crowds were expected to witness the maneuvers. Local residents, of course, would want to see what was happening in their back yards (“the timid are already nerving themselves to withstand the din”) and since the roads there were good it

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was expected many “automobilists ... far into the thousands” would make the trip to see the excitement. The “din” would be considerable, since the opposing armies had more field artillery than had ever before been present at maneuvers, and many “artillery duels” were expected.30 Troops were supposed to be in their camps by sundown on August 11, 1912, but some were delayed. The camps were all located away from main roads; this would make the movements more realistically difficult for the troops. The planners did not tell the press where the camps were, so that opposing armies could not read in the newspaper where their enemy was bivouacked. This was a reasonable precaution, partly foiled by the New York Times, which published a list of locations where troops had been seen “in the vicinity of.” The list may not have done any harm, however, since great care was taken to conceal the troops. One New York National Guard Seventh Regiment officer was within a few hundred feet of his unit, but could not see it. He encountered a “native” who laughed and told him his regiment was “right over yonder.” The Seventh was part of the attacking force, which in this “theoretical war” was to attempt to “destroy” New York.

Picturesque and Stirring Spectacle The defenders, including some “loyal troops from Brooklyn,” would attempt to prevent the “capture and sacking of the metropolis” of New York. Both forces had the same provost marshal, who combined some supply and policing functions and was well prepared with personnel and money to investigate claims for any damages that might be done by the troops to the fields and crops of Connecticut farmers. Estimates were printed of the value per acre of various crops in the area, with fields of beets and onions being the highest, and an order forbid soldiers from being nearer than one mile to acreages of these vegetables.31 On the 13th of August the aviators, as expected, were observed by large crowds of people. One of the pilots was Lieutenant Benjamin Foulois, an experienced officer who had flown with Orville Wright on the first cross country passenger flight. Crowds saw Foulois ascend to two thousand feet and “work the wireless instrument attached to his biplane” to inform his side of the enemy’s progress. Other aviators were not so lucky. Two aviators aboard a “hydroaeroplane” landed on the water too hard and damaged one of their pontoons. Since they were wearing lifebelts they were able to get ashore, but their plane had to be sent for repairs. Another flier, a local boy and a crowd pleaser, had his engine quit while he was aloft. He “volplaned” (glided) down, which the crowd thought a daring feat and applauded, but then he “shot above a crowd of ducking, screaming women, wabbled [sic] perilously and


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then banged down on the tail of a Burgess-Wright flyer in which Lieutenant Foulois had been scouting but a short time before.” On the ground the fighting was “spectacular.” There were several skirmishes during the day and a battle developed around Great Ring Hill. This was described as the “prettiest engagement imaginable, from the standpoint of spectators, hundreds of whom viewed the fight from tops of walls, porches, carriages, and tonneaus.” The Red forces approached a strategic crossroads guarded by Blue troops behind a high stone wall. Forced to take cover in the tall grass and behind lower stone walls, the Red force exchanged fire with the Blue. The noise, the galloping up and down of commanders and umpires, and the excellent view all combined to give a “picturesque and stirring spectacle” with all “the realism of actual war.” The use of terms like “prettiest” and “picturesque” makes me think that reporters were comparing the “war” they saw to the wars they remember, such as the Civil War portrayed in oil paintings of heroic battles.

Conclusions Press coverage of the Connecticut maneuvers displayed a strong interest in the new technology of aviation, though not as a weapon. Nonetheless, the first use of aircraft as bombers came in that same year of 1912, when Italian planes dropped explosives on opposing forces in Libya. Only six years later German four-engine bombers would attack London and hundreds of Allied aircraft would bomb and strafe German trenches in support of ground assaults. Support for military values is clear in the descriptions of Army–National Guard maneuvers. In fact, the first large joint maneuvers held were centered around Manassas, Virginia, the site of the first and second Civil War battles of Bull Run, and the commanding general stated that the maneuvers were meant to re-enact parts of those battles. The maneuvers and the battles were Americans fighting Americans and showed that all Americans were valorous, whether victorious or defeated. The presence of black troops caused contention, but the authorities calmed the controversy by making sure that the black soldiers were used as messengers and in other non-combat roles, so that no white man would be faced with an armed black man. Evaluations of maneuvers as demonstrating the effectiveness of American forces against an invading force were mixed. Local people thought their “soldier boys” could do anything, while war department and Army leadership appreciated the men’s spirit but not their uneven and often sketchy training. Portrayals of the Army and National Guard at maneuvers are a spectacle of manliness in control of masculinity, seeing manliness as strong self-control

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and masculinity as aggressiveness. The violent tendencies of the soldiers are under the control of brave officers, who exercise the paternalistic and principled leadership which should, in a just world, lead to a deserved victory. All fighting is in self-defense and the leadership exercises the restraint without which war would degenerate into mere slaughter. The maneuvers are also a kind of civic pageantry. The National Guard and Army units come from all over the United States and parades and reviews usually are a feature of the end of maneuvers. Bringing the two organizations together for training under a single command makes a show of unity though separate identities are not submerged —E pluribus unum. Next I want to describe the Regular Army’s plans for defending the nation’s shores with its Coast Artillery branch. The technology needed to build and use ten to sixteen inch guns was impressive, and the use of these huge weapons was predicted to be devastating to an attacker — so much so that perhaps a small army was not much of a handicap after all. Right through continued expenditures on a “Star Wars” missile defense in the early twentyfirst century, superiority and even invulnerability through technology is a theme in America’s military history.

14. Invisible Guns The Coast Artillery was the most technological branch of the Army. It needed modern technology to manufacture and operate its huge guns and modern technology was “made in America. Even the Germans who developed it so well acknowledged the United States as its prime source.”1 War and preparation for war has always been an important force driving the advance of technology. The Germans were involved in an expensive naval arms race with Great Britain in the early twentieth century; the United States and other powers strived to keep pace. Though nations tried to keep their technical innovations secret, knowledge spread rapidly. Besides armies and navies, sectors of national economies benefited greatly. Mutually profitable arrangements between producers of armaments and a nation’s military have a considerable history in Europe and America, and workers and unions could appreciate the value of large contracts for ships and artillery. Progressives welcomed technology in all areas; in fact, they thought it had a universal applicability: “They wanted social scientists— also scientific experts— to direct their reforming zeal to city, state, and federal government. Those who applied the technological spirit to such diverse realms of society came to be known to the public as efficiency experts.” The unprecedented scale of industrial operations made managerial innovation necessary and inevitable, as evidenced by the rise of Taylorism and Fordism. There were crises of control, and the response to them was “a control revolution. The organization of bureaucracies, the rationalization of these to simplify procedures and increase efficiency, the development of communication systems, such as the telegraph, postal system, telephone, and wireless, and the invention of means of acquiring, storing, and retrieving information were among the responses.”2 Technology thus is not only machinery and factories. Its development is controlled by capitalists who use it to increase profits, and it changes industrial processes and social processes. In fact, it is a “social process, it does not simply stimulate social development from the outside but, rather, constitutes 215

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fundamental social development in itself: the preparation, habituation and mobilization of people for new types of productive activity, the reorientation of the pattern of social investment, the restructuring of social institutions, and potentially the redefinition of social relationships.”3 Engineers played a critical role, because they were the “foremost agents of modern technology [and] became as well the agents of corporate capital.... They consciously undertook to structure the labor force and foster the social habits demanded by corporate capitalism. In short, they ventured to design a new (yet old) social order, one dominated by the private corporation and grounded upon the regular progress of scientific technology. The engineers had considerable advantages in attempting to bring about such a new order. They had important positions in the corporate world, and being associated with science and technology was prestigious in itself. Further, they came to view their activities as a “unified whole,” spanning a wide spectrum of activities, including “industrial and scientific standardization, patent reform, the organization of industrial and university research, and the transformation of both public school and higher education.”4 Technology was seen as a set of rational procedures carried out in a disciplined way by trained and educated people. Access to and understanding of technology was seen as important to middle-class Americans and set them off from most working-class men and possibly from all men of color and “new” immigrants. Middle-class believers in the power of knowledge, especially knowledge of complex technology, must have been reassured about the nation’s defenses after learning about the coastal defenses. Fears of attack must also have lessened for those who believed that the Coast Artillery possessed superweapons that made the nation practically invulnerable. Historian H. Bruce Franklin believes that the desire for a weapon so destructive that possession of it would make a nation powerful enough to dominate the world is an important theme in American history. The weapons developed in the fiction he examines are usually invented by a brilliant American, working mostly on his own, and are offensive weapons that kill massive numbers of the enemy.5 The guns of the Coast Artillery are the Progressive Era’s closest real counterpart to these imagined superweapons, at least when their use is portrayed in the contemporary press. An attacking navy is not only repulsed in these accounts, it is totally destroyed. Commentators seem to believe that this would be the inevitable result and that it is due to the superiority of American technology and American martial values. It was a long journey from a few muzzle-loading cannon placed around America’s seaports to the fantasy of complete destruction of an attacking fleet. Defending the principal harbors had been seen as an increasingly important part of national defense since 1866, the other important part being a navy strong enough to defeat potential aggressors before they arrived at our shores.

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The Endicott Board, appointed by President Grover Cleveland, decided that the Army should have responsibility for the coastal forts and artillery. Much work was done on coastal fortifications in the late nineteenth century, and the Spanish-American War gave a considerable impetus to these efforts. Newspaper articles speculated about what would have happened if a Spanish fleet had arrived off one of our unprotected major port cities, and how the war might have turned out differently had the Spaniards been able to menace the U.S. In 1898 the approach of Admiral Pascual Cervera’s fleet to the Caribbean set off considerable panic along the Atlantic Coast and caused American vessels to be detached to protect ports. These vessels, had the coast artillery been fully manned at that time, could have been better used elsewhere. The U.S. would be foolish to count on future enemies being as poorly armed as the Spaniards.

