The logic of pragmatism: an examination of John Dewey's logic

H.S. THAYER

THE LOGIC

OF PRAGMATISM AN EXAM I NATION OF JOHN DEWEY'S LOGIC

NEW YORK: 1952 THE HUMANITIES PRESS

.copyrzght 1952 by The Humanities Press, Inc. Printed

In

the United States of America

DesIgned by SZdney Solomon

CONTENTS

vii 9

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I.

THE LIVE CREATURE, NATURE 13 AND EXPERIENCE 1. Nature 15 2. Experience 19 3. Experience as Method: Interaction and Transaction 23

CHAPTER II.

COMMON SENSE, SCIENCE AND THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY 1. Common Sense and Science 2. The Pattern of Inquiry 3. Concluding Remarks

CHAPTER III.

32 34 49 68

THE THEORY OF INQUIRY EXAMINED 70 Introductory Explanation 70 Section 1. The Problematic Situation 75

Section 2. Hypotheses and Propositions A. PARTICULAR PROPOSITIONS B. UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS

85 87 96

vi

Contents c.

A SUGGESTION CONCERNING GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS

113

D. AN APPRAISAL OF DEWEY'S GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS

SectIon 3. The Existential Transformations Wrought by the Conclusions of Inquirzes A. THE PROBLEM B. AN INQUIRY CONSIDERED C. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS D. SUMMARY

119

161 163 176 184 194

E. INQUIRY; A REFORMULA-

NOTES

197 205 212

BIBLIOGRAPHY

220

TION

Conclusion

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I WISH to express my deep obligation to Professor Ernest Nagel who read the manuscript of this work; his insights and valuable suggestions concerning the themes as developed in this essay served as a constant source of inspiration. His insistence on clarity, rigor, and on informed and responsible inquiry in philosophy, as in the sciences, has always made philosophic discussion with him both exciting and profitable. I am also greatly indebted to Professors Irwin Edman and James Gutmann; their friendship and encouragement has meant much to more than one beginner in philosophy. I want to thank Professor Justus Buchler for reading the manuscript and offering a number of important suggestions. To Professors John Herman Randall, Jr., Herbert W. Schneider, Horace L. Friess and Dr. John C. Cooley I am grateful for criticism, instruction and advice. I also want to acknowledge my gratItude to Mrs. Vvendel T. Bush who has established the Wendel T. Bush Fellowship in philosophy at Columbta University. Without the aid of this Fellowship I do not think the following study could have been written. My thanks to Frederick B. Boyden for his assistance in the preparation of the typscript as well as for his helpful criticism of the book. To Henry Holt and Company I am especially indebted for gracious permission to quote frequently and occasion-

vii

Acknowledgments

vii i

ally at length from Dewey's Logic: The Theory ot Inquiry. I also want to thank each and all of the publishers of the books and periodicals mentioned in part 1 of the Bibliography for granting me permission to quote from these works. H.S.T. New York, 1950.

INTRODUCTION

a critical essay on John Dewey's philosophy. To many, dubious about the leading ideas of this philosopher, it will in two respects not seem critlcal enough. It is not intended as a dismissal or belittling of the positive contributions of a major philosophy, nor does it deal with anything but certain difficulties in the logic of Dewey's logical theory. It will thus doubtless seem inadequate to devotees who find many of Dewey's ideas ignored in these pages, and who may think that undue importance has been given to the particular themes discussed and criticized. If the subject of this examination may be described as consisting of matters of logic it must be remembered that "logic" in Dewey's terminology covers more than the construction and analysis of deductive and formalized systems. The scope of logic, according to Dewey, may be described in a general sense as the articulation and explicit formulation of the controlling instrumentalities and operations that function when problems are being inquired into and warranted solutions are arrived at. The theory of inquiry is a descriptive explanation of what happens when problems are investigated and solved logically or methodically and deliberately, with respect to the means taken to reach solutions. The pattern of inquiry, as a mediating process bringing about a settled or solved situation in an initially unsettled one, exhibits certain characteristic phases as cer-

HERE IS

9

The Logic of Pragmatism

10

tain operations are performed. What usually passes for logic and scientific method are not contrasted as two kinds of rational techniques for dealing with certain kinds of problems, but are incorperated as designating procedural and material means within the general movement of inquiry. It is this theory of inquiry which is dealt with critically and in some detail in chapter three; this examination constitutes the major portion of the pages to follow. However, before turning dIrectly to the particular problems occupying us in the pages to come, I have tried to introduce the general topic inquiry, by briefly describing the natural world in which inquiries are found to take place. The themes of experience and nature, which appear as fundamental notions in Dewey's philosophy, are set down here and serve to place the scrutiny of inquiry in its proper setting with respect to the materials and forces which sustain inquiries. Experience and nature are the parents of inquiry and though it function as the instrument of human survival it is nonetheless by them that the offspring is shaped and taught the lessons for which it was brought into being. These preliminary matters are discussed in chapter one. Next, in chapter two, the activities making up the distinguishing features of common sense and science are dealt with and attention is drawn to the role played by the function of inquiry in each. The pattern of inquiry is traced and certain fundamental notions raised by Dewey's account of these stages or phases of inquiry are discussed. Chapter three consists of an analysis of three topics having to do with the initial, intermediate and final stages in the pattern of inquiry as Dewey has formulated it. I have criticised what I take to be important shortcomings in

The Logic of Pragmatism

11 Dewey's treatment of these issues and, in the light of the difficulties raised, have attempted to suggest how these problems may be satisfactorily overcome. As I have provided, in the first few pages of chapter three, an introduction to the topics to be considered there, I will avoid repetition by saying nothing more about these matters for the present. The method which I have tried to employ throughout this essay may be stated roughly as proceeding in the following order: first. clarification of the meaning of that particular point or feature of Dewey's thought which we may be occupied with; secondly. supposing the idea clarified. the evidence for it is considered; finally. depending on the outcome of these preliminary steps, an alternative or revised formulation of the original point may be in order and. If so, will be suggested. Dewey's writings are not always easily understood and consequently determination of the meaning (i.e., Dewey's meaning) of a statement may force one to consider several possibilities each one of which might appear to various readers to be the real meaning of the point in question. 1£ an analysis of such an issue is to be adequate it must cover each of these possibilities; this often takes time and space and may tax the readers patience. but I know of no short