The Rise of Indonesian Communism

THE RISE OF INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

RUTH

T.

MCVEY .

THE RISE OF INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

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1he Rise of Indonesian Communism by Ruth T. McVey

First Equinox Editio n 2006

Copyright © 1965 by Cornell University; renewed 1993 lhis is a reprint editio n authorized by the originaJ publisher, Cornell U niversity Press.

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McVey, Ruth Thomas. The rise: ofIndonesian communism I Ruth T. McVey. 1st Equinox cd. Jakana : Equinox Pub., 2006. xviii, 510 p. j 23 em. ISBN : 9793780363 Includes bibliographical references (p. 359-491) and index. i . Panai Komunis Indonesia--History. 2. Communism- indonesia.

2007306456

All righTS reserved. No part of this p'ublication may be repnxluced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmiued in my form or by my mearu, deamnic, mechanical , photocopying, recording or otherwise: withom the prior permission of Equinox Publishing.

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Contents P<elace Introduction

I Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies II Birth of the Revolutionary Movement III Becoming a Communist Party IV V

vii xi

1 7 34

joining the Comintem

48

The Bloc Within

76

VI Elective AfHnities

105

VII Semaun's Program

125

VIII

The Bloc Above

IX International Relations

X Deviation XI Making a Revolution XII The Rebellions XIII Turning Points

155 198 'lSI

290 323

347

Notes

359

Index

493

Preface THE formative years of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) are of interest both for scholars concerned with modem Indonesia and for students of international Communism. One of the first political groupings in Indonesia, the PKl reflected in its early period many characteristics of a movement bridging the gap from traditional to

modem concepts of political organization and goals. As such, it exhibited openly many traits that today aTC muted but nonetheless strong in Indonesian politics, and a study of the nature of its early appeal contributes greatly to our ability to appreciate its position as the most popular Indonesian political party today. At the same time, the early PKl contributed by both its actions and its ideas to the evolving Indonesian independence movement, and neither the growth of that movement nor the colonial government's response to it can be fully comprehended without an understanding of the Communists' role. The importance of the PKI in the international Communist movement stems chiefly from the fact that it was one of the very ,few Asian Communist parties to develop something of a mass following in the early years of the Comintern. It therefore proVides a point of comparison for the evolution of Comintem policy in China, the chief arena of the Third International's activity in underdeveloped Asia. This is particularly relevant in that the bloc-within strategy, the culmination of the Comintem's China policy in the period 1920-1927, was first evolved in Indonesia, and this prior Indonesian experience was then consciously applied in China; in Indonesia, however, as the author of the present book demonstrates, application of this strategy had a very different outcome. Most studies of Communist parties tend to concentrate either on their role on the indigenous stage or on their participation in international Communist affairs. However, to prOvide a balanced view of the Piers development, Miss McVey has given her attention vii

Pre/ace to both aspects of its early existence, and in doing so she has demonstrated the interplay of domestic and international factors in detennining the party's growth. She is unusually well equipped to consider Indonesian Communism in both lights, having received her academic training first in Harvard University's Soviet Area Program, where her work was primarily concerned with the development of Comintern colonial policy. and then in the. Deparbnent of Government and the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University, where her doctoral work centered on Indonesian government and politics. Miss McVey has been studying Indonesian Communism since 1953. and in her present pos.ition as Research Associate in the Cornell Modem Indonesia Project is carrying this research forward. The present volume, conceived as the 6rst part of a general history of the PKI. is the product of research in 6ve countries and as many languages. It draws not only upon extensive interviews but also upon a mass of material hitherto largely unexplored. On the basis of these data, Miss McVey provides a solid documentation of events and presents an account and analysis of the party's internal workings that goes beyond, I believe, any other study of Communism in Asia. GEORGE

Ithaca July 9, 1965

viii

MeT.

KAlUN

Introduction THE Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has attracted considerable attention in recent years because it is the largest such organization outside the Sino-Soviet bloc and the most powerful poUtical party in its country. This notoriety is of recent vintage, but the PICI itself is not: it can claim to be the oldest major Indonesian party and the first Communist movement to be established in Asia beyond the borders of the fanner Russian Empire. It began as a Marxist socialist organization, founded in the Netherlands Indies a few months before the outbreak of World War I. By the time of the Soviet seizure of power in Russia it had been divested of its non-Bolshevik elements, and early in 1920 it officially took the title Communist. This volumethe first in what is planned as a general history of the Indonesian Communist movement-concems the PKI's development from its birth in 1914 to its temporary eclipse in 1927 after a disastrous revolutionary attempt. This period has not preViously been investigated by historians of international Communism. The double language barrier of Indonesian and Dutch has combined with the PKl's peripheral position as an object of Comintem interest to preserve its obscurity. The principal studies dealing with the development of Indonesian Communism during the colonial period were sponsored directly or indirectly by the Netherlands Indies government in the wake of the 1926-1927 rebellion and are limited in both their objectives and their point of view. Indeed, Indonesian political development in the colonial part of the twentieth century is, as a whole. still relatively unexplored territory; in the past decade several important scholarly investigations have appeared that add conSiderably to our understanding of the period. but much more needs to be done before our grasp of it can be considered in any way satisfactory. As an active participant both in the Comintem's Asian activities xi

1I1troducti0l1

and in the evolving Indonesian independence movement, the early PKl contributed to two historical streams. Its major importance as part of the world Communist movement is that it was the only Communist party other than the Chinese · in the "colonial and semi· colonial" Far East that both possessed legality and played a Significant role in the political life of its country; and it was the only one to do so in a European-governed possession. The PKI's relations with the Communist International were therefore rather different from those of its illegal or politically impotent counterparts elsewhere in the colonial world. They were more intimate, in that the PKI was able to maintain active and meaningful relations with the Comintern, and also more stramed, in that, as a movement that had achieved political significance by its own efforts, the Indonesian party had its own vested interests and its own concepts of the proper path to power. Physical distance added to the complexity of the relationship, for, having no direct access to the Indies and no means of imposing its opinion on the party, the Comintem was forced to deal with the PKI through the Dutch Communists and the highly opinionated Indonesian party representatives abroad. Under these circumstances the lines of communication knotted into a political entanglement, the snarled skeins of which were spun of national, factional, and personal differences within the Communist Jeaderships concerned . The most extreme development of the program of alliance with revolutionary nationalism, which the Comintern followed from 1920 to 1927, was the so-called bloc within, whereby a Communist party's members entered a nationalist mass movement and worked to caphrre it from inside. The strategy was followed in two countries, Indonesia and China. The result in China has been widely discussed by both Communist and non·Communist historians, for this was the program that culminated disastrously in the defeat of the Communists by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. The Indonesian bloc within has never really been considered as an aspect of international Communist policy, but it was in Indonesia that the strategy first developed and it was 6tted to political conditions there and not in China. The course of the Indonesian bloc within-unfolding in this case without effective interference by the Comintem-offers parallels and contrasts to the Chinese experience that may be useful in evaluating that still wannly debated episode in the history of Communist strategy. Though the PKI was never a large party in the colonial period. its xii

Introdu ct ion place in the Indonesian politics of its day was out of aU proportion to its numerical size. In 1924 the party itself had barely one thousand members, but at the same time it had by common concession the greatest popular following of all the Indonesian political groupings. Its relations with the other elements in the Indonesian opposition were of long-standing if scarcely harmonious intimacy; the nature of these connections and the attitudes of the non-Communist leaders toward the PKI as an ally, rival, and source of ideas are of interest because they reflected the organizational and ideological leanings of the Indonesian political elite-leanings which, in several important respects, are similar to those of the country's leadership in the period since independence. The PKI's relations were not con6ned to the elite, however; much the same as the party today, it had no special appeal for the well-educated but drew its cadres from the ranks of those who found themselves SOCially, economically, and psychologically on the border between Indonesia's traditional and modern worlds. Though its core was urban, lower-class, and ethnically. Javanese, it extended its appeal to Outer Islanders, merchants, thc religiously orthodox, members of the lesser aristocracy, and wealthier peasants, in addition to and in some places even in exclusion of the morc familiar sources of Communist support. Frankly playing upon popular messianic traditions, it thus gathered a heterogeneous follOwing whose only common characteristic was bitter discontent at the colonial status quo. In accomplishing this, the party sowed the seeds of its own destruction, demonstrating the danger of relying too much on the anarchist element which is a part of Communism's appeal: the price of the PKI's popularity was the promise of revolution, and in the end it found itself leading a rebellion its leaders knew could not succeed. The PKI's early career spanned a fateful period in the development of Dutch colonial policy, for the outcome of which the party itself was in good measure responsible. At the beginning of the century the Ethical Policy, which stressed the promotion of Indonesian social, economic, and political progress, became the guiding philosophy of Indies government. The last aim was always the policy's weakest, and with the rise of an Indonesian political opposition it was increasingly questioned by Ethicism's numerous foes. The bistory of the era in which Indonesian Communism 6rst developed is one of bittet conflict between those who were convinced that only a xiii

Introduction sympathetic approach to Indonesian political movements would eusure the healthy development of the colony and those who feared political freedom was a Pandora's box, the opening of which would result in revolution. It was a lOSing battle for the Ethici; scholars disagree on just when the tide turned against them. but the final blow their cause received is clear: it was the Communist rebelUon of 1926-1927, which ended DutCh eHorts to compromise with the Indonesian opposition and so left the Indonesian parties no real middle road between revolution and disengagement from the problem of achieving independence. There is reason enough, then, to undertake a study of the early PICl The problem, however, is how to go about it. Anyone attempting to deal with the history of a Communist movement outside the USSR must decide whether to consider the party primarily as a component of a world movement or to view it as a part of the domestic political scene. In some cases the nature of the available materials or the course of the party's history makes the choice a fairly simple one; in the case of the early PICI, however, the problem is vexing. Both its international and its domestic connections were important to the party's development; at the same time, the history of the PKl prOvides useful material for understanding both the Indonesian independence movement and the colonial policy of the Comintem. My initial intention, having come to the PKI by way of an interest in the history of Communism, was to focus chiefly on the party's character as a component of the Comintern and to deal with the domestic scene only as a background for its relations with the Third International. I found, however, that the closeness of the party's ties to its local environment, when combined with the fact that these surroundin.gs have not yet been adequately studied, forced me either to gloss over problems that were of cardinal importance for the party's attitude toward the world movement aT to devote as much attention to its domestic as to its international setting. The result is a work that views the party in both environments and is directed at students of Indonesian as well as Communist history. This has meant that I have included some information which, though doubtless familiar to one group of readers, is needed by the other and that I have discussed some problems that are germane to one set of interests but not to both. I have tried to weave my account closely enough so that this does not irritate the reader; so far as I have not succeMed in xi"

Introduction this, I hope the advantage of having both sides of the Communist coin presented in one work will outweigh the stylistic drawbacks. The paucity of studies concerning the period in which the PKI arose made limitation of the subject difficult, but it provided a clear choice in another matter. Although treabnents based on conceptual frameworks are often more stimulating than chronological accounts, it seemed to me that at this stage the latter approach would he more useful, as it would provide an easily accessible record of events, The fact that the work is devoted to analysis and suggestion as much as to annals Jed me to the same conclusion. Communism, nationalism, and colonialism are subjects on which few people agree, and I felt the reader would accordingly be best served by an account that provided enough detail , arranged in a chronological-and thus un· directed-framework, to enable him to interp~et the events for him· self. Sinee I am dealing with the PKI on several levels, I have not always been able to adhere to a presentation through time-I have deviated from it most notably in describing the party's communica· tions with the Comintern and in discussing its organization and social sources of support-but this has remained the basic structure of the study. Similar reasons prompted me to document my account closely. There are a number of points at which my version of events differs from that given in other histories, and heavy documentation is necessary if this is not to become just one more divergent source from which the bewildered reader must choose, Furthermore, although a comparatively rich amount of primary sources and contemporary accounts of the early PKI exist, not all the story could be pieced together from these, and it seemed to me important that the reader be able to check how close a source was to the event it described. Finally, the fact that an account is 6rsthand by no means guarantees its accuracy. A high degree of personal and partisan feeling colored the writings and statements of participants in the events described here; even government intelligence reports classified for internal use and dealing with matters observed firsthand were often heavily slanted by their compiler's prejudice against or in favor of Indonesian political activity. Neither the Indies Dutch nor the IndoneSian-language press was noted for checking stories before p'rinting them; the major Indonesian papers, for that matter, functioned more as journals of debate than of record and were not overly concerned with recounting xo

Introduction events. In consequence. widely differing presentations of facts-let alone motives-appear in contemporary sources on the events in which the PKI was involved. Doe way to judge wbether an event did or did not take place as described in a firsthand account is to trace the survival of the account in subsequent writings-particularly those of the side injured by that version. 1 have supplied later references in addition to contemporary ones wherever it was possible to do so, in the many cases where the 6rsthand sources might be considered skewed by bias. In an important sense, the sbarp disagreement of contemporary sources on the early PKI is all to the good. It has not been necessary for me to rely to any great extent on the analytical techniques of what .has become popularly known as Kremlinology: no lacquer of monolithic unity hid the splinters of debate in the early phase of the Indonesian party. Not only was intraparty disagreement on major issues aired publicly, but the Indies Communist press was decentralized, with regional journals reflecting the thinking and the popular approach of the provincial party leaders . who ran them. Moreover, until about 1924 the PKI was closely tied to the other components of the Indonesian national movement; it was not a closed group, and its various non-Communist observers were relatively well aware of what was going on within it. They themselves might be highly prejudiced in their views, but there was no finn division into pro- and anti-Communist in Indonesian politics of the period; consequently, we find contemporary outside accounts of the party's activities re8ecting a wide range of approaches to the subject and a correspondingly rich store of analysis. Differences in attitude toward the emergence of Indonesian nationalism Similarly lent variety to the interpretations appearing in government reports. Moreover, certain Dutch officials and scholars associated with the Indies government added to their private libraries the classified documents, intelligence and police reports, and accounts by local administrators to which they were given access. Thus materials dealing with a broad spcctrum of the party's activities, which might otherwise have been lost or hidden away in archives, were available to me; and I am grateful to the Indonesian government for granting me permission to use them. The existence of such materials, along with those of government-sponsored SOCiolOgical investigations into the two major areas of· rebellion, a few important bits of party =i

Introdu ction correspondence, advice and criticisms-some very outspoken-by the PKI's advisers abroad, and the oral accounts of surviving party leaders of the period made it possible to consider the PKl on many levels and from many angles. The result is that, in spite of the span of years that separates the early PKI from a present-day observer, the nature of the party in its first stage of development is in some ways more visible than its present personality. I hope that this volume contributes to revealing that character and, in consequence, aids in our understanding a formative period in the development both of Indonesian politics and of Asian Communism. Since the research for this study took place over a number ot years, a great many individuals and institutions contributed to its realization. I am particularly indebted to George MeT. Karun, of Cornell University, without whose encouragement and painstaking guidance the work would never have reached completion. I should further like to express my thanks to Mario Einaudi and Knight Biggerstaff, also of Cornell, who advised my study of Marxist ideology and Asian revolutionary history, and to Merle Fainsod, of Harvard, who guidcd mc to the study of Comintern colonial strategy. In the Netherlands, Professors W. F. Wertheim and G. F. Pijper were generous with their time and advice; B. Costcr made available to mc the sUlviving set of Het Vriie Woora, which he once edited, and A. van Marie and James S Holmes made the vital contribution of first suggesting that I study the Indonesian Communist movement. In Indonesia I should particularly like to thank Semaun, Darsono, thc latc Alimin, and Djamaluddin Tamin-all of whom were extremely patient and frank in answering my endless questions about the movement they once ledas well as Mansur Bogok, who was most helpful in introducing me to these and later leaders of Indonesia's revolutionary left. Finally, I wish to express my very great gratitude to those who were with me as graduate students in the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University; their companionship. made study a pleasure, and their ideas and criticisms did much to diScipline my work and broaden its approach. The major part of my research was done in the follOWing libraries, the staffs of which were most helpful to me: in the United States, the university libraries at Cornell and Harvard, New York Public Library, and Hoover Memorial Library at Stanford; in the Netherlands, the libraries of the Royal Tropical Institute, the International xvii

Introduction Institute for Social History, the Royal Library, the Documentation Bureau for Overseas Law, the Ministry for Overseas Territories, and the Royal Institute for Linguistics, Geography, and Ethnography; in England, the British Library for Political and Social Sciences and the library of the Royal Institute for International Affairs; in the USSR, the Lenin Library in Moscow and the libraries of the Institute of Asian Peoples in Moscow and Leningrad; and in Indonesia, the library of the Museum at Djakarta. My study in them was made possible by Cornell University, its Southeast Asia Program, and tbe Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, which supported various phases of my research at Cornell and in the Netherlands as well as my visits to England and the USSR; by the Ford Foundation, which granted me fellowships for work in the Netherlands, Indonesia, and the United States; by the Russian Research Center, a fel10wship from which supported my work at Harvard; and by the Fels Foundation, which made possible the writing of the study. Needless to say, none of them is in any way responsihle for the views presented in the book. Most introductions end in a fiuny of technicalities, and this one is no exception: I shall close with a note on spelling. Both the Indonesian and the Dutch orthographies were revised after the period dealt with in this volume. The names of people and organizations existing both then and now are thus spelled differently at different times. Recent works in Indonesian and Dutch referring to the earlier period generally use the new rather than the original spelling of names. Because the present spelling is more akin to actual pronunciation, I have chosen to use it except in the titles of publications. The only Significant change in Indonesian spelling is the substitution of u for the Dutch· derived oe. In Dutch, the major changes have been the dropping of doubled vowels and the ch in sch wherever their presence did not affect pronunciation.

Rum T. McVEY Ithaca

June, 1965

xviii

I

Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies ONE of the major tasks assigned the Comintem by its founders was to create a role for Communism in that act of the Asian revolutionary drama which was played out between the two world wars. In part, this concern for revolution in the East was a product of Russian proximity to the major Asian countries and the Soviet Union's consequent desire to influence events in those lands. The International's interest did not stop with Russia's neighbors, however, for its efforts in Asia were only one part of an attempt to make a place for Communism in underdeveloped areas all over the world: The East-this is not only the oppressed Asian world. The East is the whole colonial world, the world of the oppressed peoples not only of Asia, but also of Africa and South America: in a word, all that world on whose exploitation rests the might of capitaJ.ist society in Europe and the United States. l

This belief that the colonies played a vital role in shoring up the capitalist system was not part of the original Marxian system: the tradition in which the European revolutionary socialists were raised not only tended to ignore the colonial problem in general but also went so far as to deny that the Communists had a part to play in the backward areas of the world. The destruction of capitalism through socialist revolution absorbed the attention of the movement's founders; and this. they held. could only take place in highly indusbialized Western Europe, where a massive proletarian class groaned under the rule of the bourgeoisie. 2 Other societies would be consumed in the spreading holocaust, but their populations would provide neither the spark nor the fuel for it. The colonial question was thus peripheral in Marxian thought, and it was not until some years after his death that Marx's followers began to

1

Rise of Indonesinn Communism reinterpret his · system to allot the East a more important role. The cause of this reappraisal was the unprecedented prosperity the capitalist nations enjoyed at the turn of the century. Marx had pictured Europe's future as one of deepening economic crises and mounting proletarian misery. The capitalist states. however. became ~ore prosperous than ever, and-even more surprising to the revolutionaries.the economic and social position of the working class distinctly improved. Marx was thus apparently wrong, and his system had to be either abandoned or l'einterpreted to explain the new development. In response to this ideological crisis, the main body of continental socialists abandoned the belief that socialism could be gained only through revolution. The progress made thus far by organized labor showed. they held, that the proletariat could gain sufficient strength by parliamentary means to force the capitalists to accede to its demands and, eventually. to take over the government itself. This revision of Marx's theory had tremendous implications for the socialists' attitude on international questions: for if the proletariat did have a chance to participate in and eventually control the affairs of its country, it then followed that the working class had a stake in the nation's welfare and that Marx's dictum that the proletariat had no fatherland was no longer valid. The consequences of this position were vividly illustrated in 1914, when the socialist parties of the great powers decided to back their governments in war; but the implications had also been evident some years before in the debate on the colonial question at a congress of the Second (Socialist) International held in Stuttgart in 1901. At that meeting, the majority of the delegates from the major powers supported a proposal to abandon the International's previous policy of condemning colonialism outright. They reasoned that possession of colonies was not an evil in itself, for the exploitation of underdeveloped areas brought prosperity to European workers and economic and political development to the colonies.s What should therefore be cOmbated, the reformists he1d, was the misuse of colonial power and not the possession of colonies per se. 4 This left the colonial question, so far as the Revisionists were concerned, where it had been for Marx---on the periphery of socialist interest. They tended to sec the problem as one on which their stand had to be dctennined on general humanitarian grounds rather than by the 2

Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies immediate interests and desires of the European working class, Indeed, to support colonial independence frequently meant to oppose those interests and desires, for such a stance offended nationalist feelings and alarmed those who thought that the loss of the colonies would bring poverty and unemployment to the metropolitan workers, When we consider that the Revisionist leaders staked their hopes on parliamentary success-and thus' on securing widespread popular support-we can readily understand why they generally allowed the colonial question to rest as a side issue in their party platforms and why they placed far more emphaSiS on reform in the colonial governments than on speedy independence for the colonies, The Revisionist proposal was defeated at the 1907 congress by a combination of socialist delegates from the lesser noncolonial powers and representatives of the second major stream of Marxist thought, the Left or Orthodox: socialists. This was the ideological faction to which Lenin belonged and which, after much splitting, was to fonn the core of the Third (Communist) International. The radical group generally held that the reason why Marx's prophecy of capitalist crisis had not been fulfilled was that the capitalist system in the industrially developed Western countries had renewed its lease on life by expanding into less developed parts of the world: in other words, by imperialism. A number of theories on the imperialist phenomenon were developed by the radical Marxists, but the most important for our purposes is that set forth by Lenin. The Russian revolutionary asserted that capitalism, because of its anarchic, competitive nature, necessarily results in overproduction of goods and capital. The capitalist nations are forced to take up an imperialist policy in an effort to find new areas for capital inveshnent; and to ensure that a sufficient area will be available to them, the capitalist powers reserve underdeveloped areas by placing them under colonial rule. The state is thus used by capitalist interests to further their expansionist policies, and in this process nationalism, hitherto a progressive force, is twisted into an imperialist weapon. During the imperialist period, the upper levels of the working class in the metropoles may enjoy some small share of the colonial proSts; in return for this, they tend to identify with their "national interests" rather than with the interests of the proletariat as a whole. When, however, the division of the world among the great imperial powers has been completed, there will be increasingly savage wars among the

3

Rise of Indonesian Communism master nations for control of .subject areas; these conllicts will force such great sacri6ces upon the workers that they will eventually revolt and bring down the capitalist system. As I have stated, this theory was developed in response to the situation in Western Europe rather than in Asia. In explaining capitalist prosperity, however, it succeeded in bringing the colonia~ question from the outskirts of Marxist thought to its very center: for if in its imperialist stage capitalism depends for its existence on dominating underdeveloped regions, it follows that removing those areas from metropolitan control would mortally injure the capitalist system. During the existence of the Comintem, the Communists never came to the extreme conclusion that could be drawn from Lenin's theory-that is, that the colonial areas, as the "soft underbelly of capitalism," were . actually a more important arena of revolution than was industrial Europe. The docbine did, however, keep the Comintem from viewing the colonial issue simply as a side line to the revolutionary campaign in Europe. Although the requirements of Russian foreign policy would, of themselves, have forced a considerable Communist interest in the awakening of Asia. we may doubt whether this concern would have expressed itself as consistently and uncompromisingly as it did in ~e Srst two decades after the October Revolution, had it not been for thiS ideolOgical incentive. Lenin did not publish his full theoretical analysis of imperialism until 1917, but the divergence between the right and left socialist views on the subject had been clearly apparent since the tum of the century and, as we have seen, led to a major dispute at the 1907 Stuttgart congress. G The debate in that assembly was dominated by Karl Kautsky, advocating retention of socialist anticolonial views on behalf of the Orthodox left, and the Dutch representative, H . van Kol, who urged adoption of a resolution which had been proposed by the Revisionistdominated colonial commission of the congress and which prOvided as follows: The congress affirms that the usefulness of colonial policy in general, and especially for the working class, is strongly exaggerated. However, it does not reject every colonial policy on principle and for all time, since under a

socialist regime it could have a civilizing effect.' Van Kol was the principal colonial expert of the Netherlands Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP ); he prided himself on the practi-

4

Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies cal view of affairs that ten years' experience in the Dutch parliament had given him, and he let Kautsky know plainly that his advocacy of economic and technical assistance instead of socialist colonialism was sheer folly: Today we have heard once again the old wives' tale of colonial oppression, which has become boring enough for a congress of socialists. , ' . We in Holland have the right and the duty to impart our experiences to the comrades of the other countries, We Dutch socialists have won for ourselves the confidence of mi1lions of Javanese.• • . If we Europeans go [to underdeveloped areas} armed only with tools and machinery, we would be the helpless victims of the natives. Therefore we must come with weapons in our hands, even if Kautsky calls this imperialism.'

"'We have achieved signi6cant advantages for our Dutch colonies through our socialist action in Parliament," Van Kol declared, and he assured the other socialists that they would not be thanked for a persistently negative attitude toward colonialism: "If you wish to achieve for yourselves the confidence of the natives, you too must take an active part in colonial affairs," As for Kautsky's proposals of disinterested economic assistance-"Bookleamingt And he wants to civilize a country that wayl"-the portly Hollander conjectured that "the natives might destroy our machines: they might kill or even eat us, in which case (stroking his stomach) I fear I would be given preference over Kautsky," 8 When the congress finally formulated a resolution that satisfied both Orthodox and Revisionist views, the Dutch delegation was the only one to object, abstaining from the 6nal vote on the grounds that the compromise did not sufficiently acknowledge the positive aspects of colonialism.8 Van KoI's attitude reRected the main stream of thought in the Dutch socialist party. which was one of the most conservative members of the Second International. To the SDAP leaders, civilization was equivalent to Westernization, and socialism could be accomplished only by fully developed capitalist societies: 'lhe leap from barbarism to socialism is impossible." l() The advanced countries must therefore visit civilization on the less fortunate areas. whether they liked it or not; and they must encourage indigenous private enterprise in the colOnies, for only with the development of nativeowned heavy industry could the civilizing process be considered accomplished and the transfer to independence and socialism be contemplated,ll

5

Rise of Indonesian Communism In later years, the SDAP gradually modified its views on the benefits of colonialism and the economic prerequisites for independence. but nonetheless it maintained a very moderate attitude. within the main stream of liberal nonsocialist Dutch thought on colonial affairs. The party's interest in the whole subject was peripheral. for as a primarily Revisionist group, basing its hopes on labor union organization and electoral success, it concentrated its efforts and interests almost completely on the immediate concerns of the Dutch working clasS. 12 This was above all hue before World War I. when Van Kol was virtually the only socialist leader to take a real interest in the colonial question. Yet it was in this period, and from this conservative movement, that the seeds of revolutionary Leninist Marxism were planted in Indonesia.

6

II

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement IN 1913 a Dutch-owncd sugar company in Java was moved by the untoward course of recent events in that island to publish the following notice in several Indies newspapers under the candid title of "'rer. riSed"; Required, with an eye to the rising unrest among the native populace in Java. a capable NetherLmds-Indies military officer, willing to advise the management of several large enterprises concerning the preparation of their installations against attack 1

The advertisement reSected all too well the state of nerves then prevailing among. many Indies Netherlanders, who were convinced that the specter of revolution was stalking Java. Echoes of their alarm spread to Europe, where the exiled Lenin was cheered by this new threat to imperialist rule: It is being carried forward, first. by the popular masses of Java, among whom there bas risen an Islamic nationalist movement. Second. by an intelligentsia brought into being by the development of capitalism. It consists of Europeans acclimatized in the colony who demand independence for the Dutch Indies. Thlrd, by the fairly large Chinese population in Java and the other islands, which brought over the revolutionary movement in China• • ••

The amazing speed with which the parties and unions are being founded is one of the typical developments of the prerevolutionary period . . . . The workers of the advanced counbies follow with interest and inspiration this powerful growth of the liberation movement, in all its various forms, in every part of the world. 2

The cause of this disturbance was the emergence of the first mass political movement in Indonesia, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union ). 7

Rise of Indonesian Communism The SI had been founded at the end of 1911 as the Islamic Commercial Union-Sarckat Dagang Islam-in Surakarta (Solo), capital of one of the two remaining princely territories of Java. Its original purpose was to protect the interests of Javanese batik merchants from increasing competition by Indies Chinese traders; 'however, it swiftly caught the popular imagination and emerged as something far broader than a merchants' protective group. In 1912 the association was reorganized under the leadership of Umat Said Tjokroaminoto and, dropping the conunercial portion of its name, set itself up to promote the social and economic progress of the Indonesian common man. Banished from Solo, it moved its headquarters to Surabaja, the capital of East Java; very rapidly it gained adherents throughout the island, and by 1913, though nebulous in discipline and purpose, it was dearly a force to be seriously reckoned with. S The Sarekat Islam arose at a time of considerable' ferment in Javanese social, economic, and religious life. The island was already begin- . ning to feel the burden of overpopulation: in many areas there was very little unus~ arable land, and peasant holdings were being divided into smaller and smaller portions in order to take care of the growing number of cultivators. Villagers became increasingly dependent on work provided by plantations, on sharecropping arrangements, or on finding work in the towns. This process was accompanied by a gradual impoverishment, which had become sufficiently marked by the turn of the century to bring about a major revision in the Dutch colonial program. The Ethical Policy adopted at this time aimed both at improving the social and economic lot of the Indonesians and at preparing them to associate with Europeans in governing the colony. Its immediate result was a considerable increase in the visible participation of the colonial government in Indonesian affairs. Hitherto the Dutch had relied heavily on indirect rule via the traditional Indonesian social structure; under the Ethical Policy, however, the European administration was greatly expanded, technical services were added. and Western authorities began to playa direct role even at the local level. This development inevitably produced in the population a heightened awareness of the European presence: moreover, it furthered the decline of traditional authority, both indirectly and as the deliberate product of the government's efforts at social administrative modernization. In the same period the European economic role in the Indies was

8

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement expanding rapidly, creating a marked dichotomy between modern and traditional sectors of the economy. This contrast was most evident in East and Central Java, which was both the heartland of Javanese high culture and the area where Western enterprise and government were penetrating most deeply. Plantation agriculture was well established there; it was devoted primarily to the production of sugar. which expanded rapidly after the turn of the century and was Indonesia's principal export crop prior to the Creat Depression. The sugar plantations shared the irrigated lowlands with the rice-cultivating peasantry. The estates owned no land themselves but leased it from the villages surrounding the sugar mills. rotating their portion with every canegrowing season. The traditional and modern economic sectors were thus closely interlocked; the sugar-growing areas. already centers of dense rural population. became increasingly crowded as people from neighboring areas moved. in to seek work on the plantations. while the local peasantry, in chronic need of cash to pay taxes and debts; was inclined to lease out more land than it could part with and still remain selfsufficient.4 • The great burden of population on the land and the dependence of the peasantry on its powerful plantation partner provided ample opportunity for friction and abuse. and the Ethical colonial government introduced a host of new regulations and services aimed at controlling peasant-planter relations and developing the economy of the area. The benefits of its policy were not always apparent to the people, but the burdens were. Improvements in roads and irrigation works meant more taxation in labor for their maintenance, and the general increase in government activity meant greater taxation in perennially scarce cash. The traditional sources of rural leadership seemed incapable of mediating between the villagers and the impinging outside world: they appeared helpless in the face of superior European power, too closely identilled with the colonial government and/or plantations, or simply unable to master the proliferating regulations and requirements imposed on the villagers. As a result, people began to look beyond the traditional authorities for representation and .leadership, and the Sarekat Islam seemed to them a promising alternative. Having begun among the urban commercial class, it spread rapidly to the poorer population of the towns and then began to acquire a consider~ able rural follOWing. The swiftly multiplying outposts of the SI took on the aspect of complaint bureaus, to which a vast and varied number 9

Rise of Indonesian Communism of grievances were presented in the hope of redress; and Tjokroaminoto was acelaimed by many as the Ratu Adil, the Prince of Righteousness promised by tradition to lead the people in their hour of need. . The speed of the 5arekat Islam's expansion and its attraction for the uneducated peasantry in itself caused considerable European concern. It was feared that, by assuming the function of popular spokesman, the 51 would cut through the established channels of authority and drive a dangerous wedge between the administration and the people. The adulation of Tjokroaminoto and the disorganized and sometimes disorerly character of the association seemed potentially explosive factors, and even those who sympathized with the Indonesian popular awakening felt that it would be necessary to check the movement's growth. A less imme.diate but ultimately more alarming prospect was the religiOUS identification of the 51. The Dutch had built their system of indirect rule on the pre-Islamic customary (adat) structure, supporting it where necessary against the claims of Islamic rivals for popular leadership, and in general tended to discount the strength of the MusUrn religion in the archipelago. However, the recently ended A.~eh War had illustrated the folly of neglecting Islam as a foca1 point of leadership, and the emergence of Pan-Islamism as a dynamiC force in Asia, combined with the recent revival of religious energy in Java under the impact of modernist Islamic teachings, made the creation of a religiously based resistance movement seem all too possible. In the absence of the concept of an Indonesian nation-and this idea was generally lacking among the peoples of the archipelago at the time-Islam appeared to be the most likely source of unity against foreign rule; and in their early dealings with the 51 the Dutch showed themselves to be painfully aware of this fact. The 5arekat Islam's followers were united "by their profesSion of faith, but they were not agreed on their interpretation of religion or on the role it should play in the 51's activities. The movement attracted many santri, strict Muslims who wished to see it promote either the modernist religiOUS interpretations that were becoming popular among the urban commercial groups or the older fonns considered orthodox in the countryside; it also included abangan Javanese, whose MusUrn faith was mixed with a considerab1e portion of pre-Islamic beliefs and who opposed the religiOUS purism of the santrJ. It drew some of ~ts backing from lesser pri;aji (gentry) who objected to the rigid conservatism of the Indonesian regents or the princely regime in Surakarta; at

10

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement the same time it acquired support hom traditionalists who opposed the program of Westernization put forth by Budi Utomo, a cautiously progressive movement that had been founded by younger Javanese prifaii in 1908. In short, the SI was extremely heterogeneous in compo~ sition ; it expressed the malaise felt by a society undergoing profound change, and .the very vagueness of its organization and aims allowed it to include those whose dissat~faction took contradictory forms. This varied following made it most difficult for the Sarekat Islam's leaders to channel the movement and for the authorities to evolve a coherent policy toward it. Moreover, it posed the danger that such generalized restlessness, once collected in a single organization, might be turned against foreign rule-the one obvious element that could appear to both modernizers and traditionalists, santri and abangan, Javanese and non-Javanese as the cause of their frustrations.~ To the great majority of Europeans resident in the Indies, the Sarekat Islam presented a disruptive force that the government could not afford to tolerate. The number of Dutch inhabitants of the colony had been increasing rapidly since the end of the nineteenth century; most of the newcomers viewed the archipelago as a temporary abode and had littJe interest in Ethical experiments with native progress, particularly when this seemed to threaten their own security. The officials of the Binnenlands Bestuur, the European civil administration that paralleled and dominated the prifaii-run Indonesian bureaucracy, were overwhelmingly against tolerating the 51. They pointed out that the Ethical Policy was predicated on the assumption that the loosening of traditional ties, the spread of education, and the encouragement of an Indonesian awakening would result in a gradual evolution in' friendly apprenticeship to the Dutch. This, they asserted, was dangerously un~ realistic; instead, the Indonesian people would pass from domination by custom to domination by demagogues. They must therefore be kept as long as possible in the bottle of traditionalism, for once they es~ caped, they would ineVitably do so as a revolutionary force. It was Governor General Idenburg's duty, the conservatives held, to ban the Sarekat Islam as he had the Indische Partij (Indies Party), which had vainly sought recognition from him in 1912. Idenburg, however, saw the SI as something very different from the Indische Partij. That organization had had franldy revolutionary inclinations, whereas the SI showed no disloyalty; moreover, it had been clearly oriented toward the Eurasip,n poputation and thus could not be

11

Rise of Indonesian COmmunism considered to represent Indonesian opinion. The 5arekat Islam, however, appeared to represent a step toward the popular awakening that was a goal of the Ethical Policy: "We must therefore rejoice over it, even if we find this somewhat difficult. We wanted this-at least we said we did-and have encouraged it through our education.'" The movement, he considered, could serve the Useful purpose of opposing arhitrary action by employers, plantations, and government officials; its "complaint bureau" function might prove useful as an escape valve for popular frustrations and as an indicator of local grievances. If the 51 weakened traditional authOrity by bypassing it, this, he held, was because that authority was no longer able to represent and guide the people; such popular movements as the 5arekat Islam might help to replace it.' The Governor General therefore took a sympathetic attitude toward the new movement, but although his stand was supported by the Minister of Colonies and the Dutch parliament it aroused great alarm among most of the Indies Dutch. who felt the government was opening the door to chaos. To them, SI stood for Salah Idenburg-Idenburg's mistake.' Wild rumors of native conspiracy were circulated: a revolt was being organized by the 'SI; 5urakarta royalty was secretly behind the rebellion; the native police were putting pr~sure on plantation workers to join the movement; the Indonesian railway workers were org~ed to cut off conununications when the time came to revolt. For some months a mood close to panic prevailed among the Indies Dutch; nearly all sugar estates took precautionary measures against attack, and some established arsenals.' Idenburg was by no means insensitive to the fears of the Indies Europeans; moreover, he was himself seriously disturbed by the 51's rapid and undisciplined growth. Consequently, when the sugar estate operators sent a deputation to express their concern about the 5arekat Islam, the Governor General was able to assure them that be did not intend to anow the movement to expand unchecked. On June 30, 1913, he informed the SI leaders that he could not recognize the association on a centralized basis, since it had yet to demonstrate organizational and financial responsibility. However, its loca1 groups might continue to exist autonomously, and the central leadership could act as a contact body until such time as it proved itself ready to assume the responnDllities of controJ.IO In the midst of the alarms and eJcursions surrounding the rise of

12

Birth of the Reoolutionary Movement the Sarekat Islam. a young Dutch labor leader, Hendricus Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, arrived in the Indies. He was a gifted and ardent propagandist, a mystic whose search for salvation had begun with Catholicism and ended with "the Richness, the Beauty, the Luster of the Social Democratic Religion. For social democracy is, rightly understood, more than a political teaching. It brings with it the heavy burden of bearing witness, of sowing the seed of propaganda at all times and in all places." 11 Sneevliet had come to the Indies simply to seek employment, but his sense of a revolutionary vocation made it inevitable that his major activity 'would be the preaching of his politi. cal beliefs. Sneevliet's zeal made him demanding of his colleagues and chronically incapable of compromise, but at the same time he was never so sure of his own interpretation of the sociaUst faith as to be immune from changes of denomination. In this, he followed his own crises of conscience rather than the exigencies of political seU-interest. He replained in the Revisionist SOAP when most of his fellow radical Marxists left it to form the SOP, precursor of the Communist Party of Holland. In 1912, however, he switched to the radical group when the reformists refused to back a dockworkers' strike in Amsterdam. This break with the m'!derates cost him his job, for up to that point Sneevliet had been chairman of the SDAP-controlled railway workers' union (NVSTP). No other employment as a unionist was available, and since private industry showed little inclination to hire such a well-known firebrand, he decided to seek his fortune in the Indies. Before he left Holland, however, Sneevliet experienced another change of heart: disturbed at the SDP's decision to run in the Dutch elections against the Revisionist party-and thus, in his estimation, to split the socialist vote -he left it and rejOined the older group. During most of his stay in Indonesia Sneevliet was thus, in spite of his revolutionary activities, a member of the moderate SDAP and not of the proto-Communist movement. 12 Fortunately for Sneevliet, educated Europeans were in considerable demand at that time in the Indies, and his political background was therefore no bar to employment. He first joined the editorial staff of the Soeraba;lUl$ch Handelsblad, the principal newspaper of East Java and the voice of the powerful Sugar Syndicate. Shortly thereafter a fellow socialist, D. M. G. Koch, left his job as secretary of the Serna· rang Handelsvereniging (Commercial Association) and got Sneevliet 13

Rise of Indonesian Communism appointed his successor. The move to the Central Javanese capital was politically propitious, for Semarang, a rapidly expanding urban center, was the seat of such radical activity as the Indies then possessed. The atmosphere of the town was considerably more liberal than that of the other major Javanese cities, in part because it was a center for European commercial interests that hoped to develop an internal market in Java and thus looked favorably on the Ethical Policy'S goal of raising the Indonesian standard of living. IS It was these interests-import houses, banks, and manufacturing ~stablishments-that were Snee-vliet's employers, and initially their relations with their new secretary were extremely cordial. Sneevliet did an excellent job of promoting capitalism during his working hours, and the Ha..ndelsvereniging made no objection to his extracurricuIar efforts on behalf of socialism. It only asked that be not set about actually organizing a revolution; but this is what Sneevliet proceeded to do. If Semarang was the headquarters of the Indonesian railroad workers' union (VSTP), an organization in which Sneevliet took a natural · interest because of his former association with its Dutch equivalent. The VSTP was one of the oldest Indonesian labor unions, founded some five years previously; it was also progressive for its time, welCOming both sldl.led Dutch and Indonesian members into its ranks.l~ Within a year of his amval in Semarang. Sneevliet had succeeded in moving the union along more radical lines, shifting its concern toward improving the lot of the unskilled and impoverished Indonesian workers.18 Early in 1914 Sneevliet added to his full-time job in the capitalist world the task of editing the VSTP's newspaper, De Volhardmg (Persistence); at the same time he busied himself learning Indonesian and Javanese in order to communicate his beliefs to the local population,u This was not enough, however, to satisfy his desire to spread the socialist faith: real work, he felt, couJd only be accomplished through the organized eHorts of all the socialists already in the Indies. Accordingly. on his initiative a group of sixty social democrats met in Surabaja on May 9, 1914, to found the Indies Social Democratic Association (Indische Sociaal~Democratische Vereniging; ISDV).lI The ISDV was one day to become the Indonesian Communist Party, but its first meeting gave doubtful evidence that it was either Indonesian or Communist. Nearly all those present were Dutch., and the few Eurasians and Indonesians who attended remained in the background.

14

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement Most of the charter members belonged to the SDAP and not to its more radical rival. a Nearly all bad become socialists while in the Netherlands and bad come to Indonesia as fairly recent immigrants. Their reactions to the totally unfamiliar social conditions in the colony diJl'ered sharply: some abandoned Marxism so far as Indonesia was concerned, advocating Ethical gradualism as the only practical approach to so backward a society; others, stung by the grave injustices of the colonial system, insisted on the applicability of revolutionary principles regardless of the country's stage of development. 2o This latter group was the more powerful one, and so, in spite of the adherence of its members to the moderate group in Europe, the main impetus of the ISDV was toward the extreme left This was of considerable importance at its first meeting, for the moderates and radicals split at the very start over the question of the organization's function. The rightists wished to see the association become a center for exchanging ideas among the European socialists in the Indies and a fact-Goding bureau for the socialists in the Dutch parliament. They did not think it would be appropriate for the ISDV to participate in Indonesian political life itself, in the first place because the association members had neither a sufficient Imowledge of Indonesian society nor the necessary command of the local languages to have an influence on native politics. Moreover, they held the evolutionary theory that socialism was meaningful only in countries with a well-developed industrial proletariat; in precapitalist Indonesia, they considered, socialist agitation would be at best useless and would at worst lend support to irresponsible revolutionary elements in the Indonesian political world. 21 Those socialists who shared Sneevliet's viewpoint saw the ISDV's main task as propagating socialist principles in the Indies; they thought socialism could playa direct role in colonial areas, particularly by encouraging revolutionary anti-imperialism. After a heated debate the radical majority had its way, and it was declared that the party's function was to unite the Indies SOCialists, to inform the social democratic faction in the Dutch parliament of conditions in the Indies, and to spread socialist propaganda throughout the land. Now it was all very wen to elect for participation in Indonesian politics; it was another thing to Snd a means of doing so effectively. The ISDV, though it included nearly aU the socialists then in the Indies, was hardly an imposing organization: in 1915 it had only &5 members and a year later 134. 22 It had neither funds, nor in8uence, 15

Rise of Indonesian Communism nor a program comprehensible to the mass of the Indonesian population; and the moderate socialists bad been perfectly right in pointing out the drawbacks inherent in an organization composed almost entirely of Netherlanders. If the party was to be effective at alL therefore, it seemed imperative that it seek an alliance with a larger movement that would act as a bridge to the Indonesian masses. For a time the ISDV made no move in this direction, -partiy because the outbreak of World War I and the subsequent collapse of the Second International brought the Indies socialists into a temporary state of ideological sbock.23 For the first year or so of its existence, the ISDV restricted itself to theoretical discussions of the colonial problem and to collecting money for the socialist election effort in the Netherlands. 2 • Indeed, at its 1915 congress there was a strong move to allot the bulk of the party's income to the movement in Holland, and only after the congress were Sneevliet and his associates able to defeat iL

The party did attempt to increase its influence by establishing a newspaper, Het Vrije Woord (The Free Word), the first issue of which appeared in October 1915.2~ The paper was published in .Dutch, which severely limited its circulation among Indonesians-it was nearly two years before the party established an Indonesian journal-but Het Vri;e Woord did provide a public platform from which the ISDV could express its view. This proved to the party's great advantage in 1916, when it secured the admiration of radically inclined Indonesians by its stand on two issues which were then creating a considerable stir among the politically conscious public. One was the arrest of a leading Indonesian journalist, Mas Marco Kartodikromo. who had published an article critical of the government attitude toward the Sarekat Islam; 28 Het Vri;e Wooui, like most of the Indonesian-language press, took a strong stand on Marco's side. The second issue was the lndie Weerbar (Ann the Indies) campaign to establish an Indonesian militia under Dutch command. Originally the project of Netherlanders who feared a Japanese or Australian (English) move on the archipelago during World War I, it achieved surprising popularity among the politically conscious Indonesians. a number of whom saw it as a means of per· suading the Dutch to broaden their political rights. Het Vri;e WOOTd campaigned against the scheme on the grounds that it would serve militarist and imperialist ends, and its objections were shared by those

16

Birth of the RevolutionanJ Movement Indonesians who were s).;eptical of the government's willingness to reward cooperation with political concessions. The Indonesians who approved of the newspaper's position should have directed their admiration to the left wing of the ISDV, for in spite of its claims to represent the party as a whole Het Vri;e Woord was virtually the organ of its revolutionary faction. Westerveld, a plodding centrist, found himself no match for the two agitators with whom he shared the editorial board, Sneevliet and Adolf Baars. Tbe latter, a protege of Sneevliet, was the second most important of the Dutch founders of Indonesian Communism, A recent graduate of the ,engineering school at Delft-then considered a hotbed of Dutch student radicalism-he was employed as a teacher in the government-run technical school in Surabaja. Like Sneevliet, he was an enthusiastic revolutionary; but although he had a considerable knowledge of Marxist theory, his desire for revolution sprang more from a romantic and unstable nature than from lifelong dedication to the socialist cause. The result, as we shall see, was that in times of emotional crisis his enthusiasm was likely to give way to blackest despair. 21 Baars was extremely active as an editor of Het Vri;e Woord. Complctely innocent of tact, he expressed himself continuously and vitriolicaUy on its pages. His importance did not, however, lie in his accomplishments as a journalist or in his ability to alienate the moderates, but rather in his war).; of establishing contact with the Indonesian movements. Like Sneevliet, he was convinced of the need to agitate ' among the Indonesians; and he was able to accomplish more in this direction, for of all the Europeans in the ISDV he had acquired the most fluent knowledge of the Javanese and Indonesian languages. It was Baars who in 1917 established the first Indonesian-language socialist journal.28 The paper, Soeara Merdika (The Free Voice), ceased publication after little more than a year; but Baars, undiscouraged by its failure, came forth in March 1918 with a new Indonesian-language organ, Soeara Ro';ot (The People's Voice ),29 which was one day to become the , theoretical journal of the Indonesian Communist Party. Baars was also responsible for the establishment of the first Indonesian socialist group, a Surabaja-based organization that called itseU Sarna Rata Hindia Bergerak (The Indies on the March toward Equality ). The association was not a large one-in 1917, when it was founded, it had 120 members 3O-but even so it was nearly the size of

17

Rise 0/ Indonesian Communism the ISDV, and it placed before the older organization a question of considerable potential importance: Would it be better to merge the Sarna Rata movement with the main body of the ISDV on the principle that the socialist movement should not split on national or ethnic lines, or should the new organization be used to contain the socialists' Indonesian mass following? This question was pondered for some time by the ]SDV; II no clear decision was made, but after about a year Sarna Rata was quietly allowed to expire. One of the reasons no further action was taken on the Sarna Rata movement was that the ISDV leaders had in the meantime estabUshed contacts with already existing Indonesian organizations that foreshadowed a completely different relationship between the socialist party and the mass movement. In their search for a bridge to the Indonesian population, they arrived first at an alliance with Insulin de, which was then the most radical and politicaUy well developed of the nonEuropean organizations. The movement, which had been founded in 1907 as a nonpolitical, Eurasian-oriented association, inherited much of the membership and character of the Indiscbe Pamj after that ilI·fated party's dissolution in 1913. Its radicalism derived largely from the secial rejection felt by the Eurasian group from the increasingly exclusive European community and the economic threat of the gr~wing number of educated Indonesians, who were paid a lower wage scale and thus were cheaper to hire than Eurasians. Insulinde's leaders sought to overcome this disadvantage by forming an alliance between Eurasians and educated Indonesians to secure rights equal to those of the Euro. pean population. To this end they promoted an "Indies nationalism" aimed at creating a sense of common identity based on residence in the Indies rather than ethnic origin. The leaders of this movement had sought the support of the SDAP in their campaign to gain legal recognition .for the Indische Partij; the socialists had listened sympathetically, but this did not prevent the banning of the party or the banishment of its principal beads-E. F. E. Douwes Dekker (Setiabuddhi), Tjipto Mangunkusumo, and Suwardi Surjaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantoro )-for engaging in rebellious ac· tivity. The exiled leaders went to Holland, where they were taken up by members of the SDAP who objected to the government's abrogation of their civil rights. At the outset, therefore. there was a basis for cooperation between Insulinde and the socialists in the Indies. Moreover, although the organization was largely Eurasian, it did include

18

Birth of the RevolutionanJ Movement some prominent Javanese in its leadership, and in Semarang, which became its headquarters, it had a following among the urban Indonesian population. It was much larger than the ISDV, comprising some 6,000 members in 1917, and was extremely active; in addition, its Eurasian clement made it more akin culturally and linguistically to the socialist group than were the purely Indonesian movements.3Z In spite of these advantages, the alliance with Insulinde proved a mistake almost immediately. For one thing, the Eurasian-oriented movement was hardly a gateway to the Indonesian masses. Moreover, its socialist sympathy was admittedly opportunistic, for its leaders were openly interested in replacing the European ruling elite with one of Eurasians and educated Javanese; they therefore had little use for the radical socialists' emphasis on the class struggle and the plight of the Indonesian workers and peasants. 5neevliet, who at first had been greatly impressed by Insulinde leader Tjipto Mangunkusumo,33 was soon attacking him for insufficient dedication to the proletarian cause, and Tjipto himself came to resent Sneevliet's efforts to turn his party in a more radical direction. 8~ Within a year the alliance was out. At its June 1916 congress the 15DV decided to break off general political cooperation and requested that party members who also belonged to lnsulinde cease participating in it. 35 Even before the entente with Insulinde collapsed, the ISDV revolutionaries began to look for more verdant political pastures. TIlls time their attention was drawn to the Sarekat Islam, which by 1916 had hundreds of thousands of members and was far and away the giant among the Indonesian movements. Some Indonesian members of the ISDV had already become prominent in the Sarekat Islam, and both Sneevliet and Baars had addressed 51 gatherings and stood well with the movement's leaders.ao Nonetheless, the revolutionary ~ocialists hesitated to usc this opportunity: the Islamic character of the 51 and its very hazy political orientation made even the most enthusiastic proponents of mass action wonder what the ISDV could hope to accomplish with it. The increasing popularity of the Sarekat Islam persuaded them, however, that it could perhaps be seen as an Indonesian version of the Chartist movement and therefore as a fit object for socialist attention.31 Consequently, Baars cautiously introduced the subject of a new partnership for the socialists: We arc quite well aware ~hat this group, in spite of the fact that its world view is completely inimical to the socialist one and is much more receptive

19

Rise of Indonesian Communism ('0 bourgeois ideals, means great progress in the native world, if only insofar as it brings people to self-awareness and independent thought. Howev~r, the experiences we have had with lnsulinde will prevent us from attempting to

do missionary work in those circles which are necessarily closed to our propaganda.!S Baars' comment had its immediate inspiration in the Srs first national congress, which was held in Surabaja in JWle 1916. The meeting did not show an overwhelming desire for alliance with the ISDV, since its chairman cut off the speech of the socialist spokesman Semaun after only Dve minutes; 3iI but it did show a growing antigovernment feeling. At its founding convention three years before, the Sarekat Islam had unconditionally proclaimed its loyalty to the Dutch regime; now it cautiously began to raise the question of self.government. The congress criticized the administration's agrarian policY' and considered promot· ing a labor movement. Morcover, it brought up the subject of amal· gamating Islamic and socialist pr:inciples, an idea that was backed not only by the young radicals already attracted to the ISOV but also among leading representatives of the urban santri merchant class. "Socialism" was already becoming a word that meant, very roughly, opposition to foreign domination and support of a modem, prosperous, and independent Indonesia. 40 At the 1916 congress the revolutionary cloud on the SI horizon was still exceedingly small; but within a year it threatened the original leadership's control of the movement. This sharp upsurge in the radical spirit of the Sarekat Islam re8ected in good part the hardships and uncertainties that World War 1 was imposing on the Indies. As the war progressed, isolating the colony and restricting shipping. prices rose steeply, accentuating the decline in Indonesian real income, a decline that began in 1914 and continued until 1924,41 The unfortunate effects of the war added greatly to the doubts of the Indonesian intelligentsia about the bleSSings of a foreign-controlled capitalist economy. It aJso made the general populace increaSingly conscious of its disadvantaged position. This was particularly the case in the sugar-growing areas of Java, where the peasantry showed considerable dissatisfaction with the rents they received for land leased by the plantations. Rice harvests had been bad, and with importation hindered by the wartime shipping shortage, the price of that staple began to soar. Pinched by the general inflation and well aware of the high price they could obtain for rice, the peasants ·felt increasingly the in· 20

