The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities: The Case of Italy and Libya

The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities 9780230_249264_01_prexiv.indd i 10/5/2010 11:01:48 AM 9780230_2...

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The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities

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The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities The Case of Italy and Libya

Emanuela Paoletti Researcher, International Migration Institute and Junior Research Fellow, Somerville College, University of Oxford, UK

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© Emanuela Paoletti 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–24926–4 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

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Contents List of Illustrations

viii

List of Acronyms

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

1

1 1 4 8 8 10 11 12 16

Introduction and Methodology 1.1 Setting the scene 1.2 Hypothesis and research questions 1.3 Research methodology 1.3.1 Discourse analysis 1.3.2 Interviews 1.3.3 Data-gathering 1.4 Structure of the book 1.5 Conclusion

Part I 2

3

Theoretical Background and Comparative Analysis

Theoretical Framework 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Why complex interdependence? 2.3 Definition of the key concepts 2.3.1 Political realism 2.3.2 Power in international relations 2.3.3 Externalisation of migration policies 2.3.4 North–South relations and international migration 2.4 Conclusion

19 19 19 21 22 23 28

Comparative Analysis 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Negotiations on migration between the US and selected Central and Latin American countries 3.2.1 Relations between the US and Cuba 3.2.2 Relations between the US and Mexico 3.3 Cooperation on migration between Morocco and Spain 3.4 Cooperation on migration between Turkey and the EU 3.5 Conclusion

35 35

31 34

36 36 40 46 50 54

v

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vi

Contents

Part II

Migration Discourses and Practices in Italy and Libya

4

Italy and Migration 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Data on migration 4.3 Migration discourse in Italy 4.4 Italian migration policies 4.5 Italian migration policies and relations with third countries 4.6 Conclusion

59 59 60 62 68 74 77

5

Libya and Migration 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Migration from Arab countries and related Libya’s policies 5.3 Migration from sub-Saharan Africa and Libya’s related policies 5.4 Refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya 5.5 EU–Libyan relations 5.6 Libya’s official discourse on migration 5.7 Conclusion

79 79 80 85 90 94 97 102

Part III Empirical Analysis of the Bilateral Agreements on Migration 6

Historical Background on the Agreements between Italy and Libya 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Historical background from 1911 to the 1990s 6.3 Joint Communication (1998) 6.4 Memorandum of Intent (2000) 6.5 Berlusconi government (2001–2006) 6.6 Agreements between 2006 and 2008 6.7 Conclusion

7 Joint Measures on Migration 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Centres for irregular migrants funded by Italy in Libya 7.3 Repatriations from Italy to Libya 7.4 Repatriations from Libya to third countries 7.5 Coordinated patrolling 7.6 Provision of equipment 7.7 Training programmes 7.8 Exchange of information 7.9 The role of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 7.10 Push-backs 7.11 Conclusion

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107 107 108 116 119 121 131 137 139 139 139 143 151 152 156 158 159 160 163 165

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Contents vii

Part IV Externalisation of Migration Control Measures and Inter-state Relations 8

9

10

Analysis of Externalisation in the Italian–Libyan Context 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Is Italian–Libyan joint action on migration a manifestation of externalisation? 8.3 How successful has the collaboration on migration been? 8.4 Trade-offs between Italy and Libya 8.5 Conclusion

169 169 169 174 180 183

Implications for International Relations Theory 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Analysis of Italy’s and Libya’s interests 9.3 Cost-benefit analysis with reference to migration 9.4 Power and ideas: The symbolic power of migration 9.5 Analysis of wider power relations through issue-linkage 9.6 Broadening the analysis 9.7 Conclusion

184 184 186 192 196 198 204 206

Conclusion

209

Notes

215

Bibliography

234

Index

295

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Illustrations Tables 5.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 9.1 9.2

Crimes committed by foreign nationals in Libya in 2006 and 2007 Number of foreign nationals returned from Italy to Libya Repatriations from Libya to third countries financed by Italy Data on undocumented migrants deported and arrested in Libya Number of foreign nationals deported from Libya Analysis of ‘stated’ and ‘substantive’ interests of Italy and Libya Cost-benefits analysis in the negotiations on migration

99 146 152 161 179 187 194

Figures 4.1 8.1

Annual migration quotas 1996–2009 Apprehensions of undocumented migrants in Sicily 2000–2009 8.2 Total apprehensions of undocumented migrants in Italy 1998–2009 9.1 Issue-linkages in the broad negotiations

70 176 177 199

viii

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Acronyms AI AIRL ALI AMU AVRR BLM Caritas Censis COMESSA DGCS DHS EC ECRI EMP ENI EP EU ICE IDPs ILO ILO IOM IR IRCA ISTAT JHA LIFG LPRs MOU NAFTA NGO NOC PP

Amnesty International L’Associazione Italiani Rimpatriati dalla Libia, Italian Association for the Italian Exiles from Libya Azienda Libico Italiana, Italian-Libyan Economic Enterprise Arab Maghreb Union Assistance to Voluntary Return and Reintegration (project by IOM) US Border Liaison Mechanism Italian branch of the Italian Episcopal Conference Centre for the Studies of Social Investments Community of Sahel-Saharan States (later renamed as CENSAD) Italian Department for Development Cooperation in the Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry US Department of Homeland Security European Commission European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance European Mediterranean Partnership Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, Italian multinational oil and gas company European Parliament European Union Istituto Commercio Estero, Italian Institute for Foreign Commerce Internally displaced persons Immigration Liaison Officer International Labour Organisation International Organization for Migration International Relations US Immigration Reform and Control Act The Italian National Institute for Statistics EC Directorate for Justice and Home Affairs Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Legal Permanent Residents Memorandum of Understanding North American Free Trade Agreement Non-governmental Organizations Libya’s National Oil Company People’s Party in Spain ix

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x

Acronyms

PSOE SME TRIM UN UNHCR UNSCR US WMD

Socialist Party in Spain Small and Medium Enterprises Transit and Irregular Migration Management (project by IOM) United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Security Council Resolution United States Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Acknowledgements This book was made possible by the tremendous logistical, material and emotional support provided by many people. Researching and writing it was not always easy, and I deeply thank all those who accompanied me on this challenging yet uplifting journey – above all, Dr Matthew Gibney. The very idea of exploring possible trends of reverse North–South power relations was his. Through the process of data-gathering and analysis, as well as the writing, Dr Gibney taught me to ask sharp and counter-intuitive questions. Professor George Joffé from the University of Cambridge also provided valuable advice on the majority of my chapters, and I will never forget his patient and attentive attitude. Many people made the fieldwork possible. As regards interviews with Italian politicians, my former professor of Italian literature, Elena Scaroni, helped me to get in touch with her cousin, Senator Margherita Boniver. Thanks to the kind support of them both, I was subsequently able to meet senior officials at the Italian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior, as well as a former under-secretary at the Foreign Ministry. Likewise, Sister Agnese, a former high-school teacher of my mother at the College Sacro Cuore in Cortina, Italy, was instrumental in helping me arrange the interview a former Italian prime minister; and Father Ciman at the Antonianum in Padova, Italy, where I used to take religion classes at primary school, put me in touch with the ambassador and professor Sergio Romano. I am also thankful to Donatella for hosting me in her house in Rome, and to Floriana for hosting me in Brussels, during my fieldwork. Likewise, in arranging interviews with Libyan authorities, I benefited from the support of many people. To start with, Prof. Adrian Wood suggested that I contact a former professor of mine at the London School of Economics, Professor Robert Wade, who put me in touch with the former supervisor of Saif al Islam Qaddafi, Professor Nancy Cartwright. Thanks to both these academics, I was able to meet Saif Al Islam, who recommended me to one representative at the Qaddafi Foundation. The latter was immensely patient, and helped me arrange meetings with officials at the Libyan Ministry of the Interior and with police officers. In Libya, my research would have never been possible without the support of Dr Milad Saad Milad at the Academy of Graduate Studies in Tripoli. I am deeply grateful to Professor Vandewalle despite the fact that he did not know me, when I first spoke with him on the phone he provided unique help and gave me the contact of Dr Milad. The latter provided invaluable support throughout my repeated stays in Libya. Dr Milad was also exceptionally supportive and arranged some interviews with high-ranking government officials. Through Dr Milad, I met his xi

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Acknowledgements

secretary, Emma, who, with her ever-warm attitude, never failed to help me. Dr Milad also helped me find a place to stay during my third visit to Libya. Indeed, it was because of him that I met Maddalena and the Zeituni family, who hosted me in May 2008. Spending time with them was a truly eyeopening experience. Nobody has been more welcoming to me than they were, or made me feel as at home as they did. Sharing every moment of my day with them allowed me to discover a new perspective on life, where love and helping each other come before anything else. The same applies to my Libyan teacher, Naima, to whom I was introduced by Claudia Gazzini, currently post-doctoral fellow at the European University Institute. For the purpose of learning Arabic, I would have daily classes with Naima, who ended up acting as a patient, wise and forward-thinking mum. She rejoiced with me in the moments in which the research was proceeding well, and comforted me in the frequent times of distress and total disorientation. Without her enlightened and tenderly advice I would have never been able to cope with the challenges that life in Libya posed at the time. Other people whom I ought to mention for their help in Libya are Abdulla Habib Amman, Saad Elshelmani, Horacio Calderón, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Laurence Hart, Osama Koshadh, Fituri Budor, Kadhim Hashim Niama and Osama El Sedik. I remain also profoundly grateful for the support of Abdul Monem Alaiwan formerly at the Qaddafi Foundation. The process of writing and editing the manuscript was greatly facilitated in various respects by a number of other people. Paolo Cuttitta, Sijla Klepp, Bruce St John, Jean Pierre Cassarino, Hein de Haas, Rodney Hall, Stephen Castles, Mark Miller and Ferruccio Pastore occasionally read some early drafts and/or provided tremendously useful feedback. The same applies to Alex Betts who read a number of drafts and has always been a source of new ideas. Meeting and sharing ideas with them all was a real honour and pleasure to me. I also sincerely appreciated the help of Andrew Baldwin, also at St. Antony’s, who edited the manuscripts in a phenomenally timely and efficient way. Special thanks also go to Nick Van Hear and Andrew Geddes for their thoughtful and constructive comments. The process of writing was also made possible by the generous grants that I received by St. Antony’s College, the ORENGA Fund and the Oxford Department of International Development. My research was also made possible by the enormous support of either former professors or colleagues of mine who never turned away from the tedious task of writing reference letters, i.e. Mike Foley, Joerg Friedrichs, Barbara Harrell-Bond, Kenneth Booth, Michael Cox, Bridget Anderson and Jay Dyer. I also ought to thank St. Antony’s College; spending endless days and nights in the Gulbenkian room surrounded by dear and inspiring friends was a unique experience. These include Anne, Adam, Lisa, Nicola, Nahid, Magda, Atef, Daniel and Liz. I am equally grateful to Somerville College, the Refugee Studies Centre and the International Migration Institute at Oxford that supported me during the last months

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before the submission of the manuscript. The same is true for Italian friends at Oxford: Paolo, Salvo, Pegah, Iginio, Andrea and Giovanni. Above all, this research would have not been possible without the infinite love of my parents, Antonia and Maurizio, and of my sister, Giulia. They followed me in every single step of this process, with the deep conviction that I could make it. The fact that they always believed in what I was doing, despite my being often very negative and pessimistic, was the sine qua non of the whole project. I have no doubt that, without their love and support, I would have never been able to start and to complete it. The same debt is owed to my dearest friend Eli and her unyielding friendship. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my grandparents, Nonno Paolo and Nonna Emanuela. There are no words in this world that will convey sufficiently my love, admiration and gratitude to them. They have always been and will always be my role-models. Their curiosity, kindness and generosity, coupled with their consistently positive attitude towards life, are a source of continuing inspiration.

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1 Introduction and Methodology

1.1

Setting the scene

Over the last two decades, migration1 has become a salient international issue. Until the second half of the 1970s, migration policy was treated as a secondary aspect of the political debate in most European countries, and management of migration was dealt with mainly through domestic administrative measures. Since the 1980s, however, migration has been receiving considerable attention from the media, the public and politicians. As Castles and Miller (2003) have eloquently argued, we are now living in ‘the age of migration’. Although throughout history population movements have always accompanied demographic growth, technological change, political conflict and warfare, international migration ‘has never been as pervasive nor as socio-economically and politically significant as it is today’ (Castles and Miller, 1993: 260). The hallmark of the age of migration is its global character. It affects more and more countries and regions, and has linkages with complex processes affecting the entire world (Castles and Miller, 1993: 260). It is clear that human mobility has become an integral component of the global economy (Global Commission on International Migration, 2005). Globalisation, together with advances in communications and transportation, has increased the number of people with the desire and the capacity to move to other places.2 In 2009, the number of international migrants was greater than at any time in history, with 214 million people living outside their country of birth, 3.1 per cent of the world’s population (United Nations, 2009). The equivalent figure in 1960 amounted to 75 million persons, or 2.5 per cent of the world’s population (United Nations, 2006a). Statistics also show that those moving ‘South-to-South’ are about as numerous as those moving ‘South-to-North’ (United Nations, 2006b). Additionally, in recent years forced displacement has grown in complexity and scale. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2009 the total population of concern to UNHCR amounted to 34 million (UNHCR, 2009b). Despite the 1

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actual volume of international migration, which is actually not so different from certain periods in the twentieth century (Sørensen et al., 2003: 7), the real significance of the current changes lies in the increase in the magnitude, density, velocity and diversity of global connections that transcend state boundaries (Sørensen et al., 2003: 6). In broad terms, there is a growing awareness that migration is not a zerosum game. In the best cases, it benefits the receiving country, the country of origin and migrants themselves (United Nations, 2006b). Migration may have a strong and positive impact on development. For example, it is widely accepted that migrant diasporas ‘are engaged in transnational practices with direct effects on aid and development’ (Sørensen et al., 2002). Remittances improve human capital in the developing world by increasing family incomes, helping to defray education and health costs (United Nations, 2006b). Similarly, from the vantage point of industrialised countries, the structural needs arising from economic, demographic and social trends have made migration a vital ingredient of their development as well.3 Yet the prevailing political discourse across European countries sees migration as a problem, requiring a restrictive response. Indeed, migration is now commonly viewed as a key international security issue. The putative ‘global migration crisis’ (Castles, 2004; Weiner, 1995; Zolberg, 2001) has become one of the main areas in which Western societies express their anxieties and fears about the negative effects of the process of ‘globalisation’ (Bonifazi, 2000).4 Accordingly, states have responded in a variety of ways to deal with migration pressures and control borders.5 At the policy level, a wide range of measures has been formulated to either prevent migrants6 from reaching Europe, or to deter them from settling in their selected destination country (Gibney, 2004b). Evolving perceptions of migration have triggered new border control practices, which profoundly influence relations between countries. Against this backdrop, this book centres on the concepts of the border and of power relations amongst states. In order to introduce my main argument, let me define these two ideas and consider how they interrelate. The concept of the border is closely linked to that of sovereignty, which is defined as the prerogative to rule within a defined territory (De Jouvenel, 1957; Gerth and Mills 1958). Especially since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the state has considered control over borders as the constitutive attribute and sine qua non of its sovereign power (Weiner, 1985). By virtue of its ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1964), the decisions on who may enter and who may become citizens lie with the exclusive authority of the state (Weiner, 1985). As part of this logic, the migration regime of Western industrialised nations was born of a realist policy (Hollifield, 1992b), with borders expected to demark the contours of the security as well as political and economic agendas.

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Introduction and Methodology

3

The recent securitisation of migration policy across the European Union (EU)7 (Caviedes, 2004) – on which I will expand below – further reifies the dichotomous normative assumptions attached to the institution of the frontier. The increasing concern of states with protecting their territories from the threats allegedly posed by terrorism and migration has triggered a ‘fixation with secure borders’ (Caviedes, 2004), epitomised in concerns over Europe’s external frontiers. At the same time, the heightened security concerns over migration policies are rooted in the notion of territorial space as divided into ‘fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion’ (Ruggie, 1993: 144–51). The national control logic exercised within supposedly clear territorial boundaries and the presumed ‘natural’ dichotomy between citizens and aliens and between domestic and foreign domains form a major focus of this book. However, the competencies of the state with regard to border management are highly contentious (Cassarino 2006a).8 There is now fierce debate on whether the state is an analytically relevant unit of analysis and whether its authority translates into effective action to enforce control. With regard to the first point, the new ‘globalist orthodoxy’ (Weiss, 1997) contends that greater openness, in terms of trade, finance and flow of information, has rendered the notion of space and, by implication, state authority over a bounded territory increasingly irrelevant (Strange, 1995, 1996). For example, Soysal (1966) argues that the local and the global have swallowed the national. In her view, the emerging concept of post-national membership challenges national fixities and accounts for fluid confines and multiple borders (Soysal, 1996). A clear manifestation of this reconfiguration is the gradual relocation of various components of state authority to either supranational organisations or private actors (Sassen, 1998). Arguably, the influence of international organisations such as the EU and multinational corporations in framing the international agenda evinces a more general ‘retreat of the state’ (Strange, 1996). Because of deepening transnational mobility characterising the ‘era of globalisation’, the state is now considered to be ‘hollow and ‘defective’ (Strange, 1995). On these grounds, the analytical relevance of national borders has been questioned. The reconceptualisation of the state’s territoriality invites reflection on the actual capacity of states to enforce entry and exit rules. As Castles observes, the more states and supranational bodies do to restrict and manage migration, the less successful they seem to be (Castles, 2004: 205). Likewise, according to the ‘gap hypothesis’ elaborated by Cornelius and Hollifield (1994), ‘significant and persistent gaps exist between official migration policies and actual policy outcomes’ (Cornelius and Hollifield, 1994: 4). As they further emphasise, ‘it is an empirical fact that few labor importing countries have migration control policies that are perfectly implemented or do not result in unintended consequences’ (Cornelius and Hollifield, 1994: 4). Simply put, states are either unwilling or unable to prevent some irregular entry.9 From

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this empirical perspective, border control measures and the related restrictive language of states are not reflected in what occurs on the ground. These observations raise numerous questions on the meaning and scope of borders and state actions and expose an apparent paradox. The process of boundary construction in the form of restrictive policy measures and national(ist) narratives takes place alongside, and is fuelled by, the blurring of the analytical distinctions between ‘the inside’ and ‘the outside’ (Gibney, 2003; Soysal 1996: 24). Rising levels of cross-border mobility seem to coexist with trends consolidating the state authority over its frontiers. In this book, I take the view that a thorough appreciation of contemporary migration control practices by states needs to take into account these highly differentiated dynamics. In particular, I consider how such ‘contradictory propensities’ (Soysal 1996: 24) impact upon interaction between states and the way in which power is distributed. State decisions on border control are important variables, which influence not only the magnitude, characteristics and directionality of international migration, but also relations between states (Weiner, 1985). The aforementioned paradoxes in border control rules can affect the patterns of international conflict and cooperation10 between nations (Weiner, 1985). There is an important literature on ‘the irreducible political element’ characterising international migration (Zolberg, 1989: 405). In 1989, Zolberg emphasised that ‘it is precisely the control which states exercise over borders that defines international migration as a distinctive social process’ (Zolberg, 1989: 405). In other words, state practices on borders are among the main determinants of migrant movements. As a result, the manner in which states frame their access and exit norms has an impact on the behaviour of other states. In particular, migration policies and corresponding movements are the cause as well as the result of power asymmetries among countries. As Zolberg put it, ‘it is now well understood’ that, ‘in a world characterised by widely varying conditions, international borders serve to maintain global inequality’ (Zolberg, 1989: 406). In the late 1980s, he predicted that the future shape of international migration would depend in large part on how entry and exit doors would be manipulated by countries (Zolberg, 1989: 406). He conjectured that a rise in ‘North–South’ tensions over the issue of migration would lead poorer states to demand more equitable economic and political arrangements within the ‘new international order’ (Zolberg, 1989: 423). Accordingly, this book assesses the consequences of emerging practices of border control for inequalities between states. I consider how the entry and exit policies of states shape international relations and vice versa (Weiner, 1985: 122).

1.2 Hypothesis and research questions To ground this larger discussion of border and inter-state power relations, I will focus on two major issues: the practice of states to shift border control

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policies outside their territory, and the evolving patterns of North–South interaction in the area of migration. According to some commentators, the use by EU member states of extraterritorial control measures to tackle migration is an example of the broader phenomenon of externalisation, whereby the place where the control of travellers occurs moves from the border of the sovereign state into which the individual is seeking to enter to within the state of origin (Boswell, 2003; Geddes, 2000, 2005b; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2006). The techniques – to be defined below – that states use to prevent potential immigrants from accessing their territory include, inter alia, visa controls (EC, 2005a; Gibney 2004b), pre-inspection agreements (Council, 2004a) and ‘safe third country’ measures (UNHCR, 2001). In an effort to reduce the number of persons entering irregularly, EU countries are delocalising frontiers to create new borders outside of their territory (Bigo and Guild 2005; Lavenex and Ucarer 2002; Lutterbeck, 2006). Overall, these so-called ‘policing at distance’ (Bigo, 1998) measures envisaged by the Schengen regime (EC, 2005c) affect the practices of inter-state cooperation. In the process of expanding borders, the interaction between migrant-sending and receiving countries is undergoing profound changes. This observation provides the context for this research. It is therefore instructive to briefly review the scholarly debate on the matter. The discussion on migration has been dominated by the view that EU migration policies reinforce North–South11 (Brown, 2001) disparities by shifting the responsibility for providing assistance, and hosting migrants, to the latter.12 It is assumed that these so-called ‘burden-shifting’ strategies leave migrant-sending countries powerless. Accordingly, third countries13 are perceived to be under pressure from the EU to adopt a range of restrictive migration policies. As Claire Rodier points out: Countries of northern Africa are persuaded, under pressure from the EU, to introduce control measures at their own borders to prevent nationals from their neighbours in Black Africa entering, despite the fact that they could enter freely before that. As a consequence, it is worrying today to see the Union structuring its relations with third countries in line with a logic whose, often devastating, effects can be measured. (Rodier, 2006: 4) Similarly, with specific reference to Libya, Human Rights Watch notes: Pressure from the European Union that Libya should stem the flow of migrants transiting its territory has contributed to an all-out retreat from Libya’s previous open door policy for foreigners. The Libyan government has toughened its border controls and in recent years has implemented a plan to arrest and forcibly return tens of thousands of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. (Human Rights Watch, 2006b)

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Yet, contrary dynamics, whereby the migrant-sending country is capable of manipulating the migrant-receiving one as a way to advance its own agenda, have been overlooked. Accordingly, the central hypothesis of this research is that the North’s exclusionary border management practices provide the South with a greater degree of bargaining power across a number of different issues. Said practices of border control and, more specifically, of externalisation affect the way in which the North–South bargaining process is conducted, and provide Southern countries with tools for leverage in the other matters that are on the negotiating table. International migration and evolving interdependence amongst countries are reconfiguring traditional understandings of power relations. Building on the aforementioned discussion on borders and state interaction, I apply International Relations (IR) theory to the study of the externalisation of frontiers and North–South cooperation. These concepts will be put to the test by examining the case of Italian–Libyan14 negotiations on migration and, to a lesser extent, other cases of bilateral agreements on migration in the Mediterranean context and between the United States, Mexico and Cuba. I defend the relevance of the Italian–Libyan case study and the reasons for its selection below. For now, let me clarify the three sets of questions at the centre of this research. 1. First, I explore Italian–Libyan cooperation over the last ten years. How has the migration discourse being constructed in both countries? What linkage can be drawn between the official rhetoric on migration and the policies implemented? What do the selected bilateral agreements15 on migration involve? What joint measures to tackle migration have been implemented? 2. Second, I focus on the putative externalisation of migration control measures in Libya. Can ongoing cooperation with Italy be defined as an example of externalisation? If so, does externalisation increase the overall bargaining power of Libya vis-à-vis Italy? If not, in the negotiations on migration, which factors determine the bargaining position of one country towards the other? 3. Third, I propose an analysis of the agreements on migration through the lens of IR theory and, in particular, the concept of interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Which country has benefited more from bilateral collaboration on migration? How does migration relate to other issues on the agenda? What does this teach us in terms of the impact of migration on state interdependence and power relations? More specifically, how do externalisation and the securitised migration discourse affect the bargaining position of each country? Does migration call for a substantial redefinition of the North–South framework? The limited focus on state actors and, in particular, on Italian–Libyan interaction requires justification. In this book, I concentrate on states, as

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opposed to non-state actors. Some scholars believe that the exclusive focus on states is misguided (Bigo, 2006). According to this view, nation states are no longer in the ascendant, and state power has been reconfigured by the growing influence of non-state and non-territorial relations of global governance (Rosenau, 2005). Migration flows and policy responses are a ‘post-state’ phenomenon located in an international setting characterised by a variety of non-state actors (Hamilton, 1997). Crucially, interdependence theory cautions against a single-actor approach. Indeed, as I further explain below, one of its major contributions rests on the recognition of the variety of actors influencing international affairs. For example, the EU has played a central role in the definition and redefinition of the conception of borders (Geddes, 2000). The Europeanisation of migration and the emergent institutionalisation of common extraterritorial frontiers (Geddes, 2000) have deeply affected individual EU member states’ approach to migration. By contrast, I take the view that states remain influential actors in the international agreements on migration (Castles, 2000; Weiss, 1997). For example, in the Mediterranean context state bilateral relations have prevailed over multilateral ones (Collinson, 1996; Pugh, 2001). In specie, my narrow focus is based on an appreciation that, in the negotiations between Italy and Libya, the EU and other non-state actors have not played a decisive role. Whereas the EU has recently initiated a discussion with Libya, the joint actions on migration have been undertaken primarily at the bilateral level. Hence, the core of the empirical and analytical chapter will centre on bilateral interactions. I will nevertheless devote some attention to the role of the EU, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Frontex, the EU external border agency. Before turning to the methodology, it is important to keep in mind the broad landscape in which this book is situated and ask why does it all matter? First and foremost, there is an absence of literature on IR and current migration policies in the Mediterranean. This has led to the neglect of important questions of how power and interests shape the inter-state politics of migration. More than that, controversial positions such as the speculation on ‘reversed’ power relations have remained at the margin of the academic debate. This book examines those issues through an in-depth case study of one of the most high-profile and controversial cases of international cooperation on migration, that between Libya and Italy. From a comparative perspective, the agreements between Italy and Libya are a pioneering and relatively advanced example of cooperation on migration in the European context. As I explore in Chapter 3, other European countries, such as Spain and Greece, are replicating, although with marked differences, the cooperation that Italy has undertaken with Libya. Moreover, beyond the issue of migration, a scrupulous investigation of Libya can benefit the wider audience. After protracted isolation, Libya remains largely

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unknown. Yet it is expected to emerge as a significant strategic player in the international milieu in years to come. More specifically, virtually no in-depth academic research on the Italian– Libyan agreements has been conducted thus far on the basis of direct field research. Only two non-academic pieces of work on migration, by the EC (2005d) and Human Rights Watch (2006a), are supported by direct fieldwork in Libya. Furthermore, the few academic studies on Libyan–Italian relations on migration are not based on primary resources collected in Libya (Andrijasevic, 2006; Cuttitta, 2006; Pastore, 2008). This gap is attributable to both the recent nature of the negotiations on migration and the difficulty in conducting research in Libya. Hence this empirical and work on the bilateral cooperation offers a unique contribution to the debate on migration in the Mediterranean. I do not intend, however, to provide final policy prescriptions. In fact some limitations apply, and need to be borne in mind. Libya is an anomalous case because of its considerable economic resources, a political system that is sui generis, and its strategic geo-political location. Its uniqueness also stems from the fact that most of the migrants reaching Italy from Libya are foreign nationals, and that few Libyans migrate through undocumented channels.16 These realities alert us to the boundaries of this case that differs from other bilateral agreements on migration and of any general conclusions that I seek to draw on North–South power relations. Accordingly, the comparative analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 9 will serve to establish the broader dynamics whereby migration challenges and redefines patterns of reciprocity among states.

1.3 1.3.1

Research methodology Discourse analysis

This research is based on a qualitative methodological approach.17 The resources that I utilised include elite interviews, the collection of formal policy documentation, media information and secondary academic material. A multiple date source has enabled me to attain a fuller understanding of the topic. To ensure a thorough quality-check of the data, I engaged in extensive cross-referencing. This technique alerted me to the reliability of the sources by establishing accuracy, identifying possible errors and corroborating previous information. In the Italian and Libyan contexts, where primary and secondary resources on the agreements on migration are sketchy and unreliable, the exercise of determining the accuracy of the data proved to be of critical importance. In fact, the discrepancies identified in both the Italian and Libyan sources made the incongruence between the public discourse and actual policy actions more visible. The analysis of the other cases, however, is based primarily on secondary resources. The examination of the official statements and the policy decisions of Italian and Libyan authorities was based on the insights of discourse analysis.

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In mainstream linguistics, the dominant definition of discourse focuses on the interpretation of units of spoken or written language. The emphasis is on the analysis of texts. In particular, from the perspective of ‘critical discourse analysis’ the main concern is to comprehend the role played by language in producing power relations and social and political identities. In order to study the linkage between language and the social and political contexts, this approach reflects on the symbolic representations of the written and spoken word (Chadwick, 2000: 284). Notable postmodern critical thinkers such as Jacques Derrida (1978) and Michel Foucault (1971) have formulated their own techniques for conducting discourse analysis. This approach has also been widely elaborated with reference to security. For instance, Ole Wæver from the Copenhagen school argues that security is no longer tied exclusively to the military sector and has become increasingly centred on threats to ‘society’, understood as the ‘dominant identity collectivity’ (Gammeltoft, 2005: 15; Wæver et al., 1993: 2 and 18). Inspired by the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the Copenhagen school considers societal identities as discursive and symbolic constructions. To study them uses techniques such as speech acts (Gammeltoft, 2005: 15; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Without denying their relevance, a review of these arguments goes beyond the scope of this research.18 In the following chapters I will not apply discourse analysis in a systematic manner. Instead, I propose a simple working definition of discourse as the sum of ideas articulated and debated in the public arena (Chadwick, 2000: 289). Since it is embedded in political, social and historical contexts, I will look at how a discourse conflates a wide range of different voices. To explore the multifaceted nature of the migration discourses in Libya, Italy and the EU, I concentrate on three dimensions: public opinion, media, and the official position19 of the Libyan and Italian governments and of the EU. Yet, given the lack of independent media and consistent information on public opinion in Libya, the analysis will be limited to the official position of the Libyan regime. This is based on interviews with elite members that I conducted in Libya. The understanding of the official discourse turned out to be instructive, for two reasons. First, the Italian authorities provided a different account of their official position from that elaborated by Libyan officials. Moreover, some significant discrepancies were also identified between different interlocutors within or across ministries of the same country. As Pargeter documents, ‘in Italy, it appears that many officials are not familiar with their counterparts in other departments or ministries who are dealing with the same regions or issues’ (Pargeter, 2001: 7–8). For instance, I was given diverging justifications for the informality of the migration agreements. In fact, interviewees provided contradictory responses on the existence of the readmission agreements. It also emerged that the politicians who have been primarily involved in the discussions had either forgotten or retained a misleading memory of the facts.20 The reality

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that the primary actors do not have a full and precise picture of the events alerts us to the partial reliability of the information provided by those officials whom I interviewed. It also illustrates the complex manner in which discourses are constructed. The comparison between the public discourse and the actual policy actions builds upon the work of Huysmans, examining, inter alia, the nexus between the securitised construction of migration in the European context and policy implementation (Huysmans, 2000, 2004). This analytical framework directs attention to the possible double agenda, and helps detect potential incongruities between policy formulation and implementation. For this reason, in Chapter 9 I will make a distinction between ‘stated’ and ‘real’ interests. 1.3.2

Interviews

Let me now comment on the interview methods that I employed, and on the problems posed by the media as a basis for academic research. I conducted over 70 interviews with members of the Italian and Libyan governments who had been involved in the bilateral discussions, Libyan police officers, European officials (especially from the Directorate-General of Justice and Home Affairs), journalists who had researched the topic, as well as selected representatives of non-governmental organisations that have taken an active stance on the Italian–Libyan migration agreements. I lived in Libya, on an intermittent basis, for over four months, making seven trips there between January 2007 and January 2010. During each of the first three trips I was based in Tripoli for one month, while the other two trips lasted one week each. I also spent one month in Rome between June 2006 and December 2007, and one week in Brussels in July 2007 to conduct other elite interviews. The selection of the interviewees was based on their role in the negotiations. The setting up of the meetings was done through both formal and personal channels. In Libya, I benefited from the fact that I was based at the Academy of Graduate Studies (hereafter, the Academy). The other interviews with Libyan officials were made possible through personal channels, distinct from those made available by the Academy and colleagues in British universities. Similarly, the interviews with former Italian ministers and prime ministers, were facilitated by personal acquaintances. Overall, in both the Libyan and Italian contexts, personal contacts built over time greatly facilitated the process of arranging the interviews and gave access to resources not directly available to the public. Elite interviews were based on the semi-structured21 method. By placing open, non-direct questions throughout the schedule, interviewees were given the opportunity to contribute their own perspectives and concerns. The design of the questions depended on the role of each interviewee in the negotiation process. In most cases, I started the interview by inviting my

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interlocutor to explain his/her involvement with, and share his/her opinion on, the cooperation on migration. As anticipated, the majority of the governmental representatives limited their observations to the rhetorical position of their respective country. Presumably, the sensitive nature of the topic explains their reluctance to share substantive information. In stark contrast to the climate of unease that I encountered while interviewing Italian officials in Rome,22 in Libya I was unexpectedly given access to valuable resources. For example, I was invited to visit one reception centre for migrants in Tripoli23 and provided with internal documents by the Libyan Ministries of the Interior and Justice, despite having neither foreseen nor demanded to visit any detention centre or to obtain written ‘official’ documents.24 Despite this responsive disposition, Italian and Libyan authorities alike offered an account that rarely deviated from the official ‘narrative’. In Chapters 4 and 5, the official public discourses of both countries will be investigated in greater detail. Most of the representatives from both the Italian and Libyan sides consented to the interviews on conditions either of anonymity or of being consulted prior the publication of any document containing their quotations. Accordingly, all the citations in the book are kept anonymous. Furthermore, it should be noted that most of my interlocutors in Libya were interviewed twice. This not only allowed me to compare information over a period of time, but positively affected the relationship of trust between myself and the interviewees and, by implication, the depth of information provided. 1.3.3

Data-gathering

In the process of data-gathering, I was faced with a general absence of clear and direct channels of information concerning the agreements on migration, coupled with the reluctance of most of the interviewees to disclose details of the action implemented. This owes chiefly to the facts that most of the bilateral diplomatic exchanges have taken place behind closed doors, that none of the technical agreements have been publicly disclosed, and, by implication, that the scope of Italian action in Libya remains highly contested. For these reasons, a large part of the analytical exercise consisted in reading between the lines. The chapters in Parts III and IV will make explicit how I sought to question the rhetorical accounts to which I was exposed. In terms of language, the research benefited from the fact that Italian is my mother tongue and that I have a basic knowledge of Modern Standard Arabic. While in Italy most of the interviews were in Italian, in Libya I could ordinarily conduct the interviews in English. In the few cases in which the interviewee did not speak English, I either relied on a translator, who was a Libyan police officer, or employed my limited Arabic skills. For obvious reasons, in these cases the information collected was subjected thereafter to extra scrutiny and cross-checking.25 My research also relied on documents in English, Italian and Arabic. Unless otherwise specified, the texts

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in Italian and Arabic were translated into English by myself. The latter were subsequently edited by a mother-tongue teacher. For the comparative analysis in chapter I instead employed secondary academic resources, media news and official documents available online. Although my main focus is on government relations, I also conducted informal interviews with migrants in Libya. Through the support of the Roman Catholic Church in Tripoli, I was introduced to migrants from Somalia and Cameroon. On two separate occasions in January 2007, I was taken to their ‘houses’ on the suburbs of Tripoli and spent a few hours with them talking about their experiences in Libya. The talks were partly mediated by a migrant from Cameroon whom I knew through the Church. Most of our conversation covered their difficulties in living in the country, their time spent in Libyan prisons, their relations with IOM, and their aspirations to either return home or go to Europe. At this point, a clarification on the employment of media sources is de rigueur. A substantial part of this research is based on media. Handled with caution, nearly one decade’s worth of detailed reporting on the bilateral agreements on migration represents material of significant relevance. Some journalists26 have worked regularly on this topic, and their experiences contribute to the quality of their coverage. The value of the media sources derives from the systematic documentation of empirical data over an extended period of time, the information having been uncovered through investigative journalism and the recounting of contrasting perspectives.27 Despite the occasional lack of quality, these sources attest a contested and differentiated political and social scenario that adds depth to my enquiry. Therefore, while one must exercise critical acumen in evaluating its reliability, the media can be nonetheless instrumental in gaining a non-academic and long-term perspective.

1.4

Structure of the book

This book is divided into four parts. The first, which sets out the theoretical and comparative bases, comprises two chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the theoretical framework. It presents contending definitions of power, externalisation, and North–South power relations from the viewpoint of migration. This theoretical makes explicit the assumptions and limits of the terminology to be used throughout the book. In considering power and migration outside the narrow remit of international relations, it singles out the analytical framework which sustains the argument of the ensuring chapters. Second, to remedy the shortcomings of a single case study, I survey four bilateral negotiations on migration. Specifically, I analyse the work of a number of authors on the extent to which migration challenges the classical reading of North–South power dynamics. Attention will be given to

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the relations between the United States (US) and Mexico, the US and Cuba, Spain and Morocco, and the EU and Turkey. By exposing different empirical claims on migration, I will be able to contextualise the conclusions that I will draw from the Italian–Libyan cooperation. In short, this comparative analysis confirms the assumption that migration provides a ‘bargaining chip’ for migrant-sending states in their bilateral negotiations with the migrant-receiving states. In cases involving a de-territorial dimension, the first group has been able to exert pressure on the second and has succeeded in dictating the course of the negotiations relative to the other issues on the negotiating table. The stronger the fears associated with migration in the Northern countries, the more successful the migration-related tactics of the Southern countries are. The second part elaborates the empirical and descriptive groundings on which my research builds, and includes two chapters. Chapter 4 dwells on migration policies in Italy. Since this topic has already received ample attention in both the academic and non-academic literature, I do not devote excessive space to it there. Instead, I consider the Italian institutional migration framework and the migration discourse that has been constructed in the domestic arena. I will argue that migration has been increasingly defined as a societal threat, and that the emerging securitised migration discourse has influenced the functioning of Italian institutions (Huysmans, 2000: 751). This empirical account serves as a necessary background to the examination of the Italian–Libyan migration agreements and their implications in terms of power relations. In Chapter 5, attention is devoted to migration in Libya. Because of the limited academic discussion of this issue, a thorough investigation based on primary and secondary resources represents, I hope, a unique contribution to the literature on migration trends and policies in the Mediterranean. On the basis of interviews with Libyan officials, documents furnished by Libyan authorities and other sources,28 I illustrate migration patterns to and through Libya, its migration policies, the security dimension, and its relations with the EU. The critical point here is that, like Italy, the emerging Libyan political discourse treats migration as a key security issue. However, I will emphasise that, in addressing this perceived threat, the Libyan position has been characterised by profound contradictions due to conflicting motivations. I will also contend that Libya has made instrumental use of migration to improve its bargaining position towards neighbouring countries in Africa. Libya has been keen to exaggerate the securitised construction of migration and has indirectly encouraged undocumented flows through the country in order to influence the course and pace of the negotiations. The analysis of the migration dynamics in Italy and Libya, and of EU relations with Libya, establishes the framework for Part III, which is made up of two chapters concerned with the Italian–Libyan bilateral agreements on migration. In Chapter 6, after a brief historical account of bilateral relations

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since the late 1960s, I set out the chronology and content of the formal and informal agreements. Following on from this, in Chapter 7 I detail the joint measures implemented by Libya and Italy to tackle undocumented migrant flows. By relying on up-to-date and primary material, this chapter seeks to enlarge and deepen the level of understanding on Italian–Libyan relations, which have, so far, remained at the periphery of the academic research. Building upon the above empirical excursus, Part IV confronts the emerging trends of border expansion and power relations. In particular, with regard to the externalisation of border control policies, in Chapter 8 I formulate three arguments. First, the academic discussion on externalisation applied to the Italian– Libyan case is deceptive. The de-territorial action of Italy towards Libya is sui generis, since it defies the standard criteria of externalisation provided in the literature. For example, the much-cited example of the presumed asylum processing-centres built by Italians in Libya (Del Boca, 2006; Rodier, 2006: 8–9) is unfounded. The centres, the existence of which has been confirmed by both Italian and Libyan authorities, were not intended to process asylum requests but to host migrants. More crucially, the two countries have recently agreed to use them for police training and humanitarian assistance instead. In addition, far from transferring to Libya the responsibility for managing migration, the increasing Italian activity in Libya appears to have had the opposite result; i.e. Italian authorities are increasingly involved with migration-related issues and assuming new duties. Second, the Italian de-localising strategy in Libya appears to have failed. In broad political terms, Italy has not been able to involve Libya as fully as it might have wished in its ‘struggle’ against undocumented migration. Italy is dependent on its counterpart for the successful implementation of their joint measures. Moreover, bilateral cooperation has failed to reduce undocumented arrivals to Sicily significantly. Indeed, unauthorised arrivals to Sicily are in the ascendancy in relative terms (i.e. compared to previous yearly totals). Nevertheless they are negligible in absolute terms (i.e. compared to the overall irregular migrant population in Italy). Accordingly, I suggest that in the selected case study the notion of externalisation has become devoid of meaning since it does not subscribe to the standard definition of externalisation provided in the literatures. For this reason, I will rename Italian–Libyan relations as ‘de-territorial cooperation on migration’. In contrast to ‘externalisationist’ assumptions of the inequalities of state power relations in framing migration policies, the concept of ‘de-territorial cooperation on migration’ renders more accurately the complex reciprocal manner in which security discourses and related practices are moulded by the migrant-sending and receiving country alike. Novel trends in border control policies evince the gradual erosion of the presumed advantage of the second and the diffusion of power among a greater circle of states (Buzan et al., 1998).

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The third argument acts as a bridge to the analysis in Chapter 9, and I argue that, in the broader bilateral relations, neither ‘de-territorial cooperation on migration’ per se, nor the actual migrant flows, significantly affect the bilateral bargaining dynamics. Rather, the decisive factor in the bargaining patterns is the securitised discourse of migration. This argument leads back to the initial hypothesis as to whether the migrant-sending country is in a position to manipulate migration-related issues for its own purposes. This is the question that underpins the next chapter. By concentrating on the third set of questions illustrated above, Chapter 9 examines the selected bilateral actions mainly from the IR perspective. It draws together the threads of the previous chapters and endows them with more theoretical content. In so doing, I argue that the case studies partially uphold realist views of power. In the Italian–Libyan case this conclusion is based on two considerations. First, the Italian–Libyan case and the comparative analysis show that migration has acquired substantive symbolic power in the domestic and international agenda. The securitised migration discourse has been employed by Libya to exert pressure on Italy. Many scholars, and a diverse range of evidence, speak loudly of the role that the Libyan regime plays in somewhat facilitating flows of unwanted migrants to Italy, so as to extract concessions. By contrast with my initial hypothesis, externalisation does not significantly affect the bargaining power of either state. Instead, it is the framing of migration as a security issue that furnishes a critical power asset to Libya vis-à-vis Italy. Discourses on migration represent a source of leverage. In part, this view challenges the realist conception of hard power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55–6). Second, Libya has been capable of utilising migration as a bargaining chip because of its economic capabilities. The issue-linkages analysis indicates that oil and gas resources and historical Italian–Libyan business relations strengthen Libya’s bargaining position. The Libyan authorities are aware that Italy places great importance on these economic linkages and that, consequently, the Italian tolerance threshold towards Libya is high. This provides Libya with a lever that can be applied on a wide range of other issues on the agenda. Without such economic preconditions, it is doubtful whether migration could exert such a powerful lever on Italy. The striking point here is that the unique political and economic setting of Libya renders the standard North–South framework inappropriate. It needs hardly be said that Libya can be considered as part of the ‘North’ by some standards and of the ‘South’ by others. Importantly, the comparative analysis supports similar conclusions. The appreciation of the leverage enjoyed by migrant sending countries helps untangle one of my initial questions on the possible reconfiguration of the classical readings of North–South power relations. Beside economic determinants which continue to impact on states’ interaction, migration increasingly challenges views presuming irreversible inequality in states’

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power relations. Hence, on the one hand this consideration corroborates traditional accounts of power relations, placing economic assets at the centre of the power equation. On the other, it challenges this same theoretical perspective, shedding light on the growing complexity of interdependence, whereby fixed and clear-cut parameters prove elusive.

1.5

Conclusion

In his seminal work entitled The Inequality of Nations, Tucker writes that ‘the history of the international system is a history of inequality par excellence’ (Tucker, 1977: 3). The objective of this book is to deconstruct and go beyond this proposition to appreciate how new issues on the international agenda, such as migration, may partially reverse unequal North–South relations. No one can – and certainly I do not intend to – deny the massive centripetal pull that the Western model in terms, for example, of capitalism and liberal democracy, exercises over the rest of the world (Fawcett and Sayigh, 1999). Nevertheless, within this international landscape marked by widening inequalities, I seek to unravel the possible nuances and counter-trends. In this spirit, my starting assumption is that migration leads to asymmetrical power relations, to the advantage of the migrant-sending countries vis-à-vis the migrant-receiving ones. Hence, in order to examine changing power relations in the context of bilateral negotiations, and the issue of whether new dynamics of interdependence are undermining mainstream approaches to IR, the overarching question is whether the coalescing of national and international systems and the evolving states’ interests positively affect the relative bargaining position of the South vis-à-vis the North. From the perspective of border control, I shall probe whether the alleged ‘expansion in the sphere in which entrance controls work’ (Gibney, 2005: 9) impacts on North–South interactions and offers potential leeway for the South. In particular, I consider whether, by view of the multiple linkages created by a sustained bargaining process, the South is capable of extracting substantial concessions for the realisation of its own goals (Haas, 1994). From the broader IR viewpoint, I ask whether reciprocal conditionality, which issue-linkages may entail, offers an opportunity to rethink the mainstream reading of North–South power and to reconsider what is ephemeral and what is permanent in the patterns of states’ interaction.

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Part I Theoretical Background and Comparative Analysis

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2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction Locating the study of migration within the North–South debate implicates us in discussions about the meaning and normative assumptions of the concepts central to this endeavour. It is thus necessary to sketch the contending perspectives from which my argument proceeds. To do so, this chapter takes a first step by making explicit the theoretical framework based on the notion of complex interdependence which will be employed, in Part IV of the book, in order to explain and understand the empirical material. In the subsequent sections I will then bring into focus the definition of power, North–South relations and externalisation. In summarising the scholarly debate on these issues, I intend to locate my research within the broader academic debates at the interstices of international relations, development studies and migration studies. This theoretical excursus sets the necessary terrain for the more empirical discussion of the next chapters.

2.2

Why complex interdependence?

This research is approached through the lens of IR theory. In particular, I employ the concepts and analytical tools of interdependence theory,1 located within the wider frame of neo-liberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1989), to explore how states cooperate in the context of shifting borders and the repercussions thereof on North–South relations.2 One of the virtues of interdependence theory derives from its reflections on states’ efforts to address common problems (Haas, 1995: 28) and to establish relations of collaboration. It analyses how the actions of separate actors are brought into conformity with one another through a process in which each party changes its behaviour contingent on changes in the other’s behaviour (Keohane, 1994: 45). The focus is on the norms and rules explaining why states collaborate, and on the procedures by which 19

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that collaboration is carried out (Haas, 1994: 381). According to Keohane and Nye, complex interdependence (hereafter, interdependence) has three characteristics. First, it is defined by ‘multiple channels’ that connect societies, and which can be summarised as inter-state, transgovernmental and transnational relations. The second qualification of interdependence is the absence of hierarchy among issues. Foreign affairs agenda have become larger and more diverse and ‘no longer can all issues be subordinated to military security’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 26–7). Third, when complex interdependence prevails, military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the region. Force is not an appropriate way of achieving other, increasingly important goals (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 27–8). Interdependence theory and, in particular, its structural realist perspective, adopts a rationalist standpoint,3 and claims that, when Pareto-optimal outcomes cannot be achieved through uncoordinated individual calculation of self-interest, regimes become instrumental for the coordination of state behaviours (Krasner, 1995). In this text, interdependence is founded on the assumption that rational actors operate by following their own conceptions of self-interest (Keohane, 1984: 245). Indeed, regimes, and their constituent behavioural conventions, are considered to be responses to coordination problems in which the pursuit of interests, defined in narrow terms, lead to undesirable outcomes (Haas, 1994: 365).4 However, the adoption of such realist assumptions ‘does not commit the analyst to gloomy deterministic conclusions’ (Keohane, 1994: 45). On the contrary, these views can be used to explore the conditions under which cooperation occurs and the patterns of practice around which expectations converge (Keohane, 1994: 45). Overall, interdependence theory sheds light on the transaction costs specifying and enforcing the contracts that underpin exchange (North, 1984: 256). For my initial purposes, the relevance of this approach rests on its account of the nexus between power – which I define in the subsequent section – and issue-linkages (Haas, 1994). As Haas explains, the concept of issue-linkages refers to ‘the linking of separate items that appear on the agenda of the negotiators’ (Haas, 1994).5 This is understood as a learning process which reflects an emerging distribution of power. As such, the study of linkages rests on the appreciation of the ‘changing knowledge and social goals’ that define the content of the collaboration (Haas, 1980: 361). The alteration of interests is related to a perceived increase or decrease in the opportunity costs of change (Haas, 1994). The critical ‘mediating agent’ is power (Haas, 1994), which influences, and is influenced by, the knowledge of both parties and, hence, by their perception of interdependence. The distribution of power is one the main determinants of interests (Stein, 1995), and of the way in which negotiations are conducted and, hence, of how issues interrelate. The combination of different issues

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Theoretical Framework

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depends on the congruence of interests, as well as on the mediation of power (Haas, 1994). The condition of unevenly balanced mutual dependence among states stems from asymmetries in their power relations that frame the context of multiple linkages (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 12). It follows that the study of power entails the scrutiny of power disparities, i.e. how patterns of asymmetry develop and how gains are divided (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 12). By and large, the underlying assumption of interdependence theory is that simultaneous mixed-motive games do not result in a zero-sum world, but rather in a variable-sum situation where costs and benefits are determined by complex trade-off calculations made by each actor with reference to the actor’s own notion of interest (Haas, 1995). Hence, the theoretical model proposed by interdependence theory is useful for my research purposes. It bestows a vocabulary and specific tools that permit us to examine how migration generates asymmetrical benefits and shared vulnerabilities among states (Miller and Papademetriou, 1983). More precisely, its insights into how the power–interest nexus impacts on state cooperation may greatly benefit our understanding of the Italian–Libyan bargaining patterns and, more generally, of North–South power interaction. Ultimately, however, I will opt for an eclectic theoretical matrix that builds upon interdependence theory and assimilates notions borrowed from the realist and neo-Marxist schools of thought. A meaningful and accurate account of the Italian–Libyan case and the other selected cases demands that we search beyond self-contained analytical paradigms and reconcile the usage of these seemingly disparate theoretical perspectives.

2.3 Definition of the key concepts Having illustrated the fundamentals of interdependence theory and explained the reasons for selecting it, let us examine the main concepts that I will employ throughout this book, namely, realist tradition, power, ‘North–South’ relations, securitisation and externalisation. In reviewing the relevant literature I will make explicit the linkage between them and further elaborate on the central research questions to be addressed in the chapters to come. As regards the concept of power I consider three different definitions: political realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-Marxism. In elaborating these three conceptions of power, I follow, with a significant degree of liberty, the analysis proposed by Linklater (1990), who, inter alia, compares realism with rationalism and revolutionism.6 In identifying the sequence of progressively more adequate approaches to world politics, he argues that the method of ‘dialectical development’ allows us to resolve the differences between them (Linklater, 1990: 10). I do not intend to either explore or build upon this method and the related notion of emancipation in critical social

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theories. Nevertheless, his line of argument, bridging the linkage between such ‘radically different conceptions of the nature of international theory’ (Linklater, 1990: 10) and identifying common themes, is useful for us. In presenting the similarities and differences between these three approaches to power, I define the key terminology and establish the framework for answering my initial questions. Indeed, the study of the negotiations on migration elaborates upon this three-fold understanding of power. Let me start with political realism. 2.3.1 Political realism The third set of questions outlined in the introduction is based on the recognition of the enduring relevance of the realist understanding of power. On this count, two questions arise. First, why, for the purposes of this study, is it instructive to elaborate upon the realist doctrine? Second, in view of the sheer scale of realist scholarship, what do I mean, in this text, by ‘realist tradition’?7 In response to the first question, realist views of power play a central role not only in the ongoing academic debate but also in the international policy-making arena.8 That ‘realist practices and ideas predominated in the past is largely accepted even by those who claim that realism is no answer to today’s problems’ (Haslam, 2002: 14). As Haslam notes, two leading IR theorists attest the persisting relevance of realism, despite opposing it (Haslam, 2002: 14). According to Robert Keohane, ‘for over 2,000 years, what Hans J. Morgenthau dubbed “political realism” has constituted the principal tradition for the analysis of international relations in Europe and its offshoots in the New World’ (Keohane, 1986a: 9). Likewise, Michael Doyle defined realism not only as ‘our dominant theory’ but also as ‘our oldest theory’ (Doyle, 1998). In the same vein, Barnett and Duvall suggest that ever since E. H. Carr delivered his rhetorical blow against the Utopians, much of the discipline of IR theory ‘has tended to treat power as the ability of one state to use material resources to get another state to do what it otherwise would not do’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 40). These reflections constitute the starting point of this endeavour, and also reveal why employing realism is profitable for my research purposes. The predominant assumption in the IR literature on North–South relations is that the North is disproportionately stronger by economic and political standards than its counterpart. Arguably, this assumption is based on one of the central tenets of the realist doctrine, i.e. the importance of economic factors in shaping inter-state relations. Therefore, the full comprehension and attentive employment of this ever-influential political tradition is the prerequisite for untangling my initial conundrum. Concerning the second question, it is important to make explicit my working definition of realism. Undeniably, any general statement on political realism fails to grasp the multifaceted aspects of a school of thought

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that encompasses authors with profoundly different conceptions of international relations. In the words of Haslam: The realist tradition is to be seen as a spectrum of ideas of varying hues from light to dark rather than a fixed point of focus with sharp definition that distinguishes itself exclusively and at every point of the compass from its idealist counterpart. (Haslam, 2002: 249) Along the same lines, Guzzini writes that: Having nearly as many realisms as realist protagonists [ ... ] produces a severe problem for realists themselves. At some point, the ‘richness’ argument begs the question of whether realism is a coherent tradition in the first place. It is paradoxical that IR (and indeed realists themselves) seem unable to agree on a definition of realism when this very school, we are told, has held sway over the discipline for so long. (Guzzini, 2004: 536) Most of all, the indeterminacy of its central concept of power epitomises the enduring ‘identity dilemma’ of realism (Guzzini, 2004). Mindful of such pitfalls, I outline ‘the shared core propositions’ of political realism. In the view of Waltz, realpolitik has four criteria: 1. The ruler’s, and later the state’s, interest provide the spring of action; 2. The necessities of policy arise from unregulated competition of states; 3. Calculation based these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; and 4. Success is the ultimate test of policy and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state. (Waltz, 1979: 117)9 This list captures the main tenets of my working definition of political realism. States are power-maximising entities that compete in an anarchic environment on the basis of their national interest, defined in terms of security and survival. International anarchy and the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force account for the ‘security dilemma’, whereby measures that enhance one state’s security typically diminish that of others (Waltz, 1988: 619). 2.3.2 Power in international relations The appreciation of the full significance of realism compels us to probe its conceptualisation of power. This exercise is necessary, since the notion of power fundamentally shapes the realist perception of the world. To do so, after presenting the realist understanding of power, I will seek to enlarge it and consider other perspectives that will be useful for this research.

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As Waltz notes, power is defined as a function of the capability of the state: The parts of hierarchic systems are related to one another in ways that are determined by their functional differentiation and by the extent of their capabilities. The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks. States are differently placed by their power. Power is estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units. (Waltz, 1979: 97) Material capabilities define the strength of actors and their capacity to affect and control outcomes (Guzzini, 2004: 537). What is also known as ‘hard power’ (Nye, 2004)10 is ‘concrete, measurable and predictable’ (Nye, 2004: 3), because it is based on objective and material assets. A country is considered to be powerful on the basis of ‘the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence’ (Waltz, 1979: 131). In short, political realism contends that material power resources dominate other forms of power and that states with a greater preponderance of the first will control world affairs.11 For mainstream realists, then, power so defined is the ordering principle in a self-help and anarchic system that allows states to guarantee their own survival. One of the fixed laws of international relations prescribes that force ‘serves not as ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one’ (Waltz, 1979: 113). As Mearsheimer has written, ‘power is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international relations’ (Mearsheimer, 2001: 12). More precisely, Waltz asks: what does power do for you? 1. Power provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of force that others wield. 2. Greater power permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcomes of action uncertain. 3. The more powerful enjoy wider margin of safety in dealing with the less powerful and have more to say about which games will be played and how. (Waltz, 1979: 194) Relations between states are based upon relative gains and relative losses, making international relations a zero-sum game. What counts are not ‘the players’ absolute skills or capabilities but how they perform relative to their opponents’, since ‘a gain (loss) for one player becomes a corresponding loss (gain) for the opponent’ (Schweller, 1997: 928).12 In short, in an effort to understand politics ‘as it is’, the realpolitik paradigm is based on three assumptions: anarchy; statism; and politics as the struggle for power

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(Guzzini, 2004: 5). These are believed to be intrinsically valid norms that transcend both history and geography (Morgenthau, 1978). In linking the realist definition of power to one of my initial queries, it is instructive to consider how realism has attempted to explain fundamental cleavages between the North and the South in terms of power disparities. As Lake observes, the few realist scholars who have offered such an explanation have grounded their studies in international political economy (Lake, 1987).13 They argue that developing countries do not have any meaningful choices because they are controlled, directly or indirectly, by external influences (Rothstein, 1977: 9). In the words of Fawcett and Sayigh, realism ‘condemns the Third World to perpetual subservience, as weak states in the world of the strong and considers change difficult if not impossible’ (Fawcett and Sayigh, 1999: 245). Interestingly, this perspective is akin to the accounts adduced by dependency and world system theorists that I will explore further below. As Fawcett and Sayigh further note, ‘theories of dependence have also condemned the “Third World” to subservience or worse: to a state of progressive impoverishment and dependence from which only prolonged struggled or revolutionary change provides an outlet’ (Fawcett and Sayigh, 1999: 245). Broadly, the classical realist formula postulates that the critical power–interest nexus defines states’ hierarchy, with the more powerful prevailing over the weaker ones. As a struggle for power, the clash between the North and the South is considered to be ‘structural and endemic to the international system’ and it is ‘likely to endure’ (Lake, 1987: 16). The realist focus on the state and on the necessity of power is central to the present enquiry. As I will argue in the core chapters, the realist formula continues to capture important elements in the relations of power between states and, more specifically, in the agreements on migration between states. Yet it will be suggested that it is not sufficient. The complex dynamics framing negotiations on migration necessitate a broader framework of analysis. As Linklater puts it, ‘the growing importance of economic factors in world politics made students of international relations more sensitive to the need to analyse the phenomenon of change’ and ‘the need to solve a number of emerging common problems’ (Linklater, 1990: 3). While more attention to North–South relations will follow below, let us continue with our discussion of power. This reflection leads to the second understanding of power, elaborated by the neo-liberal regime branch of IR theory (Lipschutz, 2005).14 Appreciation of the complex interplay between domestic and international factor reveals new power dynamics. It is contended that ‘power today is less tangible and less coercive [ ... ] than it was in the past’ (Nye, 2004: 30). Power is not only ‘hard’, as realists have argued, but it is also ‘soft’ for it involves co-opting other actors as opposed to coercing them (Nye, 2004). Two aspects of this reduced tangibility, which I will apply in Part IV, deserve mention.

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First, power is less tangible because it is located in ‘the context in which the relationship exists’ (Nye, 2004: 2).15 On this point, Dahl’s notion of relational power and its connection with a Weberian understanding of social action may prove instructive.16 As Dahl famously wrote, ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957: 203). This notion of reciprocity exhibits an affinity with Weber’s concept of power as ‘the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his [sic] will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ (Weber, 1947: 152). Therefore, power is the capacity to carry through one’s will in a contextual interaction (Barry, 1976: 34). Power cannot be assessed a priori, i.e. independently from general norms, the actors’ particular value systems, or the specific historical context (Guzzini, 2004: 538). By contrast with the realist notion of power as a measurable capability (Walt, 2002), according this second approach ‘power is not and cannot be a property concept’ (Guzzini, 2004: 538). Second, power is closely linked to the role of ideas. In this frame, Barnett and Duvall’s concept of productive power is instructive.17 While the authors distinguish four concepts of power – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive – here I will consider only the last18 which is defined as ‘the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55). It is about clusters of meaning and networks of social forces that shape one another perpetually (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55). More specifically, productive power has two dimensions: First, productive power concerns discourse, the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced and transformed [ ... ] Discourses are sites of social relations of power because they situate ordinary practices of life and define the social fields of action that are imaginable and possible. Second discursive processes and practices produce social identities and capacities as they give meaning to them. [ ... ] Discourse, therefore, is socially productive for all subjects constituting the subjectivity of all social beings of diverse kinds with their contingent though not entirely fluid identities, practices, rights, responsibilities and social capacities. (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55–56) In other words, productive power is linked to diffuse and generalised social processes, and ‘concerns the boundaries of all social identity, and the capacity and inclination for action for the socially advantaged and disadvantaged alike’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 56). This definition is useful, because it helps to identify how ‘changing understandings, meanings, norms, customs, and social identities’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 56) affect social relations

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and challenge pre-existing orders. By employing the concept of productive power, I am able to examine how discourses shape interests and identities and, in particular, how the securitised perception of migration defines the identities and capacities of the negotiating actors and shapes their behaviour. Importantly, the selected concept raises questions that are neglected by realist theory and which are crucial for comprehending the complexity of our case study. This is not to suggest, though, that the importance of realism is in any way diminished.19 As already pointed out, I will make the case for a more comprehensive theoretical approach,20 building upon realism, interdependence and neo-Marxism. Lastly, I turn to the third definition of power from the vantage-point of neo-Marxism. A brief assessment of this theoretical tradition is warranted, since it has heavily influenced the debate on North–South relations. Before proceeding any further, I clarify this concept. I use the term ‘South’ since, unlike the notions of ‘Third Word’ or ‘Less Developed Countries’, it carries the least ideological baggage. As Brown observes, ‘South conveys nothing apart from location; but this constitutes a positive advantage, because it does not load the dice in advance’ (Brown, 2001: 196). Whereas all countries in the South share certain features, such as non-European origin and culture and widespread poverty relative to the North, the term itself does not contain any part of these connotations, and allows us a degree of latitude (Brown, 2001: 196).21 Throughout the analysis, the expressions ‘North/ South’ and ‘sending/receiving countries’ will be employed with the same meaning. Based on the orthodox Marxist themes of inequality and economic stratification, neo-Marxism, which includes, amongst others, Latin American dependency and world-system theorists, reflects on the global web of unequal economic exchanges. In disputing the Marxist emphasis on class, as opposed to the state,22 this approach posits that ‘earlier patterns of dependency and exploitation continued despite the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie’ (Linklater, 1990: 103). It was argued that major sectors of the peripheral economy were organised to serve metropolitan interests rather than to meet the needs of the local population. In simplistic terms, the classic problem of social and economic equality that Marx analysed in the context of nineteenth-century capitalism was put before the world as a whole. The metropolis in the North was seen as exercising a monopoly power over the countries in the South (Linklater, 1990: 102). Using this line of reasoning, neo-Marxism defines state power as a function of economic capabilities. The level of economic development determines countries’ positions in the world economy and the extent to which they are subject either to economic exploitation or to the dominant players (Linklater, 1990: 97–9). In other words, power depends on the wealth and the modes of production of countries and, in turn, defines these countries’ roles within the world economy. In this respect, the neo-Marxist interpretation

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of power has important analogies with classical realism; i.e. the focus on state agency, a view of the international system as a struggle over the appropriation of resources, and a conception of ‘hard’ power that allows states to influence each other’s behaviour. As Linklater reminds us, realism and neo-Marxism agree that ‘international anarchy is one of the main reasons for the existence of the inequality of states and one of the main constraints upon its super-session’ (Linklater, 1990: 103). Yet the author also notes that the realist and the Marxist perspectives ‘focus on dimensions of inequality which have tended to fall outside the other’s purview’ (Linklater, 1990: 101). While realism is concerned with the ‘traditional connection between the possession of superior economic and military power’, neo-Marxism discusses international inequality at the level of the world economy (Linklater, 1990: 101). Against the realist contention that the distribution of power rests on the economic and military assets of countries, neo-Marxism disputes the position of wealth as the primary determinant of the inequality among states. To sum up the analysis so far, an understanding of the different notions of power elaborated by realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-Marxism is instrumental for my initial purposes. On the one hand, my hypothesis on the evolving North–South power relations is rooted in these three different strands of thought. On the other, the employment of these three accounts of power will allow me to unpack my main research questions on externalisation to which I now turn. 2.3.3 Externalisation of migration policies The argument on externalisation comes as part of a wider debate centred on the notion of securitisation in the area of migration. If we now look briefly at the second we are then able to delimit the minimum features of the first. The entry of migration into the realm of ‘high’ politics is charted by Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear (1991), which was amongst the first publications in the security studies literature to assess the nexus between security and migration (Collyer, 2006: 258). This debate veers around the notion of ‘securitisation’, which Balzacq defines as the process leading to the transformation of certain entities – either subjects or objects – into a threat, and whereby threat images are modelled as the result of discursive processes taking place among the securitising actor(s) and the relevant audience(s) (Balzacq, 2008: 76). Within this constructivist reading, two major schools have studied the link between migration policy and security (GammeltoftHansen, 2005). One is represented by the book by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (1993), Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe, which gave rise to a stream of thought within security studies on discourse. The other is Didier Bigo’s research into the social structures guiding securitisation (Bigo, 1996; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2005).

