The Noun Phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar

The Noun Phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar

≥

Trends in Linguistics Studies and Monographs 195

Editors

Walter Bisang (main editor for this volume)

Hans Henrich Hock Werner Winter

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

The Noun Phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar

edited by

Daniel Garcı´a Velasco Jan Rijkhoff

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin.

앝 Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines 앪 of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The noun phrase in functional discourse grammar / edited by Daniel Garcı´a Velasco, Jan Rijkhoff. p. cm. ⫺ (Trends in linguistics. Studies and monographs ; 195) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 978-3-11-019867-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Grammar, Comparative and general ⫺ Noun phrase. 2. Functionalism (Linguistics) I. Garcı´a Velasco, Daniel. II. Rijkhoff, Jan. P271.N679 2008 4151.5⫺dc22 2007050816

ISBN 978-3-11-019867-6 ISSN 1861-4302 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ” Copyright 2008 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design: Christopher Schneider, Berlin. Printed in Germany.



     Abbreviations  Introduction    

vii

1

Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in Functional Discourse Grammar 

43

Layers, levels and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar 

63

On noun phrase structure in Functional (Discourse) Grammar: Some conceptual issues   ! " #

117

Reference and ascription in Functional Discourse Grammar: An inventory of problems and some possible solutions " 

181

Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase $ %& '()%

221

Freestanding noun phrases within documents: A pragmatic approach based on Functional Discourse Grammar ($*

263

Agreement in the noun phrase: The dynamic expression of terms and what can go wrong ) +

287

Functional Discourse Grammar and extraction from (complex) noun phrases    

321

vi

,#%%

Index of authors Index of subjects Index of languages

365 369 375



      1 2 3 A ABL ABS ACC Adv AdvP ALL ART AP ASP AUG BNC C CLF CNPC

first person second person third person addressee / adjective ablative absolutive accusative case adverb(ial) adverbial phrase allative article adjective phrase aspect augmentative British National Corpus common gender classifier Complex Noun Phrase Constraint COND conditional COP copula CREA Corpus de Referencia del Espa  D discourse DAT dative case INF infinitive DEF definite DEM demonstrative DET determiner DI Domain Integrity DIM diminutive DS different subject ECC Extra Clausal Constituent EIC Early Immediate Constituents hypothesis

EXH exhortative F feminine F(D)G Functional Grammar and Functional Discourse Grammar FDG Functional Discourse Grammar FG Functional Grammar FUT future GEN genitive case HP Head Proximity HPSG Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar IND indicative INDEF indefinite IRR irrealis LCA Linear Co-occurrence Axiom LFG Lexical Functional Grammar M masculine N noun / neuter NEG negative NF non-future NH non-human NOM nominative case NP noun phrase NUM numeral OBJ object PRF perfective PL plural POSS possessive PP prepositional phrase PPT past participle PRES present

viii -## %

PROG PROH Q R REFL REL RSM S SG SIM STC TNR TR V Vf Vi VP VOC

progressive prohibitive question marker realis reflexive relative marker resumptive marker speaker / subject / sentence singular simultaneous Stepwise Term Construction time nominalizer transitional sound verb finite verb nonfinite verb verb phrase (see fn. 9 in Introduction) vocative

         1 A

Ag CL d/def Exp i IL ILL IMP

Zero (semantic function) singular Discourse Act / addressee / anaphorical operator Agent (semantic function) clause definite Experiencer (semantic function) indefinite Interpersonal Level illocution imperative

L Lex m ML P1

layer lexeme plural Morphosyntactic Level the (special) clause-initial position P speech act participant Pat Patient (semantic function) PL Phonological Level PredP predicative phrase prox proximity R Referential Subact / relative operator RL Representational Level RP referential phrase So Source (semantic function) T Ascriptive Subact UR underlying representation VP verb phrase in FDG       C E e ep f F l M p t x X

Communicated content Speech act (FG) State-of-Affairs Episode Property / relation Speech occurrence Location Move Propositional content (FDG) Time Individual Propositional content (FG)



        The articles in this volume analyse the noun phrase within the framework of .%  // (FDG), the successor to Simon C. Dik  .% // (FG). , 0 +  was the main conference theme of the 11% 2% % $   .% // , which took place at the University of Oviedo (Gij 2004 and the present anthology consists of a selection of the manuscripts that were submitted after a call for contributions following the conference.1 There were several reasons to devote the theme session of the conference to the noun phrase (NP). First, the most recent treatment of NPs by Dik in terms of  

    !"  umously) in 1997, in the first volume of ,, *.% // . Given the fact that FDG presents a strongly revised version of Dikkian FG with respect to rules, variables, representations and overall design, it seemed appropriate to investigate how the new theory deals with one of the most basic grammatical constructions, the noun phrase. Secondly, in a recent, cross-linguistic investigation on the structure of the NP, Rijkhoff (2002) presented an alternative analysis of the NP within the FG framework. This study contains several new facts and ideas, which made it an interesting challenge to investigate to what extent the proposals he put forward could or should be integrated into the new FDG model (see also Rijkhoff this volume). All in all, the time seemed ripe for a detailed investigation of the way NPs are handled in FDG. Moreover, to analyse a major linguistic construction from various perspectives (textual, typological, logical, semantic, morphosyntactic, etc.) is an excellent way to test a new model of grammar with regard to some of the standards of adequacy for linguistic theories (see also section 1). In order to contextualize the papers in the present volume, we will first lay out the main differences between FG and FDG and explain why some FG scholars felt that a general reorganization of the model was necessary. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the history of the way NPs have been analysed in F(D)G,2 paying special attention to variables for the various entities (i.e. the   #$!  %  #&  '   ! 

2

   

(i.e. the  (  ntational frames, layers, levels, modules). Finally, in section 3, we will summarize the most relevant aspects of the articles included in the volume. The reader is invited to consult Dik (1997a; 1997b), Anstey and Mackenzie eds. (2005), Hengeveld (2004a), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006) and Hengeveld and Mackenzie (forthcoming) for more detailed expositions of F(D)G.          ! FDG may be seen as the natural descendant of FG inasmuch as it shares many if not most of the central assumptions and goals formulated by Dik (see Butler 2003 and Anstey 2004 for excellent presentations of the evolution of FG). In Dik ")**+(),-13) view the aim of FG was to provide the means and principles by which functional grammars of particular languages can be developed. And the highest aim of a functional grammar of a particular language is to give a complete and adequate account of the grammatical organization of connected discourse in that language (- .    '   #  !  '      !!  ' !quacy (in particular descriptive adequacy) such as have been formulated by Chomsky 

But since FG does not share Chomskys syntactocentric perspective on grammar, Dik (1989: 12; 1997a: 13) added that  $ / !''rences with respect to what has been called / atory adequacy-   point he introduced three additional standards of adequacy for grammatical theories, which subsequently have also been accepted in other functional approaches to grammar (e.g. Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 8): pragmatic, psychological and typological adequacy. Undoubtedly, the standard of typological adequacy has been satisfied to a greater extent than the other two, as many FG publications contain references to studies on a wide variety of linguistic phenomena in languages from many different families, which have had a considerable influence on the general architecture of the model. This strong commitment to typology continues to be an important hallmark of FDG. There is little doubt that FG has been less successful in its aim to become a theory of grammar that is also pragmatically and psychologically adequate (Butler 1991; 1999), and to some extent this has motivated the birth of FDG. As far as pragmatic adequacy is concerned, some FG practi-



2% %

3

tioners felt that the 1997 model (in spite of Dik  # 

in the quotation above) contained two major obstacles to progress towards a truly functional theory of grammar: (i) the fact that research in FG concentrated almost exclusively on the analysis of the sentence and its constituents, and (ii) the lack of integration of FG into a theory of verbal interaction. As for psychological adequacy, which roughly requires the theory to be compatible with well-established findings in the field of psycholinguistics, let us simply say that the number of studies in FG that make reference to the results of psycholinguistic research is extremely limited, which means that the theory has remained untested from a psycholinguistic point of view. Thus, on the one hand FDG can be seen as a continuation of FG, on the other hand the original model as conceived by Dik has been restructured in such a way that it is better equipped to meet the standards of adequacy mentioned above. Another major difference between FG and FDG is that FDG is explicitly designed to model the speakers #     (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 669). So even though FDG shares certain features with its predecessor FG, the differences are substantial enough to say that it offers a new research programme in the linguistic landscape. Next we will examine the differences between the two models under the headings %  //  (    // , %&34  #%%/3 &, and  * (

1.1. Sentence grammar vs. discourse grammar In various places Dik expressed his commitment to the study of connected discourse in language and it is true that over the years some FG linguists have concerned themselves with discourse phenomena. Nevertheless, in reality FG has mostly concentrated on the analysis of the internal organization of single, isolated sentences. In fact, this development was already anticipated in the first presentation of the theory, when Dik (1978: 15) stated: FG is meant to cover any type of linguistic expression (-0    estricted to the internal structure of sentences, inasmuch as there are combinations of sentences related by syntactic and semantic rules. ( 2 & 3 %5 4 5 4  /%* #   4% % %  % %   % [emphasis ours].

4

   

Perhaps the focus on the internal structure of sentences was simply a matter of priorities in the early stages of the theory, but Butler (1991) suggests that it may also be a consequence of the formal (in the sense of explicit) orientation of the theory, as discourse pragmatic aspects may be rather difficult to capture in a rigid notational system such as the one employed in FG. This is arguably an important drawback, which, according to Siewierska (1991: 2) makes FG amenable to the attacks of both formalists and functionalists alike. It seems, then, that over the years FG has reinterpreted its commitment to the study of language-in-use towards developing a grammatical theory that is merely /&%# with a model of verbal interaction. The need for a more serious treatment of discourse phenomena in FG and a greater integration of grammar (the rules) and pragmatics (when to apply these rules) into the theory was especially strongly felt in the late nineties (see the papers in Hannay and Bolkestein eds. 1998). In this period several authors proposed to enrich the architecture of the model either by adding a pragmatic module, the so-called / && (Kroon 1997, Bolkestein 1998, Vet 1998), or by extending Hengeveld ")*1* $# analysis of the sentence to account for the hierarchical organization of discourse (&4  *  && 5 G&   1996, Hengeveld 1997). Essentially, this set the pillars for the new architecture of the model, since traits of both approaches can be found in FDG. Significantly, in his presentation of FDG, Hengeveld (2004a) notes that a considerable number of grammatical phenomena relate to units that are either larger or smaller than the clause and for that reason cannot be adequately described by a sentence grammar. In particular, he argues that FDG must account for the fact that a quite a few verbal exchanges are not realized in the form of fully-fledged sentences, but rather in the form of fragments, or, generally speaking, non-clausal linguistic units (Mackenzie 1998a). Thus, FDG replaces the sentence with the  -%(Hannay and Kroon 2005) as a basic unit of grammatical analysis. The following utterances are examples of non-sentential discourse acts: (1)

a. 6 b. -&( c. ,%/ %(

The expression in (1a) may act as a vocative or address in order to initiate a verbal interaction, whereas (1b) and (1c) can serve as natural replies to a question. Hence, apart from their non-sentential nature, what these expres-



2% %

5

sions have in common is that they serve as complete contributions to discourse interaction, and must obviously be studied within the context in which they occur. At the same time, there are linguistic phenomena that relate to the organization of connected discourse and extend their influence over several sentences. In his chapters on the representation of discourse, Dik (1997b) cites a number of phenomena that serve to establish coherence relations. These include iconic sequencing, topic continuity, focus assignment and %3, which is here illustrated with an example from Kombai (adapted from De Vries 2005: 364): (2)

a. 3     #7433    /( go.3SG.NF-until.DS year one finished.3SG.NF-TR-DS die.3SG.NF 0 !# $!  !!- b. /33  /( die.3SG.NF-TR-DS bury.3PL.NF 2!!! $! -

Tail-head linkage usually involves the repetition of the verb at the beginning of the next clause (as in the case of /in the example above), but sometimes it involves the verb of the penultimate clause or even the verb of the clause before that. Such cases show even better that tail-head linkage can only be properly handled by a grammatical theory that goes beyond the boundaries of a traditional sentence grammar.

1.2. Top-down vs. bottom-up Unlike FG, FDG is a %&34/ in which the generation of a linguistic expression is assumed to start from a communicative intention which ultimately leads to the grammatical coding of a piece of information and its final articulation or execution ('  n to articulation-  ! by Anstey (2004: 45), this adds to the pragmatic-centricity of the model as opposed to the predicate-centricity of FG. In this respect FDG differs from most contemporary grammatical theories, which see the lexicon as the point of departure in the generation of linguistic structures. The top-down organization of FDG is a reflection of its commitment to the standard of psychological adequacy mentioned earlier and was strongly inspired by the psycholinguistic research of Levelt (1989).

6

   

Levelt  !  '  3    !''   ( $&%  , a . /% and an - %% . Conceptualization involves the creation of a communicative intention and the construction of preverbal message, i.e. a conceptual structure that will serve as input to the Formulator. The process of Formulation translates this preverbal conceptual structure into a linguistic structure (Levelt 1989: 11) and Articulation involves the execution of an acoustic plan by means of the appropriate physiological organs. All three components have a place in the FDG model, as can be seen in .  1 (cf. $&%$/&%5. /3 %and- %%). Figure 1 shows that there are four major modules in the organization of FDG: the conceptual, the contextual, the grammatical and the output components. Hengeveld (2004b: 369) emphasizes that the conceptual component is the trigger for the grammatical component to operate. In his view, the conceptual component is responsible for two types of processes: the development of a communicative intention, which has a direct link with the interpersonal level in the grammar (see 1.3 below), and the creation of a conceptualization of that communicative intention, which directly connects to the representational level (Figure 2).3 The contextual component represents the speech situation and includes both linguistic and non-linguistic perceptual information. As the dynamics of discourse unfold, the contextual component receives information from the grammatical component and provides the conceptual component with data that are potentially relevant for the creation of new communicative intentions and conceptualizations. One could say that it is of the major functions of the contextual component to connect the grammatical component with the other modules. The output component corresponds to Levelt   ator. However, given the fact that FDG attempts to understand the structure of discourse acts as reflections of different kinds of knowledge deployed by the %    (J. Lachlan Mackenzie, personal communication), rather than just the & , the output may take different forms of expression (written, signed or spoken signs). It is important to emphasize that the conceptual, the contextual and the output components are not part of the grammatical component (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 669). Although some scholars have made proposals as to the contents or internal structure of the conceptual component (Anstey 2002, Nuyts 2004) and the contextual component (Connolly 2004),4 FDG, as a linguistic theory, is centrally concerned with the grammatical



2% %

7

component, whose internal structure will be laid out in greater detail in the following section. "  " 

Formulation

Pragmatics, Semantics

Primitives

Encoding

Morphosyntax, Phonology

" # " 

  " 

Primitives

Articulation $  "  Expression

. 1(General layout of FDG (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 669)

1.3. Levels and layers The grammatical component in FDG is shown in more detail in Figure 2 (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 670).

8

   

Frames Lexemes Primary operators

Formulation

Interpersonal Level

Representational Level

Templates Auxiliaries Secondary operators

Morphosyntactic Encoding

Morphosyntactic level

Prosodic patterns Morphemes Secondary operators

Phonological Encoding

Phonological level

. 9( The grammatical component in FDG

Figure 2 shows that FDG posits four levels of representation in the grammatical component: the Representational level, the Interpersonal level (both inherited from classical FG), as well as the Morphosyntactic level (also referred to as the ":&  or '% % ) and the Phonological



2% %

9

level. As noted by Anstey (2004), there is a clear correspondence between the levels and the main areas of linguistic analysis: (3)   

+ /% '/% ; &*%: +*

2% &  & %% ; &*%% +

The ovals in Figures 1 and 2 indicate stages in the procedure at which particular operations take place in the grammatical component. . /% means that at this point pragmatic and semantic representations are being produced; the two " stages indicate where morphosyntactic and phonological representations (in that order) are being generated. Each operation has of its own set of primitives in the form of frames, templates and operators (among others). Although primitives are assumed to be language-specific (the lexemes of a language are perhaps the most obvious examples of language-dependent primitives), FDG aims at discovering significant cross-linguistic generalizations and hierarchies, which can predict the number and type of frames and templates that a language employs on the basis of a limited set of parameters. Unlike FG, the four levels of representation are independently organized and relate to one another through /&& , signified by arrows. One of the features of FG that is preserved in FDG concerns the use of hierarchical (layered) representations to account for differences in scope. In the next section we will discuss the internal organization of each level in the grammatical component in more detail. The discussion of layering, however, has been postponed to section 2.2, which deals with the layered analysis of both NPs and clauses (or  %).

1(B*/ ?"@>  A*% (19) / A*0+?&@ (20) 4/     A* % (21) /     These examples also show that we can characterize a linguistic category by using a combination of a formal and a functional name. Thus, a name such as A* -% informs us about the function (qualifying, rather than e.g. quantifying or localizing) as well as the form of the modifier in question (namely that the constituent belongs to the word class Adjective). One could do the same with Noun Phrase, i.e. combine this formal category label with functional labels such as Subject ('#% 0+) or Qualifying (A*0+), but it seems that in this case the problem outlined above is more difficult to circumvent (perhaps this is typical for higher-level categories like Noun Phrase or Term).13 In spite of this labelling problem, and for all practical purposes, we have decided to use the name Noun Phrase, even though this volume is not restricted to prototypical noun phrases (also devoting discussion to proper names, pronominal terms and other terms not headed by a proper noun) and in spite of the fact that a wide variety of both formal and functional issues concerning         % #!      3 '    same chapter (see e.g. Garc     ution; for more discussion on the terminology issue see Bakker and Pfau this volume).



2% %

17

2.1. The Noun Phrase in Functional (Discourse) Grammar It is possible to recognize three stages in the representation of NPs in F(D)G: 1. FG I: '      -up model; 2. FG II: multi-layered (hierarchical) representations in a bottom-up model; 3. FDG: multi-layered representations in a multiple-level, top-down model. The first two stages are separated by the introduction of a layered model of the NP in Dik .% // ; the introduction of .%3   // (section 1) marks the beginning of the third and present stage. Initially NPs (erms   !    -hierarchical or '  structures (Dik 1978: 57; Dik 1989: 55, 115):14 (22) (xi: 1(xi): 2(xi): ...: n(xi))

[n 1]

or (Dik 1997a: 132): (23) (xi: 1(xi): 2(xi): ...: n(xi))

[n 1]

In this NP schema / stands for various kinds of grammatical categories in the NP (called term operators), such as "!'

 "  ! ! ") #     ! $"$! mber). xi is the variable ranging over the set of potential referents (see below on variables for semantic categories).15 Each / signifies a predicate (typically a nominal, adjectival or verbal predicate), and each (xi)/(xi) is an open predication in (xi), i.e. a frame in which all the argument positions but that of xi have been filled. Open predications are also called restrictors, because they successively restrict the range of possible referents of the NP. The first restrictor (1/1) is normally the head noun; the others restrictors can take a variety of forms, such as an adjective, a verb (often heading a relative clause), or a possessor NP (in which case we would be dealing with a so-called term predicate; see (25) below). The colon between the restrictors indicates that the information to the right gives a specification of, or a restriction on, the possible values of xi as it has been specified at that point. To give an example, the underlying structure of the simple NP %% #is as follows:

18

   

(24) (d3xi: dogN (xi): bigA (xi))  three big dogs This is to be paraphrased as !'  /i such that the property ! #      /i, such that the property #      /i ";3 1989: 115). A complex NP, which contains one or more /# modifiers, may look like this: (25) (d3xi: dogN (xi): bigA (xi): {d1xj: gardenN (xj)Location}(xi))   #! #  #! In this example the third restrictor {d1xj: gardenN (xj)Location}(xi) is expressed as a prepositional phrase ( %  ), which is analysed as a term predicate with the semantic function Location (on term predicates, see Dik 1997a: 204-206).16 The next example has as the second restrictor a relative clause headed a verb, which refers to an event or situation (i.e. a temporal entity), which is symbolized by the e-variable, introduced in Vet (1986), which is also employed in FDG (see also section 1.3.2; m = plural, R = relative operator): (26) (dmxi: dogN (xi): [Past ei: attackV (Rxi)Agent (dmxj: childN (xj))Goal])  ! #  3!   ! Several changes were proposed to modify the original schema; this section only highlights the use of different  # for semantic categories in the modelling of linguistic expressions. The employment of * , another major change in the representation of NPs, is discussed in section 2.2. Apart from variables for term operators () and predicates (), the first book-length publication on FG used only variables /' # ! $'    ";3 1978: xi). With the introduction of layering into FG (Hengeveld 1989), however, the number of variables for/%%3

 expanded considerably. Dik (1989: 50; 1997a: 93) lists variables for five categories (notice that the y-variable has disappeared): (27) ORDER 0 1 2 3 4

STRUCTURE predicate 1st order term predication proposition clause

TYPE Property/Relation Spatial entity17 State of Affairs Possible fact Speech Act

VARIABLE f x e X E



2% %

19

Dik (1989: 113; 1997a: 129) explicitly stated that entities are mental constructs. Presumably many mental constructs of spatio-temporal entities do not exist independently of entities in the external physical world, but the relation between a mental construct of an entity and its counterpart in the real world is a difficult issue with a long philosophical history that we will not discuss here. Suffice to say that the problematic relation between mental and physical entities in the representation of linguistic expressions has also been given due attention in FG and FDG (e.g. Vet 1998), and is also touched upon in this book (see, for example, the contributions by Escribano, Keizer and Rijkhoff). Having different variables for the various kinds of entities offers several advantages for the representation of linguistic expressions. To mention one that is relevant for the current volume, they make it possible to distinguish between nouns that are used to talk about different kinds of entities (Dik 1989: 180-181). Thus, an NP headed by a noun denoting a concrete object like %# (a first-order noun) contains an x-variable, as in (d1 xi: tableN (xi))18 %%#, whereas an NP headed by an event noun such as /% (a second-order noun) will contain an e-variable as in (d1 ei: meetingN (ei)) %/% (Dik 1997a: 214-216). The use of different variables for different kinds of entities is also motivated by the fact that different kinds of entities are specified for different kinds of properties. Thus, a first-order noun like %# can be specified for spatial properties (such as weight, size, or colour   *C C# %#), whereas a second-order noun like 4 can be characterized in terms of temporal properties (e.g. duration, as in  B 4; cf. Rijkhoff 2001).19 There are also other grammatical phenomena that can be accounted for by using separate variables for distinct categories, such as the fact that languages may employ different anaphoric pronouns for different kinds of entities (Dik 1997b: 223-228). For example, English uses anaphoric % for spatial objects (symbolized by the x-variable), whereas anaphoric is used for possible facts (here symbolized by the X-variable; notice that we only use skeleton representations to bring out the contrast): (28) a. $  &&D%# E 5#%,*&& b. drop (Cherie) (xi: the briefcase), but pick_up (Tony) (Axi) (29) a. %%%%D)44E +% %% % b. think (John) (Xi: [Bill would win]) and think (Peter) (AXi) too

20

   

In addition to the categories listed in (27), variables have been proposed for places, times, manners and quantities and it seems that    logy of entities" $ and Mackenzie eds. 2005: 166) will continue to be expanded.20 The current list of variables for semantic categories in FDG at the Representational Level is as follows (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 673):21 (30) SEMANTIC CATEGORY Individual State-of-Affairs Propositional content Property/relation Location Time

VARIABLE x e p f l t

EXAMPLES (NOUNS)  5# % 354 %  /%5F5/ 5#F5&  5F5  5%&F5# 4 * 45F5*%/

Notice furthermore that linguistic expressions such as NPs and clauses can be regarded as constituting a separate ontological category with their own set of variables. This makes it possible to distinguish between linguistic expressions and the referents of those expressions (Rijkhoff 2002: 228).22 For example, one could argue that in (31) the pronoun  refers to the referent of '&, but that the pronoun in boldface %% refers to the name .% rather than the referent of that name: (31) A:2%'&.%( B: G*%&  H (i.e. 9  did you stop calling her (  ? In FDG anaphoric reference to linguistic forms or constructions is accounted for at the morphosyntactic level, where they are provided with an index (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 675; Hengeveld this volume). 2.2. Layering in the noun phrase The most significant development in FG was Hengeveld     alyse the clause as a hierarchically organized layered structure, in which each layer defines a different kind of entity. Furthermore, each individual layer comes with its own set of operators and satellites, symbolized by indexed variables  and  (representing various kinds of grammatical and lexical modifiers respectively; Hengeveld 1989; Dik 1989: 50).



2% %

21

Hengeveld   $ %   '   $!     !      '   (Hengeveld 1990: 3-6, 12): (32) (Ei: 4 ILL: 4 (S) (A) (3 Xi: 3333 (Xi): 3 (Xi))] (Ei): 5 (Ei)) (2 ei: [1 Predicate : 1 (xi) "/n)] (ei): 2 (ei)) *  /   xi: term pred: predicate frame ei: predication Xi: proposition ILL: illocution frame Ei: clause

& %       : term operators 1: predicate operators 2: predication operators 3: proposition operators 4: illocution operators



IL

RL

%%

1: predicate satellites 2: predication satellites 3: proposition satellites 4: illocution satellites 5: clause satellites

To illustrate this proposal with a concrete example, let us consider the representation of + ##*5%% #4 # % . At the Representational Level (RL), the speaker describes one event in which three big dogs engage in the activity of barking. This is constructed on the basis of the predicate frame (roughly, argument structure) of the lexeme # , which offers one slot for the agent of the action. It is in that position that the NP representation in (23) is inserted. The verbal predicate is furthermore modified by the 1 operator Prog (progressive aspect), and the whole predication is located in time by the 2 operator Past and in space by the 2 satellite % : (33) (Past ei: [Prog barkV (d3xi: dogN (xi): bigA (xi))Agent ] (ei): (d1xj: gardenN (xj))Location (ei)) At the Interpersonal Level (IL), the speaker evaluates the actual occurrence of the State of Affairs described in (33) as probable through the 3 proposition satellite & ##*. Finally, the whole linguistic expression is characterized as a declarative speech act, which is represented through the 4 illocution operator DECL:

22

   

(34) (Ei: DECL ILL (S) (A) (Xi: 33333333(Xi): (probableA)Manner (Xi))] (Ei))

(Past ei: [Prog barkV (d3xi: dogN (xi): bigA (xi))Agent] (ei): (d1xj: gardenN (xj))Location (ei)) Hengeveld  $!  '        ! ! $ ;3 (1989, 1997a), but not in its entirety. One major difference concerned the way speech acts are represented in FG: as an E-variable in Dik (1989: 50; 1997a: 66) and as a predicate in Hengeveld  #    !rrent FDG. The schema in (32) shows that Hengeveld   $!icate ILL takes the speaker (S), the addressee (A) and the proposition (X) as its arguments and in this schema the E-variable stands for the utterance rather than the speech act. The illocutionary predicate frame is maintained in FDG, as we saw in section 1.1.1, although the variable for speech participants is now 5    %!!   '   3  the addressee. Hengeveld  #     !$! # ! 0rpersonal Level and the Representational Level, a distinction due to B<  ([1934] 1999) and Halliday ([1985] 2004). Even though there are obvious similarities between the schema in (32) and the schemas that are used at the interpersonal and representational levels in FDG (section 1), there are also certain differences, in particular with respect to the distribution of layers and entities. In current FDG, for example, the proposition (now symbolized by the p-variable) is an entity that is specified at the Representational level, as shown in (9), rather than the Interpersonal Level, as in FG (shown in (32) above). Inspired by Hengeveld ")*1+-b, 1988, 1989) first proposals for a layered analysis of clausal structures and by some of Aristotle  #   (+* V. II), Rijkhoff (1988) subsequently proposed a layered model of the noun phrase. Initially only three layers were recognized: the innermost layer for qualifying modifiers (A%** ), the outermost layer for localizing modifiers (% * ) and in between a A%%* * to accommodate quantifying modifiers (it is important to point out that in this approach  !'       #  ! /   !' categories, i.e. operators and restrictors or satellites). It was argued from the very beginning that the three-layered analysis of NPs also applied to clauses, indicating that NPs and clauses (or rather !     analysed in a similar fashion. To emphasize parallels between the underly-



2% %

23

ing structure of the NP and the clause, non-first restrictors were analysed as satellites.23 In Figure 3 the hierarchical organization of the layers is represented in a concentric fashion, showing more clearly that modifiers at an outer layer have semantic scope over material specified at the inner layer or layers ( = clause satellite, = NP satellite). Recall that there is no oneto-one relationship between form and function and this is especially true for satellites (as was shown in examples (16-21) above). Consequently, semantic modifier categories such as % or %, which are expressed by affixes, function words or other grammatical markers, can still be more or less profitably connected with a certain layer, but in the case of satellites the relation between form and function is so indirect that we can only list the various forms or constructions that are used as modifiers in the clause or NP (e.g. adverb(ial), adjective, relative clause). The three-layered NP structure also contained a slot for nominal aspect markers, a new grammatical category whose members further specify the ' % of a noun (i.e. lexicalized nominal aspect or  ! ' # indicating that the entity it denotes is, for example, a singular object rather than a collective entity (Rijkhoff 1991; 2002: 100-121; this volume).24 Nominal aspect is, of course, the counterpart of verbal aspect: perfective or imperfective aspect markers further specify the -% % of a verb (lexicalized verbal aspect or  ! ' As in the case of Hengeveld  $! $   '     layered analysis of NPs (and clauses or rather !ications  # $ adopted by Dik (1997a), in particular the distinction between qualifying, quantifying, and localizing operators (Dik 1997a: 163, 218). (35) a. I *$'% %  2-Loc 2-Quant ei: [1-Qual pred [V/A] (args)] b. I *, /'% %  2-Loc 2-Quant xi: [1-Qual pred [N]

(args)]

Notice, however, that both localizing and quantifying operators are treated as   ! $     ;3 (1997a: 219) believed   esearch should be done on the interaction between Quantification and Localization of SoAs-

24

   

//%:& 5A%*5 A%%*%% Location

3

3

Quantity

2

Quality

1

2,"-,2"5",$(

")-

-'+"$,

-'+"$,

2 1 Clause satellites: e.g.  #  #/ 5 &5 B*5%/5&5

'";".-$,2", ,"0'"

::& 5A%* A%%*%%

VERB N O U N '+-,2-"2J2'5

0I;)"5

0=;20-

NP satellites: e.g(%5 5& 5&3 %& 5 %

?20@".202,"0"'' $-20-2,K -'+"$,   

1 2 3

1 Quality Quantity

2

3

Location //%:& 5A%*5 A%%*%%0+ .  %! Further research into the layered NP structure and similarities between the underlying structure of the NPs and the clause has resulted in a schema that also has a special layer for classifying modifiers (Rijkhoff to appear, forth-



2% %

27

coming a-b; this volume). Classifying modifiers (0/ 0, 0/0) indicate what  of entity is being denoted, specifying features that (sub)-categorize entities into a system of smaller sets, as in (40a-b): (40) a.  4*  b(   %27 There is no longer a complete symmetry between operators and satellites in the 5-layered NP/clause model (Figure 4). It has emerged that the elements that were originally categorized as B* operators are actually 3 * operators and that ? '$#    ably do not occur (this is explained in Rijkhoff this volume).

2.3. The noun phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar. We have seen two major developments in the representation of the NP in F(D)G. One was Rijkhoff     /!2#% !  $! ysis of clausal structures to the NP, first suggested in 1988 and later partly adopted by Dik (1997a). The other major change occurred with the introduction of FDG (Hengeveld 2004a-b, 2005; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006). As mentioned in section 1, in certain respects FDG is a continuation of FG, in particular with regard to the basic assumptions, methods and goals that characterize structural-functional approaches to grammar (Butler 2003). But we can also see a clear break between FDG and its predecessor: the top-down organization, the focus on discourse acts rather than sentences as the basic unit of analysis, and the strictly modular approach with respect both to the four main components in FDG (grammatical, conceptual, contextual, output) and to the four levels inside the grammatical component (pragmatic, semantic, morphosyntactic, phonological). As to the NP, some features of the way NPs were analysed in FG have been adopted in FDG, albeit perhaps in some modified form, but there are also some important differences. First of all, we find a strict separation between the four levels in the grammatical component mentioned earlier. This is shown in (41) and (42) for the interpersonal and the representational levels (Hengeveld thisvolume): (41) 2% & > (R RI: ............ (RI): R (RI))

28

   

(42) & %%> (x xi: (f fi: LexN (fi): f (fi)) (xi): x (xi)) 

=& %        R Identifiability, Specificity x Location, Number f Shape, Measure



;  R Subjective attitude x Referent modification f Reference modification

Since discourse units are now analysed at four distinct levels, we also get four representations of the same NP:  at the Interpersonal Level (IL)  at the Representational Level (RL)  at the Morphosyntactic Level (ML)  at the Phonological Level (PL). If we temporarily ignore the Phonological Level, the NP %%%  is represented as follows in FDG (Hengeveld this volume; R = referential subact, T = ascriptive subact): (43) ( id RI:   (1 xi:

TI

TJ

(RI))  

(fi: girlN (fi)) (xi): (fj: intelligentA (fj))(xi))

[[theart] [[intelligentA]AP girlN-8NP1]NP2

(IL)

(RL)

(ML)

The same unit would be represented in classical FG as follows: (44)

(d1xi: girlN (xi): intelligentA (xi))

The most conspicuous difference between the two models resides in the greater degree of exhaustiveness of the FDG representation thanks to the separation of levels. The FG representation in (44) comes close to the Representational Level in (43), but again, there are some significant differences. Definiteness, symbolized by !"@@  '! 0rsonal level in FDG and represented through the combination of the Identifiability operator (!! :'ntial subact variable :-.  



2% %

29

opens the way to a search for more interpersonal modifiers in the NP, a topic which is touched upon by several authors, especially Butler, in their contributions to this volume. Another obvious difference results from the addition of the morphosyntactic level in FDG. FG representations show semantic rather than syntactic properties and relations and, consequently, there is no underlying syntactic structure. Differences in constituent order across languages are accounted for through general principles, which restrict the range of possible syntactic configurations. FDG, however, assumes that general principles of word order impose restrictions not on semantic representations, but on syntactic configurations, and thus restrict the potential set of templates which are available as primitives in the grammar of languages. The representations in (43) also show that, strictly speaking, we cannot use labels such as     0sonal and the Representational Levels in FDG. At the Interpersonal Level we only know that the linguistic expression to be produced in the output component is the result of a definite referential subact (RI), which contains the two ascriptive subacts TI (girlN) and TJ (intelligentA). The Representational Level just gives us a semantic schema or frame in which the '      filled with the nominal predicate  . Another important contrast, this time with Rijkhoff    , concerns the way layers are organized in FDG, which uses the same basic format at all levels (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 671): (45) (A 1: [head] (1): A"1)) In this structure, 1 symbolizes some variable (e.g. R '   x '  !$ ' $A    

 &  % %

by operator A (and function ), and by the head and optional modifiers A-

By contrast, Rijkhoff  !      "instead of non-first restrictors) and both operators and satellites basically serve as predicates that take a certain layer in its scope (rather than a variable). Nevertheless, one could still argue that at some abstract level of representation NPs and clauses are assigned the same underlying structure both in Rijkhoff B5A   !  and in FDG (even though this is perhaps not always evident from the names used for same-level operator and modifier categories in FDG, as shown in (42)).

30

   

Notice, finally, that the superscripts on the variables for operators and modifiers in (40) and (42) indicate that FDG layers are not so much established on the basis of scopal differences between the various kind of operators and satellites, as in Rijkhoffs model, but is rather motivated by the availability of a variable for a particular kind of entity (R, x, f). 4     The previous sections have shown that there are basically three proposals concerning the way NPs should be analysed in F(D)G: 1. the analysis according to  

 ";3 1997); 2. the analysis proposed in FDG (Hengeveld this volume; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006); 3. the combined NP/clause analysis put forward by Rijkhoff (this volume; to appear). FDG, as the natural successor to FG, has adopted some aspects of the way NPs have been analysed in FG, but as we saw above, the new architecture has also made it possible, and sometimes even necessary, to come up with some new features (notably the strict separation between levels). To what extent FDG can or will accommodate Rijkhoff    sals depends on several factors. One of the major obstacles seems to be that in FDG layering is intricately connected with variables for entities at the representational level, whereas in Rijkhoff    %   $ ' !fferences in the semantic scope of operators and satellites. As may be expected, some of the papers in the present volume (those by Hengeveld, Escribano, Rijkhoff and Keizer) primarily deal with matters of representation. Others, however, are more concerned with the practical application of the model with regard to discourse-interpersonal matters (Butler, Connolly), whereas the contributions by Bakker and Pfau and by Garc    mainly deal with morphosyntactic issues. It is also true, however, that one cannot make a very strict thematic division between the chapters in this volume, as one of the advantages of the FDG model is precisely the fact that grammatical phenomena can be treated from different perspectives (pragmatic, morphosyntactic, etc.) in a coherent fashion. In the opening article, Kees Hengeveld (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) lays bare the analysis of the NP within the general structure of FDG. He argues that the separation between the interpersonal, the repre-



2% %

31

sentational, and the morphosyntactic levels of analysis in FDG allows for a more transparent and systematic treatment of noun phrases. Hengeveld takes the prototypical noun phrase as his point of departure, which he defines as an NP with a nominal head that denotes a concrete, first-order entity by lexical means and is used referentially rather than ascriptively. He then discusses examples of non-prototypical NPs from various languages and shows how they can be analysed in FDG. Jan Rijkhoff (University of Aarhus, Denmark) puts forward an alternative, 5-layered model of the NP (with parallels in the clause) within the general framework of FDG, which has separate layers for classifying, qualifying, quantifying, localizing and discourse-referential modifiers (in this approach the term  !'  !   # ! /  modifier categories). In his view, there should be no special slot for a modifier that specifies a subjective attitudinal meaning (Hengeveld  :modifiers), since such meanings can be expressed in many different ways (e.g. lexically, grammatically, morphosyntactically, prosodically  or a combination of these). Rijkhoff then suggests that all components of the FDG model represent some kind of context and argues that a separate ":3 % C'%%$/&% (C-context  !!!!  odate elements from the extra-linguistic context (notably the speech situation, including the speech participants), which in current FDG are represented in the $%:%$/&% and at the Interpersonal level in the //%$/&%. JosD 6   &E & C      "F% $ ' G%!   provides a critical assessment of the ways the NP has been analysed in FG and FDG. He observes a number of inconsistencies in the way FDG uses variables, operators and scope, which, he argues, can be eliminated if a hierarchical, binary-branching NP structure is assumed. He suggests FDG should reintroduce Dik  idea of */ , / $% % and extend the current ontology of entities. The result would be a more cogent treatment of scope and NP syntax, which does not force the theory to abandon any of its fundamental methodological principles. Evelien Keizer (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) also deals with matters of representation in her analysis of the notions of reference and ascription in FDG. She argues that variables at the representational level represent the   /   t '   ntity described, rather than the intended referent. As a consequence, a clear separation is established between the grammatical component and the contextual component in FDG. She tests the validity of her proposal against a wide variety of

32

   

forms and constructions, such as copular sentences, proper names, pronouns and appositive structures. In his article on interpersonal meaning, Christopher S. Butler (University of Wales, Swansea, UK) deals with several issues. The first part focuses on the way speaker attitude is handled in the two NP models presented in this volume: as a modifier by Hengeveld and as a global qualification of an entity by Rijkhoff. In the second part Butler argues that there are two types of interpersonal meaning: one is concerned with the discourse context (orienting the addressee towards the actuality or nonactuality of an event), the other with speech acts and certain types of modality (having to do with social and personal context). The main body of the article investigates in considerable detail the kind of interpersonal meaning that is oriented towards the social and personal context (i.e. the second type), which is illustrated with many examples from English and Spanish. The last section offers a detailed corpus-based investigation of English & as an interpersonal modifier, when it is used to express sympathy towards the referent named in the NP. Pragmatic issues also take centre stage in the article by John Connolly (Loughborough University, England, UK) on freestanding NPs in written documents: NPs that are more or less peripheral to the main body of discourse and have been characterized as instances of  3 nguage (Quirk et al. 1985: 845847). The article investigates how freestanding NPs may be treated in FDG and in particular examines the implications for the integration of grammar and pragmatics. Connolly discusses several kinds of pragmatic functions that a freestanding NP can fulfil, showing that these extra-clausal NPs are used in relation with linguistic as well as nonlinguistic material (such as images). He argues that FDG should incorporate freestanding NPs, proposes a preliminary list of additional pragmatic functions and suggests that the formulation of   '# rules  !'acilitate the integration of FDG into a wider theory of verbal interaction. Dik Bakker and Roland Pfau (both University of Amsterdam) deal with agreement in the NP against the background of the */ ":&   proposed by Bakker in several earlier studies. The authors assume a process interpretation of the F(D)G model in which matters of form and order are interlaced. Their contribution is particularly concerned with agreement phenomena in the German noun phrase, which is noted for its morphological complexity. They show that their model can account for NP-internal agreement phenomena, including speech errors, as attested in a large corpus of spoken German.