Birth of the RevolutionanJ Movement adequacy of the amounts the plantations paid to lease irrigated land. 42 The prospects for ISDV influence over the Sarekat Islam, enhanced by this general discontent, were further aided by a structural peculiarity of the mass organization. The Sarekat Islam, it happened, was a body whose head was attached by the most insubstantial of necks. We will remember that in 1913 the Governor General had refused to charter the organization on a national basis. Each branch of the Sarekat Islam therefore enjoyed independent status, and the central leadership was forced to carry on in the form of a coordinating board called the Central Sarekat Islam (CSI ). Idenburg recognized the movement nationaJly in 1916, in one of his last acts of office; but by that time its charter was already set, and CSI authority over the branches remained extremely weak. As a result of this loose organization, a forceful local leadership found little to prevent it from propagating its ideas within the rest of the movement. Even this might have done the ISDV very little good if it had had to seek an ordinary political alliance with the Sarekat Islam, for the socialist organization was still small, weak, largely European, and so divided on the question of its task in the Indies that it was unable to publish a political program. However, another structural condition-shared by most political movements in the Indies-made it possible for the revolutionaries to function not only alongside the Sarekat Islam as representatives of their own party but also within it as members of the SI itself. This was the practice of holding membership in two or more parties at once, a custom which seems to have arisen because most Indonesian movements had not begun as political parties per se. The right of political association and assembly in the Indies was denied by Article III of the Regeringsreglement (Government Regulation), which had functioned as the colony'S constitution since 1854. Article 68c of the Decentralization Law of 1903 removeo the prohibition for organizations and meetings exclUSively intended for recommending members for the local and regional councils established by this act. It was not until 1915 that the general right to political association and assembly was recognized, however, and not until three years later that its limits were defined by law.43 Although the local councils established by the Decentralization Law contained elected members after 1908, suffrage was at first limited exclusively to those of European status; it was later extended to Indonesians, but only to a severely restricted group. There was thns little reason for the Indone-

21

Rise of Indonesian Communism sians to organize for electoral purposes before 1918: even the Indies Europeans seem to have seen little need to do so, for they showed no notable interest in political party fonnation at this time. This meant that the early Indonesian organizations were founded not as parties but as organizations to promote various social, cultural, and economic interests; inevitably they were politically oriented, since their concerns involved government policy and reOected attitudes toward the colonial relationship, but they did not possess the exclusive character of political parties. Membership in one group did not preclude membership in another; particularly among the educated elite, it was common for individuals to join as many group~ as promoted projects of interest to them, It was thus possible for members of the ISDV to belong to Budi Utomo, Insulinde, or the Sarekat Islam-and 0ccaSionally to all four, As we shan see, this peculiarity of early Indonesian political structure was to inspire the Comintern's "bloc within" strategy, whereby Communist party members entered a mass movement and worked to seize control of it from within. In its initial Indonesian phase, however, dual membership was less useful in bringing ISDV members into the Sarekat Islam-the European revolutionaries did not become members of the Muslim organization H-than in bringing gifted young 51 radicals into the ISDV and guiding them in a revolutionary socialist direction. Sneevliet and Baars were very successful in this, and they soon gathered a coterie of young idealists who were troubled by opportunism and dishonesty in the CSI leadership and who found an inspiring alternative in the uncompromising "scientific" idealism preached by their revolutionary mentors. The most prominent figure in this early group of Indonesian Marxists was Semaun, who was the ISDV's spokesman at the 1916 SI congress. Born near Surabaja, the son of a minor railroad official and himself a railroad employee, he was an early member of the Sarekat Islam, joining its Surabaja branch in 1914 and short1y thereafter becoming that chapter's secretary, He soon became involved in union work in the railroads, which brought him notoriety as one of Indonesia's first labor agitators; it also brought him in contact with Sneevliet, who was then beginning his work with the VSTP. Semaun admired the efforts of the European revolutionary on behalf of the Indonesian workers, and in 1915 he joined the ISDV; a year later be was vice~chainnan of its Surabaja branch. Semaun was very young when he rose to prominence

22

Birth of the Revolutionary "Ai ovement in the revolutionary movement; in 1916, when he first enters our story, he was seventeen years old.~~ Shortly after the Sarekat Islam congress of 1916 Semaun was trans~ ferred by his employen from Surabaja, the headquarters of the CSI, to Semarang, the stamping ground of Sneevliet and the VSTP. The Cen~ tral Javanese capital already possessed a well-organized SI branch. which was much under radical in8uence. Semaun gave the group a talented and fiery spokesman; at the same time the young revolutionary's position in the SI was considerably enhanced by his association with this dynamic political machine. The Semarang SI expanded rapidly, claiming 1,700 members in 1916 and 20,000 a year later.~" Almost immediately it developed into a rival of the Surabaja organization: its appeals, expressed in the newspaper Sinor Djawa (later Sinor lJindia). were directed primarily at the urban SI branches and stressed more radical demands for social and economic justice than were expressed by TjokroanUnoto's Oetoeson flindia, the unofficial organ of the CSl. The Semarang SI leadership devoted nearly as much energy to criticizing the CSI leadership as it did to condemning the government and foreign capital. Semaun attaCked the CSl's planned participation in the Volksraad, a consultative assembly being set up by the government as a first step toward political representation, and he also led a campaign against the I"die Weerbar action, which bad support from important leaders of the Surabaja organization. The struggle over Indie Weerbar greatly agitated Sarekat Islam circles, particularly when the CSI elected to send one of its members, Abdul Muis, to the Netherlands as part of a delegation to plead for an Indonesian militia. The Semarang SI 'led the protest against the CSI action, and shortly before the Sarekat Islam congress of 1917 it announced that it would offer a resolution against the lndie Weerbar effort. Incensed, the CSI infonned the Se· marang branch that unless the resolution was withdrawn, it would break off connections with that local. Semarang replied that if the cen~ tral leadership did not behave, Semarang might very well start its own SI ccnter.·1 This crisis coincided with a threatened break between the Sarekat Islam and the ISDV. The CSI had become increaSingly upset at the dog-in-the-manger attitude taken by the ISDV, which in one breath professed a burning desire to cooperate and in the next unmercifully criticized the CSlIeaders. The Muslims finally bad enough when Baars 23

Rise of IndonesWn Commlmism violently attacked the SI leaders in a public debate on the tender subject of Int!ie Weerbar.4I The CSI decided to demand at the 5arent Islam congress of October 1917 that all relations with the 15DV be cut Off.48 The prospect of lOSing their ~ with the Indonesian movement threw the radica.1 leaders of the 15DV into something of a panic. 5neevliet, calling on the 51 heads to reconsider, assured them of the socialists' upright intentions: "Persona1Iy oppose you? Dispute your leadership over your organization?-What nonsense." But, chronically incapable of compromise, he ended his appeal with an attack on the 51 leadership as violent as any before,GO As it turned out, the socialists need not have worried. At the congress it was apparent that 5emarang had strong backing among the other 51 branches, and Tjokroammoto, whose instinct was to preserve unity at aU costs, backed down. The proposals to dea1 with the I5DV and the 5emarang 51 were quietly buried, and although the congress did not adopt the radicals' view on Indie Weerbar and the Volksraad, CSI spokesman Abdul Muis did take a long step in their direction by announcing that if parliamentary action should prove unfruitful, the 5arekat Islam would not hesitate to revolt. Moreover, the congress condemned "sinful"-that is, foreign-capitalism and demanded freedom of political organization, radically improved labor and agrarian legislation, and free public education. Gl The revolutionaries thus won their first round with the SI leadership in a game of bluff that was the pattern for relations between the two groups for the next few years. The upsurge of radical power continued, owing partly to good organization and propaganda work by 5emarang and partly to the increasing importance the CSI itself attached to its big-city branches. The major reason for this tuming toward the urbkn centers was the realization of the 51 leaders that their rural base was at best undependable. Although the movement's claimed membership continued to rise steeply-reaching a peak of two and one-half milUon in 1919-this increase was largely illusory. Membership was acquired with a low initiation fee; after that, contributions were appreciated but not required. As a result the rolls recorded those who joined and not those who lost interest. In cons~uence, many branches that flourished on paper had Simply faded out of existence in reaUty. This problem was most .acute in the countryside, where, we will remember, the peasants looked to the movement to secure the redress of their grievances. They joined the 51 in droves and overwhelmed its 24

Birth of the RevolutionanJ Movement

very

units with their demands. However, it soon became apparent to them that the local 51 leaders-who possessed little education or organizational knowledge and who were usually regarded unfavorably by both European and native officials-were no more able to secure satisfaction than were the traditional village leaders. Disappointed, the rural 51 adherents lost interest almost as rapidly as they jOined. The ephemeral nature of the movement's peasant membership was already becoming apparent during 1916, and this led the 51 leaders to attach increasing importance to the urban branches, which were usually better organized, more active, and further to the left. 52 5emarang's threat to start a rival 51 center was thus doubly alarming, and CSI concessions to the left in 1917 and after were aimed not only at placating Semaun and his follOWing but also at drawing to itself as much urban loyalty as it could. The 150V radicals were jubilant at the results of the 1917 51 congress: We merely wish to point out that it has become clear, particularly in the last tv.·o days of the congress, that if the 51 leadership wishes to preserve its mass following it will have to devote its greatest attention to the deeply felt economic needs of its exploited masses and to the radical economic and social refonns which alone can alleviate their suffering. It has also been proved that our outspoken campaign against the political puttering of the central leadership gave it a powerful push in the direction of this insight; had we not brought forth this criticism, had we, in order to preserve our "influence," tagged aJong uncomplainingly behind that leadership and only agitated in a "diplomatic" manner, the C5 I would never havc learned this obvious lesson. ~11

The I5DV bad every reason to rejoice in this upswing in its fortunes, for it had recently undergone a crisis that bad weakened it considerably but left it revolutionarily more pure. Only a few weeks before the party had been sundered by a final split between the moderate and revolutionary socialists. A breach between the two groups had long been pending, and since March of that year relations between them had been extremely bitter. The occasion of the March disagreement had been the overthrow of the Russian Ts.ar, news of which reached Indonesia on the evening of March 18, 1917. 5neevliet immediately sat down to write an impassioned article, OOZegepraal" (Triumph ), which appeared the following day in the Insulinde paper De Indiiir. In it, he strongly hinted that

25

Rise of Indonesian Communism Dutch rule in the Indies wou1d go the way of the Tsar if only the Indonesians set their minds to it. The article horrified the socialist moderates and. more important for its general impact. it alarmed the colonial authorities. The government promptly took measures to prosecute Sneevliet and to suppress discussion of the uprising, its ellorts serving to make th~ Russian revolution a cause celebre in Indonesia. Shortly after the first news of the revolt, the Semarang executives of the ISDV and lnsulinde asked official permission to hold an open meeting at wbich the revolution would be discussed; the request was refused on the ground that not enough was yet 1Cn0wn about the event to form the basis for objective discussion; a later petition by the Sernarang ISDV was denied without explanation. When Insulinde asked government permission to fonn a new branch in Bandung, this was granted only on condition that it not discuss the Russian revolution or invite Sneevliet to address it. In Surabaja an ISDV request to discuss the Tsar's overthrow publicly was refused because such a mccting wou1d constitute"a gathering of political nature which wou1d, in addition, form a threat to the public peace and order in this colony." ~ Sneevliet's trial lent additional publicity to the March Revolution. The public prosecutor's attempt to bring the socialist leader to trial was denied by the Semarang courts; only when the case reached the Indies Supreme Court was it decided the grounds were sufficient for prosecu: tion. The trial took place in November; Sneevliet conducted his own defense, which consisted mainly of an impassioned anticolonial speech lasting nine hours. ~II It won him both considerable publicity and an acquittal; the state was unable to reopen the case, though it appealed . the decision up to the Supreme Court." Sneevliet, of course, enjoyed privileged civil status as a European; nonetheless, it was general1y characteristic of the colonial authorities to exercise Widely varying control over politica1 expression. Authoritarian colonial attitudes were mingled with the precepts of Dutch parliamentary democracy; the 'result was not so much a compromise between, the two as the inconsistent application of the one philosophy or the other, depending largely on which in~ividual or branch of government decided the case. As a result, people were jailed for the mildest criticisms, while at the same time outspoken revolutionaries urged the overthrow of the government with impunity. Since the reaction of the authorities to criticism depended largely on their philosophy of colonial government, the leeway for political expression was far greater in the major 26

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement cities-especially in Ethically inclined Semarang, which acquired a moderate socialist mayor, D. de Jongh, in 1916-and this gave the urban radicals an edge in efforts at winning popularity through boldness. Though Sneevliet won the government trial handily, be had more difficulty in gaining acquittal from the ISDV moderates. The Batavia branch, which beaded the gradualist wing of the party. published a declaration denouncing the revolutionary activity of the radicals: It was Marx who, in dealing with revolutionary romanticists and half·bour-

geois anarchists, proclaimed that only at a certain economic phase and through organization and politica1 education is a fruitful action possibIe-an action which docs not work with revolutionary phrases, but is directed at formulating demands which proceed directly and logically from the social needs of the community . . . . It is the task of the Indies social democrats to teach this naive and easily aroused population to control itself though organization and discipline in the struggle for its goals. We social democrats ought not only to take the firmest possible stand against the rulers whenever they misuse their economic and political power, but also against those Europeans who. driven exclusively by political passion, hold the people back from their historical course of development. We shouJd also oppose those who. ignoring the unity of the native population groups necessary for the achievement of national independence and freedom, drive a wedge into it through their so-called socialist internationalism. ~7 At the party congress in May. the Batavia leader Scbotman repeated the Revisionist objections to promoting revolution and urged the ISDV to consider seriously the realities of its situation. As an organization, he pointed out, the party was small, isolated. and ineffective, lacking even a program to call its own; its only hope for a meaningful existence lay in affiliating with the SDAP as its Indies branch. The ccntrists under Westerveld agreed with Schotman's criticism. but they feared to force a crisis with the left by supporting his motion to join the Dutch p arty. The revolutionaries made their standpoint quite clear: Semaun declared that if Schotman's plans were accepted, he, among others, would 'resign; and Sneevliet bore his usual witness for the class struggle. for cooperation with the SI, and for mass revolutionary agitation. ~a Those hopelessly diverging viewpoints were reconciled by a compromise, the only visible purpose of which was to postpone the schism as long as poSSible. The congress determined tha t "premature resistancc" .should not be encouraged, and at the same time it pronounced tha~

ZT

Rise of Indonesian Communism . Sneevliet was innocent of engaging in such activity. In return for SneevUet's acquittal. the left approved ISnV participation in the forthcoming Volksraad election. This agreement did not prevent the radicals -and particularly Semaun--from going right ahead with their campaign against thc Volksraad. Moreover, the continuing efforts of the revolutionaries to push the Indonesian movements in a radical direction were seriously aUenating the leaders of those groups, and the ISnV moderates, although they were not interested in agitation among the Indonesian masses, did desire constructive cooperation with the heads of the Indonesian organizations. We have seen that relations between the ISDV and CSI were nearly terminated in 1917. Those with Insulinde were actually severed: the parties had cooperated against lndiii Weerbar and in some local election campaigns after the breakdown of their formal alliance the year before, but Sneevliet's criticisms proved too much for the Insulinde leadership. which announced on August 30, 1917, that all relations with the socialists were at an end.5~ For the ISDV moderates, this was the last straw. On September 8 they resigned en masse and established the Indies SDAP. Westerveld and some other centrists hung on to the older organization. but their inHuence on it was minimal and at the end of the year they went over to the moderate groUp.60 By the time of the November Revolution, then, the ISDV was reduced. to a group esscntinlly Communist in attitude. We might therefore expect the party to have greeted the Bolshevik seizure of power with clamorous approval, especially after the great publicity accorded the overthrow of the Tsar. However, the ISnV responded to the news of the second revolution almost hesitantly. Reports of the Russian uprising trickled slowly through to the Indies; it was not until late in November that the 6rst news of it was published in Het Vriie Woord.'· The early accounts left the ISDV in the dark as to the outcome of the revolt, and this was undoubtedly a major reason for its cautious handling of the news. Succeeding communiques brought increased hope, however, and soon Baars was able to write: The hope that we almost dared not cherish, the expectation that we almost dared not express-so impossible did it seem to us here in this land. where capitalism still reigns supreme and where our small group is just beginning to form the organization that will do battle with it-all this has become deep, joyful certainty. The proletariat now rules in RUSSia, at least for the time being. And every day of rest, of proletarian order, makes its mastery more secure. 82 28

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement For the Europ~an revolutionaries in the Indies, the November Revolution meant the justification of their stubborn refusal to be dissuaded by arguments of Indonesia's backwardness, its lack of a proletariat, and the absence of nearly all the factors assumed necessary for a socialist revolution. Elsewhere in Europe there were signs of coming revolt, and the ISOV cou1d hope that the wave of the revolution would ~weep over Holland and perhaps even wash the shores of the Indies. The mercurial Baars, who was finding the frustration of colonial life increasingly difficult to bear, seized upon the Communist victory in Russia with desperate enthusiasm. On Chrisbnas Day, 1917, he exhorted a rally in Batavia: The lower classes must be organized' You must organize now, the Russian example must be followed now . . . . Do as in Russia and the victory is yours! U

As party chainnan, he announced the ISOV's commibnent to the Bolshevik pattern at its May 1918 congress: The Russian Revolution naturally dominates our thoughts at present. I do not believe-to judge from reports in the European socialist papers-that there is any grDllp of socialists which is more strongly under the influence of the Russian movement than we ourselves . . . . We, too, must take the path which the Bolsheviki have chosen, even though the situation here is different. Where capitalism exists, socialism is also possible.6 ( In the same speech Baars mourned that in the light of events in Europe, "'it is bitter to be doomed to helplessness. here." M The ISDV, however, had been far from inactive in response to the Bolshevik Revolution. At the end of 1917, it began organizing soldiers' and sailors' soviets on the Russian example; and within three months it had gathered over 3,000 members into this movement. 86 The Red Guardist action began among the sailors and was centered at Surabaja, the major naval base of the Indies. It soon spread to the soldiery, however, and although its existence was evidenced more by alarming rumors than visible activity, it caused the government considerable concern. At that time the Indies army consisted of some 9,000 Europeans, 10,000 Ambonese, 18,000 Javanese, and 3,000 other Indonesians-a force the modest size of which had for some time worried Dutch residents of the Indies. The European officers were felt to be reliable, but the Ambonese were .restless; the Javanese were not notably enthusiastic soldiers and might well prove less than loyal if it came to putting down a revolt on their island. The Dutch common soldiers had little love for the

29

Rise of Indonesian Communism Indonesian population, but they also had little reason to identify with the European clviUans, who treated them as outcasts not much better th~ the natives. The government realized that their enthusiasm for the Red Cuardist action stemmed in good part from deep resenbnent of their position, and it instituted measures to improve their social and economic status. Such reforms took time to achieve, however, and with the growing momentum of the socialist revolutionary movement in Europe, it became problematical whether they might not come too late to prevent military apathy or alignment with the socialists in a bid for power. At the May 1918 ISDV congress, the party discussed how best to encourage "revolutionary defeatism" as Lenin had done, arguing that if the colonial troops could generally be persuaded not to fight, the Red Cuardists could seize power handi1y.'T At the same meeting the party, finally possessing a consensus in the absence of the socialist moderates, drew up its first program of demands 88 and attempted to formulate a policy of work among the Indonesian mas~es. The debate engendered on the latter subject gives us a glimpse into the party's eaIly struggles with a question that was to perplex many a Communist leader-how to deal with nationalism. 11te ISDV executive proposed that the party's statement of purpose declare: The Indies Social Democratic Association aims at the organization of the Indies population, especially the proletariat and the peasantry and without regard to race or religion, into an independent poli,tical party which will lead the class struggle in its native land against a ruling capitalist class of foreign race, thereby carrying on the only possible struggle for national liberation. It gives all possible support to every economic and political movement of the subject population insofar as those movements strengthen the position of that population against the ruling class."

The Semarang group moved that the world-wide character of the movement should be emphasized by cutting out the reference to oppressors of "'foreign race" and by adding that the party's sbuggle against the ruling class in the Indies would "'strengthen the international class struggle and at the same time lead the only possible struggle for national liberation." Surabaja, however, felt that even this did not go far enough, and wished to cross out the entire reference to national liberation. It was only after a heated debate that the Surabaja 30

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement branch was satisfied that the ISDV would continue to value economic revolution above national liberation and the declaration, as amended by Semarang, was adopted. 7o Not surprisingly, the chief opposition to the Surabaja position came from the ISDV central executive, dominated by Sneevliet and Baars, and from the party's Indonesian members, who wished to maintain the statement in its original fonn. 111at they were not able to prevail was in . good part because the European members or the ISOV-with the notable exceptions of Sneevliet, Baars, and the VSTP leader Bergsmawere ilI-equipped by language or interests to work among the Indonesian population. For the most part they occupied themselves with discussions of Marxist theory, observation of events in Europe, and agitation among fellow Indies Europeans. Typically, the work that most engaged their energies, the Red Guardist action, revolved around a Dutch-speaking part of the population; Similarly, the party's 6rst May Day celebration, held in Surabaja in 1918, was considered of interest only to Europeans, and no Indonesians attended. The Bolshevik victory and the increasing hopes for revolution in Europe brought new energy and influence to this Europocenbic faction, and at the 1918 congress they succeeded in moving party headquarters from Semarang, center of activity among the Indonesians, to Surabaja, its largest European branch and the most radically internationalist of its mvisions. T1 Economic conditions in the Indies worsened during 1918, as rice harvests remained poor and the shipping shortage reached an acute stage. The Indonesian parties were more critical of the government and produced a disturbing flood of criticism in the 6rst Volksraad debates. In Holland the SOAP, hitherto a small minority, emerged as the second largest party in elections to the lower bouse of parliament; the new cabinet was right of ccnter, and the socialist opposition to it assumed an increasingly rebellious aspect. In November, inspired by the German revolution, the SOAP leader Troelsua preached revolt from his post in parliament. The 6rst reports of the Troelsua Revolution threw the Indies government into something of a panic, for their incompleteness lent considerable scope to the imagination. Rumors circulated that the SDAP was organizing a seizure of power in the Indies, and a police watch was set on the house of Cramer, head of the Volksraad socialists, for it was thought that he would lead the march on the Governor General's palace to demand power in the name of the SDAP,72

31

Rise of Indonesian Communism The Indies SOAP had no thought of seizing control unless a Dutch socialist government authoriz~ it to do so, but it responded to the news of events in the Netherlands by calling a meeting of 51. Budi Utomo, and Insulinde representatives to formulate a plan of action. The conference, which met on November 16, agreed that the movements would urge their followers to maintain peace but at the same time would press the government to tum the Volksraad into a popularly elected parliament within the next three years. 73• Not all groups were so inclined to the parliamentary path. Demonstrations were organized by the ~ed Guardists among the European soldiers and sailors, and there were scumes with the police.14 On the pages of the ISDV Soeara Rd;at, Darsono urged his fellow Indonesians to follow ' the Russian example: "It is not the ruler who has the power, but the people. Let the RED FLAC fly everywhere, the sign of HUMANITY, EQUALITY, and FRATERNITY. What can stop the common man if once he begins to rebel? Let the red flag wavel" 7G The CSI Odoe-. san Hind/o. published his writings approvingly. noting that if the government did not concede extensive refonns immediately, revolution might well be the result.;e Even the Indonesian revolutionaries placed their hopes in events in Europe rather than the Indies, however. As Semaun indicated in the left 51 Sinor Hindia, the chances for violence lay in colonial resistance to a Dutch socialist regime rather than in Indonesian rebellion itself: There will undoubtedly be an attempt Ito set up a separate Indies capitalist regimeJ. but there are also socialists such as 5ncevliet and Baars in the Indies. These comrades. who have many followers among the sailors from the warships and among a great part of the European soldiers, have fellow party members in the 51 and thereby can reckon on the support of thousands of natives, among them many policemen in the cities and native soldiers, many of whom are now members of the SI. Undoubtedly the Sneevliet party will gather all its forces to carry out the mandate which the socialists in the Netherlands will send. AND WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN so IT WILL CO).(E TO A PARTICULARLY snARP STRUCCLE (IERE IN TIlE INDlES. 71

5emaun did not envision a complete divorce from the Dutch as the outcome of a socialist victory. The native socialist movement was still too weak, he pointed out, and it was likely that the leadership of the country would fall into the hands of those who would tum it over to capitalism : 1'herefore we must ask the help of socialists such as Snecvliet, Baars, and Brandstedcr, and of the [EuropeanJ sailors and sol32

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement diers, so that capitalists from coWltries like Japan and England will not invade Our newly liberated COWltry."18 The November crisis passed as quickly as it had come. The Indies opposition was restless but not ready for revolt; in Holland the Troelstra Revolution fizzled out in a shower of rhetorical sparks. As SOOD as he received word that the Dutch government would not fall, Governor General van Limbug Stirum paciGed local tempers with broad but vague promises of reform, r9 Soon thereafter a reaction set in among the governments of the Netherlands ~nd the Indies; detennined that such challenges to their authority should not rise again, they took steps to consolidate their position which were to lead to the abandonment of almost all the envisioned refonns and to the adoption of a far less tolerant attitude toward extremist agitation. The government revival of confidence was matched by deepening despair in the ISDV. Its hopes had been based so completely on a DutCh revolution that the European leadership of the movement sank into a depression that bordered on paralysis. As Sneevliet later remarked, the end of 1918 closed the ISDV's first period of growth. After that the pirty was forced to face the unpleasant facts that the German revolution would not spread to the Netherlands, that the Indonesian leaders were at least temporarily taken with Van Limburg Stirum's November promises, and that the government was now moving seriously against the revolutionaries. s!>

33

III

Becoming a Communist Party ONCE the general situation was in hand, the govenunent turned its attention to the Rcd Guardist action as the most intolerable challenge to its authority. Stiff sentences were imposed on members of the armed forces who refused duty or were suspected of fomenting trouble, and civilian leaders who were in government service were transferred to out-of-the-way places or expelled from the Indies. By the end of 1919. the movement was virtually dead, I At the same time, the authorities took steps to rid themselves of their most outspoken political opponents, expelling the Dutch ISDV leaders one by one from the country.!! The 6rst to go was Sncevliet. for whom ~xpulsion proceedings were initiated as soon as it seemed certain the Dutch government would survive. That revolutionary had long irritated Indonesian as well as government leaders,s but in the heated abnosphere of November 1918 the Indonesian opposition promptly adopted him as its martyr.4 The government added to the drama of Sneevliet's departure by taking elaborate security measures to prevent possible riots,lI and it strengthened the Indonesians' feeling of solidarity with him by following up his banishment with the arrest of Darsono. Abdul Muis, and a succession of lesser Indonesian figures , Semaun used the burst of sympathy for his departed mentor to extract promises of financial support not only from the ISDV and VSTP but also from the CSI. The purpose of his move was to provide Sneevliet with aid until he found employment and also to solidify the connections between the Indonesian mass movement and ~e European socialist revolutionaries; but since the quid pro quo was that Sneevliet would represent his supporters in the Netherlands it also gave the departed leader a basis for speaking int~­ nationally in their name.' Shortly after. Sneevliet's departure, Baars abandoned the Indies of

34

Becoming a Communis.t Party his own free will. He had lost his teaching job in October 1911, when the government decided that his political utterances had exceeded the permissible limits for those in its employ. After that he devoted full time to running the ISDV and Het Vrife Woord. but this revolutionary activity was not enough to satisfy him. Unlike Sneevliet, who alter. nated between enthusiasm and distress but never abandoned faith in his work in Indonesia, Baars .finally lost both his temper and his interest. Convinced that his calling lay with the revolution in Europe. he set forth to tilt at the Dutch bourgeoisie: Oh, there is so much that is depressing. Naturally. that is no reason in itself to leave. However, if you do not possess at the same time the firm conviction that you cannot do better work elsewhere, if, on the contrary, you are continually overcome by the passionate desire to join in the struggle abroad, where you could 6ght in another and better fashion and with greater understanding from others-then your strength is consumed by doubts. strength that is not renewed by the wann sympathy of those you are struggling to help . . . . I often said to Sneevliet that a European can't hold out in the tropics in this manner. And really, if I had had to stay in that deadly hot Scmarang another few years, with after my day's work the directing, conferring, meeting, speaking, etc., etc.-all this with the same result we have achieved up to now, namely that the masses applaud but are not ready to do anythingno, I think that I would have broken down completely in mind and body. If it had been necessary I would have perhaps made even this sacriflcc; but as , it is-if I must sacrifice myself, then I'll do it in the heat of battle.1 The rest of 1919 was a series of disasters for the European. members of the ISDV, for dwing the course of the year the government imprisoned, banished, or instituted proceedings against most of them. Loss of their best leaders, arrest and fear of arrest, and discouragement at the failure of the revolutionary movements in Europe and Indonesia all diminished the Dutch role in the ISDV, which many of its European members regarded as a dying movement,' By early 1920 the number of active Dutch members of the organization was reduced to a fraction of what it had been. Had the fate of the ISDV depended on its Dutch leadership, the party would now have faced dissolution. What took place, however, was not the degeneration of a vital center but the atrophy of a now unnecessary limb. 11te reason for this was a change in the substance of the party that had been taking place since 1917. In that year, we will

35

Rise of Indonesian Communism remember, the ISDV lost a good part of its membership as a result of the splitting off of its less radical elements. Those who left were mostly Dutch; those who entered thereafter were Indonesian. Beginning in late 1911, ISDV membership began to increase as' a result of Semarang's victory at the Sarekat Islam congress, the party's first major effort to gain converts throughout Java,' and the discontent created by the increasingly bad economic situation. In addition, the decision of the May 1918 congress to establish the ISDV as an Indonesian movement in its own right caused the party to make a special effort to attract Indonesian adherents without too much regard for whether they understood or even approved · of the movement's Communist goals. The result was an extremely rapid expansion of membership,tO which gave the ISDV some of the character-and some of the problems-of a mass movement. It also complicated relations between the central executive and the party branches, since the Europeans kept finn control of the center, whi1e the branches gave more prominence to their Indonesian adherents.t1 Whether the European leaders would in the normal course of things have yielded gracefully their control of the ISDV is an open question. This was certainly their ultimate intention, but whether their ideas about the proper thning and extent of the transfer of power agreed with those of their Indonesian coUeagues is quite another matter. This particu1ar problem was avoided. however, by the gradual expulsion of the European leaders from the colony. Fortunately for the ISOY, its Indonesian adherents possessed the talent, if not the experience, to enable them to replace the absent Europeans. In addition to Semaun, the party had acquired a first-class leader in Darsono, a young Javanese aristocrat who had dropped in on SneevJiet's mal in 1917 and been converted on the spot to revolutionary socialism. He was one of SneevJiet's closest co-workers during that leader's last year in the Indies, and he was also closely associated with Baars and the Jabor organizer Bergsma. Darsono was one of the few Indonesian Communist leaders to make a serious srudy of Marxism; indeed, he frequently had trouble adjusting his W~stem Communist ideas to Eastern conditions. He was a great admirer of the BolshevIK Revolution, which he enthusiasticaUy urged his feUow Indonesians to emulate; this led, in December 1918, to his arrest and a year's imprisonment. 1S • The Indonesian leaders of the ISDV devoted particular attention to 36

Becoming a Communist Porty developing relations with the Sarckat Islam, to which they also be· longed. They were aided by deteriorating economic conditions and general restlessness in 1918, which had a considerable effect on the spirit of the SI. The extent to which ISDV slogans found response in the popular movement was indicated by the temper of the 1918 Sate· kat Islam congress, which was distinctly revolutionary: not onlY 'did the meeting protest sharply against' the authorities, but it based its attack on the charge that the government was the protector of "sinful~ capitalism.IS The ISDV also improved its positipn within the Sarekat Islam at this meeting, as at the SI congress the previous year, by means of a threat from Semarang to split the movement. Shortly before the 1918 SI meeting, Darsono had written a series of articles attacking the promi· nent anti..semarang CSI leader Abdul Mois, and Semaun issued a pamphlet accusing Muis of baving feathered his' financial nest by sup· porting bulie Weerbar.14 Muis' position at that time was rather delicate, since he had become the editor of Neratja, a newspaper that was known to rely GnanciaDy on the govemment. 1D In it he published a series of articles arguing that a restriction of sugar plantation acreage in the interests of increased rice production-then urged by the 51 and other Indonesian parties in the face of a growing food shortage-would not advance the public welfare. This was a highly unpopular stand to take, and the Javanese Slleaders questioned whether Muis' Sumatran heart was reaDy with their people. For a while it seemed possible that Muis would be dropped from the CSI at its 1918 congress, and the radicals' concerted attack on him aimed at encouraging such a rejection. However, Muis toured Sumatra just before the meeting and was greeted there with great enthusiasm; he thus appeared at the SI congress as the head of a powerful Outer Island faction. The CSI was now faced with a very nasty problem: if it met Muis' demands, Semarang might secede; if it yielded to the leftists, the increasingly important Outer Island branches might well form their own movement. The Muis-Semarang .fight erupted as soon as the congress opened, and Tjokroaminoto quickly called a closed session of the CSI to settle it before the breach became ineparable. As a result, Darsono and Semann promised to cease their personal attacks on Muis, who, in tum, promised to follow the SI and not the government line in running Nerati~. Muis was kept on as vice-president of the CSl, and the Semarang branch was satisfied by the appointment of Darsono as official CSI

:r;

Rise of Indonesian Communism propagandist and of Semaun as CSI commissioner in charge of Central Java.II This last nomination represented a significant advance for the ISDV, for it meant that the most popular and able of the Indonesian leftist leaders now held a powerful position in the directorate of the Sarekat IslamP During 1919 the Indonesian ISDV leaders increased their efforts to inRuence the Sarekat Islam in a radical direction, and the economic situation continued to aid their project By this time inflation and poor barvests were bringing conditions of ncar famine to some areas. The rice shortage was so severe that the government instituted compulsory grain collection, which caused considerable resentment among peasants who did not want to part with their crop at the government price. ]n 1918, the Sarekat Islam bad begun a campaign to transfer a part of the land under contract to sugar plantations to the peasants for growing rice; this was supported by Governor General van Limburg Stinun, who considered such a measure necessary until rice shipments were received from abroad. The sugar interests were by no means amenable, however, since they were counting on the very high prices their product would bring on the postwar market, and to the Indonesians' distress the Governor General did not feel he could impose more thun moral suasion on the industry. The 51, Buw Utomo, Insulinde, and Indies SDAP sponsored a Volksraad motion to petition the Dutch parliament to restrict the sugar acreage, but the conservative Indonesian regents and nonsocialist Europeans in the assembly combined to defeat the proposal. The SOAP in Holland thereupon introduced it into parliament itself, but only the Ethically inclined Vrijzinnige Democratische Partij supported it. The sale result was that the Governor General appointed a commission of inquiry into conditions in the sugar areas, on which Tjokroaminoto was invited to sit; its report was not ready until 1921, by which time the crisis was long past. I S Whether or not restriction of sugar acreage would have ameliorated the immediate food problem, the lndonesian parties attached a great deal of importance to it, and their failure to achieve any satisfaction on the subject caused them to view the Indies government more than ever as the servant of Dutch capital. Even cautious, upper-class Budi Utomo took on a radical tint and at its 1919 congress expressed a desire for closer contact with the masses. Rallies held in Batavia to protest the refusal to limit sugar acreage and the use of force in government rice collections were supported not only by Insulinde. the 51. ISDP, and 38

Becoming a Communist Party Budi Utomo but also by the conservative regional associations Sarckat Sumatra (Sumatranenbond) and Pasundan.la In the rural areas there were increasing signs of dissatisfaction. Peasants in the sugar districts set fire to cane fields, in the famine-struck region of Kediri troops had to be called in to combat disorder, and in West Java the forced rice collections produced a series of incidents. More alarming to the government than these sporadic and unplanned disturbances, however, was the apparent involvement of Indonesian political groups in resistance movements. The first to be accused was Insulinde, which associated itself in early 1919 with agrarian unrest in the Surakarta region of Central Java. In recent years the government had been endeavoring to put through agrarian refonns in this princely territory so as to bring conditions in )joe with those in the directly administered regions. The refonns proceeded very slowly, and many peasants were disturbed at their delay, particularly in the matter of substituting a direct tax for the burdensome corvee duties. Others objected to their taking place at all, for they substituted incomprehensible requirements for the personal and familiar relationships of that highly traditional area. The result was general discontent, in the form of refusal to render corvee duties : the reformists claimed that their preservation was unjustified, and the traditionalists argued that they had not been sanctioned as before by customary decrees (peranata n). The movement, which lasted some six months, was headed by Hadji Misbach, who was the de facto leader of Insu}jnde in the Surakarta region as well as an active SI member and vicepresident of the ISDV-sponsored PKBT, a union of peasants and agricultural workers. The national leadership of Insulinde took considerable interest in his efforts; Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Douwes Dekker both made propaganda tours of the area. The government decided that Insulinde was responsible for the change of peasant dissatisfaction into concrete protest; Hadji Misbach and Douwes Dekker were arrested, and Tjipto Mangunkusumo was banished from the Javanese-speaking areas of the island.20 A conflict over corvee also broke out in Celebes at this time, and although it was less widespread than the Surakarta passive-resistance movement, it was viewed more seriously by the authorities because it resulted in the murder of a European official. This time the Sarekat Islam was held responsible. That organization had appeared in the Outer Islands as a reform movement demanding greater legal rights for

39

Rise of Indonesian Communism the population and a decrease in the power of the petty autonomous rulers; one of its principal projects was the substitution of taxation for corvee, which the government ,had already undertaken in the directly administered areas of Java. The Sarekat Islam made considerable headway on Celebes in the face of opposition from the association of adat rulers (Pcrkumpulan Radja), which was backed, as usual, by the local European advisers on the grounds that reforms, even when contemplated by the government, should not challenge the structure of customary authority. In May 1919 Abdul Muis toured the island on behalf of the CSI; his visit sparked new enthusiasm for the movement, and in some areas pcople began to refuse to render corvee. A month after Muis' trip, the Dutch contr6leur De Kat Angelino was killed in Toli·toli when he visited that center of unrest to enforce the corvee obligations. The Sarekat Islam as a whole was considered at fawt, and proceedings were instituted against Muis for having instigated the assassination by his visit,21 The Toli.toli incident was particularly distressing to the Ethici, for the murdered official had been considered a progressive man who had tried to improve local conditions as well as shore up traditional rule. Moreover. Muis-a member of the Volksraad. opponent of Semarang. and fonner editor of Neratja-had been thought one of ~e more rea· sonable of the Sarekat Islam leaders. If even he were to contn'bute to so serious a breach of the peace. was it not likely that the conservatives had been right in warning that the Ethical program was dangerously utopian in tolerating an Indonesian oppoSition? These suspicions seemed to be con6nned the very next month. for in July the government, investigating the shooting of a Garut peasant family that had resisted the forced rice collections. discovered the existence of a secret SI organization that appeared to aim at the over~ throw of the government. This group-known in Indonesian as the S.I. ke·Dua (Second SI) and in Dutch as Afdeling B (Section B)-was concentrated in the Priangan region of West Java. It had been started in 1911 by a Hadji Ismael, who had encouraged resistance by selling chanos (d;imat ) guaranteed to make the wearer invulnerabJe. Ismael's secret association had gained momentum with peasant objections to the forced rice collections; it seems to have acted outside the authOrity of the CSI but not in opposition to it, That the SI leadership was direct1y involved was not at all clear. but Sosrokardono, the party 40

Becoming a Communist Party secretary, was immediately arrested and later Tjokroaminoto was also put on trial. Although some Indonesian ISDV members-notably Alimin and Musso-were ultimately implicated in the affair, the party itself disapproved of the conspiracy. Much as it approved of revolution, it could hardly support a movement that appealed to the wealthier rural santri and was said to have in mind the murder of all non-Muslims on Java: We are of the opinion that we must keep both feet on the ground and not idealize obscure groups without sufficient evidence. For the time being we wish to make no further judgment of Hadji Ismael's association and continue to place more faith in the work of such people as Semaun and Darsono. 22

The Carut affair horrified the Ethica1Iy inclined Europeans, and their conservative opponents pounced upon it as proof of the correctness of their predictions. The incident created a stir not only in the Volksraad but also in the Dutch parliament. The Adviser for Native Affairs. Hazeu. who was noted for his sympathy with the Indonesian movements, was forced to resign, and the embattled Ethical Governor General van Limburg Stirum faced even more heated opposition than before. The Europeans who remained optimistic about a peaceful Indonesian transition to the modem world became much more cautious in their opinion of the ability of politically oriented popular movements to aid in this process. Those officials who considered that the Sarekat Islam {.'Ould still perfonn a useful function thought that it must be gUided into less dangerous channels; and the SI leaders, alarmed by both the sharp government reaction and their inability to curb their rural follOWing, were only too ready to agree. For both the government and the SI, the answer seemed to lie in the organization of labor unions. The conditions of the Indonesian wage earners at that time can only by described as deplorable; a government investigation concluded that the income of unskilled workers was too low to provide a "hygienically sufficient means of existence" and had .Jed to the serious undernourishment of a large portion of the population.23 Private enterprise--and particularly the plantation industry, which was by far the largest employer-turned a deaf ear to the gov. emment's moral arguments, and so the authorities enCOUraged the Jabor unions as a means of forCing the desired improvements without overt government action. Moreover, they hoped that economic activity 41

Rise of Indonesian Communism would divert the energies of the popular movement into channels less dangerous to the state than the political lines along which it had thus far moved.·· The ISDV was at least as interested as the government in turning the SI to labor organization, although for very different reasons. A tum to the proletariat would probably increase the inOuence of Semanmg. the SI branch most closely identified with labor. It might also make the CSI leaders more receptive to the ideological views of the radical socialists and less inclined to stress religion. Moreover, the ISDV was sadly aware that its own ability to organize Indonesian labor was restricted. Although the party had considerable influence among the developing organizations of skilled and semiskilled urban workersnotably the VSTP, the most powerful union of this sort-it had virtually no foUowing among the plantation workers, coolies, and landless farm laborers who formed the vast bulk of the Indonesian proletariat. Nor did it influence the various associations of Indonesian petty officials and lower white-collar employees that were emerging at the time. The ISDV leaders, conscious of their limited urban appeal, had made an effort to organize rural labor in the sugar areas, which seemed an obvious point of potential unrest. In 191.7 Porojitno, an association of peasants and unskilled laborers, was founded on the party's initiative, and in January 1918 it was reorganized into the Workers' and Peasants' Association (Perhimpunan Kaum Buruh dan Tani, or PKBT). The movement was headed by Suharijo, an SI-ISDV leader from Demak, but its guiding spirit was Baars, who at the time was an enthusiastic proponent of agrarian action. 2~ The purpose of the organization was to unite the peasantry of the sugar districts, who wanted higher rents paid for their land and higher wages for work at harvest time, with the landless laborers employed in the cane Gelds and mills. It also was supposed to function as a cooperative, which would bypass the middlemen in marketing rice. The association led a precarious existence throughout 1918, changing its leadership and headquarters with disorganized rapidity; the combination of peasant and plantation labor proved unsuccessful, and it was split into two divisions, the Peasants' Association (PKT ) and the .Estate Workers' Association (PK:BO ). At the beginning of 1919 it moved to Surakarta and came under the hegemony of Hadji Misbach; after his arrest it found a new chief in the CS[ leader Surjopranoto.28 The PBKT was far overshadowed in importance by Surjopranoto's

42

Becoming a CommuTlist Party own PFB, which he began in Jogjakarta in April 1911 as Adidarmo, the Anny of Labor, an association of vast and hazy purposes, In 1918 Adidarmo developed a special division to support Iaid-off sugar factory workers and the families of deceased laborers; this branch became known as the Union of Factory Personnel (Personeel Fabrieksbond, or PFB ) and began to organize the sugar workers for improved wages. In December 1918 it had only about 700 adherents, but at its first congress a year later it claimed 6,000 full members and 2,000 candidates.2T The PFB's rapid rise was due not only to Surjopranoto's abilities as a popular leader and to the rural restlessness of 1919 but also to the status of its chief, who as a member of the Jogjakarta royal house of Paku Alam appeared to the inhabitants of that princely state both as a modem labor organizer and as a traditional defender of his people. The other branch of labor that resisted ISDV penetration, the Indonesian petty officials, was dominated by the pawnshop employees' union (PPPB). which had been founded in 1916 and was led by the CSI secretary Sosrokardono. vice-president was Alimin, a member of the ISDV executive, Alimin, however, divided his loyalties equally between the ISDV, Insulinde, and the Sareht Islam: in union matters he was very conscious that Indonesian government employees could not afford to be too radical, so the socialist revolutionaries could not hope for too much from this toehold in the pawnshop workers' organization. With little apparent prospect of being able itself to establish successful unions outside the urban proletariat, the ISDV saw that its best chance was to influence the labor organizations led by the SI, a strategy that looked the more promising because both Surjopranoto and Sosrokardono entertained radical notions and depended on Bamboyant personal leadership rather than a diSciplined organization to control their associations, A program of penetration could best be carried out via a trade union federation, something the socialist group had been trying to establish since 1915.28 Economic hardship and increased unrest caused the ISDV to step up its efforts during 1918, but it was not until the foll OWing year that its campaign was successful. In May 1919, at a congress of the pawnshop workers' union in Bandung. labor leaders from the ISDV and SI-Sosrokardono, Alimin, ScmauD, and Bergsma-outlincd a plan to unite the unions of the two parties in a common front. They envisioned a Revolutionary Socialist Federation of Labor Unions, which would become the upper house of a "true Volksraad," the lower chamber of which would be composed of

Its

43

Rise of Indonesian Communism delegates from the Indonesian political organizations. If the plan could be put into effect, Sosrokardono asserted, "we will be able to achieve by ourselves a government for the people of Indonesia, and will be able to change the capitalist society into a socialist one." 2V It was unanimously decided to establish a committee of union representatives headed by Surjopranoto to prepare the federation, and Semaun was assigned to draft its declaration of purpose and its constitution. As this action indicated, the Sarekat Islam leaders were most sanguine about their prospects in the labor field. A strike wave that broke out in 1918 reached major proportions the follOwing year, and because of government encouragement of the unions and the sharp upswing in business during 1919 it was by Indies standards extremely successful.30 The workers, seeing in the unions the same quick remedy for their iUs that had caused the peasantry to Bock to the rural SI, joined the new organizations in rapidly increasing numbers. During 1919 the number of labor unions grew swiftly, and the majority of organized workers came under SI leadership. At the October 1919 congress of the Sarekat Islam, the ISDV distributed a pamphlet urging the delegates to "join in the class struggle" and declaring that "the task of the SI is to create the organization through which the proletariat of the Indies will liberate itself. The SI should become the organization of the worker and small peasant class." at The response to this call was more than encouraging, for the meeting ex_ hibited an almost hysterical verbal radicalism that seemed to derive in good part from a desire to cut a deBant figure before the Dutch in the face of the reaction engendered by the Carot and the Tali-tali affairs. Both Tjokroaminoto and Surjopranoto argued in favor of the program evolved at the pawnshop workers' congress, asserting that the government would be unable to ignore the demands of the people united by the "'true Volksraad." The normally conservative Hadji Agus Salim urged endorsement of the revolutionary socialist title for the labor federation in the face of Alimin's objections that this would frighten off the workers in public employ; In their arguments, the CSI leaders identificd the government more closely with the capitalist system than ever before, declaring that the Indonesian proletariat must force the capitalists to grant them needed refonns, if necessary by means of a general strike.12 The ISDV was greatly pleased by this demonstration of radical intcnt, the more so since it had taken place without much goading from

44

Becoming a Communist Party Semarang. With cause to hope that the less radical SI leaders could be either won over or worked out, its view of that movement brightened considerably. The 1919 congress, Het V1'iie Woord declared. had shown that the Sarekat Islam was exchanging its religiOUS character for a secular socialist one, for at that meeting "the struggle was directed squarely against capitalism and was not, as in previous times, an attack by a few on 'sinful capitalism,' a combination of concepts that rests on a misunderstanding of socialism." 33 All that was needed was to get rid of the "weak spots in the sturdy body of the SI" 34 for it to become a true workers' and peasants' movement. The 51 leaders proved that they were serious in their congress state· ments by moving immediately to establish Indonesia's first labor fed· eration, which came into being on December 25, 1919, at a convention of SI and ISDV unions in Jogjakarta. It consisted of 22 unions with a total of 72,000 workers; the majority of the unions were under the control of Semarang, but the greater number of workers belonged to CSI·in.8uenced unions.S~ It had been generally assumed that Surjopra. noto, head of the largest member union, would lead the federation. However, Semaun outmaneuvered him at the convention and was ap· pointed bead of the interim executive of the federation, which cstablished its first headquarters in Semarang. 86 In the beginning, the convention decided that the new federation would bear the title proviSionally approved by the recent 51 congress. However, Semaun alarmed many delegates by identifying revolution" ary socialism with Bolshevism in a speech on the significance of the Russian November Revolution for the Indonesian struggle. The union representatives did not feel they wished to go so far as to tie the fed· eration publicly to Bolshevism, and to avoid giving any impression that they were doing so they asked that the revolutionary socialist label be dropped. Much to the disgust of his fellow ISDV members, Alimin played a major part in this retreat, declaring that, although he personally favored the Bolshevik standpoint, so radical a title would merely frighten off the white"collar unions. Seeing himself outvoted on the issue, Semaun acceded to a change of name, and the association emerged as the Concentration of Labor Movements (Persatuan Per· gerakan Kaum Buruh, or PPKB).117 If the ISDV failed to obtain a Bolshevik title for the labor federation, it did manage to secure one for itself. With the establishment of the Comintem in 1919, the social·democratic label had become increas· 45

Rise of Indonesian Communism ingly identified with the_gradualist adherents of the Serond International and unacceptable for those of a revolutionary viewpoint. The Dutch SDP had acknowledged this promptly by becoming the Communist Party of Holland (CPH), and some of the European members of the ISDV thought that their party should also assert its Comintern sympathies in this fashion. By no means all of them felt the need, however, and the question might have remained open had the party not been presented by its moderate rivals with a linguistic dilemma. At its congress of June 1919, the Indies SDAP decided that it had been a mistake to establish itseU as a branch of the Dutch socialist movement; casting about for a name of its own, it ended by becoming the Indies Social Democratic Party (ISDP).S8 Not only was this title very similar to that of the revolutionary socialist organization, but it was almost impossible to differentiate in Indonesian: that language, possessing no "v" sound, substitutes a "p" instead, with the result that the ISDV members were discomfited by being referred to by the moderate title.1i Since the ISDP showed no incUnation to change its new name, the older organization decided to do so. According to Alimin;tO plans to assume a new title were made during 1919, but no action was taken that year. The party did not even hold its annual congress, principally, it seems; because the European leadership was decimated and the ' two principal Indonesians, Semaun and Darsono. spent much of their time in jail.u It was not until January 1920 that the party was able to gather, but this sixth congress was a· hurried affair that only marked time until the seventh convention, scheduled for the ISDV's usual meeting month of May. At the seventh congress, the principal topiC of discussion was the proposal to change the name of the ISDV to Perseruatan Kommunist di India (Communist Party in the Indies ).42 Among its principal sponsors was Baars, who had returned from Holland in March, having found neither revolution nor employment there. He had been rescued from political and economic idleness by the Semarang municipality, which appointed him an engineer in its department of public works; the nomination understandably raised a furor, but the government blocked neither his retum nor his reinstatement in public employ. At the congress Baars spoke for those ISDV members who wished the organization to distinguish itself from Revisionist socialism and declare its kinship with the parties then aligning about the Comintem. He was backed by the powerful Indonesian-led Semarang faction, 46

Becoming a Communist Party which had adopted a resolution advocating the proposed change of title a few weeks before. For the Indonesian majority, a principal ground for backing the change appears to have been the desire for a name in their own language, one that avoided the problem of the letter "v," n It was a humble reason for deciding to become a Communist party, but a sufficient one: the motion passed by a good majority, and on May 23, 1920, the ISDV became the Indonesian Communist Party-the first such organization to be established in Asia beyond the borders of the former Russian Empire.