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This debate sets the framework for studying EU migration policies towards third countries. Scholars have drawn attention to the ‘externalities’ of migration, i.e. the impact of the emerging European security discourse and migration policies on the decision-making settings outside the EU (Lavenex, 2002: 7). This discussion stems from the large scholarship on the European external border, by for example Anderson and Bort (2001), Donnan and Wilson (1999) and Zielonka (2001). Even though these works do not focus exclusively on migration, their conceptualisation of the emerging EU border regime establishes a basis for the analysis of the so-called process of ‘externalisation of migration policies’. The concept of externalisation was first used with regard to asylum, and was associated with the UK government’s proposal of March 2003 to build ‘transit processing centres’ outside the EU (Doukoure and Oger, 2003: 3). In order to deter those entering the EU ‘illegally’, the UK suggested establishing ‘protected zones in third countries to which those arriving in EU Member States and claiming asylum could be transferred to in order to have their claims processed’ (Blair, 2003). Subsequently, the concept was applied to migration policies as a whole. In this more general sense, externalisation refers to the EU’s attempt to project its territorial borders onto surrounding states and regions by exporting its migration and asylum policies (Geddes, 2005a: 801). This process has been defined by Guild and Bigo (2003) as ‘policing at distance’, whereby a state’s border control mechanisms are exercised outside the territory of the state by transnational security professionals. In the process of spatial reconstruction of the policy response to migration (Geddes, 2005a), transnational joint tasks are agreed, in order to address a ‘de-territorialised’ threat. According to Walters, de-territorialisation describes a movement that is de-privileging or even escaping from fixed, geographical territory (Walters, 2004: 681). A very diverse collection of issues such as migration, narcotics smuggling, weapons trading, political asylum and terrorism is made intelligible as ‘exemplars of this more general problem of ‘trans-national’ risk’ (Walters, 2004: 681). Accordingly, Effective frontier control is to be sought through cooperation between state agencies on both sides of the frontier. The activity of police must reconfigure itself as networks and ‘joint tasks’ to counteract a series of threats that are considered now to take the same form. Rather than a line which divides armed installations, or a zone of confrontation, the border becomes a joint responsibility and the locus of a new practice of police cooperation. (Walters, 2004: 682) More concretely, the externalisation agenda includes a wide range of different policies. One example is the readmission of migrants and asylum-seekers to supposedly ‘safe third countries’, outside the EU, through which they have passed (Council, 2005a). Likewise the term refers to ‘capacity-building’

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programmes, whereby development aid is employed to create protection conditions in third countries so that EU states may conclude, among others policies, readmission agreements with those governments (Human Rights Watch, 2006b: 92). Externalisation is also associated with so-called ‘prefrontier controls’ (EC, 2008b). Such measures entail, for instance, sanctions on private transport companies if they carry people who do not hold the necessary visas to enter the EU. They also involve the organisation of joint patrolling operations on sea borders to intercept boats with irregular migrants, and the locating of so-called European Immigration Liaison Officers in European neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration and to cooperate with local authorities on a wide range of immigration related issues (ECRE, 2007). Most observers contend that the de-location of frontiers beyond European borders implies the transfer of responsibility for migration management from the migrant-receiving countries to the migrant-sending ones (Carrera, 2007: 26; Oxfam, 2006).23 As Collyer writes, an important aspect of this new geo-politics is that the real impact of migration flows ‘is not in Europe at all but in the countries of transit [ ... ] In return for limited financial support, they are now held accountable by the EU for controlling access to Europe’ (Collyer, 2006: 4). One of the implications of the European attempts to externalise migration policies is the ‘largely discretionary nature of burden- and responsibility-sharing’ (Betts and Milner, 2006: 18), which leaves the migrant-sending countries worse off. Another criticism levelled against such policies is that they ‘are subject to minimal scrutiny and accountability, because they are implemented outside state territory’ (Oxfam, 2005: iii). The process of extending controls into the territory of third countries has been decried by human rights and migrant support groups as jeopardising the rights and safety of those seeking to enter (Lutterbeck, 2006). For example, in reference to the interception of undocumented migrants at sea, Oxfam has lamented the fact that the assessment of protection needs is cursory and inadequate at best, and at times non-existent (Oxfam, 2005: 38). According to the same organisation, by imposing carrier sanctions, the EU is ‘privatising’ its international responsibilities and has created a situation where international principles, such as non-refoulement, can be breached on a regular basis (Bigo et al., 2007; Oxfam, 2005: 39). In other words, the enhancement of security through an increased use of coercive measures and surveillance technology by the EU in its neighbouring countries has undermined established democratic checks and balances that should be at the core of EU practice (Carrera, 2007). In this sense, externalisation, it is contended, enshrines a series of measures which fall outside the rule of law. Externalisation by no means constitutes a coherent and monolithic set of policies (Noll, 2003). Beyond doubt, the approaches vary along a

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spectrum from addressing ‘symptoms’, through containment, to tackling root causes (Betts and Milner, 2006: 7). The outsourcing of policies is not only highly diversified, but has also changed significantly over the years. Thus the notion of externalisation is fundamentally elusive, which is why I will ultimately drop the term in favour of a more ad hoc rendering of the selected case study. These limitations notwithstanding, in Chapter 8 I will summarise the aforementioned debate and derive the main characteristics of externalisation with a view to ultimately assessing the implications for North–South power relations. Although the arguments on the latter are familiar to us from the first chapter, it is important to clarify the sense in which tensions across and beyond the North–South divide have been understood in the scholarship. This brings us to the task of confronting (1) the North–South problematique and (2) the impact of migration on interstate relations. 2.3.4 North–South relations and international migration Without wishing to probe here deep into this enduring dispute, let us elucidate how the study of North–South relations has developed over the last few decades. At its most basic, attention has centred on the increasing economic inequalities between industrialised and developing countries as well as the general process of globalisation. Notably, within the so-called ‘structuralist’ school, the works of Myrdal (1957, 1970) and Prebisch (1964), and of Latin American dependencia theorists such as Frank (1969), Dos Santos (1970), Furtado (1973), Cardoso (1973) and Wallerstein (1974a and 1974b), make a strong case for the deepening patterns of structural inequality in the world economy (Dan Walleri, 1978). Such diverse and copious writings are underpinned by a common logic, namely their opposition to the liberal paradigm of the post-war era. Rooted in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, they contend that in the world economy the resources extracted from the periphery, including raw materials-exporting and less developed countries, flow towards the core countries, including the developed, industrialised and democratic part of the world. This inequality sustains the economic growth and wealth of the latter, but produces underdevelopment in the periphery and leads to structural problems in its local economy. The question of whether the global market is able to ensure the allocation of resources and the production and distribution of goods in an efficient and equitable manner has been and remains at the centre of political and economic debate.24 A large segment of academic scholarship maintains that globalisation exacerbates inequality, both within and among states, and erodes the capacity of traditional institutions to manage new threats (Hurrell and Woods, 1999: 8, Sachs and MacArthur, 2005). It is, therefore, illuminating to consider whether the North–South framework has been applied to migration and inter-state relations.

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Until the early 1980s, scholars of political science and IR theory left the study of migration at the margins of their research.25 As Weiner wrote in 1985: Theories of international migration pay remarkably little attention to state interventions, while the literature on international relations says relatively little about population movements, except insofar as the refugee phenomenon is described as an outcome of conflicts. How do state actions shape population movements, when do such movements lead to conflicts and when to cooperation, and what do governments do in their domestic policies to adjust to or influence population flows are questions that have received far too little attention. (Weiner, 1985: 441) At the same time, one definite theoretical development of the past quarter of a century is the recognition that it is precisely the control that states exercise over borders that defines international migration (Zolberg, 1989). Notably, Zolberg et al., reflect on how the policies of receiving countries influence refugee movements, and point out that, although migration policy is partially shaped by domestic concerns, ‘it lends itself to many uses as an instrument of foreign policy, and therefore considerations arising from this sphere are usually determinative’ (Zolberg et al., 1986: 156). The appreciation that power relations change as a result of migration is one of the central tenets of my project. As Zolberg et al., further add: The expansion of the international politico-strategic system to encompass the entire globe implies that even the poorest and geopolitically least significant of states acquired some value as stakes in the politico-strategic games of the major players. It follows that internal regime changes among Third World countries tend to be perceived as having implications for the wider system, and are therefore likely to provoke some sort of response by outsiders. (Zolberg et al., 1986: 157) In the same spirit, Mitchell traces the linkage between foreign policy, international relations and migration. He underlines that the connections between ‘domestic change, external intervention and refugee flows’ and between ‘regional population movements and national immigration policies’ have ‘obvious relevance to understanding the confrontations of states with markets, and states with states’ (Mitchell, 1989: 704). As he puts it: International migration is ‘affected with an international political interest’. While it might once have been heuristically useful to view population movements as social or economic phenomena divorced from influence by (or upon) world politics, that approach is no longer viable. Both experience and research have demonstrated numerous ways in

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which migration is intertwined with international politics. (Mitchell, 1989: 682) The same opinion is shared by Teitelbaum, who, in the early 1980s, argued that the linkages between foreign policies and immigration and refugee policies were ‘not new’ (Teitelbaum, 1984: 430–1). In his own words: both sending and receiving countries have employed mass migration movements as tools of their foreign policies. There is, first, what might be termed ‘mass migration for unarmed conquest or assertion of sovereignty. [ ... ] More subtle are the uses made of migrant groups for foreignpolicy purposes. On the sending side, there is reason to believe that mass expulsions have been employed as tools to destabilize or embarrass foreign-policy adversaries. (Teitelbaum, 1984: 437–8) This line of thinking has been further elaborated by Chimni (1998), who suggests that in Cold War politics refugees were used as ‘pawns’, and assesses the implications of this for developing countries.26 Alongside the increasing attention devoted by political scientists to migration, it is thus possible to observe an emerging literature on the nexus between North–South relations and migration. This is best exemplified in the studies by Betts (2005) and Gillespie (2002), to which I return in the succeeding chapters. Within this stream of thought, there is a broad acceptance that North–South migration policies are based on ‘asymmetric interdependence’ (Baradello, 2007: 11; see also Aleinikoff, 2002; Nye and Keohane, 1987). Geddes, for example, posits that externalisation of migration and EU asylum policies ‘is closely linked to the organisational and conceptual borders within and between EU Member States, as well as their projection onto other states and regions’ (Geddes, 2005a: 801). The underlying assumption is that migrant-sending countries are the weaker partners economically and politically (Baradello 2007: 11; Hollifield, 2000) and that, by contrast, migrant-receiving states are better positioned and enjoy a capacity to act than their Southern counterparts (Baradello, 2007: 11). In other words, the thrust of much of the literature on migration has demonstrated that the benefits of migrations have been distributed unequally, to the advantage of the already more fortunate receivers, and that ‘the balance to the already unfortunate sending countries is altogether negative’ (Zolberg, 1989: 424). Departing from this reading, some observers have disputed the argument that the participation of the South in the joint efforts to control migration ‘has been dictated’ by pressures exerted by the EU and its Member States (Cassarino, 2005: 227). For example, in the analysis of the evolving patterns of interconnectedness between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, Cassarino suggests that the first have been able to ‘capitalise’ on

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their participation in the collaborative efforts on migration and ‘to exert more leverage on the enlarged EU, in terms of financial aid and development assistance’ (Cassarino, 2005: 228). The claim that migration gives increased bargaining power to the South is also made by Cuttitta (2008a) and Ellerman (2008). This is the line of enquiry that I pursue in this book, in order to explore novel patterns of interconnectedness between the North and the South. In so doing, I build upon the work of Betts (2005) who approaches the study of the collaboration on migration between states from the North–South perspective. In particular, Betts’ examination of international cooperation in the refugee regime provides a rigorous analysis based on the work of, among others, Haas and Keohane. His study of North–South relations through the concept of issue-linkages27 inspires the theoretical framework of my analysis of Italian–Libyan relations.

2.4

Conclusion

My starting hypothesis is rooted in an academic debate that has been in process for at least three decades. However, the emerging controversy on externalisation and securitisation in the North–South context raises new questions on the capacity of states to control border and to influence other actors. With regard to externalisation, in Part IV of the book I will dispute some assumptions attached to the concept, especially in relation to state sovereignty, and make the case for the limited practical efficacy despite its profound symbolic dimension. Crucially, this argument is possible only as long as we recast the assumptions within which the North–South question has thus far been confronted. My taking issue with the value and utility of North–South antithetical framing rests on the appreciation of the many fractures in the ideas and practices of externalisation and of shifting modes of states’ cooperation.

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3 Comparative Analysis

3.1 Introduction The distinctive nature not just of Libya but also of the bilateral agreements with Italy on migration prompts the analyst to be circumspect as to the conclusions that can be drawn. The nature of migration flows through Libya, which vary considerably from those of other migrant-sending countries, and its peculiar political system, preclude us from deriving general lessons relevant for the wider audience of students of development studies, migration and IR. Thus, in order to enlarge the empirical analysis, this chapter reviews selected bilateral negotiations on migration. I review secondary literature on the relations between the US and Mexico, the US and Cuba, Spain and Morocco and the EU and Turkey and I assess the extent to which migration challenges classic readings of North–South power dynamics. By examining a range of theoretical and empirical claims on migration from the perspective of IR, I seek to mitigate the shortcomings of a onecase piece of research. From the conclusions of each of the selected cases, I derive specific questions, which will be applied to the empirical discussion of the Italian–Libyan agreements in Parts III and IV. Answering such questions will help determine whether my selected case study contradicts, or not, other similar cases of negotiations on migration. In this sense, this comparative exercise is an integral part of this book, since it contextualises the findings of my research and alerts us to its limits. The four cases are discussed in separate sections, which follow the same structure. First, I present an historical excursus of the agreements on migration, and then I revisit the arguments elaborated by the relevant scholarship on the linkage between foreign policy and migration. In presenting the key phases of the agreements on migration, I ask whether migration has conferred increased bargaining power on either of the negotiating countries, whether such power was maintained over time, and to what the extent the countries involved have adapted to these changes. This exercise aims to 35

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formulate questions that will be applied to the following chapters on the Italian–Libyan negotiations on migration. This investigation is based on secondary sources. Since the overall focus of this book is on Italian–Libyan relations, I do not intend to present a detailed analysis of the selected comparative cases. In fact, they are supported neither by direct fieldwork nor by elite interviews. By relying on the research and information presented by other observers, I introduce a comparative analysis of what future, more in-depth research is required. Moreover, in the selection of the case studies I have prioritised the relations between the US and Latin American countries, since they are supported by a vast literature on the linkage between migration and foreign policy. I have also chosen the Morocco–Spain and Turkey–EU discussions because of the political, geographical and historical analogy with the Italian–Libyan case. While they have not been approached from a distinctive IR point of view, they have been subject of conspicuous and differentiated research. Other bilateral negotiations on migration, such as Philippines–Saudi Arabia, Ghana–UK, France–Algeria and Indonesia–Malaysia, would merit further discussion. However, for the sake of consistency and brevity, these other cases will not be discussed in this chapter.

3.2 Negotiations on migration between the US and selected Central and Latin American countries Historically, migration has played a significant role in the interaction between the US and individual Central and Latin American countries. As Mitchell writes, the Western hemisphere is ‘a region where the interaction between US foreign and migration policies is increasingly evident’ (Mitchell, 1992: 8). Against this background, bilateral discussions on migration between the US and Cuba or Mexico are of particular relevance. 3.2.1 Relations between the US and Cuba Within the distinctive context of East–West rivalry, ideological and strategic factors best explain the US–Cuban relations on migration (Dominguez, 1992: 41). As Nackerud et al., note, since the 1960s ‘along with a comprehensive economic blockade, an important element of the US plan was the creation of an open door to spur migration that drained Cuba of human and economic capital’ (Nackerud et al., 1999: 183).1 Successive administrations, from Eisenhower’s to Clinton’s, have, in different ways, welcomed refugees from Cuba in order to further political objectives against its revolution (Masud-Piloto, 1996: 2). As Masud-Piloto observes, although the American objectives have varied, at least two have remained constant: (1) to destabilise Castro’s government by draining it of vital human resources and (2) to discredit the regime through encouraging the flight of thousands from a communist dictatorship to a capitalist democracy (Masud-Piloto, 1996: 2).

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Comparative Analysis 37

To fully appreciate this, a brief chronicle of the four waves of migration from Cuba to the US is insightful.2 The first wave was in the early 1960s, when President Eisenhower granted automatic acceptance to over 200,000 migrants from Cuba (Nackerud et al., 1999: 184). US open migration policy towards Cubans started formally with the Cuba Refugee Programme in February 1961, which was extended with the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act 1962 and the Cuban Adjustment of Status Act 1966 (Colmer, 2000: 427). In so doing, the US set a precedent for the subsequent waves (Nackerud et al., 1999: 184). Since many of the Cubans reaching American shores did not meet the criteria outlined by the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, many of them were granted refugee status under the Walter-McCarran Act 1952 by virtue of their having fled a communist country (Nackerud et al., 1999: 184). In other words, US opposition to the Cuban Revolution gave ‘refugees’ from that country benefits setting them apart from other Latin American asylumseekers (Masud-Piloto, 1996: 2). As we shall see below, this policy, favouring ‘exit’ from Cuba, was markedly different from US migration policy towards Mexico and other Central American and Caribbean countries, to whose emigrants the US has often closed its borders (Colomer, 2000: 428). The second wave of Cuban migration took place in 1965, when the Vuelos de la Libertad, or Freedom Flights, sponsored by the United States, brought 250,000 Cubans to the US. During the third wave in April 1980, also known as the Mariel Crisis, the Cuban government allowed 125,000 Cubans to depart ‘illegally’ for the United States from the port of Mariel (Leo Grande, 1998). In response, the US government stopped issuing migrant visas to all Cubans until and unless the Cuban government took back the Cubans who had come through Mariel Harbour (Dominguez, 1992: 47). This restriction, however, was lifted by President Reagan, who sought to resume normal relations. Indeed, in 1984 the two countries negotiated an agreement to re-establish normal migration (US Department of State, 2001a). Afer a brief suspension in May 1985, the agreement was reinstated in November 1987 (US Department of State, 2001a). The 1990s witnessed the fourth wave of migration, known as the Balseros Crisis. As a result of the protests against food shortages and prolonged unannounced blackouts in Havana in August 1994, Fidel Castro ordered migrant flows to the US not be stopped, and consequently over 30,000 Cubans left for the United States. On this occasion, the Cuban leader made the following official statement: If the US does not take rapid, effective measures to stop promoting illegal departures from [our] country, we will feel obliged to instruct our border guards to do nothing to stop any vessel that is trying to leave Cuba. We have set forth our position; we aren’t opposed to solutions if they are based on sincerity and honesty, if they seek to solve the problem, if they

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aren’t proffered as a means of deceiving us – but we cannot continue to act as border guards for the US. (Nackerud et al., 1999: 178) Hence, after being made to appear essentially powerless in the face of the boatlift from Cuba, President Clinton used his executive power to authorise the interception and detention of the fleeing Cubans. Thus migrants, accustomed to being welcomed, were instead imprisoned at the US Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay (Nackerud et al., 1999: 178).3 Their detention lasted eight months, until a bilateral agreement was reached whereby Cuba gained 20,000 regular US visa slots and the automatic acceptance of Cubans as political refugees was eliminated (Nackerud et al., 1999: 178). The agreement also legalised the return of Cubans intercepted at sea to their country (Nackerud et al., 1999: 177). Hence, with this agreement the Clinton administration reversed the previous welcoming stance of the US, which had been based on the belief that the departure of migrants from Cuba would undermine the fabric of Cuban society and its government (Mitchell, 1997: 48). In other words, the US response to the Balsero Crisis represented a significant turning-point. Yet, in broad political terms, the overall US foreign policy objective remained the same, i.e. weakening the Cuban government. Thus migration represented one of the strategic policy tools for achieving this objective, both before and after the Balsero Crisis (Dominguez, 1992: 48). Simply put, migration proved to be a ‘coercive political weapon’ (Greenhill, 2002: 39, 2010) for the benefit, at different times, of both Cuba and the US. To be sure, the recent changes in both the US and Cuba invite a degree of caution about drawing any conclusions. Migration continues to be on the bilateral agenda. Semi-annual migration talks between Cuba and the US had been held regularly for a decade on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords. The US State Department, however, cancelled the 20th round of talks scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks have been held since (Wasem, 2009: 18). During his election campaign in 2008, Barack Obama promised a ‘new beginning’ with Cuba; to include, for example, the lifting of restrictions on visits by Cuban Americans to the island. In this context, in June 2009, the US and Cuban governments agreed to new talks on migration (Wasem, 2009: 19). It is unclear, however, how the discussions on migration will affect the broader bilateral negotiations with Cuba, which has been under the presidency of Raúl Castro, brother of the former dictator, since February 2008. These caveats notwithstanding, let us return to our initial questions on soft power. On the one hand, Cuba, by employing what Greenhill calls ‘extortive engineered migration’, i.e. the ‘use of the Cuban people as an asymmetric political weapon against the US’, succeeded in internationalising its domestic crisis and ‘transforming it into an American domestic political and foreign policy crisis’ (Greenhill, 2002: 39).4 According to Greenhill, extortive,

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engineered migration is ‘one of the relatively few weapons that weak actors can use to influence the behaviour of more powerful states, particularly advanced industrial democracies’ (Greenhill, 2002: 41). In reverting to this device, weak actors can manipulate successfully the actions of more powerful states and expose the vulnerabilities of the latter. During the Balseros Crisis, the US weakness derived from its being trapped between the international normative commitments of welcoming ‘refugees’ from a communist country and its domestic imperatives of controlling borders. Overall, domestic imperatives prevailed, and the US reversed its migration policies and increased its restrictive measures. Indeed, Greenhill suggests that ‘this kind of coercion can only succeed when the expected negative side effects are visible or domestically salient to the target’s population’ (Greenhill, 2002: 42). With the Balseros Crisis, the side-effects were visible enough to allow Castro to achieve one of his goals, namely, a US halt to irregular emigration (Greenhill, 2002: 59). In other words, Castro succeeded in influencing US foreign policy and forcing the latter to close its borders, by exploiting the US domestic fears associated with migration. Significantly, this point applies also to Italian–Libyan relations. As we shall see in the following chapters, the image of migration constructed around control fears underpins the instrumental use of migration by the Libyan regime. On the other hand, for its part the US sought to affect the behaviour of Cuba by using migration as a policy instrument (Mitchell, 1997: 48). This argument is elaborated by Colomer (2000). By applying Hirschman’s categories of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’,5 he demonstrates that migration was used by the US to promote both ‘voice’ against the Cuban regime and ‘exit’ from the island (Colomer, 2000). The US sought to weaken Cuba by providing refuge to members to dissatisfied Cuban citizens (exit), as well as to organise ‘voice’ among Cuban exiles and ‘internal voice’ to reintroduce American influence into the country (Colomer, 2000: 428–9). Nonetheless, as both the Balseros and the Mariel crises demonstrate, the US migration strategy proved to be double-edged. Arguably, the US open-door policy and economic blockade6 succeeded in causing disruption to the Cuban economy (Nackerud et al., 1999: 183). Yet it had some counter-effects. Exit grew ‘at the expense of contributions to collective “voice” as potential critics leave to exile’ (Colomer, 2000: 428). It also engendered domestic resentment calling for more restrictive policies (Colomer, 2000: 428). While the US adopted an exceptional migration policy towards Cuba, Cuba’s adoption of a more typical Latin American country’s migration strategy gave Castro some advantage in the interplay with the United States (Colmer, 2000: 431). In Colomer’s words: Cuba had incentives to promote successive waves of emigration to the United States in the expectation of obtaining a cooperative response by the United States toward mutual closing of borders. This has induced the United States to modify to some extent the exceptional, foreign

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policy-oriented migration policy it has pursued toward the Cuban government. (Colmer, 2000: 431) Put simply, Castro’s intention was to stop the ‘irregular and destabilising pattern of immigration between his country and the US’ (Greenhill, 2002: 45). He enticed the US to do so by using his migration ‘card’. By closing borders as a response to Cuba’s opportunistic use of migration, the US served the interests of Cuba. In broad political terms, the resulting US–Cuban migration relations might typically be described as ‘antagonistic cooperation’, whereby, for opposed and often hostile reasons, each government chose a migration policy that suited the interests of the other (Dominguez, 1992: 31). This occasional, if unintended, cooperation served the purposes of their antagonism. In the complex web of ideological and strategic factors, migration was used by both countries for the advancement of their own concepts of national interest and in order to induce policy change in their counterpart (Dominguez, 1992: 86). At different times, migration represented a power asset for both the US and Cuba. The leverage that they could exert against the other country by employing this tool evolved over time, and migration policies were adapted accordingly. The US benefited from migration as a bargaining chip at political and economic levels when it could accept significant number of migrants fleeing Cuba. From the viewpoint of negotiating leverage, openness was more profitable than closure at borders. The US found itself more vulnerable vis-à-vis Cuba when it sought to appeal to an increasingly hostile public opinion and to restrict entry. Cuba succeeded in threatening the US, advancing its demands and, hence, modifying US migration policies. It could do so by exploiting the prevailing perceptions of migration as a societal threat. Accordingly, Greenhill concludes that ‘if a target country can keep a migration surge from either being perceived as or actually becoming a crisis [ ... ] it can significantly degrade the perpetrator’s weapons [i.e. migration] capabilities’ (Greenhill, 2002: 64). 3.2.2 Relations between the US and Mexico Mexico is by far the leading country of origin for US migrants, accounting for a third (32 per cent) of all foreign-born residents and two-thirds (66 per cent) of Hispanic migrants (Passel and Cohn, 2009). While the flow of migrants from Mexico to the United States has declined sharply since the mid-2000s, the US remains the destination for nearly all people who leave Mexico, and about one in ten people born there currently lives in the US (Passel and Cohn, 2009). Likewise, as regards unauthorised migration through the US southern border, according to the Pew Hispanic Center, Mexico is the leading country of origin, claiming 59 per cent of the total in 2008, leaving undocumented migrants from Asia or Central America

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trailing at 11 per cent, and South Americans at 7 per cent (McCabe and Meissner, 2010). By some reckonings, the US–Mexico border is the most frequently crossed international border in the world, with some 350 million people crossing legally every year (Embassy of the United States in Mexico, no date). Bilateral discussions on migration between Mexico and the United States are not new. In fact, the two countries have been cooperating on border control issues since the late nineteenth century. As Rosenblum points out, with Mexico experiencing regional labour shortages after its Revolution and favouring a labour-intensive development strategy, the Mexican state discouraged emigration and actively encouraged return migration (Rosenblum, 2007). Economic considerations were reinforced by ideological and security concerns, following three US invasions of Mexico since the 1840s. Consequently, Mexico resented unilateral US recruitment of ‘guest-workers’ during the First World War (Rosenblum, 2007). Subsequently, President Roosevelt’s administration was keen to negotiate a bilateral agreement ensuring Mexican workers access to the US and making Mexico an ally in the war effort (Gamboa, 1990). The resulting ‘Bracero’ agreement in 1942 was intended to relieve wartime labour shortages and to legalise and control the flow of Mexican agricultural workers into the US (Espenshade, 1995: 198; Gamboa, 1990).7 Importantly since the nineteenth century, unauthorised entries from Mexico to the United States were a growing preoccupation for American authorities. These concerns were reflected in the laws passed in 1888 and 1891 allowing deportation of migrants who had entered the country illegally (Espenshade, 1995: 210–11). Through the 1920s and the 1930s, border apprehensions have increased significantly (Espenshade, 1995: 197).8 In the 1920s, 128,000 migrants were recorded as crossing the border. The number reached 147,000 in the 1930s, and rose to nearly 1.4 million during the 1940s and one million by the early 1950s (Espenshade, 1995: 197–8).9 The Bracero programme, however, was motivated by foreign policy considerations. According to Rosenblum, US military vulnerability in 1942 and 1951 enhanced Mexican bargaining power, partly because US authorities saw a migration deal as a key element of a stable regional relationship (Rosenblum, 2007). In support of the Alliance for Progress Programme in Latin America,10 the Kennedy administration maintained the Bracero agreement, despite domestic objections, between 1961 and 1964 (Plewa, 2009; Rosenblum, 2007). The same argument is elaborated by Cornelius and Rosenblum, who contend that, alongside economic interests, diplomatic considerations inspired US concessions to Mexico during the early years of the Bracero programme, the fundamental aim being to strengthen bilateral relations (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 110). As Teitelbaum posits, the Bracero programme is an example of how migration was stimulated, restrained or regulated through foreign policy instruments (Teitelbaum, 1984: 435). At the

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same time, migration was the means through which the two countries could repair their strained relations (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 110). Despite the growing irregular migration across the border, neither the US nor Mexico pursued bilateral cooperation on migration consistently (Rosenblum, 2007). With migration being a source of conflict, both countries opted for unilateral policy choices (Rosenblum, 2007). For example, in 1954 the US Border Patrol launched ‘Operation Wetback’, whereby more than one million undocumented Mexican migrants were deported to Mexico (Espenshade, 1995: 198). Similarly, in 1986 the US Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed in order to curb the flow of undocumented migrants into the country. The Act restricted the hiring of undocumented workers, strengthened enforcement at the US southern borders and, at the same time, decreased the numbers of undocumented aliens residing in the United States by granting an amnesty to roughly 2.8 million formerly undocumented residents (Espenshade, 1995: 211). More recently, in November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) ‘to help secure America’s borders’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2005). One of its goals was ‘to have operational control of both the northern and southern borders within five years’. In relation to this initiative, the Secure Fence Act of 2006 requested the Department of Homeland Security to construct ‘the infrastructure necessary to deter and prevent illegal entry on our Southwest Border, including pedestrian and vehicle fencing, roads, and technology’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009b). As of December 2009, half of the fence along the 700-mile US–Mexican border had been completed (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009a). As a further illustration of the ad hoc approach to migration, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations did not address labour flow issues (Rosenblum, 2007). Under the respective Mexican and US presidencies of Carlos Salinas and George Bush in the late 1980s, however, efforts were made to revive bilateral cooperation on migration (Rosenblum, 2007). The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a ‘massive border enforcement building-up’ (Cornelius, 2001: 678),11 based on more intense cooperation between the US and Mexico. In 1993, the Border Liaison Mechanism (BLM) was established to deal with a variety of issues concerning border control operations (US Department of State, 2007a). In 1996, the two countries established a Binational Study on Migration to produce a collective and state-of-the-art assessment of many aspects of Mexico-to-US migration (Binational Study on Migration, 1997), and have since consulted regularly on border safety and consular issues (Storr, 2005). Similarly, in February 2001, cabinet-level talks on migration were launched to discuss joint action to ensure safe and legal migration flows between the countries (Storr, 2005). Teams of experts were designated by the two governments to discuss a comprehensive agenda on migration (Mohar, 2004).

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Mexico and the US now treat migration as one of their top priorities (Cook et al., 2008). A Joint Communiqué of June 2001 defined migration as ‘one of the major ties that binds Mexico and the United States’ (US Department of State, 2001a). A few months afterwards, in September 2001, during the opening day of his official visit to Washington, President Fox called upon the two governments to reach an agreement on migration by the end of the year (White House, 2001). Thereupon, in March 2002, the Mexico–United States Border Partnership Action Plan was signed to create a ‘smart border’ to regulate and control flow of people and goods (White House, 2002). On the same occasion, the two presidents announced the ‘Partnership for Prosperity’ Action Plan, which entails public–private initiatives to promote domestic and foreign investment in less developed areas of Mexico with high migration rates (US Department of State, 2002b). Unsurprisingly, on 13 and 14 March 2007, President Bush met with the Mexican President Felipe Calderón in Merida, Yucat, and both agreed that migration ‘vitally links both countries, involves shared responsibilities, and represents one of the most critical issues for the future well-being’ of Americans and Mexicans (White House, 2007). As part of a wider strategy to address migration, the two presidents discussed ‘productive investment aimed at creating more and better paid jobs in Mexico’ (White House, 2007). A similar policy line has been pursued by President Barack Obama. His administration has favoured legislation that follows the logic of previous laws: that is, bringing unauthorised migrants into the legal system by recognising that they violated the law, and imposing fines and other penalties to fit the offence (Hansen, 2009). In this context, Obama has sought to strengthen the collaboration with Mexico. During a meeting on August 2009 in Guadalajara with his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderón, Obama spoke of the need for ‘a pathway to citizenship’ for millions of irregular migrants in the United States, and declared that the system had to be reworked to avoid tensions with Mexico. Without it, he said, ‘Mexicans will keep crossing the border in dangerous ways and employers will continue exploiting workers’ (Washington Post, 2009). Importantly, the success of the negotiations on migration depends on concurrent discussion of other issues, such as counter-narcotics, and trade (Sullivan and Beittel, 2009). For example, during a visit by the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to Mexico on March 2009, Mexican officials complained about mixed signals from the United States, noting that even as the US administration had stepped up law enforcement assistance at the border, Congress cut back funds for the three-year counter-trafficking campaign known as Merida Initiative (The New York Times, 2009). It is clear that in recent years Mexico and the US have been more willing to pursue cooperative efforts to control migration as part of the larger bilateral agenda. Arguably, both countries stand to benefit from legalising

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existing labour flows, enhancing labour protections, and allowing a greater Mexican role in migration oversight (Rosenblum, 2007). It is accepted that migrants make a critical contribution to continued US economic growth. As US Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez declared, ‘without people to fill the jobs’ the American ‘economy will not continue to grow’ (Migration News, 2007b). In the same vein, the Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, has repeatedly emphasised the positive direct correlation between regular migration and the economic growth. In her own words: ‘requiring illegal immigrants to register to earn legal status, will strengthen our economy as these immigrants become full-paying taxpayers. As labour leaders have made clear to me, immigration reform will be a boon to American workers’ (Napolitano, 2009). Yet public attitudes are characterised by conflicting perceptions and attitudes about migrants. According to the Pew Research Center, while favouring a change that would make it possible for many undocumented migrants to remain in the US, the public has simultaneously favoured stronger efforts to enforce existing migration laws (Keeter, 2009). Numerous polls over the past several years have found that the public generally respects migrants for their strong work ethic, but also, at the same time, that many believe that undocumented migrants weaken the economy by using public services while failing to pay their fair share of taxes (Keeter, 2009). For Mexico, migration yields economic and political benefits. It not only represents a ‘safety valve’, dissipating the political discontent that could arise from higher unemployment, but is also a source of remittances (Cook et al., 2008: 10). President Fox called migrants ‘heroes’ for their remittances of over $1 billion a month to Mexico, and declared that migrants were indispensable to creating a modern and prosperous Mexico (Martin, 2005: 454). In 2007 alone, remittances were estimated at US$24 billion (Cook et al., 2008). Arguably, migration abroad has helped ease the country’s adjustment to the rapid growth in its working-age population, and to macroeconomic shocks (Hanson, 2006: 870). Economic studies also suggest that during 1970–2000 Mexican migration to the US helped raise average Mexican wages by 8 per cent (Martin, 2005: 449).12 We can thus infer that migration relations between Mexico and the US have been ‘highly sensitive to changes in the broader bilateral, regional and global context’ (Rosenblum, 2007). Domestic and foreign policies are highly interrelated and, more significantly, migration plays a pivotal role in forging this linkage. Similar dynamics can be detected in other bilateral relations in the Western hemisphere, where, by either supporting or opposing Latin American governments, the US has either contained or stimulated migrant flows. For example, in Guatemala and El Salvador, the US unintentionally encouraged migration by sponsoring oppressive regimes (Mitchell, 1997: 50). Concerning El Salvador, the following quote of the 1982 memo from the Central American

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Refugee Centre in Washington is insightful: The United States is the only nation in the world which does not recognise Salvadorans as legal refugees and thus will not grant them political asylum. There are two major reasons for this. One is that granting political asylum to Salvadorans communicates world-wide that the government of El Salvador violates the human rights of its citizens. Since the US aids and supports the government of El Salvador, it does not want to communicate this message. Also, granting asylum to the estimated 500,000 undocumented Salvadorans in this country would open up a large sector of voiced opposition to U.S. policy manoeuvres in El Salvador. This group of dissent can be kept silent through forcing them to live underground in fear of deportation to the threat of persecution and death in their own country. (Teitelbaum, 1984: 439) By contrast, in Nicaragua the key objective of the US policy was to overthrow the revolutionary Sandinista government. This policy not only stimulated out-migration from Nicaragua, but also depended on such population movements for one of its most effective strategy was ‘the use of émigré armies (the contras) based in Honduras but led from Miami’ (Mitchell, 1997). To some extent, US border control policies were designed to influence the behaviour of the country to which they were to be applied. In the words of Cornelius and Rosenblum, the US rewarded allies by refusing to admit people fleeing these states’ right-wing authoritarian regimes, and punished communist states during the Cold War by enforcing generous refugee provisions for those applicants (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 110).13 In sum, two preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, the US–Cuban and US–Mexican contexts show that migration, foreign policy and the domestic agenda are profoundly interconnected. Migration has been linked strategically to other issues on the bilateral agenda, such as East–West confrontation and domestic economic factors. Second, both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries have, at different times, utilised migration in an instrumental manner to influence the behaviour of their counterparts. The flight of Cubans to the US provided Cuba with a bargaining device to affect US foreign policy and its border measures. Yet the opposite was also true. In relations between the US and other Latin American countries, migration was strategically influenced by the US to induce policy change in the target country. These examples generate some questions that I will apply to the Italian–Libyan case in Parts III and IV. How does migration relate to the domestic and foreign policy agenda? Have both Italy and Libya succeeded in employing migration in order to influence the behaviour of their counterpart? For now, I turn to the issue of Moroccan–Spanish interaction.

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3.3


Cooperation on migration between Morocco and Spain

Having examined the agreements on migration between the US and selected countries in the Western hemisphere, I now move on to the examination of the bilateral discussion on migration between Morocco and Spain and, to a lesser extent, the EU.14 The bulk of unauthorised migrants entering Spain through its Southern frontiers are either Moroccans, or sub-Saharan Africans transiting through Morocco or Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara (de Haas, 2008). Over the last few decades, Spain has moved from being a country of emigration to one of immigration. Official figures report that Spain hosted 350,000 foreigners in 1991, 1.5 million in 2001, 4.5 million in 2007 and 5.5 million in 2009 (Migration News, 2010b; Rosero-Bixby et al., 2008: 1). In 2009, Moroccans formed the largest group, with 758,174 citizens resident in Spain, followed by Romanians (728,580), Ecuadorians (441,455), Colombians (288,255) and British (221,073) (Tedesco, 2010). Spain is now considered one of Europe’s principal immigration countries (IOM, 2005). In 2003, it received more than a third of all migrants to the (then) 25 EU member states (Carling, 2007b). In particular, the North African Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla have become the main transit points into Europe for thousands of undocumented migrants from Africa (Crain, 1999). Concomitantly, over the second half of the twentieth century, Morocco evolved into one of the world’s leading emigration countries. With over two million people of Moroccan descent now living in Europe, Moroccans form one of the largest and most dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe (de Haas, 2005: 3). In an effort to reduce unwanted migrant flows from Morocco, Spain and the EU have sought to strengthen cooperation with the Northern African country and, at the same time, to tighten southern border controls. In May 1991, visa requirements for Morocco were established (Bodega et al., 1995: 815), and in July of the same year a Treaty of Friendship provided a process for negotiations between the two countries (Huntoon, 1998: 440). Although migration was not mentioned, the two countries committed themselves to collaborating on economic and financial issues, as well as defence, development and culture (Spain and Morocco, 1991). In February 1992, Spain and Morocco signed a bilateral agreement on the readmission to Morocco of undocumented migrants who had entered Spain through Morocco (Serra et al., 2005). During the first five years of José María Aznar’s premiership (1996–2001), bilateral negotiations ground to a halt. As Gillespie observed, while under previous Socialist Party (PSOE) administrations foreign ministers had visited Morocco once or twice a year, Aznar’s first foreign minister, Abel Matutes, made just one stop-over visit during four years (Gillespie, 2004: 3). Spanish officials took the view that Rabat could regulate the flow of migrants at will, a suspicion reinforced in August 2001 when around 800

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migrants were arrested on the coast of Andalucía in the space of 72 hours (Gillespie, 2004: 3). Following the People’s Party (PP)’s re-election in March 2000, overall Spanish–Moroccan relations continued to deteriorate. Notably, in July 2002 Spain and Morocco almost came to blows over a small island near Ceuta, at the eastern approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar (Gillespie, 2004). The islet, known to Spaniards as ‘Perejil’, was occupied successively by Moroccan gendarmes and Spanish Legionnaires, before the US State Department involvement helped to broker a return to the status quo ante (Gillespie, 2004). However, towards the end of Aznar’s government efforts were made to restore bilateral relations, at least formally (Gillespie, 2005). This approach towards deepening bilateral collaboration on migration was promoted further by the succeeding centre-left government led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (Tedesco, 2010; Wiegand, 2009). In December 2003, Morocco pledged full cooperation in a memorandum of understanding, whereby it committed itself to act against undocumented migration and to cooperate with Spanish sea patrols in return for $390 million worth of aid (Briscoe, 2004). The agreed joint actions included measures that have been labelled as externalisation of border controls, such as the readmission of undocumented migrants, similar to those implemented by Italy and Libya (Statewatch, 2004). Morocco claims to have conformed to a number of such actions (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Schuster, 2005). From January 2004, it began to accept the return of both Moroccan and nonMoroccan nationals from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as those intercepted in boats (Schuster, 2005: 13). In 2005 alone, 16,369 Moroccan migrants were repatriated (Coslovi, 2007). This number is significantly higher than the repatriations from Italy to Libya. From February 2004, Morocco and Spain began naval patrolling (Schuster, 2005: 13), and joint police training courses were intensified. The courses are held on a monthly basis and focus on the control of sea borders and intelligence-sharing (EC, 2005e). Furthermore, Morocco has adapted its legislative framework in line with the EU acquis. For example, on 11 November 2003 Morocco passed a law regulating the entry and residence of foreigners (de Haas, 2005b). The law includes heavy sanctions against undocumented migration and human smuggling but largely ignores migrants’ rights (de Haas, 2005b). Partly as a result of this cooperation, over the last few years a reduction in the number of unauthorised arrivals has been observed. The number of migrants crossing the Strait of Gibraltar decreased from 6,287 in 2003 to 5,395 in 2004 and 4,329 in 2006 (Coslovi, 2007). Likewise, according to UNHCR, the total number of undocumented arrivals in Spain has decreased from 31,859 in 2006 to 8,300 in 2008 (UNHCR, 2009a). While in 2005 most of the migrants reaching the Canary Islands were Moroccan, in 2006 out of 26,498 only 383 were of Moroccan nationality (Coslovi, 2007). Moreover, whereas in the first seven months of 2007 5,594 Moroccans landed on

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48 The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities

Spanish shores, in the same period in 2008 the number of apprehensions dropped to 4,557 (Fortress Europe, 2008). On these grounds, some commentators suggest that the putative externalising measures of Spain towards Morocco have succeeded (Coslovi, 2007). Nevertheless, the bilateral collaboration remains beset by tensions. More often than not, Morocco has been reluctant to cooperate. For example, Morocco has refused to collaborate on readmissions and it has often declared that migrants transited through Algeria, not Morocco, before arriving in Spain (Cassarino, 2008: 7). The same conflicts exist in the relations between the EU and Morocco. In 2005 the EC noted that it had not yet been able to reach a readmission agreement with Morocco (EC, 2005g; Gil-Bazo, 2006). As the EC Communication specifies: Despite several rounds of negotiations, the EC has not yet been able to agree the text of a readmission agreement with Morocco. Most of the outstanding issues are minor but some, such as the readmission of nonnationals and the forms of evidence to be provided, remain problematic. (EC, 2005g: 5–6) By the same token, the EU Action Plan for Morocco met initially with strong resistance from the Moroccan government, which argued that the Action Plan represented the unilateral security agenda of the EU (Ellerman, 2008: 186). Indeed, the Action Plan, drafted in October 1999, on measures to address the root causes of migration was delayed due to the lack of dialogue with Morocco (Gil-Bazo, 2006: 586). Moroccan authorities have emphasised that their involvement in the fight against irregular migration is contingent on the EU undertaking to support Morocco’s development efforts (Cassarino, 2005). Migration has also been strategically linked to the enduring territorial disputes over the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Wiegand, 2009). As a result, EU officials have softened their approach and adopted a series of measures to suit Morocco’s interests more closely (Ellerman 2008: 186). The implicit assertion by many academics and policy-makers is that Morocco needs to be persuaded to collaborate by means of targeted incentives and compensatory measures (Arango and Martin, 2003). Morocco’s partial compliance with the Spanish and European agenda is attributable to the complex give-and-take framework. The aggregation of the diverging issues on the negotiating table, such as migration, the fisheries agreement, the tariffs and quotas envisioned in the EU association agreement, oil resources and the dispute over Western Sahara (Gillespie, 2004), have increased the stakes and widened the scope for side-payments. The conduct of the two countries stems from their preference orderings, which, in turn, define their cooperative or non-cooperative approaches. In this context, attention needs to be paid to the interests of the two sides.

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When it comes to migration policies, Morocco is concerned most of all with migrant remittances. Already in the 1960s the transactions between migrants and their related households in the home country (Alfieri et al., 2005) represented an important source of income for Morocco (Collyer, 2004: 17–18). Between 1995 and 1999, Morocco was the sixth-largest remittance-receiving country in the world, and by 2001 it occupied fourth place (de Haas, 2005a: 18). By some reckonings, the relatively stable remittance flow is five times higher than official development aid, and also exceeds foreign direct investments, revenues from tourism, and the exports of agricultural produce and phosphates (de Haas, 2005a: 1). As de Haas observes, remittances are a ‘tool for national economic development’ (de Haas, 2005a: 16) and a primary concern in Morocco’s foreign policy agenda. Conversely, Spain has been concerned with labour migration policies (Plewa, 2009). It has sought to reassure an increasingly fearful domestic public about the effectiveness of its ‘closing border approach’ and, at the same time, to address the demand by Spanish businesses for cheap and unskilled labour. On the one hand, it has been observed that in Spain, unlike Italy, discourses of prejudice and closure towards migrants are virtually non-existent (Triandafyllidou, 2000: 385). No right-wing, anti-immigrant party has taken root in the country to channel citizens’ increasing anxiety about migration (Encarnacion, 2004: 169). Spanish political institutions have not adopted the harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies found in other European countries, such as Italy (Encarnacion, 2004: 169). On the other hand, it has been amply documented that in Spain migration has become ‘one of the three most important subjects in the national political agenda, together with unemployment and terrorism’ (Agrera, 2002: 5). Spanish politicians and media have increasingly emphasised the securitarian dimension of migration (Barrero, 2006). Accordingly, the ‘fight against illegal immigration’ has become a major concern for Spanish authorities (Carling, 2007a). The vexing reality for Spain is that its securitised approach to migration has actually strengthened Morocco’s leverage. Arguably, Morocco benefits from migrant flows not only because of remittances, but also because it makes Spain more vulnerable. Morocco has lamented its inability to control borders because of its lack of resources, yet has also shown that it can reduce, when it wants to, the number of ‘pateras’ – small boats carrying migrants – to Spain (Gillespie, 2004: 3). This point is taken further by Qadim, who suggests that the controversial process of externalising migration controls from Spain into Morocco has reconfigured overall relations with Spain and the EU (El Qadim, 2006: 89). In her words: Morocco [ ... ] has largely benefited from being a transit country with the negotiations with the EU. Indeed, by positioning itself as potential partner in the action against irregular migration, Rabat has been and still is

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capable of advancing economic and political requests. [ ... ] Because of its status as emigration country and being a partner in the fight against unauthorised migration, Morocco has been able to reposition itself in the negotiations with the EU. (El Qadim, 2006: 83) This view is echoed by Afeef, who maintains that Morocco enjoys significant bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU. Since the Maghreb region is a ‘vital transit zone for migrants from sub-Saharan African heading towards Europe, it is essential for the EU to obtain these countries’ cooperation on migration issues if it wishes to reduce arrivals in Europe’ (Afeef, 2006: 26). In her view, ‘it is clear’ that Morocco exerts ‘some degree of bargaining power in extraterritorial asylum arrangements’ and that the relations between Morocco with the EU are interdependent rather than dependent (Afeef, 2006: 26). Once again, it is important to remind ourselves that the argument that migration involves complex bargaining between states is hardly new. Indeed, this conclusion was reached by Choucri in 1977 with reference to migration across the Arab world: The new migration in the Middle East is creating bargaining power for all states involved. How that power is used will have not only national implications, but regional implications as well. The extent to which Egypt shapes and maintains bargaining power – either by arguing that the other Arab countries will gain by contributing to the development of Egypt’s manpower resources, or by proposing to withhold its labor from other Arab states if common, mutual, and shared regional gains are not envisaged – will, in turn, determine the broad lines of foreign policy and economic policies for the remaining years of the decade. (Choucri, 1977: 443) Hispano–Moroccan relations are certainly consistent with Choucri’s account. As a result of the alleged externalising policies sponsored by Spain and the EU, migration has furnished Morocco with increased leverage over Spain. These reflections generate important questions relating to my selected case study. Do the Italian–Libyan agreements involve a de-territorial dimension? To what extent does the securitised discourse on migration pervade the Italian and Libya domestic agenda? How does it influence, if at all, their bilateral negotiating patterns?

3.4

Cooperation on migration between Turkey and the EU

I now assess the dialogue on migration between Turkey and EU, and how the accession negotiations, especially on migration, have influenced their interaction. The discussions between the EU and Turkey differ markedly from the inter-state ones examined thus far. The comparison of the

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negotiations between the EU and an accession country, on the one hand, and those between two states, on the other hand, demands caution. The EU is characterised by highly complex decision-making structures and negotiating procedures, which display obvious differences from those of a state (Hix, 1999: 2). Moreover, from an analytical perspective, the EU falls within the analytical category of an international organisation as opposed to state actor. Hence a rigorous investigation would entail a separate methodological approach. Despite these shortcomings, the following comparative exercise remains worthwhile. Through this brief examination of the Turkish position on the EU’s presumed efforts to de-locate border controls, we may gain further perspective on the process of externalisation and North–South dynamics. Turkey is a country of immigration, emigration and transit migration (Icduygu, 2003). Throughout history, it has attracted a large number of migrants from the Middle East, with the key entry points being the Iranian and Iraqi borders (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006: 3). Between 1923 and 1997, more than 1.6 million people are reported to have migrated to Turkey (Kiris¸çi, 2003). For instance, during the Cold War thousand of asylum-seekers fled there from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The majority of them were recognised as refugees, and resettled to third countries, including Canada and the US, by UNHCR (Kiris¸çi, 2003). In terms of emigration, starting in the 1960s large numbers of Turkish nationals migrated to Western European countries, particularly West Germany (Jurgens, 2001). This outflow continues to the present day, through family reunification schemes, the asylum system and undocumented channels (Kiris¸çi, 2003). Additionally, since the mid-1990s the number of irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan using Turkey as a transit route has grown (Apap et al., 2004: 19; Icduygu, 2005). Turkey has been under EU pressure to control irregular migration, and has been very assiduous in harmonising its legislation with the European acquis (Icduygu, 2005: 14). For example, in 2002, as part of the wider accession discussions, Turkey started to tackle the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues. In June 2002, the Turkish government formed the Task Force on Asylum, Migration and Border Protection, composed of governmental representatives (Apap et al., 2004: 13). Working groups were set up in order to produce legislative proposals on border protection, irregular migration, the Schengen visa regime and asylum (Apap et al., 2004: 13). A few months afterwards, in August 2002, a new law including a definition of human trafficking and prescribing penalties for smuggling organisations was introduced (Icduygu, 2005: 14). Likewise, in January 2005 the Turkish Ministry of the Interior issued a circular to ensure better coordination between the police, the gendarmerie and the coast guard (EC, 2005f: 112). The same year, a law was adopted to allow the recruitment of 10,000 new policemen (EC, 2005f: 112). The new Code of Criminal Procedure, which came into force

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the same year, contains new powers on the conduct of criminal investigations, covering issues such as search, interception of communication, covert surveillance and physical examination (EC, 2005f: 112). The positive results in terms of unauthorised migrant flows were quick to emerge. In 2003, the EU Progress Report acknowledged that the trend of irregular migration via Turkey had decreased (Apap et al., 2004: 19). According to the 2005 EU Progress Report, in 2004 54,810 undocumented migrants were apprehended in Turkey, compared to 48,055 in 2003 (EC, 2005f: 111). In addition, while in 2003 5,720 foreigners were refused admission at the borders, in 2004 the number rose to 8,000 (EC, 2005f: 111). Presumably, Turkey’s revision of its migration policies and border control measures stems from its eagerness to align itself with the EU Schengen system, with a view to fulfilling the accession criteria (Icdygu, 2005; Kiris¸çi, 2003).15 However, Turkey has not been complying fully with European requests. The most recent EU progress report laments the fact that ‘Turkey has not pursued the negotiations on a readmission agreement with the European Community since December 2006.’ It therefore concludes that ‘limited progress can be reported on management of irregular migrants in Turkey’ (EC, 2008e: 71). Baldwin-Edwards reports that the Greek authorities have often resented the persisting difficulties in returning migrants to Turkey (BaldwinEdwards, 2006). Between April 2002 and November 2006, Greece submitted 23,689 cases of migrants to be readmitted. Of them, Turkey accepted 2,841. Ultimately, however, only 1,463 were readmitted (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006: 5). As the Greek authorities bluntly put it, Turkey ‘is not responding substantively to commitments it has assumed with the Greek-Turkish readmission Protocol of 2001. There is unwillingness for effective cooperation’ (Embassy of Greece, 2007). In the same vein, in October 2009, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou lamented that Turkey was continuing to refuse to honour the migrant readmittance protocol (EU Business, 2009). Reportedly, Athens has also accused Ankara of harassing aircraft belonging to the EU border agency Frontex (EU Business, 2009). More recently, in February 2010, the Greek Citizens’ Protection Minister, Michalis Chrysohoidis, sent an open invitation to Turkish Minister of Interior Besir Alatay to discuss irregular migration and organised crime. Noting the explosive potential that the two issues have gained over the past decade, Chrysohoidis called for closer bilateral cooperation to tackle the common challenge (Athens News Agency, 2010). Turkey has also been hesitant as regards the stipulations of the readmission agreements with the EU. According to some observers, in March 2004 Turkey reluctantly agreed to start negotiations with the EU on this agreement, but bewailed the level of pressure they had been under to start such negotiations (Apap et al., 2004: 22). On the one hand, Turkish lack of progress in adopting the EU acquis can be attributed less to a lack of goodwill on the part of the Turkish authorities

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than to the practical difficulties that the Turkish authorities face (Mannaert, 2003: 12). In this vein, Kiris¸çi suggests that ‘Turkey is not ready to carry out these tasks bureaucratically, organisationally and socio-economically’ (Kiris¸çi, 2001). On the other hand, Turkey expects a tangible assurance that the EU is committed to alleviating some of the burden of taking in nonEuropean refugees and asylum-seekers, as well as to granting EU membership before Turkey commits itself to all of the EU acquis (Mannaert, 2003: 13). As Pastore notes, Turkey is technically able to control unauthorised flows across its territory (Pastore, 2006). The real problem, however, is represented by the costs entailed by the new role of Turkey as a filter for transit flows towards current EU territory (Pastore, 2006: 6). Turkey fears becoming a ‘dumping ground’ for irregular migrants and asylum-seekers who are unwanted in the rest of Europe. Hence the success of the negotiation depends partly on the payoffs offered by the EU to secure Turkey’s good will and compliance. These factors could become a major obstacle to the future relations between Turkey and the EU (Pastore, 2006: 6). Another problematic aspect relates to the prospects of adopting the EU acquis. If and when membership occurs, Turkey would become a typical ‘first country of asylum’, responsible for status determination (Apap et al., 2004: 25). This raises concerns among Turkish officials, who regard existing burden-sharing mechanisms as insufficient and not profitable (Alap et al., 2004: 25; Icduygu, 2005). For a full appreciation of the broader negotiating dynamics, we ought to consider how migration relates to other issues on the agenda. Despite Turkish reservations concerning the implementation of the Schengen system, the overall bargaining dynamics appear to be more complex than those observed in the previous cases. A full assessment of the deeper political issues at stake goes well beyond the scope of this book. Because of the multidimensional and ongoing nature of the EU–Turkish negotiations, it is not possible to draw final and clear-cut conclusions. This is also due to the slow pace of the entry negotiations. As of December 2009, negotiations had opened on the twelfth of 35 chapters. Yet only the chapter on science and research policy had been completed (Migration News, 2010b). It seems reasonable, however, to assert that migration and asylum are becoming increasingly important in the overall diplomatic exchanges. Therefore, it can be argued that the European security narrative may make Europe, and Greece in particular, inclined to negotiate, which, in turn, affects the overall pattern of compliance to the advantage of Turkey. To an extent, then, perceptions of migration in relation to security as formulated in the European public arena create a situation of vulnerability for the EU, and allow Turkey to influence both the European agenda and the accession negotiations. However, the opposite is also true. The multiple equilibria characterising the accession discussions may, nevertheless, undermine the potential benefits that Turkey could derive from the migration bargaining-chip. This case, albeit peculiar, serves as a

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reminder that migration per se does not alter fundamentally the cooperative arrangements of given negotiating players. We should dismiss, therefore, excessively simplistic readings whereby migration is considered a decisive factor that grants new leverage to migrant-sending countries. Nonetheless, it seems fair to assert that migration does influence the bargaining dynamics, and that its effectiveness rests on the concomitant conditions of the overall negotiating structure. In this optic, in the Italian–Libyan agreements on migration specific attention will be devoted to the linkage between migration policies and the other issues on the negotiating table.

3.5

Conclusion

In casting the empirical net widely, this chapter looked at a range of different inter-state bilateral agreements on migration. The comparative exercise has obvious relevance to contextualising the findings of the Italian–Libyan agreements and appreciating the extent to which we can infer broad propositions beyond the specificities of my selected case. The empirical excursus demonstrated the numerous ways in which migration intertwines with international politics (Mitchell, 1989). It has emerged that receiving states are actively engaged in carrot-and-stick attempts to influence migration flows by appealing to sending countries’ interests (Hamilton, 1997: 563). Likewise, sending states have used the migration issue as a bargaining-chip to achieve other goals (Hamilton, 1997). Relations between the US and Latin American countries, and between Spain and Morocco, illustrate that migrant movements have been used symbolically and instrumentally to pursue foreign policy and domestic objectives (Loescher and Monahan, 1990). Each of the above cases sheds light on aspects that will be elaborated throughout the investigation of the Italian–Libyan collaboration. In the case of Cuban–US relations, both the receiving and sending state have been able to exert pressure on their counterpart. Mexican–US interaction, meanwhile, demonstrates how migration creates a situation of mutual economic and political dependence. Equally important are the characteristics of Moroccan–Spanish and Turkish–EU interaction. In these cases, the migrantsending country has been reluctant to collaborate with either the receiving state or the EU in the absence of significant rewards. In the latter case, however, the linkage between disparate issues on the negotiating table generates both costs and benefits. This provides us with clues as to how address our initial questions. Migration policies are part of a process wherein actors strive to advance their interests (Bartram, 2005: 12). In the process, not only migrant-receiving but also migrant-sending states are able to exert significant, yet not absolute or unilateral control over migration (Miller, 1978). In this chapter we have seen that institutional configurations evolve as policy-makers become

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susceptible to new ideas. Shifts in policy options and objectives may thus lead to unexpected outcomes whereby actors considered to be marginal to the political system may succeed in partially altering pre-existing configurations (Clemens, 1999 in Plewa, 2009: 74). Importantly, migration does not provide a bargaining-chip solely to countries located in the ‘South’, as I hypothesised at the outset of this book. Yet, under certain circumstances, it has historically helped the latter to constrain the action of their counterparts and to determine the negotiation structure in terms of agenda, rules and procedures. It is also clear that these circumstances are not fixed, and are very much history- and country-specific. The question that emerges now is whether these conclusions are consistent or not with those that I will draw for my selected case study. In particular, from this cursory comparative analysis it is possible to identify some points for further discussion in line with my initial quest. How significantly does migration affect the relations between Italy and Libya? Does it increase the bargaining power of Libya? If so, what are the conditions that make this possible? Does Italy succeed in making an instrumental usage of migration in its foreign policies? Can it do the same with Libya or not? What can be concluded in terms of overall patterns of state interdependence in relation to migration? More broadly, is it fair to assert that migration is redefining North–South power relations fundamentally?

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Part II Migration Discourses and Practices in Italy and Libya

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4 Italy and Migration

4.1 Introduction In July 2008, following reports of violent anti-Roma protests and indications that the Italian government intended to bring forward new legislative measures for stricter migration controls, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, published an alarming report on the ‘social stigmatisation and marginalisation’ of migrants in Italy (Council of Europe, 2008). The Commissioner warned that ‘concern about security cannot be the only basis for immigration policy’ (Council of Europe, 2008). Above all, he condemned the measures being taken in Italy, which lacked ‘human rights and humanitarian principles’ and could ‘spur further xenopohobia’ (Council of Europe, 2008). By some reckonings, Italy has adopted increasingly restrictive policies to address undocumented migration. In this context, the purpose of this chapter is to search beyond the complex matrix of Italian migration discourses and practices and reflect on the concurrence of seclusive and inclusive border policies. Given the vast literature on the issue, I limit this discussion to an illustration, based mainly on secondary resources, of two interrelated aspects of the Italian response to migration. First, I consider the linkage between migration and security in the Italian discourses – as defined in the introduction – and practices, and, second, the role of migration in Italy’s foreign policy agenda. Concerning the first aspect, I suggest that at the level of Italian official discourse migration has been treated as a major security issue. Images of a besieged fortress are increasingly pervading the Italian public mind and nurturing xenophobic sentiments. This has partly contributed to the introduction of restrictive migration policies. However, a thorough examination of Italian migration policies reveals a more multifaceted picture. Alongside the coercive measures and surveillance technology employed by Italian authorities to control frontiers, I make the case for the underlying openness of Italian migration policies. Contrary to the common view that Italian migration policies are inherently and solely restrictive, it is clear that the 59

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number of migrants welcomed either through the annual quotas system or the recurrent regularisations has increased over the years. Regularisations are here defined as ‘programmes that give migrants already residing in a country in an unauthorised way the ability to secure legal status on a permanent or temporary basis’ (Papadopoulou, 2005: 2). In broad terms, a discrepancy can thus be observed between the security narrative on migration at the level of discourse, and the actual policies that have welcomed more and more foreigners (Geddes, 2008). As regards the second aspect, I argue that Italian migration policies, such as the annual quotas, have been used by Italy to extract concessions from migrant-sending countries. This contention is highly significant for my research question. The appreciation of the ambivalence between discourses and practices in Italy’s overall approach to migration forms the basis of the analysis presented in Parts III amd IV on Italian–Libyan interdependence. In keeping with these two ideas, this chapter comprises four sections. First, I survey changing migration trends in Italy over the last two decades.1 In section 4.3, I look at the extent to which migration has been perceived as a security issue by the Italian citizenry, national media and politicians. This analysis will be complemented in section 4.4 by a discussion of the migration policies implemented by successive Italian governments and, in section 4.5, by an assessment of the linkage between Italian migration policies and relations with third countries. The period that I consider goes from the 1970s until January 2010. This empirical and descriptive analysis anticipates the discussion of the core chapters of this book concerned with the nexus between migration and foreign policy.