2% %

33

Daniel Garc    (University of Oviedo) examines the so-called Complex Noun Phrase Constraint within the context of FDG. The existence of restrictions on the displacement of syntactic units is arguably a challenge to functional theories of grammar, which do not make use of movement transformations, because they seem to provide a strong argument in favour of the need for an autonomous syntactic component in grammar. However, the author argues that the constraint cannot be explained on the basis of configurational restrictions alone and that the activation status of referents in discourse is crucial to a proper understanding of the phenomenon. He then shows how the cognitive status of referents can be represented in the contextual component of FDG. We hope this introduction gives the reader a good idea of the way NPs are handled in FDG and that it shows that this new theory offers an interesting and valuable framework in which to describe and explain grammatical phenomena. The relation between linguistic theories and linguistic research should be bidirectional: theories open up new paths of research, and research, in its turn, provides results that eventually lead to changes in the theory. Most of the papers in the present volume illustrate this dual relationship: they test the theory by analysing the NP from different angles and on the basis of facts from various languages, ultimately suggesting certain modifications of the theory. This, we believe, is clear evidence of the strength and the flexibility of the new theory of .%   // . Given the youth of the model there are of course many aspects that have remained undiscussed or need a more detailed treatment, but we look forward to the start of a lively debate on the basis of the data and proposals presented in this volume. Finally, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to several people who offered their generous help in the editing process. Unfortunately, the names of about a dozen colleagues cannot be revealed as they have acted as anonymous referees in the selection procedure, but we would like to express here our warmest thanks for their valuable advice. We are also grateful to Lachlan Mackenzie who carefully read the entire manuscript and offered many very useful comments, with regard to both form and content. Daniel Garc    also wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Dept. of Anglogermanic and French Studies and the Research Vice-Rectorate of the University of Oviedo. Gij" H  ";3 October 2007

34

   

&   The name .% // is still used in the conference announcements, even though nowadays most of the contributions are concerned with .3 %  // . 2. In what follows, we will employ the acronym F(D)G as a way of conflating the theory of Functional Grammar (FG) and Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). 3. The need for a conceptual component in FG was noted as far back as Nuyts (1992). Anstey (2002) is a proposal for the internal structure of the conceptual component within FDG. 4. See the articles by Butler, Connolly, Rijkhoff and Garc   in this volume. 5. In Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006) the Illocutionary frame restricts a variable    3 ! gnate a Speech Occurrence. 6. However, as will be shown in 2.1, FDG introduces two more variables  ! ' ! ! ## %!     ctively. 7. As a matter of fact, Connolly (1991) renamed functional patterns as syntactic templates( 8. Dik (1989: 348) defines P1 as  %  $  %    initial position (...), used for special purposes, including the placement of constituents with Topic or Focus function9. In FDG  # &  or & % &  only includes the predicate and its modifiers, so it should not be confused with the VP in Chomskyan-type generative grammars (this is the way it is used in Escribano   . Thus, the predicate phrase in  %# only consists of one element, . Section 2 discusses the way &  is used in this book. 10. For this reason Dik (1997a: 130) distinguished between two kinds of 'rring(  % % % and  % %%. Notice that in F(D)G we cannot really speak of    '  % !   $ntactic level. 11. In its logical sense, a % / (Latin % /) is an atomic element without a structure of its own (Vendler 1971: 116; Lyons 1977: 148). Even though in FG the notion 

 $ % $3! '/

  nserted into an argument slot of a predicate or into a adjunct (satellite) position, it was added that   $ $  ! ' ' -order spatial entities";3 1997b: 223). In a similar vein, Hengeveld (this volume) characterizes   !!  $          inal head that denotes a concrete object and is used referentially. 12. It is shown in Rijkhoff (forthcoming b) that the formal properties of this possessive construction in Dutch depend on the function it has as a modifier and vary systematically along certain parameters (Attribution, Predication, Reference). 1.



2% %

35

13. See also Dik (1997b: 92) who uses the name '  !'      are used to talk about spatial entities. 14. Mackenzie (1987) suggested omitting the x-variable after the colon in an attempt to get away from the logical-semantic nature of the representation and make it more pragmatically adequate (see also Dik 1989: 262; Dik 1997a: 63; Butler 2003: 278-279). 15. The x-variable gets a similar interpretation in FDG: the set of possible firstorder referents. 16. Mackenzie (1992b) has argued that certain prepositions are better categorized as predicates (rather than the formal expression of some function). 17. For the distinction between first-order entities (spatial objects), second-order entities (events, states, and other temporal objects or states of affairs), thirdorder entities (i.e. propositions), etc. see Lyons (1977). 18. Note that this representation does not contain an '% -Dik (1997a: 63) justifies its absence in representations for the sake of simplicity. 19. These are simple examples. In practice matters can be rather more interesting. For example, when a second order modifier such as % is used in combination with a first order entity such as #, as in  %#, the adjective forces us to interpret the book as a temporal entity, as it refers to the moment the book was published (i.e. an event). 20. See Mackenzie (1992a, 1998b, 2001) on variables for places, times and manners, Olbertz (1998) on times and Hengeveld and Wanders (2007) on quantities. Some important contributions concerning variables for entities in FG can be found in a collection of  !# !!$ $ and Mackenzie (2005), who also put the articles in a wider historical perspective. 21. Note that the C% ;  !     ysis of the Interpersonal level in FDG with the variables for the Discourse Act (A) and Speech Occurrence (F), as shown in 1.1.1. 22. For a critical discussion of this proposal, see Keizer (this volume). On variables in the NP schemas, see also Rijkhoff (1992: 190-191). Escribano (this volume) is a critical treatment of variables in F(D)G from a strictly logical perspective. 23. The name % /%% was first used in Mackenzie (1983). Interestingly, in FDG a development in the reverse direction has taken place: the clausal adjuncts that were called    #!!    ;24. On ' % see Rijkhoff (2002: ch. 2). 25. In Rijkhoff's version, modifiers at the Interpersonal Level specify % #3 % rather than #% properties (as in FDG). 26. The relationship between discourse-referential modifiers in the clause and the NP is discussed in more detail in Rijkhoff and Seibt (2005); see also Rijkhoff (this volume).

36

   

27. The phrase #* % is potentially ambiguous, meaning either    ' an unidentified boy" -classifying) or  3! of shirt" 

'ying); cf. Taylor (1996: 665) and Willemse (2005).

*    Anstey, Matthew P. 2002 Layers and operators revisited. G  +&   .% // 77. 2004 Functional Grammar from its inception. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04- %3 %    .% // , 2371. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Anstey, Matthew P. and J. Lachlan Mackenzie (eds.) 2005 $    .% // (Functional Grammar Series 26). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Bolkestein, A. Machtelt 1998 What to do with Topic and Focus? Evaluating pragmatic information. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //  #2% %, 193214. Amsterdam: Benjamins. B< K 1999 Reprint. '& % >   %%   '& . Stuttgart: UTB. Jena: Fischer, 1934. Butler, Christopher S. 1991 Standards of Adequacy in Functional Grammar.  3 % 27: 499-515. 1999 Nuevas perspectivas de la GramE ncional: los estE!  ! adecuaci !   - 0( L     - M  :!  4  Javier Mart !    >- :& "! - 0& &% /!%.5 219-256. Barcelona: Ariel. 2003 '% %   .%>   % ,  ;  '% % 3 .% , ( + % 1> -&&  % % '/&: $M + %9>. /$% )*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Connolly, John H. 1991 $%%%=  .% // . Berlin: Foris. 2004 The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"eds.), -04- %%  .% // ,



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211242. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Freestanding noun phrases within documents: A pragmatic approach based on FDG. Connolly, John H., Roel M. Vismans, Christopher S. Butler and Richard A. Gatward (eds.) 1997  + /%.% // ( Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Dik, Simon C. 1978 .% // (Publications in Language Sciences 7). Dordrecht: Foris. 1980 '%.% // . London: Academic Press. 1989 , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 9). Dordrecht: Foris. 1997a , , *  .% // ( + % 1> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20). Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b , , *  .% // (+ %9>$/&:  $% % (Functional Grammar Series 21). Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Garc   ; this vol. Functional Discourse Grammar and extraction from (complex) noun phrases. G&  > D1996 La organizaci OE? !  /  ! ! %'ncional. In: M. Caneda and J. PD&"! -="%23   $%:%  0 ,, 42-68. Vigo: Universidade de Vigo. Groot, Casper de 2005 Morphosyntactic templates. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% ":&   .% // , 135161. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Hannay, Mike and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.) 1998 .% //    # 2% %. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Hannay, Mike and Caroline Kroon 2005 Acts and the relationship between discourse and grammar. .% 12-1: 87124.

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Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood 2004 - 2% % % .% // (third edition, revised by Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen). London: Arnold. First published 1985. Hengeveld, Kees 1987a The Spanish mood system. G +& .% //

22. 1987b Clause structure and modality. In: Johan van der Auwera and Louis Goossens (eds.), 2=%%+ % (Functional Grammar Series 6), 5366. Dordrecht: Foris. 1988 Illocution, mood and modality in a functional grammar of Spanish.  '/% 6: 227269. 1989 Layers and operators.    % 25: 127-157. [also in: Anstey and Mackenzie (eds.), 146] 1990 The hierarchical structure of utterances. In: Jan Nuyts, A. Machtelt Bolkestein and Co Vet (eds.), * & %% , *>.%4, 123. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1992 03 # + %>, *5,*&*5 *. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997 Cohesion in Functional Grammar. In: John H. Connolly, Roel M. Vismans, Christopher S. Butler and Richard A. Gatward (eds.), 3    + /%  .% // 5 116. (Functional Grammar Series 18.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  G&-GonzElez (eds.), -04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% ":&   .% // , 53-86. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar J- &GonzE &! >- 6  43& "! - '%  .%   // , 927. Bern: Peter Lang.



2% %

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Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. fc. .%  // . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hengeveld, Kees and Gerry Wanders 2007 Adverbial conjunctions in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mike Hannay and Gerard Steen (eds.), '% % 3% %  "  // > 2     ; , 211-227. Amsterdam/Philadelphia PA: Benjamins. Keizer, Evelien this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: an inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Kroon, Caroline 1997 Discourse markers, discourse structure and Functional Grammar. In: John H. Connolly, Roel M. Vismans, Christopher S. Butler and Richard A. Gatward (eds.),  + /%.% // 5 1732. (Functional Grammar Series 18.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Lefebvre, Claire 1998 Multifunctionality and variation among grammars: the case of the determiner in Haitian and in Fongbe.  +$   13-1: 93150. Lefebvre, Claire and Anne-Marie Brousseau 2002 - // .#. (Mouton Grammar Library 25.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Levelt, Willem J.M. 1989 '&> . / 2%% % - %%. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Lyons, John 1977 '/%(II vols.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan 1983 Nominal predicates in a Functional Grammar of English. In: Simon C. Dik (ed.), -.% // (Publications in the Language Sciences 11), 31-51. Dordrecht: Foris. 1987 The representation of nominal predicates in the fund. G  +3 & .% // 25. 1992a Places and things. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %       .3 %+ &%, 253276. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1992b English spatial prepositions in Functional Grammar. G +&  .% // 46. 2006

40

    1998a

The basis of syntax in the holophrase. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //    # 2% 3 %, 267296. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1998b On referring to manners. In: Johan van der Auwera, Frank Durieux and Ludo Lejeune (eds.), "/>,   , 245-251. Munich: Lincom Europa. 2001 Adverbs and adpositions: The Cinderella categories of Functional Grammar. %$ "%2 41: 119135. 2004 Functional Discourse Grammar and language production. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! -- 04 - %%    .% // , 179195. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan and G&-GonzE &4! J#  "! - 2004 -04- %%  .% // ( (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 '%.%  // ( (Linguistic Insights 26.) Bern: Peter Lang. Nuyts, Jan 1992 -&%$%3+ /%, *. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 2004 Remarks on layering in a cognitive-functional language production model. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#eles G&GonzE &"! --04- %%  .% // , 275 298. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Olbertz, Hella 1998  #+ & .% // '& (Functional Grammar Series 22). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik 1985 - $/&  //   % " . London: Longman. Rijkhoff, Jan 1988 A typology of operators. G  +&   .% //

29. 1990 Toward a unified analysis of terms and predications. In: Jan Nuyts, A. Machtelt Bolkestein and Co Vet (eds.), *  &3

%%% *>%4, 165191. Amsterdam: Benjamins. [also in: Anstey and Mackenzie (eds.), 4774]. 1991 Nominal aspect.  '/% 8: 291309. 1992 The noun phrase: a typological study of its form and structure. Ph.D. diss., University of Amsterdam. 2001 Dimensions of adnominal modification. In: Martin Haspelmath et al. (eds.)5  ,*&*  % I > - 2% 3



2% %

41

%#?/1@, 522-533. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. 2002 , 0 + . Oxford: Oxford University Press [a revised and expanded paperback edition was published in 2004]. this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar. to appear Descriptive and discourse-referential modifiers in a layered model of the noun phrase.% 46-4, 2008. fc. a Synchronic and diachronic evidence for parallels between the layered structure of NPs and sentences. In: Folke Josephson and Ingmar SP "! -. /%>&%5%5/5% *(+ %. %$B/,*3 &*     + &%  % N%#  I %*5 1O%391%0(9PPL. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. fc. b On the co-variation between form and function of adnominal possessive modifiers in Dutch and English. In: William B. McGregor (ed.), ,":& + (The Expression of Cognitive Categories, Volume 2). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Rijkhoff, Jan and Johanna Seibt 2005 Mood, definiteness and specificity: A linguistic and a philosophical account of their similarities and differences. '&  3 , %   '&   32: 85-132. [http://ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/tfs/index] Saeed, John I. 2003 '/%, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell. Siewierska, Anna 1991 .% // . London: Routledge. Taylor, John R. 1996 +". Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Valin, Robert D., Jr. and Randy J. LaPolla 1997 '*%:( '% % 5 /  %. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vendler, Zeno 1971 Singular Terms. In: D. D. Steinberg, L. and A. Jakobovits (eds.), '/%, 115133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vet, Co 1986 A pragmatic approach to Tense in Functional Grammar. G  +& .% // 16. 1998 The multilayered structure of the utterance. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //    # 2% 3 %, 113. Amsterdam: Benjamins. [also in: Anstey and Mackenzie (eds.), 299324]

42

   

Vries, Lourens de 2005 Towards a typology of tail-head linkage in Papuan languages. '% 29-2: 363384. Willemse, Peter 2005 Nominal reference-point constructions: possessives and esphoric NPs in English. Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of Leuven.



'  ( 5  (         

   1 The aim of this paper is to show how the various functions and forms of a noun phrase can be handled in Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). In order to do so, I will take what may be called the standard, prototypical noun phrase as my point of departure. The standard noun phrase (i) has a nominal head; (ii) denotes a concrete, first-order entity; (iii) denotes by lexical means; and (iv) is used referentially.2 This type of noun phrase is discussed in section 3, after a brief introduction to FDG in section 2. Sections 47 then study noun phrases which lack one of the properties of standard noun phrases, in the order in which these properties are listed above. The conclusion will be that the separation between the interpersonal, the representational, and the morphosyntactic levels of analysis in FDG allows for a systematic treatment of standard and non-standard noun phrases. %    3 2.1. Introduction Figure 1 gives a general overview of the FDG model. A summary of the various properties of this model may be found in Hengeveld (2005) and Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006); a full presentation of the model is given in Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.). At the interpersonal level the hierarchical structure given in (1) applies: (1)

(M1: [(A1: [ILL (P1)S (P2)A (C1: [...(T1) (R1)...] (C1))] (A1))] (M1))

The hierarchically highest unit of interpersonal analysis given here is the move (M), which may contain one or more discourse acts (A). A discourse act is organized on the basis of an illocutionary frame (ILL), which has two

44



speech act participants (P, the speaker S and the addressee A) and the communicated content C evoked by the speaker as its arguments. The communicated content, in turn, contains a varying number of ascriptive (T) and referential (R) Subacts. Note that the latter two units are operative at the same layer, i.e. there is no hierarchical relation between them. In general, then, at the interpersonal level units are analysed in terms of their communicative function.

Frames Lexemes Primary Operators

Formulation

(M1: [(A1: [ILL (P1)S (P2)A (C1: [(T1) (R1)] (C1))] (A1))] (M1)) (Interpersonal Level)

(ep1: [(p1: [(e1: [(f1) (x1)] (e1))] (p1))] (ep1) (Representational Level)

Templates Auxiliaries Secondary Operators

Morphosyntactic Encoding

[[[lexemeAdj]AdjP lexemeN]NP [lexemeV [lexemeAdv]AdvP]VP]CL (Morphosyntactic Level)

Prosodic Patterns Morphemes Secondary Operators

Phonological Encoding

/ xxx#XXX#xxx#XXX \ / (Phonological Level)

. 1( Outline of FDG



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

45

At the representational level the layers presented in (2) are relevant: (2)

(ep1: [(p1: [(e1: [(f1) (x1)] (e1))] (p1))] (ep1))

At this level of analysis linguistic units are described in terms of the entity type they denote. These entity types are of different orders: third-order entities or propositional contents (p); second-order entities or states of affairs (e); first-order entities or individuals (x); and zero-order entities or properties (f). Propositions may furthermore be joined into episodes (ep). Note that first-order and zero-order entities belong to the same layer, i.e. there is no hierarchical relation between them. At the structural level, constituent structure representations of clauses, phrases and words are given, such as for instance in (3): (3)

[[[lexemeA]AP lexemeN]NP [lexemeV [lexemeAdv]AdvP]VP]CL e.g. .  A manN dancedV badlyAdv.

At this level underlying units become more language-specific, but the assumption is that differences between languages can be described systematically along typological parameters. An important property of the model is that the interpersonal, representational, and morphosyntactic levels of linguistic organization are built up using different sets of primitives. The interpersonal and representational levels of organization are structured on the basis of pragmatic and semantic frames, into which lexemes and primary operators (i.e. operators that are defined in terms of their meaning) are inserted. The morphosyntactic level is organized in terms of structural templates, into which, apart from lexical material from the preceding levels, grammatical words and morphosyntactic secondary operators (i.e. operators anticipating bound grammatical expressions) are inserted. Finally, it is important to note that levels are related to each other through operations, represented in ovals Figure 1. There is a fundamental distinction between . /% on the one hand, and " on the other. The process of formulation is concerned with specifying those pragmatic and semantic configurations that are encoded within the language. In terms of formulation, languages may differ in e.g. the kind of pragmatic and semantic functions that are relevant for a description of their grammatical system, irrespective of whether these functions are encoded through syntax, morphology, etc. The process of encoding is concerned with the morphosyntactic and phonological form pragmatic/semantic con-

46



figurations take in the language. In terms of encoding, languages may differ in e.g. their word order, morphological types, phoneme inventory, etc. 4      3.1. Introduction An example of the standard noun phrase is given in (4): (4)

  &%:/(

The noun phrase %%%  is (i) headed by a noun ( ); (ii) denotes a first-order entity (the concrete object #lQ"!    #  lexical means, i.e. uses lexical items (%%,  ) to build up a picture of the concept transmitted; and (iv) is used by the speaker to refer to the first order-entity denoted.

3.2. The standard case in FDG In FDG a noun phrase such as the one in (4) may be represented as in (5): (5)  

(RI))  

( id RI:

TI

(1 xi:

(fi: girlN (fi)) (xi): (fj: intelligentA (fj))(xi))

TJ

[[theart] [[intelligentA]AP girlN-8NP1]NP2

(IL)

(RL)

(ML)

The referential use of the noun phrase is represented at the Interpersonal Level (IL), where RI indicates that the noun phrase instantiates a referential subact. This referential subact contains two instantiations of ascriptive subacts (TI and TJ). The denotation of the noun phrase is dealt with at the Representational Level (RL). Here xi indicates that the noun phrase denotes a first-order entity. This first-order entity has the lexically expressed properties fi and fj, which shows that denotation is achieved by lexical means. The nominal nature of the noun phrase is indicated at the represen-



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

47

tational level, too, where the subscript of the lexical item functioning as the head is  "B-G    ' '  #% rsonal and representational levels, the morphosyntactic encoder produces a noun phrase at the morphosyntactic level (ML).

3.3. Operators and modifiers  3SG.POSS-horn-3SG.OBJ-plenty  " -    $  At first sight it seems that the expression in (20) is not a noun phrase but a clause. However, as shown in (21), the same expression may take a possessive prefix, which a clause could never take, thus clearly showing the phrasal nature of the expression: & (Na-Dene; Golla 1985: 59) (21) 43/33:3> 1SG.POSS-3SG.POSS-horn-3SG.OBJ-plenty y cow" -$   plenty on it One way of interpreting this construction is that a concrete entity is characterized in terms of a state-of-affairs in which it is typically involved. In



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

51

other words: a first-order entity is characterized in terms of a second-order entity. Example (20) may be represented as in (22): (22) (xi: (ei: [(fi: le:n (fi)) (xj: de"/j): (xi: mi (xi))Poss (xj)) (xi: xo (xi))Ref] (ei)) (xi)) This analysis is similar to the one given by Dik (1997b: 92) for internally headed relative clauses, and indeed, as (22) shows, the variable (xi) of the term as a whole is filled in with another coreferential term (xi: xo (xi)) within the predication (ei) that occupies the head position of the term as a whole. This predication is thus a closed predication in FG terms. The possibility of a term containing an open predication as its head may now also be considered. As proposed by Van der Auwera (1990: 151ff.), cases like (23) are instantiations of this situation: (23) 24    ( The headless relative (in italics) in (23) can be represented as in (24): (24) (xi: (Pres ei: [(fi: read (fi)) (xj: you (xj))Ag (xi)Pat] (ei))) Note that here the variable (xi) within the embedded predication is not filled with any lexical material, but bound by the variable of the term as a whole. In this sense it is different from the Hupa noun phrase in (21), which contains a closed rather than an open predication. Taking this analysis one step further, productive nominalizations like the one in (25) may receive a similar treatment: (25)   INDEF



%3  teach-AG.NR

This nominalization might be represented as in (26): (26) (1 xi: (ei: [(fi: teach-V (fi)) (xi)Ag] (ei))) The fact that this configuration is expressed as a noun would then be taken care of by the morphosyntactic encoder. An advantage of this approach, over the one generally advocated in FG, is that no predicate formation rule is needed, and derivational expression is dealt with in the same way as inflectional expression. Of course, such a syntactic approach to deriva-

52



tional morphology is only possible to the extent that the derivation involved is productive and regular. As soon as a derivation becomes lexically specialized it would have to be entered into the lexicon as a separate lexeme. 2 &5      Another way in which noun phrases may deviate from the standard case is by denoting a non-first order entity. Cases in point are listed in (27): (27) %%&  x individual 

f property 

e state-of-affairs /% p propositional content  l location % * t time 4 As demonstrated in Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.), semantic classes such as the ones listed in (27) are needed to account for differences in the grammatical behaviour of classes of nouns and noun phrases crosslinguistically. A case in point is nominalization in English, where different derivational processes produce lexemes denoting properties of different kinds of entities. Consider the nouns in (28): (28) 0/ % x 4 %3 , /&*3 , 3

f /35353 e :& 3%, 35&3% p &3S, 43S, #3S l # 43 *5#3 * t // 3%/5*3%/ Note that the resulting meanings of the various processes can be classified in terms of the semantic categories in (27). English does not have a productive derivational process for time expressions, but some other languages do, and this then produces meanings that are expressed in English by compounds such as // 3%/ or 4% 3%/. Consider the following example from Supyire:



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

'&* (Carlson 1994: 113) (29) I  %TT343    * V  /   his TNR-die-DEF.CL NEG PRF be.long.time .  '  !    ## -

53

/ NEG

FDG uses different types of variables at the representational level to account for grammatically relevant semantic classes denoted by noun phrases. Thus, the examples listed in (27) would be represented as in (30): (30) (xi: (fi: (ei: (pi: (li: (ti:

(fi: chairN (fi)) (fi: colourN (fi)) (fi: meetingN (fi)) (fi: ideaN (fi)) (fi: gardenN (fi)) (fi: weekN (fi))

(xi)) (fi)) (ei)) (pi)) (li)) (ti))

1      (#   6.1. Two cases of lexical non-denotation A third way in which noun phrases may differ from the standard case is when they denote, but not by lexical means, or when they do not denote at all. These cases are discussed in turn in the following sections.

6.2. Proper names and pronouns Proper nouns and pronouns can be said to have no meaning of their own, in the sense that they do not designate properties of entities in the external world, but have a conventionalized referential use6 only. In FDG these words are therefore interpreted as direct and unique instantiations of referential subacts. For this reason, they are represented at the interpersonal level, as restrictors of referential subacts, rather than at the representational level, as restrictors of entity descriptions.7 The sentence in (31) can therefore be represented as in (32): (31) 24(

54

(32)



(TI ) (RI: 2 (RI)) (RJ:  (RJ)) (ei: [ (fi: seeV (fi)) (xi)Exp (xj)Pat ] (ei))

Given their interpersonal status, proper names and pronouns may be expected to be modifiable by R operators and R modifiers only, but not by operators from the representational level. Consider examples (33) and (34) and their representations in (35) and (36): (33) + *6 (34) + 6 (35) (RI: you (RI): (fj: poorA (fj)) (RI)) (36) (RJ: John (RJ): (fj: poorA (fj)) (RJ)) + in (33) and (34) can only be interpreted as an expression of a subjective attitude of the speaker with respect to the referent of the term, and never as an instance of referent modification or reference modification (see section 3.3.3).

6.3. Vocatives In (35)(36) the pronoun and proper name have a representational counterpart, even though it is one that is not lexically filled. When these same elements are used as vocatives, they have no representational counterpart at all. They do not denote an entity in the external world, but have an interpersonal function only, bound to the speech situation itself. The expressions in (37)(38) can be formalized as in (39)(40) (see Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.: ch.4): (37) 6 (38) *5*6 (39) (M1: [(A1: [(FI: VOC (FI)) (P1)S (P2: John (P2))A] (AI))] (MI)) (40) (M1: [(A1: [(FI: hey (FI)) (P1)S (P2: you (P2))A] (AI))] (MI)) In some languages the different uses of proper names are reflected in their grammatical behaviour. Thus, in Portuguese, proper names carry a definite



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

55

article when used referentially, but appear without an article in vocative function, as in the following examples: )  + % (41)          see.PAST.PRF.1SG DEF.SG 0 > -

W( JoR

(42) =

W5    B %3!     3H VOC JoR  DEF.SG what COP-2SG.PRES do-PROGR >  $ ! #S

The fact that the vocative use of pronouns and proper names is different from their referential use is furthermore reflected in the fact that subjective modifiers such as & in (33) and (34) cannot be used in the vocative construction. )  + % (43)          see.PAST.PRF.1SG DEF.SG 0  > -

&#  poor

(44) *= &#  W5    VOC poor JoR  DEF.SG >  are you doing?

W( JoR

B %3!     3H what COP-2SG.PRES do-PROGR

6.4. (Non-)denotation: summary In sum, Table 1 represents the situations with regard to the denotation or non-denotation of noun phrases. Each situation may be interpreted as a combination of features obtaining at the interpersonal and representational levels of representation. ,#1. (Non-)denotation

Standard case Proper names Vocatives

Interpersonal (R: ": (R: Lexeme (R)) (P: Lexeme (P))

Representational (x: Lexeme (x)) (x: "/ 

56



6 &5      7.1. Two cases of non-referentiality A fourth way in which noun phrases may differ from the standard case is when they are non-referential. Here again there are two different cases that may be distinguished (cf. Rijkhoff 2002: 5657): One in which the noun phrase has no interpersonal function at all, and one in which it has an ascriptive rather than a referential interpersonal function. These cases are discussed one by one in the following sections.

7.2. Noun incorporation Smit (2005) distinguishes three cases of noun incorporation, differentiating the three types according to the layered underlying structure of the incorporated unit. These three cases are listed in (45): (45) , 3 & % f-incorporation: (fi: LexN (fi)) x-incorporation: (xi: (fi: LexN (fi)) (xi)) R-incorporation: (RI: .................... (RI)) (xi: (fi: LexN (fi)) (xi)) In the first case what is incorporated is a noun, not a noun phrase. In the other two cases what is incorporated is a noun phrase. The phrasal nature of these two cases can be demonstrated by the fact that the incorporated noun allows an (external) modifier. The difference between the two phrasal cases has to do with the referentiality of the incorporated unit: if it is a case of x-incorporation it is impossible to refer back to the incorporated unit; if it is a case of R-incorporation anaphoric reference is possible. These various properties are listed in Table 2. ,#9. Noun incorporation

f-incorporation x-incorporation R-incorporation

Modification + +

Reference +



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

57

R-incorporation is simply a matter of a different type of morphosyntactic expression of a standard noun phrase. The case of x-incorporation, however, cannot be interpreted as a standard case, since the noun phrase is not used referentially. Consider the following example from Caddo, discussed in Mithun (1984: 864866): $ (Caddoan; Mithun 1984: 866) (46)   !3!3Y 3Y. a.lot PROGR-grass-grow-PROGR .    '#

- The incorporated noun Y% #

    /  !O%   !ifier 4*            '    oration. At the same time, it is not a referential phrase. As Mithun (1984: 866) notes:   #  !$ ' '  '0B 7 orated nouns, KH] in these [...] constructions is often deducible from context, the IN   mselves are not, strictly speaking, referential. An extensive examination of texts shows that they are not used to establish discourse referents as independent N -!  (0  atively rare cases where entities first appear in discourse as IN $  equent mention of them regularly includes a restatement of the N, either incorporated or independent. In view of this non-referential nature of the noun phrase, the head of which is incorporated, it may be represented in FDG as in (47): (TI) (47) (ei: [ (fi: - - (fi))

 (xi: k'uht (xi): wayah (xi))]

(ei))

This representation indicates that at the representational level there is a full phrasal description of a first order entity, but that this semantic unit has no interpersonal counterpart.

7.3. Ascriptive noun phrases A second case in which noun phrases are used non-referentially is when they have an ascriptive interpersonal function. A case in point is (48): (48) ,/ /( This sentence may be represented as in (49):

58



(TI) (RI) (49) (ei: [ (1 xi: (fi: criminal (fi)) (xi)) (prox xj: (fj: man (fj)) (xj))] (ei)) The formalization in (49) indicates that the first-order entity description xi does not instantiate a referential subact (R) but an ascriptive subact (T).8 Once the distinction between the ascriptive and referential use of noun phrases is made and can be formalized, some differences in their behaviour can be accounted for. One example concerns anaphoric reference. Consider the following examples: (50)   (   4%( - +% ( (51) "  %(  ,%4%( Anaphoric reference to a noun phrase used ascriptively requires the use of %% or  as in (50), while the use of a personal pronoun is required in the case of referential use. Once the above analysis is accepted, identificational constructions have to receive an analysis different from the one advocated in Dik (1980: chapter 4) and Hengeveld (1992). Keizer (1992, this volume) already noticed problems with this analysis. Consider the following example: (52) +% ( If +% in (52) is taken as the predicate, as it is in Dik (1980) and Hengeveld (1992), then one would expect (53) to be grammatical, which it isn( (53) R,%4%( Rather than being an ascriptive subact, +% should thus be taken as the instantiation of a referential subact, and (52) should be represented as in (54), in consonance with Keizer (1992): (RI: [he] (RI)) (RJ: Peter (RJ)) (54) (Pres ei: [ (xi) (xi) ] (ei))



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

59

The copula is then introduced at the morphosyntactic level, to accommodate the expression of the tense operator in the absence of a verbal element.

7.4. (Non-)referentiality: summary The cases of (non-)referentiality discussed in this section may now be summarized as in Table 3. ,#$/&:  % % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Foley, William A. and Robert D. Van Valin, Jr. 1984 .%'*%:I  // . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Golla, Victor 1985 -' %+ % // &. Hoopa Vally: Hupa Language Program. Hengeveld, Kees 1989 Layers and operators in Functional Grammar.  % 25-1: 127157. 1992 03 # & %> % *5 %*&*5  * (Functional Grammar Series 15). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.) ; &*%% ":&   .% // 5 5386. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar de los J#  G&-GonzE & ! >- 6  43& "! - '%  .%   // , 927. (Linguistic Insights 26.) Berne: Peter Lang.

62



Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. fc. .%  // . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keizer, M. Evelien 1992 Reference, predication and (in)definiteness in Functional Grammar. A functional approach to English copular sentences. Ph.D. diss., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: an inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Lyons, John 1977 '/% (II vols.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mithun, Marianne 1984 The evolution of noun incorporation.  60: 847894. Rijkhoff, Jan 2002 ,0+  (Oxford studies in typology and linguistic theory). Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels, and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar. Smit, Niels 2005 Noun incorporation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% :&   .%Grammar, 87134. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Van der Auwera, Johan 1990 $/%% /. Thesis, Universitaire Instelling Antwerpen. 2006



,( 8   #      

   1 This contribution has three main goals. Firstly, so as to be able to accommodate classifying modifiers, I will propose a revised model of the noun phrase, which consists of five concentric layers of modification rather than four, as it did in the previous model (section 2).2 It will also be claimed that discourse-referential modifiers, which are specified at the Interpersonal Level, only relate to the status of the referent in the world of discourse (Rijkhoff fc. a; Rijkhoff and Seibt 2005). That is to say, attitudinal modifiers of the kind proposed in Hengeveld (2004b) (see also Hengeveld this volume; Butler this volume) are not deemed to have their own slot in the layered model of the noun phrase defended here. Secondly, I will propose some modifications regarding the contextual component with special attention to noun phrases and argue that external reality (the  / '   !      ! $  arate component and that each component of the FDG model constitutes a different kind of context (section 3). A single rule will be proposed to capture the influence of any contextual factor on the form, function or meaning of a linguistic expression. Section 4, finally, argues that in the current FDG model the Interpersonal Level in the grammatical component contains elements that actually belong to the external component (or C-context!oposes alternative schemas for the NP and the clause without variables for Speaker and Addressee. In this proposal the descriptive modifiers (i.e. classifying, qualifying, quantifying, and localizing modifiers) are specified at the Representational Level ( ##  ' ntent-. 0  6%   regarded as that part of the grammatical component that is concerned with  ##   / # !   !    $  '  !'ation, one for things or events, one for propositions, and one for clauses.

64



%         In Rijkhoff (2002) the noun phrase (NP) is analysed as having four layers of modification, accommodating (i) qualifying, (ii) quantifying, (iii) localizing, and (iv) discourse modifiers (or discourse-referential modifiers). It appears, however, that a complete analysis of the NP requires an additional, fifth layer of modification for what might be called * /  of the noun (as announced in Rijkhoff 2004, fc. a). Moreover, it will be argued that discourse-referential modifiers, which are specified at the Interpersonal Level in the grammatical component, are only concerned with the status of the referent (thing, event) as a discourse entity and not, as Hengeveld (2004a, 2004b, this volume) has claimed, also with emotional or attitudinal phenomena. This section is structured as follows. After a brief presentation of the  !' -layered model of the noun phrase (section 2.1), I will argue for the existence of an additional, fifth category of so-called */3  , which (further) specify 4%%%* is being referred to by the speaker (sections 2.2 and 2.3).

2.1. The four-layered analysis of the NP In Rijkhoff (2002) modifiers in the NP are divided into two main categories: descriptive and discourse-referential modifiers (or representational and interpersonal modifiers respectively). This division reflects the double function of NPs: they provide a physical description of an entity and at the same time they are the constructions used to refer to entities in the world of discourse. Descriptive modifiers specify properties of the referent of the NP or clause in terms of the notions Quality (how it is), Quantity (how much/many it is) and Location (where it is). The fourth and outermost layer of modification accommodates discourse-referential modifiers, which pertain to ,-, IT IS-- $ !     ' # "  events) in the shared world of discourse (e.g.  Definite'  # -dnominal adjectives, possessives and relative clauses are instances of lexical NP modifiers or     " $ lized by in Figure 1), because they involve members of lexical categories (verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs). Operator slots (symbolized by  in Figure 1) are reserved for grammatical modifier categories in the NP such as articles or demonstratives, which can be expressed as free forms, particles or affixes (for a discussion of / &%, see Rijkhoff 2002: 100121). Figure 1 also shows that clauses can



* 5%:%. 

65

be analysed in a similar fashion ( symbolizes operators,  stands for satellites; see Rijkhoff 2002: chapter 7); discourse-referential modifiers, which are symbolized by the variables - - - ! 

!' elow (Figure 3). //%:& A%*5 A%%*%%

::& A%* A%%*%% Location

3

3

Quantity

2 1

2

Quality

1

))& /%, % %%( &%

 %

/% %5 /# 5  / 

 # &% / &%

& %? #@ 

 #C #> /  %/ &5  B* &

% :

%(  / & 0+

/& 

1

1 2

Quality Quantity

3

2

3

Location //%:& A%*5 A%%*%%0+ . 1(

::& A%*5 A%%*%%0+

Symmetry in the underlying structure of the clause and the NP as in Rijkhoff 2002: descriptive modifiers (but cf. Figure 10 below).

Languages use only a subset of the modifier categories mentioned in Figure 1 and there is no one-to-one relationship between the form and the function of a modifier (only some typical forms or constructions are specified in Figure 1). For example, in many languages the adnominal distal demonstrative (a localizing operator) is also used as a discourse-referential

66



operator to mark definiteness, and relative clauses can be employed as qualifying, quantifying or localizing satellites (Rijkhoff 2002 and fc. a). A simplified version of the layered NP model is represented in (1), in which each operator (,    " , 3  $"6 as its argument (cf. Escribano this volume). Note that I am here only concerned with the analysis of NPs used for first-order or spatial entities (symbolized by the x-variable) and that the schema in (1) does not contain the predicate variable f (see Figure 3 and further below on discourse-referential modifiers !Q"@V  ,-,-U#%    (3 (1)

NPi: 4[ 3[ 2[ 1[ NOUN(xi) ]L0 1(L0) ]L1 2(L1) ]L2 3(L2) ]L3 4(L3)

x referent variable (symbolizes the referent of the NP); A term (NP) operator: 1 = qualifying operator, 2 = quantifying operator, 3 = localizing operator, 4 = discourse-referential operator;

/ term (NP) satellite: 1 = qualifying satellite, 2 = quantifying satellite, 3 = localizing satellite, 4 = discourse-referential satellite. L1 constitutes the B%** , which contains the head of the construction and accommodates B*& %  (1 in the NP, 1 in the clause) and %% ( 1 in the NP, 1 in the clause). In the 2002 model these modifiers only relate to the property that is designated by the head, such as nominal or verbal aspect markers, (typically) adjectives  if the language under analysis has them  and adverb(ial)s of manner or speed (but cf. section 2.2). The B%%** (L2) contains the quality layer and accommodates B%* /  (2, 2; 2, 2), which have to do with number distinctions (singular, plural) or cardinality. The %* (L3) contains both the quality layer and the quantity layer and accommodates   /  (3, 3; 3, 3), which specify properties concerning the location of the thing or event, such as demonstratives, tense markers, (localizing) relative clauses or adverb(ial)s such as  #! $ !$"ecall there is no direct correlation between form and function of modifiers, especially in the case of satellites).



* 5%:%.  THOSE

TWO

DOG

BLACK

1 2 3

67

IN THE GARDEN

1 Quality

2

Quantity

3

Location A*5A%*   & % %0+ 

 

 

 

 

A*5A%*  %%%0+

. 9. Simplified representation of    3! #  #!-

Thus, in an NP like    3! #  #!# only modifies the head noun and the quantifying modifier %4 specifies the number of black dog entities. Both % and %  specify the location of dog entities with all their qualitative and quantitative properties. In addition to the three descriptive layers shown in Figure 1, the underlying NP/clause structure contains a layer to accommodate modifiers that are concerned with the status of the thing or event as a discourse entity (Figure 3). Here we find values for operators such as Definite or Specific (in the clause: Realis or Actual) and satellites such as    " the clause e.g.  $ $-4 Discourse-referential (DR) modifiers appear in the outermost layer, as they have the descriptive modifiers in their scope (see also Figures 14 and 15 on other interpersonal modifier categories). Parallels between discourse-referential operators in the clause and in the NP are particularly interesting because of the various relationships that hold between realis/irrealis and definiteness/indefiniteness. I will show below that, in order to understand these relationships, we must make crucial reference to the grammatical category of specificity (see Rijkhoff and Seibt 2005 for a more detailed discussion).

68



& % %  





%%%

2'$=I'"3".""0,2-;=2.2"'

4

(3-2-0) (0-1-2-3) ("'$2+,2";=2.2"') X: 

(X  ))& e.g.  $ally ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X;' /& e.g.     X' ("'$2+,2";=2.2"') (3-2-0) ( 0-1-2-3) 4

2'$=I'"3".""0,2-;=2.2"'

4

& % %0+    %%%0+  .  %!

Jacaltec (Mayan) uses the same marker for irrealis and nonspecificindefinite reference (the variation is due to vowel harmony): % (Craig 1977: 93, see also Martin 1998) (18) G*3 #  sleep-OJ EXH CLF/he 9  !   Y7   !8 (19)

JS3Y 

# :  *3Y PL woman look_for-FUT 3 /# INDEF-OJ pot .   ed looking for a pot. [nonspecific-indefinite reference] ASP-ABS.3-start



74

Summing up, anti-symmetry between (in)definiteness and (ir)realis is due to the fact that (a) there is basically one way for an entity to be indefinite (thing) or actual (event); also, referents of &3% 0+ and   # !    %       ! ' !    #'!  for the first time. (b) there are numerous ways an entity can be definite (thing) or less than completely actual (event). Noun Phrase (thing) Definite

&-0:)*$9;+$*& )&;$:) &)&)$***), MANY

ONE

Clause (event) Realis

(GROUNDS ITSELF) '&indefinite

ONE

MANY

Irrealis

(GROUNDS ITSELF)

. [( Anti-symmetry between Definite/Realis and Specificindefinite/Irrealis.

9(1(L(=% & %%& %%% I would like to make clear at the outset that this section is not concerned with attitudinal modifiers as described in Dik (1997: 295f.), which specify the speaker    #%! !  # -order entities in the discourse world, such as the propositional contents of his or her own utterance, as in: (20) (21)

  52/% %# %( $    5**  (

Here I will mostly be concerned with manifestations of the speaker otional attitude such as sympathy or scorn towards animate entities. For example, in many languages the diminutive is used to express affection (Jurafsky 1996):



* 5%:%. 