47

IV

Joining the Comintern WRITING from Europe when the Comintem was formed in 1919, Baars assured his Indies comrades that "the ISDV can state with pride that it has always worked in the spirit which is now recognized by the Third International as the spirit of Communism," 1 At the time, however, any congruence between the policies advocated by the- Comintern and the practices of the Indonesian party was largely coincidental, for the ISDV had very little. information concerning Soviet Russia or the Communist International. About the only reports on events in Soviet Russia that appeared in Het Vri;e WOO1d during 1919 were the regular wire-service accounts of the civil war. 2 It did print the manifesto issued by the 6rst Comintem congress, but it made no comment on it, either then or later.3 The ISDV journal also serialized Karl Kautsky's Soziaiismu8 und Kolonialpolitik-a study which, though it presented an Orthodo)l; interpretation of imperialism, was written by a Marxist who had been anathema to the Leninists ever since he supported the German war effort in 1914. The ISDV leaders were not, in fact, completely sure that they wished to impose on their own party the strict ideological confonnity that the Bolsheviks were impressing on the emergent Third International. They were not even certain about the Soviet revolution itself: as party cilRinnan Hartogh remarked at the January 1920 ISDV congress, they did not have the "objective materials" to fonn a clear opinion about the Bolsheviks. However, he added that "Russia still stands in the center of our interest" and that from available indications the Soviet regime seemed to be traveling in the right dircction. 4 Concern for international ideology was limited almost solely to European ISDV leaders, who were deeply divided as to the party's course. 'We will remember that at the ISDV congress of 1918 the party had resolved to transfonn itself into a political organization of some mass substance instead of remaining an e1ite group dependent for its 48

Joining the Comintem popular following on the Sarekat Islam. This endeavor was soon brought to a virtual halt, and Hartogh noted at the following congress that: "not much has come of the reorganization decided upon at the Semarang congress, because of the expulsion of Sneevliet, who was charged with canying it out. For the time being we have not been able to do more than keep ourselves functioning, in which we have been relatively successfu1."II On December 12, 1918, the ISDV executive held a, conference in response to its leaders' realization that the Troelstra Revolution had been defeated in Holland and that the Indies government was not going to concede anything more than its November Promises. The meeting determined that the party should emphasize organization and ideological training rather than mass revolutionary agitation: Should capitalism maintain itself for some time to come, we must, far more than has been the case until now, consider it our first duty to cultivate at least a thorough socialist knowledge and sympathy among a proletarian elite here, in order to equip it to appear as the leader of a future, inevitable clash. In this manner we will fulfill the prerequisites for a true mass action. e Although this resolution was framed in response to the immediate situation, it also represented the general concept of mass action held by Hartogh, the Surapaja leader who succeeded Baars as party chairman. In his view, the purpose of the party was, first, "to supply socialist information and to cultivate a core of SOCialistically, thinking and feeling people," and, second, to influence in a socialist direction such proletarian elements as were to be found in the other Indonesian movements. 1 To this end he refused to charter any new party branch unless he knew it would contain at least one or two members "with thorough socialist training-no small requirement for Indonesia in those or later days. First, Hartogh submitted. must come the organization and the knowledge; only then could there be mass action. S The perennial argument over party membership standards was thus reopened; as before, the whole question of the purpose of the ISDV was debated. The developments of 191~the increased government restrictions. the growing popular unrest, the discovery of Section B, and the ambivalence of the Sarekat IsIam---only aggravated ~e dispute; they convinced the Semarang group of the need to spread the revolutionary word while popular feelings still ran high, but they proved just as clearly to the Surabaja leaders the need to preserve the 49

Rise of Indonesian Communism party as a small, tightly disciplined organization that could ride out the gathering reactionary storm. Hartogh was plainly aIanned by the possibility of some party members developing a Section B of their own-not unreasonably, since the Surabaja leadership bad little control over the activities of Indonesian ISDV members, some of whom, we will remember, were implicated in the SI plot.' This was one reason for his refusal to charter branch organizations unless be was sure they would contain a trained core of socialists who could control them: as Hartogh put it, unless the party maintained tight discipline, it might find itself in a compromising situation that would allow the government to wreck it. By and large, the ISDV chairman added in defense of his policies at the January 1920 congress, the Indonesian workers jOined the ·party too carelessly, were indifferent to discipline, and did not pay their dues. The sixth party congress was held to confirm the Surabaja policy, which it did by re-electing Hartogh as chairman. I G The meeting lasted only one day-January 3, 1920-and no vote was taken on the policy itself. Semarang maintained that the congress was steamrollered and subsequently refused to accept its decisions as legitimate. ll Bergsma voiced the Semarang objections in an editorial note appended to the account of the congress in Het Vriie Woord. The opposition, he stated, believed that the party should not allow fear of being compromised to interfere with the establishment of new branches where there was a demand for them. Only with a large number of branches could the socialist message really be spread, since propagandizing could only be effective with direct missionary effort.12 The debate continued on the pages of Het Vrije Woord,u and inevitably it became a major topic at the May 1920 congress. By the time of the May meeting, Surabaja was apparently ready to yield control of the party. for it approved a shift of ISDV headquarters-and thus party leadership-back to Semarang "for practical reasons." Nonetheless, Hartogh made a strong plea for his program, arguing as before that the ISDV should be an elite organization devoted to spreading "socialist infonnation" and to strengthening the proletariat against "capitalist oppressors of all nationalities.'" If Hartogh asserted that the Comintem represented the only true s0cialists and that the world revolution was at hand, but he and the outgoing Surabaja executive rejected the Semarang proposal that the party assume the Communist label. The Indonesian masses did not 51)

Joining the Comintem Wlderstand the ABCs of socialism, he pointed out; bow then could they be committed to one of socialism's many "European nuances'?

U the !SDV wishes to agree to the change in name, then it will also have to accede to tho criticism expressed about the "'false socialists" in this and other

countries. Are tbere-and I measure it very generously-ten members of our nssoc:IatJon ca.pa blc of th e independent criti cism necessary for this? I think

not. Party formation in the Indies is still in an embryOniC stage; differentia. tion is only beginning to take place. At the moment a member of the executive o f Budi Utomo is at the sa.me time a member of the executive of

one of our branches. 1 could name more such cases. Moreover, the proposal for the change of name bas not come from a majority of our members. but from a few leaders. In itself there should be no reason to object to this, provided a majority is found which. after hearing the argwnents pro and con, will come independently to a decision. In view of the nature of the majority of our members-I mean this not as a slur; I am merely stating a fact-there can be no doubt that this will not be the case.15 Bergsma. Baars, and Semaun argued against Hartogh that only a change in name was involved in order to distinguish the ISDV from the "false socialists" and identify it with the Comintern .. It ~ould not, they assured, imply a shift in policy, for the ISDV had always been sympathetic to Bolshevik socialism: "We have been Communists for a long time now," Bergsma asserted. Hartogh pointed. out, however, that the ISDV members, even if they all sympathized with the Russian Revolution. did not unanimously endorse for Indonesia such institutions as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the soviet system, which Baars himself had just mentioned as essentials of the Communist program. The ISDV was too small to indulge in sectarianism, he held; and there were too many useful things it could do without committing itself to one corner of the revolutionary arena. Finally, he announced that if the party approved the proposal, he would have to refuse any leading function in it. 18 The motion was put to a vote; only the Dutch-dominated branches of Surabaja and Bandung and a member-at-Iarge from Temate opposed the transformation of the ISDV into the PKI.17 A new executive was accordingly elected, consisting of the Semarang-based core group of Semaun (chairman ), Darsooo ( vice-chainnan ), Bergsma (secretary), Dekker (treasurer), and Baars (commissioner); members outside Semarang were Starn ( Tuban ), Dengah and Kraan (Surabaja ).

51

Rise of Indonesian Communism and Sugono (Bandung).18 For the flrst time Indonesians were given the top posts in the party. Moreover. the Netherlanders in the new executive core were noted proponents of agitation among the Indonesian masses. The new party leadership was committed to greater activity among the local population, but it still faced the problem of deBning the tenus on which this work would take place. Should the Communists aim first of all at preserving their influence in the Sarekat Islam. or should they . sacrifice this if necessary by competing with the SI leaders for popular favor? How much of Communist doctrine could be insisted on in preindustrial Indonesia. where even the party's leadership was often ignorant of-or willing to ignore-the Marxist tenets? Similar questions were being asked at this time in Soviet Russia. where the Comintem was preparing to convene a congress that would devote considerable attention to Communism in the East. The task of the Third International was not an easy one. for although Lenin's doctrine on imperialism had given an ideological basis for Communist interest in the colonial question. it provided only the haziest indication of what Asian Communist parties should do. Moreover, the problem of balancing circumstances in the precapitalist East against the need to preserve overall unity in Communist policy was an exceedingly difficult one, for which in fact the International never achieved a satisfactory solution. Behind all Comintem decisions stood the red eminence of Soviet Russia, and it was Russia's experience and interests which. beyond the requirements of ideology itself. played the greatest role in determining the first Asian program of the International. The Soviet victory was, in the first place. proof that the Communists could assume power in a country generally regarded as backward. Of equal signficance so far us the colonial question w~ concerned was the fuct that this victory was achieved largely without the active participation of the peasantry. Peasant acquiescence and approval were obtained by the promise of bread, land, and peace. but the seizure of power itself took place in the cities, and its active elements were the proletariat and the common soldiery. It is li1cely that much of the Comintem attitude toward the peasantry in the Asian revolution derived from this experience, which tended to reinforce the ideologically based disregard of the Communists for the political potential of the peasantry. Neither Marx nor Engels had had much regard for the peasants; they were considered too unorganized, too b~ck\vard , and too possessed of a "petty-bourgeois" desire 52

Joining the Comintem to own land to be an effective revolutionary force. At some points Marx and Engels had maintained that the landless peasants might adhere to the proletarian cause, but this affiliation they considered to be of a wholly subordinate nature and of little consequence for the revolution. The peasantry did not constitute a distinct class, they claimed, and therefore it could not be an independent force in the class struggle. As we shaH see the International considered that peasant demands should be a principal part of the Asian Communist program-just as the Bolsheviks had used peasant demands to gain popular support for their cause-but at the same time it was assumed that the peasantry would be a docile follower of the proletariat and that the urban workers would thus be the dynamic force of the revolution. This resulted in a curious ambivalence in the Comintern program, whereby the International insisted that the Asian revolution would be agrarian in nature and that the support of the peasantry was vital for its success, ·at the same time cautioning that the peasants could not playa truly active revolutionary role and that the Communists should refrain from relying on them too greatly. The Cominfem never abandoned this dual attitude, and it was not until the victory of Mao Tse-tung in China that Soviet policy makers came to realize that the peasantry might be a driving force and not just a vehicle in the Asian revolution. The Soviet experience in the period just after the revolution was also important in the development of the Comintem colonial program. This influence was partly negative, since Russia's greatest hopes and fears lay in the West-hope for a revolution in Europe. fear of Allied intervention in the civil war-and this, added to the then prevalent belief that Communist rule in agrarian Russia could be ensured only by proletarian victory in a highly industrialized land, led the Bolshevik leaders to neglect the Asian question. In another sense, however, the civil war period did force the Soviets to consider the East: Russia desired to maintain the loyalty of the Tsarist Central Asian territories and to maintain Russian influence vis-a-vis that of the British in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. The Soviets were in no position to use force in these areas, and so it was necessary to rely on persuasion. The semifeudal rulers of Central Asia could hardly be appealed to with Marxist slogans, and so the two themes given the greatest emphasis in Russian propaganda in the East were Islam and independence. Incongruous though it was for atheist Communism to base its plea upon religion, the Bolsheviks were well aware that Islam struck the 53

Rise of Indonesian Communism deepest emotional chord in the areas where they were anxious to gain allegiance. Consequently, the period between 1917 and 1920 saw a steady stream of proclamations, congresses, and propaganda ~mpha­ sizing Russian friendship with the Muslim peoples. The first Soviet declaration on the colonial question was an Islamic appeal-the proo. lamation "To AIl Muslim ToUers of Russia and the East," issued a few weeks after the Bolshevik seizure of power. In addition to promising religious freedom to the Islamic peoples of the fonner Russian Empire, it called on the Muslims of Turkey, Persia, and India to take up arms against imperialism. In February 1918 a "Mohammedan Central Commissariat" was fonned to further revolution in the Muslim areas of the East, and in November of that year and the next the Soviet government sponsored the first and second All-Russian Congress of Communist Muslim Organizations. I ' These activities were spurred mainly by the need for Central Asian support, but the Soviets were also intrigued by the possibility of utilizing the Pan-Islamic movement, which seemed then to be growing into a powerful force in the Muslim world. Seeing in it the same antiWestern potentialities that the Indies authorities had feared earlier in the century. they called for a "revolutionary tie with the Muslims of the English, Italian, French, German, Dutch and other colonies, who find themselves under the oppression of the European imperialists." 20 The League for the Liberation of the East, formed in November 1918, took up the question of Pan-Islamism and concluded: This movement is, to be sure, still basically national and religiOUS. But Islam has always been an active, political religion ; the Mohammedans are not exclusively or even predominantly a theological people, but a political one; their religiOUS life is filled with a political, militant spirit. Pan-Islamism can thus also be used for political purposes--especially for furthering the movement for national independence.~l

In December 1918 the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party announced that it would establish a Department of International Propaganda for the Eastern Peoples. This office was to carry the revolutionary message beyond the Soviet borders, principally via Islamic ties, for "'We, the Muslim Communists, who know better the language and the way of life of the peoples of the East, who are Muslim in our great majority, are duty-bound to take the most active part in this saered work." n These sweeping gestures were inspired by emergency conditions; 54

Joining the Comintern they were thus concerned with slogans and tactics rather than analysis and grand strategy, and they contributed little to a program for Asian Communism. The single exception was the League for the Liberation of the East (Soiuz osvobozhdeniia Vostoka ), which was established as a pilot organization from which it was hoped to develop a "special International of the East, in accordance with the peculiar circumstances under which the various nations of the East exist, have developed, and will necessarily continue to develop."!!3 . At its fO\lllding convention-the first occasion on which the Bolsheviks discussed the unification of the East against imperialism 2f_the League set forth a program that analyzed the nature of the Asian revolution and outlined the Communist role in it. It rejected the Asian bourgeoisie, declaring that only the working class-peasants, laborers, and artisans--could carry on the revolution against imperialism. The aim of the anti-imperialist movements should be to create governments based on "healthy nationalism": these were to be "workers' republics," which would embody the principles of both national and class self. detennination. In spite of Asia's backwardness, the League held, it would not be necessary for the workers' republics to pass through the capitalist stage: for with the world socialist revolution already begun the masses could seize power themselves from the feudal classes and thus avoid the period of bourgeois rule. The program envisioned the unification of these republics into a giant federation, which would be "unselfishly" exploited by Soviet Russia.2~ In addition, the League outlined an action program for the Asian revolutionaries that was adapted directly from the experiences of the Bolshevik Revolution. 28 This attempt at establishing an Asian Commupist program proved completely abortive; nothing further seems to have been done with the League, and at the Second All. Russian Congress of Muslim Communist Organizations, held a year later, the League's ideas were almost com· pletely contradicted. The congress passed resolutions calling for the formation of Asian Communist parties that would become sections of the Comintern and for support of the Asian national liberation movements as a means of overthrowing Western capitalism. Lenin, addressing the meeting on the immediate duties of the Asian Communist movements, declared : The task is to arouse the toiling masses to revolutionary activity, to translate the true Communist doctrine, which was intended for the CommlDlists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people; to carry out 55

Rise of Indonesian Communism those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to merge with the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle. . . . You will have to base yourselves on that bourgeois nationalism which is awakening, and cannot but awaken, among those peoples, and ~hicb has its historical justification. At the same time, you must find the way to the toiling and exploited masses of every country and tell them in the language they understand that their only reliable hope of emancipation lies in the victory of the international revolution, and that the international proletariat is the only a11y of all the hundreds of millions of toiling and exploited peoples of the East. 21 This view was typical for Lenin, who had been a consistent proponent of cooperation with Asian "'bourgeois nationalism" on the grounds that in precapitalist areas the bourgeoisie and nationalism were progressive forces,28 Bolshevik opinion was not united on this interpretation, however, and not only the League for the Liberation of the East but the 1919 congress of the Russian Communist Party held for a struggle against the Asian bourgeoisie. 2' At the same party congress Bu1charin advocated a policy that went much further than Lenin's toward collaboration with nonproletarian forces, The Bolsheviks, he declared, should exercise extreme opportunism in supporting movements in Asia, since anything that would hurt the imperialists would help the world revolution: If we propound the solution of the right of self-determination for the colonies, the Hottentots, the Negroes, the Indians, etc., we lose nothing by it. On the contrary. we gain; for the national gain as a whole will damage foreign imperialism . . . . The most outright nationalist movement, for example, that of the Hindus, is only water for our mill. since it contributes to the destruction of English imperialism.&!)

pn the face of it, the question of the Asian bourgeoisie was a minor one, since that class represented a small and feeble segment of Asian society; but the matter had implications that went beyond the bourgeois class itself. First of all, the Asian nationalists might be won by a program that attacked foreign capitalism, but they would dislike a frontal assault on their own struggling middle class, especially if this diverted energies from the effort against colonial rule. Moreover, mOst of the Asian nationalist leaders were members of the intelligentsia; they were thus by Marxist de6nition bourgeoiS, and the Communists referred to the movements they led as "bourgeois nationalist." The identification of nationalism with the bourgeoisie made the Commu56

Joining the Comintern nists' attitude toward cooperation with Asian nationalism dependent on their view of the Asian bourgeoisie; and this lent great importance to the question of the Comintem's attitude toward that class. By the time the Comintem was founded, in 1919. there had thus been a good deal of agitation about Asia but very little progress toward a Communist policy in the East. There existed only Lenin's fragmentary contributions on the relations between Communism and Asian nationalism, and these had been contradicted in other Bolshevik statements. There had been virtually no discussion of Communist policy toward the Asian peasantry,81 and the statements on Islam had been largely opportunistic, based on the needs of the Russian emergency. The only attempt to create an organization and policy for Asian Communism bad failed completely, which, considering that program's provisions, was just as well. The first Comintem congress added nothing to this meager progress toward a Communist colonial policy, mentioning the Asian question only in passing as a minor aspect of the world revolution. In July 1920, however, the second Comintem congress set itself to amend the Internationa1's previous neglect. Zinoviev, reporting for the Comintern's executive committe (ECCI), apologized to the congress for the committee's failure to pay adequate heed to the Asian situation.82 A Commission on National ,and Colonial Questions was appointed to outline a Communist program in the East; reflecting the importance the congress accorded the problem, Lenin himself assumed its chairman-

ship. The secretary of the commission was Sneevliet, who appeared under his Comintem name, Maring. 33 He attended the congress as the representative of Indonesia, extrapolating for the purpose on the authorizations given him by Indies organizations at the time of his expulSion from the colony. Although he clearly spoke in his capacity as a Communist rather than as an advocate of the CSI, much of his considerable activity at the congress was directed toward securing Comintern approval of cooperation with the Sarekat Islam. His reservations regarding the ISDV's close relations with the Muslim movement seem to have vanished when he left the Indies. Arriving in Holland to Gnd the radical socialists despondent over the failure of the Troelstra Revolution-which doubtless made the Indies situation seem relatively bright -he had assured a welCOming rally that the Sarekat Islam was a "proletarian movement" and that "the Mohammedan religious tend57

Rise of Indonesian Communism ency of this movement was only a side issue." 34 At the August 1919 congress of the SOP. now the Communist Party of Holland (CPH). he had spoken in the name of both the ISOV and "our comrade-in-arms, the left wing of the Sarekat Islam" and assured the meeting that:

The Sarekat Islam continues to hope for revolution, and it is justi6ed in doing so---after all, the Third International has committed itself to the liberation of the oppressed peoples in the areas exploited by European capitalism."

The news Sneevliet subsequently received from the Indies seems only to have strengthened this conviction,u and at the second Comintern congress he made a strong ,plea for international support for the Indonesian Communists' strategy :

This organization, although its name-Sarekat Islam-is a religious one, bas achieved a class character. When we realize that the struggle against sinful capitalism stands in the program of this movement, that the struggle is not omy directed against the government but also against the Javanese nobility, we can appreciate that it is the duty of the socialist revolutionary movement to establish firm bonds with this mass organization, with the Sareht Islam. I am of the opinion that only through mass action can a truly socialist movement or revolutionary resistance be organized, that orily in this way can capitalism be opposed by genuine power. 51

Sneevliet's view fortunately coincided with Lcnin's-indeed, this may well have been why he was named the commission's secretary. The Russian leader presented to the commission a set of theses on the colonial question which emphasized the necessity of cooperation with bourgeois-democratic nationalism: Tl),ere is no doubt that every nationalist movement can on1y be of a hourgeois-democratic character, because the great mass of the population of the underdeveloped countries consists of the peasantry, which is the representative of bourgeois-capitalist relationships, It would be utopian to think that proletarian parties, insofar as it is possible for them to exist in the place in these countries, would be capable of carrying out the Communist policy in the underdeveloped countries without having a de£.nite relationship with the peasant movement, without in fact supporting it. B8

am

In Lenin's view. the Communists should pursue the follOwing line in underdeveloped regions: Support of the peasant movement in the backward lands against the landowners and all fonns and remnants of feudalism. We must above all strive to

58

Joining the Comintem give the peasant movement as revolutionary a character as possible. to organize the peasants and all the exploited people into soviets wherever possible, and thus to create a close connection between the west European proletariat and the revolutionary movement of the peasants in the East, in the colonies and the underdeveloped areas. The Communist International is to create a temporary cooperation, even an alliance, with the revolutionary movement of the colonies and the backward countries; it must not, however, amalgamate with it but must maintain absolutely the independent character of the proletarian movement-albeit only in embryo forrn. 3D

It was lucky for Sneevliet that he had such a distinguished ally in his opinions, for other members of the committee on the colonial question disagreed sharply with this view. In the end, even Lenin's great prestige could not bring unity, and the committee reported two separate sets of theses to the congress. 111e alternate theses, which were proposed by the Indian Communist M. N. Roy, called for Communist opposition to bourgeois nationalism as a force basically opposed to social revolution. Roy considered the landless peasantry to be the natural ally of the proletariat and counted on increasing landlessness to bring about Communist domination of the political movement in Asia. The bourgeois nationalists, he accused, would try to take contrO'l of the less sophisticated peasant movement and usc it for their own, nonsocial~st ends; and thus the Communists must do their best to prevent the spread of bourgeois nationalism. 40 Lenin, on the other hand, argued that by nature the peasantry was bourgeois-democratic, and he did not see the landless peasants as a considerable force distinct from the rest of the peasantry. Both Roy and Lenin thought that the colonial revolution would be essentially agrarian; but their diHering analyses of the class role of the peasantry led the one to argue for cooperation with the nationalist movement and the other to reject it. 41 So powerful were the objections to Lenin"s theses that he was forced to make some amendments to his original proposal in order to make it palatable to the more radical members of the committee. These changes consisted chiefly in the substitution of the word "revolutionary" for the tenn "bourgeois-democratic" when referring to nationalist movements, an increased emphasis on the need to {onn peasant soviets, a denunciation of religion and religiOUS movements, and a demand that Communists expose those privileged classes in the colonies which benefited from and supported the rule of the imperialists.~ 2 59

Rise of Indonesian Communism In view of the difficulties Lenin's program experienced in committee, further debate seemed likely when the two proposa1s reached the floor of the congress. The Comintem, however, was saved from argument by Sneevliet, who as commission secretary effectively sabotaged Roy's

prop"'al,

.

I see no difference between the theses of Comrade Lenin and Comrade Roy. They are basically in agreement. 'The difficulty consists merely in Gnding the proper attitude toward relations between the revolutionary nationalist and socialist movements in the underdeveloped lands and colonies. In practice this difIlculty does not exist. It is necessary in practice to work together with the revolutionary nationalist elements. and we will accomplish only half our task if we deny this movement and put ourselves forth as doctrinaire Marx· ists. 43

This move presented a diplomatic way out of the situation, and both theses were adopted by the Comintem. Actually. however, only Lenin's analysis was used during the period with which we are dealing.u The Asian revolution, the Comintem thus decided, would be bour· geois-democratic in fonn , and the Communists must call first for land reform on the basis of small peasant ownership. On the other hand, the capitalist stage could be skipped a nd a peaceful transition to socialism would be possible: "If the revolutionary. victorious proletariat organizes a systematic propaganda and the Soviet govenunents come to its aid with all possible means, it is correct to assume tha t the capitalist stage of development will not be necessary for these peoples." n If Sneevliet saw the Comintern adopt a favorable view on the vital issue of alliance with bourgeois nationalism, he found it opposed in another matter of importance to the Indonesian Communists. This was the question of Pan-Islamism, which, we will remember, the Bolshevilcs had previously encouraged primarily because of their weakness in Central Asia. By the time of the second congress the Soviet position in that area of the world had improved to the point where the stick as well as the carrot could be employed to maintain Russian influence; conse· quently, it was no longer so necessary to play upon their Islamic and regional sentiments. On the contrary, these feelings were now felt to be centrifugal forces, which interfered with the establishment of Soviet authority. Thus, in spite of the manifest interest of SneevUet and others that the Comintcrn utilize Islamic solidarity. or at least be neutral on the subject, the second congress declared: 60

Joining the Comintern It is necessary to struggle against Pan-Islamism and the Pan-Asian movement and similar currents of opinion which attempt to combine the struggle for liberation from European and American imperialism with a strengthening of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobility, the large landowners, the clergy, etc.·' The Comintem position on this point was to create a serious problem for the Indonesian Communists in their relations with the Sareket Islam, for not only was Pan-Islamism then gaining powerful adherents within the Indonesian movement, but the thesis was an open invitation for the PKI's opponents to declare the Communists hostile to Islam. The party's immediate objections to the Comintem program were not based on the religious issue. however. but on the decision to support bourgeois nationalism. One might have expected the PKI to approve the Comintem endorsement of cooperation with the bourgeois nationalists in view of its implications for the alliance with the Sarekat Islam, but in fact the Indies Communists viewed any open concession to nationalism as anathema: We have fought against nationalism. We, too, desire an independent Indies, but are of the opinion that this can only be achieved lastingly and in the quickest manner through the struggle against imperialism as a whot~thus througb struggling against imperialism together with the other workers out· side the Indies, and thus by being international. 41 One reason for the vehemence of Indies Communist opposition to nationalism was the presence of Netherlanders in the party leadership. The Dutch members tended to view nationalism in its European context, ·seeing in it the reactionary force that had undone the socialist movement at the outbreak of World War I. Acutely aware of their precarious position as an alien minority in the indigenous movement, they tended to identify nationaJism with xenophobia; moreover. although they desired the overthrow of colonial rule, they viewed a revolution that barred foreigners from the archipelago as a disastrous prospect: Suppose that all [non-Muslims] were to leave the country at once: then thousands of your own countrymen would starve to death, since the Indies social organism functions in such a way that the leadership of a large number of trained technical personnel is indispensable. The persons who are

61

Rise of Indonesian· Communism capable of giving that leadership are rull chiefly non-Islamic. Throw them out of the country and in the large cities you will have famine and plague. 48 The Europocentric Surabaja group was particularly disinclined to make any concessions to Indonesian nationalist sentiment. We will remember that in the discussion of the party program at the 1918 congress Surahaja had opposed even mentioning national liberation as a feature of the Indonesian revolution. The Semarang Dutch leaders were more willing to accede to Indonesian feelings on the importance of national independence as a revolutionary goal; however, partly because they were strongly inclined toward syndicalism, they also refused to separate national from class revolution. Thus, although Bergsma argued the importance of the Asian anticolonial struggle for the proletarian revolution in Europe, he concluded that "only the Communists" method of struggle" (by which he meant class warfare) could bring national liberation; and he regretted the fact that few Asians really seemed to appreciate this.4~ A striking example of this tendency to eschew ·activity that could be construed as nationalist rather than socialist was seen at the founding of the Concentration of Labor Movements in December 1919. We will remember that the PPKB was envisioned by the SI leaders as the upper house of a "true Volksraad," the lower chamber of which would consist of political party representatives. This body was formed at the same time and place as the PPKB and was called the Concentration of People's Liberation Movements (Persatuan Pergerakan Kemerdekaan Rakjat; (PPKR). The program it adopted was close to the Communists' own, and, speaking for the ISDV, Bergsma declared that the only thing wrong with it was the assumption that it could he carried out under a nonsocialist regime. 60 Tjokroarrunoto had stated at the Concentration's founding convention that socialism was admirable but would have to wait until after the liberation of Java; this separation of the two elements of revolution was totally unacceptable to the ISDV. Accordingly, the party refused to join the · Sarekat Islam, Sarekat Hindia (formerly Insulinde), and ISDP in the Concentration, and Bergsma wished the new grouping a speedy demise. It was one thing to cooperate with non-Communists in a labor federation, for unions had an implicit class character; it was another thing to cooperate with the same people in a political alliance oriented toward independence. Acknowledging that itS refusal to join political alliances on a national, nonclass basis might well lead to the 62

Joining the Comintem party's isolation, ISDV chairman Hartogh declared that this was a risk it would have to take: "Even if this viewpoint temporarily destroys our organization every one of us, man for man, will continue to defend it and propagate it indiVidually." Ol The antinationalism of the ISDV jPKI was not simply a product of its Dutch element, however; to discover the sense in which this senti· ment was shared by the party's non.European membership we must first understand the position of nationalism in the Indonesian independence movement at the time. It is important to realize that there was then a very real distinction in the Netherlands Indies between the "national" and "nationalist" movements. Most of the Indonesian parties compromising the independence movement at this stage, although they were "national" in the sense of being Indonesian, were either founded on a regional-cultural basis-as were Budi Utomo, Pasundan, and the Sarekat Sumatra~r were international in their ideological back· ground. The PKI belonged to the latter group, and so did the Sarekat Islam. which in the words of one of its leaders. "cherishes the idea of brotherhood; it is national, but at the same time through religion inter· national." 52 Although these groups became increasingly conscious of a national identity, they did not take an Indonesian national state to be their supreme goal; this was left to a new generation of parties that arose only at the end of the period discussed in this volume. There was, however, one Indies party of this era that was vociferously nationalist; this was Insulinde, which maintained that religiOUS, ethnic. and economic differences must be subordinated to the achievement of an independent national state. But Insulinde was nationalist without being national-for it was primarily Eurasian in origin, and one of its chief reasons for promoting an Indies nation·state was to overcome the ethnic and religious barriers between that group and the main body of the Indonesian population. Insulinde's principal leader and ideologue was E. F. E. Douwes Dekker, whose political ideas mingled radicalism of both left and right. A believer in the naturally superior man-he was an admirer of the racist theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain-Douwcs Dekker argued that the Indies suffered from being explOited by a foreign elite rather than by its own. The nationalist regime that should replace colonial rule would be based on social justice but would not be socialist; the class struggle must be subordinated to the national struggle, and it was the duty of the work· ers to support the Indies bourgeoisie in its bid for power. Outside aid 63

Rise of Indonesian Communism would probably be necessary to seize power; this might be had from America or from Japan in .return for the promise that their capital would be allowed to enter the country, or perhaps from Soviet Russia. which seemed interested in promoting anticolonial revolution. This last suggestion was greeted .by the Indies Communists as rank opportunism: "'Bolshevism may be viewed by some nationalists as a welcome guest, but time will teach them that Bolshevism will also cause many of these nationalists' ideals to go up in smoke, since in a Commtmist society there is no place for the national capitalism of which so many nationalists dream." 113 Since nationalism in the Indies was embodied in Insulinde, it did not appear to be a viewpoint that sprang naturally from the indigenous anticolonial movement but was rather,like Marxism, an ideology that a certain faction wanted an essentially uncommitted national movement to adopt. The nationalist-Communist competition in this sense was very real, for Douwes Dekker's movement and the ISDV jPKI were struggling at the time for control of the Sarekat Islam. Insulinde was at the height of its activity in 1919, for all three of its major leaders had returned from exile and were making vigorous efforts to increase their political influence. In June, Douwes Dekker took his followers out of Insulinde ·and formed the Sarekat Hindia (Union of the Indies) in order to break the identification of the movement with the increasingly conservative Eurasian community and to strengthen it among radically inclined Indonesians. The Sarekat Hindia then made a major bid for in8uence in the 51, urging the mass movement at its 1919 congress to abandon its religious orientation on the grounds that it provided no sound basis for political action, change its name to Sarekat India. and adopt a program of national liberation and social iusticc.6~ Much as the Communists desired the SI to reject its religiOUS label, they refused to support the Sarekat Hindia's urgings, arguing instead that if the SI were to change its name, it would do best to call itself the Sarekat Internasiona1. They were unwilling to give their rivals any advantage, for the Sarekat Hindia's revolutionary nationalism attracted not only various members of the 51 but also a number of Indonesian Communists; it was in fact the ISDV member Alimin who made the Sarekat Hindia's principal plea for alignment with nationalism. Dogmatic inclinations were thus reinforced by practical motives in opposing nationalism: to prevent the 51 from getting its political inspiration from the Sarekat Hindia rather than from the Communists, and to 64

Joining the Comintern keep the primary loyalty of its . own members who also belonged to the SH, the ISDVjPKl stressed the hollowness of Sarekat Hindia Claims to seek social justice, its opportunistic search for foreign imperialist support, and its desire to replace colonial with Indies capitalist oppression. The Eurasiim origin and the political theorizings of Insulinde/Sarekat Hindia lent credence to the Communist arguments that nationalism was an instrument used by an aspiring bourgeoisie to secure its own hegemony; it thus did not appear to many Indonesians to be mere Marxist casuistry when the Communists argued that '1nsulinde is dangerous for the Indonesians because it seeks independence for the Indies but not for the native population .... The freedom of the country alone will be useless, at least for its natives." G~ Moreover, the energy the nationaJists displayed during 1919 proved their undOing, for Insulinde participation in the Surakarta anticorvee action resulted in the arrest of several of its major leaders and the disruption of an important part of its organization. The establishment of the Sarekat Hindia proved a mistake, for it did not acquire the image of a purely Indonesian movement, and the govenunent withheld the charter necessary for its existence as a legal party. By 1920 it was already evident that the movement was in serious trouble, and the Communists began to lose their fear of it as an alternative focus of revolutionary discontent. The failure of the Sarekat Hindia did not lessen Indies Communist opposition to nationalism. Rather, it seemed to them to prove the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist analysis of nationalism: it was an expression of bourgeois ambitions, and since in the Indies the middle class was composed overwhelmingly of non-Indonesians, its lack of appeal to the indigenous population was only natural. To the Communists this feebleness meant that the Indonesian revolution would combine the national liberation and proletarian stages of struggle and thus aim directly at establishing a socialist state. For that reason, they considered, the Indonesian revolutionary effort was on a higher plane than that of other Asian countries, where a rising native bourgeois class existed and where the independence movement was in nationalist hands. G6 This interpretation was eXpressed by the major Dutch mentors of the Indies Communist movement 57 and by all the Indonesian Communists who achieved international importance during this period; it was, in fact, one of the very few points on which they agreed. This analysis was not accepted by the Comintern, and it was even65

Rise of Indonesian Communism tuully to become an important point of conflict between the ECCI and the PKI. The Indonesian party was later charged with left deviation. an accusation that was true so far as the PKI rejected support of nationalism as such and continued to aim for a socialist and not a national-democratic revolution. On the other hand. PKI opposition to nationalism by no means meant that it refused to cooperate with the "national" movement The Indonesian Communist leaders therefore were not in the same category as India's M. N. Roy, who consistently opposed cooperation with non-Communist mass movements; they supported Indonesian participation in the SI but argued that that movement was in essence neither bourgeois nor nationalist. Since the antinationalist view was held by the Semarang as well as the Surabaja faction and by the Indonesians as well as the Dutch, the transfer of power that took place at the May 1920 party congress did not mean a change in policy. Indeed, Baars stressed that the change of name to PKI would not entail this: "we have always made it a point of honor and a point of our practical policy to direct our glance first of all to the events taking place in the world at large; we have been strong and principled internafiolUllists, combating nationalism here as a thing fatal to the proletarian and peasant population." 68 After the May meeting, a referendum was held among the party branches to confirm the decision to change the organization's name. The party locals showed themselves overwhelmingly in favor of the Communist title, and when the results of the poll were received, the executive called a special congress for December 24, 1920, to consider affiliation with the Comintern. 511 The party leadership stated plainly that it expected the congress to rubber stamp the proposal: In point of fact the executive views this congress as a fonnality. In deciding to name ourselves a "Communist party" we made it self-evident that we would abo affiliate ourselves to the international Communist organization.to

The reason for the meeting, it was explained, was to head off any pos~ sible objections from Indies ~mmunists or the Comintern as to the procedure by which affiliation was decided. It was not expected that there would be any objections to the proposal itself; after all, the executive pointed out, there had been no protests about Sneevliet representing the PKI at the recent Comintem congress. The party had learned of this only after the mccting was over, and the Semarang branch of the PKI and SI had immediately acted to remove any doubts as to his quaJ~ 66

Joining the Comintern ifications by authorizing him to represent the two parties "wherever this is necessary in his opinion." 61 Affiliation with the Comintem was not so simple a matter as the executive indicated, however; the party still had to adjust its views to the Asian policy outlined by the International. On November 20, two weeks after the PKI executive announced its intention to link the party to the Comintem, Het Vrije Woord published the 6rst detailed reports of the International's decisions on the national and colonial question.s2 Baars, speaking for the editors of Het Vrije Woord, chose first to em· phasize the similarity between the Comintern theses and the PKI view: The international congress in Moscow has thus accepted our tactic as a Communist one in the sense that the delegates there have, on theoretical and practical grounds, detennined a standpoint and prescribed a line of action which for us no longer needs to be determined and prescribed because it has already long been our own.1l3 As he proceeded, however, he let his reservations be known: In point of fact, nothing was detennined for us [by the theses on the national and colonial questions}. for on reading the theses it will be clear to everyone that they were drawn up with a special view to India and Egypt. Conditions there are different: among the nationalists in those countries can be found real revolutionaries who are driven wholly by idealism and who do not shrink before difficulties; and the attitude of the Communists there can thus be a different one from that taken here. . . . Even so. the theses concede. in our opinion, too much to nationalism. It is true that the Communist International has gone beyond the slogan that "national freedom" must come before the class struggle; but it still expects too much from nationalism and therefore spares it too greatly.

'1t is understandable and forgivable," Baars explained, .. that it is the Russians most of all who do this, since for them the nationalism of the oppressed middle classes in India, Egypt, and elsewhere really is an enonnous help in the struggle against England, the leader of the Entente." His estimation of the importance of Russia's national interest in shaping the colonial theses was very much to the point, and Russophile that be was, Baars allowed that if Indonesia had been a British dependency "if would have been very possible that-in order to help our Russian comrades and thus to deat the ruling power's imperialism a very serious blow-we would seek closer relations with nationalism." We can ahnost hear Baars' sigh of relief, however, as he found

67

Rise of Indonesian Communism himself able to draw the conclusion that, inasmuch as Indonesia was a colony and Holland was too busy making money to take part in European politics, this gesture of solidarity need not be made. Anyhow, he concluded, Indies nationalism was not reany against Dutch rule: Here, however, nationa~ is not revolutionary. and the ruling power does not fear it, but on the contrary flirts with it. We can thus pl'OCe!!d in precisely the same line which we have followed without hesitation until now, thereby acting completely in the spirit of the Communist International. U Baars's views were opposed as unorthodox by any of his comrades, there is no record of it. There was one point on which Comintern decisions did change PKI policy, however, and that was the matter of Volksraad participation. At its 1920 congress, the International determined that Communist move- . ments were to conclude alliances with parties of the non-Communist left where possible, to participate in eJections, and to use their parliamentary position to strengthen the leftist alliance. This strategy, known as the "united front from above," was advocated by the Comintem from 1920 to 1927; its opposite number, the "united front from below," was followed from 1928 to 1934 and called for the Communists to attack rather than to ally with the leadership of the non-Communist left in an effort to win over its supporters to their own party. The ISDV jPKI strategy on parliamentary participation had been curiously schizophrenic up to this point. The party had always taken part in town council ( gemeenteraad ) elections in the major Javanese cities, had formed alliances with other parties for electoral purposes, and had taken committee work in the councils seriously.54 1ts position on the Volksraad was extremely ambiguous. however. At first the party had planned to participate in the elections to the 1918 VolkSTaad, and it joined with the S1, Budi Utomo, and InsuUnde to support the centrist ISDV leader Westcrveld as a common candidate. The radicals were never more than lukewarm to the idea, however, and Semaun was violently opposed (we will remember that his attacks on Volksraad participation were an immediate cause of the Revisionist departure from the party). When the ISDVs partners in the electoral alliance wished to water down the campaign platform that the ISDV executive presented them, the party was only too willing to withdraw from the coalition and campaign against those who did participate.1I5

68

Joining the Comintem The ISDV boycott of the Volksraad was motivated principally by the thought that the assembly was do:omed to political failure. Such a body had been debated in the Dutch parliament for twenty-Bve years, and by the time it was finally established no one, Indonesian or Dutch, expected much to come of it. Its functions were purely advisory, and its method of selection made it seem highly unlikely that the left opposition would receive any representation at all. G6 With so little prospect of achieving anything by participation, it is not surprising that the ISDV decided to boycott the Volksraad in the hope of being able to say "I told you so" to the opposition groups that tried their luck. This tactic proved to be a mistake, for although Abdul Muis was the only member of the Indonesian opposition to be elected, Governor Ceneral van LimbW'g Stirum appointed to the council some of the more outspokenly anticolonial political leaders in an effort to draw the Indonesian opposition into cooperation with the government. Among them were Tjipto Mangunkusumo of Insuunde and Tjokroaminoto of the Sarekat Islam; the latter barely managed to gain party pennission to assume the post, for there was a strong noncooperation element in the 51, which seriously doubted that the appointment should be accepted.61 If the general composition of the Volksraad had been as conservative as had been widely prophesied, the ISDV could have hoped that the participating members of the Indonesian opposition would have been frustrated and angered by their experience. However, it happened that the conservative Europeans, uninterested in what they considered an unnecessary appendage to Indies goverrunent, did not bother to form parties, and those who did take an interest were largely from the Ethically inclined minority. Consequently, the elections resulted in a victory for the NIVB, a party that stood solid1y behind Van Limburg Stirum's program of Indonesian-Dutch association in colonial government.°s Together with the representatives from the "radicar partiesBudi Utomo, Insulinde, Sarekat Islam, and SDAP (ISDP)-this group fanned a majority of the council. With the Volksraad so constituted, there seemed a chance that the participating Indonesians, instead of being antagonized by their European colleagues, would find common ground with them and would thus be influenced away from the revolutionary left. An even greater danger to the ISDV was posed by the creation of the Radical Concentration in response to the events of November 1918. 69

Rise of Indonesian Communism TIle parly was not excluded from this alliance, for it was invited to take part with the proviso that it cease opposing participation in the assembly. Although some Semarang adherents were beginning to have second thoughts on the uselessness of VolkSTaad participation," the ISDV refused to change its stand. In part this was due to the same dislike of multiparty alliance that was to prompt the ISDV to reject the Concentration of People's Liberation Movements. It did not wish a nonclass alliance, and certainly not one that included the conservative Budi Utomo. Moreover, it wished to isolate the Sarekat Islam leaders as much as possible from the ISDP and Insulinde, both to preserve its own influence on them and to prevent their seeking to redress the advance of Semarang within their organization by gaining outside support. Consequently, the ISDV refusal to participate in the Radical Concentration was coupled with frantic eHorts to keep the SI out also." The attempt to prevent Sarekat Islam participation failed, and although the Radical Concentration never became an effective bloc, it did provide a basis for day-to-day contact beh,\,een key leaders of the SI,ISDP, and InsulindefSarekat Hindia. In the Volksraad context, the moderate socialist ISDP presented the chief danger to the Communists, for its representatives, familiar with parliamentary procedure and eager to influence the Indonesian delegates, gave them considerable advice and support. The ISDP was able at this time to exert a rather considerable influence on the CSI,1' with the result that the ISDV leaders saw their position as principal European advisers to the mass movement seriously reduced. Moreover, the Volksraad participants were able to use the assembly as a podium from which to make parliamentariIy immune attacks on government policy, and this became increasingly important with the steady restriction of free expression that took place after 1918. The ISDV accordingly began to question the wisdom of its Volksraad boycott, for the party could have used delegates there both to make propaganda and to pry the SI from jts parliamentary allies. At the same time, however, powerful voices within the Semarang party faction opposed participation in any representative assembly. At the beginning of 1920 Semaun refused to take part in the conunittee work of the Semarang town counciL of which he was a member, on the grounds that parliaments were useful to the revolutionaries only as a means of publiCizing their views; serious participation, he declared, merely took up time that could be devoted to extraparliamentary activ70

Joining the Comintem ity. He was backed by the syndicalist-inclined Bergsma, who argued that constructive participation in the councils was self-defeating, since it could result in refonns that would only weaken the class struggIe.12 Semaun's principal opponent in this argument was the Surabaja leader Hartogh, and the transfer of the party chairmanship from him to Semaun in May 1920 accordingly lessened the likelihood of PKI parliamentary activity. New elections to the Volksraad were scheduled for early 1921, but the party continued its boycott and refused to put up any candidates. Then came the news that the second Comintern congress had decided in favor of the united front from above; this tipped the balance in favor of pro-Volksraad opinion. On December 21, three days before the special congress to discuss PKI affiliation with the Comintern, Het Vriie Waard announced that the meeting would have a second item on its agenda: participation in the Volksraad.13 In the same issue of the party journal, Baars argued for reversal of PKI parliamentary policy. In doing so, he warned that although the opinion of the Comintem should be weighed in reaching a decision, it should not be the sole reason for changing course: We could content ourselves with calling on the decision taken in Moscow, which leaves no doubt that the Communists must take part in parliamentary elections and must assume seats in parliament if elected. , .. There is a tendency among the European parties, ns has appeared from the events follow:ing the Moscow congress, which attempts to treat the theses of that congress the way a Christian does his Bible, and which wishes to suffice with saying "it must be done," thus cutting off further discussion. However much we must applaud true internationalism as a mighty step forward, . . . we feel it necessary to guard most strongly against a spirit which demands blind subjection to Moscow's commands. 74 Baars went on to remark that Comintem decisions had been generally made with an eye to marc developed countries than Indonesia, lands where the revolution was closer at hand and Commuf.list parties could think of organizing workers' and peasants' soviets to seize power: Here in the Indies. however, there is no question of soviets or their beginnings: here our abstention (from the first Volksraad elections] was connected with the fact that in our opinion no real parliament existed. Now we must detennine our position anew on the occasion of the second elections for the Volksraad-keeping in mind, naturally, the spirit of the decisions taken in Moscow, but also knowing that conditions like those in the Indies were not taken into consideration there.'I~ 71

•

Rise of Indonesian Communism As if to emphasize that the International's attitude would not be the

sole reason for a policy change, the party executive placed the question first on the agenda. before the matter of Comintem affiliation, and discussed it almost solely in terms of the situation in Indonesia. The chief debate was between Baars. the proponent of participation,7' and Bergsma. who pointed out that the PKI could never hope to win an elected seat-it was too late to enter a candidate for the 1921 elections anyway-and that it would therefore have to rely on appointment by the Governor General. This, in Bergsma's view, was entirely too humil· iating a method. Moreover, he maintained, Moscow's ideas ·about having Communist spokesmen in parliament were fine in principle, but in practice the PKI needed all its capable people for work among the masses.H

Semaun, previously the most vehement spokesman against participation, was ready to reverse himself on the grounds that there were too few other opportunities for publicly criticizing the goVernment. He pointed out that the candidate would have to be a Dutchman, since all the competent Indonesian party leaders were disqualified because they had served prison terms. This fitted his idea of the Dutch role in the party; he maintained that the European members were little qualified by language and customs to deal with the Indonesian masses and could therefore well be spared for the peripheral function of parliamentary . represcntation. 18 After a lengthy debate a vote was taken, and Vol1csraad participation was overwhelmingly approved.7 ' The congress named J. C. Starn, an executive member from Strrabaja, as its candidate. Not long afterward, however, the PKI discovered that its candidate was due to go to the Netherlands on leave, a fact he had somehow neglected to mention at the congress.so The party therefore appointed Baars in his stead. He hardly was in th~ category of useless European; however, he was well aware that his return to the Indies had been something of a fluke; anxious to avoid expulsion, he had avoided public activities that might give cause for banishment 81 Under these circumstances, being able to air his opinions with parliamentary immunity undoubtedly seemed attractive, for Baars was not a man who bore silence easily. The party debate on VoIksraad participation was curiously unrealistic, for it rested on the assumption that the Governor General would appoint a representative of the PKl. Van Limburg Stirum had assigned seats in the first Volksraad to prominent Indonesian opponents of the 72

jOirdng the Comintem

regime with the idea of persuading them to be more cooperative; he was hardly likely to appoint a European representative who guaranteed to sabotage any tendencies toward moderation among the Indonesians. Moreover, the Governor General had grown increasingly dubious of his original decision, for he had been greatly disturbed by the sharp criti· cisms the Indonesians leveled at the government in the opening Volksraad debates. The opposition parties were less cooperative than ever, and all three major Indonesian leaders in ~e Volksraad-Tjokroami. nota, Abdul Muis, and Tjipto Mangunkusurpo--had been implicated in the violent resistance of 1919. The PKI seemed to realize the futility of its plan during the Volks· raad campaign, for as soon as the election results were announced, it declared that it had been a mistake to offer a delegate for government appointment, although it apparently did not withdraw Baars' candidacy.&2 The party campaigned against participation in the Volksraad, reminding the other Indonesian parties that the Indian National Congress refused such collaboration with the British authorities. a3 The Governor General made his stand clear by ignoring the Communist candidate, declaring that as a matter of principle he was opposed to seating Communists in the Volksraad; shortly afterward the government added insult to injury by expelling Baars from the colony.s4 Het Vrije Woord, commenting on the Volksraad nominations, consoled the party with the remark that at least "we've done our duty." III> The December 1920 PKI convention was held in the Sarekat Islam headquarters at Semarang. The walls were decorated with red and green (it was, after all, Christmas Eve) , and one of the party members had made a hammer-and-sickle design in batik, "so that the always channing color combination of the Javanese could prove that it, too, was suitable for the emblems of the revolution." 86 Few executive members attended the meeting: Darsono and Dengah were in jail, Sugondo had moved to Borneo, and only Starn was present of the executive members from outside Semarang. Indeed, there was only one other delegate from beyond that city, a representative from Bandung. A great many people were present from Semarang itseH; the congress report described them as "thousands," most of whom must have been spectators. We can only speculate about the poor partiCipation from beyond Semarang; perhaps sending delegates to three congresses in a year was more than most locals felt they could afford, particularly since

73

Rise of lndonesinn Communism the outcome of the issue to be discussed (the Volksraad question was not brought up until a few days before the meeting) was considered certain. Once the Volksraad issue had been settled, Semaun announced that the rest of the meeting would be held in closed session, since not everything that would be said on the matter of Comintern affiliation would be legally permissible to publish, especially if there were opponents who had to be convinced.87 Het Vrije Woord described the ensuing scene: Slowly, with dragging·feet. the masses leave the scene; and Snally. after half an hour, the police have also left it, having convinced themselves that those remaining are all really party members. The shrunken group collects in the middle of the hall, as far as poSSible from all the walls with· ears; and in a hushed tone further explanations arc given.88

We do not know just what went on in this conspiratorial huddle; it seems, however, that there were indeed objections. The major problem appears to have been the Comintem denunciation of Pan-Islamism. That had been a sore subject ever since publication of the Lenin theses in Het Vrije Woord, for the anti-Communist faction in the SI bad immediately and successfully claimed it meant opposition to Islam in general. It was Bnally decided that the party would do its best to explain just what was meant by Pan Islamism in the Comintern decree: ''however,'' it was added, "we cannot do anything else to prevent the demagogic use of those theses." 119 There appear to have been further protests about the applicability of Comintern strategy to the Indies. A major point of the International's colonial program called for the Asian Communists to advocate land redistribution and the abolition of large landholdings in order to attract peasant support. It was noted in the PKI discussion that this had little application in Indonesia : "the clause on land distribution is not correct here in the Indies, where large landownership is virtually nonexistent and village ownership is the norm." "If necessery," the gathering concluded, "'this will be pointed out at a fuhrre international congress." 00 Finally, the party detemtined that the Comintern program gave no cause to consider a shift in basic policy. As had been evident from their earlier discussion of nationalism and the Volksraad question, the PKI leaders considered that they and not Moscow knew the Indies and that

74

Joining the Comintern they had been in the business of colonial revolution long enough to detennine party policy for themselves. With sublime assurance in the rightness of its previously chosen course, the PKI executive therefore pronounced that: As has previously been explained, we have followed the CommWlist tactic here before there existed "orders from Moscow" concerning it. We therefore need change nothing following our affiliation as far as our tactics or method of struggle are concerned. . .. Long live the Indies Communist party. Netherlands Indies branch of the Communist International! III

75

v

The Bloc Within ALTHOUGH the second Comintern congress adopted a general policy for the East, it did not indicate just how Communist-nationalist cooperation was to be achieved. The Lenin theses had emphasized the need for alliance but had conceded very little to the Communists' prospective partners: '1'he idea is this. that we as Communists wiJI only support the independence movements in the colonial lands if these movements arc truly revolutionary, if their representatives do not oppose our training and organizing the peasantry and the great masses of the exploited in a revolutionary maqner." I Such conditions would he hard to obtain under any circumstances, and the feebleness of Asian Communism made it most unlikely that the nationalists would make an ordinary alliance on these terms. If the Comintcrn really wished to

establish Communist-nationalist cooperation,' it would have to mooify its demands radically or pennit a relationship other than the equal partnership for Communists and their allies ,envisioned in the European united front from above. The International eventually chose the latter course, and Sneevliet played an important role in the choosing. "I might also suggest," Sneevliet remarked to the second Comintem congress, ..that a propaganda offiCe of the Communist International be organized in the Far East and also in the Middle East; since the [Asian revolutionary 1 movement is of such great Significance at the present time it would be very useful to unite under one office the work that is taking place in that region and to carry on a concentrated propaganda cHort, which could not be directed satisfactorily from Moscow." 2 There seems to have been some initial hesitation regarding his proposal, but the Comintem concluded that the idea was a good one and decided to establish a Far Eastern bureau in China.' Sneevliet was chosen as its first director, reportedly on Lenin's recommendation.· His appoinbnent in preference to a Russian or an Asian would seem to indicate general Comintem approval of the ideas he had expressed at the 76

The Bloc Within second congress. if not Lenin's personal endorsement. We will remember that at the meeting Sneevliet had not on1y advocated cooperation with non-Communist Asian revolutionaries but had also sought approval of the relationship the Indonesian party had achieved with the Sarekat Islam. SneevIiet left Russia in the early fall of 1920 and returned to Holland for a few months before going to the East. His contact with Lenin at the congress had sold him completely on the Soviet experiment; he now thoroughly endorsed Russian domination of the International and maintained more confidently than ever that "the Communists must everywhere work among the masses and penetrate into [other] organizations." ~ Leaving Holland at the end of 1920, he reached Singapore in May 1921, where he was joined by Baars, on his way to Russia after being expelled from the Indies. and by Darsono, who was making a pilgrimage to Moscow for the third Comintem congrcss.6 The three revolutionaries landed in Shanghai in early June; i Baars and Darsono continued on their journey while Sneevliet settled down to Comintem business. The office Sncevliet established was to prove of some comfort to the Indonesian Communists, but during its first year it was not overly active in establishing links with Asian Communist movements outside China.' This was not Sneevliet's major purpose, however; he was in China principally to observe the situation there and to suggest a future course of Comintern action in that country. In July 1921 he attended the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai but apparently only as an observer; he played no really active role at the meeting.1I He met Sun Yat-sen in Kweilin during August or September and reportedly lectured him on the need to establish the Kuomintang as a strong. multiclass party that would unite the Chinese people--and particularly the workers and peasants-to support the national revolution, Sun is said to have agreed with Sneevliet's comments, but no fonnal commitment was made by either side. 1u It seems unlikely tllat Sneevliet had hoped for a commitment by either the Chinese Communists or the Kuomintang at this stage. Accounts differ as to whether he was instructed to deal primarily with the Kuomintang or to negotiate with any likely revolutionary force,ll but his own comments on the Chinese situation at the time do not betray marked enthusiasm for any group. The Kuomintang. he indicated, was interested in the working class solely for its own purposes. 12 As to the