4.2

Data on migration

Before turning to the study of migration trends in Italy, a cautionary note on the reliability of the statistics that I employ is required. Unsurprisingly, different sources have produced diverging figures on, for example, the migrant population in Italy. As Pastore reminds us, statistics on migration are fraught with substantive problems concerning, for example, definition and sampling methods and composition (Pastore, 2007a). They are also subject to deceptive and instrumental usage by media and politicians (Pastore, 2007a: 28). Nonetheless, referring to this data is unavoidable (Pastore, 2007a: 28), and I take the view that, employed with critical awareness, it can still help give a general idea of the changing size of migrant flows in Italy. It is well known that migration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy. Up until the late 1970s, a large number of Italians – over 25 million since the 1960s by some estimates – had emigrated to work in Europe or further afield (Chaloff and Piperno, 2004: 2). However, from the early 1980s emigration came to an halt, as Italy began to receive foreign labour. Whereas in 1985

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in Italy there were 318,700 migrants, in 1998 there were 1,250,000 (Koff, 2001: 5). In other words, in over a decade the size of the migrant population in Italy increased by 292 per cent, by contrast with the 46 per cent average across Europe (Koff, 2001: 5). Similarly, ISTAT, the Italian National Institute for Statistics, indicates that between 1992 and 2002 the number of permits given to foreigners increased on average by 77 per cent every year (ISTAT, 2004: 9). According to the same source, as of January 2009, the foreigners legally residing in Italy were 3,891,295, representing over 6.5 per cent of the total Italian population (ISTAT, 2009). Preliminary statistics also show that by the end of 2009 the number increased to 4,279,000 (Caritas, 2009; Il Clandestino, 2010). If we take into account the number of irregular migrants, the total figure of foreigners living in Italy is likely to be much higher. According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, in 2005 there were 541,000 undocumented migrants in Italy, and in 2007 760,000 (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007h: 325). Recent statistics place the number of irregular migrants in Italy between 500,000 and 800,000 (European Migration Network, 2009: 59). While it is clear that the number of migrants in Italy has grown steadily over the last three decades, it is debatable whether this marks Italy out among European countries. For example, ISTAT has found that the proportion of foreigners present is low by European standards. According to its 2007 statistics, in 2006 foreign nationals represented 5 per cent of the total population. Yet in Germany they accounted for 8.8 per cent, in Spain and the United Kingdom for 6.2 per cent and in France for 5.9 per cent (ISTAT, 2007: 2). Conversely, the calculations made by Caritas, a branch of the Italian Episcopal Conference, show that in 2006 the total foreign population residing legally in Italy amounted to 3,690,000, i.e. 6.2 per cent of the total population. Thus, Caritas concludes: Italy, along with Spain, follows Germany as the countries with the largest immigrant population in the EU and regarding annual increase, these two Mediterranean countries do not have equals in Europe and even exceed proportions in the United States (with a population five times that of Italy, the US registers over one million new immigrant entries per year). (Caritas, 2007: 4) Having observed the overall size of the migrant population in Italy, it is worth considering the origin of migrants living in Italy. Whereas in the 1970s the majority of migrants were from Yugoslavia, and in the 1980s from Iran, since the 1990s a more diversified pattern of migration has been recorded (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i: 323). Through the 1990s, an increasing number of migrants from countries outside Eastern Europe docked on Italian shores (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i). The most prevalent areas of origin were three: the Maghreb and

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Sub-Saharan Africa; the Middle East, including Turkey, Lebanon and Syria; and Afghanistan and the Indian sub-continent (Monzini, 2004: 41). Among these three groups, in the 1990s Africans were the majority, accounting for 35 per cent of the migrant population in Italy in 1991 and 28.7 per cent in 1996 (Pastore, 2007b). However, after peaking in early 2000, African migration has gradually diminished.2 Indeed, ISTAT found that in 2006 the majority of migrants in Italy were from Central-Eastern Europe (ISTAT, 2004: 4). Between 2004 and 2007, their proportion increased by 48.8 per cent (ISTAT, 2007: 4). More precisely, over these three years Ukrainians increased from 58,000 to 120,000, Romanians from 178,000 to 342,000, and Poles from 40,000 to 72,000 (ISTAT, 2007: 4). These findings are corroborated by the 2009 Caritas report, which reported that the first five largest foreign communities included 800,000 Romanians, 440,000 Albanians, 400,000 Moroccan, 170,000 Chinese and 150,000 Ukrainians (Caritas, 2009: 1). Overall, the increasing presence of migrants from Eastern Europe invites reflections on the structural changes in the European migration system resulting from a complex combination of push and pull factors.3 The study of migratory movements leads to the next strand of this chapter, concerning the discourses and practices of Italian migration policies.

4.3

Migration discourse in Italy

The linkage between media and migration has been widely researched in Italian academic and non-academic literature (Bonifazi, 1992; Campani, 2001). In particular, the analysis of Sciortino and Colombo (2004) offers a fruitful path of enquiry. While they acknowledge that ‘various descriptions of the changes in public discourse on immigration are less certain than the literature on the subject would lead one to believe’ (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 106), they identify some common elements in the perception of foreigners by the media. From the mid-1980s, migration attracted increasing attention from Italian newspapers, radio and TV (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 101). In the process, migrants started to be ‘associated with the risk of xenophobic reactions’, deriving both from competition in the labour market and from ‘the provincial and old-fashioned nature of Italian culture’ (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 101). During the 1990s, news on migrants and criminality increased, while at the same time news about foreigners’ participation in the Italian labour market practically disappeared (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 101). In 2004, the latter category accounted less than 3 per cent of the news about migrants published in periodicals, the lowest since 1969. This is remarkable, because the 1990s was a decade in which foreigners became a structural component of labour in many sectors in Italy (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 110). On the basis of such findings, Sciortino and Colombo conclude that there

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is a significant gap between reality and the media portrayal of migration (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 110). This ambivalence will become clearer in the next section on Italian migration policies. Similar findings emerge from a study conducted in 2003 by Censis, an Italian private research centre, on the media representation of migration in Italy. The survey focused on seven national newspapers, ten local newspapers and nine periodicals and a number of television broadcasts between May and September 2001. Above all, the study identified a number of ‘communicative defects’, including a tendency to over-dramatise news and to use language that favours an emotional rather than a rational response. Superficial quality checks of sources, proclivity towards sensationalist messages and biased and misleading representation of various social actors, were also observed (Censis, 2003: 4). Although direct racism was not deemed to be a pervasive feature, one of the main conclusions is that migrants were associated heavily with criminal episodes, at the expense of the everyday aspects of integration (Censis, 2003: 4). Other academic research, however, has gone so far as to qualify the Italian media as racist and to detect political interests behind it. Campani, for example, writes that: Whilst the media’s stereotypised images of immigrants are expressions of racist mentalities, lack of professional ethics or, sometimes, just plain ignorance, such images are also part of political battles and the fight for specific power interests. (Campani, 2001: 39) Likewise, the research produced by the Italian scholars Alessandro Dal Lago (1999b) and Salvatore Palidda (1996) argues eloquently that the Italian media have played a decisive role in the deepening of the ‘culture of panic and emergency’ in relation to migration. Beyond doubt, the media portrayal of migration in Italy influences, and is influenced, by public opinion, to which I now turn. Different surveys conducted over the last ten years confirm that, to varying degrees, a significant proportion of Italians see migration as a social threat. According to a survey conducted in 1996 by the business association Confcommercio, seven Italians in ten believed that migrants were making criminality worse (Jamienson and Sily, 1998: 9). Eight out of ten police officers and magistrates thought that the increase in migration was linked to the spread of organised crime. It also emerged that 94 per cent of the respondents felt that migrants had aggravated criminality. At the top of the list of activities for which they felt this to be true was prostitution (28 per cent), followed by drug dealing (25.6 per cent), micro-criminality (18.4 per cent), racketeering (3.2 per cent) and unregistered work (2.4 per cent) (Jamienson and Sily, 1998: 9). According to the 2002 annual report by Caritas, 23.9 per cent of Italians considered migrants a threat to their culture and identity, 29 per cent a threat to work opportunities, and 39.7 per cent to

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public order and security (Caritas, 2003). Likewise, the 2006 Caritas report indicated that 40 per cent of Italians believed that significant numbers of migrants are involved in criminal activities (Caritas, 2006a). Moreover, the perceived linkage of migration and crime and the lack of accurate knowledge appear to be correlated. The study produced by Makno & Consulting on behalf of the Italian Ministry of the Interior in 2007 found that 85 per cent of the Italians interviewed had a perception of migrants based on news reports, and believed that there were 50 per cent more irregular than legal migrants, which would mean 4.5 million migrants in the country (Makno & Consulting 2007)! By some reckonings, these perceptions have deepened alongside an increase in racial violence. For instance, Angel-Aiani documents that over the 1980s and 1990s growing numbers of migrants were being harassed by Italians (Angel-Aiani, 2000). However, figures released by the Ministry of the Interior indicate that while the number of offences committed against foreigners has not increased, it has remained consistently high nevertheless (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i: 373). This bleak impression of Italians’ behaviour towards migrants, however, is not the whole story. The study conducted by Bordignon and Ceccarini (2007) accounts for the many nuances in the responses of the Italian public. Although their research endorses the view that migrants are associated with security fears, it also emerges that most respondents agree that migrants should enjoy civic rights, including the right to vote. Likewise, according to a survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, in 2009, 53 per cent of Italians supported providing social benefits and political participation rights to legal migrants (German Marshall Fund, 2009: 4). Indeed, migration continues to be perceived as necessary for the economy (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2007: 36; Makno & Consulting, 2007). Accordingly, in the Italian public mind ‘securitarian fever’ coexists with an awareness that migrants are necessary for the well-being of the country (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2007: 36). In the same spirit, the report produced by Makno & Consulting attests that migration is not considered the most urgent issue, ranking well below other concerns such as unemployment and increasing costs of life and health care (German Marshall Fund, 2009: 5; Makno & Consulting, 2007). The multifaceted stance of Italian public opinion on migration is also evidenced by the so-called ‘third sector’, namely civil society organisations which have been playing an increasingly active role in the public discourse (Carella et al., 2007). Italian NGOs working on migration, such as Carias, Comunità di S. Egidio and others, have sought to defend the rights of migrants, promote their integration and combat discrimination (Bozzi and Fella, 2008). Nonetheless, the broader political impact of these organisations remains unclear. In fact they have often been described as being weak, fragmented and unprofessional, ‘devoting their energies to cultural initiatives rather than political mobilisation’ (Bozzi and Fella, 2008: 252).

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To further comprehend the overall narrative on migration in Italy, we ought to consider the approach adopted by policy-makers, which is equally complex. In broad terms, the bias towards the increasing securitisation of migration in the official discourse is overt. In the second report on racism in Italy, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) lamented the ‘diffuse employment of racist and xenophobic propaganda from certain exponents of Italian political parties. Such propaganda is focused on non-EU migrants, and on those that lack legal status’ (ECRI, 2002: 25). ECRI also indicates that, in the Italian political debate, migrants are portrayed as responsible for the worsening of security conditions and as a threat to local and national identity. Moreover many unsubstantiated generalisations are made on the relationship between migrants and drugtrafficking and prostitution. As the report maintains: ECRI is deeply concerned for the negative consequences that this propaganda yields on the perception that the Italian population has towards non-EU migrants and for the general atmosphere of intolerance and xenophobia that such a propaganda fuels. (ECRI, 2002: 25) For example, it is well known that the arrival of undocumented migrants on the island of Lampedusa was described by Italian politicians as an ‘assault’ and ‘invasion’ of Italy. On this matter, examples abound. In 2004, following the disembarkation of over 1,000 migrants at Lampedusa, the then Minister of the Interior, Giuseppe Pisanu, notoriously declared: The assault to our coasts has been organised by criminal organizations that cruelly exploit the movements of clandestine people. We cannot endorse in any possible way this game and these despicable affairs. We are dealing with this emergency with the necessary determination. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004e) Besides the ‘invasion’ analogy, the other interrelated theme is that of security. As the Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, declared: My task is to promote a vigorous line in terms of security [ ... ] The principle is to guarantee maximum security for the citizens and to prevent as well as fight in a rigorous manner clandestine immigration and to assert the principle of legality. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008a) An extract from the site of the Berlusconi government is another case in point: Italians need more security. They expect the State to effectively protect their lives and their properties. They deserve tranquillity in the face of

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the mounting aggression and the widespread criminality, which has worsened because of clandestine immigration. (Governo Berlusconi, 2008) Overall, the anti-migration and xenophobic tones of right-wing political parties such as the Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale, have been amply documented (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005; Perlmutter, 2002; Tambini, 2001). The critical point here is that the securitised dimension of migration remains a prevalent feature of the accounts formulated by Italian politicians (Sciortino, 2004). Another important aspect of the political discourse on migration concerns the putative connection between migration and terrorism. This appears to be a long-standing character of securitised narratives constructed by Italian politicians. The following quote from a senior government official is instructive: The gradual inter-linkage between the exploitation of illegal immigration not just with human, drug and arm trafficking but also with international terrorism, obliges us to be particularly vigilant with regard to the clandestine coming from the Horn of Africa where Al Qaeda has taken firm root. We also have to be vigilant with those coming from Sub-Saharan Africa where Islamic fundamentalism is spreading rapidly. (Senato, 2005a)4 In other words, the dominant political narrative continues tends to be exclusionist (Bigot and Fella, 2008). Needless to say, this securitised discourse is not peculiar to Italy; it reflects a wider anti-migrant sentiment in many European countries (Bigo, 1998, 2006). It has long been made to serve as a focal issue around which the electorate can be mobilised (Huysmans, 2000; Mitchell, 1989). The striking point here is that official pronouncements in Italy and across Europe that emphasise the security-migration linkage have critical implications for the relations with Libya. I will return to this point in Chapters 8 and 9. To argue, however, that state-sanctioned discourses are exclusively security-based is misleading. Not only have some members of the left parties criticised the securitarian emphasis attached to migration, but within the right-wing coalitions efforts have been made by some to portray ‘legal’ migration as conducive to the public good. The Minister of the Interior, Pisanu, also declared: Of course, migration nowadays is perceived as a problem. However, because of its structural nature, we have to see it instead as a resource. Regular migrants represent a significant proportion of the active population in Europe and positively contribute to the economic and social vitality of our continent. In other words, immigration is not an emergency

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and we cannot and should not qualify the phenomenon in these terms. This would prevent us from understanding and managing it. Immigration has come to be a stable feature of our everyday life – whether we like it or not – and it will cover a conspicuous part of our future and of our sons’ future. (Senato, 2003a) Likewise, a recent report produced by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri attests that ‘the hypothesis whereby extremists make a systematic utilisation of irregular migration lacks empirical basis’ (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2010: 90). In other words, concepts of multiculturalism’ and ‘integration’ remain in the lexicon of Italian politicians on both the right and left. An important question that needs to be addressed concerns the validity of the putative migration–security causal connection. To what extent do migrants represent a security threat, as a large number of Italian policymakers contend? Are the above-depicted societal fears on migration substantiated by empirical data?5 For present purposes, it suffices to observe that the issue is far more complex than the prevailing societal discourse assumes. Studies indicate that migrants are likely to be more involved in criminal activities. For example, in 1998 Jamieson and Silj analysed the involvement of Albanians in organised crime, and found that Albanian criminal organisations had ‘undoubtedly gained a solid foothold in Italy’ and were likely to want to expand their activities, competing with rival organisations for the same markets (Jamieson and Sily, 1998). This analysis is partly confirmed by a recent study conducted by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The report released in December 2007 found that between 1988 and 2006 the number of irregular foreigners arrested for criminal related offences had increased significantly (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i: 359). However, the same report maintains that, in relative terms, the offences committed by foreigners were equal in number to those committed by Italian nationals (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i). Therefore, the claim that foreign nationals are more involved in criminal activities than Italians is flawed. A further and more substantial point concerns the contested nature of the figures on crime and migrants. As Alessandro Dal Lago writes, ‘often the over-representation of migrants in judicial statistics and crime rates is the product of their social weakness’ and of improper labelling (Dal Lago, 1996: 43). In his view, not merely statistics but also policing practices suffer from a structural bias against foreigners. It follows that the above-noted figures on foreigners’ criminal offences may, therefore, reflect ‘the politics of race’ (Angel-Ajani, 2000). It has also been observed that the incidence of irregular foreigners being convicted is the consequence of restrictive migration policies, such as the Bossi-Fini law, which has prevented migrants from either obtaining or renewing their permits (De Zuleta, 2006b). As the former Italian Minister of

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Foreign Affairs, Massimo D’Alema, acknowledged, ‘clandestine immigration has been favoured by the Bossi-Fini Law, which makes it harder to regularise status’ (Stranieri in Italia, 5 May 2008). The critical point here is that statistics should not be accepted at face-value, since they reflect deeper dynamics that have much to do with the Italian cultural, social, political and legal context. Uncritical acceptance of such data may further legitimise the ‘securitarian fears’ informing the public perception on migration. As the former Italian Minister of the Interior, Giuliano Amato, made it clear: ‘there is an absolute need not to make an emotional use of the data which leads to identify the foreigner with crime’ (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007l). Accordingly, I shall take the view that the Italian security narrative is more based on perception than on a ‘real’ threat. In Chapter 9, I will argue that these perceptions have influenced the Italian–Libyan negotiations in important respects. In order to examine further the multifaceted Italian approach to migration, we need to distinguish the official discourse from the policies implemented (Geddes, 2008; Joppke, 2002). Thus I now venture into the measures enacted in Italy since the 1970s, with a view to appreciating the correlation between discourses and practices on migration.

4.4

Italian migration policies

In order to outline Italian migration policies, I follow a three-fold timeline (Caritas, 2006b: 64). The first phase covers the 1970s and 1980s, when Italy’s approach to migration was one of ‘neutrality and curiosity’ (Caritas, 2006b: 64). At that time, foreign labour regulation was determined by a law passed on 10 February 1961. This required foreign workers to obtain a work permit in order to reside in Italy, an obligation that had to be met before entering Italian territory and being formally hired by an Italian employer (D’Harmant, 1989: 113). Over the years, the debate on migration at the policy level intensified. The oil crisis of 1973 is considered to have been a turning-point,6 since this is when European countries that traditionally imported labour started adopting restrictive policies (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004; Sciortino, 2000). Despite the large-scale closure of legal entry points during the 1970s and 1980s, Italy continued to record a significant growth in migration. Responding to a recognised demand for labour, foreign workers often entered the country under tourist visas and then stayed irregularly (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004: 54). The surge in the number of migrants was also due to the successive regularisations which, as we shall see, are a central feature of Italian migration policy. The second phase, from 1986 to 1995, is defined by Caritas as a period of ‘emergency’ (Caritas, 2006b: 64). Its onset was marked by the passage of Act No. 943 of 30 December 1986. This Act was designed to protect Italians against potentially ‘unfair’ competition on the labour market. Entry and work

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permits could be issued only when it had been established that there were not enough Italians workers to fill the relevant jobs (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 2). Importantly, however, this Act also regularised approximately 103,000 migrants already living in Italy (Papdemetriou and Hamilton, 1996: 49). It also granted basic civil and social rights to foreign workers with legal status, and guaranteed equal access to health care, public housing and education for migrant children (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 2). It was not until February 1990 that the first comprehensive legislation to regulate foreigners’ entry and establish basic rules for asylum admission and processing was passed. Known as the ‘Martelli Law’, this established that any migrant – whether documented or not – who could prove that he or she had come into the country before the end of 1989 could be granted a twoyear residency permit (Hamilton, 2002). A specific budget was allocated for the construction of ‘initial reception centres’ to house migrants temporarily while they looked for more permanent accommodation (Ministero dell Giustizia, 1990). Furthermore, a committee was set up to decide how many workers from non-EU countries could enter Italy every year. In conformity with the Schengen Treaty, the Martelli Law allowed asylum-seekers to enter the country, and visas were made compulsory for all people coming from outside the EU (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 3). It is also noteworthy that 234,841 undocumented migrants were regularised (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 3). A new Decree,7 passed on 18 November 1995, marked the beginning of the third phase. This, the so-called Dini Decree, instituted severe measures against smuggling and new provisions on the treatment of migrants (Medici Senza Frontiere, 2005). The Decree also required identification cards for seasonal workers, and allowed immediate expulsions of foreigners either convicted for crimes or considered a threat to the public order (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 1996: 44). Once again, however, over 200,000 irregular migrants were regularised at the same time (Stranieri, 2003). The Dini Decree was part of a broader proposal for law reform drafted in 1993 by the Conti Committee, a commission of experts charged with amending the 1990 Act and drafting a new, comprehensive Immigration Bill. This Bill, passed as the ‘Turco-Napolitano Act’ (after the then Social Affairs and Interior ministers) on 6 March 1998, was based on the following four pillars: (1) preventing and combating ‘illegal’ entry; (2) regulating new flows of foreign workers; (3) promoting the integration of migrants holding a valid residence permit; and (4) granting basic individual rights to ‘illegal’ migrants (Parlamento Italiano, 1998). Under the first pillar, ‘temporary accommodation centres’ were established to detain undocumented migrants who had been issued with expulsion orders (Human Rights Watch, 2006a; Vassallo Paleologo, 2006: 220). Further, the second pillar facilitated entry, through the introduction of ‘sponsorship’ (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 3). Potential workers could enter the country provided they were sponsored by private

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individuals, regions, municipalities or associations that had previously deposited an economic guarantee, ensured appropriate accommodation and paid the contributions for public health insurance (Parlamento Italiano, 1998). An important aspect of the Turco-Napolitano law is the annual quota system. The law revised pre-existing regulation and introduced the so-called decreto-flussi (‘flows decree’), which establishes the maximum number of foreign nationals who may enter Italy each year for work reasons (Ministero dell Interno, no date). Some shares of this quota are reserved to citizens of particular countries, and other shares to particular categories of countries (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7; Parlamento Italiano, 1998). The remaining part of the quota is open to nationals of any non-EU-country (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7). I will return to the issue of annual quotas in the next section of this chapter. The study of the flows decrees and regularisations provides useful clues for untangling my initial question on the nexus between Italian political discourses and practices. On the one hand, a chorus of commentators has deplored the increasingly restrictive measures that the annual quota system entails (Dentico and Gressi, 2006; Vassallo Paleologo, 2008a). On the other hand, the fact that increasingly large numbers of migrants have obtained legal residence, either through the annual quotas or through regularisation (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009), has led other observers to see these measures as quite liberal (Cuttitta, 2006). This is demonstrated by Figure 4.1, which 700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Figure 4.1 Annual migration quotas 1996–2009 Source: Elaborated from Pastore (2008b), Ministero dell’ Interno (2009) and Caritas (2009). Three notes of caution are warranted. First, the year 2007 displays a drastic increase in the number of migrants because it included different decrees. This is clarified by Cuttitta who observes that ‘the last 2006 decree was regarded from the beginning as a regularisation programme in disguise’ (Cuttitta, 2008b: 48). Second, it is important to emphasise that there are disagreements as to the reliability of the figures for significant differences exist between different data sets (Cuttitta, 2008b). Third, the number of applications should not be considered a reliable indicator of the actual level of domestic demand for foreign labour, nor of the size of an existing network of irregular labour practices which take advantage of the decreto-flussi to simulate recruitment from abroad (Einaudi, 2008; Pastore, 2008b).

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presents the official figures on the annual quotas provided by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The continuous increase in the quotas demonstrates that the actual labour demand in Italy has been much higher than political actors have been willing to admit (Pastore, 2007a). As will be apparent in the ensuing discussion, even the centre-right government coalition, which won the 2001 election after proposing restrictions on migration, had to bend to employers’ associations’ requests for drastic increases. After a slight decrease in 2002, the 2005 quotas were three times as much as the 1999 ones (Cuttitta, 2008a: 47). These measures are evidence of the disconnection between what politicians say, in terms of reducing migration, and what they actually do, by welcoming larger number of foreign workers. The 1998 Act was partially reformed in 2002 by the so-called Bossi-Fini Law. In passing this new law, the then Berlusconi government sought to link the granting of new residence permits to employment requirements in order to reduce unauthorised entry (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 3). Some of the most significant changes introduced by the new law included mandatory employer–migrant contracts, stricter deportation practices as well as amnesty for undocumented migrants who had worked and lived in the country for over three months (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2002). The law also provided for the legalisation of irregular migrants employed either as domestic workers and home-helpers, or as dependent workers. Overall, 634,728 undocumented migrants were regularised, i.e. almost the same number of foreigners regularised under the previous four amnesties (Governo Berlusconi, 2002; Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 5). This was the biggest regularisation ever implemented in Europe (Giacca, 2004: 11). The Bossi-Fini law was understood in different ways (Geddes, 2008: 350). Some criticised its repressive or even racist elements (Geddes, 2008: 350). For example, an Italian NGO, Consorzio Italiano Solidarietà, denounced the severe measures introduced, including the longer period of time during which migrants could be held in detention centres, the increased number of years for which those issued with an expulsion order were banned from entering Italy and the reinforced expulsion methods (Camilleri, 2005). In fact, some measures were ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, and had to be attenuated by the government (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 5). Others have drawn attention to its inherent contradictions (Pugliese, 2006). After an electoral campaign in 2002 promising rigour and sobriety, the government had to take a more pragmatic stance (Pastore 2007a: 25). In so doing, the Berlusconi government broke two European records (Pastore 2007a: 25). First, it granted the largest regularisation in European history, and second, it approved the most generous-ever annual quota, for up to 340,000 foreigners (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009: 126; Pastore 2007a: 25).

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Significantly, the policies enforced by the subsequent Prodi government (2006–8) exhibit the same pragmatic approach, especially as concerns the quota system and the regularisations (Bigot and Fella, 2008). On the one hand, attempts were made to revise the Bossi-Fini Law. With the law proposal known as the ‘Amato-Ferrero’ presented in March 2007, significant changes would be introduced concerning entry and work permits, and the fight against undocumented migration (Bigot and Fella, 2008). The proposed legislation sought to streamline the procedures for the grant of work permits, and to facilitate the search for employment opportunities by instituting the ‘sponsor’ granting work permits to migrants who had secured jobs prior to their arrival. Moreover, the duration of the decreto flussi would no longer be annual but tri-annual, in order to allow a longer-term planning of migrant flows (Governo Italiano, 2007). The collapse of the government at the beginning of 2008 meant that this reform proposal also fell (Bigot and Fella, 2008). On the other hand, however, an unprecedented number of undocumented migrants obtained a work permit through the annual quota system and recurrent regularisations (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7). This is true for the Berlusconi government appointed in 2008. For example, a regularisation for domestic workers (maids and nannies) and care workers was conducted in September 2009. The government received approximately 295,000 applications, ‘fewer than originally predicted’ (OECD, 2009b). The critical point is that the applications were mostly submitted by people who were already residing and working irregularly in Italy. It can therefore be argued that the annual quotas are de facto regularisations (Cuttitta, 2008b). It is clear by now that regularisations and annual quotas have become a ‘chronic’ aspect of Italian migration policies (Sciortino, 2006: 1034). This is particularly extraordinary, given that, with the exception of far-left parties and some activist movements, Italy’s main political parties are opposed to regularisation programmes (Chaloff, 2003; Levinson, 2005a). For the sake of a balanced discussion, it is important to underline that, concurrently with such inclusive policies, restrictive policing practices have also been implemented. The debate concerning Romanian migrants in Italy is an illustrative example. On 30 October 2007, an Italian woman, Giovanna Reggiani, was fatally wounded by a Romanian man as she left a Rome train station (Reuters, 3 November 2007). On 31 October, the Italian government adopted an emergency decree giving prefects the authority to expel EU citizens considered a threat to public order, even in the absence of a criminal investigation (Human Rights Watch, 2008b). Shortly afterwards, seventeen expulsion orders for Romanians were signed in Genoa, and three others in Rome (Reuters, 3 November 2007). Authorities forcibly evacuated and bulldozed the Roma camp where the alleged murderer was living, and conducted similar raids on Roma camps in Bologna, Florence and Genoa (Human Rights Watch, 2008b).

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On the day after of the incident, Giuliano Amato invited all Italians to ‘prevent this terrible tiger, which is xenophobic rage, the racist beast, from getting out of control’ (Reuters, 3 November 2007). However, the surge in security measures approved by the Italian authorities remains deeply controversial. As a representative of Human Rights Watch warned, ‘if the government is serious about curbing xenophobia, it needs to lead by example [ ... ] Police raids and expulsions send the message that discriminating against Roma and Romanians is OK’ (Human Rights Watch, 2008b). Yet again, the subsequent Berlusconi government nurtured this climate of public alarm. On 25 July 2008, Italy declared a national state of emergency in response to a sharp rise in the number of landings on Lampedusa (The International Herald Tribune, 25 July 2008). Accordingly, throughout the whole country police and local authorities were given additional powers to combat what was defined as the ‘persistent and exceptional’ arrival of irregular migrants (The International Herald Tribune, 25 July 2008). A few weeks afterwards, on 4 August 2008, the Italian Ministry of Defence announced the deployment of 3,000 soldiers in major Italian cities to ensure security (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008b). The soldiers, who were not given policing powers, were expected to protect ‘sensitive’ targets, such as institutional buildings, for the next six months’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 28 July 2008). At the level of legislation, the newly elected government pushed through law no. 125/2008 which changed the Italian Penal Code and made it possible to deport a foreigner or expel an EU-citizen in case he or she has been found guilty of a crime with a sentence of more than two years (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009: 126). It also succeeded in passing law no. 94/2009, known as the pacchetto sicurezza (‘security package’) which made undocumented entry and stay in Italy a criminal offence punishable by a fine of up to 10,000 euros (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2009). The law also established citizens’ vigilante groups to detect and report irregular migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2009a). Whereas it is too early to draw overall conclusions on the migration policies of the current government, the above empirical excursus reveals a tension between the security narrative at the level of discourse, which preaches surveillance, and the measures driven by labour demand (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009), which in fact incline towards openness. While it is important to acknowledge the gradual tightening of security mechanisms targeted at undocumented migrants, the overall legislative measures, by welcoming an unprecedented large number of migrants through annual quotas and regularisations, evince a deeper pattern of inclusion (Koff, 2001: 2). The complex character of the Italian stance on migration is even more evident if we consider the migration policies towards third countries. In line with the initial objectives of this book, I now provide an (admittedly sketchy) overview of how migration has been employed by Italy as a foreign policy tool to influence the behaviour of neighbouring countries.

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4.5 Italian migration policies and relations with third countries In recent decades, Italy has played a central role in Mediterranean migration policies. Because of its geographical position as a bridge between Europe and Africa, it is more exposed than other European countries to any developments in the political and economic situation at regional level (Coralluzzo, 2008: 115). As a result, relations with Mediterranean countries in general, and the issue of migration in particular, occupy a pivotal role in Italy’s foreign policy (Coralluzzo, 2008: 115). It has been argued that one of the primary objectives of Italian foreign aid towards Northern Africa and the Balkans has been to halt irregular migration (Carbone, 2008a: 9).8 In this optic, two main aspects are pertinent: the negotiations on the readmission agreements and the annual quotas. In discussing these two issues, I rely principally on the arguments elaborated by Cuttitta (2007a) and Chaloff and Piperno (2004). Broadly speaking, readmission agreements provide for the return, to the country of origin or transit, of irregular migrants apprehended by the police forces of the destination country (Cassarino, 2007). Under these agreements, European countries can send back to another signatory state nationals not only of the latter but also of third countries, if transit through the signatory state can be proved (EC, 2005i). Importantly, the combination of readmission agreements and annual quotas has provided Italy with a ‘diplomatic weapon’ in the negotiations with migrant-sending countries (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7).9 Cuttitta examines the changing Italian quotas since 2001, and notes that: ‘reserved shares have been considered more and more as a useful lever to persuade countries of origin of migrant workers to cooperate in stopping illegal [sic] migration towards Italy’ (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7). This opinion is shared by Pastore, who highlights the two-fold purpose of the quota system. On the one hand, the internal objective is to ensure that labour market requirements for foreign workers are met in a timely and qualitatively acceptable manner (Pastore, 2001). On the other hand, the external objective is to offer concrete advantages to the principal countries of origin and transit of illegal immigrants, in exchange for a stronger commitment to preventing and counteracting this flow (Pastore, 2001). The latter issue is relevant to the present analysis. By increasing or cutting down their reserved shares, Italy has sought to either reward or punish the countries of origin for their conduct on migration flows (Favilli, 2005: 157). The second Berlusconi government has also increased the share reserved to categories of countries. Such categories include mainly countries that have concluded agreements related to migration controls or which are negotiating such agreements (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7). By giving countries of origin the chance to increase their own share in the migration quotas, Italy has had the opportunity to exert pressure on them

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to win their commitment to control borders more effectively (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7). One illuminating case is the Italian–Egyptian negotiations. In the MENA region, Egypt is considered to be the largest labour exporter (Sika, 2010; Zohry, 2003). In the European context in particular, the largest number of Egyptian migrants, 10 per cent, head for Italy (Sika, 2010). Accordingly, migration is now considered a central issue in Italo-Egyptian relations (Stocchiero, 2004). In October 2002, after deciding to cooperate on migration, Egypt obtained a reserved share from Italy (Cuttitta, 2007a). After the beginning of bilateral action on migration control in the Suez Canal area (Delicato, 2004), and after the Italian Ministry of the Interior was allowed to send a liaison officer to Egypt, Italy approved the decree granting reserved shares (Chaloff and Piperno, 2004). Egypt was rewarded with a share of 1,000 legal migrants – 10 per cent of the whole share granted to single countries (Cuttitta, 2007a). Moreover, in 2004 and 2005, after Egypt, despite the absence of a readmission agreement between the two countries, readmitted thousands of Egyptian citizens from Italy (Ansa, 15 September 2004; Ansa, 21 July, 2005), the reserved share was further increased and reached the maximum amount ever allocated to a single country, namely 7,000 (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8). Eventually, a labour agreement was signed in November 2005 (Roman, 2008: 4) and a readmission agreement on 9 January 2007 (Ansa, 9 January 2007; Ministero degli Esteri, 2007a). Ever since, repatriations to Egypt have proceeded unabated (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008c). According to Ghoneim the quota for Egypt was increased further to 8,000 in 2008 (Ghoniem, 2009 quoted in Sika, 2010). Another useful example is Tunisia. The critical linkage between migration and Italy’s development agenda emerges clearly in the following quotation by the Italian Department for Development Cooperation (DGCS) of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, concerning relations with Tunisia and Morocco: Recognizing the important role played by the private sector and above all by small and medium enterprises (SME) with regard to wealth production and distribution, job creation and poverty reduction, and its positive effect on migratory pressure containment, the DGCS set up an action plan which increases on the one hand the SME competitiveness, and on the other allows our economic system to take advantage of the economic opportunities that can be developed in those countries. (Chaloff and Piperno, 2004) Shortly after Italy committed itself to introducing a reserved share for Tunisian citizens, Ben Ali agreed to sign a readmission agreement. With the technical agreement known as ‘Exchange of notes between Italy and Tunisia concerning the entry and readmission of people without legal status’ on 6 August 1998, Italy bound itself to grant Tunisia preferential treatment in

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the annual entry permits (Balfour, 2005: 128; La Stampa, 7 August 1998). Tunisia’s subsequent failure to cooperate on migration led to the decrease of reserved shares, however (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8). After the expiry of the bilateral police agreement and the concomitant increase in arrivals from Tunisia in Sicily, the reserved share for Tunisian citizens dropped from 2,000 in 2002 to only 600 in 2003 (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8).10 Yet, six days after the signature of the agreement on 13 December 2003, Italy approved the flows decrees for 2004, which raised the Tunisian reserved share to 3,000 units (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8). In 2009 the two countries further discussed the implementation of the readmission agreement. On 29 January Italian interior minister, Roberto Maroni, and his Tunisian counterpart, Rafik Belhaj, agreed to step up the fight against migration and ‘human trafficking’. They also agreed to simplify and speed up procedures to identify Tunisian irregular migrants currently held in Italian detention centres with the assistance of European Union funds and international organisations operating in the region (Adnkronos, 28 January 2009). Different sources confirm that return of irregular migrants and terrorist suspects from Italy to Tunisia resumed in February 2009 (Camera, 2010a; Human Rights Watch, 2009b). To secure Tunisian11 support Italy offered to increase development aid to 50 million euros and to double migration quotas for Tunisian migrants (AFP, 13 May 2009). Nevertheless, Italian authorities continued to lament the reluctance of Tunisia to cooperate and the fact that, supposedly, it would accept the readmission from Italy of ‘no more than seven irregular migrants daily’ (Camera, 2009a). The linkage between foreign aid and migration policies is also meaningful. By promising and delivering special aid programmes to neighbouring countries, Italy succeeded in either initiating or deepening cooperation on migration policies therewith (Favilli, 2005: 159). Simply put, aid and development programmes have been granted by Italy as both an inducement and a reward for the efforts made by third countries to tighten border controls and fight irregular migration (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8–9). Development aid has been linked to migration ‘as a containment tool’, targeting some of the areas that put the strongest migratory pressure on Italy (Chaloff and Piperno, 2004). The principle of conditioned development cooperation was turned into law in September 2002 with the passage of law no. 189/2002 (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8–9). Article 1 reads as follows: In the re-elaboration and possible revision of the bilateral cooperation and aid programmes for non-humanitarian measures with countries that are outside the European Union [ ... ] the Italian government takes into account the collaboration that such third countries have provided with regard to the prevention of illegal [sic] migrant flows, the fight against criminal organisations working in the field of clandestine immigration,

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in human trafficking, prostitution, drug-trafficking, arms-trade [ ... ]. (Ministero della Giustizia, 2002) In sum, the investigation of Italy’s migration policies towards third countries reveals that the setting of the annual quotas and the conclusion of readmission agreements are intertwined with Italy’s foreign policy considerations. It is not my intention to suggest that behind-the-scenes political manoeuvring is the sole explanatory factor in the changing shares in the decreto-flussi. Motives related to domestic labour market and demographic issues also play an important role. I sought instead to draw attention to the relevant, although not exclusive, linkage between migration and foreign policy. An appreciation of the impact that migration has on the bargaining power of interacting states lays the groundwork for the analysis of the agreements on migration between Italy and Libya, as well as of their power relations in the following chapters.

4.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have advanced two arguments. First, there are discrepancies between the prevailing security discourse as framed by – and framing – public opinion, the official position of Italian policy-makers and the national media, and the actual migration policies. While ‘security paranoia’ continues to shape the political debate profoundly and to justify the implementation of new surveillance practices, a more pragmatic trend of openness towards foreign migrants is also observable. Put another way, if we look beneath official statements, the ‘illiberal practices of coercion’ (Bigo et al., 2007) are only part of the very diversified and nuanced range of Italian migration policies. Contrary to the prevalent argument, which assumes the relentless deepening of the ‘fortress’ discourse and practices, a close investigation of annual quotas and recurrent regularisations indicates that the number of foreign nationals has been increasing. We are thus led to take a more circumspect view, and to appreciate the complexities of Italian migration policies. In subsequent chapters, I comment further on the entrenched ambivalence that has guided successive Italian governments (Carbone, 2008b). Second, the analysis of Italian discussions on migration with neighbouring countries shows the critical connection between migration and the Italian foreign policy. In fact, one of the primary objectives of Italy’s policy towards emigration and transit countries ‘has been to ensure better cooperation in migratory flow regulation, and more specifically, control of exit movements and readmission’ of irregular migrants (Pastore, 2001). In other words, migration has been employed by Italy to extract concessions from the selected migrant-sending countries. By exploiting the clear need of the latter to export their labour force, on some occasions Italy has succeeded in

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winning their commitment to collaborate on migration. Migration, then, is one of the foreign policy tools that Italy has been used to affect the behaviour of third countries. Yet, the opposite is also true. The negotiations of readmission agreements expose the limits of European countries. Unless EU states offer positive incentives for cooperation, the policies that they propose are bound to fail (Ellerman, 2008: 185). This multifaceted give-andtake framework of shared gains and losses puts in context the discussion of the dialogue on migration between Italy and Libya.

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5 Libya and Migration

5.1 Introduction The aim of this chapter is to provide an historical analysis of Libyan migration policies. I focus on the Libyan domestic and foreign policy agenda and the role of migration in Libya’s relations with its neighbours. In introducing the discussion in Parts III and IV of the book on the Italian–Libyan negotiations on migration, I argue that Libya has a long history of using migration and border control policies to further its domestic and foreign interests. At first sight, the regime’s stance on migration appears chaotic, if not irrational. At a deeper level, however, pragmatic adaptability appears to be a constant feature of Libya’s migration policies. Indeed, the shifting stance of the Libyan regime stems from a relatively shrewd calculation of costs and benefits. It is not my intention to make the case for the existence of a reasoned and thriving grand plan informing Libya’s migration policies. In fact, any investigation of Libya’s history reveals not only profound changes in its foreign policy, but also notorious faux pas that have led to its isolation from the international community.1 In taking up John Davis’ invitation, I will argue that the standard monochrome Western account of the regime as solely deviant and unpredictable is misleading. A thorough appreciation of Libya’s migration policies reveals that its unpredictability is rooted in the recurrent use of a set of policy actions, whereby outward and inward migration serves to influence the behaviours of other countries. In keeping with this overall argument, I develop five clusters of ideas. First, I consider how migration has been used by Libya for economic and political objectives in its dealings with Arab countries,2 and also – the second cluster – with sub-Saharan African countries.3 Third, I provide a brief discussion on refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya, and assess whether they have been treated as a bargaining-chip. Fourth, I examine the role that the EU has played with regard to Libyan migration policies and, finally, the recent developments in Libya’s migration discourse. 79

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The last point and in particular the appreciation of the securitisation of migration in Libya serve to introduce the discussion in the ensuing chapters, which are concerned with how migration affects Italian–Libyan cooperation. Indeed, Parts III and IV of this book consider the extent to which the security narrative benefits Libya’s bargaining position towards Italy.

5.2 Migration from Arab countries and related Libya’s policies A thorough understanding of migrant flows to and through Libya requires a wide frame of analysis, both historically and geographically. It scarcely needs to be emphasised that movements across the trans-Saharan region span centuries and, as Braudel puts it, ‘can only be grasped if the chronological field of study is extended as far as possible’ (Braudel, 1996: 101). Indeed, Braudel’s widely cited description of the Mediterranean as an ‘espace movement’ aptly captures the distinctive feature, among others, of Libya as an historical carrefour through Africa and the Mediterranean (Braudel, 1996: 276). Since at least the eighth century, there has been intensive population mobility between both sides of the Sahara, through trans-Saharan (caravan) trade, conquest, pilgrimage and religious education (De Haas, 2006; Gregoire, 2004a). The extensive research on more recent trans-Saharan routes conducted by authors such as Gregoire and Pliez documents in detail the complex patterns of people movements through Libya as a space of exchange at the local, regional and supra-regional levels (Gregoire, 2004b; Pliez, 2000). Crucially, the flows through Northern and sub-Saharan Africa are related to Libya’s changing internal and foreign policy agenda. By way of illustration, I now investigate some of the economic and political motives of Libya that have triggered the large influxes of migrants from Arab countries into the country. In terms of the economic dimension, after the discovery of oil in Libya in 1957 migration thereto from the Maghreb grew significantly (Labib, 1979). For example, Grimaud suggests that the oil industry and the related expansion of the market influenced migrant flows from Tunisia to Libya (Grimaud, 1994).4 Already in 1957, Libyan and Tunisian authorities agreed on the import of Tunisian labour into Libya (Grimaud, 1994: 32). This trend continued throughout the succeeding decades. Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Libyan regime actively recruited foreign workers by negotiating ‘contract-packages’ entailing the ‘import’ of foreign labour for limited periods of time to work at construction sites (Beauge and Burgat 1986: 60). The consequences were not hard to discern: Between 1970 and 1982, while the total Libyan population multiplied by 1.6% and increased from less than two million to over 3 million, the

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active working population grew by 2.7%, from 450,000 to over 1,200,000. This increase is mainly due to the foreign workers whose proportion in the total active labour force increased from 11% to 50% even though the proportion of active Libyan labour force remained stationary at 20%. (Beauge and Burgat, 1986: 57)5 Specifically, a study produced by the University of Durham found that, between 1973 and 1975, the non-Libyan Arab contribution to the labour force was around 85 per cent (Birks and Sinclair, 1978: 53; Pliez, 2004). Indeed, it has been shown that through the 1970s and 1980s foreign workers from Northern Africa were instrumental in the development of both the formal and informal economy of Libya (Pliez, 1999: 207). However, economic considerations alone do not explain Libya’s openness to migrants from Arab countries. Foreign policy ambitions also played an important part. Since the revolution of 1969, Qaddafi has sought to remove any trace of Western influence, and to define Libya as an Arab nation (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 64). Notably, the Libyan colonel saw in the Egyptian Leader, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, an enduring symbol of Arab unity. In the wake of the Libyan revolution, Qaddafi was reported as saying: ‘tell President Nasser we made this Revolution for him. He can take everything of ours and add it to the rest of the Arab world’s resources to be used for the battle’ (Vandewalle, 2006: 80). Accordingly, when his hero died within a year of the coup, Qaddafi became ‘the self-appointed guardian of Nasser’s legacy nurturing the notion of Arab nationalism and unity as part and parcel of the Libyan Revolution’ (Vandewalle, 2006: 80). Despite the persistent relevance of ‘laic Pan-Arabism and reformist Islam’ in the leader’s speeches, in the 1980s relations with Arab countries deteriorated (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 64). In an effort to break out of its isolation, the Northern African regime actively pursued a regional diplomatic initiative based on Pan-Arabism (Vandewalle, 2005). In order to mend bridges with its neighbours, bilateral relations with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia were reinvigorated. In 1987, Law No. 6 was passed, according to which all nationals from Arab states, as well as from Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, could enter Libya without a visa (EC, 2005d: 11). Law No. 6/1987 provides for granting two types of residence permits to foreign nationals, depending on the purpose of residence. A red card for short-term residence is issued to those with irregular status and a green card for long-term residence to those with legal status (EC, 2005d: 11). Both residence permits have a specified validity period. A red card is issued to those nationals who have entered the country without documents and do not have a work contract. If a work contract is obtained within a three-month period, then a green card is issued on this basis (EC, 2005d: 11). This regulation built upon a previous one, Law No. 18/1980, that granted Libyan nationality to nearly every Arab under the age of 50 residing in Libya

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(EC, 2005d: 12). Likewise, in September 1985, the dispute with Tunisia concerning the expulsion of Tunisian migrants – to be explored below – was settled, the western border was opened and police controls were removed (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 89). A few years later, on 17 February 1989, the heads of state of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia signed the Treaty Establishing the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (L’Union du Maghreb Arabe, no date). The following month, on 28 March 1989, Libya announced the opening of its eastern borders (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 88; Haddad, 2003; Vandewalle, 2005: 36), and resumed diplomatic relations with Egypt, which had been severed since the border war in 1977 (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 88). Moreover, in 1990 Libya and Egypt signed the Four Freedom Agreement, allowing the citizens of both countries to cross the border without visas (El-Sayed, 2007). As a result of these factors, an increasing number of citizens from Arab countries settled in Libya (Labib, 1979). Yet while in the 1970s and 1980s the majority of migrants were from the Maghreb, the 1990s saw a significant rise in the number of migrants from trans-Saharan Africa (Pliez, 2003: 196). While migrants from sub-Sahara in 1973 represented only 3 per cent of the total migrant population in Libya, in 1984 they accounted for 9 per cent, and in 1995 for 34 per cent (Pliez, 2003: 196). I shall return to this point in the next section. However, alongside its encouragement of migration from Arab countries for economic and political reasons, the Libyan regime has simultaneously tightened migration measures. It will be argued that such apparently paradoxical patterns rest on Libya’s consistent use of migration and border control measures as foreign policy bargaining-chips. According to a study by the University of Durham, in 1971, when 2,984 Tunisian entered Libya legally, some 40,500 were prevented from crossing the border because they had no authorisation (Birks and Sinclair, 1978: 56). The same source reports that in 1976 Libya expelled6 13,700 Tunisian ‘clandestine migrants’ (Birks and Sinclair, 1978: 56). Likewise, Grimaud documents that the return of migrants from Libya to Tunisia grew steadily from 29,356 in 1969 to 33,939 in 1970 and 43,251 in 1972 (Grimaud, 1994: 31). By the 1980s, Libya had imposed severe controls on borders that led to a significant rise in ‘clandestine’ migration to the country (CESR, 1991: 157). Arguably, the concurrence of severe border control measures and expulsions and of active recruitment of foreign labour, as previously illustrated, is consistent with Libya’s broader domestic and foreign policy agenda, and reveals a certain degree of pragmatism. At the foreign policy level, targeted expulsion and the abrupt closing of borders were used to exert pressure on the countries to which migrants were sent. Domestically, the regime sought to balance economic demands for cheap labour with the need to legitimise and champion the political and economic accomplishments of

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the revolution. As Grimaud argues with reference to Tunisian workers in Libya, migrants were taken as ‘hostage’ and were used strategically in the course of the political transactions between the two countries (Grimaud, 1994: 32). In fact, the expulsion of Tunisians in 1976 coincided with the election of Hedi Nourira as Tunisian Prime Minister, who was hostile to Qaddafi (Grimaud, 1994: 32). Tunisia was dependent on Libya, which could relieve Tunisia’s severe unemployment by allowing the ‘export’ of surplus Tunisian manpower. Hence the forced return of migrants to Tunisia was intended to have a detrimental effect on Tunisia, both politically and economically.7 In other words, the expulsions to Tunisia were a political message that the Libyan leader wanted to send to the newly elected Tunisian government. Nonetheless, as a further manifestation of Libya’s oscillating stance, during the same period the proportion of forced returns was significantly lower than the number of Tunisians who entered Libya. As Grimaud concludes, this incidence epitomises, once again, ‘Libyan cynicism’ in utilising migration ‘for political ends’ (Grimaud, 1994: 34). Similarly, the large-scale expulsion of Tunisians and Egyptians in 1985 stemmed from political and economic motives (Van Hear, 1992: 5–6). In less than two months, 80,000 migrants were forced to return to Tunisia and Egypt because, among other things, Tunisia and Egypt were being accused by Qaddafi of being too close to the United States (Pliez, 2004: 141).8 The manipulation of migration through deportations has targeted not only migrants from Northern Africa, but also other foreigners from Arab countries. In 1995, one-third of the Sudanese population in Libya, around 70,000, was forcibly conducted to the border after relations between Tripoli and Khartoum deteriorated (Pliez, 2004: 142). As CNN reported, the expulsions appeared to be motivated by ‘Libyan suspicion that the Sudanese government was involved in clashes with Muslim militants in Libya’ (CNN, 14 December 1995). The same fate befell 10,000 Mauritanians when Libya wanted to condemn the rapprochement between Israel and Mauritania (Africa News, 3 December 1995; BBC 1, December 1995; Pliez, 2004: 142). Libya also closed its embassy in Mauritania and imposed economic sanctions on the country (Agence France Presse, 30 November 1995). During 1995 alone, of 335,000 foreigners who left the country, 200,000 had been expelled (Pliez, 2004: 142). In the same period, a Libyan delegation travelled to Baghdad to invite Iraqis to move to Libya to work, even though the Iraqi population in Libya was already 65,000 strong (Pliez, 2004: 142). Two years later, advertisements and publicity materials were sent to Egypt to encourage Egyptians to move to Libya (Pliez, 2004: 142). As Pliez argues: this volte-face sheds light on the limits of the instrumentalisation of the foreign labour force from the Libyan regime that is forced to make new appeals for migrants in order to counter-balance [in terms of labour force

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lost] the departure of those that it had expelled in the previous period. (Pliez, 2004: 142) As Choucri foresaw in the late 1970s: The Libyan episode [referring to the relations between Egypt and Libya] reflects the importance of political factors influencing migration and the potential use of population movement as a political threat. [ ... ] Should migration continue to be viewed as a political weapon, the volume of Egyptian workers in Arab countries could become one of the most salient foreign policy issues in the years to come. (Choucri, 1977: 425) This consideration captures the Libyan attitude towards migration in recent decades, and has direct implications for my initial question. Migration has proved to be a critical issue in Libya’s relations with its neighbours.9 The new migration law announced between January and February 2007 is a case in point. Presumably because of the economic problems exacerbated allegedly by migration, which will be analysed below, this law introduced stricter regulations on foreign labour, targeting Arab migrants. A few days before Libya’s announcement that it would not participate in the Arab Summit in Saudi Arabia (The International Herald Tribune, 4 March 2007), on 4 March 2007, this new law on foreign labour was approved. The regulation stipulated that all migrants would have to obtain a work contract or face deportation (The New Statesman, 15 March 2007). The law, enforced by the Libyan Ministry of Manpower, requires migrant workers to pay, monthly, 25 Libyan dinars in income tax, 14 dinars for insurance, 15 dinars for an Arab identity card, and 60 dinars for an accredited work permit (El-Sayed, 2007). As part of the same law, a one-month amnesty period was allowed for the estimated 1.5 million undocumented migrants working in Libya to return to their home countries without sanctions to seek work permits (Frontex, 2007). In presenting this law, the Secretary of Manpower and Training, Mautoq Mohammed Mautoq, declared that: ‘Libyan businessmen should employ local workers. They should contact the Secretariat of Manpower and Training in order to replace their foreign labours with local ones’ (Ljbc, 4 March 2007). Reportedly, between 15 and 28 February alone 1,299 would-be migrants were deported to their country of origin (Reuters, 8 March 2007). As the IOM chief of Mission to Libya, Laurence Hart, observed shortly afterwards, ‘there have been a lot of police raids since this measure passed, showing that Libyan authorities are serious this time. But [ ... ] we don’t have anything in writing of what the procedures are’ (The New Statesman, 15 March 2007). According to some estimates, as a result of this law 35,000 Egyptians left Libya (El-Sayed, 2007). Importantly, this move was perceived negatively by Arab countries. On 7 February 2007, Algeria’s Interior Minister, Yazid Zerhouni, was reported as saying that ‘if Libya considers the decision useful

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for its security, it is sovereign; but it could have effects on the approach we have to the Maghreb Union’ (The Peninsula Qatar, 7 February 2007). Perhaps to mitigate this resentment, during the meeting of the AMU, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Abdel-Rahman Shalgam, denied any Libyan decision to impose visa requirements (Alarabonline, 12 February 2007). Nevertheless, the aforementioned subsequent developments on deportation indicated otherwise. By and large, economic and foreign policy considerations are the major determinants of the changing size of the migrant population from Arab countries in Libya, and explain the apparently contradictory stance whereby open border policies coexist with restrictive ones. It is important, however, to emphasise that this explanation of migrant flows does not exhaust all the intricate historical motives behind past and present human mobility trends. Migrant flows are not determined by Libyan political and economic interests alone. For example, wars, famines and changing economic and political circumstances across northern and sub-Saharan Africa have affected migrant movements significantly (Pliez, 2002b: 32). With these provisos, I now turn to an analysis of Libya’s migration policies toward sub-Saharan Africa.

5.3 Migration from sub-Saharan Africa and Libya’s related policies The failure of the AMU Treaty, and of the related project to create a Great Arab Maghreb, made Qaddafi turn his attention, not without contradictions, to Africa (Sanchez Mateos, 2005: 440; Vandewalle, 1995: 36). In 1990, an agreement for increasing collaboration was signed by Libya and Sudan (Pliez, 2002b: 37). Likewise, in February 1994, after the International Court of Justice confirmed the sovereignty of Chad over the Aozou strip (International Court of Justice, 1994), Libya and Chad signed a number of bilateral treaties, including one on the movement of people across the borders and one on commercial cooperation (Pliez, 2002b: 37). A few years later, Qaddafi took the lead in establishing the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESSA), later renamed CEN-SAD, involving the creation of the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank with 75 per cent Libyan capital (Sturman, 2003). Early COMESSA members included Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Sudan, and eighteen states, representing more than half of the continent’s population, joined during the following three years (St John, 2003: 466).10 This multilateral initiative was aimed at defining the contours of a space within which migrants could move (Pliez, 2004: 152). One of the main objectives was: The removal of all restrictions hampering the integration of the member countries, through the adoption of necessary measures to ensure free movement of persons, capitals and interests of nationals of member

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States and [ ... ] free trade and movement of goods, commodities and services from member States. (CEN-SAD, no date) In 1998, the Libyan leader announced publicly the abandonment of PanArabism in favour of Pan-Africanism (Pliez, 2004: 14). Ever since, his slogan ‘Africa for Africans’ has been a recurrent theme in his speeches and foreign policy rhetoric. To further substantiate his role as the ‘artisan de la paix’ and ‘sage africain’ (Gobe, 1999), on 9 September 1999 in Sirte Qaddafi presented his grand vision for a ‘United States of Africa’, with a single army, currency and unified leadership (Perrin, 2004: 33; Sturman 2003). On the same occasion, the leader declared himself a Pan-Africanist and expressed Libya’s intention of welcoming migrants of African origin, while continuing to welcome Arab migrants (Ezzat, 1999). The abolition of frontiers and free circulation of people, as a response to the economic exploitation of Africa by the Western world, were the key tenets of the African project proclaimed by the Libyan leader (Solomon, 2006). As already illustrated, African passportholders were allowed to enter Libya without visas for three months, and enjoyed easier access to residency and work permits than other foreigners (Solomon, 2006). In the same vein, during his numerous televised speeches and visits to other African countries, Qaddafi was reported as encouraging African migration to Libya (Pliez, 2003: 196). In seeking to consolidate his key role as a regional actor, Libya privileged diplomacy and economy over arms. For instance, it sought to act as the principal mediator in settling regional conflicts such as that between Sudan and Chad, but also engaged in sustained investments across the African continent (Huliaras, 2001; Pliez, 2004: 14). As with relations with Arab countries, the openness towards African countries was motivated by economic and political factors. From an economic standpoint, Libya’s migration policy was driven by the need to fill the gaps in the labour force in the local market. From a political angle, the regime sought a leadership role in the international arena to counter its increasing isolation from Arab countries and the West. By welcoming migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Libya sought to reward African states for their support during the embargo era (Pliez, 2004: 14). Concisely put, the growing presence of migrants from Africa in Libya is no accident. The official Libyan discourse – to be explored below – according to which the exponential growth of migrants is due to the difficulty of controlling the 4,000 kilometre-long desert border, is not the whole story, since it overlooks the entangled historical economic and political determinants of migration. Yet again, relations with Africa, and related border control policies, were not free of ambivalence. Let us then explore further Libya’s putative ‘politics of contradiction’ (El-Kikhia, 1997), with a view to illustrating its inherent pragmatism. This exercise may help to put into perspective what is otherwise perceived as simply eccentric.

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The Pan-Africanist rhetoric was accompanied by occasional, yet recurrent, deportations targeting African migrants. As Pliez wrote: Libya is accustomed to these practices, after each period of tension with some states is followed by expulsions. The victims have been for a long time Tunisians, Egyptians, Palestinians but recently more and more people from Sub-Sahara. (Pliez, 2003: 199) Events in 2000 provide a further example of the complex position of Libya towards migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. During the summit of the Organisation of the African Union in Lomé in July 2000, the project of the African Union was adopted (Lomé Declaration, 2000). Shortly afterwards, during a trip to Ghana, Qaddafi famously stated that: ‘Africa is not 50 states. It is one nation, one people, one culture, one economy, one defence and no borders’ (Callies De Salies, 2001). In the same year, the Libyan leader proclaimed his intention to build a road from Libya to Niger and Chad, and declared that Libya was committed to strengthening ties with the South of the Sahara (Sudan Tribune, 22 April 2004). Indeed Chinese firms had been commissioned to build roads and rail networks linking Libya to Niger and Chad (Afrol News, 15 March 2010; Nkrumah, 2000; Pliez, 2002b: 33). Nonetheless, since 2000 Libyan policies towards migrants from Africa have become harsher, and the official stance on migration has increasingly emphasised the related security threats (De Haas, 2006). Commentators have attributed this policy shift to the riots in September 2000 (De Haas, 2006). After the unrest in Tripoli and Zawiya, involving Libyans and foreign nationals and where 130 migrants died (only six according to Libyan official sources),11 Libyan authorities unleashed increasingly repressive measures against foreigners as well as Libyans (Solomon, 2006: 482). These ranged from lengthy and arbitrary detention of migrants in prisons and camps to hundreds of thousands of repatriations (Pargeter, 2001; Pliez, 2004: 143). Between September and October 2000, over 6,000 Nigerians and Ghanaians were sent home (Obisesan, 2000). In May 2001, 300 Libyans and non-Libyans were asked to testify before a Libyan tribunal (Africa News, 22 May 2003). The trial resulted in seven death sentences (two of them against Libyans), 12 life sentences, and 135 prison sentences ranging from 6 months to 15 years (Pliez, 2003: 197). As I document below, ever since then Libyan authorities have expressed growing concern over the threats posed by migrants, and the pace of deportations has continued unabated (Pliez, 2003: 198). In March 2004, Law No. 2, amending the 1987 law, introduced severe penalties for irregular migrants. This came a few months before the lifting of the European embargo. Undocumented migrants, and people facilitating their stay, faced at least one year’s imprisonment and/or a €1,160 fine, and a new unit was created to enforce this law (Statewatch, 2005). Every foreigner

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had to meet four requirements: (a) proof that a Libyan could not do the job he or she was proposing to do; (b) a contract with an employer; (c) registration with the tax authorities; and (d) health certification proving that he or she did not have any contagious diseases, including HIV/AIDS (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 81). Where the individual was not able to meet such requirements, he or she would receive a permit (red card) granting a stay of three months, during which time he or she had to find work and meet the conditions in order to gain a residency permit (green card) (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 81). As Human Rights Watch highlights, ‘this system should protect those holding red or green cards from arrest and deportation, but would expose those without such documentation to greater risk’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 81). This system was reversed under the aforementioned law of February 2007. Furthermore, over the first few months of 2008, Libyan authorities implemented drastic measures to further reduce the number of undocumented migrants. On 16 January 2008, a Libyan news agency reported a governmental decision that ‘all foreigners illegally residing in Libya’ would be gathered ‘for immediate deportation’ (Jana News, 16 January 2008). According to the same source, Libyan officials had agreed ‘to take several stringent measures to ensure the implementation of legislation and decisions concerning foreigners’ entry and departure in Libya, and regulations employing non-nationals’ (Jana News, 16 January 2008). Housing authorities were instructed to destroy makeshift homes and other shelters during police raids on the outskirts of Tripoli and in other coastal cities (Reuters, 16 January 2008). While there is no solid evidence that Libyan authorities have fully implemented such a plan, the interviews that I conducted with Libyan police authorities in February 2008 reported that Libyan security forces were fully engaged ‘in an unprecedented manner’ in repatriating irregular migrants.12 It is noteworthy that the official Libyan position is that such drastic measures are the consequence of European pressure. For example, the former Libyan Ambassador to Malta declared: Now, under European pressure, we took some hard steps, some hard measures ... Under European pressure, because of immigration, Libya took some steps which normally would not take such as [ ... ] detaining them and then sending them back [to their country of origin]. And this is because of the European pressure. Because we don’t want our relations with Europe to suffer from this. But some times you end up doing something which you did not want to do [ ... ] We felt that we had to do something [ ... ] to convince them [Europeans] that we are doing our best. (Klepp, 2008) Different sources confirm that further security policies have been implemented in 2009.13 For example, new fines against undocumented foreign

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workers were introduced. In September 2009, a representative of IOM reported that in order to enter Libya, foreigners must now pay 150 Libyan dinars and in order to obtain a residence permit 500 Libyan dinars per person.14 As a result of these fines, in 2009, interviews and anecdotal evidence collected between September 2009 and January 2010 show that large numbers of foreigners have left the country.15 Hundreds of irregular migrants were also detained. In August 2009 the Ambassador of Nigeria to Libya told the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) that 2,700 irregular migrants were kept in various deportation camps in Libya (All Africa, 18 August 2009). There are also reports indicating that Nigerians are being executed for violating migration laws in Libya (Africa News, 11 August 2009). Other sources indicate that twenty migrants from Somalia were killed in a prison in Benghazi during an attempted jailbreak on 11 August 2009 (All Africa, 10 August 2009). This is also confirmed by reports on Libya produced by Human Rights Watch. While the latest report published in December 2009 states that ‘the past five years have witnessed an overall improvement in the human rights situation’ (Human Rights Watch, 2009d), Human Rights Watch also laments persistent abuse against migrants by police and by guards in Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2009c). As it has been made clear in the previous section on Libyan–Arab relations, in some circumstances migration policies have impaired interaction between Libya and its neighbours. The law passed on March 2004, for example, gave rise to tensions with some African countries. On March 2004, Ghana’s Interior Minister, Papa Owusu Ankoma, deplored the harsh treatment of Ghanaians in Libya and the humiliation of those repatriated, including being flown in cargo flights without humane facilities, seizure of their passports and imprisonment without trial (Afrol News, 11 March 2004). These restrictive measures notwithstanding, Colonel Qaddafi continued to call for a united Africa, and reiterated that Libya was a welcoming country. Alongside the strengthening of the security apparatus following the riots in year 2000, Qaddafi’s public pronouncements continued to centre on his ‘African dream’ (The Economist, 14 September 2000). In February 2002, Qaddafi announced to all would-be migrants to Libya that ‘the enormous Libyan projects necessitate a significant labour force from Africa’ (Pliez, 2004: 145). In a similar vein, in June 2005, the leader stressed that: Libya is a country belonging to all Africans. [ ... ] What we call clandestine migration is a totally natural phenomenon. [ ... ] It is normal that Africans move around their own land. [ ... ] Free yourself from the efforts that you are doing now to control borders: surveillance along frontiers, custom control, immigration and security[ ... ] Leave people free to move and to look for a job from one place to another. If they will not find this job they will go back to where they came from. (Panapress, 18 June 2005)

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Despite the tighter security policies, the number of foreigners in Libya remains high. In fact, it has reached a level unprecedented in Libyan history (Pliez, 2002b: 36–7). In 2000, Libyan authorities declared that over 2.5 million foreigners lived in the country, only 1,700 of whom possessed proper identity cards (Pliez, 2004: 144). By some reckonings, between 70,000 and 100,000 either documented or undocumented foreigners enter the country every year (Human Rights Watch, 2006a). Hence, while the employment of migrants as a foreign policy tool is not new in the Libyan context, the current scale of migration in the country, and its centrality to its domestic and foreign agenda, are. This combination of continuity and novelty has to be kept in mind for the analysis in the next chapters. At this point, the analysis of the arbitrary and changeable nature of the Libyan regime over migration needs to be complemented by an assessment of the stance of the regime towards refugees and asylum-seekers. In contending that this category of people has been used as critical ‘pawn’ by the regime in its foreign policy dealings, I intend to address one of my initial questions and locate people’s movements in the wider setting of state interactions.