% (22) 2 # % /% / 3%   I have just with my colleague-DIM 0O  3! $ #-

75

&  talked

Adjectives like        !         /

   speaker  $ $  !       typically human or animate entity: (23) %%& /& % &# 4%( In a recent article Hengeveld (2004b) has argued that & in (23) is an instance of a special category of modifiers (:-modifiers    esented at the Interpersonal Level in the FDG model (see also Butler this volume; Keizer 2004: 15).9 There are several reasons why I am reluctant to posit a special category of attitudinal modifiers at the Interpersonal Level of the NP model presented above (Figure 3). First of all, a layered model of any linguistic structure is supposed to reflect differences in semantic scope that exist between the various modifier categories. There is, however, no good evidence to show that the scope of & in the sense of  "  in 23) differs from the scope of & with another sense ( %#   money    %$ 3 !- .      $  %     '   attributive modifier & , it only has the noun in its scope. This does not imply that all adjectives, or rather all qualifying satellites, are equal. Properties denoted by qualifying satellites range from objective/permanent (e.g.  !A table  !A chair   O%A $ "-#- A apple A book # !A idea    !!A performance- .     iconically reflected in the way qualifying adjectives are ordered relative to the head noun: across languages adjectives denoting more inherent (permanent, objective) properties have a strong tendency to occur closer to the head noun than adjectives denoting less inherent (temporary, subjective) properties:10 (24) G *#*%%#%- -%#H (25) ? G *#*%% -#%-%#H Thus, the observation that a modifier such as & in (23)  !   subjective evaluation by the speaker"2#% ! 2004b: 373) is no reason to introduce a special category of attitudinal satellites at the Interpersonal

76



Level of the NP ( O%   not the same as  Octive-11 We noted above that many, perhaps most adjectives reflect some kind of subjective evaluation by the speaker (#, #%, *, %, 4 %, % %). In fact, a wide variety of modifier categories can be said to express subjective evaluations: verbal aspect markers (Comrie 1976: 17), expressions such as   vs.  /&%*, adverbial modifiers such as  * or % , forms of address (expressing different degrees of politeness)  they all involve the speaker  O%%      speaker might have said something else under similar circumstances.12 Nevertheless it is true that the NP % &  /&  in (23) has an additional communicative value in that it displays sympathy for the referent of the phrase on the part of the speaker. However, treating & as an interpersonal modifier in this construction would imply that the surplus attitudinal value is only situated in the adjective, whereas in fact speaker attitudes such as sympathy or scorn tend to manifest themselves in a variety of ways (morpho-syntactically, prosodically, in voice quality) as a property of a construction rather than through a distinct modifier category represented at one particular layer in the underlying structure (Halliday 2004: 61, 238, 3189; Butler this volume). In the following example scorn is expressed morpho-syntactically through the use of a distal demonstrative ! !% ''/-je!  al possessive construction %O (13 % (26) 2  % 4 #3    /  I find that new book-DIM of you totally nothing 0!   3  '  3" - 3  '$  - Leaving out the diminutive and using the proximal form of the demonstrative or the prenominal possessive turns the NP into a neutral expression. % (27) 2    4 # /  I find your new book absolutely nothing 0!   3  '$    3 Thus it seems that attitudes of the kind discussed here are global properties at the level of a construction rather than a local property that resides in a single modifier.



* 5%:%. 

77

How can we capture such global expressions of speaker attitude in FDG? Obviously, when the input from the pre-linguistic conceptual module enters the grammatical component, it must already be clear which part of the structure will be affected by speaker attitude. In FDG one could use, for example, a dotted line to indicate which elements in the underlying representation are within the Attitude Domain, which will effect the form, content and expression of material in that attitude domain. This kind of representation is in fact rather similar to the way discourse pragmatics, in particular Focus Structure, is handled in     //

(Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 210218). In RRG a dotted line is used to mark the potential focus domain (that part of the sentence in which focus can occur) and a triangle indicates what part of the structure is the actual focus domain (the part of the sentence which is in focus).

2.2. Evidence for the layered NP/clause model The fact that in languages such as Jacaltec or Fongbe the same morpheme is used as a discourse-referential operator in the NP and in the clause (section 2.1.3) provides strong support for the NP/clause model defended here. Evidence for the descriptive layers in the NP/clause model in Figure 1 comes from parts-of-speech systems, historical linguistics, cognitive linguistics and morpho-syntax. As to syntactic evidence, there are 24 ways to linearize a demonstrative, a numeral, an adjective and a noun in a single integral noun phrase, but most logically possible patterns are not attested in the world  ##es. Interestingly there are no gaps in the eight     --tterns that reflect the layered organization of the NP presented above (with the adjective  typically a qualifying modifier  always next to the noun and the demonstrative  typically a localizing modifier  always in the periphery (Rijkhoff 2004):

78



(28) 2&%%   dem num A N

dem num N A dem A N num dem N A num num A N dem num N A dem A N num dem N A num dem

 Alamblak, Dutch, Georgian, Hungarian, Kayardild, Ket, Nama Hottentot, Imbabura Quechua, Pipil, Tamil, Turkish Burushaski, Guaran "  -#-   !   Romance languages) Zande Bambara Berbice Dutch Creole, Bislama, Sranan Basque, Hmong Njua Sango Oromo, Fa d'Ambu, Nubi

By contrast, languages that employ one of the remaining 16  -iconic patterns as the basic order seem to be extremely rare. Greenberg (1966: 8687) had one such language in his sample, Kikuyu, which has the order [N dem num A], but Seiler (1978: 322) claims that this is a  

   variant  K3$      ! # 7B A num dem]. Hawkins (1983), whose sample contained over 300 languages, mentioned two other Bantu languages with a non-iconic basic pattern in the NP: Aghem [N A dem num] and Noni (which has [N dem num A] as well as [N dem A num]). It remains to be seen, however, if the Aghem and Noni sequences are really integral NPs (see Rijkhoff 2002: 2726 for some arguments to show that we may be dealing with appositional or complex structures rather than simple integral NPs in the case of non-iconic patterns). There is also evidence from morphology and clause-internal syntax to support the layered model outlined in Figure 1. In English, for example, different kinds of temporal satellites tend to occur in the order time duration ('    ZB*%%), time frequency (%$!$ or soZB%*%%) and time position (>$Z  %%), as in Quirk et al. (1985: 551): (29) 24%       %     Regarding morphological evidence, Bybee  % #  '   !# of inflectional morphemes relative to the verb in a representative sample of fifty languages revealed that 7---8             ' llowed by tense, and then by mood. The only exception to this ordering found in the 50-language sample is in Ojibwa, where the Dubitative suffix precedes the Preterite suffix"M$)*1V()*W-



* 5%:%. 

79

Historical evidence to support parallel treatment in the layered analysis of the clause and the noun phrase comes from various sources. For example, Gildea (1993) has shown how demonstratives have developed into tense markers in Panare. Several authors have described phonological similarities between markers of nominal and verbal plurality (see for example Frajzyngier 1977, 1997; Mithun 1988; Newman 1990) and historical connections between markers of collectivity and perfectivity (both: Quality) were already discussed by Von Garnier (1909). As to lexical word classes, it appears that languages across the globe employ one of the seven major parts-of-speech systems listed in Figure 8 (for a more detailed typology of parts-of-speech systems that also includes intermediate types, see Hengeveld et al. 2004). #   && 

  & %33& *%/

. \(

Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Type 6 Type 7

    &  noun adjective adverb noun adjective verb noun verb verb

verb verb verb

noun

Partsofspeech system (adverb = manner adverb; based on Hengeveld 1992: 69).

Apart from quantitative differences (number of distinct word classes, ranging from one to four), languages may also differ with respect to the degree of flexibility displayed by the members of a certain word class. For example, in English the adjective beautiful needs to be provided with an adverbializing suffix * before it can modify a verb: (30) '  #% (31) '#%* But there are also languages such as Ngiti (Type 3), which do not distinguish between adjectives and (manner) adverbs (Kutsch Lojenga 1994: 336):

80



0% (Kutsch Lojenga 1992: 338) (32) #!#  3]%^      V child RSM-carry:PRF.PRES light load .   !! #  ! (33)  #!#  3]%^     V light child RSM-carry:PRF.PRES load .   !!  load easily In other words, Ngiti and other languages with a Type 3 parts-of-speech system the same element is used as a qualifying modifier (? $ lliten Figure 1) in the NP and in the clause. 9(9(1 -3* /%0+% It appears that the four-layered model presented above needs to be expanded with another layer of modification, both for the NP and the clause. This layer concerns */ , which further specify the  of entity denoted by the noun (or verb) and forms the innermost layer of modification, i.e. that between the head constituent and the layer that accommodates qualifying modifiers. Classifying satellites are lexical items that further specify what kind of entity is being denoted by the head noun, for example:  in   report & % in  !     %  in   or  in    $-. 3  ginal numbering of the layers intact, this additional descriptive layer will be referred as the & -layer (Figure 9).14 Classifying modifiers typically appear adjacent to the head noun and differ from qualifying modifiers in that they do not specify an objective property of the entity (  %#,   ) or the speaker  O% attitude towards the entity (% % %%, #%&% ), but rather a particular subclass of the entity in question. Here are some more examples of classifying satellites from English and other languages: " (34) a.  4*

b(     % c.  % d.   15



* 5%:%. 

81

'4 (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2003: 53940) (35) a. " 3%3     %%

a:C people-DEF.C-GEN theatre  '     b.  3     a:C school-DEF.C.-GEN  3'    

&&% task

% (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2002: 155) (36) a. 3   & breadGEN knife ad knife b. 3  & coffee-GEN cup  '' Clause operators (A

Clause satellites (A

4. Discourse-Referential 3. Location 2. Quantity 1. Quality 0. Kind ))& & %? #@  /& 0. Kind 1. Quality 2. Quantity 3. Location 4. Discourse-Referential NP operators (A 

NP satellites ( A

. O( A five-layered NP/clause model: preliminary version (cf. Figure 10).

82



Classifying satellites also occur in the kind of classifier construction that is attested in Arrernte and other Australian languages. -

 % (Wilkins 2000: 179200) (37) a. *

   

 ant meat-ant b. 4*      

 traditional medicine meat-ant c. &/        

 socially relevant place meat-ant Even though all the constructions in (37) could be translated as  Wilkins (2000: 192) states that in each case the semantic effect of the classifying noun is different. For example, the combination 4* 

 in (37b) could be paraphrased as follows: In using the classifier construction 4*  

 !   ! meat-ant     3  ddressee to think about the referent of the noun phrase from the point of view of its having the properties of an  

 -ant !      rrent point in the discourse are its properties as an 4* !  !icine-

In other words, the classification is based on the way 'gures in a particular context: as food in (37a), as a medicine in (37b), or as an entity in a ;%"U+In English classifying adjectives differ from qualifying adjectives in that they usually do not admit intensifiers, comparison, or predicative position (Quirk et al. 1985: 1339; on non-predicative adjectives, see also e.g. Farsi 1968, Levi 1973): (38) % %  vs. * *% %  [intensifier] (39) /:/% vs. */ /:/% [comparison] (40) %& %% vs. *%%& % [predicative position]



* 5%:%. 

83

The semantic range of classifying satellites is rather broad and includes such categories as material, purpose and function, status and rank, origin, and mode of operation (Halliday 2004: 320). Essentially they relate to any feature that may serve to classify entities into a system of smaller sets. The examples show that various forms and constructions may serve as an adnominal classifying satellite (e.g. adjective, noun, genitive NP), and that it may be difficult to draw the line between a noun + classifying satellite combination and compounds or quasi-compounds (cf. also Giegerich 2005).16 Furthermore, the same adjective can function either as a classifying or a qualifying satellite (Farsi 1968; Halliday 2004: 319). For example, an adjective such as  serves as a qualifying satellite in %  $ (%$%  $!  

'$#  % #  "[%$ civil rightsExamples of classifying satellites at the level of the clause are more difficult to find, since it seems they tend to occur as incorporated forms, as in (41b): ; 0% (Merlan 1976: 185) (41) a.  %    where 3.SG:is knife 9   3'S 2 & %: (41) b. K  33%%  & 3.SG 3.SG:it-knife-cut bread 2 ! 3' There is, however, also the phenomenon called   # "4 1986, 1989; Gerds 1998) or     $ O/   "4  1984). Whereas an incorporated element is part of another word, a stripped noun is a separate word (according to phonological criteria such as stress placement), which must appear next to the verb. Thus, in Kusaiean adverbs can appear between verb and object (42a) but not between verb and stripped noun (42b).  (Gerds 1998: 94; original example in K. Lee 1975) (42) a. '  %4/  &   /%/%  Sah he sharpen diligently knife the    # 3'! # $

84



'% &&> (42) b. '  %4%4 /%/% & Sah he sharpen knife diligently   ! # $3'-sharpening As in the case of incorporation we see that in (42) a distinction is made between sharpening in general and a certain kind of sharpening, namely knife-sharpening. The crucial difference is that in the case of a stripped noun we are dealing a more or less independent element that serves as a classifying satellite at the level of the clause.17 9(9(9($*& %  Classifying operators are members of grammatical (rather than lexical) modifier categories which (further) specify what kind of spatial or temporal entity (thing, event) is being referred to. As a matter of fact classifying operators were already represented as a distinct modifier category in the  !' -layered NP/clause model, where they were erroneously categorized as ? '$#   "# )d 2). In earlier studies I argued that, just as verbs are coded for a particular -% % ( ! '       / $  !! '     ' % ( ! ' #     

        % noun   #  O  un-   $ O    %     3 '% ! '%  !'$   -% % (Dik 1997: 224f.; note that -% % is also known as lexicalized aspectuality), nominal aspect markers can change the ' % of a noun (Rijkhoff 2002: 100 121). For example, nouns in Oromo are lexically coded for a ' % that I have called     "--G      ! direct construction with a numeral), but when they are provided with a (what I call) collective or an individual aspect marker, they designate a special kind of set, viz. a % % or a % % (with just one member) respectively: = / (Stroomer 1987: 7677, 8485) (43)  horse/horses"3! set) vs.        (collective set) (44) / A"3! %  / A  (singleton set)



* 5%:%. 

85

It turns out now that the nominal and verbal aspect markers I erroneously regarded as qualifying operators in the  !' -layered model have to do with 3!     ? $      '  !$ !icated in the way they were characterized (Rijkhoff 2002: 101): It is important to make clear at the outset that .. nominal aspect markers .. specify what kind of .. entity is being referred to ..-0   !  3  

'$# rather than qualifying operators in that they relate to the kind of thing (e.g. individual, collective) or event (e.g. process, action) that is being referred to by the speaker. But that leaves us with the question: what about qualifying operators? What is the grammatical equivalent of the qualifying satellite in the NP and in the clause? This is discussed in the next section. 9(9( E-context: Addressee is singular female person Input: predicative adjective (&!) Output: predicative adjective + - suffix (&!3) In the last couple of decades two more deictic categories have been introduced: 1. discourse deixis, which concerns references to portions of the surrounding discourse; 2. social deixis, which is concerned with the grammaticalization, or encoding in language structure, of social information (Levinson 1987: 93).23 Whereas discourse deixis is obviously concerned with the D-context, social deixis must also be explained on the basis of information specified in the E-context. For example, many languages have a set of pronouns for special situations, as when the speaker wants to show respect or deference for the addressee. The impact of the social status of the addressee in the external reality (to be measured relative to the speaker        cture in the grammatical component can be captured in the following way:



* 5%:%. 

97

(57) +% / % E-context: Addressee is a person who in the current situation needs to be addressed in a respectful fashion by the Speaker. Input: A=2SG Output: U [= polite form of 2SG pronoun] 3 9    0 *I%*. New York: Dutton. Behrens, Leila 2005 Genericity from a cross-linguistic perspective. % 43-2: 275-344. Butler, Christopher S. 2003 '% %   .%>   % ,  ;  '% %  .% , ( + % 1> -&&  % % '/&: $M + %9>. /$% )*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Bybee, Joan L. 1985 ; &*> - '%*  % % #%4 ;  . /. (Typological Studies in Language 9.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. Chappell, Hillary and William McGregor 1989 Alienability, inalienability and nominal classification. In: Kiria Hall, Michael Meacham and Richard Shapiro (eds.), +   % .%%-;%%) *%'%*5.# 3  * 1\9P5 1O\O(   '  +   , % 2% %, 2436. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society. Chung, Sandra and Alan Timberlake 1985 Tense, aspect, and mood. In: Timothy Shopen (ed.),  ,*3 &*'*%% &%(/222> //%$%3

  % :, 202258. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Churchward, C. Maxwell 1953 , // . London: Oxford University Press.

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Clark, Herbert H. and Eve V. Clark 1977 +**  > - 2% % % +*%. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Comrie, Bernard 1976 -&%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Connolly, John H. 2004 The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and MarJ-& &E & (eds.), -04- %%  .% // , 89116 (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Craig, Colette Grinevald 1977 ,'% % %. Austin: University of Texas Press. Cruse, David Alan 1986 :'/%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Denning, Keith and Suzanne Kemmer (eds.) 1990 =>'%G %&( # ( Stanford: Stanford University Press. Dik, Simon C. 1997 , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Dixon, Robert M.W. 1982 G -%-% H=% "*'/% '*%:. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Ervin-Tripp, Susan 1972 On sociolinguistic rules: Alternation and co-occurrence. In: John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.),  %'%>% "% &*  $//%, 213250. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Farsi, A.A. 1968 Classification of adjectives.   18: 4560. Fortescue, Michael 2004 The complementarity of the process and pattern interpretations of Functional Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand MarJ-& GonzE &"! --04- %%  .% // , 151 178 (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Frajzyngier, Zygmunt 1977 The plural in Chadic. In: Paul Newman and Roxana Ma Newman (eds.), +&   $ %, 3756. Leiden: AfrikaStudiecentrum.



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Grammaticalization of number: from demonstratives to nominal and verbal plural. %,*&* 1-2: 193242. Frege, Gottlob 1983 & %. Function und Begriff (Nachdruck). In: Karel Berka and Lothar Kreiser, 3,:%(//% %-4   %   /  , 6382. (dritte, erweiterte Auflage unter Mitarbeit von S. Gottwald und W. Stelzner). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. First published 1891. Fries, Peter H. 1985 Towards a discussion of the ordering of adjectives in the English noun phrase. In: Benjamin F. Elson (ed.),  #+ 3 &%>+&  %ZP%-  *%'// 23 %%%%1O.%4, 123. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1992 03 # + %>, *5,*&*5 *. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1998 Terms and propositions. Paper read at the"%2% %$3    .% // (ICFG8), Free University Amsterdam, 8 July 1998. 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar J- &  &E & "! - - 04 - %3 %    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and MarJ-& &E & (eds.), - 04 - %%    .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% ":&   .% // , 5386. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar J- &GonzE & ! >- 6  43& "! - '%  .%   // , 927. Bern: Peter Lang. 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. Hengeveld, Kees and Jan Rijkhoff 2005 Mundari as a flexible language. %,*&* 9-3: 406431. Hengeveld Kees, Jan Rijkhoff and Anna Siewierska 2004 Parts-of-speech systems and word order.  % 40-3: 527570. Hetzron, Robert 1978 On the relative order of adjectives. In: Hansjakob Seiler (ed.), 3   > +&   / % $  % // 3



* 5%:%. 

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may be endowed with a discourse-functional variable; to the degree that it stands for an entity of the psychological world, it may carry a Psych-W variable, etc.). However, it would be absurd to try to integrate all those heterogeneous variables along with predicates, arguments, and #  variables3 (if any are needed) into, say, a representation of the sense of terms as reflected at the representational level so the basic point is: which variables, if any, do play a role in the computation of the NP  se and its intrinsic referential potential?4 It seems that this essential question has been somewhat lost sight of in recent F(D)G work, and the result is very heterogeneous  esentations in which most variables are doing no work at all but, on the contrary, creating confusion in the formalism and its interpretation. It may be necessary, therefore, a. to recall the nature and role of variables in general b. to clarify the variables that figure in current F(D)G representations, and c. to distinguish those that are appropriate to sense representations from those that belong to other analytical levels. Since this article is meant as a small contribution towards a better F(D)G account of NP semantics and syntax, only variables involved in the computation of the sense of terms will be discussed here in some detail, but the issues that arise apply to F(D)G variables in general, and the Ockhamian reasoning deployed here has multiple consequences at clause and other levels which will be tacitly invoked but not discussed in depth.

2.1. Why variables? To place the issues in perspective, it is convenient to start by asking whether, and why, term representations should contain variables at all. For natural language semanticists, the source of variables is the standard logical treatment of elementary quantification, in which first-order variables are introduced, bound by quantifiers, to replace awkward conjunctive statements with appropriate generalizations. In predicate logic formulae like (x) [P1(x)_ 5n(x)]  Q(x), for example, the (presumed) !%dual variable /  !$ iversal quantifier  and saturates the open position of the first-order predicates P15n, and Q. That argument position is supposed to be exactly the same as is alternatively satisfied by the referent of an ordinary name like  in  /, represented by the

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constant O' rmula like S(j). Hence, the variable /!    O '  % -occur. Yet, on a little reflection, / %$!'''  j  ntent, for whereas O ! ' ' $ '!!%!     determined partly by linguistic convention (in English,  is the name of a male, etc.) and partly through use in an appropriate discourse context, / stands only for a strange entity whose ontological status metaphysicians have been discussing, inconclusively, for over two thousand years, and which suffices to saturate a predicate only to the extent that it is  ! by a quantifier. Predicate Logic quantifiers, in their turn, are analyzed, after Frege, as second-order predicates that apply to structures like P(x) and express existential statements like 5"/ ! '    / 5"/ ! '   x-5 Under such an analysis, whereas a sentence like & contains two semantically relevant constituents coextensive with the linguist  anonical NP and VP, one like '/ %% & has no semantic constituent to match the NP / %%. This consequence, which has always seemed counterintuitive to grammarians, is justified to the extent that it accounts for the strange properties of /%% under negation, i.e., the puzzling non-contradictoriness of '/%%&/%3 %%&or -%%%&5#%/. An ordinary proper name like 5on the contrary5 being well-behaved under negation, cf. R &  ?@  % &, can be directly represented as an individual constant O'   35"O!`5"O!  %ariable at the representational level. Admittedly, most NPs are not like proper names. When terms are expressed by phrases with a common noun as head and perhaps one or more modifiers, as in %%  4 , if the right truth conditions and entailments are to follow, it is necessary to lay bare the intensional contribution of their various constituents. In the simplest cases, such phrases are constituted by monadic predicates ( 5 %5  5  5 4  , etc.)6 and, of course, predicates need subjects, so the question arises what the subject of such predicates is, an issue that entails determining what is a possible subject or predicate, i.e., choosing an ontology7 and struggling with rather complex metaphysical problems, cf. Strawson (1959). Playing on the safe side metaphysics-wise, early philosophical semantics assumed an austere ontology containing only individuals, according to which only extensional individuals could be subjects and the only predicates were first-order predicates. Russell  ")*^V   $ ' !' !e-



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scriptions, for example, would represent the meaning of lexically complex NPs like % %       4   as a conjunction of first-order predications upon a  O %!!$ !ividual%iable /  !$ ?'" -     a variable does intervene in the logical form of definite NPs. Obviously, /      # O   y by empiricist standards, but convenient in that it left the smallest possible unanalysed residue and allowed for a straightforward representation of the truth conditions introduced by the internal constituents of complex NPs. Yet, the ontological status of the !%! % / !emains, far from clear. Under some metaphysical interpretations, e.g., Locke  "7)W*^8 1997: 268-276) or Wittgenstein  "[1918] 1922: 2.021, 2.024, 2.0131), if %%  4  is represented by a formula including the string (...x)  (x) &  (x) & ,(x)..., the variable /  ! %  !' 3! '    rties !      $ icist standards on precisely those grounds. On the other hand, interpreting /    

" cluster of necessarily concurrent properties of an entity) is unwarranted, since in such a formula the 

  $  (x) is one of the predicates of /   t be a constituent of /- .   $ # alternative, apparently (cf. Loux 2002: 96-138), is to interpret / ding to the !  eory of individuals. Yet, under a !   $/ must stand either for the bundle or for a selected subset of the bundle, and, in either case, insurmountable logical problems arise: If / ! '   bundle in ...P(x) & Q(x) etc., where properties like P and Q are themselves constituents of the bundle, P(x), Q(x) etc., become tautological or downright inconsistent; if, on the contrary, / ! '    ' !  each of P(x), Q(x) etc., may well be informative, but, then, by definition, the content of / %ious clauses P(x), Q(x), etc. that are supposed to characterize an individual cannot be unified, and the bundle-theoretic definition of individual identity disintegrates. To put it simply, P, Q, etc., are in that case being predicated of different particulars and the formula is no longer a representation of any consistent bundle. The status of such !%! %      ! any of the major metaphysical theories of individuals on the market, but one thing seems clear: if we grant, for the sake of argument, that /3  out !-specified individuals"   $  '! nder-specified "& substratum theorists) cannot be synonymous with property-less, for /       $ !%!      #$ that has long been far richer. Hence, / %   to be, must

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minimally consist of the ontological properties distinguishing individuals from other entities (events, properties, etc.), except existence, since that is what an existential quantifier contributes to such formulae. Although, somewhat surprisingly, the uncertain status of /     perceived as a flaw (to my knowledge), that early approach to the logical form of NPs soon proved to have other important limitations. For example, modifiers do not always receive intersective interpretations (e.g.,     is not an individual who is both good and a driver). Various attempts were made in the literature to handle such cases without abandoning an austere first-order ontology. A popular one consisted in increasing the adicity of  to introduce a hidden argument, i.e., saying that  really means # !' !% # ! !% # - %  $  patch would not work for cases like  /4* or modal NPs like  &%%%/ , and eventually semanticists had to assume higher-typed predicates, subjects that were themselves properties, and a much richer ontology. Correspondingly, it became technically possible to quantify over properties (cf. natural language expressions like ,%/% & & %%%%5 %2*, etc() via formulae like P [P(i)  P(j)], (where P = a property and i, j individuals), and property variables became appropriate in such cases of quantification. Otherwise, the usual computational machinery suffices: second-order predicates combine with first-order predicate subjects in exactly the same way first-order predicates like & combine with first-order arguments like  to yield  &5 i.e., both cases reduce to % &&3 %C/&%.8 Thus,   , itself a first-order predicate (type <e, t>), is the result of a second-order predicate  (type , <e, t >>) being functionally composed with a first-order predicate   (type <e, t>) (cf. Partee 1995, Heim and Kratzer 1998: 68-73). Informally, predicates like  just need  bjects 3   in such cases, and the resulting predicate   will in its turn saturate an appropriate determiner of type e> to yield a name of type e (= individual), but neither the individual variable / $  %   $$   utation of such senses. In other words, higher-order properties and their  O  esented, but nothing else need be. A linguist like Dik (1997a: 133-136, 149-150) might surely object that such logical representations of complex NPs, even if they capture their bare truth-conditional aspects, are just too poorly structured to do justice to the way semantic composition operates to yield senses in natural language. For example, there is plenty of empirical evidence (e.g., from standard constituency tests like =-anaphora, Ellipsis, Coordination, etc.) that, in



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cases of multiple modification, the modifiers of natural languages are not just added one after another, as suggested by the '  O%' ulae of predicate logic, but stacked, or even attached to different hierarchically organized invisible heads within the NP (cf. Cinque 1994 and work in Cinque ed. 2002). Thus, the four modifiers in #%% 2   modify not the head noun, but different expansions thereof, i.e., minimally (more structure may be involved), if the lowest modifier modifies the noun  , the next higher one modifies 2 , etc., and, depending on which modifiers and operators (functional categories, etc.) intervene, the higher heads may, but need not, be of the same semantic type. This is absolutely correct, and further types are surely involved, but that need not entail new variables in term representations. The semantic ontology did not long remain austerely limited to individuals and properties. Another early influential enrichment was Davidson ")*W+ !  '%  orated on in Parsons (1990) and subsequent work, to capture entailments among predicates of different adicity sharing homonymous heads. Of course, predication and quantification over events9 did require a new event variable 10 and new semantic types for events, predicates of events, and events as modified in various ways, although Davidson  '   O%   ' %  ignore the hierarchical organization of natural language VPs, where arguments and modifiers appear at different layers of structure and affect different heads and different types of entities.11 Thus, constructing Logical Forms to mirror the way expressions are compositionally built in natural languages surely entails allowing for recursion of entities within entities, properties within properties, events within events,12 etc., and accepting a rich type system, a fact acknowledged in all major linguistic approaches, including F(D)G,13 but representing stacking and recursion does not require any new variables in the internal structure of sense representations, which, as argued below, reduces to functional application/composition of thorder predicates and their arguments. In sum: as semanticists have attempted to capture more subtle aspects of the sense of NPs in natural languages, the ontology has expanded to include properties/sets, events, etc., with their own properties, recursion, etc., but variables remain necessary to compute senses only to the extent quantification is involved, if at all, and play no role otherwise. The rule of thumb is just this: symbols can only be compositionally computed if they stand for entities belonging to homogeneous ontological domains (sounds, inscriptions, actions, speech acts, senses, etc.), and, by definition, if the value of a variable symbol is computed in a formula, the variable cannot be so

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computed, which makes it redundant at whatever analytical level is involved.

2.2. Variables in F(D)G term structures The original term formulae in Dik (1978: 16, 57) and subsequent FG work down to Dik (1997a: 160 footnote 1) are obviously inspired by the standard Fregean-Russellian treatment of quantification, i.e., an FG term is a structure x: (x): (x): (x), where /  ! "'- ) by a set of grammatical operators  and  !$  'onadic firstorder predicates : : .14 Although FG terms do not quite have the properties of predicate logic ones (cf. Dik 1989: 117-118), term variables raise the same issues discussed above with reference to the status of !ividual "! % %           -specific problems that have remained unsolved, if not unnoticed.15 In this section, an attempt will be made to identify them and diagnose their causes. First, the variable /  !! by Dik at the core of FG terms is problematic, and for the same reasons the logicians!%! %   were. Dik (1989: 55, 115-118; 1997a: 136) presents it as a first-order variable picking out individuals, but such a statement immediately clashes with his other assumptions. Observe that if /   !%!  %  expressions denoting individuals should be freely substitutable for it, but, of course, that is incorrect (no expression denoting an individual may replace /   erm formula), as well as being incompatible with the FG view (e.g., Keizer 1991; Dik 1997a: 131; 1997b: 11) that only terms refer to individuals. The term-variable /    !' !%!  in the FG sense any more than it can pick out individuals in the logicians representations. Dik himself (1989: 126; 1997a: 148) observes that ' llows from the definition of      !ividuals cannot be restricted  /     ! $         !'  ' it stands for an individual.16 Dik !!   ";3)**+()@*  the effect that in the case of terms structures, ntity  !!  ! as $  '!'!$ ! nstruction  $   that it is not !ividuals         " : /  !   figure as saturating their open position). But if / !     ! '   individual, what do FG operators bind, and what saturates the open position of restrictors? Dik (1989: 122, 171 footnote 8; 1997a: 140, footnote 10) alternatively analyses individuals as singleton sets, but that does not rescue /   '-standing theoretical entity: if /$ !'  -



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member set (intensionally: a property), then, type-wise, /   ! nguishable in such cases from the property variable '  #  % sets. One of them at least is otiose, or, rather, both are (cf.  ). The problem does not seem to have been clearly perceived, but the early status of /   % ! ?       FG scholars, for, since then, they have tended to deprive it of its original referential import, to add to the NP new discourse-functional, referential, or pragmatic variables (#a'-:O3 '' 1992, 2002, :2#% !  3 and to keep /   nverting it into a ! % %   gmatic %    # $! '   - :O3 '' ",^^,( ,,+-229; 2004; this volume) and other recent F(D)G writings distinguish within their underlying NP structures the ! % $ " :O3 '')**, 2002 i.e., Quality, Quantity, and Location, four in Rijkhoff this volume, by implication more in Keizer 2004, Mackenzie 2004, and Hengeveld this volume, cf.  ) from a higher !    $ !  rsonal level in Hengeveld  3"'- M  this volume). Correspondingly, aside from the term variable /' $ !B5 dditional variable, #a:Okhoff ",^^,  'B5 !    or :2#% !  &  ' rsonal level.17 Of course, something equivalent to a referential variable is still necessary if NPs are to be referentially usable, but not in the representations of the sense of NPs (cf. Escribano 2004b and Keizer this volume). Dik / of course, figured in such representations because it was meant to serve a double (representational and referential) purpose, although for the reasons described it cannot play the former role well. If a new a %  ccounts for the NP  'ntial potential, then /    !! $ justified, perhaps as a variable standing for linguistic entities (= senses). However, if / !   % / $  

   as with the logicians!;3 /       % -!  same holds if /  !    # ;3 !  #  expressions bind variables, to capture the fact that the NP corresponds to the speaker   '    /

  " ! '  % ones) to refer to a certain referent (cf. Rijkhoff 2002: 229). Anyway, treating /      $    %  !  NP-choice variable is simply incoherent. In sum, Dik  # % / #   and inconsistent, and to the extent it remains in formulae down to the latest F(D)G approaches to term structure (e.g. Hengeveld this volume; Rijkhoff this volume), the original inconsistencies remain unsolved. An early proposal to sever /'  ' '  ' ! Rijkhoff ")**,()*)!  !ferent%  -

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In the mature form of that proposal, cf. Rijkhoff (2002: 227-229), the term variable /       #ferential, a function now entrusted to a-0 !  /'     ations: in some passages (e.g., Rijkhoff 2002: 229) it ranges over the set of NPs available to the speaker as descriptions of the referent, whereas elsewhere (Rijkhoff 2002: 228) /    !   ! '   3! '   !'    /

! B5 via lexical or grammatical restrictors.18 However, the term variable /  ltaneously a    $ !  B5-choice variable, unless by B5   understood just the sense of an NP. On the contrary, what a speaker uses to refer to a referent is not the sense of an NP, but the NP %% %, i.e., a linguistic NP and its sense are categorially different things; if NPs BNPs (i.e., linguistic expressions in their full individuality) are particulars used by speakers to refer to entities of the world of discourse (or their mental correlates), the entities in the range of   /    ities from a different ontological domain. However, even if    /   O     %     xactly the same problems the logicians!;3 / !(:O3 '' / (and similarly, Hengeveld !K&   terally stand either for the sense of an entire NP or for a zero-sense entity. It cannot pick out full NP senses, which obviously cannot replace /   O '!icates expressed by nouns and their modifiers (i.e., the sense of an NP like % #%   2   cannot become the  O '  , 2, etc.), and it cannot stand for zero sense, either, for, if it does, by definition it cannot denote anything at all, and in that case nothing is bound by the operators or saturates the open position of the restrictors, and the whole term structure collapses. Observe that, in virtue of the correlation [zero intension] {universal extension}, a strictly property-less /  !3 out the whole Universe of Discourse (call it W for   ! -- %ything in W. However, in Rijkhoff (2002), as in F(D)G generally, the world contains much more than individuals, e.g., properties, events, predications, possible facts, speech acts, locations, times, manners, and what not (cf. Mackenzie 2004; Hengeveld this volume; Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.), so, clearly, /nnot range over the set W, either. Under present F(D)G ontology, /"' !!/   !   '   have some content, but by no means that of a full NP: as stated above with reference to the metaphysician     imally /   3  entities with the ontological features that distinguish individuals from the rest of the ontology,19 whatever they are, and no matter what its content is, as the underlying structure of an NP is gradually built, its value must be



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!! "'- ;3 )**+( )V^ !  ). The result is that, finally, the various tokens of the term variable pick out sets that cannot be unified, which makes any conjunctive representation incoherent.20 Hengeveld      esentational structure of NPs still keep Dik  B5-internal    / %  " atively  '  event-denoting nouns, ' '   $-denoting ones, etc., cf. Hengeveld 2004: 372; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 674, Hengeveld this volume, Hengeveld and Mackenzie, fc.) as the  O #  "

 $ complex) nominal head plus its optional modifiers. In other words, still essentially Dik  $  -.  cture proposed for the referential subact in Hengeveld (2004: 372), in particular, is (:1: [/1 ['1: LexemeN (f1) : "'1))] (x1): "/1))] (R1): ":1)).21 However, on careful inspection, certain differences emerge: whereas in Dik  

%       / straightforwardly saturated the open predicates of the restrictor and all the satellites, and thus contributed in a transparent way to the determination of the NP   !  !'   "  #   caveats expressed above), Hengeveld /" '-!    rate the head nominal in that formula, it is not an argument of the Lexeme, and it is unclear how it can be an argument of the whole head structure ['1: Lexeme N (f1): "'1))], which is already internally quantified and fully saturated. A parallel problem arises at the higher level, where the loosely added referential variable R1 is bound by a referential operator :1 (irrelevant here) and restricted by a saturated NP [/1 ['1: Lexeme N (f1) :  "'1))] (x1): "/1))] and a modifier ":1), but, again, although R1 is an argument of  nclear how it can fit into the argument-structure of the saturated nominal. On the other hand, it seems implausible to claim that both N and the NP each take two arguments of different ontological types or even domains, i.e., in the case of N, a property ('"--  !!%dual (the value of small /! in the case of the NP, an individual (but hardly the same individual) and a speech act R. The problem has not been solved even in Hengeveld         "2#% !    volume), where a head noun like   or an adjective like %% in % %%  each carry two arguments, an 'i%  !$  level operator and the term variable /i !$  # x xi operator. Such difficulties are ignored in Hengeveld pproach, and variables are treated as if they could be freely added to previously saturated structures, but the price to pay is high:    / " ' -  $        compositional derivation of sense and reference potential, and, correspondingly, :  !!!  bel to the NP, but nothing in the sense or

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reference of the NP constrains its range. Thus, the correspondence among sense, reference, and use becomes essentially arbitrary. Perhaps as a reaction to criticism in Escribano (2004b), Rijkhoff (this volume) has now removed some of the variables in Rijkhoff (2002), including all (tokens of) '%   ! " 3  '  / but one. If I do not misunderstand his proposal, in his new term formula   /esents * the (full) term variable, and stands for the referent of the NP (a discourse entity/its mental representation), but, contrary to traditional FG practice, unexpectedly occurs only once per term, at the very core, next to the noun. Obviously, this avoids one of my criticisms of Dik  and Hengeveld    ( '  $   3 '      / %    used, its value, whatever it is, will be unique, and the overall structure of the term will not become inconsistent on account of different tokens of / representing different sets or sense entities. However, if    /     term variable and stands for the referent, its placement in the core of the term structure, as an argument of the bare noun, is inexplicable, for it is not the noun &  that denotes the referent. In that case,   /  ! at the top of the representational formula, i.e., where # a    Rijkhoff ",^^,ccount.22 As shown, the tension provoked by the Janus-like status of Dik  #inal term variable has not yet been satisfactorily resolved within F(D)G. The fluctuation between Dik  2#% !  ! :O3 ''  %  '   /   ";    ## #  '$ concept of ference !        ' !     ! B5 choice, etc. That variables should proliferate in term representations, thus, is unsurprising, for in recent F(D)G work several non-isomorphic ontological spheres are invoked whose mutual relations need to be made more precise, i.e.: 1. The extra-mental world(s) endlessly shifting along the dimension of Time (Phys-W  '  ! $ 

!     evant in F(D)G (cf. Dik 1997a: 129; Mackenzie 2004; Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.). 2. The different psychological world(s) of Speaker and Addressee (Psych-W  '!  $  !! !  ' reference (cf. Dik 1989: 113, 140; 1997a: 129; Keizer 1991: 1; Rijkhoff 2002: 27, 336; Mackenzie 2004: 973, etc.). 3. The transitory discourse-generated world(s) successively negotiated by S and A at particular stages of discourse and, again, different from each other, and obviously distinct from the Phys-W ! Psych-W  '!"; -W  '-



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The speech-act world (Sp-Act-W, hereafter), constituted by S, A, their referential and ascriptive acts, time, place, etc. And, finally, The intralinguistic (! %   !  '     "6#-W  hereafter), which also differ across speakers (and are bound to differ for each individual speaker along the time dimension, although linguists tend to dismiss changes of sense occurring within short spans of time as irrelevant).23

Thus, clarifying the nature of F(D)G denotation/reference and the ontological domain over which each of the various F(D)G variables ranges should contribute to understanding which should be kept and which removed from the term formulae of the representational level. Let   ! this briefly. Starting with the variables attached at the top of NPs, Hengeveld  : apparently ranges over events in Sp-Act-W (acts of reference). As to the classical term variable / '' $'    '5 $ W, and individuals from Psych-W (or Psych-W as linguistically construed) is what Dik /   :O3 '' a pposed to be bound by, cf. Dik (1997a: 129),24 Rijkhoff (2002: 336), and Keizer (this volume, on ntal extension sets- :O3 ''  ",^^, # a %   3  out individuals from Disc-W,25 in principle distinct from Psych-W(s), although, obviously, Disc-W and Psych-W may overlap (e.g., in internal monologue), and Disc-W(s) will be internally represented for both S and A. Hengeveld B5% /"!  !/:O3 '' 2002) cannot range over '     #a!    is no reason to take it to range over      B5/ssion does not reduce to its sense. If it is interpreted as a sense variable comparable to '!  /"/ #  %B5-senses), it is a Ling-W entity; otherwise it could range over events of Phys-W (physical NP occurrences, in whatever medium, i.e., sounds, inscriptions) or entities of some other   !Q !  ' $%-rther down, in the ! % $  "; %    !!  range over Ling-W entities (cf. Hengeveld this volume; Keizer this volume). Rijkhoff  ",^^,    / !     3  $ #  5 $ W(s) or Disc-W(s), and is said to belong to the descriptive dimension of the term, which suggests that it stands for a   --$ '  Ling-W, like the th-order properties over which his ' %   #- Yet, Rijkhoff also says that    / 3     egions with minimal properties (2002: 228, fn. 19, 229), and in that case it must be a referent in Phys-W, an ontological domain that FG traditionally considers

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irrelevant, and the     !         '    /    /   :O3 ''  ",^^, ccount cannot be reconciled. Significantly, in Rijkhoff (this volume), which contains a revised version of term structure, /  !  !'  ferent of the NP, presumably a Disc-W entity as psychologically represented in virtue of the nature of linguistic construction. However, under that interpretation, why / ssociated with the core layer, a purely ! % $    said. In sum: it is necessary to clarify the ontological domain of /!  other variables in F(D)G term representations, which means no less than deciding what kind of semantics F(D)G wants, perhaps a long-term enterprise, although, in my view, only immanentist theories will eventually be capable of accounting for what happens in natural languages. However, the immediate problem with all extant F(D)G proposals concerning the underlying structure of NPs is not just that the variables range over heterogeneous domains, relevant at different analytical levels, and clutter representations (cf. Escribano 2004b; Keizer this volume), but the fact that the logical architecture of the formulae makes even those variables that should play a role in the computation of senses ornamental (cf.  ). As a consequence, the NP sense that must help the speaker assign a value to #a!3 the NP suitable to play the R role in a speech act does not result from the intensional value of the various tokens of    / ' - via simple inheritance or any explicit compositional operation. In other words, even & / relevant sense variables play no role in the computation of the intension of the NP, nor in the determination of its referential value or range of use in speech situations, which must be stipulated by extracompositional means.