An Appalling Contemplation Preparation was essential; this was the major lesson of the Spanish-American War. The Spaniards were a courageous enemy, but were woefully unprepared for modern war. If we did not wish to pay the price that they had paid, we had better look to our defenses. We had no combat experience with our new weapons in 1898, but they had performed better than anticipated, and it would be unwise to count on that happening again. The Los Angeles Times editorialized on the subject in March 1906. The paper stated that President Roosevelt had called for substantial improvements in the nation’s coastal defenses. Everyone wished for peace, but the Boer War (1899–1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) were not encouraging as to the direction the world was taking. The Times admitted that the United States was less likely to be attacked than any other great power; nevertheless, an attack would take the form of assault upon the coasts: “The Japanese fleet could shell, sack, and burn every city on that whole [Pacific] coast line.... Any attack by land on the part of any power the United States can well discount, but the destruction possible by a hostile fleet of powerful modern warships of the coast cities is an appalling contemplation.”6 The newspaper claimed that “the defense of the coast cities is by no means a difficult thing to provide” and the United States should not waste a minute in providing it. A future enemy would probably be much better armed and much more aggressive, like the Japanese, and “War starts quickly in these days.” Also, the unready defenses might tempt some enemy to attack them before they could be fully manned, in which case a war could be lost soon after it was begun. In the early twentieth century naval and coast defense technologies were

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marvels of the age. A 1901 Harper’s Weekly article by Lieutenant Godfrey L. Carden described how a factory was being built along the Delaware River to produce the turrets called Gruson turrets, to house sixteen-inch guns for defending America’s coastline. The sixteen-inchers were the largest guns America had produced, larger than the thirteen-inch guns on American battleships. American planners thought that sixteen-inch guns with the armor plate necessary to protect them were too heavy for battleships, but would be appropriate for land emplacements. In addition, on land the extra weight that would be associated with automatic loading devices could be tolerated, which would produce a high rate of fire with fewer guns. Patents, or at least the necessary information, had been obtained from Krupp in Germany to build these massive turrets out of chilled steel. Carden wrote that only the United States had been successful in learning how to make the turrets, though other countries very much wanted the information. He termed it “curious” that America was able to manufacture this invulnerable defense just when the Spanish-American War had shown that it could very well be needed. The writer of the article seemed dazzled by the numbers that he gave about the turrets and the guns, which were indeed impressive. A completed Gruson turret weighed 2,589 tons, not including the gun. The armor in the cupola would be almost five feet thick, and could withstand direct hits from naval artillery — was, in fact, “impregnable.” Lieutenant Carden described a test of a piece of Krupp chilled steel armor, held for the Italian government: “The plate subjected to trial weighed 193,895 pounds and the conditions of the test required that it withstand at point-blank range three shots from an Armstrong 100-ton gun, using Krupp’s steel shells. The shells weighed, each, 2205 pounds, while the powder charges consisted of 827 pounds of one-hole, brown prismatic powder. The actual energy developed on impact amounted as an average for the three shots to 47,466 foot-tons. The plate stood the test faultlessly.”7 Carden was so confident that the Gruson turret could not be put out of action that he claimed it needed no concealment. This would be an invaluable aid to morale of the gunners, who need not fear death or injury. He believed that even the shock of an explosion against the armor would do no harm, due to the huge weight of the turret. According to the lieutenant, there were many of these turrets defending ports in Europe, and a British admiral stated that the Royal Navy would not attack a port defended by guns in these turrets. When their use in war was hypothesized, they usually utterly destroyed an attacking fleet, just like offensive superweapons totally destroy opposing armies in future-war novels. The supposed invulnerability was never tested in combat, but may have been true in artillery duels with battleships. The guns and their crews, however, would have been quite vulnerable to land attack.

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Carden finally discussed what he probably thought was a clincher in his argument for the Gruson turret — economy. He had already stated that high quality iron and knowledge of the production of chilled iron castings was available in the United States, so that these factors would make the price of a turret much less than what Germany was charging. He estimated the cost of a turret, which housed two twelve-inch guns, to be $350,000. Since guns protected by Gruson turrets were invulnerable, however, they could take the place of the standard battery of two pairs of twelve-inch guns. The defensive expense of constructing a pit for each pair and installing gear to make the guns retractable was thought by Carden to be $160,000, so he wrote that the Gruson turrets would save money (here he was like the avid shopper who adds up money “saved” by buying goods on sale) since they would not need the pit or the retraction gear. At this point he became almost lyrical: “To appreciate a Gruson turret let the layman fancy a great mass of steel, cupola shape, lying close to the ground, and wholly enclosed save for the ports from which protrude the two enormous 12-inch guns. The great mass revolves by the mere touch of a lever, swinging the heavy guns completely through a circle of 360 degrees. At any point of the circle guns and turret cease revolving in instant response to the touch of a lever, and in that instant the ready guncaptain has caught the target on his line of sight, and the great gun is fired.”8

King Among the Great Guns If the Gruson turret was one of the wonders of the world, the gun that it housed was no slouch. In 1901 a new 16-inch gun was delivered to Sandy Hook on Long Island for testing. This weapon was “king among the great guns of the earth. Its nearest European rival is scarcely more than half as powerful; while its enormous shell, weighing over a ton and propelled with a velocity of 2300 feet per second, can deliver a crushing blow against an enemy’s ship, compared with which the impact of any other shell is a mere love tap.” The gun weighed 67 tons, and the barrel was cast from a nickel-steel ingot weighing 222,000 pounds. A Scientific American article considered what a good location for artillery defending New York harbor would be. The magazine proposed Romer Shoal, situated among the ship channels between Long Island and Manhattan. From here 16-inch guns, with their 21 mile range, could dominate the approaches to the Port of New York. These guns could open fire on enemy battleships while Romer Shoal was out of range for them, and shore guns in Gruson turrets would be “practically invulnerable.” As proof of the power of the weapon, if a gun on Romer Shoal fired a shell to the west, it would land four miles past Paterson, N.J., and the shell would reach a height of five and three quarters miles above the earth.9

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These were striking numbers and contemporary observers were mightily impressed with the size, organization, and power of the Coast Artillery. It was cutting edge technology of the day and seemed to make the ports it defended unconquerable. Accuracy was considered to be near-perfect, based on tests conducted in fine weather conditions, and gunnery was now a “scientific calling.” In the bad old days of seven years ago, railroad surveying gear stationed to the right or left of a gun would be used to determine a target’s position by triangulation. These outposts would communicate with the gun commander by semaphore and the information plotted on a board to determine the range. In 1908, however, communication was by telephone, and the plotting board greatly improved so that the gun could be fired as quickly as it could be loaded. It was estimated that these improvements made in the Coastal Artillery meant that they could now fire sixteen times more accurately at double the distance that they could in 1901. The Coast Artillery seems to have undergone its own “control revolution.” Just as industry was applying communication technology and management innovation to its processes, the U.S. Army was doing the same with its Coast Artillery. The outposts gave their information every ten seconds to a plotting room in the fortification housing the gun. Since a large naval vessel took a considerable amount of time to change course, plotting at ten second intervals was deemed sufficient to give good results. Target practice involved a tug towing an assemblage of three floats, an expanse of canvas on the middle float being the bull’s eye. The three floats covered a distance the size of a battleship. The officers on board the tug who observed the practice were aided by another innovation, a tube of magnesium attached to the shell which gave off light at night and black smoke during the day — what would come to be called a “tracer” round. Technology was continuously advancing. In 1908 it was planned to replace the 12 inch guns with 14 inch guns, so as to extend the life of artillery barrels. The twelve inch guns could fire their thousand pound shells sixty times before the barrel would have to be replaced. It was planned to use 1,660 pound shells in the 14 inch guns and less powder, which would result in the same explosive force being delivered to the target, but would prolong the life of the barrel. By 1912 the Coast Artillery defenses were essentially complete. The totals for the system were 1,582 artillery pieces of various types and calibers, and the Army had spent $140 million since 1886. It was the most extensive coast defense network in the world. The guns that made up the system were sited in forts with concrete walls up to 30 feet thick, the walls being protected by many feet of packed sand. There was effort at concealment by planting trees and lawns around the fortifications, though their location was not secret.

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Coastal defense gun on a disappearing mount, c. 1910. The gun could be pivoted below the edge of an emplacement.

Invisible Guns There were three ways of mounting artillery pieces. They could be in an armored barbette, in a turret, or on a retractable carriage. This last was the method used almost exclusively in American coastal defense fortifications, in spite of the enthusiasm of men like Lieutenant Carden for turrets such as the Gruson turret. These retractable carriages were made of steel beams which pivoted at the middle of the gun. When the gun was fired the recoil would bring the gun back and down below the edge of the fort’s parapet. While it was out of view the crew would load it and then a counterweight would be released, bringing the gun back up into firing position. These guns were referred to as “invisible” or “disappearing” guns. They were thought to be practically invulnerable, except to a shell bursting directly over the gun while it was in the down position. Such a shell burst could disable the gun and the crew, if they were loading the gun and thus were outside their bunker.10 This was disingenuous. A shell bursting over the emplacement could disable the gun at any time, though for some of the time when it was in the up position the crew would be in the bunker and probably safe. Thus the guns were not “invulnerable”; nor were they “invisible,” and they did not really “disappear.” The Scientific American believed that the contest between armor and artillery shell was over and that the shell had won. A writer described how an armor-piercing shell worked. Such a shell had a mechanical detonating mechanism that was released when the shell made contact with armor and would explode the shell once it had passed through the armor. If the shell did

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West Point cadets training on a non-disappearing coast defense gun, May 29, 1907.

not explode (some did not) it might do little damage. A picture with the article showed a shell and the fragments collected from an exploded round: “It is these fragments that do the terrible execution” after the shell penetrates armor. Other pictures showed Krupp armor plate 18 inches thick, a standard for ships, which had been easily penetrated by 12 inch shells. The article also had a photograph of a buckled and twisted steel caisson that had been placed in the sea and fired at as a test of the effect of near misses. The test showed that shells exploding in the water near a ship could do extensive damage to the lightly armored portion of the hull that was below the waterline.11 Suppose that an attacker defeated the U.S. Navy and scattered its remnants. The enemy fleet, by some combination of luck and circumstance impossible for most observers to imagine (though it should not be hard to imagine — Napoleonic Wars veteran Karl von Clausewitz spent a large part of On War describing the “fog of war” and the “friction” of war that complicated the slightest military move) then overpowers the coastal batteries. Would the nation then have to sue for peace? No. Once the enemy ships entered the minefields laid by the men of the coast artillery, they would be doomed by “the submarine mine.... There is no more dreaded or destructive