5.4

Refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya

The protection system for asylum-seekers in Libya is profoundly ambiguous. The Jamahiriya has signed neither the 1951 Geneva Convention nor the 1967 Protocol. The Libyan government continues to consider refugees and asylum-seekers as foreigners residing in Libya, without any specific distinction (UNHCR, 2007: 3). As Human Rights Watch confirms: According to top Libyan officials, an asylum system is not required because the country has no asylum seekers or refugees. ‘We do not have a law for this,’ said Muhammad al-Ramalli, the director of the Passports and Nationality Office. ‘If you do not have this problem, you do not need a law for it.’ He continued: ‘When people start to complain that they need asylum, then we’ll know [that we need a law].’ Other officials did not deny that Libya has refugees among the foreign population, but they argued that Libya’s administration could not handle asylum requests. (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 20) Yet the assertion that Libya neglects the institution of asylum in toto is false. While it has not signed the Geneva Convention, Libya has granted access to UNHCR, which opened an office in 199116 and works with Libyan authorities on asylum requests. Libya has also signed the Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa adopted by the Organisation for African Unity in 1969, which encompasses a broader refugee concept, including people displaced from their countries by external aggression or occupation, or

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events seriously disturbing public order (UNHCR, 1992). The Convention also implicitly recognises the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, Libya has signed the Convention against Torture, and under customary international law is obliged not to return any person to a place where they may face persecution or where their lives or freedom are at risk (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 21). A few other facts are noteworthy. Libya has endorsed the 1965 Casablanca Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States, and enacted the 1969 Constitutional Proclamation that prohibited the extradition of ‘political refugees’ and the 1991 Endorsement of Freedom Law which offered ‘shelter for oppressed people and those struggling for freedom’ (USCRI, 2008). According to UNHCR, in 2002 Libya hosted 12,000 refugees, including approximately 9,000 Palestinians and nearly 3,000 refugees from Somalia (UNHCR, 2003). Similarly, in 2005, 12,580 refugees were registered with UNHCR in Libya, mostly from Sudan, Liberia, Eritrea, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia and Palestine (UNHCR, 2007: 2). As of 2009, UNHCR registered approximately 9,000 refugees, although it estimated there were 30,000 in the country. The majority of refugees were Palestinians, Iraqis and Somalis, followed by smaller but growing numbers from Sudan, Eritrea and sub-Saharan Africa (US Department of State, 2010). A 2005 law allowed refugees recognised by UNHCR to receive a permit (red card) for a stay of up to three months while they fulfilled the necessary requirements for a residence permit (green card) (USCRI, 2008). Indeed, UNHCR has been able to issue refugees letters attesting their protected status. However, authorities have not always recognised them (USCRI, 2008). The negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding which started in 2007 have not been finalised. Moreover, Libya has allowed UNHCR to visit detention centres, although it has severely limited access to all detention centres for independent monitoring (USCRI, 2008). In 2009 UNHCR signed a quadripartite agreement with International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the Italian Refugee Council (CIR) and International Organization for Peace and Relief (IOPCR) (UNHCR, 2010: 5). Since 2008, in collaboration with ICMPD and CIR, UNHCR secured the release of some 640 refugees and asylum-seekers from various centres. While they have been been granted increased access to the centres – fifteen centres throughout the country as of October 2009 – many such visits have taken place on an ad hoc basis (UNHCR, 2010). Interviews with representatives of ICMPD and CIR confirmed that they did not have access to the border zones in southern Libya, where the majority of asylum-seekers enter the country (UNHCR, 2010: 6).17 Notably, Libya is in the process of drafting a refugee law (Frontex, 2007; Human Rights Watch 2006a: 23). In 2006, the Libyan Ministry of Justice established a National Legal Committee, tasked with the drafting of national legislation on asylum (UNHCR, 2010). UNHCR was invited to advice on

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the conformity of the draft with international standards (UNHCR, 2010). While its comments were largely incorporated by the drafting committee, as of March 2010 no further progress had been made to advance the bill ‘to the next stage of deliberation and eventual adoption’ (UNHCR, 2010: 5). According to one of the members of the drafting committee, its main purpose is to ensure that Libya is able to provide protection free from political considerations. In his own words: We want Libya to recognise refugee status not on political grounds but on humanitarian ones. This is because Libya throughout its history has always recognised refugee status to those coming from countries with which Libya had good relations. In other words, Libya has indeed provided protection to many people fleeing wars and persecution. This, for example, happened during the war in Kosovo and on many other occasions. Yet the decision as to whether to grant refugee status in the past and still now has been based on political considerations. Libya has been granting refugee status only to people coming from certain countries and not from other countries. Hence, the idea behind this law is to make sure that Libya is able to recognise refugee status [ ... ] on humanitarian considerations, regardless of political considerations.18 Overall, the fact that Libya has been providing refugee status and protection on the basis of political considerations was confirmed by an anonymous UNHCR informant: Libyan authorities do not always respect this [the refugee status that UNHCR grants]. Usually this depends on the nationality of the people to which refugee status is granted. For example, towards the Palestinians, Libyan authorities have showed a lot of respect. This is because they are Arab, they share the same language and they are considered to be close to Libyans. Hence, Palestinians are not treated as foreigners, and are respected by Libyan authorities. But, Libyans have shown less respect towards Africans who are often subject to detention and harassment. Even people to whom we have granted refugee status face problems in terms of detention and harassment. This is because the official Libyan position is that there are no refugees in the country.19 In other words, different sources indicate that Libya has provided refugee protection, but in a clumsy manner. As UNHCR put it, ‘UNHCR’s operating environment remains largely unpredictable, and the execution of its protection functions ad-hoc and unsystematic’ (UNHCR, 2010: 5). Let me turn, therefore, to discussion of the linkage between asylum-seekers and refugees and Libya’s foreign policy.20

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As Baer notes, Qaddafi’s attempt in 1994 to expel over 30,000 Palestinian refugees from Libya to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to destabilise the Israeli–Palestinian peace process exemplifies how Libya has used expulsion as a political weapon (Baer, 1996: 244).21 On 1 September 1994, Qaddafi made a speech condemning the proposed Israeli–Palestinian peace plan. In his own words, ‘what is happening in the name of peace is nothing but a surrender and a recognition of the existence of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians’ (Baer, 1996: 244). Arguing that the proposed peace plan was a betrayal of the millions of Palestinian ‘refugees’ created when Israel was founded in 1948, Qaddafi called for a return of the Palestinians to Palestine. In August 1995, Libya sent approximately 1,000 Palestinians via bus to the Egyptian–Libyan border, where makeshift refugee camps were constructed (Associated Press, 30 October 1995). In September 1995, Qaddafi reiterated his intention to expel over 30,000 of the Palestinians present in Libya (BBC, 30 October 1995). Likewise, in a press conference in October 1995, the Libyan leader justified such a decision on the grounds that this was not deportation, but rather return of Palestinians to their home country: Is deportation from your country or from another one? Why do you forget their deportation and expulsion from Palestine? This is a return and not an expulsion. This is pushing the Palestinians, in accordance with their wishes or not, to return to Palestine. [ ... ] Hence this is not deportation. The deportee is he who is deported from his land and not he who is pushed towards his land. The one pushed towards his home is a returnee. [ ... ] This is the first point we want to correct and show that there is a great deception, disregard of the Arabs and misdirection of international public opinion concerning what is happening now to the Palestinians. (Al Qaddafi, 1995) The speech was followed by the expulsion of other Palestinians to camps on the Egyptian–Libyan border, until the Libyan leader suspended his plans and permitted some of the Palestinians to return to Libya (Baer, 1996: 244; UNHCR, 1995: 31). However, some 250 of those expelled remained stranded on the Libya–Egypt border throughout 1996, unable to travel through Egypt and unwilling to return to Libya. Large numbers of Palestinians who remained in Libya were fired from their jobs. During 1996, thousands approached UNHCR, seeking assistance (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 1998). A similar incident occurred in March 2007, when Colonel Qaddafi decided to boycott the Arab League’s summit in response to what he considered to be the Arab leaders’ plan to ‘sacrifice’ the refugee issue in order to please Israel. As the Libyan newspaper al-Jamahiriya reported, Libya opposed ‘the settling of refugees far away from their homeland’ and wanted ‘to allow thousand of Palestinians who reside within its territory to move to the Gaza

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Strip through Egypt, before the plot to settle them in the Arab countries materialises’ (Middle East Online, 17 March 2007). However, there is no evidence that the Libyan regime actually deported them. The second example regards the ‘protection’ provided to Bosnian children fleeing the conflict in former Yugoslavia.22 In December 1992, 1,000 children were evacuated from Bosnia-Herzegovina, for a supposedly six-month stay, in a specially built compound in Al-Garabouli, a village 30 miles (50 km) east of Tripoli. In July 1994, after sixteen months of residence in Libya, the children were returned to Bosnia at the insistence of the parents (Associated Press, 10 June 1995; BBC, 2 July 1994). Presumably in providing assistance Libya intended to strengthen its linkage with Muslim nations, in opposition to the Western world (Post Standard, 4 August 1992). As CNN noted, among Serbia’s main oil suppliers, Iran, Iraq and Libya were ‘angered by the plight of the Bosnian Muslims’ (CNN, 30 May 1992). These examples corroborate Loescher and Monahan’s observation that refugees and asylum-seekers are often used as foreign policy tools: Refugees are often used, both symbolically and instrumentally, to pursue foreign-policy objectives. Symbolically, refugees ‘vote with their feet’, thereby demonstrating the bankruptcy of their nation’s political and economic system. Refugee policy also can be used to embarrass or destabilize enemy governments. (Loescher and Monahan, 1989: 12) The recourse to using refugees for political ends appears to be a consistent feature of Libya’s foreign policy. Its breach of the customary international law on asylum, and its elusive stance on asylum matters, are accompanied by initiatives providing ad hoc protection to ‘refugees’. However, to understand the full significance of migration in the domestic Libyan context, I now direct attention to EU–Libyan relations. The appreciation of such deepening diplomatic interaction carries significant implications for the negotiations between Libya and Italy.

5.5

EU–Libyan relations

With the gradual reintegration of Libya into the international community, the European Union has sought to strengthen its relationship with the former rogue state. Libya’s announcement that it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme and other factors such as the gradual settlement of the Lockerbie issue paved the way for a rapprochement between Libya and the EU. In November 2002, the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council decided that it was essential to initiate cooperation with Libya, and, on 14 April 2003, it approved the expert mission to Libya to commence talks on migration (Council, 2005a). This took place on 11 and 17 May 2003 (EC, 2005d: 21). In October 2004, the Council stated that

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Libya’s full integration into the Barcelona Process was the overall objective of the engagement. It also reiterated that participation in the Barcelona Process,23 and subsequent progress towards an Association Agreement, was ‘subject to Libya’s readiness to accept fully and unconditionally the Barcelona Declaration’ (Council, 2004b). On 11 October 2004, the European arms embargo on Libya was lifted, and between November and December 2004 a second mission to Libya was undertaken (EC, 2005d). The findings of this official visit were released in a detailed and often quoted report focusing on irregular migration in Libya (EC, 2005d). The following year, in June 2005, the Council endorsed the initiation of ‘an ad hoc dialogue’ on migration, in recognition of the fact that full cooperation could not take place in the absence of formal relations between the two parties (Council, 2005c). Informal dialogue proceeded slowly until the landmark events of 2007, namely the release of imprisoned Bulgarian nurses24 and a Palestinian doctor in July 2007, an issue considered to be as critical as Lockerbie had been25 (Butler, 2007). Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner applauded Libya’s decision, and, after the arrival of the nurses in Sofia on 24 July 2007, announced ‘a new and enhanced relationship between the EU and Libya’, which would reinforce European ties with the Mediterranean region and the whole of Africa (EC, 2007a). On this occasion, a ‘full’ EU–Libya partnership was agreed upon, and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the two parties (The Guardian, 24 July 2007). On February 2008, the EU proposed negotiating a Framework Agreement with Libya (EC, 2008a). In fact, on 14 September 2008 a preliminary session of EU–Libyan talks was held in Tripoli to prepare for the official negotiations which were officially launched on 12–13 November 2008 (EC, 2010). In particular the following three priorities for EC cooperation were identified ‘(1) improving the quality of human capital; (2) increasing the sustainability of economic and social development; and (3) addressing jointly the challenge of managing migration’ (EC, 2010: 6). In this context, the specific dialogue on migration warrants consideration. On 2–3 June 2005 the Council of the European Union adopted concrete guidelines for cooperation with Libya (EC, 2005d). Consultations were held on joint measures for rescue at sea and in the desert, and on the adoption of a joint action plan for cooperation on migration issues (EC, 2005d). The following statement by Frattini, formerly EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, summarises the EU’s approach to Libya: Our final goal is to have an agreement with Libya because we need an agreement. We need Libya involved in the Barcelona process. We will celebrate ten years of the Barcelona process this year in November, and of course we need Libya on board. But there are political preconditions. The most important precondition is the full respect, so that’s the signature, of the Geneva Convention on Refugees. To do that we should encourage

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them, I don’t like the blame and shame method. I prefer to stimulate, to help, also to provide funds because they respond. [ ... ] We should understand that if we want Libya on board, we should help Libya to do that. (The Parliament, 2005) Nonetheless, as I will explore in Chapters 6 and 7, Libya turned down the request from the EU to collaborate with Frontex, and instead asked the EU engage in a one-to-one interaction. As of 2008, the EU has offered Libya $1.9 million under the AENEAS programme (EC, no date)26 to support, among other initiatives, the IOM-managed project, Across Sahara. This will be explored further in Chapter 7. In 2009, the Commission announced its intention to allocate €20 million for migration (EC, 2010: 12). As of March 2010, the allocation of such funds had yet to be agreed upon (EC, 2010). With the announcement in July 2007 of the full partnership, Shalgam was reported as saying that the EU was committed to provide other aid on a wide range of issues including support for security on Libya’s northern and southern borders to combat irregular migration (The International Herald Tribune, 24 July 2007). Indeed, in September 2007 a press release from the Italian Ministry of the Interior indicated that the EU had agreed to finance the provision of electronic equipment to control Libya’s southern borders (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007f). As of March 2010, the few measures on migration that have been financed by the EU have been co-implemented by the Italian government and IOM (EC, 2010; IOM, 2008a). It is worth emphasising that, despite European insistence, Libya has refused to join Frontex missions as well as the Barcelona Process. As concerns the first issue, it is noteworthy that Libyan officials have continued to oppose EU-led patrolling of the Mediterranean, even though they have agreed in principle to conduct joint patrolling operations with Italy (Frontex, 2007: 9). Be that as it may, with the settlement of the dispute over the Bulgarian nurses and the immediate announcement of full partnership, the EU has implicitly complied with the Libyan agenda. As of March 2010, the North African country is still not an active member of the European-Mediterranean Partnership and, by implication, is not technically eligible for MEDA funding (EC, 2009b). Yet, even without adhering to the Euro-Med institutional framework Libya has been able to obtain partial and targeted EU assistance (EC, 2009b, EC, 2010). The ongoing discussions on the Framework Agreement would indeed entail bilateral cooperation outside the Barcelona framework.27 Arguably, because of the priority that migration has acquired in the EU political debate, the EU has opted to make special concessions to the Jamahiriya, at the expense of Libyan endorsement of the Barcelona acquis. It is equally relevant the fact that the negotiations on the Framework Agreement have continued, despite the repeated

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refusal of Libya to endorse Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union (Libyaonline, 6 August 2008).28 This brief overview of Libyan–EU interaction invites reflection on the strategic relevance of migration in foreign policy, taking us back to the main thread of this chapter. Migration has long been a pivotal issue shaping the relations between Libya and its neighbours. The interaction with the EU exemplifies the increasing reliance of the EU on its counterpart for the successful implementation of effective border control policies. While the EU–Libya agenda encompasses a diverse range of issues (EC, 2008a), migration markedly influences the wider bargaining patterns. Concomitantly, over the last few years Libya’s political discourse has increasingly emphasised the security dimension of migration. The construction and legitimisation of the migration-security paradigm has proved to be a useful expedient from Libya’s vantage-point. It is the emerging security narrative that I shall now explore.

5.6

Libya’s official discourse on migration

As Minister Shalgam stated, ‘if, for you Italians, illegal immigration is a problem, for us it’s much more – it’s an invasion’ (The Guardian, 11 August 2004). Similarly, a former Libyan Prime Minister, maintained: We are victims of illegal immigration more than you [Italians] are. You are richer and wealthier than us. Plus, the number that comes to us is higher than the number that comes to you. Your ability to control it is higher. Hence, migration is becoming for us a much bigger problem than it is for you.29 In the inaugural address of the Ministerial Meeting on Migration and Development between the African Union and the European Union on November 2006, Qaddafi made it clear that he hoped ‘to see an end to migration’. In his own words: Libya is one of the countries that have been severely affected by migration. It has depleted our resources. We have twice or three times as many people as our own in Libya. We feed them, house them, provide them with transportation, and they take their share of all the cheap products subsidized by the Libyan budget. (Al Qaddafi, 2006) By and large, migration in Libya is considered a sensitive security issue for five reasons: (1) higher unemployment; (2) rising criminality and linkages with terrorism; (3) threat to national identity; (4) spread of new diseases; and (5) educational standards. I shall now analyse each of these factors.

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First, according to Libyan officials, migrants strain Libya’s economy and labour market. A former high-ranking government representative bluntly told me: ‘migrants take a lot of jobs from us’.30 Presumably, the perceived grievance caused by foreign workers is linked to rising unemployment levels.31 According to the World Bank, in 2009 unemployment was estimated to be at least 30 per cent (World Bank, 2009).32 Furthermore, the same organisation predicted that, because 50 per cent of the population was under the age of 20, labour market tensions would increase in coming years (World Bank, 2006). This concern might explain the recent law to revise foreign labour regulations and impose new restrictions on work permits (Ljbc, 29 January 2007). It may also justify Qaddafi’s declaration in March 2008 that the Libyan economy had failed and that oil revenues would be distributed to the Libyan people (Al Qaddafi, 2008a).33 However, some of the officials whom I interviewed expressed a different opinion, conceding that migrants are instrumental in filling gaps in the labour market. For example, a representative of the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while emphasising the social and health problems posed by migrants, also maintained that Libya is ‘not against migrants. They help in the development of the country and they are a source of cheap labour.’34 Likewise an UNHCR official maintained: This is the general perception of migration, that migration is a threat. However, I believe that there is another side of the coin. Little is said about how vital migration is for the Libyan economy. Migration is indeed a vital element. Most foreign workers do jobs that Libyans do not want to do. Foreign workers represent a significant part of the Libyan economy. Clearly, the focus of the authorities is on illegal migration. But there is little discussion on the role of foreign legal workers and their contribution to the Libyan economy.35 In the same vein, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) acknowledges that ‘over the last few decades, Libya has relied heavily on foreign labour for its economic development and [ ... ] whole sectors such as agriculture and building industry depend on migrant workers’ (ILO, 2004). Second, my interviews with Libyan authorities indicate that migrants have been increasingly associated with rising criminality. As an adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasised, ‘migrants pose many problems [ ... ] and there has been a significant increase in criminal activity as a result of the higher number of foreigners.’36 Interestingly, this view appears to be endorsed by African authorities too. For example, according to the Nigerian Minister for Economic Integration, ‘many [Nigerians] are implicated in crime and prostitution in order to survive’ (Pliez, 2004: 143). Many of the governmental representatives whom I interviewed appeared to perceive migrants as a menace to Libya’s society. The problems of rising

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Table 5.1 Crimes committed by foreign nationals in Libya in 2006 and 2007 Type of crimes Killings Drug related crimes Thefts Crimes related to alcohol Fraud Public security

2006

2007

132 611 325 74 79 1

213 768 761 224 200 2

Note: It is important to stress that the data for 2006 refer to crimes that have already received a sentence from a judge, while the 2007 data are the number of people arrested but not yet sentenced. Thus, it is important not to directly compare such figures. However, the point here is that, regardless of this differentiation, the number of crimes apprehended is minor if compared to the size of the foreign population living in Libya, i.e. over 1.5 million migrants. Source: Libyan Ministry of the Interior (2007a).

drug consumption37 and of migrants as ‘assassins’ [sic]38 were mentioned on several occasions.39 For an accurate assessment to be made, it is illuminating to compare the official position with the figures on crimes committed by migrants in Libya. Statistics provided by the Libyan government indicate that, because of undocumented migration, crime increased by 30 per cent in 2005 alone.40 Yet the breakdown of crimes provided by other sources at the Libyan Ministry of the Interior indicates that the crime rate is relatively low (see Table 5.1). Indeed, as the Chief of Mission of IOM noted, the incidence of criminality is negligible if we compare it to the number of foreign nationals living in Libya. In his words, ‘if we consider that there are at least 1.5 million migrants, the proportion of criminal offences committed by foreigners in Libya is not that high.’41 Moreover, migration is treated as a security issue because of its alleged links with terrorism. According to this view, ‘terrorists’ may infiltrate the country through migrant flows. The survey conducted by Amal Obeidi at Garyounis University in Benghazi shows that for Libyan students and academics ‘illegal’ migration is the biggest concern after terrorism, since it affects negatively the security of Libya and of its neighbours (Obeidi, 2007: 13).42 Obeidi’s survey also reports that most of the respondents link migration to the ‘spread of the activities of some of the Islamic groups from other Arab countries to Libya’ (Obeidi, 2007: 13). This view reflects the opinion of other Libyan academics whom I interviewed. For example, one influential Libyan professor told me that ‘60 or 50 percent of migrants are Muslim, and many come from countries where there are extremist organisations.’43 Likewise, another Libyan professor asserted that ‘migrants represent a link with terrorist organisations. This link has been proved.’44

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The significance of this point can be further appreciated in view of the increasing concern of Libya about international terrorism. Since the 1990s, the Libyan regime has sought to realign itself and join the US struggle against terrorism (Perrin, 2004). In 1999, the Libyan government surrendered the two Lockerbie suspects, which led to the suspension of UN sanctions (US State Department, 2007). Not only was Libya the first country to issue an international arrest warrant for Osama bin Laden, but in the wake of 11 September 2001 the Colonel immediately offered condolences to the United States and provided concrete information on Al Qaeda to the Bush administration (Joffé, 2004: 223; St John, 2003). As part of the efforts to redeem itself internationally, in August 2003 the regime sent a letter to the UN Security Council formally renouncing terrorism (US State Department, 2007b). The central point here is that the Libyan regime has, for both internal and foreign policy reasons, sought to distance itself from international terrorism.45 Third, migration is considered to be a threat to Libya’s national identity. According to internal sources provided by the Libyan Ministry of the Interior, Libya attracts migrants not only for its economic opportunities but also for ‘its cultural and ethnic homogeneity’.46 Since the revolution in 1969, the Libyan leader has sought to instil a sense of national identity through a process of ‘socialisation’ based on Arab nationalism (Obeidi, 2001: 86).47 Consequently, it is feared that the increasing presence of migrants will reverse the nation-building process advocated by Qaddafi. This problem applies particularly to Libya’s southern region, where a growing proportion of inhabitants are of African origin. As Laurence Hart put it: There are some villages in the South and in the desert that are undergoing a process of ‘Africanisation’. In these parts of the country, the Africans outnumber the Libyans. This clearly raises some questions concerning integration and national identity.48 Fourth, migration is seen as facilitating the spread of new diseases. During a press conference in October 1995, Qaddafi declared: Dangerous diseases have become widespread in Libya because it has opened its borders to everybody. The AIDS was found in Libya, carried by those workers who came from abroad. Cholera was found in Ijdabya, 20 cases were found last month, because of African workers. (BBC, 26 October 1995) A number of Libyan officials interviewed at the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that migrants bring HIV and diseases, which did not previously exist in Libya. For example, the director of

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a migrant detention centre in Libya maintained: In our centre, diseases that had not been in the country for over 50 years have reappeared again. All these new diseases have been brought by migrants and include pneumonia, lice and AIDS. [ ... ] As a result, it is more difficult to manage the centre now than it was in the past. For example, a number of police officers that work in the centre got ill because of the migrants. One police officer caught a disease from a migrant and had to remain at home for one month. Another had to be cured outside the country for the same reason.49 This view appears to be confirmed by the report on Libya produced in 2006 by the World Health Organization which maintains that ‘HIV/AIDS incidence has increased due to prevailing risk conditions, such as increasing numbers of injecting drug users and unregistered immigrants from infected areas’ (WHO, 2006: 52). Nonetheless, a subsequent report by the same organisation maintains instead that ‘official data, which is very limited, does not show a high rate of HIV/AIDS infection’ (WHO, 2007: 21). Indeed, the director of a hospital outside Tripoli cautioned against this view. According to him, Africans do not significantly affect HIV infection rates. Because there is little interaction between Libyans and Africans, the spread of HIV in Libya is not pronounced. Indeed, data provided by the CIA World Factbook indicates that, as of 2001, the HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate was 0.3 per cent (CIA, 2007). According to other sources, as of 2003 the rate remained unchanged (UNESCO, 2003). Meanwhile, the director reported a higher incidence of hepatitis A, because of the practice of smoking ‘shisha’,50 introduced into Libya by Egyptians. Fifth, the Libyan security stance holds that migration offsets the educational breakthrough that Libya has enjoyed over the last few decades. One of the primary objectives, and in fact successes, of the Libyan ‘revolution’ has been the remarkable improvements in educational standards. The World Bank acknowledges that Libya boasts some of the highest literacy rates in North Africa (estimated at around 84 percent) and has made substantial improvements in the past two decades, cutting female youth illiteracy from 39 percent in 1980 to 4 percent in 2007. (World Bank, 2009) In this regard, the Italian Ambassador to Libya reported a concern shared by Libyan authorities. Many migrants are unable to provide education to their children because they lack financial resources and are undocumented. Thus, a significant number of migrant children grow up illiterate.51 Nonetheless, this information has been neither confirmed nor disproved by other sources. In fact limited official data elaborated by UNESCO indicate that education

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enrolment ratios have increased (UNESCO, 2007). In the absence of comprehensive data on the educational standards of the foreign population in Libya, it is not possible to assess its validity.

5.7 Conclusion An examination of migration flows and policies in Libya partly discredits Qaddafi’s long-standing reputation as an ‘ebullient and unpredictable colonel’ (Pliez, 2004: 7). A more precise description is provided by Soliman, according to whom the regime is an epitome of ‘controlled chaos’ (Soliman, 2004). Arguably, the continued turbulence of the regime can be regarded as a foreign policy tactic (Soliman, 2004). Qaddafi’s ‘politics of contradiction’ has proved a successful strategy. By confusing any potential interlocutor, the Libyan leader has been able to increase his bargaining power and, by implication, advance Libya’s interests (El-Kikhia, 1997; Soliman, 2004). To be sure, the regime has used controls at borders and on migration to increase its leeway not only vis-à-vis countries across Africa and the Arab world but also with countries in the ‘West’. The diplomatic dispute with Switzerland in 2008 and 2009 that resulted in Libya’s refusal to grant visas to citizens from the Schengen area (Swissinfo, 15 February 2010; Oxford Analytica, 2010) attests to the instrumental use that the Northern African country makes of entry and exit policies towards migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries alike. Because of its location at the junction between Africa, Europe and the Middle East, Libya has historically been a dense migratory space for not only migrant movements but also an increasingly intense flow of merchandise (Pliez, 2002b: 31). This complexity is summarised in Burgat’s three-fold characterisation of Libya as ‘le coeur en Orient’, ‘le raison maghrebine’ and ‘l’Afrique des commandes et des credit’ (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 106–110; Pliez, 2004: 9). This critical geo-political location has been utilised by the Libyan regime for both economic and political ends. As Lohrmann and Manfrass noted in 1974, the movement of people across nations towards places whose economies are expanding has led to the creation of integrated systems in which labour forces have become a currency for exchange between states (Lohrmann and Manfrass, 1974). Libya’s bewildering border control policies expose the critical tie linking migration with Libya’s domestic and foreign policies agenda. If one looks beneath Libyan contradictory migration policies and relations with its neighbours and with the EU, the linkage becomes clear. The semblance of chaos and unpredictability hinges upon, and conceals, a certain degree of pragmatism, exemplified in a set of policies aimed at advancing Libyan internal and foreign objectives. These policies have been neither unfailingly consistent nor politically and economically successful. Furthermore, they have not been applied in a systematic way, but rather in an ad hoc manner.

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Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a deeper trend, whereby migration has proved to be a strategic device for putting political and economic pressure on specific countries. Thereby, the distinctive framing of the political discourse around security, fear and the ‘migrant other’ fits within this larger setting of migration shaping inter-state relations. The key idea here is that the securitised stance on migration strengthens Libya’s negotiating position in the international arena.

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Part III Empirical Analysis of the Bilateral Agreements on Migration

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6 Historical Background on the Agreements between Italy and Libya

6.1 Introduction The agreement signed on August 2008 between Silvio Berlusconi, and the Libyan leader was welcomed by the former as a guarantee of ‘more oil and less migrants’ (Il Manifesto, 31 August 2008; Paoletti, 2009). As a ‘complete and moral acknowledgement of the damage inflicted on Libya by Italy during the colonial era’, Italy agreed to pay Libya US$5 billion over the next 25 years through investments in infrastructure projects, the largest project being a coastal motorway between the Egyptian and Tunisian borders (BBC, 30 August 2008; Gazzini, 2009). This agreement was portrayed, at least on the Italian side, as the final settlement of a more than four-decade-long conflicting relationship (The Economist, 28 August 2008). To appreciate why and how the two countries reached this deal, which covered everything from migration, economic relations and archaeological artefacts to colonial issues, a long-term historical view is instructive. This serves as an introduction to the core analysis on the joint measures implemented on migration in the next chapter. An account of the principal issues that have been of relevance to the two countries from the Italian colonial period to January 2010 serves to put the present-day negotiations on migration into context. Ultimately, I seek to convey the complex political and economic motivations characterising Italian–Libyan interactions, and examine the underlying bargaining patterns that will be further explored in the rest of the book. It will emerge that migration is closely linked to the other items on the negotiating table. This empirical and descriptive detour illustrates how policy options and, by implication, overall negotiation outcomes are reliant upon the more or less explicit rules and procedures institutionalising the aggregation or disaggregation of specific demands and concessions. With these broad aims in mind, I divide the following discussion into five sections. First, I outline the historical relations from the colonial period until the mid-1990s. Given the centrality of the colonial issues in the ongoing 107

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relations, understanding their full significance is important for my initial purposes. The next section is devoted to the period between 1998 and 2000, when the discussions on migration started; while the signature of the Joint Communication in 2000 is presented in the third section. In the fourth section, I examine the intense diplomatic exchange under the Berlusconi government between 2001 and 2006. The fifth section overviews the most recent developments undertaken by the Prodi government, through the agreement signed by Berlusconi in August 2008 and January 2010 when this book was completed after my most recent field research to Libya.

6.2

Historical background from 1911 to the 1990s

The historical relations between Italy and Libya have already been investigated by a number of Italian historians (Bono 2005; Del Boca, 1997a, 1997b; Labanca 2007; Rochat, 1976). In building upon their work, this chapter provides a sketchy account of the historical interaction between the two countries between the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. Well before the Italo-Turkish war in 1911, Italy had substantial economic and political relations with the then Ottoman region. In fact, Italian aspirations to establish the Quarta Sponda,1 (the ‘fourth shore’) as an extension of Italy across the Mediterranean, date back to the first half of the nineteenth century (Romano, 2005; Segrè, 1974a). Nonetheless, Italy had failed to establish a colonial empire by the nineteenth century because of, among other things, its political weakness after the Unification in 1861 (Askew, 1943: 3–4). Accordingly, after 1880 it became an axiom of Italian foreign policy that Tripoli, with its long Mediterranean seacoast must, some day, become Italian territory (Askew, 1943: 4). Libya was the only region on the North African coast that was outside the immediate colonial ambitions of the other imperial powers (Hesnawi, 2003: 50). Given its strategic geographic location, Italy saw Libya as a useful foothold that could serve the ends of its colonial designs in the Mediterranean (Hesnawi, 2003). As a result, the Italian government started implementing what was called ‘peaceful penetration’, involving the deepening of Italian commercial interests abroad to ensure incremental control over the region (Askew, 1943; Hess 1973). One of the main tools of the peaceful penetration was the Banco di Roma. Since 1887, the bank, in which the Vatican had deposited its surplus funds (Cunsolo, 1965), became increasingly active in Libya (Mori, 1957). The government entrusted the bank with its plan of ‘spontaneous colonisation’ in order to play an active role in the European colonial policy (Hesnawi, 2003: 51). In 1907, the bank opened its first branch in Tripoli and by 1911 had acquired industrial holdings, mining concessions and shipping installations in the country (Cunsolo, 1965; Hesnawi, 2003: 51). However, as early as 1904 economic penetration was deemed unsuccessful by the Italian government

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(Winston, 1990). One of the reasons was that Turks discriminated against Italian enterprises based in the region (Winston, 1990: 31). In response, Italy resorted to armed conquest. On 3 October 1911, Italy issued an ultimatum to Istanbul, and the following day the Port of Tripoli was attacked (Romano, 2005). The decision to invade taken by then Italian Prime Minister, Giovanni Giolitti, was driven mainly by diplomatic considerations at regional level (Romano, 2005). Giolitti sought to ‘prove’ to the other European states the capacity of Italy to establish its own colonial power. As Romano puts it, ‘pride and insecurity’ were the defining qualifications of Italy fifty years after its independence (Romano, 2005: 175). While other factors such as Italy’s demographic problems also played an important role (Winston, 1999: 31), Italy’s self-image in the international milieu as the ‘least of the Great Powers’ needs to be borne in mind (Winston, 1990). Indeed, it has long been recognised that the ‘anxiety’ about being sidelined or even excluded by the other international players is the thread running through Italy’s troubled foreign policy history (Pargeter, 2001: 6; Romano, 2005). The frustration of being considered a ‘Great Power by courtesy’ (Winston, 1990: 35) continues to the present day, and, as it will become clear in the chapters to come, informs current Italian–Libyan relations. A detailed examination of the Italian–Turkish war and of the subsequent developments of Italian political rule in Libya goes beyond the scope of this research. I shall therefore limit this analysis to those aspects thereof that help us to comprehend the negotiations on migration. In short, the Italian colonial occupation proved more problematic than expected (Romano, 2005). What was expected to be a very easy military venture turned into a struggle lasting for over thirty years (Segrè, 1974b: 45). While Tripolitania was brought under control by 1924, the eastern region of Cyrenaica resisted until 1932 (Hesnawi, 2003: 93). One of the contentious issues at the centre of the bilateral negotiations concerns the harm inflicted by Italy on the Libyan population during the colonial period. By now, historical research has identified with certainty a number of episodes that, by virtue of existing laws and norms, or conventions to which Italy had subscribed, can be defined as war crimes (Labanca, 2004: 303). Labanca distinguishes the crimes committed in the liberal and fascist periods. In the first period, those relevant to Libya include the organised reaction to the defeat at Shara Shat2 and the burning of Tripoli in October 1911; and, more generally the totality of actions and behaviour defined as ‘troop excesses’ between 1911 and 1915 (Labanca, 2004). One example is the Caneva decree of 5 November 1911, imposing death sentences ‘according to local custom’ (Labanca, 2004: 304). During the fascist period, repression of anti-colonial resistance included the use of chemical weapons, the construction of concentration camps, especially in Cyrenaica, to detain the civilian population (Labanca, 2004: 304) and the deportation

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of Libyans to Italy (Del Boca, 1991; Edeek, 2003: 94). The detention camps in Libya included Marsa Brega with 21,000 places, Soluch with 20,000, Sidi Ahmed el Magrun with 13,050, el Agheila, with 10,900, Agedabia with 10,000, and el-Abiar with 3,000 (Del Boca, 1991). Between 80,000 and 100,000 people died in the repression in general (Del Boca, 1991; Edeek, 2003: 94). On these grounds, some historians have made a claim of genocidal acts against the Cyrenean population (Labanca, 2004: 306; Salerno 2008). Importantly, the ‘dark side’ of the Italian colonial chapter still represents a national taboo (Del Boca, 2003 and 2005; The Economist, 31 July 2008; Labanca, 2004). Thanks to a pervasive sense of ‘collective guilt’ (La Rovere, 2008), silence has long reigned in the Italian public discourse, as well as in Italian historical studies, regarding possible crimes committed by Italy in its colonial territories (Labanca, 2004). Presumably as a response to the ‘lost debate’, if not denial, of the colonial faults (La Rovere, 2008), the Libyan leader has persistently emphasised them. In fact, until 2007 the month of October continued to be dedicated to commemoration of Libyan martyrs and, in particular, on 7 October, the regime used to celebrate the ‘day of the revenge’ against Italy (Del Boca, 1998: 129; Ljbc, 10 October 2007). While in October 2008, the ‘Fulfilment Day’ was proclaimed to mark the renewed dialogue between the two countries (Jana News, 7 October 2008), tensions appeared to persist. After the signature of the friendship agreement with Italy on 1 September 2008, which was supposed to finally settle the colonial contentions, Qaddafi declared: We would never forgive Italy for what it had perpetrated against us ... It displaced us; forced our people to live in the world’s neighboring countries; you [Italy] destroyed our land and filled it with mines; you erected gibbets, where thousands of martyrs had been hanged; even Omar alMukhtar, the hero of the Libyan resistance, was executed by hanging instead of shooting; they considered him as a rebel against the government [ ... ] which government? (Al Qaddafi, 2008b) In returning to our historical excursus, it is noteworthy that, from an economic standpoint, the new colony did not prove to be a profitable investment (Segrè, 1974b). Some of the criticism that had been levelled against Giolitti before the attack in 1911 proved correct. The land that had been defined by the Italian parliamentarian Francesco Nitti in 1911 as a ‘box of sand’ (Pecoraro, 2005) placed an economic strain on Rome. Indeed, Italian colonies failed to establish solid commercial activities. In Labanca’s words, ‘the narrowness of the commercial interests says a lot about the restricted bases of the colonial imperialism’ of Italy as ‘the last of the great powers’ (Labanca, 1993: 163–4; see also De Grand, 2004). In addition, Italy was not able to benefit from the oil resources before Libya’s independence in 1951. It has been documented that, during the

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colonial period, Italy established solid foundations for future searches of oil (Buccianti, 1999: 34). The first oil explorations, though not successful, date back to 1914 (Buccianti, 1999: 21; Curotti, 1973: 183). The studies conducted by the Italian geologist Ardito Desio prove that, by the 1930s, major oil sites had already been identified (Buccianti, 1999: 34). Accordingly, Buccianti writes that it is ‘absolutely untrue to argue that Italy has ignored the question of oil during its occupation of Libya’ (Buccianti, 1999: 34–6). If Italy was aware of the oil resources, it was, however, unable to gain from them. When the commercialisation of oil commenced in the 1960s, Italy had long gone (Vandewalle, 1995: 4). In a nutshell, the Italian colonial enterprise was based much less on economic interest than on national pride and as an outlet for surplus populations (Vandewalle, 2006: 41). The Second World War marked the end of the Italian colonial experience (Segrè, 1974b). Following the defeat of the Italian–German axis in 1943, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica came under British administration and Fezzan under the French (Lewis and Gordon, 1954). Predictably, the interest in Libya displayed by the European powers was driven mainly by their desire to secure control over its oil revenues (Bernini, 2001; Buccianti, 1999). It is also noteworthy that, in the negotiations leading to Libya’s independence, Italy played a minor role. The discussions preceding the final UN decision evince, yet again, the ‘political-psychological syndrome’ of Italy as ‘a loser’ that would haunt Italy for years to come in the conduct of its foreign policy (Buccianti, 1999: 340). Under the terms of the 1947 Peace Treaty with the Allies, Italy relinquished all claims to Libya (Klunz, 1947). After the rejection by the UN General Assembly of the Bevin-Sforza agreement, which would have granted Italy control over Tripolitania, on 21 November 1949 the Assembly proceeded to pass Resolution 289 (IV), recognising the independence of Libya (Pelt, 1970). Upon return from exile in Egypt, King Idris represented Libya in the subsequent UN negotiations. On 24 December 1951, Libya declared its independence as the United Kingdom of Libya, a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under King Idris (Khaddouri, 1963). A few years later, on 2 October 1956, Italy and Libya reached an agreement settling Libyan requests for Italian compensation for the colonial past (Segrè, 1974b: 206). As part of this agreement, the Italian government paid the sum of £5 million in colonial damages, and Libya committed itself to recognise Italian properties (Segrè, 1974b: 206). The period following the institution of the monarchy saw dramatic increases in oil production. By the end of 1955, 55 concessions had already been assigned, and by the end of the 1960s concessions covered 79 per cent of Libyan territory (Bernini, 2001: 7). Significantly, it was the British and the Americans, and not the Italians, who dominated the Libyan oil market during those years (Cricco, 2002: 10). Indeed, much of the rent was initially provided by the United States and Great Britain, in exchange for the leasing of military bases (Vandewalle, 1995a: 4). Government revenues

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from petroleum exports increased more than fifteen-fold, from US$40 million in 1962 to US$625 million five years later (St John, 2007: 205). Within eight years of its initial oil shipment, Libya became the world’s fourth largest exporter of crude oil (St John, 2007: 205). As a further illustration of the extent of change, per capita income increased from US$35 in 1951 to over US$1,000 in 1967 (St John, 2007: 205). The heavy reliance of Libya on oil revenues made the country a glaring example of a ‘rentier state’, i.e. a state that derives a substantial part of its revenue from foreign sources in the form of rent (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987: 11).3 This is a central feature of the North African country, which speaks to its distinctive social and political system and shapes ongoing diplomatic relations with Italy. As Vandewalle writes: a critical element in understanding the persistence of the regime is the presence of those rapid capital inflows in particular the power they afforded the Libyan government to pursue its idiosyncratic social and political development without much fear of political and economic repercussions. (Vandewalle, 1995a: 4) On 1 September 1969, a small group of military officers, led by 27-year-old army officer Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qaddafi, staged a coup d’état against King Idris (Vandewalle, 1995). At the time, Idris was in Turkey for medical treatment. Without having to use force, revolutionary officers abolished the monarchy, and proclaimed the new Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Qaddafi was, and is to this day, referred to as the ‘Brother Leader’ and the ‘Guide of the Revolution’ in government statements and the official press. Shortly after the revolution, on 22 July 1970, some 14,000 Italians living in Libya were forced to return to Italy, leaving behind all their possessions, and with a prohibition on ever returning (Segrè, 1974b: 210).4 The Italian companies operating in Libya were forced to terminate their commercial activities, and their properties were confiscated (Camera, 2003c, 2003d, 2004). Thereupon, Italy submitted a formal protest to the UN on the legal, diplomatic and moral inadmissibility of such a decision which would contravene the 1956 agreement (Segrè, 1974b: 209). Italy, however, remonstrated to no avail. As of today, Libya denies the validity of the 1956 treaty that the King had signed (Allam, 2006; Del Boca 1998: 128; Studio Legale Romano, 2006). As Qaddafi pointed out: They [the Italians] said there was a treaty made in 1956 with the Kingdom of Libya and this treaty settled the issue. Shameful thing! They paid about one million dinars or something like that. The Italian and the Libyan people who were ruling in 1956 ended everything [colonial-related disputes] and the King said ‘we forgive you’. If only they had mentioned those

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exiled [the Libyans deported to Italy] or asked to remove the land-mines, since there were mines at that time; but nothing of the sort happened. (Al Qaddafi, 2008b) The complaints of the Italians repatriated and dispossessed of their properties are now represented by AIRL, the Association of the Italians Repatriated from Libya, which has lobbied the Italian government to obtain full indemnity from Libya, as well as tourist visas for them to return to the country.5 These considerations need to be kept in mind, since they deeply affect ongoing bilateral relations. Broadly, the 1970s were characterised by the expansion of the oil industry, alongside the deepening of the ‘popular revolution’ discourse calling for the Libyan people to seize power through the so-called ‘democracy of the masses’ (St John, 2008b). The official ideology, also known as the ‘Third International Theory’, was formulated in the three volumes of the Green Book, first published in 1975. In March 1977, the leader proclaimed the raison d’être of the new state in the ‘Declaration of the Establishment of the People’s Authority’. This launched a political system based on popular rule through people’s committees and without political parties (St John, 2008b: 94).6 The revolution was grounded on an ‘international ideology and not a national movement’ (Anderson, 1986: 70). True to his word, Qaddafi’s support of opponents of the world status quo – whom he viewed as supporters of revolutionary causes – ranged beyond the Libyan state and the Arab world (Anderson, 1986: 70). This contributed to Libya’s growing isolation and its notorious reputation as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’. Libya’s alleged support for independence movements,7 its complicity with the Lockerbie, UTA and La Belle bombings, and its pursuit of the WMD programme,8 led ultimately to the imposition of EU, UN and US sanctions (Collins, 2004; Vandewalle, 1995).9 In this context, the role of Italy merits our attention. Despite the contentious issues related to the colonial reparations, the economic and political collaboration between Italy and Libya proceeded apace. As the former head of the Italian Intelligence Service made clear: Between the 1970 and 1974 the basic rule was to save our [Italy’s] interests in Libya and prevent ENI [the Italian multinational oil and gas company] from being thrown out. It is for this reason that we helped the Libyan leader to defeat those that were opposing the regime, provide him with weapons, organise for him an intelligence service and help with the modernisation of his armed forces. (Del Boca, 1997c: 131) Indeed, Italy’s policy towards Libya has followed the principle of politica del buon vicinato, i.e. a good neighbourhood policy (Andreotti, 1992; Mezran and De Maio, 2007). As part of this strategy, dialogue with countries

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considered to be ‘rogue states’ was preferred over confrontation. As a former Italian Prime Minister, credited to be one of the prime figures in shaping this approach, clarified during an interview: I have always tried to explain this to the US. The first question that one has to do is to have good relations with our neighbours. If we [Italians] don’t have good relations with New Caledonia it is pretty indifferent. However, with countries like Tunisia, Malta, Algeria or Libya we ought to maintain a positive relationship.10 During the embargo era, Andreotti, former Italian Prime Minister, sought to act as a mediator between Qaddafi and the other Western powers. As he declared in an interview to Il Corriere Della Sera with reference to the position adopted by the US towards Libya: The Libyan problem cannot be resolved with a military action. I do not act as the defence lawyer of anybody, nor do I propose the beatification of Qaddafi; however, I believe that speaking with him would not hurt anybody, and this applies also to the Americans. (Del Boca, 1998: 156) As a matter of fact, in the 1970s Italy was the first country to sell weapons to Libya, and Libya was Italy’s first commercial partner in Africa and the seventh in the world (Del Boca, 1998: 130–1). Between 1960 and 1970 the economic exchange between Italy and Libya increased more than ten-fold (Del Boca, 1998: 131). By 1986, when Libya launched two missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa (Del Boca, 1998: 159; Di Feo, 2005), there were 17,000 Italians in Libya, the second largest Italian community abroad after that in South Africa (Del Boca, 1998: 131). It is also instructive to note that, unlike most British and American companies, ENI was not subject to the Libyan government’s nationalisation campaign commenced in December 1971 (Chapin Metz, 1987; Collu, 2001: 92). Furthermore, on 25 February 1974 the two countries signed an agreement on scientific, technical and economic cooperation; and in the following September a new contract was reached between Tripoli and ENI (Del Boca, 1998: 131). During the 1980s, with the growing difficulties that Libya faced internationally, Italy remained a critical ally. By the end of 1982, the US had halted all crude oil imports from Libya, and announced an economic boycott on sales of selected high-technology exports and products related to oil (Vandewalle, 1995: 26). At the same time, of the four remaining major multinationals in the country, two – Exxon and Mobil – abandoned their operations (Vandewalle, 1995: 26). As a result, Libyan oil production and revenues after 1980 dropped by approximately 40 per cent (Vandewalle, 1995: 26). Likewise, tensions with the rest of the Arab world exacerbated the Libyan regime’s isolation. Amidst an environment of growing international

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hostility, Italy continued to pursue its special relations with what US President Ronald Reagan called the ‘mad dog of the Middle East’ (Stork, 1986). Many commentators have credited the Italian policy with the gradual reintegration of Libya into the international community.11 By some reckonings, Italy has been instrumental in rehabilitation of the former terrorist country (Andreotti, 1992) and, eventually, in the lifting of the EU sanctions in 2004 (Fusacchia, 2006). Consolidation of Italian–Libyan relations, however, was not without its contradictions. Alongside the economic, political and cultural12 cooperation, Libyan authorities unremittingly demanded indemnities for Italian colonial wrongdoings. On 30 July 1970, the Libyan foreign minister, Salah Bouissir, raised the issue with Italy and demanded 100 million Libyan dinars in compensation for the ‘lands usurped by the Italian government between 1911 and 1943’ (Del Boca, 1998: 130). In similar vein, during the celebration of the day of revenge on 7 October 1975, the Libyan leader declared: What Italy has committed [ ... ] represents today a major historical lesson for humanity and a tragic example of aggression, brutality and barbarism. It mirrors the arrogance of the most powerful countries when they attack those that are poor and weak. (Del Boca, 1998: 134) Within this complex landscape, where confrontational pronouncements and actions jostled with more friendly ones, tracing the history of Libyan requests for colonial repayments is revealing. The first request amounted to 100 million Libyan dinars. However, over the years Libya raised the stakes and since 2001 the normalisation of relations has been conditioned on the construction by Italy of the coastal highway from the Egyptian to the Tunisian border. Let us see in more detail how this came to be the case. On 31 July 1984, Andreotti met Qaddafi in Benghazi, Libya, and the two leaders agreed on the construction of a hospital as a symbolic gesture to apologise for the colonial past (Andreotti, 1992: 347; Del Boca, 1998: 151). Other requests were also put forward, such as the removal of landmines, the funding of research on the archaeological sites in Libya, and research on the Libyans deported to Italy (Camera, 2001). As a high-ranking Italian politician emphasised, ‘I am in favour of maintaining good relations and it is clear that in order to have good relations some reciprocity is expected.’13 Beyond the specific requests submitted by Libya, which I will discuss in greater detail below, the key point here has to do with Italian obstinacy in maintaining a dialogue with Libya. As it should be clear by now, substantive economic interests of both parties lie behind this diplomatic engagement. As Del Boca writes: Despite the continuing and patient diplomatic mending, the interaction between the two countries resembles more and more a squalid marriage

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of convenience. The two sides hate each other but they cannot break because Italy needs oil and Libyan concessions, and Libya cannot do without the Italian market for the oil and the technology from the sixthlargest industrialised country in the world. (Del Boca, 1998: 143) In other words, the Italian government endorsed Libya’s requests in the expectation of establishing a reciprocal climate of constructive interactions and, once and for all, of overcoming the colonial problem. As we shall see, the agreement signed in August 2008, seems to have settled the colonial dispute, for now.

6.3

Joint Communication (1998)

In June 1996, Renato Serri, undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made an official visit to Libya (Reuters, 25 June 1996). In the aftermath of the meeting, Serri confirmed that Libya wanted to end its international isolation and ‘participate actively to the new Euro-Mediterranean dialogue’ (Reuters, 25 June 1996). He further emphasised the determination of the Italian government to consolidate its relations with Libya and to become ‘the principal interlocutor in this new political phase’ (La Stampa, 9 November 1996). This and other meetings established the basis for the visit of the then Secretary of the General People’s Committee, Omar Mustafa El Muntasser, to Rome on 18 December 1996 (BBC, 20 December 1996; Mezran and De Maio, 2007: 443). As Aliboni points out, this meeting was in breach of the embargo set by UN, which banned diplomatic contacts with Libya (Aliboni, 1997: 2; Guazzone 2000). Nonetheless this was consistent with the above defined politica del buon vicinato. The move reflected the overall orientation of post-Cold War Italian foreign policy, which aimed at carving out an independent role and establishing a dialogue with so-called rogue-states (Pioppi 2002; Pioppi and Pargeter, 2001: 29; Silj, 1998). Evidence of the gradual rapprochement is the ‘Joint Communication’ signed on 4 July 1998 by El Muntasser and the then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini (Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, 2000: 32; Pioppi, 2002: 52). The significance of this agreement derives from the formal acknowledgement by Italy of the suffering caused during the colonial period. In acquiescing to Libya’s disavowal of the 1956 agreement, Italy regretted ‘the Libyan people’s suffering at the hands of Italian colonialism’, and committed itself to remove whatever remained of the colonialist era (Joint Communication, 1998). The Italian government promised to continue searching for the Libyan citizens who were coercively expelled from Libya, to assist Libya with the removal of mines laid during the war, to compensate the victims of mines, and to return to Libya all manuscripts, archives, documents, artefacts and archaeological pieces that had been transferred to Italy (Joint Communication, 1998).

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The agreement also involved the establishment of the Italian–Libyan Joint Company, known as ALI (Azienda Libico Italiana) and the launch of mutual preferential treatment (Pioppi, 2002). The Company was inaugurated in Libya on 30 May 1999, with the objective of promoting Italian investments in Libya (Centro Miliatare di Studi Strategici, 2002; Pioppi, 2002). It consisted of a forum of Italian and Libyan businesses to support the Libyan economy through basic infrastructure and development projects (The Financial Times, 16 April 1999). Likewise, Italian exiles would be allowed to return to Libya on tourist visas. Both parties agreed that ‘with the application of such a Communication’ there would ‘no longer be reasons of contest or tension over the past’ (Joint Communication, 1998). In short, the relevance of the Joint Communication is two-fold. First, it contravened the spirit of the UN sanctions, which were suspended one year later (Pioppi, 2002: 52).14 Second it sought to boost bilateral economic relations. As an official communication from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made clear, one of the primary aims was ‘to strengthen the collaboration across companies specialising on oil and gas’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 10 July 1998). In an interview with Il Sole 24 Ore, the representative of the government’s Institute for Foreign Commerce (ICE) in Libya, Giacomo De Gennaro, suggested that it would restore good faith between Italy and Libya and would overcome the outstanding financial issues related to colonialism, which had had the negative effect of decreasing the profitability of Italian businesses operating in Libya. Indeed, he noted that Italy’s economic role in Libya had been supplanted by France (Il Sole 24 Ore, 10 July 1998). As a matter of fact, until at least 2008 Italians companies operating in Libya continue to face discrimination. The ongoing disputes were summarised by a former representative of the ICE in Libya: Everything [the activities of Italian companies in Libya] was complicated by the 1998 protocol that established the ALI, which has engendered much suffering on Italian enterprises. The rationale behind this association was to overcome the colonial compensation. It was established that all Italian enterprises would pay a fee ranging from 0.5% of the total value of the venture to 2.5%, 3% today. [ ... ] Now, we would like to revise this association. But the Libyans have said: ‘this will happen only when the discussion, including also the “big gesture”,15 will be settled.’ Recently, the situation has got more and more difficult. There are Italian businesses that would like to renew their registration and are blocked because the ALI has not issued the clearance letter [i.e. the document confirming that the fee has been paid].16 At the time, however, the accord was welcomed as an historic turning point in Italian–Libyan relations (Pioppi and Pargeter, 2001: 33). Il Sole 24 Ore predicted that ‘from now on’ everything would be easier (Il Sole 24 Ore,

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10 July 1998). Interestingly, this position appeared not to be shared by Libyan authorities. The newspaper La Stampa reported a Libyan official as saying that they did not have time to celebrate: ‘if Italians say that this is an historical peace between us, we agree, but today we have been busy with other issues, such as the official visit of President Mubarak’ (La Stampa, 10 July 1998). The signing of the Joint Communication was accompanied by the socalled ‘Verbal Process’. However, the legal status of this document appears to be ambiguous. In fact, during an interview, a high-ranking Italian official involved in the negotiations with the Libyan leader declared himself unaware of the document.17 These ambiguities notwithstanding, this second text listed specific joint actions, including industrial cooperation, commercial exchange, energy sector, agriculture, telecommunication and tourism. Moreover, coordinated management of undocumented migration was addressed explicitly. Crucially, this is the first time that the issue of migration has been mentioned in a written bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya. Under the heading of ‘Consular and Social Affairs’, Article 3 states as follows: Both parties confirm their intention to cooperate in the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking. To this end they agreed to schedule a technical meeting in the near future. Both parties agree that another technical meeting will take place in order to establish a cooperation to deal with the falsification and illegal use of travel documents and the prevention of and fight against illegal immigration. The Arab-Libyan party has presented two proposals in Arab language concerning the drug trafficking and judicial cooperation and the Italian party reserves the right to review them. (Verbal Process, 1998) I shall return to the question of migration in the next section. For now, let us continue with the brief chronicle of the erratic diplomatic exchanges. The period following the signature of the agreement was characterised by numerous visits by Italian authorities to Libya, and vice versa. On 6 April 1999, a few days after the extradition from Libya of the Lockerbie suspects and the suspension of the UN sanctions, Lamberto Dini flew to Libya to meet Qaddafi (Il Sole 24 Ore, 7 April 1999). On this occasion, the Colonel pledged that Libya would become ‘Italy’s bridge to Africa’ and that Italy would become ‘Libya’s door to Europe’ (The New York Times, 2 December 1999). Similarly, as a press release of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented: The positive evolution of the Lockerbie case created the possibility for Libya to join the international community fully and to help in the effort

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to increase stability in the Mediterranean region. Hence, Libya can be expected to join the Barcelona Process and in this way to contribute to the dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean as well as to improve relations with the EU. (Il Sole 24 Ore, 6 April 1999) The main issues discussed between Dini and Qaddafi included collaboration in the energy sector and the construction of a US$3.8 billion gas pipeline over the following three years (Il Sole 24 Ore, 7 April 1999). In the following months, Italian companies sought to promote their business in Libya. As The Financial Times reported, since the suspension of the international sanctions ‘Italian companies have been rushing to Tripoli [ ... ] to open ties with the Libyans’ (The Financial Times, 16 April 1999). Around 20 leading industrial figures from Confindustria, Italy’s business federation, ENI, Finmeccanica, the industrial and defence conglomerate, and Impregilo, Fiat’s infrastructure building unit, visited Libya to explore forthcoming commercial opportunities (The Financial Times, 16 April 1999). At the beginning of August 1999, and one week after ENI announced a US$5.5 billion deal for gas exploration and a pipeline with Libya’s National Oil Company (La Stampa, 28 July 1999), the Italian Foreign Minister returned to Libya for the VII Meeting of the Gruppo di Lavoro Misto (Pioppi and Pargeter, 2001: 34). Upon return to Rome, he declared himself ‘very happy with the new spirit that characterises the bilateral relations between Italy and Libya’, and foresaw the beginning of ‘a new era’ in Italian–Libyan relations (Guazzone, 2000; Ansa, 6 August 1999). However, the economic and colonial issues enunciated in the Joint Communication remained unimplemented. For instance, Giacomo di Gennaro deplored the fact that ‘preferential treatment’ had yet to be given to Italian enterprises. In his words: Even though Italy has promoted significant economic activity in Libya, as we account for 50% of Libyan oil export there is still no transparency in the bidding process, and everything is in the hands of the Libyan authorities. (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2 December 1999) For our purposes, the ambivalences in the bilateral economic relations need to be borne in mind. The relative dependence of Italian companies on their Libyan counterparts invites reflection on the relative bargaining power of one country vis-à-vis the other.

6.4

Memorandum of Intent (2000)

This period of intense dialogue between Italy and Libya culminated with the two-day visit to Libya of the then Italian Prime Minister, Massimo D’Alema, on 1 December 1999. This was the first trip of a head of government to Libya

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since the imposition of UN sanctions in 1992 (Pioppi and Pargeter, 2001: 33). The primary issue discussed was international terrorism, and both countries agreed on ‘the necessity to deny support and protection to those responsible for terrorist acts’ and ‘to adopt further measures aimed at preventing, contain and repress such acts’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 December 1999). At the end of the talks, an anti-terrorism pact was signed between the two countries. During the same visit, D’Alema formally invited Qaddafi to come to Italy. ‘I told him’, he stated, ‘that we would be happy if he chooses Italy as the first country to visit in Western Europe. It is reasonable to expect that the visit will take place, even though not in the short term’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 December 1999). Qaddafi responded that he wished to go to Italy, and hoped that the Libyan people would allow him to accomplish this trip during the tenure of the D’Alema government (Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 December 1999). In fact, the visit did not take place until 2009. Until then, however, the Libyan leader sought to make his point clear. For example, in September 2008 the Libyan leader rebuked his interlocutor one more time: I told them [the Italians] it will not be possible for me to visit it [Italy]. I may visit any other country in Europe but not Italy. I will not visit it because there is vengeance between us and Italy. I told them that I prefer that the enmity continues until a generation of Libyans is able to take revenge from Italy. (Al Qaddafi, 2008b) The actual implementation of the Joint Communication was discussed in detail in a follow-up meeting in June 2000 between Lamberto Dini and the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shalgam. The issues addressed included economic investments, the ratification of the agreement signed during D’Alema’s visit, Italian-funded scholarship programmes, cooperation in the medical field, the Italian commitment to find Libyans expelled during the Italian occupation, and the removal of landmines (Inform, 14 June 2000). On 12–13 December 2000, Shalgam returned to Rome to further discuss the measures envisioned in the 1998 Joint Communication, and to explore collaborative efforts on migration. On this occasion, the first session of the Italian–Libyan Partnership, a programme covering political, economic and trade, financial, social and migratory, cultural and cooperation issues, was convened (Middle East Newsfile, 20 December 2000). Importantly, a Memorandum of Intent addressing drug trafficking, terrorism, organised crime and unauthorised migration was signed. The agreement became effective after ratification by the Italian Parliament on 22 December 2002. The agreement dedicated a separate paragraph to migration and included three main measures: 1. Exchange of information on the modus operandi and the itineraries of illegal migrant flows and the criminal organisations that favour them.

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2. Exchange of information on organizations specialised on the falsification of documents and passports. 3. Reciprocal assistance and cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration. (Memorandum of Intent, 2000) The text identifies a range of measures cantered on cooperation between police forces on specialised training and the exchange of information on criminal organisations (Memorandum of Intent, 2000). The results were praised on both sides. The Libyan Foreign Minister, Shalgam, declared that they were ‘on the threshold of the new millennium’, that relations between the two countries were ‘a model across the Mediterranean’ (BBC, 18 December 2000). This was echoed by Lamberto Dini, who reiterated that a ‘new phase’ of the bilateral collaboration would commence and that a page had been turned (BBC, 18 December 2000). Likewise, a mission by Italian parliamentarians to Libya in January 2001 found that the bilateral collaboration was satisfactory: The relations between Italy and Libya are entering a particularly solid phase characterised by intense collaboration that could lead to privileged status [for Italy] not just at economic level but also at political and institutional levels. (Camera, 2001) This euphoria, however, proved to be short-lived. Significantly, the same delegation conceded that ‘not all the points of the Joint Communication have been implemented’ (Camera, 2001). The important subtext here is that ‘the privileged relationship’ foreshadowed in the 1998 Communication had yet to be achieved. First and foremost, the tensions over the colonial reparations showed no signs of abating.

6.5

Berlusconi government (2001–2006)

In June 2001, Silvio Berlusconi was elected Prime Minister for the second time. On 3 September 2001, the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Renato Ruggero, flew to Libya to meet his counterpart as well as Italian entrepreneurs operating in Libya. The trip was motivated by the need to support Libya in the ‘recognition of its international co-responsibility’ (La Stampa, 3 September 2001). As Ruggero declared, ‘Tripoli can represent a significant element of stability in the Mediterranean and it is in the interest of Italy to make this role more credible’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 3 September 2001). Yet economic and political issues continued to be a source of antagonism between the two countries. In response to the complaints of Italian entrepreneurs in Libya about being disqualified by virtue of being Italian, the minister acknowledged the persistence of ‘this sword of Damocles’, under the guise of the colonial past, which prevented the overcoming of the past.