2.3. Multiple variables/variable-tokens and the unification/update issue Let us now turn to a different aspect of the problem of FG variables. The structure of a term like (1), represented in (2), contains several variables or variable tokens whose mutual relations also need clarification. I illustrate the problem with Dik  # % /  !''   arise with alternative  %  !   % '%   at the head N, its expansions, and its satellites, that remain in Rijkhoff  Keizer !2#% ! and Mackenzie   -



(1) (2)

=0+% % .?@ >'/&%

131

,% 4%% /-/% /( dprox3xi: studentN (xi): newA (xi): {(d1xj: AmsterdamN)Source (xi)}

According to Dik (1997b: 30) the relation between the various instances of /     '     aphoric "!( /      %  and has the same index value throughout), and he even introduces an anaphoric operator  3      icuous. That assumption faithfully echoes the logicians !!% ' ndividual%iable / ! 

!  %         ;3    $ ' dynamically constructed terms (cf. Dik 1997b: 31). Indeed, Dik (1989: 116-119) had long before clearly stated that the structure of a term like (1) does not resolve into the simple conjunction of clauses that constitutes its predicate logic representation. The difference is that natural language restrictors are stacked, the construction of terms being a step-wise process (Dik speaks of !$      .L '26 whose effect is that restrictors previously attached constrain possible subjects and the predicability of subsequent restrictors, cf. Dik (1989: 116119, 127-128; 1997a: 150; 1997b: 31-33, 37). In fact, that is what the order of the predicates separated by (   ! /

 ' rmulae.27 This, of course, has immediate consequences for the value of the possibly various occurrence(s) of the term variable /-;3")**+()@* is very clear in this respect: 0   '  $  ! be understood as $  '!'!$ !    and, discussing the predicability of new restrictors, Dik (1997a: 150) adds: . 

 '! $   !$ '   '  eries of restrictors placed on a term as construed so far which determines the predicability of the next restrictor in the series-G'      $ consistent with his idea of dynamic term construction, but it has a consequence that Dik apparently did not notice: each successive occurrence of the /%  ! ' !''"#! $! #  '  i.e., it is a different variable. Which sets are represented by each variable is not entirely clear, though. Interpreting Dik  %     ements on the structure of terms and the relative scope of operators and restrictors (cf. Dik 1989: 127128, 138, 308; Dik 1997a: 132ff.; Dik 1997b: 23; cf. also Keizer 1991: 6, fn. 4) is tricky, for they are contradictory and the FG theory of scope is too vague (cf.  ), but, if operators are themselves stacked (Dik 1989: 308)28 and restrictors (including the head noun, cf. Dik 1997a: 151) are attached in the order implied by the ( ation, what Dik ' ulae claim about the structure of a term like (2) might be more perspicuously represented as

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  ! " #

in our preliminary tree (3), left-to-right order irrelevant, and paraphrased as in (4) (parallel to Dik     '  / %%  *3 &%, cf. Dik 1997a: 161). (3)

(4)

Term [d prox 3xi: studentN (xi) : newA (xi) : {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source (xi) }]  xi {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source(xi)  }  xi newA (xi)  xi studentN (xi)   d ?  prox ?  3 xi , 3& % %% %%545 / -/% /(

 Observe, though, that in that case an inconsistency arises, i.e., the variable xi can hardly remain identical to itself throughout the stepwise derivation, or the effects of stacking will be vacuous. At the bottom of tree (3), xi would presumably stand for the universe of discourse (Psych-W, in Dik  work), or the subset of ! '! !%!uals  - 2 % ' the operator %  applies, trios of such entities (whatever they are) are denoted; after the operator % applies, trios of such entities near the speaker are denoted; after the definite operator applies, discourse/contextrelevant proximate trios of such entities are denoted, etc. The first restrictor, the head noun %%5 will then restrict that set of contextually relevant proximate trios of individual entities in Psych-W to relevant proximate trios of students, then the second restrictor, 45will restrict that set to that of trios of 4 %%, and  / -/% /5 in its turn, will restrict the resulting set, etc., until no further modifiers remain. In other words, the range of referents of the presumed term variable xi must be pdated      nstruction of the term proceeds. If the variable at the top represents the set to which the full term is intended to refer, the lower /



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variables will stand for different supersets thereof which cannot be unified with it or among themselves. Thus,& Dik, the relation between occurrences of /  !!$  ction. The same difficulty arises if   / ! % esumably is in Rijkhoff (2002): assuming it is not a &   %iable, after all, but has some content, the lowest /  !'    '!enotations in Ling-W, i.e., type /   !specified individuals" opposition to properties, events and other kinds of entities), but as    x 

 $     #ument of N and of Quantity and Location satellites (cf. Rijkhoff 1992: 191; 2002: 228), it, too, must be pdated  ''  ' 3# %  Yet, obviously, if   / !!!$ ' ations, the effect is devastating: the formula ceases to be a coherent description of an individual or set (for the same reason a metaphysician !    to be a bundle if / ! ' !''    '    ' ndle). Of course, what holds of small / !  '   !#"   variables, and ultimately of all variables that recur in stacked modification structures within NPs, VP 5    -.      the earliest FG theory of terms, and, at bottom, a consequence of the ontological incoherence of / ! !!  $       ' individuals, remains unsolved in all later F(D)G analyses (e.g., Keizer 2004; Keizer this volume; Hengeveld 2004; Hengeveld this volume; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 674) except Rijkhoff (this volume), where occurrences of the term variable / !    #  if that single occurrence is attached to the core noun, it will not pick out the referent of the full term, but a superset thereof, i.e., all individuals of the type specified by the head noun.

2.4. The variable-binding issue As argued above, in formulae of the representational component there is no reason to add variables unless they have to be quantified over, and they are not quantified over when the predicates that carry them are saturated by appropriate arguments, so it is unclear why variables should figure, along with items that express their values, in F(D)G representations. However, to stick to FG   

   '  %   3  ': nbach  # %iables, as Dik (1997a: 54 footnote) says, variables must be bound by operators term-internally,29 and this is not always the case in

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current F(D)G term formulae. On the contrary, multiple variable-binding violations arise. To start at the bottom, the f %   

!     ! ! satellites (1-n) of Rijkhoff  ",^^,( ,,+-229) formulae raise a !# problem, for they are not bound by any operator (assuming that the 1, 2a, and 2b operators cannot simultaneously bind x ! '    #ically disparate categories, a reasonable assumption). Although Rijkhoff (2002: 227-228, and fn. 18) treats Quality satellites as being of a higher type than the rest (i.e., second-order, in the basic case) and has them take the value of the 'i%  'B  # nbound variable 'i '  !B O % $ !60: if the nominal predicate is to project its properties in a compositional way to its higher expansions, the result at L1 must be the fusion of the two predicates (N, Quality satellite). Even if the variable of the satellite is !scharged   ! by the sense of the head N, the ' %  '          bound by an operator, and there is no other operator. This part of the problem is not solved in Rijkhoff (this volume), where the ' %   % been dispensed with in the higher layers, but the ' %  '     noun remains, and remains unbound, cf. Rijkhoff '  "@VFurther binding violations arise with Rijkhoff ",^^,/!a(' occurrences of / ! a  !  ! "# ring the implications of STC, cf. & ) as tokens of the same variables, respectively, as the representation suggests, biuniqueness issues arise, i.e., / ! a   ! by more than one operator each, an impossible configuration under standard views on operator-variable relations; if, on the contrary, /!a are cover symbols for sets of different variables with !!ations, as STC entails, then either each operator can bind several different variables, an offending configuration, or some variables remain unbound. The problem persists in recent work like Hengeveld (2004: 372), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006: 673-674), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.). In Hengeveld (2004), for example, the Quality operator '1 must bind the '1%   /B 

 !#   !  '1 %iable at the modifier  remains unbound, and the same applies to the higher operators /1 and :1 with respect to the pairs of variables of type /)! :1    !  !  !'  '   %   levels. This problem is not solved in Rijkhoff "  % % !'%tier model of terms, where operators no longer bind the term variable that survives at the core noun. Rijkhoff proposes, instead, to analyze operators as predicates taking the remainder of their respective layers as their argument, a solution I approve of (cf. Escribano 2004b, 2006), but still: that



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leaves the surviving /%iable of the noun as unbound as the surviving '% :O3 '' ' rmula (45). Needless to say, the variable-binding problem becomes more acute the more articulate the internal structure of terms grows. Keizer (2004: 15-16) reasonably recalls that, since nouns may denote entities of different order (zero, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th), we must expect arguments and modifiers of different  %  "K& ,^^@( )1-   term, I suggest, is just different  rders $    %    # $    ' (at least) the levels Rijkhoff (2002, this volume) postulates (in fact, rather more), no term can have more than one type of variable at its core, i.e., a term may denote an individual, or an event, or a speech act, etc., but not several of such entities at various structural levels; the parallelism with clauses breaks down here. However, the point is that Keizer  pproach obviously multiplies the $  ' !  !  !'  ! !   present F(D)G approach, the number and types of the variables awaiting suitable operators to bind them. I leave to the interested reader the task of specifying how many variables will remain unbound under a more articulated NP structure like Keizer -

2.5. Summary on variables In short, leaving aside (as heterogeneous and intensionally irrelevant, in principle) big a" B5%  ! X' iate) and :%   e top of NPs, the variables that figure in the lower, ontologically homogeneous, layers of FG   esentational formulae (the ! % $          (  /   $ neither an ndividual &   %ble, and each complex term may well contain several   /%  "   !# $ %  %     ' #% - !''%lues, some, including Rijkhoff  "   %  # / %riable, inevitably unbound, as are some of the '%   :O3 ''",^^,   volume) and Hengeveld (this volume) introduce and Keizer  ",^^@    volume) implied higher-order sense variables. Furthermore, in principle, the results of stacking under the stepwise construction of the term cannot be computed if variables are not pdated!  $ !   other hand, the formulae become inconsistent if they are, as they no longer represent the intended entity. As a consequence, current F(D)G term representations are ultimately incoherent and fail to capture the compositional relations between different elements of term-structure or their respective

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contribution to the determination of sense, reference and pragmatic adequacy. This is a serious flaw, for once the status of variables is shown to be questionable, everything else in the F(D)G representation of terms is, i.e., it is unclear what operators bind, what restrictors restrict, or how senses are assembled and reference compositionally determined. 4 $   Another major aspect of F(D)G term representations is the set of  ators-M ! $ 3#    !$ # ?ifiers, cf. Dik (1989: 137, fn. 1; 1997a: 160 fn. 1), but, under close inspection, they are rather unlike them, after all. As stated above, standard predicate logic quantifiers are formula-level constituents, explicitly take scope over restrictors containing unique unbound variables, and (vacuous quantification ignored) bind them. The syntactic and semantic function and scope of FG operators, on the contrary, is rather less clear, which casts further doubt on the soundness of the FG formalism. The first difference between logical quantifiers and FG term operators is that, as Dik himself observes (1989: 149; 1997a: 168), term operators are not sentence-level constituents, but NP-level ones. Strictly speaking, therefore, Frege   $   ' ?'         FG, and the semantic quirks of / etc. must ultimately be captured under a modifier analysis (e.g., that of Montague 1974 or Generalized Quantifier Theory; cf. Barwise and Cooper 1981). However, what is specially disturbing about the nature of FG operators is that, as shown directly, it is often unclear how they fit into term structures, whether they must have restrictors in their scope, whether they must bind variables (for variables are often unbound, as shown), and, if they must, whether they bind only one variable or are expected to bind more, even of different ontological types and domains, as implicit in current F(D)G formulae (cf. & ). Therefore, the conceptual problems surrounding variables and operators intertwine and boost each other. Dik presents term operators primarily as elements of abstract term structure, but does not clearly define either their semantic function or their syntactic structure with respect to their operands in the structure of terms/NPs, respectively. In general, an FG operator is a grammatical function applying to an  ! $ !?% "'-;3)*1*(,**-300), but it is clear that Dik did not consider operators #  predicates, since they are not assumed to take arguments and are not listed in the Fund, cf. Dik



=0+% % .?@ >'/&%

137

(1997a: 160-161). Apparently, in Dik   eory, they are '  " imately: predicates) applying to the term variable /    /   %iously operated on by lower operators (cf. Dik 1989: 308; Keizer 1991: 6), as suggested in our structure (3) above, or of / %  $ !'! by both lower operators and lower restrictors, under Dik ")**+ layered account of terms. Of course, if operators are indeed abstract features, we need not expect them to surface as free forms with identifiable syntactic functions (i.e., they can as well be realized as morphological or lexical features on the head noun), but in English and similar languages most do have overt exponents, and archetypal ones are discrete determiners or quantifiers in surface syntax, i.e., under the F(D)G analysis of NPs, noun dependents of some sort in the syntax. Rijkhoff (2002: 99) calls them #mmatical modifiers in opposition to  /   !'iers "Z    ! 2#% ! and Mackenzie (2006: 671) further add that what makes them different from other functional features is that they are non-relational (i.e., monadic) predicates, an analysis shared by Rijkhoff (this volume), where each operator takes the next lower layer of structure as its argument. To my knowledge, Rijkhoff          far, but also a major departure from traditional FG doctrine on term operators. It definitely distinguishes them from logical ones, makes them modifiers, and of course entails that they cannot bind variables. As a consequence, either the variables are removed (as claimed in Escribano 2004b and here), or they will remain unbound, and Rijkhoff removes most of them, although not all, cf. & .30 However, that is not the standard FG view of term operators. If we consider what has been written on term operators since Dik (1989), their broad role as #   !'       $'  $   on  !'$"--  $/!    -0;3  #  at least two different views co-exist:31 a. In his formulae, and even more explicitly in his occasional paraphrases thereof, e.g., Dik (1989: 315-316; 1997a: 62, 161; 1997b: 23, etc.), operators operate on the term-variable before any restrictors (not even the head!) apply, which strictly corresponds to the derivation (3) above. However, Dik  '' %   ( b. Operators are distributed in  hierarchical layers, with those at any one layer taking scope over operators and satellites at lower layers, cf. Dik (1989: 138), Dik (1997a: 161).

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  ! " #

The problem, of course, is that no single standard derivation, as represented by a graph structure, can satisfy both (a) and (b), so it is necessary to make a choice and adapt formulae to their paraphrases and graphic representations. Structure (3) above, in particular, satisfies clause (a) but violates (b). To satisfy clause (b), the structure of a term like (2) should be like (5). The layered representation (5), in the spirit of Dik ")*1*(V^)U1rlier parallel analysis of layered clause structure, corresponds to what is taken to be the intended view in Dik (1997a: 161), and is approximately the analysis of terms assumed in current F(D)G work like Rijkhoff (2002: 218228, 238, 314, 337, 341-343), Hengeveld (2004: 372), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006: 671), Keizer (2004), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.), and Rijkhoff (this volume), except in what concerns the number of layers, which varies somewhat (five, in Rijkhoff     Kzer 2004). (5)

d

Term [dprox3 xi: studentN (xi) : newA (xi) : {(d1xj: AmsterdamN) Source (xi)  }]32 (xi)

? {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source (xi) } (who came earlier, above mentioned)

prox (xi) ? {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source (xi)  }  3 xi newA(xi)  xi ? {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source (xi)  }  studentN (xi)  xi The conflict between (a) and (b) arises because, unfortunately, Dik  formulae are vague as to the structure of operators and were not revised in Dik (1997a, 1997b) to match his new layered account of terms. The vagueness is due to the lack of explicit indications as to how operators fit into terms. Observe that whereas the hierarchical structure of restrictors is clearly defined by (/ !  '  !   ctors contribute to the semantics of the term and their scope, cf. Dik (1997a: 62), operators are not separated by colons in term formulae, but juxtaposed. In Dik (1997a: 181), the term formula for %%  # is



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still (6), but all (6) suggests is that all the operators apply to /' $ of the restrictors does, as in derivation (3) above. Since Dik also says elsewhere (Dik 1989: 308) that operators are stacked and take scope over each other, in derivation (3) they have been hierarchically ordered, but as a matter of fact no hierarchical ordering follows from term formulae.33 The same ambiguity remains in the schematic formula of underlying term structure that Dik (1997a: 163) offers, i.e., exactly (7), which, again, suggests that the higher operators (all except Quality) apply to the variable / "   complex predicate?; observe that in (7) only Quant has a variable) before the restrictors do, i.e., essentially still clause (a) and derivation (3) above, rather than clause (b) and derivation (5). (6) (7)

(d prox 3 xi: # [N]:  [A]) 2 -Loc 2 - Quant x : [ 1 - Qual pred [N] (args)]

Thus, even if Dik  ")**+( )W) % ight as to operators 3#   over the whole term is ignored as inconsistent with his pronouncements elsewhere, FG term formulae, his own paraphrases thereof, and the layered view of terms do not quite match in what concerns what operators operate on or modify, and substantial ambiguity remains. Adopting clause (b) raises another problem: The '   ' yers in all current F(D)G term structures is inconsistent with STC and entails that operators and satellites of the same layer have each other in their scope, which, in its turn, causes an argument-binding violation.34 The first point should be obvious: if STC holds, layers containing more than two constituents, say an operator, a head and a satellite, just cannot be '  and nothing prevents multiple satellites (or even multiple operators) within any given layer. As to the second point, Rijkhoff (p.c.) rejects it and prefers to say that operators and satellites of the same level Ln take the same argument (Layer Ln-1), as he claims in Rijkhoff (this volume). Yet, it is unclear how two constituents of the same structural layer that contract predicate-argument relations with a third constituent can fail to take scope over each other. If A is an argument of P1, where P1 is, say, an operator, P1 and A must be constructed with each other, and must be in each other  scope (i.e., sisters); if a second predicate P2  say, a satellite  also takes A (and not [P1+A]) as its argument, then P2 must also be constructed with A, and a sister to A. Hence A is eventually constructed with both P1 and P2, and, since    '  %  5)!5,   sters, and therefore in each other   -2 (D)G   !   not mean what       #ic and all other kinds of linguis-

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  ! " #

tics,35 or operators and satellites of the same layer are indeed in each other   -G'  (D)G     !itive relation, or just not be based on      $  !36 an asymmetric relation, but in that case F(D)G scope should be carefully stated and regulated, or constituent ordering predictions based on it will be untestable, cf. section 4  . However, nothing in the F(D)G literature suggests that      ething different in F(D)G from what it means in all other major theoretical approaches in the field. As stated, the problem also has an argument-binding side: A constituent cannot, in general, be simultaneously an argument of two predicates P1 and P2. This is a standard assumption in most linguistic approaches that take semantics seriously. The relevant constraint has different names in various theories (.% IB, in Bresnan  6/     mmar, the ,% $ %  in Chomskyan Principles and Parameters Theory/Minimalist Grammar, etc.) but the basic idea is very simple and can be stated in theory-neutral terms: argumenthood is a functional concept, and functions must yield a unique value; hence, as soon as an argument receives a context-dependent semantic role (Zero, Experiencer, etc.) from a predicate P1, it cannot receive a second semantic role from a second predicate P2. It follows that if a layer Li is an argument of the satellite, it cannot simultaneously be an argument of the operator, and vice-versa.37 The other worrying respect in which F(D)G term operators differ from standard logical ones is that, under either Dik ")*1*)**+ :O3 ''  (2002) account, whenever a term contains a different number of operators and variables, either the variables must be multiply bound, a non-standard property of variables, or operators need not bind variables, a non-standard property of operators. This is the case in both (3), and (5) above, but the technical problem is different depending on how variable occurrences are interpreted. If different occurrences of / "' -  !   tokens of the same variable, the variable is usually multiply bound (assuming operators are operators and must bind a variable) and the resulting structure is incoherent; on the contrary, if they are taken to stand for different variables, some of them may remain unbound, along with all variables (e.g., '-'   (D)G term formulae simply do not provide operators, cf. & . Under Rijkhoff's (2002: 228) analysis, for example, the lower operators )! ,! ! /i%  3  but the variable, like Dik  

! !    '  #  and ends up multiply bound. On the contrary, as stated, the '%   ' Rijkhoff's (2002) formulae are all unbound unless his operators can each bind two variables of different ontological types (i.e. '!/ c-



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tively), an uncanonical assumption. Even in more recent work like Hengeveld (2004), the operators '/: ch bind two variables corresponding to non-identical sets (i.e., ' B /% -'  modifier, /  !% -/  !'!' :  head vs. :    '   !'-38 As to Rijkhoff  % !  model (Rijkhoff this volume), only two variables remain (/!'  core N), and they are both unbound. Such problems result from a) the heterogeneous content of term formulae and consequent proliferation of extraneous variables in them, and b) their layered, but weakly integrated, architecture. Within current F(D)G assumptions, the obvious way out of the vacuous quantification pitfall is to further refine the hierarchical structure of terms, distinguish more layers with variables denoting intermediate entities (sets, ensembles, restricted sets, quantified restricted sets, etc.), and allow each such layer to contain its own operator binding its own variable, i.e., to expand current analyses like Keizer (2004) or Rijkhoff (2002, this volume) by adding new binary branching layers as determined by STC. Since, as argued here, different occurrences of / "' -  !     ! '  !''   (i.e., they are technically different variables), adjusting layers to STC will surely leave variables unbound. To get them bound may seem trivially easy at first sight: FDG might simply introduce, beside  variables, exactly  (ad hoc) operators to biuniquely bind them. However, even if the additional operators can be justified within a richer type system, enforcing biuniqueness in operatorvariable relations will not of itself yield an integrated term structure that can be compositionally computed. The problem, in a nutshell, is this: to the extent it could be maintained, Dik   %iable / !    %  that held the various semantic elements of the term together, but once / is shown to stand for different sets, the glue that held terms together vanishes, and it is necessary to replace it with something. Piling up perfectly canonical layers of operators, correctly bound variables, etc. on top of each other does not help, for such layers contain predications with respect to different objects (sets), and no integrated structure results whose sense can be compositionally calculated. If the current strategy is pursued, FDG will have to develop some other device to hold the various constituents of term structure together as parts of a unified semantic representation of some entity or set of entities. In sum, the real issue, at bottom, is that the computation of sense (and reference potential) cannot be compositionally done as Dik assumed, so some other means is needed, but piling up parallel and carefully symmetri-

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cal layers of structure on top of one another or even endowing each of them with related variables and operators, predicates and arguments, satellites and heads, etc. will not make the slightest difference. What is needed, instead, is a more closely integrated representation of terms and a compositional mechanism that monotonically calculates the intensional contribution of the various heads and modifiers involved. One way to achieve that, of course, is to treat current F(D)G term operators as one-place functions (i.e., predicates) directly taking distinct layers of the term as their argument, with no variables involved, as proposed in Escribano (2004b) and Rijkhoff (this volume), although, obviously, such a strategy represents a significant departure from FG tradition, with wide-ranging implications at other levels (clauses, etc.). 3 &' ( #"  8 8( 8 8   

4.1. Current '  $  %    ';3  . Construction To the extent each layer Ln of term structure contains one (or more) operators ( n1       "Z 6n-1), and possibly one or more satellites (n1,..), an additional conceptual objection to current F(D)G doctrine is simply that such multiple branching abstract structures cannot even be built unless Dik  ant idea of     ction".L'-;3 1997a: 134-136; 1997b: 31ff, 37) is abandoned. According to STC, not only operators, but also satellites, cannot just be flatly added as sisters to previous structure, but must be stacked bottom-up in the order in which each makes its semantic contribution to the term.39 Dik .L!% properly crystallized into an explicit FG principle, although it plays an important role in all his discussions and paraphrases of how the sense of terms is built and interpreted, but in my view he underestimated its importance, for, if STC is observed, drastic consequences follow, e.g., only binary-branching structures can be derived, functional uniqueness follows, new operators and restrictors automatically acquire asymmetric scope40 over previously attached ones, and, by definition, the structural depth (i.e., the number of construction stages) of a term representation built out of  constituents is = 31.41 In the case at hand, of course, STC leaves -ary branching layers out of the question. Observe that, if only two term constituents intervene (i.e., operator and core,42 or core and satellite), no problem arises, but if the



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elements to be constructed into a given layer are a core, an operator, and a satellite (the prototypical case under current F(D)G analyses of intra-layer constituency), STC requires two of them to be attached to each other first, i.e., either [Op+Core], or [Core+Sat] (left-to-right order irrelevant) must first become a new constituent, and the third element (Sat, Op, respectively) must wait until the next constructive operation allows it to get attached to the new core, i.e., under STC *[Op+Core+Sat] is an unreachable output; possible outcomes are either [[Op+Core]+Sat] or [Op+[Core+Sat]]. To my knowledge, the STC idea has never been explicitly abandoned in FG, but, in practice, Dik himself ignored it in his analysis of clauses and NPs, and all subsequent work on term and NP structure (e.g., the current layered theory) has been flagrantly inconsistent with it. I take it, then, that STC is no longer, %, a principle of F(D)G, but this is an unfortunate accident, for if only the implications of STC are systematically extracted, there follows a much more explicit and semantically well motivated account of construction, constituency, domains, layers, scope, and surface constituent order. Also, given STC, current F(D)G principles like / 2% %* (DI, hereafter) and  + :/%* (HP, hereafter) can be strengthened, particularly as to their hierarchical importance,43 many apparent violations of DI and HP are avoided, their systematic exceptions explained, and better empirical predictions follow. Even more, not only DI and HP, but also other descriptively useful, but non-categorical and only approximately accurate FG    3 2 =  5   = 3  5$% &%= %%, and the core cases of 2 $/&:3 %*, cf. Dik (1997a: 399-401) become redundant, since they follow as consequences of more general principles, systematic exceptions to them can be explained, and the resulting structures make the conceptual problems above easier to solve. On the contrary, if STC is ignored, as has unfortunately occurred in FG, given  constituents, possible outcomes of construction multiply, constituents that are necessary at both the semantic and the syntactic level are not constructed, only loosely integrated domains like NP and Clause tend to be considered, constituent ordering possibilities and DI and/or HP violations proliferate, scope between constituents is symmetric where, under asymmetric scope, predictions would improve, etc. The negative consequences affect all aspects of semantics and syntax, including constituent order at surface structure, and cast unnecessary doubts on the standard (and, indeed, optimal) view that expression rules must operate subject to Iconicity on underlying semantic representations, cf. Rijkhoff (2002: 226, 253, 337338, etc.).

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4.2. Nice consequences of strengthening key F(D)G syntactic concepts Unfortunately, although the concepts and constructive operations % used in F(D)G do not differ significantly from those in other major and explicitly formalized linguistic theories, what exactly happens when two elements A and B are constructed into a bigger element C has never been carefully discussed in the F(D)G literature, to my knowledge, and the result is an informal view of $% %and loose concepts of/5 and'&which negatively affect the nature of the principles that F(D)G can formulate (preference rules) and unnecessarily weaken their empirical predictions. Such formal details, simply, have not attracted much attention in F(D)G, but it is necessary to work them out, or rather it is a pity not to, so I will here, in a more constructive vein than in the preceding sections, try to spell out, in terms as theory-neutral as possible, what Dik .L! really entails given F(D)G    

   !  $    # !! and must be reinstated to the place of honour it deserves among F(D)G principles. We must start with the concept of $% %. Needless to say, when A and B are here said to yield [A+B] the symbol \  ! $  convenient indication of the existence of a construction (dependence, etc.; a theory-neutral term intended) between A and B. As a matter of fact, the construction of A and B can hardly reduce to a set-theoretic operation like the sum (or the product) of A and B (& Chomsky 2005; cf. Escribano 2005b). Rather, all linguistic theories explicitly or tacitly agree that A must be functionally integrated into the structure of B (or  ), and it is so integrated to the extent it   ' M   $? "  $neutral terms intended; read % $ #      features -- Fnder various names, what everybody sees occurring in cases of Construction corresponds to the intuitive idea of   'ction ' functional properties of various kinds (adicity, semantic role, inflection, etc.). Roughly, A may be constructed with B mainly for one of three reasons: 1) to satisfy B !$"-#-M  / $? # of a certain type and assigns to it a certain semantic role, but that argument remains unsatisfied, i.e., valueless, until A is attached to B); 2) to satisfy one of its own functional attributes, e.g., if A is a referring term, it will be interpretable only if it receives a semantic role, so a valued semantic role feature is inherently expected, but the value of that feature44 (Agent, Beneficiary, Zero,emains unspecified until A is constructed with some head B; and, depending on how morphology is handled, another reason may be 3) to license A  M '   'atures (e.g., a NP in the Nominative,



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Accusative, etc., or a verb form carrying certain inflections, fit only in construction with certain other heads or dependents, etc.), cf. Escribano (2005b). When appropriate items come to be in construction with each other, their respective requirements are satisfied, and the resulting structure '  together and becomes fully interpretable in exactly the sense in which an algebraic formula can be fully evaluated only when all its variable symbols have been valued. Again, terminology varies greatly, some theories will say that construction rests on '    '     #ement -     '      '!   #    shared by everybody, as far as I know. I try to use the terms that seem more theory-neutral and either in (tacit) use in F(D)G or not likely to be resisted by F(D)G scholars. See Escribano (2004a, 2005b) for details on what I really think happens. It is '%% that allows/drives the constructive process. Notice that if, say, B is fully satisfied, that is, functionally saturated for all its attributes (adicity, roles, etc.), there will be no functional slot available for (a feature of) A to fill into B, and A will simply not be constructible with B and will not be constructed with it. Observe, furthermore, that Satisfaction is a two-place relation, i.e., A satisfies B, not a 3- or -place relation (cf. *A satisfies B C), which entails that Satisfaction-based construction is inherently a binary process (like Dik  .L- 4   'ction, even multiple mutual Satisfaction, is allowed,45 but Satisfaction must be unidirectional or bi-directional, and involve just two participant structures A and B each time it occurs, although each participant may consist of a rich set of attribute value pairs. Crucially, it is not possible for A to satisfy both B and C, or vice-versa, for B and C to both satisfy A. The former case would violate functional uniqueness (in whatever respect, semantic, inflectional, etc., is relevant); as to the latter, Satisfaction will trigger two distinct constructive operations, and one will necessarily occur first. As a consequence, two of the three participants (say, B and A) will be constructed into a new object O, and C will eventually satisfy a feature of A or B only in the sense that all features of A and B will have become features of O, but, strictly speaking, C will be satisfying a feature of O at the point it is constructed with O. In the case of term structures, assuming participants to be Op(erator), Core, and Sat(ellite),46 Satisfaction (> STC) yields two possible outcomes: a) Op+[Core], and b) [Core]+Sat, where [Core] may correspond to either a) or b), i.e., successive Cores (1-    omatic adjustment of their senses and referent potential (in the direction of increasing inten-

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sion and decreasing extension). *Op+Sat, *Op+Op, *Sat+Sat, *Core+Core are all directly forbidden provided Ops and Sats are basically predicates (#  s, in the first case) and core segments are nominals functioning as their arguments, as assumed in F(D)G analyses like Rijkhoff  "   % - .   # % %!   vial: informally, a predicate needs an argument, and will not contract a Satisfaction relation with another predicate, so it will not be constructible/constructed with it;47 correspondingly, a Core nominal inside an NP functions as an argument (of Sats or Ops, cf. Escribano 2004a, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, and Rijkhoff this volume), and will not satisfy, or be satisfied by, another nominal.48 Furthermore, a natural, and stronger, concept of / immediately results: a !   O   bMc Msfaction relation, or, informally, a step of STC in which a successful Satisfaction relation is established, i.e., the noun with its first complement, or Corei and its Sat (e.g., AP, PP, Cl, etc.), form a '% /, and so do Op and its Corej (e.g., Determiner and Corek, Quantifier and Corel, etc.). On the other hand, a full NP structure is not a strong domain, since many items in a complex NP may be completely unrelated from a semantic and syntactic viewpoint (i.e., not in a Satisfaction relation). The advantage of such stronger domains is their strict cohesiveness, i.e., by definition, nothing may intervene between Op and its Core, or Core and its Sat. If a constituent X occurs between Core and its Sat, X must be constructed with either Core or Sat; if X is constructed with Core, [Core+X] will become accessible to Sat, but Core itself will not, and since [Core+X] will not be of the same ,*& as [Core] (if it is a possible type at all), even though it became accessible, it would not trigger construction with Sat under Satisfaction; correspondingly, if X is constructed with Sat, [Sat+X] will be accessible to Core, but Sat itself will not, and [Sat+X] will anyway not be the right type of predicate to combine with Core. Thus, (% )/2%3

%* follows automatically, and since eak (= FG !   %  recursive construction of strong domains, DI is redundant and need not be added to the theory at all. Similarly, a new concept of  relativized to different stages of construction (= Core) can be defined, with further consequences in the area of surface constituent order. In fact, STC already entails that the noun is the head of the NP only at the first stage of construction; as N is constructed with its own arguments, satellites, or operators, the Head (= Core) becomes a gradually expanding nominal phrase. It follows that at any stage S in a STC, the participants in construction are invariably a Core (acting as Head, in the revised sense) and just another element, Arg, Op or Sat. That re-



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moves the anomaly that Keizer (2004: 8) observes concerning the fact that only terms contain multiple restrictors, a problem not solved by just relabelling N as the only restrictor and the rest as satellites, as she proposes. If only Core and Op are involved, assuming that Ops are monadic predicates taking the Core as their only argument, Op cannot but be adjacent to Core, since arguments must be satisfied and, by assumption, Op has only one argument, cf. Rijkhoff (this volume). Observe, furthermore, that, since both Op and its Core now are head(s), HP automatically follows from Satisfaction in this case. If it is only Sat that is constructed with Core, as the ultimate heads of satellites may not be monadic, two cases must be distinguished. If Head(Sat)49 is monadic (e.g., an adjective like #%), it will only require its  O"ZL !2!" !O L  25 requires. Of course a monadic Sat may carry its own satellite (e.g., an adverb, as in :% /*#%), but in that case the internal satellite of Sat will never intervene between Core and its Sat. The reason is, again, Satisfaction as applied subject to +  %*, another common assumption across contemporary linguistic theories, i.e., in the broadest theory-neutral version, that attributes are satisfied in a certain order as a consequence of their 3 "  /

! $ %       -#-   ,/%   3 *. Of course, Priority is itself a corollary of the binary character of Satisfaction: if two features are to be satisfied, one must -0   hand, Core is an argument of Sat, and arguments of heads must generally be satisfied before the resulting phrase, in its turn, satisfies a satellite, or it will be too late to satisfy them at all, as the types of the head as modified by the satellite and its still unsatisfied argument would no longer match.50 Hence, Head(Sat)+Core will form a continuous constituent, and both DI and HP, again, follow directly. Now, if Head(Sat) is polyadic, in principle it would seem possible for a non-subject argument of Sat to be satisfied first and linearly intervene between Head(Sat) and Core, in violation of DI and HP, and yet, interestingly (in languages like English, Spanish, French, Italian, etc., at least) such cases never occur, cf. R &  5 R%##:5R##*4(cf. Escribano 2004a, 2005b). The reason is that an independently necessary additional principle with an  $ ' %  tervenes to control the correspondence between hierarchical position and linear precedence (i.e., a possible FG /

  principle!O     3  25%   -.  3  formulation of that principle is Kayne  ")**4)   $3

 -:/ (LCA, hereafter), which, in an informal, theory-neutral, version that

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FDG may easily adopt, says simply that if A has asymmetric scope over B, A precedes B. In conjunction with the type of construction defended here, LCA plays a crucial role in preserving HP in this case for reasons, again, related to Satisfaction. When a phrase (e.g., a Sat) is constructed with another (e.g., a Core), their respective internal heads may both previously have been constructed with arguments (typically) or satellites. As a consequence, if both the noun and its Sat initially had arguments to satisfy, their respective arguments must be adjacent to their heads and may separate Head(Core) from Head(Sat), in violation of HP. Yet, as stated, the Satisfaction of arguments is subject to priority, cf. Escribano (2004a, 2005a), and, in particular, subjects are always satisfied last, hence the open slot of Sat will always be the last argument of Head(Sat) to be satisfied. Since    STC ( ttom up !%       #   ' 6L    '  Core, being the subject of Sat, will always be hierarchically higher than other Sat arguments. It follows that Core will invariably take asymmetric scope over Head(Sat) and all Sat   er arguments, and that Core will precede Sat and all Sat     That reasoning predicts two possible orderings, i.e., Core+[Head(Sat) +Comp(Sat)], or Core+[Comp(Sat)+Head(Sat)]. In the second case, Comp(Sat) will intervene between Core and Head(Sat) and HP will still be violated. However, LCA applies systematically, to all phrases, and this has particularly nice empirical consequences in SVO languages like English:51 since Head(Sat) is itself hierarchically higher than, and takes asymmetric scope over, the constituents of Comp(Sat) (by definition, since it is a sister of Comp(Sat)), Head(Sat) itself precedes its own complement. In sum: Core precedes Head(Sat), and Head(Sat) precedes complement of Sat. The only possible configuration, then, is Core+[Head(Sat)+Comp(Sat)], i.e., Core precedes any Sat containing complements (PPs, Clauses, complex APs, etc.), and Head(Sat) is adjacent to Core, which, again, saves HP (under the definition of head = Core). This captures the true side of HP, but HP has systematic exceptions, and it is important to understand why sometimes HP just cannot hold. With  ! !    /  !     ' 25         bound to enter into conflict with the higher-ranking principle of Satisfaction. For example, the head of the Core nominal *  % & #/ can never be adjacent to the head of the Sat %*. & & in ?@ *  % & #/ %* .  & &, cf. R * %*  % & #/ .  & &, R  % & #/ * %* .  & &, R %* *  % & #/ . 