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weapon to be found in the annals of coast warfare.... The moral effect of such a terrific agent of destruction as a modern minefield is compelling.” Mines were laid in “grand groups” of 21, which constituted 7 groups of three mines cabled together and anchored so as to float at the proper depth (10 to 12 feet) that they might be struck by a passing ship. These were planted in staggered rows and connected by electric cable to a point on the shore. Some mines could only be detonated by shore operators; these could be laid at any time and would be harmless to friendly vessels. Others, called “electro-contact mines,” would explode when bumped by a ship. It was thought possible for an enemy to clear the minefield by sending launches ahead of the main fleet to explode dynamite charges in the water, which were supposed to detonate the mines. This seems a risky procedure for all involved. The development of minesweeping vessels was not far off.12 By 1906 much progress had been made in preparing coast defenses, but they were and would remain undermanned, due mostly to the small size of the Army and its budget. European nations would have several shifts of men manning their coastal defenses around the clock, while most American shore batteries would have only one shift. One observer thought that he could predict what would happen if the nation remained unprepared. An outbreak of war would bring an enemy fleet to a helpless New York, where it would drop shells “at leisure” on unfinished fortifications: “The fearful paralysis of business interests in case of a bombardment would be so enormous that the mind can only form a hazy conception of the results ... even a phantom fleet would produce direful terror. The trains would be crowded with fleeing inhabitants; commercial vessels would fear to sail; business of all kinds would become stagnant. Newspapers would vie with one another in running out extras magnifying the number of ships, and many would be the failures reported.” How different the result would be if the nation looked to its defenses and was prepared. Then there would be great excitement, but it would be “merely that of a rousing election-day.” People would still take the train to go to Coney Island and other beaches, restaurants would still be busy, and people would still be making theater reservations— a “phantom fleet would have no effect and even a real one would have no terrors, for we all know that trained Americans have few equals as fighting men.” In this scenario superior technology is accompanied by a superior martial spirit and the combination is so effective that the public views a war as an exciting contest with no impact on their daily lives, an apotheosis of invulnerability.13 A 1908 magazine article speculated about what would happen in New York City if “a state of war were suddenly to be declared.” Immediately coastal fortifications would be manned, scout boats would be sent out and powerful telescopes by day and huge searchlights by night would scan the sea. The enemy fleet would probably take advantage of night and foggy or rainy

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weather to make its approach, but eventually our scout boats would detect it. Their position and course would be radioed to the defenders on shore. Bugles would sound; soldiers would rush to man the guns and the minefields, and commanders would check by telephone to see if all was in readiness. “Outside, under the cover of fog, the enemy approaches in double, wedge-shaped formation, the heaviest battleships in the lead,” the article speculated. The guns of the coastal forts outrange the biggest guns on the enemy’s ships, so the enemy commander has decided to land parties of heavily armed marines to capture the batteries by land. While this is happening the enemy battleships will attempt a run into the harbor. A scout boat locates the lead battleship and radios its position, allowing a searchlight to be trained on it, and rangefinders on the shore to give the range to the guns. Automatic loaders bring the thousand-pound shells to the guns where the artillerymen ram the shells and silken bags of powder into the breech of the 12 inch gun. All guns within range fire and the enemy flagship is “rent by an explosion that sends 20,000 tons of steel flying in every direction. Some of the fragments are hurled high in the air where the searchlights catch them above the fog now flying in long streamers before the breeze; some fall on the decks of the ships following behind.” More ships are sunk as the battle continues; none of the shore batteries suffers any damage. Onshore commanders can now hear the cries of survivors in the water and a command to ready rescue boats is given. The boats will go into action once all opposing ships have been sunk or have surrendered, which time is not far off. When the last enemy vessel has been sunk, beached by its commander, or is drifting helplessly, the enemy submarine flotilla and torpedo boats try to disable the mines. The enemy’s plan is doomed to failure, because when the small ships are in the middle of the minefield its commander detonates all the mines. The enemy boats and submarines are sent “to the bottom with all their crews save perhaps a dozen, who, stunned and bleeding, manage to disentangle themselves from their prison-house and swim or float ashore. The landing parties, which have not had time to get into action, are glad enough to surrender without firing a shot.” Throughout this account, shots from the coastal batteries land with “mathematical precision.”14 Every enemy vessel is destroyed without so much as a bloody nose among the defenders, another portrayal of utter destruction. In the future war fiction novels described earlier, the victor in a battle usually destroys the opponent completely, just as the Coast Artillery does in its hypothetical confrontations. This has much to do with the crushing naval victories of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War and with the increasing power of technology in general and military technology in particular. In another imagined attack the enemy fleet eschewed concealment, approaching on a clear but moonless night. No scout boats are needed; a

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searchlight picks up the lead battleship of the attacking column. This attack is expected; the men are sleeping at the guns and are awakened and ready in seconds. Range finding is still done by triangulation, but now the outposts are located in towers about 1 ⁄2 mile from the gun. A bell rings in each tower every 30 seconds and the towers communicate their readings to the gun commander. Mechanical calculators feed information into the plot. This information corrects the range for wind, temperature, humidity, curvature of the earth, and tides. Here we see a more complete use of information and communication, solving a military problem with technological means. Technology truly could be applied successfully to any dilemma and just might be not a solution, but the only solution. The writer of the article at this point must have been greatly impressed with the Coast Artillery and either forgot that a hypothetical enemy fleet was approaching, or was so reassured by what he had learned about U.S. defenses that it no longer seemed worth writing about. He didn’t tell us what happened on that clear, moonless night, and his article concluded with a description of a target practice exercise held in 1905. The gun crews had a new commander, the tug towing the targets varied its speed and courses at random, and there were other complicating factors. The crews achieved an overall 60 percent hits and the author thought this was an excellent performance, which indeed it was.15 The perceived power of technology in these press articles about the Coast Artillery is striking. It seems to be inconceivable that coastal defenses will fail. In the fiction about future wars discussed earlier and in the description of maneuvers in the preceding chapter, defeat is a distinct possibility. The coastal forts and their huge artillery pieces, though, are unconquerable. Technology by this time had an air of inevitability and ever-increasing power, especially when it melded men and machines together as effectively as did the Coast Artillery. When this happened technological change was also a social process, and participants were being changed by technology as they were implementing technological change. This technological change was very much a top-down process and required a firm sense of hierarchy and discipline to implement, values congenial to the military. Valuing technology and technological change also was a middle-class attitude, and it’s interesting to note the appeal to middle class values and the place of the Coast Artillery in Army recruiting. The Army tried to stress benefits like education, pensions and travel to potential enlistees. These were then prerogatives of the middle class and it seemed as though the Army wanted to offer a degree of class mobility to those who joined. The Coast Artillery was held out as the branch of the Army that required and offered the most education and the most pay. It would by no means be really available to most soldiers, but a middle-class and highly technical career was definitely there for those who could meet its challenges.

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Some observers were not as convinced of the value of the system as was the Scientific American. History Professor William T. Hull wrote about coastal fortifications in his 1916 book on preparedness. He stated that “coast defense” was something of a misnomer. In fact, the coast defense forts protected the largest seaports on the U.S. coast and, according to congressional testimony, this amounts to about 200 miles out of a coastline estimated by Hull to be about 8,000 miles. He believed it would never be necessary for an enemy to attack U.S. coastal installations: “There is nothing to hinder a strong enemy from landing elsewhere on our coast and capturing our big cities by marching inland to their rear.”16

Conclusions In earlier chapters I discussed the role of the National Guard in the nation’s defense and in strengthening the martial spirit in America, the Regular Army, including its maneuvers, often in conjunction with National Guard units. This chapter has described the Army’s most technologically advanced branch, the Coast Artillery. Army maneuvers show the thinking of the War Department and the Army leadership. Like the novels predicting future wars, the maneuver situation usually hypothesized a sudden attack by an enemy which had defeated U.S. naval forces and landed a sizable army on the nation’s shores. The enemy was never named, but during the war scares period the enemy was at first Germany and after 1906 Japan. The same theme of sudden attack is common in newspaper and magazine stories about the Coast Artillery. The maneuvers had shown how a war could be lost because of the Army’s small size and inability to respond to attacks with enough force. The power of the Coast Artillery, however, might not be limited by the small size of the American Army, because it had modern technology on its side. The admiration of the technology of the Coast Artillery seems genuine, and it must have seemed very impressive to those who read about it. However, the results of the maneuvers described in the preceding chapter probably caused new doubts about the safety of the nation from attack by a determined enemy with an army to accompany its navy, especially if the Coast Artillery turned out not to be the superweapon some observers thought it to be.