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In his own words, ‘if we live only in the past we will not be able to build the future. And what we want is a dynamic future of balanced relations’ (La Stampa, 3 September 2001). As anticipated, it was in this tense climate that the issue of the costal was first raised. Interviews with different high-ranking Italian officials confirm that the Libya request of the coastal highway was brought up for the first time on November 2001. As an Italian deputy minister admitted: I was part of the Commission of the Joint Communication and I understood that [ ... ] the hospital was not enough for them while we [Italians] always believed that the hospital would have been sufficient. It was then during the Berlusconi government that while we were thinking of the hospital, the problem arose. To our disbelief, the Libyans told us that: ‘we would like instead a highway along the coast!’18 Likewise, as a former undersecretary of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maintained during an interview: The problem explodes with us [the Berlusconi government 2001–6]. Because we kept saying that we wanted to close with the ‘big gesture’. So [ ... ] we hear them [Libyan authorities] talking about either a highway or a railway. During an informal talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Schalgam, laughingly I said: ‘look if you want to double the costal [the coastal highway that was built under the Italian colonial rule] and you will call it Balbia19 we are ready to make a deal with you!’ This was a sarcastic way to say: but what on earth are you asking? We have already built a coastal road, that is the Balbia! We could not believe it [that they were asking for the construction of a road].20 The same informant also conceded that whilst the Italians assumed that it was about a financial feasibility plan for the construction of the highway, which would have amounted to €60 million, the Libyans expected the cost of the whole project. As the undersecretary acknowledged: ‘it all started from a misunderstanding!’21 The same account is confirmed by a former Italian Prime Minister who recalled: As far as the highway is concerned it seems that there has been some confusion either due to the interpreters or to the actual dialogue. Berlusconi thought that they were discussing about the feasibility project while he [Qaddafi] meant the complete realization. The two are clearly quite different. [ ... ] Surely, there has been a quid pro quo.22 This reflection on the presumed miscommunication and the intertwining of political, historical and economic factors, serves as necessary background

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to the negotiations on migration. In February 2002, Berlusconi met the Libyan Foreign Minister, Shalgam, and stressed his ‘priority’ that Libya grant entry visas to the Italians exiles ‘as soon as possible’. The Prime Minister also emphasized the need for a ‘swift and just’ solution to the question of the credits that Libya owed to Italian companies (Ansa, 26 February 2002). Migration too became an increasingly prominent item in the bilateral and multilateral discussions. During the 5+5 Dialogue23 meeting on July 2002, Libya signed the Tripoli Declaration (Pliez, 2006), whereby a roadmap on migration and development was adopted. Participant countries committed themselves to ensuring that adequate financial resources were made available to implement joint measures for tackling undocumented migration (5+5 Dialogue, no date; Africa–EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, 2007). At the same time, the political stigmatisation of irregular migration from Northern Africa, discussed in Chapter 4, gained ground. On December 2002 the Italian Interior Minister, Pisanu declared: Over the last few days we have seen that little and over-crowed boats carrying desperate people have arrived in Lampedusa, while the charter ferries were unable to leave due to the bad weather conditions. For each boat that gets through, how many sink? This huge question mark is a very heavy burden on the European civil conscience. Above all, it demands that single countries, but even more the EU, find effective answers that can no longer be put off. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2002) To fully understand the deepening of Italian–Libyan discussions on migration, it is useful to consider the broader international setting. As already noted, after 9/11 the Libyan regime made an active effort to re-establish its international status and Qaddafi was an immediate convert to the Bush administration’s war on terror (St John, 2003: 473). On 1 September 2002, in a two-hour speech marking the anniversary of the 1969 coup, the leader proclaimed: In the old days, they called us a rogue state. They were right in accusing us of that. In the old days, we had a revolutionary behaviour. [ ... ] We now decided to address the consequences of our action. (Watanona, 1 September 2002) It was, therefore, a strategic moment for the Italian Prime Minister to pay his first visit to Libya. On 28 October 2002, Berlusconi met the Libyan leader, with the ‘categorical imperative of looking at the future’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 29 October 2002). Qaddafi, however, initiated the discussion by displaying, and commenting on, a series of photos on the suffering inflicted by the Italian colonial rule. The gift that he offered to Berlusconi was a weapon from the Italian colonial army (The Times, 30 October 2002).

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The discussion covered the visas claimed by the Italians expelled in the 1970s, the repayments of credits to Italian enterprises, and the donation of a hospital to Libya, as well the ‘symbolic gesture’ of the highway (Coralluzzo, 2008: 123; La Stampa, 29 October 2002). The two leaders also addressed joint action to tackle terrorism, irregular migration and organised crime. This is summarised in the statement of Cosimo Ventucci, Undersecretary for Relations with Parliament, on June 2003: The visit of the Prime Minister to Tripoli on October 28, 2002 has allowed us to make clear to the Libyan authorities how important the fight against criminal organisations is for us, and our expectations of full collaboration by Libya, especially with regard to the fight against clandestine immigration. Libyan authorities have declared that they are willing to help us. They have emphasised that they find it difficult to effectively control illicit trafficking because they suffer from an objective shortage of tools and resources which are necessary for an adequate control of land and sea borders to be made. For this reason, they demand our help in the European context to end the embargo and to have access to European funds which could assist them in the fight against clandestine immigration and organised crime. (Camera, 2003e) At the end of the visit, the ‘Treaty of Italian–Libyan Friendship’ was signed (La Stampa, 29 October 2002). In Berlusconi’s words, this agreement created the basis of future collaboration, intended to ‘improve the bilateral relations and the advantages to our enterprises’ (Adnkronos, 28 October 2002; Camera 2003c). Nonetheless, the outcome was not as successful as expected. As Berlusconi himself conceded: Libya is expecting an important symbolic gesture from Italy and what we have presented as reparation from the colonial past is inferior to the Libyan expectations. [ ... ] Qaddafi is definitively open to discuss and willing to listen. However, he is extremely skilled in playing arm-wrestling. He has been governing his country for over 33 years. As I told him, he is a super professional in his job, and compared to him I am an apprentice. (Il Corriere della Sera, 29 October 2002) In the same vein, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Alfredo Mantica, observed that the supposedly shared goal of overcoming the past might have had different meanings for the two countries. In his view, the challenge consisted in comprehending ‘the interpretation’ of his Libyan counterpart (Ministero degli Esteri, 2002). Regardless of the persistent difficulties in addressing the issues agreed upon in 1998 and 2000, the Berlusconi government continued the policy of previous governments, and sought to deepen collaboration with the

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North African regime. In Rome, on 5 February 2003, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs met his Libyan counterpart, Shalgam, to discuss the credits claimed by the Italian firms, the collaboration on migration, the possible visas for the Italian expelled, and the war in Iraq (Inform, 5 February 2003). The same month, Italy established a permanent liaison on organised crime and migration, based in Tripoli (EC, 2005d: 58), consisting of officials from the Department of Immigration and Border Police and the Department of Criminal Police, both reporting to the Italian Ministry of the Interior (Cuttitta, 2006: 18; Pansa, 2004a). As will be made clear in Chapter 7, its main goals include designing and testing joint projects to control terrestrial borders, sharing intelligence on criminal organisations and halting the boats of irregular migrants while still at sea. To address the technical implementation of specific measures to tackle undocumented migration, the Minister of the Interior, Giuseppe Pisanu, flew to Tripoli on 3 July 2003 (Ministero dell’Interno, 2003a). During the visit, the two countries agreed on further joint measures to control unauthorised migration and human trafficking (Agence France Presse, 25 August 2004; Ministero dell’Interno, 2003a; Parlamento Italiano, 2003), and signed an agreement involving, among other things, the exchange of information on migrant flows, and the provision to Libya of equipment to control sea and land borders. Two aspects, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, are worth noting. First, Libya did not accept the Italian proposal to implement joint patrols on the Libyan coasts, as Italy had done with Albania (Caffio, 2003: 18). Second, the accord has been neither ratified in the Italian Parliament nor made available to the public (Cuttitta, 2006: 19). I will argue that the secrecy of some of agreements has had a significant bearing on Italy’s policy options and the negotiations outcomes. Overall, the 2003 agreement failed to cement long-standing friendship, since dissent, especially with regard to the colonial chapter, endured. In January 2004, through the Libyan foreign Minister, Qaddafi sought to lay down the practical steps for Italy to meet its obligations towards the Jamahiriya and to recompense for the colonial damages (AFX News, 29 January 2004). The Libyan leader also lamented that ‘nothing’ had been done to finally resolve ‘the outstanding issues’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 5 February 2004). On 10 February 2004, Berlusconi made his second visit to Libya, and concrete actions to tackle unwanted migration were discussed (La Repubblica, 11 February 2004). Importantly, the symbolic gesture that Libya expected from Italy remained unresolved. While Italy was eager to settle with the delivery of the hospital specialising in heart diseases,24 Libya insisted on the construction of the coastal highway from Egypt to Tunisia. According to Qaddafi, this was a necessary gesture of ‘friendship and reparation’, whose realisation would make Italy ‘the only economic partner of Libya’ (La Repubblica, 11 February 2004). As Berlusconi put it, what Libya demanded

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‘shakes the blood in the veins as well as the wallets’ (La Repubblica, 11 February 2004). The scale of the financial commitment raises questions about the actual capacity of Italy to comply with Libya’s requests. Arguably, the dire status of the current Italian economy leads one to question the likelihood, as well as the repercussions for Italy, of such an unprecedented undertaking. In the rising political and economic costs incurred by Italy, the power disparity between the two countries becomes manifest. As a parliamentary committee warned in 1999, ‘with Libya we have made positive and significant steps ahead, but it is still open to question what is the price in terms of national dignity’ (Senato, 1999). Accordingly, the visit was depicted by the Italian media as an utter failure. The headline in La Repubblica reported: ‘Qaddafi freezes Berlusconi’ (La Repubblica, 11 February 2004). By the same token, the title of Il Manifesto read: ‘Berlusconi’s Italietta25 makes a meagre impression on Libya and on the international community’ (Il Manifesto, 11 February 2004). Despite the persistent swing between enmity and friendship at bilateral level, Libya’s position in the international realm kept improving. On 27 April 2004, Qaddafi accepted an invitation to go to Brussels, which marked his first visit outside Africa and the Middle East for over fifteen years (Coralluzzo, 2008: 123). On this occasion, the then President of the EC, Romano Prodi, called for Libya to join the Barcelona Process. Less than two months later, the US resumed diplomatic ties with Libya. After twenty-four years of almost no diplomatic contact, the US removed Libya from the list of designated state sponsors of terrorism in recognition of Libya’s decisions to abandon its WMD programme and to comply with the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NNPT) and the gradual settlement of the Lockerbie bombing issue (St John, 2008c).26 Largely because of Libya’s intention to reverse its pariah status, collaboration on terrorism and migration with Italy improved. On 25 August 2004, Berlusconi made a third visit to Tripoli, and the readmission to Libya of migrants who had reached Italy by boat was discussed and agreed upon (Cuttitta, 2006: 32). In fact, as the next chapter documents, the return flights from Italy to Libya commenced the following month. As is clear from the following statement by Giuseppe Pisanu on September 2004, the results were deemed positive: We have reviewed the joint measures implemented so far on terrorism and organised crime and the status of the Italy–Libya programme on immigration especially in the light of the abolition of the EU embargo. The results achieved are satisfactory. This is demonstrated by the intense activity to contrast human trafficking undertaken by Libyan authorities on the coasts. This has been possible thanks both to the autonomous effort of Libya and the collaboration with Italy based on the existing bilateral agreements. Indeed, as many as 4,500 people awaiting for

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their passage to Italy have been repatriated to their country of origin. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004g) In addition, the two countries continued cooperating on the construction of reception centres for undocumented migrants in Libya and the provision of equipment on migration control for Libya. These will also explained at greater depth in the next chapter. According to La Repubblica, the financial resources committed by Italy amounted to €10 million (La Repubblica, 29 September 2004). As Pisanu simply put it, the objective was ‘to reduce to zero the number of illegal immigrants’ from Libya (La Repubblica, 29 September 2004). Yet several voices within the Ministry of Interior, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed concern at the approach taken by the Berlusconi government towards Libya. In an interview with Il Corriere della Sera, the outgoing Italian Ambassador to Libya, Claudio Pacifico, bemoaned the poor accomplishments: ‘I leave after four years and substantially nothing has changed’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 19 September 2004). The former Ambassador attributed the existing problems to Berlusconi’s inability to forcefully respond to Libya’s instrumental use of migration. ‘It is not difficult’, he further added, ‘to understand those young people crossing the sea illegally as an expression of blackmail from Qaddafi’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 19 September 2004). Claudio Pacifico’s comments are relevant, for two reasons. First, they anticipate a key theme of this research, i.e. the extent to which migration is used as a bargaining-chip by Libya. Second, they highlight once more the relevance that migration had acquired on the bilateral agenda by 2004. On this count, the subsequent events of September and October 2004 exemplify the critical nexus between migration and the economic and political interests of both countries. On 23 September 2004, the Undersecretary of Economy, Adolfo Urso, flew to Tripoli to promote Italian businesses (Ministero del Commercio Internazionale, 2004). The official did not conceal his hopes that the end of the European embargo would expand economic exchanges and herald new alliances with Libya (Ministero del Commercio Internazionale, 2004). As a matter of fact, the lifting of the EU sanctions coincided with the beginning of the systematic repatriations of migrants to Libya, the fourth visit of Berlusconi to Libya, and the launch of the gas pipeline. On 1 October, over 1,000 migrants from Libya arrived at Lampedusa by boat, and Italian authorities immediately ordered the expulsion of 90 of them back to Libya. The account presented in Chapters 7 and 8 of the successive repatriations is proof of Italy’s steadfast determination to respond to the putative ‘invasion’ of migrants from Libya. Pisanu’s statements were unequivocal: ‘the desperate people who still think they can sail illegally to Italy must know that they will be sent back to where they came from as soon as they have been given humanitarian help’ (BBC, 4 October 2004).

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The following week, on 7 October 2004, Berlusconi visited Libya for the fourth time. The formal occasion was the inauguration of the pipeline ‘Greenstream’, part of the ‘West Libyan Gas Project’, built and operated by ENI, the first of the foreign companies active in Libya. €7 billion were invested into the 520 kilometre-long pipeline, which now supplies gas from Mellitah to Sicily (Dietricht, 2004). The pipeline, running under the Mediterranean, carries at least 280bn cubic feet (8bn cubic metres) of natural gas a year to Italian power plants (BBC, 7 October 2004). The project was credited with being the biggest of its kind in the Mediterranean (Dietricht, 2004). Significantly, the visit of Berlusconi is also associated with an event that was then perceived as a landmark. During the inauguration of the pipeline, Qaddafi declared his willingness to re-enforce relations with Italy and move beyond the colonial past, so that Italy and Libya could ‘exchange joint benefits and not enmity’ (BBC, 7 October 2004). Thus the leader solemnly announced the abolition of the commemoration of the ‘day of revenge’, which would be replaced by the ‘day of friendship’ (The Independent, 8 October 2004).27 He also asserted his intention to grant to the Italians expelled in the 1970s the possibility of returning to Libya on tourist visas. In a follow-up interview with Il Corriere della Sera, the Libyan Prime Minister, Ghanem, reiterated that for the Italians expelled there were no problems and ‘from now on’ they could apply for visas (Il Corriere della Sera, 14 October 2005). As we shall see, these pledges proved short-lived. In the midst of these events, on 14 October 2004 the Council of the European Union, in application of the Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), decided by Common Position to lift the arms embargo against Libya. As explained in the previous chapter, the EU also resolved to conduct a technical mission to Libya in order to examine collaborative arrangements to curb undocumented migration from Libya (EC, 2005d). By now, one aspect seems clear, namely, the complex give-and-take matrix that determines the shifting choices of both parties and sets the bargaining pace. The collaboration on migration by Libya was expected to be the automatic pay-off for Italy’s advocacy of an end to the European embargo. The concurrent discussions on energy and partnership in the fight against international terrorism also played an important role in the overall bargaining game (Coralluzzo, 2008: 123; Coslovi 2007). The appreciation of the substantive interests of Italy vis-à-vis Libya, and the interweaving of different items on the negotiating table needs to be kept in mind for it introduces Part IV of this book. On December 2004, an Italian delegation led by the Minister of Infrastructure, Pietro Lunardi, flew to Libya to discuss the symbolic gesture. Eventually, the feasibility plan was presented to the Libyan authorities (Il Corriere della Sera, 27 May 2005). From the intense bilateral discussions, however, it became obvious that, contrary to what Qaddafi

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had declared a few months earlier, the colonial page had yet to be turned. As the Libyan Prime Minister explained to Adolfo Urso in April 2005, the outstanding issues on the agenda were conditional upon the construction of the highway (Agenzia Aise, 2005). From the Libyan viewpoint, the matter was simple: ‘Qaddafi has felt as if he had been not taken seriously’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 27 May 2005). In a further not-so-unexpected twist, Giovanna Ortu, the president of AIRL, was informed by a journalist that the tourist visas had been granted to over-65-year-olds only (Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 April 2005). In response to the remonstration by Ortu for not being officially notified by either government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fini, solicited the Italian Ambassador Sessa to request a formal explanation from Libya. The Libyan Embassy in Italy responded that they were not aware of the new disposition until a few days after its release (Fini, 2005). Once more, miscommunication, not only between the two parties but also within the countries themselves, appears to have been a critical factor affecting the conduct of the bilateral talks. This incident reveals another critical dimension of the bilateral bargaining, i.e. the unpredictable circumstances which retard the overall negotiations. A quote from an Italian official who was involved in the negotiations may suffice to make this point: When we meet our Libyan friends [colleagues at the Libyan ministries] on the negotiating table, our problems are numerous. We begin at 8 a.m. and at 10 p.m. we are still at point number one. It would often happen that at 2 a.m. in the morning we were still negotiating. I was ready to become Iranian!28 Whereas the discussion on the highway reveals the ambiguity of Italy as to its ‘real’ commitment and capacity to meet the Libyan request, on the migration front Italy continued to display relentless determination to reduce migrant flows to ‘virtually zero’ (La Repubblica, 22 June 2003). On 6 February 2005, Giuseppe Pisanu and Nasser al Mabruk agreed to set up ad hoc teams with experts from both countries to conduct ‘investigations of human trafficking and to allow the immediate sharing of information’ (Cuttitta, 2006: ; Ministro degli Esteri, 2005). During the same meeting the Italian government committed to support a project on joint border control (Ministro degli Esteri, 2005). In conjunction with the continuation of the repatriations of undocumented migrants from Italy to Libya, on 12 July Pisanu was in Tripoli to talk with Qaddafi. As Pisanu summarised it: Particular attention was given to the fight against Islamic terrorism and the criminal organisations that control human trafficking and pitilessly exploit of clandestine immigration. These organizations have their bases in Italy, Libya and other countries in the Mediterranean region. For this

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reason, a more intense international collaboration is needed. (Agence France Presse, 12 July 2005) Pisanu clarified that, in order to tackle terrorism, which in his view was ‘knocking at Italy’s door’, new measures were to be launched (Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 July 2005; The Economist, 16 July 2005). Once again, these pronouncements are instructive in as much as they shed light on the conflation of different issues, such as migration and terrorism, into one single type. The security narrative linking migration and terrorism appears to be an increasingly decisive factor moulding the negotiations. On 17 January 2006, the status of the bilateral cooperation was further discussed between Pisanu and Qaddafi during a visit of the former to Sirte. Both parties praised the positive results in their collaboration on irregular migration. According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, ‘over 40,000 people’ had been blocked from leaving Libya, and hundreds of persons responsible for human trafficking had been arrested as a result of Italian– Libyan cooperation (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006d). The signature of a ‘memorandum of understanding’ on undocumented migration concluded the talk (Cuttitta, 2007: 17; Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 102). In an effort to seize the strategic moment before the upcoming elections, on 23 February 2006 the Italian Council of Ministers decided: to adopt all necessary measures to give more strategic relevance and operational substance to the partnership between Italy and Libya by giving priority to (a) finally close the chapter on the colonial past [ ... ] (b) and continue to search for an acceptable solution of the economic contentions concerning the credits that Italian firms claim. (Consiglio dei Ministri, 2006) In a rare spirit of general consensus, all Italian parties endorsed the position that the highway was to be built (Il Sole 24 Ore, 24 February, 2006). The Prime Minister was himself convinced that the highway ‘could be done’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 August 2006). All the factors which could have led to the final settlement were potentially there. Yet again, a major diplomatic incident got in the way. A few days earlier, an Italian minister, Roberto Calderoli, displaying a T-shirt with the controversial drawings of Muhammad published by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, provoked a protest of hundreds of demonstrators outside the Italian Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. During the protest on 17 February 2006, eleven people were killed and several wounded (Tgcom, 17 February 2006). In an attempt to remedy the situation, Berlusconi called for the resignation of Calderoli and, in an interview with Al Jazeera, he declared that ‘between our two countries there have not been and there are still no problems’ (Ansa, 21 February 2006).

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Not surprisingly, after the riots in Benghazi the Libyan position was not as well-disposed as Berlusconi’s. In April 2006, during a visit to Italy, the Libyan Foreign Minister cautioned Italian authorities that Qaddafi, after the protest in front of the Italian Consulate, would threaten ‘other similar episodes’ if Italy did not maintain its commitment to close the colonial era with the symbolic gesture of the highway (Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 April 2006).

6.6

Agreements between 2006 and 2008

In 2006, the Berlusconi government completed its full term, and yet the colonial disputes, first raised in the 1970s, were still far from being solved. In the elections held in May 2006, Romano Prodi won by a wafer-thin majority and became Prime Minister of a centre–left coalition. The ‘friendship’ with Qaddafi continued as one of the top priorities of Italy’s newly elected government (Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 August 2006). On 3 August 2006, a meeting between the Italian Foreign Minister, D’Alema, the Libyan Foreign Minister, Abdulati Al Obeidi, and the Libyan Secretary for Cooperation Affairs, Mohammed Taher Siala, sought to reinforce the dialogue on migration. In particular, the talks ranged across the opening of a new reception centre in Libya funded by Italy, the readmission agreements, the international conference on migration to be held in Tripoli, the claims of the Italian companies, and the construction of the highway (Jana News, 3 August 2006). Shortly afterwards, the Italian Foreign Minister announced his determination to sign, by the end of the year, a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Libya, to finally resolve the contentious issues related to the colonial past. While the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs applauded the re-establishment of ‘a positive relation with Libya’, the Libyan Ambassador to Italy, Hafed Gaddur, emphasised that ‘the comprehensive political and economic agreement’ depended on the construction of the highway as a symbolic gesture from Italy (Il Sole 24 Ore, 4 August 2006). Similarly, during a phone call with Prodi, Qaddafi stressed the need for a concrete gesture, which had been promised by the previous government in order to ‘heal the wounds caused by the Italian colonial occupation’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 August 2006). The message was clearly formulated by Al Obeidi, in an interview with Il Corriere della Sera: The decision [on the highway] has already been made and the highway has to be built. This has already been confirmed by the governments that have preceded this one and by the current government alike. Indeed, Prodi and D’Alema are discussing the modalities to fulfill this. (Il Corriere della Sera, 6 September 2006)

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In a surprise visit by Prodi to Libya on 8–9 September 2006 (La Stampa, 9 September 2006), and during a subsequent trip to the country by the then Italian Minister of the Interior, Giuliano Amato, on 12 September 2006, the joint efforts to control irregular migration were, once more, the top priority in the discussions (Il Corriere della Sera, 13 September 2006). Libyan officials announced their intention to send to Italy a police expert to liaise with Italian counterparts (Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 September 2006) and an agreement was reached to jointly patrol the coastline of the North African country (Il Corriere della Sera, 13 September 2006; Watanona, 14 September 2006). In praising the Italian commitment to construct the highway, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shalgam, welcomed the proposed police collaboration (Ansa, 22 September 2006). Although the construction of the highway had been promised by the Berlusconi government, Prodi endorsed the commitment. In fact, during an informal trip to Libya on 7 April 2007, D’Alema made it clear that the highway was to be built (Il Corriere della Sera, 8 April 2007). As a high-ranking diplomat clarified during an interview, on this occasion the two ministers discussed a draft agreement covering a wide range of issues, including economic cooperation, the joint measures against terrorism and migration, as well as the costal highway.29 Likewise, on March 2007 a Libyan highranking official confirmed the positive developments concerning the highway. In his own words: We have decided that Italy will build a road. We would like to have a ‘big gesture’ made by Italians. This will be done with the Italian specifications of a highway. For this reason, Prodi will soon sign a treaty, in which this will be agreed upon. [ ... ] Of course the road will be built by Italian companies. Also, in the treaty there will be no mention of the colonial issues. This is to avoid setting an international precedent. This has already been passed in the Italian Parliament. So we have agreed on the principle and idea of recompensating.30 The official also added that the rationale was that, in finally fulfilling the Libyan request for a symbolic gesture, Italy would benefit from special economic treatment, and Italian companies would be provided with new profitable opportunities. As he succinctly put it, ‘if I was an Italian, I would do this’.31 Against this background, it is worth noting that the year 2007 represented a major step forward in EU–Libyan relations. On 23 July, the Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor were released. As I explained in Chapter 5, such a decision unleashed a new phase of increasingly intense cooperation between the EU and Libya and in the next chapter I will further argue that this has important repercussions for the Italian–Libyan agreements on migration. A few months afterwards, in October 2007, wide-ranging agreement between ENI and the

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Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) further consolidated their longlasting strategic partnership (ENI, no date). ENI concessions were extended for another twenty-five years, and the capacity of the gas pipeline was increased by 37 per cent (Il Sole 24 Ore, 17 October 2007). As the chief of ENI, Paolo Scaroni, acknowledged ‘Libya is by far the first country for us [ENI]’ (Il Messaggero, 16 October 2007). It should be clear by now that if there is an underlying pattern in Italian– Libyan relations, it is an anomalous ‘logic of exchange’. On the same day that the ENI–NOC agreement was signed Al Obeidi was in Rome to discuss with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs the signature of a comprehensive agreement to settle the historical contentions (Il Sole 24 Ore, 17 October 2007). In a climate of mounting expectations, the following month D’Alema travelled to Libya in order to agree ‘in principle’ on the final treaty. As the Italian minister declared afterwards, whereas the deal was ‘not yet completed’ they had agreed ‘on the principle’ and had only to ‘finalise the details’ (Libyaonline, 11 November 2007). In fact, the Italian minister admitted the persistence of some ‘open questions’ (La Repubblica, 11 November 2007). That crucial tensions persisted emerged clearly from the fact that, during his ten-day trip to Europe in November 2007, Qaddafi visited Portugal, France and Spain, but not Italy. The decision not to go to Italy, despite repeated invitations from the Italian government, was perceived as a ‘slap on the face’ for the Italian government (Il Corriere della Sera, 11 December 2007).32 Collaboration on migration was addressed during a visit to Libya by the Italian Undersecretary of the Interior, Marcella Lucidi. On 19 November 2007 she met El Richie, the Secretary of Immigration Affairs, and Al Obeidi, which settled the basis of the agreement on joint patrolling, signed in Tripoli on 29 December 2007 (Panapress, 19 November 2007) and followed by the implementing protocol of 4 February 2009 (Senato 2009a; UNHCR, 2009). The details of the agreement will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters to come. What is relevant to us here is a brief insight into the behind-the-scenes negotiations and Libya’s striking ability ‘to put on a diverting show’ (The Economist, 30 August 2008). An Italian official recalled the signing of the December agreement in the following way: The secretary of the Prefect [the high-ranking Italian official flying from Rome] contacted me to have a detailed schedule of the meeting with Libyan authorities. I tried to tell them that it was impossible to know this in advance. But since they insisted on one, I made up myself a preliminary schedule. Once the Prefect arrived, of course, the schedule changed once again. Until the last moment, we were not sure about the text of the agreement to be signed because of the constant back-and-forth with our Libyan counterparts. Before the signature it seemed that a deal had been reached and I tried to make sure that the text was ready so that when the

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Prefect met the Libyan authorities we could finally sign it. As we met our Libyan counterparts to supposedly seal the agreement, we were informed that they were no longer happy with the text and further negotiations were needed. The Prefect who had come all the way to Libya just to sign the text could understand the difficulties that we face on a daily basis here in Libya. Unexpected developments happen every day.33 As a matter of fact, a few months later the accord on patrolling had still to be implemented. A high-level Libyan official interviewed in February 2008 deplored the fact that ‘nothing’ had been done ‘on the ground’.34 In the midst of these events, the domestic political scenario underwent another of its notorious reshuffles. On 24 January 2008, Prodi resigned after losing a confidence vote in the Senate. A snap general election was held on 13–14 April 2008, which brought Berlusconi back to power. The centre–right coalition’s comfortable win was partly attributed to its pledge to tackle undocumented migration. As Berlusconi bluntly put it, ‘one of the things to do is to close the frontiers and set up more camps to identify foreign citizens who don’t have jobs and are forced into a life of crime’ (The Guardian, 16 April 2008). With regard to Libya, the new government pursued the line of the previous administration. Libya’s stance did not alter either. As the new cabinet declared the possibility of Calderoli, who by wearing an anti-Islam T-shirt had provoked the protests in Benghazi, being appointed minister, Qaddafi’s son was adamant. In a statement on the site of his foundation, the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation, he stated categorically that ‘the minister’s reappointment would have catastrophic consequences on the Libyan–Italian relations’ (Jana News, 2 May 2008). In connection with this, the Libyan Minister of the Interior further clarified that Libya was no longer considering collaborating with Italy on migration. As he put it: Libya is involved in efforts to repel the influx of illegal migrants to Italy and it is exhausting its material resources and it is spending a significant amount of money to protect Italian shores from the wave of clandestine immigrants. Now Libya is no longer responsible for the protection of the Italian coasts, because Italy has not fulfilled its commitment to support Libya. (Rainews, 9 May 2008) Ultimately, Calderoli was appointed Minister for Regulative Simplification, and Berlusconi chose Libya as the destination of his first diplomatic trip abroad of his third term in office. On 28 June, the Italian Prime Minister met Qaddafi in Sirte for a two-hour discussion focusing on migration and, in particular, on the implementation of the agreement on common patrolling signed the previous December (AFP, 28 June 2008).

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The final deal was reached during a second visit to Libya on 31 August 2008 which was eventually publicised on October 2008 (La Repubblica, 23 October 2008) and ratified with Law No. 2 on 6 February 2009 (Parlamento Italiano, 2009). In a tent outside Benghazi, the two leaders signed a supposedly ‘historic’ agreement whereby Italy pledged to pay US$5 billion over twenty-five years in reparations, which would include a diverse range of projects such as the much-disputed highway (Gazzini, 2009; The Financial Times, 31 August 2008). The package was intended to finally conclude the long dispute over the mistreatments of the colonial times. This emerges clearly from a statement by Berlusconi himself: I would like to warmly and cordially say thank you to your Leader, who has sought strongly to reach this point and sign this accord. The agreement deals with the tragic moments of the Italian occupation in your country. On behalf of the Italian people, as a head of government, I feel obliged to offer my apologies and express our sorrow for what has happened years ago and which has affected the lives of many of your families. [ ... ] I take this opportunity to publicly praise your Leader for his efforts in all these years that have brought to your country full dignity and has placed you at the centre of international politics thanks to his moderation. (Il Manifesto, 31 August 2008) Berlusconi’s animated words notwithstanding, the speech that Qaddafi gave the following day for the thirty-ninth anniversary of the Libyan revolution was less generous: Italy pledged to compensate, but [ ... ] nothing could compensate the blood of our fathers and the Italian occupation of Libya. The reality is that if someone wanted to be your friend and if he did so in good faith and you have been recompensed for what he had taken from you, then you might say yes ‘we can be friends, behave as equals’. (Al Qaddafi, 2008b) Nevertheless, both countries contended that, with the treaty, the longstanding clash over the repayment was finally settled, and undocumented migration would be finally brought under control. The Italian Interior Minister was indeed unequivocal: ‘the most relevant part of this pact is the highway, which is the payback in order for us to patrol in Libyan territorial waters’ (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008e). In the same way, Berlusconi stated: ‘we have written a page in history and now we will have fewer immigrants leaving from the coast of Libya and coming to us and we will have more Libyan oil and gas’ (Paoletti, 2009; The Financial Times, 31 August 2008). As a matter of fact, Article 19 of the Agreement is devoted to migration. It provides an ‘intensification of the ongoing cooperation in the context of the

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fight against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and clandestine migration’ (Parlamento Italiano, 2009). The events following the agreement would lead one to conclude that Berlusconi was indeed right. In honouring his promise, Qaddafi abolished the commemoration of the Day of Revenge which was renamed the Day of Fulfilment. On 7 October 2008 the renewed friendship between Italy and Libya was praised. Yet the leader did not fail to ‘salute the Libyan respectful martyrs who defended the homeland against the Italian colonialism which took place on this same date in 1911’ (Jana News, 7 October 2008). On different counts, the bilateral relations have witnessed remarkable improvements. At the economic level, Tripoli has sought to incentivise Italian firms to invest in Libya by channelling fresh capital from Libyan sovereign funds (Ronzitti, 2009: 7). In the words of the Italian Institute for Foreign Commerce: since the agreement signed in August 2008, ‘Libya has expressed a growing and unprecedented interest for different Italian businesses’ (ICE, 2009b: 9). For example, in 2009 the Libyan Central Bank and the sovereign Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) bought 4.9 per cent of Unicredit and were about to buy up to 5 per cent of ENI (Ronzitti, 2009: 7; see Il Sole 24 Ore, 12 February 2009). Likewise, in July 2009, Libya made available 11 billion euros for Italian businesses wishing to invest in Libya (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2 July 2010). In broad terms, as of 2010, Italian investments in, and overall commercial relations with, Libya had expanded relatively to other Mediterranean countries (ICE, 2009a; Ministero dell’Economia, 2009; Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2009). The collaboration on migration also deepened. As we shall see in the next chapter, since 2008 new measures to tackle irregular migration have been introduced in Libya and also at the bilateral level. One of these includes the push-backs whereby since May 2009 hundreds of irregular migrants intercepted at sea have been returned by Italian authorities to Libya (UNHCR, 2010). The combination of these factors may explain the fact that in 2009 irregular arrivals from Libya to Italy decreased by 90 per cent (Camera, 2010b; Paoletti, 2009). In marking a definite break from the past, on 10 June 2009 Qaddafi paid the first visit to Italy since he came to power in 1969. This historic trip was intended to signal ‘a new era’ of ‘true and profound friendship’ (African Press International, 14 June 2009). Ironically, Qaddafi arrived in Rome wearing a photo pinned to his military uniform of Omar Al-Mukhtar, the Libyan resistance fighter during the colonial era who was hanged by the fascist military government in Tripoli. The picture showed Al-Mukhtar in chains at the time of his arrest in 1931 (African Press International, 14 June 2009). As expected, the visit was thwarted by bewildering and controversial episodes. In one instance, the Libyan leader failed to attend a meeting at the lower house. Eventually the Speaker, Gianfranco Fini, called the meeting off after two-hour wait (BBC, 12 June 2009). Similar incidents coloured the second

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visit of the Libyan leader which took place a few weeks after. In his capacity as Head of the African Union, on 8 July 2009, Qaddafi returned to Italy to attend G8 summit in the central Italian city of L’Aquila (Adnkronos, 7 July 2009). This time, his Bedouin tent was pitched on a sports field belonging to Italy’s tax police (Magharebia, 8 July 2009). Having sketched the tortuous historical journey of Italian–Libyan diplomatic exchanges, the lingering question is whether the agreement signed in August 2008 has fundamentally changed their bargaining dynamics. On the one hand, interviews with Libyan officials between September 2009 and January 2010 reveal a sense of unyielding dissatisfaction. The agreement – it was believed – had benefited mainly Italy’s commercial interests, rather than Libya’s. Along this vein, it has been argued that the agreement has indeed reversed the cost-benefit balance at the advantage of Italy (Dugger, 2009). On the other hand, a number of critical issues remained unresolved. In March 2010, the repayment of the Italians repatriated from Libya in the 1970s had yet to be settled (Camera, 2010d). Furthermore, Libya’s refusal in February and March 2010 to grant visas to citizens from the Schengen area, and hence also to Italian citizens, as a result of the dispute with Switzerland, is evidence of the persistent setbacks in the bilateral and multilateral relations (Camera, 2010c).

6.7 Conclusion Since the coup by Colonel Qaddafi in 1969, colonial issues have been on the agenda and have been strategically linked to other aspects of bilateral diplomatic relations. The tactic of connecting disparate points has continued to the present day and undermines the Italian stance. Libya holds that if Italy lives up to its promises and delivers the symbolic gesture, everything would ‘follow automatically’.35 Whether this is the case remains to be seen. Libya’s bargaining strategy entails the combination of multiple issues in order to change the overall balance of interests of its counterpart. This applies particularly to migration and entry and exit policies. Libya has made its cooperation on migration contingent on the fulfilment of specific conditions. As Qaddafi made clear during the Lisbon meeting in December 2007, African countries are willing to help Europe in the fight against migration if the latter pays back the damages inflicted during the colonial period (AFP, 8 December 2007). This strategy has proved costly for Italy. The succession of high-level visits by Italian politicians to Libya demonstrates the obstinate Italian diplomacy aimed at ‘clearing the Colonel’ for the rehabilitation of the Jamahiriya in the international arena (Coralluzzo, 2008: 122). It was based on the consideration that the transformation of Libya into a ‘normal country’ and a ‘privileged partner’ would ultimately benefit Italy (Coralluzzo, 2008: 122).

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Yet the political developments since Libya’s rehabilitation in the international community question such an assumption. The new era, with Libya no longer a rogue state, has not brought the expected benefits to Italy. The colonial demands have escalated, and none of the issues that first emerged in the 1970s have been fully overcome. Indeed, the striking features of the overall Italian–Libyan discussion have been the official declarations of consecutive Italian governments insisting on the allegedly imminent settlement of the outstanding problems. These pronouncements were invariably negated by subsequent developments in the bilateral negotiations – until, of course, the latest agreement. With regard to Libya’s new phase in the international arena, Saif Al Islam declared recently: ‘it is now a different history, a different page in history. It is a game and it is a win-win game’ (BBC, 28 August 2008). Whether this pertains also to Italian–Libyan relations, especially in the wake of the Friendship Treaty of August 2008, is an open question to which I will return in Part IV.

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7 Joint Measures on Migration

7.1 Introduction In 2010, the Italian Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, lauded the Friendship Treaty signed with Libya in August 2008 as it finally bore its fruits. The minister cited statistics according to which since it came into force irregular migration had decreased by 90 per cent (Camera, 2010b). In this context we are led to ask what the collaboration consists of. This is the focus of this chapter which details the measures financed by Italy in Libya in order to reduce undocumented migration from Libya. Specifically, I concentrate on the following joint actions: reception camps funded by Italy in Libya; return flights of undocumented migrants from Italy to Libya and from Libya to third countries; joint border patrolling; provision of equipment to control borders; training programmes for police staff; exchange of intelligence information; projects managed by IOM; and off-shore push-backs. Overall, the aim is to provide an empirical and descriptive analysis of the Libyan–Italian action on migration control. This sets the basis of the analytical discussion in Chapter 8 concerned with the extent to which the bilateral collaboration on migration can be regarded as a manifestation of the externalisation of border controls.

7.2

Centres for irregular migrants funded by Italy in Libya

Before beginning the analysis of the Italian-funded reception camps1 in Libya, a brief word is necessary on how the idea of centres for migrants and asylum-seekers in third countries developed within European policy circles. The proposal to fund centres to host migrants and refugees in third countries2 was discussed by the Italian Interior Minister, Pisanu, and his German counterpart, Otto Schily in a meeting on 12 August 2004. As the press release from the Italian Ministry of the Interior states: Both Ministers agree on the need to elaborate a procedure defining the treatment of people found off-shore and who cannot be repatriated to 139

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their country of origin because they invoke the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. For this category of people, the Ministers are considering the creation of European structures able to welcome them in order to process their asylum requests outside our continent. Moreover, these centres should provide voluntary protection to those recognised as refugees, either in a third country or in an EU member state. According to the Ministers, it is important to clarify whether there is a need to create extra-European reception centres, where the requests for legal immigration to Europe could be processed on the basis of the need of European countries. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004b) During a press conference in September 2004, Pisanu indicated that the centres were also intended to provide professional training to potential legal migrants to Europe. We [Pisanu and Schily] were thinking of facilities in which it was possible to process requests for asylum or regular migration to our countries, and to organise professional training courses. For example, Europe and Italy need nurses, who are not available on European territory. We cannot import nurses if we don’t provide them with an adequate professional training beforehand and a basic knowledge of the European language that they will need. Moreover, we have thought of these structures [reception camps] as places where we can provide humanitarian assistance and identify the nationality of the illegal immigrants who normally or very frequently arrive here with no documents. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c) A similar idea was put forward by Rocco Buttiglione, appointed and later suspended European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs. In several interviews, he defined the reception centres built outside European territory as a ‘good idea’.3 He further suggested that they could be used to ‘select the desired [sic] economic migrants to Europe’ (Dietrich and Vogelskamp, 2005). In this vein, he was reported as saying that the Schily proposal to set up European asylum-seeking centres in North Africa would be a move ‘in the right direction’ (The Financial Times, 25 August 2004).4 However, the fact that the two countries agreed on utilising the Italianfunded centres to specifically process asylum requests remains contentious. In September 2009 the Italian government stated its intention to realise ‘Libyan territory commissions under EU authority’ which could examine asylum requests. The commissions would be based at ‘gathering centres’ and would adhere to ‘human rights obligations and would respect the dignity of those hosted’ (Camera, 2009c). Importantly, this proposal has been put forward by the EU and, hence, it should not be seen as part of the bilateral agreements.5 Indeed, no consistent evidence is available to contradict

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the latter proposition. In line with its denial of the existence of refugees in Libya, an internal document provided by the Libyan Ministry of the Interior indicates that the centres were initially intended to host ‘migrants’ (Libyan Ministry of the Interior, 2007a). The document refers to three centres to host foreigners who had entered the country without the required documentation (Libyan Ministry of the Interior, 2007a). Likewise, according to Pisanu the informal agreement signed between Italy and Libya in July 2003 included the construction of a number of centres in Libya for the general purpose of regulating migrant movements. An official statement from the Italian Interior Ministry reads as follows: The programme under implementation [agreement stipulated between Italy and Libya in 2003] includes, among others, some measures funded by Italy and intended to create facilities regulating migrant movements. The provisions identified in this context are an Italian contribution to Libyan initiatives. [ ... ] We will contribute to the creation of these facilities that will be managed exclusively by Libyan authorities. This is because all forms of collaboration that we have discussed so far are based on the premise that Libyan sovereignty has to be scrupulously protected. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c) This proposal became operational after Law No. 241 passed in 2004 (De Zulueta, 2006a; Favilli, 2005: 159). The new regulation granted the Italian Ministry of Interior the possibility to finance, in third countries, ‘structures useful to contrast the irregular flows of migrants toward Italian territory’ (Parlamento Italiano, 2004). However, even before this law, in 2003 Italy had financed the construction of one camp for undocumented migrants in Gharyan, near Tripoli, and by the end of November 2004 construction was already under way (Corte dei Conti, 2004; EC, 2005d: 59; Libyan Ministry of the Interior, 2007a). This camp is mentioned in an internal document provided by the Libyan Ministry of the Interior, which clarifies that it was intended to provide accommodation to people who had entered the country ‘illegally’ (Libyan Ministry of the Interior, 2007a). The EC report also indicates that in the financial planning of the Italian government for 2004–5 ‘a special allocation was foreseen for the realisation of two more camps in the southern part of Libya, in Kufra and Sebha’ (EC, 2005d: 59). The same information was confirmed by members of the EP, following a visit to Libya in December 2005: The Libyan director for immigration, Brigadier Romali, confirmed that Italy had financed the construction of a detention camp 20 kilometres from Tripoli [the one in Gharyan] and that two more centres were being promised by the Italian authorities in the near future. (EP, 2005)

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In addition to these three centres, in 2006 Italy funded the construction of a fourth one. The fact that Italy has provided the financing and the technical oversight of four camps for the detention of migrants in Libya was discussed by Alessandro Pansa, former Director of Immigration and Border Police at the Italian Ministry of the Interior in a statement before the Italian Parliament: One of these centres is near Tripoli, has a capacity of 1,000 people; it be will handed over next January [2005]. We have started the construction of a second centre, of the same capacity located in Sebha, at the centre of the Libyan desert. The third centre will be realised in Kufra next to the border with Egypt, Sudan and Chad. In the same area the construction of another may commence during 2006. (Comitato Parlamentare, 2005) Nonetheless, such plans were later revised. The change in the utilisation of the centres was confirmed by Italian authorities. According to the representative of the Italian Ministry of the Interior based in Tripoli, interviewed in January 2007, their new purpose would be mainly to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants: The idea of these centres is to provide medical assistance. We are now working with Libyan authorities to make sure that these centres have a distinctive humanitarian function. We would like that these centres were utilised to provide assistance to the victims of human trafficking.6 The Libyan side, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the centres. In its view, they were ill-suited to host migrants. One representative at the Libyan Interior Ministry whom I interviewed in May 2007 maintained that the walls surrounding the camps were not high enough and, thus, could not be used to contain migrants.7 Similarly, the Director of the Forensic Department in the Libyan police lamented that the camps were not appropriate for migrants, since they were low-quality pre-fabricated structures.8 Consequently, in 2007 the Libyan police submitted a request to the Italian authorities to use the camps for police training instead.9 Other official statements by the Italian Ministry of the Interior confirm that the centres were to be used for medical and police-training purposes. In July 2007, the Undersecretary for the Interior maintained that the centres would provide humanitarian assistance to ‘stranded migrants’ and to train Libyan police (Camera, 2007a). By July 2007, the centre in Kufra had not yet been built, and construction of the Sebha one had been halted (Camera, 2007a). As of September 2009, only the centre in Gharyan had been handed over to the Libyan authorities for police training and the camp in Kufra was still under construction.10 It remains unclear, however, how Libyan authorities would define ‘humanitarian assistance’ and, by

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implication, how such centres would differ from the pre-existing ones used to detain migrants.11 In order to introduce the discussion in the coming chapters, two aspects behind the change in destination are noteworthy. First, the structures were criticised by a number of international organisations and NGOs on human rights grounds.12 Hence, Italy may have revised its policies because of this international pressure. Indeed, an Italian official explained the modification in the following way: As concerns the centres, I have to say that there are things that in a certain moment appear to be good but afterwards they are no longer deemed as positive. We did not do this collaboration, just by ourselves. I have to say that in building the camps we followed all European standards. However, a problem remains, i.e. what we thought was good in the past is seen now in different terms.13 Second, despite such a change in destination, Libyan themselves repeatedly welcomed the intention of Italy to sponsor such centres. For example, during an interview one representative of the Libyan Ministry of the Interior indicated that Libya had asked the European Union to co-finance ten new camps.14 This is consistent with the securitised discourse on migration presented in Chapter 5.

7.3

Repatriations from Italy to Libya15

The practice of returning unauthorised migrants to their supposed countries of origin has been widely employed by Italy, as well as other European and non-European countries.16 Italy has signed readmission agreements with over twenty countries, including Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Morocco, Moldavia, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland and Tunisia (Caritas, 2006a, 2009; Delicato, 2006: 13). According to Caritas, 23,955 migrants were repatriated by Italy on the basis of bilateral readmission agreements in 1999, 23,836 in 2000, 34,390 in 2001, 44,706 in 2002, 37,756 in 2003, 35,437 in 2004 and 26,985 in 2005 (Caritas, 2006a).17 More recent scattered data, however, indicate that since 2007 the number of people repatriated has decreased (Caritas, 2010). This is partly due to the fact that Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, who had represented a significant part of the irregular population, became EU citizens whose stay was legal (OECD, 2009v).18 Repatriations represent a critical aspect of the Italian–Libyan collaboration on migration. Between October 2004 and March 2006, Italy conducted systematic return flights from Lampedusa in Sicily, and Crotone in Calabria, to Libya, carrying migrants who had recently arrived in Italy

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by crossing the Mediterranean. An historical excursus of these measures is instructive. From 29 September to 8 October 2004, 1,787 undocumented migrants reached the island of Lampedusa on twenty vessels that were sighted and intercepted by the Italian police forces (Council of Europe, 2006). On 1 October, the Italian authorities ordered the expulsion of 90 foreigners from Lampedusa to Libya (Gacon et al., 2005). The following day, 2 October, three flights brought over 300 migrants and asylum-seekers to Tripoli (Gacon et al., 2005). On 3 October, two special Alitalia flights and two military planes deported another 400 people, and then on 7 October four military planes returned still more (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 113). As the Italian government stated in its response to the appeal before the European Court of Human Rights, between September and October 2004 ‘1,153 foreign nationals – most of them of Egyptian nationality – were returned to Libya on 11 charter flights’ (Governo Italiano, 2006; Ministero dell’Interno, 2004d). Before the Italian Ministerial Tribunal,19 Alessandro Pansa added that the flights were directed to Albeida Airport in Libya so that the migrants could be easily transferred to Egypt (Collegio per i Reati Ministeriali, 2006).20 A few months later, a second wave of repatriations took place. On 20 December 2004, a press release from the Italian police reported that 200 irregular Egyptian migrants coming from Libya had been boarded on a plane at Crotone Airport to Tripoli (Polizia di Stato, 2004). According to the same source, these measures exemplified ‘the positive collaboration with Libyan authorities’ (Polizia di Stato, 2004). A third series of repatriations was carried out in March 2005. Between 13 and 21 March, 1,235 migrants disembarked in Lampedusa (Collegio per i Reati Ministeriali, 2006). Of them, 421 requested protection and were transferred to Crotone. Another 494 were returned to Libya and 126 to Egypt (Collegio per i Reati Ministeriali, 2006). As the then Italian Minister of the Interior commented: Once again, we are facing an attack conducted by criminal organisations that unremittingly exploit illegal migrants. [ ... ] We will respond, as always, in a firm manner. We will provide the necessary assistance and necessary medical treatment and we will take back to the country of origin those who are not entitled to stay in Italy. The individual measures of repatriations are carried out in respect of national and international rules. (Ansa, 13 March 2005) Similarly, in April 2005, the Undersecretary at the Ministry of the Interior, Michele Saponara, claimed that the above-mentioned return flights took place with the consent of Libya and with respect for human rights laws as well as existing international laws (Senato, 2005a).

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In October 2004 and March 2006, two Italian parliamentarians visited the reception centre in Lampedusa while the repatriations were under way. One of the two provides an insightful account of their experiences: While we were in the centre of Lampedusa, from some documents that we saw we realised that these people were collectively repatriated under the same name. We saw long lists repeating the same name [of those to be repatriated]. Hence, we believe that they were not properly identified. Moreover, these people were not given the possibility to apply for asylum. [ ... ] We raised this issue during a parliamentary interrogation, asking the government how it could send back to Libya people who had not been identified. The response was that those people had been identified. Yet, when we asked if we could have the lists [with the names of those repatriated proving that they had been identified], we were told that for privacy reasons this request could not be met. 21 The same point was made by the other parliamentarian: When our interpreter shouted at them that they were being sent back to Libya, there was panic and the people who were about to get into the aircraft started running away from the plane in order not to board. [ ... ] Clearly, they had not been told that they were about to be sent back to Libya.22 Against the claim that migrants were not properly identified, the formal position of the Italian Ministry of the Interior remains that the people returned to Libya had been individually identified (Camera, 2005a; Senato, 2005a). On 12 May 2005, over 800 people arrived at Lampedusa (Ansa, 12 May 2005) and on 14 May an Alitalia flight carried 67 people from Lampedusa to Albeida in western Libya (Ansa, 20 May 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 110). Significantly, on 10 May the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights requested the Italian government not to expel eleven migrants who had appealed to the Court (European Court of Human Rights, 2005). The case, however, was archived in January 2010 (European Court of Human Rights, 2005). As we shall see later on, as irregular migrants continued to be returned to Libya, international pressure mounted for Italy to halt this controversial practice. A fifth series of return flights from Sicily took place between June and July 2005. On 22 June, the Italian authorities returned at least 45 people to Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 110). Other sources report that on 13 July, 64 Egyptians were transferred to Libya (Il Manifesto, 11 August 2005).23

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The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities Table 7.1 Number of foreign nationals returned from Italy to Libya 2004

2005

2006

Total

1,153

1,876

14

3,043

Sources: The numbers presented in this table are sketchy and are likely be incomplete. They are based on the data available from the above sources. More specifically, the figure for the year 2004 is mentioned in the written response of the Italian government to the European Court of Human Rights and refers to the people returned in October 2004. The 2005 estimate was provided by the Libyan government to Human Rights Watch (2006a). For the year 2006 the source is the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (2007).

Other flights from Italy to Libya were arranged in August 2005. On 10 August 2005, 65 migrants were put on an Alitalia flight to Libya (Arci, 2005; Il Manifesto, 11 August 2005). A few days later, between 21 and 27 August, 130 Egyptians arrived at Lampedusa and were transported first to Porto Empedocle and then to Catania Airport to be put on two military flights to Libya (Ansa, 30 August 2005). On 31 August, another 165 Egyptians were taken from Lampedusa to Libya (Ansa, 30 August 2005). Overall as table 7.1 summarizes, Libyan authorities indicate that in 2005 the number of foreigners returned from Italy to Libya totalled 1,876 (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 110). A similar figure is confirmed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, which documents that, in 2005, twenty-one flights returned to Libya 1,642 foreign nationals from Lampedusa and 221 from Crotone (European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 2007). 24 Its 2007 report makes clear that in 2006 only one repatriation flight took place (Ansa, 28 March 2006). In fact, on 28 March fourteen people were returned to Libya (European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 2007: 31). Overall, different sources contend that most of the foreigners returned to Libya were repatriated directly to third countries (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004f, 2004h). A report by the EP cites Libyan authorities saying ‘that the hundreds of illegal sub-Saharan migrants sent back to Tripoli by the Italian authorities in 2004 and 2005 have, in most cases, been repatriated to their countries of origin’ (EP, 2005a). Likewise, Siala made it clear to the EP delegation that: When illegal immigrants are returned to Libya, our mission is to contact the different embassies to verify their nationality and get them a travel visa. Afterwards we repatriate them to their country of origin. We are very happy that Italy cooperates with us by financing some of these return flights. (EP, 2005a)25

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Similarly, Human Rights Watch reports: The quickest returns are of persons sent back from Italy, because the Libyan and Italian governments have arranged their onward removal to countries of origin prior to their arrival. ‘This is arranged before they come [from Italy] so we do not hold them’ said Hadi Khamis the director of Libya’s deportation camps. He explained, ‘They are not held in alFellah but sent right home.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 55)26 The same position was reiterated by the Libyan Interior Minister, Nasser alMabruk. He was quoted by the BBC as saying that his country had helped repatriate migrants after their expulsion from Italy: Italian authorities asked Libyan authorities for their assistance [ ... ] Libya has accepted this demand and returned them to Egypt through Libya. [ ... ] They were returned on Italian flights and Italy is paying for the cost. (BBC, 7 October 2004) By and large, it appears that migrants returned from Italy were repatriated by Libyan authorities, either by air or by land (Il Tempo, 7 October 2004). It is important to bear in mind that these repatriations from Libya to third countries are distinct from those that I discuss in the next section and that concern migrants arrested in Libya and, hence, not necessarily those who had reached Italian shores. They should also be distinguished from the push-backs of migrants intercepted at see which I will also discuss in section 7.10. Since March 2006, no further repatriations from Italy to Libya have been reported. However, official statements from the Italian Ministry of the Interior are ambiguous on the matter. For instance, in May 2006, during a visit to Lampedusa, the Undersecretary of the Interior, Marcella Lucidi, declared that there would ‘no longer be expulsions of immigrants to those countries that have not signed the Geneva Convention, and among them, Libya’ (La Repubblica, 25 May 2006). Yet on the same day Giuliano Amato, met with the Libyan Ambassador to the Vatican, Gaddur, to reassure Libya about the ‘real’ [sic] intentions of Italy. Accordingly, the press release of the Ministry of the Interior states that Italy intended to cooperate with Libya in order to control borders, because in the ‘recent past’ this had produced ‘visible results’, and that Italy confirmed its ‘full collaboration to control illegal immigration especially in consideration of the beginning of the summer holiday’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 25 May 2005). In fact, the Undersecretary was reported clarifying that the ‘expulsions’ to Tripoli would ‘not be indiscriminate’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 25 May 2005; La Repubblica, 25 May 2006). However, it is important to stress that there is no evidence that return flights from Italy to Libya continued after March 2006.

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Presumably, in order to address what could have been perceived as a potential breach of the informal agreements with Libya, the Ministry of the Interior sought to remedy the possible misunderstanding caused by the statement by Lucidi, and to send ‘the right’ message to Libya. Using this reasoning, one high-level official was reported as saying: If this was the case [i.e. if expulsions to Libya were to be stopped], the expulsion machine and the fight against illegal immigration would be jeopardised. If this was the case we should transfer all the illegal immigrants that arrive to Sicily in the 13 receptions centres that [ ... ] are already full. Since we would not be able to identify them within 60 days as prescribed by law, we would have to free them. Hence, this [what Marcella Lucidi proposed] would not help the problem of reducing the time required for the identification procedures. (La Stampa, 25 May 2006) Overall, the return flights have been the object of numerous critiques. Notably, Italy has been condemned by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2005a), UNHCR (UNHCR, 2005) and the European Parliament (EP, 2005b). Italy has been also been asked to justify the expulsions by the European Court of Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights, 2005) and the Italian Ministers Tribunal (Collegio per i Reati Ministeriali, 2006). In the interest of brevity, I will not dwell upon the examination of all the criticisms made, but will focus instead on the points relevant to our purposes, which are two: (1) the absence of a formal readmission agreement between Italy and Libya and (2) the questionable legal basis, from the perspective of Italian jurisprudence, for conducting return flights. I shall now consider the responses provided by the Italian government on these concerns. This analysis sheds light on the bewildering position of the Italian government on migration policies and vis-à-vis Libya. On the existence of the readmission agreement, different arguments have been advanced. The EP deplored the secret nature of the bilateral collaboration with regard to the collective expulsions of asylum seekers and ‘irregular migrants’ to Libya (EP, 2005b). As a result, the return flights constituted a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, and the Italian authorities allegedly failed to meet their international obligations (EP, 2005b). As a matter of fact, an Italian official based in Tripoli maintained that the two countries had signed no readmission agreements.27 Yet, during an interview with me a former Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that the Italian– Libyan readmission agreement had in fact been sealed. When I argued that no formal agreements on this matter had ever been discussed before the Italian Parliament, he responded that verbal agreements hold juridical value.28 Along this line, the statements of the Italian Interior Minister evince that the two countries agreed informally to undertake repatriations

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from Italy to Libya and from Libya to third countries. On 17 September 2004, Pisanu praised the agreements with Libya in terms of the significant number of foreign nationals repatriated (Ansa, 17 September 2004) and on 27 September 2004 he confirmed that Libya had already accepted the repatriation of 800 migrants (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c). This would lead one to assume that the two countries had ‘informally’ agreed on such measures. Moreover, on 8 October 2004 in the Chamber of Deputies Pisanu reiterated that: The readmissions to Libya have been carried out on the basis of the agreements with that government and they reflect the agreements already finalised with many third countries from the Southern shore of the Mediterranean. However, the bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya neither cover the treatment of the foreigners expelled from Italy, nor the modality of their expulsion to the country of origin. The agreements [ ... ] concern the fight against illegal migration and human smuggling, as well as the provision of equipment and the cooperation on saving the lives of people traversing the Mediterranean. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004d) Other government officials endorsed this point. In the Senate on 14 October, the former Undersecretary of the Interior, Alfredo Mantovano, made it clear that the readmissions to Libya were envisioned in the agreements with Libya (Senato, 2004). Moreover, during an interview a former Undersecretary for the Interior explained the reasons for their informality: We had to address the issue of people dying off-shore [ ... ] If one of our partners, and I don’t necessarily want to say Libya, for its own reasons, is willing to have an agreement only if its items remain secret for a certain period of time, I much prefer to have this agreement, even if it is informal, instead of nothing at all. This is particularly the case if this could help save human lives and prevent unbalanced situations between countries of origin and of destination.29 Likewise, in a letter to Human Rights Watch, Giuseppe Panocchia, the Italian Foreign Ministry’s representative, attested that the readmissions to Libya were ‘based on informal agreements developed in the course of diverse bilateral meetings at ministerial level’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 106). Furthermore, in his testimony before the Ministers Tribunal, the prefect, Carlo Mosca, stated that the flights to Libya and the subsequent repatriations to Egypt took place with the consent of Libya, ‘in the absence of formal readmission agreements’ (Collegio per i Reati Ministeriali, 2006). Such a position is also clear from the response of the Italian government to the European Court of Human Rights, which asserted that ‘there is no

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agreement with Libya on readmission of illegal migrants’ (European Court for Human Rights, 2006). This point leads to the second issue concerning the legality of the return flights under Italian legislation. The Italian government argued that the return flights to Libya were lawful. For example, on 16 March 2005 Pisanu declared in the Italian Parliament that Italy was acting lawfully (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006f). In Italian legislative practice, the government is entitled to sign agreements with third countries even in the absence of the authorisation by Parliament (Favilli, 2005: 158). The vexing dispute concerns the risk of non-refoulement. In its formal response on the appeal before the European Court of Human Rights concerning the repatriations of 29 September–6 October 2004, the Italian government sought to clarify its position with regard to the nonrefoulement principle and the nature of the cooperation with Libya. It argued that the return flights to Libya fell under the definition of ‘respingimento’30 and are to be considered neither ‘refoulement’ nor ‘expulsions.’ ‘Respingimento’ is defined in Articles 10 and 13 of the Unified Text on Immigration as the situation where ‘the border police send back foreigners crossing the borders without the necessary requirements for the entry into the state’s territory as provided for in the Unified Text’ (Ministero dell’Interno, 1998). This principle of ‘refusal of entry’ is distinct from, and does not necessitate the prior signature of, a readmission agreement (Delicato, 2006). While fundamental human rights are expected to be safeguarded, foreigners are not allowed to enter national territory because of their lack of the required documentation (Delicato, 2006: 2). Hence, the Italian government rejected the charge of violating the non-refoulement principle, arguing that it had applied the principle of ‘respingimento’. The proposition that Italy has acted lawfully was formulated by the Italian authorities on several occasions. For example on December 2005, the Undersecretary, D’Alia, declared in the Chamber of Deputies: The ‘respingimento’ of migrants to Libya in many cases has been monitored until their reaching of their final destination, their country of origin – which was Egypt, contrary to what they declared. The decisions of respingimento and, in the most serious cases, of expulsion have been taken in full respect of Italian legislation and of the international norms. This applies also in the case of the most recent crisis affecting the centre in Lampedusa between October 2004 and June–September 2005. (Camera, 2005b) Nevertheless, a number of Italian parliamentarians, such as De Zulueta, Acciarini, Martone and Iovene, have repeatedly emphasised that all the available evidence points to the principle of non-refoulement having been violated (Senato, 2005b). They contended that, in conducting what they

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termed ‘mass expulsions’ (Senato, 2004), the Italian government not only breached the Unified Text on Immigration but also ‘committed a whole series of offences’.31 Similarly, the International Federation for Human Rights asserted that the non-refoulement principle had been contravened since the identification of nationality seemed to have been determined primarily by the intuition and snap judgments of two Arabic interpreters, and Italian officials did not make available the names of those expelled, despite repeated requests from Italian politicians. (Human Rights Watch 2006a) As of 2009, the alleged infringement of the non-refoulement principle remains an open question (AGI, 2007; Vassallo Paleologo, 2008b).32 As regards Italian law, however, the secrecy of the diplomatic arrangements has been deemed unconstitutional (Favilli, 2005: 164). Broadly, the lack of clarity on the arrangements of the return flights from Italy to Libya, and their sudden interruption despite the continuation of undocumented arrivals to Italy, are evidence of Italy’s shifting and ambiguous stance.33 Correspondingly, Libya’s acceptance of the repatriations invites a reflection on its position towards migration. Arguably, the Libyan substantive interest in full rehabilitation within the international community made the benefits of compliance with the return flights from Italy higher than those of defiance. This consideration directs attention to Libya’s evolving bargaining position, which I will explore in the chapters to come.

7.4

Repatriations from Libya to third countries

Alongside the return of migrants to Libya, since 2003 Italy has also sponsored the return of migrants from Libya to their putative country of origin.34 For example, the Italian Interior Ministry documents that, in 2003, Italy coordinated 25 flights from Libya to unspecified third countries (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004a: 27).35 A more comprehensive account is provided by the EC report (2005d), which documents that, between August 2003 and the end of 2004, Italy financed fifty flights. Overall, 5,688 migrants were expelled to Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Eritrea, Nigeria, Sudan, Niger, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Syria (EC, 2005d: 61–2). As indicated in table 7.2, according to the Libyan Interior Ministry, between January 2003 and August 2006, 8,899 foreign nationals were repatriated from Libya to third countries with Italian financial support (Libyan Ministry of Interior, 2007a). The interviews with Libyan police officers conducted in Libya in June 2007 reveal that Italy continues to finance flights of undocumented foreign nationals from Libya to third countries. The same information was confirmed by a Deputy Minister at the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs.36

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152 The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities Table 7.2 Repatriations from Libya to third countries financed by Italy Year 2003 2004 2005 Until August 2006 Total

Number of people deported 1,643 4,947 1,710 599 8,899

Source: Libyan Interior Ministry (2007a). It is not clear, however, if these estimates include the migrants repatriated from Italy or just those arrested in Libya. This serves as an important reminder of the limits of the available data.