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& &, etc. The reason is that all such hypothetical possibilities violate Satisfaction under Priority and/or LCA once or more. For example, in the first case, the argument of * and the first argument of %* have not been constructed with their proper heads, and, of course, the attempt to satisfy HP between * and %* causes two HP violations elsewhere. In the second example, LCA is violated, since * has asymmetric scope over ?@%& #/ and should precede it, which will cause the systematic HP violation cited. Finally, in the third example, it is the complement of %* that has not been properly attached to its head, in violation of Priority and Satisfaction (plus HP elsewhere). Granted Satisfaction under Priority, the complement of %* should have been satisfied before its subject, not the converse, which yields the idiomatically correct solution (at the expense of a systematic violation of HP). However, HP is just what Satisfaction predicts when the participants are lexical heads, and when they are not, HP holds or not depending on other principles. In short, HP is not a  # &  t sometimes holds and sometimes systematically does not, but the crucial point is that, in either case, the right facts follow from the way the  !  general principles of Satisfaction, Priority, and the LCA interact. Thus, it is not necessary to add to the grammar such ordering preferences. As a matter of fact, much the same can be said of nearly all the other FG general ordering principles in e.g., Dik (1997a: 399-404). Why it is so should be obvious to the reader at this point, but let us briefly recall the trivial reasoning involved in the case of SVO languages; for SOV and VSO languages the reasoning is more complex, and depends on assumptions about displacement that F(D)G does not share, so they will be ignored here. 2=   depends on semantic function, which depends on Construction under Satisfaction, i.e., a constituent C will have function F with respect to another constituent C"-#-#    ator) to the extent it satisfies (arguments), or is satisfied (satellites), or both satisfies and is satisfied by (features of) C"   ! '   subject to Priority, which fixes stage of attachment to the construct (roughly: first arguments, if any, according to their prominence, then satellites, according to the types they select, then operators; same sequence applied to all participants in construction), and stage of attachment determines Scope, which, under LCA, in turn determines surface order. Similarly, $% &%= %% has two sides, one vertical, the other horizontal, or, informally speaking,  nion-like 3#     image ?#- .  '  % $ '   '    ! ' Construction under Satisfaction, which fixes the relative scope of dependents; the latter is an automatic consequence of the internal structure

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the latter is an automatic consequence of the internal structure of the dependents themselves, which follows from the same principles and the LCA as applied inside the dependents. Briefly, if a Sat (of whatever scope) is monadic, it will precede its Core and Head(Sat) will be at the right edge of Sat and closest to its subject (a case of HP above); if Head(Sat) is not monadic, Sat will follow its Core, which is its subject, has asymmetric scope over Head(Sat) and Comp(Sat), and, granted LCA, must precede them (i.e., in the case at hand, complex APs, PPs, and Clauses will follow the Core; monadic adjectives and participles will precede the Core and be adjacent to it). Finally, on the vertical axis, Op will be where its scope dictates (i.e., where Satisfaction licenses its construction with the Core), and, under the present analysis (cf. also Rijkhoff this volume), being a monadic predicate, it will always precede and be adjacent to the Core (HP) unless it is an affix and special morphological rules apply. As to 2 $/&:%* ( % %, another preference rule in FG, cf. Dik 1997a: 404), of course, insofar as it is a consequence of right-branching, it follows neatly: non-branching operators and satellites (monadic predicates) will precede the Core and all right-branching satellites will follow it. However, increasing complexity correlates with semantic weight and the need to add information, and to that extent it does not entirely follow from sheer geometry: if two or more APs, PPs, or Clauses, etc. concur, our principles predict only that all will be postnominal; whether one or the other linearly precedes depends on its relative scope. Of course scope is predictable, but there is no obvious correlation between scope and  #  Z   ' '  -    $llabic word may have widest scope (e.g., an article), and a longish clause may belong next to the head (a complement clause like %%/

*/ in %%%/

*/). Thus, it is not reasonable to expect LCA, etc. to predict Increasing Complexity in full. Finally, the orders due to + /%% also follow from Satisfaction and LCA if it is assumed that a constituent may have additional attributes to satisfy which may force it to participate in ' * $3 % % elsewhere. E.g., if a constituent C (with its semantic role, inflection, etc.) is additionally specified as Focus, Topic, (Subject), Relative, etc., the Satisfaction of such additional features may lead to processes of fronting, inversion, topicalization, extraposition, etc. of C (theory-neutral terminology intended). Incidentally, that constitutes the only violation of DI the present theory tolerates, i.e., systematic violations of DI due to !splacement" eory-neutral term intended) triggered by Satisfaction. Thus, why !     ntirely explicable: a constituent C marked



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as [D-F: Foc/Top], [Cl-F: Subj], [Cl-F: Rel],52 etc., is a Focus, Topic, Subject or Relator  '    constituent C " L    B5- L  equently, such features just may not be satisfiable until C     ' been built (recall that construction works bottom-up according to STC) and becomes available to C for the purposes of Satisfaction. Of course, the positions assigned to Focus, Subject, etc. may vary, and displacement may not be involved in all cases (or the features may be realized by morphological means subject to other rules), but in some languages topics, foci, etc. are syntactic constituents and displacement occurs. In English, for example, Topic, Subject, and certain types of Focus (WHInterrogative, Neg-Constituent Preposing, Adverb Preposing, etc.; theoryneutral versions intended) do involve fronting, whereas unmarked Focus is XP-final and does not. Can the present theory predict the position of Topic, Focus, Subject, etc. in English-like languages? Indeed: a constituent C marked as Topic, Focus, or Subject must satisfy its own attribute of topicality, focality, or subjecthood and also supply a value to the topic, focus or subject attribute of its clause, C           nvalued [A: v] pair [Top(C(S87 "L(S8-2 %$ L can be constructed with C L    # -branching structure, so C will immediately acquire asymmetric scope over everything inside C ! granted LCA, will precede it. Thus, in English, topics, subjects, and such foci will occur at the left edge of their clauses. Since Rel is also a clause feature, but one with wider scope than Subject, Focus, and Topic, a constituent marked [Cl-F: Rel] must attach to C #        consequence: XP[Rel] will immediately take asymmetric scope over everything inside C ! #! 6L ! L- .   !    ntirely correct, and the reasoning can be extended to account for comparable facts in many other languages. Other theories invoke metaphors like Copying, or Movement in such cases, and various other devices (Slash, Unification, etc.) are available in HPSG, LFG, Categorial Grammar, etc.). FDG must also provide some device to account for displacement phenomena, be it at the abstract level or in the expression module. I suggest that displacement must be a) a deep phenomenon, since it has semantic consequences, but b) with surface reflexes. As to how it should be conceived of, FDG will have its aesthetic preferences, but in my view the appropriate concept is just (secondary) Construction, i.e., ultimately Satisfaction. Finally, as to the technical details, my broad suggestion is that phonological material be muted % and realized in the Topic, Focus, or Subject slot, where it can satisfy the clause-level

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feature that supports the relevant semantic interpretation of the !  ! constituent. Needless to say, this is a very quick and schematic account of how semantic and syntactic computation work under Satisfaction, and empirical discussion is necessarily scarce and limited to SVO languages, but the essential point is this: Satisfaction, as specified, entails Dik .L!  theories, including F(D)G, assume that arguments are hierarchically ordered (= Priority, basic case), so all that it has been necessary to add to what F(D)G tacitly assumes is LCA, or an expression rule to that effect. In other words, an extremely simple and general machinery that comes for (almost) free to F(D)G will elegantly account for binary branching structure, the integrity of domains, predicability constraints, functional uniqueness, head update, correct scope relations, and correct surface order, including FG general ordering preferences, to the extent they are correct, as well as explanations for systematic exceptions to them. As to the semantic front, appropriate semantic types must be defined for heads, arguments, successively richer cores, satellites, and operators/modifiers, but F(D)G, like all theories, has to do that anyway. The advantages of this approach, on the other hand, are substantial: no variables are involved in sense representations, no variable-binding problems arise, no vacuous quantification results, different intensions are automatically assigned for each core nominal as well as the topmost NP, correct scope follows, and, crucially, the various levels of term construction will be functionally integrated in the strongest possible way,  predicate-argument relations, and the sense and reference potential of the term will be compositionally determinable. All that follows from STC (<Satisfaction) once it is properly spelled out as to what it presupposes and entails and its formal details are worked out; what has been done here is just to fill in the gaps and systematically extract the consequences of a particular interpretation of STC that is perfectly compatible with F(D)G doctrine in all essential respects, in my view. On the contrary, abandoning Dik  .L !   ! $  !     allowed F(D)G doctrines that cause, severe semantic and syntactic problems. I have already extensively referred to the former (cf. discussion of the inconsistency of variables, the variable-update issue, variable-binding problems, functional uniqueness, and general semantic disintegration above). As to the syntactic problems, of course, in languages like English, loose multiply branching structures are blatantly incompatible with the results of all standard syntactic tests (e.g., coordination, zeugma, substitution by proforms, anaphora, mobility, etc.), and adopting them simply amounts to



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giving up on a precise formulation and explanation of processes like coordination, substitution, anaphora, ellipsis, processes resting on asymmetric scope (binding of reflexives, interpretation of pronouns, etc.), predicability, the fine details of constituent order and its structural motivations, and explicit accounts of syntactic and semantic composition, in general. In the case at hand, the flat layers predicted inside F(D)G NPs do not correspond to the structure that standard tests indicate exists, and make rules like NPinternal Coordination, One-Pronominalization, or NP-internal Ellipsis (theory-neutral interpretations intended) unstatable, apart from obscuring the transparent iconic relation that exists between the adicity and selection properties of lexical predicates and their patterns of occurrence in NP structures. Arguing and illustrating all that in detail would entail repeating well known textbook level facts and require much more space than is available here, and, on the other hand, sadly, F(D)G is not overly concerned with surface constituency, so I will in closing refer only to an aspect of NP structure with which the fullest F(D)G account of NPs to date, Rijkhoff (2002), is deeply concerned, i.e., the surface order inside NPs. My main claim here will be that adopting DI, HP, and other standard FG principles unnecessarily diminishes the accuracy of the predictions that accounts like Rijkhoff ",^^,3 Cglish NPs.53

4.3. Unnecessary weakness of current F(D)G predictions on NP-internal surface order One of the crucial concepts in Rijkhoff    ' B5-internal order is /, which in turn supports / 2% %* (DI). Rijkhoff ",^^,( 248-253) domains coincide with NP and clause, but NPs are too big and loose structures. A single NP may contain multiple elements that bear no semantic or syntactic relation to each other, and as a consequence DI is violated more often than it would be if domain were equivalent to the set of constituents in a given unique relation of Satisfaction. Observe that even elements of the nucleus of an NP, like two arguments of the same N, do not contract any semantic or syntactic relations with each other. Hence even the strict   "   #         to constitute a useful domain for the purposes of, say, effectively constraining surface order. Of course, beyond the nucleus, the #  % nner: a determiner or a modifier and an argument of the noun are unlikely to have any connection whatsoever, and the same holds of quantifiers and

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relative clauses, modifiers of different levels, operators, etc. As a consequence of this loose concept of Domain, Rijkhoff, like Dik (1997a: 402), must state DI in a weak form, as another tendency, cf. Rijkhoff (2002: 250) and add stipulations such as that embedded domains ! heral and not intervene between A and N, for example. On the contrary, if our concept of domain above (= construction, based on Satisfaction) is adopted, DI is a categorical fact, although it need not be stated as a specific principle, since it follows from Satisfaction, and, in fact, the + & %* of embedded domains needs no special provision, either, as, to the extent they are descriptively correct, both follow from the way Satisfaction and LCA work, as shown above, cf. Escribano (2004a, 2005a) for details (within a different theoretical framework). As a consequence of his flat view of layers, Rijkhoff ",^^,(U)UU@W '& principle, another key factor in his account of NP-internal order, is also much too weak, unsurprisingly, since it is a structure-dependent relation and must rest on F(D)G 3% '   !!  -0 the version that applies to satellites (a particular case, presumably), Rijkhoff states it as follows: 4 !'  !    /      ' the expression that they have in their scope- .      moderate content54 when only one modifier is present, but the fact that modifier and modified will be adjacent follows from Satisfaction, anyway (recall that the modified is an argument of the modifier), and, if there are more modifiers, Rijkhoff  ecomes vacuous. Rijkhoff (2002) does not discuss adjective order, but, just as an exercise in theory-checking, think of a ' ] $ $! $'    like Sat1, Sat2, Sat3, and Core, e.g., % % 4. All four are in each other    "'- ! 

  & ), so Rijkhoff    !  nothing useful about their respective order. It is compatible with results like, say, R%  %45R %% 45R % % 45 R%4%  5 * 4% %, etc., as well as the desired % % 4.55 On the contrary, a process of construction under Satisfaction, as above, would enforce a binary branching structure, Sat1, Sat2, Sat3 and Core would contract asymmetric scope relations, and such ordering ambiguities would disappear, i.e., if, assuming delicate typing of adjectives, a structure [% +[%+[ +4]]]] results from lexical selection specifications and Satisfaction, clearly %  or % will never occur between e.g.  and 4, and, granted LCA, outputs like *%  4%or * 4% % will just never be generated. Observe that % has asymmetric scope over [ b4], and must precede them, just as %  has asymmetric scope over [%+[ b4]]



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and must precede them. In sum, there is much to be gained from adopting Satisfaction, strong Domain, and asymmetric Scope. The third crucial factor of Rijkhoff    ' B5-internal order is  + :/%*, which, again, Rijkhoff (2002: 263-264) formulates weakly, as just another tendency (cf. also Dik 1997b: 402; Rijkhoff 2002: 264-290). This may be descriptively useful, but is theoretically inadequate in two respects: First, it does not give HP its due, predicting many more HP violations than actually occur, and second, it does not explain why HP systematically does not hold in certain cases. The first point is obvious: if layers are flat, HP is bound to suffer multiple violations; for instance, if a noun is simply preceded (or followed) by two modifiers (two As, two Ops, an A and an Op, two PPs, two Rel Clauses, etc.) in the same layer, and the structure is '  4 !)\4 !,\BB\4 !,\4 !)-  ! ' one of the modifiers and N will always violate HP. On the contrary, if such a nominal is built under Satisfaction, the relativized concept of Head, strong Domains, asymmetric scope, etc., the structures will be binarybranching, e.g., [Mod1+[COREMod2+[COREN]]], [[COREMod2+[COREN]] +Mod1], or [[[COREN]+Mod2]+Mod1], etc., order subject to LCA, as above, the relevant heads Mod2 and Core and Mod1 and Core will always be adjacent, and no HP violation will arise.56 Other statements by Rijkhoff in relation to HP, i.e., that the head N is as close as possible to the head V of the clause, or his first HP-derived (negative) prediction that the preferred position of any adnominal modifier57 is not between the head noun and the head of the clause (Rijkhoff 2002: 263, 290), are also inaccurate/incomplete and inferior to what Satisfaction, Priority and LCA predict. Observe that, if correct, in SVO languages like English, NP objects carrying pre-modifiers (cf. 2 %   %  %  4) and NP subjects containing post-modifiers (cf. ,4) : %%2  4 ) would both be non-preferred options, whereas, in fact, they are not only perfectly normal, but the only options available, even if the post-modifiers are long branching APs, PPs or Rel Clauses. In general, in SVO languages like English we would expect modifiers to systematically occur on opposite sides of the core depending on the NP  function and distribution with respect to the higher head, i.e., if the core noun is the head of a subject, its accompanying modifiers should all be prenominal, whereas if it is the head of an object, they should all be postnominal, etc. Obviously, that is not the case, either in English or in related SVO languages, so a stronger statement is justified: there are perfectly systematic circumstances in which an adnominal modifier of a subject (e.g., a PP or Clause) must be exactly in Rijkhoff  pposedly non-

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preferred position, between the head of the subject and the verb, and there are circumstances in which a satellite cannot be there, etc. Rijkhoff  '25-derived PHP1, i.e., that attributive adjectives are expected next to the noun, sounds sensible, and yet, under scrutiny, sometimes it does not hold, and when it does it follows automatically from more general principles. The latter needs no comment: if the noun is an argument of the adjective, it must be constructed with it under Satisfaction. More interesting is why PHP1 is systematically false sometimes, i.e., precisely whenever the noun  !   !Octive    '  ' -   example, granted Satisfaction and Priority one or more arguments of the noun may have to be satisfied (cf.   /) before any adjectival modifier of the NP can in its turn be satisfied by taking the resulting NP as its subject. If the adjective itself is monadic, it will be constructed with that NP and will not only be adjacent to it, but, in English, granted LCA, it will necessarily precede it (cf.      /, vs. R    / );58 however, if the adjective is not monadic (cf. / 4% 3 %*&%), adjacency between the two heads is impossible, in violation of HP (which does not predict why this is so), i.e., the only possible output is  // 4% %*&%, cf. */   /4% %*&%, */  4% %*&% /, etc. Now, if PHP1 were an option open in all cases, it might make sense to include it in the grammar, but it is not, and with the right sort of theory we know why, so mentioning incomplete/inaccurate generalizations like PHP1 (or indeed HP itself, for the same reasons) is misleading and unnecessary. Actually, there is more evidence that PHP1 is just a false/incomplete generalization and that more abstract and subtle principles than HP are involved. For example, HP/PHP1, like Satisfaction / LCA, predict R /%%%, but the unacceptable R%%/3 % should in Rijkhoff  $ O   '   !  violations. Observe that the two heads are adjacent, as HP demands, and that the embedded NP domain is at the periphery, as DI and Increasing Complexity/Peripherality recommend. Of course, under the F(D)G analysis, the head of  /% is not yet adjacent to , against HP, so there is no other way to satisfy both HP demands but the configuration  %%/%, which is exactly what Satisfaction, Priority and LCA also predict will happen. However, R  %% /% is not just mildly deviant, but unacceptable, so the violation is not a tolerable one in that case. Now, since what causes intolerable unacceptability inR  %%  /% is the same kind of   25 %    



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occurs in /  %/, the latter should be as marginal as the former, but as a matter of fact it is not: the   5/  %/ is quite acceptable in spite of its obvious HP violation. Of course, what causes the contrast between    5  3    R  %%  /% and  /    % / has little to do with HP/PHP1, and much to do with the adjectives# ! $#  must be satisfied, cf. Escribano (2005a). Under the layered account of NPs, in short, HP counterexamples are bound to proliferate, and Rijkhoff (2002: 290, 308) must add that    ones (e.g., those caused by the piling up of non-branching APs) are tolerated better than large ones (those arising when embedded domains such as NPs or clauses intervene). Well, other reasons (LCA, etc.) prevent the embedding of XPs, as we saw, but, leaving that aside, the fact is that some such    25 %        !   - G!#     among adjectives of size, colour, etc. which Rijkhoff does not discuss have already been mentioned in this respect, so I will cite just a more interesting case that suggests a necessary revision of the status of prepositions in FG. PPs like ) : in %  4) :5 or  /-/% / in 4&   /-/% /, being structurally as simple as adjectives in underlying FG representations59 are under Rijkhoff 

   predicted to cause only the same   25% ations as multiple adjectives cause. However, at least in English and similar languages, this is, interestingly, wrong when the violation occurs to the left of the noun: In pre-nominal position, an intervening surface PP is always much worse than an intervening noun or adjective on the left hand side of an NP. In fact, aside from idioms like 3%3 in  3%3  *  3 , PPs are completely impossible in pre-nominal position, cf. R,* % ) :45R-4 /-/% /&   

; see Escribano (2004a). Unless a bare noun with a role feature qualifies as an !!! !  ! such examples can somehow be excluded by DI, a dubious possibility, it follows that   expression principles would have to be added to HP, DI, etc., to allow some    HP violations (those involving bare adjectives and nouns, cf.  in %# ) and block others.60 Observe, though, that this problem arises only as a specific consequence of the FG view of prepositions. Under broadly similar approaches to FG  like Hawkins  ")**@   '    ! n terms of an Early Immediate Constituents principle (EIC; 4& ;omain  23  2001), it does not, as prepositions are there all along and count for the evaluation of internal complexity. The same can be said of our approach

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here: if ) :,  /-/% /, etc., are the result of combining a dyadic predicate ,  / with its first argument to yield a monadic restrictor, both the semantics and the syntax of such satellites follow nicely from Satisfaction and LCA, i.e.,  /-/% / still needs a subject (e.g., & 3  ), and the subject will have asymmetric scope over  / and its internal argument -/% /, hence, granted LCA, &  will also have to precede  / -/% / and such deviant examples will be neatly excluded. What this solution entails is an analytical distinction between freely selectable prepositions like  /, on the one hand, and governed ones (e.g., 4% in /&*4%, etc.) or bare functional  ''/  3  in % 

  % , etc. The latter may arise from late shallow features and expression rules, but since the former clearly add semantic content and their own arguments, they must be treated as dyadic predicates to all purposes (i.e., they must be available in the Fund). This is a small and well motivated modification which immediately brings a surprising number of facts under the maximally general and elegant principles of Satisfaction and LCA, cf. Escribano (2004a). 2 "   In sum, the relatively poor performance of current F(D)G principles at predicting and explaining the fine details of NP-internal order is but another consequence of the general looseness of F(D)G concepts that our previous discussion of variables, operators, scope, and NP semantics had already revealed. That looseness not only endangers the status of operators, variables, and other aspects of abstract structure, as shown above, but also largely invalidates F(D)G       ' $/ -#- :O3 ''  (2002: 313-335, 346) otherwise correct claim that important surface ordering facts follow from Scope. They certainly do, as we have tried to prove, if Scope is explicitly formulated. Unfortunately, F(D)G   #$ has not been one of tightening its formalization and exploiting the interaction of semantic and syntactic principles to simplify the grammar. On the contrary, Hengeveld has now apparently abandoned the idea of deriving order from meaning through structure and Scope. In Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006: 675) order is said to follow, not from meaning, but from !!  rpho-syntactic principles "S !  2#% !   - (2004: 45-46) the order of head and modifier is said to be fixed either by some templatic constraint, or by special indicators of the modification relation. Such an approach to surface order amounts to saying that it is not



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subject to any more general principles than the low-level idiosyncrasies of individual constructions, but, unless what has been said above about Satisfaction, Priority and LCA is completely off the mark, that is an unnecessarily weak assumption. On the contrary, a precise theory of construction, structure, and scope, coupled with the optimal assumption of iconicity between abstract and visible structures, as regulated by LCA, yields most of surface order (cf. Kayne 1994; Ernst 2002; Escribano 2004a; 2005a). Obviously, this comparison of the Satisfaction-based account and the standard F(D)G one in the area of NP-internal order is not conclusive evidence that the former is neatly superior %% %. Before accepting such a conclusion, it would be necessary to compare the performance of the two approaches with respect to the rich cross-linguistic body of order facts in e.g. Rijkhoff (2002). However, an important difference should be underlined: in the Satisfaction-based solution, all surface order predictions are directly obtained as a result of elegant interactions between principles like Satisfaction, Priority, or the iconicity constraint LCA which also control all other aspects of construction. Granted such powerful principles, phenomena like DI or HP, to the extent they hold, clearly appear as mere consequences, or incomplete generalizations, which may be useful from a descriptive point of view, but fail to identify the real forces at play and lack explanatory power. Once the stronger principles are revealed, there is no point, in my view, in proposing intuitive principles that are known to be subject to categorical and completely predictable exceptions. Most of the problems the F(D)G account of NPs faces ultimately result from a vague theory of Construction. If Construction is made to depend on strong (and, at bottom, cross-theoretically assumed) principles like Satisfaction subject to Priority and rigid (iconic) correspondence between structure and linear order (Kayne 6L    $! #ation between different elements of term structure are enforced, shallow differences like that between complementation and modification dissolve, cf. Escribano (2004a), correct constituency based on unambiguous binarybranching structures and rigid scope arises directly, FG principles like Iconic Ordering, Centripetal Orientation, Domain Integrity, Head Proximity and Increasing Complexity or even Pragmatic Highlighting (cf. Dik 1997a: 399-404, and Rijkhoff 2002) all follow as consequences of interactions among such more powerful forces, and their limits and systematic exceptions are elegantly explained, at least in English-like languages. In the case of NP structure, the functional layers assumed in current F(D)G can only arise if Dik .L !    #principles are ignored, and are not likely to be correct. Although they constitute a good

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first approximation to the most important functions of various tracts of NP construction and allow a moderately successful account of the surface order of determiners, quantifiers, heads, complements, and modifiers, the fine details do not quite fit. The higher referential and discourse layers probably do not exist as such, cf. footnote 16, (although NPs surely have such functions), whereas, on the contrary, many other layers (= constructions = domains = cores) are very likely to exist, for rather more delicate distinctions are needed both inside the nucleus of NPs and also above it, in the broad area of modification, cf. Keizer (2004) and Rijkhoff (this volume) for recent F(D)G work in that direction, and e.g., Crisma (1993), Cinque (1994), Bernstein (1997), Longobardi (2001), Giusti (2002), Scott (2002), for relevant fine details from several well-studied languages. In fact, aside from conceptual considerations (only binary-branching structures may result from Satisfaction), there is substantial empirical evidence, derived from constituency tests, binding facts, surface order, and semantic facts, that points towards that kind of structure in NPs as well as clauses. For reasons of space, such evidence has not been cited here against F(D)G B5 $  ?     $// 3 and theoretical discussions of constituency (cf. e.g. Pesetsky 1995). Certain minor syntactic details may also need rethinking in F(D)G, e.g., the status of prepositions and relative operators. In my view, very nice consequences follow from assuming that prepositions with semantic import are # dyadic predicates, with their complement and their  O (here, a nominal; in the case of adverbial PPs, a verbal phrase), cf. Escribano (2004a). As to relative operators, most of their properties can be coherently derived from the assumption that Rel is also a dyadic predicate with a special capacity to attract a clause-internal constituent, and that Rel (not the verb!) is the head of the Rel Clause. For one advantage, under such an analysis,  ! /$  ! ' : L  !  core nominal follows, and, particularly, the order of relative clauses with respect to other NP constituents in English-like languages follows nicely from scope and LCA, cf. Escribano (2003; 2004a). The major focus of attention in this article, though, has been placed on semantic issues and problems derived from the representation of NP meanings in current F(D)G, mainly two, a) the ontological status of what is meant, including the question of what symbols belong/do not belong in underlying NP representations, and b) the overall architecture of term formulae. As to the former, F(D)G seems to operate with a broad concept of #    %    ' !      !    h acts, which makes F(D)G term representations very heterogeneous. Of



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course, it is perfectly legitimate to design models of speech situations with various slots for participants and relations in them and treat linguistic expressions as values of appropriate variables in such models, or to connect NP senses with referents in e.g., models of Psych-W or Disc-W, but the theory must first show how the senses of NPs are compositionally derived, and how they constrain referential and use potential. Thus, in my view, it is necessary to be less ambitious and start from a more constrained concept of #   -61 NPs are used by speakers to refer to extralinguistic entities, but what they can name or describe is just entities of our Ling-W, i.e., senses.62 Therefore, only (symbols standing for) senses should figure in the representations on which the meaning = sense of NPs must be calculated (cf. Escribano 2004b; Keizer this volume). That excludes :a ! X    /   !icate variable ' !   %   that Dik (1989: 50) envisaged for lexical items. What remains is a) the senses of nouns of various types (individuals, substances, events, etc.) and adicities (properties, relations), b) the senses of their arguments, also of various types (individuals, events, propositions) and adicities, and c) the senses of their modifiers (properties, also of different adicities and thorder). The senses of predicates and arguments are composed by .3 % -&&%, those of modifiers and their modifieds, i.e., higherorder predicates and the predicates that saturate them as their subjects, by .% $/&%, both essentially the same operation based on Satisfaction of sense-related properties (Types). Operators are nth-order predicates, and no variables need be involved in the representation of senses,63 since, by definition, a variable appears instead of a constant. Thus, the relation and composition of Ops and Cores is essentially the same as that of Sats and Cores, cf. Escribano (2004b, 2006), but a Sat and an Op never apply to the same core (%  Rijkhoff this volume and Hengeveld this volume). Under Satisfaction, the richness of the hierarchical structure inside NPs directly entails a highly differentiated structure in what concerns semantic Types, which has not yet been elaborated. As a real compositional account of NP semantics and syntax is worked out, new, more delicate semantic Types will emerge to be added to existing ones like !%!uals   % "! #  ! properties of the latter two), cf. Pustejovsky (1995) for one such system, but that does not entail, and is not likely to determine, enrichments of the machinery in charge of construction (i.e., Satisfaction) and the monotonic computation of senses (Functional Application, Functional Composition), which is powerful enough, especially if semantic Co-Composition, cf. Pustejovsky (1995), is allowed along with (multiple) mutual satisfaction.

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Of course, what specific types should be assigned to N and all the nominal cores above N is a matter that we cannot settle here, as it entails decisions on complex issues connected with morphological derivation and other matters, but, whatever semantic types are chosen, no variables need be involved in sense representations. Needless to say, this quick overview just summarizes our previous diagnosis of conceptual problems in the area of term structure and adds bare guidelines, not detailed solutions to the substantive empirical issues that arise, e.g., Which Types (possibly different from metaphysical types of     ! .$-Shifting operations are relevant in natural language semantics? However, it hopefully will have shown that a clearer view of the implications of Satisfaction, rigid concepts of Construction, Domain and Scope, and a universal? expression principle like Kayne  LCA that enforces a tight correspondence between structure and surface order are a prerequisite to any adequate account of NP form and sense. In fact, Dik  ! ' .L   !    '  

 $ correct, programmatic statement anticipating what is formally proposed here, and ideas like Satisfaction and Priority are already assumed % in F(D)G. Also, since F(D)G has also already developed a rich linguistic ontology (individuals, masses, ensembles, properties, events, etc.), further enrichment of its Type system, as proposed here, is a matter of degree, not a deep modification, and should not raise special difficulties. On the other hand, it is true that the changes defended here would make F(D)G very different from what it is now as to the details, more rigid, and more vulnerable to empirical refutation, which is as should be from a methodological viewpoint. As to the critical tone that has prevailed in this paper, in conclusion, although in its present form the F(D)G treatment of underlying terms and surface NPs is seriously inconsistent in various respects, the problems are understandable, largely accidental (inherited from certain types of philosophical semantics) and by no means inherent to the theory, whose basic principles seem to me correct and fertile. F(D)G should be further developed into a proper account of the way natural languages work, semantically and syntactically. For this reason, the ultimate purpose of this contribution has been critical, but in a well-meaning, constructive sense, i.e., to help F(D)G scholars identify and perhaps solve some of their more pressing theoretical problems, acting from the vantage point of a sympathetic outsider with a broad view of linguistic theory, absolute academic freedom, and no axe to grind.



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&    1.

2.

3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

This work owes much to Daniel Garc   , who facilitated my access to some crucial sources, read several versions of the text, and gave me wise advice on how to write a delicate piece like this, to Jan Rijkhoff, who, as an author, reacted very elegantly to my objections, and, as editor of this volume, offered very detailed criticism and suggestions, and to three other anonymous referees who discovered various obscurities and other infelicities in earlier versions that I hope have been avoided in this. I also thank Lachlan Mackenzie for quickly sending to me an offprint of an article of his that I needed. The underlying semantic research has been sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Education under contract I+D MEC-04-HUM2004-018. Interestingly, operators do not have them, which implies that they are not semantic categories under the authors !' - .   '     $ from the fact that FG operators are considered grammatical modifiers. Yet, operators are ' !in the language system! %  $ %  consequences. This view of Hengeveld and Mackenzie      elian concept of #  "Z bjects and predicates), but leaves operators in a semantic limbo. That is, those biuniquely bound by operators, cf.  . Assuming, in the spirit of Hengeveld and Mackenzie  %/ above (cf. semantic categories = ontological categories as reflected in the language system), that at the representational level F(D)G semantics is, like all linguistic semantics, concerned with the sense of expressions, and that reference (to entities of psychological worlds in the case of FG, cf. Dik 1997a: 129) is, along strictly Fregean lines, a function of linguistic sense plus additional parameters. Actually, a logical quantifier like (x) is conventionally assumed to vacuously apply also to formulae like (z) P(z) that contain no unbound variables, and even to formulae like P(j) containing no variables at all. Thus, in Predicate Logic, (x) [(z) P(z)] and (x) P(j) are not syntactically ill-formed, although the quantifier is semantically inert in them, but the motivation has to do with economy of statement of the syntax of Predicate Calculus. Natural languages, of course, radically disallow vacuous quantification (cf. R" *5%%3  *%). Properly, predicates of higher adicity are often involved, but the various modifiers around a noun all behave as one-place predicates at the stage they are attached to their respective heads. Obviously, the head noun may itself be dyadic or even triadic (e.g., 5   , respectively) and modifiers may be headed by dyadic adjectives (e.g., , as in     &%), dyadic prepositions, participles of any adicity, etc. The term   #$  $   -  !   %ntory (or closed system) of types of entities (e.g., individuals, substances, events, etc.) that can be linguistically named or described.

164 8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

  ! " # Such terminology is standard in logic textbooks and in all Fregean approaches to linguistic semantics, e.g., Montague Grammar, Categorial Grammar(s), LFG, GPSG-HPSG, and broadly L  3$ 3  35 O % 3$")**V or Jackendoff (1990). McGee Wood (1993), Steedman (1993) and Heim and Kratzer (1998) contain clear and easy accounts for linguists. E.g., representing )/%A%  as (e) [Meeting (e) & Agent (e, b) & Theme (e, q) & At (e, h) & Time (e, < now) ], or G ,/) )  as (e1) [Seeing (e1) & Experiencer (e1, t) & Theme (e1, b) & Time (e1, t) ]  (e2) [Reading (e2) & Agent (e2, b) & Time (e2, t)], etc. Incidentally, a variable which is subject to exactly the same metaphysical difficulties posed by / %-.    #  " '  '  also affected). Actually, on the negative side, Davidson      o induced generative grammarians to counter-intuitively treat all constituents of the clause (i.e., the head predicate, the subject, objects, adjuncts, tense affixes, etc.) as predicates of events, suppressing the important differences between heads, arguments, and modifiers. Although any clause constituent adds its own truth conditions and to that extent can be thought of as a      !fferent status of heads, complements and adjuncts has wide-ranging syntactic and semantic consequences in natural languages and cannot be ignored in any structuredependent account of senses. The problem is particularly acute in current Chomskyan linguistics as understood by Kayne and Cinque, cf. Escribano (2006). In fact, apart from stacking, recursion is also involved, for events recur embedded inside more encompassing events. Davidson ")*W+  did not recognize the fact that coexisting verb modifiers often do not even make sense if predicated of a unique event. For example, it has been well known since at least Dowty (1979) that whereas a!%  !'$ telic VP  "-#- /& % %%   4), '  a  dverbials modify atelic ones (e.g., 4 %&  * ), and, insofar as no verb sense can be both telic and atelic, we do not expect the two types of adverbials to co-occur. Yet, they do, and in either order (cf. )/&%% 4     * 5 ,*  /   % *   %/%), which proves that even seemingly simple VP ! !     event structure, and therefore we need not only stacked modifiers, but modifiers applying to different event structures embedded within a single VP, i.e., complex event structures and a hierarchy of types of events and properties of events. Particularly since Dik (1989) and Hengeveld (1989) (cf., e.g., Keizer 1992, 2004; Rijkhoff 1992; Mackenzie 2004), Yet, the structure attributed to events in current F(D)G is still pretty much Davidsonian. The formulae offered in current work as representations of expressions like ' &% % #    are absolutely flat. There is no attempt to capture the fact that accom-



14.

15.

16.

17.

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plishment verbs like &% involve three different sub-events (state, change of state, causation thereof, plus an       6 ation, Theme and Agent are constituents of different sub-events. The ontology assumed in F(D)G has, of course, expanded considerably since Dik (1978), and therefore neither predicates nor their arguments need any longer be first-order, as explicitly acknowledged in Dik (1989) and later work. Keizer (2004), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.), and Mackenzie (2004) contain recent discussions of the various types of entities (properties, individuals, places, times, manners, states of affairs, propositions, speech acts), and their modifiers. In fact, the test for entity-hood is: whenever it is possible to refer anaphorically to or focus a WH-word on a constituent, its denotatum is an entity (cf. Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.). Whether the ontological enrichment affects only the intralinguistic world of senses or also the    !  

 obvious. Current pronouncements (e.g., in Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 673) to the effect that properties have no independent existence and perhaps Dik  ")**+( )U) !   between ' ! ! # ggest that the extralinguistic ontology assumed in F(D)G is still austere, but, be that as it may, its intralinguistic ontology is certainly rather rich (cf.  ). As the ontology that terms must name has expanded, parallel variables standing for properties (' %  "         "     "C etc., occur alternating with /   'F(D)G terms (cf. Dik 1989: 180-182; Keizer 1992 on properties; Hengeveld 1992a: 7, on speech acts; Dik 1997a: 131-132, 136-138; Dik 1997b: 93; Hengeveld 2004; Keizer 2004: 1516; Hengeveld 2005, and Mackenzie 2004 for a good short overview). Although I discuss matters here mostly with reference to the /% llel reasoning applies to '- To be fair, at least early FG seems to have simply inherited the problem from the logicians of the time. Russellian-Davidsonian accounts were just about all the semantic doctrine available on NPs in the early seventies, and it was natural for Dik to adopt their views. Although FG did not share the realist theory of meaning, he probably saw the mental world that FG terms refer to as sufficiently isomorphic to the     ' %$   tment. Hengeveld (this volume) shares the view that proper nouns are not modifiable in the representational level, although they can be modified by predicates of the interpersonal level (cf. + 6 Cf. also Butler this volume). Whether the higher variable and its function can indeed be associated with a specific level of structure, rather than with a function of the full NP, is dubious, though. Rijkhoff  ",^^,( ,,*-231) discourse  %    $ !     correspond to any well-defined continuous stretch of structure at the top of NPs, since discourse-oriented modifiers like  /%5  / 5 %% 5 /, etc. must also often be structurally attached under the scope of Location operators and modifiers. And, as a matter of fact, the same applies to

166

18.

19.

20.

21.

  ! " # Hengeveld    %      !   #ical features that account for the referential vs. ascriptive use of NPs, but also other elements (e.g., Hengeveld this volume). Since articles crucially help the addressee construct or identify the referent, it seems & / reasonable to associate them with that level, but articles cannot be purely  representational "--  '       $ !    % predicative uses, and, to that extent, their association with the rsonal level is questionable (cf. Keizer this volume). On the other hand, other interpersonally relevant items may occur fairly deeply embedded within NP structure (e.g. in %& 4, & is visible at the interpersonal level but not at the representational level (cf. Hengeveld this volume). Thus, whether the grammar is top-down, as in current F(D)G, or bottom-up, as in classical FG, the interpersonal and discourse  vels   '  ' the representationally relevant ones. Hence, calling reference/discourseoriented properties of NPs a further  %  '    sleading: such a structural level does not seem to exist (cf. Butler this volume). A hint in this respect is that, according to Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.), Hengeveld (this volume) the difference between referential and ascriptive NPs is just functional, not structural. If so, labelling referential tokens of NPs :'5 "'--#-2#% !,^^VQ2#% ! -,^^@ # $stake. I suspect, though, that structural differences between referential and predicative NPs may well be indirectly detectable, as they are in languages like Spanish, and, anyway, Hengeveld and Mackenzie ",^^W(W+@  # view that nothing at the representational level distinguishes ascriptive from referential uses of NPs is implausible: after all, ascriptive NPs denote properties, whereas referential ones must denote individuals. Such a radical difference in sense is unlikely to be irrelevant precisely at the representational level (cf. also Keizer this volume). Properly, in that passage, Rijkhoff  %'3  $ fits well with the metaphysical analysis of individuals in        ttempt to separate a substratum from the remaining intensional properties that may constitute an NP   Correspondingly,        '    , etc., as appropriate in NPs describing events, properties, propositional attitudes, etc. that Rijkhoff (2002) does not discuss. Apart from   /:O3 ''    !icate variables (fi'm) ranging over senses, at N and the heads of all satellites. For reasons already stated, they play no role in the computation of senses or referents and will be ignored here, although their status will re-emerge briefly below in our discussion of operators and binding issues surrounding them. Terms denoting other types of entities follow the same pattern, with different variables -



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22. A further issue is what binds    / '- ! 

  ' % -binding problems  . 23. Admittedly, this multiplicity holds only if individual competence matters. What view current F(D)G adopts with respect to the internalism/externalism issue and the private language debates is unclear to me. If individual competence does not matter in F(D)G, there is a single, idealized  #stic world the world of senses generated by each  #    

  - M that as it may, Ling-W has a place of honour in linguistic semantics. For structural/internalist semanticists like Coseriu (1992) and Chomsky (2000), what we here call 6#-W      $   !      -wise. As to F(D)G, to the extent the equation [semantically relevant entity] = [entity as construed by the language system] is assumed (cf. Dik 1997a: 129; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006), it is Ling-W, not really Psych-W, that is the core domain for semantics in F(D)G too. 24. Dik (1997a: 131) restricts the concept of '  ities named by terms functioning as arguments or satellites in clause structure, but that must be an oversight, or an NP like /* inside another NP like %*%/*  will not be a referential expression. Why predicates, predications, propositions and clauses do not 'o entities of type f, e, X and E, respectively, but merely ! #   -0 ##     $ ician, Dik was a realist with an austere Phys-W ontology (just extensional individuals) and considered predicates, predications, etc. as names of Ling-W entities (mere senses), which would explain why he adds that designation is similar to constructive reference. However, the rest of Dik  !    make room for such an asymmetry between terms naming first-order entities and those naming higher order ones. 25. Correspondingly, #C#5-  ! -order variables bound by discourse-constructed events, facts, speech acts, etc. 26. Although Dik uses both terms,      ' '  what Dik has in mind and will be preferred here. 27. Of course, the truth conditions (but just the truth conditions) of a term like % #%% 2  can, in principle, be adequately represented by a flat unordered conjunction of clauses like ... [girl(x) & Indian(x) & beautiful (x) & dark (x) & tall (x)], etc., but such a formula does not capture the fact that in natural languages head and modifiers are attached in a certain order that is subject to strict, near-categorical, constraints, cf. R%2%#%   , R% 2#%% , etc. Obviously, the grammarian can simply stipulate such constraints, but that is hardly an elegant strategy if it is possible to derive the order of modifiers from deeper principles, and Dik was clearly taking the latter course when he talked about !ynamic construction !  !    $   '      & #% C #% & on predicability (hence, on the extension of the respective sets involved). Spelling out that idea a bit, the result is that predicates like  5#3

168

28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

  ! " # %5%5 52, etc., are predicable of different sets, but in that case the sets cannot be represented by the same variable /(  $  '  3  of / ' conjunctive formula above will have a different range;  , the various instances of /  3  '  %iable. Observe that when several operators occur, they are not separated by (-- they are not attached in the order of their left-to-right position in the formula. If they are stacked, as Dik (1989) claims, the determiner is predicted to have scope over the numerator, and the same result is obtained when, following Rijkhoff   3 ;3 ")**+( )WU 

ciates each operator with a different layer of term structure. Of course, that would not yield a tree like (3), cf. infra. See Reichenbach (1947: 87, footnote and ff.). Term-internal binding is the only formal difference that Dik (1997a: 168) acknowledges between FG quantifying operators and logical ones. Recall that Frege ?'iers are functions applying to propositional functions. It also entails revising the status of all other      $  usal ones: a very significant rethinking of F(D)G, all in all. Arguably, there is a third. Number, definiteness, and case, in particular, are also said to extend their influence over the whole term on which they operate, cf. Dik (1989: 138-139, 317-319). A similar statement, generalized to all term operators, remains in Dik (1997a: 161), but must be a mistake there, for a few lines down on the same page Dik approvingly introduces Rijkhoff  ccount of term operators as associated with successive onion-like layers of term structure. That organization, of course, is strictly parallel to Dik    treatment of clause-level operators as stacked around their operand, with inner operators falling within the scope of outer ones, cf. Dik (1989: 308), which is kept in the revised version of Dik (1997a). However, Dik   $ % ' number, etc. is far from dead in F(D)G. Bakker and Pfau (this volume) still insist on the idea that the number, definiteness, and case operators are #   operators with scope over the whole term, although this may be due to a misreading of Dik /-yway, there are very good reasons why e.g. case must be a very /   '-C  (2005c) and section 4  . In (5),  / -/% / will be higher or lower (hence S !!#  whether it is taken to be an identifying satellite (cf. Keizer 2004) or a qualifying one, but the point does not affect the argumentation here. I stick to the same example just for the purposes of comparing alternative structures. If, instead of  / -/% /, the last restrictor were a relative clause like 4 /  or a discourse-level identifier like  */% they would definitely be attached as sisters to the operator d, as suggested. Observe that although the left-to-right sequence of restrictors is meant to express increasing scope, if the same criterion is applied to the sequence d prox 3 we obtain exactly the converse of what Dik elsewhere claims to be the relative scope of d, prox, and 3: the numeral will have scope over prox, and prox over d. Assuming the contrary, the operators are themselves stacked onion-like



34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

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with respect to the variable /    $lds structures like (3), not (5). From Dik '    #'         ! espect to restrictors. Just as variables must be uniquely bound by appropriate operators, arguments must be uniquely  !$  3! "rminology varies, but the differences are immaterial here) appropriate predicates, or they will not receive a semantic function and will be uninterpretable (just like uninterpreted variables in a calculus). The standard view of scope, used in mathematics, formal logic, and formal linguistics, entails that if A and B are constructed into a new entity [A*B] (order irrelevant; * = whatever combinatory operation applies), then A and B have scope over each other, and that if [A*B], in its turn, is constructed with a new object C into a structure C*[A*B] or [A*B]*C, then C and [A*B] are in each other   L   $   %!M!   B has scope over C. Linear precedence is a non-starter, though, if the structure of terms is as claimed in current layered models and the aim is to say that e.g., satellites at Ln have scope over constituents of layer Ln-1, since when the onion-like term structure is projected onto a linear sequence, the head noun precedes (and therefore would have scope over) all post-nominal satellites. Functional uniqueness entails that full NPs will not be further restricted: since the full NP must be able to receive a semantic function from the head it is constructed with (e.g., a verb), it cannot receive a second semantic function as subject of a restrictor. Hence, restrictors must operate at intermediate levels of term structure, and on categories different from the NP (i.e., not on the term variable /- 0   '   '  'ctional uniqueness that the same head nominal cannot be restricted by more than one restrictor, or by one restrictor and one operator, i.e., the structure cannot be ' Q   $$ branching, as STC predicts. The head nominal is constantly !!   construction of the term proceeds (cf. our discussion of the variable update issue above). In what concerns the ' %             !  Hengeveld (this volume), where each of the restrictors (e.g.,  , %%, in %%% ) carries its own operator and its own variable. However, the higher /     !    '/  nnot stand for the same set (i.e., two different variables). Note that, stepwise construction, according to Dik, is a deep property that affects the sense of terms, not just a surface realization detail. Actually, Dik even attributes psycholinguistic significance to it, for he claims that it reflects !! #  "#    logy), cf. Dik(1997a: 62, 135). A has asymmetric scope over B if A has scope over B but B does not have scope over A, as in the structure A[B, C]. Sisters, on the contrary, have symmetric or mutual scope, as in structures like [A, B, C].