15. “A military nation nowadays” The entire show was significant of our growing love of things military. We are, without doubt, a military nation nowadays. The pomp and panoply of war fascinates us and the army has latterly acquired a prestige never before equaled since we emerged as an independent government.1 — Town and Country, 1902

Previous chapters have detailed a strong and growing martial spirit in the United States after the Spanish-American War. In this concluding chapter I want to review the evidence for militarism and show how and why military and Progressive values were alike and worked together well. Republican administrations from 1900 to 1912, the War Department and the Army did all they could to improve the public image of the military. Opposition to a larger and more influential military reached a peak during the 1900 presidential campaign, but the Republican response to charges of militarism was effective and their decisive victory in November seemed to lay the charge to rest. The United States would continue until the 1950’s to have a small volunteer army which would expand into a mass army only during the world wars. Most other major powers had large armies whether there was peace or war, and charges of militarism against them were easier to make. But the size of a nation’s army is not the only way to evaluate the martial spirit among its people. Consider the amount of military education in this country during the early 1900’s. There were extensive programs in urban secondary schools and all land-grant colleges were required to have military training for their students. This college requirement was vaguely worded, never enforced, and practically ignored by some. However, many others had comprehensive and thorough programs that required all students to participate. There were, in addition, hundreds of private military secondary schools for boys and military colleges such as The Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute (V.M.I.). It seems likely that there was as much military training available for young men in the United States as there was in any other modern 227

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nation, perhaps more. Military training was not only intended to improve the nation’s defenses, however. It was also seen as a character builder and as preventive medicine for perceived social ills such as disrespect for authority, lack of patriotism and underdeveloped masculinity. Watching the Army perform in tournaments became a popular entertainment in the Progressive Era. Press coverage of these events was laudatory and usually mentioned the enthusiasm of the audiences. The sight of large groups of men moving in formation and performing tasks together was very impressive to spectators, and the Army seemed to be a model of power and efficiency. It did not seem to matter to anyone that some of the events were dangerous and soldiers could be injured or killed performing them; perhaps it was part of the attraction. Another sort of public display was the marksmanship contests, which were also well attended by enthusiastic crowds. The yearly national contest, held at Sea Girt, New Jersey, and later Camp Perry, Ohio, could draw 20,000 onlookers. A day at these contests would be filled with the rattle of musketry and “realistic” events like skirmish runs, making spectators think they had a taste of war. No one seemed to dislike the flavor. Preparation for war took many forms. One that was not planned by the War Department or the Army, but which at times got some encouragement from them, was the war scare that was a common feature of the years preceding World War I, in both America and Europe. Newspapers seemed to think war scares made good copy and at times would report what a relatively unimportant person or group said or thought about the possibility of Country X starting a war with the United States. Often the report would come from Country Y, sworn enemy of Country X, but this was usually not noted. In common with the European nations, there began to be almost an air of inevitability about a future war, especially, in America, with Japan. After the Mexican Revolution of 1910 there was growing speculation in print about a war with Mexico, and there were major war scares along the Mexico-U.S. border in 1911 and 1913. Army leaders were quoted, usually anonymously, and often agreed that war was indeed likely. Revulsion at such talk would not become a mass phenomenon until well after World War I, as indicated by the fact that All Quiet on the Western Front was not published until 1929 and was the first big best seller that was anti-war. There were few stories and novels about American soldiers in the Spanish-American War, probably because the war was so short. The PhilippineAmerican War began in 1899 and was officially concluded in 1902, though fighting went on long afterwards, including a sizable battle in 1913. There was no questioning of America’s military or of its role in the Philippines in stories about the fighting in the Philippines, and the American soldier was pictured as far superior to even the best Filipino rebel. These stories could have villains in uniform, occasionally even an officer, but they were few and far

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between. All the rest, the vast majority, were brave, self-sacrificing, and obedient: paragons of the martial spirit. A sub-genre of novels predicting future war was already well established by 1900 in the United States and Europe. The Russo-Japanese War, where Japan sent an expeditionary force by sea to invade Russian territory, made the world aware that such invasions were possible, especially by nations like Japan, which possessed a large and determined military. Soon after the San Francisco School Board crisis of 1906, novels and stories about a Japanese invasion of the West Coast of the United States began to appear, drenched in racism about the spreading yellow peril. Most of them saw the Japanese allying with other Asians to fight the U.S. Since these works extolled whites in general, it seems as though they were projecting onto Asians the same sort of racial solidarity that they preached for whites. This took little account of the resistance to Japanese imperialism by the Chinese and other Asians. The National Guard was every bit as important as the Army in promoting a martial spirit. The Guard was closer to the people and could often be seen in parades, in activities at their armories, at weekend encampments and in summer maneuvers. Their role in the nation’s defense was ambiguous in the early twentieth century and has remained so up until the present. The ambiguity concerns what the major function of the Guard is to be. Is it an instrument of the federal government, used in times of crisis to back up the Regular Army, or is it more a local organization, used to quell disorder and recover from disasters? Almost every early twentieth century prediction about how war could come to the United States was that this country would be invaded. In the early stages of conflict it was thought the National Guard would join with the Army and resist the invaders. Of course, the country never was invaded in that era, and there was a period of preparation before both world wars. The present war in Iraq is the first in which National Guard soldiers have been rotated into combat as units and then returned to the United States; during twentieth century wars guardsmen were integrated into new or established Regular Army units. It is one of the many ironies in the history of the military policy of the U.S. that in 2006 National Guard units were fighting in a war which began with the U.S. invasion of another country, whereas in 1906 the National Guard was thought to be a vital part of the resistance against foreign invasion. Army maneuvers, usually with National Guard units, prepared both military forces and the public for war. The public was invited and often came in large numbers; at times the crowds interfered with the training. Army leaders never minded publicity and often gave newspaper reporters much information about what was going to happen. The public was impressed by the sight of large bodies of men playing war and thought the whole thing was

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quite realistic and an accurate prediction of how things would happen if the United States were invaded. It was not commented upon that real invading armies might not pay for trampled vegetable gardens. Recruiting for the National Guard was a local affair, but the Regular Army needed to pay more attention to recruiting now that it was three times larger than the pre–1898 Army and had new overseas responsibilities. Success in recruiting for the Army was mostly a function of the state of the economy, and to this day recruiting improves when times are hard. The Army did not stress martial ideals to potential recruits and made a more practical approach. Travel to exotic lands was a draw, though most of the travel was to the Philippines, where fighting continued. Travel, however, was not the benefit that the Army stressed the most. The real attraction, according to recruiters, was the training and the retirement pay. Pensions were rare in the pre–Social-Security age, and the Army evidently thought this was a real draw. The training available was also highlighted. Recruits were told that training and promotions could make life in the Army reasonably comfortable. This was credible, but the Army needed many more infantrymen that it needed technically trained senior noncommissioned officers. The most common definition of militarism is the martial spirit among a people, and the War Department and the Army did all that they could to cultivate a martial spirit in early twentieth-century America. They eagerly cooperated with military tournament and shooting contest promoters, sent out officers to schools and colleges to train cadets, encouraged attendance at maneuvers, and took every opportunity to polish the image of the Army and its soldiers. It is true that everyone involved thought that all this effort was to prepare for a defensive war — America prepared for the invasion that would never come. No one, except perhaps for a few writers of fiction, thought that the next war would see an American expeditionary force crossing the ocean to fight on another continent. Military values and progressive values fit together very well. Progressives valued sacrificing a personal agenda for the good of the group; the military both values and demands this. Progressive were fond of public expressions of civic unity in the form of parades and pageants; so was the Army, though they were celebrating national unity and patriotism. Team sports were beginning to play larger role in America at all levels and were considered a unifying factor. The Army quite agreed with the value of these sports and actively encouraged them. Minimizing class conflict was a value to both to the Army and Progressives. It might be thought that the Army’s sharp distinctions between enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers would foment class conflict, but in theory military ranks are all valued for their contributions and military courtesies are exchanged, not offered by one group only. Everyone knows

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their place and their duties, a Progressive ideal as well as a military one. Middle class Americans saw themselves as the officers of their community, entitled to set agendas and manage discord. Challenges to such entitlements, by immigrants, working men, or people of color, were opposed, if not met with force as the Army would. Middle and upper class men were not reluctant to call upon the National Guard, however, if they thought public order was in danger. Historian Joseph Kett characterized education in the Progressive Era as very concerned with the promotion among young people of norms of behavior that were freighted with middle-class values. One of these norms was conformity, whether in the inculcation of school spirit in secondary schools, or in the implanting of loyalty and team spirit in the team sports of boys’ clubs. Another was hostility to intellectuality, evident both in The Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education and in the muscular Christianity which imbued movements like scouting. A third norm was passivity, although the rhetoric of boys-workers might appear at first to belie this. But if boys-workers praised aggressiveness (the “pugilistic instinct”), they insisted at the same time that it be directed only against other boys in the context of highly regulated team sports.2

The Army and National Guard training tried to instill these very same values of conformity, loyalty, and team spirit. Both were anti-intellectual, in the sense that they didn’t encourage debate about values, morality, or the course of the nation. And of course they valued aggressiveness, but only when ordered and channeled by commanding officers. Progressives and the Army were unsympathetic to any degree of social equality between black and white Americans. The Progressive Era was a time of increasing segregation and violence against black Americans. The Army might have been seen as a Progressive ideal. It was rigidly segregated and almost all the officers were white, though there were a few junior-grade black officers. White officers undoubtedly felt that that on the whole the black soldiers were well-treated and had opportunities that they wouldn’t have had in civilian society, but there was no hint of social equality. Finally, along with the similarities in the mind set on issues of race and class, gender attitudes were alike in the Army and civilian society. Recruiting for all-male armed forces may have been easier, since there was an increased interest in “defining and fulfilling the criteria of manhood.” In civilian society this interest led to big increases in male-only fraternal organizations, but the Army and the National Guard were obviously also available to meet the need. In gender relations societal and military norms are congruent, just as racial and class attitudes are alike. How do these observations relate to interpretations of the nature of the Progressive Era? First there is the issue of the reality of reform. I think every

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historian would agree that a reformist impulse was part of the ethos of Progressivism, though there is no agreement as to how basic the reforms were and what the motivations of the reformers were. New Left historians in particular saw reforms as not basic and made only to defend and indeed strengthen the class structure of America. Certainly the reforms made by the War Department, the Army, and the National Guard during this period were intended to strengthen the traditional system. But there is also wide agreement that Progressives wanted to change people more than they wanted to change the fabric of society. In particular, they wanted to improve morals. The military and civilian enthusiasts of the military thought that the fostering of a martial spirit in America was a positive action that would help to make the people more patriotic and more willing to support the Army and the National Guard. A lack of patriotism must have seemed like a character defect that could be corrected with the right sort of outreach. There is also wide agreement that government became more willing to intervene in people’s lives during the Progressive Era. The ways in which the Army and the National Guard exhibited themselves then are difficult to imagine in earlier times, before acceptance of a wider role for government. The near-identity of many Progressive values with military values also made these public relations efforts by the Army more successful. Cultural historians have lately concentrated on groups excluded from earlier accounts of Progressivism, such as women and African-Americans. In this way they have recovered histories and given agency to forgotten historical actors. These accounts have a bottom-up aspect; they show individuals and organizations initiating reforms on their own, without being led to do so by a government or corporate power structure. This book concerns an elites-led effort to increase the martial spirit among mostly middle-class white Americans. It too opens a new window on the lives of Americans in the Progressive Era.