During an interview in June 2007, he pointed out that Libyan authorities arranged the renting of the planes and that Italy paid for them.37 Similarly, in March 2008, another high-ranking Libyan official clarified that Italy was still financing the return flights of undocumented migrants to third countries,38 and a document from the Libyan Justice Ministry in 2008 stated that ‘the collaboration between two countries [Italy and Libya] has produced successful results, the most important of them being the collaboration on the operations for return of migrants’ (Libyan Minister of Justice, 2008). This information, however, was disavowed by the Italian officials interviewed in Tripoli between January 2007 and September 2009. According to them, Italy was no longer providing assistance with the return flights from Libya to third countries.39 In addition, the aforementioned statements by Libyan officials were not corroborated by other sources such as media and international organisations. From an Italian standpoint, the decision to interrupt the financing of the return flights from Libya may have been a consequence of the criticism voiced by the international community regarding possible human rights violations.40

7.5

Coordinated patrolling

As illustrated in the previous chapter, Libyan and Italian authorities met on several occasions to discuss, inter alia, the coordinated patrolling of land and sea borders. In December 2003, the Undersecretary at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Antonione, stated that the agreements between the two countries included the control of terrestrial frontiers, intelligence support on criminal organisations and ‘contrasting’ undocumented migration off-shore (Camera, 2003a). More specifically, in June 2004 Alessandro Pansa confirmed that Italy and Malta had agreed with Libya and Tunisia to organise joint patrols along sea borders to curb unwanted migration from Libya (Pansa, 2004b).

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Since 2002, Libya has participated occasionally in off-shore military exercises with Italy (Pagine di Difesa, 2004). In fact, in 2004 Libya gave its support to the joint patrols carried out by Greece, Malta, Italy and the UK within the framework of the Neptune project, and in 2005 Libyan units participated directly in the joint patrols (Ansa, 21 October 2005; Cuttitta, 2007a: 14; Il Sole 24 Ore, 15 October 2004; Polizia di Stato, 2005).41 However, subsequently Libya reconsidered its position. After meeting Qaddafi in September 2004, Giuseppe Pisanu declared that coordinated sea patrol systems were no longer on the agenda: It is clear that in the Libyan programme there is the idea of acquiring an autonomous capacity to control its borders and of strengthening its structures. Until recently Libya was not capable of doing such things because of the embargo. (Ministero Dell’Interno, 2004c) Likewise, at the multilateral summit with government representatives of Malta and Italy on 6 September 2006, the Libyan government, while confirming its intention to cooperate in the surveillance of the Mediterranean, also declared that no foreign naval forces would be admitted into its territorial waters (Cuttitta, 2007a: 14). On other occasions, Libyan officials have opposed altogether joint measures to control sea borders. As the Libyan Ambassador to Malta, Saad El-Shelmani, observed in 2006, for Libya to order migrants to do a u-turn to Libya was not the solution, and the joint sea patrols would have breached Libyan sovereignty (Jeune Afrique, 31 August 2006; Watanona, 27 August 2006). We will see, however, that this was bound to change after the Friendship Treaty of August 2008. At this point, it is useful to consider the Libyan position on Frontex. In September 2006, Libya’s European Affairs Minister, Abdulati Al Obeidi, said that Libya opposed Frontex on two grounds. First, Frontex could not solve the migration problem, since priority had to be given to the Libyan southern borders as the major transit point for migrant flows. Second, the design and implementation of Frontex had been taken unilaterally by the EU. Hence, the Libyan diplomat concluded that the EU proposal was ‘unacceptable’ (La Stampa, 6 September 2006). Be that as it may, Italian and EU officials continued to affirm that Libya would take part to the joint patrolling. On 23 November 2006, Giuliano Amato announced that the Libyan leader was ‘totally’ in support of the collaboration with Frontex (Ansa, 23 November 2006). Accordingly, Franco Frattini pointed out: There is a piece of good news. Libya has finally accepted our proposal to collaborate [with Frontex]. In exchange it has asked for our help to control its Southern border along the frontier with Niger. In other words, Libya told us: we commit to patrolling your [European] shores to block

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clandestine people [sic] if you [Europeans] help us to block clandestine [sic] influxes through the desert. (Il Messaggero, 12 March 2007) These claims, however, proved to be misguided. After participating in the joint operations in 2005, Libya refused to grant permission to Frontex to patrol its territorial waters.42 This is an important clue, since it sheds light on the communication difficulties between Libyan and EU officials. It is further evidence of the somewhat bewildering manner in which negotiations have been conducted. As an official from Frontex declared in June 2007: Libya has not responded to the requests of the EU to participate to the joint patrolling. This makes the whole operation very difficult especially when it comes to decide who is responsible to provide humanitarian assistance to the migrants found off-shore. (Ansa, 25 June 2007) Along the same lines, after the recent visit of Frontex to Libya between May and June 2007, a representative of the EU mission lamented: There is definitely no political will on Tripoli’s [sic] to stem the problem. No real patrols on the Mediterranean coast exist, and it is almost a freefor-all situation with clandestine trafficker groups operating all over the country. Libya definitely needs help, but there also has to be a political will to act. (The Times of Malta, 3 June 2007) The report produced by Frontex (2007) on the same visit concedes that although discussions with Libyan authorities were ‘extremely friendly and courteous’, the latter offered no clear signals, ‘as had been hoped by the mission members’, as to what its position was ‘in respect of (a) participation in Joint Operation “Nautilus” and (b) possible future operational cooperation with Frontex’ (Frontex, 2007: 6). The discussion between Frontex and Libyan authorities also addressed the patrolling of the southern borders (Frontex, 2007).43 In October 2006, Franco Frattini had already announced that Frontex intended to allocate some resources to the joint control of the Libyan southern borders (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006f). Simply put, Libyan authorities have been reluctant to patrol European borders ‘for free’. As a former Libyan Prime Minister observed: [Europeans would like Libya] to spend our time and money to fight and to protect you [Europeans] because you are showing your beautiful girls and nice life. [ ... ] The Europeans tell us: ‘you are not doing enough. This is illegal immigration that comes from your borders.’ But we cannot control these borders alone! The Europeans want us to be their police along their borders!44

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The same point was made by a former Director of the Gaddafi Foundation. During an interview, he explained that the common perception within Libyan political circles was clear: ‘let Italians and the EU pay!’45 The debate on Frontex ought certainly to be distinguished from that conducted at bilateral level with Italy. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 6, on 28 December 2007, Italy and Libya signed an agreement on the joint patrolling of coasts, ports and bays in northern Libya to prevent irregular migration (Il Corriere della Sera, 29 December 2007; Ministero dell’Interno, 2007c; UNHCR, 2009,). As the following extract of the agreement indicates, Italy committed to provide six patrol boats to Libya: Libya and Italy will organise sea patrolling with six naval units that will be temporarily given by Italy. The boats will have mixed crews, with both Libyan and Italian personnel, to conduct training and ensure technical assistance on how to utilise and maintain such boats. These boats will be used to carry out control operations, ‘search and rescue’ operations in the locations of origin and transit of the boats dedicated to the transport of clandestine immigration both in territorial and international waters. The two parties will respect International Conventions and the technical implementation will be defined by the two countries. (Bilateral Agreement, 29 December 2007) According to an Italian governmental official, the main rationale of the agreement was to save lives: The objective of this agreement is to save people who otherwise die along the journey from the Mediterranean. Each boat can be a big tragedy and hence this agreement would be preventive in nature, for search and rescue. It should not then be seen as an agreement for further closure. The primary objective is to put an end to this endless tragedy [of migrants dying offshore].46 In January 2008 the Italian Parliament approved the allocation of over €6 million for the Guardia di Finanza, the Italian police force under the Minister of Economy and Finance, to execute the agreement on joint patrolling (Senato, 2008). The following year a further €4.8 million had been budgeted to fund the ‘participation’ of the Guardia di Finanza to the mission in Libya in accordance with the 2008 agreement (Senato, 2009b: 77). This, together with Libya’s acquiescence to Italian requests on the push-backs – which I document below – signals a major policy shift from the former. The question that then arises is why Libya signed the agreement in the first place. Given the fact that it had previously rejected both European and Italian requests on the grounds of sovereignty, why did it give its consent this time? I posed the question to a high-ranking Libyan

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official, who responded: We need to engage with other European countries and we have to show them how big the problem is. By signing this agreement with Italy, we sought to strengthen our case before the EU in order to obtain more support in the fight against irregular migration.47 Beyond the debatable motivations on Libya’s compliance, the interviews with Italian and Libyan officials attested that implementation did not follow suit. In March 2008, the technical arrangements on the implementation of the accord had yet to be stipulated.48 As Pastore noted, in June 2008 the six patrol boats were still anchored in some Italian port waiting for the Libyans to declare themselves ready to accept their offer of help (Pastore, 2008a: 1). Not surprisingly, on 1 August 2008 Mantovano expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Libya ‘did not comply with the agreements’ (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008d). In signing the treaty on 31 August 2008, Italian authorities hoped that the impasse on joint patrolling had been overcome (Il Corriere della Sera, 31 August 2008). The subsequent facts already referred to at the beginning of this chapter and the push-backs, would lead one to observe that from the perspective of the collaboration on migration the accord did mark a watershed. The first three patrol boats were handed over by Italian authorities to their Libyan counterparts on 14 May 2010 (Ministero dell’Interno, 2009b) and on 10 February 2010 the remaining three (Ministero dell’Interno, 2010a). In relation to the latter, the Italian Minister of the Interior remarked that ‘the contrast to irregular migration and organised crime which manages human trafficking is the primary objective for both Italy and Libya’ (Ministero, dell’Interno, 2010a). In conclusion, the negotiations on the control of the Mediterranean are an illustration of the extent to which Libyan authorities have been able to determine the pace of the negotiations and, thereby, to quell Italian and European pressure. Up until 2008, the inability of both the EU and Italy to conduct joint patrolling exposes the constraints that they face in advancing their own agendas. This discussion calls into question the scope and substantive capacity of the Italian outsourcing action and the costs it incurred in order to secure the cooperation of its counterpart.

7.6 Provision of equipment The EC report shows that the informal bilateral agreement signed in July 2003 included, inter alia, the supply of specialised tools to help Libyan authorities patrol land and sea borders (EC, 2005d). The range of equipment delivered to Libya by Italy is listed in detail. It included Mitsubishi cars, three Iveco buses, 80 forgery document kits, 12,000 mixed wool covers, 6,000 mattresses and pillows, 150 binoculars for daylight vision,

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500 lifebuoys and 500 lifejacket, 500 wetsuits, 100 Zodiac lifeboats, 100 underwater lamps, 500 nautical light bulbs, 25 road GPS trackers, 50 signalling rockets with a range of 12 miles and 50 for beyond 12 miles, five kits for checking crime evidence, five kits for fingerprinting, 1,000 body bags, five cameras and films and 40 night-time viewers (EC, 2005d: 60). Additionally, on May 2005, the Italian Ministry of the Interior committed itself to spend €15 million over three years to equip the Libyan police with the necessary means to combat irregular migration (BBC, 27 May 2005; Il Corriere della Sera, 27 May 2005). In 2007, five jeeps fully equipped for the desert, computers and other specialised police equipment were also provided by Italy, alongside €7 million to set up an information system to register Libyan citizens (Il Corriere della Sera, 30 December 2007). This collaboration notwithstanding, the formal and informal talks that I had with officials at the Libyan Ministry of the Interior prior the agreement on August 2008 showed a general dissatisfaction with the quality and quantity of the equipment provided by Italy. For example, the Director of the Fellah detention centre, when showing me one of the 80 jeeps furnished by the Italian government, deplored the fact that despite being aesthetically pleasing, such jeeps were useless in desert-like environments.49 Yet high officials at the Libyan Ministry of the Interior expressed a different opinion. For example, the General Director of the Department of Cooperation and Relations in the Interior Ministry, remarked that the cooperation with Italy and the material support provided had been satisfactory. The problem was, instead, with the Europeans, who, as he put it, ‘come here, talk and listen to us but, in concrete terms, do very little’.50 The subtext here is that views and perceptions on the collaboration with Italy and the EU vary significantly between Libyan authorities. This consideration invites us to move away from the concept of a supposedly monolithic structure of Libyan decisionmaking and to appreciate the complexities of the Italian–Libyan negotiation outcomes. It is important to emphasise that the Friendship Treaty had a significant impact on the collaboration on equipment provisions and more broadly on defence. Under Article 19 Italy agreed to co-finance a control system at Libya’s southern border (Camera, 2009d). Reportedly, the project involving the setting up of a radar system to monitor the desert (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2 September 2008; Ronzitti, 2009) was contracted out to Selex (Selex, 2007), an Italian private company which is part of Finmeccanica, the secondlargest industrial group and the largest hi-tech industrial group in Italy. Importantly, Finmeccanica is partially owned by the Italian government with around 30 per cent of its shares (Felice, 2010). By October 2009, the implementation of the €300 million project on for Border Security and Control had already started (Finmeccanica, 2009a).51 In fact since 2008, the Italian government has authorised a number of major contracts between Italian companies with the Libyan Investment Authority on border control

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as well as aerospace, electronics, transportation and energy sectors (Casale, 2009; Finmeccanica, 2009b; Unimondo, 2010). The importance of private sector involvement in inter-state security cooperation adds a further layer of complexity for it involves us in discussions on accountability and diffusion of power. In fact this issue has been amply examined in the literature (Bigo, 2002; Van Buuren, 2010). The relevant point for us here, however, has more to do with the broader give-and-take bargaining game qualifying our bilateral relation.

7.7 Training programmes The agreement reached in 2000 included cooperation to train police officers. Indeed, Article 2 reads as follows: ‘Both parties commit themselves to cooperating in the area of specialised training and to promote cooperation between the police forces of both countries’ (Memorandum of Intent, 13 December 2000). Similarly, during a press conference in September 2004, Giuseppe Pisanu suggested that The Libyan authorities rely on our [Italian] collaboration, especially as regards training courses and the provision of know-how concerning police forces. [ ... ] There are already some forms of collaboration, such as specialised training ranging from controls on false documentation to dog-training, as well as the identification of explosives and drugs. The existing agreements between Libya and us are not in the area of migration only. We have also discussed collaboration on terrorism, international organised crime and human trafficking. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c) The training programme for Libyan police staff covered Italian language courses, techniques to control borders assistance, identification of illegal migrants and criminal police strategies. The workshops in Libya were followed by seminars in Italy focused on the structure and functioning of the Italian criminal police (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c). The same information appears in the EC report (2005d) that lists the courses organised by Italian authorities between 2004 and 2005. Specifically, it indicates that, in 2004, three courses in detecting forged documents for 60 officers, one in ‘ballistics survey traces of effraction’ for three officers, four in the Italian language, one in anti-drugs policing for 19 officers, and one in dog-training for 8 operators were held (EC, 2005d: 63). Likewise, the training organised throughout 2005 included one course in forged documents for 20 officers, one advanced course in forged documents for a further 20 officers, one course on anti-terrorism for 20 officers, and one diving course for six officers (EC, 2005d: 62). Likewise, an internal

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document provided by the Libyan police confirms that, in 2006, 249 workshops were held in both Italy and Libya and 419 Libyan officers were trained in false documentation, Italian language, scientific police and drugtrafficking (Libyan Police, 2007). As a senior official in the Libyan police confirmed during an interview, the training courses for Libyan policemen organised with Italian authorities have increased significantly over the last few years.52 A number of such training courses have taken place at the Police Academy in Tripoli, part of the Libyan Ministry of the Interior, and have been managed by IOM. In 2009, the latter also organised targeted courses for Libyan judges and prosecutors ‘on various aspects of irregular migration, including human trafficking, in a bid to enhance their understanding of the phenomenon that also affects their country’ (IOM, 2009a). For the purposes of this study, the linkage between the Italian-sponsored training courses and Libya’s security agenda deserves attention. In financing the courses, Italy has acknowledged the legitimacy of the Libyan police and, in so doing, strengthened an already powerful security apparatus (Pargeter, 2007). Italy has, ultimately, bolstered the notoriously pervasive Libyan police state (Human Rights Watch, 2006a). It has long been established that ‘the Libyan police force has become an institution for political supporters of the regime’ (Abdelmoula, 1992: 57). I am thus led to return to two of my initial questions. What does the police cooperation tell us about the relative influence of one country towards its counterpart? What is the relation between the collaborative arrangements, the security discourse and power relations? These issues are at the core of the more analytical discussion on the bilateral bargaining, to be explored in Part IV.

7.8

Exchange of information

The exchange of intelligence information between Libya and Italy is an important aspect of the bilateral agreements on migration. The collaboration on intelligence was stipulated in the 2000 agreement and focused, inter alia, on information-sharing on smuggling organisations (Memorandum of Intent, 13 December 2000). One example of this is the representative of the Italian Ministry of the Interior based in Tripoli. In the capacity of Immigration Liaison Officer (ILO), he exchanges intelligence information with other European ILOs based across other Northern African countries.53 Moreover, he works closely with the Libyan police and Ministry of the Interior on the same matter.54 Since September 2006, information-sharing was further expanded when the Libyan and Italian governments agreed that a liaison officer from the Libyan Interior Ministry would be based in Rome (Cuttitta, 2006: 19; Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 September 2006). The fact that Libyan officials are based in Rome to perform security-related functions is striking. It shows that the collaboration entails Italian officers relocating to Libya and, albeit to a lesser degree, vice versa.

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According to both parties, such cooperation has been successful. For example, the Italian Interior Ministry showed that in February 2006, as part of Operation ‘Abid’ undertaken with the support of Libya, the Italian police had been able to locate criminal organisations based in Libya, Egypt and Italy (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006a: 51, 2006b: 194). Similarly, in June and April 2006, two operations led by the Italian Interior Ministry, respectively ‘Harig’ and ‘Kafila’, succeeded in dismantling smuggling organisations operating between Italy, Libya and Tunisia (Coluccello and Massey, 2007; Ministero dell’Interno, 2007b). As a further example, in January 2007 Amato praised the joint efforts on intelligence-sharing, since the two countries had successfully located and arrested 190 migrants who were about to leave for Italy (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007a). As the representative of the Italian Ministry of Interior based in Libya emphasised: We [Italians] have provided intelligence information to Libyan officials on our investigative activities and the Libyan authorities have analysed such information, confirmed our analysis and implemented ‘on the ground’ what we had suggested. As a result, the arrivals [of undocumented migrants] to Lampedusa over the last few months have been reduced by 50%. Hence, we can say that the response from Libyan police has been positive.55 This positive judgement was shared also by Libyan authorities. An internal document provided by the Libyan Interior Ministry affirms that intelligence-sharing with Italy has been successful on several different fronts. For example, the report specifies that, in 2005, as a result of the daily cooperation between the two countries, 40,000 undocumented migrants were arrested, 59 smuggling organisations were dismantled, and measures were taken against 37 Libyans involved in these organisations (Libyan Ministry of the Interior, 2007a). According to the same source, intelligence-sharing had also led to the exponential growth in the number of undocumented migrants arrested and deported (see Table 7.3).

7.9 The role of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Since the opening of the office in Tripoli on 9 August, 2005, IOM has implemented a number of projects in collaboration with the Libyan government to provide assistance to ‘stranded’ migrants.56 The agreement signed between Libya and IOM identifies specific areas of cooperation, such as labour selection programmes for migrant workers in Libya, assistance programmes for trafficked migrants, humane voluntary return and sustainable reintegration programmes for undocumented migrants, information campaigns to raise

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Table 7.3 Data on undocumented migrants deported and arrested in Libya Year

Number of people deported and arrested

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total

3,087 4,169 7,032 5,705 39,586 47,991 86,006 193,576

Source: Libyan Ministry of Interior (2007a).

awareness amongst potential migrants, and income-generating programmes in neighbouring countries (IOM, 2005a). The projects undertaken by IOM are funded by the Italian government and the EU through the so-called AENEAS programme (Andrijasevic, 2006b; Camera 2007b).57 The most important project is entitled ‘Transit and Irregular Migration Management’ (TRIM), and aims to improve conditions at reception centres in Libya for unauthorised migrants, and to help migrants return to their countries of origin through the programme ‘Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration’. The project comprises four main areas.58 The first one concerns capacity-building, and was directed to Libyan officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Justice and Manpower. IOM has organised workshops, seminars and study-tours around Italy and Europe to expose Libyan officials to European know-how on migration management. Second, as part of TRIM, IOM has provided assistance to migrants stranded in Libya who wish to return to their own countries. As of August 2008, IOM guaranteed ‘comprehensive return and reintegration assistance’ to some 2,200 migrants from twenty-two countries (IOM, 2008a). According to IOM, an increasing number of migrants have solicited the help of IOM to return to their country. In the words of Laurence Hart, IOM Chief of Mission in Libya: Every week, hundreds of vulnerable migrants, mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa, but also from Asia, are referred to IOM by religious and charitable institutions or by their embassies to ask for voluntary return and reintegration assistance. (IOM, 2008a) These measures are distinct from the aforementioned repatriations organised by the Italian and Libyan governments. ‘For us’, a representative from IOM in Libya pointed out, ‘the “voluntary” aspect is important. We do

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not endorse forced repatriations. [ ... ] We cannot be asked to support these practices.’59 Then, in collaboration with the embassies of the countries of origin, IOM coordinates the return flights. Third, IOM is working on an information campaign that seeks to reach would-be migrants in the countries of origin to ‘discourage them from leaving their country’ and ‘to raise awareness on the risks that such decision entails’.60 The fourth aspect of TRIM involves research on the Libyan legislative framework on migration and on the statistics on unauthorised migration through Libya. On these grounds, IOM will identify possible inconsistencies and formulate policy recommendations for Libyan authorities. Lastly, IOM has initiated a dialogue with a number of countries of origin to strengthen coordinated action to identify migrants. In 2009 TRIM continued under the funding of the Thematic Programme through the ‘LI-MO’ project (European Commission, 2010a: 42). In broadening the range of collaborators across migrant-sending and receiving-countries the LI-MO project combines assisted voluntary return with reintegration initiatives.61 IOM also oversaw the implementation of an EU- and Italian-funded project, ‘Across Sahara’, to promote collaboration on border control policies between Libya and Niger (EC, 2005; Il Manifesto, 24 November 2006). The project consisted of three phases. The first focused on the training of 90 police personnel from both countries and concentrated on, inter alia, the detection of false documentation and investigation techniques, search and rescue in the desert, human rights, and assistance to voluntary return (Libyan Police, 2007). The instructors, whom I was able to meet, were mainly Italian. The second phase concerned the provision of equipment, such as jeeps, radios, GPS and specialised technology to patrol the desert. With the completion of the first two phases, fourteen contact points along the desert borders of Libya and Niger were expected to be set up. This network of police officers from both countries would then be able cooperate to guarantee control along the Libyan–Niger borders.62 In the light of the successful collaboration of the project, IOM considered the possibility of involving Algeria.63 Indeed, in 2007 the Italian government was awarded an EU grant to finance the second phase of the project Across Sahara in both Libya and Algeria (EC, 2008c). However, as of June 2007, Algerian authorities have not confirmed their interest in participating in this initiative.64 Another aspect of IOM activity that deserves mention is the camp in Tripoli intended to host migrants in the process of returning ‘voluntarily’ to their countries.65 Inaugurated in March 2008, the centre has been cofinanced by the European Union and Italy, with additional support from the United Kingdom, and is managed by IOM (IOM, 2008b). It offers temporary accommodation for up to 40 people, and its main purpose is to provide them ‘with information on the dangers of irregular migration and the option for voluntary return to their countries of origin’ (IOM, 2008b).

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7.10

163

Push-backs

On 14 July 2003, the Italian Interior Ministry issued a decree enabling the Italian Navy to intercept ships carrying migrants and, if possible, to escort the vessels back to the territorial waters of the countries from which they came (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 113).66 In presenting this decree to the Italian Senate, Mantovano pointed out that, in order to ensure the patrolling of sea borders, the Province of Ragusa had set up a ‘provincial anti- disembarkment plan’ (Senato, 2004). This measure is supervised by the local government, and is based on the cooperation between the Carabinieri, a paramilitary corps with police functions, the Guardia di Finanza and the Navy. Its aim is to ensure effective control along sea borders (Senato, 2004). According to different sources, in January 2007 this measure was still in effect (Camera, 2006a; Sardegna Oggi, 9 January 2007). Reportedly, Italy has acted on the 2003 decree numerous times. For example, the 2004 annual report issued by the Italian Interior Ministry attests that a number of boats carrying irregular migrants heading to the Italian coasts have been intercepted and escorted to their country of origin (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004a). Yet there is no clarity as to how many times the Italian Navy has implemented this decree by sending migrants back Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2006a). The report produced by Fortress Europe, a blog specialising in irregular migration in the Mediterranean, found different instances of push-back by Italian authorities forcing boats carrying undocumented migrants to return to Libya. This is clearly illustrated by a migrant interviewed by Fortress Europe: There were more than 200 of us. We left on 26 June 2006 from Farwah, an islet off the coast of Bu Kammash, half way between Rass Jdayr and Zuwarah [Libya]. After 20 hours at sea, the ship – which was called Tulaitila – was intercepted by a military corvette bearing an Italian flag. They escorted us to land, and we disembarked at eight in the morning on 28 June 2006. During the landing, around 40 people, including the passeurs, dived into the sea and managed to escape, all of the rest of us were taken to a centre. On the same day, at around 9 p.m., they loaded us back on board of the Tulaitila and escorted us until the morning, to then hand us over to a green patrol boat of the Libyan Coastguard. (Fortress Europe, 2008: 16) Hence, until 2009 there was no evidence indicating that in the specific Italian–Libyan context this practice had been implemented on a systematic basis. In fact, during the interviews conduced between 2007 and 2008 official Italian sources denied any involvement of the Italian authorities in the push-backs.67 This was due to change in May 2009.

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On 6 May 2009 Italy began returning boats carrying migrants arriving from Libya that had been intercepted in either international or national waters. Few days later, on 14 May, the Libyan Ambassador to Italy took possession of three patrol boats offered by Italy to be used to stop boats from making the passage from Libya to Italy (BBC, 14 May 2009). Where previously push-backs were considered an infringement of Libya’s sovereign power and migrants were not allowed to return to its shores, Libya now started accepted boats with undocumented foreign nationals who had departed from Libya. Presumably this sudden policy shift owes to the Friendship Treaty and, therefore, is consistent with the overall give-and-take dynamics previously alluded to. A precise account of the different instance of push-backs is provided by a report by UNHCR: from 6 May to 6 November 2009, a total of nine operations were carried out, returning a total of 834 persons to Libya (UNHCR, 2010: 3). The same source clarifies that the ‘push-back’ operations were carried out by Italian forces belonging to the Guardia di Finanza, the Marina militare (Navy) and the Guardia Costiera (Coast Guard). In particular: The persons affected by the ‘push-back’ operations were initially transferred from their unseaworthy boats onto the Italian vessels. In some cases they were taken to Libyan territory directly by the Italian authorities (6 May and 30 August 2009). During other operations, they were handed over by the Italian authorities to Libyan patrol boats, the latter operated by joint Libyan and Italian crews as foreseen by the operational Protocol between the two countries on joint patrolling. (UNHCR, 2010: 4) Between May and July 2009, UNHCR screened 632 boat returnees and found 97 to be seeking international protection (Human Rights Watch, 2009c: 51). In the same report, UNHCR quoted the Undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior according to whom neither an identification process nor an interview of the persons in question was carried out aboard the Italian vessels during the ‘push-back’ operations (UNHCR, 2010: 3). Expectedly, the push-backs provoked a national and international outcry. The main concerns centred on the fate of the persons involved, especially as regards the protection of their fundamental human rights and over Italian compliance with international human rights obligations (Nascimbene, 2009). Not only did international organisations such as UNHCR (2010) and Human Rights Watch (2009) forcefully condemn Italian action, but Italian civil society organisations (Vassallo Paleologo, 2010) and opposition parties also raised their voice. In numerous parliamentary debates centre–left MPs called upon the Italian government to stop ‘inacceptable violations to the rights of the migrants perpetuated by Italian authorities’ (Camera, 2009e: 7, 2009f, 2009g). Likewise, the European Commission observed that in 2009

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between Italy and Libya there was ‘still no clear policy framework for refugees and asylum seekers, as well as for migration management in general’ (European Commission, 2010a: 12). On these grounds, migrants intercepted by Italian authorities and subsequently incarcerated in Libyan prisons have filed a suit against the Italian state in the European Court of Human Rights (Schenkel, 2010). As of March 2010, the Italian government has consistently denied any wrongdoings. In July 2009, a representative of the centre-right party declared: The criticism [against the government concerning the push-backs] is pretentious and ungenerous for they [the actions undertaken by Italy as part of the agreement with Libya] are fully in line with the new law which makes clandestine migration a punishable offence and with the new norms extending the time that can be spent in the identification centers for possible expulsion. (Camera, 2009g: 9) In similar vein, in January 2010, the Italian Minister of the Interior made it clear that ‘the policies undertaken by the government to contrast and prevent clandestine migration have brought positive results’ (Camera, 2010b). Since November 2009, however, the Italian government has interrupted the push-backs. The explanation of the umpteenth policy change belongs to the realm of speculation.

7.11

Conclusion

The empirical findings on the joint actions on migration implemented by Italy and Libya reveal that the latter has partially supported Italian initiatives aimed at reducing irregular migration. In some cases, such as the camps for migrants, the training programmes for police officers and the repatriations of migrants to third countries, Libya has encouraged Italian action. Arguably, one of Libya’s key concerns has been to counter undocumented migrant flows and, as such, any help that Italy could offer to achieve this goal has been welcomed. In other cases, such as the patrolling of the Mediterranean, Libya has adopted an evasive and unpredictable stance. The recurrent policy shifts – such as the push-backs – and the linkage with broader diplomatic exchanges are cases in point. The piecemeal willingness of Libya to uphold the bilateral collaboration on migration, and, consequently, the Italian dependence on its interlocutor for the successful implementation of the cooperative arrangements, are revealing. The multifaceted nature of the Italian–Libyan cooperation raises the question of whether bilateral action is a manifestation of externalisation, as previously defined, and whether it succeeded in its initial goals. These queries form the background to the next chapter.

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Part IV Externalisation of Migrant Control Measures and Inter-state Relations

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8 Analysis of Externalisation in the Italian–Libyan context

8.1 Introduction During a parliamentary debate on 2 March 2010 the Italian Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, affirmed Italian commitment to enhance a ‘new governance model which involves both migration sending and destination countries to promote cooperation and common forms of discipline’ (Senato, 2010: 56). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the process whereby migrant-receiving countries seek to collaborate with, and transfer some of their migration-related responsibilities to, third countries has come to be known as ‘externalisation’. This concept is at the core of this chapter which addresses three main questions. First, can the joint collaboration be considered a manifestation of externalisation as defined in the academic literature? Second, have the joint actions discussed in the previous chapter succeeded in reducing unwanted migrant flows? Third, how has migration influenced the bargaining dynamics between the two countries? In answering these questions, I will assess the impact of the putative outsourcing of migration control practices on inter-state relations. I argue that the theoretical debate is still open both on the applicability of the externalisation concept to this particular case and on its broader representativeness. This discussion serves as a necessary prelude to the next chapter, which examines bilateral actions on migration from the perspective of IR theory.

8.2 Is Italian–Libyan joint action on migration a manifestation of externalisation? As stated in Chapter 2, a number of different definitions of de-territorialisation have been put forward. At the risk of simplification, it is possible to identify three defining aspects of externalisation, which underpin a large part of the scholarly contributions on the issue. First, the process entails the shifting of the place of where controls occur to somewhere within the states of either origin or transit of unwanted migrants. Second, control practices 169

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operate outside the purview of the rule of law, because of the lack of checks and balances ensuring compliance with international norms. Third, the collaborative arrangements are based on cross-border networks of security experts, police and military officials addressing putative transnational security threats. I now apply these three criteria to the empirical findings illustrated in the previous chapters, in order to determine whether the selected bilateral collaboration is a manifestation of externalisation defined in these terms. In so doing, I shall comment on each of the three abovementioned points in turn. With regard to the first point, i.e. the transfer of borders beyond Italian territorial jurisdiction, I argue that all the measures implemented thus far, except the push-backs, contradict the commonly held view according to which border control functions that Libyan authorities assume on behalf of Italy are being externalised. The Italian external action in Libya is subtler than this. Italy has focused on measures that do not, technically, involve the export of border management or the transfer of responsibilities to Libya. Instead, Italy has sought to strengthen the pre-existing Libyan police and security apparatus. This is epitomised by the work of the Immigration Liaison Officer appointed by the Italian Interior Ministry and based in Tripoli. To further problematise the argument that frontiers are ‘moving’ from Italy to Libya two other points are warranted. Since September 2006 informationsharing has been further increased, with the Libyan and Italian governments agreeing that a Libyan liaison officer would also be based in Rome (Cuttitta, 2006: 19; Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 September 2006). In addition, it is noteworthy that it is as difficult to leave Libya as it is to enter (Human Rights Watch, 2006a). Anecdotal evidence shows that Libyan officials have placed severe and ad hoc controls on entering the country from the EU. Requests for tourist visas to Libya can be easily turned down and foreigners have been denied access repeatedly, on unclear grounds.1 Libya’s sudden ban on citizens entering from the Schengen area between February and March 2010 as retaliation against the Swiss-instigated visa blacklist against 188 Libyans is another case in point (Reuters, 27 March 2010). Moreover, my personal experience also confirms that Libyan security officials occasionally check visas and necessary documents of passengers in third countries before they board flights for Libya. Undoubtedly this shows that, despite its widely praised international rehabilitation, the regime remains a closed one. Simply put, pre-frontier controls operate on both sides. Hence, the argument that Italian authorities have been extending their border controls outside their own territory also applies, albeit to a different degree, to the Libyan regime. The presence of Libyan officials in Italy, and the rigid as well as nebulous border policies of the former, clearly add a layer of complexity to the concept of externalisation, which, by now, appears to be overly simplistic.

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Externalisation in the Italian–Libyan Context

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Further, the debate surrounding joint interception at sea demonstrates that Libya has not succumbed to European and Italian pressure. In fact, it has opposed Frontex, which would challenge its internal jurisdiction. This suggests that Libya is not willing to act as the European immigration gatekeeper (The Malta Independent, 8 July 2008). At bilateral level, however, the collaboration benefited from the signing of the agreement in August 2008. This is demonstrated by the onset of joint patrolling in May 2009 and the implementation of the push-backs to be discussed below. Despite these ambiguities, it seems reasonable to assert that the collaboration has not been dictated unilaterally by Italy, but has instead followed a complex negotiating process where Italy has made significant compromises. Similar conclusions can be drawn with regard to the return flights of undocumented migrants from Italy to Libya. The repatriations conducted between 2004 and 2006 did not involve the relocation of Italian frontiers to Libya. The putative controls were enforced by Italian authorities on Italian soil, upon the arrival of undocumented migrants from Libya (Gatti, 2005b).2 The same applies to the return of migrants from Libya to third countries on flights financed by Italy, since their management falls under Libya’s authority. The relatively limited influence that Italy has played in this respect is substantiated by the fact that, as Chapter 5 illustrated, the Libyan practice of repatriating unwanted migrants pre-dates the bilateral cooperation with Italy. It would, then, be misleading to assume that Italy, or Europe generally, has exclusive and direct responsibility for Libya’s notorious repatriation policies.3 Moreover, considering the Italian-built camps as the exemplification of the relocation of European borders controls is equally deceptive. Far from being ‘European immigration counters’ (Rodier, 2006: 8), they are not necessarily used for detaining migrants at all. In fact, recent empirical findings show that the camps will be used for hosting neither migrants nor asylumseekers. Instead, they will serve for police training and humanitarian purposes. However, the question on asylum processing centres being set up in Libya remains unclear. Recent statements by Italian government officials would lead one to conclude that these would be managed by the EU and not by Italy alone (Camera, 2009c; Human Rights Watch, 2009c). As argued in Chapter 7, whereas Italian officials did initially consider the idea of asylum processing centres in third countries, as of March 2010 this had not been translated into concrete action either by Italy or the EU.4 Only the push-backs in 2009, however, corroborate our first criterion. According to UNHCR and Human Rights Watch, Italian authorities have not only breached the non-refoulement principle but de facto transferred to Libya the responsibility of providing assistance to migrants intercepted (Human Rights Watch, 2009c; UNHCR, 2010). As we have already seen, the Italian government has denied such allegations. As Roberto Maroni, made

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it clear: We have always acted in accordance with the non-refoulement principle because we have not denied anyone the possibility of applying for asylum. None of the migrants intercepted have expressed their willingness to apply for asylum once they were boarded on the patrol boats [on their way back to Libya]. (Senato, 2010) Beyond the question non-refoulement, the critical point here has to do with Italian action on Libyan territory. On the one hand, our first parameter is upheld insofar as Italian crews shipped irregular migrants back to Libya shores, and hence operated on Libyan territory. On the other hand, let me advance two potentially controversial claims. First, the number of those pushed-backs is relatively small compared not only to the yearly arrivals to Italy but even more so to overall migration flows to Italy. In this sense, the action of returning migrant serves as public spectacle (Anderson, 2008). It yields symbolic power both to the Italian electorate and to Italy itself, being paid back for condescending to Libya’s request on the colonial recompensations. The complex linkages between different issues will be explored further in the next chapter. Second, the very fact that, as we shall see below, Libya’s authorities ‘allow’ irregular boats to depart from Libya’s shores may lead one to counter-argue that a ‘reverse’ externalisation is in the making. In externalising what is partly a domestic issue, namely migration, Libya is thus able to put pressure on Italy and, in the process, mould bilateral diplomatic exchanges. With reference to the first criterion, a last aspect of the alleged transfer of the legal and financial burden of managing migration to Libya deserves mention. A thorough empirical analysis shows that, with the deepening of bilateral collaboration, Italy has been more, not less, involved with the task of tackling undocumented migration in Libya. In fact, Italy’s very presence and continuous investment in this undertaking suggest that the collaboration cannot be labelled as burden-shifting. On the contrary, it has entailed the sharing between the two countries of more responsibilities to control borders. Italy’s tasks over migration-related matters in Libya have significantly expanded. The fact of its increased competencies, however, highlights the novel policing practices that Italy is implementing outside its borders. This point takes us to the discussion of the second criterion. The second feature characterising the process of externalisation concerns the legality of the bilateral measures. Although the practice of border controls falls under Libya’s authority, Italy has cooperated on a wide range of security operations related to migration outside its territorial frontiers. A prominent example of this is the representative office of the Italian Interior Ministry in Libya. In so doing, Italy contributes to the export of surveillance techniques and skills to Libya. Because of the absence of clear legal

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frameworks and the avoidance of public scrutiny, the legitimacy of such operations is questionable (Favilli, 2005). Interestingly, Libyan authorities, unlike the Italian ones, were willing to share sensitive information on the bilateral measures for my research purposes.5 Be that as it may, the joint undertakings remain outside the rule of law for the ambiguous contractual relations as noted in the previous chapter. Even though it goes beyond the objective and capacity of this book to provide a systematic and rigorous legal examination of the Italian–Libyan agreements on migration (Favilli, 2005), I argue that, because of the lack of transparency in the manner in which the measures have been decided and implemented, my second parameter defining externalisation is confirmed. For example, while the agreements in 2007 and 2008 have indeed been made public, considerable uncertainty still surrounds their implementation. Third, Walters’s characterisation of de-territorialisation as joint tasks addressing evolving notions of societal threat captures some central aspects of my case study (Walters, 2004). The Italian–Libyan cooperation is based on the building up of a security apparatus transcending the internal/external dichotomy inherent in ‘the territorial state of mind’ (Bigo, 2006: 29). Indeed, Walters’s notion of ‘networked (non-)border’ cooperation identifies a fundamental feature of the selected collaboration, by virtue of its being based on the enhancement of cross-border police cooperation, mobile surveillance teams operating on both Italian and Libyan soil, a commitment to information exchange, and the recognition of some common standards in the management of migration (Walters, 2004: 680). As explained in Chapters 4 and 5, in both Italy and Libya the joint security mechanism is perceived to be the bulwark against the alleged transnational threat, whereby migration is linked with terrorism and a hybrid and fluid notion of international crime. To sum up, an empirical examination of the Italian–Libyan cooperation partially discredits the prevailing claim that outsourcing practices are creating ‘exclusion zones’ at the EU periphery, which defy sovereignty of migrant sending countries (Rodier, 2006: 20). Many of the arguments made in the literature on the Italian externalising policies appear to be inattentive to the subtleties surrounding their initial objectives and final implementation. As much as the bilateral action to tackle undocumented migration eschews clear-cut categorisation, it is crucial to appreciate the conflation of highly differentiated, if not contradictory, patterns. Overall, the first feature of externalisation outlined above is not fully attributable to the Italian–Libyan collaboration. Conversely, the latter two are upheld. Whereas border control responsibilities have not been de-located from Italy to Libya, the measures as implemented lack transparency and accountability, and involve the institutionalisation of ‘extended zones of police cooperation’ at the intersection of Italian and Libyan territories (Walters, 2004: 680). Further, it must be highlighted that in our case study the so-called ‘networked (non-)border’ system has been patchy and, as I suggest in the next section, weak.

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It can be argued that one of the initial intentions of Italy was indeed the transfer of the European border to Libya. As Pansa bluntly declared in 2004, one of Italy’s objectives was to ‘move forward the external border of the EU’ (La Stampa, 12 August 2004). However, the Italian government has not been capable of fully co-opting Libya into its ‘struggle’ against undocumented migration, as it might have wished. It is also dependent on its counterpart for the successful implementation of migration related measures. As already pointed out, most of the discussion on externalisation in the Italian–Libyan context has misused the term, because it has neglected the reciprocal nature of the negotiations. The term has, I believe, lost meaning as well as relevance, and the process itself needs to be reconceptualised. Therefore for the Italian–Libyan cooperation I will use instead the expression ‘de-territorial collaboration on migration’ (hereafter, ‘collaboration on migration’). The new expression conveys the transcendence of the territorial dimension of borders, which is the result of a complex negotiating process. While drawing the attention to a more fluid notion of national border and the intertwining of the domestic and external policy arenas (Geddes, 2005a), I also make the case for the enduring relevance of states with regard to migration management. Unlike the term ‘externalisation’, it rejects the view that the process underway involves the transfer of border control responsibilities to third countries. It also disputes the assumption that the unilateral extension of border policies simply mirrors the will of the supposedly stronger European parties. Yet it does retain the idea that transnational security networks operate on unclear legal grounds. Accordingly, the notion of ‘de-territorial collaboration on migration’ intends to offer a more nuanced account of the production and negotiation of border control policies than do concepts like ‘externalisation’ or ‘outsourcing’.

8.3

How successful has the collaboration on migration been?

In introducing the discussion in the next chapter on the relative bargaining power of each country from the viewpoint of International Relations, I now ask whether bilateral collaboration has succeeded in reducing migration pressure on Libya and Italy. Let me first clarify the feasibility of this exercise. It is necessary to bring some precision to the speculative question raised, and to comment on its methodological challenges. According to the former Italian Interior Minister, Pisanu, the measures agreed with Libyan authorities were aimed at ‘ensuring control on the land borders and block migrant flows across the sea’ (Camera, 2003b). On another occasion, the minister clarified that the ultimate objective was to reduce undocumented migration from Libya to zero (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c). In the absence of more rigorous and explicit criteria, I shall test the success of the bilateral collaboration against these two parameters and I analyse two sets of data. First, I examine the

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figures on migrants landing on Italian shores from Libya, observe whether they have increased or decreased over time, and compare them against the overall undocumented population in Italy and the annual quota system. Second, I compare them to the number of foreign nationals who have been either arrested or deported from Libya.6 This rough calculation may furnish us with an approximate idea of the extent to which the bilateral measures have succeeded in reducing migration pressure. Predictably, this exercise is not problem-free. In particular, the ensuing analysis requires, among other things, five caveats. The first concerns the comprehensiveness and reliability of the data available. The statistics on the unauthorised arrivals to Lampedusa do not allow for a rigorous account of the actual impact of the joint measures. Unless we compare them with the proportion of would-be migrants to Italy, these figures alone possess limited explanatory relevance. In fact, not only there are no recent and reliable official statistics on the presence of unwanted migrants in Libya but also, more importantly, the proportion of would-be migrants to Italy versus those who intend to remain in Libya is not quantifiable. Moreover, some of the data may contain significant errors. I will show, for example, that the statistics provided by the Libyan government to the European Commission differ from those that I received from the Libyan authorities. Secondly, the short time frame does not permit one to draw solid conclusions on the impact of extraterritorial policies on migrant flows to Italy. Arrivals from Libya started in the late 1990s and shortly afterwards the bilateral discussion on migration commenced. A period of approximately seven years precludes the soundness of the assessment and the validity of its sequitur. Thirdly, it is impossible to calculate the overall number of migrants who been prevented from coming to Italy as a result of the Italian action in Libya. Indeed, the impact on migrant flows of all the other joint actions, such as the training programmes and the provision of equipment, is not measurable. Fourthly, I shall not include in the calculation the measurement of the migrants repatriated to third countries from Italy but only from Libya with the partial financial support of Italy. As an ex post measure, such data cannot account for the increase or decrease of migration pressure on Italian and Libyan territory. Since the repatriations target those unwanted migrants who have already reached their interim or final destination, they do not provide a sound indicator for the success, as defined above, of the collaborative arrangements. Return flights act as a deterrent, the impact of which cannot be calculated. Fifthly, it is impossible to establish the extent to which the fluctuations of migrant flows stem solely from Italian–Libyan cooperation. Arguably, there are other factors, such as the international political milieu, European pressure, and Libyan domestic politics, which influence the trend of the data that I now analyse. The evolving dynamics of migrant flows hinge upon widely differing political and economic factors and multiple actors, and not just upon

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Italian–Libyan collaboration. Hence, it would be simplistic to attribute the changing patterns of migration pressure exclusively to the Italian–Libyan collaboration. Thus, the following data analysis does not pretend to do justice to such complexity. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the impact of the collaboration on migration may still prove insightful. As regards the first, statistics suggest that until 2008 the number of migrants arriving in Italy from Libya has increased, even if it had not reached unprecedented levels. Notably, in 2009, 3,185 irregular migrants landed at Lampedusa, while during the previous year 31,281 arrivals had been counted (Senato, 2010: 53). Expectedly, over the years many contradictory arguments have been elaborated. As shown in the chapter on Italian migration policies, the arrivals of migrants from Libya have been portrayed as an ‘assault’ or ‘invasion’ of Italy. The ‘emergency’ perspective echoes the view of many Italian politicians and a large part of the national media, who amplify the actual size of, and the alleged threat posed by, irregular migration from Libya, as well as by migrants in Italy generally. However, a more rigorous scrutiny of the official counts reveals that the belief that migrant flows until 2009 were unprecedented is deceptive. To be sure, consolidated estimates (Figure 8.1) indicate that between 2000 and 2006 the number of arrivals to Sicily, mainly from Libya,7 increased. Whereas the year 2006 and the first six months of 2007 registered a slight reduction in the number of arrivals, the overall upward trend is manifest (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007b). This is in line with the total figures of unwanted entries to Italy across the sea, from not only Northern Africa but also other countries such as Albania, which show a noticeable reduction (Figure 8.2).8 Hence, even though, as Figure 8.1 delineates, the number of arrivals by sea to Sicily has grown since 2000, the overall figures of disembarkation of irregular migrants to Italy have decreased. Moreover, it is well known that arrivals by

35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Figure 8.1 Apprehensions of undocumented migrants in Sicily 2000–2009 Sources: Elaborated from Cuttitta (2008a) and Senato (2010: 53).9

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50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Figure 8.2 Total apprehensions of undocumented migrants in Italy 1998–2009 Sources: Elaborated from Cuttitta (2008a) and Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (2010: 88).

sea represent a fraction of the total undocumented migrant population in Italy (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008d). According to the data provided by the Italian Interior Ministry, in 2005 60 per cent of what the government labels ‘illegal migrants’ were ‘overstayers’, i.e. people who enter the country legally and remain beyond the expiry date of their visa or legal permit (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006b: 16, 2007b). Conversely, the share of irregular arrivals by sea was estimated at 14 per cent in 2005, and 13 per cent in the first six months of 2006 (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006b). In the same vein, even if up to 2008 entries by sea to the southern Italian border have intensified, the number remains significantly lower than the annual influx of migrants though legal channels (Cuttitta, 2008b). As illustrated in Chapter 4, the migrant population that has entered though the quota system has been growing significantly. For example, in the year 2005 the Italian government issued two decrees for total quotas of 520,000 (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2006), and 720,000 were regularised in 2007 through four decrees (Cuttitta, 2008b). By contrast with such figures, the scale of unauthorised migration from Libya to Italy appears to be of minor significance. By and large, a thorough analysis of the scale of arrivals of unauthorised foreign nationals from Libya demonstrates two points. First, undocumented migration by sea from Libya represents a minor proportion of overall irregular migration to Italy. Second, the national yearly quotas and overall regular migration flows have increased significantly, suggesting that migration in Italy is not out of control and, consequently, does not pose a profound societal threat, as the public discourse claims.10 Indeed, the growing number of foreigners being regularised may be driven by market demands (De Haas, 2007). Arguably, the perceived failure of state regulation actually reveals a degree of state complicity in the maintenance of a certain level of migration (Hamilton, 1997: 552). According to Hamilton, such ‘state complicity’ may be due to the strength of organised interest groups and

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their influence on the internal dynamics of state policy-making with regard to migration (Hamilton, 1997: 552). In like manner, Freeman asserts that ‘there are important characteristics of migration politics common to the liberal democracies and these are, contrary to what most scholars seem to believe, largely expansionist and inclusive’ (Freeman, 1995: 882). In other words, despite the official discourses about ‘combating illegal immigration’, Italy, like many other European states, has little genuine interest in stopping migration, because its economy has become dependent on migrant labour (De Haas, 2007: 61; Hollifield 1992a). The direct corollary is that the alarmistic approach11 and the ‘invasion’ analogy, presented in Chapter 4, are in tension with the policies implemented, and are evidence of Italy’s migration contradictions (Pastore 2004a). At this point of the analysis, it is instructive to contextualise the above indicators on disembarkment by comparing them to the data available on the foreign nationals deterred from departing from Libya to Italy and, more specifically, on the number of people arrested and/or repatriated by Libyan authorities with the support of Italy. Before commenting on such figures, two caveats are necessary. First, a proportion of migrants deported to third countries succeed in returning to Libya, and the same is true of those repatriated from Italy.12 This raises the question of the extent to which return flights really deter undocumented migration or reduce the overall migration pressure on both Italy and Libya. Hence repatriations may not represent a reliable parameter for assessing the success of the joint action on migration. Second, different sources suggest that in Libya arrests and repatriations are conducted on a random basis (EC 2005d; Human Rights Watch Report, 2006a: 33; US Department of State, 2002a). If they do reduce the unauthorised migrant presence in Libya, there are no solid grounds for inferring that those arrested and/or repatriated are would-be migrants to Italy. Thus, although arrests and deportation temporarily alleviate the migration pressure on Libya, it is not possible to determine whether the same applies to Italy. With an awareness of these limitations, I analyse the figures available on the repatriations from Libya, and compare them with the number of arrivals to Italian shores. According to Human Rights Watch (2006a) and the European Commission (2005d), between 2003 and 2005 145,000 undocumented foreigners were repatriated from Libya: 47,991 in 2005, 54,000 in 2004 and 43,000 in 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 52). Yet such figures do not correspond to those that I obtained from the Libyan Ministry of the Interior. As Figure 8.1 illustrates, according to the latter the number of repatriations for the years 2003 and 2004 is lower than that documented by the EC (2005d).13 As I discussed in Chapter 7, while the extent to which Italians have contributed to the organisation of such flights is not clear, there are grounds for asserting that they have partially supported them. It has been proven, however, that Italy has financed the repatriation of at

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Table 8.1 Number of foreign nationals deported from Libya14 Year

No. of foreigners repatriated

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (until April) Total

3,087 4,169 7,032 5,705 39,586 47,991 86,006 8,963 202,539

Source: Libyan Ministry of Interior, 2007b.

least 3,000 foreign nationals, who upon arrival in Libya were supposedly transferred to their alleged countries of origin, and another 9,000 from Libya (European Commission, 2005d). It hardly needs to be added that such figures are relatively lower than the above discussed ones on the irregular arrivals to Italy. Mindful of the weaknesses of the data here presented, and of the fact that any conclusion on this matter is speculative, I attempt to derive three broad propositions on the success of the collaboration on migration. First, both parties appear to be increasingly serious about tackling migration, although to differing degrees. Over time, the bilateral collaborative efforts have intensified. Yet, and this is the second point, the attempts to decrease undocumented migration from Libya to Italy have not been fully successful. Until 2008 the two objectives set by Pisanu of reducing migration from Libya to zero had not been met. However, this changed with the Friendship Treaty. After 2008, the overall migration flows through Libya have been brought ‘under control’. As of March 2010 collaboration on migration seems to have achieved one of its primary objectives of containing the migration pressure on Italy and Libya. The cost and sustainability of this endeavour are the subject of the next chapter. At the same time (my third point), within the overall Italian migration scene the relevance of arrivals by sea from Libya is marginal. While the phenomenon has not decreased in relative terms, it is still negligible in absolute terms, i.e. if compared to the overall regular and irregular migrant population in Italy. The size of the unwanted inflows to Sicily evinces that overall Italian authorities have neither lost nor gained control on the overall migrant movements to Italy and that, compared to the overall annual influxes, arrivals from Libya have a minimal impact.15 What needs to be analysed now is how this inconclusive process of collaboration on migration influences the bargaining position of each of the two countries.

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8.4 Trade-offs between Italy and Libya The collaboration on migration has created a situation in which Italy is partially dependent on Libya. The successful implementation of the joint efforts rests on Libyan willingness to cooperate. Even though Italy has a strong interest in Libya properly controlling its Mediterranean coastline and closely cooperating on police matters, Libya has a different, if not contradictory, set of interests that at times clashes with Italian objectives and expectations. The double agenda and unpredictable rhetoric of the Libyan regime seriously hampers the Italian ability to contain unauthorised people movements. On the one hand, Qaddafi has expressed a growing concern with the reduction of migration to and through Libya. On the other hand, the regime benefits from smuggling networks and utilises migration to set the pace of the bilateral dialogue. Arguably, until 2008 the steady and persistent arrivals on Lampedusa testify to the reluctance of Libya to abide by Italian and European requests and to act as the ‘European gendarme’. As the author of the Human Rights Watch report on Libya (2006a) argues, if the Libyan regime wanted to block the smuggling activity, it could easily do so.16 Similarly, a member of the European Parliament admitted: In December 2005, I led an ad hoc European Parliament delegation to a visit in Libya on the issue of immigration. The delegation was struck by the fact that Libya deploys just two, yes two, patrol boats to police its 2,000km-long Mediterranean coast. It is clear that Libya needs an incentive to engage with us. (Busuttil, 2007) Along the same lines, the latest Frontex report makes no secret of the setbacks in negotiating with Libya: Despite constant calls for receiving feedback from the Libyan side on possible ways to proceed on this issue [joint EU–Libyan operations on migration] ... there was no clear initiative from the Libyan side to follow up on this issue in the short term. Although some of the Libyan representatives indicated that they did recognise the added value and mutual benefit of such cooperation, they appeared to subscribe to the general approach that the EU should make the first step to assist and support Libya to improve management at its southern borders. (Frontex, 2007: 16) All these claims have indeed been confirmed by the events since 2008. When Libya was provided ‘material’ incentive to collaborate, irregular migration across the Mediterranean was halted. Lack of sustained willingness may also be attributed to corruption within the Libyan police. The same report by Frontex (2007) also observes that

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corruption could play a key role in the migratory situation along the Libyan southern borders. As the document openly recognises: As evident as it may seem, no matter what sophisticated equipment or advanced border management concept and system might be put in place, the existence of corruption will always undermine the implementation of an effective border guard response. (Frontex, 2007: 13–15) Likewise, a recent study on the smuggling network associated to migration in Libya suggests that: There is evidence that Libyans with close connections to the [Libyan] government, including diplomats and security agents, are directly involved in the trade. Informants implicated one of Ghadafi’s sons in providing protection for those involved. Zuwareh has a long history of dealing in contraband including alcohol, petrol and cigarettes. [ ... ] The local police who are invariably low paid are open to corruption. (Collucello and Massey, 2007: 88) As a matter of fact, the Libyan police are often aware of the routes followed by the ‘smugglers’. For example, a Libyan police officer acknowledged to me that many times after the boats depart from Libyan soil they are taken to the off-shore oil platforms where Libyan police officers will arrest the undocumented migrants.17 In turn, this upholds the speculation that in Libya undocumented migration through the country and to Italy is not only ‘tolerated’ but ‘even solicited’ (Giacca, 2004). Likewise, an official at the European Commission conceded that they had observed the timely correspondence between the arrivals to Lampedusa and critical moments in the negotiations. Such correspondence, in their view, was not accidental.18 This adds a further layer of complexity to the bilateral cooperation and the patterns of interdependence to be investigated in the next chapter. Broadly, on the one hand, until 2008 the ineffectiveness of collaboration on migration partially reflected Italy’s lack of diplomatic leverage versus Libya. On the other hand, however, both before and after the 2008 Friendship Agreement, changing migration dynamics from Libya have not substantially challenged Italy’s overall migration management system. This is because arrivals from Libya constitute a minor part of the overall undocumented migrant flows to Italy, and an even smaller one if measured against the annual migration quotas and recurrent regularisations. Why, then, is Italy so concerned with migration from Libya? The answer to this question lies in the symbolic power that migration evokes in the Italian and Libya political arenas. Let me now introduce two ideas that I will develop further in the next chapter.

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First, the Italian construction of migration in a distinctive, securitised framework provides Libya with a lever. The ‘invasion’ analogy serves as a strategic tool for the Libyan regime to advance its interests vis-à-vis Italy and the EU. Libya’s increased leverage stems from the perception of migration and its securitised connotations, rather than actual migrant flows. Second, Libya has benefited from linking migration to other items on the negotiating table. One example concerns the discussions on the construction of the highway. It is worth recalling that this issue acquired a pivotal role in the bilateral dialogue, to the point of making the discussion on all other items conditional on its settlement. This was summarised by an adviser to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs during an interview: The problem is that we have the ‘big gesture’, i.e. the construction of the highway. This means that the overall bilateral relations are influenced by this one issue. [ ... ] While this remains on the agenda, all other questions have to somehow circumvent it.19 The connection of the ‘big gesture’ with migration has placed Libya in a position of strength. From the Italian viewpoint, such a concession, i.e. building the highway, was aimed at encouraging a closer bilateral dialogue. As one Libyan professor anticipated, ‘clearly migration is linked to the colonial compensations. Until the latter issue is sorted, Libya will continue to use migration against Italy.’20 Yet, according to others, Libyan requests would not be exhausted by the construction of the highway. Asked if, with the completion of the ‘big gesture’, Libya would have normalised its relations with Italy, a senior Libyan diplomat conceded: ‘Whatever Italy gives us, we will say that it is not enough!’21 While it is too early to say whether or not the agreement signed in August 2008 will finally settle the issue, it remains the case that, taken together with the other economic and political outstanding factors, Libya has been able to coerce Italy into meeting its own terms by playing the migration card. The inability of Italy and the EU to encourage Libya to fully commit itself to blocking unwanted flows to Italy, to collaborate with Frontex, as well as to join the Barcelona Process, exemplifies the limited negotiating power of the first. Some of the levers that Italy employs with other migrant-sending counties, such as the yearly quotas, cannot be utilised with Libya, because there are few Libyans migrating to Italy through either documented or undocumented channels.22 Libya has agreed to uphold certain measures of cooperation with Italy insofar as they are in line with its interests. As stated earlier, Libya is more concerned with the control of its southern borders than its Mediterranean ones,23 and has actively supported the EU-funded project Across Sahara.24 Libya has also pleaded for new camps funded by either the EU or Italy. When asked by Human Rights Watch whether Libya would ever oppose such camps on its territory, Shukri Ghanem, former

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Libyan Prime Minister, answered: ‘Why should we? [ ... ] We don’t want to be the trashcan for Europe’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 99). Hence, even though Libya has recently displayed partial willingness to collaborate on joint measures to tackle migration, such as the push-backs, it continues to wield the ‘securitised’ power that migration evokes in the Italian political discourse to extract concessions from Italy and pursue its interests in the larger European milieu. In endorsing the security logic, Italy has acquiesced to this game, to its detriment.25

8.5

Conclusion

Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, the criteria utilised in the academic literature on externalisation do not fully capture the complex reciprocity of the Italian–Libyan cooperation on migration. Thus, I opted for an alternative expression to designate the mutually embedded nature of the discourses and practices on security and migration shaping our case study, i.e. de-territorial collaboration on migration. I then sought to assess the impact of the joint actions by looking at the scale of migrant flows through Libya to Italy. I analysed the trends of undocumented arrivals in Italy, and contrasted them with the arrests in and repatriations from Libya of irregular migrants. This exercise revealed that the undocumented arrivals in Italy continued until 2008. The agreement signed in August 2008 marked a diplomatic breakthrough. Yet cooperation remains as ambivalent as ever for neither before nor after the Friendship Treaty have arrivals from Libya substantially jeopardized overall migration trends in Italy. From an Italian perspective, the size of arrivals from Libya has been neither unprecedented, nor even so unwanted. The second conclusion relates to the bilateral bargaining dynamics. The expanding collaboration, and the rising prominence of migration in the international milieu, has made Italy reliant on Libya. In turn, Libya has put emphasis on the security dimension of migration to further stir up Western anxieties and to extract specific support. In the overall give-and-take framework, the symbolic power of migration endows Libya with extra leverage. This point is crucial, inasmuch as it calls for a reconceptualisation of my initial hypothesis on the extent to which the de-localisation of frontier controls increases Libyan bargaining position. Indeed, I argued that (1) border controls are not externalised, as claimed in the relevant literature, but that a subtler de-location process is in the making; and (2) Libya’s critical power asset derives not from the bilateral collaboration per se, but from the securitised understanding of migration. We are thus led to shift our attention to the wider negotiations, and to locate migration within the framework of North–South power relations.

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9 Implications for International Relations Theory

9.1 Introduction Two days after the signing of the August 2008 agreement that supposedly marked the end of the four-decade-long dispute over the colonial past, Qaddafi made his annual speech to celebrate the twenty-ninth anniversary of the revolution. On this occasion he did not conceal the tensions that had bedevilled bilateral relations. Of course, Italy and Libya need each other; at least, Italy needs Libya. As you know, Libyan gas is exported to Italy, and Libyan oil is exported to Italy and other European countries through submarine pipes connecting Libya and Italy. Italy has big interests in Libya. It we go back to boycott, the matter would be disaster for Italy; we have threatened with this. We told them: if this chapter [the colonial one] is not closed, we will bring relations to zero. (Al Qaddafi, 2 September 2008) This excerpt conveys eloquently how economic demands have been tied to those related to the colonial past and to migration, and directs attention to the complex pay-off matrix that has shaped the negotiations. Building upon the discussion of the ‘de-territorial collaboration on migration’, I now examine the overall bilateral agreements from the perspective of IR theory. The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate how migration affects the wider bargaining dynamics. I ask whether realist views of power help explain Italian–Libyan cooperation on migration and, by elaborating on the comparative analysis of Chapter 3, the overall patterns of North–South interaction. One central question is whether realism has the last word, as it is claimed, when it comes to understanding migration and power dynamics between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries and the North and the South more generally. To paraphrase Dunne, could a scholar who understood the history of international conflict in the fifth century BC really apply the same conceptual tools to politics in the third millennium 184

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in general, and to North–South migration bargaining dynamics in particular? (Dunne, 1997: 112). How does the increasing centrality of migration to foreign affairs relate to the realist conception of power, as defined in Chapter 2? Can the transformation of state relations as a result of migration be explained by the realist tradition? If not, how can they be otherwise comprehended? In order to answer to these questions, I review the empirical analysis presented in the previous chapters through the lens of political realism. The recognition of its inability to wholly explain the changing and multifaceted nature of the case under consideration leads us to probe beneath its assumptions and to utilise alternative definitions of power, drawing principally on the concept of productive power formulated by Barnett and Duvall (2004). While starting the analysis with the realist notions of interest and power, I subsequently challenge them by engaging with the insights of interdependence theory. This purposely eclectic theoretical approach will provide the conceptual tools to scrutinise the costs and benefits to both countries and the relevance of ideas as power assets. In keeping with this reasoning, this chapter consists of five parts. First, I examine the interests of both actors beyond the migration issue. What induces each actor to establish and sustain cooperative arrangements? What are their stated objectives and ‘substantive’ intentions? Do the two correspond? This probing of the motives of Italy and Libya creates a basis for the next section, which explores who gains what within the specific boundaries of the agreements on migration. What does the cost-benefit analysis tell us in terms of power relations in the agreements on migration? What enables each country to accomplish its interests and what constrains its behaviour? In shifting the attention to the ideational dimension of power, the following section considers the relevance of ‘the symbolic power of migration’. How do the perceptions associated with migration, and, in particular, the securitised narrative, impinge on the overall negotiations? To what extent does the recognition of the symbolic power of migration challenge the realist outlook? The analysis on perceptions leads to the discussion in Section 9.5 on the broader patterns of collaboration. Here, I utilise the issue-linkage framework as defined by Haas, and assess the connection between migration and other issues on the bilateral agenda. How do the discussions on migration impact on the broader dialogue? What does the manner in which issues are linked tell us about the overall bargaining dynamics? Within the larger setting of the Italian–Libyan dialogue, are ideas and perceptions fundamentally repositioning traditional claims of power relations? In section 9.6 I compare the findings of the comparative analysis to the conclusions drawn from my case study. How does the Italian–Libyan case relate to the other cases of bilateral agreements on migration examined in Chapter 3? In other words, can we generalise the lessons of Italian–Libyan relations? Is it reasonable to assert that, on the

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whole, migration provides a bargaining-chip to the South in its dealings with the North?