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41. Obviously, this is consistent with grouping subsets of such    '  ction into as many functional     #           nature and semantic contribution of operators and satellites, e.g., a term may have a discourse status segment (for (in)definiteness), a spatial location segment (for deictics), an ordinator segment (for  %5%5etc.), a quantification segment, a modal segment (for modifiers like &# or 43#), and as many aspectual, qualification, classification, and complementation segments as need to be established. Current F(D)G ' ur or five layers have that functional character, but the functional distinctions so far established, especially in what concerns the intermediate and lower levels, are still too broad. Work like Scott (2002) reported in Cinque ed. (2002) suggests that a much more delicate layering of modifiers is justified, and recent proposals by F(D)G scholars like Keizer (2004) and Rijkhoff (this volume) point in the same direction. 42. I will use  :O3 '' "  %    ! !  its successive expansions as a consequence of stepwise construction with satellites and operators, i.e., in the sense of lexical or phrasal head of the NP. If necessary, sub-indices can be used to unambiguously identify successively bigger nominal cores, as X-bar theories do with bar levels, following an idea due to Zellig S. Harris. 43. This is an important respect in which F(D)G differs from other approaches that also explain facts, particularly constituent order facts, in terms of a compromise among competing '  -G     G $.  $'- papers in Barbosa et al. eds. (1998). The difference is that in OT, the respective  #  '  '  eting principles is explicitly defined in a hierarchy, the import of each type of violation is strictly quantified, and to that extent it is possible to predict which of the competing forces will prevail in cases of conflict. On the contrary, F(D)G does not say anything on the relative strength of its ordering preferences, and it is impossible to predict what will happen, except ex post facto. 44. It is assumed here that theoretical linguistic objects are sets or matrices of [attribute: value] pairs. An [A: v] pair is a function that applies to its carrier and yields a unique value over a restricted domain. Informally, an [A: v] pair simply expresses a proposition about its carrier. All sorts of properties can be formalized with precision in that format, which is extensively used in grammars like LFG, GPSG, HPSG, Construction Grammar, and all related computational approaches. Traditional features like +F, used in FG and many other theories, correspond to a particular subset of [A: v] pairs whose value range is Boolean (+,-). Since many attributes necessary to characterize linguistic items are not Boolean, the [A: v] format is preferred, though. An attribute is %lued     '  #%   #-F% !  leave their carriers as incalculable factors in computations, causing incompleteness or anomaly.



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45. E.g., the construction of a verb, adjective or noun with its (PP) complement, or an adjective with its N(P), satisfies both an adicity requirement on the verb, noun or adjective, and a role value, and often a case value requirement, on the complement, and semanticists like Pustejovsky (1995) claim that cocomposition (= bi-directional functional application) must be allowed. 46. Also Core+Argument, obviously; I ignore that case here, since the discussion is here focused on the structure of the upper FG layers at which Sats and Ops intervene. Arguments are also attached in a stepwise fashion, but I will ignore the details here, since I suspect in matters like event structure inside nominals there is little common ground across different linguistic schools and I want to keep this discussion as close to theory-neutral as possible. 47. In cases of predicate composition, one of the predicates functions as an argument of the other, i.e., one is type ,<e,t>>, a property of a property, (an th order property), whereas the other is just <e,t> a property of order n-1. 48. This does not entail that a noun cannot in the earlier stages of term construction function as a predicate and take its own arguments, cf. Keizer (2004) for an F(D)G view of this. What is claimed here is that even relational nouns, once saturated, form cores that function as arguments of satellites at higher levels, but cannot satisfy or be satisfied by another core nominal. 49. 2! '  '      #   -0  present context, head refers to the   ! '   -- /  predicate, usually an adjective, a semantically non-trivial preposition (cf. infra), a participle, etc. 50. There is a systematic but innocuous apparent exception: Since the subject is the last (sometimes called xternal # '   /  ! "   that it is also the  O '' !, the head of that predicate may have to satisfy a satellite of its own before satisfying its subject, since the semantic type of the object resulting after the head is completely satisfied would no longer be constructible with the satellite. This may happen only when the satellite does not alter the type of the head in a significant way, e.g., in cases like  %  :% /*    , vs. R :% /* %     . In this example, :% /* is a second-order degree property. It will therefore satisfy its argument if it combines with  , a gradable monadic predicate, but will not match the type of the combination resulting when  satisfies its subject, i.e., %     , a non-gradable property. Hence, either the adverb is satisfied first or it remains unsatisfied, dangling, and the whole structure fails. Thus, Satisfaction forces a violation of Priority in this case, unsurprisingly, as Satisfaction is the real principle; Priority just defines how it is to be applied. 51. The facts of SOV languages are different, and must be accounted for by additional principles, either Kayne "--4 %     25$  so easily deduced and saved from counterexamples in all cases. In this pro-

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grammatic conceptual discussion, I will limit attention to how much follows from Satisfaction in English-like languages. 52. It is assumed here that Focus and Topic are !   '  !   constituents that discharge them carry attributes like [D-F(unction): Top], etc., and that the Subject is a    '  "--   O   5-internal argument), hence, a subject will be marked as e.g. [Cl-F(unction): Subj]. In other theories the subject is treated as a special or / #-. logy is immaterial. What matters is that the subject is not just an argument of the verb, although it is also an argument of the verb. 53. Only a few suggestive examples can be discussed here, though. Further coverage of data is clearly impossible in the space available in this already long article, and well beyond my competence in what concerns non-IE languages. It follows that current F(D)G concepts might still prove descriptively preferable to the present version in view of the facts of a large sample of languages like that used by Rijkhoff (2002), so I am well aware that the adequacy of either the proposal sketched here or F(D)G as currently developed cannot be judged with reference to just English and similar languages. However, those few languages, especially English, happen to be those about which we know incomparably more, and to that extent it is understandable that the adequacy of theories be first of all judged with respect to how well they handle really well investigated problems known to a great majority of linguists. Also, under the assumption that Human Language is based on a unique universal computational mechanism (N.B.: such a mechanism need not be a  $/! $  not an      $/    tegy to adopt as a zero hypothesis that if an elegant set of principles makes really strong and delicate predictions in one or a few well investigated languages, such principles may well be appropriate to a wider domain. In this respect, the versions of Satisfaction, Priority, etc., presented above have a simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power (if only, in English and similar languages) that make them strong candidates worth comparing with alternative concepts. Obviously, it will be much easier to produce & / counterexamples to them than to HP, DI, etc. as currently understood in F(D)G, since the theory argued for here is more rigid, but the real issue is to determine whether the apparent counterexamples are genuine and really invalidate the principles, or just follow from low level facts, or further principles of morphology, etc., without need to abandon the principles. Of course, that cannot be done here, so all I will do is compare the predictions of the theory above with those that follow from the standard F(D)G concepts as developed mainly in Rijkhoff (2002) and Keizer (2004). 54. Even ignoring the hedge ! !   !'! !ified B will usually be adjacent, but does not say in which order (A+B, B+A?) they will occur. As shown above, depending on the internal structure of A and B, it is possible to do rather better, cf. Escribano (2004a) for details.



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55. Refining the layer structure, as in Keizer (2004) and Rijkhoff (this volume), may avoid piling up modifiers at a single layer and exclude some of the bad predictions, e.g., if one of the modifiers of 4 is ) : () *5 5 etc.), in Rijkhoff  '%-layer model it might belong to the classifier layer, which would force it to at least be adjacent to the head, i.e., only orderings containing the sub-string ) :b4 or the deviant *4b) : will be predicted. 56. Of course, the FG analysis of PPs and Rel Clauses automatically induces a violation of HP as soon as a PP or Rel Clause is attached to a noun, even if no other dependent intervenes, whereas under analyses that assume that P and Rel are heads no HP violations arise in such cases. There is strong evidence in support of the view that both unselected P and Rel are heads with their own arguments, cf. Escribano (2004a) on Ps and Escribano (2003) on Rel Clauses. 57. Rijkhoff (2002: 290, 308) directly excludes demonstratives, numerals, and adjectives from the scope of his HP constraint. The reason adduced is that such elements cause only minor violations that speakers can tolerate, whereas phrases cause intolerable processing difficulties. However, in the case of articles, demonstratives and numerals, there is no need to weaken HP: since they never take any other complements but the core nominal, appropriate layering and the relativized concept of Head above will immediately eliminate the false minor HP violation anyway. On the contrary, in the case of adjectives, which can take complements, it is a mistake to exempt them from HP, and the immediate consequence is that constructions like * %#* will be licensed (cf.  ). Of course, Rijkhoff (2002) does not really discuss complex phrases, which disguises this type of problem, but it is a problem. 58. There are a few exceptions, of course, cf. % && & %, %   #, etc., but they are not significant at this level of abstraction. See Escribano (2004a) and (2005a) for a possible explanation in terms of Focus. 59. Underlyingly, ) : is just a noun with a role feature; recall that prepositions are not predicates in FG and do not exist until the expression rules introduce them later. 60. One of the editors questions this analysis of  / -/% / as  # within FG. Yet, as far as I know, there is no other FG analysis of such modifiers: if prepositions are inserted    &   ' ' !rlying structure that PP is just a noun with an Origin/Source? role feature. If the PP contained a full NP (e.g.,  /%I %*-/% /), it could arguably be treated as an embedded domain and excluded as a O 25%olation, but, as it stands, it is no different, in my view, from having adjectives or quantifiers intervening between determiners and nouns (the  %    that Rijkhoff   rates by excluding them from the scope of HP). 61. It need not be an impoverished concept of sense, though. Thus, the affectiveinteractional aspects of meaning that Butler (this volume) discusses need not be extraneous to Ling-W as here understood. This is obvious: to the extent

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such features are expressible through linguistic means (i.e., not by means of gestures, musical resources, etc.), they belong to the language, are subject to its conventions, etc. 62. Keizer (this volume) defends the same view. Rijkhoff (this volume), and Hengeveld (this volume) emphasize the ! % yers, but it remains unclear to me whether their NPs ultimately denote Ling-W entities, or rather extralinguistic ones. As to Butler      #$      rather seems to correspond to what we here call C-World, i.e., his meanings seem to be conceptual in a broad sense compatible with the existence of different modules to handle affective-interactional concepts and narrowly conceptual-representational structures. The approach defended here, on the contrary, is not conceptualist, but internalist, or language-immanentist, i.e., our semantics is the kind of semantics that Saussure, Hjelmslev, Coseriu, (and, when he is consistently internalist, Chomsky) had in mind. The mind with all its content is surely relevant to any explanation of performance, and to the integrated account of linguistic behaviour that F(D)G aims at (cf. Dik 1989, Butler this volume), but linguistic expressions name what they can name, i.e., entities from Ling-W. The relation between Ling-W entities and C-World (and Phys-W) ones is altogether a different story, and a fascinating one. 63. In Escribano (2004b), I proposed eliminating variable-binding issues and the variable-update problem by limiting term operators and variables to a higherorder one at the top of the term structure. Of course, that was my compromise with the traditional FG assumption that all terms and clauses have an (/ [ "/8' -2 % :O3 '' (this volume) now proposes to treat operators as modifiers and nearly dispenses with variables altogether, I feel free to propose here in an F(D)G framework what I proposed in Escribano (this volume [written 2004]), in a broadly Chomskyan one. This proposal, therefore, differs from, and is incompatible with all those that maintain sense/term variables in the formulae of the representational component, e.g., Rijkhoff (this volume), Hengeveld (this volume) and Keizer (this volume).

*    Bakker, Dik and Pfau, Roland this vol. Agreement in the noun phrase: The dynamic expression of terms and what can go wrong. Barbosa, Pilar, Danny Fox, Paul Hagstrom, Martha McGinnis and David Pesetsky, (eds.) 1998 2 % )%  "H =&%/%*  $/&%%  '*%:. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press.



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Barwise, Jon and Robin Cooper 1981 Generalized quantifiers in natural language. %+3 &* 4: 159219. Bernstein, Judy 1997 Demonstratives and reinforcers in Romance and Germanic languages.  102: 87-113. Butler, Christopher S. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Chomsky, Noam 2000 04     % '%*    ;. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005 Three factors in language design. %2B * 36: 122. Cinque, Guiglielmo 1994 On the evidence for partial N-movement in the Romance noun phrase. In: Guiglielmo Cinque (ed.), +% %4  I  // , 85110. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Cinque, Guiglielmo (ed.) 2002 .% '% %   +  2+. , $ % &*  '*%% '% % ( Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coseriu, Eugenio 1992 SemE  $ E #%-0(5 ' sco MarsE- > !  !  # ,U*-282. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona. Crisma, Paola 1993 On adjective placement in Romance and Germanic event nominals. % //%  % 18: 61100. Davidson, Donald 1967 The logical form of action sentences. In: "*  -%  "%( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Dik, Simon C. 1989 ,, *.% // (+ %2( Dordrecht: Foris Publications. 1997a , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b ,, *.% // (+ %22>$/&:  % % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Dowty, David 1979 G ;;% // . Dordrecht: Reidel. Ernst, Thomas 2002 ,'*%:-%( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Escribano, J. Luis G. 2003 On relative clauses. % $   "% 2 47: 157 182. 2004a Head-final effects and the nature of modification.  3 % 40: 143. 2004b On the structure of terms in FG: Some conceptual issues (A sympathetic outsider %-Paper presented at11%2% %$ 3   .% // ( University of Oviedo, September, 2004. 2005a Discontinuous APs. % 43: 563610. 2005b Semantocentric Minimalist Grammar. -%% 27-2: 5774. 2005c English compounds and the theory of abstract case. In: Luis Quereda (ed.), ,4   I %  % " ( '%   . '

 , 107131. Granada: Universidad de Granada. 2006 NPs as just NPs. ' 28-6: 529-579. Frege, Gottlob 1952 , % /%+&G % %%#. ( Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Giusti, Giuliana 2002 The functional structure of noun phrases: A bare phrase structure approach. In: Guiglielmo Cinque (ed.) .% '% %   + 2+, 54-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press Hawkins, John A. 1994 - +  / , *  =    $%%*( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001 Why are categories adjacent?  % 37: 134. Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer 1998 '/%  % // . Oxford: Blackwell. Hengeveld, Kees 1989 Layers and operators in Functional Grammar.  % 25: 127157. 1992a 03 # + %> , *5 ,*&*5  *. (Functional Grammar Series 15.) Berlin/New York: Mouton-de Gruyter. 1992b Parts of speech. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %       .3 % + &%, 2955. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2004 Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   G&-GonzE & "! - - 04 - %%    .% /3 / , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.



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Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.) ; &*%% ":&   .% // 5 5386. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 Volume 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. fc. .%  // . Oxford: Oxford University Press Hengeveld, Kees, Jan Rijkhoff and Anna Siewierska 2004 Parts of speech systems and word order.    % 40: 527570. Jackendoff, Ray 1990 '/%'% % . Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Kayne, Richard S. 1994 ,-%3*//% *'*%:. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Keizer, Evelien 1991 Referring in FG: How to define reference and referring expressions( G +& .% // 43. 1992 Predicates as referring expressions. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %    3    .% + &%, 127. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2004 Term structure in FG: A modest proposal. G +& .3 % // 78. this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: An inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Locke, John 1997 Reprint. - "* $  / I %. London: Penguin Books, 1690. Longobardi, Giuseppe 2001 The structure of DPs: some principles, parameters, and problems. In: Mark Baltin and Chris Collins (eds.), , #  $%/&3

 *'*%%, *, 562603. Oxford: Blackwell. Loux, Michael J. 2002 ;%&*5  $%/&  * 2% % (2nd. ed.). London and New York: Routledge. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan 1992 English spatial prepositions in Functional Grammar. G +&  .% // 46. 1996 English nominalizations in the layered model of the sentence. In: Betty Devriendt, Louis Goossens and Johan van der Auwera (eds.),

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$/&: '% % > - .%% + &%, 325355. (Functional Grammar Series 17.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004 Entity concepts. In: Geert Booi, Christian Lehmann, Joachim Mugdam and Stavros Skopeteas (eds.), ; &*>-#23 %  G 3 /%, vol. 2. 973982. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. McGee Wood, Mary 1993 $%  // . London/New York: Routledge. Montague, Richard 1974 The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English. In: . 3 / +&*( '% +&     ;%. Edited by Richard Thomason), 247270. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Parsons, Terence 1990 "%% // "(-'%*'#%/'/%. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Partee, Barbara H. 1995 Lexical semantics and compositionality. In: John Gleitman and Mark Liberman (eds.), (-2%%%$%', 311 360. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Pesetsky, David 1995. a '*%:( Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Pustejovsky, James 1995 ,  %:. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Reichenbach, Hans 1966 Reprint. "/%  '*/# . New York: The Free Press, 1947. Rijkhoff, Jan 1992 The noun phrase: a typological study of its form and structure. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam. 2002 , 0 + . (Oxford Studies in Typology and Theoretical Linguistics.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar. Russell, Bertrand 1905 On denoting. ; 14: 479493. Scott, Gary J. 2002 Stacked adjectival modification and the structure of nominal phrases. In: Guiglielmo Cinque (ed.).%'% % +2+, 91 120. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Steedman, Mark 1993 Categorial Grammar.  90: 221258.



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Strawson, Peter F. 1959 2( - "*   &% ;%&*. London/New York: Routledge. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1922 Reprint. , %% 3+&. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. First published 1918.



*         (    

    "  

    In the standard theory of Functional Grammar (henceforth FG), the distinction between reference and predication has always proved to be somewhat problematic, both before and after the introduction of the layered model (Hengeveld 1989; Dik 1989; see Keizer 2004). As such, this topic provides a genuine challenge for Functional Discourse Grammar (henceforth FDG): to design, within the broad outline of the model developed so far, a coherent, psychologically plausible and intuitively appealing way of dealing with reference and ascription.2 Traditionally, the terms reference and ascription (or predication) have been taken to belong to the realm of semantics. In FDG, however, they are used to describe acts performed at the interpersonal level. It will, therefore, be worthwhile to see whether the distinction made within the FDG model between an interpersonal and a representational level may pave the way for a more adequate treatment of reference and ascription. At this moment, however, it is difficult to evaluate the possible contribution the new model can make, since the internal structure of referential and ascriptive subacts (at the interpersonal level) and the semantic units (at the representational level) have not yet received systematic treatment; nor has the relation between the two levels been fully explored. If, in the development of the FDG model, we want to avoid lapsing into the same old mistakes, now is the time to reconsider the way FG dealt with reference and ascription. The aim of this article will, therefore, be to offer an inventory of the problems with regard to reference and ascription that can be, and have been, identified in existing treatments within FG (Dik 1978, 1989, 1997a, 1997b; Rijkhoff 2002; Anstey 2002), and to indicate ways in which (some of) these problems can be avoided in FDG. More specifically, this article will address the following questions:

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 What is the nature of representation at the representational level? What does the x-variable at this level stand for?3  Is it justified to represent/symbolize the (extra-linguistic) referent of an expression within a grammar model?  What is the relation between the variables at the representational level and any extra-linguistic entities in the contextual component? Is this relation part of the grammar model or not?  How can we best exploit the possibilities offered by different combinations between, on the one hand, the subacts of reference and ascription at the interpersonal level and, on the other, the different semantic categories of the corresponding expressions at the representational level? Throughout the article, proposals will be tested by applying them to copular constructions in English, as it is in these constructions that the distinction between reference and ascription is far from clear-cut. Detailed analyses will therefore be provided of classificational constructions (   ), identity statements ( 2'%"'% ) and identificational sentences (2/+% ), both at the interpersonal and at the representational level, first of all to demonstrate the need for a new approach, and secondly to show the advantages of the new analysis to be presented. This article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses various proposals concerning reference in FG. Next, Section 3 describes the relevant new features of FDG, in particular those relating to the treatment of reference and ascription. It will be shown that, although in some respects the FDG treatment of reference and ascription is an improvement on former approaches, some problems still persist. Section 4 addresses more fundamental questions about the nature of the variables at the representational level and their relationship to the contextual component. It will be argued that if we conceive of these variables in a different way, this will allow for a treatment of reference and ascription that is both more consistent and more psychologically adequate. Section 5 demonstrates the advantages of the new proposal by applying it to proper names and pronouns, as well as to restrictive and non-restrictive appositive constructions. Finally, Section 6 offers a brief summary of the main points.



  &%. 

183

% *     2.1. Standard FG: Dik (1978, 1980, 1989, 1997a) In standard FG, terms are defined in a seemingly straightforward manner as referring expressions (Dik 1997a: 127; see also Dik 1978: 55; 1989: 111): By a term we understand any expression which can be used to refer to an entity or entities in some world. The entities that a term can be used to refer to are the potential referents of that term. The entities that a term is meant to refer to are the intended referents of that term in that use.

To account for their formal properties, Dik (1978: 16, 57) offers the following general schema for representing terms: (1)

( /i: i (xi): j (xi): ... n (xi))

where  ! '       /i is a variable ranging over a set of potential referents and each "/i) is an open predication in xi. The representation is to be read as follows: the domain of the potential referents xi is first restricted to the set of entities of which i (xi) is true; this latter set is restricted to the subset of which j (xi) is true, and so on until the open predication n (xi) gives the last restriction on the set of potential referents. In subsequent versions of the theory of Functional Grammar, this basic schema for terms remained virtually unchanged (Dik 1989: 115; 1997a: 132). With the introduction of the layered model (Hengeveld 1989; Dik 1989), the number of variables was, of course, extended, which meant that the term variable xi was from then on used only in terms referring to firstorder entities (objects, individuals), while higher order entities (states-ofaffairs, propositions, speech acts) were all provided with their own variable. These variables (e, X and E, respectively) were also used in terms referring to these entities. At a later stage, the f-variable was introduced to symbolize properties (Keizer 1992a, 1992b; Hengeveld 1992a, 1992b). None of these changes, however, affected the basic function and structure of the term as defined in Dik (1997a): terms still consisted of a term variable, one or more term operators and one or more restrictors. Thus, the important distinction between the actions of referring and predicating was maintained, both within the predication and within the term (cf. Strawson [1971] 1950; Searle 1969). In Dik (1997a: 127), for instance, we read that

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The predication may be understood in terms of the two basic acts of referring and predicating  :'#    #  $   which something is going to be predicated; predicating means assigning properties to, and establishing relations between, such entities.

Within the predication, the difference was reflected in the distinction between the predicate (verbal or non-verbal) on the one hand and its arguments (typically filled by terms) on the other; within the term, between the term variable, representing a referent, and its restrictors, designating the properties assigned to this referent. Since the actions of referring and predicating were generally assumed to be mutually exclusive (Strawson 1959: 142), this meant that terms could not be used to fulfil a predicating function. Nevertheless, it was felt that in Dutch copular constructions of the kind illustrated in (1) and (2), the post-copular expressions do serve to fulfil a predicating function (Dik 1980: 99-101). The examples in (1) could be accounted for by arguing that the expression  is not a term, but simply a nominal predicate. Confirmation for such an analysis was found in the fact that in Dutch such bare nominals do not contain a determiner, numeral or quantifier, may appear in the singular even with a plural subject, and do not allow for (pre- or post-) modification. In other words, they behave more like adjectives than like the first restrictor of a term; consequently, these nominal expressions were analysed in the same way as adjectives in this position, i.e. as non-verbal predicates (with the copula being inserted at a later stage through the rule of copula support; Dik 1980: 100). (1)

a.    ( Jan is painter > - b. +%   ( Jan and Piet are painter >!5 - c. *  # /  . Jan is famous painter

In (2a), on the other hand, the expression  cannot be analysed this way. Here the post-copular expression displays several of the formal properties of a term (see also examples (2b and c)); as such, it was analysed as a term.



(2)

  &%. 

185

a.     ( Jan is a painter b. +%   ( Jan and Piet are painters c.    # /  ( Jan is a famous painter

Since, at the same time, it was still regarded as serving the same predicating function as the bare nominal in (1a and 1b), a predicate formation rule was introduced to convert terms into non-verbal predicates. This Term Predicate Formation rule, first introduced in (Dik 1980: 103), has remained part of the standard theory (Dik 1997a: 205): (3)

, /& % /% input: any term (t) output: {(t)} (x1)

A final important, and by now generally accepted, modification made in Dik (1989) concerns the nature of the entities referred to. Whereas originally referents were thought of as entities in the real world, Dik (1989) describes them as entities in the mind (Dik 1989: 113; see also Dik 1997a: 129). As such they are part of a mental world, which need not correspond to the real world but may just as well be a representation of some mythical, fictional or hypothetical world.

2.2. Hengeveld (1992a, 1992b) In Hengeveld (1989, 1990) we find the layered model presented for the first time. Inspired by Foley and Van Valin (1984), this model offered a hierarchical representation of the clause which distinguished between an interpersonal level and a representational level. The interpersonal level consisted of two layers: the clause, represented by the variable E, and the proposition (X). At the lower, representational level the proposition was in turn restricted by a State-of-Affairs (e) consisting of (at least) a predicate and one or more terms (x). At a later stage the f-variable was introduced to symbolize the properties and relations designated by verbal, nominal and adjectival predicates (Hengeveld 1992a: 31; 1992b: 52-55). The need for this f-variable is illustrated in the following examples, which show that anaphoric reference can

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be made to properties (such as  in example (4a)) and that these properties can take their own modifiers (as shown for the adjectival predicate %% in (4b)) (Hengeveld: 1992a: 33): (4)

a. #%# 24#*  ( b. # %% (

The f-variable also proved to be useful for the analysis of non-verbal predications (Hengeveld 1992b: 77-80), where the non-verbal predicate (whether derived or non-derived) could now be provided with its own fvariable. Hengeveld also differs from Dik  #      nstead of a category of term-predicates, he distinguishes a larger class of referential predicates, which  ! !icates based on terms, i.e. referring expressions with a nominal head, and predicates based on larger referential units, i.e. predications, propositions, and clauses"2#% !)**,( 77). Apart from these differences, however, Hengeveld   ' nominal non-verbal predicates was similar to that of Dik (1980, 1997a). Thus bare nominals like & % in (5a) were analysed as non-referential predicates, while post-copular terms like /*#%  in (5b) were analysed as referential predicates (Hengeveld 1992a: 32; 37; 1992b: 80), i.e. as predicates (f) with a referential expression (x) in their scope. The difference between the two analyses was reflected in their respective underlying representations (given here in simplified form):4 (5)

a. & %( a- {(f1: president)} (x1: John) b. /*#% ( b- {(f1: (d1x1: (best friend): my))} (x1: John)

Now, copular constructions with referential predicates come in different kinds. Although various typologies have been proposed (e.g. Gundel 1977; Higgins 1979; Declerck 1988; see also Keizer 1992b, chapter 2), most of them acknowledge a basic distinction between classifying (or predicational) and identificational copular constructions. Hengeveld (1992b: 91), too, makes this distinction, relating it to a difference in the definiteness of the post-copular expression: whereas in classifying constructions the postcopular expression is indefinite, in identificational constructions the postcopular expression is definite.5 Both categories of copular construction are subsequently further subdivided into (reversible) specificational sentences and (non-reversible) characterizing sentences. Specificational and charac-



  &%. 

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terizing sentences (whether classifying or identificational) further differ with regard to the number of referents they involve: whereas in specificational sentences subject and referential predicate refer to the same entity, in characterizing sentences the two expressions refer to different entities. This results in the following typology (Hengeveld 1992b: 89): ,#1. Referential predicates +     (reversible)      (definite referential predicate)

"

    (indefinite referential predicate)

,&%. +  {(fi: (dxi)} (xi) -# /

/ {(fi: (ixi)} (xi)

"  >  (non-reversible) +   % &%  6 .  {(fi: (dxi)} (xj) -%/ {(fi: (ixi)} (xj)

Note finally that so-called identity statements (e.g. Declerck 1988: 110113) are described by Hengeveld (1992b: 87) as specificational constructions & :. Thus, an example like (6) is seen as serving no other purpose than to state that two names, ; '% and "'% , may be used for the same referent set (xi). (6)

a. ,; '%  %"'% (simplified): a- (f1: (d1x1: Evening Star (x1)) (f1)) (d1x1: Morning Star (x1))

2.3. Keizer (1992a, 1992b) In Keizer (1992a, 1992b) I drew attention to what I still consider to be a major problem in both Dik  ! Hengeveld   '  -verbal predications (see also Section 4). Whether we refer to the post-copular expression as a term-predicate or a referential predicate, in both cases the implication is that such expressions fulfil two functions at the same time: they refer to some entity while at the same time they predicate a property of an entity (either the same entity or some other entity). This means, first of all, that referring and predicating are no longer two separate acts. Secondly, from a logical point of view it does not seem to make sense to assume that if in a copular construction an expression like /*#% is

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regarded as fulfilling a predicating (property-assigning) function, it should nevertheless be analysed as referring to an entity. In Keizer (1992a, 1992b) I therefore proposed putting the f-variable in non-verbal predications to a slightly different use. As in Hengeveld  analyses of such constructions, it was used to symbolize the property assigned to the expression in argument position. However, in those cases where the copular construction is a classifying one (whether specificational, descriptional or predicational; see Keizer 1992b: 90-96), the fvariable was no longer restricted by a term; instead it merely represented the property denoted by the (combined) predicate(s) contained within this expression. As the post-copular expression was no longer regarded as fulfilling a referential function, it no longer contained an x-variable. Thus, expressions like those in (7a) were seen as involving only one referent and one referential expression (); the expression   has a propertyassigning function and, as such, does not refer to an entity. Unlike in (5b therefore, the post-copular expression in (7) contains only an f-variable (representing the property) and no x-variable: (7)

a. John is a fool. a- {(fi)} (xi)

The two approaches can thus be said to differ in terms of what is given more emphasis: the form of an element or its function in the predication. Thus, in the Dik-Hengeveld approach the post-copular expression in classifying copular constructions is analysed as a referential expression because it has (some of) the formal properties of a term. In my own approach it is the function of this expression, as a non-verbal predicate, which leads to its analysis as a non-referring expression, despite the fact that it shares a number of formal properties with terms. Evidence supporting this latter stance can be found in the fact there are also differences in formal behaviour between referring expressions (in argument position) and the post-copular expressions in question. One of these concerns the set of pronouns used to indicate anaphoric relations with the two types of expression: whereas expressions like  or ## &* , when used to refer to an individual, will be anaphorically referred to by means of the definite masculine or feminine personal pronouns  or , the same expressions, when used predicatively, trigger the neuter definite pronouns %, 4 or %%, or the indefinite pronoun  (cf. Keizer 1992b: 124):



(8)

  &%. 

189

a. $ 5 %%' * %( b. $ ##&* ( ((  4%2%#5%(

In other words, there is both functional and formal evidence for the nonreferring status of post-copular nominal expressions. Note furthermore that the approach suggested is also more efficient in that it allows for a simplification of the theory: if the post-copular expressions in question are not terms but property-assigning expressions, they can be used as predicates straight away, which means that there is no longer any need for a term-predicate formation rule. Finally, problems also arise with the analysis of identity statements proposed by Hengeveld (1992b). First of all, it needs to be mentioned that  according to Declerck (1988), on whose work the classification proposed by Hengeveld is based  identity statements like (6) are not specificational (see Declerck 1988: 113). In true identity statements, where the emphasis is on the copular verb, neither of the two expressions serves as a specification of the other, nor does either of the two expressions predicate over the other. After all, given that the order between the elements is reversible, and the focus is on the copular verb, how can one determine which part predicates over the other? A more plausible analysis is one in which both elements in an identity statement are regarded as taking argument position (for more details, see Keizer 1992b: 167). A second problem concerns the fact that on Hengeveld   $   specificational constructions, as well as identity statements, take the form of xi = xi; that is as expressing a relation between two identical entities. As pointed out by Frege ([1892] (1977: 56), this would mean that a sentence like ,; '% %"'% does not differ from ,; 3  '%   % ;  '% , which holds  &  , and can hardly be thought of as informative. Clearly, however, the two statements do not convey the same message; moreover, identity statements can be highly informative. This suggests that an analysis involving equation of one and the same entity is not adequate. Frege     #!? $   a relation between two (identical objects), but as a relation between the names, or signs, used to designate these entities (Frege 1977: 56): What is intended to be said by _# seems to be that the signs or names  and # ! #     #         %   ! under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted.

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Effecting such %  /  ns to our knowledge"# 1977: 56) is certainly one function of identificational constructions (see also the discussion of non-restrictive apposition in Section 5). Identity statements, however, seem to serve a different function: here two previously introduced discourse entities are asserted to be identical (at least in the speaker ntal representation of some world). It would therefore seem more appropriate to regard these constructions not as merely asserting a relation between two names, nor as equating two identical objects, but as equating two separate (mental) entities. (For further discussion, see Section 4.) This leaves us, however, with the question of why it is that, in the case of a (non-referring) noun phrase in post-copular expression, a predicating element displays so many of the formal properties of referring noun phrases? Moreover, when faced with such a discrepancy between the (typical) form and function of a noun phrase, which criteria do we use to determine whether we are dealing with a referring or a non-referring expression? And is it plausible to assume that the distinction between referring and non-referring expression is a clear-cut one? In Keizer (1992b: 139) I tried to resolve this issue by distinguishing between prototypical and nonprototypical referring expressions.7 A prototypical referring expression (or '   ! % ' #  (8 (9) 

 %:  /:



%:

first-order entity nominal head no valency (is non-relational) all term operators may (in principle) apply argument9

The underlying assumption is, of course, that the category of referring expressions is a graded category: some of its members are better examples of the category than others. This in turn raises the question of whether it is nevertheless a bounded category, i.e. whether we are to assume that all expressions are to some extent (no matter how small) referring expressions, or whether there are also expressions which do not belong to the category. In view of earlier remarks concerning the distinction between referring and predicating, the latter option seems the more likely one. In Keizer (1992b) I therefore suggested using the third criterion (that of function) to determine category membership; that is to say, for an expression to be a (prototypical or non-prototypical) referring expression, it must fill argument position.10 It will be clear that this approach not only makes it possible to use the term non-referring meaningfully, but also leaves intact the important distinction



  &%. 

191

between the basic acts of referring and predicating (see also Keizer 1992b: 360).

2.4. Rijkhoff (2002) This section will be concerned with one of the several additions and modifications to the theory of FG introduced by Rijkhoff (2002): the introduction of an extra variable to refer to the linguistic expression (in this case the noun phrase) itself. In his proposal for a layered structure of noun phrases, Rijkhoff (2002: 227-229) distinguishes between X and x: the former, as the referent variable, symbolizes the referent of the noun phrase, whereas the latter, the NP or term variable, symbolizes the noun phrase used by the speaker to refer to a discourse entity (Rijkhoff 2002: 228). This, Rijkhoff (2002: 229) explains, brings out the dual function of noun phrases: they have a referential side (concerned with the entity that is talked about and figures in the world of discourse) and a descriptive side (concerned with properties of this referent as a spatial entity). Rijkhoff uses this distinction to tackle the problem of identity statements. Thus, he argues (following Frege 1977), in sentence like (10), we have two different noun phrases (xi and xj) referring to the same referent (Xi). (10) ,; '% ?J5:@%"'% ?J5:@ A further advantage of such an analysis, Rijkhoff points out, is that the extra variable enables us to specify in the formal representation whether anaphoric reference is made to a noun phrase (x) or to the referent of a noun phrase (X). Consider in this respect examples (11a and 11b) (where A = anaphoric operator): (11) A: ;*# ?J5:@%4#%4  &  ?J5:@#he?-J@ /#%3 *( B: G**him?-J@ ?-:@H In this example the pronouns  and / refer to the discourse entity (Xi), whereas %% refers to one of the speaker !    ' $  noun phrase indexed as (xj).

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Both examples, however, turn out to be problematic. First of all, the most likely interpretation of (10) is one in which the hearer is assumed to be unaware of the fact that both descriptions can be used to refer to one and the same entity. Or rather, since entities are mental constructs, it may be more correct to say that the speaker realizes that there is a discrepancy between the mental representation of the hearer and his/her own, and, apparently convinced that his/her own representation is  "--ccordance with the speaker % ' $  #   !O  his/her mental representation accordingly. In other words, in the hearer  mental representation, the two descriptions correspond to two different entities. The speaker, to achieve his/her goal, takes the hearer   ctive, thus using the two expressions to refer to two different mental entities. This then also accounts for the fact that the sentence is informative: rather than Xi = Xi, the sentence states that Xi = Xj, the intended result being a mental world in which the two descriptions apply to one and the same entity (see also Keizer 1992b: 97). In (11B) we are faced with a different problem. According to Rijkhoff, the pronoun %% refers back to the noun phrase. Closer examination, however, shows that %% does not refer back to the noun phrase, but only to the restrictors within the noun phrase, i.e. the string & %%. This is clear from the fact that the anaphoric reference does not include any term operators (note that replacing %% by the relevant descriptive element would yield an indefinite noun phrase). In other words, the anaphoric relation does not hold at the level of the noun phrase, but at the level of the predicates within this noun phrase. In FG, this can be captured by analysing the anaphoric relation at the f-level, which means that (for the representation of this particular example) there is no need to introduce the extra NP-variable. 4 *     As the name suggests, the newly developed grammatical model of Functional Discourse Grammar (e.g. Hengeveld 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2005, 2006) is to be regarded as an expansion of Functional Grammar (FG) from a sentence grammar into a grammar that is also sensitive to discourse features. It has a number of novel features, some of which turn out to be relevant to the present discussion. One of these concerns the top-down nature of the model, which takes as its point of departure the communicative intention of the speaker. This intention, however, is not



  &%. 

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part of the grammatical component itself; instead it is conceived at a prelinguistic conceptual level. Information from this conceptual level functions as input to the grammatical component, where it triggers the formulation of linguistic activity. In addition to this conceptual component, the grammatical component is also linked to a contextual component, with which it interacts at various stages during the production process, and with an output component, which takes as its input the fully specified underlying representations produced by the grammatical component and converts these into the perceivable (spoken or written) expressions. A final important feature is the model   !  #&   rticular the distinction between a pragmatic module, which converts the prelinguistic, conceptual information into representations at the interpersonal level, and a semantic module, resulting in representations at the representational level. Thus, the interpersonal level accounts for all the formal aspects of a linguistic unit that reflect its role in the interaction between speaker and addressee "Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 671), while the representational level    for all the formal aspects of a linguistic unit that reflect its role in establishing a relationship with the real or imagined world it describes, i.e. it concerns designation rather than evocation, the latter being the job of the interpersonal level"Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 673). For referring expressions this means that they are no longer thought of as being built up in bottom-up fashion from the various predicates (now lexemes), but instead as originating as (sub)acts of reference at the interpersonal level. In other words, what we see is a separation between the pragmatic act of referring (representing the speaker      ' and the semantic means selected by the speaker to transmit this intention (in this case, the grammatical and lexical clues provided by the speaker to enable identification of the intended referent by the hearer). At both levels the relevant units are represented by different variables (see e.g. Hengeveld 2004a, 2005; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006). At the interpersonal level, each discourse act (A1) consists of an illocution (F1), the two speech participants (P1 and P2), and a communicated content (C1). The communicated content, which contains all the information the speaker wishes to transmit in his/her communication with the addressee, contains one or more subacts. These subacts come in two kinds: a subact of ascription (T1), which reflects an attempt by the speaker to evoke a property, and a subact of reference (R1), reflecting an attempt by the speaker to evoke a referent. At the representational level we find the following (partly familiar) variables:

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(12) '/%% *>  Individual State-of-Affairs Propositional Content Property/relation Location Time

 #> x e p f l t

The general schemas for the representation of referring expressions at both levels are given in (13): (13) IL: RL:

( R1 [8":1):  (R1)) ( i: "i):  (i))

where  and  stand for the relevant operators,  and  for the relevant modifiers,  and  for the functions of the respective units, and, finally, R1 for the subact of reference and i for any of the variables listed in (12). Now, it will, of course, be interesting to see how these innovations affect the analysis of copular constructions. First of all, the distinction between a pragmatic level and a semantic level makes it possible to account for the fact that one and the same description at the representational level can be used to perform different kinds of subact at the interpersonal level (Hengeveld 2005: 13; see also Hengeveld 2004a: 12; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2005). Consider in this respect the sentences in (14) and (15) (from Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 674): (14) a. ,%  ( (Ascription of zero-order entity: T/f) b.   

/& %% ( (Reference to zero-order entity: R/f) (15) a. '   ( (Ascription of first-order entity: T/x) b. )   %/%%( (Reference to first-order entity: R/x) In his analysis of these examples, Hengeveld distinguishes between the type of subact at the interpersonal level (T or R) and the type of entity designated at the representational level (f or x). Thus, in examples (14a) and (14b), the same property (     ! "    ' ' /

 



  &%. 