Chapter Notes Introduction

2. Ibid. 3. Ronald J. Barr, The Progressive Army: U.S. Army Command and Administration, 1870– 1914 (London: Macmillan, 1998), 35. 4. Ibid., 113. 5. Ibid., 115. 6. John R. Brooke, “Reasons for the Army Increase,” Independent, Vol. 52, No. 2714, 2909. 7. John Shafroth, “The Philippines and Our Military Power,” Forum, Jan. 1902, 595. 8. Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), 106.

1. “Our Peerless Flag Is There! Last Stage of the Great Contest,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 1900, III8.

Chapter 1 1. “The Spectral Twins,” New York Times, July 3, 1900, 6. 2. “Mr. Bryan Makes Four Speeches,” New York Times, Oct. 17, 1900, 3. 3. “Secretary Root on Campaign Issues,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1900, 5. 4. “Our Peerless Flag Is There! Last Stage of the Great Contest,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 1900, III8. 5. W.F. Manning, “Washington Letter: The Army Has Paid for Itself a Thousand Fold,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 4, 1901, B5. 6. “Transparencies” were large white banners with black lettering. When carried in evening parades and illuminated from behind with torches their message stood out very well. “Popocratic” was a Republican characterization of the Democrats, implying that they were dominated by radical populists. 7. “Vital Campaign Issues,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 23, 1900, I9. Editorial originally published in the Omaha Bee, date unknown. 8. Joseph Dana Miller, “Militarism or Manhood?” The Arena, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Oct. 1900), 393. 9. Charles E. Jefferson, “The Shadow of Militarism,” Advocate of Peace, Vol. 62, No. 9, Oct. 1900, 194–5.

Chapter 3 1. Day Allen Willey, “Training our Minutemen of the Future,” Outing Magazine, Vol. 51 (Feb. 1908), 603. 2. Patricia Albjerg Graham, Schooling in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 25. 3. Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 444–445. 4. Military Topics,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 29, 1901, 7. 5. Ibid. 6. Day Allen Willey, “Our Schoolboy Soldiers,” Munsey’s Magazine, Vol. 27 (1902), 388. 7. Ibid., 389. 8. Ibid., 394. 9. Day Allen Willey, “Training our Minutemen of the Future,” Outing Magazine, Vol. 51 (Feb. 1908), 603. 10. Ibid. 11. Major R.L. Gignilliat, “Education of Boys by the Military Method,” Scientific American, Vol. 92 (March 4, 1905), 184. 12. Colonel L.R. Gignilliat, Arms and the Boy: Military Training in Schools and Colleges (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1916), 2. 13. Ibid., 101.

Chapter 2 1. “Military Morality,” The Nation, Vol. 69, No. 1789, Oct. 12, 1899, 273–274.

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Chapter Notes — 4

14. Ibid., 5. 15. Diane Ravitch, Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 16. Blakeslee, Fred Gilbert, “Military Education in the Public Schools,” Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine, Oct. 1907, 542. 17. Ibid., 543. 18. “Military Training in Schools,” Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1909, 16. 19. “Give Rifles to Boys,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1911, I3. 20. “Teachers Quit and Go Home,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 23, 1911, II 1. 21. “Training in Schools for Military Service,” New York Times, March 3, 1912, 5. 22. Charles T. Boyd, “Military Training in Our Schools and Colleges,” Saint Nicholas: An Illustrated Magazine for Young Folks, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Nov. 1905), 48. 23. Edgar S. Dudley, “Military Education,” New York Times, Sept. 21, 1907, 11. 24. Capt. E.Z. Steever, “The Wyoming Plan for Military Training in the Schools,” School Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 (March 1917), 145. 25. Gignilliat, Arms and the Boy, 234–236. 26. Steever, Wyoming Plan, 152–153. 27. Ibid., 148. 28. Gignilliat, Arms and the Boy, 229. 29. “Baden-Powell’s Boy Scout Plan Invades U.S.” New York Times, April 24, 1910, SM 11. 30. Allen Warren, “Popular Manliness: Baden-Powell, Scouting, and the Development of Manly Character,” in Manliness and Morality: Middle-class Masculinity in Britain and America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 201. 31. Ibid., 202. 32. “Scout Plan Leaders Dine Baden-Powell,” New York Times, Sept. 24, 1910, 8. 33. “5,000 Boy Scouts Drill for Baden-Powell,” New York Times, Feb. 11, 1912, 4. 34. A.F., “Boy Scouts Movement,” New York Times, June 27, 1910, 6. 35. John L. Alexander, “Boy Scouts Not Warlike,” New York Times, July 3, 1910, 6. 36. Philip S. Foner, Militarism and Organized Labor: 1900–1914 (Minneapolis: MEP Publications, 1987), 20–21.

Chapter 4 1. “Editorial Comment,” Town and Country, April 5, 1902, 2917. 2. Steven W. Pope, “Playing Fields, Battlefields, and the American Military Sporting Experience, 1890–1920.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 3 (July 1995), 436. 3. “30,000 See Army Defeat Navy on

Franklin Field,” New York Times, Nov. 29, 1908, S1. 4. Col. W.F. Morris, “Benefits of the League’s Efforts to Propagate Athletics Evident in both Branches,” New York Times, April 21, 1907, S2. 5. Janet M. Davis, The Circus Age: Culture and Society Under the American Big Top (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 2002. 6. Jim Cullen, The Art of Democracy: A Concise History of U.S. Popular Culture (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002), 131–134. 7. Joy Kasson, Buffalo Bill’s Wild West: Celebrity, Memory, and Popular History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 243. 8. Ibid., 248. 9. Louis S. Warren, Buffalo Bill’s America: William Cody and the Wild West Show (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 280. 10. Ibid., 441. 11. Ibid., 443. 12. “The Military Tournament,” New York Times, March 27, 1900, 2. 13. “Military Tournament,” New York Times, March 29, 1900, 2. 14. Ibid. 15. “Editorial Comment,” Town and Country, April 5, 1902, 2917. 16. “Military Tourney Ends,” New York Times, April 1, 1900, 4. 17. “Are Marvels at Drill,” Washington Post, March 26, 1900, 3. 18. “Cotillion on Horseback,” Washington Post, March 11, 1903, 7. 19. Ibid. 20. “Fatal Ride at Drill,” Washington Post, April 1, 1903, 3. 21. “Crack Troop of Army,” Washington Post, April 5, 1903, B3. 22. “‘Jackies’ Cheered at Garden Tourney,” New York Times, May 13, 1905, 6. 23. “Games of Squadron A,” New York Times, March 8, 1902, 6. 24. “Regulars Carry off the Honors,” Boston Daily, Feb. 29, 1908, 3. 25. Display Ad 11, no title. New York Times, May 1, 1903, 10. 26. “Warfare as a Benefit,” Harper’s Weekly, June 26, 1909, 11. 27. Ibid., 12. 28. “Military Tournament Will Prove Revelation,” Atlanta Constitution, June 13, 1909, A13. 29. “Military Tournament to Show Soldier Life,” Atlanta Constitution, June 20, 1909, D8. 30. “Armory Opened by Tournament,” Atlanta Constitution, July 6, 1909, 1. 31. “Army Tourney on Sane Fourth,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Feb. 22, 1910, 9.

Chapter Notes—5, 6 32. “Uncle Sam’s Substitute for the Treacherous Firecracker,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 22, 1910, G4. 33. “America at Mercy of Foe,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 14, 1910, 3. 34. “800,000 to See Army Tourney,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 1, 1910, 3. 35. “Sane 4th Parade to Mark New Era,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 12, 1910, 3. 36. “Big Sane Fourth Draws Crowds,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 4, 1910, 1. 37. “Tournament Ad for Recruit,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 6, 1910, 5. 38. Ibid. 39. “6,000 Troops for Spectacle,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 30, 1911, p. 18. 40. “Soldiers Coming July 21,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 16, 1911, 5.

Chapter 5 1. George Jean Nathan, “Romance of the Recruiting Office,” Harper’s Weekly, Jan. 7, 1911, 20. 2. Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 2001. 3. “His Duties,” Boston Daily Globe, Oct. 23, 1904, 51. 4. Ibid. 5. “Toughs Not Wanted in the Army,” Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1905, 6. 6. “Cigarettes Bar from Army,” Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1906, 1. 7. Richard Kluger, Ashes to Ashes: America’s Hundred Year Cigarette War, The Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 39–40. 8. Ibid. 9. “Height Stops Career,” Washington Post, March 17, 1907, 12. 10. “Lazy Bug Shy of Army,” Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1909, 12. 11. “Cornbread Aids Southern Teeth,” Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 20, 1912, 8. 12. Franklin R. Kenney, “The Army and What It Offers,” Harpers Weekly (March 14, 1908), 17. 13. Victor Rousseau, “An American Army Problem,” Harpers Weekly (March 21, 1908), 11. 14. “Uncle Sam Wants Fighters,” Washington Post, Aug. 30, 1903, E7. 15. “Uncle Sam’s Sensational Poster Campaign for Recruits,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Feb. 20, 1910, G4. 16. “From the Common to the Field of Mars,” Boston Daily Globe, June 25, 1911, 55.