9.2

Analysis of Italy’s and Libya’s interests

To comprehend the complex dynamics framing the relations of interdependence, let us first understand what Italy and Libya seek to obtain from bilateral cooperation. I focus on interests, because these represent a fundamental ingredient in the power equation. Hence, in order to assess the validity of realism, an illustration of the interests of both parties is required. The study of the competing interests of both sending and receiving states helps us to disentangle their dynamic interaction and to make sense of policy successes and failures (Hamilton, 1997). Thus in this section I assess how interests relate to evolving perceptions and reciprocal expectations. I define national interest as the sum of the goals and aspirations of Italy and Libya within the framework of their bilateral cooperation. Specifically, I follow Burchill’s definition of interest as the ‘objective and/or subjective stake in something’ (Burchill, 2005: 10).1 I then proceed in a highly simplified manner to distinguish between ‘substantive’ and ‘stated’ interests.2 The first refers to the primary motivations of each country, and builds on the assumption that each party seeks the self-preservation and well-being of the state. I take the view that states aspire to some combination of power, security and wealth, what Waltz defined as ‘a small number of big and important things’ (Finnemore, 1996: 1). The second concerns the objectives made explicit in official settings. This roughly corresponds to the stance formulated by politicians through public statements and elite interviews. Once this distinction is conceded, I follow a two-fold analytical process. After considering the official position of each country and its policy decisions, I assess whether substantive interests coincide with the stated ones or not. Undeniably, this method suffers from some weaknesses. First, by focusing on the binary opposition, I do not intend to suggest that states speak with a united voice.3 The formulation of interests stems from unordered interdependent relationships among diverse actors who are part of, or associated with, the state (Weldes, 1996). The idea of a homogeneous and consistent set of national interests is simplistic, if not misguided, and runs the dangers of conceptual overstretching and empirical reductionism. Indeed, the official position is far from monolithic. Different ministers, for example, may think and act differently on any given issue.4 Nonetheless, while keeping in mind these shortcomings, the distinction between the official policy stance and more concealed objectives may still provide a fruitful, although not definitive, basis for discovering how coexisting agendas shape inter-state bargaining. This consideration leads to the second and more conceptual riddle. Is there such a thing as a core of ‘substantive’ national interests? As Beard reminds us, interests can never be objective and quantifiable, because

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– Preserve economic benefits deriving from cheap labour force. – Reduce negative internal impact of foreign nationals. – Selectively support smuggling networks.

– Maintain positive economic relations with Italy yet, diversify the range of economic partners.

– Obtain colonial compensations.

– Maintain leading role within the African Union. – Strengthen its reintegration in the international community.

Migration

Economic relations

Colonial issues

Relations with the EU

Substantive interests

– Strengthen the relations with the EU on its own terms

– Obtain colonial compensations.

– Maintain positive economic relations with Italy.

– Reduce migrant flows from Libya to Italy. – Fully cooperate with the Italian government.

Stated interests

Libyan interests

– Promote a more active role of the EU in managing migrant flows from Libya.

– Settle the colonial issues.

– Preserve privileged economic relations with Libya.

– Respond to the domestic electorate and its ‘security fears’ yet maintain migrant flows for clear economic reasons. – Obtain full Libyan cooperation in the fight against undocumented migration.

– Promote a more active role of the EU in managing migrant flows from Libya.

– Settle the colonial issues.

– Preserve privileged economic relations with Libya.

– Obtain full Libyan cooperation in the fight against undocumented migration. – Reduce ‘illegal’ migration while encouraging legal channels and integration.

Stated interests

Italian interests Substantive interests

Table 9.1 Analysis of ‘stated’ and ‘substantive’ interests of Italy and Libya

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they ‘cannot be separated from human motives and concerns’ (Burchill, 2005: 11). The study of the national interest is an ‘ineluctably subjective assessment’ (Burchill, 2005: 11). Accordingly, this chapter is not intended to supply the last word on the underlying motivations of Italy and Libya. Nonetheless, such intricacies should not preclude the examination, albeit problematic, of the multiple motives of each actor, which is fundamental to address my research questions on inter-state power dynamics. In order to review the interests of both countries, I separate them into the four main areas that are on the negotiating table, i.e. migration, economic relations, colonial issues and relations with the EU. I consider each of these aspects from the perspective of first Libya, and then Italy. As regards Libya, in Chapter 5 I demonstrated that migration is of increasing concern. For example, the mounting resources allocated by the Libyan government to combat undocumented migration, exemplified in the escalation of the return flights to third countries, points to the fact that Libya has a substantive interest in controlling migration. Nevertheless, the fact that the Libyan authorities are to some degree aware of how and where smuggling networks operate and yet do not fully interfere with these operations illustrates that Libya’s objectives are not limited to the unqualified reduction of unwanted migration.5 As de Haas points out: Trans-Saharan migration is less unwanted than it seems. The demand for cheap, irregular immigrant labour in Europe and post-embargo Libya is likely to persist or even increase, a demand to which a new generation of educated and ambitious sub-Saharan Africans is likely to respond. This irregular migration has generally been beneficial for economies in transit and destination countries because of the cheap labour it generates and the migration-related trade and business activities of smugglers, entrepreneurs and state officials. (De Haas, 2007: 70) Related to this, the Libyan leader has a substantive interest in keeping alive undocumented migration to Italy to ensure unremitting pressure on the Italian government. Arguably this applies to both before and after the Friendship Treaty of 2008. Hence, on the migration issue it is possible to detect a discrepancy between the substantive and stated interests of the Jamahiriya. Likewise, a tension between the official line and the policy action characterises the Libyan approach to economic relations with Italy. It is clear that Libya values ongoing collaboration with Italian firms. In 2007, Italy remained the predominant destination of Libyan exports (ICE, 2008). 2008 is also expected to see a record economic exchange between the two countries. In the first four months of 2008, exports to Libya increased by 55 per cent, and imports by 47 per cent (ICE, 2008: 6). Equally relevant is the gas pipeline from Libya to Italy, which makes Italy reliant on Libya and

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vice versa. Nonetheless, since the removal of the sanctions the situation has changed. While Libya has a strong interest in maintaining business relations with Italy, it has increasingly sought to diversify its range of economic partners. Its status as an oil- and gas-exporting country makes the alliance with Libya a precious commodity, which a growing number of countries is keen to contest (Boucek, 2004).6 While with the treaty in 2008 Libya made a clear move to the advantage of Italian businesses, broader lingering interests can be discerned. According to Gazzini, investment in ENI will allow the Italian firms and Libya’s National Oil Company to prospect together for fossil fuel deposits in third countries. Furthermore, the main economic impact of the treaty will be in fostering foreign investment and the joint ventures that the North African country needs in order to bolster its insufficient technical know-how. As Gazzini observes: By agreeing to solve pending legal disputes with a number of Italian companies who have been waiting to see their bills settled since the 1980s, Libya is trying to show the business community that it will honor contracts and thereby increase the international private sector’s confidence in the country. (Gazzini, 2009) It is thus established that economic interests related, but not confined, to Italy have profound implications for broader bilateral interactions, which I shall cover in the coming sections. With reference to the colonial issues, there is a correspondence between the substantive and the stated motivations. Until 2008 Libya insisted that, until Italy made a ‘significant gesture’ to apologise for its colonial past, bilateral relations would not be normalised. The case for emphasising this issue derived from the compelling motivations that Libya had at both the domestic and foreign levels. Advancing the request for colonial damages was consistent with internal political considerations; it helped Qaddafi to strengthen and legitimise his domestic authority (Romano, 2007). As Said has argued, the construction of opposites and ‘others’ is conducive to the building of national identity (Said, 1991: 332). The colonial narrative is one of several strategies that the regime has successfully pursued to accomplish its nation-building project.7 Moreover, by bringing this issue to the fore Libya has succeeded in creating extra inducements for Italy, outside the narrow economic and political areas of bargaining. Relations with the EU exhibit a further conflict between Libya’s official and substantive objectives. As Pliez wrote in 2003: The paradox is between the discourse preaching openness to the migrant flows from Sub-Saharan Africa and the participation to the discussions on regulating clandestine migration in the Mediterranean. For Tripoli it is about articulating two axes of its foreign policy. (Pliez, 2003: 197)

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Indeed, despite the Jamahiriya’s rhetorical claim that it is eager to deepen relations with the EU, its reluctance to join the Barcelona Process or the Mediterranean Union testifies to its multifaceted overall position. As Aliboni notes, since the Mediterranean is the essential arena for their relations, Italy and Libya have a joint vested interest in making it an area of peace and prosperity (Aliboni, 2002). Yet, while Italy is convinced that the achievement of this aim can be facilitated by a Pan-Mediterranean organisation like the European Neighbourhood Policy, ‘Libya prefers a bilateral approach with Italy as well as other European countries’ (Aliboni, 2002: 2–3). By some reckonings, Libya aspires to have a leading role within the African Union. Consequently, deepening the bond with the EU may weaken its African aspirations. As a matter of fact, Qaddafi refused to endorse the Mediterranean Union, on the grounds that it was a European project ‘cutting up Africa for hypothetical prospects with Europe’ (EU Observer, 5 August 2008). As he put it: We are member of the Arab League and also the African Union, and we will not take any chances with damaging the Arab or African Union. [ ... ] Our European partners need to understand that. We are in favour of partnership projects, but they must take account of these red lines. (France 24, 10 June 2008) The official pronouncements by Libyan authorities welcoming increased yet ad hoc cooperation with the EU, simultaneously with Libya’s refusal to abide by its formal procedures, convey the multifaceted nature of Libyan interests and the shifting loyalties. The analysis of Libya’s motives needs to be complemented with that of Italy’s. In following the same path of enquiry, the examination is broken down on the basis of the four previously identified main items on the negotiating table. With regard to migration, Italy’s prime goal is to co-opt Libya in the struggle against undocumented migrant flows. Chapter 4 made clear that Italy’s prevailing securitised wisdom partially reflects a pro-active policy line aimed at deepening the dialogue with Libya and reducing irregular migration. The employment of all available tactics to entice Libya to cooperate, coupled with the deployment of substantial resource for this cause, is proof of the concordance between Italy’s stated and substantive interests vis-à-vis Libya. Nonetheless a discrepancy between discourses and practices is also observable in Italy’s overall stance on migration. To a degree, the official narrative, preaching the security–migration mantra, clashes with the inclusive policies undertaken. It is possible, therefore, to detect an inconsistency between Italy’s substantive and stated interests when it comes to migration policies.8 Turning to Italy’s economic agenda, an overall coherence between the substantive and stated aims can be identified. Historically, economic

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exchanges have had a decisive role. The stance taken by successive Italian governments, from the embargo era until the present day, has displayed a clear bias towards sustaining and further deepening business relations with Libya. Until 2008, the underlying economic dependence on Libya, ranging from the oil industry to foreign direct investment, has placed Italy in a vulnerable position (Coralluzzo, 2008: 128). As a former Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs put it: The fact that we are highly dependent on the oil and gas from Libya is a limitation. This however is our choice. If we decide to take the gas from either Russia or Algeria we know that with them we can discuss only to a certain point. He [Qaddafi] has a strong weapon against us which is pretty tough.9 As the quote from the leader cited at the outset of this chapter makes plain, oil-exporting countries have the option of interrupting oil supplies at will and changing their business partners. Russia and Azerbaijan, which have temporarily cut oil supplies to Europe and Russia respectively, provide evidence of this (BBC, 9 January 2007). Hence, by economic criteria, Libya has a stronger foothold than does Italy. It is no surprise that the commitment to build the highway as the ‘big gesture’ was justified by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the grounds of the preservation and consolidation of Italy’s economic relations with the Jamahiriya (Ministero degli Esteri, 2007b). As part of the discussions to settle the colonial ‘chapter’, on 29 October 2007 D’Alema declared: ‘We own certain debts to Libya, but we also have a fundamental interest in our links with this essential partner’ (Libyaonline, 11 November 2007). In other words, the desire of the Italian government to overcome the outstanding issues concerning the colonial past and to normalise economic relations represents both its substantive and stated interest. As we shall see, the observed reliance by Italy on Libya was partially reversed with the 2008 treaty which benefitted ‘Italian companies first and foremost’ (Gazzini, 2009). An assessment of the Italian objectives concerning the role of Brussels brings us to a similar conclusion. As outlined in Chapter 6, Italy has been a keen advocate of the normalisation of the relations between the EU and Libya. It was the then EC President and former Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, who not only masterminded and presided over the suspension of EU sanctions but also welcomed the first official visit of the Libyan leader to Brussels in 2004. To this date, Italy continues to solicit the European institutions to lead a European-wide response to tackle migration from Libya. Indeed, the consolidation of the Italian–Libyan collaboration has been accompanied by relentless calls by Italy for a more substantive European involvement. As the President of Italy, Giorgio Napolitano, reiterated on 15 November 2007, ‘the problem of immigration cannot be addressed

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by individual states alone’ and that ‘has to be dealt with the strength of the EU’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 15 November 2007). In essence, no divergence can be detected in the Italian rhetorical claims from the country’s actual intentions concerning EU participation. In sum, whereas Libya’s stated interests are not always in accord with its substantive ones, the Italian agenda presents a more general correlation between what is being said and what being sought after. Significantly, Libya has made no attempt to hide its double agenda. The contradictory remarks of Libyan officials, presented in the previous chapters, offer substantial evidence of the fact that antithetical objectives are being declared and pursued simultaneously. Recognition of the complex motivations of both actors and of the existence of their multiple and, at the times, contradictory interests serves as a prelude to my next task. In order to unravel the dynamics of interdependence and the give-and-take framework between the two countries, I now move on to the relative costs and benefits10 within the agreements on migration.

9.3

Cost-benefit analysis with reference to migration

By referring to the theoretical insights of interdependence theory, I now look at Italy’s and Libya’s costs and benefits relative to their interests.11 By investigating the constraints affecting the outcome of the negotiations, I introduce the discussion in the sections to come on the evolving behaviour and identities of the two actors (Alker, 1977: 50). As regards the gains on the Libyan side, considerable financial and material resources to strengthen its police operations have been obtained from Italy. This has come also with a reputational gain. After decades of political insularity, the engagement with Italy on migration has allowed Libya to consolidate its role within the international community and to portray itself at the forefront in the fight against international organised crime, including terrorism. In conjunction with the European migration concerns, Qaddafi has persuaded Italy and the EU to treat its migration problem as their vital strategic concern. Collaboration with Italy has offered Libya the opportunity ‘to be seen to be cooperating in combating’ Europe’s alleged enemies, and to enhance its reputation as a responsible state (Colucello and Massey, 2007: 83). One example is represented by the return flights and push-backs from Italy, which have benefited Libya insofar as they imposed virtually no costs. The migrants repatriated were not Libyan nationals (EC, 2005). Most of the migrants simply transited through Libyan airports, whence they were directed to third countries. As the flights were sponsored by the Italian government and were not repatriating Libyan nationals, Libya had practically no obligations. At the same time, the regime enjoyed relative rewards, in the repair of its pariah image. While doubts over the full rehabilitation

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of Libya persist,12 it can be argued that, since the lifting of the international sanctions, its status has improved dramatically. The formal support of Italian initiatives to combat undocumented migration provides a timespecific benefit with limited resource costs. In the light of Libya’s interest in full reintegration into the international community, the gains resulting from formal compliance with Italy are higher than those that would have resulted from defiance. Furthermore, the more significant return for Libya is the Italian willingness to talk at ‘any cost’. Partly because of the internal political and public pressure to address the alleged emergency posed by migration from Libya, Italy has made significant concessions that, until 2008, have outweighed the benefits arising from bilateral collaboration on migration.13 Importantly the Friendship Treaty has significantly affected this overall balance. While it is too early to draw definitive assessments, it could be argued that in gaining in terms of colonial recompensations, Libya has also made important concessions such as increased cooperation on migration. For the sake of a balanced discussion, I should stress that the bilateral agreement on migration did pose a mainly reputational cost (Lipson, 1991) on Libya in relation to its presumed human rights violations. Continued criticism from, for example, human rights advocacy groups, meant that there was less of an improvement in Libya’s international relations than it had hoped for through the bilateral agreements. Even though the flights, the construction of the camps, the training programmes and the pushbacks were co-managed and financed by the Italian government, Libya’s support for such practices has been perceived to confirm its poor reputation on human rights.14 Furthermore, the protests against Qaddafi during his visit to France in December 2007 and to New York in September 2009 had to do with the regime’s continued infringements of human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2007; The New York Times, 23 September 2009). Thus the regime’s endorsement of the return flights may have partially hindered its overall foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, in broad political terms it can be argued that the clumsy nature of the agreements and the criticism directed at Libya have not significantly affected Libya’s interests and behaviour. The rapprochement with the US, symbolised by the visit to Libya of US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in September 2008, is further evidence of this (BBC, 6 September 2008). In short, Libya’s contested collaboration with Italy on migration has not significantly hampered the pursuit of its interests. In fact, the normalisation of Libya’s international status has neither positively affected, nor has it been significantly influenced by, the human rights standards of its migration policies. In fact, as indicated in Chapter 4, the number of migrants returned from Libya to third countries has increased over the recent years. Ironically, on the national media channel, Jana, Libyan authorities record fairly frequently the number of migrants arrested and/or

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deported, as evidence of their determination to reduce undocumented migration (e.g. Jana News, 12 June 2007; Watanona, 19 August 2006). Arguably, in pursuing and publicising such actions, the Libyan regime has sought to convince Europe of its commitment to tackling migration, and to raise awareness of the far-reaching social, economic and political problems that migration poses to Libya. It can therefore be inferred that the contentious collaboration with Italy on migration, despite Libya’s presumed breach of human rights, has been largely beneficial for Libya. Its international rehabilitation has occurred alongside, for example, the surge in random deportation practices targeting undocumented migrants. From the Italian viewpoint, one of the major gains is Libya’s formal collaboration on migration. Yet, as noted in Chapter 7, until 2008 this collaboration has been more formal than de facto. The inability to significantly reduce unwanted migration from Libya, or to persuade the Libyan regime to comply fully with Italian requests, evinced Italy’s continuing problems. Throughout the years, the disunited nature of the Libyan regime and its multiple identities and interests have imposed significant limitations on Italy.15 By calling officially for a firm and total fight against ‘irregular’ migration while somewhat tolerating smuggling networks, Libya has reduced Italy’s potential gains. Despite this, Italy has continued to invest significant resources, and has taken on new responsibilities to control migration in Libya. In this sense, the Friendship Treaty may be understood as a further move to entice Libya. In committing $5 billion as colonial reparations, Italy sought to secure Libya’s willingness to tackle undocumented migration. As of 2010, it appears that Italian expectations have been met. Notably, in 2009 the number of arrivals to Italy decreased by 90 per cent and commercial bilateral relations underwent remarkable expansion. By some reckonings, the Treaty has thus shifted the overall balance to the advantage of Italy (Dugger, 2009; Gazzini, 2009). Yet the extent to which these new gains for Italy will endure remains to be seen. The appreciation

Table 9.2 Cost-benefits analysis in the negotiations on migration Costs

Benefits

Italy

– Faltering Libyan commitment. – Financial resources invested with limited return.

– Formal support of Libya to collaborate on migration.

Libya

– To a limited extent, international reputational cost associated with human rights violations.

– Financial and material resources. – Italian inclination to talk “at any cost.” – Privileged position in the discussion with the EU and Italy.

Note of caution: The points sketched in this table are intended to provide a general indication of the gains and losses in the ongoing discussions on migration. Without doubt, they are not distinct factors but instead deeply interrelated.

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that the collaboration is an ongoing activity suggests caution on any conclusions drawn. One factor that has inhibited Italian diplomatic action is related to the informality of the agreements. On the one hand, the growing relevance of international human rights law has led Italy, like other Western countries, to adopt increasingly restrictive policies towards asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants (Gibney, 2003). Human rights law constrains states in terms of what they can do to migrants and asylum-seekers particularly once they enter state territory. In this optic, it ‘makes sense’ to prevent arrivals from asylum-seekers whom a state may be legally bound to grant asylum to. With the end of the Cold War asylum and migration ‘became part of the cut and thrust of domestic politics’ and government leaders found themselves facing more pressure to restrict entry (Gibney, 2003: 28) and, by implication, to seek to outsource asylum processing practices and migration control policies. On the other hand, the same human rights norms that have led countries such as Italy to adopt new measures beyond their borders in the first place have subsequently discouraged them from undertaking such policies. In Chapter 4, I documented how the Italian government was widely condemned by different international organisations. Presumably due to the mounting international pressure, in March 2006 the Italian government interrupted the practice of repatriating migrants, and the rationale of the camps was revised. The policy change under the Berlusconi government was confirmed by the subsequent government of Prodi, and by Berlusconi on his return to power. The short-term benefits of reducing undocumented migration through the return flights were wiped out by the costs of justifying controversial readmission policies. Presumably, the loss of reputation resulting from the disputed nature of the agreements became intolerable. In sum, in the negotiations on migration Libya is the privileged player who must be persuaded to collaborate, while Italy has little choice but to cooperate.16 In other words, the rising cost to Italy of ensuring Libya’s commitment creates a situation of ‘vulnerability’ for the former.17 The linkage between Libyan officials and smuggling networks, and the relative capacity of the Libyan regime to control undocumented flows to Italy, provide Libya with substantial influence over the negotiations. It may be one of the reasons why Italy eventually concurred with Libya’s requests for reparations. In broad political terms, it can be argued that the increasing relevance of migration has benefited Libya more, and imposed costs predominantly on Italy. Be that as it may, Italy has remained committed to this costly venture. The signing of the Friendship Treaty is glaring example of this. This compels us to probe the reasons behind Italy’s unwavering, perhaps self-debilitating, adherence to the bilateral arrangements. The answer lies in the perceived threat posed by migration and the related electoral-populist pressure to control borders (Zincone and Caponio, 2004).

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9.4


Power and ideas: The symbolic power of migration

In the historical background to Libya’s migration policies, I provided evidence of the recurrent instrumental use of migration as a foreign policy expedient with its neighbouring countries. Likewise, in Chapters 7 and 8 I posited that Libya’s bargaining power towards Italy is enhanced by the securitised dimension of migration in the Italian domestic debate and in the broader bilateral negotiations. The question of the relevance of realism resurfaces once again. Can the realist power prescription be in any way reconciled with the negotiating dynamics, which are engendered by ‘perceived’ threats rather than ‘real’ economic and military assets? Perceptions and systems of meanings do not feature in the realist power equation as defined in Chapter 2. As Alker noted in 1977: Old methodological prescriptions of Realpolitik – don’t trust intentions, plan in terms of capabilities, and assume opponents are trying to maximize a national interest defined as power – have been superseded by a cautious attempt better to understand the multiple subjectivities affecting policy. (Alker, 1977: 52) Following this reasoning, I argue that it is necessary to go beyond the realist concept of ‘hard power’ and explore other conceptualisations capable of providing a more subtle analysis on the relevance of ideas in foreign policy.18 Accordingly, the concept of productive power, defined by Barnett and Duvall (2005) and outlined in Chapter 2, is instructive for the purposes of this study.19 I shall therefore make the case for reconciling power, defined in terms of perceptions (Jervis, 1976), with realist views of international relations. As far as Italy is concerned, Chapter 4 showed that migration features as a paramount issue on its domestic and international agendas. This primacy is largely justified on security grounds. While there is no convincing evidence that migrants from Libya have a direct causal link with international terrorism or worsening criminal rates, the assumption underlying the overall Italian public discourse is that there is an inherent connection between these phenomena. Yet in Italy this enduring perception of migration as a critical transnational threat coexists with inclusive migration policies. In other words, the Italian political debate on migration is fraught with complexities at the levels of both discourse and practice. With regard to Libya, following the example set by the European countries, Qaddafi has carved out a distinctive, securitised stance on migration. This security-based approach to migration has shaped Libya’s identity visà-vis Italy in two ways. First, Libya has defined itself as a migrant-transit country. As Duvell argues, transit migration is an increasing concern for the European Union,

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and has turned into a political discourse (Duvell, 2006: 3–6). In this sense, ‘transit migration’ has become ‘a sort of a war cry directed at countries that are expected by the EU to keep unwanted migration off European territories’ (Duvell, 2006: 6). By adopting and refining the security mantra framing the Italian public debate, Libya has strategically portrayed itself as a migrant-transit country, as opposed to a migrant destination one. Crucially, the Libyan ‘transit migration discourse’ is deceptive. Out of a total foreign population in Libya of over 1.5 million, 15–20,000, or 1 per cent, reach Italian shores annually (Human Rights Watch, 2006a).20 While such a figure is significantly lower than the annual Italian quotas, the undocumented arrivals in Sicily place a relative humanitarian and logistical burden on Italy (De Mistura, 2007; Dentico and Gressi 2006). Libya, however, remains predominantly a migrant destination country, and its transit status is relatively marginal. Yet, in its dealings with Italy, Libya emphasises the second aspect, and tends to neglect the first. It hardly needs to be added that Libya’s discourse on transit migration, while misleading, has proved to be an optimum strategy to affect Italy’s demeanour. Second, Libya has increasingly defined migration as a major societal threat. It has articulated a foreign policy based on a view of migration that is much more racist than Italy’s. In fact, it has amplified its anti-foreign sentiments in a way that resembles the European far-right security paradigms. As documented in Chapter 5, this discourse has culminated in a set of measures, such as random arrests and mass deportations, which appear to be human rights abuses. Furthermore, the security narrative legitimises and corroborates Libyan requests for special assistance from Italy and the EU. This migration–security construct, however, lacks sound empirical grounding. Although it has been proven that Libya has experienced an exponential growth in migration over the last few decades, available data suggest that the security assumptions propounded by the regime are, for the most part, unsubstantiated. The vital point here is that the emerging identity, rooted in the securitised construction of migration, has provided Libya with new capacities vis-à-vis Italy. What weakens the Italian position are not the unwanted arrivals to Sicily per se. The critical factor influencing the Libyan bargaining position is the symbolic power that migration evokes in the Italian and European political arena. As Qaddafi bluntly put it during the European Council’s meeting in Seville on June 2002, in order to slow down the ‘invasion of Europe from illegal immigrants’ it is necessary to increase development projects, since ‘not one single Northern African state is willing to control the doors to Europe for free’ (Pliez, 2006: 69). Seemingly, the ‘invasion’ analogy serves as a strategic tool for the Libyan regime to advance its interests with Italy and the EU. By manipulating pre-existing Italian and European fears of ‘otherness’, and raising the alarm about perceived social threats, the Libyan regime has acquired significant control over the ongoing negotiations on

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migration. The values and norms framing the Italian approach to migration and to security represent a critical lever that Libya has employed in order to consolidate its negotiating power. The security-based agenda forged by the EU, supposedly to protect its values and way of life, has turned against its creator. From the point of view of Italy, it has become a double-edged device, which has been counterproductive at best.21 As we shall see, the same applies to other case studies explored in Chapter 3. This reality is enlightening, since it makes the case for Barnett and Duvall’s notion of productive power as much as it discredits the realist emphasis on ‘hard power’. The securitised migration discourse is an expression of social processes through which meanings are produced, experienced and transformed. The perception of migration sets the boundaries of social identities and defines the capacity for action of the negotiating parties (Barnett and Duvall 2004: 56). To quote Barnett and Duvall, the bases and workings of the securitised migration discourse ‘are the socially existing and, hence, historically contingent and changing understandings, meanings, norms, customs, and social identities that make possible, limit, and are drawn on for action’ (Barnett and Duvall 2004: 56). The manner in which migration is constructed moulds the behaviour of one actor towards his counterpart and his capacity to influence outcomes from any particular diplomatic exchange. The ideas framing the public debate on migration are power resources with substantive implications for relations between states. Anti-migrant perceptions have affected the actions of both Italy and Libya significantly. Thus, if an enlarged definition of power beyond the categories provided by realist thinking is desirable, the question that needs to be addressed is whether the objective criteria of power set forth by classical political thinking are still relevant in the context of the larger bargaining framework.

9.5

Analysis of wider power relations through issue-linkage

To establish whether, beside productive power, hard power also plays a role in the overall Italian–Libyan agreements, I comment first on the linkages between migration and the other issues on the agenda. To do so, first, I employ Haas’s concept of ‘issue-linkage’, and I re-elaborate the aforementioned cost-benefit methodological tools. In doing so I consider how migration relates to the other items being negotiated. Second, I comment on the validity of the realist conception of power within the larger bargaining scene. I will thus conclude that migration calls for a reconfiguration of traditional views of North–South power relations. As noted previously, the main issues on the agenda include economic relations, migration, colonial issues and relations with the EU. In unfolding the complexity of the broad negotiations, I have already shown that colonial issues have been linked to bilateral economic relations and to the Libyan commitment to migration control. Equally, the dialogue between Libya and

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Colonial issues

Economic issues

Migration

EU relations

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Figure 9.1 Issue-linkages in the broad negotiations

the EU has affected the ongoing Italian–Libyan interaction for the purpose of tackling migration. Figure 9.1 illustrates, in a highly simplified manner, how issues are grouped. The matter in question concerns how distinctive issues are only linked with certain other ones (Betts, 2004: 44–5). Who establishes how issues are linked? What does the process of grouping linkages tell us in terms the capacity of each country to advance its own agenda? In the process of linking issues, who gets what? In other words, what does the analysis of gains and losses reveal in terms of asymmetries in these bilateral relations (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 10)? What, if anything, empowers Libya in its negotiations with Italy, and vice versa? I now analyse each linkage from a cost-benefit perspective. The connection between economic and colonial issues is crucial, and has been routinely emphasised by the Libyan leader. For example, in December 2007, during the summit between African and EU leaders, Qaddafi called on Europe to compensate its former African colonies. In his own words: ‘The riches that were taken away must be given back somehow. [ ... ] If they don’t face that truth, they will have to pay the price one way or another – through terrorism, emigration or revenge’ (BBC, 8 December 2007). No doubt, this linkage has imposed a cost on Italy, which would have been better off if the improvement in economic relations had not been conditional upon the settlement of the colonial recompensations. The Libyan regime is aware of the fact that, Italy would perceive its non-compliance as disruptive for the wider interaction. From the Italian viewpoint, refuting the linkage would be more costly than accepting, on account of the detrimental retaliatory consequences that defaulting might produce in terms of impaired business relations and undocumented migrant flows. Presumably, Italian policy-makers believe that, in order to preserve the strategic alliance with Libya, accepting the rules set by the latter may increase its share of the pie. They bowed to the high costs in order to safeguard and potentially deepen the economic relations, which are considered to be strategic. This was confirmed by the events in 2008. Since October 2008, the Libyan Central Bank has purchased $64.6 million in ENI stock and expressed interest in buying up to 10 per cent of the company (Gazzini, 2009). The treaty also advantaged smaller Italian firms operating in Libya, as these companies were previously obliged

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to pay ‘success fee’ of up to 2 per cent on the total value of signed contracts (Gazzini, 2009). Simply put, the point relevant for us here has to do with Libya’s role as an oil- and gas-exporting country and its untapped business opportunities. Italy has continued negotiating with Libya come what may, largely because of its economic interests. From the perspective of Libya, the linkage between economic and colonial is beneficial, for two reasons. First, before the treaty in 2008 it has allowed Libya to explore economic relations with other countries (St John, 2008d), such as China (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007: 10), and to move away from the exclusive ties with Italy that characterised the embargo era. Second, it has led to the desired side-effect of obtaining the Italian pledge on the colonial issue. Arguably, Libya’s colonial requests might have been downplayed by Italy had they been treated in isolation from the other issues on the agenda. Moreover, the overall degree of obscurity and confusion in the Libyan diplomatic style further accentuates Italy’s vulnerability. While it may be argued that since 2008 the economic gains have moved to the Italian camp, it is too early to firmly establish the overall economic costbenefit equilibrium. As concerns the second linkage between the colonial compensation and migration, the gains are on the Libyan side. Simply put, Italy has limited interest in letting the colonial past remain on the agenda, since it touches upon unresolved tensions and ‘collective guilt’ for its fascist past. It has been amply documented that, to this day, Italians are unable to come to terms with their colonial era (Mammone, 2006). Italy accepted the tradeoff with the expectation of longer-run optimal outcomes, including a more solid commitment from Libya to control migrant flows. Clearly, Libya does not have a compelling interest in unconditionally supporting Italian policies to halt migrant flows through the Mediterranean. Hence, from the Libyan viewpoint, up until 2008 the linking of the colonial issue (which would otherwise have remained at the fringe of the negotiations) with migration, which is a top priority for Italy, has yielded the greatest benefit. The signing of the treaty, however, has also served Italian economic interests. Lastly, the grouping of migration with the involvement of the EU brings benefits to both countries. On the one hand, Libya’s gradual reintegration into the international community has been officially recognised and widely applauded, to the point that it is now treated as a privileged country. The launch of the discussion on Framework Agreement on November 2008 is an example of this (EC, 2008d). Although harsh criticism of Libya persists, especially with regard to persistent human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2006a), over the last few years the international standing of Libya has undergone a spectacular improvement. On the other hand, Italy has gained from European participation in managing migration in the Mediterranean. The transfer of some migration policy competencies

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to Brussels is expected to reduce the financial and reputational pressure that the Italian government has faced thus far. This is epitomised by the ongoing discussion on EU-led ‘commissions’ to examine asylum requests in Libya. The critical subtext here remains the securitised narrative. The symbolic power of migration plays to the advantage of both countries, since it legitimises their pleas for the EU to be more active. In emphasising this discourse, Italy and Libya have sought to win more assistance from Brussels. In the aggregate, our case study is an example of ‘tactical issue-linkage’, whereby the negotiating ploy ‘eschews reliance on intellectual coherence among the issues linked’ (Haas, 1980: 372). As Haas indicates, ‘tactical linkage is a cheap way to increase pay-offs because it expands the agenda of possible benefits to be derived’ (Haas, 1980: 373). Overall, the objective of this strategy ‘is simply to obtain additional bargaining leverage, to extract a quid pro quo not obtainable if the discussion remains confined to a single issue’ (Haas, 1980: 372). As Haas further clarifies, ‘the credibility of a tactical linkage depends on the “linkee’s” perception of the linker’s ability and willingness to withhold collaboration if the linkage is refused’ (Haas, 1980: 372). In our case, the role of the linkee is played by Libya, and the linker by Italy. Agenda-setting has represented ‘a primary tool for securing and extending power’ (Light, 1982). Italy has not withheld its collaboration, despite the linkage being unfavourable. Libya has succeeded in establishing specific connections between issues in line with its substantive interests. The construction of knowledge and the self-serving use thereof is an exemplification of how significant Libya’s leverage is in the wider bilateral relations. The tendency of Italian governments to accede to Libya’s requests is a distinctive feature of these countries’ historical relations. A clear example is Andreotti’s policy, based on the idea of ‘buon vicinato’, where compromise and dialogue were preferred over confrontation and closure (Collu, 2001). By maintaining diplomatic and economic relations during the era of UN, EU and US sanctions, when Libya was considered a ‘rogue’ state, Italy confirmed and crystallised its role as an ‘easy’ ally who would not easily abandon the long-standing relationship. This is demonstrated by the manner in which the issues have been connected; Libya has managed to impose its own ‘knowledge’ on Italy. This is best illustrated in the centrality accorded to the colonial chapter. As Gazzini notes, ‘given the lack of legal compulsion, many wondered why Italy would even enter negotiations for the treaty’ (Gazzini, 2009). The grouping of issues, indeed, reflects Libya’s preferred order. This was particularly true after the suspension of EU sanctions. During the embargo Libya’s room for manoeuvre was limited, and Italy could use its invaluable role as Libya’s advocate as a bargaining-chip. Libya’s regaining of international prestige denied Italy’s of significant diplomatic advantage. As one Italian parliamentarian foresaw in 2003, the

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removal of the embargo could not secure Libya’s effective collaboration against migration (Camera, 2003e). In fact, Italy found itself deprived of a means of pressure on its rule-breaking interlocutor. As part of these reflections, let me return to one of my initial questions, that on whether in this case realist views of power are confirmed. I argue that hard power should not be dismissed. To an extent, economic considerations continue to explain Italy’s acceptance of the issue-linkage setting dictated by Libya. Furthermore, Libya’s geo-political location, at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, makes the Jamahiriya a strategic ally whom Italy is eager to content. This may explain why Italy eventually agreed to sign a unique treaty. Indeed never before had a European state voluntarily agreed to pay a financial package to a country it once colonised (Gazzini, 2009). The Libyan regime is aware that Italy places great importance on, for example, migration and economic collaboration and, consequently, that the Italian tolerance threshold is high. This provides Libya with leverage that can be applied on a wide range of issues. Without such economic preconditions, it is doubtful that Libya could have benefited so significantly from migration-related discourses.22 I am thus prompted to make two claims. First, the realist belief in the enduring centrality of interests and hard power is upheld. At its most basic realpolitik centres on ‘the concept of interest defined in terms of power’ (Morgenthau, 1978). Accordingly, in the Italian–Libyan interaction both parties are driven by the calculation, or miscalculation, of their interests (Waltz, 1979: 117). Political realism has also to be credited for its recognition that interests, both material and ideal, dominate states’ behaviour directly (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 12). This is made clear by Beard: Interest, subjectively considered, may take the form of an idea, and every idea pertaining to earthly affairs is attached to some interest considered as material thing and is affiliated with social relationships. Neither can be separated from the other in operations called ‘understanding,’ ‘appraisal’ or ‘measurement.’ [ ... ] There are, [ ... ] no ideas without interests, and no interests without ideas. (Beard 1935, quoted in Burchill, 2005) In other words, the fact that ideas, such as the securitised migration narrative, are power assets does not by itself disprove the core assumptions of political realism. However, realist methodology fails to provide specific analytical instruments to explore the ideational dimension of power – which justifies our resorting to the concept of productive power. This leads to the second reflection. The notion of productive power is a necessary complement to the shortcomings of the realist formula. It allows us to appreciate the symbolic politics of migration based on myths and prejudices (Grabbe 2000; Zielonka,

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2001: 519), a politics that transcends calculation and sound evidence (Perlmutter 1996). The variable-sum spill-over effects across different issues deriving from multiple and evolving interests, identities and expectations expose the limits of the realist normative and epistemological assumptions. It is worth reiterating that realism assumes that state interaction is based on a zero-sum game, which is plainly disproved by our case study. Once this point is conceded, I am prompted to question the soundness of the realist outlook concerning North–South relations. The empirical analysis and the critical discussion on externalisation show that emerging interactions among states challenge mainstream conceptions of North–South power relations.23 Contemporary debates are often based on North–South polarisation, with Northern states generally enjoying more political and economic power and Southern states facing severe political and economic constraints (Betts, 2005: 50). Yet in the light of its complex political, social and economic conditions, Libya can be considered part of the North by some standards, and of the South by others. It belongs to the South because of its political stance vis-à-vis Africa and the developing world at large. Colonel Qaddafi has sought to champion the interests of the South in opposition to ‘rich’ countries. For example, he has referred repeatedly to the rights of former colonies to claim colonial compensation, and urged them to follow Libya’s lead on this matter. With the lifting of the international sanctions and Libya’s gradual international rehabilitation, Qaddafi’s argument has gained in strength, both regionally and internationally. From an economic standpoint, however, Libya is unlike what is normally considered to be a country in the South.24 Above all, its booming economy and the absence of widespread poverty distinguish the North African regime from, for example, many African countries. Moreover, its location at the edge of Europe also plays a crucial role. Due to the economic and political implications that this proximity entails, Libya can be situated at the North–South interstice (Smith, 2005). Because of all these factors, we are led to call into question the appropriateness of the North–South archetype. The unique political and economic traits of Libya render the standard North–South dichotomy inaccurate, both conceptually and analytically. In conclusion, the Italian–Libyan interaction indicates that realist views can coexist with enlarged conceptions of power, and with a more fluid understanding of North–South relations (Barnett and Duvell, 2005). While the analysis corroborates ‘hard power’ accounts, placing objective and measurable assets at the centre of the power equation, it challenges this same theoretical perspective. I therefore transcend realist assumptions, in order to gauge the growing complexity of states’ interdependence whereby fixed and clear-cut parameters are being elided. This is indeed confirmed by the comparative analysis to which I now turn.

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9.6

Broadening the analysis

The debate on the reframing of North–South power relations raises a fundamental question. To what extent can we generalise the findings of the Italian–Libyan experience? Libya is patently an anomalous case, because of its considerable economic resources, unique political system and geo-strategic location. Consequently, if my concern is with broader North–South power relations, Qaddafi’s regime can hardly be considered an exemplary focus of enquiry. To address this problem, I revisit the conclusions drawn in the comparative analysis and elaborate four points. First, the comparative analysis confirms the assumption that the migration and refugee decisions that countries make have implications for other states. Diplomatic and/or security considerations can shape migration policy and vice versa (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 109). It has long been suggested that migration represents a matter of high international politics, engaging the attention of heads of state and ministries involved in defence, internal security and external relations (Weiner, 1985: 16). The underlying assumption is that migration, as Manning wrote in 1977, is an ‘intermestic’ phenomenon (Manning, 1977), resting on the inherent connection between domestic and foreign policy-making. Second, migration has provided a bargaining-chip to states in their bilateral negotiations with other states, with which they can extract specific concessions. As Weiner argued: Induced or forced emigration can be and has often been a foreign policy tool. States have used this instrument to destabilise another, force recognition, stop a neighbouring state from interfering in its internal affairs, prod a neighbouring state to provide aid or credit in return for stopping the flow or extend their political, cultural and economic interests of those of a dominant ethnic group through internal or external colonisation or decolonisation. (Weiner, 1995: 33–4) The same position is supported by Cornelius and Rosenblum: Many sending states have strong preferences concerning receiving-state immigration policies, and both sending and receiving states may seek to employ migration as a tool of foreign policy by linking cooperation on migration control and/or access to legal entry visas to other dimensions of bilateral relations, such as trade, investment, and security relations. (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 109) Crucially, I found that this applies to both sending and receiving states. In the case of Morocco, for example, migration has weakened the bargaining position of its European interlocutors and forced Spain to make significant

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compromises to convince Morocco to collaborate. However, the relations between the US and Latin America and Italy with selected Northern African countries reveal that a migrant-receiving country is also in a position to manipulate migration for its own purposes (Greenhill, 2009). Hence, my initial hypothesis about migration reframing North–South power interaction is not confirmed since migration does not benefit solely migrant-sending countries. Third, how migration is perceived in the domestic arena affects foreign policy orientations significantly. In the aftermath of the Balsero Crisis, the Clinton administration reversed the open-door approach, partly as a result of it being perceived as weak and vulnerable in the face of the large number of Cubans fleeing to the US. As Greenhill puts it, ‘the appearance of loss of control over US borders coupled with the perception inside the US that Florida might be overrun, would be viewed by US leaders as politically costlier than the alternative of dealing with him (Castro)’ (Greenhill, 2002: 48). The same applies to the discussions between Spain and Morocco. Although, as I have established thus far, migration is a foreign policy tool which has been used by both sides, security-related ideas in the migrant-receiving countries place the latter in a position of vulnerability and are source of diplomatic leeway for the migrant-sending ones. Fourth, in the cases of cross-border collaboration on migration, the migrant-sending country has been able to exert pressure on the migrantreceiving one, and has partially succeeded in dictating the course of the negotiations because of the fears associated with migration. This is crucial for my initial hypothesis on the extent to which the contested practice of externalisation affects power dynamics between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. Migrant flows per se do not provide increased influence. The Latin American cases show that, where more powerful states do not place restrictions at borders, migration cannot be used as power asset. It follows that migration becomes a source of leverage when the receiving country seeks to oppose it and restrict entry. This is certainly true in the Italian–Libyan case. The stronger the ‘control dilemmas’ and the ‘antiimmigration’ feelings in the receiving countries, the more successful the gambits of their counterparts are. Hence, the countries in the South come to benefit from increased leverage in their wider negotiations with the North. The perception of migration as a security issue engenders a reframing of the bargaining game to the advantage of the South. If the migrant-receiving countries were not preoccupied with migration, the migrant-sending ones would be deprived of a critical lever. Against structural views treating the South as ineluctably weak, we can here detect a more complex scenario of gain and losses on both sides. On these grounds, the assumption of structural inequalities informing mainstream approaches to North–South relations appears to be inaccurate.

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I am thus led to adopt a more multifaceted reading of the evolving patterns of state interdependence. Static and uncritical usages of the North–South framework as an ordering principle preclude a subtle appreciation of the evolving patterns of economic and political inequality amongst states. The study of migration and international relations reveals that gains and losses are diffused among participants, and that the international system is characterised by multiple-sum exchanges rather than zero-sum ones. The standard assumptions on power inequality underpinning the North–South paradigm ignore the complex interplay of factors, whereby Southern countries have also succeeded to an extent in controlling the outcome of the negotiations. When it comes to migration, the countries in the ‘North’ are not the only ones that ‘can make and break the rules’ (Wood, 1995). The varying strength that countries exhibit in the agreements on migration and on other issues on the negotiating table epitomises the dispersion of authority in the current international system (Rosenau, 2005). While the globalised world remains an arena of power and influence, the levers that actors can exert are increasingly fragmented and, as such, transcend fixed paradigms. In returning to one of my initial questions, I contend that migration studies require a reconceptualisation of the North–South dichotomy and a more nuanced comprehension of the transforming manner in which states collaborate to tackle common problems.

9.7

Conclusion

The examination of the real and official motives of Italy and Libya has proved to be critical to appreciating of the costs and benefits of each country in their cooperation on migration, and, more precisely, of the unequal obligations binding the two parties in their mutual exchanges (Keohane, 1986b). In light of the fact that, at least until 2008, Italy incurred higher costs than Libya, it seems reasonable to conclude that the wider discussions on migration are an example of ‘relations among unequals’, in which the practitioners are, to different degrees, exposed to the danger of exploitation and fraudulent arrangements. The negotiations are based on exchanges of ‘mutually valued but non-comparable goods and services’, whereby the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the other (Keohane, 1986b: 6). Presumably, Italy adheres to such an imbalance in the bilateral agreement on migration with the expectation of greater gains in their overall political and economic relationship and, equally relevantly, because of the symbolic power of migration. Similar scenarios of ‘relations among unequals’ have been observed in the other cases. While more empirical research on them is warranted, it is fair to assert that the outcome of broader negotiations reflects the changing framing of issues whereby migration has moved from the fringe to the centre of the diplomatic engagements. This policy change reflects the contest among

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actors to establish knowledge and rules most favourable to them (Plewa, 2009: 39) and determines their relative power position. One of the most striking instances of this ‘redirection’ (Plewa, 2009: 489) in the bargaining game relates to the ideational reinterpretation of migration. In response to putative societal menaces posed by migration, migrant-receiving countries, such as Spain and to an extent Greece, have been willing to conduct and deepen a dialogue with their counterparts at ‘any cost’. In turn, the latter have raised alarm about undocumented migration, because this has proved conducive to obtaining ad hoc concessions. In this sense, the realist formula fails to capture the extent to which fears and perceptions associated with migration influence the behaviour and interaction of states. Barnett and Duvall’s concept of productive power allows one to remedy these pitfalls and to understand more thoroughly the impact of the securitised migration discourse on foreign policy decisions and outcomes. The fact that both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries are actively involved, and have succeeded, in shaping ideas at distinctive policy junctures (Plewa, 2009) is insightful. The co-implication of migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries at the interstice between discourses and practices discloses new ways of tackling the unyielding predicament of North–South power relations. In challenging the realist assumptions, I do not seek to discredit them tout court. On the contrary, I have argued in favour not only of the nexus between interests and power, but also of the enduring relevance of the material dimension of power. Furthermore, the study of issue-linkages reveals that the securitised nature of migration represents a power resource, thanks in part to concurrent economic and political factors. Indeed, the study of the other items on the agenda is instrumental to evaluating the relative importance of migration. For example, in the relations between the US and Latin America, migration has impacted on the diplomatic exchanges for it has been linked to concurrent political dynamics, such as the Cold War confrontation. The striking point here is that migration is emerging as a dominant feature in the international political milieu, and alters the negotiating patterns between migrant-sending and migrantreceiving countries. By taking a purposely eclectic theoretical stance, I argue that migration profoundly affects state interdependence and invites scholars to see beyond polarised views of North–South power relations. The North–South analytical construct is helpful as a starting point in as much as it is subsequently superseded.25 Migration provides a source of bargaining power for migrantsending countries in a manner that has been overlooked by the realist tradition, and displays a growing tendency towards diffusion of power (Rosenau, 1997). On these grounds it is feasible to postulate that what we are witnessing is an incremental yet convoluted process whereby power migrates. It follows that one of the challenges of future research may be the one of

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theorising more thoroughly the process whereby the influence of different actors is being repositioned in significant respects. There is a need to develop rigorous analytical tools and theoretical assumptions to reinterpret changes in the relations among states which counter traditional views of states’ inequalities and power asymmetries (Van Criekinge, 2009).

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10 Conclusion

An argument that has been made at length in the scholarly debate is that the end of the Cold War has had the effect of widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots, and that the developing world has been deprived of any strategic leverage (Clapham, 1992). Globalisation has aggravated inequality and exposed the sharp distinction between the capacities of weak and strong states (Fawcett and Sayigh, 1999: 3). Against this backdrop, this book has sought to provide something of an alternative perspective, and has challenged the North–South binary opposition with a view to appreciating the processes of transformation in inter-state relations. I thus argued that international migration partly contradicts mainstream accounts of power and reveals the shortcomings of the North–South paradigm. In a nutshell, I made the case for revisiting our understanding of states’ inequalities in the light of a metaphorical ‘migration’ of power imbued with factual and ideational aspects of international migration. In line with the three sets of questions outlined at the outset of the book, my argument was three-fold. First, I provided a detailed picture of the Italian–Libyan agreements on migration. In outlining the main phases of the bilateral discussions, I reflected on the modes of strategic bargaining, how issue-linkages emerged and how side-payments were negotiated. For Italy, I considered the mismatch between discourses and practices, as well as its increasing inability to effectively influence the behaviour of its counterpart. For Libya, I built upon John Davies’s call to appreciate the nuances of Libyan politics and society. I argued that, while it is possible to identify a common thread running through Libyan policies, i.e. the instrumental employment of migration as a foreign and domestic policy tool, it would be misleading to assume that there has been a coherent grand plan informing Libyan policies towards Italy and on migration. From the broader political perspective of Libyan foreign policy, the Libyan regime has made massive miscalculations – one example being its support for terrorist organisations, which has led to imposition of international sanctions. In simple terms, Libya believed it could bypass prevailing international norms. Presumably 209

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these episodes have served as a learning process and Libya is more aware of the opportunities and constraints within the international arena.1 From this viewpoint, Libya’s dealings with Italy testify to its increased awareness of the international norms that it has to follow; yet also of the extent to which it can circumvent standard practices for the pursuit of its own interests. The empirical analysis reveals that migration furnishes Libya with a bargaining-chip, which it has used to affect Italy’s actions. This line of thinking is corroborated by an historical examination of Libya’s policies with regard to migration and border controls. Chapter 5 showed that, since the 1970s, the regime has successfully employed migration as a policy tool in relations with its neighbours. In other words, Libya has benefited from the growing salience of migration in the international arena. The realisation that migration is a lever, which Libya has used to exert pressure on Italy, validates one of my initial hypotheses. In the negotiations on migration, Libya, unlike Italy, is the player who must be persuaded to collaborate. At least until 2008, the high cost to Italy of ensuring Libya’s commitment to the ‘fight against irregular migration’ has created a situation of vulnerability for the former. The changing willingness of the Libyan regime to control migrant flows, coupled with its notoriously unpredictable diplomatic style, imposes further constraints on Italy. The second strand of the book concerned the idea of externalisation, a central theme in the literature on European migration policies. Here two arguments were adduced. First, the Italian–Libyan interaction cannot be treated as a case of externalisation as defined by the relevant scholarship. The cooperative arrangements on migration do not involve the shifting of border control policies from Italy to Libya, since the latter continues to exercise its sovereign authority fully. Nonetheless, recent joint measures defy legal scrutiny, and strengthen what Walters terms networks of joint tasks to address transnational threats (Walters, 2004: 680–1). The vague and arbitrary use of the concept of externalisation in the literature led me to resort to the alternative notion of ‘de-territorial collaboration on migration’. This expression captures the multifaceted manner in which border control policies are negotiated and implemented, and is intended to bring some precision to the debate on the Italian–Libyan interaction. Importantly, it remains to be seen whether this term can be extended to other similar cases of bilateral cooperation on migration. My discussion, then, invites further more detailed research on the application of the term externalisation across different cases. I then considered – second argument – whether the joint measures have been successful. Two concurrent phenomena were observed. First, undocumented arrivals from Libya to Italy continue unabated. Second, due mainly to the recurrent regularisations and the annual quotas, over the years the regular migrant population in Italy has increased noticeably. While the first trend owes to the difficulties in cooperation with Libya, the second

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Conclusion 211

can be traced to Italy’s need to fill gaps in its labour force. While migration from Libya remains a marginal feature in the broader Italian migration landscape, it has come to be one of the central marks of Italy’s ‘migration spectacle’ exercise. Despite the relative success in tackling irregular migration since 2008, Italy remains heavily reliant on the collaboration with Libya. In returning to one of my initial questions, I probed the reasons for the dependency of migrant-receiving countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece and, at the times, the US. I went on to argue that it is not the unsuccessful collaboration on migration and the evolving practices at borders per se that diminish a country’s negotiating strength. The substantive factor influencing the diplomatic exchanges is the symbolic power that migration possesses in domestic arenas. The social construction of migration as a societal threat has profound repercussions for foreign policies and inter-state power relations. Simply put, the perception of migration as a security concern alters the overall bargaining matrix to the advantage of the migrant-sending country. While there is no conclusive evidence proving that migrants have any direct link with terrorist organisations, or any disproportionate responsibility for increased crime rates, the prevailing public wisdom tends to take the connection between these phenomena for granted. As Geddes writes, by being drawn into the realm of identity politics, the politics of immigration has acquired a distinctive symbolic dimension (Geddes, 2000: 22). In an attempt to answer public anxieties associated with the migrant ‘other’, politicians, at least at the level of discourse, have constructed an ‘emergency’ narrative inspired by a strongly anti-migrant stance. This strategy, however, has produced meagre benefits for migrant-receiving countries, since it has constrained their bargaining power. In the European context, the security-based discourse on migration has moulded the identity and capacity of two actors on both sides. By adopting the security mantra underlying European societies, countries like Libya and Morocco have defined themselves as migrant-transit spaces confronting an unprecedented migration problem. This emerging identity, rooted in the securitised understanding of migration, has provided them with renewed strength vis-à-vis Europe. Above all, they secured a retaliatory instrument, which has raised the bargaining stakes for the EU. This thread of narrative was elaborated further in the last part of the book, where I approached the third set of questions from the perspective of IR theory. My starting hypothesis drew on three different theoretical traditions, i.e. political realism, neo-Marxism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Accordingly, in order to identify and explain emerging negotiating patterns, I sought to combine and transcend these views. This purposely eclectic theoretical archetype allowed me to investigate the widely differing and ambivalent aspects in inter-state relations in the Italo-Libyan case as well as the other selected cases presented in the third chapter.

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On the one hand, the realist concern with hard power remains appropriate insofar as its insights into the nexus between ideas, interests and power continue to hold relevance. On the other hand, it overlooks the contextual and ‘soft’ dimension of power. In overly emphasising the material constituents of power, and in sanctioning definite and fixed rules in the conduct of foreign affairs, political realism loses sight of important subtleties. For these reasons, I resorted to the notions of interdependence and productive power, which offer useful analytical instruments to explore complex mechanisms of states’ interactions. While realist assumptions of self-interested and power-seeking actors should not be abandoned, the study of how and why states seek and undertake cooperation and construct their mutual expectations furnishes a more fertile path of enquiry. Having made the case for the relevance of perceptions on migration and security in inter-state power relations, I considered the implications for North–South power relations. The argument according to which migrantsending countries are placed in a favourable negotiating position towards the migrant-receiving ones is not new (Hamilton, 1997). In the 1970s, many IR scholars called for an end to the normative distinctions, asserting the primacy of the North over the South. It was noted that the South was ‘building new trans-national structures in order to achieve both international and domestic goals’ (Morse, 1970: 382). These views have been confirmed by my comparative analysis. On different occasions, migrant-sending countries have used migrant flows to determine the choices of other countries and to win a more advantageous position in the given negotiating structure. In an international environment where migration is considered one of the top priorities, migrant-sending countries have found new opportunities to obtain the attention and favour of the North (Gillespie, 2002). The concerns with migration in the North have led the South to increase its bargaining power by thwarting the control efforts of the North (Ellerman, 2008). Importantly, this pattern is confirmed even in the absence of substantive economic assets on the side of the migrant-sending countries. This leads to an interesting reflection on migrant-transit countries. The poorer the country, the more chance it may have of using migration as a power-increasing tool. This is because migrants are presumably more likely to transit through, rather than settle in, countries with poor economies and few resources. This issue, which I only briefly examined, deserves further research. However, it should be noted here that in the cases explored in Chapter 3 the relative weight of the migration card was contingent on its connection with other political and economic issues on the agenda. One may, therefore, generalise the findings of the Italian–Libyan negotiations and maintain that, to some degree, migration benefits migrant-sending countries in negotiations with the migrant-receiving ones. However, this statement demands a note of caution. The comparative analysis, as well as the examination of Libya’s migration policies, showed

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that migrant-receiving countries have also used migration to influence the behaviour of their counterparts. The historical examination of Libya’s migration policies shows that migrants from Arab countries, as well as from subSaharan Africa, have been used as pawns by Qaddafi in his foreign policy. Likewise, in its relations with third countries, Italy has conditioned development aid and annual migration quotas on the willingness of those countries to collaborate on migration control policies. Thus migration has been strategically employed by, and has brought advantages to, both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. Significantly, this proposition does not contradict one of my core arguments questioning the validity of the realist ‘laws’. In fact, the novel status of migration as a paramount international issue, and its implications for inter-state relations, are evidence of important changes in state interactions. Thus, while it is clear that some of the prescriptions formulated by the realist tradition are still pertinent, a critical reflection on the subtle transformations in North–South bargaining beyond the mainstream readings is necessary. The fact that perceptions related to migration affect the power position of countries calls into question the appropriateness of the parameters formulated by the realist tradition, and of its epistemological premises, for understanding power equilibria. Hence I have suggested one basic idea. Constructed images of South–North migration add a further layer of complexity to an already dense and fragmented international milieu (Rosenau, 2005) with the potential of recasting states’ preference orderings and policy options. Migration, an issue that, until few decades ago, was at the periphery of the scholarship on political science, has now acquired unprecedented prominence, because it impacts so strongly on the manner in which states cooperate. The argument on the entrenched inequalities across the North– South divide is too simplistic, since it fails to acknowledge and explain emergent structures of world politics. It is not my intention to imply that we are witnessing structural reconfiguration in North–South relations of power. By economic and political standards, the international arena remains profoundly unequal. Despite the increasing weight of emerging countries (The Economist, 18 September 2008) a large part of the developing world has yet to guarantee self-sustaining economic growth (Beckfield, 2003). It is undisputable that ‘vast inequalities of power’ have always pervaded, and still pervade, international society (Dunne, 2005). Nonetheless, this book has observed the material and ideational changes in, and the opportunities for, ‘agency’ (Ba and Hoffman, 2005) available to actors traditionally labelled as ‘weak’. I contend that migration and, more specifically, perceptions and misperceptions about national interest and international relations (Jervis, 1976) have given such actors the wherewithal to partially determine their own conditions. From a theoretical vantage-point, then, the North–South dichotomy and its static views of power are open to question. The North–South model is

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not, of course, without its merits. Yet it is analytically useful precisely in as much as it is subsequently overcome. The seemingly paradoxical patterns in the negotiations on migration make North–South boundaries increasingly fluid, and have important implications for both scholars and policy-makers. This applies to my conclusions drawn from the empirical discussion. In the Italo-Libyan case, the limited scholarly debate on Libya, because of the lack of primary resources and on-the-ground research, has precluded a thorough comprehension of the country and of its foreign policy. The detailed reconstruction in this book of the bilateral discussions on migration has aimed to clarify a topic that is fiercely debated yet largely unknown. Given that European countries have sought to replicate the Italian putative example of ‘externalising’ migration policies, the difficulties experienced by Italy can be taken as a valuable lesson. In a nutshell, they give centre stage to the often unrecognised tension between fears related to migration and relations of power. The connection between migration, ideas and the balance of power deserves further reflection if we are not only to address the phenomenon of irregular migration but also to rethink the potential of the enduring (and also transforming) structures and processes of the international system. Realist scholars assert that the laws shaping international relations do not change. My empirical study of different bilateral negotiations has demonstrated that a more nuanced outlook may reveal novel – and perhaps unanticipated – patterns in the interaction among states. In this context, more research is needed on the extent to which migration and its inter-subjective dimension influence foreign policies and power relations. Not only are our case studies unfinished stories that require further attention, but the increasingly relevant role of the EU on migration in the Mediterranean also necessitates close investigation. For example, the fact that Spain and Greece are following in Italy’s footsteps may, or may not, trigger similar dynamics with regard to the power relations between the EU and neighboring countries. The same applies to the ongoing relations between the US and Latin American countries. A thorough examination of migration from an IR perspective may shed new light on global interdependencies and, more interestingly, on the depth of the changes affecting the international system.

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Notes 1

Introduction and methodology

1. Throughout this book, I refrain from using the terms ‘immigration’ and ‘immigrants’. I will instead refer to ‘migration’ and ‘migrants’. I define the latter as the large and diversified group of people entering their destination or transit country with or without the required permits. It is also important to stress at this point that, unless otherwise specified, I do not intend to consider the issue of refugees. 2. Not all observers, however, agree that migration is on the rise. A recent World Bank report on migration, for example, contends that current migration flows, relative to population, are weaker than those of the last decades of the nineteenth century (Ratha and Xu, 2008). 3. The linkage between remittance and development remains contested, however. Some, such as Athukorala (1993), demonstrate that remittances benefit local households across the developing world. Others, for example, a report by the IMF in 2003, found that remittances may have a negative effect on economic growth (Chami et al., 2003) and may sustain conflicts (Van Hear, 2000). For more on this debate, see Massey et al., (1998). 4. In this text, I follow the definition provided by Giddens (2002). 5. Throughout the book, when I use the term borders I refer to their ‘territorial’ dimension unless otherwise stated. For a detailed account of different conceptions of borders see Geddes (2005a). 6. The terms ‘foreigners’, ‘migrants’, ‘foreign workers’ and ‘foreign nationals’ will be used with the same meaning, as will the terms ‘undocumented’, ‘irregular’, ‘unauthorised’ and ‘unwanted’. 7. Throughout the book, I will use the following acronyms: ‘EU’ for European Union, ‘EC’ for the European Commission, ‘EP’ for the European Parliament and ‘Council’ for the Council of the European Union. The latter should not be confused with the Council of Europe. 8. I cannot hope to do justice to the entire debate on this field. This brief discussion simply reviews some of the ideas that are pertinent to the present purposes. Some works dealing with the notion of borders from the perspective of political science are Anderson (1996), Mathias (2001) and Wilson and Donnann (1998). 9. Without doubt, the debate on state and border goes beyond the sketchy analysis that I have presented. For example, there is a large body of literature from a normative angle, where it is argued that internal and external exclusionary practices exercised by the state should be regarded as fundamentally undemocratic (Walzer, 1983). On this reasoning, the restrictive narrative underpinning the very conception of border is not justifiable. The state cannot claim a right to exclude would-be immigrants, because democratic principles may apply with equal force to the very people against whom the state claims this right (Fine, 2007; Gibney, 2004a). 10. In this book I use the terms ‘cooperation’, ‘coordination’ and ‘dialogue’ to refer to situations where states seek to identify generalised principles of conduct to 215

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11. 12.

13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21.

22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27.