195

% % ) in (14a), but referred to in (14b). Similarly, in (15), one and the same the nominal expression, /*#% , fulfils an ascriptive function in (15a), but a referring function in (15b). In both instances, Hengeveld continues, the type of entity is the same: in (15a) a first-order entity is ascribed, while in (15b) a first-order entity is referred to (Hengeveld 2005: 13).11 This, however, leaves us with the same problem noted in Keizer (1992b) (see Section 2.3). According to the analysis offered here, the expression /*#%  in (15a) is used to ascribe a first-order entity to the referent of the subject noun phrase ('). First-order entities, however, cannot be ascribed; only properties can be ascribed. First-order entities are concrete objects, with their own physical properties (colour, size etc.); one can ascribe these properties to a concrete object, but one cannot ascribe one concrete object to another. It is, therefore, much more plausible to analyse sentence (15a) at the representational level as involving only one first-order entity (the individual Sheila) and one property assigning element (/*#% ). The difference between /*#%  in (15a) and (15b) thus not only concerns the type of subact performed at the interpersonal level, but also the type of entity involved at the representational level (firstorder versus zero-order). This leads to the following representations: (16) a. '   ( (Ascription of property: T/f) b. )   %/%%( (Reference to first-order entity: R/x) What causes the confusion is the fact that in both cases the same form of expression is used: a noun phrase. Now, as pointed out by Hengeveld (this volume), the prototypical noun phrase has a nominal head, is lexically designating,12 denotes a first order entity, and is referential. An example is the noun phrase /*#%  in (15b)/(16b). The noun phrase in (15a)/(16a), on the other hand, is not prototypical: here /*#%  is not used referentially (in terms of the definition of referring expressions in (9)) and does not denote a first-order entity. What we are dealing with, therefore, is a non-referential, non-prototypical noun phrase, which functions to assign the complex property (or combination of properties) /* #%   to a first-order entity. This non-prototypical status is also reflected in the fact that, despite first appearances, the expression /*#%  does not have all the formal properties of noun phrases either (witness the use of different anaphoric pronouns; see example (8) above). At the same time, it will be

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clear that the subact of ascription is carried out by non-prototypical means at the representational level: whereas an ascriptive subact is typically performed by means of a verb, adjective or bare nominal, here it takes the form of a noun phrase. Finally, let us consider the effect of the new features of FDG on the analysis of identity statements. Originally, the FDG treatment of identity statements was similar to the FG treatment proposed in Hengeveld (1992b). Consider once again example (6), here repeated as (17): (17) ,; '%  %"'%

In Hengeveld (2004a: 15), we read that   3 7")+8    prosodically prominent copula, serve the purpose of stating that the act of referring to an object by using a certain name is equivalent to the act of referring to that same object by another name; hence they are statements about the validity of acts of reference. .     $  rpreted as meaning that (17) consists of two identical subacts of reference, i.e. Ri = Ri. Obviously, however, this is logically impossible: every linguistic act is uniquely situated in time; even the exact repetition of a linguistic act results in a new act. Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2005: 16) therefore offer a modified analysis, according to which identificational sentences like (18) (i.e. Declerck )*11!   $!ifying sentences) are regarded as consisting of two different subacts of reference at the interpersonal level, but as involving only one entity at the representational level (see also Hengeveld this volume): (18) 2  IL: RL:

/      (R1: [+S, -A] (R1)) (x1)

+%

(R2: Peter (R2)) (x1)

The distinction of two separate R-subacts at the interpersonal level is clearly an improvement on the original treatment of identificational sentences. Nevertheless, the proposed treatment is still problematic. First of all, we still have an equation of two identical entities at the representational level. As pointed out before, however, for such a construction to be communicatively informative, the two descriptions, though possibly applying to one and the same entity in the speaker    !"!

 $ even the    !  $     esentation of the hearer. Secondly, sentence (18) is not an identity statement (unless the copula is given prosodic prominence). This is important, since



  &%. 

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the two types of construction seem to differ exactly in the status of the post-copular expression. To try and solve (part of) the puzzle, let us begin by distinguishing various kinds of   !-             !   'ictional or mythical world  something that /   !! $ ' $ !    situation or any particular speech participants. Secondly, there are the speech participants     '    ! -0    these will show considerable overlap, but there will always be differences between them. Thirdly, there is the discourse world (or discourse domain, Vet 1986), consisting (among other things) of entities introduced into the discourse by textual means, as well as entities present in the immediate discourse situation. In the model of FDG this discourse world is represented by the contextual component (see Connolly 2004: 103; Hengeveld 2004b: 369). In what follows, I hope to show that a further distinction has to be made between the discourse world (consisting of entities introduced into the discourse by linguistic means) and the immediate situation (perhaps better regarded as part of the real or some fictional or mythical world).13 Now, let us see what happens in the case of an identity statement. According to Dik (e.g. 1997a: 3), language is   '  ction between human beings, used with the intention of establishing communicative relationships-.  ommunicative relationships, in turn, are established with the aim of bringing about a change in the knowledge (or pragmatic information) of the addressee:  $ # ' %  ction both S and A possess a huge amount of pragmatic information, PS and PA, respectively. In saying something to A, S        ''  modification in PA ";3 )**+( *- 0 !   !   ''% $    have a more or less detailed picture of the pragmatic information of A. This estimate of PA is thus part of PS, but clearly not of the discourse world. We can apply this to identity statements by placing them in a context. Consider in this respect the dialogues in (19) and (20). (19) (Two people staring at the sky:) A: 56 B: G H2*%"'% ( A: )%2'%"'% (

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(20) A: , *%*#/( B: 2%%%4; *4/( A: )% *2'; *( In both cases, we have (at least) three different worlds or domains of reference. Consider (19). Here we have an immediate situation shared by A and B, which includes a clearly visible, and presumably uniquely identifiable object x1, referred to by A as  and by B as %"'% . In addition, there is the pragmatic information of the two participants, PA and PB. This pragmatic information can best be seen as mental representations of the real world (as well as of any number of fictional or mythical worlds). Since for both A and B the object referred to forms part of the real (visible) world, it can also be assumed to form part of their respective mental representations of this world. However, despite the fact that the immediate situation includes only one element x1, the expressions used to refer to this object,  and %"3 '% enter two entities into the discourse world. This situation corresponds to PB, which, judging from B  ")*   # '  discourse includes two entities: one labelled % " '% (an object already familiar to B) and now also one labelled  (an object B is not familiar with, and which he or she assumes to be a separate entity). The discourse world does not, however, correspond to A #' ation, in which the labels  and %"'% apply to one and the same entity. Thus A, believing his/her representation to be correct, sets out to bring about a change in the mental representation of B. To achieve this, A utters an identity statement with the intention of bringing B # information (i.e. B     '    !    his/her own. In this identity statement reference is made to two different discourse entities, the intended result being a modified PB in which the two discourse entities are represented as one entity. The example in (20) can be accounted for in much the same way, the only difference being that here reference is made not to something in the immediate situation, but to a (largely shared) fictional world. Once again, what are equated are not two identical entities, nor the descriptions used to refer to these entities, but two different discourse entities which, in some other world or domain, correspond to one and the same entity. Let us finally return to example (18). As pointed out before, this is not an identity statement. The intention of the speaker is entirely different. Instead of equating two discourse entities, the speaker simply enters a new lexeme (a new label) into the discourse, which applies to the (already iden-



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tifiable) referent of the subject noun phrase. This means that the expression +% is not used referentially here: this sentence consists of one subact of reference (performed by means of the pronoun 2) and one subact of ascription (assigning the name +% to the individual referred to by 2). I will return to the use of proper names in constructions of this kind in Section 5. 3           In the previous sections I have indicated a number of weaknesses in FG and FDG treatments of copular constructions and have tried, within the new framework provided, to offer some suggestions for a more consistent treatment of these constructions. The treatment eventually proposed differs from existing analyses mainly in the way in which the post-copular term is represented at the representational level: as a property rather than an entity in classificational (or predicational) sentences, and as a separate discourse entity in identity statements. The present section will address the more fundamental question of what exactly the variables at the representational level stand for, and, crucially, whether these variables should, in fact, be part of the grammatical component. This will be the subject of Section 4.1, which will present a new proposal for the interpretation of variables at the representational level. In Section 4.2 this proposal will be applied once more to classificational sentences and identity statements.

4.1. Variables at the representational level The grammatical component includes information relating to the formal aspects of linguistic expressions. These expressions are regarded as being built up, in a modular fashion, from linguistic primitives of various kinds (frames, lexemes, operators etc.). If, however, the grammatical component is meant to contain linguistic information only, it follows that the variables used within this component can only be interpreted as representing linguistic entities, i.e. either the linguistic primitives selected during the production of an utterance or the larger linguistic units built up from these primitives. At the interpersonal level, this requirement seems to be met. At this level representations contain all (and only all) the linguistic information needed to reflect an expression       ction. Thus, the discourse act, represented by the variable A, is a linguistic unit, brought into

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existence through the process of language production. The same can be said of all the other units distinguished at the interpersonal level.14 The fact that these entities, once created, enter the discourse world (feed into the contextual component) is irrelevant in this respect: they do not exist prior to the act of communicating and are, as such, linguistic entities. Nor does the morphosyntactic level form a problem in this respect. Here, too, the units represented (phrases, clauses) are clearly linguistic in nature, the outcome of the linguistic actions performed at the preceding stages of language production. Note that it is at this level that we now find the actual expressions used to refer to some entity (cf. Rijkhoff /-variable). But what about the variables at the representational level? In Hengeveld (2004a: 6) we read that 0  #    ative intention the speaker will in most cases have to fill his utterance with basic semantic content, i.e. with descriptions of entities as they occur in the non-linguistic world. M#       !     ' !     representational level. Thus, what we should find here are the semantic units used to describe extra-linguistic entities, not the extra-linguistic entities themselves. In other words, the variables at the representational level cannot be interpreted as representing extra-linguistic entities (of whatever type): the extra-linguistic entities described at this level are part of the conceptual or contextual component, not of the grammatical component. It is, in fact, not difficult to see why extra-linguistic entities cannot be part of the grammatical component. After all, as pointed out before, the relation between the description used and some (intended or selected) referent is one of intention (in the case of the speaker) or interpretation (in the case of the hearer). The relation itself is not established through language: the linguistic expression merely serves to enable the hearer to identify the intended referent (or restrict the set of intended referents). To achieve this, speakers will choose descriptions which are likely to lead the hearer to the intended referent, but this does not mean that the description actually applies to this referent (in the real world or in the discourse world); nor does it mean that reference will be successful. Neither the intended referent nor the relation between the linguistic description and this referent are part of the grammar; as such, neither ought to be represented at the representational level. This, of course, is a major departure from standard FG, where variables symbolized the intended referent(s) of an expression. Recently, however, the problem of what exactly the variables at the representation level stand for has been acknowledged, the result being a different conception of the role of these variables in FDG, namely as indicating the type of entity de-



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scribed by an expression (Hengeveld, p.c.). Now, although this is an interesting idea, it is not unproblematic. First of all, it would mean that the variables at this level no longer actually represent an entity, but merely serve as additional instructions to the hearer. If so, it becomes difficult to defend the presence of an index. After all, if the variable merely reflects the type of entity referred to, it will suffice to choose the right type of variable: since the types (orders of entities) themselves are unique, indexing becomes superfluous. Finally, indicating the type of entity described is not what variables are for: within FDG this is typically the kind of (nonlexical) information that is provided by operators (but operators on what?). I would therefore like to suggest a different use of the variables at the representational level; a use which combines the useful ingredients of earlier approaches while respecting the function of variables and the nature of representation at the representational level. What I would like to propose is to regard the variables at the representational level as symbolizing what I will call a speaker  /    '!  -. ! ' extension set is, of course, not new  going back at least as far as John Locke "* / % (1690)  and is generally defined as the set of entities to which the property described by a lexeme applies (e.g. McCawley 1981: 154; Hanna and Harrison 2004: 232; Allen 2001: 72).15 However, the exact nature of the relationship between language and reality has been an important subject of discussion in the philosophy of language from antiquity to the present. In their very detailed discussion of this debate, Hanna and Harrison (2004) distinguish two broad camps: the Russellians and the Wittgensteinians.16 The former are advocates of referential realism, which insists that there is a direct relation between a word and (some element in) the world, and that meaning is derived from this relationship. Wittgensteinians deny the need for such a link, believing instead that meaning exists independently of the external world. On a radical relativistic view, people have no access to reality at all, only to some mental representation of reality. In what follows I will adopt a moderate relativist view, according to which the relation between a linguistic expression and some extra-linguistic element is indirect, i.e. mediated by a level of mental (or conceptual) representation.17 Instead of the term extension set I will, therefore, use a similar but nevertheless crucially different term, that of speaker  /   (18

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(21) ;%:%%:&  The entire set of mental entities to which, in the view of speaker, the property (or properties) described by the lexeme(s) used in an expression applies (apply). As such, this mental extension set is not a set of external, extra-linguistic entities  first of all because a speaker cannot possibly know all the members of this set (which would mean that the speaker him/herself does not know what he/she is referring to); and secondly because, even if this were possible, no two speakers would ever select the same set (in which case communication would become impossible). Instead, this mental extension set can be seen as a linguistic entity, in that it forms part of the long-term linguistic knowledge of a speech participant, being determined by the meaning definitions of the linguistic elements in question in the speaker  mental lexicon.19 This does not, of course, mean that this information is completely invariable. First of all, the meanings of lexemes can change, lexemes can obtain additional meanings, and new lexemes are introduced into the lexicon. As part of the linguistic knowledge of a speech participant, however, the mental extension set of a lexeme forms a relatively constant factor. Regarding the variables at the representational level as symbolizing the mental extension set of the lexical elements (restrictors) used in an expression means that it no longer represents the intended referent (set), but the entire class of mental entities from which the intended referent (set) is to be selected. Thus, whereas the selection of the referent set of an expression may require further (context-dependent) information, including the kind of information provided by operators, the mental extension set exists independently of these operators (i.e. the operators have scope over the extension set) and is determined by lexical restriction only20 (Lyons (1977) uses the term tterance-independent- B      '    %!! $ the lexemes includes information about the type of entity described. It is therefore possible to use the existing range of variables to reflect this information; it is, however, not necessary to do so. Consider the simple noun phrase in (22) as an example: (22) a. % b. (1 prox x1: [f1: dog]) Here the term variable x1 symbolizes the mental extension set of the description, i.e. the entire set of mental (first-order) entities to which the lex-



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eme dog applies. The term operators )! / %!' ' rmation about the intended referent; information which the speaker assumes will be required for the hearer to pick out this referent. The intended referent itself, however, is not represented at the representational level but either forms part of (or is introduced into) the contextual component or is assumed to be retrievable from long-term pragmatic information of the hearer. The relation between the description and the referent remains a matter of intention (speaker) or interpretation (hearer) and is therefore not coded in the grammar model. In this respect the approach suggested here differs crucially from the representation proposed by Connolly (2004). Connolly, too, assumes that the contextual component includes, among other things, the referents of the terms used in the discourse (Connolly 2004: 103). Where the present proposal differs from Connolly !    ation approach is that in his representations the variables at the interpersonal, representational and morphosyntactic levels are all co-indexed with (i.e. uniquely linked to) the non-linguistic entities at the contextual level. Thus we read that (Connolly 2004: 108) The line :CC:"/251, x252)7    % CK8     individuals x251, x252 (which are primarily constituents of the representational level, and given shape as JayN and KayN at the expression level) are referring to certain phenomena in the context. These referents are enumerated in the contextual description.

In the present proposal, by contrast, it will be assumed that the actual relation between the linguistic expressions and their intended or selected referents is not coded in the language, and should as such not be represented at any level in underlying representation. The subact of reference at the interpersonal level merely reflects the speaker   '  ntity, but is not in any way linguistically linked to that referent. Similarly, the lexical and formal features provided at the representational and morphosyntactic levels merely serve to help the hearer in his/her attempt to pick out the intended referent(s). The reference, may, however, not be successful, in which case the wrong entity is selected, or no entity at all. This is possible exactly because the identity of the extra-linguistic entity is not part of the linguistic expression. The links between expressions and extralinguistic entities will, of course, be part of the speech participants ntal representations of the discourse world. As argued earlier, however, these need to be distinguished from both the grammatical and the contextual components: the grammati-

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cal component contains only (largely shared) linguistic information, and the contextual component consists of shared knowledge only (identity of the speech participants, time and place of the discourse, (perceivable) entities in the immediate situation), while a speech participant  esentation of the discourse world may include much more information and may differ considerably from that of other speech participants. Next, I would like to argue that for the proposed use of variables at the representational level it is still useful to provide these variables with an index. Different (combinations of) lexemes introduce different mental extension sets and there is reason to assume that these need to be distinguished (uniquely) within the grammar model. Consider in this respect examples (23) and (24). (23) A: 2#%3   *% *( B: =5they:&5 %%*H (24) A: 2#%+%9PL%* ( B: They %5 %%*H So far the use of the italicized anaphoric pronouns in these examples has always been somewhat puzzling. Since they obviously do not refer back to the discourse referents explicitly introduced in the preceding sentences ( 3&* and +%9PL), their use could only be explained in terms of inference, with the pronouns referring to all the members of a class inferred from the specific referent. We can now explain this use of the definite pronoun %* by assuming that it is meant to refer to all the members of the mental extension set introduced by the noun phrases  3&* and +%9PL. For this to be possible, these extension sets must have been introduced as discourse entities into the contextual component, thus becoming available for anaphoric reference; as such it may be argued that, like all other linguistic elements, these extension sets need to be distinguishable from each other. Note finally that such an analysis confirms the idea that mental extension sets are determined by lexical restrictors only: what is included in the anaphoric reference in (23) and (24) is the information supplied by the nominal and adjectival lexemes (3&* and +%9PL/, respectively), not the information provided by the term operators.



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4.2. Copular constructions revisited In this section I will describe the implications of the new proposal for the analysis of copular constructions. We saw that, as far as classificational copular constructions are concerned, the main problem consists in the fact that it is difficult to reconcile the function of the post-copular expression with its linguistic form. Since these expressions are used in an ascriptive function, they may be assumed to describe a property: after all, it is properties that are ascribed. Thus, in a sentence like $ , the noun phrase  is felt to describe a property to the individual referred to as Charlie. Such an analysis is supported by the fact that a separate set of pronouns is used to indicate anaphoricity with these expressions (the indefinite pronouns , as well as the neuter pronouns 4, %% and % in cases of an antecedent describing a person; again see example (8) above). At the same time, the form (a noun phrase, even if non-prototypical) suggests the presence of a (first-order) referent. Now let us look at expressions of this kind in the light of what has been proposed in this section. Consider the following example: (25) A: ;* +%9PL( B: ,*  %5 %%*H As in examples (23) and (24), the definite pronoun %* here seems to take as its referent a mental extension set; in this case the extension set introduced by the post-copular expression +%9PL. This clearly suggests that post-copular expressions do have an extension set, even if the description as a whole does not refer to a specific entity from that set. We can now exploit the f-variables and the (newly defined) x-variables at the representational level to represent this situation: (26)

,    IL: (T1) RL: (f1: [mx1: [f2: car]: [f3: old]])

At the interpersonal level, the post-copular expression is analysed as an subact of ascription (T1). At the representational level, we find a complex property (f1), restricted by the mental extension set x1 ( ), which in turn is determined by two properties,  (f2) and  (f3). The extension set is specified by the plural operator, thus giving the noun phrase   . Now the use of different anaphoric pronouns can be accounted for. The

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pronouns 4, %%, % and , in example (8) take as their antecedent the complex property ascribed to the referent of the subject noun phrase (i.e. f1). The pronoun %* in (25) takes as its antecedent the extension set of the description in post-copular position (i.e. x1). Finally, the indefinite pronoun  can be used to replace only the property ascribed by the nominal first restrictor (i.e. f2, as in , 4). The approach advocated also allows for a more insightful analysis of identity statements. Consider once more example (27) (cf. example (19); CC = contextual component): (27)

   IL: (R1) RL: (x1: [f1 8 CC: entity-1

   = =

%"'%

(R2) (x2: [f2 8 entity-2

The representations in (27) no longer involve any contradiction. Sentences of this type do not involve the equation of two subacts (there is no equation at the interpersonal level), nor of two identical entities. Instead, what is asserted is that the mental extension sets of the two descriptions (at the representational level) as well as their respective discourse referents (in the contextual component), taken to be different by the hearer, are (according to the speaker) identical. A sentence like (27) is thus informative in the sense that it is meant to change the pragmatic information of the hearer, both linguistic (equation of two long-term mental extension sets) and nonlinguistic (equation of two discourse entities). This shows that, although primitives (in this case lexemes) are part of long-term knowledge, they are not invariable. Different people may attach different meaning definitions to certain lexical elements. More generally, this means that, for the FDG-model to have some kind of psychological adequacy, it must be assumed that the primitives used for creating linguistic expressions (not only lexemes, but also frames, templates, operators etc.) are those available to the speaker, i.e. those primitives that are part of the linguistic pragmatic information of the speaker. Obviously, most of these linguistic primitives are shared by all adult native speakers of a language. Nevertheless, there are always borderline cases, where native speaker judgements vary. This can only be accounted for by assuming speakers to have access to slightly different sets of primitives. Linguistic knowledge, in other words, does not differ from any other kind of long-term knowledge: it varies from person to person and can be modified and extended.



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Note, however, that the change in pragmatic information brought about by an identity statement need not be linguistic in nature. In sentence (27) above, the modification intended concerned a change both in long-term linguistic and in long-term extra-linguistic (contextual) information: the new information being that the mental extension of the lexeme  is identical to that of the lexeme "'% , and that the two corresponding discourse entities are, in fact, one and the same. In other cases, however, the change is only a short-term and contextual one. Consider (28): (28)

,%/  IL: (R1) RL: (x1: [f1 8 CC: entity-1

   = =

/*# %  (R2) (x2: [f2 8 entity-2

Here, again, the speaker wishes to convey the information that two discourse entities, which correspond to two separate entities in the hearer  mental representation of the real word, are one and the same entity. The speaker thus asserts that in the given context (note the use of contextdependent elements such as %% and /*), the two expressions are coextensive. However, since the descriptive elements involved clearly have different intensions (or meanings), they can be used to refer to different entities in other contexts. As such, the descriptions in (28) are merely used as an instruction to the hearer to find the two discourse referents in question; their (long-term) mental extension sets are not equated. 2 +      The analysis of descriptions at the representational level proposed in the previous section can also be fruitfully applied to various other types of construction. In what follows we will look at some of these constructions: proper names and pronouns in Section 5.1 and appositive constructions (restrictive and non-restrictive) in Section 5.2.

5.1. Proper names and pronouns Let us first of all consider the analysis of proper names. According to recent proposals (Hengeveld this volume), referentially used proper names are analysed as referential subacts restricted by the proper name (a lexeme)

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at the interpersonal level. At the representational level, these constructions are represented by means of the term variable only: 24 

(29) IL RL

+%   *% *( (R1: Peter) (x1)

This analysis reflects the idea that proper names have a pragmatic function (identification of a referent) but are semantically empty and should therefore not be represented at the representational level. Application of the analysis proposed in Section 4, however, leads to the following representation in (30): 24 

(30) IL RL

+%   *% *( (R1) (x1: Peter)

Here, the proper name is represented at the representational level, as it is regarded as fulfilling a semantic (restrictive) function. It is true that proper names fail to assign a property, but they do have an extension set (all the entities known by the name Peter).21 Moreover, they do provide the hearer with semantic information about the intended referent (such as gender).22 Their lack of descriptive meaning is reflected in the fact that they are not provided with an f-variable. In this way we can account for the fact that anaphoric reference can take the form of a definite pronoun, but not of the indefinite pronoun . In addition, we are now in a position to provide a more plausible analysis of example (18), which, using a somewhat simplified form, was represented as follows: (31) IL: RL:

2  / (R1) (x1)

+%  (R2: Peter) (x1)

As the intention of the speaker is not to equate two first-order entities, we are not dealing with an identity statement here; nor is the post-copular expression used to assign a property to the referent of the subject. Instead, +% is used as a special type of ascription: rather than instructing the hearer to assign a property, it instructs him/her to attach the label +% to an existing discourse entity; or, to put it differently, to expand the mental



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extension set of the lexeme +% to include the referent of 2. If variables at the representational level stand for the extension set of an expression, this means that the variables of the two nominal expressions in (31) should not be co-indexed, as the extension sets of the two expressions are not identical. I would therefore like to suggest the following representation instead: (32) IL: RL:

2  / +%  (R1) (T1) (x1) (x2: Peter)

Unlike proper names, the extension sets of first person singular and second person pronouns can be thought of as being fully determined at the interpersonal level, where 2will automatically be identified as the speaker and * as the hearer(s). It seems therefore justified to analyse these pronouns at the interpersonal level as restrictors on the R-subact. The status of the first person plural pronoun 4 is a bit more problematic, since reference includes individuals other than the speaker  referents whose identity is not determined by the reference act itself. The same is true for the third person pronouns, which provide the minimum of lexical information needed to lead the hearer to some intended referent (set). For these pronouns, representation at the representational level may seem a more plausible option. The fact that the pronouns / and  provide semantic information (on gender) seems to support such an analysis.23

5.2. Restrictive and non-restrictive apposition Keizer (2005, 2007) gives an analysis of the form and function of restrictive (or close) appositions of the kind =  G % % , % %  = G, % = G, etc. Although the different subtypes call for slightly different analyses, it is argued that all close appositions ought to be regarded as involving one referring expression (the appositional construction as a whole), which consists of two non-referential nominal constructions. Furthermore, it is argued that, irrespective of the type of close apposition, the first element functions as the head and the second element as a modifier. Translated into FDG terminology, this means that an expression like =  G % % is the result of a single R-subact at the interpersonal level, while at the representational level we find two elements: a proper name and a description. Since the extensions sets of the two ele-

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ments are clearly not identical, they will be represented by different variables (for arguments see Keizer 2005, 2007). Once again, the proper name is analysed as directly restricting the x-variable: since it does not assign a property, it is not provided with an f-variable. Observe also that, in accordance with proposals so far, the modifier is analysed as a T-subact within the R-subact.

IL: RL:

= G      (R1: (x1: (x2: [Orson Welles])

%% ( (T1) ) (x3: [f1: actor]) )

IL: RL:

,%      (R1: (x1: (x2: [f1: actor])

= G( (T1) ) (x3: [Orson Welles]) )

(33)

(34)





The present proposal also proves useful in the representation of nonrestrictive apposition constructions. Hannay and Keizer (2005) offer a discourse-based classification of non-restrictive nominal appositions in English, along with a (provisional) FDG-analysis of the various types distinguished. In the analysis proposed, the appositive element is in all cases represented as a separate discourse act, consisting of either a subact of reference or a subact of ascription. In one of the types distinguished, the speaker uses the apposition to reformulate the description provided in the host element. An example can be found in (35) (from Hannay and Keizer 2005: 173): (35) - '/  /   %%/%  / %% %  4 #  %%  %% 2 B  /#      *4 24 Reformulation can serve a number of purposes. In (35) the non-restrictive apposition *4 is added as a simplification of the description used the host element (). In examples of this kind, the host is typically an R-act at the interpersonal level, while the apposition will be interpreted as a separate discourse act consisting of a T-act only. At the representational level, however, both expressions will be analysed as having the same mental extension set: both descriptions apply to the same set of entities,25 the only difference being that the description provided in the appositive element is simpler or more accessible for the hearer than that provided in the



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host element. The actual lexemes used in the two descriptions are, of course, not identical. This leads to the following representation at the interpersonal and representational levels: (36) IL: RL:

      (A1:  (R1)  )Nucl (x1: [f1: jihad])

*4  (A2: (T1))Simpl (x1: [f2: war] [f3 holy])

1 "   This article has addressed a number of issues related to reference and ascription in FDG, all of which have turned out to centre around two main questions: (1) how to deal with reference and ascription in FDG, especially in copular constructions? and (2) what is the nature of representation, more specifically of the x-variable, at the representational level? In order to answer these questions a number of basic assumptions of the FDG model needed to be made explicit. One of these is the assumption that in the grammatical component only linguistic entities and relations are represented. It was argued that this requirement is fulfilled at the interpersonal level, where variables represent units that are created in the process of language production. At the representational level, however, variables are traditionally regarded as representing (discourse) entities; i.e. extralinguistic entities. In other words, whereas the referents of the units distinguished at the interpersonal level are part of the linguistic system, those at the representational level are not. This does not mean, however, that the information provided at the representational level is extra-linguistic. After all, it is at this level that the semantic content (or meaning) of an expression is specified, which is, of course, very much linguistic in nature. All that needs to be done to solve the problem is, therefore, to have the variables at the representational level represent the semantic content of expressions, rather than the entities referred to. It was therefore suggested that rather than the intended referent, the variables at this level be regarded as symbolizing the mental extension set of an expression. This mental extension set  the entire set of mental entities to which, in the view of speaker, the property (or properties) described by the lexeme(s) used in an expression applies (apply)  is part of the long-term linguistic knowledge of the speaker and is not directly related to any entity or entities in some (discourse) world; as such it fulfils the requirement of being linguistic in nature. Such an approach was shown

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to have the additional advantages of being psychologically adequate and of retaining representational and notational consistency over the various levels and modules of the model. In addition, the proposal calls for a strict separation of the grammatical and contextual components. Whereas the former contains only linguistic entities, the latter includes the extra-linguistic entities referred to by a speaker performing a referential act. Although the linguistic entities represented at the representational level may themselves become (extralinguistic) discourse entities (i.e., be fed into the contextual component), neither these extra-linguistic entities themselves, nor the relation between the linguistic expressions used and these entities form part of the grammatical component. Instead, the grammatical component is seen as consisting only of the (long-term) linguistic knowledge of the speaker, a considerable part of which (in most cases) overlaps with (long-term) linguistic knowledge of the hearer. Finally, it has been shown that the approach suggested not only leads to a moreconsistent treatment of copular constructions, but also proves useful in dealing with proper names and pronouns, as well as with restrictive and non-restrictive appositive constructions in English. &   1.

2.

3.

4.

Thanks are due to Lachlan Mackenzie for useful comments on an earlier version of this article and to Kees Hengeveld for fruitful discussions on the subject (which, however, have not yet led to consensus on all points; see Hengeveld this volume). I am also much indebted to the detailed comments of three anonymous referees, which, I hope, have resulted in a clearer presentation of my ideas. Any remaining errors or inconsistencies are, of course, entirely my own. In FDG, the term predication is reserved for the representational level, where it is used to describe the unit designating a state-of-affairs. At the interpersonal level, the term ascription is used in the sense of !#   perty of/assigning a property to some entity-   %   %  $  subacts of reference and ascription that are being performed; the linguistic means to perform these acts are specified at the representational level. This question is also addressed by Escribano (this volume), who describes  from the logician   '%w  the problems involved in the F(D)G use of variables, and their relation to sense, reference and the choice of NP. Following standard FG theory, the possessive pronoun is here a restrictor on the x-variable. As argued by Mackenzie (1987), it might be more appropriate



5.

6.

7.

  &%. 

213

to analyse possessive constructions as arguments (in the case of inherent relations) or satellites (in the case of possession proper) of the nominal predicate, with the semantic functions Reference and Possessive, respectively. Such an approach, the expression /* #%   would be represented (again simplified) as (d1x1: (best friend) (d1xj: I)Ref). See also Keizer (1992b, 2004). Note, however, that in most classifications of copular constructions (including Declerck 1988), there is no direct link between the type of copular construction and the (in)definiteness of the post-copular expression: generally speaking, it is assumed that both identificational and classificational constructions can contain either a definite or an indefinite post-copular expression (see also e.g. Keizer 1992b, chapter 6). The elements in this sentence can, of course, be reversed. In that case, however, the sentence is no longer regarded as a characterizational sentence, but as a specificational sentence. As pointed out by Higgins (1979) and Declerck (1988), the two types of construction are used in different contexts and exhibit different syntactic behaviour. Specificational sentences contain two referential elements, one of which is weakly referential (a kind of variable: we know the entity referred to exists, but cannot identify it), the other strongly referential (a value) (Declerck 1988: 5). The function of a specificational sentence is to specify the value of the variable, i.e. to fully establish the identity of the weakly referential element. It is typically used in answer to some (explicit or implicit) 4-question of the type 9 A      aS !   aphrased as a  ' #(d-The value (Y) therefore forms the focus of the sentence; as such it is given prosodic prominence and may appear as the focus of an %-cleft (2%+ %%%&%. ). Finally, specificational sentences have an /  %

!#( ey imply that the list of values satisfying the variable is exhaustive (Paris is the only capital of France). Hengeveld   &   ntences seem to cover Declerck  !ational and descriptionally identifying sentences (Declerck 1988, chapter 1). They are used to assign a property (i.e. provide information, in this case % &%. ) to an entity (+ ) and typically answer the question 9  is X (like)?/Tell me more about X-.      !Q   either element is given focal stress (the sentence has a neutral intonation pattern), and %-clefts are inappropriate. Finally, they are not exhaustive: Paris can be characterized in many ways. Note that Hengeveld (this volume) uses the notion of prototypicality in his treatment of noun phrases. According to Hengeveld  !'     otypical noun phrase (a) has a nominal head; (b) is lexically designating; (c) denotes a first order entity; and (d) is referential. It is important to realize that, despite the overlap in defining features, we are dealing with two separate types of category: where referring expressions form a functional category (partly defined in terms of form), noun phrases form a formal category (partly defined in terms of function). See also the discussion in Section 3.

214 8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

"   This is a simplified version of the definition given in Keizer (1992b: 139). It might be argued that fully referential NPs can also appear in satellite position, as in  # %    ; *, where the (fully referential) NP ; * functions as a satellite term (with the semantic function of beneficiary). Note, however, that the basic distinction between referring and predicating applies to the nuclear predication, and that within this nuclear predication, full terms must indeed function as arguments. Moreover, if we assume that most prepositions (including  ) are predicates (e.g. Mackenzie 1992, Keizer to appear), it is not the term ; * that functions as a satellite, but the prepositional phrase  ; *, where ; * functions as the argument of  . This means that non-specific and generic expressions do belong to the category of referring expressions. They are taken to refer to some non-specific entity or a class of entities, respectively. As such they are not prototypical referring expressions; they do, however, fill an argument slot (and, therefore, are being predicated about). Note that on this approach, there is no longer a need for term-predicate formation (see Garc   and Hengeveld 2002). As pointed out by one of the reviewers, this term is tautological, in the sense that only (and all) lexical elements designate. It goes without saying that the contextual component contains more than representations of discourse entities and entities present in the immediate context. As, in this article, I am concerned with the availability and identifiability of discourse referents, I will restrict myself to that part of the contextual component that is relevant to the discussion. For further discussion of the contextual component, see Rijkhoff (this volume); compare also Escribano  "   % lume) distinction between Physical World, Psychological Worlds, Discourse Worlds, Speech-Act Worlds and Linguistic Worlds. For a discussion of the interaction between the contextual and the conceptual components, see Butler (this volume). Note that including the speech participants (PS and PA) at the interpersonal level is justified on account on the fact that what is relevant here are their roles in the communicative situation, not the (extra-linguistic) individuals in question. Since these roles are fixed elements of any communicative setting, and since their specific (discourse-dependent) features may be reflected in the formal aspects of a linguistic expression, their representation at the interpersonal level seems to be justified (for an alternative view, see Rijkhoff this volume). The term extension is closely related to the notion of !  "    to other related terms like intension, designation, connotation, meaning and sense; e.g. Frege 1892 [1977]; Mill 1856; Carnap 1956; Lyons 1977; for a discussion, see e.g. Harder 1996: 16-29). Unfortunately, these terms have been used in many different, but often very similar and partially overlapping ways, leading to what Geach (1970: 55) describes as  !  ' '  -



  &%. 

215

16. Apart from Bertrand Russell, the realist camp is represented by such philosophers as Willard V.O. Quine, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett and John McDowell; among the followers of Ludwig Wittgenstein we find Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida. 17. For a detailed discussion of the cognitive dimension in meaning, see Harder (1996), Chapter 3. 18. Note that, despite its conceptual nature, this  /       same as the intension of a expression. The intension of an expression is generally defined as   

!  /

 "2 and Harrison 2004: 232), or, somewhat more specifically, as '  

iates to each world the EXTENSION of that expression in that world. (McCawley 1981: 401). The intension, in other words, can be seen as the meaning definition of a lexeme, that which determines its (mental) extension set. 19. One of the reviewers raised the interesting question of whether the concept of extension can be applied to temporal (t) and locative (l) terms as well. He or she correctly pointed out that in that case the difference between the expressions %%# and %%#, represented (in standard F(D)G) as (1x1: (f1: table)) and (1l1: (f1: table))Loc, respectively, cannot be derived from the meaning definition of the lexeme %#, but that the correct interpretation can be arrived at by analysing prepositions as lexical elements, with their own extension set. I do, indeed, believe that this is the right approach (see Keizer to appear). 20. I deliberately avoid use of the term &%% referent(s), since it is not clear to me whether the information provided by term operators plays a role in determining this set. 21. This has, in fact, been the generally accepted view among logicians since John Stuart Mill (1856): proper names lack sense but do have denotation; or, as Coates (2006: 371) puts it, properhood can be defined as    

! ting- Note that Coates himself prefers the term    

'#!'# perhood as $ ''# !iscounts the sense of any lexical items  in the expression that is used to do the referring"L  ,^^W(U+1Q--% descriptive expressions like ,  % or ,=  can become proper if they are used merely to refer to an object, without ascribing any properties. However, since (synchronically) senseless proper names (such as +% ) need not be used to refer (see example (32)), I still prefer the term senseless denoting. 22. For a similar view, see Allan (2001: 87-99). Here proper names are seen as designators conveying a certain amount of lexical information (e.g. referent is human, female, etc.). It is true that they are typically used as #!! #ators "K3 1972: 269), i.e. as designating the same object in any possible world (Allan 2001: 89). In that case, the proper name will function as a noun phrase (Allan 2001: 97). As a linguistic element, however, a proper name is a

216

"  

noun, which means that it can be (and indeed often is) used as a regular first restrictor (see also Keizer 1992b: 97). 23. In logical semantics this may be an unusual point of view: here pronouns are typically seen as mere pointers, devoid of any meaning. Within the pragmatic discourse-based tradition, as well as in cognitive approaches, on the other hand, pronouns are seen as having a certain degree of lexical content. Allan (2001: 69), in an attempt to bring together the various views, describes pronouns as having %$    (-#- none for the zero anaphor;    ' /. 24. This example is taken from the British component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB), a fully tagged, parsed and checked one-million word corpus of written and spoken English, compiled and grammatically analysed at the Survey of English Usage, University College London, between 1990 and 1998. 25. Note that  has, by now, two senses: apart from designating a  ggle    #  !$ ! 4    !0 $ging war, it has come to denote any conflict waged for principle or belief and is often translated to mean  $   "4-Webster Online Dictionary). Although in example (35) the expression  can have either interpretation, the analysis provided here is based on the second sense of .

*   Allan, Keith 2001 0% '/%. Oxford: Blackwell. Anstey, Matthew P. 2002 Layers and operators revisited. G  +&   .% // 77. Butler, Christopher S. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Carnap, Rudolph 1956 ;0%*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Coates, Richard 2006 Properhood.  82: 356382. Connolly, John H. 2004 The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 211242. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.



  &%. 

217

Dik, Simon C. 1978 .% // . (Publication in Language Sciences 7). Dordrecht: Foris. 1980 '%  .% // . London/New York: Academic Press. 1989 ,, *.% // . Dordrecht: Foris. 1997a , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b ,, *.% // (+ %22>$/&:  % % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Declerck, Renaat 1988 '%  $&  '%5 $%  +%. Leuven: Leuven University Press/Foris Publications. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Foley, William A. and Robert D. Van Valin 1984 .%'*%:I  // . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frege, Gottlob 1977 Reprint. On sense and reference. In: P.T. Geach and M. Black (eds.), 1977, , %  / % +& G %  %%# . , 5678. Oxford: Blackwell. First published 1892. Garc   ; !K 2#% ! 2002 Do we need predicate fames? In: Ricardo Mairal Us ! 4 Jese  5D& ]  "! - 04 + &%  - /% '% 3 %   .% // , 95123. (Functional Grammar Series 25.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Geach, Peter T. 1970    %*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gundel, Jeanette K. 1977 Where do cleft-sentences come from?  53: 543559. Hanna, Patricia and Bernhard Harrison 2004 G cG . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hannay, Mike and M. Evelien Keizer 2005 A discourse treatment of English non-restrictive nominal appositions in functional discourse grammar. In: Mar J- &-GonzE &! J. Lachlan Mackenzie (eds.), '%  .%   // ,151185. (Linguistic Insights 26.) Bern: Peter Lang. Harder, Peter 1996 .%'/%(-, *;5'% % , "( Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

218

"  

Hengeveld, Kees 1989 Layers and operators in Functional Grammar. % 25: 127 157. 1990 The hierarchical structure of utterances. In: Jan Nuyts, A. Machtelt Bolkestein and Co Vet (eds.), * & %%  , *>  .% 4, 123. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1992a Parts of speech. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %       .3 % + &%, 2955. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1992b 03 # + %> , *5 ,*&*5  *. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.) ; &*%% ":&   .% // 5 5386. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar de los J#  G&-GonzE & ! >- 6  43& "! - '%  .%   // , 927. (Linguistic Insights 26.) Berne: Peter Lang. 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668-676. Oxford: Elsevier. Higgins, F. Roger 1979 ,+3%$% %". New York: Garland Publishing. Keizer, M. Evelien 1992a Predicates as referring expressions. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %    3    .% + &%, 127. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins.



  &%.  1992b

219

Reference, predication and (in)definiteness in Functional Grammar. A functional approach to English copular sentences. Ph.D. diss., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 2004 Term structure in FG: a modest proposal. G +& .3 % // 78. 2005 Close appositions. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% :&   .% // , 381417. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2007 ,"0+ %0% %$%  %. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. to appear English prepositions in Functional Discourse Grammar. .%  15-2, 2008. Kripke, Saul 1972 Naming and necessity. In: Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), '/%0% , 353355. Dordrecht: Reidel. Lyons, John 1977 '/%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan 1987 The representation of nominal predicates in the fund. G  +3 & .% // 25. 1992 English spatial prepositions in Functional Grammar. G +&  .% // 46. McCawley, James D. 1982 " *% %% %  -4* G% % 4 #% ( Oxford: Blackwell. Mill, John Stuart 1856 -'*%/51. 4th ed. London: John W. Parker and Son. Rijkhoff, Jan 2002 ,0+ . Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in FDG. Searle, John 1969 '&%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strawson, Peter F. 1971 Reprint. On referring. In: Peter F. Strawson (1971), 3% +& , 127. London: Methuen. First published 1950. Strawson, Peter F. 1959 2. London: Methuen. Vet, Co 1986 A pragmatic approach to tense in Functional Grammar. G  +& .% // 16.