77

Rise of indonesian Communism socialistically inclined groups, there existed only Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Canton coterie, which had elected to fonn a Communist Partyi a Marxist study circle in Pekingi and a heterogeneous collection of students and teachers in Shanghai. The Chinese proletariat was, in his view, much less SOCially conscious than were the workers of Java. "In view of thCie facts," he concluded, "the immediate prospects for the development of either the labor movement or revolutionary socialist propaganda are very slim. Much weaker than in Japan, much worse than in the Netherlands Indies. 13 Sneevliet is said to have found his first meeting with Sun Vat-sen a disappointment; U in any event, Sun did not then appear a successful revolutionary, for h~ was on one of his periodiC flights from Canton. In December 1921. however, Sneevliet left Shanghai for a tour of Hunan. Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces. 15 Much of his three-month trip was spent in Canton, where he was delayed by the South China seamen's strike. HI During his visit, Sneevliet was able to take another look at the Kuomintang, which now appeared an increasingly attractive revolutionary poSSibility. For one thing, Sun's military position had improved considerably, and the Kuomintang was now a force to be seriously' reckoned with; for another, Sneevliet's opinion of Sun's socialism was much higher, in large part because .of the progress of the seamen's strike. 1T Finally, the Comintem envoy noted that of all the districts he had visited in China, the only one in which it was poSSible to organize the masses was the region in which Canton was locatedKwangtung province--since its warlord, General Chen Chun-ming, had fuzzy socialist views that put him more or less on the side of the workers.18 Sneevliet left China shortly after this journey, firmly convinced of the revolutionary value of the Kuomintang. Stopping in the Netherlands on his way to Moscow, he declared: "There can be no doubt that Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement possesses socialist leanings. even though its leader also bases his principles on traditional Chinese philosophy." 111 On July 17, Sneevliet reported on the Chinese situation to the Comintern executive. He declared that the International's best chances lay with the Kuomintang, and he sharply criticized the Chinese Communists for their secretarian refusal to take part in the practical politics of South China.20 His opinion was later published in the Comintern journal: 78 to

The Bloc Within If we Communists wish to work successfully. we must see to it that friendly relations are maintained between the South China nationalist movement and ourselves. The theses of the second congress are to be implemented in China. where the proletariat has as yet developed only to a very small degree, by giving active support to the revolutionary nationalist elements of the South. It is our task to attempt to hold these revolutionary nationalist elements together and to drive the whole movement to the left. 21

Sneevliet's view that the Communists must link themselves to the revolutionary movement in the South was supported by Markhlevsky, who had been working for the Comintern in the north of China. It also appears to have found the ready approval of the ECC!, for immediately after the July meeting 22 Sneevliet returned to China, this time as "Philips," Far Eastern correspondent of lnprecorr aod the Communist Intemotional. 23 He brought with him a letter signed by Voitiruky for the Far Eastern Section of the Com intern, ordering the Central Committee of the Chinese Corrununist Party to move immediately to Canton, the center of Sun Yat-sen's movement, and to "do all its work in close contact with Corr. [Correspondent] PlULIPp," in accord with an ECC! decision of July 18, 1922.24 Sneevliet proceeded to Shanghai and there got Sun Yat-sen to agt.:ee that the Communists could enter the Kuomintang individually; that is, they would belong to both the KMT and the CCP. which would continue to exist as separate organizations. This done, he summoned the Chinese Communist leaders to meet with him; they did so in August 1922, at a special conference of the CCP central committee: Shortly after Sneevliet arrived in China, there took place on the Western Lake at Hangchow a meeting of the Central Comnrittee of the Chinese Communist Party, at which Maring (pseudonym of Sneevlict) urged in the name of the Comintem that [the Chinese Communists) enter the KMT. He was personally a proponent at that time of a closer cooperation between the Communist Party and the bourgeois-democratic movement, though naturally only if political independence and conscious inHuencing of the movement were allowed; and this was chieHy on the basis of his experiences in Indonesia. The executive of the Chinese party. however, unanimously rejected this policy. which in its opinion would be a hindrance to the carrying out of an independent policy. Only on the grounds of international discipline was it prepared to execute the decisions of the Comintem.2 5

79

Rise of Indonesian Communism Other accounts of this meeting (the one quoted here is by former associates of Sneevliet who had access to his papers) leave some question whether the Chinese Communists were so opposed to the strategy that it was necessary to impose Comintcm discipline. 21 However, it had undoubtedly not been their idea of the proper relationship between the two movements, for only a month before they had decided at their second party congress to pursue an alliance with the Kuomintang on the basis of equal partnership. Since Sun Yat-sen indicated about the time of the CCP conference that he was not interested in an alliance except through individual Communists joining the Koumintang, it has sometimes been suggested that the strategy originated with him. 21 What appears most likely, however, is that Sneevliet described to Sun the relationship between the Indonesian Communists and the Sarekat Islam; he may have done so as early as their first meeting, where, we will remember, he reportedly lectured the Kuornintang on the proper composition and function of a revolutionary mass movement. To Sun, this form of cooperation had distinct advantages : it helped secure Soviet support, it did not force the KMT into equal partnership with a numerically insignificant ally, and it provided a means of controlling the Communists through the organizational discipline of the Kuomintang. Knowing that this kind of arrangement existed elsewhere and that it was advocated by the Comintern representative in China, he was hardly likely to have agreed to an alliance that conceded anything more to the CCP. For Sneevliet, this method of partnership was not simply the best . that the Communists could reasonably hope for in their weak position vis-a-vis the Kuomintang. He was, as we have seen, a staunch advocate of Communist participation in larger mass movements, which they could influence to the left through their superior organization and their energy in propaganda. If they were fortunate, they could win the non-Communist leadership to their side or drive it out, capturing the whole movement for themselves; if they were less successful, they could at least hope to emerge from the broken alliance with a good part of the mass movement's supporters. This had been his experience in working within the Sarekat Islam, and he is said to have pointed out the Indonesian example to the Chinese Communists,28 The Chinese Communist leaders objected to Sneevliet's project on the grounds that it ignored the class interests represented by the various parties. Doctrinally. this was a very reasonable protest, for Sneev-

80

The Bloc Within lict's concept contradicted the orthodox Marxist belief that political parties represent the interests of a single class. Sneevliet, however, argued that the Kuomintang was actually a multiclass party, containing both proletarian and bourgeois elements, and could therefore contain Communists as well as nationalists .~' The Chinese classes, he claimed, were "not differentiated"; the Kuomintang was led by revolutionary bourgeoiS intellectuals, followed by the urban proletariat of the South, and supported by the Chinese great bourgeoisie living abroad.Do Similarly, the ISDV leaders of Sneevliet's day had viewed the Sarekat Islam as a movement of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie led by the bourgeOiS intelligentsia. The class character of the leader~ ship was less important than the character of its following, for by working within the movement they could develop the class consciousness of the masses to the point where they realized that their interests lay with the Communist faction and not with their formal bourgeois leaders. Thus Baars could comment on the 1918 51 congress that, al~ though the mass movement, was still dominated by religious and nationalist elements, it would be brought to socialism by class agitation among its following: 11lat will not be easy to accomplish; it will inevitably produce clashes among the heterogeneous elements which are now still collected in the SI. On this matter our young, enthusiastic organizers await many-and sometimes bitter--experiences. For this reason it is still absolutely necessary that a separate organization eJlist, where they and the others who come to us can be fully socialist, where they can gamer socialist knowledge and find renewed strength after the defeats that ineVitably await them. But at the moment that this development of the 51 reaches its end, that it loses its religiOUS and nationalist character and assumes exclusively a class character; at that moment the imported ISDV need only abandon its distinction from the (purged ) SI in the higher unity of socialist mass action. U It is not certain whether the ECCl meeting of July 1922 went so far in its recommendation to cooperate with the Kuomintang as specifically to endorse the bloc Within-although it seems unlikely that Sneevliet would have refrained from arguing for his pet theory there, or that if it had been rejected he would have urged it on the Chinese Communists immediately afterward. The ECCI's first public endorse~ ment of the Chinese line came in a resolution of January 12, 1923, which might indicate that 5neevliet had acted on his own initiative or

81

Rise of Indonesian Communism that the Comintern was too uncertain of the feasibility of the project to endorse it openly before he had succeeded in arranging it.u However, the ECCI pronouncement coincided with Sneevliet's transfer from China: two days earlier the Comintern executive had detennined to move its ag~nt to its Far Eastern office in Vladivostok.33 Since the ECCI resolution called on the Chinese Communists to "remain within" the Kuomintang rather than to start joining it,84 it is possible that the resolution was intended not to announce a new policy but to confinn Sneevliet's tactic, despite his withdrawal. Although individual Communists had been entering the Kuomintang ever since the August 1922 conference, the bloc within was not formally adopted by the CCP until the summer of 1923, at its third congress,u and only in January 1924 did party. members join the Kuomintang en massc_ Increasingly, however, thc stratcgy became ~ dominant factor in the Comintem's view of Asia, in large Part because it became involved in thc Stalin-Trotsky feud. The ideological basis for this quarrel was Stalin's support of alliance with the refonnist socialists in Europe and the bourgeois nationalists in Asia. Trotsky fiercely opposed this, attacking the idea of a multiclass party as particularly reprehensible: In China, India. and Japan this idea is mortally hostile not only 10 the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution but alSo to the most elementary independence of the proletarian vanguard. The workers' and peasants' party

can only serve as a base, a screen, and a springboard for the bourgeoisie. at China, which experienced the extreme development of this cooperation and was at the same time a major objective of Soviet foreign policy, became the chicf issue in their argument. The passions of the China fcud inevitably affected Comintern policy·elsewhere in the Far East, especially since the International's decisions characteristically generalized practical considerations into universal theory. The result was an ever-increasing emphaSiS in Comintern Asian policy on the need to cooperate with bourgeois nationalism and a steadily growing pressure on Asian Communists to pattern their action on the Chinese example. Both in Indonesia and in China the bloc within proved an effective strategy for the rapid expansion of Communist inBuence within the national revolutionary movement. The nationalist-CommWlist alliance was, however, assumed by the Communists to be impennanent. The

82

The Bloc Within nationalist leadership might try to consolidate its position by refusing to allow the Communists sufficient leeway to develop their own strength; or the Communists might build their popular support to the point where a subordinate position was no longer necessary or profitable. As Stalin said, the bourgeois nationalist movement was to be squeezed like a lemon and then thrown away. The problem for the Communists was to determine when the lemon was ready to be discarded. In China, the course of the bloc-within strategy was affected considerably by Soviet interests. which required the alliance with the Kuomintang to be maintained to the bitter end. Moreover, the strategy was not well suited to a situation of armed revolution, for the Kuomintang as senior partner controlled a military force that gave it the power to tum the tables and throw the Communists away. The bloc within was better Stted to the Netherland Indies, where there was no question of control over armed strength or a state apparatus and where competition was solely between the partners for the favor of the masses and the loyalty of local and regional political leaders. Nonetheless, the Indonesian bloc within had its limitations; even before Sneevliet introduced it in China the strategy had broken down in the Indies. By 1920 the Indies Communists were asking themselves whether the Sarekat Islam had not been squeezed dry. Indeed, the aftermath of the Section B affair seemed to have drained the movement of its vital juices. Several hundred SI members had been arrested, and the major branches in the Priangan were so unnerved that only extensive missionary cHorts by Alimin and Tjokroaminoto prevented them from voting their own dissolution. SI membership rapidly dwindled as a mass exodus occurred of those who disapproved of Section B or feared that Sarekat Islam membership would be held against them. Many of these, of course, were only token members, but their desertion did not help the movement's shaken prestige. Some of those who left were better-situated moderates who did not approve of the movement's radicalism and its involvement in Section B; they tended to join more conservative political movements or purely religiOUS groups. By far the largest number, however, were peasants, most of whom had been inactive for years, and they jOined no new movements. 31 The result was to increase the influence of Scmarang over the SI rank and fil e, for those who left the movement were mostly adherents of the moderate wing, and those who remained were sympathetic to the Communists' radical 83

Rise of Indonesian Communism urban appeal and to charges that the CSI was weak in its opposition to the government,as At the same time that the Semarang-oriented membership of the Sareht Islam increased its relative strength, the central SI leadership became more impervious to in8uence by the Communist left. Semarang was now too obvious a challenge not to be viewed. with alann; moreover, the CSl leaders, badly shaken by the government reaction to Section B and anxious to keep out of trouble, found their Communist component an embarrassment. As a result, they began to look for a field of activity that would avoid challenging the government and also circumscribe the activity of the Communist element. The need to consolidate the mass movement arolln~ a coherent program had long been apparent to its leaders; as had been widely remarked at the time of the SI 1918 congress, the Sarekat Islam had passed the poiqt at which popular expectations and Tjokroaminoto's personality could provide it with momentum and cohesion,lIt That congress had represented the high point in the movement's revolutionary inclination and in 15DV inSuencc over it; although there was considerable rivalry on the leadership level, a general polariza~ion into right and left wings had not yet taken place. The outlines of such a diHerentiation were already evident, however, and CSI secretary 50srokardono swnmarized them as follows ! 1. The right wing looks first to lslam and seeks to propagate that religion; the pwty of the left is content us long as its faith is not made subject to other religions in Indonesia. 2. The right wing desires a struggle against domination by another race, whi1e the left sees racial domination us a result of sinful capitalism and therefore wishes to struggle primarily against sinful capitalism on the side of the workers and peasants, an effort directed against foreign rather than native capital. 3. Both parties encourage native capital fonnation: the right wing approves of the development of large Indonesian landowning and private enterprise, while the left wants nationalization of the land and cooperative enterprises. Both wish state exploitation of major industries and monopolies. 4. The right wing is anxious for [colonial} government aid and is concerned for the welfare of the country us a while, while the left urges selfreliance and places the interests of the common people first. The ·left wing takes part in the international proletarian struggle against big capital and against imperialism.40

84

The Bloc Within In 1919-1920 these divergent tendencies sharpened into a serious cleavage, as the increase in leftist influence over the rank and SIe, a1ann at government reaction to the events of 1919, and growing personal bitterness among the faction leaders divided the movement. The left wing within the Sarekat Islam looked, of course, to Semarang, where the SI executive was identical with the local PKI leadership. The right wing came increasingly to turn to Jogjakarta and to center about the CSI members Surjopranoto, Abdul Muis, and Hadji Agus Salim. Muis had an abiding dislike of the Semarang group since the time of the IneUe Weerbar action, and Surjopranoto was Semaun's chief rival for leadership of the labor federation. Salim was a moderate socialist, with close connections in the ISOP, and was also a proponent of the modernist movement in Indonesian Islam. Neither Muis nor Surjopranoto was particularly concerned for religious action; but Jogjak~ was the center of Islamic reformism in Java, Salim was becoming increasingly powerful in the SI, and religion was a cause that was popular, nonrevo!utionary, and not exploitable by the left. The weight of Jogjakarta influence in the SI thus favored a religious orientation. Between these two groups stood Tjokroaminoto. Far more than any other l~der he symbolized the Sarekat Islam, and the mass following the SI had acquired was in great part loyal to him rather than to the movement itself. He was a strongly charismatic leader; his political style was similar to that of his .sometime protege, Sukarno, and his influence lay in his acknowledged primacy as a popular leader and in his ability to balance rival factions against each other. He was an orator and not an organizer; unlike the faction leaders, he represented no special interest within the movement but attempted to represent a synthesis of its various interests. His principal concern was to preserve the unity of the Sarekat Islam; his position depended on this, and he realized also that once the SI appeared to represent particular interests it would lose its remaining prestige as the representative of all Indonesians. By 1920, Tjokroaminoto's primacy was in serious question. The Section B affair had shaken his position severely; not only did the government blame him for it, but those who earlier had questioned his policies were given added reason to think he had outlived his usefulness. It was not a time for oratory and emotion, but for consolidation and discipline, they argued. Tjokroaminoto himself agreed on the need for retrenchment, for government investigations of the Section B were 85

Rise of Indonesian Communism placing him in an increasingly awkward position, and it seemed that he might end in prison. Consequently, his defiant expressions of the 1919 SI congress were soon replaced by words of caution; in June 1920 he appealed to all SI members to avoid. controversy and not irritate the authorities.u Tjokroaminoto's caution annoyed those SI members-by no means all from the Semarang faction-who thought that the proper stance for a popular leader was one of heroic defiance and that he was abandoning his accused colleagues in their hour of need. Moreover, Tjokroaminoto seemed no longer able to take the political initiative. He had supported 51 involvement in the labor movement as a means of taking the 51 out of political controversy; but he had thus played into the hands of his two major rivals, Semaun and Surjopranoto, for the strength of the labor-oriented left was increasing alanningly within the movement. Tjokroaminoto was not overly concemed with ideology, but he was not willing to concede the leadership of his organization. He could not forgive the stinging personal criticisms the ISDV fPKI leaders had frequently addressed to him, attacks to which he grew all the more sensitive as his position weakened. Neither was he blind to Surjopranoto's hope to succeed to the SI chairmanship via his role as Indonesia's "strike king." (2 To offset the advance of his labor-oriented rivals, Tjokroaminoto began increasingly ' to support a religious focus for the 51, a course he had toyed with on previous occasions. This brought him closer to Hadji Agus Salim and his, e.lly Hadji Fachrudin, the vice-chainnan of the Muslim educational and social welfare association, Muhammadijah. Both these Jogjakarta leaders were modemists, who advocated the purification of Indonesian Islam from local traditions and its adjustment to the requirements of the times. They were also Pan-Islamists, and in June 1920 Tjokroaminoto joined them in setting up a committee for the defense of the Turkish Chalifate. He hoped thereby to generate a religious momentum for the 51, but his effort was immediately opposed by Semarang on the grounds that politics and religion did not mix. All this meant that the SI chairman became increasingly dependent on the Jogjakarta wing of his movement, and the effective headquarters of the CSI accordingly began to shift from Surabaja. Tjokroaminoto's home, to Jogjakarta. 43 Under these circumstances, the Communists began to ask themselves whether it was useful for them to continue to endorse Tjokroaminoto's 86

The Bloc Within leadership of the mass movement by professing loyalty to him as head of the SI. Their attitude toward the movement had always been a patchwork of contradictions, the inconsistency of which could be ignored only as long as the SI appeared to be moving in a revolutionary direction. Thus far the party's tacit assumption had been that Semarang's rising strength in the national movement would lead to a seizure of power from within; this would presumably take place before independence, since the PKI viewed the Indonesian revolution as aiming directly at socialism and thus not requiring bourgeois democratic leadership. By 1920, however, it was apparent that the Communists had reached the limits of the pressure they could put on the SI leaders. If the party wished to remain effective within the SI, it would have to be far more considerate of non-Communist sensitivities, temper its bid for popular support, and try to win Tjokroaminoto back to a more neutral position. Alternatively, the PKI could press a radical antigovernment program and destroy Tjokroaminoto's personal prestige in an attempt to loot the mass movement of the membership that remained to it. This action, outwardly more radical, would in fact re8ect a more conservative view of the political situation; for it would mean that the Communists had given up hope of claiming revolutionary authority over the broader mass movement in order to build an organization that would stand through a long season of reaction and retreat. The Dutch party members were particularly strong advocates of the second line. As we have seen, they were greatly disturbed by the Section B affair; no less than the CSI leaders, they felt that the incident and the government's response necessitated consolidating and diSciplining the mass movement. At first, encouraged by SI interest in labor organization, they sought to achieve this goal within the Sarckat Islam framework. 44 However, when it became apparent that the SI leaders were interested in unions as an escape from revolutionary politics rather than as an avenue to it, their reservations about subordination to non-Communist leadership were strengthened. In August 1920 Baars and Bergsma published on behalf of the PKI a detailed set of theses to guide the party's more distant branches in formulating their relationships to non-Communist groups. The theses fonned a striking contrast to those Sneevliet was then supporting at the second Comintern congress, for they resembled Roy's view and not Lenin's. In summary, they were as follows:

nise of Indonesian Communism 1. "Every popular movement must be carried on by the action of the most completely oppressed [part of the1 masses." Any popular movement. therefore, that is led by classes or groups occupying a more or less preferred position-and this includes skilled labor-is doom~ to compromise and will desert to the enemy camp as soon as the true members of proletariat have developed a class consciousness of their own. 2. The above statement is true of Indonesian popular movements, as shown by the fact that they have inevitably ended by compromising and betraying the workers. 3. The action of the privileged group in Indonesia is also characterized by an anarchic and aimless nature; its leaders do not strive to make the masses SOCially conscious. Instead, "the present-day movement very consciously puts a new spiritual slavery (the power of the leaders ) in the place of the old ( respect for authority) ." 4. "An Indies socialist movement will have to derive its support solely from the proletarianized agricultural workers and the industrial proletariat." There is no use for the Communists to work with other groups, not even with sueh organizations of skilled workers as the chauffeurs' and truck drivers' union, since «all these organizations are in any case doomed to bourgeoisification." 5. The Indies Communists must consider it their first duty to bring the proletarian masses to self-consciousness and a spirit of resistance. Until this is achieved, aU actions will be ineffective. !be present native movement is absolutely powerless precisely because it is a bourgeois movement and does not desire the consciousness of the masses." 6. The 6rst object is therefore to organize the industrial proletariat and to teach it socialism, at the same time carrying on propaganda among the proletariat organized in the Sarekat Islam, Sarekat Hindia, and Budi Utomo. The bourgeois nationalist leaders must be exposed, not collaborated with: "Agitation together with bourgeois leaders for bourgeois purposes has no use." 7. As long as the workers' movement remains as weak as it is, its activities must be carried out cautiously in order that the few existing leaders may not be lost through arrest. The theses concluded with the follOWing advice to the new branches being established outside Java: We have had enough sad experience in Java with regard to cooperation with bourgeois tmd semibourgeois elements, and we cannot advise our comrades

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The Bloc Within in the Outer Islands too strongly to follow our policy and avoid all actions of that sort. It is better to remain small for the time being and to lay a soWld basis rather than to expand rapidly and eventually have to break off that which was begun with such

enthusiasm.4~

The PKI theses reRected a retreat into radical dogma by profoundly disenchanted Europeans, but at the same time they were not unrelated to the general Indonesian political mood. The SI, Sarekat Hindia, and even uncompromised Budi Utomo were also concluding that what was now needed was not broad popular inRuence and alliances but organizational discipline and insistence that members adhere to the principles of their own group. Inevitably, this led them to reconsider the longestablished custom of multiparty membership. In June 1920 Budi Utomo adopted the principle of party discipline, which forbade members of the association to belong to other movements. Although disapproval of the Sarekat Islam's role in the Section B affair w~ a major reason for this decision, an exception was made for ~embership in the SI in order to placate the younger and less conservative Budi Utomo adherents.~B Sarekat Hindia and the PKI responded with party discipline requirements of their own, again excepting the all-important Sarekat Islam. For the time being, the CSI took no action itself. Party discipline, destroying the last hope of a unified Indonesian movement, was a course Tjokroaminoto would accept only if all other alternatives failed. Moreover, such an action would reduce the Sl's stature from one of implied primacy to that of equality with the other parties. Within the Jogjakarta faction, however, voices began to be heard in favor of expelling those who would not be loyal solely to the Sarekat Islam. Like Baars and Bergsma, the Jogjakarta leaders thought the time had come to abandon the idea of leading an amorphous mass movement and that ideological and organizational discipline must be the order of the day. In the first half of 1920 polarization developed principally within the framework of the PPKB, the latest and last cooperative eHort of the PKI-SI alliance. Relations within the federation were exceedingly complex, since the executive had practically no control over its component unions, which were loyal to the heterogeneous political viewpoints of their individual leaders. 47 Moreover, the rivalry between Semarang and Jogjakarta within the PPKB was heightened because its two principal leaders-Surjopranoto and Semaun-both wanted Tjokroaminoto's position as chief of the SI. The competition between Semarang 89

Rise of Indonesian Communism and Jogjakarta within the federation was thus particularly intense, with the result that the PPKB more often resembled a political battlefield than a functioning labor organization. ' Surjopranoto was, we will remember, the head of the sugar workers' PFB. During 1919 and early 1920 acute unrest in the sugar areas enabled the PFB to organize the plantation workers rapidly; and in March 1920 the union sent a memorandum to the Sugar Syndicate containing various wage .demands and the request that the PFB be recognized as the sugar workers' bargaining agent. 'I1ie employers replied that they wauld fire all members of the PFB if any action were taken, At this point the government took a hand; it assured the industry that it would not tolerate political strikes, but it sharply criticized the planters for refusing to negotiate or to improve wages. '!1le Governor General ordered the Residents in the sugar areas to investigate working conditions on the plantations, taking evidence not only from estate administTators but also from workers and their chosen spokesmen (that is, PFB representatives). It began to seem that the estates might be forced to recognize the PFB as a bargaining agent; they therefore decided to back down on their employees' economic demands, and they doubled wages and improved benefits considerably.48 For the PFB this victory was a hollow one, It had gained what the workers wanted but not what the union needed-its recognition as a bargaining agent. Such acceptance was doubly necessary because Indonesian workers of that day were inclined to view unions solely as associations fanned to lead strikes; they joined them in times of hardship, but once their basic economic demands were satis6ed-or the strike failed-they lost all interest in the organization. nus was a pbe· nomenon that plagued the Indonesian labor movement as a whole, and it was particularly marked among the less skilled wage earners in private enterprises, who were least inclined to organize, least able to pay dues, and most vulnerable to employer retaliation,ti RealiZing the precarious position in which nonrecognition placed both his union and his political ambitions, Surjopranoto determined to take advantage of the momentum the PFB had built up to force a strike for the acknowledgment of his union as the sugar workers' bargaining agent. In June, shortly before the beginning of the harvest season ( the only time when the plantations were in need of a full labor force and hence vulnerable ) Surjopranoto declared to a wildly cheering rally that a general sugar strike would take place unless the employers agreed 90

The Bloc Within immediately to recognize the PFB . The estates had not yet felt the power the union, he declared; of the thirty-six sugar strikes thus far, only three had actually been sponsored by the PFB. This was no com· pliment to union organization, but to Surjopranoto spirit, not discipline, was the essence. He asserted that the union's lack of a war chest and its inadequate preparation need not discourage the strikers; the workers were used to poverty and hardship, and temporary loss of income would therefore not make much difference to them.~ Tjokroaminoto backed Surjopranoto's demand, although his enthusiasm was understandably limited. Hadji Agus Salim strongly supported Surjopranoto, in good part from a desire to embarrass Semarang and to take control of the labor federation away from it. The leftist leaders themselves were in a very unpleasant predicament. They had no desire to bolster the Jogjakarta-based labor movement or to enhance Surjapranoto's position; moreover, it seemed obvious the strike would be a disaster since it was unlikely to be strongly supported by either the workers or the government. At the same time, they could not sit back and wait to say "I told you so" to a defeated PFB. The Semarang leaders had won much of their support in the mass movement by arguing that the CSI was a donothing leadership, and it would ill serve them to allow the accusation to be reversed. Caution was too easily equated in the popular mind with cowardice in politics or labor; a leader was supposed to be a hero, willing to face overwhelming odds without fear of the consequences. Moreover, if the Communists refused to participate actively in the strike, their opponents would probably blame them for its failure, and a good deal of this blame might stick. Already it had been publicly suggested in Jogjakarta that the Communists be expelled from the PPKB; the PKI could ill afford to refuse to endorse the strike at the federation's forthcoming congress, for this would almost surely mean a split on unfavorable terms for Semarang. 51 The labor federation's meeting was held in Scmarang on August I. The fires of disagreement burned briskly at the meeting, and they were industriously stoked by European advisers on both sides (Communists for Semarang, ISDP socialists for Jogjakarta) who did not share the common Indonesian preference for unity above ideology. Semaun debated hotly with Surjopranoto over the strike plans and his refusal to cooperate with the PPKB, and for a while a break seemed unavoidable. As usual, · it was Tjokroaminoto who compromised the erisis, this time

of

91

Rise of Indonesian Communism by a truly heroic eHort in which he declared, on the one hand, that he was in principle a Communist and, on the other-in order to avert demands that the PPKB take decisions on discipline qnd union organization that would favor Semarang-that the congress was not the place to discuss federation policies. The meeting ended by confirming Semaun as chairman of the federation; but its headquarters were moved to Jogjakarta, with Tjokroaminoto's backing, th~ hopelessly tangling ' its lines of control.52 Immediately after the congress proper a meeting of PPKB leaders was held to complete the plans for a sugar strike. Surjopranoto had already indicated what he wanted from S~marang-help with agitation and a VSTP strike against railroad lines serving the sugar mills. The Communists agreed, but they must have done so with heavy heartsthe sugar harvest was ending, and Semaun and Bergsma were engaged in VSTP wage negotiations that would have been ruined by a pro-PFB railway strike. A!l ultimatum was accordingly issued to the Sugar Syndicate by the PFB, accompanied by a general strike warning from the labor federation. ~'Icanwhil e, the various sponsors of the sugar strike scattered to whip up enthusiasm among the potential strikers. As Semaun traveled about the district assigned to him and acquainted himself with grassroots disinterest, he became convinced that the strike would be a disaster of much greater magnitude than he and Bergsma had imagined. Desperately he wired his findings to PFB headquarters in Jogjakarta and asked for another meeting to reconsider the strike plan. His messages were promptly intercepted and published by an enterprising Dutch reporter.~~ At this painful moment, the Sugar Syndicate rejected negotiation with the PFB on any basis, and the Resident of Jogjakarta warned that the government would take firm measures against strike leaders and agitators if the union proceeded any further with its plans. The SI leaders breathed a sigh of relief, for it enabled them to retire gracefully from what had promised to be a catastrophe. The affair by no means improved their feelings toward Semarang, however; nor did it further unity in the PKI itself, for Baars, long a proponent of agrarian action centered in the sugar areas, denounced Semaun's reversal as "undisciplined and un-Communist." ~t . Shortly after this the PFB declined into obscurity, the victim of discouragement and employer retaliation.5~ No further eHorts to organize the sugar workers (or any other plantation laborers) succeeded

92

The Bloc Within during the colonial period. Moreover, the failure of the PFB concluded effective political activity among the rural masses of the sugar areas, which had so long seemed the obvious center of revolutionary activity on Java. The PFB disaster also ended Jogjakarta's tolerance of the Communists. Salim and Surjopranoto moved to dislodge Semarang from the Sarekat Islam by announcing a conference of the CSI to be held in Jogjakarta at the end of September, to set a date for the next SI congress. The idea was to declare that, contrary ·to all expectations, there would be a convention in October. A The PPKB opposed the conference, for it had little desire to associate with the now far more powerful Communist-led unions; but the conference decided that if the CSI federation would not modify its stand, the VIPBOW would seek to establish an independent league of government employees' unions.6tI Since the new center would have absorbed nearly all the effective non-Communist unions and would in all likelihood have allied with Semarang, Tjokroaminoto conceded the issue and bestowed on the effort his not unqualified blessings.57 The united labor federation was established at a convention of unions called by the VIPBOW on September 3, 1922. Named the Persatuan Vakbond Hindia, it was, like its shortlived predecessor, assigned to organize opposition to wage and employment cuts.58 It was by no means as large as the PPKB had been in its heyday, and it was composed almost entirely of government workers.59 Suroso of the VIPBOW became its chainnan, and the executive was dominated by nonCommunists.70 The founders stipulated that the PVH would avoid political questions,11 but the Indonesian unions were no more able to untangle politics from economics in labor activity than was the government; one of the first decisions of the PVH was to appoint a committee of representatives "in the Netherlands to further its anti-budget-cutting efforts. These spokesmen were to be Tan Malaka, Bergsma, and either Sutomo or Gunawan, both nationalist students then in Holland.72 At its first congress, in December 1922, the new federation drew up a program of what were, in the Indonesian context, unrevolutionary but also unrealizable aims. The program betrayed a strong desire for state participation in the economic process, a feature that probably indi-

139

Rise of Indonesian Communism cated less the Communist leanings among its members than the overwhelming proportion of Javanese government employees; for .them, private enterprise was neither well understood, highly valued, nor better paid. As if to forestall criticism, however, the PVH stipulated that it was not against capitalism but only against its abuses, which it hoped to in8uence the government to correct.13 In spite of the modest overt role of the Communists in the PVH, they exercised considerable power because Semarang controlled the federation's largest and most active union (the VSTP) and was far better provided with leadership and money than its partners. This preponderance of resources was evident at the first PVH congress, which was moved at the last minute because the federation could not finance the gathering at its Madiun headquarters and had to accept Semarang's invitation to pay all expenses if the meeting were held there,14 Semaun and his allies do not seem to have pressed their views on the other members of the federation, however; apparently they preferred the PVH as a symbol of the cooperation possible between Communists and non-Communists if only the non-Communist leaders were willing. The non-Communist politicians were not willing, however. Small wonder, for even with the PKI partly dismissed from their ranks Semarang's influence grew among the Sarekat Islam branches, making it clear to the SI leaders that if they wished to control their organization at all, they must not embrace the PKI again. Moreover, in spite of their best intentions the Communists could not refrain from occasional stabs at the CSI members, particularly on the sensitive subject of the movement's finances; this did little to improve the temper of the SI chiefs, whose personal dislike of their Semarang rivals had reached a point at which any real cooperation would have been unlikely even if both sides had greatly desired it,T~ The increased strength of the left after the SI congress was most notable in the regions of Semarang, West and Central Priangan, and North KedirU' In the larger centers, the PKI was often able to spread its influence through the SI schools, which, as one of. the few concrete activities of the Sarekat Islam, played an important role in the movement and in the towns where they were established. The schools, which were largely though not entirely influenced by Semarang, expanded rapidly, for the officially approved educational system was sadly inadequate to popular demand for schooling, and Indonesian-run 14()

Semaun's Program

"wild schools" were springing up to fill the gap.H The effect of such schools on the battle for hegemony in the Sarekat Islam was graphically illustrated in Madiun, where the establishment of an SI school in the latter half of 1922 soon led to predominance of pro-Semarang views in that branch of the SI.18 This increase in Communist strength made the extension of party discipline both more necessary and more difficult for the SI leadership. As one C5I member later recounted, the movement spent the period follOWing the October 1921 decision in a state of severe crisis, for thousands of lesser 51 activists looked to Semaun as their principal chief; the result was a running debate in the branches on the wisdom of the party discipline decision.?& In the end two of the most badly divided locals, Madiun and Sukabumi, proposed that at the next SI congress the party discipline resolution be rescinded. so This was what Semarang wanted, for when Semaun returned hom Soviet Russia he ended the fonnation of the PSI, declaring that the task of the Communists was to ally with the national revolutionary movement and not compete with it. 8l His Soviet experience and the situation he found on his return had apparently convinced him that the proper course was to renew the PKI eHort to gain hegemony within the Sarekat Islam; and so, after Semaun resumed command of the party, the Communists engaged in a vigorous campaign to restore the bloc within. They pointed out that the party discipline measure had only resulted in greater disunity and confusion in the SI, that most major SI locals had not canied it out, and that more mudslinging between the rival leaders would seriously diminish the movement's popular support-all of which was painfully true.B2 In Semaun's effort much depended on the attitude of Tjokroaminoto, who, we will remember, had been in preventive detention when the party discipline decision was taken. He had been released in May 1922, but because he had been convicted of perjury and was free pending appeal to the Indies supreme court, he did not immediately resume public life. In August he was acqUitted, but he still remained carefully ~on­ committal on the subject of party discipline, giving Semarang cause to hope he might support a reconciliation. as Gradually, however, it seemed that Tjokroaminoto was repeating the perfonnance he gave after the March 1921 SI congress: having disanned the opposition by raising .hopes of a rapprochment, he was working to strengthen his influence among the Sllocals and tum them against his rivals. 84 He began publi-

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Rise of Indonesian Communism cation of Islam dan Socialisme ( Islam and Socialism). a work on an Islamic socialist phiJosophy intended as an ideological substitute for Communism in his movement. u In November 1922 he chaired, and Hadji Agus Salim oommandcd, the first AI-Islam oongress; inspired by India's All-Muslim League. it was intended to promote the interests of Indonesian Islam and also to further political orientation in a religiOUS direction. The PKI oould hardly have been enthused about the gather~ ing, since it was strongly Pan· Islamic and implicitly anti-Communist; however, the party was anxious not to open itself to attack on religious grounds. and not only refrained from criticizing the oongress but sent a representative to it. SS In the last months of 1922, Tjokroaminoto began an intensive campaign to centralize the SI by calling for the creation of cadres (warga TUmeksa ) within every SI local to guard the, unity of the branch; these cadres would also be members of a Partai Sarekat Islam (Sarekat Islam Party ). into which it was hoped the CSI and its branches would eventually be totally absorbed. The aim of the new party. Tjokroaminoto declared, would be to support the people of the Indies in a struggle for independence based on Koranic principles,81 This he proposed to submit to the next 51 congress as his solution to the party discipline question; and the CSI announced that since it seemed certain Tjokroaminato's proposal would be accepted, an official organ for the party was being established under his editorship.ss A few days later the first issue appeared; in it Tjokroaminoto declared that if his ooncept were not accepted, he would resign as chairman of the SJ.8' The Communists oontinued to urge the bloc within, but Tjokroaminoto's activities naturally gave them pause.to Accordingly, they cast about for an alternate fonn of alliance in order, as Semaun put it, "to avoid breaking connections with the national movement through a possible expulsion from the S1." 8 1 This was not difficult, for the events of 1922 had created an abnosphere favorable to ooalition efforts. The Indian National Congress had provided the example and the autonomy movement an issue for attempts at unmcation, the most notable of which. in June 1922, was the All-Indies congress.82 It was not until November, however, that more than ephemeral coordination was achieved, via the establishment of the Radical Concentration, which was intended as a grand alliance of all the major Indonesian movements.'3 As its name suggests, the Radical Concentration was a descendant of the Radical Concentration of 1918 and the Political Concentration 142

Semaun's Program (League of People's Liberation Movements) of 1920. There were two Significant diHerences, however: assessing the increased disillusionment with the government and the example set by the Indian National Congress, the new alliance decided its chief Seld of action was not in the Volksraad but in mass extraparliamentary pressure on the authorities; and it extended farther to both the right and the left of the Indonesian political spectrum than had its forerunners. On the right, it had the active participation of Budi Utomo 9i and the regional movements Pasundan, Sarekat Ambon, and Sarekat Minahassa; on the left it included for the 6rst time the PKI.1I5 The Communists attended the ISDP-Ied meeting that founded it, and Semaun stressed to his followers that "the PKI is very, VERY much in agreement with tile Concentration, for the PKl desires with all its heart to further the weUare and progress of the people of the Indies .... Unity of action toward a common goal: this must now be emblazoned on the banner we all hold high, the banner of the common needs of the people of the Indies." 96 At the PVH congress in December, Semaun urged the federation similarly to commit itseU to the new political alliance.lli The new united front was imposing in its outward dimensions, and so general was the sentiment against the Indies government's recent policies that its members were able to agree on a broad program of demands. U Had it achieved real cohesion, the Radical Concentration might have inaugurated a new period for the Indonesian national movement; but solidarity was unfortunately not the coalition's most notable quality. It is significant that the alliance was inspired by the Dutch-led ISDP; the Indonesian leaders themselves, no matter how clearly they saw the need for a common front in principle, continued to be more conscious in practice of their diHerences. Nor was the Radical Concentration given time to establish a tradition of cooperation, for very soon after its founding a clash between two of its adherents shook the entire Indonesian movement and created enmities that would have disrupted the sturdiest alliance. This conBict was, not surprisingly, a quarrel between the Sarekat Islam and the PKI. The congress at which the CSI was to reopen the party discipline issue had finally been set for February 1923, and both sides qUietly prepared their forces for a battle royal. In public, if we can judge from the arguments presented in the Communist and CSI press at this time, the two opponents restricted themselves to fairly oblique sparring. This mildness was perhaps due on the Communist

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Rise of Indonesian Communism side to vestigial hopes for reconciliation," and on the SI side to Tjokroaminoto's disinclination to give his opponents cause to attack him directly; in addition, neither side wished to be accused of taking an unconstructive, disunifying position. There was no direct struggle over the issues, but instead the two rivals used disagreement on the site of the cOngress (each naturally wanted to hold it in its own strong· hold ) in order to bring each other's good faith into doubt. loo By the time the congress met, from February 17 to 20 in Madiun, it was clear that Tjokroaminoto was not to be persuaded from his course. According to the Budi Utomo leader Sutopo, Tjokroaminoto told him shortly before the meeting that he had concluded Islam was the only element that could unite the Indonesian people and that he intended to make this the basis of the Sarekat Islam's activities, As for the Com· munists in the SI, they had done their best to spread dis.trust of the CSI leadership, and the movement was better rid of them. Their fate, he said, wou1d be sealed at the congress. I OI The meeting itself was heavily attended, and 1,200 to 1,500 onlook· ers filled the schoolhouse where it was held and overflowed into an adjoining thatched shed. There were 117 delegates representing about forty branches-more divisions than had been represented at the October 1921 congress, but no improvement considering the spadework that had preceded it and the fact that, unli,ke its predecessor, it was not the movement's second convention in less than a year. Those who did attend were solidly on Tjokroaminoto's side, however. Semarang's viewpoint was supported by only three pro-Red branches (Madiun, Tjepu, and Ngandjuk ), all of them from East Java and all with divided loyaltics; Semaun himself did not attend. lOll Indeed. the PKl had announced several days before the gathering that it would hold a special congress immediately thereafter, including an agenda that clearly re8ccted expectation of a complete break. 11a At the S[ convention. Salim and Tjokroaminoto acted as a team, making sure that the initiative remained constant1y in their hands. Opening the meeting. Tjokroaminoto announced that it had been decided to discuss establishment of the PSI openly rather than in closed session, as had been scheduled. Salim then spoke, stressing the Islamic nature of S[ socialism. After this Tjokroaminoto announced that he had visited fifty-two SI locals before the congress and that forty-five of them had declared themselves in favor of the PSI; he asked the delegates therefore to affirm the branches' appr.oval. At this point the Corn-

144

Semalln'S Program

munists tried to argue that a decision on the PSI should properly follow a discussion of party discipline. Tjokroaminoto instead declared the proposal for establishing the PSI accepted, and only then opened the meeting to discussion of party discipline, instructing the Communists to state the principles of their organization and its attitude toward religion. Sukendar, the chief PKI representative, responded with a statement that was well argued but highly theoretical, concerned with labor relations in industrialized societies, and partly in Dutch, and hence beyond the reach of most of the audience. The Red delegates stressed that there was no essential difference between their principles and those espoused by the C5I; although they asserted that Communists need not be unbelievers, they had to admit that on the subject of religion their movement was "neutral" (that is, secular). This was bad enough from the religious representatives' point of view, but Sukimo, an undiplomatic Red delegate from Madiun, made it worse by criticizing the money-grubbing and hypocrisy of the pious. This threw the meeting into an uproar, and the unfortunate speaker was forced to flee the podium in order to escape a beating. The party discipline measure was passed by an overwhelming majority; the delegates reportedly maintained the same position in voting that they had held on arriving at the congress. 11K All this took place on the first day; by the end of it the Communists were permanently out of the SI, which went on to work out a formula for a Partai 5arekat Islam in accordance with Tjokroaminoto's concept. It was decided that the executive of the new party would be the same as the C5I; gradually the older mass movement would be transformed into a cadre-composed PSI commanding a substructure of occupationally based "unions," which would contain the rank and Sle. IOG Like the 1921 party disCipline decision, this program was more drastic in appearance than in fact: 51 leaders apparently feared to alienate local politicos, for the proposed PSI units maintained the right to decide their own membership, and the mechanism for securing adherence to party disCipline was the same one that proved so inadequate after the previous congress.toe It was immediately evident, however, that this time neither side was reluctant to force its adherents to choose. Tjokroaminoto announced that he would visit places where S[ locals were under Communist control and set up rival pro-PSI units, and be did so promptly thereafter. 101 The PKI held its own congress and drew up a plan of battle, and the two groups exchanged recrimina-

145

Rise of Indonesian Communism tions so violent as to jeopardize the entire Indonesian opposition. lOS The battle naturally wreaked havoc on the Radical Concentration and PVH; even more serious was its impact on the mass membership of the Sarekat Islam, which was deeply disillusioned by fighting within the local SI executives and by the accusations the national leaders flung at each other. Almost universally, Indonesian opinion expressed distress at the dispute and urged that the opponents forget their quarrel in favor of the common struggle against the Dutch. IOII However, the rancor stored up during a long and unhappy partnership could no longer be dammed; it 800ded the entire movement and ended hopes for unity at this stage of Indonesia's national development. The first of Semaun's objectives after he returned to the Indies-the unification of Indonesian political forces-was thus destroyed; shortly thereafter his second project, the establishment of a powerful and disciplined labor movement, died. a stiU more violent death. The precipitating event was a strike by the VSTP, the result of the long-suppressed effort of the railroad workers to achieve their demands of 1920 and to ward off the consequences of the depression. The railway union had increased steadily in membership and income from dues during the latter half of 1922, the direct result, as the VSTP pointed out, of the rail and tram workers' fear of the depression. IlO Pressure increased within thc union for action to prevent the crisis from affecting. the workers; at the same time the government and private companies began to layoff employees and raise job requirements, and moved toward redUcing wages and the cost-of-Iiving bonus. It seemed increasingly likely that the VSTP leadcrs would be forced either into an aggressive action, which they realized would be unsuccessful, or into a surrender of much of their prestige among the workers. Gradually, as a government report described, Semaun began to lean toward the first alternative: In the course of the year 1922 the preachings of the reformer were mixed with a new tone, which found greater response among the mass of the PKI following-that of a strike forced on the workers through hung~ as a result of the rationalization measures or through the government's actions against their leaders. Now here and now there, sometimes weakly and sometimes strongly, his urging to direct action made itself beard, an appeal better suited to that group of the urban proletariat upon whlch the misfortune of the times pressed than were admonitions to calculated preparation and undiminished exertion for a goal which lay in the indefinite future. When the partial withdrawal of the cost-of-living bonus was eventually announced,

146

Semaun's Program a spirit of resistance arose among Ule workers, and especially, among the members of the most powerful and best-led organization, that of the rail and tramway personnel (VSTP):11I

The government had announced the first cost-of-Iiving bonus reduction, to take effect on January 1, 1923, and the private rail lines had stated they would also announce major wage and personnel cuts on that day. The VSTP therefore decided to hold its twelfth congress soon after that date. The central issue of the meeting would be a proposal by the Tjirebon VSTP branch to consider whether the rationalization measures, if put through as planned, should be protested by an industrywide strike or by strikes against individual firms, or whether a slowdown, mass resignation, or some other form of protest should be made. Announcing this, the VSTP executive declared that it did not intend to suPPort actions for wage raises during the depression, but it would insist that the pay scale not drop below that of the state-line level of 1921. If the companies wished to rationalize, the executive asserted, they could best do so by lowering their highest salaries and holding their lowest ones at a reasonable level. lI2 Until the congress met, both the VSTP and the PVH tried other methods of putting pressure on the government and alleviating discontent among workers already affected. Depression Committees were formed, anti-budget-cutting demonstrations were held~ cooperative enterprises for the unemployed were discussed, and appeals and protests were addressed to the Volksraad, the Governor General, and the government in Holland.1I3 The other Indonesian parties joined in protesting the government refusal to compromise on the drastic rationalization plans; and even the collaborationist PEB (Political-Economic Union), which had been founded to encourage Indonesian political activity outside the opposition, protested the government's handling of the issue.l14 Their efforts were of no avail, for the beginning of 1923 brought the promised acrossthe-board reduction in the cost-of-living bonus, and its complete elimination was set for six months later. When the VSTP convened its congress in February 1923. it inevitably centered its discussion on a strike.l1~

At the meeting the railroad union leaders empqasized that the strike, if it came, would not be the result of unreasonable demands by the workers but of the government's stubborn refusal to yield at all in its plans to cut wages of its lowest-paid employees. Semaun polled the

147

Rise of Indonesian Communism representatives of the locals, almost aU of whom reported that their members wanted an industrywide strike held as soon as possible. 1lI The VSTP leader agreed to this demand but asked that the action be postponed to allow for a last round of negotiations with the authorities and the private companies concerned. The strike, he emphasized, must be well disciplined and properly timed, and must not consist of local ventures at wildcat walkouts and sabotage. 1I1 The congress yielded to his arguments, and the final decision to strike was thus postponed once again . Even before the VSTP congress, the government had announced that any state railway workers who struck would be instantly dismissed. 1 ill Semaun, who gave every indication of realizing the consequences of a strike, was thus in the unhappy position of the leaders of the pawnshop workers' union a year before. Nor did the government offer any crumbs of concession on which a face-saving retreat could be based. On the contrary. it went out of its way to indicate that it had no intention of dealing with Sernaun at all. The PVH had proposed him as its representative to the Salary Commission. whieh the government had formed to determine a general wage policy for state employees; the nomination was promptly and rather acidly rejected on the grounds that it was "political." The refusal upset the Indonesians considerably. for the PVH had made its nomination in good faith. Sernaun was not only the head of what was currently Indonesia's major union, but the government had in previous years indicated that in spite of his political views it considered him to be one of Indonesia's more responsible labor leaders and had consulted him regarding government labor policy during 1920-1921. 1111 At its December 1922 congress, the PVH proposed to seek an audience with the Governor General to· reverse this decision; Semaun himself opposed the idea, however, arguing that there was little reason to put faith in the commission. and after some debate a motion of no confidence in the Salary Commission was passed. 1w The Salary Commission's prospects could certainly be doubted, for it was 'already apparent that the government had in mind a wage system highly unpalatable to the Indonesians. In 1913 the goveniment had established a single salary scale, with an extra allowance only for .offi· cials brought hom the Netherlands. It now thought that this was un· necessarily expensive. High salaries were d~med essential to attract Europeans to In~es government service, and the Eurasians, who filled

148

Semaun's Program most of the middle-level functions, were thought to need a higher standard of living than Indonesians in public employ. As a result, a three-step salary scale was proposed, one that was to all intents and purposes racially based. Not only did it place the Indonesians at the low end of a wide wage range, but it seemed to conSrm that the classification of the population into European, Native, and Foreign Asiatic legal categories (a measure introduced in 1919 ) was to be used to institutionalize the subordinate status of the ethnic Indonesians. This in fact was what eventually happened; the new salary scale contributed to the process by removing any remaining community of interest between the various racial groups in public employ. llll The Salary Commission contained only one Indonesian representative, but it consulted with leaders of the major Indonesian public employees' unions. The first meeting took place in Batavia on February 19, 1923, with representatives of the teachers' union (PGHB ) and Semaun and Najoan of the VSTP. Both unions asserted that the planned pay raises, intended to restore partially the cost-of-living bonus, were so set up that they would ben eSt only the higher-paid (that is, non-Indonesian ) employees. Half of the salary-increase budget was for higher-paid officials; this meant, Semaun pointed out, that the bulk of the Indonesian public servants could expect a raise of 5 to 8 per cent in place of a 25 per cent cost-of-living bonus. Similar objections were voiced in Jogjakarta at the commission's next discussions, where the spokesman for the union of teachers training sch?Ol employees ( Kweekschoolbond ) denounced the intended wage scale. At the final session, held in Surabaja on F ebruary 24, the VIPBOW attacked the commission even more sharply, demanding the government res!rict salary differentiation and establish a two-step wage scale, based on whether the employee was an Indies resident or an imported specialist. These complaints were received unsympathetically, and the debate became so heated that the Indonesians walked out before the conference ended.1 2~ These developments did much to alienate thc politically conscious Indonesians, the great body of whom worked for the government. They accordingly sympathized with the railroad workers, who grew increasingly impatient for a strike after further discussions with government and private employers failed. On March 8 and 9, 1923, a closed meeting of VSTP leaders was held in Bandung; they decided, reportedly without Semaun's approval,1 ~3 to go ahead with plans for 149

Rise of Indonesian Communism an industrywide strike. One last round of negotiations took place on April 9 and 12; the government and private spokesmen refused to concede on any of the points offered by the unions, and thereafter Scmaun and his fellow VSTP leaders accepted a strike as inevitable. 124 Having made this decision, the VSTP cruefs began an intensive campaign to gain sympathy and support for the coming confiict, pressing the argument that a strike was being forced upon them. The government, which had been observing this progress with disfavor, now stepped in; on April 18 Semaun and the recently returned Darsono were informed that if they did not moderate their actions they would be in immediate danger of intemment.I !!~ The effect of this warning was unhappy, for Semaun lost his temper and said that if any VSTP leaders were arrested, the union would immediately strike. illS His challenge was a political error, for it aroused the criticism of otherwise sympathetic Indonesian moderates. As the Budi Utomo leader Sutopo remarked, Semaun possessed the admirable qualities of honesty and sincerity; but he had evidently fallen prey to the "sins of the West"pride and stubbornness. l27 His declaration was also a major strategical blunder, for it gave the government an opportunity to force the strike before the union was prepared and before the sugar harvest, when the railroads of Central and East Java fun ctioned at peak capacity. On May 8, two days after his challenge to the government, Semaun. was carted off to jail, charged with having breached the speech laws a month before. The Semarang tramway personnel struck as soon as they heard of his arrest, and they were joined by demonstrative walkouts o( sellers in the public markets, machine shop employees, and automobile and truck drivers from that city. Wit1.'lin a few days the strike had spread to Pekalongan, Tegal, Madiun, Surabaja, and Tjirebon, and it then advanced rather raggedly to the other railroad centers of Java.us In a short time most VSTP adherents (though, as in the pawnshop strike, only the Javanese ones 1211) were out on strike. D. M. G. Koch, who was then editor of the East Jav3 edition of the Indische Courant, visited strike rallies in Surabaja and nearby Wonokromo on the evening before the VSTP stopped work: That night joumey is clearly etched in my memory. We visited several working class houses, where fifteen to thirty railroad workers received their instructions from locnlleaders. It was impressed on them that they were to handle their equipment properly and, before leaving the railway installations . and workshops, to replace tool5, drive the locomotives into the sheds after

150

Semaun's Program putting out the fires, and in general to commit absolutely no sabotage. The mood was embittered and detennined. They were reminded of the seriousness of th~ strike plan, and the duty of solidarity was stressed. taO

The result of the strike was predictably disastrous in spite of such efforts to avoid wmecessary hostility. The government dismissed all striking employees, established strict military control over the rail lines, prohibited the right of assembly for the VSTP, and drastically re· stricted it for all organizations in the residencies of Semarang, Kediri, Madiun, Pekalongan. Priangan, and Surabaja. It also took stem measures against the strikers. Koch recalled: There was in Surabaja a neighborhood of about three hundred company houses for lower personnel of the state rail line. On the morning the strike began the people received orders to move out of those houses; police and soldiers dragged furniture and household goods from them. It was a miserable sight. Weeping women sat with their few possessions on the roadside, in a drizzling rain. My wife went over and met a couple of women with babies several weeks old. whom she took along in the car and installed in a few rooms in the outbuildings of our house. Their husbands naturally also came to us for shelter. A police commissioner warned that we were making ourselves liable to prosecution: it was "support for the strike." and the government had let it be Imown that any fonn of support for the strike would be punished. Shocked, I wrote a sharply worded article over the affair; but the official antistrike action did not go so far that I was prosecuted for this. although according to the law it was a criminal offense. 1Sl The law which made,punishable the sheltering of strikers' families was Article 161 bis, which was added to the Indies criminal code two days after the strike had broken out: He who. with the intent of disturbing the public peace or disrupting the economic life of the community. or knowing or being in a position to Imow that such disturbance of the public peace or disruption of the economic life of the community would be the result, causes or abets that several persons abandon or in spite of lawfully given order refuse to, carry out work for which they have contracted or to which they are bound by virtue of their employment. will be punished with imprisonment of up to nve years or a fine of not more than ten thousand guilders. The Dutch socialists attacked the law as a juridical monstrosity, drawn up to enable the government to prevent any act it might choose to interpret as connected with what it defined as a strike, It showed, too. the SDAP accused, that Fock's government was bent on destroying all

151

Rise of Indonesian Communism Indonesian opposition; in protest, the socialists took the unusual step of joining with the CPH to oHer parliament a motion criticizing the Indies government, urging,Fock's removal, and asking an end to the extraordinary rights and the measures imposed in connection with the strike.lS~ In the Volksraad, Indonesian, ISDP, and some NIVB delegates protested the government handling of the strike, but without eHect. The great weight of European opinion approved the firm measures and applauded Article 161 bis precisely because it did constitute a political weapon : The magistrate no longer has to salt away WI1lTllllU against notorious leaders order to employ them at a moment when they have committed a deed which the Jaw does not forbid (as happened with Semaun, and again with Sudibio [another VSTP leader]); instead, he can haul the mischief-maker straight from the podium at the very moment he oversteps this Jaw. This can only serve to improve respect for laW.ta3 in

Under the new law many VSTP and other radical leaders were arrested, seriously impairing the leadership of both the union and the PKI.'U Partly as a result of the government measures, which included restriction of the union"s use of the mails and telegraph service, and partly as a result of its own poor organization, the VSTP central executive was virtually cut oH from its branches outside Semarang. so that it could not give leadership to the strike. Sugono had been named "strike dictator" and temporary chairman of the unUm follOWing Semauo's arrest, and a "Central Leadership of the Rail and Tram Strike in the: Netherlands Indies" was formed as soon as the strike broke out. It appears, however; to have been unable to communicate in any way with the VSTP branches, and it had little idea of the general progress of the strike. Moreover, because of the restricted freedom of assembly, it could not meet with more than two strikers at a time.135 Within a few weeks the VSTP finances, substantial though they were for an Indonesian union of that day, had been exhausted,lM and the workers, who soon saw the hopelessness of their cause, began to ask for their jobs back again. l3T The union accepted the inevitable and tried to negotiate the reacceptance of the strikers. A "council of mediation" was set up, and Sugono and Kadarisman held discussions on behaU of the VSTP; but since they refused to negotiate without a guarantee that all strikers would be taken back, they very qUickly reached an impasse. tlS The government was adamant, and the private companies were both disinclined to deal with the union and eager to take advan-

152

Semaun's Program tage of the strike to make drastic wage and personnel cuts. Its back broken, the strike lingered on until July, when the government announced its intention to banish Semaun; then it quietly succumbed. The government justified its severity by arguing that the strike was inspired by political and not economic motives. It pointed out that Semaun's arrest had been the immediate cause of the walkout, and that the VSTP leaders and their allies tried to tum it into a general strike.J3tI On the other hand, the state railroad authorities had said even before the VSTP congress was held that a strike would be considered illegal, and the government had Similarly called "political" the PPPB strike of the year before. It thus seems quite likely that the authorities would have taken the same attitude regardless of Semaun's action or the calls for a general strike. The government interpretation of the nature of the conflict was protested not only by the Communists, who ' insisted that it was purely economic, HO but also by the less radical Indonesian groupings. It could hardly be claimed that the strike was pushed upon the workers by their leaders, since, as the government's own reports pointed out, the reverse was patently the case. Union demands had been nonpolitical and were in most instances justified: the railroad workers were among the most underpaid in the state employ, and elimination of the cost-of-living bonus would reduce their wages by one-fourth. As for the striking employees of the private lines, most of them had not benefited from the wage raises granted in many other industries; their demands were essentially the same as those presented in 1920, at which time the authorities had thought them reasonable. In spite of the abject .failure of the strike itself, the VSTP action gained some advantages for the left ; Indonesian opinion nearly unanimously d enounced the harsh measures taken to suppress the strike, thus increasing sympathy for the radicals and disillusionment with the government. HI The Communists had gained their martyr: Semaun, Sinor Hindia proudly announced, had become the Gandhi of Indonesia. HZ The martyr gained was not worth the leader lost, however; and the increased general sympathy with the revolutionary standpoint did not make up for the discouragement and disorganization inflicted on the Semarang-oriented labor movement. Like the pawnshop workers' union before it, the VSTP went into a state of shock from which its recovery seemed for a long time dubious. tn The rest of the leftist unions sank into profound apathy, and the PKl executive frankly admitted that it was having trouble maintaining contact with its

153

Rise of Indonesian Communism branches, collecting dues, and publishing the party paper. 1U The restrictions on the right of assembly prevented the Communists from convening in their major centers: no PKl meeting was held in Semarang, for example, from early May until October 1923, after the ban was lifted.us The middle of 1923 thus saw both major branches of the Indonesian opposition in a state of distress. The Communists had been crippled by the VSTP defeat, and the SI was feeling deeply the effects of the split with Semarang. The attempts to unite the Indonesian movement through the Radical Concentration and the PVH diSintegrated amid these turbulent events: both of these organizations expired in June, almost unnoticed in the wake of the railroad strike. 1te Indonesian political opposition was not again united in a single coalition until 1939; the non-Communist labor organizations retired from politics and thenceforth functioned more as white-collar professional associations than as unions. Serna un, who had ended by doing what he had warned his followers against, departed for the Netherlands in August. Sinar Hindfa hopefully predicted his return :

The

We cherish, however, the hope that you will some day be allowed to tread the Indies soil once more. The portents of this can already be seen in the people's struggle in Europe (which has now begun in Cennany) to destroy the capitalist system, root and branch. It is, in short. the world-wide people's movement which will make it possible to bring you and other comrades bac1c from exile. l41 He was not to return, however, for more than thirty years. The events surrounding the VSTP strike strengthened the trend among the Indonesian political elite to bifurcate along revolutionary and quietist lines. This same separation appeared in the mass membership of political movements, with the result that popular support for the less radical leaders melted into indifference, leaving the politically active remnant committed to the revolutionary left. It thus came about that, in the period we are about to d iscuss, the energy and popularity of Tjokroaminoto's Sarekat Islam faded very rapidly, and by the end of 1923 the PKI was viSibly the only major representative of the Indonesian popular movement. The bloc within had ended, but in this case quite differently from that in China of the 19205. Of the two competing wings, the Communists emerged the victors; but they had gained command of a dying movement.