Notes reduce transaction costs (Ruggie, 1992). It is noteworthy, however, that some scholars have drawn a distinction between the two concepts (Stein, 1995). I define the concept of North~South in section 2.3 in Chapter 2. The concept of ‘burden-sharing’ and ‘burden-shifting’ with reference to asylum is discussed by, for example, Betts and Milner (2006); Chimni (2001); and Rodier (2006). The terms ‘third countries’ and ‘neighbouring countries’ are treated as synonymous. Throughout the text I will aslo refer to Libya as a Northern African country and as the Jamahirya. In addition, Qaddafi will be called ‘the Libyan Leader’, the ‘Leader of the Revolution’ or ‘the Colonel’. Throughout the book I define the terms ‘agreement’, ‘accord’ and ‘treaty’ as the generic bargaining process from the initial negotiation to enforcement and management. This understanding is based on the vast literature on complex interdependence to be examined below. Anonymous interview on 23 January 2008. As such I will not rely on statistical and numerical analysis and I will privilege a constructivist methodology (Moses and Knutsen, 2007). For more on this, see Blommaert (2005) and Gee (2005). Hereafter, rhetorical or official or political discourse. When I refer to public discourse, I mean the sum of public opinion, media and statements from politicians. For example, a former Italian prime minister could not recall that when he signed the Joint Communication an accompanying document was also agreed by both parties, also known as ‘Verbal Process’. I follow Wengraf’s definition, according to which semi-structured interviews have a number of interviewer questions prepared in advance, but these are designed to be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer must be improvised in a careful and theorised way (Wengraf, 2001: 5). The Italian authorities based in Libya were certainly more willing to share information. Throughout the book, I will not mention the centre that I visited. While I provide extracts from the interview with the director of the centre, I will not comment on the conditions of the building or of the migrants detained. Since I was not given access to the internal rooms where migrants were detained and the visit lasted no more than 15 minutes, I cannot make a fair assessment on the overall quality of the centre, nor I can generalise on detention conditions in Libya. However, the reliability of the information provided in such documents is highly questionable. Occasionally, the documents had been written by my interlocutors in response to my specific questions. Most of the time, they were in Arabic, and the level of information that they presented varied significantly. Yet again, the gaps and inconsistencies that I identified when comparing diverse sources of information helped me further appreciate the complexity of Italian and Libyan policies. It must be clarified that all the quotations from Italian and Libyan sources have been translated by myself, unless otherwise stated. Among the most prominent are Fabrizio Gatti and Stefano Mencherini. This approach has been inspired by Carling (2005). At this point, it must be stressed that the employment of media sources in the study on migration in Italy is not new. A major past example is Sciortino and Colombo (2004).

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Notes 217 28. Inter alia, media sources and documents provided by European institutions and Human Rights Watch.

2 Theoretical framework 1. Keohane and Nye do not use the term ‘interdependence theory’, and refer instead to ‘complex interdependence’, which they see as ‘an ideal type of world politics that is opposite to realism’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 23). In this book, however, I self-consciously employ the expression ‘interdependence theory’. This stems from the definition by Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner of ‘general theoretical orientations’ that ‘suggest relevant variable and causal patterns that provide guidelines for developing specific research programs’ (Katzenstein et al., 1998: 646). As it is approached in this text, ‘interdependence theory’ offers relevant variables, and suggests how they interrelate. Another qualification is in order here. The concept of regime was originally conceived within a multilateral framework to study negotiating patterns between more than two countries. However, I depart from this framework and apply the concept of interdependence, and the analytical tools thereof, to bilateral cooperative arrangements. As I will emphasise throughout the book, I employ the analytical tools exposed by realism, as well as interdependence theory, with a significant degree of flexibility. The exercise of adapting and combining different concepts and analytical frameworks is intended to facilitate the answering of my initial questions. 2. It could be argued that another potential analytical tool for assessing how states cooperate is game theory, which is concerned with analysis of the behaviour of decision-makers whose choices affect each another. One of its better-known problems is the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, for the sake of coherence I will not elaborate on these approaches. For a discussion on how they have been applied to IR, see, for example, Snidal (1985). The concepts that I borrow from interdependence theory and from the work of Barnet and Duvall suffice to answer my initial questions. 3. The reference to the realist strand of interdependence highlights the diversity within this school of thought. Therefore, we ought to keep in mind that a number of different perspectives can be identified under the general heading of interdependence. For more on this, see Krasner (1995). 4. In the chapters to come, I will not use the concept of regime which has been mainly applied to multilateral fora. For the purposes of coherence, I will focus instead on other selected aspects, such as the notion of issue-linkages. 5. See also Sebenius (1983). 6. In broad terms, it is possible to associate neo-liberal institutionalism with rationalism, since the latter ‘places particular emphasis on the high-level order which states can achieve in the context of anarchy’ (Linklater, 1990: 9), and neo-Marxism with revolutionism, which ‘contends that a “cosmopolis” [ ... ] will realise the moral potential of the species if already “immanent” within the international system of states’ (Linklater, 1990: 9). 7. Hereafter the terms ‘realist tradition’, ‘realist doctrine’, ‘mainstream realism’ and ‘realpolitik’ are employed with the same meaning that I now define. 8. In this book I focus on the realist conception of power. Accordingly, it is not part of the purpose of this book to assess the validity of other aspects of realist thinking, such as balance of power. 9. Waltz is considered to be the most prominent neo-realist (or structural realist) scholar. His ideas have to be differentiated from realism. As Waltz reminds us,

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10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

18.

Notes ‘neorealism retains the main tenets of realpolitik, but means and ends are viewed differently, as are causes and effects’ (1988: 616). Waltz’s neo-realism suits our purposes, since it challenges and transcends the Hobbesian claim that the life of man is ‘nasty, brutish and short’, which is not relevant for this study. As Waltz puts it, ‘neorealism rejects the assumption that man’s innate lust for power constitutes a sufficient cause of war in the absence of any other’ (Waltz, 1988: 617). Significantly, the neo-realist conception of power and the realist one build upon the same assumption. As Waltz clarifies, ‘realist theory, old and new alike, draws attention to the crucial role of military technology and strategy among the forces that fix the fate of states and their systems’ (Waltz, 1988: 624–5). These distinctions between realism and neorealism should not detain us here. By and large, the reader should know, however, that the realist definition of power presented hereinafter is drawn from both realism and neo-realism. This book does not aim to provide a rigorous consideration of political realism and power. This deliberately eclectic usage of realism, I believe, helps me address my initial questions. Although the debate on hard and soft power is a central one within IR scholarship, I will not elaborate it extensively in this book. For more on this, see, for example, Abnott and Snidal (2003) and Weaver (2005). Paraphrasing Keohane and Nye (1977: 11). As further evidence of the diverging viewes within the realist tradition, Waltz would not subscribe to the zero-sum game argument. In his view, the characteristics of great-power politics in a multi-polar world are ‘interdependence of parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses’ (Waltz, 1988: 624). These critics include Hudson (1977) and Cox (1979). It goes beyond my initial purposes to illustrate the conceptual underpinnings of this school of thought. In short, neo-liberalism centres on the notion of regimes as social institutions. As Katzenstein et al., say, ‘where the neo-liberal institutionalism research differed with realist argument was not on its assumptions about actors, but rather on the nature of the exemplary problem in the international system’ (Katzenstein et al., 1998: 663). While realism regards coercion and power as the critical factors determining relative gains and distributional conflicts, neo-liberalism is concerned primarily with market failure, which could be resolved through the voluntary acceptance of institutions (Katzenstein et al., 1998: 663). On the relational dimension of power, see also Hall (1997). This comparison has already been elaborated by Guzzini (2004). The literature on the ideational dimension of international relations is certainly vast. Some of the many studies on this matter are: Goldstein and Keohane (1993), Hall (1989) and Jervis (1976). It is also important to emphasize that my categorisation of Barnett and Duvall’s analysis (2004) as neo-liberal institutionalism may appear problematic, given that they clearly differentiate their insights of power from the one defined by neo-liberal institutionalism. Nevertheless, here I take the view that their formulation builds upon and complements my view of Barnett and Duvall. This justifies the categorisation proposed herein. The same applies to my merging of constructivist reading of power with neo-liberal institutionalism. To be sure, all four concepts are insightful as much as analytically useful. Yet for the purposes of coherence I consider the one that is more instrumental for my initial purposes, i.e. productive power. Although I do not consider the other three concepts that they elaborate, I fully uphold their belief that multiple

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Notes 219

19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

24. 25. 26.

27.

3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

concepts of power generate a more robust understandings of international politics. Indeed, as it will emerge through the discussion, I ultimately put forward an eclectic theoretical framework combining realism, constructivism and neoliberal institutionalism. Here I paraphrase Linklater (1990: 2). Notably, the attempt to expand the analytical terrain set by realism is not new in the literature. For example, Linklater (1990), as well as Barnett and Duvall (2005), have already pointed out that it is desirable to combine realist insights with wider conceptions of power. On a cautionary note, it must be noted that not all countries in the Southern hemisphere fall within the category of ‘sending’ or ‘developing’ states. Therefore, it is important to be aware that the terminology employed hereafter still suffers from conceptual weaknesses To be sure, this statement cannot be said to apply indiscriminately to the whole Marxist school. For example, Linklater (1990) reminds us that neo-Marxism still does not consider the state as a independent entity, since it defines it as part of the capitalist system. It is important to emphasise that not all scholars subscribe to this view. For example, according to Doukre and Oger (2007: 2), externalisation implies burden-sharing of the European frontiers with bordering countries. Paraphrasing Hurrell and Woods (1995). For a literature review of migration from the perspective of international relations theory during the 1980s, see Mitchell (1989). Other pioneering discussions on migration and foreign policy include Cornelius (1989); King (1983); Miller and Papademetriou (1983); Portes and Walton (1981); and Miller (1979) with reference to the Algeria-Franco negotiations on migration. To be sure, a number of other authors have applied the concept of issue-linkages to migration. See, for example, Fawcett (1989), as well as the Berne Initiative Studies (2005). The analysis by Betts, however, remains distinctive since it elaborates the concept of issue-linkage within the North–South framework.

Comparative analysis For more on this, see Arboleya (1996) and Tulchin and Hernandez (1991). The analysis of such four phases builds upon the work of Nackerud (1999). For more on this, see Arboleya (1996) and Pedraza (1996). The domestic crisis, according to the author, refers to the ‘economic downturn and social unrest’ that Castro faced in the mid-1990s. For the sake of precision, the categories developed by Hirschman are ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’. In addition, Colomer (2000) refers to ‘hostility’ as well. An exploration of the economic embargo against Cuba goes beyond the purposes of this discussion. For more on this, see Schwab (1999). The Bracero programme was terminated in 1964 as a result of public opposition, the US civil rights movement, and the effective lobbying of labour, Church and ethnic groups. The author quotes figures from the US Immigration and Naturalisation Service (1993). A word of caution concerning these figures is in order. Espenshade himself warns on the reliability of the data provided: ‘apprehensions data are

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13. 14.

15.

4

Notes a conceptually inappropriate indicator because they measure undocumented aliens who have failed in their attempt to enter the United States, whereas the issue of general policy and research interest pertains to the number who succeeded. [ ... ] Not all aliens who enter the United States clandestinely are captured by the Border Patrol’ (Espensahde, 1995: 198). However, it must be noted that different accounts of this exist. According to Hanson (2006: 870), between 1911 and 1925 680,000 legal migrants from Mexico, representing 5 per cent of Mexico’s population in 1919, entered the US. Be that as it may, Hanson also notes that ‘large-scale illegal immigration in the United States is a relatively new phenomenon’ (Hanson, 2006: 870). The programme was launched in 1961 and aimed to establish economic cooperation between North and South America, in an effort to counter the perceived communist threat posed by Cuba. For more on this, see Levinson (1972). It is not the aim of this chapter to address the linkage between the increasing border control and border apprehensions. For more on this, see Cornelius (2001). It is noteworthy, however, that, according to recent estimates, remittances from the US to Mexico have declined. Remittances for the first nine months of 2009 were down over 10 per cent compared with 2008, putting them on track to reach a total of $22 billion for 2009. The New York Times on 16 November 2009 reported on ‘reverse remittances’, that is, Mexicans in Mexico sending money to jobless relatives in the US (Migration News, 2010a). For more on this, see also Loescher and Scanlan (1986). In this section, I shall focus on bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco, and only marginal attention will be given to the role of the EU. This is not to underestimate the relevance of the latter dimension, however. For an introduction on this, see Gillespie (2005). This is not the place to elaborate on the extent to which Turkish authorities wish to join the EU. Some commentators have pointed to the increasing scepticism amongst the public and officials alike. For more on this, see Oguzlu (2004) and Teitelbaum and Martin (2003).

Italy and migration

1. It is not my intention to provide a detailed analysis of migratory trends throughout Italy, which would require a book-length examination eclipsing my own research purposes. Hence, the following analysis to follow is by no means an exhaustive one. For more accurate examinations, please see Monzini et al., (2004). 2. The same findings are confirmed by Sciortino – in the article in Monzini et al., (2004: 21). It is beyond the remit of this discussion to elaborate this point in detail. However, it suffices to point out that an extensive discussion exists on the changing pull and institutional factors that have influenced cross-Mediterranean migration. For more on this, see Zimmerman (1995). 3. Arguably one of the factors that has had an impact on migrant flows has to do with the financial crisis. This issue, however, goes beyond the purposes of the present analysis. For more on this see OECD (2009a). 4. Hereafter ‘Senato’. Likewise, in the references, I will refer to the ‘Chamber of Deputies’ as ‘Camera’.

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Notes 221 5. Other interesting parameters could be the supposed linkage between migration and terrorism, as well as the impact on employment figures. For an analysis of these issues at European level, see Buonfino (2004b, 2004c); Canoy et al., (2006); Collyer (2006). 6. Not all commentators agree with this view. Colombo and Sciortino (2004), for example, dispute that a thorough analysis of the data suggests that immigration into Italy did not begin in 1974. 7. For an account of the Italian jurisprudence and the differences between ‘laws’ and ‘decrees’ see Fameli and Socci (2007). 8. Other considerations than migration determine Italy’s relations with third countries. For the purpose of consistency, I do not elaborate on this aspect. For more on this, see Colombo and Ronzitti (2008) and Holmes (1993). Neither do I elaborate in detail Italy’s foreign policy agenda and its overall relations with the EU. On this concern, see Balfour (2005) and Carbone (2008a). As a last precaution, in this chapter I do not intend to suggest that the quota system and the readmission agreement derive solely from foreign policy considerations; economic and demographic factors also influence Italy’s stance on migration. For a comparative analysis on such issues at European level, see Stalker (2003). 9. An in-depth examination of the bargaining dynamics of the readmission agreements and the costs and benefits for migrant-sending and receiving countries may be found in Cassarino (2008). 10. However, Cuttitta also clarifies that ‘this was however in line with the decision of reducing reserved shares for single countries and increasing reserved shares for categories of countries, which made the instrument of reserved shares more flexible’ (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8). 11. Interestingly the EU faced similar difficulties in convincing countries across North Africa to sign readmission agreements. See for example PANA (13 March 2009).

5

Libya and migration

1. I am grateful to the conversations with Professor Lisa Anderson (on 13 May.2008) as well as Professor George Joffé for these insights. Comprehensive historical accounts can be found in St John (2008a) and Vandewalle (2006). 2. In this context, Northern Africa includes Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The emphasis on the Libyan policies towards Arab versus African countries necessitates two clarifications. First, it must be emphasised that the analytical distinction between the policies aimed at migrants from Arab countries versus those targeted at sub-Saharan Africans is not without its problems. Undoubtedly, this blunt distinction runs the danger of overlooking the subtleties and entangled nature of Libyan migration rhetoric and actions. Nonetheless, it provides a fruitful basis for exploring the extent to which migration through Libya has changed over time and has been used as a strategic device in the two different political contexts. For this reason, while maintaining this categorisation, in the course of this chapter I will not only unravel the discrepancies and contradictions within the two set of policies but also explore how they overlap and interrelate. Second, Libya has historically also attracted migrants from Europe, the US and Asia; and large communities from, inter alia, Italy, the UK, the US and the Philippines have settled in Libya. Significantly, according to some scholars Libyan policies towards these foreign communities confirm the initial hypothesis of this chapter on

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Notes migration being manipulated by the regime for political motives (Davies, 1987: 106). However, without denying the relevance of such migrant movements from economic and political perspectives, for the purpose of coherence and because of space limitations, this chapter concentrates on migrants from Africa. The employment of foreigners for foreign-policy purposes is not limited to migrants from Africa and people seeking asylum in Libya. For example, following the killing of a British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, allegedly by a Libyan national, in 1983, four British citizens were detained in Libya. Terry Waite, the envoy of the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, succeeded in establishing a contact with the Libyan Colonel, and eventually secured the release of the hostages. For more on this see Barnes (1987). More recently, two Swiss nationals were detained in Libya after Hannibal Qaddafi, son of the Libyan leader was administratively arrested on suspicion of assaulting hotel staff (Agence France Presse, 1 August 2008). The more recent events of Libya denying to release visas from Schengen countries as a response to the diplomatic dispute with Switzerland is another case in point (Libyaonline, 20 February 2010). This is confirmed also by Beauge and Burgat (1986), Birks and Sinclair (1978) and De Haas (2006), who report that in 1975 the majority of expatriate workers in Libya were from Arab countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan and Morocco). The only non-Arab countries were Pakistan (accounting for 1.7 per cent of the total) and Yugoslavia (2.9 per cent). At this point of the analysis, a cautionary note is required concerning the reliability of the data on migrants either residing in or going through Libya. The very exercise of calculating the number of foreigners in Libya is fraught with difficulties. The lack of consistent figures provided by the Libyan government is aggravated by the fact that there is little consensus among different nongovernmental sources on the size of migrant flows through Libya (Pliez, 2000). Mindful of these shortcomings, I provide here a rough, yet by no means complete, idea of the changing size of the foreign population in Libya since the late 1950s (Pliez, 2000). This exercise aims to set the basis for the core of this chapter, which analyses Libya’s interaction with its neighbours. Throughout the book I will use interchangeably the expressions ‘repatriation’, ‘return flights’, ‘expulsions’ and ‘readmission’ to refer to the practice of returning migrants from Italy to Libya, as well as from Libya to third countries. An account of the legal implications of this practice goes beyond my present purposes. For more on this, see Cassarino (2007) and Schieffer (2003). In a formal meeting of the Tunisian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Social Affairs in March 1970, it was declared that ‘the emigration of labour-force abroad is a necessity. Indeed the evaluation of our demographic structures compared with our economic development capacity tells us that 270,000 people will be unemployed in 1980. Hence the placement of Tunisians abroad appears to the only possibility of providing them with an employment’ (Grimaud, 1994: 32). However, according to Burgat and Laronde (1996: 105) the number of Tunisian expelled was 100,000. Interestingly, the authors also specify that the precedent had been set by Algeria towards Morocco in 1977. Libya’s interaction with Arab and African countries is not limited, however, to migration. For an account of the wider economic and political relations, see Deeb (2000), Otayek (1986) and Solomon and Swart (2006). As an illustration of the fact that there are no clear boundaries between the Libyan approach to sub-Saharan Africa and Arab countries, it is noteworthy that Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco joined CEN-SAD in 2001–2 (Sturman, 2003).

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Notes 223 11. Different sources provide different data. For example, Young et al., (2007: 834) report between 50 and 500 dead in the period between August and September 2000. 12. Anonymous interviews with Libyan officials in February 2008. 13. Anonymous interview on 29 September 2009. 14. Anonymous interview on 29 September 2009. 15. Anonymous interviews on 29 September 2009 and 12 January 2010. 16. Anonymous interview on 6 February 2007. 17. Anonymous interviews on 12 January 2010. 18. Anonymous interview on 13 May 2007. 19. Anonymous interview on 24 May 2007. 20. I selected the examples of Palestinian and Bosnian refugees; but they are by no means the only cases of political manipulation of refugees by the Libyan government. For example, Pliez (2002) reports a third instance. In 1983 Qaddafi welcomed Touareg refugees who were fleeing repression in Niger. Putatively, his intention was to destabilise the ‘government’ in Niger. As a matter of fact, in the course of a few years ‘une diaspora en communautés’ moved to the border between Libya and Algeria. In particular, a large number of Touareg settled in the Libyan towns of Sebha, Koufra and Tamanrasset (Pliez, 2002: 35). On this, see also Bourgeot (1995). 21. On the issue of forced mass repatriations of Palestinians see Van Hear (1992). 22. Anonymous interviews on 24 May 2007 and 13 May 2007. 23. The Barcelona Process, launched by Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in November 1995, brings together the 27 Members of the European Union and 12 Southern Mediterranean states to discuss economic, political, cultural and social issues. For more on this see EC (2009a). 24. Five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor were imprisoned in 1999 for supposedly deliberately infecting children with HIV in Benghazi, Libya. The death sentence proclaimed by the Libya’s highest court became a major issue in EU–Libyan relations. For more on this see Amnesty International (2007) and Butler (2007). 25. Anonymous interview on 25 July 2006. 26. For a brief illustration of the AENEAS technical assistance fund, see Higazi (2005). 27. Anonymous interview on 3 March 2008. However, the EU acknowledges the difficulties in furthering the cooperation because of the weak institutional capacity of the Libyan beneficiaries, the lack of clear sector strategies and the possibility of insufficient cooperation from the Libyan authorities (EC, 2010: 20). 28. Qaddafi did not attend the first meeting of the Mediterranean Union on 12 July 2007. He justified his opposition on these grounds: ‘This is taking us for fools [ ... ] We do not belong to Brussels. Our Arab League is located in Cairo and the African Union is located in Addis Ababa. If they want cooperation they have to go through Cairo and Addis Ababa (Reuters, 10 June 2008). 29. Anonymous interview on 7 May 2007. 30. Anonymous interview on 7 May 2007. 31. Anonymous interview on 7 May 2007. 32. This figure, however, is disputed by other sources. According to the EU unemployment in 2008 stood at 20.7 per cent (EC, 2010: 32). 33. As of March 2010, it remains to be seen whether the regime will commit to such promises.

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224 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45.

46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

Notes Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007. Anonymous interview on 24 May 2007. Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007. As evidence of the fact that Libya is increasingly serious about drug abuse in November 2009 Libya signed a ‘host country agreement’ with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). According to UNODC, the agreement paves the way for the opening of a UNODC sub-regional office for the Maghreb countries to be located in Tripoli (UNODC, 2009). Anonymous interview on 23 May 2007. During the informal talks with police officers and representatives at the Libyan Ministry of the Interior in January and May 2007. Document provided by the Libyan Ministry of the Interior, January 2007. Anonymous interview on 4 May 2007 in Tripoli, Libya. The survey was conducted within the University of Garyounis in Benghazi. Beyond the information that Obeidi provides, it is almost impossible to rigorously assess Libyan public opinion because of the highly controlled and centralised political system and the total absence of a free press. Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007. Anonymous interview on 4 June 2007. On this matter it is noteworthy that throughout my research I could not actually find sound evidence of this linkage. For more on this topic see Pargeter (2005). On this matter, it is illuminating to comment on the manner in which the regime has sought to fight domestic extremist groups. The most prominent of these was the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), established in 1995 and allegedly associated with Al Qaeda (Gambill, 2005; Ronen, 2002b). In addition, the LIFG was reported as having connections with extremist groups across Northern Africa and the Middle East (Gambill, 2005). In the 1990s, Qaddafi had hundreds of key members of the LIFG and other extremist groups arrested (Ronen, 2002b). They were eventually sentenced in a mass trial in 2002, with two receiving death sentences and others received life imprisonment (Pargeter, 2005). Recent reports, however, document the persistence of extremists groups associated with Al Qaeda and based in Libya (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2010: 36). Document provided by the Libyan Ministry of the Interior, January 2007. However, the analysis by John Davies indicates that Qaddafi has never actually sought to create a sense of Libyan nationhood as opposed to Arabness. In his words, the Libyan leader ‘scarcely attached any notion of statehood to it [Arab nationalism]. Qaddafi’s willingness to dissolve the Libyan state and his readiness to amalgamate with Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Chad is a symptom of his uncertainty about the boundaries of the nation and his indifference to the sovereignty of the state – Libyan or other’ (Davies, 1987: 31). Anonymous interview on 4 May 2007. Anonymous interview on 28 May 2007. Anonymous interview on 2 June 2007. Anonymous interview on 16 May 2007.

6 Historical background on the agreements between Italy and Libya 1. Quarta Sponda – ‘Fourth Shore’ – is the expression coined by Mussolini to refer to Libyan territory, which added to the roughly three shores that Italy has along the Adriatic, Tyrrenian and Ionian seas.

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Notes 225 2. In October 1911, around 600 Italians were killed in what was considered to be an ambush by the Libyan resistance. The Giolitti government responded with, inter alia, massive deportation to the Italian islands of Ponza and Ustica and the execution of thousands of Libyans (Del Boca, 2005). 3. In this book I will not analyse in depth the Libyan economy or its dependence on oil revenues. For more on this, see Sandbakken (2006) and Vandewalle (1998, 2006). 4. Throughout the book I refer to them interchangeably as Italian ‘exiles’ or ‘repatriated’. 5. The issue of the indemnity claimed by the repatriated Italians will not be investigated in detail in this book. For more on this, see Segrè (1974), Sinagra (no date) and Studio Legale Romano (2006). 6. The complexity of Libya’s ideology and social and political structures go beyond my research purposes. For more on this, see Davies (1987) and Obeidi (2001). 7. For example, Libya provided weapons to the IRA. For more on this, see BBC (14 August 2001) and Simons (1993). 8. The Lockerbie bombing refers to the explosion of Pan Am flight 103 on 21 December 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 259 passengers and crew, including 189 Americans, as well as 11 people on the ground. The United States and Britain held Libya responsible for the bombing. For a detailed account of this, see Matar and Thabit (2004). The Lockerbie bombing was followed, on 19 September 1989, by the bombing of the French airline UTA’s fight 772 over Niger, killing 171 passengers and crew. For a brief account of this, see McNamara (2007). The La Belle incident refers to the bombing the bombing of the La Belle discothèque in Berlin on 5 April 1986, which killed three people (including two US soldiers) and injured more than 200 other people (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005). As regards WMD, Libya was also reported to have built three chemical weapons facilities in Rabta, Sebha and Tarhuna in the 1980s and 1990s. However, in December 2003 Libya issued a statement announcing that it had agreed to dismantle its WMD programmes (Bahgat, 2008). 9. The US designated Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. In 1982, an embargo on oil exports was placed on the country, and in 1986, after the bombing in Berlin, Libyan government assets in US banks were frozen. In September 2004, President George W. Bush formally ended the US trade embargo on Libya to reward it for giving up WMD, and two years later, in June 2006, he rescinded Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism (St John, 2008c). The UN sanctions were imposed in 1988 against Libya for its refusal to hand over two Lockerbie suspects. Subsequently, sanctions 748, 883 and 731 between 1992 and 1993 established a total air blockade and an arms embargo. Following the extradition of the Lockerbie suspects, UN sanctions were suspended in April 1999 and finally lifted in September 2003 after Libya accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing (Hurd, 2005). In 1986 the European Community agreed to place an arms embargo on Libya (European Political Cooperation Presidency, 1986). The measures were partially abolished in 1999 and finally lifted in August 2004 (Fusacchia, 2005). 10. Anonymous interview on 13 June 2007. 11. It is important to emphasise, however, that not all commentators agree with this view. For example, according to Pioppi, ‘Italy did not cover a role as a protagonist in the diplomatic mediation that anticipates and follows the surrender of the Lockerbie suspects and that marks the onset of Libya integration in the international community. [ ... ] Italy had a role of simple walk-on part’ (Pioppi, 2002: 52).

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Notes

12. For an in-depth analysis on the cultural collaboration see Rossi (2000). 13. Anonymous interview on 13 June 2007. 14. However, according to Pioppi (2002) the signing of the agreement did not constitute a formal breach of the international sanctions. 15. Expression used to refer to the construction of the coastal highway. 16. Anonymous interview on 25 January 2007. However ICE reports that the agreement signed in August 2008 between Italy and Libya abolishes ALI (ICE, 2008). 17. Anonymous interview on 8 February 2007. 18. Anonymous interview on 18 December 2006. 19. From Balbo, Italian Governor-General of Libya between 1933–34. 20. Anonymous interview on 14 December 2006. 21. Anonymous interview on 14 December 2006. 22. Anonymous interview on 13 June 2006. 23. Such a forum includes the following countries: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, along with their counterparts from Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and Malta (5+5 Dialogue, no date). 24. The interview with an undersecretary for Foreign Affairs documents that one hospital was inaugurated in 2001 in Benghazi (interview conducted on 14 December 2006 in Rome). It was commissioned by INSO, an Italian company, and amounted to €300 million (Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 April 2005). 25. Italietta literally means: the little Italy. The word has a deprecatory connotation. 26. In the same period, Qaddafi agreed to compensate the victims of the 1986 bombing in Berlin (Associated Press, 10 August 2004). 27. The following year, however, the Day of Revenge was reintroduced (Adnkronos, 11 October, 2005). As already illustrated in October 2008 the Day of Revenge was replaced by the Day of Fulfilment. 28. Anonymous interview on 18 December 2006. 29. Anonymous interview on 3 March 2008. 30. Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007. As a matter of fact, the accord signed in August 2008 explicitly referred to the formal apology of Italy for the colonial past. 31. Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007. 32. However, the BBC reported that it was the Italian Prime Minister’s decision not to invite the Libyan leader (BBC, 10 December 2007a). 33. Anonymous interview on 2 March 2008. 34. Anonymous interview on 3 March 2008. It is noteworthy that in the following month, March 2008, Qaddafi gave a speech in which he famously declared that all oil revenues would be distributed to the Libyan people and that the public sector would be drastically reduced. For more on this see Al Qaddafi (2008a) and ICE (2008). 35. Interview with high-ranking Libyan official at the Foreign Ministry 3 March 2008, Tripoli.

7

Joint Measures on migration

1. I will use the terms ‘reception camps’ and ‘centres’ with the same meaning. For a critical analysis on the issues see Dentico and Gressi (2006). 2. According to the information made available by the Italian government, the discussion with Schily focused not on the camps to be built in Libya, but rather on those in a third country or an EU member state.

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Notes 227 3. Among others, on the radio station Deutschlandfunk on 27 August 2004 (Dietrich and Vogelskamp, 2005). 4. Buttiglione’s ideas were subjected to substantial criticism (Melting Pot, 2005b). A similar proposal known as ‘transit processing centres’ was put forward by Tony Blair (Blair, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 94; Noll, 2003). 5. The idea of building centres to process asylum requests has been proposed by the EU and, as of March 2010 it was still being negotiated as part of the framework agreement (Human Rights Watch, 2009c). 6. Anonymous interview on 23 January 2007. 7. Anonymous interview on 26 May 2007. 8. Anonymous interview on 28 May 2007. 9. Anonymous interview on 26 May 2007. 10. Anonymous interview on 29 September 2009. 11. For a detailed account of the camps built and managed by Libyan authorities to detain irregular migrants see Fortress Europe (2008a). 12. These include, for example, the European Court of Human Rights, the EP and UNHCR. See Amnesty International (2005b), Dietrich (2005) and Human Rights Watch (2006a: 115–16). 13. Anonymous interview on 10 February 2008. 14. Anonymous interview on 26 May 2007. 15. As previously clarified in this book, I regard the terms ‘repatriation’, ‘expulsion’ and ‘return’ as having the same meaning. 16. For example, on the EU readmission agreements, see Statewatch (2003). For an introduction to readmission agreements, see Collinson (1996). 17. There is significant inconsistency in the available data concerning repatriation. For example, the website of the Forza Italia (no date) states that between 1998 and 2001 43,754 migrants were ‘expelled’ and that between 2001 and 2004 this number grew to 65,483. The latter estimates do not correspond to those provided by the Minister of the Interior, who in September 2004 stated that 42,317 migrants had been either expelled or repatriated that year. 18. In January 2010 the Interior Minister declared that between 2008 and 2009 42,000 had been repatriated, which means, on average, less that the rates of the previous year. In fact the Minister himself recognised that ‘many difficulties’ hampered the implementation of such operations (Ministero dell’Interno, 2010b). 19. For a summary of the different appeals, see Human Rights Watch (2006a). 20. According to the text of the interrogation before the Tribunal, Pansa stated that, even though Tobruk Airport would have been better because of its proximity to the Egyptian border, the flights landed at Albeida Airport, not only because it is bigger but also because Tobruk is not part of the Convention on International Maritime Organisation. 21. Anonymous interview on 12 July 2006. 22. Anonymous interview on 8 February 2007. 23. According to the newswire Ansa, between June and July 2005 741 foreign nationals were flown out, ‘mainly’ to Libya (Ansa, 21 July 2005). 24. The total would be 1,863, which differs from the number provided by Libyan authorities to Human Rights Watch and illustrates, once again, the dubious reliability of the data available. 25. The same information emerges from another report by the EP following a visit to Libya in April 2005 (Flautre, 2005). 26. It is important to stress, however, that, according to other sources, some of the migrants who were repatriated from Italy were not taken back by air to their

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228

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

Notes countries of origin, but had instead to return by bus through the desert (Cuttitta, 2006: 189). Anonymous interview on 23 January 2007. Anonymous interview on 8 February 2007. Anonymous interview on 18 September 2006. The word ‘respingimento’ literally means ‘repulsing’. Anonymous interview on 8 February 2007. In January 2010 the case brought to the European Court of Human Rights was archived. The decision was taken on the ground that it was impossible for the Court to gather the necessary information on the particular circumstances of the claimants (European Court of Human Rights, 2010: 10). As already illustrated, Italy has signed and made publicly available readmission agreements with other countries. The same is true of other European and nonEuropean countries. For example, in October 2005 Libya and the UK signed a memorandum of understanding to facilitate deportation to Libya ‘of persons suspected of activities associated with terrorism’; the text thereof is available in the libraries of the House of Commons and House of Lords (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2005). There is no evidence on the repatriations from Libya funded by Italy prior to 2003. The report does not specify when these repatriations took place, but it can be assumed that it was during 2003. Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007. Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007. Anonymous interview on 3 March 2008. Anonymous interview on 10 February 2008 and 29 September 2009 in Tripoli, Libya. Anonymous interview on 10 February 2008. For example between 10 and 20 October the Eastern Sea Borders Centre led joint patrols including forces from Cyprus, French, Germany, Malta, Spain, the United Kingdom, Libya and EUROPOL. More precisely, nine Libyan officials were on board ships of the Italian Navy to participate in the training and actual patrolling (AGI, 21 October). It is noteworthy that, according to a statement of the then president of the Schengen Commission, Di Luca, in May 2004, it appears that the Italian–Libyan joint patrolling had already taken place and was deemed successful. The Frontex report (2006) confirms that in 2006 efforts were made for ‘concluding working arrangements’, but does not specify their outcomes. The Terms of References of the Frontex mission state that one of the main objectives of the visit was ‘possible EU assistance to Libya related to management of its southern borders’ (Frontex, 2007: 21).This information was confirmed by the members of the Libyan police that I interviewed. For example, it emerged from informal talks I had with Osama El Sedik, Project Manager at the International Organization for Peace, Care and Relief as well as other police staff. On the general intention of the EU to patrol Libyan Southern borders see Agence France Presse (6 June 2007). Anonymous interview on 7 May 2007. Anonymous interview on 4 June 2007. Anonymous interview on 2 March 2008. Anonymous interview on 3 March 2008. Anonymous interviews on 2 March 2008 and 3 March 2008.

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Notes 229 49. Anonymous interview on 28 May 2007. 50. Anonymous interview on 8 June 2007. 51. As a matter of fact the collaboration between Finmeccanica, and in particular its AugustaWestland is not new. Italo-Libyan defence cooperation stretches back to at least 2006 when Finmeccanica, AgustaWestland and the Libyan Company for Aviation Industry signed an agreement to form a joint venture called Libyan Italian Advanced Technology Company (LIATEC) (Defence Wed, 2010). 52. Anonymous interview on 3 February 2007. 53. Anonymous interview on 23 January 2007. 54. The daily collaboration between the Italian and Libyan police has been confirmed by both parties during informal talks that I had with both Italian and Libyan officials in Libya in June 2007. 55. Anonymous interview on 20 May 2007. 56. For an account of the expression employed by IOM, i.e. ‘stranded migrant’, and the people falling under the IOM mandate, see Perruchoud (1992). 57. In 2007, for example, out of the €2 million allocated by the EU, Italy provided €700,000 (Il Corriere della Sera, 30 December 2007). 58. What follows is a summary of the two interviews with Laurence Hart, 16 January 2007 and 4 May 2007, Tripoli. 59. Anonymous interview on 16 January 2007. 60. Anonymous interview on 16 January 2007. The practice of IOM to support voluntary return has been the focus of much controversy (Gosh, 2000b). For a general introduction to EU policies on return, see Cassarino (2006b) and IOM (2004). 61. Anonymous interview on 12 September 2009. 62. Anonymous interview on 16 January 2007. 63. Anonymous interview on 4 May 2007. 64. Anonymous interview on 6 May 2007. 65. Anonymous interview on 1 October 2009. 66. However, according to Cuttitta, under a legislative amendment of 2002 naval ships were also allowed to board vessels suspected of transporting undocumented migrants outside Italian territorial waters (Cuttitta, 2007a: 6). 67. Anonymous interview on 15 January 2007 in Tripoli, Libya.

8

Analysis of externalisation in the Italian–Libyan context

1. An article pointing out the difficulty of obtaining tourist visas is Solomon (2006). A further illuminating example of the random character of visa procedures is the case of 3,000 tourists on a cruise boat who were denied permission to visit Tripoli because of a newly implemented law requiring Arabic translation of passports (Il Corriere della Sera, 14 November 2007). 2. The same information was confirmed in interviews with two Italian parliamentarians (on 12 July 2006, and 8 February 2007 in Rome, Italy) who were in Lampedusa while the return flights were being carried out. 3. This is not to deny, however, that Italy and Europe have in fact influenced Libya’s stance on migration. As such, the recent surge on repatriations conducted may partly owe to Libya’s willingness to yield to the requests of Italy and demonstrates that it is serious about migration (Collucello and Massey, 2008; Paoletti, 2008).

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Notes

4. Neither the elite interviews conducted in Italy and Libya nor the official documents and secondary resources indicate that the initial idea of these centres was to process asylum requests. 5. I was given detailed lists of the Italian-funded return flights from Libya to third countries as well as other internal documents commenting on the Italian–Libyan dialogue. Furthermore, without my even asking, the Libyan police gave me the opportunity of visiting a migrant detention camp in Tripoli, whose director was particularly eager to talk about the problems concerning the management of these centres. 6. This comparison is not problem-free. Arguably, you cannot really compare the undocumented arrivals to Sicily to the annual quotas because the latter, unlike the first, respond to particular economic considerations based on the job market. Hence, even if the first is much lower than the second, it may still be a problem beyond control, as many politicians and media contend. Nonetheless, it could be argued that both undocumented arrivals in Italy, and those arrivals who enter annually through the quota system, are low-skilled and hence do not differ significantly. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 4 the regularisation programmes that the Italian government has sponsored may suggest that the overall undocumented population in Italy may not be so unwanted, and, more significantly, may not represent such a significant threat to Italian society and its economy as it is often purported to do. 7. At this point, the analysis demands a note of caution concerning the provenance of the migrants. Among others, Cinzia Gubbini, a journalist for the Italian newspaper Il Manifesto, questions whether most migrants come from Libya as the official Italian sources claim. She suggests that this might not always be the case. During an interview, Gubbini pointed out that, in October 2004, two weeks before the arrivals of over 1,000 migrants to Lampedusa, supposedly from Libya, a boat of migrants was recorded close to the Tunisian cost. Nonetheless, interviews with Italian officials from the Ministry of the Interior whom I interviewed contended that supposedly clear parameters existed to establish the provenance of the boat carrying migrants. On the basis of the evidence of smuggling networks based in Libya (Colluccello and Massey, 2007), its geographical proximity to Italy, the official agreements that Italy signed with other Northern African countries deterring migrants from leaving, as well as the large migrant population living in Libya, I take the view that the argument of Gubbini remains unconfirmed. This, however, is not to deny tout court the fact that a small proportion of undocumented migrants arrives by boats to Italy from countries other than Libya. For example, on March 2007 it was reported that a growing number of boats from Algeria reaches the Italian region of Sardinia (Magharebia, 9 March 2007). 8. Hence not just to Sicily but other southern Italian shores, such as Puglia, Calabria and Sardinia. The high number in the late 1990s is due to migration from Albania. On this, see, for example, Bonifazi and Sabatino (2003). 9. As a further note on the questionable reliability of the data, the report on security produced by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri for the year 2009 reports that the arrivals to Lampedusa in 2007 amount to 30,657 (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2010: 89). This does not correspond to the figures for the same year provided by the same organisation elsewhere (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2009) and used herein. 10. On the issue of economic integration of foreign nationals, see, for example, the yearly report produced by Caritas (2005) and (2006b). Further, it might be argued that the migrants crossing the sea should be differentiated from those

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Notes 231

11.

12. 13.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

9

entering Italy as part of the national quota. Arguably, the former, unlike the latter, do not necessarily respond to the specific labour force demand. Yet this cannot be correct, given that the migrants benefiting from the quota system and the regularisation are de facto often those already residing in Italy with irregular status (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006c). It is important to stress that this stance stems partly from the significant loss of life that migration from Libya involves. For an account of this aspect, see Fortress Europe (2008a). Anonymous interview on 16 January 2007. The same point is supported by Caritas (2005: 129) and Coslovi and Piperno (2005: 23). Furthermore, the figures mentioned in the latest Frontex report (2007) differ from those provided by the Libyan authorities. According to the first, ‘during 2006, the Libyan authorities had apprehended 32,164 illegal migrants and had repatriated 53,842 during the same period’ (Frontex, 2007: 10). As a further confirmation of the errors included in the data available, such figures are much higher than the supposedly comprehensive figures for deportations and arrests by Libyan authorities. In principle, the latter should be higher than the former. Yet the opposite is the case. This is not to deny the humanitarian challenge that the arrival of undocumented migrants to Italian southern shores poses to the Italian reception system. For a critical analysis of this, see Andrijasevic (2006a). Anonymous interview on the phone 23 March 2007. Anonymous interview on 28 August 2007. Anonymous interview on 25 July 2006. Anonymous interview on 18 December 2006. Anonymous interview on 4 June 2007. Anonymous interview on 26 September 2007. According to the representative of the Italian Ministry of the Interior in Libya, 19 Libyans arrived at Lampedusa in 2005 and 50 in 2006. Anonymous interview on 23 January 2007. Anonymous interview on 16 January 2007. Anonymous interview on 16 January 2007. It goes beyond my initial purposes to assess why Italy has taken this policy line and corroborated a discourse that has proved to be counterproductive at best. One possible explanation has to do with electoral politics. For more on this, see Bigo (2002).

Implications for international relations theory

1. For a more in-depth discussion of interest, see Burchill (2005) and Finnemore (1996). 2. This distinction is inspired by the work of Hein de Haas (2007: 58–61) and Hamilton (1997), who discuss the ‘secret’ interests of states with regard to migration. On the study of state interests with regard to migration, see also Baradello (2007: 41). 3. With regard to Italy, and in particular to the fact that there is limited communication between different ministries, see Pargeter (2001: 7–6). I do not explore this point further, since I could not find more substantive evidence for such a discrepancy with regard to migration policies specifically. 4. The lack of collaboration between ministries has already been noted in Chapter 1.

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Notes

5. This emerged in the course with numerous discussions with Libyan police officials in May 2007 and February 2008. 6. For a summary of all the recent contracts signed by different countries in Libya see Cometto (2008). 7. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess the extent to which Qaddafi has succeeded in building a sense of national identity. For more on this, see Obeidi (2001). 8. The corollary to this argument is that if Italy made no secret of this inclusiveness and moderated its security ‘paranoia’, it would be able to deny Libya the extra lever that derives from this very restrictive policy line. This consideration, however, belongs to the realm of speculative prescription, which takes us outside my purposes. 9. Anonymous interview on 14 December 2006. 10. It is not my intention to review in detail the literature on cost-benefit analysis. Some of the works within the IR literature in this connection include Jervis (1992), Levy (1992) and Nye (1967). In this chapter, I focus on selected aspects relevant to our initial purposes, and it should be noted that I will use the expressions cost/benefit and gain/loss interchangeably. 11. In this context, I elaborate concepts that have been discussed with reference to regimes. Arguably, the interdependence dynamics within regimes are distinct to those in a bilateral dialogue. However, as I suggested in Part I of the book, the conceptual framework proposed by regime theorists may also prove instructive for the study of bilateral negotiations. 12. The criticism with regard to human rights that Qaddafi’s trip to Europe provoked is instructive. For example, the French Foreign Minister refused to meet the Libyan leader (Reuters, 14 December 2007). Likewise, while the meeting between Rice and Qaddafi on 5 September 2008 was regarded by many as an historic turning-point (BBC, 6 September 2008), it was also criticised as legitimising a regime still deemed undemocratic (Human Rights Watch, 2008c). For example, Joe Biden, US vice-presidential nominee, expressed reservations on account of the persistent lack of freedom and political prisoners (The Independent, 5 September 2008). 13. One of the losses that could be ascribed to Libya is the domestic problems caused by increasing irregular migration. However, as shown in Chapter 4, this is not necessarily related to the bilateral negotiations with Italy. 14. Among others, one controversy concerned the manner in which Libyan authorities repatriated the undocumented migrants flown from Italy to third countries. See, for example, Gatti (2006a, 2006b). 15. For example, the peculiar decision-making structure, whereby significant decisions have to be approved by the Leader, was mentioned during an anonymous interview on 2 March 2008. 16. This sentence paraphrases Betts (2004: 45). 17. This is a concept developed by Keohane and Nye (1977: 13–15). 18. The non-unified nature of the state, epitomised in the multiple nature of its motives, highlights another potential weakness of the realist tradition, which assumes the state to be a unified actor and overlooks its internal dynamics. In this book, however, I refrain from addressing this point, since it would demand an in-depth analysis of the realist definition of state and an empirical overview of the multiple actors influencing Italian and Libyan rethoric and policy actions.

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Notes 233 19. The linkage between power and knowledge has already been explored by realist authors. For example, Nicolò Machiavelli, and E. H. Carr rather more recently, recognised the role of ideology and ideas as power resources. Thus we are reminded once more about the limits of the definition of realism, which I presented in Chapter 1. Yet my underlying point still stands: the constructivist work of Barnett and Duvall raises questions and provides analytical tools that are useful for my research and have been neglected by mainstream realist scholars (Hall, 1997). 20. Of course, to this figure we ought to add those losing their lives when crossing the Mediterranean. According to Fortress Europe, since 1988 12,955 migrants have died. This figure includes migrants leaving different Northern African countries and not just Libya (Fortress Europe, 2008c). 21. This reflection raises a set of more substantial questions. In defining migration as a threat, what are policy-makers seeking to defend? What makes policy-makers take such a securitised stance towards migration? What conception of state and of state interest underlines such an alarmist and counterproductive view? Are we talking about a perceived or a real threat? Not only would it be interesting to analyse what is real as opposed to constructed, but also there is the question of what the state is seeking to preserve and how this fits within the realist credo. This question opens up a series of issues concerning the complex process of identifying and defining state interests, and the extent to which states motives are rational and coherent within an overarching conception of state interest. Yet while addressing such questions is crucially important, it transcends the purposes of this book. In other words, for the purposes of coherence I shall refrain from addressing such questions, and instead invite future researchers to do so in the specific context of Italian–Libyan relations. 22. These reflections belong to the realm of pure speculation. As such, their purpose here is to furnish a circumspect and impressionist account of the implications that issue-linkages yield within the larger framework of power relations. 23. Morgenthau himself also argues that politics is influenced by irrational/emotional elements which may deviate from rationality (Morgenthau, 1946). 24. This is not the place to discuss the contested meaning of developing countries and the different terminologies that have been employed. For more on this, see, for example, Edwards (1989) Escobar (1995) and Fawcett and Sayigh (1999: 5–6 and 15–33). This issue has also been discussed in Chapter 1. 25. While keeping in mind these critical caveats, I will continue to use the expression in the final chapter.

10 Conclusion 1. I am grateful to Professor Lisa Anderson for sharing this idea with me.

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Texts of the Italian-Libyan agreements consulted Bilateral Agreement, 29 December 2007 (text provided by anonymous informant). Joint Communication, 4 July 1998, Available online at: http://www.airl.it/accorditrattati2.php [Accessed 27 October 2008]. Memorandum of Intent, 13 December 2000 (text provided by anonymous informant). Treaty of Friendship, 31 August 2008, Available online at: http://www.repubblica. it/2008/05/sezioni/esteri/libia-italia/testo-accordo/testo-accordo.html [Accessed 25 October 2008]. Verbal Process, 4 July 1998, Available online at: http://www.airl.it/accorditrattati1. php [Accessed 27 October 2008].

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Index Accession negotiations to the European Union, 50–3 African Union, 87, 97, 137, 187, 190, 223 Al Mukhtar, Omar, 110, 136 Al Obeidi, Abdulati, 10, 11, 131, 133, 153 Al Qaeda, 66, 100, 224 Albania, 67, 125, 143, 176, 230 Algeria, 36, 48, 81, 82, 84, 114, 143, 162, 191, 219 Amato, Giuliano, 68, 72, 73, 132, 147, 153, 160 Amensty of migrants, see under Regularisations Amnesty International, 148 Andreotti, Giulio, 113–15, 201 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 82, 85 Association of the Italians Repatriated from Libya (AIRL), 113, 129 Asylum, 79, 90–4 see also under Refugees Azienda Libico Italiana (ALI), 117 Aznar, José María, 46–7 Balseros Crisis, 37–9 Barcelona Declaration, see under Barcelona Process Barcelona Process, 95–7, 119, 126, 182, 190, 223 Benghazi, 89, 99, 115, 130–1, 134, 223, 224, 226 Berlusconi, Silvio, 65, 71–4, 121–31, 134–6, 195 Bevin-Sforza, agreement, 111 Big gesture, 117, 122, 132, 182, 191 Blair, Tony, 227 Border, concept of, 2–7, 29–34, 169–74 Bossi-Fini Law, 67–72 Bracero programme, 41, 219 Braudel, Fernand, 80 Brussels, 126, 191 Bulgarian nurses, 95–6, 132, 223 Burden-sharing, 5, 30, 53, 172, 216, 219 Burden-shifting, see under Burden-sharing

Bush, George On Mexico, 42–3 On the embargo on Libya, 225 On the war on terror, 100, 123 Calderón, Felipe, 43 Cameroon, 12 Camps During colonial time, 89, 109–110 For migrants in Italy, 72, 134 For migrants in Libya, 87, 93, 139–43, 147, 193, 195 Managed by IOM in Libya, 162 Canada, 51 Canary Islands, 47 Caritas, 61–4 Castro, Fidel, 37, 39–40, 205 Castro, Raul, 38 CEN-SAD, 85–6, 222 Centres for migrants, see under Camps Ceuta, 46–8 China, 200 Citizenship In the Italian context, 65, 70, 73 In the Libyan context, 82, 137 In US-Mexican relations, 43 Clinton, Bill, 36, 38, 205 Clinton, Hillary, 43 Cold War, 33, 45, 51, 116, 195, 207, 209 Colonial Period, 108–16 Recompensation, 113, 121, 124–5, 135, 172, 193–4, 195, 199 Communism, 36–9, 45, 220 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESSA), see under CEN-SAD Complex interdependence, 19–21, 33, 181, 185, 198–206 Convention against torture, 91 Convention on refugee problems in Africa, 90 Cooperation, in International Relations, 4, 20–1, 32–4, 78, 204–8 Cost-benefit analysis, 21, 192–5

295

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296 Index Council of Europe, 49, 148 Council of the European Union, 94–5, 128, 197, 215 Criminality In the Italian context, 62–7, 73, 76 In the Libyan context, 98–9 In Turkey, 51–2 Cuba, 36–40 Cyrenaica, 109, 111 D’Alema, Massimo, 68, 119, 120, 131–3, 191 Decreto-flussi, 70–2, 77 Democracy Industrial democracies, 39 Lack of, 232 Liberal democracy, 178, 215 Of the masses, 113 Demography, 77, 109, 221 Dependencia, see under Dependency theory Dependency theory, 31 Deportation During colonial times, 109 In international relations, 33 In Italy, 69–73, 143–51 In Libya, 82–9, 93, 127 In the US, 41, 45 Detention During colonial times, 110 In Italy, 71, 76 In Libya, 87, 91–2, 101, 141–2, 157, 216, 230 In the US, 38 De-territorialisation, 29, 169, 173 see also under Externalisation Development aid, 2, 30, 34, 49, 74–6, 213 Dini, Lamberto, 116, 118–21 Dini decree, 69 Discourse analysis, 6, 8–15, 26–9, 50–104 Education and migration in Italy, 69 and migration in Libya, 97 Egypt, 111, 142–7, 150, 160, 222 Eisenhower, Dwight David, 36–7 El Salvador, 44–5 Embargo, see under Sanctions Employment In relation to migration in Italy, 64, 71–2

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In relation to migration in Libya, 98 In relation to migration in Mexico, 44 In relation to migration in Spain, 49 ENI, 113–14, 119, 128, 132–3, 136, 141, 189, 199 European acquis, 47, 51–3 European Commission, 94–7 European Council, see under Council of the European Union European Court of Human Rights, 144–5, 148–50, 165 European Neighborhood Policy, 190 European Parliament, 148, 180 European-Mediterranean Partnership, 96, 116, 119, 190, 223 Expulsions, see under Deportation External dimension, European, see under Externalisation Externalisation In the Italian-Libyan context, 169–83 Theoretical debate, 28–31, 33 Towards Morocco, 47–50 Towards Turkey, 51 Fascism, 109, 136, 200 Fiat, 119 Fini, Gianfranco, 67–72, 129, 136 Finmeccanica, 119, 157–8, 228 First World War, 41 Fletcher, Yvonne, 222 Fortress Europe, 59, 77 Fox, Vicente, 43–4 Framework agreement (between Libya and the European Union), 7, 95–6, 200 France, 36, 61, 117, 133, 193, 226 Frattini, Franco, 95, 153–4 Friendship Treaty (between Italy and Libya), 138, 139, 153, 157, 164, 179, 183, 188, 193–5 Frontex, 7, 52, 84, 96, 153–5, 171, 180–2, 228 Frontier, see under Border, concept of Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation, 134, 155 Gas pipeline, 119, 127–8, 133, 184, 188, 191 Gaza Strip, 93–4 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees, 90, 95, 140, 147

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Index Ghana, 36, 87, 89, 151 Giolitti, Giovanni, 109–10, 225 Greece, 52–3 Green Book, 113 Greenstream, see under Gas pipeline Guardia di finanza, 155, 163 Guatemala, 44 Guest-workers, 41 Hammarberg, Thomas, 59 Health And migration in Italy, 64, 69–70 And migration in Libya, 88, 98–101 Highway, coastal, 115, 122–5, 129–35, 182, 191 see also Big gesture Historic gesture, see under Big gesture, Highway, coastal HIV/AIDS, 88, 100, 101, 116, 223 Hobbes, Thomas, 218 Honduras, 45 Human rights, 30, 59, 73, 89, 140, 143–4, 149–52, 162–4, 171, 193–5, 197, 200 Human Rights Watch, 73, 88–90, 147, 149, 164, 178, 180 Human trafficking, 76 Ideas in IR theory, 26–7, 196–8, 204–6, 214 Identity Identity politics, 211 National identity, 9, 26, 189, 232 In relation to migration, 65, 100–1 In relation to migration policies and power relations, 196–7, 211 Identity cards, 40, 69, 81, 84, 88, 90–1 Idris, King, 111–12 Illiberal practices, on migration, 77 Immigration Liaison Officers, 30, 42, 75, 125, 159, 170 Independence, of Libya, 109–11 Indonesia, 36 Inequality, 4, 16, 27–8, 31–4, 206, 209–14 Integration, 63–4, 67, 69, 85, 94, 100, 230 Interdependence, 6–7, 16, 19–21, 27, 33, 55, 181, 192, 196–208 Interests In International Relations, 20–3, 32 In the bilateral context, 128, 136, 137, 186–92

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297

In the Italian context, 63, 110–15, 121 In the Libyan context, 79, 85, 102 In the Moroccan context, 48, 54 International aid, see under Development aid International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 91 International Organization for Peace and Relief (IOPCR), 91 International Organization of Migration, 84, 89, 96, 99, 160–2, 229 International protection, 30, 44, 51, 90–4, 120, 140, 144, 164, 181 Intolerance, 65 Iran, 51, 61, 94, 129 Iraq, 51, 83, 91, 94, 125 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 225 Islamic extremism, 66, 129 Israel, 83, 93 Issue-linkages, 20–1, 34, 185, 198–203, 207, 209 Istituto Commercio Estero (ICE), 117 Italian National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), 61–2 Italian Refugee Council (CIR), 91 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 41 Keohane, Robert, 20, 22, 34, 217, 218 La Belle, bombings at, 113, 225 Labour market In Italy, 60, 62, 68, 71, 73–5, 77, 211, 230 In Libya, 80–4, 86, 89, 98, 102 In Spain, 49 In the US-Mexican context, 44 Lampedusa, 114, 123, 127, 143–50, 160, 175–6, 180–1, 230 Landmines, 110, 113, 115–16, 120 Latin America, 27, 31, 36–45 Law International law, 30 In Italy, 67–76 In Libya, 81–94, 98, 109, 114 In the US-Mexican context, 41, 43–7 In Turkey, 51 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), 224 Libya’s National Oil Company (NOC), 119, 133, 189 Linklater, Andrew, 21, 25, 28

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298 Index Literacy, 101 Lockerbie bombing, 94, 100, 113, 118, 126, 225 Lome Declaration, 87 Maghreb, 50, 61, 80–5, 102 Malaysia, 36 Mali, 151 Malta, 88, 114, 143, 152–3, 171 Manpower, 50, 83, 84, 161 Mariel Crisis, 37–9 Marina Militare, 164 Maroni, Roberto, 65, 76, 139, 169, 171 Martelli Law, 69 Marxism, 27–31, 219 Marxist-leninism, 31 Mass expulsions, see under Deportation Mauritania, 82, 83, 226 Media, 8–12, 49, 60–3, 77, 126, 152, 176, 216, 217, 230 Mediterranean Union, 97, 190, 223 Melilla, 46–8 Mexico, 40–6, 220 Middle East, 50, 51, 62, 102, 115, 126, 202, 224 Mobility, 1–2, 80, 85 Morgenthau, Hans J., 22–5, 202 Muslim, 83, 94, 99 Mussolini, Benito, 224 Nasser, Gamal Abd, 81, 129 Nationality In Italy, 140, 151 In Libya, 81, 90, 92, 146 In Morocco, 47, 75 Neo-liberal institutionalism, 19, 21, 25, 28, 211, 217, 218 Neo-marxism, 21, 27–8, 211, 217, 219 Neo-realism, 218 Nicaragua, 45 Niger, 85, 87, 151, 153, 162, 223, 225 Nigeria, 89, 98, 143, 151 Non-refoulement, 30, 148, 150–1, 171–2 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 42 North-South, 25–8, 31–4, 203–8, 209, 212–14 Nuclear weapons, 126 Nye, Joseph, 20, 24–6, 217

9780230_249264_13_ind.indd 298

Obama, Barack, 38, 43 Oil, 15, 48, 68, 80, 94, 98, 107–19, 135, 181, 184, 189–91, 200, 225, 226 Ottoman period, 108 Outsourcing, 174 Palestine, 91, 93, 222 Palestinian doctor, see under Bulgarian nurses Pan-Africanism, 86–7 Pan-Arabism, 81, 86 Pateras, 49 Petrol, see under Oil Pisanu, Giuseppe, 65, 66, 123, 126–9, 139–41, 149–50, 153, 158, 174, 179 Political realism, 22–8, 185, 202, 211–12, 218 Population, 24, 27, 32, 60–2, 65, 80–5, 99, 143, 175, 177–9, 197, 210, 222, 230 Poverty, 27, 75, 203 Power Hard power, 15, 24–5, 28, 196, 198, 202–3, 212, 218 Productive power, 26–7, 43, 185, 196–8, 202, 207, 212, 218 Soft power, 25, 38, 212, 218 Prisoner’s Dilemma, 217 Prisons in Libya, 12, 87, 89, 95, 165, 223, 224 see also under Detention Prodi, Romano, 72, 108, 126, 131–4, 191, 195 Public opinion, 63–5, 77, 93, 216 Push-backs, 136, 163–5 Qaddafi, Hannibal, 222 Qaddafi, Muammar, 134–7, 153, 180, 184, 189–93, 196–7, 199, 203–4, 213, 216 Qaddafi, Saif, 134 Quarta sponda, 108, 224 Readmission agreement Between Italy and Libya, 9, 30, 126, 131, 143–51 Between Italy and third countries, 74–8 Between Morocco and Spain, 46, 48 Between Turkey and the EU, 52 Reagan, Ronald, 37, 115 Realpolitik, 23–4, 196, 202, 217–18

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Index Refugees, 5, 32–9, 45, 51, 53, 90–4, 95, 139–41, 165, 204, 215, 223 see also under Asylum Regularisations, 60, 68, 70–3, 77, 181, 210, 231 Remittances, 2, 44, 49, 215, 220 Rentier state, 112 Reparations, see under Colonial, Recompensation Resettlement, 51 Respingimento, 150, 228 Revolution Cuba’s, 37 Libya’s, 81, 83, 100, 101, 112–13, 123, 135, 184 Mexico’s, 41 Rice, Condoleeza, 193, 232 Riots, in Libya in 2000, 87, 89 Rogue state, 94, 114, 116, 123, 138, 201 Rome, 10, 11, 72, 110, 116, 119, 120, 125, 133, 136, 159, 170 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 41 Russia, 51, 191 Said, Edward, 189 Salinas, Carlos, 42 Sanctions American sanctions, 113, 193, 201, 225 European sanctions, 113, 115, 127, 191, 193, 201, 225 On Mauritania, 83 UN sanctions, 100, 113, 117, 118, 120, 193, 201, 225 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 97 Scaroni, Paolo, 133 Schengen System, 5, 52–3, 102, 137, 170 Treaty, 69 Visas, 51, 222 Second World War, 111 Securitisation, 3, 21, 28, 34, 65, 80 Security In international relations, 9–10, 20, 23–8, 204–11 In Italy, 64–8, 73, 77 In Libya, 80, 85, 87–102 In relation to migration policies, 3, 6, 13–15, 29–30, 59–60 In the EU-Turkish context, 53

9780230_249264_13_ind.indd 299

299

In the Italian-Libyan context, 130, 158–9, 170–4, 182–3, 187, 190, 196–8 In the Morocco-Spain context, 48–9 In the US-Mexican context, 41–2 Siala, Mohammed, 10, 131, 146 Smuggling networks, 29, 47, 51, 69, 149, 159, 160, 180–1, 187–8, 194–5 Somalia, 12, 89, 91 South Africa, 114 South-to-South migration, 1, 80–5 Soviet Union, see under Russia Spain, 46–50, 54, 61, 133, 204–5, 207, 211, 214, 228 Statistics, 1, 60–1, 67–8, 99, 139, 162, 175–6 Stranded migrants, 229 Sub-Saharan Africa, 46, 50, 62, 66, 79, 80, 85–90, 91, 146, 161, 188–9, 213, 221, 222 Sudan, 81, 83, 85–6, 91, 142, 151, 222 Surveillance, 30, 52, 59, 73, 77, 89, 153, 172–3 Switzerland, 102, 137, 143, 222 Technology, 30, 42, 59, 114, 116, 146, 162, 218, 229 Territory, 2–5, 24, 29–30, 53, 68, 93, 108, 140–1, 150, 164, 170, 172, 175, 182, 195, 224 Terrorism International, 3, 29, 49, 120, 124, 192, 196, 199 Libya sponsored, 113, 126, 225 In relation to migration, 66, 99–100, 221 In the bilateral collaboration, 128–32, 136, 158, 173 Trafficking, 136, 142, 154, 156–60 Transit migration, 5, 30, 46, 48–51, 74, 77, 153, 155, 188, 196–7, 212 Trans-Saharan, 80, 82, 188 Tunisia, 75–6, 80, 81–3, 87, 114–15, 152, 160, 221, 230 Turco-Napolitano law, 69–70 Turkey, 50–4, 62, 112 UNCHR, 1, 47, 51, 90–4, 98, 148, 164, 171 Unemployment, see under Employment

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300 Index United Kingdom, 61, 111, 162, 225 United States, 36–45, 61, 83, 100, 111, 225 United States of Africa, 86 UTA bombing, 113, 225 Vatican, 108, 147 Visas In the Cuban-US context, 37–8 In the Morocco-Spain context, 46 In the Turkish-EU context, 51 To Italy, 69, 177 To Libya, 81–6, 102, 113, 117, 123–5, 128–9, 137, 146, 170, 222 To the EU, 30

9780230_249264_13_ind.indd 300

Waldner Ferrero, Benita, 95 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 31 Waltz, Kenneth, 23–4, 186 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 94, 113, 126, 225 West Bank, 93 Western Sahara, 46, 48 World Bank, 98, 101, 215 World System theory, 25, 27 Xenophobia, 65, 73 Yugoslavia, former, 61, 94 Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez, 47 Zawiya, 87

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