    #C

* X, #C*/&%%%4  X,  */&%* X noun phrase with & as modifier &  isolated noun phrase noun phrase as constituent of clause , /, *, , , 4% + & (singular) zero det., numeral, /C*CC/*, %, etc. (plural) * before &

4/ before &

% before &

possessive determiner (/*, , * , etc.) before &  demonstrative det. (%C%, %%C%) before &  additional modifier (%%, ) after &

choice of head lexeme with feature [infml.] (e.g. , *)

246

$ %& '()% 

Z(L(Z(. /&%%C% %%%%% % % .  The structure in (44) for %& % , where the modifier is used interpersonally, is modelled on that given by Hengeveld (this volume): (44) (Def RI: ----":I): (fj: poorA (fj)) (RI)) (xi: (fi: doctorN (fi)) (xi)) We may now see this as the first stage in the linguistic representation of a       " ptual) entry which maps on to the English word % is accompanied by an (affective/interactional) entry corresponding to sympathetic attitude. This entails a lexicon in which lexemes are indexed for the conceptual and affective/interactional features which they realize. But this is clearly not the whole story. The choice of appropriate lexical items to encode the relevant content depends on selections from the contextual component, especially in terms of degree of formality. Adopting a highly simplified three-point scale of formality (informal, neutral, formal), we may say that the use of interpersonal modifiers such as & is characteristic of interactions with informal or neutral formality rather than those at the top end of the scale. This claim is strongly supported by the information in Table 3, which lists, for various combinations involving & , the sections of the BNC (World Edition) which have at least three occurrences, together with the frequency per million words in each section13. 



2% & /%& 

247

,# -  % ,  ;  '% % 3 .% , ( + % 1> -&&  % % '/&: $. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2003b '% %   .%> -  % ,  ;  '% % 3 .%, (+ %9>. /$% )*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Connolly, John H. 2004a Context in Functional Discourse Grammar. Unpublished ms. 2004b The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 89116. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2007 Mental context and the expression of terms within the English clause: An approach based on Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mike Hannay and Gerard J. Steen (eds.) '% % 3.% '%  " // >2 ; , 193-208. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Dik, Simon C. 1997 , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Faber, Pamela and Ricardo Mairal Us 1999 $% %  :  "  #( (Functional Grammar Series 23.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.



2% & /%& 

259

Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (eds.) 1994 '/%  : I  , *  "/&  .( Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2002 ;I  // >, *"/& .( /19( Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Halliday, Michael A. K. and Christian M. I. M. Matthiessen 1999 $%  ":&  %  ;> - 3) -&3 & %$%( London/New York: Cassell. 2004 -2% %%.% // , 3rd edn., revised by Christian M. I. M. Matthiessen. London: Arnold. Hannay, Mike 1991 Pragmatic function assignment and word order variation in a functional grammar of English.  + /% 16: 13155. Hengeveld, Kees 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand Mar !  J#   G&-GonzE & "! - - 04 - %%    .% /3 / , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.) ; &*%% ":&   .% // 5 5386. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668-676. Oxford: Elsevier. fc. .%  // . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey Pullum 2002 , $/#  //   % " . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joanette, Yves, Pierre Goulet and Didier Hannequin 1990 %/&  #$//%. New York: Verlag. Keizer, Evelien this vol. Reference and ascription in F(D)G: an inventory of problems and some possible solutions.

260

$ %& '()% 

Levinson, Stephen C. 1997 From outer to inner space: linguistic categories and non-linguistic thinking. In: Jan Nuyts and Eric Pederson (eds.), $3 &% %,1345. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Locke, John L. 1995 Development of the capacity for spoken language. In: Paul F. Fletcher and Brain MacWhinney (eds.) ,#$3 , 278302. Oxford: Blackwell. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan 1998 The basis of syntax in the holophrase. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //    # 2% 3 %, 267-295. (Studies in Language Companion Series 44.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2000 First things first: towards an Incremental Functional Grammar. -% % 32: 23-44. Mart, Mingorance, Leocadio 1998 " / :/!%3>   7 %   ; %  ; ( Edited by Amalia Mar :ales. Granada: University of Granada. Nuyts, Jan 1992 -&%   $%3+ /% , *  ( Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2001 "&%/;%*5$&% %>-$%3 + /%+ &%. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Pederson, Eric and Jan Nuyts 1997 Overview: on the relationship between language and conceptualization. In: Jan Nuyts and Eric Pederson (eds.) $&3 % %, 112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rijkhoff, Jan 1992 The noun phrase: A typological study of its form and structure. Ph.D. diss., University of Amsterdam. 2002 ,0+ ( Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in FDG. fc. Layering and iconicity in the noun phrase: Descriptive and interpersonal modifiers. In: Christopher S. Butler and Miriam Taverniers (eds.), special issue of % devoted to layering in functional grammars. Schumann, John H. 1997 The neurobiology of affect in language. Supplement 1 to    48. Solms, Mark and Oliver Turnbull 2002 ,) %2 G >-2% %%%0  '#%":& . New York: Other Press/Karnac Books.



2% & /%& 

261

Springer, Sally P. and Georg Deutsch 1998 % )  % ) > + &%  / $% 0 . 5th edn. New York: Freeman. Wierzbicka, Anna 1992 '/%5 $% 5  $%> I  / $&%  $% 3'&$ %. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996 '/%>+ /I ( Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wray, Alison 2002 . /  %:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



  Sam, you have been most helpful! c. Clause-internal or parenthetical. ":/&> You, Sam, have been most helpful! d. Post-clausal. ":/&> You have been most helpful, Sam!

Among these subcategories, the present paper is concerned specifically with freestanding NPs, as found in (written English-language) documents such as books, articles, web-pages, and so forth. We shall take it for granted that any of these documents may contain not only language-text but also non-linguistic material, particularly images,

264

($*

such as pictures or diagrams. As Kress and van Leeuwen (1996: 39) remind us, discourse is in general multimodal. Attention will be focused here especially upon those freestanding NPs which can be characterized as being: (3)

a. Relatively peripheral to the main body of discourse. b. Characterized by the sort of syntactic structure for which Quirk et al. (1985: 845-847) employ the term  3 nguage.

The term  3 ##  !$]3 et al. to the following: (4)

a. b. c. d. e. f.

Headings. Titles. Labels. Notices. Newspaper headlines. Advertisements.

Quirk et al. (1985: 845) state that simple block-language expressions tend to take the form not of sentences but of NPs or nominal clauses. Other types of structure are also found. However, in the present paper, of course, we are concerned only with those of the NP category. Before going any further, let us make clear how the term B5 # used in the present paper. It will be assumed that (in English syntax) an NP consists of the following: (5)

a. A head-word, which is either a noun or a pronoun, and which is obligatory, except in instances of ellipsis b. Optionally, one or more modifiers. Structurally, a modifier may comprise (i) a single word, (ii) a group of two or more words forming an embedded phrase, or (iii) an embedded clause. Subject to various constraints, modifiers may appear either before or after the head-word. However, because modifiers are generally optional, it is possible for an NP to contain just its head-word.

We need also to consider the representation of freestanding NPs within FDG. As an example, let us suppose that the NP ,+ #/ (6a) occurs as the heading of a chapter in a document. This NP would be represented along the lines of (6b) at the interpersonal level and (6c) at the representational level:2



(6)

. %& 4%/%

265

a. ,+ #/ b. (+id R1: T1 (R1)) c. (1p1: (f1: problemN (f1)) (p1))

No syntactic or semantic function has been assigned to this NP, as the term plays no role within any larger grammatical structure. (If one were to insist upon at least a semantic function, then this would presumably have to be f on grounds of consistency with possible expansions such as ,  % & #/ or , & #/   4 in which the f '    !  assigned to the NP in question.) Nor is any proposition-related representation suggested, since (6a) does not embody a claim of either truth or falsity. Rather, the salient function of the chapter-heading (6) consists in its discourse-pragmatic role of introducing (or ushering in), and at the same time encapsulating, the ensuing  !$/       -6 us, therefore, turn to the subject of pragmatics, for it is with this domain, rather than with grammatical details, that the present paper is fundamentally concerned.3 In the next section we shall consider how freestanding NPs may be treated from the point of view of pragmatics and discourse, within the framework of Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) outlined by Hengeveld (2004a, 2004b). This will lead on to a discussion of the implications for the broader theory of verbal interaction envisaged by Dik (1997a: 4). Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn. % ' Wow! (expressing amazement). c. Discourse organization ":/&> Introduction (as a chapter heading). d. Discourse execution ":/&> Yes (in response to a question during the conduct of a conversation).

Clearly, the kind of headings with which we are currently concerned belong in principle to Dik '  # $ '!    #& - However, there is a slight problem here. Dik (1997b: 386-403) divides the category in question into the following subcategories: (8)

a. Boundary marking ":/&> Anyway... (indicating the transition of one part of a conversation to the next part). b. Orientation ":/&> As for you, ... c. Tail ":/&> [It # !8  -

All of these subcategories apply to constituents that are attached to clauses, rather than to freestanding items like headings or titles, and are therefore not suitable for our present purpose. Instead, we shall employ a subset of the functions identified by Quirk et al. (listed in (4) above), plus some others: (9)

a. b. c. d. e. f.

Heading Titling Prelim Finish Label Caption

These terms will be explicated more fully as we proceed. (It is possible that future research will indicate the need for additional functions, but for present purposes we shall confine ourselves to those in (9).)



. %& 4%/%

267

2.1. Heading, Titling, Prelim and Finish First of all, we shall consider headings and titlings. A  !# %   usher in a particular unit within the discourse hierarchy. Headings can be layered, with the topmost (layer-1) being the most general, while subordinate headings occupy layer-2, and so on downwards. For purposes of discourse representation, a layer-1 heading may be denoted as in (10a), a layer-2 subheading as in (10b), and so on. (10) a. heading[1] b. heading[2] A  #   % ! #  ' !   ' some self-contained item (such as an image) that appears within a document. The term  # !!  mpass not only the title itself, but also any directly-associated material, particularly the name of the author, if this is juxtaposed to the title. How may we accommodate headings and titlings within the framework of FDG? Let us start with an example. Suppose that we have a book called .%% by J. Smith, and that we are going to treat this book as constituting a single, coherent discourse. Suppose also that the first chapter is headed 2% %, and that we are going to regard that chapter as one of the transactions within the discourse concerned (though not necessarily the first, as there may, for example, be a preface). Suppose, further, that the opening sentence of the first chapter reads: .% 3 %  % %*  /    *%/  / //%( In sum: (11) a. ,%#> Functional Linguistics J. Smith b.  %&% > Introduction c. '% %#* %&% > Functional Linguistics is the study of human language as a system of human communication. In the present example, the titling of the book can, in fact, be considered to be the opening move in the entire discourse. This move contains two assertive acts, communicating respectively the title and the author.

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Note that if the title had been .% %> G%   % ;2H5 then this would, in itself, have consisted of two acts: an assertion and a question.4 The second of these acts would conventionally be called the  -titlet the latter term is not really necessary for our purposes. The titling in (11a) also doubles up as the topmost heading of the discourse hierarchy. However, a titling can generally be expected to do more than just usher in the text of the document. It can also be expected to provide what we might (figuratively) call the '     !  esents to the outside world. That is to say, the titling generally appears on the cover of the document, and furthermore it serves to identify the document distinctively (and perhaps uniquely) and thus to provide a handle for storage and retrieval, as for instance in a situation where books or reports are catalogued and requested by their authors and titles. Consequently, we shall treat the function of  #   distinct from that of  !#- Moreover, we shall encounter examples below in which titlings do not simultaneously serve as headings. Accordingly, employing (in essence) the style of discourse representation developed in Connolly (2004) and omitting dispensable detail, we may represent the material in (11) in the following manner:5 (12) ENTER DISCOURSE D1  ENTER MOVE M1 M1 = titling = heading[1]  ENTER ACT A1 /* %%# */6 A1: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m1) (Audience)] (A1) ILLS(A1) = ILLA(A1) = representative LEAVE ACT A1 ENTER ACT A2 /* % # */ A2: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m2) (Audience)] (A2) ILLS(A2) = ILLA(A2) = representative LEAVE ACT A2 LEAVE MOVE M1   ENTER TRANSACTION T2  ENTER MOVE M11



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M11 = heading[2]  ENTER ACT A51 /*  %&% */ A51: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m51) (Audience)] (A51) ILLS(A51) = ILLA(A51) = representative LEAVE ACT A51 LEAVE MOVE M11 ENTER MOVE M12 /* % %#* */  ENTER ACT A52 /* &% %&% */ A52: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m52) (Audience)] (A52) ILLS(A52) = ILLA(A52) = representative LEAVE ACT A52 LEAVE MOVE M12   LEAVE TRANSACTION T2     LEAVE DISCOURSE D1 The fact that this representation makes explicit the assignment of the pragmatic functions  !# ! #   %B5   rtant, as it makes clear that although these NPs may lack a syntactic or semantic-relational function, nevertheless they do have a specific discourserelated function. The term  !   '  '' !#aterial which precedes the body text, but does not act as a heading or titling, while a '      ' !# erial that occurs at the end of a body text. Examples of prelim material can be seen when the sender  !!

 and the date are included at the top of a letter, or when the date and place of publication are displayed at the beginning of a book. Such information may help to contextualize the discourse. However, if information referring to the date and place of the origin of a document is placed at the end of a body text, such as the preface of a book, then it constitutes a finish. Note that the salutation (  ) at the beginning of a letter and the sign-off at the end (K ) belong under the heading of interaction man-

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agement rather than discourse organization; see (7) above. Dik (1997b: 384-385) uses the terms !!

 !  %-taking   !    respective functions.

2.2. Other matters of block language At this juncture it is convenient to consider briefly those items listed in (4) above that we do % propose to adopt here as functions of freestanding NPs, namely notices, headlines and advertisements. An example of a block-language notice would be a road-sign containing just the freestanding NP: (13) Low Bridge This has very little structure, and from the discourse point of view there is no titling or heading, but simply the message itself. The latter comprises a single move containing only one assertive act. The latter serves as a warning to the drivers of tall vehicles, and thus has the illocutionary force of a directive,7 since it seeks to influence the overt behaviour of drivers who read it. An appropriate FDG-style representation of this notice would therefore be as follows: (14) ENTER DISCOURSE D1  ENTER MOVE M1  ENTER ACT A1 A1: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m1) (Audience)] (A1) ILLS(A1) = ILLA(A1) = directive LEAVE ACT A1 LEAVE MOVE M1 LEAVE DISCOURSE D1 Simple as this may be, it appears to be all that is required, and there seems to be no reason to include a discourse-pragmatic function such as  Of course, it is possible for notices to be more elaborate than this. For instance, we could imagine a notice with a heading (such as % ) and a body (such as 0 /65 0 /6 and so forth). In sum:



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(15) a. > Rules of the House b. )*> No smoking! No denims!  Such a notice would be represented along the following lines: (16) ENTER DISCOURSE D1  ENTER MOVE M1 M1 = heading[1]  ENTER ACT A1 /* % */ A1: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m1) (Audience)] (A1) ILLS(A1) = ILLA(A1) = representative LEAVE ACT A1 LEAVE MOVE M1 ENTER MOVE M2 /* % %#* */  ENTER ACT A2 /*  % %% */ A2: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m2) (Audience)] (A2) ILLS(A2) = ILLA(A2) = directive LEAVE ACT A2 ENTER ACT A3 /*  %% */ A3: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m3) (Audience)] (A3) ILLS(A3) = ILLA(A3) = directive LEAVE ACT A3   LEAVE MOVE M2 LEAVE DISCOURSE D1 As for headlines in newspapers, these can be considered to constitute a type of heading. However, accommodating newspaper headlines and articles within discourse analysis is not necessarily straightforward. Let us take an example. Suppose that there exists a newspaper entitled /, 3

% *, aimed at UK-nationals living overseas who wish to be kept up-todate with current events in the UK. This newspaper is likely to consist of

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articles on a set of topics which bear little relationship to one another, other than the fact that they happen to be of current interest. Consequently, we may be reluctant to regard the entire document as a single discourse, but may prefer, instead, to treat each article (together with its associated headline) as a separate discourse-strand.8 To continue with our example, suppose that an issue of this newspaper contains an article with the headline 2/& /%, +%%* and another with the headline 2 G2/& %. The first article opens with the sentence: %   /4*% *( The second begins: ,) %&&%% 44#%( In sum: (17) a. ,%4&& > Home Territory b.  % %> Improvement in Train Punctuality c. '% %#* % %> Rail travellers received some good news yesterday. d.  %> Increase in Wine Imports e. '% %#* %> The British appetite for wine shows no sign of abating. Note that because the titling NP stands outside of all the various discoursestrands, it does not function as a discourse heading. Thus, the material in (17) may be represented along the following lines: (18) ENTER DOCUMENT  ENTER MOVE M1 M1 = titling  ENTER ACT A1 /* %%4&& */ A1: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m1) (Audience)] (A1) ILLS(A1) = ILLA(A1) = representative LEAVE ACT A1 LEAVE MOVE M1 ENTER DISCOURSE D1  ENTER MOVE M2 /*  % % */



. %& 4%/%

M2 = heading[1]  ENTER ACT A2 A2: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m2) (Audience)] (A2) ILLS(A2) = ILLA(A2) = representative LEAVE ACT A2 LEAVE MOVE M2 ENTER MOVE M3 /* % %#* */  ENTER ACT A3 /* &% % % */ A3: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m3) (Audience)] (A3) ILLS(A3) = ILLA(A3) = representative LEAVE ACT A3 LEAVE MOVE M3   LEAVE DISCOURSE D1 ENTER DISCOURSE D2  ENTER MOVE M11 /*  % */ M11 = heading[1]  ENTER ACT A61 A61: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m61) (Audience)] (A61) ILLS(A61) = ILLA(A61) = representative LEAVE ACT A61 LEAVE MOVE M11 ENTER MOVE M12 /* % %#* */  ENTER ACT A62 /* &% % */ A62: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m62) (Audience)] (A62) ILLS(A62) = ILLA(A62) = representative LEAVE ACT A62 LEAVE MOVE M12   LEAVE DISCOURSE D2   LEAVE DOCUMENT

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There are two further points to note. Firstly, if an article contains subheadings, then these can be treated as layer-2 headings, as before. Secondly, the article headings will almost certainly appear subordinated to the newspaper titling through being printed in smaller-sized lettering. However, as already stated, this does not mean that the newspaper titling constitutes, in terms of discourse-level analysis, the top-level heading for the individual articles. This state-of-affairs is reflected in the representation (18). As for advertisements, a comprehensive treatment of this large subject is not feasible here. However, see, for instance, Cook (2001) who provides a useful overview, and Rush (1998) whose study of the NP in this type of discourse reveals further syntactic details, especially in relation to the structure of the modification preceding the head-word. Nevertheless, we are in a position to make some brief remarks. To begin with, certain advertisements consist of language-text only, while others are multimodal in character. For the moment, we shall confine ourselves to the purely linguistic type. Some advertisements are very simple, for instance    '65 while others are more complex. A newspaper or magazine may have columns of classified advertisements of items for sale, organized under headings such as $ , ;2% /%, and so on. In the body text of the column are listed a series of entries, such as I& %&3 %( + P19 University of Cheesebury b.  %*> Lecturer in Linguistics. c. '% %#* %*> An interest in FDG would be an advantage. d.  %> Lecturer in Phonetics e. '% %#* %> Experience of Experimental Phonetics essential. It is apparent that this example is capable of being assigned a representation along much the same lines as (18) above. 4  b. #> 

c( $&%>

Figure 1 Exports of lollipops from Slurpland during the 1990s Exports (millions) Year9 Currency Crisis

The term  #   !$/ !-Brally, it applies to the image as a whole. A         !    /  otation which indicates the intended meaning of some element within the image. In the present example the horizontal axis is labelled K and the vertical axis is labelled ":& %?/@( A        the image or to some element within it, for the purpose of aiding interpretation; cf. Kosslyn (1994: 16). Here, the NP $

*$  helps us to understand the sharp downturn in the number of exports during 1995, and therefore functions as a caption. It is not a label, since the element of the graph to which it applies (namely the %  !!emand a label such as % %& #%4 % *   % /#   :& % and the lowest point on the curve would demand a label such as /// . The chart is not, of itself, intended to represent a graph of the occurrence of the causal factors that might influence the level of exports, and this is, of course, precisely why additional information supplied by the explanatory caption is helpful. We are thus put in mind of the fact pointed out by Barthes (1977: 3741) that images typically allow for more than one possible interpretation. For instance, a chart portraying a curve within the framework of two orthogonal axes (as in Figure 1), but without any textual annotation or accompaniment, would be capable of being assigned an indefinitely large number of possible meanings. What titlings, labels and captions do, however, is to point the viewer of the image towards one particular interpretation among the different possibilities. Barthes terms this effect  rage         %   '/ ' $    '   rather than drifting from one possible understanding of the image to another. (It would also be possible for the suggested interpretation to be given an attitudinal slant, for instance by replacing $

*$  in Figure 1 with a more pejorative caption such as "/;//%.) Titlings, labels and captions attached to images can all be analysed in terms of their pragmatics. Each of the five examples in (20) constitutes an individual communicative act that is not directly a part of a larger language-text (though the image to which it is attached could be regarded as a constituent of the overall, multimodal discourse out of which the document



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is constructed; see Connolly 2000 for further details). These communicative acts may be represented along the following lines: (21) ENTER MOVE M40 M40 = titling ENTER ACT A101 /*  &% */ A101: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m101) (Audience)] (A101) ILLS(A101) = ILLA(A101) = representative LEAVE ACT A101 ENTER ACT A102 /* %%/ */ A102: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m102) (Audience)] (A102) ILLS(A102) = ILLA(A102) = representative LEAVE ACT A102 LEAVE MOVE M40 ENTER ACT A103 /* #: */ A103 = label A103: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m103) (Audience)] (A103) ILLS(A103) = ILLA(A103) = representative LEAVE ACT A103  ENTER ACT A105 /* &% */ A105 = label A105: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m105) (Audience)] (A105) ILLS(A105) = ILLA(A105) = representative LEAVE ACT A105 The pragmatic functions of titling, label and caption, respectively, are duly made explicit in this representation. It may be noted that the titling in this example is not a heading within a discourse hierarchy. Within the titling there are two acts  the title itself being preceded by a descriptor (.  1) whose purpose is to identify the image as a graphical element within the discourse and to number it within a sequence of such elements within the text as a whole. Another issue calling for comment is the question of whether the pragmatic functions with which we are concerned in the present paper apply to moves, acts or both. The examples adduced above suggest that if the discourse analysis of a document reveals the grouping of acts into moves, then functions such as heading or titling apply in general to entire moves

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(though it is, of course, possible for a move to contain just one act). However, it appears that pragmatic functions such as labels on images are not generally grouped into moves; and in cases where the layer of the move is superfluous, the pragmatic functions concerned have to be regarded as applying to individual acts. Further examples of NPs with the functions of titling or label can be found abundantly in web pages. A web page regularly contains a title and display of body material which is in general multimodal in character. This material often includes clickable items that facilitate links to other parts of the document or to other documents. These items are frequently (though by no means always) picked out in some special way, for instance through underlining or through mounting on a button-icon. Such items serve as labels for the relevant clickable areas in the display, for the purpose of indicating the information to be accessed, or the action to be performed, by clicking on the screen-areas concerned. At this point we may return briefly to advertisements, but this time to consider those in which language-text is combined with one or more images. It turns out that the pragmatic functions of titling, label and caption are all applicable to freestanding NPs attached to such advertisements. For instance, a page of advertisements for cars may include a series of entries, each of which consists of a picture of a particular type of car, together with a titling giving the make and model. Possibly some of these pictures might contain labels, such as 3B%**4, attached to the appropriate region of the image. Alternatively, an advertisement for car-interior upholstery might consist of picture of a car interior, devoid of any titling or label, but accompanied simply by the caption '%*6 (Whether other pragmatic functions would also be needed to deal adequately with the use of freestanding NPs in advertisements will be left as an open question.) 3  $/&:  $% % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Garc   ; this vol. Functional Discourse Grammar and extraction from (complex) noun phrases. Hengeveld, Kees 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Keizer, Evelien this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: an inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Kosslyn, S.M. 1994 "/% &(New York: Freeman. Kress, Gunther and van Leeuwen, Theo 1996  2/> , //    ( London: Routledge. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan and Mar! J#eles G&-GonzE & (eds.) 2004 - 04 - %%    .% // ( Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik 1985 - $/&  //   % " . London: Longman. Rijkhoff, Jan this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in FDG. Rush, Susan 1998 The noun phrase in advertising English.    + /% 29: 155171. 1997b




   imates of each other #3  !#-  # ;3     $ %mpact on the pragmatically relevant structuring of linguistic expressions (1997a: 11), the truth is that, as noted by Siewierska (1991: 148), pragmatic functions in FG are only recognized if they have a formal impact on the linguistic expression. This justifies Cornish ",^^@()U)  %  that the form-oriented aspect of pragmatic functions    3  $ over the discourse-cognitive dimension- G'    ;3 ")**+a: 311) is well aware of the relevance of the notions given and new information and topicality and focality in his model of verbal interaction, but the relation between these notions and the intraclausal pragmatic functions Topic and Focus remains unclear. This problem has long been noted in the FG tradition (see e.g. Siewierska 1991: 155ff.; Mackenzie and Keizer 1991; Hannay 1991; Bolkestein 1998; Cornish 2004) and different solutions have been suggested to bridge the gap between grammar and discourse in FG. However, possibly due to the priority granted to the theoretical problem itself, to my knowledge no studies of specific linguistic processes have been offered in the FG tradition in which formal marking is linked to the cognitive status of referents. This is unfortunate, for if Topic and Focus assignment relates to the informational status of referents with respect to the pragmatic knowledge of both speaker and addressee in a given communicative setting, constraints on pragmatic function assignment can only be discovered if the role of the cognitive status of referents is taken into account in grammatical description. One of the most important differences between FDG and standard FG, as presented in Dik (1997a, b), is the top-down orientation of the former,



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which now intends to construct its internal architecture in such a way that it becomes compatible with well-established findings in the field of psycholinguistics. In particular, Levelt (1989) views linguistic behaviour as a process running from communicative intention to actual speech generation. In accordance with this top-down organization, FDG takes the   -% rather than the clause as the basic unit of linguistic description. Discourse Acts can be decomposed into Subacts of Reference and Ascription to which, following the practice in classical FG, the pragmatic functions Topic and Focus are assigned. Another important novelty in FDG is the introduction of both a cognitive and a contextual (also named  %      !Oacent modules to the linguistic generator. Hengeveld (2004a: 3) characterizes them as follows: The cognitive component represents the (long-term) knowledge of the speaker, such as his communicative competence, his knowledge of the world, and his linguistic competence. (...) The communicative component represents the (short-term) linguistic information derivable from the preceding discourse and the non-linguistic, perceptual information derivable from the speech situation.

Even though these two components are not part of the grammatical system proper, they are introduced into the theory in the belief that some grammatical processes may be best understood if reference is made to them. In my view, the cognitive and contextual components can be useful in understanding the grammatical coding of referents in discourse and in discovering significant correlations between the syntactic expression of Topic and Focus and the status of referents in the pragmatic knowledge of both speaker and addressee.5 An articulated pragmatic theory along those lines is presented in Lambrecht (1994), who argues that the information structure of an utterance depends on the mental states of the interlocutors and thus is not a constant function associated with a sentence but, rather, a function of the communicative situation in which the expression is uttered. Two information structure categories that will be relevant in this article are Identifiability and Activation, which are characterized as follows (Lambrecht 1994: 76): -IDENTIFIABILITY, which has to do with a speaker 



 '   a discourse representation of a particular referent is already stored in the hearer !  "-.   !  ACTIVATION, which has to do with the speaker 



 '    '    '!' 

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referent as already %!  $

   nactive in the mind of the hearer at the time of the speech act.

The cognitive distinction between identifiable and unidentifiable referents is coded in many languages through the formal distinction between definite and indefinite noun phrases, although other means such as word order and case markers are also relevant. Unidentifiable or brand-new referents can be of two types: anchored or unanchored, a distinction taken from Prince (1981), who claims that an entity is anchored if the NP representing it is linked to another referent contained in it. The crucial thing here is that anchored entities should contain at least one anchor that it is not itself brand-new or it wouldn %   #$-6 Prince (1981: 236) offers the following examples to illustrate the contrast: (1)

a. -*2CC%&/# C4/244 ?@4% b. H*4/4 4%

 (1b) is anomalous because the anchoring entity is marked as indefinite and, therefore, assumed not to be known to the addressee. Note, additionally, that anchoring constructions may allow definite descriptions of entities without any prior mention of them in discourse (cf. , * 2CC% &/# C 4/ 2 4 work(s) with-  ding to Hawkins (1991: 411fn), an anchoring construction makes a context available in which the referent can be interpreted as unique by the hearer, and, therefore, the use of a definite article in the anchored NP is acceptable. Lambrecht (1994: 95) notes that activation has correlates in grammar: phonological attenuation and zero coding in morphosyntax are properties of activated referents or presuppositional structure, whereas prosodic prominence and full lexical coding typically entail the inactive status of a given referent (see also Chafe 1994).7 Accessible or semi-active referents (those which are peripheral, but not directly focused upon) can be of three types: deactivated or / $ ccessible '! '   '  schema or 'ally accessible ! /-externally accessible     $ 

 - .    ation between the areas of identifiability and cognitive activation is given in the following table (Lambrecht 1994: 109):



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,#1(Identifiability and Activation according to Lambrecht (1994) IDENTIFIABILITY Unidentifiable Anchored Unanchored Identifiable ACTIVATION Inactive Accessible Textually Situationally Inferentially Active

What is the role of the topic and focus functions in this model? According to Lambrecht (1994: 115116) the activation states of referents should be seen as preconditions for topic and focus function. Thus, the same activation state may be reflected in topic or focal status. This is illustrated with the following contrast in Italian and French (emphasis in original): (2)

a. IO PAGO / MOI je PAYE. I PAY. b. Pago IO / C MOI qui paye. I $-

The pronominal expressions in (2) have the same activation state in both examples, but receive focus function only in (2b). This expression is likely to be uttered in a context in which it is presupposed that someone has to pay something and two or more people intend to do so. Therefore, the sentences differ only in the pragmatic function of the pronominal expressions but their referents are necessarily active since they are speech participants themselves. Topic and focus thus relate to the status of a referent with respect to a given proposition, whereas identifiability and activation relate to the mental representation of referents. Obviously, there are important relations among both parameters to the extent that, for instance, a referent is interpretable as the topic of a sentence only if it has certain activation properties or a significant degree of pragmatic accessibility. In Lambrecht  !   3%    '   !!   topic of the expression. However, before making this communicative deci-

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sion he also evaluates the status of that referent in his interlocutor ! and decides upon the formal properties of the sentence. Activation properties act, therefore, as a precondition for topic status and, consequently, (Lambrecht 1994: 165)     ''iently accessible topic referents must pose certain difficulties of interpretation, hence will tend to be perceived as ill formed-  $     ' llowing scale: ,#9(Lambrecht ")**@.  $  TOPIC ACCEPTABILITY SCALE Active Accessible Unused Brand-new anchored Brand-new unanchored

Most acceptable

Least acceptable 

Lambrecht (1994: 262) notes the complementarity of the topic accessibility scale with focal prominence: those referents which are low on the scale are likely to be coded as non-topics, i.e. focal constituents. Hence, the scale predicts that the more inactive a given referent is, the more likely it is to function as a focal constituent. Activation and Identifiability are mental notions which are undoubtedly dependent upon properties of the human mind. Different authors have stressed the relevance of cognitive processing in the efficient identification of referents. Deane (1992) claims that topicality and focality are discourse concepts which can be defined in cognitive terms as both can be subsumed under the more general concept of %%% (see also Chafe 1994, who introduces the term %% %); according to Deane (1992: 30), apacity to attract attention is a logical prerequisite of topic status, since it would be difficult to talk about something to which the audience could not be expected to attend-0!!'  nformation, by virtue of being new or more important, is likely to attract attention immediately. New topics and focal (i.e. new) information are introduced on-line according to current communicative needs and decisions. Consequently, active topics by definition require little attention and hence little processing effort. New topics (typically introduced via special constructions) should require more attention since they demand a greater effort on the addressee     linguistic expression with the right referent.



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Given that the human mind has limitations as to the amount of information that can be processed at a given time, we expect to find relevant restrictions on the attention load that linguistic expressions can demand. One such limitation has been formulated in various ways in the literature: Giv ")*1@ -chunk-per-clause QL ' ")**@()^1= 04 2 $% % or Lambrecht  ")**@()1@+ &'& %  ), all of which roughly amount to claiming that each unit of discourse or proposition cannot contain more than one chunk of new information. In terms of the Activation notion introduced above, this amounts to saying that there can only be one % !  activation applies to a single referent, event or state, but not to more than one"L ')**@()^*- 0    @     out to be crucial in a pragmatic account of the CNPC; it is to the CNPC that I now turn. 4  "#&'  "   3.1. The CNPC in classical Generative Grammar: A brief history In the early days of Generative Grammar, restrictions on the application of movement operations were built into the structure of the rules themselves, which led to the postulation of rules of enormous complexity and obscured the fact that different constructions were subject to similar constraints. In his dissertation, L      $/> :

observed that certain structural configurations function as slands blocking the operation of syntactic rules, since their constituents cannot be extracted and moved to other syntactic positions. One of those syntactic environments immune to extractability is the so-called L  / B  5   which Ross defined as an NP dominating a clausal unit. The behaviour of this environment as a syntactic island can be observed in the following examples (Ross [1967] (1986): 75): (3)

a. 2#D'%%=%%44 %%E( b. ,%42#D'%%=%%44 FFFE (

(4)

a( 2#D0+%/D'%%=%%44 %%E( b. * ,%42#D0+%/D'%%=%%  44 FFFEE (



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As noted by Ross, these sentences differ only in that the sentential object of # is embedded in an NP headed by / in (4a), but not in (3a). This difference must then be connected to the fact that the complement of the verb 4 can be extracted in (3b) but not in the corresponding (4b). A similar situation obtains if the dominated clausal constituent is not a complement but a relative clause, as in example (6a). As relative clauses are necessarily embedded within NPs, extraction appears to be blocked, as shown in (6b) (Ross 1986: 71): (5)

a. 2 D0+%%/%#%%%/E( b. ,/42 D0+%%/%#%FFFE(

(6)

a. 2 D0+%%/%D'44#%%%/EE( b. R,/42 D0+%%/%D'44#%FFEE  (



But it is not only relativization that is impossible out of a complex NP. Questioning elements in this syntactic context also yield ungrammatical sentences, as in (8b): (7)

a. 2#D'%%=%%44 %E( b. G%*#D'%%=%%44 FFFEH

(8)

a. 2#D0+%/D'%%=%%44 %EE( b. *G%*#D0+%/D'%%=%%  44 FFFEEH



Again, a similar paradigm is obtained if we try to question an element within a relative clause modifying a lexical noun: (9)

a 2 D0+%%/%#%+% E( b. G* D0+%%/%#%FFFEH

(10) a. 2 D0+%%/%D'44#%+% EE( b. *G* D0+%%/%D'44#%FFFEEH These facts led Ross to propose the following principle (1986: 76), which he named



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,$/&:0+$% %?$0+$@ No element contained in a sentence dominated by a noun phrase with a lexical head noun may be moved out of that noun phrase by a transformation.

In a number of subsequent publications, Chomsky ([1973] 1977a, 1977b) pursued this line of inquiry. He suggested that the CNPC be derived from a more general principle of '#*, a locality constraint, which had the effect of banning all long distance movements. Roughly, the concept of Subjacency prohibited movement out of a constituent if it meant crossing two bounding (cyclic) categories. The number and syntactic category of the bounding nodes seem to be subject to language variation, but in the case of English, the data suggest that the NP and the Sentence (S) impede syntactic movement. Chomsky (1977b) examines further properties of the rule of whmovement and assumes that the process of topicalization presents essentially the same syntactic features. Thus, it is not possible to topicalize a constituent if that entails a violation of Subjacency, as can be observed in (11): (11) a. *,#52&%D0+% /%D'%%    FFFFEE  This also explains why it is not possible to have both processes at the same time: both extracted constituents must end up in the same syntactic position, resulting in ungrammatical examples such as those in (12b and c): (12) a. 4*%#%/ ( b. R,4/%#4*H c. RG/%#4*%H One of the consequences of identifying NPs as bounding nodes is that leftward wh-movement out of * NP is banned, given the fact that the moved constituent has to cross two bounding nodes (S and NP). This seems to be correct for a great number of examples, such as the ungrammatical extractions in (13):8

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(13) a. b. c.  

$/* % D0+%4 % E( *G D'$/* % D0+%4 FFFFEEH *, 4 D'$/* % D0+%4 FFFFEE & (

However, there are cases which may seem rather problematic. This is the case of so called cture   /  ")@( (14) a. 24&% . b. GD'*D0+&% FFFEEH In order to explain the grammaticality of (14b), Chomsky suggests a reanalysis process in which the PP  is extraposed out of the NP, thus allowing extraction without violating Subjacency (see Bach and Horn 1976 for the underlying reasoning). However, as Chomsky (1977b: 114) himself acknowledges, the conditions on the application of the rule are rather obscure. For example, it does not seem to apply to the verb % *, witness the ungrammaticality of (15b), where the bracketing indicates the resulting structure after the application of the reanalysis rule:9 (15) a. % *&% . b. *GD'% *D0+&% ED++FFFEEH A second source of problems is exemplified with the ungrammatical construction (16b): (16) a. 4)&% % . b. *GD'D0+)&% ED++FFFEEH (Chomsky 1977b: 115; ex. 206) (16b) is ungrammatical, in spite of the fact that, after the application of the reanalysis rule, the moved element only crosses one bounding node. Clearly, an additional explanation is needed to account for these cases; Chomsky proposes the '& '#% $%, which prohibits movement out of structures with an overt constituent in subject position (e.g. ) in (16b)). To summarize so far, we have seen that it is not possible to extract an element from a complex NP, and that the structural machinery introduced in Generative Grammar to account for this fact, the Subjacency condition in particular, leads to banning movement out of any NP. There are two



. :% % /?/&:@0+

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exceptions to this generalization:   !



%   - Consequently, two solutions have been proposed to account for each of them: the reanalysis of nominal PPs as verbal PPs and the Specified Subject Condition.10 In the following section I will present data from a number of languages to defend the view that island constraints cannot be fully accounted for on the basis of configurational restrictions only. This will lead me to propose an alternative analysis in section 4.

3.2. The CNPC in six languages In the generativist tradition long distance displacement is generally formulated in terms of syntactic movement. However, a brief look at (part of) the typological data available seems to suggest that wh-movement and subjacency effects do not necessarily go hand in hand. The existence of island violations in several languages is well-known in the generativist tradition and different authors, both formalists and functionalists, have remarked on the importance of pragmatic factors in arriving at a full understanding of this phenomenon. In what follows I will present some relevant data from a number of languages as well as the most interesting aspects of the theoretical analyses proposed to explain them. A constituent c of a sentence S is dominant in S if and only if the speaker intends to direct the attention of his hearers to the intension of c, by uttering S.

Relative clauses, they claim, are generally used non-dominantly, the dominant part of the sentence being in the matrix clause, which accounts for the impossibility of extracting linguistic material out of them.12 However, the following sentences are grammatical precisely because the relative sentences in them are used dominantly (1979: 55):13 (20) a. %      /    ( That are there many who can like . $  ke that. b. %    /    ( That know I many who can like 03 $  3 - The crucial question, then, is how to establish the circumstances under which relative clauses can be used dominantly. The authors believe that



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this is connected to the low information status of the matrix clause; in their own words, when the matrix functions as an    ' !   rest of the sentence is used dominantly. For example, if the matrix contains an existential operator or if the main verb is semantically neutral, the relative clause becomes dominant and extraction of constituents may be possible. The following examples, in which the matrix predicate sequentially increases its complexity, illustrate the relevance of this factor: (21) a. ?%    & % /      %( That have I asked many who have done 0 % 3!$  %!  - b. *%     %   /      %( That have I made-fun-of many that have done 0 % made fun of many that have done that. c. *%      //   j#%( That house know I a man who has bought 03     #    - A similar paradigm is obtained in the following English examples (1979: 58): (22) a. b. c. 

,%4% %%%  /*&&4( ?,%4% %%24/*&&4( *,%4% %%2// 4%/*&& 4(

As will be shown in section 4.1.2., the nature of the matrix predicate will turn out to be a relevant factor in accounting for the informational properties of extraction processes.  , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b ,, *.% // (+ %22>$/&:  % % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. D0    2001 '%:  %  "&l> "d * -!. Madrid: CE!-



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Erteschik-Shir, Nomi and Shalom Lappin 1979 Dominance and the functional explanation of island phenomena. , %% 6: 4185. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Giv. $ 1984 '*%:> - .%3,*& 2% %( Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Goldberg, Adele E. 2006 $% % % G ( , 0%     %  . Oxford: Oxford University Press. G&-GonzE &4! J# 

2001 , ,/3,& 2% > "  / ". Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Grosu, Alexander 1982 The extragrammatical content of certain  !    - ,3

%% 9: 1767. Haig, John H. 1996 Subjacency and Japanese grammar: a functional account. '%   20: 5392. Hannay, Mike 1991 Pragmatic function assignment and word order variations in a Functional Grammar of English.  + /%16: 131155. Haspelmath, Martin 1999 Explaining article-possessor complementarity: economic motivation in noun phrase syntax.  75-2: 227243. Hawkins John A. 1991 On (in)definite articles: implicatures and (un)grammaticality prediction( % 27-2: 405442. 1999 Processing complexity and filler-gap dependencies across grammars.  75-2: 244285. Hengeveld, Kees 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% ":&  

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.% // 5 5386. Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar J#   G&-GonzE &!>-6 43&"! -'%.3 %  // , 927. (Linguistic Insights 26.) Bern: Peter Lang. 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. Hong, Sun-ho 2003 On island constraints in Korean. In: Gregory K. Iverson and SangCheol Ahn (eds.), 107125. ":& %      %(Seoul: Hankook Publishing Co. Hornstein, Norbert and Amy Weinberg 1995 The Empty Category Principle. In: Gert Webelhuth (ed.),  3 /%  ) , *  % ;/% +  /, 241296. Oxford: Blackwell. Keizer, Evelien this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: An inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Kluender, Robert 1992 Deriving island constraints from principles of predication. In: Helen Goodluck and Michael Rochemont (eds.), 2$% %>, *5 -B%+ 5 223258. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Kuno, Susumu 1987 .%'*%:. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lambrecht, Knud 1994 2 /% '% %   '% . /. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lehmann, Christian 1984   %% > ,*&   '% % 5 ,    .%5/&/  //%. T