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VIII

The Bloc Above ON MARCH 4, 1923, the Communists convened a special "Congress of the PKI and Rcd sr to decide what steps to take after their expulsion from the Sarekat Islam. The meeting was held in Bandung, with a session two days later in Sukabumij 2,000 to 3,000 persons attended, including delegates from fifteen PKI branches, thirteen Red 51 locals,

and thirteen labor unions.' The PKI executive was not so well represented: only Semaun, Subakat, and Sukarsono appeared. for the other members of the party's current governing board-Tan Malaka, Bergsma, Harry Dekker, Gondojuwono, and Dengah-were either in prison or exile. 2 They were present in spirit, however, for portraits of Malaka and Bergsma, Sneevliet and Baars lined the red-festooned walls of the

congress han, together with pi'ctures of the newly returned Darsono and the PKI's international heroes, Marx, Lenin, and Gandhi. 3 The atmosphere was charged with stored-up resentment of the "White" Sarekat Islam, and Semaun and other Communist leaders bitterly denounced Tjokroaminoto and the CSI. Some of their audience thought they went too far, in fact, and various complaints were addressed from the floor. The only objector to receive satisfaction, however, was a Bandung student, the future Indonesian president Sukarno, who censured Hadji Misbach for the personal nature of his attack on Tjokroammoto and won both considerable applause and an apology from the Muslim Communist leader.4 The Sarekat Islam, Semaun and Sukendar charged, no longer represented the people's interests; only the PKI could do this, for it alone was the defender of the poor and the leader of the' fight for independence from foreign capitalist rule. Marxist and Koranic teachings were similar, Misbach and Sugono stressed; the PKI strove for freedom of religion and defended the right of Indonesia's Muslim population to the unfettered exercise of its religion. It sought to recapture Indonesia's idyllic past, Darsono declared; before the advent of foreign capital, the 155

Rise of Indonesian Communism people had enjoyed prosperity and social justice, and it was to this

state that the party wished to return.1i Laying the foundations for a popularity contest with the Sar~kat Islam, the party took up the major issues on which the recent SI congress had hoped to gain mass support and fonnulated even stronger positions: It adopted resolutions denouncing the government's latest tax measures and the contract coolie system and declared its intention to further the interests of the peasantry and to cooperate with other Indonesian political groupings. S On the last point the party declared that, although it hoped eventually to see the country adopt a sovietbased socialist system. it realized that in a colonial land like Indonesia this goal ·could be attained only g;.adually and through parliamentary action. The PKl therefore would concentrate its political agitation in a campaign for a real parliament and would cooperate with all parties that shared a sincere interest in this refonn. The Sarekat Islam, it emphasized. was not sincere. Since the CSI was basing its argument against the Communists largely on religion, a major object of the PKI meeting was to proclaim its support of Islam without abandoning the stand that religion and politics did not mix. It could do so because of the colonial govcrnment's promotion of Christianity and its attempts to regulate Muslim religious affairs: Muslims! Community of Islam. W ill lhe PKI be able to represent the OF COURSE! Here is til e (WOOf:

j'lteresis of til e Islamic faith?

READ!

The standpoint of the PKI regarding the defeme ckcided in the follOWing motion:

of the ISUJmic faith

is

Resolution VI The congress of the PKI and Sukabumi 51, gathered on Tuesday morning, March 6 at Sukabumi, etc., recognizing that in the Indies religious instruction in Islam is restricted through government regulations, to wit, that religiOUS teachers are obliged to secure permission for the giving of instruction from the head of the regency, declaring that the PKI does not agree to governmental intervention ill religious affairs, resolves: to call on the executive of the PKI to take the necessary steps toward the rescinding of this regulation {and] toward the liberation of religion from the state.;

156

The Bloc Above The most important resolutions taken by the congress were, however, on the organization of the movement's mass following. The PKI declared it intended to win the members of the non-Communist Sarekat Islam in the same manner the SI had indicated at its preceding congress it would use against its opponents: everywhere a White SI branch existed, the Communists would found a competing unit. To distinguish them from their local rivals, they would take the name Sarekat Rakjat ( People's Union), a name that the PKI hoped (overoptimistically, as we shall see) would soon be assumed by all the Red SI branches. At the same time, the party made clear that it did not intend to create a rival to the CSI, as it had decided after the October 1921 schism, but would subordinate the mass units openly and directly to the PK1 itself: 1. In all places where Red Sis exist, a branch of the PKI will be established. 2. The Red SI and PKI branches will work together. 3. This cooperation will center about the struggle against capitalism. 4. All major matters will be referred by the PKI and Red SI branches to the executive of the PKI in Semarang, attention of Chainnan Semaun. 5. At least once a year the PKI will hold a congress, at which the delegates of the Red SIs and the PKI will determine policy in defense of the interests of the people of the Indies. 6. The Red 51 units need pay no dues to the PKI ; they have only !o pay the costs of sending delegates to the annual congress. 7, PKI funds will be obtained from PKI branches (80 per cent of the funds received by PKI units must be deposited with the central executive), 8. The Red SIs will thus be in a financial position to defend the interests of their members. for they need not contribute to the PKI executive nor need they pay the expenses of such PKI and Red 51 propagandists as Hadji Misbach, Darsono, Abulrachman, etc.: their travel costs will be paid by the executive of the PKI. 9, Wherever a capitalist SI d 10 Tjokroaminoto exists. the PKI will establish a party branch and an SR, which will work together in the same way the PKI and the Red Sis do. 10, Further information on this matter can be obtained from the PKI executive.'

it is now clear," the party proclaimed, "that the Red SI and the PKI and the future Sarekat Rak;at .....RE UNITI:!) into one fortress, one army, one front for the defense of the interests of the people of the Indies." 9 In effect. this dccision reversed the position of the PKI on the mass

1.57

Rise of Indonesian Communism movement; for whereas the Communist party had previously acted as a bloc within the mass organization, it now set itself openly at the head. The system it proposed was similar 10 that envisioned by Tjokroaminoto for the relationship between the PSI and the mass following of the Sarekat Islam, and, as we shall see, it arose from the same concern -the desire to create an organization in which mass participation was subject to the strict control of a disciplined and ideologically cohesive elite. It was, however, far from clear that the PKI strategy corresponded with Comintem ideas on Asian Communist relations with the mass movement. The International's support of a close relationship with Asian nationalists had been expressed pointedly at its fourth congress, which convened in Moscow in November 1922. At this meeting the Comintem formally announced the end of the revolutionary period that had fonowed World War I. The capitalist system, it stated, had now temPorarily stabilized; therefore, the European Communists must pursue a defensive tactic, consolidating their forces and working for refonns in alliance with socialist parties. Interpreting this program for Asia, Karl Radek warned that the Eastern Communists must be cautious and remember that soviets could not be formed overnight in the Orient. The Asian Communist parties, he said, were all too often ineffective groups of intellechlals who lacked any contact with the masses. To remedy this. the Communists must increase their activity in the labor movement and among the peasantry; they must associate with the revolutionary bourgeoisie and, if necessary, even with feudal elements. tO Unless the Asian Communists showed. some practical achievement along these lines. Radek warned, they could not expect the International to give great attention to the Eastern question or to place its confidence in the Asian parties. The Comintern, it was obvious. was increasingly impressed by the prospects of association with Asian nationalism; for although the colonial Communist movements had not progressed much beyond embryo stage, nationalism was a visible revolutionary force. The masses, it seemed, were with the nationalists; and 10 the Massesl" was the slogan proclaimed by the fourth congress as world Communism's immediate task. In acknowledgment of this, the Asian parties were called on to participate in any movement that would give them access to the people.l l The bloc within, newly adopted in China, was suggested as a method for this approach, and Chinese Communist representative Liu

158

The Bloc Above Jen-ch'ing explained how his party hoped thereby to gain control of the Chinese revolutionary movement. 12 Comintern support of the bloc within for aU Asia was, however, by no means unambiguous: the same congress warned the Asian Communists at various points that in forming their partnership with nationalism, they should not forget to retain their proletarian purity, to criticize the local bourgeoisie, to adopt a program of agrarian revolution, and to struggle against reformism within the labor movement.IS It was apparent that the International was still undecided as to how far Asian Communists should go in distinguishing themselves from their nationalist partners. On the one hand, concessions to nationalism seemed imperative; on the other, powerful voices still opposed sacrificing the purity of the Asian proletariat. The tenns of the European united front from above couId not be ignored, lest the unity of the intemationalline be broken; nor couId the Comintern overlook the problems created by Soviet diplomatic interests, which in the Middle East were served by militant anti-imperialism and in Western Europe were opposed to an outspoken stand. These conflicting considerations, when combined with a general ignorance of the situation in the countries concerned (and a not innequent indifference to the whole subject ), led the congress to adopt a program that advised the Asian Communists to have their cake and eat it too. The Asian Communists, however, wanted to be supplied with the recipe for the cake, an understandable desire in view of Communist claims to scientific understanding of political events. To make the situation more complicated, Asian delegates usually had very definite ideas on certain ingredients of the recipe, depending on their interpretation of the situation in their individual countries, and they were accordingly upset when the International seemed to exclude them from its analysis. The result was considerable unhappiness on the part of the Asian delegates at the way in which the Eastern question was handled, and they ended by formally protesting to the meeting. a The objection, when read out on the floor of the congress, received a hearty round of applause, l~ an unusual demonstration of rebellion even in the fairly liberal first years of the
Rise

~f

Indonesian Communism

must not indulge in nationalist race hatred but seek representation in government bodies and spread the idea of the abolition of private property and the establishment of soviets, for if capitalism collapsed quickly in Europe, they might assume power directly and without violence. Above all. he concluded, the party must concentrate on the politica1 education of the Indonesian workers, for they were the inhcri· tors of the Indies future.81 Darsono's analysis reRected in part the sectarian view common, as the Comintem noted, to Asian Communists of that day: Our comrades in the colonies often err along the paths of left communism. Themselves educated by a literature which proclaims the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is only with the utmost difficulty that they can adapt themselves to combining the work of gathering together the young proletariat and the craftsmen of China, Corea, India and Egypt, against the foreign and native bourgeoisie, with the attempt to support the national emancipation movement of the young native bourgeoisie agaiJ?-st the capitalist center by which it is being suppressed: Decades will again have to pass before actual practice will be successful in combining the struggle for national emancipation among the colonial peoples with the proletarian revo-lution in Europe and America.1l8 This tendency to think in the tenns of European Marxism was evident in the new party constitution, which the March 1923 congress had ordered drawn Up.8' A revision of the PKI "action program, statement of purpose, and statutes was published in draft fonn in November 1923, and with minor alterations it was adopted by the June 1924 PKI congress. 10ll By all rights the Communist action program of 1924 should have diHered great1y from the one proclaimed in 1918 by European revolutionaries who expected the inuninent world overthrow of capitalism. In fact, however, the new program was almost startlingly the same. 10l It is Significant that the reason the party gave for having issued it was not that the old program had been too European but instead that it had been social..democratic rather than Communist; and indeed, the changes made were largely in the direction of the left.1M The new declaration of principles cried to explain the PKl standpoint in popu1ar tenns,toa but it did not water down those principles from the proletarian internationalism of the 1918 version. On the contrary, the PKI took pains to point out that it was interested in a class struggle and not a national one :

188

The Bloc Above The fact that there is a foreign regime in Indonesia-a diHerencc of nationality and religion-hides the economic conflict, which is a struggle between workers and capitalists. The oppression under which the native population groans makes it difficult or impossible for the native workers to see the cia$! struggle, which is the conffict between the working class and the capitalist class. The indignities to which the native population is subjected give the workers of this nationality the feeling that it is not economic op~essioll but natiollal oPIJfessioli which causes these wretched conditions. [Explanation of the proposition that the struggle is really economic and that only economic revolution will bring welfare to the people.] If this is the case, then it is not merely its own interests which force the Indonesian proletariat to awakCll to the struggle against capitalism, but it is also its desirc to achieve the independencc of Indonesia aud the welfare of the people which leads the Indonesian proletariat to oppose capitalism, even in its own country. In this struggle against capitalism the Indonesian proletariat will join hands with other groups of workers, without regard to nationality or religion. Therefore the effort of the proletariat here must be an international one, for this means the summoning of all the forces of the proletariat, of every religion and nationality.HH Neither in the new action program nor in the statutes and statement of purpose was the Sarekat Rakjat mentioned. Instead, a provision for "extraordinary membership" in the party was adapted from the statutes of 1918: Local associations may become extraordinary members of the Party while

continuing to maintain their own name; but to this name must be added the words Hwbstructure of the PKI" if this association is a political one and "PKI Cel" if it is of another naturc. Regional associations may also cnter the Party as extra<Jrdinary members if the Executive of the Party so allows. Such a request to become a member of the Party will be viewed as a collective request by all the members of the associations in question. H.owever, the entrance of the associations as members of the Party does not mean that their members become members of the Party. Associations which have become members of the Party are bound by the decisions of the Party, no matter what the nature of these decisions. These associations will still maintain fully the right to govern the internaJ arrangements of their groups themselves, as long as their decisions and activities are not in conOict with the principles of the Party, its action program, or the decisions which have been taken by the Party. If the Executive refuses to admit an association to extraordinary membership, that association may appeal to the Party's annual congress. This congress will then decide on the request.105

189

Rise of Indonesian Communism Into this framework the Sarekat Rakjat was fitted. Not only was it placed directly under the PKI, in the spirit of the March 1923 congress, but it joined the party; each SR branch was declared to be a PKI "member" and subject to party discipline. To ensure Communist control, the PKI also decided that the SR units, although each had only one vote, could never have more than one-third the total votes at a congress and that no SR could be established unless six PKI members (a party cell) resided in that locality.lDlI This last provision, had it been followed literally, would have practically eliminated the movement in the rural areas; in practice, a compromise was reached whereby the SR branches in the towns developed "subsections" in the surrounding villages, which worked under their guidance and thus under the indirect control of the nearest PKI unit. The reason for placing the SR in a close and subordinate relation to the party. Semaun later stated. was to ensure PKI domination of the mass organization and to prevent it from diluting the party's proletarian charactcr. 101 Doctrinaire leftism doubtless contributed to this insistence on overt and stringent control of the mass movement, but the policy was at the same time conservative, reflecting much the same sort of agonizing reappraisal that the Sarekat Islam leaders had undertaken after the Section B affair. Like the CSI, the Communist executive was feeling the unreliability of its mass support and pondering whether it would not be in the long run better to exist as a disCiplined and ideologically trained urban core rather than as a foCal point for general unrest. The mixed feelings the PKI central leadership had about its mass following resulted in great ambiguity in its popular approach during 1923--1924. Although the Red SI/SR membership was overwhelmingly nonproletarian, the PKI leadership centered its program myopically on the urban working class; although its mass following was strongly antiDutch. the Communist executive strenuously insisted that the party was intcmationalist and did not oppose the Netherlanders as such; although its adherents were at least nominally Muslim, the PKlleadership emphasized that it wl.ls nonreligiOUS. As a result, party pronouncements were very confused; what was said by the PKI executive and what was preached by the leaders in the hinterlands was often completely opposed. How much this acted as a brake on the expansion of PKI popular support is difficult to say, but it seems likely that its effect was consid-

190

The Bloc Above crable. The March 1923 decision to transform the Red SIs into the Sarckat Rakjat and place them directly under the party was received reluctantly. When the Semarang SI members were confronted with the proposal, they responded with dead silence, and their leaders decided it would be better not to put the matter to a vote ·right then.I08 It is reasonable to assume that if the SI branch traditionally identified intimately with the party was so hesitant, less closely associated units must have been even more so. Although the PKI congress had expressed the hope that the Red Sis would change their title, with its nationalist and religiOUS flavor, to Sarekat Rakjat, this did not generally happen in 1923, even in Semarang.l ~ Not until April 1924 was it announced that all Red SIs would adopt the new name, A statement of leaders from sixteen West Java Red SI and SR units declared that the leftist units would thereby distinguish themselves from the SI and proclaim their belief that religion was too noble to be involved in politics. The meeting gave little evidence of the ideological orthodoxy and self-control desired by the party. "Every state is a deception." Alimin reportedly declared. "'in every state there is oppression"; 110 and other speakers expressed equally bitter grievances against authority. Apparently, the question of adopting the Sarekat Rakjat title was still something of a hot issue, for it was discussed in closed session; the decision does not seem to have been generally carried out by the units of the mass organization until after it had been reiterated by the June 1924 party congress. In its efforts to give the movement a sense of proletarian discipline, the party leadership campaigned energetically during 1923-1924 to improve the ideological and organizational level of both PKI and SR branches. Courses in Marxist theory were given; indoctrination and propaganda were carried on by the Red SI schools, which had changed their name to Sekolah Rakjat (People's Schools) in April 1924,111 and by adult literacy courses. Tracts on the Communist program and principles were published, including the first Indonesian translation of the Communist Manifesto, and a campaign was begun to increase circulation of PKI-sponsored periodicals. 1I2 A Center for Revolutionary Propaganda (CORP) was established in Semarang under the chairmanship of Subakat, one of the party's chief theoreticians; it was to provide funds and direction for Communist propaganda and indoctrination, and it reportedly also established several schools.1I3 In addition, the party attempted to consolidate its publications, resolving to 191

Rise of Indonesian Communism concentrate on a few strong daily papers rather than on the plethora of financially (and ideologically) unstable provincial journals it then pos~ .sessed.1U Here, however, there seems to have been resistance from local Communist leaders, who wanted the prestige and propaganda opportunities of their own papers; despite reiteration of this decision by the June 1924 PKI congress, there was no visible reduction in the number of minor journals or increase in the central party organs. Sarekat Rakjat members were encouraged to improve their knowl~ edge to the point where they were able to join the party. The system for absorption into the PKI seems to have differed from place to place, but in the Semarang area it was reported that an SR member received a green card on first admission; this entitled him ·to participate in general activities but not to attend closed meetings. If investigations showed that he was not a spy or a troublemaker, be received a white card, which indicated that he was a fun member but not ideologicaUy trained. ]f he followed several indoctrination courses successfully, he was given a red card, which entitled him to be a leader or a propagandist.tu. An SR member could (at least in theory) join the PKI if (1) he was literate, (2) he had a sufficient knowledge of Communist doctrine, (3 ) he was sufficiently familiar with the organization, (4) he was completely trustworthy, (5 ) he would subject himself to party discipline without reservation, and (6) he was willing to carry on Communist propaganda workY' The necessity for discipline and indoctrination was also the theme of the PKI convention of June 7-10, 1924. 'This congress will not, like the previous ones, be concerned only with arousing the masses and winning their hearts, but must be one which will gather the revolutionary forces into an organization ruled by strict discipline," the party journal explained. -rhe time of agitation ruone, the time of making one's voice heard only through meetings and in newspapers, is now past, and the moment has come to form an organization." 1I1 The meeting was held in Batavia, at the Arab athletic club AI-Hambra at Pasar Senen; the actual number of delegates was quite small (seventy-six, from thirty~ two party branches), but its open sessions were heavi1y attended by the public and many stood outside to listen. It took the important steps of ratifying the new PKI program and statutes and electing a new executive; Winanta, a former mbtor official of the state railway line and a leader of the Communist movement in Bandung, became the party chainnan. 118 192

The Bloc Above This ninth congress voted to change the organization's name to its present one, Partai Komunis Indonesia, for with the party ~ipline debates "partai" had become the term for a tightly organized, independent political movement, and "Indonesia" was by then widely used as an anticolonial name for the Indies. In addition, the meeting decided to transfer party headquarters from its home in Semarang to the capital city of Batavia. The move, it was stated, would enable the party to taunt the colonial regime and the ISDP socialists in their stronghold. It probably also reflected the growing importance of the PKl strength in West Java and its difficulties in Central Java, where anests and rcstrictions of political activity in the wake of the VSTP strike and the bombings had had a severe impact on party activities. Since proximity to party headquarters aHected local activity and the inHuence of regional leaders on the central command, the move shifted further PKI sources of strcngth and weakened the Semarang-based leaders,H'i We might note in this connection that the PKI did not use the Soviet party system of Central Committee, Politburo, Secretariat, and so on, but maintained the Duteh fonns! the party was headed by a hoofdbestuur, or main executive, consisting of chainnan, vice-chainnan, secretary, treasurer, and commissioners (members) located in the headquarters city, together with members representing major units outside that city. Policy decisions were taken in the name of the Hoofdbestuur, which was the equivalent of a Central Committee and was sometimes referred to as such (for example, in correspondence with the Conlintern ). Day-to-day affairs were offiCially handled by a dageli;ks bcstllur (executive in charge of routine administration), which consisted of the main executive members in the headquarters city. Actually, however, ultimate control lay with the party branch of the center city, which was empowered to place candidates for office before the congresses and to lead the party in "extraordinary circumstances." Members of the DageIijks bestuur were almost invariably also· officers of this branch executive. Because of its leading role, and because it was easier for leaders in or near the headquarters city to attend party conclaves, the central branch effectively dominated the PKI machine. The machine itself was a very imperfect one, however: because the party organization was more dependent on leaders than the leaders were on it, the central branch could not generally impose its will over strong objections from powerful outlying units. As PKI activities outside Semarang became

]93

Rise of Indonesian Communism more important, the relative power of the leading branch declined. The move ,to Batavia facilitated this process because, although party activity in West Java was of growing importance, the recently revived Batavia branch was not yet a significant organization nor was Batavia the site of major PKI unions. Conversely, the Semarang branch, though greatly weakened by reverses, remained an important center of PKI activity, particularly in the Jabor field; it continued to put out the principal PKI publications and remained the headquarters of a number of the most powerful party leaders. ExpanSion of the PKI thus implicitly threatened central control of the party. At the June 1924 congress, the keynote speech was made by Darsana. "Lengthy and vigorous applause resounds as he enters," the government rapporteur recounted; "his appearance is modest and polite; he has the pleasant manner of the cultured Javanese. His large glasses give him the appearance of a scholar, and indeed mucb of what he says smacks of the study lamp." 120 His main themes were discipline, internationalism, and proletarianism. A party without discipline, he declared. is a wall without cement, a machine without screws; but with discipline even a small party can, like the Bolsheviks in Russia, achieve great victories. The PKI must be intcrnational and must not forget that the Dutch workers arc its great allies. The party must not forget that the trade unions arc its basis, but at the same time it must also increase its work among the youth. the women, the peasants. the intellectuals, the Chinese minority, and the Indonesian members of the armed forces and police. It must especially endeavor to increase the social consciousness of the peasantry. The vi1lagers only know that they must pay more taxes and that taxes go to the Dutch; therefore, they view the Dutch as their enemy. They must be taught through the Sarekat Rakjat that it is international capitalism and not just the Dutch that is at fault. The party must concentrate on organization and not on agitation; its leaders must avoid giving provocation for arrest, and cadres must be trained to make up for losses through imprisonment. Terrorism must be rejected, for the revolution will come when the time is ripe; premature action wi1l not serve the cause. "Our party desires to make easy the birth of the Communist era," Darsono concluded. "He who wishes peace must prepare himself for war, so that his opponent gives in from fear." I!!l Other speakers emphasized the same themes. Aliarcham discussed the failure of the nationalist movement and predicted that Tjokroa-

194

The Bloc Above minoto's national-religious effort would also fail, for it served the Indonesian petty capitalists, who could not possibly survive the competition 'o f foreign big capital. Only the PKI would endure, for it alone was organized about the economic struggle. Soviet Russia and Turkey must be Indonesia's examples, he declared, and the congress cheered, Subakat urged the party to become strong enough to demand a parliament elected by universal suffrage. Unlike the March 1923 meeting, the congress did not view this issue as a basis for cooperation with other parties: the speakers had only harsh words for the Sarekat Islam, the ISDP, and Burn Utomo. Instead, it was argued, the plank was a useful first step toward the establishment of soviets, which, in the spirit of the new action program, were envisioned at village, factory, district, prOVincial, and island levels, under the command of a central soviet. At the June congress, outgoing party secretary Sukendar presented an important set of theses (drawn up, it has been claimed, by Tan Malaka) I Z!! analyzing the nature of the Indonesian revolution and outlining the tasks of the party. In Indonesia, he declared, the revolution would be proletarian, for "the absence of a real national bourgeoisie precludes any successful effort by nationalist parties." 128 The PKl must rely on the urban working class, the only objectively revolutionary group. The petty and part of the great bourgeoisie were subjectively revolutionary in the colonial situation, but they were not reliable and should not he taken into the party: A Communist party like that in Indonesia must bear in mind that not all revolutionaries bethe simultaneous overevaluation of the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation movement and the underestimation of the significance of an alliance of the working class with the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism . . . . The present period of reaction which we are experiencing demands other methods of united work nnd contact with the masses. The successes of Anglo-Dutch capitalism in Indonesia call for the organization of a broad struggle on the economic level as the primary step. In the inunediate fu ture [the Indonesian Communists] are faced with the task of carrying out longterm, methodical, painstaking work for the establishment of conned:ions with the masses 011 the basis of representing their daily economic and cultural needs. This is a very difficult task, but it is absolutely necessary during the period when the proletarian forces are gathering themselves against government reaction. The experience of the Soviet labor unions has shown that such a skillful adaptation to changing circwnstances, such a systematic and thorough penetration into the very depths of the working mass, such a slow and patient guiding of its various clements-however small they 00into the r~oluti onary struggle gives assurance of victory at the moment of the decisive engagement with the govemmcnt and the bourgeoisie. BG After some three months the Indonesian delegates met again with representatives of the ECCI, this time in the presence of Stalin himself. Stalin declared himself not unfavorable to revolution at the tim~for as 1926 wore on, the International's situation, particularly in China, was such that it began to talk increasingly of a revolutionary upsurge in the East-but he was opposed to an effort that showed every sign of disorganization and little promise of success.811 As a result, Alimin and Musso began their journey back to the Indies, bearing instructions denouncing their program and calling for restoration of the party's legal status and for radical nationalist agitation. It was now early October, six months from the time they had left Singapore. This was the result of the Alimin-Musso expedition as the Comintcm 338

The Rebellions saw it; but according to Semaun, there is a little more to the story.IT We wiII remember that while meeting in Singapore the Prambanan leaders bad discussed the possibility of Moscow's opposition to their project; they had then decided that in case of a Comintem refusal they wou1d carry on the battle by guerrilla warfare. The arguments of the International in rejecting the PKI plan were accepted readily enough by Alimin, but not by the strong-willed Musso. That leader. after chafing for a time at his enforced inactivity in Moscow, with little hope that the Comintem would reverse its position, detennined to send off the message that would set in motion the alternate Singapore plan. The problem was how to get the word through, and the key to this was Semaun, who before leaving the Netherlands for Russia had arranged with the CPH for an address through which, in cases of extreme need, messages could be forwarded to the PKI contact in the Indies. Musso, knowing of this, asked Semaun to provide him with the address; but Semaun, whom Musso had inadvisedly told of the Singapore conference's alternate decision, refused to do so. Musso was not easily defeated, however; he next proceeded to Semaun's· assistant (who, we will remember, seems to have been the student Iwa Kusumasumanbi) and told him that Semaun had said that he might send a message via the secret address. Sure enough, the ruse worked, and Musso triumphantly sent off the fateful wire.18 Semaun soon discovered what had happened, and he was now faced with a very uncomfortable problem. Should he confess what had taken pl9-ce to the Comintem, thus bringing the wrath of the ECCI upon his head? No, discrete silence would prevent unpleasant feelings all around: Semaun thus detennined to say nothing, and sh~rtly thereafter, when the meeting with Stalin took place, three of the four Indonesian participants knew it to be a farce. Alimin and Musso journeyed home to the Indies with no great haste; it would, after ali, have been embarraSSing to arrive before it was too latc. It would fonn a dramatic conclusion to our story if we could recount that the PIC! had received Musso's message and proceeded to battle as planned. Unfortunately, however, we have no evidence, either from the available police reports, or from confessions of the leaders of the uprising, or from circumstantial evidence, that the party ever received Musso's command. In the first place, the Communist contact on Java, Dr. Kwa, was not so secret as supposed, and he may never have gotten the message. On the other hand, if the government had intercepted the 339

Rise of Indonesian Communism wire and interpreted it corrcct1y, it would probably have made much of it in later reports on the Communist uprisings, since it was eager to prove the Communists were inspired by commands. from abroad. Could the Dutch Communists have gotten wind of the affair and refused to transmit the message? We have no record of this. Assuming, however, that Dr. Kwa received the command, to whom would he have given it? Presumably to the party leaders in Bandung, who fonned the official executive and who included those participants in the Singapore conference who wer:c still at large.~ D We have observed, however, that the Bandung executive had been growing increasingly disturbed by the party's descent into anarchy and had concluded that discipline must be restored before any further move toward revolt was made. A message assuring Comintem support might well have altered its position radically, but not one refusing aid; if that leadership re· ceived Musso's message, it showed no signs of being swayed by it. Tan Malaka's executive-ill-exile would, of course, have Batly opposed an independent revolt. ,As for the rebels gathered in the Batavia committee, they were already determined for an uprising, and Musso's message would merely have echoed the decision already taken. In point of fact, the situation · had already passed well beyond the stage where Musso's co~and would have made any difference. When we left the PKI on Java to recount the adventures of the mission to Moscow, it was September 1928, and the party section in Tegal was about to revolt on its own. The uprising was to take place toward the end of the month, and it was decided to give the sign by exploding a firecracker. Unfortunately, the gentleman to whom the signal was entrusted misWlderstood the date, and so the local revolu· tionaries gathered on one night but the firecracker did not go off until the next. The Tegal rebellion was thus literally stillborn, and the Indies was preserved temporarily from revolution. to The public peace did not remain undisturbed for long, however, for the Batavia committee, to which the initiative now passed, was proceeding apace with its plans for revolution. In the middle of October Dahlan, a West Sumatran Communist and one-time student at the school for native officials ( Stovia), returned to the capital and took over the leadership of the committee; in handing over control to him, Sukrawinata is reported to have advised him not to contact the Bandung executive because of that body's "weak-kneed viewpoint." 71 Meanwhile, the committee members had been polling the PKI 340

The Rebellions branches about the Batavia plans for immediate revolt: Baharuddin Saleh went to Padang (which agreed), Mahmud to Makassar (uncertain) , and Herujuwono to Surakarta (uncertain), Surabaja (refused), Semarang (refused), Tjirebon (refused,) and Tegal (agreed). Sukrawinata' went to Bantam and the Priangan (agreed), and Bakar, a friend of Mahmud, went to Palembang (which refused). 72 In spite of. this very mixed reception the leaders of the Batavia conunittee, meeting in the capital at the end of October, set their action for the nigbt of November 12, 1926. barely two weeks oH.T! On the night of November 6, the rebel leaders met in Tjirebon to discuss final arrangements for the uprising. At this conference, it is claimed. Herujuwono was put in charge of the action in West Java, Salimun and Abdulmuntalib were given command over Central Java, and the Semarang leader Mohanunad Ali was entrusted with East Java. a The revolt was set definitely for midnight on November 12; all Java and the West Coast of Sumatra were to rise up. Final instructions, it was stated, would be sent out to the sections by the revolutionary headquarters, which would henceforth be located in Tjirebon, where police surveillance was relatively lax. 70 Dahlan remained in the capital to organize the action there. On November 7, meetings were held by various party units on Java to commemorate the Bolshevik revolution and to receive the news of the revolt pians,18 and on November 8 Herujuwono is reported to have conferred in Tjirebon with the leaders of the VSTP, who with much reluctance agreed to support the uprising with a strike on November 13.71 Meanwhile, the revolutionary emissaries visited the major PKl sections to infonn them of the impending revolt: AbdulmWltalib traveled to Semarang, but he was too closely trailed by the police to contact the party there; Mohammad Ali journeyed to East Java and, having shaken his trackers, was able to talk with Communists in that area; Herujuwono went to West Java and talked to the leaders in Batavia and Bantam. The net result was, reportedly. that all the party sections consulted declared their support except those of Surakarta, Jogjakarta, Madiun, and some units from the eastern tip of Java. The last instructions for the uprising were sent out from Tjirebon between November 9 and 12, and the final go-ahead was given harely twenty-four hours before the revolt was to begin.18 Just how much the party leadership in Bandung knew of these events is unclear, although it seems most unlikely that it was com341

Rise of Indonesian

Comnllln~

pletely ignorant of so widespread a plot against its authority. The Singapore center was certainly aware of the Batavia committee's existence, for a few days before the revolt Djamaluddin Tamin wrote Dahlan and begged him and Baharuddin Saleh to come to Singapore as soon as possible to discuss party policy.19 According to one of the rebel leaders, Bandung made a last vain effort to avert disaster in November by issuing a circular to all the PKI branches calling for a purge of the party and a return to the strict centralization that had prevailed before the December 1924 conference. On November 10, a referendum for the election of a new executive was called for by the Priangan section an? Bandung subsection (the "leading unit" of the party), which nominated the antirebellion leader Suprodjo as chairman. so By this time, however, the central leadership actions were quite beside the point; the situation was far out of its control. We might also ask ourselves just what the police were doing at this time and whether all these events were unknown to them. Indeed, the attitude of the authorities is very curious, for they were well aware of all but the immediate details of the plot. From British intelligence sources and their own spy in PKI Singapore headquarters they knew of Musso and Alimin's journey and of the debate between Tan Malaka and the party leaders in the Indies; they were also well acquainted with the Batavia conunittee and its intentions, for one of the major sources I have used to describe this organization is a government report written not after the uprisings but in October 1926.81 The Netherlands Indies intelligence service had known the secret party code for some time, and the correspondence between the sections presented it with little difficulty. They knew and shadowed the leaders of the rebellion; but they did not act. On November 7, Abdulmuntalib sent a coded wire to the Pekalongan party chairman which gave the moment for the revolt; the local authorities deciphered it but somehow did not think it a matter of importance. The wire read. decoded: Urgent. Salimun. Pekalongan; also for Temanggung. The time is set for November 12/ 13, 1926, between midnight and 2 A.M. The people everywhere must revolt; all government officials and police must be killed. Abdulmuntalib, November 7, 1926.82 It was not until the evening of November 11 that someone thought this of sufficient intere.~t to show it to the Resident of Pekalongan. That 342

The Rebellions gentleman, being of a somewhat more nervous nature, warned Batavia and ordered the arrest of the Corrununist leaders in his distriCt. 83, While the government was rousing itself to action, Tjirebon's final instructions were being sent out to the party branches. The method by which these messages were distributed was . (we will remember here the plans laid down in December 1925 ) that coded messages were brought, generally by railroad and tram conductors, to the major party branches, which then put them into another code (each district had its own) and sent them on to the section leaders. The instructions were then decoded, written on little red notes, and distributed, generally by women, to the group leaders.8-4 One of the three main messages sent by the Tjirebon PKI was addressed to AbduImuntalib, who, we will remember, was in charge of the Central Java revolt. He, however, had been so closely watched by the police that he could not accomplish anything in Semarang; instead, he had returned on November 12 to Tegal. There he stopped at a Chinese inn, outside which the police took up their vigil. Their attention was soon rewarded, for a woman appeared looking for the PKI leader; when they searched the lady, the police discovered the instructions for the Central Javanese rebellion. u With knowledge of the party plans in Central Java now gained from two sources, the authorities arrested the leaders in that area and thus prevented the outbreak of revolt in the districts that had inspired it: Pekalongan, Tegal, Tjirebon, and Temanggung were silent on the night of November 12.86 Surabaja and Semarang, once the main source of PKI strength, were Similarly inactive; and in Jogjakarta, Madiun, and Magelang there was no sign of revolt. In Kediri and Banjumas some preparations for an uprising had been made · but, owing partly to the arrest of local leaders and partly to disorganization and lack of support, they yielded only a few belated scuHles. In the Surakarta area of Central Java there were disturbances; these took place five days after the uprising began and were led not by the regular party leaders, who were against participation, but by local unionists and, reportedly, remnants of the Mu'alimin movement. 87 In West Java, uprisings did break out on the night of November 12. They were not entirely unexpected. In Batavia, reports of coming ac· tion had been circulated for several days, and on the afternoon of November 12 it was learned that the railway workers were planning to set off a general strike on the follOWing day. However, partly because

343

Rise of Indonesian Communism of a lack of harmony between the European and Indonesian adrninis* trators of the area, no real preventive measures were taken. Toward midnigbt a number of armed bands appeared in the streets; clashes with policemen and watchmen tl?Ok place. an attack was made on Clodok prison, and the telephone exchange was seized. Bands comprising up to three hundred persons also appeared in the Tangerang and Meester-Comelis '(Djatinegara) areas, fought with police patrols and passers-by, started fires, and (in Tangerang) invaded a small police barracks. It was apparent that there were 'ccrtain general objectiVescutting off communications, opening prisons, and attacking police and officials-hut the attempt was, to say the least, badly organized. By morning order had been restored, and the revolution in the capital was over.88 Three hundred persons were immediatcly arrested and more were added as investigations revealed the names of others thought to he involved. Reportedly, an attempt was made to continue the 6ght by Suriasupamo, a previously undistinguished group leader who was proclaimed "resistance dictator"; but the authorities soon discovered and arrested him. 8V 11le situation was more serious in Bantam and the Priangan. for the government did not know enough about the West Java revolutionary plans to act in time against the leaders; at the same time rural unrest was of such proportions that the disorders extended into the countryside and consequently took longer to quelL Incidents in the Priangan. beginning on the night of November 12, consisted of sabotaging communications lines and assaults and arson committed by armed groups. Insofar as their actions showed purpose, they were directed against village heads, police, and lower Indonesian officials. In Bantam, the· area of widest revolt. the uprising took a religiOUS character; those who participated in it felt themselves to be engaging in a sabil-illah (holy war) and prepared themselves for it by the appropriate rituals.1Kl As in other areas, they were armed mostly with knives and cutlasses (kelewang ), but a few possessed firearms. Incoming troops and constabulary forces found communications lines cut and roads blocked, but they met with little or no resistance; the population did its best to vanish. The resistance took the form of brief, uncoordinated raids; during one of them a Dutch railroad official was killed. Although the murder of Europeans and Indonesian officials secms to have been a principal desire of the participants in the revolt, and although this would have been easy enough to accomplish physi344

The Rebellions cal.Iy, the momentum of thc rcbeUion never overcame the psychological barrier to this most extreme rejection of the social hierarchy: no other European, and no Indonesian official above the rank of wedonll, was harmed, although some raids were made on houses of those who were not home. The actions that put dO ....'1l the main part of the Java revolt were made on the orders of the Residents of the areas concerned. It was only on November 17 that the Attomey General ordered the arrest of all persons known to be Conununists and to have any sort of leading capacity. This was followed by mass arrests and the rapid decline of the movement; by December the uprisings were effectively over, al· though disorder and incidents of arson continued for some time. The revolution had not come to an end in Sumatra, however: in· deed. it had n~t begun. On November 4 Bakar. a representative of the Batavia committee, had been sent to that island to inform its leaders of the plans to revolt on the night of November 12. However, Arif FadilIah, the erstwhile prorebellion chairman of the Padang· PKI section, declared that he would go along with an uprising set off by the official party executive but not by the Batavia committee." Bakar traveled up and down the West Coast arguing with the local party units, but met mixed reactions and was himself arrested on November 22. Meanwhile, conferences were being held between the leaders of various Communist groups to agree on a date: one mooting decided on November 15, another wanted November 16, and the Sarekat Djin (Ghost Union. a Sumatran Communist terrorist group) decided that its units would revolt on November 21. Always someone disagreed or something went awry. however; and so the arguments continued into December, with the party leadership meanwhile diSintegrating under a wave of arrests. Finally, on January I, 1927, local groups in Silungkang proceeded to act, haVing come to the conclusion that: All we do is talk, talk, and once again talk. We are having an endless string of meetings. but nothing else. This way we will never get anywhere. We will go on meeting until nothing comes of the whole rebellion. We ean no longer go back. Whoever wants to stop us now gets killed--even if he is our own father, our own mother's brother! And if the subsection committee itself goes against us, then it will die, tool 02

The rebellion spread rapidly; fighting was heavier than in Java, and the rebels seem to have been better anned. Nonetheless, resistance was 345

Rise 0/ Indonesian Communism broken by January 4, and by the 12th it was all over. As in Java, one European was killed. While all this was going 00, Alimin and Musso were wending their way back from Moscow. By the time they bad gotten to Shanghai, they heard of the Java revolt; accordiog to DjamaIuddin Tamin, they wired the Singapore party center to expect them in from Bangkok on De· cember 15. 83 They next proceeded to Canton, w~ere they obtained false passports from the office of the Kuomintang foreign ministry, and then traveled, via Hongkong and Bangkok, to Singapore. Conveniently for the authorities there, their telegram had been sent to the spy who had been planh;d in PKI Singapore headquarters. The pollee did not close in immediately, however, and they were thus able to meet with Subakat and present the Comintem's now sadJy outdated mis· sives.H Together with Subakat and another companion, Umar Cirl. they proceeded to Kota Tinggi, Johore; it seems that Hadji. Moham· mad NUT Ibrahim, the Sumatra PKI leader who bad negotiated with them for procuring anns for the Sumatra rebellion, had made some arrangements to meet them in Johore on their return. 811 Subakat and Umar Giri, having good reason to suspect they were being followed, urged their companions not to stay in Johore. Musso and AIimin refused to become alarmed. but they did not calm their escorts, who fled alone." TIlls, it turned out, was the course of wisdom as well as panic, for on December 18 Musso and Alimin were arrested. At the time they were carrying with them $2,500 in U.S. banknotes, which they declared had been given them by sympathizers from the Philippines; it was apparently all the material aid forthcoming from the International.IIT With this, the adventure on which the PKl had embarked in December 1924 was brought to an inglorious end.