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17. Uncle Sam’s Sensational Poster Campaign for Recruits,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Feb. 20, 1910, G4. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. “Landis in Error, Army Men Aver,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 26, 1911, 5. 21. E.E. Morgan, “Merely the ‘Retort Courteous’ to the Decriers of the Army,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 2, 1911, E2. 22. “Eager to Enlist,” Los Angeles Times, April 12, 1902, 1. 23. “American Militarism,” New York Times, Feb. 23, 1905, 8. 24. Charles A. Selden, “Luring the Army Recruit,” Harper’s Weekly, Feb. 15, 1908, 27. 25. H.O.S. Heistand, “The United States Army as a Career,” New York Times, Sept. 6, 1908, SM1. 26. Ibid. 27. “Severe Talk for Officers,” Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1901, 4. 28. “Enlistments Falling Off,” Atlanta Constitution, March 18, 1901, 4. 29. “Not So Ready to Enlist,” Atlanta Constitution, May 16, 1901, 5. 30. George Jean Nathan, “Romance of the Recruiting Office,” Harper’s Weekly, Jan. 7, 1911, 20. 31. Ibid., 21. 32. Cupid as Recruiting Officer,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 1, 1903, 55. 33. T. J. Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America (New York: Basic Books), 1994.

Chapter 6 1. “The President at Sea Girt Camp,” New York Times, July 25, 1902, 1. 2. James Trefethen, Americans and Their Guns: The National Rifle Association Through Nearly a Century of Service to the Nation (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1967), 26. This account of the early days of the NRA is based on Trefethen’s book. 3. Army and Navy Journal, Aug. 12, 1871, 3. 4. “‘Teddy’ Loves Sports,” New York Times, April 21, 1907, VIII5. 5. “Will Encourage Marksmen,” New York Times, Dec. 18, 1900, 10. 6. “Camp Perry Range Open,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 15, 1909, V18. 7. Trefethen, Americans and Their Guns, 109. 8. “Plans for Great Shoot,” New York Times, Aug. 25, 1901, p. 13. 9. “Ten Nations Join in Big Shoot,” New York Times, August 10, 1913, 9.

236

Chapter Notes — 7, 8

10. “Marksmen go to Church,” New York Times, Sept. 7, 1903, 4. 11. “Big Shoot Opens Today,” New York Times, Aug. 30, 1901, 3. 12. “The President at Sea Girt Camp,” New York Times, July 25, 1902, 1. 13. “An Exciting Day Here at the Shooting Range and on the Baseball Diamond,” Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1901, 9. 14. “Marksmen are Born, Not Manufactured,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 14, 1909, V17. 15. “Man of Iron Nerve,” New York Times, Oct. 3, 1909, XX7. 16. Ibid. 17. “National Board Promotion Rifle Practice,” Forest and Stream: A Journal of Outdoor Life, Travel, Nature Study, and Shooting, Vol. 70, No. 8 (Feb. 22, 1908), 315. 18. Trefethen, Americans and their Guns, 128. 19. Ibid., 130. 20. “National Marksmen’s Reserve,” Forest and Stream: A Journal of Outdoor Life, Travel, Nature Study, and Shooting, Vol. 63, No. 10 (Sept. 4, 1904), 207. 21. Ibid. 22. John Elfreth Watkins, “Army Men Shoot in Sharp Match,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 2, 1906, E2. 23. Trefethen, Americans and Their Guns, 82. 24. “Local Shots Score High,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 5, 1909, VI8. 25. “School Clubs for Practice,” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 29, 1909, VI5. 26. “Schoolboy Shooters in Rifle Tournament,” Los Angeles Times, April 4, 1909, VI5. 27. Ibid.

Chapter 7 1. “It Would Make Us of One Mind,” New York Times, July 12, 1898, p. 6. 2. Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 166. 3. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 10th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 447. 4. Walter LaFeber, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume II, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University, 1993), 91. 5. Ibid., 101. 6. Ibid., 205. 7. Ibid., 184. 8. Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American History (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1980), 59.

Chapter 8 1. “Japan’s Message to the United States,” New York Times, July 17, 1907, SM1. 2. “Emperor William’s Attitude,” New York Times, May 9, 1900, 3. 3. “Germany and Monroeism,” New York Times, May 6, 1900, 1. 4. “War with United States,” Los Angeles Times, May 9, 1900, I4. 5. “Standard Oil Plot Foreshadowed War,” New York Times, May 1, 1900, 1. 6. Von Brandt, M., “The German Press and Foreign Relations,” The Living Age, July 14, 1900, 115. 7. “German-American Relations,” New York Times, June 2, 1901, 4. 8. “Possibility of War with the German Empire,” New York Times, Dec. 29, 1901, 1. 9. “Germany and the U.S.,” New York Times, Dec. 30, 1900, 6. 10. “What Germany Thinks,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 31, 1901, 2. 11. “War with Germany,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 8, 1901, 1. 12. Stephen Bonsal, “Greater Germany in Brazil,” North American Review, Vol. 176, No. 554, Jan. 1903, 59–68. 13. Ibid., 68. 14. “General MacArthur’s Fear of War with Germany,” New York Times, Dec. 11, 1903, 1. 15. “Germany and South America,” Advocate of Peace, Vol. 66, No. 1, Jan. 1904, 3. 16. “Anti-American Move Planned by the Kaiser,” New York Times, Aug. 8, 1906, 1. 17. “The Coming Struggle with Japan,” New York Times, Aug. 18, 1905, 6. 18. “Perkins Expects a Conflict,” New York Times, Feb. 2, 1907, 1. 19. Ibid. 20. “Hobson on Race Supremacy,” New York Times, Dec. 17, 1907, 2. 21. “Expects War and Japanese Victory,” New York Times, Aug. 25, 1907, C4. 22. “Germans Think Outlook Bad,” New York Times, July 17, 1907, 1. 23. “Germans See War Clouds,” Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1907, I1. 24. “Germany Sees War Clouds,” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 8, 1908, I7. 25. Help from Germany,” New York Times, Aug. 16, 1907, 6. 26. “Japan’s Jingoes Make the War Talk,” New York Times, June 17, 1907, 1. 27. “Japanese are Friendly,” New York Times, June 18, 1907, 2. 28. “Japan’s Financial Condition,” New York Times, Aug. 22, 1907, II4. 29. “Japan and America,” New York Times, Sept. 7, 1907, BR536.

Chapter Notes—9, 10 30. “Japan’s Message to the United States,” New York Times, July 17, 1907, SM1. 31. “Japanese Admiral Here Talking Peace,” New York Times, July 11, 1907, 2. 32. F.P. Dunne, “Mr. Dooley on the Japanese Scare,” New York Times, June 9, 1907, SM1. 33. John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), x. 34. W. Dirk Raat, Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 105. 35. “Army Quickly Moves to Frontier Camps,” New York Times, March 9, 1911, 3. 36. “Both Sides Would Resist,” New York Times, March 9, 1911, 3. 37. “Call Militia to War Game,” New York Times, March 9, 1911, 1. 38. “Great War Game Excites the Suspicions of the Experts,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1900, I1. 39. “Guild for Mexican Post,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1911, I2. 40. “Hospital Ship Ready for Troops,” New York Times, March 10, 1911, 3. 41. “Like Real Wartime as Local Troops Go,” New York Times, March 9, 1911, 1. 42. “Troops Arriving at Texas Camps,” New York Times, March 10, 1911, 2. 43. “Army Aeroplanes Tested,’ New York Times, March 16, 1911, 2. 44. “Army Doctors Vigilant,” New York Times, March 23, 1911, 8. 45. “Troops Held as Warning,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1911, I1. 46. “The Texas Maneuvers,” New York Times, Aug. 9, 1911, 8.

Chapter 9 1. Arthur Wellesley Kipling, The Shadow of Glory: Being a History of the Great War of 1910–1911 (London: Alston Rivers, 1910). 2. I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War, 1763–1984 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 44. 3. Ibid. 4. H. Bruce Franklin, War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination (New York : Oxford University Press, 1988), 21–22. 5. I.F. Clarke, The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871–1914 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 19. Clarke is quoting Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and its Present Crisis, 1891, 175. 6. Franklin, War Stars, 21. 7. Ibid., 40.

237

8. Ferdinand Grautoff, Banzai! (New York: Arno Press, 1975), vii. 9. Ibid., x–xi. 10. Ibid., 4. 11. Ibid., 93. 12. Ibid., 119. 13. Ibid., 126. 14. Ibid., 183. 15. Ibid., 193. 16. Ibid., 215. 17. Ibid., 243. 18. Ibid., 293. 19. Marsden Manson, The Yellow Peril in Action: A Possible Chapter in History (San Francisco: Britton and Rey, Jan. 2, 1907). 20. Ibid., 8. 21. Ibid., 13. 22. Ibid., 24. 23. Ibid., 28. 24. Arthur Wellesley Kipling, The Shadow of Glory: Being a History of the Great War of 1910–1911 (London: Alston Rivers, 1910), 56. 25. Ibid., 128. 26. Ibid., 218. 27. Ibid., 224. 28. Ibid., 237. 29. Ibid., 328. 30. Ibid., 331. 31. Ibid., 335. 32. Ibid., 378. 33. Ibid., 383. 34. Ernest Hugh Fitzpatrick, The Coming Conflict of Nations; or, The Japanese-American War, a Narrative (Springfield, Ill.: H.W. Rokker, 1909), 23. 35. Ibid., 71. 36. Ibid., 208. 37. Ferdinand Heinrich Grautoff (Seestern, pseud.), Armageddon 190- (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trübner, 1907), xiv. 38. Ibid., 396. 39. Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1909), 205. 40. Ibid., 270. 41. Ibid., 307. 42. Franklin, War Stars, 40.

Chapter 10 1. J.D. Whelpley, “The Militia Force of the United States,” North American Review, Vol. 174, No. 543, February 1902, 278. 2. Ibid., 276. 3. Ibid., 278. 4. “State Militia,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1901, B1. 5. “Second Regiment,” Los Angeles Times, July 30, 1901, 3.

238

Chapter Notes —11, 12

6. “Fourth at Riverside,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1901, 11. 7. “Santa Catalina Island,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 15, 1902, A5. 8. “Militia Operations near Long Beach,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 7, 1902, 11. 9. “Decided Improvement in the Long Beach Camp,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1902, p. A1. “Hay-footing” and “straw-footing” refers to the Civil War stories, very likely apocryphal, of farm boys being taught to march by commands of “Hay-foot, straw-foot” rather than “left, right, left, right.” 10. “No Buttonhole Bouquets on Soldier Blouses,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 16, 1903, A1. 11. Dailey Paskman and Sigmund Spaeth, Gentlemen, Be Seated! A Parade of the Old-Time Minstrels (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Doran, 1928), 28–29. A minstrel show usually opened with musicians seated in a semicircle, with “Mr. Bones” seated on the far right and “Mr. Tambo” seated on the far left. Their instruments were the “bones,” usually made of ebony and played like castanets, and the tambourine. 12. Ibid., 89. The first part of a traditional minstrel show was musical; the minstrels would play perhaps 10 songs. The second part was the “olio,” which was comedy routines and sketches with some music. The Seventh Regiment men started their entertainment with a minstrel olio; the second part of their show was routines from burlesque and vaudeville. 13. Ibid., 26. The usual master of ceremonies was called “Mr. Interlocutor” and was a pompous straight man. He was usually either white or a black man in whiteface. 14. “Soldiers Make Stage Debut,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 11, 1908, I4. 15. “Night Battle Scene Enlivens Big Harbor,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1908, I1. 16. “Women in Thick of Sham Battle,” New York Times, May 26, 1911, 13. 17. “Reproduction of the Custer Massacre,” New York Times, July 6, 1902, 21.

Chapter 11 1. “State Army on Guard at Mines,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 23, 1900, 1. 2. David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 252. 3. David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth-Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 12. 4. Ibid., 24.

5. Ibid., 31. 6. Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, 328. 7. Ibid., 272. 8. Philip S. Foner, Militarism and Organized Labor: 1900–1914 (Minneapolis: MEP Publications, 1987), 10. 9. Ibid., 12–13. 10. Ibid., 14. 11. Ibid., 15. 12. David Montgomery, Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United States with Democracy and the Free Market During the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 102–103. 13. “State Army on Guard at Mines,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 23, 1900, 1. 14. Ibid. 15. “Fate of Struggle in Balance,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1900, 1. 16. Ibid. 17. “Operators Give All Miners Ask,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 18, 1900, 1. 18. “State Troops to Quell Albany Strike Riots,” New York Times, May 15, 1901, 1. 19. “Twenty-Third Gets Orders,” New York Times, May 15, 1901, 2. 20. “The Albany Strike Grows More Serious,” New York Times, May 16, 1901, 1. 21. “Labor Condemns Court of Appeals,” New York Times, May 17, 1901, 2. 22. “Soldiers Shoot Two Albany Merchants,” New York Times, May 17, 1901, 1. 23. “Conference fails to Settle Albany Strike,” New York Times, May 18, 1901, 1. 24. “Ninth Regiment’s Return,” New York Times, May 19, 1901, 3. 25. Foner, Militarism and Organized Labor, 12. 26. Ibid., 14. 27. “Boy Shot by a Guard,” Boston Globe, June 13, 1902, 1. 28. “More Soldiers!” Boston Globe, Oct. 7, 1902, 1. 29. “Miners Vote to Continue Strike,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 9, 1902, 1. 30. “Union Men Told to Quit Militia,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 18, 1902, 2.

Chapter 12 1. “Cornerstone Laid for 71st Regiment Armory,” New York Times, May 1, 1902, 4. 2. Robert M. Fogelson, America’s Armories: Architecture, Society and Public Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 155. 3. “New Armory Is Urged,” Washington Post, Jan. 2, 1910, ES3.

Chapter Notes—13, 14 4. “Sentiment Growing in Atlanta for the Erection of a Big Armory,” Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 30, 1906, C7. 5. “Armory Going to the Park,” Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1909, II2. 6. “Put No Dancing Hall in Call,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 1, 1909, II 1. 7. “Somerville to Have a Handsome New Armory,” Boston Globe, Sept. 19, 1902, 7. 8. “Cambridge Has a Magnificent New Armory,” Boston Globe, Oct. 11, 1903, 5. 9. “Marlboro’s New Armory,” Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 1905, 25. 10. “Plans for Brockton’s New Armory Complete,” Boston Globe, May 12, 1905, 4. 11. “New Armory for Chelsea,” Sept. 27, 1908, 10. 12. “City to Aid Armories,” New York Times, April 12, 1903, 17. 13. “Plans for New Armory,” New York Times, Aug. 13, 1903, 14. 14. “Cornerstone Laid for 71st Regiment Armory,” New York Times, May 1, 1902, 4. 15. “A Guardsman Up in Arms,” New York Times, March 26, 1906, 8. 16. “Lays Cornerstone for Costly Armory,” New York Times, Dec. 19, 1909, 16.

Chapter 13 1. Rutherford Corbin, “The Third Battle of Bull Run,” Harper’s Weekly, Sept. 3, 1904, 1350. 2. Leonard Wood, “Military Training in Time of Peace,” Outlook, 978. 3. James F. Archibald, “Maneuvers of the California Guard,” Overland, Vol. 38, Aug. 1901, 132. 4. Thomas Wilhelm, Report Upon the Mobilization at Santa Cruz, California of the Division of National Guard of California, Commanded by Major-General John H. Dickinson, N.G.C., San Francisco, July 1, 1901. 5. P. Eastman, “The Fort Riley Maneuvers,” Review of Reviews, Vol. 28, Nov. 1903, 569. 6. Rutherford Corbin, “The Third Battle of Bull Run,” Harper’s Weekly, Sept. 3, 1904, 1350. 7. “Gen. Corbin’s Lawn Fete,” Washington Post, Sept. 4, 1904, E4. 8. “Society and the Maneuvers,” Washington Post, Sept. 5, 1904, 6. 9. Charles D. McKenna, The Forgotten Reform: Field Maneuvers in the Development of the United States Army, 1902–1920, Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1981, U250M3, 8124806, 90. 10. “Defend Negro Militia,” Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1904, p. 4.

239

11. Ibid. 12. “Grant Wins Victory,” Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1904, 2. 13. Ibid. 14. “Bell Routs Grant,” Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1904, 1. 15. “Favored Bell’s Army,” Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1904, 7. 16. “Lessons of Maneuvers,” Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1904, 8. 17. “Siege of Boston,” Harpers Weekly, Aug. 14, 1909, 9. 18. J. Harry Hartley, “Trying to Save Boston from Capture,” Boston Globe, Aug. 8, 1909, 37. 19. “Troops Move to Defend Boston,” Boston Daily, Aug. 8, 1909, 1. 20. James H. Creedon, “On the Firing Line of Both Armies,” Boston Daily Globe, Aug. 16, 1909, 2. 21. “Flank Move by Red Army,” Boston Globe, Aug. 18, 1909, 1. 22. “Boston Free of Invaders,” Boston Daily, Aug. 24, 1909, 1. 23. Editorial, Boston Daily, Aug. 24, 1909, 9. 24. Ibid. 25. Maneuvers and the Military,” The Nation, 1909, 343. 26. Jennings C. Wise, “The Farce of our Military Maneuvers,” Scientific American, Vol. 101, Dec. 25, 1909, 487. 27. Wood, “Military Training,” 979. 28. “War Begins Today; City Under Attack,” New York Times, Aug. 10, 1912, 16. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. “Troops take Field to Save New York,” New York Times, Aug. 11, 1912, 5.

Chapter 14 1. Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989), 9. 2. Ibid., 299. 3. David F. Noble, America by Design (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), xxii. 4. Ibid., xxiii–xxv. 5. H. Bruce Franklin, War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 6. “The Paths to Peace,” Los Angeles Times, March 7, 1906, II4. 7. Godfrey L. Carden, “Gruson Coast Defence Turrets,” Harpers Weekly, March 16, 1901, 289. 8. Ibid., 290. 9. “World’s Greatest Gun,” Harpers Weekly, Dec. 13, 1902, 1329. 10. “Guns of the Coast Defense,” Scientific American, Vol. 106 (May 18, 1912), 441.

240

Chapter Notes —15

11. “Gun Versus Armor,” Scientific American, Vol. 106 (May 18, 1912), 442–3, 460. 12. “Coast Defense by Submarine Mines,” Scientific American, Vol. 106 (May 18, 1912), 444. 13. Henry J. Case, “New York’s Inadequate Seacoast Defence and the Grave Responsibility of Congress,” Harper’s Weekly, Oct. 13, 1906, 1362. 14. Francis John Dyer, “The Defenders of Our Shoreline,” World’s Work, Vol. 15 (Feb. 8, 1908), 9881. 15. “Coast Defenses of the United States,” Scientific American, Vol. 106 (May 18, 1912), 438.

16. William L. Hull, Preparedness: The American Versus the Military Programme (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1916), 221.

Chapter 15 1. “Editorial Comment,” Town and Country, April 5, 1902, 2917. 2. Joseph Kett, Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1790–Present (New York : Basic Books, 1977), 193.

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Index References in bold italics indicate pages with photographs.