346

XIII

Turning Points

The Communist International welcomes the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Indonesia and pledges its complete support. Workers of the world! Do not pennit the Dutch imperialists to drown the struggle for freedom of Indonesia in bloodl Hasten to the aid of the Indonesian nghters! Organize mass meetings, express your sympathy for the insurrection in Java, and protest against imperialist terror. Organize demonstrations before the Dutch Embassies and Consulates and demand freedom for the Indonesian people and the military evacuation of the colony. Suppressed peoples of the worldl The insurrectionary Indonesians are your advance guard, they express the will to freedom which is your common property. Do everything in your power to support them in their struggle! Down with imperialist terror! Long live the united anti-imperialist front of the workers and the suppressed peoples of the world! Long live the free people of Indonesia!l

With this manifesto, adopted by the ECCI on November 20, 1926, and made public the next day, the Comintern announced its acceptance of the Indonesian fait accompli and its full support for the revolutionary effort. We might well ask whether the International could have done otherwise and still demonstrated its support for the colonial antiimperialist effort. One possible alternative was the response taken by the Dutch Communist party. When it heard of the Java uprising, the CPH announced that the rebelJion had been consciously provoked by the Indies government in an effort to smash the revolutionary movement; it called for an investigation into its causes and urged amnesty for those who had been arcested.2 10 other words, it treated the affair as the end product of a govenunent campaign of persecution rather than as a spontaneous revolt against Dutch rule, and its response was aimed at exposing the injustices committed by the authorities and not at urging a continuation of the 6ght. The ECCI rejected this alternative, instructing the CPH to adopt a

3D

Rise of Indonesian Communism more positive attitude toward the Indonesian rebellion.s At its seventh plenary session, which began on November 22, 1926, the Comintern executive further criticized the Dutch party attitude; speaking for the ECCI, the Czech delegate SmeraI declared: I have seen extracts from the Dutch press that the Communist paper, instead of advocating for the Javanese insurgents the Leninist principle of national self-detennination to the point of separation and the establisrunent of an independent state, have proposed and supported jointly with the Social Democrats, a plan for a mixed investigation committee to be sent to Java. This is to be found in the press of our Party during the days in which blood Bows in Java. At such a time the party demands that the government grant Java "self-administration'" such as Great Britain has condescended to grant India. We are infonned that the Party even tolerates in its midst such a trend of thought as implies that the great mass uprisirig in Java was the work of provocateurs. 4

CPH representative De Visser attempted to ward off the stream of criticism by assuring that tbe Dutch Communists had seen their mistake and altered their position: How did it happen that the Dutch Party did Dot immediately take a sharp and correct standpoint? When the 6rst reports concerning the uprising were received, the Party was of the opinion that this was another provoked struggle. But since the Party rocognizcd that the Javanese workers had gone over to an annoo uprising. it did everything in its power to support them.~

It had been the CPH's misfortune to have been a political step behind the International. It was only a short space-for, as De Visser re. minded the ECCI, the minimum program of demands for Indonesia, which the CPH had presented at the time of the revolt's outbreak, had been drawn up with the help of the Orgburo (Organization Bureau) of the Comintem itseU.6 Nonetheless, the distance was important, for it marked the International's progress from the "stabilization of capitalism" period, with its emphasis on alliance with non·Communist groups and on organization rather than agitation, toward a more out· spokenly revolutionary line. Chief among the reasons for this change were the Chinese revolution and the Stalin-Trotsky feud: Trotsky, although his position had been greatly weakened, could not be completely written off as a political force, particularly since his criticisms of Communist strategy in the Chinese revolution seemed to be proving true. Since early 1926, Chiang 348

Turning Points Kai-shek had shown signs of breaking with the Chinese Communists; having consolidated his power within the Kuomintang. he began to remove CCP members from important functions and, in the coup d'etat of March 20, 1926, moved against the Communist organization in Canton. The Comintern was thus forced to consider whether it should advocate a strategy that would give the CCP greater independence from the Kuomintang (a move that would inevitably hasten a break) or whether it should continue to support the bloc within the KMT, hoping that if Chiang did decide to break with the Chinese Communists, he would at least continue his alliance with the Soviet Union. The International decided _on the latter course, for Stalin wished neither to lose the advantages of a Soviet alliance with China nor to give the Trotskyists a chance to claim that they had been right in the quarrel over Chinese Communist strategy. At the same time, the Comintern· sought to cover its retreat before Chiang and to prepare for a possible break by adopting a theoretical analysis of the situation further to the left. The period of capitalist stabilization wa~ in its final stages, it was announced; a new revolutionary wave was rising in the East, and this meant both that the struggle against imperialism would take a sharper fonn than before and that differences between the truly revolutionary and the hesitant elements in that struggle would increase. In claiming that the revolutionary tide in the East was on the rise, the Comintem was faced with an embarrassing problem: it had very little evidence for this, Chiang Kai-shek, it is true, had made remarkable progress in his campaign to secure north China, but Chiang was an increasingly doubtful revolutionary element from the Communist point of view. As for the rest of the East, it showed no noticeable revolutionary stirrings. Under these circumstances, the outbreak of the Javanese rebellion just before the ECCI's seventh plenum came as a most welcome event. Here was proof that the Comintern colonial strategy had been correct, that the period of capitalist stabilization was coming to an end, and that the flame of revolution was beginning to lick from China to the other countries of the East. 'The revolt against imperialism is spreading from one country to another. From China it has extended to Java," the ECCI manifesto on the Indonesian revolt proclaimed.1 Bukharin, opening the plenum, saluted both the Chinese and the Indonesian peoples for their revolutionary effort, and Manuil349

Rise of Indonesian Communism sky described the glowing revolutionary prospects the Comintem China policy had brought to the East: At the same time liberated China will become the magnet f~ aU the peoples of the yellow race who inhabit the Philippines, Indooeria, and the numerotU islands of the Pacific. China will becom~ a major threat for the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism because the problem of spreading its gigantic population out over the Pacific confronts it even more intensely than it does Japan. China will fulfill this task among the island inhabitants of the Pacific, not with fire and sword, but bound up with the process of the revolutionization of the native population.' "That [the Comintem's] judgement over the role of the Chinese revolution is well-founded," he observed, "is proved by the uprising in Indonesia." , Semaun, who for once did not have to apologize for PKl behavior to the International, announced to the plenwn that the rebelUon in Java had sparked a "'real civil war": "Now a great uprising has broken out. The Chinese revolution has exercised a great inHuence on the Indonesian population and thereby contributed to its resort to arms." That the revolt had occurred directly under Communist leadership and not, as in China, under the aegis of a bloc within he ascribed to the fact that Java possessed no national bourgeoisie and hence no real nationalist leadership. Perhaps the Dutch would suppress the revolt, but, he assured, others would soon break out. "Long live the Communist movementl Long live the Cominternl'" he concluded, and was rewarded with resounding applause. 10 In nearly every Comintern reference to the Indies in this period, it was stressed that the r ebellion justrned the Comintern's China policy: The Chinese revolution is becoming morc and more a great centre of attraction for the awakening masses of the Colonial East. Indonesia (the Dutch Indies) is already in a state of revolutionary ferment which in some places has passed into an open civil war against foreign capital, above all Dutch.ll That the [Indonesian I revolt should occur just at this time, is doubtless to be attributed in no mean degree to the powerful effect produced by the recent events in China. It is the victories of the Canton army, which have strengthened the confidence of the Indonesian people in their power. . . . The Indonesian revolution will be victorious, just as the Chinese revolution will be victorious! 12 350

Turning Points The Chinese Revolution is becoming a Centre of attraction for the awakening of the Far East. This has been proved by the rising which has taken place in Indonesia against Dutch imperialism.13 On November 25 the Profintem followed the EGCI with a manifesto calling for demonstrations and strikes in support of the Indonesian revolution. On December 23, it issued a second proclamation, which announced that "blood is running in rivers in West and Central Java» and renewed its call for support of the ''heroic fighters of Indonesia." 14 By this time Java was hardly running red with blood, although the rebellion that took place a week later in Sumatra prevented the proclamation from seeming entirely unreal. However, such emphasis on a continuing Indonesian revolution was maintained in Comintem writings some months after it had become clear that the rebellion was quite d'ead. It may be doubted that the International's leaders themselves had expected that the Indonesian revolt would achieve major proportions, let alone lead to Communist victory. Not only had it recently rejected the proposals for rebellion on the grounds that the ill-prepared adventure was foredoomed, but Semaun left for Holland in the middle of the ECCl's plenary session in order to sign an agreement bequeathing command over the Indonesian revolutionary movement to the Perhimpunan Indonesia, a move he would hardly have made if he had thought the PKI had any chance of success. It had, in fact, been clear from the outset that the rebellion would be a disaster. The Dutch Communists had based their response on "this fact, but the defense of the Comintem's China policy at the seventh plenum caused the ECCI to deny it. Once having introduced the Indonesian revolution as a major evidence of its Asian success, the International found it hard to admit that the revolt had fizzled out, particularly since it was becoming increasingly clear that the China program was itself to end in disaster. Not long after the Indonesian revolts, Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist coup brought down the house of cards which the Comintem had so hopefully erected in China. For a time, the International insisted that that edifice still stood, and during the same period faith was still expressed in the continuance of the lndonesian revolution; but gradually the Comintem forced itself to face the facts in both China and the Indies, and by the early swmner of 1927 continuing revolutionary activity in Indonesia was rarely mentioned. This development, coupled with the Soviet Union's rapid retreat toward proletarian isolationism in 1927-1928, ensured that the argu-

351

Rise of lrulonesian Communism ments the Comintern offered to explain the failure of the Indonesian revolt took an entirely dilJerent line than those made in the ECCI, criticisms of 1925 and 1926. Gone now were the accusations that the PKI had ignored other political parties, that it had not made enough concessions to nationalism. and that it had not established itself as a bloc within the SR. There was no intimation that the rebellion should not have been undertaken-merely that it should have been better prepared: The whole course of the revolt, however. ·betrayed the lack of earnest political and orgarusatory preparation of this movement as a whole. It is extremely characteristic that the revolt was under the general sl~gan of the fight against Dutch imperialism, and without a concrete political and economic slogan which would have mobilized broad masses and would have made the revolt the last and deciding point of a general strike and a peasant insurrectionary movement. The Conununist Party sent out its best forces to occupy the various government institutions, without having sufficiently prepared them beforehand, and thus enabled the government to overcome easily the advance guard of the national-revolutionary movement in Indonesia.l~

This situation was no doubt enjoyed greatly by Alimin and Musso upon their return to Russia. They had been held for a short time by the Singapore authorities, and then. much to the annoyance of the Dutch (who had long been irritated by the haven afforded Indonesian Communists across the Straits) they were released because there was no evidence their activities had threatened the peninsular status quo. liS Expelled from Singapore, they returned via China to the Soviet Union. to discover that their once-rejected policy was now justified in spite of the fact that the revolution had proved an utter failure. Alimin took full advantage of this at the ensuing Comintem congress (the sixth, in August 1928), freely offering criticism of the International's new colonial program, which he considered insuffiCiently radicaJ. and declaring that the major failing in the Indonesian rebellion had been the Comintern's: The Indonesian delegation considers it necessary to give a short report regarding the latest events and the uprisings in Indonesia. The Party in Indonesia is very young. since it was only established in 1920, and during the development of the Party. we worked without any guidance of the Communist International, so that mistakes were inevitable, Despite the extraordinary and brutal white terror of the Dutch Covem352

Tuming Points ment, our Party grew rapidly and gained great influence among the masses. During our legal existence, from the year 1920 to 1925, OUI Party was able to eliminate the reformist leaders of the national movement and to create through the revolutionary movement Communist tendencies in the trade unions Dnd peasant movements. These unions are completely in the hands of the Communist Party. Our influence was not limited to the proletariat but extended also to the peasantry, the army, police force and some intellectuals. The government arrested and deported hundreds of Communist leaders, ordered the closing of the Farty headquarters and arrested the members of the Central Committee. We cOnsider it a serious mistake-tbat during the uprising which lasted two months, the Communist International remained inactive. The blame cannot be put on our. Dutch Party because our comrades did what they cou1d to support the rebellion. The Communist International ought to have instructed all its sections, especially in Germany, France and America to support the uprising and to make a campaign with demonstrations, through the press, etc., in favour of it. But this has not been done. It is a sad experience of the Communist International and we hope thilt such a mistake will not occur again. H "The task of the Communist Party," it was declared at the sixth congress, "'u to reconquer its legality, so that it can once more carry on its propaganda openly." III This, however, was impoSSible. Measures had been taken to destroy the Communists' mass following, 19 and 13,000 persons had been arrested in connection with the revolts. A few of them were shot for having been involved in killings; 5,000 more were placed in preventive detention, of which 4,500 were sentenced to prison after trial. This relieved the authorities of those persons whose participation in the revolt could be proved; however, many others whom they considered dangerous ( including the great part of the PKI leadership) could not be convicted under the existing laws. Consequent1y, the government decided to use its powers of banishment on a massive scale, and ordered the removal of 1,308 persons, and such family members as desired to accompany them, to a spot on the upper reaches of the Digul River in New Guinea. None of the internees successfully escaped from the camp, and only a very few (most notable of them Sardjono) survived phYSically and ideolOgically to take part in the movement after the fall of the Indies regime. 20 11ris action put an effective end to Communist activity in the Indies for the remaining period of Dutch rule. Thereafter an occasional real 353

Rise of Indonesian Communism or imagined agent was discovered to have been sent to the colony, and an occasional real or imagined plot was urunasked; but the movement itself showed no signs of returning to life, More than that, however, all mass political activity seemed to have been brought to an end by the defeat of the revolt. The Communist debacle seemed to have finished popular hope that anything was to be achieved by political action, revolutionary or otherwise; and the Indonesian masses retired from the stage, not to return until Japan's victory over the Dutch proved once and for all that the white ruler was not invincible. The PKI had been the last of the older generation of Indonesian political movements to play an active rolc; the others, as we have seen, had either given up entirely or retired from the struggle against Dutch rule. The removal of the Communists from the political scene caused the new generation, which had hitherto been gathering in the backv ground, suddenly to occupy the center of the stage. These were the secular nationalists, who saw their antivDutch cHorts direct1y in tenns of a striving for an Indonesian nation-state rather than in the internationalist framework of Islam or Communism or in the political and cultural particularism of the regional movements. The leaders of this group were to become the leaders of the Indonesian revolution, and their ~ppearance on the political stage thus fonned a major turning point in the development of the national movement. Willy-nilly, the organizations founded by the new generation were restricted to the elite: Not only was the general population apathetic to political proselytizing, but the government no longer allowed its opponents any benefit of doubt. The uprisings, setting off a violent reaction of Netherlands and Indies Dutch opinion, ended the political leeway afforded by the coexistence of Western democratic and colonial authoritarian standards. Those who had predicted disaster at the time tolerance was shown to the infant Sarekat Islam were proved correct, it seemed; political freedom could not be allowed to the population; the state should check and not encourage the transfonnation of Indonesian society, and it must be concerned above all else' with preserving its authority. Abuse was heaped on those who had sought "to apply the slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity to the Eastern peoples, against all reality and from humanitarian and sentimental considerav tions, having lost their belief in the mission of fatherland and race." 21 Even moderate opinion did not defend the Ethical stand on politics, but sought to disassociate it from that policy's other goals:

354

Turning Points When we think how much intelligence, good will, energy. money. and time have been spent both in the motherland and the Indies itself during the past 25 years in attempts to achieve the ideal of granting political rights to the native population-a Western-inspired blessing which it has neither desired nor appreciated-we ask ourselves if it would not have been better to have expended that enormous devotion on the economic advancement of the people, a gift that the Oriental mentality also understands and values. It is in our view not too late to change course. henceforth abandoning politics insofar as possible, in the first place ceasing to organize the people in socalled political parties, and instead cooperating to devote all energies to making the population stronger economically, through providing it with more practical knowledge and more capita!.:!:!

Governor General de Graeff, who in his inaugural address to the Volksraad had declared his desire for a reconciliation between the government and the non-Communist Indonesian opposition, found his hopes shattered, "I cannot conceal from you that I am deeply disappointed," he wrote Idenburg. "Wary of everything that smelled of 'politics' I came here \vith the purest of motives, hoping to create about the Government an abnosphere of trust and cooperation; and after fourteen months of unceasing labor I see as the only result that the gulf between white people and brown is wider than ever. that race instincts reign supreme, and that sober, reasonable argwnents fall upon deaf ears," n He soon found himself participating in the extension of repressive measures to the nationalists, who were themselves growing more intransigent in the fa ce of an intolerant Dutch conservatism, which was convinced that ~ the militant nationalists are as much the enemies of their own people as the Communists are" 24 and which viewed all political criticism as an attack on· the state. The stage was being set for the emergence of revolutionary nationalism, intellectually derived from the West but emotionally rejecting its institutions, which was to become the dominant strain in Indonesian political thinking and to provide the context for a resurgent Communist movement,

355

Notes and Index

CHAPTER I 1. Mikhail Pavlovich, "Zadachi Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi assotsiatsii vostoKovedeniia" ( The Tasks of the A11-Russi:m Scientillc Academy of Orientology), Novyl Vastok. I ( 1922) ,9. 2. T he revol ution which modem socialism strives to achieve is, briefly, the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoiSie, and the establishment of a new organization of society by the destruction of all class distinctions. This requires not only a proletariat that carries out this revolution, but also a bourgeoisie in whose hands the productive forces of society have developed so far that they allow the final destruction of class distinctions . . . . The bourgeoisie, therefore, in this respect alSl;l is just as necessary a precondition of the socialist revolution as the proletariat itself. Hence a man who will say that this revolution can be more easily carried out in a country, because, althOtlgh haVing no proletariat, it has no bourgeoisie eitileT, only proves that he has still to learn the ABC of socialism. Friedrich Engels, "On Social Relations in Russia," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Writings (Moscow, 1955), II, 49-50. 3. Marx himself had not completdy denied that the metropolitan powers brought progress to their colonies, for he noted that they destroyed the traditional "feudal" social systems and replaced them with Western, capitalist fanus, thus brioging the oolonies further aloog the road to socialist revolution. It was, however, a purely involuntary oontribution, arising from no kindly intentions on the part of the metropolis: England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was 'activated ooly by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulflll its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? H not. wha tever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. Karl Marx, "The British Rule in India," in Marx aod Eogels, Selected Writing'. 1, 351. . ' 4. For a more thorough development of these views, see Eduard Bernstein, Eoolutwnary Socialism (London, 1919 ). pp. 169-175, and the same author's "Problome des Sozialismus" (Problems of Socialism ), in his Zur Theorle uoo Geschichle des SozialismU! ( Berlin, 1904), Part II. p. 96. Bernstein was the major theoretician of the Revisionist school of socialist thought and was one of the sponsors of the move to soften the socialist attitude toward colonialism at the 1907 congress. 5. For Lenin's view of the 1907 congress, see his article, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart," in Lenin, Tlte National Liberatio n lIfovement in the East (Moscow, 1957), p. 40, 6. Intemalkmalcr Sozialisten-Kongreu zu Stuttgart, 18 bi.J 24 August 1907 ( In ternational Socialist Congress at Stuttgart. Aug. 18 to 24, 19(7 ) (Bellin. 10(1), p. 112.

7. lnlemalionaier Sozialisten-Kongreu. pp. 36-37. For a general deSCription of Van Kol's attitude toward the oolonial question at this time, see O. M. C. Koch, Hatlg Slot . Figuren uU lief oude loo/e ( Favorable Balance: Figures from the Bygooe I ndies) (Amsterdam, 1960), pp, 91-92. Koch, like Van Kol a moderate socialist, was later to become the SOAP's principal colonial expert. For the SOAP's official account of its colonial policy in this period, see Daan van der lee,

359

Notes, pp. 5-12 De S.D.A.P. en lruionesUi (The SDAP and Indonesia)

(Amsterdam, 1929).

pp. 31--36. 8. Intemotioooler Str..illllsten-Kongreu, pp. 36-37. 9. lnlemalfonaler Scniallsten-Kimgreu, p. 40.

10. Van Koi at the 1907 eongr=-;. IntenuJtimuder So;:.iDllsten-Kongren, p. 36, 11. Van Kal did not begin to urge independence for Indonesia as a final goal until 1919-1920 ( Koch, BoUg Slot, pp. 94-95). He advocated a native-owned heavy industry for Java not only because of his interpretation of wcialist doctriDe but also because of his admiration for Japan. To help finance this development. he suggested that Holland sell off all the Indies archipelago save Java, Swnatra, and the Lesser Sunda Islands. The therM of industrialization was taken up _~ Van KoJ's successor a5 SOAP parliamentary spokesman on colonial affairs. vliegen, who held that the establishment of ImlODe5ian-owned heavy industry was a prerequisite to independence. Soo Van der Zee, De S.D.A.P., pp. 30-31, 34-36; H. A. Iderna, Porlementoire ge4IChieden;." 0011 Nederltmdsch-lndU!, 1891-1918 ( Parliamentary History of the Netherlands Indies, 1891- 1918) ( The Hague. 1924). pp. 295-296, 327. 12. Van der lee. De S.D.A.P., p. 5; Koch, Bolig Slot, p. 92.

CHAPTER II 1. Advertisement appearing in the SoerbojoMch Handeublad on 1uly 15, 1913; quoted in F. L. Rutgers, ldenburg en de Sarekat Islam (Idenburg and the Sarebt Islam ) (Amsterdam, 1939), p. 75. 2. Lenin. ''The Awakening of Asia," Pravda, May 7, 1913, in Lenin, NationtJ U berallon Movement, pp. 59-00. 3. For accounts of the Sl's beginnings, see Robert van Nie1, The Emergence of the Modem Indonesian Elite ( The Hague and Bandung, 1960), pp. 89-95; and Belcheidcn betre{fende d e vereenJg/ng 'Sorekat I&lam' ( Information Concerning the Association "Sareht lslam") (Netherlands Indie!! Government. cIassiIied, Batavia, 1913) , pp. 1-19. A pred~sor of the Surakarta organization, the Sareht Dagang Islamijah. had been founded In Batavia (Djakarta) by Raden M&.oi Tirtoadisurjo in 1909. Tirtoadisur}o also established an organization called Sarelcat Dagang Islam In BuiteDZOl'g ( Bogar) in 1911, and was afterward asked to come to Surakarta by Hadji Samanhudi to organize the batik merchants' association that Samanhl1di wished to promote. The Sl1rabrta organization WIl!II not related to its short-liwd predecessors, and Samanhl1dl ra ther than Tlrtoadisurjo is generally given th e credit for founding it. 4. For a summary of the then current arguments concerning the effect of the sugar industry on peasant agriculture, see A. NeijtzeU de Wilde. Een en onder omtrent den weIooartnoenllrnl der lnlarnhche beoolking (Concerning the State of Welfare of the Native Population) ( Weltevreden, 1911 ), pp. 98-128. 5. For analyses of the Sarekat lslam's character and its Implications, presented to the Governor General by the Adviser for Native Affairs for consideration in detennining whether to legalize the association, see BC$che/den betrefJemk de oereeniging 'Sorekat bl4m,' pp. 8-59. 6. Idcnburg, letter to Kuyper, June 1913; quoted in Koch, Billig Slot, p. 14. 7. See B. 1. Brouwer, De hcud/ng oo n Idenburg en Col/in tegenooer de Indoneri.fche beweging (The Attitude of Jdenburg and Colijn toward the Indonesian Movement ) ( Kampen, 1958 ). pp. 47"""""9; Idema, Parlementaire, pp. ~294; Buclleitkn betref!ende de vereeniging 'Sarekat blam: pp. 41-42, 11-77.

360

Notes, pp. 12-14 8. Koch, Ball{: Slot, p. 15. 9. See Rutgers, Idenburg. pp. 68-75; B. Alkema, De Sarikat Islam (The Samt Islam) (Utrecht, 1919), pp. 14, 1I~... 20; Koch, Batig Slot, p. 14; Brouwer, De houd/ng, p. 45. 10. For Idenburg's decision, and documents on its elL:ecution and justiGcation, see Beschefden betre{fende de oereeniging 'Sarekat Islam,' pp. 00-77. 11. SneevlJet, quoted in Voor orlfhefd en socia1isme (For Freedom and Social.ism) (Rotterdam, 1953 ), p. 44. The book, hereafter cited as VVS. is a memorial to Sneevliet by some of his former associates. Sec also Koch, 8atig Slot, p. 110, for a character sketch of Sneevliet. 12. For these data on Snecvliet's life, see VVS, pp. 45-47; W. van Ravcsteyn, De W01ding van het communisme In Nederland (The Development of Communism in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam, 1928), pp. 128-129; A. Baars and H. Sneevliet, Ret proces Sneevlfet. De socia1-demOCTatie In Nooerlanmcll-Indiii (The Sneevliet Trial. Social Democracy in the Netherlands Indies ) (Semarang. n.d. [1917]), pp. 77-78; and Koch, Batfg Slat, pp. llO-1l2. 13. See D. M. C. Koch, Veralltwoordlng; een halve eeuw In IlldvnesUi (JustiS. cation: A Half Cenhuy in Indonesia) (The Hague and Bandung. 1956) , pp. 69-72, fOf a description of the political atmosphere in Semarang at this time. It might be noted that the city's principal newspaper, De Locurrwtief, was one of the very few European foumals in the Indies to support the Ethical position; Its coverage of Indonesian political activity in the flrst quarter of the century was considerably more extensive and objective than that provided by the other Dutchlanguage dailies. . 14. See Koch, VeTllntwoordlng, p. 76, and Bat/g Slot, p. 112, for descriptions of Sneevliet's relations with the Handelsverenlging. 15. The first union in the Indies, the Staatsspoorbond. was also n railroad organization, founded in 1905 by employees of the state-run nlil line. The union was open to both Dutch and Indonesian workers, but its leadership remained in the hands of the Dutch and its character was essentially that of an association of salaried employees. The membership of the VSTP (Vereniging van Spoor- en TramwegpersoDlX'l-AssociatiOll of Rail and Tramway Personnel) was originally dnlWll almost e:o
:171

Notes, pp. 39-42 atmosphere the appearance of Dr. Tjipto Mangu nkusumo and Hadjl Mlsbach had the same effect as foxes in a henhouse," R. Kern, letter to Governor General FoeK, dated Weltevreden. Aug. 18, 1921, no. 166, c1assjfied, p. 5. For a dctai1ed account of the Surakarta anticorvee movement and the me3liUTeS taken "against it, see Mcdedee1lngen 1920, pp. 19-2.5. Other accounts may be found in De Indluhe Cid", XLI ( 1919), 1029-1032, 1144-1155, 1197-1198, 1273-1274; IUld M. Balfas, Dr. Tfipto MangunkusumD (Djakarta and Amsterdam, 1952), pp. 102107. A vote of thanb to Hadj i Misbach was tendered by the JUDe 1919 Iruullnde congress; De lndbche GUh, XLI (1919) , 1165. He was also received with applause by the 51 congress th at year, which discussed and defended the movement. See Sareknt-I.rlam c<mgre.r (46 not/onaal ccngru) 28 Oct.-2 Noo. 1919 te Soerabaja (Sarebl Islam Congress [Fourth National Congress]. Oct. 26-Nov. 2, 1919, at Surabaja) (Netherlands Indies government, c1assiBed, WeltevredeD, 1920),

pp.35-37. 21. See Mededeellngen 1920, pp. 28-31; Kolonlaal Verslag, 1918, Hoofdstuk B, cols. 72-74; Dc Indi$che Cltb, XU ( 1919), 1449-1450; Sorckot-l.Jlom congt'el . . . 1919, pp. 33-35 (report by Abdul Muis) . Muis, according to the government aCCO\lnt, had urged the aholition of corvee but had cautioned his audiences to fulllll thc obliga tions as long as they were sanctioned by the government. De Kat Angelino's fatal mistake seems to have been that he offended strict Muslim sentiment in Tali-toll, where relations between the authorities and the people were already weakened by a quarrel over the succession to the local throne, by making his visit during the month of Ramadan and refusing to postpone the execution of unfulRlled corvoo until the end of that fasting period. 22. C. 5., "Op den twoesprong" (At the Crossroads), HVW, Oct. 11 , 19 19, p. 12. The Dutch Communist parliamentary leader Wljnkoop attempted to absolve the Sarckat Islam leadership by asserting that Section B represented a religiOUS reaction to the CSI, Jed by hadjis who o p~ its increasingly secullU' orientatiOll. See lIandelingen der Sialen-Generaai, T weedc Kamer (Proceedings of the States General, Lower House), 19 19/ 1920, p. 1147: hereafter cited as Handelingen 2e Kamer. For d iSC\lssions of the affair and ib aftermath, see HandeIIngen 2e Kamer, pp. 1158-1162 (report of the Colonial Minuter) and 1108-1113 (remarks by the SDAP spokesman Albania ); Handelingen Volhraad, First Session, 1920, pp. 435-438: Second Session, 1920, pp. 364-365 (Abd ul Muis' remules ): MededeeUngen 1921, p. 7; Oetoemn Hlndla, Sept. 8, HU9, in IPO, no. 36, 19 19, pp. 31-32; Neratia, Aug. 19, 1922, in IpO, no. 35, 1922, p. 294: Sarekatblam congre.r . . . 1919, pp. 24-33: Tjipto Mangunku$.Umo, }let communlnne In Indw: nanr oorJciding tHIn de rellctf~ (Communism in the Indi~: In Conn~ tion with the Disturbances ) ( Bandung, 1926), p. 12; HOS, pp. 117- 118; Van Niel, Emerg«nee, pp. 145-150; Brouwer, De h01Jlling, p. 80: De Indl.sche Gid.r, XU (1919) , 1201- 1202, 1269-1272, 1298-1305, 1446-1449, 14SQ....1455. 23. Mededeellngen 1921, p. 24. See aLro Koch, Verantwoordlng, pp. 125-127. For a general discussion of the relationship between the sugar Industry and the population in the plantatiOli areas during the colonial period, see Sclosoemardjan, Social Cha nge.J In l ogjakart4 ( Ithaca, 1962 ), pp. 262-284. . . 24. See Mededeel/ngen 1920, pp. 4-5, 10. An Indies official later described the policy as follow, : Not only was the government advisod to maintain the favorably ne\ltral attitude which it had thus far shown toward the SI, but denyiog completely the enormous differences between the European and native societies. it was advised 10 accept not only favOl1lbly but even hoortily the new trend in the 51, which placed the

372

Notes, I'V 42--44 economic stru ggle in the foregooWld and aimt.-d at organizing the pt.'1lslInts in the villages and ,the workers on plantations and factories lor a struggl~ to be~er

their lot; and thIS was done on the grounds that the modem labor uruon tactics practiced in Europe seemed DOt to have proved harmful for the growth of the social organism there.

Instructions of the Resident of Banjumas,

J. J. van Helsdingen, no. 20974/4,

Banjumas, Dee. 11, 1926, p. 8; referTing to the very secret letter of the Government Commissioner, Dec. 9, 1918, no. 588, p. 8. Emphasis in the text.

25, TIms Baars responded to the revolutionary events of November 1918 by urging the Indonesian movements to demand rum! instead of parliamentary reform : ''We want no words or reports now: we must see deeds. Improve the distribution of water, build irrigation dams everywhere, away with the land rent ordinance! Nationalize the sugar factorics: make all proprietary lands communal property. After that village administration ought to be reformed; and on1y then can a parliament do useful work." Soeara Ra'jat, Dec. 6, 1918, in lPO, no. 15, 1918, p. 3. 26. See l/VW, Mar. 10, 19 18, p. 138; Sill(lr Hlndm, Oct. 20 and 31, 1918, In IPO, no. 44, 1918, pp. 2.0, 24; Paro Pati, Nov. 14, 1918, in IPO,

DO.

46, 1918,

p. 7; Koemandang-Dfawi, Dec. 9, 1918, in lPO, no. SO, 1918, p. 3; Medan8eTgCTak, Jan. 1919, in lPO, no. 5, 1919, p. 5. 27. Mededec/lngen 1921, p. 13. 28. In October 1915 a meeting was held between the eJ.:ecutives of the ISDV and various unions in which the socialists had influence in Older to form a committee to coordinate labo r and political actions. The committee was established, but to the radicals' displeasure it only included the labor unions; nothing seems to have resulted from it, probably because of the growing split between right and left socialists and between Indonesian and European-status employees (HVW, Nov. 10, 1915, p. 24; Jan. 25, 1916, p. 68; Aug. 18, 1919, p. 402) . In mid-1916, the VSTP endorned Scmaun's proposal to sound out other unions about a general action for a cost-of-Iiving bonus; this resulted in February 1918 in 'formation of a multiunion committee. Attempts to develop it into a federation foundered, however, because of the divergent interests of European and Indonesian worken; thereafter attempts to unite European and Indonesian unions were abandoned (Smar Hindia, July 31, 1920, in IPO, no. 31, 1920, p. 16; history of the establishment of the first Indonesian labor federation [PPKB} by its sectetary, Najaan ). 29. Quoted in HOS, p. 113; see further Hartogh, "De Wensch-de vader der gcdachte" (The Wish-the Father of the Idea), HVW, Aug. 16, 1919, p . 402; Blumberger, Nati01ltJfut, p. 133; Aldit, Sedfarah, pp. 40-41; Sl V, p. 370, col. b ; HVW, Mar. 10, 1918, pp. 136-137; llVW, May 24, 1919, p. 308; De Indilche GidI, XU (1919),1023-1027; Danna Kondo, Oct. 10,1920, in IPO, no. 48, 1923,

pp.33-34. 30. According to statistics proVided by Sernaun, a total of 7,000 workers went on strike in 1918, 66,000 in 1919, and 83.000 in 1920. The 1918-1920 strike wave had in gcneral economie rather than political aims, and omy about on~uarter of the actions ended in complete defeat. See Semaun's report in Peroyi ,"eul reooliutslormykh organizatlil Dafnego Vortoka, pp. 284-286; hereafter cited as Peroyi "'ezd. 31. Lul8terf/Dengatlumlahl (Listenl) (Surabaja, 1919). See also Hartogh, "De wemch," p . 403; HVW, Mar. 15, 1919, pp. 207-208; C. 5., "Op dec tweesprong," p. 13; Nota (Note [on the 1919 51 congress} (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden, 1920 ), p. 15.

. :rl3

Notes, pp. 44-46 32. C. -S., "Het S. I. -con~" (The 51 Congress), lIVW, Nov. 1, 1919, p. 33; "Vieroe S.I.-coogres" (Fourth 51 Congress), IfVW, Nov. 1, 1919, p. 35; SI Y, pp. 370; 001. b-371, col. 3; BJumbcrger, NationolUt, p. 69; HOS, pp. 113-114; Aidit, Sed/arah, pp. 41-42. 33. C. S., "Het S.I.-congres," p. 33, See also Hartogh, "De wensch," p. 403. 34. C. S., "Op den tweesproog," p. 13. 35. According to E. P. ZaXaznikova, ''Prof!lOiuznoe dvizhenie v Indonezii v 191~1926 ggo" (The Trade Union Movement in Indonesia, 1918-1926 ), in lugoVostochnaia AzUIl, ocherki ekQllOmiki j istorii (Moscow, 1958 ), pp. IM-I55, the federation CQlJIbinoo in mid-1920 the sugar workeJS' union (30,000 members) , VSTP (over 8,000). dockworkers' (3,000), Semarang printers' union (2,000), pawnshop workers' (5,000), teachers' (4,000). public works employees' (2,000), and the metal workers', oU workers', chauffeurs', and other smaller unions. See also Tan Mahla, "Die Gewerbchaftsbewegung auf Holliindisch Ost-Indien" (The Trade Union Movement in the Dutch East Indies), Rott' Ct'werlachofuIntcmotionlJle (no. 5/B), 1923, p. 543. FO£ a description of the feder.ltion's organi2:.ation as O\ItIinoo at the DecembeT 1919 convention. sec Mededeelfngen 1921, p. 10. 36. Noto, p. 22; SI V, p. 371, col. b; P. B. [Bergsma}, "De Valccentralo" (The Concentration of Labor Movements ) , HVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 109; HOS, p. 114. Surjopr3noto became Vice-chairman; Najoan (ISDV-SI) was named secretary, but he was soon replaced by Hadji Agus Salim (CSI ). Bergsma was made treasurer, and the other executive members-Sjahbuddin Latief, Kartorubroto, H. Sutadi, Sugcng, and Tjokromidjojo-were CSI adherents. See H. Sutadi, article in Darma KontkJ, Oct. 10. 19-20. in IPD, no. 48. 1920. p. 33. 37. P. B., "De VakceniTale," p. 109. 38. "Jaarvergadering Indische S.D.A.P." (Ann ual Meeting of the Indies SDAP), De lndi-sche Cids, XLI (1919). 1171-1172. 39. Sec "Jaarvergadering S.D.A.P." (Annual Meeting of the SDAP), HVW, June 21, 1919, p. 21. 40. A1imin, Riwajat Hidup (Autobiography) (Djakarta. 1954) , pp. 14-15. 41. HVW, Dec. 27, 1919, p. 97, "Vers1ag van de zevende jaarvergaderlng der I.S.D.V." (Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of. the ISDV ), HVW. June I, 1920, p. 253. 42. The use of the word Per!erikatan, which strictly translated in its present usage means "association" or "union" rather than "party," does not seem to have bud any special significance, for the official Dutch equivalent was PartiJ del' Kom· munislen in Indii>-Party of the Communists in the Indies. See HVW, May 5, 1920, p. 229; ''Versing van de zevende Jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V." HVW, June I, 1920, p. 254. Since it did not consider that adopting a new name meant becoming a dif· ferent party, the PKI of the 19205 continued to refer to this meeting as its 5eventh congress. The Deeembcr 1920 and March 1923 congresses were not numbered, presumably because the fanner was "extrnordinary" and the latter a ~Coogres.'i of the PKI and Red SIISR." The December 1921 party congress was held at the time to be the eighth and the June 1924 congress the ninth. However, the January 1947 party convention, meeting during the war of independence, caUed itself the fourth congress, presumably in order to make clear the distinction between the Indonesian-led PKI and the Dutch.led ISDV. Subsequent Communist congresses have followed this numbering. Postcolonial party historians have stressed a qualitative difference between the ISDV and PKI. Usuany they have referred 10 the May 1920 congress as the party's first, though not invariably. For example, Njoto. in his

374

Notes, pp. 46--50 report to the 1959 congress, gives the December 1921 meeting as the fint; Blntong Merah (Red Star, tIlC present party journal ), special sixth congress issue, 1900, I, 178. The second and third congresses are placed before 1925 in recent party histories, but otherwise their dating is quite arbitrary. 43. Api, Aug. I, 1924, in IPO, no. 32, 1924, pp. 279-280: interviews with Darsono and Semaun, 1959.

CHAPTER IV 1. Baars, "Bricvcn uit Holland" (Letters from Holland ), dated 24 Apr. 1919; In HVW, July 21, 1919, p. 364. 2. The ISDV ncwspaper published numerous reports on the revolutionary situa· tion in Germany, however: it also ran as a serial the account by a British journalist, Arthur Ransome. of his "Six Weeks in Soviet Russia." An indication of the state of information and the slowness with which news was received is that on Aug. 30, 1919, Het Vrile Woord published a report of Maxim Gorky's death-a large, black·bordered report, for Corky, after Lenin, was the paper's favorite Russian revolutionary. It was not until January 1920 that the ISDV discovered Corky was stUl alivc; it had received a copy of the Dutch Conununist newspaper De Tribune of Nov, 1, 1919, in which Corky's current activities were mentioned (P. B., "Maxim. Corky," HVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 108) . 3. 1.'he manifesto was published in instaUments in HVW, Sept. 13, 20, 27 and Oct. 4, 1919 (pp. 437-438, 446, 452-453, a nd 6-7). 4. ~Yerslag van de zesde jaarvcrgadcring dcr I.S.D.Y." (Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the ISDV) , HVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 113: bereafter cited as Verslag Z&de. 5. Verslag wsde, p. 113. 6. The ISDV executive decision of December 1918, as quoted by Hartogh at the sixth party congress (Verslag u!dc, p. 114). 7. Ver.tlag ZC$de, p. 114. 8. Verdag zesde, p. 114. 9. See vBr.·H., "De jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V." ('The Annual Meeting of the ISDV). HVW, Jan. 17, 1920, p. 120. At the May 1920 party congress Hartogh again took up the problem of Section B, declaring that, although it ~ understandable for such clandestine organlzations to arise, It was necessary for the popular leaders to keep clearer heads. He reprimanded those PKI members who were too admiring of the Section B action; Tjokroaminoto and a number of other non·Communists critici2:ed him sharply for acting as if he felt the entire SI were involved. See "Verslag van de zcvende jaarvergadering dec I.S.D.V," (Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the ISDY), HVW, June I, 1920, p. 253, hereafter dted as Ver.llag uverule; Soeara Ra'jat, May 26, 1920, :in IPO, no. 23, 1920, p. 2. 10. AJI members of the previous executive who made themselves available were re-elected; the new leaders were Hartogh (Dutch, chairman), Dengah ( Indonesian, secretary), Krnan (Dutch, treasured, Cluwen (Dutch, executive member representing Lawang), and Semaun, Bergsma, and Darsono (executive members representing Semarang). See VersIag :::e!de, p. 123. II. Statement by Waworuntu on behalf of the Semarang delegation to the May 1920 congress, in Ver.llag ::;evende, p. 254. See also vBr.·H, "De parvergader:ing cer I.S.D.Y.," p. 120. 12. vBr.·H, " De jaacvergadering der I.S.D.V.," p. i20. 13. See v~r ..H, "Het nieuwste gevaar" (1be Latest Danger ), HVW, Jan. 31,

:ff5

Notes,

pp. 50-55

1920, pp. 135-138; P. B., HOe '{lomme' massa" (The "Stupid" Masses), HVW, Jan. 31, 1920, pp. 136-139; and Hgh., "Dom" (Stupid), HVW, Feb. 21, 1920, p. 161. 14. Ver&log .::evende. p. 253. 15. De Tribune, Aug. 16. 1920, p. 4; and see Venlag uvende, p. 253. Baars accused Hmogh of opposing th e name change because the party for which he felt the most sympathy-the German USP-had Dot adopted the Communist title. He added, however, that in his estimation Hartogh was not at heart an independent socialist but II CommWlist, albeit a cautious one (VCtslag zeoonde. pp. 267-268), 16. VersWg zevende, pp. 254, 265-268; see also De Tribune, Aug. 16, 1920, p. 4; Aug. 11, 1920, p. 2; Aug. 18, 1920, p. 2. 17. Verslag ::eoonde, p. 254; De Tribune, Aug. 19, 1920, p. 2. The rundown of votC$ given in D. N. Aidit's history of the movement rcl'ers to the results of the referendum held later among the party branches (Aidit, Sedlarah. p. 44); see llVW, Oct. 20, 1920, p. 9. 18. Venlag uuende. p. 254. 19. See Elias Hurwicz, m e Ori6n4polleik d6T Dritten lrUema/iOflQle (The Eastern Policy of the 11Iin1lntemational) (Berlin, 1922), pp. 12, 15, 26; Edward Hallett CIUT, The Bol.Jhevik RellOlulian, 1917-1923 (New York, 1953 ), Ill, 232, 234, 236; L. A. Modzhorian, "Borba demokratichcskogo lagena za oatsiona}'nulu nezavisimost' i natsional'nyi suverenitet" (11Ie Struggle of the Democratic Camp for National Independence lind National Sovereignty) , Sooet.tkoe gorudtJrltoo j provo, January 1953, p. 57; Xenia Eudin and Robert North, Soviet Ruufa and the East, 1920-1927 (Stanford, 1957 ), pp. 46, 77-79; A. A. Guber, "Izuchenie istOOi stran Vostoka v SSSR :til 25 let" (Twenty-Five Years of Research on the History of the East in the USSR), in Dvadtsat' pint' let /&1orichukoi naukf v SSSR (Moscow, 1940), p. 232. 20. Achmed Z.-ilikov, ''The New Russia and the Peoples of the Orient," .Novaia Zhi:,,,', Jan. 19, 1918, II~ quoted in Hurwicz, Oriempolitik, p. 14. 21. Quoted in Hurwicz, Ori6n4polUlk, pp. 17- 18. 22. Zhi;m' Natsioool'rwstei (no. 5), Dec. 8, 1918, as translated in Elldln and North, Soviet Russia, p. 162. Tbi5 department developed twelve country sections, wbich extendL-d its authority beyond the exclU!livcly Islamic areas to include China, Korea, Japan, and India (Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 78). 23. K. Trolanovskil, Vo.rtok" i ,eooliu/3iia (The East and the Revolution) (Moscow, 1918) , pp. 66-67; and see Hurwicz, Orientpolitlk, pp. 17-18. The League was created at a conference that began in Moscow on Oct. 31, 1918. 24. Trolanovskii, Vo.rtok", p. 65. Troianovskii, one of the founders of the League, sets forth the program drawn up by the League at its 8rst congress. 25. Troianovskii, Vostok", pp. 66-71 ; see also Hurwicz, OrlentpolUfk, pp. 19-23. The League, apparently renecting Russian concem over Japanese expansion in the East, dedared that since the varied development of different Asian nationalities made possible an Asian imperialism, it would be best for Eastern countries to unite on a basis of equality: "It can begin with a narrower fedcration, say the Indian, and expand to a broader one, to a federation of the whole broad Asian continent, to the United States of Alila" (TroillflQvksii, Vo.nOkH, p. 67). The program further announced : In its ooonomic policy the League for the Liberation of the East proceeds from the principle of the natoral international division of labor and the highest utilization of the econemic and te1:' and 'internal concentration on study.' Both the leaders and rank-and-file workers are serious1y engaged in preparation for future activities, the study of international questions, etc." (Semaun, '1ndiiskoe dvizhenie," p, 276). In this report Semaun stressed the importance of the Semarang-sponsored schools and hoped the party wowd soon start a training seminar to provide teachers for a nationwide Communist ~bool system (p. 274). It was such activity, he claimed (interview, 1959 ), on which he had hoped Tan Malaka would concentrate. We might note that the use of ~hools as an idcologiUlI instnunent was not uncommon in Indonesia in the 1920s; the most sUcalSsful were Suwardi Surjaningrat's Taman Siswa schools, which avoided politics hut stressed cultural nationalism. 46. Malab, Toendoek, p. 33. 47. The debate centered about Sneevliet's expulsion; the Dutch party was not only concerned with the issue per se but wanted to support Sneevliet's efforts to get pennission to return to the Indies. For the major arguments, sec lIandelingen 2c Kamer, 1918--1919, p. 2047 (Albania) ; 1919-1920, pp. 1148--1149 (Marchant), 1163 (l\linister de GraafT), 1124-1125 (Van Ravesteyn); and Van der lee, De S.D.A.P., pp. 52, 55, 131- 133. 48. Although the right of association and assembly was recognized in 1915, it was only defined by the Royal Decree of Dec. 17, 1918, no. 38. nus determined that no official pennission was needed to found a political association, but in order fOf one to be recognized as a corporate entity its statutes had to be approved by the government. Associations deemed by the Indies ropreme court to be in conHict with public order were forbidden, as were secret societies. The police might attend and dissolve public meetings but not closed ones, and prior permission was needed only lor open-air meetings. After the unrest of 1919 it was decided that in any part of the colony where disturbance was threatened, the right of assembly could be restricted by requiring prior permission for all public meetings, police attendance at all meetings, and five days' notice for closed meet_ ings, which could be forbidden. These restrictions were widely employed in the ~'Ugar aroas durin g 1920. Mededeclingen 1920, pp. 17-18. 49. See Mededeelingen 1920, pp. 41-43. The government stated that too many officials failed to drnw the necessary conclusions from Baars's dismissal from hill government teaching job; the memorandwn pointing this out became commonly known as the "muzzling memorand1llll." (mullkorfcircul4ire). SO. The SOAP spokc.~man in the I1pper house of parliament charged that during 1920 "prosecution for infractions of the speech and press laws was carried

399

Notes, pp. 120-122 to such an excess that a secret memonmdum was issued by the Attorney GenernI to the prosecuting offic:ials Il5ldng them henceforth not to undertake such action without informing him 8.'5 head prosecutor" (Mendels, speech of Mar. 31, 1922, quoted in Van der lee, De S.D.A.P., p. 143). 51. Sinar Hindkl, June 25, 1921, in lPO, no. 26, 1921, p. 578; SOOlltQ Boemlpoetro, July I, 1921. in IPO, 00. 21, 1921, pp. 48-52; Octoc.Jt2n H/ndia, Ju1y 9, 1921 , in lPO, no. 28, 1921, pp. 67-68; Nero'fa, July 13 and 14, 1921, in Ira, no. 28, 1921, pp. 115-118; Nerat/a.lu1y 19, 1921, in lPO, no. 29, 1921,. pp. 154-155, Soeara Boemipoctra, Ju1y 15, 1921, in IPO, no. 30, 1921, p. 197; Nerotia, Sept. 29, 1921, in lPO, no. 40, 1921, pp. 51....5Et 52. For ,descriptions of PPPB debates 0 0 strike plans, _ Kaoom MoctW, Sept. 26-Oct. I, 1921. in lPO, DO. 40, 1921, p. 49; Nerat;a, Sept. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921, pp. 51-56; Oetoesan HlndkJ, Sept. 26-Oct. 1, 1921, in lPO, no. 40, 1921, p. 61; Soeara Bocmipoetra, Dec. 1, 1921, in [PO, 00. 49, 1921, pp. 467-469. 53. Mededeelingen 1922, pp. 27-28. The background of the strike prcsented here is derived from Mededeellngen [922, pp. 21-29; T an Malaka's accounts in Toendoek (pp. 12-13) and "Mijn verbanning" (May 20,1922) give approximately the same IIIlIIlysis in less detail Other comments may be found in Ovcrzlcht CS I 1921 (p. 62) and Blumberge r, Communist (pp. 29-30). 54. Malab, Toondook, p. 49; see also Malah. DP I , 75. 55. The strike began in Ngupasan, near Jogjakarta, with lhe Bring of a pawnshop official who refused to carry an article to the auction place. Thereupon forty coworkers left their jobs in order, as they put it, to seek jU51ice from the Assistllnt Resident. They v.-ere discharged. The followin g day the strike spread to the ~..,rrounding areu, and 50 on until it covered most of Central Java; Med.rde..lIngen 1922, pp. 24-26; Tan Malaka, Toendook, pp. 12-13; and "Mijn verbanning." May 20, 1922. The walkout wu nnt completely spontaneous: the officia1 who began it had conferred with the PPPB executive the day before, and this body negotiated with the local p.wmshop service heads the evening before the strike; Medcdcelingen 1922, pp. 27-28. However, the actinn Wll.'l clenrly nol p ressed by the union leaders upon the workers; the reverse was true. 56. Mededeelingen 1922, p. 30. The ~act number of the workers who took part in the slrike is not known; some sources give 1,000 (out of a total of 5,000 pawnshop workers on Java, 2,000 of whom belonged 10 Ihe PPPB). Cuber, Indofl.Cz/ia: Souia/'no-ckonomiche$kkl ocherki (Indonesia: Socia-Economic Out· lines) (Moscow, 1933), p. 331; Blumbergcr, Comm!lni.tt, p. 30. Tan Malab, h<m'cver, stated that 2.000 were involved (Toendook, pp. 12-13); and this wa.~ also theJigure given by Sinor Hindla ( May 15-20, 19'22, in IPO, no. 21, 1922, p. 282). Not all the 5trikers seem to have been union members, and not all the union members went on strike. A Communist report on labor activity in this period laid the dcfeat of the action chieBy to the lack of solidarity shown by the pawnshop workers; Boedisoetjitro, Vusitzg, p. 1. It wa5 complained that nnly the Javanese 5truck and the government replace:d them with Sumatraru; Neral;o, Sept. 25-30, 1922, in lPO, nQ. 40, 1922, p. 4. Fnr that matter, the PPPB, altllough it contained the great majority of the organized pawnshop employees, did not in· clude them all; Dutch and higher Indonesian officials belonged to the PBOH and PPB. According to the government, the number of participants in the sbil:e was nowhere 50 great that the pawnshops could not do business; Mededeellngen 1922, p. 31. 57. Mede(leelingen 1922, p. 30; "Communisme," p. 532, eol. h. 58. "Communisme:' p. 532, col. b; Malah, Toendoek. pp. 3, 12-1 3; and DP 1, 75; Mecledeelingen 1922, p. 30.

400

Notes, pp. 122-125 59. Ovenlcht CSI 1921, pp. 62, 00. 60. Mcdedeelingcn 1922, p. 30; the clact number was 965 (out of 5,000) . is the government figure; Ncrat fa declared that the number who lost their jobs lU 1:1 result of the strike was 1,400 (May 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 21, 1923, p. 347); Sinor Hind/a claimed thai it was about 2,000 (June 7, 1922, in IPO, no. 24, 1922, p. 412; Aug. 27,1922, in IPO, no. 32, 1922, p. 198). 61. Mededcelinglln 1922, p. 32. 62.. Mededeelingen 1922, p. 31; Neratia, Apr. 10, 1922, in lPO, no. 16, 1922, pp. 88-89. For Indonesian Volksraad criticism of the government attitude towa rd the strike and Budi Utomo's role in it, see Hondelingen Volhraod, 1922, F irst Session, pp. 104-108, 131, 185-187, 189-192 (speeches by 'Salim, Dwidjosewojo, an d Sutadi ); for Indies Dutch views, see pp. 200-203. 63. Mededcelingen 1921, p. 9. M . Letter from the !luislant RCloidcnt of 5urakarta to the Budi Utomo elecutive, Feb. 22, 1922; leiter of the Budi Utomo elecutive to B. F. O. Schricke, Mar. 4, 1922; see also Handel/ngeo Vo/ksrtuJd, 1922, First Session, Bijlagen, Ond. I , Md. I, Stuk 6, pp. 9-10. The most radieaJ action with which Budi Utomo had been connected during the strike was Sutopo's acceptance of the chai nnanship of a committee to assis t the strikeI"$; this was promptly disapproved by the party's executive, however, and he resigned in favor of Suwardi Surjaningt"ll t. Hondefingen VolksrtuJd, 1922, First Session, p. 187 (Salim). 65. As a reswt of the strike, the membership of the PPPB dropped, according to one account, from 2,000 to 200 (C uber, Indonczjja, p . 3 11 ). See also Nerotjo , .Apr. 10, 19"22, in lPO, no. 16, 1922, p. 89. 66. The action against Malaka and Bergs ma was not because of their part in the PPPB strike, although thios was added to the charges against them; the Attorney General had propo~d their banishment to the Governor Ceneral on Dec. 23, 1921. This was before Malaka had become chainnan of the PKI; presumably the government thought him dangerous because of the great success of the SI schools. Bergsma was expelled from the Indies by a government decree of Mar. 2, 1922; the same directive banished Malaka to Kupan g, on the island of Timor. He requested to be allowed inslead to leave the Indics, and , as was custom.·u y, this was granted ; at the end of March he sailed for Holland. Malaka, DP I, 78--79, 88, and Tocndock, pp. 3-4, 12; De Indise/Ie elch, XLIV (19"22), 531-532; "Communisme," p. 532. col. b.

nus

CHAPTER Vll 1. Si Tetop, Oct. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 51, 1921, p . 543. 2. See Algemeen Indisch Dogblod, Aug. 15, 1925; Nicuwc Rotterdomsche Couront, Sept. 22, 19"25, for accounts of the spcculation5 current after Semaun's departure. On the other hand, rumors were circulated after Semauo's return that he had not really been in Russia at all, causing the VSTP to drculate two " torpedo letters" in indignant refutation (Nerotfo, Oct. 9-14, 1922; Oetoewn Hindla, Oct. I S, 1922; Si Tetap, Sept. 20, 1922; in IPO, nos. 42, 43, an d 45, 1922, pp. 127, 171-172,272). 3. SifUlr lIindia, June 6-10, 1922, in IPO, no. 24, 1922, p. 406; hereafter cited as SU. A similar exposition of Semaun's purpose is given in Soeoro Ro'jat, May 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 143. Fonnation of a committee to aid the starving Russian cbildren had been an item on the agenda of the 1921 PKl congress (Soearo Ro'jat, Nov. 1, 1921, in fPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 383). Semaun declared on his retu rn 1I1al he had decided "the poo r rontlit iom are not to ~

401

Notes, 1'p. 125-128 blamed on incorrect administration by the Bolsheviks but on the many enemies that make things difficult for the Soviet Republic"-namely, opportunists in the party, non·Conununlsts who stiJl held Important positions, the economic boycott of Russia, and capitalist qlODsorship of counterrevolution (SH, p. 406). 4. SH, p. 407; Goenawan, Semaoen (Semaun) (Bandung. 1924 ) , p. 12. TIlt! latter work is a pamphlet defending Semaun and his program; it quotes most of Semaun's homecoming speech verbatim. 5. Semaun, editorial in Sinor Hindia, Dec. 1, 1919, and Soeara Ra'lat, Dec. 19, 1919, in lPO, no. 48, 1919, p. I , and no; 51, 1919, p. 1; and see Dfawli Tengah, Dec. 3, 1919, in 'PO, no. 49, 1919, p. 2. 6. For the development of the railroad strike issue during 1921 , see Sina, Hindia, June 20, 1921, and OetQeSllf'l Hindla, Jwy I , 1921. in lPO, no. 27, 1921, pp. 12-15; SI Tetllp, June 30, 1921, in lPO, no. 30, 1921. pp. 200-203; Defoe· tan mndia, Jwy 11, 1921, in lPO, no. 29, 1921, pp. 11S-119; Si Tetap Aug. 31, 1921, in lPO, no. 40, 1921. p. 86; Sinar Hlndia, Oct. 13, 1921, in lPO, no. 42, 1921, pp. 135-136; Si Tetap, Sept. 20, 1921. in IPO, no. 46, 1921, pp. 353-354; and Mededeelingen 1921, p. 18. 7. 11mt this was the main substanCt'l of the quarrel was evident from the d ispute in the party on Semaun's return. Aceounts that claimed Semaun had been urged to visit Russia by European PKI members who considered him to have deviated from the orthodox international path also declared that the principal objection to hi! policie5 was that he refused to tale sufficiently strong antigovernment action ' (Algemeen IndUch Dagblad, Aug. I S, 1925; Nieuwe Rotterdam.sche Courant, Sept. 22, 1925). "The same view of the essence of the quarrel is taken in the government reports Ovemcht V6n den Inwendigen politieken tvesfand in 1923 (Survey of the Internal Poutical Situation in 1923 ) (Nether. lands Indies government, Weltevreden, March 1924), p. 2, and Mcdedulingen 1924, p. 2. 8. "The summon s to the congress Wa$ addressed to the workers of Korea, China, Japan, and Mongolia. See Eudin and North, Soviet Rwrlll, p. 145; C . Safarov, "Von Washington bis Moskau" ( From Washington to Moscow), I"" p1'ckorr (Genean-Ianguage edition of Imp1'ecorr), Jan. 17, 1922, pp. 54-55; and "Theses Adopted by the Executive Conunittee of the Communist International on the Washington Conference," lnprecorr, Oct. 1. 1921, p. 3. 9. Semaun, interview, 1959; First Cong,e$l of the Tolle" of the Far East (Petrogr-ad, 19-22), p. 237, hereafter cited as Toilers; Ch. E. [Eidussl, " Der erste KODgres5 der revolutioniiren Organisationen des Femen Ostens," (The First Congress of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East) , Die Rotc Gewerkachaft.r-IntemotionoIe (organ of the Prolintern, hereafter RGI), DO. 9,. September 1922, p. 603. 10. Semaun, interview, 1959. 11. As Semaun stated in apology to the congress, he began to study English. the language of the meeting, only two months before it gathered in Moscow (thus, presumably, after he anived in Irkutsk ); and as there was no one at the meeting who cowd interpret Dutch or Indonesian, he was red~ced to silenCt'l ( Toilers, pp. 151 , 191). 12. In addition to the better-known accounts of the lDL'eting, a lengthy description written by Sneevliet can be found ill KHet kongres van Bakoc" (The Congress of Baku ) , De Tribune, Nov. I, 2, and 4, 1920. Aceording to this report, the meeting started late, because the special train carrying the ECCI and its retinue from Moscow did not reach Baku until 2 A . M. Revolutionary spirits were not

402

Notes, pp. 128-129 dampened by the delay, and the delegates poured into the Baku theater, where an orchestra played, everyone sang the "Internationale," Zinoviev made a speech, and greetings were read from innumerable participating and sympathizing organizations. Then everyone \llent home to bed; the following evening fonnal se~ sinns began. The day after that was Friday (Muslim sabbath ), and the delegates did not work but were entertained by a parade that culmin~ ted in the, unveiling of a statue of Man:, with explanations of his meaning for the East. Woodrow Wilson, U oyd George, and Clemenceau were burnt in effigy. On the next day, the proceedings were embarrassed by the presence of Enver Pasha, whose wish' to addre$ the meeting had to be diplomatically ignored. On the last two days practical policy discus.~ions were held. The congress ended on Sept. 7, 1920. 13. The text of the greeting may be found in "De Hotlandsche Omununisten aan de volkeren va n het Oosten" ( The Dutch Communists to the Peoples of the East ), De T ribune, Oct. 22, 1920, p. 1; see also De Tribu ne, Oct. 25, 1920, p. 3; Nov. 3, 1920, p. 3. 14. II Kongress, p. 195. This unenthusiastic conunent may refer to the primarily Central Asian orientation of the meeting or to the fact that the originru plans for the convention, which had been made before the second Comiutem congress, had been superseded by the events of that meeting. According to CaIT, BoLsllcvik Reuolution, Ill, 260, the only Far Eastern represen tatives at the meet· ing were eight Chinese. Sneevliet, however, mentions that among the 1,891 delegates representing 32 national groups there were small delegations from Korea, China, and India .( "Het kongres van BaJcoe," Nov. 2, 1921 )-in addition, of COUI5e, to himself for the Netherlands Indies. 15. For the congress resolutions, see Pervyi s"eul oorodoo Vostoka (First Congress of the People of the East) (Petrograd, 1920), pp. 183-186. 16. Huriez, OrWntpolitik, p. 33, suggests that the Baku meeting was intended to establish the Asian Internationru called for by the League for the Liberation of the East two years before. However, Wijnkoop's conll:dent statement after the second Comintcrn congress that there would be no center for Asian propaganda outside Moscow indicates that the council mlly have been thought up after that meeting or at the Baku congress itself. The head of the council was Mikhail Pavlovich (S. Vel'tman), who also became the fint director of the AlIRussian Scientille Association for Ori(''Dtal Studies. For descriptions of the council's functions and career, see Pertly; ,"eul naradov Vo.rloka, pp. 211_213; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, Ill, 280-268; Eudin and North, Soviel Russia, pp. 82-85. 17. " Mos"oll en het p.1D-lslamismc," p. 3 (a statement by the PKI executive). 18. The minutes of the congress list no delegate from the Indie5; see Protokolle des dritlen Kong. resses der Kommuni.stischen Intematlonale (Protocols of the Third Congress of the Communist International) ( Hamburg, 1921), pp. l~ 1071, hereafter III Kongress. But it seems certain that Darsono wa~ there ( Darsono, interview, 1959; Kahin, Nationdi..tm, p. 76; Djoehana, "History of the Indonesian National Movement," The Voice of Free llllhmeria, no. 15, 1946, p. 8 ). It is quite possible that he was included in the Dutch delegation or that the conwess listin): is incomplete. 19. Darsono, interview with C. McT. Kallin, 1955, and with the author, 1959. Darsono had learned German, the principal Comintern language, while in prison in the Indies. Rnd he made his report to the rongress in that tongue. 20. According to one Soviet source, Lenin was persuaded by a group of Near Eastern deleg.1 tes who ","'ere disturbed at the persecution of the Turlcish Commu_

403

Notes, pp. 129-131 nists by Kernal and the collapse of Communist rule in Gilao (B. Z. Shumiatskii, '12 istori! Komsomola I Kompartil Kilain" (From the Hislo!), of the ,Youth Movement and Communist Party of China). Reooliutsionnyl Vostok, no. 4/ 5, 1928, p. 218). 21. ShumiatsJdi, "b: Istorii," p. 219. 22. ShumJatsldi, " iz !stori!," p. 219. 23. Shumiabkii, "b; istarii," pp. 219-220. Chang', these, are given on pp. 220-222 and are traru!liatoo in part in Eudin and North, Sot."ict Ru.m'a, p. 144. 24. Omclusion of Chang's theses, 3.'l tran slated in Eudin aDd North, Soviet Rusrla, p. 144. 25. 1II KongrfMs, p. 1010. 26. III Kongress, p. 1018. Although Roy slated that "not one single member of the European and American delegations opposed this," he was supported by the French delegate Julien, who declared that the French Communi~-ts had come to Moscow prepared to ask for changes in the theses of the SC(X)Ild Cominlem congress that would make possible still greater cooperation with the nationalist movements (pp. 1029-1005 ). Julien's cri ticism was not, however, backed by the other Freneh representatives. '1:1. III Kong rel.S, p. 1016. In fairness to the Cominlern, it should be pointed out that limitation on the speaking time of the Eastern delegates was due at leart in part to Asian insistence on talking at great length and in resound ing generalities. As one commentator put it, ''\Vcstern indifference and Eastern Bowery eloquence .had combined to reduce the discussion on the Oriental question to a sort of neeusary eviJ, to be gotten over with as qUickly as possible." Demetrio Boersner, Bohheoib and the Notional and Colonial Que.rtion (1917-1928) (Geneva and Paris', 1957 ), p. 109. 28. III Kon~re.tS, p. 1035. This comment was made by Kolarov, speaking in the name of the prc~idium . 29. III Kongreu, p. 1016; emphasis in the text. 30. Semaun claimed to have visited China on the way; SII, pp. 406, 4(11, and Coenawan, Semllocn, pp. II , 13. A visit to Sneevliel is claimed in MataMm, Oct. 24, 1922: la oosche Courant, Aug. 16, 1923 {statement of the rcar,(m~ for Semaun's b.1nishment, in the official Netherland, Indies governmen t fournal l. A. K. Prin)tgodigdo, Sediarah Pergerakan Rakfat IndoRello (History of the Indonesian Popular Movement) (Djakarta, 1950 ), p. 38; and Tamar Djaja. Trio Komunis Indonesia (Three IndOne5ian Communists) (Bukit Tinggi, 1946? ), p. 29. Sneevliet:, it has been claimed, accompan ied Semaun to Moscow; J. H. Francois, 37 lar IndQnemclw orilhdthbewe~in~ (:.rr years of the Indonesian Independence Movement) ( n.p., n .d.), p. 16. It is also asserted that Sncevliet )'!llve him some letters to take baclc to Indonesia (Mataram, Oct. 24, 1922). That Semaun saw Snoovliet in Shanghai seems on1y natural; one would expect. too, that Sncevliet ,gave him some message to take back to Java. If he accompanied Semaun at all, however. it WM probably no farther than lrlmtsk, since we know that Snoovliet WlIS in China at the time Semaun Wall in Moscow. I have seen no other sources that indicate Sneevlict made a trip to Russia at this time. Semaun also claimed to have stopped for a time in Siam-whether going to or from Russi."\ is unclear, but the latter seems more likely-and in his homecoming speech he commented briefly on the political situation In that country. 31. Shortly after the Balm congress the ECCl decided to hold a CongTC!'l~ of the Peoples of the Far East, in Siberia: l :vcstiiD, Sept. 29, 1920, as cited in Whit_ ing, Soviet Pol/de!, p. 77. See also CllfT. Bol.Jhev/k Revolution, Ill, 1525. This

404

Notes, pp. 131-132 was apparently an attempt to nmke up for the almost exclusively Central Asian orientation of the Baku meeting. Nothing further came of the protect until the summer of 1921, when the great PO'"Ycrs announced plans for a conference on arms limitation in the Pacific; Russia was not invited, and the Soviets !w.w in the snub an indication of imperialist intentions to keep them out of the Paci6c. The ECCI, meeting just after the third Comili.tem congress, determined to reply to this threat with a demonstration of Asian opposition to the conference, through the medium of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. 32. l1\e meeting had been originally planned as a demonstmtion to which a ll revolutionary anti-imperia1ist organizations of the Far East should be invik-d. Disagreement arose, however, apparently as to whether bourgeois nationalht organizations shou1d be included. The problem was put off temporarily by deciding to '.invite everyone and to detennine which delegates should be admitted "to the congress at Irkutsk itself; Shumiatskii, "Jz istorii," pp. 223-2.24, referring to'll letter to this effect written by Chang ral-lei to the Far En;stem Secretariat of the Comintem on July 29, 1921. 33. The Congress met in Moscow until February 1 and held a final session in Petrograd on February 3. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), the move and the delay occurred beuuse of Lenin's illness; at aoy rate Irkutsk was an out-of-the-way spot for a congress in which malor Russian leaders had become interested. 34. The interpreta.tions given the published record of the congress by Western schoL1rii have differed rather widely; Boersner, Bolsheviks. pp. 114-115, sees Zinoviev representing the left wing and Safarov the right wing in the controversy, whereas Whiting, Soviet PoUcies, pp. 74-86, finds the enllie meeting controlled by a Zinoviev-Ied left. CalT, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 526-528, depicts Zinoviev as taking a dogmatic revolutionary view oriented about the Japnnesc proletariat and Safarov adopting a somewhat more cautious but still leftist stand, The official language of the meeting was English, but the English-language account of the proceedings (Toiler3) is less complete than the Russian one (Pervyi s'·e:::d ) , which contains additional reports, including Semaun's. In the English account, Semaun is referred to as Simpson, delegate from Java. 35. Shumiatskii, '"h; istorii," p. 227. Since Shumiatskii wrote in the period of Stalin's ascendancy, he possibly exaggerated that leader's role in correcting the deviant trend of the meeting; on the other hand, Stalin, who was then Commissar of Nationalities, seems to have been interested in the meeting even though not offieiaJly connectcd with it; .'iCe Carr. Bolshevik Revolution, III, 528. Lenin's interest ill the gllthering is remarked in Semaun's account; see below. 36. Toiler!, p. 151 (Semau n's statement of agreement with ZiTKIviev). In his greetings to the (:'Ongress, Sernaun observed: The industrial prolet.1riat that has sprung up due to the foreign capital invested in our country is already beginning to move on the road of the revolutionary struggle against the imperialists . . . . The peoples of the Far East, and also the proletariat of Java and the Dutch Indies will play, due to their geographical position, a decisive part, and they will be the chief base for the coming imperialist war. But the future war will be used by the proletariat of Java and the Dutch Indies, as well as the proletarillt of India for the purpose of making Ii joint at· tack with thejroletanat of the Far East upon world imperialism, At this congress I hope to lin comrades from the Far East, who will find means of uniting the proletariat of the entire world for the decisive struggle against imperialism and for the achievement of the final victory of the proletariat.

405

Notes, pp. 132-134 Toilers, p. 15. Most Asian representatives to the congress tOOk a far less speci6caUy proletarian stand, the tenor of their speeches being anti.imperialist rather than Communist; Carr, BohlU1trik Revolution, 528, and Boersner. Bolshevlkr, p. 116. Of the Asians attending the congrw, only about baH were declared Com·

m.

munists; the others ..... ere mostly revolutionary nationalists of one sort or another. Carr, p. 526; see also Eudin and North, Souiet RuuIa, p. 146. Semaun's mIl5.'!lage

was probably written for him-perhaps by Sneevliet-considering his poor English at the beginning of the conference. when it was delivered. Semaun also presented a detailed report on the Indonesian movement; he was unable to deliver it orally because of translation difficulties ( Tolle,.!, p. 191), but it was published later in the Russian.language account of the congress (Pertlyi t"ezd. pp. 254289).

37. Toikn, p. 6; "Gewerkschnftsfra gen auf clem Kongress der Wetktiitigen des Femen Ostens" (Labor Union Questions at the Congress of the Toilers of tho Far East), RGI, Mar. 192.2, pp. 214-216; «Die Tatigkeit des Vollzugsbtir05 der R.G.I." (The Activity of the Executive Bureau of the Prollntem), RGI, no. 2, Feb. 1922, p. 148. The rommission was fonned on the initiative of the Pro6ntem (Red Intemational of Labor Unions), which had been established the summer before and which found in the rongress an opportunity to get in touch with the representatives of the Asian labor movements. According to the Prollntern article 6rst cited, the rommission evolved into a separate conference of Far l!:astem labor union representatives which acted independently of the congress and did not report bade 10 it. The meeting Wa.'l beaded by Lowvsky, the Secretary General of the Pr06ntem. Work proceeded slowly at first, the account states, since the European and Asian representatives Icnew very little of each othen' movements; but the results of three days' discussions were very useful. As for the Indonesian representative on the rommittee, he is referred to as chieHy concerned with the inequality of pay for European and native workers in his country. 38. "Manifest des Kongresses deT Werktiitigen des Femen Ostens 1m' die Volker des Femen Ostens" (~ I anifesto of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East to the Peoples of the Far East), InprekorT, Feb. 14, 1922, pp. 143-144. 39. SIl, p. 407; the meeting with Lenin is also referred to in Semaun, "Brieven over den strijd in het Dosten" (Letters on the Struggle in the East), De Tribune, June 6, 1925. It has been suggested that Semaun's polley of caution was the result of ECCI instructions not to push revolution in Indonesia, advice inspired by the Soviel desire not to provoke the West at that time; Carr, Bolshevik Revolul/en, Ill, 481, note I. This may have been the case, but no evidence ha~ been offered for it. 40. Semaun, intel'Yit:w, 1959. 5emaun was then no longer a Conununist Party member. 41. According to Semaun, Lenin made his remark on the NEP speci6cally in connection with the question whether the soviet system should be advocated by Asian Communist movements. Zinoviev had urged this at the congress of the Toilers of the Far East; see Toiien, p. 154. Lenin, as We will remember from the account of the seeond Comintem congress, thought the idea too radical and had included it in his theses only as a compromise v.ith the more leftist sentiment of the congress colonial commission . 42. 511, pp. 4()6..407; Coenawan, Semooen, p. 12. 43. 511, p. 408; Cocnawan, Semaoen. pp. 13-14. 44. Tan Malab, "De beweging in lndiii" ( The Movement in the Indies), De Tribune. Sept. 5, lQ')..2; see also Eyquem, "Aux Indes Nllerlandaises," pp. 8()...81.

406

Notes, pp. 134-137 Tan Malaka complained that the Dutch papers were reporting that Semann had said. "Moscow cannot support the Indies; the Indies must help themselves; the Indies still need the Netherlands' aid," Malaka said he couldn't believe Semaun had said this, but that even if he had, it should be vie\\"ed as the aberration of an individuaJ and not of the whole Indonesian Communist movement. 45. See further SH, pp. 408-409: Djoehana, "History," p. 8; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. ll2; Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah. pp. 38-39. 46. Semann, article in 51 Tclap. June 30, 1922, in lPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 149. He has maintained rilis position to the prescnt day; see the analysis presented in Semaun, Konsepsi Pcrekonomian Dtlllia (A Concept of World Economics) (Djakarta, 1957). 47. 51 Tetap, June 30, 1922, in l PO, no. 30, 1922, p. 148. See also Oetoesan Hi!1dta, July 22, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128, reporting a speech by Semaun to the Tjirebon VSTP. 48. 51{, p. 407; Goenawan, Semaoen, p. 13. Scmaun may have been referring to independence achieved by overthrowing capitalism in Holland, as had been hoped in the revolutionary days of 1918, but he did not so qualify his statement. 49. Mruaka, DP 1, p. 98. Since this autobiography was written long after Malaka had broken with orthodox Communism, it is unlikely that his remarks were colored by oomiderations of loyruty. 50. Jo'or an anruysis of the early lcadcrship'~ deviationist tendencies by the prescnt party chaimum, see D. N. Aidit, "The Birth and Growth of the Communh1: Party of Indonesia" in his Problerrl$ of the I ndonesian Revolution ( n. p., 1963), pp. 68-72. 51. For Semaun's arguments, see Cocoawan, Semaoen, pp. 13-14; SEl, pp. 408-409; Si Tetap, June 30, 1922, in IPO, DO. 30, 1922, pp. 148-149; Soearo Ra'jat, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 234; Socoro Ra';at, May 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 143; OctoeSlln Jlindia, luly 22, 1922, in JPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128; SifUl r HilltUa, Aug. 14, 1922, in IPO, no. 35, 1922, p. 300. See also Semaoen. "Brievcn over den strijd in het Oosten," June 6. 192.5; Blumbcrger. Commun~. p. 311; Blumberger, NatiollOlist, p. 112; Djoehana. "Hhiory." p. 8; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 2-3; Pringgodigdo, Sed/arah, pp. 38-39. 52. Tan Malab, "De beweging in Nederlandsch Indie," Sept. 5. 1922, citing reports in the Nieuwe Rolterdarrl$cllC Courant. 53. 51{, p. 409. 54. Semaoen, "Brieven over den strijd in het Oosten" June 6, 1925. 55. See comments by Ngadino in Sirwr Hilldia, May 29-June 3, 1922, in [PO, 00. 23, 1922, p. 377; by Daehlan in Soeara Ra';at, June 30. 1922, in lPO, DO. 33. 1922, p. 234: and by Sud,1nnan in Sinor mndia, Jan. I , 1924, in IPO, 1lO. 4, 1924, p. 148. Also Poesaka VSTP ( Heritage of the VSTP; Semarang 1923), pp. 17- 19: Blumberger. NatilJnallst. pp. 141- 142; l8lnm Bergerak. July 1 and 10, 1922, in l PO, no. 33, 1922, pp. 245-246. 56. VSTP membcr.;hip was broken do"'Jl by a union publication as follows:

Beginning 1920 End 1920 October 1921 End 1921 June 1922 End 1922

I ndonesian

Dutch

Chinese

Total

6,235 12,084 16,831 15,621 7,642 9,549

236

23

95 104

34

6,494 12,213 16,975 15.769 7,731

4f17

45

40 46 44

43

15

102

',=

Noteg, I1P' 1.'37-139 Poe~ka

VSTP, p. 19. During Scmaun's absence the VSTP was led by Harry Dekker; Sinar Hindia, Jlln. 5-12, 1923, In lPO, no. 7, 1923, p. 290. . 57. See Scmaun, in SI Tetap, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, pp. 148149. For discussloru of Seamaun's advice, see Sooaro Ra'jat, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 234; Sinar Hindla, Aug. 14, 1922, in lPO, no. 35, 1922, p. 300; aDd Oetoo.ran H/ndla, July"22, 1922, In lPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128; "Communisrne," p. 533, col. 3; Ooorzlcht 1923, p. 2; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. ~. 58. Programma Congres, ka 12 dan V.S.T.P. langgal 3-4 Februari 1923 (Program of the Twelfth Congress of the VSTP, February 3-4; 1923) (Sernamng. 1923?), leaOet. 59. For accounts of these propaganda tours, see Si Tetap, June 30, 1922, in 11'0, no. 30, 1922, .p. 149; Sinar Hlndla, Aug. 21-30, in lPO, no. 36, 1922, p. 349; Mededeellngen 1924, p. 2; Ooerzicht van den inwendigen politieken toostand (April-December 1924) (Survey of the Intemal Political Situation [AprilDecember 19'24]) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden? 19M?). p. 2, hereafter Ovenicht 1924; Blumberger, Nationali.sf, pp. 141-142. 60. Sinar HinJia, May 1-7, 1922, in IPO, no. 19, 1922, pp. 204-205; report_ ing a Sarebt Postel congress that elected Sudibio (PKI ) chalnnan of the union. None of the previous executive member!! attended the meeting. which charged them with neglect leading to the union's virtual collapse. 61. Sudibia also became chairman of this union. It was remarked in Sinar lIindio, Dec. 19, 1922 (lPO, no. 52, 1922, pp. 591-592) , that the new executive had done its best to revive the PFB but that the sugar workers were generally content with the gains of 1920 and thus showed little interest in the union. 62. Motor, January 1923, in fPO. no. 4. 1923, p. 166; Oetoe.wn Hlndla, May 2-6,19"..2, in IPO. no. 19, 1922, pp. 210-211. This union, the ABBH, was chaired by Suradi; the Inlandsche Algemeene Politlebond (Ceneral Native Police As· sociation) was led by Prawirosardjono. 63. The cost of living for Indonesians on Java rose steeply until 1920. The jn~ price of poorest-qunlity rice was 110 in 1916 and 289 in the last quarter of 1920 (1914 = 100) and it then dropped rapidly to 147 in 1923; Prljzen, Indeu:ii!e", pp. 73-78, Table VII. Moreover, it appears that in some sectors wages of private employees were not reduced in spite of the slump; a government survey of wages in SUrab.lja, the renter of such industry as the Indies then possessed, stated that wages actually rose on the average until 19"..3. Nleuwe Rottef"damfChe Courant, June 29, 1926. 64. Sinar Hindio , Dee. 27/29, 1922, in lPO, 00. 1, 1923, p. 118, speech by Suroso to the December 1922 PVH congres.~. 65. See Octoe&an Hindia, June 28, 1922, in IPO, no. 28, 1922, p. 58. !be meeting was attended by representatiYe$ from the VIPBOW, the Surabajn branch of the Sareht Postel, Kadasterbond (union of employees of the land-registry offices), Opiwnregiebond (union of employees of the opium service) , Inlandselle Douanebond (union of native customs offidals), Inlandsche Politiebond (union of Indonesian police), and Landskas Bond (union of treasury employees). 66. Oetoesan H/ndio, June 28, 1922, in lPO, no. 28, 1922, p. 58. The new league, it was declared, would be the Verbond van Inlandsehe Landsdienaren (Association of Native Public Servants). 67. See Soeara Boemfpoetcra, Sept. I, 1922, in lPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 506. Tjokroaminoto slated that he hoped the new body would be an alliance rather than a union, since a close relationship between Communists and non-Communists 4Q8

Notes, pp. 139-141 like that in the old PPKB had proved eminently unsuccessful. "May this pmiseworthy effort bear handsome fruit," he concluded, adding his regrets that he wa, too busy to attend the founding meeting. 68, Nerat;a, Sept. 25-JO, 1922, In IPO, no. 40, 1922, p. 3. 69, The federation claimed at its first congress ( December 1922) to represent eighteen unions, with 32,120 members. or these, 13,000 belonged to the VSTP, 4,500 to the VIPBOW, 4,000 to the PCB (assistant teachers), 2,200 to the PPPB, and the rest to fourteen smaller unions; report of the ·congress, ill Sinar H/ndla, Dec. 27/ 29, 1922, in l PO, no. I , 1923, p. 17. This figure is undoubtedly too large, however; the PPPB, for c1I"ampie, could claim some 2,200 membe~s before Its strike but not afterward, and the VSTP elsewhere gave its 5tren gt h at the end of 1922 as 9,607 ( Poesaka VSTP, p. 19). The PVH chainnan later claimed the federation had about 23,000 members at the start. Of these, only 1,600 were in p rivate employ, 400 of them representing the FFB; Soeroso, "De Indonesische vakbeweging," p. 213. Blumberger, Nationolld, pp. 141-142, estimates the federation at about 25,000 members. The (socialist) InternationaJ Federation of Trade Unions gave PVH membership as nineteen unions and about 33,000 members; De 10dUche GMs, XLVII, 1925, p. 452. 10. The fi rst pennanent executive of the PVH, elected at its. December 1922 rongress, consisted of Suroso (chainnan ), Mardikun (secretary-treasurer), Dj()kosuwamo, Kartodarmodjo, and Ngadino; Sinar HindiD, Dec. 27/ 29, 1922. in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 2 1. 11. Sinnr Hind/o, Dec. 27 !2.9, 1922, in IPO, no. I , 1923, p. 21; Ooor:.ichl 000 den Inwendigen politieken loe.rlond In 1923 (Survey of the Internal Political Situation in 19'23 ) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, WeJtevreden, 1923 ), p. 2, hereafter Over:.ichl 1923. 12. P. B., "Het Eenheidsfront in Indoncsie" (The United Front in Indonesia) , De Tribune, Sept. 8, 1922, qlloting a telegram Signed by Suroso and Semaun for the PVH. According to 5uroMJ, Berg!>w a helped dmw up a prote.>t against the impending withdrawal of the co_doOf_li ving bonlls, which the PVH sent the Dutch parliament; Sino r 1/indio, Dec. 27!2.9, 1922, in IPO, no. 1.1923, p. 18. The idea for a Netherlands committee probably st(''fllmed from the decision of the June meeting of government employees' unions to send a representative to Holland to plead for e.l emption of the I ndQflesian publie employees from the budget-cutting campaign; Oetoe8lln Hindia, June 28, 1922, in IPO, no. 28. 1922, p. 58. 13. Sinar Hindla, Dec. 18, 1922, in IPO, no. 5 1, 1922, pp. 547-548, program and statement of principles of the PVH. The program contained many demands characteristic of poslindcpendencc Indonesian labor attitudes. In addition to the statist orientation, it emphasized welfare provisions, job scctlrity, and paymen t according to social ra ther than economic criteria; all these. have heen continuing features of the Indonesian labor viewpoint. 74 . Sinor Hindia, Dec. 27 / 29, 1922, in IPO, no. I, 1923, p. 18; SioaT lliruiia, Dec. 16/18, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 546. 75. This opinion is expressed in Blumberger, Communist, pp. 3 1-32; "Communisme," p. 533, col. 3; Over:.icht CS t 1921, p. 66; Mededeelingen 1924, p. 1. 16. Over::.icht 1923, p. 3; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. I, 3. 71. l1Kl expansion of 51 schools was particularly notable in West Java. One pro-Semarang newspaper in tlKl district reported that in short succession schools .... ere founded in Sukabumi, 5umedang, Tasibnalaja, Tjirebon, and "other 51

409

Notes, pp. 141-142 centers"; Matahari. Aug. 3, 1922, in lPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 240. The major West Java SI school Wll.'l in Bandung, Gunawan, head of the Bandung PKI/SI. had been a prime mover in establishing the SI school system. 78. Boedi Oet(1fllo. Feb. 24 / 26, 1923, in lPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 418. 79. HOS, p. 134, quoting a letter by Wondoamiseno. BO. This proposal was entered formally :It a congress of the PPPB in August 1922, after PKI and Semarang 51 delegates pleaded for an end 10 party discipline. Soea1a Ra';a!. Sept. 1, 1922, in lPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 491. 81. Oocrzicht 1923, p. 7. 82. For some of the Communist arguments agamsl party discipline, see Malahan, Aug. 27, 1922, in lPO, no. 37, 1922, p. 415; Soeara Ra'/at, Sept. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 491, Malahari. Sept. 30, 1922, in lPO, no. 41, 1922, p. 97, Oetoe$tm Hi!idkl, Oct. 20, 1922, in lPO, no. 43, 1922, pp. 173-174; Sina r Hindia, N.ov. 9, 1922, in lPO, no. 40, 1922, p. 299. 83. At the August 1922 PPPB congress Tjolaoaminolo declared he was undecided on the party discipline issue but thought it should be discussed at the next 51 congreliS, this apparently satisGed the PKl, for Soeara 8.a'/at, Sept. 1, 1922, in l PO, no. 3 1, 1922, p. 491, remarl:cd that Tjolcroaminoto's return to political life was a saving medicine for the ailing movement. 84. A government account of this period considered Tjokroaminoto's attitude toward reunification at least in part due to political naivete: "{The quanell centered once more about the principle of unity, for the Communist ISemaun1, who was in this respect more experienced, recognized bener than Tjolaoaminoto then did how wea\.: the position of the Indies popular movement was, in this socially underdeveloped and geographically divided land, when confronted with the united forces of foreign capital and the power of the colonial authorities; and he appredated more fully how much preparation and exertion were required to begin the realization of the desired better social order." Mededeelingen 1924, p. 3. 85. The study was first published seriaUy in the PPPB journal, Soeara Boemipoe/era, which Tjokronminoto edited, beginning with the issue of Sept. 1, 1922. 86. Sinal' Hindia, Nov. 4, 1922, in fPO , no. 45, 1922, p. 249. The congress convened on Nov. 1; for accounts of its role in the CSI-PI;:I feud, see MededeelingerJ 1924, p. 4; 51 V, p. 379, col. b. 87. Neratja, Od. 3O-Nov. 2, 1922, in lPO, no. 45, 1922, p. 240; Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 5 and 12, 1922, in IPO, nos. SO and 51, 1922, pp. 490--491, 536; and sec Mcdedeelingen 1924, pp. 3-4; Dver;:icht 1923, pp. 3-4; Bhunberger, Communist, p. 31. 88. Neratia, Jan. 3, 192.3, in lP~, no. 2, 1923, pp. 59--60. 89. Tjokroaminoto, "Partij 5.1. : Voorstel terhadap Icepada ' Se\.:alian 5audara Kaoem 5.1. di Hindia" (The S.1. Party: A Proposal to All 51 Comrades in the Indies ), ParH; 5.1., Jan. ll, 192.3, pp. 7-10. 90. For the arguments on party discipline presented by both sides in this period, see Sinar Hindia, Sept. 1, 1922, in lP~, no. 39, 1922, p. 491; Oetnewn mmiia, Oct. 20, 19"-2, in lPO, no. 43, 19-22, pp. 173-174; Neratia, Od. 3O-Nov. 2, 1922, in lPO, no. 45, 1922, p. 240; SinaI' H/rniia, Nov. 0, 1922, in lPO, no. 46, 1922, p. 299; Sina l' Hindin, Nov. 21, 1922, in lPO, no. 48, 1922, pp. 398399; Octoe.ron Hindta, Nov. 16, 1922, In lPO, no. 47, 1922, p. 347; Sneara Ra';m, Nov. 1, 1922, in EPO, no. 48, 1922, pp. 420--421, OetOC8OJl Himikl, Dec. 5, 1922, in lPO, no. SO, 1922, pp. 400-491, Sino r Hindia, Dec. 13, 1922, in lPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 544; Sinal' H/ndia, Dec. 14, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 545;

410

Notes, pp. 142- 144 Sinor II1ndiQ, Dec. 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, pp. 545-546; Oetoesan Hindla, Jan. 23, 1923, in lPO, no. 5, 1923, p. 191; Sinor Hlndill. Feb. 7, 1923, in lPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 349.

• 91. Semaoen, "Brieven over den 5trijd in het Oosten," June 6, 1925, referring to the Radical Concentration. 92. For IndoIJe5:ian conunent on these efforts and on the All-India Congress, see Panggocgah, Apr. 1, 19'22, in [PO, no. 19, 1922, pp. 230-231; Neralja, May 30, 1922, in lPG, no. 23, 1922, pp. 371--372; Neratfa, June 6, 1922, in lPO, no. 24, 1922, pp. 417--418; Darmo Kondo, June 24, 1922, in IPO, no. 28, 1922, p. 60; Isfom Bergerak, July 1 and 10, 1922, in lPO, no. 33, 1922, pp. 244-246; Motallari, Aug. 3, 1922, in lPO, DO. 33, 1922, p . 240. The last is an article by the PKl leader Mohammad Sanun, iII which he ~lIpported the All·Indies Congress and the attempts to unite the Indonesian movements and at the same time wamed that these clTom should not be based on race or religion, since in the Indies these were divisi ... e elements. 93. The Radical Concentration was founded on the initiative of the ISDP at a IJ'Ieeting of IndieJi opposition parties held in Batavia in NO\'elllber 1922. See Sinor Rindla, Dec. 18, 1922, in 'PO, no. 52, 1922, p. 589; J. Stokvis, "VolwaardJg parlement voor Indonesle?" (A Real Parliament for the IndJeJi?), Het Volk, No .... 17, 1939; Blumberger, NatioTwlf.st, p. 31. Ib headquarten were also establUhed in the capital city, under a permanent interparty conunithle; Boedi Oefome, Apr. 11, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, p . 103. 94. Budi Utomo had broken with the Concentration of People's Liberation Movements after a short flirtation wi th the argument that the coalition was too rndJcaJ. Now, however, growing disillusionment plus a rising young progressive elemeot in the Javanese party caused it to declare adherence to the new alliance on the grounds that the reactionary forces had become so powerful th at a united front against them wrus necessary; Boedi Odomo, Apr. 11, 19'23, in IPO, 00. 16, 1923, p . 103; Blumberger, Natwnalist, p . 31. 95. A list of major participating organizations and a summary of its manifesto is given in Sinor llindla, Jan. 9, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, p. 75. 96. Semaoen, Sikapnfo Parti; Kommunist India (P.K.I.) terhadap pada RadicaleConcent ratl6 (Viewpoi nt of the Indies Communist Party toward the Radical Concentration) (Semarang, 1923), pp. 14--15, emphasis in the text. See also Semaun, in Soeara Ro'/at, Jan. 1923, in lPO, no. 5, 1923, pp. 212-213. 97. See the resume of Semaun's speech to the congress in Sinor llindUl, Dec. ZT/29, 1922, in lPO, no. I , 1923, p. 22. 98. This program consisted of five basic ~k'ffillIlds on the government: 1. Freedom of political action, assembly , speech, etc.; an end to banishment, t'xile, and political arrest. 2. Increased government aid lor the unemployed; lin increase in public worn; equal pay for all races. 3. Adequate government support for health and education. 4. Government encouragement of new industries; reduced military expenditures; increased taxation of large industries and decreased taxation of the common people. 5. Fulfillment of the promises for increased independence for the Indies made by the government in November 19 18.

" 1923-lndoocsia-Im," Indonesia Mertklw, Apr. 1m, p . 29; Semaoen, SilwPfl;a, pp. 11-14. 99. It is interesting to DOte in this connection that, as far as we can see from

411

Notes, pp. 144-146 the prw; di gest accoWlts, the Conununists did not attack Tfolcroaminoto directJy in the month~ just before the congress. The one heated deb:lle in which Semarang

engaged was with Salim's NcratitJ, not v.i th T;okroaminoto's Oetoesan Ilioo/a. The only article at all directly critical of Tfokroomfnoto hJmself was one that declared his inconsistencies a hindrance to the orderly development of the Imloncsian movement but also described the 51 leader as a Communist and an internationalist at heart. Sinar Hlndia. Feb. 7, 1923, in lPO, no. 8, 1923. p. 349. 100. The date of the meeting was also :tIl issue: Scmarang wanted it held as SOOJl as possible, and Tjokroaminoto wanted it delayed until he had completed his campaign. Semarang offered to pay the costs of the congress if it were held in that city. For the arguments, see Oe/oeMn Hlndhl, Oct. 28, 1922, Soeara Ra';at. Nov. 1, 1922, and Sinar Ilindia, Nov. 9 and 21, Dec. 12, 14, and 20, 1922, in lPO, nos. 44, 46, 48, SO, 51, 1922, pp. 218, 299, 399, 420--421, 503, 545-546 , Nero/fa, Dec. 30, 1922, and Jan. 6, 12. and 13, 1923, and Sinor Ilindla, Jan. 3, 6, and 10, 1923, in fPO, nos. 1-3, 1923, pp. 2.2-24, 65, 107-110. 101. Sutopo, article in 80edi Odorno, Feb. 24 and 26, 1923, in lPO, DO. 9, 1923, p. 418. The following aClCOl.lnt of the congress is drawn chieBy from E. Cohee, Kort verswg von hct verhandelde op Ilet congru der "Centraal 5arikat-I.swm" Ie Madioen oon 16-20 Februari 1923 (Short Report on the Transactions of the Congress of the "Centrnl 5arekat Islam" at Madiun on Feb. 16-20, 1923) ( typescript. by the Acting Adviser for Native Affairs). See further De lndische Gid.r, XLV (l923). 529-533; 51 V, pp. 380, cok a-b; Ovemcht 1923, pp. 4-5; Mededee/lngen 1924, pp. 4-5; A. A. Guber, "Natsional'no-;elves could not be reckoned to the advan taged groups

or

429

Notes, pp. 184-186 ei ther by standard of living or rank of employment, however; Mansvelt therefore rejects the thesis that the revolutionary movement was Jed by an emergcot midd1e class and argues that it appeared to have been headed by people ~ri. eneing proletarianization (pp. 218-220). 89. An example of PKI support from local traditional elites was adherence of the noble association Rukun Asli to the party when it penetrated Bantam in 1925. The PKI did not usually addres:s specific appeals to the prifafl at a higher level, although occasionally this was done-for example, Semaun's pamphlet KellGriWn Indonesia jong Dfangkat &tonal! Bekmda Tiop2 Tahoen (aUae 500.000.000 (f5OO,000,000 in Indonesia ProSts Are Taken to Holland Each Year) ( Europe. January 1925), which urged the prl/ali and the Indonesian soldiery (appealed to as Latriia. warriors) to join in the struggle against the Dutch because colonialism injured all Indonesian classes. 90. ThU.'l Musso offered himself as leader of the Sarekat Postel, saying that although he knew nothing of p>stal affairs, he would throw himself energetically into the workers' cause; Sooa ra Ponel, May 1920, in lPO, DO. 22, 1920, p. 3, article by Musso. Tjoboaminoto and Salin}. who then led the CSI-sponsored union, gave him a position in it. n e SI leaders lost interest in the Sarekat Postel after the pawnshop strike; for a while it languished, but in 1924 Musso again took it in hand; Sooara Ponel, May 3 1, 1925, in IPO, 00. 27, 1925, pp. 4546. In a similar vein Prawirosardjono, leader of the Surabaja Red SIISR, explained to the August 1924 CSI congress why he had chosen to eltchange his allegiance to the Sarekat Islam for loyalty to the PICI : he was in need of financial support after imprisonment for It political offense: none had been forthcoming from the SI, and so he had switched to the Communists; VBT.lag (l(Jn hd H e Kongre. fU r Centrale Sarikat hlam, p. 12. The importance of the movement as a source of employment is stressed in Man.welt's study of Communist internees. Noting that they lost jobs frequently for political and other rea50nS and often were unemployed for considerable periods. Mansvelt found it small wonder that they took positions, even at very low remuneration, as 5R school teachers, propagandists, and as party, union, and SR officiak "Since it appears that these functionaries often had to support themselves from the dues they received, they had an interest in eltpandlng the number of memben [of the organizations they headed]," he added; Mansvelt, "OndelWijs en Communisme," p, 220. 91. An instance of this tolerance was the PKI attitude toward Mas Marco, the journalist the ISDV had defended In 1916. Marco had become a party member and had a popular following In the Suralarta area. In late 1920 he was wooed away from the PKi by a CSI offer of its .o;ecretarysbip. He promptly appeared as a major anti-Communist agitator, attacking the party on the sensitive subject of the Lenin theses and religion. Soon, however, he had a spat \l.ith the CSI and announced his retirement from politiCS: the PKI expressed sympathy and was rewarded by his return to its camp. 92. Typical of the ambivalent PKl attitude toward religious Communists, the party newspaper did not mention the Dutch Communist nomination of Hadji Misbach for parUament ( a1though .the CPU had obviously intended it to be accorded wide publicity in Indonesia) eltccpt to announce, on inside pages, his nomination and rejection; Api, May 22 and 26, 1925. At other times, however, Api c:.:pressed strong concern for religion, usually to defend "true Islam" against the "perverted doctrine" of the Muhammadijah. 93. Vemag De, p. 24. For other oomments on the varied Dature of the discontent mobilized by the Communists, see Schrieke, "Political Section," pp. 101-

430

Notes, pp. 186-188 103, 108-112; Mededeel/ngen 1924, pp. 6, 10, 12-13; Blumbergcr, Nat/onali.rt, pp. 115-116; "Communisme," p. 553, col. h. 94. Sfnar Hfndla, Jan. 22. 1924, in lPO, no. 5, 1924, p. 194; from an editorial expressing admiration for the program of Auguste Blanqul. 95. SQeaTa & 'fat. May 26, 1920, in lPO, no. 23, 1920, p. 2; Sinar Himlla, Apr. IS. 1921, in lPO, no. 17, 1921, p. 176. The latter article offers a week-long "Communist course," open to all at a ten-cent entrance fee ; it was to deal with Communist theory, history, and organization and also with oratory. journalism, and

how to lead the people. 96. Mededeelingen 1924, p. 11 ; Overzicht 1924, p. 11; "Verslag SJ. Merah dan S.R. Semarnng Tahoen 1924," May 26, 1925; Api, Jan. 5 and 20, 1925. Among those arre..1cd, on Oct. 23, 1923, were Aliareham, Partondo, Budisutjitro, Suradi, Rabijan. Ambijah, Misbach, and Suwamo. All were released for lack -of evidence on Feb. 24, 1924, except Suwamo and Misbach. who were banished. 97. Sinor H iooia, Oct. 30 and Nov. 1, 1923, in IPO, n05. 45 and 46, 1923, pp. 264-267, 302-304. 98. K. Radek, "Lenin's Life and Work," Itlpr6corr, Mar. 6, 1924, p. 147. Radek was then chief of the Eastern SectjOD of the Comintern. 99. When il annoWlced plans to convene after the February 1923 51 congress, the PKI had indicated its intention to discuss a new program and declaration of principles; this was done in a closed. session at the March 1923 meetiDg. Sloor H/ooia Feb. 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, p. 298; Apl, Feb. 28, 1925. 100. The draft version was published as Patioman Persarekatatl Kommunirl Iooia (Guideline for the Communist Party of the Indies) (Semarang, November 1923) , together with the Indies Communist Manifesto of 1920 (which explained in terms of the European Socialirt-Communist schism why the ISDV changed it. name 10 PKI) and the 1918 ISDV program for its lown oouncil election campaigns. A second preliminary version of the action program was published in Soeara Ra'iat, Feb. I, 1924; the final version of the program, statement. and statutes was published as Parlai-Reglement dan P.K.l. (Corutitution of the PKI ) (WeitevrOOen, 1924). 101. 'I11e items of the 1924 action program arc summed up as follows:

a. Establishment of representative bodies in the ' fonn of soviets (village, factory, district, province, island, and central soviets). (The reader who was not acquainted with the soviet system was referred in a footnote 10 Tan Malab's Parlemen alau Sovfct?) b. Freedom of political action, speech, pres.'l, assembly, and strike. c. Labor legislation, an eight_hour day, no night worlc. where possible, DO labor for c:hlldren under seventeen, protection of working women, extensive sodal insurance for worlcers, improvement of worlcing oonditions, labor inspection, abolition of the contract coolie system, aid to orphans and abandoned children, abolition of Wlpaid labor for village and state authorities (heereoolensten and desadiemten). d. Abolition of proprietary lands; fannin g to be carried on under the direction of village councils; government aid and interest-free credit to Indonesian agricu1tum; DO government aid to the big plantations; prohibition of land-leasing. e. Nationalization of monopolies, banks, and all essential industries. £. Steps to remove aU encouragement of the desire for se16sh gain and undesirable rivalry among the various groups of the working people. g. Prohibition of reoeiving interest.

431

Notes, pp. 188-190 h. Universru taxation based 00 a steeply graded income tax, with the only direct tax a lu:rury tax. i. Universal free education until the age of seventeen, In the local language, with Malay as a possible second tongue. Education compatible with local em. tOffill and needs; more technical, agricultural, and un.ivcl'Sity education. j. Equality before the Jaw; free !ega] aid; no imprisonment without charge. k. Improvement of prison conditions. . I. Separntion of church and state, DO government aid to religion. m. Replacement of the anncd forces by a people's militia. n. Law enforcement by people's councils. o. Improved public health and hygiene; food distribution 10 be directed by public bodies. p. Improvement of housing conditions. q. Strict prohibition of nonmedfcinal a1cohol and drugs.

r. Open diplomacy. s, Avoidance of aU policies that cou1d worsen Indonesia's relations with other countries or Involve it in war.

Parlol-Reglement darl P.K.l., pp. 13-20. 102. It might be noted that the draft of the new action program publ.ished in November 1923 was almost identical with the 1918 version. The February draft did not contain the June 1924 dem.1nd for SO"iets but kept the passage on free and secret elections from the 1918 program (but left out In the .Gnal 1924 versions). It called lor Malay (Indonesian) as the .Gm language of Instruction, althou gh the June 1924 program reverted baclc to the 1918 demand that the regional language he given fim place with Malay as a possible second language. The February draft did contain the final version's new provisions against the acquisitive ~plrit (no. 6), against receiving interest (no. 7) . for open diplomacy (no. 18 ) , and against involvement In foreign conl1icb ( no. 19) . This last provision probably originated in the current Cor¢ntem campaign against a presumed imperialist plot to attack Soviet Russia. The February version also contained a provision that Indonesia should recognize Soviet Russia and establish trade relations with It in order to overcome tbe depression In the Indies; this was omitted from the final version. This may have been a concession to nationalist sentiment, or it may rel1eet the objections to Soviet engagement in international trade that v.'e noted earlier. 103. The November 1923 draft sfatement of principle!! is contained In Padoman Per.wrekaten Kommunm Indio, pp. 1-4: the June 1924 version was published first in Soeara Ba'jat, June 20, 1924 (lPO, no. 28. 1924, p. 91), and then in Parlai-RegiemCTl t dati P.K.I., pp. 3-11. The declaration described how capitaJism, the embodiment of greed, had risen in Europe and spread to America and Japan and how in Indonesia it had separated the people, who had once lived freely, from thcir means of existcnce and made them slaves of the factories and planta. tions. Workers, pe.'\sants, and intellectuals all suffer under thb S)'!item, the declaration stated, and they must all unite against it; their struggle mU!t he class-based and intemationaJ and must not be affected by nationality or reUgion. 104. Partaj.Reglerrnmt dati P.Kl., pp. 7, 9. Emphasis in the text. lOS. Article 4, "Statuten dari Partai Kommunisf Indonesia" (Statutes of the Communist Party of Indonesia ) , Parlal-Reglemcnt dati P.K.I., pp. 23-24. 106. Dingley, TIle Pea$!lnts' Movement, p. 39. This system of SR organimtion bad already bet-n put into prnctil.'e by the latter part of 1923; Kern, Qverz{cht

432

Notes, 1'P, 190-191 R&idelllencfJflfef'fmtie, pp. 7-8. Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 122, gives a somewhat dilferent version of the limit on SR voting strength at PKI congresses: he states the maximum was one-fourth the number of votes possessed by the party, PKI b.ranehes could send up to ten delegates to a congress, but SR branches could send only three. See further Semaoen, "Srieven." June 10, 1925; Cuber, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v lndonezli," 1933, p. 191; Meded£eZingen 1924, p. 10; Bergmeijer, Ret Commllni.nnc in Indlii, p. 3. "DingIey" estimates that about half the Sarekat Hakjat membership was poor and middle peasants, and another quarter small shop owners, traders, artisans, and so on ( p.40) . 107. Semaocn, "Brieven," June 10, 1925; and see DingIey, The Peasants' Movemelll, p. 39; Cuber, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Indonezii," 1933, p. 191 ; S. Rutgers, "De Indonesische nationale beweging tOl 1927," p. 48. 108. Police report on the Semarang SI meeting of Apr. IS, 1923 (typescript, D.p., n.d.), at which Aliarcham. its chairmnn, reported on the recent SI and PKI congresses. 109. Some Sareknt Rakjat units were established in that year, but these seem to have been new groups introduced to combat the local White SI in accord with the decision of the 19"...3 PKI congress; there were not many of them. See Kemadioean Ilindia, Oct. 10, 1923, in [pO, no. 42, 1923, p. 89. Other new leftist mass Wlits were established not as SRs but as Red SI branches; see SinaI' H/ndla , Jan. 9, 1924, in IPO, no. 3, 1924, pp. 110-113. 110. Quoted in Vergadering IJGn de Sarikat Raiat te Bandoeng (Meeting of the Sarekat Rakjat at BandWlg) (unsigned typescript, dated 1924, Stokvis Collection, Intemationaal instituut voor sociaal geschicdenis, Amsterdam), p. 5. For description of the congress, see pp. 4-17. See also Algcmeen Indisch Dagblad, Apr. 22, 1924; De Locomolief, Apr. 26, 1924; Soerapati, Apr. 20, 1924, and Ma/ahari, Apr. 25, 1924, in IPO, no. 19, 1924, pp. 240-241, 246. The meeting took place in Bandung on Apr. 20-21; its fi rst public session was attended by a claimed 1,200 people. The !}Ilhering was led by Alimin and Musso (Batavia), Sardjono (Sukabum[) , Kartawirja, Winanta, Mohammad SanU'li, Cunawan, and Bassach (BandWlg), Djunaedi ( Tjiamis ), Muchlar (Bogor), and Sastrosuwirjo ( Tjlrebon) . Aliareham, c1",;rrnan of the St:marang SI, represen ted that unit and PKI headquarters. 111. This was decided a t a congress held in Semarnng on Apr. 22-24 by the FOISO (General Fund for SI Education), a supervising body for the school system establi~hed at the March 1923 congress. At the same meeting the FOISO changed ils nnme to Fund for the Peoplc"s Education (Fonds Onderwijs Rakjat; FOR). Since Ihe SR schools were fad of Communist influence, note the places where they then existed: Semlmmg, Surabnja. Bandung, Kertosono, Pate, Sumedang, Tjimahi, Purwokerto. Tjirebon. Ngandjuk, Salatiga, Ungaran, Ambarawa, Madiun, Sukabumi, Tjiwidej. Tjiljalenka, Tjiamis, IGntelan, Ngoro, and Ngrambe. The FOR congress discussed whether political education should continue to be given in the schools, apparently beeause the penalties for it were so great; it was decided that it was important to educate the chUdren in the proper political spirit. Plans were also made to establish trade schools, publish school books and periodicals for young people, and to spread the school system outside Java. SifUJr Hindia, Apr. 25, 1924, in IPO, no. 18, 1924, pp. 198-199. 112. Soeara Ra'fat, Jan. 16, 1924, in IPO, no. 7, 1924, p. 299. The Manifest Kommunist oleh Kilrl Man: dan Friedrich Engels (Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) (Scmamng. 1923) was translated by PartoDdo,

433

Notes, pp. 191-195 who provided all explanatory introduction in which he apologized ror the awk_

wardness that resulted because the document, which Wa5 about European conditions, could not be rendered easily into Indonesian (p. 1 ). It was published serially in Soeara Ra'lat, beginning on Apr. 12, 1923, and subsequently issuocl as a pamphlet. The 2,000 copies of this edition, printed on the VSTP press in Semarang, were sold out within a year. A second edition was put out in 1925, this time with an introduction by Alr:an Zain (Subakat ); Manlfen Kommunilt oleh Karl Man: dan Friedrich Engel! (Semarang, 1925) p. 1. 113. Indb cm Courant, Sept. 18, 1924. 114. Hobromarkoto, Nov. 9, 1924, in IPO, no. 50, 1924, p. 498. 115. De Loromotlef, Sept. 30, 1924. 116. Over:Jcht von het resultant oon het gehouden ontkrwek der rommunl.sCbcm beweglng In de aldeeling Pali (Survey of the R~ult of the Investigation of the Communist Movement in the Pati Dimict ) (typescript copy of a Netherlands Indies government report, Stokvis collection), hereafter Ooer.:icht Patio 117. "Ons congres" ( Our Congress) , translation into Dutch of an article i.o Soe/lTa Ra';at, May 30, 1924, pp. 2, 5; emphasis in the text. See also the $UIDDW}' of this article In IPO, no. 25, 1924, pp. 588-569. 118. Other members of the cxecutive were Budisutjitro (secretary-treasurer) and Marsum (commissioner); members-at-large were to be appointed from Semnrang, Sumbaja, Padang, and Temnte. This made a total of seven executive members, although rune were required by the p.:uty statutes; this was pointcd out by Sinor Hindia, June 26, 1924, in IPO, no. 27, 1924, pp. 19-20. Possibly the party was reluctant to put more leaders than absolutely necessary in prominent positions because of the danger of arrest. The newly elected leaden were by no means straw men, however, in spite of the fact that several of them were relative newcomers to the organization. Djamaluddin Tamin, written statement, dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.1.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, pp. 18-19, jurtiGably describes the d ectlOlJ of the June 1924 executive as marking a major shift in party power. The account of the congress presented here is drawn from Verslag 9dc ( the report of its proceedings by the Aeting Adviser for Native AlTairs ) and from Overzlcht 1924, pp. 3-7. The congress agenda W8!i published in Sinror mndla, May 19, 192-1, and in Soeara Ra'jat, May 10, 1924 (lPO, no. .21, 1924, pp. 329, 44111 9. The branches represented at the ninth party congress were primari1y from West Java: Batavia, Bogor, Su1cabumi, Tjiandjur, Bandung, Tjimahi. Garut, Tjibatu, Tasikm.1laja, Uadjapclah, Tjiamis, Bandjar, and Tjirebon. Other Javanese branches attending were Semarang. Salatiga, Ambarawa, Djepara, Wirosarl, Tjcpu, Randublatang, Sunthaja, Purworedjo, Kebumen, Jogjalcarta, Kiaten, Madiun, Blitar, and Kertosono; from the Outer Islanm Padang, Langsa, Makassar, and Temate sent delega tes. 120. Ver.l"lag 9de, p. 4. 121. Verslag gde, p. 9; emphasis as in the text of this account of the highlights of Darsono's speech. 122. Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959. According to Djam~uddin Tamin, one of Tan Malab's most prominent d isciples, the theses were given to AJimin when he visited Singapore in February 1924 ; we do mow that AlImin made a trip to Singapore at that time. Nerat/a. Apr. 26, 1924, in IPO, no. 18, 1924, p. 196, and see SiMI lIindia, Mar. 8, 1924, in IPO, no. 11, 1924, p. 47. Later publication of these theses as a PKI pamphlet indicates that they were considered very important; Sukindar, These bagi Kcada'an Socltil dan Ekonom/# I"Crta TIara bagi

434

Notes, pp. 195-199 Mengadokan Organisatle don Taktfek dl Indorwria (Theses on the Social and

EconorrUc Situation and on the Formulation of Organization and Tactics in Indonesia) (Weltevreden, 1924) . If Malaka was indeed the author of the theses. . it Is interesting to note his endorsement of the relationship between the Sarekat Ra1clat and the PKI. 123. Suldndar, These. p. 22; see also the summary of Sukendar's report in VeT,lag 9de, pp. 19-20. 124. Suldndar, Thew. pp. 25-26. 125. Sukindar, These, pp. 33-34. 126. Suldndar. These, p. 34. 127. The PKI reported on the Sekolah Rakjat school system that although the authorities removed many teachers (in some cases forcing the schools to close), the schools were generally able to take advantage of the many unemployed teachers after the governmen t curtailed its education budget. Similarly, although parents in public and private European employ withdrew their chilmen from the schools for fear of dismissal, new pupils were easily gotten because the demand for education was far greater than the supply of schools. S. W. Pannono, "Sekolah Ra'jat Akan DibocnoehP" (WiU the People's Schools Be Stopped?) Api, Jan. 2. 1925. A Comintern report on youth activity in Indonesia claimed that by 1926 there were some fifty schools, with 4,500 students, and it gave the Barisan Muda membership as over 1,000; " YCI," InPTeeorr VII (1927), no. 47. 1060. The FOR sponsored a monthly publication, Barl.wn Mocda, for the youth 'group and pupUs in the SR schools. 128. For financial complainl5, see Soeara Ra'jat, June 10, 1924, in IPO, no. 26, 1924, pp. 62S--629, and June 30, 1924, in IPO, no. 29, 1924, pp. 144-145. The membership was given by Darsono at the June 1924 congress; Versing 9de, p. 5. 129. See Soeara Ra';at, Apr. 30, 19-2-:1, in lPO, no. 23, 1924, p. 440, and May 20, 1924, in IPO, no. 25, 1924, p. 5fJ7; De Laeorrwtief, Sept. 30, 1924; MedcdeelingeR 1924, p. 13; "Communisme," pp. 534, col. b, 535, 001. a.