Addams, Jane 14–15 airplanes 125 Albany, New York, streetcar strike 172–176 Alger, John 11 Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers 176 American Federation of Labor 168–169 Anderson, Col. 186 Anti-Imperialist League 106 Aoki, Sh¨zÉ 107, 119 Archibald, James F. 195–196 Armageddon 190 147–148 Armories see National Guard armories Arms and the Boy 18–20 Army-Navy football game 39–40 Army reforms 10–13, 63 Atlanta, Georgia: armory 186–187; tournament 54–56

Bryan, William Jennings 5, 106 Buffalo Bill’s Wild West 42–44 Buffington, Brig. Gen. Adelbert 88 cadets 17, 18 Cambridge, Massachusetts, armory 189 Camp Frank Murphy, New Jersey 87 Camp Perry, Ohio 86, 91 Carden, Godfrey L. 218–219 Carter, George R. 112 Carter, William H. 123, 125, 127 castellated style 184 Catalina Island sham battle 158 Cervera, Pascual 217 Chafee, Adna 198 Chambers, John Whiteclay II vii, 151 Chelsea, Massachusetts, armory 189 Chesney, George Tomkyns 129 Chicago Association of Commerce 60 Chicago, Illinois, tournaments 56, 57–62 Chicago Law and Order League 59 cigarette smoking 28, 66–67 circuses 41–42, 61–62 The Citadel, South Carolina 17 Clarke, I.F. 129 Cleveland, Grover 217 Coast Artillery 215–226 coast defense guns 219–222 Cody, William F. “Buffalo Bill” 42–44, 46–47, 165 Coghlan, Joseph G. 50 Cole, Truman 160 Columbus, Ohio, armory 190 The Coming Conflict of Nations; or, The Japanese-American War, a Narrative 145–147 Connecticut maneuvers 210–213 Corbin, Rutherford 194, 198, 199, 200 cornbread 68 Creedmoor, New York 85, 86 Culver Military Academy, Missouri 18–20

Baden-Powell, Robert 30, 31, 32–34 Banzai! 131–137 Barkin, Kenneth vii Barr, Matthew 176–177 The Battle of Dorking 129 Bauer, C.F. 110 Beban-Crosby Act 23 Bederman, Gail vii, 40 Benjamin, Park 129 Beveridge, Albert 6, 7 Biggs, David vii blank cartridge race 52 Bolger, “Budley” 163 Bonsal, Stephen 110–111 Boston, Massachusetts, maneuvers 204– 209 Bowley, Capt. A.J. 57 Boy Scouts 31–33, 34, 35 Boyd, Capt. Charles T. 25 Brazil 107, 109, 110, 111 Brockton, Massachusetts, armory 189 Brooke, Maj. Gen. John R. 12

249

250 Danish West Indies 108 Davis, Richard Harding 45 Denn, William 49 de Segur, Gaston 110 Dewey, George 12 Dewey, John 20, 36 Diaz, Porfirio 121, 122, 125 Dickinson, General 159 disappearing guns 221 disappearing targets 85 District of Columbia armory 184–185 Dooley, Mr. 120 double pursuit 51 Dozier, Melville 23 drill 36 Du Bois, W.E.B. 200 Dudley, Edgar S. 26 Eiselman, E.A. 20 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 11 Endicott Board 217 Evans, Admiral Robley 120, 121 Farwell, Arthur Burrage 59 Fee, Ira B. 29 Fitts-Jones, Minona F. 59, 60 Fitzpatrick, Ernest 145–147 Fogelson, Robert 183 Follmer, Lt. Col. 187 Foner, Philip vii Fort Meyer, Virginia 44, 48–50 Fort Riley, Kansas, maneuvers 197 Fort Slocum, New York, Recruiting Station 69, 70 Foulois, Benjamin 125, 212 Franklin, H. Bruce vii, 130, 216 fraternal organizations 156 Fremantle, Edmund Robert 148 Gaston, Lucy 66–67 Gatling gun 46, 56 George, Henry 174 Germany, relations with United States 102–104 Gignilliat, R.L. 18–20 Gobin, John P.S. 171, 178 Gompers, Samuel 170 Governor’s Island, New York, sham battle 163–164 Grant, Frederick Dent 56, 59, 164, 202 Grautoff, F.H. 131–137, 147–148, 211 Great White Fleet 105 Gruson turrets 218–219 Hardie, F.H. 45 Hare, J. Madison 87 Hay, John 11 Heistand, H.O.S. 78–79 Hepburn, “Pete” 79–80 Hobson, Richmond Pearson 114, 115–116

Index Hofstadter, Richard 3, 40 Homeopathic Hospital 41 hookworm 67 Hull, William T. 226 Hunt, R.H. 190–191 Hyde, T.T. 92 Industrial Workers of the World 35, 169–170 interventionism 151 invisible guns 221 Jamestown 124–125 Japan, relations with the United States 104–106 Jefferson, Charles E. 9 Jews 22 Jones, Albert 85 Jones, Howard 112 Jones, Mary Harris 171 Kasson, Joyce vii Kelly, Philip 176–177 Kenney, Franklin R. 68–69, 72–73, 75–76 Keppel, Mark 23, 57 Kett, Joseph vii, 231 Kipling, Arthur Wellesley 140–145 Knights of Labor 168 Krupp armor 218 labor 167–182 LaFeber, Walter 105 land grant colleges 5, 17 Landis, Kenesaw Mountain 75 Lea, Homer 148–150, 211 Lloyd, Brian vii Long Beach, California, National Guard encampment and sham battle 158–159 long-range targets 88 Los Angeles, California, armory 187–188 Low, Seth 190 MacArthur, Arthur 112–113 Mahan, Alfred 10 Manassas, Virginia, maneuvers 198–204 Maneuvers 194–214, 229 Mann, Fred 49 Manson, Marsden 137–140 marksmanship 84–100, 228 Marlboro, Massachusetts, armory 189 Martin, I.H. 186 Massachusetts Special Commission on Military Education and Reserve 20 McClellan, George B. 191 McGerr, Michael vii McGowan, Acting Mayor 192 McKinley, William 5, 11 McNamara, John W. 173 Meade, Richard 102 Menshikoff, M. 116–117 Merritt, Wesley 47

Index Mexico, relations with the United States 120–127 Miles, Nelson 46 militarism: defined 10, 23; issue in 1900 Presidential campaign 7–12 Military Athletic League 41 military tournaments 40–62 military training in schools 14–37, 227–228 militia 154–155 Miller, Joseph Dana 8 Milling, Lt. 210 Mills, Albert L. 210 minefields 223, 224 minstrel shows 160–161 Mitchell, John 167, 171 Miyakawa, Masuji 118 Montgomery, David vii Morgan, E.E. 76 Morris, W.F. 41 Mother Jones see Jones, Mary Harris Muller, Private Karl 67 muskets 84 Nasaw, David vii Nathan, George Jean 80–82 national anthem 52 National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice 92–94 National Guard 154–166, 193, 229; armories 183–193 National Marksmen’s Reserve 92–93 National Rifle Association 84, 85, 86, 92, 94–95, 96, 97, 98 National Trophy 95 New Castle, Wyoming 30 New York, New York: armories 190–192; tournaments 41, 45–48 O’Ryan, John F. 163 Palma Trophy 87, 88 Parabellum see Grautoff, F.H. Parker, James 24–25 Parmalee, Philip 125 Pawtucket, Rhode Island, streetcar strike 177–178 Pennsylvania coal strikes 170–172, 178–180 Perkins, George F. 114 Peterson, Vernon 177 Philippine Islands 12 Pilcher, Col. William L. 75 Playground Movement 41–42 Political Equality League 59 Portsmouth Treaty 105 racism 151, 200–201, 204, 231 range-finding 225 Ravitch, Diane vii Read, John J. 88 recruiting 63–83, 230; posters 71, 72, 73

251

rescue race 49 Reventlow, Ernst 117–118 Riverside, California sham battle 158 Roe, General 174 “Romance of the Recruiting Office” 80–82 Romer Shoal 219 Root, Elihu 5–7, 11, 46, 106, 191 Root-Takahira Agreement 105 Roosevelt, Theodore 1, 3, 8, 32–33, 45, 67, 84, 88, 92, 103, 104, 105, 106, 191, 217 running man targets 85 Ryan, W.D. 180 Ryder, John D. 206–207 Sane Fourth Association 56–57 San Francisco School Board crisis 105 San Pedro, California sham battle 162 Santa Cruz, California: maneuvers 195–197; National Guard encampments 156–158 Santo Domingo 113 Sargent, Dudley Allen 19 Sea Girt, New Jersey 85, 108, 86, 88, 89–90, 94 Selden, Charles 77 The Shadow of Glory: Being a History of the Great War of 1910–1911 140–145 Shafroth, John 12 Shenandoah Pennsylvania 170, 179, 180 Sheridan, Wyoming, sham battle 164–165 skirmish matches 85–86 Slavin, Cpl. Charles 49 Slotkin, Richard vii Smith, Frederick A. 210 socioeconomic change 98–99 Soldiers Home 65 Somerville, Massachusetts, armory 188–189 Southern California Teachers Association 23 Spencer, Bird W. 88 Stafford, William Henry 161 Stake drill 50 Steever, E.Z. 26–31 Stimson, Henry 60, 125–126, 163, 206 street riot drill 51 strikes 167–182 Stromquist, Sheldon, vii Stuart, Alan 68 Swinton, John 173–174 Taft, William Howard 3, 61, 106, 121, 123, 124, 126 Taylor, Frederick W. 215 technology 215–216 tent-pegging 48, 51 Texas maneuvers 121–125, 126, 127 Theatrical Protective Union 176 Toledo, Ohio, tournament 53–54 Tournaments 40–62, 99, 228 United States foreign relations 101–106 United Traction Company 172–175

252 The Valor of Ignorance 148–150 Van Cortland Park, New York City, sham battle 162–163 vaudeville 42 Vincent, Howard 7 Virginia Military Institute 17 von Brandt, M. 108–109 von Clausewitz, Karl 222 Voorhees, Foster M. 88 Wakatsuki, Reiziro 118 Wankowski, Robert 187, 188 war fiction 129–150, 152, 229 war scares 197–128, 151, 228; Germany 107–113, 128; Japan 113–120, 128; Mexico 121–127 Washington, Booker T. 200 Western Federation of Miners 35 Wheeler, C.K. 79

Index Wheeler, Joseph 203 Whelpley, J.D. 154, 155 Wiebe, Robert vii Wilhelm, Thomas 196–197 Willey, Day Allen 14, 16, 18 Wilson, Woodrow 3 Withington, Chandler 192 Wobblies see Industrial Workers of the World Wood, Leonard 12, 123, 124, 194–195, 207, 209 Wyoming Plan 26–31 Yamamoto, Gombel 119–120, 121 The Yellow Peril in Action: A Possible Chapter in History 137–140 Young, Albert 180 Young, John R. 61

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