CHAPTER IX 1. Begrootlng 1927, pp. 209, 229 (parliamentary query and government reply on the refusal of entry to the CentrosoillZ agent Kcmalopov) . 2. Ret V,;;e Woord (Mar. 18, 1921, p. 8) responded to an article in De Lveomotief, which said that Baars was trying to arrange for Communist propagandists to be brought from the Netherlands to the Indies, that they were to come oot from Holland but Soviet Russia. Very likely thu was sarcasm; in any event, there was no sign that such efforts bore fmit. 3. Pavlovich, "Zadachi Vserossiiskoi oauchnoi assotsiatsli vostokovedeniia," p. 9; and M. Pavlovich, ''Zadachl sovetskogo vostokovedenila" (The Tusks of Soviet Orientology), NOfJy/ Vostok, no. 16/17, 1927, pp. iv-v. Nooyi Vostok (Tho New East) was the journal of tho association. 4. A. A. Guber, '1zucheniia istom strnn VO-I'tOKa v SSSR 1.a 25 let" (Twenty. Rve Years of Historical Research on the Countries of the East in the USSR), in Varga, Volgin, and Pankratov, eds., Dvadtsat' pkIt' let fstoricheskol naukf tI SSSR (Moscow/Leningrad, 1942 ), pp. 274-275. Gubcr was one of the few Soviet Southeast Asia $Cholars of stature in this early period; he began publishing on indonesian political and economic history in the mid·I920s. According to his essay, the Rrst Communut Asia experts were greatly hand ica pped by lack of contact wi th the countries of interest and by L1nguage barriel"5. Their .first producl5

435

Notes, pp. 199-202 tended to be political trncts noto'tble more for revolutionary fervor than for of the area _reoeemed. After a time there was a reaction against this, resulting in concentmtion on Adan social and eronomic conditions. particularly the agrnrian problem; but these efforts were also frequently or limited value. S. For a discussion of these irutilutions, see I. Bomzdin. "Izuchenie Vostoka sovremennol Rossii" (Research on the East in Con temporary Russia), in Sultanlade, 00., KoToniafnyl VO$fok ( Moscow, 1924 ), PI? 345-353; Rapport. ttl, fa preparation par Ie gouoomemem rovUtfque da reoolta colonWlu (Report on the Preparation of Colonial Revolts by the Soviet Government) (TIle Hague, D.d.), pp. 16-25; Eudin and North, Soviet Ruu/a, p. 81; Gw;tave Cautherot, Le Bolcheoisme aux colonlu et fimperialiMrle rouge ( Bolshevism in the Colonies and knowled~e

Red Im perialism) (Pari~. 1930), pp. 33--40. 6. II Kongre&~. pp. 195- 196. 7. The Brst director of the university was Broido. then Deputy Conunissar of Nationalities. It is not apparent which government body controlled the Wliversity after the dissolution of the Commissariat of NationaJities io 1924, but in 1936 it was directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Eudin and North, Soofet Ru.rriD, p. 85. See further pp. 85-89 and Carr, &l.throfk Reoolut/on, III, 268-269; Prauda, July 25, 1922; Neutmliseering, p. 9, note 3. 8. Eudin and North, Soviet Ruuia, pp. 86-87. According to this source, the school was restricted to Chinese nationals. Karl Radek, its rector, so stated in a press interview, at which he also dedared that it would be strictly scienti6 e and not involve itseH in propaganda or any sort (wOe Chlneesche Wlivettiteit te Mookou" (The Chinese University at Moscow), De Indl8che CKh, XLVII, 19"'-5, 1105. Presumably thb claim wa~ to mollify European opinion concerning Soviet encouragement of colonial revolution; Indonesians were in fact asked to attend the university, and a Netherlands Indies government report, based on British intelligence sources, claimed that there were i1so Japanese, Koreans, and Indochine$C attending. Politick pol/tloneel ooomc1!t ot:!eT de maand Nooomber 1927. Ertrem/stuehe beweglng ( Political Police Survey for the Month of November 1927. Extremist Movement ) mbneo. (n.d., clusi6ed), no. II, p. 43. 9. Dtehet l$polkoma Kominlema (Ap1'er 1 925~.-lantlO r' 19!!6g.) ( Report of the Executive Committee of the Comlntern [April 1925-January 1926]) ( Moscow/Leningrad. 1926), pp . .50-.51. 10. Dlehet l$pollroma Komlntema, pp. 50-5 1. II. The March 1925 ECCI plenum sent directives to aU its $Cctfoos announcing the plan to establish courses and asking (or students; Otchet lspolkoma Komintema, pp. 50-5 1. 12. PolUleke nota PKI, p. 9. The Comlnlem letter said that row students who had already arrived were progreSSing weU but does not indicate whether these ...:ere Indonesian students. It was added that the candidates sbou1d be in good health and have had adequate preparation fOf their study; a knowledge of French, English, or German was recommended. 13. PoUtleke nota PKI, p. 9. 14. Semaun, interview, 1959. 15. Blumber2;cr. NatioooJue, p. 358; "Communisme." p. 955, col. b. 16. See IIVW, May 25, 1917, p. 160; HVW, Fcb. 20, 1918, p. 124. 17. Nleuwe Rotterdamsehe Courant, Mar. 18, Apr. 14, and Aug. 6, 1929. 18. I np1'ecorr, Sept. 4, 1928, pp. 1042, 1186, 1206; Oct. 4, 1928, pp. 12291231, 1250, 1254. n.e dele~te, who used the name "n. Alphonso," Is usually assumed. to have been Tan Malaka: but according to Danono and Semaun (ID-

436

Notes, pp. 202-203 terviews, 1959) , Malab was not at the meeting. Malaka does not claim to have attended It in any of his later writings, and his orthodox Communist opp::ments.

although anxious to pin the Trotskyite label on him, have not made a point of this incident. According to Darsooo, "AlphODSO,» whose real name seems to have been Mohammad Tohir, went to Moscow about 1925 CIT 1926 after attending a youth ronference in China. This may be the 1926 Communist Youth Congress heM in Canton, to which the PKI had indicated its intention of sending a delegate; see Politiek verslag 1926, p. 16. He remained in the Soviet Union W1ti1 about 1933, bot his career as It Comintem agent ended when he refused to foUow the party line. 19. Alimin, interview, 1959; and Alimin, Riwoiat Hidup, pp. 24-28. Alimin stated that he began his studies afte r the sixth Comintem congress and mm.-lined at the school for three years. 20. Nwwc RottcrdiJmsclle Courant, Sept. 8, 1930. Th.il; story is very interesting if true, since Subalmt, Djamaluddin Tamin, and the other members of this faction had set out in an independent direction under the leadenhip of Tan Malab; although they did not openly rejcd the Comintem nor WCl'e they rejected by it, they did not feel themselvcs bound by the International's decisions. 21. This docs not, however, exclude the possibility that Indonesians other than revolutionary trainees and established party leaders may have visited Soviet Ru~ia during the early period. In 1923, for example, a Sumatran new5paper published a letter purportedly written by "Mohammad Thahir" from Vladivostok, expressing enthusiasm over the conditiom he had observed theI-e; Pantjaran Beri/a, May 9-13, 1923, in lPO, no. 24, 1923, pp. 484-485. Thahir's identity is unclear; possibly he was an ordinary seaman, but he may have been the "Alphonso" of the sixth Comintern congress (see footnote 18 above ), or perhaps even Mohammad Taber gcla r Mara Sutan, who was active in modernist Wamic education in West Sumatra, had once helped Tjipto Mangunkusumo and AJimin edit the Batavia lnsulinde journal Modjopall lt, and was involved with the Communist movement in its ISDV days. 22. Darsono and Semaun, interviews, 1959. Tan Malab, who describes his stay in Russia in some detail in his autobiogI1lphy, does not mention having attended any school there. Baars, wri ting after his break with Communism, claimed that he had met Semaun and Darsono a number of times during their sojourns in Moscow; according to him, they worked for the Comintern and ProBntem tlJere and spent their time reading newspapers and letters for news from Indonesia, from which they could· then write reporU. They lived in a hotel with other foreigneT"S, he claimed, and led very iwlated lives; Baars, Sowjet Rtlof8/afl(1 in de proct.i;k, p. 9. 23. See Euclin and North, Soviet Russia, pp. 84-85. 24 . .Soeara Ra'jat, Sept. · 16, 1921 , in IPO, no. 39, 1921, p. 34; ]alXUche Courant, Aug. 16, 19-23; De Locomotief, Feb. 21, 1922; Tamar Djaja, Trio, p. 22: Malab, " Mijn verbanning," May 10, 1922; Malaka, TCJeJKWek, pp. 18, 25-27, 32. SneevJiet himself reported having conferred with Subakat on PKI affairs whUe in Canlon, De Baanbreker, Feb. 15, 1930. Malaka also related that not long before his banishment in 1922 Najoan "vanished" from Indonesia and was reported Variously in Shanghai and Bombay; it was rumored that his trip was somehow connected with his activity as leader of the dockworkers' union; Malah, Toendoek, p. 87. 25. Snoovliefs dbillusionment with the Comintem began, according 10 some of his fonner associates, while he was in China; VVS, p. 62. His unhappiness with certain aspects of Communist policy came oul strongly in an article written

437

Notes,

pp. 203-205

on the ill·fated Canton strike of February 1923; Maring, " Krovavyi epizod v istorii Kitaiskogo rabochego dvizheniia" (A Bloody Episode in the History of the Chinese Labor Movement), Kommun/st/sche,kll Internattional. (no. 26/27). 1923. As Whiting remarla, Soulet Policies, p. 101, the article displayed marked evidence of un·Communist "bourgeois sentimentality" in its condemnation of the violent and futile affair. Oddly enough, the Comintem jouma! pubUshed the report. a1though its edilol'li noted they did not completely agree with it. 26. VV5, p. 82. 27. This is the report cited as Maring, Oekooom/sche. 28. Sinar Wildie, May 29-June 3, 1922, in lPO, no. 23, 1922, pp. 377-378; Soeara &'jot, May 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 192.2, p. 144. 29. Sinar Hindia, Nov. 11, 1922, and Hoedi Detamo, Nov. 2-16, 1922, in IPO, nos. 46 and 47, 1922, pp. 300, 331; SinaT Hint&, July 4, 1923, and Soearo Ra';.at. July 16, 1923, in lPO, nos. 28 and 32, 19"....3. pp. 72, 369; De IntilscM Gid.r. XLV, 1923, 831-833; Mededeellngen 1924, pp. 8-9; BegrooUng 1925, pp. 198, 218. 30. Samin, "The Situation in Indonesia," l"precotT, Oct. 4, 1928, p. 1245 (coreport on the colonial revolutionary movement at the sixth Comintem congress). For oomIDCnt of SO€ara Ra'fat on Aug. I , 1923, see lPO, no. 35, 1923, pp. 419420. 31. FrOfn the Fourth to the Fiftll World Congreu (London, 1924 ), p. 103. At the third Prolintem congress, which ran concurrently with the 1924 Comintem meeting. it was announced th at the ProBntem had succeeded in the "establishment of regular connections wi th Dutch and British India"; MrJrdunarodrwe

profdoi:henle 1923-I924gg., p. 6. 32. De Tribune, June 26 and 21, 1922. The foreign leaders prc5ellt were listed as Cachin from France, MacManus from England, Pied: from Germany, IlfId Tilfl Malaka from Indonesia. 33. Malah, DP I, p. 10"2. The work, Tan Malalca, lndone:iia I eli menD rnJ probu:hdaemsia Vostoka (Indonesia and Its Place in the Awakening East), was published by the Krasnaia Nov' (Red News) publbhing house in 1924, and then, apparently considered worthy of wider distribution, was reissued by the government publisher (Gosizdat) in 1925. It received very favorable reviews; see B. Puretskin, review in Pechof f Reooliulsila, no. I, 1926, p. 214; and Kim, review in Novyi Vostok, no. lOl lI , 1925, pp. 325-328. In another account of his Soviet stay, Mala!.:::! remarked that he did not have much time for reading but was absorbed in studying Communism in action and in writing on Indonesian affairs for the Comintem; }'falaica, Madilog: Materfali.mw, Di4lektika, Logikil ( Mad.i1og: Materialism, Dialectics, Logic) (Djakarta, 1951 ), p. 14. 34. Bergsma in Franekcr, the Netherlands, to Semaun in Sematang, Feb. 20, 1923. This is the omitted portion of the letter quoted on p. 240. 35. In a letter to "B6" (Baars' wife?) dated Feb. 2, 1923, Bergsma wrote: "At the end of December I returned from Moscow. Was there about a month. . . . Jep is staying in Moscow for the time being. He's studying." Bergsma further remarked that he had neither money nor II job: '"The party in Holland does nothing for me," he complained, not even helping him pay for material sent to Jep in Moscow or to the party in Indonesia. The PKI, hOW6vcr, had sent some money to help him out. He had received a letter from Sneevliet the week befoTe; "He was in Moscow. Still had the plan to come here, 1 don't know if it'll go through though:' 36. Malab, DP I, p. 104; Tan }.falaka, Them (Buldt Tinggi. June 1946 ),

438

Notes, pp. 206-210 p. 39; and see Peringatan, p. 30. Kahin, NatiofI(Jlism, p. SO, states, however, that Malakn claimed he was assigned the port of Comintcm representative for Southeast Asia at the Comintem congress of November 1922, effective at the beginning of 1923. 37. In addition to the evidence to be brought out in the course of this narra_ tive, we have Sem:l.un's support for Malaka's claim ( Interview, 1959) . although Semaun said he received his appointment at the Pacific Transport Workers' Omference in 1924. In Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communin 51ruggle in Mala!la (New York. 1956 ), p. 6, reference is made 10 a Japanese Intelligence report from World War II stating that in 1925 Tan Malaka was the chief Comintem representative in Southeast Asia; Tsutsui. Chijin. Mampo guruci-ron ( Military Government in the Southern Regions) ( Tokyo, February 1944), p. 335. Postcolonial PKI accounts tended to deny or minimi7.e Malaka's claims to a role in the Comintem until the publication in 19tH of Pemoo,.ontakon November 1928, an account compiled by the party's Historical In~-titute. In this work Malaka is described as having repre_ sented the PKI in the Comintem and having been a member of the secretariat of an ECCI Far Eastern Bureau, based in Shanghai, in which he represented the PKI (p. 123). It does not appear that Malllka actually worked in Shanghai during this period, but Comintern China headquarters were for a time located in that city. Possibly the account confuses the Comintern office with the Red Eastern Labor Bureau in Canton (see below). 38. Malab, Them, p. 39; see also Kahin, NatloMiism, p. BO, note 52. 39. Alimin, Analyns (Jogjakarta, 1947), p. 14. 40. Semaun, interview, 1959. 41. Malaka said he also inquired of Sun the possibility of obtaining a Chinese passport; Sun replied that he could be of little service, since a Kuomintang pass would be worse than nothing as far as travel outside KMT territory was concerned. Ho .......,ver, he suggested, if Tan Malaka were to contact the Seamen's Union in Hongkong, that organization might be able to help him to a more serviceable document. Malab, DF I, pp. 105-107: and see Tamar Djaja, Pusalca Indonesia, p. 211: Pcringatan, pp. 30, 50. 42. Malaka, DF I. p. 114. 43. Malab, DF 1. p. 114. For an announcement of the establishment. of the office, see Trctii kongre!-S Krasnogo Interruu.rionola pro/80iuzov 8-22 julia 1924g. (Third Congress of the Red Intemationru. of Labor Unions, July 6-22, 1924) (Moscow, 1924), p. 345, hereafter 1II Kongres.f Kramogo; and Api, Apr. 4, 1925. For references to Malakn's position with this office, see Folilieke nota PKl, p. 4; Soerabaja&ch HandeIsblad, Aug. 26, 1924. 44. L. Heller. "Die Pazi6k-Konferenz der Transportarbeiter in Kanton" (The Pacific Conference of Transport Workers in Canton), RGI, July/August 1924, p. 54; and see Malaia ent.nklopediia po mezhdunarodnomu profdl)/zilenllu, col. 1808. 45. Malaka, DP I, pp. 116-119. 46. MaJaka, DP I , pp. 120-121. 47. MaJaka, DP I, p. 120; the ted of the request is given in Api, Jan. 3, 1925, p. 1; see also 1000 Bode, Mar. 17, 1925. Malaka wrote that he had been- working as a correspondent for Chinese and Philippine newspapen for about a year, but he refused to name the papers or the doctors he had consulted in Canton. He asked to go to Sukabumi or Salatiga or some other place on Java, saying that he had friends in those places who could nurse him. 48. De Trilnme, Feb. 27, 1925.

439

.. _••

Notes, pp. 210-211

49. The text of the government reply, dated Mar. 12, 1925. is reprinted in Api. '~.1_~.~~.1~1_

1~.~_

emment said it would detennine Tan Malaka's place of residence, that he would not be informed of it beforehand. but that in any case it wouJd not be Java. 50, Text of Malab'! Jetter in Api. Apr. 30, 1925; and Nievwe JWtterdtJmsche Courant, June 3, 1925. 51. MaIaka, DP I, pp. 121-123; Peringatan, p. 30, Malaka said that In Canton he had gotten to know a "Miss Carmen," the daughter of a former Philippine revolutionary, wh().'J!l mother ran a hostel for Filipinos there. She had given him valuable tips on Philippine life and had taught him some Tagalog, which he picked up caliily since it was related to Indonesian. He also got to mow a guest of the hostel. Dr. Mariano Santos, who was 0 0 his way home from Europe and was to become vice-president of the Univel"llity of Manila. Santos a proponent of the wlity of the Indonesian peoples; since Tao Maim was already strongly drawn to Pan.lndonesianism, the two of them strock up a friendship, acamling to MaJal:a, and maintained contact until World War II. 52. Semaun, interview, 1959; ''Pidato Semaun: Adjaran2 Tan Malab Sewadjar dengan Adjamn Marx, Engels dan Lenin" (Semau n's Speech: The Teachings of Tan Malaka Are in Aecordante with the Teachings of Man:, Engels, and Lenin), in Perlngatan, p. 103. The Communist Party of the Philippines was established in 1930; Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom 1946-1958 (New York. 1958 ), p. 140, claims that Tan Malllica "p.lid a quiet visit" to the Philip" pines in 1929 and there got in touch with several Filipino Communist leaders who had been in Moscow and who subsequently founded the party. MaJaka however, does not claim in his autobiography to have been in the country after 1927 or to have been connected with the founding of the group; since he was not reticent about describing his revolutionary aecomplishrnents, his participation is dubious. More probable is the suggestion by Dapen Liang, Thl: D~lopml:nt 0/ Philippine Political Partie, (Hong Kong. 1939), p. 256, that Malaka helped inspire moves that ended in the formation of the party by his contact with sympathetic FUipinos during h is 1927 sojourn in the coun try. 53. Malaka, Them, p. 47; and DjamaJuddin Tamin, interview, 1959. 54. Api, Mar. 16 and Apr. 7, 1925; Java Bock, Apr. 24, 1925; Malaka DP I, p.143. 55. The establishment of a Red labor international was called for in July 1920; see Pro/intem 0 rezoliulsiiakh (The ProGntern in Resolutions) (Moscow, 1928 ), pp. 9-11. In the following month a sort of pre-Profinlern, the International Councll of Trade and Industrial Un.iOIU, was established (pp. 12-15 ). 56. Si Tetap, Jan. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 8, 1921, p. 31 (article by Semaun on the YSTP congress); De Loromotlef, Feb. 21, 1922, citiDg De Volhardfng (Dutchlanguage organ nf the YSTP) of Febroary 1921, no. 1/2; JaV(l$Che Courant, Aug. 16, 1923. The PKI journal, publishing Zinoviev's call for the unification of the labor movement in the Profintem at the R1LU founding congress. called on Indonesian workers to become conscious enough of their own strength tn join the world movement. This indicates that no Indnnesian union had yet affiliated with it; Soeora Ra'fot, Aug. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 37, 1921, pp. 643-844. 51. Letter from Walter C. Smith (an American Communist) to W. A. van Knrdcnoordt in Semarang, dated Seattle, May 21, 1923. The delegate was premmably Darsono, who attended the concurrent third congress of the Cominlern. Smith's letter included an Inquiry, on behalf of some American Communlsb who

was

440

Notes, pp. 211-214 had attended the congress, about the missing Indonesian delegate. On the other hand, Profintern records of the congress listed as present one delegate from Java, who possessed voting rights; Deslat' let Pro{interno u rC"'-Oliub//akh (Ten YeatS of the Profintem in Resolutions) (Moscow, 1930), p. 36; see also Carr, Bolsheuik Reoolution, III, 401. It is possible that Darsol\o was there on paper but not in fact. 58. "Brief des revolutionaren GewerkschaItszentrums an das Vollzugsburo de, R.C'!." (Letter of the Revolutionary Labor Federation to the Executive Bureau of the ruLU), RGI, November 1922, p. 328. See also Ezhegodnik Komintema, p. 775; Musso, "How the Influence of the Amsterdam International Is Penetrating in Indonesia," Eastern aOO Colallial Bulletill, no. 11, November 1929, p. 22. 59. "Aus der GewerkschaIts-Bewegung in Nicderliindisch-lndien" (From the Labor Movement in the Netherlanru Indies ), In prekorr, Apr. 11, 1923, p. 368. 60. ''The Governor General's lkport" in Benda and McVey, Communist Uprisings, p. 5, note 4; MdJt, Sediorah, p. 53; Blumberger, Communist, pp. 27-28. The flrst-named account is a translation of the abridged version of Politieke nota PKl prepared for public CQnsumption. 61. II. KOllgress Kra.snogo 1ntematsionakl profsciuwv v Moskoo 19 no/abria-2 de1wbria 1922 godiJ (The Seeond Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions in Moscow, Nov. IS-Dec. 2, 1922) (Moscow / PetTOgrnd, 1923) , p. 260, hereafter II Kongrcss Krasnogo; MaltJia cntsiklopedi/a po mczhdunarodllOmy profdviuwniiu, coL 558. 62. Programma Congres, ka 12 ckrj V.S.T.P. Tanggal 2-4 Februari 1923, p. 1. 63. See Prolinlem v rC"'..oliutn/akh, pp. 95--96. 64. Ch. E., "Der erste Kongress der revolutJoDaren Organisationcn des Fernen Ostens," p. OOJ. Emphasis in the text. 65. Mezhdunorodrwe profdvitllerlic 1923--1924gg. (The International Labor Movement, 1923-1924 ) ( Moscow, 19"..4 ), p. 291; see :llso II Kongress Krasnogo, p. 291, (or expressions of admiration for thc revolutionary quality of the Indonesian labor movement. Semaun was elected 10 the presidium of this congress as the representative for the Far East. The discussion of the Profintcrn's activities in the CQlonial and semicolonial areas was led by Leo Heller, with Semaun as one of the two comporters. There were two delegates fTOm Java listed as present at the congres,~, one with and one "dlhoul voting rights. The fonner was probably Scmaun and the latter the Dutch fonner VSTP leader Harry DeUer, who attended the CQncurrent fifth Comintern CQugress as a representative of Indonesia. See Deswt' let Prolintema, pp. 121-122. 66. "Tiitigkcilsbericht des Vollzugsbtiros det RC.J. tiber die Zeit von Juli bis September," RGI, October 1922, p. 687. ffr. L'I.S.R. au tral'oil 1924-1928 (The RlLU at Work 1924--192.8) (n.p., 1928), p. 11. In Ctloo dc, Kommunistischen Internationale 19251926 (Report of the Executive of the Communist International 1925--1926) (Hamburg. 1926), p. 362; "Resolution on the Chinese Que~tlon," lnpreexm. May 13, 190-6, p. 649: "The World Economic and Political Situation," InpreoorT, Jan. 22, 1928, p. 104; Scmaun, "Der internationale Imperialis:mus und die Kommunistiscbe Partei Indonesiens," p. 58; IV semia Tsentrarnogo 8Ot)Cta KrO$nogo Intematsianala profsieuzoo. p. 4; Bcrg~ma, "ProgTe5S of the Revolutionary Movement in Indonesia," InprcoorT, Dec. 31. 1925, p. 1366: Bergsma, "Labour Struggles in the East Indies," Inprecoff, Oct. IS, 190...5, p. 1106; Darsono, "Die Lage der Volksbewegung Indonesiens" ( TIle Situation of the Indonesian Popular Movement), Die Kommunlsti.Jclle Intematwna1e. Nov. 9, 1926, pp. 415, 419. 98. Aidil, Sed;arah, p. 57. 99. Scmaun, "Der internationa1e Imperialismw: und die Kommunistische Partei Indonesicns," p. 60. 100. "Discussion of the Report of Comrade Zinoviev," Irrpreccrr, Mar. 10, 1926, p. 278.

463

Notes, pp. 287-292 101. Semaun, " Pmfessional'noe dvizhenie v Indonezii" ( TIle Trade UnfoD fo.lovement in Indonesia), Kra.myi Intematrional Pro/8OI1lwv, March 1926, p. 356. Semaun also urged at the Profintem meeting that the PKI form celli via labor unions in as many enterprises as possible; it should unite its unlom in a Central Committee of Trade Unions IUld should put forward sJogans for the Indonesian independence movement such as "'Indonesia for the Indonesians." "A Federal Government Structure," and NA Cenbal People's Assembly"; pp. 350, 356.

102. Shelloi rossll/renyi plenum ispolkomtJ Kominlema (17 feoralla-15 mdmJ 1926g.) (Sum Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Qnnmittee of the Comintcm, Feb. 17- Mar. 15, 1928 ) ( Moscow/ Leningrad, 1927). p. 1. Other Asian members of the ECCI presidium at this time were listed as Sen Katayama (Japan ), Roy ( India ), and Su-fan (China). 103. TotigkeiUbcricht der Erekulioo der Kommunistbchen lnternatlonole 19251926. pp. 362-364. 104. Schrieke, "Politica1 Section," p. 145.

CHAPTER XI 1. Soera1xJ;mch Handeltblad. Aug. 10, 1925; according to this account, the system was used princip.1JJy among urban worken. 2. Blfltlge algmneen vcrslog: Politick oven/eht 1925 ( Appendix to the General Report: PoUtical Survey 1925 ) (Typescript, signed by the Resident of Semarang. dated Semarang, February 1926), pp. !-...3; hereafter dted as BIj14ge 1925, N/{tuwe Rotte..dam.Jc/lf' Courant. Sept. 8, 1925; Polu~k Verdog 1926. pp. 2-S. During 1925 only one open meeting was held by the PKI and SR in Semarang. as against tv.'O eJcccuti ve and nineteen membership meetings of the PKI and four. e:tecutive and fifty_five membership meetings of the SR, In the regency of Salatiga 188 meetings were held in · all, in Kudus 140, and, in Pat! 33-an illustration of the tactic of holding numerous small gatherin gs: Bfjlage 1925. p. 2., and see De TelegTfUl/. Jan. 1, 1926. In Bandung alone, the PKI held 50 separate meetin&, on Jan. 1. 1925: Api, Jan. 2. 1925. 3. &pport oon het hoo/d, p. 99, footnote 1; Ooonkht Patl, p. 15. outlining a meeting of the Scmarang PKI in October 1925, at which the reorganization was set down for that area; and De Telegraaf. Feb. I, 1926. In aetna] practice there seems to havo been no universally adhered .. to system, however: in early 1926 the organizationa] pattern reported to be in general use In the Semarang region had each party subsection run by five members (chairman, secretary, treasurer, and two commissioners); these were aided by twelve directors, who were given the rank of sergeant. Under each of these directors was a cadre. and each cadre had charge of ten ordinary members, or soldiers; Polltiek verslag 1926.

p.8.

.

Polilieke nota PKl, p. 7. For Sanusi's trip to Canton, see Api, Mar. 13 and Apr. 7, 1925; Jaoo Bode. 24, 1925. DjaDlaiuddin Tamin ( interview. 1959) clabned Alimin visited Malaka in early 1925 and was informed of his ideas on party strategy; Malaka mentions in his autobiography that Alimin visited him twice while in e:rilc before his journey to the Philippines in 1925: DP I. p. 143. Malaka's pam.. phlet, Naar de 'Republlek ..lndonetla' (Toward the Indonesian Repuhlic), was writ .. ten at the end of 1924 and was fi rst published In Canton in Apri1 1925; it is further described below.

4. 5. Apr. Tan

464

Notes, pp. 292-296 6. Api, Apr. 27, 28, and 29, 1925. 7. Bljlage 1925, p. 3. 8. Api. July 12-17, 1925, in lPG, no. 30, 1925, pp. 154-155; Mou>o, Dec. 7, 1925, in IPG. no. 51, 1925, p. 614: De lnd/.sche CicLJ. XLVII (1926),456-457: Politiek Veqlag 1926, p. 16. According to the last accou.ot, the OPI, with headquarters in Semarang, was a pet project of Darsono's. Its headquarters and leaders' homes were raided in early 1926, and it thereupon expired. 9. Over:z:fcht 1924, p. la, describing the situation at the end of 1924. 10. See "Nadere beantwoording van bij de behandeling der begrooting en clet suppletoUe begrooting van Noocrlandsch-lndie voor het dienstjaar 1926 geste1de wageD" (FW'lhcr Reply to Questions Submitted Owing the Discussion of the Budget and Supplementary Budget of the Netherlands Indies lor 1926 ). in Begrooling 1927, p. 244, hereafter cited as Nadcre 1927. The case was that of Woro Ati, who had made the statement at a public ' SR meeting in 1925; she was sentenced by the Malang district court in January 1926. 11. Scbrieke, "Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra," pp. 146-147. Such pressure was considered to have been used with success in Atjeh, the Lampung districts, and Paiemhang, however; Verslag 1926, pp. 11, 14-15; Verdag 1927, p. 21. 12. De GraaH, memomndum of reply to parliament in the debate on the 1925 Indies budget; Begroollng 192.5, p. 214. 13. Api, Sept. 1,2, and 3, 1924, in lPG, no. 37, 1924, pp. 508-510, 511-512; Api, Feb. 16, 1925; SoeraboJasch HandeLsblad, Sept. 2, 1924; Ovenicht 1924, pp. 8, 16. 14. R. Kern. Oprichtlng van con,ra-vereenlglngen tegen het communJsme (Establishment of Counterassociations Against Communism) (typescript report by the Adviser fOf Native Affairs to the Governor Ganeml, dated Weltevreden, . June .15, 1925, 00. e/189, classified), pp. 1--3. 15. Kern, Opriehllng van COl1i'fa-tlCree,lIgingen, p. 7. The turning in of cards had a particular force, as Kern notes, because of the great weight Indonesians gave to symbols. To hand in a card was regarded as a true sign that its owner had broken with Communism, and those who did so often became enthusiastically IIIId Violently Illlti·PKI. 16. Api reported roaming bands in the Prlangan who asked people whether they were "'Vltite" or "Red" and beat those who answernd "Red"; Feb. 20-23, Mar. 2-7, 1925, in IPO, nos. 9 and 11, pp. 412, 503. The stated goals of the Sarekat Hidjau were to cherish arid protect religion, prince, government, teachel'll, f:lther, and race; Soerapati, June 8, 1925, in IPO, no. 28, 1925, p. 3&5. The purpose of Anti-Communisme was said to have been to tight Communism, promote religion, :lnd keep an eye on Indonesian political movements in general; lI/ndla Baroe, Feb. 15, 1925, in IPO, no. 9. 1925, p. 420. 1be Kaum PalllHrall, which was centered in Bandjarnn, had been founded several yean before a!O an am:lteur theatrical group, with the broader purpose of strengthening ties between the prljaji and the people; In 1924 it turned into an anti-PKI mutual aid association in response to local SR activity. The Communists did not aceuse the 51 of being Involved In any of the Sarekat-Hidjau type of organization. 17. Kern, Opr/ellllng van conlra-cerelffiigingen, p. 4. Two other reports in the Kern collection deny vehemently any government coDlicction with the Sarekat Hidjau groups, which are described as purely 5pontaneous associations of respectable and olderly Indonesians defending themselves against Sareht Islam and SR aggressiveness; letter from Attorney General Wolterbeek Muller to the

465

Notes,

pp.

296-299

Governor General, dated Wcltevrcdcn, ~lay 28, 1925, no. 1978 A.P., classified, and report from Resident of Priangan Eijken to the Attorney General, dated Bandung, May 19, 1925, W. lSO / 25;l.C., classified. Apparently these were composed to mollify Volksraad deputies who had charged the government with collusion in Sarekat Hidjau violence and demanded an inquiry. For Salim's article-; against the Sarekat Hidjau, see lIindw Barae, Feb. 19 and 26, 1925, in [PO, nos. 9 and 10, 1925, pp. 416-418, 463--464, and in Kaoem KUa. Feb. 9-19, 192.5. in lPG, no. 9, 1925, p. 420. For other statements condemning the Sarekat Hidjau and similar org:mizatiOIlS in the non-Communist op~ition press, see Hlndla Bol"Ofl, Feb. 15 and 18, 1925, Bolatentara Islam. Feb. 14-21, 1925, and Panggoegoh, Feb. 18, 1925, in IPO, no. 9, 19'25, pp. 418, 420, 431, 434-435; Sri Dfojobofo. Feb. 14, 1925, in lPG, no. 10, 1925, p. 484; Dormo Kondo, Mar. 4-7. 1925, Hlndio Bame, Mar. 5-11, 1925, Kaoem Kita, Mar. 2-9, 1925, Kemadlooan Hlndio, Feb. 28, 1925, in IPO , no. II , 1925, pp. 508-509, 511-5 14, 516-519, 522; Hlndio Bame, Mar. 12-18, 1925, Kaoem Kita, Mar. 11-16, 1925, Kemadjoean H/ndio, Mar. 9-14, 1925, Sedlo Oetorno, Mar. 10, 1925, in IPO, no. 12, 1925, pp. 560-583, 567, 574-575. 18. H/ndia Baroo, Mar. 5-11 , 12-18, &loom Mooda, Mar. 3, Kaoem Klta, , Mar. 11-16, 1925, in IPO, nos. II and 12, 1925, pp. 511-514, 519, 560-568. 19. The first report of the League, in an enthusiastic letter by «Memh," was published on the first page of Api, Mar. 25, 1925. However, the editors commented that the writer should investigate more clO5ely before he committed him_ sell to the organization. It seemed to be composed of heterogeneous class elements (the letter had mentioned not only PKI followers but also members of the Chinese, Arabs, and Dutch [Eurasian?] minority groups who felt themselves threatened by the Sarekat Hidjau) , and the party therefore must warn against it. See also Api, Mar. 31, 1925. Dne of the government reports on the Sarekat Hidjau refers to the League as having both SR and SI members; Eijken to the Attomey Cenernl, p. 3. Dingley, Peawnts' Movement, p. 44, speaks of the leagues as endorsed by the party, however. According to ''l1le Covernor General's Report," p. 10, they were recrui ted from strong-arm clements and existed in Batavia, Peicalongan, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, Kepiri, and Tjiandur in the Priangan. 20. Sarekat-18lam Congre! (3e nationaal eongrell), pp. 6-7, describes the discussion of this point at the 1918 SI congress; see also ''The Bantam Report," p. 47. 21. Api, Mar. 24, 1925; the appeal, written in Sundanese by the Bandung Communist leader Gunawan, was spread about the area in leaflet form by the PKI. See also Api, Feb. 26 and Mar. 25, 1925, for simllar appeals. 22. Api, editorial of Feb. 15, 1925. For a similar analysis of the problem COIlfronting the PKI, see the editorial in' Panggoegah (Suwardi Surjaningrat's paper ), Feb. 18, 1925, in lPO, no. 9, 1925, pp. 434-435. 23 . Api, editorial of Jan. 6, 1925. 24. This was claimed by some rebel leaders to have been their calculation, according to Ovenlellt oon den Inwendigen poliHeken tocstQnd (Februari 1926Maart 1927) (Survey of the Internal Political Situation, February 1926-March 1927) (Netherlands Indies government, typescript, clnssified) , p. 24. 25. Samin (Darsono], "The Situation in IndoneSia," Inprerorr Oct. 4, 1928, p. 1246 (coreport on the revolutionary movement in the colonies, presented to the sixth Comintem congress) . 26. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. IZ2, quoting Instruction No.2 issued by l'KI headquarters on Mar. 24, 1925. The reference to proletarian dictatorship here is one of the relatively rare instances in which it W:l.'l stated that therf!

466

Notes, 1'1'. 299-303 would be any prelude to the achievement of Communism after the revolution. 27. Schrieke, "Political Seetion," pp. 122-123, citing In$lmction No.2, Mar. 24, 1925. 28. 'The Governor General's Report," p. 3. 29. Alimin, Louteren wi; ons! p. 85. 30. D. H. Meijer, "Over bet bendewezen op Java" (Concerning Gangs on Java), IndtmemJ, Ill, September 1949, p. 188, suggests that the reason not much note was taken of these groups during the colonial period was that they operated only among the Indonesian part of the population, that local officials were either afraid to complain or in league with them, and that the regents did not like to bring these groups to the notice of the Dutch, who would only accuse them of being unable to keep order. For an explanation of the . phenomenon in psycholOgical tenus, see P. M. van Wulfften Pruthe, Over het bendewezen 01' Java ( Concerning Gangs on Java) (Amsterdam, 1948?). 31. ''The Bantam Report," p. 23. 32. Special areas for outlawry have been cited as North Bantam, the Priangan, Batavia, Bogor, Tjirebon, Indrnmaju, and Krawang in West Java; Surakarta, Jogjakarta, and the north coast of Central Java; and Madlun, South Kediri, Patjitan, Bodjonegoro, Ngawi, Gresilc, Puger, and Kraksaao in East Java.; Meijer, "Over het bendewezen op Java," p. 179; D. H. Meijer, Japan tofnt den oorlog: Dooomenten over / (JOa (Japan Wins the War: Documents on Java) (Maastricht, 1946), pp. 26, 96. The Communist lll1its that most strongly urged rebellion during 1926, or engaged In the uprising, were from North Bantam, the Priangan, Batavia, and Tjirebon in West Java and Suralcarta and the north coast of Central Java. Anti-Commlll1ist fighting groups were from the Priangan, Bogar, Tjirebon, Kediri, Ngawi, Madiun, and Djepara, and Anti-Ruffian Leagues were in the Priangan, Batavia. Peka1ongan, Jo~akarta, Surakarta, and Kook!. 33. Others included the SI-Anjar (Sukabumi), Sarekat Sedjati (Semarang), Sarekat Abangan {K1aten}, and Sareknt Setya Warga (Southeast Borneo); SI V, p. 374, col. a. Similarly, such groups in West Java took advantage of the Dutch collapse at the. time of the Japanese invasion to extract contributions from the population in the name of the advancing Japanese (who were portrayed as bringing the promised utopia) and to present themselves to the incoming forces as the effective localleade\"S; Meijer, "Over het bendewezcn op Java," pp. 182-193, citing Slamet Sudibio, "Perampokan" (Banditry), series of articles in Asia Raya, 1942. 34. Samin, "The Situation in Indonesia," p. 1247. 35. "The Bantam Report," pp. 42--43. For a similar description of propaganda in the Minangkabau area, see Schriclcc, 'The Causes and Effects of Communism on the W('_~ Coa.d of Sumatra ," p. 161. 36. Venltlg 192$, pp. 9-33; Vc,sla~ 1926, pr. 8-33; Over;r.lcht SWK, p. 8. 37. Kenuulfoetln Hindia, Dec. 5, 19-23, in TPG, no. SO, 19"...3, pp. 513--514. An earlier action of the Scram!: SI may have been the reason for one of the mom curious charf(es in the Jogjakarta-Semarang feud that followed Darsono's attack on Tjokroaminoto. At the time (late 1920 and early 1921) participation in the se(X)fld Volksraad was debated in the SI: the left generally ury::ed noncoopera _ tion and the ri~ht wanted to accept a scat. Serang supported the candidacy of F. van Lith, S.J., a well-known West Java missionary who outspokenly supported toleration of the IndoflCl
125.

92. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 177, quoting a statement reported to have been made by Kamaruddin, one of the rebel leaden. For a description of the

Sumatra revolt and the events leading up to it, see pp. 15~177; also Ovemcht SWK, pp. 10-19; and Blumberger, CommunUt, pp. 80-91. 93. D}amaluddio Tamin, interview, 1959. In his autobiography Alimin says they chose the Shanghai-Canton-Hongkong-Bangkok route because it was the only safe one at the time; Alimin; Riwafat Hldup, p. 22. 94. Alimin, R/wa;at Hidup, pp. 22-23; Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959. 95. Over:.icht SWK, p. 10; Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 166, citing the noteboob of Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim (who had been 8ITCSted on Nov. 14, 1926). 96. Alimin, R,lwa;at Hidup, pp. 22-23; DjamaIuddin Tamin, interview, 1959. rn. ''The Governor General's Report," p. 8, note 8; NieuW{) Rotterdanuche Courant, Jan. 24, 1927.

CHAPTER XIII 1. "Manifesto of the E.C.C.I. on the Insurrection in Indonesia," [nprecorr, Nov. 25, 1926, p. 1390. 2. The party's immediate response to the uprising was, for the Communists, extremely moderate. Apparently in an effort to do what it could to soften the retaliation ag~1: the PKI, it sent De Graeff a wire blaming everything on his predecessor: "NAS-CPH executives in combined meeting view uprising West~ Java as result misru1e by former Governor General Foek. Provocative stand of authorities paved way for this expression despairing resistance, True guilty peTSOlU former Governor and his advisers. Protesting against numerous recent arre5ts we ask general amnesty for poJitica1 prisoners, persecuted people, and internees. With this deed beginning of new course could be demonrtrated in visible manner, NAS: Sneevlict, Dissel; CPH: De Visser, Bergsma. Nov. 13, 1926." Quoted in De A,beid, Nov. 20, 1926, p, 1.

488

Notes, pp. 348...,J52 3. Vanter, "The Revolts in Indonesia," Inp1'ccorr, Jan. 13, 1927, p. 102. 4. Inp1'ccorr, Dec. 1, 1926, pp. 1430-1431. 5. lnprecorr, Dec. 1, 1926, pp. 1635-1636. 6. ProtolroU. Erweitcrtc Eukutioe der Kommunlrlischen lntemationale. M08kau, 22. November-l6. Dezember 1926 (Protocol. Enlarged Executive of the Communist International. Moscow, Nov. 22-Dec. 16, 1926) (HamburgtBerlio, 1927), pp. 480-481 , hereafter cited as ProtokoU. The program had called for aOlllCsty for political prisoners, compensation for the victims of the "White Terror" in the Indies, and the appointment of a workers' commission to investigate the situation in the colony. 7. "Manifesto of the E.C.C.1. on the Insurrection in Indonesia," p. 1390. Emphasis in the text. See also "Ocherednye voprosy mczhdunarodnoi revoliutsii" (Special Questions of the Intematiomu Revolution), Bol'shevlk, Jan. 1, 1927, p. 4 . For an analysis of the Soviet attitude toward the Chinese situation in 1926, and in particular of the role of the seventh ECC1 plenum regarding CCP strategy, see Schwartz, Chinese Communism, pp. 54-60, 79-83. 8. Manuilsky, "Discussion of the Report on the Situation in China," InprecorT, Dec. 30, 1926, p. 1595. Emphasis in the text. For Bukharin's remarks, see ProtokoU, p. 5. 9. ProtokoU, p. 345. 10. Protokoll, pp. 8-9. Semaun sat on the Chinese Commission and the Agrarian Commission at the seventh plenum and was re-elected to the ECCI presidium; pp. 12-13. 11. Bucharin, "The World Situation and the Tasks of the Comintem," lnprccorr, Dec. 3, 1926, p. 1456. 12. Semaun. "The Rebellion in the Dutch East Indies," In precotT, Dec. 2, 1926, p. 1438. 13. Kitaigorodsky, "Leninist Teachings on the Colonial and National Revolutionary Movement and the Current Problems of the Revolutionary Movement in the East," InprecorT, Jan. 13, 1927, p. 95. See further Van MUnster, "The Background and Hi~1:ory of the Insurrection in Java," p. 1499; "Before the Sixth Congress of the Comintem," lnprecorr, JWle 7, 1928, p. 566; Kja! Samin [Darsono], "Der Aufsland auf Java und Sumatra (Indonesien)" (The Uprising on Java and Sumatra [Indonesia]), Die Kommunl.ttlsche lrltemationale, Mar. 29, 1927, p. 643; ''The Echo of Chinese Events in India," InprccorT, Feb. 4, 1927, pp. 245-246. 14. Krasnyi lntematslonal Profroiuwv, December 1926, p. 644. For the November manifesto, see lnprecorr, Dec. 2, 1926, p. 1438. IS. '!he E.C.C.I. on the Tasks of the CommWlists in Indonesia, lnprecorr, Dec. 8, 1921, p. 1562. For other criticisms, see "&foro the Sixth Congress of the Comintern." p. 566; and Semaun, 'Vokrug vosstanie na l ave" (Concerning the Uprising on Java), Krasnyi lntematsional Prof:wiuzoo, January 1927, p. 71. Semaun's report criticized the poor coordination of the revolutionary e1I'orts, which prevented the rebellion from spreading throughout the country. Neither, he claimed, had sufficient work been done to subvert the soldiers and police. " . In the political aspect, too, the uprising was prepared in a far from satisfaotory manner. This is apparent from the fact that the masses did not support the anned outbreaks in sufficient measure, either by powerful strikes or by the seizure of banks, etc." 16. The British authorities for their part seem to have taken the attitude that their Indies counterparts were heavy-handed and unsuhtle in dealing with their R

489

Notes, pp. 352-353 opponents. See the comments of the Singapore police commissioner on his interrogation of Alimin and }.Iusso; Rene Ooraet, Singapore: A Police Background (London, 1947?), p. 110. 17. InprecoTT. p. 849. Darsono (Samin) explained the failure of the revolution to the sixth congress on more orthodox line!; ; il lay, he $aid, in the mistaken line developed by the December 1924 congress, the arrest of party leaden and the consequent inexperience of those at its head, the (aiJure to draw the Indonesian masses into the struggle, the lack of an effort to subvert the police an d armed forces, inadequate organization and political preparation. faiJure to pre5ellt clear popular demanw, and lack of contact with the Comintem and: other Communist parties; Inpreccrr, pp. 1245-1246. Mwso, writing a few yCaJ3 later on the Java uprising. rejected the claim that the revolt had not been sWlicient1y well prepared: i1le uprising was well prepared, but unfortunately it began too blc; that is, when it began all the experienced leaden had already heen arrested and thrown in prison. Aside from thill, the slogans which l:olrerto, and Tjllatjap and the Regent of BanjUffillll (typescript, dated Banjumas, Dec. II, 1926, no. 20974/4) that in the rural areas Communists were to be boycotted by putwan de$O (village decision, nominally reached by conscnsus) to the effect that "(I) their part of commun~1 property shall be denied them; (2) they shaU be granted no help in building house.~, the cultivation of their land, or at funerals or other occasions; (3) they shall be denied penniolsion to hold celebrations; (4) they shall be ",Uowed no 10.... n5 from the village banl: or grain storehouse." Moothly urn of villages applying these rneamres and the persons agairut whom they were enforced were to be provided the ResJdent; pp. 1- 2. 20. For a description of government measures in response to the rebellion, see Blumbergcr, Communist, pp. 107-123. 11le thousand internees of Mansvelt's study (made before most of the west Sumatran internment dedsiolU were made but after nearly all those from the other district.'! had been detcrmined) were £rom the following region~ : Bantam 84, Bogor 16, Central Priangan 18, other West Java residencies 193, Pe!calong:m 38, Semarung 125, Rembang 17, Banjum.u 20, lCedu 21, Jogjalcarta 34, Surakarta 83, Madinn 47. Surabaja .oil, Kediri 77, Pasuruan 32. Bemid 21. Djembe!- I , Madma I , Lampung 8, Palembang 5, East Coast of Sumatra 19, Benkulen 23, West Coast of Stlmatra 11 , Tapanuli 9, Atjeh I, Menado 2, Celebes 9, Pontianak II, Moluccas 33. Eight wern women and thirteen were Chinese; none had European status; Mansvelt, "Onderwijs en Communisme," pp. 204-205. The regional origins of the first 838 pel'5Oll5 interned may be found in "Ovenlcht van den inwendlgen politielren toestand (1924-April 1928)" (Survey of the Internal Political Situation, 1924-April 1928). Metledee-lingen ckr Re~eerlng omtrent enkele onderwerpen van al~emcen befone (Weltcvreden, 1928), col. 2. More internees were added after the ori~inal 1,300: there were abotlt 3,000 in the DiguJ camp at the beginning of 1930; Ds Te1egraat, Feb. 18, 1930, citing a stalcm~t by the Dutch govcrnment. The rollowin~ year, however, the government began to reduoe their numbe!- after an investigation showed: many were not dangerous or bad been banJ.shed for InsufBcient reason;

490

Notes, pp. 353-355 see Nieuwe ROUerdam,lche Couran1, Jan. 14, 25, 31, and Mar. 3, 1931. As the major concentration colony for opponents of the Indies regime, the camp on the Digul became a prime nationalist revolutionary symbol. For descriptions of the camp and life of the internees, see "Overz.icht van den inwendigen politieken toestand (1924-15 April 1928):' cols. 11-18; A:tge Kramp-Nielsen, "Met de COIIlD1unisten naar den Boven-Digoer' (With the CoIIlD1unists to the Upper Digul) , Haag.rch Maandblad, 1927, pp. 233-244; L. J. A. Schoonheyt, BovenDigoel (Upper Digul) (Batavia, 1936 ); Mev. Philippa-Raden Soekasih and G. van MUruter, I ndonesia, een politiestaat ( Indonesia, a Police Stafe) (Amsterdam, n.d.), pp. 6-10; Sjao/azad {Sutan SjahrirJ, I ndorlesi.rche Overpeinzingen (Indonesian Reflections) ( Am~ie rdam, 1945 ), pp. 50-70. 21. H. H. A. van Gybland Oosterholf, Het Communim1e tegenover de gekleurde rauen (Communil;m against the Colored Races) (reprint from De NedetwndeT, Oct. 29 and 31 and Nov. 2, 19-27) , p. 10. 22. H. G. Heijting, Jaoo', onmst (Java's Unrest) (Amsterdam. 1927), p. 38. Emphasis in the text. 23. Letter of Oct. 30, 1927, quoted in Brouwer. De hooding, p. 119. 24. M. W. F. Treub. Het gist in I ndie: cen analyse der hedendoag.rche In-wnd.rche beweging (Fennent in the Indies: An Ana1ysis of the Contemporary Native Movement) ( Haarlem, 1927), p. 61.

491

INDEX Entries followed by an asterisk represent first references to works cited 1ater in the book by short title. Figures appearing in parentheses are note numbers.

Abangan, !2. !L !1Q.. 424n !.m ABBH (Driven and Mechanics Union) , 4080 (@ Abdul Am, 4250 tlll Abdul Murad, 482n 00 Abdulkarim, 42& '-TIl. 4SOn (M1. 478n ill 4820 ~ ;m1 AbdulmuntaJib, ~ ~ 4260 4720 '-1!1 4820 ~ 4860 (1Ql. 48'70 (17) Abdultaclunan, 157 Abidin, Zainul, 482.n (37) Abihuno,363o (36) Achmad Cbatib, 425n (73) Adat, lQ. 40 Adidarmo, 43 AlInan, Hadji, l'M Mandl, 4820 (38) "Agenda van het S. L oongres," 388n

m

crn.

(40)Agrarian 37tn

m

m

mm

, gQ, ~ ~ .we also Peasantry,

"Louteren wi; 011:11," 3800 ( 54) · Riwalat Hldup, 3740 (40)· Alkema, Sarekat 1:1am, 361n ~

All-Indies Congress. !!!. l42. All-Muslim League. Indian, ill All-Russian Gongres.'! of Muslim Communist Organizations, first, M.. 55 All-Russian (later All-Union) Scientific AlISociation for Oriental Studies, ~ 403n

uru

A1maJiJd, ZaiD, 426n '-1'l.l

AmbaraWQ, 4330 Ull1 434n !..!!ru: Ambijah, 43In (96) America, !tl. Sf Anarchism, M. !§'l.. ~ 4840 (!.'l) Ansor movement, 479n ( 1.2 ) Anti-Communist groups. gQL 2M Anti.imperialist organixation, ~ 2.2.3 Antl+Ribut Bond, 296 Antistrike law, ~ 310 Anwar, S. M., 4260 (77 ) ApI,178 Arbitration courts, 4140 (119) Arif, Hadji, 426n (77) Arii F adillah, ~ 470n 488n ffi1} Army of Labor, see Adidarmo Article l53 1M and fer, 326 Articles 155 and ~ 258 Article 161 bu, ~ 416n (132) An:, L'Evolution. 363n (36) · Associationiml., 1m.. ill Assar, Said Hamid, l.8a. 460n (54) Atjeh. lQ. ~ 1M. ~ 426n LTI1. 460n {M1 464n l!!1 478n i l l 479n {1g1 481n (M1 482n {M1 490n ( 20); see oW Langsa Atjeh War, l.O. Abnasumarta, 471n (69)

mm

m

493

Index Baan. Adolf (continued ) ill 3730 (M1 376n UR 380n ~ 381n U!:!1 3830 {M1 3840 ill 390n (M. ~ 399n ~ 4370

Bergmcijcr, Hot Communl$me In 1ndll, 419n ~ Bergsma, Pieter, ;!!, ~ ~ !ill. ~ ~ 7l. 1Z. ~ ~ ~ !QL ill. !]l, ~ l23.!M. ~ Nl.. ~ ~

(g!)

uBrieven uit Holland," 3750 ~ "Ret aanstaande S. L congres," 3650

"ru